Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making [Unabridged] 1443856614, 9781443856614

Citation preview

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

By

Melania-Gabriela Ciot

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making, by Melania-Gabriela Ciot This book first published 2014 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2014 by Melania-Gabriela Ciot All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-5661-4, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5661-4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword ................................................................................................... vii Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Formulating the Problem Describing the Research The Motivation of Using Qualitative Research “The Sample” Research Methods Interrogations of the Research Chapter One ............................................................................................... 14 Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War Context and Debates Regarding the Contemporary International System The Actors of the Contemporary International System Arguments for Restructuring the International System after the Cold War Concepts and Theories Regarding the Restructuring of the Contemporary International System Current Status of the Restructuring of the International System Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 56 Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches The Role of Decision-Making in Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation Levels of Analysis of Foreign Policy Decision-Making Models of Decision-Making The Rational Actor Model The Organizational Behaviour Model The Government Policies Model

vi

Table of Contents

Chapter Three .......................................................................................... 117 Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models The Cybernetic Model The Prospective Theory The Poliheuristic Theory The Multiple Streams Model Psychological Approaches Groupthinking Counselling System The Cognitive Approach Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 159 Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making Cognitive Idiosyncrasies Social Perception Idiosyncrasies Motivational Idiosyncrasies Emotional (Affective) Idiosyncrasies Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 187 Idiosyncratic Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process (Case Study) Romania's EU Accession Negotiation Process Proposal regarding the Analysis Model of the Relationship between the Personal Characteristics of the Decision-Maker and Executive Behaviour in Foreign Policy Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 254 Conclusions Bibliography ............................................................................................ 267 Index ........................................................................................................ 296

FOREWORD

The concern for the subject treated in this paper came from the perceptions generated by the impressive sequence of events on the international scene in which the speed, diversity and the agglomeration and seriousness of events make not only the specialists in foreign policy and international relations analysis wonder where the answers lie, but also how the macro and micro decisions in international politics are made, who the actors are, and how they react to such situations that affect our daily lives. Such events which are seemingly hard to explain, have a reason in the complexity of global interdependence. Foreign policy decisions are influenced by many factors. The real world is complex and many variables have to be considered when making a decision. Often the expected effect can have unexpected characteristics and often may be accompanied by consequences that the originators have not suspected. The psychological approach to decision-making facilitates the understanding and explaining of the complexity of foreign and global policies precisely because of the prolonged transitional stage of the contemporary international system. Why this concern for foreign policy decision-making? Because it proves the necessity of a transformation of the international system to one based on cooperation, collaboration and communication. Because the psychology of decision-making is reflected in foreign policy, where situations involving choices occur in varying degrees: from starting a war, peacemaking, forming an alliance, establishing diplomatic relations, implementing a certain position, imposing economic sanctions or the ratification of conventions. Why is the study of the foreign policy decision-making process important? Because we can thus cover the cognitive processes that lead to a decision and "we enter the mind of" leaders who make decisions. We can also identify the individual and general behavioural patterns of decisions and we can identify views on leadership styles and the personalities of leaders, which cannot only be revealed through a systematic approach to foreign policy analysis. The course of world politics is shaped by the decisions of leaders. Uncertainty involved in decision-making in foreign policy can belong to the motivations, beliefs, intentions or calculations of the opponents. If we

viii

Foreword

cannot understand how decisions are made, then maybe we can understand the decisions and, perhaps more importantly, we can predict some results on the international scene. Both the Cold War and the previous history of international relations have mainly shown processes of change in the international system, as a result of the encounter of conflicts and war; even the last post-Cold War decades demonstrate that another world conflict is not possible anymore (in one year time we will record the sad celebration of the passing of a century since the First World War), which is why I have proposed an analysis–a case study of the negotiation process in connection with decision-making in foreign policy because I believe that leaders, states, regional and international organizations, including international NGOs should go through a new phase of learning about political and diplomatic negotiations and beyond. This paper brings a new element into the study of international relations by analyzing the subjective elements (idiosyncrasies) that occur in decision-making at the individual level. The use of psychological methods of analysing the foreign policy decision-making process proposes a necessary investigation path into international relations. The case study is Romania’s process of accession to the European Union (2000-2004), from the perspective of the analysis of psychological factors that intervene in the decision-making at the individual level (Chief Negotiator of Romania's accession to the European Union). Through discourse analysis (political and public speeches, media representations and interviews), I have tried to identify the idiosyncrasies that have acted in decision-making, providing a measure of their influence regarding decision-making in foreign policy. This paper is an invitation addressed to the specialists in foreign policy analysis, in international relations, to dare to use new approaches for the deciphering and involvement in foreign policy decision-making. A word of gratitude is sent to my colleagues at the University who have supported me with competence and patience in undertaking this scientific approach, convincing me that there are brave pioneers who succeed not only for them but also for others, and that appreciation could only come as a just measure of the hard work done. University “Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai” Cluj-Napoca, 11.11.2013

INTRODUCTION

Formulating the Problem In recent years there has been a significant increase in the importance of the study of decision-making within several specialty areas (Zang 2009, 15). Foreign policy decisions are influenced by many factors. The real world is complex and many variables must be taken into account when a decision is made. The role of information processing, as well as the classification and idiosyncrasies necessitate a psychological approach to foreign policy decision-making (Mintz and De Rouen 2010, 97). The psychological approach to decision-making also facilitates an understanding and an explanation of its complexity in other disciplines, especially in international relations theory. The psychology of decision-making is reflected in foreign policy, where situations involving choices occur in varying degrees: starting a war, peacemaking, forming an alliance, establishing diplomatic relations, implementing a certain position, imposing economic sanctions or the ratification of conventions (Mintz and De Rouen 2010, 3). Decisionmaking in foreign policy relates to the choices made by individuals, groups or coalitions, which affect the actions of a nation at an international level (Mintz and De Rouen 2010, 3). Decisions taken in the field of foreign policy are characterized by the stakes involved, by a high level of uncertainty and by substantial risk (Renshon and Renshon 2008, 509). Studies in international affairs only focus on the actions of states and their leaders. To decipher these actions it is useful to know what lies behind a decision, and what is pressing the action and the event. Decisionmaking in foreign policy is an important area of research because the manner in which decisions are made can determine a possible choice to fall into a pattern. Therefore, an actor can reach a different result depending on how the decision was made. Moreover, significant cognitive limitations distort information processing. Some decisions are carefully calculated, while others are intuitive. The analysis level of the foreign policy decision-making process is different from that of international relations, where experts talk about individuals, states and the system as the main unit of analysis. In foreign policy decision-making, units refer specifically to entities which decide:

2

Introduction

leaders, groups and coalitions. Foreign policy decisions can be examined in terms of three levels: individual, group and coalition (Hermann 2001, 47). Decisions at the individual level refers to the behaviour of groups, coalitions and states. These decisions occur where leaders have a surplus of power within the state. Strong leaders do not have to seek consensus. Examples include Fidel Castro in Cuba, Mao Tse-tung in China, Stalin in the USSR (Hermann 2001, 47). Institutional constraints are not a major factor for these decision-makers. Individuals are very important in critical situations. Margaret Hermann states that in high-level diplomacy, crisis and the interest of leaders increase the likelihood of individual decision-making (Hermann 2001, 48). For example, decisions to start a war or to attend international meetings are often associated with decisions made by a dominant leader. Studies related to the decisions made at the individual level focus on psychological factors related to the personality of the decision-maker, on operational codes, learning, evoked sets, cognitive consistency and misperceptions. Why is the study of the foreign policy decision-making process important? Because we can thus uncover such cognitive processes that lead to a decision and "we enter the mind of" leaders who make decisions. We can also identify general behavioural patterns and individual decisions and can generate views on the leadership styles and personalities of leaders, which cannot be revealed through a systematic approach to foreign policy analysis. This approach to foreign policy analysis has the potential to become more and more important to the study of international relations. The foreign policy decision-making process may deepen the understanding of idiosyncrasies, motivations and perceptions that occur in making a decision, especially at the individual level. Moreover, the growth and development theories of cognitive psychology and decision theory have stimulated advances in the study of foreign policy decision-making. The course of world politics is shaped by the decisions of leaders. Any uncertainty involved in decision-making in foreign policy can belong to motivations, beliefs, intentions or calculations made by the opponents. If we cannot understand how decisions are made, then maybe we can manage to understand the decisions and, perhaps more importantly, we can predict some results on the international scene (Mintz and De Rouen 2010, 4). Factors such as the personality and beliefs of leaders, leadership style, emotions, images, cognitive consistency, use of analogies, intelligence, the manner in which they influence decision-making and the expected results question the explanatory power of the rational model. But this does not mean that decision-makers are irrational (Mintz and De Rouen 2010, 97),

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

3

but rather, they are limited by their abilities to going through all the stages of the rational model. The presence of idiosyncrasies (these personal and social factors) (Campanale and Shakun 1997, 13) influencing decisions can lead into other approaches to decision-making, which are different from the "classical" rational model. Rationality in foreign policy decisionmaking cannot be considered the sole factor. In the best case, it may be taken as a reference factor, but postmodern approaches bring the consideration of the role and influence of psychological factors to the attention of specialists. At the individual decision-making level, Jackson and Sorensen talk about the limited capacities of human beings to make rational and objective decisions, and these limitations are related to the way in which information is perceived and processed (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 234). The effects of cognition and beliefs upon foreign policy-makers are demonstrated by the beliefs’ content of the decision-makers, through to the organization and structure of the decision makers’ beliefs by common patterns of perception (or misperceptions) and cognitive stiffness (or flexibility) for change and learning (Rosati 2000, 47). The literature on human cognition and belief brings questions regarding the notion of rationality and calls for a different interpretation of cognition. Rosati calls on specialists in international relations to not just stick to "simplistic and naive statements" about rational choice but to focus attention on cognitive approaches in order to substantiate their theories in psychology (Rosati 2000, 47). It should be noted that the approach to foreign policy decision-making can relate to issues that affect all nations. Nations have security issues, commercial disputes and many other situations on their agenda (environmental and political) which require decisions. Given the complexity of the foreign policy decision-making process, it becomes clear that the approach to foreign policy analysis, focusing on decision-making is vital to the understanding of the foreign policy behaviour of our world and the specific behaviour of different nations. Foreign policy decision-making has models and theories that can help us understand how bias, error, uncertainty and internal policies may determine decisions. The idea for this research came from an article written by Erik Jones (2003), called Idiosyncrasy and integration: suggestions from comparative political economy, in which he tried to find answers to questions regarding the coincidence of national idiosyncrasy and international integration, and of process of European integration. The article is based on Karl Polanyi’s (1957) insistence on the social embeddedness of market institutions and

4

Introduction

Gunnar Myrdal’s (1956) interpretation of the cumulative causality behind integration at the national and international levels. The article concludes by suggesting a research program that could develop from the interface between idiosyncrasy and integration. So, it was interesting to see if idiosyncasies could appear at the level of European integration from the point of view of accession: When examining any particular facet of European integration, the first step is to look where reactions differ across member states and the second is to attempt to analyze plausible distributive accounts for these differences in reaction. The point is not that integration and idiosyncrasy covary in some direct or linear sense. Rather it is that any aspect of integration may give rise to reactions that differ from one member state to the next for distributive reasons which are strongly influenced by the local structural environment. (Jones, 2003, 152)

Describing the Research This research brings a new element into the study of international relations through the analysis of subjective elements (idiosyncrasies) that occur in the decision-making process at the individual level. The use of psychological methods for the analysis of foreign policy decision-making opens a new path of investigation in the field of international relations. The case study which will be the subject of this research, is the process of Romania’s accession to the European Union (2000-2004), from the perspective of the psychological factors that have intervened in decisionmaking at the individual level. Although many researchers have tackled this topic (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 2005, 2003, Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, Gallagher 2010), this paper brings a new perspective: the analysis of the subjective elements that influenced the decision-makers involved. The decision-maker analyzed is considered to be Romania's Chief Negotiator, Minister Delegate, Professor Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬. Through discourse analysis (political speeches, public, media representations, and interviews conducted during 2000-2004) we shall try to identify the idiosyncrasies that have affected decision making. The analysis model used is an adaptation of one belonging to Wilson (2006). The work has been organized in accordance with reporting standards in the field of social sciences. The main chapters of this paper are: the introduction, evolutions in the International System after the Cold War, the foreign policy decision-making process–recent approaches, alternatives for the decision-making models, idiosyncrasies in foreign policy decision-

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

5

making, an idiosyncratic analysis of Romania's E.U. accession negotiation process (the case study) and conclusions. This research is a qualitative one, and this is an important and new research element in the field of international relations, where quantitative research methods are present in a high enough proportion. The option for qualitative research is given by the fact that it fosters the study of a topic, process or phenomenon "in its natural environment, based on the meanings that people bring with them" (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 3). After formulating the problem to be investigated, giving reasons for the choice of qualitative research, specifying the study periods and a "sample" of publications and research methods to be used; the interrogations from which this scientific investigation starts, will be presented. They aim to identify the idiosyncrasies that influenced the decision-making process of Romania's accession to the EU (at an individual level), their specificity, only for the decision-making process of the accession to the European Union, and the determination of political, cultural and social idiosyncrasies at some individual level, that have led to the decision-making process of Romania’s accession to the European Union. The answer to these questions will be given through the qualitative research, respectively the discourse analysis of the interviews, the media representations and public and political discourses from the period between the years 2000–2004, of Romania's Chief Negotiator with the EU. The theoretical and methodological basis of this research consists of five chapters, each of them managing to complete the overall picture for an understanding of the psychological approach to decision-making. The first of these chapters is "Evolutions in the contemporary international system after the Cold War". It provides an overview of the context and recent primary debates on the international system and the main actors, then presents some arguments advocating its restructuring. Changes in the structure of the contemporary international system are distinct from changes in the system unit. Therefore, changes in polarity will cause changes in the way in which the security is realised. Changes in polarity are those that have spread most rapidly in the contemporary international system. What changes should occur in order to transform the international system? The most available answer is that the system transforms itself and that interdependencies strengthen its ties and the institutions smooth the way for peace. The subchapter "Arguments for restructuring the International System after the Cold War" provides some of the necessary answers. The chapter continues with a description of the concepts and theories relating to the restructuring of the international system and the current state of the restructuring. The Contemporary

6

Introduction

International System has waited for more than two decades to be restructured and its concepts reconsidered. The end of the Cold War could not stop the international crisis. On the contrary, some old concepts were reactivated and some new concepts, including Europe, have begun to emerge stronger. Some strategic regions of the world have increased in importance and the balance of global power was always considered when important international political decisions were taken. This "traditional" behaviour of the important actors in the international system after the Cold War, explains the slow rhythm and sometimes the withdrawal from the main transformations of the system. The last two decades have shown that the phenomenon of transformation and the processes within the international system could not be stopped. The Contemporary International System can be considered as a complex network of units involving many interactions, transactions and communications. In order to see these interactions as power relations (balance of power), the cooperative and integrative potential of transactions and communication needs to be observed (Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬ 2010, 25). The second chapter of the thesis, "Foreign policy decision-making process–recent approaches" describes the most important elements of decision-making: its role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, the types of decisions, levels of analysis and context for decisionmaking. In recent years, the importance of the decision-making process has increased significantly in several specialty areas. This psychological approach to this process provides “hooks” for understanding and explaining its complexity in other disciplines as well, especially in international relations theory. The first subchapter brings a new, pyschological approach to the perspective of international relations decision-making, also arguing its usefulness. Among the levels of the decision-making analysis, the most important for this work is the individual level, as it will highlight the subjective factors that influence decision making. The chapter ends with the presentation of three “classic” decision-making models: the rational actor, organizational behaviour and government policies. Decision-making models cause the premise that it is useful to conceptualize nations as unitary rational actors whose behaviour can be adequately explained by reference to the structure of the system, because individuals, groups and organizations acting on behalf of the state are sensitive to pressures and internal constraints, including elite action, electoral politics, public opinion, interest groups, ideological preferences and bureaucratic policies. The alternatives to the traditional models of decision-making analysis are presented in chapter three. It is a chapter that will provide the bridge

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

7

between the three traditional patterns of decision-making analysis and the subjective elements that influence a decision, but have not yet been caught in the patterns of model analysis. All models of analysis used for analyzing foreign policy decision-making are mentioned: the cybernetic model, the prospective theory, the poliheuristic theory, the multistream model and the psychological approaches (groupthinking, the counselling system and the cognitive approach). The most useful to the present research is the psychological approach. This is done individually, with particular attention to the psychological aspects of the decision-maker, especially the perception of the actor. Important elements to be considered in the analysis of the foreign policy decision-making process are: the misunderstanding of the intentions and actions of other actors and the underlying reasons behind them, pre-existing beliefs (hence the tendency to perceive other states as more hostile than they really are) and mistaking desires for reality (wishful thinking). Psychological approaches have challenged the concept of rationality within the decision-making process because they focus on the human factors and the influences that shape the responses that decision-makers use for the outside world (Saikaly 2009). The fourth chapter "Idiosyncrasies in foreign policy decision-making" presents the subjective (psychological) factors acting at an individual level and influencing decision-making. Basically, the presence of idiosyncrasies demonstrates the need for a psychological approach to foreign policy decision-making (Mintz and De Rouen 2010, 97). The factors acting here are: the personality and beliefs of leaders, leadership style, emotions, images, cognitive consistency, the use of analogies, intelligence and how these influence decision-making and the results expected. These factors call into question the explanatory power of the rational model. This chapter presents the main types of idiosyncrasies acting in decisionmaking: cognitive idiosyncrasies, idiosyncrasies of social perception, motivational and emotional idiosyncrasies. The fifth chapter of the thesis synthetically describes Romania's accession process to the European Union, from an idiosyncratic standpoint, this being the first such case applied to us. After presenting the accession of Romania to the European Union, using the psychological approach, based on the scheme developed by Hermann (2011, 9), the idiosyncrasies that acted with the previously mentioned decision-maker factor will be identified in the public communication made by Romania's chief negotiator with the European Union in 2000-2004. The paper ends with the final conclusions, presenting our responses to the interrogations of the research, but also with some proposals for future research.

8

Introduction

The Motivation of Using Qualitative Research Băban considers that in recent years, we have witnessed the emergence of a methodological paradigm that is complementary to the positivist one and the new paradigm: ...emphasizes the social construction of reality, the ultimate goal being a richer, more nuanced and authentic understanding of phenomena [...]. (Băban 2002, 12)

Sociology, anthropology and political science have quickly adopted qualitative methodology because it does not only belong to a single scientific discipline (Băban 2002, 13). What is relevant for the use of qualitative analysis in international relations is precisely the possibility of studying a subject-phenomenon “in its natural environment” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 4). Qualitative research is given by the complexity of social interactions and the meanings attributed by the participants in these interactions (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 4). In the field of international relations, qualitative analysis brings useful information through specific research methods, that can develop explanations of problems or of a process or situation analyzed (Hancock and Algozzine 2006, 7). Where few data are available, qualitative analysis helps to identify the factors that influence a situation (Hancock and Algozzine 2006, 8). Qualitative research does not belong to a single scientific discipline, it offers the possibility of an interdisciplinary approach to a certain topic. The dynamics of international relations favour interdisciplinary approaches and the presence of psychological investigation methods, the analysis of the psychological factors that influence the evolution of a situation, advocate for qualitative research. This type of research involves the interpretation of data, usually few in number, within the social and cultural context, for a certain period of time (Grix 2001, 44). Another important argument for the use of qualitative research is its own interpretive and creative character (Băban 2002, 30): "In the social sciences everything is interpretation, nothing speaks by itself" (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 13). To understand the data, a combination of knowledge, rational and intuitive understanding and also interpretative ability are required (Webb 1998, 556). Qualitative research fosters the holistic approach to a situation, and it is reflective regarding the role of the researcher in the research process. The case study is a type of qualitative research, different from other approaches belonging to other scientific disciplines, and requires intense analysis and

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

9

descriptions of a single unit in space and time (Hancock and Algozzine 2006, 11). The topics frequently approached by the case studies are about individuals, events and groups. Using the case study enables a deep understanding of a situation and of the people involved in it, and can influence policies, procedures and future research (Merriam 2001, 7). All of these features constitute grounds for choosing qualitative analysis, i.e. the case study and discourse analysis as the main research methods.

Study Periods The study period investigated is 2000-2004, when Romania’s accession negotiations to the European Union and the activity of the decion-making factor as Chief Negotiator were conducted.

“The Sample” Quotation marks are used because in qualitative research the term “sample” is not used. In qualitative research, the size of the "sample" is not important. For example, the discourse analysis of ten interviews can provide equally valid information as hundreds of responses to a structured analysis. This research will analyze the public communication of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ;܈‬i.e., interviews, media representations and public speeches, as well as policies supported and presented on various national and international media channels (printed media, TV and online).

Research Methods The present qualitative research uses the case study as a research strategy, the method of data analysis is the discourse analysis and the interpretation method is interpretive research (Băban 2002, 21-22). The case study was chosen for this research because it favours the analysis of multiple sources of information, the research process being defined by systematic steps, designed for a careful investigation of the case (Hancock and Algozzine 2006, 10). Choosing the case study as a research strategy means that: a) it is a qualitative research method, b) the research is holistic and consistent; c) it uses some kind of "sample"; d) the "sample" is selected in real contexts; e) the topic to be discussed is diffuse; f) it may involve triangulation (using multiple research methods); g)

Introduction

10

research considers a single process, phenomenon or situation (Gerring 2007, 17). The study unit in this case is represented by Romania’s accession negotiations to the European Union. The main research method used is discourse analysis, one of the “traditional” methods of qualitative research (Neuman 2008, 61). It has experienced impressive developments in the last decade (Băban 2002, 121). The psychological approach to decision-making, through language study, will provide an identity to the decision-maker, to the mental processes that occur, without ignoring the individual; his behaviour will be contextualised (Băban 2002, 122). The history of discourse analysis can be characterized by a return towards the language of German phenomenology, French poststructuralism and postmodernism (Băban 2002, 122): "the rediscovery of language was a crucial time for the development of discourse analysis in the social sciences" (Harre 1995). This method has opened the way to the investigation of meanings and the way they are made. Every person, event or situation can be described in several manners, and taking into account the social context is the most important one (Băban 2002, 123). Discourse analysis will basically provide, basically, the social story of human subjectivity by studying linguistic resources that build and replicate the sociopolitical domain (Burman 1991, 325): discourse analysis is the method that studies how language is structured in a certain way so that it produces meanings and discourses which operate independently of the intentions of the speaker or the text writer. (Parker

1992, 125) This research method will facilitate the highlighting of the idiosyncrasies that influenced the decision-making process involved in negotiating Romania’s accession to the European Union. The individual level of the decision-making process will be analyzed by means of a scheme elaborated by Wilson (2006, 29), starting from the one proposed by Hermann:

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

11

High level of political decision Has great latitude in decisionmaking

Nature of situation

Personal characteristics

Beliefs

Vision on the world

Is forced to define the situation

Reasons

Is possible to take part in the decisionmaking process

Decisionmaking style

Interpersonal style

Personal political style

Filters Interest in foreign policy

Training or expertise in foreign policy

Sensibility to the environment

Degree of attention for foreign policy

Extension of the repertory of behaviours into foreign policy

Openness to change

Executive behaviour in foreign policy

Fig. 0-1. The relationship between personal characteristics of decision-makers and executive behaviour in foreign policy, based on Margaret Hermann's theoretical framework (adapted from Wilson 2006, 29).

12

Introduction

Based on the elements presented in the previous figure, their representation in the public and political discourse, the media representations and interviews conducted by the Chief Negotiator for Romania’s accession to the European Union, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, in 2000-2004, all of which appeared in national and international publications of that period were identified. The meanings contained in the investigated material offer the size of the representations (Neuman 2008, 61), and the system of meanings and social constructions (Băban 2002, 133), a trademark of the idiosyncrasies that occur. Basically, the speech is seen as a social construction, as a sum of meanings shared by a certain community (Băban 2002, 133). Therefore, the psychological approach to the decision-making process of Romania’s accession to the European Union was to analyze the representations and elements presented in the previous figure, from the public communication made by Romania's Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬. The analysis was conducted in three stages: a) a description of how the language is used (metaphors, evaluative terms used and representations); b) an interpretation; and c) explanations, the most important step, which would highlight the relationship between power, domination and ideologies grounded in statements. We have sought to identify discursive patterns that would mark the presence of certain types of idiosyncrasies, and investigate the association of their presence with the decisions undertaken. An important element that will transpire throughout the analysis, which will have a bearing on the decision-making analysis, is the identification of the elements of power, favoured by the use of discourse analysis; "discourses reproduce the power relationships" (Băban 2002, 130). Reflexivity is a central concern in discourse analysis, representing the point of connection between the individual and society (Băban 2002, 129). The reflexivity of the researcher aims to produce new meanings of phenomena, it involves evaluations and requires options, but also active participation in the production of knowledge. Note that discourse analysis also recognizes the active role of the analyst (Băban 2002, 130).

Interrogations of the Research This research has started from the following questions: Which are the idiosyncrasies that influenced the decision-making process of Romania’s accession to the European Union? Are these idiosyncrasies characteristic only to the decision-making process of Romania’s

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

13

accession to the European Union? Are there specific elements (political, cultural or social) that have influenced the emergence of the individual idiosyncrasies in the decision-making process of Romania’s accession to the European Union?

CHAPTER ONE EVOLUTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTER THE COLD WAR

Context and Debates Regarding the Contemporary International System Post-crisis economic recovery is happening at different speeds–faster in the advanced economies and slower in the emerging or developing ones (as of April, 2010, Global Financial Stability Report mentioned). Among the advanced economies of the world, the United States is recovering faster than Japan and the European Union. Among the emerging and developing economies, Asia is in a more advanced position, while other emerging economies, and the economies of the Commonwealth, are still behind. Such an economic recovery will continue at different speeds. Although the global economic recovery has gained "in traction", stability is not yet assured (Blanchard and Viñals 2010, XI). IMF estimates indicate a decrease in losses caused by the crisis at $2.3 trillion in April 2010 from $2.8 trillion in October 2009 (the lowest point reached by the crisis). The general framework indicates significant differences between the segments of the banking systems characterized by lack of capital, a high risk of further asset damage, and chronically poor profitability. Corporate strategies which should have provided solutions for low earnings growth were greatly affected by the damaging of assets, which has hit both gains and capital. At the same time, better growth prospects in many emerging economies and low interest rates in major economies have triggered a resurgence of capital flows into some emerging economies. These increased capital flows have come with an increased risk of inflation pressure and asset boom. So far there is no clear record of assets, although there are some hot spots and risks may occur in a distant time horizon. Recoveries of cross-border financial flows have brought some changes in the exchange rate–depreciation of the US dollar and appreciation of other currencies of advanced and emerging economies. But these changes have

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

15

been limited and global current account imbalances are expected to widen again. Perspectives over activity remain uncertain and the risks deriving from fiscal fragility have come to the foreground. A main concern is that political manoeuvres in many advanced economies have extended. Moreover, the sovereignty risks in advanced economies could undermine the financial stability gains and extend the crisis. The rapid growth of public debt and deterioration of fiscal balances can be transmitted to the banking systems or across borders. This underlines the need for political action to support the recovery of the global economy and the financial system. The political agenda should include several important elements. One of the key tasks that should be achieved in the future is to reduce the vulnerability of sovereignty. The ability to sustain a long-term high global growth against a medium term one depends on the rebalancing of global demand. This means that economies which before the crisis had an excessive external deficit will need to consolidate their public finances so as to limit the damage to growth and demand. Economies that have an excessive current account surplus will have to increase domestic demand to sustain growth, as excessive deficit economies lower their demands. As the currency of the excessive deficit economies depreciates, surplus economies' currencies will appreciate. Rebalancing will have to be supported by the financial reform sector to favour the growth of structural policies for both types of economy, either with surplus or deficit. However, the current times are the times of mortgage crisis, banking crisis, crisis of the system and not least, crisis of confidence (Chorafas 2009, XIV). At a meeting of the Harvard Club on April 4 2008, the respected economist Dr. Paul Volker said that usually financial crises do not occur in the absence of economic problems, which are to be found at the base, adding that the financial system has failed the test market (Chorafas 2009, XIV). He also pointed out that current events have shown that specific risk management tools did not work. His thesis is the following: ¾ Global economy needs a global regulatory solution; ¾ Regulated institutions are placed in a better position to face the crisis than those uncovered by regulations; ¾ Lack of stability of the dollar affects the world economy. Economic and financial experts warn of the danger of a second crisis, that of the credit default swaps; such a credit offers buyers and sellers the

16

Chapter One

opportunity to separate exchange risk from such characteristics as loan (for example, the interest rate). Theoretically, this is like an insurance policy to protect against the exchange risk, but in reality, it is merely another tool of speculation on credit quality, which has been assessed in a portfolio for each bank and for many investors, and now appears to be just toxic (Chorafas 2009, XIV). The transition from a bipolar to a unipolar system and then to a multipolar one, with more centres of power, has shown that the international system should be dynamic and find its operating mechanisms while on the go, by means of reforming. An interesting approach to the international system belongs to Professor Zaika Laidi at the Centre for International Studies and Research of the Institute of Political Studies in Paris (Laïdi 2005, 1). He states that, as our world has become increasingly broader, our ability to find out its meanings has diminished: With the end of communism came the end of the intimate alliance between power and ideology. There isn’t any power in our globalized world which can claim to provide meaning. In our desperation, we look into the past at the old models (religious traditions, nationalism, ethnicity) to give us a new sense of identity. But how effective are these old certainties in a globalized world, which is constantly in a state of flux? (Laïdi 2005, 1)

The end of the Cold War did not just mean the end of communism, but the end of an intense historical period, the most intense geostrategic expression and the most complete ideological form. The strong feelings about change in the world order that was to come about after the fall of the Berlin Wall are equal to our inability to provide meaning or interpretation. Professor Laidi speaks of three principles that have been deployed with the fall of the Berlin Wall (1) "foundation" (meaning the basic principles of a collective project), (2) "unity" (meaning that the "images/representations of the world" are reunited as a whole), (3) the "end" or "ultimate goal" (meaning projecting it somewhere, where it seems to be better). It was obvious that "market democracy" have triumphed, and political, economic and financial turmoil fit less well into a general framework, though they were never more interdependent. Never has the need to project ourselves into the future been stronger, and this leads to a greater rupture between our historical past and our difficulty in interpreting it. These ruptures are at the foundation of the global crisis: a crisis unable to provide us with meaning. The author speaks further about nationalism (closely linked to the search for identity), as one of the important features of the post-Cold War,

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

17

which is based on three sources, which are sometimes complementary: sense of loss, fear, and instrumentalization. The first source–the sense of loss–is one of the motivating forces of neo-nationalism that is present in Russia today. This was about the fall of an empire, rather than the end of communism, a fact which has greatly damaged Russia's identity. It is obvious that the idea of "returning to nationalism" will not be supported if it implies only the return to a past that once existed. The peculiarity of Russia today is that it can have a brief appeal to history because, following the end of communism, the situation is not similar to that of 1917, but to that of the sixteenth century. The double rupture, with communism and the empire, is fuelling feelings of humiliation and loss. Fear is the second motivating force of the identity movement. It is generally based on self-fulfillment in anticipation of reality. Therefore, in Yugoslavia, the idea of breaking the Federation was mentally present long before it actually happened. When the fire of discord was kindled for the first time in Slovenia, when it was expected to happen in Kosovo, it was precisely because the Slovenians–more economically advanced and ethnically homogeneous–anticipated the rupture. Therefore, they separated from the Federation of Yugoslavia, fearing the consequences of this rupture. In contrast, the Bosnians, who could hardly afford to become independent, opted to maintain the Federation. It was only when the survival of Yugoslavia was impossible, that the fear of bearing the costs of the Serbo-Croatian dismantling forced the Bosnians to think of them more in terms of a nation, even as an Islamic one. Their nationalism is not genetic because they are a creation that belongs to Tito. The strength of fear has left them with no other choice but to declare themselves "nationalists". It is easy to see that the explanation of the Yugoslav conflict as a mechanism of the exacerbation of nationalism or of religious antagonism is assumed to be an effect of this cause. In this case, religion lubricates rather than establishes the celebration of difference. Instrumentalization is the third factor of post-Cold War nationalism. It expresses a simple reality: nationalist claims are never purely abstract or symbolic. In order to thrive, they need occasional meeting requirements or concrete materials, whose rationality is relatively clear: claims related to the possession of a national identity are made for not having to share the wealth and other goods with those considered deprived. Rejecting the idea of socialism and redistribution, "economic segregation" does not have any motivation to advance under cover. Lombard regionalism or Flemish or Slovenian nationalism cannot be understood without taking this factor into account.

18

Chapter One

The identitary approach, belonging to Professor Laidi is complemented by an analogy of Freud's theory on the "narcissism of small differences", focusing on the artificial formation of groups around a "fixed point". This idea can be translated into the field of international relations, where the system bears the clear signs of a deployment process: the loss of collective labels following the death of the bipolar system (the loss of a fixed point, if we take Freudian theory as a reference). The unipolarity exercised by the United States at the beginning of the post-Cold War period did not result in a clear delineation of the functioning mechanisms of the international system, despite the strategies initiated by the administrations of President Bill Clinton (building the nation, social international assistance and use of force) and President George W. Bush (nurturing relations between the great powers and rebuilding the national military force) (Ikenberry 2002, 40). The author even speaks of the outlining of a comprehensive strategy by the United States to fulfill its "imperial ambition". Maybe it was just the vulnerable spot of the unilateral US power: emphasizing military force, at the expense of the political and economic ones. The agenda of President Barack Obama, self-proclaimed at the start of his term as the "American President from the Pacific", with special attention to maintaining the liaison with growth reservoirs in Asia and Latin America, and by his European tour which started in May last year, has demonstrated a reconsideration of the global agenda (Puúcaú 2011). Europe is considered "America's vital global partner" (Puúcaú 2011). Today, decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, neither the mechanistic thesis of decline, nor of a unipolar world are enough to understand the US role in the world, for reflecting their structural power in the post-Cold War world (Laïdi 2005, 140). If the idea of unipolarity and decline co-exist in the debate, it is because the terms capture elements of truth, or do not take into account all situations. The theme of decline remains important for understanding the need to choose between internal and external priorities and remains operational if a reference is made to a mechanistic approach (short-term) or a dynamic one (long-term). For almost symmetrical reasons, the unipolarity theme offers advantages and disadvantages. It allows the United States to demonstrate its prominent place on the world stage, taking into account the inertia of its potential competitors: this is why there will be a sort of "American unipolarity by default". This idea is not enough for an understanding of the international reality, because, with the end of the Cold War, the conditions for insertion into the global system have been changed by globalization itself.

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

19

In contrast with Asia, but following the example of the Islamic world, Europe has stated and publicized its desire to have a meaning within the contemporary international system (Laïdi 2005, 48). Europeans feel the need to set their own agenda regarding the future, while Asians are interested in the current arrangements. Thanks to the interaction between economic interdependence and cultural interpenetration, the world ceased to resemble a billiard game, where each ball was a nation-state (Laïdi 2005, 140). It is rather the sum of global processes, which are fluid and social (such as drugs, trade, environment, financial markets and media), and towards which the nationstates have a position of total domination "from beginning to end", but are looking to control those in a manner that is most advantageous to them. Within this ever-growing-in-complexity social system, the idea of a global architecture loses its value. It is no longer a matter of building a world like "planetarium Meccano" in which are used good plans prepared by embassies, but rather in the best case, it is a question of regulating global social processes in which states, businesses, organized social groups and individuals may intervene. If the meaning of the term is related to the ability of a nation to unite the "planetary ambition" with the increase of the collective well-being and social cohesion, then this explanation is valid for demonstrating that the United States was the last superpower of the world. It can be said that globalization has caused the loss of the unipolarity of the contemporary international system for three main reasons: the first is the fact that states have a lesser role in spreading political processes, and social, economic and cultural rights and that, as a result, the ambition of states to "carry" messages to other states was reduced: a US-originated technology no longer has an American meaning; the second reason is explained by the rapid acceleration of diffusion processes, so that political actors can–at best–form, channel and influence these processes, but cannot resist them: for example, the world power of CNN which is only marginally dependent on American political power; the third reason is that globalization is evident everywhere in the world and the priority of the states is not so much linked to the idea of carrying their own message, but to regulating globalization so as not to obey it completely (Laïdi 2005, 142). Even for a very strong actor like the United States, globalization is much too extensive a process to be controlled. In trying to achieve this aim, the purpose has become too defensive: it is no longer necessary to cut an empire to the size of a state, in an environment that can be formed, but to redefine the state territoriality in a globalized social system (Laïdi 2005, 143). Both for the United States and for other powers, this is not about defining the sphere of influence, but rather of delineating their role

20

Chapter One

in a globalized space. Globalization is a broad and comprehensive process, which cancels the states’ political claims of playing an exclusive global role. Another important element to consider in light of the term “superpower” is the divisible nature of power. If we hear more about the decoupling between the military and economic power, another reason appears on stage: the decoupling between economic strength and social cohesion (Laïdi 2005, 144). Today, as a result of intensified international economic competition, in almost all advanced economies, social cohesion determines the dominance of technological flexibility, as in Europe, or an increased tolerance for unemployment or social flexibility, which is reflected in the disappearance of guaranteed employment, or increased income. Medium-term projections indicate that the most powerful vector of US influence in the world is its social model and not its economic power, also based on military infusions. The dissemination of this model, especially in Europe, will not depend on the political will of the United States. The advantages of the communitarian model of identification, while increasing social atomization with the breaking of social ties and the merchantability in social relations and tolerance of inequalities are the most relevant elements of the "Americanization" of the world, even independent of the intrinsic political power of the United States, in its desire to maintain or not maintain troops in Europe, and to take part or not take part in international security issues. If the American power continues to have something to say worldwide, then this will be due to its social model and reconversion to the "smart power", rather than its political and military power, as used to happen during the Cold War, with all the ambivalences which this model implies: on the one hand, factors related to flexibility and mobility, and on the other hand elements of social disintegration. Globalization has once again emphasized the blurring of "the positive" and "negative influence" and this is the final step in breaking the subjective link which was established in the past between influence, progress and modernity. The architecture of the contemporary international system feels the need for change, and major economic players within the global governance will have a say in this regard: the G20 and G8 forum. G20 is the forum of finance ministers and Central Banks Governors which was created to address the specific needs of the international monetary and financial system, to strengthen the international financial architecture, to serve as a platform for discussion and to address international economic questions and, therefore, the group reflects a much broader constituency and global legitimacy than its parents G7/G8,

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

21

although it still excludes the representation of the poorest countries or of those in developing countries. This forum has connections with other important actors, international organizations (IMF Development Committee, Finance Committee, Financial Stability Forum, WTO, UN, OECD, NEPAD), has its own publications and issues its own documents, thus proving the important position that it upholds. G20 brings together countries whose populations amount to two-thirds of the world population and 90% of GDP. However, the G20 does not have the mandate and capacity to tackle a variety of global issues. Therefore, one of the future proposals is to convert this forum into a group of leaders (Hajnal 2007, 1). The international post-crisis led to a deeper analysis of the causes of the situation arising in 2008 and to developing a strategy to provide guidelines designed to reduce external imbalances. At the meeting which took place on April 14-15 2011 in Washington, G20 members established several indicators for evaluating persistent large imbalances, which will allow the focus to be on a two-step integration process: 1. public debt and fiscal deficits, private savings and private debt; 2. external imbalance composed of the trade balance and net investment income flows and transfers, taking into account at the same time, the exchange rate, fiscality and further monetary policies. To complete the first step, several milestones were established that will be achieved by evaluating the indicators mentioned above. Without the political targets these landmarks will set benchmarks for each indicator available, favouring the identification of countries for the second step of the evaluation. Four approaches have been proposed: ¾ a structural approach, based on an economic model and economic theories, in which each member of G20 will have one indicator as an assessment reference, so that the specific circumstances, including large commodity producers, can be taken into account; ¾ a statistical approach of the members of G20, which will reference the national historical trends; ¾ a statistical approach which will reference specific historical indicators of G20 members against groups of countries at similar stages of development; ¾ a statistical approach which will reference specific national indicators of G20 members in relation to the entire G20.

22

Chapter One

The statistical approach will be based on data from 1990-2004, because this is the period preceding the emergence of external imbalances. The reference values in the period 1990-2010 will also be used. In all four approaches, the forecast for 2013-2015 will be compared with the values suggested by the indicators, to determine whether or not this is a case for an in-depth assessment. Those countries which will be identified, in at least two of the four approaches, as having strong imbalances, will be evaluated in-depth to refer, in the case of the second step, the nature of the roots of the imbalance and to identify the impediments to adjustment. Professor Dani Rodrick, of Harvard University, believes that the G20 leaders meet too often and offer grandiose theoretical solutions, but lack a plan for immediate action in response to a crisis (Rodrik 2008, 21). Discussion of a new global financial system should not be at the top of the agenda of this forum. The immediate challenge is uniting against unilateral actions that may create a vicious circle which can drag the world economy into a deeper crisis. Professor Rodrick offers some solutions: the agreement of G7/G8 members on their governments' members having an appropriate degree of fiscal expansion to stimulate their economies, common actions of the policy-makers on the degree of fiscal expansion that will be more effective than individual action, current account surplus countries should adopt policies that increase domestic demand the creation by the IMF of a Short Term Liquidity Fund where developing countries would have access to some facilities of four of the emerging economies, those whose accidental financial excesses are not their own fault. The financial crisis, Rodrick states, has clearly shown that a new approach to financial regulation at national and international levels is urgently needed. The rules governing global financial functioning should be reconsidered to ensure that finances serve their primary purpose–allocations for projects with high profitability and minimum risk–without creating instability and crisis (Rodrik 2008, 22). Raghuram Rajan, former IMF Chief Economist, and Professor at the University of Chicago, believes that the G20 leaders should focus on global governance and that they should boost the IMF's financial strength (Rajan 2008, 29). Global financial coordination requires a wider group than the G7/G8 and G20 and the European Union should hold a single position in the G20+, in order to facilitate a broader representation. The secretariat of this new group should be a restructured IMF. Rajan believes that the current dialogue conducted in the global economy is a dialogue of the deaf, because:

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

¾

¾

¾

23

the industrialized countries stopped seeking funding long ago, they believe that they are now responsible global citizens and are carefully watching their political independence. They seem to see that the role of multilateral institutions is in correcting political mistakes and in the transparent mercantilism of the emerging economies; the emerging markets feel they have made a comeback, they believe that multilateral institutions have an agenda set by the industrialized countries and do not see why their policies should be under the control of industrialized countries, since industrialized countries show insufficient support to multilateral institutions; developing countries, assaulted by their own problems, have less time and interest for the global agenda.

Unfortunately, global issues constantly arise and they are not just financial. The availability and price of resources are of critical importance. Ideally, these resources will be available for everyone in a free market. Unfortunately, government action distorts the market. The decisions made by a small group of countries on issues ranging from promoting biofuels to restricting access to investment or production have a big impact. While some countries adopt policies exempting them from the shock of resources, the access to resources is uneven. Dialogue can help in finding better global solutions. Even though the world has learned the dangers of borrowing from neighbours in a trade strategy, echoes are still heard in cross-border investments. More and more barriers have to be considered by the industrialized countries when investing in emerging economies. The old barriers related to promoting stability and security still exist–and all this while emerging markets have been historically urged to reduce barriers for investments; in some cases it happens. Rajal states that global financial integration has increased the size of shocks whose subjects are the states themselves, especially in situations involving private capital. The size of the resources available to multilateral institutions like the IMF has not preserved peace over the size of the potential impacts and the needs of a broad emerging market (Rajan 2008, 40). Daniel Gros, Manager of the Centre for European Policy Studies says that "800 years of financial crises have taught us that another crisis will follow." He believes that within the G20 meetings, Europe must have two priorities: increasing the IMF’s independence, and finding a balance

24

Chapter One

between banks (acting transnationally) and the control authorities (acting nationally) (Gros 2008, 41). Regarding the first priority, Gros believes that the IMF must become more independent in order to be able to provide an early warning of the dangers that may arise on the financial markets, without taking political implications too much into account. Creating the Euro Area and the IMF representation could reduce the US right to veto in criticizing US policy. Gros's conclusions are clear: an integrated international banking market is not compatible with a national banking supervision, even if European policy-makers do not recognize this. European supervisory authorities will have to follow the same European rules to avoid a trap that may appear at the bottom. There should be an exchange of information on systemically important institutions, so that the risk can be perceived from the early stages (Gros 2008, 43). The same level of cooperation should be installed in the globally important banks. It is unlikely that this will be achieved worldwide, especially if it does not appear for the first time in Europe. Wendy Dobson draws some important conclusions in the preamble to the need for transformation of the international relations system: the first priority should be to consider reinstalling public confidence in the global economy and financial markets; formulating a general framework with new rules, but not new institutions and restructuring the IMF; stimulating the real economy and replacing G7 with G20 (because this forum is based on criteria of economic significance and location, which gives it legitimacy) (Dobson 2008, 53).

The Actors of the Contemporary International System Changes in the structure of the contemporary international system are distinct from changes in the system unit. Therefore, changes in polarity will determine changes in the way in which their security is realized. Significant changes occur when the number of great powers is reduced to two or one. Competition in a multipolar system is more complicated than in a bipolar one, because of the uncertainties about the comparative capabilities of states which multiply as their numbers increase, and because the estimates on cohesion and strong coalitions are difficult to create (Waltz 2000, 1). Within the international system, the political units are interconnected. Very important actors in the international system of the twentieth century were: the nation-states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational corporations (TNC), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

25

and actors-networks (Puúcaú 2007, 72). The role of state actors is to represent the population of a defined territory, to face threats to welfare, public security and sovereignty. Non-state actors aim to introduce certain topics on the international diplomatic agenda, such as raising citizens’ awareness of regional or global problems, and lobbying the Government or international organization to meet certain equity interests and direct action, including the use of force. Traditionally, power and authority are considered to belong to the states, but globalization calls this certainty into question (Higgott, Underhill and Bieler 2003, 1). Globalization is a complex process and its approach has two opposing views. Globalists consider globalization as evolving inevitably towards a world without borders and to "a global playground", in economic terms, where the global companies are key players. There is little or no place left for the role of states, which can only provide the infrastructure and public goods required by business. Some experts, who are advocates of this view, talk about a void in state authority or the withdrawal of state authority. These changes are called internationalization rather than globalization and are defined as dramatic increases in the flow of goods, services and capital across borders (Higgott, Underhill and Bieler 2003, 7). The cited authors are of the opinion that none of the two extreme views conceptualize the role of state and the non-state actors in the context of globalization. The state has strengthened its position in some areas, but it is clear that it has lost out in others. The role of the state was not diminished, but it has been changed. The state has been and continues to be restructured. Although the state retains a significant degree of importance, a wide range of non-state actors have larger capabilities for the structuring of global politics and the economy. Regarding the role of the state in international relations, John M. Hopson stated the existence of two major debates: the first, in which the postmodernist movement, critical theory, constructivism, feminism and Marxism are included, is centred on the fundamental role of the state. In the second category Neorealist theories are situated, which deny the central importance of the state in international relations (Hobson 2003, 15). Theories about the role of the state can be divided into two general categories: one category of normative theories, which take into account the most desirable or appropriate form of the state, and explanatory theories, which take into account those who control the state, the forces that shape it and its behaviour.

26

Chapter One

The first debate, published most clearly in the 1970s with the emergence of the interdependence theory, is concerned with the answer to the question of whether the states prevail regarding social forces or nonstate actors. Formulated in reverse, this debate concerns the degree of autonomy that states have from the non-state actors and social processes. One of the opinions is supported by neorealists, according to which state is the central actor in international politics. Another opinion belongs to liberals and pluralistic radicals, who believe that autonomy of the state is declining, as countries are influenced by (interdependent) economic processes and non-state actors (particularly MNCs). Specifically, they are against neorealist claims that the state is a rational actor which is coherent, autonomous and interested in security policy to the highest degree. In contrast, they believe that international interdependence will lead to a breakdown of states into distinct entities and that the states will prioritize economic policies and distribution, and ensure welfare and environmental protection before military security. Adherents to neorealism argue that the states' system turns a game of billiards into a spider’s web of economic transactions which cut through the porous borders of the nation-states and drop the "obsolete" theme of the sovereignty of states. There was also a counterpart to this theory, stipulating that the state continues to be interested in its autonomy and sovereignty (Hobson 2003, 18). In the 1980s there was a parallel and complementary debate to the first one (neo-Weberians), which argues that states have the greatest autonomy and primordiality in society, ultimately reaffirming the autonomy of social forces (Hobson 2003, 218). Following this trend, in the 1990s, advocates of this theory "of the state" affirmed that economic performance was not based on the ability of states to comply either with market principles (as liberals) or the needs of an economically prevailing class (Marxists), but rather it was maintaining a strong status or development of the state, with an infusion of autonomy and proactive measures (this theory was used to explain the success of the "east Asian tigers") (Hobson 2003, 219). In recent years there has been a change in the debate between "state centrism" and "centrism of society" towards a second debate of the "autonomy of the state and society", in seeking answers to the question "to what extent do states structure society and societies shape the states?”

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

27

Fig. 1-1: Configuring the state within the first debate (adapted from Hobson 2003, 218)

Hobson believes that the second debate centres on the power of the state as an agent, with its two sides: domestic and international. The first facet refers to what experts call the "institutional autonomy of the state." This power of the state as an agent is interpreted as an ability to develop domestic or foreign policy, but it is also power to shape domestic policy, regardless of the socio-structural internal demands, or the interests of nonstate actors. In international relations theory, this means that neorealism grants power to the state with the greatest autonomy or internal agent, while liberalism, Marxism, postmodernism and constructivism grant it the least power. The second facet, that of the international agent power of the state, refers to the ability of the state to elaborate foreign policy and to shape the international framework, free of international structural requirements or of the interests of non-state actors. At the extreme, this power is about the ability of states to logically alleviate inter-state competition and create a climate of peace and cooperation. This "international power of the state" should not be confused with the neorealist notion of "power of the state" or "state capacity", which refers to the ability of states to comply with international competition and the logic of "the structure of international politics" (Waltz) (Hobson 2003, 7).

Chapter One

28

Fig. 1-2: State configuration in the second debate (adapted from Hobson 2003, 6)

In high proportion

Reduced internal agent power of the state. States comply with the requirements of internal actors/non-state structures

Large internal agent power of the state. States are independent of the actors/nonstate structures

International agent power of the state.The power of the state to determine policies and shape international relations, free from structural international constraints

Moderate international agent power of the state. The power to determine policies and shape the international system, free from international constraints, but insufficient

In small proportion

In reduced proportion

Large international agent power of the state. The power to determine policies and to shape the international system is free of international constraints, as is the power to reduce interstate competition and/or logic of anarchy

Internal agent power of the state. The power of the state to determine policies and shape internal realities, free from internal structural constraints or interference of non-state actors

In high proportion

Without international agent power of the state. States do not have international agent power to determine policies and to shape the international system, without international constraints, states must comply passively to the structure of the international system

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

29

A special position on the interpretation of the role of states occurs in social theory of international politics, one of the most innovative contributions to the field of contemporary international relations. This theory is built starting from the argument that the manner in which the states perceive each other (and represent each other socially) has consequences for the relations between them. According to this constructivist theory, international interaction generates “cultures of anarchy”, differentiated by the degree to which different actors perceive themselves as enemies, rivals or friends. These roles help define the interests and capacities of states and generate certain trends in the international system. The constructivist perspective is shaped by Alexander Wendt and concerns the states and system of states (Wendt 2011, 33). According to this theory, the states are key players in the regulation of organized violence (one of the fundamental problems in international politics), and the structure of the system of states is relatively independent of other structures in the contemporary international system, such as the world economy. The author believes that states are real actors, to whom we can assign anthropomorphic qualities, such as desires, beliefs and intentionality. The first quality shows that an actor cannot be reduced to its parts, the state being an organizational actor, represented in a significant measure by the structure of state-society relations. When interacting, states do it as part of a state-society complex, which affects their behaviour, similarly to how the interaction between capitalists is affected by hiring workers; that does not mean states can be reduced to societies, such as capitalists cannot be reduced to the relationship with the workers. The second quality is that of "giving life" to this model of state by identifying intrinsic motivational inclinations or national interests. It is about identities and interests. There are four types of identities (corporate, "label"-type, role and collective) and two types of interests (objective and subjective). Each identity has associated needs or objective interests and the purpose assigned by actors constitutes subjective interests which motivate their actions. The national interest is constructed of objective interests of state-society type complexes, consisting of four needs: physical survival, autonomy, economic welfare and collective self-esteem. The interpretations that states give to these needs tend in the direction of self-interest, and this predisposes them to competitive policies, thus not meaning that states are inherently concerned with their own self-interest. The third quality shows that states are ontologically prior to the state system. The state is pre-social to other states in the in the manner in which the human body is pre-social.

30

Chapter One

These entities are constructed by self-organized internal structures, one social and another biological (Wendt 2011, 203). The role of non-state actors can be highlighted by different approaches to globalization (Wendt 2011, 211). There are two main categories of non-state actors. The first category comprises private corporations’ actors, who are divided into two categories: transnational corporations (TNC) and multinational corporations (MNC). While TNCs are struggling for a worldwide intra-firm division of the workforce, MNCs tend to replicate production in a number of regions to avoid the risk of trading blocs. A second category of non-state actors is composed of: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which play an important role in global growth, partly due to new technologies such as the Internet. Some NGOs, which are bigger and more active, refer to global social movements (GSMs) and the second category of NGOs is divided into two categories: privately-funded NGOs (present especially in the West) and state-funded NGOs (OGONG-GONGO–Governmentally Organised Non-Governmental Organisations), MANGO (Manipulated Non-Governmental Organisations) or GRINGO (Governmentally Initiated Regulated and Non-Governmental Organisations), present especially in Southeast Asia. Basically, the world can be investigated from the perspective of state authority of a wide range of non-state actors and the relationships between them. Globalization is, in fact, a technological and social revolution, progressing towards an integrated and globalized production structure, with a specialized, but interdependent labour market. This structure of production is supported by a pattern of transnational financial markets and monetary relations that provides key infrastructure investments, production and trade in goods and services. This approach belongs to the neo-liberal discourse, centred on deregulation and market liberalization, the dismantling of state functions, on the organization of production at a transnational scale and the emergence of global financial markets. Within this discourse, the transfer of authority from the state to the market is inevitable, but also beneficial. The new powerful actors in this discourse are the TNCs, which enjoy a prominent role in a globalized structure of the market and believe that the consumers, rather than the states, are representative of the civil society. Of course, this part of the speech that focused on the TNC is questionable. Some analysts believe that most companies are MNCs with an obvious national base (Hobson 2003, 222). Corporations in large countries especially value national foundations. Noguez exemplifies this by the failure of Ford Company’s global strategy in 1970, which followed a regional structure of production, especially in

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

31

Europe and North America (Noguez 2003, 174). But the vast majority of TNCs have strains in small countries like the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden. The question arises: would it not be easier for these companies to transnationalize production? Smaller markets, characterized by high production costs and low research capacity have imperatively led these companies to expand overseas when national trade had weakened and investment barriers had emerged. TNCs and MNCs undoubtedly play an important role in global economic governance. The increasing importance of these actors does not mean the decline of the state’s significance. The establishment of a private sector often involves negotiations between companies, governments and NGOs. Walter states that the structural strength of TNCs and MNCs, due to increased capital mobility, is overestimated (Walter 2003, 51). Important developing countries such as China, Indonesia and Brazil continue to receive FDI. Favourable economic prospects show there is TNC interest towards these countries, prompting them to comply with the conditions required. Taking as an example the manner in which industrial restructuring was done in Central Europe, TNC attempts to sidestep the principles of liberalization have shown that they are sources of authority in the global system, but that they share this authority with the states and other non-state actors (Lorentzen 2003, 193). Another approach on globalization takes into account the hegemony of American values: limited state apparatus, representative government and the liberal concept of freedom and choice. It is an approach that goes in the direction of international economic development. This view of globalization assumes a positive relationship between democracy and development and would be a moral failure if it did not follow this path. Leading international actors subscribe to this approach. First, the nongovernmental organizations (INGO), for example the World Bank and IMF, appear as driving forces trying to establish a form of American capitalist democracy in the former communist bloc countries, and in countries where there exists a variant of capitalism, as in East Asia. However, the dissemination of liberal capitalism continues to be challenged by the NGOs (Lorentzen 2003, 210). At one level, this battle can be described as a challenge to the old multilateralism, consisting of the interaction of states and the new multilateralism, which is trying to build a civil society and political authority at a global scale, even building a global system of governance. The strategies of these two types of multilateralism differ significantly. On the one hand, the INGOs are trying to increase their areas of influence geographically by attracting new members, and functionally by covering

32

Chapter One

more issues, while GSMs, on the other hand, promote a normative, politicized approach. Many GSMs consider that INGOs are tools to ensure US hegemony, or, at least, hegemony of the OECD in the global economic order. Through their interaction with INGOs, GSMs attempt to change the assumptions of this order and thus change political outcomes. They advocate transparency and call for responsible democracy at an international level. Although traditional multilateralism has not been replaced by the new multilateralism, changes in INGO practices have occurred because of the need to accommodate GSMs. Moreover, governments have become aware that the support for, or neutrality towards, GSMs is an important element for the development of international policies, as well as for the development and implementation of policies in the domestic context. Finally, international NGOs/GSMs can be driving forces that can strengthen the domestic NGOs’ capacities to transfer their policies abroad. Therefore, international NGOs support civil society projects within a state vis-a-vis their governments. In this respect, an important role lies with the think tanks (Stone 2003, 211), making possible the projection of government policy externally, but also internally (Stiles 2003, 32). A third approach of globalization is one in which the states continue to establish rules in the international economy, even if it is said that national sovereignty is eroded. This approach of globalization is part of the dialectical discourse of regionalization, where regionalism is seen as a way to keep capitalism within the global economy on the one hand, or even as a manifestation of globalization, on the other hand. Regionalization is part of the globalization phenomenon. In this regional approach, MNCs are important actors, like the states. They present the basic characteristic features and values of the country of origin and pursue a regional strategy, rather than a global one, which is evidence that the importance of MNCs does not mean the withdrawal of states. The last approach to globalization refers to the realist tradition of international relations theory, that globalization involves a change of political and economic relations between the former great powers at an international level, and between capital and the workforce on a national scale. This approach recognizes that the structural constraints of globalization are rooted in the agency and there is therefore enough room for the actors to initiate and change political outcomes, particularly in the area of redistribution between the beneficiaries and losers of globalization. By itself, this does not mean the end of the state. The approaches to globalization presented above, show that the distribution of authority and power is different between the actors. The

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

33

common feature of these approaches is that there are two distinct entities: the state and the market. Finally, we must remember that non-state actors are involved in the governance process which revolves around the states. The most obvious case is the associations of firms, whether domestic or transnational, or the inter-state negotiations. State policies are inconceivable without the powerful interests of these corporations. Markets are structured by the processes of state policy, often directly reflecting the preferences of the powerful corporate elites, which, in turn, find themselves in a process of inter-company competition (Underhill 1997). It is quite difficult to see the NGOs and INGOs or other types of nonstate actors as distinct actors related to states or state policy processes. Some NGOs have been created or encouraged by the state or by INGOs, which are extensions of the states, and the states' INGO policies are subject to their efforts and their reason to exist. The distinction between "state actors" and "non-state actors" is useful, but should be employed with caution and should be understood as an abstraction, not a representation of a more subtle reality.

Arguments for Restructuring the International System after the Cold War Changes in polarity have spread most rapidly in the contemporary international system, but have not yet transformed it: If the system were transformed, international politics wouldn’t any longer have been international politics and the past wouldn’t be used as a guide for the future. (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 2)

We should probably have used other terms such as "worldwide system" or "global system" or "worldwide politics" or "global politics", suggesting, for example, the emergence of a different type of relation between states, if we take security as a reference. What changes should appear in order to transform the international system? The most common answer is that the system transforms itself and that interdependencies strengthen its ties and the institutions pave the way for peace. One argument that supports the transformation of the contemporary international system is the limitation of the role of some international institutions. An edifying example is the changing role of NATO, which has not ended its activity since the end of the Cold War, but on the

34

Chapter One

contrary, has added new members and promises to expand even further. However, NATO's recent history illustrates the subordination of international institutions to national goals. Another argument for the transformation of the international system is the changing distribution of the national capabilities of states, which causes a continuous need for establishing equilibrium. The realist theory says that the original balance of power will reform, but it cannot make a clear prediction at this moment. This limitation in prediction is because the international system must deal with the pressure exercised by the structures upon the states and on the responses of the states to these pressures. One of the last challenges is related to the way in which governments respond to pressures exerted upon them and how they take advantage of opportunities when these are presented to them. At the end of the Cold War, the international system became unipolar. In light of structural theory, unipolarity is the least sustainable international configuration. The argument is related to two reasons: one is that dominant states have taken too many tasks beyond their own borders, thus weakening themselves in the long-term and the second reason is related to the fact that despite the moderate restrained and tolerant behaviour of the dominant force, weak states will worry about the future behaviour of dominating states. Imbalance in the international system has enhanced the consolidation of the power of some states and alliances with others, to restore the international state of equilibrium. Another argument for the transformation of the international system is the fact that international politics has been centred for two centuries in Europe (Harrison 2004, 112). The two world wars have ended European dominance. The return to this dominance still remains a cause for speculation. The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity did not occur in Europe, but in Asia. International development and the external responses of China and Japan show the growth of these countries to the level of great powers. China has become a major power without too much endeavour, and will remain so for a long time, provided it remains politically united and competent. Unlike China, Japan is still reluctant to assume the status of a great power. The country's economic growth since 1990 is placing it at the centre of regional and global affairs. The large volume of this country’s business outside its borders further accentuates its global role. In a system dominated by its own aid, the possession of most abilities, but not of all the capabilities of a great power, leaves a state’s vulnerabilities to other states, which have the tools of the less powerful states.

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

35

The theory of balancing the power of states is based on the states’ desire for survival, and of continuing that certain state’s autonomy (Harrison 2004, 115). Alignment is a much more common behaviour of states than balancing which tends to become a fad. Whether or not states align faster than they balance is a question that seeks an answer. An affirmative answer to this question will lead to a rejection of the theory of the balance of power. States try out many strategies for survival. The search for balance is one of them, as well as alignment. Uncertainties in international politics and internal pressures have caused states to make dangerous choices. Many countries have insufficient resources for balancing and thus have little space to manoeuvre. Equilibrium theory does not predict uniformity of state behaviour, but rather a major trend of the states at the system level, at the regional level. It is not surprising that states are trying different strategies for survival. Structural changes affect the behaviour of states and the results which these interactions will produce. This does not make a crucial break in the continuity of the international system. The transformation of the international system could achieve this. However, this transformation of the international system is waiting for the day when it will not be populated with countries that will not be able to help themselves. If this would occur, then we should answer the question about who could rely on the help for the disadvantaged or endangered. The perennial uncertainty of the states related to their future leads them to make decisions based on relative gains rather than absolute ones. Without this shadow, the leaders of states will no longer have to wonder what they will do tomorrow, or if tomorrow will be like today. States should combine their efforts and work together, without having to worry about how they would charge each other. Taking as references the main theories of international relations, the post-Cold War period has been a historical context for testing and redefining them (Harrison 2004, 120): for structuralism and neorealism this period has meant a major change in the global balance of power; for institutionalism, patterns of economic and institutional interdependence range across key strategic areas; in the line of liberalism, a common core of liberal democracies dominate the emerging international system for the first time in history. The ambivalence of the significance of the Cold War has raised many doubts and consecutive difficulties. There have been several attempts to address the conceptual change which occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union and to use the resulting framework for the analysis of emerging trends in the international system. By directly confronting the

36

Chapter One

issues related to the end of the Cold War and the theories that dominated international relations in the post-Cold War period, there appears to be a need for a reconceptualization of the international system from the previously-mentioned period. It is about a new understanding of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism and an evaluation of their predictions for a new synthesis of their intrinsic meanings. This new synthesis integrates the collapse of the Soviet Union into a holistic concept of historical trends in the international system and generates a broader research agenda on the nature of the post-Cold War order, produced by the debate between neorealists and institutionalists (Harrison 2004, 125). The collapse of the Soviet Union had implications for the systemic approaches to international relations and established the implications of liberal theory on the research to come about the post-Cold War period. The intimation of the nature of change in the international post-Cold War system must be kept in mind. Mark Neufeld believes that the change of authority from state towards the market will be the biggest change that will happen in the international political economy (Neufeld 1996, 43). It will be felt most prominently in the fields of production, trade, investment and finance, and will have the greatest impact on the daily lives of citizens. One of the biggest structural changes will occur due to the increased power and influence of the MNCs and TNCs and of networks which they have built. Referring to Europe and the changes that will occur at this level, Mearsheimer considers that the prediction is certainly multipolarity, some countries (Germany, France, Britain and perhaps Italy) will each assume the status of a great power and the distribution of power and nuclear weapons between states is uncertain (Mearsheimer 1990).

Concepts and Theories Regarding the Restructuring of the Contemporary International System In a world of growing interdependence [...] if the country with the highest power fails to lead, the consequences for international stability will be disastrous. (Nye, 1990, 153)

So wrote Nye in 1990, referring to the period immediately following the Cold War. Throughout history, anxiety about decline and changing the balance of power has always been present and accompanied by tensions and miscalculations. Since then, policy-makers and analysts have spoken of the possibility of restoring multipolarity in the international system of the twenty-first century, and this has proved to be true. The system crisis

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

37

of today, generated by an economic and financial crisis, by globalization, and the influence of emerging economies, determines a new direction and outlook on the concepts and methods that will transform the contemporary international system. Modernization, urbanization and communication expansion have redirected power distribution from governments to private actors. Military power is exercised with more difficulty today, when social movements have awakened the consciousness of nationalism in the poor and less powerful countries. Another trend in the distribution of power is linked to the spreading of modern technology which has increased the ability of states which are further behind. In addition, many countries have managed to increase their military options related to nuclear weapons, and this may include Argentina and Brazil as well. Military capabilities will add regional power to the respective states and will increase the costs of regional intervention for the great powers. This is a general problem, in which states try to control non-state actors. The solution to many transnational problems is collective action and international cooperation (Nye, 1990, 160). The new power resources, such as the ability to use communication effectively and the development and multilateral use of institutions, are now much higher. Cooperation will be required for smaller states, which are unable to cope with internal problems such as drugs, health and environmental degradation. The nature of international politics highlights the importance of intangible forms of power; and national cohesion, world culture and international institutions have a special significance. Nye spoke of the power switch from "capital" to "information", but the ability to respond quickly is the "critical power" and this is true not only in the field of information but also of services, especially finance, insurance and transportation (Nye, 1990, 161). Intangible changes in the balance of power have an effect on military power, but also on their interdependencies. But one of the concepts introduced by Professor Nye, which will lead to the restructuring of the contemporary international system is that of "soft power" (Nye, 1990, 162). The trends described above highlight the change in the traditional exercise of power. A state may get what it wants today because other countries want to follow it, or because they have agreed to a situation which produces those effects. Basically, setting an agenda and structuring situations in global politics will cause changes for the others, in particular cases. This aspect of power–to make other countries want what another state wants–is called "soft power". This

38

Chapter One

power is just as important as the traditional one ("hard power"). If a state legitimates its power in front of other states, it will encounter less resistance in getting what it wants. This power and its sources (cultural attraction, ideology and institutions), although not new, will exert an evergrowing influence in the restructuring of the contemporary international system. In 2006, Professor Nye launched a new concept of "smart power" which was defined as "the ability to combine hard and soft power into a winning strategy" (Nye, 2006). Chester Crocker believes that smart power involves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity-building and the design of power and influence in order to have an optimum costeffectiveness ratio, but also political and social legitimacy (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2007, 13). Remaining in the sphere of the conceptual, Buzan clarifies the concept of "international society", as compared with the "international system" (Buzan 1993, 327). One of the approaches this concept refers to is the fictional status of the states, which are considered merely as "imaginary communities", based on the strength and willingness of people to believe in them. This perspective is a normative one and offers two answers to the question of the motivation someone would have to adhere to for such an approach in international relations (Buzan 1993, 230). The first answer is connected to the fact that it works well as an empirical tool. This is the situation where the concept of society fits the observed data and provides a way of understanding which is not available to other alternative concepts. The second answer is more political: it refers to promoting the concept based on the manner of understanding international relations, which will have practical benefits regarding how states relate to one another. Another approach defines international society as a group of countries which do not necessarily form a system, the behaviour of one state being an essential factor in the calculations which other countries make, but they establish the dialogue, the rules and the common institutions in conducting their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements (Buzan 1993, 233). By this definition it is clear that the system and the society are two distinct entities, avoiding the confusion between the system (as parts which interact) and the society (as selfawareness and self-regulation). Buzan draws attention to the difference between the "international society" and the "global society". While the concept of "international society" refers to the nature of the relations between states, the concept of "global society" refers to a holistic approach to individuals, non-state organizations and global population and focuses on the global society

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

39

identity and the overall arrangements (Buzan 1993, 236). The international and global society can refer to the entire global system, but may also relate to subsystem phenomena (Europe, Islam and ancient Greece). Therefore it is possible to have a co-existence of the international and global society, or to have a part of the system which is an international society, while other parts are not. Continuing the explanation of the involvement of the term "society", Baker and Chandler believe that the global civil society is the outline of the future global political order, in which states no longer have a seat of sovereignty, a status set by a specific treaty and subsequently exported across the globe (Baker and Chandler 2005, 20). For many experts, the global civil society changes our approach on sovereignty, as new expressions of the non-state political community and the lack of boundaries challenge territorial sovereignty as an exclusive foundation of political community and identity. This challenging of the system is increasing, as it promises a reconstruction and reimagining of the political world. Whether we are talking in terms of the democratization of global governance institutions, or the dissemination of human rights around the globe, or the emergence of a global citizenship, in a global public sphere, global civil society is understood as a source providing the necessities for these changes (Baker and Chandler 2005, 53). Transnational civic actions may be at the basis of the current international system transformation. Optimism about the power of transformation of the international system by global civil society is rooted in the view that nation-states, which have a central position in the international order were set aside by the new international actors, which are ever more powerful, some of them operating "from above", through new forms of global governance, and other "from below" being witnesses to the action of non-state actors and networks which operate internationally. The limits of sovereignty, which formerly were clearly structuring the world of politics, are no longer as current. As a result, although states are necessary for understanding the mechanisms that shape the international system in the twenty-first century, they are far from being sufficient for this understanding. It is clear that there is a new important actor, an actor whose shape and contours are not yet clear and are still disputed, but whose existence is obvious: the global civil society. Talking about the restructuring of Europe, in the dynamic context of contemporary international system transformation, Stefano Bartolini presents a theory of political structure within the changing conditions of territorial boundaries’ delimitations (Bartolini 2005, 53). The author has

Chapter One

40

established a correlation between micro-individual choices and the corresponding systemic processes: Individuals The choice of the individual actor to extract himself Cultural and solidarity ties of the individual actor lead to the increase of the exit costs Individual inclinations political commitment

Exit Loyalty

Voice

Key-concepts Formation of the centre Building the system

Political structuring

Systemic processes Control of system boundary transcendence Maintenance of systems and system processes through collective identity, solidarity ties and institutions, participation rights Within the structuring of the channels and the organizations of the system for political representation

Table 1-1: The micro-macro concept framework (adapted from Bartolini 2005, 54) The decision to exit the system is an individual one, which can be actively induced, or may be charged at different costs, depending on the boundaries which have been set. Therefore, the ability to control the transcendence of the system boundaries corresponds, at a systemic level, to the individual output choices. This ability is labelled as the "formation of the centre". Individual loyalty represents the psychological and emotional connection which mediates between voice and exit, thus raising the costs of the trainer. At the systemic level, this corresponds to maintaining the system and its processes through collective identities, solidarity ties and institutions and participation rights and it receives the label of "training the system" which is different from "training of the centre." The voice is the individual inclination for political engagement. At the systemic level, it requires the structuring of channels and organizations of the system for political representation and represents the political structuring of the form of governance. In short, individual outputs, loyalty and voice features correspond to the macro features of the "training centre", "building system" and "political structuring". The author believes that this framework can be applied to various political territorial formations. Nation-states are specific configurations of this framework. This framework can be applied to formations other than nation states, namely the pre-nation states and post-nation states. The exemplification of this framework on the restructuring of Europe by the formation of the European Union is also very interesting:

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

41

Figure 1-3: Analytical triangles of the political structure of nation-states (after Bartolini 2005, 113) Formation of the centre

Internal hierarchy Control of exit options

Building the system (loyalties and solidarity)

Building external limits National identity (area of cultural equality) Social division(social equality area)

Internal political structuring

Political participation (political equality area)

Cleavage of systems (differentiation of ideological systems)

Interest of intermediate systems (differences of corporative interests)

Relations between centre and periphery (differentiation of territorial interests)

42

Chapter One

Another concept which may result in restructuring within the field of international relations is that of "temporal dynamics" (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, 85). A hegemonic global policy of comparisons replicates the reflexes of a double movement: the difference is unconsciously treated with disorder, fear, suspicion and condescension. Fortunately, the recessive voices of modernization theory can be used in the present. While not denying human communality, the idea of a general arrangement of human efforts is not rejected. The author advocates the cultivation of an ethnological model of comparison, where the primary position is used as a benchmark for its own criticism. The power of diversity is a new concept which calls for the analysis of the space between us to value the common existence. Along with this new concept a new mixed model is proposed which can be applied for the assessment and resizing of the global political space. Cultural and political practices that we have used are heterogeneous and complex. We reject the temptation to embrace the usual options: a world of national particularism, a world of cosmopolitan principles, or a global governance. The author believes that it would be preferable to entertain the option that leads to a new arrangement of global space and mixed models that recognize and protect the difference (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, 90). It is about reimagining a world in which different forms of the mixed model coexist. It is not about an international society, nor a global cosmopolis. Blaney and Inayatullah imagine a new global space in which heterogeneous social processes (global, regional and local) and political arrangements perform, involving various ways of delimiting the authority negotiated separately, overlapped or jointly (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, 98). A new theory that can support the restructuring of the contemporary international system is the modern theory of systems that Mathias Albert speaks about, inspired by Luhmann's sociological theories (Albert and Hilkermeier 2004, 1). This theory is built around the concept of "global society", which is not seen by Luhmann as an emergent contemporary phenomenon, but as something whose existence cannot be denied if the society is seen as consisting of communication, and communication is seen in light of the possibility of interconnection with all the means at its disposal. This sociological theory is useful for international relations in trying to find an adequate vocabulary for this discipline, which in describing the overall societal context, cannot be reduced to the international system. The Modern Theory of Systems will have the following basic concepts: power, sovereignty, governance and war (Albert and Hilkermeier 2004, 5).

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

43

Rational theory provides another approach to the restructuring of the contemporary international system, starting from a strategic, rational approach of choice (Glaser 2010, 149). Today, we must take into account the perspective of a state that must face an international environment, which presents constraints and opportunities. The international environment is considered to be anarchic, i.e. it does not have any authority to strengthen international agreements and prevent the use of force. The state is considered to be a rational actor; it makes decisions in its own interests, taking into account constraints and international opportunities. The theory analyzes the strategy which a state should choose, closely resembling the rational man theory. This theory-project, of neorealist-structural-realist orientation, as the author himself states–incorporates major rationalist assumptions or revolutionary mechanisms which select and remove states that behave irrationally. This theory will be useful in the future, because it can tell us what it is that a state can do best (e.g. security), and when it must take into account the constraints and opportunities imposed by the international system. In other words, understanding the impact of the international system on the behaviour of a state requires rational theory, even if the states do not always act within the line of its constraints. The new theory of war and regional peace offers the opportunity of filling the gaps in the existing literature, as considered by its author, Benjamin Miller (2007, 52). This theory takes into account the source of conflict and cooperation among the great powers. Even if the great powers exercise significant effects on regional affairs, they do not provide the only answer to the big differences between regions, with reference to war and peace. Therefore, three challenges are taken into account: 1.

2.

Defining the general type of effects which the great powers have on regional war and peace by comparing the effects of regional and domestic factors. Thus, the idea that, instead of using the simple dichotomy of war and peace, we should introduce the following terminology: situations of war and peace, "cold" or "warm" peace: the great powers have effects on the"cold" outputs and regional factors and the internal effects on the results of "hot"outputs. What are the regional and internal key-factors that provide the strongest explanation of the variations in the situations of war and peace between regions and the transition of regions from war to peace and vice versa?

Chapter One

44

3.

Research carried out by Miller, who buttresses his theory, led to the idea that terms such as "state", "nation" and, in particular, the balance between them, deserve increased attention in the context of contemporary international relations (Miller 2007, 78). These concepts are essential for understanding regional, civil and interstate wars and violent incidents.

The power cycle theory developed by Doran explains why the structural crisis of the international system can be understood by examining how states have become a hegemonic threat (Doran 1991, 3). What are the factors or conditions that led to the rising of one state above the others and thus to aspire to hegemony? The answer came by following the evolution of France during three centuries: …the relative capacity of a state within a system increases when its absolute growth rate is greater than the absolute rate of growth of the entire system (systemic standard). (Doran 1991, 4)

Analysis conducted by the author shows that changes in the relative power of a state within the system and the change of the system structure are just two aspects of a single dynamic. Moreover, the changes of a state over time reveal its growth and decline within the system, its power cycle or the role capacity. Once the process of growth and decline of a state has been recognized as a process assigned to a systemic analysis, the dynamics can be fully explained and the impact of the change in the system structure on the behaviour of the state can be assessed. Thus the emergence of critical moments in the international political development of a state, when it experiments with a new vision on security and the role of foreign policy appears natural and easy to deduct, as if it were inductively derived from the study of history. The presence of these theories and concepts in the field of international relations represents the signal for the need to convert the contemporary international system and the intense concerns of specialists in this field towards this transformation.

Current Status of the Restructuring of the International System The contemporary international system has waited for over two decades to be restructured and its concepts reconsidered. The end of the Cold War could not stop the international crisis. On the contrary, some old

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

45

concepts have been reactivated and some new concepts have begun to emerge stronger, Europe included. Some strategic regions of the world have increased their importance and the balance of global power was always present when important decisions were made in international politics. This "traditional" behaviour of important actors in the international system after the Cold War explains the slow rhythm and sometimes the withdrawal from the main transformations of the system. The last two decades have shown that the phenomenon of transformation and the processes in the international system could not be stopped. In this international context, when impulses directed towards globalization press for quality and major changes in the contemporary international system, global interdependence is manifested not only in the economic area, but also in the political, social, cultural and communication areas. The generation of more and more benefits and regional and global interdependence produces more vulnerabilities. Therefore, the management of global interdependence is a "necessary way for equilibrium and for the international public goods so much desired by people" (Puúcaú, 2010, 54). The contemporary international system can be considered to be a complex network of units which are involved in a variety of interactions, transactions and communications. To see these interactions as power relations (balance of power), the cooperative and integrative potential transactions and communication need to be observed (Puúcaú, 2010, 25). Professor Puúcaú agrees with Modelski (2008) when he considers that globalization and interdependence are not accessories of the international economic and financial crisis, but are instead products of historical evolution (Modelski 2008). The redistribution of power accentuates the problem of anarchy in the contemporary international system. An interesting approach belongs to Grevi (2009), who sees the interaction between the redistribution of power and increasing interdependencies and says that this leads to an asymmetric allocation of various goods (Grevi 2009, 28). In this context, the author suggests a transition to an international interpolar system, specific to the years of interdependencies. The long transition towards a new international system facilitates the condition of the current international economic crisis. At the same time, the current economic crisis has accelerated the process of change and transition towards the interpolar international system (Grevi 2009, 33).

Chapter One

46

Fig. 1-4: The asymmetric nature of interdependencies (according to Nye 2003, apud Puúcaú 2010, 39) Sensitive interdepen dence States A and B

Interconnectivity

Global communication, trade and environmental effects

Interdependency

Short-term power

Asymmetry

Vulnerable interdependencies

More long-term power

The post-crisis world should be different, and the New World will have to consider the management of global interdependencies (Grevi 2009, 40). The last fifty years have been a remarkable period in world history. Not only have we experienced an unprecedented technological and economic development, but an increasing number of poor countries have participated in this progress. The current crisis predicts a new era, one that may be less favourable to growth in poor countries. It is too early to know in the long-term how much time would have to pass in order to achieve financial stability in advanced countries. But even if the worst part of the crisis has passed, we will enter a period where global trade will increase slightly, external finance will be cut and the appetite of the United States and other rich countries for managing current account balances will be reduced significantly (Rodrik 2008, 125). The great international crisis after 1989, including "9/11" has signalled the need for change in the international system. The financial and economic crisis which started in 2007 due to system changes that were so necessary, did not match the pace and direction of global development. It was still the international financial crisis which has highlighted the role of global interdependencies, which were sometimes blamed for the intensity and extent of the crisis (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2010, 19). The complexity of the institutional dynamics of the international system in the post-Cold War period highlights the finding that emerging order can be regarded as a distinct hybrid that reflects an aggregate composite of different trends (Buzan 1993, 327; Wendt 2011, 115). This has increased the prospect for peaceful global change and works for an

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

47

equal rights structure on the distribution of tasks and responsibilities within the emerging international order. The observed general trend is associated with a complex mixture of continuity and change, which has major abnormalities to predict the neorealist and institutionalist theories. By contrast, it is comparable with the rates of the behaviour associated with the liberal model (Harrison 2004, 112). The end of the Cold War, marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, has generated the conditions for restructuring the international system. This was the end of a power structure where the international system was divided between the US and the Soviet Union. The removal of the wall between East and West Berlin was the signal for the reunification of Germany, and the fall of The Iron Curtain. Since then, the international system has been in a continuous process of change: from a multilateral system with multiple poles of power into a globalized world which includes a new network system characterized by the diffusion of power, multiple actors, new forms of interaction, complex interdependencies and a change of power. Historical facts from the last two decades have shown that people of the state and international organizations were not prepared to consider a new vision and new perspectives on the development of the international system. Therefore, the current international system has evolved from an extended period of transition to one driven by circumstances and learning through action. Due to globalization, new problems and global issues arose: climate change, energy security, migration, terrorism, and a new dimension of global competition. Our contemporary world can be imagined as a fast web system, typified by an increasingly interdependent network. This network is complex, with multiple connections and links between actors: states, NGOs, TNCs, IGOs and INGOs. These international actors exercise authority and engage in political action beyond state borders: an increased extensive communication and affiliation network, linking people from different societies, even if they do not belong to the same formal organizations. These new forms of interaction have materialized through different channels. States do not monopolize these contacts. There are many formal and informal connections, not only among government officials at different levels, but also between transnational organizations, non-governmental organizations and individuals. By looking at these facts, it becomes increasingly clear that state institutions and governments in an increasingly interdependent world are less able to cope with key issues, as some of them have acquired an important international dimension. Consequently, we can mention two basic characteristics that have re-

48

Chapter One

formatted the contemporary international system: the dynamics of power distribution and the deepening of global interdependence (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2010, 93). Since the end of the Cold War, in many different places in the world, experts have established new centres for the study of "global governance." This phrase can be an alternative to the state system, something different from global governance. The novelty of this phrase is represented by the ways of managing the economy and society, which are different from what has been achieved so far by individual states. Foundations have provided the necessary resources for the research of "global governance"–often without a clear idea of the true meaning. New journals and conferences with similar titles have proliferated. At the same time, there was a revival of interest from the policy-makers and academics towards the possibilities of reforming existing international organizations, from the United Nations to the International Monetary Fund. There was intense political rhetoric, with many examples of how existing organizations can be reformed and made to work more efficiently, with a more inspired vision for a better future for society and the global economy (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2010, 94). But nothing has changed fundamentally. Realists inside and outside government, universities and the media have received confirmation of their skepticism about the preparation of states to confer real authority and independent legitimacy of inter-governmental committees. They remained cynical towards the potential contribution of government organizations for the improvement of the human condition. Liberal internationalists share optimism and hope by appealing to reason. Rational choice, supported by game theory, is used to explain the increased contact between state bureaucracies. The obstructive intervention of the same bureaucracies can be explained when their exclusive powers and privileges are endangered. Empirical evidence suggests that the strengths of inter-governmental conferences and of the secretaries take into consideration three significant areas of state policies (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2010, 95). One area relates to the right to use the armed forces or not. The second is related to the right to tax and secure a loan. The third area relates to the power to determine what is legal and what is criminal. Since state governments are constituents of inter-governmental organizations, the insertion of the research results into the global governance and institutional reforms will not be questioned. Starting from a state-centred assumption, the obstructions raised by the states against radical institutional reform cannot be overcome. Conventional theories of international relations offer unsatisfactory answers. Realist structuralists perceive change only in terms of relations

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

49

between states. Therefore, in the contemporary international system a bipolar or multipolar balance may occur between the most powerful states (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2010, 95). Or it might conceivably be an unbalanced structure or a hegemonic structure of the power of the state, either regionally or globally, in which case the structure of the world system may belong to one or more blocks, each dominating in a certain region. A better answer to the question "Who or what is responsible for the change?" is directed towards three perspectives: technology, markets and policies. But policies should involve governments more than politicians. These are important because the choices in technology and the changes in markets may be affected by decisions or non-decisions of governments. But policy also refers to the actions and decisions of all those in search of support from others in order to achieve their goals. Finally, the actions and decisions taken by corporate strategists should be included as they respond to the changing markets and the technologies affected by luck and chance in life for the companies and their prospects of survival against competitors. Their political decisions will shape the course and development of the production of goods and services and, therefore, international trade and transnational investment (Hix 2005, 34). The current international crisis underlines the role of cooperation among global actors (states and non-states). We are able to understand just how institutionalized cooperation (global governance) is important. Neoliberal institutionalists are very active in arguing the conditions and methods by which world politics is institutionalized (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2010, 50). Most of the post-Cold War institutions were created under the pressure of reform. They have been heavily criticized for failing to perform. Neoliberal institutionalists tend to see interdependence as the defining structure of the international system. Transgovernmental relations are necessary but not sufficient in a world of complex interdependencies. Private sector and NGO involvement in global governance can lead to successful global cooperation (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2010, 51). The new world order in Slaughter's vision describes a system of global governance that institutionalizes cooperation and contains conflicts, so that all nations can reach peace and prosperity, improve the management of capital and meet the minimum standards of human dignity (Slaughter 2004, 15). The concept of the New World Order was used to refer to George W. Bush's vision of the post-Cold War world, towards the post September 11, 2001 world. The term is used by the previously-mentioned author for the conceptual delimitation of the infrastructure of the world order–an order based on the three dimensions of state institutions. The vision of the new world order includes horizontal and vertical networks,

Chapter One

50

networks for the collection and sharing of information, political coordination, strengthening cooperation, technical assistance and training. They may be bilateral, plurilateral, regional or global. Taken together, they will provide the skeleton or infrastructure for global governance. By contrast, in a world of government networks the same officials that judge established rules and laws are those representing national interests abroad. From this perspective global governance is not an issue which concerns the rules set by the states, but the manner of addressing and resolving problems that arise when citizens act globally–from murder to trade and civic engagement. Even when supranational officials take part in government vertical networks, they need to work closely with national parties and must capitalize on national power in order to be effective. Many experts and commentators have identified various pieces of this infrastructure. For example, financial regulations become customary for describing the new international financial architecture as a combination of G7, G8 and G20 networks with traditional institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (Slaughter 2004, 20). EU analysts are familiar with the concept of a "regulatory network"; different regional and political organizations have adopted this form of organization. Besides the European Union, both APEC and the Nordic System are essential "network of networks", organizations composed of networks of national ministries and parliamentary bodies. According to these views, the main features of the new world order model are (Slaughter 2004, 25): ¾ ¾ ¾

¾

¾

The state is not the only actor in the international system, but it is still the most important actor; The state does not disappear, but manifests itself through component institutions which interact increasingly with partners situated outside the borders; These institutions represent different national interests, even if they admit common professional identity and substantial experience, for instance judges, regulators, ministers and legislators; Different states have evolved and will continue to evolve towards mechanisms for the re-aggregation of the distinct interests of their institutions, when necessary. In many circumstances, states will interact as unitary actors in traditional ways; Governmental networks are in accordance with international organizations.

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

51

An interesting analysis of the international system is put forth by Ewan Harrison, who divides the post-Cold War period into two sub-periods: the 1989-1999 decade and post-1999 decade (Harrison 2004, 114). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has generated major opportunities but also relevant issues for the study of international politics. The post-Cold War transition period presents a historical context for testing and redefining international relations’ theories. Preconditions are present for each of the three dominant perspectives of the emerging international order. In line with the neorealist approach, the end of the Cold War has brought major changes in the global balance of power. In line with institutionalism, patterns of economic institutional interdependence vary in key strategic regions. In line with liberalism, a stable group of liberal democracies dominates the emerging international system for the first time in history. There are indicators of major discontinuities in the overall pattern of institutionalized powers, especially in the first decade of the post-Cold War period (Harrison 2004, 120). They are pressuring the United States to reduce military involvement in Europe and East Asia, which began immediately after the Cold War. There are also pressures on the secondary states in these regions in order to update their contributions to multilateral security and economic institutions and to exercise their influence on a more autonomous basis than in the past (Harrison 2004, 121). These discontinuities pose as anomalies for the institutionalist predictions about continuity in the post-1945 structure of multilateral post-Cold War agreements. However, they do not fit well with neorealist assumptions. While elements of competition between the positions of the major powers are present in the emerging international order, the dominant trend now appears to be aimed at a qualitative change in the density and structure of the multilateral relations between the great powers (Harrison 2004, 125). This can be seen in two trends. First, the patterns of change in the relations between the major powers have been peaceful: this was the global situation. This happened not only in Western Europe but, critically, this tendency also developed in East Asia. Therefore, the purpose of pacification in the relations between the great powers in the international system has a global geographic expansion, operating in all strategic areas that are serious candidates for the state of polarity. Secondly, there is a general trend towards increasing the equality of status among the major powers of the multilateral institutions. The United States is encouraged to decrease commitments in key strategic regions and to renegotiate other multilateral frameworks between major powers (Harrison 2004, 129). This will lead to a change in the structure of accountability arrangements

52

Chapter One

between the great powers, which will affect the diplomacy of economic and security-related issues. Indeed, the equalization of rights and responsibilities in the security arena facilitates a parallel shift in the economic arena because of the dependency adopted by the American military hegemony (Harrison 2004, 128). Therefore, the quality or the type of institutionalization within the international system is increasingly symmetrical. Together, these two trends combine to highlight the way in which the anomalies for neorealism and institutionalism are consistent with the predictions made by liberal theory. From the point of view of foreign policy adjustments we observe that in the first decade of post-Cold War transition, the international system has achieved reflexivity, which opens up a set of questions about the nature of knowledge (Harrison 2004, 129). There was much talk on the fact that the assimilation of reflexivity is associated with a change in the trajectory of socialization within the international system, located outside the balance of power and oriented towards peace. This behavioural trend was identified and measured in relation to a pre-defined set of empirical criteria. Therefore, a set of social scientific hypotheses was tested, as reflecting a plausible assessment of the empirical properties of the international system after the Cold War. The conclusion that the system has reached reflexivity also involves the finding that a descriptive and explanatory approach cannot adequately capture the most distinctive historical feature. Since 1999, the international system has been shaken by a series of major global crises. The attacks launched on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 were quickly followed by military campaigns directed at changing regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. These developments have inevitable consequences for the analysis of the emerging international order and, therefore, it is appropriate to reflect on their significance for the nature of post-Cold War international change. If the hegemonic alignment proves unsustainable, an alternative and a more optimistic scenario for the future may be offered by the institutionalist theory (Keohane 2002, 2). The logic of institutionalist arguments tends to indicate that the risk of hegemonic decline and overstretching, which is intrinsic to the unipolar status of the United States of America, encourages a reliance on multilateralism. In order to deal effectively with terrorist activities, the United States need to cooperate with others on a range of issues connected with policies located at the basic level, such as immigration, policing and obtaining a consensus on agreement information. In the case of unilateralism and preventive interventions, institutionalists can identify long-term implications for the United States associated with consistent behaviour. These actions can

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

53

cause the "boomerang effect" whereby the United States is encouraged to return to multilateral channels and tools to reach its goals, or to establish precedents which will be expensive. Therefore, "the shadow of the future" may emerge in which hegemony, as a long-term initiative, is replaced by the restriction of behaviour so that it may encourage and require reciprocity from others in the future. Johnson remains sceptical about the prospects for a stable international order in the early years of the twenty-first century which will be characterized, in his view, by a reaction against the American imperial presence. In this respect, there is a difference in emphasis from the script for a liberal international and quiet order, centred on peace (Johnson 2000, 15). An interesting approach to the post-Cold War period and the restructuring of the international system belongs to Dorman (1991, 22). The author characterizes the contemporary international system through four categories of assumptions: (1) the power cycle theory (to change the structure of the system), (2) the theory on the causes of war, (3) the theoretical evaluation of the system transformation crisis, and (4) the new concept of international political equilibrium. The key characteristics identified by the author are: ¾

¾ ¾ ¾

¾ ¾

The United States will exceed its peak of relative national capability. In terms of an economic growth rate, the top part of the US power cycle will be flat, postponing the significant decline of the twenty-first century. Slow economic growth will exacerbate the decline; In a completely transformed system, Russia is going through crucial times. The system will have to absorb the shock of rapid decline; Japan may move up through the higher point, in a completely transformed system. It will influence the way in which the US will handle foreign policy; Considering its rapid development, China can reach the first inflexion point for the entire duration of the system transformation. Not many estimates can be made of the relative national capacity; The European Union is focused on deepening economic cohesion and political integration. Community leaders can form a new political union anytime; Important changes occur in the emerging economies, repositioning the balance of power of the leading states.

54

Chapter One

In the contemporary international system changes occur faster than in previous centuries, the systems have less durability and the decentralized nature of each international system remains a precondition for the acceptability of the constituent units: the nation-states. The function of the system’s transformation in contemporary terms is expressed as follows: (1) the central system should be extended to include new members, (2) as the relative power of the individual states changes, so does the purpose, interest and role of the state (3) a new balance of power and role between the main governing units will emerge so that stability is preserved (Dorman 1991, 56). The dramatic and unexpected nature of the changes which occurred in the international system after 1989, have opened up fundamental questions about the trajectory of the international system. In a relatively short period, the structure of superpowers has disintegrated. After a period of uncertainty, the outline of a new international order became clearer. Shaping trends lead us to believe that the international system is in a historical process of transformation. Under these circumstances, critical assessments focus on the historical significance of this process. The speed of change will depend very much on the extent to which key players are in tune with the emerging trends and how well they will be able to incorporate knowledge into their strategies. Thinking differently about international relations after the Cold War will contribute to their playing an important facilitator role in the historical transition which occurs in the emerging international order. The post-Cold War period is similar to other post-war periods: it will become sui generis, it is already becoming a period which belongs to itself. Each day that passes defines it more closely and in relationship to what it is, rather than what preceded it. In the same way in which the world after the Second World War was a "new world", which brought political, economic and cultural renewal, and not a world "which cared for the wounds of war", the post-Cold War period will produce new values (Dorman 1991, 58). This period, built on new values and new relationships, can be called, the "world of time" (Laïdi 2005, 146). The international system which referred only to the world of states was replaced by a global, restructured system of states, the forces of change for the economic interdependences and the interpenetration flows between companies. The idea of a new world order deeply changes its meaning. Now it is no longer the case of constructing a stable architecture of world relations, capable of lasting for "thousands of years", but of the regulatory processes that are constantly in motion or constantly in transition. Therefore, the failure of the new world order must be considered as a

Evolutions in the International System after the Cold War

55

historical misunderstanding. Perhaps there will never be a new world order. On the other hand, we must not desperately expedite for a new global social system. The years of the post-Cold War period have taught us a vital lesson: the reconstruction of a meaning for the global world, which is universal, abstract and goal-oriented, is very difficult to ascertain. The repudiation of urgency in the post-Cold War world is the second issue of meaning. It is a problem for countries that fail to rehabilitate duty, determination for action, or prohibit an action, if the action does not refer to keeping longterm goals. This principle is of value to domestic affairs, but also to external ones. The post-Cold War period reassembles a semantic crypt where the words were barely used and popularized and have thus lost their meaning and have fallen into obscurity: the new world order, solidarity, democracy, market, universality, subsidiarity, all suffering from an exceptional erosion and substantial loss of meaning in just a few years. So we can agree with Laïdi: Nothing is more urgent than the task to find the simplest and most common words in a stable and collective collection of meanings, no mission is more urgent than rebuilding a symbolic separation between the sphere of everyday experience and the pursuit of a new horizon of expectations. (Laïdi 2005, 153)

CHAPTER TWO FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS: RECENT APPROACHES

The Role of Decision-Making in Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation The importance of decision-making has increased significantly in recent years in several specialty areas. The psychological approach of this process provides anchors to the understanding and explanation of its complexity and within other disciplines as well, especially in international relations theory. Three psychological perspectives–cognitive psychology, social psychology and neuropsychology–represent major areas for the decision-making process (Zhang 2009, 15). Cognitive psychology has led to a flourishing of research and has gained the attention of other areas of interest: economy, political science, and management. From the point of view of cognitive psychology, decision-making is seen as a result of information processing. The first researchers were concerned with how people compare and weigh the various dimensions of a choice and then select the best solution. Latest research has shown how people may not be able to process all relevant information relating to a choice because of limited cognitive resources. It may be that they do not want to process all information relating to an option in making a decision. For example, people are not going to compare and choose from a list of some dishes for breakfast, they just choose a satisfactory option. Therefore, people can stop searching for information when they find a satisfactory option. Additionally, people rely on other rules when making decisions. Heuristic applications preserve cognitive resources and adapt them to the social context in many situations (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996, 650). However, the application of heuristics generates significant costs and cause errors in making a decision.

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

57

Another important contribution in addressing cognitive decisionmaking theory belongs to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 2000). This theory includes three big sentences: the first is that people perceive loss and gain differently. The pleasure that people have as the result of a gain is perceived as being lower than the pain in people who are at a loss. Second sentence: an outcome is perceived as a gain or a loss depending on the framing mode, based on reference points. The following can be considered as reference points: a person’s degree of health, past experiences, expectations or social comparisons. Third sentence: people in general have a risk aversion in gains and seek risk in the domain of loss. Prospect theory has been applied in various areas of decision-making, especially in marketing and management. The most important limitation of the perspective of cognitive psychology is that it neglects some human motivations. Therefore, in everyday life these results might not be found. Researchers in social psychology and the decision-making process have the potential to fill this gap related to motivations and choices. The contributions of researchers in social psychology regarding the decision-making process bring into focus how reciprocity, emotions and self-control affect choices. First of all, people consider reciprocity when they have to make a choice. Reciprocity puts a significant constraint on profit maximization. Secondly, emotions influence choices. Research shows that not only emotions generated by the situation of choice impact upon reasoning and decision-making, but also emotions which are irrelevant to the situation of choice have an effect upon decision-making. Some emotions may have specific effects. For example, although anger and fear are negative emotions, anger leads to risk-seeking, whereas fear leads to risk-aversion (Lerner and Keltner 2001, 146). It is possible that future research on emotions and choices will address the finding of correlations between emotions and specific dimensions, such as agitationcalm and approach-avoidance and will examine how these different emotions influence choices. Thirdly, self-control influences an important aspect of decision-making, namely intertemporal choices, involving exchanges between costs and benefits at the same time. People need to exercise self-control over their immediate desire for short-term gains and obtaining long-term benefits. A major question in the decision-making process is related to the direct influence of motivation in making a decision or to the motivation that gives shape to behaviour by processing information. Significant advances in research have been made showing how emotions influence choices. Some research suggests that people ignore the probability of success when

58

Chapter Two

under the influence of intense emotion (Loewestein et al. 2001, 267). Other research has centred on how emotions influence the perception of information (Schwarz 1990, 527). The theoretical model which describes how emotions or motivations format behaviour requires more attention (Baumeister 2007, 167). The study of neuropsychology and decision-making is an emerging theme (Eshel et al. 2007, 1270). The advantage of neuropsychology is that it provides an objective measurement of mental processes. However, this approach is constrained by the fact that the structure and functions of the human brain are still a mystery. This approach has contributed more to the confirmation of existing theories by using a new method, rather than by the construction of new theories. What are the prospects of the integration potential of unidentified data within future theories? Firstly, a deeper understanding of the process of attention can provide an integrative theory of the psychology of decisionmaking. Attention is an operational phase of information processing. Recent research suggests that attention is a platform for all cognitive processes–working memory (Eshel et al. 2007, 1271). Since attention resources are limited, attention can explain the application of heuristics in decision-making. Secondly, understanding the impact of self-confidence upon the choice may facilitate the formation of an integrative theory of motivation in making the decision. People are motivated to defend, to maintain and to gain self-confidence. In social psychology, many studies have documented the importance of confidence in setting goals, emotions and cognitions. Self-confidence can affect the importance of reciprocity, the manner in which and the moment when people experience intense emotions and how they choose certain options depending on how their identity is affected. Recent research has begun to explore how self-confidence affects individual choices and interpersonal negotiations (Zhang and Baumeister 2006, 81). Future research should build a theory on the role of selfconfidence in decision-making. The psychology of the decision process is applicable to varying degrees in the field of foreign policy where situations involving choices occur: from starting a war, peacemaking, forming an alliance, the establishment of diplomatic relations, implementing a certain position, the imposition of economic sanctions or the ratification of convention (Mintz and De Rouen 2010, 3). The decision-making process in foreign policy relates to the choices made by individuals, groups or coalitions, which affect the actions of a nation on the international scene (Mintz and De Rouen 2010, 3).

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

59

Usually, the theory of the rational actor was the model in the foreign policy decision-making process and the most commonly used in international relations (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 72). However, in recent decades we have witnessed the emergence of a rich specialized literature on the psychology of decision-making in foreign policy within a group, coalition and leaders. Mintz suggests the determinants which influence the decision-making process in foreign policy (Mintz and De Rouen 2010, 4): decision environment, psychological factors, international factors and internal factors. An interesting approach to decision-making is related by the authors Elisabetta Brigham and Christopher Hill who consider that there are two important parts of the decision process: development and implementation. The two authors believe that the implementation of the decision-making process is the most difficult part because the variable environment interferes, which implies a continuous flexibility from the decision makers (Brighi and Hill 2008, 117). The implementation of the decision-making process is the period when decisions are translated into actions and may lead to problems and surprises for the decision-makers whose intentions are usually diverted by the complexity of praxis. The new variable introduced in the analysis of foreign policy (foreign policy decisionmaking) is the environment. In implementation phase of the decision, the actors are confronting the environment, and the environment is confronting them. In essence, this phase involves interactive, strategic processes which are important when you have to translate foreign policy objectives into practice and when you have to turn the praxis into desired outcomes. Implementation of foreign policy is conceptualized as a form of strategic and dialectical interaction between actors and the foreign policy environment. The success of any implementation of foreign policy depends not only on clearly-defined objectives and the choice of instruments, but also on the interaction between the actor and the context in which the strategy is positioned or the actor's ability to adapt to unforeseen circumstances. In interpreting the above authors, context means the actor’s perspective on what is "international": the perimeter of "international" (from regional to global) and the dimensions composing the "international" and which interconnect (Brighi and Hill 2008, 117). In fact, Brighi and Hill (2008) speak of social and political actors pursuing the course of action and succeeding in achieving goals. Implementation is an action that is more political than technical. Implementation of foreign policy decisions and behaviour brings into

Chapter Two

60

focus the foreign policy behaviour. To conceptualize the behaviour and its implementation, the analysis of foreign policy must adopt a strategicrelational approach. The essence of this approach lies in the interaction between the actor strategy and the context. The approach is called strategic because the actors are oriented towards achieving set goals. In the process of developing the action, players must take into account the strategies of other players. The approach is also relational because it assumes that the actors and their behaviour become understandable when viewed in conjunction with the environment. This strategic-relational model was introduced to reject the idea that the action must be reduced to external constraints and internal preferences (Brighi and Hill 2008, 119). This model can be applied to foreign policy. First, the strategic-relational approach assumes that no strategy and no context addressed in isolation can explain the success or failure of a specific foreign policy in delivering a specific outcome. Exclusive centralization on the internal political process cannot explain those instances where the results have diverged from the intention. Conversely, exclusive centralization on the context brings in too much emphasis on constraints and opportunities that shape the action and thus cannot contemplate the real meaning of intentionality. The illustration of this model is the following: Fig. 2-1: Strategic relational approach to foreign policy (adapted from Brighi and Hill 2008, 120) Actor Ideas

Political process

External politics behaviour

Conte

In applying this model of foreign policy, three indicators are relevant: first, avoid using the term "structure" because the context is not a monolithic, impenetrable structure, with pre-existing powerless actors. Rather, the context is built from the other actors and the relationships they maintain. The coexistence of different actors, the interaction between them and the complex aggregation of interests make the "international" an uneven territory of foreign policy. The probability of achieving a goal is dependent on the strategic placement of the actor in the field: considering

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

61

its position in relation to the context, some actions will determine its success relative to others. Moreover, due to the inherent relational nature, the context has different meanings for different actors, depending not only on where they are placed, but also on the interpretation they give to the features of the land where it is located. For example, the cycles of isolationism and interventionism in the foreign policy of the United States can be understood not just as an object that changes the position of the country in the world, but more importantly, as a result of different interpretations of the same position, with default limits and opportunities (Brighi and Hill 2008, 120). Secondly, it is worth noting the continuous interaction between actors and the context through which the behaviour occurs. This interaction is mediated by the role of ideas and discourse. Therefore, it is important to consider how the context responds to the behaviour of the actor, but also how these responses are filtered through perceptions, paradigms and narratives. Thirdly, there is a constant feedback from the actor to the background and vice versa. The product of an interactive process, foreign policy behaviour provides the context with feedback–restructuring the environment or leaving it unchanged–but also the actor, allowing adaptation. Regarding the place of implementation in foreign policy decisionmaking, Brighi and Hill present an adapted version of the model developed by Brecher, emphasizing the processes of action, reaction and feedback, which characterize the decision-making process, creating endless loops of politics and implementation, rather than a clear line of formulation-choice-decision-action that a rational choice would require (Brecher 1974, 7). Given the complexity involved in the foreign policy decision-making process, it becomes clear that the approach to foreign policy analysis centred on decision-making is vital for understanding the behaviour of foreign policy, of our world and the specific behaviour of different nations. Foreign policy decision-making is equipped with models and theories that will help us to understand how bias and errors, uncertainty and internal policies may determine decisions.

62

Chapter Two

Fig. 2-2: The place of implementation in the foreign policy process (after Brighi and Hill 2008, 121) Operating environment External Internal

Decision-makers

Psychological environment

Image-Perception-Culture

Formulation and decision

Action

Implementation

Levels of Analysis of Foreign Policy Decision-Making The analysis of the foreign policy decision-making process is different from that in the field of international relations, where experts talk about the individual, the states and the system as the main unit of analysis. Within the foreign policy decision-making, units refer specifically to the deciding entities: leaders, groups, coalitions. Foreign policy decisions can be examined in terms of a three levels perspective:

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

¾ ¾ ¾

63

Individual; Group; Coalitions (Hermann 2001, 47).

A stratification of the levels of analysis of foreign policy is performed by Jackson and Sorensen (2007, 228). The authors distinguish three levels of analysis: ¾ ¾ ¾

Systemic level (for example: the distribution of powers between states, economic and political interrelationships); Nation-state level (for example: type of government, democratic or authoritarian state apparatus and relations between groups in society, bureaucratic state apparatus); Individual decision-makers level (e.g. his/her way of thinking, basic beliefs, personal priorities).

Theories at the systemic level explain foreign policy indicating the conditions in the international system which obliges states to act in a certain way. Therefore, systemic theories refer mainly to the conditions prevailing in the international system, creating a plausible connection between these conditions and the actual foreign policy behaviour of states. Not all theories of the international system agree with the terms primarily characterizing states. In the table below are given three views of the international system (realism, liberalism and constructivism) and the main theoretical assumptions, political instruments and specific predictions of the post-Cold War period, from the perspective of each (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 229): Conceptions Main theoretical assumptions

Realism Anarchy. States compete for power and security

Main political instruments

Military and economic power

Post-Cold War predictions

Rebirth of competition between great powers

Liberalism States want progress and prosperity. Commitment to liberal values Institutions, liberal values, networks of interdependence Increased cooperation and dissemination of liberal values

Constructivism Collective norms and social identities forming behaviour Ideas and discourse Agnostic: depends on the content of the idea

Table 2-1: Three conceptions of the international system (after Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 229)

64

Chapter Two

The same author gives an interesting perspective on levels of foreign policy analysis by finding correspondences with the decision-making models. Nation-state level approaches focus on different types of relationships between the state (government) and society. These approaches bring to our attention the decision-making process within state apparatus, raising the question: are state decisions based on rational choices? Given the decisional model of the rational choice, the states are able to identify the challenges in foreign policy and make the best decisions in terms of benefits and costs, considering the goals and values that the state supports (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 45). Jackson and Sorenson (2007, 232) ask whether, indeed, this is how states make decisions or if things are more complicated than that. The authors suggest two affirmative approaches: The Governmental Policies’ model provides answers on how states act and the “groupthinking” approach arguing the dynamics of small groups negatively affects the quality of decision-making process at the group level (Jackson and Sorenson 2007, 232). We can conclude that, at the nationstate level, two decision models correspond: The Governmental Policies and the "groupthinking" models. For the individual level of decision-making, Jackson and Sorensen talk about the limited capacity of human beings to make rational and objective decisions, limitations linked to the way in which information is perceived and processed (Jackson and Sorenson 2007, 233). The effects of knowledge and belief on foreign policy-makers are manifested by: the belief content of the decision-makers, by organization and structure of the decision-makers’ beliefs, by common patterns of perceptions (or misperceptions) and by cognitive stiffness (or flexibility) regarding change and learning (Rosati 2000, 45). The literature on human knowledge and belief systems questions the notion of rationality and calls for a different interpretation of knowledge. Rosati urges specialists in international relations to not just stick to the "simplistic and naive assumptions" of rational choice but to focus attention on cognitive approaches in order to substantiate their theories in psychology (Rosati 2000, 74).

Models of Decision-Making Goldstein and Pevenhouse state that the foreign policy process is a decision-making process and that states act because members of the government (decision-makers) choose those certain actions (2006, 139). Decision-making is a process that establishes a direction, in which adjustments are made as a result of feed-back that came from the outside world. Decisions are made by actions intended to change the world, and

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

65

the information coming from the outside is monitored to assess the effects of these actions. These assessments will then enter into a future decisionmaking process. Fig 2-3: The decision-making process as establishing direction (according to Goldstein and Pevenhouse 2006, 141) Implementing Action Individual and group psychology

Effects

DecisionMaking

Situations Monitoring

Internal and international

Perception (filtration)

Decision-making models are based on the premise that it is useful to conceptualize nations as unitary rational actors whose behaviour can be adequately explained by reference to the structure of the system, because individuals, groups and organizations acting on behalf of the state are sensitive to pressures and internal constraints, including maintaining the elites, the electoral politics, public opinion, interest groups, ideological preferences and political bureaucracy. Concepts such as "national interest" are not defined only by the international system, let alone by its singular structure; they tend to reflect elements within the domestic political arena. Therefore, instead of assuming, like realists, that the state can be conceptualized as a "black box"–that the internal political processes are not necessary to explain the sources of external behaviour–the decision-making process analysts believe that these internal processes must be taken into consideration, with attention focused on policy-makers (Holsti 2006, 327). To analyze how the states interact with each other, it is useful to observe the process through the eyes of those who act on behalf of the state: policy-makers and groups and the organizational contexts in which they operate. The aforementioned author proposes a synthesis of the most important three models used in decision-making (Holsti 2006, 328):

Chapter Two

66 Conceptualization of decisionmaking Premise

Governmental policies

Group dynamics/ organizational model

Decision-making at individual level

Decision-making as a result of negotiations with the authorities Organizational core values are imperfectly internalized Organizational behaviour is a political behaviour Structure and standard operating procedures affect the substance and quality of decision-making

Decision-making as a product of group interaction Most decisions are taken by a small elite group The group is different from the sum of its members Group dynamics affect the substance and quality of decision-making Groups can be more efficient for some tasks and less for others Pressure for conformity; Risk-taking tendency within the group (controversial) Leadership quality/ groupthinking

Decision-making is a result of individual choice The importance of the subjective approach (defining the situation) and cognitive processes (information processing, etc.)

Constraints of rational decisionmaking

Imperfect information resulting from: centralization, hierarchy and specialization Organizational inertia; Conflicts between individuals and organizational units Bureaucratic policies and negotiations dominate decisionmaking and its implementation

Sources of theories, insights and evidence

Theory of organizations Sociology of authorities/bureaucrats Bureaucratic policies

Social psychology Sociology of small groups

Cognitive limitations of rationality Information processing distorted by cognitive consistency dynamics (unmotivated influences) Systematic and motivated influences in causal analysis Individual differences regarding skills (problem-solving abilities, tolerance of ambiguity, defence and anxiety mechanisms, seeking information) Cognitive dissonance Cognitive psychology Psychology of dynamics

Table 2-2: Theoretical models of foreign policy decision-making attempt to (Allison and Zelizow 2010, 14) ¾ ¾

provide an overview of the product of analysis in various fields of foreign policy and international relations; provide a number of categories that can be used to judge the product;

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

¾ ¾ ¾

67

undermine the myths of the non-theoretical nature of foreign policy analysis and the clear inconsistency of efforts in different areas of foreign policy; challenge the basic categories and assumptions which most analysts use to conceptualize foreign policy issues; outline alternative theoretical frameworks, challenging and precise (the core of general argumentation can support itself).

Previously cited authors present arguments as to why these models of decision-making are important for finding explanations for an action or a set of governmental actions that does not offer sufficient clarification about an event in foreign affairs: placing Soviet missiles in Cuba, sending US troops to the Persian Gulf, the German surrender of sovereign control over its currency to adopt the Euro, the failure to defend what the UN declared to be safe areas in Bosnia (Allison and Zelizow 2010, 20). In trying to find an explanation, we can put ourselves in the place of the nation or the national government dealing with foreign affairs problems and try to find out why they would choose that action. Analysts have explained the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba as a defence mechanism of Cuba against a US attack. US troops have moved into Saudi Arabia to eliminate aggression. Germany joined European partners, adopting the single currency, to progress towards European integration. The UN failed in Bosnia because the member states involved had not the will to resist Serbian aggression (Allison and Zelizow 2010, 20). Treating national governments as if they were individuals, and centrally coordinated, provides an unnecessary simplification for understanding choices and policies-related actions. But the decision-maker in matters of national policy is not a single individual who makes calculations, but a conglomeration of large organizations and political actors. In trying to understand the foreign problems, analysts engage in a series of related actions, logically separated: description, explanation, prediction, evaluation and recommendation. The explanations of some analysts show regular and predictable characteristics which reflect unrecognized assumptions about the character of enigmas, categories in which the issues should be analyzed, the types of evidence that are relevant and the decisive factors of the events. Many associated assumptions form theoretical models or frames of reference, from which questions arise, for which we try to come up with answers: What happened? Why did it happen? What will happen? When explaining an event, the analyst cannot describe the entire state of the world that led to

68

Chapter Two

that event, but he will try to distinguish the relevant factors that led to its appearance. Most analysts describe the behaviour of national governments in terms of a single basic model, the rational actor model. Both they and the ordinary citizens understand events in foreign affairs as the more or less deliberate actions of national governments (Allison and Zelizow 2010, 21). The non-specialists personify the actors and talk about their goals and their choices. International relations theorists focus on the problems of relations among nations to explain the choices that some rational unitary actors make. Strategic analysts focus on the logic of action, without any reference to a particular actor. For each of these groups, the aim is to show how the nation or the government could have chosen to act the way they have acted, given the strategic issues they were facing. Predictions on what a nation will do or would have done are generated by a rational calculation made in a particular situation, given the specific objectives. Even though the most used model for foreign policy decision-making was the rational actor model, we have to add some reference frameworks that will focus on the governmental apparatus: organizations and political actors involved in the policies process. The perspective of Model I (rational actor), that the major events have major causes, must be weighed against the assessment: 1. monoliths are black boxes that contain various mechanisms and levers which form a highly differentiated decisionmaking structure 2. major actions derive from countless smaller actions, possibly conflicting ones, of the individuals which are at different levels in organizations, in the service of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals and political objectives (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 22). National goals and pressures created by the problems in international relations should be facing intranational mechanisms from which governmental actions result. The second decision-making model in foreign policy, presented by Allison and Zelikow is that of Organizational Behaviour, which is based on organizational theory (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 22). According to this model, whatever the Model I (rational actor) characterizes as "actions" and "elections" is thought, this time, as being the responses of large organizations acting in accordance with specific patterns of behaviour. Analyzing the location of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the analyst of Model II (organizational behaviour) contextualizes the subject of unclarity: what context, pressures and organizational procedures led to this decision? He will focus on specific concepts: existing organizational components, their functions and standard operating procedures for the procurement of

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

69

information (e.g. about the forces or strategic intentions of the main actor), defining the feasible options (e.g. sending average range rockets to Cuba vs. constructing new intercontinental rockets) and implementing them (e.g. the placement of missiles in Cuba without the operation being revealed). The third model described by the authors focuses on the policy of a government. This model states that the events in the field of international business are characterized neither as uniform choice nor as responses of organizations; what happens is a result of bargaining games that occur between players that make up the national government. In relation to the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the analyst Model III (government policies) contextualizes an element that arouses perplexity: the results of which types of negotiations between the players led to key decisions and actions? He focuses on concepts: players whose interests and actions have an impact on the problem in question, factors that influence perceptions and their positions, the procedure established action or channel preferences and performance aggregation of various players. Inferential patterns are invoked: if a government takes action, that action is the result of negotiations between the players of that game. An explanation of the Model III event is as follows: when he discovered who determined how the man who acted accordingly. Predictions are generated by identifying the game that will show the problem, the key players and relative power, and a talent for negotiation. The metaphor used by Allison and Zelikow to explain the difference between the three models is very interesting (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 23). The game of chess is the element of comparison. Most observers would assume (Model I) that a player moves the chess pieces according to plans and tactics in order to win. Even a pattern of movements can be designed, which might cause some observers, after watching more games, to consider the hypothesis of Model II: the chess player might not be represented by a single individual, but rather by a looser alliance of semiindependent organizations, each moving the pieces in accordance with standard procedures. We can thus assist in the process of moving separate sets of pieces, each according to certain rules. It can be assumed that the pattern of the game might suggest the hypothesis of Model III to an observer: a number of separated players with different objectives, but having the power to act jointly upon the pieces, can decide over the movements which result in a collegial negotiation. In reference to the Cuban missile crisis, the same authors state that the decisions of the crisis which had to be taken at high level seem ideal for an analysis in terms of Model I. Models II and III are forced to compete in the field of Model I (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 23).

70

Chapter Two

A different classification of the decision models of foreign policy is made by Gross Stein (2008, 102). The author talks about the "cognitive revolution" and the psychological models, going beyond the classic framework of the three models described by Allison and Zelikow (2010, 14). The three models of decision-making, according to Gross Stein are: rational, psychological and neurological/neuroscientific. The questions from which this whole classification starts are related to a working group conducted in 2007 by the Munk Centre for International Studies from the University of Toronto, a group which consulted experts in order to find the meaning of rational foreign policy and conflict resolution. The practical problem brought to the attention of this group was to resolve the IsraelPalestine conflict. The most important question raised is: what stands in the way of finding a reasonable solution to this conflict? Why did the two governments fail to move forward on the path of a rational compromise? These simple questions are only the mask for more complex problems. What does "knowing a rational solution" mean? What is a "rational solution" in the context of the real world? What are the criteria for establishing what is rational? From whose perspective? If one of the parties rejects a solution to end the conflict, is it necessarily "irrational"? Are there good reasons for the fact that the solutions found by experts are not chosen by governments? These questions lead to others: how do political leaders act when important foreign policy decisions have to be made? How is the concept of "rationality" interpreted in politics and decision-making? The author provides one answer: “not very well” (Gross Stein 2008, 102). An interesting comparison regarding the manner of decision-making belongs to Breuning (2007, 88). The decision-making process is like an iceberg, the surface of which is represented by the decision-maker/makers, and what is not seen is the bureaucracy that continually provides the decision flow (Breuning 2007, 88). These are the levels that the leaders rely on, those that provide the localization of information and the implementation of decisions. The author provides a useful summary of the three decision-making models discussed by Allison and Zelikow: the rational actor model, the organizational behaviour model and the model of governmental policies (Breuning 2007, 97):

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

Politics is determined by Key-actors

Decisionmaking process

71

Rational Actor Model National interest

Organizational Behaviour Model Organizational inertia and feasibility

Government acting as if it were a rational decision maker, singular 1.Identification of national interest

Organizations operating under standard operating procedures (PSOs)

Governmental Policies Model Complex negotiation between individuals and agencies Individuals, guided by their own role and interests

1. Organizational expertise and interests determine preferences

1.Horizontal: interests determined by role and agency

2. Identification of options

2. PSO adaptation

3.Cost/benefit analysis of options

3.Feasibility determines the chosen policy

2.Vertical: interests driven by the place in the hierarchy

4. Choosing the political alternative that best serves the national interest

3. Negotiation and other political manoeuvres determine the choice of policy

Table 2-3: Decision-making models (adapted from Breuning 2007, 97) Before starting the description of the "classic" decision models developed by Allison and Zelikow, the intervention of Bendor and Hammond should be mentioned, which reorganizes the decision models mentioned above (Bendor and Hammond 1992, 301). Their approach is based on four different assumptions: ¾

The first class of assumptions is concerned with the number of actors. The classical approach to the study of international relations posits that the government of a sovereign state behaves as a single actor. The contrasting approach of the decisional models developed by Allison and Zelikow refers to the breakdown of the government into multiple stakeholders (2010, 14). It is to be noted, however, that the rapid change in multiple actors asks for specifying whether multiple actors pursue the same goals, or conflicting goals. Very different models and very different understandings of the decision-making process will emerge from these assumptions. Although Allison and Zelikow are less explicit than they should be, they assume in Models II and III (the models of Organizational Behaviour and of Governmental Policies) that the actor's goals are in conflict (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 14). But even if the actors have the

Chapter Two

72

¾

¾

¾

same goals, this does not mean that decision-making is a trivial matter. Even if there are no serious conflicts regarding the goals, still the coordination of the actions of a large number of actors executants is not an easy task. Therefore, a model can logically stipulate the multiple actors whose objectives are similar. This will lead to a second statement: A second class of statements is preoccupied by the purpose of decision–whether a central purpose in the book The Essence of Decision is to understand the relative virtues of the models: government-actor-singular versus government-actor-multiple; the results of the comparison will be lost if the second set of variables is neglected (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 23). A third class of assumptions refers to the degree of rationality attributed to the decision-makers. As Allison and Zelikow emphasize, the classical approach assumes that decision-makers are rational. In contrast, the organizational behaviour theorists (Simon 1957, 270), and also psychologists (Jervis 1970, 15; Steinbruner 2002, 141) maintain the idea that all agents have limitations of their cognitive capacities. Although there is a continuum of possibilities, these can be simplified by dichotomy. A model may stipulate if agents are perfectly or imperfectly rational. A model can assume that decision-makers are perfectly rational, although it may postulate that they are imperfectly informed about the results that will appear (prospective uncertainty) or what has already transpired (retrospective uncertainty) (Bendor and Hammond 1992, 303). It seems clear that information problems can affect the prediction of models. Therefore, the fourth category refers to the amount of information attributed to decision-makers. We can simplify and say that complete information presents neither retrospective nor prospective safety. Therefore, all players know the structure of the game (including costs), what everyone has done in the past and the outcome that will result from any set of movements. When having incomplete information we can talk about retrospective or prospective uncertainty, or both.

The four categories of statements can be configured as follows:

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

Individual decision-maker More decisionmakers, same goals More decisionmakers, conflictual goals

Perfectly rational 1a 1b Complete Incomplete information information 3a 3b Complete Incomplete information information 5a 5b Complete Incomplete information information

73

Imperfectly rational 2a 2b Complete Incomplete information information 4a 4b Complete Incomplete information information 6a 6b Complete Incomplete information information 2a Complete information

Table 2-4: Typology of decision-makers (according to Bendor and Hammond 1992, 303) This typology will help us to identify various models of the political process. To serve this purpose, these categories of this typology must be exclusive and collective. Model I (rational actor) belongs obviously to cell 1. Indeed, Allison's description suggests placing it in cell 1a, with the assumptions about the singular rational actor with complete information (Bendor and Hammond 1992, 303). We will argue that, however, the complete information statement neglects what international relations theorists have identified as central to their field, namely the pervasive uncertainty about the capabilities, motives and actions of others. Other arrangements (in the sense of acquiring knowledge) can be obtained by the singular actor models, by relaxing the claim of perfect rationality, moved to cell 2. As examples, psychological analysis of individual rationality in foreign policy decision-making may be cited. At first glance, we can say that Model II (organizational behaviour) belongs to cell 4b. However, rational actors have to deal with uncertain environments and they use adaptive strategies. Allison, in describing Model II, mentions the conflicting goals ("parochial priorities", "conflict resolution" and "organizational imperialism") (Allison 1971, 81). Therefore, Model II may seem to belong elsewhere, perhaps in cell 6. As an observation, the assumption of conflicting goals in the Organizational Behaviour Model is unassailable. For the most important issues, organizations and their leaders do not agree with their objectives. However, the authors find that interesting hypotheses can be generated by withdrawal into cell 3 (Bendor and Hammond 1992, 303). This class of models is ideal for examining coordination problems among perfectly rational actors.

74

Chapter Two

The centre of Model III (governmental policies) refers to multiple decision-makers with conflicting goals, the third line of the typology. Describing this model, Allison emphasizes negotiation and other political processes as the focus point of the decision and removes the problems involving information processing (Allison 1971, 162). Moreover, the discussion about power involves actors who are apparently able to make strategic calculations about maximizing influence. These actors seem to have cognitive capacities assumed by the Rational Actor Model. Therefore, we conclude that classical rationality is assumed for Model III in cell 5. Model III belongs in cell 5b, although Allison suggests a different classification (Bendor and Hammond 1992, 303). According to the typology developed by Bendor and Hammond, Model II can be classified in cell 6 or maybe 6b (Bendor and Hammond, 1992, 304). Model III, which seems to belong to cell 5 (and possibly 5b) can be classified into cell 6 and even 6b. Therefore, the authors believe that Models II and III, which have a different intellectual pedigree and which Allison tried to distinguish between, share the same analytical basis.

The Rational Actor Model Trying to explain international events by specifying the goals and calculations of nations or governments represents the distinguishing mark of rational actor model. By analyzing Morgenthau's (2007, 224) interpretations and those of Schelling (1960, 232), those who explain international events and their developments in terms of securing a balance of power, Allison and Zelikow conclude that each assumes that what must be explained is an action, i.e. a behaviour that reflects the purpose or intent (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 30). Each admits that the actor is the national government. Each believes that the chosen action is a calculated solution to a strategic problem and each explanation consists in indicating the aim pursued by the government and that the action was a rational choice (given the nation target). These assumptions characterize the rational actor model, and the conceptual contrasts between Morgenthau and Schelling are obvious. There are, however, similarities between Morgenthau's method of "rational reconstruction" and Schelling’s "indirect solving of the problem”, or similarities between "the rational statesman" by Morgenthau and "the game theorist" of Schelling. The rational actor model can be illustrated as follows (Goldstein and Pevenhouse 2006, 14):

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

75

Fig. 2-4 : Rational actor model (adapted by Goldstein and Pevenhouse 2006, 141). Ordering goals by importance

Establishing alternatives to achieve goals Establishing clear goals in a given situation

Investigating the consequences of each alternative Choosing the best alternative

Most contemporary analysts interpret an international event as template, in terms of this framework. The assumption that the events which occur in international relations are the acts of nations, became important in analyzing these problems, so that the rational actor model was rarely acknowledged: explaining a phenomenon in foreign policy means simply to show how a government has rationally chosen action. So, the reference framework may be called classic. Allison and Zelikow mention the essential concepts of the rational actor model (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 32): ¾ The aims and objectives: the interests and values of the agent are translated into a “reward”, "utility" or "preference" function which represents the desideratum or usefulness of alternative sets of consequences. At the beginning of the decision-making process the agent has a reward function which puts in order all the possible sets of consequences in terms of his values or goals. Each set of consequences includes a number of side effects. The agent is expected to be able to rank preferences for each possible set of consequences that could result from a certain action. ¾ The variants: the rational agent must choose from a set of alternatives which have been presented to him as a decisional tree. Alternative courses of action may include more than a simple act, but specifying the course of action must be sufficiently precise to differentiate it from other variants. ¾ Choice: rational choice is simply the selection of a variant whose consequences lie at the top of the reward function of the decisionmaker.

76

Chapter Two

These categories formalize the concept of rational action that supports the economic decision and game theory and political science, and also the notion underlying our daily assumptions regarding human intention in individual behaviour, but also in national foreign policy. Rationality refers to making the appropriate choice, which maximizes the value within certain limitations. The reference framework of the rational actor model is deeply rooted in our thinking, and this can be observed by studying the language used in relation to international events: "Israel's decision to attack," "China's policy towards Taiwan" or "American action in the Persian Gulf " (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 31). Labelling the relevant aspects of a state as the "policy" or "decision" of the nation means entering the pattern of the rational actor. The decision requires a decision-maker and a choice out of several options, with reference to a particular purpose. Policy means the achievement, in a number of particular cases, of the objectives of the agent. This concept identifies phenomena as actions taken by agents who have certain intentions. Identification involves the simple extension towards governments of the assumption: what people do is rational, at least in terms of intent. Allison and Zelikow, paraphrasing John Harsanyi say that rational behaviour is often a powerful explanatory principle that can clarify a large number of empirical facts of human behaviour in terms of a few simple assumptions about the goals that people want to reach (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 31). Applying the rational actor model in foreign policy indicates a broad spectrum in which more information about the agent is provided or implied: in the worst case with the least information, the agent is a theoretical state in the international system ("the state wanted ... "), empowered with comprehensive rationality. As complexity increases in terms of specifications, information and context, the agent can become a generic state (classified by the type of regime, e.g. democracy), or an identified state ("the United States wanted ...."), precise in time and space, and if the leader's personal values and visions are essential, the agent becomes a personified state ("the Clinton administration wanted ...."):

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

77

Fig. 2-5: Applying the rational actor model (from Allison and Zelikow 2010, 36) Claims about rationality Limited rationality (inferior) Limited rationality (superior) Comprrehensive rationality Theoretical state (unity)

Generic state (democracy)

Identified state (United States)

Personified state (Kennedy)

Information about the agent

Applying the rational actor model is explained by statements and evidence, serving as the engine of a generic state (e.g. democracy). Such a state has several specific purposes (peaceful relations with other democracies) or is inclined to favour some options (cooperation with other democracies). With additional information, analysts have outlined an identified state, whose political culture or history determines trends in perceptions or misperceptions which influence the state towards certain options (e.g. attack vs. defense) or estimates of the consequences (for example, an "operational code"). The particular circumstances of a state can be described in such detail that the most important factors for explaining X and Y are not extremely difficult to identify. The personified state (Clinton or Kennedy) falls into this range. Bueno de Mesquita believes that, in terms of any rational theory, any rational actor model assumes that actors (as decision-makers) are opting for those feasible solutions, defined by personal values or preferences. The interest of decision-makers can include or not include the national interest (2009, 2). Decision-makers connect alternatives to preferences or indifference, consider impediments (e.g. geographical location) and the anticipated actions of others and, based on their desires, act in accordance with their own beliefs. Such models consider looking at past actions and

78

Chapter Two

anticipative actions of the staff involved, in trying to understand the options of international conflicts. The specialized literature clearly shows that decision-makers (rational actors) do not have complete freedom of action and are not in total control (Bueno de Mesquita, 2009, 3). They must adapt their behaviour according to what they want to achieve, often being forced to abandon their preferred purpose for options ranked two or three. It may be that, ultimately, they choose the last option, even if they acted rationally at each stage of the decision-making process. Moreover, decision-makers will not consider all alternatives, when the costs involved far exceed the gain. The rational actor model involves three major claims (Kent 2005, 2): first, the unitary actors or states are the ones making the major decisions; secondly, unitary actors calculate the costs and benefits of alternative modes of action and choose the most useful ones; thirdly, the international environment is the determining factor in foreign policy decision-making. The author proposes an individual rational actor model, the "theory of the presidential decision-making process" (the US case), which provides the link between domestic and international contexts of decision-making, based on the president’s behaviour of following goals with perseverance (Kent 2005, 3). Additional elements are related to factors connected only to the president, in the case of possible gains or losses, but also to his current political position. As a result of these additional elements, presidents can change the key assumptions of the rational actor model on transitivity and invariance. George distinguishes between objectives– analytical rationality (an over-intellectualized perspective on foreign policy) and political rationality (taking into account the concerns of policy-makers and political interests) (George 1993, 20). Kent's theory (2005) assumes that presidents with political capital make decisions differently from presidents with few political resources. The success or failure of a policy represents a deposit or a withdrawal of presidential capital resources, which will affect future decisions and political opportunities. This theory is centred around political resource and proposes the following illustration model:

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

79

Fig. 2-6: American decision-making model (according to Kent 2005, 8)

International System Presidential resources Presidential Resources (PR) (PR)

Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy Action (FAA) Action

Internal

Internal Policy politics (IP)

When they need to make a decision, presidents are confronted with domestic and international pressures. It is still Kent who assumes that the level of political resources available to the president determines that he is the one who mediates decision-making (Kent 2005, 8). When presidents realize that the success or failure of a decision has future consequences on maintaining their position, they will choose options which are politically rational. Although acquisitions in the foreign policy arena may not always be directly translated into electoral success, the foreign and domestic policies are intertwined and can affect the level of political resources available to the President, and also his tendency to take risks. According to this, foreign policy actions can have positive or negative consequences, which transcend the international arena and may affect the president domestically, providing the basis for understanding the importance of political resources in foreign policy decisions. The same author has investigated how political pressure and context influence individual decision-making. An interesting element explored by Kent is the study of the nature of risk in foreign policy decision-making, creating a risk measure and determining the foreign policy relations which increase the risk for the president (Kent 2005, 83). The risk typology, developed by the same author, considers factors such as: public opinion, relative national resistance and the level of conflict in bilateral relations. Breuning's statements (2007, 57) range on the same coordinates of individual approaches to the rational actor model. The author states that the assumption of the unitary actor refers to the decision-makers’ action as homogenous entity (Breuning 2007, 57). This means considering the

80

Chapter Two

government as an individual actor and not of a group of decision-makers or a composite of agents. The rational actor model is present at the system level and at the state level, where states’ behaviour in foreign policy will be important, but also the description and assessment of this behaviour. At the individual level it raises the question of exercising the rational actor model: do governments or states even act as singular actors? Although rational actor theory can provide plausible explanations, they do not always fit the facts. Sometimes, these plausible explanations are good enough, but in other cases there are missing pieces in the puzzle , for example in the case of Argentina and the Malvinas Island crisis decisions. What may be considered as a weak argument, with benefits on prospection, may appear much more reasonable once we have realized how decision-makers represent their world, what motivates them, what options they perceive and how they evaluate those options. Can we expect these individuals who make decisions to act rationally? This question will lead us towards the normative theory of rationality, which provides a model for rational behaviour and assesses current behaviour by means of that model. The model specifies the process by which decisions should be taken: confronting the situation which requires a decision, the defining of the situation by the leaders, setting goals, investigating options, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option and choosing the option that best suits the purpose at the lowest cost (Breuning 2007, 58). The empirical theory of rationality is less applicable to judging a decision than in providing an understanding of how leaders make a decision. Researchers following the line of the empirical theory of rationality believe that, rather than evaluate a decision by the standards of good decisions (as the normative theory of rationality), it is important to understand how and why decision-makers reach a certain decision, as a first step to suggesting how to improve the decision-making process (Breuning 2007, 60). Empirical analysts are trying to determine what decision-makers knew, or when or where they knew it and what they did with that information. They do not insist on comprehending the whole decision-making process, but on providing the questions which are presented in the comparative table below.

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches Normative rationality Process

81

Empirical rationality

1. What are the relevant goals of foreign policy?

1. Who are the relevant decisionmakers?

2. Which are my options?

2. What do they know and since when?

3. What are the benefits (expected benefits) and disadvantages (expected costs) of each option? 4. Decision-making–choosing the option that performs best in cost/benefit analysis.

3. How do they interpret information? 4. What are the options they perceive as realistic? 5. How do they evaluate these options?

Theory or model

The prescribed decision-making process serves as standard for reasoning.

The decision-making process is subject to investigation

Statement

Strictly following the prescribed process leads to the best possible decision.

The quality of the process is related to the quality of the decision.

Table 2-5: Comparison between the empirical and normative rationality (according to Breuning 2007, 60) The rational actor model provided by normative theory is irrelevant for empirical analysts, who are interested in selecting and evaluating options. In fact, many of the empiricist theorists believe that the normative theory of rationality provides a useful framework, but criticize these theories in order to ignore the difficulties of acquiring information, the impact of personality and previous experience, and also the interactions between decision-makers. The empirical rationalist theory considers questions such as: how can the personality of a leader predispose the understanding of the information to some extent? If the information is incomplete–as often happens in foreign policy–how do policy-makers gain confidence, so that they end up understanding the situation? Do decision-makers even weigh the options, as suggested by the normative model of rationality? If that happens, what is the mechanism by which decision-makers choose the option that will be considered or given up, and how do they evaluate the options in front of them? One element specified by Breuning refers to how the decision-makers solve problems, following the path of the first solution they formulate,

82

Chapter Two

without weighing other options (Breuning 2007, 62). This is a quick way to solve the problem and to make time to address other situations. This kind of solution is called satisfaction. Basically, the decision is made based on experience, and this practical decision, based on experience, is called heuristic. Hosoya (1974), in his analyzing of the rational actor model in Japan's decision to attack the United States at Pearl Harbour, identifies the presence of non-rational factors; present in the education and training of Japanese military leaders were the values of courage and honour (Hosoya 1974, 353). They were taught to prefer death to surrender or humiliation. Even Japanese civilian leaders shared the same basic values. Japanese victories throughout history were a permanent source of confidence and pride. All these psychological factors have helped to prevent the Japanese decision-makers from using means-end decision models and cost-benefit calculations. Therefore, the use of this decision-making model in explaining some events must take into account the specific cultural and psychological elements of a nation. The same idea of the influence of cultural factors in making a decision is supported by Gaenslen (1986), who analyzes the decision-making process in China, Japan, Russia and the United States (Gaeslen 1986, 78). The main results of the study suggest the advantage of superiors over subordinates for the Chinese, Japanese and Russians when compared to the Americans, and due to cultural differences, the Chinese, Japanese and Russians have more resources available than the Americans situated at the same level. The statements of rationality represent the basis of the constructivist theories (Bueno de Mesquita 2009, 2). The condition of rationality sets the theorists’ perspective on how people select actions based on motivations or preferences, but it does not explain anything about the content of the respective preferences (Zagare 1990, 238). Constructivist theories are best suited to determine how preferences are formed. Rational models are more suitable as models for action. The content of assumed preferences varies from one theory to another. Specific decision models in the field of international relations vary in terms of what they assume as the ultimate goal, or specific set of goals for their actions. These might be national security, national strength, public and personal health, control over international norms, standards or policies, personal power or survival in politics and professional life. The actors can be individual citizens, elites, leaders, states, non-governmental organizations, international governmental organizations, multinational corporations and other entities. Therefore, the statement of rationality limits neither the purposes for which it is studied, nor the identity of the

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

83

actors who pursue these goals. The limits refer to the way in which actors choose actions according to their own desires and beliefs. It does not require the notion that the state is a rational actor (Zagare 1990, 238; Vandenbrouke 1984, 365). The rational actor paradigm concerns the articulation of the reference frame. Allison and Zelikow have formulated the following framework (2010, 37): ¾ The basic unit of the analysis: governmental action as a choice. Foreign policy events are perceived as chosen actions by the nations or by the national governments. Governments select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives. The solutions to strategic problems are fundamental categories depending on which one the analyst realizes needs to be explained. ¾ Organizing concepts ¾ The national unitary action–the nation or government, the unitary and rational decision-maker is the agent. This agent is anthropomorphized as if it were a person with a set of preferences (a substantial utility function), a set of perceived choices and a single estimate of the consequences resulting from each alternative. ¾ The problem–the action is chosen in response to the situation the actor is facing. Threats and opportunities on the strategic international “market “prompt the nation to react. ¾ The action as a rational choice–its components include: ¾ Objectives–national security and national interests are the main categories through which strategic goals are perceived. Analysts focus on the main objectives and combine them intuitively. ¾ Options–actions performed in order to achieve the objectives represent options. ¾ Consequences–implementing each alternative action will produce a series of consequences. Relevant consequences constitute benefits and costs in terms of goals and strategic objectives. ¾ Choice–rational choice maximizes value. The rational agent selects the alternative whose consequences are considered as best placed from the perspective of his goals and objectives. ¾ Dominant pattern of inference–If a nation or its representatives

84

Chapter Two

takes a certain action, that action must be selected as a means of maximizing value for achieving the objectives of the actor. The explanatory power of the rational actor odel is derived from this inferential pattern. The problem is solved by identifying the goals which the action serves. ¾ General sentences–the sentences which explanations depend on should be clearly formulated. The basic statement about the behaviour which maximizes preferences delivers simple sentences, important for most of the explanations in terms of the rational actor model. The general principle can be formulated as follows: the probability of any action results from a combination of: relevant values and goals of a state, alternative courses of action perceived by a state, estimated consequences arising from each version, a net assessment of each set of consequences by the state. This combination leads to two obvious sentences: ¾ An increase in the perceived cost of an alternative (a reduction of the value of consequences resulting from an act or a reduction in the probability of obtaining the consequences set) reduces the likelihood of that action being chosen. ¾ A decrease in the perceived costs of an alternative (an increase in the values of the consequences resulting from an act or an increase in the probability of obtaining the consequences set) increases the likelihood of that action being chosen. ¾ Evidences–the fundamental method used in the analysis of the rational actor "indirect solving of the problem." The evidence regarding the details of behaviour, statements of governmental officials and governmental documents are then arranged so that a coherent picture of the maximizing value choice becomes visible. An analyst of the rational actor model should insist on rules of evidence, to produce statements about the governmental objectives, options, and consequences which allow him to make a distinction between the different analyses. A synthesis of this framework in the form of questions shows the following pattern: Explaining a phenomenon X: Means: 1. X is the action of a state; 2. The state is a unitary action;

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

3. 4. 5.

85

The state has a consistent utility function; The state acts in connection with threats and opportunities; The action of the state maximizes the value.

Questions: ¾ What threats and opportunities is the actor facing? (e.g. the balance of strategic nuclear forces in 1962); ¾ Who is the actor? (The Soviet Union or its leader from 1962, Nikita Khrushchev; ¾ What is its utility function? (e.g. survival, maximizing the power, minimizing the threat, etc.); ¾ To maximize the actor's goals in these conditions, which is the best choice? (e.g. the installation of Soviet missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba). Some of the formulas which are using the rational actor model to evidentiate the behaviour prediction of some states must be mentioned. One of these programs is the one which generated the expected utility theory, created by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, on international conflicts (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 60). This theory assumes that decision-makers tend to maximize the expected utility of risk options: they weigh in the utility of the individual and choose the option that weighs the heaviest. The game theory must identify the actors, rules of the game, the results combined with each possible combination of movements, costs incurred for these results to the actors and the concept of the solution (Morgan 2004, 33). Some of the most commonly used games are: the "prisoner's dilemma", "chicken game" and "tooth for tooth" (tit for tat) ( see Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 64-67). For a deeper understanding of the rational actor decision-making model, Allison and Zelikow offer a peek into different paradigms (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 39). Classical realism claims that, by their nature, people are motivated to try to dominate others, transforming politics among nations into a struggle for power and the realpolitik necessary for survival. The two postulates of the rational actor model express the essence of classical realism: 1. unitary states are key actors in international affairs, and 2. states act rationally, calculating the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and choosing the action which maximizes utility. The realists start from the assumption that the international environment is a jungle and the

86

Chapter Two

prevailing goals which the states pursue in political life are security and strength. National interests, influenced by cultural and political context, are motivated by the objective realities of power. Neorealism (structural realism) is an academic alternative to classical realism. The exponents of this trend have tried to distinguish from the previous ones by aspiring to be "scientific" and attaching importance to the system-level variables. Classical realists have used a logic which depends on the reasons or inclinations of the states: bad things happen because of bad states or bad statesmen. Neorealists emphasize the logic of the situation: bad things happen even when states are good, but are situated in regions with problems. The fundamental supporter of neorealism is Kenneth Waltz (2006), the author of the Theory of International Politics, one which explicitly attempts to reduce Morgenthau's political realism to a more systematic and rigorous theory of international politics (Waltz 2006, 27). The essence of structural realism is identifying the international conditions in which nation-states exist. Waltz said that states are unitary actors who, in the worst case, seek their own survival and, at best, strive for universal domination. States are rational and maximizing in value. How will a state act when faced with another in terms of Waltz's theory? First, it will increase its capacities (e.g. the purchase of weapons). Then it will join an alliance (counterbalance) with several other states, in order to restore the balance of power. He foresaw, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unravelling of NATO and also the formation of one or more new alliances aimed at limiting the emerging hegemony of America (Waltz 2006, 147). The essence of the rational actor model in terms of neorealism is that the state as the main actor, whose actions are rational, will calculate the costs and benefits and will choose the maximum expected value. Another assumed hypothesis is that survival is the most important issue, that some states seek to dominate others and that states are selfish, seeking only their survival and security, not wanting to depend on other countries to ensure their vital interests. Another factor that neorealism takes into account is the behaviour of states, not just their aggregated power, to explain with whom alliances are made and for how long. Another exponent of neorealism, Stephen Walt says that alliances are not formed in response to imbalances of power, but in response to imbalances of threat. The threat is interpreted not only in terms of military objective power, geographical proximity, defensive or offensive orientation, but also by the intentions and behaviours of states. The variants of structural realism variants are presented in Colin Elman’s chart (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 68):

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

87

Fig. 2-7: Anarchy-hypotheses and several possible foreign policy strategies (in Allison and Zelikow 2010, 68) Anarchy

Ordering principle Unit initiations

Egoism

Principle or behavioural rule

Problem generated by the system

Self-help

Cheating (Neoliberal institutionalism)

Survival (neorealism)

Offensive neorealism

Aspiration to hegemony

Possible strategies

Alignment for profit

Expansion

Defensive neorealism

Balancing- Alignment-ConcealmentSelf-denial-Integration

Limits the number of actors; Lengthens the shadows of future; Forms international regimes and enforcement mechanisms (Oye)

88

Chapter Two

International institutionalism takes a step outside structural realism to focus on institutions and system interactions, as major causal factors, to describe cooperation between states. The exponents of this trend indicate the increasing number and importance of international institutions, and the growing prominence of economic and transnational interactions (Keohane 1986). Among the most prominent supporters of this current trend are Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Stephen Krasner and Lisa Martin. According to institutionalists, institutions matter because they affect the information available to state actors and the transaction costs for cooperation between nations. International institutionalists start from the essence of the rational actor, which is a unitary state actor who rationally maximizes its value in the context. This theory assumes that the states are the main actors in world politics and that they behave based on what they consider to be their own interests. They recognize the importance of structural factors used by neorealists (anarchy and the distribution of power), but insist that for explaining the action of states another level of systemic factors is necessary, namely international institutions. Keohane states that institutionalism must be completed with a theory about the state–a theory to analyze the origins of interests, specific objectives, beliefs and perceptions of states. Liberalism–placed within the rational actor model seems surprising. Theorists of this paradigm focus on liberal democracies and recognize pluralism in domestic politics. Goals, beliefs and states’ tendencies towards action are configured by the political regime (democratic or dictatorial). The state is therefore also analyzed as a unitary actor. The rational actors choose to initiate a conflict or, on the contrary, to be peaceful. Many liberal theorists argue that a state, through its governance, respects individual rights, political and economic pluralism and political and economic cooperation and will reflect these values in its external behaviour, showing respect for the rights of other nations and for international law, being ready to cooperate rather than clash (Keohane 1986).

Conclusion In its simplest form, the rational actor model represents the link between purpose and action. Knowing the goal of an actor means knowing his future behaviour. By observing behaviour and taking into account the goal of the actor identified in an action, a hypothesis can be formulated about why he did what he did. The rational actor model not only includes calculations about

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

89

objectives, but also about the situation in which the actor finds himself. This context presents the threats and opportunities which the actor considers as options, with pros and cons. The actor chooses alternatives that best fit his interests. In applying the rational actor model, the analyst will need to take into account the objectives, the options he identifies, the benefits and costs they estimate from each option and the ease or reluctance to take risks. An imaginative analyst will invent goals which an actor might have had, or you might have, no matter how unlikely those are, weaving a logical network of consequences towards an imaginary intention. In the most restricted version of foreign policy analysis, homo economicus reappears as polis strategicos. Geopolitical conditions, the distribution of power, geography, the balance of threats, as well as hardware and software components are combined with the minimum objectives of a state. This kind of analysis was used in the 1930s to explain or predict the behaviour of Germany. One of the elements that was removed by the British Prime Minister Chamberlain, and which is stressed quite often, is the role of idiosyncrasies manifested for the purposes which Hitler set for himself (Keohane 1986). These things could be identified from a simple reading of the books written by Hitler, where he expressed specific theories on ethnicity, the vital necessity for German territorial expansion and the supremacy of the Aryan race. In the situations of Hitler and Saddam Hussein, Western leaders thought they could explain and predict the decentralized actions of the state, using the rational actor model. It began with the logical essence and a minimum of objectives, focusing on leaders with opinions and particular values. However, by labelling everyone as nationalist they have issued idiosyncratic values, calculations and evaluations, an indecision for which they would have needed more information. In both cases, the behaviour reflected even more idiosyncratic values and calculations, which could be understood only through a careful analysis of the specific personalities and perceptions. In Hitler's case, there was a unique vision of the world and a sense of mission and in the case of Saddam there were personal images regarding his historical destiny in the Arab world and their contemptuous representations of the United States. Where leaders are concerned, we are talking about three types of reasoning to which three key questions correspond (Keohane 1986): how does the actor select, derive and represent the information about the state of the system? How does he determine the standards that the information is assessed by? How does he select and initiate a response? There are three sets of judgments: of value, of reality and instrumental. All three reasons

90

Chapter Two

converge to the rational actor paradigm. Judgements of value (that which counts for the states) influence goals and objectives, but also affect the aspects of reality that the state wants to observe. Value judgements can be influenced by instrumental calculations, the state being influenced by the thing it thinks will get. In many of the prestigious works of foreign policy, regarding states and leaders, the key assumptions of the rational actor model manifest obvious logic: unitary actors with specific objectives that maximize value (Keohane 1986). Also when explaining the actions of nonstate actors (international institutions, international non-governmental organizations) this paradigm is predominant. The respective authors believe that this model has great explanatory power. In a more recent approach, Brighi and Hill (2008) believe that the rational model, which emphasizes the setting of goals with the power available and then choosing the most appropriate tool to achieve them, rarely conforms to the current practice of foreign policy (Brighi and Hill 2008, 133). The current leaders are facing unexpected problems and are taken back to the first solution at hand, constantly bearing in mind the need to build a support coalition within the government, one which can lead public opinion. It was the case in the Balkans in the 1990s, when the Western states clung to the complex consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, finally making commitments to a protectorate for three countries (Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo).

The Organizational Behaviour Model This classic model emphasizes the benefits of the division of labour, hierarchy and centralization of expertise associated with rationality and obedience. The adepts of this theory assume clear boundaries must be kept between policies and decision-making on the one hand, and management and their implementation on the other. Recent approaches, unlike the classical ones, see organizations differently. The central premise is that decision-making in bureaucratic organizations is constrained not only by formal legal rules intended to increase rationality and eliminate unpredictable aspects of bureaucratic behaviour. Rather than a denial appears an emphasis of political character of bureaucratization, but also of more “informal” aspects of organizational behaviour. Complex organizations are composed of individuals and units with contradictory perceptions, values and interests that may arise from their own parochial interests ("what is best for my organization is also best for my career"), or different perceptions of problems encountered inevitably in the division of

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

91

labour ("where you stand depends on where you sit"). Organizational and implicit norms, established prior to political commitments, inertia and standard operating procedures may give shape or may distort the structuring of problems, the channelling of information, the use of expertise or the rate options are to be considered. Consequently, organizational decision-making is essentially of a political nature, dominated by negotiating resources, roles and missions, and by compromise, rather than analysis (Holsti 2006, 328). Organizational behaviour can be interpreted as "an action chosen by a rational, unitary decision-maker: centrally controlled, fully informed and a maximizer of value" (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 129). The rational decision-maker is not limited to an individual, it means a "huge conglomerate of organizations which have flexible alliances". Governments perceive problems through these "organizational sensors, they define the alternatives and estimate the consequences, acting as organizations applying the procedures (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 129). Therefore, the abovementioned authors consider that we can understand organizational behaviour as a result of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behaviour. Responsibility for solving complex tasks incumbent on the government is divided among large organizations. Every organization deals with a particular set of problems, acting "quasi-independent". Some important issues fall solely in the care of a single organization. Organizational behaviour relevant for any issue reflects the independent response of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders that could substantially influence the specific behaviour of the organization, but can rarely precisely control. To solve these complex tasks, the behaviour of a large number of individuals requires coordination, involving standard operating procedures: rules according to which they act (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 129). A government is made up of existing organizations, each with a wellestablished set of programs and standard operating procedures, basically the behaviour of these organizations is determined by a previously established routine. However, organizations are changing, knowledge accumulates over time, and organizational change can take place in response to major disasters (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 130). Holsti believes that this model of foreign policy decision-making rarely conforms to the Weberian "ideal type" of rational organization (2006, 330). Some analysts assume that times of crisis can provide the motivation and means to reduce the non-rational aspects of bureaucratic behaviour: crises tend to force decisions to the top of the organization,

92

Chapter Two

where a superior quality of intelligence is available; information entering at the peak of the organization directly, reducing the distorting effects of different levels of information processing by the organization, and broader, less parochial values will be invoked. Decisions made in a short time, during the crisis, reduce the opportunities for decision-making by negotiation. Among the most commonly used techniques we mention: log rolling, incrementalism, lowest-common-denominator and muddling through (Holsti 2006, 330). Mintz and DeRouen and Breuning consider that the dynamic element of Organizational Behaviour is the standard operating procedure (SOP) (Holsti 2006, 330). It governs the lower levels of decision-making. Often, government decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty, are not crisis decisions and are based on guidelines or administrative rules. The two aforementioned authors emphasize the importance of another term, which Braybrook and Lindblom introduced in 1963, referring to the dynamics of organizational decisions: incrementalism (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 74). In terms of decision-making in these circumstances, even the studies of international crisis from the bureaucratic-organizational perspective are not uniform. Allison Graham's analysis of the Cuban (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 77) missile crisis presents some criticisms at the level of the bureaucratic dysfunctions regarding the disposition of US aeroplanes in Florida, the location of the naval blockade and the grounding of the flights from Alaska, which could have been parasitized USSR. Richard Neustadt's study on the two crises involving the US and the UK, reveals the significant erroneous perceptions of interests and political processes (Neustadt and May 1986, 215). McKeown stated the importance of organizational routines in decisionmaking, especially in the foreign policy of the United States (McKeown 2001, 1164). The author presents two points: one empirical and one theoretical. The empirical one is a close examination of the evidence which suggests that routines and plans did not limit the USresponse in the Cuban missile crisis. This is due to several reasons: the time available to decision-makers to face the missiles’ threat and consider the implementation of measures was much higher than considered. Therefore, the absence of plans and routines raise questions about the lack of development of these plans and routines a few months before the event (18 months before), when appeared the first considerations of the possible placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Secondly, when the decision-makers found that they did not have any plans to deal with this event, as they wanted, they got new plans or changed to the existing plans. This

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

93

happened quite quickly, so that new plans were made available when the presence of missiles was confirmed by photographs. Third, when the leaders found the plans and routines too restrictive, they were able to overcome them or to intervene personally, without denying the obstacles created by the routines. The theoretical point of view refers to the fact that, when the agreed routines are expensive, leaders can find them feasible and attractive. This can be understood in terms of two processes. The first includes the Organizational Behaviour Model, which is often regarded as the basis of the perspective on the organization, quite rigid and with stereotyped behaviour. An expanded concept of the organizational process suggests that a governed organization is not less capable of considering the variety and flexibility in responses. The second process involves strategic interaction between organizational decision-makers. Adherence to the plans is a cooperative behaviour; damages have their cost, but sometimes it is worth it. In such a game, plans and routine matter not only because of their ability to limit the organizational responses, but also because their plans can be evaluated in the negotiations, the basis for perceptions, positions and objects of political support. The critics of the organizational behaviour model have focused their attention on a few elements. They assumed that increased bureaucratic negotiation fails in adequately differentiating the positions of the participants (Holsti 2006, 331). In the American system, for example, the president is not just another player in the organizational system. Not just because he is the final person to make the decision, but he also selects the other players, a process that is crucial in formulating the future decision. Also, the conception of bureaucratic bargaining tends to emphasize the non-rational elements up to the point of exclusion of the original intellectual differences, which may be rooted in broader concerns, including disagreements over national interest. Indeed, the decisionmaking process, if properly managed, promotes and legitimizes multiple arguments (multiple advocacy) among the officials and it may facilitate a high class decision. This model is useful, especially for understanding the sliding between executive decisions and foreign policy actions that may occur during implementation, but it may be less valuable in explaining the decision. Holsti states that Allison's analysis on the Cuban (Holsti 2006, 331) missile crisis does not indicate a strong correlation between the bureaucratic roles and the assessment of the situation or of the political recommendations presented by Allison in Model III: governmental policy (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 211). The author believes that Allison has not given sufficient evidence on policy implementation, which raises doubts as

94

Chapter Two

to the adequacy of the realistic traditional conceptions of the unitary rational actor. The characterization of government action as organizational behaviour differs from the rational actor model. When referring to the missile crisis, the rational actor model analyst would ask why Khrushchev deployed missiles in Cuba or why the United States responded with a blockade and an ultimatum. Governments are "anthropomorphized", as if they were a person. In the organizational behaviour model explanations, subjects are never designated individuals or governments as a whole. The subjects of the organizational behaviour model are the organizations, and their behaviour is explained according to the organizational goals and practices which are common for the organization members, and not those specific to one or another of the individuals. Allison and Zelikow highlight five extra points for supporting the organizational theory in explaining organizational process (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 210): firstly, why the organization? Because organizations are formal groups of people gathered on the basis of precise rules, a set of structures and procedures created to conduct a specialized activity. Secondly, because the organization creates capabilities for achieving the goals and tasks that otherwise would not be achieved. Thirdly, the existing organizations, the routines and their programs constrain behaviour. In the fourth place, organizational culture manages to shape the behaviour of individuals within the organization in ways that take into account the informal and formal norms. Finally, organizations are less analogous to individuals than they are with a technology or a set of technologies. The paradigm of organizational behaviour which is relevant to foreign policy has been developed by Allison and Zelikow (2010, 144): I. The basic unit of analysis: governmental action as an organizational result. Foreign policy actions can be considered as organizational processes in three main directions. The first concerns the fact that the situations are organizational responses. The authors mentioned here exemplify this by interpreting the US military interventions in the Persian Gulf War, the operation "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm" (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 145). These were organizational actions. For instance, the actions of the soldiers in platoons, form companies, then battalions, brigades, divisions and corps as part of a unified command at the level of the theatre of operations. The decisions of governmental leaders have led the operational procedures. A second direction concerns the existing organizational capabilities for using the physical goods–this is the range of choices that the political leaders have at their disposal. With reference to the previous example, it was

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

95

the existence of equipped and trained troops in combat units which were able to be transported over thousands of miles, which enabled the start of the Gulf War. The third direction concerns the fact that the organizational answers structure the situation within the limits in which the leaders must take a decision. They provide information and take the first steps in outlining the issue to be presented to the leaders. The formal choice of the leaders often occurs after the climax has occurred. Innovation can occur when leaders try to undertake a new activity where there is no established organizational capacity or routines. Leaders need to realize that the benefits will come from creating an effective organizational product to be used in a future crisis, not in the one that takes place in the present. II. Organizing concepts A. Organizational actors–are organizations which have loose alliances, with the governmental leaders situated right above them. The constellation of organizations works when organizations carry out routine actions. In the case of state governments, the ministries, the departments and the agencies are the main actors. B. Factor-problems and fractional power–require that problems be cut and distributed to various organizations. In the case of the United States Government, the State Department has diplomacy as primary responsibility; the Defense Department handles military security, the Treasury deals with economic issues and the CIA with intelligence assessment. The primary power must accompany the primary responsibility: the Department of Defense acquires weapons necessary to ensure national security and the CIA gathers relevant intelligence. When organizations undertake something, a big part of what they do will be determined within the organization, so that each organization perceives the problems, processes the information and carries out a series of autonomous actions. An important aspect is that the size of the organization considers that a single CPU should take all important decisions. C. Organizational missions–organizations interpret mandates in their own terms, and many governmental organizations have official status in which the areas of competence are specified.

96

Chapter Two

D. Operational objectives, special capabilities and culture– refer to the primary responsibility. For a limited set of problems they combine with the requirements for action, producing distinct sets of beliefs about how to implement a mission and the capabilities required to achieve it. Beliefs create organizational culture emphasized by: how success is defined in operational terms, the selective information available to the organization, special systems or technologies operating in the organization in order to achieve the task; professional standards for recruiting and retaining staff in the organization; the experience in making decisions and the distribution of rewards by the organization. So, organizations develop relatively stable inclinations regarding priorities, operational objectives, perceptions and problems. E. Action as an organizational answer–which refers to the programmed framework of organizational action characterized by: 1. Objectives: compliance defines acceptable performance–the objectives of an organization are defined by a set of targets, together with constraints. A successful compliance means a successful action. 2. Sequential attention given to objectives–the conflict between operational targets and constraints is solved by the sequential attention mechanism. The subunits of an organization interested in an issue which has occurred, solves the problems in terms of targets and constraints considered important. 3. Operational standard procedures–refer to general rules that allow the concerted action of a large number of individuals, each responding to some basic signals. The most important procedures are based on the incentive structure of the organization, on its norms or basic attitudes, on professional culture or the operating style of its members. 4. Programs and repertoires–each set of operational procedures requires a program

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

97

which is available to the organization for dealing with a situation. The list of relevant programs for a particular type of activity represents an organizational repertory. The number of programs in a repertory is limited, when properly activated, organizations are running programs that may be changed substantially in a particular situation. The more complex the action, and the greater number of individuals involved, the more important are the programs and directories. 5. Avoiding uncertainty–by arranging a negotiated environment, organizations seek to maximize autonomy and regulate the reactions of other actors who they must deal with. Where autonomy is not possible, the primary environment (relations with other organizations, including the government) is stabilized by arrangements such as budget breakdowns, areas of responsibility and established practices. The secondary environment (international relations with the world) is stabilized between allies by concluding contracts (formal and informal alliances) and "club relations" (i.e., the relationship between the US State Department and the British Foreign Office). Where the international environment cannot be negotiated, the remaining uncertainties are tackled by organizations with a set of standard scenarios representing the contingency events they are preparing for. 6. Issue-directed search–focuses on the unusual discomfort which should be avoided (looking first for symptom vicinity, then the current alternative). The search patterns reveal biases that reflect factors such as specialized training, experience in the different parts of the organization and patterns of communication within the organization. 7. Organizational learning and change– organizations seek answers to questions which

98

Chapter Two

are not standard, routine procedures evolve, new information and skills are being assimilated within the organizational cultures' world view. This learning and change derives from existing procedures. The conditions under which dramatic changes are most likely to occur include: a lavish budget, a prolonged period of austerity and dramatic failures. F. Central coordination and control–the need for the coordination and centrality of foreign policy for the nation's welfare ensures the involvement of government leaders in the processes of organizations which divide power. The intervention of government leaders can affect the inclinations and routine procedures of each organization. It is not possible, however, to centrally target the operations and to permanently control the organizational activities. The result is the new focus on targets or established constraints. G. Decisions of government leaders–concern the choosing of those organizations that will implement a certain program and where they would do it. Leadership options regarding the change of governmental behaviour include: the activation of a program in favour of another; the activation of routine organizational procedures in a new context; the simultaneous activation of several programs of the organizations. III. Dominant inference pattern–at any given time, a government consists of an established conglomerate of organizations, each with its own notions regarding important tasks, special capabilities, programs and repertoires. The characteristics of governmental actions result from the routine procedures established and the choices made by government leaders within the programs established. The best explanation regarding the behaviour of the organization at t time is t-1, and the best prediction for what will happen at t +1 time is t. The organizational behaviour model refers to the discovery of special skills, repertoires and routine organizational procedures that have produced results which contain the event analyzed. If an analyst notices the correlation between the behaviour of the members of an organization and the routine procedures of the organization, that behaviour does not provide any evidence regarding the intentions of the leaders. IV. General considerations (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 154)

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

99

A. The organized existing capacities influence the choice of the government–if there are any special capabilities of an organization, then that organization is likely to be chosen, because the option is available at low costs. Organizations created to provide an option generate information and assessments and the implementation of the exercise of that option becomes more probable. B. Organizational priorities determine organizational implementation: 1. Organizations tend to emphasize the objectives best suited to their special strengths and the hierarchy of beliefs within the culture of the organization. 2. If conflicting goals are consistent with the capabilities and culture of the organization, inconsistent constraints will be addressed in turn. C. Implementation reflects a previously established routine procedure–the details and nuances of the organizations’ actions are determined by organizational routine, not by the indications of government leaders. D. Leaders neglect the calculation of administrative feasibility at their own risk–this refers to the leaders’ compliance with the following elements: organizations are lacking cutting edge tools; rarely are projects made requesting deviations from the established programs, conducting unscheduled tasks; projects involving the coordination of organizations are rarely carried out in the form in which they were designed; projects bringing together the projects of a few organizations will set up an interaction of routine procedures, with unforeseen and dangerous consequences; resistance occurs when a particular part of a problem is contrary to the goals of the organization; government leaders expect every organization to do their job starting from the existing level of competence; government leaders may receive distorted or incomplete information from the organizations. E. Limited flexibility and incremental change–refers to: 1. Organizational budgets change incrementally– as a whole, but also in parts, at intra-

100

Chapter Two

organizational level. Predictions that involve significant budgetary changes in one year between organizations or between the units of the same organization should be avoided. 2. Culture, priorities and organizational perceptions are relatively stable. 3. Procedures and organizational repertoires change incrementally. 4. New activities consist of the easy adapting of the existing programs and activities. 5. A program, once started, is not interrupted when the objective costs outweigh the benefits. 6.Long-term planning–according to the organizational behaviour pattern, this planning concerns the actual contributions of these units to the outcome of policies. Long-term planning tends to become institutionalized, and then treated with indifference. F. Imperialism-most organizations want to be autonomous. They follow increases in budgets, staff and attractive new territories. The issues that arise in regions with ambiguous and changing boundaries are dominated by colonizing activities. G. Targeted change–targeting major factors (personnel, rewards, information, budgets) can result in major changes over time. V. Specific sentences (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 157) Discouragement–the organizational behaviour paradigm suggests that the scenarios which dominate the strategic literature are less interesting than some additional scenarios that occur independently of the conditions of balance or imbalance. First, the unwanted event which occurs may be a consequence of organizational action (e.g. the launching of a rocket by a member of the organization who has the missile). The question arises: what is the control system of the adversary? If the physical mechanisms and the standard operating procedures allow the existence of multiple centres of decision to launch nuclear missiles against the United States, the probability of such an event being triggered will increase if the conditions are unbalanced or unstable. Secondly, what behavioural patterns does the enemy hold to bring the strategic capabilities to the state of alert? If the procedures are too flexible, an accident could happen, if the procedures

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

101

are irregular and the forces are not on alert, it is important to calculate the risk and the difficulty of defusing the situation. Thirdly, organizational processes secure the framework for open elections to the enemy leaders. In the fourth place, the answers of routine organizational procedures establish the framework and the rules when the government leaders are faced with the problem of choice. In the fifth place, how likely is it that organizational procedures determine an accidental release? The values to be considered (by the American system) are reducing losses and protecting against replies (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 158). A. The posture of the forces–is determined by organizational factors such as goals and procedures existing in the military services and in research and design laboratories. The choices of governmental leaders determine the total budget for the government, and influence some major purchase decisions, but the importance of the posture of forces derives from the routine operation of organizational units. VI. Evidences–the affirmation of organizational trends is an important change of perspective within this paradigm. The examination of governmental action through the use of concepts and sentences can be useful. With a minimum of information about the organizations which constitute a government, about the routine and standard operating procedures and the characteristics of the organization, the rational actor model can be improved.

Conclusion The organizational behaviour model provides the most valuable theoretical basis for interpreting how options are evaluated, in relation to the preferences of an actor in an organization. Since players tend to maximize their goals in an organization, decision-makers should evaluate the alternatives (Christensen and Redd 2004, 72). This decision-making analysis model is used for examining the manner in which context influences the choice of a solution (Christensen and Redd 2004, 69). Two elements are necessary for understanding the decision-making process from the perspective of organizational behaviour: (1) how they reach a decision, and (2) why do actors have certain preferences in the decision-making process? (Christensen and Redd 2004, 71) Governmental actors will negotiate results according to the political goals they pursue. The occupation of a high position in the foreign policy

102

Chapter Two

environment allows the actors to participate in the negotiation (Allison 1981, 164). Actors will negotiate to maximize their influence in the political sphere. Decision-makers have stereotypes within the organization in which they operate, which will generate influences upon the chosen solution. This will give decision-makers the ability to fit a wide range of events into a predetermined pattern, to reduce the number of categories and to save time and mental effort, involving the costs of nuances (Vertzberger 1990, 126). The organizational behaviour model emphasizes that the actors in an organization represent the force that determines the choice of a solution in foreign policy decision-making (Christensen and Redd 2004, 82).

The Government Policies Model This model rejects the idea that government decision-making is a rational process based on clear procedures, formal and legal, considering it rather a "negotiation process" in which individuals compete for position and personal power (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 232). Allison and Zelikow believe that government behaviour cannot be understood as organizational output, but in the form of a "negotiated outcome;" "results are formed and deformed by the interaction of competing preferences" (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 211). Unlike the rational actor model, this model does not consider a unitary actor, but several actors in the position of players, acting on their own conceptions and personal goals, whether organizational or national. Individuals share the power and have different opinions on how to act. Governmental decisions and actions result from the political process. There are cases when a group is successful in an action over other groups, supporting other solutions; different groups pulling in different directions produce a result or an outcome that differs from what was intended. Brighi and Hill believe that leaders must be clear and reflective about the goals they set, but in foreign policy there should not be the illusion that equilibrium may occur later or that they can rely on any means in order to provide results (Brighi and Hill 2008, 133). The implementation phase of foreign policy decisions has always involved some moments which may be lost due to transaction costs, political friction and disappointment. Because the decisions almost never fall in execution of the leaders, they rely on the members of government structures, and some of them can slow down or speed up the policy or even conduct their own policies, through

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

103

competition. Moreover, they could only be accused of inefficiency, which may endanger the original policy. The main characteristics of the governmental policies model are (Kackson and Sorensen 2007, 233): ¾ Bureaucrats and bureaucracy are driven by the interests of agencies wanting to ensure their survival; ¾ Agencies and bureaucracies are involved in a constant competition for stakes and different prizes. The network effect is a political process where struggles for organizational survival, expansion or development are inevitable; ¾ Competition produces an intra-agency bureaucratic culture and a behavioural pattern. The axiom "where you stand depends on where you sit", describes this condition; ¾ Bureaucratic structures have a number of advantages over elected officials in the reality of policy-making. They include expertise, continuity, responsibility for implementation and longevity. These features create an asymmetric power relationship between professionals, dependent on bureaucratic structures and elected officials; ¾ Policy-making within the governmental framework is characterized by negotiation, accommodation/adaptation and compromise; ¾ In a governmental system, the proposals for change are driven by political considerations; governments have an entrenched interest in their own preservation; ¾ By their own nature, governmental policies raise questions about control, responsibility, responsiveness and accountability in a democratic society. Mintz and DeRouen consider that the governmental policies model refers to how decisions involving bureaucrats may involve political competition (2010, 71). An interesting opinion belongs to Vandenbrouke, who brings to this decision-making model elements related to the personality of the leader involved (1984, 484). Citing the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the author states that the key player was President Kennedy, who made the final decision and whose main strategy was to avoid domestic criticism and to fight against communism. To this are added the elements belonging to the personality of the president: personal values, innovative management style, courage and activism. The author states that a complex

104

Chapter Two

understanding of the event will be possible by extending this model with cognitive theory, which will be detailed later. Breuning interprets the governmental policies model, but also the organizational behaviour model through the president's advisers’ system (Breuning 2007, 98). The author notes that the governmental policies model accentuates the perceptions and priorities of the counsellors formed by the organizations that employ them and by their personal ambitions and interests. As a result, policy choices are the end-result of complex negotiations at multiple levels: hierarchical, between superiors and subordinates, with their own agendas, and horizontally, between the heads of agencies representing the different interests of the government. While it is important to recognize that the bureaucratic structure of advisers (advisory birocracy) rarely works as effectively and dispassionately as the rational actor model assumes, it is important to recognize that corrections could come from both the counsellors of the leaders and the leaders themselves. The advisory system that surrounds the leader can mediate or exacerbate distortions in the flow of information, from organizations and individuals within the bureaucratic structure. Strathman believes that the competitive nature of the political system affects the goals and desires of the governmental actors (Strathman 2005, 43). While some formulas enable the inclusion of personal interests, the general approach assumes that organizational interests dominate the personal interests of bureaucrats (Vanderbrouke 1984, 474). Ripley (1995) considers that the interests of bureaucrats shape the cognitive styles of bureaucrats, with an impact on the process of encoding information (Ripley 1995, 85). The bureaucrats internalize broader bureaucratic interests; they self-fulfill their prophecies and set the direction for political action. Halperin (1975) believes that bureaucrats win the game by placing the right argument, whose preferred policy is consistent with a shared image of a group decision (Halperin, 1975). The claim is that leaders make decisions consistent with what they think is supported by their close circle; leaders use shared images to lead their decisions. The arguments most capable of capturing the images shared by the group influence the choice of policy. However, there are some constraints on these calls. For example, Halperin (1975) specifies four distinct limitations of the bureaucratic structures that tend to capture the shared conception of the group (Halperin 1975): the organizational channels of information (e.g. selective information is collected by every bureaucrat and is not shared with other group members), the long-term interests of bureaucrats, the respect for expertise and the content of shared imagination. By recognising these

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

105

limitations, bureaucratic structures present information selectively and bypass these blockages. Vandenbrouke believes that the study of organizational behaviour reveals that the manner of a behavioural variant of an organization at a certain time is slightly different from its previous behaviour (Vanderbrouke 1984, 484). An organization faced with a new situation will typically try to reduce an unfamiliar situation to a familiar problem or solution. For example, the author describes CIA behaviour in the case of Guatemala and in the Cuban missile crisis, identifying behavioural similarities. Critics of the governmental policies model say that this model tends to go too far into the negative view of bureaucratic structures. Governmental negotiations can lead to better decisions because of the values and interests, which become clearer during the process. Moreover, the bureaucratic approach tends to downplay the role of the president in the American system (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 233). Among the criticism of this model lies the need to have detailed information about the players, which is not always available. Therefore, some results from the government would not be certain (Vanderbrouke 1984, 487). The richness of this model is in the improvement of the explanations as new materials appear. A second big limitation of this model, in Vandenbrouke's vision, is given by its inability to consider the deficiencies in decision. Not even the goals and values of individual actors are sufficient enough to explain the persistent refusal of decision-makers to face unpleasant events. An interesting approach belongs to Drezner (2000, 733). The author suggests that institutions can generate ideas and the Governmental Policies Model shows that. These ideas determine foreign policy. The author launches the term "institutions which infuse ideas," arguing that the place of these institutions in the structure of foreign policy will determine their ability to survive and prosper, in contradictory ways. The institutions which infuse ideas possess a structural isolation from the influence of other organizations and will survive in a consistent manner. Isolation allows the agency to develop an organizational culture dedicated to fundamental ideas, prevents the introduction of competitive ideas or tactics. Pre-existing bureaucratic structures will automatically resist the introduction of new actors in the political mix and will impose restrictions. Developing a strong organizational culture will prevent new institutions from compromising with other agencies. An isolated institution will be pressed to overcome bureaucratic divisions in the dissemination of ideas. The novelty brought by Drezner is the conceptual approach, which does not try to turn into a general theory of the Governmental Policies Model (Drezner 2000, 734). However, the approach does not suggest the

106

Chapter Two

origins of bureaucratic preferences, the strategies of maximizing the organizational usefulness and the results. In particular, the ability of bureaucratic structures using organizational culture as a means of spreading ideas is crucial in determining the results. The approach is consistent, in rationality and constructivist elements, emphasizing the role of organizational culture within the Governmental Policies Model. Anderson notes that previous limitations and justifications imply consistent governmental behaviour over time (Anderson 1981, 744). If what counts as an acceptable alternative is limited by the need for stable expectations, the behaviour at time t should not be different from the behaviour at time t+1. But the fact that a governmental behaviour expresses stability does not imply justifications, precedents and the desirability of consistency as causative factors. It is understood that the forces that led to a particular behaviour at time t should determine the same behaviour at time t+1. In this case, stable expectations will be more of a consequence rather than the cause. The question that arises here is: what comes up in the foreign policy decision-making process and results in justifications and precedents which act as constraints over what counts as an acceptable alternative? One constant in the decision-making process is that the proposal over the course of action is accompanied by justifying arguments. Organizational decisions must be justified in terms of goals and objectives. Discontinuity between public and private motivations for supporting a proposal suggests a well-defined social distinction between legitimate and illegitimate justifying arguments. Three factors influence the legitimate foundations of argumentation: organizational purposes, shared images and standards of leadership and deliberation. The paradigm of governmental policy has the following elements (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 241): I. The basic unit of analysis: government action as political outcome– national conduct in international relations can be conceived as something that emerges from the “subtle, simultaneous, overlapping and often very serious games of those situated on different positions in government" (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 241). The authors consider that the decisions and actions of government are the resultants of international policy achievements, in the sense that what is happening is not the solution of a problem, but the result of a compromise between officials with different interests and influence alike; political, in the sense that activity resulting in decisions and actions is best characterized as a negotiation using the channels of government

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

107

members. Government actions’ analysis involves examining all of its official actions affecting a certain result. It is important to recognize: that the relevant government action represents a cluster or a collage of relatively independent decisions and actions of individuals and groups of players in different games, as well as from formal governmental decisions and actions which are a combination of preferences and the relative influence of the central players or subsets of the players who are in different situations. (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 241);

II. Organizing concepts–can be arranged as parts in the answers of four questions. Who is playing? What factors determine the perceptions, preferences and position of the players in a problem? What determines each player's impact on the results? How are the position, and influence and movements of the players to reach decisions and governmental actions combined, within the game? A. Who is playing? 1. Players in the positions–the governmental actor is composed of individual players and groups of players; it is the agent for the particular government decisions and actions, and the players are individuals who are placed in certain positions. The positions define what players can and should do. Advantages and obstacles with which each player can enter and play in different games come from his position, as well as the obligations to achieve different tasks. B. What factors determine the perceptions, preferences and position of the players in a problem? 1. Parochial priorities and perceptions. When asked "what is the matter?" multiple responses could be given, influenced by the position from which the question is addressed. The factors that encourage organizational parochialism (organizational behaviour model) put pressure on the players at the top or within an organization, the representatives of an organization being sensitive to his orientation. In many cases, the trends and priorities arising from the position are enough to allow analysts

108

Chapter Two

to make reliable predictions about the attitude of a player. 2. Goals and interests–for broader national goals, in addition to security interests and personal interests, the internal political and organizational interests come into play. 3. Stakes and attitudes–overlapping interests (national interest, organizational interest, operational objectives and personal concerns) are the stakes at play. These stakes are a mixture of individual interests configured by the issue in question. Depending on the stakes, a player decides which attitude to take on that certain issue. 4. Deadlines and facets of the problems–first of all, a problem has to be well-defined, associated with one of the ideas generated by the government and with an opportunity for action, determined by an event which will start. Deadlines and events raise the problem and force the players to take action. In the arena of national security, the budget, the requests for instructions from the military groups and the scheduled information reports set recurring deadlines for decisions and actions. Secondly, political speeches or extremely important events may force decisions. Thirdly, crises require decisions and action. The deadline raises the question in a context and affects problemsolving. In the case of a problem, the players see different facets of the issue. The facet seen by each player is not only determined by the aims and interests, but also by the channel that an issue is raised on and by the deadline. What determines each player's impact on the results? Power is a mixture of three elements: bargaining advantages, skills and willingness to use the advantages of negotiation and the perceptions of other players over the first of the previouslymentioned elements. The sources of the bargaining advantages include: formal authority and responsibility; effective control over the resources needed to carry out the action; expertise and

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

109

control over the information that authorizes someone to define the problem, to identify the options and to assess feasibility; control of information authorizing the bosses to decide whether and how decisions are implemented; the ability to influence the objectives of other players from other games; the ability to persuade other players and the access to players who have the presented advantages of negotiating benefits and the ability to persuade them (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 245). B. What is the game? 1. Action channels–are regulated means by which the government action is taken in a particular type of problem. Action channels structure the game by pre-selecting the major players, causing their usual points of entry into the game and distributing the particular advantages and disadvantages of each game. These channels determine who will turn out with the action. Typically, the issues are recognized and determined within a channel set to produce action. 2. The rules of the game–are derived from a constitution, legislation, and interpretations of courts of justice, executive orders, conventions and even culture. Some rules are implicit, others are explicit. Some are sharp, others are confusing, some are stable, and others are changing. This is the combination which defines the game. The rules establish the positions, the ways in which individuals have access to the position, the power of each position and the channels of action for each position. They restrict the spectrum of acceptable government decisions and actions. Rules penalize certain moves (negotiations, coalitions, persuasion, deception, threat) declaring them illegal, immoral, dishonorable or improper. 3. Action as political resultant–government decisions and actions occur in the context of divided power, of separate judgements on important elections, when the policy appears to be the mechanism of choice. Each player

110

Chapter Two

handles power so as to obtain the results that will promote his concept on national, organizational, group or individual interests. Other important elements are: the environment in which the game takes place (an uncertainty about what to do, the realization that something needs to be done and the crucial consequences of the action. Such features are forcing citizens to become active players), the pace of the game leads players to struggle to capture the attention of others; the structure of the game–power divided by individuals with separate responsibilities, validates each player’s feeling that the others do not understand his problem and must be convinced to consider it from a less narrow perspective; the law of the game–he who hesitates loses, he who is insecure is dominated by the confident; the reward of the game–the effectiveness and the impact on results encourages rough play. III. The dominant inference pattern–if a nation decided on an action, it is the result of negotiation between individuals and groups within the government. The power of this decision-making model is given by the presentation of the game (action channels, positions, players, their preferences, interventions) that led to the resultant, i.e. the action. When the outcome of a decision is due to an individual or group, this model tries to identify the details of the game that made the victory possible. IV. General statements–will use basic information on: the rules of the game, the importance of skilfulness, of reputation and other characteristics that players use; the distribution of strengths and weaknesses, evaluating each player regarding alternative rewards. A. Political resultants–refer to a number of factors: 1. Preferences and attitudes of the players, which can have a significant effects on government action; 2. Advantages and disadvantages of each player vary substantially from one channel of action to another;

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

111

3. The mixture of the players and the advantages of each player change during the action channels. B. Actions and decisions–governmental action does not involve governmental intention. The resultant of governmental behaviour is rarely intentional, with various individuals with different intentions contributing to the result (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 249). The resultants can fit the preference of an organization in the context of the political game: 1. Most results appear in games involving players who perceive different facets of the same issues, and which vary considerably according to the actions they prefer. Because there are different definitions of the problem, there are different solutions; 2. Actions rarely follow a doctrine accepted by all players; 3. Actions consisting of a number of issues arising from several games do not reflect a coordinated government strategy. C. Problems and solutions 1. Solutions to strategic problems are not discovered by detached analysts; the problems for the players are more limited and more extensive than the strategic issue. Each player focuses on the decision to be taken, affecting each player's stake. The difference between the aspect that the analyst and the player focus on is huge; 2. Decisions that require substantial changes in governmental action reflect a coincidence: bosses are seeking solutions and players are seeking the problem (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 249). D. The attitude depends on the rank–the player can resist or ignore the conditioning resulting from the person's place in government and place within the action channel. Someone’s attitude is strongly influenced by the place occupied. Knowledge of organizational settlement provides significant information about the probable

112

Chapter Two

attitude. “The chiefs and the Indians”–the requests addressed to the presidents, chiefs, "Indians" are very different in terms of policy elaboration and then implementation. Foreign policy issues to be addressed by the president are limited by his full agenda; he must solve the problem that entered first on the agenda. The chiefs in foreign policy are facing burning issues and can attract the attention of the president and members of the government on important issues. They have to build a coalition of relevant forces. Some problems are set and advanced by the "Indians" who struggle with others from different departments, their major problem being how to attract the attention of their superiors and how to bring an issue into an action channel. So, in the policy-making process, the issue viewed top-down is how to keep one’s room for manoeuvre until time clarifies uncertainties; seen sideways, it means involvement (how to make others enter into the coalition with me), and looking up it means trust (how to make the boss trust me and do what must be done). Paraphrasing Neustadt, the essence of any responsible official’s task is to convince the other players that his version of what should be done is what the latter’s own responsibilities would require from them (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 251). E. Principle 51-49–the terms and conditions of the game affect the time spent by the players, thinking of policy choices and the strength and safety with which they substantiate the preferred alternative. The players must make decisions in a short time, entering into competition with other players, being forced to argue with more confidence. They internalize the game requirements. International and intranational relations–the actions of a nation affect the actions of another, defending the advantages and disadvantages for the players of the second nation. The players of a state can follow or try to achieve certain international goals through direct participation in the international game of another state, when the circumstances allow this. If the action channel is destined for a common policy of at least two states or the citizens of several states, the distinction between

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

113

international and intranational goals is lost in a game that concerns them both (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 251). F. The aspects of the problem are different from one chair to another–the occupied seat influences perspective and attitude. A function of the group process, analyzed by this decisional model, is getting a limited agreement on the facets of the problem. G. Wrong expectations–the pace of development of the games allows for limited attention to each game separately and requires focus on priority games. Players often lack detailed information about the details of other players’ games and problems. The tendency of waiting for others to act in a certain way, on the issues which are not a priority, cannot be avoided. H. Poor communication–as communication tends to be rapid, it becomes elliptical; in a noisy environment, each player believes that they have expressed more strongly and more clearly than the others have understood him. I. Reluctance–it seems overwhelming because every player is engaged in multiple games. Reluctancy in the course of a game reduces leakage which can harm priority games, allowing other players to interpret the results in the least intrusive manner. J. Styles of play–highlights the important differences in the behaviour of careerist bureaucrats, those who entered the system on a lateral path of those politically appointed. The differences depend on long-term expectations. Bureaucrats must adopt a compliance code if they want to survive changes in administration, those who have entered on a side track or those politically appointed are temporary employees, interested in the public policy or other measures that can be taken in a shorter time. The style of play is significantly affected by how a player understands his action, some players not being able to articulate the governmental policy game because of the notion that their function does not legitimize such activity. V. Specific statements A. The use of force during crises 1. The probability that the US government should make a decision to use

114

Chapter Two

military force in a crisis increases as the number of individuals who have an overall initial personal preference for forceful military action grows in the following positions: the President, the adviser on national security problems, the Defense Secretary and Secretary of State and the Director of the CIA (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 252); 2. The perception of these individuals on an issue is radically different. Differences will be partially predictable, given the pressures of the positions and the personalities of those concerned; 3. These factors include the way in which the problem is set to an action. An action force is more likely if the action is brought as a movement evolving an uncertain meaning and susceptible to varying interpretations of other players; 4. The result will be influenced by the way in which the problem was configurated in view of an action. An action in force is more likely if the action is formulated as an evolving movement, its meaning being uncertain and susceptible to various interpretations from other players. B. Military action 1. For a military action whose decision and implementation will be postponed, time will be used for the advocates to try to convince the opponents to join in; 2. Major decisions, regarding the use of military force are not simple presidential or majority decisions, but decisions obtained by a large majority; 3. There is not any military action which is chosen without extensive consultation with military players (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 253). VI. Evidences–refers to the access of the analyst to a large number of participants in the decision-making process and to the documents of

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Recent Approaches

115

that event. The art in using this model is precisely the reconstruction of the process, based on information derived from several sources, governmental documents, newspapers, interviews with direct participants and discussions with close observers of the participants (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 253). Once the event is reconstructed, the documents allow a better understanding of those who participated, the facets of the problem, how the problem has been configured in view of the adoption of an action and how the results were understood. For every challenging action of the government, this decision-making model provides the tools needed for sorting evidence and for the observation of gaps.

Conclusion The study of the decision-making processes by the governmental policies model has focused more on describing organizational interactions and not on the development of positive theories of action (Drezner 2000, 734). To obtain encouraging results, it is necessary to use strategies for the organizational maximization of utility. In particular, the ability of governmental structures to use organizational culture as a means of spreading ideas is essential for determining certain results (Drezner 2000, 734). The governmental policies model has focused almost exclusively on the decisions of a security crisis, then extending to the longitudinal analysis of the "routines" of foreign policy (Allison, 1981). This model of analysis should be extended to the other cases, precisely because of the power of the elements of organizational analysis. The focus of decision-making within governmental structures is not constrained to legal and formal rules by which they intend to win rationality and eliminate the unpredictable aspects of bureaucratic behaviour. Rather, it is an enhancement rather than a denial of the political nature of government structures, and of other informal aspects of organizational behaviour (Holsti 2006, 329). Studying international crises from the perspective of the governmental policies model is different from the decision-making process. The analysis of the Cuban missile crisis by Graham Allison has identified several critical points in the functioning of governmental structures, relating to: the placing of aeroplanes in Florida, the location of the naval blockade and the grounding of aeroplanes in Alaska (Allison and Zelikow 2010, 266). It should be considered the strong role of governmental policies in the analysis of the decision-making process, by the correlations established

116

Chapter Two

between the roles within the governmental structures, the situation assessment and subsequently the policy recommendations (Holsti 2006, 331). The critics of this model of analysis of the decision-making process have focused on a few points: the emphasis on negotiation within the governmental structures has led to the failure of differentiating the positions of the participants; in the case of the United States of America, the president's position is not just that of another actor in the decisionmaking process, he is the one who decides the composition of the actors in this process and makes the final decision; the concepts of bureaucratic bargaining tend to emphasize the importance of non-rational elements, up to the exclusion of genuine intellectual differences, even disagreements over national interest (Holsti 2006, 331).

CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVES FOR THE DECISION-MAKING MODELS

The Cybernetic Model This model creates the transition between the "traditional" models, described in the previous chapter, and their more dynamic and flexible alternatives, which will be presented throughout this chapter. Mintz (2007) introduced the term “behavioural international relations– BIR”, which refers to "all that isn’t rational choice theory": prospective theory, poliheuristic theory, the cybernetic theory, operational code analysis, leadership psychology, emotions and misperceptions, images, information processing, etc. (Mintz 2007, 157). Behavioural International Relations are an oriented process. An interesting perspective of anthropological origins is brought by Herbert Simon (1985, cited by Mintz, DeRouen, 2010), who distinguishes between rational and cognitive decision-makers (Simon 1985, 295). He states that the term homo economicus refers to past approaches, and homo psychologicus to recent ones. The author distinguishes the psychological models based on the claim that decision-makers have limited information processing capabilities. Instead of looking objectively for all sources, to get to the best information, decision-makers ”will select an alternative which is acceptable”. Mintz and DeRouen (2010, 68) said that while rational schools focus on maximizing behaviour and on the cost-benefit comparison, cognitive schools prove how people make decisions and learn in a defined rational environment. Simon (1985) argues that people are bounded by rationality and procedures (Simon 1985, 295, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 69). The authors said that bounded rationality is procedural in the fact that a behaviour is adaptive to the constraints imposed by the external circumstances and capacities of the decision-maker. The cybernetic paradigm excludes the need to calculate the procedures and optimal alternatives based on the preferred results, by eliminating the

118

Chapter Three

alternatives or ignoring the environment and the problem of variety (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 69). The cybernetic model can be applied to the group level. Organizations do not perform their own reassessment and monitoring, but rather make some adjustments (Cashman 1993, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 70). Within this default setting, decisions which must be made in the larger organizations are divided into smaller units and will be carried out by subunits of the organization (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 480, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 70).

The Prospective Theory Ever since its formulation, the prospective theory has become a reference psychological theory in the study of the decision-making process (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This theory argues that people have an aversion to risk when it relates to gains and a risk acceptance when relating to losses. The prospective theory has broad implications for international relations. It is used in explaining the use of armed intervention when presidents are in a difficult situation (DeRouen 1995, 671). McDermott (2004) used this theory based on the risk-taking approach, trying to explain the behaviour of states in international relations (McDermott 2004, 173). In the field of international relations, politicians have tried many times to explain and find answers to questions such as: why do wars between nations start? How are the treaties for arms control being negotiated? Which are strategies that can improve crisis management techniques? Many of the seemingly unexplainable behaviours in international relations have a common element, which has been ignored so far. The key to explaining and predicting these phenomena lies in understanding the nature of the risk-taking behaviour in international politics. Many of the problems that policy-makers at the central level need to cope with, are joined by the extension on the alternative of risk involvement. Risk-taking mechanisms can explain and predict many political phenomena, especially those occurring under a high degree of uncertainty or incomplete information (McDermott 2004, 3). Risk is inherent in any situation involving uncertainty. In a sense, any decision made under certainty "is trivial by definition" (McDermott 2004, 173). The author believes that any important decision involves elements of risk. When confronting a situation, the decision-maker faces the factors that influence his choice. Decisions are so difficult because they incorporate elements of risk. The author states that what most people consider as being

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

119

decisions, are actually turning points in the decision process, representing the moments when the natural, automated decision-making processes have failed in working well enough to remove the unconscious nature of their standard operations. Decisions occur when there is time pressure, task complexity, awareness of the available alternatives and a good alternative assumption that leads to the desired result (Mc Dermott 2004, 173). The prospective theory provides a thorough situational analysis: risktaking behaviour is based not only on the individual predispositions of a leader, but derives from a cognitive response to a situation that restricts how the options are interpreted and how the choice is made. It is a theory of the decision-making process and of reasoning. Decisions are based on judgements that are subjective in nature. As a result, decision-makers are likely to be influenced in their judgement even before they intervene in the decision-making process. Kent (2005) specifies two elements which differentiate the prospective theory from the expected utility theory/model: dependence on the reference point and the value of the s (Kent 2005, 106) -shaped function. The figure below (3-1) graphically presents this comparison: Fig. 3-1: Comparison between the Expected Utility and the Prospective Theory (according to Kent 2005, 107) Expected Utility

Prospect theory Losses

Gains

Point of reference Losses

Gains

Value

Jack Levy (1992) illustrates the experimental theory which belongs to Kahneman and Tversky (Levy 1992, 174). One group was given a scenario invoking a range of gain. These subjects were asked to choose from a guaranteed win of $3,000 and 20% chance of loss and 80% chance of receiving $4,000: 80% of subjects chose the guaranteed gain. Another group was given the information in terms of loss. They had to choose from the 80% chance of losing $4,000 and the 20% chance of losing nothing, or a safe loss of $3,000; 92% of the respondents accepted the game. The

120

Chapter Three

author notes that in both cases the subjects tend to prefer the smaller gain value. This experiment highlights the aversion to loss (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 75): „Prospective theory suggests that avoiding loss is more important than securing gain” (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 76). Individuals share what they own and are concerned with the loss of what they already have. The endowment effect is the name given to the value that people have(Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 76). Interpreting the graphical comparison shown above, Kent (2005) believes that the concave shape of the function value for gains produces different results, a tendency to overestimate the current position (Thaler 1980, 39). Levy (1997) believes that people tend to value what they have, more than what they do not have and giving up a certain good is greater than the utility of its purchase (Levy 1997, 89). For example, the owner of an object refuses to sell it at a price that he would never have originally paid (Knetsch 1989, 1277). One implication of the endowment effect is the accommodation of the winnings. Experiments suggest that individuals will adjust faster to gains than to losses (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991, 1342). Gains are seen more as being permanent, and therefore, more effort is put into keeping them. Losses are seen as being temporary and individuals commit to a risk acceptance behaviour to regain what they have lost (Kent 2005, 110). The value of the s-shaped function: Prospective theory suggests that the decrease in the value of gains is proportional to the increase and that losses affect more than the satisfaction obtained by the gains (Quattrone and Tversky 1988, 719). Rather than the linearity of the value of a function belonging to expected utility, the values of the function of the prospective theory are concave in gains and convex and steep in losses. The value of the s-shaped function is an important starting point in relation to the expected utility models. The aversion to loss: the value of the s-shaped function is steeper (convex) for losses than for gains. This is an indicator of the people’s tendency to overestimate relative losses against comparable gains (Levy 1992, 100). The pain of loss exceeds the pleasure of gain. When we are dealing with a game that involves a 50% chance of winning or losing the same amount of money, most people are averse to the idea of taking risks. Substantial research has documented this claim (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 251; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991, 1344; Fischoff 1982, 103). In Levy's vision, the prospective theory has two phases: the editing phase, when the decision is presented and the options are identified. Framing the effects occurs in this phase as the prospective theory states

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

121

that the informational manner in which the decision is presented can affect the choice. This assertion counteracts the rational model's insistence that the order and method of information are not critical determinants of choice (McDermpott, 2004, 71). Therefore, information can be framed so that it can change the outcome of the decision. Kent (2005) considers the effect of framing, referring to the different ways in which the same decision can be framed and different frameworks can lead to different decisions. The effects of framing occur when the same alternatives are evaluated in relation to different reference points. The glass can be half empty or half full, depending on how the decision-maker perceives himself as being above or below the reference point. The strategic actor will always know where he is and where he wants to be politically. Phase two of the prospective theory is the evaluation phase, when the choice is being made. This choice is based on a reference point and on the value or utility function. As already stated, the prospective theory considers the changes to the reference point as critical. The example of McDermott (2004) involves a person who has $1,001 at the end (McDermott, 2004, 104). From the perspective of the prospective theory, if a person began with $1, he would be happier than if he had started with $1,000. The change according to the starting value is relevant. The value of the curve for the individuals may take various forms, depending on the propensity for risk. The curve is concave for gains, reflecting risk aversion. The curve is convex for losses, reflecting the desire of risk in order to cover the losses (Levy 1992, 171). Reference Point Dependence: making decisions based on the similarity to other situations. Changing the orientation of risk depends on how the results are perceived (gains or losses) relative to the reference point (Quattrone and Tversky 1988, 720). The reference point is, usually, the current state of balance, or the status quo, which the person is accustomed to (McDermott 1998, 20), but can also be a desired state, based on the goals of the decision-maker (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 1039). What is important to consider are the gains and losses from the reference points and the absolute gains and losses. The reactions of the decision-makers to gains and losses related to the reference points adds clarification to our understanding on how foreign policy decisions are made (Kent 2005, 111). For example, the operation designated "Desert Storm" in January 1991. Mc Dermott and Kugler analyzed this operation using the prospective theory and stated that the solution in this case was not the desired one, because none of the major players had realized that the Saudi peace initiative could work. The prospective theory focuses on how

122

Chapter Three

the current results have been achieved: why Bush made those decisions at the time (McDermott and Kugler 2001, 78). The effect of reflection: the attitude towards risk varies depending on the situational context of the decision-maker (McDermott and Kugler 2001, 79). This is in contrast to a standard conception of risk orientation, noting that individuals have characteristics that predispose them to take or avoid risk (Kowert and Hermann 1997, 612; George and George 1998, 27). The prospective theory suggests that decision-makers have risk aversion, respecting the gains and accepting the risk, respecting the losses, with an effect of reflection on the reference point (Levy 1992, 105). Rather than explaining the presidential decisions based only on individual characteristics or personality, the political context of the decision-maker (the president) provides important variables that help us to understand foreign policy decisions. For example, the defining foreign policy events under President Clinton took place in the Balkans. In Bosnia and Kosovo, President Clinton, together with NATO, intervened in the civil wars to end violence and to stop the multiplying of conflict in the region. Although state actions were similar, the political risks were different. In December 1995, as a result of the Dayton Peace Agreement, President Clinton agreed to assign 20,000 US troops for peacekeeping duty in Bosnia. The action was surprising given the political context. There were concerns that events could take a turn similar to those in Somalia a few years ago. The decision to use U.S. troops was in opposition to what Republicans (who held the majority in Congress) wanted; they were against the use of US troops, even for peacekeeping. Furthermore, the action was not well received by the public either. Interestingly, this action, although unpopular, took place during the Clinton administration's involvement in the campaign for the re-election of the president. Given the context, President Clinton took the political risk and sent the US troops to Bosnia. In the fall of 1999, President Clinton had to deal with similar situations in Kosovo: ethnic conflicts and the possibility of their extension in the region. As in Bosnia, four years earlier, Congress opposed the use of US troops in peacekeeping operations. In contrast to the situation in Bosnia, public opinion was evenly divided regarding the presence of US troops in Kosovo; 45% were in favour of the presence of American troops, and 45% were against. Unlike the political risk assumed by President Clinton in Bosnia, this time risk-taking was not so obvious. Even if the United States participated in the NATO campaign, significant efforts were made to avoid casualties. Why did President Clinton accept the risk in Bosnia and avoid risk in Kosovo? Mission objectives were not different. Public opinion was more supportive of the presence of US troops in Kosovo than

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

123

in Bosnia. The answer is: "Bill Clinton, who downplayed the importance of foreign affairs, was the recipient of NATO victory in Kosovo, although he gained little political capital from this situation" (Halberstam 2001, 482). Politically, there was very little to gain but a lot to lose in Kosovo (Halberstam 2001, 482). One of the concepts related to prospective theory is the sunk cost (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 77). These costs often cause leaders to continue on a given route, even if circumstances change in the worst direction. The examples provided by the authors are: President Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam and President George W. Bush in Iraq (see Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 77). The interesting study conducted by Kent (2005) envisages joint comments highlighted by Farnham (2004), who addressed the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy and stressed the need for developing a theory of the foreign policy decision-making process that can provide policymakers’ responses to context (Farham 2004, 442). We also need to understand how the political context characteristics affect their thinking. Moreover, prospective theory was called the "reference-dependent theory" without a reference point theory (Levy 1992, 100). Through his study, Kent argues that taking a higher risk in the foreign policy of the President of the United States means failure (Kent 2005, 111). Although the United States is a powerful country, militarily and economically, and the public always expects success from America's actions, their cooperation and conflict are involved at various levels of risk, and the prospect of failure and its consequences increase when actions involve conflict. Another important conclusion of the study was that the decision-makers (the president) will respond in a confrontational manner when the approving of their action is below the reference point, and will be much more cooperative when it is above the reference point (Kent 2005, 111). McDermott (2004) considers that prospective theory does not simplify political analysis, on the contrary, it gets more complicated (McDermott 2004, 72). Theory points to the psychological considerations that may be relevant to certain types or explanations of foreign policy decisionmaking. There are several advantages of introducing these factors in the analysis of the decision-making processes of external politics. Prospective theory brings forward dynamic, empirical explanations, situational decision-making under risk. It brings forth the understanding of complex phenomena such as the effects of framing and loss aversion, which could not be addressed in terms of the rational actor theory and other theories/models of decision-making. The clarification brought forth by the

124

Chapter Three

prospective theory opens the horizon for understanding the decisionmaking process, for issues left unclear by other theories. The relative disadvantages of this theory must also be mentioned. It is difficult to operate with this theory in a historical and political context. It often provides predictions that are redundant. McDermott mentions two important aspects to consider when the prospective theory is applied in international relations. One refers to the importance of motives in the decision-making processes, opposed to the imperatives offered by normative considerations. The second refers to the importance of context for decision-making, which emphasizes that people do not maximize the value of existing preferences, but rather work towards solving problems, and their preferences are constructed as part of creative solutions to challenges and problems which the individual must face (McDermott 2004, 73). The reasons for actions matter to people. They want to have a meaning for the action which they want done, they want to know why some are opting for a certain alternative and often require justification for their choice, especially if they know they will have to provide answers to others in the future (especially politicians). The rational actor model does not bring such help to the decision-makers; by contrast, formal models offer utility values and calculations indicating the vague subjective nature of the decision-making process. Formal models are more appropriate for economic analysis, perhaps even for psychological experiments, but rarely match real political contexts, including the international ones. A second consideration mentioned by McDermott (2004) refers to the difficult decisions which are the hardest, because of the involvement of elements of conflict over the goals, values and choices. Difficult decisions require careful consideration because of the trade involved by giving up some things, in order to receive more, or of the same or different dynamics. In the problem-solving mode, and not just the maximizing value ones, individuals may require more freedom to be more complex and unpredictable in theory than they are in reality. And if the theory attempts to understand and explain human behaviour, as opposed to its simple predictions, then, in the decision-making process, particularly the political one, psychological considerations are implicit in the phenomena. Also, it is unclear whether people should make decisions based on rationality. Taking into account the assessment and perception of risk, where social values encourage the proper appreciation of unknown factors in a manner directed by rational calculations, even rationality may not provide the most valuable measure of optimal choice behaviour; glorifying

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

125

raĠionality as a criterion for assessing the usefulness of a behaviour represents a choice between other values. It is possible that the place held by rationality, "in another universe" might be held by emotionality (McDermott 2004, 186). The same author states that irrational, cognitive strategies have evolved over time, for a certain reason: they can be considered as effective and efficient strategies to understand and meet the needs of the world. It is not yet clear if anyone will be better or more capable if he submits these strategies in order to purchase "more rationality".

Conclusion The strengths of the prospective theory are divided into four categories: the dynamic nature of the theory, the empirical basis and the descriptive accuracy; the situational focus and the explanatory power (McDermott 2004, 175). Many theories of international relations are classical, including the neorealist and realist approaches. Prospective theory provides predictions and explanations which enable subsequent change in time due to the influence of the external environment (McDermott 2004, 176). It provides an analytical framework for the decision-maker to consider the substantial changes which have occurred over time, and also a motivation for them (McDermott 2004, 176). Regarding empirical support, the prospective theory brings forth fundamental changes of normative theories of the decision-making process (McDermott 2004, 177). Because it is based on empirical studies, it does not require implicit or explicit statements to support its predictions. Unlike the rational choice theory, the prospective theory does not require a certain type of behaviour, but provides an alternative to it. Most theories of international relations disregard the psychological influences that occur in decision-making. Prospective theory brings to these influences to our attention when considering the influence of the situation upon the decision, stating that the analyst of the decision-making process must know the idiosyncrasies of a leader to predict and explain his behaviour (McDermott 2004, 178). This theory, by its nature, involves a psychological approach to the decision-making process, but it has, in turn, a number of shortcomings. However, its virtue lies in its explanatory power. It can be taken into account in explaining the decision-making process, where the rational actor theory is insufficient. For example, in the specific, particular cases,

126

Chapter Three

which do not fall into a particular type, it can be successfully applied prospectively, because of its flexibility (McDermott 2004, 179). Among the weaknesses of this theory we note: the difficulty in operationalizing variables, political and psychological imperatives that cause certain events, a relative lack of parsimony and difficulties in picking up psychological applications to political phenomena (McDermott 2004, 180). The prospective theory does not offer a simplification in the analysis of decision-making. It brings to our attention a number of psychological elements that may be relevant for certain situations or analysis, or for explaining the political processes of decision-making.

The Poliheuristic Theory The term "poliheuristic" can be divided into "poli" (many) and "heuristic", „which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by decision-makers to simplify complex foreign policy decisions” (Mintz 2007, 554, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 79). "Poli" might refer to the fact that political leaders measure the gains and losses in political terms (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 79). Marike Breuning (2007) believes that the poliheuristic theory incorporates elements of the normative and empirical theory of rationality (Breuning 2007, 164). Mintz (2010) believes that the poliheuristic theory is a combination of cognitive and rational schools of interpretation of the decision process (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 78). Breuning suggests that foreign policy decisions are made in two stages, each characterized by a different approach (Breuning 2007, 65). During the first phase, decisionmakers use the non-compensatory principle to determine their own options. They evaluate the political response rate and give up all that is unacceptable on one or more dimensions. This means that a political response which is attractive in some ways will be removed, if it has one drawback that affects the national interest or the political interests of decision-makers (Mintz 2003, 27). In other words, one or more advantages of an option cannot compensate for the critical disadvantages of that option. Basically, the disadvantage has "veto" power over the political option, and is eliminated from further considerations. After generating a set of options which use the non-compensatory principle, the poliheuristic theory postulates that decision-makers will subject the remaining options to careful analysis over the second stage of the decision-making processs (Breuning 2007, 66). The second stage often involves a weighing of the costs and benefits of remaining alternatives in a manner similar to that specified by normative rationality, indicating that not all alternatives are evaluated, but only those

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

127

which have passed a minimum threshold of acceptability. Therefore, the poliheuristic theory delineates rational behaviour: decision-makers are rational, in the sense of optimal policy results, but the cost-benefit analysis they perform is directed by a set of alternatives which have already been deemed acceptable. The poliheuristic theory integrates the aspects of psychological models with those of normative rationality. In this process, the two stages of the decision process are something akin to the cybernetic model. The latter concept is used to separate the normative rationality from the empirical one: it defines the decision-makers as rational within the scope of their knowledge. This means that in order to determine whether a decisionmaker reached a rational decision, we must know what he knew when the decision weas made (Simon 1985). The poliheuristic theory "agrees" with the cybernetic model, meaning that the options which seemed acceptable, based on the decision rule of the non-compensatory principle, used in the first stage, are subject to the costbenefit analysis of normative rationality in the course of the second stage. However, the cybernetic model delineates the options based on the knowledge of the decision-maker, while the poliheuristic theory adds the request that policy options must meet a minimum threshold of political acceptability to be considered, in the second stage of the decision process (Mintz 2003, 555). By adding the requirement of acceptability, the poliheuristic theory implies a distinct political dimension to the question of considering a certain policy alternative, and assumes that politicians rarely choose an alternative that could bring political disadvantages (Mintz 2005, 30). The cybernetic model assumes that the inclusion of policy options is determined only by the information which the decision-maker has at hand. So the decision-makers will consider the pros and cons of all the options that they know exist, not just those which have crossed the minimum threshold of assumed acceptability. Both the cybernetic model and the poliheuristic theory highlight the importance of investigating what the decision-makers know and how they interpret the information. Both fit under the large umbrella of empirical approaches to rationality and underline the option of the evaluating process, rather than selecting the options (Breuning 2007, 66). Decision-makers design their options in the context of the knowledge they have, but these are not neutral: world leaders view the world in their specific way, influenced by their personality, education, knowledge, experiences, and historical events. The resulting predispositions are reflected in the task of making sense of the events that are happening worldwide, determining the availability of policy options and choosing

128

Chapter Three

specific foreign policy decisions. Marijke Breuning suggests that policymakers address the world from a point of view that would be advantageous for them. Their perceptions are affected by the way information is presented to them. This is a topic that belongs to the prospective theory, which takes into account the fact that the preferences of decision-makers change in predictable ways, depending on how the situation is presented to them (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 457). Prospective theory focuses on how the choice is affected by the framework it is placed in, problem representation favours the investigation of how the decision-makers represent their situations. Representations of problems are mental models or schemas in the context of a broad understanding of how the world works by the decision-maker. The concept of representation of the problem is similar to that of the worldview. The difference is that the worldview is general and shows a personal and global understanding of the world of the person, while the representation of the problem is specific to a problem or situation (Sylvan and Voss 1998). Representing a problem is a product of the knowledge, experience and beliefs of a person, each individual influencing the way new information is assimilated and how it receives meaning (Sylvan and Voss 1998, 189). In poliheuristic theory sense, even if options have passed the initial non-compensatory stage, scanning will depend largely on how the problem is represented. Representing the problem will determine which options are specific and which are plausible, but it will also help us to understand why certain choices are perceived as feasible and others are rejected. We can say, in short, that the representation of the problem can be understood as a process which is completed before the first stage (noncompensatory) occurs (Breuning 2007, 69). The government policies model and the poliheuristic theory are used by Christensen and Redd (2004) to examine the policy advice given in various contexts, which influence choice. The counsellors in the organization are compared with situations where the ruling is given by a separate political adviser. The results of the two researchers are influenced by political assessments in a non-compensatory way and political assessments may be affected by the presence of several governmental advisers. These results have significant implications for the way information is presented in the counselling groups. Specifically, the two researchers were interested in how the nature of political counselling, and also the differences in the disclosure of information influence foreign policy choices. The government policies model focuses on organizational counselling, the leading choice of foreign policy decisions, while the poliheuristic theory mentions that the political

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

129

calculations are supreme and non-compensatory in affecting foreign policy decisions. In most cases, foreign policy decision-making is linked to poorly structured problems. The information is available only for some aspects of the problem. Making a decision is difficult when there is not enough information to build a complete picture of a situation. Incomplete information is inherent in foreign policy decisions. At the same time as the decision-makers are striving to make sense of the situation based on incomplete or limited information, they refuse to reveal to the opponents the full extent of their own knowledge or all details of their strategy. Even if this is done to maintain a level of surprise in a conflict or a war, or in order to have leverage in negotiations, it means that incomplete information is inherent in foreign policy decision-making (Breuning 2007, 67). One of the ways, suggested by the above-mentioned author, to gain the understanding of a wrongly structured problem is the historical comparison with a similar, yet better known, situation. This comparison will help fill gaps in the current situation, will help decision-makers to build a representation of the current problem and point out some possible solutions. This process is called analogical reasoning (Neustadt and May 1986, 17; Houghton 1996, 523), beginning with a tendency to build a representation of the problem from the incomplete information available (Novick 1998, 510; Kane, Ledgeway and Duff 1994, 387). Decisionmakers turn to their own memories for similar or related problems. This analogy is a problem which has been solved in the past, and the decisionmakers are confident that they have understood it. The current problem and possible analogies are compared to determine which aspects of the two situations are similar and which are different. The core of these comparisons is the effort to determine whether a particular analogy contains common significant elements with the problem to be solved. If it does, the next step is to consider the fact that the solution used in the similar situation could be an appropriate response to the current situation as well (Spellman and Holyoak 1992, 913). In some cases, the analogy indicates what not to do. More careful analysis of the differences and similarities between the current and historical issues of foreign policy have useful potential. There have been cases in which the decision-makers were taught to engage in more careful comparisons. Unfortunately, it can be a difficult task for decision-makers to engage in such a comparative analysis of current and past situation due to the poor utility of analogy in the psychology af analogical reasoning. Decision-makers tend to put undue emphasis on surface similarities and

130

Chapter Three

ignore the deeper structural differences. They remember the lessons learned, but not the details. In fact, decision-makers choose a less significant analogy for the analogue situation than for the general lesson of the present case. In other words, decision-makers use historical analogies as schemas. A schema is a psychological concept defined as a mental representation of knowledge about a concept or an individual situation (Fiske and Taylor 1984, 13). Using analogies as if they were schemas eliminates the need for a careful, punctual comparison between the current situation and the historical analogy, and precludes a deep and thorough analysis of the current situation. Once decision-makers have classified a situation as an example of a schema, they have framed the situation and the interpretations of the opponents’ actions; the viability of particular solutions are seen through the “coloured lenses of that framework" (Breuning 2007, 74). Choosing an analogy depends on the individual who decides foreign policy. The formative experiences of decision-makers were disproportionately considered for a long time. Choosing a specific analogy as a metaphor for the current situation is not necessarily determined by a close comparison. For the first time, the analogies are often chosen because of the historical events which the decision-makers recall, because of formative experiences or recent events. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy had recently read a book about the First World War, which he used as an analogy and which made him aware of the high cost of errors (Allison and Zelikow, 2010, 111). Secondly, the greater the complexity of the decision-maker, the more he will move below the surface of similarities and perceive the deeper structural similarities between the current situation and the historical event. It is true that we have taken the analogies into account and have thought that decision-makers use their knowledge of history to think about current issues (Breuning 2007, 74). It is possible that analogies are used in order to be connected to the audience, whether it is a private conversation with a decider group or a public communication. It is difficult to know to what degree analogies are used as tools of thought versus verbal justifications (Breuning 2007, 74). However, the psychological literature suggests that people think in terms of analogy. In fact, more generalized schemas are a product of analogical reasoning. Moreover, communication with others is an essential part of the decision-making process, because foreign policy decisions are rarely made by an isolated individual. Most often, groups of decision-makers reflect on an issue, even if a person will be responsible for the decision made.

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

131

The poliheuristic theory is applicable to the decisions of nondemocratic, autocratic leaders (Kinne 2005, 114). These leaders are concerned about threats to the regime, political power, and legitimacy and that is why they apply the non-compensatory principle, to avoid massive losses. The author cited above states that the theory is applicable to single party autocracies, military dictatorships and autocratic personalities. Military and economic considerations may be non-compensatory for leaders, but the poliheuristic theory sees domestic policy as the essence of decision-making (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 79). Mintz (2005) has summarized the very essence of the poliheuristic theory, which integrates elements of the "decision school" of the rational choice theory, with elements of the ”school of cognitive decision psychology" (Mintz 2005, 95): 1.

2.

Leaders typically use more than one decisional rule throughout a decision. Specifically, policy-makers use a two-step process in making a decision: they employ the non-compensatory principle, that of avoiding major political losses in the initial screening of alternatives, and use analytical decision rules in the second stage of decision-making; Leaders evaluate the gains and losses in political terms–the domestic policy is the essence of decision-making (Mintz and Geva 1997, 84).

Conclusion The poliheuristic theory was developed as an alternative to the classical model of the rational actor model and the cybernetic model. It focuses on the process and also on the outcome of the decision-making process (Christiensen and Redd 2004, 73). This theory involves two stages: in the first stage the decision-maker is investigating possible alternatives, using heuristics and thus reducing the number of alternatives. The second step involves assessing the remaining alternatives by using more analytical decision rules (Christiensen and Redd 2004, 73). Mintz and Geva believe that the "foreign policy decision-making strategy is to compare alternatives to predetermine the value within a set of alternatives" (Mintz and Geva 1997, 87). The analysis of the decisionmaking process provides predetermined values of the alternatives and the decision rules require the non-compensatory removal, or a selection process using the poliheuristic theory (Dacey and Carlon 2004, 53). It also demonstrates that a decision-maker with risk aversion, called the

132

Chapter Three

representative decider of risk, will fail between the counsellors and the median voter and that a decision-maker with loss aversion, called the decider with stong loss aversion, may fail between counsellors and the median voter. This analysis of the decision-making process by using the poliheuristic theory is important, highlighting the conditions under which the decision-making process takes place (Dacey and Carlon 2004, 54). The second stage of the decision-making process, from the poliheuristic theory perspective, has an influence on the overall expansion analysis of decision-making as it "may involve maximizing decisional rules for selecting one alternative from the subset of alternatives" (Mintz and Geva 1997, 83).

The Multiple Streams Model An interesting approach to the decision-making model belongs to the researcher Ramona Saikaly (2009, 5) who adapts Kingdon's decisionmaking model ("multiple streams"), a model used mostly in domestic policy, stating that the pre-existing solutions formulated within the political communities are just one of the three major processes which must converge to establish a certain policy on the agenda (Kingdon 1995, 3). The researcher believes that the model is proactive, because the decisionmaker does not have to wait for the problem to occur in order to develop the solution, but rather, it develops the solution, expects the appropriate issue to appear and, within the adequate political context, attaches the solution to the respective problem. This model was used by the author for domestic policy, but Saikaly proved its utility in foreign policy as well. Through the research conducted, Saikaly (2009) proves that, contrary to conventional understanding of foreign policy decision-making, as a process responsive to events and problems, this can be addressed proactively, by bringing existing solutions to the agenda that otherwise would not be reached. Kingdom (1995) argues that his model is related to the ideas which will come and pre-existing solutions are such ideas (Kingdon 1995, 109). Saikaly (2009) presents Kingdon's model, stating that there are three streams or families of processes, which converge into the governmental agenda setting (Saikaly 2009, 6): 1) Recognizing the problem, or the "flow of the problem"; 2) Formulating or refining the policy proposals or the "policy flow"; 3) The policy of the “political flow”.

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

133

The flow of the problem appears where the problems, by the indicators, capture the attention of decision-makers. According to Saikaly (2009), Kingdon specifies the conditions which become problems when moving to action (Saikaly 2009, 6). Entrepreneurs are those who will try to point out a problem by highlighting indicators (for example, members of the Bush administration pointed out violations of UN resolutions by Iraq, as indicators of the Iraqi problem). They have tried to define the problem so as to attract the attention of policy-makers and the general public. However, problems do not become apparent only through indicators, they often require an impulse given by a "triggering event" such as a disaster. Changes in policies, under these circumstances, will have to be preceded by changes in responsiveness towards changes in ideas. Rasler (2000) argues that disasters or shocks cause a change in how the enemy is perceived, leading to a change in the level of hostility directed toward the enemy (Rasler 2000, 699). Legro (2000) adds that the change in action or behaviour depends on the perception of decision-makers on the old structure of the idea, and if it is no longer appropriate, they must prepare a new set of ideas (Legro 2000, 419). Birkland (2006, 20) states that the change will often occur after a catastrophic event. Kingdon believes that only a centralized event brings forth the evidence of new ideas (1995, 103). The flow of policies occurs where policy formulation and policy proposals' adjustment occurs. The policies of the communities, including researchers, members of the academic staff, and groups of analysts, interact and generate ideas. Kingdon refers to this level as the "primitive soup" (Kingdon 1995, 16). It is the level at which bills are introduced, speeches are compiled and proposals are introduced, in an effort to raise public awareness and target audiences with the new ideas. These communities have policies’ initiators, who assume the role of promoter of ideas and whose main characteristic is their desire to invest time and resources in order to push forward their own policies. Many ideas are generated, but only those which meet the selection criteria survive: technical feasibility, value acceptability within the policy community, tolerable cost, public acceptance and receptivity among elected officials. Finally, when given an opportunity, a proposal or solution, they must be ready-made, otherwise the opportunity will be lost (Kingdon 1995, 117). The political flow contains status changes of the national spirit, of the election results and of the ideological distribution of central and local government. How politicians perceive the state of the nation influences the policies that they will support. A change in administration or partisan distribution in senior management leads to new priorities and a different

Chapter Three

134

agenda. Kingdon suggested that a proposal is based on an agenda by a process of combining these three streams (Kingdon 1995, 162). Figure 4-3 will illustrate how this combination requires policies originators to take advantage of policies’ loopholes or opportunities, in the problem flow of policies or politics, by attaching a problem to the preferred solution and by pushing them to a responsive political system. However, to succeed in their efforts, policy initiators must be prepared to act quickly when a door of opportunity opens, otherwise the opportunity may be lost before they have a chance to submit their proposals. Finally, the inference of this model is that if a government takes an action, that action is the result of a pre-existing solution, attached to a problem at the right political moment and advanced on the agenda by skilled entrepreneurs. Fig. 3-2: Multiple stream model (adapted by Saikaly 2009, 8)

Problem stream Indicators Centralizing event Initiators

Policies stream Ideas Proposals Initiators

Politics stream Changes in nation’s state Administration Members of leading teams

Policies entrepreneurs System flexibilization Investing resources Combination of flows

SETTING THE AGENDA

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

135

Psychological Approaches Jackson and Sorensen (2007), showing the approaches used in the analysis of foreign policy, identify the psychological and cognitive processes approach (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 234). This is done individually, with particular attention to the psychological aspects of the decision-makers, especially the perception of the actor. Working on the research of Jervis, from 1968 and 1976, and Margaret Hermann, from 1984, the authors point towards important elements to consider in the analysis of foreign policy decision-making: the misunderstanding of the intentions and actions of other actors and the underlying reasons–actors seeing what they want to see, not what is really going on, being guided by pre-existing beliefs (hence the tendency to perceive other states as more hostile than they really are); their engagement and confusion of desires with reality (wishful thinking) (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 235). Margaret Hermann studied the personality characteristics of fifty-four prime ministers, claiming that factors such as leadership experience in foreign affairs, political style, political socialization and a broader view of the world must be taken into account in the decision-making process to truly understand how leaders conduct foreign policy (Hermann 1989, 57). Psychological approaches challenge the concept of rationality in the decision-making process (Kinder and Weiss 1978, 708) because they focus on human factors and the influences that shape the responses that the decision-makers use for the outside world (Saikaly 2009, 11). Throughout this chapter two approaches will be presented: (1) groupthinking explores what happens in small groups and the impact of the group on the decision-making process; (2) cognitive approach explores the effects of beliefs and perceptions on the individual and the impact that these have on the decisionmaking process.

Groupthinking The term "groupthinking" was introduced by psychologist Irving Janis in 1972 when trying to describe a process by which a group reaches a bad or irrational decision (Janis 1972, 72) and emphasizing the importance and occurrence of pathologies which it produces (Saikaly 2009, 11). When using groupthinking, the group does not focus on the consideration of alternatives but aims for unanimity rather than the best possible decision (Saikaly 2009, 11).

Chapter Three

136

Foreign policy decisions are made closer to the tip of the iceberg (Breuning, 2007, 67): by the leaders and their small circles of advisors or by groups of decision-makers. These are the small groups, where decisionmakers meet face-to-face and where decisions are made based on the information and analysis provided by various agencies and departments. When decisions are the result of groupthinking, they share several characteristics: objectives are not clearly defined; alternative actions are not clearly explored; the risks involved by the preferred choice are not sufficiently considered; the search for information is inadequate; and information is processed in a distorted manner. Here are some detailed characteristics of groupthinking (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 23): ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

¾

Illusion of invulnerability: the group believes that its decisionmaking is beyond question, which creates excessive optimism and extreme risk-taking; Belief in the inherent morality of the group: this is why members ignore the moral and ethical consequences of their decisions; Collective rationalizing: group warnings that may lead them to reconsider their own statements before reframing old decisions; Stereotypes outside the group: some are labelled as too mean or stupid to provide guarantees for their strategies or attempts to negotiate with them; Self-censorship: members tend to avoid deviations from the consensus and minimize the significance of their own doubts and counter-arguments; Illusion of unanimity: separated from the silence of selfcensorship, members share the belief that they are unanimous in their own judgements, with silence meaning consensus; Direct pressure of the dissidents: challenges or sanction comments are made to express strong arguments against group stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, but loyal members do not raise questions; Self-titled guards: these members protect the group from adverse information that can threaten the shared illusions about the effectiveness and morality of group decisions.

Saikaly (2009) mentions that Paul 't Hart (1994) criticizes groupthinking for failing to explain the relationship between the eight characteristics and reviews them, adding the structurally different relationships between leaders and subordinates which lead to this type of decision-making (t’Hart 1994). Given this perspective, Schafer and Crichlow (2002) argue

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

137

that, while the structural factors contribute to groupthinking, situational factors, such as stress, contribute very little, if at all, to this result (Schafer and Crichlow 2002, 46). Cashman (1993) notes that groupthinking situations bear distinguishing marks. The syndrome is usually related to the group, where the members are of a similar age and education (Cashman 1993). Mintz and DeRouen (2010, 45) believe that groupthinking situations arise especially if the group is isolated from external influences and if it lacks an impartial leader „who can tolerate dissidents”. Some authors mentioned show that groupthinking can be identified in the following cases: Pearl Harbour, the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 235), the crisis in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 (Yetiev 2003, 420). Jackson and Sorensen (2007, 235) state that groupthinking does not always have to be counterproductive; there can also be "successful" cases such as the Marshall Plan and the Cuban missile crisis. 't Hart (1997) believes that there can be a few "remedies" used that will avoid the negative consequences of groupthinking and determine the acquisition of group capabilities to make better decisions. Groupthinking tries to explain foreign policy decision-making by small groups seeking to maintain cohesion in the face of the stress caused by external pressure (Chapman 2006, 1391). Although small groups provide emotional support in solving complex problems, the accent on unanimity and chance diverts the search for and the evaluation of all possible options, suppressing views that may be essential to results and causing the appearance of failure (t’Hart 1997). Mintz and DeRouen (2010) believe that the group often has unrealistic assessments, overestimating their own potential and ability to succeed and will be less likely to have a backup plan in case of failure or the ability to monitor past decisions (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 44). Other researchers have extended the understanding of small group decisions by introducing various features and patterns of inter-group dynamics, such as leadership qualities (Hermann et al. 2001, 83), rivalries and conflicts (Hermann et al. 2001, 133), coalitions and decision rules (Hagan et al. 2001, 169), group dynamics and political manipulation (Garrison 2001, 775). Breuning (2007) considers that the problem of groupthinking is not only the poor or non-consideration of alternatives, but first of all, the fact that decision-makers fail to critically examine the representation of their problems and options before making decisions or failing to question whether there are not other possible options, apart from those which they

138

Chapter Three

have considered (Breuning 2007, 68). It can occur as a result of strong cohesion among a small group: they perceive the world in a similar way so none of them is able to offer an alternative view to cope with the situation (Richards 2001, 259). In essence, groupthinking is the problem of a distorted or one-sided representation of a problem, based on incomplete or deficient information, so that none of the members of the group raises questions because nobody can imagine another way of understanding the problem or nobody dares to suggest that a person whom they all they see as an expert can be wrong. It can be said that nobody wants to play the devil's advocate. Breuning (2007) believes that President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis, intentionally left the decision-making to a small group of advisors (Breuning 2007, 68). He was aware that his presence might influence the nature and content of the discussions of his advisers. The author recalls that President Kennedy had organized the executives in a collegial style, which can develop a closed system of mutual support. When the system works well, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the decision process can avoid the pitfalls of groupthinking. When the system is not functioning well these pitfalls may occur. The formalistic style does not have any mechanisms to counteract the distortion of information. When the system works well, emphasizing analysis helps avoid the problem of groupthinking, but when it does not work well, this style of organizing the executives may suffer from groupthinking without their realizing that the distorted vision on the problem is not accurately representing the problem. Mintz and DeRouen (2010, 47) suggest that it is possible to avoid groupthinking and indicate the way suggested by Janis, regarding the searching of options by the leader (Janis 1972, 82). In contrast with groupthinking, Mintz and DeRouen (2010), define divergent thinking (polythink) as the plurality of the views, visions and perceptions of group members (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 49). Another important element on which Mintz and DeRouen draw attention is the effect of polarization which can occur at the group level (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 53).

Counselling System Mintzand DeRouen (2010) said that group counselling can shape foreign policy (and domestic) through the support offered in setting the agenda, information handling, framing alternative courses of information, control over information flows, preventing the filtering of conflicting and nonsupportive information, interpreting new information in a certain way

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

139

and acting as "guardians" for the one they are advising. Advisory groups can be powerful and influential (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 31). An interesting and subtle comparison is achieved by Breuning (2007), focusing on various aspects of the counselling system that surrounds a leader (Breuning 2007, 89). Just like an iceberg, where the greater part is under the ocean, most of the counselling system is not visible. The peak of the iceberg is the leader and his close advisors. The rest of the iceberg is actually the bureaucracy that leaders rely on to shape the policies and implement the decisions. Even if we know that bureaucracy is present, we are not always sure that those who work in this bureaucracy are present or whether they influence foreign policy decisions. A perfect system of guidance does not exist: each system has its peak points. Leaders work best if the counselling system fits their personality (Kowert, 2002, 21) and must always be alert to the potential problems of the system which the counsellors choose. Breuning (2007) identifies three approaches to the organization of the advisory system: formal, competitive and collegial (Breuning 2007, 92). The formalistic approach to a group counselling organization emphasizes a hierarchical structure with a clear chain of command. This does not mean that the individual counselling group of each leader will employ the same type of organization. Rather, it means that leaders who have committed to this type of organization would like to have an orderly decision-making process. Each of the counsellors provide the leader with information in the field of expertise and the jurisdiction of each department. Instead, these advisers get information and advice from individuals working within their department or agency. Some leaders will want the department director to provide information and he will synthesise the information (e.g. President Truman). The Presidents of the United States have employed staff at the White House to synthesize information and advise them (Breuning 2007, 92). The competitive approach uses multiple communication channels. It is the element of cooperation between counsellors in this organizational system. However, they are all aware that the leader can access information from a variety of sources including the subordinates of the department, which creates an atmosphere of competition and conflict. All advisors are rushing to provide early information to the leader so that their department may appear favourable, and they can play a crucial role in framing, thus representing the policy problem. As a result, counsellors may present partial, incomplete or biased information. Leaders can reach more comprehensive or less balanced approaches to problems. Internal competition can be difficult in the group of advisers and may have

140

Chapter Three

unpleasant consequences. It takes time and attention from the leader. When properly managed, it can provide the leader with a wide range of information and he can utilize this information network. For him, this approach can generate creative solutions, because there is a confluence of different ideas and points of view. Moreover, this system is very good at generating feasible solutions: ideas are modified and tempered as a result of interfering with other ideas, but also of the need to defend certain ideas in debates with others. The competitive system can generate creative solutions which are politically acceptable and more difficult to accomplish bureaucratically. The third alternative takes the advantages of the benefits derived from multiple approaches, but tends to cultivate a team spirit rather than a competitive one. This alternative is the collegial approach. Like the competitive approach, the leader is at the centre of the extensive informational network. Advisers do not provide information to the leader individually, but debate policy options within the group. The objective of such discussions is the exchange of ideas–without the conflict that accompanies the competitive system–and the acquiring of innovative policy proposals. The leader communicates directly with the advisers, but sometimes goes to the subordinates in the department and obtains information outside the chain of command. In the collegial approach, the emphasis is on teamwork rather than competition. Of course, the differences of opinion can always get out of control, and advisors may become competitors. On the other hand, there is the risk that the team thinks too much alike and the exchange of ideas becomes a mutual understanding. The difficulty in achieving the collegial approach is that it requires a delicate balance of the diversity of opinion, mediating differences and maintaining a team spirit. Not all leaders have the skills to manage interpersonal relationships between counsellors in order to maintain a collegial system over time. A synthesis of the three approaches of the counselling system organization is presented below (Table 3-1):

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

141

Table 3-1: Description of the modes of organization of the counselling system (adapted from Breuning 2007, 92) Nr. Crt. 1

2

3

4

Characteristic Probability for distorting information The degree to which the leader is exposed to background and interpersonal conflict Global reaction to the decisionmaking process

Rigour in the consideration of alternatives

Formalist approach Big Lacks internal monitoring for information distortion Small for both cases

Competitive approach Small Multiple perspectives presented and openly discussed Big for all cases

Small Centred on the best solution; May react slowly or inadequately in crisis

Big Centred on feasible solutions; Dependent to a large degree on the skills and leader involvement

When working well: Big Rigorous, orderly, objective

When working well: Big Cacophony of voices, the leader is exposed to partial or influenced information. When not working well: Small Competition of staff, selfinterested actions, rather than work.

When not working well: Small Emphasis on objectivity can distort political pressure and public opinion

Collegial approach Small Multiple perspectives presented and discussed Big for background conflict Small for interpersonal conflicts Big Aims to identify solutions that are optimal and feasible Dependent to a large degree on the skills and leader involvement When working well: Big Provides discussions, teamwork, consideration of multiple viewpoints. When not working well: Small Closed system of mutual support and groupthinking

142

Chapter Three

A point of view that appears in discussions on the organizational structure of counselling is that inadequate, incomplete and influenced information takes their place within the initiators of policies. In some cases the information is not adequate just because someone made a mistake or has not researched enough to find (by consulting alternative sources of information) that the information he has is not credible. But not all failures in policy-making can be transferred to such problems. This does not mean that the distortions are deliberate misinformation efforts. No matter how well the advisory system works, it remains a political system. Counsellors have their own worldview, but also their own interests and ambitions (Garrison 1999, 17). Even counsellors appointed by the leader will not always perceive their interests to be perfectly aligned with those of the leader. On the contrary, the members of the permanent bureaucracy are not necessarily antagonistic with the political agenda of the leader. Finally, policy options are a result of the dynamic influencing process through which counsellors do more than just collecting, processing and interpreting information (Breuning 2007, 93). An interesting study was conducted by Strathman (2005) who attempts to blend insights from psychology and foreign policy in order to create a framework for understanding the description of the foreign policy advice system (Strathman 2005, 4). The author’s approach on the organizational system is a competitive one. Successful advisers are those who start at four power sources (access, expertise, experience and rhetoric) towards “more peaceful" attack positions. However, these "attacks" are constrained by the dispositions of the leader (e.g. military assertiveness and political knowledge) and the strategic situation (the foreign policy issue that the decision-maker has to deal with). The researcher has built a set of assumptions that combines power bases, the predispositions of the leader, the strategic situation and counselling techniques to predict when the advisers will count. She used experiments and comparative case studies to explore empirical hypotheses, the experiment employing psychological counselling by exploring the impact of counselling on the personality type. The experiment results are combined with the theoretical model and applied to four different cases of decisions made by the President of the United States: the capture of USS Pueblo, the capture of USS Mayaguez, the decision to send troops to Lebanon and the decision not to send troops to Rwanda (Strathman 2005, 114). The decision-making process was followed by using primary and secondary sources and the influence of the US.presidential advisers was thus discovered. The results suggest significant paradoxes (e.g. US president often ignored military advisers). Even if every counsellor develops an aura while listening to the US

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

143

President, this role play is usually obstructing the true nature of the political process and the role of advisers within it. The truth is somewhere in between. Rarely do the advisors have absolute power over the leaders, regardless of the professional analysts and observers who may have this influence. On the other hand, the advisers are not insignificant. It is hard to imagine Nixon without Kissinger, Bush without Scowcroft or Wilson without Colonel House. World history is based on the complex relationships between leaders and their advisers. We present below the conclusions of the research performed by Strathman (2005): Table 3-2: The characteristics of counselling (adapted from Strathman 2005, 255-256). Characteristic Gaining access

Invoking expertise

Building a coalition

Expectations Successful counselling is attached to the degree of access that a counsellor has to a leader (Garrison 1999) Leaders require advice from the counsellors on the issue they are facing. When counsellors invoke expertise, they rely on the knowledge they have to convince the leaders. Advisers with expertise in an area are favoured by the leaders (Benveniste 1977). Leaders are convinced of the recommendations accepted by the majority of their immediate circle. As a result, advisers who reach other advisers to create a bureaucratic negotiation will be followed in their decisions (Allison, Zelikow 2010).

Conclusions Gaining access is necessary but not sufficient for successful counselling. Expertise is limited by the perception of expertise and the number of experts. In both cases, expertise fails in creating a silent message. The lack of data during the crisis erodes the perception of expertise, while longterm interventions dilute the message. Building coalitions is a successful counselling technique: group power persuades decision-makers. A warning means time. In general, advisers need a long time to create an acceptable deal within their inner circle, making it by using a technique inadequate to crisis.

144

Chapter Three

Hesitation

Counsellors who violate expressed influences or preferences convince leaders. The cost of hesitation creates credible signals which in turn, create beliefs (Calvert 1985).

Embellishment

When decisions are limited by short periods of time or the lack of information, the counsellors who will be able to fill the gap of information by using metaphors and analogies can minimize the uncertainty of the leader, and make peaceful recommendations. Embellishment interacts with information deficit to persuade the leader (Neustadt and May 1986, Khong 1992). Conversely, when decisionmakers have to cope with information overload (abundance of information and time pressure), they often cover it. Counsellors simplify by minimizing uncertainty through information overload and making peaceful recommendations (Vertzberger 1990). Tversky's research (1972) suggests that uncertainty is a function of the options of the leaders from which they must choose. In general, decisionmakers do not feel comfortable when they have to compare two similar options. As a result, the advisers who eliminate options during the decision-making process will bring persuasive arguments.

Simplification

Avoiding– decreasing

It is possible that a wellfounded hesitation is theoretically stronger, but that is why it is not used: because of cost. Violation of preferences may mark a counsellor as not reliable and therefore decrease his power. As a result, hesitation will only happen in extreme circumstances. Argumentative forms matter more than content of recommendations. In general, leaders must face the lack of resources in a decision, convinced by the rhetoric that fills the gaps in knowledge.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, argumentative forms matter more than content recommendations. When belief is understood, researchers need to examine how the rhetoric changes and manipulates the uncertainty of leaders. In general, advisers who can re-frame the decisions by minimizing the "valid" options gain the power to convince in the decision-making process. By changing the size of the decision, advisers may argue peacefully.

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

145

The Cognitive Approach Cognitive psychology has shown the importance of the differences between the desires of rational decision models and the awarding, estimating and reasoning processes used frequently by the individuals (Gross Stein 2007, 104). It explains these differences by the need for simple rules for processing information and reasoning, necessary for making sense of uncertainty and a complex environment. The human mind has a preference for simplicity. Also, individuals are against ambiguity and want, in exchange, consistency. Moreover, they misunderstand the essence of probability (Tetlock 2006; Dawes 1998, 497), being weak estimators. Finally, individuals have a risk profile that moves them away from rational choice models, and as a result, we are more averse to loss than to gain. All of these four attributes compromise the ability of rational choice, being the key factors that influence the decision-making of foreign policy. Jackson and Sorensen (2007), addressing the individual level of the decision-making process, draw attention to the influences and constraints that they need to cope with, suggesting different modes of analysis. Quoting Holsti (2004), the authors state that among the cognitive constraints of rationality are also included limitations on the ability of the individual to receive, process and assimilate information about a situation, the inability to identify the entire set of alternative policies and insufficient knowledge connected to the consequences of each option (Holsti 2004, 27). Basically, these limitations are related to how individuals perceive and process information. The aforementioned authors resort to the research results of George (1980), according to which each individual acquires during his development, a set of beliefs and personal constructs about the physical and social environment (George 1980, 57). These beliefs provide for the individual a relatively consistent way to organize and make sense of what the world would otherwise be–a series of signals and clues collected from the environment. Basically, these beliefs and constructs simplify and structure the outside world. Knowledge is at the heart of international relations (Young and Schafer 1998, 63) and emphasizes the importance of concepts such as power and interest. But despite the importance, the methodologies of systematic psychological analysis of knowledge have only recently been developed. In research conducted by the authors mentioned above, they attempted to identify the role that knowledge plays in international politics, the challenges raised by the need to assess knowledge and how technology supports the use of these challenges. The essence of their study focuses on operational code analysis, conceptual maps, the theory of the image and

146

Chapter Three

conceptual theory (Young and Schafer 1998, 64). Each area is examined, taking into account the theoretical developments, methodological approaches and the correspondence of predictions with the observed behaviour. The two researchers advocate for understanding the role of knowledge in international phenomena. Saikaly (2009) believes that cognitive approaches take into account the definition of the situation by the leaders, how they perceive the outside world and how they receive and transmit information, all affecting the decision that they will make (Saikaly 2009, 212). Leaders can have deeply rooted beliefs, and lives full of experiences that influence how they perceive the outside world (Mowle 2003, 562). Rosati (2000) criticizes the rational actor model and argues that states are made up of individuals who develop foreign policy. Individuals are those who act, not the states, what matters is human knowledge and the psychological characteristics of decision-makers, with a profound impact on policy outcomes (Rosati 2000, 53). He suggests several ways in which human cognition (addressed as the process of acquisition of knowledge through the use of reasoning, intuition and perception) and the beliefs of policy-makers matter. Jackson and Sorensen (2007) have taken these methods, considering them as a base from which others can develop (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 235): (1) by the content of policy-makers’ beliefs–the study by Nathan Leite is illustrative (1951); he identified the belief system of the Soviet communist elite, synthesized in an operational code, consisting of philosophical beliefs by which the "diagnosis of a situation" is realised, and of instrumental beliefs, contributing to the framing of a course of action. Another interesting study is that of Stephen Twing (1998), which shows how American myths and cultural traditions helped to structure a worldview and a decision-making style throughout the Cold War. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) have studied the cognitive complexity in the international decision-making process, following the influence of beliefs about foreign policy in relation to specific situations; (2) by organizing and structuring policy-makers’ beliefs–the belief system and images of the decision-makers may vary, some belief systems are coherent and comprehensive, while others are fragmented and vague. This latter type is prone to uncommitted thinking, where decision-makers face uncertainty and are located at the intersection of information channels, tending to adopt, at different times, different patterns of beliefs for the same decision problem; (3) by common patterns of perception (and misperceptions)–there are many ways in which patterns of perception can lead to different visions, one of which is creating stereotypical images of the opponents. Rosati

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

147

(2000, 54) showed how, during the Cold War, John Foster Dulles rejected new information about Soviet behaviour, which was unrelated to the negative image that he had of the Soviets. Confusing desires with reality (wishful thinking) is another source of bias. During the Vietnam War, American policy-makers were convinced that the United States could not lose the war, and this imposed the path of increasing involvement in Southeast Asia; (4) by cognitive rigidity (and flexibility) for change and learning–the deeply-rooted images and beliefs tend to resist change. Analyzing beliefs about Kissinger’s foreign policy, Harvey Starr has demonstrated a considerable stability of his convictions content before, during and after holding the official position. When core beliefs change, this occurs as a result of strong shocks and setbacks. Mikhail Gorbachev's new way of thinking emerged in a period of severe Soviet economic and political crisis, the image of American leaders about Japan changed dramatically after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the tragedy of the Vietnam War changed the American elites’ image of the role of the US in the world. In the study he made based on Kingdon's multiple stream model, Saikaly (2009) considered three important elements of the cognitive approach: beliefs, perceptions and contextual interactions (Saikaly 2009, 138). Some scholars tend to understand the content of beliefs as operational codes, which provide a perpective image of the outside world (Walker 1995, 697; Marfleet 2000, 546). Other researchers are trying to understand the content of beliefs as a conceptual map that provides a small set of representations for a specific situation (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, 78), or are trying to address beliefs as tools for knowledge or an understanding of the social and psychological functions of the action (Jervis 2006, 642). In addition, some scholars organize beliefs in schemes that provide mental images, shortcuts and simplifications about other players (Fiske, Shelley and Taylor 1991, 16) or personal meanings of social and historical events (Duncan 2005, 965). Perceptions are cognitive mechanisms which relate to stereotyping, simple causal inferences and historical analogies that create patterns of thought to help leaders in the decision-making process (Holsti 1976, 11; Khong 1992, 17; Shimko 1994, 655). Contextual interactions are able to show that the perceptions and beliefs of the leader towards the contextual factors, rather than individual factors, make the difference in the interpretation of the situation by the leader. Hermann (1993) suggests that predominant leaders are either insensitive to context, guided by their own beliefs and predispositions, or sensitive to context, guided by pragmatism and contextual factors (Hermann 1993, 78). Keller (2005) states that

148

Chapter Three

different leaders have different interpretations of the same internal constraints: some respect constraints and therefore lead a peaceful foreign policy, others accept the challenge and lead a more aggressive foreign policy (Keller 2005, 206). In addition to the above, Holsti (1976) adds a socio-psychological perspective, represented by public attitudes, images and stereotypes, but also by the effect of travel, personal contacts or other forms of interactions between the states (Holsti 1976, 78). D'Amato (1967, 295) conducted a very interesting study which took into account the psychological constructs that can influence foreign policy decision-making. This study focused on four constructs, dimensioned on the axis of a concrete-abstract continuum: (1) Systemic-personalist–how decision-makers receive the mechanisms of the model in their decision; (2) Hawk-Dove–the desire to use power and force; (3) Incremental-avulsive–the degree of change between past and present decisions; (4) Flexibility-rigidity–the degree of flexibility of the constructs. The conclusions reached by D'Amato indicate the similarity of the individual decision-making process to the group decision-making process in terms of decision-making results. The only difference recorded is the easier manner of obtaining the information of a decision-making process not related to foreign policy from an individual, rather than from a group. Also, personnel often change within the decision group, which may lead to a more difficultly managed flexibility. On the other hand,we should not assume a priori that an individual exhibits a higher consistency and avoids cognitive dissonance more often than a group. In an interesting study, Geva, Mayhar and Skorick (2000) attempt to link two major theories of international relations: the validity of the results and of the process through a new one–the theory of cognitive calculations (Geva, Mayhar and Skorick 2000, 447). This theory is based on the cognitive calculations model of foreign policy decision-making, with the assumption that an individual is the one who leads the foreign policy decision-making process, and the model should represent his own capabilities. Several derivatives of the model were tested through an experiment, regarding the effects of the quality of information on the parameters of process and choice. The outcomes support aspects of the theory of cognitive calculations, some of which contribute to expediting the decision-making process. The consequences of incorporating

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

149

information used in the experiment within the mathematical model of the cognitive calculations, have shown the parallelism of human behaviour with the predictions of the model. The cognitive calculations model in foreign policy decision-making is focused on information interaction which brings its own interpretation of international conflicts (defining quality and valence), via the theories of decision-making in international relations and the integration of the mechanism by which interpreted information is converted into a political option (Geva, Mayhar and Skorick 2000, 448). This model seeks to identify four fundamental characteristics of foreign policy decision-making: valence, relevance, reliability and redundancy of information. Researchers believe that these factors influence the decision-making process and the chosen option. To answer the question about how the decision-makers of foreign policy integrate the information into valence, relevance, reliability and redundancy parameters, researchers have introduced the concept of implicit theory of international relations (ITIR). This represents knowledge stored and beliefs held by any decision-maker regarding international events. The basis of this knowledge incorporates the perceived relations existing between concepts which describe the international arena. Also, the ITIR concept relates to similar conceptualizations of the international system of beliefs (Taber 1992, 888), operational codes (Allison 1971, 116), images (Hermann et al. 1997, 403) and conceptual maps (Young 1996, 129). Basically, the researchers refer to ITIR as a critical source for defining the relevance of the new information and its relation to other elements included in the process. Moreover, beliefs about the source of information and the compatibility of its valence with previously acquired knowledge can be translated into the trust of the decision-maker. The results of the investigation conducted by Geva, Mayhar and Skorick (2000, 456) show the anxious influence of some connotations of information. The premise that threat and anxiety decrease information processing has coincided with the results of the research. Although the model of cognitive calculations is not substantial for demonstrating the role of emotions in the decision-making process in foreign policy, they specify that indicating stress in experimental conditions has decreased the decision threshold, affecting a decrease in the number of elements needed to reach a decision. Finally, the researchers stress the need for careful consideration of how emotions, as primary factors, influence the cognitive process of the foreign policy decision-making process (Geva, Mayhar and Skorick 2000, 457).

150

Chapter Three

Jackson and Sorensen (2007, 237) consider that these approaches are important because they can influence foreign policy decision-making (that is, the individual cognitive processes and the belief system). These views are important because they cause us to speculate about the claims we make on rationality, because when we study the effects of system structures or internal pressures that are put upon the decision-makers, the usual claim is related to rationality. The relationship between the structure of the system and the behaviour of the actor is often forgotten by the statement of rationality, which allows theorists to predict that leaders will respond to the incentives and constraints imposed by the environment (Keohane 2002, 167). Literature in the field of human knowledge and belief systems questions this notion of rationality and calls for a different approach to it, urging scholars in the field of international relations to include the cognitive approach and to consider the theories in a more psychologically realistic manner (Rosati 2000, 74). Goldgeier (1997) points out that since the existence of threats depends on the individual and societal perceptions, it must incorporate the psychological dimension of threat perception and identity formation in structural analysis (Goldgeier 1997, 79). The author draws attention to the consideration of perceptual variables (the neorealist approach), the role of ideas (the neoliberal approach) and identity (the social constructivist approach) and their incorporation into operational models of analysis at the psychological level. More of a novelty is Clinician Meichebaum’s intervention (2011), which suggests that in the counselling team of political decision-makers there should also be a cognitive therapist, who could help decision-makers to develop questions, carefully selecting those to be used in making decisions, the preservation of rational beliefs, engaging in the identification of motivational and cognitive errors, finding shorter impulsive-cognitive modes, employing heuristics and stereotypes, using analogue and metaphorical thinking that otherwise can distort and compromise the efficiency in solving problems, drawing attention to the confusing of desires with reality and to the denial procedures that can contribute to failure, thus helping them to consider the credibility of the information source and the long-term consequences of the decisions to be taken (Meichebaum 2011, 87). Effective decision-making can be influenced by misperceptions induced by a failure in empathy, perspective reduction processes and groupthinking, but also by procedures of "imitating the system." The most important contribution of Meichebaum’s study (2011) is the synthesizing of lists of cognitive errors and distortions to be avoided by the decision-makers, called decisional checklists (Meichebaum 2011, 90):

Motivational and cognitive errors in decision-making

Using cognitive shortcuts

Desire for cognitive consistency

Nr. Crt.

1

2

151

The tendency to engage confirmatory distortions and seek information which is consistent with previous visions or existing assumptions. This is known as "the drunkard search", to describe someone who is looking for keys under a lamp light at night, because there is the best light, even if he lost his keys along the way. The directive to seek information that matches what you are looking for, or asking only those who have common views illustrates the confirmatory distortions (Houghton 2008).

The tendency to use the most peaceful and most handy examples and the tendency to consider them as the most representative for a class of events. Heuristics can be emotionally charged and can be withdrawn (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1986). The tendency to use stereotypes and dichotomous thinking in formulating decisions (Kahneman et al. 1987). The tendency to use metaphors and analogies which can simplify and misinterpret the complexity of the current situation. The tendency to outline an experience which is familiar from historical analysis, but which distorts the present situation (Dodge 2008, Dyson and Preston 2008). The tendency to reason by historical analogies, using history to justify policies which have already been established, by misinterpreting historical parallels and engaging in rhetorical jujitsu (Lakoff and Johson 1980).

Description/examples of errors

Table 3-3: List of motivational and cognitive errors in decision-making (adapted from Meichbaum 2011, 90)

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

3

152

Distortions and cognitive deficits

The tendency to engage in informational processes which fail to consider how interrogations and statements are framed, failure to consider multiple non-violent options or alternatives, failure to consider the full range of consequences, a lack of consideration for what follows after decisions; failure to calculate the best course of action, which is in their own interest and is most consistent with their values (Dodge et al. 1990, Jervis 1976, Tversky and Kahneman 1986). The tendency to maintain a hostile attributional distortion which easily views every challenge as a sign of "intentionality", which contributes to the aggressive side effects. The tendency to misread or misunderstand interpersonal relationships and a failure to consider alternative interpretations (Dodge 2008). The tendency to fail to demonstrate empathy with the opponent and a failure to open the perspective on what may contribute to the decision-making process of others. This can help avoid conflicts and their resolution (Houghton 2008). The tendency to engage in impulsive momentary decisions when complex problems appear and therefore failure in weighing the consequences (Gladwell 2005, Houghton 2008). The tendency to make fundamental attribution rrors by overestimating the interpretation of an individual’s action as the result of situational factors, while someone else's actions are seen as a result of our own dispositions. These errors of attribution can lead to overestimation or underestimation of behavioural responsibility, thus leading to a misinterpretation of the behaviour of an individual or group (Fiske and Taylor 1984, Ross and Nisbett 1991).

The tendency to stubbornly maintain a mental set and get the "cherry on the cake" for consistent data and to manipulate information to fit the pre-existing notions which can be anchored to the alleged defects. Wanting to hear what a person wants to hear and disregarding incompatible information and seeing participants as opponents who are not "part of the team" (Suskind 2004).

Chapter Three

153

The tendency to engage stereotypical errors of thinking. Decision-makers can make not so wise decisions because they think they are smart, strong and invincible. "Fear", "hubris" and "irrational exuberance" can lead to a narrow vision and immoral choices (Sternberg 2002, 2007). The tendency to make errors related to schema or the tendency to make decisions based on personal situations and development ("hidden agenda"), which will go beyond the demands of the present situation (proof of manhood, of not looking weak, winning elections, improving popularity a procedure of distraction) (Houghton 2008, Iyengar and McGuire 1993, George 1980). The tendency to lack curiosity, avoiding debates and confrontations between counsellors, engaging in denigration or wishful thinking ("wishful thinking") (Woodward 2006). The tendency to motivate defensively when failure occurs (to blame others, external events or chance), rather than to emphasize emotional maturity, to raise anxiety, ask provocative questions (about the validity of deeply rooted assumptions). Leaders need support and guidance to learn from mistakes and failure (Hackman, Wageman 2007). The tendency to depend on groupthinking processes which endeavour for unanimity and group cohesion and contribute to homogeneity, solidarity and a sense of fairness and invulnerability. Isolation of the decision-making group contributes to self-censorship, collective rationalization, self-enhancing of selfanalysis, and some members of the group act as "guardians" of decision-makers. These processes are exacerbated when decisions must be made under time pressure. These processes of groupthinking can lead the group members on a road, which, in retrospect, was wrongly initiated. Groupthinking tends to be linked to external ideas and policy-makers and thus fails to encourage difficult and challenging questions (Brown and Paulus 2002, Janis 1982, Stroebe and Diehl 1994).

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

154 Tend to use the game with the system procedures, where counsellors intentionally and strategically decide to avoid, misrepresent and selectively distort the views and positions of other advisers and to manipulate the results of decisions. This kind of "bureaucratic battle" may take the form of using back channels and trades which may undermine the decision- making process.

Chapter Three

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

155

Thaler and Sunstein (2008, 34) emphasized that training in decisionmaking should include the following: x x x

x x

Searching and analysing the present situation or problem and careful consideration on how interrogations are framed; An account of the major goals, values and interests which will be affected by the proposed decisions; Generating a wide range of options and alternatives and considering the pleasant and unpleasant consequences of each skill to address critical questions and think about the problem and the decision-making process; A careful consideration of the issues and potential barriers that may arise during the implementation of contingency plans; A process of corrective feedback, incorporated in the evaluation and the willingness to change course, if necessary.

The decision errors identified and summarized by Meichbaum are very useful for the decision-making process (2011): Table 3-4: Types of decision-making errors (adapted from Meichebaum 2011, 92). Nr. Crt. 1

Type of error

Defining

Using shortcuts in thinking

The tendency to use "mental habits". Choosing examples at hand (from the past) and using them as representative examples. The tendency to seek historical analogies which misrepresent and do not fit the circumstances or situations. The tendency to seek information that is consistent in light of previous visions. Searching for information which "fits" with what they are looking for.

2

Thinking by historical analogies

3

"The drunkard search" or using confirmatory distortions

Examples It is the same as..., exactly as...

Affirmations "just like”.

Searching for the keys under the light of the lamp because the light is better there, although he lost the keys on the way.

Chapter Three

156 4

Mental patterns that lead to a narrow vision

The tendency to stubbornly maintain beliefs that lead to the selection and manipulation of data which will "fit" with what an individual wants to hear or believe. The tendency to fail to consider the short-term, intermediate and longterm consequences of the actions of an individual. The tendency to engage in impulsive decisions.

5

The lack of consequential thinking

6

Quick decisions

7

Using “black and white” thinking

The tendency to have biases in reasoning.

8

Arrogance

9

Defensive motivation

10

Lack of curiosity

11

Using groupthinking processes

12

The game of the system

Exaggerated pride, the gain of "irrational exuberance" and undeniable selfconfidence. The tendency to blame others, the events, the chance. Avoiding debates, minimizing confrontations, not questioning data accuracy. Making efforts to achieve unanimity and cohesion, focusing on group solidarity and homogeneity of decision. Strategic bypass, misrepresenting the positions of advisers.

"Choosing the cherry on the cake" of data. Always framing the facts which are a plus. The way of framing the questions influences decision-making. Lack of planning and vision for the future. Stage of Denial. "If there is a simple solution to a problem, it is usually wrong." "Are you with us or against us?"; You did this "on purpose" without checking. Omniscience. I do not need to consult with others. Failure to learn from errors or failures. "We are now facing a communication failure".

Self-censorship, refractory to ideas from outside the closure in the decision-making process. Exclusion of links in the chain of command.

Alternatives for the Decision-Making Models

157

The new results from neuroscience research (Gross 2008, 109) do not eliminate the possibility of learning and change. Reflection can occur after the choice, but it prepares the decision-makers for the next decision. The challenge is understanding how and when emotions are engaged, when they improve the decision and how emotions engage and reflect and motivate. Neuroscience research on choice is not opposed to priming the unconsciousness by repetitive patterns and design of the system ("free will not", different from the "free will"). In this context, research on learning and change, which has long been neglected, becomes important in foreign policy analysis. But we must keep in mind that taking the path of knowledge, instead of rationality has a potential downside (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 240). The centralization of studies restricted to human knowledge brings many questions to the research agenda; the collection of information for analysis will be time-consuming. There can also be the danger of an undisciplined proliferation of categories and variables, by adding to the levels of analysis. Thus it will be difficult to determine which are the most important, and the explanations of individual cases will erode the possibility of generalizing the cases (Holsti 2010, 31). Anyway, what needs to dominate is the idea of combining different theories and models of analysis (Tetlock and Breuslauer 1991, 79; Levy 1994, 279; Gross Stein 1996, 104).

Conclusion The cognitive approach to the foreign policy decision-making process opens a new perspective. Considering personal elements such as the personality traits of the decision-maker, his belief system, images, stereotypes, prejudices, values, but also socio-emotional elements, related to the environment in which he was reared and educated, influence decision-making and explain the decisions which cannot be analyzed through the rational actor model and its alternatives. It adds the explanation of the influence of irrational beliefs, creating a link with the idiosyncrasies involved in the decision-making process. Knowledge of these elements contributes to an increase of the predictive power of decisions to be made. The individual level of the foreign policy decision-making process is the "beneficiary" of this innovative approach. Although unaddressed so far in the Romanian literature, the current trends in this area support its consideration along with other "established” models of analysis.

158

Chapter Three

One of the reasons we have focused on it was the study by Keith Shimko (1994, 670) on "metaphors" (cognitive concepts) which leaders use in making foreign policy decisions. As we have seen, the cognitive approach provides great explanatory and predictive power in the field of foreign policy. Although many things still need to be clarified regarding the decision-making process, the field of international relations has become extremely sensitive to the study of the role of beliefs and cognitive processes of decision-makers, but also to how these influence the worldview and the choice of alternatives within the decision-making process. This approach helps us to better understand current political dynamics (Rosati 1987, 170).

CHAPTER FOUR IDIOSYNCRACIES IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

The role of information processing, as well as classification and idiosyncrasies, have indicated the need for a psychological approach to foreign policy decision-making (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 97). This chapter describes the psychological elements that may influence foreign policy decision-making. Specialists bring to our attention factors such as the personality, beliefs, leadership style, emotions, images, intelligence and how they influence decision-making and the results expected. These factors call into question the power of the rational model (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 97). But this does not mean that decisionmakers are irrational (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 97), but rather, that they are limited by their abilities to follow through all the stages of the rational model. The presence of idiosyncrasies (personal and social factors) (Campanale and Shakun 1997, 13), influencing decision-making can lead towards more complex-realistic approaches of decision-making, which are different from the "classical" rational model (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 97). Fagen mentioned two styles of decision-making in foreign policy: calculated and emotional (Fagen 1962, 214). The term idiosyncrasy comes from the Greek idios, which means "private", sun which means "with" and krasis, which means "mixture, blend", so, freely translated, the term means the "personal mixture" or "personal blend" (Keys 2003, 2) that each person brings to a relationship. This mix of personal characteristics is made and influenced by internal and external factors (social) (Meams and Thorne 2000, 15). Idiosyncratic empathy is the element which can be used by the decision-maker in order to emphasize the importance of transparency in relation to other people and the decision-maker’s intuition, and also to facilitate the direct relationship between the people involved in decision-making. Speaking about the consideration of idiosyncrasies in the psychological approach, Suzanne Keys (2003, 2) says:

160

Chapter Four valuing idiosyncrasies requires a high degree of integrity, rigorous selfdiscipline and continuous dedication to the consideration of human qualities [...]. To be human means to be capable of awareness regarding your strengths and weaknesses and not being afraid of being vulnerable. [...].

The risk of considering idiosyncrasies in the decision-making process requires the consideration of more stringent criteria, according to norms, and the effort to be the same as, rather then be “yourself”. This system is based on fear, i.e. to be trusted, and if the decision-maker cannot be considered "reliable" because he is idiosyncratic and ethical, then not only the decision-maker will suffer, but also those who will feel the results of the decisional process (Keys 2003, 12). As presented in the previous chapters (Chapters 2 and 3), rationality in decision-making in foreign policy cannot be considered the sole factor, but, at most, a benchmark factor. But postmodern approaches bring to the attention of specialists the consideration of the role and influence of psychological factors, which can only improve the quality of decision-making. Goldstein and Pevenhouse mention the levels at which individual idiosyncrasies may occur: the first level is that of misperceptions and selective perceptions (when the filtering of information is performed); the second is that of affective idiosyncrasies (emotions felt by the consequences of actions related to the like or dislike of a person) and the third level, that of cognitive idiosyncrasies (cognitive balance and cognitive dissonance) (Goldstein and Pevenhouse 2006, 145). Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur organize the psychological factors (idiosyncrasies) that influence decision-making (those that occur during a negotiation) in four categories: cognitive, social, motivational and emotional idiosyncrasies (Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur 2004, 8). We will try to frame the idiosyncrasies into the same pattern.

Cognitive Idiosyncrasies Cognitive idiosyncrasies are systematic deviations from the normative models which prescribe rational behaviour, as articulated in game theory and other normative principles (Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur 2004, 10). They result from heuristic information processing, such as framing, anchoring and overevaluation (Neale and Bazerman 1991). The authors mentioned above identify two approaches which have characterized research on the presence of cognitive idiosyncrasies in the processes of negotiation. The fundamental argument identified by them is that the decision-maker/negotiator suffers from perceptive errors or misperceptions

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

161

when assessing risk, the value of a game or other circumstances. This approach identifies the economic model of expected utility (see Chapter 3). The second approach derived from the concepts of schemas or cognitive maps (Gilovich 1981, 797) or from the cognitive-mental models developed by cognitivist psychologists (Evans 1993, 561; Tabossi, Bell and Johson-Laird 1999, 299). These structures (schemas, maps and models) operate directly on information processing, including attention, categorization and withdrawal. Raghubir and Das (2009) state that cognitive idiosyncrasies can be identified in five different stages: perception, memory recovery, information integration, reasoning and behaviour. Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur (2004) summarize in a table the cognitive idiosyncrasies which occur during a decision-making/negotiation process, and the authors who identified them:

Chapter Four

Theory Prospective theory and the cybernetic model

Anchoring

Cognitive idiosyncrasies Framing

Research Bazerman, Magliozzi and Neale (1985): decisionmakers/negotiators framing a situation positively, present a greater risk aversion than those framing the situation negatively. Bottom and Studt (1993): Positive frameworks can be trusted when they are not shared by all parties. De Dreu, Emans and van de Vliert (1992): decisionmakers/negotiators are influenced not only by their own staff, but also by that of others. Northcraft and Neale (1987): decision-makers’ tendency to fail towards the sufficient adjustment of a reasoning from the initial baseline value. Galinsky, Seiden, Kim and Medvec (2002): Initial offerings affect the satisfaction of the decision-maker/ negotiator towards their results, more than the objectual success does. Korhonen, Oretskin, Teich and Wallenius (1995): an idiosyncratic starting position impacts on the outcomes of negotiation/decision-making. Ritov (1996): initial offer values influence the final profit for the initiator and others. Galinsky ‫܈‬i Mussweiller (2001): the effects of the initial offer on the results is moderated by the perspective addressed.

Table 4-1: Cognitive idiosyncrasies in negotiation/decision-making (adapted from Thompson, Neale and Sinaceur 2004, 10-11)

162

Information processing theory

Utility

Overevaluation

Availabilty

163

White et al. (1994): reservation price seems to be the dominant reference point. Whyte and Sebenius (1997): Anchoring effects are as large for a group as they are for the individuals, this is because groups tend to adopt the majority rule or the consensus. Northcraft and Neale (1986): more concrete information affects the decision-making during a negotiation. Borgida and Nisbett (1977): live, concrete and emotional information impacts more than abstract information, pale and emotionally weak ones. Taylor and Thompson (1982): live information does not have greater impact than information equal in terms of information, but "pale". Neale (1984): negotiators for which negotiation costs are not prominent, behave in a less concessionary manner. Bazerman and Neale (1982): negotiators tend to overestimate the probability that a neutral arbitrator would choose their offer. Neale and Bazerman (1985): negotiators who overevaluate themselves make fewer concessions and reach lower performances, unlike those who are realistic about their own potential. Simons (1993): when the dyads conceptualize utility as subjective preference, they tend to achieve more integrative agreements.

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

164

Perception of task

Perceptual frames

Chapter Four Pinkley (1990): negotiators can have one of the three different cognitive frames: based on relationships, emotional-intellectual and compromise-win. Pinkley and Northcraft (1994): cognitive frameworks influence the content of agreements and the results of negotiation. Thompson and DeHarpport (1998): when both sides share similar perceptions of their interactions, the negotiator is more gentle.

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

165

Cognitive consistency is the most prominent cognitive theory of how perceptions influence decisions (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 98). It means that decision-makers minimize certain information which is not compatible with their pre-existing images and beliefs, or pay exaggerated attention only to information that is consistent with these images and beliefs. Within a group or in the "groupthinking" (see Chapter 3) where the information that was in disagreement with the consensus of the group, there may appear the tendency to perceive new information in light of previously held expectations (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 98). In other words, new information is processed through pre-existing images and decision-makers perceive what they think is there (Jervis 1976, 117, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 98). At the level of knowledge, idiosyncrasies of the two elements may occur: (1) cognitive content and (2) cognitive process (Young and Schafer 1998, 66). The cognitive content refers to what an individual thinks, at the level of knowledge; the cognitive process refers to the use of such content at a conscious and unconscious level. Another example given by Mintz and DeRouen (2010, 99) is the evoked set, a term taken from Jervis (1976). This refers to the immediate concerns which are in the mind of the decision-maker. Suefeld, Cross and Stewart (2009) identify two cognitive variables which cause the appearance of idiosyncrasies (Suefeld, Cross and Stewart 2009, 9): conceptual complexity (Hermann 2006, 178) and integrative complexity (Suefeld, Tetlock and Streufert 1992, 394), both descendants of the cognitive style theories proliferated in the 1960s (especially the theory of conceptual cognitive complexity). Another cognitive idiosyncrasy refers to the variables of the verbal style, developed by Weintraub (2006, 138). These variables attempt to differentiate people based on the idiosyncratic use of verbal structures. The advantage of such analysis is that these verbal structures, such as imagery and complexity are not handled consciously, like the semantic content. According to this author, people can be identified as belonging fully or partially to a certain style. Thus, several dimensions of personality can be deduced (Weintraub 2006, 143): ¾ ¾

A large number of qualifiers (like perhaps might be), occurring in the text may indicate indecision or a lack of desire to have a point of view; Using the retractors (for example, anyway, however) are signs of impulsivity. Frequent users of retractors are people who draw

Chapter Four

166

¾

¾

¾ ¾

¾

¾

¾

conclusions quickly or give conclusions too quickly and then they will have to amend or withdraw them; Using the pronoun I, rather than we indicates the need of a person to be seen as independent, vs. a spokesman for a group or a cause. Using the pronoun me means passivity, that is things are done behind the respective person, without the possibility of control (for example, when there is pressure, manipulation or victimization); Using impersonal forms (someone did this, where the subject is not specified), where it is more feasible to make a recognizable reference, is known as impersonal reference. If a source uses too many such impersonal forms, it appears to be emotionally detached. The opposite trend, a high number of personal indications may reflect self-oriented concerns; Oppositional behaviour or stubbornness is indicated by the use of negatives (not, never, nothing); Using explanations (because, therefore, since) suggests rationalizing, points of view which are justified, explained or excused. People using these words extensively are hyper-rational, and those who use them less are didactic and do not feel the need to explain to others; Those who usually assign emotions or self assessments (often saying I like something) or use other expressions related to emotions, transmit warmth. The lack of these words can mean coldness or detachment; Adverbs which emphasize or add more authority to a statement are adverbial intensifiers (very, really). The use of these enhancers adds an ounce of drama to the statements. People who use few adverbs can be boring; Direct references appear when the person speaking refers directly to the person spoken to. References can be counted directly, as the person speaks. Using these words indicates a friendly or engaging behaviour, and those who make few references are seen as being shy or detached.

Also, observing how people spontaneously explain events may verify whether they tend to see the causes of positive or negative events as being primarily internal or external (caused by their actions or by external forces), stable or unstable (consistent/chronic or temporary and short), and global or specific (resulting from a wide variety or intrinsic aspects of an individual or of a nation, or, alternatively, resulting in a specific area, the limited aspects of a person or of a nation). Those who see positive events

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

167

as caused by internal, global or stable factors and negative events as caused by external, unstable and specific factors, have an explanatory optimistic style. Those who reverse speech patterns like those listed above are classified as pessimistic. Evidence demonstrated by Satterfield and Seligman (1994) shows that those who are pessimistic tend to be passive, indecisive and weak in solving problems and, therefore, this variable is to be considered for the decision-makers (Satterfield 1994, 78). The optimistic explanatory style is associated with better physical and mental health and with occupational success (Kahneman and Rehnshon 2006, 35). D'Amato (1967, 294) mentions the influence of four constructs that influence the decision-making process: ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

Systemic-Personalist–how the decision-maker receives the environmental mechanism; "Eagle-Swan"–the desire to use power and strength; Incremental-Avulsive–the degree of change of present and past decisions; Flexible-Rigid–the degree of flexibility of previous constructs.

Images represent another cognitive idiosyncrasy (Goldstein and Pevenhouse 2006, 147). They are mental representations used for framing and organizing the world, and can be considered a kind of stereotype that the mind uses to categorize events and people. Therefore, images are formed from cognitive processes (Hermann et al. 1997, 407). Images are useful for simplifying the complicated world, but they place the decider in a situation of risk by supra-generalizing, being formed by the interweaving of three elements: strategic balance, perceived opportunity or threat and perceived culture (Hermann et al. 1997, 407). Images are important for other aspects of foreign policy decisionmaking. For example, the operational code and cognitive maps use images to explain decisions. Cashman (1993, 145) states that images are used to create the system of beliefs. Goldstein and Pevenhouse (2006) identify mirror images as cognitive idiosyncrasies that relate to the two sides of a conflict which keep opposing images of opponents (e.g. "they are defensive, we are aggressive"). The same researchers talk about the psychological projection of their own feelings on another actor (Goldstein and Pevenhouse 2006, 145). Schemes contain individual knowledge about a person, role, group, event or other objects (Kuklinski, Luskin and Bollard 1991, 1343). These are important concepts in the analysis of foreign policy because the impact

168

Chapter Four

of previous information is profound and it influences decisions at all levels of analysis. Schemes save time and energy and therefore people use them. The rational model is based on orders, rather than looking for coherence. Sometimes, information processing is influenced by the memory of previous experiences. Analogies (or historical analogies) (Goldstein and Pevenhouse 2006, 146) represent a strong cognitive command. When leaders experience events demanding decisions, they tend to reflect the past showing similar circumstances, alternatives and possible outcomes. Past events are referred to as analogies. They help us to provide a sense of the environment and new situations (Houghton 1996, 524). If the alternative has been selected and implemented, the decision-maker can learn from this experience. The analogy and its counterpart, learning, can provide useful commands. However, they can lead to disastrous results if the wrong lessons are learned or if the current situation is not a reflection of the reference event. Understanding how nations learn can help to provide a sense of following purpose by a state, the ways to accomplish it and to make decisions (Goldsmith 2005, 1). Learning from the past appears when the decision-makers look at the past in order for it to be helpful in solving present problems (Khong 1992, 6). Many studies of foreign policy decision-making processes attribute the behaviour of states to the distribution of resources, alliances or regime type (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 104). However, the focus on learning can help choose the option even when these factors do not vary with the position taken by a government (Goldsmith 2005, 2). Leaders can learn from each other and from their past events. Axelrod (1976) brings conceptual maps to the attention of the foreign policy decision-making process, with a different meaning from the traditional, psychological one (Axelrod 1976). A cognitive map (conceptual) is a graphical deployment of the system of beliefs, using figures or numbers (Maoz 1990, 116). In other words, cognitive maps are diagrams of individual decisions and causal assertions. The arrows represent causal directions that connect points within the cognitive maps. Maoz (1991, 117) provides the example of Kissinger's conceptual map, with its two nodes: "the Soviet concept of the balance of powers" and "foreign policy leadership". Causal arrows go from the first to the second node. The value of this conceptual map is in influencing Kissinger's belief system on the Soviet Union and the overview it offers on the structure of the decision. Conceptual maps support decision theory by exposing the nexus between what the decision-maker states as a choice and the results it expects from these choices.

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

169

Conceptual maps are applicable in the following situations: (1) decisions that are vital to national security, such as those involving situations of war, (2) decisions that are made at the highest level by leaders unconstrained by bureaucracy, (3) long-term policy planning, with a high degree of uncertainty, (4) decisions made in ambiguous or uncertain situations, resulting from inadequate information, and (5) where decisionmakers are constrained by stress (Holsti 1976, 30). Conceptual maps enable a determining of the most satisfactory strategy or other strategic decisions by the decision-makers. The greatest benefit provided by this technique is a "glance" into the structure of beliefs of the participants involved in making a decision. Valuable research by Findlay and Thagard (2011) has identified emotional change, using a new method of graphic representation, the cognitive-affective map to analyze emotional changes occurring during the negotiations in 1978 at Camp David, which led to an agreement between Egypt and Israel. The two authors have used this technique to model the mental states of the two negotiators Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, based on details provided by the memoirs of Jimmy Carter. This account has enabled the measurement of the emotional states of the Israeli and Egyptian leaders, generating maps that showed how Sadat’s and Begin’s attitudes changed during deliberations, eventually leading to a settlement of the major conflict. This method for facilitating the recognition and reconciliation of emotional differences between the disputants can contribute to peaceful agreements. Selecting the concepts which drew the cognitive-affective maps have followed this method: 1. 2.

3. 4.

Identifying the main concepts, beliefs, goals and emotions of the person who will be analyzed; Identifying these elements as emotionally positive or negative and representing them through ovals or hexagons. The ovals are positive emotional elements and the hexagons negative ones. The rectangles are neutral elements or those having positive and negative aspects; Identifying the relationships between elements that are complementary, mutually supportive (thicker lines) or conflicting and incompatible (dashed lines); Introducing the resulting cognitive-affective map to others, to see if they understand the presentation of the situation.

The figure below (4.1) renders these conventions by graphic representation:

Chapter Four

170

Fig. 4-1: Conventions for the cognitive-affective map (after Findlay and Thagard 2011, 5)

Positive element

Mutual support

Neutral element

Negative element

Strong positive

Goldstein and Pevenhouse (2006, 145) mention another cognitive idiosyncrasy: mistaking desires for reality (wishful thinking) that is the overestimation of the probability of getting the expected results. Cognitive idiosyncrasies filters are some of the theoretical filters for the study of the behaviour of the decision-maker. The cognitive approach is the individual approach to an inherent social situation.

Social Perception Idiosyncrasies The idiosyncrasies of social perception differ from cognitive ones regarding the nature of the influence, which is centred on the perception of social objects, events and people (Thompson and Hastie 1990, 98; Thompson, Peterson and Kray 1995, 5). Compared to cognitive idiosyncrasies, social perception idiosyncrasies are inherently interpersonal and deeply rooted in the perception of social entities and social situations. Table 4-2 creates an incursion on the idiosyncrasies of social perception. The table is organized into idiosyncrasies of self-perception and idiosyncrasies of others’ perceptions.

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

171

Table 4-2: Idiosyncrasies of the social perception (adapted after Thompson, Neale and Sinaceur 2004, 17-18) Perception centre Self

Idiosyncrasies

Research

Illusion of transparency

Gilovich, Savitsky and Medvec (1998): people tend to overestimate the extent to which others can discern internal states. Keysar, Ginzel and Bazerman (1995): decision-makers’ tendency to behave as if others knew their inner states. Voraurer and Claude (1998): the tendency of decision-makers to overestimate the transparency of their own objectives, especially when communication with others is less constrained. Kronzon and Darley (1999): people identifying the authors and victims will tend to have an idiosyncratic assessment of the ethical behaviour. Neale and Bazerman (1983): decisionmakers with open perspective will have a greater success in creating integral arrangements than those with fewer perspectives. Bazerman and Neale (1983): Many decision-makers tend to think about the interests of other parties as being opposed to their own. Thompson and Hastie (1990): Rigid perception leads to lower individual potential and profit. Pinkley, Griffith and Northcraft (1995): rigid perceptions arise through specific idiosyncrasies for information searching and its processing. Ross and Stillinger (1991): decisionmakers devalue concessions made by other parties, often as a function offered to them.

Perspective approach

Others

Rigid perception, creative devaluation

Chapter Four

172 Extremism

Fundamental attribution errors Knowing the other party, ignoring the cognitions of others

Idiosyncrasies of coercion

Robinson, Keltner, Ward and Ross (1995): a tendency for passive receptors to believe that their own perceptions are circumscribed by the objective reality. Morris, Larrick and Su (1999): a tendency to see the behaviour of others in dispositional terms, rather than the effects of a situation. Neale and Bazerman (1991): a tendency to ignore the cognitions of others Carroll, Bazerman and Maury (1988): tend to ignore contingencies when decision-makers cope with uncertainty. Blount and Larrick (2000): an inability to accurately predict the effects of the negotiation procedures over the opponent. Bottom and Paese (1998): a tendency to think that the other party may conclude more, leading to the best results of the negotiation. Rothbart and Hallmark (1988): a tendency to think that efficient coercion is performed only on opponents, not on yourself.

Mintz and DeRouen (2010, 101) question whether the leaders’ beliefs can influence foreign policy decision-making. Beliefs provide powerful frameworks for the interpretation and understanding of decision-making situations (Renshon and Renshon 2008, 512; Walker, Schafer and Young 1999, 611). They can block or give some shape to information. Domestic and international factors influence the decision-making process and this is mediated by the beliefs of the leaders. The authors mentioned above, quoting Walker and Schafer, specify that the internal dispositions of the individual influence foreign policy decisions in different ways (Walker and Schafer 2000, 529). Simon (1985, 294) refers to the possibility of influencing the "radical process of irrationality", by the actions that are based on unmediated and unbiased feelings by the thought processes. The second possibility identified by Simon (1985) is the process performed on the background of rationality by which actions are based only on environmental information, internationalized by the thinking processes. The Operational Analysis Code (OAC) is an approach to the political analysis of the leaders, which focuses on a set of political beliefs or, more

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

173

broadly, on a set of beliefs incorporated in the personality of a leader, or generated by a "cultural matrix of society" (Walker and Schafer 2000, 530, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 102). Suefeld, Cross and Stewart (2009) present two dimensions of the leader's operational code (Walker, Schafer and Young 1999, 176): the first dimension is a set of philosophical beliefs of the leader (these are elements of the leader diagnosis, attributional tendencies when he tries to make sense of the actions of other leaders, groups or nations); the second dimension is a set of instrumental beliefs (these are prognosis elements of the leader, his preference for using a particular strategy). To infer these beliefs from the written texts, the VISC test analyzes each sentence in the source material. If the subject accompanies the verb, the categorized phrase is attributed to the self. Sentences about self form the basis of instrumental beliefs, because they express what the speaker has done, is doing or will do. On the other hand, if the sentences are assigned to other nations or actors, the categorized sentence is others. Such sentences form the basis for measuring philosophical beliefs, as they are statements about countries and global actors, and therefore, express beliefs about the nature of the political universe. In addition to the two main categories of beliefs, there are some subdivisions for each (philosophical are denoted by F, instrumental by I, and the most important beliefs are denoted by M) (Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur 2004, 22): ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

[M] F-1: the essential nature of the world (for example, if the world is essentially one of conflict or one of harmony); F-2: optimism regarding someone’s ability to achieve goals; F-3: predictability of the political future measures how the variables of other countries find themselves in their strategies (the more variables, the less predictable); [M] F-4: ability to control historical development, conceptually similar to the belief about the control of events (Hermann, 2006); F-5: the role played by chance; [M] I-1: the approach of goals or direction strategy (the use of force vs. diplomacy and cooperation); I-2: the pursuit of goals or tactics intensity (e.g. strength, threat or punishment of other nations); I-3: risk orientation or the variety of tactics used in many situations (a low variety involves a great risk acceptance, as leaders step forward without much regret for the context or feedback);

Chapter Four

174

¾

¾

I-4: periodization/flexibility of tactics or the perspective to change tactics in two aspects: the prospect of change from cooperation to conflict and vice versa; the prospect of change from words (e.g. verbal opposition and threats) to facts (e.g. actions taken, such as punishment and reward); I-5: exercise of power is the measure of the degree to which a leader favours each of the six strategies available: reward, promise, calling for support, opposition, threat or punishment. The proportion of each tactic, verbally expressed or assigned to a person or group, forms the index of a division.

The social perception approach to the study of the idiosyncrasies of the decision-maker was enhanced by the research conducted in the field of social psychology. This approach is rooted in the psychological principles of knowledge, but is moving from the cognitive centre to the perception of the other part, of the self and the relationships. Attributional processes related-research represents the key to addressing social perception (Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur 2004, 22).

Motivational Idiosyncrasies These arise from the activation of specific needs and goals. Where it is believed that social perception idiosyncrasies are present, the motivational idiosyncrasies can be switched by the presence of particular social goals. Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur (2004) talk about a change in the goals that influence reasoning, behaviour and results and set four motivational goals: self-realization, closure and coherence, cooperation (maximizing shared goals) and responsibility (or pressure of coherence) (Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur 2004, 22). Table 4-3 presents a synthesis of the motivational idiosyncrasies conducted by the authors mentioned above:

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

175

Table 4-3: Motivational idiosyncrasies (adapted from Thompson, Neale and Sinaceur 2004, 23-24) Nature of motivational idiosyncrasies Self-realization

Closure, consistency and balance

Idiosyncrasies

Research

Egocentrism and self-serving

De Dreu, Nauta and van de Vliert (1995): assessing self-serving behaviour in a conflict results in the reduction of the solving of problems and a greater possibility of having conflict in the future. Thompson, Valley and Kramer (1995): a tendency to feel bad if you know that your opponent is successful. De Dreu, Koole and Oldersma (1999): decision-makers with a high need for closure (vs. those with a lower level of need) are more influenced by central points, when setting limits and making concessions. De Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti and Pierro (1999): a higher pressure of conformity and a smaller equal participation in collective negotiations when the need for closure is higher (vs. lower) in the group. Axelrod (1984): an indefinite time horizon creates incentives for cooperation. Heide and Miner (1992): Open-closed anticipated future interaction and the frequency of contacts increase the chances of apparent cooperation. De Dreu and Boles (1998): social value orientation influences the choice and recalls heuristics in the individual preparation for negotiation. Thompson and DeHarpport (1998): the ability to capitalize, on the basis of common interests, decreases dramatically when only one of the parties has an orientation towards common interests.

Bittersweet effect Need for closure

Cooperation

Future interactions

Social value orientation Common guidelines

Chapter Four

176 Responsibility

Responsibility

Ben-Yoav and Pruitt (1984a): responsibility reduces (or increases) mutual benefits when the expectations of future interactions are absent (or present). Kramer, Pommerencke and Newton (1993): shared social identity leads to equality, high liability leads to equal results. De Dreu, Koole and Steinel (2000): responsibility decreases rigid perception and leads to more integrated agreements. Wilson (1992): a desire to save leads to greater aggressiveness and a lack of compromise from the negotiator.

Suefeld, Cross and Stewart (2009) highlight the motivational idiosyncrasies: the motif of power, the motif of affiliation and the motif of accomplishment (Suefeld, Cross and Stewart 2009, 10). They were originally designated in the Thematic Apperceptive Test, a projective personality test that asks subjects to generate stories based on drawings. Later, imagination was calculated by verbal and nonverbal materials, and it can be measured remotely by using cognitive variables through content analysis. The motivational perspective on the idiosyncrasies involves taking into account the conditions through which cognitive processes will be engaged. This perspective provides the theoretical framework for activating the unconscious goals (subjective). The most investigated processes are cooperation and competition. However, the reasons are not sufficient to understand the complexity of emotions that occur in the decision-making process. Research on the role of emotional idiosyncrasies in the decisionmaking process have recently begun to gain ground.

Emotional (Affective) Idiosyncrasies Emotional idiosyncrasies refer to the misperceptions of one person or more. These may, in turn, address more inconsistencies or connections between feelings and actions, feelings and reasonings or feelings and different stages of negotiation. Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur (2004, 27) suggest three types of misperceptions which emotional idiosyncrasies focus on: (1) inaccuracy in terms of reasoning and emotions that can be seen in others or themselves, (2) wrong beliefs about the duration of

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

177

emotional states, and (3) wrong beliefs about the causal effects of emotion and behaviour. Table 4-4 presents the the idiosyncrasies that may occur in the following areas: Table 4-4: Emotional idiosyncrasies (adapted from Thompson, Neale and Sinaceur 2004, 28) Nature of emotion Positive emotions

Negative emotions

Idiosyncrasies Positive

Anger

Research Carnevale and Isen (1986): happy individuals exchange information more easily and can be creative in negotiations. Barry and Oliver (1996): argue that emotions influence decisions in negotiation, opponents’ selection, forming offers, concessions, economic results, the desire for future interactions and respect for the terms of the agreement. Forgas (1998a): positive moods produce fewer critical reactions and are more compliant than negative moods. Forgas (1998b): Happy individuals are more cooperative and successful in bilateral or group negotiations. Kramer, Newton and Pommerenke (1993): positive moods and motivations to maintain them lead to over-confident positive self-evaluation. Pillutla and Murnighan (1996): wounded pride leads to feelings of injustice and rejection of the objective offers. Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui and Raia (1997): angry decision-makers achieve little joint gains, unsuccessfully claiming more value for themselves. Allred (1999): anger provokes retaliation sequences at the level of impulses and behaviour.

178

Chapter Four

There is evidence that emotions play an important role in foreign policy decisions. Leaders are influenced by public opinion, and in turn, by domestic and international events. Nations often carry out revenge attacks on their citizens and territory–acts that evoke emotions and feelings like hatred, fear, anger, revenge and insecurity (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 100). McDermott (2004, 700) explains how emotions play an important role in decision-making: the presence of fear or anger can complicate the decision-makers’ decision-making process, which may be lacking. Emotions can also have a positive role. Love, sympathy and empathy have important influences on decision-making. Emotions influence the processing of information by the leaders and the importance they attach to different dimensions of an emotionally-charged or neutral situation (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 100). Mintz and DeRouen (2010, 100) mention an interesting study conducted by Nehemia Geva, Steven Redd and Katrina Mosher in 2004, who used experimental methods to sense how emotions influence people in processing information and making decisions (McDermott 2004, 700). Hatred, fear, love, threat and support not only produce different choices, but also variations in how people get to choose one option (spontaneous vs. calculated, intuitive vs. rational, maximizing vs. satisfying). Affective theories explore how personality and emotion (insecurity and fear) can influence decisions (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 114, Mandel 1986, 253). The authors mentioned the work of Winter (2003, 477) who defines personality as a particular way of integrating perceptual processes, memory, reasoning, tracking goals and emotional expressiveness. The study of personalities can aid an understanding of the ways leaders make certain decisions, since other leaders in similar situations make other decisions. Suefeld, Cross and Stewart (2009, 10) provide a review of the psychological literature addressing psychological profiles, develop a portrait of the subject's personality as the source of strategic predispositions, and then present an approach which measures the selected psychological variables that are activated in certain specific cases. The two approaches to identify psychological factors correlated with the trends of competitive or cooperative behaviour in conflict situations and the dynamic approach can be used, in particular, to monitor real-time changes which can predict the direction of leader decision. The outbreak of war, including surprise attacks, is associated with reducing the complexity in the structure of information processing and the increase of power motivation, compared with the motivation for affiliation and the perceived ability of the leader to

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

179

influence large-scale events. Recent research has begun to use these theories to study terrorism. In fact, the authors assume that the first approach (psychological profiling) refers to considering the intrinsic personality traits of the leader influencing foreign policy decisions, while the second approach (dynamic) estimates that these intrinsic personality traits interact with the environment, and situational factors (internal and external) influence foreign policy decisions of the leaders. Suefeld, Cross, Stewart (2009, 11) mention two ways that we can establish links between the personality profile and the decisions of leaders: ¾ ¾

Retrospectively, by generating profile leader measurements and then interpreting those measurements, involving knowledge of the foreign policy decisions of the leader. Prospectively, by creating a profile of the leader, using the profile to make predictions about the decision of the leader in current or imminent situations and then confirming or refuting these predictions.

Gallagher (2005) underlines the importance of personal traits in international relations and provides a new approach for understanding risk taking by the Big Five theory/model of personality. The risk-taking perspective is built around the five factors of personality: openness, extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeability and stability. Keller and Yang (2008, 691) mention four characteristics that guide the decision-maker to the political context: accentuating the task or interpersonal relationships, the need for power and faith in a person's ability to control events and self-monitoring. Leadership style analysis helps us to understand why certain decisions are made by leaders and why certain alternatives are not chosen (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 115). The authors mention the work of Hermann et al. (2001, 83) who introduce a framework developed for understanding the "internal elements" of the leadership style. The distinction researchers make is between leaders who are motivated by goals and those who are motivated by context. In the first case, the leaders seek to solve a problem, so they are task-oriented and change the position or ideology with more difficulty. They choose their staff on the basis of loyalty and similarity to their own person. It is less likely that leaders motivated by mission should seek broad domestic and international coalitions before starting an action or maintaining a policy.

180

Chapter Four

Mintz and DeRouen (2010, 115) consider that falling in the other category are the more circumspect and adaptable leaders, according to the context of the current situation. These leaders consult, discuss and are more open to flexible solutions for various problems. Hermann et al. (2001, 83) are providing the key dimensions to distinguish these types of leadership: (1) if the leader accepts political constraints, (2) the leader's willingness to accept new information and (3) the focus of the leader on the problem or the relations. Researchers identified four leadership styles: fighter, strategic, pragmatic and opportunistic (Hermann et al. 2001, 83, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 117). The fighter provokes political constraints and is close to the new information. This type of leader is essentially free of constraints in pursuing his own worldview. The most telling example is Fidel Castro (Hermann et al. 2001, 83, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 117). The opportunist, in contrast, is aware of the political constraints and seeks information. Political negotiation is the key component of this type of leadership (hence the similarity to the decision-making model of government policies, see Chapter 3). This type of leader will not risk alienating important political actors, in stark contrast to leaders like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (Hermann et al. 2001, 83, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 117). The strategic leader faces constraints, but is open to information. This type of leader knows what he wants and seeks relevant information to achieve his goals. He is bold but informed when it comes to quality in these ambitious aspirations. Hafez al-Assad of Syria is an example of this category (Hermann et al. 2001, 83, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 117). Another type of leader is qualified as pragmatic, who respects political constraints, but is closed to the information. Political constraints and attitude towards information may be supplemented with a third dimension, the motivation for action. These two types of motivations for action and the four categories listed above, fighter, strategic, pragmatist and opportunist provide another eight nuanced categories (Hermann et al. 2001, 83, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 117). For example, the fighter can be expansive or peaceful, depending on the motivation based on the problem or the relation. Expansionist leaders are those who have motivation provided by a problem to be solved. These leaders will expand their control over resources or territory. A pacifist fighter, who is more comfortable with relationships, may influence others towards his cause (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 117). Mintz and DeRouen (2010, 117) consider that an incrementalist leader, who must face the constraints of a problem, is open to information (thus

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

181

being strategic) and, in terms of motivation, is centred on manageability. A charismatic leader, who is open to relationships, will face constraints and is open to information (also strategic), but in terms of motivation focuses on relationships, prompting others to act (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 117). If we take into consideration the three dimensions (sensitivity to political constraints, openness to information, motivation for action) we will determine if a leader is goal- or context-oriented (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 118). Goal-oriented leaders would rather take strong measures, while those context-oriented will manifest an aversion to risk and take measures more carefully. Starting again from Margaret Hermann’s model, Wilson (2006, 24) has conducted a qualitative study on the effects which the personality of Prime Minister David Lange had on the outcome of the dispute between the two nations (the ANZUS crisis–the dispute between New Zealand and the US). The research uses the theoretical framework articulated by Margaret Hermann which seeks to demonstrate the relationship between the idiosyncratic characteristics of leaders and the foreign policy behaviour of the respective nations. Wilson (2006) has conducted several interviews with people involved in the ANZUS crisis. Through this study, Wilson (2006, 28) found that the personality of Prime Minister David Lange was essential for resolving the dispute, concluding that the studies conducted by Hermann are a useful tool in determining the effects that the personality of a leader have on a specific foreign policy result. Considering Hermann’s investigations, Wilson presents a synthetic model which can be used as a benchmark for analyzing the personality of the leader. It takes into account the following factors: the nature of the situation (decision latitude, defining the situation and participation), personal characteristics (beliefs, motives, decision styles and interpersonal style) and "personal filters" (interest in foreign affairs, training in foreign affairs and environmental sensitivity). The model developed by Wilson (2006, 28), based on Hermann's work is valuable, drawing attention to the influence which the personality of the decision-maker exerts on foreign policy behaviour (Wilson 2006, 28). Multiple frames of analysis have been proposed for emphasizing the link between the personality of the decision-maker and foreign policy conduct. However, some researchers still believe that this relationship has yet to be demonstrated (Blondel 2006, 115). Blondel (1987, 115) suggests the building of a general model and then developing the various dimensions of the relationship between the personal characteristics and leadership impact. The model developed by Wilson (2006), at Hermann's suggestion,

Chapter Four

182

is easy to understand and suitable for qualitative analysis. Figure 4-3 renders the theoretical framework of the works of Hermann: Fig. 4-2: The relationship between the personal characteristics of decision-makers and government behaviour in foreign policy, based on the theoretical framework of Margaret Hermann (adapted after Wilson 2006, 29) High level of political decision Nature of situation

Personal characteristics

Has great latitude in decisions

Beliefs

Is forced to define the situation

Reasons

World vision

Decisional style

Is possible to participate in the decisionmaking process

Interpersonal style

Political personal style

Filters

Interest in foreign policy

Training or expertise in foreign policy Sensitivity to environment

Degree of attention to foreign policy

Extension of the repertoire of behaviours in foreign policy Openness to change

Government behaviour in foreign policy

An interesting and current classification of leadership styles is performed by Thompson, Neale and Sinaceur (2004, 32), expressed in the

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

183

form of metaphors: the preconscious decision-maker/negotiator, situational decision-maker/negotiator and the learning body. The first metaphor, the preconscious decision-maker/negotiator, describes the behaviour of an actor who is strongly influenced by mental processes’ operations and states of which the actor is more or less directly aware. The leader’s behaviour is influenced by the activation of constructs and processes situated at a lower level than the conscious one. Research conducted by Kray, Thompson and Galinsky (2001, 942) on the performance of men and women in negotiating, reveals an activation of stereotypes which can dramatically influence behaviour. The second metaphor, the situational decision-maker/negotiator, is a distinction from traditional information processing theory, which forms the basis of the cognitive approach. According to the cognitive approach, knowledge and its consecutive products (e.g. cognitive idiosyncrasies) are located in particular contexts and cannot be reduced to elements of individual knowledge, as it is often done in social psychology, where the states are measured at the individual level. The integrating potential of the decision-maker/negotiator calls for a particular constellation of interests that extends beyond the individual perspective that the decisionmaker/negotiator focuses on. The third metaphor, the learning body, raises the question of eliminating idiosyncrasies. There are many studies in the literature about the ways to reduce the influence of idiosyncrasies on the decision-makers. In recent years, attention has been focused on learning at different levels (individual, groups and organizations), also from the perspective of different theoretical approaches (psychological, educational, and so on) (Kray, Thompson and Galinsky 2001, 945). In this tradition, the decisionmaker/negotiator is seen as a learning body. One of the guidelines is related to learning by analogy, but the critical issue that arises concerns the circumstances in which the decision-maker will recognize the applicability of an older problem in a new domain. Leadership styles can be analyzed by using a comparison of cases. In an acknowledged research (Post 2003, 56), Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton are compared by using the evaluation of case studies, character analysis and psycho-biographical analysis. The study compares the results of these analyses with the systems of beliefs, personalities and cognitive and leadership styles. Another classification of leadership styles distinguishes the following categories: collaborative, contingent, transactional, traditional, charismatic, transformational and administrative (Miller and Miller 2007).

Chapter Four

184

An important role in decision-making, at the leader level, are the influences (Devitt 2009, 20) of the group of counsellors, and their personal qualities, such as personality or belief system. The researcher noted that cognitive, emotional and social needs, and the increased sense of duty are elements that motivate leaders. The environment of the leader is one which may stimulate or inhibit the shape which he sketches for politics. It is not only about the strengths and weaknesses of the leader and his group of advisers, but also about the force of the external factors. Leadership psychology refers to the psychological elements and claims that every decision-maker brings with him when he makes a decision (Renshon and Renshon 2008, 510, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 120). In an interesting study, Kelly and Barsade (2001, 99) track how emotions influence the decision at the level of a group. The researchers propose a model for understanding these influences starting from the individual level, that of emotions, moods, feelings and emotional intelligence, which individuals bring to the group. These will influence the formation of an affective composition of the group. They even study the affective processes that may occur in the group by contagion, modelling and the effects of emotional manipulation. The figure below shows the model developed by Kelly and Barsade (2001): Fig. 4-3: Group states and emotions (adapted from Kelly and Barsade 2001, 101). Non-affective context

Non-affective processes

Non-affective results

Affective context

Individual level of states and emotions

Shared states and emotions; Explicit processes Shared states and emotions; Implicit processes

Affective compositi onal effects

Group emotion

Idiosyncracies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

185

Emotional idiosyncrasies are the latest among the categories of idiosyncrasies that may occur in decision-makers/negotiators. This perspective results from social psychology, but also from focusing on the knowledge that the decision-maker/negotiator realizes. Emotional idiosyncrasies have two distinct processes: initial states resulting in particular behaviours and outcomes, and the final states that can be assigned to the use of specific behaviours and outcomes. Therefore, emotions serve as dependent and independent variables in research (Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur 2004, 31). Idiosyncrasies are an important factor acting in foreign policy decisionmaking. The decision-making process is changing, as decision-makers today are in position to form coalitions based on political interests and to take the context into account. This is the paradox of contemporary politics culture: the power of decision does not belong only to those who hold formal positions, and the difference between decisive decision-making institutions and the persons in the respective positions is of paramount importance (Friedman 2012): Presidents make history, but not how they want to. They are coerced and harassed on all sides by reality. [...] is important to remember that candidates will say what they have to say in order to be elected, but even when they say what they think, they will not be able to pursue their goal. [...] the US presidency was designed to limit the president's ability to lead. He can at most guide and frequently not even that.

Conclusion The use of psychological methods for the analysis of foreign policy decision-making is one of the newest approaches. These methods do not intend to replace the “traditional” (rational) ones, but they may enhance the analysis, especially at the individual level. Alternative models of decision-making analysis warn about the elements of subjectivity and the idiosyncrasies that influence the choice of solutions to the problems. Knowing the types of idiosyncrasies (cognitive, social perception, motivation and emotional) and their identification, favours the anticipation of the solution to be chosen, but also outlines the strategies that will have to be addressed. We believe that now, when the decision-making processes become more complex and involve more actors, the dynamic field of international relations needs to diversify the methods they use as much as possible, and must have an openness to the knowledge belonging to other fields (e.g.

186

Chapter Four

psychology), which can only make the specific strategies of decisionmaking more efficient.

CHAPTER FIVE IDIOSYNCRATIC ANALYSIS OF ROMANIA’S EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATION PROCESS (CASE STUDY)

The object of the present research is the process of Romania’s accession to the European Union (2000-2004), from the perspective of the analysis of the psychological factors which intervened in decision-making at the individual level. This paper brings a new perspective by analyzing the elements of subjectivity which influenced the decision-makers involved. The decision-maker analyzed is Romania's chief negotiator, Minister Vasile Puúcaú. Through discourse analysis (political and public speeches, media representations and interviews conducted between 20002004), we will try to identify the idiosyncrasies that influenced the decision-making. The analysis model used is an adaptation of the one belonging to Margaret Hermann and validated by Wilson (2006, 29). In this research we will summarize Romania’s accession negotiations to the EU to understand the internal and external framework in which the decision-making process was performed and the individual decision-maker to be reviewed has worked, namely the chief negotiator for EU accession. We will point out the significant elements to address the complex reference scheme (see the Introduction). We also note that the presentation of Romania's EU accession process is done not from a factual and interpretive perspective, but just as a reference/starting point for the analysis of thematic idiosyncrasies in an event of European foreign policy and negotiations.

Romania's EU Accession Negotiation Process The major political decision of Romania’s accession to the European Union was taken by the European Council of 16-17 December 2004 and the Treaty of Accession to the European Union was held the following year, in April 2005. Since 1 January 2007 Romania has been a member of the European Union according to the projection of the Accession Treaty.

Chapter Five

188

The European negotiation process remains "still today the foundation of Schuman's scheme" (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 24). The tendency of the European Union to impose itself in the contemporary international system, to meet the challenges of globalization, and the end of the Cold War, has provoked theoretical debates in theory and impressive casuistry (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 25). The subject of the negotiations to the European Union is currently in the public consciousness due to the EU’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 26). For the Member States, the accession negotiations had a different shape from others on the international scene, and for countries aspiring to membership in the European Union, they were required to participate in the process of building trust between the negotiating parties, so that to create a mutual perception about how each candidate will be able to face the challenges of accession. (Inotai 2007)

Analysis of the accession process should include contextual elements related to stakeholders, the effect of negotiation guidelines, the negotiating strategies and tactics of the EU/Member States, the impact of the accession criteria on the candidate’s internal training, the internal training evaluation and negotiation chapters and the comparative picture of the results obtained by other countries in negotiating accession (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 13): ¾ ¾

¾ ¾ ¾

a high degree of institutionalization (formal and informal rules’ framework in which behaviour patterns have evolved); the permanent, continuous and interconnected degree of negotiations (the result of a negotiation results in a new negotiation situation, while the actors involved continue to interact); the distinctive character and role of the players involved in negotiation; the great importance of informal negotiations in close connection with formal negotiations; the connections between sectors and levels and between internal and external negotiations.

The figure below (5-1) gives a schematic presentation of the enlargement process:

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

189

Fig 5-1: The Accession Process (after Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 665) A European state addresses to the European Council an application for EU membership The European Council calls on the Commission to submit a Review

The European Commission shall state to the Council its opinion on the state’s application

The Council (unanimously) adopts the decision to start negotiations with the candidate state

The Council, through the presidency, leads negotiations with the candidate

The Commission proposes and the Council agrees by consensus the guidelines of the EU position in the accession negotiations The draft Treaty of Accession is agreed to by the EU and the candidate

The Accession Treaty is subject to approval by the EU Council and the European Parliament

The European Parliament approves the Treaty of Accession with a simple majority

The EU Council unanimously approves the Accession Treaty

The Member States and the applicant state officially sign the Accession Treaty

Member States and the applicant state ratify the Accession Treaty

After ratification the Accession Treaty enters into force: the candidate becomes a Member

190

Chapter Five

In the European Union negotiations are closely connected to the preferences and interests of the state and nonstate actors, to the enforcement of institutionalized rules and the "special moments" of the political and economic development of the EU in the direction of deepening integration and enlargement (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 34). An Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is established on behalf of the European Union for each candidate country, so negotiations are bilateral between each candidate and the Member States in a multilateral framework (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 27). Formal negotiating sessions are held at the IGC, but the most significant take place between the Chief Negotiator and the Member States' representatives, but with other officials as well, even from other candidate countries (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 27). The exchange of Position Papers is realized between the working groups of the Council of Ministers of the European Union and the negotiating team of the candidate state; the European Commission prepares a draft of the common positions for the Council in response to the candidate state’s position papers, and also technical documents about the implications of the negotiating positions (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 28). A significant part of the informal negotiations and arrangements for the implementation of the acquis communautaire is carried out with the Commission. The structures and institutions involved on behalf of the candidate countries are different (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 28), but they all have a Chief Negotiator; what differs is his position related to government structures. The coordinating role of the Chief Negotiator is essential, and his ability to influence is visible in the final phase of the negotiations and the drafting of the Accession Treaty (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 28). He works closely with line ministries, involved in working groups on the chapters of the acquis, he arbitrates between different government agencies, supports the views expressed by the government negotiating team, [...] argues position document contents to the European institutions and Member States, supporting the goals of the accession negotiations and the national interest of the candidate state. (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 28)

We emphasize that the Chief Negotiator has the power to take the appropriate data for the preparation for accession and to present them in suitable positions to the momentary goals of the future candidate state. This leads negotiations according to set strategy and tactics, seeking the most appropriate formulas to harmonize the objectives and specific assertion of the national interest stage. He must deal with the tendencies of using the bargaining power of the other party (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 31). It must be noted that, for each wave of accession, the criteria are being reformulated

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

191

according to the stage of evolution of the acquis, European policy development and the European and international context (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 28). The features of the negotiating system of the European Union and the EU accession negotiations are rendered schematically in the table below (Table 5-1) (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 35-36): Table 5-1: Characteristics of the negotiation system in the European Union and the EU accession negotiations (after Ciprian Gori‫܊‬ă, 2008, 35-36) Main dimensions of the negotiating system in the European Union

Topics of the negotiating system in the European Union Negotiations on the nature of the European Union (for accession to the European Union or EU development)

Negotiations on the European Union

Negotiations within the European Union

Negotiations within the committees (comitology)

Multiple international structures

Characteristics - intergovernmental process of harmonization of different national interests - interdependencies between networks, politicization of procedural developments, high density of networks - performed in various arenas/meetings - take place as group negotiations - comply with the characteristics of the international multilateral negotiations (unequal participants with individual strategies) - importance of supranational dimensions - influenced by institutional dynamics and the form of the assemblies - impact of the supranational dimension

192

Chapter Five Forming coalitions

Cultural diversity

Legitimation

Negotiations of the European Union

Changing environment

Crisis situations

- instrument to influence the agenda - pressure on coalition formation increases proportionally with the number of participants - there is not an established pattern of coalition - differences in negotiation style (Teutonic, Gallic, Saxon) - developing a common culture of negotiation, in a professional and organizational sense - transfer from security issues to economic and social ones - growing demand for democratic participation: increasingly significant role of civil society, which means a new dynamic of networks - with each enlargement, the negotiation environment has changed, becoming more heterogeneous with the increasing number of members (networks are growing in importance) - need to streamline the functioning of the Union: new techniques of negotiation - need for coherent and efficient foreign and security policy: at present the result of a negotiated agreement

The accession negotiation steps are: screening, preparing position papers, negotiation based on the position papers, the Accession Treaty, ratification of the Accession Treaty (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 35-36). The principles and procedures of the accession negotiation take into account the objectives of the accession negotiations process and the technical characteristics of European negotiations (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 35-36). The figure below (5-2) schematically presents these stages in the process of negotiating the accession to the European Union (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 666):

EU Council

Stage IV: The Accession Treaty

Stage V: Ratification of the Accession Treaty

EU Council

Stage III: Negotiation based on the negotiating positions

European Parliament

Parliament of the Member States

EU Council

EU presidency

European Commission

EUROPEAN UNION

Stage II: Preparing position papers

Stage I: Screening

STAGES

Last CIG reunions

CIG reunions in Brussells or Luxemburg

CIG reunions in Brussels or Luxemburg

Screening sessions in Brussels

FORMAL NEGOTIATION

Parliament Referendum

Government Integration committee Negotiating team

Government Integration Committee Negotiating team

Government Integration Committee Negotiating team

Inter-ministerial negotiating team Negotiating team

CANDIDATE STATE

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process 193

Fig. 5-2: The process of negotiating accession to the European Union (after Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, 2007, 666)

194

Chapter Five

The substance of the accession negotiations is the acquis, divided into chapters: 31 for the fifth wave of enlargement and 35 for ongoing accession negotiations, with different degrees of difficulty, and the candidate countries related to them according to the internal stage of preparation (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 29). In Romania’s case, these chapters were: Free movement of goods, Free movement of persons, Free movement of services, Free movement of capital, Company law, Competition policy, Agriculture, Fishing, Transport policy, Taxation, The economic and monetary union, Statistics, Social policy and employment of labour, Energy, Industrial policy, Small and medium enterprises, Science and research, Education, training and youth, Telecommunications and information technology, Culture and audiovisual policy, Regional policy and coordination structural instruments, Environmental protection, Consumer protection and health, Justice and home affairs, Customs union, External relations, Common foreign and security policy, Financial control, Financial and budgetary provisions, Institutions, Diversity (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 5). The candidate states shall indicate the technical date for the moment of accession (for example, Romania–2007) and from the setting of that date to the acknowledgment of a realistic date for the moment of accession, the candidate countries have undergone a process of monitoring/evaluation (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 29). The accession negotiations were influenced by variables generated by internal factors (in the European Union: internal reform, the development of European policies, changes in the policy of Member States, and in the candidate countries: the impact of the implementation of Community rules on the economy and the social, political and external factors (e.g. the war in Iraq and transatlantic relations) (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 30). The accession negotiation is based on a win-win formula and is characterized by the fact that: 1) it is a process of discovery, both parties informing each other about what they want, what they intend and what they offer, 2) it is a strategic interaction–parties seek to influence each other and to adapt their behaviour to get the best results, 3) it is an exchange process in which each side tries to read the behaviour of the other (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 31). Important elements of negotiation are: (1) the technical-level–issues are resolved by reference to a clear set of rules and criteria, without going into the interdependencies, (b) the political level–problems in an area not necessarily solved by calling on a set of rules, but getting into the interactions area, the complex interdependencies of several topics and areas (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 31). The final solutions may be influenced in several

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

195

ways: (a) legal arguments/technical (implies a set of rules and criteria which is clearly defined and accepted by the negotiating parties, and the skills to use them), (b) the promotion of mutual interest, starting from the win-win aspiration and continuing with the efforts of all parties to find the best formula, (c) the use of power capacity, using the ability to convince the other side with conditionalities and the capabilities to reject something that the other party wants, without taking into account the legal and technical considerations (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 31). It is important that the accession negotiations are conducted at several levels. Currently, the Member States reach agreement on a mandate for negotiations with the candidate state, at the technical and political level of the European Commission, and then the opinion is analyzed by the Enlargement Group of the EU Council, the permanent representatives discuss it in COREPER (Committee Permanent Representatives), and following that the decision on a certain opinion is to be made by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 44). On the basis of this mandate, the Member State holding the Presidency of the EU Council negotiates the specific conditions of accession with the candidate country (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬, 2013, 18; Friis and Jarosz 2000, 12-13). The accession negotiations are conducted through the Accession Conferences at two levels: ministers/heads of delegations and chief negotiators/deputy chiefs of delegations. According to procedure, during a presidency of the EU Council, at least one meeting is held at the ministerial level and one at the level of the deputy chiefs of delegations, with the possibility that the frequency of these meetings can be adapted according to need. The Accession Conferences are held separately with each of the candidates (Friis and Jarosz 2000, 51). The political-institutional and procedural characteristics of the process of accession negotiations are schematically represented in the figure below (Fig 5-3) (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 667):

Chapter Five

196

Proposes common positions

to the problems which appear during negotiations

Is in direct contact with the candidate country tofind solutions EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Present their own positions to the negotiating chapters

FINAL NEGOTIATIONS

Adopts common positions

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Delivers its opinion

EUROPEAN UNION

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

COREPER

CANDIDATE STATE

NEGOTIATING TEAM

Fig. 5-3: The institutional framework of the accession negotiations (after Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, 2007, 667)

The draft of the EU accession has provided a framework for the modernization of Romanian society, on the condition of the structural reform of the economy, institutions, laws, political system, the rule of law, etc., according to the Copenhagen criteria (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 32). The Europeanization process refers to the internalization of the values, laws, and procedures of the European Union and represents a "practical and desirable opportunity” of “real, systematic and integrated" modernization in Romania (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 32). Like other candidate countries, the dynamics of the negotiations for the accession to the EU, between 2000-2004, took into account elements of

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

197

strategy: institutional, policies and developments in the external environment and internal negotiation, external perceptions of the preparation of Romania’s conduct, strategic objectives on the criteria for accession and negotiation chapters, but also the forecasts on the evolution of negotiations (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 339). The internal preparation had to be linked to developments in EU policies and with other components of the external environment of negotiation (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 339). The negotiations for the accession to the EU started in February 2000 amid a strong geopolitical substrate, and the internal effect was one of accelerating the country's modernization (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 34). For Romania, at the proposal of the Commission and the European Parliament; the European Council added conditionalities linked to the effective action of implementing the reform of childcare institutions and measures to redress the macroeconomic situation of the country (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 34). The need to coordinate the interests and actions of domestic actors was very important for the negotiating process in the context of considering the institutional structure which held the EU accession negotiations. The schema of coordinating the negotiation process in the terms mentioned above, may be expressed as: Fig. 5-4: The schema of the negotiation process coordination (after Brusis ‫܈‬i Emmanouilidis, apud Ciprian Gori‫܊‬ă, p. 341) Government or distinct coordination

Policy coordination - Special administrative structures or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Coordinating the technical process–involving institutions with responsibilities in the field of European integration and accession negotiations

From an EU perspective, the strategic evolution of negotiations with the second group of candidate countries ("Helsinki", of which Romania was part), took the same model of approaching the negotiation as the "Luxembourg" group members, i.e. of opening the easy chapters of negotiation first. Due to the double size approach of the negotiation process (internal training and external environment of negotiation) during the year 2000, the negotiations were opened for nine chapters and provisionally closed for six (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 340). Right from the beginning of Romania’s accession negotiations, the EU position was that membership involves "fully accepting the present and future acquis, as

198

Chapter Five

well as the rights and obligations arising out of the institutions and policies system of the Union" (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 36). Specific to the fifth wave of EU enlargement was the fact that the structures and institutions of the community part were the same as in previous enlargements, while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have developed a different institutional framework to achieve their objectives of accession (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 39). The accession negotiation process involves significant management activity linked to coordination between governmental agencies and public administrations. The states from Central-Southeastern Europe have coordinated for policies, politics and procedures. There were two options for policy coordination: the European Affairs Ministry, which was to be responsible for this, or the creation of a specialized body. Romania created the Ministry of European Integration (MIE), but only at the end of 2000 with functions on: strategy, regulation, representation, state authority and administration. The responsibilities of this Ministry involved leading and coordinating the activity of the National Delegation for the negotiation of Romania’s accession to the European Union, and also the negotiation process as a whole, linking its specific activities to those of ministries and other public administration authorities (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 40). The European negotiation for EU membership accession was strongly institutionalized, even by the "intergovernmental expression", a very important principle being the principle of transparency (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 46). Therefore, Romania has made public all position papers and the negotiating team has given significant attention to public communication. In December 1999, amid the Helsinki European Council decision to start accession negotiations with Romania, the Bucharest Government appointed a Chief Negotiator for EU accession, but it was only by GD. No. 243 of 22 February 2001, that the National Delegation of Romania's EU accession negotiations was established, composed of the head of the National Delegation (Chief Negotiator), co-chairs of sectoral delegations (Secretaries of State for European integration from in line ministries) and members of sectoral delegations (working groups). The National Delegation was intended to assess the readiness of each chapter in view of the conduct of negotiations, organizing and evaluating the process of negotiating accession to the European Union, following the commitments assumed by Romania (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 41). The second article of the GD. No. 243 stated that the Chief Negotiator was a member of the Romanian Government, as a Minister-delegate (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 41). In the completion phase of the position papers the National Delegation had regular consultations with parliamentary parties, regular briefings of

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

199

the Parliamentary Committee for European Integration and sectoral committees were held, with public debate being permanently encouraged (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 41). The completion of Romania’s negotiation process in December 2004 led to the possibility of Romania becoming an EU member on 1 January 2007, and also to the emergence of solutions of development, and economic and social management. By the accession negotiations, in addition to the Treaty of Accession, Romania also achieved 50 transitional periods and derogations (most of all former candidate countries), but the most important thing obtained would be the assessment of the effects, the impact of implementing solutions for applying the acquis in all areas covered by the accession negotiation chapters. (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2007, 54)

Proposal regarding the Analysis Model of the Relationship between the Personal Characteristics of the DecisionMaker and Executive Behaviour in Foreign Policy The individual level of the decision-making process will be analyzed by means of a scheme developed by Hermann which considers several levels (Hermann 1993). See Fig. 5-5. This scheme will be completed, at the level of personal characteristics, with the four categories of idiosyncrasies (cognitive, of social perception, motivational and emotional, as described in Chapter 5) to be identified in public and political discourses, representations of the media and interviews by Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, the Chief Negotiator for Romania’s accession to the European Union, between 2000-2004, and published in national and international publications of the period. By building this scheme of analysis, Hermann tries to answer the question: How can the idiosyncrasies of the political leaders influence their behaviour with respect to foreign policy? (Hermann 1978, 1983, 187, 1989). Hermann divides her theory into three distinct sections: first, the nature of the situation in which the leader is found, second, the personal characteristics of the political leader, who will have a great influence on foreign policy which will be outlined by the respective leader, and the third section examines the second set of personal features, which Hermann calls filters. These are the elements which influence the degree to which the leader's personal characteristics have an impact on the foreign policy of a nation; we can identify: the leader’s interest in foreign policy, his

Chapter Five

200

training in the field of international relations and his general sensitivity to the political environment (Hermann 1989, 18). Fig. 5-5: The relationship between personal characteristics and behaviour of executive decision-makers in foreign policy, based on the theoretical framework of Margaret Hermann (adapted from Wilson, 2006, 29) High level of political decision

Nature of situation

Personal characteristics

Has great latitude in decisions

Beliefs

Is forced to define the situation

Reasons

World vision

Is possible to take place in the decisionmaking process

Decisional style

Interpersonal style

Political personal style

Filters

Interest in foreign policy

Degree of attention towards foreign policy

Training or expertise in foreign policy

Extension of the repertoire of behaviours in foreign policy

Sensitivity to the environment

Openness to change

Executive conduct in foreign policy

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

201

The variable nature of the situation has three conditions which allow the personal characteristics of the political leader to have a greater impact on foreign policy. The first condition refers to situations where the political leaders have great latitude for decision-making. Hermann (1989, 52) refers to the “honeymoon” period which follows the difficult times (or slippage) during an electoral period. It may be mentioned that the new leadership can afford a certain "capital" based on personal popularity or fear which may place them in a better position to generate changes in policy or to impose their own will. The second condition refers to situations in which the personal traits of the leader compel him to define or interpret the respective situations. An ambiguous situation is a good example of this. The third condition refers to situations in which the personal traits of the leader will have an impact on foreign policy when he participates in the decision-making process. Crisis situations are examples in this case. In addition to Hermann's theoretical basis, and in order to explain this scheme, we may mention the four conditions identified by Fred Greenstein, where the leader's personality is important (Greenstein 1969, 46): (a) when the political actor occupies a strategic position, i.e. the Prime Minister; (b) when the situation is ambiguous or unstable, (c) when there is not a clear precedent or work routines, and (d) when a spontaneous or particular effort is needed. For a better illustration of the environmental impact on the decisionmaker, Greenstein configures a quite clear scheme (Greenstein 1992, 109): Fig. 5-6: Influence of environment/political situation on the political behaviour (after Fred Greenstein, 109) Environment of the political actor

Predispositions of the political actor

Political answer

202

Chapter Five

Blondel has also emphasized the importance of situational factors in the analysis of the influence of the personality of the leader, stating that leaders are different according to different situations (2006, 134). The personal characteristics’ variable: beliefs, reasons, decisional style and interpersonal style are the most relevant to foreign policy, in Hermann’s view; relevant meaning "variables from the clusters of traits, often described as idiosyncratic determinants of political behaviour" (Hermann 1993, 59). This is the main reason we have added to the scheme proposed by Hermann the four categories of idiosyncrasies (cognitive, of social perception, motivational and emotional) which influence the foreign policy decisions of the political leader. The scheme proposed by Hermann and shown above (see Fig. 5-5) will thus have the following structure:

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

203

Fig. 5-7: The relationship between personal characteristics and their influence on foreign policy decision-making High level of political decision Has a great latitude in decisions

Nature of situation

Personal characteristics Cognitive idiosyncra sies

Beliefs Idiosyncrasies of social perceptions

Is forced to define the situation

Reasons

Motivational idiosyncrasies

Vision of the world

Is possible to participate in the decision-making process

Decisional style

Interpersonal style

Emotional idiosyncrasies

Personal political style

Filters

Interest in foreign policy

Training or expertise in foreign policy

Sensitivity to the environment

Degree of attention towards foreign policy

Extension of the repertoire of behaviours in foreign policy

Openness to change

Executive conduct in foreign policy

204

Chapter Five

The beliefs and reasons of a leader form his worldview and decisionmaking style and interpersonal style contains his political style/behaviour. Beliefs can be general (e.g. the political leader believes in his ability to control events) or specific (e.g. belief in his ability to influence the political events of the nation) (Hermann 1993, 59). The reasons of a political leader refer to the determinants of an action "the wish which activates it" (Hermann 1993, 59). This feature is similar to Barber's model, which divides leaders into four categories based on their motivation to engage in political action: power, information acquisition, debt and emotions (Barber 1985). The desire for power is considered the driving force of a political actor (Hermann 1978, 59). Hermann states another relevant reason which influences the decision-making process: the need for independence and the need for structure (Hermann 1978, 60). The decision-making style is defined by the leader’s preferred methods of making decisions (Hermann 1978, 60). Snyder and Robinson suggest five factors included in the decisional style (Snyder and Robinson 1961, 64): (a) reliability, (b) openness to new information, (c) preference for certain levels of risk and the size of the stake, (d) the ability to postpone without anxiety, and (e) rules for adjusting uncertainty. Decision-making style can be seen similarly to instrumental beliefs articulated in George’s operational code, which represents all the leader’s beliefs about appropriate strategies and styles of operating in global politics defined by their philosophical beliefs (George 1969, 191). Barber also mentions four different decision-making styles: flexibility, compulsivity, compliance and withdrawal (Barber 1985). Hermann suggests other components of the decision-making style: preference for compromise and preference for planning instead of activity (Hermann 1978, 60). Finally, the interpersonal style refers to the "specific ways by which a political leader interacts with other political leaders" (Hermann 1978, 60). Some examples include suspicion, paranoia or manipulation. Hermann suggests that a leader's sensitivity towards other leaders, the planning of actions and other means of persuasion should be the facets of the interpersonal style (Hermann 1978, 60). Having articulated the personal characteristics of the decision-maker in the processes of foreign policy, Hermann seeks to examine the nexus between them and foreign policy behaviour. Two aspects of foreign policy are influenced by personal characteristics: (1) the strategies employed by the government in its foreign policy, and (2) the styles through which foreign policy is achieved (Hermann 1978, 60). Adopting a general cooperative or competitive attitude towards other nations could be examples of this. Foreign policy styles are the methods

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

205

that the government uses in the formulation and execution of foreign policy, such as using personal diplomacy and the relative involvement of bureaucratic structures in the foreign policy process (Hermann 1978, 60). As a result, the strategies are concerned with substantive foreign policy and the styles which focus on the means of its formulation and execution. These strategies and styles are influenced by the personal characteristics of the leader (Hermann 1978, 60). The final part of the scheme developed by Hermann belongs to filters, also a set of personal characteristics which influence political behaviour in foreign policy decision-making. First, the influence of the personal characteristics of a leader without a general interest in international relations will have a minimal effect. The bigger the interest, the greater the attention the leader will focus on foreign policy. An interested leader will be consulted on foreign policy decisions and will keep up with the latest developments in international relations. The interest of a leader in international relations can predetermine the course of an action (Hermann 1978, 56). Once the interest in foreign policy has been established, the leader’s training and expertise in the field of international relations will be analyzed. Hermann considers that the leader must have specialized training, occupying a position of minister of foreign affairs, ambassador or other official positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before occupying the current position. A leader without previous experience will not have the necessary personal experience to rely on, only providing little knowledge of what is to come, and thus possibly generating an international failure. Through training and experience in international relations, the leader can adopt a much broader perspective of the repertoire of foreign policy behaviours. A third personal characteristic of this set, is the general sensitivity to the environment which influences the "consistency of the relationship between other features and foreign policy" (Hermann 1978, 57). Hermann defines environmental sensitivity as "the extent to which an individual is receptive to stimuli from the environment that surrounds him" (Hermann 1978, 57). Less sensitive political leaders will adjust stimuli to comply with their point of view, while the more sensitive political leaders will adapt their views if prompted by stimuli.

206

Chapter Five

Conclusion The theoretical model developed by Hermann comprises three sections: the nature of the situation, personal characteristics, and filters. In this sections are included a large number of variables through which we can study the personality and behaviour of a foreign leader policy. This model was adjusted by introducing the four types of idiosyncrasies: cognitive, of social perception, motivational and emotional. This model will be used to identify such variables in public and political discourses, media representations and interviews conducted by Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬the Chief Negotiator for Romania’s accession to the European Union between 2000-2004, and which appeared in national and international publications of the period. Consequently, the analysis will be carried out in three stages: a) a description of how the language is used (metaphors, evaluative terms used and representations) b) interpretation, and c) explanations, the most important stage, which will highlight the relationship between power, domination and ideologies grounded in claims. Discursive patterns will be identified that will mark the presence of certain types of idiosyncrasies and be the association of their presence with the decisions made.

High Level of Political Decision It is the first variable in the scheme of analyzing decision-making and the influence of the personal characteristics of decision-makers. The Chief Negotiator was a Minister-Delegate, a member of the Government and the head of the National Delegation for negotiating Romania’s accession to the EU (GD no. 273/2001). The Chief Negotiator played an important role in the Government, arguing the position of Romania, in the process of negotiating accession, to the Prime Minister and other cabinet colleagues. Basically, his position covered a wide range of decisions which were taken in different socioeconomic sectors nationwide. He was a direct participant in the decisionmaking process within the Government and in the process regarding the foreign policy of Romania, being able to influence the direction of the actions which needed to be taken. If we speak in terms of power at a decisional level, we mention that in Romania’s case the completion of each position document had to be approved by the line ministry, by the negotiation team (Chief Negotiator), the National Delegation for Accession Negotiations and through internal and external consultations and then it had to be submitted to the

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

207

Government for approval along with the substantiation file. Once it had the approval of the Romanian Government, the position paper was officially submitted to the EU Council. The Chief Negotiator was the one who made the final decision concerning the construction of the position document for each opened chapter of negotiation, as he was the one who submitted it to the Government for approval, involving their presentation and argument before the Prime Minister and the cabinet members. In the accession negotiation process, within the National Delegation of Accession Negotiations, the Chief Negotiator was the only institutional political actor empowered to speak on behalf of Romania with the representatives of the European Commission. From the position he occupied, the Chief Negotiator had the greatest power to influence Romania's position, relative to the criteria for accession, the foreign policy domain being the subject for exercising such influence. The Chief Negotiator exerted great influence and power in building the internal and external environment of negotiation: [...] this environment must be built, must be prepared in accordance with the expectations, preferences, interests of the actors involved in negotiating, not only the institutional ones, but also political, economic and even idiosyncratic (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2005, vol. 3, 7). Or [...] since the end of 2000 I was directly involved in the formulation of negotiating positions for joining the European Union and the transposition into the national legislation of the acquis communautaire. I also participated in creating the strategy and the implementation of European policies in Romania, the ultimate goal of which was a beneficial and effective European integration of the Romanian society (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2008, 9).

The external environment of negotiation was influenced by the Chief Negotiator’s official visits to the Member States and official meetings with high representatives of community institutions, which have become the predominant elements of approaching the issue of accession (in particular for unblocking situations and decision-making in sensitive political contexts) (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 96).

The figure below shows the high position of decision occupied by Romania’s Chief Negotiator (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 353):

208

Chapter Five

Fig. 5-8: The position of the Chief Negotiator in decision-making (after Ciprian Gori‫܊‬ă, 353)

As shown in the previous figure, the strategic position of Chief Negotiator had an impact on a large number of structures, directly influencing the decision-making process related to Romania's EU accession negotiations. This position was defined as a normative act, HG 273, of 22 February 2001, and offered the possibility of influencing foreign policy decisions by approving position papers and by the

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

209

diplomatic management of the meetings with the representatives of the European Commission, but also of the Member States or other candidate states.

Nature of the Situation The different courses of action available to the leader will depend on the circumstances under which he must operate. A tight situation will highlight the limited affordable options when the leader is involved in foreign policy decision-making. The variable nature of the situation is determined by three factors: decision latitude, defining the situation and participation of the leader.

Decision Latitude As mentioned in the description of the general model proposed by Hermann (1978, 56), it referred to a “honeymoon period” which follows after some difficult electoral situations. The starting moment of the mandate of Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬is placed in the context of changing forces of political power, and of the winning of national elections by a party with a centre-left political orientation. This change took place amid broad popular support, the Social Democrats being able to solely form the government. It is a significant aspect to mention, the accumulation of capital being a predeterminant of the decision taken by the Government for the establishment of the Ministry of European Integration (a national option) and the designation of a leader who was a prestigious professional in international relations, and both internationally and nationally recognized (a capital of professional prestige and popularity), who received wide latitude in decision-making. Figure 6-8 reflects the clearly-defined and high-level position held by the Chief Negotiator for Romania’s EU accession in the decision-making process, especially in foreign policy. Through this position, the Chief Negotiator was able to generate the change of policies, imposing a European route of development. Among the conditions listed by Fred Greenstein, through which the leader's personality influences foreign policy decision-making (Greenstein 1969, 46), the first condition appropriate for the case analyzed when the decision-maker occupies a strategic position. Therefore, we give significant attention to the idiosyncrasies that will influence decision-making. The Chief Negotiator sets the dynamic pace to the drafting of position documents as required by the position, and in less than two months his

210

Chapter Five

negotiating team had prepared a number of documents corresponding to the entirety issued during the year 2000. This was due to the big decision latitude of the Chief Negotiator: We are in the process of finalizing the position papers for the Energy and Social Policy chapters, the consultation phase has began and we hope that in July we can send to Brussels two more chapters, namely the one on the Free movement of goods and the chapter on Taxation, and in SeptemberOctober we hope to finalize position papers on at least four chapters, Financial Control, Free Movement of Services, Industrial Policy, Economic and Monetary Union–and we intend to introduce the chapter we will discuss more, much more, I'm sure, in the second half of the year: Justice and Home Affairs (Dorina Zdroba, “Uniunea Europeană de la vis la realitate”, Radio România Actualităаi, hour 12:04, 4 April, 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

We note that the verbs used are action verbs in the first person, marking precision, safety and decision-making power. Another element that exemplifies decision latitude is connected to the fluidization of the flow of position documents in relation to the European Commission, a procedural change, the technical consultations taking place before finalizing the official documents and transmitting them to the Council of the European Union (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2001). The Chief Negotiator created and conducted a new approach to the negotiation strategy in relation to the Union, using the maximizing formula and announcing it publicly. This was also noticed by Commission officials, who remarked on a change in the culture of public management (Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬2012). This approach was driven by the need to "burn stages"–an expression used by the Chief Negotiator to refer to the sequence of steps which needed to be taken quickly in negotiating a chapter (Gori‫܊‬ă 2008, 359): For the period from May to July we are ready to send other chapters, perhaps five or six, and for September-October, we will send another three or maybe five chapters. As such, I used a minimal formula of 9, maximum 10 to 11 chapters to be placed in work (Ana Maria Bota, “Gunar Lund: Cred că nimeni nu se a‫܈‬teaptă ca România să facă progrese foarte rapide”, BBC, hour 21:00, May 17, 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

The strategic position occupied in the decision-making process and the power to influence the coordination within this process is publicly stated: We need Government involvement at the peak, in obtaining coordinated decisions, consulted with the other members of the cabinet, quick decisions, which are required at this stage of negotiations and for the

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

211

chapters that are now in progress (Sorina Man, „24 de ore”, Radio România Actualităаi, June 18, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

We can conclude that the Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬had wide latitude in the decision-making process, benefiting from the capital of professional prestige, popularity and public support, with opinion polls indicating at the start of his mandate the support of 80% of Romanians for joining the European Union. Changing policies and negotiation strategy, requiring a dynamic pace to complete the position papers are significant evidence for the factor analyzed, decision latitude.

Defining the Situation The second factor of the variable nature of the situation refers to circumstances in which the personal traits of the leader compel him to define or interpret the respective situations. In the case we are analyzing, the reference is considering defining the context in which the accession process is realized, in the spirit of transparency and accessibility of information to the public. There have been numerous public interventions, in interviews given by the Chief Negotiator, in which he explains and outlines the framework for achieving the negotiations, always having a real desire to engage citizens as "rational actors of the European construction": Because it is very much desired, both in the EU and in the candidate countries, that the citizens be well informed in practice they are the rational actors of the European construction. When referring to Romania, quote of candidate state, it is especially important now, because Romania is preparing intensively for joining a Union, which, at present, is undergoing deep transformation and virtually in 2007, when Romania will become, I am convinced, an EU member, the EU will look very differently from today. And then, even more so, to have citizens supporting the European reconstruction process represents both legitimacy, and transparency, and real democracy (Vasile Damian, „Campanie de informare a cetă‫܊‬enilor în legătură cu aderarea României la Uniunea Europeană”, Radio France International, July 15, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

We should note the presence of a cognitive idiosyncrasy, which refers to the model decision-making process adopted by the Chief Negotiator, namely that of the rational actor, which results from the use of the term rational actors. For a better insight into the process of accession negotiations, the Chief Negotiator presents the National Delegation’s activity:

212

Chapter Five We did the negotiation simulations, to understand what it means to negotiate with the EU and, in this context [...] they have become much more sensitive to the actions taken by the Government, the Parliament, the EU; they became not only the transmitters of data, of information, but have become commentators of these changes, of these transformations. And this seems to me extremely important, because they have become from mere receptors; actors of the process of communication and information of the citizens (Vasile Damian, „Campanie de informare a cetă‫܊‬enilor în legătură cu aderarea României la Uniunea Europeană”, Radio France International, July 15, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

We also note the Chief Negotiator’s desire for the real involvement of citizens in the process of communication, for a full understanding of the mechanisms of the negotiation process, by the presence of the term actors of the communication process. Also present in this fragment by the use of the word actors is the cognitive idiosyncrasy which refers to the model decision-making process used. It was also an example of shaping the general framework of negotiation. The Chief Negotiator had several interventions in which he outlined the general framework of negotiations, and also the specific framework of a particular chapter of negotiation. We note that during 2003, the Chief Negotiator had several interventions to clarify the framework of realization of the negotiations, in media coverage: It isn’t an easy process, it isn’t a simple political process, it is a process of structural substance, and in the negotiation we do nothing but argue what is happening inside the country. As such, we are focusing, at the moment, on the continuation and development of reforms in several areas, such as that of the market–and here you have noted [...] the continuous effort to create a functioning market economy, to create a competitive environment for developing market operators, economical and financial operators which are able to perform domestically, but also on the European and global market. Then, we are very focused on how we communicate, obviously with the EU authorities, but also with the other member states and with the ten candidate countries that will join the EU in May 2004 [...]. As such, we could say that our effort is focused both internally and in the Community area as well (Gabriela Langada, “Cum comenta‫܊‬i actualitatea politică– Multiplicatorii de opinie europeană ‫܈‬i participarea lor la pregătirea pentru aderare”, Radio România Actualită‫܊‬i, August 20, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

We have seen an example of outlining a specific framework for the market economy. An important element identified here is communication, the attention given to transparency in decision-making. We have identified

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

213

the presence of the adjective concentrated, derived from the action verb to concentrate, meaning involvement, activism and the importance given to the process. The message is clear, of engaging and continuing the actions started. Another example of defining the event refers to the anticipation of the framework for the development of events, often seen in the interventions of the Chief Negotiator. It is a model for creating a bridge between what has been done, is being done and will be done, it is the political message of continuity, transmitted internally and internationally: In the upcoming period we are handling the completion of the implementation plans in all areas, and for this we have checked again with the local and central authorities, because Romania's national interest requires that the implementation plans which we will soon send to Brussels to be as realistic as possible, because according to them, basically, our policies will be clearer, but also the EU will focus in the environmental policies and in relation to Romania (Gabriela Langada, “Cum comenta‫܊‬i actualitatea politică–Multiplicatorii de opinie europeană ‫܈‬i participarea lor la pregătirea pentru aderare”, Radio România Actualită‫܊‬i, August 20, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

It is a message of responsibility ("we have checked again") and full employment ("we handle the completion") in the process of negotiating the accession to the EU. The cause-effect relationship is emphasized by using the preposition because, indicating the Chief Negotiator’s orientation towards results/effects. The involvement in the decision-making of foreign policy is clearly expressed: if Romania's policies become clearer, the EU will focus on relations with Romania, namely the professionalism shown in public policies will cause a change in strategy from the EU in addressing the relationship with Romania. In other words, the strategic position occupied by the Chief Negotiator could cause a change in the negotiating strategy, which could have repercussions in changing the social perception regarding the management of public policies (idiosyncrasy in the social perception). We can conclude that it is obvious the permanent concern of Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬was for shaping the framework for the negotiations, especially in the public area, to arouse public interest and to actively involve it later (communicational actors). General and specific descriptions of the negotiating framework are evidence of accountability and professionalism in the performance of his role by this decision-making actor.

214

Chapter Five

Participation in the Decision-Making Process Personal characteristics will have a greater impact on foreign policy in situations where political leaders are involved in decision-making. In addition to exercising the institutional role of decision-maker in the process of Romania’s accession to the EU, the Chief Negotiator also had the intrinsic motivation to engage in activities, this being a personality trait. We noted the presence of a motivational idiosyncrasy: "As for me, I have chosen the path of my Professor, who told me in the early 1990s, that if I believe in something I should get involved". Consequently, the presence of Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬assumed direct involvement at the institutional level through the position held, but also on an assumed personal level, and the presence of idiosyncrasies is proof of this. Involvement also occurred in the training programs of accession, because the Chief Negotiator considered the EU accession preparation as a form of modernity and modernization of Romanian society. First, we must note that by the institutional position occupied, that of Deputy Minister, Romania's Chief Negotiator with the EU, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬ was responsible for articulating the outcomes of the national policies to the EU international arena. Media appearances, press conferences and public speeches abroad have clarified Romania's position in the EU accession process. Then the meetings he had with high officials of the European Commission and of the Member States are evidence of the strong political involvement of a fully committed actor. Not least, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬was appointed by the Government of Romania to lead the National Delegation Accession Negotiations, a sign of accountability in the activities of foreign policy, his being the leading, representative voice of Romania's accession process. The dimensions of the Chief Negotiator’s involvement are very interesting, ranging from change, to transformation, to insistence to strong awareness of the participatory role. We will illustrate only a few of these dimensions, through excerpts from interviews. For example, he considered any community from outside the Romanian borders as an "agent of change, which has the ability to understand and be able to participate in this development” (Mariana Tomescu Vâlceanu, “24 de ore”/“24 hours”, Radio România Actualităаi, 21 July, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬. The cognitive idiosyncrasy regarding the analysis of the rational actor decision-making is present in the phrase agent of change, also a good example for the vision on involvement. We have identified another dimension of involvement:

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

215

At the moment we are at the stage in which we prepare for the completion of negotiations and, moreover, I would like to tell you that we are in the phase where we work tremendously for the transposition of the acquis, i.e. of the European legislation into the national law and at the same time, the insistence is on institutional construction, on the development of administrative capacity, because, after all, all this legislation and all the changes that happen with its enforcement, means the transposition of these changes in real life (Mariana Tomescu Vâlceanu, “Opiniile societă‫܊‬ii civile”, Radio România Actualităаi, 15 August, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

The involvement is present in the use of action verbs (and their derivatives, adjectives, adverbs and nouns) and the phrases: "we work tremendously", "transposition of the acquis", "insistence", "institutional construction", "application", "transformations", "transposition of these changes in real life". These are records of a person who is committed and responsible for the consequences of the actions that he undertakes. The participatory role is directly evidentiated: [...] we need first an awareness of the participatory role in all of us. It was a joy for me, and I said that I considered it special that there is a local initiative which feels the need and sees the utility of such an endeavour, for themselves to be actors of the process of preparing the population, the citizens regarding the 2007 moment, and obviously beyond 2007 (Gabriel Langada, “Cum comentaí actualitatea politică?–Multiplicatorii de opinie europeană ‫܈‬i participarea lor la pregătirea pentru aderare”, Radio România Actualităаi, 20 August, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

We move to a stage which is beyond participation, that of community awareness, which translates, from the policy-maker to each actor involving himself in politics. The framework shaping is presented as anticipatory, referring to 2007 and beyond, thus achieving the connection between the two factors of the variable nature of the situation. Therefore, in addition to his own involvement in the decision-making, the Chief Negotiator goes beyond this level and implements the role of each participant in civic life, suggesting an awareness of this role in the framework outlined in advance for the moment of accession to the EU2007. It is a proof of insight and of centring on the results and on political action, which can offer the desired results only through involvement and public support. In conclusion, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬was totally involved in the negotiation of Romania’s accession to the EU, his efforts being obvious. His position of Chief Negotiator had no precedent in Romania’s international relations,

216

Chapter Five

and demanded a high level of involvement. Moreover, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬had a wide latitude for decision-making and defining the situation and the framework for the negotiation process was at hand. As a result, through his professional and public/political involvement Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬has undoubtedly played a decisive role in the process of negotiating, influencing it in a positive manner.

Personal characteristics According to Hermann's model, the most relevant personal characteristics are: beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style (Hermann, 1978, 59). The contribution of this paper is to introduce a layer between the level of beliefs, reasons and the worldview, that of idiosyncrasies. They will be divided into four categories: cognitive, of social perception, motivational and emotional and will be identified in the media coverage of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, in the period 2001-2004. Beliefs, motives and idiosyncrasies compile the decision-maker's vision of the world. We believe that the presence of idiosyncrasies at this level is more than welcome, as these elements of subjectivity influence the formation of social representations of the individual, and therefore of the decisionmaker. The decision-making style and the interpersonal one form the personal political style. The identification of convictions, reasons, and idiosyncrasies reflects the leader’s vision of the world. The reasons driving a leader relate to the desires they activate, like the desire for power or approval. Beliefs and reasons will shape the perspective on the political process and thus they can help shape the future agenda. The decisionmaking style includes the preferred methods of a leader for making decisions. Interpersonal style relates to the characteristic ways in which the leader interacts with other decision-makers. In the following we will analyze the presence of these factors of the variable personal characteristics.

Cognitive Idiosyncrasies For the convenience of following the identifications of these factors we have proposed a synthetic, tabular form, in order to offer an overview:

Cognitive idiosyncrasy Framing Prospective theory and the cybernetic model

217

Although it is a proof of the flexibility of the Negotiator, considering the suggestions from the European Commission determines a reformulation of the accession framework. The social partners also have an influence on the formulation of this framework suggested by the European Commission.

“From these perspectives, Romania attaches great importance to the annual report of the European Commission, a working document for the Government of Romania. Together with the social partners, the entire Romanian society’s efforts are made to reduce deficiencies signalled in the Report” (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, “EU Enlargement: Linking Civil Society, the Citizen and the State”, Berlin, 22 November, 2001).

“In the upcoming period we are handling the completion of the implementation plans in all areas, and for this we have checked again with the local and central authorities, because Romania's national interest requires that the implementation plans which we will soon send to Brussels to be as realistic as possible, because according to them, basically, our policies will be clearer, but also the EU will focus in the environmental policies and in relation to Romania” (Gabriel Langada, “Cum comentaí actualitatea politică?–Multiplicatorii de opinie europeană ‫܈‬i participarea lor la pregătirea pentru aderare”, Radio România Actualităаi, 20 August, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬. Also influenced by the frameworks set by others (European Commission):

Example Shaping a positive framework, default risk aversion:

Table 5-2 The cognitive idiosyncrasies of Chief-Negotiator

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

218

Disponibility

Anchoring

"[...] we have created the institutional framework and I want to tell you that [...] we will amend the legislation, so that the institutions we are already proposing at central and localregional level to be fully integrated in the legislative package, in the acquis communautaire” (Gabriel Langada, “Cum comenta‫܊‬i actualitatea politică?–Multiplicatorii de opinie europeană ‫܈‬i participarea lor la pregătirea pentru aderare”, Radio România Actualităаi, 20 August, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬

or

“There will be a few consultation meetings on very important chapters, such as energy or agriculture. These will be consistent meetings, where each partner will explain the political objectives, within the 2007 term and after 2007, and then hopefully in October and in November, December to organize accession conferences for about four, five, six chapters” (Gabriel Langada, “Cum comentaí actualitatea politică?–Multiplicatorii de opinie europeană ‫܈‬i participarea lor la pregătirea pentru aderare”, Radio România Actualităаi, 20 August, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬,

“This enhanced cooperation and the commitment of the Government of Romania to implement coherent measures aiming to consolidate a functioning and competitive market economy, levelled with the European standards, will prove beneficial for Europe as a whole, with impact on the regional stability” (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, The International Symposium “Romania and the EU”, Accademia di Romania, Rome, 6 November, 2001). The Chief Negotiator made decisions on structuring the position papers, only after having enough information from the specific work groups, in consultation with the social partners:

It is present not in the form described in chapter 5, page 220, but in the form of the perseverence of achieving the objectives assumed, the dynamic work rhythm of the Chief Negotiator being known:

Chapter Five

Information processing theory

Perceptual/cognitive frameworks

Utility

219

The cognitive emotional-intellectual framework is also outlined.

The relationship evoked is with the Ministry of Administration and Interior, which generated a network, by setting up local subsidiaries with specific tasks, creating a framework for the implementation of the acquis.

"The Ministry of Administration and Interior has recently established a structure within the ministry with local administration subsidiaries, dealing only with programming, funding and implementation of environmental policies at the local level" (Dorina Zdroba, “Pulsul zilei”, Radio România Actualităаi, 17 September, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

Perceptual frameworks are divided into three categories: based on relationships, emotionalintellectual and compromise-win. Each of these can be found in the interventions of the Chief Negotiator, demonstrating flexibility, partnership orientation and professionalism (using the art of compromise). For the cognitive framework based on relationships:

In this example, the establishment of a single market and common rules are utility indicators met by both parties to the negotiation

”The coming force of these agreements meant, in fact, the abolishment of the internal borders between the signatory states and the establishing of a single market border where the immigration control takes places, according to a common set of rules regarding visas, the right to asylum, the control of external borders, etc” (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, “Migration in Europe”, Institute of International Sociology, Gorizia, 17 September, 2001).

Appears when the benefits are seen by both sides, Romania and the EU (besides, the whole process of negotiation was based on the win-win principle):

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

Perception of the task

Cognitive consistency

220

With the responsibility of the rational actor, the Chief Negotiator explains the particularity of the negotiation process for Romania (different pace, strategy of development for the process of negotiation), the fact that the images and pre-existing beliefs, the perception of the negotiation process from the part of the EU and the population, before taking this function, have not influenced him, thus imposing his own pace.

"In Romania’s case, I explained why Romania came later to the negotiations, why it has conducted negotiations starting from a thinner chapter containing acquis communautaire than other states, and finally, we presented the current state, how Romania is simultaneously achieving three important steps in the transposition of the acquis, the development of public administration reform and the establishment of special institutions designed to implement the acquis and finally, the third fact is switching immediately to the application of the acquis communautaire” (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, “Cooperarea transfrontalieră–cheia unei Noi Europe”, Radio România Actualităаi, 10 September, 2003).

Clearly indicated are the common perception ("like us", "first perception") and the common task ("negotiation process"). It refers to how perceptions can influence decisions and how images and pre-existing beliefs can influence decision-makers. The Chief Negotiator showed that only his own perception, images and beliefs have influenced the decision:

"I noticed that, in general, like us, the first impression is that of quantity, of how we have developed quantitatively in the negotiation process, i.e. the number chapters closed-open finalized [...] each of the negotiating states followed their own way and the political decision of a group’s accession belonged to the Member States and the European Council” (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, “Cooperarea transfrontalieră–cheia unei Noi Europe”, Radio România Actualităаi, 10 September, 2003).

Similar perceptions on the task (common perceptions of Romania and the EU regarding the negotiation process):

Chapter Five

Evoked set

Cognitive process

Cognitive content

221

So the action verbs (to say, to support, to do) and emotional factors (desire, joy). We also notice the topic of the sentence, the introduction of emotional elements indicating emotional involvement and responsible commitment to achieve objectives. Refers to the immediate concerns that are in the mind of the decision-makers, who can be influenced by competing events:

"[...] I would like to say that I am happy to have been supported in several key elements, namely the regional policy and policy implementation of regional development in Romania will be done according with the EU objectives" (Victoria Stângescu, „Cum comenta‫܊‬i actualitatea politică”, Radio România Actualităаi, 14 October, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

“I am absolutely convinced that this vote will show how much is perceived an important step forward which all citizens want to accomplish. I would urge all our citizens to take responsibility not only of the desire to be in the EU, but to participate in the processes that are running now, preparatory of the respective moment, because we, Romanians, for so long have wanted to stop being passive subjects in history, but active participants" (Victoria Stângescu, „Cum comenta‫܊‬i actualitatea politică”, Radio România Actualităаi, 14 October, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬. It refers to the use of certain content at a conscious and unconscious level, this can be evidenced by the presence of verbs of action in the first person (for the conscious level) and at the unconscious level, by the presence of verbs and nouns expressing emotional states (e.g. "I am happy"," I want", "desire", "I'm sad", etc.):

It refers to what an individual believes at the level of knowledge. Often Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬presents his point of view with specific elements which mark this affiliation (e.g. "I am convinced", "I want", "I", "I would urge," "to participate," "we, Romanians”, “ active participant):

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

Integrative complexity

Conceptual complexity

222

"Also, for Chapter 21–Regional policies and structural funds, we have largely met our commitments, just a few weeks ago, by the decision of Government, the departments were established, specific units for processing structural funds in administrative units in our institutions and in this way we hope next year to be able to complete this chapter under good circumstances. Tomorrow, actually, we are expecting to complete the implementation plans for Chapter 22–Environmental protection" (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, Radio România Actualităаi, 10 July, 2003) Creating a framework for a comprehensive approach in general. This is highlighted, through presentations regarding the degree of negotiation of several chapters, belonging to a larger domain, for example market economy:

This media intervention is exposed in the first press conference after assuming the interim position from the Ministry of European Integration presenting immediate concerns (planning timeline negotiations in 2004) under the influence of competing events (evaluation of progress and presentation of areas that will be developed), due to the resignation of the Ministry of European Integration at that time (H. Puwak) in the context of suspected European funds’ fraud. Specialized, technical language is present in many interventions, some abundant in specific terms, showing a good grasp of concepts:

"The stakes could not be clearer. How our progress will be assessed and how the domains needing more development will be presented, these will be essential to plan a timeline of ongoing negotiations in 2004, and given that we have proposed a main objective to finalize negotiations in 2004, during the current mandate of the European Commission, we hope to have this opportunity just from the conclusions of the country report and hopefully a negotiation strategy with Romania" (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, “Radiojurnal”, Radio România Actualităаi, 22 October, 2003).

Chapter Five

Verbal style

223

"I would urge all our fellow citizens to take responsibility, not only of the desire to be in the EU, but to participate in the processes that are taking place right now, in preparation of the respective moment, because we, Romanians, for so long have wanted to stop being passive subjects in history, but active participants” (Victoria Stângescu, „Cum comenta‫܊‬i actualitatea politică”, Radio România Actualităаi, 14 October, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

First person pronouns mean acting as a representative of a group and being independent for what you stand for:

"[...] the draft of a new draft which might take a while, but I hope that this directive will appear quickly, this spring so we can move forward” (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, “24 de ore”, Radio România Actualităаi, Radio România Actualităаi 7 Januar, 2003).

Qualifiers: rarely uses qualifiers, might, maybe; the action verbs are those that dominate (to insist, to participate, to support, to focus, etc.). Even if qualifiers are present (might), they are immediately followed by an emotional indicator (I hope), just to show personal involvement and a desire to achieve the goals set, and then by an action verb (to advance) to reconfirm the responsible commitment:

“We focus primarily on the chapters that will give the final contour, the functional characteristics of market economy. We insist on the four freedoms. I do not know if we will be able to finalize, say, this semester, all four, because in December we’ve just opened Chapter 3–Free movement of services and the Community method is that there must pass a period of implementation and evaluation, to go further, but we hope that the Free movement of goods, Free movement of persons and Free movement of capital would be temporarily closed this semester" (Mariana Tomescu-Vîlceanu, “24 de ore”, Radio România Actualităаi, 7 Januar, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬. Many of the factors indicated by Weintraub (2006, 138) are found in the interventions of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬:

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

224

Direct references appear when the person speaking is referring directly to the person he is speaking to and the use of these words indicate engaging behaviour:

"at the moment it is very, very important how the firms’ managers respond to the questionnaire which was sent to the Department of the Environment" (Dorina Zdroba, “Pulsul Zilei”, Radio România Actualităаi, 1 July, 2003).

Adverbial intensifiers (e.g. very, really) add importance to the statements:

"[...] I would like to say that I was happy because several key elements have been sustained, namely that the regional policy and the implementation of regional development policies in Romania will be in line with the EU objectives” (Victoria Stângescu, „Cum comenta‫܊‬i actualitatea politică”, Radio România Actualităаi, 14 October, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

Using attributors to transmit warmth–expressing emotions or self assessments (often saying I like something) or using other expressions related to emotions. As I said, there are many examples of their presence:

"Therefore, at the moment, it is very, very important how the firms’ managers respond to the questionnaire which was sent by the Department of the Environment, so we may argue as well as possible, I repeat, on behalf of Romania and the benefit of each of the investors or the existing companies" (Dorina Zdroba, “Pulsul Zilei”, Radio România Actualităаi, 1 July, 2003).

Using explanations (e.g. because, therefore, since) suggests rationalization, points of view which are justified, explained or excused, and the people who use these words are hyperrational, obviously also for the Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬:

Chapter Five

Images

Constructs which influence the decision-making style

Manner of presentation of events

225

"I have entered this formula and I hope to succeed in negotiating it, which means a fairly consistent financial support given to Romania" (Varujan Vosganian, Ziua Economică, 2 April, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬. They talk about the psychological projection of one’s own feelings on another actor and are a kind of stereotype which we use to categorize events and people:

The event explained is the changing of the presidency of the European Commission, the causes are internal (EU level), global (accession of ten countries) and stable (have continued). For the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, the dyad of constructs is flexible-rigid, with emphasis on the element of flexibility:

"Secondly, the Greek Presidency has focused on the signing, ratification of treaties, of the accession concluded with the ten new states. Therefore, I say that, technically speaking, the procedures went almost normally, meaning that our relations with the European Commission– the negotiation unit–have continued” (Varujan Vosganian, Ziua Economică, 2 April, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

Specific elements of the verbal style which are not present: retractors (a mark of impulsivity), the use of impersonal forms (indicating emotional detachment) or excessive use of negatives (indicating the oppositional behaviour). An explanation of events is done within the cause-effect parameters. In the presentation of events, the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬addresses internal causes, global and stable, indicating an explanatory optimistic style:

"I think the time we have left wouldn’t be enough it, but if you invite us to Hunedoara, we promise to do a simulation to see what happens at the accession negotiations’ table” (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, “Chat cu multiplicatorii de informa‫܊‬ie europeană”, Extranet Delegaаia Comisiei Europene în România, 26 January, 2004).

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

Learning

Historical analogies

226

or

"Then we take into account the fact that in Romania we have transposed into our legislation a large amount of the acquis communautaire and we make efforts to apply this acquis communautaire in our daily lives" (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, România 1, 9 May, 2003).

"Think that even during the Cold War period the decisions on the accession of a state were political. Also now, the decisions are political" (Varujan Vosganian, Ziua Economică, 2 April, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬. It is the counterpart of historical analogy and highlights how decision-makers learn from the past or from other leaders. It can also refer to an understanding of how nations learn and can help to provide a sense of the pursuit of a purpose by a state (signing the Accession Treaty), of pathways (accession negotiation strategy, position papers) to meet them and of making decisions (made from the institutional position occupied by the Chief Negotiator):

The psychological projection is attributed to other actors (European Commission and the Member States), the belief is that the same process is perceived (do not have any signs indicating that they would perceive a different process). It is present also due to the professional training of the Chief Negotiator (a graduate of the Faculty of History and Social Sciences):

"Therefore, I hope that, once the Athens moment had passed there would be a willingness also from the European Commission and from Member States to lean more towards the efforts of Romania and Bulgaria. From the point of view of the decision in Copenhagen in December, at least at the moment, I do not have any signs indicating that they would perceive a different process, and not the one that includes Romania as well” (Varujan Vosganian, Ziua Economică, 2 April, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

Chapter Five

Conceptual cognitive/affective map

227

All the highlighted elements indicate a learning activity, transposition involves learning, then the effort to find ways of implementing, the use of energy to build something (again by learning). Can be done in this case, because the accession negotiation process involves decision-making at the highest level. In the specific case analyzed, we chose the cognitive-affective maps; emotional elements being a specific cultural factor, present in the political discourse. We performed three cognitive-affective maps: first, for the moment the Chief Negotiator took office, second, for the period of exercising the mandate (2001-2004) and the third, for the moment of finalizing the mandate, with further prospects to be continued. Due to the graphic layout, we will not render these maps in this table, but exterior to that.

"to show that we are ready to make an effort to exert power for a small piece, for a brick into the building of this European edifice" (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, România 1, 9 May, 2003).

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

Chapter Five

228

It is interesting to follow the graphical layout of Romania's position, of the Chief Negotiator and the European Council, the meaning of these key elements, being the eloquent expression of the effort made by the National Delegation for Accession, coordinated by the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬. As mentioned previously, the first conceptual map renders the period prior to the taking of office, respectively the moment when Bucharest sent the official request of formal accession to the European Union, in 1995, up to the Chief Negotiator taking office in 2000, namely Professor Vasile Puúcaú:

Repositioning Romania

Acceleration of Reform

Worrying economic situation 1998 National program of legislative harmonization

Department for European Integration 1995

Abandonment 1997

Without progress 1998

UE

Sustained effort

Fig. 5-9: Cognitive-affective map before taking office by the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬

Accesion Treaty 2005

integration Coordination of technical process

Working groups (29)

Policies coordination

compromise

Position papers

negotiations

IDIOSYNCRASIES

Win-win

National interest

Transpositionof the acquis

EU interests

enlargement

Council of Europe

Member States

Member States

Position documents

ROMANIA

CHIEF NEGOTIATOR

Romania’s interest

Beginning of Romania’s accession negotiation process 1999

Ronamia’s accession 2007

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process 229

Fig. 5-10: Cognitive-affective map during the mandate of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫( ܈‬2001-2004)

negotiations

Chapter Five

230

Contacts of Member States

Openings domestic actors and public operators

Romania Member State of EU

Strategies and development programs

UE

credibility Pro-active approach

predictability Acquis implemented

Actor on the Single Market

stability

Post-accession strategy

Fig. 5-11: Cognitive-affective map at the end of term of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫( ܈‬2004)

In all three cognitive-affective maps, the emotional elements were included using a thicker line. The consideration of these factors is a typically Romanian mental feature and the previous schemes highlight the role that they played in the process of negotiating Romania’s accession to the EU. The most complex of the three maps is the second, where the organized, rational and focused-on-delivering-results intervention of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬is visible. We mention that achieving

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

231

these conceptual maps is an innovative exercise, based on psychological knowledge, and, at the same time, a pioneering one, which is meant to pave the way for improvements, in relation to the case analyzed in this research, but also in other cases to be studied by other researchers. These cognitive-affective maps also represent the passing-through element to another category of idiosyncrasies, that of social perception.

Idiosyncrasies of the Social Perception We shall continue on the same pattern of idiosyncrasies’ identification: Table 5-3 The Idiosyncrasies of the Social Perception of Chief Negotiator Idiosyncrasy of social perception Self Illusion of / transparency

Example The principle of transparency was regularly followed from the beginning of the negotiation process, by which its essence was explained, to the strategy for accession and the public presentation of the position papers for each chapter. This principle has also been respected after the end of mandate, the presentation of negotiations being the subject of numerous books published by Professor Vasile Puúcaú: "Regarding the negotiations for Romania's accession to the EU, the current Government has embarked on a new path: one of facts, not of words [...]. We will present synthetically the stage of accession negotiations to the European Union [...]. We will present further the negotiation methodology” (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, “Noua abordare a negocierilor de aderare a României la Uniunea Europeană”, Summer University Izvorul MureЮului, 17 August, 2001). The strict observance of the principle of transparency emphasizes the responsibility and the importance of the national action coordinated by the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬.

Chapter Five

232 The perspective approach

Decision-makers with open perspective will have a greater success in creating integral arrangements than those with reduced perspectives. An additional argument for the presence of this idiosyncrasy is in the flexible style of the Chief Negotiator and the openness of perspective which give a feeling of safety and trust, just by this characteristic disclosure of future intentions: "We continue our training and, you see, the Belgian Presidency has announced a set of domains covering the chapters. We intend and it is our objective by the end of this year, to get into that rhythm, because Romania has been switched off at the end of the year 2000 from the other states. We must rejoin this pace to be able to find ourselves again in the structure of a presidency, regarding its priorities. This is what we are doing, we are opening and proposing for opening processing of a set of chapters which will be submitted during the months of September-October” (Mariana Tomescu Vîlceanu, “24 de ore”, Radio România Actualităаi, 27 July, 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

Others

Rigid perception; creative devaluation

Knowing the other party

Highlighted words and phrases mark the perspective and the future. This is not strictly about a rigid perception regardless of the views of other parties, but about a prioritization of our own interests, even under the conditions of using the win-win principle: "the negotiation that we do means harmonizing national interest with the interests of the European Union, seen both through the lenses of the 15 Member States and by those expressed by Community policies. After the moment of accession, the negotiation will continue to merge our interests with the European ones. I want to tell you that all these developments will only potentiate the national character” (Cecilia Caragea, Indigo, August 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬. It is largely due to basic training, and also the expertise gained through positions held in diplomacy:

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

233

"[...] the analyses we conducted for various Western institutions and organizations, in terms of geopolitics and geostrategy, at the end of twentieth century, and regarding the European processes of this period, including the integration of Romania into the EU and NATO” (Cecilia Caragea, Indigo, August 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

Other types of idiosyncrasies present in the descriptions provided in Chapter 5 of this paper, are not to be found for the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫( ܈‬that is: extremism, fundamental errors of assignment and idiosyncrasies of coercion), we believe due to his emotional balance and deep knowledge of international relations and European studies. Regarding the convictions and belief system, we must specify that the Chief Negotiator’s substance of rationality is very strong, one of the most commonly used models of foreign policy decision-making being that of the rational actor. Another proof of rationality is the use of action verbs and explanatory elements. Among personal characteristics, Hermann places beliefs first. Therefore, shaping the belief system of a leader is extremely important for predicting the subsequent decisions he would take in different situations. The operational analysis code is a more rigorous and systematic variant for structuring beliefs into categories, which is why we have opted for this alternative. We mention that we have not used the VISC test or any other psychological test specific for quantitative analysis. We propose the same schematic form for outlining the operational analysis code for the system of beliefs:

Chapter Five

Main category of beliefs Philosophical beliefs - the fundamental philosophical belief is harmony "the negotiation will continue to merge our interests with the European one" (Cecilia Caragea, Indigo, August 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬

Optimism

Ability to control

- the ability to control historical development, conceptually similar to the belief about the control of events.

- political future measures how other countries’ variables are found in the strategies of the decision-maker. "If we really want a higher standard of living, we must roll up our sleeves and get to work" (Cecilia Caragea, Indigo, August 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬

- one's ability to achieve goals "we are in a constant transition and the EU has now proposed a very deep reform. For Romania it is a historical opportunity. We have the opportunity, together with negotiations, to build programs that harmonize perfectly with the EU development levels, from both the institutional and economic point of view. Then I think again, about the standard of living [...]"(Cecilia Caragea, Indigo, August 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬

"The negotiation [...] means harmonizing the national interests with the interests of the European Union" (Cecilia Caragea, Indigo, August 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬

The essential nature of the world (main philosophical belief)

Predictability

Identified convictions

Subdivision

Table 5-4 The Main Categories of Beliefs of Chief-Negotiator

234

Instrumental beliefs

Risk orientation

Intensity of tactics

Direction of the strategy (main instrumental belief)

The role played by chance

235

- refers to the use of multiple variants or tactics.

- refers to strength, threat, punishment, etc. In the previous example we have emphasized words and phrases that mark perseverance. "I would like to tell you that in Chapter 10 we have asked for more transitional periods for VAT and excise duty, all these attached to the administrative component, to our ability to apply and correlate better these financial sets with those of the European Union" (Septimiu Roman, “24 de ore”, Radio România Actualităаi, 26 October, 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬

- refers to the use of diplomacy and cooperation vs. force in approaching goals. Previously we have exemplified the choice of cooperation. "It means, from our perspective, a concentration of resources, of efforts and, at the same time, an extraordinary work. I defined, from our point of view, the accession process in three words: mind, management and resources. I think if we go this way, our interests will harmonize with the interests of the EU" (Geta Du‫܈‬a, “Procesul de aderare–definit prin trei cuvinte: minte, management ‫܈‬i resurse”, Adevărul de Harghita, 21 August, 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬

- the role played by chance "The principle of competitiveness, or competitiveness assessment is, at the moment, fundamental in the EU. As such, we are on the same resonance from the point of view of interest" (Geta Du‫܈‬a, “Procesul de aderare–definit prin trei cuvinte: minte, management ‫܈‬i resurse”, Adevărul de Harghita, 21 August, 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬

"For Romania it is a historical opportunity [...]"(Cecilia Caragea, Indigo, August 2001, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

236

Exercise of power

Periodization/flexibility of tactics

- refers to the use of available strategies, in this case the call for support, marking the need for a concerted effort from all parties involved in the complex process of integration in order to maintain the fixed schedule.

- refers to the change in tactics, in this case, Romania has not proposed to implement EU requirements, but to impose its own point of view (a derogation). "No negotiating chapter can be opened if, prior to that, internal legislation is not, to a great extent, compatible with EU legislation (the acquis communautaire). This justifies Government pressure on Parliament to adopt laws without which negotiations cannot be opened, but also to avoid the situation of Romania being accused of infringement" (Ziarul financiar, 18 February, 2002)

"At least for one domain we will require a derogation from EU legislation. It is the Energy chapter, where Romania will require a derogation from EU directives governing the minimum oil products reserves. Minister Puúcaú believes that the EU will accept this because Romania does not need to store petroleum products to the level required by the EU" (Ziarul financiar, 18 February, 2002)

Chapter Five

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

237

Therefore, the operational analysis code is currently present through the two sets of beliefs, philosophical and instrumental. For a comprehensive approach of the system of beliefs of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, we propose the consideration of personal values (moral and social) which led to the expression of the following beliefs: work, professionalism, responsibility, commitment, involvement, perseverance, dedication, progress/development . The identification of idiosyncrasies of social perception helps to indicate attributional processes that occur at the individual level, with the prognostic value for the decisions to be taken by those leaders.

Motivational Idiosyncrasies These arise from the activation of specific needs and purposes and appear where the idiosyncrasies of social perception are present, and they can be turned on by the presence of particular social goals. Moreover, Hermann, in the scheme through which this analysis is realized, distinctly identifies beliefs and reasons as defining elements for the personal characteristics that influence foreign policy decision-making. We will also follow in this case the same form of the analysis model:

Chapter Five

Closure, coherence and equilibrium

Coherence and equilibrium

Motivational idiosyncrasy SelfEgocentrism and accomplishment self-serving

"Exactly this was the purpose of our meeting, because we asked on the one hand, an activity much more insistently correlated with environmental policies in relation to EU policies and, on the other hand, we requested that the work be given a much greater concreteness, more pragmatism and come up with concrete programs and projects to be useful to the activities in the field of environment" (George Nu‫܊‬ă, “Cronica sonoră”, Radio România Actualităаi, 19 February, 2002, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

The need for self-accomplishment (through self-improvement) is present, the verb to expedite indicates this, we focus means gathering all efforts to achieve more than they have proposed: also the opening of the 12 chapters. This idiosyncratic need is manifested in the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, but the need for closure is not present, due to the flexible negotiation style adopted, and his sanguine temperament:

"We focus, primarily, on the 12 chapters which are not opened. We presented to all ministries and the Parliament our intention to expedite the negotiations. I asked the ministries to draft laws. I had discussions with the MP’s from the Commission of Integration and Presidents of the two Chambers to lobby the Standing Bureaus, in the specialized committees, so that the projects should be promoted as a priority" (Ziarul financiar, 18 February, 2002).

Example Will be present in the sense of self-overcoming and the use of available resources to achieve the objectives set. Being the user of a rational decision-making model, in most cases, egoism and self-serving and can be interpreted only in the sense of perseverance (one of the beliefs present):

Table 5-5 The Motivational Idiosyncrasies of Chief Negotiator

238

Cooperation

Future interactions

239

The underlined words and phrases indicate future, concrete actions, with timelines and the specific negotiation process and the field to which they relate, involving cooperation and coordination.

"In terms of Social policies chapter, Romania will elaborate, by the end of 2002, a new labour code, which will implement the Community provisions in the field [...] along with the continuation of structural reforms in health, the Government's priority list for the first half of 2002 also includes adopting the Law regarding equal opportunities between men and women, the Union Law and the Law on insurance against accidents at the workplace or occupational diseases" (Alina Mihaela Dima, “Sub semnul integrării: Extinderea UE, ultima sută de metri sau ultima ‫܈‬ansă?”, Piaаa finaciară, March, 2002, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

Coherence is determined by use of a prepositional phrase on the other hand,… on the other hand, the participle correlated, and balance indicates the four courses of action: (1) more persistent activity, (2) more concrete activity, (3) definite programs, and (4) definite projects. Refers to future actions, with a defined or undefined time horizon, future interactions being marked by the specificity of action negotiating and preparing position papers, which means cooperation with working groups and line ministries:

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

240

Orientation of social value

In addition to elements indicating the transformation of Romanian society, there are presented issues of cooperation, the discussions had with MP’s and officials from other countries, indicating the adherence of Romanian society to the values enshrined in in the EU.

"To these imperatives Romania answered by a presentation regarding the structural transformation in the Romanian society both in economic terms, but also social, legal, institutional; and, of course, I have had very interesting discussions both with the MP’s present and officials from other countries, but also with German officials and especially with very valuable experts, who were invited by the German Foundation to present various pragmatic topics on this subject" (Mădălina Andronescu, “Seminarul privind viitorul UE”, Radio România Actualită‫܊‬i, 10 March, 2002, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

It refers to the social benefits of the negotiation process on Romanian society, economic, social, institutional modernization and transformation, being often referred to by the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬:

Chapter Five

Responsibility

Responsibility

Common orientations

241

The responsibility transpires in achieving the implementation of the acquis in the legislature, in everyday life and in the economy.

"So, I would insist more on the quality of these chapters and on the fact that they were opened, which means that basically we have taken this step to enter the acquis, to apply it in Romanian legislation, but also in everyday life or in the real economy” (Mariana Tomescu Vîlceanu, “24 de ore”, Radio România Actualităаi, corespondence from Bruxelles, 21 March, 2002, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

The explicit indication of the word partnership is the mark of common orientation and prosperity increase in the current and future EU area, and reconfirms this intention. The three common EU objectives to many Member and Candidate States, are and will be: convergence, cohesion and competitiveness. It is one of the Chief Negotiator beliefs, and is frequently found at motivation level:

"The central message of the organizers of this meeting was that the Member States and candidate countries, those who are in the process of negotiating with the European Union should be create a partnership for sustained development, for prosperity increase in the current and future EU area. For this, three concepts were discussed: convergence, economic and social cohesion and competitiveness” (Mădălina Andronescu, “Seminarul privind viitorul UE”, Radio România Actualită‫܊‬i, 10 March, 2002, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

The entire negotiation process is based on the win-win principle, so common interests are present:

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

242

Chapter Five

If we consider the classification of reasons made by Suefeld, Cross, and Stewart (2009), which consists of: the reason of power, the reason of affiliation and the reason of accomplishment, in the case of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫( ܈‬as we mentioned in the previous table), the reasons of accomplishment and self-overcoming are at the basis of the actions carried out (Suefeld, Cross and Stewart 2009, 10). Knowledge of motivational idiosyncrasies is important because it helps to identify the actions in which the decision-maker will engage. In this case, it is important to remember that the actions with social value, which imply responsibility, achievement, coherence and equilibrium and future interactions are what motivated the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬.

Emotional Idiosyncrasies The newest category of idiosyncrasies has been gaining ground lately, also thanks to the increasing influence of psychological methods in the study of foreign policy decisions. Knowing this group of idiosyncrasies is the most important, as these items are related to temperament and the unconscious (this sum of emotions) and it manifests itself in cases where personal benefits for the decision-maker may appear, in the sense of professional capital, prestige, recognition, rewards, self-realization, etc. And to illustrate and analyze this category of idiosyncrasies we have chosen the form of the schematic table: Table 5-6 The Emotional Idiosyncrasies of Chief Negotiator Emotional idiosyncrasies Positive emotions

Example Positive status, cooperation and motivation lead to successful negotiation actions. These elements are present in the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬: "I would like to tell you that I have really a joy because several key elements have been sustained, namely that regional policy and implementation of regional development policies in Romania will be in line with the EU objectives" (Victoria Stângescu, “Cum comenta‫܊‬i actualitatea politică?”, Radio România Actualităаi, 14 October, 2003, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬. Positive emotions, the unconscious message are indicated by the verb I would like, and the word joy indicates such a positive emotion. Another example:

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

Negative emotions Anger

243

"this thing rejoices us because it means we begin to see the fruit of systematic work, consistent on this route of our internal preparation for the accession process” (Mariana Tomescu Vîlceanu, “24 de ore”, Radio România Actualităаi, corespondence from Bruxelles, 21 March, 2002, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬. Much less, but still present are negative emotions present in speeches of the Chief Negotiator: "But I was also saddened and hurt especially by the moment when the intervention was made. Why now? Of course, it was known that Romania should be given the last evaluation, in the Parliament of France, for NATO accession [...] And why Romania? Because in Romania there is a very hectic atmosphere: we are in pre-election campaign. What bothered me very much–as Chief Negotiator for integration–was that Mr Oostlander said he wanted to create shock. And he was successful, indeed– through discussions in our country, such as they were: voices were agitated, irrational voices, voices that have found something to do–so a very diverse attitude. I saddens me–once again I say it–that these stereotypes of the 90s still find echoes [...] this why I said that I do not feel comfortable with the motion proposed by Mr Oostlander: the proposal to suspend negotiations has generated very radical debates” (Ilie Călin, “Stereotipii despre România anilor ’90”, Adevărul de Cluj, 10 February, 2004, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬. Many negative emotions are present in this excerpt from the virulent intervention of the Chief Negotiator addressed to the MEP Oostlander: sadness, discomfort, agitation and anger. This last negative emotion that is emphasized several times by the questions Why now? and Why Romania? and reinforced by the cavalcade of other negative emotional states, indicates the strong commitment of the Chief Negotiator (who in that action, also appealed to the official position which he addressed, specifying it explicitly) and the responsibility to achieve the goals assumed: Romania’s EU accession.

244

Chapter Five

Psychological approaches to the foreign policy decision-making process involved psychological profiling according to the "classical patterns", often used in clinical psychology. Identifying emotional idiosyncrasies represents a support and an indication of an avant-garde direction in the analysis of the decision-making process. A retrospective identification of these idiosyncrasies will help prospect the future actions of the decision-maker, therefore the process of identifying idiosyncrasies is set to achieve the "classic" value of a psychological profile. Even if, this time, we do not realize the psychological profile, we will specify some of the psychological elements presented in Chapter 4 of this paper, and identified in this case in order to form a general picture. In terms of the leadership style demonstrated (Hermann et al. 2001, 83) by the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, we consider that he is a leader motivated by purposes (Romania’s EU accession), who is focused on solving problems, thus being focused on the mission, and changing position or ideology with difficulty. These leaders choose their staff on the basis of loyalty and a similarity to their own person. Of the four leadership styles (fighter, strategic, pragmatic and opportunistic) identified by Hermann (2001, 116), Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬belongs to the strategic style, the one who faces constraints but is open to new information. This type of leader knows what he wants and seeks relevant information to achieve his goals. He is bold but informed when it comes to quality, in this case ambitious aspirations (Romania’s EU accession). Political constraints and the attitude towards information may be supplemented with a third dimension: the motivation for action. These two types of motivations for action and the four categories listed above: fighter, strategist, pragmatist and opportunist provide other nuanced categories (Hermann et al. 2001, 116). In terms of motivation, the strategic leader, Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, belongs to the category of the charismatic leader, who is open to relationships and is the one who faces constraints, is open to information, and focuses on relationships, being able to motivate others to act. To summarize, the three dimensions–sensitivity to political constraints, an openness to information and motivation for action–helped us to identify a goal-oriented leader in the person of the Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬. Goal-oriented leaders will tend to take rather strong measures, unlike those who are context-oriented, who will manifest an aversion to risk and take action more carefully. Moreover, it is also a confirmation of one of the decision-making models used by the Chief Negotiator, that of the prospective theory, being a supporter of risk, without having risk aversion.

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

245

An interesting and current classification of leadership styles is performed by Thompson, Neale and Sinaceur (2004), expressed in the form of metaphors: the preconscious decision-maker/negotiator, situational decision-maker/negotiator and the learning body (Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur 2004, 32). Out of these categories, the Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬belongs to the last one, that of the learning body. A supporter of the rational actor decision-making model, the presence of rational verbal indicators shows an attempt to decrease the influences of idiosyncrasies, but this is not done consciously. By his profession, and by the presence of the cognitive idiosyncrasy of learning by analogy, the Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬belongs to this category. Another classification of leadership presented in Chapter 5 of this paper distinguishes the following categories: collaborative, contingent, transactional, traditional, charismatic, transformational and administrative (Miller and Miller 2007, 3). As in the case of temperaments, where we cannot say that we belong exclusively to one type, in this case we consider that the Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬belongs to the transformational type (a new accession strategy with a new dynamic), with elements from the charismatic and collaborative types. As we mentioned at the beginning of the emotional idiosyncrasies analysis, these are the newest class of idiosyncrasies. Their importance is significant and will increase with more frequent use of psychological approaches in the analysis of foreign policy decision-making. In the case analyzed we presented a leader in whom we found positive and negative emotions, who reacts to external influences and is prone to learning, collaboration and transformation. The four categories of identified idiosyncrasies, especially beliefs and reasons (considered of significance in this variable) are the ones that shape the worldview of the decision-maker. In this case, we can state that the Chief Negotiator is a fine connoisseur of the realities of international relations, especially of the external context where the accession negotiation process took place. That is why he was so focused on shaping the internal and external environment of negotiation and on the principle of transparency.

Decisional Style As we have stated on many occasions, the predominant model of decision-making in foreign policy used by Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, is that of the Rational Actor, which is based on the consideration of costs and benefits. The presence of this type of decision-making is evident by

246

Chapter Five

the terms negotiated for the implementation of the acquis in different areas, and sometimes even by the initiation of some exceptions to this. During the discourse analysis of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, we have identified verbal style elements indicating rationality, and even hyper-rationality. In the first case, it is about the presence of action verbs (to focus, to make an effort, etc.), of construction verbs (to build, to develop, and so on) and of the explanatories (of course, because, since, also and so on). We will present yet another piece of media appearance, used to highlight negative emotions, just to confirm that during an emotional message the Chief Negotiator used, at the decisional level, the rational actor model: We must take things with calm and reason, to see what is useful for us to take the necessary measures and to respond with dignity, because this means consideration, not necessarily for that particular MEP, but to the European Parliament institution. My opinion is that we should pay attention to this action, since we are in pre-election campaign for the European Parliament and, most certainly, other MEPs will raise questions concerning certain aspects of Romania (Ilie Călin, “Stereotipii despre România anilor ‘90”, Adevărul de Cluj, 10 February, 2004, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

The rational actor model is now present by the presentation of cost (to take the necessary measures) and benefits (what is useful for us), but also by the presence of words and phrases that indicate emotional balance and calmness (calm, reason, respond with dignity, means consideration for the institution of the European Parliament). Another model of decision-making in foreign policy used by the Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, is the prospective theory. In many cases, the risk was assumed (e.g. accelerating the rhythm of the opening of negotiation chapters), but the elements of rationality were those that led, in fact, to taking a calculated risk: [...] it was a decision considered appropriate in a given international circumstance. Romania has not betrayed the European Union in favour of the US because, simply, there is no question of enmity between the US and the EU. Relations between the United States and the European Union are too strong to be shaken by the International Criminal Court issues. Romania defends the interests of NATO and fulfills the commitments made in the negotiations with the EU (Traian Gheorghe Horia, “Cititorii Telegrafului de Constan‫܊‬a să doarmă lini‫܈‬ti‫܊‬i, într-o diminea‫܊‬ă se vor trezi în Uniunea Europeană”, Telegraful de Constanаa, 31 August, 2002, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

247

Therefore, at some point, a risk was taken for Romania in international circumstances, in a difficult situation (ICC involvement). The following statements explain the respective rational decision and reiterate the position assumed. The key to explaining and predicting these phenomena lies in understanding the nature of risk-taking behaviour in international politics. Many of the problems that central-level political decision-makers need to cope with, are joined by the extension regarding alternative risk involvement. Let us not forget that prospective theory is a theory of reasoning, therefore, the presence of this decision model is a completion of the rational actor model. Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, is not risk averse, he accepted risk in relation to the loss (failure to conclude the accession negotiations). This is why he changed the accession negotiation strategy and dynamized the whole process (a fact proven by the belief system which characterizes him). The presence of the prospective theory decision-making model was marked by the identified cognitive idiosyncrasies: framing, anchoring, availability.

Interpersonal Style The manner in which Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬interacted with other decision-makers, officials, or the group of collaborators is what defines the interpersonal style. In terms of leadership, elements of the collaborative style have been identified which demonstrate that interpersonal style is based on collaboration and cooperation. The negotiating team (counsellors) have an average age of 26 to 30 years, and the dynamic and engaging work environment was built by the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬. In the discourse analysis of media coverage we have identified numerous verbs of construction which demonstrate the ability to coagulate teams and to motivate them to achieve a common goal: the completion of accession negotiations. An important element to be noted is the relatively open, friendly and warm relationship he had with the press. For example, we present an excerpt from an answer given to a journalist to the question "I asked myself why there wasn’t a woman installed in your position?": I have several comments to make here, answered Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫–܈‬because I do not agree with you. On several points: my colleagues tell me that I'm charming, talkative, and there are many lady Commissioners in the European Commission. I’m joking. [...] I think the negotiator's personal charm matters less than rigour and dedication (Traian Gheorghe Horia,

248

Chapter Five “Cititorii Telegrafului de Constan‫܊‬a să doarmă lini‫܈‬ti‫܊‬i, într-o diminea‫܊‬ă se vor trezi în Uniunea Europeană”, Telegraful de Constanаa, 31 August, 2002, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

Also for evidentiating the idiosyncrasies that the Chief Negotiator was aware of, regarding his role in society and how he related to other actors, we present another excerpt from the same interview: I think, for many, I am a kind of bogeyman, the one who tells them that they must do something because they have committed to it. My role in Romania is to explain what European policies are, how a specific provision of the acquis is properly applied in Bucharest, Cluj or Surduc. I must convince the peasants to associate, to form farms which are subsidized by the European Union, to cultivate products that are competitive on the EU market and in the manner that Europeans want them[...]. I must convince the Mayors that we cannot provide facilities unless they comply with the EU, and that environmental standards will be tougher [...]. We need to convince workers that their products must comply to the same quality standards as in the European Union and these employers need to upgrade and create working conditions for the employees, workplace hygiene, etc. as in the EU. We must all understand that on the EU market we must be competitive, otherwise we will not resist (Traian Gheorghe Horia, “Cititorii Telegrafului de Constan‫܊‬a să doarmă lini‫܈‬ti‫܊‬i, într-o diminea‫܊‬ă se vor trezi în Uniunea Europeană”, Telegraful de Constanаa, 31 August, 2002, interview with Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬.

The message of construction and full commitment to the task he has to accomplish is obvious. In conclusion, Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬brought a sense of duty and responsibility to the community. Decision-making and interpersonal style favoured the shaping of a distinct political style based on moral values and respect for the principles committed to. For the field of international relations, in particular the European arena, the presence of Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬meant, for the 2000-2004 period, a change, a transformation of the work strategy, innovation and the outlining of a framework for specific relationships. The success in negotiating, the signing of the Treaty of Accession by Romania in 2005, and the subsequent integration of Romania into the EU on 1 January 2007, is due, in good part, to the political and decision-making style of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬.

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

249

“Filters” The last variable in the decision-maker analysis scheme indicates a second set of personal characteristics and includes several factors: interest in international relations, professional training and expertise in the field mentioned above and sensitivity to the environment.

Interest in International Relations Introducing this factor derives from the professional training of the Chief Negotiator, as he is a Professor (from 1995) and a doctoral supervisor (since 2000) in the field of international relations. Among the areas of competence of the Chief Negotiator we note: international relations and international negotiations, the contemporary history of international relations, Central and Eastern Europe in the international relations of the twentieth to the twenty-first century and European integration and European negotiation. His interest in international relations was manifested by extensive scientific work through the books, studies and articles published, and the numerous lectures held at national and international conferences to which he was invited. He has published over thirty books as sole author, coordinated fifty volumes and written hundreds of studies and articles on international relations as sole author or in collaboration with other authors. He has also coordinated and participated in numerous research projects financed from abroad or from Romania. And to highlight his interest in the field of international relations, we must specify that Professor Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬has initiated two doctoral programs in international relations, five Masters’ programs, a Bachelor’s Degree program and a research institute in the same field. Professor Vasile Puúcaú is well known in the field of international relations in Romania and in Europe for his innovative, constructive and dynamic spirit. Moreover, he is one of the well informed and recognized voices of public opinion with articles published in national daily newspapers (Adevărul, Ziarul Financiar, etc.) and local papers. He has made many appearances on various TV channels, radios and online, all on European and international issues. This editorial and scientific activity is reflected in the positions he has occupied in scientific and editorial committees: Romanian Journal of Society and Politics, a member of the Advisory Board, “Eastern Journal of European Studies”, Centre for European Studies, Al. Ioan Cuza University, (Iaúi); Editorial Board, IUIES Journal (Gorizia); Editorial Board, ISIG

250

Chapter Five

Journal (Gorizia); Editor, International Politics and Diplomacy Collection, “Sincron’’ Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, "Central European Issues" (Bucharest); “Central European Political Review” (Budapest); Coordinator Collection “Politica’’, Dacia Publishing House (Cluj-Napoca); “Foreign Policy–Romania”; ’’Dosarele Istoriei’’ (Bucharest); „Revista de Studii Politice úi RelaĠii InternaĠionale” (Bucharest); ’’Eurolimes”–Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies (Oradea). His professional affiliations in numerous relevant profile organizations maintain his focus on foreign policy: Academy of Political Science, New York; Association of International Law and International Relations IUIESGorizia/Trieste; The Commission of History of International Relations; The Commission of Military History; The Steering Committee of the European Institute of Romania, Bucharest; Scientific Committee of ISIGGorizia-Trieste; The European Institute, Florence; The Board of Directors of the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin; President of the Scientific Committee of ISIG-Gorizia-Trieste; Romanian Society of Historians and The Romanian Society of European Law. Therefore, the intense scientific and publishing activity of Professor Vasile Puúcaú, Chief Negotiator of Romania's accession to the European Union, demonstrates his permanent interest in international relations.

Professional Training and Expertise in the Field of International Relations Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬is a graduate of the Faculty of History and Philosophy at the "Babes-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca, having a BA in history and social sciences. He expressed an interest in contemporary history and international relations and began his academic career as an Assistant Professor in the same faculty. His interest in international relations was manifested early in his professional and academic career, specializing, through internships and scholarships (Fulbright and Irex), in the United States, France, Italy and Russia. He continued his academic career, climbing the steps of the academic hierarchy, becoming a Professor in 1995 in the field of international relations, a doctoral supervisor in 2000, also in international relations and European studies, and since 2011 he has been Professor Ad Personam Jean Monnet Chair. He debuted in diplomatic activity in 1991 as director of the Romanian Cultural Center in New York, subsequently occupying several positions at the highest levels of representation: Minister-Counsellor, Charge d'Affaires/Acting Ambassador of the Embassy of Romania in the USA (1992-1994), Minister delegated Chief Negotiator for EU Integration

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

251

(2000-2004), Minister of European Affairs (2008-2009), Member of the European Parliament, and in the legislatures 2000 to 2008, he held several official positions on foreign policy as a deputy in the Romanian Parliament (Secretary of the Committee for European Integration of the Romanian Parliament, member of the Romanian Foreign Policy Commission, President of the Romania-Denmark Friendship Group, President of the RomaniaAzerbaijan Friendship Group, a member of the Romania-The Netherlands Friendship Group). Currently, Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬is a Professor in the Faculty of European Studies of the “Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai” University of ClujNapoca, where he teaches classes in International negotiations and European negotiations. He is the director of the Institute of European Research, Director of the Centre for International and European Negotiations and Mediation and Manager of the Department of Cultural Diplomacy and Global Economy, which belongs to the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy in Berlin (where he is a member of the Board of Directors). Therefore, his professional training and expertise in international relations enabled the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, to exercise his institutional role at a high level, gaining international recognition and flexibility in the repertoire of behaviours he adopted in foreign policy.

Sensitivity to Environment It is the last factor of the variable “filters”, the one which marks the consistency in the relationship between the other characteristics and the environment (Hermann 1978, 57). Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬showed his consideration for internal and external factors through the development of the strategy for negotiating Romania’s accession to the European Union, especially by preparing the internal and external environment for negotiation. Changes in the international arena and bilateral negotiations with the EU, but also separately with each country, have not influenced the reconsideration of some elements of the negotiation strategy. Externally, the Chief Negotiator was working continually to build the external environment of negotiation, taking into account events taking place in the international arena, as in the case of the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001: Europe needs strong borders. And I mean external borders, because cooperation among member and candidate states must be further consolidated in order to not let happen similar events with those of 11 of September. In this respect, Romania appreciates the project initiated by

252

Chapter Five Italy for institutionalising a joint European border police. This initiative is of great importance not only for improving regional stability, but also for protecting borders of the new EU Member States. Romania is interested in developing bilateral cooperation and consultation in the field of securing borders and combating illegal immigration, due to the vast experience Italy has in the field. Cooperation with the highly qualified Italian Border Police and consultations at a specialised level (including Schengen issues) will bring benefits for both sides, benefits not only at national level, but regional too (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, “Preparing Romania for accession to the EU”, The International Symposium “Romania and the EU”, Accademia din Romania, Roma, 6 Novermber, 2001).

To build the internal environment, the Chief Negotiator initiated a dialogue with civil society, professional associations, employers and trade unions: the transformations involved by a society moving towards a functioning market economy cannot take place without a permanent dialogue with the social partners. Employers' associations and trade unions have an important role in defining and implementing these policies. In this context, the National Delegation for Negotiation has ongoing consultations with the employers' associations and trade unions regarding the negotiating chapters, especially those with economic impact. [...] Just to boost dialogue with civil society, we have created the e-mail negociator.sef @mie.ro, where we have already received numerous comments, studies, analyses and suggestions on negotiations with the EU. We must not forget that this is a process which regards not only the politicians, but the entire civil society, every citizen, as an entity and an identity (Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, “Voluntariatul în România ‫܈‬i rela‫܊‬ia cu societatea civilă din Uniunea Europeană”, Conferinаă privind Ziua Internaаională a Voluntariatului, 3 December, 2001).

Sensitivity to the internal and external environment has determined the openness to change and also the behaviour of the Romanian executive in the process of negotiating accession, the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, being the one who presented the position papers on the chapters of negotiation in the Romanian Government, and negotiated with the European partners on its behalf. In conclusion, the second set of Personal Characteristics, "filters", have demonstrated the important role played by the interest, permanent concerns, professional training, but mostly the expertise in international relations of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬. His vast professional experience, permanent connection to internal and external realities, capacity to adapt, to transform and to change the negotiation strategy,

Analysis of Romania’s EU Accession Negotiation Process

253

openness to dialogue and flexibility in relation to all national and European structures involved in the difficult negotiation process of Romania's accession to the European Union, have contributed greatly to the success of this objective, which will bear his personal touch.

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS

The decision-making process in foreign policy is an important area of research because how decisions are made can make a possible choice fall into a certain pattern. Therefore, an actor can reach a different result, depending on how the decision is made. Moreover, significant cognitive limitations distort information processing. Some decisions are carefully calculated, while others are intuitive. The level of analysis of the foreign policy decision-making process is different from that in international relations, where experts talk about individual, states and system as the main units of analysis. In foreign policy decision-making units refer specifically to the deciding entities: leaders, groups and coalitions. Foreign policy decisions can be examined in terms of three levels: individual, group and coalitions (Hermann 2001, 47). Studying foreign policy decision-making is very important because we can thus cover the cognitive processes that lead to a decision and "we enter the mind of" a leader who makes decisions. We can also identify the general behavioural patterns and individual decisions and can generate views on leadership styles and the personalities of leaders, which cannot be revealed solely through a systematic approach to foreign policy analysis. This approach to foreign policy analysis has the potential to contribute more and more importantly to the study of international relations. The foreign policy decision-making process may deepen the understanding of idiosyncrasies, motivations and perceptions that occur in making a decision, especially at the individual level. Moreover, growth and development theories of cognitive psychology and decision theory have stimulated advances in the study of foreign policy decision-making. The course of world politics is shaped by the decisions of leaders. Uncertainty involved in decision-making in foreign policy can belong to the motivations, beliefs, intentions or calculations of the opponents. If we cannot understand how decisions are made, then maybe we can understand decisions and, perhaps more importantly, we can predict some results on the international scene (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 4).

Conclusions

255

Factors such as the personality and beliefs of leaders, leadership style, emotions, images, cognitive consistency, the use of analogies, intelligence, all of which influence decision-making and the expected results, question the explanatory power of the rational model most often used in the analysis of foreign policy decisions. Therefore, we have presented in our paper an analysis of the main models of decision-making in foreign policy, in order to pair and compare the results of the psychological analysis of idiosyncrasies, which is our main concern. Regarding the analysis of the foreign policy decision-making process and of the models presented in Chapter 2 (rational actor model, organizational behaviour model and the model of governmental policies) and in Chapter 3 (cybernetic model, prospective theory model, poliheurisitic theory model, multiple flow model and psychological approaches), all are designed to form an overview of the interpretative variants that can be used by specialists in the field of international relations. In its simplest form, the rational actor model links purpose and action. Knowing an actor’s objective means knowing his future behaviour. By observing his behaviour and taking into account the objecive of an actor identified in an action, a hypothesis can be formulated about the reason why he did what he did. The rational actor model includes calculations about the situation in which the actor finds himself, not just objectives. This context presents the threats and opportunities which the actor considers as options, with arguments pro and con. The actor chooses alternatives that best fit his interests. In applying the rational actor model, the analyst will need to take into account the objectives, the options he identifies, the benefits and costs he expects from each option and the ease or reluctance to take risks. An imaginative analyst will invent goals which an actor might possibly have had, no matter how unlikely, thus weaving a logical network of consequences into an imaginary intention. The organizational behaviour model provides the most valuable theoretical basis for interpreting how options are evaluated, in relation to the preferences of an actor in an organization. Since players tend to maximize their goals in an organization, decision-makers should evaluate alternatives (Christensen and Redd 2004, 72). This analysis model of decision-making is used to examine how context influences the choice of a solution (Christensen and Redd 2004, 69). Two elements are necessary for understanding the decision-making process from the perspective of organizational behaviour: (1) how a decision is reached, and (2) why the actors have certain preferences in the decision-making process (Christensen and Redd 2004, 71). Governmental actors will negotiate results by the

256

Chapter Six

political goals they pursue. Occupying a high position in the foreign policy environment allows actors to participate in the negotiation (Allison 1971, 164). Actors will negotiate to maximize the influence they have in the political sphere. The governmental policies model has focused almost exclusively on crisis decisions regarding security, then extending onto the longitudinal analysis of the "routines" in foreign policy (Allison 1971, 164). This analysis model should be extended to other cases as well, because of the power of the organizational analysis elements. The focus of decision-making within government structures is not constrained to legal and formal rules, by which they intend to win rationality and eliminate the capricious aspects of bureaucratic behaviour. Rather, it is an enhancement rather than a denial of the political nature of governmental structures, and of other informal aspects of organizational behaviour (Holsti 1976, 329). The cybernetic model can be applied to the group level. Organizations do not realize reassessment and monitoring of their own, but rather make some adjustments (Cashman 1993). With this default setting, decisions which must be made in larger organizations are divided into smaller units and will be carried out by sub-units of the organization (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 480). The prospective theory provides predictions and explanations which enable subsequent changes in time due to the influence of the external environment (McDermott 1998, 176). It provides an analytical framework for decision-makers to examine not only the significant changes which have occurred over time, but also a motivation for them (McDermott 1998, 176). This theory, by its nature, involves a psychological approach to decision-making, but has, in turn, a number of shortcomings. However, its virtue lies in its explanatory power. It can be taken into account in explaining the decision-making process when the rational actor theory is insufficient. For example, in particular and specific cases which do not fall into a particular pattern, the prospective theory can be successfully applied, exactly because of its flexibility (McDermott 1998, 179). The poliheuristic theory was developed as an alternative to the classical model of the rational actor model and the cybernetic model. It focuses on the process, but also on the outcome of the decision-making process (Christensen and Redd 2004, 73). This theory involves two stages: in the first stage the decision-maker is investigating possible alternatives, using heuristics and thus reducing the number of alternatives, the second stage involves assessing the remaining alternatives by using more analytical decision-making rules (Christensen and Redd 2004, 73).

Conclusions

257

The multiple flow model was used mostly in domestic policy, stating that pre-existing solutions formulated within political communities are one of the three major processes which must converge to establish a certain policy on the agenda. It is a proactive model, because the decision-maker does not have to wait for the problem to occur to develop the solution, but rather, he develops the solution, expecting the appropriate problem to show itself and, in an adequate political context, attaches the solution to the problem. This model was used by the author for domestic policy, but Saikaly proved its applicability in foreign policy as well (Saikaly 2009, 5). Psychological approaches are carried out at the individual level, with particular attention to the psychological aspects of decision-makers, especially the perception of the actor. Working on the research of Jervis from 1968 and 1976, and of Margaret Hermann from 1984, the authors point to important elements to consider in the analysis of foreign policy decision-making: the misunderstanding of the intentions and actions of other actors and underlying reasons–actors see what they want to see, not what is really going on, guided by pre-existing beliefs (hence the tendency to perceive other states as more hostile than they really are) and their commitment and confusion of desires with reality (wishful thinking) (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 235). Psychological approaches have challenged the concept of rationality in the decision-making process (Kinder and Weiss 1978, 708; Wilson, Timmel and Miller 2004, 226) because they focus on human factors and the influences that shape responses which decision-makers use for the outside world (Saikaly 2009, 11). Two approaches were presented: (1) groupthinking–explores what happens in small groups and the group impact on the decision-making process, and (2) cognitive approach–explores the effects of the beliefs and perceptions of the individual and the impact these have on the decisionmaking process. The last category presented in the analysis models of foreign policy decision-making process (psychological approaches) made the transition towards exploring the idiosyncrasies which can influence this process, especially at the individual level. The presence of idiosyncrasies (of these personal, social factors) that influence decision-making can lead to other approaches to decisionmaking which are different from the "classical" rational model. Rationality in decision-making in foreign policy cannot be considered as the sole factor. At best, it may be taken as a reference factor, but postmodern approaches bring to the attention of specialists the consideration of the role and influence of psychological factors. Recently, George Friedman noted that "personal values are more idiosyncratic than those derived from an

258

Chapter Six

ideology, but both represent a desire to govern with principles and policies" (Friedman, Character, policy and the selection of leaders, f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120904&utm_term=gweekly& utm_content=readmore&elq=225bf45626944151a89838cb2a72a22b, 4 September, 2012). This research has brought a new element into the study of international relations through the analysis of the subjective elements (idiosyncrasies) that occur in decision-making at the individual level. The use of psychological methods of analysis of the foreign policy decision-making process opens a new path of investigation into the field of international relations. The case study was Romania’s accession to the European Union (2000-2004), from the perspective of the analysis of psychological factors that intervene in decision-making at the individual level. This paper brings a new perspective to the analysis of the decisionmaking process: the analysis of subjective elements which influenced the decision-makers involved. The deciding factor analyzed is Romania's Chief Negotiator, Minister Vasile Puúcaú. Through discourse analysis (political speeches, public speeches, media representations and interviews conducted during 2000-2004), we identified four types of idiosyncrasies that influenced the decision-making. This is qualitative research, and another important element of novelty in the field of international relations research, where quantitative research methods are present in high enough proportion. The option for qualitative research was given by the fact that it fosters the study of a topic, a process, a phenomenon "in its natural environment, based on the meanings that people bring with them" (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 3). The study period investigated is 2000-2004, when Romania’s accession negotiations to the European Union took place, and also the activity of the decision-maker as Chief Negotiator was carried out. Within the qualitative research, the size of the "sample" is not important (quotation marks were used because in qualitative research the term “sample” is not used). For example, discourse analysis of ten interviews can provide equally valid information as hundreds of responses to a structured analysis. This research examined the public communication of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Puúcaú, i.e., interviews, media representations and public and political discourses supported and played on various national and international media channels (print, TV and online). The analysis was based on a scheme developed by Margaret Hermann and validated by Kiri Anna Wilson, through which were identified the variables and factors influencing a decision (Wilson 2006, 29). This scheme has been improved

Conclusions

259

by the present research by adding idiosyncrasies, with the four types (cognitive, of social perception, motivational and emotional) at the level of the second variable personal characteristics, thus determining the formation of a worldview, with a prognostic role for the foreign policy decisions that a leader will make. The chosen research strategy was the case study, the data analysis method was discourse analysis and the method of interpretation was interpretative research (Băban 2002, 21-22). The interrogations which started this research were: ¾ ¾ ¾

What are the idiosyncrasies that influenced the decisionmaking process of Romania’s accession to the European Union? Are these idiosyncrasies characteristic only of the decisional process of Romania’s accession to the European Union? Are there are specific elements (political, cultural or social) that have influenced the emergence of the individual idiosyncrasies in the decision-making process of Romania’s accession to the European Union?

Following the analysis of the decision-making process of the EU accession negotiations at the individual level (Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬, we have noticed the following: ¾

¾

The four categories of idiosyncrasies have acted in the analysed case as well: cognitive, of social perception, motivational, emotional. This was revealed by the discourse analysis applied to the media interventions of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬ and exemplified by excerpts from the "sample" investigated. Consequently, the answer to the first question was built by identifying the four categories of idiosyncrasies in decisionmaking at the individual level. In the category of cognitive idiosyncrasies the following categories were identified: framing, anchoring and availability (marks the connection with the prospective theory in the analyzed case), utility, perceptual/cognitive frameworks (based on relationships, emotional-intellectual, compromise-win), perception of task, cognitive consistency, idiosyncrasies related to cognitive content, idiosyncrasies related to the cognitive process, evoked set, conceptual complexity, integrative complexity, idiosyncrasies of the verbal style (through

Chapter Six

260

¾

¾

¾

¾

¾

qualifiers, first person personal pronoun, explanations, attributors, adverbial intensifiers and direct references), presentation manner of events (explanatory optimistic style), constructs that influence decision-making style (the dyad flexible-rigid), images, historical analogies, learning and cognitive-affective maps. For a complex image on cognitive idiosyncrasies which acted at the individual level, in the decision-making process of Romania’s accession to the European Union, three cognitive-affective maps were designed describing the vision of the Chief Negotiator of this process before taking the official mandate, during his mandate and at the end, with the implicit prospections. Making these cognitive-affective maps is a novelty, with strong influences of psychological analysis, but a useful, pragmatic, integrative element which might be an alternative for the psychological profiling of a decision-maker in international relations. Also identified are idiosyncrasies of social perception, centred on the self and others, also exemplified with excerpts from speeches and interviews of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬: transparency (self-centred) perspective approach (selfcentred), prioritizing their own interests (centred on others), knowledge of the other party (centred on others). Another innovation was the building of the operational analysis code, a more modern, more rigorous and well structured version than the belief system. Two major categories of beliefs were identified and illustrated: philosophical and instrumental, with corresponding subdivisions: (a) philosophical beliefs: the essential nature of the world (main philosophical conviction), optimism, predictibility, ability to control, the role played by chance, and (b) instrumental beliefs: direction of strategy (main instrumental persuasion), intensity of tactics, risk orientation, periodization/flexibility of tactics, the exercise of power. Also developed was a system of beliefs based on identifying values (moral and social): work, professionalism, responsibility, commitment, involvement, perseverance, dedication, progress/ development. In the motivational idiosyncrasies category, several categories were identified: self-realization (self-overcoming and the use of available resources to achieve the objectives set out), coherence and balance, cooperation (future interactions, social value

Conclusions

¾ ¾

¾

261

orientation, common orientations) and responsibility. We mention that at the basis of the actions taken by Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, is the motif of achievement and self-overcoming. It is important to remember that the actions with social value, which imply responsibility, achievement, coherence and balance and future interactions are those which motivate the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬. Of the emotional idiosyncrasies there were identified both positive emotions (joy, desire, hope, etc.) and negative emotions (sadness, distress, anger, and so on). In terms of the leadership style used by the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, this is a leader motivated by purpose (Romania’s EU accession), focused on solving problems, thus being focused on the mission, changing his position or ideology with difficulty. If we take as reference the four leadership styles classification done by Hermann (2001, 116), Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬belongs to the strategic style: a leader who faces constraints but it is open to information. This type of leader knows what he wants and will seek relevant information to achieve his goals. With these ambitious aspirations (Romania’s EU accession) he is bold but informed when it comes to quality. In terms of motivation, the strategic leader Chief Negotiator Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, belongs to the category of charismatic leader, focused on relationships, being able to motivate others to act. Summarizing the three dimensions, we obtain, in the person of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, a goal-oriented leader. Among the categories of leaders expressed in the form of metaphors, the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, belongs to the learning body category. An adept of the rational actor decision-making model, the presence of rational verbal indicators indicates an attempt to decrease the influences of idiosyncrasies, but this is not done consciously. By profession and by the presence of the cognitive idiosyncrasy of learning by analogy, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬belongs to this category. According to the classification made by R. W. Miller and J. B. Miller, we consider that Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬belongs to the transformational type (a new accession strategy with a new dynamic) with elements from the charismatic and collaborative types. The four categories of identified idiosyncrasies, but especially beliefs and reasons, shape the worldview of the decision-maker. In this case, we stated that the Chief Negotiator is a fine connoisseur of the realities of international relations, but mostly

Chapter Six

262

¾

¾

¾

of the external context in which the negotiation of the accession process took place, which explains why he was so focused on shaping the internal and external negotiation environment and on the principle of transparency. By listing all the categories of idiosyncrasies identified in the decisional process of Romania’s accession to the European Union at the individual level (Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬, we have answered to the first interrogation of the research: yes, there are idiosyncrasies which have influenced the decisional process of Romania’s accession to the European Union and they belong to the following categories: cognitive, of social perception, motivational and emotional. The second interrogation of the research: Are these idiosyncrasies characteristic only for the decision-making process of Romania’s accession to the European Union? We will answer yes, they are specific to the decision-maker Vasile PuЮcaЮ who was involved in the decision-making process of Romania’s accession to the European Union. To support these statements, we will state that not all of the categories listed under each type of idiosyncrasy have been identified. This is explained by the presence of the Chief Negotiator in this decision-making process. From the psychological point of view, we cannot say that exactly these idiosyncrasies will manifest themselves in another decision-making process that would involve Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, because according to the international and internal context, the action of other subjective, personal factors and other idiosyncrasies will take shape (more, less, or exactly the same may appear). In this fact lies the novelty of psychological approaches to the foreign policy decision-making process at the individual level; the fact that every time, any situation must be addressed in a complex way, and that we must leave room for situational interpretation and personal variables. For the case examined, we mentioned that the following specific elements were not identified in the verbal style for the cognitive idiosyncrasies: retractors (a mark of impulsivity), the use of impersonal forms (indicating emotional detachment) or the excessive use of negatives (indicating oppositional behaviour). For the idiosyncrasies of social perception, we did not find in the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬: extremism, fundamental errors of attribution and idiosyncrasies of coercion, because of his emotional balance and deep knowledge of international

Conclusions

¾

¾

263

relations and of European studies. For the motivational idiosyncrasies there were present versions of those presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis, but lacking those related to egocentrism, self-serving, closure. For emotional idiosyncrasies we have identified a very good emotional communicator, with many affirmative, positive verbs; the idiosyncrasies of negative emotions have been rarely encountered (especially anger), being motivated by his determination to achieve the purpose. The last interrogation of the research concerns the identification of specific elements (political, cultural or social) that have influenced the emergence of the individual idiosyncrasies in the decision-making process of Romania’s accession to the European Union. As we answered to the second interrogation of research, it is obvious that there were such factors, as all elements from the internal and external environment affect us and influence the decisions we make (from the daily to the professional ones). Therefore, even the decision to start the accession negotiations to the European Union was a political one, so that there were other political factors of influence at the individual level: the political orientation of the government, the parliamentary majority’s desire for accession facilitated a harmony in the Government and "the easy imposition" of the position papers. It was the merit of the Chief Negotiator to succeed, at the level of Government and Parliament, working with members of the opposition, civil society, associations and trade unions, to achieve a general consensus for achieving the objectives assumed by Romania in the accession negotiations, the political stakes of the upcoming general election, which took place in the autumn of 2004; the international context in which Romania was placed, the support offered to the resolution of the conflict in the Balkans; all these were political assets, skilfully exploited by Romania to begin the accession negotiations. Romania’s joining of NATO in 2004 created the social and individual predispositions of the Chief Negotiator, which resulted in a strong extrinsic motivation to also succeed in the process of accession to the EU and opened up possibilities for the transformation and creation of public policies adapted to national and local needs, with the existing model in other Member States. At the level of the cultural factors that influenced the emergence of idiosyncrasies, we identified: the presence of group

Chapter Six

264

¾

representations (specific for those cases where there is a strong motivation to achieve an end result that will be reflected upon all people of the community). This representation often appeared in the speeches of the Chief Negotiator, by the use of the personal pronoun (us, for us) and by the verbs used as the first person singular (we will open, we strive, we work, we hope, etc.), but especially through the repeated use of the term we Romanians. Another cultural factor that influenced the emergence of identified idiosyncrasies is the social perception of the "others", often present in the mind of the Romanians who wanted to join the group of advanced countries. This cultural factor orginates from the communist period (until 1989), when the option of the West was the rescuing solution. There is a high probability that this national cultural factor manifested itself in the establishment of a strong motivation in the Chief Negotiator to succeed in Romania’s EU accession (which includes the "old West"). Another specific cultural factor acting on the building of idiosyncrasies is the national negative emotional experience (victimization, discrimination, abuse), which the Chief Negotiator, Puscas, wanted to turn into a positive one, hence the high frequency of positive emotional idiosyncrasies, also present at the level of the verbal style. We note that at the individual level, the social and moral values identified in the idiosyncrasies of social and motivational perception have led to a strong intrinsic motivation of Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫ ܈‬to demonstrate that through labour, responsibility and commitment, "we, Romanians" can also succeed. At the level of the social factors that influenced the construction of idiosyncrasies, we noted: the large popular support (over 80%) of Romanians regarding Romania’s EU accession (with direct effects on the employment and accountability of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫)܈‬, the internal social pressure of the opposition in the context of the political struggle of 2004, the evolution of group mentality, also accelerated by the Chief Negotiator (from a segregationist to an integrationist perspective for the social benefit of Romanians), the prospect of a new group image of Romanians (as EU members), civil society activism, of the employers’ associations and trade unions, with great social impact in support of Romania's accession to the EU and of the Chief Negotiator‘s team, transparency in decisionmaking promoted permanently by Chief Negotiator, Vasile

Conclusions

¾ ¾

265

Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, and the professionalization of the media which was interested in a subject with national and international social implications. All the elements that describe the variables in Hermann’s (2001, 116) scheme were characterized at the level of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬. This research also identified the foreign policy decision-making model used by the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, in Romania's accession process to the EU, namely the rational actor model and the prospective theory. Based on the analysis of idiosyncrasies, we propose a new model for the analysis of foreign policy decision-making at the individual level, where the identification of the four types of idiosyncrasies is the central element, going towards a validation of Leigh Thompson’s proposal, which speaks of the mind and heart of the negotiator (Thompson 2006, 23). We have called this model, the Negotiator Model. This model joins the older behavioural trend, manifested in international relations and fostering the psychological approach to decision-making. He stated that, in any foreign policy decision-making, we must take into account the idiosyncrasies acting at cognitive, social perception, motivational and emotional levels, but also catch the situational factors (external/international and domestic/national) which describe the situation in which the analyzed process occurs. Therefore we mention two important axes: one of idiosyncrasies and the other of situational factors. At the level of idiosyncrasies will be identified four types of idiosyncrasies, described in the fourth chapter, namely: cognitive, of social perception, motivational and emotional. Particular attention will be given to the emotional idiosyncrasies, those that have the greatest influence in decision-making at the individual level and the highest predictive value. For the situational factors, the internal and external positioning of the certain case will be considered. After a retrospective analysis of the individual decision-maker’s idiosyncrasies, several alternative decisionmakings will be generated at the individual level. Then the prediction of the decisional choice will be performed, the one that the decision-maker will opt for. This model could be successfully applied in situations involving the initiation of a negotiation process, with the psychological accents being obvious. The Negotiator Model is intended to be to be an open invitation to

Chapter Six

266

¾

other specialists in the field of international relations, towards specific validation. Based on this research we have answered all three interrogations and now state that there were idiosyncrasies that occurred at the individual level, of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, in the process of Romania's accession to the European Union. These idiosyncrasies were divided into four categories: cognitive, of social perception, motivational and emotional. They are specific to the individual decision-maker for Romania's accession process to the EU, thus keeping a national character. There were political, cultural and social elements which have influenced the emergence of individual idiosyncrasies, in the process of Romania’s accession to the European Union.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Works Albert, M., and L. Hilkermeier. 2004. Observing International Relations Niklas Luhmann and World Politics. London: Routledge. Baker, G., and D. Chandler. 2005. Global Civil Society: Contested Futures. London and New York: Routledge. Bartolini, S. 2005. Restructuring Europe. Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation-state and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Băban, A. 2002. Metodologia Cercetării Calitative. Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană. Benveniste, G. 1977. The Politics of Expertise. 2nd edition. San Francisco: Boyd & Fraser Publishing Company. Birkland, Th. A. 2006. Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Cashman, G. 1993. What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict. New York: Lexington Books. Chorafas, N. D. 2009. Financial Boom and Gloom–the Credit and Banking Crisis of 2007-2009 and Beyond. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Denzin, N. 1994. “The Art and Politics of Interpretation.” In Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 500-529. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage. Denzin, N., and Z. Lincoln. 1994. Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage. Dobson, W. 2008. “Delivering Change. Together.” In What G20 Leaders Must Do to Stabilise our Economy and Fix the Financial System, coordinated by Barry Eichengreen and Richard Baldwin, 53-55. Centre for Economic Policy Research. Doran, C. F. 1991. System in Crisis–New Imperative of High Politics at Century’s End. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dougherty, J., and R. Pfaltzgraff. 1990. Contending Theories of International Relations. New York: Harper and Row.

268

Bibliography

Eichengreen, B., and R. Baldwin. 2008. The Essays: What G20 Leaders Must Do to Stabilise our Economy and Fix the Financial System, 2125. Centre for Economic Policy Research. Gallagher, T. 2010. Deceniul Pierdut al României. Bucureúti: All. Gelfand, M. J., and J. M. Brett. 2004. The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture. Stanford Business Book, Stanford: Stanford University Press. George, A. L. 1993. Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace Press. Glaser, C. L. 2010. Rational Theory of International Politics. The Logic of Competition and Cooperation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Grix, J. 2001. Demystifying Postgraduate Research: from M.A. to Ph.D. The University of Birmingham: University Press. Gros, D. 2008. “Europe's Two Priorities for the G20.” In What G20 Leaders Must Do to Stabilise our Economy and Fix the Financial System, edited by Barry Eichengreen and Richard Baldwin, 41-43. Centre for Economic Policy Research. Hajnal, P. I. 2007. G8 System and the G20. Evolution, Role and Documentation, 1-10, 151-159. Ashgate e-Book. Halberstam, D. 2001. War in a Time Of Peace: Bush, Clinton & the Generals. New York: Scribner Halberstam. Hancock, D. R., and B. Algozzine. 2006. Doing Case Study Research: a Practical Guide for Beginning Research. N.Y.: Teachers’ College, Columbia University. Harrison, E. 2004. The Post Cold War International System. Strategies, Institutions and Reflexivity, 112-136. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. Higgott, A. R., Underhill, G. R. D., and A. Bieler. 2003. “Introduction: Globalisation and Non-state Actors.” In Non-State Actors and the Authority in the Global System, coordinated by Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler, 1-13. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, e-Library. Hix, S. 2005. The Political System of the European Union. 2nd ed. London: Palgrave. Hopson, J. M. 2003. The State and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inayatullah, N., and D. Blaney. 2004. International Relations and the Problem of Difference. London and New York: Routledge. International Monetary Fund. 2010. Global Financial Stability Report. Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer System, Washinghton, D.C.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

269

Jackson, R., and G. Sorenson. 2007. Introduction to International Relations. Theories and Approaches, 222-247. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Johnson, C. 2000. Blowback: the Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York: Metropolitan Books. Keohane, R. 1986. Neo-realism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press. Keohane, R. O. 2002. Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World. London: Routledge. Kingdon, J. W. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 2nd ed. New York: Harper Collins. Klotz, A., and D. Prakash. 2008. Qualitative Methods in International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Laïdi, Z. 2005. A World Without Meaning–the Crisis of Meaning in International Politics. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, e-Library. Leite, N. 1951. The Operational Code of the Politburo. New York: McGraw Hill. Lorentzen, J. 2003. “Foreign Capital, Host-country-firm Mandates and the Terms of Globalisation.” In Non-State Actors and the Authority in the Global System, coordinated by Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler, 193-208. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, e-Library. Maoz, Z. 1990. National Choices and International Processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Meriam, S. B. 2001. Qualitative Research and Case Study Application in Education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Miller, B. 2007. State, Nations and Great Powers. The Sources of Regional War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Modelski, G. 2008. Globalization as Evolutionary Process. London: Taylor and Francis Group. Morgenthau, H. 2007. Politica între Naаiuni. Ia‫܈‬i: Polirom. Neufeld, M. 1996. “The Restructuring of International Relations Theory.” In The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, edited by Susan Strange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Neuman, I. B. 2008. “Discourse Analysis.” In Qualitative Methods in International Research. A pluralist guide, edited by Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, 61-78. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Nye Jr., J. S. 2006. In Mideast, the Goal is 'Smart Power’. Boston: Boston Globe.

270

Bibliography

Puúcaú, V. 2007. RelaĠii InternaĠionale/transnaĠionale. 2nd ed., 72-80. Cluj-Napoca: Eikon. Pu‫܈‬ca‫܈‬, V. 2010. Managing Global Interdependencies. Cluj-Napoca: Eikon. Rajan, R. 2008. “Reforming Global Economic and Financial Governance.” In What G20 Leaders Must Do to Stabilise our Economy and Fix the Financial System, coordinated by Barry Eichengreen and Richard Baldwin, 29-32. Centre for Economic Policy Research. Rodrik, D. 2008. “Making International Finance Safe for the World Economy–Not the Other Way Around: What Should the G20 Communiqué Say?” In What G20 Leaders Must Do to Stabilise our Economy and Fix the Financial System, coordinated by Barry Eichengreen and Richard Baldwin, 21-25. Centre for Economic Policy Research, VoxEU.org Publication. Slaughter, A.-M. 2004. A New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stiles, K. W. 2003, “Grassroots Empowerment. States, Non-state Actors and Global Policy Formulation.” In Non-State Actors and the Authority in the Global System, coordinated by Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler, 32-47. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, e-Library. Stone, D. 2003. “Private Authority, Scholarly Legitimacy and Political Credibility.” In Non-state Actors and the Authority in the Global System, coordinated by Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler, 211-225. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, e-Library. Strange S. 1996. The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Studer Noguez, M. I. 2003. “How Global is Ford Motor Company’s Global Strategy?” In Non-state Actors and the Authority in the Global System, coordinated by Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. G. Underhill and Andreas Bieler. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, e-Library. Tetlock, P. E., and G. Breslauer. 1991. Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy. Boulder: Westview. Twing, S. 1998. Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: the Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Underhill, G. R. D. 1997. The New World Order in International Finance. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Waltz, K. N. 2006. Teoria Politicii InternaĠionale. Iaúi: Polirom. Wendt, A. 2011. Teoria Socială a RelaĠiilor InternaĠionale. Iaúi: Polirom.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

271

Specialized Works Allison, G. T. 1971. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little Brown. Allison, G., and P. Zelikow. 2010. Esenаa Deciziei. O Explicaаie a Crizei Rachetelor din Cuba. Ia‫܈‬i: Polirom. Allred, K. G. 1999. “Anger and Retaliation: Toward an Understanding of Impassioned Conflict in Organizations.” In Research on Negotiation in Organizations, vol. 7, edited by Robert J. Bies, Roy J. Lewicki and Blair H. Sheppard, 27-58. Greenwich, CT.: JAI. Axelrod, R. 1976. “The Cognitive Mapping Approach to Decision Making.” In Structure of Decision, edited by Robert Axelrod. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Barber, J. D. 1985. The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. 3rd ed. New Jersey. Bazerman, M. H., and M. A. Neale. 1983. “Heuristics in Negotiation: Limitations to Effective Disputes Resolution.” In Negotiating in Organizations, edited by Max H. Bazerman and Roy J. Lewicki, 5167. Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage. Bazerman, M. 2006. Judgement in Managerial Decision-making. 6th ed. New York Inc., John Wiley and Sons: Hoboken. Blondel, J. 2006. Political Leadership: Toward a General Analysis. London, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. Braybrooke, D., and Ch. E. Lindblom. 1963. A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as Social Process. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. Brecher, M. 1974. Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press. Breuning, M. 2007. Foreign Policy Analysis: a Comparative Introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillian. Brighi, E., and C. Hill. 2008. “Implementation and Behaviour.” In Foreign Policy. Theories. Actors. Cases, edited by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dune, 117-136. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brusis, M., and J. A. Emmanoulidis. 2000. Policy Approaches of Advanced Candidate Countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Project on “Issues and Consequences of Eastern Enlargement” jointly realized by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, Centre for Applied Policy Research. Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, Siverson, A. R. M., and J. D. Morrow. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T. Press.

272

Bibliography

Bueno de Mesquita, B. 2009. Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences, and Perceptions. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: C.Q. Press. Camerer, C. F. 1995. “Individual Decision-making.” In Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by John Kagel and Alvin Roth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O., and P. R. Aall. 2007. Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. U.S. Institute of Peace Press. Dawes, R. 1998. “Behavioural Decision-making and Judgement.” In The Handbook of Social Psychology, edited by Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Linzey, vol I. 4th ed., 497-548. New York: McGraw-Hill. DeRouen Jr., K. 2001. Politics, Economics, and Presidential Use of Force Decision Making. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen. —. 2003. “The Decision Not to Use Force at Dien Bien Phu.” In Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policies Decision Making, edited by Alex Mintz, 11-28. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Eagley, A. H., and S. Chaiken. 1993. The Psychology of Attitudes. New York: Harcourt Brace. Ferejohn, J. 1991. “Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England.” In The Economic Approach to Politics, edited by Kristen R. Monroe. New York: Harper Collins. Fiske, S. T., and S. E. Taylor. 1984. Social Cognition. Reading, MA.: Addison Wesley. Fiske, S. T., and S. E. Taylor. 1991. Social Cognition. 2nd edition. New York: Random House. Forejohn, J. A. 1991. Rational Choice and Social Theory, Working paper. Forman, E., and M. A. Shelly. 2001. Decision by Objective. New York: World Scientific. Gallagher, M. E. 2005. High Rolling Leaders: the “Big Five” Model of Personality and Risk-taking during War. Working Paper presented at the International Studies Association–South Conference, November 5. Garrison, J. 1999. Games Advisers Play: Foreign Policy in the Nixon and Carter Administrations. College Station, TX.: Texas A.&M. University Press. George, A. 1980. Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy. CO.: Westwood Press. George, A. L., and J. L. George. 1998. Presidential Personality and Performance. Boulder: Westview Press.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

273

Gerring, J. 2007. Case Study Research. Principles and Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gladwell, M. 2005. Blink: the Power of Thinking without Thinking. New York: Little Brown. Goldsmith, B. 2005. Imitation in International Relations: Observational Learning, Analogies and Foreign Policy in Russia and Ukraine. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. GoriĠa, C. 2008. Negocierile de Aderare la Uniunea Europeană. Bucharest: Editura Economică. Greenstein, F. I. 1969. Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization. Chicago: Marham. Gross, J. S. 2008. “Foreign Policy Decision-making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological Models.” In Foreign Policy. Theories, Actors. Cases, edited by Susan Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, 101-116. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. 2002. “Psychological Explanation of International Conflict.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Rise and Beth A. Simmons, 292-308. London: Sage. Halperin, M. H. 1975. National Security Policy-making: Analyses, Cases, Proposals. Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books. Harre, R. 1995. “Discoursive Psychology.” In Rethinking Psychology, edited by Jonathan Smith, Rom Harre ‫܈‬i Luk Van Langenhove. London: Sage. Hermann, M. G. 1978. “Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy.” In Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies, edited by Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann. Beverly Hills. —. 1983. “Assessing Personality at a Distance: a Profile of Ronald Reagan.” Mershon Centre Quarterly Report (Ohio State University), 7. —. 1983. Handbook for Assessing Personal Characteristics and Foreign Policy Orientations of Political Leaders. Columbus, OH.: Mershon Centre Occasional Papers. —. 1984. “Personality and Foreign Policy Decision-making: a Study of 54 Heads of Government.” In Foreign Policy Decision-making: Perceptions, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence, edited by Donald Sylvan and Steve Chan. New York: Praeger. —. 1987. “Assessing the Foreign Policy Role Orientations of Sub-Saharan African Leaders.” In Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, edited by Stephen G. Walker. Durham.

274

Bibliography

—. 1989. Defining the Bush Presidential Style. Mershon Memo: Ohio State University. —. 1989. Personality Profile Data on Gorbachev. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association held in London, March. —. 1993. “Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-making.” In Diplomacy, Force and Leadership, edited by Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, 77-94. San Francisco: Westview Press. —. 2006. “Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis.” In The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, edited by Jerrold M. Post, 178-212. Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press. Holsti, O. R. 2006. Making American Foreign Policy. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. Inotai, A. 2007. Some Key Issues in Understanding the Negotiations on Accession to the European Union, Working Paper, No. 122, 16. Budapest: Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Science. Iyengar, S., and W. McGuire. 1993. Explorations in Political Psychology. Durham: Duke University Press. Janis, I. 1972. Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Janis, I. L. 1982. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. 2nd edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Janis, I. 1983. Groupthinking. 2nd edition. New York: Houghton. Jervis, R. 1970. The Logic of Images in International Relations. New York, Princeton: Princeton University Press. —. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and A. Tversky. 1987. Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. 2000. Choices, Values and Frame. New York: Cambridge University Press. Khong, Y. F. 1992. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decision of 1965. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kowert, P. A. 2002. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisers? Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

275

Levy, J. S. 1997. “Prospect Theory and the Cognitive-rational Debate.” In Decision-making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-rational Debate, edited by Nemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO.: Rienner. Levy, J. 2003. “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy.” In Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, edited by David O. Sears, 38-48. New York: Oxford University Press. Mandel, R. 1986. “Psychological Approaches to International Relations.” In Political Psychology, edited by Margaret Hermann, 251-278. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. McCrae, R., and P. Costa Jr. 2006. Personality in Adulthood: a Five-factor Theory Perspective. 2nd edition. New York: The Guilford Press. McDermott, R. 1998. Risk-taking in International Politics. Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. McDermott, R. 2004. Political Psychology in International Relations, 173-177. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. Mearns, D., and B. Thorne. 2000. Person-centred Therapy Today: New Frontiers in Theory and Practice. London: Sage. Meichenbaum, D. 2011. “Ways to Improve Political Decision-making: Negotiating Errors to be Avoided.” In Psychological and Political Strategies for Peace Negotiations: a Cognitive Approach, edited by Francesco Aquilar and Mauro Galluccio, 87-98. New York: Springer. Mintz, A. 1997. “Foreign Policy Decision-making: Bridging the Gap Between the Cognitive Psychology and Rational Actor Schools.” In Decision-making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate, edited by Nemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner. —. 2003. Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision-making. New York: Palgrave. —. 2003. “Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Poliheuristic Perspective.” In Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making, edited by Alex Mintz. New York: Palgrave. Mintz, A., and N. Geva. 1997. “The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making.” In Decision Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate, edited by Nemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner. Mintz, A., and K. De Rouen Jr. 2010. Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making. New York: Cambridge University Press. Morgan, T. C. 2004. “Rational Choice and Game Theoretic Approaches: Introduction.” In Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations, edited by Zeev Maoz et al., 33 MD.: Lexington Books.

276

Bibliography

Neale, M. A., and M. H. Bazerman. 1991. Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation. New York: Free Press. Neustadt, R. E., and E. R. May. 1986. Thinking in Time: the Uses of History for Decision Makers. New York: Free Press. Parker, I. 1992. Discourse Dynamics-critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology. London: Routledge. Post, J. 2003. The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders. Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press. Preston, Th. 2001. The President and his Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs. New York: Columbia University Press. Puúcaú, V. 2003. Negotiating with the European Union: Preparing the External Environment of Negotiation, vol. 3. Bucharest: Editura Economică. —. 2003. Negociind cu Uniunea Europeană. Pregătirea mediului intern de negociere, vol. 4. Bucharest: Editura Economică. —. 2005. Negociind cu Uniunea Europeană. Pregătirea mediului de negociere (2003-2004), vol. 5. Bucharest: Editura Economică. —. 2005. Negociind cu Uniunea Europeană. Comunicarea publică úi negocierea pentru aderare (2003-2004), vol. 6. Bucharest: Editura Economică. —. 2007. România spre Uniunea Europeană. Negocierile de aderare (2000-2004). Bucharest: Institutul European. —. 2008. Teme Europene. Cluj-Napoca: Eikon. —. 2013. EU Accession Negotiations (a Handbook). Vienna: Hulla & Co, Human Dynamics. Putnam, R. 1999. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Twolevel Games.” In Theory and Structure in International Political Economy, edited by Benjamin J. Cohen. Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T. Press. Ripley, B. 1995. “Cognition, Culture, and Bureaucratic Politics.” In Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation, edited by Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick Jude Haney, 85-98. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Rosati, J. A. 1987. The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and their Impact on Behaviour. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Ross, L., and R. E. Nisbett. 1991. The Person and the Situation. New York: McGraw Hill.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

277

Saikaly, R. 2009. Decision Making in US Foreign Policy: Applying Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model to the 2003 Iraq Crisis. Ph.D. diss., Kent State University. Sathasivam, K. 2003. “No Other Choice: Pakistan’s Decision to Test the Bomb.” In Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making, edited by Alex Mintz, 55-76. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Schelling, T. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Schultz, K. 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schwarz, N. 1990. “Feelings as Information: Informational and Motivational Functions of Affective States.” In Handbook on Motivation and Cognition: Foundation of Social Behaviour, edited by Edward T. Higgins and Richard M. Sorentino, vol. 2, 527-561. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Simon, H. 1957. Models of Man: Social and Rational. New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc. Snyder, R. C., and J. A. Robinson. 1961. National and International Decision-making: Toward a General Research Strategy Related to the Problem of War and Peace. New York: Institute for International Order. Steinbruner, J. D. 2002. The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis. New York, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sternberg, R. J. 2002. Why Smart People Can Be So Stupid. New Haven: Yale University Press. Stroebe, W., and M. Diehl. 1994. “Why Groups are Less Effective than their Members: on Productivity Losses in Idea-generating Groups.” In European Review of Social Psychology, edited by Wolfgand Stroebe, and Miles Hewstone, vol. 5, 271-303. Chichester: Wiley. Suedfeld, P., Tetlock, P. E., and S. Streufert. 1992. “Conceptual/integrative Complexity.” In Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis, edited by Charles P. Smith et al., 393-400. New York: Cambridge University Press. Suefeld, P., Cross, R. W., and M. Stewart. 2009. Indicators, Predictors and Determinants of Conflict Escalation and De-escalation: a Review of the Psychological Literature. D.R.D.C. Toronto Contractor Report CR-2009-074. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Defence R. & D. Canada. Suskind, R. 2004. The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Education of Paul O’Neil. New York: Simon & Schuster.

278

Bibliography

Sylvan, D. A., and D. Haddad. 1998. “Reasoning and Problem Representation in Foreign Policy: Groups, Individuals, and Stories.” In Problem Representation and Foreign Policy Decision Making, edited by Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sylvan, D. A. F., and J. F. Voss. 1998. Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tabossi, P., Bell, V. A., and P. N. Johnson-Laird. 1999. “Mental Models in Deductive, Modal, and Probabilistic Reasoning.” In Mental Models in Discourse Processing and Reasoning, edited by Gert Rickheit and Cristopher Habel, 299-331. Amsterdam: Elsevier. ‘T Hart, P. 1994. Groupthink in Government: a Study of Small Group and Policy Failure. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. —. 1997. “Foreign Policy-making at the Top: Political Group Dynamics.” In Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policymaking, edited by Paul ‘t Hart, Erik K. Stern and Bengt Sundelius. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ‘T Hart, P., Stern, E. K., and B. Sundelius. 1997. Beyond Groupthink: Politicial Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Taylor-Robinson, M., and S. Redd. 2003. “Framing the Poliheuristic Theory of Decision: the United Fruit Company and the 1954 US.led Cup in Guatemala.” In Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making, edited by Alex Mintz, 77-100. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Tetlock, P. E. 2006. Expert Political Judgement: How Good is It? How Can we Know? Princeton: Princeton University Press. Thaler, R. H., and C. R. Sunstein. 2008. Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press. Thompson, L. 2006. Mintea Юi Inima Negociatorului. Bucharest: Meteor Press. Thompson, L., Peterson, E., and L. Kray. 1995. “Social Context in Negotiations: an Information Processing Perspective.” In Negotiations as a Social Process, edited by Roderick Kramer and David Messick, 536. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage. Thompson, L., Neale, M., and Sinauceur, M. 2004. “The Evolution and Biases in Negotiation Research. An Examination of Cognition, Social Perception, Motivation and Emotion.” In The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture, edited by Michele J. Gelfand and Jeanne M. Brett, 7-44. Stanford Business Book: Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

279

Vertzberger, Y. Y. I. 1990. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision Making. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press. Walter, A. 2003. “Globalisation and Policy Convergence. The Case of Direct Investment Rules.” In Non-state Actors and the Authority in the Global System, coordinated by Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler, 51-73. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, e-Library. Weintraub, W. 1981. Verbal Behaviour: Adaptation and Psychopathology. New York: Springer. —. 2006. “Verbal Behaviour and Personality Assessment.” In The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, edited by Jerrold M. Post, 137-152. Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press. Wilson, S. R. 1992. “Face and Facework in Negotiation.” In Communication and Negotiation, edited by Linda L. Putnam and Michael E. Roof, 176205. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage. Winter, D. 2003. “Personality and Political Behaviour.” In Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, edited by David Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis, 477-508. New York: Oxford University Press. Woodward, B. 2006. State of Denial: Bush at War. Part III. New York: Simon & Schuster. Yetiv, S. 2004. Explaining Foreign Policy: US Decision Making and the Persian Gulf War. Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press. Zang, L. 2009. “New Directions in the Psychology of Decision Making.” In Encyclopedia of Psychology of Decision Making, edited by Denis Murphy and Daniel Longo, 15-21. New York Inc.: Nova Science Publishers.

Studies and Articles American Educational Research Association. 2006. “Standards for Reporting on Empirical Social Sciences Research.” Educational Researcher, vol. 35(6): 33-40. Adevărul de Cluj. 2004. Stereotipii despre România anilor ’90. Reporter Ilie Călin, February, 10. Adevărul de Harghita. 2001. Procesul de aderare–definit prin trei cuvinte: minte, management Юi resurse. Reporter Geta Du‫܈‬a, August 21. Allred, K. G., Mallozzi, J. S., Matsui, F., and C. P. Raia. 1997. “The Influence of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation Performance.”

280

Bibliography

Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 70(3): 175187. Anderson, P. A. 1981. “Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision Making.” American Journal of Political Science 25(4): 744-747. Astorino-Courtois, A., and B. Trusty. 2000. “Degrees of Difficulty: the Effect of Israeli Policy Shifts on Syrian Peace Decisions.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(3): 359-77. Barry, B., and R. L. Oliver. 1996. “Affect in Dyadic Negotiation: a Model and Propositions.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 67: 127-144. Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K., De Wall, N. C., and L. Zhang. 2007. “How Emotions Shape Behaviour: Feedback, Anticipation, and Reflection, Rather than Direct Causation?” Personality and Social Psychology Review 11: 167-203. Bazerman, M. H., and M. A. Neale. 1982. “Improving Negotiation Effectiveness under Final Offer Arbitration: the Role of Selection and Training.” Journal of Applied Psychology 67: 543-548. BBC. 2001. Gunar Lund: Cred că nimeni nu se aЮtepta ca România să facă progrese foarte rapide. Hour 21:00, reporter Ana Maria Bota, May 17. Benartzi, S., and R. H. Thaler. 1995. “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 73-92. February. Bendor, J., and Th. Hammond. 1992. “Rethinking Allison's Models.” American Political Science Review 86: 301-322. June. Ben-Yoav, O., and D. G. Pruitt. 1984. “Accountability to Constituents: a Two-edged Sword.” Organization Behaviour and Human Processes 34: 282-295. Blount, S., and R. P. Larrick. 2000. “Framing the Game: Examining Frame Choice in Bargaining.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 68(I): 1-12. Borgida, E., and R. E. Nisbett. 1977. “The Differential Impact of Abstracts vs. Concrete Information on Decisions.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 7: 258-271. Bottom, W. P., and A. Studt. 1993. “Framing Effects and the Distributive Aspect of Integrative Bargaining.” In Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process 56: 459-474. Bottom, W. P., and P. Paese. 1998. “False Consensus, Stereotypic Cues, and the Perception of Integrative Potential in Negotiation” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 27: 1919-1940.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

281

Brown, V. R., and P. B. Paulus. 2002. “Making Group Brainstorming More Effective: Recommendations from an Associative Memory Perspective.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 11: 208212. Brulé, D. J. 2005. “Explaining and Forecasting Leaders’ Decisions: a Poliheuristic Analysis of the Iran Hostage Rescue Decision.” International Studies Perspectives 6: 99-113. Burman, E. 1991. “What Discourse is Not.” Journal of Philosophical Psychology 4: 325-338. Calvert, R. L. 1985.“The Value of Biased Information: a Rational Choice Model of Political Advice.” The Journal of Politics 47: 530-555. June. Carnevale, P. J., and A. Isen. 1986. “The Influence of Positive Affect and Visual Access on the Discovery of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral Negotiations.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 37: 1-13. Carroll, J. S., Bazerman, M. H., and R. Maury. 1988. “Negotiator Cognitions: a Descriptive Approach to Negotiators’ Understanding of their Opponents.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 41: 352-370. Chapman, J. 2006. “Anxiety and Defective Decision Making: an Elaboration of the Groupthink Model.” Management Decision 44(10): 1391-1404. Christensen, J. E., and S. B. Redd. 2004. “Bureaucrats versus the Ballot Box in Foreign Policy Decision Making–an Experimental Analysis of the Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Poliheuristic Theory.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(1): 69-90. February. Costa, Jr., P. T., and R. R. McCrae. 1992. “Normal Personality Assessment in Clinical Practice: the NEO Personality Inventory.” Psychological Assessment 4: 5-13. Dacey, R., and L. J. Carlson. 2004. “Traditional Decision Analysis and the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(1): 38-55. February. D’Amato, A. A. 1967. “Psychological Constructs in Foreign Policy Predicitions.” Journal of Conflict Resolution XI(3): 294-311. De Dreu, C. K. W., Emans, B. J. M., and E. van de Vliert. 1992. “The Influence of Own Cognitive and Other’s Communicated Gain or Loss Frame on Negotiation Behaviour.” International Journal of Conflict Management 3(2): 115-132. De Dreu, C. K. W., Nauta, A., and E. van de Vliert. 1995. “Self-serving Evaluations of Conflict Behaviour and Escalation of the Dispute.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 25: 2049-2066.

282

Bibliography

De Dreu, C. K. W., and T. Boles. 1998. “Share and Share Alike or Winner Take All? The Influence of Social Value Orientation upon Choice and Recall of Negotiation Heuristics.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process 76: 253-276. De Dreu, C. K. W., Koole, S. L., and F. L. Oldersma. 1999. “On the Freezing and Seizing of Negotiator Inferences: Need for Closure Moderates the Use of Heuristics in Negotiation.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25: 348-363. De Dreu, C. K. W., Koole, S. L., and W. Steinel. 2000. “Unfixing the Fixed Pie: a Motivated Information-processing Approach to Integrative Negotiation.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79: 975987. de Grada, E., Kruglanski, A. W., Mannetti, L., and A. Pierro. 1999. “Motivated Cognition and Group Interaction: Need for Closure Affects the Contents and Process of Collective Negotiations.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 35: 346-365. De Rouen Jr., K. 1995. “The Indirect Link: Politics, Economics and US Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39(4): 671-695. Dodge, K. A. 2008. “Framing Public Policy and Prevention of Chronic Violence in American Youth.” The American Psychologist 63: 573590. Dodge, K. A., Bates, J. E., and G. S. Petit. 1990. “Mechanism in the Cycle of Violence.” Science 250: 1678-1683. Drezner, D. 2000. "Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy." American Journal of Political Science 44: 733-749. October. Duncan, L. E. 2005. “Personal Political Salience as a Self-schema: Consequences for Political Information Processing.” Political Psychology 26(6): 965-976. Dyson, S., and T. Preston. 2006. “Individual Distractions of Political Leaders and the Use of Analogy in Foreign Policy Decision Making.” Political Psychology 27: 265-288. Elgstrom, O., and M. Smith. 2000. “Negotiation and Policy-making in the European Union–Processes, Systems and Order.” Journal of European Public Policy 7(5): 673. Eshel, N., Nelson, E. E., Blair, J., Pine, D.S., and M. Ernst. 2007. “Neural Substrates of Choice Selection in Adults and Adolescence: Development of the Ventrolateral Prefrontal and Anterior Cingulates Cortices.” Neuropsychologia 45: 1270-1279. Evans, J. S. 1993. “The Cognitive Psychology of Reasoning: an Introduction.” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

283

Experimental Psychology Special Issue: The Cognitive Psychology of Reasoning 46: 561-567. Extranet Delega‫܊‬ia Comisiei Europene în România. 2004. Chat cu Multiplicatorii de Informaаie Europeană, January 26. Fagen, R. F. 1962. “Calculation and Emotion in Foreign Policy: the Cuban Case.” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. I(3): 214-221. Farnham, B. 2004. “Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-making.” Political Psychology 25: 441-463. June. Fischoff, B. 1983. “Predicting Frames.” Journal of Experimental Psychology 9: 103-116. Forgas, J. P. 1998a. “Asking nicely? The Effects of Mood on Responding to More or Less Polite Requests.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24(2): 173-185. —. 1998b. “On Feeling Good and Getting Your Way: Mood Effects on Negotiator Cognition and Bargaining Strategies.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74: 565-577. Friis, L., and A. Jarosz. 2000. ”When the Going Gets Tough: the E.U.’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland.” Journal of European Integration, University of Cambridge 23(1): 12-13. Gaenslen, F. 1986. “Culture and Decision-making in China, Japan, Russia and the United States.” World Politics 39(1): 78-103. Galinsky, A., and T. Mussweiller. 2001. “Promoting Good Outcomes: Effects of Regulatory Focus on Negotiation Outcomes.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81: 657-669. Galinsky, A., Seiden, V., Kim, P. and V. H. Medvec. 2002. “The Dissatisfaction of Having Your First Offer Accepted: Counterfactual Thinking in Negotiations.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28(2): 271-283. Garrison, J. A. 2001. “Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, his Advisers, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda.” Political Psychology 22(4): 775-807. George, A. L. 1969. “The Operational Code: a Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making.” International Studies Quarterly 13: 190-222. Geva, N., Mayhar, J., and J. M. Skorick. 2000. “The Cognitive Calculus of Foreign Policy Decision-making: an Experimental Assessment.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(4): 447-471. Gigerenzer, G. G., and D. G. Goldstein. 1996. “Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality.” Psychological Review 103: 650-669.

284

Bibliography

Gilovich, T. 1981. “Seeing the Past in the Present: the Effect of Associations to Familiar Events on Judgements and Decisions.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40: 797-808. Gilovich, T., Savitsky, K., and V. H. Medvec. 1998. “The Illusion of Transparency: Biased Assessment of Others’ Ability to Read One’s Emotional States.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 617-638. Goertz, G. 2004. “Constraints, Compromises and Decision Making.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(1): 14-37. Goldgeier, J. 1997. “Psychology and Security.” Security Studies 18(1): 79112. Greenstein, F. I. 1992. “Can Personality and Politics be Studied Systematically?” Political Psychology 13(1): 105-128. March. Hackman, J., and R. Wageman. 2007. “Asking the Right Questions about Leadership: Discussion and Conclusions.” The American Psychologist 62: 43-47. Hagan, J. 2001. “Does Decision Making Matter?” International Studies Review 3(2): 5-47. Hagan, J. D., Everts, P. P., Fukui, H., and J. D. Stempel. 2001. “Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise, and Anarchy.” International Studies 3(2): 169-216. Hagar, G., and T. Sullivan. 1994. “President-centred and Presidencycentred Explanations of Presidential Public Activity.” American Journal of Political Sciences 38(4): 1079-1083. November. Heide, J. B., and A. Miner. 1992. “The Shadow of the Future: Effects of Anticipated Interaction and Frequency of Contact on Buyer-seller Cooperation.” Academy of Management Journal 35: 265-291. Herman, M. 2001. “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: a Theoretical Framework.” International Studies Review 3(2): 47-82. Hermann, Ch. F., Gross Stein, J., Sundelius, B., and S. G. Walker. 2001. “Resolve, Accept, or Avoid: Effects of Group Conflict on Foreign Policy Decisions.” International Studies Review 3(2): 133-68. Hermann, M. G., Preston, Th., Korany, B. M., and M. T. Shaw, M. 2001. “Who Leads Matters: the Effects of Powerful Individuals.” International Studies Review 3(2): 83-132. Herrmann, R. K., Voss, J. F., Schooler, T. Y. E., and J. Ciarrochi. 1997. “Images in International Relations: an Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata.” International Studies Quarterly 41: 403-433. Hosoya, C. 1974. “Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-making System in Japan.” World Politics 26: 353-369.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

285

Holsti, O. R. 1976. “Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-making– Foreign Policy Actors Viewed Psychologically.” American Behavioural Scientist 20(1): 11-32. September/October. Houghton, D. P. 1996. “The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign Policy Situations.” British Journal of Political Science 26: 523-552. Houghton, D. 2008. “Invading and occupying Iraq. Some Insights from Political Psychology.” Peace and Conflict 14: 169-192. Huth, P., Bennett, S., and C. Gelpi. 1992. “System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 36: 478-517. September. Huth, P., and B. Russett. 1993. “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models.” The American Political Science Review 87: 61-73, March. Ikenberry, G. J. 2002. “America’s Imperial Ambition.” Foreign Affairs 81(5): 44-60. September/October Indigo. 2001. Reporter Cecilia Caragea, August. Ireland, M., and G. Scott. 2001. “Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45: 547-568. Jackman, R. W. 1993. “Rationality and Political Participation.” American Journal of Political Science 37(1): 279-90. Jervis, R. 1992. “The Political Implications of Loss Aversion.” Political Psychology 13: 187-204. —. 2006. “Understanding Beliefs.” Political Psychology 27(5): 641-663. Jones, E. 2003.” Idiosyncrasy and Integration: Suggestions from Comparative Political Economy.” Journal of European Public Policy 10(1): 140-158. February. Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: an Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” Econometrica 47: 263-291. Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., and R. H. Thaler. 1991. “Anomalies: the Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 193-206. Winter. Keane, M. T., Ledgeway, T., and S. Duff. 1994. “Constraints on Analogical Mapping: a Comparison of Three Models.” Cognitive Science 18: 387-438. Keller, Jonathan W. 2005. “Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis Behaviour: a Contingent Monadic Peace?” International Studies Quarterly 49(2): 205-31.

286

Bibliography

Keller, J. W., and Y. E. Yang. 2008. “Leadership Style, Decision Context, and the Poliheuristic Theory of Decision Making: an Experimental Analysis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(5): 687-712. Kelly, J. R., and S. G. Barsade. 2001. “Mood and Emotions in Small Groups and Work Teams.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 86(1): 99-130. September. Kelman, H. C. 2008. “Evaluating the Contributions of Interactive Problem Solving to the Resolution of Ethnonational Conflict.” Peace and Conflict 14: 28-59. Keysar, B., Ginzel, L. E., and M. H. Bazerman. 1995. “States of Affair and States of Mind: the Effect of Knowledge about Beliefs.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process 64: 283-293. Kinder, D. R., and J. A. Weiss. 1978. “In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives of Foreign Policy Decision-Making.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 22(4): 707-735. December. Kinne, B. J. 2005. “Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: a Poliheuristic Perspective.” International Studies Perspectives 6: 114128. Kirschner, P. A., Sweller, J., and R. E. Clark. 2006. “Why Minimal Guidance during Instruction Does Not Work: an Analysis of the Failure of Constructivist, Discovery, Problem-based, Experiential and Inquiry-based Teaching.” Educational Psychologist 41: 75-86. Knetsch, J. L. 1989. “The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves.” The American Economic Review 79: 1277-1284. December. Korhonen, P., Oretskin, N., Teich, J., and J. Wallenius. 1995. “The Impact of a Biased Starting Position in a Single Negotiation Text Type Mediation.” Group Decision and Negotiation 4: 357-374. Kowert, P., and M. Hermann. 1997. “Who Takes Risks? Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41: 611-37. October. Kramer, R., Newton, E., and P. Pommerenke. 1993. “Self-enhancement Biases and Negotiator Judgement: Effects of Self-esteem and Mood.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 56: 110133. Kramer, R., Pommerencke, P. and E. Newton. 1993. “The Social Context of Negotiation: Effects of Social Identity and Accountability on Negotiator Judgement and Decision-making.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37: 633-654.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

287

Kray, L. J., Thompson, L., and A. Galinsky. 2001. “Reversing the Gender Gap in Negotiations: an Exploration of Stereotype Regeneration.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80: 942-958. Kronzon, S., and J. Darley. 1999. “Is this Tactically Ethical? Biased Judgements of Ethics in Negotiation.” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 21(I): 49-60. Kuklinski, J., Luskin, R., and J. Bolland. 1991. “Where is Schema? Going Beyond the ‘S’ Word in Political Psychology.” American Political Science Review 85(4): 1341-1356. Lau, R., and J. Levy. 1998. “Contribution of Behavioural Decision Theory to Research in Political Science.” Applied Psychology 47(1): 29-44. Legro, J. W. 2000. “The Transformation of Policy Ideas.” American Journal of Political Science 44(3): 419-432. July. Lerner, J., and D. Keltner. 2001. “Fear, Anger and Risk.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81: 146-159. Levy, J. 1992. “An Introduction to Prospect Theory.” Political Psychology 13(2): 171-186. —. 1994. “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.” International Organization 48(2): 279-312. Loewestein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., Welch, N. 2001. “Risks as Feelings.” Psychological Bulletin 127: 267-286. MacDonald, P. 2003. “Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: the Competing Epistemo-logical Foundations of Rational Choice Theory.” American Political Science Review 97(4): 551-565. Marfleet, B. G. 2000. “Symposium At-a-distance Psychological Assessment: the Operational Code of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis: a Comparison of Public and Private Rhetoric.” Political Psychology 21(3): 545-58. Markman, K., and P. Tetlock. 2000. “‘I Couldn’t Have Known’: Accountability, Foreseeability, and Counterfactual Denials of Responsibility.” British Journal of Social Psychology 39(3): 313-325. McDermott, R., and J. Kugler. 2001.“Comparing Rational Choice and Prospect Theory Analyses: the U.S. Decision to Launch Operation ‘Desert Storm’, January 1991.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 24: 49-85. September. McKeown, T. 2001. “Plans and Routines, Bureaucratic Bargaining, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Journal of Politics 63: 1163-1190. Mintz, A. 1993. “The Decision to Attack Iraq: a Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37: 595-618. —. 1995. “The Noncompensatory Principle of Coalition Formation.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 7(3): 335-349.

288

Bibliography

—. 2004. “How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48: 3-13. —. 2005. “Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and National Security Decisions.” International Studies Perspectives 6: 94-98. —. 2007. “Why Behavioural I.R.?” International Studies Review 9(1): 157-162. Morris, M. W., Larrick, R. P., and S. K. Su. 1999. “Misperceiving Negotiation Counterparties: When Situationally Determining Bargaining Behaviours are Attributed to Personality Traits.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77: 52-67. Mowle, Th. S. 2003. “Worldviews in foreign policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict.” Political Psychology 24(3): 561-92. Neale, M. A. 1984. “The Effect of Negotiation and Arbitration Cost Salience on Bargainer Behaviour: the Role of Arbitrator and Constituency in Negotiator Jjudgement.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process 34: 97-111. Neale, M. A., and M. H. Bazerman. 1983. “The Role of Perspective Taking Ability in Negotiating under Different Forms of Arbitration.” Industrial and Labour Relations Review 36: 378-388. Northcraft, G. B., and M. A. Neale. 1986. “Opportunity Costs and the Framing of Resources Allocation Decisions.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process 37: 348-356. Northcraft, G.B., and M. A. Neale. 1987. “Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: an Anchoring-and-adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 39: 84-97. Novick, L. R. 1988. “Analogical Transfer, Problem Similarity, and Expertise.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 14: 510-20. Ochsner, K. M., and J. J. Gross. 2005. “The Cognitive Control of Emotion.” Trends in Cognitive Science 9: 242-249. Pillutla, M. M., and J. K. Murnighan. 1996. “Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 68: 208-224. Pinkley, R. 1990. “Dimensions of Conflict Game: Disputant Interpretations of Conflict.” Journal of Applied Psychology 74: 117-126. Pinkley, R., and G. B. Northcraft. 1994. “Conflict Frames of References: Implications for Dispute Processes and Outcomes.” Academy of Management Journal 37(I): 193-205.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

289

Pinkley, R., Griffith, T. L., and G. B. Northcraft. 1995. “Fixed Pie A-lamode: Information Availability, Information Processing and the Negotiation of Suboptimal Agreements.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 37: 101-112. Preston, Th., and P. ‘t Hart. 1999. “Understanding and Evaluating Bureaucratic Politics: the Nexus between Political Leaders and Advisory Systems.” Political Psychology 20: 49-98. Pia‫܊‬a financiară. 2002. Sub semnul integrării: Extinderea UE, ultima sută de metri sau ultima Юansă? Reporter Alina Mihaela Dima, March. Radio France Internationale. 2003. Campanie de informare a cetăаenilor în legătură cu aderarea României la Uniunea Europeană, realized by Vasile Damian, July 15. Radio România Actualită‫܊‬i. 2001. 24 de ore, realized by Mariana Tomescu Vâlceanu, reporter Radu ‫܇‬arpe, July 27. —. 2001. 24 de ore, realized by Septimiu Roman, coresponden‫܊‬ă din Bruxelles, October 26. —. 2002. Cronica sonoră, reporter George Nu‫܊‬ă, February 19. —. 2001. Intenаiile Guvernului privind procesul de aderare, Show “Uniunea Europeană–de la vis la realitate”. Hour 12:04, realized by Dorina Zdroba, April 4. —. 2002. Seminarul privind viitorul UE, reporter Mădălina Andronescu– correspondence from Berlin, March 10. —. 2002. 24 de ore, realized by Mariana Tomescu Vâlceanu, correspondence from Bruxelles, reporter Lumini‫܊‬a Apostol, March 21. —. 2003. 24 de ore, realized by Mariana Tomescu-Vîlceanu, reporter Victor Caraculacu, January 7. —. 2003. Audierile în Parlament pentru validarea candidaturilor miniЮtrilor desemnaаi să facă parte din noul cabinet. Show “24 de ore”, realized by Sorina Man, June 18. —. 2003. Pulsul Zilei, realized by Dorina Zdroba, July1. —. 2003. Realized by Iana Ioni‫܊‬ă, July 10. —. 2003. Multiplicatorii de opinie europeană Юi participarea lor la pregătirea pentru aderare. Show “Cum comenta‫܊‬i actualitatea politică”, realized by Gabriela Langada, August 20. —. 2003. Cooperarea transfrontalieră–cheia unei Noi Europe, September 10. —. emisiunea „Cum comenta‫܊‬i actualitatea politică”, realizator Victoria Stângescu, 14 octombrie 2003 —. 2003. Radiojurnal, October 22. România 1 2003. May 9.

290

Bibliography

Rasler, K. A. 2000. “Shocks, Expectancy Revision and the De-escalation of Protracted Conflicts: the Israeli-Palestinian Case.” Journal of Peace Research 37(6): 699-720. Redd, S. B. 2002. “The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision Making: an Experimental Study.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(3): 335-64. —. 2005. “The Influence of Advisers and Decision Strategies on Foreign Policy Choices: President Clinton’s Decision to Use Force in Kosovo.” International Studies Perspectives 6: 129-150. Renshon, J., and S. Renshon. 2008. “The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making.” Political Psychology 29(4): 509-536. Richards, D. 2001. “Coordination and Shared Mental Models.” American Journal of Political Science 45(2): 259-76. Ritov, I. 1996. “Anchoring in Simulated Competitive Market Negotiation.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process 67: 16-25. Robinson, R. J., Keltner, D., Ward, A., and L.Ross. 1995. “Actual versus Assumed Differences in Construal: Naive Realism in Intergroup Perception and Conflict.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68: 404-417. Rosati, J. A. 2000. “The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics.” International Studies Review 2(3): 45-79. Rose, K., and C. Webb. 1998. “Analysing Data: Maintaining Rigour in Qualitative Study.” Qualitative Health Research Journal 8: 556-562. Ross, L., and C. Stillinger. 1991. “Barriers to Conflict Resolution.” Negotiation Journal 8: 389-404. Rothbart, M., and W. Hallmark. 1988. “In-group and Out-group Differences in the Perceived Efficacy of Coercion and Concilliation in Resolving Social Conflict.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 55: 248-257. Quattrone, G. A., and A. Tversky. 1988. “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice.” American Political Science Review 82: 719-736. September. Satterfield, J. M., and M. E. P. Seligman. 1994. “Military Aggression and Risk Predicted by Explanatory Style.” Psychological Science 5: 77-82. Schafer, M., and S. Crichlow. 2002. “The Process-outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision Making: a Qualitative Study Building on Groupthink.” International Studies Quarterly 46(1): 45-68. Shimko, K. L. 1994. “Metaphors and Foreign Policy.” Political Psychology 15(4): 655-71. December.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

291

Simon, H. 1985. “Human Nature in Politics: the Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science.” American Political Science Review 79: 293304. Simons, T. 1993. “Speech Patterns and the Concept of Utility in Cognitive Maps: the Case of Integrative Bargaining.” Academy of Management Journal 36(I): 139-156. Spellman, B., and K. Holyoak. 1992. “If Saddam Hussein is Hitler then who is George Bush? Analogical Mapping Between Systems of Social Roles.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62: 913-33. Stein, J. G. 1996. “Deterrence and Learning in an Enduring Rivalry: Egypt and Israel, 1948-1973.” Journal of Strategic Studies 6: 104-152. Sternberg, R. J. 2007. “A Systems Model of Leadership: WICS.” American Psychologist 62: 34-42. Taber, Ch. S. 1992. “POLI: an Expert System Model of US Foreign Policy Belief System.” American Political Science Review 86: 888-904. Taylor, S. E., and S. C. Thompson. 1982. “Stalking the Elusive Vividness Effect.” Psychological Review 32: 439-445. Telegraful de Constan‫܊‬a. 2002. Cititorii Telegrafului de Constanаa să doarmă liniЮtitаi, într-o dimineaаă se vor trezi în Uniunea Europeană, reporter Traian Gheorghe Horia, August 31. Thaler, R. H. 1980. “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice.” Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 1: 39-60. Thompson, L., and R. Hastie. 1990. “Social Perception in Negotiations.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process 47: 98-123. Thompson, L., Valley, K. L., and R. M. Kramer. 1995 “The Bittersweet Feelings of Success.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 31: 467-492. Thompson, L., and T. DeHarpport. 1998. “Social Judgement, Feedback, and Interpersonal Learning in Negotiation.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process 58: 327-345. Tversky, A. 1972. “Elimination by Aspects.” Psychological Review 79: 281-299. March. Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1981. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” Science 211(4481): 453-458. Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions." Journal of Business 59: 251-278. October. Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1991. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: a Reference-dependent Model." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 1039-1061. November. Vandenbrouke, L. S. 1984. “The 'Confessions' of Allen Dulles: New Evidence on the Bay of Pigs.” Diplomatic History 8: 365-376.

292

Bibliography

Voraurer, J. D., and S. Claude. 1998. “Perceived versus Actual Transparency of Goals in Negotiation.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24: 371-385. Walker, S. 1977. “The Interface Between Beliefs and Behaviour: Henry A. Kissinger’s Operational Code and the Vietnam War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 21: 129-168. Walker, S. G. 1995. “Psychodynamic Processes and Framing Effects in Foreign Policy Decision-making: Woodrow Wilson’s Operational Code.” Political Psychology 16: 697-717. Walker, S. G., Schafer, M., and M. D. Young. 1998. “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modelling Jimmy Carter’s Operational Code.” International Studies Quarterly 42: 175-190. Walker, S. G., Schafer, M., and M. D. Young. 1999. “Presidential Operational Codes and Foreign Policy Conflicts in the Post-Cold War World.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43(5): 610-625. Walker, S., and M. Schafer. 2000. “The Political Universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and his Advisers: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in their Operational Codes.” Political Psychology 21: 529-543. Waltz, B. K. 2000. “Structural Realism after the Cold War.” International Security 25(1): 1-33. White, S., Valley, K., Bazerman, M. H., Neale, M. A., and S. Peck. 1994. “Alternative Models of Price Behaviour in Dyadic Negotiations: Market Prices, Reservations Process and Negotiator Aspirations.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process 57: 430-447. Whyte, G., and J. Sebenius, 1997. “The Effect of Multiple Anchors on Anchoring in Individual and Group Performances.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process 69: 75-85. Wilson, D. S., Timmel, J. J., and R. R. Miller. 2004. “Cognitive Cooperation: When the Going Gets Tough, Think as a Group.” Human Nature 15(3): 225-250. Yetiv, S. A. 2003. “Groupthink and the Gulf Crisis.” British Journal of Political Science 33(3): 419-42. Young, M. D. 1996. “Cognitive Mapping Meets Semantic Networks.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 21: 129-168. Young, M., and M. Schafer. 1998. “Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relations.” Mershon International Studies Review 42: 63-96. Zagare, F. C. 1990. “Rationality and Deterrence.” World Politics 42(2): 238-260.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

293

Zhang, L., and R. F. Baumeister. 2006. “Your Money or your Self-esteem: Threatened Egotism Promotes Costly Entrapment in Losing Endeavours.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32: 881-893. Ziarul financiar. 2002. Parlamenul chemat să voteze de urgenаă legile integrării, February 18. Ziua Economică. 2003, reporter Varijan Vosganian, April 2.

Documents Conference regarding the International Day of the Volunteer, Voluntariatul în România Юi relaаia cu societatea civilă din Uniunea Europeană. 2001. Cluj-Napoca, December 3. Conference EU Enlargement: Linking Civil Society, the Citizen and the State. 2001. Berlin, November 22. GD no. 243, 2001, February 16 “Monitorul Oficial al României”, no. 194, March 1. Conference Migration in Europe 2001. Institute of International Sociology, Gorizia, September 17. Conference Noua abordare a negocierilor de aderare a României la Uniunea Europeană. 2001. Universitatea de Vară Izvorul Mure‫܈‬ului, August 17. The International Symposium “Romania and the E.U.”, Preparing Romania for accession to the E.U. 2001. Accademia di Romania, Rome, November 6.

Electronic Sources Comuniqué–Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington D.C. 2011. April 14-15. Accessed on February 20. http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx. Bean, M. 2010. The Effects of Personality and Uncertainty of the Decision-making Process and New Venture of South African Entrepreneurs. A research project of the University of Pretoria. Accessed 2012, February 22. upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/.../dissertation.pdf. Buzan, B. 1993. “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet English School.” International Organization 47(3): 327-352. Summer. Accessed 2012, January 20. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706979, [upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/.../dissertation.pdf].

294

Bibliography

Campanale, F., and B. Shakun. 1997. Behavioural Idiosyncracies and How They May Affect Investment Decision, 13-17. Accessed 2012, February 21. www.aaii.com/.../b... Devitt, S. 2009, Presidential Decision-making in International Crises. Case Studies in the Nixon, Carter and Reagan Administrations. M.A. thesis. Accessed 2012, March 3. www.hpu.edu/CHSS/.../2009SteveDevitt.pd… Findlay, S. D., and P. Thagard. 2011. “Emotional Change in International Negotiations: Analyzing the Camp David Accords Using Cognitiveaffective Maps.” Group Decision Negotiations, DOI 10.1007/s10726011-9242-x, Springer Science+Business Media B.V. Accessed 2012, January 21. cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/.../Findlay-Thagard.inte... Friedman, G., 2012. The Election, the Presidency and Foreign Policy. Accessed July 31. www.stratfor.com/.../election-presidency-an... Friedman, G. 2012. Character, Policy and the Selection of Leaders. Accessed September 4. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/characterpolicy-and-selection-leaders?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium= email&utm_campaign=20120904&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content= readmore&elq=225bf45626944151a89838cb2a72a22b. Goldstein, J., and J. Pevenhouse. 2006. “Foreign Policy.” International Relations. 7th Edition. Pearson, Longman. Accessed 2012, February 21. www.pearsonhighered.com/.../samplechapte... Grevi, G. 2009. “The Interpolar World: a New Scenario.” Occasional Paper 76. June. Accessed 2011, June 15. http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/the-interpolarworld-a-new-scenario/ Hermann, M. 1999. Assessing Leadership Style: a Trait Analysis. Columbus, OH.: Social Science Automation, Inc. Accessed 2010, August 10. http://www.socialscienceautomation.com/ Docs/LTA.pdf Holsti, O. R. 2004. Theories of International Relations. Accessed 2010, August 6. www.duke.edu/-p.feaver/holsti. Kahneman, D., and Rehnshon, J 2006. “Why Hawks Wins?” Foreign Policy: 34-38. Accessed 2012, February 3. www.foreignpolicy.com/.../why_hawks_wi... Kent, T. 2005. Politically Rational Foreign Policy Decision-making. Ph.D. diss., Kent State University. Accessed 2011, May 20. repository.tamu.ed... Keys, S. 2003. Idiosyncratic Person-centred Therapy. From the Personal to the Universal. PCCS Books. Accessed 2012, February 20. christianegeiser.ch/.../Rez_idiosyncratic.pdf.

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making

295

Mearsheimer, J. J. 1990. “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War.” Atlantic Monthly Online, August. Accessed 2012, February 21. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/mearsh.htm. Miller, R. W., and J. P. Miller. 2007. Leadership Styles for Success in Collaborative Work. Accessed 2012, February 3. www.leadershipeducators.org/.../Miller.pdf. Nye Jr., J. S. 1990. “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy 80: 153-171, Autumn. Accessed 2010, February 3. http://www. Jstor.org. Puúcaú, V. 2011. “Agenda europeană a Statelor Unite” Adevărul, on-line. Accessed May 22. http://www.adevarul.ro/adevarul_europa/Agenda_europeana__a__Stat elor_Unite_0_485351806.html. Raghubir, P., and S. R. Das. 2009. The Psychology of Financial Decision Making: a Case for Theory-driven Experimental Enquiry. Accessed 2012, February 3. citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/.../download?doi... Strathman, B. A. 2005. Who Advises? Power, Politics and Persuasion in Foreign Policy Decision-making. Ph.D. diss., Kent State University. Accessed 2011, May 25. etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Strathman%20Brent%20A.pdf?... Wilson, A. K. 2006. David Lange and the Anzus Crisis–an Analysis of the Leadership Personality and Foreign Policy. Ph.D. diss., University of Canterbury. Accessed 2012, January 20. ir.canterbury.ac.nz/.../1/thesis_fulltext.pdf.

INDEX

acceptability, 127 Accession Conferences, 195 accession negotiations, 192 accession process, 188 acquis communautaire, 190 actors-networks, 25 administration reform, 220 administrative, 183 administrative capacity, 215 American unipolarity, 18 analogical reasoning, 129 analogies, 2 anarchy, 88 anthropology, 8 arrangements, 38 authority, 25 autonomy, 26 balance, 35 balance of power, 6 banking systems, 14 bargaining, 69 behavioral international relations, 117 behavioral patterns, 2 beliefs, 7, 202 bipolar, 16 building trust, 188 bureaucracy, 103 bureaucratic bargaining, 93 bureaucratic negotiation, 93 bureaucratic policies, 6 Bureaucratic structures, 103 businesses, 19 candidate countries, 199 capitalism, 31 case study, 9 charismatic, 183 chicken game, 85 choices, 57

circumstances, 21, 209 civil society, 31 classification, 1 Coalitions, 63 cognitive approach, 7, 145 cognitive approaches, 3 cognitive calculations model, 149 cognitive consistency, 2 cognitive idiosyncrasies, 7 Cognitive idiosyncrasies, 160 cognitive limitations, 254 cognitive processes, 2 cognitive psychology, 2, 56 cognitive-affective maps, 227 collaborative style, 247 collaborative,, 183 collegial approach, 140 commercial, 3 commitments, 198 communism, 16 communitarian model, 20 community, 12 Competition, 24 competitive approach, 139 competitive policies, 29 competitiveness., 241 conceptual map, 228 conceptual maps, 168 conditionalities, 197 consensus, 2 constructivism, 25 contemporary international system, 5 contingent,, 183 convergence, 241 cooperative, 6 coordination, 72 Corporate strategies, 14 cosmopolitan, 42

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making Council of Ministers, 190 counseling system, 7 Counseling system, 138 crisis, 15 critical theory, 25 cross-border, 14 Cuban missile crisis, 138 cultural factors, 263 cultural interpenetration, 19 culture, 37 cybernetic model, 7 cybernetic paradigm, 117 decision- making process, 6 decisional checklists, 150 decisional style, 202 Decision-making models, 6 Decisions, 23 Decisions at the individual level, 2 democracy, 31 dependency, 52 derogations, 199 description, 206 developing economies, 14 development, 31 dialogue, 22 diplomatic management, 209 Discouragement, 100 discourse analysis, 4, 9 domestic context, 32 drugs, 19 economic interdependence, 19 economic power, 20 economic strength, 20 electoral politics, 6 elite, 6 emerging economies, 14 emerging markets, 23 Emotional (affective) idiosyncrasies, 176 emotional idiosyncrasies, 7 emotional indicator, 223 emotions, 57 endowment effect, 120 energy security, 47 environment, 19 EU enlargement, 198

297

European Commission, 190 European construction, 211 European Council, 197 European negotiations, 192 European Parliament, 197 European Union, 196 Europeanization process, 196 expertise, 205 explanations, 206 explanatory power, 7 federation, 17 feminism, 25 filters, 205 financial coordination, 22 financial markets, 19 financial reforms, 15 financial regulation, 22 financial system, 15 Foreign policy decisions, 62 foreign policy makers, 3 formalistic approach, 139 fractional power, 95 game of chess, 69 game theory, 76 geostrategic, 16 global agenda, 23 global citizens, 23 global civil society, 39 global economy, 15 global governance, 39 global power, 6 global social processes, 19 global system, 18 globalization itself, 18 globalized space, 20 globalized world, 16 governance, 31 government, 23 government policies models, 6 Governmental negotiations, 105 Governmental Policies Model, 103 great powers, 24 Group, 63 groupthinking, 7 hard power, 38 harmonize, 235

298 hegemony, 31 Heuristic, 56 high-level diplomacy, 2 holistic, 9, 36 human cognition, 3 human factors, 7 identitary approach, 18 identity, 10 ideological preferences, 6 idiosyncrasies, 1, 2 idiosyncrasies of social perception, 7 images, 2 Images, 167 implementation, 59 incrementalism, 92 Individual, 63 industrialized countries, 23 information, 37 information processing, 1 institutionalism, 35 institutionalized cooperation, 49 Instrumental beliefs, 235 integration, 23 integrative, 6 integrative theory, 58 intelligence, 2 intentionality, 29 interaction, 31 interactions, 6 interconnection, 42 interdependence theory, 26 interdependent network, 47 interdisciplinary approach, 8 interest, 2 interest groups, 6 Intergovernmental Conference, 190 intergovernmental organizations, 24 international, 22 international crisis, 6 international framework, 27 International institutionalism, 88 International negotiations, 251 international order, 47 international organization, 25 international politics, 27

Index international relations theory, 1 international scene, 2 international security, 20 international society, 38 international stability, 36 internationalization, 25 interpersonal negotiations, 58 interpersonal style, 202 interpolar system, 45 interpretation, 206 interpretive research, 9 inter-state negotiations, 33 interventionism, 61 intranational, 68 intranational relations, 112 intuitive, 8 involvement, 237 Islamic world, 19 isolationism, 61 knowledge, 8 language, 10 liberalization, 30 management, 46 market, 26 market democracy, 16 market economy, 212 Marxism, 25 meanings, 12 mechanistic approach, 18 Member States, 207 mental processes, 10, 58 mercantilism, 23 methodological paradigm, 8 migration, 47 Military action, 114 military force, 18 misperceptions, 2 Modernization, 37 motivational, 7 Motivational idiosyncrasies, 174 motivations, 2 multilateral institutions, 23 multinational corporations, 30 multipolar, 16 multipolar system, 24 nation, 1

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making national, 22 national capabilities, 34 national identity, 17 national interests, 29 nationalism, 16 nations, 3 nation-state, 19 negotiated environment, 97 negotiating parties, 188 negotiation methodology, 231 negotiation process, 102 negotiation simulations, 212 negotiation strategy, 210 negotiations, 69 negotiator, 183 Negotiator Model, 265 Neo-realist, 25 network of units, 6, 45 network system, 47 neuropsychology, 56 neutrality, 32 new world order, 49 non-compensatory principle, 126 non-governmental organizations, 30 normative theory, 80 nuclear weapons, 37 Operational Analysis Code, 172 operational codes, 2 organization, 3 organizational actor, 29 organizational behavior, 6, 90 organizational behavior model, 90 organizational culture, 94, 106 organizational parochialism, 107 organizational procedures, 98 organizational process, 94 organizational repertoires, 100 organizational theory, 94 peace, 27 perceptions, 2 personal characteristics, 199 personal values, 237 personality, 2, 7 phenomenology, 10 polarity, 5 policy flow, 132

299

policy makers, 22 policy options, 127 political flow, 133 political independence, 23 political science, 8 political system, 104 political units, 24 polyheuristic theory, 7, 126 population, 21 Position Papers, 190 postmodern, 3 postmodernism, 10 poststructuralism, 10 power, 2, 25 power cycle, 44 power cycle theory, 44 power of diversity, 42 power relations, 6, 45 power relationships, 12 prestige, 242 prisoner's dilemma, 85 private corporations actors, 30 professionalism, 237 prospect theory, 57 prospective theory, 7, 118 psycho-biographical analysis, 183 psychological approach, 1 psychological approaches, 135 psychological factors, 2 psychological profiles, 178 psychological profiling, 179 public finances, 15 public goods, 25 public opinion, 6 qualitative research, 5 quantitative research methods, 5 rational actor, 6 Rational Actor Model, 68 rational and objective decisions, 3 rational choice, 3 rational model, 2, 90 Rationality, 3 realpolitik, 85 reasons, 202 reciprocity, 57 reflexivity, 52

300 regional, 25 regional development, 223 regionalisation, 32 regionalism, 17 regulatory processes, 54 religion, 17 religious antagonism, 17 representation, 128 representations, 12 risk, 1 risk management, 15 role of states, 29 rules, 32 screening, 192 security, 3 security policy, 26 self-control, 57 self-interest, 29 sensitivity, 205 situational factors, 202 smart power, 38 social and cultural context, 8 social atomization, 20 social cohesion, 20 social construction of reality, 8 social constructions, 12 social context, 10 social factors, 3 social flexibility, 20 social interactions, 8 social model, 20 Social perception idiosyncrasies, 170 social psychology, 56 social relations, 20 social representations, 216 social sciences, 4 socialism, 17 society, 12 Sociology, 8 soft power, 37 sovereignty, 15, 26 space, 9 sphere of influence, 19 standard operating procedures, 68 standard operations, 119

Index state authority, 25 state system, 29 state-society complex, 29 statistical approach, 21 status quo, 121 stereotypes, 102 strategic regions, 6 strategic-relational model, 60 Structural changes, 35 structural policies, 15 structural power, 18 structure, 3 subjective elements, 4 subsidiarity, 55 superpower, 19 system, 38 system unit, 24 tactics, 173 technology, 37 terrorism, 47 The cybernetic model, 117 The multiple streams model, 132 The use of force, 113 think tanks, 32 time, 9 tooth for tooth, 85 trade, 19 trade strategy, 23 traditional, 183 training, 205 transactional, 183 transactions, 6, 45 transformation, 33 transformational, 183 transitional periods, 199 transnational corporations, 24, 30 transnational financial, 30 transnational organizations, 47 transnationally, 24 transposition of the acquis, 220 Treaty of Accession, 187 unipolar system, 16 unipolarity, 18 units, 1 universality, 55 urbanization, 37

Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making utility theory, 85 values, 22 verbal style, 165, 246 vulnerability, 15 win-win principle, 241

world order, 49 world politics, 2 world power, 19 world stage, 18

301