Multiethnic Korea?: Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea 1557291101, 9781557291103

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Multiethnic Korea?

Multiethnic Korea?

Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea

Lie INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA ● BERKELEY

TK 1

TK 1 cover.indd 1

Edited by John Lie TRANSNATIONAL KOREA 1

1/23/2015 11:52:38 PM

Notes to this edition This is an electronic edition of the printed book. Minor corrections may have been made within the text; new information and any errata appear on the current page only. Transnational Korea 1 Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea John Lie, editor ISBN-13: 978-1-55729-168-4 (electronic) ISBN-13: 978-1-55729-110-3 (print) ISBN-10: 1-55729-110-1 (print)

Please visit the IEAS Publications website at http://ieas.berkeley.edu/publications/ for more information and to see our catalogue. Send correspondence and manuscripts to Katherine Lawn Chouta, Managing Editor Institute of East Asian Studies 1995 University Avenue, Suite 510H Berkeley, CA 94720-2318 USA [email protected]

May 2015

Multiethnic Korea?

TransnaTional Korea 1

Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary south Korea

edited by John lie

a publication of the institute of east asian studies, University of California, Berkeley. although the institute is responsible for the selection and acceptance of manuscripts in this series, responsibility for the opinions expressed and for the accuracy of statements rests with their authors. The Transnational Korea series is one of several publication series sponsored by the institute of east asian studies in conjunction with its constituent units. The others include the China research Monograph series, the Japan research Monograph series, the Korea research Monograph series, and the research Papers and Policy studies series. send correspondence and manuscripts to Katherine lawn Chouta, Managing editor institute of east asian studies 1995 University avenue, suite 510H Berkeley, Ca 94720 [email protected] library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Multiethnic Korea? : multiculturalism, migration, and peoplehood diversity in contemporary south Korea / John lie (editor).        pages cm. —  (Transnational Korea ; 1) includes bibliographical references and index. isBn 978-1-55729-110-3 (alkaline paper) — isBn 1-55729-110-1 (alkaline paper) 1. Cultural pluralism—Korea (south) 2. Multiculturalism—Korea (south) 3. Korea (south)--ethnic relations. 4. Korea (south)—race relations. 5. immigrants--Korea (south) 6. Korea (south)—emigration and immigration. 7. Korea (south)—social conditions—1988–  i. lie, John.   Ds904.5.M85 2014   305.80095195--dc23 2014007574

Copyright © 2014 by the regents of the University of California. Printed in the United states of america. all rights reserved. Cover image by David Chung. Cover design by Mindy Chen.

Contents

Preface Contributors 1 Introduction: Multiethnic Korea John Lie

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Part I: an EMErgEnt MultIEthnIC/MultICultural SoCIEty? 2 late Migration, Discourse, and the Politics of Multiculturalism in South Korea: a Comparative Perspective Timothy C. Lim

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3 Korea: Multiethnic or Multicultural? Nora Hui-Jung Kim

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4 tolerance, Tamunhwa, and the Creating of the new Citizens EuyRyung Jun

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5 Makeshift Multiculturalism: the transformation of Elementary School teacher training Nancy Abelmann, Gayoung Chung, Sejung Ham, Jiyeon Kang, and Q-Ho Lee

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Part II: MIgrantS anD othErS 6 the needs of others: revisiting the nation in north Korean and Filipino Migrant Churches in South Korea Hae Yeon Choo

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7 north Korean Migrants in South Korea: From heroes to Burdens and First unifiers Jin-Heon Jung

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8 Beyond Motherlands and Mother love: locating Korean adoptees in global Korea Eleana Kim

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9 Diverging Paths, Converging Ends: Japan’s and Korea’s low-Skilled Immigration Policies, 1990–2010 Keiko Yamanaka

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Part III: DIvErSIFyIng KorEa 10 race-ing toward the real South Korea: the Cases of BlackKorean nationals and african Migrants Nadia Y. Kim

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11 almost Korean: Korean amerasians in an Era of Multiculturalism Sue-Je L. Gage

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12 Can the union of Patriarchy and Multiculturalism Work? Family Dynamics in Filipina-Korean rural households Minjeong Kim

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Part Iv: CoDa 13 Korean Multiculturalism in Comparative Perspective Jack Jin Gary Lee and John D. Skrentny

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Index

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Preface

after Multiethnic Japan appeared, several people asked whether i planned to write a book on the same topic for Korea. i halfheartedly mumbled something vaguely affirmative on more than one occasion, and i am pleased that the conditions of south Korea and of my life made this faint promise a reality, however short of a full-scale study—and with a question mark to boot—the final product has turned out to be. The myth of monoethnic and monocultural Korea is tenacious. This is paradoxically, or precisely, because historical evidence doesn’t support it, though the surprisingly persistent and powerful nationalist historiography in south and north Korea casts the messy past as an epic narrative of a singular, unified, and pure people. The story has convinced enough south and north Koreans so that for the second half of the twentieth century it became a simple matter of commonsense: natural, obvious, and irrefutable. The family romance of the blood-unified nation faces at every turn the recalcitrant reality of human movements and mixings, ethnic heterogeneity, and cultural diversity. The prevailing response, at least until very recently, was denial or denigration. i can only hope that the deleterious consequences of monoethnic and monocultural fantasy will subside, if only in small part because of this and other efforts. This volume is the outcome of two workshops held at the Center for Korean studies, University of California, Berkeley, in september 2009 and october 2010. i am grateful to the academy of Korean studies (this work was supported by the academy of Korean studies [KsPs] grant funded by the Korean government [Moe] [aKs-2007-Ma-2002 and aKs-2012Baa-2102]), the Korea Foundation, and the institute of east asian studies, University of California, Berkeley, for their financial and logistical support. several scholars, who for various reasons did not contribute chapters to this volume, participated actively in one or both workshops. i wish to thank Henry em, Joe Hankins, elaine Kim, Kyu Hyun Kim, Myoungkyu Park, and gi-Wook shin. i wish also to acknowledge andrew eungi Kim

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and ingyu oh for alerting me to the importance of this topic. Kate Chouta and Christopher Pitts offered their unmatched editorial skills in shaping the prose. yunhee roh helped with the references. For all matters organizational and logistic, aaron Miller proved invaluable, and he, Martin Backstrom, Wen-hsin yeh, and Dylan Davis were indispensable to the making of this book. John lie

Contributors

Nancy Abelmann is associate vice chancellor for research (Humanities and arts) and the Harry e. Preble Professor of anthropology, asian american studies, and east asian languages and Cultures at the University of illinois at Urbana-Champaign. she writes on family, class, gender, education, and migration with a focus on south Korea and Korean/asian america. she has published books on south Korean social movements; women and social mobility; and film; and on Korean americans—most recently, The Intimate University: Korean American Students and the Problems of Segregation (2009). she is coeditor of No Alternative? Experiments in South Korean Education (2012) and of South Korea’s Education Exodus: The Life and Times of Early Study Abroad (in press); and coauthor of Making Family Work: How Korean American Teens and Parents Navigate Immigrant America (in progress). Hae Yeon Choo is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Toronto. Her research centers on gender, migration, and citizenship. intersectional analysis empirically informs her articles in Gender & Society and Sociological Theory. Her book manuscript, “Citizenship beyond the Books: gender, labor, and Migrant rights in south Korea” (under contract with stanford University Press) examines how inequalities of gender, race, and class affect migrant rights through a comparative study of three groups of Filipina women in south Korea—factory workers, wives of south Korean men, and club hostesses. Gayoung Chung is a doctorate student in the Department of education Policy, organization, and leadership at the University of illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Her current research is on the activism of undocumented Korean american youths struggling to navigate their life within the intertwined tension of restricted citizenship and racial stereotype. she has been also working on invisible children of undocumented migrant workers in south Korea and their transnational identity formation.

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Sue-Je L. Gage is an assistant professor in anthropology at ithaca College. Her specialization is the lives, histories, and experiences of “mixed” Koreans known as Korean “amerasians” in south Korea and in the United states. Her research focuses on race, belonging, globalization, international relations, policy, militarization, and interagency collaborations. she has conducted long-term fieldwork over the last twelve years working with amerasians in south Korea and other asian american communities in the United states. Her work is interdisciplinary, transnational, and multisited, exploring holistically how amerasians as local, national, and global citizens identify themselves and strategically use their identities to maneuver within Korean society, the United states, and the globalizing world. she teaches courses on race, identity, citizenship, gender, media representation, policy, asian america, northeast asia, and the anthropology of the U.s. military. Sejung Ham is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of educational Policy studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her research focuses on the imaginaries of the “global citizen” at american universities in a global context. specifically, sejung’s dissertation examines how the social and academic experience of asian international undergraduates in the globalized american university shape their identity and belonging as global citizens. EuyRyung Jun, an anthropologist, received her Ph.D. from the University of north Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2011 and is now a collegiate assistant professor in the Division of Humanities and social sciences at Pohang University of science and Technology (PosTeCH), Pohang, south Korea. Her doctoral research explored the new social and ethical landscape created by migrants in south Korea, and her current research focuses on the emergence of the discourse of animal welfare and its broad implications in the governance of south Korea’s society. she has published an article in Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology and has another one to be published in Positions: Asia Critique. Jin-Heon Jung is a research fellow and the seoul lab coordinator at the Max Planck institute for the study of religious and ethnic Diversity in göttingen, germany. He works on Korean Christianity with a focus on north Korean migration in the context of seoul and late–Cold War northeast asia. His forthcoming books include a monograph titled The Christian Encounters of North Korean Migrants and the South Korean Protestant Church (global Diversities series, Palgrave Macmillan).

Contributors

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Jiyeon Kang is assistant professor of Communication studies and Korean studies at the University of iowa. she earned her doctorate in Communication from the University of illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Jiyeon’s research focuses on the civic use of the internet, globalization, and south Korean youth and politics. she is currently completing a book manuscript on south Korea’s candlelight protests between 2002 and 2013, titled Igniting the Internet: Youth, Activism, and Post-Authoritarian South Korea. she is also working on the changing ideals and experiences of study-abroad students in the nexus of the United states, China, and south Korea. Eleana Kim (Ph.D., anthropology, nyU) is an associate professor of anthropology at University of California-irvine. she is the author of Adopted Territory: Transnational Korean Adoptees and the Politics of Belonging, which won the James B. Palais Prize from the association of asian studies and the social science book award from the association of asian american studies, both in 2012. Her research on adoption has been supported by the Fulbright Commission, the social science research Council, and the Korean Foundation, and has appeared in journals, including Social Text, Anthropological Quarterly, and the Journal of Korean Studies. Minjeong Kim is an assistant professor of sociology at san Diego state University. she studies global gender issues, international marriage migration, migrant families, asian american studies, and the mass media, and her ongoing research focuses on the state-family dynamics in the process of immigrant incorporation. Kim was a Woodrow Wilson Dissertation Fellow in Women’s studies for her research on Filipina marriage migrants in south Korea, one of the first extensive qualitative research projects on the population. she has published several book chapters and articles on the topic in such journals as Social Politics, Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, Sociology Compass, and Journal of Korean Studies (forthcoming), and she is currently working on a book manuscript, tentatively titled “elusive Belonging: Marriage Migrants and ‘Multiculturalism’ in rural south Korea.” Kim’s other research project examines Korean professional immigrants in the United states and the dynamics between gender relations and immigration policies. With Christine e. Bose, Kim coedited Global Gender Research: Transnational Perspectives (2009, routledge), and she has also published work on race, gender, and sexuality in the media. Nadia Y. Kim is associate professor of sociology at loyola Marymount University. Kim researches “race”/ethnicity/nation, gender/relationality, citizenship, immigration/transnationalism, community politics, asian american studies, and Korean and Korean american studies. she

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authored the award-winning book Imperial Citizens: Koreans and Race from Seoul to L.A. and is penning another for Stanford university Press on marginalized and undocumented immigrants of color, citizenship, and environmental justice. Nora Hui-Jung Kim is an assistant professor of sociology at the university of Mary Washington. her research interests include international migration, multiculturalism, race and ethnicity, nationalism, citizenship, and East asia. She has published articles in the International Migration Review, Nations and Nationalism, Citizenship Studies, and Journal of Korean Studies. Jack Jin Gary Lee received his B.a. (honors) in sociology from the university of Chicago and his M.a. in sociology from the university of California, San Diego. he is currently a doctoral candidate in sociology at uCSD, and his fields of interest are political sociology, the sociology of law, and global and transnational sociology. lee’s research focuses on the social consequences of jurisdictional politics in relation to state formation. For his dissertation, he is examining the bureaucratization of the colonial state in the British Empire. Q-Ho Lee is a Ph.D candidate in anthropology at the university of Illinois at urbana-Champaign. his research project is subjectivity formation of patients with chronic illness and the social dynamics of citizenship and biopolitics in Singapore. John Lie teaches social theory at university of California, Berkeley. his publications on South Korea include Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea (Stanford university Press) and K-pop: Popular Music, Cultural Amnesia, and Economic Innovation in South Korea (university of California Press). Timothy C. Lim is a professor of political science at California State university, los angeles. his most recent book is Politics in East Asia: Explaining Change and Continuity (rienner, 2014). John D. Skrentny is professor of sociology and co-director of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the university of California-San Diego. a former guggenheim Fellow, he is the author, most recently, of After Civil Rights: Racial Realism in the New American Workplace (Princeton university Press, 2014). his research presently focuses on the politics of immigration reform in the united States; immigration policy variations in

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east asia and europe; and the dynamics of employer demand for scientists and engineers. Keiko Yamanaka lectures in the Department of ethnic studies and in international and area studies at the University of California, Berkeley. since 1994 she has studied international labor migration in asia, focusing on immigrant communities in central Japan, including Brazilians and nepalese. she has also investigated feminized migration and civil activism in east and southeast asia. in more recent years, she has compared the impact of civil society on policy formation in Japan and south Korea. Currently, she is interested in social incorporation of marriage migrant women in rural Japan. Her latest publications include an edited book, Wind over Water: Rethinking Migration in an East Asian Setting (Berghahn Books, 2012), with David W. Haines and shinji yamashita.

one

introduction Multiethnic Korea

JoHn lie

Until the 1990s, to speak of south Korea and multiethnicity or multiculturalism in one breath would have struck virtually everyone as bizarre, contradictory, or delusional. For one indisputable characteristic of south Korea—and of north Korea as well—was said to be its ethnic and cultural homogeneity. The dominant folk notion of Korean peoplehood was a singular people, of shared blood. The metaphor of blood descent underscored the equation of Korean peoplehood with an extended family or a nation based on kinship ties. Hence, a common conception was that all Koreans are the same, or at least very similar: they look and act alike, speak the same language, believe in the same things, and eat the same food. The prevalence of collective pronouns in south and north Korean speech underscores the reflexive presumption of commonality. surprised and at times violent reactions awaited evidence to the contrary, whether in finding a diasporic Korean with a poor command of the natal tongue or in encountering a “Korean” person with “mixed” (or “impure”) ethnoracial parentage (honhyŏl, or “mixed blood”). Critical intellectuals were no different in assuming little or no ethnic or cultural diversity in south Korea or even Korea as a whole.1 The rare presence of foreigners merely affirmed the essential homogeneity of (south) Korean people and culture. nonetheless, few observers can now state with much conviction or cogency that contemporary south Korea is a monocultural and monoethnic society. By 2011, there were over 1.4 million foreign residents in south Korea—the equivalent of over 3 percent of the total population.2 it would 1 as a recent english-language overview asserts, Korea is “one of the most homogeneous societies in the world” with “no significant ethnic minorities” (seth 2010, 1). 2 Kukche in’gu idong t’onggye yŏnbo 2012 (seoul: Kukka t’onggye p’ot’ŏl, 2012). This figure

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be easy to dismiss the case for multiethnic south Korea by noting that perhaps two-thirds of the resident foreigners are Chinese citizens of Korean descent. even when someone might stress the relative paucity of nonethnic Koreans who have settled in south Korea, he or she would be hard pressed to argue that recent north Korean refugees or return migrants from China (Chosŏnjok) and elsewhere are well integrated into south Korean society. in any case, the irrefutable increase in international marriage and the resulting children—at least one-tenth of marriages in south Korea have involved a foreign spouse since the mid-2000s3—makes a mockery of any unreconstructed claim for south Korea as a monocultural or monoethnic country. Furthermore, it is becoming difficult to remain deaf to the voices of those who have been defined or define themselves as part of multiethnic and multicultural Korea, an expanded notion of Korean peoplehood that had hitherto excluded them. Before i proceed, let me stress the essentially contested concepts of multiculturalism and multiethnicity. Most claims of modern peoplehood—in this case, being (south) Korean—entail a notion of common descent and contemporary commonality, such as shared phenotype, language, and culture (lie 2004). Moreover, many suggest that the bottom line is a matter of a shared bloodline or gene pool. yet, as reams of recent scholarship suggest, one cannot neglect the historical and social construction and constitution of ethnic, racial, and national categories and realities. almost everyone is wont to believe that north and south Koreans belong to the same group called “Koreans.” as the evidence of north Koreans in contemporary south Korea suggests, however, the claim of cultural homogeneity—the same set of assumptions and outlooks, or the same repertoire of reflexes and behaviors—is almost surely wrong. Beside the facts of linguistic drift and cultural differentiation—not surprising given that the two countries have coexisted without much interaction since the end of the Korean War—there is the brute reality of physiological difference. By the early 2000s, the average height of south Korean men was 13 centimeters taller than that of their north Korean counterparts: a difference that would be tantamount to a “racial” distinction (schwekendiek 2009). Do we then conclude that north and south Koreans are different peoples? That is, do they constitute distinct races, ethnicities, and cultures? The hypothetical unified Korea would be, in one line of thinking, certainly a multicultural nation-state, and perhaps even a multiethnic one. needless to say, ongoing discussions and debates on the concepts of excludes naturalized south Korean citizens. 3 statistics Korea at http://kostat.go.kr/portal/english/news/1/8/index.board?bmode =read&aseq=70238&pageno=10&rownum=10&amseq=&sTarget=&sTxt= (retrieved 16 March 2012).

Introduction

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race, ethnicity, and culture—in short, peoplehood—remain unlikely to be resolved, precisely because they are deeply embedded in our conflicting conceptions of the social world. it is not the purpose of this volume to adjudicate among distinct solutions to the puzzles of human classification. The south Korean government has employed the multicultural idea because its focus has been on integrating foreign spouses into their ethnic Korean families and the south Korean nation. Meanwhile, the indisputably multiethnic and multinational contingent of migrant workers has for the most part been excluded. in this line of reasoning, multicultural Korea (here, different “peoples” who are coming to and assimilating in the [south] Korean nation) retains not only the integrity of Korean culture and people, but also often assumes their implicit superiority. Be that as it may, the contributors to this volume employ both concepts—multicultural and multiethnic—to make sense of an intriguing facet of the recent and continuing south Korean social transformation. The Mythical Genealogy of the Korean Nation national historiography, as in family lineage or biblical genealogy, begins prototypically from an originary couple and usually traces a pure descent of fellow coethnics and conationals. never mind that concrete history is replete with sexual encounters and exogamous unions with members outside of the in-group, not to mention migration and naturalization. after all, to the best of our knowledge, all human beings hail from the african continent; the original human beings are africans in our conception of peoplehood, and they left africa to populate the rest of the world only some 50,000 to 100,000 years ago.4 Physical-anthropological evidence seems to point to the proximate origin of contemporary ethnic Koreans in present-day Mongolia (saha and Tay 1992). Defenders of the Korean nation, however, are unlikely to be happy with their identification as africans or Mongolians. The story of origins is hardly ever innocent, and the received Korean tale certainly follows this rule (Pai 2000). The mythistory of Korea begins with Tan’gun—and the incredible interspecies coupling between a human being and a bear (though transmogrified into a human being thanks to garlic and mugworts)—but we know, even from conventional, nationalist 4 For a readable, recent account, see Martin Meredith, Born in Africa (new york: Publicaffairs, 2011). see also luca Cavalli-sforza and Francesto Cavalli-sforza, The Great Human Diasporas, trans. sarah Thorne (new york: addison-Wesley, 1995). There is a tendency among historians of Korea to begin with the hazy, distant past—usually the Paleolithic period; its continuity and relevance for contemporary south Korea are merely assumed. For an overview of “prehistory,” see sarah Milledge nelson, The Archaeology of Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

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historiography, that its descendants have experienced migrations into and out of the present-day Korean peninsula.5 There is, after all, no biological or even physical-anthropological category called the “Korean race.” The Tan’gun myth itself is a narrative of political legitimation and cultural differentiation from China: a story of the new monarch, not the beginning of a people. There were, after all, different sorts of people living in “Korea” when the new king descended from the heaven above (Koo 2007). Furthermore, as the undeniable reality of the three kingdoms and what are euphemistically called regional diversity in the Korean peninsula suggests, the unity of the Korean people remained at best a contested and inchoate idea until the late nineteenth century (s. Kim 2010). if there is something of a consensus on the recent historiography of nations and nationalisms, then it is the idea that a more or less integrated nation, as well as the associated idea of an inclusive popular national identity, is of recent vintage. There are two broad reasons for the belated origins of a unified nation or an integrated people (lie 2004). First, without nationally integrated schooling or mass media, linguistic and cultural diversity—or regional differences—reigned almost everywhere. even in a relatively small and cohesive nation, such as France in the late eighteenth century, national linguistic unification was more an ideal than a reality, with perhaps only a quarter of the population speaking Parisian French. village and regional identities remained dominant, as landlocked peasants had neither the means nor the desires to identify their lives to the central, national standard. in Chosŏn dynasty Korea, a country that had a relatively underdeveloped transportation and communication infrastructure, as well as no established national systems of education or even a standing army, regional differentiation and the relative autonomy of village life precluded the widespread appreciation of popular national identity. in spite of its reputation as the “Hermit Kingdom”—and somewhat in tension with the basic stability of traditional, agrarian Korea—migration to and from contiguous asian countries continued.6 second, the very idea of a unified people presupposes a social order in which status or class differences pale in significance to the commonality of ethnic or national membership. The crucial idea of descent, however, restricts the notion of status-based peoplehood to people of the same status, not to the modern grouping of ethnicity or nation. Blood-based 5

For one attempt to make sense of the significance of migration and naturalization in premodern Korea, see Pak Ki-hyŏn, Uri yŏksa rŭl pakkun kwihwa sŏngssi (seoul: yŏksa ŭi ach’im, 2007). 6 see, e.g., the influx and assimilation of people from the Japanese archipelago delineated in Han Mun-jong, Chosŏn chŏn’gi hyanghwa, sujik Waein yŏn’gu (seoul: Kukhak charyowŏn, 2001).

Introduction

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lineage, then, circumscribed premodern status groups as something akin to the modern american idea of race as a group sharing the same sanguinary or genetic material. The chasm between nobles and peasants rendered the two groups as literally two distinct races or peoples. in this regard, Confucian Korea featured strict status hierarchies in which the elite—yangban—differentiated themselves qualitatively from ordinary people, the vast majority of whom were peasants.7 although the yangban may have held a proto-peoplehood identity, they did not extend the ambit to include their status inferiors. status societies, in short, stunted the proliferation of peoplehood identity. Be that as it may, the absence of cultural and status integration in premodern Korea cannot prove the absence of a popular national identity: absence, after all, is never a conclusive proof. nonetheless, it seems clear that the conception of the modern nation and its associated idea of popular national and ethnic identity came to Korea from the West via China and Japan in the late nineteenth century. These notions spread largely as a consequence of threats to and actual conquests of the Korean peninsula (schmid 2002). if various nationalist and independence movements asserted the sovereignty and integrity of the Korean nation, then the reality of colonization slowly expanded its appeal and legitimacy to the larger population.8 The assertion of a people in itself—an idealized imposition of the Korean nation—gradually transmogrified into a people for itself— a growing recognition of the reality of the Korean people. yet it would itself be a retrospective idealization of the anticolonial movement and ideology during the Japanese colonial period to assert unproblematically the valence of the nation or peoplehood identity. numerous intellectuals decisively swung to pro-Japanese ideas, embracing the Japanese colonial ideology of Japanese and Korea isogeny and identity (lie 2001). indeed, the Japanese government’s promotion of Korean and Japanese marriage merely increased the actual number of such cross-strait unions: another 7

see, inter alia, yi Chun-gu, Chosŏn hugi sinbun chigyŏk pyŏndong yŏn’gu (seoul: ilchogak, 1993), and yi Ŭn-sik, Chosŏn ŭi Sijip’ŭsŭdŭl (seoul: Ch’ŏngmoksan, 2008). The existence of a hierarchical, status-based society neither precludes social mobility nor complex differentiations not just of status ordering but also along other social dimensions. Furthermore, it is important to stress that the formation of a status society was in flux, and it would be historically misleading to assert a unitary, fixed Confucian order to premodern, traditional Korea. see Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea (Cambridge, Ma: Council of east asian studies, Harvard University, 1992). 8 needless to say, introduction and dissemination of the modern national idea is a complicated and complex one. For useful pointers, see, inter alia, Michael edson robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920–1925 (seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989), and Kenneth M. Wells, New God, New Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1991).

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inconvenient reality for the claim of either monoethnic Japan or Korea.9 resistance occurred largely outside of the Korean peninsula, exemplified by the later north Korean leader Kim il-sung’s guerilla warfare in Manchuria and by the later south Korean leader rhee syngman’s lobbying efforts in the United states. These initial articulations of diasporic nationalism formed the bases of the two Koreas after the liberation.10 if anticolonial nationalist ideologies and movements spread the idea of the Korean nation and people, then the infrastructural and ideological developments in the twentieth century ensured its widespread dissemination and identification. Japanese colonial rule, especially from the 1930s, sought to assimilate the colonized Korean population into the ambit of Japanese peoplehood, but one ironic and indelible consequence was to enhance some Koreans’ identification as ethnic Koreans.11 another unintended consequence of colonial rule was the development of universal, compulsory education (at least for boys), the construction of the peninsula-wide transportation and communication circuits, and other modern developments that integrated the Korean social space. From the intensely local and regional orientation and identification emerged a larger reckoning and understanding, whether because of schools, military, commerce, and other institutions that penetrated the countryside or internal agrarian problems and external economic opportunities that unleashed a massive displacement and depopulation of the countryside. Colonial infrastructural development and colonial-era migration laid the foundation of a more cosmopolitan—that is, supralocal and supraregional—identity.12 Just as significantly, the colonial era accelerated the erosion of traditional status hierarchy. not only did the Japanese rule undermine the legitimacy of the yangban elite—and displaced the monarchy—but also all the 9

on Japanese and Korean isogenesis, which in turn justified the Japanese ideology of assimilation and the policy of encouraging marriage between Japanese and Koreans, see Kanazawa shōzaburō, Nissen dōso ron (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1929). on the Japanese colonial policy on assimilation, see Miyata setsuko, Chōsen minshū to “kōminka” seisaku (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1995). see also Mark Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Korea, 1910–1945 (seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), and Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University asia Center, 2011). 10 see my forthcoming book, Korean Diaspora. 11 For changing conceptions of peoplehood during the colonial period and after, including ethnicity and citizenship, see gi-Wook shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea (stanford, Ca: stanford University Press, 2006), and Pak Myŏng-gyu [Myoungkyu Park], Kungmin, inmin, simin (seoul: sohwa, 2009). 12 see, e.g., gi-Wook shin and Michael robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University asia Center, 1999). see also the old and polemical but informative study by Pak Kyŏng-sik, Nihon teikokushugi no Chōsen shihai, 2 vols. (Tokyo: aoki shoten, 1973).

Introduction

7

people in colonial Korea became in principle Japanese subjects. although far from being egalitarian, a formal assertion of Korean commonality was implicit in the Japanese interpellation of Korean subjectivity. More strikingly, egalitarian ideals, such as Christianity and communism, spread. The foundation of anticolonial nationalism in any case featured the idea of the integrated Korean nation and people, itself a modern idea.13 in short, Japanese colonial rule and ideology provided the essential crucible for the post-liberation ideology of a monoethnic and monocultural north and south Korea. The idea of the Korean nation and people, thus, elevated the status of the erstwhile peasant majority to share the legacy, cultural and genetic, of the yangban elite. Dynastic history became national history, and the Korean nation or people came to take part in the supposed continuity of Korean civilization, stretching at times to five thousand years. not surprisingly, this newfangled idea found ready scholarly validations in the new nationalist historiography and human sciences, which took the integrity of Korean peoplehood seriously, though somewhat inconveniently locating the origin of the Korean people and history outside of any traditional zone of Koreanness in either Manchuria or Mongolia (em 2013). interestingly, Japanese scholars and bureaucrats, many of whom were in turn influenced by the nationalist strain in german thought, widely promoted the idea of the people (Volk) and did much to lay the foundations of national historiography and cultural studies, as well as the later notions of monoethnic and monocultural nationhood.14 in spite of the nascent and inchoate expressions of monoethnic nationalism in the colonial period, explicit articulations of the post-liberation common sense—the idea of an ethnically homogeneous Korea—were far and few in between. Korea was, after all, colonized; some Koreans regarded themselves as Japanese, while some Japanese immigrated to the Korean peninsula. Colonial Korea was—to put it somewhat anachronistically—multiethnic and multicultural.

13 For a still relevant and useful overview of colonial-period Korean nationalist politics, see Chong-sik lee, The Politics of Korea Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963). 14 given the preponderant influence of german thought and culture on prewar Japan— and hence on colonial Korea—it is baffling that there is very little, in any language, on the german impact on modern, pre–World War ii Japan and Korea. see, faute de mieux, Mochida yukio, ed., Kindai Nihon to Doitsu (Kyoto: Mineruva shobō, 2007), for Japan, and Paek ChongHyon, Togil ch’ŏrhak kwa 20-segi Han’guk ŭi ch’ŏrhak (seoul: Chŏrhak kwa Hyŏnsil, 1998), for Korea.

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The Making of Monoethnic and Monocultural South Korea Whatever the historical veracity or accuracy of my argument thus far, what is almost certainly indisputable is that, after the emergence of the two Koreas in 1948, both north and south Korea became nationalist as a matter of ideology and, over time, of instinct. The inconvenient paradox long remained and remains that there are two more or less legitimate Korean polities, with increasing cultural—and, as i noted, physiological— drift. north Korea is unfortunately outside the purview of this volume, but the ideology of autonomy (chuch’e) that was originally political and economic in emphasis soon dominated its cultural and ethnic identification.15 The ostensibly communist national ideology transformed into a cult of the ruling family—at a level of success that would have been the envy of Chosŏn monarchs—as well as an ideology of the corporal and spiritual purity of the (north) Korean nation (Myers 2010; cf. Kwon and Chung 2012; ryang 2012). along with the fratricidal rhetoric, paradoxically or predictably the two regimes frequently posed mirror images of each other, whether in policy or ideology. an indisputable and consistent element of convergence was hypernationalism and systemic xenophobia. Border surveillance and thought control characterized both north and south Korea in the 1970s. The other Korea became for each regime the radical other and the ultimate enemy. expelling and extirpating foreign and impure elements occurred hand in hand with the promotion of pure—though, in fact, semi—Koreanness. in terms of language, both regimes sought to nationalize and purify it by minimizing the use of Chinese characters (Chŏn 2008). another commonality was the belief in racial homogeneity and purity of the Korean people and the marginalization of “impure” Koreans and non-Koreans. The idea of purity recurs in the writings of Kim il-sung and Park Chung Hee. one unintended consequence was the maltreatment of “impure” Koreans, who could be described proximately as those outside of the power structure and more loosely as “polluted” by external influences and ideologies. This was true, for example, of the Zainichi population (ethnic Koreans in Japan) who had repatriated to the “paradise” of north Korea around 1960 (Morris-suzuki 2007; lie 2008). Because of their long immersion in Japanese life, they were often relegated to second-class status, if not castigated as spies. The same sort of treatment was meted 15 For a revealing study of the early years of the north Korean state, see Charles K. armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2002). see also James Cotton, Civil Society and Nationalism in North Korea (Canberra: Dept. of international relations, research school of Pacific studies, australian national University, 1991), and Bruce Cumings, North Korea (new york: new Press, 2003).

Introduction

9

to Zainichi who studied in or repatriated to south Korea in the late 1960s and 1970s. They were often under governmental surveillance, believed to be spies for north Korea, and some were incarcerated and tortured (sŏ 1994). similarly, miscegenation was regarded suspiciously, and the offspring—the scandal of honhyŏl—were often targets of informal bullying and formal discrimination. The ideological stress on purity stemmed in part from the desire to shore up the shaky political legitimacy of the two dictators, and the xenophobic policy and ideology played well to some who were encountering the industrialized, urbanized, and cosmopolitan world from their previously agrarian, rural, and parochial existence.16 in a sense, both countries—in spite of protestations to the contrary—distrusted cosmopolitanism and valorized the narrow, unsophisticated conception of their collectivity and commonality. in the immediate post–Korean War decades, both regimes pursued nationalist and xenophobic policies that in turn contributed to a popular understanding of north and south Korea as ethnically and culturally homogeneous nations. Between the liberation and the Korean War, both north and south Korea destroyed the foundation of yangban rule by a thoroughgoing land reform. Communist rule in north Korea promoted the idea of a fundamentally egalitarian peoplehood that was also violently nationalist. south Korea, at least under the rule of rhee syngman in the 1950s, took a less stridently nationalist tone. in part this reflected rhee’s pro-american, Christian mind-set—he himself was married to an austrian woman and his nationalist credentials were less than perfect, given his long sojourns away from Korean life and culture—as well as his reflexive subordination to U.s. rule and mandate. yet nationalist sentiment manifested itself in his virulent anti-Japanese sentiments, although rhee’s rule merely replaced formal Japanese rule with informal american rule.17 The april 1960 student revolution and the subsequent military coup toppled the rhee regime and ultimately ushered in Park Chung Hee, whose rule decisively shaped the contours of contemporary south Korea (B. Kim and vogel 2011). During his long reign, Park came to create a 16 Xenophobia in south Korea, at least after the Korean War and until the 1980s, coexisted with strong pro-american sensibility. if Japan was constructed as the reviled colonial power, then the United states played its positive counterpart. in reality, of course, pro-Japanese sentiments existed along with anti-american attitudes. For an overview of south Korean anti-Japanese and anti-american sentiments, see, respectively, Pak yu-ha, Hannichi nashonarizumu o koete (Tokyo: Kawade shobō shinsha, 2005), and sim yang-sŏp, Han’guk ŭi panmi (seoul: Hanul ak’ademi, 2008). 17 still relevant is gregory Henderson, Korea, The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1968). Compare the accounts of rhee in Kim Kwang-dong et al., Hanʼguk hyŏndaesa ihae (seoul: Kyŏngdŏk ch’ulp’ansa, 2007), and yi Chu-yŏng, Yi Sŭng-man kwa kŭ ŭi sidae (seoul: Kip’arang, 2011).

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strong and expansive state apparatus and encourage export-oriented industrialization and political, economic, and cultural nationalism. Park’s nationalist policy not only expressed his dream of the new people and the new nation but also his need—especially after his narrow victory in the 1971 presidential election—to shore up his tottering popular support (lie 1998). if Park’s initial effort to create a revolutionary new society failed, his attempt to promote nationalism was much more successful. He could not quite purify the Korean nation of corruption and other evils—he reviled big business and crony capitalism at first, but came to embrace and over time to encourage them—but his cultural policy sought to cleanse the south Korean nation by strengthening its traditional and folk elements and eradicating “alien” accretions. That is, the construction of south Korean national identity was coeval with the elevation of the local and the ethnocentric to the plane of the national and the devaluation and dismissal of the external and the non-Korean (y. Kim 1976). Most explicitly, in 1974 his regime launched the first five-year plan for cultural development, devoting much government energy and resources into promoting folk arts and “traditional culture.” He also sought to spread Korean cultural elements abroad, such as Taekwondo, as a means of combatting communism and enhancing south Korean soft power.18 in contrast, he enforced a ban on Japanese cultural imports, though he was said to be an avid consumer of Japanese popular music and movies. even popular singers believed to be unduly influenced by Japanese popular music, such as yi Mi-ja, were criticized. although Hollywood movies could not be excluded—in part because of the pro-american position but also for fear of U.s. disapproval and reprisal—there were other efforts to prevent the import of foreign music, movies, and other cultural products. Cultural nationalism in this instance dovetailed nicely with economic nationalism and the fervid effort to curb costly imports. even more ideological was the purification of the language. in part this was an attempt to make standard (south) Korean speech but there were also systematic attempts to extirpate foreign elements, such as the use of Japanese vocabulary and Chinese characters (yu Cho 2007). Most notably, the traditional stress on learning Chinese characters declined in favor of using almost exclusively the Korean script (han’gŭl). This measure reflected not only a strike against the nonnational but also against the traditional sinified elite. The predominance of Chinese characters in academic books of the 1960s rendered them legible to educated Chinese 18

on sport policy, see gwang ok, Transformation of Modern Korean Sport (elizabeth, nJ: Hollym international, 2007).

Introduction

11

and Japanese readers. By the 1990s, most books were written almost exclusively in the Korean script. The rapid integration of the national language and the spread of the new standard speech were relentlessly promoted by nationwide broadcast in radio and television (in contradistinction to the distinct phonology of the north Korean broadcast). given the paucity of people who did not look Korean in the 1970s— with the exception of american soldiers and missionaries, who in turn accentuated the ostensible unity and commonality of Koreans—the cultural integration during Park’s rule provided cogent evidence for south Korean monoethnic and monocultural nationalism. People began not only to speak alike but also to dress alike, subdividing themselves into ready categories of social differentiation: the urban office workers with their suits, white shirts, and ties; the male students with their school uniforms and short haircuts; the urban wives with their Western frocks and permed hair. everyone seemed to drive the same car: a Hyundai Pony. one consequence was that deviance and marginality became matters of private and public opprobrium. even minor deviations from the standards of selfpresentation posed suspicions of ethnic or moral deviance. a man with a moustache might be regarded as possibly Japanese or a Japanese sympathizer. a woman of a certain age with straight hair may be Japanese or perhaps engaged in a dubious occupation. in body shape and self-fashioning, there was a fine margin of deviation beyond which suspicion and disapprobation would be cast. restrictions on foreign media and travel ensured the protection of ethnocentric imaginaries. auto-essentialism was the order of the day. exercised especially on the youths of the modernizing nation—students at an arm’s length but soldiers directly and mercilessly—the new south Korean type was not only marked by linguistic, corporal, and sartorial conformity, but was above all a disciplined subject—the increasing sanctification of punctuality, for example—and a nationalist and patriotic soul. The modern military and business organizations, along with the modernizing government bureaucracy, promoted the virtues of social discipline, ranging from obedience to diligence (Janelli and yim 1993; Moon 2005). Peasants working according to a diurnal, seasonal rhythm, to put it polemically, became factory and office workers operating according to the tick of the clock. That is, south Koreans in the 1970s—much like their counterparts in the north—seemed to march to the beat of the same drum. given that the expression of Koreanness came to be defined narrowly, it was not very difficult to perform in non-Korean ways and thereby incur the wrath of parents, teachers, elders, friends, and strangers. People with a nonstandard accent or those who did not know the price of common consumer goods were frequently suspected of being north Korean spies. if

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government policy encouraged the suppression of deviance (in the case of identifying spies, the government offered a sizable reward), it unleashed the whole populace to become collective judges and enforcers of the newfound south Korean normality. as a diasporic Korean in the 1970s and 1980s, i passed hardly a day without explicit injunctions to express my ethnic subjectivity, from an official at passport control who lectured me on the responsibilities of being a Korean outside of the Korean nation, to total strangers who in the name of the Korean nation screamed at me when i conversed in a non-Korean language. it should not be surprising that other diasporic Koreans, whether from Japan or the United states, at times faced extreme harassment and even physical violence as they deviated, often unknowingly, from the prevailing norm of Koreanness. if diasporic Koreans should fail the test of Korean peoplehood, then people of mixed descent were often summarily dismissed from the ambit of Korean peoplehood. Because of the prevailing belief in the pure blood descent and racial homogeneity of the Korean people, any intrusion of alien elements rendered people impure and therefore non-Korean. People with an ethnic Japanese parent, for example, assiduously occluded their ancestry in shame and fear. Passing was the norm: my mother, who had brownish hair but “impeccable” Korean ancestry, assiduously dyed her hair black in fear that she might be regarded as a “mixed race” person. The logic of exclusion applied with special force to amerasian children, often, though far from always, the union of african-american soldier fathers and south Korean sex-worker mothers. Discrimination not only violated the emerging belief in Korean purity but also combined social aspersion against sex workers (and the presumption of poverty and immorality) and the south Korean adoption of american-style racism against blacks.19 although their presence was scarcely deniable, the ideological blinder and the exclusionary mind-set occluded them from most people’s vision of the ethnic constitution of south Korea. The narrowing parameter of Korean peoplehood contributed to the more pressing factors of economic opportunities and political and social liberty in encouraging the exodus of south Koreans. The government sought to have south Koreans work abroad or even emigrate, whether to 19

For an exemplary study that combines the larger political context with ethnographic attention to the workings of “camptowns,” where american soldiers and south Korean women often mingled, see Katharine H. s. Moon, Sex among Allies (new york: Columbia University Press, 1997). For works that trace this phenomenon outward, see Ji-yeon yuh, Beyond the Shadow of Camptown (new york: nyU Press, 2004), and grace M. Cho, Haunting the Korean Diaspora (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). on the american roots of south Korean racism, see the indispensable study by nadia y. Kim, Imperial Citizens (stanford, Ca: stanford University Press, 2008).

Introduction

13

germany as “guest workers” in the 1960s or to the Middle east as temporary laborers in the 1970s. The belief in the overpopulation of south Korea and the slack demand for labor were the main rationales of the government. The lure of a modern, affluent, and peaceful life—in contradistinction to that in south Korea—motivated many to seek to immigrate to the United states and elsewhere. in the massive movement out of south Korea, a fair number were those who did not fit well into the emerging norm of Korean peoplehood. These included not just amerasians but also those hailing from north Korea or disadvantaged regions, such as Honam, as well as the divorced, disabled, and others with disadvantages or different lifestyles and outlooks. another stream out of the peninsula has been the “export” of babies; south Korea became a major country of origin for international adoption, primarily to the United states. since the end of the Korean War, more than 160,000 south Korean infants have been adopted abroad, with about 120,000 in the United states.20 Ethnic Cleansing and Social Discrimination as i noted, Park’s narrow victory in the 1971 presidential election convinced him to reinforce his ruling repertoire: economic growth to satisfy the population and nationalism to sustain his popularity. anticommunist nationalism was deployed in part by exaggerating the threat from north Korea—a confusing utilization of nationalism in which coethnics were the most dire threat to the existence of the (south) Korean nation. The external enemy found its internal counterparts not only in north Korean agents and spies but also in the form of ethnic others. The most populous and visible group, the Chinese minority, became a target of Park’s ethnic cleansing. simultaneously, Park’s nationalism was far from uniform and consistent. in championing his personal and regional networks, he often gave privileged access to power and wealth to his coregional peers from the southeast (north and south Kyŏngsang provinces) at the expense of others, especially those from the southwest (north and south Chŏlla provinces). Park’s nationalism, in other words, operated often as a form of regionalism. People from China had been living in the Korean peninsula from time immemorial, as some of the first human residents in the Korean peninsula 20

adoption became very active after the Korean War and continues to this day, though the number of children adopted has been declining in the past two decades. For an overview, see Kathleen Ja sook Bergquist, M. elizabeth vonk, Dong soo Kim, and Marvin D. Feit, eds., International Korean Adoption (new york: routledge, 2007). see also eleana J. Kim (2010) and Mia Tuan and Jiannbin lee shiao, Choosing Ethnicity, Negotiating Race (new york: russell sage Foundation, 2011).

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were those whom we would today call Chinese. ideologically, too, Chosŏn Korea was a tributary state of successive Chinese dynasties.21 Just as much as proto-ethnic Korean consciousness may have been strong among the yangban elite, and the “Hermit Kingdom” was sealed from excessive foreign contact, inflows and outflows of people from the Korean peninsula to the Chinese mainland and elsewhere continued throughout recorded history. after all, much to the dismay of most Koreans, a fair number of people outside of the Korean peninsula believe that Koreans are basically Chinese.22 The proximate origin of the ethnic Chinese minority in south Korea was the emigration from the mid-nineteenth century (Wan 2008). Facing famines and seeking opportunities, some made their way to the Korea peninsula. over time, they created a Chinatown in inchon and seoul (near Myŏng-dong), providing not only sources of Chinese food and goods but also a center of trading networks. Paradoxically, two distinct sentiments characterized modern Korean attitudes toward China and Chinese people. on the one hand, there was a strong strand of reverence for Chinese civilization and therefore for the ethnic heirs to this grand tradition. on the other hand, the poverty of modern China, colonized and denigrated by imperial powers, with its embodiment in the impoverished immigrants who arrived in the Korean peninsula, generated a deeply pejorative image of China and the Chinese. in the post-liberation south Korea, the negative sentiment was reinforced by the strident anticommunism of the south Korean government (China being a major sponsor of north Korea, its foremost enemy). Park’s antiforeign sentiments focused on this reviled group as a significant impediment to his goal of a “pure” Korean nation. a highly significant act was the removal of Chinese residents, many of whom ended up in, among other places, Taiwan, Japan, and the United states.23 The 21

in contrast to the received south Korean nationalist historiography, one might question the extent of cultural identity and political autonomy in Chosŏn Korea. see, e.g., Kirk W. larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University asia Center, 2011). 22 see yahoo! answers at http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=2012031600444 1aaPvoX4 (retrieved 19 March 2012). similarly, a French sinologist argued at length with me—someone who would pass most tests of Korean peoplehood—that i am “basically Chinese.” He would not be convinced otherwise. 23 i was surprised in the early 1990s to dine at Chinese restaurants in three major college towns in the Midwest (in the “i” states of iowa, illinois, and indiana) with the same name (yenching). More surprisingly, not only did the owners know of each other, but they all hailed from seoul. one of my current offices is across the street from another restaurant owned by an ethnic Chinese person who grew up in seoul. south Korean expatriates—and many others—are ironically the beneficiaries of Park’s exclusionist policy of a generation ago. Korean-style Chinese food is much more difficult to find outside of south Korea than

Introduction

15

south Korean version of ethnic cleansing did not entail massive physical violence and certainly not much bloodshed, but it was symbolically valent in enunciating its vision of monoethnic nationalism and enacting a state policy to realize that goal. in the course of the 1970s, rapid economic growth generated a great deal of concerns about rising inequality and the unenviable conditions of the industrial workers as well as others seemingly left behind by the “miracle on the Han.” one striking manifestation was a functional equivalent of ethnic discrimination in the form of regional discrimination against people from Honam or Chŏlla province (yu 1990). The region was the birthplace of Kim Dae Jung—the defeated contender in the 1971 presidential election who was later hounded into exile and imprisoned before his ascension to the presidency in 1998—but more critically Honam people came to represent the flipside of the emerging elite clustered around Park’s closest cronies from the Kyŏngsang provinces. relatively little investment was made in the infrastructural and industrial development of the southwest, and powerful government posts and key economic positions frequently excluded Honam people. in effect, tacit discrimination—which was in fact voiced openly in many circles—stunted the life chances of people from the southwest. The functional equivalent of ethnoracial discrimination operated, including crass jokes and stereotypes about Honam people’s speech, mannerisms, food, and the like.24 similarly, but less systematically, nonnormative south Koreans were frequently excluded from prestigious positions and remunerative employment. The mark of success came to depend critically on the performance of normative (south) Koreanness, which often insisted on right and proper appearance. in so doing, any obvious ethnic mixture or signs of physical disability damned potential applicants, as well as those who exhibited nonnormative ideology and behavior, such as antigovernment activists and those who spent a long spell abroad. By the 1970s, then, the belief in monoethnic and monocultural Korea was hegemonic in south Korea.

Korean food, which follows any significant congregation of ethnic Koreans, and south Koreans in particular are almost uniformly delighted to savor their favorite dishes outside of south Korea. 24 There is a paucity of analyses and writings on regional discrimination and regional identity. see, however, Pang Ha-nam et al., Hyŏndae Han’guk sahoe ŭi pulp’yŏngdŭng (P’aju: Hanul, 2004).

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The Pinnacle of Monoethnic and Monocultural South Korea in the 1980s The 1979 assassination of Park ended an era in south Korea, but what followed was a continuation of the political-economic structure institutionalized during his rule. The 1980 gwangju (Kwangju) massacre demonstrated the brute force of general Chun Doo Hwan’s military rule, as well as the spreading cracks in the sheen of authoritarian polity. What made the 1980s the height of monoethnic and monocultural belief, however, was the growing popularity of antigovernment ideologies and movements that were often stridently nationalist and populist. Chun sought to sustain Park’s policy in a changing, increasingly less favorable, context. The violence in gwangju—at the heart of the relatively underdeveloped Chŏlla province—testified at once to his shaky legitimacy and the limits of brute force. Thus, he continued Park’s twin foci of economic growth and anticommunist nationalism. a common conflation was to simultaneously seek economic and cultural nationalism, manifesting for example in various campaigns against foreign commodities. Thus, south Koreans were subjected to calls to forego coffee in favor of nationally produced tea, to don south Korean ties instead of foreign ties, and to inhale Korean instead of foreign cigarettes.25 all these policies paradoxically were replicated in—and in some ways promoted to assuage—antigovernment student movements. The role of university students in national politics has a long and hallowed history in modern Korea. Whether one looks to the March First Movement in 1919 or the april 19th student revolution in 1960, university students were frequently at the forefront of the major movements that shaped modern Korean history (H. i. Kim 2005; M. Park 2008). in the 1980s, they again played a central role in contesting and resisting the military rule. in spite of the popularity of Marxism and other foreign ideologies, the dominant strand of the antigovernment movement that broadly incorporated workers and farmers was populist nationalism: the ideology of the people (minjung).26 Minjung ideology delineated a long history of Korean people’s struggle against foreign and domestic oppressors. its populist nationalism manifested itself at times in xenophobic and even racist attitudes. Certainly, the “people” frequently excluded nonethnic Koreans, and Koreans in turn 25 on consumption nationalism, see laura C. nelson, Measured Excess (new york: Columbia University Press, 2000). 26 see, among many works on this topic, Kenneth M. Wells, ed., South Korea’s Minjung Movement (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1995), and namhee lee, The Making of Minjung (ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2009).

Introduction

17

were believed to be a racially and ethnically homogeneous group. Cultural nationalism expressed itself in the recuperation of folk art and the expunction of foreign culture, including, for example, the use of Chinese characters.27 in all these ways, the radical students of the 1980s turned out to be good students of Park’s cultural nationalism. The most obvious exception was the powerful strand of anti-americanism that was not merely a tactical denunciation of U.s. support for the south Korean military rule, but expressed a desire to rid (south) Korea of any alien elements (steinberg 2005). Purification was the order of the day. Thus, government and antigovernment forces and ideologies had striking convergences in matters of cultural nationalism. a significant strand in the 1980s version of south Korean cultural nationalism—increasingly promoted by the government—was the burgeoning belief in (south) Korean destiny and greatness. it is fair to say that most (south) Korean elites historically harbored inferiority complexes toward imperial Chinese powers, Japanese colonizers, and american informal superiors after the liberation. The representative colonialperiod intellectual yi Kwang-su’s capitulation to Japanese rule—he took an ethnic Japanese name and encouraged Koreans to write in Japanese, for example—or the post-liberation south Korean politicians’ penchant to wield american names—the leader between rhee and Park was widely known as John Chang—manifested the not-so-deeply veiled assumption of Korean inferiority. all this began to change with the rapid economic growth that reached its initial plateau during the 1988 seoul olympics. The swelling national pride manifested itself in hypernationalist articulations and expressions. some went to comical excess, including the bizarre claim of Jesus’s Korean origin or the incredible contention of the Korean invention of Chinese characters.28 Triumphant nationalism that was insistently ethnocentric assumed the monoethnic and monocultural constitution of (south) Korea. as i said, it stood uneasily in the face of the reviled enemy north Korea—was it “Korean” or was it merely “perverted”?—and also against the inescapable existence of minority groups, from the discrimination against Honam people to the denial of ethnocultural others. Chun’s authoritarian rule and 27 The Hankyoreh (Han’gyŏrye), which began publication in 1988, was not only a selfconsciously leftist newspaper, but it also almost exclusively used Korean characters, even minimizing the use of “Western”—that is, arabic—numerals. This is but a tip of the cultural nationalist iceberg that was the minjung movement. 28 i heard both claims several times in the course of my year-long stay in seoul (1988– 1989). indeed, in one long disquisition by an elderly man, Jesus, Confucius, and the Buddha were all said to be Korean.

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its enemies, especially the “people’s movement,” converged and mutually stimulated the claim of south Korean nationalism, however. They agreed in believing south Korea to be ethnically and culturally homogeneous and, over time, a special and superior country. if the south Korean celebration never attained the smug self-satisfaction of Japan in the 1980s—“Japan as number one”—it was not for want of trying. The Post-IMF Crisis and the Rereckoning of South Korea extreme though sentiments of triumphant nationalism may have been in the 1980s, they proved to be lightly held. all the celebratory self-adulation evaporated almost overnight after the so-called iMF (international Monetary Fund) crisis in 1997. if bankruptcies and unemployment in the aftermath of the asian currency crisis shook the south Korean economy and self-confidence, it merely exemplified the underside of globalization that had been sweeping south Korea for some decades.29 Beyond the accelerating flows of capital, commodities, and people— the overarching reality of globalization—south Korea began to shed its cultural-nationalist past, associated with the bad old days of economic impoverishment and political authoritarianism, in the 1990s. economic enrichment and worldly experience—not only from the mass media, now largely freed of censorship and import restrictions, but also from increasing foreign study, work, and travel—rendered internationalization palatable and even popular, even if it coexisted with lingering expressions and sentiments of hypernationalism. in any case, a new generation that had no conscious memory of authoritarianism or poverty, and growing up moreover in a world of globalized media, had little truck for anachronistic nationalism, though they cultivated their own expression of patriotic pride. Kim Dae Jung, the president from 1998 to 2003, encouraged an actively global role for south Korea. Segyehwa (in effect, “globalization”) became the buzzword of the day, though it had also been promoted by Kim’s predecessor, Kim young sam. The joint hosting of the 2002 World Cup with Japan was part and parcel of this cultural offensive, which accompanied the comprehensive end of the ban on Japanese cultural imports. Kim’s successor roh Moo-hyun continued his predecessor’s policy. south Korean corporate giants, such as samsung and Hyundai, were expanding 29 For causes and consequences, see respectively John lie, “The asian economic Crisis; or, What Crisis,” at www.bus.umich.edu/Facultyresearch/researchCenters/Centers/Cse/ Csesite/newsletter/Current/lie.pdf (retrieved 19 March 2012), and Chang Kyung-sup, “The end of the Development era,” Economic and Political Weekly (15 Dec. 2011): 67–72. see also Jesook song, South Koreans in the Debt Crisis (Durham, nC: Duke University Press, 2009).

Introduction

19

and intensifying their global reach, planting south Korean presences not only in the United states and Japan—for long the two main targets of export-oriented industrialization—but also around the world. simultaneously, south Korean tourists, missionaries, and students were also diversifying their destinations. These disparate experiments in cosmopolitanism, not surprisingly, returned to south Korea and redounded on its self-perception. a significant facet of the government-sponsored cultural globalization was the symbolic outreach to diasporic (south) Koreans (yoon 2004). north Korea had long shown more interest in “leading” overseas ethnic Koreans, but from the 1970s there had been various governmentsponsored efforts to maintain ties with diasporic communities. acknowledging their importance in promoting a south Korean political and economic agenda—whether to generate a favorable climate of world opinion or to assist concretely in economic expansion—south Korean regimes looked increasingly, albeit intermittently, to overseas (south) Koreans. The explicit avowal of globalization in the 1990s incorporated and integrated these scattered efforts. interestingly, these efforts to embrace diasporic Koreans also began to include hitherto excluded groups, such as south Korean adoptees in europe and elsewhere (e. Kim 2010). The year 2006 marked something of a watershed. The celebration surrounding the visit of the super Bowl MvP Hines Ward—the child of a black father and a Korean mother—seemed only to seal President roh’s promotion of multiculturalism as part of the future, globalized south Korea. it was also the year in which over a third of south Korean male farmers married foreign nationals. By the following year, the total number of foreign residents exceeded one million (2 percent of the total population), of which 44 percent were from China—of whom about one-third were ethnic Koreans or Chosŏnjok (g.-s. Han 2007). Multiculturalism (tamunhwa) emerged as something of a buzzword in south Korea. The rapid construction of the state apparatuses dedicated to multiculturalism spawned institutions, convened conferences, and in general created a climate in which the very self-identification of south Korea as a monocultural and monoethnic society was untenable. Multicultural education, for example, became a quasi-official policy, establishing teacher-training institutes and generating discussions within and without the education establishment (Pak 2011). it would be misleading, however, to locate the sources of increasing ethnic diversity and the promotion of multicultural policy to presidential policies or outlooks. rather, the ineluctable reality was the globalizing world economy in which south Korea had long been inextricably enmeshed.

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associated with the political and economic transformations were fundamental structural changes. rapid urbanization and the valorization of urban life, for example, denuded rural areas of younger people. The sheer absence of south Korean women willing to settle into rural farming households had already created something of a crisis by the 1990s. Foreign brides from less-wealthy countries— not just ethnic Koreans from China but also Filipinas, vietnamese, and other nationalities—populated the countryside and the city alike.30 The very idea of the multicultural family was well-established by the mid-2000s, replete with considerable government funding for local governments and ngos especially to promote south Korean men marrying asian women (H. M. Kim 2007). government officials and media pundits could see no alternatives to the increased import of foreign women for hapless south Korean male farmers. if the support for the “multicultural family” was the kinder and gentler side of south Korean government policy, then its meaner and rougher side was the often reckless treatment of foreign, migrant workers. The looming labor shortage, especially for low-paying, often dangerous, and therefore less attractive jobs, heralded the import of construction workers from China, southeast asia, and elsewhere, as well as the recruitment of foreign nationals in highly skilled professions and health-care work such as nursing.31 given south Korea’s affluence, aging society, and low fertility, the influx of foreign, migrant workers appeared almost as a foregone conclusion to its projected labor shortages. Whereas south Koreans had ventured abroad to work as construction workers or sex workers a mere generation ago, foreign workers were now to occupy these less prestigious jobs in south Korea.32 in this regard, the south Korean pattern largely replicated the experience of other affluent industrial societies. it was one of the obvious contradictions of south Korean multiculturalism in the early 2000s that it could celebrate foreign wives (and occasionally husbands) and their children but largely ignore the conditions of foreign workers, especially low-skilled and low-paid ones. in terms of foreign brides and migrant workers, the most numerous 30 see, e.g., Choon soon Kim, Voices of Foreign Brides (lanham, MD: altaMira Press, 2011). Transnational or international marriage has become a trans-asian—and indeed a global— phenomenon. see Wen-shan yang and Melody Chia-Wen lu, eds., Asian Cross-Border Marriage Migration (amsterdam: amsterdam University Press, 2010). 31 For some early discussions, see Wang-Bae Kim, “Migration of Foreign Workers into south Korea,” Asian Survey 44 (2004): 316–335, and andrew eungi Kim, “global Migration and south Korea,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32 (2009): 70–92. 32 even the camptowns now find a steady influx of foreign workers. see sealing Cheng, On the Move for Love (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

Introduction

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and visible remain ethnic Koreans from China (Chosŏnjok) (H. Park 1996; H. Kim 2011; Kwŏn 2011). Because of China’s multicultural policy, many ethnic Koreans in China retained facility in the Korean language, thereby facilitating in turn their livelihood in south Korea. The lure of south Korea has even goaded nonethnic Koreans from China to seek opportunities, at times masquerading as ethnic Koreans (Freeman 2011). even more than ethnic Koreans in China, north Korean refugees— most commonly referred to as T’albukcha, or “north Korean defectors”— might be expected to claim an easy assimilation to south Korea. However, as i noted at the outset of this chapter, their lives—though celebrated at first—are inextricably intertwined with their difficulties in adjusting to the land of their coethnics.33 indeed, their marginalization and increasingly negative stereotyping challenge the very foundation of monoethnic and monocultural Korea ideology. Furthermore, the ubiquitous discourse of south Korean multiculturalism generates backlashes by the actually existing multiethnic and multicultural populations. Many mixed-race children, for example, express sentiments of bewilderment and neglect as well as sharp criticisms of south Korean discrimination.34 The same can be said for south Korean adoptees who have returned to their “homeland” (e. Kim 2010). south Korea’s eager embrace of globalization renders the unreconstructed defense of ethnic and cultural homogeneity unfashionable and anachronistic. What is remarkable is how few people—even as the vast majority unreflectively believed in the idea of monoethnic and monocultural south Korea until very recently—express revanchist nationalism of the sort that seeks to exclude ethnic and cultural others, though sotto voce and internet expressions of xenophobia and racism cannot be ignored.35 The question is no longer whether south Korea is multiethnic and multicultural, but rather what it means concretely to talk of south Korean diversity and Korean cultural identity. after all, the current government policy presumes assimilation as a matter of course, albeit mainly for foreign spouses and not for migrant workers. is this mode of multiculturalism 33 For some early studies, see Jih-Un Kim and Dong-Jin Jang, “aliens among Brothers?” Asian Perspectives 31 (2007): 5–22, and Chang Zoo song, “Brothers only in name,” in Diasporic Homecomings, edited by Takeyuki Tsuda (stanford, Ca: stanford University Press, 2009), 281–304. see also stephan Haggard and Marcus noland, Witness to Transformation (Washington, DC: Peterson institute for international economics, 2011). 34 given the paucity of serious discussion in south Korea, see, e.g., Chŏn Kyŏng-su et al., Honhyŏl esŏ tamunhwa ro (seoul: ilchisa, 2008). 35 see, e.g., “ask a Korean” at http://askakorean.blogspot.fr/2012/02/outer-edges-ofkoreas-racism-and.html (retrieved 19 March 2012).

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a more palatable version of south Korean nationalism in which Korean identity and superiority are taken for granted? Does the embrace of globalization and multiculturalism denote the decline of racial, ethnic, and cultural discrimination? What place would diasporic Koreans—those who return and those who do not—hold in multicultural Korea? What if north and south Korea become unified? The Contributions if i had sought to publish a book on multiethnic south Korea in the 1970s or 1980s, the modal response would have been either anger or laughter, or perhaps sheer incomprehension. increasingly, at least in south Korea, a common reaction would be an insouciant nod. in spite of a spate of books published on this and related topics in south Korea, there are preciously few anglophone writings and, as far as i know, this book is the first of its kind.36 The contributors and i therefore did not attempt comprehensive coverage or to focus narrowly on one theme or another. instead, the chapters center around three topics: the politics of multiculturalism, migrations, and ethnic and cultural—or peoplehood—diversity. Part 1 presents macroscopic and ethnographic looks at south Korean multiculturalism. Timothy C. lim offers an overview of the belated but sudden “multicultural turn” in south Korea. The explosive expansion of media and political attention to multiculturalism after 2000, and especially after 2005 or so, reflects in part the changing economic and demographic realities of south Korea (and of the world at large), but he seeks to trace, via useful comparisons to germany and other cases, the emergence and shape of multicultural policy and debate in south Korea. He points not only to the blind spots of south Korean multiculturalism but also to its assimilationist tendency. He also stresses the significance of actors— ngos and migrants themselves—who respond and at times resist the state imposition of its narrow vision of the south Korean multicultural future. nora Hui-Jung Kim engages in a discourse analysis of south Korean media responses to the coming of a multicultural society. ranging from associating multiculturalism and multiethnicity with the West with pejorative connotations of conflict and instability to regarding them as at once inevitable and beneficial, a common assumption is that Korea has been and has remained a culturally and ethnically homogeneous society, at 36

in south Korea, see, among many books and articles, Kim Ŭn-mi, Tamunhwa  sahoe, Han’guk (P’aju: nanam, 2009); yang Myŏng-dŭk, Tamunhwa  sahoe  tamunhwa  kyohoe (seoul: Han’guk changnogyo ch’ulp’ansa, 2009); and Ŏm Han-jin, Tamunhwa  sahoeron (seoul: sohwa, 2011).

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least until very recently. like lim, Kim points to the widespread equation of multicultural policy with assimilationist policy and bemoans the marginality of migrants’ voices as well as the persistent neglect of ethnocultural justice in contemporary south Korea. euyryung Jun, using her ethnographic study, finds the root of contemporary south Korean multicultural policy in the discourse of “Korean difference” that emerged in the 1990s. rather than promoting a society of tolerance and equality, the new multicultural policy not only excludes migrant workers from its ambit and remit but also cements the “culturalization of inequality.” What she calls the “new citizen subjects,” who respect difference and diversity, are simultaneously a government project to create a “nationally competitive” people in the age of globalization. Hence, south Korean multicultural policy and the “multicultural apparatus” place great stress on education: to create a nation capable of surviving and thriving in the globalized world. nancy abelmann and her colleagues focus on multicultural education—a central element of south Korean multicultural policy according to Jun. in an ethnographic tour de force, they report on the faculty members, students, and others at seoul national University “elected” to serve and staff the newly built “multicultural apparatus.” Because of the rapid and compressed introduction of multicultural policy, abelmann and her colleagues point to the general bafflement and confusion—not to mention ignorance—about the point and practice of multicultural education. They describe an “empty-imperative” that is very much under construction in their account of “makeshift multiculturalism” at this concrete site. Part 2 turns to migrants and others in contemporary south Korea. Hae yeon Choo compares the “needs talk” of recent north Korean refugees and Filipino migrants via the workings of their respective churches. although dubbed the “people of freedom,” north Koreans are also said to lack a viable “work ethic” and perceived to be in dire need of help in order to “make progress.” Choo also discloses considerable hostility that coethnic north Koreans face in south Korea. in contrast, Filipinos face “vulnerabilities” as migrant workers vis-à-vis not only the state and its vigilant border control but also their employers. The kin- and ethnic-based migrant church does much to sustain the new ethnic community. Jin-heon Jung’s essay focuses squarely on north Koreans in south Korea. although widely lauded as “anticommunist heroes” in the 1980s, their position in south Korea has shifted since the 1990s, often following the south Korean regime’s unification policy. By the time of Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine Policy,” a great deal of ambivalence and even hostility greeted north Koreans, who were increasingly regarded as “lazy” and “violent,” as Choo also stresses. Jung explores the interactions between

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north Koreans and south Koreans in the context of the effort of evangelical Protestant churches to create new subjectivities. He also stresses the inevitable diversity of the north Korean population in south Korea and raises provocative questions about a multicultural or multiethnic society that has trouble accommodating coethnics. since the 1988 olympics, some of the more than 160,000 south Korean infants who had been adopted abroad have returned to south Korea— 3,000 to 5,000 each year—which is the topic of eleana Kim’s chapter. she discusses distinct framings of these groups, from the “latter-day minjung [people]” to “deterritorialized nomads.” in discussing the work of progressive ngos, Kim observes how progressive activists’ hope of revolutionary social change has transmuted into an assimilation project for adoptees. The case of another “coethnic” group raises myriad questions about south Korean multiculturalism and multiethnicity, both as ideologies and as practices. Keiko yamanaka’s comparative study begins from the similarities in Japanese and south Korean policies toward low-skilled workers. Because both governments denied the need or even the presence of low-waged workers, both countries acknowledged migrant workers by stealth means, such as by calling them trainees or by “importing” coethnics (JapaneseBrazilians or Korean-Chinese). yet since the mid-2000s, she notes divergence in immigration policies, especially stressing the progressive character of south Korean reforms. she explains it by pointing to the vibrancy of south Korean civil society and the work of pro-immigrant ngos in contemporary south Korea. Part 3 analyzes groups leading multicultural or multiethnic lives in contemporary south Korea. nadia y. Kim stresses the near absence of two groups in south Korean popular discourse, policy discussions, and academic debates: “biracial” children, especially with south Korean mothers and african-american fathers, and recent migrants from africa. Underlying the neglect in part is the presumption of white superiority common in south Korea, at least until very recently. Kim argues that the conceptual language of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism over that of race and (ethno)racism inadvertently reifies the country’s belief that Blacks are the most biologically and culturally different from them and perpetuates the relative “closeness” and state “privileging” of diasporic Koreans, asians from the Pacific region, and lighter-skinned people who themselves endure inequality. it also enables the state and like-minded adherents to promote policies of cultural assimilation of minorities that, in reality, deny pluralistic equality on the related basis of biological (racial) criteria. 

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sue-Je l. gage focuses on what south Koreans often call “mixed blood” (honhyŏl) people. she argues that the predominant south Korean perception essentializes them as offspring of south Korean sex-worker mothers and african-american gis, with presumed inferiority in class status, educational attainment, and cultural accomplishment. They are also “no longer” or “almost” but not quite “Korean.” she points out not only the narrow and misleading stereotypes but the overgeneralizations implicit in such a racialized narrative. she also explores the “double consciousness” of “mixed-blood” south Koreans and teases out their tensions and contradictions in a self-consciously multicultural society. Minjeong Kim’s ethnographic research takes her into the household dynamic of international marriage migrants, in particular Filipina wives in rural south Korean households. in spite of the government’s promotion of international marriage migration and multicultural family—as we see in several essays—Filipinas often suffer from their low status in the family as well as negative stereotypes within and without the household. The south Korean government’s multicultural policy—however limited— stops at the gate of the household within which private patriarchy control immigrant wives and sustain nationalist patriarchy. Finally, in lieu of a concluding chapter, Jack Jin gary lee and John D. skrentny place south Korean multiculturalism and multiethnicity in comparative perspective. observing the broad similarities of south Korean immigration and multicultural policies to those of neighboring asian states, they focus more concretely on guest workers, marriage migrants, and refugees. They stress the preponderant role of the developmental state, which pursues policies instrumentally: balancing the social costs of multicultural society, for example, with the structural needs of lowskilled labor. Their salutary stress on comparison generates fresh takes and queries on the ongoing saga of south Korean multiethnicity and multiculturalism. Quite clearly, south Korean multiethnicity and multiculturalism resist definitive statements because some of the fundamental processes are only beginning—“makeshift multiculturalism”—and there are inevitable unknowns, such as the potential impact of Korean unification. The topic is a great grist for the mills of academic analyses and political debates, and i can only hope that the chapters in this volume will contribute to expunging the increasingly outdated notion of monoethnic and monocultural south Korea and contribute in turn to a more inclusionary and expansive conception of Korean peoplehood.

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References Chŏn su-t’ae. 2008. Haek ihu en t‘onghap Nam-Puk ŏnŏ. seoul: Taehan kyoyuk munhwa sinmun ch’ulp’anbu. em, Henry. 2013. The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea. Durham, nC: Duke University Press. Freeman, Caren. 2011. Making and Faking Kinship. ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press. Han, geon-soo. 2007. “Multicultural Korea.” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:32–63. Han, Kyung-Koo. 2007. “The archaeology of the ethnically Homogenous nation-state and Multiculturalism in Korea.” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:8–31. Janelli, roger l., and Dawnhee yim. 1993. Making Capitalism. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. Kim, Byung-Kook, and ezra F. vogel, eds. 2011. The Park Chung Hee Era. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. Kim, eleana J. 2010. Adopted Territory. Durham, nC: Duke University Press. Kim Ho-il. 2005. Han’guk kŭndae haksaeng undongsa. seoul: sŏnin. Kim, Hyejin. 2011. International Ethnic Networks and Intra-Ethnic Conflict. new york: Palgrave Macmillan. Kim, Hyun Mee. 2007. “The state and Migrant Women,” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:100–122. Kim, sun Joo, ed. 2010. The Northern Region of Korea. seattle: Center for Korean studies, University of Washington. Kim, yersu. 1976. Cultural Policy in the Republic of Korea. Paris: Unesco. Kwon, Heonik, and Byung-Ho Chung. 2012. North Korea. lanham, MD: rowman and littlefield. Kwŏn Hyang-suk. 2011. Idōsuru Chōsenzoku. Tokyo: sairyūsha. lie, John. 1998. Han Unbound. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. ———. 2001. Multiethnic Japan. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. ———. 2004. Modern Peoplehood. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. ———. 2008. Zainichi (Koreans in Japan). Berkeley: University of California Press. Moon, seungsook. 2005. Militarized Modernity. Durham, nC: Duke University Press. Morris-suzuki, Tessa. 2007. Exodus to North Korea. lanham, MD: rowman and littlefield. Myers, B. r. 2010. The Cleanest Race. Brooklyn, ny: Melville House.

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Pai, Hyung il. 2000. Constructing “Korean” Origins. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University asia Center. Pak yun-gyŏng. 2011. Taminjok, tainjong hakkŭp e taehan chilchŏk sarye yŏn’gu. P’aju: Han’guk haksul chŏngbo. Park, Heh-ran. 1996. “narratives of Migration.” Ph.D. diss., University of Washington. Park, Mi. 2008. Democracy and Social Change. oxford: Peter lang. ryang, sonia. 2012. Reading North Korea. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University asia Center. saha, n., and J. s. H. Tay. 1992. “origin of the Koreans.” American Journal of Physical Anthropology 88:27–36. schmid, andre. 2002. Korea between Empires, 1895–1919. new york: Columbia University Press. schwekendiek, D. 2009. “Height and Weight Differences between north and south Koreans.” Journal of Biosocial Science 41:51–55. seth, Michael J. 2010. A History of Korea. lanham, MD: rowman and littlefield. sŏ sŭng. 1994. Gokuchū 19 nen. Tokyo: iwanami shoten. steinberg, David i., ed. 2005. Korean Attitudes towards the United States. armonk, ny: M. e. sharpe. Wan, enmei. 2008. Higashi Ajia gendaishi no naka no Kankoku Kakyō. Tokyo: sangensha. yoon, in-jin. 2004. K’orian tiasŭp’ora. seoul: Koryŏ taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu. yu, eui-young. 1990. “regionalism in the south Korean Job Market.” Pacific Affairs 63:24–39. yu Cho, young-Mee. 2007. “Diglossia in Korean language and literature.” East Asia 20:3–23.

Part i. an emergent Multiethnic/ Multicultural society?

TWo

late Migration, Discourse, and the Politics of Multiculturalism in south Korea A Comparative Perspective

TiMoTHy C. liM

This chapter addresses two related but analytically distinct issues. The first is the surprisingly early and seemingly strong multiculturalist turn in south Korea, a turn that has been led by the Korean state. The second centers on the concrete implications and broader meaning of this turn toward multiculturalism, both for south Korean society and for the immigrants themselves. on the first issue, my argument is straightforward and, i readily admit, even a bit banal. To wit, i contend that the seemingly strong embrace of multiculturalism in south Korea is, in part, the product of related structural and demographic changes. structurally, south Korea has become an export-dependent, labor-importing country. Decades of high-speed and outward-oriented economic growth and industrialization, to be more specific, have created a persistent gap between the demand for low-paying, low-skilled (factory, agricultural, construction, and service) work and the supply of domestic workers willing to do this work. Demographically, south Korea’s extremely low fertility rate—one of the lowest in the world at 1.15 in 20091—is perhaps the most salient factor. This has contributed significantly to the labor shortage and will lead, barring a sudden and sustained increase (a very unlikely scenario), to a long-term need for continued 1

Based on an estimate from statistics Korea (available at http://kostat.go.kr/portal/english/index.action), the 2009 rate represented a significant decline from the previous year’s rate of 1.19, and translated into 445,000 live births. The oeCD birthrate average is 1.64. significantly, the average age of pregnant women in south Korea is also increasing. in 2009, the average increased to almost 31 years old, up from 25.7 years in 1999. all figures cited in “Birthrate Declines again in 2009,” Korea Herald, 24 august 2010.

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immigration. a second and equally well-recognized demographic factor is another persistent gap, the marriage gap. Here, the imbalance is between an oversupply of marriage-ready men (primarily, although not exclusively, in the rural areas) and an undersupply of Korean women willing to marry them. structural and demographic variables, however, do not tell us all we need to know. This brings us to a third and perhaps more novel factor: late migration. late migration, i should immediately stress, is not a variable, but instead constitutes an important context within which domestic and transnational actors, institutions, and social forces interact to produce specific outcomes related to immigration. very simply put, i argue that late migration—like late industrialization—has likely had a significant impact on the strategies and policies purposefully chosen by the state and other actors, pushing them onto a multiculturalist path much sooner than may otherwise have been expected. a particularly important part of the context of late migration, moreover, is the perceived (whether fairly or unfairly) backwardness of non-Western regimes with respect to their adherence to international norms on human rights. i will have more to say on this point later. on the second issue, my argument is a little less conventional. i agree with many other analysts that the Korean state’s embrace of multiculturalism is partly, if not mostly, “fictitious.” That is, the state’s conception of multiculturalism is narrowly defined and, more importantly, primarily assimilationist (i discuss this later in this chapter). even more, it is clearly and explicitly meant to apply to only a small category of foreign residents in south Korea, the so-called marriage migrants. at the same time, i argue that the limited and largely rhetorical—but nonetheless headlong—embrace of multiculturalism has significant implications, both now and in the future. specifically, it has meaningfully altered, or is in the process of altering, the hitherto unquestioned intersubjective foundation of Korean national identity. Prior to the start of large-scale in-migration to south Korea, it was almost certainly the case that the large majority of south Koreans assumed their society to be irrevocably and unconditionally homogenous. even more, this assumption was based on the nearaxiomatic belief that only “Koreans” (i.e., those that shared a common bond based on blood and ethnicity) could belong to Korean society. The embrace of multiculturalism has not, by any means, extinguished these societal assumptions, but it is—at least potentially—far more than lip service or empty rhetoric. in particular, it has led to a still developing, but potentially profound, discursive shift in south Korea, a shift from a rigidly monocultural and extremely parochial discourse on identity and belongingness to one that acknowledges, even if still at a mostly surface level, both the reality and desirability of cultural diversity in south Korea. The discourse of multiculturalism, in other words, has introduced a new

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cultural logic into south Korean society, which may have a number of unintended but far-reaching social and political consequences. The implications of this discursive shift, therefore, should not be dismissed or underestimated. in concrete terms, this shift will likely lead to a number of meaningful political changes. Most obviously, we may see significant changes in immigration policies, particularly those policies that have, until recently, largely barred non-Koreans from becoming “members”—as denizens or citizens—of Korean society. These changes, moreover, will likely not be limited to marriage migrants, but will eventually include a much wider range of immigrants. There is already some evidence of this, although (admittedly) there is a conjectural element to this part of my argument. other changes are less obvious, but may, in the long-run, be no less important. These include a shift in K–12 educational policies and curriculum, the incorporation of “diversity” training in government agencies, the introduction of antidiscrimination laws and efforts to root out institutional discrimination, and so on. in fact, a large number of such polices have already been introduced by the national government—although, as critics are quick to point out, simply introducing new policies is very different from their effective and sustained implementation, still less broad acceptance by society at large. again, this is an issue i will return to later in this chapter. Some Theoretical Considerations My twofold argument, i might note, is not overtly theoretical. Theory or theorizing, however, is unavoidable in any argument on social, political, or economic phenomena. Thus, while i do not directly posit a “theory of multiculturalism,” there are a number of important theoretical assumptions and principles underlying my discussion. The most salient, perhaps, is that intersubjective forces—for example, conceptions of national identity, belongingness, and rights—can and do have significant objective effects. intersubjective values, beliefs, and understandings—key elements of culture2—have a great deal of potential for constraining or enabling political and social change. This is not to imply that culture (or a discursive shift) stands alone, that it can somehow explain change, or the lack of change, all by itself. it cannot. instead, cultural understanding helps make possible certain courses of action or policies that might otherwise be considered unrealistic or simply impossible. For instance, in the context of south Korea’s 2 in this chapter, culture is defined as a shared, learned, and symbolic system of values, ideas, beliefs, and practices that shapes and influences our perceptions and behavior— culture is an abstract “mental blueprint” or “mental code” (Dahl, n.d.). This definition highlights the intersubjective character of culture, and also connects it to dominant discourses within and across societies.

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erstwhile monocultural and highly exclusionary reality, the discriminatory treatment and outright repression of “mixed blood” amerasians (honhyŏl) was considered natural and appropriate: they were outsiders who did not and could not belong to Korean society. any attempt to accept or integrate such people into Korean society, in this view, was patently absurd and unwarranted. yet, the adoption of a multiculturalist rhetoric has seemingly forced Koreans to reconsider, almost overnight, their past treatment of this group. The impossible, in short, suddenly and somewhat inexplicably became quite possible—and even imperative for Korean society. of course, cultural change or significant discursive shifts do not materialize out of thin air. They reflect, in part, changes brought about by other processes (economic, social, and political) occurring at multiple levels, from the local to the global. in particular, as i have already suggested, economic/structural and demographic forces have played a key role in propelling a rethinking of attitudes in south Korea—but, it is important to add, not in determining what these attitudes (and beliefs) might be. This partially indeterminate or contingent aspect of cultural change and of the immigration process more generally underscores another principle underlying my argument: the centrality of politics, that is, of power, agency, and the struggle between or among competing interests. in south Korea (or anywhere else), it will ultimately be politics, or political relationships and dynamics, that determines the shape and character of multiculturalism and the manner in which the immigration process as a whole unfolds. in these political relationships and dynamics, i must emphasize, the calculus of power is complex and fluid. Thus, while the Korean state certainly is a powerful actor, immigrants and migrants are not powerless, despite their subordinate and marginal position in Korean society. indeed, in their brief time in south Korea they have demonstrated—as i have discussed at length elsewhere (see lim 1999, 2003, and 2006)—a remarkable ability to draw from a variety sources, including cultural and ideological ones, to exercise agency and bring about important political and social changes, particularly in the area of labor rights. To fully understand the latent and actual power and agency of immigrants, migrant communities, and their allies in south Korea, therefore, we need to go back to a point i made earlier: the importance of context. late immigration is part of this context, but so too—and very importantly—are the interconnected contexts of (1) south Korean political and economic development, which has provided significant opportunities and space for effective activism; and (2) south Korean democracy, which provides an institutional basis for marginalized groups to challenge more “powerful” state and dominant social actors. With these points in mind, the remainder of this chapter will be organized as follows. in the

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next section, i will discuss a number of basic concepts around which this chapter is organized: multiculturalism, assimilation, and integration. Following that, i will address the multicultural turn in south Korea from an admittedly cursory comparative perspective. i have two purposes. The first is to underscore the commonalities between south Korea’s experience with immigration and the question of assimilation, integration, or multiculturalism. The second is to highlight the divergent paths that once rigidly monocultural societies can take as they respond to the challenges of increasing and increasingly permanent immigration. Following this comparative exercise, the remaining sections will focus on south Korea’s response to its multicultural reality. Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Integration “Different countries,” as Tiryakian sensibly puts it, “will react differently to new multicultural and multiracial realities” (2003, 27). To this, we can add that the same country will react differently in different situations over time, but also toward different immigrant groups at the same time. some countries, through the state, may suppress or attempt to occlude emerging multicultural realities by forcing (or attempting to force) newcomers to return to their country of origin. in the same vein, they may treat nearly all or most immigrants as temporary residents—no matter how long they have resided in the country—thereby denying them the right to citizenship or denizenship.3 This was and still is the preferred policy of the Korean state toward the vast majority of recent immigrants, most of whom have entered the country as unskilled workers. another—often simultaneous— response is the outright or total rejection of cultural differences, and the subordination, through institutionalized and state-sanctioned discrimination, of out-groups. again, we can find evidence of this in south Korea, especially in the state’s treatment of amerasian or honhyŏl individuals, whom i mentioned earlier. in other situations, the state might accept the settlement of immigrants, but refuse to recognize cultural differences by requiring newcomers or “others” to assimilate, that is, to adopt the values, practices, and norms of the dominant culture—by force or compulsion, if necessary. in France, for example, efforts to ban the burqa, niqāb (or veil), and other Muslim 3

Denizens, according to Hammar, are immigrants who have not obtained full citizenship in their new country, but nonetheless have legal and “permanent” resident status (1990, 1). as a denizen, the immigrant has the right to work and reside in the host country without time restrictions. a denizen may enjoy almost full social, economic, and civil citizenship rights, but typically has limited access to political rights—some countries allow denizens to vote in local elections (atikcan 2006, 7–8).

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garments reflect, at least to some degree, a compulsory form of assimilation: French authorities have essentially made it illegal to express certain values or beliefs through traditional cultural practices.4 assimilationist policies, however, can take a largely passive form, for example, by simply expecting immigrants, on their own (that is, without state support or encouragement, still less force of law), to become part of the dominant culture. Passive assimilation, however, has clear drawbacks: instead of assimilating into the dominant culture, immigrants may form largely selfcontained and isolated “ghettos” or parallel societies (ghaffar-Kucher 2006, 4). Predictably, the existence of such enclaves—particularly ones that are relatively large—are often viewed as problematic and potentially dangerous to the larger society. Thus, once formed, they typically engender a more proactive reaction on the part of the state, which may take the form of integrationist policies and/or multiculturalism. integration, some assert, is premised on the recognition of and tolerance for cultural differences, albeit only to a certain extent. it allows immigrant groups, as ghaffar-Kucher explains, “to preserve their religious, cultural, and linguistic identities while fully participating in their new home country’s political sphere” (2006, 4). The manner in which “recognition” or “tolerance,” however, concretely plays out can vary considerably from one context or situation to another. indeed, integrationist policies, in their weaker form, “could be described as a variation on the basic theme of assimilation” insofar as broader problems of institutional discrimination, economic inequality, and other social issues are left unaddressed (Foster and stockley 1984, 48). in this regard, we might argue that it is indifference, as opposed to tolerance, toward cultural differences (a multicultural reality) that characterizes “weak” integration. in addition, in whatever form, integrationist policies are generally strongly biased toward the one-way integration of ethnic, minority, or immigrant groups into mainstream society, and generally on terms defined or dictated by the state (or mainstream society). Cultural differences, in this view, are tolerated to the extent that they do not come into conflict with or contradict the broader goals and interests of the state or the values, norms, and mores of the dominant society. There is, i should emphasize, nothing necessarily or inherently wrong with integrationist or assimilationist approaches: they simply represent reactions to the reality of increasing cultural diversity; 4 one French government official, in discussing the legislation banning the burqa, explained the basis for the law as follows: “given the damage it produces on those rules which allow the life in community, ensure the dignity of the person and equality between sexes, this practice, even if it is voluntary, cannot be tolerated in any public place” (“Burqa Ban Passes French lower House overwhelmingly,” 13 July 2010, CNN World).

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even more, according to some scholars, they are themselves normatively defensible.5 Multiculturalism, by contrast, represents something quite different—or at least it has that potential. Tiryakian, for example, tells us that multiculturalism can mean, on the one hand, “recognition of minority communities and their cultures as part of the institutional fabric of the social order, but [still] under the aegis and ultimate sanction of the state and its national culture.” on the other hand, it could entail “overhauling the structure of the national culture to have a more complex, diversified or hybrid culture, with autonomy for each of the major minority cultures while protecting and enhancing rights of individuals” (2003, 31). From a less expansive perspective, by contrast, others assert that multiculturalism, when espoused as an official ideology, is essentially a state program used to manage racial and ethnic diversity (Kong and yeoh 2003), or to minimize people’s consciousness of class (Foster and stockley 1984). Ultimately, then, multiculturalism (and we might add assimilation and integration) remains a diffused and contested concept (radtke 2001). There is, as Joppke and lukes assert, “no MC [multiculturalism] tout court; there are only specific context-dependent multicultural problematiques” (1999, 16). This latter view fits in well with my basic approach, which emphasizes contingency and process. in this regard, my approach puts emphasis on the discursive significance of multiculturalism in marking the beginning of a new process, especially within the context of hitherto monocultural societies. i argue that the introduction of the multiculturalist idea shifts the discursive balance in a way that allows minority or immigrant groups, and their domestic allies, greater space to exercise agency and power, and to bring about concrete social and political change. This does not mean that significant changes will necessarily take place—or that they will be sustained over time—but it does increase the prospects for (significant) change. Thus, to repeat my basic position: to understand the multiculturalist turn in south Korea, we need to be aware, not just of its immediate concrete impact (which may be minimal), but of its longer term implications. This awareness, however, also requires that we understand the particular dynamics and context of south Korea. With this in mind, let us now turn to a more detailed discussion of the multicuturalist turn in south Korea. To aid in this discussion and to help support my argument, i will address the Korean case from a comparative perspective. 5 on this point, Brubaker (2001) provides a useful discussion. in his article, he presents evidence of a “massive differentialist turn” in the last third of the twentieth century, which has brought back “not the old, analytically discredited and politically disreputable ‘assimilationist’ understanding of assimilation, but a more analytically complex and normatively defensible understanding” (531).

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The Multiculturalist Turn: A Comparative Perspective The word “multiculturalism,” as Kim nicely documented, was rarely uttered in south Korea before 2000—it appeared only 235 times (as a headline word) in the mainstream vernacular press during the entire decade between 1990 and 1999 (2009, 43). Between 2005 and 2008, by sharp contrast, there were at least 99,222 articles featuring the term “multiculturalism” (43). it would be difficult to envisage a more dramatic change in the popularity of what, to a certain extent (especially in south Korea at the time), was a dry and academic concept. significantly, multiculturalism became much more than just a buzzword—its pull, in other words, was not limited to topical or human interest stories in the mainstream press. instead, the term also became a focus of attention within Korean academia and, more importantly, in policy-making circles. indeed, virtually overnight, multiculturalism became, for all intents and purposes, official government policy (although, as i noted earlier and as i will discuss in more detail later in the chapter, the government’s current interpretation of multiculturalism is extremely narrow). on the surface, the rapid embrace of multiculturalism—in whatever form—is perplexing. after all, despite a dramatic increase in its foreign resident population over the past two decades, the degree of ethnic and cultural diversity in south Korea remains relatively low by international standards. in 2009, specifically, the Ministry of Justice estimated a foreign resident population of a little under 1.17 million 1,170,000 people, or 2.35% of south Korea’s total population. For south Korea, this is not at all an insignificant figure, but it is nonetheless very small compared to many countries—such as australia and germany—that have faced or are currently facing the same issues. My mention of australia and germany is not, as i already suggested, accidental. Both countries can serve as a basis for very useful comparisons with south Korea. They also provide a convenient and valuable way to gain a better perspective on Korea’s reactions to the process of immigration. With this in mind, it is important to note that australia and germany were at one time every bit as committed to maintaining cultural homogeneity in the face of large-scale immigration as south Korea. This was manifested in australia’s immigration restriction act (the so-called White australia policy) and in germany’s long-standing efforts to reject any permanent settlement by non-german immigrants, while simultaneously encouraging “resettlers” (Aussiedler)—people of german descent whose forebears left germany generations ago—to return to germany as citizens. For a very long time, in fact, german political leaders unequivocally rejected the notion that germany was, empirically or culturally, a multicultural society (that is, a country of immigration). This is still mostly

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the case: in germany, the principle of multiculturalism is still generally eschewed, despite a foreign population that grew to 7.1 million or 8.8% of the total population by 1995 (the foreign-born population, in the same year, was 11.5%). not surprisingly, large-scale migration to germany is not new. in the postwar period, it began in 1955 with the implementation of a “guest worker” program that (unintentionally) brought millions of foreign workers (and eventually their families) into West germany on a permanent basis, including a very large population of Turks: in 1990 (in the newly reunited germany), Turks accounted for 31% of all foreign residents in germany with a population of almost 1.7 million (Castles and Miller 2003, 201). The german government’s first response, especially to the culturally dissimilar Turks, was exclusion and discrimination. But, as the immigrant population become more and more embedded in german society (and the economy), the government eventually and grudgingly turned to an outwardly integrationist but still strongly assimilationist policy (Pautz 2005). This shift, however, only began taking shape in 2000. in australia, by contrast, multiculturalism is now the central feature of its immigration and social policy. still, it is important to understand, the multiculturalist turn in australia took a very long time to materialize: it was not until the early 1970s—after over a century of immigration6—that the move to multiculturalism first emerged. even more, for almost the entire time prior to its multiculturalist turn, australian policy was aggressively and forcefully assimilationist, especially toward the indigenous population of aborigines. as James Jupp explains it, “The objectives of White australia were assimilationist, creating an ethnically homogenous society. aboriginal population was expected to die out, with those of ‘mixed race’ (now the majority) assimilating into the majority population to the point of eventual invisibility” (1995, 208). in fact, beginning in 1937, a conscious effort was made exterminate aboriginal culture (à la Japan’s attempt to destroy Korean culture during the colonial era); as part of this policy, children were forcibly taken from their parents and placed in institutions (both government-run and missionary) so that an entire generation could learn “white culture” (a practice highlighted in the feature film Rabbit-Proof Fence). in addition, aborigines were not allowed to use their native names or practice their traditional culture. it was, one 6 From the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, however, most immigration to australia was from great Britain and ireland. This was largely planned and meant to keep australia “white.” significant immigration from non-anglo (including non-Celtic), non–english-speaking countries did not begin in force until 1947, when mass migration programs were launched to deal with an increasingly serious shortfall in domestic labor (Jupp 1995, 209).

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scholar argues, an attempt at cultural genocide (Bartrop 2001), elements of which stayed in place until the 1970s. This aggressive assimilationist policy softened over time, and was replaced by an integrationist policy beginning in the 1960s. The responses to increased immigration on the part of australia and germany are instructive. They evince, on the one hand, a general pattern of reactions to immigration and/or a multicultural reality. on the other hand, the experiences of australia and germany underscore the importance of specific contexts in creating significant differences in approaches to immigration and social policy. The general pattern can be seen in (1) the underlying economic/structural processes that drive immigration in the first place; and (2) the type of reactions that occur once this process begins to unfold. on the latter point, we can see, for example, that australia and germany have—up to a point—followed a broadly similar path, namely, from exclusion and assimilation to integration. australia, of course, has made the further move to multiculturalism, a move that in germany has thus far remained submerged.7 However, a concrete distinction between these “stages” (or responses), as i already discussed, is usually difficult to discern. nonetheless, the language or discourse used to describe shifts in immigration approaches is almost always clear-cut. Thus, while germany’s current policy may, in practice, be more assimilationist than integrationist, there is no ambiguity in the rhetoric: as otto schily (the german federal minister of the interior) put it, “There is broad social consensus that germany is a country of immigration . . . [which has] succeeded in initiating the first systematic policy on immigration and integration . . .” (emphasis added; schily and Meyers 2005, n.p.). notice, too, that schily also defines germany as a “country of immigration”: this marks a significant change in rhetoric and discourse, since for decades, the german state absolutely refused to use that phrase. given this pattern, it is quite tempting to conclude that germany is bound to move to a multiculturalist approach, just as australia has done. But this conclusion is not (theoretically or empirically) warranted. For, as a number of scholars have demonstrated, there is often a back-andforth movement between approaches (see, for example, Brubaker 2001 and Joppke 2004). in addition, as i pointed out earlier, there have also been significant differences between australia and germany in terms of 7

Joppke (2004) points out that multiculturalism has never been officially adopted in germany, but that some government agencies, particularly the Federal Commissioner for Foreigner affairs, have long espoused the notion that germany was a “multicultural society,” a fact that had to be mirrored in state policies (253). There is some evidence that the concept of multiculturalism is seeping into germany at the micro or individual level, particularly in teacher-training and education (see sliwka 2010).

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their response to immigration and cultural diversity. i have already mentioned one of these: the existence of an indigenous population in australia prompted a systematic and highly coercive assimilationist approach, one that lasted for decades. germany’s approach, by contrast, was more implicit than explicit. in addition, quite unlike germany, “at no time was the notion of guestworkers a part of immigration policy [in australia]” (emphasis in original; Foster and stockley 1984, 28). The reason is clear: from the beginning, australia needed to build a larger permanent population, which meant that permanent settlement and family migration was part-and-parcel of the state’s approach to immigration. australia’s very strong multiculturalist turn, of course, marks another major difference compared to germany. all these differences tell us that we need to look more closely at germany and australia—and south Korea or any one of a score of other countries—to adequately understand both the particular choices they have made, and the implications and meaning of those choices as the immigration process continues to unfold. at the same time, to repeat a point made earlier, there are also general patterns and types of responses to immigration and cultural diversity that apply, to a certain extent, to most countries (especially democracies). This dual perspective can be usefully applied to south Korea. South Korea’s Responses to its Multicultural Reality

The south Korean state, as i have already indicated, has demonstrated a range of reactions to increasing cultural diversity and its new multicultural reality. indeed, one can argue that the Korean state has adopted every approach mentioned earlier at one point or another, and often concurrently.8 as we have seen, this is not atypical: south Korea, in important respects, is no different from most other countries that have faced increasing immigration, and it is especially similar to other democracies. But there is, it is also important to emphasize, a compressed and accelerated character to these reactions that makes south Korea stand out. in particular, once 8

Kim provides a useful typology and asserts that the south Korean government is currently employing three of four basic modes of immigrant or minority incorporation: (1) total exclusion, (2) differential exclusion, (3) pluralism, and (4) assimilation. each mode, moreover, is characterized by a particular rhetoric. For “total exclusion” the rhetoric is ethnic homogeneity and reunification; for “differential exclusion” and “pluralism” the dominant rhetoric is human rights; and for “assimilation” the primary rhetoric is multiculturalism. Total exclusion, according to Kim, refers to territorial closure: there are either no immigration policies or “zero immigration” policies. Differential exclusion denotes the denial of formal membership—i.e., denial of access to citizenship or naturalization. Pluralism refers to incorporation of immigrants without necessarily transforming the ethnic/cultural heritage of the immigrants, and the assimilation mode of incorporation refers to policies that aim to culturally transform immigrants into “Koreans” (2009, 64).

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large-scale immigration started to unfold in the 1990s, south Korea seemingly jumped onto the multiculturalist path—or at least embraced the discourse of multiculturalism—much more quickly than is warranted by the scale and scope of current immigration and by its monocultural “heritage.” This is also quite apparent from a comparative perspective, as we have just seen, as both germany and australia pursued highly exclusionary policies or engaged in coercive assimilation for extended periods of times. (i do recognize, of course, that south Korea pursued a very similar pattern with regard to its amerasian and Hwagyo [ethnic Chinese] communities, both of which are very small and largely static.) a good part of the compressed and accelerated process in south Korea might be explained,9 as i posited at the outset, as a consequence of “late migration.” late migration is not a variable per se, but an overarching context in which the immigration process in certain countries is playing out. The two main elements of the late migration context include (1) the experiences of other countries with large-scale immigration and (2) international norms, especially regarding human rights. Both elements directly and indirectly shape the domestic political context and the specific choices that are made within this context. on the first element, my argument is straightforward. it is partly based on the premise that late migration, quite simply, provides actors with hindsight—that is, with a retrospective view that they would not have otherwise have had. For policymakers this is particularly important in that they can derive their basic ideas and strategies on immigration and social policy from the experiences of other states. on this point, consider south Korea’s First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, released in June 2009 (Korean immigration service). it is clear from this plan that Korean policymakers not only considered policy responses made by other countries toward immigration, but also incorporated “lessons” from these responses into the Basic Plan. The plan noted, for example, that south Korea needed to avoid the type of social conflicts that have occurred in other countries that lacked a viable “social integration policy” (4). Korean policymakers, in short, “knew” that exclusionary and heavyhanded assimilationist policies have generally not worked, and therefore would likely not work in south Korea. This is not meant to suggest that hindsight provides a trouble-free or unproblematic policy path (it certainly does not); rather, it merely tells us that hindsight tends to narrow the range of policy choices. societal actors, too, can learn from the experiences of other countries: 9 My argument here, i readily admit, is largely hypothetical and preliminary. Further research, particularly field research in south Korea, is necessary and will be completed at a later date.

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they understand the often unstated intent and implications of various policies. in south Korea, this was especially apparent in domestic opposition—primarily by foreign worker groups—to the employment Permit system (ePs). The ePs is south Korea’s “guest worker” plan, which not coincidentally is modeled very closely on germany’s guest worker program. Despite an effort to portray the plan as a great leap forward beyond the existing industrial trainee system10—and in many respects it was—a number of foreign worker groups (in particular, the Migrant Trade Union) in south Korea vehemently and unrelentingly protested against the ePs. They particularly objected to the three-year provision, which was explicitly designed to prevent the right to long-term or permanent settlement in south Korea (immigration law in south Korea stipulates that a foreign resident must maintain five years of continuous residence in the country to qualify for permanent residency). The highly formalized procedures of the ePs were also viewed as new ways of trapping foreign workers in vulnerable positions under the guise of a “fair” and “just” employment system. interestingly, these same groups—and foreign workers more generally—are largely silent on south Korea’s multiculturalist turn. as Kim argues, this is likely because foreign workers understand that the “way [official] multiculturalism is practiced in Korea sends a strong signal to the migrant workers that they do not belong to Korea. only marriage migrants are invited to be members of a new multicultural Korea” (2009, 112). Kim may be correct, but there are likely other factors at play, too. First, for foreign workers, the more immediate concern is establishing a longer term right to stay and work in south Korea. They understand—in the context of late migration—that this is a far more important and foundational step in the process of securing their positions in Korean society. second, it is important to reemphasize that foreign workers have only eschewed state multiculturalism and not the principle of multiculturalism in toto. The reason is clear: immigrant groups clearly understand the importance of establishing their own voice and of defining multiculturalism on their own terms; they understand that the manner in which multiculturalism is defined and incorporated into society has important implications for their lives in south Korea. Multiculturalism, in short, has become enmeshed in a political struggle—albeit largely tacit and generally low-key thus far— between state agencies and ordinary immigrants (including their organizations), but also Korean activists, academics, and others. since i will discuss the “politics of multiculturalism” in a separate section, i will not say anything more on this topic for now. The second element of late migration links to the broader significance 10

i discuss the industrial trainee system in more detail elsewhere. see lim (2003).

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of international norms (especially those concerned with human rights) on domestic politics and policy, a subject that has been the focus of much attention and considerable debate (Cortell and Davis 2000). indeed, there are a number of critics who argue, quite forcefully, that few if any analyses have been able to show a specific causal relationship between international norms and domestic outcomes. on the issue of immigration policy specifically (and, even more specifically, on the issue of why liberal states accepted unwanted immigration), Joppke (1998 [2006], 528) writes, “the international human rights regime is not so strong as to make states fear and tremble,” and “devoid of hard legal powers, the international human rights regime consists of the soft moral power of discourse.” This is “better than nothing,” Joppke admits, but hardly determinative. i would generally agree, but as gurowitz (1999) has argued, the effects of norms are often indirect and variable, but can nonetheless be very important in specific contexts. on this point, i should note that Joppke focused his attention on Western states, which have been subject to less scrutiny with regard to human rights than other countries around the world (and, because of this, are able to practice a double standard with regard to human rights, at least to some extent).11 it is also fair to say that certain countries, owing to their particular histories and desire for greater status in the international system, are more sensitive to international regimes than others: south Korea is one of these. still, the question remains: how are international norms important? gurowitz provides a simple answer. she writes, “shifts in norms, whether domestic or international, can make room for new voices by altering contexts and making new types of action possible” (418). in addition, norms help to legitimate both causes (that activists and others, such as civic organizations, may fight for) and the actors themselves (419). norms become an important source of power for weaker actors and, at least to some extent, a frame of action for even the most powerful actors (in a specific political context). in the case of south Korea, it is fairly clear that international norms on human rights have both made new types of action 11

in addition, i might point out, scholars are increasingly recognizing the potential importance of soft power in world politics, a position espoused most famously by Joseph nye (2004). To nye and many other observers of world politics, soft power has become almost as important as hard power, which rests primarily on physical resources: military forces, population, territory, raw materials, and the like. soft power, by contrast, is based on largely intangible resources such as the attraction of one’s ideas, culture, business practices, intellectual know-how, political and social values, and so on. To nye, exploiting the potential of these resources is crucial. Countries that do so will exercise greater influence in the world, which, in turn, will allow them to achieve greater security and prosperity for their own citizens. The upshot is simple: Joppke’s dismissal of “soft moral power” is, perhaps, unwarranted.

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possible and have helped to legitimize both the goals or causes espoused by immigrants and the immigrants themselves. This began in the early 1990s, when foreign workers first began to press for basic labor rights, an issue i discuss at length elsewhere (see lim 2003). in this process, workers and their domestic allies intentionally and strategically infused a human rights discourse into their demands for more protection and more humane treatment, both from employers and from the state. The movement was successful in defining the workers as “as rights-bearing individuals,” and was particularly successful in cultivating support within the mainstream media, which consistently and indefatigably repeated the link between human rights and the treatment of foreign workers in south Korea. indeed, even undocumented (or “illegal”) workers in south Korea are provided basic labor rights. Thus, in very short order—in a period spanning less than two decades—foreign workers in south Korea went from having essentially no labor rights and protections to having the full protection of Korean labor laws.12 This was not necessarily because, i should emphasize, the state was swayed by the importance of international norms in and of themselves; rather, as gurowitz suggests, it was because their acceptance was viewed as “the necessary price of existence in the outside world.” The Korean state’s preoccupation with human rights, i should add, is well reflected in the First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (2009), which i mentioned earlier. a significant part of the plan is devoted to “protecting foreigners’ human rights,” which includes protection from discrimination and better treatment of immigrants held in detention. in addition, and perhaps more importantly, the plan links human rights and multiculturalism, and highlights human rights as an overarching goal of immigration policy. in the first chapter of the Basic Plan, “The Basic Direction of immigration Policy,” for example, is the following heading: “1.2 Developing into a more mature, multicultural society where human rights are respected” (12). needless to say, “words on paper” may mean very little. and, i am not suggesting, by any stretch, that adopting the rhetoric of human rights means that human rights norms are, in fact, dictating south Korea’s immigration policy. instead, i am suggesting that the state has been unwilling to ignore international norms and has been forced, at a minimum, to pay lip service to respect for human rights—and by extension to multiculturalism—since “respect for cultural diversity” and discrimination against 12

The extension of labor rights actually began in the early 1990s. over the next decade, labor rights were gradually extended to foreign workers—typically as a result of cases brought before Korean courts. The creation of the ePs, however, did away with the fiction of the industrial trainee system, which essentially had classified full-fledged workers as “trainees.” as trainees, according to the logic of the program, the foreign workers were not entitled to standard wages and full labor protection.

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immigrants have become parts of the broader human rights discourse. This latter point, in fact, has been made explicit by international organizations. in a 2007 report by the U.n. Committee on the elimination of racial Discrimination (CerD), for example, the following recommendation was made: the committee requests that the Korean government, “in accordance with articles 2 and 5 of the Convention, adopt further measures, including legislation, to prohibit and eliminate all forms of discrimination against foreigners, including migrant workers and children born from inter-ethnic unions.”13 significantly, these issues generally make their way into the national press. The CerD report, for example, provoked this response in the Korea Herald: in the committee’s recommendations, there is much to heed for the Korean government, civic groups and general citizens alike, such as a call for the inclusion of human rights awareness programs in the nation’s official education curriculum to increase public understanding of societies with multiple ethnic/cultural backgrounds. People should be taught from an early age to treat all races as equal and this sense of equality should be extended to children from international marriages living next door and those studying in the same classroom and to workers in Korean factories that produce our daily necessities. a sense of national identity is valuable but it should not be confused with racial supremacy, particularly over people from less affluent parts of the world. ethnocentrism, which is an enemy of world peace, could now harm domestic harmony as more and more foreigners make Korea their home. (“accepting Diversity,” 22 august 2007)

all of this helps explain—and this brings us back to my key point in this section—the unexpectedly quick embrace of the multiculturalist idea in south Korea. But, my larger argument, to repeat, is that the embrace of multiculturalism by the state is, even if it is little more than lip service right now, nonetheless significant. i will focus on this issue shortly, but first it would be useful to discuss in more detail the Korean state’s conception of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism in South Korea: State-Initiated and State-Defined

as i have already made clear, multiculturalism has been narrowly defined in south Korea. it is generally equated with what the state refers to as “social integration,” which in turn is primarily (though not wholly) 13

Cited in “Un CerD Urges the republic of Korea To Take effective Measures in order to eliminate Discrimination against Foreigners,” 23 august 2007. available on the international Federation for Human rights website at www.fidh.org/Un-CerD-urges -the-republic-of-Korea-to-take.

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directed at immigrant women who marry Korean men. Han geon-soo, in fact, marks the beginning of south Korea’s official multiculturalist turn as april 2006, when the government announced comprehensive measures for marriage-based migrants (2007, 49). as Han and other critics have pointed out, these measures are primarily aimed at the immigrants themselves, although there are some small exceptions.14 even more, the issue of multiculturalism is framed primarily as a product of the immigrant’s (the migrant brides’) failure to properly adapt to Korean society. Consider, on this point, the following (unedited) passages from the First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (46), which detail why marriage immigrants need assistance in the first place: The failure of immigrants through marriage to adapt to Korean society undermines the foundation of families and incurs major social costs. Despite their having lived in Korea for a long time, most immigrants through marriage lack sufficient knowledge of Korean language and culture to live conveniently in Korea. (Most immigrants through marriage, especially those from vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, suffer from communication problems.) •

Insufficient understanding of Korean society exposes immigrants through marriage to discrimination and human rights abuse. The children of these marriages also suffer education problems. systematic and step-by-step education starting from arrival is needed.

•

Most of the immigrants through marriage have stated they have difficulties in their daily lives as well as in their family and social relationships.

•

The immigrants through marriage also have problems in raising their children because of the depression they suffer from their radical change in environment and social isolation. (emphasis added.)

To resolve these problems, the Basic Plan proposes a “social integration program” that will provide standardized education to marriage migrants, access to multilanguage websites and counseling services, improved social services (including child care and support during pregnancy), employment services, and the facilitation of “self-help groups.” From this brief review, it is fairly clear that official multiculturalism has, in addition to its more obvious integrationist elements, a very strong assimilationist character—at least toward marriage migrants. The focus on marriage 14 Han notes, for example, that the government has also stressed “multicultural education for multicultural family members so that various programs would not simply force marriage-based migrants to assimilate into Korean society” (2007, 50).

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migrants, as i have suggested several times, is no accident. as Kim (2009), Han (2007), and others have noted, the state’s muliticulturalist policies have tended to target marriage migrants to the exclusion of other immigrant groups. The implication is obvious: multiculturalism, such as it is, is not only narrowly defined in largely integrationist and assimilationist terms, but also limited to one specific and relatively small group of immigrants in south Korea. it is important to understand, however, that multiculturalism is an inherently intersubjective and contested concept. so, while the Korean state has propounded a particular, and particularly limited, conception of multiculturalism, this does not mean that the state’s view will remain unchanged, still less unchallenged. indeed, while there certainly is no multiculturalism tout court, there are many competing interpretations or conceptions of multiculturalism (especially outside of south Korea), many of which have far greater legitimacy than the (current) official version in south Korea. Practically speaking, this means that the Korean state cannot simply put forth a “fictional” version of multiculturalism without expecting a torrent of criticism from both within and outside the country. in fact, since its introduction by the Korean state in 2006, there has already been a demonstrable—and very quick—expansion away from a strict assimilationist and integrationist interpretation. referring again to the First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, the government also discusses the need to infuse a multicultural sensibility into the Korean educational system, beginning at the preschool level. The plans include revising textbooks designed to “enhance understanding of a multicultural society,” providing teacher training courses “dedicated to multicultural education,” inviting “immigrant lecturers” to teach classes on multicultural understanding in elementary and junior high schools, and raising awareness “through social education.” While it is easy to scoff at the intent and effectiveness such policies, they represent, even if only in nascent form, “recognition of minority communities and their cultures as part of the institutional fabric of the social order.” The key point, to repeat, is that multiculturalism must be understood as a fluid concept. once introduced and embedded into the social and political environment, moreover, it can no longer be easily controlled by the state or any single actor. not only does its meaning become part of a political process, but the concept itself—as it is incorporated into the broader discourse on immigration—begins to exert influence on the policy choices available to the state and societal actors. it can, as i asserted at the outset, make the impossible possible—and could even be considered imperative for Korean society. With this in mind, i will now turn to the last major section of this chapter.

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The Politics of Immigration and Multiculturalism in South Korea earlier i noted that multiculturalism has become enmeshed in a political “struggle” between state agencies and ordinary immigrants (including their organizations), as well as other social actors in south Korea (e.g., Korean activists and academics). This struggle may still be dominated by state action, but, as i also noted, there has been a low-key but readily discernible effort on the part of nonstate actors (primarily the immigrants themselves) to question, challenge, and subvert the emerging state-centric discourse—often through the “politics of everyday resistance.” Challenging the state’s version of multiculturalism, in this view, is not easy, especially for those actors who lack the means and resources to provide a strong and “loudly heard” alternative voice. But, immigrants to south Korea have demonstrated a remarkable degree of persistence and capacity to pursue their interests and goals. as i discussed very briefly earlier, this began with efforts to challenge discriminatory labor practices designed to keep wages for foreign workers low (this was one of the goals of the industrial trainee system) and to fight for basic labor rights. Foreign workers used whatever strategies that were available to them, including simply deserting their places of employment—walking off the job (as “industrial trainees”) to find a better paying job elsewhere. indeed, they did this with a high degree of frequency: in 1993, for example, almost 60 percent of all industrial trainees left their positions without authorization (cited in lim 2006, 146). significantly, this essentially compelled the Korean government (and the main business organization overseeing the trainee system, the Korean Federation of small Businesses) to agree to substantial increases in the basic “allowance.” But foreign workers also used a number of other more explicitly political strategies, including sit-ins, demonstrations, and other forms of public protests. in most of these efforts, foreign workers worked closely with a network of Korean civic organizations, or nongovernmental organizations (ngos), including the Citizens’ Coalition for economic Justice (CCeJ), Minbyŏn (lawyers for a Democratic society), the archdiocese of seoul, the Joint Committee on Migrants in Korea (JsMK), and Korean labor unions (in particular, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions). The immigrant–ngo nexus was critical to the success of foreign workers. equally critical was the institutional context of Korean society. since south Korea’s democratic turn in 1987, social actors have relied on democratic institutions and processes—and particularly the Korean court system—to press for their rights and to challenge state authority in a variety of areas, including, of course, immigration. indeed, in south Korea it took almost no time for foreign workers and their allies in Korean civil society

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to make use of the courts. one of the earliest and most significant steps occurred in 1993 with a decision by the seoul superior Court establishing the right for undocumented foreign workers to receive compensation for industrial injury. This set the stage for a slow but inexorable expansion of worker rights that, for all intents and purposes, led to the establishment of the ePs (for further discussion of this issue, see lim [2008]). This use of the court system in south Korea should be kept firmly in mind. For, just as the courts played a critical role in the politics of labor rights expansion for foreign workers, they are likely to play an equally prominent role in the expansion of rights related to long-term immigration: from education for the children of “guest workers” to residency and citizenship rights, family reunification rights, and so on. all of this, i might note, fits a general pattern among democratic countries that have experienced sustained largescale immigration, and south Korea thus far has not shown any indication that it will be an exception. so what does all this imply for the “politics of multiculturalism” in south Korea? The key implication is clear: despite a subordinate and marginalized position in Korean society, immigrants and immigrant groups (and their allies) have a capacity to challenge and reshape the emerging state-centric discourse on multiculturalism. There is, in fact, already evidence of this challenge taking shape. one of the most salient examples of this can be found in the creation of the Migrant Workers Television (MWTv) in november 2004. according to ahmed Mahbub, one of the cofounders of MWTv,15 his primary motivation for creating the station was to give migrant workers their own voice so that they could control, in unmediated fashion, their representation in Korean society. importantly, too, Mahbub’s goal was to broadcast in as many languages as possible (in 2006, MWTv had programming in Bengali/Bangladeshi, Burmese, Chinese, Tagalog, sinhala/sri lankan, indonesian, english, and russian), and to provide a “multicultural forum” for all immigrant groups in south Korea, including marriage migrants. in addition, MWTv produces Korean-language programming explicitly to reach out to Koreans (interview by author, 16 June 2006, in seoul). even more, Mahbub was quite aware of the need to change south Korea’s monocultural mindset. as he put it: The number of migrant workers in Korea will surely grow in the future, but Koreans are still very nationalistic. This is creating a gap between the reality of Korean society and the attitudes and perceptions of Korea about their society. This gap is getting bigger, but the public doesn’t even seem 15

There were three other cofounders: a Korean media artist, and two other foreign workers, one from Burma and one from nepal. Mahbub is from Bangladesh.

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aware of it. in other words, the sense of Korean people is not changing. The situation is becoming more and more severe. Migrant workers need to be accepted as residents and citizens in the future, but this will be impossible if Korean attitudes do not change. Korea cannot stay “onenation.” (interview by author.)

While severely under-resourced,16 MWTv is partnered with an open access station in seoul (rTv), and is able to reach a national audience through satellite broadcasts (up to four million households in south Korea, potentially); all programs are also available online through a video on Demand (voD) system. Whether or not MWTv or similar organizations are effective in shaping the dominant state-centric discourse on multiculturalism remains to be seen. Thus far, they likely have had little direct impact. nonetheless, their activities are representative of an unwillingness by immigrants and their communities to accept either their exclusion from Korean society or the dominant discourse of the Korean state, mass media, and others on multiculturalism and immigration. This unwillingness to accept the assimilationist (and integrationist) precepts of Korea’s state-centric multiculturalism, it is important to add, can also be found among the country’s 125,087 marriage migrants, of which about 109,211 are foreign women and 15,876 are foreign men (Kis statistics 2009, 709).17 Consider on this point the upsurge of marriages, beginning in the early 1990s, between ethnically Korean women from the yanbian region of China (Chosŏnjok) and Korean men.18 These marriages were encouraged by the Korean state (as well as local Korean governments, assemblies, and farming associations), in large part because the ethnically Korean women were considered more likely to assimilate smoothly into traditional Korean family structures (abelmann and Kim 2005). This, not surprisingly, was the same reason for encouraging “coethnic” (primarily male) worker migration by Chosŏnjok, which was also a significant aspect of south Korea’s early immigration policy. Both efforts failed. in the case 16

at the time of my interview (in 2006), MWTv received about 3.1 million won (roughly $2,600) a month from the Korea Broadcast Commission and in-kind contributions from rTv, a public access channel (the in-kind assistance included use of cameras, editing equipment, broadcast studios, and office space). The Korea Broadcast Commission would also provide funding for special projects (ahmed Mahbub, interview by author, 16 June 2006). 17 The figures i found are inconsistent. according to the The First Basic Plan on Immigration (2009), “the total number of immigrants to Korea through marriage stood at 146,508” in December 2007, including those who became naturalized Korean citizens, which was 44,291 of the total (45). The figure cited in the text is from the Korean immigration service and includes data for 2009. 18 in 2009, Chosŏnjok women accounted for about 20 percent of all international marriages (Kis 2009, 696).

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of marriage migrants, there were several dynamics at play. First, as H. K. lee (2008) explains it, Chosŏnjok women and their families took advantage of this open-door policy for immigration to south Korea: cross-border marriages, for a time, were not only the easiest and most important channel for Chosŏnjok women to enter south Korea, but they were also one of the few legal ways to bring family members. This was because the south Korean government allowed the Chosŏnjok wives to send two invitation letters to their parents to come to Korea. These letters, however, were easily sold to the highest bidder, and so abuse of this privilege was fairly common (112). in addition, a good number of marriages were “fake”; that is, they were used primarily as a way to immigrate to south Korea. Thus, after arriving in south Korea, many women would simply desert their husbands. Fake marriages became such a problem that by 1996 the south Korean government was forced to revise its visa requirements—in consultation with the Chinese government—to make the marriage approval process more complicated (lee 2008, 112). a second dynamic is primarily cultural. Freeman argues, using her intensive fieldwork that many Chosŏnjok women “were motivated to leave their villages and marry into south Korea out of a sense of independence, adventure, entrepreneurship, and a longing to live a ‘modern’ life in a ‘developed county’” (2005, 97). in contrast, many of the men they married, and their families, expected subservient, dutiful, and wholly “Korean” wives. There was, to put it simply (perhaps a little simplistically), a culture clash. rather than passively accept the roles that were being assigned to them, many of the Chosŏnjok women rebelled by deserting their husbands and new families—a situation that nicely parallels that of the industrial trainees who deserted their trainee positions en masse. although these women were grouped with those who married Korean men under false pretenses (through fake marriages), Freeman asserts that the motivations were different. The upshot, however, is similar: in both situations, immigrants challenged—whether consciously or unconsciously—the cultural roles assigned to them by the Korean state and society; they challenged, subverted, and effectively undermined the assimilationist and integrationist strictures of the multiculturalist mode they were supposed to fit. importantly, it is not only Chosŏnjok women who have engaged in this process. Marriage migrants from the Philippines (who constitute about 5 percent of all international marriages in Korea) have also challenged the assumptions of south Korea’s state-centric multiculturalism. (For a much deeper analysis of Filipina “marriage migrants” in south Korea, see chapter 12.) in one case, 116 women married to Korean men presented a petition to the Philippine embassy in seoul. The petition demanded “justice and equal rights,” as well as the right to Korean citizenship after two years of residency in Korea, whether married or divorced. This latter demand, the

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group argued, was necessary to give wives more power relative to their husbands, who would use access to Korean citizenship as a “weapon to abuse (blackmail) their wives.” even more, the petition asked that Korean men be required to learn about their wives’ cultures and languages before getting married (“Foreign spouses in Korea speak out on Their rights,” Korea Times, 3 July 2005). although this petition did not lead to any changes in itself, an incident in July 2010—the murder of a vietnamese woman, Thach Thi Hoang ngoc, by her Korean husband, just eight days after their return to south Korea—sparked a flurry of activity within the government, including a proposal by the Ministry of Justice that Korean men receive some form of mandated “multicultural education” before marrying (“Police Clamp Down on Marriage Brokers,” Korea Times, 18 July 2010). Filipino marriage migrants in Korea, it is also worth noting, have formed two organizations, the Filipino Korean spouses association (formed in 2001) and the Philippine Korean Wives association (founded in 2004). May Cordorva, a migrant-wife-turned-activist, has been a particularly outspoken opponent of the assimilationist and integrationist assumptions of Korean multiculturalism. as she put it (in this verbatim quote), “We always have a trouble about the cultural and some family problems. Most of Koreans are forcing us [foreign wives] . . . to follow their culture. yeah, we did, but the trouble is that they want us to forget about our culture for the reason we married them, but for me that’s the big cause of problems of the migrant married couples” (Cordova, n.d.). What i have described here are decidedly “small acts,” but in a particular context, they take on greater salience, sometimes requiring only a single, unanticipated incident to trigger a flurry of more significant changes. The murder of Thach Thi Hoang ngoc was one such event. another relatively small incident occurred a year earlier, in 2009, when Bonogit Hussain (an indian national), who was riding a bus with a Korean female friend, became the victim of a physical and racist assault. after extensive coverage by the national media—both in south Korea and india—Korean prosecutors charged the suspect in the verbal assault with contempt, the first time such charges had ever been applied to an alleged racist offence. This subsequently led to discussions in the national assembly for another first in south Korea: a law against racial and ethnic discrimination. Hussain, it is important to note, was an activist in india (and a Ph.D. candidate who was then working for a Korean university) and the one who made the incident public: with the help of his friend, he reported the crime to the police and to the media.19 Thus, what was a rather mundane incident—Hussain pointed out that such crimes occur every day, but are 19

information about this incident comes from two sources: “setting a Precedent on racism,” Korea Herald, 6 november 2009; and “it’s less Korean, But Can it Be More open? south

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very rarely reported20—ended up having far-reaching implications. The larger point, to repeat, is that such incidents take on greater meaning in certain contexts. Prior to 2000, south Korea’s larger socioeconomic and political context gave little to no room for the development of immigrant rights beyond basic labor rights. But, with the introduction of a multiculturalist discourse—even one dictated and determined by the state—the context has changed. in this new context, behaviors and attitudes, once taken for granted as natural or normal, can take on new and very different meanings. But this does not happen automatically. instead, the meaning attached to specific behaviors and attitudes is constructed through the actions and attitudes of other actors, such as Bonogit Hussain, May Cordova, and many others. Thus, while multiculturalism may mean one thing today in south Korea, it may mean something very different five, ten, or twenty years from now. Conclusion it is easy to dismiss the introduction of multiculturalism in south Korea as little more than a cynical effort by the state to disguise a strongly, even coercive, assimilationist and integrationist policy. But, as i have suggested throughout this chapter, the concept of multiculturalism cannot be entirely co-opted by the Korean state. This is partly because of its unavoidable fluidity; but it is also because multiculturalism has, for a long time, been part of worldwide discourse where the contrast between south Korea’s state-centric version and other, especially more “radical” versions, is often very stark. and because the prevailing conception of multiculturalism can been used to justify a range of conflicting policy choices on immigration— from an exclusionary mode to a highly inclusionary one—we can expect a struggle over the “true meaning” of multiculturalism to ensue. as i noted at the outset, this is a fundamentally political process, even if the “political struggle” between and among different actors is largely submerged and indirect. For the most part, this has been the case in south Korea. at the same time, this is a struggle that is only beginning to coalesce. For the first few decades after the beginning of large-scale immigration to south Korea is Contemplating First law against racial or ethnic Discrimination,” International Herald Tribune, 2 november 2009. 20 admittedly, though, these assaults are most common against ordinary foreign workers, not professionals. Hussain himself was quite aware of this. as he put it, the vast majority of foreign workers “face much worse situations than mine. They cannot complain for two reasons. one, they might lose their jobs, Two, [they think] ‘even if i go to the police, nothing will happen.’” and, they are probably right. When Hussain first went to the police, they initially treated him—not his attacker—with suspicion. The police questioned his immigration status and refused to believe that he was a university professor. They also referred to him as a “foreigner with a hard life,” implying that he was an unskilled factory worker (“it’s less Korean”).

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Korea, the focus was on the expansion of labor rights. and, while that “war” has not been won by foreign workers, it is clear that significant changes have occurred, culminating (thus far) in the creation of the ePs. This was a more overt struggle, one that relied very strongly and perhaps crucially on the institutional context of Korean democracy. in this struggle, moreover, there was an intimate conjunction of interests between foreign workers and Korean ngos and activists. This conjunction of interests has weakened over the issue of long-term immigration and multiculturalism, as even Korean progressives have tended to view Korea’s “blood purity” and monoculturalism as near sacrosanct. Ultimately, it is not entirely clear how multiculturalism will develop in south Korea or how immigration policy, particularly with respect to long-term rights of residency (denizenship) and citizenship will play out—for both foreign workers and marriage migrants. But, there is no basis for rejecting major, if not fundamental, changes in the south Korean context. indeed, as i have attempted to show, the prospects for significant change are quite strong. References abelmann, nancy, and Hyunhee Kim. 2005. “a Failed attempt at Transnational Marriage: Maternal Citizenship in a globalizing south Korea.” in Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia, edited by nicole Constable, 101–123. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. atikcan, ece ozlem. 2006. “Citizenship or Denizenship: The Treatment of Third Country nationals in the european Union.” SEI Working Paper 85. Falmer, UK: sussex european institute. Bartrop, Paul r. 2001. “The Holocaust, the aborigines, and the Bureaucracy of Destruction: an australian Dimension of genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research 3:75–87. Brubaker, rogers. 2001. “The return of assimilation? Changing Perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, germany, and the United states.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 (July): 531–548. Castles, stephen, and Mark J. Miller. 2003. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. new york: guildford Press, 3rd ed. Cordova, May. n.d. “organizing Migrants and experiences of Collective action among Filipino Women Marriage Migrants in south Korea.” available at http://docs.exdat.com/docs/index-161241.html (retrieved 4 February 2013). Cortell, andrew P., and James W. Davis, Jr. 2000. “Understanding the Domestic impact of international norms: a research agenda.” International Studies Review 2 (spring): 65–87.

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Dahl, Kathleen. “Definition of Culture.” n.d. available at https://sites. google.com/a/eou.edu/kathleen-dahl/definitions-and-concepts (retrieved 4 February 2013). Foster, lois, and David stockley. 1984. Multiculturalism: The Changing Australian Paradigm. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters. Freeman, Caren. 2005. “Marrying Up and Marrying Down: The Paradoxes of Marital Mobility for Chosŏnjok Brides in south Korea.” in Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia, edited by nicole Constable, 80–100. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. ghaffar-Kucher, ameena. 2006. “assimilation, integration, or isolation? (re-) Framing the education of immigrants.” Current Issues in Comparative Education 9 (December 7): 3–5. available at www.tc.edu/ cice/issues/09.01/CiCe_Fall2006_vol9(1).pdf (retrieved 4 February 2013). gurowitz, amy. 1999. “Mobilizing international norms: Domestic actors, immigrants, and the Japanese states.” World Politics 51 (april): 413–445. Hammar, Tomas. 1990. Democracy and the Nation State. Aliens, Denizens, and Citizens. aldershot, UK: gower. Han, geon-soo. 2007. “Multicultural Korea: Celebration or Challenge of Multiethnic shift in Contemporary Korea.” Korea Journal 47:32–63. Joppke, Christian. 2004. “The retreat of Multiculturalism in the liberal state: Theory and Policy.” British Journal of Sociology 55:237–257. ———. 2005. Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. ———. 1998 [2006]. “Why liberal states accept Unwanted immigration.” World Politics 50 (January): 266–293. reprinted in The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies, edited by anthony M. Messina and gallya lahav. Boulder: lynne rienner Publishers. Joppke, Christian, and steven lukes, eds. 1999. Multicultural Questions. oxford: oxford University. Jupp, James. 1995. “From ‘White australia’ to ‘Part of asia’: recent shifts in australian immigration Policy towards the region.” International Migration Review 29 (spring): 207–228. Kim, Hui-Jung. 2009. “immigration Challenges and ‘Multicultural’ responses: The state, the Dominant ethnie, and immigrants in south Korea.” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin. ProQuest/UMi. UMi Publication no. 3384154. Kong, lily, and Brenda s. a. yeoh. 2003. The Politics of Landscape in Singapore: Construction of “Nation.” syracuse, ny: syracuse University Press.

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Korean immigration service (Kis). 2009. The First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, 2008–2012. seoul: Ministry of Justice. lee, Hye-Kyung. 2008. “international Marriage and the state in south Korea: Focusing on governmental Policy.” Citizenship Studies 12 (February): 108–123. lim, Timothy C. 1999. “The Fight for equal rights: Foreign Migrant Workers in south Korea.” Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance 24:329–360. ———. 2003. “racing from the Bottom in south Korea? The nexus between Civil society and Transnational Migrants in south Korea.” Asian Survey 43:423–442. ———. 2006. “ngos, Transnational Migrants, and the Promotion of rights in south Korea.” in Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective, edited by Takeyuki Tsuda, 235–272. lanham, MD: lexington Books. ———. 2008. “Will south Korea Follow the german experience? Democracy, the Migratory Process, and the Prospects for Permanent immigration in Korea.” Korean Studies 32:28–55. nye, Joseph. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. new york: Public affairs. oezcan, veysel. 2004. “germany: immigration in Transition.” Migration Information Source: Country Profiles. available at www. migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?iD=235 (retrieved 22 august 2010). Pautz, Hartwig. 2005. “The Politics of identity in germany: The Leitkultur Debate.” Race and Class 46:39–52. radtke, Frank olaf. 2001. “Multiculturalism: sociological aspects.” in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 15, edited by neil J. smelser and Paul Baltes, 10184–10189. oxford: elsevier science. schily, otto, and Joanne J. Meyers. 2005. “german immigration issues.” Carnegie Council for ethics in international affairs. available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/transcripts/5280.html (retrieved 4 February 2013). sliwka, anne. 2010. “From Homogeneity to Diversity in german education.” in Educating Teachers for Diversity: Meeting the Challenge, Centre for educational research and innovation, 205–217. Paris: oeCD. Tiryakian, edwar a. 2003. “assessing Multiculturalism Theoretically: E Pluribus Unum, Sic et Non.” International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS) 5:20–39.

THree

Korea Multiethnic or Multicultural?

nora HUi-JUng KiM

in recent years, a rapidly expanding discussion of south Korea’s (hereafter Korea) transition to a multiethnic and multicultural society has taken place. Major newspapers, whether politically inclined to the left or the right, have published editorials and opinion columns announcing the advent of a multicultural society, and editors have urged the Korean government and the Korean people to change both social structure and mindset to accommodate the country’s increasing ethnocultural diversity. Because of the widespread myth of ethnic homogeneity in Korea, this sudden interest in multiculturalism is both unexpected and puzzling for many people. in this chapter, i shed light on the mode in which ethnocultural diversity in Korea is managed by critically analyzing how the news media articulates the idea of a multicultural and multiethnic Korea. Three different perspectives of a multicultural and multiethnic society can be applied to Korea. The first limits multiculturalism and multiethnicity to Western (and a few asian) countries. This perspective implies that Korea is not such a country. The second perspective, which has been the most prevalent one since 2006, is that Korea is becoming a multicultural and multiethnic country as a result of globalization and international migration. like the first perspective, this one includes a binary image of multicultural and multiethnic Western countries contrasted with homogenous Korea. Korea’s transformation to a multiethnic and multicultural society occurs in the course of Korea becoming more globalized and Westernized. Finally, a few columnists have argued that Korea has always been a multiethnic country. From this third perspective, the transition to a multicultural and multiethnic society is not unprecedented, but rather a matter of degree. overall, there is a widespread consensus that Korea is undergoing a significant transformation and is more multicultural and multiethnic than

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ever before.1 There is also a general agreement that the transition to a multicultural and multiethnic society is inevitable, but may be beneficial if managed well. nonetheless, a closer examination of the media discourse reveals that the transition to a multiethnic and multicultural society remains an incomplete project. Most Koreans, like their Japanese counterparts (lie 2001), firmly believed and took pride in the “fact” that Korea was a homogeneous country in terms of culture, ethnicity, and class. By entertaining the idea of a multicultural and multiethnic Korea, Koreans embrace, though possibly with some hesitation, the ethnic differences between the new members of the Korean nation and ethnic Koreans. However, most Koreans have yet to embrace or respect cultural differences. rather, the goal of erasing these cultural differences through incorporation measures remains. as such, Korea may be becoming a multiethnic society, but not a multicultural society. This chapter consists of three parts. First, i outline changing views on multiculturalism and multiethnicity vis-à-vis Korean society. second, i delve more deeply into the nature of the multicultural and multiethnic Korea portrayed in the news media. This section will reveal the discrepancy between multiethnic and multicultural in the news media discourse. Finally, i conclude with a call for addressing a neglected issue in Korea— the issue of ethnocultural justice. i rely primarily on a discourse analysis of news media to address these issues. However, in analyzing and interpreting media discourse, i also bring in data and insights i acquired during seven months of fieldwork in Korea from February through august of 2006, and follow-up fieldwork during June and July of 2008. The Multicultural Explosion in South Korea scholars consider Korea one of the few ethnically homogenous nationstates in the world (shin 2006). it is a country notorious for its strong ethnocultural definition of nationhood and its obsession with purity of blood. in august 2003, for example, yi yu Chin, an actress with a Korean mother and a white father (a soldier), held a press conference to confess that she was not a “pure” Korean. she cried out of shame during the entire press conference. There had been rumors that she might be mixed or was not “pure” Korean. But up to that point, she had denied the allegations for 1

By general consensus, i mean the prevalence of that particular view; i do not claim that there is one unified voice regarding multiculturalism and multiethnicity in the Korean news media. Quite to the contrary, there are competing views on the nature of multiethnic and multicultural Korea. i will explore the competing views later in this chapter.

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fear of being ostracized from Korean society. For sure, part of the shame owes to the fact that she had lied about her background, not just the fact that she was of mixed race. and the online responses to reports of the event show that readers were sympathetic to the actress. nonetheless, the fact that there had been rumors about her ethnic or racial “purity” and that her “coming out” captured nationwide media attention is indicative of how strong and deep-rooted myths of ethnic homogeneity are in Korea. The idea of ethnic homogeneity was politically mobilized and reinforced through independence struggles against Japanese imperialism during the early to mid-1900s, and through economic development mobilization strategies from the era of military dictatorship through the late 1980s (Kim 2009; Koo 1993; shin 1998, 2006). The current democratized Korean government is not free from the myth of ethnic homogeneity, which is reflected in its foreign-labor policies. Korea, along with Japan, is not accepting immigrants despite its acute labor shortage, aging population, and declining fertility rates. scholars identify the myth of ethnic homogeneity as one of the most important reasons for the absence of immigration policies in Korea (seol and skrentny 2004). rather than accepting immigrants, the Korean government unofficially accepts labor migrants using guest worker schemes (seol and skrentny 2004). a guest worker’s maximum length of stay is three years. By restricting the length of stay and prohibiting guest workers from bringing family members, the Korean government is attempting to maintain the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean population. against this backdrop, a recent increase in the use of the terms “multicultural” (tamunhwa) and “multiethnic” (tainjong) in the media is intriguing. The number of news articles containing the word “multicultural” has increased rapidly in the past few years. Whereas there were only 235 total entries for the ten years from 1990 to 1999, the number increased to 15,317 in 2005, 19,233 in 2006, 27,894 in 2007 and 36,778 in 2008.2 To analyze the meaning of multiculturalism and multiethnicity in the Korean context, i focus on editorials and opinion columns among the newspaper articles. i conducted two separate searches: one using “multicultural” (tamunhwa) and the other using “multiethnic” (tainjong) as the keyword. a total of 479 editorials and opinion columns are included in the data set. among those, 142 mentioned both multicultural and multiethnic, while 197 mentioned only multicultural and 140 mentioned only multiethnic. Table 3.1 summarizes the frequencies of editorials and opinion columns 2

i used the search engine service provided by the Korean Press Foundation (www.kinds. or.kr). This search engine’s database includes 181 newspapers, both national and local. i counted each news article as one entry regardless of where and how many times the word “multicultural” appeared in the article.

0%

% Describing Korea

3%

% Describing Korea

6

13

0%

1

25%

12

—

0

1997

6

—

0

20%

5

100%

1

1998

Source: Korean Press Foundation (www.kinds.or.kr).

40

25% 100%

% Describing Korea

Total

4

1

0%

4

0%

1

1996

Total

Both

35

Total

Multiethnic

1

Total

Multicultural

up to 1995

7

100%

1

0%

6

—

0

1999

5

—

0

20%

5

—

0

2000

Table 3.1 Number of Editorials and Opinion Columns, by Year

13

0%

4

0%

9

—

0

2001

9

33%

3

0%

6

—

0

2002

11

25%

4

29%

7

—

0

2003

5

0%

2

0%

2

100%

1

2004

10

71%

7

33%

3

—

0

2005

65

84%

38

75%

20

100%

7

2006

125

87%

45

67%

21

97%

59

2007

164

78%

32

40%

5

98%

127

2008

479

142

140

197

Total

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and the proportion in which Korea is described as either multicultural or multiethnic, or both. as shown in this table, there was a sudden increase in the number of articles containing the terms “multicultural” and “multiethnic” after 2006. The increase in multicultural was larger than the increase in multiethnic. indeed, the rate of increase in the number of articles with multicultural is so explosive that it may be referred to as a “multicultural explosion,” borrowing glazer’s (1997) term. The overall use of the terms increased, as well as their use as descriptors of Korea, as indicated in the percentages in table 3.1. Before the multicultural explosion, multiethnic appeared more frequently than multicultural. With the multicultural explosion in 2006, however, editorials and opinion columns mentioning multicultural outnumbered those containing multiethnic. While the number of articles mentioning only multiethnic remained relatively constant, the number of articles mentioning both words increased sharply. Multicultural (tamunhwa) and multiethnic (tainjong) are frequently used without much distinction in Korea. indeed, they often appear as a set of words, tainjong tamunhwa sahoe (multiethnic multicultural society), as if describing inseparable characteristics.3 Multiethnic Multicultural Society: Three Versions

What does tainjong tamunhwa sahoe mean in the Korean context? Careful readings of news articles reveal three different ways in which multiculturalism and multiethnicity relate to Korea. The first perspective considers multiculturalism and multiethnicity a property of only Western (and a few asian) societies. This view is evident mainly before 2006, for example, in reference to cases such as the Bosnian War in 1995 (“Multiculturalism and the 21st Century,” Segye ilbo [segye daily], 4 June 19954), apartheid in south africa (multiple entries, including “The africa national Congress’s general strike,” Han’gyŏrye sinmun [The Hankyoreh], 6 aug. 1992), and the 1992 african-american–Korean conflict in los angeles (multiple entries, 3 The terms “ethnicity” (injong) and “nationality” (minjok) are often used interchangeably in Korea. indeed, as a reviewer of this chapter aptly pointed out, the reference to the term “multinationality” (taminjok) in the news media had shown a significant increase during the multicultural explosion. However, the chapter’s analysis does not include the analysis of multinationality for two reasons. First, the chapter focuses on how the meaning of multicultural (tamunhwa) is constructed. While multicultural and multiethnicity (tainjong) frequently appear as a single set of words, the term multinationality does not. second, focusing on the notion of injong (ethnicity) brings an analytical consistency to this volume, without digressing to the related but separate issue of nation and nationalism. 4 The titles and contents of editorials and opinion columns cited in this chapter are all translated from Korean by the author.

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including “The History of ethnic Conflicts,” Han’guk ilbo [Hankuk daily], 14 May 1995). as implied by the context in which multiculturalism and multiethnicity are mentioned, multiethnicity is often portrayed as a source of social conflict and instability. This view was succinctly stated by one columnist who concluded, “Many countries are experiencing growth pains due to ethnic conflict. . . . Fortunately, Korea doesn’t need to worry about ethnic conflicts. Being a monoethnic society is not always a good thing, but it certainly is advantageous in terms of building a well-integrated society” (“The Task of social integration,” Han’guk ilbo, 25 June 1992). The flipside of this understanding of multiculturalism and multiethnicity as a primarily Western phenomenon is the assumption that Korea is not a multiethnic society. This view is presented implicitly in the following statement: “in a multiethnic country like the United states, proportional representation is proposed as a remedy for racial discrimination, but the scheme may also work as a remedy for the prevalent regionalism in Korea” (“Toward Proportional representation,” Segye ilbo, 30 Dec. 1992). However, sometimes the assumption of ethnic homogeneity is explicitly expressed, as in the following statement: “it is not such a good idea to adopt american policies without any modification because we’re not a multiethnic society [like the United states is]” (“layoffs Create employment?” Han’gyŏrye sinmun, 20 Jan. 1997). in this respect, more significant than the occasional reference to Western multicultural societies is the absence of multicultural and multiethnic discourse in the Korean news media. among the 479 editorials selected for the study, only 26 percent were written prior to 2006 (see table 3.1) revealing the recency of the news media’s interest in multiculturalism and multiethnicity. The most common use of the terms multicultural(ism) and multiethnicity in the Korean media is in the acknowledgment of the increasing ethnic diversity of the Korean population. of articles containing the terms multicultural, multiethnic, or both, 95 percent, 29 percent, and 75 percent, respectively, expressed the view that Korea has become/is becoming/will soon become a multicultural and multiethnic country. While there was only a single editorial on multiculturalism in 2005, the number increased to fifteen in 2006, seventy in 2007, and 144 in 2008. articles including the terms multiethnic and both multicultural and multiethnic follow a similar pattern. The acknowledgment of increasing ethnic diversity in Korea coincides with the sudden increase in the number of opinion columns and editorials. The Korean news media began to pay more attention to the issue of multiethnicity and multiculturalism only after the issue was considered a Korean, rather than a foreign, topic. Thoroughly explaining the causes of this sudden explosion in the

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multicultural discourse goes beyond the scope of this chapter.5 However, one important reason is the increasing number of nonethnic Koreans living in Korea due to international migration. The main immigrant groups are guest workers and female migrants via international marriage (hereafter “marriage migrants,” kyŏrhon iminja). guest workers constitute approximately half the foreign population, while marriage migrants account for about 10 percent of the foreign population. nonetheless, because marriage migrants are expected to stay in Korea while guest workers are expected to return to their country of origin, the recent interest in multicultural and multiethnic discourse is mainly due to the presence of marriage migrants. This selective inclusion of marriage migrants and exclusion of guest workers is one of the key characteristics of Korean multiculturalism. i will explore this issue further in the following section. like the first view, the second perspective maintains that Korea has preserved ethnic purity until quite recently. Consider statements such as “We, who have managed to maintain the purity of monoethnicity for thousands of years, are finally becoming a multicultural society” (“The advent of a Multicultural society,” Maeil kyŏngje [Maeil economics], 19 apr. 2007) and “The current policy issues include the preparation for the transition to a multicultural and multiethnic society that is unprecedented in Korean history” (“Female Migration in east asia and Korean society,” Kyŏnghyang sinmun [The KyungHang], 11 nov. 2006). in this second perspective, the transition to a multicultural and multiethnic society is a fairly recent phenomenon, and the long-preserved ethnic purity is what makes this transition more challenging for Koreans. in this respect, acknowledging ethnic diversity, intentionally or unintentionally, confirms and reproduces the (inaccurate) view that Korea has, until recently, been a monoethnic society. There is yet a third perspective on how multiculturalism relates to Korea. This view asserts that “the purity of blood in a strict sense had never held true [because] there had been frequent exchanges of genes among different people before the establishment of a state [in the Korea peninsula]” (“We Must Take Care of Multicultural Families,” Ch‘ungbuk ilbo [Chungbook daily], 10 June 2008). For example, the perspective acknowledges continued miscegenation with the Chinese, Mongols, Japanese, and europeans either through invasion or cultural exchange (“a Multicultural society Does not Come True simply by Dressing Foreigners in Hanbok [traditional Korean dress],” Oh My News, 25 apr. 2007), and the 5

several factors contribute to this sudden multicultural explosion, including the Korean state’s interest in incorporating immigrants, increasing pressures from international institutions such as the United nations, and Korean civil society activism. For more discussion on the causes of the multicultural explosion, see Kim (2009).

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presence of ethnic Chinese (Hwagyo) as early as 1882 (“Korean Hwagyos: Those Who are not Chosen,” Maeil Sinmun, 6 Mar. 2008). However, this view remains an uncommon one. indeed, only eight articles expressed this view. Challenges and Opportunities for a Multiethnic Multicultural Korea

This section provides a more in-depth analysis of the second version of multiculturalism and multiethnicity. as discussed in the previous section, a common perception in Korea is that the country is entering an unprecedented stage that demands some preparation and structural and cultural modifications. Korea becoming a multicultural country is viewed as presenting both challenges and opportunities. increasing diversity is a challenge because Koreans have never had to deal with issues of ethnic diversity and are still obsessed with purity of blood (mentioned in 48 percent of articles).6 This ethnocentric attitude is identified as one of most serious challenges to immigrant incorporation. Writers of these articles raised concerns that the failure to incorporate immigrants will pose a serious threat to social stability because these ostracized and alienated immigrants will soon form a social underclass (16 percent of articles). The following two quotes illustrate the challenges for a multiethnic Korea: it was ethnic minority workers who faced discrimination who mainly participated in the riot in France. in the United states, Hispanic workers organized a May Day rally to demonstrate their political power. in the case of Korea, it is estimated that 18 percent of children of marriage migrants have experienced some sort of discrimination and alienation just because their mothers are foreigners or because their Korean is not native-like. . . . if we let these children become alienated and fail to incorporate them properly, there will be serious side effects and social problems in the near future. The responsibilities and damages will all fall on us as a community. (“let’s get ready for a Multicultural society,” Pusan sinmun [Busan daily], 22 sept. 2006) The virginia Tech incident makes me want to not watch the news. . . . it wouldn’t take long for our society to become a multicultural society like the United states. a majority of international marriage families belong to the lower economic class. in addition to economic hardship, they are also suffering from our prejudice and misconceptions about them. The virginia Tech incident calls for actions from the central and local governments and citizens to pay more attention to the underprivileged, 6

only editorials and opinion columns relating to Korea are included in this analysis; those that do not mention Korea are excluded. Thus, the percentage is calculated not on the basis of the total number of articles in the data set (n = 479) but on the basis of the numbers of articles referring to Korea (n = 335).

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as illustrated in the two quotes here, an increasing number of immigrants and greater ethnic diversity is described as a serious threat to social stability and unity. However, the threat is only a potential one, which might be realized in the form of tragic events like the civil unrest in France and the virginia Tech shooting if Korea fails to take proper precautions. in contrast, the transition to a multiethnic and multicultural society is considered both inevitable and beneficial. international marriage increased initially because of the demographic and economic conditions of rural communities (H. lee 2008).7 Without addressing root causes, labor and marriage migration will not stop and, in this sense, the transformation to a multicultural and multiethnic society is inevitable. However, the transition can be beneficial because incorporating marriage migrants and their children can stimulate the declining fertility rate and lessen the pressure placed on an aging population (mentioned in 4 percent of articles) and may even revitalize rural communities (mentioned in 6 percent of articles). Moreover, the media presents the transition as a solution to the challenges posed by globalization and internationalization; the children of marriage migrants can grow up to be global leaders (mentioned in 17 percent of the articles). Finally, multiculturalism and multiethnicity is considered one of the defining characteristics of developed (read: Western) countries. Thus, Korea’s transition to a multicultural and multiethnic society is both a result of and an indicator of Korea’s economic development (mentioned in 28 percent of articles). For example, a columnist at Hongsŏng sinmun described the potential benefits of multiculturalism in the following way: The increasing number of international marriages and the children of such unions has been easing the burden of one of the most serious social problems in Korea—low birth rates. The number of children in rural areas is expected to rise thanks to international marriages. Many branch schools in small rural areas were on the verge of being closed, but many of them are experiencing revitalization. again, thanks to international 7 The Korean developmental model of the 1960s and 1970s, which relied on cheap labor and an export-oriented economy, caused a massive rural-to-urban migration. The benefits of economic development were unevenly distributed across urban and rural areas in Korea. While the standard of living in urban areas significantly improved, in rural areas it became relatively worse. This uneven development led to an increasing unwillingness among urban Korean women to marry rural bachelors and give up the benefits of a high standard of living, leading to the deterioration of rural communities.

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marriages. (“We Must embrace Multicultural Families,” Hongsŏng sinmun [Hongsŏng newspaper], 15 June 2007) The multicultural family phenomenon is one of the noticeable consequences of the ever-worsening rural economy caused by the WTo [World Trade organization] and FTa [Free Trade agreement]. Members of multicultural families in rural areas can help us overcome problems of aging and the shrinking rural population. Further, they can be pioneers of and great human resources to Korean agriculture. Toward that end, we need to provide them with opportunities, which start with acknowledging and respecting multiculturalism and having more open minds toward them. We must treat marriage migrants not as foreigners but as Koreans and respect them as such. (“Multicultural Families as a new engine for rural Development,” Segye ilbo, 21 Jan. 2008)

These quotations are typical examples of the ways in which Korean newspapers describe the contributions that immigrants, particularly marriage migrants and their children, make to the Korean nation-state. Just as the threat that immigrants pose to the Korean nation-state is a potential one, so is their contribution. Whether immigrants and ethnic minorities will become a threat or a resource depends on the success or failure of attempts to incorporate members of these groups. Multicultural Assimilation in Korea: Cultural versus Ethnic Diversity The number of foreign residents in Korea is increasing and will most likely continue to increase. it may be safe to conclude from this trend that Korea is becoming a multiethnic society. But is Korea really becoming a multicultural society where ethnocultural differences are respected and celebrated? The experiences of other multiethnic societies show that multiethnicity does not necessarily guarantee cultural diversity. often immigrants are pressured to abandon their cultural heritage and assimilate to the mainstream culture. indeed, multicultural recognition in Western countries required the political mobilization of discriminated ethnic minorities for better politics of recognition (Taylor 1994). even with political mobilization, cultural discrimination and stereotypes have persisted. it is not enough to ask, therefore, whether Korea is becoming a multicultural and multiethnic society. The more important issue is what kind of multicultural and multiethnic society is envisioned and proposed. The answer to this question depends more on the interpretation of multicultural than on the interpretation of multiethnicity because the meaning of multiculturalism varies greatly in different contexts (vertovec 1998). in the following section, i will analyze the nature of multiculturalism in the context of the multicultural explosion in Korea.

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Multicultural Family and Multicultural Society

according to vertovec (1998), the most common usage of “multicultural(ism)” is to describe the demographic characteristics of a given society, particularly the ethnic and accompanying cultural diversity among different ethnic groups. Multiculturalism is also used to describe a particular mode of managing ethnocultural diversity. While multiculturalist approaches vary, they tend to share a common tenet that cultural differences should be celebrated and preserved. Toward this end, the state guarantees, if necessary, special rights or services to members of certain cultural groups. all in all, multiculturalism can be defined as a collective effort by various groups in a society, including the state, civil society, and minority groups, to promote ethnocultural justice (Kymlicka 1995). However, multiculturalism in Korea has little to do with ethnocultural justice. one of the main factors leading to the multicultural explosion is the Korean state’s attempt to assimilate marriage migrants and their children under the guise of multiculturalism. The target groups of the project—marriage migrants and their children—are referred to as “multicultural families” (tamunhwa kajŏng) and “children of multicultural families” (tamunhwa kajŏng chanyŏ). While these are widely used expressions in Korea, literal english translations of these Korean terms sound awkward at best. The term multicultural family was initially suggested by several Korean intellectuals and activists to replace the term “mixed blood” (honhyŏl), which has a negative connotation. Multicultural was also preferred over multiethnic for a similar reason. as explained in the previous section, multiethnic has negative implications such as a lack of purity and a source of social conflict. a new term like multiculturalism would provide a foundation with fewer negative connotations for the project of incorporating marriage migrants and their children. sixty-eight percent of the articles surveyed commented on either multicultural families or the children of multicultural families. The prevalence of terms such as “multicultural family” (tamunhwa kajŏng) and “multicultural children” (tamunhwa chanyŏ) in the discourse of multiculturalism is unique to the Korean context. in other countries experiencing immigration, such as Canada and australia, immigrants are accepted as family and individuals. Those families and individuals collectively form a cultural community or group. it is these cultural communities that are the building blocks of multiculturalism discourse and practice. in contrast, in Korea, (mostly female) immigrants become members of Korean families, and it is these multicultural families that are the unit of Korean multiculturalism. Multicultural families exist in Korea, but cultural communities do not. Confined by relationships with a Korean

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family, immigrants’ capacity to advocate ethnocultural justice is severely limited. The discourses of multiculturalism focusing on multicultural families highlight the unique characteristics of Korean multiculturalism, as illustrated in the following two quotations. in the last year, the divorce rate among international marriages increased threefold; about 30% of marriage migrants in Korea have experienced discrimination and disrespect and 15% of them are victims of domestic violence. . . . The seed of a successful marriage can be planted in the effort to transform foreign brides into “Korean daughters-in-law.” Husbands may accompany their wives and attend various programs prepared for marriage migrants. Mothers-in-law teach marriage migrants the bread and butter of housekeeping. Daughters-in-law, who came to love Korea and become Koreans, introduce relatives in their hometowns to other Korean bachelors—this is the kind of model that would lead us to a true multiethnic and multicultural society. (“obsession with Purity of Blood is in our Way to a Multiethnic and Multicultural society,” Han’guk ilbo, 17 april 2007) We must help them [marriage migrants] assimilate to our culture as soon as possible. We must help them to get used to our way of eating, [wearing] clothing, and housekeeping There has been some mobilization among women’s organizations to help marriage migrants. Those organizations are helping marriage migrants settle down in Korea by teaching marriage migrants the Korean language and Korean alphabet, how to make kimchi and soy sauce, how to wear a hanbok, and the roles of women in a family. (“We Must Take Care of Multicultural Families,” Ch‘ungbuk ilbo [north Ch‘ungch‘ŏng daily], 10 June 2008)

as demonstrated in the quotes here, there is an interesting interaction between the goal of assimilation and the discourse of multiculturalism. authors of both editorials urge Koreans to overcome the obsession with purity of blood and to accept multiculturalism, or at least to acknowledge that Korea is a de facto multiethnic and multicultural country. Marriage migrants and their children are portrayed as victims of outdated obsession and prejudice. authors then suggest helping marriage migrants and their children escape victimhood by assisting their assimilation into Korean culture. Thus, what these authors mean by “multicultural” families is, in fact, “multiethnic” families; a family composed of some members with Korean ethnicity (the husband and the in-laws) and some with non-Korean ethnicity (the wife and their mixed-ethnic children). The term multicultural is simply preferred to multiethnic because of the negative connotations of multiethnic. The authors prescribe erasing the presumed

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cultural difference between the immigrant wife and the Korean husband by teaching the immigrant wife Korean ways of being and doing. a quick examination of the multicultural programs offered in Korea confirms this unconventional marriage between multiculturalism and assimilation found in the media discourse.8 Multiculturalism, as practiced in Korea, is largely a task of the Korean government (48 percent) targeting marriage migrants (31 percent), their children (22 percent), and their family members (26 percent). indeed, 80 percent of all events or programs are targeted to so-called multicultural families. The concentration on multicultural families rose from 63 percent in 2006 to 80 percent in 2007 and 81 percent in 2008. a total of 364 programs were identified; 186 of them were targeted at marriage migrants (51 percent). The breakdown of 186 programs provided to marriage migrants are Korean-language training (17 percent), classes related to mothering and parenting (9 percent), Korean culture and tradition classes (13 percent), programs on relationships (9 percent), mentoring services (5 percent), support for wedding ceremonies or visits to their home countries (21 percent), financial support or fund-raising (9 percent), and general training (16 percent). Here, i provide some examples of programs as they were reported in the newspaper. The descriptions of these events and programs provide a clearer image of the nature of programs regarding marriage migrants. The south Kyŏngsang Women empowerment Center hosted a lecture titled “laughter Fosters a relationship between Mothers-in-law and Daughters-in-law” as a part of a larger program, Multicultural Families of love. The audience of the lecture had the chance to reassure feelings toward each other. (“Fostering relationships between Mothers-in-law and Daughters-in-law of Multicultural Families,” Kyŏngnam sinmun [south Kyŏngsang newspaper], 5 June 2007) The Korean Women’s association north Chŏlla branch held an event titled “Putting Multicultural Families on the right Track” to help them better understand Korean culture and their expected roles in the community. The events covered traditional Korean etiquette and the tea ceremony. in addition, there were events such as rice-cake making that provided marriage migrants the opportunity to become familiar with Korean culture. (“Korean Women’s association, Putting Multicultural Families on the right Track event,” Chŏnbuk ilbo [north Chŏlla daily], 29 sep. 2008) 8 The KinDs search engine returned 1,238 news articles with the word “multicultural” in the heading from 1996 through 2008. These articles do not include editorials or opinion columns. of the 1,238 articles, 1,230 refer to events in Korea. Types of programs and measures, target groups, and the agent of policy implementation are identified from those 1,230 articles. For more detailed analysis of the incorporation programs, see Kim (2009).

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The north Chŏlla association of Women’s organizations organized a dialogue between couples in multicultural families in various places in the north Chŏlla area for two days on the 12th and 13th. With twentyfour multicultural couples invited, this program was designed to foster mutual understanding of each other’s culture. on the first day, Prof. gwak delivered a lecture on the importance of communication between husbands and wives in the course of living a life as marriage migrants. The lecture was followed by a Korean-culture class covering traditional Korean wedding customs and etiquette. (“nCaWo launches Programs for Multicultural Families,” Chŏnbuk ilbo [north Chŏlla daily], 14 Dec. 2008)

examining the specifics of the programs confirms that, in practice, Korean multiculturalism is primarily an attempt to eradicate cultural differences within a multicultural family by assimilating marriage migrants as Korean mothers, wives, and daughter-in-laws. This Korean-style multicultural assimilation indicates the ambivalence most Koreans have about abandoning the long-lasting view of the homogeneity of the Korean nation. as was the case in Japan (lie 2001), homogeneity in Korea includes ethnic, cultural, and class dimensions.9 The presence of marriage migrants and their children challenged the notion of ethnic homogeneity. The news media cite statistics showing that the number of “foreigners residing in Korea” has reached almost 2 percent of the Korean population and declare that Korea has become a multicultural society.10 However, 3 percent is a low percentage compared to the immigrant proportion of other countries. Moreover, the Korean immigration Bureau’s operational definition of “foreigners residing in Korea” is nonKorean citizens who plan to stay more than ninety days in Korea. among those foreigners, a majority are temporary migrants who will leave Korea in two or three years (such as guest workers). a significant portion of those foreigners in Korea are ethnic Koreans such as Korean-Chinese (Chosŏnjok) and Korean emigrants (seol and skrentny 2009). This leaves only a small portion of nonethnic Korean settlers. in this sense, the multicultural explosion in Korea might be viewed as much ado about nothing. However, what is important is not the actual size of the ethnic minority population in Korea, but how Koreans and the Korean government respond to these individuals. Most Koreans have ignored the fact that a significant number of Koreans have a multiethnic background and have 9 although i have not explored the class issue in this chapter, the anxiety expressed over children of marriage migrants growing up to form an underclass may indicate concerns with uncovering the class difference of the Korean nation. 10 see, for example, Kim Hyŏng-jung, “let’s embrace Multicultural Families [Tamunhwa kajŏng podŭmja],” Chungdo ilbo, 5 nov. 2008.

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excluded ethnic Chinese and amerasians (Korean children fathered by americans) to hold on to the myth of ethnic homogeneity. For several reasons (which are beyond the scope of this chapter), most Koreans now seem to be willing to relax the ethnic-purity assumption. The multicultural explosion in Korea is the harbinger of this change. a closer examination of the nature of the multicultural explosion, however, reveals that most Koreans have yet to embrace or respect cultural differences. Marriage migrants and their children have introduced a degree of heterogeneity that Korean society has never before experienced, which is suspected to cause serious social problems. skin tones and facial features are hard to change, but cultural markers can be erased as migrants acquire Korean standards. as such, Korean multiculturalism is more of a means to maintain social stability than a means to boost ethnocultural justice in the face of increasing ethnic diversity in Korea. of course, this unusual combination of multiculturalism and assimilationist goals is not the only perspective observed in the multicultural explosion. some commentators raise concerns that too much emphasis on assimilating marriage migrants into Korean culture is not true multiculturalism. For example: immigrants in Korea must have their own traditional holidays and customs. With the biggest Korean holiday just around the corner, it begs us to reflect how much we have cared to understand their culture and tradition. it is of acute concern to design a systematic multicultural education program to bring about peace and harmony among our future generations. (“Multiculturalism, Multicultural Family, and Multicultural education,” Seoul ilbo [seoul daily], 17 sep. 2008) Korean policies regarding multicultural families mainly consist of programs to teach marriage migrants Korean culture, such as Koreanlanguage classes, so that they can monitor their children’s educational progress and communicate with their in-laws. This is none other than cultural violence. Their culture must be respected as much as ours is. a mother who doesn’t have pride in her own culture cannot raise children who do. (“respect for other Cultures,” Munhwa ilbo [Munhwa daily], 2 May 2008)

The views espoused in these quotes are similar to the conventional understanding of multiculturalism—a collective effort to advance ethnocultural justice in a given society. However, these views remain marginalized; of 339 editorials and opinion columns containing the term “multicultural,” less than 10 percent maintain a critical stance on Korea’s multicultural explosion. even such a critical view of the way Korean multiculturalism is practiced

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often falls short of addressing ethnocultural justice in a broader sense. in conjunction with improving ethnocultural justice in a given society, some multiculturalists also advocate international ethnocultural justice. viewed from the perspective of international relations, multiculturalism may function as a discourse of anti-Westernism and anticolonialism (vertovec 1998). as a reaction against the present unidirectional cultural flow, from occident to orient, multiculturalism can be a discursive tool for colonized and/or non-Western countries to reject the colonizers’ or Westerners’ values on the basis of their universality and standardization and to address ethnocultural justice at the international level. However, in the Korean context, respecting cultural differences is valued not for its own merit or value, but for the instrumental value it brings to Korea’s reputation. in other words, multiculturalism is framed as a way to appeal to foreign (presumably Western) nation-states, as expressed in the following quote. Foreign experts scold that even if Korea might become an economic power, it can never become an advanced, culturally rich country unless we transform our attitudes, manners, and culture. With this criticism in mind, the whole society is making much ado about so-called multicultural policies and multicultural education. We shouldn’t hurry to try to assimilate them [migrants]. in a multicultural society, we must try to engage in a true intercultural dialogue and at the same time create a transcultural identity in which there is no mainstream culture but everyone has his or her equal share. This is the future for Korea and the reality for our future generation. Making a multicultural Korea may indeed be the last chance given to us. (“a Multicultural Korea in the Making,” Han’guk kyŏngje sinmun [Hanguk economy daily], 11 nov. 2008)

like the authors of the two previous quotations, the author of this opinion column warns against merging the discourse of multiculturalism and the goal of assimilation. Doing so, which may be considered Korean-style multiculturalism, would only reveal strong ethnocentric attitudes among Koreans. instead, the author argues for a more truthful interpretation and implementation of Western-style multiculturalism. Forging a truly (read: Western-style) multicultural Korea is necessary in order for Korea both to avoid being criticized by Western experts and to become more like Western nation-states. in this sense, Korean multiculturalism uncritically accepts the discursive construction of the liberal free occident versus the nonliberal unfree orient (Brown 2006). not only is the effort to address domestic ethnocultural justice absent in Korea, but a critical evaluation of hegemonic Western values and standards is also lacking. Becoming a multicultural country and embracing multiculturalism is acceptance, not rejection, of Western norms and standards (see chapter 4 in this volume).

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Marginalized Voices in “Multicultural” Korea as lie notes, what allowed the Japanese to believe in the homogeneity of Japanese society was “the silence of the actually existing minority groups” (2001, 138). ethnic minorities in Korea have been silenced through most of modern Korean history and their voices are once more marginalized in the multicultural Korea. There are only four articles in my study that were authored by those who are not ethnic Koreans, and these authors are all whites from Western countries. not only are the voices of ethnic minorities underrepresented, their attitudes toward multiculturalism are quite different from ethnically Korean authors. ethnic minority group members are either indifferent toward, or critical of, the multicultural explosion in Korea (Kim 2012). For example, a migrant worker made the following comment about Migrants’ arirang, Korea’s government-sponsored multicultural festival.11 From the beginning to the end, Koreans controlled every aspect of Migrants’ arirang. Just displaying exotic cultures won’t bring Koreans and migrant workers closer. Cooperation and communication [in the process] are essential to achieve the aim. if the festival continues to run like it does now, no migrant workers will be interested in participating in the festival anymore. (author interview, July 2006)

The migrant activist expressed his disapproval of the “multicultural” event due to the lack of representation of migrants in the process. indeed, migrant national associations in Korea “are simply mobilized to various government-organized events. They do not either express opinions on multiculturalism or initiate multi-cultural events of their own” (s. lee 2007, 103). The ethnic Chinese are critical of the multicultural explosion as well. one Korean Hwagyo exclaimed: Korea is now becoming a multicultural country? i almost want to say “shame on you” to the Korean government. Korea is the only country in the world where there is no Chinatown and the only country in the world where non-Korean ethnic groups are completely ignored.12 How could 11

Migrants’ arirang is a government-sponsored (Ministry of Culture and Tourism) multicultural festival. The festival started in 2005 and has become an annual event held at the end of May. Arirang is the name of an old Korean folk song, in which the lyrics symbolize the hardship of the oppressed Korean nation and its will to overcome such hardship. The purpose of this festival is twofold. First, it provides migrants, especially migrant workers, a chance to take a break from demanding work. second, the festival aims to provide an opportunity for Koreans to encounter different cultures. 12 it has to be noted that various local governments in Korea launched Chinatown con-

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they dare to say that they are now multicultural? i just can’t understand. (a third-generation woman who now lives in singapore, interview via e-mail with the author, June 2008).

some ethnic Chinese suspect that the Korean government and civil society organizations are more willing to incorporate female marriage migrants and their children because they belong to a family in which the head of household is a Korean male. The thing is that [the Korean government] does not consider us “immigrants” and that’s why we are excluded [from most immigrant policies]. They consider us just “foreigners.” Take the definition of multicultural family for example. There are a lot of multicultural families between ethnic Chinese and Koreans. Those families are not considered multicultural families. of course, they are doing economically much better than the so-called multicultural families, but i bet they still feel excluded. (secondgeneration male college professor, author interview, June 2008)

similarly to migrant workers and ethnic Chinese residents, mixed-race Koreans are skeptical of the multicultural explosion. Before the multicultural explosion, most mixed-race births in Korea involved a Korean woman and an american solider. These offspring are referred to as “amerasians,” a term coined by Pearl Buck. amerasians faced systematic discrimination and were forced to either live as second-class citizens in Korea or leave Korea; many chose to leave Korea (for more on this, see chapter 11 in this volume). although recent policy development regarding marriage migrants and their children may have some positive impact on amerasians, they are not direct beneficiaries of these policies because most amerasians have already emigrated to the United states. Those who still live in Korea are skeptical of the multicultural explosion as well. according to a survey of adolescents with mixed ethnic or racial background in Korea, about half of the students included in the survey reported indifferent or skeptical views about the multicultural explosion and 71 percent indicated a desire to emigrate (Korean youth Counseling institute 2006).

struction/revitalization projects in early 2000 in an effort to attract Chinese-owned capital. The rationale behind these projects was twofold: First, the absence of any Chinatowns in Korea, despite over a century of ethnic Chinese settlement, was an indication of the hostility toward China and the Chinese on the part of Koreans. government officials and members of the Korean business community suspected that Chinese entrepreneurs would be unwilling to invest in Korea unless Korea provided a friendlier atmosphere for the Chinese. second, given the context of China’s increasing economic power, more and more Chinese from mainland China were traveling abroad as tourists.

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Conclusion With the internationalization of multiculturalism, more and more countries are shunning the practices of assimilation and instead adopting multiculturalism as a mode of immigrant incorporation (Kymlicka 2007). along with some other asian countries (Kymlicka and He 2005), Korea joined the bandwagon of multiculturalism around 2006. When i began my fieldwork in Korea in the fall of 2006, i needed to reformulate my original research questions and hypotheses almost immediately. i was initially interested in studying activism by and on behalf of foreign workers and hypothesized that foreign-worker activism would resemble the activism of the Korean labor movement. i expected to find an absence of multiculturalism discourse, given the long-lasting and deep-rooted myths of ethnic homogeneity. However, the beginning of the multicultural explosion in the fall of 2006 led to unexpected findings. My new research question has become: What explains this unexpected multicultural explosion and what is the nature of Korean multiculturalism? in the course of my research, i was repeatedly challenged as to whether the multicultural transition in Korea is worthy of in-depth investigation. Critics suspect the empirical significance of Korea, considering it as a case of multiculturalism that has yet to be established. The sources of this doubt are twofold. The first is a matter of degree: Korea is not a multicultural country to the same extent that Canada, australia, and the United states are. Korea is not even a multicultural country to the extent that most Western european countries are. as mentioned earlier, the proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities is still about 2 percent in Korea. Therefore, critics argue that the multicultural transition in Korea is not yet mature enough to merit in-depth study. The second concern is related to the authenticity of Korean multiculturalism. some scholars argue that the substance of Korean multiculturalism (tamuhwa) is totally different from multiculturalism in Western countries. There are no ethnic communities (except ethnic Chinese residents) that can claim multicultural rights in Korea; only “multicultural families” exist. Critics argue that there is no use analyzing the Korean case from a multiculturalism framework. indeed, my analysis has shown that Korean multiculturalism is primarily a means to assimilate marriage migrants and their children. i have also argued that Korea is possibly becoming a multiethnic society, but not a multicultural one in a strict sense. However, i agree with lim (2010, 71; see also chapter 2 of this volume) in that multiculturalism in Korea is “more than mere rhetoric.” i also argue that the benefit of retaining multiculturalism as a policy guide and discursive framework outweighs the drawbacks, even if doing so may disguise

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the true nature of Korean immigrant incorporation policies and discourses. as Kymlicka (2001, 2007) noted, the specifics of multiculturalism in any given society are bound to vary depending on the particularities of the nation-building process in that society. Multiculturalisms are remedial measures to undo the ethnocultural injustices that occurred during the nation-building process. The Korean modern nation-building process has erased cultural and ethnic differences for the sake of national unity, which was politically mobilized in the context of the divide between north and south Korea and state-led economic development. The experiences of ethnic Chinese and amerasians testify to the injustice committed during this process. as i have demonstrated in this chapter, the Korean nationbuilding project in the age of international migration and globalization continues to homogenize cultural differences. This cultural expunging is unfair to marriage migrants and their children, who are unduly pressured to acquire Korean cultural traits. Multiculturalism requires both Koreans and the Korean government to reconsider the injustice imposed on marriage migrants and their children in the name of incorporation, and instead offer “fairer terms of incorporation” (Kymlicka 2001). References Brown, Wendy. 2006. Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire. Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press. glazer, nathan. 1997. We Are All Multiculturalists Now. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. He, Baogan, and Will Kymlicka. 2005. introduction to Multiculturalism in Asia, edited by Will Kymlicka and Baogan He, 1–21. new york: oxford University Press. Kim, nora Hui-Jung. 2009. “Framing international norms and Constructing national identity: The Migrant Worker advocacy Movement and Korean national identity reconstruction.” Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 4:678–695. ———. 2012. “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Belonging: The Puzzle of Multiculturalism in south Korea.” Citizenship Studies 16, no. 1:103–117. Koo, Hagen. 1993. “The state, Minjung, and the Working Class in south Korea.” in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, edited by H. Koo, 131–162. ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press. Korean youth Counseling institute 2006. Tamunhwa kajŏng ch’ŏngsonyŏn yŏn’gu [research on children of multicultural families]. seoul. Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. new york: oxford University Press.

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———. 2001. Politics in the Vernacular. new york: oxford University Press. ———. 2007. Multicultural Odysseys. new york: oxford University Press. lee, Hey-Kyung. 2008. “international Marriage and the state in south Korea: Focusing on governmental Policy.” Citizenship Studies 12, no. 1:107–123. lee, seon ok. 2007 “Migrant Worker Political activism and Multiculturalism in south Korea.” in Multiculturalism in Korea: A Critical Review, edited by Kyungsuk oh, 82–107. seoul: Hanul Books. in Korean. lie, John. 2001. Multiethnic Japan. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. lim, Timothy. 2010. “rethinking Belongingness in Korea: Transnational Migration, ‘Migrant Marriages’ and the Politics of Multiculturalism.” Pacific Affairs 83, no. 1:51–71. seol, Dong-Hoon, and John. D. skrentny. 2004. “south Korea: importing Undocumented Workers.” in Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective, edited by W. a. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, P. l. Martin, and J. F. Hollified, 481–516. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. ———. 2009. “ethnic return Migration and Hierarchical nationhood.” Ethnicities 9, no. 2:147–174. shin, gi-Wook. 1998. “nation, History, and Politics.” in Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity, Korea research Monograph 26, edited by H. i. Pai and T. r. Tangerlini, 148–165. Berkeley: institute of east asian studies, University of California. ———. 2006. Ethnic Nationalism in Korea. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1994. “The Politics of Recognition.” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by a. gutmann, 27–73. Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press. vertovec, steven. 1998. “Multi-Multiculturalisms.” in Multicultural Policies and the State: A Comparison of Two European Societies, edited by M. Martiniello, 25–38. Utrecht, The netherlands: ercomer.

FoUr

Tolerance, Tamunhwa, and the Creating of the new Citizens Currently, multiculturalism in Korea is focusing too much on governing foreigners, who constitute only 2 percent of the population, but it should rather focus on transforming Koreans, who constitute 98 percent. —a migrant-center staff member

Does that mean that I am some kind of commodity? —a Korean-Chinese (Chosŏnjok) woman

eUyryUng JUn

By the time i made an appointment to meet with attorney shin, a human rights lawyer, late one morning in the fall of 2008, the countless events and programs related to multiculturalism that were sprouting up had left me feeling overwhelmed. More than half a year had passed since i started my long-term fieldwork in the greater seoul area the previous winter. This time, i was forcing myself to finally accept the fact that i could hardly follow all the events and do ethnographic research. i was overwhelmed not only by the tremendous number of symposiums, seminars, conferences, lectures, festivals, and classes that were organized around the theme of multiculturalism, but also by the range of experts involved in this “booming multicultural industry.” Participants included researchers in disciplines such as pedagogy, cultural anthropology, sociology, women’s studies, linguistics, social work, and public administration; various professionals in the field of culture and arts; elementary and middle school teachers; and various nongovernmental and civil society organizations from the Unesco Korea office, to, of course, local migrant centers. From my perspective as a researcher who had been studying the issue of migration in south Korea through the activities of migrant centers and migrant trade unions, the abrupt emergence of a “tamunhwa (multicultural) apparatus” that transcends traditional migrant advocacy groups

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reflected a magnificent shift in the politics of migration in the country. at an individual level, i was seeking to understand how the work of some of the migrant center staff was quickly shifting from rights advocacy to organizing cultural events. “it’s hypocrisy,” said shin, when i asked him how he would describe the current situation that is unfolding under the name of tamunhwa. i first met shin in 2004 when i worked as an intern at the Friends of Migrants (FoM). at that time, he had just started his career as a “public interest lawyer” and FoM was where he began to assist migrants with his legal expertise. i knew that he had a mild and gentle personality but also that he could be very sharp and critical when it came to politics. shin continued, “The current situation makes me think of a zoo . . . and it is all happening within the fence drawn by the state government.” Quoting Television and the Zoo by the French philosopher olivier razac,1 shin told me that the ways in which multiculturalism is being represented in Korea through various state-funded and civil society programs, with their extreme focus on “displaying” the “cultures of migrants,” reminded him exactly of the zoo discussed in the book. shin said, “Multicultural conflicts should work as a creative and productive force. But Korean multiculturalism is what has already been defined by the government. it exists simply to prevent multicultural conflicts.” less than a week after this meeting, i had an opportunity to participate in a two-day multicultural class in a junior high school in ansan, a suburb of seoul known for its industrial complexes and its large migrant population—the largest in the country. i was invited to this event while conducting an interview with reverend Jung, the director of the ansan Migrants’ Center and a board member of the Borderless village,2 who then complained that the host school’s request did not give his center enough time to prepare for the multicultural classes. “My work here is full of meetings outside,” said Jung. “it takes time to see who is available each time and schedule accordingly. and then you need to buy and prepare materials to bring to those classes and so on. . . . it was such short notice, you know.” according to him, the city of ansan recently selected tamunhwa and sports as its two main specialties and appointed some of the local schools as tamunhwa sibŏm hakkyo (showcase multicultural schools), which means they have to allot a certain portion of their curricular activities to 1

in the book, the author discusses how “living natives” from africa and america used to be displayed in museums and expos in european and american cities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to educate and entertain Western audiences about the world of difference and diversity. 2 a group affiliated with the ansan Migrants’ Center, who organized various multicultural programs from 2006 through 2008.

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multicultural learning. Jung told me that the center had been offering a number of multicultural classes to local schools since the previous year. Usually, the center has a pool of migrants from various countries who are fluent in the Korean language and thus are able to serve as one-day instructors in local schools. When i arrived at the center to accompany the instructors to the host school, i saw how hectically organized class preparation was. i learned that this time four teachers were to be sent to the school to represent and provide basic information about their home countries: Bangladesh, China, Côte d’ivoire, and Mongolia. The Mongolian teacher caused the others to worry by being late, while the teacher from Côte d’ivoire was upset that there was no poster for his country. While he made an ad-hoc poster of his own, another teacher—a Chosŏnjok woman who was teaching about China—complained of how late reverend Jung contacted her this time, as an emergency replacement for the person who regularly takes the “Chinese part.” Half jokingly, she said, “you know what reverend Jung said when i complained to him? He said that just me, myself, will do! Does that mean that i am some kind of commodity?” While i reflected on the complexity of this brief remark, the delayed Mongolian teacher returned with milk to show students how to make Mongolian-style tea. in a rush, all of us—including the four multicultural teachers, one staff member from the center, and myself—quickly got into a van. That day, each teacher taught two fifty-minute sessions to the students. some focused on giving basic information about their home countries (e.g., location, climate, ways of greetings, and so on), while others focusing more on giving the students the opportunity to directly experience the country hands-on (e.g., through food and music). These two anecdotes poignantly capture the dilemma and the paradox of multiculturalism in Korea. i met many good-willed activists in the migrant advocacy field who shared the bitterness and dismay that attorney shin conveyed earlier. Certainly, this negativity stems from the state’s sudden entry in multicultural affairs and the rather abrupt emergence of the “tamunhwa apparatus” that has grown to encompass provincial and municipal governments, institutions of higher and secondary education, and a variety of civil society groups and ngos. some of the activists i met said that many civil society organizations like migrant centers would soon either simply subsidize state programs or disappear. However, at the same time, many civil society groups welcomed the state’s entry into migrant and multicultural affairs. as i will discuss in this chapter, the real dilemma here is that the “civil society” that aspired to create an alternative vision of multiculturalism, whether by working with the state government or not, has in fact played an important role in suppressing what

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shin calls “creative and productive forces” and, thereby, producing more governance. Here, the Chosŏnjok teacher’s earlier question points to a paradoxical situation. amid humble intentions to educate citizens and build a better society in which migrants and their children do not face discrimination, migrants themselves were not only excluded from this process but also progressively reified as mere instruments for the Koreans’ own ethical project. This chapter is guided by the following two questions: What are the specific ways in which tolerance and multiculturalism were received in south Korea since the 1990s? How did the discourse and practice of tamunwha that was shaped in the earlier understanding of tolerance develop? i will start by discussing the discourse of tolerance and what i call the “Korean difference,” which serve as a “moral imperative” to migrant centers’ discourse and the practice of multicultural sensitivity that emerged later, in the mid-2000s. Throughout the chapter, i use the term tamunhwa to refer not simply to another variation of multiculturalism, but to the specific and contested set of discourses and practices that generated the sorts of political and ethical dilemmas and paradoxes illustrated earlier. Tolerance and the “Korean Difference” in order to map out the discursive landscape of tamunhwa, i will start with the political theorist Wendy Brown’s critique of tolerance and liberal multiculturalism as the discourse of power (2006). not only is her critique of the politics of tolerance conceptually relevant for my discussion of the practices and discourses of tamunhwa, but the reviews her book received upon its publication in Korea are interestingly symptomatic of what i will call the discourse of “Korean difference.” This is a discourse that relies on and highlights a conception of difference between Korea and the West and, thus, serves as a ground for justification for certain developmentalist and disciplinary practices. The recent emergence of tamunhwa discourses that focus on the education of the Korean citizenry is one telling example of such practices. With the emergence of the political rhetorics of islam, nationalism, fundamentalism, culture, and civilization in the aftermath of september 11, Brown argues, a discourse of tolerance was rearticulated as a “civilizational discourse that identifies both tolerance and the tolerable with the West, marking nonliberal societies and practices as candidates for an intolerable barbarism that is itself signaled by the putative intolerance ruling these societies” (2006, 6). The history of imperialism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the event of september 11 now merge together to reendorse the opposition between “the free, the tolerant, and

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the civilized on one side, and the fundamentalist, the intolerant, and the barbaric on the other” (6). Brown argues that although tolerance in civilizational discourses is not the same as liberalism, it is nonetheless “mediated by” a “liberal grammar and analytics” and “also constitutes an element in the constitutive outside of liberalism over the past three centuries” (8). she says, “if tolerance today is considered synonymous with the West, with liberal democracy, with enlightenment, and with modernity, then tolerance is what distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them.’” i reapply Brown’s imperialist dichotomy between “us” as the West and “them” as the rest for the Korean context. in Korea in recent years, tolerance as the “good” has been translated and mobilized by turning Brown’s dichotomy on its head—that is, “tolerant them” and “intolerant us.” not only is tolerance interpreted as another name for liberal democracy and “progressive politics” that the “advanced West” represents, but it also points at what Korea does not—not fully—have. if the discourse of tolerance as a disciplinary power regulates the other both inside and outside (Brown 2006), the Korean discourse of tolerance is a narcissistic one shaped tremendously by the problematics of the self and its development. such a problematization of the self projects the imaginary other as the “good” (i.e., the West, democracy, modernity, and freedom) and the self as being in a chronic state of deficiency. Through this, tolerance, belonging to others and representing progress, operates as a disciplinary power by mobilizing one’s shame and embarrassment over one’s incompleteness, on the one hand, and one’s will and zeal to improvement, on the other. To illustrate how the discourse of tolerance is interpreted in the Korean context, and how the dichotomy of us versus them is problematized, i will consider Korean readers’ reviews of Brown’s book on the website of Aladdin, one of the major booksellers in the country. reader #1 anyway, i agree with her when she [Brown] says the discourse of tolerance depoliticizes things by neglecting historical backgrounds and the problem of power. on the other hand, i would wonder if such discourse [of tolerance] has ever fully taken root in Korean society. . . ? Her critiques may not apply to the current situation in Korea.”3 (emphasis mine.) reader #2 Tolerance as the empire’s instrument for governance? Perhaps it may not be easily accepted in the Korean society that is full of intolerance. . . . The tolerance that this book discusses is mostly that of the U.s. and europe, 3

available at www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?isBn=8961950231 (accessed 15 Mar. 2013).

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euyryung Jun which operates as a strategy of governance. There seems to be a difference between the tolerance found in the U.s. and europe where there has been already such a mixture of different races and where the idea of noblesse oblige has developed fully, and the tolerance in Korea.”4 (emphasis mine.) reader #3 “With the publication of I Am a Taxi Driver in Paris in 1995, the idea of tolerance introduced by the author Hong se-hwa widely appealed to our society. at the time when there was a serious lack of tolerance—and, it is still the case now—tolerance became the culture of the haves (whether what they have a lot is knowledge, money, or power).5 (emphasis mine.)

it is striking that each commentator relies on the notion of the Korean difference and treats tolerance as a measurable thing. according to the commentators, there was a “serious lack of tolerance” before, but even now, it has not yet “fully taken root” in Korean society. Thus, although a critique of tolerance may be possible and justifiable in the context of the United states or europe, it is not applicable to Korea, which is “full of intolerance.” it is noteworthy how the commentators either explicitly or implicitly reendorse tolerance by treating it within a developmentalist framework in which only two options exist—to achieve tolerance or not. again, the question i want to raise is not whether Korean society has become more tolerant or not, but what tolerance has been synonymous with, and in which ways the discourse of tolerance has been mobilized in the country. as the last commentator points out, tolerance became a popular term—at least within civil society circles—with the publication of a book titled I Am a Taxi Driver in Paris in 1995. Written by Hong se-hwa— a former employee of a trading company posted in Paris and who was branded an agent of the north Korean regime in the 1970s and exiled in France until mid-1990s—the book is a combination of the author’s life stories and his reflections on French society. in 2007, twelve years after publication, Hong’s book was featured in the “50 greatest Books of our Time” series by Han’guk ilbo, a major south Korean daily. The headlines read, “Making into a book one’s own experience of coexisting with difference in the land of liberty,” and “Tolerance, still valid in the age of neoliberalism.” The Han’guk ilbo article claims that Hong’s book “received such an ardent response by offering an opportunity for Korean society, which lacked the virtue of recognizing difference even after democratization, to look back 4 available at www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?isBn=8961950231 (accessed 15 Mar. 2013). 5 available at http://100in.tistory.com/1454 (accessed 15 Mar. 2013).

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on itself.”6 From his own experiences of living as an “exile as well as a migrant worker,” Hong “saw the value of tolerance as the defining feature of French society.”7 “Tolerance,” continues the article, was “like a mirror image that reflects not only the dire political and social situations in Korea of the 1960s and 1970s but also the ‘invisible’ machinery of oppression that is yet dominating our minds.”8 The book, which enjoyed tremendous success (sixty editions were printed before the book was revised in 2006), became a “must-read for college freshmen” following its publication.9 This article defines tolerance and the recognition of difference as features of “consummate” democracy and as “still valid in the age of neoliberalism.” in equating tolerance with progressive politics and democracy, the discourse treats it from a developmentalist framework that distinguishes “French society” (which is “full of tolerance”) from “our own” (which is “lack of tolerance”). such an understanding of tolerance and the self-critical discourse of “Korean difference” shaped the logic of the practice of tamunhwa that emerged later in the 2000s. importantly, too, when the government began embarking on its multicultural project, it was the nationwide consensus built on the necessity of multiculturalism that helped facilitate the partnership between civic groups such as migrant centers and the government. i will discuss how this partnership still existed amid heated discussions and critiques generating questions about what should be a better way to achieve “genuine multiculturalism.” The State-Society Partnership under the Necessity of Multiculturalism it has not been long since the term tamunhwa emerged as a catchword in public arenas in Korea. The year 2006 is noted as the year when the tamunhwa industry exploded and the state poured money into the civil and academic sectors, producing a new public space for discussions of multiculturalism. since then, a number of state ministries have begun offering integrationist and welfare services to so-called marriage immigrants and their multicultural families while, at the same time, funding civic groups to organize related programs. among the state and nonstate groups alike, the term tamunhwa was employed as the opposite of tanil munhwa (“monoculture”) and a remedy to tanil munhwa’s limitations and problems. notably, too, progressives and conservatives alike interpreted multiculturalism as a code of social ethics and policy for the age of globalization.10 Within 6

Han’guk ilbo, 17 May 2007. Han’guk ilbo, 17 May 2007. 8 Han’guk ilbo, 17 May 2007. 9 Han’guk ilbo, 17 May 2007. 10 For example, in 2008 Yŏnhap nyusŭ featured the preparation meeting for the Hanguk 7

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civil society groups, discussions have been mostly confined to the debates over tamunhwa versus assimilation, or civil-society-led-tamunhwa versus state-led-tamunhwa (e.g., Kim 2007; Kim et al. 2007; lee 2007; oh 2007). Meanwhile, ideas of tolerance and the recognition of difference and the other that are the foundation of tamunhwa have seldom been challenged, but rather have been reinforced. The state government’s multicultural agenda, as laid out in the Korea immigration service’s and the Committee of alien Policy’s “Policy on Foreigners, Current Progress and Future Plan,” aims to support marriage immigrants and their families with various programs, on the one hand, and to promote the value of coexistence and respect of difference and diversity among the Korean citizenry, on the other (Korea immigration service and the Committee of alien Policy 2007). in so doing, it is supposed to realize an “open society that cohabits with foreigners.” in this plan, the “open society” is inherently tied to “social integration,” “minimizing social conflicts,” and thus “enhancing national competitiveness” on a global scale. a year earlier, the Department of Multicultural Families, which was then under the low Fertility, aging society section in the Ministry for Health, Welfare, and Family affairs (MHWFa) had launched services for marriage immigrants and their children. Meanwhile, the then Department of Multicultural Policy in the Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and sports (MCTs) began funding civic groups such as the Borderless village and the Damunhwa (Tamunhwa) open society to organize multicultural festivals and related programs and events. state investment in multiculturalism during the mid-2000s generated a renewed partnership between the state and migrant centers,11 in which the state mainly funded organizations while the larger migrant centers with more expertise and experience in migrant and related cultural affairs took on the role of primary organizer of the actual tamunhwa programs. This partnership between the state and the larger migrant centers and/ or the association of the centers, however, was not always an easy one as it constantly generated public debates and critiques over the government’s multicultural policy and the definition of “genuine multiculturalism.” notably, some of the most vocal critiques from civil society came from those activists whose organizations had begun to create multicultural programs with state funding. indeed, regardless of whether they Damunhwa Center, where “the conservatives and the progressives, and Buddhist and Christian leaders united themselves for an advanced Korea through the establishment of tamunhwa society” (1 Dec. 2008). 11 in the early 2000s, the Joint Committee with Migrants in Korea and the Kim Dae Jung government worked together to create the employment Permit system, the first stateregulated foreign labor policy.

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received government money or not, migrant centers and other concerned civic groups constantly evaluated the government’s conduct. specifically, their critiques revolved around the following two themes. 1. The exclusion of migrant workers in the state’s multicultural policy. oh gyung seok, a sociologist and former member of the Borderless village, argued that the state government relies on the “divide and rule policy” and seeks to regulate different groups of migrants differentially (oh 2007, 35). oh specifically refers to the situation in which the state’s multicultural focus is concentrated on marriage immigrants and their so-called multicultural families while it maintains its regulatory policy on foreign labor by regularly deporting undocumented migrants. By doing so, oh continues, the government prevents unity among the different groups of migrants. oh’s position captures the general sentiments among migrant centers, many of which have denounced the government for policing undocumented migrants. For example, in an anticrackdown rally and press conference organized in seoul on 15 May 2008 following the arrest of Torna limbu, then the newly appointed chairperson of the Migrants’ Trade Union, activists and staff from migrant centers and various solidarity groups chanted, “Multicultural society in the front and targeted crackdowns in the back! lee’s government is lying!” While migrant centers appealed to a more inclusive model of tamunhwa that includes migrant workers, most of them, however, were in fact ambiguous and ambivalent when it came to legalizing undocumented migrant workers and/ or extending the rights of residence to migrant workers. Their criticisms against the government were more or less limited to the human rights violations in the deportation and detention of migrants. 2. State intervention in the private lives of marriage immigrants and their “multicultural families.” The second line of critique came most vocally from the groups working for migrant women. ngos and feminist academics alike argued that the state only aims at Koreanizing migrant women and assimilating them directly into the Korean patriarchal system with a variety of programs offered through the MHWFa and the regional Multicultural Family Centers. Criticizing Korean-language classes offered to marriage immigrants, some even argued that it is “more multicultural” to give them and their children opportunities to learn and use their own mother tongues. Many of these critiques drew from discourse on “cultural autonomy” and the “rights to difference.” For example, in a symposium held in sook Myung Women’s University in spring 2008, the representative of the Multicultural Family association denounced the MHWFa for

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ignoring migrant women’s diverse cultures and their different ways of raising children. Despite the surge of critiques and debates over the better ways of realizing a multicultural society, numerous multicultural programs have appeared since the mid-2000s, either through close partnerships between state and civil society organizations or between private funding organizations and smaller civic groups. These multicultural programs relied heavily on the idea of resocializing and reculturalizing individual Korean citizens in multicultural ways and thereby cultivating their “multicultural sensitivity.” They were indeed part of an effort to appeal to both the culturalist tones in civic rhetoric and the funding available to civil society organizations for the creation of tamunhwa projects. These programs were often predicated on the idea that Koreans, rather than migrants, have to adjust to the new social reality created by the growing migrant population. The discourse and practice of tamunhwa thus defined, however, did not significantly challenge the agenda already shaped by state interests. as i have noted, the government had already developed a plan to promote multicultural values among the Korean citizenry with an aim to realize an “open society that cohabits with foreigners.”12 Within the state bureaucracy, it was the Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and sports that undertook the task of promoting cultural diversity in the general citizenry and funding many migrant center–organized multicultural festivals and classes. in an interview i conducted in May 2008, lee Ji Cheol, the former director of the Department of Multicultural Policy at the MCTs, rephrased the government’s position as follows: after all, the issue of immigrants should be approached from a cultural perspective. it becomes important to embrace diverse cultures and, thus, to prevent cultural clashes from happening like you see in the West. . . . if mobilizing the notion of the homogeneous nation was useful in the task of developing the country in the 1970s, now in the age of globalization it is not valid anymore. our perspective on immigrants needs to change. it is important to change our people’s awareness. (emphasis mine.)

lee clearly notes how the mode of development has changed from that which is reliant on “ethnic nationalism” to that which embraces and promotes “diversity.” Here, i would like to highlight how much the language of “culture” seized both the government and civil society organizations. it not only offered a space for the two to work together—albeit not seamlessly—but 12

“Policy on Foreigners, Current Progress and Future Plan” (Korea immigration service and the Committee of alien Policy 2007).

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also facilitated the process in which questions of inequality can be lumped together under the category of the so-called cultural difference and translated as the attitudinal problems involving it. i will proceed by examining the ways in which the discourse of tamunhwa among migrant centers developed as a project of creating the new citizen-subjects who can better adjust to the social changes brought by increasing migration and globalization. More specifically, i show how the project of engendering multicultural sensitivity among individual citizens with an aim to better the living environment for immigrants and migrants in the country and, thereby, producing “collective justice” becomes a self-disciplinary project. in this project, the question of the other is used to create a sense of moral satisfaction in the Korean self. in the practice of munhwa ch’ehŏm, or “cultural experience,” which depends upon the reified difference and otherness of migrants, the boundary between the education of difference and the consumption of difference is easily blurred. Tamunhwa as a Project of Creating New Citizens Our society has been overlooking cultural infrastructure so far. Immigrants are a gift to us. They mean an opportunity for Korean society to be reborn in the world. We need to utilize the current situation actively and positively. —a presenter at a public hearing organized by MCsT to create a legislative plan for multicultural assistance

it is important to understand how the reception of multiculturalism in Korea in the 2000s has been inseparable from the subject of education, that is, the education of the citizens. in other words, and especially among concerned civic groups and academics, there often has been no clear-cut distinction between the discourses on multiculturalism and the discourse on multicultural education—from those that focus on the abstract and philosophical notion of cultivating a “new sensitivity” to those that focus on the practical implementation of multicultural curriculum within secondary institutes. among the concerned civic groups and activists, such a focus on the citizen’s education has usually been represented as changing the national ethos and transforming people’s consciousness. During my fieldwork, i met many individuals who would tell me that changing Korean people’s consciousness and awareness of migrants and their different cultures was a better, “more genuine” way of realizing a multicultural society. seo Jung Won, the former chief director of Migrants’ arirang,13 used to tell me about what she called kungmin chŏngsŏpŏp, trans13

The largest multicultural festival in the country that began in 2005. For the first few

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lated as the “law of people’s sentiment.” according to seo, this “law” is superior to any formal law as the latter will have to be based on the principle of the former. By using such an expression, seo emphasized that people’s consciousness and sentiments can be more powerful than written law in promoting or delaying social justice. The discourse of reshaping individual citizens’ consciousness often merged with existing critiques of the old-fashioned, statist-nationalist, and/or hierarchical educational system. With followers in fields ranging from pedagogy to cultural anthropology since the 1990s, alternative education discourse argues for creativity and autonomy, which they claim have been sacrificed in mainstream education that focuses on getting into college and the so-called chuip sik kyoyuk (“rote learning”), which emphasizes students’ performance in exams. Joining the discourse of alternative education, the discourses of multiculturalism and multicultural education in Korea placed emphasis on the subject of the body as the medium of the new education that will serve an alternative to the “exam- and brain-centered” education in particular and the old way of socialization in general. Cho yong Hwan, a professor of education at seoul national University, relies on a similar opposition between the “body” and the “head” when he argues, “Understanding of multiculturalism should be done not through the head but through the body (embodied understanding)” (2008, 252). For Cho, multicultural education should be fundamentally about “seeking a better life and a better world” and “reorganizing the way of life and the mode of existence accordingly with a recognition of the fact that the life in the late modernity is essentially a multicultural one” (252). Cho’s argument for multicultural education that is mediated through bodily domains and that derives from the notion of remaking the social life according to “the life in the late modernity” precisely captures how the discourse and practice of tamunhwa developed among migrant centers. Their multicultural programs focused on cultivating “multicultural sensitivity” among individuals and on giving individual participants opportunities to “experience” the material cultures of migrants and improve their sensitivity to difference through such sensory activities. Many of the migrant centers i encountered during my fieldwork in the greater seoul area had at least one tamunhwa program, either multicultural festivals or multicultural classes.14 These tamunhwa programs usually years, it was organized by the Damunhwa open society, an association of migrant centers, and hosted by the MCsT. 14 Here i do not include other programs that only contain the word tamunhwa and do not actually differ from conventional programs migrant centers organized in the past, e.g., language classes, counseling programs, and various other support programs. Why these activities are carried out under the name of tamunhwa needs to be addressed separately.

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offered the participants a chance to experience various foreign cultures in the form of dress, cuisine, customs, games, performances, and so on. as my visit to the ansan Migrants’ Center demonstrated earlier in the chapter, often the migrant centers’ clients with a good command of the Korean language would be sent out as one-day instructors to local schools to teach about and represent their home countries. in this setting, the counterpart of Cho’s notion of tamunhwa education that relies on the body was the idea of munhwa ch’ehŏm, or the “bodily experience” of cultures. in the Korean language, kyŏnghŏm is generally the term that is directly translated as “experience.” The basic difference between ch’ehŏm and kyŏnghŏm is that while kyŏnghŏm assumes a certain distance from its object, ch’ehŏm is experience that is not mediated by cognition but rather through the body and the senses, assuming directness and wholeness between the experiencing subject and the object of its experience. Here, i would like to emphasize how neatly the idea of ch’ehŏm compromises what migrant centers often called the social distance and the social gap between Koreans and migrants that, they argue, is generated by the former’s ignorance of the latter. in an interview i conducted in 2006, the representative of the civic group that initiated one of the first such programs explained that it is necessary for Koreans to develop cultural sensitivity in order to coexist peacefully with migrants. she especially emphasized that Koreans are ignorant of diverse and different cultures and how this ignorance is a significant barrier to bridging the social gap and distance between Koreans and migrants. another interview i conducted in the same year with an activist from a different organization echoed the same logic. Unsurprisingly, children, more often than adults, were the main target group for the tamunhwa educational programs. The two interviewees agreed that tamunhwa education is much more effective when given to youth. The children who learn to respect others’ differences and rights would grow to be good multicultural citizens. For example, a pamphlet for the “Human rights Class—Difference Means Beautiful,” a program for children organized by a local migrant center, describes itself as follows: our Human rights Class—Difference Means Beautiful is an asian cultural experience and human rights education program that supports our children to become free of prejudices and the fear of what is different from us and to grow up as healthy and tolerant members of society who are capable of cohabiting with global citizens through experiences in the cultures of various asian countries.

The program focuses on developing multicultural sensitivity among the “native” or racially or ethnically Korean children who are referred

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to as “our children” vis-à-vis migrants and their children. The subject of multicultural sensitivity is almost always marked as native Koreans distinguished from their “objects”—migrants and racially mixed people and families (cf. Brown 2006). no less importantly, the migrant centers’ emphasis on ch’ehŏm and sensitivity training mobilizes the body of individual citizens as the site to mediate various forms of inequality—pertinent to class, gender, and race—and as the site to negotiate with them. if migrant centers’ mobilization of the sensitive and tolerant self individualizes social inequality and injustice, their practices that focus on the individual body and the enrichment of its degree of ch’ehŏm turn the whole politics of inequality into a body management; things become a matter of correcting and modifying one’s body, soul, thoughts, conduct, and ways of being, and this to achieve a state of moral perfection (Foucault 1988). Here, an individual’s moral perfection implicitly becomes equivalent to a nation’s moral perfection and “cultural” advancedness (Marshall 1950). in discussing the relationship among multiculturalism, neoliberalism, education, and citizenship in three cases of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United states, Katharyne Mitchell argues that multicultural education in these countries is shifting from a “concern with the formation of tolerant and democratic national citizens who can work with and through difference” to that of “strategic cosmopolitan” who can compete better in the deterritorialized, neoliberal global economy (2003, 387). if multicultural state subjects were strategic under a Fordist regime of accumulation where state boundaries were more or less fixed, she says, this kind of subject becomes increasingly irrelevant in the post-Fordist, neoliberal world order. What is worth noting in Mitchell’s discussion is the intimate nexus between the institution of education, state, and the economy, where the production of citizens that function within the demands of the neoliberal market order, and restructuring the state accordingly, becomes an important matter. i argue, south Korea serves an example in which the discourse of bringing up multicultural citizens who coexist harmoniously and respectfully with other members of society—what Mitchell calls the Fordist model of multiculturalism—and the discourse of producing “strategic cosmopolitans,” or neoliberal multiculturalism, do not contradict each other. rather, they essentially constitute the two sides of the idea of the “national competitiveness” that the state government explicitly promotes and civil society groups either explicitly or implicitly endorse under the name of “social progress.” indeed, more often than not, some conservative groups such as the Hanguk Damunhwa Center and the conservative media promoted multiculturalism explicitly within the framework of “enhancing the national competitiveness.” For example, while Tonga ilbo notes, “The

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foreigners who face difficulties in medical services, education, and welfare would easily have antagonistic sentiments toward Korea, which in turn will work against our national image and competitiveness” (2 Feb. 2009), Chŏsun ilbo praises “tamunhwa as the most powerful source of competitiveness in the global economic era” (8 Dec. 2009). additionally, and at a more fundamental level, if one considers neoliberalism as a theory/practice that concerns the question of subjectivity as well as that of market, then there is no surprising contradiction between the multiculturalism that is “accompanied by the spirit of the ethical self” (Mitchell, 399) and the neoliberal multiculturalism that is based on a concept of culture as another form of capital. i suggest that the Korean case serves as a good example of the promotion of the culture of tolerance becoming part of the political project of reorganizing the social as well as the ethical in a way that is amenable to a neoliberal regime. Summary i have explored the ways in which the discourse and practice of tamunhwa among civil society organizations like migrant centers were designed to produce new citizens who know how to respect others’ differences and value diversity and who can therefore adjust to the changing social environment brought about by globalization within and outside the country. This practice of tamunhwa finds its antecedent in the discourse of tolerance that emerged in the mid-1990s, which drew from the prevalent notion of the “incomplete (Korean) self” and served as a powerful justification for the former’s disciplinary and developmentalist logic. situated in this genealogy, the practice of tamunhwa based on educating individual citizens and enhancing their multicultural sensitivity inherently relies on and is maintained by the reified otherness of migrants. i have also noted how the making of multicultural and cosmopolitan citizens fundamentally constitutes “enhancing the national competitiveness” in the global market. This linkage has been promoted by a variety of actors from the state government to conservative groups and the media. This does not yet exclude those progressive groups who may not explicitly endorse the neoliberal notion of competitiveness but, nonetheless, operate based on the idea of making new citizens and a new society according to the globalized, late modern world order. rather than simply saying there is no difference among progressives and conservatives, and civil society and the state in Korea, i suggest we see how their seemingly different multicultural agendas may closely intersect in the idea and the effort to reengineer Korean society and the Korean nation according to the demands of the global economy. i also suggest that the political dilemma found here

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transcends the divide between the “conservative” and the “progressive,” and that any effort to explain it will necessarily involve an interrogation of the ways in which the question of state and (civil) society has evolved in Korea since the 1990s. References Brown, Wendy. 2006. Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire. Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press. Cho yong Hwan. 2008. “The Definition and Purpose of Multicultural education.” in Understanding of Multicultural Society Asia, edited by Pacific Centre of education for international Understanding, 210–249. seoul: Tongnyŏk. Chŏsun ilbo. 2009. “Dubai and Tamunhwa Competitiveness.” Foucault, Michel. 1988. “Technologies of the self (a seminar with Michel Foucault at the University of vermont, october 1982).” in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, edited by luther H. Martin, Huck gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton, 16–49. amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Korea immigration service and the Committee of alien Policy. 2007. Policy on Foreigners, Current Progress, and Future Plan. Marshall, T. H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class. london: Pluto Press. Mitchell, Katharyn. 2003. “educating the national Citizen in neoliberal Times: From the Multicultural self to the strategic Cosmopolitan.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 28, no. 4:387–403. oh, gyoung seok. 2007. “What Kind of Multiculturalism?” in Multiculturalism in South Korea: A Critical Review, edited by oh et al., 25–44. seoul: Hanwool. Tonga ilbo. 2009. “Tamunhwa is Power.” Yŏnhap nyusŭ. 2008. “The Conservatives and the Progressives Together support Tamunhwa.”

Five

Makeshift Multiculturalism The Transformation of Elementary School Teacher Training

nanCy aBelMann, gayoUng CHUng, seJUng HaM, Jiyeon Kang, anD Q-Ho lee

in this ethnographic study of a south Korean teacher-training university’s early adoption of a multicultural curriculum in 2009, we make observations about the manner in which south Korean institutions and individuals are enacting or inhabiting the country’s multicultural regime, or what euyryung Jun in this volume calls the “tamunhwa (multicultural) apparatus,” to indicate a state-orchestrated effort at transformation.1 We observed what we have come to think of as “makeshift multiculturalism,” namely, the speedy adoption of a project that is not yet clearly defined or delimited. We analyze the process of election in which institutions, units, and individuals are elected to serve as the vanguard of the promotion of multiculturalism, even as that project remains vague. We found that those elected largely embrace their leadership as a veritable moral calling for a “higher (national) good,” even as they are often quite perplexed as to what exactly that calling entails (c.f. “alternative value” in g. s. Han 2007). in the field—in the college classroom, in the activities of a multicultural club, and in a summer grant elementary school mentoring program—we found faculty and students confused about the meaning and mandate of the multicultural project. We found people to be most ambivalent not about their election itself but rather about the bureaucratic organization of the multicultural apparatus—one that sometimes seemed to be antithetical to higher principles. if at some moments the makeshift project seemed to allow for something creative or productive to emerge, at other moments it 1 We are grateful to Hae yeon Choo for her very helpful comments. This project was supported by the academy of Korean studies (Korean studies Promotion service) grant funded by the Korean government (Ministry of education) (aKs-2010-DZZ-2101).

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struck some as a fundamentally empty signifier, one that seemed to point to nothing more than the bureaucratic apparatus itself. an already considerable secondary literature, including a number of chapters in this volume, has variously decried the “hypocrisy,” “paradox,” and “fiction” of south Korea’s multicultural regime as nothing more than a bid for elite global membership (Jun, lim, and n. Kim in this volume; g. s. Han 2007); an aggressive assimilationist and even violent project masquerading as liberal and enlightened (n. Kim in this volume; Kang 2010; Hong 2010); a program designed to do no more than solve south Korea’s fertility and marriage crises (H. M. Kim 2007; U. Cho 2007) or enhance national security and economy (Watson 2010); and finally as a project that obscures the neediest migrants (e.g., the undocumented, the unmarried, and so on) (n. Kim in this volume). We appreciate these critiques and the careful discourse analysis of the mid-2000s “multicultural explosion” (n. Kim in this volume; Jun in this volume points to 2006 as the moment of explosion; n. Kim in this volume to the 2005–2008 period), but nonetheless argue here that “hypocrisy,” “paradox,” and “fiction” do not entirely do justice to the complicated social field that, as Jun describes in this volume, “has grown to encompass provincial and municipal governments, institutions of higher and secondary education, and a variety of civil society groups and ngos” (chap. 4). We are thus interested in the often considerable and honest confusion of the scores of south Koreans who have been variously mobilized in the name of multiculturalism. This confusion indexes, we argue, the makeshift character and sometimes progressive potential of this intensive and state-supported project. in this vein, we concur with Timothy lim in this volume, who notes that even a largely “lip-service” embrace of multicultural rhetoric can make for “real effects,” and can even have “unintended consequences” (chap. 2). lim outlines south Korea’s “late migration regime” in which people are sensitive to international (justice) norms, and thus respond in a “compressed” and accelerated manner. We suggest that it is as relevant to speak of south Korea’s “late multiculturalism” regime such that the imperative is widely embraced, even as the meanings remain somewhat unmoored. in a related vein, Jun (chap. 4) describes south Korea’s developmentalist approach to multiculturalism—“achieve tolerance or fail”— and unpacks the social logic of the “tolerant they” and “yet intolerant us.” For Jun, this “narcissistic project” (i.e., the transformation of the south Korean citizenry) makes “objects” of migrants and racially mixed people and families. While we concur with Jun’s argument about the social logics at hand, our findings echo lim’s openness to a social field that is emergent; thus we remain cautious about fixing the political character of these developments.

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This is equally a U.s. story: since the notion of multicultural education received explosive attention in the 1980s, its meaning has been an object of controversy (sleeter and grant 1987, 2003). south Korea accelerated this discussion, negotiating a local model of multiculturalism in only a few years, while the United states has been debating the matter for several decades. We thus consider the makeshift multicultural society we found in our field as a state of productive confusion, the process of fashioning a social logic rather than a binary logic, as Jun suggests. This chapter’s ethnographic subjects include faculty members, students, and bureaucrats, while the venues include bureaucratic meetings, student club sessions, and a summer orientation. With these subjects and venues we highlight the tension between apparently empty signifiers on the one hand and substantive debate on the other. We settle neither on hypocrisy nor profound debate, observing instead their interesting coexistence. We begin with a discussion of how members of the faculty of seoul national University of education (snUe) were called to action in the name of multiculturalism, observing the manner in which they navigated this often inchoate yet enormously consuming imperative. “The Control Tower”: Seoul National University of Education in south Korea, almost all elementary school teachers earn their teaching credentials at national universities of education (kyodae). as south Korea took stock of what appeared to be precipitous increases in so-called international marriages—and the multicultural families and multicultural children to which they give rise—considerable public concern emerged about the new generation of children beginning in the early 2000s.2 at issue were both how these children would navigate south Korean schooling and how south Korean schooling would manage their diversity.3 it was in answer to these concerns that national universities of education were elected to be a natural beacon for imagining a transformed south Korean elementary school and elementary school education that could accommodate these children. in 2009, the students in these universities were thus envisioned as a vanguard who would serve this new population. as the most prestigious national university of education, snUe was elected to lead this 2

as gage reviews in this volume, there has in fact been diversity in south Korean schools for quite some time, including the mixed-race children resulting from the long-standing U.s. military presence, long-standing Chinese ethnic communities, and so on. gage makes the important point that the contemporary multicultural discourse obscures the existence of the long-standing amerasian population. 3 obscured in these discussions and in multicultural discourse at large is consideration of undocumented children and migrant children (i.e., in comparison with those children born of international marriages with Koreans, most often Korean men).

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initiative, serving, in the words of one Ministry of education bureaucrat, as a “control tower.” Multicultural election was organized by a number of government units including the Ministry of gender equality and Family, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), and the Ministry of education, science and Technology (MesT), as well as provincial government bodies. in 2008, snUe was designated as one of the twenty active Brain Tower (aBT) universities in the nation by the MoJ. in the announcement of the final list of selected universities, the ministry stated that it would give support to the aBT universities in order to “provide outstanding universities with opportunities to take part in developing policies for the facilitation of multicultural understanding and the making of a migrant society, as well as to pioneer new academic fields in relevant disciplines” (J. Chung 2008). Under this project, universities were expected to develop and research policies for south Korea to adopt as it moves toward a multicultural society; to establish courses and graduate programs for research on multicultural society; and to provide language and cultural education to migrants. The program we focus on here is the “Multicultural Family-student education support Project,” a two-year project launched by MesT in 2009 in conjunction with the country’s national universities of education.4 The goal of the project was to prepare “pre-service multicultural teachers” for the “multicultural classrooms” they would experience in a “multicultural society.” Three projects made up this program. The first was the creation of multiculturalism-related courses to equip future teachers with an understanding of multicultural education and to provide them with experiences of multiracial and multicultural “classrooms of the present or the future.” To promote these classes, MesT offered $10,000 per year to each participating university. The second project was to establish multiculturalism student clubs on each campus. each university was expected to organize clubs for students with interests in multicultural education so as to nurture “voluntary participation.” MesT budgeted $3,000 per year for each campus to support these activities. Finally, universities were expected to develop summer Mentoring Programs (sMP) in which college students would visit elementary schools during school breaks in order to work closely with multicultural children. students were to be selected from those participating in the multicultural education courses or clubs. Participants in the mentoring program would be compensated with wages, and their hours could count toward the forty hours of community service required for graduation. Further, students appreciated that this experience 4

With the exception of ewha Womans University, training to become an elementary school teacher in Korea is available only at specific national universities.

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would enhance their employability; the local office of education that oversees the employment of elementary school teachers set a policy to include questions related to multicultural education on the selection test. Travel costs and wages for the students would be shared by the university and MesT. MesT invested approximately 1.4 million dollars in the program, more than one-fourth of the total budget for multicultural children in 2009 (MesT, 2009). snUe took part in all of these programs, beginning with the 2009 spring semester course “Understanding Multicultural education,” which was open to eighty students and would be offered every semester. it was cotaught by eight professors.5 Forty-two students were selected for the multiculturalism club. The club was organized by the faculty, who selected students on the basis of an essay and interview. We learned that one of the professors in charge was himself worried about the top-down approach of this government project, an approach at odds with the necessarily voluntary nature of what the professor called genuine student activities. The 2009 project report on the program articulates that the purpose of the club establishment is: (1) to facilitate preservice teachers’ understanding of and “voluntarism” for multicultural education and the children of multicultural households, and (2) to train experts who could later 5

Course Title Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Week 7 Week 8 Week 9 Week 10 Week 11 Week 12

Week 13 Week 14 Week 15

Understanding of Multicultural education Multicultural society—The changing of Korean society and understanding of multiculturalism. Theories of Multiculturalism 1—Meaning and situation Theories of Multiculturalism 2—Theories and Methods Multicultural Families and Children 1—Types and Characteristics Multicultural Families and Children 2—The development and emotion of multicultural children. exploring Multicultural society—Discovering and reading of multicultural field. Understanding of Multicultural Field—special Talk language education in Multicultural society 1—Korean language education language education in Multicultural society 2—Methods of Korean language education language education in Multicultural society 3—Bilingual education realities of Multicultural education 1—Peer group relationship and Personality education realities of Multicultural education 2—Development of understanding of multicultural education (mutual understanding, tolerance, and solicitude) Multicultural art education—approaching by art education Multicultural society and Consulting—Problems of Consulting and experiences in school Final exam

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contribute to the multicultural student mentoring project. according to the report, the club had to run study groups on multiculturalism under the instruction of the professor in charge and also conduct voluntary services for multicultural family students through cooperation with the local Multicultural Family support Center. Finally, a planning team for the mentoring program was established in March 2009, and the following month students were recruited through an essay test and interviews. Prior to working in the field, students received training in May and the university also held orientation sessions with newly designed mentoring manuals. in this program, mentors would visit their mentees’ schools and provide mentoring for one or two children at a time. in order to be informed about the mentees in advance, they were also required to spend three hours with the teacher in charge before meeting with the kids. They also had to consult with the school about the mentoring schedule and methods and conduct a total of sixty hours of mentoring. The Faculty We begin with a discussion of three faculty members’ understanding of their own election as multiculturalism emissaries at snUe and more broadly in the south Korean educational college system at large. even as they wrestled with the meaning of this election—that is, the real nature of the imperative—they were nonetheless sincerely committed to a multicultural imperative that could make for meaningful and positive transformation. We then introduce two meetings: the first on a draft of the handbook to be used in the training of college students who would participate in the sMP (summer Mentoring Program), and the second a meeting of representatives from nearly all of the national universities of education to demonstrate the on-the-ground workings of south Korea’s late migration and multiculturalism regime. as mentioned earlier, for those elected to realize a multicultural transformation, the execution was often quite unstable, confused, and even conflicted; most alienating was the close-up encounter with the workings of the bureaucracy. in line with Jun’s arguments in this volume, these faculty members were indeed embracing a self-disciplinary regime in which they were attempting to become a “tolerant us,” but we suggest that the on-the-ground workings were productive in their own right. Both Dr. Bae, who was deeply involved in the Mentoring Program and the College Club at snUe, and Dr. Cho, who was active in the institute that housed the south Korean MesT funding, were somewhat surprised to reflect on their own quite sudden and yet intense involvement in the MesT-funded activities. indeed, they had no training in or research

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experience with multiculturalism when they were elected to become agents in the snUe multiculturalism vanguard. nonetheless, by the time we spoke with them, each was working hard to fashion a coherent story about the rationale and importance of the quite taxing work that they had shouldered in the name of multiculturalism. appreciating that they, not unlike the students we will turn to later, found themselves swept up in activities about which they were not entirely clear, we are interested in understanding how they navigated their election. Dr. Bae explained that prior to beginning this work, he had in fact had no interest in multicultural education. He spoke of the serendipity of his having become—quite in spite of himself—a founding member of the research institute for Multicultural education through which he was later chosen to play a leadership role in the Multicultural Club and summer Mentoring Program (sMP). as a scholar in a philosophical field in education, a field understood to be largely devoted to the fashioning of “Korean” citizens, multiculturalism, he admitted, was quite far from his expertise. But by the time we talked to him, he had come to think that the concerns of multicultural children could in a broad sense be thought of in relation to human rights. He had even begun to imagine ways in which multicultural education might share the foundations of the traditional field of education in south Korea. His turning point was when he encountered a MesT representative who instructed him that in order to succeed in multiculturalism, one has to really immerse onself, which is exactly what he had decided to do. in these ways, Dr. Bae documented his nearly chance encounter with multicultural education, but elaborated on the quite easy way in which it had come to motivate his activities and even his sense of his own academic future. We are particularly interested in the compressed manner in which he came to embrace the urgency of multiculturalism and in turn the imperative for a full-fledged commitment. Dr. Cho, a health scientist by training, had little preparation for the activities she would find herself swept up in. in our conversation, she echoed what many people told us about the escalating numbers of multicultural children in elementary schools. although by international standards the numbers are very small (see lee and skretney in this volume), the percentage increases and even the raw numbers were impressive to her, as they were to many south Koreans and to the south Korean media in particular. she told us, for example, that within a single year a 40 percent increase had brought the seoul number to 2,064 children (for a city of roughly 10 million, one might instead be underwhelmed by this number). in describing how she came to serve as the director, she first stressed that although she had not volunteered herself, she had nonetheless developed a “sense of

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crisis” (wigi ŭisik) and “a feeling of duty” (ŭimugam). she then talked more substantively about multiculturalism, describing the “demands” of multicultural families and suggesting a grassroots imperative. she described her sense that in the beginning there “were no experts,” implying that someone needed to forge ahead in these uncharted waters. after nearly two years at the institute, Dr. Cho stressed her sense of the importance of “this [historical] moment” as one of critical social transformation. as did Dr. Bae, Dr. Cho had even come to see a health connection to the concerns. she spoke of her field’s increasing interest in “wellbeing,” of “achieving a healthy and happy life even in the midst of fast change,” and drew the parallel to “an education curriculum that makes people fulfill their dreams without being discriminated against.” like Dr. Bae, Dr. Cho had managed to make sense of her election and to weave the multicultural imperative back to her own training and research expertise. We noted both professors’ deep-seated embrace of the urgency of their assigned task and in turn their efforts to consider the implications of multicultural education for their own areas of expertise. Finally, we introduce Dr. song, whose election narrative is somewhat different because she did in fact bring prior expertise to the issues at hand. What she shared with the other faculty, however, was awe at the imperative of this new regime, an awe that she in fact articulated in religious terms. as a scholar with an early interest in bilingualism and who had spent time abroad, it made sense for people to turn to her on matters of multiculturalism and particularly language. However, she devoted most of her conversation with us to her ceaseless awe at the speedy manner in which south Korea was adopting multiculturalism and even bilingualism; the refrains of our conversation with her were “Korea is such a fascinating place” and “Korea is so dynamic.” We get ignited really quickly—the U.s., in contrast, is so slow. living in Korea is like riding a roller coaster. When someone says, “We need something!” the entire society “mobilizes.” This can be a real strength. Multicultural education is spreading so fast.

as our conversation continued and she began to describe the extent of her own quite remarkable election as a veritable multicultural architect, particularly in the MesT, she spoke of the working of “god’s hand.” Part of her “surprise” at the “dynamism of Korean society” was at the nearly effortless way in which government officials and teachers could so easily adopt the multicultural mandate. like Dr. Cho, she stressed the impressive numbers and thus the urgency of the matter: she recalled her concern that “we’re in trouble, teachers are not at all prepared for this type of student.”

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Furthermore, she was forthright about her own role in the transformation of snUe into a veritable control tower for multicultural education. When we asked her about her own active and reportedly effective role in galvanizing support for multiculturalism, we were interested in the way in which she described herself as a rainmaker for multiculturalism. she reported having repeatedly told a particular story from the years she spent as a mother in the United states (where she was giving her children a precollege study-abroad experience). The story goes that she was pulled over by a policeman shortly after getting her driver’s license. The policeman took her license and left her waiting for what seemed an interminably long time, so she decided to get out of the car and suggest to the policeman that she move her car to the curb. at which point, she continued, “the officer pointed his gun at my head and said, ‘don’t move.’” To south Korean audiences she summarized dramatically that her cultural ignorance—not knowing the dangers of confronting the police in the United states—could have cost her her life (i.e., given that the police can act in the name of self-defense) and that hence south Korea was in dire need of multicultural education. The power of this story was apparent, even if we weren’t her usual audience. That south Koreans were “quickly swayed” by her story spoke, she told us, to “south Korea’s dynamism.” The details and efficacy of this story aside, we were struck by her simultaneous surprise at “south Korea’s dynamism” and this candid account of her own hand in the making of what Dr. Cho described as Korea’s sense of crisis with regard to multiculturalism. all three professors thus spoke to the urgency of multiculturalism, whether to highlight the odd contingencies of their own election (Bae and Cho) or to marvel at their own role in the election at large (song). in these professors’ accounts we observe that although they were assigned to be the keepers of the control tower, they were quite silent on the message and content. nonetheless, because they were compelled by a sense of urgency, a constant across our interviews, they were motivated to cobble something together in the name of multiculturalism, hence the productive nature of their confusion—their real willingness to do something, even as it might appear quite makeshift. Troubles in the Control Tower

We now turn to a meeting at which Dr. Bae made a formal presentation of the draft of the summer Mentoring Program Handbook to a representative from the Ministry of education, science and Technology. oddly, the MesT representative very quickly made it clear that he was not the person in charge of the project administration, but that he had been a very early advocate for multicultural education programs and referred to himself as

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“having been nearly crazy” on these issues. also present at this meeting was one contributor to the handbook. in fact, the meeting was a bit slow to start because Dr. Bae was nervously phoning several other contributors and busily making apologies to the MesT representative for the modest showing of coauthors. The MesT representative did in fact ask why so few people were present. Dr. Bae then asked our then three-person research team— we had expected to sit outside the circle at the large table—to come to the table. as we made up half the number of the people in the room, at first we worried that our presence might get in the way, but within moments it was entirely clear that the MesT representative had absolutely no interest in us. very early in the meeting, Dr. Bae indicated his sincere hope that the handbook draft would be circulated to all the universities of education that were to participate in the Mentoring Program. However, he added that in order to respect local specificities and the particular needs of other participating provincial universities, it would be important for them to tailor the handbook and perhaps cut chapters or even add other discussions. in his words, he anticipated “editing that would conform to regional circumstances.” ignoring these remarks, the MesT representative proceeded instead to a page-by-page review of typographical errors, formatting inconsistencies, and other minor editorial issues in the over two-hundred-page document. at one point he exclaimed, “a document like this one [i.e., with its many editorial errors] truly infuriates people like me from the MesT.” Dr. Bae remained respectful and controlled and subserviently indicated his intentions to correct the document. nonetheless, Dr. Bae did persist in his attempts to bring up his primary concern that the manual be adapted to the needs of other universities. eminently clear was that Dr. Bae was foundationally ill at ease with his own responsibility for editing a book that would serve the entire country. in some sense, he was abdicating his “national” election, hoping to retreat in the name of regional conditions and autonomy. We nervously observed the MesT representative’s dismissive posture as Dr. Bae sheepishly brought up these issues again and again. eventually, however, the MesT representative unequivocally dismissed Dr. Bae’s concerns: let’s face it—even if you were to send this draft to the provincial universities of education, it is unlikely that they would offer any editorial opinions. What’s more, we need to consider the costs of such a process. it would be a problem if each and every university were to be printing different books.

He continued, without skipping a beat, to remind Dr. Bae and the others of the fragility of the project funding by telling them that although many

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other divisions of the MesT had been cut that year, this multicultural project had been spared. Further disrespecting Dr. Bae’s concerns, the MesT representative went on to discuss the economies of scale and renown that could be achieved by publishing this handbook not only for use by the universities of education, but also for the general public. it was apparent that the MesT representative, in a very different vein, was appealing to what he imagined was the ego or pride of the snUe representatives’ leadership role in this initiative. By the end of the meeting, a browbeaten Dr. Bae literally had no choice but to stand by defeated as the MesT representative took charge by phoning a budget officer at snUe (having first demanded officiously that someone bring him the phone), someone who he clearly had worked with on many occasions. instantly this financial officer appeared and was mobilized to inquire about various printing efficiencies. By then it was late in the day, and the budget officer reported that he would have to supply the figures later. as for the matter of the other universities of education, the MesT representative imperiously humored Dr. Bae, announcing that he would take charge of the other schools’ approval of the handbook. The meeting quickly dissolved as the MesT representative inquired as to the restaurant where they would dine. We understand these to be on-the-ground negotiations in which Dr. Bae attempted to mobilize multiculturalism as a necessarily grassroots initiative, but was thwarted in the name of both bureaucratic efficiency and the power invested in snUe (i.e., by the MesT). The singular handbook would be efficiently mass produced and would bring glory to the multicultural mandate that the MesT representative had proclaimed to be “crazy about.” We note the disjuncture between the ideals of the multicultural mandate for the three faculty members and the on-the-ground negotiations over these state-supported programs. While our conversations with the faculty members revealed the productive and creative potential of even a state-supported top-down initiative, this meeting with the MesT representative calls attention to the state-orchestrated piece of that equation, one that in this case foreclosed an arguably more progressive agenda. Progress Report: Provincial Talk-Back

We fast-forward now to a gathering a month later of representatives from nearly all of the universities of education that were to participate in the summer Mentoring Program. The agenda included short presentations from all of the representatives about their multiculturalism courses the preceding spring and about their plans for the sMP. The meeting also

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included a presentation by this chapter’s coauthor nancy abelmann who shared her provisional reflections on south Korean multiculturalism. Professor abelmann felt that she could not say no to Dr. Bae’s request, given that he was kindly exposing his own activities to her ethnographic scrutiny. a young female administrator from MesT who was formally involved in the administration of multicultural projects was also present. With our discussion of this meeting we highlight the tension between an apparently empty bureaucratic initiative and an urgent, compelling social imperative. some of the reports were honest about the failings and limitations of both the spring course and the Multicultural Club. For example, the representative from the Kyonggi University of education, the area of south Korea with the largest number of multicultural families, described difficulties in recruiting for the club: unless students were participating in the sMP in order to secure a summer stipend, they were not interested in joining. The representative from the north Chŏlla University of education, in a very different vein, shared his concern that those in the sMP be properly selected and prepared, stating that “poor mentoring [i.e., of multicultural students] is worse than no mentoring.” He also discussed some practical matters, including the problem that the neediest area in his province was quite far from the residences of the college students and that it would be nearly impossible for them to do the mentoring activities twice a week as prescribed. He inquired as to the possibility of special provisions, including additional funds to cover transportation costs. We were particularly interested to hear him tell the group that they planned on adopting a manual that they had written themselves (i.e., not the standardized one). The meeting took a sudden turn when it was time to hear from the representative from the University of education in south Kyŏngsang Province (KnUe). after describing their own quite robust program and noting that there had in fact been little information shared among the universities (indeed, we were struck that many of the other universities had more farreaching programming), the representative, the most fancily clad of the group, went on to say the following: even if snUe is not in charge of this project, in reality it is at the center. But the circumstances of each university of education are in fact all very different. But this project is so very centralized. i simply can’t understand why i had to make my way in the rain to come here [i.e., to seoul, a roughly five-hour trip—and it was a truly rainy day].

it was apparent to us that Dr. Bae was quite taken aback at this sudden and quite aggressive comment. Compelled to respond (and recalling his painful meeting concerning the manual discussed earlier), he replied,

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really, it is only housecleaning matters that we have taken on; we have nothing to do with evaluation. as for the standardized manual that does not take regional variation into account, that was really a decision on the part of MesT for budgetary reasons. as for information sharing, i guess that is what this meeting is about.

With these remarks, Dr. Bae had matter-of-factly described what we knew was his considerable disappointment at the meeting the month earlier. We could recognize that he was gingerly reserving criticism of MesT and defending himself on the matter of communication by referring to the meeting itself. it was shortly thereafter—in a room that was by then quite tense—that the MesT representative spoke up. she began by addressing the earlier query about the possibility of extra funds for mentoring projects in more remote areas and continued: let me comment on the matter of the role of snUe. We at MesT have been working with the provincial departments of education, but this is our first collaboration with universities of education. We have had to accomplish this project very quickly, and actually there are only two of us at MesT responsible for these activities. The reason that we have primarily worked with snUe was in order to be able to communicate with all the universities of education. it has nothing to do with any evaluation [i.e., of valuing snUe more]. It is only a matter of SNUE passing on the information. . . . and snUe’s role is to serve as a messenger for the other universities. in this way [snUe] is [nothing other than] a communication channel and a control tower. it isn’t that snUe is monopolizing this project; only that it is a nearby partner. and in the future we plan to take each region’s particularities into consideration. (emphasis added.)

it would have been hard for any listener that day to not have picked up on the contradictions in even these short remarks. Her comment that snUe was merely a communication channel and a control tower perhaps best epitomized the contradiction; these mixed metaphors at once minimized and elevated the role of snUe. The speedy imperative and short-staffing were meant to convince that arrangements were makeshift. no doubt for the well-dressed representative who had made her way in the rain, the control tower metaphor rang most true. The colleague from Kyŏnggi Province picked right up on the MesT representative’s remark by calling for greater regional autonomy, particularly on budgetary matters. He particularly discussed the provision that prohibited any funds to be used toward faculty salaries, offering that without incentives it was difficult to get faculty buy-in for multicultural programs. He also asked that MesT send its work orders with more lead

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time. and finally he reported that a number of elementary school principals had told him that they would much prefer that no one came (i.e., to the sMP), saying, “What are we [i.e., our schools/children], an exhibit?” in what would prove to be the only statement that day that questioned the very foundation of the project, he went on, “i must admit i have come to think that these sorts of programs might, on the contrary, be scarring these multicultural children. i think this program should not only target multicultural children but instead all children [i.e., including ethnically Korean children].” These were pregnant remarks: indeed, the question as to the proper target of multicultural programming—all Koreans versus multicultural Koreans—is, as many of the chapters in this volume indicate, a sensitive issue. We will see later in this chapter that this was also an issue for the students. Further critique was lodged by another representative about the structure of funding that went nearly exclusively to the students carrying out the mentoring. He complained both that universities were not sufficiently supported to orchestrate these activities and worried that the quite generous stipend for students would propel some to join for the money alone. With these two outbursts, the provinces had clearly voiced their displeasure—to contest snUe’s election and, in these last remarks, that of their own universities and students as well. echoing the meeting about the manual, this gathering too draws our attention to the vexed line between the compelling imperative of multiculturalism on the one hand, and the lifeless bureaucratic structure of the endeavor on the other. Together, these two meetings reveal the features of south Korea’s makeshift multiculturalism and of the ways in which people are elected by and inhabit this regime. For MesT, it was clear in both meetings that the efficient management of this urgent project was premium and that centralization would best serve that task. as a special elect, snUe was a link in this efficient chain: it was the control tower, the messenger. as we saw from the first meeting, however, this role was an ambivalent one for snUe. and as the events in the second meeting reveal, it was not lost on provincial representatives that their own election was partial at best. What was fascinating about both meetings was how very little was mentioned about the grist of multiculturalism or interventions in the name of multicultural children or the education of future teachers. The final comments of the second meeting were in fact remarkably similar to the first, asking foundational questions about the multicultural children themselves and about the university students who had been elected to serve in the name of these multicultural programs. in these meetings, then, we find again the tension between the progressive potential of still unmoored multiculturalism and the bureaucratic shell game of what seemed at times a hollow project.

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Student Election as we have discussed, the structures of election speak in fact to the makeshift nature of south Korean’s hurried multicultural project. This was perhaps nowhere more apparent than for students, whose own election was multiply mediated through a series of mandated MesT programs administered by the faculty. like their professors, many students also quickly embraced the mandate, loosely speaking with conviction that diversity and tolerance were befitting of a transforming south Korea that could then in turn more fully belong to the panoply of the world’s advanced nations. What this late migration/multicultural society should look like, however, was entirely unclear to them. likewise, they too at moments bristled at the bureaucratic infrastructure itself, which seemed to have a life of its own, an empty imperative that pointed to nothing at all. The Multicultural Club

We attended four sessions of the first season of the Multicultural Club and followed up with individual meetings with some of the students (and in one case a meeting with five students). The very organization of the club— namely, a requirement for people who would participate in the sMP— speaks to the tensions between an embrace of the multicultural imperative and skepticism about the structure of the bureaucracy-led project. The first meeting of the club was telling. Dr. Bae began by telling the students that they should give their group a name. even as he orchestrated the meeting, he was a bit sheepish about his role: several times he apologized to those present that ideally they should be the authors or architects of the club (here we can recall his own interesting parallel relationship to MesT). He put this thought into words this way: “if i end up leading this group it will be as if i have forced you to be here. . . . so my role should simply be to support you—to be a shield for you. so this is why we need a president and vice president as well.” With “shield,” we think he meant to indicate that faculty authority would allow, if ironically, students to fashion their own safe space for honest conversation. Dr. Bae then introduced Jun as the club president, admitting however that his first selection was not Jun, who was a sophomore, but a more senior woman. Jun began his sincere remarks by saying that he was “completely puzzled” about the whole thing and that he could have never imagined becoming the leader of such a club, or for that matter even being accepted in the sMP (he had applied). “But,” he continued, “the club is a good thing, i’m very happy to be a member, and i’ll work hard for the club.” employing the metaphor of birth, Dr. Bae closed the meeting by again charging the group to take ownership of the club. “To reiterate, i’m sort

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of a delivery boy—you are the people who will give birth to the baby. . . . you have the responsibility to raise this [club] beautifully. your leaders are the ones who should sacrifice.” The birth metaphor is perhaps apt for a multicultural project that points foundationally to a new and transformed south Korea. That the first meeting had managed to skirt the issue of multiculturalism itself struck us at the time as rather remarkable, but with hindsight speaks to structural aspects of makeshift multiculturalism—to an inevitable solipsism in which the apparatus can seem to point nowhere other than to its own bureaucratic exercise. Dr. Bae again dominated the second meeting of the club, giving a very similar overview to the one he had provided at the first meeting and showing a film on human rights. interestingly, although the students had been assigned a reading (on multiculturalism), the grist of the meeting was again not all that substantive. after perfunctorily summarizing the chapter, Dr. Bae told the students, “you can find everything you need about multiculturalism on the internet” and encouraged them to “study more so as to become specialists.” inadvertently, he managed to fashion multiculturalism as an instrumental tool with which to secure jobs (after first browsing on the internet): “you should volunteer to put what you learn into practice. This is especially important for seniors because the seoul City education Department is really keen on multicultural education these days.” Continuing with an insider nugget, he reported that a seoul official had told him privately that snUe students would be able to get jobs in seoul if they were well versed in multicultural education, because the city exams and job interviews would touch on the matter. although Dr. Bae was committed to the ethical imperative and good of multiculturalism, students that day might have felt that multiculturalism was being sold as an employment commodity. Furthermore, he reviewed all the details of their financial compensation for participating in the sMP, assuring them that if they ended up, for example, assigned to a school that was harder to travel to they would be further compensated. in our conversation with him, however, Dr. Bae had admitted that he worried that students were in this “only for the money [i.e., the sMP wages].” We were intrigued by the necessarily contradictory functions that Dr. Bae had been elected to play: on the one hand, his own election mandated the election of students and more specifically the peopling of particular funded projects, such as the club, while on the other hand, his sincere commitment to multiculturalism motivated him to make something real of it. it was this tension that dogged him as he felt compelled both to sketch the emergent reward structure for those electing multicultural training and

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to ask students to participate from the heart, in precisely a disinterested manner.6 The third meeting was the first meeting without Dr. Bae. Jun began by calling for a “female volunteer” to serve as vice president of the club. a junior in english education quickly volunteered, and bowing to the group admitted that she had “no idea about what she needed to do.” Jun seemed determined to spark a debate and began by provocatively inquiring as to what students thought about the relative needs of multicultural versus poor children. He prodded them, “What about half-white multicultural children, where do they fit in?” it was somewhat apparent that Jun himself seemed more convinced that the state should extend its services to the neediest children, their multicultural (i.e., racial) characteristics aside. Having sparked little conversation, he went on, perhaps obviating the very topic (of the club itself), to say that “i would rather think of them [i.e., multicultural kids] as simply poor kids. . . . i feel more comfortable thinking of those kids as just like us—no different.” and he prodded them again by asking about refugee (ethnic) Koreans from China and north Korea, wondering if they would count as multicultural. in a quite tentative conversation, students admitted that their knowledge of multiculturalism was pretty shallow, and that in most cases that it began only when they learned that the snUe entrance examination would include questions on the topic. indeed, from the outset their multicultural election was in a sense hollow, in the way in which we have been using that term. That Jun had prodded the group by asking about what sort of difference should matter spoke to a resounding theme of the semester-long “introduction to Multiculturalism” course that many of them were taking that semester. each session of the course was taught by a different faculty member, and students told us that little had been done to integrate the often confusing and hugely repetitive information. Furthermore, a number of students complained that the course had been impractical, telling them very little about how to actually deal with these kids in real life. as 6

Dr. Bae was in fact concerned about the snUe students’ ability to understand the situation of less privileged students, multicultural children among them. He told us that he had recently been “shocked” to learn that 30 percent of snUe students had attended elite specialty high schools (e.g., foreign language and science high schools). Furthermore, he told us that many snUe students hailed from seoul’s most prosperous neighborhoods south of the river. He worried whether they could really understand “difficult children” (ŏryŏun haksaengdŭl), referring both to children from difficult backgrounds as well as children who can be challenging to teach. in this way, Dr. Bae was both suggesting that multicultural children stand in for the ideal or neediest educational subject, while at once calling attention to the increasingly middle-class contours of the secure teaching profession.

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one student put it, “thinking and reality are entirely different matters.” another put it, “mostly i really wanted cases and solutions.” They nonetheless felt that a resounding theme was the somewhat paradoxical lesson that “multicultural students are no different and should be treated just like all other Koreans.” “like regular Koreans” was how another student put it. as was the case for Jun, however, this seemed to some of them to pose a fundamental challenge to south Korean education itself, as they wondered during the follow-up interviews how in fact these multicultural children would fare under south Korea’s extreme educational competitiveness (e.g., in south Korea’s after-schooling or shadow education market). one student reflected on his own teaching in a gifted class this way: “i can’t even imagine my own [future] children fitting in, let alone these multicultural kids. so, i think we need to think about what they need, whether they need extra help, and also how to help them develop a fondness for Korea.” With this comment, this student upset the implicit “Korean/multicultural person” binary by asking who, after all, really counts as Korean. “Would his children’s lives,” he hinted, “be any different than those of the multicultural children at the heart of these programs?” a provocative remark by another student similarly called attention to the fuzzy borderland of the “us” and “them” of multiculturalism. at one of the club meetings, a student who actually was there as a girlfriend and was not participating in the club or sMP spoke up to say that during her student teaching in seoul, she had been chided for her inappropriate clothing. adding that “Korean” children are prohibited from even dying their hair, she wondered about whether there is any “real tolerance of difference” in south Korea, and asked, “How can we really even talk about multiculturalism?” although she laughed as she spoke about this, as if to say, “i’m a bit of a renegade here,” it appeared to us that many students wondered about how easy it would be to treat these kids no differently in light of south Korea’s own regnant systems of normativity. Furthermore, although with a quiet voice, some students admitted to their own fears about accepting these kids as “regular students” and more generally about the sort of society south Korea was becoming. in this way, students were registering powerful contradictions: a formal curriculum in the name of difference that seemed to downplay it; their own hunches of real differences that they might have to deal with in the field; and, finally, multicultural children aside, their recognition of the powerful sway of normative culture in south Korea. These sorts of tensions were ones that surfaced again, both during the summer training retreat and during their summer mentoring itself.

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Multiculturalism in the Field

not dissimilar from student experiences within the class and the club, the summer activities were again at times confusing for students as they navigated largely unspoken competing visions of a multicultural society: one that spoke of difference, and another that largely remained silent and imagined in U.s. terms a postracial social order of sorts. The training day began with formal presentations that echoed their coursework with a focus on multicultural kids as “no different.” students, upon reflection, spoke of their difficulties in understanding how it was that difference could matter so little, thinking again about the intensive educational system and about the difficulties of “learning Korean culture.” students were then divided into twenty-five-person teams (with a professor on each team) and charged to discuss four questions: Why is multicultural mentoring necessary? What will i do as a mentor? How can i connect with these kids? What kinds of curricular and extracurricular activities should i do? While some groups were lively, the conversation dragged so much in one group that they finally decided to just pass the questions and let people silently add their thoughts on paper. There was considerable consensus among the groups: that the schooling system is not equipped to deal with multicultural children (hence the necessity of this program); that these children need to be guided in order to build their “self-esteem” and to “be able to actively participate in south Korean society” (to counteract their “passivity” and “negativity”); that they should, on the one hand, respect these children’s unique cultural backgrounds (e.g., the countries that one of their parents are from), but on the other hand treat them as “no different” and in a “natural” manner while also educating them in “Korean etiquette and culture”; and that they should cater to the particular needs of the kids in their activities. We suggest that these students were walking—and being asked to walk—a fine line: they were not to call attention to these students’ differences, but the differences (of background and need) had motivated the inception of the very programs themselves. We appreciate these conversations, however, as meaningful ones—ones that engaged the grist of the matter, even as they touched on the contradictions entailed in makeshift multiculturalism. Perhaps it can be said that self-consciousness about the apparatus itself can be productive: compelling faculty and students alike to query the name in which they have been activated/mobilized, as well as the apparatus of that very mobilization. We have asserted here that south Koreans, in this case the faculty and students at teaching training universities, were navigating the challenge of their election as multicultural agents. While appreciating with many

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observers that compressed multiculturalism in south Korea does ring of “hypocrisy,” “paradox,” or “fiction,” we nonetheless assert that this conclusion does not do justice to the complex social field that is multiculturalism in south Korea today. With “makeshift” we have indexed both a considerable confusion and a space for generative activity, honest reflection, and what lim in this volume writes of as “real effects” or even “unintended consequences” (chap. 2). We have thus called for a simultaneous acknowledgment of particular organizational or bureaucratic features that characterize south Korea’s “late multiculturalism,” and of the productive potential of this system with its still open signification. References Cho, U. 2007. “Toward a Multicultural society?” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:5–7. Chung, J. 2008. “20 Universities Were voted as ‘active Brain Power (aBT)’ by Ministry of Justice.” Financial News, 23 May. available at http://m.fnnews.com/view?ra=arcview&arcid=00000921320761&cd ate=20080523&cate_idx=10. Han, g. s. 2007. “Multicultural Korea: Celebration or Challenge of Multiethnic shift in Contemporary Korea?” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:32–63. Hong, W. P. 2010. “Multicultural education in Korea: its Development, remaining issues, and global implications.” AsiaPacific Education Review 11:387–395. Kang, s. W. 2010. “Multicultural education and the right to education of Migrant Children in south Korea.” Educational Review 62:287–300. Kim, H. M. 2007. “The state and Migrant Women: Diverging Hopes in the Making of ‘Multicultural Families’ in Contemporary Korea.” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:100–122. Kim, n. K. 2009. “Multicultural Challenges in Korea: The Current stage and a Prospect.” International Migration 47, no. 4:1–22. lim, T. 2012. “south Korea as an ‘ordinary’ Country: a Comparative inquiry into the Prospects for ‘Permanent’ immigration to Korea.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38, no. 3:507–528. Ministry of education, science and Technology. 2010. Education Plan for Multicultural Family Students [Damunhwa gajok haksaeng gyoyuk jiwon gyehoek]. sleeter, C., and C. a. grant. 1987. “an analysis of Multicultural research in the United states.” Harvard Educational Review 57, no. 4:421–445.

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———. 2003. Making Choices for Multicultural Education: Five Approaches to Race, Class, and Gender. new york: John Wiley and sons. Watson, i. 2010. “Multiculturalism in south Korea: a Critical assessment.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 40, no. 2:337–346.

Part ii. Migrants and others

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The needs of others Revisiting the Nation in North Korean and Filipino Migrant Churches in South Korea

Hae yeon CHoo This chapter focuses on two migrant groups at the margins of multicultural projects in south Korea—north Korean migrants and Filipino migrant workers—and examines how religion has intervened in the project of nation-making as south Korea’s self-definition has begun to shift from ethnically homogeneous to multiethnic.1 Despite being state-driven, south Korea’s multicultural initiatives are far from cohesive and clearly defined; instead, they are better understood as contingent and in-themaking, typifying what nancy abelmann and her colleagues call in this volume “makeshift multiculturalism.” various state and civil society actors have participated in the making of south Korean “multicultural apparatuses” (Jun, chap. 4), compelled by a moral calling and sense of urgency (abelmann et al., chap. 5) as well as religious and spiritual commitment (W. Kim 2007). These diverse partnerships with moral and religiously motivated civil society actors have stimulated an ongoing debate about the subjects and contents of state-sponsored multiculturalism in south Korea. The Protestant churches i studied in south Korea were major actors in the area of migrant advocacy and assistance for north Korean and 1

This research was supported by the social science research Council international Dissertation research Fellowship, the national science Foundation Dissertation improvement grant in sociology, and the american Philosophical society lewis and Clark Fund. i thank John lie and my fellow participants in the Multicultural south Korea Workshop at UC Berkeley; Joseph Hankins, Chaitanya lakkimsetti, and Jessica Cobb who offered comments on an earlier draft; and all the research participants who opened their chapels, homes, and hearts to me, especially the late Pastor Peter seung-Pil Chang, whose commitment to migrant advocacy continues to inspire many.

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Filipino migrants. These churches were deeply involved in the production and implementation of south Korea’s migration and settlement policy through collaboration and contention with the state. Within the structure of restrictive refugee and immigration policy, Protestant churches play an integral role in ensuring that migrants’ de jure rights are translated into de facto rights.2 For example, in acknowledgment of a shared ethnic nationhood, south Korean law and policy stipulate that north Korean migrants receive south Korean legal citizenship as well as the associated rights and provisions upon arrival in south Korea. However, without the assistance of south Korean Protestant churches that operate shelters and mission homes in China and other asian countries on the route to south Korea, it would be nearly impossible for north Korean migrants to make their way to south Korea to claim these rights.3 in the case of migrant workers from asia and africa who are not ethnically Korean, Protestant churches have advocated expanding labor rights for both documented and undocumented migrant workers whose claims to rights and belonging are curtailed by restrictive immigration laws and guest-worker policies. Both groups face discrimination and disrespect in their daily lives in south Korea, and Protestant churches help them bring claims to the south Korean state and civil society. as such, south Korean Protestant churches are important sites for symbolic boundary work (lamont and Molnar 2002). The significant role that religion and faith-based advocacy groups play in the lives of migrants is not limited to south Korea but is instead a global phenomenon. scholars have documented how religious institutions meet migrants’ various needs; these institutions offer a space to maintain ethnic identity and solidarity, obtain day-to-day social assistance and support, pursue opportunities for upward mobility in the host society, and organize for immigrant justice.4 in addition, researchers have investigated how religious institutions challenge the state as they operate according 2 Protestant-based organizations and churches dominate the field of social assistance and activism for north Korean migrants and migrant workers, with the exception of one Buddhist organization for north Korean migrants and the Catholic Church’s advocacy network for Filipino and vietnamese migrant workers. see W. Kim (2007) for a detailed historical examination of the Christian church’s role in advocacy work on behalf of migrant workers in south Korea. 3 For a more detailed description of the involvement of south Korean Protestant churches with north Korean migrants in China and south Korea, see Jung (chap. 7). 4 For research on the use of religious institutions for upward mobility, see Cao (2005), ng (2002), ong (2003), and yang (1999). see Chong (1998) and Min (1992) for research on mutual support and the maintenance of ethnic identity. For a comprehensive review of the literature on religion and immigration, see Cadge and ecklund (2007), ebaugh and Chafetz (2000), and yang and ebaugh (2001).

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to principles derived from religious tenets that differ from the law and policy of the host nation-state.5 While this literature offers a rich account of the various ways that religious institutions have collaborated with and struggled against the state to meet the needs of migrants, few scholars have critically examined how these institutions have defined and acted upon migrants’ needs and how their actions influence boundaries around nationhood and citizenship. Following political theorist nancy Fraser (1989), i suggest moving the analytic gaze from needs satisfaction—whether and to what extent the state should satisfy certain needs of a given constituency—to the politics of needs interpretation—how these needs are defined and interpreted, and which actors have the final say on these matters. For Fraser, such “needs talk” moves beyond a simple tallying of which needs are met to function “as a medium for the making and contesting of political claims: it is an idiom in which political conflict is played out and through which inequalities are symbolically elaborated and challenged” (1989, 161–162). in this chapter, i delve into needs talk via competing claims of inclusion and exclusion and address the undertheorized issue of “constituency” in Fraser’s discussion. Fraser considers the group to whom needs belong “a given constituency” that is more or less taken for granted. However, whether a certain group is regarded as a legitimate constituency whose needs should be taken seriously and which specific boundaries define that constituency are open to contestation. Therefore, i argue that the politics of needs interpretation is inseparable from the politics of constituency: the discursive and material contestation of whether a group is considered a deserving constituency that merits the attention and resources of the state and civil society. Using data from fourteen months of ethnographic research, i compare needs talk within two migrant Protestant church settings in south Korea.6 5

For research on church-based collective immigrant activism that challenges the state, see Christiansen (1996), Hondagneu-sotelo (2008), and Menjívar (2007); for an exploration of faith-based ngos’ refugee resettlement work operating under government jurisdiction, see nawyn (2006, 2007). 6 i conducted the field research for this chapter in two phases. i conducted the study of Protestant churches for north Korean migrants from May to august of 2005 in two churches in seoul (Prosperity Church and Blessing Church), and i completed the study of the Filipino migrant churches from July 2008 to april 2009 in three Protestant churches (Peace Church, Justice Church, Jesus Church) in a segregated migrant neighborhood (which i refer to as Factorytown) on the outskirts of seoul. i conducted participant observation in sunday worship services, Bible study meetings, religious and social events, choir practices, and small prayer groups; in addition, i completed in-depth interviews with pastors, church leaders, and migrant church members. The denomination of the churches included Methodist, Presbyterian, and episcopalian, but denominational affiliation mattered little to migrants and

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i examine everyday interactions in the churches as a space that transforms migrants into a deserving constituency of the Korean nation-state. Within this space, the needs of migrants are produced, interpreted, and contested by migrants and church leaders. This comparison reveals the ways in which the Protestant church, via north Korean and Filipino migrant churches, partakes in the politics of constituency through the rhetoric of inclusion for migrants, and how this rhetoric relates to needs talk among south Korean church leaders and migrant congregational members. approaching needs talk as a site of political claims-making, i demonstrate how the boundaries of the nation are redrawn through the daily conversations within the church. Reclaiming the Nation in North Korean Migrant Churches it was north Korea Mission Week at Prosperity Church, a south Korean megachurch located in central seoul famous for its evangelical zeal. “oh, dear god,” Pastor Donghyun lee intoned as he took the stage for the opening prayer in front of more than two thousand people gathered in the main chapel for the sunday worship service, “We pray for north Korea with all our hearts. Though they have sinned and fallen on the side of evil, have mercy on them. Father god, save north Korea from evil, and unite the divided nation with Thy power.” as the congregation responded with fervent shouts of “amen,” Pastor lee associated the evil of north Korea with its idol worship, which, in his opinion, is a cause of extreme poverty: There are a few things that god punishes most harshly. one of the most serious sins in god’s eyes is to worship false idols. Do you know why north Korea is so poor and undeveloped? look at all the statues of Kim il-sung and how they made the people worship him. north Korea is cursed because they worship a human as a false idol instead of god.

after the prayer, youn Hee, a thirty-five-year-old north Korean migrant woman, took the stage to offer her testimonial. she began, “i am here today church leaders; instead, the “migrant church” identity was paramount. in south Korea, the primary form of Protestantism, regardless of denomination, is evangelicalism (Chong 2006; Kim 2000); this identity was reflected by church members, who referred to these churches as “born again” or “Christian” instead of referring to a specific denomination. overall, the churches for north Korean migrants tended to be politically and theologically conservative, while migrant worker churches were more progressive in terms of advocating for minority rights, although these divisions were fluid on the ground. in north Korean migrant churches, the Korean language was used, and in Filipino migrant churches, english was used for worship while Filipino members communicated in Tagalog. interviews were conducted in Korean, english, and Tagalog, depending on the interviewee’s preference. all names of people and churches are pseudonyms, and all quotes were translated by the author.

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to talk about how people live in hardship in north Korea.” as youn Hee spoke in a soft voice, the congregation fell silent. she described her family’s suffering during the north Korean food crisis—her grandmother and father had starved to death. she described her father’s last day: “i was so glad that day because i brought home some corn flour. He was very weak, but he ate a little bit and said it tasted very good.” The next morning youn Hee’s father never opened his eyes. “at least i was glad that he enjoyed his last meal,” she said with tears shining on her cheeks. youn Hee went on to speak about crossing the river to China to earn money to send to her family by working in a variety of jobs from waitressing to farm work before she met a south Korean pastor who helped her migrate. Her testimonial highlighted the great suffering in north Korea, including starvation, police brutality, censorship, and political repression. youn Hee juxtaposed her struggles in north Korea with the help she had received from south Korean churches. she spoke with reverence of the south Korean pastors who had saved her and the energy she gained through morning prayers at the governmental educational facility of Hanawon, where north Korean migrants are required to stay for three months upon their arrival in south Korea. Many in the congregation were sobbing by the time youn Hee closed her testimonial by saying, “it is Kim il-sung and Kim Jung-il that are evil. They are to blame, not common north Koreans,” to which the people responded, “amen.” as demonstrated in youn Hee’s presentation, north Korean migrants played a central role in constructing the idea of a bifurcated nation in mainstream south Korean churches, reinforcing the long-standing political standoff between south and north Korea.7 in the form of testimonials, these migrants offered concrete accounts of how the “evil” north Korean regime persecuted its citizens, emphasizing the need to save north Koreans and achieve a unified nation. The presence of north Korean migrants on south Korean soil served as a testament to both the failure of north Korea and the superiority of south Korea. as people of freedom (as they were referred to in Prosperity Church), north Korean migrants were portrayed as having crossed from oppression to liberty. By demonstrating that they had actively terminated their affiliation with the evil north, these migrants were welcomed into south Korean society as an affirmation of the possibility of national unity. on the same day that youn Hee delivered her testimonial at Prosperity 7

The exclusion of north Korea was central to the imagined community of south Korea. The division of a single Korean nation into two opposing states during the Cold War led to a process of nationhood and state-building in which each state used the other as the negative part of its self-definition (Moon 2005).

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Church, Pastor sungchul Park, a thirty-eight-year-old north Korean migrant, delivered a sermon at Blessing Church, a small gathering of north Korean migrants located in a neighborhood on the east side of seoul in a public housing project. Pastor Park used his personal experience as a refugee in China and a newcomer in south Korea to build his north Korean congregation. “We have a special mission to pray for north Korea,” he explained in front of the small gathering of fewer than twenty people who sat on the floor of a cramped room with no air conditioning. in contrast to Prosperity Church’s message that poverty is a sign of god’s condemnation of north Korean evil, Pastor Park claimed that Christianity is a religion for the poor. He drew the congregation’s attention to the suffering of Jesus Christ: People called him Jesus of nazareth. What does that mean? Calling him Jesus of nazareth is not a compliment. as i studied biblical history, i found out that nazareth was an impoverished region, and people from that region were stigmatized. it’s just like calling us north Korean defectors. it’s pejorative . . . Jesus knows how much we suffered, because he himself suffered like us. He will hear our cry and our prayer before anyone else’s and give us the blessing we all deserve.

By linking the suffering of north Korean migrants to the suffering of Jesus, Pastor Park expressed a strong connection to north Korean citizens living in poverty. He told his congregation that one day, he had cried out to god in tears and prayed, “god, why are you only in south Korea, and not in north Korea? Why haven’t you come to north Korea? even you don’t like to be in poor places, do you?” Pastor Park continued, “god told me, ‘i have a special mission for you. Keep praying for north Korea. Have faith in my power.’” in Pastor Park’s understanding, god’s blessing of material prosperity would not be freely granted but instead must be achieved through faith and prayer. Under this theology, north Korean migrants had a special mission to pray for the spiritual salvation and material well-being of those they left behind. according to Pastor Park, north Korean migrants would be integral to the nation’s reunification and to achieving prosperity in both the north and south. Because of this conviction, Pastor Park strongly opposed the south Korean government when it changed the term for north Korean migrants from “north Korean defectors” (t’albukcha) to “new settlers” (saet’ŏmin) in 2005. Using the term “new settler” was a depoliticizing move on the part of the south Korean government; by removing the reference to north Korea, the government intended to decrease the stigmatization of new migrants. While some north Korean migrants

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appreciated this change, others vehemently opposed it, including many members of Blessing Church. as Pastor Park explained: There’s nothing wrong with the term “north Korean defectors” itself. That’s what we are, and changing the name to “new settlers” would not change that. if anything, “new settlers” sounds like we are like other migrants, like foreigners, but that’s not true. We escaped north Korea in search of freedom, and we risked our lives to come here.

according to Pastor Park, the term “north Korean defectors” highlighted migrants’ active choice to leave north Korea for south Korea, which they considered a land of freedom. Conflating these migrants with “any other migrant” would downplay their struggle for their own freedom and that of their countrymen, a spiritual mission that was at the heart of the politics of constituency for north Korean migrants. In Need of a Work Ethic: The Problems of a Socialist Upbringing

When north Korean migrants stepped down from the pulpit after delivering testimonials about the atrocities in the north, they resumed daily lives in which they faced negative stereotyping and discrimination. although these migrants made the move from “poverty to wealth,” by migrating from north Korea to south Korea, in mainstream south Korean churches, migrant poverty and other social problems were attributed to their origins. For north Korean migrants, acceptance into south Korean society hinged on the condition that they rid themselves of the “stains” associated with north Korea. south Koreans asserted that these stains were noticeable in migrants’ speech, appearance, and manners.8 “They are not to be easily trusted,” asserted Pastor Junghyun Kim, a major figure in missionary work for north Korean migrants. He continued: They lack a sense of morality, because in north Korea, they are used to saying whatever was asked of them, so they didn’t learn to think for themselves what is right and wrong. They would tell you lies without any qualms because that’s how they survived there—by being selfish and deceiving one another.

Pastor Kim claimed that north Korean migrants, because of their earlier experiences, needed the Christian religion to settle successfully in south Korea. He believed that Christianity would serve as a corrective to a north Korean upbringing. in the eyes of Pastor Kim and other south 8

see Choo (2006) for an examination of the gendered production of ethnic markers for north Korean migrants in south Korea.

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Korean pastors who worked closely with north Korean migrants, north Korean traits must be unlearned through the church. The stain of being north Korean was also connected to migrant poverty. Pastor Kim argued that north Korean migrants lacked a strong work ethic, which rendered them incompetent in the south Korean market economy. in his words, even if you get [north Korean migrants] a job, they just cannot adjust to the work, and usually they leave even before the month is out. When they leave, i get them another job, but . . . the reason that they leave is that they were in communist society for a long time, right? What is socialism? in socialism, just going to work is all the work you have to do. you don’t have to work hard. They have the same attitude even when they come here. . . . so they just don’t have any idea what competitive society is, what capitalism is, so what kind of employer would like that?

For Pastor Kim, instilling a capitalist work ethic in north Korean migrants was an important part of his Christian mission. He explained, “Whenever i meet north Korean youth, i tell them, ‘you should not sleep more than four hours a day. you are already behind compared to south Koreans your age. you cannot possibly imagine that you can compete with south Koreans. That’s not as easy as you think. you should work two times, three times harder to catch up.’ ” Church leaders, because they believed that a deficient work ethic was a central problem for north Koreans, used church interactions to cultivate a strong work ethic among migrants. sermons, hymns, and prayers were commonly used to help produce hard-working subjects. For example, at Prosperity Church, a south Korean choir leader in her forties taught the north Korean migrant congregation a hymn promoting hard work. Before she sat down in front of the piano, she told the congregation: “This hymn is really powerful for you. How wonderful it is that all of you are now in south Korea, after all the hardships in the north. now let us praise god, who blesses those who work hard.” The congregation then sang the following hymn: Don’t ask why you are the only one facing hardships. Be grateful and see the blessings the lord has saved for you. although at this moment, your burden seems too difficult to bear, god is working even now. even when others are tired and sitting down, you should stand up. Be strong, be strong. The lord is holding your hands. if you believe that the lord is with you, you can overcome any hardships.

The lyrics and the leader’s presentation emphasized the value of individual hard work and god as a source of power in that effort. The depiction

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of god in these lyrics is noteworthy—god is portrayed as someone who perseveres when others have given up. Pastor Park of Blessing Church was also a firm believer that dedication to god would transform a person with an impoverished north Korean past into someone with a wealthy south Korean future. However, whereas the leaders of Prosperity Church viewed each north Korean settler as an individual who needed to cultivate a work ethic, Blessing Church was grounded in a mission of collective empowerment based on shared experiences as north Koreans. in his sermon, Pastor Park spoke passionately of the need for hard work and upward mobility in the name of god: although we are now living in small public housing apartments, if we keep good faith and pray, one day god will bless us and we will be living in 60 p’yŏng [2,000 square foot] apartments. We should pray, and we need to work hard to make nonbelievers think, “ah, that family was blessed and became wealthy because they accepted Jesus as their lord,” and then they will follow our path.

Following the sermon, the congregation sang an energetic hymn: “We can do it. let’s do it. For believers, nothing is impossible. Though i am little, though i am weak, the lord supports me. Have no doubt, have no fear. Miracles happen. Within the Word, within the faith, we can do it, let’s do it!” Both Blessing Church and Prosperity Church emphasized hard work as a Christian virtue that the congregation must cultivate and wealth as a sign of god’s blessing.9 By emphasizing individual effort through prayer and hard work, north Korean migrant churches like these incorporated congregants in a “self-improvement” project that ignored the discrimination that north Korean migrants confronted in the labor market and other spheres of everyday life. given this context, how did north Korean migrants participate in and respond to the needs interpretation put forth by the church? North Korean Migrants and the Pursuit of Progress through the Church

Most north Korean migrants i met during my fieldwork discussed the importance of working hard to “make progress.” These north Korean 9

in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber claimed that capitalism grew out of cultural habits and expectations rooted in Protestantism. according to Weber, a belief in both an individual’s dedication to work in the secular world as god’s calling and the accumulation of wealth as a sign of personal favor from god fostered the development of capitalism. This analysis is reflected in south Korean Protestant churches’ focus on material concerns (Kim 2000).

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settlers defined progress in various ways: for some, progress meant better academic performance or obtaining a stable and well-paying job; for others, it meant losing their accents and learning how to cook and dress “better” to be more in sync with the south Korean middle-class style. The common element in their pursuit of progress was the strategy of distancing oneself from other north Korean migrants; my north Korean migrant interviewees believed that avoidance of their fellow migrants was critical to achieving upward mobility. Hyun suk, a thirty-seven-year-old migrant, exemplified this attitude. When i asked whether he spent time with other north Korean migrants, he shook his head firmly and replied: “What good is that going to do? if i associate with other north Koreans, there is no progress. i don’t learn anything. i want to stay away from them.” avoiding other north Koreans and interacting solely with south Koreans was not easy, however, because of discrimination against and hostility toward north Korean migrants. in addition, migrants noted that not every south Korean represented progress equally. su young, a sixty-one-yearold woman migrant, contrasted south Korean members of her church with other south Koreans she met in her daily life, especially her neighbors in the public housing project: They are totally different people. When i go to church, people speak nicely to me. They understand what we went through and how we suffered. They would come and talk to me, [saying] “it must have been really hard,” and it feels very good to be understood. But the people in my apartment building are of low quality. They treat us really badly. you know, in my building, there are disabled people, poor people, and us north Koreans. our neighbors don’t have any culture whatsoever. They say nasty things to us. one night, the old guy, the head of my apartment complex, shouted to us, “shut up! Did you learn to behave like that in north Korea from general Kim?” . . . We weren’t even that loud. and other neighbors call us north Korean beggars, something like that. so i try to spend little time at home.

Compared to the blatant hostility she encountered from her neighbors, the church was a welcoming place for su young. Because su young was one of the few north Korean settlers who came to south Korea through a family network instead of assistance from the church, she first encountered Protestantism after migrating to south Korea. su young connected her decision to become Christian to attaining membership in south Korea: i thought to myself, “now i am a south Korean, i will do things in the south Korean way.” and when i met the Christian volunteers at Hanawon, they are like college graduates. They are not fools. if church does something bad to them, why would they go to church, you know? it must

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do something good. so i decided to become Christian myself and began attending services at Hanawon.

Church groups were active in providing social assistance for north Korean migrants, illustrating their prominence in south Korean civil society. north Korean migrants like su young accepted Protestantism as part of “the south Korean way.” The fact that well-educated middle-class citizens—in contrast to the “disabled people and poor people” su young met in her public housing project—attended Protestant churches suggested that Protestantism was not only a reliable source of benefits, but also a pathway to upward mobility and belonging in south Korea. Protestant church leaders in south Korea defined progress and selfimprovement against migrants’ north Korean past and the lifestyle of their fellow migrants, reproducing the hierarchy between north and south Korea in north Korean migrants’ daily lives. eun sim, an ambitious nineteen-year-old woman, attended an alternative school for north Korean migrant youth where she was preparing to take the exam to attend college. in 1997, when she was barely eleven, eun sim left north Korea for China at the height of the food crisis. in our conversation, she described the tension she felt between her desire for progress and her discomfort at being grouped with other north Korean migrants at the alternative school, saying: i like the teachers here, and they are all very nice and i learn a lot. But when i spent time with north Korean students here, they are so different from the university elder brothers and sisters i meet in the church. They are like different kinds of people. i know that that’s an elite university and only really smart people attend, but when i spent time with them, they are very considerate of others. even a small thing, like when we get water, they would bring my water too, something like that. But here, people are crude, use a lot of bad language, fight with each other, and i find myself using more bad language, [having] a stronger north Korean accent, and becoming aggressive. i don’t like that.

eun sim repeated this contrasting perception of south and north Koreans in her descriptions of many different events in her life, from her refugee years in China to her transition period in south Korea. she proudly emphasized how she had been helped by many south Korean adults, including diplomats in the south Korean embassy where she sought asylum, teachers and government officials at Hanawon, pastors in the church, teachers at alternative schools, and university students. The south Koreans she met at church encouraged and supported eun sim’s aspirations and hard work in pursuit of upward mobility. in contrast, she

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described other north Korean migrants in a negative light, as people who did not work hard and distracted her from her goals. eun sim’s descriptions reflect a dilemma that many north Korean migrants faced: they had to distance themselves from other north Koreans to achieve success and upward mobility in south Korea. For many north Korean migrants, the Protestant church was a paradoxical space. While it offered the resources and support necessary for north Korean settlers to achieve social mobility and acceptance, church leaders also viewed migrants as deficient people from a deficient state. This perception of north Korean migrants led church leaders to promote an active project of self-transformation for migrant churchgoers, in which the standard of progress was distance from their north Korean pasts. Under this framework, Blessing Church faced significant disadvantages in mobilizing north Korean migrants compared to mainstream south Korean churches like Prosperity Church. in addition to lacking material resources, Blessing Church encouraged its members to embrace their association with their pasts and with other north Korean migrants. The Protestant Church’s inclusion of north Korean migrants was a complex move to reclaim a Korean nation that encompassed north Korea by transforming these migrants into proper capitalist subjects with a strong work ethic who were able to assimilate to south Korea as reformed individuals. The politics of constituency within the Protestant Church were significantly different in the case of migrant workers without a shared ethnic nationhood, however. i will examine this different type of needs talk in the next section. Transcending the Nation in Filipino Migrant Churches “sojourners are like orphans and widows,” Pastor Paul at Jesus Church observed as he began his sermon during the sunday worship service for the congregation of Filipino members and south Korean visitors. He continued, “god commands us to serve them. like orphans and widows in Jesus’ time, migrants today can’t survive without help from the people in this country.” as part of a mission to provide assistance to migrants, Pastor Paul and other south Korean pastors in “Factorytown”—a segregated migrant neighborhood on the outskirts of seoul—led migrant churches for over ten years. When south Korean visitors from more affluent, established churches visited Jesus Church, Pastor Paul spoke passionately about the importance of migrant worker mission work as god’s calling to serve the sojourners. similarly, at Peace Church, migrant workers were accepted as “the least of these,” for whom Christians had a responsibility to care. as the

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national church convention approached, Pastor Jaehoon Won at Peace Church asked lisa, a Filipina migrant worker in her late twenties, to read the prayer of the people in Korean at the gathering. among the four people assigned specific roles, lisa represented marginalized groups. Her prayer read, “We pray for the homeless on the street, the poor who struggle for daily bread, the sick who need your care, and the migrant workers whose work is hard and difficult in this land. Please give your blessing and protection.” Through this form of representation, migrant workers who did not have a Korean ethnic identity were symbolically incorporated into south Korea as subjects who needed protection, provision, and blessings “in this land.” alongside widows, orphans, the sick, the homeless, and the poor, migrant workers were considered a vulnerable group in south Korea. Creating a space of acceptance for migrant workers was not an easy task within the restrictive guest-worker system in south Korea, which did not grant legitimate long-term residency, thus rendering migrant workers undocumented. The church’s understanding of migrant workers as sojourners to be welcomed clashed with state immigration policy imposing a division between legal temporary workers and “illegals.” When i accompanied a deacon of Peace Church to the immigration office, Mr. Baek, the government official in charge, looked at us with disdain and said, “you are helping illegals, right?” He continued, “We Koreans need to learn from Japan. i heard that the ngos there don’t offer any help to illegals. They are law-breakers; they are breaking the law of our country, and we shouldn’t be dealing with them.” Despite immigration officers’ negative attitude toward undocumented migrant workers, in the eyes of the church, migrant workers’ legal status was not important. Migrant workers were brothers and sisters in need of help and protection as sojourners. During a sermon one sunday at Justice Church, Pastor suan lee asked, “Many of you are illegal, but are you sinful under god?” after a pause, a few congregants quietly answered “no.” The pastor affirmed this, saying, “of course not. somebody might say breaking a law or a regulation is sin, but that’s the law of the world. god’s law is different. Under god, you are not sinful because you are helping other people. you are helping your family back home. We are on the side of god.” in order to include migrant workers as part of the deserving constituency in south Korea, Korean churches engaged in active symbolic work. For example, a skit titled “Migrant Workers and the story of simchŏng,” written by Pastor lee and performed by Filipino members of Justice Church, adapted a popular Korean folktale to depict the lives of migrant workers. in the original folktale, a young woman, simchŏng, sacrifices her

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life to cure her blind father, is saved by a god of the sea, and becomes the wife of a king. every Korean knows this story, which is a morality tale emphasizing filial piety and sacrifice for the family, but how does this story relate to migrant workers who do not share this folk culture? Pastor lee’s script began with a story of a Filipina migrant woman, dramatizing how she left her country when her father died and the family was in dire poverty. Her mother cried in despair, “now he’s gone, and there’s nothing to eat in the house. How will i feed my four children?” The daughter replied, “Don’t worry, mother. south Korea is recruiting migrant workers. i will go.” The mother cried even more, “i am so sorry, i am the one who should go, but with these little ones . . .” The daughter traveled to Korea, but with her meager salary as an industrial trainee, she could not send enough money home to support her family; she then decided to run away from the factory and earn more money as an undocumented worker. similar stories of sacrifice were enacted as the skit continued and another mother and daughter came to south Korea to help their families. The skit ended with an explicit message as the migrant workers met with sim Ch’ŏng. “you are just like me,” sim Ch’ŏng said, “because we were all willing to make a sacrifice for our families.” after Filipino migrants performed this play in three churches in seoul, Pastor lee expanded on this point in his comments. “i hope you now understand why migrant workers are here,” he said. “even without visas, they need to work to help their poor families.” Many congregation members nodded, affirming, “yes, we do,” and “amen.” Many people in the audience cried. after one performance, the pastor of the host church came up to the stage and thanked the group, saying: “Thank you so much for coming here. god told us to be with the lowly, the poor, and the oppressed, that is, to be in Canaan. instead of our going down there, Canaan came to us today.” a particular understanding of migrant workers as a group of the vulnerable, the lowly, and the oppressed emerged from interactions such as these. By acknowledging that migrant workers shared with south Koreans an ethic of sacrifice in the name of family, Christian churches engaged in the work of establishing migrant workers as legitimate members of the “lowly” class residing in south Korea and requiring Christian care. In Need of Protection and Surrender: Problems of Vulnerability

Filipino migrant worker churches shared an understanding of migrant workers as sojourners, and based their needs interpretation on the problem of vulnerability. according to the churches’ assessment, this vulnerability had multiple sources. The first element of vulnerability was

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migrants’ disadvantaged position in the workplace. even though migrant workers—both documented and undocumented—were legally entitled to labor rights, language barriers and/or undocumented status rendered migrants vulnerable to labor violations such as withholding salary, severance pay, or overtime pay. Migrants therefore often sought the assistance of the church to enforce their rights by filing cases at the labor office or negotiating directly with factory owners. Peace Church also ran a migrant advocacy ngo with a government contract to offer assistance with labor and medical issues, and other churches offered similar assistance. every sunday, church members shared their concerns with the pastor and the congregation, and pastors did whatever they could to assist with various problems that extended well beyond labor violations to include medical emergencies, family conflicts, and domestic violence. For example, during one sunday worship service at Jesus Church, Mike, a Filipino migrant worker in his forties, shared his concern and asked for prayers. Mike had not received his salary for two months, and the factory owner had not kept his promise of paying the overdue amount. Pastor Paul responded to Mike’s request, saying: “god doesn’t like it when people do not get what they deserve. it is [the owner’s] responsibility to give the fruit of your hard work.” He then led the group in a collective prayer: Dear god, please help Mike to receive the money he earned. The owner might be having difficulty, but help him to have a change of heart and give [Mike] the money. god, Mike worked in December and January, during the cold and difficult times. Be with him so that he can get the pay on the day he was promised.

Pastor Paul not only prayed for Mike and other church members but also visited factory owners to advocate on their behalf. after the sunday service, Pastor Paul visited Mike’s boss to ask for the payment, and Mike successfully received the money two weeks later. For church leaders, a second source of vulnerability was migrant workers’ undocumented status. instead of welcoming migrant workers as sojourners sent by god, the immigration office regularly arrested and deported migrant workers. Whereas the church was able to assist with workplace vulnerabilities, in matters of immigration control, churches were as helpless as the migrant workers they served. When a large-scale immigration crackdown took place, it disturbed the whole migrant community, significantly affecting migrant churches as well as migrant workers. The crackdown was viewed as a setback to their hard work, and clergy members were enraged and dismayed. Pastor Paul was visibly shaken

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after a major crackdown in Factorytown in november 2008, when eleven out of forty congregation members were deported. “How can they do this to them?” he exclaimed. He was especially upset by the manner in which the government conducted the crackdown, breaking into people’s homes, chasing them, and arresting them with handcuffs, all of which took place right in front of his church. Pastor Paul continued, “What did they do wrong? all they wanted and did was to work hard. and they treat the people like criminals, without any respect!” Pastor Won at Peace Church concurred with this sentiment of rage and betrayal: “How could they do this to us? How dare they come in here and take our people like that?” His words described a shifting boundary between “us” and “them,” where south Korean churches and migrant workers were constituted as a “we” that was under attack by the immigration office. The first sunday after the crackdown, the worship services were emotionally intense. at Peace Church, Pastor Won was barely able to contain himself. He kept repeating, “i am sorry. i am so sorry that i couldn’t protect you. i am the sinner. i failed to do my work.” as the hymn “god Be My shelter” filled the room, church members hugged one another and consoled church members whose family members were taken by the immigration department. after worship, the congregants gathered in the houses of those who had been arrested and helped pack their belongings. in all the churches, people collected money to help purchase airline tickets to the Philippines for those in detention centers. Korean pastors drove back and forth to bring migrants their luggage, passports, and money. after the initial wave of strong emotions subsided, migrant churches in Factorytown decided to take refuge in god’s plan to handle their vulnerability to immigration control. “There is one thing that i want you all to remember,” said Pastor Won at Peace Church in a desperate voice: it breaks my heart so much when i see people get hurt. When the immigration grabs you, don’t jump. ali from Bangladesh, you know, is lying in a hospital bed now because he ran to the mountain and fell off a cliff. He broke his arm, and he will not be able to recover completely. What is that? When the immigration comes, just go with them. There’s nothing you can do at that point, is there? your health is more important than anything. remember that, because it is a god-given body. god has plans for you, so don’t hurt yourself and go with them.

The Filipino congregation, consisting largely of undocumented migrants, affirmed Pastor Won’s message by laughing and nodding their heads. They had seen fellow migrant workers become disabled from injuries incurred during crackdowns and had heard about people who died while

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running from immigration officials. Under such difficult circumstances, the message that god had a plan and that Christians needed to surrender to god’s will was delivered by pastors and affirmed by congregations. The act of surrender was required not only for migrant workers, but for all church members. During a sermon one month after the crackdown, Pastor Paul confessed that his own confusion and despair led him to realize that he needed to surrender. That day [of the crackdown], i thought to myself, why am i doing this here? What’s the meaning of all this? i was crying in my heart, thinking, “maybe i will just quit.” But before i could think of anything, a word came out of my mouth that we would begin a hundred-day prayer. it wasn’t my word but was from god. . . . see now, through our hundredday prayer, how we have grown, our faith has been strengthened. Have faith in god. once you accept Jesus Christ as your personal savior, where you are doesn’t matter. We are all sojourners. you are sojourners in Korea, but you are sojourners in the Philippines as well. Wherever we are, we are only temporary before we enter the Kingdom of god. although it is sometimes hard to accept, god has His plan, and we follow His will for the expansion of His Kingdom.

after the sermon, linda led the group in singing the hymn “i surrender.” The congregation sang, “all to Jesus i surrender; all to Him i freely give. i will ever love and trust Him, in His presence daily live. i surrender all; i surrender all. all to Thee, my blessed savior, i surrender all.” in response to shared vulnerabilities, pastors of Filipino migrant churches encouraged their congregants to follow god’s will and plan. Whereas migrant workers had to live with the insecurity of possible deportation, Korean pastors struggled to cope with the insecurity that they could lose their congregants at any time. The notion of shared vulnerabilities distinguished Filipino churches from north Korean migrant churches. in the case of north Korean migrants described earlier, the work ethic prescribed for migrants was viewed as a quality south Korean church members already possessed and could transmit to migrants. in contrast, the cultivation of surrender in Filipino migrant churches was understood as a communal effort. The process of surrendering to god’s will engendered a transformation of the self, not only for migrants but also for Korean pastors and churches. This understanding of the south Korean church and Filipino migrants as a collective led to a discursive transformation; the term “sojourner,” at first limited to migrant workers, ultimately became an expansive category including all people on earth. The national boundaries of Korea and the Philippines were thus transcended, creating

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a mutual bond among church members. However, the Korean nation was bypassed in the process, rather than expanded and reworked to include migrants; as a result, the idea of the Korean nation as intact and homogeneous remained unchanged. Filipino Migrants and the Building of Extended Family in the Church

in Factorytown, all three churches shared an understanding of migrant workers as sojourners in vulnerable positions. They distinguished three elements of need among migrant workers: the need for spiritual guidance, the need for assistance with matters of labor and daily living, and the need to cultivate surrender to god’s plan. south Korean Christian churches’ understanding of migrant workers as sojourners—temporary residents who long to return to their home countries—and their belief in the need to cultivate surrender resonated with some migrant workers. Tessa, a Filipina woman in her fifties who had lived in Korea for over a decade, accepted Pastor Paul’s suggestion to integrate her life as a migrant with her spiritual journey under god’s plan; this integration helped her deal with the insecurities she felt as an undocumented worker. “god will decide when i will return home,” said Tessa. “i would like to stay and work to save more money and learn more about the Bible, but i will follow god’s plan. if the immigration [officials] come to my factory one day, i will just say, ‘Thank you, god,’ and follow them.” yet Tessa had no plans to return until that day, and intended to live her life in Factorytown “according to god’s will.” However, many migrant workers did not view themselves as sojourners. instead, they wished to stay in Korea “as long as i can,” “as long as god lets me,” or “forever.” “We like it here,” Boyet, a Filipino man in his early fifties explained. He continued, “Why don’t Koreans and Filipinos just switch our countries? Koreans seem to like it in the Philippines,” referring to the many Koreans who travel the Philippines for business, tourism, and learning english. Katherine was another migrant worker who wanted to stay in Korea permanently. she explained, “i’d love to work and live here and take vacations in the Philippines. Here there are jobs, and you can walk around at night without worrying about safety. i’d like to immigrate if they let me!” Katherine was acutely aware that Koreans, including the church members who helped her, did not appreciate her desire to immigrate. although she had lived in south Korea for thirteen years, Katherine often said she had been in the country for only six years to avoid looking like “too much of an old-timer,” and to avoid hearing, “isn’t it about time to go back?” Katherine told me about a Korean woman she met through the church in another factory town:

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she was very nice and would bring me oils and fruits. But she would always say to me, i wish you would earn enough money soon to return home. i just smiled and didn’t say anything. But in my mind, i was like, “no, i am not leaving. i am not going anywhere. i will stay here forever.” But i didn’t want to say that to her.

By selectively presenting herself and her intentions, Katherine demonstrated an awareness that the benevolent assistance from churches was contingent on their understanding of migrant workers as sojourners— temporary residents with vulnerabilities. Despite rhetoric framing migrants as sojourners, Christian churches functioned as a primary site for Filipino migrants to develop roots in Factorytown and elsewhere in south Korea by providing support and a sense of respect that migrants often lacked. For example, when Julie, a forty-year-old Filipina woman found out she was pregnant with her fifth child, Pastor Paul and the Jesus Church members were the first to celebrate with her. Pastor Paul took her to the hospital for a check-up because her husband worked during the day. although Julie had worked in the same factory for more than five years, she did not tell the Korean owner and managers about her pregnancy until she was five months along. she explained, Because had i told them two months ago, they would say, “you stupid, go to a doctor” [for an abortion]. Many say, “Why don’t you just abort the baby? Here in Korea, it’s legal.” and i tell them, “Why? This is godgiven life.” We didn’t plan this, but my husband and i are happy that we have a baby.

Julie expressed discomfort that the Korean factory owner and manager did not respect her as a mother: “They don’t think about me, [they] only think about themselves and the work. if i leave, it’s difficult for the factory, but what about what i want and my personal life? They don’t think about that.” Within her church community, Julie was able to garner the respect and support that was absent in her workplace. When she gave birth to her daughter, Pastor Paul baptized the baby, and 107 church members witnessed the baptism as godparents. not all of these congregants made it to the baptism party, but many did, and they contributed money to the family. The social support offered by the church community also provided migrants with a sense of kinship. in Factorytown, Filipino migrant workers referred to themselves and one another by church affiliation; for example, a member might say, “i am a Peace member,” or “He’s Justice, so i don’t know him too well.” Migrants’ core groups in south Korea consisted

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of church acquaintances, and which church Filipino migrants attended had less to do with religion than social networks. Thirty-year-old Florence was a Peace Church member, but she was also a devout Catholic and missed Catholic rituals like confession and ash Wednesday services. When i suggested that she might attend a Catholic church, she shook her head. “How can i do that?” she whispered, “What would ate lhisa say? you know how she is. We all go to the Peace, period.” By “we all” Florence meant her extended family (from the Philippines), including her husband Tommy, Tommy’s second cousin Peter, Peter’s brother Jhun, Jhun’s wife lhisa, and lhisa’s sister Bella and her husband ato. among the family, 45-year-old lhisa had spent the longest time in Korea, living in Factorytown for seventeen years. Her husband joined her a few years after she arrived and found work at a furniture factory, and one by one other family members came as well, including Florence and Tommy, who arrived only two years prior to our interview. as the family spent more time in Korea and welcomed new family members, they built strong bonds in the migrant community through the space of Peach Church. not all family members attended church regularly, but regardless of how religious they were, they were always “Peace Church people.” Many migrant workers had more relatives and friends in Korea than in the Philippines because their family members had migrated to countries around the globe in search of work. as they built kinship networks around the church, migrant workers in south Korea responded to their needs interpretation by creating a space of home as long-term settlers within a Christian church that embraced them as “temporary” sojourners. Conclusion in this chapter, i comparatively examined the needs talk occurring in south Korean Protestant churches regarding north Korean migrants and Filipino migrant workers. in north Korean migrant churches, which were charged with Cold War ideology, north Korean migrants were included as “people of freedom,” and church leaders emphasized migrants’ active journey from oppression in north Korea to the freedom of south Korea. Church leaders considered north Korean migrants to have a poor work ethic because of their socialist upbringing and believed that the transformative process of Christianity could help migrants become appropriate capitalist and south Korean subjects. Many north Korean migrants affirmed the needs talk of the church in their pursuit of upward mobility and acceptance. in Filipino migrant churches, migrant workers were included as sojourners in need of protection who provided examples of “the least of us” alongside disadvantaged Koreans. These churches

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constructed migrant workers’ needs against the problem of vulnerabilities. Church leaders provided protection against these vulnerabilities in the form of assistance and advocacy, but they also encouraged members to surrender to god’s plan in the face of immigration control. in response, Filipino migrants built kinship and ethnic communities using migrant churches as a basis for their long-term stay in south Korea. examining the politics of needs interpretation within Protestant churches reveals the everyday actions and messages through which the churches maintain the boundaries of the south Korean nation while advocating for and fulfilling the defined needs of migrants. in north Korean migrant churches, church leaders acknowledged and problematized the north/south divide; dichotomies between Christians and the unsaved, good and evil, and capitalism and communism were compared to the division between south and north Korea. in this sense, the church’s work with north Korean migrants served as a testing ground where the nation could be symbolically reunited by renouncing the “evil” north Korean state. in contrast, in Filipino migrant churches, the rhetoric of the sojourner as a temporary resident, combined with the cultivation of surrender, transcended the nation, bypassing the work of expanding the national boundaries beyond ethnic nationhood to actively include migrant workers. as such, the work of needs interpretation involved creating a constituency whose group definition fit the symbolic boundaries of the south Korean nation, as these churches instilled a certain set of values and morals to a selective group of newcomers while discursively expelling the national others. These everyday interactions between migrants and south Koreans buttress state-driven “makeshift multiculturalism” in south Korea and shape the shifting meanings of south Korean nationhood and citizenship. References Cadge, Wendy, and elaine H. ecklund. 2007. “immigration and religion.” Annual Review of Sociology 33:359–379. Cao, nanlai. 2005. “The Church as a surrogate Family for Working Class immigrant Chinese youth: an ethnography of segmented assimilation.” Sociology of Religion 66:183–200. Chong, Kelly H. 1998. “What it Means To Be Christian: The role of religion in the Construction of ethnic identity and Boundary among second-generation Korean americans.” Sociology of Religion 59:259–286. ———. 2006. “negotiating Patriarchy: south Korean evangelical Women and the Politics of gender.” Gender and Society 20:697–724.

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Choo, Hae yeon. 2006. “gendered Modernity and ethnicized Citizenship: north Korean settlers in south Korea.” Gender and Society 20:576–604. Christiansen, Drew. 1996. “Movement, asylum, Borders: Christian Perspectives.” International Migration Review 30:7–17. ebaugh, Helen rose, and Janet saltzman Chafetz, eds. 2000. Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations. Walnut Creek, Ca: altaMira Press. Fraser, nancy. 1989. Unruly Practices: Power Discourse and Agenda in Contemporary Social Theory. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Hondagneu-sotelo, Pierrette. 2008. God’s Heart Has No Borders: How Religious Activists Are Working for Immigrant Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kim, andrew e. 2000. “Korean religious Culture and its affinity to Christianity: The rise of Protestant Christianity in south Korea.” Sociology of Religion 61:117–133. Kim, Woo-seon. 2007. Church and Civil Society in Korea after Democratization: The NGOs’ Activism for Migrant Workers. Ph.D. diss., University of California, san Diego. lamont, Michèle, and virag Molnar. 2002. “The study of Boundaries in the social sciences.” Annual Review of Sociology 28:167–195. Menjívar, Cecilia. 2007. “serving Christ in the Borderlands: Faith Workers respond to Border violence.” in Religion and Social Justice for Immigrants, edited by Pierrette Hondagneu-sotelo, 104–121. new Brunswick, nJ: rutgers University Press. Min, Pyong gap. 1992. “The structure and social Functions of Korean immigrant Churches in the United states.” International Migration Review 26:1370–1394. Moon, seungsook. 2005. Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea. Durham, nC: Duke University Press. nawyn, stephanie J. 2006. “Faith, ethnicity, and Culture in refugee resettlement.” American Behavioral Scientist 49:1509–1527. ———. 2007. “Welcoming the stranger: Constructing an interfaith ethic of refuge.” in Religion and Social Justice for Immigrants, edited by Pierrette Hondagneu-sotelo, 141–156. new Brunswick, nJ: rutgers University Press. ng, Kwai Hang. 2002. “seeking the Christian Tutelage: agency and Culture in Chinese immigrants’ Conversion to Christianity.” Sociology of Religion 63:195–214. ong, aihwa. 2003. Buddha Is Hiding. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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yang, Fenggang. 1999. Chinese Christians in America: Conversion, Assimilation, and Adhesive Identities. University Park, Pa: Penn state University Press. yang, Fenggang, and Helen rose ebaugh. 2001. “Transformations in new immigrant religions and Their global implications.” American Sociological Review 66:269–288.

seven

north Korean Migrants in south Korea From Heroes to Burdens and First Unifiers

Jin-Heon JUng

This chapter provides a historical overview of the south Korean state’s shifting identity politics with regard to north Korean migrants,1 as well as an ethnographic study of intraethnic contact zones. it is in these zones that north Korean migrants and south Koreans interact, encounter cultural differences and similarities, and negotiate a new sense of belonging in envisioning a reunified nation. My aim is to explore how north Korean subjectivities have been shaped through practices of individual and national imaginations and negotiations that are quintessential to modern nation-building in Korean history. i argue that Korean ethnicity should not be understood as a self-evident unit that shares a homogenous identity, but rather as a product of the complex social processes of boundarymaking (Wimmer 2009). in the growing discourses and practices of multiculturalism in south Korea, Korean ethnicity is perceived to be a whole in comparison to “other” foreign migrant groups (see lim 2010; g.-s. Han 2007; K.-K. Han 2007; oh 2007). indeed, some intellectuals have pointed out potential problems of Korean ethnic nationalism, which is by no means singular in how it ignores not only internal cultural differences (e.g., grinker 1998; Kwon 2000), but also multicultural values that encourage appreciating other ethnicities and customs (e.g., Park 2009). Following Bhikkhu Parekh (2000), Myeong-Kyu Park (2009) suggests the necessity of a “spirit of multiculturalism” in the reunification process.2 The daily struggles of north 1 instead of “defector,” the term generally used in the media, i refer to the north Koreans as “migrants,” which offers a more comprehensive meaning. 2 Parekh stresses that “if we are to develop a coherent political structure for a multicultural society, we need to appreciate the importance of both unity and diversity and establish a satisfactory relationship between them” (2000, 114).

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Korean migrants in adjusting to south Korean society gives rise to questions about the narrow-mindedness of south Korean nationalism that was once believed to be ingrained in and descended through “our” blood. in this light, this chapter is devoted to two key projects. The first is a historical examination of north Korean defectors. Whereas in the past north Korean defectors were publicly celebrated as national heroes and heroines by anticommunist authoritarian regimes (1960s–1980s), today it is only within the space of nongovernmental organizations—in particular, the evangelical Protestant megachurches—and in the logic of human rights and through religious conversion that they are empowered to criticize the “evil” north and celebrate the triumph of “market democracy” in the south. The second is a study of how such seemingly upward politicaleconomic mobility is not always satisfying to migrants, who indirectly contest hypocritical and “selfish” south Korean nationalism. They believe that those who adhere to such nationalistic sentiment are not interested in understanding what their “poor” brethren from and in the north have been and are experiencing. as part of the larger field of concerns about multiethnic Korea, i demonstrate how north Korean migrants are not nameless refugees, nor are they merely social welfare beneficiaries;3 rather, they are “becoming and being made” (ong 1996) as “the chosen unifiers” of a future reunified Korea by both themselves and south Korean society. i have organized this chapter into three parts: the first is a historical overview of state-led identity politics with support programs that have changed according to the regime. The second provides ethnographic vignettes of the interactions between north Korean migrants and south Koreans within the church setting. i shed light on the Korean evangelical megachurches, which are by no means alone in imagining themselves as a social laboratory of a Christian, reunified nation-state. The third section concludes with a summary. Heroes to Burdens on 25 February 1983, lee Woong-pyung (yi Ung-p’yŏng) defected from north Korea by flying a Mig-19 fighter jet to the south, leaving his entire family behind. The south Korean Chun Doo Hwan regime, which had 3 For more discussion about refugee identities, see lisa Malkki (1995, 1996) who points out ways in which international humanitarian organizations dehistoricize particular refugee individuals and groups (e.g., Hutu refugees in rwanda). There is no refugee camp for north Korean border crossers in China or elsewhere, so their case is different from refugees in such a site. However, refugee studies like Malkki’s are useful to understand “humanitarian interventions that focus on refugees as their object of knowledge, assistance, and management” (Malkki 1996, 377) in the context of south Korea.

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taken office in a coup d’état, took this opportunity to display its political and moral legitimacy over north Korea.4 a few months later, on a rainy day in april, lee cried, “long live south Korea! (Taehan Min’guk manse!)” at yoido square where there was a welcoming ceremony combined with an anticommunist convention and a total of around two million people holding umbrellas and pickets proclaiming, “let’s smash communists!” over twenty years later, north Korean newcomers in the airport hesitate to show their faces, often wearing masks. While lee Woong-pyung held public press conferences, few newcomers allow researchers or reporters to take their pictures or write down their real names or even their ages. They are afraid for their families who remain in China or north Korea and who might be arrested or even punished with death. in order to avoid this, they usually try to bring the rest of their family members to south Korea. Whereas lee brought a Mig-19 fighter jet and classified secrets that the south Korean regime valued at the time, these newcomers bring nothing but their own bodies and stories of famine, sexual abuse, labor imprisonment, and family separation in north Korea and/or China, narratives that are no longer valuable and are unwelcomed by the south Korean state. lee was awarded about 1.3 billion Korean won (Us$1.4 million) in compensation, about 480 times the average annual income of south Koreans in 1983,5 and continued his profession with the south Korean air Force, while most newcomers today end up with only temporary or part-time jobs. More significantly, these newcomers seldom or never tell their southern counterparts that they are from north Korea out of fear of being judged (pyŏllage bonda) or being discriminated against in the job market (for adults) or at school (for young people). subtle differences in speech and behavior serve as remarkably significant markers that occasion real fear and discrimination.6 4 Byung-ho Chung addresses “the military regimes in the south, which lacked political legitimacy and publicly displayed the border crossers as proof of their success, while the conservative political groups in the U.s. and Japan used them as proof of their moral superiority to the communist regimes” (2009, 5). 5 lee Woong-pyung received the highest cash compensation according to the compensation system at the time, which, as is shown in this chapter, later changed to a long-term support system. 6 andrei lankov (2006) argues that the problems north Korean migrants confront in the process of adjustment to south Korea are caused mainly by two factors. First, he points out that the government (i.e., the Kim Dae Jung and roh Moo-hyun presidential period from 1998–2007) “has moved to the policy of quietly discouraging” (107) the migration of people from high-ranking backgrounds in the north by decreasing cash rewards in an attempt to normalize the relationship with the north Korean regime; and second, as recent “defectors” are mostly from working-class backgrounds and are limited in their career options, they often must rely on south Korean governmental support in the form of the low-income level

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Compared to former defectors, those who have arrived since the 1990s receive a smaller cash award and no guarantee of employment. They are mostly expected to assimilate into the neoliberal social welfare state. yet the transition of former socialist north Koreans into capitalist citizens is not merely predicated on economic upward mobility (cf. Berdahl 2005). rather, my ethnographic data suggests that it becomes more complex and ambiguous as the newcomers encounter south Korean society, which they must approach as another home country where the state no longer provides economic stability and a political meaning for life (i.e., heroes or heroines). They find themselves situated in a new order of cultural and ideological boundary-making together with the presence of foreign migrants and other Korean returnees (e.g., ethnic Koreans from China). in other words, as the state depoliticizes their migration, the newcomers encounter negative cultural biases that characterize them as being lazy, dependent, violent, and ignorant burdens even as their presence is still symbolically valued in envisioning a possible reunification of the two Koreas. Korean scholars and critics nearly always stress the importance of understanding the migrants first as unifiers who would or should work for the reunification of two Koreas on the one hand, while acknowledging the cultural differences of the two Koreas on the other (Chung et al. 2006; Chung 2009; Jeon 2007; yoon 2009). Table 7.1 presents demographic changes in the number and gender of north Korean migrants who defected to south Korea in the last decade.7 Prior to the 1990s, the average annual number of those who fled to the south was less than ten, and thus for about half a century from the 1950s till 1998 the total number of migrants was less than one thousand. However, in the past several years the number has increased to about two thousand annually. What is also striking in this demographic shift is the gender ratio; in the late 1990s, female northerners made up only 12 percent of the total, but as of December 2012, about 70 percent of the north Korean population in the south is female. The main reasons and consequences of this of family welfare. While partly agreeing with his points about demographic change—the increasing numbers of migrants from working-class backgrounds—and of the “outdated” knowledge and skills that recent newcomers bring, i doubt his underlying principle that presumes that the north Korean regime would be destabilized by the mass exodus of the middle and upper ruling classes. This scale of exodus was partly effective in the case of german unification, but what has been missing in this structural approach to understanding the former “heroes” and newcomers alike are such cultural and emotional dimensions as, for instance, a sense of belonging in school and the workplace, and feelings of alienation, discrimination, unfairness, etc. that both former “heroes” and recent migrants alike undergo in the process of adjustment to the south. 7 see the ministry website (www.unikorea.go.kr) for more demographic information on north Korean migrants in south Korea.

116

947

12%

Female

Total

Female rate

46%

1,043

478

565

2001

55%

1,142

632

510

2002

63%

1,285

811

474

2003

67%

1,898

1,272

626

2004

Source: Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea.

831

Male

1950s– 1998

960

424

2005

69%

1,384

Table 7.1 North Korean Migrants through June 2014

75%

2,028

1,513

515

2006

78%

2,554

1,981

573

2007

78%

2,803

2,195

608

2008

77%

2,914

2,252

662

2009

75%

2,402

1,811

591

2010

70%

2,706

1,911

795

2011

72%

1,502

1,098

404

2012

76%

1,514

1,145

369

2013

82%

732

601

131

June 2014 (tentative)

70%

26,854

18,776

8,078

Total

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trend as revealed by ethnographic data will be explored in the following sections. What follows is a brief analytical summary of the changing categorizations of the northerners given by the south Korean state.8 Byung-ho Chung, in his recent article (2009), divides north Korean migrants into six groups according to their social definitions.9 With reference to his categorization of these changing definitions, i divide them into three categories that have changed over time: anticommunist heroes, defecting compatriots, and new settlers. it is worthwhile to note that south Korean civil organizations planned campaigns for north Korean famine relief followed by peace campaigns for understanding north Korea beyond the Cold War at the same time that they felt the effects of the 1997 asian Crisis (commonly called the iMF Crisis by south Koreans). also relevant, both south and north Korea sought to normalize their relationship while undergoing a severe crisis as part of the consequences of changing global climates—the collapse of the socialist bloc and the late-1990s world economic crisis. Division, the Cold War, and Anticommunist Heroes (1945–1993)

The north and south Korean states have governed their subjects and determined what type of access individuals and families have to the rights, benefits, and resources that the state grants to full citizens. Countless dissidents in both states have been persecuted, and in the guilt-byassociation systems of the Cold War era, their family members and relatives alike have had restricted access to rights and opportunities typically granted citizens.10 south Korean modern nation-building consisted of constructing “proper” politico-cultural citizens who were ready to serve and protect “our nation” from communism and communists and devote themselves to national economic development. such “masculine,” militant, and anticommunist norms of good citizenship have been perpetuated as the modality of modern south Korea through division politics,11 which 8

This is important for further discussions of citizenship, as Foucaultian theory reminds us of the need for understanding theories and practices of citizenship as developed by nation-states and as a set of political mechanisms controlling and regulating the “level, type, and range of societal membership” (rocco 2004, 15). 9 some Korean scholars tend to only consider the northerners who came to the south after the Korean War, and often divide them into two groups; one being those who came to the south before the 1990s, and the other being those who came to the south after the 1990s. 10 The guilt-by-association system was allegedly officially abolished in the 1980s, but effectively existed in security screening until recently in south Korea. 11 see seungsook Moon’s Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea for a sociological discussion on what Moon calls “the making of its members as duty-bound ‘nationals’” (2005, 2).

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soo-jung lee (yi su-jŏng) refers to as “south Korea’s competition with and negation of the legitimacy of north Korea based on the ideology of anticommunism” (2006, 2). The concept of “northerners” emerged at the birth of national division12 and has been shaped by this doctrine of anticommunist citizen-subject making. Their physical appearances and the anticommunist propaganda they engaged in for the south Korean state contributed to south Koreans’ construction of stereotypes of northerners. in addition, their sociocultural status in south Korea has depended heavily on the government’s legal and administrative support system. The state played the role of “a strong cultural and political actor” (Kelleher 2003, 19) in the making of northerner subjectivities in south Korea. The second category used to define former north Koreans is “system selective migrants” (1945-1950) and includes people who fled from the socialist north to the south at the dawn of national division. They were called “Crossers to the south” (Wŏllammin), and their settlement in seoul was known as “liberation village” (Haebangch’on). During the Korean War (1950–1953), approximately 650,000 war refugees moved from the north to the south. These two groups constitute the first generation of northerners, and they experienced family separation due to national division; today, they still make up the major portion of divided families (isan kajok) in south Korea.13 “Heroes who returned to the state” (Guisun [Kwisun] yongsa) (19621993) is the label applied to a small number of defectors from the north who, beginning in the early 1960s, received special treatment and financial rewards when the then-militant Park Jung-hee regime set up the special relief act for Patriots and Heroes Who returned to the state. They 12

The existence of “northerners” as a category was contemporaneous with their southern counterparts’ social discrimination, which was based on cultural biases that had been present even in the Chosŏn dynasty preceding modern Korea. Historical records show that few bureaucrats from northern provinces were able to achieve the higher positions that were all occupied by southerners. see sun Joo Kim (2009) for a more detailed history of that period. The cultural biases of south Koreans with regard to northerners in my project, however, are not merely bound to the region but are rather a modern product constructed by and inflected with the Cold War legacy and class distinction. 13 Divided families are those who were separated from their immediate family members due mainly to the Korean War. The first inter-Korean family reunion meeting took place in 1985, and it was held periodically only after the inter-Korean summit in 2000 up until 2008. The estimated number of the divided families ranges from about half a million in James Foley’s Korea’s Divided Families: Fifty Years of Separation (2003) to ten million in the press. as the number of those who have had a chance to reunite is still significantly small and the first generation is dying, the issues on the divided families are reminiscent of the national division as a tragedy of family (cf. K. o. Kim 2004; s. J. lee 2006).

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were treated similarly to the patriots of Korea’s independence movements and were taken care of by the Ministry of Patriots and veterans affairs. The amount of the award (borogŭm) increased if one brought weapons and valuable information (lee Woong-pyung, mentioned earlier, was rewarded according to this compensation system). Before 1993, however, the number of “heroic defectors” was no larger than ten per year, and the financial burden on the government for compensating them was not that great. some “heroic defectors” served to deliver anticommunist propaganda by lecturing throughout the country to south Korean audiences—a task they were required to do as a reciprocal favor for the south Korean regime. lee sang-soo (yi sang-su) (1992) discovered that the “heroes” coming to the south in the 1960s and ’70s lectured, on average, four to eight thousand times per person up through the early 1990s. With little doubt, the whole purpose of the lectures was to portray the members of the north Korean socialist regime as war-mongering, brutal, and “evil” reds, ruling over citizens who were “living on thin gruel” (kangnaengichuk) and deprived of all agency and basic freedoms—thus offering proof that “north Korea is not an appropriate place for humans to live” (lee 1992). The format and content of most anticommunism lectures that the “heroes” delivered were largely managed by south Korean national security agencies, and some information was revealed to be incorrect or distorted. For example, Mr. Kim, who came to the south in 1999, told me: i realized that there were some imposters among the famous north Korean lecturers. For instance, one man has been saying for years that “there is no ancestral worship allowed in north Korea. no other than Kim ilsung can be worshiped, that if one did such things, his whole family would be persecuted,” things like that. i was perplexed to hear that as an audience member with other south Koreans because my family continued to carry out such traditions every year, and i lived in Pyongyang. He was lying before me, but i was not able to offend him, because it might hurt our [north Korean] image before south Koreans.

What is significant in this account is that the state manipulation in describing everyday life in north Korea generated mistrust of north Koreans not only among the migrants themselves, but also among their southern counterparts. nonetheless, the “heroes” adopted conventional life trajectories that the newcomers tended to follow. First, the so-called anticommunism lectures were, for some “heroes,” a main income source and an almost mandatory national duty to compensate for the support of the south Korean state. either scheduled by the government or a conservative civil organization, some “famous” lecturers continued to be invited

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and paid for their lectures. second, the format of the testimonies became a specific genre that south Korean audiences became familiar with and that north Korean border crossers were expected to perform before an audience. Settler Kin or Defecting Compatriot (1993–1997)

i now turn to the changing definitions and support systems of the government since the 1990s. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the soviet Union led to the post–Cold War era in world history. This historical transformation awakened the south Korean people to the fact that the Korean peninsula had become one of the last divided nations. The popular desire for peace in the peninsula transcended the previous concerns about ideological competition with socialism. However, as the north Korean economic situation worsened and the country faced a devastating famine, the number of north Koreans crossing the border into China in search of food increased rapidly, as did the number of those who came to south Korea by way of China. Whereas defectors in the previous decades consisted primarily of the ruling elite— e.g., government officials, party members, and military officials—the new migrants were from less privileged social classes, and generally were factory workers, farmers, women, and even young adults, which demonstrated the realities that the north Korean food distribution system had collapsed (Chung 2003). The Kim young sam administration (1993–1997) changed several policies pertaining to migrants. The north Korean Brethren Who returned to the state (Kwisun dongp’o) act was legislated to protect north Koreans who had “returned” to the south in 1993. The newcomers were treated as economic refugees and the government division that took care of them changed from the Ministry of Patriots and veterans affairs to the Ministry of Health and society (now the Ministry of Health and Welfare) signifying a changing social implication—the northerners had gone from political “heroes” to low-income citizens. During this time, the government subsidy for their housing and resettlement was reduced so that each individual only received a one-time payment of about Us$7,000 for resettlement and Us$8,400 for housing.14 The “returned brethren” from the north underwent serious adjustment problems, ranging from unemployment and poverty to social 14 The change in supplements implied that the previous act was established to lure potential defectors as a form of competition with the north. Kim sang-gyun underscores this aspect of the act prior to 1993 that “has promoted regime and other political propaganda and its main targets are spies, soldiers, etc. The services and rewards provided were excessive [for this reason]” (1994, 47–48, cited in yoon 2001, 291n11).

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discrimination. in comparison with the former “heroes,” the brethren were no longer protected by the state, and at least half were unemployed (song 1996). in addition to material poverty, culture shock, and psychological loneliness, feelings of guilt impeded their social adjustment process. Moreover, the north Korean famine caused an increase in border crossings at the sino–north Korean border area, creating the need for the south Korean government to establish a better support system for the newcomers (Chung 2009; yoon 2001). New Residents or First Unifiers: Envisioning Reunification (1997–Present)

after the late 1990s when the number of north Korean migrants increased rapidly, the south Korean regime came to see the issue of north Korean migrants as part of their long-term plans for national reunification. The Ministry of Unification took over the matter from the Ministry of Health and society. The Kim Dae Jung administration (1998-2002) tried to maintain a balance between the normalization of inter-Korean relations and support systems and programs for newcomers. While mobilizing south Korean society to overcome the 1997 asian Financial Crisis, the Kim Dae Jung regime carried out a policy of engagement—the sunshine Policy— with north Korea, aiming to promote economic assistance and interaction with the north. as part of the effort Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang, the first time in the divided nation’s history that the head of state of either region had visited the other. During that visit the so-called 6.15 Joint Declaration was announced. For north Korea, south Korea became vital in dispensing famine relief aid. south Korea, meanwhile, was likely to attract foreign investors to spur its economic revival by stabilizing the political climate. Culturally, such a historical moment gave rise to a sense that anticommunism seemed to have become a bygone ideology of former authoritarian regimes in south Korea (s. Kim 2006; Cumings 2007). This transforming geopolitical condition simultaneously affected the direction of a policy for north Korean migrants. in 1997 the act for the Protection and resettlement support for the residents Who escaped from north Korea was passed. Based on this act, the Hanawon (House of Unity) was established in January of 1999 as a government resettlement center operated by the Ministry of Unification. as such, the south Korean government support system for the newcomers became part of long-term plans for national reconciliation rather than for anticommunist propaganda. The Kim Dae Jung administration provided about Us$36,000 per adult for resettlement; the following administration under roh Moo-hyun further modified the support system from a onetime payment to a long-term distribution of resettlement money and an incentive system for encouraging individuals to become independent,

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self-sufficient capitalist citizens. By situating them in a state welfare system with a special support program, a main force at the state level may be the principle that they are expected to assimilate as “regular citizens” into the south Korean value system. such state-led depoliticization of north Korean migrant identities, however, came to face a backlash from south Korean anticommunist wings and north Korean migrant activists, both of whom protested against the normalization of an inter-Korean relationship. Meanwhile, it opened up more diverse and competing discourses and practices in which the migrants began to engage much more actively than ever before. some migrant activists rejected the official terms “residents escaped from north Korea” (Pukhan it’al chumin) and “new settlers” (saet’ŏmin), instead preferring to refer to themselves with politically weighted terms like “defectors” (t’albukcha) and “refugees fled from north Korea” (t’albuk nanmin). Furthermore, they led various forms of “Free north Korea” campaigns in collaboration with international societies and the south Korean right wing. other migrants also came to interact with south Korean civil society—albeit in a different way—through job training, after-school programs, counseling services, and so on. it is during this period, while providing a social welfare system, that the south Korean state has gradually retreated from giving a political meaning to northerners in south Korea and has begun normalizing relations with the north Korean regime. Concomitantly, north Korean migrants are relying on civil society to facilitate a search for meaning and new social networks to supplement what the state no longer provides. The following sections are devoted to a discussion of the social process of interactions between north Korean migrants and their southern counterparts. among the sites of daily interaction—such as workplaces, village offices, job training classes, schools, streets, and so on—i pay particular attention to the church, which i see as serving as the primary contact zone where migrants and their southern counterparts encounter unexpected cultural differences and negotiate a new sense of belonging by envisioning a Christian reunified nation. Born Again: Interactions and Negotiations of Belonging 15

Previous works acknowledge that the migrants’ Christian experiences and reliance on church services are all significant throughout their life trajectories.16 However, many scholars tend to consider Christianity, or religious 15

an earlier version of this section was previously published in Jung (2011). see, for example, Choo 2006; Chung et al. 2006; Chung 2009; Jeon 2000, 2007; y. y. Kim 2009; and yoon 2007 for sociological discussions about north Korean migrants and the importance of the church in China and south Korea. 16

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matters at large, as merely incidental or side issues for migrants. When the church is mentioned, most often it is in instrumental terms with reference to the services the church does or should provide. instead, i regard the church as the primary intraethnic “contact zone,” which Mary louise Pratt defines as “social [space] where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination” (1992, 4). This chapter asserts that religion serves as a window through which we can better see how the complex ideological, political, and cultural tensions (i.e., nationalism, imperialism, freedom, human rights, etc.) all meet in the reconfiguration of migrant identities. More precisely, for the north Korean conversion as a project, this study asserts that the evangelical church, in concert with international anticommunist and north Korean human rights advocates, renders north Korean migrants as “freed” from the communist regime, and “revives” their religiosity by replacing “Kimilsung-ism” (Kim Il-sŏng ijŭm; the ideology of Kim il-sung, or Chuch’e, the north Korean national ruling philosophy) with south Korean Christianity.17 north Korean migrants who came to south Korea in recent years are no longer expected to contribute to the state’s anticommunist propaganda, but to adopt south Korean ways of thinking and behaving for “themselves” and thus for a national future—a reunified nation. However, Myung-hee, a woman in her early thirties whom i met in 2006, was very pessimistic about a “vision” of national reunification. While appreciating that she was accepted as a south Korean citizen, she hesitantly though assuredly said that the current physical division between the two Koreas would be nothing compared to the cultural conflicts between north and south Koreans. according to her, north Koreans have a much stronger sense of pride (chajon’gam), which makes them intolerant of their southern counterparts, who may look down upon them. Meanwhile, she praised god, whom she got to know in south Korea, and was attending missionary training programs in which she interacted with south Korean Christians. This section is devoted to examining secular and religious interactions between north Korean new arrivals and their southern counterparts in a church setting, which i consider to be a primary contact zone. i maintain that Korean ethnicity is a result of complex negotiation processes and is not a taken-for-granted unit in which individuals share the 17 Korean churches also serve as interethnic contact zones with regard to multicultural and foreign migrant workers’ labor and human rights. leading civil organizations working for foreign migrants, such as Borderless villages and the Korea Migrants’ Center, are founded and run by progressive pastors and Christians and with little doubt grew out of 1980s social activism.

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same language, ancestors, and history.18 Following andreas Wimmer’s suggestion, this section explores north and south Korean intraethnic boundary-making by examining “the processes of social closure and opening that determine where the boundaries of belonging are drawn in the social landscape” (2009, 256). since the mid-1990s, when a famine took at least one million north Korean lives, people have crossed the Tuman river, a natural border between China and north Korea, in desperate search of food. it is in this area that escalating numbers of migrants risk their lives to make their way to south Korea in search of a “better life” (yoon 2003; suh 2002; Chung 2009). interestingly, statistics show that a startling 80 to 90 percent of north Korean migrants identify themselves as Christian when they arrive in south Korea; around 70 percent of them continue to rely on church services for support after they arrive (Jeon 2007). one’s meaning of life or meaningful life, so to speak, is often conceived of as being no less important than material prosperity. Thus, their “better life” is likely not only associated with conditions of physical and economic security, but also tied to a journey in search of meaning. Sincere Citizens and the Healing of Spirit: North Korean Migrants in Freedom School

When the migrants arrive in the south, Protestant churches play an important role in their resettlement. after the government, churches provide the second-largest set of resources, including financial aid, household goods, and sunday lunch and prayer and Bible-study gatherings. some of the churches run special training programs for improving the migrants’ spiritual lives and job opportunities. The church imagines itself to be fostering a social laboratory that simulates the conditions of a reunified nation (e.g., Freedom school Brochure 2007; ns Church Task Force Proposal 2006). Depicted as returned “prodigal sons and daughters,” the Korean church gives a symbolic meaning to their identity, the “first generation unifiers” who can contribute heavily to the evangelization of a unified nation.19 as predestined evangelical sub18

at one time in south Korea “our wish” was unification, or “Uri ŭi sowŏn ŭn t’ongil.” one ethnically homogenous and independent nation-state is an ideal form that most ethnic nationalists across the modern world aspire to. This wish has hardly been dismissed, instead growing stronger over time across regions in the era of globalization (anderson 1983, 1992; Wimmer and Cederman 2009; appadurai 1996; ong 1996, 2003). 19 Kim Byung-ro, a Christian scholar of unification and theology, states that “in the unification processes, south and north Koreans experience conflicts due to a gap between rich and poor or different value systems. if the Korean church would work hard in serving north Korean migrants, it could contribute to not only gradual peaceful unification but also ultimately the revival of the Korean church” (Kungmin ilbo, april 2008, my translation).

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jects, called “reserved missionaries” (yoon 2005, 8), they follow the logic and nature of the repentance story of “the prodigal son” and are expected to deconstruct and denounce their past as being outdated and evil, and to integrate into the modern and good south Korean Christian “family.” Furthermore, north Korean converts are urged to acknowledge that their disconnection from god was a “sin” caused by the north Korean communist regime and Kim il-sung and Kim Jong-il whom they once worshiped. according to the north Korean national law and mind-set, the migrants are national traitors, but in Protestant language it is north Korea that deceives its people with “Kimilsung [Kim il-sŏng] cultism.” in this way, most north Korean converts’ religious confessions demonize north Korea and celebrate a “god-blessed” south Korean society. Thus, evangelical language directs the migrants to discount present encounters as suffering and to instead see experiences in south Korea as part of god’s plan to strengthen their belief. according to the north Korean mission, they carry the weight of god’s calling to “return” to their homeland as god’s warriors to enlighten their families and neighbors with Christianity and the free market economy. although they are located at the bottom of the church hierarchy as well as south Korea’s class pyramid, they are served by established south Korean deacons, deaconesses, and pastors who, in turn, try to let them feel god’s “love.” The south Korean church believes that no one else is better equipped than the north Korean migrant to realize god’s great plan for a Korean nation and the kingdom of god. i will now recount the experiences of a weekend training program run by a megachurch in seoul. around fifty north Korean adults, ranging in age from their twenties to fifties and who have passed an entrance exam, attend the program every saturday and sunday for about ten months. By attending the weekend classes, weekly group Bible study, and various outdoor activities, each individual receives a monthly stipend of about Us$200. reflecting the current demographics of new arrivals, about 80 percent of the people are female and 20 percent are male. “i am the future of the nation!” This is the motto of the Freedom school (Fs), which sounds decisive, heroic, and definitely nationalistic. The school’s name suggests that freedom is what the migrants did not have in north Korea. The dean of the school, Mr. song, a gentle forty-six-year-old Christian and former college instructor of north Korean politics, stresses with great conviction that the motto is god’s calling to empower these “brethren” to be born-again national leaders. The motto is a sacred message hung on the wall, printed in a cute font on a square cloth on which there is also a map of the Korean peninsula. The motto is attached to a pink heart with wings, and smaller pink hearts are embroidered here and

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there. it was made to promote the message that the future of a unified Korea must be carried out not by masculine warriors of god, but by love. on the other side, “love and bless you (Sarang hago ch’ukbok hamnida)” is written in various colors, and the cloth is attached to the wall right above a school board panel. Judged by the wall and ceiling decorations, Fs does look like a sunday school classroom. in a sense, it is: “What we are doing for them is simple. That is, just like fixing a necktie if it is not put on in a right way, we assist them to make up for some minor shortcomings,” stated a deacon of the Fs advisory board (emphasis mine). Fixing a necktie is a metaphor for the north Korean mission used by the south Korean evangelical churches, and it is a task that the Fs is actually carrying out for north Korean migrants in the south. in this account, “we” and “they” are all Koreans, sons and daughters of the Father. But “they” have been living far away for a while, and have recently “returned.” They need to be refashioned to become “normal” in the south. south Koreans at Fs assume that they need to fix only the very “minor errors” of their northern counterparts. “We” and “they” believe themselves to be ethnically homogeneous, and the presumption is that Korean culture is inherently embodied in all Koreans. such ethnic nationalism, in which race, ethnicity, and nation are conflated throughout Korean modern history (shin 2006; Palais 1998), is at the heart of the Christian mission for north Korean migrants and north Korea. as the metaphor of fixing indicates, the Freedom school is designed to help the migrants to be born again as modern citizens. norms like sincerity, hard work, self-reliance, and independence are emphasized as the “truth” for a successful life in south Korea. interestingly, these values were also equally stressed in the principles of north Korean Chuch’e ideology. However, south Koreans typically stereotype north Korea migrants as somewhat lazy, lacking will, and being dependant, as commonly observed in postcommunist transitions. such stereotypes are often simply interpreted as a byproduct of Chuch’e ideology, and thus they need to be refashioned as “sincere” returning brethrens. What makes north Korean assimilation cases unique when compared with other postcommunist cases is that—as sheila Jager (2003) noted in the Korean War Memorial, which contains a carving of a south Korean elder brother soldier (literally) embracing a smaller north Korean soldier—north Korean migrants are situated as younger siblings in the Korean family system and automatically subordinated in the Korean ethnic hierarchy. it is in this context that the concept of sincerity (sŏngsil) emerges as the most important attitude that migrants should have in south Korea, and, at the same time, the most contested value in negotiating “true” Christianity. First, sŏngsil in the Fs lecture series means a complex set of mindful

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and bodily manners that include being modest, obedient, gentle, enduring, hardworking, and unselfish. second, in light of the family metaphor, sŏngsil represents the familial, social, and religious obligation that the newcomers are expected to adopt in place of outdated Chuch’e bodily habits. as the deacon’s expression “fixing a necktie” crystallizes, Korean Christians who work for the migrants tend to measure their degree of social adjustment, personality, and more importantly their religiosity by their bodily appearance and behaviors. speaking the seoulite language, whitening one’s skin, and behaving in a friendly and docile way are a few among many examples that are taught for the sake of making “sincere” north Korean subjects in the job/religious “market.” ironically, however, the Fs staff always stresses the importance of the interior mind over the exterior body. Thus, in addition to fixing a necktie, healing (both as a metaphor and a ritual) is a key focus in the Freedom school program. i will use a particular story to illustrate this matter, from when i visited a key Fs program. in mid-september of 2006, the Fs designed a two-day outdoor activity called Ch’iyu, or healing camp, for north Korean trainees. The purposes of the camp were (1) to heal wounded souls through an experience of god’s advent, (2) to help them find true dignity in their existence within god, and (3) to cut off the past life and rebuild a new life with Jesus Christ. it was apparent that the ultimate goal of the camp was to convert the north Korean migrants. Historically, this goal is not particularly new, as throughout the history of Christianity the ultimate healing is completed when people convert to Christianity (Porterfield 2005; Wightman 2007). The list of purposes, which is short and concise, also represents a more or less negative image that most south Korean adults have of north Korean migrants—their souls and hearts are wounded, their self-esteem is low, and their past lives are all ruined and contaminated. on the night of the first day, after a series of lectures and worship services, an intensive healing ritual took place for about four hours. it was intense: young south Korean volunteers, who led all the gospel worship services, kept weeping together with north Koreans. so-yong (so-yŏng), a north Korean woman in her early forties, suddenly fell down on the floor as if possessed by a spirit. Her face was wet with tears, her arms and legs were shaking, and the symptoms were not medical in nature. Fs director Mr. Kang and Pastor Choi immediately approached her and started shouting “go away! i command you in the name of Jesus, go away!” That was a spectacular scene that, i felt, heated up peoples’ emotions. i was looking forward to witnessing more dramatic moments, such as so-yong springing up from the floor and praising god. However, no such drama occurred for about half an hour. Both Mr. Kang and Pastor Choi looked

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exhausted, and Mr. Kang asked another woman to take So-yong back to the second floor to lay her down on a bed. the next morning, I happened to be engaged in a short talk with Mr. Kang and Pastor Choi. Kang whispered in a small voice, “Well, it was almost done, but eventually they didn’t fully open their minds.” and then he stated: you know, we are all the same nation [Hanminjok]. I said to myself, one step more, one step more. . . . last night, I felt that I was almost there. But they didn’t fully open. . . . I don’t know, but there is something like a glass between us and them. I can’t break it. as I want to break it, they seem to make the glass thicker. I don’t know what the glass is and why I felt that way always. . . . I think it may be due to the fact that they were drowned in Kim Il-Sung Ideology for too long.

his last account manifests what both Kang and Choi were attempting to do to So-yong: to “cure” her soul, which was presumably possessed by the demon of Kim Il-sung, not the holy Spirit. a little while after this conversation, I also happened to have a short conversation with So-yong and another woman, Chae-eun, in person. at the time, both were attending a theological college. having woken up late, So-yong was looking pale. I said to her, “I guess you were possessed by a spirit last night, how do you feel now?” She replied, “Well, I don’t know what it was, but I just couldn’t move. Maybe because I was too tired, since I haven’t taken a rest in recent days.” She then added, “I had taken exams. you know it’s hard to read books and there are lots of things to memorize. . . . So I haven’t slept for three days.” Comparing Kang’s account with So-yong’s, I was struck by the differences. Kang perceived So-yong’s state to be a possession by an inner demon, the deeply embodied “evil” Chuch’e. Meanwhile, So-yong claimed it was caused by being burnt-out, with a fatigue that in turn was caused by carrying out heavy duties as a mother and student in her forties. this episode is significant because it represents ongoing miscommunication, conflicts, and negotiations between north Korean migrants and South Korean Christians, thus opening up a question about the ambivalent nature of Korean evangelical nationalism in practice. Sŏngsil and healing entail key virtues for South Korean Christians who serve their northern counterparts and work for the north Korean missionization. Without a doubt, I had witnessed how hard South Koreans work for the migrants in the name of god. Simultaneously, however, it should be noted that their individual-oriented belief practices and South Korean–centered support programs both tend to overlook the crosscultural dimension when interacting with their counterparts. thus, I also

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witnessed that while appreciating their religious life in the church setting, some migrants criticized south Korean evangelicals as being materialistic and hypocritical. such accounts, however, are hardly presented in public, partially due to the nature of biblical language and the church hierarchy. instead, their confession narratives draw our attention to the ways in which migrants reformulate and reinterpret their memories, present life, and future life. Their narratives are all suggestive of understanding their aspirations of reconfiguring alternative subjectivities in religious terms. Conclusion in this chapter, i have examined north Korean migrants’ subjectivities that have been shaped and transformed mainly in accordance with south Korean state powers, themselves shaped by local and global geopolitical circumstances. The first section reviewed the official treatment and definitions applied to the northerners who came to south Korea after national division. By examining the gradual changes in how they were perceived, from national anticommunist celebrities to new settlers, i underlined how state powers and interests influence the northerners’ resubjectification processes in south Korea, and further illuminated the ways in which the different terms for north Korean migrants end up serving as quasi-ethnic markers. empirical data is crucial in dismantling the assimilationist tendency found in the policies toward the northerners and a reunification rooted in a belief of Korean ethnic homogeneity. i agree with Han Kyung-Koo’s argument that the real enemy of multiculturalism in Korea is not a strong sense of Korean ethnic homogeneity, but the “very sense of being civilized and culturally superior” (2007, 12). at the same time, i assert that such superior mind-sets and attitudes are relational, and need to be scrutinized in light of the actors’ efforts to overcome, challenge, negotiate, or reproduce consciousness through interactions with others. north and south Korean intraethnic relations offer us a chance to review the complexity of the basic assumptions embedded in the modern identity politics that are inevitably intertwined with the still-felt effects of the Cold War and national and global aspirations in south Korean society. The second part has thus explored north Korean migrants’ encounters and interactions with south Korean Protestantism with a focus on conversion processes that are intermingled with both the adoption of south Korean ways of thinking and the envisioning of a Christianized reunified nation entailing behavioral changes, biblical language use, reinterpretations of time and space, and the projection of a new identity. in terms of the search for meaning in one’s life, Christian membership seems to comfort migrants

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on this account—a radical transformation from a worthless being to god’s beloved son or daughter. My ethnographic data, which i have not been able to incorporate in this chapter in its entirety, brings me to a story that has an ambiguous ending. equally ambiguous are north Korean migrants’ life trajectories in the context of seoul, south Korea, where they find a pan-Korean ethnic nationalism does not really exist, but a wide-reaching ignorance and indifference to the everyday lives of the brethren in the north and north Korean migrants themselves. indeed their ambiguous resubjectification processes reveal the current tendency in which increasing multicultural discourses are ambivalently intertwined with a taken-for-granted Korean ethnic nationalism in the government support system and identity politics for north Korean migrants. This set of seemingly competing discourses reveals institutional competition among government offices—that is, the Ministry of Unification, Presidential Committee on social Cohesion, and Ministry of Public administration and safety, in favor of providing support programs for north Korean migrants during the lee Myung-bak administration (2008–2012) (Choi 2011). in civil societies, however, there are emerging alternative discourses and practices in which both multicultural and nationalist sentiments are equally credited and discredited for their roles in recognizing differences and similarities and reconfiguring a sense of belonging. My focus in this chapter was on religious organizations such as megachurches that are significant for the northerners to claim their distinctive life trajectories, seek a social network, and thus configure a new sense of belonging. Conversion to Christianity for some north Korean migrants means revaluing their past suffering in spiritual and cultural terms; subordinating to the south Korean–centered church hierarchy; otherwise widening their path in transnational missionary networks; while devoting themselves to carrying out god’s calling that is, in their accounts, intimately tied with national evangelization. What this complex series of life trajectories and transformations among north Korean migrants tell us in light of a multiethnic Korea may have to do with an unfinished national aspiration, namely reunification. it is right to argue that a reunification of two Koreas aspired to by north Korean migrants who claim that they are chosen to be first unifiers should be realized in dynamic and plural interactions among the people as well as in spirit. Acknowledgment

The author is grateful to the Center for Korean studies at the University of California, Berkeley, for hosting the book workshop in which the participants provided valuable comments to develop this chapter. in the process

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of writing, this work was supported by the academy of Korean studies grant funded by the Korean government (MesT) (aKs-2011-aaa-2104). References anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. london: verso. ———. 1992. “The new World Disorder.” New Left Review i, no. 193:3–13. appadurai, arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. austin-Broos, Diane. 2003. “The anthropology of Conversion: an introduction.” in The Anthropology of Religions Conversion, edited by andrew Buckser and stephen D. glazier, 1–12. lanham, MD: rowman and littlefield. Berdahl, Daphne. 2005. “The spirit of Capitalism and the Boundaries of Citizenship in Post-Wall germany.” Society for Comparative Study of Society and History 47, no. 2:235–251. Choi, narae. 2011. “The north Korean refugee Policy of the lee Myungbak government: nationalism and Multiculturalism.” SAIS US-Korea 2010 Yearbook, 163–175. Washington, D.C.: U.s.-Korea institute at sais (The Paul H. nitze school of advanced international studies), Johns Hopkins University. Choo, Hae-yoon. 2006. “gendered Modernity and ethnicized Citizenship: north Korean settlers in Contemporary south Korea.” Gender amd Society 20, no. 5:576–604. Chung, Byung-Ho. 2003. “living Dangerously in Two Worlds: The risks and Tactics of north Korean refugee Children in China.” Korea Journal 43, no. 3:191–211. ———. 2009. “Between Defector and Migrant: identities and strategies of north Koreans in south Korea.” Korean Studies 32:1–27. Chung, Byung-Ho, Wook Taek Jeon, and Jean-Kyung Chung, eds. 2006. Welcome to Korea: Bukjoseon saramdul ui namhan sari. seoul: Hanyang University Press. Cumings, Bruce. 2007. “Kim Jong il Confronts Bush—and Wins: a new Page in north–south Korean relations.” Le Monde Diplomatique, october. Foley, James. 2003. Korea’s Divided Families: Fifty Years of Separation. london: routledgeCruzon. Freedom school brochure. 2007. seoul. grinker, roy richard. 1998. Korea and Its Future: Unification and the Unfinished War. new york: st. Martin’s Press.

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Han, geon-soo. 2007. “Multicultural Korea: Celebration or Challenge of Multiethnic shift in Contemporary Korea?” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:32–63. Han, Kyung-Koo. 2007. “The archaeology of the ethnically Homogeneous nation-state and Multiculturalism in Korea.” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:8–31. Harding, susan Friend. 2000. The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics. Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press. Jager, sheila. 2003. Narratives of Nation Building in Korea: A Genealogy of Patriotism. armonk, ny: M. e. sharpe. Jeon, Wook Taek. 2000. Saram ŭi t’ongil ŭl wihayŏ [For people’s unification]. seoul: orŭm. ———. 2007. Saram ŭi t’ongil, ttang ŭi t’ongil [Unification of people, unification of land]. seoul: yonsei University Press. Jung, Jin-heon. 2011. “Underground railroads of Christian Conversion: north Korean Migrants and evangelical Missionary networks in northeast asia.” Encounters 4:163–188. Kelleher, William F. 2003. The Troubles in Ballybogoin: Memory and Identity in Northern Ireland. ann arbor: University of Michigan Press. Kim, Ki-ok. 2004. Isan kajok, ‘pan’gong chŏnsa’ to ‘ppalgaengi ’to anin [Divided families, neither ‘anticommunist fighters’ nor ‘communists’]. seoul: yŏksa pip’yŏngsa. Kim, s. 2006. The Two Koreas and the Great Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kim, sang-gyun (Kim sang-Kyun). 1994. “Jŏmgŏm kwa chihyang: Uri ŭi suyong taese wa changgi pangan” [examination and aim: our attitude of acceptance and a long-term plan]. in Pukhan t’alch’ul tongp’o ŏttŏk’e hal kŏsin’ga [How To handle north Korean defectors]. seoul: Minju p’yŏnghwa t’ongil chamun hoeŭi. Kim, sun Joo. 2009. Marginality and Subversion in Korea: The Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812. seattle: University of Washington Press. Kim, yoon young. 2009. “Making national subjects: education and adaptation among north Korean immigrants in south Korea.” Ph.D. diss., University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Kwon, Hyŏk-bŏm. 2000. Minjokchuŭi wa palchŏn ŭi hwansang [nationalism and illusion of development]. Korea: sol. lankov, andrei. 2006. “Bitter Taste of Paradise: north Korean refugees in south Korea.” Journal of East Asia Studies 6, no. 1:105–137. lee, sang-soo. 1992. “Wŏllam Kwisun yongsa ŭi sam, kŭ pit kwa kŭrimja” [north Korean defector’s life, its ray and shadow].” Sahoe p’yŏngnon (March):232–239.

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lee, soo Jung. 2006. “The Making and Unmaking of the Korean national Division: separated Families in the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras.” Ph.D. diss., University of illinois at Urbana-Champaign. lim, Timothy. 2010. “rethinking Belongingness in Korea: Transnational Migration, ‘Migrant Marriages’ and the Politics of Multiculturalism.” Pacific Affairs 83, no. 1:51–71. Malkki, lisa. 1995. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 1996. “speechless emissaries: refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization.” Cultural Anthropology 11, no. 3:377–404. Moon, seungsook. 2005. Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea. Durham, nC: Duke University Press. ns Church Task Force proposal. 2006. seoul. oh Kyung-seok. 2007. “Ŏttŏn tamunhwajuŭi in’ga: Tamunhwa sahoe nonŭi e kwanhan pip’anjŏk chomang” [Which multiculturalism? a critical view of the discussion about multicultural society]. in Han’guk esŏ ŭi tamunhwajuŭi hyŏnsil kwa chaengjŏm (Multiculturalism in South Korea: A Critical Review), edited by oh Kyung-seok, 21–56. seoul: Hanul. ong, aihwa. 1996. “Cultural Citizenship as subject-Making: immigrants negotiate racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United states.” Current Anthropology 37, no. 5:737–762. ———. 2003. Buddha Is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Palais, James B. 1998. “nationalism: good or Bad?” in Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity, Korea research Monograph 26, edited by Hyung il Pai and Timothy r. Tangherlini, 214–228 Berkeley: institute of east asian studies, University of California. Parekh, Bhikhu. 2000. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press. Park, Myung-kyu. 2009. “neisyŏn kwa minjok: Kaenyŏmsa ro pon ŭimi ŭi kan’gyŏk” (“nation and Minjok: similarities and Differences from the Perspective of Conceptual History”). Tongbanghakchi 147:27–65. Porterfield, amanda. 2005. Healing in the History of Christianity. oxford: oxford University Press. Pratt, Mary lousie. 1992. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. new york: routledge. rocco, r. 2004. “Transforming Citizenship: Membership, strategies of Containment and the Public sphere in latino Communities.” Latino Studies 2, no. 1:4–25.

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shin, gi Wook. 2006. Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy. studies of the Walter H. shorenstein asia-Pacific research Center. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. song, Ŭi-dal. 2006. “T’albukcha charip kyoyuk sigŭp” [imminent need of a training for north Korean defectors to self-support]. Chosŏn ilbo [Chosun daily], 7 February. suh, Jae Jean. 2002. “north Korean Defectors: Their adaptation and resettlement.” East Asian Review 14, no. 3:67–86. van der veer, Peter ed. 1996. Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity. new york: routledge. Wightman, Jill. 2007. “new Bolivians, new Bolivia: Pentecostal Conversion and neoliberal Transformation in Contemporary Bolivia.” Ph.D. diss., University of illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Wimmer, andreas. 2009. “Herder’s Heritage and the Boundary-Making approach: studying ethnicity in immigrant societies.” Sociological Theory 27, no. 3:244–270. Wimmer, andreas, and lars-erik Cederman. 2009. “ethnic Politics and armed Conflict: a Configurational analysis of a new global Data set.” American Sociological Review 74:316–337. yoon, in-Jin. 2009. Pukhan ijumin: Saenghwal kwa ŭisik, kŭrigo chŏngch’ak chiwŏn chŏngch’aek [north Korean migrants: life and consciousness, and settlement support policy]. seoul: Chimundang.

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Beyond Motherlands and Mother love Locating Korean Adoptees in Global Korea

eleana KiM

since the end of the Korean War in 1953, more than 160,000 children from south Korea have been adopted into Western nations. raised in white homes and communities in north america, Western europe, and australia, the vast majority of the children adopted between the 1950s and 1980s typically had very little exposure to other Korean immigrants, cultural practices, or products during their childhoods. sixty years since the first Korean transnational adoptions, more than 120,000 children have been adopted into homes in north america, and the remainder by Western european and australian families. The vast majority of these adoptions are also transracial, with the adoptive parents of european descent. originally intended to address an internationally recognized crisis of “mixed-blood war orphans” (honhyŏl chŏnjaeng koa) who were fathered by american and european soldiers and born to Korean women, transnational adoption from south Korea continued well past the mid-1960s, when numbers of mixed-race children began to be superseded by those of full Korean parentage. These children were sent from orphanages, which functioned as magnets for foreign sponsorship money and also as daycare services for poor and working-class families. During a period of rapid economic growth in which the state priorities of national defense and population reduction overshadowed the state welfare needs of poor families, transnational adoption functioned as a “quick-fix solution” (sarri et al. 1998), fueled by notions of the american Dream and educational and economic opportunities offered by the West. Xenophobic ethnonationalism, poverty, and patriarchy were the political, economic, and social conditions that led to the mass exodus of mixed-race war orphans of the immediate postwar period, the economic orphans of the 1960s and 1970s, and, finally,

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the children born to single women, who have constituted the majority of adoptees since the mid-1980s.1 President Park Chung Hee had an ambivalent attitude toward overseas adoption and attempted to curtail the numbers of children being sent overseas by enacting policies to promote domestic adoption, but his successor, Chun Doo Hwan, expanded the adoption program as part of a population-control policy that privileged out-migration. This explains the paradoxical coincidence of south Korea’s “economic miracle” and the escalating numbers of children leaving Korea in the 1980s, a decade in which nearly nine thousand children were adopted overseas in a single year. in Western nations, well into the 1980s, transnational adoption was nearly synonymous with south Korea, and the children were frequently referred to as “orphans,” conjuring images of war-torn Korea and third world poverty. in the lead-up to the seoul summer olympic games in 1988, negative media coverage of adoptions from south Korea prompted the scaling back of adoptions, and adoption agencies, which had functioned with nearly no government oversight until that point, were subject to state-imposed quotas. Changes in kinship norms, gender ideologies, and adoption preferences among south Koreans have meant that the numbers of adoptees leaving the country has declined to less than one thousand per year, with the majority of the children being infant boys, a stark shift from the 1950s and 1960s, when the majority of children were infant or toddler girls. after the 1988 seoul olympic games, adoptees, as adults, began returning to Korea in increasing numbers to learn more about their roots or to locate their Korean families. south Korean state projects beginning in the late 1990s enthusiastically welcomed adoptees back as “overseas coethnic brethren” (chaeoe tongp’o) framing their experiences through motherland tours that were designed to foster sentimental attachments to the nation and to restore ethnic identity. This is an example of how Korea’s proactive globalization project, or segyehwa, dating from the mid-1990s, mobilized diasporic discourse in the service of promoting long-distance nationalism with the larger goal of harnessing the economic and human capital of its overseas populations. around the same time, returning adoptees and their reunions with their Korean mothers became major media spectacles in which “mother love” expressed the nation’s yearning for its abandoned children. Both sets of discourses framed adoptees as essentially Korean, and as dependent upon a paternal state and a maternal nation to provide the roots of their authentic identities. 1

For a more detailed history of adoption from south Korea, see eleana Kim (2010, chap. 2).

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in this chapter, i update and complicate this picture by focusing on the historical conjuncture of the adoptees’ returns, south Korea’s proactive globalization drive, its emergent democratic civil society, and the rise of post-iMF neoliberal techniques of government. in particular, i ask what adult adoptees can tell us about transforming modes of personhood and civic participation in contemporary south Korea that exist in tension with emergent neoliberal rationalities, residual minjung (ideology of the people) cultural politics, and dominant categories of nation and citizenship. Honorary Ambassador, Toby Dawson in February 2007, the bronze medalist of the 2006 Winter olympics men’s mogul competition, Toby Dawson, was reunited with his Korean father at a press conference hosted by the Korea Tourism organization (KTo). The KTo had just the previous day named the Korean-american adoptee an honorary Pr ambassador (myŏngye hongbo taesa), and he had also been selected to be a representative for south Korea in its bid to host the Winter olympic games at Pyeongchang. Dawson’s celebrity status was, in fact, the key to his success in locating his Korean family. after announcing his intention to look for his birth parents during the Turin olympics (with his personal story and childhood photographs posted to the nBC website, and interviews with the american and south Korean media about his search), hundreds of south Koreans came forward claiming him as their long lost son. Dawson balked at the opportunistic desire of so many people who seemed to want to a piece of his celebrity and cancelled his post-olympics trip to Korea. over the next year he conducted a secret search with the help of the KTo, which arranged the Dna tests that ultimately confirmed that Kim Jae-su, a bus driver living in Pusan, was Dawson’s biological father. at a press conference where the two met, seemingly for the first time, the intensity of the media spectacle and the thorough corporatization of this government-sponsored family drama were noticeably evident. against a backdrop of KTo and lotte Hotel logos, under the glare of a thousand camera flashes, the two embraced, with reporters instructing them: “Please embrace each other again.” When asked what he said to his father when they embraced, Dawson responded, “i said in Korean, which was very broken, Abŏji, orae kidaryŏssŏyŏ [Father, i’ve waited a long time], that he didn’t need to cry, that he should be strong, because this should be a happy day.” in this iteration, “mother love” and “paternal state” were conflated in the figure of the birth father, who is much less commonly featured in adoptee reunions.2 The spectacle of patrilineal filiation staged 2

The familial spectacle of the transnational ethnic Korean celebrity is one that has been reproduced by the south Korean media over the past few years. Mixed-race american foot-

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at the press conference melded seamlessly with Dawson’s filial loyalty to the nation, materialized through his newly minted role as ambassador and representative of Korea on the global stage. To complete the spectacle, a few months later, Dawson and his wife were remarried in a lavish traditional Korean wedding ceremony in Pusan, which was also a highly publicized media event sponsored by Kia Motors, Pusan lotte Hotel, asiana airlines, and Wedding networks, a wedding event company. The olympic games hold a particular resonance with Korean overseas adoption, as it was twenty years prior to Dawson’s reunion, when Korea hosted the 1988 summer olympics, that international reporters chose to highlight, to the great embarrassment of Koreans and the Korean government, the export of children as the dark underbelly of Korea’s economic miracle. yet, much has changed since that time. For one thing, south Korea’s advanced nation status has become more firmly secured, the iMF economic crisis (1997–1998) notwithstanding, and, for another, adult adoptees have successfully come of age. state-sponsored globalization projects since the late 1990s have celebrated the returns of adult adoptees, resignifying them from abandoned children of war and poverty to valued assets and cultural bridges. Dawson is exceptional in that he was literally enrolled as an ambassador for Korean tourism and sports, but adoptees have, for decades, been framed as “ambassadors” or “civil diplomats” in Korean government rhetoric that attempts to spin them as exemplars of internationalism rather than as victims of Korea’s rapid modernization and entrenched patriarchy. From the perspective of adoptees, however, these roles are not necessarily welcome, nor are they realistic, since most feel ill equipped to perform any metaphoric diplomacy due to their limited Korean language ability and their lack of knowledge about Korean culture. The state’s attempt to capitalize on adoptees’ disjunctive histories continually downplays the untenable and uncomfortable place that adoptees have found themselves inhabiting, as subjects caught between ball player Hines Ward, after winning the MvP award in 2005, made a “homecoming” trip to Korea with his Korean mother, eliciting a media outpouring that provoked national self-reflection on the plight of mixed-race Koreans in Korea. Daniel Henney, half–Koreanamerican and half-British, has become a major television and film star after moving to Korea to pursue a modeling career. He brought his mother, a Korean adoptee, to Korea in 2005 on her first trip there since she was adopted in 1958. in both Henney’s and Hines’s cases, the sons’ rise to stardom provided the motivation for their mothers to return to a country with which they had an ambivalent, if not antagonistic, relationship. in Dawson’s case, rather than returning with his Korean parent, he went to Korea in order to locate the source of his own Koreanness. His celebrity status as a transnational adoptee was thereby further enhanced through the visible evidence and proof of his Korean “blood,” publicly demonstrated through his reunion with his Korean father.

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nation-states, dominant cultures, and global hierarchies of race and gender. Dawson’s celebrity notwithstanding, adoptees cannot be easily interpreted as elite cosmopolitans. rather, given the assimilationist ideologies under which they were raised in the West, their cosmopolitanism or flexible citizenship, if it can be framed as such, should be recognized as being hard earned, and is often incomplete and partial. adoptees move from one set of liminal experiences in their adoptive countries to encounter another set in Korea, where the possibility of finding a comfortable place of “authentic” belonging seems to be, as of yet, beyond their grasp. in what follows, i describe how adoptees are contributing to a newly globalized Korea, not as ambassadors like Dawson, but as resident social actors who are invested in local, national, and transnational political projects. in addition, i argue that the relationship between adoptees and Korea has taken on new dimensions in the context of the intensification of economic neoliberalism and the rise of multiculturalism in post-iMF south Korea. Beyond blood and roots, beyond mother love and motherland, claiming belonging in Korea increasingly requires conformity to neoliberal values of entrepreneurship and self-regulation. Dawson’s touching story was accompanied by an announcement that he intended to set up the Toby Dawson Foundation to help adoptees locate their biological families. Dawson’s project is commendable in that it acknowledges not only that there are other less fortunate adoptees who have not been reunited with their Korean families, but also that there are issues related to being adopted that cannot simply be solved through a miraculous family reunion. indeed, the postreunion phase can be equally challenging for adoptees and their Korean families as they attempt to navigate the narrow straits of familial intimacy and cultural difference with few resources or guides to help them proceed. yet Dawson’s plan for his foundation largely ignored and eclipsed the long term and ongoing work of adult Korean adoptees who have already been engaged in over a decade of grassroots activism in Korea and other parts of the world. Moreover, the intensely public display of his personal life contrasts with the self-conscious attempts by adoptee activists to resist the reduction of adoptee experience to generic melodramas and their concerted struggles to construct viable political identities. since the early 1990s, adult adoptees have been returning to Korea in increasing numbers, largely thanks to the job opportunities made available by the expansion of the english-language teaching market in Korea, especially in the post-iMF era. an estimated three to five thousand adoptees return every year, most for short-term visits, but a growing number are returning to live and work for extended periods of time, usually a year or longer. During my ethnographic research with resident transnational

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Korean adoptees in seoul (2000–2008),3 a fluid yet identifiable network of adoptees was centered around the adoptee-established ngo, global overseas adoptees’ link (goa’l), which functions as a home base for adoptees who return to Korea, often without known relatives, social connections, language skills, or cultural knowledge. Despite many of the strides adoptees have made in gaining recognition in Korea, in asserting their belonging to the nation and in attempting to intervene into adoption policies, their social and political agency continues to be fundamentally constrained by their lack of linguistic fluency. issues of language and translation persist, in which adoptees often feel excluded from discussions that concern them directly—whether it is their own birth family searches, cultural representations, or debates about adoption policy. Because of these limitations, adoptees depend upon native Korean ngo volunteers for basic access to services, guidance while visiting Korea, interpretation in birth family searches and reunions, and in their campaigns to promote adoptee rights and recognition. This dependency on native Koreans restricts adoptees’ social agency and thereby fosters doubt and distrust among many regarding the interests that motivate the Koreans who help them. Because the majority of Korean ngos and their volunteers are affiliated with Protestantism, adoptees, especially those with secular outlooks, can be especially skeptical of the evangelical designs of Korean volunteers. likewise, because of the association of international adoptions with illicit financial gain, some adoptees also wonder if there is an economic interest that lies behind the charitable efforts of the Koreans who help them. even if these suspicions have some basis in reality—certainly many young volunteers seek to make international connections with english-speaking adoptees—my research suggests a different constellation of personal and historical factors that make adoptees ideal objects of charity. New Objects of Charity: Adoptees as Latter-Day Minjung adoptees may have been resignified as successful diplomats in official government rhetoric, but progressive intellectuals in Korea by the 1990s began remembering them as victims of the authoritarian developmentalist state. at that time, the adoption issue became enfolded into a range of recuperative historical projects that framed adoptees as part of the Korean people, sharing histories of oppression with other groups whose victimization by the regimes of the past granted them a redemptive form 3 This research was conducted through fellowships from the James West Memorial Fund for Human rights, the Fulbright Commission, the social science research Council, and the Korea Foundation.

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of cultural citizenship under the liberal democratic administrations of the present. With the lifting of authoritarian state control over free speech and public discourses, a range of formerly repressed social justice issues was unearthed in the 1990s. Called by some academics (ahn 2002) a “coming to terms with the past” (kwagŏ ch’ŏngsan), or “the straightening up of history” (yŏksa paro seugi) as it was called by President Kim young sam (s. n. Kim 2000), this process of historical reckoning brought into the public sphere marginalized and stigmatized groups, such as comfort women—Korean women conscripted as sex workers by the Japanese imperial army—civilian victims of the state-sponsored Cheju island massacre in 1948, and the victims of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising. Thus, the 1990s witnessed a conjuncture among adoptees’ returns, processes of historical reclamation and coming to terms with the past, and the rise of the “civil society movement” (simin sahoe undong), which led to the identification of adoptees as one of many social justice causes championed by middle-class civic activists.4 in this identification, adoptees are framed as latter-day minjung, and their problematic temporality illuminates the incomplete nature of the democratization movement, as well as of the nation’s modernization and decolonization processes. The nationwide protests of June 1987 brought an end to decades of authoritarian rule in south Korea, and as such 1987 marks both the beginning of democratic transformation and the end of the student- and worker-led movement for democracy, which promoted a populist cultural nationalism centered around a notion of the common people, or minjung. The minjung movement emerged in the 1970s, and by the 1980s university students, factory workers, farmers, and religious figures were part of an interconnected field of social practice and discursive production, 4 Political sociologist Jaeeun Kim argues that these processes in the 1990s involved the rediscovery and official recognition of two types of victims who were “suddenly rescued from decades of invisibility and silence.” she describes the two groups as being comprised of “those who were victimized directly by the anti-human rights crimes committed by the repressive authoritarian state” and “those victimized indirectly by the inability of the shamefully weak and helpless state in the past.” Kim counts the prodemocracy activists who were falsely imprisoned and tortured in the former category and adoptees and so-called comfort women in the latter category. i argue, however, that adoptees cannot be so easily accommodated into dominant periodizations of postmodern and postcolonial Korea, and in fact they recall the failures and incomplete nature of both processes. Part of the ambivalence that surrounds the discourse of overseas adoption in Korea is attributable to a problem of temporality. Unlike other “rediscovered” overseas coethnics, such as Korean-Chinese or Korean-russians, adoptees are not displaced casualties of Japanese colonialism who are construed as returning family. neither can they be recuperated as victims of the repressive state apparatus like the prodemocracy movement activists or migrant workers sent to germany and south america in the 1970s. and the fact that adoptions are continuing to take place means that one of the symptomatic practices of the “weak state” has yet to be reformed.

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promoting a postcolonial historiography in which the minjung were the proper subjects of history. Many scholars have attempted to evaluate the dissipation of minjung-inspired activism and the emergence of civil society (simin sahoe) ngos in the post-1987 period. sociologist Hagen Koo argues that “the separation of the labor movement and social movements is, in fact, the most significant development in the 1990s.” He writes, “Whereas most social movements in the 1980s, like the environmental movement and urban housing movement, were closely allied with the labor and student movements, under the same ideological banner of minjung, in the 1990s tensions and competitions began to appear between the two types of movements, eventually leading to a clear separation of the two” (2002, 44). nancy abelmann and namhee lee, however, note a more complex and ambivalent relationship between the ascendant civil society groups and minjung activism, especially, as seungsook Moon notes, since there exists a continuity between the two movements not only in terms of concerns with democratic social change but also in terms of leadership composition.5 Moreover, the minjung discourse and symbolism have been transposed from class-based populism to groups such as adoptees who represent formerly unacknowledged and rediscovered victims of the authoritarian state. These dynamics became apparent in the work of Koroot, one of the main adoptee service providers in seoul. Koroot is one of a handful of ngos that has emerged since the turn of the millennium to address the needs of adoptee returnees. Primarily a boarding house and community center, Koroot also offers interpretation assistance for adoptees, most commonly for birth family search and reunion services. it also serves as a meeting place for adoptees and hosts cultural events, field trips, and holiday parties. established in 2003 by members of the Citizens’ Coalition for economic Justice—a forerunner of the moderate, middle-class civil society movement—Koroot is managed by Kim Do-hyun, a minjung theologian and minister who was involved in the radical student arm of the prodemocracy movement of the 1970s and ’80s. He returned to Korea in 2003 after eleven years in switzerland and england to take over the position at Koroot. in our conversations he continually stressed his interest in fostering an active civil society (hwalbalhan simin sahoe). 5 These dynamics have become even more troubling for progressive intellectuals who decried the convergence of democratization and economic neoliberalization of south Korea’s economy, especially during the asian financial crisis. These ironies are explored by Jesook song, who notes that the very activists who sought to remake Korean society in the 1980s had, by the late 1990s, become state technocrats and agents of governmentality who designed and implemented policies of neoliberal reform that functioned to control and marginalize people who in the past would have been celebrated as minjung.

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Despite his role as a religious leader, reverend Kim’s calling was not to save adoptees through evangelism but to serve adoptees who were the unacknowledged “minjung,” victims of a patriarchal and authoritarian state that privileged national security over social welfare and made it impossible for class- and gender-subordinated women to keep their children. reverend suh Kyung suk, a founder of the Citizens’ Coalition for economic Justice, was a key supporter of overseas adoptees in the mid1990s and became a crucial liaison between goa’l and the government during that time. at Koroot’s first anniversary event, he told the audience of donors and supporters, “Whenever we meet adoptees, we share a common feeling—that feeling is our guilty conscience (choe ŭisik). . . . Through Koroot, we hope to atone a little bit for this guilty conscience.” The guilty conscience that he articulates is complexly intertwined with the unfinished business of the minjung movement, which coincided with the height of transnational adoptions in the 1970s and ’80s, and privileged class issues over gender equality and reproductive politics (s. K. Kim 1997). in this way we can see how the civil society movement is at once an extension of the 1980s democratization movement and also a critical revision of its basic principles (D. C. Kim 2006).6 reverend Kim envisioned Koroot as a place through which to provoke social change—through the rethinking of the family and the place of birth mothers in Korean society and by altering the consciousness of Koreans regarding adoption and adoptees. at Koroot’s first anniversary event he made a decidedly minjung statement to compel the attendees to donate money by proclaiming: “adoptees are the center of the world” (ibyangindŭl i segye chungsim imnida); through Koroot, we can change the world!” Koreans’ personal motivations, therefore, are entirely shaped by their membership in the Korean nation, the legacies of the minjung, and a moral vision for the future of the nation in the global world and dispensational time. For reverend Kim, helping adoptees is intimately linked to his radical past as a student activist and his more moderate present—both inform his identity as a Korean whose vision of citizenship is shaped by participation in an “active civil society” and progressive social change. in contrast to reverend Kim, for whom adoptees represent unacknowledged victims of the authoritarian state, a younger generation of Koreans who desire to help adoptees are influenced less by the unfinished business of the minjung movement and more by dominant values of civic 6

More could be said here about the distinction between what suh called his “guilty conscience” (choe ŭisik) and the more often-cited sentiment of han, perhaps an indication of a shift on the part of minjung undongkwŏn from populist identification with the common people to paternalistic guilt in the post-1987 era.

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engagement in contemporary south Korea and their own “cosmopolitan striving” in the context of globalization (Park and abelmann 2004). Both of these generations gain social capital through their work with adoptees, and ironically they need to sustain a view of adoptees as “Koreans” who are fundamentally alienated from “Korea” in order to maintain the logic of paternalism that lies at the basis of the volunteer ethos. in fact, just a short time before the anniversary event, the female elders of the saemunan Church had held a prayer meeting at Koroot, in which the framing of adoptees as objects of charity was made explicit in their appeals to Christ to bestow mercy on the poor and pitiable adoptees. referring to them as poor and pitiable people (kananhan saram; pulssanghan saram), the women attributed the suffering of adoptees to the failures of the Korean people (uri minjok), for which the women’s prayers sought atonement. Thus, the benefits that Koreans earn from helping adoptees are not simply reducible to monetarist logic; rather, they exist in tension with the convergence of democratization and liberalization processes in post-iMF south Korea. Through the course of my research, i began to see how ngos mediate not only the experiences and cultural incorporation of adoptees, but also contemporary modes of citizenship for South Koreans, by providing them opportunities to perform and actualize their own belonging to the postcolonial, postmodern nation, imagined as an active civil society in which participation in social issues through volunteerism is a defining feature of modern personhood. Through their encounters with adoptee others, native Koreans assuage their guilty consciences and enroll in progressive movements for social change, which, in the context of Korea’s recent history, enables them to be better members of the newly democratized national body. These processes, however, mirror the problematic politics of representation of the minjung era in which, as Chungmoo Choi writes, “the movement was an exercise in speaking for its subjects.” south Koreans become empowered citizens and historical subjects based upon the incomplete citizenship of other Koreans who are their objects of civic paternalism and charity.7 ngos thereby provide opportunities for south Koreans to expand their personal notions of who counts as belonging to the nation, but also, by constructing adoptees as objects of charity, risk reinforcing social stratifications that retain adoptees in a marginalized position vis-à-vis the dominant public sphere. 7

These dynamics of power are perhaps unavoidable, but reverend Kim in particular seeks to use his position to provide spaces for adoptee voices to be heard. He has published adoptee texts in translation and works closely with an adoptee advisory board to ensure that Koroot’s programs and services are centered around adoptees’ needs and concerns. in his speech at the Koroot event, he implored his listeners to donate money to help him accomplish various projects that would empower adoptees.

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New Agents of Change and Paradoxical Participation The paternalism of Korean ngos toward adoptees is perhaps inevitable, but it should not obscure from view some of the actual effects that adoptees have had on Korean conceptions of adoption and adoptees. Through their very embodied difference, in interactions with Korean volunteers, adoptees stretch the bounds of the nation, pushing native Koreans to rethink their ethnonationalist assumptions of cultural citizenship, the politics of adoption, and the rights of adoptees to birth information. Belgian adoptee activist and artist Mihee nathalie lemoine addressed the audience of Korean donors at the Koroot first anniversary event and made explicit the ways that adoptees and adoption trouble the Korean social imaginary–– in the contradiction between Korea’s impressive modernization and its ongoing practice of international adoption, in adoptees’ Korean bodies without Korean qualities, or kat’ŭn minjok without munhwa, and in the resignification of adoption as a transnational strategy of upward mobility. lemoine spoke in French, with reverend Kim’s daughter, who was raised in switzerland, translating into Korean. after welcoming her audience to the first year anniversary for Koroot, she stated, it’s also the fiftieth year of international Korean adoption, so i hope this occasion will allow us to reflect upon international adoption, and also to reflect upon where we are sending these children. Korea is a wealthy nation. so i ask why it is that two thousand children have left Korea this year. and why they have left every year for the past ten years to foreign countries. . . . i hope that if you happen to meet an adoptee, an international adoptee, who does not speak Korean well or who does not understand Koreanness (coréenité), that, instead of having the impression that this person is not Korean, you will be able to think of Koreanness in a more inclusive way (un coréenité plus large).8

The interpreter at this point stumbled, seemingly unsure of how to translate the idea of “being Korean” or coréenité to her audience, and unable or unwilling to denaturalize for her Korean audience hegemonic notions of ethnonational belonging. Moreover, she struggled to put into words the Koreanness of the Korean adoptee, who is “Korean” by dint of birth, ethnicity, and appearance, but culturally other, positioned outside of common conceptions of cultural citizenship and nationhood (minjok): 그래서 한국어를 하지 못하는 입양 -- 한국계 입양인들을 만나시면 한국어를 잘 하지 못하는 이유로… 그런 다르다는 이유로… 정말 -- 외국인이라는 아니면 다른--같은 민족, 같은 사람 아니라는 느낌을 주시는지 마시고 8

My translation.

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eleana Kim 더 열린 마음으로 받아드리실 수 있었으면 더 갑니다. [so, if there is an adoptee who can’t speak Korean––if you were to meet an adoptee of Korean descent and because he can’t speak Korean well . . . or for some other reason . . . please don’t feel that he is a foreigner or not the same Korean [race] (minjok) or person (saram) as you, but try to receive him with a more open mind.]

lemoine concluded by stating, “if you continue to send children overseas, don’t think that it’s yuhak [overseas education]. it’s not at all like yuhak–– it’s adoption, which is to say that it’s irreversible.” lemoine was a founding member of goa’l, and through her activism and artwork has strived to gain legal recognition and cultural acceptance for adoptees. one of goa’l’s most successful campaigns was to mobilize for adoptees to be included in the overseas Koreans legislation of 1998, which granted them, along with other foreign nationals of Korean descent, privileged visa status and the ability to stay and work in Korea for extended periods of time. in addition, on a cultural front, goa’l worked to alter the very terms by which adoptees were referred to in Korea, advocating for a shift from ibyanga, or adopted child, to ibyangin, adopted person, to counteract the implicit infantalization of adoptees and to underscore the fact that they are fully agentive persons, unashamed of their adopted status. More recently, goa’l advocated for the inclusion of adoptees in dual citizenship legislation. With the passage of the bill in the south Korean national assembly in april 2009, the recovery of Korean citizenship is now a reality for tens of thousands of adoptees. This desire for legal citizenship is connected to concerns around adoptee rights, and the ability of foreigner-established organizations like goa’l to function on equal footing as native-Korean ngos in terms of government grants and fundraising. in contrast to the government, which categorizes them as foreign nationals and which assumes that they are short-term visitors or tourists who will return to their real homes, meaning their adoptive countries, goa’l is part of an emergent field of cultural production in which Korean adoptees who live in Korea are articulating alternative subjectivities and cultural identities as members not only of the global Korean family but also as participants in the nation with particular stakes and interests in maintaining their presence there. This articulation of an alternative Korean subjectivity is coincident with the emergence of a range of other groups now residing within south Korea and making claims on the state—amerasians, migrant laborers, multicultural families, return migrants, and other overseas ethnic Koreans. goa’l’s campaigns largely focus on birth family search, the promotion

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of social awareness of adoptees’ existence in Korea, and addressing their practical needs and political recognition. other adoptee activists are involved more directly in politicized movements to reform the practice of international adoption. Truth and reconciliation for the adoption Community in Korea (TraCK) and adoptee solidarity Korea (asK) are two such groups that have been founded since 2004 by american adoptees who share a commitment to social justice and who are dismayed by the fact that Korea, despite its standing as a leader in the global economy, continues to send children overseas for adoption. adoptee activists are staking claims on being Korean based on locality and experiences grounded in the present, rather than in a nostalgic yearning for “roots” or a psychic desire for a lost past. Unlike Dawson, whose return as a long-lost son consecrated his legitimacy as a Korean, adoptee activists have been working with much less fanfare to establish their claims to being of the nation as well as staking their claim to legitimate belonging in the nation. in this way adoptees living in Korea are participating in Korean globalization from within, rather than as metaphoric bridge-builders or ambassadors linking the West with Korea. out of their collective project for self-determination are emerging concerns over the reproductive rights of Korean women, the adoption system as an international institution, and the welfare of Korean children. activist adoptees are currently pursuing alliances with an emergent social movement of Korean birth mothers, as well as campaigning to reform Korea’s social welfare system and end Korea’s overseas adoption program. goa’l gained full recognition as a south Korean ngo in 2004 and received its first major grant from the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 2005. By giving goa’l a substantial sum, the state seemed to be acknowledging the ongoing presence of adoptees within the national borders, and also recognizing goa’l’s services as increasingly necessary as the next and largest wave of adoptees comes of age. Koroot, for its part, has begun addressing the practical ways in which adoptees might be “bridges,” whether economic or cultural or both. it started a ten-week-long weekend “business school” in the spring of 2005 that helps long-term returnees adapt to Korea and to “construct a career path in [their] field.” including lectures by owners of small businesses, employees of foreign and Korean corporations, professors, and tourism experts, the course was partly funded by the seoul metropolitan government with a grant specified for “government participation projects for ngos” (piyŏngni tanch’e sich’ŏng ch’amyŏ saŏp). yet, discourses of “participatory democracy” and “civil society” in the context of south Korea’s post-iMF cultural and economic neoliberalization may be overly invested in naive and celebratory representations

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that fail to take into account the multiple vectors and circuits of state power.9 The secretary general of goa’l, swiss-Korean adoptee Dae-won Kim, discussed with me his concerns that goa’l, by making it easier for adoptees’ needs to be met in Korea, might also be facilitating the government’s deferral of implementing necessary social-welfare reforms, especially in terms of the overseas adoption program. What Kim articulated is similar to what Julia Paley calls “paradoxical participation” in her study of social movements in postdictatorial Chile, in which the encouragement of civic participation actively recruits individuals into the neoliberal rollback of state services and thereby displaces state accountability onto selfregulating, “responsibilized” subjects. she writes, “participation offered a sense of meaning to citizens at the same time as it limited avenues through which citizens could act” (2001, 146). indeed, one can see how the work of ngos and the increasing visibility of adoptees in the Korean media can work to naturalize and normalize the return of adoptees to the motherland as an expected part of the adoptee life cycle, and adoptees as constituting their own special subcategory of the global diaspora who are being actively trained to assimilate to Korean culture and economy. as government-funded postadoption services are increasingly institutionalized, they extend state biopower, which rationalized the export of adoptees as excess bodies, into techniques of government in the “post-” period, through what the government calls the “restoration of [Korean] identity” and other restitutions for the prior sacrifices of language, culture, and family. even as children continue to be sent abroad, the institutionalization of postadoption services helps to guarantee that those children will have an easier time identifying as Koreans and an easier time returning to the motherland, especially as adult adoptees begin to take on greater responsibility to help fill in the gaps—in services and in personal and national histories—that the state and adoption agencies have demonstrated little will to directly address. These processes also promote a model of the adoptee-citizen who identifies his or her own needs and addresses them through entrepreneurial innovation with limited state oversight. Orphans of Globalization: Adoptees as Deterritorialized Nomads adoptees in Korea, like other Koreans, must negotiate their relationship to the changing dynamics of the state and the market in the context of south 9 in fact, the shifting winds of political power have direct economic impact on “civil society,” as was demonstrated soon after the start of the conservative lee Myung-bak administration (2008–2013). ngos budgets were slashed, and government grants became more difficult to obtain, requiring ngos and civil society organizations to seek alternative sources of revenue.

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Korea’s neoliberal transformations.10 Many adoptees recognize that their own value as returnees is predicated on the economic relations between their adoptive nations and Korea, and their ability to contribute to Korea’s economic future. yet even as these geopolitical and economic relations have opened up new opportunities for adoptees to travel and work, they have also foreclosed the futures of other adoptees, who find themselves out of time and out of joint in Korea. Whereas the authoritarian state once leveraged children’s bodies for foreign capital, today, those same adoptees find their human value predicated on the demands of a flexible economy. in this context, what happens to adoptees who are evaluated to be worthless? How do they justify their place in society? There is a prevalent assumption that adoptees who return to Korea are following a well-accepted model of middle-class personhood that normalizes postcollegiate travel as an enriching personal experience that, in a globalized economy, can also be a beneficial investment in one’s future employment prospects. indeed, the fact that many adoptees take advantage of the english-language teaching market is an obvious indication that they seek opportunities to gain experience living abroad and to accumulate economic and social capital. adoptees who stay beyond one or two years, however, become worrisome to their adoptive parents and friends back home, to south Korean government officials, and to other Koreans. even as returns and “roots seeking” have become normalized stages in the transnational adoptee lifecycle, adoptees are still viewed as properly belonging in their nations of citizenship, their adoptive countries. Koreans especially share this view, given the fact that so many returning adoptees of the same generation, those in their twenties and thirties, seek desperately to escape the country’s economic and social constraints. Thus, the longer adoptees stay in Korea, the more they seem to be squandering their economic and social capital. Unless they are able to leverage their employment into a more legibly “global” or “flexible” category, such as a job in 10 in south Korea, where the iMF bailout entailed a massive restructuring of the economy to conform to global standards of liberalization, progressive intellectuals bemoan the sad irony of democratization’s dovetailing with neoliberalization. Unlike the paradigmatic examples of neoliberalism in latin america, neoliberalization in south Korea entailed the establishment of the welfare state and its expansion, yet the simultaneous installment of neoliberal values through the concept of workfare. To be precise, i follow anthropologist Jesook song’s use of the term neoliberalism, which puts “neo” in parentheses to mark the fact that liberalism in Korea coincided with neoliberalism on the global stage, extending the reach of a universal monetarist policy that privileges economistic measures of human value. The socialist futures that motivated and mobilized students and workers in the 1980s not only faded with the fall of the Berlin Wall; they were transformed into consumerist values and notions of responsible citizenship by the very social actors who decried state power and global capitalism in their more radical pasts.

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a multinational corporation, upper-level management in an englishlanguage institute, or small business entrepreneurship, these adoptees begin to take on a pathologized hue. skeptical onlookers wonder what future such adoptees can have in Korea. adoptive parents fear that Korea will cease to be multicultural value added and instead begin to replace “home”—the Korean adoptee who returns to Korea and does not leave risks subverting the neoliberal logic at the basis of adoption. The adoptee begins to appear “ungrateful,” having given up his or her end of the bargain—a bargain that exchanges love and opportunities for the obligation to reproduce the wealth, status, and cultural values that comes with a middle-class family and Western citizenship. For Koreans, adoptees who overstay risk regressing into the very burdens on the state that their adoptions were intended to circumvent. The majority of adoptees i met during the course of my research conformed to the middle-class model of the adoptee who seeks roots and natal family, but returns home to continue on the path of upward mobility promised by adoption. adoptees who stayed on in Korea, however, sustained lives of considerable liminality—many of them worked in jobs without any opportunity for advancement, were single, and devoted the majority of their time to maintaining the community of adoptees in seoul. This lack of futurity becomes worrisome and troubling for many, including other adoptees, who consider them to be “losers,” as one person told me. in fact, the deferral of “going back”—this time back to the states or to europe—was a prominent feature in the talk of long timers in Korea who would intermittently announce that they were finally going to leave Korea this year, or the next year. For many adoptees, activism to reform or end the adoption system structured their sense of hope and future temporality. These adoptees’ timescapes were regulated according to cycles of international adoptee conferences, summer surges of adoptee returnees, and periodic events in the political calendar that promised opportunities to articulate opposition to the ongoing practice of transnational adoption. Their agency and citizenship are grounded in the common goal of ending adoptions, which, ironically would mark the end of the adoptee community as well. Conclusion in sum, i have shown how, in the context of Korean “civil society” and progressive politics, Korean volunteers and adoptee advocates have been able to modify their more radical projects for revolutionary social change into moderate forms of participatory democracy, which rely on the incomplete membership of adoptees who exist as marginally assimilable others

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to the Korean nation. some adoptees’ own ngo projects also become modes of self-governance in which adoptees themselves provide the services that the state is unable to furnish. These might be regarded as successful campaigns for self-empowerment, yet even with the promise of full citizenship rights, adoptees continue to be marginalized as others by the very ngos that attempt to ameliorate the conditions of their daily existence in Korea. Moreover, adoptee recognition is increasingly predicated on the localization of neoliberal values in which entrepreneurship and economic bridge building are offered as the idealized models for the roles that they can play as members of global Korea.11 in the context of adoption politics, these discourses and projects reinforce the notion that adoption is an acceptable social welfare policy solution in which original sacrifices of language, family, and culture can be recovered in the postadoption phase. They also shift focus away from the ongoing and unresolved “adoption problem” (ibyang munje) by foregrounding a partial view that equates adoptee upward mobility with the success of adoption. These developments also shed light on the multiethnic transformations south Korea has witnessed with the influx of migrant workers and international brides, primarily from south and southeast asia, since the early 2000s. These migration flows have fueled an explosion of popular discourse, government policy, and academic knowledge production related to “multiculturalism” (tamunhwa) and its effects on Korean economy, society, and politics. Multiculturalism’s promise in Korea, as it has been in Western contexts, is the dismantling of conservative ethnonationalisms and racialized myths of homogeneity, yet this promise, as many observers have noted, has been slow to be realized. in fact, multiculturalism in Korea has not promoted the coréenité plus large (a more-inclusive Koreanness) that Mihee lemoine exhorted her audience to consider, but has, through government and ngo programs, encouraged Koreans to have a “more open mind,” without disturbing the prevailing notions of minjok (Korean race) or even saram (personhood), much as the Korean interpreter dulled lemoine’s more pointed intervention at the Koroot event described earlier. adoptees, who as of yet have not been included within state or civic projects of multiculturalism (yoon 2009), thereby reveal the underlying ethnic assumptions of Korean-style multiculturalism (tamunhwa), which i view to be a response to social and economic transformations related to 11

i follow ong’s definition of neoliberal rationalities in which “cultural discourses converge with the rationality of the market, conflating the moral value of liberal egoism with one’s command over capital. The neoliberal discourse that increasingly defines citizenship in economic terms, by insisting that citizenship is the civic duty of individuals to reduce their burden on society and to build up their human capital, becomes a vital supplement to the classic liberal rights–based definition of citizenship.”

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globalization and more expressive of state and citizen anxieties over the racial and ethnic differences of new migrants than of a progressive shift away from ethnocentric notions of cultural difference and national identity. adoptees are considered to be racially and ethnically Korean by most Koreans and from the perspective of the state and its overseas Koreans policies, yet they open a gap between minjok (Korean race) and munhwa (culture). adoptees’ own multiculturalism, like that of other “ethnic Korean” migrants, is considered to be unproblematic precisely because the (in)ability to assimilate the ethnic other, rather than the pluralistic acceptance of cultural difference, is what is most at stake. in this way, adoptees make visible the ways in which multiculturalism serves as a gloss for multiethnicism, while leaving untouched the myth of ethnic homogeneity (Han 2007). in more direct ways, my research suggests how adoptees’ ethnic roots permit them incorporation into the nation, not only as long-lost children returning to their motherland, but as economic actors whose human value is evaluated within global capitalist hierarchies, which also offers implications for understanding broader patterns of multiethnic incorporation within south Korea. Whether as “ambassadors” or english teachers, adoptees are well aware of the ways in which their reception in the “motherland” is conditioned not only by their genealogical origins but also their class privilege. one implication of this study is that, if participation in the Korean nation is, through global migration and the multiethnic turn, entering a postidentity phase in which one’s cultural citizenship and incorporation in the nation are no longer solely determined by essentialized “blood” identities and assimilation into the dominant culture, then this process is also accompanied by views of personhood inflected with neoliberal rationalities in which citizenship and well-being are increasingly tied to free-market values of economic self-regulation and entrepreneurship. References abelmann, nancy. 1996. Echoes of the Past, Epics of Dissent: A South Korean Social Movement. Berkeley: University of California Press. ahn, Byung-ook. 2002. “The significance of settling the Past in Modern Korean History.” Korea Journal 42:7–17. Choi, Chungmoo. 1997. “The Discourse of Decolonization and Popular Memory: south Korea.” in The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital, edited by lisa lowe and D. lloyd, 461–484. Durham, nC: Duke University Press. Deleuze, gilles, and Felix guattari. 1983. Anti-Oedipus. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

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Han, geon-soo. 2007. “Multicultural Korea: Celebration or Challenge of Multiethnic shift in Contemporary Korea?” Korea Journal 47:32–63. Kim, Dong-choon. 2006. “growth and Crisis of the Korean Citizen’s Movement.” Korea Journal 46:99–128. Kim, Jaeeun. 2006. “incorporating Koreans abroad: The Politics of Membership in the ‘Divided nation.’” Paper presented at the seminar Theory and research in Comparative social analysis, University of California, los angeles, 16 november. Kim, samuel n. 2000. Korea’s Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kim, seung-kyung. 1997. Class Struggle or Family Struggle? Lives of Women Factory Workers in South Korea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Koo, Hagen. 2002. “Civil society and Democracy in south Korea.” The Good Society 11:40–45. lee, namhee. 2007. The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea. ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press. Moon, seungsook. 2005. Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea. Durham, nC: Duke University Press. ong, aihwa. 2003. Buddha Is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Paley, Julia. 2001. Marketing Democracy: Power and Social Movements in Post-Dictatorship Chile. Berkeley: University of California Press. Park, so Jin, and nancy abelmann. 2004. “Class and Cosmopolitan striving: Mothers’ Management of english education in south Korea.” Anthropological Quarterly 77:645–672. sarri, rosemary C., y. Baik, and M. Bombyk. 1998. “goal Displacement and Dependency in south Korean-United states intercountry adoption.” Children and Youth Services Review 20, no. 1/2:87–114. song, Jesook. 2009. South Koreans in the Debt Crisis: The Creation of a Neoliberal Welfare Society. Durham, nC: Duke University Press. yoon, in Jin. 2009. “The Development of Multiculturalism Discourse and Multicultural Policy in south Korea: With a Focus on the roles of the government and Civil society.” Trans-Humanities 1:63–99.

nine

Diverging Paths, Converging ends Japan’s and Korea’s Low-Skilled Immigration Policies, 1990–2010

KeiKo yaManaKa Japan and south Korea (Korea hereafter), two recent countries of immigration in east asia, adopted similar immigration policies in the early 1990s. They did so in response to an influx of foreign workers from around the region, who filled the growing demand for low-skilled labor among middle- and small-sized companies in both countries. yet despite the rapidly increasing number of immigrant workers, governments in Japan and Korea denied the very fact of their presence while officially reaffirming the principle of allowing in only high-skilled foreign workers. as a result, each government instituted a variety of de facto immigrant categories that would, in effect, allow for the continuing employment of lowskilled laborers in jobs shunned by locals. The three major categories were (1) “illegal” visa-overstayers, (2) industrial trainees on contract, and (3) coethnics from abroad, such as, in the case of Japan, Nikkeijin (people of Japanese ancestry) from Brazil, and, in Korea, Chosŏnjok (people of Korean descent) from China. By the mid-2000s, in the face of growing contradictions inherent within such immigration policies, Korea began to initiate reforms in order to narrow the gap between policy and practice. in august 2004, the country launched the employment Permit system (ePs), guaranteeing immigrant workers legal protections roughly equivalent to their native Korean counterparts. in December 2006, seoul abolished the industrial Technical Trainee Program (iTTP), blamed for repeated human rights violations and a spike in the number of undocumented workers in the country. in the same year, a variety of organizations in Japan—including national ministries, political parties, and civil groups—began to address increasing ethnic diversity among the Japanese population, while also focusing on

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alternative programs for low-skilled foreign workers. To this day, however, despite the heightened attention on such issues, Tokyo has yet to introduce major changes to its immigration policy. in previous studies (yamanaka 2010, 2011), i argued that the divergence in immigration policies in Korea and Japan beginning in the mid-2000s was in part due to historical differences and to the differing ability of civil societies in the two countries to intervene in the policy-making processes on behalf of immigrant rights. Korea’s successful democratic transition in the 1980s allowed coalitions of proimmigrant ngos (nongovernmental organizations) to employ highly confrontational strategies in opposition to the state (s. Kim 2004, 2007). in Japan, however, the entrenched bureaucracy‘s regulatory framework kept independent civil groups isolated, rendering them ineffective in challenging state policy (Pekkanen 2004, 2006). such differences played a key role in distinguishing the political dynamics behind the enhancement of immigrant rights in Korea and Japan (lee and Park 2005). in this chapter, i will focus on the process and context of policymaking in these two east asian countries from the early 1990s to the late 2000s. By discussing how each of the three categories of low-skilled immigrant workers—unauthorized, trainee, and coethnic—came to exist in both Korea and Japan, i will highlight contrasting patterns and interactions among the major political actors: these being the state and civil society in Korea and, in the case of Japan, the national government, local governments, and civil society. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section offers a brief review of theories that account for diverging and converging patterns of state immigration policies. This is followed by a discussion of the dynamic and rapid changes in Korea’s immigration policy, with a focus on the critical role played by civil society there. The final section offers an analysis of Japan’s comparatively static policymaking process, a process long monopolized by the state and only mildly challenged by local governments and civil society in the area of immigrant integration. Divergence and Convergence in Immigration Policies By definition, the immigration policies of highly advanced economies are contradictory. on the one hand, governments are compelled to import foreign workers in order to alleviate labor shortages. on the other hand, they fear that the increase in social diversity that comes as a result of immigration will undermine national integrity. Consequently, immigration policies are frequently inconsistent, generating sizable gaps between the official line and actual outcomes (Cornelius et al. 2004). although a

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specific country’s history of immigration and minority relations may frame individual responses, policies regarding “needed but unwanted” immigration have generally converged among highly advanced economies with liberal democracies (Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998). For example, in post-WWii europe, the eU’s human rights conventions put pressure on member countries to adopt similar policies in managing immigrants and refugees. in traditionally immigrant countries such as the United states, despite the official restrictionist rhetoric, “client politics” tends to promote expansionist policies in favor of labor-short industries, such as agriculture in California. in asia, a handful of areas in the region—Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand—have until recently been labor senders to the United states and elsewhere. receiving immigrant workers, in contrast, is only a recent phenomenon that began in the 1980s as a result of these countries’ rapid economic development. lacking experience in dealing with an influx of immigrant workers, governments in these asian countries typically assembled strategies that were ad hoc and inconsistent, creating disparities between official policy and outcome. in this process, as they scrambled to regain control of their national borders and labor markets, governments across the region often copied the policies of countries more experienced in immigration matters. as a result, by the early 2000s immigration policies in east and southeast asia broadly converged around three major goals: “(1) those that aim to limit the number of migrants; (2) those that aim to limit the duration of migrants’ residence and employment; and (3) those that aim to prevent migrants’ integration into local society” (yamanaka and Piper 2005, 14). Clearly these policies were intended to maintain low-skilled foreign workers in temporary jobs without allowing their families to accompany them, offering only the slightest possibility that they would seek to settle permanently in the countries in which they worked (seol and skrentny 2009a). explaining the lack of family cohesiveness among migrant workers in asia, seol and skrentny (2009a) cite the absence of a supernational rights institution, as exists in the eU, that could enforce regionwide conventions on all members. according to the authors, asia’s elites—governments, bureaucracies, and big businesses—still hold to a developmental state mentality, viewing low-skilled foreigners simply as instruments in their economic development goals. Further, in a regional comparative analysis, skrentny et al. (2009) find that both asia and europe provide special privileges to coethnic returnees that are unavailable to noncoethnic migrants. in asia, however, such privileges are intended to facilitate economic development, whereas in europe they are more likely expressions of ethnic solidarity.

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as the discussion here amply illustrates, a regional comparison is useful to an understanding of patterns of convergence and divergence in immigration policies across histories and cultures. existing studies suggest that asian policies are converging around a highly instrumental model aimed at economic development. Within asian countries, however, i argue that there are distinct patterns specific to the history and political climate of each nation. in the following sections, i will focus on the historical contexts and political processes in Japan and Korea that framed the three categories of de facto immigrant workers at the low skill level: (1) unauthorized workers; (2) industrial trainees on contract; and (3) coethnic returnees from abroad. Despite these convergent programs, my analysis reveals very different dynamics in policy formation that nevertheless lead to similar results in the two countries. Behind such divergent processes lie contrasting narratives of nation building, democratic transitions, and the roles played by civil society. By delineating changing relations and interactions among major players specific to each country, i hope to highlight the main factors associated with their divergent policy-making processes, which have nonetheless resulted in converging immigration policy patterns between two east asian countries characterized by comparable economic development, demographic structure, and constitutional democracy. Korea The Minjung Legacy

The legacy of Korea’s “confrontational civil society” in opposition to the state goes back to the period of military dictatorship, and specifically to the period from 1973 to 1987. in 1972, President Park Chung Hee launched the Yushin (revitalization reform) Constitution, dramatically increasing his power while simultaneously shutting down all oppositional forces. His successor, President Chun Doo Hwan, violently crushed a popular protest in Kwangju in 1981 and arrested thousands of prodemocracy politicians, professionals, and religious leaders. in a spontaneous response to the state’s brutality, a broad range of prodemocracy civil society organizations (including students, workers, and churches) joined together to effectively direct their collective resources toward public campaigns. it was this unprecedented mobilization of the masses, known as the minjung (people’s) movement, which finally brought down the authoritarian Chun regime, giving birth to Korea’s contentious civil society and to a democratic social movement (s. Kim 2004, 2007; n. lee 2007). With the roots of Korea’s fledgling democracy firmly planted, civil society lost no time consolidating its democratic gains. a “new Citizens’

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Movement” (sinsimin undong) emerged in the last phase of the country’s democratic transition (alagappa 2004, 5). The movement attracted the attention of former prodemocracy activists who had sought alternative ways to reform Korean society and politics (s. Kim 2004, 2007). a number of civil groups and related coalitions emerged to pressure the state on behalf of their new constituencies, bringing with them the same highly confrontational approaches, including sit-ins and hunger strikes, that had proven so effective in the earlier democracy campaigns. as will be discussed, such militant campaigns for immigrant rights within Korean society had a tangible impact on the process of governmental policymaking. Controlling Global Workers

Toward the end of the 1980s, Korea received an influx of immigrant workers from neighboring countries. initially, a high proportion of these workers were Chosŏnjok from China’s northeastern provinces, the majority of whom were unauthorized (H. lee 2005; lim 1999). in response, seoul instituted a raft of immigration policies in 1991 to control the increasing numbers of foreign workers. like Japan, Korea allows for the entry and exit of skilled foreigners only. in order to legally admit unskilled foreigners without amending the law, the Korean government adopted the industrial Technical Training Program (iTTP), following Japan’s industrial Trainee system (discussed later) (seol and skrentny 2004, 493). Korea’s trainees, like their counterparts in Japan, were explicitly denied protection under Korea’s labor laws, which included the rights to unionize, to undertake collective bargaining, and to pursue collective action (lim 2006). However, the demand for inexpensive labor quickly exceeded the amount of labor the iTTP was able to supply. as ever larger numbers of foreigners entered the country on tourist and other non-work-related visas, many were funneled into one of the so-called 3D (dirty, difficult, dangerous) jobs traditionally shunned by Koreans. similarly, a high number of industrial trainees found upon arrival that their wages were unacceptably low and immediately left their jobs in pursuit of higher wages, thereby breaking their contracts and losing their legal status in the country. Consequently, the number of unauthorized workers in Korea tripled from 55,000 in 1993 to 148,000 in 1997. These figures accounted for more than 60 to 80 percent of the total number of immigrant workers in the country during the same period (see figure 9.1). and while the number of industrial trainees also increased from 10,000 to 81,000, their numbers remained less than half that of unauthorized workers. such figures alerted the Korean government to the acute necessity of overhauling the iTTP. in search of a new policy, Korea looked again to Japan, adopting in 1997 what amounted to a replica of the latter’s Technical Practical Trainee

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Figure 9.1 Number of Low-Skilled Foreign Workers in Korea, 1987–2008 350,000

300,000

Number of Workers

250,000

200,000 Visa Overstayers Employment Permit

150,000

Industrial Trainees Coethnics

100,000

50,000

0 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Year Source: H. Lee 2010

system (TPTs). as in Japan, Korea’s revised industrial Technical Trainee Program permitted industrial trainees to engage for one year in actual on-the-job duties after two years of training. Five years later, the iTTP was further revised to extend actual job performance to two years after one year of training (W. Kim 2007, 110; lim 2006). When the iTTP was first instituted in 1997, Korea was in the midst of the asian economic crisis, which effectively diminished the country’s need for immigration reform. over the next several years, despite high unemployment rates among Korean workers, the number of unauthorized workers increased, climbing to 289,000 in 2002, doubling the number in 1998 (see figure 9.1). among them were increasing numbers of Chosŏnjok, totaling about eighty thousand (seol and skrentny 2009b, 155). Fluent in Korean, Chosŏnjok workers proved mobile in the labor market, though unlike in Japan, where Nikkeijin were privileged with preferential visas, Korean policy granted no such special visas for Chosŏnjok. This was primarily because the Chinese government objected to their citizens receiving preferential treatment abroad, fearing such treatment would lead to a diminished sense of loyalty to their homeland in China (seol and skrentny 2009b). Despite their Korean ancestry, therefore, Chosŏnjok workers became subject to many forms of exploitation in Korea (lim 1999).

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Challenging the State

in the years following the initial influx of foreign workers to Korea, their plight went unrecognized by the Korean media and public. This changed, however, in January 1995 when a group of thirteen nepalese trainees staged a sit-in at Myŏngdong Cathedral in central seoul, a site long associated with nonviolent protests. Korea’s largest ngo, the Citizens’ Coalition for economic Justice (CCeJ), helped organize the nepalese protest, and was highly successful in drawing public and political attention to moral questions regarding the deployment of third world workers in unwanted jobs. according to lim (1999, 349), however, it was the establishment of a special court after the protest that brought about “far-reaching, legalinstitutional change” with regard to immigrant rights in Korea. Korean proimmigrant ngos supported abused workers who in turn brought their cases to the special court (yamanaka and W. Kim 2008). By doing so, workers legally challenged the state’s role in permitting severe forms of exploitation to continue. Between 1995 and 2000, the court ruled in a number of decisions in favor of immigrant plaintiffs, substantially improving their labor rights.1 such changes marked a major victory for civil groups— citizens and immigrants—that relentlessly fought for equality among workers regardless of nationality and legal status (lim 1999, 2006; W. Kim 2005, 2007). an understanding of the strong commitment to immigrant rights within Korea’s civil society requires a historical and organizational explanation. it should be emphasized that, historically, the influx of migrant workers arriving in Korea began only a few years after the democratic transition occurred in 1987. once democracy had been achieved, former activists began seeking out new agendas that would eventually form the platform of Korea’s new Citizens Movement. The timely arrival of third world workers caught the attention of these activists, who regarded them as the new minjung, victims of globalization (W. Kim 2007). among these activists were progressive Christian church leaders who were heavily committed to the protection of human rights for vulnerable foreigners working in Korea’s 3D jobs. The historical continuity linking Korea’s democracy struggle with the fight for immigrant rights also translated into organizational effectiveness among immigrant advocacy groups in their challenge against the state, which allied with business interests seeking to enhance the country’s 1

These changes included financial coverage for unauthorized workers in compensation for work-related injuries (1994), provision of severance pay to unauthorized workers (1997), application of the labor standards law for unauthorized workers (1998), and application of the occupational accident law to unauthorized workers (2000).

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global competitiveness. Following the 1995 nepalese protest, a coalition of proimmigrant groups—the Joint Committee of Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK)—began mobilizing their resources, manpower, and networks in order to address the urgent need for reforming the immigration system. JCMK advocates identified the iTTP as the root cause of exploitation and discrimination, and targeted the committee’s campaign toward achieving two main goals: (1) abolishing the trainee system, and (2) creating a workpermit system that recognizes low-skilled foreigners as legitimate workers (lim 2006). Using public rallies, sit-ins, and even hunger strikes, proimmigrant activists pressed the government to end the trainee program and adopt a work-permit system in its place. Their relentless campaigns soon threatened the Korean Federation of small Businesses (KFsB)—the association of small business owners—long the main advocate and beneficiary of the trainee program (lim 2006). in turn, KFsB began a powerful campaign to counter efforts by immigrant rights advocates. Caught between the opposing demands, the Korean government agreed to implement a compromise plan, called the employment Permit system (ePs). The new contract-labor system defined unskilled foreigners as legal workers but denied them mobility in the Korean labor market. Prior to the system’s implementation, however, the government announced the deportation of large numbers of unauthorized workers in a move that was met with vehement protests by immigrant advocates (y. lee 2009). in response, the government proposed an amnesty and a oneyear work permit for unauthorized workers who agreed to leave Korea when their new one-year permit expired (n. Kim 2008, 591). The government’s proposal was appealing to many unauthorized workers, particularly those who had been in the country for less than four years, and by the end of 2003 a total of 184,000 applied for amnesty (H. lee 2010; see also figure 9.1). The following year, the government finally launched ePs, but in the face of strong opposition from KFsB it was unable to abolish the existing iTTP until the end of 2006. Assisting Chosŏnjok

Unlike Nikkeijin workers in Japan, Chosŏnjok in Korea did not enjoy preferential treatment with regard to their admission and employment in the country. The result was a large proportion of Chosŏnjok filling the ranks of unauthorized workers, as described earlier. The growing presence of ethnic Koreans from China in Korea’s foreign worker population posed a dilemma for policymakers as well as advocacy groups. on the one hand, preferential treatment would offend Korea’s powerful neighbor to the west (seol and skrentny 2009b). on the other hand, such treatment would

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go against universal principles of equality for all immigrants regardless of ethnicity, nationality, and gender (n. Kim 2008; y. lee 2009). and yet, considering the historical circumstances under which ethnic Koreans fled the peninsula during Japan’s occupation, they drew much sympathy among proimmigrant ngos (H. lee 2010). The humiliation suffered by the Tongp’o (overseas Koreans) of being labeled as illegal workers in Korea was perceived by these ngos, along with Chosŏnjok leaders, as an injustice, and even betrayal, that needed redressing. such ethnonationalistic calls from grassroots organizations carried an emotional appeal for the public that the Korean government tacitly incorporated into its immigration policies, creating a special program in iTTP for Chosŏnjok workers, granting them a larger quota and higher wages than foreign workers of non-Korean ancestry (seol and skrentny 2009b, 154). Further political momentum for preferential treatment of coethnic returnees came in 1998 when the Korean government established the act on the immigration and legal status of overseas Koreans (overseas Koreans act). Hard hit by the asian economic crisis, the government in seoul sought to boost the economy by attracting high-skilled workers and wealthy investors of Korean ancestry from Western countries, mainly the United states. The law, however, excluded coethnics from China (Chosŏnjok) and the former soviet republics (Koryŏin) on the ground that their ancestors had left Korea before the establishment of the republic of Korea in 1948. However, according to seol and skrentny (2009b), the main reason for excluding these two groups from the government’s definition of overseas Koreans was economic. Most Chosŏnjok and Koryŏin were from less developed countries and the majority were unskilled. The low value attached to these less affluent Koreans clearly suggested the “hierarchal nationhood” conceived by the state that ranked Korean americans higher than Chosŏnjok and Koryŏin (seol and skrentny 2009b). The passage of such an exclusionary law outraged Korean ngos and Chosŏnjok leaders, who in turn filed a lawsuit with the supreme Court arguing that the law was discriminatory (n. Kim 2008, 591). outside the court, advocates for coethnic rights protested with demonstrations and hunger strikes. in 2002 the supreme Court ruled the overseas Koreans act unconstitutional, leading to a redefinition of overseas Koreans in 2004. Meanwhile, the controversy over Chosŏnjok and their legal position within the country’s immigration policy attracted increased attention from policymakers. Presidents Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003) and roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) approached the issue from the standpoint of Korean “nationhood,” thus endorsing the “ethnicity card” in forming national policy (n. Kim 2008; H. lee 2010). The result was a gradual expansion of special provisions given only to returning ethnic Koreans, mostly Chosŏnjok. in 2002

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the government created the employment Management system, allowing Chosŏnjok to work for up to two years in such labor-short industries as restaurants, housecleaning, and elder care (seol and skrentny 2009b, 154; H. lee 2010, 577). Three years later, as part of the efforts to reduce the number of unauthorized workers, the government instituted another program aimed exclusively at Chosŏnjok, the voluntary Departure Program. The program, which guaranteed the issuance of a visa allowing recipients to work for up to three years provided they first voluntarily leave Korea and stay abroad for one year, reduced the number of unauthorized Chosŏnjok from about 48,000 in 2004 to 29,000 in 2006 (seol and skrentny 2009b, 157). Finally, in 2007, as part of the latest effort to relax admission and employment regulations for Chosŏnjok in Korea, the government launched the visit and employment system. The new law allowed low-skilled Chosŏnjok to work in select sectors of the service and construction industries for up to three years during a maximum five-year stay in the country (H. lee 2010). The impact of these special programs was significant and immediate. as figure 9.1 shows, the number of coethnics in Korea jumped from 19,000 in 2004 to 84,000 in 2006. With the implementation of the visit and employment system in 2007, the number skyrocketed to 235,000 in that year and to 298,000 the following year. it should be noted, however, that unlike Nikkeijin in Japan, Chosŏnjok in Korea have yet to attain the right to bring their families to Korea. This may be explained by the state’s fear that large numbers of Chosŏnjok might be tempted to stay permanently in Korea if such a privilege is accorded to them (H. lee 2010, 578). Changing Dynamics

From the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, despite strong opposition from business leaders, Korean civil society was highly successful in challenging the state in support of the rights of low-skilled immigrants, as described earlier. Toward the end of the 2000s, however, changes were imminent in advocates’ relations with the government and between themselves. First, the 2004 implementation of ePs and the 2007 legalization of Chosŏnjok employment significantly decreased the number of undocumented workers. as with iTTP, ePs prohibited contract workers from switching jobs upon arrival. Thus for immigrant labor unions and their Korean supporters, ePs was deemed unfair to immigrant workers.2 nonetheless, the fact that ePs showed lower defection rates as compared to iTTP assured the government that it was achieving at least some of its original goals, the foremost being to reduce the number of undocumented workers and 2

My interviews with ngos, including an immigrant worker union, in seoul and Busan in 2009 and 2010.

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to protect workers’ rights while employed in the country. Differing perspectives on and assessments of ePs among proimmigrant ngos generated divisions regarding goals and the methods by which they would be obtained. Controversy over preferential treatment of coethnic immigrants created further tensions among advocates already shaken by internal conflicts (n. Kim 2008). second, the 2007 presidential election brought about a conservative government with a strong bent toward economic development. The new regime ended a decade-long “friendly” state-civic collaboration (1998–2008) that went a long way in promoting immigrant rights. in place of contentious labor issues, the new government expanded multicultural programs designed to integrate increasing numbers of immigrant wives of Korean citizens and their children into Korean society. The shifting demographics of Korea’s immigrant population, combined with increasingly divisive politics among advocates, consequently helped the state realign the country’s immigration policies in favor of the state vis-à-vis civic activists. Japan Controlling the Oldcomers

if Korean civil society is characterized by a confrontational legacy of democratic transition, Japanese civil society constitutes “social capital without advocacy” (Pekkanen 2004a). such low politicization of Japanese civil society can be traced back to Japan’s modernization period. since the early 1900s, immigration has remained part of the national agenda controlled by the state. With the annexation of Taiwan in 1895 and of the Korean Peninsula in 1910, the population of the Japanese empire came to include a high proportion of non-Japanese (oguma 1998). among them, Koreans (the oldcomers) formed the largest immigrant group, approaching two million in 1944 (De vos and lee 1981, 37). Following Japan’s surrender in august 1945, most Koreans repatriated to the peninsula, but about 600,000 chose to remain in Japan. Under the U.s. military occupation, the Japanese government quickly moved to exclude the former colonial citizens from the new Japanese nation. in 1947 the government passed the alien registration ordinance, requiring resident Koreans to register with the state while retaining their Japanese citizenship (shin 2010). in 1952, when Japan gained full independence following the signing of the san Francisco Peace Treaty, the government announced that Koreans had lost their right to membership in Japanese society. in the same year, in order to govern this new “alien” population, the government established the immigration Bureau within the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the main governmental agency in charge of controlling national borders and resident foreigners.

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such historical inequality continues through new institutional arrangements. according to shin (2010), the new immigration agency was staffed with officials who had once served the colonial offices in prewar Korea. These former imperial servants, who constituted a “trust network” within the immigration agency in postwar Japan, were charged with making policies dealing with the country’s former colonial subjects. The result was the MoJ’s adoption and maintenance of highly exclusionary policies throughout the postwar era, denying social rights to resident Koreans and even violating their basic human rights (shin 2010). However, systematic oppression based on shared identity often unites disadvantaged groups, prompting the development of a collective consciousness and a movement for change. in Japan, social movements for ethnic minority rights began in the 1960s and 1970s in tandem with the rise of progressive local politics committed to raising quality of life in the midst of rapid industrialization (Haig 2009). a small but highly assertive group of Japanese-speaking second-generation Koreans rose to claim their rights as local residents in such cities as Kawasaki and osaka, where liberal mayors were open to their demands. at the national level, the compulsory fingerprinting of alien residents highlighted the state insensitivity to ethnic minority rights, drawing sharp criticism and protests from civil rights advocates, including Korean activists. in 1993 heightened opposition pressured the government to finally eliminate the fingerprinting regulation. Taking into account Japan’s ascending status in the international community, gurowitz (1999) argues that international human rights norms, pressed home by Japanese advocates in opposition to the state, played a critical role in the latter’s decision to reconsider its position on ethnic minority rights.3 a unique aspect of Japan’s movement to protect the rights of foreigners, however, is embedded in local politics (Takao 2003). The strong resistance of the national government to the enhancement of ethnic minority rights had long prevented local governments from implementing regional agendas aimed at improving the quality of life for all residents in their respective jurisdictions. But because they were legally responsible for providing public services to all residents regardless of nationality, local governments, along with grassroots groups, including neighborhood associations, took local issues “into their own hands.” While the adoption of a series of international conventions in the 1970s officially lifted sources of social inequality against foreigners at the national level, it was at the local level that “a new 3 as such, Japan’s ratification of a series of international conventions created a watershed in the 1970s and 1980s for the government’s amending unequal provisions in law and exclusionary practices against women, children, and ethnic minorities (Tanaka 1999).

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distribution of power and resources” between the state and citizens allowed foreign residents to participate as community members (Takao 2003, 530). The unique position of local governments as an intermediary often put them at odds with the national government in implementing initiatives intended to expand the rights of foreigners. However, as shown here, in the face of a widening disparity between national policy and local realities, the intermediary position of local governments played a significant role in advocating for the rights of global immigrants in the 1990s and the 2000s. Controlling the Newcomers

as mentioned earlier, a large and diverse population of immigrant workers emerged in Japan during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their demographics, cultures, and relationships with Japan markedly differed from those of the formerly colonial citizens and their descendants. Beginning with Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in the late 1980s and iranians in the early 1990s, the new wave of immigrants (the newcomers) had few historical ties with Japan. Many entered the country on tourist visas, working illegally and overstaying their visas to continue their employment. Few spoke Japanese with any fluency, and a large number were unfamiliar with Japanese ways of life. in response to this influx, in 1990 the Japanese government revised its immigration Control and refugee recognition law to institute three major changes affecting unskilled labor. First, the law confirmed the state’s stance against employment of unskilled foreigners, defining such employment as a criminal offense. second, it created a new long-term residence visa for foreign nationals of Japanese ancestry (or Nikkeijin) up to the third generation, allowing them to enter and reside in the country with few restrictions. Third, the law also created a new visa category for industrial trainees. in the same year, the government instituted a new industrial Trainee system (iTs, Sangyō kenshūsei seido), permitting foreign trainees to receive on-the-job training for two years in companies with less than fifty employees. Because the trainees were not defined as workers, they were conventionally paid below-market wages and were not protected under the labor standard law (Kawakami 2009).4 in 1993, the government enacted the Technical Practical Trainee system (TPTs, Ginō jisshūsei seido), which stipulated that, upon completion of one year’s training, trainees would engage in job performance for their second year, this time under the protection of the labor standard law. in 1997, the period of technical practical training was extended to two years, thus permitting trainees to work for up to three years. 4

The labor standard law is applied to all workers regardless of nationality.

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Figure 9.2 Number of Low-Skilled Foreign Workers in Japan, 1992–2009 400,000

350,000

300,000 Visa Overstayers Nikkeijin (Brazilians, Peruvians)

250,000

Industrial Trainees

Number of Workers

Pre-College Students Entertainers

200,000

150,000

100,000

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0 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008

Year Source: H. Lee 2010

Due to Japan’s sluggish economy throughout the 1990s and 2000s, labor demand for foreign workers fluctuated greatly. However, the number of Nikkeijin (most from Brazil and, fewer, from Peru) continued to increase, surpassing 300,000 in the year 2000 and reaching 377,000 by the end of 2007 (see figure 9.2). Most Nikkeijin were hired by labor brokers as temporary workers and were sent to small-scale factories to assemble machinery parts (Higuchi and Tanno 2003). in sharp contrast to the rapidly increasing number of Nikkeijin, the number of unauthorized workers decreased steadily during the same period, especially after 2001 and the terrorist attack on new york’s World Trade Center. Thereafter, Japanese authorities strengthened law enforcement against foreigners deemed to be “criminal” or potential “terrorist” threats, causing their numbers to dwindle from 252,000 in the year 2000 to less than 200,000 in 2006. The same period witnessed a rapid increase in industrial trainees (two-thirds of whom were Chinese), with their numbers nearly doubling from 36,000 in 2000 to 71,000 in 2006. Because employers often allowed industrial trainees to engage in actual job performance, immigrant rights advocates called them “workers in disguise” (gaikokujin Kenshusei Mondai network 2000). in

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the labor–short service industries, foreign students, most of whom were Chinese and enrolled in Japanese-language school, worked legally as part-timers to support their student life in Japan. similarly, professional entertainers were admitted to sing and dance, but many of them, mostly from the Philippines, ended up working as hostesses in bars and clubs. Assisting the Newcomers

although opening Japan’s “side doors” to increasing numbers of Nikkeijin and industrial trainees, the 1990 revised law did not address the rights of these newcomers as residents or workers. in the absence of legal protections, these foreign workers frequently encountered inequality based on their nationality, immigrant status, and gender. immigrants in need of assistance, including the majority of Nikkeijin who did not speak fluent Japanese, sought help with local administrations and grassroots groups, usually civic groups known for philanthropy, such as the Catholic Church and community labor unions (roberts 2003; shipper 2008; Haig 2009). as migrant workers’ numbers increased, Japanese grassroots activists—socially conscientious citizens, such as religious leaders, labor unionists, social workers, and other professionals—became aware of the urgency and gravity of problems facing immigrants. in order to effectively aid these newcomers, citizen activists formed informal organizations, drawing on previous volunteer experience and existing networks (shipper 2008). But while these groups were highly dedicated to their cause, a combination of limited memberships (usually less than fifty) and narrow geographic reach, as well as a shortage of funding, seriously undermined their ability to help immigrants (Pekkanen 2006). Consequently, most tended to concentrate their efforts on providing services such as language classes and cultural programs, and solving relatively simple individual problems. some community-based labor unions provided legal consultation indispensable for unauthorized workers who experienced labor rights violations, such as unpaid wages and industrial accidents (roberts 2003; shipper 2008; Urano and stewart 2007). Toward the end of the 1990s, recognizing the importance of collective action beyond their localities, loosely connected citizens’ groups began coordinating efforts and resources toward the development of systematic strategies and lobbying of national leaders (Milly 2006, 134–135). in 1997, they established the national network in support of Migrant Workers (Ijū rōdōsha to rentai suru zenkoku nettowaku, commonly called Ijuren), dedicated to projecting their agenda directly onto the national political scene, networking policy-specific expertise, and exchanging information on local implementation practices (okamoto 2004). Two years later, an offshoot of this national advocacy network began consolidating support

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for increasing numbers of industrial trainees. Because they were not recognized as workers, industrial trainees were frequently exposed to serious labor abuses and human rights violations at the hands of employers. activists with the Foreign industrial Trainee Problems network (Gaikokujin kenshusei mondai netowarku) brought some of the more extreme cases to the local court, thus sending a strong message to abusive employers and the state, which allowed such exploitation to continue (ibusuki 2009). over the years, as immigrant rights’ advocates became familiar with administrative procedures in relevant ministries and grew increasingly sophisticated in employing policy expertise, they succeeded in making inroads through regular negotiations with, and mediating among, various national agencies (e.g., ijuren 2011). However, in Milly’s assessment (2006, 148), despite some incremental positive outcomes, on the whole, advocates’ efforts have not been successful in bringing about major changes in governmental policies regarding immigrants’ rights. Integrating the Newcomers

according to Pekkanen (2006), Japan’s civil society is characterized by its dual structure. on the one hand, large numbers of Japanese citizens belong to voluntary organizations, such as neighborhood associations, that aim to raise social capital. on the other hand, very few participate in advocacy organizations intended to bring about social change. This duality is primarily a result of Japan’s “regulatory framework,” by which civil society is rigidly controlled by the bureaucracy (Pekkanen 2006). The 1998 passage of the special nonprofit activities law relaxed many restrictions for some types of nonprofit organizations. However, laws governing formal civil groups granted the bureaucracy enormous power to monitor and sanction their formation, finances and public activities (Pekkanen 2000, 2004b, 369). as a result, independent activist groups view the government with a high degree of suspicion, while the government rarely regards them as equal participants in policymaking (e.g., Flower 2008). in this asymmetrical balance of power between the government and civil society, it has been the national government that, almost singlehandedly, makes decisions regarding major national agenda items, including immigration. However, in the face of an increasing gap between national policy and local realities, new actors emerged by the early 2000s that included mayors and municipal bureaucrats from industrial cities where large numbers of newcomers, mostly Nikkeijin, and their families were settled. in the early 1990s, a sudden and large influx of newcomers imposed serious administrative and financial difficulties on the municipal administrations of industrial cities where they settled. Unlike the governments of Kawasaki and osaka, which had hosted the oldcomers for decades,

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governments of the cities that received newcomers, such as Hamamatsu and Toyota, had no experience managing large and distinct immigrant populations within their jurisdictions. Upon receiving the newcomers, however, these municipal administrations responded with their own innovative programs, offering assistance in the areas of language, health, housing, education, and welfare (e.g., Tegtmeyer Pak 2003; yamanaka 2006; Haig 2009). But despite the administrations’ good intentions, many of the programs failed or were discontinued before they had a chance to succeed. This was because local administrations lacked not only the authority to make decisions about immigrants, but also the financial support to continue programs designed to assist them. local governments, therefore, relied heavily on temporary funding and volunteer participation to implement special programs for immigrants. recognizing the limitations of individual initiatives, in 2001 thirteen mayors of cities with large newcomer populations formed a council with the intent of submitting a collective appeal to the national government for administrative reform (Haig 2009, 127). since its inauguration, the Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign residents (CCHCFr; Gaikokujin shūjū toshi kaigi) has facilitated the exchange of information and the sharing of experience between member cities, helping to develop alternative policy proposals with which to press the national government for change.5 These mayors and their deputies, because of their connections with officials in relevant ministries, were able to deliver their demands directly to national policy-makers. They have thus become “the de facto voice on immigrant integration in central policymaking circles” (Haig 2009, 129). over the years, their efforts have yielded some positive results. in 2006, after one year’s research by a special committee, the Ministry of internal affairs and Communications (MiC) announced the Plan for the Promotion of Multicultural Community Building, intended to provide a framework for local governments to create independent measures to integrate newcomers into their local communities. The plan’s central concept, “multicultural coexistence (tabunka kyosei) with foreigners,” reflected the overarching idea and slogan that many local administrations had been promoting for years before gaining official recognition by the MiC. since then, many national agencies have proposed their own programs, thus participating in the national debate regarding the integration of newcomers (roberts 2008; Tai 2009). However, an unfortunate turn of events in international affairs suddenly halted Japan’s nascent efforts to establish a new direction in its 5

as of 2010, a total of twenty-eight cities belonged to the CCHCFr.

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immigration policies. in the fall of 2008, an economic crisis that began in the United states swept across Japan, causing massive unemployment among workers in the export-oriented manufacturing industry. The negative impact of this recession was far greater on foreigners than on Japanese citizens. among Nikkeijin workers, unemployment was estimated at more than 40 percent, whereas that for indigenous Japanese workers hovered somewhere around 5 percent (Higuchi 2009). as a result, many Nikkeijin left Japan, triggering a sharp plunge in their numbers from 377,000 in 2007 to 325,000 in 2009 (see figure 9.2). similarly, the number of visa overstayers decreased from 150,000 in 2008 to 92,000 in 2009, while industrial trainees dropped from 87,000 to 65,000. Facing larger numbers of unemployed, and therefore impoverished, Nikkeijin workers and their families, the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and labor announced in 2009 that it would offer a lump sum payment to subsidize the return of Nikkeijin to their home countries on the condition that they stay abroad for the ensuing three to five years (san Francisco Chronicle 2009). in my own research in Toyota and Hamamatsu in early 2010, i found that the majority of Nikkeijin workers were still unemployed and increasingly impoverished as they lost income and housing (yamanaka 2010b). in response, municipal administrations organized a task force to assist those unemployed through limited job creation and housing development. However, participants in such efforts involved mostly small numbers of committed Japanese grassroots groups, working to help impoverished immigrant families in their daily lives by running food drives, negotiating with local administrations for public housing, and helping unemployed foreigners fill out application forms for unemployment insurance and social welfare programs. Conclusion The account here of the processes and dynamics behind state and civil society efforts in expanding immigrant rights in Korea and Japan elucidates many political factors at work in each country over the last two decades. Both Korea and Japan implemented similar low-skilled immigration programs aimed at economic growth. These programs utilized inexpensive labor supplied by unauthorized workers, contract workers, and returning coethnics from abroad. However, differing paths toward nation building and the roles played by civil society groups in the nation-building process gave rise to contrasting dynamics between key actors in each country, with the end result being the creation of similar policies. For Korea, the country’s recent democratic transition allowed civil society to challenge the state’s adoption of policies hostile to immigrant

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workers. Meanwhile, the large presence of undocumented workers prompted the state to reform its policies in the early to mid-2000s. in this process, proimmigrant groups, including immigrants themselves, were highly contentious, challenging the state to adopt more inclusive policies. The fact that coethnics from China were initially denied protection motivated some ngo leaders to throw themselves into the fight for immigrant rights. Tacitly combining ethnonationalism with economic rationality, the Korean government approved special treatment for Chosŏnjok, legalizing their employment in economic sectors suffering from severe labor shortages. in Japan, exclusionary policies aimed at controlling former colonial citizens and their descendants continue to shape state policy regarding newcomers, including coethnics from latin america. Japan’s immigration law governs national borders and foreign residents, but does not refer to their rights as workers and residents. Nikkeijin workers and their families enjoy many privileges unavailable to immigrant workers of non-Japanese ancestry. Their increasing numbers and lack of access to basic public services, however, prompted municipal administrations to initiate their own integration programs with the collaboration of grassroots organizations. in the absence of effective advocacy groups, it has been the association of these local governments that succeeded in winning the attention of the national government to the mounting problems that they and their foreign residents face. The present study comparing Korea and Japan highlights the importance of historical and political factors specific to each country that nevertheless have resulted in similar immigration policies. given the highly restrictive policies employed by countries of immigration in the region, future studies must sort out converging and diverging factors that allow such policies to remain in place. Acknowledgment

i thank Peter schurmann for his useful comments on the first draft of this article. References alagappa, Muthiah. 2004. Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. Cornelius, Wayne a., Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip l. Marti, and James F. Hollifield, eds. 2004. Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, 2nd ed. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press, 2004.

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De vos, george, and Changsoo lee. 1981. “The Colonial experience, 1910–1945.” in Koreans in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation, edited by george De vos and Changsoo lee, 31–57. Berkeley: University of California Press. Flower, P. r. 2008. “Failure to Protect refugees? Domestic institutions, international organizations, and Civil society in Japan.” Journal of Japanese Studies 34:333–361. Freeman, gary P. 1995. “Modes of immigration Politics in liberal Democratic states.” International Migration Review 24, no. 4:881–902. gaikokujin Kenshusei Mondai network. 2000. Mayakashino gaikokujin kenshu seido [Foreign trainee system in disguise]. Tokyo: gendai Jinbunsha. gurowtiz, amy. 1999. “Mobilizing international norms: Domestic actors, immigrants, and the Japanese state.” World Politics 51, no. 3:413–445. Haig, Ken. 2009. National Aliens, Local Citizens: The Politics of Immigrant Integration in Japan in a Comparative Perspective. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley. Higuchi, naoto. 2009. “Mass Unemployment of Japanese latin americans as a Disaster Made by Humans: The Consequences of labour-Market Flexibilisation during the economic Crisis in Japan.” available at www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/non_ WP_pdfs/events_2009/annual_Conference/g_Higuchi_Mass%20 Unemplyment%20of%20Japanese%20latin%20americans.pdf. Higuchi, naoto, and Kiyoto Tanno. 2003. “What’s Driving Brazil-Japan Migration? The Making and remaking of the Brazilian niche in Japan.” International Journal of Japanese Sociology 12:33–47. ibusuki shoichi. 2009. “gaikokujin kenshusei seido wo meguru saiban to sono soten” [lawsuits regarding the foreign trainee system and their conflicts]. in Gaikokujin kenshusei: Jikyu 300 yen no rodosha, 2 [Foreign trainees: Workers paid 300 yen per hour, 2], edited by gaikokujin Kenshuse Kenri network. Tokyo: akashi shoten. ijuren. 2011. “shocho kosho 2010” [negotiation with ministries]. Migrants Network 136 (January). Tokyo: ijuren. Japanese Ministry of Justice. avaiable at www.moj.go.jp/Press (retrieved 1 october 2010). Joppke, Christian. 1998. “Why liberal states accept Unwanted immigration.” World Politics 50 (January):266–293. Kawakami sonoko. 2009. “Seido sousetsu kara 15 nen, genkyo to mondaiten” [Fifteen years since the inauguration of the system]. in Gaikokujin kenshusei: Jikyu 300 yen no rodosha, 2 [Foreign trainees: Workers paid

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300 yen per hour, 2], edited by gaikokujin Kenshusei Kenri network. Tokyo: akashi shoten. Kim, nora Hui-Jung. “Korean immigration Policy Changes and the Political liberals’ Dilemma.” International Migration Review 42, no. 3:576–596. Kim, sunhyuk. 2004. “south Korea: Confrontational legacy and Democratic Contributions.” in Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, edited by Muthiah alagappa, 138–163. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. ———. 2007. “Civil society and Democratization in south Korea.” in Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State, 2nd ed., edited by Charles K. armstrong, 53–71. london: routledge. Kim, Woo-seon. “Human rights Discourse and Culture in the social Movement for immigrant Workers in south Korea.” available at www.calstatela.edu/centers/ckaks/kmc_papers.htm (retrieved 1 november 2005). ———. 2007. Church and Civil Society in Korea after Democratization: The NGO’s Activism for Migrant Workers. Ph.D. diss., University of California, san Diego. lee Heyjin. 2010. “Kankoku ni okeru hiseiki tairyusha to ‘gohoka’ wo meguru genjyo” [The present status surrounding unauthorized stayers and ‘normalization’ in south Korea]. in Hiseiki taizaisha to zairyu tokubetsu kyoka: Ijushatachino kako, genzai, mirai [irregular stayers and the special residence permit: The past, present, and future of the immigrants], edited by Kondo atsushi, shiobara yoshikazu, and suzuki eriko, 201–230. Tokyo: nihon Hyoronsha. lee, Hye-Kyung. 1997. “The employment of Foreign Workers in Korea: issues and Policy suggestion,” International Sociology 12, no. 3:353–371. ———. 2005. “The Korean Diaspora and its impact on Korea’s Development.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 14, no. 1–2:149–168. ———. 2010. “Preference for Co-ethnic groups in Korean immigration Policy: a Case in ethnic nationalism?” Korea Observer 41, no. 4:559–591. lee, namhee. 2007. The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea. ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press. lee, yoonkyung. 2009. “Migration, Migrants, and Contested ethnonationalism in Korea.” Critical Asian Studies 41, no. 3:363–380. lee, y. W., and H. Park. 2005. “The Politics of Foreign labor Policy in Korea and Japan.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 35:143–162. lim, Timothy C. 1999. “The Fight for equal rights: The Power of Foreign Workers in south Korea.” Alternatives 24:329–359.

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———. 2006. “ngos, Transnational Migrants, and the Promotion of rights in south Korea.” in Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective, edited by Takeyuki Tsuda, 235–269. lanham, MD: lexington Books. Milly, Deborah. 2006. “Policy advocacy for Foreign residents in Japan.” in Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective, edited by Takeyuki Tsuda, 123–151. lanham, MD: lexington Books. oguma, eiji. 1998. Nihonjin no kyokai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chosen, shokuminchi shiahi kara fukki unodo made [The boundary of Japanese: okinawa, ainu, Taiwan, Chosen, from colonial occupation to restoration movement]. Tokyo: shinyosha. okamoto, Masataka. 2004. “ijuren no koremade to korekara” [The past and future of ijuren]. M-Netto 73:2–21. Pekkanen, robert. 2000. “Japan’s new Politics: The Case of the nPo law.” Journal of Japanese Studies 26, no. 1:111–143. ———. 2004a. “Japan: social Capital without advocacy.” in Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, edited by Muthiah alagappa, 223–255. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. ———. 2004b. “after the Developmental state: Civil society in Japan.” Journal of East Asia Studies 4, no. 3:363–388. ———. 2006. Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. roberts, glenda s. 2003. “ngo support for Migrant labor in Japan.” in Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society, edited by Mike Douglass and glenda s. roberts, 275–300. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press. ———. 2008. “immigration Policy: Frameworks and Challenges.” in The Demographic Challenges: A Handbook about Japan, edited by Florian Coulmas, Harald Conrad, annette schad-seifert, and gabrielle vogt, 765–779. leiden: Brill, 2008. san Francisco Chronicle. 2009. “Japan: Foreign Workers offered Plane Trip Home.” april 9, a2. seol, Dong-Hoon, and John D. skrentny. 2004. “south Korea: importing Undocumented Workers.” in Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, 2nd ed., edited by Wayne a. Cornelius et al., 481–513. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. ———. 2009a. “Why is There so little Migrant settlement in east asia?” International Migration Review 43, no. 3:578–620.

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———. 2009b. “ethnic return Migration and Hierarchical nationhood: Korean Chinese Foreign Workers in south Korea,” Ethnicities 9:147–174. shin, Hwaji. 2010. “Colonial legacy of ethno-racial inequality in Japan.” Theory and Society 39, no. 3/4:327–342. shipper, apichai W. 2008. Fighting or Foreigners: Immigration and Its Impact on Japanese Democracy. ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press. skrentny, John, stephanie Chan, Jon e. Fox, and Denis Kim. 2009. “Defining nations in asia and europe: a Comparative analysis of ethnic return Migration Policy.” in Diasporic Homecoming: Ethnic Return Migration in Comparative Perspective, edited by T. Tsuda, 44–72. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. Tai, eika. 2009. “Japanese immigration Policy at a Turning Point.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 18, no. 3:315–344. Takao, yasuo. 2003. “Foreigners’ rights in Japan: Beneficiaries to Participants.” Asian Survey 43, no. 3:527–552. Tanaka, Hiroshi. 1999. Zainichi gaikokujin: Ho no kabe, kokoro no mizo [resident foreigners: legal barriers and cleavage in mind]. new edition. iwanami shinsho 370. Tokyo: iwanami shoten. Tegtmeyer Pak, Katherine. 2003. “Foreigners are local Citizens, Too: local governments respond to international Migration in Japan.” in Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society, edited by Mike Douglass and glenda s. roberts, 244–274. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press. Urano, edson, and Paul stewart. 2007. “including the excluded Workers? The Challenges of Japan’s Kanagawa City Union.” Journal of Labor and Society 10 (March): 103–123. yamanaka, Keiko. 2006. “immigrant incorporation and Women’s Community activities in Japan: local ngos and Public education for immigrant Children.” in Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective, edited by Takeyuki Tsuda, 97–119. lanham, MD: lexington Books. ———. 2010a. “Civil society and social Movements for immigrant rights in Japan and south Korea: Convergence and Divergence in Unskilled immigration Policy.” Korea Observer 41, no. 4:615–647. ———. 2010b. “economic Crisis, Policies and Civil society To assist Unemployed latin american immigrant Workers in Central Japan.” Paper presented at “Multiculturalism in Japan? immigration, Citizenship and nation in the age of globalization.” stanford University, 23 april. ———. 2011. “Policies, Civil society and social Movements for immigrant rights in Japan and south Korea: Convergence and

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Divergence.” in Migration to Japan in Comparative Perspectives, edited by glenda roberts and gabriele vogt, 89–108. Munich: iudicium. yamanaka, Keiko, and nicola Piper. 2005. Feminized Migration in East and Southeast Asia: Policies, Actions and Empowerment. Occasional paper 11. geneva: United nations research institute for social Development. yamanaka, Keiko, and Woo-seon Kim. 2008. “Civil activism and immigration Policy in Japan and south Korea.” Paper presented at the international Conference on global Migration and Multiculturalism in east asia. Korea University, seoul, 7–8 november.

Part iii. Diversifying Korea

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race-ing toward the real south Korea The Cases of Black-Korean Nationals and African Migrants

naDia y. KiM

although students of south Korean multiculturalism have laudably given voice to the many non-Koreans who live in a country known, until recently, for its ardent self-image as tanil minjok (a monoethnic people), two voices i present here are often muted in the literature. one is of Black-Korean singer insooni (insuni)—arguably one of the nation’s most respected, beloved, and longest-lasting entertainers—and the other is of an african migrant, a de facto community leader of the growing group of nigerians who call seoul home. says insooni at a 2006 summer retreat for the country’s multiracial children, who daily suffer the indignities of oppression and discrimination: “you must work harder than any Korean. . . . you know why i am what i am? Because i work harder” (Kirk 2006). says the nigerian community leader in response to the question of why his coethnics (and other africans) are moving out of seoul: “Just because we are nigerians we are asked to pay the security deposit twice as big as the one other nationals pay” (H. lee 2010). Why are such struggles absent in most studies of minority populations in the republic of Korea (roK), those that led to the moniker “multicultural society?” and why do insooni and the nigerian community leader not sound like those who live in a self-proclaimed multicultural country? What can we learn from the social locations and the “subaltern-speak” of the Black Koreans themselves to gain intellectual traction on how they are treated by the south Korean nation-state and how they interpret and act in response?1 These are the signal questions that inspired the writing of this 1 although i understand why scholars of Korean studies, including those in this volume, use the term “amerasian” to include the Black-Korean offspring of at least one U.s. military parent, i eschew the term altogether. although language is partial and imperfect in every

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critical review. The body of work on south Korean multiculturalism has, in my view, been very timely, well-researched, and theoretically rich. The contributions to the present volume are certainly testament. Credit must first be given to those who study a civil society that changes as quickly as its dizzying fashion trends. once mired in the various dimensions of a self-described single-blood society (touted as one of the most monoethnic in the world), now scholars must scramble to make sense of a south Korea proudly touting itself as a multicultural nation, seemingly overnight, with the state on the loudest sound horn. Despite the daunting task, researchers on south Korean multiculturalism have trenchantly captured its underbelly. Beyond casting into relief government-made and -sponsored inequities mystified by Kumbaya-like mantras (H. Choe 2007; g. Han 2007), studies have addressed how the state has prioritized the cultural assimilation of the migrant wives of the “unmarriageable” rural Korean farmers (H. J. Kim 2009). Multiculturalism, then, Hui-Jung Kim argues (2009, this volume chap. 3), has been about addressing the country’s urgent need for people—given a rapidly aging society and the lowest birth rate in the developed world—and a desire to show moral progress to the advanced Western states. That is, the state is engaging in a new form of nation building by using old tactics: redrawing its boundaries by preserving the traditional Korean family, the bedrock of the national family, on the backs of impoverished vietnamese, Filipina, and other migrant women (H. J. Kim 2009). Therefore, although the women mastering han’guk mal (the Korean language), kimchi preparation, and obedience to mothers-in-law are oftdistilled into tropes about what is best for them or into depoliticized multicultural festivals, such acts uphold hegemony. The state and many ngos and promigrant activists therefore do not define and enact multiculturalism as pluralistic equality of all groups (H. J. Kim 2009; see H. s. Kim 2006), be they child-bearing and culture-carrying wives or the ethnic Chinese or single Muslim men. in this chapter i do not contest these arguments about the state. i am rather critiquing an omission in the scholarship. in part because of state policy, much of the existing literature focuses on these female marriage migrants or the asian labor migrants to whom the state has granted legal status as “industrial trainees” (g. Han 2003), with particular attention to the Chosŏnjok (ethnic Koreans from China) and the Hwagyo (ethnic Chinese in Korea).2 respect, “amerasian” privileges the american status, de-ethnicizes the Korean status, and excludes those who are not part-american, not a military descendant, and/or are born of a Black mother. 2 of course, exceptions exist, such as a study by Kim and Kang (2007) on seoul’s new ethnic residential and social concentrations, which provides an equal look at the islamic (Bangladeshi, indonesian), Mongol, Japanese, Filipino, French, and italian communities.

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i argue in this critical review of the literature, however, that few include or examine the Black-descent populations on the peninsula—namely, the multiracial children of military couplings or the african migrants—in their research on south Korean multiculturalism.3 The dearth of works on part-Black multiracial children is unexpected in light of superbowl Xl MvP Hines Ward’s 2006 visit, which was widely seen as the opening salvo on a multicultural south Korean future. While other Korean children who looked like Ward continued to be segregated and excluded on the peninsula, President roh Moo-hyun and others down the pecking order embraced Ward as a prodigal Korean son, all despite Ward’s public censure of discrimination against children like him. i see part of the reason for the omission in multicultural works as the state’s and ngos’ influence in defining who indeed are the nation’s “multicultural citizens” (see Kymlicka 1995). But what of the Black-Korean multiracial individuals, most of whom have long called the peninsula home? By focusing this essay partly on the Black-descent multiracial children i do not imply that those Koreans with White, latino, or tribal ancestry—or those who are “Kosian” (with Korean and other asian parentage)—are central to roK multiculturalism or to debates in the academic literature; nor would i argue that they are treated as the equals of “pure” Han-blood Koreans. These “mixed-blood” offspring (derided as t’wigi), who are the embodied markers of much of south Korea’s ambivalence toward U.s. (neo)imperial rule, have never seen equality, nor does it appear to be in the offing in the near future.4 Children with Black ancestry, however, are on the bottom of this multiracial social order. Furthermore, the roK government’s designations of who is legal may be influencing scholarship, as most african labor migrants are undocumented by government design. in overlooking the vulnerable african migrant population, however, we inadvertently reify the country’s belief that Blacks are the most biologically and culturally different (see Cho and Faiola 2006) and perpetuate the relative “closeness” and state “privileging” of diasporic Koreans, 3

some studies of the mixed-race Korean population have been done (e.g., K. Han 1994). even the recent craze in Korean popular culture for Korean-White actors lee yoo-jin, Daniel Henney, Dennis oh, Julien Kang, and sean richard does not mean full equality, as actress lee yoo-jin (and her agency) had hidden her White ancestry until government papers revealed otherwise, and she admitted at a press conference through shameful tears her “transgression.” Much of the public viewed her differently thereafter and was outraged (sung 2010; gage chap. 11 this volume). in addition, the girl group Chocolat, ironically named, consists of a majority of Korean-White biracial singers but has enjoyed moderate success, although Kolleen Park has gained notoriety as a Korean-White musical director, conductor, actress, and judge on Korea’s Got Talent. Few Korean-White people, however, rank in the top echelons of, the government, military, corporations, academe, the medical and legal fields, and the like. 4

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asians from the Pacific region, and lighter-skinned people who themselves endure inequality. The relegation of part-Black Koreans to the bottom of the multiracial order and of africans to the lowest migrant rung is in part the result of Korea’s profound influence by euro-american and Japanese imperialist hierarchies of whiteness over blackness (Han 2003), themselves tied to economic development and social-class statuses (n. Kim 2008; see lie 1998). anti-Black discrimination also flows from internal class–skin color social orders and Korea’s desire to compensate for, and erase, reminders of the U.s. (patriarchal) dominance in their country, a superpower about which they are ambivalent, and their past as a “nothing” third world country (n. Kim 2008). if we indirectly reify such societal ideologies by not questioning who Korean multiculturals are and, in turn, how they should be treated, we will continue to overlook those who languish in the shadows, including the lesser known Middle eastern and south asian labor migrants. Middle eastern and south asian migrant workers, however, at least have been mentioned or addressed (Kim and Kang 2007; s. Choe 2009), in part because of the growing islamic community who frequent the mosque in it’aewŏn (Kim and Kang 2007) and the small number of Koreans (mostly women) who have married south asians (s. Choe 2009). The New York Times also used an indian male professor’s encounters with blatant prejudice as the leitmotif for a story on the country’s broader struggles with race (s. Choe 2009).5 i have yet to find, however, such attention to the african migrant community on the peninsula (see g. Han 2003 for exceptions). although our focus may be steered by south Korean society’s navigation of racial/ethnic diversity, i contend that the principal reason for the omission is our insufficient use of the explicit and conceptual language of “race” and “racism” in our analyses. Certainly, race and race-based criteria are implied or mentioned in scholars’ treatises on Korean blood nationalism in the context of multiculturalism. given prominence in the word “multicultural” itself, the association of “culture” and cultural diversity with new immigration is not surprising or uncommon, nor is the focus on ethnicity or ethnonationality. in fact, Han (2007) finds that multiculturalism is a ruse for multiethnicism in that it does not fundamentally change the stricture of monoethnicity. it is likewise not surprising that we often use ethnicity and race interchangeably, following Korea’s rare differentiation between the two (shin 2007; n. Kim 2009). in fact, many students 5 indeed, there is evidence of discrimination against non-Korean professors, as they are often left out of faculty meetings for lack of Korean language skills and out of decision making for lack of Korean cultural literacy (Mcneill 2011).

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of south Korean multiculturalism have emphasized the futility of a truly diverse society if this lack of differentiation persists (H. Choe 2007, 2008; g. Han 2007, 2008; see Kang 2008). To be sure, Korea’s single-blood nationalism crystallized in resistance to colonial Japan (shin 2007) and later to the United states (n. Kim 2008). and, to be sure, in scholarly conceptualizations of the two category systems, there is overlap. ethnicity, however, is generally regarded as a cultural phenomenon grounded in shared national origins, history, language, and the like, while race is defined by biological, heritable characteristics like blood, genotype, and phenotype (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; see omi and Winant 1994). gi-wook shin (2007) argues that Korean society in fact distinguished between the two historically: race “served as a marker that strengthened ethnic identity, which in turn was instrumental in defining the notion of nation” (see also robinson 1988; shin 1998; schmid 2002). since in the Korean imagination being Korean in body rarely has been extricated from being Korean in practice—such as speaking the language, knowing the history, and enacting Confucian norms like filial piety—Koreanness is called into question if both cannot be taken for granted (n. Kim 2009). But, just as Koreans have differentiated between race and ethnicity in the past, human populations operating within matrices of domination (Collins 2000) do not manage well with neat social categorization. given the power of context, the coupling of biology and culture do not always make the best marriage. For instance, south Korean society traditionally has categorized the world into three encompassing “races”: White, Black, and yellow. yet, while many south Koreans learn to see their east asian neighbors (Japanese, Chinese) as distinct biological races, at other times, they are conditioned to subsume them all under the “yellow race” (hwang saek injong). rarely does a hybrid race get considered (gage, chap. 11) or split off into a fourth race. at times, the distinctiveness of nonKorean migrants’ bloodlines, hence cultures, are cast into relief; at other times, it is their cultural closeness that is emphasized. even under south Korea’s biologized ethos, then, race and ethnonationality are not always coterminous. Most importantly, i contend that if minorities in a fiercely nationalist state are being grouped and treated, often in life-threatening ways, on the basis of racial criteria (e.g., blood line), yet are increasingly couched in the language of culture (e.g., cultural assimilation) per the new multiculturalism (lim, chap. 2; n. H. Kim, chap. 3; e. Kim, chap. 8), then scholars are inadvertently helping the state’s self-interested projects. academe becomes implicated in the production of Han Korean dominance, one that depends on economically enriching the “pure-bloods” by relegating the foreign- and darker-looking people to the lowest-status,

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lowest-paying jobs. in recasting south Korean multiculturalism, then, we should use the language of race per the Western colonial construction, or adopt more integrated concepts like ethnoracial (see Barth 1998). We should also jettison sole usage of the term “multicultural” to employ the language of “multiracialism,” referring to the various racialized groups who call south Korea home (e.g., nigerians, vietnamese, iraqis) as well as peoples of multiple racialized backgrounds whose phenotype cannot be singularly categorized (e.g., Black Koreans). Using race as an analytic category also forces us to study groups with whom Han Korea cannot easily claim biological or cultural commonality or hold up as paragons of a gradual egalitarian society under multiculturalism: african migrants. it allows us to name the roK state’s refusal to grant african migrant workers legal “industrial trainee” status as racism and ethnoracism, not just ethnic nationalism. in this vein, we would conceptualize the state as a thoroughly racialized and racializing (omi and Winant 1994; goldberg 2002) system and interpret the following bold conclusion by Janet Mintzer, president of Pearl s. Buck international, in such a manner. as president of a foundation that champions child victims of race discrimination, she states publicly: “My impression is that there is more discrimination against amerasians in south Korea than anywhere else in asia and that it has not improved significantly” (Demick 2004). i seek to make an initial intervention here by reviewing existing information on groups that do not fit into a narrative of the welcomed migrant global village in wealthy south Korea: (1) the multiracial children of Koreans and Black U.s. soldiers, and (2) african migrants. Their voices are significant as they, too, force cracks in the legitimacy of, and betray the motivation behind, the cause célèbre of a multicultural south Korea. Drawing on journalistic articles and internet websites and blogs (most of which include interviews), as well as extant multicultural scholarship and the little research on either population, i provide background information on Black-Korean residents (of which there is a substantial amount journalistically) and african migrants (of which there is little in any form). i also address the main issue of how both groups are aware of, and experience, racialization processes and racism vis-à-vis the multicultural explosion. Here, the dearth of academic research on Black-Korean multiracial residents led to my reliance on biographical information on public figures—namely, singers and athletes—and on sue-Je gage’s contribution to this volume to piece together an analysis. overall, i find that despite Black Koreans’ and african migrants’ endless tales of identity crises, rejection, dejection, struggles for justice, threadbare survival (for some), and doubts about the multiculturalness of south Korea, they still consider it home, or count it as one of two. such a DuBoisian double consciousness

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shows in the sizable contingent who choose not to go to the United states even when they have the opportunity to do so; who find that their U.s. experiences, even for school, are not ideal or do not match the romanticized ideal; and who resign themselves to living in Korea without a strong collective movement to represent their voice in nonpolitically correct, unapologetic terms (gage, chap. 11). such a double consciousness makes ever more pressing scholars’ task of including both groups in the multicultural population, analyzing their social stations vis-à-vis the multicultural explosion, and proffering policy prescriptions to realize equality and justice for all who cannot make a life in Korea because of how they look. Theoretical and Contextual Background “Even Though We’re Not the USA, Remember, Our Homeland is Korea, Not Africa”

in my book Imperial Citizens: Koreans and Race from Seoul to LA (2008) i found that much of Korean society’s views of whiteness over blackness prior to america’s post–World War ii advent were profoundly shaped by a confluence of interrelated factors.6 They included a local as well as Japanese folk valorization of the color white and distaste for the color black, an agrarian order premised on such gradations of skin color, Confucianist notions of natural and obligatory inequalities between groups, biological constructions of nations since the enlightenment, previous encounters with elite Whites but not elite Blacks, a scattered introduction of euroamerican racial ideologies under Japanese colonial rule, and a lack of antiracist movements in the country’s history (notwithstanding those against racialized national oppression, like Japanese colonization). Taken together, these dynamic factors primed Koreans for the White-over-Black institutional order imported by the U.s. military beginning in 1945. specifically, Whites’ justification of african enslavement and Black segregation on the basis of racial inferiority helped affirmed to Koreans Black people’s “inferior” ethnonational blood line, one they traced to an african national family. in this way, the congruence across Korean and american ideologies was, and remains, striking. The story of anti-Black ethnoracism, however, does not end with this congruence. it is also fundamentally about how Korean society’s penchant for consanguinity serves as a symbolic point of resistance against U.s. (neo)imperialist power and its pollution of Koreans’ once “pure blood” and the culture that attends it. as such, the more Han Korea can compensate by ignoring, stamping out, and impoverishing the evidence—that 6

Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this and the following paragraph comes from n. Kim (2008), especially chapter 4.

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is, the multiracial children—the less inferior and subjugated they feel. Discrimination against the offspring of a mostly american male–Korean female sexual relationship is also about patriarchal nationalism: Korean women are meant to be the possession of Korean men and there is no greater reminder of one’s inferiority than an outsider’s ability to conquer one’s women. in addition, the mothers of Black Koreans (and other amerasians) who are “prostitutes” from poor families are themselves excluded from the realm of the Korean (gage, chap. 11). The reservation of the most severe racism for Black-Korean nationals, then, and the barriers placed in the way of their mothers, relies on the harshest forms of micro and macro discrimination at the nexus of ethnoracism, patriarchal nationalism, and classism. although south Korean society traces all Black peoples’ blood line to the african continent (n. Kim 2008), their ethnoracism toward the migrants who hail from africa draws on a different political-economic context than that of the part-Black multiracial children. While the children were part of south Korean society long before rapid economic development and are the product of ongoing U.s. (neo)imperial power, the vast majority of africans are illegally entering a south Korea of their own volition, drawn by its powerful g-20 economy. although much of Korean society perceives foreign migrants’ need for their cities’ worst jobs as an expression of inferior national blood, the african continent’s lowest position in the world economy signifies the most inferior of blood lines. south Koreans, therefore, have positioned themselves below euro-america but above africa, shaped historically by a Western Darwinist view of the world as the White top, asian middle, and african bottom (see russell 1991, 6) and by Japan’s blackening of the countries from which its labor migrants hailed starting in the late 1980s (lie 1998). While south Korea has realized its nationalist goal of being a “whiter” and more middle-class nation-state than those from, say, “blacker” vietnam or “black” ghana, they are perpetually compensating for their inferiority vis-à-vis the United states as they do with the children of U.s. soldiers. also operating under the specter of colonial Japan, one way that the Korean populace tends to negotiate not being on top but in the middle of the racialized global economic order is to dissociate from the very symbolic africa they once were and fear returning to: poor, underdeveloped, war-torn, and starving. Han geon-soo finds this dissociation in popular cultural depictions of africa as teeming with unintelligent and incoherent primitives or in news coverage that cannot seem to move beyond famine and murderous ethnic cleansing (2003, 159–160). in government circles, anti-african statements are commonplace, such as a Korean national

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assembly member’s remarks that some of his colleagues seemed to think south Korea was “a primitive country in africa.” elsewhere in the Korean imagination, africa is a premodern “source of life”—abstract, romantic—through which people from more advanced civilizations “find themselves” (159). in Han’s words, such an africa allows much of Korean society to “fulfill their desire in order to enjoy the fruit of having born [sic] the hardships of the painful twentieth century” (161). in summary, Koreans’ status as a formerly colonized and presently occupied people tends to manifest in an ethnoracist displacement of their inferiority onto part-american children and foreign labor migrants. The response, a tragically familiar one, is deftly captured by laura Mulvey who writes, “it cannot be easy to move from oppression and its mythologies to resistance in history; a detour through a no-man’s land or threshold area of counter-myth and symbolisation is necessary” (1987, 11). south Korean society, i argue, is still wandering through this detour through oppression, only now in multiculturalist garb. For the remainder of the chapter, i address, in turn, the historical and sociopolitical context of Black Koreans and undocumented african labor migrants and how both are treated, and respond to such treatment, under ethnic/patriarchal nationalism and multiculturalism. Black Koreans: Perspectives of Race and Multiculturalism through Hines Ward Who Are “Amerasians”?

after Korea regained its independence from Japan at the end of World War ii, the country began to see the number of multiracial children, mostly those of part White or Black ancestry, grow (ro 2006) and then swell in the wake of the Korean War’s thriving red-light districts around U.s. army bases. The figure once reached 40,000 in the 1960s when the sex industry with american gis was at its peak, according to the national Human rights Commission of Korea, but has decreased to the current level of 5,000 after many emigrated to the United states and others passed away (shim 2006). With an estimated 30,000 children of Korean and southeast asian parents in the wake of 1980s labor migration (ro 2006), the total number of multiracial children is estimated at 35,000, according to Pearl s. Buck international (hereafter Buck international). of the 5,000 multiracial Korean/non-asian population, estimates show that 60 percent have White american fathers while the rest have fathers who are Black american, putting the number of Black-Korean offspring at roughly 2,000 (Kirk 2006). The reliance on estimates owes to the lack of an official government

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tally on the population and the fact the multiracial offspring have long been treated as aliens or outcasts because they are assumed to be born of american gis and prostitutes (shim 2006); in fact, a sizable number of the women are not prostitutes (yuh 2002). it was not until recently, in the 1990s, that the roK had chosen not to tie citizenship rights directly to family blood line, leaving orphans with no legal status for all those years. The difficult childhoods lived by these multiracial orphans or children of mostly maligned parents have often meant a difficult adulthood. a 2003 study by the state human rights body on amerasians found that most could not find marital partners and had conflictual marriages because of discrimination and mental stress; in all, over 71 percent were single or divorced (shim 2006), not surprising given that their parents rarely stayed together themselves. in 2011, 40 percent of seoul’s divorce suits were filed by interethnic/-racial couples (Korea Times, 8 May 2011). Because 83 percent of first-generation amerasians were raised by single mothers who were sex workers or worked in low-paying, part-time jobs, lee Ji-young, a spokesman for Buck international, remarked, “generation after generation, mixed-race people get poorer, locked in a vicious circle of poverty.”7 Many multiracial Koreans are relegated to the red-light districts near U.s. army bases, working as entertainers, sex workers, and food servers. of those adults who work, less than 30 percent have jobs, and most are temporary. lack of educational attainment also entrenches intergenerational poverty. almost 10% of multiracial people do not enter or finish primary school, while 17.5% drop out of middle school, according to 2002 figures from Buck international. The ngo also reported, “it’s very hard for them. Maybe one or two a year goes to college, up to the second generation,” with “ladies [being] left behind” for they are “lower educated, and about 10 percent of them are completely illiterate” (Kirk 2006), an astounding fact in a country with a 99 percent literacy rate. Hines and Hope?

given similar occupational and educational inequities in the United states and other developed economies, those on the bottom of this multiracial hierarchy, Black-Korean nationals, often have the best chance at success and wealth in the fields of entertainment and athletics. such professions, of course, offer no guarantee of either success or even life satisfaction. a middle-aged singer who had enjoyed some success in the past, James lee, had left the discriminatory halls of his high school early and searched for low-skilled work, sending resumes to about ten factories. each time he was rejected for “unknown” reasons. lee has been singing on nightclub 7

Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this paragraph comes from shim (2006).

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stages to support himself, telling a newspaper, “i have lived in constant stress over somebody jeering at me just because i’m mixed blood. i couldn’t break away from a sense of inferiority” (shim 2006). These sentiments of never being good enough and never belonging were echoed by many of the multiracial Koreans that gage interviewed (chap. 11), though not all of them were part Black. Contrast the treatment of lee with that of american Hines Ward, the man who broke open the gates to south Korea’s claim on a new national identity, but whose Black-Korean brethren we hear little about in multicultural discourse. Born in seoul of a Korean mother and an africanamerican gi father, Ward was adored and embraced as a Korean hero during his 2006 “homecoming” visit: a dinner guest at the president’s Blue House, an honorary citizen of seoul, and a darling of the news media who used him as a poster child of south Korea’s multicultural future. a survey of south Korean newspapers makes apparent that no Black-Korean star—even singers insooni and yoon Mi-rae (Tasha), athlete Jang yae-eun, or american stars such as r&B singer amerie—ever received the fanfare given to Hines Ward and his mother (Washington 2009). The public adulation of Hines Ward as a “Korean” despite his obvious african ancestry would seem to disprove my claim that Korean society fails to accept those of Black ancestry as equals. scholar Myra Washington (2009), however, observed that south Korea was really doing it for south Korea. The state and its supporters wanted to claim Ward to elevate the country’s status in the eyes of advanced, promulticulturalist Western nation-states and to better their record on human rights after the release of the United nation’s CerD report. Washington (2009) also found that the country’s awareness of its exceptional economic growth and industrialization just decades earlier compelled them to make Ward a symbol of “Korea’s desire to put behind them the effects of imperialism by both its asian neighbors and the West,” and of “its acceptance of the flows [and effects] of globalization.” in brief, Ward was signaling Korea’s national identity of the future. The Korea Joongang [Chungang] Daily, English Version (lee 2006) reported that some observers perceived the Ward adulation to reflect many Koreans’ longing for internationally known figures commensurate with the nation’s powerhouse economy. Chun Byeong-jun of Chungang University remarked, “This is a sort of collectivism. . . . if the country had many internationally acknowledged people, the interest would be divided. as it is [few], the attention gets focused.” Mr. Chun also noted “the timing of the new love affair,” emerging after south Korea’s most talented geneticist and cloning researcher Hwang Woo-suk had falsified his most prominent research accomplishments (lee 2006). none of these reasons for the Ward hero worship, however, had to do with granting multiracial Koreans,

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especially those of Black heritage, full sociocultural citizenship and equality of opportunity. Indeed, this is still a country where not long before Ward's celebrated homecoming "television spots urged Koreans to be indifferent to South Koreans of mixed blood" (Lee 2006). To be sure, Ward was not naive about the ethnoracism. In contrast to the false, romanticized reports that 2006 was the first time Ward and his mother Kim Young-hee had returned to his birth country since departing in the late 1970s, Mrs. Kim told the Chason ilbo, "When we went to Korea in '98 [when Ward was in his early twenties], even Korean people who looked educated spat when we walked by. Koreans judge others based on their appearance and their age. Those kinds of Koreans think that they are so special" (8 Feb. 2006). Perhaps cautioned by his mother, Ward chose to visit in 2006 without his wife and son, who look fully African-American. He made sure to say to the press that they would accompany him the next time he made the trans-Pacific journey (Kirk 2006). Many South Koreans themselves were not naive. As the Korea Herald (K'aria heroldil) reported, "When Ward became a national hero after his Super Bowl success, many biracial Koreans were understandably confused-Ward became a celebrity for the same reason that biracial Koreans are ostracized" (Ro 2006). Many blog sites set up by multiracial Koreans or observant expats living in South Korea waxed eloquent on how backward the country was on the question of race, and how shameless it seemed about its obvious two faces. Perhaps no one better captured the hypocrisy

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than Hines Ward’s mother herself, whose own Koreanness has been questioned. During a visit to Buck international in 2006, Chosŏn ilbo (6 apr. 2006) reported that Kim spent much of the time wiping away tears as she watched her son play with the kids. Finally, one of the other multiracial kid’s mothers came over to Mrs. Kim and said that she wouldn’t hesitate to leave south Korea if she could. Kim grabbed her hand and said, “Do it. i, too, often thought the same thing. . . . What would have become of us if i’d brought Hines back to Korea? Perhaps he could have become nothing more than a beggar. Who here would have hired me even as a house cleaner?” she recounted how she was spat on by other Koreans when she walked around the streets with little Hines (and again with twenty-something Hines). she added, “nobody helped when i was having a tough time, but now that Hines is famous, they are showing us a lot of attention. . . . yeah, well. it’s burdensome. That’s life, isn’t it?” equally skeptical, lee Jee-young of the Buck international office told the Chungang ilbo newspaper that despite Mr. Ward’s success, life for mixed-blood Koreans will continue to be difficult. “i have experienced this sort of thing [multiracial Korean fanfare] several times, although this is the most extensive. . . . The fact is, placing mixed children for adoption here is almost impossible, and it won’t get better” (B. lee 2006). others who were not purging their conscience of what they knew was a racist reality nor refashioning the country’s image into a racially democratic one showcased their cynicism, indignation, and/or rage. an editorial cartoon, which appeared in the progressive newspaper The Han’gyŏrye in 2006, cast into relief the injustice of the Ward hero worship and perhaps harnessed the anger on the part of multiracial individuals. The heading, top right, reads “chamsi sŏng pakkurŏ oech’ul…,” meaning “a short jaunt outside the castle…” denoting the pure-blooded Koreans— tanil minjok, per the sign above the castle—who have temporarily left its protected walls to worship a smiling Hines Ward with a collective “wow” (literally, wa). The Black-Korean children leaning against the outer wall, long outcasts of the pure-Korean castle, appear uncertain of what to do: leave the cold shadows of their lives and bask in the warm light of Hines Ward, enter the temporarily opened door of a castle to which they never belonged, or just stay put? The decision to seemingly stay put perhaps is explained by the child, left, who peers up at the castle’s sign: tanil minjok. Ward’s mother and newspaper cartoonists were not the only ones to complain about the ruse and double standard. Korea’s Queen of Hip Hop/soul and most influential rap star, part Korean–part Black yoon Mi-rae (Tasha), lambasted the hypocrisy almost a year later: “When the success of half-Korean U.s. football player Hines Ward raised interest in

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mixed-race children in Korea last year, i was so furious. . . . Were there no mixed-race children in Korea before Hines Ward? and have things changed now? no, it’s as if nothing has happened” (Chosŏn ilbo, 24 Feb. 2007). The reaction of yoon Mi-rae, a child of an african-american gi and a Korean mother, points to her experience not only of incessant humiliation and institutional exclusion while growing up, but also her conflicts with the music industry. she was often told by record executives to hide her father’s racial background, perhaps to say one grandparent was part Black, as her african ancestry is not always readily apparent. she does not have a dark complexion and she changes her loosely curly hair at will. Therefore, she could rarely sing about her family and her life of discrimination in Korea, which placed her at odds with her label and prevented an album from being released for four years, an eternity in the Korean music business that usually spells one’s demise. she was able to rebound, however, because multiracial people in Korea, especially those of Black ancestry, have been accepted in the music industry (though not acting or beauty [see sung 2010]) in true hegemonic and profiteering fashion. in doing so, south Korea also seems to be seeking global cultural recognition by emulating the prominence of Black singers and rappers in the United states, europe, and elsewhere. Her enormous success in south Korea, and the fact that she has lived and can live (at least in part) in the United states, also explains the latitude that she has to sing publicly about her Black ancestry, her Black father (with whom she is close), and her struggles with discrimination. a new or fledgling Black-Korean artist would likely not have such a chance, sticking rather to innocuous, apolitical bubble-gum K-pop. one of the songs from yoon’s 2007 comeback album, “Black Happiness,” from which some verses are excerpted and translated here, laid bare the life that she had to hide so long from her fans: “Black Happiness” My skin was dark from my past People used to point at me even at my mom, even at my dad who was Black and in the army People whisper behind my back, said this and said that i always had tears in my eyes although i was young i saw my mother’s sadness everything seemed like it was my fault Because of my guilt i washed my face all day, as much as i could With my tears i melt the white soap i always hated my dark skin Why, oh why, does the world judge me

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…. Then i turned nineteen i have to lie i put white makeup over my face They told me to wear a mask They said my mom’s race was okay, but not my dad’s every year i was nineteen During the times when time stopped i felt like i was in jail and i leaned on myself i spent endless, painful days

Washington (2009) argues that the south Korean state and mass media were also, however, responding to a situation that they had not faced so extensively before and that belied their multicultural image machinery: mainstream american criticism of south Korea as categorically racist against multiracial peoples, especially those who looked like Ward. Many U.s. news stories focused on how fortunate Ward was to have grown up in the United states as the extreme discrimination against multiracial children in south Korea would have tragically limited his life opportunities (Herskovitz 2006; cf. Washington 2009). of course, the claim falsely insinuates that no such discrimination exists in the United states. The U.s. press was so vocal in part because no other Black-Korean american star had quite the stature or the poignant biography of Hines Ward. The super Bowl is the biggest sporting event in the United states, the pinnacle of a sport that is distinctly american, and Ward had just been named Most valuable Player after a brilliant, unselfish performance. He was born in the land of the Morning Calm, of utmost importance to a people who express nationalism by touting their embodiment of their land (n. Kim 2008). after leaving everything to move to the United states, Ward’s mother Mrs. Kim endured a divorce and lost custody of her son in a court battle with her african-american ex-husband because she did not speak english, leaving Hines to be raised by his paternal grandmother. although Mrs. Kim was alone in the United states, knew no one, had no job skills, and knew nothing about the U.s. system, she stayed close to win back her son. By the time Ward had run away to his mother at age seven and was in her legal custody again, Mrs. Kim had juggled sometimes up to three menial jobs at once, typically averaging $4 per hour, to survive and demonstrate fitness as a parent (Chosŏn ilbo, 8 Feb. 2006). although the wide linguistic and cultural chasm with her son proved difficult in the early years, she worked hard to bridge that divide. Hines would grow to love and appreciate his mother so deeply that after he turned professional, he bought her a large home (which she found too big and subsequently moved out of) and

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pledged to support her and end her working days (she continues her work at a school cafeteria by choice) (Chosŏn ilbo, 8 Feb. 2006). This touching family biography was splashed across countless Korean newspapers, television stations, and internet sites, for it resonated well with the cherished Confucian narrative of parental sacrifice and a child’s repayment through filial piety (Washington 2009), not to mention an exceptional work ethic. To be sure, it would be difficult for anyone in any society not to be touched by the story’s universal themes of love, loss, rejection, hope, and triumph. one would almost have to lack emotion to feel no inspiration. Despite the hegemonic interests of the state and the nationalist prejudices of even the most promigrant ngos (H. J. Kim 2009), i do not argue here that no south Koreans are willing to sacrifice privilege to achieve a nation of ethnoracial equality and that anyone who sees Ward as a catalyst to that end is naive. indeed, many Black-Korean nationals who have lived lives of rejection, exclusion, and sorrow are some of the most inspired, hopeful, and optimistic about Ward as the bridge to a multicultural Korea. after all, change must start with the ability to envision it. an example is the once popular singer Park il-Jun whose struggles with racial discrimination live on (he was fifty-two at the time of the following 2006 interview). To Yŏnhap Nyusŭ Agency he said he was emotional when he watched Hines Ward’s touchdown catch that helped clinch the Pittsburgh steelers’ super Bowl Xl victory over the seattle seahawks. growing up in an even more homogeneous society than the one that rejected yoon Mi-rae (almost thirty years younger), in school Park rarely found respite from the bullying, harassment, and discrimination by students and teachers because of his darker skin color. He admitted, “When i was little, i drank a lot of milk in the belief that this would help whiten my skin color.” When he debuted in the music world in 1977, he was forced to wear thick yellow makeup to allay Koreans’ derision for interracial children (shim 2006). owing to south Korea’s love-hate relationship with the United states (abelmann and lie 1995; n. Kim 2008), the bodies marked by U.s. (neo)imperial dominance and the challenge to Korean men’s possession of their women had to be covered up. Within this historical context of Koreans’ anti-american backlash, Park was hopeful about Ward’s potential to engender change: “i hope the attention to Ward will provide an opportunity to change society’s treatment of children from interracial marriages.” a forward on south Korea’s professional women’s basketball team, Jang yae-eun, is another Black-Korean public figure who saw Ward’s accomplishments as more than a mere success story. The daughter of an african-american serviceman, Jang suffered enormously despite being raised by a loving Korean mother. she was compared to objects that

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were black like charcoal, constantly reprimanded that she was african whenever she declared herself Korean, and condemned by elders who detested her fluent Korean (ro 2006), demonstrating that only certain Koreans on the peninsula had to align their body with their body’s practice (see n. Kim 2009). similarly, gage (chap. 11) found that multiracial Koreans in general were presumed to have inferior intelligence and a cultural gap owing to a “mixed” composition. Because of such ethnoracism, Jang admitted, “i even once wished that no more black-Koreans would be born at all” (USA Today, 9 Feb. 2006). on Ward’s success, she remarked, “it gave me a lot of hope, that i, too, can do it. Because although we live in different countries, we’re both biracial and in sports. i wish to hear more and more stories like Ward’s, because such stories really encourage mixed race kids like me” (H. e. Kim 2006; see Herskovitz 2006). This last line shows that she does not simply mean becoming rich and a worldclass athlete like Ward, but that she and other “mixed race kids” need constant reminding that they can be anything in a country that has constantly reminded them that they are nothing. another emerging athletic star, inch’ŏn United forward Kang soo-il is also the child of a Korean mother and a Black-american gi. The twenty-two-year-old, however, was the only Black-Korean interviewee i found who perceived his dark skin as garnering him more positive attention than “pure Koreans,” and thus helping his soccer career. “i used to regret that i had dark skin. i even hit friends who made fun of me. But now, i realize that it could be a benefit to me. if i play the same level with my teammates, i get more attention because of my skin color” (USA Today, 9 Feb. 2006). His words reify south Korean pronouncements of a new multicultural reality and the political import of the recognition of difference (Taylor 1994). indeed, gage (chap. 11) finds that other multiracial Koreans have the ability to maneuver within hegemonic inequalities precisely because the latter often work at cross purposes. For instance, some believe they are better-looking than Han Koreans because they have the bigger eyes, higher nose bridges, and, among women, the bodily curves for which many Han Koreans get cosmetic surgery. Many multiracial Koreans also have american english names and speak some english, which they deploy situationally and strategically to their benefit. Part of Kang’s inspiration came from Hines Ward himself, with whom he is similar, not only in terms of parental heritage but in his devotion to repay his mother for her many sacrifices (he sends virtually all of his paycheck to her, saying, “i want to succeed as a football player to please my mom” [J. Kim 2009]). after Kang met Ward during the 2006 visit, he remarked, “i set my goal in life after meeting Hines Ward. [repeating

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Ward:] ‘set your goals high, do your best to achieve it while thinking of your mom and praying for it’” (J. Kim 2009). as singer insooni (lee insoon, yi in-sun) is the peninsula’s most wellknown resident of Korean and Black parentage, her words of being greatly “inspired” by Ward carry much weight. Her life story differs from that of yoon Mi-rae not only in terms of age (lee is nearly twenty-five years her senior) but also in her more apparent african ancestry, her lack of english proficiency, her south Korean (not Korean-american) husband, and her thirty-year reign in the music industry, almost unheard of in the ruthless, trend-driven, youth-heavy celebrity culture. When she was born to a Korean mother (Kim yang-bae) and an african american gi father, Mrs. Kim’s family forced her either to abandon her child or be disowned. Kim yang-bae chose her daughter. raised only by her mother, insoon began her career at twenty years old. Despite her beautiful and unique voice, she could only eke out a living by performing at pubs. she was discovered by a producer who helped land her a spot in a female trio called the Hee sisters, “Korea’s first archetypical ‘girl group.’” although the trio was adored by many male fans, Kim was forced to wear a hat or handkerchief to hide her hair each time they performed. Moreover, Chungang ilbo reported, she was “often banned from appearing on Tv shows and was denied the chance to participate in an international singing competition as a representative of Korea. yet, today, she is still one of the country’s most influential musicians.”8 When it came time to give birth to her daughter (with her Korean husband), insooni flew to the United states to give her child american citizenship. as insooni publicly stated, her daughter would thus have the option of leaving Korea in case she inherited her mother’s dark skin and suffered the same immense pain. as reported, “While other mothers may count the number of their babies’ fingers or toes right after they are born, insooni checked her daughter’s skin color.” it is not surprising that she would continue to feel plagued by these issues, as a contingent of Koreans did not appreciate her heart-felt rendition of “our Beautiful Country” (gage, chap. 11). although Ward’s visit gave her new hope for the future of multiracial children on the peninsula (sung 2010), she is the same woman who tells those children every year the travesty that the only way they can realize their dreams is to “work harder” than any other Korean (ro 2006). This, along with the choice to make her daughter a citizen of a country she barely knows, reveals the depth of her pain despite her hope in Hines. 8

The information in this paragraph and the following paragraph comes from sung (2010).

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African Migrants: The Shadows (Must) Speak Community with a Capital “C”

although the roK state officially records family lineage as a way to determine one’s Koreanness, appearance is  often the de facto criterion used by wider society. Both lineage and appearance work to subordinate Black Koreans as “not really Korean” (and “quasi-american”), while most african labor migrants’ lack of Korean blood means that their darker skin and “africanesque” features mark them as wholly ineligible for claims to Koreanness. The african migrants’ illegal status, too, intersects with race to place the group outside the boundaries of the country that, each day, they try to survive within. These africans are thus the other population largely missing from public discourse and scholarly research on Korean multiculturalism. i found a helpful academic piece by Han geonsoo (2003) that i cite extensively, some newspaper articles and blog sites, and the now-expired website www.nigeriancommkorea.com of the nigerian Community Korea. indeed, the lack of sources was confirmed by a graduate student beginning to write his Ph.D. dissertation about african migrants, who said that almost no scholarship existed. Han (2003) reports that nigerians, ghanaians, and other ethnic africans first came illegally to Korea in the 1990s through inch’ŏn Port and worked as longshoremen.9 Thereafter, the migrants bought junkyard cars and returned to nigeria and ghana to establish transportation businesses, in turn spreading the word about this land called Korea where one could make lots of money and realize the “Korean Dream.” as south Korea’s immigration policy prefers highly skilled professional workers as entrants and denies african migrants legal entry, the men have to enter the country through personal or informal broker networks. Demographically, Han found a population of mostly single males in their twenties and thirties in his informal survey of fifty-five workers. as is true of much of the labor migrant population, about half had received some college-level education and had held a professional position in their sending country (e.g., teacher, technician, trader, priest); about one-third had worked previously in other countries as migrant workers. of all the non-Korean labor migrants on the peninsula in 2003, Han estimated that over two thousand were african workers (perhaps more, given those who fly under the census radar). The majority originated from nigeria, ghana, and egypt. Many came to south Korea in the hopes of learning how to invest there, 9

The information in this paragraph comes from g. Han (2003, 163–68) unless otherwise indicated.

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as well as to draw on the asian Tiger as a model for developing their own country’s economy. The vast majority of african migrants live in it’aewŏn, the commercial and residential area that surrounds seoul’s yongsan U.s. military base, owing to its many businesses and social-cultural organizations that support african and other non-Korean ethnics’ lifestyles and needs. i also infer from news articles and blogs, however, that south Korean discrimination against africans also explains their largely segregated existence in the it’aewŏn area. Between 2004 and 2009, the number of african migrants rose about 80 percent, from 385 registered residents to about 706 (Korea Times, 13 apr. 2010). in late 2010, roK government crackdowns on africans seem to have forced a good number of the undocumented to nearby cities where other non-Koreans have settled (lee 2010), a point to which i will return. Living the Multicultural Promise?

nigerians make up the largest contingent of african migrants in the yongsan District at about 70 percent (lee 2010). Through their website titled “nigerian Community, south Korea” (www.nigeriancommkorea.com; since expired) they demonstrate that they are in the country to stay and do not see themselves as sojourners. one can infer that they are doing their best to make a home away from “home” and to integrate themselves into south Korean society without relinquishing their political, cultural, and identity connections to nigeria. visitors to the site first read: This Website is designed to furnish you with comprehensive information on the unfolding events in the nigerian community south Korea. Through the site, you will also be equipped with the current and useful information relating to developments in nigeria. The website is also geared towards offering you the opportunity of having access to a host of useful websites in nigeria. we hope that these web pages will go a long way to satisfy your curiosity about nigerian living in south Korea and home. (emphasis mine.)

This online introduction reveals that the nigerian community to which the site primarily refers is the one in south Korea, but they also reference the diasporic community across the globe seeking information on the goingson in the homeland: politics, how President goodluck ebele Jonathan is doing, the status of the national soccer team, and so on. as evidence that the nigerian migrants are in south Korea to stay, they have established a local hierarchical political system to which people are elected and must fulfill strict responsibilities, bearing such titles as Honorable obinna, the “President of nigeria Community south Korea” and “Chief Whip” eze.

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as further evidence of settlement, and in line with g. Han’s (2003, 163) findings, the Business page highlights the establishment of the nigerian investors Forum under the auspices of the nigerian community, which, it writes, “has come a long way and is gradually settling into different areas of business in Korea like export of general goods, Travel and Tours, Hotels / restaurants” and is “working to provide an enabling business environment for the nigerian investors by way of arranging workshops and seminars.” importantly, there is evidence that the nigerian migrants believe in the principle of multiculturalism insofar as they prioritize the positive recognition and empowerment of their homeland and culture in their asian host nation. The introduction to the “Constitution of the nigerian Community, republic of Korea,” reads: We the citizen of the Federal republic of nigeria domiciled in the republic of Korea realizing the needs for regular interactions, exchanges, guidance, care for one another in our collective determination to portray a positive image of our father land before our host Country and the International Community, having decided to form a strong Community that will protect and give full and unfettered expression of equal justice, love, peace, prosperity and unity…

similarly, in section ii, “aims & objectives,” two of the bullet points read as follows: d) To collaborate with the embassy of the Federal republic of nigeria in e) The promotion of nigeria’s rich culture

Finally, in the section “responsibilities of Members,” one of the requirements that must be met to avoid losing community membership status reads as follows: d) all members of the nigerian Community, irrespective of the constitutional duties as executive, shall observe the nigeria national day celebration as it is done in nigeria, in conjunction with the embassy.

in multiculturalist fashion, the nigerian migrants also politically organize to gain from the host government greater recognition as an ethnicity and nation (Hanagan 1997; Koopmans et al. 2005). on the about Us page under the link “Brief History about nigerian in south Korea” is proud mention of seoul city’s acknowledgment of nigerian civic leaders’ work for their own community: “in recognition of the nigerian Community by the host country, emmanuel njoku and Hon. Ujah C. oduh, became the first and second nigerian to receive an honorary citizenship from the

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seoul Metropolitan government” (interestingly, this same honorary citizenship was conferred on Hines Ward). The website also shows nigerians’ efforts toward gaining rights as a cultural group (see Kymlicka 2005) when host government(s) are antagonistic. on the home page is a link to a speech delivered by the community leader Honorable obinna at a hearing on Korean immigration law, tax law, and local laws and regulations for nigerian residents. The excerpt here reveals the legal discrimination that nigerians feel they have suffered at the hands of the roK state, that which has “debased” individuals and the homeland writ large: Today’s epoch making event mark’s a remarkable history in nigerian Community south Korea. it is a clear indication of a road map to normalcy-on the lingering ugly situations that have so much debased the integrity of nigerians in Korea and nigeria at large. in the first instance, i wish to express my appreciation to His excellency the ambassador of the Federal republic of nigeria to Korea, for his effort to create this enabling atmosphere for nigerians to close ranks with Korean immigration services and national tax services, in order to arrest the problems nigerians are facing in Korea. … i feel deep sorrow and pain for the sufferings endured by nigerians in Korea, precisely at Korean immigration Direct Foreign investment department. These suffering [sic] are real and serious. But [i] wish to state that [the] communication gap, language barrier and lack of understand-

ing of Nigerian investors’ convenient style of financial transactions and business system, are responsible for the situation.

… We expect together with all good, democratic approach and peace loving forces that this seminar…would occasion a result that will represent a clear call for the supremacy of the authority of the rule of natural justice; so that nigerians could enjoy prosperity, progress and peace in Korea. (emphasis mine.)

striking is Honorable obinna’s belief that the roK state’s lack of understanding of nigerian business culture is one of the reasons for its rejection of some form of nigerian foreign investment, a multiculturalist perspective on problem solving. Despite the overall website’s clear admiration for south Korea’s powerhouse economy and elevation in the world order, nigerians are also airing their ongoing conflicts with the roK state. in this vein, the constitution lists two benefits of membership in the community as follows: a) every member shall be protected against abuse or discrimination within the pretext of the law in the republic of Korea. k) Handle Cases of Maltreatment of nigerians

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obinna’s speech may also be a criticism of the seoul immigration office’s discrimination against nigerian migrants, prompting his coethnics’ gradual relocation from it’aewŏn in seoul to foreigner-heavy ansan, Tongduch’ŏn, and other cities in Kyŏnggi province.10 asked why nigerians seemed to be moving out of it’aewŏn, the Korea Times reported that “the leader of the nigerian Community” (likely obinna) explained that soaring living costs and racial discrimination were the culprits.11 He lamented, “Just because we are nigerians we are asked to pay the security deposit twice as big as the one other nationals pay. itaewon is a great place for us to live. But it has become too expensive to stay in the area.” He also complained about the seoul immigration service’s stricter screening of nigerians: “The seoul office is known to take a harsher stance toward us. i heard many nigerians decided to relocate to gyeonggi Province to extend their visas more easily.” The Korea Times also reported that governmentled crackdowns on african visa overstayers and terrorism suspects ahead of the november 2010 g-20 summit were responsible for the african flight. such raids would not be surprising given the state’s history of exploiting and oppressing “undesirables” ahead of events that place south Korea on a global stage, like the 1988 olympics and the 2002 World Cup, as it is so conscious of the euro-american imperialist gaze (n. Kim 2008; see g. Han 2003, 161). This form of state ethnoracism against african workers, however, seemed to be unfounded, as there are visa overstayers of all stripes on the peninsula and i could not find any evidence of alleged terrorist activity in my review of literatures. Perhaps the government was motivated by the fact that the africans’ presence, namely along “african street,” has heightened perceptions of an it’aewŏn already in disrepute as more dangerous and crime-ridden at night. on my visit to the foreigner-heavy area during a short personal trip in late 2008 and early 2009 i did not see anything criminal or dangerous, but these are, of course, impressions, not ethnography. Worth noting is that most travel blogs also consider the fears to be overblown and racially stereotypical (though a few disagree). nonetheless, the perception of it’aewŏn as dangerous has only reaffirmed to many south Koreans their view of Blacks as entrenched in urban poverty and criminality around the world. importantly, recent government raids on a migrant community do not 10 The yongsan District office reported in august 2010 that the number of nigerian residents declined 18.8% (to 605 residents) from 2008. legally residing ghanaians in the district also dropped in number. The Korea Times reported that “african street” seems to have become desolate and the number of africans consorting in it’aewŏn fewer (H. lee 2010). 11 The information in this paragraph is from H. lee (2010).

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sound like the realization of a multicultural society. indeed, south Korea today sounds much like the one africans experienced eight years ago. in Han geon-soo’s 2003 interviews, african workers mentioned their bouts with seemingly unmonitored institutional discrimination in the workplace (2003, 168). They worked longer hours for less pay and had shorter lunch breaks compared to other migrant workers, especially ethnic Koreans from China and Central asia. on the everyday level, the migrants reported that buses and subways were major sites of racial discrimination. often, no one would sit next to them even if no other seats were vacant, or many bus drivers would cover their noses and ask them to sit far back. Hailing from Mali, twenty-eight-year-old Moses reported that a bus driver asked him to get off the bus and another actually sprayed deodorant on him (g. Han 2003, 168). Thinking themselves well-intentioned, other Koreans would tell the migrants how lucky they were to live in their country where they would no longer starve (169). interestingly, some african migrants reported that because of Korean society’s biases against underdeveloped nations, Black americans were treated better than they were, prompting some to introduce themselves as such (170). given the country’s fixation on the status of nation-states within the global order, this observation seems to have merit. at the same time, the fact that much of Han Korea treats the offspring of Black american soldiers (and Black americans in general) so poorly (Kim 2008) lays bare the severity of their mistreatment of those directly from the african continent. exercising a form of resistance, african migrants are critical of Korean society. The migrants revealed to Han (2003, 170) that Koreans were racist, nationalist, and had lost their community spirit, as they did not even help their own impoverished and disabled who panhandled on streets and subways; people in their african countries would never be so cruel, they argue. They also remarked that Koreans do not practice their vaunted Confucianism, citing an example of a fifty-year-old ghanaian man beaten by Korean teens (170). The Muslim africans in particular thought Koreans were too sexually liberal, citing men’s womanizing and women’s hypersexualization in mass media (171); the latter also fit well with what they considered unjust gender discrimination against women. one could argue, however, that the workers’ dichotomization of a bad Korea, on the one hand, and a good nigeria, ghana, or egypt, on the other, would tend to overlook complex nuances and commonalities. african migrants’ perceptions, however, as well as job, housing, and state and police discrimination point to how “un-multicultural” south Korea has been and continues to be. The lived experiences of african migrants, in brief, betray the amount of work that needs to be done to raise much of south Korean society’s political consciousness on forms of racism; it does not appear

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that the majority are ready to sacrifice certain privileges and resources to live up to a multicultural calling, especially one rooted in redistribution and not just recognition (Kymlicka 2002). Conclusion Despite the conclusion of most scholars that the roK state is reproducing “pure Han” dominance under a multicultural cloak, this does not mean that no forms of minority recognition or resource sharing have been realized. Hegemonic nation-building requires that dominant systems secure the consent of the masses by integrating and rewarding the previously subordinated, lest all legitimacy and powers of coercion be lost. such a hegemonic multicultural project, especially one that seeks to gain approval from the modern West (H. J. Kim 2009), requires that south Korean discourse, ideologies, and realities change in some fashion. in addition, hegemony does not mean that there are no well-intentioned elected officials, businesses, or “Han Korean” citizens making real efforts toward a multicultural society. in other words, the state is not homogenous and, in fact, has originated and enacted some of the most fundamental policies, laws, and cultural changes that move toward the inclusion of multiracial Koreans. For instance, the state has made some bold moves to prove that a multicultural Korea is more than just talk. it approved changing the vaunted language in textbooks of a nation “united by one bloodline” to that of a multiethnic or multicultural nation. in 2010, the state also established a provocative policy of free day-care services from birth to age five for all multicultural children, irrespective of parental income (Korea Times, 9 sep. 2010). in 2005 the state also instituted the first landmark change to military policy on multiracial individuals when it allowed mostly “Kosian” men to enlist for the first time. The policy, however, still forbade those of visibly “mixed-race”—namely, part-Black Koreans—from serving due to fears they would not fit in. To much of Black Korea, their continued exclusion was a major setback, as whether or not a man fulfills his military duty is deemed crucial for entering and succeeding in the south Korean job market (shim 2006). Yŏnhap Nyusŭ Agency (12 oct. 2010) reported that effective 2011, the government would finally lift the ban on “visibly mixed-race” enlistees, establishing provisions to fight discrimination and allow the men special treatment. in addition to this watershed moment in roK military history, it appears promising that the country’s first official primary school for multicultural children opened in 2011. Created by an ad hoc private committee led by political insiders, it would be the first multicultural institution for elementary education accredited by the state

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if approved. Currently, graduation certificates from the unofficial schools are not recognized (Do 2009). in other realms, three domestic crayon manufacturers have pledged to change the label “skin color” on the peach-colored crayon to “light orange,” in the wake of ngo pressure (shim 2006). not only does representation affect the self-esteem of multiracial children and non-Koreans, but such changes force Han Korea to cease taking its status as the dominant group and reference point for granted. representation of multiracial families and children has also gotten a boost in its first television channel “salad Tv,” created by migrant advocate Park Kyong-ju (Kwon 2010). on the level of individual attitudes, news articles are finding that some south Koreans are starting to question why they feel so uneasy about mixed-race people, with some blaming the older generation. Perhaps a certain Miss Hong captures it best when she quips: “i do not know why these people are discriminated against. . . . They are all Koreans” (Kirk 2006). indeed, powerful institutions are intervening in unprecedented fashion to mitigate such prejudice. in 2009 the first contempt charges were applied to a case of racism when a Korean man hurled slurs at an indian professor (Bonogit Hussain) sitting on a bus. The incident prompted rival Parliamentary parties to begin drafting legislation that would provide an official definition of racial and ethnic discrimination as well as impose criminal penalties, a move that caught the attention of the New York Times (s. Choe 2009). Certainly, as this chapter showed, even Black-Korean nationals and african migrants who have suffered the most dehumanizing practices on the part of individuals and institutions have hope in south Korea. at the same time, their ability to make public statements about Korea to the contrary seems unlikely, the value of their sentiments notwithstanding. in an increasingly “racially PC” country in which multiracial children, particularly of part-Black origin, still do not call the shots in their respective professions and lives, it is hard to imagine that successful Black Koreans in particular would not feel censored in some way. Professional basketball player Jang yae-eun is trying to reach Hines Ward’s stature in the country; footballer Kang soo-il is trying to qualify for the national roK team for the World Cup; and insooni is trying to sustain a thirty-year career in an industry full of much younger and much “purer” Koreans. and even after wresting control from her label and releasing the most personal and race-conscious album of her career, rapper yoon Mi-rae’s response to an interview request about life as a multiracial artist three years after the album’s release was thus: “an official from Jungle entertainment, which represents yoon, said, ‘she feels uncomfortable talking

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about [her background]’” (sung 2010). Her reticence is not altogether surprising, though perhaps it should be. and more questions arise as newer Black Korean entertainers enter the multicultural scene: will the rising yet controversial Black Korean pop singer Michelle lee be offered a different path from that of her predecessors? as goes the old adage, south Korea is giving mixed signals, with those of ethnoracism, at times, seeming to drown out the signals of anti-racism. on a popular televised national singing contest lee proved herself to be the most capable singer yet lost to a “pure Korean,” opening the social media and telephone floodgates to “monkey”-bashing as well as outrage over the ethnoracist decision. and, yet, in a bold move that even yoon Mirae cannot always make despite her long, enviable career, lee’s very first single “Without you” is about being bullied and excluded in south Korea her entire life. similarly, recent advertisements for KT&g company’s new cigarette brand, This africa, featuring monkeys rolling cigarettes and news-reporting that “africa is Coming!” were taken down after a global backlash and at the insistence of the roK state. yet months of these ubiquitous ads in seoul spurred no public Korean protest or boycott; KT&g got to keep monkeys on the cartons; and the glaring dearth of african atudies, school curriculum on africa, and mass media/consumer sensitivity about its people persists (Bonate 2013). it is hard to imagine that the (mostly undocumented) african migrants would not be jailed or deported for publicly protesting the racism of these ads, let alone of the job and housing market. rather, the experiences of these migrants point to the pressure to laud Korea’s success and to post grievances about racism in vague terms, as what they say in public can be used against them to justify further discrimination. equally troubling about the state’s pursuit of the “real multicultural Korea” is Jasmine lee, an ethnic Filipina, who endured an onslaught of racist xenophobia by internet users when she was the first naturalized immigrant to become an roK lawmaker. it seems that a multicultural south Korea is finally going to have to contend head on with the racist attitudes that minority residents experience daily and with some Han Koreans’ claims that free day care and military preferences are versions of reverse discrimination (see Do 2009). Without turning multiracial Koreans into pitiable victims, the state, ngos, and the nascent progressive movement are going to have to contend with the fact that about 40 percent of biracial Koreans have attempted suicide in response to their struggles with bigotry, per the state-run national Human rights Commission report (ro 2006). one thing academics and scholar-activists can do, i have argued, is to include, and conduct empirical studies on, these two groups (and the many others who live in the shadows) and analyze the ways their presence

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problematizes ethnic and patriarchal nationalism as well as claims of a multicultural democracy. although well-intentioned, we unwittingly reify hegemonic projects that ultimately uphold Han Korean dominance and express pity for minorities when we overlook certain populations and do not use concepts of race and racism to describe inequality on biological and essentialistic bases. in the absence of these concepts, the state and like-minded institutional forces can rest on the multicultural language of cultural assimilation to deny minority groups pluralistic equality. indeed, the state and its adherents would not promote cultural assimilation ad nauseum if it did not seek to maintain Han dominance. Multiculturalism in salad bowl fashion, with all ingredients in the bowl being of equal value, is nowhere to be seen. gi-wook shin (2007) identifies ethnic nationalism as the primary culprit in the multicultural equation: ethnic nationalism will remain an important organizing principle of Korean society. neither democratization nor globalization has been able to uproot the power of nationalism.… it should be recognized that ethnic nationalism has become a dominant force in Korean society and politics and that it can be oppressive and dangerous when fused with racism and other essentialist ideologies. Koreans must strive to find ways to mitigate its potential harmful effects and use it in constructive manner. in particular, Koreans must promote cultural diversity and tolerance, and establish democratic institutions that can contain the repressive, essentialist elements of ethnic nationalism.

i would argue, however, that in a country like south Korea, ethnic nationalism has always been entwined with ethnoracism; the two are not discrete in the way he describes. There is no “us” without a “them,” and an ethnic nationalism that has been biologized for decades can never be solely about a nation and its culture. i do not see any way for the country to use ethnic nationalism in a constructive manner, unless the signal goal is to become the first nation-state ever to achieve salad bowl multiculturalism in practice. otherwise, the only way to go is to completely let go. Perhaps the best people to ask would be the ones who have never been allowed to bask in the light of the Morning Calm. References abelmann, nancy, and John lie. 1995. Blue Dreams: Korean Americans and the Los Angeles Riots. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. Barth, Fredrik. 1998. introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Origin of Culture Difference, edited by F. Barth, 9–38. Prospect Heights, il: Waveland Press.

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Bobo, lawrence, and vincent l. Hutchings. 1996. “Perceptions of racial group Competition: extending Blumer’s Theory of group Position to a Multiracial social Context.” American Sociological Review 61, no. 6:951–972. Bonate, liazzat. 2013. “antiblack racism in Korea.” 3 December. available at http://africasacountry.com/antiblack-racism-in-korea/ (retrieved 8 august 2014). Cho, Joohee, and anthony Faiola. 2006. “steelers MvP gives s. Korea a Most valuable Perspective.” Washington Post, 8 april, a01. Choe, Hyun. 2007. “south Korean society and Multicultural Citizenship.” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:123–146. ———. 2008. “The Challenges of Korea To Become a Truly Multicultural society.” Koreana Journal 22, no. 2:25–29. Choe, sang-Hun. 2009. “south Koreans struggle with race.” New York Times, 1 november. available at www.nytimes.com/2009/11/02/ world/asia/02race.html?pagewanted=1 (retrieved 4 november 2009). Chosŏn ilbo. 2006. “Hines Ward’s Mother recalls Hard road to success.” 8 February. available at http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_ dir/2006/02/08/2006020861017.html (retrieved 18 December 2010). ———. 2006. “Football star’s Mother looks Back in anger.” 6 april. available at http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_ dir/2006/04/06/2006040661002.html (retrieved 21 January 2010). ———. 2007. “yoon Mi-rae returns to Her roots.” 24 February. available at http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_ dir/2007/02/24/2007022461007.html (retrieved 24 January 2011). Collins, Patricia Hill. 2000. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, 2nd ed. new york: routledge. Demick, Barbara. 2004. “Biracial entertainers overcome Prejudice in south Korea / Pre-WWii ‘Hermit Kingdom’ Culture slowly Changing.” 13 april. available at http://articles.sfgate.com/200408-13/news/17440655_1_south-korea-korean-biracial (retrieved 20 January 2011). Do, Je-hae. 2009. “Multicultural Primary school Will open in 2011.” available at www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ nation/2009/09/117_52573.html (retrieved 8 February 2011). goldberg, David Theo. 2002. The Racial State. oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Han, geon-soo. 2003. “african Migrant Workers’ views of Korean People and Culture.” Korea Journal 43, no. 1:154–173.

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———. 2007. “Multicultural Korea: Celebration or Challenge of Multiethnic shift in Contemporary Korea?” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:32–63. ———. 2008. “Korea’s emerging Multicultural society. Koreana Journal 22, no. 2:1–13. Han, Keyongah. 1994. “The status and Problems of Mixed-race Koreans.” M.a. thesis, Hyosung Women’s College, seoul. Hanagan, Michael. 1997. “Citizenship, Claim-Making, and the right To Work: Britain, 1884–1911.” Theory and Society 26:449–474. Herskovitz, John. 2006. “s. Korea a lonely Place for Mixed-race Children.” Washington Post, 5 March. Hong, Won-Pyo. 2010. “Multicultural education in Korea: its Development, remaining issues, and global implications.” Asia Pacific Education Review 11, no. 3:387–395. Kang, shin-who. 2008. “is Korea Homogeneous Country?” Korea Times, 22 December. available at www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ nation/2008/12/117_36575.html (retrieved 18 January 2010). Kim Hye-sun. 2006. “Han’guk ui tamunhwa sahoe tamnon kwa kyŏrhon iju yŏsŏng” [Discourses on multicultural society and marriage migrant women]. in Tongbuga tamunhwa sidae Han’guk sahoe ui pyŏnhwa wa t’onghap [Transformation and integration of Korean society in the era of multicultural northeast asia], edited by Korean sociological association. seoul: Presidential Commission on northeast asian Cooperation initiative. Kim, Hyung-eun. 2006. “Biracial Basketball Player Jang ye-eun Dreams of Becoming next Hines Ward.” Arirang News, 26 February. available at www.arirang.co.kr/news/news_view.asp?nseq=59728&code=ne2 &category=2 (retrieved on 28 February 2011). Kim, Hui-Jung. 2009. “immigration Challenges and ‘Multicultural’ responses: The state, the Dominant ethnie and immigrants in south Korea.” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison. Kim, Jae-won. 2009. “Mixed-Heritage Footballer Has World Cup Dreams.” 26 May. available at www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ sports/2009/05/136_45706.html (retrieved 18 December 2010). Kim, eun-mee, and Jean s. Kang. 2007. “seoul as a global City with ethnic villages.” Korea Journal 47, no. 4:64–99. Kim, nadia y. 2008. Imperial Citizens: Koreans and Race from Seoul to LA. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. ———. 2009. “Finding our Way Home: Korean americans, Homelands Trips, and Cultural Foreignness.” in Diasporic Homecomings: Ethnic Return Migrants in Comparative Perspective, edited by Takeyuki Tsuda, 305–324. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press.

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Kirk, Donald. 2006. “steelers MvP visits Korea, and sparks soulsearching on race.” The Christian Science Monitor, 5 april. available at www.csmonitor.com/2006/0405/p01s02-woap.html (retrieved 19 December 2010). Koopmans, ruud, Paul statham, Marco giugni, and Florence Passy. 2005. Contested Citizenship. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Korea Times. 2010. “african Population in seoul’s itaewon rises.” 13 april. available at www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ nation/2010/04/113_64096.html (retrieved 28 February 2011). ———. 2010. “Multicultural Kids.” 17 september. available at www. koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2010/09/137_73241.html (retrieved 14 May 2011). ———. 2011. “Multicultural Marriages account for 40% of Divorce suits.” 8 May. available at www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ nation/2011/05/113_86638.html (retrieved 14 May 2011). ———. 2012. “Jasmine lee Faces racial Backlash.” 2012. available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ nation/2012/04/117_109014.html (retrieved 10 september 2013). Kwon, Mee-yoo. 2010. “salad Tv offering Bowl of Multiculturalism.” 27 January. available at www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ nation/2010/01/113_59778.html (retrieved 18 January 2011). Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy. oxford: oxford University Press. ———. 2005.”liberal Multiculturalism: Western Models, global Trends, and asian Debates.” in Multiculturalism in Asia, edited by W. Kymlicka and B. He, 22–55. oxford: oxford University Press. lee, Brian. 2006. “Heartwarming or Cautionary, Ward’s story resonates Here.” Korea Joongang Daily, 10 February. available at http:// joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2683566 (retrieved 18 January 2011). lee, Hyo-sik. 2010. “are africans leaving itaewon?” 9 september. available at www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ nation/2010/09/117_72832.html (retrieved 28 February 2011). lie, John. 1998. Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. Mcneill, David. 2011. “south Korea Brings in Foreign Professors by the Thousands—at a Cost.” The Chronicle of Higher Education International, 27 February. Mulvey, laura. 1987. “Changes: Thoughts on Myth, narrative, and Historical experience.” History Workshop 23 (spring): 3–19.

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New Daily. 2010. “Hanguk yeoseong mangchineun rujeoae cheonguk” [Paradise for losers where Korean women are ruined]. 17 august. available at www.newdaily.co.kr/news/article.html?no=52604 (retrieved 28 February 2011). omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. 1994. Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s. new york: routledge. ro, Chris. 2006. “Mixed-race Koreans suffer from Discrimination and Prejudice in society.” Korea Herald, 5 november. available at www. beuni.com/be_new/500131194 (retrieved 18 December 2010). robinson, Michael edson. 1988. Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920–1925. seattle: University of Washington Press. russell, John. 1991. “race and reflexivity: The Black other in Contemporary Japanese Mass Culture.” Cultural Anthropology 6, no. 1:3–25. schmid, andre. 2002. Korea between Empires, 1859–1919. new york: Columbia University Press. shim, sun-ah. 2006. “a longtime Bigotry: For Mixed-race Children in Korea, Happiness is Too Far away.” Yonhap News Agency, 4 april. shin, gi-wook. 1998. “nation, History, and Politics.” in Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity, edited by Hyung-il Pai and Timothy Tangherlini, 148–165. Berkeley: institute of east asian studies, University of California. ———. 2007. “Korea Faces Challenges of Multiethnic society.” Walter H. shorenstein asia-Pacific research Center news. available at http:// aparc.stanford.edu/news/korea_faces_challenges_of_multiethnic_ society_20070723/ (retrieved 19 December 2010). sung, so-young. 2010. “a long struggle for Multicultural stars.” Korea Joongang Daily, 9 March. available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/ article/view.asp?aid=2917530 (retrieved 21 January 2011). Taylor, Charles. 1994. “The Politics of recognition.” in Multiculturalism, edited by amy gutmann, 25–73. Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press. USA Today. 2006. “a Continent away, Ward Finds stardom in south Korea.” 9 February. available at www.usatoday.com/sports/football/ nfl/steelers/2006-02-09-ward-korea-buzz_x.htm (retrieved 18 December 2010). Washington, Myra. 2009. “From the Football Field to the global arena: Hines Ward and the Creation of a new Korean national identity.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the international Communication association, Chicago, 20 May 2009. Yonhap News Agency. 2010. “Military To introduce Measures To Help enlisted Mixed-race Personnel.” 12 october. available at http://

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english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/10/12/1/0301000000aen2 0101012007700315F.HTMl (retrieved February 2011). yuh, Ji-yeon. 2002. Beyond the Shadow of Camptown: Korean Military Brides in America. new york: new york University Press.

eleven

almost Korean Korean Amerasians in an Era of Multiculturalism

sUe-Je l. gage We can no longer think of societies as isolated and self-maintaining systems. Nor can we imagine cultures as integrated totalities in which each part contributes to the maintenance of an organized, autonomous, and enduring whole. There are only cultural sets of practices and ideas, put into play by determinate human actors under determinate circumstances. In the course of action, these cultural sets are forever assembled, dismantled, and reassembled, conveying in variable accents the divergent paths of groups and classes. These paths do not find their explanation in the self-interested decisions of interacting individuals. They grow out of the deployment of social labor, mobilized to engage the world of nature. The manner of that mobilization sets the terms of history, and in these terms the peoples who have asserted a privileged relation with history and the peoples to whom history has been denied encounter a common destiny. —eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History

since the end of the twentieth century, five major events have altered the (re)construction of Koreanness and the terms of history: (1) the Japanese occupation, which brought Japanese understandings of social Darwinism and pan-asianism; (2) the revival of the Tan’gun myth to create a mythico-history for Koreans to resist occupation, hence the decisive nature of “purity” within Koreanness through minjok-ism as part of an “imagined community”1 process; (3) the U.s. military imposition since 15 august 1945, which introduced its own race-based ideologies and practices and the births of thousands of “mixed-blood” Koreans; (4) the 1

on the term “imagined community,” see Benedict anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991).

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Women’s Movement of the 1990s, and (5) globalization and the recent dramatic increase of international marriages and children born from those unions in south Korea. This volume addresses many of these changes and the impacts they have had on people within the Korean ethnonationalistic terrain. according to Martha Finnemore, states cannot be understood without reference to the changing international structure of international and transnational social relations that shape our perceptions and roles in that world (1992). it is through these external relations that Koreanness continues to be transformed and renegotiated, but not without power at play. This echoes eric Wolf’s quote at the start of this chapter, for it is the “cultural sets of practices and ideas, put into play by determinate human actors under determinate circumstances” that bring the past into the present and express the interconnections with others as part of a common destiny. Multiculturalism in south Korea is part of that set of equations and practices. it promises the equality, recognition, rights, and, most of all, the acceptance that “mixed” Koreans have desired for more than sixty years. it offers the possibility to acknowledge our “common destiny” through reconciling and voicing the silenced histories and institutionalized exclusion and discrimination of mixed Koreans, particularly Korean amerasians, as “mixed” Koreans continue to diversify and claim Koreanness. Based on research from 2002 to 2009 in south Korea and the United states, this chapter focuses on a specific population in south Korea that has been essentialized and grouped under the label amerasian, also referred to more generally as honhyŏl or “mixed blood.”2 it aims to uncover a history of what eric Wolf would refer to as “people without history” (1982)— people that Helen Zia might call “MiH” or “missing in history” (2001), who are critical to the implementation of multicultural policy in Korea today. i utilize several theoretical lenses and frameworks in the examination of oppression as experienced by Koreans known as Korean amerasians, who exist on the peripheries of Koreanness, a consequence of “the national order of things.”3 This chapter is epistemological by asking how we know what we know about amerasians in south Korea through the examination of various purviews of knowledge, including the reflexive knowledge of a mixed Korean female anthropologist. This chapter focuses on the particular history of amerasians in south Korea by addressing not only the situational nature of Koreanness that lingers from the time of 2

Korean amerasian here is defined not by its strict political definition from the amerasian act of 1982, which will be discussed later in this chapter, but more generally to include anyone with U.s. american paternity and Korean maternity born in south Korea since 1945 without U.s. citizenship. 3 The “national order of things” is a concept from liisa Malkki’s text Purity and Exile (1995).

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Japanese occupation and the status of the republic of Korea in the international community, but also the ways that “the amerasian” is understood and seen by other Koreans and americans, and more importantly how amerasians envision themselves as Korean. Paulo Freire, in his book Pedagogy of the Oppressed ([1968] 2000), argues that the oppressed have been dehumanized, and yet it is through that pedagogical experience of oppression that it and its causes can be objects of reflection. Through reflection there can be engagement in the struggle for liberation, making possible the pursuit of freedom—not an easy task as it threatens the oppressor and challenges the adapted structure and the internalization of oppression to which the oppressed are resigned. This is the duality that W. e. B. Du Bois called “double consciousness.” Freire notes that almost always during the initial stages of the struggle against oppression, the oppressed, instead of striving for their liberation, become the oppressors or “sub-oppressors.” elaine Kim and Chongmoo Choi suggest that Korea never had the opportunity to “decolonize” (1998). in this nondecolonized state, Koreans became oppressors and suboppressors of others, particularly Chinese-Koreans (Hwagyo), mixed Koreans like Korean amerasians, and Korean women in the camptown in its national reconstruction post–World War ii. This oppression has now included many others in more recent years with globalization. essentialism plagues diversity or true understanding and acceptance of difference. “The ability to bestow meanings—to ‘name’ things, acts, and ideas—is a source of power [whereby] control of communication allows the managers of ideology to lay down the categories through which reality is to be perceived” (Wolf 1982, 388). amerasians in south Korea have been called many pejorative names—honhyŏl, t’wigi, kkamdungi, miguk nom, to name a few—all denoting non-Koreannness and a lack of belonging. The inherent diversity within this politicized group is astounding— from age, generation, gender, blood quantum, class, education, “race,” and parentage, to family support, english fluency, Korean fluency, citizenship, “acceptance,” and everyday experiences. These factors not only divide mixed Koreans, but also bring them together as a marginalized identity. However, as Wolf rightly points out, control over communication also “entails the ability to deny the existence of alternative categories, to assign them to the realm of disorder and chaos, to render them socially and symbolically invisible [because] once things are named, . . . power is required to keep the meanings so generated in place” (388). This involves not only a political or legislative process, but also a social one. This chapter does not attempt to disentangle all of these differences; its purpose is to show how Korean amerasians are persistently relegated to non-Korean

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identities, yet “almost Korean.”4 This politicized group is the “elephant in the room” in south Korea as it grapples with multiculturalism today. Unlike other perspectives that tend to focus on amerasians as victims, this research argues for seeing honhyŏl, or “mixed blood,” Koreans as challengers to and resistors of the mythico-history of “pure blood.” it is within a system of core and peripheral experiences of oppression whereby Korean amerasians take center stage to help bridge the past with the present, to help Korea “decolonize,” and offer reconciling and sincere pathways toward the fulfillment of multiculturalism. Who Are Amerasians? American Perceptions By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commander and Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, I hereby establish military control over Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude and the inhabitants thereof, and announce the following conditions of the occupation: All powers of government over the territory of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude and the people thereof will be for the present exercised under my authority. Persons will obey my orders and orders issued under my authority. Acts of resistance to the occupying forces or any acts which may disturb public peace and safety will be punished severely. For all purposes during the military control, English will be the official language . . . —general order number 1 made by general Douglas Macarthur, 1945

When general Douglas Macarthur announced general order number 1 in 1945, it marked the symbolic end of Japanese occupation in Korea and 4

The title of this chapter came from a panel eleana Kim and i organized in 2007 for the american anthropological association titled “almost Korean: (re)emerging Differences and inequalities in south Korea.” This research is based on fieldwork and research from 2002 to 2009 in south Korea and the United states. There are several people who contributed to this chapter. First and foremost i want to thank Koreans known as “amerasians” and “mixed-blood”—thank you for your lives and for sharing them. Thank you to John lie, the anonymous reviewers, editors, University of California, Berkeley, and the Korea Foundation. This research began as part of my dissertation work in 2002, which was guided by a phenomenal committee: anya Peterson royce, roger l. Janelli, Marvin D. sterling, and Phillip Parnell at indiana University, Bloomington. Without James Kang-McCann, Woo soonDuk and the sisters, Pio suh, the Pearl s. Buck Foundation international, Korea staff, Jung Da-eun, and funding from indiana University’s anthropology Department, Fulbright iie, Fulbright-Hays, and ithaca College this research would not have happened. Thank you also to eleana Kim, Horace Underwood, and Jae-ok shim. and, a heartfelt thanks to my mother, sister serina, brothers Kim and Jimmy, and to my daughter, sarah yong-Hee, whose support and lives have guided and inspired me through this journey.

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the start of another occupation by the United states, known formally as the american Military government in Korea (aMgiK). The U.s. military presence continues today with approximately thirty thousand U.s. military personnel stationed in south Korea, but has historically included as many as four million since 1950 (U.s. Department of Defense). Between 1945 and 2000, international marriages and relationships occurred primarily between U.s. male soldiers and Korean women. During my initial research trip in 2002, interracial unions were still relatively rare in south Korea outside of the camptowns. While it is estimated that one in five Korean women worked in the camptowns (Moon 1996), women who engage in relations with non-Korean others, particularly those within the U.s. military, have been stereotyped as prostitutes, a label and symbolic reference to kijich’on, or the U.s. military camptown. Progeny born of unions between asian women and U.s. soldiers stationed abroad are also emblematic of the camptown and U.s. imperialism, also found elsewhere in asia or wherever the U.s. military has a presence abroad (gage 2013). The stereotypical U.s. image of “the amerasian” could be likened to a scene in Braddock – Missing in Action 3, where Chuck norris returns to vietnam to find his amerasian son and other “orphans” in order to “return” them to their true home, the United states. The film depicts a pitifully thin, blond-haired child with blue almond-shaped eyes, wearing tattered clothes and speaking broken english, who needs to be rescued and safely returned to his true country, america—the place where he can be his true self and no longer an orphan (orphan being defined in terms of abandoned paternity and his whiteness), but asian nonetheless and the offspring of a U.s. soldier and an asian woman. This is just one of many pop culture and media examples of how the image of amerasian is conveyed in the United states (gage 2007a). Many americans are familiar with the concepts of “gi babies” or “war babies” from media and nongovernmental organizations (ngos), but few think of them at all. For those that do, amerasian is a label deserving pity because of the shame of their sons’ indiscretions in asia, along with a chosen ignorance. rarely did americans consider that thousands of american men sent overseas would have relations with women abroad, let alone have children with those women. The U.s. government also has historically turned a blind eye to one of the most predictable scenarios of sexual relationships, coerced or consensual. While ngos do not necessarily always effect change, specific combinations of governmental and nongovernmental individuals and groups, social movements, and processes may ultimately change state behavior and policy. in many cases, ngos utilize a framing process that involves essentializing the very populations that these organizations attempt to assist. in the specific case of amerasians, it was the political and social

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organization of difference that categorized these individuals as “almost,” but not quite american or Korean. The men who fathered them were seen as american, and the women who mothered them as asian prostitutes, with the existing U.s. racial hierarchy and Korean and american patriarchies at work. The term “amerasian” was conceptualized in the early 1930s by Pearl s. Buck, a nobel laureate in literature. she reiterated this point in an interview by saying, “i am compelled to the conclusion that the most needy children in the world are those born in asia whose mothers are asian but whose fathers are american. They are a new group of human beings, a group that asians do not know how to deal with, illegitimate as well as mixed in race. our present project, therefore, is the amerasian” (PsB Foundation 1984). she founded the Welcome House in Korea in 1956 to provide an educational and adoption service for “mixed-race” Koreans—children of unions between local Korean women and U.s. and naTo support forces—and subsequently established similar Welcome Houses in other countries. earlier, after the U.s. occupation of Japan, Miki sawada established the elizabeth Thunders Home in Japan for “mixed-race” Japanese (gage 2007a). Wherever there are americans in asia, there are amerasians, particularly in asian countries colonized or militarized by the U.s. government since the late 1800s. U.s. private agencies such as the Holt adoption agency, started by Harry and Bertha Holt, were drawn to south Korea after watching media representations of the war. The Holts watched a film shown by World vision about the Korean War and the mixed-race children born and “orphaned.” Many americans saw these children as american, since their fathers were U.s. soldiers, using the rule of blood as a determining factor in citizenship, as well as american patriarchy. However, the context of the 1950s was an explicitly race-based society where antimiscegenation laws were still upheld, which made the adoption of mixed black Korean children more difficult. Harry Holt traveled to Korea and adopted eight “mixed-race” children in 1955, and so began the formalized history of international adoption, the only viable solution seen at that time to the “problem” of unwanted mixed-race children in countries devastated by war. Wolf points to how a “kin-ordered mode” is used to distinguish human beings when modes of production converged with the interconnections of people. This mode distinguishes based on descent and affinity symbolized through “blood, bone, or fertilizing spirit . . . [where] some kinfolk emerge as ‘more equal than others,’ and lesser kin confront the real limits of kin-based assistance. a social world divided into insiders and outsiders, moreover, creates the problem of strangers and orphans” (1982, 389). Thousands of amerasians and other Koreans in south Korea were adopted to the United states,

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Canada, and several european countries. From the beginning, amerasians were seen as a problem that did not neatly fit within established “kinordered modes.” social workers at the time and up until the late 1970s described their work as baby hunting: finding blond-haired babies in the U.s. military camptowns in south Korea and pleading with mothers to relinquish their children for a “better life” in america. They were told that they did not belong in Korea, in essence connecting social/economic/ political factors of domestic spheres with the international. in april 1979, Father alfred Keane from the st. vincent’s Home for amerasians in incheon, south Korea, approached Congressman stewart B. McKinney, who had served in the U.s. air Force during the Korean War era. Father Keane requested that a bill (later to be known as H.808) be written to help amerasians obtain visas to travel to the United states as citizens. a similar bill was requested by Jody Darragh of the Pearl s. Buck Foundation, later proposed in the senate bill s.1698 by senator Jeremiah a. Denton and senator Carl levin.5 While Father Keane was lobbying in Washington, Father Benedict Zweber, Pio suh, and adult amerasians who had formed the amerasian association continued their efforts in Korea, assisting amerasians and Korean orphans at st. vincent’s in incheon for the purposes of adoption and immigration. Many of these so-called orphans were not orphans at all, but their mothers had been strongly “encouraged” to relinquish their children’s care to these orphanages, which they believed were “safe places” and symbolic of a transition into better futures for their children in the United states. Together with representatives from the Pearl s. Buck Foundation, Father Keane and Korean amerasians who presented personal testimony fought for political recognition in the United states of amerasians in asia as U.s. citizens. at that time there were approximately two thousand amerasians in south Korea registered with the Pearl s. Buck Foundation,6 but these numbers are highly contested as many people were not counted, and the exact number of amerasians is still unknown. What resulted from their efforts was the amerasian act of 1982 or Pl 97-359, which granted to certain amerasians born between 31 December 1950 and 22 october 1982 in Cambodia, Korea, laos, Thailand, or vietnam the possibility of immigration to the United states—not as citizens, but with a refugee-like status, despite laws 5

Congressional record, Proceedings and Debates of the 97th Congress 2nd session, volume 128-Part 20, 1 october 1982 to 30 november 1982 (Washington, DC: government Printing office, 1982), 1 october 1982, 27271. 6 statement of reverend alfred Keane from amerasian immigration Proposals Hearing before the subcommittee on immigration and refugee Policy, 97th Congress on s.1698, 901–902. 21 June 1982.

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of citizenship based on blood. on 22 october 1982, the day the amerasian act was written into law, then president ronald reagan spoke the following: This is a happy occasion, i think, for all of us here. Today i’m signing into law a legislation that comes to grips with a problem that i think should touch every american’s heart. During the last three decades, when tens of thousands of our airmen, soldiers, marines, and sailors went to southeast asia and Korea to prevent aggression and protect the vital interests of our country, a number of amerasian children were born. When the fathers returned to the United states, far too often innocent children were left without parent or without a country. Through no fault of their own, these children have frequently lived in the most wretched of circumstances and often have been ostracized in the lands of their birth.7

The troublesome notion of “fathering” and timing is complicated not only by deaths in asian wars fought by U.s. soldiers, but also by the Department of Defense’s informal sanctioning of prostitution near U.s. military installations overseas. several countries, particularly in asia, have had a long history of U.s. and U.n. military presence, which engendered a system of prostitution catering to soldiers’ entertainment in U.s. military camptowns. Katharine Moon argues in her book Sex among Allies: Military Prostitution in US–Korea Relations that “private relations among people and foreign relations between governments inform and are informed by each other” (1997, 2). she explores how and why women became symbols of Korean–U.s. assurances and commitments of the U.s. military presence in south Korea. With this structural set-up of “legal/illegal” prostitution, many male soldiers thought of themselves as having sexual relations with local women and nothing beyond that—they certainly did not imagine themselves as fathers. These intimate relations began in Korea in 1945 and continued after 1982; there are thus more amerasians in Korea who are excluded from immigrating under this law. While limitations and exclusions of the amerasian act were legitimized and codified in this way, certain kinds of materialized “proof” of mixed americanness were required for consideration under this law. The imaginings of authenticity and legitimacy of race as biology, blood, and citizenship are simultaneously entangled and denied within the history and context of this law, leaving those who were not eligible subject to statelessness within the republic of Korea. Korean amerasians who immigrated to the United states under this law, some of 7 ronald reagan, “remarks on signing a Bill Providing for the immigration of Certain amerasian Children,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan (Washington, DC: Us government Printing office, 1983), 1372.

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whom have now become naturalized citizens of the United states, experience racism in american society, as well as from Koreans and Korean americans in the United states. it is naive to believe that immigration could somehow remedy and/or erase the problems of discrimination and racism that amerasians—many of whom experienced multiple abandonments and racism from all sides—faced in Korea. on several occasions i sat with Korean amerasians at a Korean restaurant in the United states and wondered why i was the only one speaking Korean to the Korean servers and staff, even though many of them spoke Korean among themselves. “i don’t really feel comfortable speaking Korean,” one Korean amerasian woman remarked, explaining that she had just recently started speaking Korean after finding her high school friends in south Korea. “i guess it depends on the people and place,” replied another who spoke fluent Korean with his wife and me inside their home. Korean amerasians are part of the Korean diaspora, but their designation as honhyŏl, and the marked experiences from their lives in south Korea as well as in the United states, is charged with emotions and memories found in their present-day interactions. For Korean adoptees, including Korean amerasians and those who immigrated under the amerasian act of 1982, the historical and personal connections to “home,” or what one Korean amerasian who immigrated to the United states referred to as the “motherland,” is irrevocable and an important part of their identity as Korean. in eleana Kim’s chapter in this volume and in her book Adopted Territory, she describes how the Korean government began a process of reconciliation for “ethnic” Korean adoptees (2010); however, Korean amerasians, adoptee or otherwise, have yet to receive reconciliatory efforts. Who Are Amerasians? Korean Perceptions “Why do honhyŏl hate Koreans?” a young Korean college student asked me during my first preliminary research trip to seoul in 2002. at the other end of the spectrum, the question asked by amerasians is: “Why can’t they accept me as Korean?” Koreanness is believed to be transferred in the blood, as long as the blood is considered “pure” Korean blood, most notably transferred by the father to the child. This paternal relationship establishes gender as a factor in “race” transference and identity. For example, many adoptees or emigrants who have returned to the homeland but cannot speak the language are still considered Korean enough. appearance and language serve as primary markers of identity within Korea. as a result, many Koreans believe that their Koreanness is carried through the blood. Patrilineal history is the official recording of blood purity and

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group identity in Korea. Within this ethnonationalistic framework, identity is ascribed and then claimed with strict rules of membership, although these rules and identities can and do change. in many cases, Koreanness today seems to be an identity that can be claimed, but one that also needs to be ratified by other “Koreans.” ideas like race and the power given to this idea are manifested in social relations through modes of communication. abelmann and lie remind us that “ethnicities are born and nurtured amid a stream of political ideologies, material goods, and media images flowing across national boundaries” (1995, 12). as such, while Koreanness is undergoing reconstruction, strict notions still exist regarding who may rightfully claim that identity. “Koreans are the most racist people in the world,” a Korean woman with a black Korean amerasian daughter told me angrily as Koreans stared at us walking by. i had heard this several times before and would hear it repeated throughout my field research by other amerasians and Korean women who had relations with non-Korean men. Their statements led me to wonder: What does it mean to be racist in Korea? What does “race” mean within the Korean context of the Korean self and for the other? The historical and structural partitions of the U.s. military camptowns in south Korea, and the experiences of women who have borne children from relationships with american non-Korean men, provide insights into understanding the history of amerasians in south Korea and the perceptions of them as not belonging. The Camptown

areas for sexual entertainment and consumption exist outside the military installations of all camptowns in Korea. ann stoler, in her examination of indonesia and colonial rule, says that sexual arrangements were critical in creating colonial categories and distinguishing the ruler from the ruled (2002). according to Bruce Cumings, camptown areas have little to do with Korean culture, but rather are a way of life for many people (1992). “[They have been] an integral part of Korea’s subordination to Japanese and american interests through most of this century [the twentieth]; the military base in the it’aewŏn [yongsan in seoul] area, after all, was Japan’s for four decades, and now it has been ours [the U.s.’s]. . . . in 1945 the camptowns just switched patrons” (Cumings 1992, 174). The “web of subordination” to which Cumings refers is still present. as one enters the camptown area, it is as though a visceral line has been crossed. an invisible door, once entered, takes you into a place transformed by pollution. The camptown is what Catherine lutz refers to as “the edge and essence of the U.s. ‘empire’” (2004). More specifically, with reference to the military, she defines empire as “a constellation of state and state-structured private

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projects successfully aiming to exert wide-ranging control, through territorial or more remote means, over practices and resources beyond the state’s boundaries” (lutz 2006, 594). Power cannot exist alone, but builds upon collaboration with supranational institutions like the iMF, the World Bank, and ngos whose interests lie in global capital and the maintenance of global hierarchies (Hardt and negri 2000). This appears to be true in the south Korean national and local context as well, in the structuring of shops, clubs, international “middle men” serving as brokers between women elsewhere in asia and south Korean club owners, local governments, police, and the Korean special Tourism association (KsTa) of the camptowns, as well as the U.s. military and government (gage 2013). The camptown is a place where Korean women historically served as “ambassadors” to help ease tensions between the United states and Korea through their bodies (Moon 1996). gi-Wook shin argues that race nationalism in Korea arose in response to colonial racism as influenced by social Darwinism during the Japanese occupation (2006, 224). i would add that it was during the U.s. military presence after 1945 that notions of race in Korea appeared, compounded by experiences of oppressions prior to and during that time. U.s. notions of race and ethnicity have influenced Korean conceptions of race, particularly in the spatial and transnational contexts of the U.s. military camptown areas and those within those borderlands. These ideas became integrated into Korean society as they were enacted and experienced directly, especially in regard to whiteness and blackness, and were placed on amerasians. These areas began as intersections of the United states and the republic of Korea (roK) and have expanded to become multiethnic spaces of interaction (gage 2013). The camptown areas are not necessarily the sole location for U.s.-roK relationships on the individual level, nor are they the only spaces where amerasians are born; however, they are central places where identities are marked and perceived. i found that women who worked in the clubs continued to do so in some form because these were the only jobs available to them. For many retired sex workers, working in clubs as madams or dishwashers was a way of life, a continuation of their former kijich’on lives, serving the U.s. military with physical labor. However, though some of the women i met were not engaged in the sex industry, they knew it was assumed that they were. Koreans understand this symbolic and lived inequality of power, and historical events since then, such as the Kwangju Uprising and massacre and the economic and environmental impacts of the U.s. military’s presence in south Korea have solidified these feelings of Korea as less than america, and as a consequence positioned amerasians as scapegoats of U.s. imperialism in Korea.

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“International-Marriage Women”

Former president syngman rhee is said to have intentionally (re)created the camptowns that existed during the Japanese occupation as areas of prostitution because of the high incidence of rape after the U.s. military began its presence in south Korea. Korean women were called upon to “serve their country” through their bodies. The gender dynamic of identity and loss of identity is contradicted in the numerous examples of Korean men who marry or have relations with non-“Korean” women who retain their Korean identities and cultural citizenship. rhee, the first democratically elected president of the republic of Korea in 1948, was married to a white austrian woman. This relationship was not questioned, nor was his identity as Korean. When the gender dynamic is reversed, however, the effect is different, as Korean women who marry or have relations with non-Korean men were often perceived as polluted, especially those involved with U.s. soldiers. Fredrick Barth states that ethnicity goes beyond cultural difference; it is the “social organization of cultural difference” that distinguishes members from nonmembers (1969, 17). When members violate the behaviors established as appropriate for membership, they are no longer full-fledged members of the group. ethnicity is both subjective and objective in this regard. according to george Devos, ethnicity is where “the personal and societal intertwine.” He defines ethnicity as “a feeling of continuity with a real or imagined past, a feeling that is maintained as an essential part of one’s self-definition” (1995, 353). The intricate connections between race, ethnicity, and nation are complicated by these boundary violations, but speak to how Korean amerasians are not “multicultural,” rather “multiethnic.” There is a hierarchy not only of Koreanness, but also of women and “mixed blood.” “even if we were at the bottom of the hierarchy, at least we’d be in it,” one Korean amerasian man explained to me. abelmann and lie go on to state, “These marriages conjure up images of the union of south Korean and american peripheries: the poor farm girl from a south Korean village who makes her way to the bars and brothels of the ‘base villages,’ and the poor U.s. recruit from one of america’s rural states – the movement from one pocket of poverty and discrimination in south Korea to another in the U.s.” (1995, 59). Korean-american military wives who seek to escape from the degrading comments and looks also experience difficulties in the United states, including racism, sexism, and classism (yuh 2002). The extended family continues to be affected by the negative associations. abelmann and lie found that “if people hear that you went [to the United states] to get a

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degree at Harvard that’s one thing, but if you went because your sister married an american, then you are merely paja munsan [the names of two U.s. military bases, referring to those who immigrate via the U.s. military]” (1995, 61). The pure blood ideology and the large U.s. military presence in south Korea creates a complicated relationship between all parties involved, at the international, national, local, and individual levels. The notion of “our women” as vessels of the nation-state responsible for the health of the nation was seen as being violated by this human intersection and by the children born from unions taking place in a space of national insecurity and lack of recognition. The problem is often dealt with by relegating it to the past and dismissing it as something not to be explored (gage 2007a, 91). Korean amerasian adoptees meeting their mothers for the first time, or amerasians who have always known their mothers but desire to know their histories, are frequently told: “it’s in the past.” This remark is often made by Korean and Korean-american women who want to separate themselves from their histories and the negative associations and stereotypes related to kijich’on and gis or “dirty work.” Their efforts to avoid revisiting the past are revealed in the distinction between “us” and “those women,” or the women who married gis and immigrated to the United states and “those women” who stayed. no clear distinction can be made between Korean-american women who have a history with kijich’on and Korean women who continue to live and work in kijich’on; neither can one be made between amerasians born and/or raised in the United states or Korea. even if a Korean woman and a non-Korean man did not meet in the camptown or have any affiliations with the U.s. military, there is a link between all of these groups. However, this connection does not necessarily mean that they see one another in a similar light, let alone in a positive one. The intersections of class, race, gender, education, and english abilities dictate associations with “normal” Koreans in the United states, as well as in Korea. as a result, they create social support networks of women like themselves. i have heard both Korean and Korean-american women complain about “those Korean women” who spoke english to them, or displayed their jewelry like badges of pride and distinction, or married officers or professionals and lived in big houses in the best neighborhoods, all of whom were married to white american men. They feel inferior to these women and believe they cannot measure up, as the shadows of the camptown and race politics follow them and their children more closely than others. in this context, kijich’on women who “stay” make up a hierarchy of “fallen” women ranging from “bad” to “worse.”

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Emic Perceptions of “Race” in South Korea

i explored the perceptions of “race” in south Korea in areas beyond the camptowns, primarily in university areas and shopping districts in seoul.8 The general consensus of the Koreans interviewed during a study conducted in 2002 during the World Cup in south Korea was that there were at least three races— white, black, and asian, and sometimes latin. rarely did anyone mention the possibility of mixing. The interviewees conveyed a confidence in these races as being isolated, with strong statements about the assumptions of each racial group. The surveys i conducted on perceptions of race in Korea brought to light the presumed correlation between race and beauty, race and behavior, and race and socioeconomic position and power. Whites were marked primarily by their “white skin,” followed by adjectives like “blond hair,” “beautiful,” ” blue and green-eyed,” “having double eyelids,” “sharp high noses,” and “thin lips.” These were followed by descriptors like “wealthy,” “cultured,” “educated,” “liberal,” “sexually open,” “superior,” and “powerful.” Blacks were also initially marked by their skin tone: “They have black skin,” “curly hair,” “large buttocks,” “thick lips.” Then on to other descriptors: “they’re good at sports,” “poor,” “not educated,” “they have a hard life,” “they’re pure black,” “one of their parents is from africa,” “unrefined and awkward,” “talkative.” Many respondents said that asians have “skin color” or “yellow skin,” as taught in Korean educational curricula and textbooks. skin color was followed by “black hair,” “round plain face,” “no double eyelid,” “small eyes and nose.” other descriptors included: “hard-working,” “ambitious,” “introverted,” “obedient,” “respectful of community,” “proud of their ethnicity,” “in the middle between whites and blacks.” The stereotypes of the three race categories are striking, not just because participants were so confident in their assertions about these groups, but because few had had any direct experience with anyone from another ethnic group and that they were making judgments based on magazine images of female models. after each interview, i asked the respondent to identify her own “ethnicity.” The response was generally a decisive confirmation that they were Korean, voiced with irritation at the question. Those who pointed out “Korean” women in the pictures were asked why they thought they were Korean. The responses included: “i have a feeling,” “i can easily know their faces [more] than other people,” “Because they look like me,” “They are people from where i belong,” “They have my skin color,” “i’m familiar 8 With the help of Jung Da-eun, i conducted a preliminary study in the summer of 2002 where participants were asked to sort images of women’s faces in any order they wished.

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with them because they look like me. if i met them outside Korea, i’d try to talk to them because they look Korean,” and “We are the same race. i belong to this group.” This sense of us/them is apparent in these statements, conveying the idea that “i know who i am” and anyone outside of that definition is not Korean. This suggests a subjective and visceral understanding of what it means to be Korean; thus, one could preliminarily conclude that physical appearance is a primary aspect of identification for Koreans. although group membership boundaries are complex, it appears that many Koreans categorize themselves and their world according to this uncontested process. it is in this same vein that euyryung Jun, nancy abelmann, et al. in this volume critique south Korea’s speedy efforts to implement “multiculturalism” in its vaguely understood state without any interrogation of historical discrimination or racism. Despite certain pitfalls, the study presented shows how “race” is conceptualized as a triad hierarchy of white at the top, asian in the middle, and black on the bottom, without any possibility of intermixing. such ideologies and hegemonic beliefs affect how any “mixed-blood” group is identified or not identified. in my interviews with Koreans about the concept of honhyŏl, over and over they asserted that it means “american and Korean mixed blood,” with no room for other meanings. The persistence of this concept reveals the challenges faced by amerasians in south Korea and their lack of recognition as Korean. “no matter how i try to be Korean, i can’t,” one amerasian man explained. Preferences in Korea for teachers of english are based on ideas of “race” and “beauty” as well as on presumptions of appearance, power, intellect, and superiority that privilege whiteness within the Korean context. nadia Kim, in her book Imperial Citizens (2008), echoes this idea. a Korean english academy supervisor explained this racial and beauty preference for english teachers to me in detail. “Their first preference is white women with blond hair, then brunette. Their second choice is a white man. Their third choice is a Korean-american.” When i asked about african americans, she responded, “They don’t want them because Koreans think they bring drugs into the country.” There was no mention of amerasians as able english teachers within the supervisor’s explanation of the desired preferences. However, amerasians’ perceived racial identity and the presumed correlation with beauty is a factor. an amerasian man told me about his friend’s experience in trying to get an english teaching job. “My friend, she’s twenty-five percent american [black] and seventy-five percent Korean. Her father’s half Korean. Well, she applied to be an english teacher and they told her everything was fine, but they were looking for someone whiter.” However, while mixed white Korean americans are accepted within

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these academies, white Korean amerasians are not, which reinforces a hierarchy of accepted non-Koreans. There are strong notions of Koreanness and the Korean “race,” but a disregard for the possibility of racism. it seems ironic that this could pass without notice. Balibar and Wallerstein state that “neo-racisms” go beyond the “biological” to extend to all forms of “otherness”—class, nationalism, ethnicity, “interbreeding,” religion, gender, and so on (1992). John lie provides an example of this neoracism in Japan involving returning Japanese migrants and other “asian” residents (2001, 18). Data from my interviews suggest that for many Koreans presumptions of the biological are the primary determinants in racing self and others. However, further interviews and observations reveal that the problem is much more complicated, as seen in the experiences of KoreanChinese (Chosŏnjok) migrant workers and Japanese Brazilian workers returning to the “homeland.”9 since the early 1990s, south Korea has moved more toward democracy and embraced globalization, or segyehwa. The flow of ideas gave Korean women more impetus to advocate for change, which led to the rise of women’s movements and changes in citizenship laws in south Korea. Many of the women’s groups involved in this movement included those that supported amerasians and their mothers. Through their efforts, bilateral citizenship became law, which meant that legal citizenship would be granted to the children of single mothers; therefore, either the mother’s or father’s side could establish legal membership into the state for their child. This change was monumental, giving amerasians legal status and recognition in south Korea for the first time since 1945—the year in which the first amerasian was born. now they could register to vote, get national health insurance, and go to school legally; but because the new law did not grant them full citizenship, they could not serve in the military. However monumental, legal citizenship did little for recognition and nothing for cultural citizenship. Deep-seated stereotypes and prejudices still remain in many Korean minds and appear in their actions, as evidenced in the discussion about the recent incorporation of “other” Koreans into Korean identity, the spatial and personal stereotypes of the camptown and the women presumed to be sex workers, as well as many Korean perceptions and fears of migrant workers. These perceptions continue to expand and change because of globalization and transnationalism, along with the push toward political correctness (PC), in the same way that the United states has made attempts at equality and multiculturalism. not 9 For information on Japanese Brazilians see Takeyuki Tsuda’s (2003) Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilians Return Migration in Transnational Perspective. new york: Columbia University Press.

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only does this create an era of censorship and self-censorship on what is spoken about in terms of race and racism, but it denies the realities and lives of many individuals. With this changing social context, us/them distinctions become further delineated and restricted, but are sometimes hidden under the veil of what it means to be PC. Double Consciousness, Intersectionality, and Strategies of Asserting Koreanness This sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. –W. e. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk I know that people may see the connection in the looks and racial history. . . . But the truth is I am a Korean girl who happens to have an Afro-American father. –Kang Min-jung

Du Bois discusses the experiences of “double consciousness” as a two-ness of “an american, a negro . . . two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (1903, 5).10 For amerasians in south Korea there is also this sense of double consciousness, but it goes beyond the black/white paradigm to include asianness more generally and Koreanness more specifically, as they look through their own eyes as well as through the eyes of “Koreans,” and white and other ethnic/racial “americans.” Du Bois refers to three manifestations of double-consciousness: the power of essentialization and the stereotypes that misrepresent while simultaneously knowing a reflexive truth about oneself; racism that excludes one from mainstream society; and the internal conflict between what it means to be “african” and “american.” although he is specifically speaking to the black experience in the United states, his ideas can be applied to many marginalized populations, including “mixed blood” Koreans. For many Korean amerasians, there is no sense of community or a separate culture, yet the dominating discourse and representations by a few amerasians silences their expressions of self, diversity within, and Koreanness. Terence Turner critiques the use and misunderstanding of “culture” in the multicultural movement (1993). gilroy rightly points out that even when essentialism is replaced, the alternative has been the “dissolution of the essential black subject” (1991). Both of 10

The second quote is from a twenty-year-old student at Jeonju University. in Bae Hyunjung, “Barack obama, Just U.s. President to Me,” Korean Herald, 12 november 2008.

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Figure 11.1: Koreanness and Almost Koreanness Figure 11.1: Koreanness and almost Koreanness

these scholars’ statements have relevance to the Korean amerasian experience with multiculturalism in Korea today. a report from 2002 found that despite free compulsory education, almost 10 percent of amerasians did not enter or graduate from elementary school, and almost 18 percent did not finish middle school. Fifty-six percent were unemployed, and of those who did have jobs, 33 percent worked in hard manual labor. no amerasians held any governmental position (Yŏnhap, 14 March 2002). according to anya Peterson royce, “governments can prescribe laws, but they cannot regulate people’s hearts” (gage 2007b), which is echoed within Korean amerasian experiences despite bilateral citizenship law since the 1990s. Critical race studies approaches populations in the united States through the lens of “intersectionality,” to better understand the experiences of individuals on the ground and how they are linked to institutionalized structures and social practices. the daily experiences of marginalized peoples are filled with microaggressions whereby race, gender, class, and so on intersect. Critical race studies illuminates how social inequality happens and how it can be changed (Crenshaw 1991). to graphically represent the various aspects of marginalization, I utilize a rendering of critical race studies, intersectionality, and world systems analysis. as depicted in figure 11.1, the centrality of “pure blood” ideologies in Korea are like a planet with residual moons of “almost Koreanness,” whereby race, gender, class, and type of mixture intersect to determine ones relative proximity or distance to Koreanness. the central core symbolizes the “pure blood” ideology, not as a biological reality, but as a reference point for subjective experience and defining of ethnonationalistic belonging. Blackness is relegated to the most distant spectrum of that system, as further discussed by nadia Kim in her chapter within this volume. Within the semiperiphery, mixed white Korean celebrities who “pass” exist within the inner semiperipheral line, and white and Korean mixes with married parents, american citizenship,

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upper-class status, english fluency, and educational attainment are just outside that semiperipheral line. Within the periphery are extraordinary mixed black Korean celebrities, followed by mixed other asian Koreans with married parentage, a Korean father and an international asian mother, respectively. outside the realms of the periphery are white amerasians, followed by black amerasians farthest from subjective perceptions of Koreanness. gender is a factor in all of these realms, whereby female intersections are placed within closer proximity to “Koreanness” than their male counterparts within each respective sphere. as this rough visual image suggests, the assumption that “mixed” Koreans, let alone Korean amerasians, are similar or part of a community misrepresents them. images and stories often feature those who have “made it,” and stories of the most desolate are often recycled; although there is a very real essence to those stories, others are left out. one amerasian mother expressed her concern about one vocal amerasian, saying, “sometimes he’s on Tv talking about honhyŏl, and i get so embarrassed. He only talks about negative things and about how horrible our lives are.” she was not alone, as several amerasians voiced a similar concern about how they were being represented and how the stories presented in the media did little to change things. assumptions generally made about amerasians are their lack of Koreanness, inferior intelligence, low social class, and lack of culture and english-speaking abilities. it is also assumed that their mothers are prostitutes and their fathers are U.s. soldiers. one Korean mother of an amerasian daughter said to me, “They question Jeannie’s intelligence, like their children are smarter than she is, but she’s very smart, smarter than them!” an amerasian woman told me the story of meeting her future Korean inlaws for the first time. “They asked me, ‘Do you know how to cook rice?’ They asked me this! They think my mom since she works in a club, so she doesn’t have any education, so she can’t even teach me to cook rice! i’m Korean, i eat rice everyday!” stereotypes such as these convey presumptions about a lack of Korean culture and a lack of normality that imagine amerasians as having some kind of developmental and cultural gap because of their mixedness. one prominent assumption about amerasians in south Korea is that all of them want to live in the United states. The discrimination and exclusion they experience lead to a “push-pull” dilemma of whether to stay in Korea and be almost Korean or go to the United states and be almost american. several amerasians said they did want to go to the United states, and that legally they should have the option of U.s. citizenship and all the resources therein; but not all have this desire. For example, a young black amerasian woman i interviewed said,

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i used to want to go [to the United states] and find my father. now i want to go to study. When i was younger i didn’t really want to go to the states because i just felt abandoned and i was in despair about being an american. if i ever do go, i don’t think it will be easy, since i don’t speak english well. i don’t think it will change my life. i want to study there, not live there. it will be tough, but i think it will be a good chance for my life to be like other students.

For a family with an amerasian father, Korean mother, and two young adult children, there was no reason to go. “Why go? We’re Korean.” For those who did immigrate under the amerasian act, experiences were not as smooth as they expected, and some still have not become U.s. citizens. For these two examples, there was a definitive Korean self, as well as a strategy to maintain that Koreanness, whether it was accepted by others or not. While an amerasian identity and label tend to suggest certain assumed experiences and ways of being, the names amerasians are given or give themselves also play roles in their experiences. names allow amerasians to strategically use and shift their identities to obtain membership among various groups as an act of agency. The way they are perceived at birth appears to affect what names they are given. Many are born with one name or multiple names; later they might change their names and create new ones. one amerasian mother explained why her son and daughter have different “ethnic” names. “yuh yun, i call her Kimchee Face because she looks Korean. Johnny, he looks american, so people treat him differently. They tease him at school and ask him to speak english. He doesn’t know how, but yuh yun, she is really good at english.” Their amerasian mother had given them names she felt appropriate to their appearance at birth. Justine, another amerasian mother, has always been ashamed of her american name and explained that it is listed on her mother’s family’s hojŏk or family record. she said that when she was young, people would tell her she looked american. “now people say i look more Korean. Maybe my face is changing? i feel Korean, but i don’t look Korean. My name is not Korean.” Friends and family call her by her Korean name—Cho sun-young, a name she asked her mother to create during her elementary school years after she experienced racism there. “But americans call me Justine,” she said, introducing herself that way. Because her family registry lists her american name, it is on all of her iD cards, and she must use it in official situations. i asked her which name she preferred, and she responded, “sun-young. it’s more comfortable.” recently she began using Justine again when she started to work as a bartender in one of the camptown clubs. she explained that when her daughter was born, it was

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important for her to give her daughter a Korean name. another Korean amerasian named Pak Wan-ki also goes by sam and has both names written on his business cards. When i asked him about his american name, he said, “My friend gave it to me. He said i looked like a sam.” generally Wan-ki introduces himself as Pak Wan-ki, but when meeting foreigners or americans, he introduces himself as sam. royce discusses how the “social context plays a vital role in determining the relative flexibility of any group” (1982, 189). Through my interviews i found that depending on the context, amerasians use names that create the most open arena in which to navigate, allowing them to expose and express their identities while still maintaining their Koreanness. Acts of Patriotism

Historically, the ethnonation of Korea with “race” as a membership focus has reached out to the Korean diaspora to help build the nation, as overseas Koreans have a civic duty to contribute to the state’s development and prosperity. nonmembers by contrast must prove their “worth” through extraordinary means. While amerasian entertainers and singers can gain some access to Korean society through those avenues, their position as “Korean” is not completely accepted. one marked example is insooni (insuni), an amerasian singer who became popular in the late 1970s and still remains popular as she crosses musical boundaries. she sang a passion-filled patriotic song called “our Beautiful Country.” This performance was not well received by some Koreans because of her “nonKorean” status. in May 2003, a young actress named lee yoo-jin publicly announced after her five-year career in the entertainment business that she was the daughter of an american father and a Korean mother. With tears in her eyes, she apologized to the public for never acknowledging this. “i’m not sure i would have been able to do this five years ago,” she explained (JoongAng Daily, 20 Feb. 200411). While some can “pass” as Korean without much notice, others cannot. What i found in my interviews with amerasians is their lack of sympathy for lee yoo-jin, especially among black amerasians. “i don’t know why she cried [her emphasis]. she’s beautiful and she already is successful. she didn’t have to lie. i knew who she was when i first saw her on television, but she kept denying it,” one young black amerasian woman said. “Who cares? she’s already famous and has a lot of money,” another black amerasian man explained. Their comments relay the different levels of inclusion and exclusion experienced by mixed Koreans in Korea that differentiate their experiences. 11

references to JoongAng Daily in this chapter refer to the english online version of this news source.

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as lee yoo-jin stated, she would not have been able to make this public acknowledgment five years prior to her coming out. Did this have something to do with her personal emotional readiness or the social context of Korean society? i would argue that it was probably both. royce discusses how physical constraints limit strategies of performing ethnic identity. she states that while one can alter physical features “by nose jobs, hair straightening or frizzing, protecting one’s skin from the sun or overexposing it, contact lenses to change eye color, dressing to change body type,” and so on as well as “movement style” and “nonverbal repertoire,” these strategies are within certain limits (1982, 189). Previously, lee had denied accusations that she was “mixed,” and performed a Korean identity. The popularity of mixed white and Korean-american females in south Korea was booming at the time of her “coming out”—a time of increased consciousness of human rights and globalization. While entertainment has been one of the only access roads to peripheral membership into Korean society for amerasians, the individual has to be extraordinary in some way to gain such access, especially if blackness is part of his or her identity. Passing facilitates entry, and both whiteness and beauty are important factors to access “passing.” Today, the exotification of the white amerasian female face has created symbols of beauty that cover media and television with individuals such as american-born mixed Korean white females like Kim Deana, Jennifer Wilsen, or Keri-lee graham, and english/Korean language program star lisa Kelly. it has also created a new subset of what it means to be a specific kind of honhyŏl in Korea that only applies to certain white mixed Korean-american females who are upper-class, beautiful, model-like, english-speaking, and educated. These individuals serve as objects of the Korean gaze, symbolizing whiteness and power through the mixed Korean female body, for Korean consumption, but not acceptance. The hosting of the 2002 World Cup in south Korea was an expression of patriotism for all Koreans, including Korean amerasians. at the amerasian Christian academy, a school begun for amerasians, principal James Kang and the students were excited about the World Cup soccer games. They sang the songs and wore the red T-shirts and bandanas supporting the Korean team. Commenting on the World Cup, Kang said, “it’s a good opportunity for Koreans to learn about other people and maybe be more open.” i asked how the students responded when the United states played Korea. He replied, “it depended on if they had american fathers or not. They were torn. But the U.s. lost, so now everyone’s just wearing the reds’ T-shirts” to support the Korean team. an amerasian man in his late fifties explained his feelings of patriotism this way: “our fathers fought for our country to remain free of communism.” Despite his pro-american position in south Korea, when i asked him about the United states–Korea

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game in the World Cup, he told me he cheered for the Korean team, of course! Korean Military Service

Korean military service is mandatory, requiring a two-year commitment. some Korean males attempt to avoid it, but few succeed. amerasian men have been excluded from this duty, despite the fact that some wish to fulfill it, as it serves as not only a symbol of masculinity, but also national duty and membership providing cultural capitol and networks for life. When i asked why amerasians are exempt, no one could give me a concrete answer, but it seemed to be related to racism and racial violence. an article featured in the JoongAng Daily in 2003 discussed changes in military exemptions because of the concern over the declining male population. “The board said any mixed-race male whose mother is single will be required to serve. Males with prominent mixed-race background appearances will still be exempt” (JoongAng Daily, 2 July 2003). “Prominent mixed-race background appearances” concerns visual perceptions of “phenotype,” specifically “blackness,” which reinforces the existing “racial” hierarchy to privilege certain forms of whiteness and passing. The exemption status that amerasian males have affects their futures and social standing. Without a reputable family, education, or money and connections, military service becomes a way of entry, a way of expressing national identity, citizenship, and commitment to the state through patriotic duty. i met two young men who desired to serve their country, the republic of Korea, through military service. Kyung-tae, who “looks Korean” enough, was able to join the military without notice. “i don’t tell anybody that i’m honhyŏl. They just think i’m Korean,” he explained. He was adopted as a child by a Korean family, which registered him in their family registry, but maintained contact with his mother. Johnny, however, who does not “look Korean” enough because of his presumed blackness, was not able to join. “i tried to go into the (Korean) military, but they didn’t accept me because of my color,” he told me, disappointed. John went on to express his anger about this rejection based on his appearance. “i think if someone wants to join even if they experience racism, they should be able to. i wanted to serve my country [his emphasis], but now i see they don’t want me because they think i’m different, not like them.” While amerasians are now legal citizens of south Korea with partial resources, citizenship continues to be imagined in terms of blood purity. English

Despite evidence of Korean ethnic pride, the overwhelming message in south Korea is clear: the english language is not only a symbol of identity,

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it is more importantly a symbol of power. What i found was that speaking fluent english and broken Korean was a way mixed Korean americans could be viewed more positively. The principal of the amerasian school expressed that getting an education and speaking english were ways for amerasians to contribute to the state—the Korean state. english serves as cultural capital to help amerasians gain social mobility. The principal, teachers, and students at the school know that this intentional strategy to teach all courses in english does not exist in a vacuum, rather it is within the context of institutionalized racism and discrimination experienced within the “alternative curriculum” of everyday life outside the school walls (gage, Kang, and Diggs 2013). Why is learning and mastering english so important? Frantz Fanon writes about the power that colonial languages have over the rest of the world (1967). one amerasian man frequently translates for the local police department when a dispute or accident occurs in which a U.s. soldier, civilian, or english-speaking foreign resident is involved. He received a citizen award from the city in which he lives for his service. it appears that through the english language, Koreans acknowledge amerasians as worthy and human, as most Koreans seem to attach learning english with class and the promise of better economic and professional opportunities, as described earlier. When amerasians are unable to speak english, however, they are viewed negatively. one mother’s reason for enrolling her amerasian child in an all-english curriculum school was about acceptance for her child. she said, “Koreans are nicer to amerasians who speak english. That’s why i want Matthew to learn english.” another Korean mother and black amerasian father told me about how Korean mothers would not allow their children to play with their child; that is, until they learned that she could speak english. amerasians sometimes perform an identity as “american” through the use of english when surrounded by Koreans, even if they do not speak english fluently, which i witnessed often. in an interview with an older amerasian male who had lived in the United states for several years and had kept his state driver’s license, he said, “i was driving drunk one night and got pulled over by a Korean police officer. i waved this [pulling out his U.s. driver’s license] and said, ‘no Korean.’ The police officer waved at me to go and said, ‘oK, oK’ in english.” i looked over at his driver’s license and noticed that it was about to expire, and asked him, “What are you going to do when it expires?” He responded, smiling. “oh, they don’t look at that.” similar to the paja munsan designation for Koreans who immigrated to the United states through a female relative who married an american soldier, people are also marked by their method of english acquisition in Korea. Many amerasians said they liked living in kijich’on or U.s. military

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camptown areas, but that’s not true for other Koreans who live there. “i like to live in TDC [Tongduch’ŏn], but some of the people here they never say they live here. They just say they live in Uijeongbu because they are ashamed of living in TDC, even if they can speak english well.” Where and how you learn english in Korea is a marker of identity. learning it in camptown areas while servicing the U.s. military, even if you are a shopkeeper, carries some stigma, despite your fluency. The english there is learned in the dirty streets of kijich’on, not in a legitimate english hagwŏn, or academy, or as an international student abroad. Through various strategies and claims to Korean identity through names, acts of national pride, citizenry, and language fluency, among many others, amerasians can assert themselves within Korean society and navigate in very creative ways as acts of agency. With Korea’s globalization, diversification, and increased encounters with others, renegotiation of identity as Korean is made more flexible in more recent years, as it brings a broader definition of otherness into the discussion. However, many amerasians still feel disheartened because of a continued lack of cultural citizenship and acceptance as Korean and because they are left out of these negotiations. one twenty-seven-year-old woman expressed it in this way: “lots of Koreans say that Korean society is changing and becoming more globalized. i think Korea is behind and they just pretend to be, but their heart is not.” she speaks of images and realities that don’t match up in everyday life. Multicultural Korea? When the impossible makes itself possible, the event takes place (possibility of the impossible). —Jacques Derrida, Paper Machine

like Tiger Woods’s reception in Thailand after he won the Pga, Hines Ward’s recent fame in Korea as a returning hero occurred after he was named MvP for the Pittsburgh steelers when they won the super Bowl in 2006. Then president roh Moo-hyun greeted him, and government officials pronounced him an “honorary citizen,” remarking on his Koreanness. They said, “He showed perseverance, resilience, and modesty, the core characteristics of the Korean people, and gave pride to all Koreans at home and abroad.” For Ward, this was all very shocking, especially his new-found membership as a Korean. He remarked, “The Korean community has supported my mother and me for the first time in my life” (esPn, 4 apr. 2006). Ward’s mother described to the media how she was spat upon and insulted by Koreans prior to leaving Korea with her african-american

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husband and child (sg news, 3 apr. 2006). Many Koreans, especially amerasians, recognize the discrepancy between Ward’s acceptance and the everyday experiences that amerasians encounter. There is a question of how much ripple effect his return has and will have on Korean society, but there’s hope. at the time of his return in 2006, President roh Moohyun was in office. The president was a former human rights lawyer, and the context of Korean society at that time created a stronger sentiment of possible change. The Hines Ward Helping Hands Korea Foundation, created in south Korea by Ward as a tribute to his mother, is operated by the Pearl s. Buck Foundation in Korea to help mixed-race children. Ward has also advocated for an antidiscrimination law and was asked to participate in the inauguration of former president lee Myung-bak alongside leaders from around the world. The return of Hines Ward and the ongoing efforts and lives of Korean amerasians and other mixed Koreans have stirred a conversation and an acknowledgment of others, more so now than at any other time in Korean history. With the election of Korea’s first female president, Park geun-hye, in 2013 and her pledge to prioritize national reconciliation, economic democracy, and social welfare, as well as her public apology for her father’s human rights abuses (BBC news, 25 Feb. 2013), that hope continues. The challenge of many democratic countries is how to protect the nation while accommodating the diverse populations within (gutmann 1994). We hear about concepts like “multiculturalism” and “politics of recognition,” but what do they mean, who are they for, and how do they play out? like globalization, multiculturalism is a constellation of ideas. From a Western perspective, Martha nussbaum (1997, 110) discusses how the label multiculturalism “can refer to the appropriate recognition of human diversity and cultural complexity.” it presupposes an acknowledgment of identity; in other words, recognition and acceptance of our identities, and the supposition that society cannot fail to “help.” as a Western concept where race and racism have played an extensive part in social inequalities, multiculturalism has been put forth to “clarify” notions of diversity and “race” as a social construct, but in effect creating more confusion than clarity (Heckmann 1993). When applied to international contexts, it can also present as a form of cultural imperialism that gets lost in the translation process, particularly when there is no definitive understanding of what it is. Friedrich Heckmann discusses how multiculturalism is defined in seven ways: 1. as an “indicator of social change, referring to the changing ethnic composition of the population; an allegedly rather homogenous population [that] has become heterogeneous”;

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sue-Je l. gage 2. a “normative-cognitive way” to express that immigration is a reality and a need, and society should accept all the consequences; 3. “multiculturalism as tolerance towards others”; 4. culture redefined and reevaluated—“cultures of immigrants are seen as opportunities for the enrichment of one’s own culture”; 5. an attitude; 6. a political-constitutional principle for the distribution of rights and resources; 7. a critical category that is “well-intended, but illusory, which overlooks the necessity for a common culture, language and identification.” (1993, 245)

With these various definitions and understandings, despite the fact that they all relate to the idea of inclusion and recognition without assimilation, there are inherent challenges to the idea as a formative policy instituted by governments. The inherent problem with multiculturalism and its implications for amerasians in south Korea is that it presupposes that Korean amerasians have a culture separate from Koreans. according to the Korean scholar Han geon-soo, the Korean government has adopted multiculturalism as a way of responding to multiethnicization. He refers to Korea’s multicultural policy as a “fictive declaration” that has little substance because the government has changed few of its policies to recognize others. it views migrant workers as “temporary” residents, which could be seen as advocating for assimilation (2007). The fear of cultural demise is part of the discourse, as Korea has one of the lowest birth rates in the world. This attempt to “multiculturalize” also becomes problematic when it comes to “mixing,” because it continues to place people and groups into boxes, albeit boxes that “should” be respected. Charles Taylor’s notion of the “politics of recognition” addresses this issue (1994). He states that the demand for recognition and dignity are basic human needs. recognition or nonrecognition influences identity, and nonrecognition causes damage and pain and oppresses people. Taylor tells us that the politics of recognition is itself a distinctively modern phenomenon and has come to mean two rather different things: on one hand, a politics of universalism, emphasizing the equal dignity of all individuals; on the other hand, a politics of difference that also has a universalist thrust: everyone is to be recognized for his or her unique identity. How can this be achieved? The resulting behavior might lean more toward political correctness, which has hidden forms of racism and discrimination that go unresolved and unaddressed. Despite these challenges, the current

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discourse on multiculturalism in Korea is linked to rights advocacy and has opened up a discussion about the process of redefining national identity. Most of all, it offers the possibility of acknowledgment and cultural citizenship for marginalized minorities and the hope for reconciling the past and past oppression, which are all essential to the processes of building national policies of multiculturalism. For them to work, however, they need to be enforceable and structured within all governmental departments and practices alongside a ground-up activism of marginalized peoples to transform society into one that wants changes, understands the importance of why those changes are necessary, and one that is willing to do the work of reconciliation and healing. For many amerasians, globalization and multiethnicization in Korea have created new expressions and perceptions of identity. one amerasian man discussed the difference between when he was school-age and now: i mostly stayed at home after school. i didn’t go out much. People would say, “look at that black kid. . . .” now, i tell people my mom’s Korean and they usually compliment me, saying that my Korean is good. Where i work i have to talk to Koreans and americans . . . so some americans think i’m Korean because i can speak Korean, they just think i’m a dark Korean. Koreans think i’m Hawaiian or samoan or they’ll ask me if i’m mixed. i’m proud of being mixed. you know mixed people are better looking, right?

i watched Korean children yell “Hello, hello” to the string of amerasian children on an outing to the zoo one day, and the amerasian children waved and said “Hello” back. one mixed black amerasian boy five years of age was holding my hand as this was happening and said confidently, looking at the strand of Korean kids dressed in their matching blue shirts, “i’m Korean and i speak english, too.” i think his words speak to his level of self-confidence and pride in his identity as Korean with a very special skill and identity as bilingual, while at the same time he acknowledges that his Koreanness continues to be questioned. The national Human rights Commission petitioned to bar the word honhyŏl and to change it to “multicultural family” because of its “offensive characterization” (JoongAng Daily, 24 Dec. 2003). in 2007, the U.n.affiliated international Convention on the elimination of all Forms of racial Discrimination (CerD) called on the south Korean government to ban the widespread use of “pure blood” and “mixed blood” and reported that the country’s emphasis on ethnic homogeneity works as an obstacle to interethnic and cultural tolerance and friendship (Bae 2007). When a word is created for a group, it implies a division. a “mixed” Korean can never be a “real” Korean. More than the word itself, it is the associations

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and perception of behaviors that follow that are the real sources of concern. it also asks one to question how much of the multicultural rhetoric is surface political discourse because of the imposition of the international community, namely the United nations. Much of the multicultural discussion on the governmental level has focused on other minorities that are “less than” but still within the “acceptable” realms of Koreanness since their link is through their Korean fathers, given the pervasiveness of patriarchy in south Korea. Their mothers, however, are of “other” asian descent, and are providing the push for reconstructing Koreanness and multiculturalism in south Korea. Currently, over 13 percent of all marriages in south Korea—and 36 percent in rural areas—are categorized as “international” (y. Kim 2007, quoted in Han 2008). There has been a 70 percent increase since 1997 of school-aged children born from these cross-cultural marriages (“Kukche Kyŏlhon” 2007; Ministry of Health and Welfare 2007, quoted in Han 2008). This new diverse group of “mixed” Koreans includes many with fathers who are foreign nationals, some of whom are in Korea illegally and risk deportation, and whose mothers are Korean. More common in the rural areas, there are those with Korean fathers and vietnamese, Filipina, Mongolian, or other asian mothers. Many of these women were brought into Korea through third parties as international brides and are still adjusting to the Korean society and language. The population that continues to be disregarded is once again the amerasians, which questions whether the rhetoric is truly concerned with all historically marginalized “Koreans.” Paulo Freire warns us about the counterproductive nature of this kind of division: Because it is a distortion of being fully human, sooner or later being less human leads the oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. in order for this struggle to have meaning, the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a way to create it), become in turn oppressors of the oppression, but rather restorers of the humanity of both. This then, is the great humanistic and historical task of the oppressed: to liberate themselves and the oppressors as well. (1968, 28)

There is a need to transcend the boundaries and the emotive responses of fear, fatalism, and despair in order to reflect and find the courage for active engagement, or praxis. Hannah arendt calls praxis the highest and most important level of the active life, essential to the process of humans achieving freedom through the construction of a common world (1958), similar to Wolf’s mobilization that sets the new terms of history. amerasians represent one example of the changes and challenges of belonging within our world today. globalization and multiculturalism

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may be ways of creating a more “pluralistic” society in south Korea, but what are the intentions? Who gets to set the rules and who is left out? There is a need for us to understand the complex ways in which we exist within oppressive systems, particularly when there have not been many opportunities to “decolonize our minds, to recover ourselves, to claim a space in which to develop a sense of authentic humanity” (smith 1999, 23). linda Tuhiwai smith asks us to consider “rewriting” to “reright” our position in history as a necessary step in the process of reclaiming ourselves. Boundaries of Koreanness and criteria for belonging in Korean society are not fixed or stable, but respond to internal and external dynamics that will continue to change. as south Korea grapples with its diversifying society, it is still uncertain whether there is any change to the “pure blood” ideology. While globalization and multiculturalism make explicit a new sense that Koreans share their space with others at this point in time, it does little to challenge the privileges that accompany membership in that category. it currently only serves as a rhetorical and empty container for “diversity” in south Korea that displaces social and political practices, as well as history and lived experiences. Despite these obstacles, Koreans known as amerasians and other “mixed” Koreans are creating a force that must be reckoned with, as they are not only diversifying, but staying. as new racisms emerge, so do more strategies. This population illustrates how they are finding their place in Korean society by challenging categories and presumptions of pure blood and how they are making a space for themselves as Korean. References abelmann, nancy, and John lie. 1995. Blue Dreams: Korean Americans and the Los Angeles Riots. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: The Origins and Spread of Nationalism. london: verso. arendt, Hannah. 1973. The Origins of Totalitarianism. san Diego: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Bae, Hyun-jung. 2008. “Barack obama, Just U.s. President to Me.” Korean Herald, 12 november. Bae, Ji-sook. 2007. “Koreans reassess Concept of Blood Purity.” Korea Times, 2 september 2007. Balibar, etienne, and i. Wallerstein, eds. 1990. Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. london: verso. Barth, Fredrik. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Difference. Prospect Heights, il: Waveland Press. BBC News. 2013. “Park geun-hye sworn in as south Korean President.” 25 February. available at http://bbc.co.uk/news/worldasia-21570512 (retrieved 26 February 2013).

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Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1991. “Mapping the Margins: intersectionality, identity Politics, and violence against Women of Color.” Stanford Law Review 43:1241–1299. Cumings, Bruce. 1992. “silent but Deadly: sexual subordination in the U.s.-Korean relationship.” in Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia, edited by saundra Pollock surdevant and Brenda stoltzfus, 169–175. new york: The new Press. ———. 1995. “Bringing Korea Back in: structured absence, glaring Presence, and invisibility.” in Pacific Passage: The Study of AmericanEast Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, edited by W.i. Cohen, 337–374. new york: Columbia University. ———. 1996. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. new york: W.W. norton and Company. Derrida, Jacques. 2005. “as if it Were Possible, ‘Within such limits.’” in Paper Machine, trans. rachel Bowlby. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. Devos, george a. and l. romanucci-ross. 1995. “ethnic identity: a Psychocultural Perspective.” in Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict, and Accommodation, edited by l. romanucci-ross and g. Devos, 349–380. Walnut Creek, Ca: altaMira Press. Du Bois, W. e. B. [1903] 2009. The Souls of Black Folk. new york: Barnes and noble Classics. ESPN. 2006. “steelers’ Ward returns to south Korea.” 3 april. available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2394894 (retrieved 4 april 2006). Fanon, Frantz. 1967. Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by richard Philcox. new york: grove. Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press. Freire, Paulo. [1968] 2000. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Translated by Myra Bergman ramos. new york: Continuum international Publishing group. gage, sue-Je l. 2007a. “The ‘amerasian Problem’: Blood, Duty, and race.” International Relations 21, no. 1:86–102. ———. 2007b. “Pure Mixed Blood: The Multiple identities of amerasians in south Korea.” Ph.D. diss., indiana University. ———. 2013. “never off-Duty: empire and the economies of race and gender in the U.s. Military Camptowns of Korea.” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review (e)Journal, no. 5. gage, sue-Je l., James Kang-McCann, and greg Diggs. 2013. “Before There Was asian america, There Was amerasian.” Asian American Literary Review: Special Issue on Mixed Race 4, no. 2:13–30.

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gilroy, Paul. 1991. “it ain’t Where you’re From, it’s Where you’re at . . . : The Dialectics of Diasporic identification.” Third Text 13:3–16. gutmann, amy. 1994. introduction to Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, edited by Charles Taylor, 3–24. Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press. Han, geon-soo. 2007. “Multicultural Korea: Celebrating or Challenges of Multiethnic shift in Contemporary Korea.” Korea Journal 44:32–63. Hardt, Michael, and antonio negri. 2000. Empire. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. Heckmann, Friedrich. 1993. “Multiculturalism Defined seven Ways.” Social Contract Press 3:245–246. JoongAng Daily. 2003. “new limits Placed on Military exemptions.” 2 July. ———. 2004. “They’re Here, They’re Biracial—get Used to it.” 20 February. Kim, elaine, and Chungmoo Choi, eds. 1998. Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism. new york: routledge. Kim, eleana. 2010. Adopted Territory: Transnational Korean Adoptees and the Politics of Belonging. Durham, nC: Duke University Press. Kim, nadia. 2008. Imperial Citizens: Koreans and Race from Seoul to LA. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. lie, John. 2001. Multiethnic Japan. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. lutz, Catherine. 2004. “Homefront: Communities reshaped by War.” Paper presented at indiana University, Bloomington, 5 november. ———. 2006. “empire is in the Details.” American Ethnologist 33, no. 4:593–611. Malkki, liisa. 1995. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memories, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Moon, Katharine H. s. 1996. Sex among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.– Korea Relations. new york: Columbia Press. ———. 2000. “strangers in the Midst of globalization: Migrant Workers and Korean nationalism.” in Korea’s Globalization, edited by s. s. Kim, 147–169. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. nussbaum, Martha C. 1996. Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. ong, aiwa. 1996. “Cultural Citizenship as subject-Making.” Cultural Anthropology 37:737–762. Pearl s. Buck international. 1984. Facts about Amerasians in Korea. Perkasie, Pa: Pearl s. Buck Foundation.

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royce, anya Peterson. 1982. Ethnic Identity: Strategies of Diversity. Bloomington: indiana University Press. SG News. 2003. “new Hero opens old racial Wounds in south Korea.” 3 april. available at http://sg.news.yahoo.com/060402/1/3zslk.html (retrieved 4 april 2003). shin, gi-Wook. 2002. The Paradox of Korean Globalization. Working Papers. stanford, Ca: stanford University shorenstein asia-Pacific research Center. ———. 2006. Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. simmons, g. l. 1995. Korea: The Search for Sovereignty. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press. smith, linda Tuhiwai. 1999. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. new york: Zed Books. stoler, ann. 2002. Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press. Takeyuki, Tsuda. 2003. Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilians Return Migration in Transnational Perspective. new york: Columbia University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1994. “The Politics of recognition.” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by amy gutmann and Charles Taylor, 25–74. Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press. Turner, Terence. 1993. “anthropology and Multiculturalism: What is anthropology that Multiculturalists should Be Mindful of it?” Cultural Anthropology 8:411–429. United nations. 2002. “United nations international Convention on the elimination of all Forms of racial Discrimination (CerD).” reports submitted by state Parties under article 9 of the Convention. seoul, 4 october 2002. United states Department of Defense. 2008. Defense Manpower Data Center. Washington, DC. Wolf, eric. 1982. Europe and the People without History. Berkeley: University of California Press. Yonhap News. 2002. “amerasians, legacy of U.s. Military Presence, live under Prejudice.” 14 March 2004. yuh, Ji-yeon. 2002. Beyond the Shadow of Camptown: Korean Military Brides in America. new york: new york University Press. Zia, Helen. 2001. Asian American Dreams: An Emergence of an American People. new york: Farrar, straus, and giroux.

TWelve

Can the Union of Patriarchy and Multiculturalism Work? Family Dynamics in Filipina-Korean Rural Households

MinJeong KiM Deok-ro runs a small hardware store in a downtown marketplace in sŏjinkun (sŏjin County) located in the southwestern region of south Korea (hereafter Korea).1 it is a bustling area near a bus station that carries people to and from a city about half an hour away. at the end of each day, he returns to his quiet house surrounded by rice fields, a small portion of which he tends with his aging mother and his Filipina wife, Maia, for subsistence farming. Deok-ro was matched with Maia through the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, also known as the Unification Church (UC). He was not a church member, but a nongch‘on ch‘onggak (farm bachelor) who could not find a bride because of his rural location and its lagging socioeconomic conditions. Because Deok-ro lacked a sense of commitment to the church, he refused to observe the three-month separation Period—a UC rule that forbids a newlywed couple from consummating their marriage immediately after the Blessing (wedding). The general rule is: when a bride matched through the UC arrives in Korea, instead of joining her new family right away, she must stay in a local church. However, Deokro confronted the church and brought Maia home after only a month. He declared that he was the taejang (captain) of his own house, and his wife was his, not the church’s, though he quickly conceded that he did not own Maia. When the couple got married, he told his new bride that she could leave him if she wanted, but she could not take their children. To show that he did not take his wife for granted, during our interview he emphatically reported two promises he had made to Maia at the time of their match: he 1

all names of people and places are pseudonyms.

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would never hit her and he would never touch another woman. However, when asked if he had made any preparations to live with a Filipina wife, such as learning english or Tagalog, he replied, “Why would i study? of course she should study Korean” (his emphasis). Kyŏrhon iminja (marriage migrants) like Maia constitute an important segment of international migration to Korea; this group has attracted a great deal of attention from the government, academia, and the public. as many authors in this volume (lie, lim, n. H. J. Kim, Jun, and lee and skrentny) point out, families with marriage migrants, dubbed tamunhwa kajok (multicultural families), have been the main target of the Korean state’s multicultural campaign. simultaneously, the authors contend that Korean multiculturalism is rather assimilationist as it prioritizes cultural assimilation of marriage migrants. Deok-ro’s comment (“she should study Korean”) reflects a general principal of the Korean state’s multiculturalism, as well as a common understanding of both Koreans and marriage migrants. since Filipinas (and other marriage migrants) are in Korea, it would be more helpful for them to learn Korean language and customs. yet, to assume this understanding is merely for the sake of convenience would be fallacious naïveté. it stems from Confucian patriarchal ideology and practices embedded in Korean family relations. even in contemporary society, and more so in traditional rural households, it is still believed that upon marriage, a bride is no longer a member of her natal family but a member of her husband’s family. a new daughter-in-law is expected to learn and obey the affinal family’s rules and ways of running the household. Deok-ro’s declaration implied this axiomatic tradition in the private sphere. Moreover, for marriage migrants, this entails learning Korean culture and customs, which inevitably results in a form of ethnic assimilation. Most critics of Korean multiculturalism and its contradictory ethnocentric patriarchy have focused on the analysis of “public patriarchy” by focusing on state policies and public programs for marriage migrants, but few have examined its collusion with “private patriarchy,” the control of women at home (Walby 1990). Based on my findings in one-year-long ethnographic fieldwork in two rural towns, including interviews and participant observation, in this chapter i examine family dynamics in FilipinaKorean families to show the tension between multiculturalist rhetoric and ethnocentric patriarchy on the interpersonal level and highlight the aspect of private patriarchy in the context of Korea’s multicultural enterprise.2 This shift of focus to private patriarchy is meaningful in two folds. 2

My fieldwork ran from July 2005 to June 2006 in two rural counties. i conducted indepth interviews with thirty-five Filipinas and twenty-five Korean men.

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First, a separate understanding of public patriarchy and private patriarchy reveals an important source of tension between multiculturalist rhetoric and ethnocentric patriarchy vis-à-vis multicultural families, which pertains to what euyryung Jun calls a question of “genuineness” (chap. 4). For example, Jun discusses how the Korean government’s exclusion of migrant workers from the ambit of the multicultural policy perpetuates discrimination and fails to promote diversity and inclusiveness. if the Korean state is more concerned about controlling immigrant populations in a way to maintain Koreans’ ethnic identity rather than realizing a multicultural society as it boasts, i argue that the Korean state almost exclusively targets marriage migrants in its multicultural enterprise because it reckons that marriage migrants could not threaten Korea’s ethnic identity under the power of patriarchy in the private sphere. However, some authors acknowledge that even the state-imposed multicultural turn could have progressive potential. Timothy lim (chap. 2) stresses that a discursive shift in Korea’s multiculturalism can be followed by meaningful changes in reality, a position that nancy abelmann and her colleagues also hold (chap. 5). i also believe that this is ineluctable. even with this stance, one must ask: how can Korean multiculturalism become genuine when private patriarchy is reluctant to embrace cultural differences at home? a marriage migrant moves physically to her affinal family and community and is enveloped within the regime of private patriarchy. Her ethnic assimilation is not just directed by the state but likely demanded by family members, not only husbands but also cohabiting or close-by parents-in-law. Thus, without addressing the dominant patriarchal household rules, multicultural society is out of reach. second, the shift to private patriarchy requires a consideration of marriage migrants’ agency, which is often overlooked in discussing state policies, as well as Korean family members’ agency in perpetuating culture and structure. With postcolonial perspectives, feminist literature of marriage migrants has become more cognizant of women’s agency (Constable 2003; Faier 2009; Freeman 2005; Kim 2012, 2013a, 2013b). lim (chap. 2) describes how marriage migrants form their own organization and some even react against assimilationist Korean multiculturalism. agency, defined as the ability or capacity to act in one’s best interest (gardiner 1995), configures not only women’s direct resistance to oppressive power but also covert forms of everyday resistance (scott 1985) and strategic cooptation (Kandiyoti 1988). This chapter shows how Korean family and community members actively maintain Korean identity and practices by relying on Confucian patriarchal practices, and how Filipinas negotiate with tensions and clashes in their familial relations. Before i turn to discussing the tension between multiculturalism and

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the dominant patriarchal rule in families and communities, let me first briefly discuss feminist debates on patriarchy and multiculturalism. Patriarchy, Nationalism, and Multiculturalism Western feminist discourse of multiculturalism concerns two types of multiculturalism (okin 1998). one is called “the politics of recognition” and stresses recognizing the groups that are not represented in what we consider “culture,” such as women, people of racial minority, gays and lesbians, and indigenous populations. The other type has been concerned with the acculturation process of immigrants and the group rights of ethnic minorities, including political representations, protection of cultural (e.g., language, history) and religious expressions distinctly different from the majority, and to be exempt from certain generally applicable laws, and public policies and subsidies for cultural activities or education (okin 1998). especially in the context of the latter, okin provocatively asks: “is multiculturalism bad for women?” (1999). Many empirical cases have been documented where special group rights are granted for cultural survival but these group rights involve patriarchal practices that may even be harmful to women, ultimately compromising women’s rights (okin 1998; song 2005). For example, when a woman of an aboriginal tribe is subject to injustice (e.g., domestic violence or discrimination), she may not be protected under the federal court, because the court will not interfere with the tribe’s autonomy. Here the two tiers of patriarchal systems—the public patriarchy of the state and the “private” patriarchy of the tribal community—operate in such a way that the state, which offers provisions to protect both women’s rights and multicultural rights, fails to influence the “private” sphere that is governed and controlled by a male-dominated community. The two-tier patriarchal system is also found in egypt’s personal status law (Hatem 1986). When the patriarchal state relaxed the public control of women by enhancing the integration of women into the public sphere (through education and work), the egyptian government passed the “personal status laws” for the maintenance of the Muslim mechanisms of private control of women. again the “private” patriarchy, in this case for cultural nationalism, is protected from the (Western-style) liberalization of social and cultural practices and women’s entrance into the public sphere. These cases bring up a question: can genuine multiculturalism be materialized without addressing private patriarchy? in this chapter, i examine this question through the case of Filipina marriage migrants in Korea. The case of international marriage presents a slightly different situation where

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Figure 12.1. number of international Marriages by gender (1990–2010) 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000

Int’ Marriage Foreign Wives

20,000

Foreign Husbands

15,000 10,000 5,000 0 1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Source: statistics Korea 2012.

migrant women are not in their own minority group, but situated in their marital families and communities dominated by Koreans—the ethnic majority. in this context, Koreans’ ethnic nationalism is less about resistance to any (perceived or real) oppressive power than unreconstructed adherence to their ”Korean” identity. interestingly, marriage migrants, whose position is prescribed to the lowest rung under the Confucian ethnocentric patriarchal rule, are singled out as the subject of the Korean multicultural project; this is an oxymoron that needs to be addressed. in the following sections, i briefly describe the Korean context regarding international marriage migration and the state’s response to it. International Marriage Migration to South Korea as of 2010, 10.5% of all marriages in south Korea were between Koreans and foreign-born spouses; 8.1% of all marriages and 76.7% of all international marriages were between Korean men and foreign-born women (statistics Korea 2012). The total number of foreign wives registered in 1990 was 619; this skyrocketed to 31,180 by 2005 (see figure 12.1). The rate of increase has varied by ethnic group (see table 12.1). The number of women from China was 3,566 (51 percent of all foreign wives registered that year) in 2000, peaking at 20,582 in 2005 (67 percent); the number of vietnamese women rose from 77 in 2000 (1 percent) to 9,623

77 / 1

819 / 12

240 / 3

64 / 1

1/0

43 / 1

231 / 3

730 / 11

Vietnam

Japan

Thailand

Mongolia

Cambodia

Uzbekistan

United States

Other

740 / 8

262 / 3

66 / 1

2/0

118 / 1

182 / 2

701 / 7

134 / 1

6,977 / 72

502 / 5

9,684 / 100

Source: Statistics Korea 2012.

3,566 / 51

1,174 / 17

6,945 / 100

China

Philippines

Total

2001

N/%

2000

N/%

700 / 7

267 / 2

183 / 2

2/0

194 / 2

327 / 3

690 / 6

474 / 4

7,023 / 66

838 / 8

10,698 / 100

N/%

2002

Table 12.1 Foreign-Born Wives by Nationality 2003

895 / 5

322 / 2

328 / 2

19 / 0

320 / 2

345 / 2

844 / 5

1,402 / 7

13,347 / 71

928 / 5

18,750 / 100

N/%

2004

911 / 4

341 / 1

247 / 1

72 / 0

504 / 2

324 / 1

809 / 3

2,461 / 10

18,489 / 74

947 / 4

25,105 / 100

N/%

2005

2006

14,566 / 49

1,117 / 4

29,665 / 100

N/%

851 / 3

285 / 1

332 / 1

157 / 1

561 / 2

266 / 1

883 / 3

905 / 3

331 / 1

314 / 1

394 / 1

594 / 2

271 / 1

1,045 / 4

5,822 / 19 10,128 / 34

20,582 / 67

980 / 3

30,719 / 100

N/%

2007

983 / 3

376 / 1

351 / 1

1,804 / 6

745 / 3

524 / 2

1,206 / 4

6,610 / 23

14,484 / 51

1,497 / 5

28,580 / 100

N/%

2008

1,010 / 4

344 / 1

492 / 2

659 / 2

521 / 2

633 / 2

1,162 / 4

8,282 / 29

13,203 / 47

1,857 / 7

28,163 / 100

N/%

2009

1,232 / 5

416 / 2

365 / 1

851 / 3

386 / 2

496 / 2

1,140 / 5

7,249 / 29

11,364 / 45

1,643 / 7

25,142 / 100

N/%

2010

1,216 / 5

428 / 2

317 / 1

1,205 / 5

326 / 1

438 / 2

1,193 / 5

9,623 / 37

9,623 / 37

1,906 / 7

26,274 / 100

N/%

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(37 percent) in 2010. in the early years, Filipinas were the first large group that was “new” to the Korean soil and P‘illip‘in puin (Filipina brides) often represented marriage migrants from southeast asian countries. a variety of transnational and domestic factors have facilitated these international unions (Kim 2010). First, Korea’s neoliberal economic development created a significant rural-urban gap and one of its symptoms was the issue of bachelor farmers who made national headlines in the late 1980s (shim 1993). after the 1990 short-lived national campaign to find brides for these bachelor farmers, local governments and communities organized the matching for Korean farmers with Chosŏnjok, ethnic Korean women from China (Freeman 2005). in addition, the Unification Church, which promotes international unions, played an instrumental role in matching Japanese women and Filipinas with Korean farmers (see Kim 2012). With the growing visibility of Filipinas in the late 1990s, the media cautiously relayed the stories of Filipina brides settling in rural areas (Kŭkŏt i algo sipta [TV Docu] 2001). at first, marriage migrants were viewed with patronizing acceptance (“who else would marry farm bachelors?”), since they seemed to assuage the societal headache of the bachelor farmer issue. Then, in the 2000s, the number of marriage migrants increased drastically based on the collusion of two factors. The first immediate factor was the proliferation of profit-oriented transnational commercial matchmaking agencies (onishi 2007; Wang and Chang 2002). By the mid-2000s, commercial agencies reached urban areas, aggressively and indiscriminately advertising young, virginal women from southeast asian countries to Korean men who seem to have difficulty attracting local women because of low incomes, divorce, or physical and mental disabilities. yet, the inflation would not have been possible without Korea’s elevated stature in the asian regional bloc during this period. Korea recovered from the economic crisis in the late 1990s with the ever-increasing movement and interactions of asian citizens for labor migration, transnational businesses, intraregional tourism, and study abroad programs (Jones and shen 2008). simultaneously, hallyu (Korean wave)—the fad for all aspects of Korean popular culture, including movies, television shows, music (K-pop), and cosmetics—has swept across asia (Hanaki et al. 2007; lie and Park 2006), whetting the interest of southeast asian women. less-popular explanations than women’s economic motivation include the supremacy of heterosexual marriage (marriage is a social norm), patrilocality (the bride moving into the groom’s residence), and normative hypergamy—women marrying up—in this case, geographically (see Kim 2010). The postmigration reality for many marriage migrants may not measure up to the projected image of the “Korean dream.” since the first

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reports of Chosŏnjok wives’ abandonment of Korean families, international marriage was often portrayed as rife with cultural clash, abuse, deception, and poverty, as well as a high rate of divorce. several highly publicized domestic violence cases, some of which tragically ended with the wives’ deaths (Huan Mai in 2007 and Thach Thi Hoang ngoc in 2010), fueled both demeaning stereotypes of multicultural families and Koreans’ own sense of failure in advancing human rights, which accelerated the multicultural project for marriage migrants. The exclusive accommodation of marriage migrants stems from both direct benefits and symbolic bearing on Korea’s status as a developed country. The immediate benefit, of course, was the alleviation of the bachelor farmer issue. even though the absolute number of marriage migrants is higher in cities where the general population is much larger, the trend’s impact on rural areas is much more significant, with one-third of new marriages in rural areas involving foreign-born brides. However, this is rather skin deep. as Heh-rahn Park argues, the Korean government has strategically deployed marriage migrants to quell farmers’ vociferous demands for economic security in an era of globalized markets and to pacify farm bachelor issues by “shifting its own responsibility for rural reform onto the backs of Chosŏnjok brides, whose productive and reproductive labor was expected to resuscitate the rural economy and repopulate the countryside” (Freeman 2005, 84). Moreover, with the sharp fertility decline in the last decade, gendered programs for marriage migrants function as part of pronatalist policies, molding women’s role as biological as well as cultural reproducers (Kim 2013b). symbolically, marriage migrants present a base test to Korea in terms of their status in the international system. First, the influx of marriage migrants serves as a tangible indication of the economic miracle Korea claims it has achieved. a controversial Chosŏn ilbo article (2006) attests to this. on 21 april 2006, Chosŏn ilbo ran an article titled “Pet’ŭnam Ch‘ŏnyŏdŭl, ‘Hŭimang ŭi ttang, K‘oria ro’” (vietnamese women flock to “Korea, the land of hope”). The accompanying picture showed a line of women with their faces blurred sitting in a room, with the caption reading “Han’guk wangjanimdŭl, uri rŭl teryŏka chuo” (Korean Prince, please take us away). This captured the popular view that the presence of marriage migrants stroked Koreans’ nationalist pride. However, Chosŏn ilbo was heavily criticized by both Korean and vietnamese civic organizations for portraying vietnamese women as commodities without regard of their human rights (nam 2006). Feminist and civic activists called for implementing regulations for commercial agencies that matched women indiscriminately to any men who would pay (Kyŏrhon chunggaeŏppŏp [act for the regulation of Marriage Brokerage

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agencies] was implemented in 2008). international news reports of this case, and other cases where young women were murdered at the hands of Korean husbands, undermined Korea’s status, which had been perceived to be elevated by economic success. eventually, Chosŏn ilbo issued an apology through a vietnamese newspaper on 11 May (Chae 2007). in the 2007 ruling on Huan Mai’s murder case, the judges wrote: . . . at this moment, we are compelled to painfully confess our inner savagery covered by the facade as a twenty-first-century economic power and civilized country. Marriage should be protected and cherished as a fruit of love. However, we did not have an ability to protect this value wholly. The victim, Huan Mai, came here with a Korean dream to become a wife of this land. We did not have the capacity to protect her precious wish. nineteen-year-old Huan Mai’s letter (to her husband) reads very mature, which therefore shames us more. a wish that this case should not just end with the punishment of this defendant is on account of this self-reflection. (Kim, shin, and son 2007)

This reveals that the judges did not see Huan Mai’s murder as merely an individual’s responsibility, but that of the nation (“to become a wife of this land”). also, as lim (chap. 2) and n. H. J. Kim (chap. 3) explain, it shows how they associate failing to prevent Huan Mai’s death, a failure in human rights, with the shortcomings of an aspiring candidate for advanced nationhood. This self-reflection, a drive for self-improvement (Jun chap. 4; abelmann et al. chap. 5), and “sensitivity to international regimes” and standards of human rights (lim chap. 2) were part of the driving force of Korea’s multiculturalism. Korea’s Response to Multicultural Families one of the first major efforts by the Korean government was the Yŏsŏng kyŏrhon iminja kajok sahoe t‘onghap chiwŏn taech‘aek (Plan for Supporting the Social Integration of Women Marriage Immigrants and Families)— what Hye-Kyung lee (2008) calls the “grand Plan”—on 26 april 2006. This was a comprehensive policy under the direction of the Ministry of gender equality and Family (MgeF), with the goal of incorporating international marriage migrants into various family services and developing unique services and programs to meet the needs of international marriage migrants and their families (e.g., some are gender-specific programs dealing with child rearing or domestic violence). as part of the plan, the Kyŏrhon iminja kajok chiwŏn sent‘ŏ (Marriage immigrant Family support Center) was established and by early 2007, thirty-eight centers were open. Under this plan, the public multicultural campaign commenced and the Korean government actively promoted it by providing substantial funds.

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local governments competitively developed public services for marriage migrant families, in part to secure more funding. especially for rural governments, events and programs for marriage migrants became one of the major sources of funds and attention from the central government. For instance, at the MgeF’s 2006 Family Month Ceremony that i attended, eight of nineteen awards were granted to counties, districts, and individuals who made efforts on behalf of marriage migrants. Furthermore, two government bodies, the Ministry of gender equality and the Ministry of Health and Welfare, competed over the whole project, shuttling it back and forth between them. in March 2008, the Tamunhwa kajok chiwŏnpŏp (Multicultural Family support act) was implemented, and the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Family affairs took over the task of running the programs for marriage migrants. The Marriage immigrant Family support Center was renamed Tamunhwa kajok chiwŏn sent‘ŏ (Multicultural Family support Center), and by early 2010, 159 centers were in operation nationwide (now under the Ministry of gender equality and Family). Their services consist of five areas: (1) educational services to aid in understanding the Korean language and Korean culture; (2) interpretation and translation support; (3) child-care support; (4) support for the education of children; and (5) employment and venture support. Based on previous critiques that the grand Plan focused primarily on assimilation, some programs included marriage migrants’ natal culture, especially language. For example, at my field site, one campaign poster read “Tamunhwa chanyŏ ŭi ijung ŏnŏ sayong ŭn gŭllobŏl lidŏ ŭi ch‘ŏtkŏrŭm imnida” (Bilingual ability of multicultural children is the first step toward global leaders), which was intended to encourage parents to teach both parents’ languages to their children. similarly, the media has reported that local multicultural family support centers organize bilingual language contests for multicultural family children. another program at my field site was an essay contest titled “My Korean life” in which marriage migrants submit essays written in their native tongue. However, these “multicultural” programs were contained among marriage migrants and their children, and have not yet had much impact on the broader society’s understanding of multiculturalism, let alone so-called multicultural families. Current media representations in the name of multiculturalism reinforce social hierarchy by class, race, ethnicity, and nationality, as well as assimilation. a reality television program titled Love in Asia, which shows the lives of marriage migrants and their visits to natal families, began to air in 2005 with the support of the MgeF. one goal of the show was to counter negative stereotypical images of marriage migrants, such as opportunist wives, abusive husbands, or loveless couples. yet, this show—especially

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when compared with Minyŏdŭl ŭi Suda (Chitchat of beautiful women), a vibrant talk show that features young, educated, and urban non-Korean women, including whites from the global north—perpetuates the notion that marriage migrants are from poor families in underdeveloped countries and are in needy households in Korea. nowadays, marriage migrants are routinely featured in news programs, especially during holidays such as Ch‘usŏk, or new year’s Day. These representations are ostensibly to display that Korea has become a “multicultural” society, but a prioritized message tends to be how migrant wives have learned Korean customs and traditions and become part of the local Korean community. Women’s daily lives are embedded in a private patriarchy in which they must follow a hierarchical order delineated by ethnicity and nationality as well as gender and age. Familial hierarchy under the rules of Confucian patriarchy prescribes the lowest status for young brides due to their age and gender. in Filipina-Korean families, Confucian patriarchy intersects with ethnic nationalism, not only demanding Filipina marriage migrants to culturally assimilate, but also marginalizing Filipinas’ ethnic markers and making Filipinas others based on their nationality. Marriage migrants may occasionally represent their natal culture in community activities and television shows, but do so only to ephemerally display cultural diversity. However, in the public campaign, multiculturalism as represented by marriage migrants emphasizes family, making it difficult to challenge patriarchal structures (lee 2008). Migrants’ culture, while it certainly entered a “multicultural process” (lim chap. 2), is marginalized; the promotion of multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka 1995) or the creation of hybrid culture has not appeared on a horizon. The authors in this volume all have attempted to explain this lag. This chapter adds to this discourse with a particular focus on the interactions and dynamics in interpersonal relations. Tension and Conflict between Multiculturalism and Patriarchy Becoming Part of a Korean Family

it is important to closely examine the domestic sphere coinhabited by Filipinas and Korean family members because it is a dominant part of Filipinas’ lives in their new country, especially those in rural areas. Many factors influence interpersonal relations between Filipinas and their Korean family members, the most obvious being language and cultural differences. as Deok-ro in the opening episode mentioned, Filipinas are expected to learn the Korean language, but this was accompanied with the suppression of speaking Tagalog. oftentimes, i found Filipinas were wary of talking in Tagalog in my presence because, they told me, Korean

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family members instructed them not to speak Tagalog when Koreans were around them. in fact, it was not limited to family members who participated in this kind of “language policing”—neighbors did so, too. one day, i was visiting a corner store that one of my Filipina informants ran. This was a spot where elderly neighbors came to hang out. Three or four Filipinas from the neighborhood also often came to the store to spend time together. in this setting where elderly Korean male neighbors and younger Filipinas encountered one another, Koreans half-jokingly made a rule: Filipinas had to pay a “fine” whenever they were caught speaking Tagalog. This rule was not strictly enforced; the elders did not demand money from the young Filipinas. When Filipinas were “caught,” they often bantered with the elders, which ended up with the latter’s repeated advice that Filipinas should make an effort to speak Korean since they are in Korea. This shows that Korean family members and neighbors firmly believed that Filipinas should learn the Korean language and follow Korean customs by minimizing their Philippine markers. This kind of cultural assimilation is demanded especially because of their societal location in patriarchal families. Previously, i mentioned that one of the most significant factors that influence interpersonal relations in Korean-Filipina households is women’s performance of reproductive labor, because they are primarily viewed in their gendered roles as wife, mother, and daughter-in-law (Kim 2013b). reproductive labor (or domestic labor) entails physical and emotional work for the maintenance of household and family members, such as housework and care work (child care or care of the elderly); it is integral to forging personal relations. Two aspects of reproductive labor are particularly important to examine with regard to Filipina marriage migrants in rural areas: the relationship with parents-in-law and women’s participation in farming. at the age of twenty-two, Cynthia gonzales was matched to her husband, lee seong-jin, ten years her senior; for Cynthia, all the wishes that Filipina marriage migrants dream of came true. seong-jin was not only a hard-working man, but also a romantic who was not shy about expressing his affection for his wife. When she was in the Philippines, he studied english and wrote touching letters to her. When she was staying in the Korean UC, he brought a bouquet of roses to her. Cynthia first lived with her parents-in-law, learning how to do housework in the Korean family and how to work on the farm. With her devoted husband, she diligently studied Korean and also worked hard on the family farm, which was substantial, including both rice fields and a fruit farm. after the birth of their first son, Cynthia and seong-jin moved out of his parents’ home in a remote village to the central town where she could readily enjoy the company of her Filipina friends. seong-jin commuted

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from their house to his parents’ land, and visiting seong-jin’s parents at least once a week was a regular routine that Cynthia never missed. in addition, Cynthia joined seong-jin during the busy seasons from spring to fall. Cynthia said that if she needed to send money to the Philippines for special occasions or emergencies, she just had to tell her husband in advance, and he would prepare it in a few days. she was the only Filipina in my primary site whose own mother came from the Philippines to care for her when she gave birth to her second son, which is considered a privilege for daughters-in-law by south Korean traditional standards.3 Within a Korean patriarchal family in a rural area with a strong Confucian culture, women provide reproductive labor not only for their husbands and offspring, but also for their husbands’ family members. in many homes, it is difficult to gauge a Filipina’s relationship with her Korean husband apart from her relationship with his parents, because a daughter-in-law’s attitude toward her parents-in-law is integral to a son’s filial obligations to his parents. With only one exception, all thirtyfour Filipinas whom i interviewed began their Korean life by living with their parents-in-law. about twenty of these women eventually moved out and set up their own home apart from their in-laws; the transition was established in various ways, including repeated demands by young couples accompanied by arguments and confrontations, or amicable decisions within the family. even after setting up a separate residence, their houses were not very far from each other—in neighboring towns or only a few houses apart—and most women maintained frequent interactions with their husbands’ parents. Thus, Filipinas’ daily routines continued to involve visits to their parents-in-laws’ houses as well as work for the nuclear family unit. as shown in Cynthia’s case, women’s participation in farming—part of her contribution to the household as income-generating productive labor—also becomes reproductive labor, because a woman’s participation is required as a member of the family and deemed an expression of commitment to her Korean family. When these wives perform their reproductive role satisfactorily, they are said to be good wives and daughtersin-law, and they can advance and solidify their position at home, which enables them to negotiate certain matters to their advantage. in contrast, a Filipina wife’s refusal to participate in family farming is often interpreted as disobedience against her parents-in-laws, which creates hostile family relations and isolation. 3 nowadays, especially in the cities, couples have more frequent interactions with a wife’s parents. For example, it is common that a wife’s mother helps with child care when the wife has a paid job.

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Under this patriarchal rule, Filipina marriage migrants are expected to follow Korean culture in every aspect of quotidian life, from cooking, eating, and doing laundry to everyday manners in interactions with inlaws (e.g., don’t ask questions directly), as well as by learning the Korean language. Most Filipinas are inadequately prepared for these expectations, lacking information and an understanding of what is entailed in the familial obligations they are expected to fulfill. in recent years, especially after the passage of the Multicultural Family support act, local governments have offered Korean language classes and other technical classes (e.g., cooking or child-rearing classes). except for language classes, however, these classes are temporary or sporadic. Without sufficient support from Korean family members and a clear understanding of each family’s unique styles, it is difficult for wives to utilize what they learn. Therefore, some Filipinas use cultural difference as a justification for exemption from important tasks of daughters-in-law, especially cooking. Korean mothers-in-law who find it difficult to teach Korean cooking often continue to take on this task, while Filipina daughters-in-law take care of other tasks such as setting the table and washing dishes. after they establish separate households, many Filipinas use their freedom to serve a mixture of Korean and Philippine dishes to their husbands and children. This situation is probably the reason why nakamatsu (2003) contends that foreign women were not required to culturally assimilate in order to be recognized as legitimate wives and mothers. This presents a potential for multiculturalism, though it is too early to celebrate. in families with marriage migrants, Korean is the only language used for communication. Children of Filipina-Korean couples always have Korean names. When a Filipina’s legal status is naturalized, she often changes her name, encouraged by family members and local government officers (for the sake of convenience). Philippine cultural elements are often contained for their own consumptions in weekly gatherings or are marginalized for “multicultural days.” More importantly, they are considered exceptions to the norm that is Korean customs. This belief is further justified because of Filipinas’ low standing in the family. Therefore, patriarchal familial practices lead Filipinas toward ethnic assimilation and keep them away from multicultural reality. Exclusion of Transnational Ties with Philippine Families another factor that affects a Filipina’s personal relationship with Korean family members is transnational ties with her Philippine family, or the lack thereof. This issue arises from the time a Filipina-Korean marriage is contracted.

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ailyn loanzon, a woman from Mindanao, attended a UC seminar because of her neighbor’s touting and only agreed to go to a matching appointment to earn a free trip to Manila. in Manila she met her future husband, Kŭn-chae. When she agreed to be matched with Kŭn-chae in the UC ceremony, she did not understand that their marriage was indeed legally valid. after a three-day stay in Manila, Kŭn-chae returned to Korea and ailyn to Mindanao. ailyn was too afraid to tell her parents that she had gotten married. However, she continued to communicate with Kŭnchae through the UC members who helped with translation. When her paperwork was cleared and her trip to Korea was impending, she finally confessed to her family that she was going to Korea to meet her husband. Her parents were angry at her for marrying without consulting them. What’s more, they were afraid that she was being tricked into something other than marriage (e.g., sex work). With the assurance from Kŭn-chae via telephone, ailyn’s parents reluctantly bid her farewell. in Korea, ailyn was a devoted wife and daughter-in-law with exceptional Korean skills, which made her stand out in the community. after she had her first baby, ailyn and Kŭn-chae made their first trip to the Philippines. That was two and half years after his first phone conversation with his in-laws. Under the Confucian patriarchal tradition, a married woman is considered a member of her husband’s family, so frequent association with her natal family is discouraged. While this tradition has been gradually fading, especially in cities where women who work outside the home rely more and more on their mother’s assistance for child care, a wife’s relationship with her in-laws is still prioritized over a husband’s relationship with his in-laws. in Korean-Korean marriages, at least one meeting between a husband’s parents and a wife’s parents (or family members if the parents are deceased) prior to a wedding is a required custom. However, in international marriages mediated by introduction agencies, as shown in ailyn’s case, the unique context in which marriage is contracted excludes Filipinas’ natal families from the beginning of marriage. Most Korean husbands matched through the UC do not have a chance to meet their in-laws until the couple makes a trip back to the Philippines after the Filipina wife has settled in her new home. Men who go through commercial agencies or who are matched through personal contacts may visit a woman’s home and have a wedding with her family there first and then come to Korea for a wedding with the Korean family. in both cases, a meeting between the bride’s and groom’s parents is rare. in my study, only eleven of thirty-five Filipinas i interviewed indicated that their Korean husbands had met their parents. Furthermore, except for two families who invited Philippine family members to Korea, no Korean

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parents had met their Philippine in-laws. Many Filipinas expressed discontent and even anger about their husband’s avoidance of meeting their families and felt it was unjust for husbands to demand that wives respect their in-laws, but not reciprocate. Therefore, transnational, inclusive relationships between Philippine and Korean families are not common. The interactions between most Philippine-Korean families are limited to occasional gifts in the mail or wire transfers of money to the Philippines, which reinforces stereotypes of migrant wives. Whereas the issue of providing financial support for Philippine families is uncomfortable for Filipinas, the issue of visiting the families in the Philippines is a matter that Korean husbands often try to evade. Most Korean husbands regrettably attribute their limited interactions with their parents-in-law in the Philippines to their insubstantial income and to language barriers. Thus, one can argue that this is more of a class issue. indeed, two family members who invited Philippine family members did so because they could afford to, but even in these cases, the visits were allowed only with legitimate reasons (e.g., Cynthia’s mother came after the birth of her second child to help with child care and with her recuperation). at the same time, husbands’ noninvolvement with wives’ families is tolerated, in part because of patriarchal tradition. Therefore, the imbalanced in-law relationship between husband and wife means that while the woman’s subject-making process as a Korean wife and daughter-in-law continues in Korean family settings, a Korean husband’s relationship with his in-laws in the Philippines often remains tenuous, marginalizing Filipinas’ connections with the Philippines and depreciating Filipino identity or culture. once again, the potential of multiculturalism is hindered by patriarchal practice. “Others” in the Family

Two closely related factors—the misinterpretation of monetary costs for marriage and the stereotypes of marriage migrants—can have a long-term impact on the relationship between Filipinas and their Korean husbands and/or parents-in-law. in traditional arranged marriages, the groom’s and the bride’s families exchange gifts and dowry money, creating bilateral social relationships between the two families. However, in transnational arranged marriages, the groom’s family gives money to a mediating agency, part of which may go to the bride’s family (at the agency’s discretion); this commercial exchange between the agency and the groom’s family creates a unilateral transaction between the groom’s family and the bride’s family (Wang 2007). This situation results in the misconception that brides are commodities, and therefore legitimates the authority

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Korean family members imagine they have over new brides. The unequal relationship between Filipina wives and Korean family members is also grounded in the unequal economic standing of the two countries in the global hierarchy. The popular discourse on marriage migrants’ motives for international marriage focuses mainly on this economic aspect: women from developing countries seek partners from developed countries who can provide economic security and allow them to support their families in the home country. This popular discourse seldom considers a woman’s desire for affection and commitment. in Korea, this misogynistic stereotype was supported by media reports on Chosŏnjok women deserting their farmer husbands to find jobs in the cities when they could not fulfill their wishes with their husband’s support. Korean husbands and parents who have spent a great deal of money for marriage are fearful of the possibility of desertion, for both the financial and emotional costs it brings. Despite their positive assessment of Filipinas’ potential to be devoted wives and mothers (due to their Catholic background, thus against divorce and abortion), Koreans cannot completely disregard the possibility that Filipinas might leave their matched partner when their supposedly ulterior goal does not materialize. regardless of the low-class status of rural families in Korea, or the fact that Filipinas often have higher educational attainments than their husbands, Korean parents-in-law believe that their own standing is superior to that of the family in the Philippines because of the presumed economic position of south Korea in the global hierarchy. This belief plays a role in Korean parents-in-law’s attitudes toward their Filipina daughters-in-law. The suspicions held by Korean family members are extremely frustrating and insulting to Filipinas because these suspicions not only imply a monetary motive for marriage and cunningness on the part of Filipina wives, but also demean their natal families. Celia sering was one of the Filipinas who actively participated in family farming. Celia, who was a foot taller than the average Filipina, was, in her husband’s words, “a better worker than any Korean.” in spring and summer, she worked from 4:00 a.m. until 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. alongside her Korean family members. ahn Jae-yŏng, Celia’s husband, said that all he wanted from UC matching was someone who could care for his parents as if they were her own parents, so he had no complaints about his hardworking wife. Her chores at home included not only cooking for family members, but also feeding the three cows they owned. Jae-yŏng did not hesitate to share the housework by helping with cleaning and washing clothes in winter (they did not have a washing machine). Celia said that she loved her husband and her three children dearly. The introverted

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Jae-yŏng, who likes to write poems, and the extroverted Celia complemented each other well and were very much in love. The only problem in Celia’s life was her father-in-law, who detested her outspoken manner. a few times, she was so angry that she left home. However, she did not go far—one time she spent a night at Cynthia’s house in the central town and another time she went to the bus station but could not leave, so she just waited for her husband to find her there. on summer days when farmers are busy planting rice, Celia often missed her Korean class. Then, one day in 2006, she came to the class. she said she came to introduce her new sister-in-law from vietnam, but after the class, she confided in me, with her eyes filled with tears, about a spat she had with her father-in-law. still visibly upset from the altercation, Celia said that this time she really wanted a divorce. When i asked her what happened, she told me she couldn’t remember what started their argument. But when she “talked back to him” as she often did to make her points, her angry father-in-law yelled at her, saying “[Do] Philippine daughters-in-law disrespect their fathers-in-law like that? no Korean daughter-in-law would do such a thing.” Celia had heard this kind of slur before, and she always despised it. she knew she worked harder than most Korean daughters-in-law, and said that she did not deserve to hear him say things like “Philippine daughter-in-law.” Celia’s father-in-law’s “otherizing” undermined her sense of full membership in her family and in Korean society, not only in terms of her gendered and generational position as daughter-in-law, but also with regard to her ethnicity. The volatile relationship between Celia and her parents-in-law frustrated her to such an extent that she fantasized about severing her ties to her husband, though she knew that she could not carry out such a threat. The tension from this particular episode eventually passed, but it seemed difficult to smooth out their relationship. as illustrated by Celia’s case, some Filipinas’ stories revealed an interesting pattern of conflicts between fathers-in-law and daughters-in-law. This is different from the common narrative of conflicts between mothersin-law and daughters-in-law. For example, Darlene Jordana relayed her story of when she was slapped by her father-in-law after she affronted her parents-in-law who accused her of sending money to the Philippines without telling them. Darlene’s father-in-law apologized to her right away and has since been good to her. Probably because of the guilt he felt for hitting his daughter-in-law, Darlene’s father-in-law often spoke to his wife on Darlene’s behalf and she now asked her father-in-law if she had anything to discuss. While the pattern is difficult to explicate without accounts from the fathers-in-law, it is noteworthy that the tacit familial rule—grounded in homo-social Confucian rules—that daughters-in-law

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are under the supervision of mothers-in-law and should go to mothers-inlaw for any negotiations is not observed when it comes to Filipinas. Further examination is needed to see if and in what ways the presence of Filipina daughters-in-law transforms traditional family relations in Korean society. nonetheless, this clash between father-in-law and daughter-in-law is a fitting symbol of the tension between patriarchy and multiculturalism. Darlene’s difficulty with her parents-in-law is partly because of a Korean family’s own class burden within an unstable agricultural economy, but more importantly because of their biased view that women’s ties to the Philippines are a threat to the Korean family’s financial security and welfare. The “othering” of Filipinas makes it difficult to picture “multicultural families.” Conclusion Does embracing international marriage migrants make Korea a “multicultural” society? The Korean government seems to think so, as its effervescent multiculturalism campaign emphasizes only marriage migrants. This was their first misstep. Despite its vociferous promotion of “multiculturalism,” the Korean government tacitly prioritizes marriage migrants’ cultural, and thus ethnic, assimilation over incorporation and diversity. This second misstep has been addressed with a discursive turn since the 2008 Multicultural Family support act, but migrants’ cultural practices are marginalized. While at various “multicultural” events, diverse cultures are “displayed” and “objectified,” in daily life, cultural differences are discouraged and suppressed. This chapter identifies another barrier in the Korean multicultural process: patriarchal familial relations in the private sphere. in this chapter, i argue that the Korean government places international marriage migrants as the face of their multicultural projects because marriage migrants are contained under the rules of private patriarchy in Korean families and communities. in other words, it is presumed that Korea’s ethnic nationalism will not be encroached on by the inclusion of marriage migrants, or, at least, be less threatened since marriage migrants’ cultural influence is controlled in a localized private patriarchy. By identifying several factors that influence the interpersonal relationships between Filipina marriage migrants and Korean family members, i closely examined how marriage migrants are relegated to the lowest status in the family because of their age and gender, and how marriage migrants are perceived as “others” because of ethnicity and nationality. i do not want to perpetuate a simplistic portrayal of marriage migrants’ husbands and in-laws as those who only dominate foreign wives (Piper

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1997; nakamatsu 2003). in my long-term ethnographic research, i found many Filipina-Korean couples who, like other married couples, share mutual affection and trust. Korean parents-in-law experience a range of emotions from a sense of excitement, nonconformity, helplessness, and suspicion to discontent and anger when they receive their new family member from another country. negative stereotypes of marriage migrants and the unique matching and migration process, combined with a sense of nationalistic superiority, fuel Korean family members’ prejudicial views of Filipina migrants as potential threat to their family finances. However, Korean family members, especially whose socioeconomic class is low, are often under constant pressure of economic constraints and are usually not equipped with knowledge about how to accommodate their Filipina daughter-in-law with their limited means of communication (often consisting only of bodily gestures) and Filipinas’ gradual yet slow learning of Korean skills. This reveals an obvious yet critical issue, that so-called multicultural families may not have a full understanding of what multiculturalism means or agree with what multiculturalism represents. lieba Faier (2009) argues that Filipina migrants in rural Japan transform the meanings of Japanese culture and identity. similarly, despite Korean family members’ efforts to contain marriage migrants via ethnocentric patriarchy, Filipinas amalgamate both Korean and Philippine elements as strategies for resistance or survival. However, their efforts are not recognized as a path to multiculturalism because they occur under the rubric of “family,” which is metaphorically written only in Korean. The tension and conflicts that arise in these families could be ameliorated if Korean families, communities, and the government move beyond a less-than-genuine multiculturalism campaign and embrace truly inclusive attitudes about diversity. However, this incorporation of diversity will be possible only when the government and the society simultaneously challenge patriarchy. References Chae, eun-ha. 2007. “Chosŏn ilbo, Pet’ŭnam kukmin ege ‘mollae’ sagwa” [Chosŏn ilbo, ‘secret’ apologies to vietnam]. PRESSian, 19 May. available at http://www.pressian.com/news/article.html?no=49458 (retrieved 26 July 2008). Constable, nicole. 2003. Romance on a Global Stage: Pen Pals, Virtual Ethnography, and “Mail-Order” Marriages. Berkeley: University of California Press. Faier, leiba. 2009. Intimate Encounters: Filipina Women and the Remaking of Rural Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Freeman, Caren. 2005. “Marrying Up and Marrying Down: The Paradoxes of Marital Mobility for Chosonjok Brides in south Korea.” in Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia, edited by n. Constable, 80–100. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. gardiner, Judith Kegan. 1995. introduction to Provoking Agents: Gender and Agency in Theory and Practice, edited by Judith Kegan gardiner, 1–20. Urbana: University of illinois Press. Hanaki, Toru, arvind singhal, Min Wha Han, Do Kyun Kim, and Ketan Chitnis. 2007. “Hanryu sweeps east asia: How Winter sonata is gripping Japan.” International Communication Gazette 69, no. 3:281–294. Hatem, Mervat. 1986. “The enduring alliance of nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal status laws: The Case of Modern egypt.” Feminist Issues 6, no. 1:19–43. Jones, gavin, and Hsiu-hua shen. 2008. “international Marriage in east and southeast asia: Trends and research emphases.” Citizenship Studies 12, no. 1:9–25. Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1988. “Bargaining with Patriarchy.” Gender and Society 2, no. 3:274–290. Kim, Minjeong. 2010. “gender and international Marriage Migration.” Sociology Compass 4, no. 9:718–731. ———. 2012. “gendered Desire and Heteronormativity in the Transnational Matchmaking Process.” in Social Production and Reproduction at the Interface of Public and Private Spheres: Advances in Gender Research, vol. 16, edited by Marcia Texler segal, vasilikie Demos, and esther ngan-ling Chow, 15–38. Bingley, UK: emerald group Publishing. ———. 2013a. “Weaving Women’s agency into representations of Marriage Migrants: narrative strategies with reflective Practice.” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies 19, no. 3: 7–41. ———. 2013b. “Citizenship Projects for Marriage Migrants in south Korea: intersecting Motherhood with ethnicity and Class.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State, and Society 20, no. 4: 455–481. Kim, sang-joon, shin Dong-heon, and son sam-rak. 2007. “sarin (Pet’ŭnam sinbu sarin sakŏn)” [Murder (Murder case of vietnamese bride)]. national legal information Center, Korean Ministry of government legislation. available at www.law.go.kr/lsW/ precinfoP.do?precseq=71041 (retrieved 26 July 2008). Kŭkŏt i algo sipta [TV Docu]. 2001. “nongch‘on ŭro sijip on P‘illip‘in sinbudŭl” [Filipina brides in rural towns]. 13 January. seoul: seoul Broadcasting system.

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Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. oxford: Clarendon Press. lee, Hye-Kyung. 2008. “international Marriage and the state in south Korea: Focusing on governmental Policy.” Citizenship Studies 12, no. 1:107–123. lie, John, and Myoungkyu Park. 2006. “south Korea in 2005: economic Dynamism, generational Conflicts, and social Transformations.” Asian Survey 46, no. 1:56–62. nakamatsu, Tomoko. 2003. “international Marriage through introduction agencies: social and legal realities of ‘asian’ Wives of Japanese Men.” in Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration, edited by nicola Piper and Mina roces. lanham, MD: rowman and littlefield. nam, Jong-young. 2006. “Tŭlkkŭllun Pet’ŭnam i ch’iyok ŭl ŏttŏk’e . . .” [seething vietnam, this humiliation . . . ]. The Hankyoreh. 1 May. available at www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/120011. html (retrieved 26 July 2008). okin, susan Miller. 1998. “Feminism and Multiculturalism: some Tensions.” Ethics 4, no. 108:661–684. ———. 1999. Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press. Piper, nicola. 1997. “international Marriage in Japan: ‘race’ and ‘gender’ Perspectives.” Gender, Place, and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography 4, no. 3:321–338. scott, James C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. new Haven, CT: yale University Press. shim, Jae-Hoon. 1993. “rural exodus: Farming for Brides; south Korean villagers struggle To Find Wives.” Far Eastern Economic Review 156:24. song, sarah. 2005. “Majority norms, Multiculturalism, and gender equality.” American Political Science Review 99, no. 4:473. Walby, sylvia. 1990. Theorizing Patriarchy. oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wang, Hong-zen. 2007. “Hidden spaces of resistance of the subordinated: Case studies from vietnamese Female Migrant Partners in Taiwan.” International Migration Review 41, no. 3:706–727. Wang, Hong-zen, and shu-ming Chang. 2002. “The Commodification of international Marriages: Cross-Border Marriage Business in Taiwan and vietnam.” International Migration 40, no. 6:93–116.

Part iv: Coda

THirTeen

Korean Multiculturalism in Comparative Perspective

JaCK Jin gary lee anD JoHn D. sKrenTny

When someone from south Korea and someone from europe both say, “i live in a multicultural society,” do they mean the same thing?1 We argue that multiculturalism, usually understood in the West as the equal recognition and inclusion of persons of different groups in public life, has taken on different meanings in Korea (and, indeed, in the wider industrialized east asia) and in europe.2 our larger point is that the emergence of multiculturalism in south Korea (henceforth Korea) should be understood in a comparative perspective. More specifically, the extent of the multicultural transition of nation-states in asia is limited in comparison to europe as their multicultural policies have been shaped by the economic goals that are characteristic of “developmental states” (Wong 2004). in terms of demographics and policies, multicultural developments in Korea bear a greater similarity to other developmental states in east asia than to southern european states that also became migrant-receiving states in the past few decades—about the same time as Korea. as recent countries of immigration, Korea, Japan, italy, and spain have begun to depend on migrants because of the needs occasioned by labor market shortages, 1

The authors would like to thank fellow participants of the Multiethnic Korea workshop for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Jack Jin gary lee would also like to acknowledge the asia research institute (ari) at the national University of singapore and the Tan Kah Kee Foundation for their support. While both authors contributed to the argument presented in this chapter, lee took the lead in drafting and writing it. 2 nora H. J. Kim (chap. 3) maps the discourse of multiculturalism in the Korean mass media, highlighting three different perspectives on the issue of ethnic diversity in Korean society. similarly, Jun (chap. 4) and abelmann et al. (chap. 5) reveal how the Korean state’s institutionalization of tamunhwa, i.e., multiculturalism, through civil society organizations and the education system, respectively, has led to ambivalence and, sometimes, confusion about state-driven multiculturalism among social actors who are tasked to educate Koreans and migrants about ethnic and cultural differences.

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structural economic demands, and demographic imbalances (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004). as such, they form the core of our comparisons to understand Korea’s recent multicultural turn. We also include singapore and Taiwan, as they shed light on the institutional dynamics of multiculturalism in Korea despite their colonial histories of migrant settlement.3 To examine these regionally oriented differences, we explore variations in policies and outcomes concerning the settlement of three groups of migrants in our cases: guest workers, marriage migrants, and asylees/ refugees. We view their settlement as factors leading to multiculturalism in industrialized states in the twenty-first century. in this regard, we are concerned with the question of migrant settlement because it reveals the limited though still significant nature of multiculturalism in asia. as Kim (2007) and lee (2008) have demonstrated, the emergence of multiculturalism in Korean governmental discourse has been linked to the increase of international marriages between Korean men and foreign women. This official recognition and accommodation of the “multicultural family” contrasts with the temporary status of guest workers who do not have rights of family reunification (Kim 2007; seol and skrentny 2009a). Thus, rights to settlement demarcate the boundaries of multiculturalism prior to policies of immigrant integration. To conclude, we will compare the significance of ethnic return migration as it is a salient feature of Korean immigration policy. Because coethnic preferences in admissions policies are a contradiction of multiculturalism, their existence further underscores the ambivalence of Korea’s multiculturalism. Will Kymlicka (2005) identifies trends toward liberal multiculturalism in Western democracies in their treatment of minority nationalisms, indigenous peoples, immigrant groups, and “metics,” long-term residents who are excluded from the polity. our focus on guest workers, marriage migrants, and asylees/refugees roughly corresponds to the latter two groups. With regards to immigrants and metics, Kymlicka (2005) observes that Western countries have mostly adopted race-neutral admissions policies, instituted public support for immigrant-based ethnocultural diversity, and granted legal status and even citizenship to irregular migrants, refugees, and guest workers who have become de facto settlers.4 in southern europe, states have implemented repeated regulariza3 For the purposes of comparison, we consider singapore to be similar to the industrialized east asian states of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan because of the state’s directive role in economic development; in contrast, newly industrialized countries like Malaysia and Thailand have been more reliant upon foreign direct investment in achieving economic growth (Jomo 2001). geographically, singapore is part of southeast asia and is a member state of the association of southeast asian nations (asean). 4 This is an optimistic assessment. it may be reconsidered in light of the introduction of

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tion programs in response to the de facto settlement of undocumented migrants (gonzález-enriquez and Triandafyllidou 2009). This has been a systemic feature of the spanish and italian immigration regimes. Whereas the Korean government did implement a regularization program by making temporary e-9 non-professional employment visas available to most undocumented foreigners in 2003, this has not been repeated (Kong et al. 2010; yoo et al. 2004). Before this, “amnesty” in Korea simply meant the temporary suspension of fines for overstaying to encourage voluntary repatriation (seol and skrentny 2004). as He and Kymlicka (2005) recognize, the Western model of liberal multiculturalism and its group categories may not fit in asia because of the differences in the nature of the groups involved. in this case, the regularization of undocumented foreigners reveals differences in the possibilities and likelihood of their long-term settlement in Korea and southern europe. likewise, our purpose in this essay is to employ the comparison of immigration policies and their outcomes to better understand the ground-breaking yet still limited nature of Korea’s multiculturalism. We show that though Korean multiculturalism represents a great change with tremendous opportunities and challenges, this significance is best understood in relation to the Korean past, rather than to comparable migrant-receiving states in europe.5 Multicultural Developments: Demographic Comparisons How many foreigners of different ethnic origin are in Korea? How does this compare to other states? are there regional differences? seol and skrentny (2009a) have pointed out that migrants make up much smaller proportions of the populations of Korea and Japan than comparably developed european countries like italy, spain, and greece. Table 13.1 demonstrates this variation. Korea and Japan are most similar in terms of the proportion of migrants in their populations. also, there are clear differences in terms of the magnitude and proportion of migrants between each of our east asian and southern european cases. There are also distinct regional differences. The proportion of migrants in all east asian countries (0.4%; excluding integration requirements for residency in Western european countries and the increasing restrictiveness of the european asylum regime beginning in the mid-1980s (Joly and suhrke 2004). 5 as John lie observes in his introduction to this volume, the south Korean state’s adoption of multicultural policies in the 2000s marked a dramatic departure in the self-understanding of south Korea as a monoethnic and monocultural society. in relation, Timothy lim (chap. 2) argues that the emergent discourse of multiculturalism will likely effect changes in immigration policies in a way generally similar to developments in Western states such as australia and germany.

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Table 13.1 International Migrant Stock (Estimates Based on Foreign-Born Population)* 2010 Total (Thousands) Korea

2010 % of Total Population

2005–2010 Average Annual Average Annual Net Rate of Change (%) Migration (Thousands)

535

1.1

-0.6

-6.0

Japan**

2,176

1.7

1.7

30.0

Singapore

1,967

40.7

5.5

100.0

Spain

6,378

14.1

6.5

350.0

Italy

4,463

7.4

7.5

330.0

Source: United Nations Population Division 2009. * Estimates for Taiwan were not available. ** Estimate based on population of foreign citizens.

singapore) is markedly lower than southern europe (9.5%) (Un Population Division 2009). The downward decrease in migrants in Korea from 2005 to 2010 may be explained by the fact that migrant workers were not included in the official statistics.6 in fact, an upward trend is more likely. Drawing from Korean government statistics, Kong et al. (2010) show that international migrants in Korea have continually increased from 1985 to 2007. Foreigners made up 2.2% of the population in 2007, as compared to 0.6% in 1995 and 1.06% in 2000 (Kong et al. 2010). even so, this is still much lower than spain and italy. among our east asian cases, singapore stands out as an exception. Migrants make up 40.7% of the total population. This is even higher than classic countries of immigration like the United states, Canada, and australia (Un Population Division 2009; reid 2010). While this is not surprising given that singapore has been an immigrant society, reid (2010) and Kaur (2006) have noted that contemporary migration to singapore was separated by a period of interruption from the historical flows that populated the country when it was a British colony. reid (2010) states that immigration rates in singapore plummeted in the period of independence 6 Citing a similar downward trend in the migrant population in Korea from 2000 to 2005 in U.n. figures, Hugo noted that they did not include migrant workers, while comparable Korean government figures showed an upward trend (2008, 14).

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and nation building after World War ii, but they have been allowed to increase significantly since the 1980s to maintain low-skilled labor costs and develop the economy. Kaur (2006) observes that this increase reflected some continuity with the past since many of the “new” sources—for example, south asia and indonesia—were also sources in the colonial period. notably, contemporary migration to singapore has been marked by the same set of structural factors and historical conditions as the recent countries of immigration, Korea, Japan, spain, and italy. This is also the case for Taiwan. While U.n. Population Division figures do not include Taiwan, Taiwan governmental figures report that there were about 32,000 guest workers on work permits at the end of 2005. This is 3.1% of the total workforce in Taiwan (lu 2011). Compared to singapore, this places Taiwan closer to Korea and Japan in terms of the magnitude of its migratory flows. We are concerned not only with the magnitude of international migration, but with the sources of migratory flows in understanding the demographic realities of multiculturalism. as Kong et al. (2010) state, the origins of international migrants in Korea are not “diverse”; 80% of them came from countries in asia in 2007. This is similar to Japan, where foreigners from countries in asia accounted for 73.9% of registered foreign nationals in 2006 (national institute of Population and social security research 2008). in both countries, intraregion migratory flows have been significant in defining the ethnic composition of their multicultural societies. although we do not have comparable data for singapore, we observe a similar demographic trend; 94.9% of foreign-born singaporean residents (singapore citizens and permanent residents only) in 2000 were born in Malaysia, greater China, south asia, and indonesia (reid 2010). a similar phenomenon may be observed in Taiwan. in 2008, 35.0% of migrant workers originated from indonesia, 22.2% from vietnam, and 22.1% from the Philippines (lu 2011). in contrast, we observe a more even distribution of migrant sources in spain and italy. among legal foreign residents in italy in 1999, 428,354 originated from europe, 366,415 from africa, and 209,230 from asia (Calavita 2004). as for spain, 40.4% of legal foreign residents in 2000 came from europe, 29.2% from africa, 22.3% from latin america, and 7.9% from asia (Cornelius 2004). While our figures for spain and italy may not be directly comparable with Japan and Korea, they provide plausible evidence that migrants in southern europe are significantly more diverse. Table 13.2 illustrates the significance of intra-asia migration in Japan and Korea. aside from the United states, Brazil, and Peru, other countries in asia have been the main sources of migrant flows into Japan and Korea.

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Table 13.2 Top Sources of Foreigners in Japan and Korea by National Origin* Japan

Korea

1995

2000

2006

1995

2000

2007

Korea (48.9%)

Korea (37.7%)

Korea (28.7%)

China (25.1%)

China (32.5%)

China (47.2%)

China (16.4%)

China (19.9%)

China (26.9%)

USA (19.3%)

USA (17.8%)

USA (10.5%)

Brazil (13.0%)

Brazil (15.1%)

Brazil (15.0%)

Japan (10.2%)

Philippines (5.7%)

Vietnam (6.7%)

Philippines (5.5%)

Philippines (8.6%)

Philippines (9.3%)

Taiwan (10.2%)

Japan (5.3%)

Philippines (4.8%)

USA (3.2%)

Peru (2.7%)

Peru (2.8%)

Philippines (7.0%)

Taiwan (4.9%)

Thailand (4.5%)

Total Total Foreign- Total Foreign- Total Foreign- Total Foreign- Total ForeignForeigners ers 1,686,444 ers 2,084,919 ers 269,641 ers 491,324 ers 1,066,273 1,362,371 Sources: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2008; Kong et al. 2010. *The figures for Korea were based on the total numbers of foreigners staying in Korea on 31 December of each year. Data for Japan was based on the total numbers of foreign nationals registered in Japan. While Korean statistics include American military service personnel (31,608 in 2007) (Kong et al. 2010), the Japanese figures do not include American service personnel because they are exempt from Japanese visa laws and regulations under the Status of Forces Agreement.

nevertheless, these figures also indicate that migrants from countries like China, the Philippines, and vietnam have begun to outnumber historical foreigner communities like the Koreans in Japan and the Taiwanese in Korea.7 not surprisingly, these new migrant groups have become symbolic markers of the multicultural turn in Japan and Korea. Despite the emergence of these new migrant communities, the presence of ethnic return migration restricts the ethnic diversity brought about by international migration. as Kong et al. (2010) highlight, the large numbers of Chinese migrants in Korea is misleading. They estimate that about 65% 7 While the long-standing Zainichi (i.e., resident in Japan) Korean population has remained one of the largest groups of foreigners in Japan, the resident Taiwanese in Korea, who entered Korea decades ago, have been outnumbered by other nationalities even though they have consisted of the majority among permanent residence visa (F-5) holders (Kong et al. 2010).

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of Chinese immigrants in Korea are ethnically Korean (Kong et al. 2010). in table 13.2, we can also detect the presence of ethnic return migrants in the rise in migrants from Brazil and Peru in Japan (the Nikkeijin) and in the migrant population from the United states in Korea (Korean-americans). as we will demonstrate, both countries have turned to ethnic return migration as partial solutions to labor shortages, and, specifically in the case of Korea, bride shortages as well. in contrast, there is little evidence of large-scale ethnic return migration to spain and italy. Thus, ethnic return migration in Japan and Korea further limits the ethnic diversity of migration in comparison to our southern european cases. The comparisons of migrant populations provide a demographic basis for our argument that multiculturalism in Korea, while similar to other industrialized countries in asia, is limited in extent and different from multiculturalism in southern europe. We find more evidence when we examine the numbers of foreign children in schools in Korea, Japan, spain, and italy.8 seol and skrentny (2009a) have stated that this can be an indicator of current or potential migrant settlement. in their analysis, there were only about 1,574 foreign children in schools in Korea in 2005; this excludes the 8,000 children who are enrolled in foreign schools (seol and skrentny 2009a). if we examine their combined numbers in light of the total number of foreigners in Korea in 2005 (747,467, according to Kong et al. [2010]), foreign children composed a mere 1.3% of the population of foreigners. This is similar to Japan, where foreign children consist of only about 3.6% of all foreigners (seol and skrentny 2009a). seol and skrentny (2009a) add that the slightly larger Japanese figures need to be treated with caution as a large number of foreign children are either Nikkeijin or children or grandchildren of the displaced Koreans and Taiwanese populations who are officially defined as special permanent residents. in comparison, the numbers of foreign schoolchildren and their proportion of the foreigner population are significantly larger in spain and italy. in 2005, there were 608,040 schoolchildren in spain (12.7% of foreigners) and 500,000 in italy (20% of foreigners; seol and skrentny 2009a). These stark differences in the numbers of schoolchildren indicate the lack of migrant settlement in Korea despite the nascent multicultural transition. To understand this disjuncture, we turn to policies that constrain migrant settlement and shape the boundaries of Korean multiculturalism. 8 While we do not have the figures for singapore, we speculate that they may lie in between our east asian and southern european cases. since 1997, the economic Development Board has led efforts to make singapore into an educational hub, or “the global schoolhouse” (Huang and yeoh 2005). These efforts have also been regionally oriented, targeting potential students in asia (Huang and yeoh 2005).

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Guest Worker Policies: Differentiated Controls versus Ex Post Facto Regularization We first examine guest worker policies comparatively to demonstrate the nature of multiculturalism in Korea. simply put, a multicultural Korea does not include guest workers and their families. The e-9 non-professional employment visa category, for guest workers only, allows for a single two-year extension of employment contracts. also, the employment Permit system (ePs) act states that foreign workers need to go through a sixmonth “employment restriction period” after their final departure before they can be employed again in Korea (Ministry of employment and labor 2010). instead of the possibility of de facto long-term residence, these regulations likely facilitate circular migration patterns where migrants may alternate between employment in Korea and their homelands. Would migrants return to their countries of origin? Why would they do so given Korea’s structural dependence on cheap low-skilled labor? it is reasonable to doubt the feasibility of these regulations when the numbers of undocumented workers in Korea had consisted of almost 80% of the total foreigner population as of late 2002 (seol and skrentny 2004; yoo et al. 2004). south Korea has a structurally embedded demand for low-skilled labor that has been the result of labor market segmentation and low-skilled labor shortages among small- and medium-sized firms in industries like manufacturing, fishing, and construction (seol and skrentny 2004; Kim 2009). This has been compounded by the fact that Korea is an ageing society where the total fertility rate has steadily plummeted to 1.08 in 2005, way below the replacement level of 2.1 (Kim 2009). given these structural economic and demographic factors, it may seem plausible to foresee the settlement of undocumented migrants. However, this ignores the policy factors that contributed to the emergence of undocumented migrants. Prior to the introduction of the ePs, Korea’s “foreign trainee” program had been modeled after Japan’s (seol and skrentny 2004). it was introduced and significantly expanded in 1991 and 1993, respectively, following pressure on the Ministry of Justice from the Korean Federation of small Business (KFsB) (seol and skrentny 2009a; Kong et al. 2010). This program led to relatively large numbers of undocumented foreigners through foreign trainees’ overstaying their visas or running away from exploitative employers. However, the introduction of the ePs act in 2003 has likely improved working conditions for legal foreign workers since it gives foreign workers and Koreans equal coverage under Korean labor laws (cf. yamanaka chap. 9). The ePs act was also accompanied by a one-time regularization of undocumented foreigners. as Kong et al. (2010) note, this led to the decrease in the proportion

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of undocumented foreigners among the foreigner population, and only 20.8% of foreigners were undocumented as of 2007. Under the ePs policy, policymakers installed a set of monetary incentives or safeguards, aiming to guarantee the successful conclusion of employment contracts and the subsequent return of foreign employees. The employer subscribes to a Departure guarantee insurance that consists of 8.3% of the worker’s monthly pay (Ministry of employment and labor 2010). The worker can claim this sum only if he fulfills at least one year of employment without abandoning his position. in contrast, foreign employees are required to purchase return Cost insurance to cover their return expenses (Ministry of employment and labor 2010). as such, these measures of the ePs discourage foreign workers from abandoning their legal status and becoming undocumented. Beyond this change in policy factors, we also find evidence that migrant settlement has not occurred even with a relatively large proportion of undocumented foreigners. as seol and skrentny (2004) note, the asian economic crisis in 1997 led to the departure of unemployed migrants; returning to their home countries was straightforward because they had not brought their families or settled. given this lack of migrant worker settlement and the introduction of the ePs, guest workers are unlikely to become settlers and demand greater social inclusion as they have in europe. Moreover, the implementation of the ePs requires bilateral investment in a labor recruitment system. For instance, to be considered for employment under e-9 visa rules, foreigners need to pass a basic Korean proficiency test (ePs-ToPiK). They also need to undergo preliminary training in the Korean language and culture and in basic industrial training in their home countries. The test and preliminary training are both conducted through sending agencies located in the workers’ home countries. These requirements highlight the bilateral economic cooperation that underlies Korea’s employment Permit system. as of 2010, Korea signed MoUs with fifteen countries (all within asia) to supply low-skilled labor under the e-9 visa or the H-2 Working visit visa (for ethnic Koreans) (Ministry of government legislation 2010). The Korean government thus plays an active role in the importation and facilitated returns of low-skilled labor, which it can limit through industry-based quotas. Under these varied instruments of state control, we contend that guest workers are not a significant factor in the development of multicultural policies in Korea. nevertheless, structural economic and demographic factors have led to an unprecedented increase in migrant workers since the late 1980s, contributing to the emergence of a multiethnic Korea (Kim 2009). We distinguish the Korean and east asian experience with migrant labor from our

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southern european cases in two ways. First, the control of labor migration in east asia is more differentiated and stratified according to the skill level of migrants. While the differentiated admission and settlement of labor migrants according to their skill levels is a global phenomenon, the controlled admission and return of low-skilled migrants in east asia contributes to the relative lack of migrant settlement. This greatly limits the role of guest workers in the development of multiculturalism in Korea and the rest of asia. in contrast, southern european states have not implemented stringent mechanisms of control to the same extent. For instance, guest workers in both spain and italy have rights to family reunification with their spouses and minor children (international organization for Migration 2008). This brings us to the other key distinction. Both spain and italy have repeatedly employed regularization programs to respond to the persistent presence of undocumented migrants instead of establishing proactive labor migration policies (gonzález-enriquez and Triandafyllidou 2009). ex post facto regularization programs characterize the southern european approach to undocumented migrants, many of whom fulfill structurally embedded labor needs. in contrast, east asian states, with the exception of Japan, have implemented work-permit schemes that allow the state to manage and control labor migration, and to sanction the presence of undocumented migrants. While we have emphasized the broad similarities of labor migration systems in our east asian cases, their historical trajectories demonstrate institutional dynamics that help explain the boundaries of multiculturalism in asia. lu (2011) compares the emergence of labor migration policies in singapore, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Critically, she finds that their development of policy has been influenced by the experiences of other states in the region, rather than by their emulation of the West.9 This parallels the demographic outcomes of their immigration policies. The diffusion of guest worker policies within our east asian cases can be traced from the initial issuance of temporary work permits to Malaysian workers in singapore in 1965 (lu 2011). Kaur (2006) highlights the introduction of three instruments of control with the amendment of singapore’s immigration act in 1988. Thus, the work-permit scheme, the foreign-levy scheme, and internal enforcement measures were put in place. according to Kaur (2006), the work-permit scheme differentiated workers according 9 This suggests the relevance of “channeled” learning as an important mechanism of policy diffusion in the domain of guest worker policies in asia, according to simmons, Dobbin, and garrett (2008). They define “channeled” learning as the selective processing of information obtained through available successful examples, communication networks, and supranational institutions.

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to their skill, race, and gender, while the foreign-levy scheme introduced levies on employers of foreigners to reduce the nation’s dependence on low-skilled labor migrants, and the internal enforcement measures that were introduced included penal measures for illegal migrant workers. interestingly, this policy development also provided for an “amnesty” for illegal migrants, but amnesty was followed by deportation without other penalties (caning and/or prison terms) rather than settlement (Kaur 2006). singapore’s policy was further institutionalized with the employment of Foreign Workers act 1990. This has been the basis of the state’s current policies, which provides different settlement and social rights to foreign laborers according to their skill levels and salary. in particular, the rights of foreign domestic workers are the most restricted. Because of the state’s perception of their “nature of work,” they are not covered by the employment act (unlike other low-skilled migrant workers), and they will be repatriated if they are found to be pregnant (yeoh 2006). Furthermore, like other low-skilled workers, they may not bring family or marry singaporeans, and they are subject to regular medical checks. Hence, yeoh (2006) characterizes singapore’s policies toward low-skilled migrant labor as a case of “structural (non)incorporation.” While their physical presence is clearly indicated in the sanctity of the homes (one in seven households employ a foreign domestic worker) and in public spaces (as visible in the appearance of weekend foreign worker enclaves in conservation districts, parks, open spaces and leisure sites),

their structural position within multicultural Singapore society is carefully excluded. (yeoh 2006, 32; emphasis added.)

The “structural (non)incorporation” of foreign low-skilled labor contrasts greatly with the active recruitment and retention of skilled foreign professionals, entrepreneurs, and investors. singapore’s foreign worker policies are highly instrumental and subordinate to the city-state’s active pursuit of economic globalization (yeoh 2006). singapore’s case is instructive for two reasons. Firstly, it has served as a successful model of state control over migrant worker flows for other asian states. as lu (2011) demonstrates, the design of Taiwan’s guest worker policies is not only similar to the singaporean model; Taiwanese policymakers had studied singapore’s policies (among others) in 1989 and recommended that Taiwan adopt singapore’s control measures while simplifying its permit categories. Taiwan enacted the employment service act in 1992. like in singapore, guest workers in Taiwan do not have rights to family reunification, and they could not marry or become pregnant until policymakers removed these restrictions by the end of 2002 (lu 2011; Council of labor affairs [2001] 2014, 10). and, as seol and skrentny

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(2004) discuss, Korea’s labor Ministry and ngos had favored a workpermit system to replace the industrial Technical Training Program (iTTP; discontinued in 2007). These reformers had viewed Taiwan’s work-permit scheme as a model that granted rights without migrant settlement (seol and skrentny 2004). Their proposal, which was to become the ePs, would grant low-skilled migrant workers coverage under Korea’s employment laws, which was not the case with the iTTP (seol and skrentny 2004). nevertheless, it maintained state control over labor migrants. However, we note that guest workers may marry Korean citizens, unlike in singapore and Taiwan. in contrast, Japan is in some ways even more extreme than singapore in its policies to hold off multiculturalism, relying on its “foreign trainee” system (rather than rights-bearing “workers”) and ethnic return migration to fulfill low-skilled labor demands. We discuss Japan’s approach to immigration in the context of its emergent discourse on multiculturalism in the following section. second, the singapore case shows that exclusionary and instrumental policies can exist even within an east asian state that is already a multicultural nation. Unlike Korea and Japan, which have long celebrated their myths of homogeneity (lie 2001 and this volume), singapore is a former British colony dominated by Chinese but with large proportions of Malays and indians. yet the case of singapore suggests that the preservation of homogeneity is not the basis of the roughly similar labor migration policies in east asia. Though Korea allows marriage with Korean citizens, it shares with singapore and Taiwan highly restrictive policies. The importance of guest workers in fostering multiculturalism depends on their ability to settle and be included by public institutions. in both spain and italy, the illegal migrant population repeatedly grew following multiple regularizations despite the introduction of restrictive border control measures (gonzález-enriquez 2009; Finotelli and sciortino 2009). Critically, both states have granted social rights to education and health care to illegal migrants because of concerns over the social integration of migrants. italy did so in 1998 with its first systematic immigration law, immigration act 40/1998, while spain did so with the organic law on rights and Freedoms of Foreigners and Their social integration, 4/2000 (gonzález-enriquez 2009; Finotelli and sciortino 2009). To be sure, some of this extension of rights was instrumental; gonzález-enriquez (2009) adds that these rights had been introduced in spain not only on humanitarian grounds, but because of fears of contagious diseases from immigrants and concerns over juvenile delinquency. in addition, regular migrant workers in both spain and italy also have rights to family reunification subject to conditions regarding their period of stay. in contrast, guest workers do not have these rights in east asia. in this regard, seol and skrentny (2009a)

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have argued that the absence of supranational institutions that can pressure states to grant family reunification rights to migrants helps to explain the lack of migrant settlement in east asia.10 However, supranational institutions have also exerted pressure on spain and italy to restrict immigration because of their position on the southern borders of the european Union. For instance, Finotelli and sciortino (2009) point out that act n. 39/90, the legge Martelli, introduced restrictive immigration measures, like visa requirements and sanctions for human trafficking, as part of italy’s signing and ratification of the schengen agreement.11 The law demonstrated that italy could prevent unwanted immigration into the schengen space. nevertheless, this law also created a “very liberal” regularization program in recognition of the need for migrant labor (Finotelli and sciortino 2009). as such, Finotelli and sciortino (2009) argue that italian immigration policy has had to maintain an uneasy balance between the structural demand for low-skilled migrant labor and restrictive norms that stem from eU pressures as well as domestic anti-immigrant populism. These contradictory pressures have been compounded by deficiencies in the legal recruitment of foreign workers and weak internal controls (as compared to restrictive border measures) (Finotelli and sciortino 2009). We observe a similar dynamic in spain. as gonzález-enriquez (2009) points out, the spanish government’s fiscal austerity has led to periodic or individual regularizations as a “cheap model” of managing labor migration. like italy, the spanish state relies on a quota-based guest worker system where employers recruit workers in their home countries. This creates problems for employers who cannot do so. Unlike east asia, where the state (Korea) or private brokers operating under the framework of guest worker programs (Taiwan and singapore) have acted as intermediaries, the spanish state ruled out public investment in such infrastructure. While the introduction of a job-searching visa might be an alternative, gonzález-enriquez (2009) notes that this is not feasible partly because of pressures from other eU states to prevent unwanted immigration into the schengen space. 10 in the european Union, family reunification is governed by the Council Directive 2003/86/eC on the right to family reunification (Family reunification Directive). With regards to non-eU migrants, it defines family reunification as “the entry into and residence in a Member state by a family member of a third country national residing lawfully in that Member state in order to preserve the family unit, whether the family relationship arose before or after the resident’s entry” (international organization for Migration 2008). 11 The schengen agreement of 1985 constitutes an internal space in europe where the free movement of persons is guaranteed, and where a single external border is applied to all signatory states. italy and spain signed the agreement in 1990 and 1991, respectively.

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Thus, the schengen agreement, with its requirements for restrictive external border controls, has placed constraints on the ability of spain and italy to meet structurally embedded demands for guest workers. nevertheless, these southern european states have resorted to regularization programs to “manage” labor migration. in italy, roughly 1.4 million migrants have obtained residents permits through such programs since 1986 (Finotelli and sciortino 2009). similarly, spain has regularized more than 1.1 million persons through seven extraordinary regularizations since 1991 (gonzález-enriquez 2009). even so, this has not “solved” the problem of irregularity. an estimated 580,000 migrants (19 percent of the registered foreigner population) had irregular status in spain at the beginning of 2008, while the long-term irregular foreigner population in italy was estimated to be over 500,000 at the end of 2008 (gonzálezenriquez 2009; Finotelli and sciortino 2009). What does this portend for multiculturalism in spain and italy? We have demonstrated that, compared to east asia, guest workers in southern europe have had greater possibilities of settlement and more access to social rights. Therefore, we argue that though their rights are still restricted in many ways,12 their legal treatment fits into the liberal multicultural trend of greater recognition and inclusion (Kymlicka 2005). in comparison, the “structural (non) incorporation” of guest workers in east asia has excluded them in the making of multicultural policies. instead, we turn to the east asian path to migrant incorporation—marriage migrants and their multicultural families. A Korean Path toward Multiculturalism: Marriage Migration and Social Integration The rise in international marriages in east asia since the early 1990s has been closely associated with the establishment of international trade and capital flows within the region. it has consisted mainly of men from more developed countries marrying women from developing countries in east and southeast asia. Based on available data estimates, Jones and shen (2008) state that Taiwan (32%), singapore (17%), Korea (14%), and Japan (5%) had the highest proportion of international marriages (out of all marriages) in east and southeast asia around 2005. However, the majority of these marriages were marriages between persons of the same ethnicity, e.g., marriages between Korean-Chinese (Chosŏnjok) women and Korean men (Jones and shen 2008). in Korea, the increase in international marriages began in 1992 with the normalization of relations with China (lee 12 Calavita (2007) criticizes the quota-based system of spain and italy for institutionalizing the economic marginality of regular and irregular migrants, stating that it undercuts policies of integration.

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2008). since then, marriages between Chosŏnjok women and Korean men have accounted for the largest proportion of international marriages in Korea (lee 2008). initially, these marriages were promoted by local governmental groups who introduced Korean farmers to Chosŏnjok women (lee 2008). similarly, state-arranged international marriages occurred in Japan in the late 1980s (nakamatsu 2003). This initial wave of international marriages contrasts with the privately arranged (through commercial brokers or social networks) marriages that have subsequently characterized international marriages in east asia from the late 1990s onward. like labor migration, marriage migration has had a strong intraregional orientation. Jones and shen (2008) identify China, vietnam, the Philippines, and indonesia as the major countries of origin of marriage migrants in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and singapore. in comparison, we know much less about international marriages in spain and italy.13 Hence, we focus on marriage migration and its relation to multiculturalism in Korea in comparison to other east asian states. in east asia, marriage migration has been a salient feature of multicultural developments; this is particularly so for nation-states that have claimed to be monoethnic, like Korea and Japan. Unlike guest workers, marriage migrants have settled and been incorporated in Korean society. nevertheless, the terms of their social and political integration have been conditional upon their fulfillment of certain gender-based obligations. The legal status and rights of foreign spouses in Korea has been the subject of several policy changes, marking a tentative but gradual progression toward greater economic and social inclusion. one of the first changes was the granting of F-2 residence visas in 2002, which allowed marriage migrants to seek employment (lee 2008). and, in 2005, marriage migrants who had not been naturalized could apply for permanent residency after two years of residence in Korea (lee 2008). This would facilitate their daily activities and exempt them from the need to request extensions of stay. one key policy change affected the right to settlement of foreign wives. Previously, a foreign wife had to return to her country of origin (without her children) if she divorced her husband during the first two years of marriage (lee 2008). This was changed in 2003 such that a foreign wife could extend her residence visa and apply for naturalization if (1) her husband was deceased or missing, (2) they had separated or divorced because of her husband’s actions, or (3) she had been the caregiver of their children 13

Beck-gernsheim (2007) points out that much academic attention has been given to the marriage practices of migrant populations in europe. The significance of their focus is the ability of migrants to socially integrate using marriage as a benchmark. even so, Beckgernsheim’s (2007) overview of transnational marriages in Western europe highlights the main trend that migrants have usually married a partner from their family’s country of origin.

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or his parents. Despite this change, the legal status of the foreign wife was still defined through her past or present duties as a wife (especially in the second and third conditions). lastly, foreign wives and their families were included in the social security system only in 2007 (lee 2008). The gradual inclusion of marriage migrants has constituted a pathway to multiculturalism for Korea. Crucially, the official adoption of multiculturalism as a policy was institutionalized through the Plan for Promoting the social integration of Migrant Women, Biracial People, and immigrants, or the “grand Plan,” as announced on 26 april 2006 (Kim 2007; lee 2008). The plan identified the Ministry for gender equality and Family (MgeF) as the main coordinating agency for a set of social policies aimed at the comprehensive support and protection of foreign wives and their children, and at increasing Koreans’ acceptance of a multicultural society (lee 2008). The Korean immigration service’s (2009) First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy echoes the grand Plan in its section on “High-Quality social integration.” notably, in both plans, the provision of social rights only extends to foreign wives and their multicultural children. no other groups were named as targets of the proposed policies despite the official recognition of Korea as a nascent multicultural society (Korean immigration service 2009). Kim (2007) criticizes the MgeF’s narrow definition of “multicultural families” in its “research report on the Preparation of the Multicultural Family support law.” she quotes the report: The multicultural family refers to a family formed by a Korean citizen and a legally residing marriage migrant or foreign worker through matrimony, kinship, or adoption. Families created by the marriage between foreigners of different nationalities or denizens are excluded (Park and Cho 2007; cited by Kim 2007, 106).

in relation, the aims of this law are to acculturate foreign wives of Korean citizens as well as provide marital and child-care social services; as Kim (2007) adds, it has an assimilationist rationale (cf. lim chap. 2). notably, male foreign workers who have married Korean citizens are not the intended recipients of these benefits (Kim 2007). it is also the case that, except for any children they may already have, foreign wives are not allowed to bring family members to Korea. Thus, Korea’s multicultural developments have been closely coupled to the settlement of foreign wives. Despite the liberal use of “multiculturalism” in official rhetoric, the institutionalization of multiculturalism in Korea has been unlike trends toward liberal multiculturalism in europe. Marriage migrants have been recognized and included only as the wives of male Korean citizens, while their cultural identities and individual rights are secondary. generally, Korea’s gradual integration of

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“multicultural families” has been similar to Taiwan’s treatment of female marriage migrants. The Taiwanese state began introducing inclusive measures after 2002, providing marriage migrants with relatively open access to employment, Mandarin courses, and inclusion in Taiwan’s universal health-care system (Wang and Bélanger 2008). However, Wang and Bélanger (2008) critique the fact that the Taiwanese state defined its questions about integration support measures according to traditional gender roles in a 2003 general survey. This revealed a salient assumption of Taiwanese policy-makers. The legal status of marriage migrants “is dependent on the patriarchal principle, thus a differential citizenship is created” (Wang and Bélanger 2008, 98). in other words, migrants are recognized and included in the polity according to state’s ascription of their (unequal) roles and identities. With respect to the inclusion of marriage migrants, multiculturalism in Korea and Taiwan has been shaped by patriarchal assumptions about their place within the family (cf. M. J. Kim chap. 12). in contrast, the singaporean state has only recently begun to create social integration measures for the foreign spouses of singaporean citizens. since 1 april 2012, marriage migrants who are able to obtain the “long-Term visit Pass-Plus” (lTvP+) would qualify for some health-care subsidies at levels similar to permanent residents, and enjoy easier access to employment; persons with this status would also benefit from a longer duration of residence (immigration and Checkpoints authority 2012). Previously, marriage migrants were neither eligible for any health-care subsidies nor granted preferential access to the labor market as it was assumed that their (typically male) spouses would be responsible for supporting them. nevertheless, this new status does not introduce these benefits as rights. rather, it is a pragmatic measure designed to support singaporean families with foreign spouses in a context where international marriages in singapore have increased significantly from 2003 onward (national Population secretariat 2009). The integration of marriage migrants into singapore’s multiracial framework is a subject for further research. in singapore, multiracialism has been grounded in “the formal equality of the administratively homogenized racial groups”—Chinese, Malay, indian, and others (CMio) (Chua 2005, 185). This means that in policy, each group has equal standing. nevertheless, as lai (1995) highlights, this mode of classification is rigid, as a person’s racial category under the CMio classification would determine the official designation of his or her mother tongue and belonging to an ethnic culture. in relation, further research may investigate the recognition and inclusion of marriage migrants and their children within singapore’s multiracial system. ironically, because of an unwillingness to formally accept low-skilled

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labor migration, Japan may be the closest of our east asian cases to the experiences of spain and italy. like these southern european states, Japan’s situation exemplifies a large-scale “illegal immigration policy” (Morris-suzuki 2009). in this regard, Korea’s immigration policy was similar to Japan’s before the ePs act (seol and skrentny 2004). But, despite Korea and Japan’s common dependence on undocumented migrant labor, seol and skrentny (2009a) argue that the lack of family reunification rights for low-skilled migrant workers distinguished these two countries from the West. simply put, rights to family reunification allow for the increased possibility of uncontrolled migrant settlement, leaving the door open to european-style multiculturalism. as we have demonstrated, Korea’s implementation of the ePs consolidated its control of low-skilled labor migration, effectively excluding guest workers from settlement and multicultural policies. in contrast, Japan’s maintenance of its “illegal immigration policy” may have inadvertently encouraged the development of a broader application of multiculturalism, one that included all foreigners. We suggest that the lack of an effective guest-worker program to meet structurally embedded labor market needs and the presence of local integration initiatives may have fostered the increasing presence of undocumented migrant workers and encouraged the long-term residence of the Nikkeijin. Together with the growing trend of international marriages, this increased presence of foreigners in Japan and other demographic pressures have prompted some policymakers to consider the limited integration of low-skilled foreign workers, including the Nikkeijin and marriage migrants. as Tai (2009) points out, the Japanese meaning of multiculturalism has been encapsulated in two idioms, tabunka kyōsei (multicultural living-together) and seikatsusha (people living their lives). While these ideas are not equivalent to european ideals of liberal multiculturalism, they represent broad notions of mutual accommodation between different persons. Tabunka kyōsei took on concrete meanings as local governments in Japan responded to the increase in foreigners in the 1990s by offering them basic public services (Tai 2009). at the same time, the Japanese central government had put in place measures that would increase the numbers of foreigners in Japan. in the 1990 revision of the immigration Control and refugee recognition law, the state added to the number of foreigner residence categories. This included a long-term resident status for returning coethnics from latin america, the Nikkeijin (Tai 2009). also, Japan’s Technical intern Training Program was implemented in 1993 through a decree from the Ministry of Justice (Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). These constituted a hierarchy of foreign labor—skilled foreign workers; the Nikkeijin who had de facto permanent residence and open access to employment; foreign trainees and technical interns who were temporary and lacked

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protection by labor laws; and undocumented migrant workers at the bottom (Tai 2009). Tai (2009) situates the Japanese government’s shift toward multicultural integration from 2005 onward. as she relates, several policy proposals and plans for the admission and integration of foreigners were expressed by different central government agencies. one landmark publication was The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ Plan for the Promotion of Multicultural Community Building. This plan was the first government document to use the term tabunka kyōsei, and it recognized the importance of local integration measures. another report in 2006 by the Council for the Promotion of regulatory reform (CPrr), an advisory group to the prime minister, recognized the growth in the employment of foreign workers, including the Nikkeijin, and problematized their working conditions and treatment; this included concern for the education of the children of migrant workers. Compared to Korea, Japan’s multiculturalism has focused on the limited social integration of both migrant workers and brides as foreigners. However, it is highly doubtful whether Japan will permit greater migrant settlement. Crucially, the implementation of integration measures at the national level has been tentative at best. The Cost of Settlement: Refugees and Asylees We have demonstrated the demographic limits and institutional boundaries of Korea’s multicultural developments in a comparative perspective. in particular, Korea’s pathway to a multicultural society has been shaped by the implementation of the ePs in 2003 and the national-level institutionalization of policies concerning the social integration of foreign wives in 2006. Korea’s policies and their outcomes, in their treatment of guest workers and marriage migrants, have been closer to other east asian states than to our southern european cases. The question of migrant settlement as a pathway to multiculturalism should also take into account the recognition and admission of refugees. in this domain, the distinction in outcomes between east asia and southern europe is slightly blurred by the case of spain. as figure 13.1 shows, the size of the refugee population in spain (3,970) as of January 2010 was only slightly larger than Japan’s refugee population (2,332). in contrast, there were 54,965 refugees in italy. This large difference between spain and italy may be explained in two ways. For one, spain’s refugee admissions policy places more requirements on asylum seekers. in spain, the “inadmissibility procedure” has been a key instrument of screening asylum applicants before the application process (JubanyBaucells 2002). This additional stage has been effective in reducing the

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Jack Jin Gary Lee and John D. Skrentny Figure 13.1 Comparison of Refu gee and Asylum-Seeker Populations

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number of asylum applications; only 3.25% of asylum-seekers were recognized in 1999, one of the lowest rates in Europe (Jubany-Baucells 2002). There is no such requirement in Italy. Also, asylum seekers in Spain need to present their applications for asylum within the time limit depending on their legal status. Otherwise, their applications may be rejected. No deadlines exist for the submission of asylum requests in Italy. Secondly, Italy's relatively high refugee figures have been a result of its closer geographic proximity to conflicts in the Balkans and the Mediterranean rim (Hamilton 2002). Despite Spain's relatively restrictive asylum process, it still admitted more refugees than Japan and Korea combined. 14 Two factors help to explain this outcome. First, the design of the asylum process in Korea and We omit Taiwan and Singapore from this analysis as neither state is a signatory of the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol. 14

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Japan make it more difficult for asylum-seekers to seek refugee status. seol and skrentny (2009a) point out that Korea’s refugee policy is administered through immigration law, which requires that asylum-seekers report their illegal presence to authorities who are also in charge of the repatriation of undocumented persons. This structure also authorizes the minister of justice to decide upon asylum applications at his or her discretion. The same structure exists in Japan. in spain and italy, asylum applications are processed through the Ministry of the interior. The determination of refugee status is the responsibility of specialized bodies. in spain, the interMinisterial Commission on asylum and refugees is responsible for formulating a proposed decision for the Ministry of the interior; while in italy, the determination of status is carried by a territorial commission for recognition of international protection. These bodies offer greater oversight over the initial determination of refugee status, and they include a representative from the United nations High Commissioner for refugees (UnHCr). in addition, asylum-seekers in Korea need to file their application within a year of their entry; this casts late applicants into the category of illegal migrants. no deadline exists in Japan and italy. While spain also places a deadline on asylum applications, rejected asylum-seekers face a lower risk of deportation as irregular migrants. in this regard, the tacit acceptance of irregular migrants as a low-skilled labor source and the weakness of internal enforcement in spain and italy may be another factor for the greater presence of refugees. in southern europe, the risks of rejection are lower than in Japan and Korea, where deportations are enforced regularly. The result of these differences is that refugee/asylee settlement in Korea has been very limited. The refugee population in Korea was only 268 as of January 2010. Compared to Korea, Japan’s refugee population is 8.7 times larger. Clearly, refugee flows have not constituted a significant factor in Korea’s multicultural transition. Korea does settle a different group of forced migrants: north Koreans. The numbers are not massive. as of December 2009, 18,009 north Koreans have been resettled in south Korea (Ministry of Unification 2010). in contrast, their population was only about 10,000 as of May 2007 (seol and skrentny 2009a). While north Koreans are considered citizens under the south Korean constitution, benefits to facilitate their social integration in south Korea decreased as more north Koreans arrived each year. lankov (2006) reports that the international collapse of communism and the subsequent change in the composition of north Korean defectors from 1995 to 2000 transformed south Korea’s policy toward defectors. after the collapse of communism, south Korea’s reevaluation of unification policy in the 1990s took place amid public discussions of the experiences and negative economic

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outcomes of germany’s unification (lankov 2006). This changed the political value and perceived costs of defection as it could affect the stability of north Korea. The economic value of defectors changed at the same time. While early defectors to south Korea consisted of skilled north Korean elites, later arrivals mostly consisted of low-skilled workers or dependents. Consequently, their settlement benefits have been radically reduced, consisting of only reduced payments of “settlement money” and a vocational training scholarship for most defectors by 2005 (lankov 2006). Conclusion: Managed Multiculturalism and the Developmental State Why has refugee settlement been constrained? and, more generally, why has migrant settlement in Korea been limited? one way to understand the Korean similarities with other asian states—including one as different as the multicultural, former colonial state of singapore—as well as their differences with european immigration policy models is to consider immigration and multiculturalism as part of the more general approach to statecraft. specifically, the “developmental state” model remains resilient in east asia and continues to emphasize economic growth and productivity over redistributive policies and equality (Wong 2004). The instrumental nature of Korean immigration policy-making fits with the notion of a developmental state focused on growth over other concerns (relative to other industrialized states). Because a developmental state seeks to avoid social costs while maximizing economic growth, immigration policies in Korea ought to be shaped by the perceived costs and benefits of settlement. We can see this in the policy to regulate work permits, where visas are granted to the economically useful workers, but denied to the workers’ dependents, who contribute nothing to productivity yet use state resources. similarly, Chang (2012) argues that the Korean state’s commitment to economic development has shaped the social and economic practices of citizenship as well. Consequently, developmental policies are an integral part of Korean political culture and they have served as the basis for state-society relations or, in Chang’s words, “developmental citizenship.” Korea’s response to the settlement of another group of refugees excluded from UnCHr’s counts, north Korean defectors, also helps demonstrate the significance of perceived costs in formulating settlement policy. By discouraging their entry and settlement, Korea’s refugee/asylee policy fits the model of a developmental state. in relation, the case of north Korean refugees indicates the limited salience of ethnicity in determining integration policies. Within a developmental state, the political and economic interests of the nation-state structure the settlement and integration

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of groups. We see this clearly in the case of ethnic return migrants. While Korea has shown considerable preferences to coethnic foreigners in its immigration policies, seol and skrentny (2009b) observe the construction of a “hierarchical nationhood” in that rights to settlement have varied according to the skill level of coethnics. The implementation of the visit and employment Programme for ethnic Koreans with Foreign Citizenship in 2007 allowed coethnic foreigners to visit and seek short-term employment within designated economic sectors that require low-skilled labor (seol and skrentny 2009b). While legally open to all coethnic foreigners, only the low-skilled Chosŏnjok use this visa (H-2). on the contrary, the overseas Koreans act, as amended in 2003, granted skilled coethnics the F-4 visa status, which is almost equivalent to citizenship sans political rights (seol and skrentny 2009b). in practice, this effectively positions skilled ethnic Koreans from developed countries above the Chosŏnjok. in our comparative analysis, the institutionalization of “hierarchical nationhood” in Japan and Taiwan also fits the model of a developmental state. The unequal positions of the Nikkeijin in Japan and the “overseas Chinese”15 in Taiwan may be explained by their relative capacities to contribute to national economic development (seol and skrentny 2009b; skrentny et al. 2007).16 in spain, guest workers and irregular migrants from its previous colonies in latin america fulfill the same function (skrentny et al. 2007). However, it has been far easier for these postcolonial migrant workers to obtain permanent residence in spain than for the Chosŏnjok to settle in Korea. With hierarchical nationhood, nation-states in east asia have sought to avoid the social costs of a multicultural society while partly solving their structurally embedded demands for low-skilled labor. it is in this light that the rationale underlying Korea’s limited multicultural transition may be understood. We have analyzed Korea’s multicultural developments by examining the extent of the inclusion of guest workers, marriage migrants, and refugees in a comparative perspective. Multicultural developments in 15

Cheng (2002; cited in lu 2011) has argued that the category of “overseas Chinese” is class specific, and that the low-skilled overseas Chinese from southeast asia migrate to Taiwan as guest workers or marriage migrants while the “overseas Chinese” are typically identified as Chinese professionals from developed countries. notably, Taiwan does not admit guest workers from the People’s republic of China (PrC) because of considerations of national security and identity (Cheng 2003; Tseng 2004). similarly, compared to other marriage migrants, marriage migrants from the PrC face a longer waiting period before they may be naturalized (Friedman 2010). 16 even in multicultural singapore, with its commitment to racial equality, the state’s promotion of Confucian-style asian values and the use of Mandarin has served to orient and privilege middle-class Chinese singaporeans as culturally adept economic actors who can take advantage of China’s rise as an economic power (goh 2009).

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Korea bear a striking similarity to those in other east asian states, while diverging significantly from various trends of liberal multiculturalism in (southern) europe. in this regard, we established differences between our east asian and southern european cases by comparing institutional barriers to migrant settlement and their demographic outcomes. Therefore, we have argued that the implementation of the ePs act had effectively excluded guest workers in the formulation of multicultural policies in Korea. instead, the social integration of foreign wives and their children according to patriarchal norms has characterized the nascent institutionalization of multiculturalism in Korea. lastly, we interpreted Korea’s limited recognition and settlement of refugees (including north Korean defectors) as part of the policy-making repertoires of a developmental state. The Korean path to multiculturalism, then, has been strategic and shaped according to the perceived costs and benefits of the settlement and social integration of different migrant groups. References Beck-gernsheim, elisabeth. 2007. “Transnational lives, Transnational Marriages: a review of the evidence from Migrant Communities in europe.” Global Networks 7:271–288. Calavita, Kitty. 2004. “italy: economic realities, Political Fictions, and Policy Failures.” in Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, edited by W. a. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, P. Martin, and J. F. Hollifield, 345–380. stanford, Ca: stanford University Press. ———. 2007. “law, immigration, and exclusion in italy and spain.” Papers: Revista de sociología 85:95–108. Chang, Kyung-sup. 2012. “Developmental Citizenship in Perspective: The south Korean Case and Beyond.” in Contested Citizenship in East Asia: Developmental Politics, National Unity and Globalization, edited by K. s. Chang and B. s. Turner, 182–202. new york: routledge. Cheng, lucie. 2002. “guest Workers, Citizenship, and nation-Building ideology” [in Chinese]. Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies 48:14–46. Cited from lu 2011. ———. 2004. “Transnational labor, Citizenship and the Taiwan state.” in East Asian Law—Universal Norms and Local Cultures, edited by a. rosett, l. Cheng, and M. y. K. Woo, 85–104. new york: routledge Curzon. Chua Beng Huat. 2005. “The Cost of Membership in ascribed Community.” in Multiculturalism in Asia, edited by W. Kymlicka and B. He, 170–195. oxford: oxford University Press.

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index

abelmann, nancy, 106, 119, 172, 253, 255–256 aborigines of australia, 39 act for the Protection and resettlement support for the residents Who escaped from north Korea (1997), 151 act on the immigration and legal status of overseas Koreans (overseas Koreans act), 192, 323 active Brain Tower (aBT) universities, 98 adoptee solidarity Korea (asK), 177 adoptees, Korean, 165–166, 180–182; as deterritorialized nomads, 178–180; globalization and, 166, 168, 174, 177–180; as latter-day minjung, 170–174; as new agents of change and paradoxical participation, 175–178; as new objects of charity, 170–174; number of, 13; reunion with Korean biological families, 167–170, 172. See also Dawson, Toby adoption of south Korean children, transnational/international, 13. See also adoptees african migrants, 211, 213–214, 216–218, 221; Community with a capital “C,” 229–230; discrimination against, 230, 232–234; and the multicultural promise, 230–235 “african street,” 233 agency, 279

alien Policy, Committee of, 86 “almost Korean,” 247–249, 261, 261f, 262 amerasian act of 1982, 245n2, 250–252, 263 amerasian children, 267, 271; exclusion, 12, 72, 271. See also amerasians amerasian Christian academy, 265 amerasian entertainers, 264, 265 amerasian families, 220 amerasians, 245–247, 260, 267–268; american perceptions, 247–252; assumptions made about, 262–263; attitudes toward, 246–247, 262, 267; citizenship, 259, 261, 266, 268; defined, 245n; discrimination against, 34, 72, 75, 216, 245; education and employment, 261; feelings about going to United states, 262–263; globalization, multiculturalism and, 271–273; Hines Ward and, 268–269; Korean perceptions, 252–260; language and, 267; marriages, 220, 271; and the media, 262; military service and, 259, 266; names, 263–264; norms for, 246; origin of the term, 75; patriotism and, 265; pejorative names for, 246; use of the term, 211n, 245, 245n2; who they are, 219–220, 247–260. See also Black Koreans; honhyŏl american Military government in Korea (aMgiK), 217, 244, 247–248, 251, 253–256

332 anticommunism, 14, 144, 147–148, 151–153 anticommunism lectures, 149–150 anticommunist heroes, 147–150 anticommunist propaganda, 148, 149, 151, 153 april 19th student revolution of 1960, 9, 16 arendt, Hannah, 272 asian financial crisis of 1997 (iMF Crisis), 18, 147, 151, 168, 189, 192, 283, 308; post-iMF crisis and the rereckoning of south Korea, 18–22 assimilation, multicultural, 39–42, 41n, 47–48, 67–73; integration and, 35–37 asylees, 302, 319–322, 320f australia, 38–41 Bae, Dr., 100–101, 103–107, 109–111 Balibar, etienne, 259 Barth, Fredrick, 255 Basic Plan. See First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy Bélanger, Danièle, 317 bilingualism, 102, 286 biracial Koreans. See mixed-blood Koreans “Black Happiness” (yoon), 224–225 Black Koreans, 211–217, 257; perspectives of race and multiculturalism through Hines Ward, 219–228; racism and discrimination against, 211, 213, 214, 216–220, 222, 224–227, 233, 235–238; theoretical and contextual background, 217–219. See also african migrants; part-Black Koreans Blessing Church, 124–125, 127, 130 blood purity. See “pure blood”/blood purity Brown, Wendy, 82–84 Buck, Pearl s., 249 Buck international (Pearl s. Buck international Foundation), 223, 250, 269 camptowns, 12n, 248, 253–256, 267–268 capitalism. See neoliberalism

Index Chang, John, 17 Chang, Kyung-sup, 322 “channeled” learning, 310n Cheng, lucie, 323n15 children, multicultural. See multiracial children Chinese, Malay, indian, and others (CMio) classification, 318 Chinese, “overseas,” 323 Chinese minority in Korea, 14; ethnic cleansing of, 13–15 Chinese powers, imperial, 14, 17 Cho, Dr., 100–102 Cho sun-young (Justine), 263–264 Cho yong Hwan, 90 Choi, Chongmoo, 246 Choi, Pastor, 157–158 Chŏlla (Jeolla), 15, 16. See also Honam people Chosŏnjok (Korean-Chinese) women, 51–52, 283–284; marriages with Korean men, 314–315 Chosŏnjok (Korean-Chinese) workers, 189, 323; assisting, 191–193 Christianity, 130, 135, 138, 159–160, 277. See also Filipino migrant churches; north Korean migrant churches Chun Byeong-jun, 221 Chun Doo Hwan, 16, 17–18, 166, 187 church: as the primary intraethnic “contact zone,” 153, 153n. See also Filipino migrant churches; megachurches; north Korean migrant churches church hierarchy, 155, 159, 160 Citizens’ Coalition for economic Justice (CCeJ), 172, 173, 190 citizenship, 35, 52–53; of amerasians, 259, 261, 266, 268; blood purity and, 266; defined, 181n; developmental, 322. See also denizenship; new citizens classroom, multicultural, 98 Cold War era, division, and anticommunist heroes, 147–150 collective justice, 89

Index colonialism: and anticolonial ideology, 5, 6, 246. See also imperialism Committee on the elimination of racial Discrimination (CerD), 46, 221 communism: collapse of, 321. See also anticommunism communist national ideology in north Korea, 8 Communist rule in north Korea, 9 Confucian patriarchy, 287 contact zones, intraethnic, 142, 153; defined, 153 Cordorva, May, 53 courses, multiculturalism-related, 98, 99, 111 cultural autonomy, 87 cultural nationalism, 10, 17, 171, 280 cultural sensitivity, 88–93 cultural vs. ethnic diversity, 67–73 culturally superior and civilized, sense of being, 159 culture, defined, 33n Culture, Tourism, and sports, Ministry of. See Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and sports Cumings, Bruce, 253 Darragh, Jody, 250 Dawson, Toby, 177; as honorary ambassador, 167–170 democracy, 187–188; immigrant rights and, 190; participatory, 177–178. See also prodemocracy movement democratic transformation, 171 demographics, 31–32 denizens, 33, 35n denizenship, 35, 55 Denton, Jeremiah a., 250 Derrida, Jacques, 268 developmental citizenship, 322 developmental states, 25, 186, 301; managed multiculturalism and, 322–324 Devos, george, 255 difference, 246–249; rights to, 87 differential exclusion, 41n

333 Donghyun lee, 122 double consciousness, 25, 216–217, 246, 260 Du Bois, W. e. B., 246, 260 economic development, 66n economic nationalism, 10 economic transformation, 20, 178–179, 181–182 economics and nationalism, 10, 202 economy, globalized, 179 editorials describing Korea as multicultural/multiethnic, 60, 61t, 62 education, 80–81, 261, 267. See also Freedom school; seoul national University of education; tamunhwa programs education, science and Technology, Ministry of. See Ministry of education, science and Technology (MesT) egypt, 229, 280 emigration, 12–13 empire, defined, 253–254 employment, 261. See also labor; workers employment Management system, 193 employment Permit system (ePs) act, 55, 193–194, 308–309, 312, 318; and bilateral investment in labor recruitment system, 309; excluded guest workers in the formulation of multicultural policies, 324; implementation, 43, 184, 191, 193, 308–309, 318, 319, 324; and industrial trainee system, 45n; iTTP and, 191, 193, 312; opposition to and criticism of, 43; overview, 43, 184, 308; undocumented workers and, 193; worker rights and, 50 english language, 266–268. See also bilingualism; language entertainers, amerasian, 264, 265 essentialism, 11, 238, 246, 260 essentialization, 245, 248, 260 ethnic cleansing, 13–15

334 ethnic nationalism, 24, 88, 142, 156, 160, 216, 219, 238, 281, 287, 295. See also ethnonationalism; nationalism ethnic purity. See purity ethnic terminology, 214, 215 ethnicity: defined, 255; vs. race, 214, 215. See also specific topics ethnocentric patriarchy, 278, 279, 281, 296 ethnocentrism, 46, 65, 73 ethnocultural justice, 68–69, 72–73 ethnonationalism, 165, 175, 181, 192, 202, 245, 253, 261. See also ethnic nationalism; nationalism ethnoracism, 216–219, 222, 227, 233, 237, 238. See also racial and ethnic discrimination european Union (eU), 313 evangelical churches. See megachurches exclusionary policies, 41n, 42, 87, 192, 195, 202, 310–312 Faier, lieba, 296 familial hierarchy, 287 families: amerasian, 220. See also multicultural family(ies) Family Federation for World Peace and Unification. See Unification Church family reunification, 148n13; defined, 313n10; first, 148n13; rights to, 302, 310–313, 318. See also adoptees: reunion with Korean biological families Fanon, Frantz, 267 fertility rate, 31 festival, multicultural, 74 Filipina-Korean rural households, family dynamics in, 277–278, 287, 295–296; becoming part of a Korean family, 287–290; patriarchy, nationalism, and multiculturalism, 280–281; tension and conflict between multiculturalism and patriarchy, 287–290. See also Philippine families Filipino Korean Wives association, 53

Index Filipino migrant churches, 138–139; building of extended family in the Church, 136–138; in need of protection and surrender: problems of vulnerability, 132–139; transcending the nation in, 130–138 Finnemore, Martha, 245 Finotelli, Claudia, 313 First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (2009), 42, 45, 47–48, 316 “foreigners residing in Korea,” 71 Fraser, nancy, 121 Freedom school (Fs), 154–157 Freeman, Caren, 52 Freire, Paulo, 246, 272 Friends of Migrants (FoM), 80 gage, sue-Je, 216, 227 gender, 262. See also patriarchy; women germany, 38–41 ghaffar-Kucher, ameena, 36 ghana, 229, 234 global overseas adoptees’ link (goa’l), 170, 173, 176–178 global workers. See workers, foreign globalization, 18, 93, 259, 268; adoptees and, 166, 168, 174, 177–180; multiculturalism and, 19, 21, 23, 58, 181–182, 269, 271–273; orphans of (see adoptees). See also internationalization globalized economy, 179 god, 155. See also Christianity; Filipino migrant churches; north Korean migrant churches gonzález-enriquez, Carmen, 313 “grand Plan” (Plan for Promoting the social integration of Migrant Women, Biracial People, and immigrants), 285–286, 316 great recession, 201 “guest worker” plan. See employment Permit system (ePs) act “guest worker” program in germany, 39 guest workers policies: differentiated

Index controls vs. ex post facto regularization, 308–314. See also workers, foreign gurowitz, amy, 44, 45, 195 gwangju massacre of 1980, 16 Han, geon-soo, 45, 218–219, 229, 234, 270 Han Kyung-Koo, 159 Health, Welfare, and Family affairs, Ministry of. See Ministry for Health, Welfare, and Family affairs Health and Welfare, Ministry of. See Ministry of Health and Welfare health care, 317 Heckmann, Friedrich, 269–270 Henney, Daniel, 168n2 hierarchical nationhood, 192, 323 hierarchy: church, 155, 159, 160; familial, 287; of foreign labor, 318–319; between north and south Korea, 129; social, 286; status, 5, 6; women and, 255, 256, 287 Holt, Bertha, 249 Holt, Harry, 249 homogeneity, 71, 312; beliefs and myths about, 1, 2, 7, 8, 12, 16–18, 21–23, 32, 58–60, 63, 71–72, 74, 88, 119, 136, 156, 159, 181, 182, 312; class, 59, 71; cultural, 1, 2, 18, 21–23, 59, 71; ethnic, 1, 7, 16–18, 21–23, 41n, 58–60, 63, 71–72, 119, 154n18, 156, 159, 182, 271; of north and south Korea, 9; of other countries, 38, 39, 74; racial, 8, 12, 16–17, 181, 317. See also purity Honam people, 15, 17. See also Chŏlla Hong se-hwa, 84–85 honhyŏl, 252; connotations of the term, 68; use of the term, 25, 246, 258, 271. See also amerasians; mixed-blood Koreans Huan Mai, 284, 285 human rights, 44, 45, 220, 221; foreign workers and, 54; international norms for, 32, 42–45; marriage migrants and, 284–285; multiculturalism and, 45–46,

335 101; vietnamese women and, 284–285. See also First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy; undocumented workers: rights of Human rights Class—Difference Means Beautiful program, 91–92 human rights norms, international, 195 Hussain, Bonogit, 53–54, 236 Hwang Woo-suk, 221 hypernationalism, 8, 17. See also nationalism Hyun suk, 128 I Am a Taxi Driver in Paris (Hong), 84–85 “illegal” visa-overstayers, 184, 196 illegal workers. See undocumented workers iMF crisis. See asian financial crisis of 1997 immigrant incorporation, 65, 75–77; modes of, 41n. See also assimilation; marriage migration; social integration immigrant workers. See Chosŏnjok (Korean-Chinese) workers; migrant workers; undocumented workers immigrants, 305–306, 306t; categories of, 184, 187 (see also undocumented foreigners); lack of understanding of Korean society, 47; through marriage, 47, 51n17 immigration and multiculturalism, politics of, 49–54 immigration Bureau (Japan), 194 immigration Control and refugee recognition law (Japan), 196, 318 immigration policies, 184–185; challenging the state, 190–191, 193, 201–202; changing dynamics, 193–194; controlling global workers, 188–189, 189f; divergence and convergence in, 185–187. See also Japan’s immigration policymaking process immigration restriction act 1901 (australia), 38

Index

336 immigration service. See Korea immigration service imperial Chinese powers, 14, 17 Imperial Citizens: Koreans and Race from Seoul to LA (Kim), 217, 258 imperialism, 82–83, 221; cultural, 269; Japanese, 60, 214; U.s., 248, 254; U.s. (neo)imperial dominance, 213, 218, 226. See also colonialism industrial Technical Trainee Program (iTTP), 184, 188, 189, 191–193, 312 industrial trainee status, 212, 216 industrial Trainee system (iTs), 188, 196 industrial trainees, 49, 184, 187, 188; abuse of, 199; desertion of their trainee positions, 49, 52; immigration Control and refugee recognition law and, 196, 198; number of, 188, 189f, 197–199, 197f, 201; visa category for, 196; as “workers in disguise,” 197. See also industrial Technical Trainee Program insooni (lee insoon, yi in-sun), 211, 228, 236, 264 integration: multiculturalism, assimilation, and, 35–37. See also social integration international Convention on the elimination of all Forms of racial Discrimination (CerD), 271 international marriage migration to south Korea, 281, 283–285; foreignborn wives by nationality, 281, 282t, 283. See also marriage migrants “international-marriage women,” 255–256. See also marriage migrants international marriages: children from, 46; Japanese and Korean, 5–6 (see also mixed-race persons); number of, 281, 281f, 283. See also marriage migrants; marriage(s) international Monetary Fund (iMF) crisis. See asian financial crisis of 1997 internationalism, 168

internationalization, 18, 66, 76. See also globalization intersectionality, 260, 261 “introduction to Multiculturalism” course, 111 italy, 313, 314, 319, 320 Jang yae-eun, 226–227, 236 Japan: number of low-skilled foreign workers in, 197, 197f; refugees and asylees, 320–321; top sources of foreigners in, 305–306, 306t. See also Technical Practical Trainee system Japanese ancestry, foreign nationals of. See Nikkeijin Japanese colonial ideology of Japanese and Korea isogeny and identity, 5 Japanese rule, 5–7 Japan’s immigration policy, 184–185, 200–201; illegal immigration policy, 318 (see also Japan’s immigration policymaking process) Japan’s immigration policymaking process: assisting the newcomers, 198–199; controlling the newcomers, 196–198; controlling the oldcomers, 194–196; integrating the newcomers, 199–201 Jeolla. See Chŏlla Jesus Christ, 17, 124, 135, 157 Jesus Church, 130, 133, 137 Joint Committee of Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK), 191 Joppke, Christian, 37, 44 Juche. See Kimilsung-ism Jun, euyryung, 96, 109, 111 Jupp, James, 39 Justice, Japanese Ministry of, 194, 318 justice, minister of, 321 Justice, south Korean Ministry of, 53, 98, 303, 308 Justice Church, 171 Justine (Cho sun-young), 263–264 Kang, James, 265

Index Kang, Mr., 157–158 Kang Min-jung, 260 Kang soo-il, 227–228, 236 Kaur, amarjit, 304–305 Keane, alfred, 250 Kim, Dae-won, 178 Kim, elaine, 246 Kim, Hui-Jung, 41n8, 43 Kim, Hyun Mee, 316 Kim, Jaeeun, 171n4 Kim, Junghyun, 125–126 Kim, nadia y., 258 Kim Dae Jung, 15, 18, 151, 192 Kim Do-hyun, 172–174 Kim il-sung, 6, 8 Kim Jae-su, 167 Kim yang-bae, 228 Kim young-hee, 222–223, 225–226 Kim young sam, 18, 171 Kimilsung-ism, 153, 155 “kin-ordered mode,” 249–250 Kong, Dongsung, 305 Koo, Hagen, 172 Korea Broadcast Commission, 51n10 Korea immigration service, 86 Korea Tourism organization (KTo), 167 Korean-american women, 255, 256, 265 Korean-americans, 192, 258–259, 267, 307 Korean-Chinese. See Chosŏnjok “Korean difference,” 82; tolerance and the, 82–85 Korean Federation of small Businesses (KFsB), 191 Korean nation: mythical genealogy of the, 3–7; mythistory, 3–4. See also specific topics Korean people, idea of a unified, 1, 2, 4–5 Korean race, 4, 176, 181, 182 Korean reunification, 124, 139, 142, 145, 151–154, 159–160 Koreanness, 11–12, 15, 175, 229, 272; and almost Koreanness, 247–249, 261, 261f, 262; double consciousness, intersectionality, and strategies of asserting, 260–268; events that altered the terms

337 of history and (re)construction of, 244–245; reconstruction of, 244–245, 253, 272, 273; transference of, 252–253. See also specific topics Kosian (with Korean and other asian parentage), 213, 235 Kymlicka, Will, 302–303 labor: dependence on undocumented migrant, 318; hierarchy of foreign, 318–319. See also migrant workers; workers labor standard law (Japan), 196 language, 10–12, 102, 252, 286–288. See also english language lankov, andrei, 144n6 late migration, 32, 100, 109; elements of, 42–44 late migration regime, 96 learning, “channeled,” 310n lee, H. K., 52 lee, James, 220–221 lee, Jasmine, 237 lee, Michelle, 237 lee, namhee, 172 lee, suan, 131–132 lee Ji Cheol, 88 lee Ji-young, 220, 223 lee sang-soo, 149 lee Woong-pyung, 143–144 lee yoo-jin, 213n4, 264–265 lemoine, Mihee nathalie, 175–176, 181 levin, Carl, 250 lie, John, 253, 255–256, 259 lim, Timothy C., 96, 190 Love in Asia (reality Tv program), 286–287 lukes, steven, 37 lutz, Catherine, 253–254 Macarthur, Douglas a., 247–248 Mahbub, ahmed, 50–51 marginalized voices in “multicultural” Korea, 74–75 marriage gap, 32

338 Marriage immigrant Family support Center, 285, 286. See also Multicultural Family support Center marriage immigrants: state intervention in the private lives and “multicultural families” of, 87–89. See also marriage(s) marriage migrants (kyŏrhon iminja), 277–278; defined, 64; number of, 51; programs regarding, 70–71. See also specific topics marriage migration, 314–319 marriage(s): amerasian, 220, 271; fake, 52; immigrants through, 47, 51n17 (see also marriage immigrants). See also international marriages McKinney, stewart B., 250 media, 60, 61t, 62, 221–228, 262 megachurches, 155, 160. See also north Korean migrant churches; Prosperity Church mentoring. See summer Mentoring Programs Middle eastern labor migrants, 214 migrant settlement, cost of, 319–322 migrant stock, international, 303–304, 304t migrant worker flows, state control over, 310–312 migrant workers, 214; exclusion in state’s multicultural policy, 87; in Japan (see Japan’s immigration policymaking process). See also workers “Migrant Workers and the story of simchŏng” (skit), 131–132 Migrant Workers in Korea, Joint Committee of, 191 Migrant Workers Television (MWTv), 50–51 Migrants’ arirang, 74 military service, 235, 259, 266 minister of justice, 321 Ministry for Health, Welfare, and Family affairs (MHWFa), 86–88 Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and sports (MCTs), 86, 88

Index Ministry of education, science and Technology (MesT), 98–109 Ministry of gender equality and Family (MgeF), 285, 286, 316 Ministry of Health and Welfare, 150, 177, 286 Ministry of internal affairs and Communications (MiC), Japanese, 200 Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Japanese, 194, 318 Ministry of Justice (MoJ), south Korean, 53, 98, 303, 308 Ministry of Unification, 151 minjung, 16, 24, 167; adoptees as latterday, 170–174 minjung legacy, 187–188 minority incorporation: modes of, 41n. See also immigrant incorporation Mintzer, Janet, 216 Mitchell, Katharyne, 92 mixed-blood Koreans, 1, 12, 167n, 213, 221, 222, 244, 273; attitudes toward, 236, 247, 258–259, 264, 267; attitudes toward pure-blood Koreans, 252; categories of, 272; discrimination against, 21, 34, 227, 235, 245, 246, 264, 266, 271; “double consciousness” of, 25, 260; Du Bois and, 260; hierarchy and, 255, 266 (see also racial hierarchy); military service and, 235, 259, 266; multicultural explosion and, 59–60, 75; multiculturalism and, 25, 68, 69, 92, 245, 255; objectification, 96; peoplehood and, 12; perceptions and stereotypes of, 25, 227, 262; poverty among, 220; vs. “real” Koreans, 271–272; terminology, 25, 68, 211n, 245, 246, 252, 258, 271. See also amerasians; honhyŏl; international marriages; part-Black Koreans mixed-blood war orphans, 165, 249. See also “orphans” mixed Korean-americans, language and, 267 mixed-race celebrities, 261–262

Index mixed-race children, 21, 165–166, 223–224, 227, 269, 271; adoption, 223, 249. See also amerasian children; multiracial children mixed-race Japanese, 249 “mixed-race” persons, 12. See also international marriages; mixed-blood Koreans mixed white and Korean-american females, 265 monoethnic and monocultural south Korea: making of, 8–13; of the 1980s, pinnacle of, 16–18. See also tanil minjok monoethnic nationalism, 7, 15 Moon, Katharine H. s., 12n19, 251 Moon, seungsook, 172 mother love: beyond motherland and, 169; birth father, paternal state, and, 167–168; and yearning for abandoned children, 166 multicultural children, 68. See also amerasian children; mixed-race children; multicultural family(ies) Multicultural Club, 99–101, 106, 109–112 multicultural developments: demographic comparisons, 303–307 multicultural discourse, 32–33, 69; explosion of (see multicultural explosion) multicultural explosion, 59–67, 76, 96, 97, 216, 217; causes of, 63–64, 64n; and marginalized voices in “multicultural” Korea, 74–75; multicultural family, multicultural society, and, 68, 71, 72 Multicultural Family-student education support Project, 98 Multicultural Family support act of 2008, 286, 290, 295 Multicultural Family support Center, 100, 286. See also Marriage immigrant Family support Center multicultural family(ies), 68–73, 75; defined, 316; Korea’s response to, 285–287. See also Filipina-Korean rural households; Philippine families

339 multicultural Korea, 268–273 multicultural programs, 70–71. See also tamunhwa programs multicultural reality, south Korea’s responses to its, 41–46 multicultural sensitivity, 88–93 multicultural society, 68–73. See also multiethnic multicultural society multiculturalism, 31–33, 54–55; authenticity of Korean, 76; definitions, 32, 43, 46–48, 68, 80, 269–270; dilemma and paradox of, 81; emergence, 19; “genuine,” 86, 279; increasing use of the term, 38; Korean path toward (see marriage migration; social integration); Korean state’s (supposed) embrace of, 32; “makeshift,” 95–97, 103, 108–110, 113, 114, 119, 139; managed, and the development state, 322–324; meanings, 54; of other countries compared with Korea, 76; politics of, 50; as property of particular societies, 62–64; rapid embrace of, 38; the real enemy of, 159; state-initiated and state-defined, 46–48; terminology, 60, 62, 62n3, 68, 69, 214, 216 (see also amerasians; mixed-blood Koreans: terminology); theoretical considerations, 33–35; ways in which it relates to Korea, 62–65. See also specific topics multiculturalism, concept of, 2, 3; as fluid concept, 34, 48, 54 multiculturalist turn and a comparative perspective, 38–48 multiethnic multicultural Korea, 1–2; challenges and opportunities for a, 65–67 multiethnic multicultural society: three versions of, 58, 62–65. See also multicultural society multiethnicity: concept of, 2, 3; as property of particular societies, 62–64; terminology, 60, 62, 62n3, 68, 69 (see also amerasians; mixed-blood Koreans: terminology)

340 multilingualism. See bilingualism multiracial children, 68, 211, 213, 216–220, 223, 225, 228, 236, 317; from international marriages, 46. See also amerasian children; mixed-race children; part-Black multiracial children multiracial Koreans. See mixed-blood Koreans multiracialism, 216, 317 Mulvey, laura, 219 nation-building, 77, 147–148, 201, 235 nation-states, 154n18, 234, 322–323 national Human rights Commission, 237, 271 national network in support of Migrant Workers (Japan), 198–199 nationalism, 8, 16, 17, 21, 22, 160, 215; anticolonial, 6, 7; anticommunist, 13, 16; colonial racism and, 254; economics and, 10, 202; evangelical, 158; multiculturalism and, 181, 214, 238, 280–281; Park Chung Hee and, 9–11, 13, 17; patriarchal, 218, 219, 238, 280–281; populist, 16; rhee syngman and, 9; triumphant, 17–18. See also ethnic nationalism; ethnonationalism; hypernationalism nationalist historiography, 3–4, 7 needs satisfaction vs. needs interpretation, politics of, 121 neoliberal rationalities, 182; defined, 181n neoliberalism, 84, 85, 92, 93, 169, 172n, 177–181 new citizen-subjects, 89 new citizens, making, 89–93 new Citizens’ Movement, 187–188, 190 nigerian Community Korea, 211, 229–233 nightclubs, 254 Nikkeijin (foreign nationals of Japanese ancestry), 184, 189, 193, 196–199, 201, 202, 307, 318–319, 323 9/11 terrorist attacks, 82 nongovernmental organizations (ngos),

Index 248; adoptees and, 170, 172, 174–178, 181; migrants and, 49, 55, 87, 190, 192–194. See also specific NGOs norris, Chuck, 248 north and south Korea: enmity between, 8, 13, 14; hierarchy between, 129; reunification, 124, 139, 142, 145, 151–154, 159–160 north and south Koreans as “Koreans,” 2 north Korean Brethren Who returned state to the state act, 150 north Korean migrant churches, 119–120, 121n6, 138–139; and interactions and negotiations of belonging, 152–154; pursuit of progress through, 127–130; reclaiming the nation in, 122–130; sincere citizens and the healing of spirit, 154–160 north Korean migrants/defectors, 21, 124, 142–143, 152, 159–160; division, Cold War, and anticommunist heroes (1945–1993), 147–150; in Freedom school, 154–159; from heroes to burdens, 143–159; interactions and negotiations of belonging, 152–154; new residents or first unifiers: envisioning reunification (1997–present), 151–152 (see also Korean reunification); number and gender of, 145, 146t, 147; reasons for difficulty adjusting to south Korea, 144n6; settler kin or defecting compatriot (1993–1997), 150–151; social process of interactions between south Koreans and, 152–159 “northerners,” concept of, 148 nussbaum, Martha, 269 nye, Joseph, 44n11 obinna, Honorable, 232–233 oh gyung seok, 87 okin, susan Miller, 280 opinion columns describing Korea as multicultural/multiethnic, 60, 61t, 62 oppression, nature of, 246

Index “orphans,” 248, 250. See also adoptees; mixed-blood war orphans “otherness,” forms of, 259 “overseas Chinese,” 323 overseas Koreans act, 192, 323 “overseas Koreans,” defined, 192 Paley, Julia, 178 paradoxical participation, 178 Parekh, Bhikkhu, 142 Park, Heh-rahn, 284 Park, Kolleen, 213n4 Park, Myeong-Kyu, 142 Park Chung Hee, 8–11, 13, 14–16, 166, 187 Park geun-hye, 269 Park il-Jun, 226 part-Black Koreans, 214, 223–224, 235 part-Black multiracial children, 213, 218, 236 patriarchy: ethnocentric, 278, 279, 281, 296; nationalism, multiculturalism, and, 280–281; private, 278–280, 287, 295; public, 279–280. See also under Filipina-Korean rural households patriotism: acts of, 264–266. See also nationalism Paul, Pastor, 130, 133–136 Peace Church, 130–134, 138 Pearl s. Buck international Foundation (Buck international), 223, 250, 269 peoplehood, 7, 12, 13, 14n22; conceptions of, 1–4, 6n11, 25; egalitarian, in north Korea, 9; Japanese, 6; nationalism and, 9; status-based, 4 peoplehood identity, 5 people’s sentiment, law of, 89–90 Philippine families, exclusion of transnational ties with, 290–292; “others” in the family, 292–295 Philippine Korean Wives association, 53 Philippines: marriage migrants from, 52–53. See also Filipina-Korean rural households Plan for Promoting the social integration of Migrant Women, Biracial

341 People, and immigrants (grand Plan), 285–286, 316 pluralism, 41n Policy on Foreigners, Current Progress, and Future Plan, 86 political correctness (PC), 259–260 Pratt, Mary louise, 153 preferential treatment, 189, 191–192, 194. See also special treatment prodemocracy activists, 171n, 188 prodemocracy movement, 171n, 172, 187 progress, definitions of, 127–129 Prosperity Church, 122–124, 126, 127 prostitution, 218, 220, 248, 249, 251, 255, 262. See also sex workers Protestant churches. See Filipino migrant churches; north Korean migrant churches “pure blood”/blood purity, 12, 215, 217, 223; citizenship and, 266; discrimination and, 271; mythico-history of, 244, 247; patrilineal history and, 252. See also mixed blood Koreans “pure blood” ideology, 9, 10, 256, 261, 273 purification, 10, 17 purity: vs. impurity, 8, 12, 59–60; Korea as having preserved it until recently, 64; multiculturalism and, vii, 55, 59–60, 64, 65, 68, 69, 72, 235, 271, 273; Park Chung Hee and, 10, 14, 17. See also homogeneity race: emic perceptions of, 257–260; vs. ethnicity, 214, 215 racial and ethnic discrimination, 214; laws against, 53. See also african migrants; Black Koreans; ethnic cleansing; ethnoracism racial hierarchy, 156, 169, 214, 218, 220, 249, 255, 258–259, 266. See also hierarchical nationhood; “kin-ordered mode” racial homogeneity and purity, 8. See also purity

342 racial stereotypes, 257. See also under mixed-blood Koreans racial terminology, 214, 215 rape, 255 razac, olivier, 80 reagan, ronald, 251 recognition, politics of, 270 refugees, 196, 318–322, 320f. See also north Korean migrants/defectors reid, anthony, 304–305 religion. See Christianity; Filipino migrant churches; north Korean migrant churches “reserved missionaries,” 154–155 reunification, Korean, 124, 139, 142, 145, 151–154, 159–160 reverse discrimination, 237 rhee, syngman, 255 roh Moo-hyun, 18, 19, 192, 213, 268–269 royce, anya Peterson, 261, 264, 265 rural households. See Filipina-Korean rural households sawada, Miki, 249 schengen agreement, 313, 314 schily, otto, 40 schools, 80–81, 267. See also Freedom school; seoul national University of education sciortino, giuseppe, 313 segyehwa, 18, 166, 259. See also globalization self-transformation, Christianity and, 122, 127, 130, 135 seo Jung Won, 89–90 seol, Dong-Hoon, 168, 307, 309, 311–313, 321, 323 seoul City education Department, 110 seoul national University of education (snUe), 97–98; as “control tower,” 97–100; faculty, 100–108; Multicultural Club, 109–112; multiculturalism in the field, 113–114; student election, 109–114; troubles in, 103–105

Index sex between U.s. soldiers and local women, 251. See also prostitution sex workers, 12, 20, 25, 171, 220, 254, 259. See also prostitution sham marriage. See marriage(s): fake shin, gi-wook, 215, 238, 254 sim, eun, 129–130 singapore, 302n3, 304–305, 307n, 310–315, 317, 323n16 skrentny, John D., 168, 307, 309, 311–313, 321, 323 small Businesses, Korean Federation of, 191 smith, linda Tuhiwai, 273 social Darwinism, 254 social discrimination, 13–15. See also racial and ethnic discrimination social hierarchy. See hierarchy: social social integration, 46–47, 314–319. See also integration social integration program, 47 social transformation, 3, 58, 66, 96, 109, 110, 159–160, 181–182, 245; education and, 89, 95, 97, 100, 102, 103 (see also seoul national University of education); of family relations, 69, 295; international brides and, 69, 181. See also self-transformation socialist uprising, problems of a, 125–127 song, Dr., 102–103 south asian labor migrants, 214 spain, 313–314, 319, 321 special treatment, 148, 202, 235. See also preferential treatment st. vincent’s Home for amerasians, 250 state-society partnership under the necessity of multiculturalism, 85–89 status hierarchy. See hierarchy: status stoler, ann, 253 student clubs, multiculturalism, 98–100. See also Multicultural Club su young, 128–129 suh, Pio, 250 suh Kyung suk, 173

Index summer Mentoring Programs (sMP), 98–101, 103, 105–106, 110 sungchul Park, 124–125, 127 syngman, rhee, 6, 9 system selective migrants, 148 Tagalog, 287–288 Tai, eika, 318–319 Taiwan, 305, 311, 312, 317, 323 tamunhwa (multiculturalism), 86–88, 93, 181, 182; definition and use of the term, 82, 85; as project of creating new citizens, 89–93. See also multiculturalism tamunhwa apparatus, abrupt emergence of, 79–81 tamunhwa programs, 86, 90–91. See also multicultural programs tanil minjok (monoculture/monoethnic people), 85, 211, 223. See also monoethnic and monocultural south Korea Taylor, Charles, 270 Technical Practical Trainee system (TPTs), 188–189, 196 television, 50–51 Thach Thi Hoang ngoc, 53, 284 Toby Dawson Foundation, 169 tolerance, 86, 92, 93; integration and, 36; and the “Korean difference,” 82–85; multiculturalism and, 112, 270; recognition and, 36; students and, 109, 112 total exclusion, 41n Truth and reconciliation for the adoption Community in Korea (TraCK), 177 Turner, Terence, 260 “Understanding Multicultural education” course, 99 undocumented foreigners: ePs policy and, 193, 308, 309; number of, 184, 193, 202, 308–309; settlement, 303, 309 undocumented migrant labor, dependence on, 318

343 undocumented migrant workers, legalization of, 87, 131 undocumented migrants: african, 213; policing and deporting, 87, 230; regularization programs and, 302–303, 310 undocumented migrant workers: attitudes toward, 131, 318–319; local integration initiatives and, 318 undocumented workers: abuse of, 133; churches and, 131; ngos and, 131, 192; rights of, 45, 50, 87, 120, 133 Unification, Ministry of, 151 Unification Church (UC), 277, 291 United nations High Commissioner for refugees (UnHCr), 321 United states army Military government in Korea, 217, 244, 247–248, 251, 253–256 universities: active Brain Tower (aBT), 98. See also seoul national University of education university students, role in national politics, 16 victims, types of, 171n visit and employment Programme for ethnic Koreans with Foreign Citizenship, 323 visit and employment system, 193 Wallerstein, i., 259 Wang, Hong-zen, 317 Ward, Hines, 168n2, 213, 221–228, 268–269 Washington, Myra, 221, 225 White australia policy, 38 Wolf, eric, 244–246, 249 women, 256; discrimination against, 234; hierarchies and, 255, 256, 287; Korean-american, 255, 256, 265; multiculturalism and, 280. See also gender; marriage(s); patriarchy Won, Jaehoon, 131, 134 work ethic, need for a, 125–127

344

Index

workers, foreign: challenging the state, 190–191, 193, 201–202; controlling, 188–189, 189f; number of low-skilled, 188–189, 189f. See also guest workers policies; migrant workers; undocumented workers

yeoh, Brenda s., 311 yi in-sun. See insooni yi Kwang-su, 17 yi yu Chin, 59–60 yoon Mi-rae (Tasha), 223–225, 228, 236–237 youn Hee, 122–123

xenophobia, 8, 9, 16, 21

Zainichi (ethnic Koreans in Japan), 8–9 Zia, Helen, 245 Zweber, Benedict, 250

yangban, 5, 6

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES The Institute of East Asian Studies was established at the University of California, Berkeley, in the fall of 1978 to promote research and teaching on the cultures and societies of China, Japan, and Korea. The institute unites several research centers and programs, including the Center for Buddhist Studies, the Center for Chinese Studies, the Center for Japanese Studies, the Center for Korean Studies, the Group in Asian Studies, and the Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Studies. Director: Associate Director:

Kevin O’Brien Martin Backstrom

CENTER FOR BUDDHIST STUDIES Chair: Robert Sharf CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES Chair: You-tien Hsing CENTER FOR JAPANESE STUDIES Chair: Steven Vogel CENTER FOR KOREAN STUDIES Chair: Laura Nelson GROUP IN ASIAN STUDIES Chair: Bonnie Wade INTER-UNIVERSITY PROGRAM FOR CHINESE LANGUAGE STUDIES Executive Director: Thomas B. Gold

KOREA RESEARCH MONOGRAPHS (KRM)

24. Lancaster, Lewis R., and Richard K. Payne, eds. Religion and Society in Contemporary Korea. 1997. 25. Shin, Jeong-Hyun. The Trap of History: Understanding Korean Short Stories. 1998. 26. Pai, Hyung Il, and Timothy R. Tangherlini, eds. Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity. 1998. 27. Hesselink, Nathan, ed. Contemporary Directions: Korean Folk Music Engaging the Twentieth Century and Beyond. 2001. 28. Choi, Byonghyon, trans. The Book of Corrections: Reflections on the National Crisis during the Japanese Invasion of Korea, 1592–1598. 2002. 29. Dilling, Margaret Walker. Stories inside Stories: Music in the Making of Korean Olympic Ceremonies. 2007. 30. Kim, Hyuk-Rae, and Bok Song, eds. Modern Korean Society: Its Development and Prospect. 2007. 31. Park, Hun Joo. Diseased Dirigisme: The Political Sources of Financial Policy toward Small Business in Korea. 2007. 32. Finch, Michael, trans. Min Yŏnghwan: The Selected Writings of a Late Chosŏn Diplomat. 2008. 33. Pettid, Michael. Unyŏng-jŏn: A Love Affair at the Royal Palace of Chŏson Korea. 2009. 34. Park, Pori. Trial and Error in Modernist Reforms: Korean Buddhism under Colonial Rule. 2009. 35. Patterson, Wayne. In the Service of His Korean Majesty: William Nelson Lovatt, the Pusan Customs, and Sino-Korean Relations, 1876–1888. 2012. 36. Yeh, Wen-hsin, ed. Mobile Subjects: Boundaries and Identities in the Modern Korean Diaspora. 2013. RESEARCH PAPERS AND POLICY STUDIES (RPPS)

40. Hao, Yufan. Dilemma and Decision: An Organizational Perspective on American China Policy Making. 1997. 41. Wakeman, Jr., Frederic, and Wang Xi, eds. China’s Quest for Modernization: A Historical Perspective. 1997. 42. West, Loraine A., and Yaohui Zhao, eds. Rural Labor Flows in China. 2000. 43. Sharma, Shalendra D., ed. The Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security, and Foreign Policy. 2000. 44. Arase, David, ed. The Challenge of Change: East Asia in the New Millennium. 2003. 45. Kang, Sungho, and Ramón Grosfoguel, eds. Geopolitics and Trajectories of Development: The Cases of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Germany, and Puerto Rico. 2010. 46. Lee, Hong Yung, ed. A Comparative Study of East Asian Capitalism. 2014. SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS

Han, Theodore, and John Li. Tiananmen Square Spring 1989: A Chronology of the Chinese Democracy Movement. 1992. Scalapino, Robert. From Leavenworth to Lhasa: Living in a Revolutionary Era. 2008. Thompson, Phyllis L., ed. Dear Alice: Letters Home from American Teachers Learning to Live in China. 1998. PUBLICATIONS WITH THE SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF EARLY CHINA

Qiu, Xigui. Chinese Writing. Trans. Gilbert L. Mattos and Jerry Norman. 2000. von Falkenhausen, Lothar, ed. Japanese Scholarship on Early China, 1987–1991: Summaries from Shigaku zasshi. 2002.

For a complete catalogue and current prices, see http://ieas.berkeley.edu/publications/catalogue.html

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