Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea: Across National Boundaries 9781793634085, 9781793634092

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Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

Korean Communities across the World Series Editor: Joong-Hwan Oh, Hunter College, CUNY

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Korean Communities across the World publishes works that address aspects of (a) the Korean American community, (b) Korean society, (c) the Korean communities in other foreign lands, or (d) transnational Korean communities. In the feld of (a) the Korean American community, this series welcomes contributions involving concepts, such as Americanization, pluralism, social mobility, migration/immigration, social networks, social institutions, social capital, racism/discrimination, settlement, identity, or politics, as well as a specifc topic related to family/marriage, gender roles, generations, work, education, culture, citizenship, health, ethnic community, housing, ethnic identity, racial relations, social justice, social policy, and political views, among others. In the feld of (b) Korean society, this series embraces scholarship on current issues such as gender roles, age/aging, low fertility, immigration, urbanization, gentrifcation, economic inequality, high youth unemployment, sexuality, democracy, political power, social injustice, the nation's educational problems, social welfare, capitalism, consumerism, labor, health, housing, crime, environmental degradation, and the social life in the digital age and its impacts, among others. Contributors in the feld of (c) Korean communities in other foreign lands are encouraged to submit works that expand our understanding about the formation, vicissitudes, and major issues of an ethnic Korean community outside of South Korea and the Unites States, such as cultural or linguistic retention, ethnic identity, assimilation, settlement patterns, citizenship, economic activities, family relations, social mobility, and racism/discrimination. Lastly, contributions relating to (d) transnational Korean communities may touch upon transnational connectivity in family, economy/fnance, politics, culture, technology, social institutions, and people. Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea: Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park and Joong-Hwan Oh Health Disparities in Contemporary Korean Society: Issues and Subpopulations, edited by Sou Hyun Jang and Joong-Hwan Oh Koreatowns: Exploring the Economics, Politics, and Identities of Korean Spatial Formation, by Jinwon Kim, Soo Mee Kim, and Stephen Suh Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, by Sung-Choon Park Transnational Mobility and Identity in and out of Korea, edited by Yonson Ahn Korean Diaspora across the World: Homeland in History, Memory, Imagination, Media and Reality, edited by Eun-Jeong Han, Min Wha Han, and JongHwa Lee Mediatized Transient Migrants: Korean Visa-Status Migrants’ Transnational Everyday Lives and Media Use, by Claire Shinhea Lee LA Rising: Korean Relations with Blacks and Latinos after Civil Unrest, by Kyeyoung Park Medical Transnationalism: Korean Immigrants’ Medical Tourism to Home Country, by Sou Hyun Jang Transnational Return Migration of 1.5 Generation Korean New Zealanders: A Quest for Home, by Jane Yeonjae Lee Transnational Communities in the Smartphone Age: The Korean Community in the Nation’s Capital, edited by Dae Young Kim

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea Across National Boundaries

Copyright © 2020. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Edited by Sung-Choon Park and Joong-Hwan Oh

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

Chapter 1 was previously published in Mi-Kyung Kim. 2017. “Multiculturalism as a Political Project for a New Korean Nation-Building: Explaining the Political Consensus on Multiculturalism Policy.” Journal of Democracy and Human Rights, 17 (3): 35–61. Chapter 2 was previously published in Timothy C. Lim and Dong-Hoon Seol. 2018. “Explaining South Korea’s Diaspora Engagement Policies.” Journal of Asian Sociology Development and Society, 47 (4): 633–662. Chapter 3 was previously published in Jamie Shinhee Lee. 2011. “Globalization and Language Education: English Village in South Korea.” Language Research, 47 (1): 123–149. Chapter 4 was previously published in You Piao. 2017. “Hierarchical Citizenship in Perspective: South Korea’s Korean Chinese.” Journal of Asian Sociology Development and Society, 46 (3):557–589. An earlier version of Chapter 5 was published in Keunsun You. 2017. “A Research on Social and Self Perspective towards Highly Educated Korean Returnees Focusing on Business Context.” Journal of Secretarial Studies, 26 (2): 203-228. Chapter 6 was previously published in Jin Suk Bae. 2018. “Acquiring Higher Education Credentials at Home: Korean Student Return Migrants from Latin America,” Journal of Multi-Cultural Contents Studies, 27: 207–237. Chapter 7 was previously published in Hyung Wook Park. 2018. “Living as Foreign Scientists: Stories of Nineteen Expatriate Professors in South Korea.” Journal of Science & Technology Studies, 18 (3): 45-100. Chapter 8 was previously published in Park, Kwang Woo. 2016. “Creating Hidden Social Capital: A Case of Indonesian Immigrants of Wongok-dong in South Korea.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 19 (3): 1–37. Chapter 9 was previously published in Julia Jiwon Shin and Don Tajaroensuk. 2018. “The Construction of Migrant `Illegality`: The Case of Thai Migrant Workers in South Korea.” Journal of Democracy and Human Rights, 18 (3): 89–115. Chapter 10 was previously published in Soon-yang Kim and Soo-jung Go. 2016. “Freeing the Migrant Women in South Korea from a Shackle of Poverty: An Inquiry into the Causes of Poverty and the Suggestion of Policy Responses.” Korean policy sciences review, 20 (2): 241–281. Chapter 11 was previously published in Farrah Sheikh. 2019. “Exploring how mobility affects Muslim lives: The case of Yemeni refugees on Jeju Island.” International Journal of Diaspora & Cultural Criticism, 9 (1): 70–99.

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Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

vii

Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 PART I: NEW MIGRATION REGIME IN SOUTH KOREA 1 Multiculturalism as a Political Project for a New Korean Nation-Building: Explaining the Political Consensus on Multiculturalism Policy (2003–2012) Mi-Kyung Kim

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2 Explaining South Korea’s Diaspora Engagement Policies Timothy C. Lim and Dong-Hoon Seol 3 Globalization and Language Education: English Village in South Korea Jamie Shinhee Lee PART II: RETURN MIGRANTS FROM UNEVEN AND UNEQUAL KOREAN DIASPORA 4 Hierarchical Citizenship in Perspective: South Korea’s Korean Chinese Woo Park 5 A Research on Social Perspective toward Highly Educated Korean Returnees in Current Business Context Keunsun You v

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17 33

59

85 87

117

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Contents

6 Acquiring Higher Education Credentials at Home: Korean Student Return Migrants from Latin America Jin Suk Bae PART III: LABOR MIGRATION FROM THE GLOBAL NORTH AND GLOBAL SOUTH

141

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7 Living as Foreign Scientists: Stories of Nineteen Expatriate Professors in South Korea Hyung Wook Park

163

8 Creating Hidden Social Capital: A Case of the Indonesian Immigrants of Wongok-dong in South Korea Kwang Woo Park

199

9 The Construction of Migrant “Illegality”: The Case of Thai Migrant Workers in South Korea Julia Jiwon Shin and Don Tajaroensuk

221

PART IV: FAMILY MIGRATION AND REFUGEES 10 Freeing the Migrant Women in South Korea from a Shackle of Poverty: An Inquiry into the Causes of Poverty and the Suggestion of Policy Responses Soon-yang Kim and Soo-jung Go 11 Exploring How Mobility Affects Muslim Lives: The Case of Yemeni Refugees on Jeju Island Farrah Sheikh

237

239

273

Index 291

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About the Contributors

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

301

List of Figures and Tables

FIGURES

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Figure 1.1 Average Naturalization Rates in OECD (2004–2012) Figure 3.1 Photo of Banner Figure 3.2 Photo of Airport Figure 3.3 Photo of Honor Pledge Inside the Passport Figure 10.1 Factors Leading to Migrant Women’s Poverty Figure 10.2 Nationality of Migrant Women Figure 10.3 Average Monthly Incomes of Migrant Women and Their Husbands (%) Figure 10.4 Working Statuses of Migrant Women and Their Husbands (%) Figure 10.5 Migrant Women’s Social Network (%) Figure 10.6 Result of Path Analysis

28 67 77 77 243 245 248 249 256 263

TABLES Table 1.1 Multiculturalism Policies in Korea 25 Table 5.1 Number of Korean Outbound Students in Higher Education (2007–2016) 120 Table 5.2 List of Articles on “Yuhak” or “Yuhakpa” from 2002 to 2017 124 Table 5.3 Respondents’ Gender and Age Distribution 130 Table 5.4 Demographic Survey Results in Summary 130 Table 6.1 Overview of Participants 145 Table 7.1 Basic Information on the Nineteen Interviewed Professors 168 vii

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

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List of Figures and Tables

The Number and Proportion of Foreigners among the Regular (Tenured or Tenure-Track) Faculty Members in Science and Engineering at Five Major Korean Universities in 2016 Table 8.1 Characteristics of Indonesian Interviewees Table 9.1 List of Interview Participants Table 9.2 Sites and Events for Participant Observations Table 10.1 Trends in International Marriage in Korea (case) Table 10.2 Occupation of Migrant Women and Their Husbands (%) Table 10.3 Migrant Women’s Korean Language Ability (%) Table 10.4 Migrant Women’s Monthly Incomes by Educational Level (thousand won, %) Table 10.5 Monthly Incomes of Migrant Women’s Husbands by Educational Level (thousand won, %) Table 10.6 Comparison of the Recognition on Health Status (%) Table 10.7 Changes in the Medical Institutions that Migrant Women Mainly Use (%) Table 10.8 General Characteristics of Those Surveyed Table 10.9 Result of Descriptive Analysis Table 10.10 Result of Correlation Analysis Table 10.11 Result of Multiple Regression Analysis

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Table 7.2

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171 201 225 227 244 249 252 253 254 255 255 259 260 260 262

Acknowledgments

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We are very grateful to Courtney Morales, associate acquisitions editor, and the editorial staff for taking interest in our work and generously supporting the publication of this collection of articles about global migration from South Korea. This project is to introduce and showcase South Korean scholarship in the feld of global migration that has remained inaccessible to American readers thus far. South Korea has undergone rapid neoliberal globalization as part of its economic recovery in 1997, which opened the door to an infux of diverse migrants in class, race, and gender from both the Global North and Global South. As such, South Korea is an excellent case to study global migration and to address the Global North-centric perspective in migration studies and other relevant felds. An edited book of this kind has been in order. We thank all the contributors of this book for their contributions, support, and encouragement. We thank all the journals where the works of the contributors frst appeared for their generous permissions to reprint the articles in this book.

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Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

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Introduction

The political upheavals around the world, particularly in North America and Europe, which characterize the current historical conjuncture—represented by Brexit, the election of President Trump in 2014, and the rise of white nationalism and right-wing populisms against immigrants and “global elites”1—are arguably due to persistent social inequalities under neoliberal globalization2 and, more problematically, to the degeneration of discontents into the nativist backlashes against globalization in absence of robust new democratic political projects. The complexity of the current conjuncture in which major social categories, such as class, race, and nation, all vie for attention defes an easy explanation and renders it imperative to overcome the deeply trenched tendencies of reducing race to class, ethnicity, or nation, or vice versa,3 in order to heighten our analytic faculty. Promisingly, in globalization, migration, and transnational studies, there is a growing awareness that the national border discriminates against individuals based on class, race, gender, and other social categories (Balibar 2002), and thus it is critical to examine the intersections of class, race, and gender in migration experiences. Yet, there have not been enough studies, leaving the intersections of class, race, and gender undertheorized, particularly from a global and transnational perspective.4 Moreover, a growing consensus is emerging among scholars to move beyond the tendency to study global migration only from the perspective of the Global North host societies (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). In the same vein, there is a relative disregard and an oversimplifcation of social relations and conficts of the sending country in the Global South (Park 2020). As a corrective to this issue, we need to closely examine social relations and conficts in the Global South that are as complex as those in the Global North. Contemporary South Korean society is an excellent case study for 1

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2

Introduction

cross-border migration that provides a comparative perspective outside of the traditional Global North, and it can make a signifcant contribution to these scholarly endeavors. South Korea is one of the most spectacular economic success stories among the Global South countries. It rose from the ashes of Japanese colonization and war, from being one of the world’s poorest countries to an economic powerhouse, emerging as one of the newly industrialized countries riding “the economic renaissance of East Asia” (Arrighi 2009). Through this transformation, South Korea, at least on appearance,5 remained a relatively homogeneous society in terms of race and ethnicity until the early 1990s. But, it had become one of the most diasporic nations as its citizens dispersed around the world during the colonization and the war whose remittances contributed to the country’s independence and postcolonial development (Armstrong 2013; Kim 2011). The economic crisis across East Asia in 1997, “a major disruption in the South Korean economy and in the livelihood of the Korean people” (Koo 2007, 2), jolted the country to undergo an abrupt and brutal neoliberal globalization, and an infux of newcomers accompanied such expedited societal transformation. South Korea experienced a dramatic change in its pattern of global migration, oft-termed “migration transition,” in which the country shifted from a predominantly migrant-sending country to a receiving country with the fastest growth rate of migrants in East Asia (Kim 2017). As a result, South Korea has gone from a racially and ethnically homogeneous society to a multiracial and multicultural one within a short time span. South Korea recovered from the economic crisis and got back on track to achieve economic prosperity in a relatively short period. For one, gross national income per capita6 of South Korea more than tripled during this period, jumping from less than 10,000 US dollars in the early 1990s to over 30,000 US dollars in 2017 (Korean Statistical Information Service). At the same time, neoliberal policies that followed the economic crisis, including a structural adjustment program of The International Monetary Fund demanded in return for a bailout, have given rise to profound inequality, creating a havoc in the lives of middle-class families and widening the income and wealth gap to deepen economic bipolarization (Hwang 2015). Parasite, a Korean movie that has received international accolades, including the Academy award for best picture in 2020, is a social commentary on inequality and the rising class tension in South Korea as a result of neoliberalism/neoliberal policies. The new social inequalities from neoliberal globalization, reconfgured with entrenched inequalities, have mediated and differentiated the entry of diverse newcomers to South Korea. Similar to the United States, the neoliberal restructuring has involved, above all, the “fexibilization” of labor that replaced lifetime employment and job security with lay-offs and contingent

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Introduction

3

work (Lee 2011; Kim 2016). It has been a process of “labor polarization” (Lee 2011) increasing job precariousness, accompanied by a growing wage disparity between employees at large corporations and those in small-sized and medium-sized frms. For instance, the percentage of an average wage in frms with 30 to 99 workers compared to that of frms with over 500 workers went from 99 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 2008 (Kim 2016, 307). Coupled with a decrease in middle-income manufacturing jobs and an increase in service sector jobs, this wage gap has led to a “dualization” of the South Korean labor market with stable and well-paying jobs on the top and low-wage and contingent jobs on the bottom (Kim 2016, 2017). Therefore, while the unemployment rate among young Koreans remains relatively high despite the dwindling size of youth population (Choi 2017), there is a worker shortage in small- and medium-sized enterprises, particularly in industries such as manufacturing, farming, and fshing, in jobs stigmatized as “3D” jobs—meaning dirty, dangerous, and demanding—but shunned by young Koreans (Kim 2017; Yun 2012). With the implementation of labor migration policies, like the Employment Permit System, the worker shortage has become a pull factor of migration and has drawn low-wage migrant workers from relatively poor countries, such as Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam, and from rural regions in China, particularly Korean Chinese. The industrialization of South Korea has also resulted in massive domestic migration of young Koreans, particularly women leaving rural areas for cities, creating what is called a “bachelor surplus” in rural regions (Kim 2017). That “surplus,” coupled with the country’s newly acquired economic prestige, has given rise to an international marriage market in South Korea and a large-scale marriage-based migration largely through what South Koreans generally call “multi-cultural families,” that is, a marriage between a lowincome older Korean man from a rural area and a foreign young woman from one of the poor Asian countries (Kim 2017). These women often, in turn, become part of networks for their family members and friends to migrate to South Korea to work and/or marry, creating a pattern of chain migration. Just as low-wage migrant workers are flling the worker shortage in the bottom tiers of the dualized South Korea labor market, newcomers are also flling jobs in the top of the labor market. Globalization and economic ascension have been a process in South Korea—particularly, Seoul as a global city—of integrating into the global circuit of transnational capital and fnancial networks, housing branch offces of global corporations, wooing direct investments, and opening its fnancial and service markets through a series of free trade agreements. Accordingly, many foreign managerial and professional elites are readily visible in South Korea. Globalization has reached beyond the corporate sector in South Korea and has been reshaping its academia and even nonproft sectors. Korean

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Introduction

universities strive to excel in its evaluation and rankings, which are crucial for government funding and high enrollments, by including lectures in English and hiring foreign-born faculty members (Kim 2011). Neoliberal globalization has created a top-tier labor market in South Korea that prefers the Global North academic credentials and English fuency (Abelmann et al. 2015; Koo 2007; Park and Lo 2012). This is the South Korean backdrop for, or the obverse of, the massive emergence of Korean international students on North American campuses who return to South Korea as high-skilled return migrants (Park 2020). With many international student returnees working in government, corporate sector, and academia, along with the recent democratization of English profciency among young college-educated South Koreans, the global cosmopolitan corporate culture has increasingly become more normative in South Korean society. Thus, while the majority of the new migrants and immigrants in South Korea are low-wage workers and women from the Global South, transnational migrants from the Global North are considerable in size. They include Korean Americans, white and nonwhite Americans, and Europeans who come as part of the corporate managerial class, university faculty, or “native English speakers” in English language learning institutions. Today, newcomers in South Korea are very diverse. They are different not just in personal attributes like race, ethnicity, class, gender, and the place of origin but also because social inequalities have mediated and differentiated their entrance into and presence in the country. Therefore, migration experiences are radically different in South Korea, depending on one’s race, class, gender, and the place of origin. Transnational migrants from the Global North tend to dwell in urban centers and business districts while low-wage migrant workers and women who migrated through marriage from the Global South reside in rural or marginalized areas in the periphery of the country. Examining the intersection of class, race, and gender in their migration experiences by comparing and contrasting such varied experiences is much needed to deepen our understanding of globalization and its impact. A sizable volume of literature on Korea immigration and diaspora exists (e.g., Abelmann and Lie 1995; Kim 2008; Ahn 2019; Han, Han and Lee 2019), refecting the history and scope of the Korean diaspora. There is a burgeoning literature that focuses on particular ethnic groups or a certain category of migrant groups in South Korea—mostly on low-wage migrant workers or migrant women married to Korean men (e.g. Kim 2018; Choo 2016)—and a few isolated works on Korean return migrants, Korean Americans, and white transnational migrants. However, few studies have brought together diverse new comers in a comparative perspective and have provided an overview on the breadth and spectrum of the diversity of migration in South Korea. The book aims to fll that gap. The collection of works in this edited volume, originally published in South Korea and inaccessible to American

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

Introduction

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readers, provides a close look at each of the diverse migrant groups. It makes visible the differentiation and divergence of migration experiences—mediated by and reproducing the new and old inequalities—due to race, class, gender, and the place of origin, among others and provides ensemble snapshots of the intersection of class, race, and gender in contemporary South Korean society. By moving beyond the Global North-centric perspective and taking seriously the discriminatory nature of the national border, this edited book draws attention to the intersection of race, class, and gender in South Korea society, which has been largely neglected even in South Korean academia as the concepts of race and racism still remain quite new and unfamiliar. In so doing, this book seeks to address one tendency in migration and transnational studies in North American academia. That is, while being astute about the social dynamics of class, race, and gender in the Global North host society, scholars relatively ignore social dynamics in Global South societies as if it were a monolithic ethnic entity (Park 2020). One apparent reason is that scholars in the Global North academia, which is still the hegemonic center of the global knowledge production, are largely less familiar with societies in the Global South. To overcome this tendency, we have to establish a more democratic global academic order where scholars in the Global South have an equal voice. The introduction of works by scholars who are mostly based in South Korea is an attempt to give an equal voice to those outside of the Global North academia in migration and transnational studies. Finally, while migrants from the Global North residing in the Global South deserve the same level of scrutiny as migrants from the Global South dwelling in the Global North, the former has been largely left out of purview as “expats” in global migration studies. This edited book aims to tackle this skewed perspective. Overall, this edited book can provide a comparative perspective vis-à-vis the traditional Global North societies of North America and Europe with regard to social inequalities under globalization and the nativist and xenophobic backlashes against it. DISCUSSION AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOK In part I, the chapters illustrate the new migration regime in South Korea established through a set of policies refecting diverse ideologies and interests under globalization. This new regime has ushered in a dramatic change in the global migration pattern in South Korea over the last three decades. Mi-Kyung Kim provides an analysis of the political context that produced multiculturalism policies, aiding in South Korea’s rapid transition into a multicultural and multiracial society, which have placed the country ahead of other Asian countries in recognizing rights of migrant workers, legalizing

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Introduction

the voting rights of the foreign-born, and initiating dual citizenship to facilitate naturalization, among others. Kim points out that the multiculturalism policies initiated by the liberal party in power continued and even expanded when the conservative party came into power in the mid-2000s and raises the question of how the opposing political parties in very polarized South Korean politics reach such an exceptional consensus on multiculturalism. Kim argues that this surprising consensus was reached, because the two parties regarded multiculturalism not merely as a migrant integration purpose but as a political project for new nation-building, even if they have differing ideologies and motivations. For the liberal party, multiculturalism is a political project to build a nation-state based on normative ideas of human rights, liberal democratic citizenship, and civic nationalism and do away with traditional ethnic nationalism. For the conservative party, it is a project to boost national economy and competitiveness and build “Global Korea” by overcoming ethnic nationalism that can be a barrier to the free fow of labor, capital, and talents under neoliberal globalization. The political forces on the right and left in South Korea have been aligned as such in creating the new migration regime and causing a rapid migration transition of the country. Timothy C. Lim and Dong-Hoon Seol examine the South Korean diaspora policy that enabled the Korean diaspora, mostly ignored until the mid-1990s, to return to South Korea. Employing an analytic frame of foreign policy, Lim and Seol analyze how various domestic and foreign forces, agencies, and actors interacted and shaped the passage of the 1999 Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans, the most notable South Korean diaspora policy. A common instrumentalist view, which Lim and Seol problematize as “only part of the story,” regards the diaspora policy as targeting high-skilled ethnic Koreans in the Global North as “global talents” to enhance the country’s economic competitiveness while excluding those in the Global South, particularly ethnic Koreans in China and the former Soviet Republics. Lim and Seol explore and interweave political, institutional, and international contexts to it by focusing on actors at intersections. Lim and Seol analyze the policy-making process as an assemblage of many factors that included the following: the then-incumbent South Korean president’s political connection to the diaspora; conficts and alignments among various national government agencies; Korean Chinese and civil rights organizations’ public oppositionbased human rights principles; and the international contexts such as the Cold War tensions with the Chinese and U.S. governments and global capitalism. Their delicate analysis deepens our understanding of the new migration regime in South Korea. Jamie Shinhee Lee draws attention to the social fabrics of the new migration regime and provides a glimpse of the social milieu of South Korea today under neoliberal globalization with an examination of a new type of English

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Introduction

7

language education institutions, called an “English Village.” As college-educated South Koreans adapt to and compete in the labor market that prefers the Global North academic credentials and English fuency, a frenzy over English language education has accompanied the globalization of South Korea. An English Village and other types of English language education institutions have mushroomed throughout the country and predominantly whites from North America and other English-speaking countries and Korean Americans have been hired to work in these institutions. An English Village is a theme park-like space, set up by local governments and targeting particularly lowincome students who do not have the fnancial means to study abroad. To simulate an “immersion” experience, students interact and speak with “native English speakers” in cafés, stores, and other daily spaces in an English townlike village. It is a space where South Koreans’ endeavors for social reproduction and racial and colonial desires intersect with a language ideology and a national project to reinvent Koreans as “global citizens.” The chapters in part II look at the experiences of Korean “return migrants” from the Global North and South. In looking at varied groups of return migrants, the chapters in this part reveal divergence in their experiences in South Korea, which depends on whether one migrated back from the Global North or the Global South, despite their shared Korean ethnicity. Woo Park examines the different legal statuses among return migrants from China—that is, ethnically Korean Chinese migrants or Joseonjok in Korean—and analyzes a “hierarchical citizenship,” within the migrant group. The three citizenship statuses are: “the Special Status of Overseas Korean,” the “Foreign Korean Worker” status, and the “Foreign Worker” status. Park argues that, while seen as ethnically Korean, Korean Chinese migrants are treated as foreign labor in the labor market and that the hierarchical citizenship is constructed by the differential inclusion of Korean Chinese which is determined by a combination of economic logic, ethnic identity, and the exclusion of ethnic Koreans in China and the former Soviet Republics from the South Korean diaspora policy. Keunsun You examines transnational migrants largely from the Global North who are former international students and have returned as skilled migrants. As the obverse of the rapid neoliberal globalization of South Korea, there has been an unprecedented infux of Korean international students, along with other Asian international students, on North American campuses since the 1990s. They are not just temporary sojourners as they often acquire legal permanent residency in the host society, taking advantage of its immigration policy of prioritizing skilled labor. Scholars generally agree that Asian international students’ study abroad in the Global North is a family strategy for social reproduction (e.g., Kim 2011; Koo 2007; Waters 2005, 2006): they study in the Global North to acquire cultural capital in the forms of academic credentials and English profciency, which they seek to convert back into economic capital

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Introduction

in the country of origin. You’s study examines how Korean international students’ cultural capital has recently been devalued in the industrial sector and reports returnees’ efforts to make up for the devaluation and increase their market values vis-à-vis other former international students and Koreans. As South Korea acquires economic and cultural prestige globally, more student members of the Korean diaspora who live in the Global South come to attend universities in South Korea. Their migration is aided by the government’s diaspora engagement policies and initiatives to increase college enrollment and internationalize the country’s higher education. Jin Suk Bae investigates students from Korean immigrant families in Latin America who attend universities in South Korea as they deem a Korean college degree more valuable than one from Latin America. Bae suggests that for those who have been educated and learned English in international schools in Latin America, a Korea university that provides classes in English may be a stopover in their transnational journey, moving through “internationalized spaces” in their pursuit of cultural capital. Bae fnds that this group of students have an easier time adapting to Korean society than non-Korean international students because of their fuency in Korean and English and familiarity with Korean culture. However, they still experience social isolation, because their interactions with Korean-domestic students are limited. The chapters in part III explore labor migrants from the Global North and Global South. These migrants include transnational managerial and professional elites and undocumented low-wage workers. Their respective migration experiences reveal the intersection of class, race, and the hierarchy between the Global North and South in South Korea. Hyung Wook Park examines an understudied group of transnational migrants, that is, professional elites from the Global North occupying the top echelon of the South Korean labor market. For Korean universities to remain competitive in the globalization of higher education, they are increasingly hiring foreign-born professors and scholars who are mostly Korean and Asian Americans or whites from North America and Europe. Park reports that the transnational professional elites come to South Korea to take advantage of the globality of science. In so doing, they continue to push for further globalization of the South Korean academia by treating it as in the periphery and expecting their local Korean colleagues to speak English. Park’s rich data shows that these transnational professional elites fnd themselves caught in tensions with their resenting local colleagues who can feel marginalized in their own country from race, culture, language, and the global academic hierarchy between the Global North and South. It shows a glimpse of the ongoing struggles over globalization in South Korean academia. The absolute majority of labor migrants in South Korea are low-wage workers from relatively poor countries in Asia, and their experiences are vastly different from the elite migrants. Kwang Woo Park’s ethnographic study of

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Introduction

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low-wage Indonesian workers describe an informal “hidden social capital” they have created to form a more inclusive local identity to move beyond differences and social divisions from their country of origin, to cope with social marginalization, and build community and networks in South Korea. Julia Jiwon Shin and Don Tajaroensuk investigate “illegal” Thai workers, those without “a right to have rights” (Arendt 1958) in stark contrast to transnational elites who possess “a surplus of rights” (Balibar 2002). Shin and Tajaroensuk argue that their “illegality” is constructed by state policies, legal-institutional structures, and economic logic that serve the dominant power in South Korean society. Shin and Tajaroensuk’s research reports how an “illegal” status shapes Thai workers’ migration experiences, and how they use their migration networks to organize their transnational lives despite their “illegal” status in South Korean. Finally, the two chapters in part IV examine two distinct categories of migrants from the Global South, namely women who migrate to South Korea through marriage- and family-based migration and male refugees. These migrants together highlight the gendered dimensions of discriminations based on class, race, and ethnicity. For women, an international marriage market has been a major channel for migration to South Korea. Soon-yang Kim and Soo-jung Go examine migrant women from relatively poor Asian countries who are largely married to low-income older Korean men. With detailed fgures and data illustrating the trends of international marriage and the harsh reality of inequalities the migrant women face, Kim and Go report that the women are often trapped in poverty due to various barriers including language, lack of employment opportunity, social network, access to health care, and limited formal education. Refugees are nowhere near being a major migrant group in South Korea. A recent arrival of a group of Yemeni male refugees drew a nationwide attention and caused a huge controversy around xenophobia, Islamophobia, and human rights in South Korea. Employing the framework of Muslim mobilities, Farrah Sheikh provides a timely research on Yemeni refugees. Sheikh’s examination on the refugee’s experiences of overt and covert discrimination in South Korea shows how nonwhite status, class, gender, religion, and the place of origin intersect in South Korean society. FUTURE RESEARCH We wrap up this introduction with some suggestions on future research. First, we need more research on the intersections of race, class, and gender in migration experiences, particularly in the Global South. As this edited book illustrates, the nation-state is populated with individuals who are unequal not only in terms of wealth and class but also in terms of mobility and rights—that is, those

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Introduction

with “a surplus of rights” and those deprived of even “a right to have rights”— due to the new intersections of race, class, gender, nation, and coloniality under globalization. Given that a new type of social inequality cuts across the national community as such, it is increasingly problematic to categorize a country as a whole into either the Global North or the Global South. Rather, there should be more attention on transnational formations, and new social conficts due to it, within the nation-state in order to deepen our understanding of globalization and sharpen our analytic lens for the current conjuncture. To be more specifc, moving beyond identifying transnational ties of immigrants and migrants as an alternative to assimilationist theory, future research can explore the formation of transnational social groups as a social process inextricably intertwined with the dualization of domestic labor market under globalization, where transnational managerial and professional elites are on the top and low-wage transnational migrant workers are on the bottom of the labor market. We also need to understand its social implications. The literature on “transnational capitalist class” (Sklair 2001) is a notable innovation in this regard, although it largely ignores or reduces race to class and thus becomes simply unable to capture the intersection of class and race in transnational social felds. A theorization on “racialized transnational elites” (Park 2020) is, among others, an endeavor to intervene in such reductions. There should be more studies in this light, employing a nonreductionist analytic frame. Such studies on the making of transnational social groups can also engage with and reframe the growing literature on international students and their transnational social reproduction (Kim 2011; Waters 2005, 2006), which has largely confned its purview to the domestic class reproduction. Future research can investigate the connection between transnational reproduction of domestic class and production of transnational social groups. Lastly, such studies can provide a framework to examine “expats” or migrants from the Global North residing in the Global South who have been largely omitted thus far in global migration studies that have focused on underprivileged migrants from the Global South. There are only a very few studies on this transnational actor to date, including one chapter in this book, though there seems to be an increased awareness to study them. Using a nonreductionist analytic lens, future research can frame American and European migrants dwelling in the Global South as part of the making of transnational social groups and how their growing presence affects and shapes local social dynamics of class, race, and gender in the Global South. NOTES 1. Stephen K. Bannon, a former White House chief strategist and leading fgure of white right-wing populist movements in the United States, names “global elites” as

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a source of resentment as he was quoted saying, “The global elite is brutalizing the little guy” (Sullivan 2018). 2. See Harvey (2007)’s sophisticated analysis of neoliberalism and its history. 3. See Omi and Winant (2015) for a seminal and critical discussion on the tenacious tendencies of reducing race to class, ethnicity, or nation in social science. A recent prime example of such reductions is the literature on “transnational capitalist class” (Sklair 2001) which, though an innovative endeavor to grasp new transnational formations, ignores the racial differences within the transnational social group. 4. See Park (2020), for example, for a discussion on conceptual blockage and defciency in studies on global migration in which he identifes two main transnational fgures that have dominated the felds, and registers “racialized transnational elites” as a transnational actor who have been largely ignored. 5. It is noteworthy that the racial and ethnic homogeneity of Korea is, to some degree, a myth serving the ethnic nationalism of the country. Suffce it to mention two recent notable examples to illustrate it. A signifcant number of Chinese diaspora came as the country opened up during the Japanese colonization, but they have been forced to assimilate under the South Korean military dictatorship after the independence and became almost invisible as they look the same and show little signs that can distinguish them ethnically. And about 30,000 U.S. troops have been stationed throughout South Korea since the Korean War, and their conjugal relationship with Korean sex workers has been a major basis of Korean immigration in the United States (Cho 2008). In South Korea, the U.S. troops’ presence have been largely contained in military camp towns with limited exposures to the South Korean general public. Their invisibility and containment creates a façade of racial and ethnic homogeneity. 6. Gross national income per capita is defned here as “calculated as the total income earned in return for participation in production activities of all residents divided by the total population in a nation” (Korean Statistical Information Service).

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REFERENCES Abelmann, Nancy, Soo Ah Kwon, Adrienne Lo, and Sumie Okazaki. 2015. “South Korea’s Education Exodus: History, Context, and Motivation.” In South Korea’s Education Exodus: The Life and Times of Study Abroad, edited by Adrienne Lo, Nancy Abelmann, Soo Ah Kwon, and Sumie Okazaki, 1–24. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Abelmann, Nancy and John Lie. 1995. Blue Dreams: Korean Americans and the Los Angeles Riots. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ahn, Yonson, ed. 2019. Transnational Mobility and Identity in and Out of Korea. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Origin of Totalitarianism. New York, NY: Harcourt. Armstrong, Charles. 2013. The Koreas. New York, NY: Routledge. Arrighi, Giovanni. 2009. Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. London: Verso.

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Balibar, Etienne. 2002. “What is a Border?” In Politics and the Other Scene, 75–86. London: Verso. Cho, Grace M. 2008. Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy, and the Forgotten War. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Choi, Kyungsoo. 2017. “Getting to Grips with South Koreas Youth Unemployment Malaise.” Global Asia 12 (2): 48–53. Choo, Hae Yeon. 2016. Decentering Citizenship: Gender, Labor, and Migrant Rights in South Korea. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Han, Eun-Jeong, Min Wha Han, and Jong Hwa Lee, eds. 2019. Korean Diaspora across the World: Homeland in History, Memory, Imagination, Media, and Reality. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Harvey, David. 2007. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Hwang, Sun-Jae. 2015. “Long-Term Implications of Neoliberal Restructuring and Rising Inequality.” Korean Journal of Sociology 49 (3): 97–120. Kim, Hak-Jae. 2016. “Three Dualization Processes in Korea: The Labor Market, Welfare Policy, and Political Representation.” Journal of Asian Sociology 45 (2): 297–326. Kim, Jongyoung. 2011. “Aspiration for Global Cultural Capital in the Stratifed Realm of Global Higher Education: Why do Korean Students go to US Graduate Schools?” British Journal of Sociology of Education 32 (1): 109–126. Kim, Minjeong. 2018. Elusive Belonging: Marriage Immigrants and “Multiculturalism” in Rural South Korea. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. Kim, Nadia Y. 2008. Imperial Citizens: Koreans and Race from Seoul to LA. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kim, Richard S. 2011. The Quest for Statehood: Korean Immigrant Nationalism and U.S. Sovereignty 1905–1945. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Kim, Gyuchan. 2017. “Migration Transition in South Korea.” OMNES: The Journal of Multicultural Society 8 (1): 1–32. Koo, Hagen. 2007. “The Changing Faces of Inequality in South Korea in the Age of Globalization.” Korean Studies 31: 1–18. Korean Statistical Information Service. Gross National Income per Capita (at Current Prices) in 2017. Available at: http:​/​/kos​​is​.kr​​/vis_​​eng​/n​​so​/wo​​rldIn​​Eng​/s​​ elect​​Wor​ld​​InEng​​.do. Lee, Byoung-Hoon. 2011. “Labor Solidarity in the Era of Neoliberal Globalization.” Journal of Asian Sociology 40 (2): 319–334. Levitt, Peggy and Nadya Jaworsky. 2007. “Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends.” Annual Review of Sociology 33: 129–156. Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 2015. Racial Formation in the United States, 3rd ed. New York, NY: Routledge. Park, Sung-Choon. 2020. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Park, J. Sung-Yul and Adrienne Lo. 2012. “Transnational South Korea as a Site for a Sociolinguistics of Globalization: Markets, Timescales, Neoliberalism.” Journal of Sociolinguistics 16 (2): 147–164.

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Sullivan, Kevin. 2018. “A Nationalist Abroad: Stephen Bannon Evangelizes TrumpStyle Politics across Europe.” The Washington Post, September 26, 2018. https​:/​/ ww​​w​.was​​hingt​​onpos​​t​.com​​/poli​​tics/​​a​-nat​​ional​​ist​-a​​broad​​-step​​hen​-b​​annon​​-evan​​geliz​​ es​-tr​​ump​-s​​tyle-​​polit​​ics​-a​​cross​​-euro​​pe​/20​​18​/09​​/25​/4​​f47d0​​46​-c0​​de​-11​​e8​-be​​77​-51​​ 6336a​​26305​​_stor​​y​​.htm​​l​?nor​​edire​​ct​=on​​&utm_​​term=​​.d03c​​21063​​e29. Sklair, Leslie. 2001. The Transnational Capitalist Class. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell. Waters, Johanna L. 2005. “Transnational Family Strategies and Education in the Contemporary Chinese Diaspora.” Global Networks 5 (4): 359–377. ———. 2006. “Geographies of Cultural Capital: Education, International Migration and Family Strategies between Hong Kong and Canada.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 31: 179–192. Yun, Ji-Whan. 2012. “The Korean Way of Financial Rationalization and Discouraged Workers.” Korea Journal 52 (3): 148–176.

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Part I

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NEW MIGRATION REGIME IN SOUTH KOREA

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Chapter 1

Multiculturalism as a Political Project for a New Korean Nation-Building Explaining the Political Consensus on Multiculturalism Policy (2003–2012)

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Mi-Kyung Kim

This1 study examines the political consensus on multiculturalism policy in Korean politics since the mid-2000s. Political polarization has been recognized as one of the most important features of Korean politics after democratization in 1987 (Lee 2005, 2010).2 In the Korean context, political polarization can be conceptualized as the process of political mobilization based on antagonistic emotions toward and ideological attacks against rival political parties.3 The two major Korean political parties have long been ideologically opposed on almost every policy issue. As such, it is surprising that they have shown a shared commitment to multiculturalism policy since the mid-2000s. This seems to be an exceptional phenomenon given the polarization of Korean politics. The concept of multiculturalism has a short history in Korea, which is one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in the world. It was only after 2006 when multiculturalism frst came to have any social and political signifcance in Korean society (Kim 2010: 107). At that time, the governing liberal party (then known as Uri, currently called Deobooleoh Democratic Party) enacted an immigration policy paradigm shift from immigrant control to immigrant integration, which drew sudden attention to multiculturalism. Traditionally, the Korean government’s immigration policy was limited to dealing with the problems in national border control. Since the mid-1980s, facing increasing numbers of immigrants, the Korean government has expanded the scope of immigration policy in order to deal with problems that could not be easily resolved with the old policy framework of regulation and control. 17

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Most of all, the legal status, rights, and social conditions of immigrant populations have become an increasingly important social issue. Furthermore, the Korean government has also been forced to adapt to the evolving global discourse and normative attitudes toward international migration, which have been infuenced by a new paradigm for global justice and human rights since the 1990s. Under these internal and external pressures to change the traditional approach to immigration policy, Korean policymakers found multiculturalism to be a highly attractive idea. In August 2003, before shifting its immigration policy paradigm, the liberal Korean government frst implemented a legalization process for illegal immigrant workers with the introduction of the Employment Permit System (EPS). EPS was implemented to deal with the labor shortage problem of small and medium frms. At the same time, it aimed to reduce the number of illegal immigrants by improving immigrant workers’ rights and the working environment. Under the previous Industrial Training System (ITS), the Korean government could not effectively monitor and protect immigrant workers, because most of them were under the control of private recruitment agencies. After establishing a new legal framework for managing immigrant workers in 2003, the Korean government moved more dramatically toward pursuing the agenda of immigrant integration with the announcement of the Grand Plan for social integration of married immigrant women and their children, naturalized Koreans, and foreign residents in April 2006 (Lee 2010: 49).4 The Grand Plan intended to integrate interracial couples and their children into mainstream Korean society, and in doing so minimize the possibility that they would become a marginalized group in Korean society that could cause social tension. In accordance with the government initiative, in July 2007, the Korean National Assembly passed the Basic Law Pertaining to Foreigners in Korea to enumerate foreigner rights and legal protections. Importantly, the multiculturalism policies initiated by the liberal left-wing government were sustained even after the conservative Grand National Party5 took over as the ruling party in 2007. Many political commentators expected that the new government would attempt to roll back policies that were enacted under the old liberal government. In fact, this did happen to some extent, as in the case when plans to create a new administrative capital in Sejong City were canceled. Additionally, the conservative government had a very different approach to policy regarding North Korea. These actions created very polarized political conficts between the governing party and the opposition party. However, multiculturalism policy was an exception. In 2008, the Korean National Assembly passed an important institutional framework called the Multicultural Families Support Act, which aims to protect international immigrants and their children from social discrimination

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and human rights violations. This act established the legal institutional base for multiculturalism policy by providing a legal defnition of multicultural families, married immigrants, and naturalized citizens. It also clarifed the responsibilities of state and local governments to help multicultural families. Notably, this act was seen to be consistent with the ideological position of the old liberal government, in that the act expressed liberal values of human rights based on antiracism, antidiscrimination, gender equality, and cultural diversity. Multiculturalism policies were some of the most ambitious policies initiated by the old liberal left government and worked toward the national agenda for increased participatory democracy, balanced regional development, and social integration. That this multiculturalism policy was furthered by the new conservative government, which was pursuing a very different, almost ideologically opposite national agenda for social and economic policy, is very surprising. To explain this, this study explores the underlying logic of multiculturalism policy shared by the two different administrations from 2003 to 2012. The study proposes that multiculturalism policy is a political tool for nationbuilding that the political parties could work on together, despite their ideological differences. This study is organized as follows. Section 2 identifes the conventional explanations of the current consensus of multiculturalism in Korea: the rise and fall of multiculturalism and state-led multiculturalism. Section 3 develops an alternative explanation from the theoretical perspective that multiculturalism is a political project of a new multicultural nationbuilding, in light of the historically homogenous Korean context. Lastly, the conclusion summarizes the main arguments and discusses their theoretical and empirical implications for furthering the study of multiculturalism policy in Korea.

POLITICAL CONSENSUS ON MULTICULTURALISM IN KOREA: CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism The political consensus building on multiculturalism policy beyond the ideological divide between two major parties in Korean politics may be explained by the theory of the rise and fall of multiculturalism (Entzinger 2014; Kymlicka 2010). This argument assumes that the national consensus for multiculturalism is necessarily fragile and temporary, since it is contingent on changes in public opinion and political parties’ strategic calculations. This has been the case in many European countries. If we accept this argument, the current consensus on multiculturalism is in danger of falling apart if

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the Korean population fears that multiculturalism has gone too far and when the political parties attempt to stoke voters’ fear and anxiety for their own political gains. Many European countries have experienced a backlash against multiculturalism since the mid-1990s (Kundnani 2002; Joppke 2004). However, Kymlicka (2010) contends that this backlash stemmed from the perception of multiculturalism as the celebration of cultural differences, rather than as a politically liberal value of human rights. He points out that the narrative of the decline or failure of multiculturalism in European countries has been largely produced by postmulticulturalists who have no faith in multiculturalism as the celebration of cultural differences. They require a new approach for dealing with cultural-ethnic minorities that have become isolated from the mainstream of their society (Kymlicka 2010). Their new approach is called “the civic turn of immigrant integration” or “civic integration policies” that they hope will replace the failed multiculturalism policies in some European countries (Joppke 2007; Borevi et al. 2017). It aims to assimilate immigrants into the mainstream of their host countries by formalizing integration requirements, such as language and knowledge tests of the host country, establishing rules of family reunifcation, and implementing policies for permanent residence and naturalization. It is necessary to distinguish the views of postmulticulturalists from those of the antimulticulturalists because the latter comes from both the radical right and the radical left. Unlike the antimulticulturalists, the postmulticulturalists do not entirely deny the merit of the idea of multiculturalism. However, they are very unhappy with how multicultural policies have turned out. In most European countries, multiculturalism was rooted in social movements for minority rights that began in the late 1960s and was mainly supported by social-democratic parties. However, the social-democratic parties mistakenly defned multiculturalism narrowly as the protection of cultural and ethnic minority identities in society. This generated a contradiction between their denial of a national identity and their respect of identity politics (Cuperus 2011; Kymlicka 2012). As a result, they found themselves in a precarious situation when identity politics clashed with national identity in the 1980s. If multiculturalism is institutionalized as the protection of cultural rights and the preservation of the identities of cultural minorities, this may encourage cultural minorities to isolate themselves within a society because under the condition of political, social, and economic inequality, the only way of preserving their own cultural identities is to make themselves look distinctive from others. This situation led postmulticulturalists to criticize multiculturalism. However, their proposed civic integration policies have been also criticized as “no-immigration policies” which prevents low-skilled immigrants and their families from being admitted to the host country and

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as “the privatization of integration” which reduces the role of government in immigrant integration processes (Joppke 2007: 8). At this point, it is necessary to clearly defne multiculturalism. Kymlicka’s defnition of multiculturalism as “a political project that attempts to redefne the relationship between ethno-cultural minorities and the state through the adoption of new laws, policies or institutions” (Kymlicka 2010: 99) is useful in the Korean context. If Korean multiculturalism is narrowly defned to emphasize cultural diversity, Korea risks repeating the failed multiculturalism of many European countries. Multiculturalism is better conceived of as a political project to redefne the relationship between ethnic minorities and the state. Hence, if we want to explain the current political consensus on multiculturalism in the context of highly polarized Korean politics, we need to consider the following question: how has the Korean state tried to manage ethnic minorities, who recently became visible for the frst time in Korean history?

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State-led Multiculturalism Another conventional explanation for the political consensus on multiculturalism in a society is known as the state-led multiculturalism argument (Yoon 2009; Watson 2010). This argument refects an analytical tendency simply to assume, rather than to explain, the state’s ability to construct a consensus among political elites and society for multiculturalism. State-led multiculturalism is defned as a government’s efforts to embrace and manage ethnic diversity in its society. As previously defned, multiculturalism is a political project to redefne relations between ethnic minorities and the state. Under this defnition, it is common for states to engage in multicultural policies as a way to manage the ethnic minorities, particularly when foreign populations are relatively large. However, the experience of some European countries shows us that state-led multiculturalism may not always succeed. More importantly, unlike in other countries, it is not necessarily the case that the Korean government can overcome political polarization to mobilize political elites and society. The power of the Korean government is generally weaker in this age of high polarization since the power balance between the state and society was signifcantly changed in the democratization process. Furthermore, as a study of the development of Korean multiculturalism argues, the formation of multiculturalism policy has not been entirely driven by the Korean government. Rather, it has been constructed through the creation of policy networks between the state and civil society in Korea since the mid-2000s (Yoon 2009). In fact, an advocacy coalition for ethnic minorities’ human rights formed in the early 1990s and has heavily infuenced the process of government policy making for multiculturalism policy since the mid-2000s (Seol 2001).

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In January 1994, a symbolic social event focused Korean civil society’s attention on immigration workers. Eleven unregistered immigrant workers from Bangladesh and Nepal who suffered from industrial accidents organized a sit-down strike in front of Myeongdong Cathedral, in Seoul. They urged the Korean government to improve conditions for immigrant workers through such acts as the provision of industrial accident compensation. This event encouraged the formation of an advocacy coalition that consisted of various civil and religious organizations and activists. This coalition included the Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea (representing 39 immigrant worker centers), the Korea National Council of Churches, the Human Rights Committee, national organizations of trade unions, and Korean branches of international organizations for human rights. The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, a government agency established in November 2001, was an important member of the advocacy coalition. The commission believed that improving the rights of immigrant workers and ethnic minorities was the most important aspect of improving human rights in Korea. Therefore, it persuaded the prime minister to abolish the ITS and to introduce the EPS in 2003. It also played a crucial role in harmonizing Korean culture with international norms as specifed by international treaties of human rights, including minority and immigrant rights. Early in the development of multiculturalism in Korea, the advocacy coalition and its support groups focused on pressuring the Korean government to abolish the ITS, to improve social conditions and human rights of immigrant workers, particularly illegal ones, and to reform the legal framework of employment and antidiscrimination of immigrant workers. In 2002, this pressure fnally resulted in the two major parties’ presidential candidates to include the issue of reforming the current ITS in their electoral platform. The newly elected left-leaning president Roh Moo-hyun publicly promised to replace the old ITS with the new EPS in March 2003 and implemented the new immigrant workers employment system in 2004. With this reform, Korea became the frst Asian country to recognize the legal rights of immigrant workers. However, there still existed a signifcant imbalance between the legally guaranteed rights and the actual rights of immigrant workers. Thus, some groups within the advocacy coalition became more radical, claiming that the only way to reduce the imbalance would be to abolish the EPS and establish another new system that would allow immigrant workers to freely choose where to work and to be able to leave employers without fear of repercussions.6 After the introduction of the EPS, however, the Korean government turned its policy attention to another immigrant group, that is, married migrant women and their families.7 The number of married immigrant women increased rapidly from 11,017 in 2002 to 43,121 in 2005.8 In light of this situation, the Korean

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government aimed for enhanced social integration of married migrant women and their families in 2006 under the Grand Plan, with the goal of minimizing ethnic conficts.9 The Korean government’s approach to the incorporation of migrant women and their families was based on a desire to tolerate cultural differences of individuals of different ethnic origins while at the same time not tolerating the group right of racial and ethnic differences “by separating culture from race and ethnic exclusivity” (Watson 2012: 235).10 In analyzing multiculturalism in Korea, it is useful to fnd where the inspiration for this approach came from. In fact, many European countries have also taken this approach. For instance, according to a study of Swedish multiculturalism policy after 1975, the Swedish government pursued “functional integration” to imply that immigrants were allowed to maintain their ethnic identities only to the extent that their group identity did not disturb the performance of their functions expected by the majority in Swedish society (Alund and Schierup 1991: 14). This logic of functional integration assumed that those immigrants who were not successful in performing their expected functions would be blamed for their failure to properly integrate their group identities into the mainstream society. The same logic of functional integration can be applied to the Korean context. But, uniquely, state-led multiculturalism in Korea is more political than that in most European countries. The Korean government attempted neither to repeat “the 3C model of multiculturalism”11 that was widely challenged in many European countries nor to pursue “the cultural mixing and civic integration model” that was proposed as an alternative to the failed multiculturalism by the postmulticulturalists. Rather, the nature of multiculturalism pursued by the Korean government seems to be close to the Canadian model of multiculturalism based on the idea of human rights and liberal-democratic citizenship as theorized by Kymlicka (2010). It is clear that global trends to support human rights and liberal-democratic values originally inspired multiculturalism policy in Korea, which has long been supported by Korean liberals. At the same time, however, the liberal global trends were integrated with a vision of a new Korean nationalism in a globalized world. This is the strategic value that the conservative party found that led it to support multiculturalism policy despite originally being initiated by their liberal counterparts. MULTICULTURALISM AS A POLITICAL PROJECT: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION Multiculturalism for a New Korean Nation-Building On May 25, 2006, President Roh Moo-hyun laid out to Korean citizens his vision of the future of Korean society in which different racial and ethnic people

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lived in harmony with each other. Furthermore, he hoped that the mixed-blood offspring of Koreans and non-Koreans could work and live without facing discrimination under the well-developed institutional protections of labor and welfare (Kim 2012: 15). He suggested that to realize such a vision of Korean society would be much more important than other policy initiatives such as attempting to increase exports. The same vision of a new multicultural Korean society was also pursued by Roh’s successor, the conservative Lee Myung-bak, who established the First Basic Plan of Policy for Foreigners (Immigration Policy) in December 2008. The plan proposed three policy goals: the enhancement of national competitiveness through an open door immigration policy; the transformation toward a multicultural society to preserve human rights; and immigration policy handled in a lawful, consistent, and proper manner (Kim 2012: 18). Multiculturalism has been directly shaped by immigration policy in Korea. However, unlike other countries that accepted the idea of multiculturalism for managing immigrants, Korea attempted to use it more strategically for a new nation-building project. Multiculturalism policy in Korea can be considered an ambitious political project for expanding the ethnic boundary of Korean nationality, not just a policy to assimilate ethnic minorities. Thus, multiculturalism policies implemented by the Korean government differ from civic integration policies that intend to encourage immigrants to participate in mainstream society. Importantly, the policies recognize the presence of deep-seated racial and ethnic prejudice, discrimination, and socioeconomic inequalities in Korean society. Table 1.1 summarizes the legal and institutional situation of multiculturalism policies in Korea. Table 1.1 uses the eight indicators from the Multiculturalism Policy Index, originally developed by Banting and Kymlicka (2006) for comparing multiculturalism across different countries. Considering the short history of multiculturalism in Korea, the legal and institutional framework for multiculturalism policy has been relatively well developed. The Korean government established the Basic Law regarding the Better Treatment of Foreign Residents in 2007 and the Multicultural Family Support Act in 2008. The conservative government even expanded the scope of multiculturalism policy to not only consider immigrant workers but also married female migrants and their families. Furthermore, it began to implement the First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (2008–2012) that included specifc articles to safeguard human rights of foreign residents in Korea, to declare stricter enforcement of immigration law and to encourage deeper social integration of multicultural families. The government conceived of this First Basic Plan as a necessary action for enhancing national competitiveness with a proactive open border policy in an increasingly globalized world. In this, the conservative ruling party shared the mentality of the Grand Plan proposed by the liberal government they succeeded.12

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Table 1.1  Multiculturalism Policies in Korea Indicator1

Legal and Institutional Details

Legal Affirmation of Multiculturalism

• Establishment of the Center to Support Immigrant Spouses (2006) • Basic Law regarding the Better Treatment of Foreign Residents (2007) • Multicultural Family Support Act (2008, revised in 2011) • Ratification of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (February 25, 2010, by the Korean National Assembly)

Multicultural Education

• Promotion of Public Understanding on Multiculturalism (Article 18, Framework Act on Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea) • Multicultural Educational Policies organized by the Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development • Framework Act on Education • Local Laws for Multicultural Education Promotion (2013, Kyung Nam Office of Education)

Multicultural Representation in Public Media

• Multicultural Family Broadcasting (funded by the nonprofit foundation Woongjin and the Seoul Metropolitan Government) • Migrant Network TV (supported by Seoul Metropolitan Government, Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, and Hyundai, http://www​.mntv​.net/)

Exemptions from dress codes

• No official dress codes

Dual Citizenship

• The revised Nationality Law of 2010 allows dual citizenship

Funding Multicultural • Funding for Local Multiculturalism Promotion Programs Activities and NGOs (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family)

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Funding Bilingual (mother-tongue based) Education

• Language Education for the Gifted Program for children from multicultural families organized by Local Multicultural Family Support Centers (http://www.liveinkorea.kr/intro.asp) and financially supported by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family • Provision of multilanguage services (Article 11, Multicultural Families Support Act).

Affirmative Action for • There is no xenophobia and racial discrimination law on Ethno-Minorities record. One was proposed, but never passed, in September 2009. • Article 22 of the Employment Permit System (EPS) Act and Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act prohibits unfair discrimination against foreign nationals. Note: A more detailed description and justification of the eight indicators can be found on the MCPs Index website (www​.queensu​.ca​/mcp).

1

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The underlying logic behind this is that it is important for the government to take the lead in guiding the inevitable social transformation by establishing a centralized institution of social protection and regulation for various members of Korean multicultural society. Thus, the central government was the main actor to shape and implement multiculturalism policy in Korea regardless of which political party was in charge. Of course, the vision outlined in the laws is not always consistent with the actual situations of multiculturalism in Korea. Despite this, before we judge whether or not the Korean government has achieved substantial development of multiculturalism, we frst need to understand why the Korean government has actively pursued the legal institutionalization of multiculturalism in such a rapid and committed manner. Korea was the frst Asian country to recognize the legal rights of immigrant workers in 2004. Korea also became the frst Asian country to grant foreigners’ voting rights in 2005 (Waston 2010: 240). Furthermore, Korea legalized dual citizenship in 2010, while neighboring Japan and China still hesitate to do so.13 Why has Korea taken the lead in multiculturalism policy compared to its peers? The answer to this question is that multiculturalism policy in Korea is not merely a cultural project for celebrating cultural rights and diversity of ethnic minorities, but rather a political project aimed at nation-building. Therefore, in the Korean context, it is not appropriate to defne the concept of multiculturalism exclusively in terms of cultural diversity.

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Dual Faces of Multiculturalism in Korea Proponents of multiculturalism in Korea can be classifed into two groups. One group, which consists largely of those with liberal political leanings, shares a commitment to the completeness of democratic consolidation. They perceive multiculturalism as a force capable of bringing about a more liberalized and democratic society. They frame multiculturalism in terms of liberal-democratic citizenship, human rights, and various liberal values, such as civility, tolerance, and justice. That is, they framed the pursuit of multiculturalism as the liberal nationalist project for creating a new nation-state beyond the traditional Korean national identity based on ethnic homogeneity (Waston 2012: 243; Yang 2010: 3). If this is the case, how can they distinguish their project from one of assimilation? In the liberal vision, it is not only immigrants but all Koreans who should change perceptions of identity, values, norms, and practices. In the process of social transformation toward a more liberal and democratic society, all Koreans should learn multiculturalism through civic education in order to participate in the process of creating a new Korean identity and nation and thus “gain the status of a truly developed country” (Kim 2015: 11). In other words, the concept of assimilation is not appropriate in this vision, because all people

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Multiculturalism as a Political Project

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need to participate in the process of building a new Korean nation-state. In particular, the families resulting from marriages between non-Korean women and Korean men are not specifcally targeted. Rather they are conceived as a new model of Korean nationality that can positively contribute to the expansion of “the boundary of Korean-ness.”14 It was this kind of perception that led the liberal government of the mid-2000 to initiate multiculturalism policy. Another group that champions multiculturalism was composed largely of conservatives. They believe that multiculturalism can help them achieve a national transformation toward a more competitive society in the globalized world market. They think that realizing the conservative vision of “a Global Korea” would require overcoming the old Korean identity based on ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Multiculturalism, then, provides a way to vitalize the national economy, as cultural diversity could become a resource to attract fows of people and capital in the Korean part of the globalized market. The conservative group does not only consider immigrant people as a solution to labor market problems caused by demographic and social changes. Rather, it imagines “a country of immigration” as the proper future of Korea. The conservative group’s commitment to multiculturalism is serious and should not be underestimated as rhetoric without substance. Although they represent different ideological orientations, both groups share the idea of multiculturalism as the driving force for a political project to socially transform Korean society and create a new national identity. This project aims to redefne the boundary of Korean identity and to achieve national unity in the face of diverse internal and external challenges. While the project rejects an assimilative approach, it still recognizes the nature of collectivity in unity and identity. The project specifes an important limitation on how much cultural diversity may be tolerated in Korean society. At the same time, it specifes how the native Korean majority should manage its relationship with ethnic minorities. In expanding the ethnic boundary of Korea, the Korean government considers the legal recognition of nationality as the best way to reduce the risks of disintegration that are expected to occur in the process. As we have observed from Western societies, the process of social transformation toward a multicultural society always confronts either antimulticultural impulses or a multicultural resistance to test the limitations of multicultural tolerance in a society.15 The Korean government is attempting to reduce this risk through a process of immigrant integration that prioritizes political identity based on the legal recognition of nationality over cultural identity based on race, ethnicity, or religion. This is one of the most effective policy instruments to integrate immigrants into mainstream society. As shown in fgure 1.1, Korea had a relatively high percentage of average naturalization rates from 2004 to 2012, even when compared with

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Figure 1.1  Average Naturalization Rates in OECD (2004–2012). Data source: International Migration Outlook 2016, p.402 (Table A.6: Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries and the Russian Federation).

some European countries including Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Luxemburg that have a longer history of immigrant integration. This refects the Korean government’s commitment to immigrant integration based on the legal recognition of nationality. Under the Korean Nationality Law, naturalization is available to those who have stayed in Korea for fve years or longer as well as those married to Korean nationals and who have lived in Korea for at least two years. Moreover, the Korean government has exploited a policy network with pro-immigration civil organizations for encouraging and helping married immigrant women to obtain Korean nationality and to integrate through various activities and services in Multicultural Family Support Centers (Chung 2010: 669). Additionally, the Korean government legalized dual citizenship for Koreans residing overseas, highly skilled foreign nationals, and foreign residents married to Koreans from January 1, 2011. The Korean government explained that the purpose of this revisited nationality law was to bring in talented foreigners and fght the negative economic impacts of demographic changes due to the low birthrate. However, if we consider the fact that many immigrants consider whether or not they can keep their original nationality when they consider naturalizing, a better explanation of the legalization of dual nationality may be to provide an incentive for naturalization. CONCLUSION In the Korean context, the new multicultural nation-building project is continuing with the understanding that Korean society is already transforming toward a more multicultural society. This is happening despite the fact that Korea is one of the most culturally and ethnically homogeneous countries in

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Multiculturalism as a Political Project

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the world. In fact, many studies that analyzed Korean public acceptance and perception of multiculturalism found out that most Koreans have shown relatively positive attitudes toward the prospect of becoming a multicultural society (Hyun 2007: 138; Hwang 2010; Yoon et al. 2010). As discussed above, this positive attitude toward multiculturalism has been largely constructed by the cross-party consensus in Korean politics. For many Koreans, multiculturalism is perceived to provide a constructive link between inevitable domestic social and demographic changes and national prosperity in a changing global environment. In particular, Korean political and industrial elites have found a solution for managing immigration and border control problems in a globalized world by linking labor market policy and immigration policy to multiculturalism policy. However, they do not assume that a multicultural solution is a passive solution for reducing social risks in a multicultural society with visible ethnic minorities. Rather, it is a more active solution for reformulating national citizenship and social membership and expanding the ethnic boundary of Korean national identity in the age of globalization. To borrow Kymlicka’s (2012: 18) words, “immigrants are invited to add a new identity to the old Korean one.” Put differently, multiculturalism is a way to achieve a new nationalism in Korean context. On the other hand, Korean multiculturalism has been oriented toward liberal norms and values, such as human rights, social justice, equality, and cultural diversity. Multiculturalism, in the initial stages of its development, was the liberal government’s political project to complete the process of democratic consolidation by legalizing those liberal norms and values. They thought that a more liberal and democratic society should be a more multicultural society. However, this does not mean that liberal groups have been entirely driven by a vision of a multicultural society in which ethnic majority and minority groups coexist without tension. Rather, they are strategically combining multiculturalism with the process of institutionalizing liberal norms and values such as antiracism and antidiscrimination in order to reduce the risk of cultural and ethnic conficts in Korean society. In this regard, multiculturalism is not entirely a project to celebrate cultural diversity. Given the cross-party consensus, Korea has achieved signifcant progress in multiculturalism policy. In addition to good policymaking, Korea has some advantages favorable to the development of multiculturalism: well-organized border control, heterogeneity of immigrants, and immigrants’ positive economic and social contributions. However, the sustainable development of multiculturalism depends on the institutionalization of human rights. If anxiety based on racial and ethnic prejudices is not appropriately dealt with, severe antimulticulturalist backlash may be politically mobilized from both sides of the political spectrum, with poor results for the future of Korean politics.

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NOTES 1. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2010-32A-B00009). 2. This chapter was previously published in Mi-Kyung Kim. 2017. “Multiculturalism as a Political Project for a New Korean Nation-Building: Explaining the Political Consensus on Multiculturalism Policy.” Journal of Democracy and Human Rights, 17 (3): 35–61. 3. In this sense, political polarization does not necessarily refer to the actual policy differences between the two major political parties in Korean politics. 4. Notably, in the same year, a top American Korean football player named Hines Ward visited Korea, which captured the attention of the public and spotlighted interracial populations in Korean society. 5. The party’s name was changed to Sae-Nuri before the legislative election for the 19th National Assembly in 2012. In December 2016, the party split into two, the Liberty Korea Party and the Bareun Party, as a result of the political crisis caused by President Park Geun-hye’s abuse of presidential power. 6. Korea did not sign the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and Members of Their Families, a treaty that took effect on July 1st, 2003. 7. The Korean government conducted an offcial survey to examine the situation of married immigrant women in the end of 2004 and upon receiving the results promptly implemented a policy aimed at improving married immigrant women’s human rights. 8. In 2002, there were 7,041 Chinese women married to Korean men, accounting for 63 percent of the total number of married immigrant women. This number rose to 20,635, or 66 percent, in 2005. Women of other nationalities, and in particular Vietnamese women, were more represented after 2005. 9. Korean society’s fear of the possibility of racial and ethnic conficts was enhanced by observing the ethnic confict in France in 2005. At that time, the Korean news media extensively covered the violent protests by ethnic minorities and young immigrants. 10. While the Korean government was trying to remove racial and ethnic implications from its multiculturalism policy, in 2007 the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination warned that the importance of ethnic homogeneity in Korean society might hinder the construction of a more tolerant society. 11. The 3C model of multiculturalism refers to a multiculturalism policy that celebrates cultural traditions of ethno-cultural minorities represented by their clothing, cuisine, and music for the purpose of promoting understanding and tolerance of cultural differences in a multicultural society. 12. On the other hand, the Korean national assembly ratifed the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression in 2010. 13. There are seven Asian countries that currently permit dual citizenship: Sri Lanka, Cambodia, the Philippines, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Vietnam.

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14. Some studies criticize these kinds of perception as having an important limitation because it still relied on the racial and ethnic prejudice to defne married immigrant women and their children’s national identity through the male Korean bloodline (Waston 2012: 238). This criticism of racial and ethnic constraints in Korean multiculturalism has been primarily voiced by a more radical group within the liberal group. 15. In Korea, a lawmaker of the conservative governing party who was also the president of a parliamentary discussion group on multiracial issues in society proposed an anti-racism bill in September 2009. Fierce debates on the pros and cons of the bill were conducted in a public hearing. The bill ultimately did not pass.

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REFERENCES Alund, Aleksandra and Carl-Ulrik Schierup. 1991. Paradoxes of Multiculturalism: Essays on Swedish Society. Aldeshot: Avebury. Banting, Keith and Will Kymlicka (eds.). 2006. Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Borevil, Karin, Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen, and Per Mouritsen. 2017. “The Civic Turn of Immigrant Integration Policies in the Scandinavian Welfare States.” Comparative Migration Studies 5(9). pp.1–14. Chung, Erin Aeran. 2010. “Korea and Japan’s Multicultural Models for Immigrant Incorporation.” Korea Observer 41(4). pp.649–676. Cuperus, Rene. 2011. “Why Was the Left Trapped into Multiculturalism?” Social Europe Journal, June 8, 2011. http:​/​/www​​.soci​​al​-eu​​rope.​​eu​/20​​11​/06​​/why-​​was​-t​​he​ -le​​ft​-tr​​apped​​-into​​-mu​lt​​icult​​urali​​sm/. Entzinger, H. 2014. “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of the Netherlands.” In Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. Migration, Minorities and Citizenship, edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.59–86. Hwang, Jung-Mee. 2010. “Analysis of Multicultural Acceptability in Korea: From the Perspective of New Politics of Membership.” The Journal of Asiatic Studies 53(4). pp.152–272. Hyun, Choe. 2007. “South Korean Society and Multicultural Citizenship.” Korea Journal 47(4). pp.123–146. Joppke, Christian. 1996. “Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain.” Theory and Society 25(4). pp.449–500. ———. 2004. “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy.” British Journal of Sociology 55(2). pp.237–257. ———. 2007. “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe.” West European Politics 30(1). pp.1–22. ———. 2010. Citizenship and Immigration. London: Polity Press. Kang, Mi Ok. 2014. Multicultural Education in South Korea: Language, Ideology, and Culture in Korean Language Arts Education. New York, NY: Routledge.

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Kernerman, Gerald. 2005. Multicultural Nationalism. Vancouver: UBC Press. Kim, Andrew Eungi. 2010. “Korean Multiculturalism: The Genealogy of the Concept, Shifting Meanings, Issues and Implications.” The Journal of Asiatic Studies 53(2). pp.102–129. Kim, Nora Hui-Jung. 2015. “The Retreat of Multiculturalism? Explaining the South Korean Exception.” American Behavioral Scientist 59(6). pp.727–746. Kundnami, Arun. 2002. “The Death of Multiculturalism.” Race & Class 43(1). pp.67–72. Kymlicka, Will. 2010. “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies” International Social Science Journal 61(1). pp.97–112. ———. 2012. Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future. Migration Policy Institute. www​.migrationpolicy​.org​/transatlantic. Lee, Byoungha. 2010. “Incorporating Foreigners in Korea: The Politics of Differentiated Membership.” The Journal of Multicultural Society 1(2). pp.35–64. Lee, Sook-Jong. 2005. “Democratization and Polarization in Korean Society.” Asian Perspective 29(3). pp.99–125. Lee, Sung-Woo. 2011. “The Political Polarization and the Partisan Sorting in Korean Politics.” Democracy and Human Rights 11(3). pp.109–138. National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRC). 2003. A Report of Human Rights of Migrant Children in Korea. http:​/​/www​​.mang​​onet.​​kr​/ko​​rean/​​fles​​/nhrc​​ _migr​​ant​_c​​hi​ldr​​en​.pd​​f. Seol, Dong-Hoon. 2001. “The Social Network of Civil Organizations to Support Migrant Workers.” A paper presented at The Korean Sociological Association Annual Meeting (2001 .06), pp.323–342. Watson, Iain. 2012. “Paradoxical Multiculturalism in South Korea.” Asian Politics & Policy 4(2). pp.233–258. Yang, So-Mang. 2010. “The Korean Way to Multiculturalism.” Yousei International Affairs Review 1(2). pp.1–23. Yoon, In-Jin. 2009. “A Comparative Analysis of Immigration Policy of South Korea and Taiwan: With a Focus on Foreign Migration Workers.” ARI Working Paper Series No.3. pp.1–24. Yoon, In-Jin, et al. 2010. South Koreans’ Perceptions of Migrant Workers and Multicultural Society. Paju: Korean Studies Information.

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Chapter 2

Explaining South Korea’s Diaspora Engagement Policies

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Timothy C. Lim and Dong-Hoon Seol

Over1 the past several decades, more and more governments around the world have been attempting to engage with their respective “diasporic communities”—that is, with communities of people who have some ethnic, cultural, or historical link to their homelands or countries of origin.2 These communities may include frst-generation emigrants, or they may be the children of emigrants, and subsequent generations, who have never set foot in their putative homelands. In some cases, engagement between “homeland” governments and diasporic communities has been long-standing; but in many other cases (which includes South Korea), efforts at diasporic engagement are relatively recent. The more recent efforts, it is useful noting, have a largely instrumental purpose, namely, diaspora engagement policies (Gamlen 2006)—also known as extraterritorial citizenship strategies—are designed, frst and foremost, to be part of a broader national economic strategy. Diasporic communities, more specifcally, are viewed as valuable sources of scarce “global talent” and, in some case, as sources of potential investment. Thus, states use diasporic engagement policies to co-opt this talent or investment to enhance national economic competitiveness in an increasingly competitive global economy (Ho 2011). Accordingly, diaspora engagement policies are typically, albeit not always, targeted toward highly skilled individuals residing in economically advanced or knowledge-based economies. Low-skilled or unskilled workers living in poorer countries, by contrast, have often been excluded; but when they are included, they are typically accorded very limited rights. In other words, in the eyes of national policymakers, diasporic communities are not viewed equally; instead, they see, as a number of scholars have observed, a “hierarchy of nationhood.” In this hierarchy, members of some diasporic communities are automatically accorded privileged status, including full citizenship. But other communities, even those whose members have 33

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“shared blood” (i.e., a common ethnic-racial identity) and strong historical ties are seen and treated as inferiors or as easy-to-exploit, fully expendable labor (Seol and Skrentny 2009; Seol and Seo 2014; Piao 2017). South Korea has, on the surface, been no exception to this general trend. As we will discuss shortly, the South Korean government mostly ignored its diasporic communities until the mid- to late-1990s. The key turning point was the 1999 Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans. The Overseas Koreans Act (hereafter, the OKA) was, in many respects, a watershed as it marked the frst major policy designed to incorporate ethnic Koreans—specifcally those without Korean citizenship—into South Korean society (Rhee 2001; Seol 2002; Lee 2002, 2003, 2005, 2002a, b; Kim 2002; Chung 2003, 2004). In its original form, it is important to note, this 1999 law refected the same basic motive behind diasporic engagement policies of most other countries at the time (Ho 2011); that is, it was clearly a policy designed to strengthen the South Korean economy. It was also targeted at a diasporic elite (i.e., high skilled and affuent ethnic Koreans in the wealthiest economies), while, at the same time, it intentionally excluded ethnic Koreans— primarily those living in China—who lacked the desired skills (or capital) the South Korean state deemed vital. This suggests, then, that South Korea’s turn toward diasporic engagement was part of a global trend and refected a generalized process. There is more than a little truth to this (instrumentalist) view of diaspora engagement in South Korea. Still, as we argue, it tells only part of the story. To see why, it is necessary to consider the overlapping contexts within which diaspora engagement policy is not only made but also put into practice. There is, to be sure, the economic context, but, as with any public policy, there is also a political context, a sociocultural context, and an institutional context. Even more, because diaspora engagement policy, in general, deals with populations outside the borders of a single country, there is an international/geopolitical and transnational context. On this last point, it is important to emphasize an easily overlooked but core characteristic of diaspora engagement policy: it is neither a wholly domestic nor a primarily foreign policy. Instead, it falls somewhere in-between. To put the issue more colloquially, diaspora engagement policy is “neither fsh nor fowl.” The notion that diaspora engagement policy is neither fsh nor fowl is something we want to highlight. For, it suggests that a proper account of diaspora engagement policies in South Korea (and in any other country) requires a consideration of factors, processes, and relationships both inside and outside the borders of the country. This is, we recognize, a somewhat banal assertion. Yet, in analyses of a given country’s public policies, there is a tendency not only to assume a sharp distinction between the domestic and the foreign/international but also to assume that this distinction requires different frameworks of analysis. We argue, however, that the line between domestic

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and foreign policy, in general, has always been blurred and has become even blurrier in an era of globalization and transnationalism. This is especially true for those public policies that clearly include both an international or transborder element, as is the case with diaspora engagement policies. This suggests, in turn, that an integrated framework—one that can bring together domestic and foreign policy analyses—may be needed. Fortunately, such a framework already exists, namely, foreign policy analysis, or FPA.

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EXPLAINING DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT USING A “FOREIGN POLICY” APPROACH The term “foreign” in foreign policy analysis is potentially very distracting, since it suggests that FPA is limited to an analysis of foreign policy. And while it is certainly true that FPA scholars focus almost exclusively on foreign policy, in principle, there is no reason why FPA cannot be applied to other types of public policies, including and especially those that are neither fsh nor fowl. In the very short discussion that follows, then, our intent is simply to provide a bare-bones overview of the FPA approach as a useful framework of analysis for examining South Korea’s diasporic engagement policy—not, to reiterate, as a type of foreign policy but instead as a public policy with obvious international and transborder implications. Our frst point is this: FPA is an analytical framework that posits an interactive and mutually constitutive relationship among factors at three basic levels of analysis: the individual, the domestic, and the system or the macro-structural. A lot has been written about these three levels of analysis, so we will not go over that same ground (for a classic discussion, see Singer 1961; for a more recent analysis, see Hudson 2014). Instead, we will highlight the key aspects of our FPA approach, which begins with an actor-centered orientation. A focus on actors—both state and nonstate—is important for one basic reason: (abstract) structures, systems, institutions, regimes, and larger processes cannot make policy; only people can. Human intervention, and, therefore, human agency is always necessary in an examination of the policy process (Hudson 2005). At the same time, our approach recognizes, as we have already emphasized, that decision makers (and other actors) do not and cannot act in a vacuum: every public policy decision is inescapably made within different domestic-level and system-level contexts or structures, which have a major impact on what actors can and cannot do, as well as on the choices they ultimately make. Still, as we have already argued, context or structures do not dictate decisions or control outcomes. In this regard, our FPA framework sees these contexts/structures as creating “circumstances of choice” that constitute the environment of decision making and action (Bakalova 2013).

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This leads to our second major point: a big part of FPA analysis revolves around both analyzing the circumstances of choice in which decision makers and others are enmeshed and explaining the relationship between the circumstances and choices that are made. Rather than discuss these two issues in abstract terms, we will instead lay out a few basic and interconnected issues or assumptions—based on our FPA approach—for examining South Korea’s diaspora engagement policy. First, given the larger patterns and trends on the establishment of diaspora institutions and the increasingly strong movement toward diaspora engagement across the globe (Gamlen 2014), it is almost undeniable that the actions and behavior of decision makers in South Korea refect shifting system-level conditions and dynamics. These system-level conditions include geopolitical shifts (e.g., the end of the Cold War), global economic dynamics—most notably, the expansion and deepening of neoliberal capitalism—and the embedding of a new, transnational normative regime on human rights. The task, again, is to analyze and assess the infuence of these big-picture phenomena on and within South Korea. Second, while system-level (and regional-level) conditions are dynamics are undeniably important, it is imperative that they be linked to the intentions, interests, and power of individual and collective actors (Carlsnaes 1992). In other words, policies are not only actualized through the decisions and actions of people but also through their interactions (and struggles) with each other. Process and politics, simply put, matter. This leads to a third, tightly connected issue. In examining process and politics, FPA is strongly concerned with the domestic-level policymaking context. For, no matter what, every public policy, at some level, is subject to or mediated by country-specifc legal, institutional, and bureaucratic arrangements, which privileges certain actors (e.g., the president or prime minister, bureaucratic leaders, national or state legislators, or nonstate actors). These arrangements also suggest the degree of power domestic actors have, as well as the manner in which that power is exercised. In the FPA approach, therefore, domestic policymaking arrangements are generally considered a vital part of any explanation of public policy, whether foreign or domestic (Hamilton and Tiilikainen 2018; Kegley and Wiffkopf 1983). In South Korea, the president and the state bureaucracy play a particularly prominent role in the formulation and implementation of public policy in general, which partly refects the legacy of the developmental state (Yoon 2016). As we will show, this was very much the case with South Korea’s diasporic engagement policies specifcally. Our analysis, we should note, will focus most strongly on the role of the bureaucracy, which has clearly had the biggest hand in shaping South Korea’s diasporic engagement policies. At the same time, it is important to understand, the state bureaucracy does not exist on or as an island: it

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not only interacts with other actors, both inside and outside of government, but it also interacts with itself, so to speak, in that it is not a single collective actor but is composed of many different sets of actors. On this last point, in other words, it is crucial to disaggregate the state in general and the state bureaucracy more specifcally. Finally, in examining the circumstances of choice, it is essential to incorporate subjective or intersubjective factors—that is, culture, identity, and norms must be taken into account. Indeed, FPA embraces the incorporation of such factors into explanations focused on the making and development of policies, as all facts—including the institutional and structural facts—are necessarily mediated through a cognitive process. In other words, all facts (even seemingly purely objective ones) are given meaning as a “consequence of being perceived, reacted to, and taken into account by actors” (Carlsnaes 2012, p. 126). It is worth noting, too, that intersubjective factors are themselves the product of changes in and interactions at all three levels of analysis. In South Korea, as we will argue, norms on human rights, democratic governance, and social justice—which simultaneously operate at the global/transnational, domestic, and personal-cognitive levels—have intersected to shape the country’s diasporic engagement policies.

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A Very Brief Discussion of the Relevant Literature Our FPA approach, we should note, is designed to fll what we consider to be a signifcant gap in existing studies on South Korean diasporic engagement policies, especially the OKA. That gap, again, is the lack of integrated, multilevel analyses of public policies that are neither “fsh nor fowl.” Previous studies, both in English and Korean, have tended to be largely descriptive (Kim 2002) or focused primarily on instrumental factors, that is, the rational economic interests for incorporating diasporic communities (see, for example, Choe 2006) or on legal-institutional issues (Chung 2003; Choi 2018). Others focus strongly on a combination of state power and geopolitical conditions (Park and Chang 2005) or on broader “macroregional transformations” (Kim 2009). We believe that there is immense value in all these approaches, but their analytical scope is too narrow. It is crucial, in our view, to connect domestic-level and international/transnational factors into a coherent framework of analysis, while also giving serious attention to agency. This is exactly what our FPA approach purports to do. With the foregoing discussion in mind, this chapter will focus on, albeit not exclusively, the origin and development of South Korea’s principal diaspora engagement policy, which, to repeat, is the OKA, originally passed in 1999 but later amended many times, including a major revision in 2004. Our overarching objective is to show that the OKA is a complex mix of instrumental

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motivations, identity-based and discursive politics, bureaucratic and organizational processes, and regional and global dynamics.

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South Korea’s Diaspora Engagement Policies and the 1999 Overseas Korean Act For most of its short history, as we noted above, the Korean diaspora was mostly ignored. Indeed, prior to the 1990s, there was little to no offcial effort to directly engage with the Korean diaspora. Instead, to the extent that the South Korean state dealt with its diasporic communities, it mostly did so in an ad hoc and diplomatic fashion. The character of this engagement is refected in two early policies related to overseas Korean communities: the 1961 Technical Assistance Agreement with Germany (which was related to the dispatch of Korean nurses and miners) and the 1965 Korea–Japan Agreement on the Legal Status and Treatment of Koreans Residing in Japan (Song 2017). Both policies were the product of government-to-government negotiations and involved no input from members of the Korean diasporic communities in Germany and Japan, respectively. To be sure, there were other, more direct efforts at engagement. During the period of rapid industrialization under Park Chung Hee, for instance, the government established the Korean Institute of Science and Technology and the Korea Development Institute “for the purpose of inducing the return of foreign-educated (mostly in the United States) PhDs in engineering and economics” (Young 2003, p. 76). In addition, under Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993), the government allowed ethnic Koreans from China to visit South Korea on a travel certifcate, rather than a visa (Choi and Lee 2015). Still, between 1948 and the early-1990s, offcial engagement with the Korean diaspora was rare or very narrowly constructed. The election of Kim Young-sam (KYS), who served as South Korea’s president from 1993 to 1998, however, marked the beginning of a gradual but major political shift. In his inaugural address, KYS spoke of the “creation of a new Korea,” which included more “active and inclusive policies” toward the Korean diaspora (Yoon 2017, p. 287). The primary product of KYS’s initiative was the establishment of the Overseas Koreans Foundation in 1997, a minor but auspicious step as it provided an institutional basis for ongoing engagement with the Korean diaspora. The impetus for KYS to consider a formal diaspora engagement policy, it is worth noting, initially came from the Korean American community, which called for South Korea’s Nationality Act to be amended to allow for dual nationality. “Those who rallied for such an amendment”, according to Lee (2003), “emphasized the need to entice talents and successful businessmen of Korean descent to return to contribute to development back home.” The KYS administration, however, “decided to rule out the idea” in 1996 (Lee 2003, p. 108). In rejecting the demands of the

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Korean American community, the KYS government went out of its way to stress that overseas Koreans should focus on becoming “decent and respectable citizens of their host states” (cited in Lee 2003, p. 108). The failure of this frst effort is instructive, as it provides a useful perspective for assessing the passage of the 1999 legislation, which moved forward very quickly. Indeed, when Kim Dae Jung (KDJ) took offce in 1998, progress on a diaspora engagement policy was virtually immediate. One reason for this is fairly clear: unlike his predecessor, KDJ had strong personal and emotional connections to the Korean American community (with which he had developed strong ties when he was an opposition leader during the authoritarian era3) and was, therefore, much more sympathetic to their appeals. As president, moreover, he had the capacity to turn his individual interests into actual policy. To appreciate the analytical relevance of KDJ’s personal and emotional interest, consider a counterfactual question: What if KYS had been similarly (personally) motivated to establish a diaspora engagement policy? While it is impossible to answer this question, it is not hard to imagine that the apparent lack of personal interest on the part of KYS played a key role. After all, without the support of the president, let alone active resistance, it was far more diffcult for appeals from the Korean American community to gain political traction. Certainly, though, it is not enough to assert that individual interests and motivations were the only things that mattered. That is decidedly not the argument we are making. Instead, as we emphasized at the outset, it is crucial to adopt an integrative multilevel (FPA) approach, which requires us to consider the circumstances of choice, as well as the roles that other actors (including institutional actors) necessarily played, both in the formulation and implementation of the policy. Still, it is reasonably clear that the impetus for the OKA came from KDJ, who, shortly after taking offce, directed the Ministry of Justice to draft a bill that would grant overseas Koreans, including nationals of foreign states, rights not available to aliens of non-Korean descent (Lee 2003). Of course, presidents do not write laws themselves; instead, bureaucrats do. This tells us that, in an analysis of the OKA, we need to shift our attention to the South Korean bureaucracy. Importantly, as we already suggested, FPA tells us that the modern state bureaucracy should not be conceived of as a unitary collective actor motivated by a single overarching interest, namely, the national interest. Instead, a state’s bureaucracy should be understood as a complex institution composed of many associated but also discrete units or agencies, with competing agendas and differential levels of political power, as well as different procedures, personnel, and perspectives. Such is certainly the case with the state bureaucracy in South Korea. Before examining the political process and dynamics inside the South Korean bureaucracy, however, it would be useful to say just a few words about its especially prominent role in South Korea’s policy process.

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Bureaucratic Power and the Legacy of the Developmental State As many observers know, the South Korean state (along with other states in East Asia) has long been viewed as the quintessential developmental state. While the term “developmental state” has been subject to much analytical abuse over the years (Weiss 2000), one of its most uncontroversial—and also most enduring—features revolves around the establishment of a very strong and extensive bureaucracy with a signifcant degree of autonomy and insulation from both parliamentary and societal pressures. During South Korea’s authoritarian period, not surprisingly, presidential power and autonomy was an even more prominent feature of the developmental state. Together, the legacy of bureaucratic and presidential power and autonomy—while often overstated even during the years of authoritarian rule (for a discussion of this point of view, see Lim 2001; Woo-Cumings 1991, 1999)—underscores a key and virtually undeniable fact about policymaking in South Korea: it has long been dominated, or at least disproportionately infuenced, by a relatively narrow range of state actors. To be sure, the transition to and ultimate consolidation of democracy in South Korea since 1987 has invariably had a meaningful and signifcant impact on the policymaking process inside South Korea, allowing for a more pluralistic process in which the legislature, political parties, interest groups, media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or civil society more broadly, have come to play increasingly signifcant roles. Still, deeply embedded legacies are hard to uproot completely. Recent research by Yoon (2016) provides strong empirically based evidence of this last point: Yoon convincingly demonstrates that bureaucratic (and presidential power) continues to occupy an outsized role across a range of (largely domestic) policy issues in South Korea. We will not provide details here and simply note that Yoon’s analysis shows that bureaucratic and executive infuence is signifcant at all stages of the policymaking process, from advocacy, to shaping policy alternatives and outcomes, to implementation, and fnally to policy revisions, both minor and major. The legacy of the developmental state, more specifcally, is important insofar as institutionalized practices and norms from the past persist to the present. This appears to be the case in South Korea. One of the most important of these legacies, as we have already emphasized, is the relative insulation and autonomy of the executive branch (which includes the bureaucracy), particularly from parliamentary pressures. In practical terms, this means that both the bureaucracy and the president are able to exercise a great deal of policymaking authority largely on their own terms. This does not mean, however, that executive and bureaucratic authority is unchecked. It certainly is not. As in any consolidated democracy, the South Korean Constitution is

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the supreme law of the land both in principle and practice; it also provides for a formal system of checks and balances among the three branches of government in South Korea. Thus, while it is fair to say that the executive branch continues to exercise outsized power in South Korea (compared to many other democracies, including Japan and the United States), it is subject to clear constitutional and institutional constraints. This said, it bears repeating that the South Korean bureaucracy is not a unitary or monolithic actor. It is, instead (as is the case with bureaucracies everywhere), functionally divided, which means that the different elements of the bureaucracy may not always share the same vision, interests, and goals. It is to this issue that we turn next.

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Diaspora Engagement and the Role of Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process As in any modern state bureaucracy, the various ministries in South Korea have their own interests, organizational procedures, and expertise. They may strongly disagree on the substance of particular policies, particularly in cases where a policy overlaps with or encroaches on the jurisdictional authority of several ministries at the same time. When this happens, each ministry, sometimes in coalition with other ministries or sometimes acting alone, may use whatever resources it has to infuence the content and shape of the policy. Even when there is little disagreement on the basic need or rationale for a particular policy, the ministries—including individual leaders or stakeholders within the ministries—will compete with one another to ensure that the fnal policy most strongly refects and promotes their specifc interests. As Graham Allison (the doyen of the bureaucratic politics approach in FPA) put it, “The name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government” (Allison 1971, p. 144). The upshot is this: the process of bureaucratic politics can lead to a result in which narrow or parochial bureaucratic interests ultimately have more sway than a broader national interest. The interest of the various ministries, it should also be noted, is at least partly embedded in the organizational DNA (i.e., the standard operating procedure, mission, and norms) of each individual ministry. Thus, in South Korea, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT)—which, not coincidentally, were also the ministries most intimately involved in creating the 1999 OKA—tend to pursue fairly predictable or routine paths. This last point refects a basic principle in what is known as the organizational process model. This model, too, is skeptical of the notion that policymaking is entirely or mostly rational process, whereby the costs and benefts of

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each policy choice are carefully weighed in relation to a clear-cut national (as opposed to parochial) goal to which everyone subscribes (Welch 1992). Instead, this model suggests that organizational imperatives strongly infuence choices and positions well before a policy decision even comes to the table. In South Korea, it is fairly clear that the bureaucracy, in general, and the aforementioned ministries, more specifcally, played a central role in developing the 1999 OKA. More importantly, it is clear that their respective positions were, at least to some degree, predefned by their bureaucratic missions and routines. In the initial deliberations, for example, MOFAT was very quick to object to including ethnic Koreans in China in the OKA, despite the fact that a few years earlier, in 1996, it had defned overseas Korean “compatriots” as anyone of Korean descent, irrespective of nationality or citizenship (Korea Times, September 30, 1999). MOFAT’s objection, not surprisingly, was based on its fear that the Chinese government would react negatively to a foreign government (i.e., South Korea’s government) attempting to exercise infuence, even if only indirectly, over several million Chinese citizens—China has long had the largest ethnic Korean population living outside of the Korean peninsula, estimated about 1.9 million in 1990 (Seol 1998; Kim 2003), a number that has since decreased to about 1.8 million in 2010. MOFAT, in other words, saw the issue through the lens of foreign relations and was primarily concerned with ensuring that the Overseas Koreans Act would not damage the country’s always delicate relationship with the People’s Republic of China. On this point, it is useful pointing out that South Korea’s “friendly” policy toward ethnic Koreans in China (known as Joseonjok) had already irritated China. As we already noted, under the administration of President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993), the South Korean government treated the Joseonjok liberally by allowing them to enter their “homeland” without a visa; instead, they were issued travel certifcates. At the time, South Korea had no diplomatic ties with China. The MOEL, which was formerly the Ministry of Labor (MOL) (the redesignation was made in 2010), was also strongly opposed to an expansive defnition of ethnic Koreans, which would have, in principle, allowed ethnic Koreans in China to freely enter the South Korean labor market on the same terms as any South Korean citizen. (The OKA did not confer citizenship on eligible ethnic Koreans, but it came close to doing so since it allowed a special visa status, economic rights, and social benefts, including access to national health care.) Ever since the beginning of large-scale foreign worker migration to South Korea, however, the MOL/MOEL (hereafter, we will only use the current designation of MOEL) had endeavored to manage the “importation” of foreign worker and to control the terms of their employment and residency in South Korea. This is particularly evident in South Korea’s

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frst foreign worker employment scheme, the Industrial Technical Training Program for Foreigners (ITTP), which was offcially launched in 1991. Under this program, foreign workers were classifed as “trainees,” which was a transparent effort to institutionalize substandard wages and labor standards for a burgeoning category of low-skilled but increasingly needed workers (Lim 1999; Seol and Skrentny 2004a). The exploitative character of the ITTP, we should note, encouraged a large number of foreign workers to abandon or avoid it altogether: many entered South Korea through the program but quickly left their positions and found work on their own. Others began working in South Korea on an undocumented basis without going through the ITTP. In 1999, for example, undocumented foreign workers outnumbered trainees by a margin of almost three to one (Seol and Skrentny 2004a). While the rise in undocumented workers was clearly not ideal or desirable, from the standpoint of the MOEL, it was tolerable. After all, its goal was clear: meet the needs of the Korean economy—and specifcally, the small-sized and medium-sized business sector—by tapping into a large pool of foreign workers. Admittedly, though, the growing number of undocumented foreign workers was clearly worrisome; thus, in the early 2000s, a new program for foreign workers—the Employment Permit Program for Foreigners (EPP)—eventually took the place of the ITTP (for further discussion of the EPP, see Seol 2005; Kim 2015; Choi and Lee 2015).4 The MOJ was the only major bureaucratic actor that was initially open to a more expansive defnition of ethnic Koreans, in part because it was not concerned with bilateral relations or the labor market per se. It is not clear, however, why the MOJ held such an expansive view, except that offcials within the ministry took seriously the idea that all Koreans shared a common bloodline, and therefore were entitled to equal treatment (Chosun Ilbo, September 24, 1999). Moreover, after being directed by KDJ to draft a policy on overseas Koreans, the MOJ decided to follow in the footsteps of Japan, which had wrestled with the same issue itself about a decade earlier. In the case of Japan, ethnic Japanese living outside Japan, referred to as Nikkeijin, were allowed in virtue of their “blood ties,” to enter Japan for a period of up to three years (a period that was easily and almost automatically extended) and allowed to work in any capacity, including as unskilled labor (see Goto 2007). The right to take on unskilled work was made exclusive to the Nikkeijin among all categories of foreign workers. The Japanese case is relevant, in part, because of the proclivity on the part of South Korean bureaucratic actors, in general, to borrow directly from policies adopted by major countries (Japan, the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom).5 Accordingly, the MOJ’s initial conceptualization of ethnic Koreans did not discriminate between those living in the United States, Europe, or other well-off countries, and those living in China, Russia, or other poorer areas of the world.

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Nonetheless, with MOFAT and the MOEL in solid agreement that ethnic Koreans from China not be included in the legislation, the MOJ’s initial decision to include Joseonjok, as well as ethnic Koreans in former USSR (referred to as Goryeoin), was clearly on shaky ground. MOFAT’s opposition was particularly strong: shortly after the release of the draft bill, ministry offcials reacted quickly and vehemently: not without irony, they criticized the draft as a “blood-centered approach” based on a “narrow-minded nationalism” (cited in Lee 2003). MOFAT’s position and infuence were apparently decisive. Thus, while the fnal version of the law did not explicitly make any geographical or socioeconomic distinctions, it limited eligibility to ethnic Koreans who “emigrated abroad after the birth of the Republic of Korea, i.e., 1948, and [who] relinquished their Korean nationality, and their lineal descendants” (cited in Seol and Skrentny 2004b). The intent was crystal clear: all Joseonjok and Goryeoin were summarily excluded from benefting from the legislation. Tellingly, in explaining the exclusion of Joseonjok in particular, the MOJ referred to the objections of both the MOEL and MOFAT. Note, on this point, that the MOJ’s evolving position was at least partly a function of the role it was obliged to play in providing legal justifcation for offcial policy. Thus, in responding to a case brought before South Korea’s Constitutional Court (more on this below), here is what the MOJ argued: Provisions in the OKA aim to ease restrictions imposed on economic activities of ethnic Koreans with foreign nationalities based on their preemptive rights in Korea. Therefore, the necessity to apply these provisions to ethnic Koreans who emigrated before the establishment of the Korean Government is weak because they do not have any preemptive rights in Korea. Simplifcation of regulations on entry and exit of ethnic Koreans who emigrated before the establishment of the Korean Government could lead to an infux of ethnic Koreans with Chinese nationality, relatively low-waged workers, into the nation’s labor market and cause a signifcant number of social problems. . . . It is also very likely that the State will face diplomatic frictions with China who [sic] is extremely sensitive to nationalism among racial minorities within its border if the Act were to include ethnic Koreans who emigrated before the establishment of the Korean Government as potential benefciaries of the Act. (Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case 2001)

Of course, it is not always the case that the MOJ would simply yield its organizational interests to provide legal justifcation for the positions of other ministries. The debate over how an “overseas Korean” was defned, however, was not central to the concerns to the MOJ. If anything, the much more restrictive defnition advanced by the other ministries refected the MOJ’s long-standing mission to keep tight control over the immigration process.

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Thus, the ministry had little to gain from “going to war” against the MOL and MOFAT, the latter two of which had a keen interest in the shape of the OKA, and particularly in the defnition of an overseas Korean. Even more, MOFAT’s position was signifcantly buttressed by the fact that the OKA had clear and undeniable implications for South Korea’s relationship with China and other concerned countries: the possibility of serious diplomatic frictions was hard to ignore or dispute (we will return to this point shortly). Indeed, when a public policy has clear international implications, MOFAT’s position generally takes precedent under the principle of “uniformity/identity of the government” (jeongbu dongilche wonchik), which suggests that the Korean government must generally speak with one voice when it comes to issues of diplomatic and security policy (for further discussion, see Lee 2013). As a result, MOFAT was able to exert outsized infuence in this particular case. And because the position of the MOL was complementary—that is, it wanted a restrictive defnition in order to control the entry of overseas Koreans from China, as well as the former Soviet Union—there was less room for the MOJ to maneuver in.

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The Political and Legal Reaction The details of the legislative and bureaucratic process are, of course, more complicated than presented here, but the point is clear: the frst major diaspora engagement policy passed by the South Korean government was not the product of a unitary state simply writing and then implementing policies designed to maximize economic benefts to the country. Admittedly, it still can be argued that the end result of the 1999 legislation was nonetheless instrumental, even though it was based on different and competing bureaucratic motivations. Crucially, though, the 1999 legislation was not the end of the story. Indeed, the law was almost immediately challenged by the Joseonjok and an array of 61 civil society groups inside South Korea (Korea Herald, December 4, 1999). Importantly, the Joseonjok and their allies in South Korea were already well-versed in the politics of protest and in political activism more generally. This was primarily due to their long struggle for labor rights as immigrant workers, an issue that has been examined in detail elsewhere (see, for example, Lim 1999, 2003). One of the frst protests against the 1999 OKA, before it came into force, was a hunger strike staged at Myeongdong Cathedral (the symbolic site of many protests throughout the decades), which was followed by a direct plea to KDJ to veto the bill. Although KDJ refused, the protests still proved to be at least partly effective. According to Lee (2003), in reaction to the protests, “the government announced ‘supplementary measures,’ which expanded the scope of eligibility to apply for Korean nationality and relaxed

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entry qualifcations” (Lee 2003, p. 109). More specifcally, the supplemental measures revised the original requirement to include those ethnic Koreans “who moved to China before August 15, 1948 but are currently or used to be registered on the Korean household register, those who desire to join their siblings in Korea, those who have contributed or are expected to contribute to Korea’s national interests, and their spouses and unmarried offspring” (Lee 2003, p. 109). Importantly, this fairly signifcant change did not require approval by the legislature (i.e., the National Assembly) but instead was made via a presidential decree. The presidential decree, it is worth noting, is often an extremely important element of the policy process in South Korea (and is similar to, but more powerful than, an executive order in the United States). Most simply, the presidential decree allows the executive branch to exercise a great deal of control over how a policy is implemented through detailed additions and revisions to existing laws. As we already noted, these decrees are not subject to legislative approval but are often quite extensive and far-reaching. The Overseas Koreans Act itself was subject to fully thirteen presidential decrees between 1999 and 2014, more than one of which dealt with the core issue of who qualifed as an overseas Korean. Returning to the key point, despite a more expansive defnition of overseas Koreans, political activists were far from satisfed. As part of the early push to challenge the law, three Joseonjok went to the South Korean Constitutional Court to plead their case. In its response, the MOJ, representing the government, argued that the case should be thrown out because the complainants were “foreigners with Chinese nationality,” and since the law was not concerned with “natural human rights,” they had no standing to bring the case. The MOJ went so far as to claim that the complainants could not even prove that they were ethnic Koreans, and thus were not eligible to bring the case based on the prerequisite of “self-relatedness” (Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case 2001). The Constitutional Court, however, disagreed with the MOJ. The Court argued that the 1999 OKA violated the principle of equality in Article 11 of the Constitution. As a result of the Court’s ruling, the government was obliged to rework the defnition of individuals who qualifed as an “overseas Koreans” within the context of the OKA. It was a long process, but on March 4, 2004 (about 27 months after the Court’s ruling), the Act was amended, again by presidential decree,6 to include the following defnition for the term overseas Korean: “A person prescribed by the Presidential Decree of those who have held the nationality of the Republic of Korea (including Koreans who had emigrated to a foreign country before the Government of the Republic of Korea was established) or of their lineal descendants, who obtains the nationality of a foreign country” (Act on the Immigration and Legal Status). The central point: the change was not only dramatic but also unequivocally against the expressed interests of the

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MOFAT and MOEL. It bears repeating, too, that the change would not have happened were it not for the challenges mounted by the Joseonjok in tandem with South Korea’s large and infuential NGO community. Obviously, the South Korean courts played a pivotal role, too. It should also be noted that revision was likewise supported by Korea’s mainstream press (see, for example, an editorial in the Korea Herald, December 5, 2001). The 2004 amendment did not address all the concerns of the Joseonjok, particularly since it did little to nothing to resolve the legal status of those that were in Korea on an undocumented basis. However, one year later, the MOJ established a new program—the Voluntary Departure Program (VDP)— designed to provide legal status only to Joseonjok who were undocumented. The VDP required undocumented Joseonjok to leave South Korea on a voluntary basis, but then permitted them to re-enter the country (after one year) to work up to three years (Seol and Skrentny 2009). Then, in 2007, the Korean state created the “Visit and Employment Program,” which permitted the Joseonjok free entry into and departure from South Korea in designated sectors requiring low-skilled work or simple labor activity (Seol and Skrentny 2009). The key to this policy change was the permission for free entry and departure; other labor importation programs required foreign workers (who were not part of the Korean diaspora) to remain in South Korea—the duration of their visas. This new program reversed a long-standing prohibition on the relatively free movement of “simple labor” into and out of South Korea.7 None of this is meant to imply that the OKA has somehow transformed into a policy designed to subvert the interests of the Korean state. But the foregoing analysis is meant to imply, in keeping with the FPA approach, that the OKA was very much the product of human decision making and agency taking place within South Korea’s particular (postauthoritarian and democratic) institutional setting, which included the legacy of the developmental state, an active an infuential civil society (both domestic and transnational), and an independent judiciary. Still, as we have made clear, any comprehensive analysis of South Korea’s diaspora engagement policy cannot neglect system or macrostructural factors. Indeed, one would be hard put to assert that the OKA was solely the product of individual-level and domestic-level factors or that its timing was disconnected from the larger international shift toward diaspora engagement. The Bigger Picture: The International and Transnational Context Power relations within the international/regional system played a role in the construction and unfolding of the OKA—specifcally, the fear of damaging relations with China (and to a lesser extent, with the United States). As

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we already clearly argued above, this was directly evident in the role that MOFAT played in the debate over and construction of the OKA. From the very beginning, to repeat, MOFAT offcials were strongly concerned with the potential confict between the provisions of the OKA and the domestic laws of those countries where ethnic Koreans resided. These concerns, it should be noted, became an explicit issue in the relationship between the two countries. For example, in May 1998, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) formally raised questions about the OKA while the law was still being developed. In a meeting between high-level offcials in the MFA and MOFAT, more specifcally, China formally voiced concerns about the law and “urged the Korean government to take a cautious stance” with respect to the inclusion of ethnic Koreans in China. The MFA also warned South Korea about the potentially “negative impact of the enactment of the law on Chinese-Korean relations” and even suggested that China would delay opening a Korean consular offce in Shenyang—a key hub for three northeastern provinces in China where most Korean Chinese residents live (Goh 1998). In response, MOFAT’s deputy minister simply and diplomatically said, “Since the fnal draft of the related law has not been fnalized, we will take note of the position of the Chinese side” (Goh 1998). Indeed, there is no doubt MOFAT took the Chinese warning to heart, as about fve months after China offcial raised questions about the OKA, South Korea’s Foreign Minister Hong Soon-young expressed the ministry’s offcial opposition to the measure allowing for dual citizenship, which was part of the original proposal for the OKA, and specifcally cited “possible diplomatic conficts.” Notably, this occurred during a high-level policy coordination meeting between MOFAT and the MOJ (Korea Herald, September 17, 1998). In subsequent negotiations over the law, MOFAT offcials expressed concern that the OKA would be interpreted as a policy of “Pan-Koreanism,” which would “cause reaction and alertness [among] neighboring countries,” violate international law, and even create an obstacle to the reunifcation of the Korean Peninsula (MOFAT 2006). Interestingly, MOFAT also argued the following: “Giving legal preference to ethnic Koreans with foreign citizenship over foreign citizens who are not ethnically Korean, is incompatible with the obligation to abolish the prohibition of discrimination based on international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination” (MOFAT 2006, p. 33). Whether or not violation of human rights treaties was a genuine concern, it is reasonably clear that the international context infuenced MOFAT’s position vis-à-vis the OKA and that MOFAT’s position, in turn, had an effect on the overall deliberations. Keep in mind, too, that the Joseonjok were left out of the original version of the OKA.8

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More generally, the fact that there was an emerging bilateral relationship between South Korea and China to begin with speaks to an underlying structural process tied to geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics and to the Cold War order. Very simply put (and leaving out an immensely complex history), the emergence of a geopolitical rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States created a structural division in the international system, separating the so-called communist world from the capitalist West (and its allies). In this situation, as Kim (2009) insightfully argues, it was all but impossible for South Korea to construct a “transborder Korean nation” that incorporated ethnic Koreans in enemy states, including, of course, the Joseonjok in China. The reason was clear: The Cold War order superimposed “geopolitical frontiers onto emerging national borderlines” (Kim 2009, p. 146). Even more, the confation of geopolitical frontiers and national borderlines led the South Korean state to essentially erase the Joseonjok from “its rhetorical practices, bureaucratic routines, and organizational structures for nearly half a century” (Kim 2009, p. 147). The Joseonjok, in this view, were only able to “reappear” once the Cold War ended, as the collapse of the Cold War order broke down the once insurmountable geopolitical barrier between South Korea and the communist world. In the post–Cold War era, it is important to emphasize that structural forces have also been at play. More specifcally, the ever-increasing integration of the global economy has brought many pressures to bear on individual states and their societies. From this perspective, it is evident that diaspora engagement policies are a product of the increasingly competitive dynamics of global capitalism. The logic is clear: state leaders use overseas coethnics to stimulate national economic development, usually by encouraging inward investment—which some of have dubbed “Diaspora Direct Investment,” or DDI (USAID 2009)—or by attracting individuals with sought-after skills or abilities (i.e., “global talent”). As Ho (2011) puts it, “International and national policy-makers regard the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies as a means to beneft national development by ‘connecting the dots’ to join up and mobilize geographically dispersed emigrant knowledge and investment.” These strategies make a lot of sense, from an instrumental perspective, which is a key reason why they have been embraced by a range of countries around the world (Trotz and Mullings 2013). In South Korea, the economic (or instrumental) utility of the “Diaspora Option” (Pellerin and Mullings 2013) was well understood, and it unequivocally played a central important role in the establishment of the OKA. Indeed, once the MOJ was directed to write the legislation, the policy debate tended to focus mostly on the idea that diasporic community would be a key element of South Korea’s economic future. This view, for example, was advanced by South Korea’s National Security Agency (Gukga Anjeon Gihoekbu 1998),

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which highlighted the relatively large population of overseas Koreans as a tremendously valuable source of human and social capital (also see, Choi 2013; Shin and Choi 2015). The Overseas Koreans Foundation also played an important role in emphasizing the economic importance of the Korean diaspora, both in the initial and subsequent debates over the OKA. One example of this was an analysis commissioned by the Overseas Koreans Foundation in the early 2000s, which estimated that the economic value of the Korean diaspora was $120 billion or 20–25 percent of South Korea’s GDP at the time (Yonhap News Agency, February 19, 2003). More generally, this is how one observer, Park (2015), described the policy discussion surrounding the OKA: “The Overseas Korean Act refected the orientation of a growing chorus of policy makers, legislators, activists, and elites who defned overseas Koreans as economic assets comparable to ethnic Chinese for China and the Jewish diaspora for Israel” (Park 2015, p. 76). The effort that went into justifying the economic importance of the Korean diaspora to the homeland can be interpreted in several ways. On the one hand, it suggests that structural pressures essentially compelled policymakers and others to recognize that they had no choice but to tap into all economic resources in order to remain globally competitive and economically viable; thus, their rhetoric merely refected economic reality. On the other hand, it might—and, as we argue, does—suggest a more subjective process. After all, compared to most countries that consider the diaspora option, South Korea was economically far stronger, larger, and more dynamic (in the late 1990s). To be sure, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) had a major impact on the South Korean economy and almost certainly shaped the debate over the OKA. But by the time the OKA was fnally passed in August 1999, the most devastating effects of the crisis had already faded, and the need for the diaspora option was clearly not as strong. Consider, on this point, that the South Korean economy suffered four straight quarters of negative GDP growth beginning in the frst quarter of 1998; yet, by the frst quarter of 1999, economic growth had recovered to 5.4 percent, while second quarter growth was a very strong 10.8 percent—in the third quarter, growth was stronger still at 12.8 percent, followed by 13 percent in the fnal quarter of 1999 (cited in Koo and Kiser 2001). Simply put, there was no objectively determined need for the OKA in the waning months of 1999 (the law did not enter into force until December 4, 1999). Even after the law passed, it could have been vetoed or abrogated, once it was clear that the economy had, for all intents and purposes, fully recovered. Still, it is quite likely the immediate and after effects of the crisis—combined with the country’s long-lived developmentalist orientation—deeply infuenced the thinking of South Korea’s policymaking establishment. The AFC provided, in this sense, the push that made it possible for South Korea

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to fnally embrace the diaspora option, albeit as an economic strategy rather than a cultural or social policy. On this last point, it is important to reiterate a basic claim: The OKA was not necessitated by economic pressures, but was, instead, justifed on economic or developmentalist grounds. The distinction may seem slight, but it is quite important, since it tells us that (structural) economic factors infuenced but did not cause the initial policy shift. But what about subsequent developments, especially the changes to the defnition of an overseas Korean? The changes would be hard to attribute to economic dynamics, because they were tied strongly to political activism on the part or on behalf of marginalized groups and to the judicial system in South Korea. This raises another crucial question: What motivated these two sets of actors? There is an obvious answer in the case of Joseonjok political activists, namely, they wanted to protect or promote their “rights.” But why did they believe or assume that they had any rights to protect or promote in the frst place? After all, they were not citizens of South Korea, which suggests that they should not have had any expectation at all of challenging the right of a foreign government to determine its own national immigration policy. It is clear, though, that they were tapping into a global and increasingly well-established discourse on human rights, which, in their view, gave them license to challenge the long taken-for-granted presumption of (absolute) state sovereignty. The courts also rejected, albeit implicitly, traditional norms of state sovereignty in ruling, frst, that a foreign national (i.e., the Joseonjok) can be a “bearer of basic rights,” and thus have standing to fle a constitutional complaint.9 And, second, that “socioeconomic and security reasons” alone could not be used as the basis for legislation that discriminated between different groups of foreign nationals (although the basis for its reasoning was that the state itself was at fault because it originally planned to include all ethnic Koreans). While it would be easy to argue that the Court’s ruling was premised entirely on domestic norms and practices—on the institutional context of liberal democracy in the postauthoritarian period—the treatment of foreign citizens is highly variable among consolidated democracies. In the United States, for example, Supreme Court rulings has long held that foreign nationals are “persons” within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution; yet, the Court has, at different times (most often, in the period before 1955), constitutionally condoned xenophobic policies. Given South Korea’s long history of exclusionary policies (toward foreign nationals) and given the government’s legal argument that the inclusion of ethnic Koreans in China in the OKA represented both a security and economic threat, it is perplexing that South Korea’s Constitutional Court ruled against the government. At the same time, the Court’s ruling was not particularly surprising: for decades, South Korea has been slowly shifting

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away from a near-obsessive focus on security and developmentalism toward greater alignment with international (human) rights norms (Schattle and McCann 2014). To be sure, the shift has been uneven within South Korea’s political system—as the debate over the OKA demonstrated—but it has been signifcant. And it has been particular signifcant for the country’s judicial system, which is, for obvious reasons, most closely associated with questions of individual rights (as opposed to state rights). The upshot is this: the normative structure of international relations or global politics has also had an effect on the choices that different actors made, in large part by shaping or reshaping their dispositions (i.e., values, preferences, and attitudes). Importantly, the choices that emanate from a rights-based structure are, generally speaking, in confict with the choices created by the geopolitical and economic structures. Thus, from a structural perspective, decision makers are often faced with a dilemma, which enhances the signifcance of agency. This, of course, takes us back to the starting point of our FPA approach, namely, an actor-centric orientation in which human decision makers are understood to be the key point of intersection among the various determinants of public policy.

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CONCLUSION The foregoing analysis is designed to show that South Korea’s formal or offcial engagement with the Korean diaspora (primarily through the OKA) is best understood and explained through an integrated multilevel and multidimensional perspective, which puts human decision makers at the center of analysis—that is, an FPA approach. The FPA approach is not typically used to examine ostensibly domestic policies, but, as we discussed, diaspora engagement policy falls into a nebulous area: it is neither wholly domestic nor foreign policy; it is “neither fsh nor fowl.” Indeed, applying an FPA approach to “neither fsh nor fowl” policies, in general, may be a necessity, for, as we have tacitly argued, it is almost certainly the case that an exclusive focus on either domestic-level or macro-level (international and transnational) processes and factors will provide only a partial and distorted explanation. In the same vein, the neglect of agency is often a glaring, but unrecognized, weakness in many analyses. At the most general level, then, our goal has been to make the case for the utility of the FPA approach. Of course, we are also centrally concerned with South Korea’s diaspora engagement policy. As we have shown, it is a mistake to see the OKA as primarily, still less solely, a product of bureaucratic and organizational politics, or of a “developmental state,” or of domestic politics, or of overarching structural factors, and so on. Instead, the OKA refects the push and pull of

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a mélange of factors and processes, which can be analytically separated, but which also must be seen as part of an integrated whole that puts human decision makers at the center. In this regard, the discussion in this chapter does not do justice to the intricacies of the interaction and relationships between and among the various factors. Instead, we have endeavored to provide a meaningful and, we hope, insightful overview.

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NOTES 1. We presented a draft of this argument at the Korean Ethnic Return Migration and Diasporic Engagement Policy in Comparative Perspective Conference, Ateneo de Manila University, Manila, Philippines, December 14-17, 2016. Papers from the conference, including an earlier version of ours, will be included in an edited book: Diasporic Returns to the Ethnic Homeland: The Korean Diaspora in Comparative Perspective, edited by Takeyuki Tsuda and Changzoo Song (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). The present article, however, has been signifcantly expanded, revised, and updated. In addition, Dr. Lim’s research for this work was supported by a travel grant from the Northeast Asia Council (NEAC) of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS), through the support of the Korea Foundation (KF), and by the Laboratory Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2018-LAB-2250001). Both authors also received an international research grant for humanities and social sciences of Jeonbuk National University (JBNU) in 2016 to encourage collaborative research between JBNU faculty and international scholars. This article is a product of that collaborative research effort. 2. This chapter was previously published in Timothy C. Lim and Dong-Hoon Seol. 2018. “Explaining South Korea’s Diaspora Engagement Policies.” Journal of Asian Sociology DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, 47 (4): 633 – 662. 3. KDJ spent several years in the United States during the early 1980s. During his time in the US he visited church groups, students, and large gatherings of Korean Americans. KDJ also received a signifcant amount of fnancial support from the Korean American community, which generally viewed him quite favorably (Ungar 1984). 4. There is a great deal of debate over the rationale for the EPP. As one anonymous reviewer of this manuscript suggested, a major intent of the EPP was to reduce the number of undocumented foreign workers exposed to exploitation. Others—especially immigrant activists themselves—have argued that the EPP did little to resolve the exploitative conditions faced by workers. While this is an important debate, it is beyond the scope of our present argument. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the EPP has not completely resolved the issue of exploitation and mistreatment of immigrant workers in South Korea. 5. This “proclivity” to borrow directly from policies adopted by major countries is evidenced by the Korean government’s practice of commissioning reports that contain extensive analysis of overseas cases. Indeed, it is rare to fnd government reports

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that do not include foreign cases. See, for example, Seol, Lee, Yim, Kim and Seo (2004); Seol and Rhee (2005); Kwak and Seol (2010); Kwak, Rui and Chang (2011); Chung, Rho and Lee (2013); Jeon, Gho, Lee and Son (2017). In addition, we might note, one of the authors of this article has frsthand knowledge of the government’s strong tendency to borrow from policies adopted by major countries, as he has been involved in preparing reports and advising government offcials. 6. Prior to the presidential decree and in response to the court’s ruling, a group of twenty-three members of the National Assembly submitted a bill that would grant all ethnic Koreans rights of entry, property ownership, and economic activity regardless of nationality (Korea Herald, December 10, 2001). 7. Some issues still remain. For example, the revised version of the OKA only acknowledges up to third-generation Goryeoin (ethnic Koreans living in territories of the former Soviet Union such as Uzbekistan) as overseas Koreans who qualify for permanent residency. Fourth-generation Goryeoin over twenty must enter Korea on short-term visitor visas and the leave the country every ninety days. As of November 2017, South Korea’s National Assembly was still considering proposals to revise the law (see Choi and Kim 2017). 8. For further discussion on how South Korea’s relationship with China impacted MOFAT’s position, see Shin (1999) and Lee, J. (2002b). 9. The original decision that a “foreigner” can have a status similar to a citizen in that both can be the bearer of basic rights was made in 1994.

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Lee, Geun. 2013. “The ‘Principle Uniformity/Identity of the Government’ of Korean Diplomacy.” Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 29 [In Korean]. Lee, Jeanyoung. 2002a. “Korea’s Policy towards the Ethnic Koreans Abroad: Issues and Implications.” Korean and World Politics 18(4): 133–162 [In Korean]. ———. 2002b. “Korea-China Diplomatic Relations and Ethnic Koreans in China: Focusing on the Constitutional Court Decision of the Unconformable to Constitution of the Overseas Koreans Act in 2001.” National Strategy 8(4): 77–99 [In Korean]. Lim, Timothy C. 1999. “The Fight for Equal Rights: The Power of Foreign Workers in South Korea.” Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance 24(3): 329–358. ———. 2001. “Bringing Competition In: Capitalist Development in South Korea and the Limits of Institutionalism.” Competition and Change 5(2): 103–133. ———. 2003. “Racing from the Bottom: The Nexus between Civil Society and Transnational Migrants.” Asian Survey 43(3): 423–442. MOFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade). 2006. Overseas Korean Policy of Roh Moo-Hyun Government (Chamyeo Jeongbu eui Jaeoidongpo Jeongchaek). Seoul: MOFAT [In Korean]. Park, Hyun Ok. 2015. The Capitalist Unconscious: From Korean Unifcation to Transnational Korea. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Park, Jung-Sun, and Paul Y. Chang. 2005. “Contention in the Construction of a Global Korean Community: The Case of the Overseas Korean Act.” Journal of Korean Studies 10(1): 1–27. Pellerin, Hélène, and Beverly Mullings. 2013. “The ‘Diaspora Option’, Migration and the Changing Political Economy of Development.” Review of International Political Economy 20(1): 89–120. Piao, You. 2017. “Hierarchical Citizenship in Perspective: South Korea’s Korean Chinese.” Development and Society 46(3): 557–589. Rhee, Jong-Hoon. 2001. “The Policy of Korean Government towards Overseas Koreans: Directions for Revision.” Sources of Overseas Koreans Policy 62: 148–157 [In Korean]. Schattle, Hans, and Jennifer McCann. 2014. “The Pursuit of State Status and the Shift toward International Norms: South Korea’s Evolution as a Host Country for Refugees.” Journal of Refugee Studies 27(2): 317–337. Seol, Dong-Hoon. 1998. “Causes and Countermeasures against the Victimization of Overseas Employment Fraud of Joseonjok in China.” Korean Journal of Victimology 6: 67–102 [In Korean]. ———. 2002. “Ethnic Korean Chinese Workers in Korea: Are They Ethnic Koreans, or Foreigners?” Trends and Prospects 52(Spring): 200–223 [In Korean]. ———. 2005. “Global Dimensions in Mapping the Foreign Labor Policies of Korea.” Development and Society 34(1): 75–124. Seol, Dong-Hoon, and John D. Skrentny. 2004a. “South Korea: Importing Undocumented Workers.” Pp. 481–513 in Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Second Edition, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifeld. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ———. 2004b. “Joseonjok Migrant Workers’ Identity and National Identity in Korea.” Pp. 259–283 in Korean Identity: Past and Present. Seoul: Institute of Korean Studies, Yonsei University.

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———. 2009. “Ethnic Return of Migration and Hierarchical Nationhood: Korean Chinese Foreign Workers in South Korea.” Ethnicities 9(2): 147–174. Seol, Dong-Hoon, and Hae Chun Rhee. 2005. Employment of Overseas Ethnic Koreans in Korea and Its Socio-economic Effects on Korean Labor Market. Gwacheon: Ministry of Labor [In Korean]. Seol, Dong-Hoon, June J. H. Lee, Kyung Taek Yim, Yun-Tae Kim, and Useok Seo. 2004. Comparative Study of International Labor Migration Management in Germany, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and Korea. Gwacheon: Ministry of Labor [In Korean]. Seol, Dong-Hoon, and Jungmin Seo. 2014. “Dynamics of Ethnic Nationalism and Hierarchical Nationhood: Korean Nation and Its Othernesss since the Late 1980s.” Korea Journal 54(2): 5–33. Shin, Gi-Wook, and Joon Nak Choi. 2015. Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Shin, Sam-Ho. 1999. “State Council of Korea Approved the Overseas Korean Act.” Yonhap News, August 31, 1999. Singer, J. David. 1961. “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations.” World Politics 14(1): 77–92. Song, Young-Ho. 2017. “Laws and Regulations Regarding Overseas Koreans.” Pp. 327–336 in The Korean Diaspora: A Sourcebook, edited by In-Jin Yoon, and Young-Hun Jeong. Seongnam: The Academy of Korean Studies Press. Trotz, D. Alissa, and Beverley Mullings. 2013. “Transnational Migration, the State, and Development: Refecting on the ‘Disaspora Option’.” Small Axe 17(2): 151–171. Ungar, Sanford J. 1984. “A Korean Exile’s Long Journey Home.” New York Times, December 23. USAID. 2009. Diaspora Direct Investment (DDI): The Untapped Resource for Development. Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development. Weiss, Linda. 2000. “Developmental States in Transition: Adapting, Dismantling, Innovating, Not ‘Normalizing’.” The Pacifc Review 13(1): 21–55. Welch, David A. 1992. “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect.” International Security 17(2): 112–146. Woo-Cumings, Meredith. 1991. Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ——— (ed.). 1999. The Developmental State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Yoon, In-Jin. 2017. “Re-Establishing Goals and Implementation System of Overseas Koreans Policy.” Pp. 285–303 in The Korean Diaspora: A Sourcebook, edited by In-Jin Yoon, and Young-Hun Jeong. Seongnam: The Academy of Korean Studies Press. Yoon, Jiso. 2016. Advocacy and Policymaking in South Korea: How the Legacy of State and Society Relationships Shapes Contemporary Public Policy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Young, Soogil. 2003. “Comments on Chapter 4.” Pp. 73–76 in The Korean Diaspora in the World Economy, edited by C. Fred Bergsten, and Inbom Choi. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

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Chapter 3

Globalization and Language Education English Village in South Korea

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Jamie Shinhee Lee

Language1 ideologies and policies are closely intertwined.2 They are not just abstract ideas or noble plans envisioned and executed only by authorities or institutions. Their involvement in an everyday language user’s life can be fairly concrete and specifc. Speakers’ perceptions are easily infuenced and frequently shaped by language ideologies, and individuals subscribing to certain language ideologies often rationalize their personal education decisions. The formidable power of language ideologies affecting language practices and beliefs is articulated by several scholars (see, for example, Kubota 1998; Seargeant 2009; Silverstein 1979; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). Language ideologies are often recycled in the form of uncontested folk beliefs, and their infuence can be quite irresistible. Currently no language shows a more revealing ideology than English, which approximates blind faith. The power of English language ideology is vividly articulated in Kachru’s (1998: 96) idea of “a linguistic albatross around the necks of the users.” He argues that “the mythology about English as a language, its curriculum, its research agendas, and its pedagogy, continue to be constricted and imposed in a deliberate and planned way as a loaded weapon” (Kachru 1998: 95). English language ideology in contemporary South Korea is closely related to the concept of globalization. In promoting globalization ideologies, it is challenging to conceive a more appropriate example than English Villages, simulated English-speaking theme parks designed for domestic language immersion experiences within Korea. According to Jong (2008), “South Korean students have been able to immerse themselves in a close-to-natural English speaking environment, without leaving the country.” The establishment of these villages presents a robust exemplar of a particular Korean stance on globalization and its signifcant bearing on English language education policy nationwide. Therefore, the movement in support of English 59

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Villages in Korea needs to be understood as a representative of Korea’s English language ideology with much broader implications than the usual pedagogical concerns and consequences. When the idea of English Villages was frst introduced, it attracted much attention from the media. Among the newspaper articles I have read regarding English Villages, Mitchell’s (2006) description below is arguably the most intriguing one, presenting a factually accurate portrayal of the Paju English Village with a slightly dramatized political fair.

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Imagine going for a stroll down the street of any quaint little English town, with its characteristic pubs, restaurants and red brick terraces and, as in every U.K. town or village, everybody says hello to you in English. But just then, you notice something typically uncharacteristic, reels of barb wire and warning signs in the distance reading “landmines nearby.” You quickly realize that this is not in the U.K.; this is Paju, South Korea, also known as the closest city to North Korea and the infamous DMZ.

Apparently even an ever-threatening North Korean presence and the military tension in the nearby area do not discourage enthused parents from sending their children to the Paju English Village for “experiential” English learning. Discussions on globalization and studies on English education are not scarce in linguistic research, but a close examination of the connection between the two is not readily available. Most of the discussions tend to be highly abstract and theoretical, failing to empirically show the connection between theory and practice. In this chapter, I attempt to provide what is inadequately done in earlier research by covering both the discursive and the practical, focusing specifcally on a case study which reveals a fascinating connection between a broad, national globalization initiative and tangible, concrete English education practices. This study departs from earlier research on globalization, in that it does not discuss globalization merely from a theoretical perspective and treat it mainly as an abstract concept; rather, this study views globalization as an ideology and a process affecting linguistic and pedagogical issues in a “real” sense. Thus, in contrast to highly conceptual previous studies, this study empirically shows how ideas rationalize and normalize actual practices. Globalization studies discuss issues related to economy, politics, and culture, generally not treating language as a main object of investigation. However, I argue that globalization has a profound impact on language and education too, particularly in the form of promoted and accepted ideologies regarding language policy. Another insight this study foregrounds is that globalization does not paint a unifed picture around the world—how globalization is imagined and

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discussed can be highly localized, the center and peripheries of globalization reacting differently. As a country not at the center, South Korea approaches globalization as a top-down process and sees it as an opportunity to make the nation greater. In other words, globalization in South Korea has an undoubtedly nationalistic undertone. In addition, globalization and improvement of English profciency nationwide are considered to be ultimately good for the economy. This chapter presents a case study of globalization directly infuencing language education and argues that globalization can be a compelling rationale for educational reform, especially if it is understood to have concrete social and economic advantages for those who participate and disadvantages for those who do not. J. S. Lee (in press) observes that in this day and age, it is not uncommon for Koreans to have metalinguistic discourses about English; that is, the English language is “talked about,” which indicates that English has now, welcomed or not, penetrated into the South Korean public’s awareness and has become part of discourse. Fairclough (2006: 5) discusses the complex interplay between “processes” of globalization and “discourses” of globalization, emphasizing how discrete they are in concept yet how closely they infuence each other. He argues that discourses of globalization not only represent but also help to create processes of globalization. He recognizes the polyphonous nature of discourses of globalization, constructed by different “agents.” Fairclough lists fve main sources of “voices on globalization”: academic analysis, governmental agencies, nongovernmental agencies, the media, and people in everyday life. In this chapter, I attempt to include several voices on globalization in relation to English Villages. The data in this study consist of written texts on English Village in the public domain mainly from its home page (both in English and Korean versions), newspaper articles, and blogs, as well as photos and brochures personally collected during my visit to the largest Gyeonggi English Village, Paju Campus, including a follow-up observation log. My aim is to include both professional and nonprofessional voices and offcial and unoffcial texts in discussion. The majority of datasets come from the Gyeonggi English Village’s main website. In addition, using one of the most popular search engines in Korea, Naver, in September 2009, I conducted the keyword search for Yenge Maul (English Village) and selected the frst ffteen hits in the categories of news and blogs. The blogs in the data were maintained by ordinary citizens, but I noticed that news item postings were often imported from reputable newspaper websites. Drawing upon textual and discourse analysis (Fairclough 2003) often utilized in the analysis of public written texts, this study examines language ideologies embedded in various texts regarding the English Village (EV hereafter) and related discourses about segyehwa (globalization) available in the public domain. In addition to written texts, I also view the physical set up

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(setting) of the English Village itself as a manifestation of English language ideology; to be specifc, English submersion ideology, referring to the belief that English can be learned best only in an English-saturated environment in which everything, not only the language spoken but also buildings and signs, represents foreign elements. For this reason, I discuss the physical environment as well in this chapter.

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CONTEXTUALIZING ENGLISH EDUCATION POLICY IN SOUTH KOREA There is no sign of the power of English—perceived or real—dwindling in South Korea. Empowered by repeated discourses on globalization in the media, the momentum of English is so evident that some even argue that it is no longer a language of choice for Koreans but a language of necessity. For instance, Nam (2005) asserts that English in South Korea is in transition from a tool for social advancement to the indispensable language for survival. Park and Ablemann (2004: 651) present a brief history of the past thirty years of education policy in South Korea. Some of the milestones include the Chun Doo Hwan regime’s “equality of educational opportunity” prohibiting “all kinds of private after-school education” in 1980 in an attempt to reduce the gap between haves and have-nots and the Kim Young Sam regime’s “segyehwa, extending English education to elementary school (grades 1–6)” in the mid-1990s. Kim Young Sam viewed segyehwa as “the main pathway to the country’s development and national prosperity” and proposed “turning South Korea into a center of global management and reforming institutions and people’s thinking in order to promote globalization” (Koh 2000: 197). The Kim Young Sam administration (1992–1997) formed the Presidential Segyehwa Promotional Committee in January 1995 (Cherry 2007) and promoted segyehwa “to brace the nation for cascading developments and sweeping changes in the world to build the Republic into a frst-rate nation in the coming century” (Oh 1999: 147). The South Korean government’s ambition to emulate a frst-world country was viewed by some as “a national ego trip” (Cherry 2007: 51) but was rhetorically presented and justifed in the name of segyehwa as “a national goal” to meet “a global standard of excellence in all areas” (Oh 1999: 149). Among a few areas, education was identifed as one of Kim Young Sam’s globalization priorities (Koh 2000). Kim Young Sam’s segyehwa-oriented education initiative has been consolidated by the current Lee Myung Bak Administration’s public English education vitalization policy, which is part of Lee’s well-publicized yenge kyoyukuy taypyenhyek (a dramatic overhaul of English education). President Lee was reported to deplore Korean college graduates’ inability

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to communicate in English. According to the dramatic overhaul education reform, Lee Myung Bak proposed in January 2008 before he took offce, (i) most English classes will be taught entirely in English beginning in 2010, (ii) 23,000 new English teachers will be hired by 2013, and (iii) 4 trillion won ($4.2 billion) will be injected into English education over the next fve years. Lee Kyung Sook, the head of Lee’s transition team, was reported to say that “national competitiveness is directly related to English education,” echoing President Lee’s position (Kim 2008). Lee Myung Bak’s education reform centers on enhanced English education in public schools, greater autonomy of schools, and more intense competition among students (Hwang 2008). He proposes reducing exorbitant private education expenses by signifcantly improving the quality of public education and making a far-reaching shift from grammar and reading centered English instruction to speaking oriented “silyongcek” (practical) education (Ahn 2009). Considering burdensome expenses for private education reported in the media—21 trillion won (approximately $17 billion) with the biggest increase (11 percent) in out-of-school English programs (Hwang 2008); Lee’s plan to strengthen public education to release the economic pressure on the average household appears to be sensible at least in its conceptualization but whether it will stop the practice of relying on private tutoring and out-ofschool lessons all together is highly questionable. English education, which used to be provided only from junior high onward, is now available in elementary school due to a 1997 reform. In evaluating the general effcacy of these newly implemented English classes, Whang (2000: 29) claims that “the average English profciency of Korean children has obviously improved over the past three to four years since the introduction of English as a regular subject.” He does not provide specifc empirical evidence. However, my own personal observations, albeit sketchy and anecdotal, suggest that this claim has some validity. In addressing English language pedagogical issues, Lee (2007) notes that many believe that grammar translation-oriented English education in South Korea has produced so-called book-smart English readers but not streetsmart English speakers who can “get things done” in real life. Whang (2000: 28) raises concerns for overemphasizing only “shortcuts” and “hardships” involving “mastering” English and underrepresenting an “adventure into a whole new world by means of English.” He asserts that there is “a dire need for fundamental reform in English education” and emphasizes the need to incorporate practical English expressions into teaching (2000: 200). Despite the broadly acknowledged importance of English, when it comes to yengehoyhwa (English conversation), many Koreans have mixed feelings. J. S. Lee (in press) characterizes this love/hate relationship with the English language as the coexistence of zeal and emotional distress regarding improving

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speaking skills. Some are concerned that the entire nation is obsessed and consumed by English. This type of claim may appear hyperbolic, but some Korean parents even consider having their children undergo an operation “snipping the thin tissue under the tongue” presumably “to sort out misplaced L and R sounds” (Chae 2004) and couples are willing to live apart with the husband in Korea and the wife abroad for their children’s early exposure to English (Lee 2007). Certain individual efforts to improve English appear excessive. It is understandable that some of the current English language education initiatives and policies in South Korea can be viewed as overdriven. These institutional and individual choices are indicative of agents acting in accordance with “felds” and “capital” as articulated in Silver (2005). The following section focuses on the very frst serious and unequivocally globalization-driven educational initiative, English Village.

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GLOBALIZATION AND ENGLISH VILLAGE In this section, I contextualize the English Village in detail and explain how closely it is connected to globalization and English submersion ideologies by discussing overarching discursive constructs and underlying beliefs (3.1), instructional objectives (3.2), and staffng and facility (3.3 and 3.4). Offcial mottos and statements available on its website as well as staffng and infrastructure in the English Village emphasize the unifed position that globalization is critical for Korea’s future and English profciency is required for “global” Koreans and English submersion—English-only teaching—is the key to the success. Studies published in the West or by Western scholars often acknowledge high mobility, enhanced telecommunications, and an increasing sense of interconnected time and space as characteristic of globalization (Dutceac 2004; Giddens 1990; Harvey 1990; Kearney 1995). Although these traits are not completely ignored, globalization in Korea tends to be viewed as synonymous with self-improvement with the aim of catching up with “the frst world.” For example, Kim (2000: 3) defnes it as “Korea’s unique concept encompassing political, economic, social, and cultural enhancement to reach the level of advanced nations in the world” (emphasis added). Park and Abelmann (2004: 646) argue that English is “an index of South Korea’s and South Koreans’ cosmopolitan striving in the global order.” They further suggest that what it means to be South Korean is shifting to mean “‘South Korean in the world’—a prospect that calls for the mastery of English as an index of cosmopolitan striving,” which is defned as “the desire to become citizens capable of living at home in the world” (2004: 650). Park and Abelmann’s observation that “English works simultaneously as both a local

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and global sign, and that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are not contradictory” (2004: 645) sums up how the relationship between English and globalization is locally conceptualized in South Korea. Three conceptualizations of globalization summarized by Dewey (2007: 334) present predominant approaches to and attitudes toward globalization in academic discourse. The hyperglobalist position assumes that “globalization is driving a construction of new economic, social, and political world orders, leading ultimately to greater overall homogeneity,” while the skeptical position maintains that “national governments retain the power to regulate trade, commerce, and politics, and that any interdependence operates only at surface level.” The transformationalist position argues that “globalization is regarded as the driving force responsible for fundamental sociopolitical transformations” (ibid) and South Korean globalization seems to show predominantly the so-called “transformationalist” position. Regarding globalization and its relation to English, Bianco (2003: 287) asserts that English is characterized as “connoting opportunity, supranational communication, and econo-technical modernity” and that “the massive expansion of globalization-induced pluralism makes state-centered explicit processes of LEP.”3 Bianco’s characterization is also echoed in the South Korean government’s globalization project segyehwa, which is “a state enhancing, top-down strategic plan” (Kim 2000: 3). President Lee Myung Bak proposed a bill called “Global Korea,” which is an effort to “court foreign investment, make nice with old allies and step-up English language education” (Newsweek 2008). Shin (2007) reports that the Korean Ministry of Education recommends an English-only policy in English education for third and fourth graders in elementary school and seventh graders in junior high school with the policy affecting one grade higher each year. Jeju, a southern resort island in South Korea, is scheduled to become a self-governing province in which English is used as an offcial language (Kim 2008). I would not argue English language ideology per se is truly unique to Korea, but the degrees to which Koreans are preoccupied with education in general are quite striking. In particular, “a near-obsessive quest” (Park 2009: 2) for English has received unfavorable titles such as “a national religion” (Park 2009: 1) and “English frenzy” (ibid.). Seth (2002: 1) notes that the most contributing factor to prestige and social class in South Korea is likely to be education, asserting that “education is a national obsession in South Korea.” He argues that “the preoccupation with the pursuit of formal school was the product of the diffusion of traditional Confucianism attitudes toward learning and status, new egalitarian ideas introduced from the west and the complex, often contradictory ways in which new and old ideas and formulations interacted” (Park 2009: 6). Park (2009) suggests that this deep-rooted education fever has been turned into English fever fueled by “the process

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of globalization in the late 1980s and the economic crisis in the late 1990s” (2009: 52) and reinforced by “a series of governmental policies in the early 1990s” (2009: 55). In cosmopolitan Korea, English is considered “a class marker” (Park and Abelmann 2004: 646) and “a modern skill” for “higher education and the job market” (Park 2009: 41). The notions such as a linguistic handicap (Seth 2002) and unspeakableness of English (Park 2009) are often identifed as the roots of the problems weakening international competitiveness, decelerating globalization, and feeding anxiety over improving English. According to Park (2009: 38), “particularly since the 1980s, when Korea started to focus on gaining international recognition and economic stability within the global market, the Korean government pushed its citizens to be more profcient in English.” As long as South Korea remains a developing country, the concept of catching up with the frst world will be part of various discourses promoted by the South Korean government including educational policy. Globalization, understood mostly by educated, well-traveled Koreans in the past, is now recognized even by marginalized populations such as undereducated elderly citizens because of its frequent occurrences in the media. Their understanding of the term itself might not be accurate or adequate, but the importance of English was metalinguistically highlighted particularly in relation to globalization (Lee 2009b). One of the most compelling cases in which the ideological interconnectivity between globalization and use of English is evident is English Village. In an attempt to actualize the idea of creating “global Koreans” through more communication-oriented, fun, economical English education alternatives, Gyeonggi English Culture Foundation (GECF hereafter) was founded in April 2003, initiating a one of a kind project. The banner (photo taken during my 2006 visit to the EV) showcases the predominant rhetoric of globalization behind this project. The phrase “Global Inspiration,” the English motto of Gyeonggi Province, and its Korean motto “Seykyeysokey Gyeonggi-do” (Gyeonggi Province in the world) sum up Gyeonggi’s vision and aspiration toward globalization. Gyeonggi is considered an optimal place for English Villages because of its proximity to the Seoul metropolitan area (approximately an hour away from downtown Seoul by train) and land availability. Seoul is already overcrowded and overbuilt; it cannot provide the kind of land required for mega language learning facilities resembling an actual town with the charm of an amusement park and a Hollywood movie set. I visited Paju, the largest English Village campus, when it just opened in 2006. In addition to on-campus learning, its website runs an online program called Cyber English Village,4 which is freely available; users do not have to be associated with the EV.

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Figure 3.1  Banner. Photo taken by Jamie Shinhee Lee.

The main idea behind the EV is clearly articulated in the section called “concept” on its offcial website (http://english​-village​.gg​.go​.kr​/eng)5 as follows:

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(1) The Gyeonggi English Villages are places where people can use the English language in a variety of contexts as well as experience English speaking cultures. All this can happen right here in Korea. There is now an alternative to traveling abroad for this type of experience. The English Village offers a similar environment that students, families and teachers might experience in a foreign country, all right here in our own backyard. (emphasis added)

The idea is to provide “authentic” English-speaking spaces within Korea where Koreans can use English in a variety of real-life contexts. The slogan “Feel and experience English in Korea!” clearly articulates the project’s emphasis on experience-based English learning and projects a sense of selfreliance, not having to rely on costly resources outside Korea. IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTS A textual analysis of the public relations flm released by the Press Center of Gyeonggi EV reveals three main themes: (i) globalization, (ii) economy, (iii) and English education reform. It is asserted that “we want to instill in students

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a better sense of their role in the global community.” They note that “another agenda for leading the world in the establishment of English Villages is to boost our international competitiveness through globalization initiatives.” The details are as follows: (2) If Koreans speak English more fuently; the atmosphere will be more appealing to continued foreign investment in Gyeonggi Province and Korea. It is an essential. Companies and their families will be more likely to relocate to our peninsula and live for extended periods if our citizens are true global citizens that help make living in Korea a comfortable, culturally-rewarding experience. (emphasis added) (http://english village​.gg​.go​​.kr /eng/ aboutgecf/ vod​_pr​.​jsp)

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The if-conditional syntactic structure in (2) suggests that “Koreans speak English more fuently” and “our citizens are true global citizens” are two conditions which will result in creating a foreign investment friendly and foreigner welcoming environment. The idea that two conditions are argued to yield the same fnal outcome makes one conclude that “true global citizens” means “Koreans speaking English more fuently.” A direct ideological link between linguistic capital and economic capital in folk conceptualization of “global” is salient in this text. The overarching argument is that striving to improve fuency in English is intended to accommodate non-Koreans, but in the end, Koreans will beneft from stronger economy. Similar discourses are put forth in the Korean version. The following statement addresses the main function of the EV. (3) Seykyeysokuy kyengkito, tongpwuka kyengceyuy cwungsimchwuk kyengkitolul mokphyolo kwuknay choycholo yengemaulul cosenghan kyengki yengemaulun hyencay chwucincwungin cheyhem yenge haksup infra kwuchwuk saepul chacilepsi cinhaynghaye global incay yangsengkwa tomin yenge kwusa nunglyek hyangsangul thonghan kwukceyhwa mind payyangey kyeninchaka toykey ssupnita. [With the aim for Gyeonggi Province to be a world province and the central axis of North East Asian economy, we vow to play the role of a locomotive (driving force) to cultivate internationalization-minded, global human resources through improving English speaking skills of the residents of Gyeonggi Province by making steady progress on building the very frst experiential English training infrastructure in Korea.]

In this exclusively Korean text, three English lexical items stand out: “infra,” “global,” and “mind”, which are italicized. The word “global” is combined with the Korean noun incay (human resources). The buzz word “global” is

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reinforced by the concept “Gyeonggi in the world,” not Gyeonggi in Korea. Gyeonggi envisions itself not simply as a province in Korea but as a supranational or superordinate space, not being subject to the usual intranational jurisdiction. In other words, the vision they have about the province is transnational, not being bound to one country. Moreover, this text stresses that the main contributors to make this vision a reality are “English speaking” individuals with international orientations, which is referred to as “kwukceyhwa (internationalization) mind” in the original Korean text. The conceptualization of global in this excerpt is closely related to language skills, similar to the English text in (2); that is, being bilingual, mainly with profciency in English, is treated as the determining factor for claiming global citizenship. In addition, excerpt (3) clearly reveals an ideology of economy, echoing the English discourse in excerpt (2). Although producing English-speaking Koreans is given frst and foremost importance in this project, it is not argued to be the fnal goal. Instead, it is seen as a means to the ultimate goal of Korea becoming the economic hub in Northeast Asia. As to why Koreans need to “speak English more fuently” and how the EV project fts into the picture, excerpt (4) offers an explanation.

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(4) The world is changing rapidly due to the development of transportation and IT technology. Along with these, English has become a major infuence in connecting and uniting the world. In this global era, it is essential to help the public speak English more fuently, in order to establish an atmosphere where foreign enterprise can do business without hindrance, to help foreign residents to feel more comfortable, and to facilitate cultural exchange. For this reason, Gyeonggi Province has been putting its heart and soul into the English Village project, which provides all the residents of the province with an environment in which they can easily experience English in person. (emphasis added)

Excerpt (4) reinforces predominant English language ideologies: (1) The Korean public’s English fuency is not adequate. (2) The English language has become more powerful thanks to technological advancements. (3) The English language connects and unites the world. (4) English is essential for successful business. (5) English is required for cultural exchange. All of these discourses present only pragmatic views on English and fail to address some of the well-known critical concerns such as the concern that English is a killer language, that English is an imperial language, or that English is a language encasing and reinforcing social inequalities (e.g., Pennycook 1994, 1998; Phillipson 1992). Economy-oriented arguments also drive predominant ideologies in the EV project. Pragmatists can be easily attracted to the supposed

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money-saving idea of the EV. Most Koreans are painfully aware that so-called authentic English education in English-speaking countries can be fnancially burdensome. It is not known whether or not many Korean parents sent their children overseas, because they could afford to do so. It is quite possible that they did it even if they were in debt, because they thought it would be a good “investment” for their children’s future, which raises a serious economic and social concern. Some parents consider a more long-term choice rather than temporary overseas English programs. This long-term solution, however, involves uprooting an entire family solely for a child’s education. According to Dong-Ah Daily (March 30, 2006), “41% of Korean parents who have elementary school students are willing to emigrate for children’s education if possible” (cited in Lee 2007: 1). As a more economical alternative to costly overseas English education, the EV claims to provide affordable education for “all” stating that “by giving students an experience in English at a reasonable cost, the fnancial burden for private English education is decreased.” If the EV can accomplish what it set out to accomplish, it may alleviate some fnancial pressure on workingclass Korean parents who want to arrange private English lessons for their children but simply cannot afford to do so. EV’s discourses about economical education alternatives are often coupled with the rhetoric of reducing social inequalities supposedly caused by the English language, or to be more precise, socioeconomic class stratifcation between those who have resources to improve English and those who do not. For instance, among the students from third grade through ninth grade in Gyeonggi Province and/or active members of the Cyber English Town, those from low-income families recommended by the Ministry of Education are offered free education. This is an attempt to rectify inaccessibility of private English language education to students from a low socioeconomic class. Along with economy, culture is construed as a key component in defning what “global” means to Koreans, which, excerpts (5) and (6) suggest, has something to do with developing keen interests in other cultures and countries. (5)Yengekwen kwukkauy maulkwa yusahan hwankyengeyse seykyeyuy tayanghan mwunhwalul cheyhemhamyense seykyeysimin uysikul paywuko yengeka mokceki anin uysasothongul wihan swutanilanun kesul nukkikeyhapnita. [Experiencing various cultures of the world in an environment similar to English speaking countries, students in the English Village will acquire a sense of being global citizens and come to realize that English is not a purpose but a means of communication.]

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(6) In addition to learning and studying the international language, we want to instill in students a better sense of their role in the global community. We can do this by introducing other cultures and other worldviews from people all over the world.

Excerpt (6) implies that an understanding of cultures and views other than one’s own can be obtained by means of “the international language” (i.e., English), and further, that an enhanced understanding of the world outside your own will ultimately lead to heightened self-awareness. Excerpt (5) shows that learning English in Korea is driven by “instrumental motivation,” a utilitarian goal to gain something practical or concrete, not by “integrative motivation,” a desire to identify with target language speakers and cultures. Another channel through which the “global” element of the project is managed and reinforced is Cyber English Village. Its main purpose is described as follows: (7) Cyber English Village is for everyone who is interested in learning English. It is opened all year around for free to all members. Anyone can join, regardless of their residential area.

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Furthermore, specifc ways in which the Cyber EV can be effectively run are recommended. It is suggested that the Cyber EV is created to (1) promote and supplement the EV, (2) maximize the advantages of online English learning, (3) establish a spontaneous and continuous online learning space, and (4) improve Gyeonggi residents’ English skills. The mastermind of the EV Project is the GECF, whose council consists of the governor of Gyeonggi Province and fourteen board members and two supervisors. The subheading “intent” of the foundation reads: (8) a. Increasing need for English as a basic element of globalization and an information-oriented society. b. Need for building the English Village, where students can experience and learn English in everyday life. c. Establishment of a specialized organization, the Gyeonggi English Culture Foundation, for successful construction of the English Village.

In addition to the general intent, GECF articulates its specifc objectives as follows: (9) a. Raising the international competitiveness of Gyeonggi Province through improvement of Gyeonggi residents’ English skills. This will allow Gyeonggi Province to become internationally competitive. Gyeonggi is

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promoting the English Village Project to offer residents the best learning environment and a distinctive opportunity for English education. b. Equipping Gyeonggi province residents with high-level English language skills by expanding opportunities for English learning and cultural experience. c. Contributing to foreign currency savings by studying English without going abroad. d. Completing and supporting the public education by providing and [sic] English practice ground for all students in Gyeonggi Providence. e. Attracting foreign capital and promoting foreign investment by improving the globalization and competitiveness of Gyeonggi Province. f. Raising international competitiveness by improving Gyeonggi residents’ English ability and their experience with international cultures.

Both the EV homepage and GECF website showcase similar discourses that emphasize practical motivations for learning English and urge proactive approaches to globalization. The texts above neither depict Koreans as victims of globalization nor address problems with globalization, rather it is implied that Koreans can beneft tremendously from globalization by actively participating in it and using it to their advantage. In addition to overtly articulated fnancial benefts, positive impacts of the project EV are argued to be extensive enough to deal even with family issues. As discussed in Lee (2007), an overzealous goal to provide English education for Korean children in English-speaking countries has given birth to a new form of family called Kirogi family (wild goose family) since the mid-1990s in South Korea. It refers to an immigrant family in which the father is left behind in Korea to support the family and the mother lives with children in English-speaking countries for their education. Unsurprisingly, this unique living arrangement poses several challenges for many families due to issues from homesickness to marital breakups. The project EV promises to ease the pain of family separation as follows: “Parents need not feel anxiety, loneliness or fear like they do after sending their children overseas for language and culture training.” A fnal argument appeals to the idea of addressing widely perceived performance anxiety many Koreans claim to suffer because of their insuffcient English-speaking skills. The mission statement of the EV identifes one of the objectives as helping students build confdence in speaking English. This particular goal is said to be reached by implementing creative alternative English education through EVs, as indicated in the excerpt below. (10) We want our young students to overcome their fears and anxieties when dealing with the study and usage of the English language. If we can improve their self-confdence by exposing them to situations and teachers from around the world, then we have accomplished our mission.

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PEDAGOGICAL OBJECTIVES The discourse of English education reform is predominantly manifested in the EV’s pedagogical objectives. The main instructional goal is said to “create an environment where learning English is entertaining” and to “modify current thinking and methods of English education.” They propose the 3 E Model, which is conceptualized as follows: Education: Cultivate English speaking ability through experiential education. Develop various educational programs that are age and level appropriate. Experience: Apply the programs in real life by role-playing different jobs and functions. Create a village which simulates different situations. Entertainment: Learn English in a fun, motivating manner. Complete education through PE, sports, leisure, culture life. (emphasis added and adapted from http://english​-village​.gg​.go​.kr​/eng)

As specifcally articulated in the pedagogical goals above, the focus is on developing everyday applicable spoken English in a rather oxymoronic “created” naturalistic living environment.

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PARTICIPATING AGENTS There are different participating agents in this project. According to the EV’s offcial documents, over 700 residents (teachers, staff, and students) reside on-site year round: 500 students; 200 teachers; 100 native speakers; 100 Korean instructors and employees. Three different types of agents are involved in teaching: (i) regular program teachers, (ii) one-day program teachers, and (iii) “edutainers.” Both one-day program teacher and edutainer positions require “various artistic talents (acting, singing, dancing etc).” The faculty in the EV project are assigned to work as an employee, such as a café owner, a book store clerk, a cashier in a convenience store, a doctor in the EV, and so forth. These assigned jobs are not their real-life professions; rather, they simply “play” one in the EV. Therefore, a certain level of acting is involved. The main purpose is to provide a variety of opportunities for visitors and trainees to conduct their daily routines in natural environments albeit quasi. Different programs are offered in the EV. Students can either enroll in short-term residential programs ranging from a weekend to a summer or participate in various nonresidential programs during a day trip to the EV with reasonable general admission fees,6 approximately $5 for non-adults (ages 4–18) and $6 for adults. Initially residential programs in the EVs were

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designed to target young learners, mainly accommodating elementary and junior high school students. However, some campuses now offer short residential programs from two to three days to three weeks for professionals such as teachers and civil servants. Nonresidential programs are open to the general public with no age limit with the purchase of a daily admissions ticket. Visitors can participate in many of these programs with no additional fee. In principle, both teaching staff and administrative staff, interacting with students enrolled in residential programs and visitors, are supposed to have roles to play and tasks to perform. Whatever they do, they are there to provide as many opportunities to use English as possible for visitors and residential program students. After the Immigration area, the frst building that catches visitors’ attention is the information center where they are greeted by English-speaking administrative staffers who distribute brochures and maps and recommend some free programs people can take advantage of while visiting the EV. These employees do not have regular teaching hours but serve as quasi-teachers to offer help in English. Visitors need to communicate with the EV employees in English to complete business transactions in various stores in the EV. The underlying assumption is that visitors’ actual participation will lead to informal but experience-oriented learning. Job announcements for English teachers in South Korea often contain potent gatekeeping texts. It is not uncommon that they specify who’s “in” and who’s “out” even for application eligibility. A blunt wording such as “only wenemin (‘native speaker’) can apply” appears in recruitment notices more often than not. A telling example comes from a posting with the title “Teachers Wanted” dated April 30, 2007, on the Gyeonggi EV website (http:​ /​/eng​​lish-​​villa​​ge​.gg​​.go​.k​​r​/eng​​/recr​​ui​t​/j​​obs​.j​​sp). The heading “qualifcations” reads:

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Positions available for only Native Speakers of English—US, UK, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, South African teachers.

No subtlety is found in the wording “only Native Speakers of English.” It clearly states that only speakers from English as a Native Language (ENL) countries will be considered for positions. Native speaker favoritism is a recurring rhetoric related to advertisements about instructors in the English language teaching industry (Lee 2009a). This ad, however, has an extended notion of native speakers of English. The addition of South Africans to the category of eligible native speaker teachers is a noteworthy new development. In the past, there has been a strong preference for North American teachers (i.e., Americans and Canadians) even though British, Australians, and New Zealanders are equally considered to be “native speakers.” Gatekeeping ideology in teacher hiring is most salient in the dichotomy between “native” and

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“non-native” but is also seen in the favoring of North Americans over nonNorth Americans—not all native speakers are treated equal. The EV seems to depart ever so slightly from this traditional approach and attempts to include native speakers other than North Americans. However, when it comes to the division of labor and who can do what, the age-old native vs. nonnative issue is still there. Excerpt (11) demonstrates wenemin ideology by valorizing only and all native speaker teachers as “kind” and “detailed oriented.” These wenemin teachers are seen as the sole agents who facilitate students’ success in the program. (11) Chincelhako caseyhan wenemin sensayngnimuy citolo yengeey tayhan hungmiwa oykwukinkwauy tayhwaey tayhan casinkamul sime cwue susuloka thoyso hwu culkepkey haksupey imhal swu isstolok hapnita.

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[Under the guidance of kind and detail-oriented native speaker teachers, students will be more interested in English and build their confdence in conversations with foreigners, which will enable them to enjoy studying (English) on their own after completion of the program.]

The main factor in the division of labor between “native” and “non-native” seems to be related to how much speech is involved, how routinized a task is, and how complex an interaction may be. My observations during the visit to the Paju Camp in 2006 indicate that native English speakers are normally assigned to handle residential programs involving heavy instructional duties or play characters in theatrical productions necessitating delivery of scripted dialogs as well as impromptu conversations that elicit audience participation. Nonnative English speakers and Korean nationals tend to work in places that deal with more or less predictable or formulaic conversations, such as the information center, the immigration desk, video kiosks, ice cream stalls, and so forth. As of September 2008, seventy native speaker instructors and forty Korean instructors are featured in the Paju Campus website’s instructor section (English village​.gg​.go​​.kr /paju/about/fteacher​.j​sp). According to a recruitment announcement for native speakers (dated April 30, 2007 http://englishvillage. gg​.go​.kr​/eng​/recruit​/jo​bs​.jsp), they must have a Bachelor’s degree or above; ESL teaching experience and TESOL certifcate (teaching-related certifcates) are not required but preferred. On the other hand, hiring practices for Korean nationals seem more selective. A recruitment notice7 5 posted on the Korean website (dated June 28, 2008 http:​/​/eng​​lish-​​villa​​ge​.gg​​.go​.k​​r​/cus​​tomer​​ /noti​​ce​/no​​​tice_​​view.​​jsp) shows similar requirements; a Bachelor’s degree is a must and English literature or Education majors are considered favorably and TESOL certifcate holders are preferred. Unlike Korean teachers, there

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is no major-related preference for native speakers as long as they are college graduates. On the other hand, Korean nationals have to take a written test subsequent to an initial paper screening and prior to an interview, from which native speakers are exempt.

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PHYSICAL SETUPS AND INFRASTRUCTURE According to its website public relations material, the EV in Paju “is designed to realize the same atmosphere as a town in England. It will create an authentic environment so that participants can learn and speak English in a natural setting.” Considering that American English is valued, and North Americans are preferred as English teachers in Korea, it is intriguing to note that the EV replicates “a town in England.” The website does not have an offcial explanation or rationale for this. Arguably, this has to do with the assumption that England represents the old Western world and America epitomizes the modern West. Visually speaking, modern city buildings do not offer a uniquely foreign experience to Korean visitors since skyscrapers are very common in Korea as well. On the other hand, a quaint little European town is something Koreans are not familiar with and certainly has a “foreign” feel. The physical setups in the EV play a role in reinforcing English language ideologies. For instance, Western physical environments in the EV endorse the idea that “native” is better than “non-native.” That is, not only teachers but also buildings and learning spaces should look like the ones in ENL countries. The facilities in the EV are supposed to be used mainly for education purposes; these are spaces to provide English language learning experiences for visitors and residents in the EV. However, unique physical setups and infrastructure in the EV enable visitors to experience more than language learning. The EV is quite a versatile space serving multiple purposes. My impression during my visit to Paju Camp in Summer 2006 is that the EV is a combination of a movie set, an amusement park, and a language school. In fact, depending on the individual visitor’s level of interest and participation, the visit could be either a feld trip to a Hollywood movie set or a fun day at an amusement park, or potentially an “English-only” class. Both public and commercial facilities are available in the EV. In addition to music, science, and other content-area classrooms, outdoor facilities such as an amphitheater, theme plazas, and a performance hall and a gymnasium are available. Moreover, places one will be bound to come across as a tourist or an immigrant outside Korea, such as immigration and customs at the airport, a bank, a post offce, a police station, a clinic, a convenience store, a book store, and restaurants are in full operation, creating a feeling of “authenticity” of living and working environments in ENL countries. The frst place all visitors have to go through

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in the EV is immigration at the “mock” airport with departure and arrival signs (fgure 3.2).8 Here visitors fll out a form before their passport is issued to them. The honor pledge page inside the passport (fgure 3.3),9 in particular item 1, shows EV’s English-only policy. The participant-oriented fexibility in the EV has advantages and disadvantages. It caters to different types of visitors, which is an advantage. If a visitor is serious about learning English, the entire day can be spent accordingly. Motivated visitors can take advantage of many nonresidential daily programs in which transactions and conversations should be carried out only in English. The EV mainly offers opportunities for Koreans to use English in a variety

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Figure 3.2  Airport. Photo taken by Jamie Shinhee Lee.

Figure 3.3  Honor Pledge Inside the Passport. Photo taken by Jamie Shinhee Lee.

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of real-life simulations but participation in these programs is voluntary. Since the EV is a hybrid space between a school and an amusement park/movie set, visitors who are not in regular residential programs can either be active participants or passive spectators. Less motivated visitors may simply observe what others do and still gain some new experience of being exposed to an English immersion environment which can be both linguistically and visually quite interesting and unfamiliar.

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VOICES OF CONCERNS The EV has its attractions; it projects a certain charm as a novelty and as the very frst example of an entertaining, experience-oriented, mass catering, reasonably priced English-only speaking zone within Korea. However, it has generated a fair amount of criticism as well. I highlight some of the representative arguments against the EV. Concerns range from purely educational to political. The fact that politicians discuss the EV as part of their campaign agenda indicates that English education has become a main issue to capture the South Korean voters’ attention. It is a strong indication that English education is highly politicized and anything related to the English language is not just a linguistic issue. Kim (2006) reports the candidate Kim Yong Han staged a demonstration demanding the immediate closing of the EV and criticized Son Han Kyu, the board director of the Gyeonggi English Culture Foundation, for his initiative, the EV project. Kim’s main argument hinges on the observation that Gyeonggi EV serves only “2.5% of the 19.4 million students in Gyeonggi Province” and that Son allegedly used it as “a tool to satisfy his own selfsh desire in regards to his political ambitions.” Also, the Deputy Minister of Education Kim Jin Pyo is reported to have insisted that “[w]e should stop building English Villages” due to outrageous expenses involved. He states that “it costs 200–300 billion won to build and maintain one” and that it would be more cost-effective if three wenemin (native speaker) teachers were hired for 100 million won per school (Gyeonggi Shinmun 2006).10 In reaction to Kim’s remark, an opposition political party leader counterattacks, “It is nonsense to demand an immediate stop to the English Village project. I cannot think of a better educational facility for regular citizens who cannot afford expensive private English lessons and overseas language programs.” The politics involving English Villages are discussed in Park (2009). He suggests that “the intersection of class anxiety and pursuit of English is saliently demonstrated in the politics surrounding the recent boom in the construction of English Villages” (2009: 46). Whether you are pro-EV or anti-EV is part of the political debate.

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According to a poll conducted by Empas (www​.empas​.com) cited in Weekly Hangook (2006), 58 percent of 3,700 respondents support the idea of expanding EVs, while 42 percent oppose. Anti-EV citizens argue that EVs do not provide a permanent solution to increasing social inequalities triggered by the English language. They note that the gap between haves and have-nots in terms of accessing private English lessons may not be resolved, because there are students who cannot even afford to go to an EV. Instead, they assert that schools should be responsible for quality English education, not EVs. The pro-EV respondents in the poll suggest that EVs offer practical alternatives to grammar translation-oriented English education and enable many Koreans to reduce their education expenses for private English lessons, both domestic and overseas.

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CONCLUSION This chapter identifes the English Village as a fascinating sociocultural site in which political, economic, pedagogical, and linguistic instantiations of globalization coexist. The discourse of globalization has found its way into an ambitious project called English Village, which offers a participationreinforced English immersion edutainment space for the general masses in Korea. Its objectives and visions feature three dominant ideological constructs: (i) global Koreans, (ii) economical educational alternatives, and (iii) experiential learning. As a case study of English necessitation ideology, to borrow Park’s (2009) term, the project English Village is particularly worthy of discussion in connection with globalization. The project English Village emphasizes mainly pragmatic and economic approaches to globalization and English language education, and its benefts and problems have not been thoroughly examined yet. The main goal of EVs is to produce Koreans who are profcient in English, which is argued to be an important quality to facilitate, if not determine, participation in globalization. Both the idea of economical educational alternatives and the notion of experiential English instruction are pedagogy-related ideologies. However, the former is based on an economy argument and latter a teaching method. Economical educational alternatives are closely related to the idea of making private English programs more accessible to the general public at a reasonable rate. In other words, they refer to economically sensible domestic educational options that can discourage Koreans from going overseas and paying excessive fees for English immersion programs, and consequently reduce the existing inequitable educational opportunities between haves and have-nots. On the other hand, the ideology of experiential English instruction advocates language learning through real-life experiences, devaluing textbook-oriented, grammar translation-infused instruction.

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However unnatural and “fake” it may appear, all business transactions (e.g., ordering a meal at a restaurant) are supposed to be conducted in English even when they deal with fellow Korean national working staff in the EV. This could be construed as unnatural, since it is undoubtedly the Korean language that is used as a means of communication in interpersonal communication outside the EV. By providing a close replica of a town in Englishspeaking countries in Korea, the EV is supposed to enable average Korean citizens to experience what it is like to travel and live outside Korea. The project certainly emphasizes both experiential and entertainment elements in English education. Native speaker preference is overt in recruitment ads. However, not all working staff in the EV are native speakers of English. There is a division of labor between native speakers and Korean nationals in the EV. The project at least makes it possible for both native and nonnative teachers to engage in informal and quasi-real instructional processes in their own capacity. The instructional staff in the EV assume a unique hybrid identity with three roles combined―worker, actor, and teacher. Visitors demonstrate different degrees of participation in various theme-based activities in the EV. Although the EV project is signifcant as a one of a kind initiative for English education reform, it is not without limitations or criticism. The antiEV camp is concerned, because it is a costly operation benefting only a fraction of the general population. EV proponents are optimistic that it will help Koreans improve yengehoyhwa (English conversation) skills in Korea without spending an outrageous amount of fnancial resources on overseas English programs, which has been argued to be detrimental to the domestic economy. I am critical of the uncritical pursuit of Engli​sh-is​-the-​answe​r-to-​ all-o​ur-pr​oblem​s ideology in South Korea, but at the same time, there is a need to see if the idea of realizing economical, public-centered, home-grown English education opportunities can succeed or not. The project English Village stresses mostly pragmatic and economic approaches to globalization and English language ideology. In South Korea, as in Silver’s (2006) study, “the teaching of English was consistently defended with utilitarian, economic justifcations rather than cultural, or other reasons” (2006: 54). The entire nation, from the president to average citizens, is emotionally and discursively invested in globalization and English language education. The idea is that Koreans need to improve English-speaking skills to participate in the global economy and English simply serves as a practical linguistic tool, not a purpose, to fulfll South Korea’s global ambition. The concept “global” means bilingual with English fuency and an international outlook. English Villages are part of processes and discourses of globalization in South Korea and represent a compelling instantiation of economy-driven language ideologies.

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NOTES 1. My thanks to Dennis Daniels for his comments on earlier versions. I am also grateful to Sun H. Lee who arranged my visit to the research site. 2. This chapter was previously published in Jamie Shinhee Lee. 2011. “Globalization and Language Education: English Village in South Korea.” Language Research, 47 (1): 123–149. 3. This term was initially introduced to mean Language Education Policy earlier in the original paper. 4. For further discussion, see excerpt (7). 5. Unless different URLs are provided separately, all excerpts regarding the English Village Project in this study are from http://english​-village​.gg​.go​.kr. Both the English version and the Korean version are included in the data. When the Korean transliteration is not provided, it means that the original text was in English. 6. When I visited the Paju Camp in 2006, the rates were $1 for non-adults (ages fve to eighteen) and $2 for adults. Now it is free for everyone after 6:00 PM and children under four and senior citizens over sixty-fve are admitted free. It is open 9:30 AM to 10:00 PM Tuesday through Sunday. 7. The main data collection was completed in 2006, and this type of recruitment notice for Korean teachers was not available at that time. 8. This is a picture taken during my visit to Paju Camp in Summer 2006. 9. I was issued a passport during my visit, but the photo of the honor pledge inside the passport was taken later. 10. The article was originally written in Korean and these quotes are my translation.

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Fairclough, Norman. (2003). Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. Routledge. Fairclough, Norman. (2006). Language and Globalization. Routledge. Giddens, Anthony. (1990). The Consequence of Modernity. Polity Press. Gyeonggi Shinmun. (2006). Retrieved September 1, 2009 from http://blog​.naver​.com (April 2, 2006). Harvey, David. (1990). The Condition of Postmodernity. Basil Blackwell. Hwang, Jang-Jin. (2008). “Lee presses education reforms hard.” The Korea Herald (Electronic version, December 18, 2008). Jong, Lee Tee. (2008). “English villages in the heart of S. Korea: Mock setting provides context for kids to learn English.” The Straits Times (Electronic version, October 5, 2008). Kachru, Braj B. (1998). “English as an Asian language.” Links & Letters 5, 89–108. Kearney, Michael. (1995). “The local and the global: The anthropology of globalization and transnationalism.” Annual Review of Anthropology 24, 547–565. Kim, Heesook. (2008). “Offcial use of English in Korean society and language contact theory.” Harvard Studies in Korean Linguistics XII, 50–63. Kim, Insoo. (2006). Kim Yong-han hwupo pantay [Candidate Kim Yong-Han’s Opposition]. Retrieved September 1, 2009 from http://blog​.naver​.com (April 3, 2006). Kim, Kwang-Tae. (2008). “South Korea’s next president seeks to strengthen English education.” The Associated Press (January 30, 2008). Kim, Samuel S. (2000). “Korea and globalization (Segyehwa): A framework for analysis.” In Samuel Kim, ed., Korea’s Globalization, 1–28. Cambridge University Press. Koh, B. C. (2000). “Segyehwa, the Republic of Korea, and the United Nations.” In Samuel Kim, ed., Korea’s Globalization, 196–216. Cambridge University Press. Kubota, Ryuko. (1998). “Ideologies of English in Japan.” World Englishes 17, 295–306. Lee, Hakyoon. (2007). “‘I am a kirogi mother’: Globalization and familism in Korean immigrant women.” In Proceedings of the 8th ISKS International Conference on Korean Studies. Vol. 1: Society/Education, 1–10. Center of Korean Studies, University of London. Lee, Jamie S. (2007). “English villages in Korea: ‘Experiential’ English learning in ‘our own backyard’.” Paper presented at the American Association for Applied Linguistics Conference, Costa Mesa, CA, April 22. Lee, Jamie S. (2009a). “E-tailing English language teaching.” In Current Issues in Unity and Diversity of Languages, 2640–2653. Linguistic Society of Korea. Lee, Jamie S. (2009b). “‘I must be blind!’ Korean elderly women talk about English and globalization.” Paper presented at the University of Michigan Linguistics Colloquium, Ann Arbor, MI, March 13. Lee, Jamie S. (in press). “Teach me English: English and metalinguistic discourse in South Korean flm.” In Jamie S. Lee and Andrew Moody, eds., English in Asian Popular Culture. Hong Kong University Press. Mitchell, Terence. (2006). “South Korea’s new English town: English camp part of national strategy to reduce overseas education.” OhmyNews (Electronic version, April 2, 2006).

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Nam, Jung Mi. (2005). “The changing role of English in Korea: From English as a tool for advancement to English for survival.” Journal of Pan Pacifc Association of Applied Linguistics 9, 227–240. Oh, John K. (1999). Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development. Cornell University Press. Park, Hyu-Yong. (2006). “Seykyeyhwa sitayuy yengehaksup yelkiey tayhan piphancek tamlon: Sahoycek kihohwa kwacenguy thamsayk” [Critical discourse analysis of ‘English-learning’ boom: In the lens of social symbolization]. Sahoyenehak [Sociolinguistics] 14, 169–196. Park, Jin-Kyu. (2009). “‘Education fever’ in South Korea: Its history and symptoms.” English Today 25, 50–57. Park, Joseph S. (2009). The Local Construction of a Global Language: Ideologies of English in South Korea. Mouton de Gruyter. Park, So J. and Nancy Abelmann. (2004). “Class and cosmopolitan striving: Mother’s management of English education in South Korea.” Anthropological Quarterly 77, 645–672. Pennycook, Alastair. (1994). The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language. Longman. Pennycook, Alastair. (1998). English and the Discourse of Colonialism. Routledge. Phillipson, Robert. (1992). Linguistic Imperialism. Oxford University Press. Seth, Michael J. (2002). Education Fever: Society, Politics, and the Pursuit of Schooling in South Korea. University of Hawaii Press. Seargeant, Philip. (2009). The Idea of English in Japan: Ideology and the Evolution of a Global Language. Multilingual Matters. Shin, Hyunjung. (2007). “English language teaching in Korea: Toward globalization or glocalization?” In Jim Cummins and Chris Davison, eds., International Handbook of English Language Teaching, 75–86. Springer. Silver, Rita E. (2005). “The discourse of linguistic capital: Language and economic policy planning in Singapore.” Language Policy 4, 47–66. Silverstein, Michael. (1979). “Language structure and linguistic ideology.” In P. Clyne, W. Hanks, and C. Hofbauer, eds. The Elements of a Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels, 193–247. Chicago University Press. South Korea’s Sarkozy. (2008). Newsweek (Electronic version, March 3, 2008). Weekly Hankook. (2006). (Electronic version, April 19, 2006). Whang, Patrick. (2000). “The expansion of English language education in South Korea.” ESL Magazine 3(4), 26–28. Woolard, Kathryn A. and Bambi B. Schieffelin. (1994). “Language Ideology.” Annual Review of Anthropology 23, 55–82.

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Part II

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RETURN MIGRANTS FROM UNEVEN AND UNEQUAL KOREAN DIASPORA

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Chapter 4

Hierarchical Citizenship in Perspective South Korea’s Korean Chinese

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Woo Park

Between1 the late 1800s and late 1940s, particularly during the colonization of Korea by Imperial Japan, a considerable number of Koreans moved to Manchuria.2 They moved for a variety of reasons, some to take part in Korea’s independence movement, others for missionary work, and still others for business or employment. And when Manchuria became a part of the People’s Republic of China some of this population moved back to the Korean Peninsula. A large number, however, stayed, and became Chinese nationals. This latter group came to be called Joseonjok (Korean Chinese, Chanxianzu or Chaosenzu in Chinese) (Piao 2017). In the late 1980s, large numbers of this Joseonjok population began to move from China to South Korea. It was a rapid process: while before 1987, there were less than 1,000 Joseonjok visitors to Korea a year (Diplomatic White Paper 1991, p. 218), by 2015, the number living in South Korea reached 618,673 (Korean Immigration Service Statistic 2016). This is a similar number to the population of Yanji (or Yeongil), the capital of China’s Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefecture. It is also about one-third the size of the Joseonjok population in China (1,830,929, according to the 2010 Chinese census, China Statistical Yearbook 2010). This migration was driven, on the one hand, by a shortage of blue-collar labor in South Korea created when its economic structure began to transform in the 1980s (Seol 1999), and on the other, by the decline in socioeconomic status experienced by some Joseonjok in the wake of China’s rapid transition away from socialism (Piao 2017). Later, in the 1990s, institutions like the Overseas Korean Foundation and laws like the Overseas Korean Act established a relationship of interdependence between the South Korean state and overseas Koreans, and a variety of complicated legal statuses were established for those with Korean heritage wishing to work or live in Korea (Piao 2012; Piao and Kim 2012). It is the 87

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logic and motivation behind the creation and reworking of these legal statuses that this chapter will focus on. This is not an entirely fresh endeavor—the legal and socioeconomic status of South Korea’s Joseonjok has already attracted the attention of a small number of scholars. These scholars can be divided into those concerned with the group’s categorization and those who analyze its role in providing a pool of immigrant labor. Within the frst group, there are scholars drawn to practical questions about how the state should be dealing with the Joseonjok. Some, such as Lee (2001) and Loh (1999, 2002), argue that the Joseonjok need to be legally categorized as Overseas Korean (jaeoedongpo), while others, like Jung (1999) and Park (2001), argue that the Joseonjok should be categorized as normal immigrants but with their special cultural and ethnic characteristics taken into extra consideration because a state applying regulation to another state’s citizens based on ideas of blood and descent could cause diplomatic confict (Lee 2002). There are also scholars interested in the way the Joseonjok’s ethnic identity is refected in the legislation process (Kim 2016). These approaches are related to a perspective from which the Joseonjok are seen as part of the Korean diaspora (Jung 2013). The second group (interested in the Joseonjok’s economic role) argues that imported labor (including Joseonjok) flled the industrial jobs avoided by the domestic labor force (Lee 1994; Lee et al. 1998; Seok et al. 2003) and was economically effcient. A part of the foundation of South Korea’s economic development was the unskilled and low paid workforce who endured discrimination in the secondary labor market. For these scholars, the industrial demand created the need for this labor, and the functional requirement decided foreign workers’ citizenship status (Seol and Skrentny 2009; Seol 2012). So, we can see these studies that emphasize the importance of the Joseonjok’s ethnicity argue that nationality and blood-ties determine their citizenship status in South Korean society, while studies focusing on the domestic industrial labor force suggest that the Joseonjok will be, or are already, fxed in the unskilled labor market by the state’s citizenship policy. This chapter takes a different stance. For when we trace the development of Joseonjok citizenship status, it will become clear that their status is not solely determined by former nationality or ethnic blood-ties, nor is this population simply stuck in the lower, unskilled, labor market. Moreover, the idea that Joseonjok citizenship status can be explained exclusively in terms of economic function implies that it differs little from the status of foreign nationals. But a key element of Joseonjok’s position in South Korea is that they act as foreign labor while being seen as ethnically co-national. This contradiction introduces signifcant issues as it is translated into legal statuses. As such, we cannot simply treat Joseonjok citizenship in the same way we treat the statuses of those who are both ethnically and legally non-nationals. Both

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of the aforementioned groups, despite their detailed and careful analyses, fail to recognize the complex way of economistic thinking and ideas about ethnicity combined to produce Joseonjok status in South Korea’s society and economy.3 And neither group makes the wider implications of Joseonjok citizenship status explicit. This then will be the goal of the present chapter—to reexamine the formation of Joseonjok status in South Korea in a way which draws out the complexity behind its development and allows us to ask more general questions about its signifcance. After all, according to Chang (2012a 2014a), the character of South Korea’s neoliberal transformation is revealed in the state–citizen relationship: it would be productive, then, to ask what Joseonjok citizenship status tells us about Korean (and maybe even East Asian) society.

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HIERARCHICAL CITIZENSHIP Citizenship studies in social science, including sociology, have often looked at the citizenship rights of immigrants in the context of globalization. This research has been interested in the legal status and rights of people who have moved across borders, as well as the kind of political action immigrants have taken part in, as they seek to acquire status and rights in their new country (Cohen ed 1996; Soysal 1994; Bauböck ed 2006; Castles and Davidson 2005). Citizenship can be seen as a set of “contributory rights” and obligations situated within the framework of the nation-state relating to labor, public services (e.g., military, legal services), parenting, or family formation. Turner argues that they are “contributory rights” since claims upon a society are only effective if based upon contributions. That is, if the claimants are supplying something that society requires, such as participation in the labor market, the military, or in social reproduction (Turner 2001). However, the concept of citizenship explains the relationship between the state and various social groups (as well as the citizen) as they emerged from a relatively long and stable modernization process, and does so on the basis of Western rationality. As such, state–society relations and the formation and development of civil society in East Asia cannot be adequately explained through Western theories of citizenship (Chang 2012b, 2012c) These ideas need to be modifed if they are to help us understand the situation in South Korea (Chang and Turner 2012; Turner and Chang 2012). Chang’s (2010, pp. 5–8) overarching theory of South Korean (and East Asian) society is useful here. His guiding concept is the notion of “compressed modernity.” Compressed modernity draws attention to the complex relationship between modernity and Korea’s traditional ideas and practices,

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which coexist thanks to its adoption of Western experience over just a few decades. This relationship is the cause and result of the political and economic transformations witnessed in Korea over the last century, as well as the repeated reorganizations of its state–society relationship. Under this transformation “There have arisen transformation-orientated state, society, and population for which each transformation becomes an ultimate purpose in itself, the process and means of the transformation constitute the main sociopolitical order, and the transformation-embedded interests form the core social identity.” Accordingly, Korean citizenship under neoliberalism can be called transformative citizenship. Transformative citizenship can be defned as “effective and/or legitimate claims to national and social resources, opportunities and/or respects and accrue to citizens’ contributions to the nation’s or society’s transformative purpose” (Chang 2014a, pp. 163–164). Neoliberalism demanded the transformation of a series of economic and political structures, including the labor market. This was pursued by the South Korean state and international order through the creation of a new ideology and policies designed to materially integrate citizens into public life (a project which was both possible and inevitable because of the weak state–citizen relationship). As such, the citizenship of Koreans came to be based, not on frmly established rights, duties, and identities within a stable social system, but rather on the basis of “contributions” that are subject to constant upheavals in state and society. From within these transformations always emerge social groups that are either excluded or oppressed (Chang and Turner 2012; Chang 2012c). This exclusion and oppression is produced by individuals’ contributory differences and in South Korea has led, according to Seol and Skrentny (2009), to a form of “hierarchical nationhood” whereby Joseonjok and Korean Americans occupy different social strata: Korean Americans are seen as more important than Joseonjok by society as a whole and by the state as more signifcant economically and politically. Park (2012) detects a similar phenomenon in the case of North Korean Defector’s citizenship. Her research focuses on the position of female defectors under South Korean patriarchy in the context of the country’s continued division and uses the term “hierarchical citizenship” to help describe their situation. From this perspective, hierarchy can be seen as an aspect of transformative citizenship and that citizenship status of South Korea’s immigrant communities is determined in signifcant part by their contributory role within the country’s ongoing political and economic transformation (or development). This is an important point for the present chapter because it means we can determine the direction of the state’s political and social changes through the citizenship status of migrants who enter the country. To help achieve this, we will defne hierarchical citizenship

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as “the system of statuses formulated by a state according to how much (and how) an individual can or should contribute to the community’s political, economic and social transformation.”4 This chapter measures the citizenship status of citizens, quasi-citizens, overseas-Koreans, and foreigners without ethnic ties to Korea through residence status (and/or visa type). The rights conferred by these statuses are divided into economic rights (including labor, consumption, investment, employment), cultural rights (such as education and residence autonomy), and political rights (such as the right to participate in elections). And, as we shall see, the conditions for being granted these statuses and the associated rights are based on the migrants’ “contributory” role or resources. The chapter will examine each of the statuses occupied by Joseonjok in Korea in turn, beginning with “Foreign Worker” status, before moving on to the “Special Status of Overseas Korean” and fnally the “Foreign Korean Worker” status. This analysis will then be tied into an examination of the state–citizen (society) relationship in connection to the country’s transition into neoliberalism.

JOSEONJOK AS “FOREIGN WORKER”

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The Logic of Foreign Worker Policy and Its Problematic Institutionalization In the mid-1980s, labor shortage and rising wages for domestic workers prompted the South Korean government to set up an “Industrial Technical Training System” (ITTS) so that businesses could employee de facto foreign workers (Lim and Seol 2000a, 2000b). These workers were given the status of “Industrial Trainee” and began to receive offcial visas from the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) before entering Korea from 1991. Once these workers were integrated into the industrial feld, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) established rules to manage details like their contractual relationship with employers, extra benefts, and economic activities. However, before long, there were numerous cases of workers overstaying their visas or changing their place of work without offcial permission due to inexperience with foreign workers and the ineffcient administration. This made the need for a dedicated agency clear and the government responded by assigning responsibility for the recruitment and introduction of foreign workers to the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSMB) (MOJ 1993). The KFSMB set up the Industrial Technology Training Cooperation Team and established its own guidelines for the introduction and operation of “Industrial Trainee.” Industrial Trainees frst entered the country under these guidelines in May of 1994. In 1997,

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the KFSMB released their “Manuals for ITTS Employers” which set out procedures governing trainee recruitment, training period expiration, and departure from the country. However, there were many problems despite these efforts at systematization: small and medium businesses complained about delays getting workers into the country and problems with workers suddenly disappearing without notice; there were investigations of corruption in the system; and Nepalese workers bearing signs reading “We may be from a poor country . . . but we have our basic human rights too” staged a sit-in protest in Myeong-Dong Cathedral (Yamanaka 2010). These issues led to calls for fundamental improvements.5 In 1996, the Globalization Promotion Committee (GPC) set up the “Comprehensive Foreign Labor Policy.” Under this policy, GPC decided to completely revise the ITTS rather than introducing the Employment Permit System (EPS) proposed by Ministry of Labor (MOL). However, because this proposed new system greatly altered the existing wage regulation-free arrangement it immediately ran into opposition from other government departments recommending partial reform of the existing ITTS framework instead. These departments also argued that EPS’s faced increasing labor burdens (Hankyoreh August 1, 1996a, 1996b).6 This opposition stymied the GPC’s original plan, and they had to settle for proposing a partial overhaul of the ITTS, which would be called the Training and Employment System (TES), to be put into action from 1998. Its main feature would be to allow some trainees to obtain an employment visa after their workmanship and related skills have been assessed (Kyunghyang Shinmun September 10, 1997). However, the Korea Employers Federation (KEF) offcially opposed this redesign as well (Maeeil Business News Korea September 24, 1997), and the problem ended up being passed on to the next administration. The MOL also tried to amend the Immigration Control Act (ICA) for this introduction of TES, but the departments impacted made their opposition clear and claimed that the legislative amendment was diffcult (Hankyoreh October 24, 1997). A compromise of sorts was fnally reached, and the MOJ introduced the term “Trained Employee” into the ICA in December 1997 (over which they had control), along with details about trainee importation and management. On April 1, 1998, the E-8 Employment Training Visa was introduced alongside the C-4 (short-term employment), E-1 (for University Professors), and E-2 (Special Activities) visas in the Enforcement Decree of Immigration Control Act (Presidential Decree 1998, paragraph 1). From then on, after passing the Foreigner’s Employment Training Qualifcation Exam and completing a two-year training period, Industrial Trainees were able to change their existing D-3 (training) visa to a Training Employment visa (E-8), which would provide a one-year guarantee of legal worker status.7 On February 6, 2000, the Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA) announced

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that TES would be put into full-scale operation (KFSMB and KSBI 2001, pp. 10–14, 2004, pp. 46–53).

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“Foreign Worker’s” Limited Sphere of Socioeconomic Activity From the above, we can see that foreigners receiving training in South Korean businesses were directly required by capital (especially small-sized and medium-sized capital) and that they were imported into Korea through a “planned,” state-led selection process. In this environment, industrial trainees faced various limits on their socioeconomic activities. Not only was economic activity outside the workplace heavily restricted but trainees were also not easily able to quit their job: any change of workplace or training plans had to be reported to the head of the relevant immigration offce by the person or organization that invited the trainee to South Korea (MOJ 1991). From 1994, trainees had to receive a recommendation from the President of the KFSMB8 sixty days before visa expiration if they wanted to extend their stay (KFSMB 1994; MOL 1995), and in 1996, it was decided that when trainees entered or left the country, the head of their workplace had to immediately report this to the local immigration offce. Moreover, once they entered the country, the trainee’s status (such as their place of work and training plans) was checked frequently (MOJ 1996). Under TES, trainees’ status as laborers with the right to work might be recognized, but other rights and freedom were not granted (KFSMB and KSBI 2004, pp. 46–57). From 2002, industrial trainees were supposed to stay at the same workplace and could only move if the employer did not want to keep the trainee on or closed the business (Presidential Decree 2002, article 1 paragraph 5): changing workplace was rigorously restricted and controlled, and even when possible, it inevitably required them to go through a complicated bureaucratic process. As such, under the ITTS and TES, foreign workers were not truly incorporated into the labor market and could not engage freely in socioeconomic activity. This groups’ legal status in South Korea, and the rights based on this legal status, were prepared for the sake of the employer who decided to introduce them into the country and according to the administrative agencies’ economic logic. It was a logic secured by the state in law and policy, and employers who exploited the system’s various problems and loopholes often made the trainees’ situation worse. Industrial trainees’ pay was based on South Korea’s minimum wage system from the beginning of the policy (MCI 1992). The frst three months, however, were considered a training period and only 80 percent of the normal wage was paid during this time. Overtime work, night work, and holiday work was paid at a rate of 150 percent of the basic wage. And the trainees had to deposit 50 percent of their monthly wage into an installment savings

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account at a bank predetermined by their country of origin. Joseonjok trainees born in China, for example, had to use Industrial Bank.9 These savings could not be withdrawn outside of exceptional circumstances, such as the trainee’s own death or illness, the bankruptcy of the training company, or a temporary suspension of operations at the company. Any other reasons would have to be approved by the President of the KFSMB (KFSMB 1997, pp. 8–10). At the time, it seemed as if TES would make up for many of ITTS’s limitations, and in terms of the transitional stages between ITTS and EPS, it was a somewhat positive development. But TES severely limited the socioeconomic activities of foreign workers. And because it tied the legal length of stay in South Korea to the training and employment period, this introduced a new risk for those with Foreign Worker status: if, when moving companies, a trainee’s contract could not be fnalized in time, they automatically became unregistered immigrants and lost the right to claim any kind of social security. Some employers took advantage of this situation to illegally exploit foreign workers. ITTS, TES, and other policies relating to “foreign workers” were oriented toward industrial requirements. Under this system, Joseonjok were not distinguished from other foreign laborers. They were both given the same rights.

JOSEONJOK AS THE “SPECIAL STATUS OF OVERSEAS KOREAN”

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The Logic of Overseas Korean Policy From the formation of the South Korean government, to the administration of Roh Tae-Woo and its “Nordpolitick” strategy, the purpose of South Korea’s policy for overseas Koreans can be seen as being shaped by regime competition with North Korea. The main object of this policy is the ethnically Korean residents and citizens (hangukgyomin) of liberal democracies in North America, Japan, and Europe (Oh 1983; Kim 1991); but in 1988, the Special Declaration by President Rho Tae-Woo in the Interest of National Self-esteem, Unifcation and Prosperity made clear that South Korea “will make necessary arrangement to ensure that Koreans residing overseas can freely visit both parts of Korea” and will “continue to seek improved relations with the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries” (Diplomatic Chronology of Republic of Korea 1998, pp. 538–540). In the Follow-up Measures on the Implementation of the Open-door Policy for ensuring Free Visits of Overseas Koreans to South and North Korea, the government specifed that “We will ensure that those Koreans residing in Communist-bloc countries can make free visits to the Republic of Korea” (DCROK 1988, p.

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584). As a result of this policy change, ethnic Koreans from China and the Soviet Union could participate in the World Korean Athletic Meeting held in Seoul from September 26–30, 1989. And with the opening of the Incheon– Shandong Intercity passenger Ferry, it became easier for Joseonjok to visit Korea to meet relatives (DWP 1990, pp. 189–190). After the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China in 1992, Joseonjok also began to enter Korea, not as “overseas Koreans” but as Chinese citizens. These changes refected South Korea’s confdence that they had begun to secure economic superiority over North Korea. The civilian government’s (moonminjeongbu) so-called “new overseas Korean policy” (singyopojeongchaek) was actually based on the existing policy (gyominjeongchaek). Its headline change was to extend the validity of the visitor’s family visa issued to overseas Korean, including joseonjok, from three months to two years—changes made to strengthen ties with the visitor’s home countries (DWP 1996, p. 269). The government attempted to streamline the overseas Korean policy in 1996 by clearly distinguishing between two categories: ethnic Koreans with South Korean nationality living abroad, who were dubbed “overseas Korean nationals” (jaeoegukmin), and ethnic Koreans without South Korean nationality, who were called “Korean compatriots with foreign nationality” (oegukjeokdongpo). The former concept was applied to those receiving legal protection from the South Korean state. The latter was a much broader concept, concerning more general cultural and educational policies of the South Korean state (DWP 1997, pp. 286–287). Regarding China’s Joseonjok as “Korean compatriots with foreign nationality,” the South Korean government stated that “despite the fact that, thanks to the Chinese government’s policies protecting ethnic minorities, this group preserved Korean culture and language relatively well, we have to consider that compared to ethnic Koreans from other regions they have limited understanding of and sentiment towards their mother country (mogukuisik), and that the Chinese authorities are concerned about our government’s excessive interest in them. So, to avoid impinging on China’s ethnic minority policy our policy should not be to offer direct governmental support, but to instead strengthen support from local private sector organizations and civil society” (DWP 1997, p. 288). The Overseas Koreans Foundation (OKF), established in 1997, is representative of the civilian government’s systematic policy toward ethnic Koreans living abroad. In Osaka, in November 1995, and in Los Angeles, in September 1996, President Kim Young-Sam announced that the OKF center would be established in Seoul and declared that he would be promoting wide-ranging project for overseas Koreans (DWP 1997, pp. 288–289). The Overseas Koreans Foundation Act (OKFA) of 1997 and the establishment of the OKF center can be seen as an important milestone in the institutionalization and

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legalization of the South Korean government’s relationship with overseas Koreans. Through this system, ethnic Koreans from all over the world, including Joseonjok living in China, began to be tied into a new offcial relationship with South Korea. When President Kim Dae-Jung visited the United States in 1998 (while South Korea was reeling from effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis) he asked Korean Americans to help their mother country and promised to solve their issues with dual nationality. The MOJ subsequently began to properly examine the subject of immigration and residency status, including the problems with dual nationality, and the government proposed systematically revising the problematic legal status of overseas Koreas (Kyunghyang Shinmun August 26, 1998). With this commitment, the 1999 Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Korean (AILOK 1999) passed through congress with overwhelming support (154 votes in favor against only 8 votes against and 4 abstentions) (Kim 2002, p. 87). So, within four years of the GPC establishing the category of overseas Korean (especially for the “Korean compatriots with foreign nationality”) the AILOK passed through congress and set in place the basic framework defning the legal status of this new category. However, the AILOK made a distinction between populations of ethnic Koreans who left Korea after the formation of the Republic of Korea, and those who continued living in China (Joseonjok), the Soviet Union, or former Soviet Republics. The latter groups were omitted from the overseas Koreans category. This discrimination did not pass unnoticed by the excluded groups, whose civil society groups, academics, and political circles all called attention to the problem. As a result, it was proposed in 2004 that the originally excluded groups be incorporated, and from 2007 the law was gradually applied to Joseonjok (Piao 2011). Conditions and Socioeconomic Right for the “Special Status of Overseas Korean” Revision of the AILOK did not provide a stable legal status for all overseas Koreans (including Joseonjok). The state showed priority to overseas Koreans in professional work. For example, anyone who had stayed in South Korea for six months or more as a professional, who had a master’s degree or higher from a Korean university, or who had a professional job in their country of residence or third-world country could get the Special Status of Overseas Korean unless they had previously overstayed on a short-term visa (MOJ 2007a). The South Korean government started to expand the Special Status of Overseas Korean in 2009, making it available to a wider range of overseas Koreans10 then also decided to grant the Special Status of Overseas

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Korean status to people overseas Koreans with specifc roles in the secondary labor market (especially for the Joseonjok workers).11 Those who received the Special Status of Overseas Korean began to be issued with Domestic Resident Registration Cards (gungnaegeososingojeung). These ID cards had a big, positive effect on the holder’s everyday life, especially for those used to the limitations associated with the “Alien Registration Cards” normally issued to noncitizens. Cell phone subscription, for example, was much easier, and the cardholders were eligible for the same contract conditions as full citizens. There were also other benefts extended to those with the Special Status of Overseas Koreans status. The maximum stay period was increased from two to three years (AILOK 2008a, article 10), and this could be extended even longer. Re-entry permits were also no longer necessary for those exiting and re-entering the country in the middle of their stay. Moreover, foreign nationals with the Special Status of Overseas Koreans were allowed to freely engage in employment or other economic activities in the primary labor market, as long as they were not damaging social order or economic stability (by, for example, violating customs law or regulation, or engaging in unskilled labor). Ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality who were registered residents in South Korea were also granted the same right to acquire, possess, use, and dispose of property as full citizens (except in military bases and facilities). They were permitted the same rights as full citizens to use domestic fnancial institutions and could receive the same interest rates (although capital transactions were still restricted in order to regulate against hot money).12 Lastly, registered residents with the Special Status of Overseas Korean were eligible for health insurance after staying more than ninety days in Korea (AILOKb 2008, Articles 6–16).13 However, people with the Special Status of Overseas Korean (Korean compatriots with foreign nationality) couldn’t participate in elections or stand for offce. They were, in sum, given economic rights but not political rights. The Selective Relaxation of Conditions for Permanent Residency and Naturalization Conditions for Permanent Residency The South Korean government sought to achieve what they called an “orderly opening” by easing the requirements for permanent residency and improving the living conditions for residents. At frst, they set the permanent residency income requirement for professional foreign workers at a level more than four times per capita income, assuring that only those with a higher economic status than ordinary Korean citizens were eligible. However, in 2007, the income requirement was reduced to a level corresponding to three times per

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capita income. They also altered the requirement so that overseas Koreans with foreign nationality who have been residents in Korea in the past, but were now living abroad, were also eligible (MOJ 2007b). After this, the South Korean government granted the status of permanent residence to those who have lived over two years in the country with Overseas Korean status if they fulfll one of the following conditions: (1) have an annual income more than twice the per capita income for the previous year; (2) are over 60 years of age and receives a pension from overseas that is more than twice South Korea’s per capita income; (3) have paid more than 500,000 KRW or more in property tax last year, or, despite not paying property tax themselves own (or lives with a family member who owns) a property with a considerable rent deposit; (4) have invested over 500,000 USD in South Korea; (5) are, or have been in the last three years, delegates for Overseas Korean organization, or corporate representatives recommended by the head of a foreign embassy (MOJ 2008, 2009a). The government also relaxed the requirements for permanent residency eligibility for ethnic Koreans in the secondary labor market. However, rather than directly granting permanent residency in this case, candidates were able to apply once fve years had passed since they frst acquired resident status. This was thought of as a way to both help alleviate the shortage of skilled production workers and to show gratitude to those who had worked diligently and obeyed domestic laws (MOJ 2007c). The policy at the time was actually to encourage worker circulation, so the amount of time workers could stay in Korea was actively limited. However, this meant that many workers had to leave Korea almost as soon as they managed to acquire some skill. That made it very diffcult to form effcient employment relationships in the industrial feld, an issue that negatively affected productivity levels. Since 2009, the number of eligible candidates for permanent residency has been increasing quickly. This is particularly the case for Foreign Korean Workers in the secondary labor market, where conditions for permanent residency have been relaxed even more: workers with long service in certain areas of industry, people with the assets needed to cover living costs, and those with technical qualifcations recognized by the South Korean government have all been added (MOJ 2009a). Those recognized as part of the wider Korean ethnic group have been able to apply for and receive the status of permanent resident much easier than other foreign citizens. Conditions for Naturalization The naturalization process of foreign citizens normally takes one of fve general paths:14 general naturalization, simplifed naturalization, special naturalization, naturalization through parents, and restoration of nationality.

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However, as the policy for the naturalization of ethnic Koreans was systematized, it became possible for ethnic Koreans, including Joseonjok, to become South Korean nationals through a separate, additional process within the existing framework. This process was created in 2001 through the Established Rule of MOJ, No. 551. In 2005, the Established Rule of MOJ, No. 729 further defned the concept of “Korean compatriots with foreign nationality” used for applications to acquire (or recover) nationality. This was defned as someone who had Korean nationality in the past or is the direct descendent of someone who did. Since Koreans in China who left the Korean Peninsula (or its associated territories) before the foundation of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, or were born in China before that day were considered to have forfeited their Korean nationality they wouldn’t be included in this category. Those who thought they should be included and wanted to recover or acquire Korean nationality had to frst prove that they or their forebears had been Korean citizens.15 According to the 2005 ruling, this could be proved with: a copy of your own family register; a copy of your mother’s or father’s family register along with a birth certifcate proving your relationship to this family (notarized, or with an offcial document guaranteeing authenticity); a family register proving your relationship to a Korean citizen within four degrees of kinship (notarized, or come with an offcial document guaranteeing authenticity); a genealogy with a letter of guarantee; the results of genetic tests undertaken by an accredited medical institutions (MOJ 2005a). Since then, these standards have been changed somewhat, the most important change being the extension of four degrees of kinship to six in 2007 (MOJ 2007d) and to eight in 2013 (MOJ 2013). Where an applicant could not prove that they themselves had been citizens of South Korea, it was possible to reacquire nationality by providing proof about to their parents. First of all, they would need a copy of the maternal grandfather’s family register. Then they would need a family register proving one of their parents is related to a Korean citizen within four degrees of kinship and proof that this is actually their mother or father. Alternatively, they could provide a genealogy with a letter of guarantee or the results of genetic tests undertaken by an accredited medical institution (MOJ 2005a). These paths to naturalization were generally only open to those who had entered and stayed in South Korea legally. However, in rare cases, especially where there were “humanitarian” concerns, it was possible for ethnic Koreans living as undocumented immigrants to become naturalized South Korean nationals. According to the Established Rule of MOJ, No. 729 and No. 781 this was possible for (1) those introduced into a South Korean family register (through marriage or adoption, for example) and their unmarried children; (2) the spouse and unmarried children of those who have received permission to

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reacquire South Korean nationality and have given up their previous nationality; (3) Ethnic Koreans with Chinese nationality (Joseonjok) who entered South Korea legally before the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea on August 24, 1992 (except undocumented immigrants and immigrants with fake passport) (MOJ 2005a, 2007e). From 2013, a new system was introduced to allow the family of qualifed applicants to stay in South Korea. Here, the concept of “family” extended to spouses, children, and the children’s spouses. As such, this rule could be applied to family members who were on the family register of the person possessing Korean nationality or who were staying with them in South Korea. If a family member of a person who has reacquired South Korean nationality and given up (or has pledged to give up) their former nationality has entered the country illegally, but has an appropriate reason to stay in Korean (such as family reunifcation), then they could apply for permission to stay once the immigration rule violation had been dealt with. The only real exception was if they had been involved with people smuggling or passport forgery (MOJ 2013).16 At this point then, the eligibility criteria for South Korean nationality has been expanded to include, not only Joseonjok who used to have Korean nationality but also Joseonjok who cannot prove they used to be Korean national, Joseonjok who have stayed in the country without permission of documentation, and even the families of Joseonjok who have simply made an application for Korean nationality. The status of “overseas Korean with foreign nationality”—which has become almost equivalent to full Korean citizenship—has been granted selectively according to the individual’s level of economic contribution. So Joseonjok were not collectively acknowledged by the government as having the Special Status of Overseas Korean, and this was not a policy whereby all Joseonjok could freely engage in economic activity within South Korea’s labor market. It was a system that recognized only a certain class of Joseonjok as the Special Status of Overseas Korean and did so according to strict criteria. This included, frst of all, Joseonjok who possessed human and social capital that could be transferred to the primary labor market in Korea, or who possessed the economic capital to contribute to the expansion of private sector investment and/or help create employment in South Korea. Second, it included those who, in their role as professionals, or thanks to their association with particular parties, states, or organizations, could play an important role in the development of a positive, mutually benefcial relationship between South Korea and China. Third, Joseonjok who were incorporated in the secondary labor market could also be granted the Special Status of Overseas Korean if they had shown that they could, and would, fll positions that were avoided, not only by South Korean workers but also foreign workers.

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Once they gained the Special Status of Overseas Koreans, it granted rights effectively equal to full South Korean citizenship, meaning the range of socioeconomic activity its holders enjoyed was very different to that of people with Foreign Worker status. For instance, the Domestic Resident Registration Card issued with the Special Status of Overseas Korean was comparable to South Korean citizen’s Registration Card (jumindeunglogjeung), and because its holders could leave and re-enter the country without re-entry permits, it essentially allowed permanent residency—the period of stay was not linked to employment contract like it was for foreign workers. Holders could also engage freely in economic activities outside the secondary labor market, buying, and selling property, just like South Korean citizens, and using domestic fnancial institutions, just like full citizens as well. Health Insurance, too, was provided for those with the Special Status of Overseas Korean. The Special Status of Overseas Koreans even greatly improved holders’ chances of being granted permanent residency of becoming a naturalized Korean as it opened up separate (and easier) tracks to permanent residency and naturalization unavailable to other non-nationals. So, although not all regulations pertaining to Joseonjok with foreign nationalities could be removed, those incorporated into South Korea with the Special Status of Overseas Korean were legally and institutionally very different to other groups of foreign workers in secondary labor market. It is clear that one portion of the criteria determining the Special Status of Overseas Korean eligibility according to the AILOK was an individual Joseonjok’s human and social capital and another portion was the value of their long-term employment in one of Korea’s unattractive jobs. The South Korean government displayed the nature of its blood-based nationalism in selecting ethnically Korean Joseonjok individuals to play the role of industrial worker (and investor) in South Korea’s labor market. However, not all of the Joseonjok population possessed the same human, social, and economic capital. And not all possessed the same skills. As such, those who could be incorporated into the primary labor market began to be systematically separated from those who could be included in the secondary labor market. This was the division between the “Special Status of Overseas Korean” and the “Foreign Korean Worker.”

JOSEONJOK AS “FOREIGN KOREAN WORKER” From EMS to VES: The Logic behind Overseas Korean Labor Force Policy Institutionalization The Employment and Management System (EMS) was introduced in 2002, when the AILOK’s unconstitutional character had been acknowledged,

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and the collective action of Joseonjok organization demanding that they be offered the same recognition offered to other groups of ethnic Koreans was in full swing. EMS was designed to supplement the existing ITTS framework so overseas Koreans with foreign nationalities from countries like China could be used in the service sector, manufacturing, construction, offshore fshing, and agricultural industries (Offce for Government Policy Coordination 2002). Under EMS, the South Korean government lowered the minimum age of Joseonjok employees in Korea from thirty to twenty-fve, and allowed them to work in the construction industry. It also simplifed the procedure for both job seekers and prospective employers (MOL 2004). With the lower entry age, the increased range of industries in which employment was possible, and the simplifcation of procedures for entry into the country and employment once there, it became much easier for Joseonjok to enter South Korea and fnd employment. However, from the August 17, 2004, EMS was absorbed into the 2003 EPS procedures for “special” circumstances. The EPS was an early attempt at reducing the high rate of illegally employed foreign workers inadvertently caused by ITTS limitations. It was also supposed to improve the system’s ability to adjust to changes in domestic economic and labor market conditions. To achieve these goals, it introduced a comprehensive legal system that prevented the employment of foreign workers without specifc authorization and was calibrated to encourage the employment of foreigners in professional and technical felds (Song 1993, pp. 88–91). It was hoped that EPS would alleviate the problems faced by foreign workers with industrial trainee status (such as human rights issues and the ease with which they could fall into illegal employment or overstay their visa). Under EPS, when a company applied for the introduction of foreign workers, the government reviewed this application before granting the business owners with an employment permit and the foreign workers with a work permit. One signifcant feature was that foreign workers who received work permits in this way were guaranteed the same working conditions as domestic workers. However, these work permits were not easy to obtain, and, with South Korean workers struggling to fnd domestic employment at the time, it was really a policy intended to minimize the impact of foreign workers in the domestic labor market (Maeeil Business News Korea, February 14, 1995a, 1995b). Despite the EMS’s limitations, it was widely expected that the introduction of EPS would cause dispute among stakeholders. Regardless, a governmentwide “Improvement Plan for the Policy of Foreign Laborer” was fnalized in 2003 (OGPC 2002; MOL 2003). Meanwhile, after a cut-throat debate, the National Assembly’s Environment and Labor Committee passed the Foreign Laborer Employment Act (FLEA) on July 31, 2003 (Environment and Labor

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Committee of National Assembly of ROK 2003). As a result, EPS was put into effect from August 17, 2004. Included in the EPS’s “special” cases section were Joseonjok who had already entered Korea with an F-1 (Korean relatives visiting) visa (Presidential Decree 2004, Article 19). In 2005, the Ministry of Justice began measures to introduce the Visiting and Employment System (VES) to remedy the limitations of the existing EMS and EPS frameworks (MOJ 2007f, p. 1). This was not simply about the introduction of foreign workers but a policy regarding foreign ethnic Koreans (especially for the foreign Korean workers from China and former Soviet Union) (MOJ 2005b). It looked to ease foreign ethnic Koreans into the South Korean workforce, a measure which was attractive given the worker shortage caused by the country’s low fertility and aging. However, immigrants introduced in this way are absorbed into the low-income classes, and as such, it was necessary to consider the negative effect that this kind of immigration could provoke. This included the kind of human rights violations and social confict that is brought about when immigration is mixed with a national identity that emphasized pure blood. The motivation for this policy was, then, not simply about solving workforce issues. There was a national consensus that human networks are important. The policy regarding ethnic Koreans from China and former Soviet Union countries could (1) strengthen the global ethnic Korean network, (2) develop the ethnic Korean society in China and former Soviet states, and (3) develop Korea’s economy at a low cost (MOJ 2005b, p. 1). The AILOK affected workers in the primary labor market but not those in the secondary market, where there was a labor shortage. To deal with this shortage, the government decided to attract more Joseonjok by expanding the AILOK to apply to overseas ethnic Koreans in both labor markets. This was achieved by combining the visitor visa and employment visa so that Joseonjok visiting Korea were permitted to engage in employment without changing to an employment visa. This new visa, which was valid for four years and ten months and allowed stays of up to two years at once, permitted holders to engage freely in the secondary market (although participation in the sex industry or other occupations seen as immoral was restricted). Overseas Koreans without family (or relatives) in South Korea were allowed to work, but in order to prevent just anyone coming to work in the country by claiming Korean heritage, the Foreign Laborer Policy Committee established a visa quota and required applicants to provide Korean Language test scores. Also, in order to prevent students from abandoning university education to fnd employment in South Korea, only overseas Koreans over twenty-fve years were allowed to work. According to the MOJ, the long-term plan was to abolish the visa quota, allow absolute freedom to work in the country, grant the Special Status of Overseas Korean or resident status to all overseas

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Koreans, and abolish the maximum stay period (MOJ 2005b, pp. 6–12). As of 2017, Joseonjok as Foreign Korean Worker can stay in Korea for a total of four years and ten months. If you are not employed at this point but still want to stay for the extra period, then you need to make a return trip to China. When VES became the responsibility of the MOJ, this policy began to undergo systematization (MOJ 2007f, p. 1). First, the MOJ eliminated various EMS restrictions. Once a business had been issued with an Overseas Korean Employment Certifcate, they could fnd and employ any Foreign Korean Worker without need for further authorization. Foreign Korean Workers could move freely between industries, but rather than applying for permission simply had to report the change to the relevant authority. Whereas under the previous EMS, they were only permitted to work in twelve sectors (such as construction, manufacturing, fshing, and the service industry), they now had access to thirty-two sectors (MOJ 2006). This system was put into operation on March 4, 2007. In this way, VES brought together ITTS, TES, EMS, EPS, and the other policies covering industrial workforce and non-national ethnic Koreans. It was also a transition stage toward granting the Special Status of Overseas Koreans rights equivalent to those of full citizens. If Joseonjok enter South Korea for the frst time with the Special Status of Overseas Korean, rather than Foreign Worker status, then regulation governing their residency and economic activities dissolve. Through the visiting employment visa, the opportunities for Joseonjok without relatives in the country to come to South Korea have increased as well as the period for which they can stay. For those who were already employed in Korea before VES was introduced, it became legal to fnd new employment through personal contacts rather than having to go through a government agency, as long as they reported the conclusion of their previous contract. After the 2008 fnancial crisis, VES underwent some revision. From 2010, the FLPC limited the number of visiting employment visas to 330,00017 and Joseonjok entering South Korea began to be issued short-term multiple-entry (C-3) visas rather than visiting employment visas. Visiting employment status began to be granted only upon successful completion of a course at a private technical training academy (which could be attended with a D-4 training visa). This is the policy as of 2017. Socioeconomic Autonomy In contrast to people with the “Special Status of Overseas Korean,” who were prohibited from participating in most jobs in the secondary labor market, the status of “Foreign Korean Worker” was given to Joseonjok who could be incorporated only into the secondary labor market.

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Unlike under ITTS and TES, Foreign Korean Workers were now able to engage freely in economic activity in almost all areas of the secondary labor market. This is directly related to the fact that the labor market in Korea is constantly in need of industrial manpower. The Joseonjok who were eligible for visiting employment were able to stay in Korea for up four years and ten months. During this stay, Joseonjok were able to move freely in Korea’s labor market. Importantly, unlike under previous systems, the employee– employer relationship was no longer skewed so far in favor of the employer. Their freedom was relatively well guaranteed. After staying in Korea for the maximum four years and ten months, they could return to China and reapply for the same residency status as before. It was even possible to make the application in China, and then return to Korea with a short-term visa to wait for it to come through. Although Joseonjok living in Korea as a Foreign Korean Worker did not quite have equal status with Korean citizens, their socioeconomic freedom within the labor market was similar. Moreover, if their skill in a specifc industrial area increased enough, then it was possible for them to change their Foreign Korean Worker status to permanent residency, Special Status of Overseas Koreans, or even to acquire full nationality.

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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION China’s postsocialist transformation (which began at the end of 1970s) was also an ideological transition, in that it brought with it the idea that inequality could be tolerated in the name of development. China’s Joseonjok society was not able to escape this structural transformation and experienced rapid social and economic differentiation. While Joseonjok who were incorporated into the leading edge of the postsocialist society could rise into the upper class, other Joseonjok who had experienced a decline in socioeconomic status were forced to leave in search of new opportunities. The inequality born of Chinese Pragmatism (or Liberalism) forced a population to seek new opportunities in the midst of South Korea’s own unequal society (Piao 2017).18 The state-dominated globalization of Korea, since the early 1990s, did not begin of its own making but was made necessary by the political and economic context of neoliberal globalization, and the concerned transformations have embodied various neoliberal tendencies (Chang 2012a). A part of the logic of this globalization was institutionalized by a strategy which attempted to reinstate South Korea’s past conditions of work and marriage through foreign bodies (Chang 2014a, p. 172). One of the major targets of this economic (and industrial) development plan and strategy for social reproduction was the large number of foreign workers and brides from Asia who had

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been incorporated into Korean society. The major part of this population is Joseonjok, an extremely complex group as their ethnic identity and status as industrial workers is intricately intertwined (Piao 2012). From the late 1980s and early 1990s, there have been about 600,000 Joseonjok incorporated into Korean society, and this population is split across the primary labor market (Piao 2013), secondary labor market (Seol 2012), and social reproduction (Kim 2012, 2014). The period of rapid industrialization that instigated a transformation in South Korea’s macro-political economy began in the 1980s. The fragmented labor market and labor supply problems that were the result of this change become a key issue for Korean society to resolve. As labor supply became a serious diffculty for small-sized and medium-sized businesses, they demanded that the state allow them to hire foreign labor. And because of the key roles of small-sized and medium-sized enterprises in almost all areas of the secondary labor market, the state relented and developed a policy of gradually introducing a foreign labor force. This policy decided the kind of labor to be employed by these small-sized and medium-sized businesses based on their functional role, and the state managed the nature of the available foreign labor through the visa statuses and their requirements. These citizenship policies for foreign workers (or migrants) have changed over time in line with economic globalization. It was also in the 1980s that South Korea’s competitive advantage over North Korea became clear, with global or regional events, such as the Asian Games and the Olympics being a prime example of South Korea boasting of their system’s superiority. In this context, the state began confdent moves at the end of the 1980s to reconfgure their relationship with ethnic Koreans overseas, especially with those residing in communist counties. As South Korea reinstituted friendly relations with communist countries one after another, Korean capital came into contact with a huge market and the ethnic Koreans from China, while CIS countries met South Korea’s segmented labor market. Subsequently, the Asian fnancial crisis in the mid to late 1990s also fashioned a new relationship between South Korea and overseas Koreans, and the state enacted a series of laws to allow Korean Americans (particularly, but not exclusively) to help their mother country. South Korea’s economic globalization thus came to include a kind of “compatriot (ethnic) globalization.” Joseonjok as “Foreign Workers (oegukinnodongja)” were gradually incorporated (in numbers limited according to the nature of the industries and the skill level of the Joseonjok workers) into the secondary labor market according to the visa statuses made available by the state. These people’s socioeconomic autonomy was severely limited, and the increasing numbers of immigrant workers existing entirely outside the system exposed the limits of the system: those Joseonjok incorporated into the secondary labor

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market had their freedom restricted despite existing inside the system, and those outside the system were blocked from any kind of citizenship. On the other hand, the South Korean state hoped that the newly institutionalized “Special Status of Overseas Korean (jaeoedongpo)” status would allow groups like overseas Koreans to contribute to the country’s development (or globalization) both offcially and effectively. This was when the conceptual, blood-based notions of what constituted fellow countrymen began to be made concrete in law. However, Korea’s existing population of Joseonjok in the secondary labor market was excluded from the jaeoedongpo status and strongly opposed this discrimination. Their effort, coupled with the constant demand for foreign industrial workers, has had a signifcant impact on the gradual transformation of the state’s legal status of Joseonjok (or Korean Chinese in a broad sense). However, despite this, not all Joseonjok were allowed equal access to the jaeoedongpo status, because the state continued to distinguish between those in the primary labor markets and the “Foreign Korean Workers (dongponodongja)” in the secondary labor markets. Under globalization, Korea’s immigration policy has an economistic (kyeongjeajueijek) character: the nationalistic basis of policies governing overseas ethnic Korean has been adapted and subordinated to practical industrial needs. Human capital, social capital, and economic capital were the criteria for how effectively and effciently Joseonjok individuals could contribute to specifc industries and at what level. This has had the effect of stratifying the legal statuses of South Korea’s Joseonjok population: holders of the Special Status of Overseas Korean have superior socioeconomic status and can change (upgrade) their legal status by actively utilizing their resources while Joseonjok with Foreign Korean Worker status, with their particular skills and function in industry, have been granted a legal status almost equivalent to that of full South Korean citizens. In this citizenship status system, economic contribution is the primary way in which one can upgrade one’s status—the hierarchy of citizenship statuses for Joseonjok is a concrete refection of the country’s economistic citizenship policy. To summarize, the citizenship status of Joseonjok in South Korea has not been simply based on past nationality or ideas about ethnic blood ties. It was instead based on the resources and contribution required by society at that particular time. This economistically oriented citizenship policy, to which the nationalist factors are subordinated, has created an internal hierarchy of citizenship statuses for Joseonjok. And that has in turn created institutional possibilities for Joseonjok individuals to acquire higher statuses. Thanks to this hierarchy, the Joseonjok ethnic group could diversify to participate in various areas of the labor market rather than being fxed as a socioeconomic status group fulflling one specifc role in the labor market.

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The South Korean state has justifed the selective inclusion and exclusion of “citizens” by selecting and reorganizing the logic of nationalism and economic development as the state’s needs changed, and whichever direction the state has taken, it has helped to create socioeconomic inequality.

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NOTES 1. This research was fnancially supported by Hansung University. 2. This chapter was previously published in You Piao. 2017. “Hierarchical Citizenship in Perspective: South Korea’s Korean Chinese.” Journal of Asian Sociology DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, 46 (3):557–589. 3. The frst group emphasizes ethnicity and ignores industrial and economic factors, while the latter group does the opposite, stressing industrial and economic matters while ignoring ethnicity. 4. The term “hierarchy” is common in citizenship studies. Whereas normally scholars focus on the hierarchy of states under world capitalism’s division of labor (a prime example is Castels’s (2005) research), I have focused on the hierarchy within one immigrant group. 5. The government decided that the issues with workers changing or abandoning their jobs without permission stemmed from low wages, and suggested a minimum wage system. This would raise the basic monthly wage from 200–260 USD to 320 USD (260,000 KRW). The KFSMB also pushed for more comprehensive insurance for Industrial Trainee (who were at that point denied insurance against industrial accident), looking to increase the cap from 2 to 30 million won (Maeeil Business News Korea January 18, 1995). 6. See this article for an analysis of the issues surrounding self-interest in the development of regulatory systems. 7. When the Industrial Trainee system began trainees were given six months residency at most. From 1996 this was extended to two years. 8. Although in practice recommendations were not provided by the president himself, but by those in more junior positions. 9. Workers from China, Bangladesh, and Thailand were assigned to Industrial Bank. Workers from Vietnam, the Philippines, and Myanmar were allocated Kook-Min Bank. Workers from Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan had to use Dong-Nam Bank, and Sri Lankan, Mongolian, and Nepalese workers were allotted Dae-Dong Bank. 10. Specifcally, those who have been staying in South Korea for over six months while working in recruitment, cultural arts, trade management, or as professors; (2) graduates of four-year undergraduate programs and students receiving scholarship from the South Korean government; (3) those with the right to permanent residency in OECD countries; (4) Representatives and registered employees of corporations; (5) owners of private businesses with sales of more than USD 100,00 in the previous year; (6) multinational company executives, media executives and reporters,

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lawyers, accountants, doctors, artists, agricultural engineers, marine engineers, aviation engineers, researchers at research institutes, university professors and associate professors at universities in their country of residence; (7) a delegate or deputy delegate of an offcially recognized ethnic Korean associations for culture and art (offcially recognized groups include: the Joseonjok Entrepreneurs Association, the Korea International Trade Association, the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Artists Association, the Yanbian Korean Traditional Cuisine Association, and the Beijing Goguryeo Cultural Economy Study Group); (8) former and current members of the National Assembly, civil servants, and employees of state-owned enterprises with more than fve years’ service; (9) university professors (including associate professors and lecturers), principals of educational institutions for ethnic Koreans (also vice-principals, head teachers, head secretaries), middle and high school teachers, elementary school teachers; (10) individuals who manage, or want to manage small businesses (MOJ 2009b). 11. Specifcally: (1) people who have entered Korea with a short-term or H-2 visa more than ten times in the last two years (as long as they stayed less than thirty days each time), and those who stayed in the country less than 150 days in one year after entering with a visiting employment visa; (2) people with a H-2 visa who graduated from a four-year undergraduate course and submit a letter stating that they are not employed as an unskilled worker. (MOJ, 2009b). In 2010 the South Korean government extended the Special Status of Overseas Korean to existing workers in the secondary labor market. This applied to (1) those who have worked for more than one year in the same position in manufacturing, agriculture, fshing, care work, or as a household employee; (2) those who have worked for over six months in manufacturing, agriculture or fshing and have acquired a work-related qualifcation whilst in Korea; (3) those who have stayed in the country for more than 200 days per year for the last two years, or those aged sixty-three or older. Joseonjok workers in longterm employment within sectors with severe labor shortages can also qualify for the Special Status of Overseas Korean (MOJ 2010). 12. In this case, “hot money” refers to capital moved regularly and rapidly between fnancial markets to make use of different interest rates. 13. Refer to Jung (1999, pp. 182-183) for additional explanation of the conditions applying to activity in the property and fnancial markets by residents with Overseas Korean status. 14. Lee (2012) has described various conditions of naturalization. Here I only focus on the conditions of naturalization for Joseonjok. 15. See Kim’s (2016) excellent research on the process by which conceptual compatriots became legal compatriots. 16. Providing all the supporting documents did not guarantee a successful application, however. There were cases when nationality would not be granted. For example, if the applicant had lived or studied in North Korea, or if they had worked for the Communist Party, or in the military, or in government agencies. Where the documents were insuffcient exceptions could be made for individuals who had made important contributions to Korea’s independence or were people of “national merit”. These exceptions could also be made for their kin (MOJ 2005a).

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17. At the same time, the number of people possessing Overseas Korean status increased, meaning that the total population of Joseonjok in Korea could expand. 18. This phenomenon can be seen as a part of the Globalization of Asia, or specifcally, the “Asianization of Asia” (Chang 2014b).

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REFERENCES Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans. 1999. Act No. 6015. Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans. 2008a. Act No. 8896. Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans. 2008b. Act No. 9140. Bauböck, Rainer, ed. 2006. Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Castles, Stephen and Alastair Davidson. 2000. Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging. New York, NY: Routledge. Castles, Stephen. 2005. “Hierarchical Citizenship in a World of Unequal NationStates.” Political Science and Politics 38(4): 689–692. Chang, Kyung-Sup and Bryan S. Turner. 2012. “Introduction: East Asia and Citizenship.” Pp. 1–12 in Contested Citizenship in East Asia: Developmental Politics, National Unity, and Globalization, edited by Kyung-Sup Chang and Bryan S. Turner. London/New York, NY: Routledge. Chang, Kyung-Sup. 2010. South Korea Under Compressed Modernity: Familial Political Economy in Transition. London and New York, NY: Routledge. Chang, Kyung-Sup. 2012a. “Predicaments of Neoliberalism in the Post-Developmental Liberal Context.” Pp. 70–91 in Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond, edited by Kyung-Sup Chang, Ben Fine, and Linda Weiss. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Chang, Kyung-Sup. 2012b. “Developmental Citizenship in Perspective: The South Korean Case and Beyond.” Pp. 182–202 in Contested Citizenship in East Asia: Developmental Politics, National Unity, and Globalization, edited by Kyung-Sup Chang and Bryan S. Turner. London/New York, NY: Routledge. Chang, Kyung-Sup. 2012c. “Different Beds, One Dream? State-Society Relationships and Citizenship Regimes in East Asia.” Pp. 62–85 in Contested Citizenship in East Asia: Developmental Politics, National Unity, and Globalization, edited by Kyung-Sup Chang and Bryan S. Turner. London/New York, NY: Routledge. Chang, Kyung-Sup. 2014a. “Transformative Modernity and Citizenship Politics: the South Korean Aperture.” Pp. 163–180 in South Korea in Transition: Politics and Culture of Citizenship, edited by Chang Kyung-Sup. London/New York, NY: Routledge. Chang, Kyung-Sup. 2014b. “Asianization of Asia: Asia’s Integrative Ascendance through a European Aperture.” European Societies 16(3): 337–342. China Statistical Yearbook. 2010. Retrieved September 10, 2017. http:​/​/www​​.stat​​s​ .gov​​.cn​/t​​jsj​/p​​csj​/r​​kpc​/6​​rp​/​in​​dexch​​.htm. Cohen, Robin, ed. 1996. The Sociology of Migration. Cheltenham/Brookfeld, VT: Edward Elgar. Diplomatic Chronology of Republic of Korea, 1988.

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Diplomatic White Paper, 1990. Diplomatic White Paper, 1991. Diplomatic White Paper, 1996. Diplomatic White Paper, 1997. Environment and Labor Committee of National Assembly of ROK. 2003. Act on the Employment of Foreign Workers. ELCNA. Hankyoreh. August 1, 1996a. (In Korean) “Amnal heomhan yeonsuchwieopje [The Toughest TES].” 3rd page. Hankyoreh. August 1, 1996b. (In Korean) “Oegugin yeonsuchwieopje chujin [Promote Foreign TES].” 1st page. Hankyoreh. October 24, 1997. (In Korean) “Oeguginyeonsuchwieopje yeongi [Foreign TES Postponed].” 26th page. Jung, In-Sup. 1999. (In Korean) “ Jaeoedongpoui churipgukgwa beopjeong jiwie gwanhan beomnyurui naeyonggwa munjejeom [Analysis of New Acts of Legal Status of Overseas Koreans].” Seoulgukjebeobyeongu [Seoul International Law Journal] 6(2): 301–321. Jung, Keun-Sik. 2013. (In Japanese) “Korean diaspora no keisei to saihensei [The Formation and Reconstruction of Korean Diaspora].” Pp. 1–21 in Korean diaspora to higashiashashyaka [Transition of Intimate and Public in East Asia], edited by Mastuda Motoji and Keun-Sik Jung. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. Jung, Yeon-Soo. 1999. (In Korean) “Jaeoedongpoui churipgukgwa beopjeong jiwie gwanhan beomnyurui juyonaeyong min jaengjeom geomto [A Review of Main Contents and Issue of ‘Overseas Korean Act’].” Beobjo 48(11): 178–193. Kim, Bong-Seop. 2002. (In Korean) “Jaeoedongpobeobui baegyeonggwa jaengjeom [The Background and Issues on the ‘Overseas Korean Act’].” Gojoseondangunhak 7: 75–134. Kim, Heung-Soo. 1991. “Jeongbuui gyominjeongchaek [Overseas Korean Policy of Korean Government].” Gyominjeongchaekjaryo [Overseas Korean Policy Materials] 39: 73–79. Kim, Hyun-Mee. 2012. “The Emergence of the ‘Multicultural Family’ and Genderized Citizenship in South Korea.” Pp. 203–217 in Contested Citizenship in East Asia: Developmental Politics, National Unity, and Globalization, edited by Kyung-Sup Chang and Bryan S. Turner. London/New York, NY: Routledge. Kim, Hyun-Mee. 2014. “The State and Migrant Women: Diverging Hopes in the Making of ‘Multicultural Families’.” Pp. 147–159 in South Korea in Transition: Politics and Culture of Citizenship, edited by Chang Kyung-Sup. London/New York, NY: Routledge. Kim, Jae-Eun. 2016. Contested Embrace: Transborder Membership Politics in Twentieth-Century Korea. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business and Korea Small Business Institute. 2001. (In Korean) Oegugin saneobyeonsujedo baljeonbangan [The Development Plan for Foreign ITTS]. Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business and Korea Small Business Institute. 2004. (In Korean) Oegugin yeonsuchwieopjeui jeongchaekjeong hyoyulseonge gwanhan yeongu [A Study on the Policy Effciency of Foreign ITTS].

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Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business. 1994. (In Korean) Oegugin saneopgisuryeonsu hyeomnyeoksaeob unyong yoryeong [Operation Tips for Foreign ITTS Cooperation Projects]. Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business. 1997. (In Korean) Yeonsueopche sukjisahang [Manuals for ITTS Employers]. Korea Immigration Service Statistics, 2016. Kyunghyang Shinmun. August 26, 1998. (In Korean) “Sasilsang 2junggukjeong heoyong/jaeoedongpo teungnyebeobane uryeoban gidaeban [Dual Nationality Virtually Acceptable – Half are Waiting in Anticipation, Half are Concerned about OILOK].” 3rd page. Kyunghyang Shinmun. September 10, 1997. (In Korean) “Oegugin saneobyeonsu chwieopje doip [Introduction of Foreign ITTS].” 2nd page. Lee, Chul-Woo. 2012. “How Can You Say You’re Korean? Law, Governmentality and National Membership in South Korea.” Citizenship Studies 16(1): 85–102. Lee, Hye-Kyung, et al. 1998. (In Korean) Hanguksahoewa oegugin nodongja: geu jonghapjeong ihaereul wihayeo [Korean Society and Foreign Workers]. Seoul: Miraeillyeoksenteo [Center for Future Human Resource Studies]. Lee, Hye-Kyung. 1994. (In Korean) “Oegugin nodongja goyonge gwanhan yeongu [The Employment of Foreign Workers in Korea: Its Impacts on Labor Market].” HanGuksahoehak [Korean Journal of Sociology] 28(F): 89–113. Lee, Jean-Young. 2002. (In Korean) “Hangugui jaeoedongpojeongchaeng: jaeoedongpobeom gaejeongui jaengjeomgwa daean [Issues and Implications: Korea’s Policy towards the Ethnic Koreans Abroad].” Hangukgwa gukjejeongchi [Korea and World Politics] 18(4): 133–162. Lee, Jong-Hoon. 2001. (In Korean) “Jaeoedongpojeongchaekgwa jaeoedongpobeobui gaeseon banghyang [Policy for Korean Chinese and Right Directions of the Law for Overseas Koreans].” Jaeoehaninyeongu [Studies of Koreans Abroad] 11(1): 165–190. Lim, Hyun-Jin and Dong-Hoon Seol. 2000a. (In Korean) “Oegugingeulloja goyongheogaje doim bangan [An Introduction Plan for Foreign Worker’s Employment Permit System].” MOL Report. Lim, Hyun-Jin and Dong-Hoon Seol. 2000b. (In Korean) “Hangugui oegugillyeong jeongchaek [Foreign Laber Policy in Korea].” Hanguksahoegwahak [Korean Social Science Review] 22(3): 153–186. Loh, Yeong-Don. 1999. (In Korean) “Sowi jaeoedongpobeobe gwanhan yeongu [A Study on the ‘Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Korean Nationals Residing Abroad].” Incheonbeopangnonchong [Inchon Low Review] 2: 57–71. Loh, Yeong-Don. 2002. (In Korean) “Jaeoedongpobeobui gaejeongbanghyange gwanhan yeongu [A Suggestion for the Amendments of the ‘Law of Korean’ Abroad].” Gukjebeopakoenonchong [The Korean Society of Journal International Law] 47(3): 97–119. Maeeil Business News Korea. February 14, 1995a. (In Korean) “Oegugin jeoimyeoron sajeon chadan [Government to Forestall Idea that Foreigners Should be Paid Less].” 38th page. Maeeil Busienss News Korea. February 14, 1995b. (In Korean) “Oegugin goyongheogaje doip [Introduction of the Foreign EMS].” 1st page.

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Maeeil Business News Korea. January 18, 1995. (In Korean) “Oegugin saneobyeonsuje eotteoke bakkwina, yeonsuchwieopje god sihaeng, chabyeol sijeong [How is Foreign ITTS Changing? Foreign ITTS Will be Implemented Soon and Discrimination Will be Corrected].” 15th page. Maeeil Business News Korea. September 24, 1997. (In Korean) “Oegugin yeonsugigan 2nyeon geonui [Foreigners’ Training Period should be Extended to 2 Years].” 4th page. MCI. 1992. (In Korean) Oegugin yeonsuja gwallijichim [Management Guidelines for Foreign Trainees]. MCI. MOJ. 1991. (In Korean) Oegugin saneopgisul yeonsusajeung balgeum deunge gwanhan eommucheori jichim [Business Process Guidelines for Visa Issuance under ITTS]. Directive No. 255. MOJ. 1993. (In Korean) Oegugin saneopgisul yeonsusajeung balgeum deunge gwanhan eommucheori jichim [Business Process Guidelines for Visa Issuance under ITTS]. Directive No. 294. MOJ. 1996. (In Korean) Oegugin saneopgisul yeonsusajeung balgeum deunge gwanhan eommucheori jichim [Business Process Guidelines of Visa Issuance under ITTS]. Directive No. 368. MOJ. 2005a. (In Korean) Oegukgukjeong dongpoui gukjeokoebong deunge gwanhan eommucheori jichim [Business Process Guidelines for Reinstatement of Nationality for Compatriots with Foreign Nationality]. Established Rule No. 729. MOJ. 2005b. (In Korean) Oegukgukjeokdongpo jeongchaeng banghyang geomto [Review of Policy Direction Regarding Overseas Korean with Foreign Nationality]. MOJ. MOJ. 2006. (In Korean) Dongpo jayubangmun heoyong chwieopbeomwi hwakdae [Expansion of the Scope of Employment Allowing Free Visits by Overseas Korean Compatriots]. MOJ. MOJ. 2007a. (In Korean) Jeonmunjing jongsa junggung min gusoryeondongpo, jayuroun churipgung min gyeongjehwaldong ganeunghaejyeo [Restrictions on Immigration and Economic Activity Lifted for Professional Chinese and Former Soviet Compatriots]. MOJ. MOJ. 2007b. (In Korean) Jeonmunoegugillyeong deung yeongjugwon buyeo yogeon wanhwa: jeonmunoegugillyeok, oegukgukjeokdongpo, gwageo jaehanhwagyo daesang [Residency Requirements Relaxed for Professional Foreign Workers, Overseas Koreans with Foreign Nationalities and Former Chinese Korean]. MOJ. MOJ. 2007c. (In Korean) Oegugin geullojado yeongjugwoneul chwideukal su itda: beommubu, sungnyeon saengsangineung oegugillyeogui injeongeul wihan guchejeong gijun maryeon [Foreign Workers Can Also Acquire Permanent Residence: Ministry of Justice Establishes Standards to Recognize Importance of Skilled Production Workers]. MOJ. MOJ. 2007d. (In Korean) Oegukgukjeong dongpoui gukjeokoebong deunge gwanhan eommucheori jichim [Business Process Guidelines for Reinstatement of Nationality for Compatriots with Foreign Nationality]. Established Rule No. 785. MOJ. 2007e. (In Korean) Oegukgukjeong dongpoui gukjeokoebong deunge gwanhan eommucheori jichim [Business Process Guidelines for Reinstatement of Nationality for Compatriots with Foreign Nationality]. Established Rule No. 781.

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MOJ. 2007f. (In Korean) Oegukgukjeokdongpo poyongeul wihan bangmunchwieopjedo [VES, an Engagement Policy towards Overseas Koreans with Foreign Nationalities]. MOJ. MOJ. 2008. (In Korean) Yeongjugwon chwideugi boda swiwojyeotseumnida: beommubu, tujaoegugin deunge daehan yeongjugwon buyeo yogeon wanhwa bangan maryeon [Permanent Residency Acquisition Made Easier: Ministry of Justice Prepares to Relax Permanent Residency Requirements for Foreign Investors]. MOJ. MOJ. 2009a. (In Korean) Yeongju jagyeong buyeo daesang hwakdae annae [Information on Additional Groups Being Eligible for Permanent Residency]. MOJ. MOJ. 2009b. (In Korean) Junggung, CISdongpo, jaeoedongpo jagyeokbuyeo daesang hwakdae annae [Information on Chinese and CIS Compatriots Becoming Eligible for Special Overseas Korean Status]. MOJ. MOJ. 2010. (In Korean) Teukjeongsaneopbunya chwieop, bangmunchwieom dongpo deunge daehan gungnae janggicheryu min chwieom heoyong gwallyeon jeolcha annae [Information on Employment Permits and Long-Term Residency for Compatriots Employed in Special Industries or with Visiting Employment Visas]. MOJ. MOJ. 2013. (In Korean) Oegukgukjeong dongpoui gukjeokoebong deunge gwanhan eommucheori jichim [Business Process Guidelines for Reinstatement of Nationality for Compatriots with Foreign Nationality]. Established Rule No. 1012. MOL. 1995. (In Korean). Oegugin saneopgisul yeonsusaengui boho min gwallie gwanhan jichim [Guidelines for Protection and Control for Foreign Industrial Technical Trainees]. Established Rule No. 258. MOL. 2003. (In Korean) Jisokseongjanggwa gieobeul wihan oegugin goyongheogaje [Foreigner Employment Permit System for Sustainable Growth and Enterprise]. MOL. MOL. 2004. (In Korean) Oegukgukjeokdongpoui chwieopgihoe neolbeojyeo [Expanding Employment Opportunities for Compatriots with Foreign Nationalities]. MOL. Offce for Government Policy Coordination. 2002. (In Korean) Oegugillyeokjedo gaeseonbangan [Improvement Plan for the Policy on Foreign Laborers]. OGPC. Oh, Chae-Gi. 1983. (In Korean) “Jeongbuneun gyominsahoeui anjeonggwa jeongchage yeokjeomeul dugo itda [Government Put Emphasis on Social Stability and Settlement of Overseas Korean].” Haeoedongpo [Overseas Korean] 9: 8–9. Park, Gi-Gap. 2001. (In Korean) “Hangukcheryu junggukdongpoui beomnyulmunje [Legal Problems of Korean Chinese in Korea].” Gangwonbeopak [Kangwon Law Review] 14: 301–323. Park, Keong-Suk. 2012. (In Korean) “Talbugijuja saengaesae tuyeongdoen jipdanjeong sangheungwa geosi gwollyeokgujo: jisokdoen hanin diaseupora, gabujangje, wigejeong simingwon [Macro Powers embedded in the Collective Miseries of North Korean Defectors: Korean Diaspora, Patriarchy, and Hierarchical Citizenship].” Gyeongjewa sahoe [Economy and Society] 95: 288–332.

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Piao, You and Yong-Sun Kim. 2012. (In Korean) Uriga mannan hangung jaehan joseonjogui gusulsaengaesa [The Korea We Meet: Oral History of Joseonjok in Korea]. Seoul: Book Korea. Piao, You. 2011. (In Korean) “Hangung cheryu joseonjong dancheui byeonhwawa injeongtujaenge gwanhan yeongu [A Study on the Transition of Korean Chinese ‘Organization’ and Struggle for Recognition in Korea].” Gyeongjewa sahoe [Economy and Society] 19: 239–265. Piao, You. 2012. (In Korean) “Joseonjogui hangugijuwa jeongchang 20nyeon: ijunodongjawa dongpo saieseo [20 years of Migration and Settlement of Joseonjok in Korea: Between Compatriot and Foreign Worker].” Pp. 1–13 in Joseonjogui sinijuwa kontencheu gihoek [New Migrant and Contents Plan for Korean Chinese]. Jaeoehaninhakoe [Overseas Korean Association]. Piao, You. 2013. (In Japanese) “keizaiteki incentive to tokyuteki minzokusyugi: saikan chyukoku chosenzokuwo chyusinni [Economic Incentives and Instrumental Nationalism: Focusing on the Joseonjok in Korea].” Pp. 289–306 in Korean Diaspora to higashiasiashyaka [Transition of Intimate and Public in East Asia], edited by Mastuda Motoji and Keun-Sik Jung. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. Piao, You. 2017. (In Korean) “Chogukjeong sanggyeonggwa seourui joseonjok [Transnational Migration of Joseonjok and Come up to Capital City].” Pp. 329–349 in Seoulsahoehak: seourui ilsang, gonggan geurigo saramdeul [Sociology of Seoul: People, Space and Everyday Life], edited by U-Seok Seo, Mi-Ree Byun, Baek-Yung Kim, and Ji-Young Kim. Seoul: Nanam. Presidential Decree. 1998. Enforcement Decree of Immigration Control Act. Presidential Decree No. 15764. Presidential Decree. 2002. Enforcement Decree of Immigration Control Act. Presidential Decree No. 17579. Presidential Decree. 2004. Enforcement Decree of Act on the Employment, ETC, of Foreign Workers. Presidential Decree No. 18314. Seok, Hyun-Ho, et al. 2003. (In Korean) Oeguginnodongjaui ilteowa sam [Workplace and Life of Foreign Workers]. Seoul: Jisikmadang. Seol, Dong-Hoon and J. Skrentny. 2009. “Ethnic Return Migration and Hierarchical Nationhood: Korean Chinese Foreign Workers in South Korea.” Ethnicities 9(2): 147–174. Seol, Dong-Hoon. 1999. (In Korean) Oeguginnodongjawa hanguksahoe [Migrant Workers and Korean Society]. Seoul: Seoul National University Press. Seol, Dong-Hoon. 2012. “The Citizenship of Foreign Workers in South Korea.” Citizenship Studies 16(1): 119–133. Song, Byung-Joon. 1993. (In Korean) Saneobillyeogui sugeubwonhwalhwa bangan: oegugillyeogeul jungsimeuro [Improvement Plan of Industrial Labor Force: Focus on Foreign Labor Force]. Korea Institute for Industrial Economics. Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. 1994. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Turner, Bryan S. and Kyung-Sup Chang. 2012. “Whither East Asian Citizenship?” Pp. 243–254 in Contested Citizenship in East Asia: Developmental Politics,

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National Unity, and Globalization, edited by Kyung-Sup Chang and Bryan S. Turner. London/New York, NY: Routledge. Turner, Bryan S. 2001. “The Erosion of Citizenship.” British Journal of Sociology 1(1): 189–209. Yamanaka, Keiko. 2010. “Civil Society and Social Movements for Immigrant Rights in Japan and South Korea.” Korean Observer 41(4): 615–647.

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Chapter 5

A Research on Social Perspective toward Highly Educated Korean Returnees in Current Business Context

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Keunsun You

The number of international students enrolled outside their country of citizenship has shown dramatic growth over the past years (OECD, 2016, p.328).1 It is clear that the increase in global demand for higher education, advancements in transportation and communication technology, and the internationalization of labor markets for highly skilled people have given students stronger incentives to study abroad as part of their tertiary education (OECD, 2016, p.329). In higher education sector among OECD countries, student mobility has increased more than double during the previous decade worldwide. Particularly, students from Asian countries took up more than half of the category in OECD countries. The remarkable growth rate of Korean students has shown slight decrease lately (OECD, 2013, 2016); it once was one of the major student-exporting countries followed by China and India (OECD, 2013a, p.304). There have been more than 200,000 Korean students in overseas higher education since 2007. Compared to other student-exporting countries in Asia, the number of Korean-outbound students is very high in proportion to its national population. Thus, going abroad for their tertiary education became relatively less scarce these days than years before2. As international mobility of individuals increases, the cultural adaptation to the sojourning places has invited academic attention from various felds of studies. On the other hand, the returning-home phase has comparatively been neglected within the studies as well as among practitioners managing crossborder mobility of intercultural sojourners (Szkudlarek, 2010). Furthermore, academic concern on this unusual outbound movement of Korean students has been surprisingly limited (Ghazarian, 2014). 117

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Sojourners usually acquire international life experience in the process of completing academic degrees and added-worth, and potentials from the diversity and dynamism in academic sojourning could turn them into highly qualifed human workforce. Thus, the term, Human Resource contains one of the highly critical issues in the future Korean demographics. Media and major research institutes (Eom, Bae, and Chang, 2005; Guthridge, Komm, and Lawson, 2008; PwC, 2014a, b; Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2005) have consistently expressed concerns over the impacts of imminent demographic changes from aging population and low fertility rate. National labor productivity has already been low, which was less than half (49.3%) of that of the United States in 2011 (Kho, Bae, Ye, Jin, Kim, Park, and Ryu, 2013) placing Korea in the lower rank among other OECD countries in the sector (OECD, 2014a). It is refected in high turnover rate (25.2%) of the new recruits from college graduates (Korean Employers Federation, 2014), and this fgure has shown steady increase since 2007. Considering the aforementioned contextual surroundings of Korea, each human resources group requires enhanced analysis and understanding for its utmost participation confronting the imminent population crisis ahead. As described earlier, the number of Korean academic sojourners has increased to a level of unusual scale in global higher education; resources are limited for understanding this group and related phenomenon properly. This workforce with overseas academic sojourning experience has unique aspects, because they could partly be lost as brain drain or some would return to their home country and could establish social and business links between their home and host countries what is also called brain circulation (Solimano, 2002 as cited in OECD, 2016, p.329). Therefore, the research question is how the highly educated Korean returnees perceive themselves under the dynamic social changes within Korean business context. As a beginning approach to deal with this underexplored group, the focus of this study is placed toward returnees who have completed one or more of their higher education overseas and resettled back home in business context. The research purpose is frst to grasp the fow of changes in social perspectives toward this specifc group of people based on extensive literature review and content analysis. Next, analyze their selfperspective in order to identify the concrete social status and positioning of the returnees in the current Korean business context through complementary survey. To execute the above, content analysis over the topic was conducted as well as general literature review to capture the chronological perspective changes on Korean returnees. Following survey investigated the self-perspectives and additional opinions concerning their competitiveness and repatriating experience within the career and Korean business organizational context.

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The result of this study could suggest comprehensive understanding over the highly educated Korean returnees from objective stance and broaden research perspective over diversifying aspects of workforce in Korean business context. YUHAKPA(留學波) RETURNEES IN KOREA This chapter is the literature review focusing on global, local statistics and reports with regard to Korean academic sojourners.

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Perspective toward Yuhak(留學: Study abroad) in Korea Yuhakpa(留學波) is a Korean expression, which refers to a group of people who go abroad for educational purposes and it has long been a privileged title implying highly qualifed intelligence and education due to the exclusiveness of the international experience allowed to a certain class of people in the modern history of the country. Presumably over 4 million students are enrolled in tertiary-level education out of their own countries worldwide and more than half are mainly from Asian countries such as China, India, and Korea. The number of Koreanoutbound cross-border students in higher education once marked the third largest in the world in 2011 (OECD, 2013a, 2014d). In 2013, nearly 240,000 Korean students went abroad, which is roughly 7 percent of the total college population of the country (Fischer, 2014). In proportion to national population, Korea marks the highest rate of outbound students in higher education (Ghazarian, 2014). With regard to this unusual scale of international student mobility from Korea, Ghazarian (2011, 2014) explained that students in Korea’s highly status-conscious culture are reluctant to attend domestic universities that do not have strong reputations and school background, a basis of informal social groupings that serve as an important source of social capital among South Koreans. Thus, Korean students chose to study abroad for higher education even to sacrifce the opportunity to develop a social network since the lower prestige domestic college or universities do not offer the same level of personal branding as a degree from well-known universities (Ghazarian, 2011). In addition, overheated competition in local college admission process is also burdening students and family, and their disappointment and dissatisfaction may lead them to look alternatives abroad. The changing scales of outbound students in higher education for the past decade are summarized in table 5.1. While the grand totals have shown downward move since 2013 mainly due to the shrink in elementary and secondary

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

Under-graduate Graduate Language Others

‘08

81,972 41,993 93,994 N/A 93,994

90,031 36,969 89,867 N/A 89,867

217,959 216,867

‘07

107,112 37,468 98,644 N/A 98,644

240,949

‘098

112,273 40,579 99,035 N/A 99,035

251,887

‘10

123,370 40,799 98,296 N/A 98,296

262,465

‘11

115,314 38,864 61,435 23,6009 85,035

239,213

‘12

Source: Ministry of Education (2008–2016). Statistics on Korean-Outbound Students in Higher Education. Grand Total: Total number of outbound students in higher educational level including all non-degree programs Sub Total: Number of outbound students in non-degree programs in language or others Language: Number of outbound students in non-degree language course Others: Number of outbound students in non-degree training programs except language courses

Nondegree Sub Total

Grand Total Degree

Year

Table 5.1  Number of Korean-Outbound Students in Higher Education (2007–2016)

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88,942 55,145 62,155 20,884 83,039

227,126

‘13

105,786 34,774 51,160 27,823 78,983

219,543

‘14

‘16

123,542 100,011 34,873 33,167 23,517 30,859 32,764 59,271 56,281 90,130

214,696 223,908

‘15

120 Keunsun You

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level of education, demand for higher education has expanded. Global economic recession and low-birth rate after the year of 1990 (KB Financial Group, 2012) are also accountable for the decrease. Though in slight fuctuations, Undergraduate and Others categories are offsetting the other decreasing factors and main forces that maintain the level of grand totals. As the scale of outbound students grew, Yuhak (留學: Study abroad) turned into one of the major choices in higher education among Korean students and parents. The number of people returning from overseas educational sojourning has accordingly increased and academic interest on the repatriation of these people and their unique experience of international sojourning began to appear (Park, Chang, Lee, Min, Choi, Lee, and Byun, 2008; Heo et al., 2014; Kim and Kim, 2014; Kim, 2015). However, the attempts have limits of small samplings (Park et al., 2008), narrow research perspective (Heo et al., 2014), and restricted sojourning locations, etc. (Kim and Kim, 2014; Heo et al., 2014; Kim, 2015). Meanwhile, Kim‘s longitudinal study on academic sojourners’ in the United States (2015) has substantial signifcance in terms of applying longitudinal methods to observe the sojourners’ changes in status and perspectives. Major Concepts in Global Human Workforce

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Adaptability According to a report from Pricewaterhous Coopers (here after PwC), 93 percent of the business leaders recognized the importance of hiring and retaining talent within the organizations, but 61 percent have not yet taken any specifc action to deal with the issue (PwC, 2014a). Meanwhile PwC’s following report suggested Adaptability as major defning element in talent competition (PwC, 2014b) that the more adaptable are a nation’s workers, the better the match between talent supply and demand, and the wider the talent pool for employers. In less adaptable talent markets, poorly matched candidates drive up recruitment costs associated with hiring and onboarding people. The report prospected that if talent markets become more effcient, worth of 130 billion U.S. dollars of productivity could be released. Companies successful in managing highly adaptable talent can recruit and retain these people more effectively due to two reasons. First is the higher frst-time acceptance rate indicating effcient recruiting process and a better ft between employer and employees. Second is the lower short-term resignation rate which represents those resigning their post within a year. As previously described, more than a quarter of the new recruits from college graduates in Korea leave the job within the frst year of employment (Sung, Bae, and Noh, 2004; Korea Employers Federation, 2014). This impact

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is clearly refected on the low level of national labor productivity3 among OECD countries (OECD, 2014a), which is below half (49.3%) of that of the United States in 2011 (Kho et al., 2013). Under the constant uncertainty and changes ahead, enhanced level of adaptability and fexibility will be prospected as key factors for qualifed workforce in the future society.

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Diversity Diversities in surface and deep-level of organizations have broadened in terms of gender, generation, and even in ethnic aspects worldwide (Baldwin, Bommer, and Rubin, 2008). Historically known as one of the countries with strong ethnic homogeneity, the composition of Korean population has rapidly diversifed in recent years. It became a net immigration country since 2005,4 which is mostly attributable to the infux of foreign labor, international marriage migrants, and international students (OECD, 2013b). Eventually, legal immigrants within Korea reached 1 million in 2007. Business sector welcomes these changes in hope for a breakthrough resolving extended economic recession. In 2011, the Korean Academic Society of Business Administration included Diversity-Embracing Management as one of the major concepts in their list of Ten Management Keywords for 2020 (Kwon, 2011). A survey on Korean CEOs also disclosed that 68.7 percent of business leaders perceived intensifying diversity in corporate human resources composition and 74.3 percent expressed the anticipation of enhancing the corporate performance through it (Tae, Lee, Yoon, and Seo, 2011). But effective diversity management is still in its infancy despite the leaders’ keen perception over the concept. Not to mention the unusual scale of Korean academic sojourners among other OECD countries, the sojourning experience of Korean returnees from overseas higher education involving adaptability and diversity, which invites further academic analysis. As previously reviewed, academic approach toward this subject has not been active, it would be relevant to start from broader perspectives to understand the social atmosphere surrounding the phenomenon. With the above in consideration, the following chapter will discuss the chronological changes in social perspective toward the returnees for the past decades through media content analysis. SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE CHANGES TOWARD KOREAN RETURNEES This chapter will review the chronological perspective changes toward Korean returnees through content analysis. Media representation refects how the social perspective toward Korean returnees has evolved through the

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years. International movements of general Korean public had been strictly controlled by government until the late 1970s (DongA Daily, 1979). Since the major governmental measures began releasing the restriction in 1981 (Lee, 1981) and reached complete liberation in 1989. These changes gradually faded the exclusiveness embedded in outbound tertiary education and Yuhakpa within Korean society. In order to examine the fow of social perspective toward returnees in more structured way, major periodicals such as newspapers and magazine articles were retrieved from Korean and English portal sites from 2002 to 2017.5 The results are summarized in table 5.2 by listing the article selection according to the dates, titles, and the sources. There are other important issues with regard to the phenomenon of academic sojourning, for example, early-year sojourning in primary or secondary education, brain drain or brain circulation in highly educated R&D professionals. Each has its own agenda that requires independent approach; therefore, the focus of the research in this occasion is specifed to the general Korean returnees who have sojourned for higher education in order to grasp the comprehensive view of social perspective changes upon the returnees in chronological fow as an early-stage approach to the topic.

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From 1990 to 2002: Golden Age Returnees were highly respected and welcomed with the opening of Korean stock market in 1992. International business and fnancial organizations rushed in and created high demands for qualifed global-minded workforce equipped with English communication skills. From the late 1990s, global talents search among these business organizations got further competitive by doubling the number of recruitments from returnees with overseas degrees such as MA or PhD offering 30 percent higher salary than that of local college graduates (Hwang, 2004). The trend continued for several years and was clear among the workforce in science and engineering backgrounds or the graduates from prestigious academic institutions mostly in the United States and other major English-speaking countries (Shin, 2002). From 2003 to 2010: Burgeoning Skepticism As the number of returnees increases, social perspectives upon them have changed accordingly (Marginson, 2006). The returning rush of Korean international students began from 2003 with the global economic crisis in the United States and European region. One survey around this period revealed that over 60 percent (60.3%) of the job seekers with postgraduate education think their higher academic degrees are hindering employment. Furthermore, 38.3 percent confessed that they deliberately lowered the fnal academic

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

2008 2009

2007

2004 2005 2006

2002 2003

Year

Newspaper Title

Chosun Weekly Magazine Chosun Ilbo Hankook Ilbo Maekyung Daily Kookmin Ilbo

09.28. 09.28. 12.03. 10.14. 05.12. 06.26.

Chosun Ilbo-a Chosun Ilbo-b Hankyung Daily NEWIS Kookmin Ilbo Chosun Ilbo

04.13. Hankyung Business 06.21. Chosun Ilbo 09.21. Hankyung Business

01.08. 11.27. 03.06. 03.14. 03.14.

06.03. DongA Ilbo 11.20. Daily UNN (University News Network) 12.25. Maekyung Daily

Date (mm​.d​ d.) Headlines

Author

Hiding Ph.D. degrees to get a job Half of the MBAs are jobless 9 fold growth of share of Yuhakpa in bank executives in decade 54% of major companies recruiting global talents this year Shadows in global talents war; companies’ search efforts turn out to be inefficient Talent search for Yuhakpa and foreigners: nationality doesn’t matter Overflowing Yuhakpa, no more halo effects Global talent war: major changes in Korean human capital in the era of 1 million foreigners within the country Stuck in the middle; sad returning-early sojourners Advice to returnees; pile up job experience through internship No jobs for returnees, the salmons Companies search for global talents; Yuhakpa and local foreigners Yuhakpa, U-turning home: global recession lead them for careers at home In-depth report: 48% of HR managers doubt the competency of Yuhakpa

“Job searching at home”, Yuhakpa is rushing back

Shin, HM Park, YY Kim, DH Youm, KS et al.

Chang, SK

Lee, SH, & Shin, HK Hwang, SH Kim, KS Lee, KS

Corporate Talent War: search for Yuhakpa M.A. and Ph.D. holders Shin, YS 84% of MA, PhD, and Yuhakpa think “higher degrees impede their job search” Ohn, HJ

Table 5.2  List of Articles on “Yuhak” or “Yuhakpa” from 2002 to 2017

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2017

2014 2016

2013

2010 2012

The Economist DongA Ilbo Daily UNN Premium Chosun DongA Weekly

Herald Economics Hankook Ilbo Hankyoreh Daily Maekyung Daily

07.28. Chosun Ilbo 08.17. Chosun Ilbo 01.20. Edaily

10.04. 07.26. 10.31. 11.14. 11.16. 07.06. 08.12. 11.21. 05.09. 05.30.

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Yuhakpa took the majority of executives in major companies U-turning Yuhakpa & immigrants: sweeter home in time of global recession Sad returnees; jobless in host and home countries Tears of elite students in SKY universities No jobs even for Yuhakpa or local elites. Returning students; plight of the sea turtles Returning Yuhakpa with Top university degrees Issue diagnosis: unique local alumni network overpowering Ivy leaguers From sea turtles to sea kelp; changing perspectives on Chinese Yuhakpa Brain Drain: 47% of general, 60% of Ph.D. academic sojourners never return home 500 Korean scientists based in U.S. declined to return home News Q: Brain drain-Talented human resources are leaving Korea 52% said ‘No’ to early-year academic sojourning

Kang,YS & Park, SC Oh, HY Shin, HY

Kim, SS Bae, SJ Huh, S Chung, W et al. Editorial Kim, JH, & Kim, YH Yu, MD Park, SJ

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backgrounds to get more job interviews. Majority of business organizations (81.1%) started to reduce exclusive benefts from higher degree holders in the recruiting process (Ohn, 2003). The skepticism insinuated over their job performance and work attitude. One survey in 2004 disclosed the mounting disputes over the job performance of Yuhakpa employees as well as their lack of loyalty and uncooperative attitude within the organizations (Hwang, 2004). A report from one headhunting agency in 2005 refects these changes that nearly half (46%) of the customers who acquired overseas MBA degrees were unemployed (Kim, 2005). In 2006, “Yuhakpa executives in bank industry increased nine folds during past decade” captured the headlines of the major newspapers. In that report, English profciency was suggested as one of the top prerequisites in higher positions in fnance, business consulting, and diplomatic area, which fueled already overheated English education in every level of educational institutions in Korea. It further affected the curriculum of public elementary schools and even higher education which resulted in rush of opening lectures delivered in English irrespective of the contents among the local universities (Hankook Ilbo, 2006). Corporate search for global talents got proactive. Companies started global recruiting for global workforce, a.k.a. Yuhakpa including returnees in Korea and sojourners in host countries. They even stated clear willingness to hire non-Korean applicants regardless of nationality or geographical locations (Hankyung Business Magazine, 2006). At the same time, dispute over returnees’ job performance, job commitment, and loyalty continued. Human resources managers expressed negative opinions over the Yuhakpa returnees within the organization. They evaluated that returnees tend to overestimate their role and competence in the organization which result in low job satisfaction (Lee, 2006). Economic uncertainty extended in major host countries and security issue post 9/11 particularly in the United States shrank substantial governmental support in career policy toward non-U.S. citizens around this period (Chosun Ilbo, 2006). Korean job market was not favorable to returnees any longer that they had to compete with local college graduates, who have strengthened their competitiveness through international and internal exposure to the stricter recruiting standards. Returnees’ language profciency has been exclusive in the past; however, their lack of local network and organizational adaptability began to offset Yuhakpa’s comparative advantage in local job market (Chang, 2007). From 2008 to 2010: Diversifying Perspectives Despite worldwide economic recession, the number of Korean academic sojourners in the United States remained the highest level in 2008, even

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ahead of China and India (Kim, 2009; Yuom, Lee, Park, Chae, and Han, 2009). Corporate competition for global talents intensifed further in Korea and nearly 70 percent (69.5%) of business organizations maintained positive stance toward hiring qualifed global workforce, an increase over 15 percent from 54.1 in 2006 (Park, 2008). Favoring academic degrees from top twenty business schools in the United States, specifcally MBAs with fancy career and language profciency got further stronger (Chosun Ilbo, 2007b). However, human resources managers’ evaluation of these workforce was still negative that their lack of understanding over local business and organizational culture leads to low job satisfaction, which is refected in returnees’ higher turnover rate (Youm et al., 2009). On the other hand, a survey in 2010 disclosed Yuhakpa returnees took up nearly 20 percent (18.7%) of higher management positions in top thirty companies in Korea, which implies an ongoing demand for returnees in highly professional positions (Kim, 2010).

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Post 2010: Diversifying Workforce and Brain Drain As European fnancial crisis extended to global economy since 2008, increasing number of countries reduced career benefts once offered to international students as a protective measure for domestic workforces (OECD, 2013b). It triggered sojourning students’ returning home. Impact from economic recession during this period was comparatively severe in the United States and major European nations than in Korea, which became a niche for international immigrants as well as academic sojourners (Bae, 2012). The mobility of people refected the fact that the number of inbound population outnumbered that of the outbound for the frst time, which suggests that more people are coming into Korea since 2006. The net infow of population reached its peak in 2013 and most active in age 20s group (37.1%) (Statistics Korea, 2014a). Although the impact from global economic recession during this period may have been less damaging Korean economy, it also suffered prolonged status of jobless growth. Thus, increasing number of returnees under business shrinkage in local job market turned their competitive advantages not as privileged as they had been. Yuhakpa benefts in the recruiting process have diminished as corporate perspectives and competition with local college graduates became intense (Chung, Im, Kim, Bae, Chang, and Kim, 2012; Maekyung Daily Editorial, 2012; Kim and Kim, 2013). An expert from Korea Labor Institute commented that the scale of returnees in Korea has grown to be infuential group in local job market that requires subsequent policies (Bae, 2012) and the term Returnee appeared in

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transliterated Korean expression in the articles featuring their struggles in Korean job market (Huh, 2012). From 2014, signs of brain drain were detected in certain sectors. It is particularly clear among the highly qualifed workforce in R&D sector (Park, 2016; Kang and Park, 2016; Oh, 2016; Shin, 2017). Meanwhile, an interesting article regarding Chinese returnees revealed ongoing analogous process in contemporary Chinese economic context (Yu, 2014). Total expenditure on overseas academic sojourning showed clear downward move since 2011, and it is mainly accountable to the decline in early-year sojourning and expanded scale of returnees over the years in local job market (Lee, 2016). As have reviewed so far, social perspectives toward Korean returnees have changed upon the scale of the group within the society and global and national economic trends. Academic degrees from overseas lost their scarcity in Korea where globalization and educational infation prevail and even perceived as a requirement rather than a relative merit for particular jobs (Ghazarian, 2014). In the meantime, corporate expectations on Yuhakpa applicants have evolved from their language profciency to concrete performance, adaptability, and loyalty in the workplace. KOREAN RETURNEES’ SELF-PERSPECTIVES This chapter describes the survey process and result. Findings from the survey were analyzed upon the previous two chapters’ discourses.

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Participants and Data Collection Participants for the study should satisfy two major conditions. First, they should be Koreans who have sojourned abroad for tertiary education which includes BA, MA, or PhD courses. Second, they should be currently employed in full-time position in Korea. Thus, those in academic organizations such as universities, colleges, and any related research institutions were excluded. Independent research perspectives need to be applied toward returnees in academic or research-oriented organizations in the future studies due to their distinctive features from those in business context. Data collection used internet survey tool. Online questionnaire was constructed using survey application in Google Drive. To locate relevant samples for the topic, “Snowball” sampling method (each respondent assisting in the recruitment of relevant other samples) was used. The recipient of e-mail request containing online access link could participate in the survey by clicking it which directly connects the survey questionnaire website. Responses

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were automatically assembled into author’s Google account for subsequent analysis. The survey proceeded for one month. Five business days after the frst request, reminding message was transmitted to encourage the survey participation by phone call, e-mail, or mobile messenger. The reminders repeated every Friday throughout the whole period. As the snowball sampling initiated from the author’s personal network of acquaintances, there may be limitations in the representativeness of the subjects for this study. Demographic Data Total 209 responses were collected and seventeen cases were removed due to the technical aspect of the survey tool. These cases were double or multiple identical transmissions from a single participant. Thirty responses from college faculty members, students, and people who are currently unemployed were excluded. As a result, forty-seven non-usable responses had been removed, leaving 162 relevant cases for subsequent analyses. Among the demographic results, gender and age distribution are presented in table 5.3. The number of male respondents was higher and average age was 34 (33.6). Nearly 70 percent (107, 66%) of the participants’ major was liberal arts, followed by science and engineering (34, 21.0%) and art and others (21, 13%). With regard to their higher education overseas, BA degree holders were 97 (90.0%), MA, 34 (23.4%), and PhD, 8 (2.5%). Multiple overseas degree holders were twenty-three people (14.2%). The United States was the number one (94, 58.0%) in sojourning location followed far behind by in the order of the United Kingdom (19, 11.7%), Japan (17, 10.5%), China (13, 8.0%), Australia (10, 6.2%), and Canada (10, 6.2%). Further details of demographic information are summarized in table 5.4.

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Analysis on Descriptive Responses Participants were inquired to write their own view on sojourning experience to the following open question: “What advice would you give to the sojourners who are considering returning home on completing their study abroad?” Overall review of the responses revealed that they are well aware of the changes in social perspective toward Yuhakpa returnees in Korea. Among the twenty-three males in the age twenties group, seven people recommended job experience in the host countries during the sojourning and fve mentioned the importance of maintaining local networking in home country while they were away because it could build up useful network for job search after the repatriation.

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Table 5.3  Respondents’ Gender and Age Distribution Number of Responses Gender Male

(Total) Age

20s 30s 40s

Age

20s 30s 40s

162 88 26 37 25 74 22 41 11

Female

Percent (within each group) 100 54.3 16.1 22.8 15.4 45.7 13.6 25.3 6.8

(29.5) (42.1) (28.4) (29.7) (55.4) (14.9)

Table 5.4  Demographic Survey Results in Summary

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Category

Number of Responses

Length of Sojourning 1–3 years 3–5 years 5–7 years More than 7 years Length of Time since Return from Sojourning Less than 1 year 1–3 years 3–5 years 5–7 years More than 7 years Length of Experience in Current Job Less than a year 1–3 years 3–5 years 5–7 years More than 7 years Current Job Status Staff Junior Manager Middle Manager Senior Manager Director or above Others Annual Income (Korean Won) Less than 30 million 30–50 million 50–70 million 70–90 million Above 90 million Others

Percent (%)

42 49 36 35

25.9 30.3 22.2 21.6

18 43 41 22 38

11.1 26.5 25.3 13.6 23.5

40 59 31 10 22

23.5 35.8 19.9 7.6 13.2

55 39 24 30 11 3

34.0 24.1 14.8 18.5 6.8 1.8

24 70 32 11 24 1

14.8 43.2 19.8 6.8 14.8 0.6

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One thirty-year-old male respondent compared Korean organizational culture to that of military and suggested as below: If you don’t like military culture, look for a job in a foreign or multinational organization where the managers are foreign nationals. If you prefer a stable position in Korean major company, be assertive at work and conform to organizational culture then you will be completely assimilated in less than a year. If you like alcohol, the assimilation period will be shortened!

Another twenty-nine-year-old male participant also described the unique Korean organizational culture:

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Korea is pretty much internationalized now but it is still in the dynamic progress heading for an enhanced level of globalization. So if you want to repatriate effectively, you need to step back and observe the streams of change in advance. Strong conservatism and elders-frst culture still prevail in Korean organizations and society.

Among the forty-one responses from male participant in their thirties, ten people recommended job experience in the host countries. Four in the same group admitted benefts of being Yuhakpa-returnees in the society have clearly diminished that sojourners need to take further efforts to enhance their competence in Korean job market if they plan to repatriate from sojourning. Responses recommending job experience in the host countries during the sojourning were widely distributed in all age groups. Among the forty respondents in over 40s male group, ten people emphasized job experience in the host countries and some even put it as another requisite to language profciency from sojourning. The response from female participants was further specifc and precise in description. Among the thirty-fve responses from the females in age 20s group, six people expressed that there are no more benefts for Yuhakpa returnees in Korea, therefore, the language profciency from overseas sojourning is no longer as proftable as before unless it is effectively supplemented with relevant business career. With regard to this, one twenty-fveyear-old female participant wrote: The language ability you achieved from overseas sojourning is defnitely a strong skill here but it is a double-edged sword. If you depend on it too much, you might not be as successful as you expected in your career path. Thus, you need to develop matching business competency as well in order to be competitive in Korean job market.

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The other twenty-nine-year-old female also described: There are too many Yuhakpa in Korea now so they are not as welcomed as before. So you need to be more realistic and specifc about what you really want from your career here. For example, if you want a job in public, government-related organizations or institutions, your sojourning experience might be a plus factor but adapting to those organizational cultures might be substantially diffcult.

Eleven females in age twenties group also put job experience or any type of activities that could facilitate adaptation in their host countries. Readiness for repatriation was refected in seven responses that the preparation for repatriation needs to be strategically planned and prepared ahead in constant contact with local networks and information on Korean job market during the entire sojourning period. One twenty-nine-year-old female specifcally described the importance of interpersonal network as below: I think it is quite important to maintain the interpersonal networks you have built both in Korea and your host country. Because whether you settle in host country or come back to Korea, they will be a valuable asset for your career path.

In addition, one twenty-seven year-old female provided an impressive comment on attitude toward cultural differences as below:

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Do not compare or judge Korean or your host country’s culture. Culture is not a matter of right or wrong. Accept the difference per se. Be more careful when you apply the value, thought or habits you newly acquired from your sojourning experience in Korean context.

The perspectives refected in thirty-two responses from age 30s female group appeared further cautious in their responses on repatriation. Eight people said decision for repatriation should be based upon overall systematic review of information on both circumstances in Korea and host country. One thirty-fve-year-old female expressed: Decision to repatriate should be made carefully after refecting yourself whether you can adjust to Korean corporate culture or not. I have seen several Yuhakpa returnees who have failed to adjust in Korean major companies.

Other thirty-eight-year-old female responded regarding the organizational culture in Korea as below: They say plenty of Yuhakpa out there but still there are even more Koreans who don’t have any overseas experience in the organization. In this context, I think

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the most important attitude is to have respect on each other. Each group has its own strength; therefore, harmonizing efforts to complement and share each other’s experience will be essential in repatriation.

Six responses from over forties female group were analogous to these streams. In terms of global progress, Korea is one of the nations that have shown unprecedented advancements in short period of time and this is generally perceived by the participants in their responses. On the other hand, some respondents expressed concerns over the still prevalent strong conservatism in Korean organizational culture. These respondents are daunted to express newly acquired perspective or knowledge from their sojourning in the current organizational atmosphere. Most of the respondents, therefore, chose to conform to the organizational culture frst when they confront these conficting situations rather than to be expressive of themselves. These reactions had been observed from Asian returnees in the prior researches. Kidder’s research on Japanese returnees (1992) found their ambivalent feelings about the changes that make them feel “un-Japanese.” Therefore, they recognize the problems in the process of the repatriation but are reluctant to express or give up the newly acquired values or changes from the sojourning experience. This demonstrates the dilemma of Japanese returnees, whether to maintain or trim the new aspects and changes from their sojourning experience. In Vanichakorn’s study (2005) on Thai returnees’ case represents the similar aspects that Thai returnees had to be selective in applying knowledge and ideas they had learned from sojourning experience because of cultural differences, resource availability, and constraints, such as the resistance from certain aged superiors or jealous administrators within the organizations they belonged. The interpretations for this similarity among Asian returnees’ reactions could be found in the cultural context frame. Japan has been categorized as a high-context culture with strong homogeneous and tight society as Korea and marked by beliefs of Japanese uniqueness that places people from other cultures on the outside of it (Trandis, 1990 as stated in Kidder, 1992), because the distinctions between insiders and outsiders are greater in high-context cultures (Hall, 1976). Meanwhile returnees in the above studies had sojourned mostly in major English-speaking countries, which are under lower context culture, and the similarities found in three Asian countries refect the conficts between higher and lower context cultures (Hall, 1976) or collectivism6 and individualism7 (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 2010). The result from the current research appeared analogous to the above streams. The sojourning location was highly concentrated in the United

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States, the country of low-context culture and strong individualism where things are expressed much more explicitly. On the other hand, Korea, Japan, and Thailand are typical higher context culture with strong collectivism, where many things are left unsaid, letting the culture explain. Interdependence between the members of the group is emphasized in the culture of collectivism and everything is produced and controlled by the group or society. Therefore, a society with strong collectivism stresses the importance of ingroup cohesion and group goals usually come ahead the individual goals.

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DISCUSSIONS The fndings from the survey on Korean returnees for this study provided a simple and general set of data which made brief understanding over the group possible. It showed that respondents’ felds of study were concentrated in liberal arts, whereas previous studies on sojourners were mostly focusing on science or R&D professionals (Heo et al., 2014; Park, 2015; Kang and Park, 2016; Oh, 2016). The United States was the most favored sojourning location followed far behind by the United Kingdom, Japan, and China, which represent keen preference for English-speaking countries as academic sojourning among Koreans. China was the fourth popular sojourning location in the current survey, whereas it has been the next popular one to the United States in the annual national statistics (Ministry of Education, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). The current survey included only the academic sojourning for offcial degrees in higher educational level from BA to PhD courses excluding other nondegree sojourning such as language or other exchange programs. The national statistics data from Korean ministry of education (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) contain all types of sojourners so the discrepancy between each data group might be attributable to the trend of increasing sojourners in China particularly in non-degree programs. These results imply the increasing gravity of China as next popular academic sojourning location among Korean students. Additional fndings from the descriptive responses from the current survey offered enhanced understanding over the respondents’ self-perspective on their sojourning experience. In general, job experiences in the host country were strongly recommended from all age groups. Their self-perception within the home country was comparatively realistic and objective. Majority of the respondents think that language profciency from sojourning should be juxtaposed with substantive job competence from relevant feld experience and knowledge for successful repatriation in terms of business context. Some concerned the negative aspects of unique Korean corporate culture stressing strong hierarchy which hinders returnees’ proactive and creative approach with their potential competence within the organization.

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Future demographics and globalization in Korea will further diversify many aspects of age, gender, ethnicity, or nationality. The impending demographic issues such as aging population and low fertility rate are casting a shadow toward the future of the country and corporate talent search is getting intense. Meanwhile, adaptability is emerging as one of the core values for the future workforce. With the above in consideration, it is crucial that every group of human resources in Korea should be effectively functioning within the society. The result of this study could provide general understanding over the Korean returnees in business context. Literature review disclosed that scale of returnees has expanded swiftly within the Korean society for the past decades, and they are incrementing one of the diversifying aspects to the contemporary workforce within the business organizations. As a communication specialist in business organization, it is important for secretaries or offce/ administrative professionals to have a relevant understanding over the organization and its workforce with various experiences and backgrounds. From the above perspective, fndings from the study could offer some meaningful ground information for them to have a better picture of the workforce with sojourning experience within the business organizations. There is limit of generalization and representativeness due to the sampling method and operational restriction with regard to the respondent group. Thus, subsequent studies need to focus on various aspects embedded in crosscultural experience of Korean returnees or sojourners for conceptualizing the signifcances in each social context so that these highly talented workforce could fully perform their capacity within their affliation.

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NOTES 1. An earlier version of this chapter was published in Keunsun You. 2017. “A Research on Social and Self Perspective towards Highly Educated Korean Returnees Focusing on Business Context.” Journal of Secretarial Studies, 26 (2): 203–228. 2. International mobility of general Korean public has been restricted by government until January 1, 1989. 3. Labor productivity is measured as GDP per hour worked and is one of the main determinants of living standards. Productivity is a measure of the effciency with which available resources are used in production. (OECD, 2014). 4. Infow and outfow of people who have sojourned over 90 days in Korea. Korean and Non-Korean both included (Statistics Korea, 2014) 5. Korean articles were retrieved from Korean portal, “Naver” using Korean key words such as 해외유학(海外留學) or 유학파(留學波). English articles were retrieved from global portal, Google using English key words such as Korean Returnees, International Students, or Academic Sojourners.

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6. Collectivism: A society in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lives continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 515). 7. Individualism: The opposite of collectivism. A society in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him- or herself and his or her immediate family only (Ibid., p. 519). 8. Grand Total for year 2009 showed slight inconsistency. 243,224 was the grand total appeared in 2009 data but all the rest annual data presented 240,949 for 2009’s grand total. 9. Data for Others category in non-degree programs available since 2012.

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Guthride, Mathew, Asmus B. Komm, and Emily Lawson. “Making talent a strategic priority.” The McKinsey Quarterly, November 1, 2008: 49–59. Hall, E. T. Beyond Culture. New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1976. Hankook Ilbo. “English is the power: Nine fold growth in Yuhakpa share in bank executives in decade.” HankookIlbo, Society section, Morning edition, March 6, 2006. Hankyung Business Magazine. “Talent search for Yuhakpa and foreigners: Nationality doesn’t matter.” Hankyung Business Magazine, April 13, 2006. Heo, Dae Nyoung, Jun-Young Lee, Naeyang Jeong, Bon Chul Ku, and Choonghan Song. “A study on the critical factors that affect Korean students’ decision to return to Korea after graduating from the top 5 universities in USA.” Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society 17, no. 1 (2014): 264–288. Hofstede, Geert, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov. Culture and Organization: Software of Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and its Importance for Survival. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2010. Huh, Seung. “Sad returnees: Jobless in host and home countries.” Hankyoreh Daily, Society section, Evening edition, October 31, 2012. Hwang, Sung-Hye. “Hiding Ph.D. degrees to get hired.” Chosun Weekly Magazine, January 8, 2004. Ju, Seyoung. “Global talent war 2.0: from recruitment to utilization.” SERI Management Note 166, Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2012. Kang, Young-Soo, and Seung-Chan Park. “500 Korean scientists based in U.S. declined to return home.” Chosun Ilbo, July 28, 2016. http:​/​/biz​​.chos​​un​.co​​m​/sit​​e​/ dat​​a​/htm​​l​_dir​​/2016​​/07​/2​​8​/201​​6​0728​​00230​​.html​. KB Financial Group. “Market trends of Korean international students.” KB Daily Knowledge Vitamin 12, no. 38 (2012): 1–4. Kho, Hyun-Chul, Sung-O Bae, Je-Eun Ye, Hyun Jin, Myung-Jin Kim, Joo-Young, Park, and Ji-Eung Ryu. “5 Core HR strategies for the era of low economic growth.” CEO Information 886, Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2013. Kidder, Louise H. “Requirements for being Japanese: Stories of returnees.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 16 (1992): 383–393. Kim, Do-Hoon. “Yuhakpa, U-turning home: Global recession lead them for careers at home.” Kookmin Ilbo, May 12, 2009. Kim, Jeehun. “Returning experiences of Korean early study abroad (Jogijuhak) students who studied in Southeast Asia.” The Language and Culture. Korean Language and Culture Education Society 9, no. 2 (2013): 101–120. Kim, Ji-Hyun, and Yong-Hwan Kim. “Returning Yuhakpa with top university degrees.” Donga Ilbo, August 12, 2013. Kim, Jong-Young. Transnational Middlemen Intellectuals: Higher Education in US and the Birth of Korean Elites. Gyeonggi: Dolbegae, 2015. Kim, Kyung-Soo. “Half of the MBAs are jobless.” Chosun Ilbo, November 27, 2005. Kim, Kyung-Sook, and Min Hee Kim. “The infuence of academic stress and acculturative stress of Republic of Korean studying abroad and psychological adjustment.” Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issues 20, no. 2 (2014): 67–88. Kim, Sang-Soo. “Yuhakpa took the majority of executives in major companies.” Herald Economics, October 4, 2010.

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Korea Employers Federation. 2014 Survey on Employment Status Features of New and Experienced Employees. Korea Employers Federation Economic Research Center HR Team, 2014. http:​/​/www​​.kefp​​laza.​​com​/k​​ef​/ke​​f​_pre​​ss​_vi​​ew​.js​​p​?num​​ =3484​​&page​​Num​=0​​&s​Mod​​e​=100​​0​&key​​word=​신입. Lee, Kyung-Sun. “Shadows in global talents war: Companies’ search efforts turn out to be ineffcient.” Kookmin Ilbo, March 14, 2006. Lee, Young-Keun. “Toward to era of liberalizing restrictions on international mobility.” DongA Ilbo, June 16, 1981. Maeil Kyungje. “No jobs even for Yuhakpa or local elites.” MaeKyung Economy Editorial, November 16, 2012. Marginson, Simmon. “Dynamics of national and global competition in higher education.” Higher Education 52 (2006): 1–39. Ministry of Education. Statistics on Korean Education: Outbound Tertiary Students. Seoul: Korean Educational Statistics Service, MOE, 2008. http:​/​/kes​​s​.ked​​i​.re.​​kr​/pu​​ bl​/li​​st​?su​​rvSeq​​=2008​​&menu​​Seq​=0​​&divi​​sio​n=​​&item​​Code=​​02. ———. Statistics on Korean Education: Outbound Tertiary Students. Seoul: Korean Educational Statistics Service, MOE, 2009. http:​/​/kes​​s​.ked​​i​.re.​​kr​/pu​​bl​/li​​st​?su​​rvSeq​​ =2009​​&menu​​Seq​=0​​&divi​​sio​n=​​&item​​Code=​​02. ———. Statistics on Korean Education: Outbound Tertiary Students. Seoul: Korean Educational Statistics Service, MOE, 2010. http:​/​/kes​​s​.ked​​i​.re.​​kr​/pu​​bl​/li​​st​?su​​rvSeq​​ =2010​​&menu​​Seq​=0​​&divi​​sio​n=​​&item​​Code=​​02. ———. Statistics on Korean Education: Outbound Tertiary Students. Seoul: Korean Educational Statistics Service, MOE, 2011. http:​/​/kes​​s​.ked​​i​.re.​​kr​/pu​​bl​/li​​st​ ;js​​essio​​nid​=3​​3a8Mr​​y5Kyq​​oNXAS​​Lr2yB​​t4D0z​​2BamM​​CnBwo​​dfYPj​​n8yn2​​n9Oni​​ WPKDm​​RhyO9​​3zX​?surv​​Seq​=2​​011​&m​​enu​Se​​q​=0​&d​​ivisi​​on=​&i​​temCo​​de​=02​. ———. Statistics on Korean Education: Outbound Tertiary Students. Seoul: Korean Educational Statistics Service, MOE, 2012. http:​/​/kes​​s​.ked​​i​.re.​​kr​/pu​​bl​/li​​st​?su​​rvSeq​​ =2012​​&menu​​Seq​=0​​&divi​​sio​n=​​&item​​Code=​​02. ———. Statistics on Korean Education: Outbound Tertiary Students. Seoul: Korean Educational Statistics Service, MOE, 2013. http:​/​/kes​​s​.ked​​i​.re.​​kr​/pu​​bl​/li​​st​?su​​rvSeq​​ =2013​​&menu​​Seq​=0​​&divi​​sio​n=​​&item​​Code=​​02. Ministry of Employment and Labor. Survey Report on Labor Conditions on Employment Type. Seoul: Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL), 2000. http:​/​/lab​​orsta​​t​.mol​​ab​.go​​.kr​/n​​ewOut​​/rene​​wal​/s​​tatre​​port/​​onlin​​epubl​​ist​.j​​sp​?cd​​=8​&ko​​ en​=ko​​&sel​e​​ct​=4&​​P​_ID=​​3​&rpt​​Id​=4. ———. Survey Report on Labor Conditions on Employment Type. Seoul: Ministry of Employment and Labor, MOE, 2009. http:​/​/lab​​orsta​​t​.mol​​ab​.go​​.kr​/n​​ewOut​​/rene​​wal​ /s​​tatre​​port/​​onlin​​epubl​​ist​.j​​sp​?cd​​=8​&ko​​en​=ko​​&sel​e​​ct​=4&​​P​_ID=​​3​&rpt​​Id​=4. Ministry of Justice. KIS Monthly Statistics September. Seoul: Korea Immigration Service, MOJ, 2014. http:​/​/www​​.immi​​grati​​on​.go​​.kr​/d​​oc​_ht​​ml​/at​​tach/​​imm​/f​​2014/​​ /2014​​10262​​07828​​_1​_1.​​hwp​.f​​​i les/​​Secti​​ons1.​​html. OECD. Education at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013a. http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1787​/eag​-2013​-en. ———. International Migration Outlook 2013. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013b. http:​ /​/dx.​​doi​/1​​0​.178​​7​/mig​​r​_out​​loo​k-​​2013-​​en (accessed on September 29, 2014).

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———. GDP Per Hour Worked: Indicator. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014a. http:// dx​.doi​/10​.1787​/1439e590​-en (accessed on September 29, 2014). ———. Society at a Glance 2014: OECD Social Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014b. http://dx​.doi​/10​.1787​/soc​_glance​-2014​-en (accessed on September 29, 2014). ———. Education at a Glance 2016: OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016. http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.187​/eag​-2016​-en (accessed on July 31, 2017). Oh, Hyun-Young. “News Q: Brain drain-Talented human resources are leaving Korea.” Chosun Ilbo, August 17, 2016. http:​/​/new​​s​.cho​​sun​.c​​om​/si​​te​/da​​ta​/ht​​ml​_di​​r​ /201​​6​/08/​​08​/20​​​16080​​80152​​1​.htm​​l. Ohn, Hyung-Joo. “84 percent of M.A., Ph.D., and Yuhakpa think ‘higher degrees’ impede their job search.” Daily UNN (University News Network), November 20, 2003. Park, Curi, Jiyoung Chang, Jooeun Lee, Grace Min, Yunseo Choi, Seungyon Lee, and Sooyon Byun. “An explorative qualitative study of multicultural identities in returnee college students in Korea.” Korean Psychological Association Annual Conference, 2008: 512–513. Park, Se-Joon. “Brain Drain: 47% of general, 60% of Ph.D. academic sojourners never return home.” DongA Weekly, No. 1040, May 20, 2016. http:​/​/wee​​kly​.d​​onga.​​ com​/R​​el​/3/​​all​/1​​1​​/535​​104​/1​. Park, Yu-Young. “Companies search for global talents: Yuhakpa and local foreigners.” NEWIS, October 14, 2008. Pricewaterhouse Coopers. “Fit for the future: Capitalising on global trends.” 17th Annual Global CEO Survey, 2014a. http:​/​/www​​.pwc.​​com​/g​​x​/en/​​ceo​-s​​urvey​​/2014​​/ asse​​ts​/pw​​c​-17t​​h​-ann​​ual​-g​​lobal​​-ceo-​​s​urve​​y​-jan​​-2014​​.pdf. ———. “Adapt to survive: How better alignment between talent and opportunity can drive economic growth.” A Global Study by PwC into the Value Gained by a Better Talent Fit Commissioned by LinkedIn, 2014b. http:​/​/www​​.pwc.​​com​/g​​x​/en/​​hr​-ma​​ nagem​​ent​-s​​ervic​​es​/pu​​blica​​tions​​/tale​​nt​-ad​​aptab​​ility​​​/down​​loads​​.jhtm​​l. Samsung Economic Research Institute. “Attractive Korea-10 strategies to upgrade national competency.” Outline of the sourcebook for G10 in Y10 Project Seminar co-hosted by National Parliament Market Economy and Social Security Network Forum & Samsung Economic Research Institute, June 29, 2005. http:​//​www​​.seri​​ .org/​​db​/db​​SymVL​​.html​​?menu​​=db06​​&pubk​​ey​=db​​20050​​62900​​1​&pub​​no​=62​​02​&co​​ de​=d​b​​20050​​62900​​1​#CON​​T. Shin, Ha-Young. “52% said ‘No’ to early-year academic sojourning.” Edaily, January 20, 2017. http:​/​/www​​.edai​​ly​.co​​.kr​/n​​ews​/N​​ewsRe​​ad​.ed​​y​?SCD​​=JG21​​&news​​id​=01​​ 32512​​66157​​99688​​&DCD=​​​A0070​​2​&Out​​LnkCh​​k​=Y. Shin, Yon-Soo. “Corporate talent war: Search for Yuhakpa M.A. and Ph.D. holders.” DongA Ilbo, June 3, 2002. Statistics Korea. “2013 international population transition statistics.” Press Release, July 10, 2014. http:​/​/kos​​tat​.g​​o​.kr/​​porta​​l​/kor​​ea​/ko​​r​_nw/​​2​/2​/5​​/ind​e​​x​.boa​​rd​?bm​​ode =read​&bSeq​=&aSe​q=328​341&p​ageNo​=1&ro​wNum=​10&na​vCoun​t=10&​currP​ g=&sT​arget​=titl​e&sTx​t= (accessed September 23, 2014). Sung, Sang-Hyun, Sung-O Bae, and Hyun-Tak Noh. “Era of turbulence, human is the competitiveness-7 Global HR trend.” CEO Information 460, Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2004.

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Szkudlarek, Betina. “Reentry: A review of the literature.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 34 (2010): 1–21. Tae, Won-Yu, San-Woo Lee, Woo-Keun Yoon, and Eui-Jung Seo. “Source of creativity and innovation: Managing diversity in organization.” CEO information 822, Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2011. Vanichakorn, Neelawan. “Application of international education: How would skills and knowledge learned abroad work back home.” The Journal of Industrial Technology 1, no. 2 (2005): 49–53. Ye, Ji-Eun, Hyun Jin, Jeun Jung, and Hyun-Kook Cho. “BRAVO Generation: The new generation of employees in the business organization.” CEO Information 727, Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2009. You, Keunsun. A Research on Factors Infuencing Korean Sojourners’ Repatriation. PhD diss., Korea University, 2015. Youm, Kang-Soo, Seok-Ho Lee, Seun-Huyk Park, Min-Ki Chae, and Kyung-Jin Han. “In-depth report No. 3: 48 percent of HR managers doubt the competency of Yuhakpa.” Chosun Ilbo, June 26, 2009.

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Chapter 6

Acquiring Higher Education Credentials at Home Korean Student Return Migrants from Latin America

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Jin Suk Bae

The International Organization for Migration (2004: 56) defnes return migration as “[t]he movement of a person returning to his/her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country,” adding, “This return may or may not be voluntary.”1 Tsuda (2009: 1) categorizes diasporic return into two types: “the return migration of frstgeneration diasporic peoples who move back to their homeland (country of birth)” and “ethnic return migration, which refers to later-generation descendants of diasporic peoples who ‘return’ to their countries of ancestral origin after living outside their ethnic homeland for generations.” Return migration of the various groups of the diaspora has taken the form of strategic movements in search of better economic or social opportunities in the groups’ ethnic homelands or has occurred because of homecoming instincts, ethnic ties and affnities, and immigration policies that favor ethnic connections in the ancestral homelands (Gmelch, 1980; Ley & Kobayashi, 2005; Oxfeld & Long, 2004; Tsuda, 2009). This chapter focuses on the specifc diaspora group composed of 1.5- or second-generation Koreans from Latin America whose migration purposes are particularly driven by educational opportunities within their ethnic homeland. In other words, they were either born in or immigrated to Latin America when they were young and grew up in Latin American countries through their high school years and then came to the Republic of Korea (hereafter “Korea” or “South Korea”) in order to enter a university in Seoul. One of the key questions addressed in this chapter is concerned with the central motivating factors, including transnational migration networks, behind younger Korean returnees’ decision to study in 141

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Korean universities. In addition, due to their upbringing in the Americas, these younger Koreans have diverse linguistic backgrounds. This study particularly examines how their multilingual competences selectively affect their adjustment processes in Korea as well as their decisions with respect to return migration. What then are the expectations of Korean returnees in their pursuit of higher education in Korea? What advantages or diffculties do these educational student-migrants encounter in Korea given their unique combination of Korean heritage and international background? Education-related concerns, in particular, can be an important source of motivation in stimulating transnational movements and even determining volumes and directions of migration fows. Although many people relocate to places far from their homes for the sole purpose of gaining educational credentials at specifc locations (Park & Bae, 2009), relatively little research has examined the motivations and experiences of students who move abroad for their higher education (Brooks & Waters, 2010). With regard to student mobility, students can be categorized into three groups: outgoing studyabroad participants, incoming international students, and domestic students who stay at home (Jon, 2009). The literature on educational migration issues in Korea has mainly dealt with outbound cases, especially focusing on Korean nationals’ tendency to study abroad in the early stages of their educations (Park & Bae, 2009; Song, 2012). The formation of transnational households and so-called “wild geese families,” as well as South Korean children’s return and readjustment at home as students or young professionals, has also been studied (Lo & Kim, 2012). An increasingly popular migration trend among Korean families involves transnational migration to English-speaking countries, enabling their children to earn overseas educational credentials and acquire the English language as economic capital within the global market (Song, 2010). In the pursuit of English skills as global, linguistic capital, some Koreans have formed transnational families with children and their mothers residing in English-speaking countries, while their fathers stay at home in order to support their educational expenses. While the literature has focused on how educational aspirations prompt outbound movements among Koreans, this study sheds light on the inbound student migration, conceiving South Korea as a diasporic, educational hub that attracts younger Korean returnees from various countries. This study aims to delve into how these returnees’ diasporic and educational aspirations converge or diverge within the urban space of Seoul. Furthermore, this chapter explores returnees’ experiences in the broader context of the recent internationalization of higher education, which has rendered global student mobility more dynamic than ever. This study contributes to the far less well known but emerging research on growing international student fows and students’ experiences in mid-level study-abroad destination countries like Korea.

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MIGRATORY PATTERNS OF THE KOREAN DIASPORA FROM LATIN AMERICA Close to one million second- and third-generation descendants of Korean and Japanese immigrants scattered across Latin America, Eastern Europe, and China have return-migrated to Korea and Japan since the late 1980s (Tsuda, 2009). Since the mid-nineteenth century, Koreans have migrated internationally for various reasons. Up to the beginning of World War II, Koreans moved mainly to neighboring countries such as China, Russia, and Japan (DeWind et al., 2012). However, after the 1960s, the receiving countries became more diversifed and expanded to include those in Europe and the Americas (Guimaraes, 2006). Due to their wide, geographic dispersal, people of Korean descent have settled in approximately 170 countries. However, since the 1990s, an increasing number of overseas Koreans, who were formerly dispersed in various countries, have returned to Korea. Korean return migrants interact with other Korean nationals on a daily basis as foreign workers, marriage migrants, professionals, and international students (Yoon et al., 2015). According to research on diaspora student returnees, Korean Chinese students are numerically dominant and have become a subsequent focus of research interest (Jo, 2002; Kim & Han, 2013).2 In contrast, Korean diaspora students from Latin America have been extremely understudied. The majority of Koreans settled in Latin America after the 1960s, when the Korean government encouraged agricultural family emigration to Latin America. According to statistics issued by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of 2017, there are 106,784 Korean immigrants in Latin America. There are 51,534 Koreans in Brazil (48.26%), 23,194 in Argentina (21.72%), 11,673 in Mexico (10.93%), 5,312 in Guatemala (4.97%), and 5,090 in Paraguay (4.77%). However, Koreans in Latin America have shown relatively high levels of mobility, and their migratory movements are multidirectional, involving continuous migration within Latin America or globally. Some Koreans who originally settled in Latin America have returned to South Korea or have relocated to the United States due to political and economic crises in Latin America or for other reasons, including fears of criminal targeting or in order to obtain better educations for themselves or their children (Bae, 2014; Joo, 2007; Park, 2014; Ropp, 2000). Park (2014) identifes various migratory trajectories among Koreans in Latin America especially in pursuit of better economic opportunities. She maintains that “Korean immigrants in South America have shown a high propensity to remigrate to countries such as the United States, Canada, South Korea, and Mexico, exhibiting tendencies of a ‘rhizomatic diaspora’ that covers three or more bases of relocation.” During their migrations, Korean immigrants’ resettlement in other Latin American countries was facilitated by their diasporic economic niches,

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such as the clothing manufacturing business combined with their linguistic and cultural competence. Bae (2014) maintains that more diverse and better educational and employment prospects in the United States have drawn Korean immigrants from Latin America to the United States. A large number of Korean secondary migrants residing in the New York area express their uneasiness about career prospects or the utility of a Latin America-based education, given the limited occupational opportunities and economic rewards in Latin America. Korean immigrants in Latin America have either sent their children to countries such as Korea, Canada, or the United States, particularly for their university degrees, or Korean families of diverse socioeconomic backgrounds have moved together to the United States. Joo (2007) examines experiences of Korean return migrants from Brazil, focusing on ethnic and economic aspects. For elderly Korean immigrants, uncertainty about their increasing old age upon retirement was the main reason determining their return migration, and, due to familiarity with Korean culture and language, they have experienced relatively smooth adaptation in Korea without distinct ethnic discrimination; however, some younger return migrants might experience diffculty in adapting to Korean society. The literature has examined economic motivations behind diverse migratory patterns of Koreans from Latin America (Joo, 2007; Park, 2014) or has focused on Koreans’ educational movement from Latin America to Anglophone destinations (Bae, 2014). This chapter will newly address various issues relating to the intersectionality of educational concerns and mobility among Koreans from Latin America, concentrating on their return fows into Korea.

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KOREAN DIASPORA STUDENT RETURNEES FROM LATIN AMERICA Methodologically, this study utilizes statistics, government documents, and other secondary sources both in English and Korean. The most signifcant element of research data, however, was empirically acquired through openended, in-depth interviews with seventeen Koreans from Latin America currently enrolled in degree-seeking programs in Seoul-based universities (table 6.1). Interviews were conducted between July and October 2017. Utilizing the snowball method, I beneftted from further referrals to other research participants through initial contacts. Interviews lasted between an hour and three hours. Most of the interviews were conducted in Korean and only two in English. The research group was made up of fve males and twelve females. The group was composed of 1.5-generation or Latin American-born secondgeneration Koreans, most of whom had lived in Latin America for over ffteen

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

Chansol(M) Jiyoung(F) Aera(F) Jinhee(F) Jisoo(F) Miae(F) Minjun(M) Eunmi(F) Sunghee(F) Yunhee(F) Taeho(M) Hyejun(M) Jungeun(F) Hyejin(F)

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

1994 1996 1995 1994 1997 1996 1993 1997 1997 1999 1993 1991 1980 1995

1995 1996 1998

Birth Year

Paraguay Ecuador Korea Korea Bolivia Guatemala Mexico Korea Bolivia Panama Ecuador Korea Brazil Korea

Korea Korea Guatemala

Birth Country Korea Korea Korea, Guatemala Korea, Paraguay Korea, Ecuador Korea Korea Korea, Bolivia Korea, Guatemala Korea Korea Korea Korea, Panama Korea, Ecuador Mexico Brazil Korea

Country of Nationality

Paraguay Ecuador Ecuador Dominican Republic Bolivia Guatemala Mexico Dominican Republic Argentina Panama Colombia Mexico Brazil Mexico

Peru Guatemala Guatemala

Country of Former Residence in Latin America

1994–2012 1996–2015 1998–2015 1998–2012 1997–2016 1996–2014 1993–2014 2002–2015 1997–2016 1999–2016 1993–2012 1994–2011 1980–1998 1999–2011

1997–2014 1997–2015 1998–2016

Period of Residence in Latin America

2013 2016 2016 2012 2017 2015 2015 2016 2017 2017 2013 2012 1999 2015

2015 2016 2017

University Entrance Year1

1

In the case of two participants, Jinhee and Jungeun who have continued their studies in graduate schools, the years they first began their undergraduate programs in Korea are inserted for their “university entrance year” in the table above.

Minju(F) Soojin(F) Jinho(M)

1 2 3

Name (Gender)

Table 6.1  Overview of Participants

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years. The average duration of their residency in Latin America was 17.3 years. Their birth places were as follows: seven were born in South Korea, and ten in countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Paraguay. The Korean-born respondents frst came to Latin America attached to their parents’ movement mainly for economic purposes. Eight respondents hold Korean nationality only; seven hold double nationality; and two hold Latin American nationalities only. The majority of them are in their early twenties. Their median age is 23.5. Respondents include those who have attended universities in other countries: three are Latin American university dropouts and two are U.S.-based university dropouts. Five respondents came to study in Korea alone, while two cases include all the immediate family members who returned to Korea. The majority of respondents have formed transnational families with their parent(s) or sibling(s) living in Korea or in Latin American or European countries. In order to protect respondents’ privacy, all names used in this chapter are pseudonyms.

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CHOOSING TO BE EDUCATED IN THE ETHNIC HOMELAND While two respondents are part of family-unit return migrations to Korea, the following are other overlapping factors that infuenced respondents who came to Korea individually in pursuit of their higher education: parental infuence, value of Korean degrees, interest in Korean culture and knowledge, scholarship opportunities, better-quality higher education, English-language course availability, and easy application procedures and admission. In addition, some respondents recall the existence of their siblings, friends, and relatives in Korea, and information circulating through transnational social networks encouraged their choice of Korea as a study-abroad destination. People migrate in response to perceptions about the geography of relative value. Some locations provide a more valuable and desirable education than do others (Waters, 2009). In the case of some respondents, their decision to go to Korea was strongly infuenced by their parents. Parents expected that their children would have a better educational environment and more career options by acquiring degrees in Korea. The same comment often resonated with respondents themselves, who gave the following evaluation: “[T]he Korean degrees will be more recognized than the ones from Latin American universities, thus offering more future opportunities.” Sunghee from Argentina explains: My parents worried that I would end up in the garment business like them. If I get the degree in Argentina, there are no other options to live in another country. The degree is not to be recognized in other countries.

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Korean immigrants in Latin America are disproportionately engaged in the garment industry (Shin, 2009), where children sometimes join their parents’ businesses. Latin American respondents state that one of the reasons that they did not consider attending the local university was because of the low-quality education. More importantly, they were concerned that Latin American countries are less well known, and Latin American university degrees will be less recognized, thus limiting their mobility or professional opportunities in other countries. Given the global university hierarchies and subsequent production of unequally valued degrees, immigrant youths’ higher education decisions on where to study tend to be closely related to future plans for their places of work and residence. Students’ living and educational costs in Korea are being supported in various ways: parental support, their earnings from part-time jobs as translators or private tutors, student loans, or scholarships. Scholarships were another important dimension of student mobility (Collins, 2014). Transnational ethnic connections that enabled ethnic return migration could be forged by the policies of homeland governments that had reached out to their ethnic descendants abroad and encouraged them to return home (Tsuda, 2009). As part of the Korean government-initiated diaspora policies, the Overseas Koreans Foundation (OKF) was established in 1997. OKF grants scholarships to younger-generation Korean diaspora intending to come to Korea for their undergraduate and graduate studies in Korean universities. By securing the OKF scholarship, students are offered monthly stipends and tuition waivers by certain universities. In some cases, the OKF scholarship was the key factor infuencing respondents’ decisions to study in Korea, serving as the main fnancial resources for their education-related expenses. Younger Koreans from Latin America have embarked on their higher education in Korea infuenced and shaped by various intersecting factors and development from different locations of the globe. The rest of the chapter mainly focuses on the linguistic and cultural aspects of returnees’ homecoming and educational experiences. This chapter, frst of all, fnds strong transnational continuation of the importance of the English language among Korean returnees and the efforts they make and obstacles they face to consolidating their Korean ethnicity during their adaptation processes in Seoul. TRANSNATIONAL CONTINUATION OF THE USE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE Language is regarded as an important factor in deciding a study-abroad destination (Park & Bae, 2009) and as an important resource for the construction of space defning a signifcant part of migrants’ educational and social

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experiences. Most respondents declare that they have a good or excellent command of English owing to their earlier education at international schools in Latin America. There are different options for Korean immigrant children in Latin America with respect to primary and secondary educational institutions: public schools, relatively expensive international schools, or overseas Korean schools. Except for four respondents, most Korean returnees have experience attending international schools in Latin America. The growing infuence of international schools is one aspect of the increasing internationalization of education (Hayden, 2011). Some families desire the international school form of education as a prestigious commodity, which is perceived to be superior to the form of education that would be experienced in local schools. Above all, English-language education has been consistently cited as a strong reason for parental choice of an international school. While native English-speaking families favor an English-language education for their children, so too do many nonnative speakers who perceive the long-term investment of an education expected to deliver fuency in English as a complement to children’s ethnic languages (Potter & Hayden, 2004). Korean parents, both at home and abroad, are known for their educational fervor (Seth, 2002). Partly concerned by the low quality of the public educational system in Latin America, Korean parents with fnancial resources often prefer to send their children to private schools, despite expensive tuition fees, especially international or American-accredited schools (Joo, 2010), where 50–90 percent of the classes are taught in English. For example, tuition fees for prestigious international secondary schools in Brazil amount to thousands of dollars a year. Joo (2010: 344) points out that some Koreans in Brazil “doubted the usefulness of Portuguese in their future life if they planned to remigrate,” adding, “Many parents preferred to send their children to expensive prestigious international schools to teach English for the bright future instead of Brazilian public schools.” Therefore, despite their geographic locations in countries in which the dominant, offcial languages are Spanish or Portuguese, many Korean youths in Latin America tend to acquire high levels of academic as well as conversational English, as a result of their earlier, local experiences of attending international schools for both their primary and secondary education. Korean students receive this training by taking courses and speaking and writing in English. Depending on the composition of their faculty and class, the respondents used English solely or mixed English with Spanish both inside and outside of their classrooms. Through their experiences attending international or American-style schools within Latin America, not only were these students able to learn and practice English but they were also exposed and became accustomed to American-style curriculums, educational systems, and culture. Sometimes,

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due to their English-emphasis education, the respondents missed out on opportunities to further develop their Spanish- or Portuguese-language skills, although they tended to use a conversational type of Spanish or Portuguese with their friends and neighbors. Some of them avoided attending Latin American universities due to their unfamiliarity with academic Spanish. Their enrollment within international schools may have hindered their development of a strong attachment to their country of residence or promotion of a nation-based cultural identity as Latinos, leading these migrant children to exist within a transnational space. Jinho, who was born in Guatemala, narrates:

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I went to an American-accredited school in Guatemala from elementary to high school, where almost all the classes, over 90%, except Spanish-language classes, were taught in English. I speak a modest level of Spanish, yet, as a matter of fact, I’ve never formally been educated in Spanish. That was one of reasons I wasn’t even considering going to any Guatemalan university.

Moreover, the respondents testify that their experiences in international schools in Latin America imbued them with the idea of studying abroad itself. In their high schools, the respondents were provided with abundant information about study in the United States through study-abroad fairs. High school teachers guided students through the process of preparing for and applying to American universities, giving them the additional ability to take Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) classes. Preparation to apply to U.S.-based universities naturally became part of the culture and training in international high schools in Latin America, the respondents recalled. In addition, belief in the importance and investment of English education in the pre-migration stage was also prevalent among some returnees who attended public schools in Latin America. They took intensive English classes at private institutes or through a special scholarship program. As a public high school freshman, Jisoo was selected as a recipient of the Englishlanguage scholarship program granted by the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia. Through this three-year program, she received intensive training in Englishlanguage studies and American culture and was also provided with TOEFL classes. She narrates: Attending an American university is expensive. So, my original plan was to graduate from a Bolivian university with good grades, because in Bolivia, education is way easier, and then go to the graduate school in the States. But, for some reason, I again changed my plan and came to Korea, because I wanted to study in English. I already knew that there are Korean universities that teach classes in English, so I knew I could do it without a good Korean ability.

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Transnationalism is defned as the process by which migrants actively maintain a variety of ties (political, social, economic, and emotional) to more than one country simultaneously (Basch, Schiller, & Blanc, 1994). Transnational networks refer to the socioeconomic linkages and relationships that migrants develop and maintain with both their countries of origin and of destination (Cassarino, 2004). In addition, immigrant communities forge and sustain transnational networks and connections, not only with their countries of origin but also between diasporic or neighboring communities in other countries. Partly due to geographic proximity, younger Koreans in Latin America often had the opportunity to travel to the United States in order to visit relatives or friends who lived there. Some of them participated in summer cultural immersion programs in various universities or in international Model United Nations conferences, which were held in the United States. Infuenced by their English-language classes and direct experiences with American culture and society, the respondents became familiar with the United States and hoped to study in and learn more about this country. Due to the aforementioned factors, most of the respondents had once planned to attend or had actually applied to U.S.-based universities. Generally speaking, by the time they graduated from high school and applied to American universities, these students were mentally prepared, for and aspired, to study abroad (they tended to prefer the United States, but became open to any location later on), yearning to study within a context in which they could utilize their academic English. Respondents who were even offered admission with a partial tuition scholarship into U.S.-based universities, infuenced by other overlapping factors, chose to attend universities in Korea due to the relative affordability of studying in Korea. In Korea, university tuition fees are cheaper than international high school education costs in Latin America. U.S. university attendees often dropped out partly due to the exorbitant costs of living and studying in the United States,3 choosing to study in universities in Seoul as a second trial. Seeking a similar transnational or English-dominant educational environment as they were accustomed to in Latin America, younger-generation Koreans have continuously moved through internationalized space in Latin America, the United States, and South Korea. ENGLISH-EMPHASIS INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA English competence proved helpful to respondents’ admission and adaptation to Korean universities. Utilizing their English competence, Korean youths from Latin America are admitted to Korea-based universities through an

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exclusive entrance system, which is easier than the regular university admission system. Their residencies in Latin American countries typically last over ten years. Ethnic Koreans with experience of completing their primary and secondary education overseas are admitted outside the admissions quota system (Kim, 2015). Even prior to their departure to Korea, Korean diaspora youths were infuenced by the recent trend of internationalization of Korean higher education, which resulted in an especially rapid increase in Englishlanguage courses in Korean universities. Due to the existence or increase in English-taught classes, respondents’ English ability serves as global linguistic capital conducive to returnees’ educational endeavor in their ethnic homeland. Korea is experiencing an overall decline in its domestic higher education student population as a falling fertility rate results in an overall decline in the university-age population and the number of Korean national students going overseas for their higher education has increased since the 1990s. Thus, Korean universities began making efforts to recruit students from overseas, promoting internationalization of higher education in Korea (Byun & Kim, 2011). In 2004, the Korean government initiated the Study Korea Project as a main program to recruit international students. The goal of the Study Korea Project was to attract 50,000 international students to Korea by 2010. The newest target, the Study Korea Project 2020 set up in 2012, aims to attract up to 200,000 international students by 2020 (Byun & Kim, 2011). In particular, the Korean government introduced a funding program to provide higher education institutions with fnancial support for increasing the number of English-language courses (Byun et al., 2011). It was expected that creating an English-friendly study environment would make Korea more competitive as a study-abroad destination for foreign students, and that, at the same time, an increase in the ratio of English-language university lectures would absorb the study-abroad demand of domestic Korean students (Baek & Kim, 2016). In Korea, the number of international students has grown remarkably, from 32,557 in 2006, 83,942 in 2010, 84,891 in 2014, to 123,858 in 2017. The internationalization of higher education in Korea not only produced an increase in the number of international students, but also brought other structural changes to institutions, including the internationalization of faculty members and the introduction of English-language lectures (Baek & Kim, 2016). A few respondents chose a major that was directly related to their own interests or selected practical majors including computer science, engineering, or mechanics, regardless of the existence or proportion of English-language classes in their major of choice. Overall, however, the respondents’ knowledge of and familiarity with English tended to infuence their choices of major. Respondents testifed that they actively researched majors in which they would

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be able to take advantage of their multilingual backgrounds including their English skills, as well as Spanish or Portuguese to a lesser extent. Respondents were also informed of English-dominant departments and programs among Korean universities through their transnational networks of students or graduates of Korean universities or through websites of Korean universities. These students were occasionally advised to pursue a language-related major or a major that had a heavy English-language curriculum by their parents or others from their social network. Their parents often emphasized to their children how competitive and academically profcient domestic Korean high school students are. These parents were sometimes concerned about the possibility that their children, who were mostly educated in Latin America, would fail to catch up to Korean national students, who are very competitive in a feverishly academic, exam-oriented environment (Seth, 2002), and accustomed to studying rigorously in order to enter a university. Jinhee who came from the Dominican Republic narrates:

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I originally wanted to major in physics but just followed my parents’ advice and ended up majoring in English Literature in my university in Korea. My parents had thought that, due to the different levels of high school math and science in Korea and the Dominican Republic, I would not be able to compete with Korean national students especially those who graduated from specialized science high schools. Mom and dad suggested that I go for English by utilizing my linguistic ability.

Like Jinhee, some of the students from Latin America chose languagerelated majors. Most of the respondents looked for departments in which the courses would be offered in English. Even those who majored in Korean-dominant departments preferred taking English-language classes as their minor courses. Sometimes, respondents experienced limitations in their majors due to their lack of Korean-language skills; there were only a few majors in which they could choose only English-language courses. Respondents gave up on majors such as criminal justice and journalism because those majors were not offered in English. ENHANCING KOREAN IN SPANISH CLASSES Korean-language ability and interest in Korean culture also notably affected the decision by returnees to come to Korea. Some respondents cite as one of the motives behind their decision to study in Korea their desire to reconnect with their ethnic roots and explore and further develop their linguistic and cultural heritage. Koreans in Latin America have a relatively short immigration

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history, one that began in the 1960s. Korean immigrants in Latin American countries are known to retain relatively strong Korean ethnic and linguistic connections (Joo, 2007; Park, 2002). Most of the respondents speak an intermediate or good level of Korean. Respondents scored an average of four out of six on the Test of Profciency in Korean (TOPIK).4 In Latin America, respondents learned and practiced their Korean through Korean media and books, at home, within Korean-language schools, or in Korean churches. Furthermore, while in Latin America, respondents maintained and developed their ethnic language and identity not only through direct interactions with the Korean immigrant community but also during their short visits to Korea. Koreans in Latin America tend to maintain close relations with their extended families or friends even after their emigration, and respondents have visited Korea at least once before embarking on their university education in Korea. In addition, during the transitional period before they entered a university, most respondents took intensive Korean classes at language institutes within Korea. Although they are relatively strong in their conversational Korean, the respondents seem concerned about their lack of strong academic-level Korean vocabulary and writing skills. The increase in English-taught courses in Korean universities renders their adaptation processes in Korea easier; however, their lack of academic Korean fuency limits their options among Korean universities. Although those who attended English-dominant international high schools regret that their Spanish ability was not as good as that of other Latinos, most respondents learned and used Spanish with their siblings, friends, or local people, and spoke a good or native-like Spanish. Jiyoung, an Ecuadorianborn recipient of the OKF scholarship, is now a sophomore at a Seoul-based university. Jiyoung chose to major in Spanish because she anticipated it would be “easier” for her to study due to her native fuency in that language; however, that expectation would not be completely met. At her current school, most Spanish classes are taught in Korean: Spanish-written texts are being used, but Korean professors explain and give lectures related to the assigned readings in Korean. Jiyoung thinks that she is engaged in a “reverse” learning process from other classmates, learning academic Korean words corresponding to Spanish ones: Although I’m a native Spanish speaker, I need to make lots of effort to catch up with other classmates due to my limited Korean skills. I have to look up and memorize every diffcult Korean word. Yet I think it is an absolutely necessary preparation for me to get a job and settle down in Korea. I am enhancing my Korean through Spanish classes.

Except for Spanish or Portuguese majors, most respondents have never taken any courses in Latin American languages within Korea. The Korean

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government-initiated internationalization of higher education in Korea emphasizes English-language classes; only a few Korean universities have Spanish or Portuguese departments. There are more English-taught classes available than other foreign-language classes. Spanish or Portuguese often function as social languages, through which respondents communicate and socialize with old friends or other international students from Latin America whom they meet on campus or at Latin bars and restaurants in Seoul.

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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: EDUCATIONAL STOPOVER IN SEOUL? Since the 1990s, an increasing number of overseas Koreans, who were formerly dispersed over approximately 170 countries, have returned to South Korea not only as foreign workers, marriage migrants, or professionals, but also as international students (Yoon et al., 2015). Korean student returnees, especially from Latin America, have been extremely understudied. Considering that South Korea is ranked as a mid-level international education destination in global university hierarchies, this article explores factors that motivate students to attend Korean universities and subsequent educational experiences of younger-generation Korean return migrants from Latin America. Compared with outbound Korean nationals’ early study-abroad movement whose purposes were educational from the beginning, Koreans in Latin America initially immigrated mostly for economic reasons. Parent-initiated immigration to Latin America gave children access to various languages including Korean, Spanish, Portuguese, or English. For these immigrant families, educational concerns gradually emerged as younger-generation Koreans grew and Korean parents became economically more established in Latin America (Bae, 2014). Along with the secondary migration to the United States and Canada, return migration to Korea has been considered a viable option for improved higher education opportunities among Koreans in Latin America. First, Korean diaspora youths testify that they came to study in Korea because of such factors as parental infuence, the superior utility and recognition of degrees from Korea over those from Latin America, interest in Korean culture and language, scholarship opportunities, affordable educational expenses, better-quality higher education, and easy application procedures and admission. Second, although returnees are originally from Latin American non-English-speaking countries, the research fnds strong transnational continuation of the use of the English language among Korean returnees, especially coinciding with the recent internationalization of higher education in Korea. Compared with other foreign students, Korean diaspora youths from Latin America came to Korea individually or with their returning migrant families.

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In either case, they came with previously established transnational migration networks and linguistic capital and cultural knowledge, which facilitated returnees’ smoother adaptation to Korea. Moreover, returnees’ English competence acquired while in Latin America helped their educational experiences in their ethnic homeland. Yet returnees have encountered limitations in choosing their majors, and some have somewhat struggled to fully grasp instructors’ lectures in Korean-taught classes due to their lack of mastery of strong academic Korean. However, academically, most returnees are satisfed with the overall quality of education, managing their studies relatively well. However, in terms of social relations, most respondents face limitations assimilating on campus or into Korean society. Respondents explain that they tend to socialize primarily with other Korean returnees from Latin America or prefer to associate with the Spanish- or English-speaking foreign population. Returnees seem to isolate or separate themselves from other majority domestic students without having any meaningful interactions with one another. Returnees majoring in departments dominated by local students feel more disconnected from others than those having schoolmates with international backgrounds. Korea is one of the fastest-growing destinations for international students (Collins, 2014). The campuses of Korean universities are seemingly transforming into relatively multicultural spaces in terms of their mix of nationalities and cultures. However, it has been noted that foreign–local–cultural interaction remains low in Korean universities despite an increasingly diversifed population of foreign students and that Korean campuses are still far from becoming inclusive places of learning. It has been challenging for Korea to transition from diversity in numbers, or “structural diversity,” to a meaningful diversity of interaction and inclusion, or “intercultural diversity” (Moon, 2016). The value of diversity in Korean universities is neglected at all other levels including the curriculum, university administration, and governance, and in the campus climate in addition to students’ interactions (Moon & Shin, 2016). Some returnees made efforts to mingle with other Korean students through school club activities or team projects for courses; however, they often experienced conficts with domestic students due to intercultural differences. Respondents recalled that they had an especially hard time because of the hierarchical nature of interactions among club members according to seniority. Respondents also thought that they were treated differently from other Korean students due to their imperfect Korean-language skills or ignorance of Korean history or popular culture. Moreover, respondents found Korean society to be too competition-oriented and perceived Korean nationals as somewhat close-minded in general. When returnees found that their frsthand experience differed from the ethnic homeland they had previously seen and imagined through watching Korean TV shows in Latin America and that they

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did not ft in, they planned to leave Korea upon receiving a university degree and relocate to other countries. Do Korean universities merely serve then as an educational stopover for the Korean diaspora youths from Latin America? Carling and Erdal (2014: 2) note that international migration can be “an ongoing social process, and return migration is sometimes an elusive concept that blurs into sustained transnational mobility.” The authors add, “Since return migration need not be a permanent physical move, but rather something enmeshed in transnational mobility, the two phenomena overlap” (Carling & Erdal, 2014: 2). Upon graduation, Chansol from Paraguay wishes to secure a job with a Korean company in order to acquire the necessary professional experiences and build networks that will beneft him when he begins operating his own business between Korea and Latin America in a few years. However, most other respondents indicated plans to relocate to another country, preferably in North America or Europe, to attend graduate schools, or work there, having no intention of returning to Latin America or settling down in Korea. Due to their multilingual and multicultural backgrounds, as well as previous immigrant experiences and their dissatisfaction or disappointment with Korean society, these students are likely to be very mobile and cosmopolitan. The lack of adequate job prospects in the original immigrant country in Latin America was cited as one of the reasons respondents only want to visit rather than live there. Initially, the mobility of these students was occasionally related to their family’s return migration. Some returnees seem to utilize their Korean university degrees as a stepping stone to their further secondary or continuous migration to the third country. Korean returnees from Latin America have multilingual and multicultural competences and display great potential as important assets in facilitating Korea’s connection with foreign countries and diaspora communities, both culturally and economically. Because of their combination of international backgrounds and Korean heritage, returnees sometimes serve intermediary roles in helping foreign students to adjust to Korean society. Furthermore, returnees can act as unique resources for Korean domestic students to develop intercultural and global perspectives. In turn, returnees can be more connected to Korean society and culture by interacting more closely with domestic students. As part of the university-initiated efforts and policies by the Korean government for the further genuine internationalization of higher education, a more multicultural-friendly environment and interactions between domestic and diaspora students should be facilitated. There should be more intercultural understanding, and multicultural education programs should be nurtured. University-level offcial consultations and support programs for Korean diaspora students should be implemented. In order to minimize cultural diffculties, professional counsels who can guide and advise returnees on

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their cultural adjustment should be made available. Diaspora youths studying in Korea should be given fruitful opportunities not only to acquire Korean degrees, but also to further develop their Korean cultural knowledge and language competences and widen and consolidate social ethnic networks. Through more positive experiences while studying in Korea, returnees will be better able to build closer and continuing relationships with their co-ethnics and the ethnic homeland. NOTES 1. This chapter was previously published in Jin Suk Bae. 2018. “Acquiring Higher Education Credentials at Home: Korean Student Return Migrants from Latin America,” Journal of Multi-Cultural Contents Studies, 27: 207–237. 2. The previous literature on Korean-Chinese students studying in Korea has examined issues relating to their ethnic and national identities (Jo, 2002) as well as adaptation processes in Korea (Kim & Han, 2013). 3. It is estimated that, for dormitory expenses and tuition fees only, the cost of attending a public or private university in the U.S. amounts to about 12,000 ~ 30,000 dollars annually. 4. The TOPIK was introduced in October 1997 and was designed to increase Korean-language dissemination and enhance Korean profciency for international students in Korea (Baek & Kim, 2011).

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REFERENCES Bae, J. S. (2014). “New York Koreans from Latin America: Education, family, and class mobility.” Journal of British & American Studies, 30, 395–416. Baek, S. G. & Kim, H. H. (2016). “Internationalizing higher education in Korea: Government policies.” In Oh, Y. C., Shin, G. W., & Moon, R. J. (eds.), Internationalizing Higher Education in Korea: Challenges and Opportunities in Comparative Perspective (pp. 29–50). Shorenstein Asia-Pacifc Research Center. Basch, L., Schiller, N. G., & Blanc, C. S. (1994). Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States. New York, NY: Routledge. Brooks, R. & Waters, J. (2010). “Social networks and educational mobility: The experiences of UK students.” Globalisation, Societies and Education, 8(1), 143–157. Byun, K., et al. (2011). “English-medium teaching in Korean higher education: Policy debates and reality.” Higher Education, 62(4), 431–449. Byun, K. & Kim, M. (2011). “Shifting patterns of the government’s policies for the internationalization of Korean higher education.” Journal of Studies in International Education, 15(5), 467–486. Carling, J. & Erdal, M. B. (2014). “Return migration and transnationalism: How are the two connected?” International Migration, 52(6), 2–12.

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Cassarino, J.-P. (2004). “Theorising return migration: The conceptual approach to return migrants revisited.” International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 6(2), 253–279. Collins, F. (2014). “Globalising higher education in and through urban spaces: Higher education projects, international student mobilities and trans-local connections in Seoul.” Asia Pacifc Viewpoint, 22(2), 242–257. DeWind, J., et al. (2012). “Korean development and migration.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38(3), 371–388. Gmelch, G. (1980). “Return migration.” Annual Review of Anthropology, 9, 135–159. Guimaraes, L. L. (2006). “The Korean community in Brazil: Challenges, achievements and prospects.” Paper to be presented at the 3rd World Congress of Korean Studies, 1–12. Hayden, M. (2011). “Transnational spaces of education: The growth of the international school sector.” Globalisation, Societies & Education, 9(2), 211–224. International Organization for Migration. (2004). Glossary on Migration. Geneva: IOM. Jo, H. Y. (2002). “A study on Korean-Chinese students studying in Korea: Focusing on their meanings of mother country and ethnicity.” Studies of Koreans Abroad, 12(1), 65–114. Jon, J. E. (2009). “‘Interculturality’ in higher education as student intercultural learning and development: A case study in South Korea.” Intercultural Education, 20(5), 439–449. Joo, J. T. (2010). “Culture and ethnicity in the Korean transnational community in Brazil.” Journal of the Institute of Iberoamerican Studies, 12(2), 323–356. ———. (2007). “Korean return migrants from Brazil: Ethnic and economic aspects.” Korea Journal, 47(2), 160–183. Kim, M. K. & Han, J. S. (2013). “Study on Korean Chinese and Han Chinese international students’ adaptation process in Korea.” Journal of International Culture Exchange, 2(3), 5–24. Kim, S. (2015). “Redefning internationalization: Reverse student mobility in South Korea.” In Collins, C. S. & Neubauer, D. E. (eds.), Redefning Asia Pacifc Higher Education in Contexts of Globalization: Private Markets and the Public Good (pp. 41–56). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan US. Ley, D. & Kobayashi, A. (2005). “Back to Hong Kong: Return migration or transnational sojourn?” Global Networks, 5(2), 111–127. Lo, A. & Kim, J. (2015). “Early wave returnees in Seoul: The dilemmas of modernity and morality.” In Lo, A., Abelmann, N., Kwon, S. A., & Okazaki, S. (eds.), South Korea’s Education Exodus: The Life and Times of Study Abroad (pp. 168–188). Center for Korea Studies Publications. Moon, R. J. (2016). “Internationalization without cultural diversity? Higher education in Korea.” Comparative Education, 52(1), 91–108. Moon, R. J. & Shin, G. W. (2016). “Korean higher education: Internationalization, but not diversity.” In Oh, Y. C., Shin, G. W., & Moon, R. J. (eds.), Internationalizing Higher Education in Korea: Challenges and Opportunities in Comparative Perspective (pp. 89–108). Shorenstein Asia-Pacifc Research Center.

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Park, J. S.-Y. & Bae, S. (2009). “Language ideologies in educational migration: Korean jogi yuhak families in Singapore.” Linguistics and Education, 20, 366–377. Park, K. (2014). “A rhizomatic diaspora: Transnational passage and the sense of place among Koreans in Latin America.” Urban Anthropology & Studies of Cultural Systems & World Economic Development, 43(4), 481–517. ———. (2002). “‘10,000 Senora Lees’: The changing gender ideology in the Korean diaspora as refected in the clothing industry.” Amerasia Journal, 28(2), 161–180. Potter, D. & Hayden, M. (2004). “Parental choice in the Buenos Aires bilingual school market.” Journal of Research in International Education, 3(1), 87–111. Oxfeld, E. & Long, L. (2004). “Introduction: An ethnography of return.” In Long, L. & Oxfeld, E. (eds.), Coming Home? Refugees, Migrants, and Those Who Stayed Behind (pp. 1–15). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania. Ropp, S. M. (2000). “Secondary migration and the politics of identity for Asian Latinos in Los Angeles.” Journal of Asian American Studies, 3(2), 219–229. Seth, M. J. (2002). Education Fever: Society, Politics, and the Pursuit of Schooling in South Korea. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press and Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii. Shin, E. H. (2009). “The interplay of economy and ethnicity: The case of the textile and apparel industry and Korean immigrant communities.” In Kim, H., Park, K., Oh, M. D., & Yu, E.-Y. (eds.), Korean American Economy and Community in the 21st Century (pp. 315–347). Los Angeles, CA: Korean American Economic Development Center. Song, J. (2012). “The struggle over class, identity, and language: A case study of South Korean transnational families.” Journal of Sociolinguistics, 16(2), 201–217. ———. (2010). “Language ideology and identity in transnational space: Globalization, migration, and bilingualism among Korean families in the U.S.A.” International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 13(1), 23–42. Tsuda, T. (2009). “Introduction: Diasporic return and migration studies.” In Tsuda, T. (ed.), Diasporic Homecomings: Ethnic Return Migration in Comparative Perspective (pp. 1–18). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Waters, J. L. (2009). “Transnational geographies of academic distinction: The role of social capital in the recognition and evaluation of ‘overseas’ credentials.” Globalisation, Societies and Education, 7(2), 113–129. Yoon, I., et al. (2015). “South Korean nationals’ perceptions of overseas Koreans: The effects of national consciousness, multicultural acceptance, and contact experience.” Korean Journal of Unifcation Affairs, 27(1), 31–68.

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Part III

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LABOR MIGRATION FROM THE GLOBAL NORTH AND GLOBAL SOUTH

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Chapter 7

Living as Foreign Scientists Stories of Nineteen Expatriate Professors in South Korea

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Hyung Wook Park

Once called the “Hermit Kingdom,” Korea, especially its southern half, has been integrated into the globalizing world since the end of the Cold War (Alford, 1999; Kim, 2000; Chang, Seok, and Baker, 2009).1 Science is possibly the most important enterprise that Koreans are promoting in this age, as it is thought to symbolize knowledge and practice shared by researchers across national borders. Yet the global face of Korean science is also inwardlooking, just like Korea’s globalization itself. As Gi-Wook Shin has argued, Koreans’ effort for globalization has been a way of expressing their ethnic nationalism (Shin, 2006: 204–221). Therefore, nationalistic and globalizing movements are mutually corroborating rather than conficting in South Korea. Likewise, the Korean effort for making their science “global” has also been made in their nationalistic context. To many Koreans, science is a strategic arena that should be elevated to the “global level” (segyesujun) to make the ethnic nation stronger and more competitive. In this age, the community of expatriate science professors in Korea showcases the contradictions of globalization. Occupying a sizeable number of faculty posts in the country since the inception of the World Class University (WCU) project in 2008, foreign professors in science have represented how globalized Korea has become in the twenty-frst century. Their increased number in Korean universities refects the expatriate faculty community’s growth as whole, which is considered a prime index of Korea’s global takeoff, along with the number of foreign students, English-only courses, faculty publications in international journals, and collaborative projects with overseas scholars (Palmer and Cho, 2011; Lee and Lee, 2013; Shin and Jang, 2013; Moon, 2016). At the same time, the WCU project reiterates South 163

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Korea’s long-lasting nationalistic desire to join the world’s leading powers, which supposedly have a large group of outstanding scientifc and technical experts recruited across the world. But it may not be easy for Koreans to fulfll this desire. As several journalistic reports portray, a fairly large number of foreign professors are resigning to fnd better posts in other countries, and some of the remaining scholars feel deeply frustrated (McNeill, 2011; Moon, 2013; Ch’oe, 2015; Fouser, 2015; Yi, 2015; Matthews, 2016; Mun, 2016). They have found it hard to work for the Korean universities and academia with its strong hierarchy and rigid bureaucracy. Housing, food, and banking services also make their lives diffcult, while the Korean language deepens their isolation in the campus. Some of them even mention xenophobia and racism in Korean society. This problem has attracted scholarly attention. Three articles written by Kim (2016), Sim (2014), and Palmer and Cho (2011) have analyzed the origins of foreign professors’ agonies and anxieties in the context of the country’s efforts for globalizing its higher education. In her study of Underwood International College of Yonsei University, Kim has claimed that Koreans failed to integrate foreign academics “in a meaningful way” due to their “systematic disempowerment” of expatriate professors in the campus. Similarly, Sim has pointed to Korean universities’ lack of proper leadership, persistent sexism, and internal struggle as the major factors that would disappoint expatriate professors. In the same vein, Palmer and Cho have mentioned discrimination against foreigners in faculty promotion and tenure exercises as a probable cause of their discontent. I revisit these problems by focusing on expatriate science faculty members, who have not yet been investigated in depth. In effect, Kim’s and Sim’s research subjects were humanities scholars and social scientists, while Palmer and Cho did not even specify their subjects’ felds. Yet natural scientists’ lives in Korea should be distinct. Above all, many of them have their own laboratories, which make a substantial difference to their lives. They should acquire a constant stream of sizeable research grants for purchasing and updating experimental equipment and must also recruit and manage a number of graduate students as laboratory workers. These are usually not the concerns of those in the humanities and social sciences. In fact, natural scientists are more favorable to globalization. While the social sciences and humanities often address locally specifc questions and rely on localized methods and approaches, the natural sciences are thought to deal with universal phenomena with globally shared research tools. Of course, this distinction is not absolute. In the age of globalization, all academic disciplines are globalized through international journals and transnational conferences. Nevertheless, some notable differences persist. For example, French philosophy is very different from British philosophy, let alone Chinese or

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Hindu philosophies.2 In contrast, most natural scientists will deny that such differences are matters of concern in their felds. In Korea, it was found that the colleges in “hard disciplines (engineering, natural science, medicine, etc.) are [more] aggressive” in their response to the government’s drive for globalization (Shin and Jang, 2013: 156). This feature of natural science is partly a consequence of its historical development. As Thomas Schott has claimed, “the institutionalization of science in Europe,” especially after the seventeenth century, “codifed a conception of nature as invariant in time and place” (Schott, 1993: 197). Natural scientists thus developed their “belief in the universal validity of science,” which became a conceptual basis of their defense of free exchange of ideas across national borders (Schott, 1991: 443). Stichweh (1996) has detailed this process by showing how the “progressive internal differentiation of science” amid its nationalization in the nineteenth century fostered the globality of researchers and professional organizations around the world. Similarly, Crawford, Shinn, and Sörlin (1993) have stressed the simultaneous progression of “nationalization and denationalization” through the “standardization” of nomenclature, methods, and measurements. The concurrent nationalization and internationalization of science imply that it may be hard to fnd universal epistemology and egalitarian practice shared across the world in the age of globalization. Many STS scholars, especially after the start of the Strong Programme, have investigated locally contingent knowledge production and appropriation (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985; Gooding, Pinch, and Schaffer, 1993; Hess, 1995; Livingstone, 2003). Science has been globally institutionalized, yet it is also a local enterprise whose practices differ widely according to regional situations. But local scientifc communities are all different in power, which inevitably produces the division and tension between “center” and “periphery” in making the globality of science (Ben-David, 1971; Schott, 1991; Lebeau, 2003; Hwang, 2008; Gibbons, Limoges, Nowonty, Schwartzman, Scott, and Trow, 2010). Formed by the unequal political relations during the age of imperialism, the “center” usually means North American and Western European countries that primarily produce mainstream scientifc knowledge, while the “periphery” is known to be the rest of the world, including many Asian countries that experienced colonial rule until the mid-twentieth century. The periphery supposedly consumes knowledge coming from the center or produces only marginal or subsidiary knowledge. However, the peripheral countries have been neither passive nor static in the global scientifc arenas. Appropriating sciences from the metropole, Asian practitioners built their hybrid techno-cultural formations in making their own modernity (Gooday and Low, 1998; Prakash, 1999; Arnold, 2000; Clancey, 2002; Rogaski, 2004; DiMoia, 2013; Andrews, 2014). Against this backdrop, we can understand that Korean sciences—as

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a product of an Asian country that experienced traumatic colonization and destruction until the mid-twentieth century—may not yet have completely departed from periphery, while some engineering communities in the country have become centers of the world’s knowledge economy (Kim, 2005, 2012; Hwang, 2008). Despite the substantial economic growth, Korea is still not regarded by “global talents” as an ideal place for their long-term career planning (Shin and Choi, 2015: 2–5). My chapter borrows the insights and perspectives from these studies. I argue that the globality of science is a main factor that fosters the continued stay of many foreign scientists, who, in their local contexts, manage what is entailed in this globality, namely, Korea’s perceived status as a peripheral country in the dynamics between “center” and “periphery” in the world sciences. Various factors, including their ethnic origin, professional experiences, intentional strategies, and unintended institutional circumstances, make possible their divergent responses to Korea’s local settings and peripheral attributes, which lead them to justify and make possible their long-term stay in Korea. This analysis deals with situations, which are partly similar to, but not the same as those of foreigners in Arnold’s (2000), Clancey’s (2002), and DiMoia’s (2013) historical writings. Unlike the foreigners in these studies, some of my interviewees came from Asian countries, while many of those from North America or Europe are junior scholars with lesser scientifc experience than seniors in their departments. To some Asians scientists, Korea was close to center, which might facilitate their global career advancement. To most Western professors, however, Korea was close to periphery, as they found several features of Korean scholars and academia different from the conventions of European or North American institutions where they were trained. However, the foreign professors could make sense of their stay in their local contexts, especially through their intentional efforts or some unintended circumstances that prompted them to address and redefne Korea’s peripheral characteristics on their own terms. They burred and moderated the boundary between center and periphery and appropriated—or even internalized—several features of Korea and its scientifc institutions that did not appear central to them. I relate these points in four sections. The frst section introduces my research subjects and main methods. In the second section, I briefy portray the formation of Korea’s historical legacy of state-driven science, which is followed by the third section that discusses how this legacy shaped some of my interviewees’ stressful encounters with the Korean culture in their institutions that they regarded as peripheral. In the fourth section, I analyze some foreign professors’ strategies and circumstances that enabled them to address the peripheral characteristics of their universities and institutions. This section has three subsections that respectively deal with the foreign professors’ moderating, appropriating, and incorporating the peripheral features of

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Korea’s scientifc communities and practices. In studying these features, I do not deal with foreign scientists’ actual research programs and their progression. Although this topic is very important, it must be investigated in another publication. Instead, my chapter addresses cultural dimensions of foreign scientists’ lives and their adaptation, which I think are also highly signifcant in understanding the globality of science.

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INTERVIEWEES AND RESEARCH METHODS This chapter relies on my interviews conducted from May 2016 to March 2018. I met nineteen science professors at six Korean institutions, including fve major universities and a national research institute. The interviewees were those who replied to my email invitation that I sent to most foreign scientists in these institutions.3 They were either tenured or tenure-track faculty members, except one at Hanyang University, who was in a nontenure track post.4 I will call these people with simple anonymous designators, such as “Professor A,” which comes with some general information (table 7.1).5 Occasionally, however, I will also write down a real name or use terms like “a biochemist,” if there is a good reason to do so. Among them, six professors were ethnically Asian, while the others were Caucasian.6 However, their ethnicity does not necessarily tell where they “came from.” Many of them were born and educated in different countries and worked in several cities in distinct continents prior to becoming a faculty member in Korea. Nevertheless, I found, their ethnicity remained important in their adaptation to Korean universities. Regardless of their transnational paths of career, all Caucasians interviewed by me were born and educated in Europe or North America, while Asians, even after their education in Western institutions, were culturally attached to Asia. This was true for some Westernized Asians who spent a large part of their early lives in the West. There are two common features applicable to all my interviewees. First, all of them used the term, “science,” to designate their job, although their research felds were diverse, encompassing the physical and biological sciences as well as some disciplines dealing with more practical matters.7 Second, they were all men, probably refecting the skewed gender constitution and discrimination in Korean academia (Ch’oe, 2008; Cho and Park, 2010). Of course, I emailed female foreign professors, whose number was quite small. None replied. This chapter uses qualitative research—especially narrative inquiry—as the main method. By tracing the stories of people’s lives, narrative analysis explores the implicit, as well as explicit, meanings of their shifting experiences imbedded within their social settings (Clandinin and Connelly, 2004).

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SNU SNU SNU SNU SNU SNU SNU SNU SNU KAIST KAIST KAIST KAIST KAIST KIST KIST Yonsei University Hanyang University Sungkyunkwan Univ.

Institution June 7, 2017 May 18, 2016 June 9, 2017 May 18, 2016 June 7, 2017 May 17, 2016 May 18, 2016 May 23, 2016 May 19, 2016 March 2, 2018 March 8, 2018 March 8, 2017 March 8, 2018 March 9, 2018 March 6, 2018 March 7, 2018 May 17, 2016 March 6, 2018 March 7, 2018

Date of Interview Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian Asian Asian Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian Asian Caucasian Caucasian Asian Asian Asian

Ethnicity Asia Europe Europe Europe Europe Europe Europe Europe Asia North America Europe North America North America North America North America North America North America Europe North America

Location of Terminal Degree Tenure track Tenure track Tenure track Tenure track Tenure track Tenure track Tenured Tenured Tenure track Tenured Tenured Tenured Tenured Tenured Tenured Tenured Tenure track Nontenure track Tenure track

Tenure Status on the Day of the Interview

SNU, KAIST, and KIST, respectively, stand for “Seoul National University,” “Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology,” and “Korean Institute of Science and Technology.” Interviews were conducted in each professor’s office or nearby conference rooms in the campus.

Professor A Professor B Professor C Professor D Professor E Professor F Professor G Professor H Professor I Professor J Professor K Professor L Professor M Professor N Professor O Professor P Professor Q Professor R Professor S

Designation in the Paper

Table 7.1  Basic Information on the Nineteen Interviewed Professors

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168 Hyung Wook Park

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Used by sociologists, historians, and anthropologists, this method is useful for uncovering the contexts of research subjects’ lived experiences. For this work, I spent more than two hours per person and analyzed the cultural implications of their replies, alongside their gestures, facial expressions, and tone of voice, which were recorded and transcribed. Although these interviews were largely unstructured, I usually asked the following questions:

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1. In what contexts did you come to Korea? 2. Do you think that you are scientifcally successful after coming to Korea? 3. How have you acquired your research grants? 4. Are you getting along well with your colleagues in the department? 5. How are you recruiting and managing your graduate students? 6. Are you comfortable with communicating with Koreans, including your departmental colleagues and graduate students? 7. How are you interacting with your professional peers, including those in other countries? 8. Has your life in Korea been satisfactory? Will you stay there for the rest of your professional career? Some professors’ answers to these questions went far beyond the original scope of my inquiry. When they kept speaking, I allowed them to relate whatever they wanted to say without stopping them. From their long responses, I learned a lot about their troubles, anxieties, and agonies. But I do not regard these as the defnite “truth” of their lives. Rather, I interpreted them as objects of my analysis, which aims at a nuanced understanding of their lives as scientists in their social worlds imbedded in the modern history of Korea (Miller and Glassner, 2016). For this purpose, I appropriate the perspectives of historians and sociologists of science, who constitute the feld of STS. To make sense of the foreign scientists’ transnational career and cultural experiences, I will utilize STS scholars’ works on the formation of the national and international characteristics of science. These works include historical and sociological studies of Korean scientifc communities, which address the legacies of the military regimes and developmental nationalism (Kim and Leslie, 1998, Song, Lee, Song, and Kim, 2003; Park, 2006; Chekar and Kitzinger, 2007; Kim, 2008, 2011, 2014; Hong, 2012; Bak, 2014; Park and Cho, 2018). STATE, SCIENCE, AND FOREIGN ACADEMICS IN KOREAN HISTORY The modernity of South Korea, including the formation of modern science and technology, cannot be described without referring to military

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dictatorship, especially the regime under President Park Chung Hee. Seizing power through his 1961 coup, Major General Park militarized the entire country in the name of industrialization, economic growth, and anticommunism. Park implemented what Moon (2005) has called “militarized modernity,” which included the establishment and systemic support of the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST)—a research institute—and the Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS)—a national science university that later became the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) (Kim and Leslie, 1998; Mun, 2010; Kim, 2011). As science and technology were considered a foundation of the anticommunist state’s rapid modernization against the North Korean threat during the Cold War, students attending KAIST were given full scholarship and exemption from military service, if they would work for defense industry after graduation. In this process, Korean scientists were deeply engaged with the matters of the state, its authority, and military-style hierarchy (Kim and Leslie, 1998: 169–170; Song, Lee, Song, and Kim, 2003; Park, 2006; Bak, 2014). Some of them, including Choi Hyung Sup, became key technocrats responsible for the direction of the state’s industrial and scientifc growth, and others actively promote their research with governmental funding. Yet there were several issues. Above all, basic research attracted less attention from the military government in this era (Kim, 2011: 538–541). Moreover, few Korean scientists questioned the politics and military culture of the state, while some even actively justifed them (Moon and Kang, 2013: 241). Overall, most scientists were barely interested in the persistent movement for democracy (Hong, 2012: 260; Park and Cho, 2018). When this democracy eventually came long after Park’s death in 1979, Korea underwent a considerable change without abandoning its state-centered modernization program.8 Kim Young Sam, the frst president of the democratic civilian government, demilitarized the country and started the drive for segyehwa (globalization) in 1994 (Kim, 2000; Shin, 2006: 205–209). This governmental drive initiated a signifcant structural evolution in Korean economy including the privatization of public corporations and the liberalization of fnancial markets. Korea’s membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996 was a culmination of this evolution spurred by the state, but Kim’s work made the country vulnerable to the impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. While the sudden surge of unemployment then terrifed many Koreans, however, university professors, including the science faculty, could partly distance themselves from the unexpected repercussion of globalization. Their jobs remained relatively stable and secure. Moreover, most Korean universities still did not hire many foreigners. For instance, the number of expatriate professors in Seoul National University (SNU) increased from

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14 to 20 during Kim’s regime (1993–1998), but their proportion in the entire faculty remained around 1 percent (Seoul National University, 2003). Neither foreigners nor a foreign economic crisis could trouble Korean scientists. However, more expatriate scholars began to come after 2008, as the Korean government under President Lee Myung-bak launched the WCU project. In the age of the neoliberal economic order, President Lee’s globalization policy was even more aggressive than Kim Young Sam’s. His WCU project did introduce some changes in Korean academia through its tripartite programs (National Research Foundation, 2013). The frst was to create new disciplines or departments through collaboration between foreign and Korean scholars. The second was to hire overseas researchers into existing university departments as regular faculty members for collaborative work with Koreans. The third was to invite global academic leaders, such as Nobel laureates, as visiting professors in Korean universities as strategic advisors. As a result, major Korean universities came to have far more foreign professors, including those in science and technology (table 7.2). In a sense, however, Lee did not appear to make a complete departure from the legacy of the past shaped during the military regimes. Both Lee Myung-bak and Park Chung Hee aimed at enhancing the level of research in Korea, especially scientifc investigations, using the government’s power and budget. Admittedly, Park’s dictatorial approach substantially differed from Lee’s neoliberal policies, implemented alongside stronger corporate initiatives. Nevertheless, Lee’s administration still relied much on its own drive and infuence in many arenas of the country. In particular, Lee’s “Four Major

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Table 7.2  The Number and Proportion of Foreigners among the Regular (Tenured or Tenure-Track) Faculty Members in Science and Engineering at Five Major Korean Universities in 2016 The Number of Foreign Faculty Members in Science and Engineering Seoul National University KAIST Yonsei University Hanyang University Sungkyunkwan University

The Number of All Faculty Members in Science and Engineering

The Proportion of Foreign Nationals in the Science and Engineering Faculty (percent)

53

500

10.6

49 22 31

467 329 327

10.5 6.7 9.5

22

349

6.3

The data came from an official website of the Ministry of Education of Korea, Taehak allimi [Information Service of Higher Education in Korea] (http://www​.academyinfo​.go​.kr/)

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Rivers Project” (sadaegang saŏp) was accused by several social activists and environmentalists, who were afraid that Lee would reinitiate the state-driven civil engineering program in Park’s time that had severely destroyed Korea’s nature (Normile, 2010; Park and Cho, 2018: 62–65). Indeed, the WCU project had several problems. While the project led to an increase in the publication of high-impact journal articles, including those registered in SCI (Science Citation Index), it achieved only a moderate success in globalizing the Korean research community due to several reasons (National Assembly Budget Offce, 2011; Korea Education Development Institute, 2012; Kim, Yi, and Jang, 2014). These included the “ambiguity” in project designations, the inappropriate project evaluation system, the obscure academic standard for foreigner hiring, and the advanced age of “global scientifc leaders” invited to Korea long after retirement. Some journalists reported that most invited foreign professors were deeply unhappy in the campus and left for different countries after staying in Korea for a few years (McNeill, 2011; Mun, 2016). Nevertheless, their total number might appear constant due to the continuing stream of new hires, as Kim (2016) showed with her study of expatriate social scientists and humanities scholars at Yonsei University. However, foreign academics in the natural sciences, at least according to my research, reacted rather differently, although I could hear similar concerns. Among the nineteen professors I met, only three (15.8%) expressed their deep disappointment, while nine (47.4%) were quite satisfed with their lives in Korea. Seven (36.8%) were neither entirely satisfed nor disappointed. They had a number of complaints, but felt that there were several strong reasons for their continued stay. What caused these differences? How are these professors living and working in Korea? Why do some of them want to leave? CULTURAL CONFLICT, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE FACULTY LIFE IN A PERIPHERAL COUNTRY The foreign professors I interviewed came to Korea for various reasons. Some were contacting Korea’s professional community prior to accepting an offer. They were already aware of several Korean scholars through international conferences and occasionally visited the country as colloquium speakers. For instance, Professor H was asked to apply for a Korean faculty post by his Korean colleagues whom he had met in an international workshop. Professor G came to Korea due to the recommendation of his advisor who befriended a senior Korean scientist in the same discipline. To Professor I, a cooperative project of Korea and his country was important in his professional career,

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because his role in that project as a graduate student ultimately gave him a faculty job, after he fnished his doctoral training. Yet others chose to stay in Korea without any previous professional engagements. Professor A came to Korea, because he wanted to feel “true Asia,” which might let him experience something unavailable in his country. Professor D applied for a Korean university professorship, when he repeatedly failed in his funding applications in his earlier university, which would not confer tenure to those without enough external grants. Meanwhile, Professor N had to accept a job in Korea, as it was the only country that gave him an offer during the 2008 global fnancial crisis. There were also six professors married to Korean women, and three of them came to Korea due to their family.9 Either for their children’s education or their wives’ desire to return, they had to settle down in Korea. These reasons illustrate how globalization as a complex worldwide phenomenon became interlinked with the Korean government’s nationalistic drive. They came to Korea for several different causes, refecting the complexity of globalization with its myriad facets affecting various people in distinct situations. Yet it was the Korean government that ultimately brought the majority of them to the country. Despite their dissimilar reasons, eleven of them landed on foreigner-only positions offered by the WCU project. The World Class Institute (WCI) project, a Korean governmental program similar to WCU but was implemented to hire scientists in research institutes rather than universities, motivated two interviewees at KIST to come to Korea (Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of Korea, 2011). This interlinking does not conceal the cleavages between the Korean government’s “managed globalization” and the globalization as a force of transnational scholarly migration (Alford, 1999). In truth, some of the expatriate professors stressed that their universities hired them for a wrong reason. Four out of nineteen complained that their schools employed foreigners only to enhance their international ranking, which partly depended on the proportion of expatriate scholars among the regular faculty. Professor F, one of these professors, even said that his university just wanted to use its foreign professors to advertise itself as a globalized institution of higher education. To Professor G, his university did not really understand why foreigners were necessary. Most major schools in the West had at least 50 percent of foreigners among both the faculty and students, because it was unlikely that the smartest and brightest people could be found only among their own countrymen. Without being aware of this truth, he claimed, his Korean university administrators and the government were concerned only about their school’s reputation as an international institution. But this problem was certainly less signifcant than the cultural problems, as many journalists have pointed out. During my research, three professors bitterly complained that they were isolated in the campus. They hardly

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interacted with Korean faculty members in the same department, even though they were willing to get closer to them. According Professor F, his country’s scholars often invited each other to their homes to have dinner together. To him, this was a primary way of socialization in Europe, but Koreans appeared to regard their home as their “castle.” No outsider could enter that castle, unless he or she was a very close friend. In such a situation, there occurred another problem that could have a more serious repercussion: Due to the lack of social relations in the school, they were never asked to serve any faculty committee, and the absence of committee activities caused the rejection of their frst tenure applications. In their university faculty evaluation system that had three components—research, teaching, and service—their isolation in the campus meant that there was no way for them to earn credits for “service.” Not surprisingly, a central factor underlying these troubles was the Korean language. Except for two professors who could speak Korean, all the others felt that it was diffcult to master the language.10 To them, their university did not fully fund their language courses and never allowed them to have a leave of absence for a semester to master the language. As they did not have enough time or motivation to take the language courses with their own money, they regrettably failed to learn the language even after staying in the country for many years. There were several signifcant problems due to their limited command of Korean. Above all, they could not understand the university’s offcial emails written only in Korean, and some of the emails contained crucial information, such as a revision of the tenure and promotion policy. Furthermore, some foreign academics found that most faculty members in the department, during their casual conversation in the campus, kept speaking Korean even when foreign scholars approached them to join.11 Although many of these Koreans had fnished their doctoral training in English-speaking countries, they did not attempt to speak English in such a situation, except for a small number of exceptional people. But even this problem was less troublesome than another critical issue: Fourteen professors said that their department’s faculty meetings were held only in Korean. In KAIST, there was a free real-time translation service that considerably eased their concern, but the translator was not always available. In such cases, there was no way for them to know what was discussed in the meeting. Several foreign academics perceived that Koreans’ “refusal to speak English” insinuated its status as a peripheral country in the world of science. Professor E asserted that English is the lingua franca of science. Scientists were supposed to speak English, whenever they discussed science, especially in an international setting. Indeed, Professor A said that German scientists would quickly change their language to English upon meeting a foreigner,

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even if they had been talking to each other in German. Why was this diffcult in Korea? Clearly, Korean is distinct from German, a European language similar to English. Associated with this linguistic difference is Koreans’ experience in a developing country under the American hegemony, which has formed their sense of cultural inferiority with regard to English. Admittedly, many Koreans regard their language as “the most scientifc in the world” (Shin, 2010). Yet this nationalistic pride often pales in front of the need to use English to interact with Americans as well as scientists of the “center,” with whom they are not always comfortable (Hwang, 2005: 408). In fact, some foreign professors were sympathetic toward this quandary. According to Professor L, Korean academics felt that their intellectual capability would drop considerably whenever they tried to say something in English: “When they use Korean, their IQ is 150, but as soon as they speak English, their IQ becomes 100.” Professor M pointed to a related issue during his class. His Korean students often thought that they became “second-class citizens in their own country,” when they could not understand his lecture in English. However, Professors D and F were less considerate. During the interview, they told me that they were not just frustrated but even angry when Koreans did not try to speak English. Their failure to speak lingua franca showcased Korea’s peripheral status in global science, as their language remained a peripheral tongue. To several foreign professors, Korea’s intra-school hierarchy and the culture of obedience was an equally salient cause that made Korea peripheral. As I have written, President Park left a longstanding legacy through his “militarized modernity,” which crafted professional communities obedient to the state and the authority. Despite the recent movement for more democratic science governance, this legacy is still continuing in the twenty-frst century (Bak, 2007, 2014; Kim, 2014). However, it displeased many foreign academics. To Professor F, obedience to the authority appeared more important than scientifc achievement for professors’ success in Korea. Similar complaints were addressed by KAIST professors. Right after receiving a job offer from KAIST, Professor N heard from his colleagues that he should not accept it as Korea was a country with a strong hierarchy based on seniority. Although he did accept the offer, as no other post was available amid the global fnancial crisis, he indeed was troubled by chair of his department right after coming to the country. When he requested a leave of absence for his frst summer break, the chair rejected it by saying that the new professor must work harder and longer. Professor N recollected that he seriously considered resignation at the time. Expatriate scientists saw similar problems among graduate students in Korea. In fact, many of them agreed that their Korean students were hardworking and quick-witted. Professor L even said that his students at KAIST

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were “world-class.” However, some foreign professors were less enthusiastic. In particular, Professor C acknowledged that his graduate students were certainly less capable and creative than their counterparts in a German university where he stayed for his sabbatical. For him and other foreign faculty members, their students lacked certain key qualities for successful research, such as creativity, enthusiasm, and strong will to overcome failures. For a reason for this problem, six expatriate professors referred to Korean students’ “excessive obedience” to their professors.12 Their “obedience” discouraged the growth of their critical spirit, which might be a key feature in scientifc endeavors. In this sense, Professor G claimed that some students’ obsession to show respect toward their professors was “not a normal part of good science,” which he meant to be the science in “center.” To the foreign academics, this in part resulted from Korean professors’ manner of training graduate students. Professor D said, “In all the Korean labs, students are kept as prisoners, basically, six days a week, sometimes seven, and they are supposed to be here at nine, and they go home at nine or ten, and they have no life, and they go home only after their professor go home.” In effect, he was partially right. As revealed to the public through the laboratory conditions of the veterinarian Hwang Woo Suk—the key fgure of the stem cell scandal of 2005—Korean graduate students are not just “obedient” but also are enforced to endure long work hours that can often continue with inadequate payments throughout Sundays and public holidays. Hwang justifed this exploitation in the name of their future success, which would also enhance the nation’s competitiveness, as stem cells were regarded as the country’s next growth engine (Chekar and Kitzinger, 2007; Kim, 2008a, b, 2014). However, such exploitations could backfre, as could be seen in the misconduct committed in Hwang’s laboratory. More recently, an exploited engineering student at Yonsei University even tried to harm his academic advisor. He created a bomb that exploded in front of his academic advisor, who had severely admonished him during his laboratory training (Ch’oe, 2017). Of course, these episodes do not indicate that all Korean professors are abusive. For instance, Hong and Chang (2010) have shown how the SNU molecular biologist Narry Kim (Kim Pinnaeri) successfully fostered her graduate students’ creativity in the laboratory, especially through her friendly and egalitarian approach. However, my interviewees at SNU said that Narry Kim, whom they knew well, might be an exception, as other Korean professors at the university were far more authoritarian. Professor N at KAIST also said that at least two-thirds of his Korean colleagues were harshly treating their graduate students during laboratory education. In general, the abuse seems at least partially true, as Eun-Kyoung Lee and Chulwoo Oh reported: many Korean graduate students themselves complained of their advisors’ authoritarian attitude and exploitative practices (Lee, 2006: 92; Oh, 2010).

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Several foreign professors found another feature of Korea as a peripheral country in hoesik, the Korean-style dinnertime get-together with alcoholic beverages. Like foreign students in Korea, many foreign professors thought that Korea’s drinking culture was odd and excessive (Moon, 2016: 100). Repeated dinner gatherings with alcoholic beverages were generally seen useless and inappropriate to expatriate academics. According to Professor D at SNU, hoesik was even “disgusting,” when he saw that many senior male faculty members were “getting drunk together, shouting, and singing” with “no sense of shame.” To him, such behavior was “not socially acceptable” in “the Western world.” Furthermore, Professor C commented, the faculty hoesik was not just socially unacceptable but was also unethical and illegal, because many Korean professors paid for their casual hoesik with their corporate credit cards that their schools issued only for research expenses. This was a “bad use of money.” Professor J at KAIST also remarked that his Korean colleagues drank too much and often, even during weekdays: “It was Monday evening. I joined the departmental dinner. They drank until 2 am, or perhaps 4 am. I thought that it was unacceptable and unprofessional.” After such a long overnight drinking, how could they commence their usual scientifc research in the next morning? Professor J thus concluded that Korean scientists were “not disciplined enough,” compared to his colleagues in the United States. Hoesik also looked like a ritual for reconfrming the pecking order in the campus formed according to gender and seniority. To Professor D, it was a “boys’ club,” as most professors who came there were men. Furthermore, Professor H, who was otherwise getting along well with his Korean colleagues, was shocked to see the following scene during a dinner meeting of his department. He recalled: It’s like a formal dinner, a departmental dinner. What I saw is that, sure, we give way to the seniors, they take a seat frst, but one thing that I really, truly cannot understand is that, you see, all the female faculties had to stand outside, all the guys going frst. No, what age are we in today? It’s the twenty-frst century . . . . These are something that are against my belief.

Although he told me that he and other foreign academics should “make some compromises” in Korea with a different culture, this observation was a reminder of the gulf between Korea and the more egalitarian—or “central”— countries where he had lived in the past. Foreign professors observed gender discrimination in other occasions (Sim, 2014). To Professor B, for instance, SNU had a great female professor, with a brilliant research career. Her experimental discoveries were very signifcant, as she was one of the most innovative scientists in the country. But she was utterly powerless in her university, as she was still considered a

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young woman. The problem was that she was the most helpful and sympathetic toward foreigners in the department. Since she had no power, there was little that she could do for him and other expatriates. To some of my interviewees, Korea was peripheral not only for sexism but also for racism and xenophobia. Five among nineteen scholars interviewed by me mentioned racism in the country, and three of them were deeply frustrated by it. Admittedly, Professor G stressed that foreigners’ diffculties largely came from Korea’s “ethnic nationalism” rather than “racism.” Foreigners might fnd many things in the country inconvenient, but it was not an outcome of Korea’s indigenous racist culture. However, Professor F bitterly complained that he was a victim of “implicit and subtle” racism, prevalent among his professional colleagues in the university. To him, his Korean colleagues often isolated and bullied him with suggestive words and gestures. However, the attack was not even “implicit and subtle” to Professor D, who told me what happened during a faculty meeting:

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There was a faculty meeting, and we were all sitting there, and two other foreign professors were there as well, and then one of the older professors stood up and started shouting, red in the face. I asked the person next to me what he was shouting about. He said, “We don’t want foreigners in this department.” We were taking their space, and there were better Koreans who could take this space. We were just a kind of token, we are not real professors. And he, on other occasion, told my [colleague] directly to his face, “You are not a real professor. You are just here to teach in English.”

He added that the older xenophobic professor was completely obscure outside of Korea, while he and his foreign colleagues were well known in international scientifc societies due to their impactful publications. They were assaulted by a peripheral senior scholar with little contribution to global science. Notably, a KAIST professor told me a similar story. Professor J said that he was attacked by an older Korean colleague during a departmental meeting for discussing new faculty hiring. When Professor J attempted to raise his opinion as a specialist in the feld of hiring, the older professor stopped him and expressed his own view in Korean. At the end of his long speech, the senior scientist uttered just one sentence in English, turning toward Professor J: “We are going to hire only Koreans.” Professor J then wondered how this senior colleague could do this, if he did not even know the feld of hiring well. Professor J regarded himself as an internationally renowned expert in that feld, while the senior professor was not just a non-expert in the feld but also was completely obscure outside of Korea. The senior academic wanted to exercise his power in a peripheral institution where seniority was still important.

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These unhappy encounters might illuminate what Stephanie Kim, C. Fred Alford, and Gi-Wook Shin have discussed on Korea’s globalization. Kim (2016) claims that Yonsei University systematically disempowered expatriate faculty members, even though they were hired for the university’s global takeoff. In a similar sense, Alford (1999) has argued that globalization is a necessary evil to Koreans, who do not want globalization at all. They open their country to globalization, only when they have to do so. Shin (2006), however, are opposed to such views, as he fnds that Korea’s globalization is closely intertwined with its internal politics and cultural conditions, including its nationalism. However, my research suggests that this intertwining is not without a bitter confict. There are two sides in this confict. Koreans want to continue their conventional way of managing academic affairs and human relations, which, at least to foreigners, may seem fraught with sexism, racism, and blind conformity to authority and seniority. Some expatriate professors are deeply unhappy with what they see in Korea and regard them as typical characteristics of a peripheral country. Even Koreans’ language practice can be considered a facet of the country’s peripheral status. But their lives in this periphery can become considerably better and easier depending on their local contexts, including their family life.

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GLOBAL SCIENCE AND LOCAL CONTEXT: CENTER, PERIPHERY, AND FOREIGN PROFESSORS Many of my interviewees found a reason for their continued stay in their family. Most of all, having a Korean spouse was important. Their wives did various works in lieu of themselves, including housing search, bill payments, and even translation of emails from their schools. As I have already discussed, three of my interviewees came to Korea due to their wives and families. The other three married Korean women after their arrival. For these six professors, their family further justifed their continued stay in the country, especially after they came to have children. With their half-Korean children attending local schools, it was hard to leave the country, no matter how diffcult their lives were in their universities. Professor P at KIST had a slightly different situation, as his unmarried Korean partner headed the department where he worked. As both scientists were working in the same building, it was diffcult for one of them to move to another institution in a distinct country. There were other kinds of localization, although their endeavor did not necessarily pay off. For instance, Professor A made his unoffcial Korean name, by which he was called within the department. This probably made him more approachable in the school. But a more drastic move was to

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acquire Korean citizenship: Professor N changed his nationality through his successful Korean citizenship application. As the country did not permit dual citizenship, he was completely naturalized as a Korean. However, this seemed to be a strategic move rather than an expression of his loyalty to the nation. He said that he would leave Korea at any time with another attractive job offer. In effect, his citizenship did not always lessen his troubles. He had to spend more time in fling his tax return due to his wife and children who did not become Koreans. He was also distressed by his wife’s longstanding unemployment as well as his children’s education in a Christian international school. He and his family were Muslim. However, Professor N determined to remain in Korea due to his “global scientifc success,” which was more important than his Korean citizenship. During his career at KAIST, he stressed, he tried to be a scientist with an international academic recognition. He kept publishing in top journals of the world, which led him to be successfully tenured at KAIST. This also enabled him to ignore his university’s hierarchical culture and faculty politics, because even some authoritarian Korean professors could not disregard the number of his publications and their total citation counts. He thus declared, “I have no attachment to any country,” as he could go anywhere as far as he could continue his research and publish in major journals. To him, the “republic of science,” with its universally shared rules of conducting and evaluating research, was far more important than a particular country, as Polanyi (1962) had argued many years ago. Strikingly, this differed from what Kim (2016) found through her study of scholars in the humanities and social sciences, who complained that their disciplines’ criteria of academic evaluation were different from those of their school. The foreign scholars who denounced Korea’s cultural problems also emphasized that their research was successful in the country. For example, Professor F accusing the “implicit and subtle” racism toward him recently published two papers in a top international journal with his Korean graduate students. One of these papers was cited in a Korean daily newspaper as a highly successful case of foreign faculty invitation, without ever mentioning the deep cultural troubles that he ran into. Even Professor D, who seemingly suffered a severe xenophobic abuse in his department, acknowledged, “Academically, it’s been a great success [to come] here.” From him and his graduate students, I heard that his laboratory was annually publishing more than fve papers in mainstream international journals, which benefted not just him but also his students, who also wanted global scientifc recognition for their own career advancement. When I asked these students if they ever worried about their foreign advisor’s ability to give them faculty posts in Korea, they said they were not really concerned. Probably, they said, their publication in major journals like “Nature or Science” would be enough for their future job placement.13

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Natural scientists’ universal standard of research was also important to Professor L, who had been equally ineffectual in cultivating relationship with other scholars in the campus. During the interview, he bitterly complained that his Korean colleagues overlooked him since he came to Korea in 2009. He perceived this isolation most painfully, when one of his graduate students married another student under the supervision of a Korean professor in the next door. He then found that he had not even had lunch with his Korean colleague, let alone pursuing any cooperative projects together. In academic terms, however, Professor L was exceptionally successful in Korea. His h-index is the highest among all professors in his department. To most of my interviewees, their laboratory symbolized and made possible such a global scientifc success, which appeared unrelated to any other locations in Korea. In particular, Professor H said that he usually stayed in his laboratory from 9 am to 11 pm for six or seven days a week, because there was nothing else he would like to do. Prior to his Korean stay, he had worked at Singapore, a tropical country with its hot and humid weather. Yet he did not care, because he rarely went to other places outside of his heavily airconditioned laboratory. Connected to the rest of the world through the latest information technology, his laboratory was thus placeless. Hence, Singapore and Korea, despite their different climate, were not distinct to him, because his placeless laboratory allowed him to pursue his transnational scientifc research, along with other prominent scholars of the world. Some expatriate academics emphasized that science was not just transnational but also “cosmopolitan.” According to an astronomer, his feld was cosmopolitan, because he and his colleagues were observing the same “nature,” which, to him, had no national borders. Unlike the humanities and social sciences, he claimed, his feld had little to do with politics, as it dealt with “pure” nature, uncontaminated by social complications. Moreover, his discipline was far from any vested interest, because it did “not need much money” owing to its relatively simple procedure of data collection. In a sense, even his residence in Korea was not necessary, because the few global observatories located strategically at several cities with dry weather and clear sky were the actual places where most astronomers would gather across national borders and cooperate for their work. Their science was thus a “bridge-maker.” In effect, international collaboration was a key part of the scientifc life of all foreign professors interviewed by me. Many of them stressed that they were successfully pursuing their projects with other investigators in various countries in the world, including Japan, Switzerland, Luxembourg, France, Austria, Australia, Germany, and the United States. In particular, Professor D said that he was able to make a connection to them “out of the blue” by simply emailing them. In many instances, the scholars in these countries sent positive replies, as far as their research goals were similar.

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International collaboration also occurred even within their laboratories. Most of my interviewees had graduate students coming from various foreign countries, including China, India, Tunisia, Iran, Bulgaria, Vietnam, and Columbia, although the largest ethnic group was, of course, Korean. Initially, students from these countries emailed the professors before their application, based on the faculty profles posted in the university websites. If they could meet the university admission requirements, they could join the laboratory under the supervision of the professor whom they wanted to learn from. None of my interviewees said that they ever rejected a student accepted by the university, because they always needed more manpower in their laboratories. Yet these two kinds of internationalization were different, refecting the center–periphery dynamics in the globalizing world. The professors tried hard to start and maintain their relationship with renowned scholars in the world’s industrial powers—including their own countries of origin—while few were pursuing cooperation with scientists in Asia except Japan. Some considered joining Asian research networks, but only Professors D and G mentioned that they had ever conducted actual cooperation. Professor N even said that “geographical proximity is not very important in research.” Obviously, what he meant was that for a global recognition he needed a connection with scientists in the “center” rather than those in Asian countries that were geographically close to Korea. In contrast, as Professor P said, most foreign graduate students came from “the third world.”14 To these “third world” students, Korea’s top schools certainly had a merit, as they seemed better than institution in their own countries. From the professors’ viewpoint, their students were good enough for various laboratory tasks, although they may not always be highly skilled or intelligent. What was important was to maximize the use of their manpower for producing papers publishable in the world’s premier journals. Foreign professors, landed on a country between the two, were thus always vigilant to be successful using networks and human resources available to them. But all these efforts might not be entirely successful if it had not been for certain conditions that made sense of their stay. Signifcantly, they had to address what they perceived as peripheral attributes of Korea and its academic institutions. In this respect, their ethnicity and past experience were important. In particular, Asian professors were encountering a very different world. BLURRING AND MODERATING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN CENTER AND PERIPHERY My Asian interviewees saw their students from a distinct point of view. Just like Western professors I met, they struggled hard to achieve their global

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success with their graduate students’ work. But they did not say that their students were from the “third world.” To Professors S and R, all their students came from their own countries. Professors H and I did not train any foreign students, as their supervisees were entirely Korean. Professor Q did not yet have any graduate students, while Professor N had some foreigners, whom he never regarded as “third-world boys.” Another critical difference was found in their perception of their ethnicities and their cultural relevance. Admittedly, Korea was not convenient to Professor N, since it had little infrastructure catering to Muslims. However, the country was satisfactory to the others, and their ethnicity was a key: Professor I enjoyed Korean food and culture that were similar to those of his country. Even Koreans’ face was akin to his countrymen’s, and the Korean language could be easily translated to his own through Google translate with a reasonable accuracy, whereas translation from Korean to English was much less reliable. Similarly, Professor Q mentioned food, culture, and ethnic similarity as a reason for his intention to stay long in Korea, while Professors R and S stressed that the Korean dining and drinking practices were conveniently similar to their own. In contrast, due to his extended international career, Professor H did not necessarily view Korea from an Asian viewpoint. Yet he still emphasized the signifcance of the country’s strategic location in East Asia, especially its proximity to China, as a factor for his extended stay, because he expected that it might be easy to start collaborative projects with people in China, in which he was very interested, probably owing to his ethnic origin. Furthermore, four of these Asian academics did not view Korea and its universities as peripheral. Professor Q asserted that “Seoul is an exciting and dynamic city,” full of young people’s energy. He also said that Yonsei University is one of the best schools in Korea—“one of the top three, or if not, one of the top fve.” To this professor, university rankings within Korea did matter, while no Western academics mentioned it. Likewise, Professor I regarded SNU as a major international academic institution, because the faculty at his university had long established an equal collaborative relationship with several scientists in his home country where he fnished his doctoral training. He was participating in a cosmopolitan project with scientists in Korea, America, and his home country. Professor I had another reason for his satisfactory life in Korea. He found that he could manage his students well through English, which, in some contexts, was not a language of the center of global science but a regional medium of communication between people who were not born in the West. Like other foreign professors who spoke English in teaching their students, Professor I used English in training his graduate students. But he

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unexpectedly discovered its new use, when he found that he should also look after his students’ distress. He said:

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We had some personal problem like a psychological problem, mental problem. The student could obviously explain it to me . . . . For Korean students, it is easier to explain in English than the Korean language, because they can honestly express their opinion, because English expression is very straightforward. But if you make a conversation with Korean, you have to unclearly explain it to other people, and that is, sometimes there is a misunderstanding of each other. But in my case, students can honestly explain their concern or some psychological problem, so our communication sometimes works well . . . . Some Korean students do not [explain] their problems to their parents, because parents expect many other things from the kids.

As an Asian with no education in English-speaking countries, he did not appear entirely fuent in English, just like his Korean students. Hence, it is possible to interpret his remark—“English expression is very straightforward”—not as the true “straightforwardness” of the English language but as his and his students’ limited command of it. However, their mutual communication could become even easier, precisely because neither was very fuent. Sometimes, an inadequate command of a language can make it useful for more direct communication, as one’s excessive confdence in her or his native language can foster misunderstanding, especially under the multiple layers of cultural assumptions in a language community. Professor I thus found a new dimension of English, which, to him and his students, was not a language of the center of the world’s science but a regional communicative tool useful for fostering a positive faculty–student relationship in his laboratory. Professors S and R were even more positive on his university and Korea as a whole. They were grateful for Korea, as it provided them and their students with an opportunity to learn from experts in their universities. Korea was also a “rich country” to Professor S, who had been deeply disappointed by the previous university in his hometown that had made him teach too many students with a minuscule salary. After moving to Sungkyunkwan University, he was thus pleased by a substantial pay rise and a reasonable teaching load. Notably, his Korean students “spoke English very well.” His Korean colleagues were also remarkably helpful and drank very little during hoesik, unlike SNU or KAIST professors whose binge drinking astonished several Western academics. Similarly, Professor R, a nontenure track professor at Hanyang University, came to Korea, because his original university in his own country assigned him too much administrative duty, even though he was just a junior scholar. He thus decided to learn more in Korea for two years before his return to his home with a stronger scientifc expertise. This

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decision turned out to be good. To him, Korean students were far more disciplined than those in his country and were able to produce higher quality original work if given an assignment. More crucially, his faculty mentor at Hanyang generously invited him to join his research project, with which he could also educate his own student from his country. Koreans were all kind, polite, and scientifcally advanced. How can we interpret these remarks, which seem diametrically opposed to those of several Western scholars in SNU and KAIST? One possible answer is that the science faculty members at Hanyang and Sungkyunkwan, especially the professors in the two Asians’ departments, were scientifcally stronger than their counterparts in SNU and KAIST. They might also be more considerate and less xenophobic than the abusive Korean scientists mentioned by Professors D, F, J, and N. Similarly, the Korean students the Asian academics happened to teach might have been more competent and creative. Equally plausible, I think, was that the professors’ experience depended on the perceived status of their native country in the global knowledge economy. Even though both were trained in the West, their original identity as Asians remained strong, alongside their membership in the academic networks in their own countries. Seen from these countries, which might be considered more peripheral than Korea, their current academic environment appeared close to center. Certain features of Korean academia did not look peripheral even to some Western scientists. To Professor K, a scientist from Europe, it was easier to work in his department at KAIST, because all research seminars, if not faculty meetings, were conducted in English. In contrast, everything was in Japanese in his earlier school on the other side of the East Sea. The Korean universities’ hierarchical culture could also be considered normal from the standard of Europe. Professors C and E indeed said that the European universities they attended had comparable authoritarianism. Perhaps authoritarianism is not a unique characteristic in Korean academia, but a universal feature in all countries’ institutions of higher education. Interestingly, even Korea’s drinking culture could be seen from a different angle. Whereas Professor C wondered why his Korean colleagues drank so often and much—unlike the scholars he had met at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, who seem to drink moderately just once a semester—Professor L claimed that Korean scientists’ drinking culture was not different from that of the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory (CSHL), a cosmopolitan research institute in Long Island, New York. There he saw that many renowned scientists suddenly went out for a drink in the night during their experimentation. They might talk about interesting recent discoveries and might even drink until 3 am to conclude their scientifc conversation. What, then, do these statements mean? I do not mean that an objective comparison is possible with these few people’s comments: It is unclear if

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Korean scientists feel more comfortable with their use of English than the Japanese, especially Professor K’s former colleagues. Likewise, no comparative research has been done about the community culture at KAIST and CSHL. Several STS scholars do say that hierarchy and authority are a normal part of laboratory life, but their study probably does not mean that Koreans and Germans share the same authoritarian culture in their universities (Latour and Woolgar, 1986: 216–230; Ravetz, 1996: 104–108; Golinski, 2005: 17–18). Rather, what I think is more important is foreign scientists’ perception of the Korean scientifc community, as it might look very different, depending on their past experiences. What made them develop distinct views were their global voyages, including Professor K’s migration from Japan to Korea, Professor E’s doctoral training in Europe, and Professor L’s research experience at Cold Spring Harbor. Even to Western academics, depending on their career paths, at least some features of Korean universities and academia may not look like the hallmarks of peripheral scientifc institutions and communities. The center–periphery distinction can thus be fexibly understood by expatriate professors, who thereby make sense of their career in an East Asian country.

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APPROPRIATING THE PERIPHERAL Some foreign scientists did not even need this fexibility, because they were working in a highly Westernized school. In truth, Professors O and P at KIST were enjoying their lives in Korea, since their department, launched nine years ago with the WCI project, had many foreign scientists, whose number was more than a half in the entire faculty. This was partly because of the WCI project’s rule, which stipulated that the chair of each funded group should be a foreigner (Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of Korea, 2011). In this environment, there was no need to be frustrated with the Korean language, because everyone spoke English in the department. As the general departmental culture was Western, they were not embarrassed or confused by “Korean ways.” But Professors O and P did not think that they were in a global center of scientifc research. Professor O said, “KIST is not Yale,” where he had been trained as a postdoctoral researcher. KIST was certainly less prestigious in his scientifc felds. Moreover, KIST was still carrying its historical legacy as a militarized institution established by President Park. Professor P said, “There are many weird things here.” They found strict security precaution and red tape in every portion of their scientifc life. Even a USB stick could not be freely chosen, as they must use only the hardware approved by the institution. Their graduate students also had a few problems, since some had

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signifcant diffculties in comprehending scientifc concepts and conducting experiments.15 However, working in a peripheral institution was not bad. Professor P said that if he could go back to North America, it would be eventually good for his career advancement but he should then give up his well-designed laboratory at KIST and set up an entirely new one. Furthermore, it was easy to secure money for his research at KIST. They did not need to apply for grants coming from other organizations, because their research budget was guaranteed by the Korean government. Once the department received the money, it was distributed to each principal investigator in the department after their discussion. Professors O and P did not have any complaint on this process, as they received enough amounts of fnancial resources every year. In contrast, Professor P said, there was no guarantee that he could ever acquire the same amount of money in America, as most funding exercises—either at the National Science Foundation or the National Institutes of Health—should be extremely competitive. The other foreign professors were generally content with their funding. Professor N said that he had initially worried about research support during his frst year at KAIST. Yet he was soon able to gain a reasonable amount of money, including an overseas grant. Its absolute amount, minus personnel expenses, was quite comparable to what was available to his peers in major American universities, because the student salary was cheaper in Korea. The astronomer stressing the cosmopolitan nature of their discipline also said that his research was well funded in the country. Similarly, Professor D, who had failed in all his funding applications in the United States, found that it was considerably easier to gain money for his experiments in his current Korean university. A theoretical physicist even said that he was receiving too much money, although his group needed just computers and conference trip supports. These foreign science professors’ funding situations illustrated a key local factor that made possible their global scientifc enterprises. Even transnational projects were driven by national interests affecting major scientifc institutions supported through each country’s public funds (Crawford, Shinn, and Sörlin, 1993). In Korea, their major, if not sole, patron was the National Research Foundation (NRF), whose aim—as posted in its homepage—was to “contribute to promoting the nation’s academic and technoscientifc advancement and research potential.”16 Interestingly, the English version of NRF’s website did not mention the term, the “nation” (kugka), in its introductory page. Instead, it said that its mission was to “promote research creativity and nurture global researchers.”17 The “nation” was deliberately erased in NRF’s international face and was replaced by the term “global” for expatriate scholars and other international audiences. Of course, this was not so much a deception as a

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facet of the contradictory nature of Korea’s globalization. NRF, a governmental institution supported by Korea’s tax revenues, aimed at promoting the nation in the “global stage” by aiding foreign, as well as domestic, scientists. The foreign scholars’ research with their international networks should thus foster Korea’s stronger “competitiveness” (kyŏngchaenglyŏk), which might assist in its further advancement in the twenty-frst century. How, then, are the foreign professors so successful in their NRF funding applications? Even though funding is less competitive in Korea than America or Europe, a large number of academics do fail. How, then, do expatriate scientists acquire money necessary for their projects? For this, I found at least two factors, both of which were also related to Korea’s regional conditions and problems. Not to mention the formal agendas and visions of NRF, the actual logistics of funding applications heavily depended on local circumstances, which the expatriate scholars could not highly praise. The frst should be found in NRF’s peer review system that relied only on the scholarly community within the country. To most expatriate professors, this was a signifer of Korea’s peripheral status. Professor A complained that it was diffcult to fnd world leaders in the Korean scientifc community due to its limited size and meager internationalization. Unlike American or European research communities, Korean academia was not likely to have the best talents in each discipline, due to its relatively small size and the modest number of foreign participants. Professor C also told me that in Korea there were only three scholars, including himself, who had expertise in his subdiscipline. He did not know if any of these two colleagues ever reviewed his NFR proposals, but his applications were successful so far, unlike his earlier attempts in Germany where funding was a much trickier affair. Strikingly, he did not completely deny the possibility that at least some of his NRF applications were reviewed by non-expert referees who could have approved his proposals that were unintelligible but looked “impressive” to them. The weakness of NRF and Korean academia could also beneft foreign natural scientists pursuing interdisciplinary cooperation. Professor B said that due to the lack of experts in his subfeld in the NRF review board—refecting the tiny Korean academic community as a whole—his proposals were often assessed not in terms of its overall disciplinary relevance but its use of new technologies. Appropriating this weakness, he was able to implement several cooperative projects with engineers in his university who wanted to apply their new inventions to the natural sciences. The weakness of Korean academia as a regional community thus made possible some of his “crazy projects” that could have been impossible in his country. The second reason for the international faculty’s successful funding application was connected to another factor constituting Korea’s peripheral status, that is, the characteristics of their graduate students. As I have already

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mentioned, many foreign professors worried that their Korean students’ obedience could discourage their creativity. Although Professor L stated that his KAIST students were scientifcally promising, other professors were far less enthusiastic. Their students were too compliant and docile to be scientifcally successful. However, these students were essential in a task that belonged to neither their coursework nor thesis project: They were quite willing to help their advisors complete their funding proposals, even though this job had nothing to do with their formal school duties. In effect, except for Professor F who had spent “almost two years” in translating the NRF guidelines from Korean to English by himself, all the other expatriate professors I interviewed had little diffculty in acquiring money from NRF due to their students. While the foreign professors wrote down the technical justifcation part in English, their graduate students completed the rest in Korean, which was required by NRF. The professors’ “obedient” students thus played a main role in their successful experiences, even though it was unclear if it was a part of their offcial task assigned to them. These two reasons imply the complexity of globalization in science through Korean institutions. It appears that NRF was at least partly successful in implementing its global mission by patronizing a number of expatriate faculty members with international collaborative networks. Yet this modest success was made possible by the problems of the Korean science and higher education, which might initially disappoint the foreign science professors. Korea’s small and ethnically homogeneous scholarly community and the docile graduate students ironically enabled the expatriate scholars to do their job well.

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INCORPORATING THE PERIPHERAL Some foreign professors did not simply derive beneft from what they thought was the peripheral features of Korean science but also actively incorporated them in their own way. Admittedly, many expatriate professors regarded Korea’s “managed globalization” as a peripheral country’s struggle fraught with critical limitations (Alford, 1999). Professor G states that Koreans want to “become globalized on the one hand, but, on the other hand, don’t let the globalization in too much.” However, all foreign professors were deeply engaged in this managed globalization, especially through their Englishonly courses, one of the main components of President Lee Myung-bak’s globalization drive (Palmer and Cho, 2011: 121–128). They were expected to be exemplars for Korean professors who were also encouraged to teach in English. For this task, a KAIST chemist David Churchill, along with his father and two Korean coauthors, even published a manual for Koreans who

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were enforced to teach English-only courses. The manual, How to Prepare for General Chemistry Taught in English (Hwahak: Yŏngŏ kangŭi irŏk’e chunbihaja), was published through Darakwon, a Korean company specializing in reference books (ch’amgosŏ) for various state licensing exams (Churchill, Churchill, Yi, and Kim, 2010). In writing this manual, he made a unique choice: He did not choose to win Koreans’ heart and assuage their anxiety in the age of globalization by teaching his classes in Korean. Instead, he chose to be an active collaborator for a peripheral country’s managed globalization project, in which English fuency is supposedly essential. More striking was some of my interviewees’ way of administering their laboratories and graduate students. As I have mentioned, many expatriate academics disliked their Korean colleagues’ manner of enforcing laboratory discipline. In their own laboratories, they thus led their students to work voluntarily without administering any strict scheduling or rules, except for those concerning safety. However, some of the foreign academics were as harsh as Koreans when it came to the matter of running their laboratories. The most prominent among them was probably Professor E. When I asked how he trained his students, he asserted that all of them should come to the laboratory by nine o’clock in the morning. Even though there was no “police offcer” enforcing this, it was a defnite rule that all his students must comply with. After that, they had to have a meeting with their advisor, who would guide their actual experiments that they should carry out during the day. Their work would then continue until late night, in stark contrast to the laboratory research in Europe where the professor himself was trained. While everyone there went home around 4:30 pm, Korean graduate students were working harder and longer, and this was the key reason why they were more productive and skillful. Being proud of his graduate students and their productivity, he said that he would stay in Korea for the rest of his career. In contrast, Professor A was not entirely satisfed with his students. He said, “When I was a graduate student, I would probably not go to the lab once a month.” However, his students now were having every Sunday off. According to him, his “graduate students . . . didn’t experience the hardship in the same way as the previous generation did,” as they had “nice life when they grew up.” In his laboratory, they thus continued to live like this: You come at 11 and you read your emails and the news and then it’s 11:30 and you go to [student cafeteria], and you have lunch, and you are back at 12 at your desk, then you’re full, and you have to [digest]. And then maybe you start to do some work once maybe at one o’clock, okay? You work from one to fve, that’s four hours. And then at 5 you start thinking about going to dinner, and at 5:30 you do go to dinner. Okay? And it’s six, may be past six, because you walk around, and you work two more hours until 8 o’clock, and then it’s

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time to go home. So, how many hours have you worked? It’s six hours. That’s it. Not even eight.

Some sorts of the Foucaultian discipline were thus necessary for his students (Foucault, 1995). As there was “very ferce competition . . . around the world,” they should “work like crazy” like older Koreans. While Koreans’ work hours were “50 percent more than other people” in “the OECD,” no other countries “showed bigger progress than Korea in the last forty years.” But his graduate students did not make this professor’s life unhappy in the campus. The professor’s point was not that they were undisciplined or lazy but a stronger discipline was imperative to further the competitiveness of his laboratory. Of course, he said, his students were not like those at Cambridge. His Korean students were probably less competent than those at Britain’s top school. But most Koreans were extremely hardworking, and this was the basis of their “tremendous success” so far. Korea and its students were not yet at the center of the world science, yet their diligence would further enhance their status in the global age. These remarks illustrate Professor A’s internalization of Korean practices and discourses. He accepted not just some Korean professors’ harsh management style but also their national cultural discourses, such as hard work, competitiveness (kyŏngchaenglyŏk), and the legacy and importance of Korea’s rapid industrialization. His view that Korean students were less capable than those at Cambridge but would work harder also refected some people’s notion that Koreans were “hands,” not the “brains” in a “global division of labour” (Chekar and Kitzinger, 2007: 294–295). This dimension points to a factor for some foreign scientists’ successful adaptation to Korean universities. Professor A was well-recognized for his academic achievement and was appreciated in the campus for his contribution to his university’s internationalization. Professor E was also successful at SNU as he was soon tenured after the interview. It may then be unsurprising that Professor D, who had complained of Koreans’ treatment of graduate students as “prisoners,” recently resigned to accept an offer from a European university.18 While some professors became globally successful by appropriating a peripheral country’s practices and discourses, others could not do so. They thus had to leave. CONCLUSION As far as I know, this is the frst study of the lives of expatriate scientists in South Korea in a contemporary context. I think that my chapter has illustrated not just their experiences in a foreign country but also several common features shared by South Korean scientifc communities. Foreigners’ gaze can

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sometimes be more illustrative, as it can point to the problems in the cultural practices that Koreans themselves often take for granted. Their comments can also illuminate a hitherto neglected dimension of Korea’s globalization. Through this study, I have discussed certain key reasons for the continued stay of foreign professors of science in Korea. I have analyzed why they chose to stay by focusing on the globality of science, which entails the center–periphery dynamics, understood and appropriated in different ways by them. Many of them, especially Western academics, thought that their Korean institutions were peripheral in the global scientifc knowledge economy. They indeed pointed to several persistent problems that embarrassed them during their Korean stay. Yet these problems, alongside their intentional efforts and unintended circumstances, led to the reinterpretation of the meanings of the peripheral traits of the Korean academic culture and practice. This reinterpretation also affected their ways of doing science in Korea, as they found what might not be always available in their own countries, that is, easier and more fexible funding opportunities as well as obedient and hardworking graduate students as lab workers. Ironically, some of the problems of Korea contributed to their long-term stay. These foreign scientists had to deal with various local issues, such as cultural isolation, language problems, authoritarianism, sexism, and even xenophobia. These issues are partially a consequence of the historical trajectory of Korean science, which has been an engine of the postcolonial country’s rapid growth and industrialization under a military dictatorship. Even Korea’s globalization itself is a legacy of this trajectory, although its scope—especially in popular culture—has recently broadened far beyond the early perimeter of “managed globalization” (Jin, 2016). I have claimed that Korea’s historical legacy and its current formulation, along with some scientists’ professional experiences, ethnic origins, and strategies, contributed to increasing the length of their stay in this era. This chapter has thus shown that their scientifc life critically depended on their interaction with both the global arenas of the natural sciences and Korea’s local cultural contexts. NOTES 1. This chapter was previously published in Hyung Wook Park. 2018. “Living as Foreign Scientists: Stories of Nineteen Expatriate Professors in South Korea.” Journal of Science & Technology Studies, 18 (3): 45-100. 2. Of course, these regional philosophies themselves have been globalized, as they developed their own worldwide journals and global academic networks. Yet few would deny that linguistic and cultural differences still matter.

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3. The rate of reply was extremely low in Yonsei, Hanyang, and Sungkyunkwan Universities, as only one professor in each of these universities agreed to be interviewed. None at Korea and Chung-Ang Universities replied to me. I was not able to fnd any foreign professor in natural science at Pohang University of Science and Technology (POSTECH), although it is another major research university. According to the Information Service of Higher Education in Korea, there are four foreign regular science professors at POSTECH. It seems that they are all Koreans with foreign nationalities. In general, this study has dealt only with professors in elite universities in Korea. It would be even harder to interview expatriate professors in less prestigious schools, as their proportions in the regular faculty was even lower than those in Yonsei, Hanyang, and Sungkyunkwan Universities, where I could meet just one professor per university. In addition to the foreign science faculty, I also interviewed three graduate students at Seoul National University. 4. In the university website, the title of this foreign faculty was just “assistant professor.” 5. In my paper, I cannot reveal any further details of the interviewees, as I have to protect their privacy according to the rules of the research ethics set by the Institutional Review Board of my university. Their names, nationalities, and academic departments could not be specifed, as such information can be used to spot their identities in the relatively short list of foreign science professors in each institution. 6. No interviewee was an ethnic Korean with a foreign nationality. 7. I mostly contacted foreign professors in natural science colleges. However, I also emailed those in other colleges, as far as their felds of research included the basic sciences. 8. After Park’s death, Chun Doo Hwan, another military dictator, seized the power through a bloody coup. Although he had to listen to the voice of participants of the 1987 democratic movement, his military cooperator, Roh Tae-Woo, was elected in that year’s democratic election. The frst civilian government could start only after Roh stepped down in 1992. 9. For Professors B, H, and L, their family and spouse were the key factor of their migration to Korea. 10. Professor A spoke Korean fuently, while Professor M’s Korean was passable. 11. Professors A, D, and L mentioned this as a possible problem. 12. Professors B, D, F, G, I, and J were concerned about this issue. 13. Interviewed on May 18, 2016, in the lobby of the college building. The faculty webpage of his university showed an impressive list of publications. 14. Most of my interviewees did not have any students from “center” countries, except for Professors and A and P, who had students from Britain and the United States. 15. At KIST, the principal investigators can have graduate students, who are offcial registered in different institutions. They are trained at KIST, but will have their degrees from the universities in which are enrolled. 16. National Research Foundation, Ch’edan sogye [Introduction to the Foundation]. (http​:/​/ww​​w​.nrf​​.re​.k​​r​/cms​​/page​​/main​​?me​nu​​_no​=9​​9, accessed 26 June 2017).

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17. National Research Foundation, Introduction. (http​:/​/ww​​w​.nrf​​.re​.k​​r​/eng​​/cms/​​ page/​​main?​​me​nu_​​no​=22​​1, accessed June 26, 2017). 18. I received an email from him on May 8, 2017.

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DiMoia, J. P. (2013), Reconstructing Bodies: Biomedicine, Health, and NationBuilding in South Korea since 1945, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Foucault, M. (1995), Discipline and Punish (trans. Alan Sheridan), New York, NY: Vintage. Fouser, R. J. (2015, October 26), “Han·mi·il ‘oekukin kyosu’ nŭn oelopta” [Korean, American, and Japanese ‘Foreign Professors’ Are Lonely], Kyosu Shinmun. Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowonty, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., and Trow, M. (eds). (2010), The New Production of Knowledge, London: Sage. Golinski, J. (2005), Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Gooday, G. J. N. and Low, M. F. (1998), “Technology Transfer and Cultural Exchange: Western Scientists and Engineers Encounter Late Tokugawa and Meiji Japan,” Osiris, Vol. 13, pp. 99–128. Gooding, D., Pinch, T., and Schaffer, S. (eds). (1993), The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hess, D. J. (1995), Science & Technology in a Multicultural World, New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Hong, S. (2012), “The Relationship between Science and Technology in Korea from the 1960s to the Present Day,” East Asian Science, Technology and Society, Vol. 6(2), pp. 259–265. Hong, S. and Chang, H. W. (2010), “Sirhŏmsil kwa ch’angŭisŏng: Ch’aegimja wa sirhŏmsil munhwa ŭi yŏkhal ŭl chungsimŭro” [Laboratory and Creativity: The Role of the Leader and Laboratory Culture], Kwahakkisurhak Yŏn’gu, Vol. 10(1), pp. 27–72. Hwang, K. (2005), “The Inferior Science and the Dominant Use of English in Knowledge Production,” Science Communication, Vol. 26(4), pp. 390–427. ———. (2008), “International Collaboration in Multi-Layered Center-Periphery in the Globalization of Science and Technology,” Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 33(1), pp. 101–133. Jin, D. Y. (2016), New Korean Wave: Transnational Cultural Power in the Age of Social Media, Urbana-Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. Kim, D. and Leslie, S. W. (1998), “Winning Markets or Winning Nobel Prizes? KAIST and the Challenges of Late Industrialization,” Osiris, Vol. 13, pp. 154–185. Kim, G. B. (2011), “An Anatomical Chart of South Korean Science and Technology in the 1960s,” East Asian Science, Technology and Society, Vol. 5(4), pp. 529–542. Kim, K. (2005), “Kukchejŏk in kwahakkwa kukchijŏk in yŏn’gu” [Global Science and Local Research], Kwahakkisurhak Yŏn’gu, Vol. 5(1), pp. 31–54. Kim, L. (2008a), “Explaining the Hwang Scandal,” Science as Culture, Vol. 17(4), pp. 397–415. Kim, S. (2014), “The Politics of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research in South Korea,” Science as Culture, Vol. 23(3), pp. 293–319. Kim, S., Yi, P., and Jang, D. (2014), “Segyesujun yŏn’gujungsim taehak saŏp ŭi sŏnggwa punsŏk: BK21 saŏp kwaŭi pigyo” [An Analysis on the Research Outcomes of World Class University Project Comparing with BK21 Project in Korea], Kyoyuk Chaejŏng Kyŏngje Yŏn’gu, Vol. 23(3), pp. 61–88.

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Chapter 8

Creating Hidden Social Capital A Case of the Indonesian Immigrants of Wongok-dong in South Korea

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Kwang Woo Park

Most scholars agree that social capital infuences societal outcomes (Bourdieu, 1986: 251; Coleman, 1990: 302; Putnam, 2000: 22).1 Even though social capital makes an impact upon social outcomes, there are differences according to types of social capital. In this regard, Putnam (2000: 22–23) suggests two types of social capital: bonding and bridging. Bonding capital refers to within-group connections. This type of social capital is often created in ethnic enclaves where immigrants maintain their connections with those who have the same social background such as ethnic, religion, and regional origin. Bridging social capital signifes connections between different and heterogeneous groups. In other words, bridging social capital can be yielded by networks with those who have different social backgrounds in ethnicity, race, culture, and other social cleavages (Grant, 2001). Although the social capital notion of bonding and bridging type successfully categories a variety of social capitals into two parts, there is a problem to focus on horizontal connections. For this reason, Woolcock (2001: 13–14) suggests linking as the third type of social capital. This indicates connections among varying power positions and social statuses, including civil societies, government agencies, and representatives of the public and the private sector (Grant, 2001). The diverse types of social capital imply connotative meanings. Putnam (2000: 22–23), for example, insists that the bridging social capital is more important than that of bonding in getting ahead. As the bonding social capital tends to produce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups, it can lead to the reinforcement of in-group identities and make some groups marginalized. However, the social capital of bridging type can contribute to social integration through formulating relations with which it is possible for immigrants to 199

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assess external assets and information in the host society. Although the social capital of bridging plays a pivotal role in enhancing access to additional resources, it has the limitations with horizontal networks as well, because it does not consider the lack of resources in some groups or problems of the different allocation of the sum of resources among various groups due to an uneven fnancial or power position (Wakefeld and Blake, 2005). In this point, the social capital of linking produced among people in dissimilar situations is helpful in overcoming the defect with that of bridging. In this context, the social capital of bonding type has been used to explain the socioeconomic mobility of ethnic minorities (Portes and Zhou, 1992; Sanders and Nee, 1996: 246; Waldinger, 1986: 269–274) and understand the academic performance of American Asians (Bankston and Zhou, 2002: 313–314; Zhou, 1997: 63–95, 2005: 131–159) in the host society. However, immigrants’ formation of bonding social capital can also cause isolation within the host society due to a lack of social relationships with natives. The implication here is that building social relationships with natives can reduce social discrimination (Mowu, 2002: 518–521). In other words, immigrants can access much-needed resources through the native population of the host society. Thus, the formation of bridging social capital can have a positive impact on immigrants’ adaptation into the host society. However, the use of all these perspectives is limited in examining the case of the Indonesian immigrants of Wongok-dong in South Korea since they do not address the social cleavages within the immigrant group.2 Indonesian immigrants have endeavored to sustain their lives through building up both bonding and bridging social capital with people who have the same or different social backgrounds in Wongok-dong. However, the process is different from that outlined above. On the one hand, the Indonesian immigrants build bonding social capital not with those who have different social backgrounds but with kawan sekampung3 based on their affliations to local languages and regions of Indonesia. On the other hand, some of the Indonesian immigrants form bridging social capital not only with Koreans but also with Indonesian migrants who have different social backgrounds. That is, there are possibilities to build bridging social capital within the Indonesian immigrant group. Although there are chances to build bridging social capital among Indonesian immigrants, who have different social backgrounds, it happens that Indonesian themselves yield specifc resources by using their status as a foreign migrant worker in South Korea. In this regard, formulating linking social capital with Koreans plays an important role in accessing additional resources among the Indonesian immigrants. Resources produced from linking social capital can create bridges within the socially divided Indonesian immigrant group in the context of Wongok-dong.

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Having provided background, I suggest that the Indonesian migrants have the chance to formulate “hidden bridging social capital” among those who have different social backgrounds through building linking social capital in Wongok-dong. To support this central argument, I explore how both the integrated and isolated Indonesian migrants4 of Wongok-dong enhance their transnational activities5 in terms of building social capital.6 To undertake this research, I did an ethnographic feldwork in Wongokdong7 from October 2010 to September 2011. Using a method of participant observation, I observed developments of social relationship among Indonesian migrants that could yield social outcomes and transnational activities in various places, such as Indonesian restaurants, community offce, religious facilities, and sociocultural festivals and events. By conducting participant observation, I focused on exploring the possibilities of building social relationship among people who have different social backgrounds. I had questions such as what is objective of these activities or facilities, who or which organization supports these activities or facilities, who are the participants in these activities or facilities, do social relationships between people who have different social backgrounds build due to these activities or facilities, what social outcomes are yielded by the activities or facilities. These questions enabled me to realize the mechanisms for putting on Indonesian migrants’ transnational activities and role of social capital. Based on these observations, the data generated became gradually deeper, more situational, and specifc. In terms of conducting interviews, a snowball sampling method enabled me to recruit ten Indonesian immigrants and three Korean as interviewees. Table 8.1 presents several characteristics of my Indonesian informants. As we can see, there are differences among Indonesian interviewees in terms of their hometown, paguyuban, and relation to Indonesian Community in Corea (ICC). By conducting formal and informal interviews with Indonesians, who have different social backgrounds, I asked interviewees about their social Table 8.1  Characteristics of Indonesian Interviewees Name

Hometown

Paguyuban

Relation to ICC

Asri Entis Hermin Kalim Muslim Saiful Wanto Yani Yanto Zhunk

Bima Cirebone (West Java) Bima Golontalo (Sulawesi) Lombok Bandung (West Java) Kendal (Central Java) Cirebone (West Java) Blitar (East Java) Bandung

GABIM None GABIM None GALOK None Bahurekso Parayangan Blitar Parayangan

ICC member None ICC member None None None ICC member None None ICC member

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life in both Indonesia and South Korea on matters, such as the meaning of their home town, and perceptions of their communities and of people both who have common and those who have different heritages. This enabled me to investigate the relationship between distinct characteristics of Indonesian migrant group and the building of different types of social capital. In this regard, I tried to uncover how social capital operates among them in the Wongok-dong of South Korea. On the basis of this question, I could identify issues of isolation and integration that resulted in more marginalized and or integrated groups through the building of different types of social capital. I endeavored to investigate the pattern of producing and consuming transnational activities among Indonesian migrants by focusing on asking questions about their economic, social, and cultural transnational activities. Generating these data provided to explain Indonesian migrants’ transnational activities related to social capital in the Wongok-dong of South Korea.

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INTEGRATED INDONESIAN MIGRANTS AS THE PRODUCER OF AN “INDONESIA” In this section, I suggest that the integrated Indonesian migrants of Wongokdong have actively produced an “Indonesia.” The Indonesian migrants who cannot freely move between South Korea and Indonesia have made great efforts to connect with their compatriots within Korea, particularly by seeking ways to experience a hometown atmosphere in Korea. Based on this context, there is a need for sustained social contact with their home and therefore migrants create their places in Korea to fulfll that desire. In this regard, several Indonesian migrants have used their position as an integrated Indonesian to achieve this in the Wongok-dong. Owing to distinct features of the town, both Korean people and Indonesian migrants can become resources for each other in formulating the linking social capital. To Korean people, Indonesian migrants can be a resource for pursuing economic profts, gathering foreign migrants for various objectives. For an Indonesian, having Korean networks gives them to pride and a powerful position within their group due to diffculty of building social relation with Koreans in Korea. Although Korean and Indonesian people become resources for each other, Indonesian migrants must satisfy the demand of Korean people. As a result, integrated Indonesian communities, such as ICC8 that represents Indonesian migrants, are useful for obtaining access to Korean networks. As an integrated Indonesian in Wongokdong, the immigrant’s specifc skills, knowledge, and social networks enabled them to make social relationships with Koreans. Based on this, accumulated networks with Koreans and Indonesians can be used to prepare foundations to achieve transnational activities in the Wongok-dong of South Korea.

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Making a Product Some Indonesian migrants integrated into Wongok-dong have initiated ethnic businesses by using their social networks with Indonesian migrants as well as with Korean natives. The Indonesian migrants with E-9 visa are not allowed to work in any places except the designated labor sectors, such as manufacturing, fshing, and the construction industry. For this reason, they cannot work in such service sectors as restaurants, mobile phone shops, and the like. Despite that, some of Korean business owners hire Indonesian migrants as part or fulltime workers. Korean merchants do this because of the importance of having an Indonesian network to achieve economic gain. In other words, the success of this type of business depends on its Indonesian employees’ ability to gather potential customers. For this reason, Koreans want to hire those Indonesian migrants who are active and well known within the Indonesian group. And thus Indonesian employees can obtain the right to resell international calling cards from Korean mobile phone shop owners. For example, Zhunk is a fulltime seller of international calling cards. Although he used to work at the factory, he could be employed as a seller by one Korean businessman. Actually, he is very famous among the Indonesian migrants of Wongok-dong. He had performed a lot in demonstrations as a leader of a workers’ band. Because of his well-known status, he appeared at the hit Korean flm titled Banga Banga. Because he is very famous among Indonesian migrants, he can easily attract second international calling cards sellers as customers.9 He has twenty-fve customers who are leaders of paguyuban and are from other regions such as Uijungbu, Suwon, and Pyeongtaek. Through extra jobs provided by Koreans, migrants are able to achieve economic success as time goes by. Based on this, migrants can start their own businesses to meet the demands of Indonesian migrants. The migrants then remit the money to Indonesia where it is used to support their family, repay debts, pay the immigration process fees of family members, and invest in real estate. After fulflling these duties, they can spend the surplus money on themselves. In general, they seek new business by using the fnancial frepower and know-how accumulated by long-term experience in South Korea. For instance, Hermin is one of the executives of ICC. In addition, he is well known as a fashion model and a master of ceremonies among the Indonesian migrants of Wongok-dong. He has lived in Korea for more than fve years. Since 2004, he worked at a mobile phone shop as a part-time worker on weekends. From that time, he could make a lot of money from part-time job. It was enough to boil the pot in Korea. Thus, his salary from the factory could be remitted to Indonesia. Remitted money was used for building a house and buying land in his hometown. In addition, he bought two minibuses. After that, Hermin turned his interests toward other business. Economic power and

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his relationship with his Korean boss in the mobile phone shop enabled him to start to sell high-cost goods such as smart mobile phones to Indonesian migrants. Indonesian married migrants have also used their special status to open their own businesses in Wongok-dong. Although it is possible for working migrants to earn extra money in unoffcial businesses, it is impossible for Indonesians with an E-9 visa to register a business. However, Indonesian married migrants, as the spouse of a Korean, can open and formally register a business. Moreover, their position plays a key role in attracting Indonesian customers due to their Korean language skill and knowledge of Koreans: Yani is a female married migrant and an owner of Warung10 “S.” She emigrated to Korea twelve-years ago and started work at the factory during the early years of her immigration. At the factory, she met one Korean guy and got married to him. In 2008, this married couple decided to open their Indonesian restaurant when they heard that there were shops selling foods, international calling cards, and groceries to Indonesian migrants which worked well in Wongok-dong. They thought that there were advantages in terms of initiating an Indonesian restaurant because of their status. Yani could formally register her business by using her spouses’ position as Korean. In addition, she already knew how to cook several Indonesian foods and had already established an Indonesian migrant network. After starting the restaurant, she encountered various problems with Indonesian compatriots and tried to solve those troubles. She held a fundraising campaign in her restaurant for injured Indonesian migrants. Furthermore, she worked as an interpreter when her fellow Indonesian people needed help. Due to her various activities for Indonesian migrants, Yani was appointed Oegukin Ingwon Jikimi, a protector of foreign migrants’ human right, by Ansan Foreign Migrant Community Service Center. Finally, the human capital of migrants produces Indonesian entertainments in Wongok-dong. There are many Indonesian musical bands in Wongokdong. The members of these bands consist of Indonesian migrant workers who, after emigrating, earned enough money to purchase musical instruments. And then, they started to organize a band as a hobby and play for Indonesian audiences. Over time, the Indonesian bands started performing for Koreans who want to use the migrants’ talents to achieve their objectives. For instance, one Indonesian band participated in demonstrations against the crackdown on foreign migrant workers; another Dangdut11 band was often called upon by Koreans to present Indonesian traditional culture at multicultural festivals. As a result of their activities, the band members became famous among people in Wongok-dong. The following story is about one Indonesian front man of a Dangdut band. Wanto is a leader of the band, Maeswara. In 2008, he was a leader of paguyuban Kendal and started

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to perform the duty of a MC, master of ceremonies, when paguyuban have events. On the basis of this, he started a band to enjoy Dangdut with friends. Moreover, he was working as an executive of the ICC. He performed several roles such as a MC at Tabligh Akbar, Indonesian festivals, multicultural festivals, and song festivals. These activities have brought positive effect to his band. Namely, Maeswara became a popular band among Indonesians. This band became one of the biggest Indonesian bands due to the huge profts. In the Wongok-dong context, Indonesians who had special skills obtain chances to present their performances in public. As a result, their activities were commercialized by the needs of Indonesian migrants.

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Preparing Cultural Space Spaces for Indonesian people have been created and maintained not only by some integrated Indonesians but also by Koreans who want to achieve their goals in Wongok-dong. Even though there are Indonesian restaurants run by Indonesian married migrants in Wongok-dong, most Indonesian restaurants are run by Korean merchants.12 For them, the most important thing is acquiring Indonesian customers. However, they cannot avoid competition with other Indonesian business owners due to the presence of a large number of Indonesian restaurants in Wongok-dong. This creates tension that can spill into action designed to undermine a competitor. For example, there was an incident when somebody reported the presence of illegal Indonesian employees in Indonesian restaurants to the immigration offce. All Indonesian cooks, waiter, and waitress employed in Indonesian restaurants are undocumented migrants.13 Although immigration offcers already knew this, they usually do not arrest them. However, immigration offcers are required to act on specifc reports of undocumented migrants. Thus, Indonesian employees of Warung ‘D’ Warung ‘N’ Warung ‘A’ and Warung ‘K’ were arrested over several days. Related to this incident, the Korean owner of Warung ‘S’ said as follows: After employees were arrested at Warung “D” all Indonesian restaurant owners in Wongok-Dong gathered to discuss this issue. However, these were repeated. Yesterday, thus, we had meeting again. Owner of Warung “K” asked his friend who is working in immigration offce. His friend did not say who informed against them. But he said that the informer was in the same line of work. [. . .] Because of this, cook of my restaurant ran away. She was very afraid of this.

That is, an anonymous Warung owner reported the presence of undocumented migrants working in a particular Warung to immigration offcers because of competition among restaurant owners.

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The apprehension of Indonesian employees causes problems for restaurant owners since the owners are unable to run the restaurants at full capacity until they replace the arrested employees. In addition to fnding new Indonesian employees, the owners also incur a fne for illegally hiring migrants without the appropriate paperwork. More signifcantly, the owners lose Indonesian customers and access to the wider Indonesian networks. Basically, there are two types of full-time Indonesian employees in the restaurants of Wongok-dong. The frst is the female cooks in the kitchen, the second the male waiters who prepare drinks and serve food to customers. These people are very important in attracting Indonesian migrants to their restaurant. Indonesian migrants choose to visit those Warungs where they are likely to fnd the taste of their respective hometowns (You, 2011: 66–67; Park, 2016: 148–152). Thus, Korean owners have to consider this when they hire a cook. However, female cooks have limited opportunities to extend their network due to the small number of female Indonesian migrants in Wongok-dong. In this regard, the male waiters are crucial since they are more likely to lead more customers to the restaurant due to their wider personal networks. Therefore, the loss of Indonesian employees means a loss of Indonesian customers from the paguyubans in Wongok-dong. The Korean owner of Warung “A” stressed about the importance of Indonesian employees as a below:

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The important thing to maintain restaurant is paguyuban. Most of the Indonesian migrants are members of one of the paguyubans. There are strong bonds among them. So, friends of my employees visit our restaurant to help and see them.

It is Koreans that own and manage most of Indonesian restaurants in Wongok-dong. But their maintaining depends upon attracting people through active Indonesian employees. Similarly, the ICC offce was provided by a Korean businessman who wanted to use the power and networks of an integrated Indonesian community. Although the ICC was established in 2006, it did not have any fxed places for its group members to meet until early 2010. Prior to 2010, the members gathered in the paguyuban house, Ansan Foreign Migrant Community Service Centre or Indonesian Warungs. When I frst met executives of the ICC, they were in their own offces. I asked Asri, an ICC executive, about the time when the offce was frst setup. He said, “a Korean provided us the space. Maybe, he wanted to sell international calling cards to us.” The offce was located in Wongok-dong and consisted of one big hall, a meeting room, toilet, and kitchen. There were several tables, chairs, desktop computers, and a big desk in the hall. In the meeting room, I found one big whiteboard, one big table, and many chairs. At that place, I met the Korean businessman named Kim.

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I introduced myself as a researcher and explained to him what my research was about. His role was as an executive advisor to the ICC. He said to me:

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I’m supporting the ICC. However, I also do this for my business [. . .]. I equipped several computers in the hall for Indonesian visitors. In addition, Indonesian friends [the ICC members] wanted to prepare a kitchen. So, it is under construction now. [. . . ] ‘E’ [an ICC member] will work in this offce. [. . . ] the ICC will be dramatically changed compared to before. I have a lot of plans to help Indonesian migrants in the near future. You are in good time for your research.

I could observe the various activities performed in the ICC offce. One of the ICC executives was hired as a full-time worker selling international calling cards to Indonesian migrants. In addition, Kim, as an executive advisor of the ICC, endeavored to assist the ICC with various projects. For example, the ICC members followed his suggestion to create a newspaper called the ICC News. The paper reports on various matters, such as recent activities of the ICC, information about fundraising for building the Indonesian masjid (Islamic temple) in Ansan, activities of Universitas Terbuka (Open University), introductions of the Indonesian embassy in Seoul, and includes several commercial advertisements for pre-paid international calling cards/ fight tickets, and so forth. Kim also wanted to hire a person to teach Korean language to Indonesian migrants and supported the Universitas Terbuka (UT), often helping to secure classrooms for UT lectures. Even though these activities superfcially appear to be meant for Indonesian migrants, they actually mask the Kim’s efforts to not only monopolize Indonesian networks but also obtain information about them in order to develop his business by using the status of the ICC. Kim had plans to sell various products such as tour packages, mobile phones, and Korean ginseng to Indonesian migrants. He expected that he could easily build social relationship with Indonesian migrants by providing space to the integrated Indonesian community. In doing so, he secured himself many opportunities to sell products to Indonesian networks. The Indonesian masjid was established by an integrated Indonesian migrant community in Wongok-dong. According to Park (2016: 163–167), Indonesian migrants have felt insecure and unsettled because of the absence of their own masjid. And thus they have endeavored to establish that community. Among their efforts, performances of paguyuban bands have played a key role in fundraising for the Indonesian masjid. However, although Indonesians in Wongok-dong aspired to have their masjid, segregations within the group obstructed free fowing of ideas and action to achieve their goal. In this regard, the ICC, as an integrated Indonesian community was

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crucial to solving the problem, as Wanto, a member of the ICC and a Dangut band leader, explained: As you know, it was diffcult to achieve the mutual exchange of ideas among paguyubans due to differences of hometown. However, the ICC has members from various paguyubans. We could gather leaders of each paguyuban to have a congress. So, we could mediate opinions of each paguyuban. As a result, we decided to have performance of Indonesian bands for fundraising. We could easily mobilise Indonesians from paguyubans for that event as well. [. . .] As far as I remember, participated bands were Maeswara, Dinasty, Workers band, Galok band [Lombok], Kosmis Band [Makasar] and Campur sari [Sragen].

Therefore, the integrated Indonesian community spontaneously established the masjid by using its powerful and integrated status in Wongok-dong.

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Performing National Ceremony In addition to the products and spaces produced by the position of integrated Indonesians in Wongok-dong, the Tabligh Akbar (great sermon) is an event that demonstrates the power of integrated Indonesian communities. In 2010, the fourth Tabligh Akbar was held in front of Ansan Foreign Migrant Community Center during the Chuseok holidays. About 3,000 Indonesian migrants living in the Kyeonggi province, the Indonesian ambassador and his family, and the head of Ansan Foreign Migrant Community Centre attended the ceremony. In addition, Ustadz Wijayanto and Dick Doank were invited from Indonesia for the event.14 The ceremony is held annually by the KMI (Komunitas Muslim Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim community), a federation of eighteen Indonesian masjids scattered throughout South Korea. Members of the organization place a high value on religious rather than regional origin and stress that prayer can eliminate conficts among Indonesians from different hometowns. The KMI realized the need to enhance togetherness among Indonesian migrants through religion and, on the basis of this perspective, planned the Tabligh Akbar. While the KMI is credited with setting up the Tabligh Akbar, the ICC too played an important role in assisting the KMI with the annual event. The KMI organized a fundraising event called Sumbangan with many Indonesian masjids in South Korea. Both of them invited Islamic leaders and celebrities from Indonesia to South Korea. However, they discovered that they were limited in terms of mobilizing people from each paguyuaban and by a lack of Korean networks. In this context, the ICC, as the manager of all paguyubans, helped the KMI to overcome its limitations. More importantly, a venue for

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the event was rented through the ICC’s Korean networks as Asri, an ICC member, explained: The ICC had a lot of chances to contact with Koreans in Ansan Foreign Migrant Community Center. Whenever they needed us for festivals and other activities, we helped them. For this reason, Koreans helped us as well. Every year, we have held Tabligh Akbar in Ansan. We could rent the place for this through Koreans. [. . . ] KMI is a big community. However, they just focus on religion. So, they do not have Korean friends.

The two integrated Indonesian communities of the ICC and the KMI, thus, worked together to produce the Tabligh Akbar—an Indonesian national ceremony in Ansan. In summary, as some integrated Indonesian immigrants with Korean networks use their specifc resources, they initiate their own businesses, create Indonesian cultural spaces, and hold national ceremonies in Wongok-dong.

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ISOLATED INDONESIAN MIGRANTS AS THE CONSUMER OF “INDONESIA” In the previous section, I showed that some of integrated Indonesian migrants who have extended networks with Koreans and Indonesians create and maintain an “Indonesia” in Wongok-dong. In this section, conversely, I reveal that such isolated Indonesian migrants, whose relationships remain outside their paguyuban, have just consumed this “Indonesia” created by those integrated migrants. The Indonesian migrants as members of paguyubans have effectively coped with the different surroundings of South Korea by using resources from their paguyuban. Employing the social capital of bonding type, they could eliminate cultural fatigue, secure temporary housing in Wongok-dong, obtain job opportunities, and prepare unexpected incidents (e.g., deportation). These social outcomes produced by paguyuban enable the isolated Indonesian to adapt themselves to Korean society, too. Nonetheless, more valuable resources can be yielded by integrated Indonesian migrants who have established the linking social capital with Koreans. Although there are social divisions within the Indonesian migrant group, the isolated migrants have made transnational connections without serious barriers with the assistance of integrated migrants thanks to the “hidden bridging social capital.” Thereupon, here I focus on how passive Indonesian migrants obtain the benefts of enjoying their hometown atmosphere in the Wongok-dong of South Korea.

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Consuming Products Isolated Indonesian migrants can easily undertake transnational activities by consuming the products produced by integrated migrants in pursuit of economic proft by emphasizing Indonesian identity rather than paguyuban. For example, consuming international calling cards by Indonesian migrants are different according to their circumstances. On average, the Indonesian migrants spend 100,000 won per month on communication expenses. The Indonesian migrants residing outside Wongok-dong tend to buy international calling cards at mobile phone shops and Indonesian restaurants of the town. In contrast, the migrants living in Wongok-dong buy such cards wherever they want, but those living outside travel to the town at the weekend to buy international calling cards for the week ahead. In other words, the migrants living outside Wongokdong have diffculty in accessing the means to perform transnational activities because of their location. However, friends can provide another way of buying international calling cards without going to Wongok-dong. Each pre-paid international calling card has a code under a hidden silver sticker. To make a call, people remove the sticker and put the number into their mobile phone. Thus, Indonesian dealers of international calling cards often just send the code to customers by text message, as Saiful, who lives in Eujungbu, said:

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It is diffcult to buy a pre-paid international calling card in Eujungbu. Frankly speaking, I can buy it from a shop, but it is very inconvenient. To buy a telephone card, I should go to the shop. It is located very far from my factory and dormitory. Also, I do not have time to buy it during the weekdays. The best way to buy a telephone card is through my Indonesian friends [international calling card dealers]. [. . .] I do not consider that I should buy an international calling card from only Kawan sekampung. You know! I’m not a person from paguyuban but a national person. Every customer is the same for me.

Most international calling card sellers can purchase cards at a relatively cheap price from Indonesian persons working for Korean merchandisers. They can then be redistributed to friends for a proft.15 More importantly, however, international calling card sellers stress Indonesian identity beyond their paguyuban to attract customers as many as possible. Hence, those isolated Indonesian migrants who have not easy access to shops or restaurants selling international calling cards can comfortably purchase them from sellers looking to earn money from the business. Moreover, the assistance of integrated Indonesian migrants pursuing economic profts based on revealing national identity instead of their hometown membership can help isolated Indonesian migrants to eliminate the economic burden of conducting transnational activities. Indonesian migrants consider

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telephone calls and online communication as the only ways to connect with family and friends. For this reason, devices such as mobile phones and computers have become essential to maintain their lives in South Korea. On arrival in South Korea, Indonesian migrants immediately buy a mobile phone. Although some of them buy a second-hand phone to use for talking and texting, most of them are interested in obtaining a smartphone to use Social Network Service (SNS). By using Facebook and Twitter, they communicate without extra expense. Since they cannot afford personal computers, smartphones are the best choice for those wishing to use SNS. However, it is diffcult for them to buy these devices. Those migrants who have an E-9 visa cannot get a credit card because of their temporary status and lack of economic base in South Korea. For that reason, paying cash is the only way to purchase a smartphone, which costs around 800,000 won. In this regard, Hermin who works at a mobile phone shop talks about his experience:

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There are a lot of Indonesian friends who want to buy a smart phone, like Samsung Galaxy and Iphone, which are expensive. However, many of them do not have enough money to buy that. In this case, I can sell a mobile phone to them. For example, I purchase it instead of them. They pay money to me through three times. It’s like an installment plan. If the price of the mobile phone is 800,000 won, I can earn 80,000 in commission. [. . .] However, I do this not for only economic profts but for Indonesian migrants who suffer from fnancial problem. I should help Indonesian migrants because I’m Indonesian too.

Therefore, isolated migrants can overcome such an economic barrier with the help of an integrated Indonesian who wants to earn money emphasizing their national identity rather than paguyuban. Migrants also consume Indonesian cultural products. For example, Indonesian musical bands regularly perform at the various events such as paguyuban gatherings, multicultural festivals, Indonesian festivals, and wedding ceremonies. Although there are many Indonesian bands, most of them were founded according to their members’ regional origin.16 Consequently, each band mainly focuses on performing for its own paguyubans. We used to support paguyuban events that were related to our members. For example, we did performances for Berpes, Kendal and Bojonogoro since members of our band were from these regions. [. . .] We went to the Indonesian embassy to hold a concert. At that time, a former leader of Kendal who was working there asked us to do this. (Wanto)

Nevertheless, Indonesians who are members of other paguyubans also can obtain benefts from these bands. During Seol (Korean New-year) and

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Chuseok (Korean Thanksgiving Day), each paguyuban has a big gathering. At these events, the inclusion of a band is considered as crucial to the paguyuban’s plans; hence, the pre-existing relationship between paguyuban and band members is very important. However, many paguyubans have found it diffcult to secure a band because they don’t have a relationship with band members from the same regional origin. However, SNS has provided them with a chance to contact band members. Last Chuseok, we had six performances. We got a lot of requests from many paguyubans. These were Berpes, Blitar, Kediri, Bima, Bojonogoro and Kenal. In addition to events during Chuseok, we held concerts for Indonesians in Yongin and Ejungbu. [. . .] I got many messages from strangers. They requested me to hold performances for them. Maybe, they must have looked at my Facebook. I uploaded many pictures about our performances there. Even though I did not know these Indonesians, accepting their demands was no problem to me. They make us money. We got 500,000 won per performance. However, the main income is from large tips. It was more than 1,000,000 won each concert. [. . .] More importantly, my band performance for every Indonesians in South Korea because I’m an Indonesian beyond paguyuban (Wanto).

Wanto was happy to hold concerts for unfamiliar Indonesian people, to whom he was not connected, in his pursuit of proft. However, he did not forget emphasizing his identity as an Indonesian instead of paguyuban for justifcation of his economic activities. Thus, isolated Indonesian migrants can “consume” the products of Indonesia created in Korea, in this case, the hometown atmosphere brought by an Indonesian band, with the help of integrated migrants.

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Occupying Cultural Space In Wongok-dong, prepared spaces can be used by isolated Indonesian migrants as the social capital of hidden bridging. They obtain services from Warungs that were established to make money. Although Indonesian migrants visit Warung to satisfy their hunger, the main role of the Warung is to provide a hometown atmosphere to them. When an Indonesian enters a Warung, he can escape from South Korean surroundings. At the center of the Warung is a big television broadcasting Indonesian programs, the walls are decorated with pictures of famous Indonesian tourist sites, Indonesian food flls the shelves, all advertisements are written in Indonesian, and every conversation takes place in Indonesian. The only difference is that this space is in South Korea and its owner is a Korean. Indonesian migrants who have a Rumah Kontrakan17 can feel a hometown atmosphere in their house. To

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isolated migrants without any group connections, visiting a Warung is the best way to feel a sense of home. In this regard, Indonesian migrants stress the identity as an Indonesian rather than member of paguyuban. Entis said:

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Whenever I do not have work, I always spend my time in the Warung. Staying at the house is very boring since I live alone. In addition, I do not have TV and computer. However, I can watch TV [Indonesian programmes] and use the Internet here. [. . .] There are Indonesians who I can talk with as well. I do not care about paguyuban because I’m an Indonesian. Thus, I can brighten my hour of loneliness by staying here.

Although migrants from particular regions of Indonesia have occupied several Warungs, Warungs are businesses that need to make good proft and are, consequently, open to everyone. Owners of Warungs have, thus, endeavored to ensure that the atmosphere in their restaurants is not overly weighted toward one group of Indonesians. In this regard, the owner of Warung “S” from Sunda (West Java) said that “I can speak Javanese and several local languages of Indonesia, except Sundanese, since I have to build rapport with people from other regions. This is the way of running my business.” Namely, the owner of Warung reveals her diverse identities by speaking local languages in spite of her membership of paguyuban in pursuit of economic proft. Therefore, every Indonesian can enjoy a hometown atmosphere in the Warungs. In contrast to the need for proft that drives Warung owners to keep their restaurants open to all, the occupiers of the Indonesian mosque, Sirothol Mustaqim, open the space to all Indonesian people from a sense of religious duty. For example, Indonesian migrants get married in the Sirothol Mustaqim. Before the Indonesian masjid was established in Wongok-dong, they would have held their wedding in the Bangladeshi masjid or the Ansan Foreign Migrant Community Center. Since December 2007, however, Indonesian migrants have had their own mosque. After its establishment, a dominant group was formed in the mosque calling themselves “masjid people” to distinguish themselves from Indonesians who do not follow Islamic rules. Thus, the masjid is regarded as a place safe from “polluted Indonesians.” However, when it comes to weddings, the “masjid people” are willing to relax a little and are happy to allow Indonesian couples who used to “sinfully” live together (to save the money and soothe their loneliness in Wongok-dong) to marry in the mosque. I asked a leader of Sirothol Mustaqim about this unbalanced situation. He explained: Cohabiting with a girl without marriage is disgraceful as a Muslim. So, most of them are isolated and must feel loneliness due to their faults. However, a

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wedding is the most important event of a human’s life. So, we should help them whatever they did before. The masjid prepares space and food for the wedding. This is a kind of prayer to Allah.

Although “masjid people” stressed the importance of following Islamic rules, they should cover up all Indonesian migrants due to their social status as a Muslim leader in Wongok-dong. In a similar vein, the ICC felt a duty, as an integrated Indonesian community, to offer its offce as a temporary masjid during Ramadan. Indonesian migrants could use this space for prayer meetings and for buka puasa18 meals in this period. Yunos, a member of the ICC, led prayers and so on instead of an imam. The gathering was held in the ICC offce for the beneft of undocumented Indonesian people, the location of Sirothol Mustaquim was inaccessible to undocumented Indonesian migrants (Park, 2016: 165–166). For this reason, the ICC offce, which is located in the center of Wongok-dong, was considered as the best option for a Ramadan gathering. As a result, the offce was full of Indonesian people during Ramadan. The gathering continued for about one month, and I met a lot of unfamiliar Indonesians at the offce. One Indonesian explained the reason for his participation:

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After the movement of the masjid, I could not go to the masjid because of crackdown. I’m a bit nervous to go there. However, I’m happy with this. During Ramadan, I want to pray formally with people. We can do this in my room but I prefer to come here. Fast is very hard. It is almost one month. Because I feel backbreaking, I miss my family, friends and hometown a lot in this period. [. . .] Paguyuban? It does not matter. We are all Indonesian Muslim. Important thing is that we can share diffculties of fast and emotion toward Indonesia with people. It makes me calm.

Through emphasizing identities such as Indonesian and Muslim, isolated Indonesian migrants could use the ICC offce and enjoy a hometown atmosphere by sharing their emotions and friendship during Ramadan. In this context, one of the ICC members said, “I’m proud of our activity [. . .] we should help Indonesian people wherever they are from since our motto is united in diversity.” In other words, they stressed the accomplishment of a mission as an integrated community rather than focusing on personal relationships with people, which in turn contributed to making the ICC offce a space that was open to all Indonesian people. Although each of the ICC members has his or her own membership of paguyuban, that is, they perform activities to enhance integration among them by preparing temporary masjid at the ICC offce due to their social status as an ICC executive.

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Participating in National Ceremony We saw earlier that integrated Indonesian migrants in Wongdok-dong create Tabligh Akbar, but isolated migrants consume the ceremony in addition to the integrated communities. To Indonesian migrants living outside Ansan, the long holiday of Chuseok is considered as the best time for visiting their paguyuban and hanging around with their kawan sekampung. Therefore, quite a number of Indonesian migrants from across South Korea come to Wongok-dong at that time and participate in Tabligh Akbar. At the fourth Tabligh Akbar, about 3,000 Indonesian people participated without any barriers. In other words, they could escape from the psychological burdens and fears associated with particular Indonesian groups such as paguyuban and religion. It was held in front of Ansan Foreign Migrant Community Center, at an open space (unlike the closed rooms offered by the warungs for paguyuban events) and a nonreligious space (unlike the masjid). Therefore, participants did not need to worry about tensions with other paguyubans or their own lack of adherence to Islamic doctrine and they could attend the event as an Indonesian without hesitations. In fact, I could not go to masjid in Korea. I did not fast during Ramadan. Also, I saw a lot of sexy girls here. Because of this, I’m reluctant to go there. However, at Tabligh Akbar, there was an Islamic reader but he was not in the masjid. It was just a festival of Indonesia. [. . .] I’ve never seen that before. So many Indonesians came there. (Kalim)

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We are separately having events according to our paguyuban. People cannot go to the events of another paguyuban. Nevertheless, we were the same in Tabligh Akbar since we are Indonesian. I like it. (Yanto)

Indonesian migrants who participated in Tabligh Akbar stood in a place not occupied by any Indonesian group, could sing along to Dick Doank’s song full of longing for home, and shed tears during Ustaz Wijayanto’s impressive sermon. Although Tabligh Akbar was consumed by isolated Indonesians without hesitation, integrated Indonesians created the event to promote themselves and justify their presence as a leader among Indonesian migrants in South Korea. Through this religious event, the KMI could do the fundraising to build a new Indonesian masjid in Ansan and enhance togetherness among separated Indonesian groups. These tangible (fundraising) and intangible (enhancing togetherness) achievements could be enough to show their sense of mission as Muslim leaders and members of an integrated community in South Korea not only to Indonesian elites, such as the ambassador, but also to Indonesian migrants at the event.

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Because of the “hidden bridging” social capital, isolated Indonesian immigrants can enjoy transnational activities such as consuming various products, occupying their cultural spaces, and participating in national ceremonies without huge barriers with the assistance of integrated Indonesian immigrants in Wongok-dong. As a result, both Indonesian immigrant groups strengthen transnational activities in Wongok-dong.

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CONCLUSION In terms of the concept of social capital, this research contributes to a new perspective on the bridging social capital through which we can look at the Indonesian immigrant group and the distinct features of Wongok-dong. Indonesian immigrants engaged in the formulation of social capital. Putnam (2000: 23) insists that different types of social capital, such as bonding and bridging, lead to different ends. However, this perspective has limitations in the case of Indonesian immigrants in Wongok-dong. Although each of the Indonesian immigrants builds different types of social capital in keeping with Putnam’s perspective, the inequalities in the social outcomes yielded are not visible because of their “hidden bridging” social capital. Wong (2007: 39) presents the concept of unseen social capital. He argues that unseen social capital is produced not by social relations for purposeful reasons but by the nature of everyday social relations between individuals. More specifcally, while seen social capital is “characterized as functional, visible, organization-based, and demonstrated in public manifestations on a well-organised and regular basis,” unseen social capital is “informal, subtle, and less instrumental in nature” (Wong, 2007: 179). Based on this perspective, characteristically unseen social capital “can be altered or destroyed, and can be subject to livelihood priorities and circumstance changes” (Wong, 2007: 179). This approach is helpful in explaining the features of Indonesian migrants’ social capital in Wongok-dong. As I addressed previously, there are integrated and isolated Indonesian groups. Each group formally builds social capital following the concept of seen social capital. However, hidden social capital is embedded in invisible networks between integrated and isolated Indonesian migrants. It is consciously or unconsciously accumulated awareness about their identities as an Indonesian and Muslim rather than members of paguyuban. One of these identities can be informally revealed in response to various circumstances in Wongok-dong. Thus, Indonesian immigrants who have latent identities can build the hidden bridging social capital to sustain their lives in the Wongok-dong of South Korea. Performing transnational activities is one of the important social outcomes that result from building that kind of social capital among Indonesian

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immigrants in Wongok-dong. Transnational activities play an important role in sustaining the life of Indonesian immigrants as temporary visitors in Wongok-dong. For this reason, Indonesian immigrants endeavor to enhance their transnational activities through various means. However, Indonesian migrants’ access to particular transnational activities is limited according to their networks with Korean natives and Indonesian people from different social backgrounds. Thus, the social capital of bridging is crucial to access the resources needed for transnational activities. Although there are differences in terms of building social capital among Indonesian immigrants, as mentioned previously, people can still be involved in transnational activities. Indonesian immigrants integrated into Indonesian communities, such as the ICC, and Sirothol Mustaqim, can easily build the linking social capital with Koreans due to their position in Wongok-dong. For this reason, they can easily access resources for conducting transnational activities in Wongok-dong. However, isolated Indonesian immigrants who cannot extend their social networks beyond their paguyuban are also involved in transnational activities, since integrated Indonesian immigrants provide them with the resources for conducting transnational activities to enhance their reputation or make money. Thus, both integrated and isolated groups can sustain their lives through performing transnational activities in Wongok-dong. In the process of creating social capital further, integrated Indonesian migrants emphasize their national identities as an Indonesian, a Muslim and the like, rather than their membership of a particular paguyuban when building “hidden social capital.” This is due to their intention to pursue economic profts and their relatively high social status among Indonesian immigrants in Wongok-dong. Although the relationship between integrated and isolated Indonesian immigrants is not immediately visible, the rearrangement of identity of integrated Indonesian immigrants enables isolated Indonesian immigrants to access the resources for achieving transnational activities in Wongok-dong. Hence, this perspective contributes to correct Putnam’s view, through yielding the “hidden bridging” social capital among the Indonesian immigrants’ group in the Wongok-dong of South Korea. NOTES 1. This chapter was previously published in Park, Kwang Woo. 2016. “Creating Hidden Social Capital: A Case of Indonesian Immigrants of Wongok-dong in South Korea.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 19 (3): 1–37. 2. Indonesia is well known for the most complex nation in the world due to its ethnic and cultural diversities (Drake, 1989; Neher, 2002). The complexity in

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Wongok-dong is reproduced by Indonesian migrant people as well. When I was in Wongok-Dong, there were a lot of Indonesian ethnic groups such as Javanese, Sundanese, Makassarnese and Sasaknese people. Based on these ethnic diversities, Indonesian immigrants establish their own hometown community, called as Paguyuban. 3. Basically, Kawan sekampung stands for people from the same region in Indonesia. 4. According to Park (2016: 135-181), Indonesian migrants maintain boundaries based on their shared heritages such as origin of region in Indonesia, language usage, and cultural customs. As a result, Indonesian migrants establish hometown community called paguyuban and isolate themselves within that town. On the other hand, Indonesian immigrants strengthen national identity beyond local boundaries with sharing experiences in Korea. Thus, the integrated Indonesian migrants who extend social networks outside of their paguyuban also appeared in Wongok-Dong. 5. Transnationalism can be defned the situation of migrants being connected to the country of origin and to the new country of residence through social, economic, political and cultural webs of connections brought about by the movement of people (Schiller et al., 1992: 1). The various transnational practices that occur between home and host countries can be categorized in terms of economic (remittances, ethnic businesses and collective transfer of resources and goods to local communities), political (electoral participation and political mobilization) and socio-cultural activities (visiting and maintaining contact with family and friends in home country, joining organization in the host or home society and participating in cultural activities) (Al-Ali et al, 2001; Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1214) 6. From earlier discussions, in terms of using the notion of social capital, many scholars regard the main components of social capital as trust, networks, norms of reciprocity, relationships and values. Even though these elements enable us to analyze social capital, these components as analytical tools can be used differently according to the different levels of research. I believe that the most important task for this research is how Indonesian immigrants yield social capital to sustain their lives in Wongok-Dong In this regard, I defne social capital as social outcome which is produced by components such as networks, relationships, social support, shared norms and trust. Even though I included various components of social capital for this research, each component may not work independently to analyze Indonesian migrants’ social capital. To analyze of social outcome, thus, I endeavored to combine these components to illustrate the whole picture of the Indonesian migrants’ social capital rather than focusing on investigation by each concept. More importantly, this work focuses on exploring typology of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking) to yield new perspective of the concept instead of tracing conceptual history of ‘social capital’ and reviewing the main theoretical development. 7. The nature of Wongok-dong offers a perfect illustration to explore typology of social capital because of characteristics of the town. Wongok-dong is well known as the number one multi-cultural space in Korea due to presence of foreign migrants from different countries and favorable atmosphere toward to immigrants. Thus, there are possibilities to exchange social support among migrants of the same

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nationality and build social relation with immigrants from other countries and even with Koreans. This context enables us to clarify relationship among immigrants’ various types of social capital. 8. ICC is an integrated Indonesian community in Korea. Indonesian migrants separately maintain their own community based on shared heritages such as ethnic group, language usage and cultural practices. However, each leader of Indonesian hometown communities realized that there was needed to enhance solidarity among Indonesian migrants who have different social backgrounds in Wongok-dong. As a result, ICC was founded in 2006. Based on social relationship within ICC, representatives from each paguyuban could extend their social networks beyond their locality. 9. According to Rath and Eurofound (2011: 2), ethnic entrepreneurs can create jobs for others such as relatives, friends and acquaintances. Although Zhunk obtained his jobs through a Korean, he can distribute jobs to Indonesians as a secondary international calling card seller. Therefore, he create jobs for the Indonesian immigrants in South Korea. 10. Warung is a small restaurant or cafe in Indonesia. 11. Genre of Indonesian popular music that is partly derived from Hindu, Malay, and Arabic music. 12. During my feldwork periods, there were four Indonesian restaurants run by Indonesian married migrants among the total of thirteen Indonesian restaurants. 13. Those migrants who have E-9 visa cannot work in the service sectors under the EPS. For this reason, Indonesian persons who want to work in a Warung have to quit their designated job and become undocumented migrants. 14. Ustadz Wijayanto is one of religious leaders in Indonesia. Dick Doank is an Indonesian popular singer. 15. Usually, international calling card sellers purchase a card for about 10,800 Korean won and redistribute it for about 12,000 Korean won. 16. Galok (Lomgok), Workers Band (Indonesia), Maeswara (Central/East Java), Dynasti (Central Java), Kosmis (Makasar: Sulawesi), Campur sari (Seragen: Central Java), and dream formation (East Java) 17. A house contracted by members of hometown community. 18. Buka puasa means to open the fast.

REFERENCES Al-Ali, N., R. Black and K. Koser. 2001. “Refugees and Transnationalism: The Experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27(4): 615–634. Bankston, Carl L. and M. Zhou. 2002. “Social Capital as Process: The Meaning and Problems of Theoretical Metaphor.” Sociological Inquiry, 72(2): 281–317. Bourdieu, P. 1986. “The Forms of Capital.” In J. G. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. New York, NY: Greenwood. Drake, C. 1989. National Integration in Indonesia: Pattern and Policies. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.

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Grant, E. 2001. “Social Capital and Community Strategies: Neighborhood Development in Guatemala City.” Development and Change, 32: 925–997. Guarnizo, L. E., A. Portes and W. Haller. 2003. “Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants.” American Journal of Sociology, 108(6): 1211–1248. Mowu, T. 2002. “Racial Differences in the Effects of Job Contacts: Conficting Evidence from Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Data.” Social Science Research, 31(4): 511–538. Neher, Clark D. 2002. Southeast Asia in the International Era. Oxford: Westview. Park, K. W. 2016. “Diaspora (un)Making of Boundaries: The Case of Indonesian Immigrants in Wongok-Dong.” Southeast Asian Review, 26(1): 135–181. Portes, A. and M. Zhou. 1992. “Gaining the Upper Hand: Economic Mobility Among Domestic Minorities.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 15: 491–522. Putnam, R. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. Rath, J. and S. Anna. 2011. Promoting Ethnic Entrepreneurship in European Cities. Luxembourg: Publications Offce of the European Union. Sanders, J. and V. Nee. 1996. “Social Capital, Human Capital, and Immigrant SelfEmployment: The Family as Social Capital and the Value of Human Capital.” American Sociological Review, 61: 231–249. Schiller, N. G., L. Basch and C. Blanc-Szanton. 1992. “Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 645(1): 1–24. Wakefeld, S. and P. Blake. 2005. “Family, Friend or Foe? Critical Refections on the Relevance and Role of Social Capital in Health Promotion and Community Development.” Social Science and Medicine, 60: 2819–2832. Waldinger, R. 1986. “Immigrant Enterprise: A Critique and Reformulation.” Theory and Society, 15: 249–285. Wong, S. 2007. Exploring Unseen Social Capital in Community Participation: Everyday Lives of Poor Mainland Chinese Migrants in Hong Kong. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Woolcock, M. 2001. “The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic Outcomes.” Isuma, 2(1): 11–17. You, I. S. 2010. Migration Strategy and Organisation of Transnational Space: A Case Study of Indonesian Migrant Workers in Korea. M.A. Dissertation, Hanyang University. Zhou, M. 1997. “Growing up American: The Challenge Confronting Immigrant Children and Children of Immigrants.” Annual Review of Sociology, 23: 63–95. Zhou, M. 2005. “Ethnicity and Social Capital: Community-Based Institutions and Embedded Networks of Social Relation.” In L. Glenn, T. Modood and S. Teles (eds.), Ethnicity, Social Mobility and Public Policy in the US and UK. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Chapter 9

The Construction of Migrant “Illegality” The Case of Thai Migrant Workers in South Korea

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Julia Jiwon Shin and Don Tajaroensuk

The1 total number of international migrants is estimated at 244 million or 3.3 percent of the world’s population in 2015 (UN DESA, 2016).2 International migration has emerged in the last few decades as a critical political and policy challenge. One of the most controversial issues for migrant-receiving countries is irregular or “illegal” migration, which has now deeply encompassed within the global migration system. Irregular migration generally refers to “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries” (IOM, 2011). For destination countries, irregularity or “illegality” (which is the more commonly used term) is entering, staying, or working in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. For the sending country, it is the case that a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfll the administrative requirements for leaving the country. As De Genova (2002) points out, the general approach to illegal migration has been policy-oriented, thereby casting it as a problem that can be reduced or solved through public policies, such as stronger border control and strict enforcement of immigration and residence controls. In this frame, illegal migration is generally considered to be an individual behavior which infringes on the immigration law of the receiving country. Thus, “illegality” in the migratory process widely implies ineligibility for basic needs and legal protection for noncitizens in the host society. As Coutin (2000: 27–47, cited in De Genova, 2002: 427) points out, “illegals” generate “spaces of nonexistence” and “the social space of illegality” is a negation of legal personhood which is also “a space of forced invisibility, exclusion, subjugation, and repression.” 221

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The illegal migration of Thai workers to South Korea (hereafter, Korea) has also become a controversial issue in both Korea and Thailand. Due to the treaty of visa exemption between the two counties, the number of undocumented Thai migrants in Korea has been increasing in recent years. Thai workers are accused of taking advantage of the exemption visa to enter Korea as “tourists.” As tourists, Thai nationals are permitted to stay in Korea for ninety days without a visa. During the frst quarter of 2018, over 57,000 Thai migrants overstayed their ninety-day visa-free period,3 and thus became “illegals” under Korean policy, since a migrant is not permitted to either extend their stay or change their visa status during their stay in Korea. This study aims to understand the factors that shape and construct the “illegality” of Thai migrants in Korea. It chiefy considers illegal migration as a phenomenon rather than a problem, exploring migratory processes, experiences, and perceptions rather than searching for policy solutions (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). The study examines state policies and institutional and social factors that have constructed and sustained the illegal migration of Thai workers to Korea. We challenge conventional views that illegal migration is either produced by the state or by an individual’s delinquent behavior. By examining the experiences and perceptions of undocumented migrants in Korea, it explores how illegal migration may become a strategic choice for some migrants, employers, and various institutions and examines to what extent illegality is constituted under the international migration system. This study is divided into four main sections as follows. First, it conceptually discusses illegal migration and illegality. The next section discusses research methods including feldwork and interviews. The third section examines the ways in which migration networks and institutions determine the illegality of Thai migrant workers in the Korean Labour Market. The fnal section discusses the way in which illegality is socially constructed and what “illegality” signifes to the undocumented migrants themselves. THE CONCEPTS OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION AND ILLEGALITY According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2011), there is a tendency to restrict the use of the term “illegal migration” to cases of smuggling and traffcking in persons. However, this study follows the more common, less restrictive usage of the term and treats irregular and illegal migration interchangeably. In this study, the term “undocumented” is deployed in place of “illegal” when it refers to migrants in order to repute the criminalization of migrant individuals in the policy discourse.

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There are three general types of illegal migration. The frst type is crossing the border without the necessary authorization or documents required by the authorities of the destination country. Those are cases of smuggling of migrants and traffcking in persons as defned “illegal” by IOM. The second refers to those who legally entered but “over-stayed their legal visa-exempt period” and reside without proper documentation. The third type is related to migrants who engage in unauthorized employment. There are two cases for this type: those who are “non-compliant” (overstaying and illegally working) and those who are “semi-compliant” (residing legally but working in breach of employment restrictions for their immigration status) (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). De Genova refers to the latter type as “deportable” (De Genova, 2002). States draw the legal frameworks that determine lawful entry, residence, and employment of migrants. Ruhs and Anderson (2010: 197) argue that “states defne the boundaries of the ‘spaces of (il)legality’ within their territories,” which is varied and complex. Most receiving countries impose stratifed immigration statuses which denote different employment restrictions, economic, political, and social rights. Thus, the legality of migrants’ employment primarily depends on their immigration status. In this sense, illegality is “produced” by the state (De Genova, 2002; Black, 2003; Samers, 2004). On the other hand, migrants and employers are also strategic agents, visà-vis the state’s legal and institutional framework. From the very beginning of the migratory process, migrants draw selectively on institutional rules and resources in pursuit of their interests. In the labor market, employers may offer employment to a migrant even if he or she does not have the state’s permission to work or breach the employment restrictions imposed on migrants. Such actions affect the state’s policies on migration. For example, the selective and restrictive measures on the immigration control in Korea have not successfully controlled irregular migration. Rather they have increased the likelihood of migrants seeking alternative migration routes and placed additional pressures on migrants to turn to illicit businesses, which involve additional costs and a higher risk of exploitation (Shin, 2008). In reaction to the continuous irregular fow and the increasing numbers of undocumented workers, the state then imposes stricter rules and regulations on immigration and employment, thereby increasing structural constraints. Thus, a comprehensive conceptual approach needs to acknowledge the actions and motivations of migrants and employers as well as the state (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). RESEARCH METHODS The empirical data in this study were derived from interviews with Thai migrant workers in Korea and participant observation in religious and cultural

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events and migrant-related organizations. A total of twenty-eight cases were collected during feld research in Gwangju, Ansan, and Osan over the course of seventeen months (January 2017–May 2018). It was not possible to access lists of Thai migrant workers (particularly, the undocumented), so this study used “snowball sampling.” This technique allowed the researcher to fnd key informants, who introduced other interviewees. In 2017, the researcher frst met a couple of Thai workers in Gwangju Metropolitan City who became the main informants for the study. They helped the researcher to access the research sites and provide crucial information about Thai migrant communities in Korea. Gwangju is selected as the primary feldwork location since the researcher was able to gain access to local Thai migrant communities with the help of key informants in the area. Most migrant workers in Gwangju live and work in the Western areas of the city, including Wolgok-dong, Usan-dong, Jangdeok-dong, Suwan-dong, Docheon-dong, and Bia-dong. Many factories and sub-contract job agencies are located in this area of the city. Social spaces for migrant communities, such as ethnic restaurants, grocery stores, nightclubs, and religious centers, arose in the same area. Ansan and Osan were the other feldwork locations, as they host the biggest Thai communities in Korea. One of Thai temples is located in Ansan where “Songkran (Thai New Year) festival” takes place every year. Ansan and Osan are both industrial areas with large numbers of Thai workers. A key informant helped the researcher access the local migrant communities in both cities. Among the twenty-eight interview participants (see table 9.1.), ten are male and eighteen are female. Nineteen workers are undocumented and of these, fourteen are female and fve are male. Most migrants came from the Northeastern region of Thailand. The majority of male workers work in factories or in the agriculture industry. The female migrants were engaged in various types of work, mostly in the service sector. Seven workers were employed as a masseuse; others as managers or staff at restaurants or karaoke places. The number of workers in the agricultural sector is disproportionately low since most interviews were conducted in urban areas. During the feldwork, participant observation was also conducted in order to interpret the verbal interviews and acquire information on the formal and informal institutions supporting Thai migrant communities in Korea (see table 9.2). Cultural and religious events, Thai restaurants, Thaionly night clubs, and Thai temples were focal points for gaining access to Thai migrant communities in Korea and looking closely at the ways in which undocumented migrant workers are mobilized and migrant networks are organized.

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Age

34

40

30

33

40

29

24

22

31

39

-

22

Case ID

G1

C1

BT1

J1

B1

KK1

K1

Ph1

J2

R1

N1

P1 MM1

Male Female

Male

Male

Male

Female

Male

Female

Female

Female

Female

Male

Female

Gender

Daily laborer/ Agriculture Monk Masseuse

Factory worker

Agriculture

Agriculture

Factory worker

Restaurant Owner

Restaurant

Factory worker

Factory worker

Factory worker

Karaoke staff

Job in Korea

Table 9.1  List of Interview Participants

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Ansan Gwangju

Gwangju

Osan

Gwangju

Gwangju(staying in Hwasun)

Gwangju

Gwangju

Gwangju

Gwangju

Gwangju

EPS EPS Undocumented Monk1 years Undocumented 4 years

Undocumented 7 Months Undocumented 7 Months Undocumented 5 years Undocumented 4 years Marriage 4 years Undocumented Undocumented -

Gwangju

Bangkok Northeast

Northeast

Northeast

-

East

-

East

North

Northeast

North

North

Undocumented3 Months South

Thailand

Place of Origin (Thailand)

Status/Length of Stay

Residence

(Continued)

Came to Korea with a boyfriend and a younger brother

Married to a Pakistani Married to a Korean

Key informant

Interview conducted in Thailand Currently in Thailand

Note

The Construction of Migrant “Illegality” 225

Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea : Across National Boundaries, edited by Sung-Choon Park, and

Age

34 33 30 33 24 24 45

-

25

50

30s

43

36

33

25

Case ID

K2 O1 O2 B2 CC1 Y1 N2

H1

T1

K3

K4

K5

P2

P3

S1

Female

Female

Female

Female

Male

Female

Female

Female

Female Male Female Male Male Female Female

Gender

Table 9.1  (Continued)

Masseuse

Masseuse

Masseuse

Masseuse

Student

Thai grocery store

Unemployed

Restaurant manager

Masseuse Factory worker Masseuse Factory worker Factory worker Factory worker Unemployed

Job in Korea

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Undocumented5 years Undocumented3 years Undocumented10 years Undocumented3 years EPS7 months Undocumented7 months Marriage 20 years Business visa 16 years Asylum seeker (G1)4 months Undocumented Student Undocumented Undocumented Undocumented Undocumented -

Gwangju Gwangju Gwangju Gwangju Gwangju Gwangju Gwangju (Hwasun) Gwangju

Gwangju

Gwangju

Gwangju

Gwangju

Gwangju

Gwangju

Gwangju

Status/Length of Stay

Residence

Former EPS worker

-

-

Central

Northeast

Northeast

Northeast

Northeast

Bangkok

Married to a Korean

In relationship

In relationship

Note

North North Northeast North Northeast Northeast -

Place of Origin (Thailand)

226 Julia Jiwon Shin and Don Tajaroensuk

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Table 9.2  Sites and Events for Participant Observations Date

Sites/Events

Location

Jan 27, 2017

S* Thai restaurant

May 7, 2017 July 24, 2017 Aug 1, 2017

Songkran festival (Thai new year) EPS Support Center - K* Thai restaurant - Visiting the industrial sites - Assistance Center for ForeignersGwangsangu Multicultural Family Support Center - Korea Immigration and Integration Program Church event to support Thai communities

Songjeong-dong, Gwangju Pyeong-dong, Gwangju Pyeong-dong, Gwangju Wolgok-dong, Gwangju

Aug 6, 2017

Oct 15, 2017

Nov 11, 2017 Nov 11, 2017 and afterward Nov 17, 2017 Nov 19–25, 2017 March 3, 2018 Mar 11, 2018 Mar 17, 2018

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March 25, 2018 April 1 & 8, 2018 May 21, 2018

Wedding ceremony of a Thai friend Regular weekend social visits to the local migrant community Thai Embassy: fundraising event Birthday party for a worker Thai night club Opening a bank account service by **bank Working as a daily laborer in an agricultural field Thai Temple Thai temple: fundraising event Osan Migrants Workers Center Multicultural Asian Community

Songjeong-dong, Gwangju

Gwangju G** churchBongseondong, Gwangju Sangmu, Gwangju Gwangju Seoul Wolgok-dong, Gwangju Unnam-dong, Gwangju Wolgok-dong, Gwangju Gwangju - Muan Ansan Gwangju Osan

THE CONSTRUCTION OF “ILLEGALITY” OF THAI MIGRANT WORKERS Massey et al. (1993: 451) note that “as organisations develop to support, sustain, and promote international movement, the international fow of migrants becomes more and more institutionalised and independent of the factors that originally caused it.” Through the routinization of the social practices of migration and the articulation of the strategic goals of individuals and institutional agents, international migration becomes institutionalized, and access to migration is controlled by specifc rules and the mobilization of resources (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). The migrant institution then becomes a permanent feature of social life, consisting of knowledgeable individuals and the

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agents of organizations and other institutions, including social networks and the state. Goss and Lindquist (1995) further develop the concept of the “migrant institution” to articulate between various levels of analysis. They defne the migrant institution as “a complex articulation of individuals, associations, and organizations which extends the social action of and interaction between these agents and agencies across time and space” (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 319). The concept of the migrant institution emphasizes the increasingly signifcant role played by intermediary agencies in international migration. This is particularly relevant to the case of illegal migration from Thailand to Korea, which has become increasingly institutionalized. This study discusses the three main factors that have constructed and sustained the illegal migration of Thai workers in the Korean context—the migrant policy of the destination country, migrant institutions and migrant networks.

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“EPS” or Not For Thai migrants, there are two ways to work in Korea. On the one hand, one would go through the Employment Permit System (EPS), the legalized process by which the Korean government recruits migrant workers. On the other hand, one could opt for irregular migration by entering Korea as a tourist, taking a job, and overstaying. In 2018, the total number of Thai migrants in Korea is 168,711, of which only 24,022 (14%) are legal workers. The rest do not have employment or residence visas (Ministry of Justice, 2018). The number of EPS vacancies for Thai workers is 7,000 in 2018. Considering Korea as a popular migrant destination country for rural Thais, it is not suffcient to meet the demand. Interviewees mentioned the following reasons for neglecting the EPS and choosing an irregular migration path to Korea. First, the EPS involves a long institutional process but there is no guarantee that the applicant would be selected because there are too many applicants. One EPS worker working in the agricultural sector explained that: It took about 9 months to fnish the whole process, from studying Korean, completing the application, etc. Some people could not wait for 9 months. If a person is in debts, he/she has to pay the monthly interest. Many of my neighbours could not come. I was very lucky to be selected. (J2, male, 31-year-old)

One EPS applicant had to wait two years and nine months. Many interviewees complained that despite the long waiting list for the EPS selection, Thai authorities call for new applicants every year.

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Second, the high cost of migration and debts make people opt for the faster and easier path for migration to Korea. The majority of migrants in this study obtained a loan from a private money lender or institution who charges higher interest rates than banks because it is diffcult for people with low incomes to get bank loans. My business collapsed, and I could not earn suffcient income to pay my debt each month. My land would be confscated if I could not pay off my debts. In Thailand, there is no way to fnd a job to pay off the debt. (N1, male) Since I decided to come to Korea, I have borrowed money from a private institution. The interest is very high. I cannot wait for getting a job through “EPS”. I had to fnd a job and pay off the debt as soon as possible. (J1, female, 33-year-old)

Under these circumstances, many workers simply ignore the EPS. Instead, they opt for the faster migration route allowed by the visa exemption program. I just ignored EPS because I could come to Korea with a tourist visa which is much faster than waiting for the long EPS process. With a tourist visa I could stay here for 90 days. If I could not get a proper job within three months, I could decide to go back to Thailand. (K5, female, 43-year-old)

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Finally, many women migrants have raised concerns that the EPS discriminates against women. As mentioned above, the majority of undocumented migrant participants in this research are women. As the EPS is largely dominated by male migrants, the chances of women for migrating to Korea are limited. An undocumented migrant woman in a relationship with an EPS worker complained in an interview that “the EPS always selects men.” She further explained that: If a woman is selected, it is normally an agricultural job which requires living far away from the city and being isolated. I could not stay with my boyfriend in the factory because I was not chosen to work with him. . . . Employers chose us; we could not make our own choices. (Y1, female, 24-year-old)

Thai migrant workers frequently complain about gender discrimination in the EPS on Facebook and other online social networks. Even though the EPS does not explicitly specify any gender requirement, in reality men have been selected by manufacturing industries and women tend to be allocated to agricultural industries, which often goes against their preferences. On social media, some EPS applicants testifed that Thai EPS authorities only approved male applicants to be on the waiting list.

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Migrant Institutions On the Move: Migrant Brokers “Brokers” or “agencies” are well known in Thailand, especially in the Northeastern region of Thailand, where the majority of undocumented workers in this study come from. Agencies aid the illegal migration of individuals providing information on jobs and employers. Many agencies advertise on social media, such as Facebook, to connect and recruit people. Many migrant agencies in Thailand are in fact phony “tourist agencies,” charging broker fees from migrant workers (who initially enter Korea as “tourists”). The agencies facilitate labor migration in three primary ways: recruitment, training (i.e., preparing for immigration control at the airport), and transportation. Agencies could reduce the risks for illegal migration but only at a signifcant cost. On one private Facebook group, potential jobs for Thai migrants are posted daily. Most jobs require the recruit to pay the broker’s fee, typically between 1,000,000 won and 3,000,000 won. A twenty-four-year-old male factory worker explained how he got a job in Gwangju.

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I paid 50,000 baht (1,600,000 won) to the broker for a full service. The agency met me at the airport and transferred me to the factory directly. It was very convenient for a new comer like me. The agency also helped me to fnd accommodation to live. But that was 4 years ago. Nowadays, I have heard that many fake agencies exploit newcomers. (K1, male, 24-year-old)

On the other hand, “social networks may become migrant networks” (Goss and Lindquist, 1995), since successful migration experiences inspire friends, relatives, and others to follow. This reinforces the strategies and social relationships on which migrations are based. Migrant networks are based on strong personal relationships with family members, relatives, and friends. Workers in Korea who have good relationships with employers and other workers act as an intermediary agency who advises potential migrants on migration to Korea and help them fnd jobs. Migration through social networks is the best way to reduce risks and costs for new migrants. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next section, such networks are also substantial for sustaining undocumented migrant communities in Korea. A thirty-three-year-old female worker said: My uncle was deported to Thailand due to his illegal employment in Korea. He urged me to come to Korea and advised me on how to come. He then introduced a woman who helped me get a job. I came here, thanks to the advice and support from my uncle. (J1, female, 33-year-old)

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Another (a friend of J1) commented that: I came after J1 who had already worked in Korea for 2 months. Once she settled here, I came after her to fnd a job and stay with her. She also helped me to fnd a job. I got a job in the frst week I arrived. (MM1, female, 22-year-old)

The empirical data highlight that migrants act strategically within the migrant institution. In order to learn the rules and access resources, individuals require assistance from other individuals who interpret the rules and distribute resources within the migrant institution. In this case, both the potential migrants and recruitment agencies or private brokers draw selectively on institutional rules and resources and exploit them in pursuit of their own interests. Those practices become institutionalized and inevitably reproduce the system of migration (Shin, 2008).

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Working in Korea: Employment Agencies and Employers Once residing in Korea, local private employment agencies are the most salient group in contact with members of Thai communities. Undocumented migrant workers fnd jobs through local employment agencies which connect migrants directly with local employers. Through a contract with an employment agency, an undocumented migrant worker could get either short-term (daily, weekly) or longer-term (monthly) employment. The agency then deducts a monthly commission fee from the worker’s wages. Thus, employment agencies do not only violate the Immigration Act by being involved in the employment of undocumented migrants but also unlawfully derive economic benefts from intermediary activities.4 In order to closely examine the local recruitment process of undocumented migrant workers, the researcher worked as a day laborer on an agricultural feld in Muan County, South Jeolla Province. Due to the decrease of the rural population, the agricultural sector chronically suffers from the shortage of labor and local employment agencies deploy day laborers to the feld in demand, typically for harvesting crops. The key fgure in this process is a local Thai intermediary (Mr. A) who is in regular contact with employment agencies. Before the working day, jobseekers ask Mr. A for a job. Mr. A posts a list of jobs on the following day on Facebook or the Line chat application commonly used by Thai migrants. In the early morning of the working day, the researcher joined the group of workers gathering at the appointed place and got on the bus that transported workers to the feld. There were about forty workers in the bus. The nationalities of workers were diverse and included Thai, Vietnamese, and elderly Korean workers (mostly women aged 60 or above). Workers were deployed to different sites depending on the demands

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of employers that day. The researcher worked on a large plantation feld with a mixture of Thai, Vietnamese, and Korean workers. At six in the evening, the bus took the workers back to the city. As the workers disembarked, the employment agent gave them their daily wage in cash. Meanwhile, many small and medium enterprises and small local factories rely on the supply of undocumented migrant workers by private employment agencies or on individual contacts with migrants in order to employ cheap, temporary, and fexible workers. According to Article 18 (Restrictions on Employment of Aliens) of the Immigration Act, “no person shall employ any person not holding the status of stay” that allows him/her to engage in job-seeking activities. It is noteworthy that many undocumented workers commonly claim that many factories tactically recruit both legal workers and illegal workers. One interviewee explained: Some factories need only “Pee Noi” (undocumented workers). It seems to be because they need a faster process of recruitment. But many factories mostly employ “Pee Noi” with a very few EPS workers to trick immigration offcers during workplace inspections. (K1, male, 24-year-old)

A signifcant number of undocumented women in this study have worked in the service sector as masseuses and karaoke staff. On Thai social media sites, it is commonly observed that many migrant women who work in massage parlors in Korea also engage in prostitution. One female interviewee noted that migrant workers in the “entertainment industry” tend to be part of the labor pool of transnationally networked institutions.

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In the entertainment industry, we have networks in many countries. Women that are part of those networks frequently change workplaces in many countries. We work for a short term and then have to move to another place. (G1, female, 34-year-old)

Migrant Networks in Korea One of the key factors for the survival of undocumented Thai migrants is the strong Thai migrant network in Korea. The Thai migrant network is fexible as it can transform and evolve depending on government policies or other circumstances at any given time in order to avoid risks and increase their likelihood of staying for a longer term in Korea. There are a number of substantial roles of Thai migrant networks. First, Thai migrant networks are important job agencies that provide information on jobs and connect migrant workers and local employers. For the “non-compliant” (living and working illegally), in particular, such informal

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connections to the labor market is vital for their survival in Korea. Recently, the Thai migrant network has become more trustworthy due to an increasing distrust of formal job agencies. Fake agencies advertise on social media to defraud newcomers who have no relatives or social connections in Korea and put these jobseekers in a poor position. The broker fees for most agencies have risen compared to fve years ago. The Thai migrant network helps potential migrants to reduce risks and costs of migration by providing reliable information. Second, Thai migrant networks create valuable social spaces that maintain and protect Thai communities in Korea. It is observed that many migrants depend materially and emotionally on the social relations within the network to a great extent. The migrant network functions as a safety net for undocumented migrants. For instance, when a worker gets into trouble with their employer, his/her friends in the local Thai migrant network can mediate the confict or help the worker to get another job. It means when an undocumented migrant has problems with an employer, he/she can leave the workplace anytime with the support of friends from the inner network. Also, when migrants have health problems, they can get support from the network, such as being taken to a hospital and getting fnancial donations from network members for hospital treatment. Third, while the Thai migrant network is largely exclusive, a migrant’s immigration status is totally irrelevant to his/her membership. Legal and undocumented workers spend time together in the local community meetings and events. Migrants exchange information, share problems and solutions through meetings and social gatherings organized by the networks. Thai migrant networks in Korea have been economically strengthened by new businesses and cultural associations, such as Thai restaurants, grocery stores, night clubs, and temples. Ethnic businesses are primarily run by Thai marriage migrants who have a secure legal status in Korea. Migrant social places have greatly strengthened Thai migrant communities. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PEE NOI Pee Noi literally translates to “little ghost” in Thai, which is a term associated with international migration in recent years. Over the last decade, the Thai news media has frequently publicized reports about Thai undocumented workers seeking jobs for higher wages in Korea, depicting them as Pee Noi. Hence, Pee Noi has been used domestically to identify Thai undocumented migrant workers by migrants themselves and society at large. Though the social meaning of Pee Noi is complicated, in general, it refers to people who are “invisible” and have no stable residence. Pee Noi are not eligible for legal or social protection in both Thailand and Korea.

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In Thai social media, there have been contentious discussions about the “illegal migration” of Thai workers to Korea. Members of the Thai middle class who visit Korea for tourism, shopping, or business complain that “illegal” Thai migrants in Korea may adversely affect their legal visits to Korea by inspiring the passage of more stringent immigration policies. A Thai TV drama denigrates Thai migrant workers in Korea as “the poor” who are opportunistic “gold diggers.”5 Pee Noi is, therefore, socially constructed as “being selfsh,” “trouble makers,” and “illegals” who only concern for their economic benefts rather than the country’s relations with Korea. At the same time, during the feldwork, it was observed that undocumented Thai migrant workers also used the word, Pee Noi to identify themselves. When migrants use the word to refer to themselves, it loses the negative social construction of Pee Noi in Thailand. Rather, it serves as a term to identify with those in similar situations. Some workers are discouraged because they feel that their lack of education, knowledge, power, dignity, and respect make them invisible in both Thai and Korean societies, and this, for them, is embodied in the term Pee Noi. However, for most Thai migrants, self-identifcation of Pee Noi is largely unrelated to illegality. It is rather a mutual term for identifying migrants themselves. The migrants are satisfed with their life in Korea and enjoy a quality of life they did not have in Thailand. They are not “poor” while they are working in Korea. Being Pee Noi brings them and their families in Thailand substantial material benefts while contributing to the Korean economy which suffers from a shortage of workers. While undocumented migrants are easily exposed to unfavorable treatments and sometimes exploited by employers and agencies, in everyday life much of the time, they are no different from legal migrants and are accepted by locals. De Genova (2002: 422) argues that illegality is not only “a juridical status that entails a social relation to the state” but also a social relation that is “fundamentally inseparable from citizenship.” In other words, in everyday life, undocumented migrants engage in social relations with legal migrants and citizens such as neighbors, coworkers, and employers. It is indisputable that the illegal status of migrant workers has a decisive effect on the migrant’s vulnerable position in the labor market. However, on a day-to-day basis, the illegality of undocumented migrants seems to be irrelevant to most of their social activities. CONCLUSION The empirical research of undocumented migrant workers in this study underlines that illegality is not simply “produced” by the state nor merely the outcome of strategic choices of migrants and employers. Rather, this

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study concurs that international migration is “the outcome of a complex combination of individual actions and social structures” (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 344). Migrations “do not just happen; they are produced. And migrations do not involve just any possible combination of countries; they are patterned” (Sassen, 1998: 56, cited in De Genova, 2002: 424). Likewise, as seen in this study, illegal migration is neither random nor selfgenerating but is constructed and sustained by the complexity of individual actions, institutional structures, and migrant networks under the migration system. Such multifaceted factors have constructed and sustained the fow of irregular migration under the system of international migration. Illegality cannot be examined in isolation from other processes and phenomena. In particular, this study highlights that various migrant institutions, which are increasingly operated on social media, are crucial in facilitating the illegal migration of rural Thai to Korea. Strict policies and regulations on labor migration have made it diffcult to enter Korea through legal channels. Thus, would-be migrants need to acquire knowledge of rules and access to resources. This largely takes place through assistance from intermediaries who interpret the rules and who distribute resources to migrants. Potential migrants and recruitment agencies (or private brokers) draw selectively on institutional rules and resources and exploit them in pursuit of their own interests. Within the increasingly institutionalized migration system in Asia, international migration has become a highly lucrative “business” and recruitment agencies and brokers are essential actors in the migration system. When choosing whether to migrate, people calculate the cost and accessibility of the destination country, the information available on social networks, and the choice of occupations, all of which are heavily modifed by migrant networks. These networks become institutionalized and inevitably reproduce the system of migration. When we consider the social construction of illegality, it becomes clear that illegal migration is not merely a legal or human rights issue but is a profoundly socio-political question. Undocumented migrants are not necessarily victims of exploitation or criminals. The study demonstrates that in everyday life, illegality is irrelevant. Migrants, employers, and locals seek economic benefts regardless of legal status. Illegality is essentially the product of both legal-institution frameworks and dominant power in society. The Pee Noi have been denigrated as “illegals” and are subjected to excessive and punishing form of policing both in Thailand and Korea. Illegal migration will continue as long as social inequality continues to exist. Thai migrants in Korea suffer from less poverty than rural Thais, but migration is obviously not a solution for the deep-seated problems of centralization and social polarization in Thailand.

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NOTES 1. We would like to thank the reviewers for their insightful comments on the chapter. 2. This chapter was previously published in Julia Jiwon Shin and Don Tajaroensuk. 2018. “The Construction of Migrant ‘Illegality’: The Case of Thai Migrant Workers in South Korea.” Journal of Democracy and Human Rights, 18 (3): 89–115. 3. ThaiPBS, “Over 57,000 Thais are overstaying in South Korea,” ThaiPBS news, March 16, 2018. http:​/​/eng​​lishn​​ews​.t​​haipb​​s​.or.​​th​/57​​000​-t​​hais-​​overs​​tayin​​​g​-sou​​th​-ko​​rea/ 4. According to Article 8 (Employment Permission for Foreign Workers) of the Act on the Employment, etc. of Foreign Workers, “No person, other than an employment security offce, shall intervene in the selection, referral, or any other employment of foreign workers.” 5. Club Friday The Series 9, รักครั้งหนึ่ง ที่ไม่ถึงตาย ตอนรักที่หลุดลอย (Love is run away) Ep.3 [2/5], 1.50 mins, https://youtu​.be​/D3el2tSYMMU

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REFERENCES Black, R. 2003. “Breaking the Convention: Researching the ‘Illegal’ Migration of Refugees to Europe.” Antipode 35: 34–54. Coutin, S. B. 2000. Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants’ Struggle for U.S. Residency. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. De Genova, N. P. 2002. “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life.” Annual Review of Anthropology 31: 419–447. Goss, J. and Lindquist, B. 1995. “Conceptualising International Labour Migration: A Structuration Perspective.” International Migration Review 29(2): 317–351. IOM. 2011. Glossary on Migration. International Migration Law Series No. 25. Geneva: IOM. Available from: https://www​.iom​.int​/key​-migration​-terms (Accessed on August 1, 2018). Ruhs, M. and Anderson, B. 2010. “Semi-Compliance and Illegality in Migrant Labour Markets: An Analysis of Migrants, Employers and the State in the UK.” Population, Space and Place 16: 195–211. Massey, D. S., et al. 1993. “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal.” Population and Development Review 19(3): 432–466. Ministry of Justice. 2018. Monthly Statistics on Immigration and Foreigners, April (in Korean). Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea. Samers, M. 2004. “An Emerging Geopolitics of ‘Illegal’ Immigration in the European Union.” European Journal of Migration and Law 6: 27–45. Sassen, S. 1998. Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money. New York, NY: New Press. Shin, J. J. 2008. Unpacking the Gendered Process of International Migration: The Case of Migrant Women in South Korea. Ph.D. thesis, University of Warwick, UK. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). 2016. The World’s Cities in 2016. New York, NY: United Nations. Available from: http:​ /​/www​​.un​.o​​rg​/en​​/deve​​lopme​​nt​/de​​sa​/po​​pulat​​ion​/p​​ublic​​ation​​s​/pdf​​/urba​​nizat​​ion​/t​​he​ _wo​​rlds_​​citie​​s​_​in_​​2016_​​data_​​bookl​​et​.pd​f (Accessed on August 1, 2018).

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Part IV

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FAMILY MIGRATION AND REFUGEES

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Chapter 10

Freeing the Migrant Women in South Korea from a Shackle of Poverty An Inquiry into the Causes of Poverty and the Suggestion of Policy Responses

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Soon-yang Kim and Soo-jung Go

The massive infow of foreigners since the late 1990s has changed South Korea (hereinafter Korea) to a multicultural society.1 Foreigners exceeded 1.4 million in 2013, recording 2.8 percent of total population. Among diverse kinds of foreigners, while foreign workers stay for a short period of time in Korea, migrant women are expected to permanently reside in Korea as Korean citizens and formulate multicultural families by giving birth to their children. In particular, in terms of quantity, about 35 percent of newlyweds in the agricultural sector are matched between the migrant women from lessdeveloped countries and Korean bachelors. Thus, the Korean government and society pay special attention to the provision of support and protection to migrant women. However, despite a bundle of public programs to support migrant women, a majority of migrant women are in extreme poverty for diverse reasons. More alarming is that they may not break away from poverty shackle and may pass on poverty to their children, unless well-timed and adequate policies are enforced to tackle their condition. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to suggest the policy responses to release the migrant women in Korea from a poverty trap, by narrating the intertwined factors causing their poverty. For the aim, this chapter frst introduces the multicultural trend in Korea since the late 1990s and then narrates the contemporary poverty situation of migrant women. The next chapter traces the factors that cause migrant women’s poverty, including employment, language, education, health, social network, and discrimination. Subsequently, this chapter evaluates contemporary policies to tackle the 239

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poverty of migrant women and suggests policy responses to release migrant women from the shackle of poverty. Regarding research methods, the two main methods are document research and survey research. Document research mainly depends on the survey data conducted by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), a competent government department in charge of multicultural family, and the nationwide statistical data relating to migrant women. Other government publications are also utilized. Particularly important materials are 2012 National Survey on the Actual Condition of Multicultural Family and 2009 National Survey on the Actual Condition of Multicultural Family, published by the MOGEF. MOGEF conducts a nationwide survey on the general matters of multicultural family and migrant women every three year. 2012 Social Survey the Statistics Korea published in 2013 is another important data source for document research. This chapter also conducts a survey research, targeting the Vietnamese migrant women residing in Daegu Metropolitan City, to check the statistical relationship among the factors infuencing the poverty of migrant women. The result of survey research is analyzed through such statistical techniques as correlation analysis, regression analysis, and path analysis. Further, this chapter quotes newspaper materials in patches to examine the contemporary situation of migrant women more vividly. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

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The Meaning of Poverty Although the concept “poverty” is defned diversely, it essentially refers to economic or income deprivation and is largely divided into two basic types: absolute poverty and relative poverty (Iceland, 2006). With regard to absolute poverty, scholars regard poverty as the minimum income level or poverty line that is necessary for maintaining physical survival (Kim Y.-M., 1990). The following are the defnitions of absolute poverty. Absolute poverty is claimed to be an objective, even a scientifc defnition, and it is based on the notion of subsistence. Subsistence is the minimum needed to sustain life, and so being below subsistence level is to be experiencing absolute poverty because one does not have enough to live on. (Alcock, 1997: 68) Absolute measures typically attempt to defne a truly basic—absolute—needs standard and therefore remain constant over time. . . . Absolute poverty measures have thresholds or poverty lines, that remain constant over time . . . The

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assumption underlying most absolute measures is that there is a measurable subsistence level or income or consumption below which people should be deemed economically disadvantaged or deprived. (Iceland, 2006: 21)

Meanwhile, relative poverty is related to the perspective of inequality. According to Alcock (1979: 69), “relative poverty is a more subjective or social standard in that it explicitly recognizes that some element of judgment is involved in determining poverty levels, although as we shall see the question of whose judgment this should be is a controversial one.” Relative poverty “defnes poverty as a condition of comparative disadvantage, to be assessed against some relative, shifting, or evolving standard of living. Relative poverty can be defned as comparative economic deprivation” (Iceland, 2006: 21). It is based on the notion that poverty is relative to a society’s existing level of economic, social, and cultural development. While relative poverty can take different forms, “the most common method to gauge it is setting a threshold at a percentage of the median of household income” (Iceland, 2006: 25). However, although we may classify poverty into two kinds and a general trend moves from absolute concept to relative one, in reality, the two concepts are mingled in many cases. An absolute defnition of poverty necessarily involves relative judgment to apply it to any particular situation and relative defnition requires some absolute core in order to distinguish it from broader inequalities. As Alcock (1997, 73) contends, “most attempts to defne and measure poverty do combine both, usually by selecting a poverty standard, expressing it in income terms and then applying it to the income distribution of a particular society in order to reveal the proportion in poverty.” In Korea, absolute poverty was offcially measured through the concept of minimum living cost or national minimum. Until June 2015, the National Basic Livelihood Security Program used this concept as a line of poverty. In the meantime, relative poverty is measured through the median income. However, since July 2015, the program has changed its eligibility criterion from the minimum income criterion based on the concept of absolute poverty to the standard median income based on the concept of relative poverty. Also, income criterion relies upon not individual base but household, when selecting the benefciaries of national welfare services, including public assistance services. Accordingly, we need to take the income of migrant women’s husbands into consideration, when debating the poverty of migrant women. This chapter takes the same position. Research Framework With regard to the causes of poverty, as Iceland (2006: 70) stated, “it is commonly believed that individual failings or wayward values propel people into

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poverty.” That is, poverty has mainly been attributable to personal defects, such as indolence and lack of professional skills. Even today, neoliberalists emphasize the role of individual-level traits, such as family background and educational level, in affecting individuals’ economic status (Iceland, 2006: 70). However, this perspective often overlooks the enormous impact of the social and structural contexts with which individuals cannot cope effectively. It is obvious that individual failings impact individual’s poverty, but the factors causing poverty are complicated and diverse. Among them, structural constraints and environmental context are beyond individuals’ capacities. Migrant women, in particular, confront diverse structural and cultural barriers, such as low-paid job, language matters, racial discrimination, social prejudice, exclusion from social networking. Truly, migrant women’s poverty is caused by a variety of factors. But except the case of property inheritance, the most critical determinant of individuals’ poverty level is whether they are employed or unemployed and in which type of occupation they are employed (Alcock, 1997). Unemployment directly intimidates individuals’ economic lives, because it deprives individuals of income. The quality of employment is another factor causing individuals’ poverty. It is certain that individuals who are unsteadily employed or work in low-paid occupation cannot free from poverty (Iceland, 2006). On the other hand, employment and the quality of occupation are infuenced by diverse kinds of capabilities and characteristics of individuals, such as educational level, vocational skill, and health (Jordan, 2003). In particular, in case of migrant women, language matters become one of signifcant barrier to getting jobs, since many of them are not profcient in commanding the languages of newly settled countries. Migrant women who are unfamiliar with language have also diffculties in acquiring relevant information on jobs and formulating social networks in the host country. Other barriers are the general low-level education of migrant women and the disapproval tendency of the host country on migrant women’s academic achievement in their homeland. In many cases, educational background becomes one of critical factors that decide the type of occupation and the quality of employment (Iceland, 2006). It is true that most of workers with low-level educational background are engaged in low-paid jobs or simple manual labor. Moreover, many studies reveal the close correlation between individuals’ academic achievement and their income level (Kim S. et al., 2010). Health condition also consists of one of the factors that infuence the quality of employment and resultantly the income level of individuals (Mullahy and Wolfe, 2001). The persons who suffer from ill health cannot be employed steadily, and therefore their pay level will be lowered. Meanwhile, strong social networking makes individuals very advantageous in collecting useful information and getting jobs. In Korea, jobs in small-sized and medium-sized

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companies are offered through the personal introduction of current employees, thus broad social network with community neighbors can be a useful tool for collecting job-related information. However, in many cases, migrant women tend to formulate social network within their homeland friends (Kim S., 2013). Furthermore, Korean society has maintained cultural and ethnic homogeneity. Thus, cultural exclusionism has been pervasive for a long time, and as a natural result, unwelcoming of or racial discrimination against foreigners has not been unusual in Korea (Kim, Hwang and Lee, 2007). In particular, under the strong tendency of Korea’s cultural authoritarianism that positions everything in hierarchy (Baik, 1982), migrant women from less-developed countries are vulnerable to discrimination. With regard to employment and job quality, discrimination against migrant women brings about disadvantages in their job hunting as well as promotion and salary-setting in workplaces (Kim, Jo and Min, 2010). It is of course that this situation of discrimination is connected directly with the poverty of migrant women. Apart from the employment status of migrant women, the economic status of their husband becomes one of direct factors determining the poverty level of migrant women, under the situation where a majority of household income is earned by the male head of household in Korea. In many cases, migrant women’s husbands engage in the farming sector or simple manual working that is

Figure 10.1  Factors Leading to Migrant Women’s Poverty.

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generally low-paid and unstable (MOGEF, 2013). Thus, their economic status is generally inferior and this makes multicultural households poverty-stricken in Korea. Figure 10.1 illustrates the factors that lead to the poverty of migrant women, mediated by employment and occupation-related factor. Cross the Threshold of Multicultural Society

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International marriage in Korea is not a new phenomenon. Since the stationing of American soldiers in the 1950s, only a few Korean women have married them. Meanwhile, with the infow of foreign workers since the 1990s, some of them have selected Korean women as their brides (Kim S., 2013). However, until recently, the number of international marriage was tiny and mainly matched between foreign men and Korean women. It was since the late 1990s that the international marriage between Korean men and foreign women has become prevalent. Many Korean bachelors who cannot fnd their fancés in Korea have turned their eyes to less-developed countries, such as China and Southeast Asian countries, with the help of international matchmaking agencies (Lee S. et al., 2008). As of 2012, international marriage occupies 8.7 percent of total marriages in Korea and 72.9 percent of international marriages are made between Korean men and foreign brides (see table 10.1). With regard to the residential area of Korean bachelors who marry foreign women, an absolute majority of them reside in the agricultural sector or urban peripheral areas. In particular, many of single farmers seek their fancés from abroad, since most Korean women are reluctant to marry farming bachelors (Kim and Shin, 2008). The ratio of international marriage in the agricultural sector was 33.9 percent in 2010. By nationality, most of migrant women come from mainland China and Southeast Asian countries. As shown in fgure 10.2, migrant women from China occupy majority, followed by Vietnamese. Among Chinese nationalities, the Korean Chinese occupy 31.5 percent of total immigrant brides. The Korean Chinese can command Korean language Table 10.1  Trends in International Marriage in Korea (case) Total Sum of Marriage (A) 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

304,877 308,598 330,634 327,715 326,104 327,073 305,507

International Marriage Korean Men + Korean Women (B) B/A (%) Foreign Women + Foreign Men 15,202 34,640 38,759 36,204 34,235 28,325 23,316

(5.0) (11.2) (11.7) (11.0) (10.5) (8.7) (7.6)

10,698 25,105 29,665 28,163 26,274 20,637 16,152

4,504 9,535 9,094 8,041 7,961 7,688 7,164

Source: The Statistics Korea (2015), The Statistics of Marriage and Divorce in 2014.

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Figure 10.2  Nationality of Migrant Women. Source: National Statistics Portal http:// kosis​.kr, e-Nara Portal http://www​.index​.go​.kr. Note: among 55.6 percent of Chinese nationality, 31.5 percent are Korean Chinese and 24.1 percent are full-bloodedly Chinese.

quite well and tend to reside in urban areas where service sector jobs are relatively abundant (Kim S., 2013). However, except the Korean Chinese, the great majority of migrant women poorly command Korean language, and this greatly restricts their everyday lives in Korea (Yang and Min, 2010). Meanwhile, the divorce rate of migrant women is much higher than that of ordinary Korean couples. While 16,152 migrant women married Korean bachelors in 2014, 6,998 couples were divorced in the same year. The rate of divorce to marriage reached 43.35 percent in 2014, indicating the failure of many migrant women in adapting to the Korean society (Seol et al. 2009). The reasons for divorce are diverse: maladaptation to Korean culture and society, confict with Korean husbands and their family members, big age gap and lack of mutual understanding between migrant women and Korean husbands, and low economic status, among others (Kim S. et al., 2010). Another concern is to provide migrant women’s children with proper educational opportunity, as the number of multicultural children increases geometrically. While the number of multicultural children was 107,689 in 2009, it increased to 56.5 percent in the past three years, by recording 168,583 in 2012 (Ministry of Security and Public Administration, 2013). As most migrant women command Korean language poorly and are unfamiliar with the Korean educational system, they cannot properly support the learning of their children (Jun et al., 2008). The poverty of migrant women of course deepens the educational inequality of their children in a country where private education is prevalent. Also, many multicultural children suffer from discrimination and bullying in schools because of their differences in appearance (Gyeong-sang-buk-do, 2007). Precedent Studies on the Poverty of Migrant Women Along with the rapid progress of multicultural society in Korea, bulks of studies on migrant women have been conducted. Research topics are wide and diverse, encompassing the following subjects: stress and psychological

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adaptation, social and cultural adaptations, childcare and education, family lives, life satisfaction, social network, health, language, etc. However, despite the active researches across diverse subjects on migrant women, the studies on the poverty of migrant women are scarce. Even though some studies refer to the poverty matters of migrant women as part of their general life conditions, most of them are the fact-fnding reports conducted by government departments or the government-sponsored institutes. Meanwhile, some precedent studies touch migrant women’s poverty as a component of social exclusion (Kim and Shin, 2008; Kim J.-W., 2011, Kim and Lee, 2013), but the proportion of poverty matters is generally small, as they treat a wide range of social exclusion. Accordingly, precedent studies focusing on migrant women’s poverty are limited. The following are examples. Seol and Yoon (2008) analyze the difference of migrant women’s socioeconomic adaptation to the Korean society by their residential area and nationality and suggest social policy measures to facilitate their socioeconomic adaptation. Chun and Pyo (2007) investigate the economic conditions of the migrant women in Choong-buk Do and suggest policy measures to improve their economic conditions and integrate them into neighboring communities. Sung (2015) examines the expectation and preparation of migrant women on their later life through an in-depth interview with the Vietnamese migrant women in Daegu Metropolitan City and fnd that they are hardly prepared for their old ages and show very low-level recognition on the necessity to prepare for old ages. Cha and Kim (2008) compare the depression level of migrant women and investigate how the childbirth and economic activities of migrant women infuence their depression level, through the survey research targeting the migrant women from Japan, China, and Vietnam. Lee H.-S. (2014) analyzes the economic diffculties that migrant women experience in Korea, by conducting interview with the migrant women in Gyeong-gi Do. She concludes that variables such as discrimination, differences in lifestyle and culture, and diffculties in communication impact leading to the economic diffculties of migrant women. Lee H.-A. (2013) describes the vivid story on the economic lives of migrant women through in-depth interviews. The research question is, “what is the meaning of economic life that migrant women experience?” Lee, Yang, and Yoon (2012) examine the economic life and consumption style of migrant women residing in island areas. MIGRANT WOMEN’S POVERTY AND DIVERSE CAUSES The Harsh Reality of Migrant Women’s Poverty Most migrant women, except Korean Chinese, have diffculties in commanding Korean language. They also lack particular professionalism and thus

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face diffculties in getting decent jobs. Although some are employed, most of them work in simple manual jobs like part-time workers in restaurants. Their husbands also mostly engage in agricultural and fshery sector or simple manual working (MOGEF, 2013). As a result, many migrant women confront poverty in agricultural or urban periphery areas. Meanwhile, poverty in the capitalist society greatly infuences not only the daily lives of migrant women but also the quality and education of their children. For migrant women , poverty can negatively affect their health status, by bringing about excessive physical labor, poor nutrition intakes, and the impediment in receiving medical treatments. Poverty also makes it impossible for migrant women to plan for their future. Of course poverty is the cause of inferior housing conditions and impediment in receiving education for re-employment or for the upward mobility of occupation. The deepening of poverty in a particular group negatively impacts the integration of the whole society. Making things worse, poverty leads to various problems which are entangled, and thus it is diffcult for migrant women to escape from the shackle of poverty. When poverty is not overcome by parents, it is transmitted to the children. Under the situation where the dependence on private education is exceedingly high, the children from poor households generally show low academic achievement. In particular, the poverty of migrant women is intertwined with their lower capability of language and ignorance of the Korean educational system. Accordingly, there is an urgent need to diagnose the causes and contemporary situations of migrant women’s poverty and draw up measures to tackle it. In actuality, the primary motivation behind marrying Korean bachelors is, for most migrant women, to enjoy economically stable lives in Korea. It is undeniable that the bulk of migrant women dream of rosy future before coming to Korea (Kim and Shin, 2008). They immigrate to Korea with the hope of escaping from poverty in their homelands. Thus, they endure the marriage with Korean bachelors who are usually much older than migrant women and do not mind settling in the agricultural sector in which most Korean women are reluctant to live. In return for marriage, a few Korean bachelors regularly send money to parents-in-law. However, the economic reality of migrant women and their husbands is different from their wishes. Most migrant women are caught in a poverty trap for diverse reasons. As fgure 10.3 shows, 95.1 percent of migrant women earn less than 2,000 thousand won (approximately 1,920 US$) as average monthly income. Their husbands’ monthly income also ranges between 1,000 and 3,000 thousand won mostly. In 2013, 89.0 percent of migrant women’s households were under the average monthly income of Korean households, that is, 4,040 thousand won (E-Today, October 4, 2013). A majority of migrant women suffer from poverty. We need to take measures against their poverty, because their economic status should be enhanced to

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Figure 10.3  Average Monthly Incomes of Migrant Women and Their Husbands (%). Source: adapted from MOGEF (2013).

accomplish social integration. According to Donggu of Gwangju Metropolitan City, the monthly household income of 70 migrant women (43.4%), among 161 migrant women surveyed, was 1,500 thousand won, which is even under the minimum living cost of a four-strong family (1,546 thousand won). If we cannot solve the poverty problem of migrant women, migrant women will confront the sense of difference and their poverty will pass down to their children. (Excerpt from Gwangju Ilbo, November 8, 2013)

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Furthermore, unlike ordinary Korean couples, the decision-making power of Korean husbands on property management is much greater in case of multicultural families. According to MOGEF (2013), while the rate of decision a Korean husband makes on property management is 45.9 percent, the rate of decision made by migrant women is just 22.7 percent among the respondents. This outcome may arise from migrant women’s defciency of knowledge on the Korean economic system and Korean husbands’ distrust on migrant women. Meanwhile, 32.3 percent of migrant women answered that they exert decision-making power on property management equally. Diverse Causes Arousing the Poverty of Migrant Women Unstable Employment and Low-Paid Occupation The income level of a certain individual is mainly determined by his/her status of employment and type of occupation (Alcock, 1997). In particular, in case of migrant women, the employment status and occupation type of their husbands are critical in deciding the poverty level of migrant women, under the situation where most migrant women are unemployed or low-paid. Despite many migrant women trying to get jobs, 47.0 percent are unemployed for a variety of reasons, including language problem, defciency of skill, and

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opposition from family members. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate of migrant women’s husbands records 10.2 percent, and this amount is much higher than 4.3 percent of national unemployment rate in 2012 (MoGEF, 2013). We can trace the high unemployment rate of migrant women’s husbands from their lack of professional skill and disadvantages in terms of age. Meanwhile, the majority of migrant women are employed in simple manual working (29.9%) and service sector (23.9%), such as restaurant. 13.6 percent of migrant women are employed in small-sized and medium-sized factories as manual machine operators (see table 10.2). These occupational sectors are usually low-paid. Moreover, although 10.3 percent of migrant women are employed as professionals, most of them work as part-time Chinese or English language teachers in elementary schools, and thus they are also usually low-paid (Kim O., 2008). Although some migrant women possess certifcates from their homelands, Korean workplaces usually do not acknowledge Table 10.2  Occupation of Migrant Women and Their Husbands (%) Migrant Women Managers Professionals Clerks Service sector employees Salespersons Workers in agriculture and fishery Artificers Machine operators Simple manual workers Career soldiers Total

0.1 10.3 4.6 23.9 6.6 4.5 6.4 13.6 29.9 100.0

Spouses 2.1 7.6 7.7 4.5 6.4 9.0 18.3 26.1 18.4 0.1 100.0

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Source: adapted from e-Nara Portal http://www​.index​.go​.kr and MOGEF (2013).

Figure 10.4  Working Statuses of Migrant Women and Their Husbands (%). Source: adapted from MOGEF (2013) and http://www​.mogef​.go​.kr​/index​.jsp.

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them. Thus, it is very hard for migrant women to get jobs equivalent to their skill and profession. Migrant women’s husbands are also mainly engaged in low-paid occupation, such as machine operators (26.1%), simple manual workers (18.4%), and artifcers (18.3%). 9.0 percent of husbands are working in the feld of agriculture and fshery where income level is usually low. In sum, the absolute majority of migrant women and their Korean husbands are engaged in simple labor, and thus their salary level must be low, tightening migrant women’s shackle of poverty. The working status of migrant women is more desperate. The majority of migrant women are unstably employed and low-paid. According to fgure 10.4, 35.0 percent migrant women are employed as temporary workers and 18.9 percent migrant women are unstable day laborers. 9.5 percent respondents are engaged in unpaid household labor, whereas small numbers of migrant women are self-employed in the level of mom and pop stores and thus their future is unstable. In sum, about 70 percent of employed migrant women are working in unstable workplaces, and resultantly their economic statuses become unstable too (Yang and Min, 2010). It is of course that these kinds of unstable jobs provide low salaries. Meanwhile, although the job statuses of migrant women’s husbands are better than those of migrant women, their job stability is also much insecure to those of ordinary Korean workers (Gyeong-sang-buk-do, 2007). More than half of employed husbands are engaged in unstable labor, making possible forejudge their disadvantageous working conditions and low level of salary. While many of migrant women try to fnd jobs, their job-seeking routes are very limited, due to the lack of understanding of Korean job market (Kim, Jo and Min, 2010). According to MOGEF (2013), 26.2 percent of migrant women depend on friends and acquaintances from their homelands in seeking jobs, whereas only 13.7 percent of respondents rely on their Korean friends and neighbors. 20.3 percent of respondents depend on husbands’ family and relatives as a main job-seeking source. Thus, the majority of migrant women seek jobs through informal routes, and usually this kind of job-seeking cannot guarantee regular and decent working. Meanwhile, migrant women’s dependence on public institutions as their job-seeking route is very low (5.9%), putting the government’s effort to support the job placement of migrant women in the shade. In the meantime, 19.0 percent and 7.5 percent of migrant women make use of mass media and private agencies, respectively, as job-seeking routes. Regarding the necessary measures to help migrant women’s employment, according to Yang and Min (2010), targeting 57,440 migrant women, 29.7 percent of respondents count the government’s job placement effort as the most reliable resource. Even though the government enforces diverse programs through local job centers, the reality is that many of migrant women

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do not properly make use of these programs due to diverse reasons, including lack of relevant information and the poor accessibility to programs. The government’s support for childcare and nurturing is ranked the second by recording 22.9 percent (remainders are Korean language education 18.4%, vocational education 14.1%, understanding and support of husbands and family members 6.5%, no need of help 2.9%, and others 5.6%). As ordinary Korean housewives do, childcare and nurturing become one of key barriers for migrant women to get jobs (Jo et al., 2008). Programs for Korean language and vocational training are also highly demanding. Migrant women’s poor command in Korean language becomes one of critical barriers in getting jobs (Kim O., 2008), thus high demand for language training programs seems to be natural. With regard to vocational education, according to Yang and Min’s (2010), only 11.4 percent of respondents have experiences of participating in the government’s vocational training programs. On the other hand, 74.9 percent of respondents intend to participate in vocational training in the future. The misconception of migrant women’s husbands and other family members is another obstacle to migrant women’s getting jobs. Some husbands and Korean family members worry about the possibility of their women being misled into malicious trap in the search for jobs (Kim and Shin, 2008). In few cases, working migrant women take the wrong route to earn extra money, such as working at illegal adult entertainment business.

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Language Problems Language problems of migrant women become a signifcant barrier in their adaptation to general Korean lives, including job-seeking, childcare, and formulating social network. According to MOGEF (2013), language problem is the most serious diffculty with which migrant women are confronted in Korea. In other miscellaneous cases, 39.8 percent of migrant women count language problem as the biggest barrier in living Korea, followed by economic diffculty (34.9%), loneliness (34.9%), differences in life style and custom from those of their homelands (26.8%), childcare and education (24.4%), prejudice and discrimination (19.1%), food (11.4%), confict between family members (11.3%), and visiting public facilities (7.0%) (http://www​.mogef​ .go​.kr​/index​.jsp). In particular, except the Korean Chinese, migrant women’s poor command of Korean language exerts a negative impact on educating their children signifcantly. Many migrant women cannot communicate with their children at home, let alone helping with their homework. As a result, the educational standard of migrant women’s children is much lower than that of ordinary Korean children (Jun et al., 2008). In a country where the correlation between economic status and educational achievement is very high, it is apprehended that migrant women’s poverty can pass on their children.

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Specifcally, as able 10.3 shows, more than half of migrant women are not profcient in Korean language. In particular, when considering the statistical fgures in the survey, including the Korean Chinese who occupy 31.5 percent of total migrant women, Korean language command of the rest of migrant women will be much lower than the average. According to table 10.3, the language profciency of Korean Chinese (Josunjok) migrant women is much higher than that of Vietnamese migrant women. However, one thing we should pay close attention is to carefully interpret “average” category. Mostly, respondents checking “average” category evaluate their language ability neither good nor bad, and thus they are mostly irresolute in determining their answers. Accordingly, we need to refer to fve-point Likert scale simultaneously to grasp the meaning of “average” more precisely. According to table 10.3, the fve-point scale of Vietnamese migrant women is much lower than that of Korean Chinese migrant women. Among the areas of language ability, migrant women’s capabilities of reading and writing Korean language are lower than those of speaking and comprehension. Migrant women who have diffculties in reading and writing Korean language may have rare opportunities to get stable and well-paid jobs (Kim S. et al., 2010). The government survey proves that migrant women’s poor command of Korean language becomes the biggest barrier in getting jobs. According to MOGEF (2013), 28.9 percent of migrant women count their poor capabilities to command Korean language as a primary barrier to get jobs, signifying migrant women’s language problems can be one of reasons of their poverty. Meanwhile, defciency of suitable works and lack of experience in Korea Table 10.3  Migrant Women’s Korean Language Ability (%)

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Very poor Speaking Comprehension Reading Writing

Total KC Vietnamese Total KC Vietnamese Total KC Vietnamese Total KC Vietnamese

3.4 0.3 7.1 2.7 0.3 5.5 5.2 1.4 9.6 8.4 2.7 14.8

Poor

Average

Good

Very good

12.3 2.0 24.5 10.6 2.0 21.3 14.1 4.0 25.6 19.1 7.0 30.6

29.0 13.6 48.0 28.3 12.3 47.4 26.8 15.0 40.2 26.2 16.4 38.9

18.3 17.9 15.8 20.0 18.2 19.7 18.3 17.5 18.5 14.9 16.5 12.0

37.0 66.2 4.7 38.5 67.2 6.1 35.7 62.1 6.2 31.4 57.4 3.8

Total

5point scale

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

3.73 4.48 2.87 3.81 4.50 3.00 3.65 4.35 2.86 3.42 4.19 2.60

* KC: Korean Chinese migrant women. Source: adapted from MOGEF (2013).

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occupy 22.5 percent and 19.1 percent, respectively (remainders are discrimination against foreigners 13.9%, lack of family and friends to help job-seeking 5.9%, disapproval of homeland academic career and certifcates 5.6%, disapproval of homeland work experience 4.9%, and others 3.6%). Low Level of Education

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It is contended that individuals’ educational level is closely interrelated with their income level. In most cases, educational level has a decisive effect on employment quality and salary level, and thus it becomes one of direct causes of individuals’ income level (Alcock, 1997). According to MoGEF (2013), 79.5 percent of migrant women are below high school in their educational level. Among them, 10.3 percent are below elementary school, 23.5 percent are middle school, and 45.6 percent are high school. Only 20.5 percent of respondents are undergraduates or more. Moreover, migrant women’s academic qualifcations in their homelands are not acknowledged in the process of job-seeking. As a matter of course, even graduates are engaged in simple manual labor in Korea. Meanwhile, table 10.4 shows the general relationship trend between migrant women’s educational level and their monthly income. While only 7.8 percent of high school earn more than 3,000 thousand won in a month, 18.3 percent of undergraduates record more than 3,000 thousand won in their monthly income. The income level of elementary school and middle school is generally lower than that of high school. Thus, from this statistics, it can be understood that the educational level of migrant women is generally low, and in addition their academic background is not acknowledged fairly in Korea (Yang and Min, 2010). As a result, many migrant women are engaged in low-paying simple labor, making the sustenance of their poverty unavoidable. The close relationship between educational level and monthly income is also partly proven by the income level in comparison of migrant women’s Table 10.4  Migrant Women’s Monthly Incomes by Educational Level (thousand won, %)

Less than 500 500–1,000 1,000–2,000 2,000–3,000 3,000 or more Unknown Total

Elementary School Graduate

Middle School Graduate

High School Graduate

College-Level Graduate or More

9.7 21.3 35.7 11.8 3.6 18.0 100.0

5.4 18.9 39.9 16.8 5.1 13.9 100.0

4.4 16.1 41.1 20.0 7.8 10.5 100.0

4.2 11.7 32.7 20.6 18.3 12.6 100.0

Source: Kim S. et al. (2010) and http://www​.mogef​.go​.kr​/index​.jsp.

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Table 10.5  Monthly Incomes of Migrant Women’s Husbands by Educational Level (thousand won, %) High school graduate or below Less than 500 500–1,000 1,000–2,000 2,000–3,000 3,000–4,000 4,000 or more Total

3.6 9.6 50.1 27.5 6.3 2.4 100.0

Junior college graduate 4.1 6.0 37.6 33.8 11.2 7.1 100.0

University graduate

Graduate school or more

4.5 5.4 26.3 33.5 16.1 14.2 100.0

1.4 3.7 13.2 23.1 19.8 38.8 100.0

Source: adapted from MOGEF (2013: 490).

husbands based on their educational backgrounds. As shown in table 10.5, the monthly income of migrant women’s husbands becomes high which is directly proportional to their education level.

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Ill Health Individual’s health condition is another variable infuencing his/her job status and economic matters as a result (Mullahy and Wolfe, 2001). It is understandable that unhealthy individuals have diffculties in getting jobs and cannot devote themselves fully to their jobs. And in this way, ill health makes individuals poor. According to MOGEF (2013), the health condition of migrant women is pretty good, as 61.6 percent respondents positively answered about their health condition (very good 40.2%, good 21.4%). Only 10.7 percent migrant women evaluate their health condition negatively (poor 7.9%, very poor 2.8%). 27.7 percent migrant women evaluate their health status as average. It is assumed that this statistical outcome can be analogized from the relative young ages of migrant women. As the international marriage between Korean bachelors and foreign women is a recent phenomenon, the majority of migrant women are between twenties and forties in their age groups (Kim S. et al., 2010). This fact is proven by the comparison of health status between migrant women and general Korean women (see table 10.6). While the health status of migrant women scores 3.88 in a fve-point scale (very poor 1 and very good 5) and that of general Korean women score is 3.25. This result can be inferred from the fact that the category of general Korean women includes old-aged women. Regarding medical institutions that migrant women mainly visit, the number of migrant women using hospitals/clinics increased from 73.3 percent in 2009 to 82.0 percent in 2012. The percentage of primary dependence on pharmacies dropped from 13.0 percent to 5.9 percent during the same period

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Table 10.6  Comparison of the Recognition on Health Status (%)

Migrant women General Korean women

Very poor

Poor

Average

Good

Very good

Total

Mean

2.8 3.2

7.9 16.5

27.7 40.1

21.4 32.4

40.2 7.9

100.0 100.0

3.88 3.25

Source: MOGEF (2013: 340) and The Statistics Korea (2013), 2012 Social Survey.

Table 10.7  Changes in the Medical Institutions that Migrant Women Mainly Use (%)

2009 2012

Hospitals and clinics

Herbal medicine clinics

Public health centers

Pharmacies

Others

Do not use

73.3 82.0

5.9 2.6

4.6 1.2

13.0 5.9

4.2 0.1

8.3

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Source: Kim S.-k. (2010) and MOGEF (2013).

(see table 10.7). These statistics may indicate that migrant women became more accustomed to visiting hospitals/clinics directly without depending on other medical centers like pharmacies. However, many migrant women have diffculties in using medical institutions in Korea, due to bad communication (20.9%), high cost of medical services (13.2%), complicated procedures in using medical institutions (3.9%), and inconvenient transportation (3.2%) (MOGEF, 2013). Thus, migrant women’s accessibility to medical institutions is not high, as ever. Further, health problem of migrant women’s husbands can also become one of factors leading to migrant women’s poverty in a situation where main household incomes are earned by household head in Korea. In the survey of MOGEF (2013), 46.9 percent of migrant women’s unemployed husbands point to their ill health as the reason for being unemployed. In particular, as the majority of husbands are engaged in manual labor, their ill health may directly infuence their job status. Weak Social Network Social network can also help job seekers in fnding employment. In many cases, vacancies in small-sized and medium-sized companies are flled up not by formal employment advertisement but through referrals of existing employees. However, the majority of relevant studies prove the weak and vulnerable social networking of migrant women (Lee and Bae, 2008). Most migrant women are not profcient in Korean language and naturally have diffculties in understanding Korean society and culture. If someone cannot command language properly and are unfamiliar with cultural characteristic,

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they may have diffculties in making friends and acquaintances. In particular, the Korean society has maintained ethnic and cultural homogeneity for a long time, and thus tends to be exclusive to foreigners (Choi M. et al., 2009; Hong, 2008), hampering migrant women’s access to surrounding communities. According to fgure 10.5, with respect to persons who seek advices on job opportunities, 20.1 percent migrant women do not have any adviser or guide around. 24.9 percent respondents discuss job matters with co-migrants and friends who are also not very familiar about Korean job market. Meanwhile, 34.6 percent migrant women do not have any friends to share leisure time and dilettante lives in Korea. In this regard, more than one-third of migrant women are isolated from neighbors or communities. 27.5percent migrant women do mainly spend spare time with their homeland friends and this also proves the exclusive peer relation of migrant women. Many migrant women tend to restrict their companionship within homeland friends who can communicate easily and share cultural similarity. As a result, migrant women’s social network is generally weak and narrow and in particular, their relationship with Korean neighbors is not strong. While migrant women’s selective companionship with their homeland friends can enhance emotional stability, it can make migrant women diffcult in adapting themselves to Korean society. It is also probable that migrant women’s lack of companionship with Korean neighbors restrict their access to job-related information that is necessary in managing economic lives in Korea. On the other hand, migrant women have little experience of group activities, such as affliating to private organizations and political parties, in Korea. According to MoGEF (2013), only 4.5 percent of migrant women have experience of affliating to social or political groups in Korea. Migrant women’s

Figure 10.5  Migrant Women’s Social Network (%). Source: adapted from MOGEF (2013).

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ignorance of the Korean social system and indifference to political matters make them passive participants in social and political issues.

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Discrimination Racial discrimination is a signifcant social crime in a civilized society, and thus such behavior is condemned strongly. Racial discrimination becomes a substantial barrier to achieving social justice (Braziel, 2008). In a situation where racial discrimination exists, minority groups inevitably are confronted with diffculties in getting jobs and fulflling economic requirements (Iceland, 2006). As mentioned above, Korea has long been racially homogeneous and exclusive to cultural differences. Multiculturalism has not been familiar to Korean people (Kim B., 2008). Moreover, Korea has shown a heavy tendency of cultural authoritarianism, which understands things through hierarchical ordering (Hong, 2008). On this cultural soil, while white persons from advanced countries tend to be treated highly, foreigners from less-developed countries, including migrant women, tend to be treated contemptuously. According to MOGEF (2013), 41.1 percent of migrant women have experience of discrimination in Korea. In particular, discrimination in workplaces is signifcant, by recording 2.5 point in a four-point scale. Discrimination in workplaces includes a variety of disadvantages in salary, working hour, promotion, and human relations. Experience of discrimination in public spaces, such as market, restaurant, and bank, also marks high score by recording 1.74 point. The scales of other discrimination experiences are 1.73 in streets and villages, 1.53 in government institutions, and 1.5 in schools and nursery facilities. The following comments prove the seriousness of discrimination against migrant women. There is a strong racial prejudice against the residential areas where multicultural families concentrate. People recognize some districts in Seoul and Gyeonggi-do where foreigners are populous as ghetto areas. Immigrants from Asian countries symbolize poor people and are the target of sympathy. Many Koreans disparage them as the persons who need public support and have high probability of crime. Some Koreans see immigrants as the object of hatred who deprive of their job opportunities, spaces, and welfare benefts. We can see the prejudice against immigrants even in TV dramas and public advertisements. Jeong Hye-sil (director of TAW Network), excerpt from Younhap News, December 17, 2013. Currently, three out of a hundred are foreigners. I don’t know why Koreans who respect guests very much disregard migrant women from less-developed countries. We should embrace them with open mind as the same Korean people. (Lee-ra (former MP), excerpt from Herald Biz, July 5, 2013)

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Husband’s Economic Status The economic status of migrant women’s husbands is generally inferior to ordinary Korean men, and this contributes to making migrant women live in poverty in Korea. According to MOGEF (2013), migrant women’s husbands engage in the following sectors: machine operators 26.1 percent, simple manual workers 18.4 percent, artifcers 18.3 percent, workers in agriculture and fshery 9.0 percent, clerks 7.7 percent, etc. Professionals and managers are only 7.6 percent and 2.1 percent respectively, whereas the proportion of professionals is 15.2 percent among ordinary Korean men (Statistics Korea, 2012 Economically Active Population Survey, 2013). Meanwhile, the average monthly income of migrant women’s husbands during the recent three months is as follows: below 1,000 thousand won 12.3 percent, between 1,000 and 2,000 thousand won 45 percent, between 2,000 and 3,000 thousand won 28.8 percent, between 3,000 and 4,000 thousand won 8.5 percent, and above 4,000 thousand won 5.4 percent. In totality, 86.1 percent of migrant women’s husbands earn less than 3,000 thousand won in a month, and this amount is far below the monthly income 3,000–3,500 thousand won of the average Korean men living in Seoul (Segye Ilbo, 2014.11.18). It is obvious that the income level of migrant women’s husbands is lower than ordinary Korean men and this inevitably makes multicultural family poverty-stricken.

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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS RELATING TO MIGRANT WOMEN’S POVERTY This chapter examines the contemporary situation of migrant women’s poverty and traces the factors leading to poverty. With broad references to precedent studies, this chapter assumes that both individual characteristics and environmental reasons have an impact on migrant women’s poverty. Accordingly, this chapter distinguishes the infuencing factors on poverty into two categories: individual factors and social or contextual ones. While individual factors include language ability, educational level, and health status, social factors include social network and discrimination. With regard to measurement, language ability is gauged through the profciency level in Korean language, whereas educational level is measured by migrant women’s recognition on the propriety of their educational level vis-à-vis managing their lives in Korea. Heath status is measured by the questionnaire on the subjective recognition of heath situation. Meanwhile, the variable “social network” gauges the participation of migrant women in community activities, and discrimination is measured by migrant women’s recognition on the openness and discriminative practices of Korean society.

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With these questionnaire items, this chapter conducts a survey as a supplement to document research, in order to identify the factors infuencing the poverty of migrant women. A survey was carried out between November 25 and December 6, 2015, targeting seventy-fve Vietnamese migrant women residing in Daegu Metropolitan City.2 This chapter conducted multiple regression and path analysis to analyze the infuencing factors. Each survey question consists of Likert fve-point scale. Table 10.8 shows the general characteristics of those surveyed. With regard to the general description of survey result, respondents regard their educational level is quite high (mean 3.81) enough to live in Korea. Meanwhile, differently from the nationwide survey conducted by the MOGEF (2013), the Vietnamese migrant women residing in Daegu Metropolitan City evaluate their health status rather negatively (mean 2.87). They also regard their income level as a little low (mean 2.84). Details of descriptive analysis are suggested in table 10.9. According to the result of correlation analysis (refer to table 10.10), the variables of language, social discrimination, social network, and job status showed meaningful correlation with the poverty of migrant women. In particular, the variable “language” shows the greatest correlation with migrant women’s poverty, and this indicates that migrant women’s poor command of Korean language becomes one of the main factors leading them to poverty in Korea. Their poor command of Korean language can be an obstacle in getting decent jobs, obliging them to work in low-paid jobs. Furthermore, it is a concern that the low-level linguistic skills of migrant women may have a negative effect on educating their children, causing the vicious cycle of inheriting poverty. Meanwhile, the variable “discrimination” shows strong

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Table 10.8  General Characteristics of Those Surveyed Socioeconomic Variables Age structure 20s 30s 40s and above Educational level High school graduate and below Junior college graduate College graduate and above Length of stay 3 years or less 3–5 years 5–10 years 10 years or more Monthly household Less than 1,000 thousand Won 1,000 thousand Won – 2,000 income thousand Won 2,000 thousand Won – 3,000 thousand Won More than 3,000 thousand Won

Number (case) 37 21 14 47 10 13 25 13 22 13 3 40

Percentage 51.3 29.2 19.4 67.1 14.3 18.6 34.2 17.8 30.1 17.8 4.2 55.6

23

31.9

6

8.3

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Table 10.9  Result of Descriptive Analysis

Language Education Health Discrimination Social Network Job Status Poverty

Mean 3.24 3.81 2.87 2.35 3.12 3.83 2.84

Std. .836 .515 .723 .979 .854 .601 .663

Median 3.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 3.00

Minimum Value 1 3 1 1 1 2 1

Maximum Value 5 5 4 4 5 5 4

Table 10.10  Result of Correlation Analysis

Language Education Health Discrimination Social Network Job Status Poverty

Language Education Health 1 1 .266* -.013 -.137 1 -.053 -.134 .162 .299** -.237* .300** -.153 .002 .090 .149 .210 .367**

DiscrimiSocial Job nation Network Status Poverty

1 -.050 .407** .253*

1 -.207 .276*

1 .290*

1

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