America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump 9781788319102, 9781784539986

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To my parents, wife, noor of my eyes, Elham and Husna, and, most importantly, the ordinary Afghans: who have received nothing from the four-decade-long war but an extraordinary amount of suffering, and who are ‘thirsty and hungry’ for peace and security.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research and writing of this book would have not been successfully completed without the essential and gracious support of many individuals. Special gratitude and personal thanks are due to all of them. I should like to express my sincerest gratefulness to my editor Tomasz Hoskins at I.B.Tauris. Without his unfailing support, guidance and patience this book would never have seen completion. Equally, I am grateful for the support provided by Arub Ahmed and Tia Ali at I.B.Tauris. I am thankful to the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, especially to Professors Anoush Ehteshami, Clive Jones, and most importantly, John Dumbrell. Professor John devoted a great deal of his precious time to reading and commenting upon this work and making many invaluable suggestions. Gratitude is also due to my school teachers in Afghanistan and to my lecturers at Bedford College, University of Northampton and UCL for their invaluable teachings and support throughout my student life. My research required many Afghan sources that were unavailable in the UK. I want to express my thanks and gratitude to those in Kabul (whom I cannot name for security reasons) for assisting me with arranging interviews with Afghans from all walks of life. I feel indebted to my all interviewees, particularly those ordinary Afghans who shared their views with me and allowed me to physically experience their lives – they are my inspiration, my heroes and heroines, and it is for them that I wrote this book. As I promised them, I stayed committed to voicing their concerns uncensored.

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Last but not least, my deepest appreciation goes to my family, my uncles Qazis Abdulrahman and Khalilurahman Momand, my sisters and brothers, and especially my parents, Qazi Hajji Asadullah and Bibi Hajji Dorani, for their continuous prayers, love, encouragement and unwavering moral and financial support, which have made it possible for me to accomplish one of my main goals. I am and will always remain grateful to my wife for her thoughtfulness, patience, endurance, understanding, and unstinting support. This book could have not been completed without her unwavering support. I am truly blessed to have her and my two beautiful children in my life.

INTRODUCTION

Walking among hundreds of men, women and children at freezing dawn in 1994 to take ourselves from the war zone in Makroyan to the safety of Khair Kha¯na, an elderly man pointed to concrete walls with large gates and told my grandfather, ‘Peace and security will come when those gates reopen.’ The gates belonged to the American Embassy in Kabul and had remained shut since the killing of its Ambassador Adolph Dubs in 1979. The Afghans, to say the least, had been disappointed in America for having abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Mujahedeen toppled the communist government of President Mohammad Najibullah. Seven years later, in 2001, not only did the gates reopen, but also thousands of United States (US) troops entered Afghanistan as part of President George W. Bush’s Global War on Terror (GWOT). Whether the elderly man remained alive from the Mujahedeen’s brutal civil war of 1992–6, which killed tens of thousands of Afghans, is unknown, but what is known is that most Afghans, following the American intervention, were profoundly hopeful. Western leaders, especially President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, repeatedly told the Afghans that the international community would never again leave Afghanistan alone, that the Taliban was history, and that instead the international community would assist the Afghans to form a government with strong institutions to establish peace, prosperity, stability and democracy. The new Afghan Government would be strong enough to free the Afghans from the evil forces of civil war, terrorism, criminality and abuse of power by the strongmen (or warlordism),

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unlawfulness, a weak state/ineffective governance, the tolerance of corruption, opium production/addiction, regional interference, oppression of women, poverty and unemployment, to name but a few. Though the Afghans have always been sensitive to invading powers, they did not turn against the American presence on their soil in the first few years of the intervention. Having had been sick and tired of the above wicked forces in the past two-and-a-half decades, they embraced the US anti-terrorism war. More than 16-and-a-half years later, in May 2018, however, Afghanistan seems to have gone from bad to worse. Not only have the Taliban, the Haqqani network and Al Qaeda made a successful comeback, but also the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has gained a foothold in the country. Insurgents are present in more than half of Afghanistan’s 398 districts, and the United Nations (UN) has rated them as having a substantial, high or extreme level of risk. Several provinces are in danger of falling to the Taliban. After months of advancing, the Taliban managed to take control of Kunduz twice, in September 2015 and again in September 2016, until they were driven back by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The hostilities in 2015 alone left at least 3,500 Afghan civilians dead and 7,500 wounded – and another 10,453 civilians injured or killed in 2017.1 What I call the powerful syndicate – composed of warlords, strongmen, drug lords, land-grabbers, smugglers, criminals, thieves and some wealthy individuals – has spread its roots in all three branches of the government and has almost become a state within a state. President Ashraf Ghani estimates its net value to be approximately $20 billion.2 Its wealth and influence have enabled the syndicate to have democracy in hand and make it dance the way it wants to. Opium production rose from 185 tonnes in 2001 to 8,200 tonnes in 2007. Opium harvest showed an increase of 43 per cent in 2016 compared to 2015. Afghanistan is turning into a narco-state, in which many members of the powerful syndicate as well as regional elements, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, in particular, are reportedly involved in the illegal drug trade.3 In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index list of 2017, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Afghanistan remained among the most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption has become part

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of Afghanistan’s culture. In 2017 Afghanistan stayed on the UN’s list of the poorest of the poor countries. If it was not for donor inflows to cover the account deficit of more than 50 per cent of the GDP every year, Afghanistan’s economy would collapse.4 As recently as May 2018, 54 per cent of Afghans live under poverty line.5 More than 40 per cent – some even estimate the actual figure to be around 70 per cent: nine million out of the 14 million workforce6 – are unemployed. One hundred to 1,500 young Afghans have left Afghanistan daily in the past few years for Iran, Pakistan and Western countries to find work or, at the very least, be safe from the suicide attacks or the collateral damage of the war between the insurgent groups and the ANSF. In 2015, about 178,230 Afghans applied for asylum in Europe. Lack of employment caused many young Afghans to escape reality and take drugs. Drug addiction had soared three-and-a-half-fold since 2009, from one million addicts to almost three-and-a-half million.7 Some Afghans had been hopeful for the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) led by the Western-educated academic President Ghani and the high-ranking member of the Northern Alliance Abdullah Abdullah. But their hopes have been dashed by the President and the Chief Executive Abdullah’s never-ending haggling and bickering over the share of government seats and policy choices. The NUG has not yet delivered on almost 90 per cent of its promises.8 Given the internal division, wavering international support and, most importantly, the Pakistani Army’s increasing backing of the insurgent groups, ordinary Afghans believe the NUG would never be able to fulfil its pledges, which amounted to the provision of social, political, economic and physical security to the Afghans.9 To all intents and purposes, the NUG has remained ineffective: a government perceived by many Afghans to be worse than its predecessor. What is more disturbing is that Afghanistan has been once again turned into a platform on which the regional and international powers compete for influence. Ironically, it is as if history has repeated itself. As they did in 1979–92 and 1992–2001, the Afghans now carry out the fighting of regional and international players. Afghanistan has become a battlefield between neighbouring countries in which daily ten to fifteen mothers receive the coffins of their sons who serve in the ANSF – and perhaps the same number, if not more, Afghan parents mourn the deaths of their insurgent sons.10 Since Pakistan’s military establishment

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would not back down from supporting the insurgency, and the international community would not provide sufficient resources to the NUG, the Afghanistan War has led to a stalemate. In the past ten years, I have spent a lot of time in Afghanistan and met Afghans from all walks of life. Never have I seen the Afghans as despairing as they are today, especially after former US Secretary of State John Kerry ‘imposed’ on them the ‘undemocratic’ NUG in contradiction of the Afghan Constitution. Ordinary Afghans are concerned about whether their family members will be caught next in the Taliban’s suicide attacks or the US/Afghan Government’s bombardments. The poor are worried about whether their children will die from hunger, while the wealthy are concerned about whether their sons or daughters will be kidnapped next. A few are optimistic about the future. The subject matter of most discussions in Afghanistan is how to get out of the country. More than 16-and-a-half years after the US and the allies intervened in Afghanistan, hope, stability and peace have yielded to despair, insecurity and ‘civil’ war. As Afghanistan’s security situation worsened, more and more Afghans, including former President Hamid Karzai, began to believe in conspiracy theories. They attach various possible motives to US involvement in Afghanistan, all of which require an unstable Afghanistan. The causes ranged from creating a military balance in the region against Russia, China and India’s rising military and economic capabilities and powers, primarily to curb China and Russia’s influence in Central Asia and the Caucuses, to being in close proximity to Iran so that the US could keep a close watch on the latter. From the US secretly working with Pakistan to destabilise Afghanistan and to hand over the Afghanistan’s Pashtun belt to Pakistan, to the US working with India and Afghanistan to destabilise the entire region, Pakistan in particular, in order to counter the Chinese naval presence in Gwadar, seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and break up Pakistan; one such policy was argued by Pakistani officials to be the provision of support to Baloch insurgencies. From obtaining better access to the oil and natural gas resources of Central Asia to exploiting an estimated $1 – 3 trillion untapped mineral deposits of Afghanistan. And from capitalising on Afghanistan’s illicit drugs worth about $70 billion per year on the streets of Europe to having access to the oil of Iran.

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I met with Afghans from all walks of life, including many government officials, watched hundreds of Afghan political programmes and read an equal number of books and articles, and found the conspiracy theories to be wide and nationwide in Afghanistan (and in Pakistan); even certain US policy makers and area experts admitted their presence. The Afghans found it difficult to buy into the assertion that the most powerful country in the world, the US, was unable to stabilise Afghanistan. A few thousand Taliban were ‘nothing to defeat’ for America; it could ‘get rid of them in a week’, Afghan interviewees often told me. ‘But America wouldn’t do so because the Taliban works for America’, they would add. For the Afghans, America pursued the strategy of ‘divide and rule’ to justify its strategically significant presence in Afghanistan. President Karzai was convinced that the US wanted to weaken Afghanistan to create many small states in its place, and hence it (and the UK) radicalised the Pashtun.11 The US and the allies have lost more than 3,400 of their soldiers – at least 2,350 are American – in Afghanistan and provided well beyond $115 billion in development assistance. They have assisted the Afghans to make many unprecedented achievements in politics (such as institution-building), the economy, human rights, education, telecommunications, construction, health care and free media, to name but a few. The US and the allies continue to pay more than $8 billion annually in military and civilian aid. Why, then, are America (and the allies) perceived with a suspicious eye in Afghanistan (and Pakistan)? The answer is that the Afghans are blinded to the aforementioned achievements and distrust America because their grand desire of peace and security has not been achieved. One ordinary Afghan described the need to me succinctly: ‘We can stay without food, but no longer without peace and security.’ The Afghans, including Karzai (as well as many Westerners), have numerous unanswered questions about American involvement in Afghanistan, which boil down to the following six. (1) What were US motives in Afghanistan? (2) If they were to establish a secure and peaceful Afghanistan, why did it fail?

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(3) If ineffective governance was to blame for the failure, as most US politicians told the Afghans, why did the US support policies that visibly bolstered bad governance and pushed Afghanistan towards instability? (4) If the Pakistani Army’s support for the insurgency was to blame for the failure, as most US politicians gave it as an excuse, why did the US with all its extraordinary capabilities not decisively deal with Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism? (5) If Afghanistan’s ‘inherent characteristics’ were to blame, as many US policy makers implied, why was there peace and security during the 40-year era of King Zahir Shah? (6) Why did ‘bewildering’ changes take place in American Afghan policy over the course of 16-and-a-half years? The last two questions require clarification. The inborn Afghan characteristics/complexities/differences, as US policy makers invoked, encompassed Afghanistan suffering deeply from decades of civil war, religious extremism, drug mafia, neighbouring interference (Pakistani in particular, with which Afghanistan shared 2,500 miles of porous border), poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and the presence of different ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, tribal, and political groups, who ‘had not been getting on’ with each other for centuries. These groups were backed by regional countries for their own conflicting interests. In addition, as explained in Chapter 6, the Barack Obama Administration invoked ineffective governance, insufficient ANSF, and having an insurgency (the Taliban) that was indigenous and from the largest ethnic group (Pashtun) while the Kabul Government was largely being ‘made up of minorities’. These inborn characteristics, in many policy makers’ opinion, were a major source of conflict, or the ‘civil war’. With regard to question six, as part of its GWOT, the Bush Administration intervened in Afghanistan in early October 2001, and only in June 2011 did the Obama Administration decide to begin to end US involvement in Afghanistan. Due to the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, Obama made some alternations to US Afghan policy in mid-2016 to delay the planned US withdrawal. President Donald Trump’s South Asia strategy in the region brought further changes to US Afghanistan policy. During these 16-and-a-half years, the US policy towards Afghanistan therefore experienced a number of

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changes, evolving from a policy of ‘abandonment’ prior to the 9/11 terrorist acts to a military ‘intervention’; from a ‘counterterrorism’ to a ‘counter-insurgency’ strategy; from ‘rooting out’ terrorism to ‘containing’ it; from treating the Taliban as ‘terrorists’ and consequently the ‘enemy’ to declaring them as ‘non-terrorists’ and thus ‘not enemy’; from the goal of ‘defeating’ the Taliban to ‘degrading’ them; from seeing Afghanistan as having ‘compelling’ relevance to US national security interests to seeing it as having ‘minimal’ importance; and from intending to spend as long as it took to secure a ‘democratic’ and ‘strong’ Afghanistan to the objective of establishing a ‘good enough’ state so that the US could have a quick exit. As pointed out above, these policy changes have ‘confused’ the Afghans (and Westerners alike), including former president Karzai.12 Many Afghans, for example, asked that if the US intervened in Afghanistan to destroy terrorism, then why did it leave now when, in fact, there were more terrorist groups? This book is written to address the wave of concerns ordinary Afghans (and many Westerners) have about US involvement in Afghanistan, and therefore seeks to offer answers to the six questions highlighted above. The overall aim is to provide a rich-in-detail analysis of American foreign policy towards Afghanistan from the start of the Bush Administration to the first 16 months of the Trump Administration. To fulfil the aim, six decisions – made by extensive decision making in Washington, DC, over the course of 16-and-a-half years – are identified and made subject to analysis. These six decisions, each of which marked a key developmental turning point in American Afghan policy, are as follows. Following the 9/11 terrorist atrocities, the first decision in late 2001 produced the resulting GWOT policy, with its first stop or intervention being Afghanistan. The second turning point occurred when the Bush Administration, having toppled the Taliban regime, made the decision in early 2002 to employ a counterterrorism strategy. The strategy essentially lasted for almost the entire length of the Bush Administration. The third turning point took place when Obama in late 2009 endorsed the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, and ‘approved’ a counter-insurgency strategy. The decision not only signified a key turning point, but also showed the debate over the Afghanistan War in a different light. In June 2011, Obama made the

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decision to withdraw the 30,000 US troops by the end of 2012, and the rest by 2014. The decision seemed to mark the beginning of the end of the US’s longest war, the Afghanistan War, highlighting another turning point in US Afghan policy. While most, if not all, US forces would leave by the end of 2014, the decision set out US long-term policy for the remainder of Obama’s second term in office. The penultimate turning point was reached when Obama made some changes to American Afghan strategy in mid-2016 to delay the US exit. Trump coming into office and his aggressive posture against ‘Radical Islamic Terrorism’, including his strategy for South Asia in August 2017 that encompassed Afghanistan, materialised the final turning point. The Foreign Policy Decision-Making Approach from Foreign Policy Analysis13 is used to find out what US Afghan policy towards Afghanistan was at each turning point (or decision), and how and why it was made. It further analyses why and how the policy failed or, on occasions, succeeded, once it met reality in Afghanistan. The roles of personal beliefs and images of policy makers, especially of Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump, bureaucratic positions of policy makers, domestic factors or influences and ‘false policy assumptions’ in the decision making process are explored. Domestic factors include the responses of Congress, the media, area experts, and ordinary Americans who would jointly form the public debate, which in turn help shed light on the context the policy makers operated in. The term ‘process’ is defined as ‘the steps and tasks performed by a group that lead to a decision or policy choice being made’.14 In simple terms, however, ‘process’ means the way a decision was formed: who said what, how and why when the policy was made. To provide a unique, broader and original understanding of American foreign policy making towards Afghanistan, the process of each of the six decisions on Afghanistan is divided into four phases: initiation, formulation, implementation, and evaluation. In the initiation phase, the focus is on domestic factors or influences that brought the issues to the attention of the policy makers, giving an understanding of who the key players are, why they push a particular recommendation/proposal/view, and how they do so. In the formulation phase, the book focuses on how and why the policy or decision was made, who said what, how and why (who made what contribution), and what the end policy became. This phase has a subjective outlook, as it tries to

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understand the perceptions of those who are involved in policy making, and attempts to re-create their definition of the situation. For the implementation phase, the book shifts its focus to what happened after the policy was translated into action in the theatre of war in Afghanistan as well as Washington, DC. Was the policy successful? If not, why not? Here the analysis is objective, explaining why and how policy assumptions proved inaccurate (or accurate) and how those failures (or successes) impacted decision making in Washington, DC. In the evaluation phase, the views, reviews and recommendations of each of the decisions by Congressional committees, area experts, media and the general American public are considered. Ordinary Afghans’ views are also subject to analysis at this stage. While the book analyses all four phases of each of the six key developmental turning points or decisions, the formulation and implementation phases are given special attention due to their being capable of offering a more comprehensive analysis of American policy making towards Afghanistan. It is important to mention what this book does not try to do. The book does not directly offer answers to the above six questions. It is equally not the direct intention of this study to deal with conspiracy theories discussed above, as the book is primarily occupied with American foreign policy decision making towards Afghanistan. By analysing the decision making processes of the six decisions, however, the book indirectly provides answers to the six questions, as well as explains what the driving force behind the American foreign policy towards Afghanistan from its intervention in 2001 to Trump’s South Asia policy in 2017 has been. Over the course of ten years’ research, I consulted hundreds of primary and secondary sources for this book, both Afghan and English. During research, I noticed that Western perspectives had formed most opinions and interpretations of events in Afghanistan. These opinions and perspectives – in many cases ignorant of the social, political, cultural and religious realities of Afghanistan – in turn influenced decision making in Washington, DC. Through the ‘implementation and evaluation phases’ of decision making, or through the theme of ‘false policy assumptions’, I, on the other hand, drew extensively on Afghan viewpoints, as I was fortunate enough to have command of both Pashto and Dari languages.

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For Afghan sources, I have spent a lot of time in Afghanistan in the past ten years, conducting dozens of what I call ‘over-the-tea’ talks with middle-range officials from the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, as well as having conversations with hundreds of ordinary Afghans. Most of the officials spoke on condition of anonymity. The Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan enabled me to access Presidents Karzai and Ghani’s speeches, interviews and statements. I also read many Afghan textbooks and watched hundreds of programmes by the BBC World Service in Pashto and Persian, Radio Television Afghanistan, Ariana Television Network, TOLOnews and Lemar TV. These programmes not only broadcast ordinary Afghans’ opinions, but also allowed the area experts and government officials to express their viewpoints. For materials in English, I combed through hundreds of sources, including classified documents published by WikiLeaks; published memoirs by the officials from the Bush and the Obama Administrations, which had covered the decision making process for almost all of the six decisions; public records, that is, countless statements, interviews, speeches and policy briefs, which officials from the Bush, Obama and Trump Administrations had made in relation to Afghanistan; Congressional hearings as well as opinions, statements, media interviews and policy suggestions by Congressional members; newspapers and magazines, especially those by the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal and Foreign Affairs; and books and academic articles by scholars and area experts. The structure of this book proceeds chronologically in the hope to provide a clear and accessible narrative of US foreign policy making analysis towards Afghanistan. The book has 13 chapters. The initiation and formulation stages of the GWOT, which resulted in the decision to intervene in Afghanistan in late-2001, are the subject of Chapters 1 and 2, respectively. Chapter 2 also covers decision making for the Bush Administration’s counterterrorism strategy. Chapter 3 provides an insider’s insight into Bush’s War Cabinet – parenthetically, by ‘War Cabinet’ the book means the Principals Committee, as the US does not have a War Cabinet as such. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the GWOT strategy, and its derivative, the counterterrorism strategy, at the implementation and evaluation stages between 2003 and 2008 in both Afghanistan and Washington, DC.

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With Obama coming into office in 2009, the book moves to decision making during the Obama Administration. While Chapters 6 and 8 dedicate themselves to the analysis of Obama’s surge decision in late 2009 to deploy 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan as part of his Af-Pak policy at the initiation and formulation phases, respectively, Chapter 7 offers an insider’s insight into Obama’s War Cabinet. Chapter 9 examines Obama’s Af-Pak strategy at the implementation phase in 2010–11 in both Afghanistan and Washington, DC. Chapter 10 covers the Af-Pak strategy at the evaluation phase, as well as studying the formulation of the withdrawal decision Obama made in 2011. Chapter 11 analyses the withdrawal decision at the implementation phase in Afghanistan in 2011– 16 as well as studying Obama’s final policy alternations in mid-2016. Trump’s radical views and his South Asia strategy that incorporated the Afghanistan War in 2017– 18 are covered in Chapters 12 and 13, respectively.

CHAPTER 1 THE INTERVENTION DECISION AT THE INITIATION STAGE

When the White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr informed President George W. Bush that the United States of America (US) was under attack because a second plane hit the second tower, Bush was infuriated that someone had dared to attack America. He made up his mind at that moment that the US was going to war. Later that morning in his first conversation with Vice-President Dick Cheney, Bush declared that the US was at war. A moment later, Bush told some of his staff in Air Force One that the US was at war, and when he found out who the perpetrators were, they were not going to ‘like’ Bush as president.1 This declaration also allowed Article II of the American Constitution to kick in, giving the president wartime powers as a commander-inchief. It was an extraordinary announcement, not just because of Article II or because Bush made it spontaneously and in the heat of the moment without consulting anyone from his War Cabinet, but because it was a break with US past, which had treated terrorist acts as a criminal or a law enforcement action. Bush regarded the 9/11 attacks as an act of war because Al Qaeda managed to kill thousands in a few hours. Al Qaeda’s objective was ‘mass murder’ and, in the light of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of rogue states, Al Qaeda could – and did – manage to achieve its aims. The killing of thousands and, if involving some forms of WMD, possibly hundreds of thousands did amount to an act of war.2

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On the same day at 3:30 p.m. via a video conference Bush called his first National Security Council (NSC) meeting following the terrorist attacks from Nebraska. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet told him that all the signs – known Al Qaeda members on the planes, Al Qaeda operatives being ‘picked’ up by intelligence monitoring congratulating each other, and only Al Qaeda being capable of such ‘sophisticated’ and coordinated attacks – linked the attacks to Al Qaeda based in Afghanistan. Bush declared he would not send a milliondollar missile to hit a five-dollar tent, but rather respond deliberately, forcefully and effectively by involving US ground forces. He was to start the war on the offensive by attacking the terrorists overseas before they could attack the US again at home.3 This policy, again made impetuously, would become known as the Bush Doctrine of ‘preventative self-defence’. Bush maintained that the US would not distinguish between terrorists and those who harboured them. This policy would become known as the Bush Doctrine of ‘no distinction’. By inventing the doctrine, Bush wanted to overturn the policy of the past, which treated terrorist groups as ‘distinct’ from their sponsors.4 Both the articulation of war and the invention of the doctrines of no distinction and preventative self-defence informed US foreign policy for years to come, and potentially put the US at war with a ‘faceless’ enemy scattered around many dozen countries, yet Bush made them in less than a day without consulting any of his advisors, not even his Secretary of State Colin Powell. It did not matter if Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Powell between them had 100 years of experience in dealing with national security matters, while Bush did not possess even one.5 Even if the advisors had disagreed, they perhaps could not have changed Bush’s mind, since after the 9/11 atrocities Bush the ‘Decider’ was much more ‘in broadcasting mode’, telling his advisors what he thought and what policies he was going to employ and far less interested in hearing his advisors’ views. Being a ‘gut player’ with strong beliefs and having no self-doubt, once Bush made his mind up based on his instincts it was difficult to persuade him to do otherwise. According to Robert Gates, Bush did not like his instincts being questioned, ignoring any policy ideas that did not fit his intuitive sense. He knew what to do and all he wanted to hear, in the words of Powell, was how to get it

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done.6 However, Bush, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and others claimed that the above three supported the doctrine.7 In fact, Rumsfeld had been one of the proponents of the doctrine of no distinction since 1984. In his speech in 1984 he had pronounced that there was no difference between terrorism and the states sponsoring it, and he had characterised terrorism as ‘a form of warfare, and must be treated as such’. Cheney, too, supported the Bush Doctrine of no distinction, arguing that, before 9/11, the US had dealt with terrorism as a law enforcement action, but that approach had remained unproductive, as Al Qaeda delivered a major blow to the US on 9/11. In order to eradicate terrorists before they attacked, the US had to launch war against terrorist groups and states that supported them.8 Cheney and Rumsfeld might have influenced Bush’s thinking prior to the 9/11 events, but, as seen above, Bush consulted no one between the 9/11 terrorist acts and the 9 p.m. NSC meeting, a period of 12 hours in which Bush made four major decisions on US foreign policy: the announcement of the US being at war with terrorism; the invention of the Bush Doctrines of no distinction; preventative self-defence; and taking the war overseas to the enemy. Therefore, Bush alone was responsible for the announcement of war and the making of his three doctrines. It was his instinctive response to the 9/11 events. The Bush Doctrines, incidentally, are a set of foreign policy principles that Bush developed to guide his administration’s foreign policy, especially his Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Equally, Bush as a person, as president, was largely responsible for intervening in Afghanistan because it was these doctrines and the declaration of war that brought Afghanistan to the forefront of the US campaign against terrorism. There was no evidence to connect the Taliban regime to the 9/11 events, yet they were to be targeted because they ‘harboured’ Al Qaeda. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter only qualifies a country to self-defence and to go to war when there is an imminent attack against the country; in the case of the US, the 9/11 terrorist attacks had already taken place. Whether the 9/11 attacks constituted an act of war under Article 51 was further questionable.9 To make matters worse, Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution only permits Congress to authorise war, yet Bush without an explicit authorisation of the Constitution declared war. The president thought 9/11 was an act of war and believed Al Qaeda and the Taliban

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jointly posed a serious threat of further attacks, so he ‘took the fight overseas’ to the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan to confront the threat ‘before’ it fully materialised. Afghanistan intervention was therefore out of ‘necessity and self-defense, not revenge’.10 Bush also involved the US in what later became known as its longest war to bring Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime to justice. He considered ‘justice’ as the central theme in the first few days of 9/11 until officials from the Defense Department, mainly Rumsfeld, advised him that the chief US goal was not to punish, reattribute or retaliate, but to protect America; Rumsfeld remarked that in the first days Bush ‘blurted out’ what ‘sprang’ to his mind, including calling the US struggle against terrorism ‘a crusade against evil’.11 Afghanistan invasion was likewise necessary to show ‘resolve’. In a discussion between President-elect Bush and Donald Rumsfeld on the possibility of the latter becoming Secretary of Defense for the incoming Bush Administration, Rumsfeld shared the experiences, thoughts and beliefs he had formed over the years. Rumsfeld told Bush he considered terrorism a major threat to the world as it had, especially when supported by a rogue nation, the capability of altering the behaviour of a great nation. Rumsfeld was unhappy with, and disappointed in, US reactions to terrorism in the previous decades. The US decisions to withdraw from Beirut and Somalia under fire, and its failure to act vigorously in response to Al Qaeda’s lethal attack on USS Cole in Yemen, invited the enemies to act more aggressively. The policy of defending against terrorists or running away from them proved time and again to be incapable of defeating terrorists. For Rumsfeld, the successful way to defeat terrorists was ‘to take the battle to them; to go after them where they live, where they hide; to go after their finances and their networks; and even to go after the nations that harbor and assist them. The best defense would be a good offense [emphasis added]’. In 1984, Rumsfeld and Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz had warned that the US could not afford to be a ‘global Hamlet’ while terrorism was on the rise. Rumsfeld and Shultz had recommended that America should be able to pre-empt a terrorist attack by responding ‘in a variety’ of forms and could start ‘at times and places of our choosing’ – the same words that Bush would pronounce 17 years later following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.12

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Rumsfeld told Bush in the meeting that he predominantly was disappointed by Bill Clinton’s Administration’s weak approach: when terrorists had challenged or attacked America, President Clinton often played ‘softly’ by embracing a cautious, even ‘squeamish’ response. Rumsfeld added that, in extreme cases, such as the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed more than 200 and wounded more than 5,000, Clinton had used cruise missiles. (Many policy makers from the Clinton Administration might disagree with Rumsfeld’s claim, however, since Clinton was eager on several occasions to authorise the ‘boots on the ground option’, that is, dropping ‘a small combat team’ into bin Laden’s training camp in Afghanistan to engage him directly. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton showed reluctance, however, as it involved a lot of risks. Shelton wanted Clinton to authorise a large-scale operation, but Clinton disagreed.)13 According to Rumsfeld, the enemy, especially Osama bin Laden, took the weak responses by the US as a sign that America was not willing to defend its interests because American soldiers were not willing to engage in long wars at battlefields and would flee once they were under attack. For Rumsfeld, these feeble responses/retreats, caused partly by the American public’s aversion to overseas military interventions due to American failure in the Vietnam War (many foreign policy experts as well as members from the previous administrations, including Bush Senior, however, might disagree with Rumsfeld as they believed that the Persian Gulf War of 1991 had ‘kicked’, or vanquished, the Vietnam Syndrome)14 and partly by the bureaucracy in Washington, continued to show a lack of resolve on the US side and showcased America as vulnerable, irresolute and weak. ‘Weakness is provocative . . . so is the perception of weakness’, but strength would have deterred the terrorists’ escapades, Rumsfeld told the president-elect, and the latter ‘nodded in agreement’. In Rumsfeld’s view, Osama bin Laden had declared war on the US and by 9/11 he had been winning. However, Rumsfeld, if appointed Secretary of Defense, and if America found itself under attack by terrorists, would come to the president not for use of missiles, but for unleashing the US military against the perpetrators. Rumsfeld then told Bush that if Bush was uncomfortable with Rumsfeld’s view, Rumsfeld was the wrong man for the job. Bush replied that Rumsfeld was the Secretary of Defense he had been looking for.15

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Bush likewise believed that Clinton’s approach to Al Qaeda’s persistent attacks on US assets was weak to the extent that the administration invited Al Qaeda to attack again and again. A technically and military advanced America’s response with missile attacks was ‘frail’, ‘pathetic’, and really ‘a joke’, making America come across as ‘impotent’. It created a worldwide image that the American people were both ‘materialistic’ and ‘hedonistic’, had no values, and, when struck, were not willing to fight back. Bush agreed that US weak responses clearly emboldened Osama bin Laden and his followers. George Tenet, too, observed in his memoir that US withdrawal from Somalia gave Osama bin Laden a perception that the US was a soft target, ‘a paper tiger’, and was easier to defeat than the Soviet Union.16 But that perception was not going to hold under the Bush Administration. When Bush and his advisors, mainly Cheney, Rumsfeld and Tenet, suddenly found America under attack on 9/11 by Al Qaeda, headed by Osama bin Laden, they were to prove Osama bin Laden wrong: America was not a paper tiger that could be compelled to ‘run in less than twenty-four hours’. Al Qaeda interpreted the US’s lack of serious response as a sign of weakness, but Bush and his principals were determined to change that impression, and on Monday, 17 September, made a formal decision: America was to fight a GWOT with the aim to destroy and eliminate terrorism worldwide, and the first battlefield would be Afghanistan.17 It was therefore a question of when rather than if Bush, Rumsfeld, Tenet and Cheney would put their beliefs of dealing offensively, as opposed to defensively, with terrorists into practice. Their consistent beliefs as well as their images of terrorism as a major threat to the world enormously helped construct the Bush Doctrines, which were the backbone of the GWOT. Bush’s image of America’s role in the world similarly played a crucial part in the construction of his doctrines. Bush believed that human freedom and fear were at war and that advancement of the latter depended on America. It was time that good acted against evil. On a personal level, the advancement of human freedom, or the freedom agenda, for Bush was both ‘idealistic’ and ‘realistic’. Realistic, since it was the most practical way to protect America in the long run. Idealistic, because Bush saw the spreading of liberty and democracy as a good deed that would eliminate fear and terror by oppressive regimes. The latter conviction was also based on

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Bush’s strong belief in Christianity. For him, the US (good) acted against terrorists (evil) to defend freedom (a practical gift from God) and release oppressed people from their cruel regimes.18 His popularity among Americans in the first days after 9/11 seemed to have made him assume that he – and America in general – would be perceived as good, as a hero, by those who are oppressed, and this emboldened his resolve further in the declaration of the GWOT. However, it is important to mention that the freedom agenda became a central part of US objectives when the US could not find WMD in Iraq, the primary justification the administration had used to go after the Saddam Hussein regime. It is then that the freedom agenda became known as one of the Bush Doctrines; Bush himself described it as his fourth doctrine.19 It is equally vital to mention that Bush was not a liberal internationalist. During his presidential debates, prior to his election, he did not talk about liberating women in Afghanistan, nor did he once mention ousting the Taliban regime or going after Al Qaeda; most of his campaign focus was on domestic policies, specifically those relating to education, tax and national defence. There are some, including Rice herself, who attributed Bush’s beliefs in the liberty or freedom agenda as one of the primary variables for the GWOT.20 But that did not seem to be on Bush’s or other advisors’ minds when they debated the Afghan strategy. During the research for this book, I only once came across a policy maker (Rice) mentioning the freeing of Afghan women as a good cause to end the Taliban regime during the decision making for the GWOT.21 Nevertheless, Bush and his advisors assumed that, after the defeat of the repressive Taliban regime, a ‘free society’ was likely to emerge in Afghanistan.22 So the freedom agenda, especially liberating Afghan women, was incidental to the main objective: to dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban (a part of global terrorism) in order to maintain security in America. Otherwise, Afghan women have been ‘repressed’ since the Mujahedeen victory in 1992, and, even though it had a moral duty after the Soviet withdrawal, the US had not only not helped them, but also left Afghanistan to its own fate, and into the hands of its neighbours, who supported different factions of the Mujahedeen to fight between each other, which resulted in the killing of thousands of its nationals.

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However, the incidental after-effect of the overthrow of the Taliban regime was an excellent outcome for the Bush Administration, as it attracted broader support for the Afghan invasion. Regardless of the freedom agenda, during the 9/11 period Bush enjoyed tremendous domestic support, as Americans wanted him to bring to justice the ‘bastards’ who had engineered the 9/11 atrocities. Looking straight into his eyes, a firefighter at Ground Zero, who lost many of his colleagues, pleaded with Bush: ‘George, find the bastards who did this and kill them’. Calling him by his first name, asserted Bush, was a personal message from an electorate to its president. As he shook hands with others at Ground Zero, where he had gone to visit a few days after 9/11, he started to hear more pleadings: ‘Do not let me down!’; ‘Whatever it takes!’ There was understandably a ‘bloodlust’ for revenge.23 That day had a profound impact on Bush as he went through a variety of emotions; seeing the rubble and debris of the Twin Towers, he was totally shocked; incredibly proud when seeing firefighters and other volunteer citizens assisting their fellow countrymen day and night; overwhelmed by the warmth he received from New Yorkers; stunned when he witnessed how the crowd was hungry for revenge; and emotional when he met the families of those who had lost their loved ones. In response to someone from the crowd at the back that they could not hear the President, Bush declared that he could hear them, the world heard them and soon those responsible for 9/11 would hear all American people. The crowd exploded with a roar, chanting, ‘USA, USA, USA’. The unrehearsed response by Bush, coming out on the spur of the moment, made Bush feel incredible; it was a release of energy Bush had never felt before. Had it been possible to live his entire life in a day, Bush would have chosen this day. This was the day he saw how determined the Americans were to carry out justice, and how clearly they wanted him to share their determination.24 The encounter with ordinary Americans at Ground Zero, who wanted their commander-in-chief to do something, further emboldened Bush’s resolve. It also dramatically increased the pressure on Bush and his War Cabinet to bring the perpetrators to justice ‘whatever it took’.25 So did the 24-hour cycle of the media. The 9/11 acts were the most watched on television terrorist acts in history, and, in many ways, including the loss of American lives,

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surpassed Pearl Harbor, in which 2,403 Americans had been killed by Japan’s military strikes. The 24-hour media made 9/11 much more impactful by playing over and over again the images of the plane crashing into the South Tower, desperate people jumping from the upper floors to their deaths to escape the unbearable heat inside and, above all, the towers collapsing one after the other. The more the broadcasters played the images, the more obliged Bush felt to act with tenacity. When the Defense Department delayed the war plan for Afghanistan, Bush pushed for urgency, reasoning with his War Cabinet that the entire world was watching America’s response, and most importantly, Americans had been through a shocking experience, and their patience would run out if they soon did not hear from their commander-in-chief about a war plan with a starting date to go after Al Qaeda. The demands of those people he had met at Ground Zero were still on his mind, those who wanted him to bring the perpetrators to justice, when he pushed for an urgent war plan. Bush refused to accept he had been ‘hasty’; he was ‘decisive’. Bush’s instincts had been telling him that soon the American people would ask: ‘What are you doing? Where’s your leadership? Where is the United States? You’re all-powerful, do something.’26 Bush’s job approval rating further forced him into doing ‘something’. It jumped from 55 per cent before 9/11 to 91 per cent. The White House Chief of Staff Karl Rove, Rumsfeld, and the Head of Fox News, Roger Ailes, made Bush aware that if history taught them anything, including his own father’s polling after the Persian Gulf War, his polling support would not remain for long if the public did not see Bush act decisively and at the earliest opportunity. Rumsfeld was aware of the essence of time, as, after the massacre of Americans in Beirut, American support for action against terrorists rapidly waned.27 Bush was also aware that when the approval rating dissipated with the general public, Congress would follow suit. But in the first days of 9/11, Congress showed its extraordinary support by passing a unanimous war resolution, authorising, in effect, all three Bush Doctrines and his declaration of war, and by receiving extremely well the President’s Congress speech of 20 September 2001; the members of the Joint Houses stood and clapped after almost every sentence Bush uttered.28 Congress certainly demonstrated the national mood. Ordinary Americans suddenly found their president as their saviour and hero. Reportedly, about 80 million Americans watched the abovementioned

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speech by Bush. Sports matches paused in order to hear what the commander-in-chief had to say.29 The overwhelming public-media-Congress support, seen partly in Bush’s high approval rating, made Bush even more buoyed up, vowing to himself that from 9/11 onwards his focus would be on protecting America from terrorism and, most importantly, rooting out terror worldwide no matter how long it took, though Bush and his policy makers wanted to act soon, before Bush’s approval rating was dissipated. He vowed he would change the direction of history and become a ‘transformational’ president.30 The support was an important factor in building up confidence levels among the policy makers, Bush in particular, to wage such a broad war on terrorism. So, too, was the decision to put an end to the constant fear of further terrorist attacks. Bush and Cheney saw a different America on 12 September, where commercial aircraft were grounded, the New York Stock Exchange was closed, the Twin Towers had disappeared, the tourism and insurance industries were all severely hit, and armed vehicles patrolled the streets of what Cheney called the ‘wartime capital’, Washington. Bush was informed that many families from cities had escaped to the countryside in case the skyscrapers they lived in were the next targets, and similarly those who worked in them had feared to go to work in case suicide bombers targeted the buildings. Families had stocked up on basic necessities in case there were further attacks. As Bush saw it, ‘the psyche of the nation had been shaken’.31 Such was the psyche of the White House. For the whole day of 11 September Bush was kept away from the White House since there were intelligence reports that more planes were heading to crash into the White House. Bush, however, returned at 6:30 p.m. against the advice the CIA had given, but a secret service agent, heavily breathing, abruptly woke Bush at midnight and said, ‘Mr President, Mr President, the White House is under attack! Let’s go!’ He ushered Bush together with his wife and their two dogs into the bunker underneath the White House. They did not even have time to change and Mrs Bush had to be guided by her husband since she did not have time to put on her contact lenses. As Bush put it, they ‘must have made quite a sight’.32 Indeed, one of the most powerful men on earth had to hide in the bunker in such a humiliating fashion only to find out minutes later that the plane was one of their own.

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Bush was not alone in going through personal fear and humiliation. Rice was not able to go to her apartment because of the threat. For the first few nights after 9/11 she stayed at the White House. On the morning of 9/11, Cheney, too, was rushed through by secret agents to the basement because an incoming, unidentified plane was making for the White House. The aircraft then collided with the Pentagon. Soon Cheney left for an unknown and secure location. It was the first of many more times that he was evacuated to unidentified locations just to make sure the next terrorist attacks did not ‘get’ both him and the president, as it would have decapitated the government.33 Bush and his Cabinet could not go through such fear forever. In their view, they had to do something, as Rumsfeld, Tenet and, according to Bush, Cheney in particular were fearful of further attacks, especially those involving some form of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. They became suddenly fearful because, after the 9/11 terrorist acts, their assumptions about US security and the capability of Al Qaeda were fundamentally changed once Al Qaeda demonstrated that they could deliver such a hard blow to the heart of America’s economic and military power.34 Moreover, relying on intelligence sources, Tenet told the War Cabinet that certain Pakistani scientists had provided Al Qaeda, which had been acquiring chemical, biological and radiological nuclear weapons since 1993, with information on how to make nuclear weapons. Worse, some of Russia’s nuclear materials had been smuggled, and Russian President Putin could only account for materials on his watch as president. Had these materials found their way into the hands of Al Qaeda? The CIA did not know. In short, Tenet could not reassure them 100 per cent that Al Qaeda did not possess WMD, was not developing them, and had not smuggled some into America. Cheney replied that if the policy makers had even a one-per cent doubt about it, they should treat it as if Al Qaeda had nuclear weapons, as the conventional risk assessment did not apply when it came to WMD in the hands of terrorists, who would not hesitate to utilise them against the US. The Soviets, just like the US, wanted to live and use nuclear weapons as a deterrent, but Al Qaeda would ‘embrace the moment’ when the US feared death. An Al Qaeda equipped with some forms of WMD, thought the policy makers, would ‘change history’, since it would turn Al Qaeda into a superpower and ‘bring death’ to

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countless American families and drastically alter the free nature of US society. In such a scenario neither the FBI nor the Defense Department nor the CIA could help.35 The threat of WMD was not the only idea within the advisors’ minds, however, as Bush received CIA intelligence in his morning briefings that warned him about other threats, at times 100 of them, some imminent and as impactful as 9/11, to US facilities both inside and outside the country. Being disturbed by the ‘incredible number’ and their impact, Bush asked Tenet to make a list of targets Al Qaeda was most likely to strike within the US, but Tenet replied that there were simply too many targets in the US to protect. Rumsfeld’s Beirut experience taught him that it was physically impossible for the US to protect its every corner day and night. For him, the terrorist had to be lucky once to carry out a terrorist attack, but the US always to prevent terrorist attacks. However, the principals did everything at home to defend America and its way of life, including holding NSC deputies’ meetings to focus on preventing threats, heightening security at home, and giving unprecedented powers to the security services. But whatever they did internally, the grim reality remained unaltered; the US homeland was still open and vulnerable since Al Qaeda was freely operating in Afghanistan, representing a significant strategic danger to the US36 and its liberal nature. America’s good life – the financial conditions, the chance to better oneself, individual freedom, public safety and many other values – was the result of the liberal and democratic nature of America. America was not so much ‘a land’ and ‘a people’ as ‘a way of life’ that embodied a notion: individual freedom. The terrorists were threatening the very liberal nature of America. The US had to change either the free nature of its society by taking more severe measures, or the way terrorists lived by going after the places where they grew. The US opted for the latter; it was terrorism which had created the dreadful milieu and ‘the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows’.37 The milieu in which the policy makers made the decision for the GWOT was a period when the possibility of another wave of attacks was real and imminent in their minds. Christopher Meyer, the British Ambassador to Washington, claimed that if one did not live in America

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in September 2001, one could not easily imagine the weight piled on Bush himself. The president was responsible for nearly 300 million American lives, and the fear of further terrorist acts was formidable. Bush thought that another wave of strikes on America would have brought America to a standstill, both economically and security-wise, and his administration to a premature political death. After all, it was bad enough that 9/11 happened under his presidency. Another one and his character would have come across as too ‘incompetent’ to protect America. For many weeks after 9/11, Bush had troubling and sleepless nights. Tenet equally spent restless nights shaken by how this could have happened under his leadership at the CIA, and another attack would have further damaged the CIA’s standing.38 Bush and his principals, feeling guilty about 9/11 taking place on their watch (and perhaps about ignoring previous intelligence on possible Al Qaeda threats),39 were under tremendous pressure to defuse the threats, especially the threat of WMD, as soon as possible and get the country and the administration back to normal in the short term. The purpose of terrorists was to terrorise the US to alter its behaviour and its values, and to try to make the US live in fear. But for the administration, it was important to keep and defend Americans and all those values that were dear to them, and to turn around the trend by forcing the terrorists to live in fear. So a strategy needed to be made to incorporate the Bush Doctrines to root out terrorist groups worldwide, including those in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 2 THE INTERVENTION AND COUNTERTERRORISM DECISIONS AT THE FORMULATION STAGE, SEPTEMBER 2001—FEBRUARY 2002

The National Security Council (NSC) held a number of meetings between 11 September to the day President George W. Bush officially announced the invasion of Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. However, it was the period between 11 September and 16 September in which the Bush Administration made the strategy for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) that began in Afghanistan, specifically in the meeting held at Camp David on Saturday, 15 September. In the second NSC meeting in the evening of 9/11 in the bunker of the White House, Bush, who seemed ‘in charge’, ‘determined’ and direct, repeated his declaration of war and the three doctrines, making it clear that countries needed to choose between the United States of America (US) and the terrorists. After linking Al Qaeda to the 9/11 atrocities, the principals declared the US at war with Al Qaeda based mainly in Afghanistan. In relation to Afghanistan (and Pakistan), Bush’s three doctrines were going to be automatically applicable if the Taliban refused US proposals and continued to ‘harbour’ the perpetrators, Al Qaeda. For Bush, it was important to dismantle the Al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan. In response to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet’s assertion that Al Qaeda had connections to about 60 countries, Bush simply and decisively stated: ‘Let’s pick them off one at a time’.1

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It was clear that the principals were not debating the wisdom of the three doctrines, or whether to go to war against global terrorism, as Bush had already decided it minutes after the second plane hit the second tower. But rather the debate was shifting towards how to go to war and how broad the enemy, terrorism, was. This was the case throughout policy making. While the evening NSC meeting of 11 September was important in terms of showing that all the Bush Doctrines were already made up and the advisors did not hold them up to scrutiny, the Camp David meeting was vital because it debated in detail the GWOT policy that initiated in Afghanistan. A couple of days before, Bush had told everyone to bring their policy ideas to the Camp David meeting for discussion. It was the following Monday that Bush announced his decision. This long, rich-indetail and result-producing meeting, therefore, is the focus of the first part of this chapter to discover how the War Cabinet formed the decision. When it came to a strategy for Afghanistan, the CIA had the upper hand compared to the Defense Department, because the CIA had contact with numerous parties involved in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance included, since the Soviet invasion. In the previous few years up to 9/11, the CIA deployed its teams five times to the Panjshir Valley, the stronghold of the Northern Alliance, to bolster the Northern Alliance’s capability. Additionally, by 10 September 2001, the CIA had hundreds of sources, subsources and relationships with eight different tribes all around Afghanistan. Due to its extensive contacts, the CIA had managed to prepare a plan entitled ‘Blue Sky’ to weaken Al Qaeda in Afghanistan well before Bush came to power. But, due to Bill Clinton Administration’s concerns for Pakistan’s increasing internal instability, the uncertainty of command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the possibility of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan and the Bush Administration’s lack of interest in confronting Al Qaeda prior to 9/11, the Clinton and Bush Administrations had not shown much commitment. Now Bush wanted the CIA to present its plan, and so at Camp David, on 15 September, Tenet produced the agency’s refined plan entitled ‘Destroying International Terrorism’, and the ‘Initial Hook’ being the destruction of Al Qaeda and the ‘Closing [of] the Safe Haven’ in Afghanistan. The CIA plan required the deployment of CIA operatives inside Afghanistan to immediately assist and work with the Northern Alliance

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and other opposition groups, including some six Taliban commanders, against Al Qaeda and the Taliban and provide a way for the introduction of US Special Forces. CIA operatives and Special Forces would then provide first-hand information for US military bombing. Due to the CIA’s years of preparation, the mission could start immediately, and Al Qaeda and the Taliban would be defeated in a few weeks’ time. The plan also required the US to engage Afghanistan’s neighbours, namely Pakistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, to stop all border crossings. To acquire Pakistan’s cooperation and that of ‘stans’ states – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan – Tenet said that the CIA appreciated everyone’s help to speak to their counterparts, including the President who was to talk to the Russian President Vladimir Putin who had influence in the ‘stan’ states. The CIA’s covert work further pleased Bush when Tenet informed the President that CIA drones had been operating out of Uzbekistan for a year on surveillance missions to provide ‘real-time’ videos of Afghanistan. The CIA could always equip them with Hellfire missiles. As veteran journalist Bob Woodward claimed, after days of rhetoric by the president to bring the engineers of 9/11 to justice, the CIA presented Bush with a real and quickly implemented strategy to take justice to the perpetrators of 9/11. The strategy was quite impactful on the president because the offensive plan was capable of going after the Al Qaeda leadership, shutting their safe haven in Afghanistan, and eventually pursuing them in 92 countries around the world.2 Tenet did not have to worry about the Pakistan problem either, as it had already declared its support of a possible US campaign in Afghanistan. Pakistan, one of the very few countries that had recognised the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the Taliban, was a strong supporter of the Taliban regime and had tremendous influence with the Taliban. Both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Tenet stressed the importance of Pakistan concerning any strategy being made towards Afghanistan. They initially, however, had assumed that convincing Pakistan to give up the Taliban and be on the US’s side was not straightforward, since relations with Pakistan were not cordial due to US sanctions on Pakistan following the latter’s nuclear tests in the 1990s, the Bush Senior Administration’s decision to abandon the region, including its only regional ally, Pakistan, following the Soviet disintegration, and the

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distrust of Pakistani officials towards US motives. Pakistani officials would greet not with open arms but with a suspicious eye any US policy towards Afghanistan, and thus could cause ‘problems’. Nevertheless, Bush ordered the State Department in the evening NSC meeting of 11 September to talk with the Pakistani leader General Pervez Musharraf about whether he was with the US or the terrorists. To the pleasant surprise of Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Pakistan accepted all State Department demands made a day after 9/11. The requirements were as follows: to stop Al Qaeda members crossing the border into Pakistan; to end ‘logistical support’ to Al Qaeda; to grant ‘overflights’ and landing rights and access to Pakistan’s naval and air bases, as well as borders; to provide the US with ‘immediate’ intelligence and immigration information; to condemn the 9/11 attacks and curb internal support for them; to stop immediately ‘shipments’ of fuels to the Taliban and to stop Pakistani fighters joining the Taliban; and for Pakistan ‘to break off all relations’ with the Taliban regime.3 To put it simply, Powell had asked Pakistan to help destroy the Taliban regime that it, especially its intelligence service, the InterServices Intelligence (ISI), had worked for years to create. Bush thought highly of the State Department’s work in relation to Pakistan. Bush was then completely engaged and, as Tenet claimed, was going ‘a hundred miles’ per hour, and if a member of his Cabinet could not keep up, he was not interested in that member. The Pentagon, as Tenet claimed, seemed to have been one of the slow riders, as the president was disappointed when he learned that the Pentagon had no contingency plan for Afghanistan, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton’s war options were simple and not attractive. The options were as follows: the Clinton option of using cruise missile strikes against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan; combined missile attacks with a bombing campaign; or missiles plus manned bombers with ‘boots on the ground’. While the first two options did not require time, the last option required time to be executed because the Defense Department needed bases and overflight rights, and, once they were acquired, time to deploy Search and Rescue Teams and Special Forces; not to mention the time required to develop diplomacy with the ‘stan’ states. Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney and even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were unimpressed, describing the options privately as ‘unimaginative’ and ‘unoriginal’. Bush was not interested in the first

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two options, as he was not going to ‘pound sand’ like the Clinton Administration. Bush chose the third option and wanted military forces to be on the ground as soon as the Defense Department could prepare an effective response. Shelton wanted months, but Rumsfeld reassured Bush that the Pentagon would work around the clock to develop an appropriate plan, and develop it soon, before there was another attack on the US homeland.4 The Defense Department would buckle down to alter Shelton’s unimaginative military options, but the advisors could do nothing to change Afghanistan’s forbidding geography and history of ‘empire killer’, something that really troubled the policy makers. Bush wanted to know the worst that could happen. The reply was that, firstly, the situation could become really chaotic in Afghanistan and spread to Pakistan, unleashing a whole set of ‘demons’. Pakistan’s choice, said Cheney, of being a partner with the US could lead the extremists to try to bring down Musharraf’s government and get access to its nuclear weapons. Bush saw this as a ‘nightmare scenario’, announcing quick medicine for it: the US needed to provide Pakistan with financial and humanitarian assistance because Musharraf was indeed taking an enormous risk.5 Another risk – derived from the defeat of the British in the nineteenth century and the Soviets a century later – was that the US could become bogged down in Afghanistan. But the fact that the US was playing a supportive role in Afghanistan, thanks to the Blue Sky plan by the CIA, decreased the level of concern among the principals. The strategy had the effect of killing two birds with one stone; the plan did not ask for a traditional army but a few CIA paramilitary teams with some Special Forces that would help the Afghans, mainly the Northern Alliance, to liberate themselves from the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld did not see the Northern Alliance’s weaknesses, including accusations of serious abuses of human rights during the four years of the civil war in Kabul, and the Northern Alliance being backed up by Iran and Russia, as obstacles because they had to defeat an enemy who was planning to launch further attacks. They were at war, and consequently warfare posed ‘excruciating moral trade-offs’. Given the circumstances, the US was prepared to use every means to defend its freedom and security, and as such it was willing to ally with ‘less than savory characters’, those whom the US in ordinary circumstances would not have accepted as its allies.

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As it became apparent in later NSC meetings, however, the CIA was not unanimous on the Northern Alliance. The National Counterterrorism Center favoured immediate and substantial aid to the Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban, whereas the CIA operatives from Islamabad thought that allying with the Northern Alliance meant allying with Russia, India and Iran. These countries, especially India, were Pakistan’s mortal enemies and they had nurtured the Northern Alliance to reduce Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. If the US assisted the Northern Alliance, it would anger Pakistani officials as well as the Pashtuns from the south and hence create a civil war. Therefore, some CIA operatives from Pakistan suggested that the Taliban should continue to be part of future Afghanistan. The defense leadership, notably Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, fought against the CIA’s concern. For Rumsfeld, the view by the intelligence officials from Pakistan seemed to be influenced by Pakistani interests, which were not necessarily matching US ones. Rumsfeld believed that there were ways to avoid the civil war, but they could not afford to lose some 20,000 experienced fighters of the Northern Alliance, the only plus point in an otherwise challenging fight in Afghanistan. The risk of the Pashtuns was manageable, in Rumsfeld’s opinion, as the US could reach those Pashtuns in the south who were against the Taliban. This policy resulted in supporting Pashtuns like Hamid Karzai and Gul Agha Sherzai. In Cheney’s view, the entire argument that siding with the Northern Alliance would alienate Pakistan was misguided.6 Thus the Northern Alliance would become a core part of US strategy in the GWOT on the Afghan stage. The inclusion of the Northern Alliance also played a significant role in public diplomacy or the propaganda aspect of the strategy for Afghanistan, as well as the GWOT. In a later NSC meeting, held on Sunday, 23 September, and chaired by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice without the President, it was again Tenet who recommended that the Afghan war be cast not as Westerners against Afghans, or Westerners against Islam, but as Afghans – with the support of America – against foreigners, the Arabs, who had returned to Afghanistan and established bases. Efforts should be made to make it clear to the Afghans that the US was not in Afghanistan to build bases there, and it was important to push the Afghans to fight. The

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CIA experts had been aware of the ten years of failed Soviet attempts, so, according to Woodward, ‘the general rule was to study what the Soviets had done and do the opposite’. Bush later approved Tenet’s recommendation. It, too, was Tenet who proposed a political plan for Afghanistan in the same NSC meeting of 23 September, and Bush later approved it by giving the task to the State Department to execute it, which it did, resulting in the Bonn Conference that chose Hamid Karzai as the Interim Leader. The plan asked for bringing in the former Afghan King, Zahir Shah, who lived in exile in Italy, in the process, as it would strengthen their campaign and provide for a future political process.7 The risk of America being bogged down in Afghanistan, however, facilitated the discussion for the Defense Department in the Camp David meeting to argue its famous ‘Iraq argument’; in case the US was stuck in Afghanistan, should they go for other terrorist-sponsored states, such as Iraq, which were more achievable? This way, success was more possible and it would maintain national and international support. Moreover, Afghanistan did not have many valuable targets, whereas Iraq had the kind of targets upon which the US could wreak great havoc that would cause other terrorist-supporting nations to change their behaviour. The Iraq inclusion would have given the Defense Department a greater role in policy making, as, according to Woodward, previous to the 9/11 attacks, ‘the Pentagon had been working for months on a military option for Iraq’ – as the CIA had been doing for Afghanistan – which the administration believed to have been determined to acquire and use WMD on America. Every one of the NSC advisors knew the enemy was terrorism and the states that harboured terrorism, but the question for the Defense Department was which states to include and, most importantly, how to define terrorism. Rumsfeld, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, Wolfowitz, Cheney and, according to Feith, Rice believed in the broad-and-sustained-campaign-against-internationalterrorism-and-rogue-states argument, which went like this. Terrorism was not just Al Qaeda and its operatives in Afghanistan; nor could terrorism be defeated if the US eliminated Osama bin Laden and crashed his safe haven in Afghanistan, as his men would shift to others – such as Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and many other countries with safe havens – and continue to pose the threat of further attack. Furthermore,

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the issue of WMD by rogue states would be left untouched. Thus a global campaign was needed, as the enemy was worldwide, compromising both terrorists, especially Al Qaeda and Islamist jihadists, and other groups and states that supported them to harm US interests, including those rogue states that were involved one way or another in the proliferation of WMD, such as Libya, Iran and Iraq. Defeating terrorism meant striking a blow against those countries that sponsored terrorism. Iraq, as mentioned, was one of them.8 Rumsfeld, like Wolfowitz, was specifically in favour of including Iraq with Afghanistan in the first stage of the campaign. At Camp David, however, Rumsfeld himself did not ask for the inclusion of Iraq, but his influential deputy, Wolfowitz, did. His request was so persistent and distracting that Bush had to quieten him, adding that Bush only wanted to hear the principals’ views, not those of their deputies.9 Bush said to his advisors that there was enough discussion on Iraq in the morning session, so in the afternoon meeting he wanted to hear views of his principals on Afghanistan only. In the afternoon gathering, Powell advised that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda should be the first target. An ultimatum should be issued, giving the Taliban ‘48 hours’ to hand over Al Qaeda leadership or else they would share Al Qaeda’s fate. Bush should avoid going after Iraq because America would lose the coalition they had signed up, the support at home, and the support of the United Nations (UN) and some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. If they found the link to 9/11, then they could aim at Iraq, too, and maybe Syria and Iran. Powell, unlike Wolfowitz, however, doubted that such a link existed. But for the time being, they should set aside the option of Iraq until maybe later, once the US was successful in Afghanistan. Powell, once a military man himself, doubted the ability of US Central Command to engage in two or more fronts at the same time. Finally, he suggested the US present to the world evidence of Al Qaeda being behind 9/11 to make a concrete case for war in Afghanistan. Powell believed the goal from the outset should not be to change the regime, but to persuade them to reform. Powell did not see the Taliban as a serious problem and wanted them to disaffiliate themselves from Al Qaeda.10 Rumsfeld opposed giving evidence to the world since the precedent would not be helpful to pre-emptive actions in the future against a threat to the US; in the future they might not have enough information to

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make a case for an action. The CIA should not give all importance to Osama bin Laden, Rumsfeld advised, as the war would start with the aim of destroying him and his network, but would not end after defeating Al Qaeda; mentioning Osama bin Laden a lot would risk promoting him and narrowing the public attitude towards the broad anti-terrorist war. The Taliban should not stay in power in any case, even if they accepted US conditions, since the US would risk sending a message to other nations that they could support terrorist groups and then negotiate an agreement with the US. Finally, Rumsfeld was not bothered by the fear of losing the coalition. The mission was to decide the coalition; the coalition should ‘not determine the mission’. Rumsfeld recommended to Bush that they needed first to define their mission, and then choose which partner suited it best. Rumsfeld advised against those partners that had unacceptable conditions to the US, and against ‘a large coalition’ to be attached to every activity or operation; the operation would not benefit from being fastened to a large coalition, since many countries might have different views and internal and external concerns. As a former US Ambassador to NATO, Rumsfeld did not like the ‘tedious, laborious consultative process by which America and its European allies reached their decisions’.11 Bush, on the other hand, was bothered by Powell using the coalition as a justification for the US not doing this or that. He did not want the coalition to be used as a reason for his advisors to abstain from certain actions, and he certainly did not want the coalition argument to dictate terms, adding, the US ‘may be the only one left. That’s ok with me. We are America.’12 Cheney, who agreed with Rumsfeld on the issue of the coalition, clarified as well that, if need be, America alone would shoulder the GWOT. Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld apparently believed that America’s powers would enable it to fight the war alone. For Powell, nevertheless, the coalition was important and he persistently, and regardless of what Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld thought, warned that many countries, especially Muslim, would refuse to be part of the coalition if the option of Iraq was brought to the table.13 It is clear from Powell’s argument that the State Department advocated a traditional law enforcement approach to punish only those who had harmed the US, but the defense leadership was going for a wider campaign; that is, to disrupt and destroy all those who might be

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planning the next attacks. Invoking the broad-and-sustained-campaignagainst-international-terrorism-and-rogue-states argument, Feith argued that the State Department did not get the simple fact that it was not Al Qaeda that constituted the enemy, but an ideology. Radical Islam or ‘Islamic extremism’ must be confronted in its entirety. A strategic response would include all Islamic terrorist groups – from Al Qaeda to Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia, to Lebanese Hezbollah and many others 2 and states sponsoring terrorists – from Afghanistan to Iraq and many others. It was not important whether a state or organisation had a link to the 9/11 attacks, as the US objective was not to punish terrorists, but to prevent further attacks in (pre-emptive) selfdefence of the US. A ‘network of states, non-states entities, and organisations’ involved in supporting these terrorists jointly constituted a severe threat of further attacks to the US. To defeat such a broad enemy on almost every continent, maintained Feith, the GWOT needed to be wide, long and ‘sustained’; Rumsfeld at Camp David explicitly talked about the importance of sustaining the war which would take years rather than months.14 Powell, however, disagreed with the international characterisation of the enemy as well as the inclusion of Iraq, arguing that Americans wanted them to combat Al Qaeda and that that was what they needed to focus on. For Powell, it was easier to mobilise the world against a specific enemy, Al Qaeda, as it was easy to pass a UN resolution, as well as gather a large number of coalitions.15 Tenet favoured a global war but he, nevertheless, recommended starting only with Afghanistan. Bush said that Tenet advised him that hitting Iraq was a ‘mistake’. Andrew Card in his turn agreed to go for Al Qaeda as it was the enemy. ‘An enemy’, Bush corrected him.16 Cheney supported the broader campaign, as this was not a war against certain individuals or cells responsible for 9/11, but rather a global war where the US wanted to go after the networks, organisations and states that supported and aided terrorists. The priority, however, should be to prevent the next attack, especially one involving WMD, and therefore it was important that the US did everything to prevent terrorists from accessing WMD, including the adoption and implementation of internal security measures. Afghanistan should be the first to be dealt with, he advised Bush, because it was the place where the terrorists had plotted the 9/11 attacks and might plan the next attack. Iraq did pose a threat

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but it should be postponed until they had an effective plan to combat the threat the Taliban and Al Qaeda posed in Afghanistan. Cheney, like Powell, was also in favour of striking at Al Qaeda and persuading the Taliban to displace their leader, Mullah Omar, who had betrayed them by inviting in the outsiders – he did not want the Taliban to be defeated if they accepted US conditions. Tenet, on the other hand, told them it was difficult to distinguish between the two, as, according to his intelligence, all the targets were intermixed.17 So everyone voiced their opinion to Bush, excluding Rice. Bush had told her only to listen and express her suggestions later. Rice played the role of an ‘honest broker’ by ensuring all the (contrasting) views reached the president in a fair, neutral and orderly manner. Rice, however, was of the same view as Cheney, Powell, Tenet and Card in opposing action in Iraq.18 Bush was yet to make a decision by the coming Monday as to which camp he would go with. On Monday, 17 September, Bush informed his War Cabinet that over the weekend he had made the decision, whose general authority dealt with both home and Afghanistan. At home, the CIA, FBI, Justice Department and other relevant departments were given more authority, including pre-emptive power, to protect America within from further attacks. For Afghanistan, Powell was to give an ultimatum to the Taliban, something that Bush later included in his Congress speech of 20 September 2001. If the Taliban did not comply – a prospect the policy makers correctly assumed to be more likely – Bush was to use Shelton’s third option. The Pentagon, meanwhile, should develop a detailed plan to include the new and unconventional targets in Afghanistan; the timing for its implementation, which allies America needed to enlist (Bush stressed the British to be given a role); how and when to be included; and how much cost the plan would incur. Bush wanted the plan ‘quick’, adding that he intended to hit Afghanistan so severely that other terroristsupporting nations would take notice. While it would take another six days for the Defense Department to produce a plan, and three more weeks, to the frustration of Bush and Rumsfeld, to put it into effect, Bush for Afghanistan authorised the CIA’s Blue Sky plan with all its steps. The CIA could operate freely and fully in Afghanistan with its paramilitary teams and operatives, as well as drones. It gave the CIA unprecedented authority to deal with

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terrorism, including eliminating, imprisoning and sending terrorists to third countries for interrogation. The second document he signed was military, intelligence, diplomatic and financial actions, and steps the War Cabinet needed to take in order to carry out the GWOT, actions regarding Afghanistan included. As for Iraq, Bush had allowed the debate on Iraq to be held in the morning session at Camp David so that he learned his advisors’ views. But Bush disapproved of going into Iraq and Afghanistan because he did not intend to simultaneously commit America’s military forces to two wars. It would have created a lack of focus, which would have been a huge risk. He was committed to rooting out terror from the world, but he was to do so one at a time. Bush’s second worry over Iraq was that most of the NSC advisors – Cheney, Powell and Wolfowitz – were from the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and he did not want them to use 9/11 as an excuse to retaliate. Finally, there was no evidence to link 9/11 with Iraq, though Bush believed Saddam Hussein had been involved. Bush, nevertheless, wanted the Pentagon to continue to develop a plan for Iraq.19 The continuous building of the Iraq plan for possible action, as well as Bush’s order to the other US departments to take anti-terrorist measures against many terrorist organisations that had no clear link to 9/11, were clear indications that Bush approved the Defense Department’s advice to keep the campaign wide and sustained in order to destroy international terrorism from the world to prevent further attacks on the US, as opposed to punishing the 9/11 perpetrators, Al Qaeda and its backers. Bush had only differed with the Pentagon on the timing; the Defense Department wanted at least Iraq, Afghanistan and Al Qaeda in the first phase, but Bush decided to destroy one at a time. Bush’s decision, to be specific, was in line with Cheney’s view of Camp David covered above. Cheney tended to tell Bush his ideas privately, especially during their private lunches, so it is not far from reality that Cheney had met Bush between the Camp David meeting and the following Monday, a period in which Bush made the decision, to elaborate on his ideas and to ensure Bush followed them. Bush had the tendency to listen to Cheney’s ideas without testing them.20 By the NSC meeting on 6 October 2001, the CIA implemented its part of the strategy for Afghanistan, as its paramilitary group, the

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Jawbreaker, had already entered Afghanistan on 27 September with millions of US dollars. They had since been active. The State Department had impressively managed to sign up a strong coalition, Pakistan, Russia and the ‘stans’ in particular, and had spoken to Zahir Shah about a political process after the Taliban defeat. Rumsfeld, who had been frustrated with his military leadership for the delay in producing the war plan, also confirmed that its war plan was almost effective. Its name was Operation Enduring Freedom, and it had four stages: to merge CIA operatives with Special Forces to clear the way for conventional forces; the air campaign; ground forces from the US and coalition partners; and finally to stabilise the country and help Afghans build a free society. In short, after nearly a month, the military, diplomatic and political (though this part was still at its crawling stage due to the lack of attention) aspects of Afghan strategy had almost been shaped, and the Secretaries told Bush they were ready. Bush, backed by an angry and united American people, gave the go-ahead for Operation Enduring Freedom on Sunday, 7 October, marking the first step of the GWOT in Afghanistan. After much talk of ‘quagmire’ and the panic of whether the Afghan strategy was working, Afghanistan was ‘liberated’ within two months and a few days. Tenet claimed that with ‘110 CIA officers, 316 Special Forces personnel’ and US air power following the CIA’s plan, the CIA won one of ‘the greatest successes’ in the history of the Agency when they defeated the Taliban and Al Qaeda in most of Afghanistan.21 But Feith gave most, if not all, credit to the Defense Department, especially to Rumsfeld, for the development of the Afghan strategy, and hardly mentions the CIA’s efforts. Feith explained the strategy as follows: remove the Taliban regime and do not just aim at Al Qaeda; involve a small number of US ground forces to avoid the mistakes the Soviet Union had made; support the Northern Alliance and other antiTaliban forces in Afghanistan in the Afghan war against foreigners; and give utmost importance to the ‘precision strikes’. The goals were to make an example of the Taliban as a state supporting terrorism and to disrupt and defeat Al Qaeda/Taliban, part of the international terrorist network, in order to reduce the capability of international terrorists to launch new attacks on the US homeland. It was important for the strategy to deal with the Taliban as soon as possible and with maximum effect to force other terrorist-supporting states to change course.22

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The toppling of the Taliban would also result in the incidental objective of the Afghan strategy: the freedom agenda; though the Defense Department did not seem committed to doing its share. For the establishment of democracy and the spreading of liberal values, a political process was needed, but it was not something the policy makers debated enough in NSC meetings, but rather left it to be improvised on the ground. As seen above, the CIA war proposal for Afghanistan at Camp David included all the above aspects of the strategy Feith mentioned. Tenet admitted that the CIA was not a policy maker, but a policy implementer. In Afghanistan’s case, however, the CIA first entered Afghanistan, as it was an intelligence war, and hence the CIA played a prominent role. Moreover, the CIA had extensive contacts in Afghanistan and developed a covert plan years back. The Defense Department lacked both, maintained Tenet, and was extremely slow in making a military plan from scratch, a plan that dealt with unconventional warfare in a primitive, rugged terrain of Afghanistan where the enemy were ‘guerrilla fighters’ who lived in ‘caves’ and rode ‘mules’. Feith himself admitted that Rumsfeld was sensitive and unhappy with CIA officials making policy arguments; instead of ‘describing a situation’, the CIA ‘prescribed’ a way when it put forward the Blue Sky plan. The CIA not only made the policy for Afghanistan, but also accelerated the process of decision making by constantly warning of imminent future attacks if Bush did not act pre-emptively to defuse them.23 One should never see US intervention in Afghanistan in isolation, however. Afghanistan was part of an overall strategy on the GWOT, which the Defense Department, with the support of the Vice-President, substantially shaped due to its successful policy proposal of keeping the GWOT as a ‘broad-and-sustained-campaign-against-international-terrorism-and-rogue-states’ with the chief-purpose-being-not-to-punishterrorism-but-to-prevent-further-attacks. It is vital to mention, however, that, the decision to launch GWOT was the decision of Bush himself: his gut reaction to the 9/11 terrorist events. As discussed in Chapter 1, his three doctrines and his extraordinary invocation of war were the core pillars of the overall GWOT strategy. The overall strategy consisted of the following: warn the government or organisation to give up terrorism; in the case of disobedience, deploy a small member of US forces; make the maximum effect of US

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technology – or in two words, ‘fight smart’; strangle the regime; and move to the next organisation or state. Using or ‘supporting’ the population, mainly opposition like the Northern Alliance, against the regime was an important part of the overall strategy; so, too, was the propaganda of ‘liberating’ the population. The spreading of democracy, or advancing hope and liberty instead of fear and repression, was its incidental outcome, however. Coalitions were welcomed if they joined on the US’s terms, or else it was a US war, and if need be, it could fight it alone. By authorising Tenet’s Blue Sky war plan, the GWOT’s overall objective emerged as ‘destroying international terrorism’ with the initial hook being ‘destroying’ Al Qaeda and ‘closing the safe haven’ in Afghanistan in order to prevent further attacks on the US homeland, as well as safeguarding the American way of life. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US grand strategy of ‘containment of Soviet expansionism’ seemed to be replaced by the grand strategy of ‘destroying international terrorism network’ to defuse the threat against the US and its allies. Like containment, this new grand strategy would take years rather than months, as due to the GWOT being a ‘broad-and-sustained-campaign-against-international-terrorismand-rogue-states’, it would start in Afghanistan but end once terrorism was defeated/rooted out in its entirety on all four continents, and rogue states that supported terrorism or acquired or had WMD either changed their behaviour or faced, in plain language, regime change.24 The strategy truly was a dramatic change from the past.

To Counter Terrorists or Build Afghanistan: That Was the Question After the Taliban was ‘defeated’ and Al Qaeda was on the run, as Seth Jones discusses in his deeply researched book, the NSC held a meeting in February 2002 in the White House Situation Room to discuss their Afghan strategy. Every policy maker agreed that the Taliban was a ‘spent force’ and ‘so decimated’ that they no longer posed a threat. However, there was a deep divide among the policy makers as to how to proceed in Afghanistan. Colin Powell recommended that the American forces join the international peacekeeping forces in Kabul and help extend the Karzai Administration’s authority beyond the capital. Powell was aiming to pursue a similar policy to that of the Bush Senior Administration in the

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post-1989 invasion of Panama, where US forces spread around the country after ousting the Noriega Government to take charge of the whole country. Over the years Powell had developed doctrines, and part of his doctrines required that American forces, when deployed overseas, should be much larger than the forces employed by the adversary, especially during stability and nation-building operations. Richard N. Haass, then the Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, had held informal talks with the European allies of the coalition, and he believed that 20,000 to 40,000 peacemakers could be recruited for the task, half American, and half from Europe.25 Condoleezza Rice, generally wary of nation-building operations, did not want to cause confusion because some European allies might see their objective as peacekeeping, while the US saw it as fighting terrorists. She was anxious that if the US deployed more troops, the coalition partners might place the responsibility of fighting on the shoulders of US forces. Consequently, she remained indecisive, leaving the issue unresolved.26 Donald Rumsfeld took the opposite position to Powell, however, because neither did he buy the message that the European allies would provide more troops for peacekeeping operations, nor was it advisable to deploy more US forces, since a larger commitment would ease pressure on the allies to contribute. Rumsfeld – and his main civilian advisors, namely, Wolfowitz and Feith – opposed the deployment of more troops, who would be required to take part in nation-building and peacekeeping to create a stable and democratic Afghanistan. They had several reasons. The US had achieved its main goals so the Pentagon civilian leadership wanted to move on to the next target for its GWOT. Rumsfeld argued that the US was not in Afghanistan to transform a ‘deeply conservative Islamic culture into a model of liberal modernity’, ‘eradicate corruption or to end poppy cultivation’, or ‘take ownership of Afghanistan’s problems’. For Rumsfeld, Afghans needed to take charge of ‘their own fate’ and ‘build their society the way they wanted’. Committing the US and its troops to nation-building and peacekeeping to create a stable and democratic Afghanistan, though desirable, was not a US goal. It was not necessarily within US powers to achieve such an Afghanistan, since nation-building and peacekeeping, such as the Clinton Administration’s engagement in Bosnia in 1996 and Kosovo in 1999, required a large number of troops and billions of US dollars. The GWOT ‘that lay ahead

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was too big, too broad and too multidimensional’ for the Bush Administration, so it could not afford to deploy troops in great numbers to every country it was going to ‘liberate’ to rebuild. Also, a large commitment would limit the Defense Department’s ability to act quickly in case another surprise like 9/11 took place; the terrorists would act against the US if they believed that the US was entrenched in Afghanistan and could not act elsewhere. So the Pentagon wanted a ‘light footprint’, or a small number of US troops, which was equally consistent with Bush and Rumsfeld’s ‘transformation’ agenda, which placed more reliance on technology and less on traditional ground forces. Accordingly, the Defense Department’s war plan for Afghanistan had two ‘new dimensions’ to it: fighting unconventional warfare; and fighting ‘smart’ – that is, relying more on US highly technical military weapons, and using as few soldiers as possible with speed and mobility. The fighting-smart-with-a-small-footprint aspect of the plan was contradictory to the Powell Doctrine of deploying an overwhelming number of US forces and then engaging them in keeping the security. A light footprint, as well as the lengthy aspect of the GWOT, was also incompatible with the Powell Doctrine of avoiding a long-term commitment without a clear plan as to when to end the operation. Unlike the Powell Doctrines, the Defense Department’s ‘transformation’ plan and its views in general concentrated on how to run the war and defeat terrorists, but gave little attention to what happened after the war, especially in the political process. It was to be left to the indigenous peoples. This way, the US managed to avoid creating dependency. For the defense leadership, US strategic policy should be to provide military, financial and other logistical support to the Afghans, Iraqis, Sudanese and others to rid themselves of the common enemy, and, once they did so, the indigenous people needed to take the lead role in peacekeeping and nation-building. The Vietnam War lesson taught Rumsfeld to push US indigenous allies to do more for themselves from the beginning of the war. Rumsfeld wanted the US in Afghanistan to play only a supporting role, rather than a leading role. Giving the allies the leading role would carry additional benefits: the US would come across as a liberator, not an invader; it would prove to the Afghans that the US was not fighting the Afghans but only those who supported terrorism. The Northern Alliance, or what the Pentagon

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civilian leadership called the ‘regional leaders’, could both fight the remnants of Al Qaeda to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist base once again – the main US goal after ousting the Taliban regime – and keep the peace on the streets, so Rumsfeld and his two civilian advisors, unlike Powell, saw no need for additional US forces. For the defence leadership, keeping a strong presence would make it easier for Al Qaeda and the Taliban to depict the US as an occupier like the Soviet Union and consequently provoke Afghans’ historic confrontation to invaders, thus diverting the US focus from hunting terrorists. Never had a foreign invader managed to rule the Afghans, who always relished a great deal of autonomy, so it was wise that Bush left the governing of Afghanistan to the Afghans, and instead focused on chasing terrorism, which required a light footprint. Finally, there was a specific reason that Rumsfeld refused a bigger commitment. Before Operation Enduring Freedom began in Afghanistan, Rumsfeld visited Afghanistan’s neighbours and found that Pakistan did not trust India, Russia and Iran, and saw the Northern Alliance as the latter countries’ proxies; India did not trust Pakistan; Russia distrusted US relations with Central Asian states; and almost every state did not trust Russia. In short, the region was full of ‘suspicion and intrigues’, and Rumsfeld did not find an honest and forthright country, as every neighbouring country had ‘an agenda’ for Afghanistan, often conflicting, and every country was prepared to ‘jockey for influence’ in whatever government was going to be established in Kabul. Based on this, as well as Afghanistan’s inherent complexities described in the Introduction, Rumsfeld told Bush that they would not be able to bring about stability, let alone democracy. He did not see a future in which Afghanistan’s different ethnic groups would come together to create a central government based on the will of the people. He advised Bush to limit the mission to dealing with the terrorists (a counterterrorism strategy) and get out as soon as possible, or else, like Beirut, Afghanistan would become a ‘swamp’ for the US. His Beirut experience had taught him that it was easier to get into something than it was to get out of it. Beirut had also educated him never to use US troops as a peacekeeping force; they were ‘too big’ a target. So against what Powell and the State Department wanted, the Defense civilian leadership (and Vice-President Cheney) advised Bush

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that the US would fight the foes and liberate the country, but not occupy or engage in peacekeeping or nation-building operations.27 If one goes by Bush’s speeches, he, too, held the same opinion as the Defense Secretary and the Vice-President. Bush had made it clear during the election campaign that US ground forces were there to win wars, and consequently should not be used for ‘open-ended’ and ‘unclear military’ assignments, and certainly not for nation-building. Bush and Rice called nation-building ‘unfocused’, ‘ill-judged’ and a waste-ofresources activity. When Afghanistan was in the process of being ‘liberated’ from the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Bush told his War Cabinet that US ground forces would not stay to do the ‘police work’; he wanted to transfer policing and other similar undertakings to the coalition partners. The White House spokesman Ari Fleischer made it clear numerous times that Bush did not want US troops to be engaged in nation-building and peacekeeping. As for the decision in question, Bush saw that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were defeated, so he accepted the military advice that the 5,000 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 8,000 US troops in Afghanistan were the right number to pursue terrorists. He and the military were cautious about repeating the experience of the Soviet Union and the British, whom the Afghans viewed as an occupier.28 Accordingly, the War Cabinet decided to deploy 8,000 US troops with the mandate to hunt the Taliban and Al Qaeda members – that is, a solely counterterrorism strategy – and not to engage in peacekeeping and reconstruction, a decision that essentially set out US Afghan policy for Bush’s remaining years in office. The 5,000 ISAF only remained in Kabul, as the extension beyond Kabul to villages would foster resentment among ‘a proud population’ and provide more targets for the Taliban to attack. Rumsfeld also successfully persuaded the other policy makers, especially the president, not to let Karzai threaten the use of US forces against ‘uncooperative’ and threatening leaders or warlords; Karzai should learn to use political ‘incentive’/‘disincentive’ and ‘patronage’ to continue to govern. Rumsfeld and his light footprint camp believed that a combination of a small number of US troops, Afghan forces, who mostly belonged to warlords, US air power and other modern technology would suffice to establish security in Afghanistan. The Defense

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Department yet again turned out to be the obvious winner. Richard N. Haass said that Powell ultimately failed to persuade the others, as the president, the vice-president, the secretary of defense and the national security staff all did not favour an ambitious project in Afghanistan. Powell seemed ‘resigned’, and when James Dobbins told him that it was not going to be satisfactory, Powell replied that it was ‘the best’ they could do.29 Why did Bush listen to his vice-president and secretary of defense, but not to his secretary of state? To provide an answer, it is important to shed light on Bush’s War Cabinet.

CHAPTER 3 AN INSIDER'S INSIGHT INTO BUSH'S WAR CABINET

The presidential candidate Bush in 2000 did not know about the outside world, nor did he seem to be interested in it. He had scarcely travelled outside America, did not read about other countries, and barely knew foreign leaders. During his election campaign he had no knowledge of who Musharraf was, and thought that the Taliban were a rock-and-roll band. However, in response to allegations that he was inexperienced in foreign policy, Bush would reply that he had one of the finest foreign policy teams in the history of America. Bush therefore was ‘a foreign policy novice’ dependent on the advice of the members of his most experienced team, including Richard (Dick) Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and, at times, George Tenet.1 Vice-President Cheney had worked for three presidents (Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush), been in the House leadership (Minority Whip, the second-ranking position in the Republican leadership), and had a seat on the House Intelligence Committee, as part of which he dealt with the Soviet threat to the Middle East, Latin America and South Asia, including Afghanistan. These positions had allowed him not just to gain a world of experience, but also to form ‘a practical sense of how things worked’ both within Washington and abroad. A vice-president constitutionally bears no responsibility and is only there to succeed the president if the latter is unable to complete his term. If asked, he could only give advice to the president, and the impact of his

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advice depended on whether the president listened to it. But Bush listened to Cheney’s advice regarding important policy issues. A ‘grateful’ Cheney and his esteemed mentor Rumsfeld believed that Bush did so for several reasons: Bush knew Cheney had no ‘personal agenda’ and thus the advice was treated as free from any personal or political ambition; Cheney kept his advice confidential and did not disclose it to the media; often kept his counsel in the meetings even if he disagreed with Bush; was a good listener; always ‘did his homework’; was always ‘on top of information’ that enabled him to ask important questions in the National Security Council (NSC) meetings to provide the president with information that otherwise would have not come to the surface; and got things done in ‘an unfussy way’.2 Others, however, claim that Cheney took advantage of Bush’s lack of knowledge in foreign policy and extended his leverage by appointing a team of foreign policy experts, consisting mainly of his staff. In Rice’s view, this was a team that tried to establish ‘an ultra-hawkish independent power center within the administration’, a team which operated separately from the NSC, reportedly increasing Cheney’s power by far compared to vice-presidents from previous administrations.3 It seems that a mixture of personal qualities that Bush appeared to have liked – command of bureaucracy, deep knowledge of and experience in foreign policy, Cheney’s decision not to run for presidency – as well as having his own foreign policy team, access to the president, and Bush’s promise to keep Cheney involved in policy making made Bush respect his vice-president, value his advice,4 and as such turn him into one of the most influential vice-presidents in the history of America. The vice-president in turn trusted, respected and admired his esteemed mentor, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Like the vice-president, Rumsfeld was a dominant and well-known politician with an impressive CV; he had been considered four times for vice-presidency (Nixon, Ford, Ford, Reagan), once running for the presidency; a member of Congress at the age of 30; a White House Chief of Staff/Secretary of Defense (Ford); an Ambassador to NATO (Nixon); Personal Representative of President Reagan to the Middle East; and a successful (and by 2001 quite wealthy) private sector chief executive officer. Rumsfeld’s standing with the president was dramatically enhanced by Cheney’s close friendship/working relationship with the secretary of

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defense, dating back over three decades, in which, in various positions, Cheney had worked as either an assistant or a deputy to Rumsfeld. A very ‘grateful’ Cheney reveals that it was Rumsfeld who brought him from an academic career into politics, helping him secure various positions at the White House in the 1960s and 1970s. Over the years, Cheney tried to express his gratitude by recommending Rumsfeld for certain posts, and eventually managed to have him appointed as Defense Secretary in the Bush Administration. Ultimately, Cheney could repay some of the gratitude he had owed to his ‘esteemed mentor’ Rumsfeld.5 Cheney was close to the president, and Rumsfeld to Cheney, and over time the two made a good team with the president. These two became the driving force when it came to foreign policy, as the president would heavily rely on the experience and prominence of his vice-president and defense secretary. Rumsfeld would make policy ideas in NSC meetings, and his close, trusted and old friend/confidant/prote´ge´ Cheney would provide additional support for them during the private lunches the president and vice-president had together. They, therefore, turned into two ‘giants’ who managed to control decision making within the administration.6 As seen in the previous chapter, policy ideas made by other departments, especially the State Department, did not appear to prevail if the two giants opposed them, including Powell’s policy proposal to prevent the Northern Alliance from entering Kabul abandoned by the Taliban before an international force was established. But, as seen in the previous chapters, the Defense Department nearly always triumphed when it fought for a policy idea; and even for more money. The Pentagon’s budget was increased from $293 billion in 2001 to $427 in 2006. But the budget of the State Department under Powell’s leadership continued to constitute approximately 6 per cent of that of the Pentagon.7 Like Cheney and Rumsfeld, Powell, too, had a world of experience in national security issues: a four-star general who had served as a commander of the US Army Forces Command in 1989, a National Security Advisor (Reagan), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bush Senior) and a possible presidential candidate with potential to succeed.8 It was due to his prestigious figure and deep experience that the candidate Bush apparently made him part of his team, as it brought political weight to the administration. Bush had an ‘easy-going’

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approach, Rumsfeld maintained, but not in relation to Powell, since Bush thought of Powell as a man with a lot of accomplishments. However, Powell soon disappointed Bush. Rumsfeld, Cheney and Feith piled up a number of complaints against Powell that seemed to have distanced Powell from the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld (plus the neoconservatives) triangle, particularly the president. The grievances were numerous. Powell refused to follow the president’s views and instructions, but preferred to listen to the career diplomats at the State Department. In comparison to Powell, a ‘loyal’ Rumsfeld made sure he held tight control of the generals to ensure that the civilian decisions – Bush’s instructions – were dutifully followed by the military. Powell criticised the administration’s policies to people outside of the administration, leaked information, did not work together with the Defense Department, and told lies when he claimed that Bush did not take the State Department’s position into account regarding foreign policy. Powell likewise incorrectly argued to have fought unilateralism and conservatism within the administration, since the secretary of state neither spoke at NSC meetings ‘in strong opposition’ to the viewpoints of the president or others, nor presented clear policy options before the president. Powell seemed to be more ‘comfortable’ discussing poll numbers than suggesting policy options, being ‘attuned to public approval’, and being hesitant to engage the military, but in favour of long-term sanctions.9 This description of Powell’s behaviour clearly shows that Powell did not favour the president’s course on any given subject, including policies made towards Afghanistan, and, instead of opposing it in NSC meetings, the State Department leaked its opposition to the media. In the process, Powell came across as good, reasonable and ignored, while Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld as bad, unreasonable and in charge. While the above account of Powell’s behaviour is open to question, it is obvious that Powell did not appear to feel that he was an insider, but an outsider, who found himself more in agreement with his career diplomats than the president. The former are foreign policy experts who often do not agree with contradictions. Consequently, as it seems, Powell found it hard to become part of the circle which was driving the policy. The State Department – ‘the first among equals’ under the Constitution, which, in principle, is at the core of foreign policy decision

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making – should have been the one to influence and implement foreign policy. Powell in theory was the most important advisor to the president concerning foreign policy, as he was at the helm of coordinating the US activities overseas, yet it was the Defense Department that drove foreign policy.10 Powell also found it hard to become part of the inner circle due to the incompatibility of his beliefs, including past (military) experience. Cheney and Rumsfeld had little faith in economic sanctions and favoured military options,11 and therefore naturally found themselves in agreement with the Bush Doctrines that required tough and offensive actions against terrorists. But the Vietnam veterans, such as Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, as Mann reveals in his excellent book, were cautious about wars because many civilian leaders, some of whom had some kind of deferment (for example, Cheney, who had a student and later a parent deferment), did not understand war, as they studied it in an intellectual way, and had not seen first-hand ‘their friends get their heads blown off’ for a cause the American public did not believe in. Powell mistrusted those civilian officials who had no war experience, and once they pressed for war, Powell perceived them as the ‘latter-day versions of Vietnam’s Robert McNamara’. Powell was dismayed and frustrated by the ‘docility’ of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for ‘blindly’ fighting the war in Vietnam without asking the political leaders, who almost entirely had started the war, to produce clear objectives for them.12 Due to his frustration with the way the civilian leadership managed the Vietnam War, Powell developed conditions, later known as Powell Doctrines, for when to engage the US military in war. As explained in the previous chapter, many of these doctrines were incompatible with numerous aspects of the decision to hunt terrorists, and consequently Rumsfeld disregarded them, managing to lose Powell’s voice in the policy making process. Powell partly refrained from being insistent on his doctrines because the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and its subsequent policies were essentially military decisions and, due to his military background, he could not influence them; he alleged some members of the administration, especially the turf-conscious Rumsfeld, might feel sensitive.13 In September 2001, for example, when Secretary of State Powell telephoned Musharraf about the seven US demands, Rumsfeld was quick to complain that some of the demands had military

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implications, and yet the State Department had not consulted the Defense Department.14 Though Powell and Rumsfeld previously did not work closely together, Powell must have been aware of the saying among the Republicans that, when it came to defending one’s bureaucratic turf, Rumsfeld remained ‘the best’ since he did not lose. When Rumsfeld became White House Chief of Staff in the Ford Administration, he strengthened his power and cut Kissinger’s, and, in order to consolidate his power further, he assumingly engineered the Halloween Massacre of the Cabinet reshuffle. Rumsfeld reversed the way Cheney-Powell briefings during the Bush Senior Administration had been conducted, as when the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Myers appeared before the press, Rumsfeld did all the talking.15 Ironically, Rumsfeld, as Feith himself admits, would defend the realm of his department, but would equally not hesitate to encroach on the turf of other departments. For example, the Defense Department’s advice regarding the GWOT was not limited to the viewpoint of the Defense Department, but encompassed issues that fell within the authority of other departments.16 With such a bureaucratic man (and with such a driving and combative style, someone who ‘didn’t have the best bedside manner in the world’)17 at the Pentagon, who had the overwhelming support of the vice-president and the trust of the president, Powell could do little when it came to military decisions, such as the counterterrorism strategy, or the decision to launch the GWOT. Moreover, with the president and vice-president not trusting him, and with his doctrines being thrown out of fashion, he could hardly persuade the president to take his policy opinions in an anti-terrorism war that was run mainly (and successfully so far) by the Defense Department, a war in which the US military was seen as the leading, if not the only, solution to ‘root out’ terrorism. Neither would the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage influence the counterterrorism strategy. Armitage was close to and extraordinarily loyal to Powell, and their friendship went back to the Vietnam War. Supportive of the Powell Doctrines, he shared a similar outlook with Powell on ‘events and people’. Like Powell, Armitage was a Vietnam veteran, mistrustful of people with strong views and ideologies, such as Wolfowitz and Feith, as their experiences of Vietnam had taught

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them that events in many cases ‘outrun’ someone’s preconceptions. Like Powell, he disliked Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz (the feeling was mutual on Rumsfeld’s side) and did not get on with Cheney, whom he believed to have not supported him in the Bush Senior Administration to win the approval of Congress as Secretary of the Army. Cheney likewise disliked him for his continuous grumbling over the matter.18 The NSA Condoleezza Rice had previously worked exclusively in the Bush Senior Administration and therefore had been close to none of the two camps. Bush, however, was close to Rice and liked and trusted her more than anyone in the Cabinet. Rice had daily access to Bush, knew the president far better than the rest of Cabinet, and both spent a lot of time together.19 Due to this personal access and special depth of likeness by the president, Rice could have been one of the most influential NSAs and a strong voice in matters debated at NSC, but she seemingly failed to make herself heard due to three obstacles. The first was her tendency to ‘stay out’ of policy fights between Powell and Rumsfeld. Instead she often ‘bridged’ differences in the policy making process, rather than bringing different policy options to the president to make a decision. She would employ a policy suggestion from one department and a process from another. In trying to seek consensus, she temporary appeased agencies but left ‘fundamental differences unaddressed’. Consequently, the unhappy agency, most of the time the State Department, would leak its policy options through the media. Thus, instead of being debated in the NSC, these policy opinions were scrutinised in the media. Rumsfeld disapproved of this ‘detrimental’, ‘uncommon’ and ‘academic’ way of handling the policy making process, which did not take advantage of Bush’s willingness/firmness to make difficult decisions, and prevented the NSC from engaging in the candid, open and fair hearing of views. Rumsfeld, on numerous occasions, suggested solutions to Rice (in effect, telling Rice how to run her NSC), but she refused, perhaps believing that bringing interagency differences before the president would have shown a personal shortcoming on her side.20 Second, as a novice NSA, she was more tolerated than respected by Rumsfeld, Cheney and even, on occasions, Powell. At times Rumsfeld refused to share war planning with her, and Cheney seized major responsibilities from her, such as chairing the Principals Committee. As Provost at Stanford University, she had no senior-level experience in

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government, and consequently ‘had some painful professional growing up to do before she would reach the stage of taking on either Cheney or Rumsfeld with either directness or success’.21 Standing against the two was complicated, due to their long experiences in the executive government and to the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld (plus the neoconservatives) triangle whose (productive/successful) policy suggestions were the driving forces behind the GWOT. Standing up to them could have been detrimental to her career, so Rice was careful to avoid confrontation with them. Instead she got on with her job by focusing on how to achieve Bush’s instructions by translating them into policy. In the process she neither questioned Bush’s instincts, the assumptions they derived from and their likely consequences, nor went against policy opinions made by Rumsfeld and Cheney. Furthermore, in the first few years after 9/11, Bush was certain of what to do and the defense leadership’s policy ideas fitted well with how to achieve Bush’s ‘what-to-do’, so she could hardly question these policy opinions at any rate.22 Finally, between the 9/11 terrorist acts, and the start of the Iraq War – or a period described by Francis Fukuyama as ‘the neoconservative moment’ – the doctrines had produced impressive results in Afghanistan. Domestic support for the GWOT, especially due to the military success of its first step in Afghanistan, was as high as it had been days after 9/11.23 So, perhaps no one, including Rice, naturally saw the need to question any aspects of the GWOT and its offshoot, the counterterrorism strategy, and went ahead with the policy opinions of their originators. Furthermore, the realist Rice, from the school of Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, believed (like Bush) that America was doing the world a favour by expanding the number of free and democratic states and thus creating ‘a new balance of power’ that favoured freedom. Accordingly, Rice genuinely did not disagree with the calling of ‘realism in the service of ideals’.24 The compatibility of this aspect of her belief with Bush and the neoconservatives must have been another reason why Rice did not go against the Bush Doctrines and Cheney and Rumsfeld’s broad definition of terrorism. Consequently she did not mind if policy making was commandeered (and even incapacitated – not to say, in certain cases, almost collapsed) by the two gigantic policy makers;25 and, to a certain extent, by the neoconservatives.

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The neocons were present from the start in the Bush Administration. Alongside Cheney and Rice, some of the neocons – Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Hadley, Lewis (Scooter) Libby – served as advisors during the 2000 pre-campaign period. Wolfowitz, as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was the leading and most influential neocon in the Bush Administration. He did his best to ensure his (neocon) men, most of whom had previously worked for him and been his decades-old friends, took important positions in the administration: Libby as Cheney’s Chief of Staff; Zalmay Khalilzad in charge of Afghanistan and Iraq at the NSC; Feith as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Richard Perle, one of the godfathers of the neoconservative movement, as the Head of the Defense Policy Board, an independent advisory group to the Secretary of Defense.26 Cheney and Wolfowitz had developed an enduring bond since the Bush Senior Administration when Wolfowitz had been Defense Secretary Cheney’s Under Secretary of Defense. Cheney saw Wolfowitz as one of those (Hadley and Libby) whom Cheney trusted the most. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz knew each other for years, and the former liked and respected the latter. Though a domineering character, Rumsfeld often showed deference to Wolfowitz. In fact, Feith continues, due to his previous posts, namely, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Reagan Administration, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Bush Senior Administration, as well as his position as the Dean of Johns Hopkins’ University School of Advanced International Studies, Wolfowitz had become an expert on East Asia and the Pacific and the Middle East, especially in relation to Iraq. As far as Rumsfeld was concerned, Wolfowitz’s knowledge was ‘encyclopaedic’.27 Rumsfeld therefore relied on Wolfowitz for security advice. His closeness with Cheney and Rumsfeld and the fact that Wolfowitz was seen as an expert strengthened Wolfowitz’s bureaucratic muscles in decision making and gave more weight to the policy suggestions of a Deputy Secretary of Defense whose job typically involved dealing with personnel, budget and management chores. According to Feith, many of the Pentagon’s policy ideas discussed in the previous chapter originated from Wolfowitz.28 Wolfowitz, Libby and Hadley must have also contributed to the policy making atmosphere within the presidential campaign

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environment. Since Wolfowitz served Bush as advisor on national security issues and missiles during the 2000 pre-campaign environment, it is very possible he (and his men) provided his opinions to the president (and Cheney and Rice) on how to deal with terrorism, how relevant planting democracy in the Middle East was to US national security, and how Saddam was a threat to US national security. Bush, a novice on foreign policy, might have been influenced by these pieces of advice, or seeds of neocon ideas, before 9/11 even materialised. During the making of the GWOT strategy, however, both Wolfowitz and Feith evidently made it possible for the neoconservative ideas and principles to be applied to US foreign policy by inserting neoconservative ideas into the advice and recommendations they (especially Feith as part of his job) provided Rumsfeld with, many of which made their way to the NSC meetings headed by Bush. Libby and, to a certain extent, Hadley then were effective within the White House by providing additional support for these ideas.29 Perle was effective in supporting them when he independently advised the Pentagon civilian leadership. Influenced by Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer, neoconservatives’ ideas could be summed up as follows: go after ‘tyranny’ by engaging in a direct military war and therefore abandon the strategies of deterrence and containment in favour of offensive military actions – always be prepared to solve problems through military means; be precise and firm in one’s decision/belief and (like President Reagan) call ‘a spade a spade’; be prepared to pre-empt an attack involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons; be prepared to act unilaterally if critical US interests were in question and the American allies proved sluggish; preserve US main objectives in the Middle East and South Asia, namely, keeping US and Western access to the regions’ oil; the US is and should act like an empire; preserve US pre-eminence (or ‘strategic depth’), partly by developing unmatched military strength and partly by preventing the emergence of a US competitor, especially a hostile one; and use the US pre-eminence (of which the neocons were very proud) to shape the future security environment by getting rid of dictators and authoritarian regimes, and instead spread American ideas, mainly democracy, to build a peaceful relationship among the great nations. Neocons – like the Democrat President Woodrow Wilson, and unlike Kissinger and Scowcroft – rejected ‘peace through the balance of power’ in favour of ‘peace through moral security’.30

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Fortunately for the neocons, Cheney and Rumsfeld agreed with those ideas, or else Secretary of Defense Cheney would not have approved the Defense Planning Guidance by Libby in 1993, and Cheney and Rumsfeld would not have been signatories to the founding Statement of Principles of the Project for the New American Century in 1997. William Kristol, son of influential neoconservative Irving Kristol, set up the project, which was considered to be ‘the political arm’ of the neoconservative movement. Like Wolfowitz and the other neoconservatives, Cheney and Rumsfeld, the ‘offensive realists’ or ‘conservative nationalists’ gave US military high priority, were in favour of a strong national defence, and preferred to use military power to ‘reshape’ the world according to their own ‘interests’. They were proud of, and had extraordinary belief in, US unmatched capabilities – money, weaponry, political influence and, especially, military might – and were certain of victories if the US engaged in wars. Moreover, they wanted to go on the offensive, favoured unilateralism, disapproved of nation-building/ using US forces for peacekeeping, showed strong opposition against communism/de´tente/the opening to Beijing, disapproved of any treaty curtailing the use of arms, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, had a commitment to American exceptionalism, and acted as if they ‘ran an empire’.31 As seen in the previous two chapters, many of the above neoconservative ideas and recommendations as well as Rumsfeld and Cheney’s viewpoints could be found in the reasoning of President Bush for developing his doctrines that greatly influenced the intervention in Afghanistan, and later the counterterrorism strategy. Like the neocons’, the attitude of Rumsfeld and Cheney during the preinvasion (Iraq) period was one of ‘incautious optimism’ (to some extent) of failing to balance ideals/goals with national capacities.32 For example, Rumsfeld suggested a wide campaign and Cheney supported it without question. One feature, however, that distinguished Cheney and Rumsfeld from the neocons (and Bush) was the vice-president and secretary of defense’s lack of enthusiasm with regard to the commitment to spread democracy, particularly in Afghanistan. Rumsfeld and Cheney always preferred a more practical and pragmatic approach; this was seen in Rumsfeld’s advice to President Bush before intervening in Afghanistan. If a force

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was willing to take over from the US in those ‘liberated’ countries, they cared less about the characteristics of the force. Since Bush (and surprisingly the ‘realist’ Rice) were very enthusiastic about spreading democracy, Cheney and Rumsfeld seemed to have gone with the president and never let it become an apparent disagreement among the three. Syria’s interference forced the Reagan Administration to withdraw from Lebanon in a humiliating manner, and Rumsfeld vowed to himself that in future the US would defeat those small countries – such as Syria, Iran, North Korea and, of course, Iraq – which opposed America’s national security interests.33 Accordingly, like the neocons, whose primary objective was (arguably) to oust the Saddam regime in Baghdad, Rumsfeld, too, wanted to get rid of a rogue nation like Iraq that posed a security threat to America. Iraq and Iran had a history of posing threats to America and thus were included in the ‘axis of evil’ list. Afghanistan was never on Rumsfeld’s list of rogue nations. He and Cheney therefore were not keen on leaving a large number of US troops for peacekeeping or rebuilding purposes. They wanted the GWOT to move to its next stage: Iraq. If there is anyone from the Bush Administration who has no regret about invading Iraq, it is the ‘conservative’ (‘I mean really conservative’)34 Cheney. It is therefore right to claim that the Bush Administration consisted of an alliance between the defence hawks and the neocons, and 9/11 only strengthened the alliance. 9/11 provided the defence hawks and the neoconservatives the chance to turn their (consistent) views into policy, thereby forming the GWOT strategy. Bush as president was ‘an eager enabler’, not an ‘active architect’, in the making of the GWOT. The naive/inexperienced (in foreign policy) and very angry-and-emotional-by-the-9/11-acts president’s gut feeling or instinct was to be tough and aggressive towards terrorism. So Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives’ ‘belligerence’ fitted very well with the president’s own natural tendencies. Cheney and Rumsfeld, together with the neocons, might have been unable to launch America into such a broad war had President Bush not agreed with them. ‘George W. Bush considered himself a visionary, comfortable with big “strategic plays” and scornful of piecemeal, incremental policy making unworthy of America’s greatness’.35 The ‘top-down, no-nonsense, decisive, macho leader’, who was proud of US abilities, wanted, like Presidents Wilson

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and Roosevelt, to be seen as a ‘transformational’ president, someone who was in the process of changing the direction of history by making terrorism ‘obsolete’ on the face of the earth and instead spreading democracy.36 The next question to consider is whether the GWOT and its offshoot, the counterterrorism strategy, managed to root out terrorism once translated into action at domestic and international levels.

CHAPTER 4 THE COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AT THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE, 2002—8

As seen, the neocons, the defence hawks Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the president’s beliefs, past experiences and images formed assumptions that the counterterrorism policy – and therefore the Global War on Terror (GWOT) strategy – were based on; assumptions that convinced the principals that the strategy would accomplish its overreaching objectives. Whether the policy assumptions turned out to be false or accurate is the subject of this chapter.

The Iraq Preoccupation Makes the Afghanistan War Forgotten By 2006 the Taliban, the Haqqani network and the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Hezb-e-Islami had managed to launch a hurricane of terrorist activities with the goal of toppling the Hamid Karzai Government and force US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops out of Afghanistan, and by 2007 and 2008 it was at its worst. As of 2004, and especially in 2005 and 2006, the sectarian violence (and insurgency) in Iraq equally started to get worse, turning the country into, as President George W. Bush put it, a ‘hell’. Against the Bush Administration’s incautiously optimistic (and even arrogant) assumption, the US, with all its unmatched capabilities, was on the brink of ‘losing’ its GWOT in

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(both) Afghanistan (and Iraq) when the policy met the reality there. Democratisation, liberation and stabilisation gave way to a lengthy insurgency (sectarian) violence and war.1 One important factor why the Bush Administration did not succeed in Afghanistan was the impact of the Iraq War over the Afghanistan War. After the 9/11 terrorist acts up to early 2008, the Iraq War kept the administration preoccupied with what I describe as five main developments or phases. First, the National Security Council’s (NSC) debate over the possibility of whether to include Iraq in the first phase of the GWOT prevented the NSC from debating the Afghan strategy in detail in September 2001. Second, to prepare for the Iraq invasion and to produce in-depth plans for post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the NSC held daily meetings throughout 2002 and early 2003, not just among themselves but with allies, to the extent that, according to Bush, the policy makers’ phone lines were ‘burning’. Third, the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) saga (2003 – 4), that is, the US media attacked Bush and Cheney for lying and misleading the country into the Iraq War when the administration did not find WMD (used as the primary justification for invasion) in Iraq. Eventually, CIA Director George Tenet and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley had to take the blame for the wrong intelligence. This, according to Cheney and Rice, amounted to ‘a public apology’, which seriously hurt the credibility of the Bush Administration. Fourth, the increasing sectarian violence/insurgency in Iraq (2004 – 7), which turned the American media, Congress, and, most importantly, two-thirds of Americans against the Bush Administration, to the extent that some Democrats, who had gained control of both Houses of Congress in the mid-term elections in late-2006, were considering ‘impeachment hearings’ against Bush. Fifth, when Bush approved the unpopular surge in Iraq (to employ the counter-insurgency strategy), Congress, the US media and many influential actors both within (such as Senator Barack Obama) and outside the US – all of whom believed that America had ‘lost’ the GWOT in Iraq and Afghanistan – opposed the surge for not being the right strategy to solve the sectarian violence in Iraq. Congress instead

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sent Bush a war-funding bill, mandating the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq; Bush vetoed the bill. By the final two phases, not just domestic support, but also international support for the GWOT had been lost and Bush and Cheney’s popularity (not just at home but worldwide) was at its lowest. During these five phases, especially the last four, the Administration, Congress, the American (and international) media and the American public at large were so engaged with the Iraq saga that it had little time for the Afghanistan War.2 Fortunately for the administration, Bush’s gamble paid off in late 2007; the surge had worked and domestic pressure began to ease off after the security situation had significantly improved, as Al Qaeda had been weakened, Shi’a militia extremists had been disrupted and ethnosectarian violence had been reduced.3 But by then it was too late for the ‘forgotten war’ in Afghanistan, as a total of six years had been wasted! The administration’s reaction to the changing situation in Afghanistan varied over the six years. Between 2003 and 2005, the administration would showcase, especially for the 2004 presidential election, the achievements in Afghanistan cited in the Introduction. Moreover, well into 2005 the policy makers, US officials from Afghanistan, certain members of Congress and the media to some degree believed that the US was winning in Afghanistan.4 By 2006, however, the administration knew that there was a resurgence on the rise in Afghanistan and that the US had not been winning. Though the administration initially tried to cover it, some of its senior members began to admit that the administration could not provide sufficient resources, namely, enough boots on the ground, sufficient time and attention, and an appropriate level of financial aid, because all their attention was focused on Iraq. On the contrary, key US capabilities and the most experienced and the best qualified US personnel from all relevant agencies (for example, the Afghan-American Zalmay Khalilzad, who had deep knowledge of Afghanistan) were taken out of Afghanistan and sent to Iraq. The US had 20,417 troops in Afghanistan but 141,100 in Iraq in 2006, and out of the overall funding allocated for the two wars, only 13 per cent went to Afghanistan; the rest (87 per cent) were directed to the Iraq War. In the same year, due to the Iraq pressure, US aid fell by 38 per cent for Afghanistan, and Rumsfeld wanted to withdraw 3,000 US troops,

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but, due to the opposition from NATO and US officials in Afghanistan, he had to abandon the plan. During the research for this book it became clear that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations between 2004 and early 2008 held a few hearings on Afghanistan compared to many dozens on Iraq, especially hearings on evaluating new strategies for the latter. Afghanistan, too, was in need of reviving the counterterrorism strategy, as its ‘bicycle’ by 2006 was equally ‘teetering’. But the administration (and Congress) did not have the necessary resources and therefore could not act in accordance with the changing situation in Afghanistan, allowing the ‘good war’ in Afghanistan to go ‘bad’. In a frank admission before the House Armed Services Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen, with whom Gates would agree, said it was ‘a matter of resources and capacity’, as in Afghanistan the Bush Administration did what it could, but in Iraq the administration did what it ‘must’.5 It was not just a matter of ‘resources’ and ‘capacity’, but also a case of the Bush Administration being pressurised, nervous, worried and even fearful between late 2003 and early 2008 for facing the same fate as the Lyndon Johnson Administration, that is, losing another war and leaving another Vietnam behind. In fact, losing the Iraq War had worse consequences than the Vietnam War, because, as Bush anxiously thought, in Iraq Al Qaeda would be left in control of a country with vast oil reserves and pose a serious threat of further attacks on the US, and further embolden Iran in pursuit of nuclear weapons. Bush knew that in Iraq there were about 10,000 Al Qaeda operatives, compared to a few hundred in Afghanistan. It was true that the situation had deteriorated in Afghanistan in 2006, but not to the extent it had done in Iraq. In Afghanistan the south and east were insecure, but the Afghan Government was strong enough to manage the insurgency. But the Iraqi Government could not, and therefore, as Rumsfeld and Bush as well as Gates admitted, the entire focus was on finding a solution to the Iraq War in 2006 and 2007, while allowing Afghanistan to slide down the priority list.6 Bush found that the world, and the bureaucracy in Washington, DC, were more complex than he had perceived them. Congress, mainly the Democrats (and the media) had turned Washington, DC, itself, as Gates claimed, into a ‘war zone’;7 a really politically intense milieu. It was mostly to do with Bush’s false policy assumptions.

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Indeed, the Bush Administration, as Gates claimed, had assumed that the Iraq War would not affect their counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan because the Iraq War would, too, be ‘successful’ within months, and the US, as part of its task of ridding the world of terrorists and rogue states, would be moving to the third target: perhaps one of the states from what Bush called the ‘axis of evil’. Furthermore, some called it the ‘Afghanistan War’, but the administration strongly assumed by the beginning of 2002, especially at the time they made the counterterrorism strategy, that there was no war in Afghanistan. It had ended, as the Taliban and Al Qaeda were gone: killed, injured, imprisoned or simply disappeared. Rumsfeld made a public announcement to that effect in early 2003.8 As seen, the administration had been proved false. The fierce opposition of the allied countries (including France and Germany) to the Iraq invasion, which had shown overwhelming support for the intervention in Afghanistan, including NATO historically invoking Article 5 and many of its members contributing troops and treasure in the Afghanistan intervention, revealed the blow to the assumption that the US would continue to receive international support for its sustained anti-terrorism campaign. The US policy makers, with all their ‘soft power’, could not persuade their closest NATO allies, let alone others such as Russia or China, to join the US in the second phase of the anti-terrorism campaign to remove the Saddam Hussein regime, and therefore had to invade Iraq without a UN resolution. The division was so deep that it even made some analysts predict that NATO would split.9 It must have been the first revelation to Bush that the world did not operate in the black-and-white frame (be with or against us) in which he had seen it in late 2001. Bush believed at the start of his anti-terrorism campaign that he and the US (the latter being ‘a force for good’) were doing the world (and the American public) a favour by ridding it of terrorism/oppressive regimes (an enemy to all, including Muslim countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) and instead spreading democratic values (beneficial for every human being, including Muslims). Bush had assumed that the people of these subcontinents would support US intervention, since they had been oppressed for years but had no chance to liberate themselves. But the president found it shocking when the US and he did not receive a hero’s welcome both at home and in the two invaded

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countries as the war continued. Unlike what the Taliban and Al Qaeda tried to portray (and many Afghans believed), however, I found no evidence to show Bush or his administration was at war with Islam. Conversely, Bush perceived Islam as a peaceful religion that did not permit the killing of innocent people, but terrorists blasphemed it by giving it a wrong interpretation.10 Another reason why the administration was overconfident in 2002 in its decision to wipe out terrorism worldwide was due to the GWOT being a ‘smart’ war that required thousands of US ground troops, as opposed to hundreds of thousands, and a few billion US dollars, rather than hundreds of billions. The effectiveness of the assumption in question was going the administration’s way up to the invasion of Iraq, as Afghanistan had been ‘liberated’ with a few hundred US forces/ operatives and the cost of the war in Afghanistan stood at $3.8 billion by January 2002, and the annual cost of the GWOT was expected to be less than $10 billion. But by the middle of Bush’s second term the GWOT had cost thousands of US lives (and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and Afghans) and hundreds of billions of US dollars, and so it was no longer an economical war. US abilities, especially its technologically advanced weapons – as the newly appointed US Commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, told Bush – had failed to substitute for ground forces.11 Petraeus offered a new strategy named counter-insurgency for Iraq to a ‘deeply’ concerned president, a strategy that Petraeus had successfully used in Mosul early in the war. Petraeus told Bush that the strategy’s premise was that basic ‘security’ was needed before ‘political gains’ could follow, and once the US won over the general population, terrorists would lose support among the population and disappear of their own accord. For Petraeus, what was required in Iraq and Afghanistan was an understanding about the people and their cultures, as well as the motivations and politics of the insurgency, not ‘transformation’. By using highly technical weapons to hunt terrorists, the US would never win over the population; only reversing (and, eventually, getting rid of) the feeling of insecurity was the answer.12 It was the reverse of Rumsfeld’s counterterrorism strategy, which cared not about the ordinary people and their security, but about killing terrorists. For Rumsfeld, it was the responsibility of the Afghans (and the Iraqis) to establish security for themselves. Rumsfeld believed that the US needed to help the Afghans (and the Iraqis) to help themselves,

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and if the US did not take its hands off ‘the bicycle seat’, the Afghans/ Iraqis ‘would never learn to ride’. Bush disagreed, saying if the Afghans/ Iraqis ‘can’t do it, we will. If the bicycle teeters, we’re going to put the hand back on. We have to make damn sure we do not fail.’13 Bush’s quotation was another way of admitting that the ‘light footprint’ aspect of the GWOT rested on a false assumption, as ordinary people could not be assumed, at least for the first few years, to establish security without US help. Bush’s quotation showed the initial thinking in the direction of a counter-insurgency and when Rumsfeld showed opposition Bush replaced him with Robert Gates. The false assumptions discussed above (and some below) seemed to have weakened the bureaucratic muscles of the defence hawks and the neoconservatives. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, those who advocated a light footprint, were long gone from the administration. The federal grand jury had indicted Cheney’s Chief of Staff Scooter Libby for having leaked the covert identity of a secret CIA agent, and the indictment had adversely affected Cheney’s foreign policy team. Besides, Condoleezza Rice was the Secretary of State, and, unlike 2002, she had grown in confidence and was more protective of the State Department’s turf. Unlike Colin Powell, she was close to Bush and consequently much more influential in foreign policy. Unlike Rumsfeld, she got on well with the new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who was more of a team player, and both did not tend to allow Cheney to interfere in their departments’ affairs. In fact, the NSC excluded Cheney from certain foreign policy decision making, particularly when it knew that Cheney had opposing ideas. Cheney’s power over foreign policy had therefore diminished considerably, and it was no surprise that Rumsfeld was easily replaced, despite Cheney’s attempts to save him. From this point on, one can see that Rice, Hadley and Gates, with whom, according to Gates, Bush agreed on practically every issue, as well as General Petraeus, began to influence Bush in handling the GWOT. Furthermore, by now, Bush was not so much in broadcasting mood as he had been in early 2002, so he did not seem to mind his instincts being questioned, especially by his National Security Advisor Hadley.14 But regardless of who had the more bureaucratic power within the White House, none of the policy makers could find a solution to the ‘Pakistan problem’.

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Pakistan Played the Role of both a Firefighter and an Arsonist Renowned Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid gives a fascinating account of how Musharraf and his Cabinet discussed the seven US demands made by Powell in September 2001. In the meeting, the nine corps commanders, some of whom were said to have been supporting the Islamist fundamentalist parties and most of those were believed to be supporters of the Afghan Taliban, told Musharraf that US demands were unacceptable as the US offered nothing in return. They added that there would be a negative domestic reaction by deserting the Taliban; the Kashmiris would particularly be disappointed in the military, thinking they might be next. Musharraf warned his commanders that if Pakistan did not cooperate, there would be severe consequences. India would take the opportunity and offer bases to the US military, and Pakistan would then face a hostile India allied with US military forces. Bush could declare Pakistan a terrorist state and make it a target of his doctrines; the US could then target Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from neighbouring Afghanistan. And the Kashmiri cause would seriously be jeopardised. In short, Pakistan would lose on all fronts and its very existence would be put in danger. It was not a case of bravery or cowardice, added Musharraf, but of protecting Pakistan’s national security – defined by the military as keeping arch-enemy India at bay (including in Afghanistan); proliferating nuclear weapons; trying to either control or exercise preeminent power over the government in Kabul, both for Pakistan’s own interests (including making use of Afghanistan’s natural resources, such as water) and to pre-empt new Pashtun threats to Pakistan’s unity (since no Afghan Government had accepted the Durand Line as its official border, which had unnaturally separated ‘one brother from the other’ by dividing the Pashtun tribal lands in two); and, to a lesser extent, especially in later years, dealing with threats from radical Islam within Pakistan.15 This way, in Musharraf’s opinion, at least they could still keep India at bay and there would be no danger to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. After seven hours of discussion, they agreed to accept the seven US demands for the time being, but later the Pakistanis would express their private reservations and not necessarily accept all the American requests.

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According to Rashid, Pakistan’s policy was summed up in the phrase: ‘First we say yes and later say but . . .’16 Musharraf had to come up with this two-faced policy, since he could neither alienate his generals nor say no to the most powerful state in the world. Like Iago from Othello, Pakistan’s role in US Afghan policy was insincere and disingenuous from the start of the GWOT drama in Afghanistan, playing the role of both a firefighter and an arsonist. Musharraf then saw US Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin on the evening of the meeting and voiced his acceptance of the seven demands, but asked for US leniency, patience, understanding, support and carefulness not to ‘push’ Musharraf ‘too hard’ because of the repercussions from his decision to support the US. The US, of course, initiated financial support in accordance with Pakistan’s requests – which were the removal of all US sanctions, the forgiveness of $3 billion US debt, the resumption of military supplies, and more loans from the US and the World Bank. The policy of not pushing Musharraf too hard inhibited the Bush Administration’s robustness in dealing with Musharraf’s two-faced policy and proved detrimental to the administration. The Bush Administration refused to place conditions on its financial assistance and did not ask for the handover of the Taliban commanders, since both policies were deemed to push Musharraf too hard. Instead of using US assistance to fight extremists, the Pakistani Army used it to strengthen its military capabilities, and assist the very Taliban and the Haqqani network that were fighting US forces; US financial assistance was used for killing US troops in Afghanistan.17 So it was damaging the continued refusal of the Bush Administration for many years to listen to the frustrated voices of Afghan, US and NATO officials from Afghanistan, who claimed that the Pakistani Army provided active support for the Taliban. Bush believed in personal bonds, and since he had established one with Musharraf, he did not believe Musharraf would deceive him. Powell liked Musharraf and they were friends, and the former was disinclined to buy the claims about Pakistan’s secret support for the Taliban. Rumsfeld did not want to put pressure on Musharraf because the latter could sabotage the GWOT and the search for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Rice, Mullen and Anne Patterson, Ambassador to Pakistan, called Pakistan a steadfast, historic and vital ally in the GWOT.

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Officials from the Pentagon thought of Pakistan as ‘part of the solution, not the problem’. CENTCOM Combatant Commander General John Abizaid stated in Kabul, as late as August 2006, that he ‘absolutely’ did not believe that Pakistan was assisting the Taliban. Almost all of the above invoked Pakistan’s achievements of having captured a number of key Al Qaeda leaders as a justification for Musharraf’s cooperation. In fact, in the presidential campaign of 2004, the Bush Administration would use Pakistan’s alliance as one of the greatest achievements of the GWOT. Many in Congress seemed to be of the same view as the administration.18 By late-2005, however, divisions in the Bush Administration over Pakistan’s complicity on the GWOT in Afghanistan had begun to show – but almost four years were lost. Khalilzad revealed some of these rifts, consistently warning senior ‘colleagues’ in Washington about the support and sanctuary provided to the Taliban by the Pakistani military, particularly Pakistan’s intelligence service, the Directorate Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Karl Eikenberry, who became the Head of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan in 2005, admitted that he eventually became convinced of Pakistan’s collusion. In Washington, senior policy makers began to accept that the ISI supported the insurgency, but views differed as to whether senior officials from the Pakistani Government and military were too involved.19 Between 2006 and 2007, however, the Bush Administration gathered solid evidence of senior-level complicity. The evidence proved that the ISI and the Army provided assistance to the Taliban and other insurgents in a variety of forms: arranging sanctuary and training; supplying military, logistical, financial and medical support; running factories (madrassas) to produce manpower; helping insurgents cross the border; aggressively collecting intelligence on the movement of Afghan and coalition forces in eastern and southern Afghanistan and then passing it on to the insurgents; planning military operations; helping the spread of propaganda; assisting ‘the wrong people’ to obtain high-profile jobs in the three branches of the Afghan state; helping the spread of ethnic, linguistic, tribal, sectarian and other divisions among Afghans (through a variety of means, including through high-profile people in the three branches of the state and certain media outlets); and staying regularly in touch with the Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, his son Siraj Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.20

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A worried Bush told Musharraf of Pakistan’s duplicity in spring 2006, but the latter refuted the allegations, reiterating that he was ‘totally’ cooperative with the US in the GWOT in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But when the State Department provided targets for Pakistan, the accomplishment of which would have closed the sanctuary in Pakistan, Pakistan did not cooperate. Moreover, numerous truces and arrangements that Musharraf made with Pakistani Taliban and tribal leaders, some of which were aimed at helping stop the Taliban from recruiting members and infiltrating into Afghanistan, failed one after the other. After years, Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld admitted that the primary cause of the trouble in Afghanistan did not originate in Afghanistan, but it came from Pakistan. It became clear to Bush that ‘Musharraf either would not or could not fulfil all his promises’. For Bush, the Pakistani Army played a double game because it was ‘obsessed’ with the threat coming from India, and the Afghan Taliban was part of ‘the answer’ to that threat.21 Consecutive Pakistani governments since 1975 kept the same strategic position that Afghanistan should be ‘a proxy in the wider regional’ contest with India, and the threats the Islamic extremists presented to the stability of Pakistan should be countervailed by ‘the geopolitical’ and strategic advantages they provided Pakistan with. For the Pakistani Army, the control over the land beyond ‘the Sulaiman Mountains’ (southern and eastern Afghanistan), which would give them ‘strategic depth’ against India, was a vital national security issue, otherwise they would be left with their backs against ‘the wall’ (Afghanistan) if and when India attacked Pakistan. Internal extremists, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, could both provide manpower to the Afghan Taliban and be used against India in the Kashmir jihad. Using extreme groups would therefore enable the ISI to have sufficient influence in the politics of Afghanistan and the region. In case Lashkar-e-Taiba or the Afghan Taliban went against the ISI’s wishes, they would be ‘intimidated’ or even ‘disciplined militarily’.22 The Afghan Taliban therefore provided Pakistan with a government in Afghanistan that the Pakistani Army had desired since the middle of the 1970s, because it was against India, ‘Pashtun-dominated’, and ‘sufficiently religious’ but ‘not nationalist enough’ to raise the issue of Pashtunistan. By 10 September 2001, arguably 90 per cent of Afghanistan was under the control of the Pakistan-backed Taliban. By many accounts, the

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remaining ten per cent was predicted to be soon taken by them following the assassination of the charismatic and well-respected Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. If that had occurred, Pakistan would have been in complete occupation of Afghanistan. But Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan reduced from ‘90 per cent’ to almost ‘zero’, as the Bush Administration allied themselves with the Northern Alliance to oust the Taliban. Pakistan’s worries were not addressed when it pleaded with the Bush Administration not to rely heavily on the Northern Alliance and not to let them take over Kabul. As seen in Chapter 2, Rumsfeld opposed it. Once the Northern Alliance moved 6,000 troops into Kabul, the ISI’s ‘worse nightmare’ came true, and the ISI told the Pakistani media that Bush had betrayed them, and that the Northern Alliance leaders were proxies of India who were now in control of Kabul. The Northern Alliance control of the government meant Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan, not to say in the region, was significantly reversed. Instead, India, Iran and Russia – all regional supporters of the Northern Alliance, and all, especially India, Pakistan’s regional competitors – consolidated their influence in the Karzai Administration.23 India by far was the obvious winner. It took full advantage of the victory by establishing a huge diplomatic presence in Kabul and another four major cities in Afghanistan. It provided massive aid programmes. For Musharraf, the opening of numerous consulates in those Afghan cities closer to Pakistan had only one motivation: to interfere in Pakistan. The ISI accused the Afghan Government of providing the Indian secret agency, RAW, with access to Pakistan’s western borders, and training and funding Baloch and Sindhi dissidents in Pakistan. Bush, in 2006, to the abhorrence of Pakistan, offered India an agreement that endorsed India’s nuclear arsenal, giving India Great Power status. This was another ‘slap’ in Pakistan’s face, which further isolated Pakistan in the region. Thus, US intervention in Afghanistan had considerably reduced Pakistan’s sway in the region, particularly against its arch-rival, India. For Pakistan, the Indian threat was more important than its pledge to America. Yet, the naive Bush Administration assumed that Pakistan would continue to keep supporting the seven US demands. Contrary to the assumption, the ISI once again started its support for the Indiahating Taliban, which had successfully blocked the Indian presence for a

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decade, to regain its influence against India, Iran and Russia. The more Pakistan interfered in Afghan affairs, the closer Afghanistan became towards India, and the more intensified the war became. Without the US realising it, Afghanistan had become another ‘Kashmir’ – another battleground for balance of power – between India and its regional allies (Russia, Iran and some Central Asian states) and Pakistan and its allies (Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, China) who competed for influence while the US and its NATO allies found themselves enmeshed. The US-led anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan progressively evolved into a bloody regional contest between the US and its allies and all the major countries in the region, giving birth to a ‘New Great Game’ in the region.24 The Iraq War not only played a major role in reviving the New Great Game, but also diverted American attention from the central front: Pakistan.25 As the Bush Administration invaded Iraq and downsized its troops and other resources in Afghanistan, Pakistan turned its attention to Afghanistan; it had been long that Pakistan had been sharpening its sword. As the Bush Administration got deeply embroiled in Iraq by the end of 2003 and the Iraq War began to become unpopular, the Pakistani military started increasing its open secret support to the insurgents to launch the hurricane of violence in Afghanistan in 2005 and 2006. The Pakistani military must have known, and got emboldened by the fact, that the Bush Administration by then had squandered credibility nationally and support internationally, and was too financially, militarily, politically and psychologically exhausted to engage in yet another war with Pakistan. Had the Bush Administration not been stuck in Iraq, it would have been able to keep a close eye on Pakistan’s behaviour. Perhaps the need might never have arisen, since Pakistan would never have dared to create an obstacle to US Afghan policy if the Bush Administration still had its credibility and its ‘resolve’. As the situation became better in Iraq by the beginning of 2008, the Bush Administration turned its attention back to Afghanistan, and consequently approved orders that allowed US Special Operations Forces to carry out ground operations in Pakistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, which were executed in South Waziristan in September 2008. In response, Pakistan’s civilian government, its military, parliament and media went ballistic, warning that such operations were in breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty, and only Pakistan’s armed forces had such a right.

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Bush, who by 2008 was frustrated with Pakistan’s double game, and his policy makers seemed to be at a loss as to what to do with Pakistan. The US had exhausted all other means (political, diplomatic and financial), and the only option left (the military response) provoked such anger in Pakistan that it even ‘alarmed’ Bush.26 The Administration could not even apply sanctions for reasons explained in Chapter 5. But at the same time the failure to deny the insurgents its safe haven in Pakistan had ‘blocked strategic victory’ in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s support for the insurgents meant that the US was fighting an enemy that could always be reinforced from open-door tribal areas with more than half-a-million students in madrassas and 150 training camps and other facilities in which insurgents were trained and housed and sent to Afghanistan. Until the Taliban-producing factories and the sanctuary were there, the likelihood of the US winning the war was zero. US Commander in Afghanistan General McKiernan told Gates that if the US could find a way to take care of the safe haven in Pakistan, he ‘would secure Afghanistan in six months’. The commander had a point, as, on a daily basis, the insurgents crossed the border from the tribal areas with free will and attacked the Afghan and coalition forces.27 Pakistan’s support for the insurgents meant the US was not only not winning strategically and militarily, but also losing diplomatically, as more and more Afghans (and Pakistanis) believed in conspiracy theories discussed in the Introduction. Though such possibilities (conspiracy theories) were scarcely credible, they were widely believed by the Afghans and Pakistanis from all walks of life, significantly damaging the US standing among ordinary Afghans and Pakistanis. Afghans began to distrust America and its assistance towards Afghanistan, and began to lose hope once again. The Bush Administration knew that the ISI had been actively spreading these theories in Afghanistan. The ISI were sending messages that Afghanistan was ‘invaded’ and therefore there was a call for religious duty, jihad, upon each Afghan to defend his or her country against the US/the allies (or the kafirs, the ‘non-believers’) and the Afghan Government (or ‘the traitor’). The indoctrination also had a question for the (rural) Afghans: did they want to be a Shah Shujah (a British ‘puppet’) or a Wazir Akbar Khan (an Afghan hero who fought against the British Empire)?28 They were exactly the same messages that the

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CIA/ISI used to spread during the Soviet invasion. Portraying the US as an invader or occupier and the Karzai Administration as the ‘government of ‘traitor’/‘non-believers’ that needed to be rooted out refuted the Bush Administration’s assumptions that the US would be seen as supporter/liberator and the regime in Kabul as a ‘legitimate democratic government’. To make matters worse, the administration had used Afghanistan as an example of the states that sponsored terrorism to change their behaviour, but Pakistan’s support for the Taliban was now sending the opposite message; the US was stuck in Afghanistan (and of course in Iraq up to 2008) and could hardly do anything, so rogue countries could freely support terrorism and proliferate WMD. The Bush Administration had assumed that it wanted to ‘fight smart’, yet Pakistan’s interference eventually forced the Obama Administration to deploy almost 200 times more troops than the Bush Administration had used to defeat the Taliban/Al Qaeda in 2001. Pakistan’s support of the insurgents (as well as Iran and Syria’s secret backing of the Iraqi insurgents) not only cost the US the Afghanistan War, but also invalidated the Bush Doctrines. Policy makers accepted publicly that Pakistan’s direct support for the insurgents in Afghanistan (and Iran’s support of the Shi’a groups in Iraq) caused the deaths of thousands of US soldiers. Surely the Bush Doctrines, especially the ‘no distinction’ one, could have been just as applicable to both countries. Yet the Bush Administration did not take ‘the fight overseas to the enemy’, that is, the states supporting the terrorists – Pakistan, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria – to defeat them to ‘prevent’ further harm to US citizens in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Bush Administration eventually had to change its firm belief in American capabilities. Bush knew he could no longer use America’s technologically advanced military to achieve their ambitious goal of eliminating terrorism worldwide. With roughly 150,000 troops in Iraq, and with all its ‘soft powers’, the US found itself unable to tackle the sectarian violence there. With around 60,000 US/NATO forces in Afghanistan, the US could not stabilise two provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. If America could not achieve stabilisation in two provinces, how on earth could it eliminate terrorism or states supporting terrorism or proliferating WMD worldwide? It could not because, by 2008, the two wars had weakened the Bush Administration considerably, and

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thus the sense of ‘whatever it takes’ was gone. So, too, were the Bush Doctrines ‘over in reality’, though ‘rhetoric’ still continued.29

The Light Footprint Part of the Strategy Proved Disastrous Due to its aversion to nation-building and the preparations for the Iraq War, the Bush Administration, at the Tokyo Conference in 2002, handed over some of the responsibility of rebuilding the Afghan institutions to other states, assuming that these nations would shoulder the responsibility and the costs. This became known as the ‘lead nation’ approach. Germany, however, seriously failed to fund and manage the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP). For example, it allegedly only sent 41 trainers to train 3,500 Afghan officers, forcing the State Department in the middle of 2003 to take over the responsibility. Since it did not have its own branch to train the police, it contracted DynCorp. DynCorp did not have the capacity to rebuild a broken police force from scratch in ‘a tribal society’, and thus a frustrated Defense Department had to take over in 2006. In nearly four years, three different agencies handled the ANP, and by the time the Defense Department took over and increased its efforts to rebuild, incalculable damage had been done. But even then, as Seth Jones found, the ANP continued to be ‘ill-trained, poorly paid, under-equipped, and inadequately armed’. For a year or so, the Italians, who were responsible for rebuilding the justice system, failed to dispatch a team of experts to Afghanistan to provide training to the members of the judiciary, making ‘the underperforming Germans look good’. The World Bank ranked the Afghanistan justice system between 2002 and 2006 ‘in the top 2 per cent of the most corrupt countries’. In 2007, Afghanistan managed to get a place in the 99.5 per cent of the ‘most ineffective justice systems worldwide’, and Afghans continued to complain of pervasive corruption in the justice system. The outcome of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration was as bad as the justice system. Japan and the UN only managed to disarm low-profile militia and did not succeed in disarming warlords and commanders. The UK’s plan to reduce the cultivation of the opium poppy by 70 per cent by 2008 and by 100 per cent by 2013 proved to be a laaf (exaggeration) when opium production rose from a couple of hundred

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tonnes in 2001 to more than 8,000 tonnes in 2007. The growth in production enabled Afghanistan to provide more than 90 per cent of the world’s opium, which brought $4 billion into the Afghan economy, more than half of Afghanistan’s total legal economy of $7.5 billion for that year. The Taliban largely benefited both financially and politically (in the latter case, by providing security for farming communities) from the illicit drug trade. Moreover, as Ashraf Ghani and Ministers of Counter Narcotics General Khodaidad and Mobarez Rashidi claimed, it boosted corruption in the Afghan Government, because it influenced many ministries and governors as well as Members of Parliament. The US training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) was relatively successful compared to other areas. However, due to the intertwinement of the five pillars, failures in one neighbouring area meant failures in the others.30 The policy makers had incorrectly assumed that these countries would effectively shoulder their responsibility. When the Bush Administration itself was not interested in rebuilding the key institutions, essential to the establishment of good governance, other states obviously would not fully commit. It was a US war and the US should have handled it effectively. But the Bush Administration ‘piecemealed it . . . One of the problems is when everybody has a piece, everybody’s piece is made third and fourth priority. Nobody’s piece is first priority. Stuff didn’t get done.’31 If the US had established effective ANA, ANP and a legal system, and if the necessary weapons and ‘equipment’ were provided to them, rural Afghans in the south and east might have been protected, and hence there would have been little support for the Taliban, and law and order might not have been eroded. The absence of effective governance, or in fact, any governance in most rural parts of Afghanistan, distanced ordinary Afghans from the Afghan Government and the coalition forces, and made the job of the ISI much easier to recruit anti-government fighters.32 Handing over the responsibility to NATO in the middle of 2003 to minimise costs and avoid Afghanistan being a distraction to the next phases of the GWOT did not prevent the downward spiral of insecurity, as NATO suffered from three factors. First, as the situation deteriorated, NATO did not have the counterterrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities (the necessary level of troops, military equipment and other resources) to defend the population from the insurgents. Second, lack of

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cooperation/coordination between NATO and the US and the absence of unity of command to oversee reconstruction and stabilisation meant that every country was operating in the same area with ‘different missions and different rules of engagement’. Last, and most important, some NATO states, such as Italy, Spain, France and especially Germany, refused, despite constant US pressure, to allow their troops to join US forces in combat missions against the Taliban and other terrorist groups. For them, as promised by the Bush Administration, the Afghanistan mission was a reconstruction project or peacekeeping mission, and that was what their parliaments (and in Germany’s case, its Constitution) and their populations had allowed them to pursue, and hence their ‘caveats’ represented domestic realities. Britain, Canada, Australia, Denmark and the Netherlands, however, did not adopt many formal caveats. For Bush, the outcome was ‘a disorganized and ineffective force’, as coalition forces fought by different rules and many did not fight at all. General Dan McNeill, the NATO Commander in Afghanistan, admitted that the adoption of caveats, the lack of equipment and the lack of unity of command strongly hampered the ability of NATO commanders to make and implement military plans to deal ‘quickly’ with an effective and adaptive enemy, especially as the latter escalated violence in 2007 and 2008.33 McNeill’s admission also suggests that the US, contrary to the assumption, could not afford to fight the war alone. US Commanders in Afghanistan had to rely on NATO forces because the counterterrorism strategy allowed fewer US troops in Afghanistan. The small footprint aspect of the counterterrorism policy, especially in the first few years, resulted in ‘insufficient troop levels’ and ‘resources’ in any post-conflict construction since WWII. The US provided 1.6 troops per thousand Afghans, compared to 19.3 per thousand in Kosovo, or 17.5 troops in Bosnia, and $60 per Afghan, compared to $577 per inhabitant in Kosovo, or $277 per inhabitant in Bosnia.34 Moreover, the assistance provided had numerous shortcomings and consequently proved less effective. To begin with, neither the US/ NATO and their non-governmental organisations (NGOs) nor the Afghan Government had a clear, unified and long-term economic strategy. The lack of such a policy did not allow assistance to be distributed efficiently and to all corners of Afghanistan. Every country had its own agenda and acted by their needs and requirements, often

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allocating the aid to those areas where its forces were present or where it felt safe, and often their efforts were reactions to the problems and solving crises as they arose. Consequently, most provinces in the east and south were left out. Second, between 80 and 95 per cent of the assistance was channelled through NGOs and other international organisations, thereby creating a parallel bureaucracy and inevitably weakening the Afghan Government. While donors and NGOs refused to distribute their money through the Afghan Government, as they deemed it to be corrupt, they equally suffered from pervasive corruption. For example, some NGOs would spend 80 per cent of their budget on administrative costs, which should not have exceeded more than 15 per cent. Third, most US contracts would be conditional on American goods and services (many times more expensive). Worse, the US also gave multiple contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars to certain people (members of the powerful syndicate), who would sell them to others, and others yet to others. A million-dollar contract would eventually be sold for a quarter of its worth. Consequently, the quality of the job the contractors/subcontractors delivered was often ‘bad’, but the US turned a blind eye. Finally, their aid was aimed at short-term (humanitarian/drug eradication) solutions, that is, for one year, so that the donors could report back to their governments and the Afghan Government could make it part of its yearly budget plan. Both tried to make a point that Afghanistan received aid. Nevertheless, Afghans remained frustrated, as the US and other donors were not willing to invest in a long-term economic infrastructure, such as agriculture, mines, roads, factories, electricity and water systems/dams. Such investments would have enabled the impoverished Afghanistan to stand on its own feet and provide jobs for the Afghans in the long run. Most Afghans agreed that 80 per cent of the overall US/NATO assistance was wasted; that is, a handful of Afghan contractors, ministers, governors as well as some NGOs members profited, but most Afghans did not see the benefit.35 As explained in Chapter 5, the failure to build the nation, as had been promised by Bush,36 particularly the implementation of an economic infrastructure, disappointed the Afghans and strengthened the insurgency. It had a more severe impact when Bush announced a

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‘Marshall Plan’ – the military victory to be followed by a moral victory that would result in peace and both financial and physical security for the Afghans – and did not deliver it.37 Rumsfeld, however, argued that the US never had a ‘full-fledged’ plan to rebuild Afghanistan or ‘bring prosperity to’ its every corner. Such an objective ‘would have amounted to a fool’s errand’. Using American soldiers to ‘remake Afghanistan into a prosperous American-style nation state or to try to bring our standard of security to each of that nation’s far-flung villages would be unwise, well beyond our capability, and unworthy of our troops’ sacrifice’.38 While Afghanistan would not be as ‘prosperous’ as America, it at least required a sufficient number of troops to establish security. By limiting ‘the size, geographical scope, and functions’ of ISAF, and by repudiating the need to engage US forces in peacekeeping, the administration allowed large parts of Afghanistan to remain without authority; parts that eventually the powerful syndicate, notably warlords and other criminals, filled in. The administration had assumed that lowprofile US presence supported by warlords would make the US come across as liberator rather than occupier. While Pakistan’s interference did not allow for this characterisation (many of) the warlords played a major role in the lack of security, the collapse of law and order, the promotion of corruption, and the weakening of the Afghan Government by impeding the rebuilding of key institutions such as defence and interior, extorting money from ordinary Afghans, getting involved in the illegal drug trade/other criminalities such as land-grabbing and taking ownership of revenues.39 Some even used linguistic, tribal, ethnic and other differences to keep their reign and to take advantage of money the US and the Afghan Government gave them for maintaining the security of highways/ provinces and for doing US anti-terrorism war. Contrary to the assumption, Afghans did not see the warlords as ‘liberators’ and ‘friends’; they were terrified of them. The warlord strategy distanced ordinary Afghans from the US, planting the seeds of more and more distrust.40 So did the constant coalition bombardment. Since there were fewer troops, the US relied more and more on aerial bombardment, resulting in more civilian killings, and thus causing another blow to the Bush Administration’s effort to convince the Afghans that the US was there to help establish a peaceful Afghanistan.41

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Thus, almost every expert on Afghanistan – including many US officials, such as Bush, Cheney, Wolfowitz, four former US Ambassadors to Afghanistan, namely, Khalilzad, Robert P. Finn, Ronald E. Neumann and Eikenberry – believed that the light footprint part of the strategy proved disastrous for Afghanistan.42 Bush admitted that, in retrospect, the counterterrorism strategy’s ‘rapid success’ with low troop levels created ‘false comfort’, and the administration’s desire to maintain a light military footprint left the American commanders in Afghanistan ‘short of the resources’ they needed. It took several years, maintained Bush, for these shortcomings to become clear.43 By then, the insurgents had strengthened, the rural Afghans had remained as poor and hopeless as they had ever been, and so they had little inducement to risk their lives by standing against the Taliban or Haqqani network, and the administration was so embroiled in Iraq that it could not provide the necessary resources and troop levels to put things right.

CHAPTER 5 THE COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AT THE EVALUATION STAGE AND BUSH'S TILT TOWARDS A COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY, 2007—8

By 2008, the Afghans’ evaluation of Bush’s Global War on Terror (GWOT), especially its offshoot, the counterterrorism policy, was critical. They piled up a number of complaints. As the Taliban began to regroup in 2003 and launched their violent attacks, the Afghans began to get worried, questioning why US soldiers and the International Security Assistance Force did not expand to all provinces to deal with the Taliban and establish security. A few years later, they were frustrated and at a loss to hear that the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – with their significant political, military and financial resources – could not defeat a few thousand immature insurgents armed with ordinary weapons. The Afghans wanted to ascertain why the US and NATO were slow in building Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) so that they took responsibility in their country. Many Afghans began to suspect the international community’s good intentions as the US and NATO continued to fail to train an adequate number of ANSF. The Afghans were surprised by the apparent US inaction towards neighbouring countries’ meddling in Afghan affairs, especially the Pakistani Army’s open secret support of the Taliban and other insurgent

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groups. As the US and NATO states began to hint at Pakistani interference as an excuse for not winning the war, the Afghans were shocked. Donald Rumsfeld in his memoir claims that the impression of the US in the world is that America ‘can put a man on the moon’ if it commits to it; America is able to do almost anything if it ‘really’ wants to.1 His claim certainly represented the Afghan image of US capabilities. The Afghan public believed that the US had tremendous influence within the Pakistani Government and could easily stop the Army, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), from supporting the insurgent groups if it ‘really wanted to’. At least the US could secure the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan. More and more questions arose among the Afghans when the US employed none of the above policies, and Pakistan (and Iran) continued to fuel insecurity through its support for the insurgency. The Afghan public saw that many of the ministers, deputy ministers, governors and Members of Parliament were made up of the powerful syndicate. Some of its members were accused of a variety of crimes, including war crimes, human rights abuses, possessing illegal weapons/ militias, harassing and killing ordinary Afghans, being involved in the illicit drug trade, land/property grabbing, having private prisons, becoming a threat to women’s rights, corruption, the assassination of those who spoke against them and kidnapping. Some members of the powerful syndicate were more powerful than President Hamid Karzai, especially at the start of the Karzai era. By 2008, the syndicate had managed to establish a mafia system, turning Afghanistan into a ‘valley of the wolves’. Several members of the powerful syndicate had private security firms, construction companies and NGOs, and the US and NATO gave most of their huge contracts to them. The US also chose them to carry out its anti-terrorism war and keep highways, provinces and districts safe in return for millions of US dollars. As national and provincial officials, some of them pocketed most of the funding for reconstruction purposes. Some provincial officials reportedly took most of the revenue, giving little to the central government. Illicit drug trade, receiving regular sums of money from their people whom they had installed in prominent positions in the three branches of the state, kidnapping of wealthy Afghans for ransoms, land grabbing and exploiting Afghanistan’s mines, to name but a few, became other

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sources of their income. By 2008, they had managed to bolster their private militias, increase their wealth dramatically and strengthen their connections both within the state and to regional players; some allegedly had even become the fifth column for regional powers. The powerful syndicate believed in money, power and weapons, and hardly obeyed the rule of law; they spoke through the rule of the gun. They saw the rule of law as a ‘joke’ and ensured it did not apply to them or their relatives. The worse punishment a corrupt member of the syndicate could get would be a transfer from one ministry to another, or from one province to another. The syndicate therefore played a considerable role in weakening governance and the rule of law, as well as fuelling corruption. Their abuse of power forced thousands of young men to join the insurgent groups, thus bolstering the insurgency. While some Afghans blamed Karzai for empowering this ‘bad company’, most Afghans, including Karzai, blamed the US (and NATO), complaining that the US intervened in Afghanistan to kill its enemy, Al Qaeda, but strengthened those who had been harmful to Afghan national security interests. They questioned: Why did the US choose the syndicate when it had the opportunity to choose ‘good’ people? And why did the US turn a blind eye towards transitional justice? Many naturally concluded that the US had ulterior motives when it ignored the crimes committed by the syndicate and instead rewarded them by giving them medals, seats, money, titles, security and political leadership. Ordinary Afghans, however, equally were unhappy with those who claimed to be ‘good’, the so-called technocrats, those educated Afghans who had returned to Afghanistan after decades of exile in the West. While some of them seemed ‘good’, most of them were allegedly involved in pervasive corruption and other ‘immoral’ behaviour. They used to wash plates or clean tables in restaurants in America and Europe, but the US ‘imposed them on us’ as ministers and governors, I heard several of my interviewees complain. Many Afghans claimed that most of the so-called technocrats, many of whom seemed to have an ‘unquenchable thirst for power’, were preoccupied with one mission: how to fill their pockets and run to America or Europe. Like the powerful syndicate, many of them saw government as a way of making money. Another common complaint was the absence of good governance, as the three branches of the state – the executive, the legislative and the

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judicial – in reality had turned into private businesses and many of their occupants into political businesspeople. Normally, high-profile officials at the central and provincial levels would pay regular sums of money to stay in their positions. Since they leased their positions from their seniors, they had to charge their juniors, and the juniors in turn charged those who were below them. Important seats, such as those in the Ministry of Finance or Kabul Municipality, were sold at the highest price. The result was that if an Afghan needed a government service – for example, applying for a birth certificate or paying the electricity bill – he or she had to pay a bribe. The civil servant had to ask for a bribe to make enough money both for themselves and for their senior (in order to keep their leasehold seat). Instead of maintaining a watch on the government’s performance, many Members of Parliament turned a blind eye in turn for ‘favours’. Like their brothers (and some sisters) in the powerful syndicate, they paid less attention to the needs of their constituents and remained focused on how to make themselves more wealthy by building up supermarkets and mansions, not just in Afghanistan but abroad, notably in Dubai. What mattered most to them was buying zero-mile expensive cars, decorating their offices with expensive chairs and carpets, and keeping dozens of bodyguards. When constituents complained, Members of Parliament would argue that they had not won the seats through votes, but had bought them; Members of Parliament would manipulate the system and elect themselves again and again, making the Afghan public lose their trust in elections and democracy. Education, experience, skills and other abilities did not often come in useful for employment. Money, nepotism, patronage, which political party (tribe, province and ethnic group) one belonged to and the capability of how much money one could pay to his/her seniors were the merits that secured one a job. Incidentally, many officials, including Members of Parliament, made fake undergraduate and master’s degrees. In actuality, they could not even write a paragraph about the subject they had their master’s in; in some cases, they could not even read or write. Privately, if one talked about real capabilities and commitment to the country, one was laughed at. ‘You’re crazy! Make money and live in Dubai or the West; this country would never get stabilised’, they would say. ‘Meanwhile, enjoy yourself’, they would add. You could hardly find many members of the powerful syndicate or the technocrats in

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Afghanistan during weekends, as they spent their weekends, Thursdays and Fridays, in Dubai, Tajikistan and India, apparently ‘enjoying’ themselves (reportedly ‘partying’, ‘womanising’, ‘drinking’ or spending time with their families). Sometimes, you had more than three ministers and a dozen deputy ministers in the Cabinet from one district of about 100,000 population. Other times, you had one tribe being entirely isolated in the east and south while another had all the powers, forcing many from the neglected tribe to join the Taliban. Some held Karzai responsible, arguing there was no political will to curb corruption; others blamed the US for imposing the powerful syndicate, corrupt technocrats, ineffective economic system that the powerful syndicate owned and manipulated, and for the shortcomings in the distribution of their assistance discussed in the previous chapter. Someone who did not have a donkey before the Taliban Government now had mansions and supermarkets. The US, however, turned a blind eye and ‘did not investigate’ where the money came from. Azizullah Ludin, who would later become the Head of the Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption, would send more than 300 court cases of corrupt officials between 2010 and 2014, many of them ministers and governors, yet no high-profile official ever received a prosecution. The Taliban, on the other hand, had established a shadow (parallel) administration, with the primary focus on ‘security’ and ‘justice’. One could ‘load his bicycle with piles of notes’, yet no one dared to touch him/ her unless he risked having his hand chopped off. Their efficient legal system delivered prompt and effective ‘justice’, which applied to everyone regardless of their position, wealth and connections. The Taliban would solve a case in ten minutes, which the Afghan Government would usually take months or even years to do, and even then the results would most likely be unjust. To illustrate the point, a man applies to his district governor in Farah to solve his land problem. The district governor asks for a million Pakistani rupee (sadly, the currency in use in those provinces bordering Pakistan), but when the frustrated man takes the case to the Taliban, they solve it satisfactorily in the space of a few hours without the man having to spend a single rupee or afghani. The Afghans also blamed the US for failing to have a clear economic policy. While the US talked of having committed billions of US dollars

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for nation building, ordinary Afghans would only benefit from a small percentage of the development projects as more than two-thirds of the assistance were wasted for reasons explained in the previous chapter. The vast majority of Afghans suffered from poverty and unemployment. It was true that the Afghans had high expectations, sometimes unrealistic, from the international community. Nevertheless, they believed that if there was enough developmental assistance, and, most importantly, if developmental aid provided was spent effectively, Afghanistan might have been in a better position in terms of security, economy and politics. Incidentally, what the US was prepared to give and what Afghans expected from the US were a major source of misunderstanding (and grievance) during the Bush Administration (and exacerbated during the Barack Obama Administration). About 75 per cent of the Afghan population lived in agricultural areas, yet the US economic policy, if one existed, gave it little attention. The question I often heard from the Afghans was: Why did the US not invest in our infrastructure? Investment in infrastructure, they argued, would have created long-term employment opportunities and consequently reduced poverty and youth unemployment. The Afghans, as they had been used to, wanted everything from the government, including jobs, even though in an open market economy it is the private sector, not the government, that is primarily responsible for creating jobs. Poverty and the high unemployment rate forced many young men – especially in the east, south and west – to join the Taliban insurgency for less than a few hundred US dollars a month. By 2008, three types of insurgents had been formed: the ideological, the angry (those who had joined the insurgency due to abuses by the powerful syndicate and US/NATO forces) and the economical (those who had become insurgents due to poverty and unemployment). Ordinary Afghans lived under four power structures: the Afghan Government; the international forces; the powerful syndicate or the mafia; and the Taliban. The first two hurt (through collateral damage) those Afghans who lived under the Taliban influence, while the last two caused harm to those who lived in the cities (through their abuses of power or suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices). Ordinary Afghans felt secure nowhere. According to the Afghan proverb, a poor man either cries or curses, but the Pakistani Army’s interference gave another dimension to the

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saying: a poor man can also fight. The Pakistani military officials took advantage of the Afghan grievances as well as their cultural and historical sensitivity to foreign troops and gave them weapons and money to fight against the ‘occupiers’ forces’, as the US and Pakistan had done in the 1980s. So the cause of insecurity (and insurgency) was three-dimensional: the combination of wrong US policy assumptions (international), which caused the above grievances (internal), and, most importantly, neighbouring countries’ interference (regional). The cure for insecurity primarily lay in Washington, the Afghans and their president believed, but, by 2008, the Bush Administration had failed to provide one.2 Back in Washington, the evaluation of US Afghan policy was equally critical. Indeed, by 2007, and particularly 2008, criticism had mounted by members of Congress, Democrats in particular – most notably Senators Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden – the press, formal officials and area experts over the Bush Administration for its ‘failure’ in the security, governance, counter-narcotics and reconstruction aspects of US Afghan strategy discussed in detail above and in Chapter 4. Instead of pursuing Al Qaeda and working on stabilising Afghanistan, the assessments maintained, something that had a direct link with US national security, the Bush Administration made its task much more complex by invading Iraq. Iraq was not the first line to battle international terrorism, but the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in which the instigators of the GWOT still lived freely and posed a threat to the US and the allies in both Afghanistan and their own countries. Afghanistan, not Iraq, needed a surge. The US invasion of Iraq helped not just to raise the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also to weaken US allies in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. President Bush vowed not to repeat his father’s mistake of abandoning Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, but he surprisingly made the same mistake (by Bush Senior) that facilitated the initial instability and the eventual takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. There was a great opportunity when there was goodwill for the international community to succeed, but this was missed when the Bush Administration did not commit sufficient resources and military forces. The assessments jointly concluded that the Iraq War, the miscalculations in US Afghan strategy (the false assumptions discussed

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in Chapter 4, especially the light footprint strategy), and the incompetence of the administration sent the ‘good’ and ‘necessary’ war in Afghanistan off course, facilitating the conditions for Al Qaeda and the Taliban to make a triumphant comeback in Afghanistan and Pakistan.3 There were some – Biden, General James Jones, Admiral Mike Mullen and Ahmed Rashid, among many others – who talked of a possible US strategic ‘defeat’ in Afghanistan (a possible takeover by the Taliban) and the border areas, ‘the epicentre’ of terrorism, and warned the administration of severe consequences of losing its anti-terrorism war. The repercussions are spelled out in Chapter 6. However, the US could turn around the misfortune, the losing war, if it came up with ‘a smarter strategy and a lot more attention and resources’.4 A new or smart strategy in the environment of 2008 meant a counter-insurgency strategy, which had just ‘saved’ the US from failing in Iraq. The two wars had become a dominant issue for the 2008 presidential campaign, and the Obama and Clinton primary campaigns, and later Obama’s presidential campaign, made it the central part of their foreign policy stance, especially using them as a political weapon to hurt the Republicans. They consistently told the Americans that the Bush Administration invaded Iraq (a ‘bad’ and ‘reckless’ decision) at the expense of the Afghanistan War (a ‘good’ and ‘necessary’ war). Both Clinton and Obama promised Americans that, if they won the election, they would withdraw troops from Iraq (the war of ‘choice’) and redeploy them to Afghanistan, the true front on the GWOT.5 For Biden, if he and Obama won, they would even make good on Bush’s Marshall Plan for Afghanistan. They would also, unlike Bush, show serious commitment towards Pakistan, as Musharraf supported the Taliban because Bush did not provide enough financial support to Pakistan.6 All these promises were a clear sign that the counterinsurgency strategy would be employed regardless of who won the incoming election. Bush’s decision making style was equally subject to criticism. The GWOT and, especially the counterterrorism decision, were the results of a process consisting of what James Dobbins described as ‘backchannel dealings’, ‘secrecy’ and ‘a dysfunctional advisory’ arrangement. Back-channel dealings and secrecy became worse as the GWOT continued in Afghanistan and Iraq. In his application of the ‘top-down approach’, or ‘management model’, in decision making, which

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accentuated ‘inspiration and guidance’ from above and ‘loyalty and compliance’ from below, Bush succeeded in doing away with proper debate and orderly dissent from those at the bottom level, who disagreed with the decision. An orderly and structured process requires that policy should be thoroughly evaluated at bottom levels and then elevated level by level until it finds itself in the Principals Committee in the National Security Council (NSC), by which time it should be scrutinised by all those with relevant experience. But Bush’s operating style was the other way around. He simply said, in effect: this is the policy, which took me two minutes to make, and now find me ways to implement it. Experts and career officials from relevant agencies – who would tend to listen to facts rather than gut feeling or ideas invented in the US by those who had ideological purity and partisan loyalty – never got the chance to take part in the decision making, as Bush excluded them. Bush (unlike Obama) seemed not to have liked a prolonged decision making process described by James Pfiffner as the ‘multiple advocacy’ model, in which policy experts were listened to, alternative policy options were evaluated and policy opinions were scrutinised. He wanted decisions fast. The inclusion of career diplomats and qualified executive branch experts with years of experience and the adoption of a multiple advocacy approach might have questioned the underlying assumptions of the GWOT. The experts might have discussed and disagreed with the Bush Doctrines and advised against the declaration of war to defeat terrorism worldwide because of the sheer impossibility of the task. They could have prevented the effect of ‘groupthink’,7 that is, a sense of ‘we can easily’ achieve the objectives of the GWOT to root out terrorism by not underestimating the enemy and chances of failure; might not have downplayed the shortcomings of the counterterrorism strategy and exaggerated the usefulness of the light footprint strategy; might have discussed alternatives to the invasion of Afghanistan; might have considered what to be done if things went wrong, especially a contingency plan in regard to the double game played by Pakistan and to the possibility of the US being entangled in Afghanistan; dissent from Colin Powell might have been taken seriously; it at least would have enabled the administration to ascertain more precise information about the history, culture, society and traditions of Afghanistan (and Iraq) and its decades-long disputes with Pakistan.

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Gates, Steven Hurst and the renowned Afghan expert Amin Saikal argue that being ignorant of Afghanistan and Iraq’s details was one major destructive factor, causing the US to announce objectives impossible to achieve. Learning in detail about the Af-Pak disputes, Bush might have requested concrete pledges from Musharraf, and, most importantly, kept a close watch on Pakistan’s behaviour post-Taliban defeat. Had he properly debated the way the Afghans perceived the warlords, he might have found alternatives to them, or at least developed a strategy to minimise their influence after the Taliban was defeated. Most importantly, Bush might have discovered alternatives to the decision to invade. In the end, an entirely different decision might have resulted. Instead of discussing the details regarding Afghanistan (and Iraq) as well as the wisdom of the GWOT, the discussion centred on developing a war plan, the issue of how wide terrorism was, and whether Iraq could be included.8 While most in their assessments converged with one another on what went wrong in Afghanistan, there were, however, some who diverged on some aspects of the Bush Administration Afghan policy. An effective and strong government was not historical in Afghanistan, as local Pashtuns have historically resolved their conflicts through jirgas and shuras and never submitted to the central government. The Bush Administration (and, to a lesser extent, the Obama Administration) and NATO neglected to work closely with Pashtun tribes in the rural parts of Afghanistan – the centre of the Taliban’s focus – especially in the east and south to keep insurgents weak, and instead, through its ‘lead nation’ approach, focused on institutional building, attempting to create an effective central authority.9 It was politically and historically ‘illiterate’ of the Bush Administration to assume that the lack of a central government meant these rural areas were ungoverned and posed a threat, because the Code of Pashtunwali, which everyone abided by, meant they were one of the most governed societies in the world.10 Said T. Jawad, on the other hand, argued that building Afghan institutions such as the police and the Army was necessary and the appropriate solution. What Afghanistan needed, he implied, was a centralised government (with strong institutions) that provided security to its entire people.11

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Barnett Rubin, however, linked the failures of rebuilding the security reforms to the local Afghan networks, as their ‘resilience undermined the establishment and functioning of stronger formal state institutions’. The Afghan ministries remained just ‘buildings’ rather than functioning bureaucracies, and each successive owner brought its own people. The ‘accelerated timetable’ of Bonn did not help either, as it created a dysfunctional structure of government without effective institutions.12 In their important book, Tim Bird and Alex Marshall disagreed with Rubin, as for them it was partly the result of a failed Western model based on ‘the decentralized, and economically highly privatized, liberal peace theory agenda’. Liberal peace theory emphasises ‘high-speed institutionbuilding’ before liberalisation, and turns the government into enabler rather than provider or facilitator. It had worked for the West to decentralise the economy, but this externally dictated agenda did not work for Afghanistan. By making the state the enabler and the global private sector the ‘facilitator’ of reconstruction, the state in Afghanistan was left ‘abstract’. Political and economic liberalisation often creates destabilising ‘side effects’ (including instability) in post-conflict environments. In Afghanistan it encouraged the reconstruction of the wrong kind of state where the presence of the powerful syndicate and the lack of an effective government were its ‘natural by-products’.13 US Pakistan policy has also been subject to heated debate, and the contested policy area was whether the Bush Administration (and later, the Obama and Trump Administrations) should get tough towards Pakistan for its two-faced policy or continued engagement with Pakistan. Those in favour of getting tough14 argued that diplomacy, persuasion, bribery and begging did not persuade (or force) Pakistan to change its calculations. Making use of its soft powers to maximum effect, it was time the US (and NATO) rethought its policy towards Pakistan (as it did towards Russia for its interference in Ukraine in 2014). They, Khalilzad in particular, recommended a number of options. The US can cut its financial and military aid, apply economic sanctions to Pakistan (such as asking financial institutions, for example, the International Monetary Fund, to curtail their support for programmes), impose financial and travel sanctions on Pakistan’s military leaders complicit in the insurgency, freeze their accounts, use military operations against Taliban and Haqqani sanctuaries/leaders in Pakistan

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(and Iran), such as the killing of Mullah Mansour in Pakistan in 2016 (when he was on his way from an apparent two-month stay in Iran), revoke Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO ally, and, if these measures still failed, the US should explore a long-term effort to contain and isolate Pakistan by putting Pakistan’s name on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, or getting the UN Security Council to condemn Pakistan for supporting terrorism. These options would create conditions in which the Taliban and their supporters would be compelled to opt for a political solution, thus opening the way for the US long-term goal: a secure, stable and peaceful Afghanistan. Others disagreed.15 If the US employed the above harsh measures, they would weaken even more the already fragile Pakistani Government. In the worst scenario, as the policy makers from both the Bush and Obama (and some from Trump) Administrations and area experts assumed, the Pakistani Government could collapse, and the Pakistani Taliban or other radical Islamist terrorist groups might obtain access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. A country with atomic powers and with the second-largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia led by radical Islam would be the worst nightmare of America as well as NATO. For instance, terrorists would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against the US and the allies, including India, thus plunging the region, and possibly the world, into a nuclear war. At the very least, the Pakistani military might become weaker and consequently unable to provide stability; instability in Pakistan could destabilise the entire region, Afghanistan included, causing an influx of millions of refugees into Europe. Even if the Pakistani Government did not fall and its military remained effective, Pakistan had the ability to further undermine US efforts in Afghanistan by intensifying its support for the Taliban, giving its nuclear weapons to US enemies, or interfering with US/NATO supplies to the landlocked Afghanistan, 75 per cent of which were transported daily through the Khyber Pass and Spin Boldak. Jonah Blank went a step further by questioning the tough camp’s wisdom – that is, whether it was strategically wise ‘to trade’ a potential disaster in Afghanistan for a potential disaster in Pakistan with a around 200 million population and in possession of the world’s fifth-largest nuclear

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arsenal. And whether it strategically wise to push the US into having a confrontation with Pakistan and by extension with its ‘all-weather friend’, China. Thus, for the US, all of the above possible scenarios were worse than the current situation in the region, especially in Pakistan. It was assumed that continued engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbours at all levels – especially keeping some level of cooperation (a long-term relationship) with Pakistan and the continuation of providing military and civilian assistance to the country – provided a better chance for peace talks and regional stability. At the minimum, it managed threats emanating from Pakistan and continued to help prevent Afghanistan and, especially, Pakistan from being further destabilised. Some accused the Bush (and Obama) Administrations of failing to make a concrete effort to solve the territorial tensions between India and Pakistan,16 which were seen as the solution to the Afghanistan conflict. Numerous others, on the other hand, disagreed, claiming that, even if a solution was offered for the Kashmir problem, Pakistan would still continue to support certain terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Afghan Taliban, for other strategic and domestic purposes, including using these terrorist groups to fight those extreme groups that aimed their violence against the state of Pakistan.17 All in all, by 2008, the Bush Administration was under tremendous pressure due to the scathing evaluation of its Afghan policy. The overall conclusion by domestic actors was that the administration was losing in Afghanistan unless it had to come up with a new strategy. Due to the domestic pressure by the domestic actors – namely, Congress, the media/press and the area experts – President Bush, on 9 September 2008, announced the ‘silent surge’ for Afghanistan. He would bring home 8,000 troops from Iraq and about 5,000 of them would be redeployed to Afghanistan after the month he left office. Furthermore, in November 2008, he would send to Afghanistan a marine battalion followed by a combat brigade to join the 31,000 US troops already in Afghanistan. The additional troops would take part in the ‘silent surge’. The 15-per cent influx of troops was in response to senior leaders at the Pentagon who had been calling for months for more troops in Afghanistan to fight the growing Taliban threat there, and the declining violence in Iraq allowed for troops to be deployed to Afghanistan. Indeed, as Mullen publicly admitted, the administration,

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due to the Iraq War, could not do much previously because it simply did not have sufficient troops to deploy to Afghanistan.18 During the time Bush announced the silent surge, Rice, Petraeus, Mullen, David D. McKiernan, Senior NATO Military Commander General Bantz J. Craddock, Douglas E. Lute, as well as senior White House officials conducted ‘major new reviews’ of the war strategy and overall mission in Afghanistan. These reviews assessed the fissures over the Afghan policy: what was the right number of troops in Afghanistan; whether to increase the troop levels in Afghanistan and adopt a robust counter-insurgency strategy; how best to spend the billions of US dollars; and what was the best way to deal with the deteriorating situation in Pakistan? The top priority for these assessments was why the US was not winning in Afghanistan seven years after the intervention. Most of the assessments, including Lute’s, called for ‘a more robust counterinsurgency effort’, including more troops and civilian resources in Afghanistan and closer cooperation with Pakistan to deal with the extremists. In the last months of the Bush Administration there was ‘a new urgency’ to adjust the strategy ‘to put the mission in Afghanistan on the right path’ for the next president. Like 2001, Afghanistan again became ‘a front-burner issue’ for Washington.19 During this period, General David D. McKiernan requested 15,000 combat and support troops beyond the 8,000 additional troops Bush had approved for deployment early in 2009. Bush was going to approve it, but decided against it once the Obama team urged him to leave the decision to Obama. The Bush Administration quietly handed over the classified reviews and reports. It was up to the new administration, said Bush, to reconsider the reports as they saw appropriate and then adopt them as their own. Vice-President Cheney, however, was surprised the following year to hear Obama’s Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel claiming that the Bush Administration had left them with no plan. Referring to the Lute assessment, Cheney implied that the Bush Administration did leave Obama with a plan that required a counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.20 The announcement of the ‘silent surge’, Bush’s willingness to approve the pending troops request by McKiernan, the appointment of counter-insurgency strategy expert/author Petraeus as the Head of CENTCOM, Cheney’s claim that they had a plan (a counter-insurgency)

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for Afghanistan but passed it to the Obama Administration, and the favourable domestic environment (that is, Congress, media and area experts as well as officials assessments calling for a counter-insurgency strategy) for the counter-insurgency strategy in 2008 America were all indications that the Bush Administration was equally eager to apply the very strategy written by Petraeus in Afghanistan, had it had more time on its watch. While it did not have the time to apply the strategy, it at least moved in the direction of a counter-insurgency strategy, marking the first step towards the second turning point in US Afghan strategy. Now it was down to the new president, Obama, to employ the counter-insurgency strategy and thus turn the losing Afghanistan War into a success.

CHAPTER 6 THE SURGE DECISION AT THE INITIATION PHASE

In 2009, after President Barack Obama announced an end to the war of ‘choice’ in Iraq and approved the pending troops request by US Commander in Afghanistan David D. McKiernan, and deployed 21,000 (17,000 þ 4,000) US troops in February, little was written and talked about Iraq because now the ‘war of necessity’ began to take centre stage. The newly appointed US Commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal’s request for another 40,000 US troops, or four brigades with enablers, to conduct ‘classic counterinsurgency operations’, further intensified public debate on the Afghanistan War. Obama found that the members of his War Cabinet, Congress, the press, the area experts and the general public were divided on the Afghanistan War and whether to surge, siding, some by coincidence and others by design, with either the military or the Head of US Central Command General David Petraeus camp, or the Vice-President Joe Biden camp. The Petraeus or the military camp urged Obama to honour McChrystal’s requests. But the Biden group or camp advised Obama not to. Obama’s trusted advisors within the White House, who constituted the president’s ‘inner circle’, had similar views to those of Biden, and since Biden was vice-president and had a wealth of experience in foreign policy, the group often let him speak for all those in the Af-Pak review. The members of the two opposing camps as well as the inner circle/ trusted advisors are named below and in Chapter 7.1

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Biden, his group members and their supporters invoked what I call the ‘Afghanistan-having-minimal-relevance-to-US-national-securityinterests’, ‘missing-prerequisites-of-counter-insurgency-strategyand-thus-the-wrong-strategy’, ‘three-Pakistan-related problems’ and ‘Afghanistan-another-graveyard-another-Vietnam’ arguments for their opposition. These arguments, and the assumptions they carried, are as follows. The Taliban did not constitute an enemy because they were not connected to Al Qaeda, would not allow Al Qaeda to return to a Talibanled Afghanistan, given the fact that Al Qaeda carried a real security threat to Afghanistan, and only fought US forces because the latter were present in Afghanistan or else the Taliban had an inward or national outlook. Moreover, intelligence reports suggested that Al Qaeda operatives were not in Afghanistan but in Pakistan, and would not return from the safety of Pakistan to a hazardous Afghanistan, where the US had numerous bases and freely conducted operations. Afghanistan therefore was not as important as the military was trying to portray it, and the US did not have to employ the expensive counter-insurgency strategy to defeat those insurgents who were not an enemy, and whose defeat would not be essential to the defeat of Al Qaeda. Defeating the Taliban was too ambitious and unachievable, and an unnecessary goal as far as US interests were concerned in Afghanistan. The counter-insurgency strategy would further compel the US to overlook other domestic and international interests – and threats. The US received Al Qaeda threats not just from Afghanistan but also from other countries such as Yemen and Somalia, and so the US should see Afghanistan in the global context and understand that it could not afford, politically and financially, to respond with a counter-insurgency strategy to every country with the presence of Al Qaeda. To those, such as George W. Bush, Hillary Clinton and a few others,2 who argued that the US had a moral duty to stabilise Afghanistan, the Biden group questioned how much treasure and lives the US needed to sacrifice to bring about such an Afghanistan. It warned Obama that at a time when the US had economic difficulties (elaborated in Chapter 8), relying on the Democrats alone would not be a guarantee to pass the financing for the expensive strategy. The Biden camp opposed the counter-insurgency strategy not only for being expensive and requiring nation-building, but also for not being

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the right strategy for Afghanistan. A counter-insurgency strategy required competent and effective indigenous security forces as well as good and reliable government to take over the responsibility (hold and build) once US forces cleared an area. The security forces would establish security and a competent government would quickly, honestly and effectively provide basic services to win over the population. Pointing to a number of shortcomings within both the Afghan Government and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), these two important prerequisites of a counter-insurgency strategy essential for bringing a counter-insurgency strategy’s ultimate goal, security, and for transferring responsibility to the Afghans, were missing in Afghanistan. Building both was a slow process that required years of training, not the 19-month period that the military proposed. More troops would only deepen the dependency on US forces by the ANSF. (US forces should therefore only occupy those places which could be transferred to the Afghans.) The shortcomings the Biden camp cited within the Afghan Government were pervasive corruption, criminality, warlordism, favouritism, lack of a political class, lack of a strong, able and cooperative president, a failure to reach all parts of Afghanistan, and a limited revenue base. Weaknesses within the ANSF that the Biden camp invoked were as follows: illiteracy, pervasive drug addiction, lack of skills, lack of representation, the presence of ‘ghost’ forces, a high attrition/dropping out rate and (later on) the Taliban’s infiltration into the security forces, who turned their guns against their Western advisors before defecting to the Taliban. A successful counter-insurgency strategy, according to Petraeus’s own counter-insurgency strategy manual and studies conducted by the RAND Corporation, required one counter-insurgent for every 50 Afghans, but even if Obama approved McChrystal’s 40,000 troops request, the military leaders would not have anywhere near 600,000 counter-insurgents for about 30 million Afghans. The military’s counterargument was that, although a robust build-up of the ANSF would help McChrystal to reach the right number (600,000), that number was not required straightaway, because McChrystal’s counterinsurgency operations focused on certain provinces in the south and east. According to the military leaders, provinces in the rest of the country, especially in the north, were peaceful.

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The Biden group found this argument erroneous, since insurgents, as rational strategists, would either go underground for the duration US troops were there, or relocate themselves to places or provinces where there were no or fewer coalition and US forces. If this happened, would the military be able to establish security? Would the military then not be asking for more US troops? The military leaders’ reply was that the surge would work like ‘ink blots’ that would expand across the map of Afghanistan. The Biden camp did not buy this assumption. Instead the Biden camp assumed that insurgency would expand to those parts of Afghanistan that were peaceful during the Af-Pak review. A counter-insurgency strategy worked in urban Iraq, but not in rural, landlocked, mountainous, vast Afghanistan with numerous inherent complexities, named in the Introduction, especially Afghanistan sharing 2,500 miles of porous border with Pakistan – the border issue worried the Biden camp the most, especially when none of the requested troops were going to be placed in the border areas. According to the counterinsurgency strategy expert, the French David Galula, these were all conditions that worked against a counter-insurgency strategy. Furthermore, successful counter-insurgency required a duration of ten to 14 years, but given that the US had been in Afghanistan for more than seven years, it was politically, financially and practically impossible to sustain a heavy footprint for ten more years. The ‘three-Pakistan-related problems’ argument was the most worrying as far as Pakistan’s role in relation to the employability of a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan was concerned. First, the projected counter-insurgency strategy did not extend beyond the Afghanistan borders to the sanctuaries in Pakistan. So, as long as the terrorist safe havens in Pakistan remained, where the Taliban rested and rearmed and then crossed into Afghanistan, it did not matter how many troops the US deployed to Afghanistan, because an end to the insurgency would not be brought. Second, the Biden camp assumed that Pakistan held the key to ending the conflict in Afghanistan, and US Afghan policy was against the interests of Pakistan in Afghanistan, as it aimed at creating a unified Afghan Government which was sympathetic to India, Pakistan’s mortal enemy, and at wiping out the Taliban, the very forces supported by Pakistan for its geopolitical interests in the region. By proposing a counter-insurgency strategy, the military leaders were not only ignoring

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Pakistan’s concerns, such as the increasing India’s influence in Afghanistan, but also even further undermining Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and the region. Pakistan, of course, would not allow this to happen, and would increase its support for the insurgency in Afghanistan and exploit even further the ideology of religious resistance that the West had fostered during the Soviet invasion. Therefore, no matter how many US troops fought in Afghanistan, an end to the insurgency was impossible if Pakistan continued (and it would) to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. Third, Pakistan, situated at the crossroad of a strategic region – bordering Afghanistan, China, India and Iran; all important to the US in different ways – had a (Muslim) population six times greater than Afghanistan, possessed nuclear weapons, and was politically unstable. Furthermore, most of the Al Qaeda operatives and almost all Taliban top members, the hardcore and the irreconcilable, had their camps in Pakistan. For all of the above factors, Pakistan was more important to US national security than Afghanistan, and therefore stability in Pakistan was considered the primary US objective, yet assumingly the surge was detrimental to that particular objective in two ways. First, the intensification of war could make it worse for Pakistan, as it could cause more influx of militants and Afghan refugees into Pakistan,3 make more vulnerable the US-NATO ground supply route that the Pakistani Army safeguarded, undermine the present fragile political consensus in Pakistan to fight the insurgents, and further strengthen Islamic groups against the Pakistani Government, as the former would use Pakistan’s cooperation (the proposed counter-insurgency strategy required even more) as a reason to continue to fight against Pakistan’s government. Most, if not all, of Pakistan’s civilian and military officials argued that US presence in Afghanistan united the Pashtun on both sides of the line, and thus strengthened Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pashtuns from both sides of the Durand Line joined the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban to fight against the US and coalition forces and their ‘puppets’, the Pakistani and Afghan Governments. Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan was an issue that Pakistan was sensitive to, since it could result in its internal destabilisation, similar to the 1971 Bengali

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nationalistic uprising that resulted in the separation of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Second, the proposed counter-insurgency strategy would further unbalance the allocation of resources in favour of Afghanistan, which at the time of the Af-Pak review, to the resentment of Pakistan, was ‘30:1’. For the Biden camp, Afghanistan’s most important relevance to US interests in the region was its proximity to Pakistan (and, of course, Al Qaeda, which was mostly located in Pakistan). So it was important to get Pakistan right or else the US would not win – the proposed counter-insurgency strategy was sending the Af-Pak strategy more and more in the wrong direction. Biden strongly disagreed with the military assumption that stability in Afghanistan meant stability in Pakistan. For Biden, it was the opposite. Consequently, even if the US sacrificed hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of US lives for a counter-insurgency strategy to stabilise Afghanistan (a big ‘if’), it would not guarantee stability in Pakistan. The Biden camp feared that the US would not ever be able to stabilise Afghanistan the way the military wished for. Instead, Afghanistan was becoming another Vietnam for the US because Afghanistan, like Vietnam, was incrementally sucking the US into an endless war. If Obama approved the expensive surge, he would repeat ‘Lyndon Johnson’s footsteps’ and be ‘locked in Vietnam’; Congress would bring a premature end to the war, and, like Johnson, Obama would take the blame for losing the war, as most of the military leaders would not be in their positions in a couple of years’ time. Moreover, using as evidence the appalling failures of past empires over 2,500 years in Afghanistan, most notably the Soviet Union and the British Empire, the Biden camp worried that the US would equally fail in Afghanistan. History showed that the 28 million or so Pashtuns on the Pakistan side, as well as the 15 million Pashtuns on the Afghanistan side, would unite against a force that they considered to be an invader. The US faced the same Pashtun insurgency that the Soviets had encountered in the 1980s, and if the US could not succeed with tens of thousands of troops on the ground, it would not with more – more troops would simply protract failure. Given this reality, some, including the anti-war liberals, the grass roots of the Democratic Party, argued for a total withdrawal, but most believed it was wise for the US to apply a less expensive strategy, namely,

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the counterterrorism-plus strategy. The ‘counterterrorism’ part of the strategy would pursue Al Qaeda (if there was any) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the ‘plus’ part would provide trainers to build up a moderate number of ANSF to retain security, and expand reconciliation to encourage some Taliban fighters to join the Afghan Government. The number of US/NATO (approximately 100,000) forces present in Afghanistan would be sufficient to carry out the job until more ANSF (not 400,000, though) were trained to take over responsibility for their country. A counterterrorism-plus strategy was flexible enough to follow the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan or any other countries. Since it was inexpensive and could therefore be sustained indefinitely, it had the capability to eventually disseminate Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan that would lead to the group’s eventual defeat. It could defend US interests without having to commit to rebuilding the war-shattered Afghanistan. It also had the potential to make it possible for US forces to secure a way out of Afghanistan in the near future. These were the views and assumptions of the Biden camp or group – namely, National Security Advisor to the Vice-President Antony J. Blinken, Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Afghanistan-Pakistan Douglas E. Lute, Deputy National Security Advisor Thomas E. Donilon and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John O. Brennan, General James Cartwright, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, Senior Advisor to the President David M. Axelrod and US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry4 – those who supported the camp in Congress, mostly the Democratic Party, including its influential members such as Carl M. Levin, Nancy Pelosi, Jim McGovern and, especially, John Kerry (who tried to counterweight against the heavyweight Republican Senators),5 the press6 and other outside actors or area experts who, through their testimonies to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations or articles in foreign policy journals, either directly supported or found their beliefs, views and images consistent with the camp.7 The military and its supporters in Congress and the media, on the other hand, emphasised what I term the ‘Afghanistan-havingcompelling-relevance-to-US-national-security-interests’, ‘multiple-anticounterterrorism-plus-rationales-and-thus-the-wrong-strategy’, ‘antithree-Pakistan-related problems’ and ‘Afghanistan-was-not-a-Vietnam-

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and-America-was-not-the-Soviet-Union’ counterarguments. The counterarguments, and the assumptions they carried, were as follows. If the US retreated, or if the counter-insurgency was not approved, Afghanistan would slowly but surely fall into the hands of the Taliban, resulting in a US defeat with (potentially) severe consequences. A destabilised Afghanistan would lead to chaos and a civil war, becoming a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups – whose members would return to Afghanistan and plot (another 9/11) against the US and allies; groups that the US and the allies might have never dreamt of emerging. A destabilised Afghanistan would feed insecurity in the nuclear Pakistan that could result in a destabilised Pakistan, making it possible for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to topple the fragile Pakistani Government and obtain access to its nuclear weapons. And a destabilised Afghanistan would lead towards instability and bloodshed in the region, Pakistan included, and terrorist groups would be able to significantly expand their numbers and the areas they controlled. In short, there would be a momentous rise in global terrorism, drug production, illegal immigration and, most frightenedly, nuclear proliferation – escalation in nuclear rivalry in South Asia was capable of triggering war (perhaps WWIII) in which Pakistan and India might not hesitate to launch nuclear weapons against each other; at the very least, significant damage to the US, the UN and NATO future power and standing; and a possible disintegration of NATO. The US would have no choice but to enter Afghanistan once again, this time, though, a less hospitable environment. (Parenthetically, the Biden camp did not think that a Taliban takeover would materialise with the presence of already 100,000 coalition and US forces in Afghanistan.) To stop the above possible scenarios from happening, Afghanistan, the only country where the US had a great deal of leverage to freely operate to target Al Qaeda forces in Pakistan, was strategically vital to the US, and therefore the resources the US was spending were worth it. It was inaccurate to compare Somalia and Yemen with Afghanistan and the tribal areas, because in the former countries Al Qaeda was not in close proximity to nuclear weapons. Both Al Qaeda and the Taliban were allies, impossible to separate, and therefore both constituted one enemy. Al Qaeda provided the Taliban, especially the Haqqani network, with funding and other assistance, such as help with suicide bombing, improvised explosive

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devices and propaganda techniques. Al Qaeda and other extremist groups in turn received safe haven, a training ground and other support from the Taliban. Almost all extremist groups, Al Qaeda included, recognised Mullah Omar as their religious leader and they all had one ideology and purpose: to topple the governments in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the entire subcontinent, and instead establish radical Islamic regimes. One’s winning would therefore strengthen the other, and one’s victory would naturally be considered the victory of the other. Efforts to persuade them to join the national government would remain futile. The only way to bring about a healthy and effective state to the Taliban insurgency was to defeat them, even if it took more years. The only strategy capable of defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda was the proposed counter-insurgency strategy, not the suggested counterterrorism-plus strategy. A counterterrorism-plus strategy was a component of a counter-insurgency strategy and, without a counterinsurgency strategy a counterterrorism-plus strategy was impossible, ineffective, incorrectly interpreted, useless, capable of creating more enemies than friends (or self-defeating), detrimental to Pakistan and unable to provide security and thus reverse momentum. It was impossible because the US needed intelligence on Al Qaeda and the Taliban leaders, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and without what Petraeus called ‘enormous infrastructure’ in Afghanistan, they were unable to acquire it. It was ineffective as US forces killed leaders in Iraq, but the violence continued to intensify; incorrectly interpreted by Biden to argue that a counterterrorism-plus strategy required fewer troops, it could only come into motion with the existence of a counterinsurgency strategy; useless by itself, since it would neither remove sanctuaries in Afghanistan, nor prevent Al Qaeda from establishing bases in Afghanistan; unworkable and short-sighted on its own, because it would not leave Afghanistan in a stable position, as it had not done in the past seven years, but offer endless killings to the Afghans, and thus had the potential to create more foes (terrorists) than friends. An intensified counterterrorism campaign could turn Pakistanis (and even Afghans) against their government, making the downfall of the Pakistani Government possible. No drone programme would then be able to save the situation. And, most importantly, a counterterrorism-plus strategy was one of many pieces of a counter-insurgency strategy, such as improving

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governance, protecting the population, and providing economic development. So it alone would fail to reverse momentum (that is, ‘momentum in the minds of the Afghan people’; the confidence levels among ordinary Afghans in both the Afghan Government and the international community were very low because it did not address the factors that had caused the ‘crisis of confidence’ among Afghans). Security or the protection of ordinary Afghans, McChrystal’s main objective, meant securing Afghans not just from increasing insurgency, but from all the evil forces touched upon in the Introduction and scrutinised in Chapters 4 and 5, including mistakes made by the coalition forces, and, most importantly, lack of resources. McChrystal described ‘the coalition’s mistakes’ as excessive dependence on aerial bombardments, collateral damage, lack of oversight on huge contracts that facilitated corruption, failures to deliver on promises and lack of respect for the culture. It was these evil forces that had caused insecurity, allowing the momentum to sway in the Taliban’s favour. Petraeus and McChrystal told Obama what Petraeus had told President Bush: security was the ‘foundation’ for all other progress. Without security, ‘nothing’ could be improved. It would be impossible to achieve McChrystal’s ends to train and increase the ANSF to 400,000 – the already 100,000 Afghan National Army to 240,000, and the 80,000 Afghan National Police to 160,000 – to eventually take responsibility in their own country, improve governance, reduce corruption and persuade the Taliban to reconcile themselves with the Afghan Government. Due to the lack of security, many of the Taliban reunited were practically under house confinement in order to be protected from the Taliban retaliation. The military contended it was only plausible to reconcile themselves with the Taliban when the US established security and had the upper hand in the fight, something that they did not have during the Af-Pak review, and could only be achieved by a counterinsurgency strategy. The Biden camp, however, assumed that it was possible to make peace with the Taliban even if they applied a counterterrorism-plus strategy. The Biden camp further disagreed with the military’s argument that major risks originated from lack of security; they emanated from corrupt governance. The military leaders admitted that there were shortcomings within the Afghan Government and the ANSF, but with the application

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of a counter-insurgency strategy, both would be improved, as it did in Iraq once conditions changed. The Petraeus camp further admitted that the Pakistani safe havens were a problem, but assumed that once Afghans saw the benefits of a counterinsurgency strategy, that is, security and the betterment of the Afghan Government, the camps in Pakistan would lose their significance. It would do so since their support base in Afghanistan would evaporate; the Afghans would stand against those who fostered insecurity among them once they saw real improvement in security and governance. Pakistan would remain with no choice but to accept the Afghan Government and persuade the Taliban to join it. Petraeus and McChrystal had in mind how the support provided by Iran and Syria to the Iraq insurgency had become fruitless once the counter-insurgency strategy began to show results. Iran and Syria both had to jump onto the winning train to have close relations with the Nouri al-Maliki Government; at least this way they exercised some influence. Second, Pakistan did not hold the key to the Afghan conflict. If the US established security, assumed the military leaders, Pakistan’s role (like the role of Iran in Iraq) would be minimised. However, for the military, Pakistani and US interests in Afghanistan were not incompatible; insurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan was equally a serious threat to Pakistan’s stability. That was what Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani had recently told Petraeus. Kayani had added that Pakistan would not only cooperate with the US in Afghanistan, but also act in the near future against Al Qaeda and its Pakistani associates in Swat and South Waziristan. A counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan would encourage/strengthen Pakistan to fight against a common enemy which posed a risk to both countries. Third, a strong US presence in Afghanistan would ensure stability in the country, which would equally help Pakistan’s security and stability. It would keep Al Qaeda and other insurgents in Pakistan, especially in its tribal areas, under severe pressure through counterterrorism operations (enabled through a large US footprint in Afghanistan), considerably reducing the chances of Pakistan getting sucked into a civil war or falling apart, or the Pakistani Government succumbing to Pakistani insurgents, or, worst of all, nuclear weapons getting into the hands of Al Qaeda and its followers. Stability in Afghanistan would also ensure Pakistan did not

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suffer from the blowback of terrorism and refugees. Thus the military leaders assumed that the fate of Pakistan was linked to the fate of Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, was not as important as Afghanistan, since the war was all about (ultimately) defeating terrorist groups, and the military leaders were eager to do so on the ground in Afghanistan, the centre of conflict, where the fighting was happening. The only way to eventually defeat Al Qaeda was to keep a strong presence in Afghanistan, as the US could not employ the strategy in Pakistan anyway due to Pakistan’s negative view of the US, and the sheer impossibility of the applicability of the strategy in Pakistan (explained in the Conclusion). Therefore, if a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan meant more allocation of resources, so be it! Finally, Petraeus seemingly disagreed with the assumption that if the US did not get Pakistan right, it would fail no matter what it did in Afghanistan. The US did not get Iran or Syria right, yet it brought the Iraq War to a successful end. The military camp was likewise optimistic that the US would not meet the same fate as the Soviet Union due to several factors. More than 90 per cent of Afghans did not support a Taliban regime in Afghanistan, as the Afghans had seen the Taliban’s barbaric and repressive rule in the 1990s in which half of the Afghan population (women) were practically imprisoned, minority rights were infringed and the country’s social, economic and political systems were shattered to pieces. More than twothirds of Afghans supported the US presence in Afghanistan, as they understood that a lack of US presence would lead to either a civil war of the early 1990s, or a Taliban takeover of the late 1990s. US forces were equipped with weapons suitable for military theatres like Afghanistan, but the Soviet soldiers had not been. The Soviet Union never used a counter-insurgency strategy, and thus, instead of protecting the civil population, the Soviet Union barbarically and indiscriminately bombed villagers, killed or imprisoned its inhabitants and, at the end, burned the entire place, thus leaving hardly any living species. There were approximately 150,000, some even claim 250,000, Mujahedeen fighting the Soviet Union and its puppet government in Kabul, but in 2009 the Taliban number was much smaller – 25,000 to 40,000. Finally, unlike the jihad era of 1980s, two-thirds of insurgents fought in order to survive or make a living, or were even forced to join

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the insurgency and hence they could be targets of reconciliation. Once the US applied a counter-insurgency strategy, they would win over the population, and the strategy would produce the same outcome in Afghanistan as it had done in Iraq. The military leaders were not therefore bothered by the Biden camp’s assumption that Congress (and the American public in general) was turning against the war, and if the American casualties and US spending went up in a war without an end, Congress would terminate funding. The military assumed their planned counter-insurgency strategy would be successful in Afghanistan, and once the military showed success, Congress would change its mind and support the war. It was the case with the Iraq War, too, before the surge, but many Senators changed their minds. Meanwhile, Senator Lindsey Graham privately told Emanuel, who was worried that Congress might not fund the surge troops, that if Obama approved the surge they would make sure the administration won the Republican support to pass the financing for the decision. Afghanistan would not turn into another Vietnam, assumed the military, because similar false assumptions had been made about the Iraq War. Nor was the escalation of war in Afghanistan similar to the ‘domino theory’, which influenced ‘the thinking behind US escalation’ in Vietnam, because terrorists would cause another 9/11 from the region if they were given a breathing space. The Vietnam argument was based not on facts but on idealism; those who had opposed the Iraq War now turned their idealism against the Afghanistan War. The military leaders and their supporters repeatedly and publicly warned that, if Obama listened to those arguments and did not approve the surge, or approve a strategy of ‘instrumentalism’ (marginal shifts in strategy and resources), then Afghanistan would become a ‘quagmire’ for the US. Incidentally, while the Biden camp acknowledged that a US retreat from Afghanistan would be hard, it did not assume it to be strategically detrimental to US interests. The military, however, assumed that if the US retreated (which they called ‘defeat’), it would have severe consequences explained above. These were the counterarguments and assumptions of the military camp – namely, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and McChrystal8 – Blair and Peter Lavoy from the Directorate of

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National Intelligence,9 the military’s supporters in Congress, mostly Republicans, including heavyweight (and hawkish) Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, Joseph I. Lieberman and Representative Eric Cantor,10 the press11 and other outside actors who gave testimonies to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations or wrote articles in influential foreign policy journals and magazines.12 The above opposing beliefs, views and images of the Afghanistan War must have woken Obama up to the complexities of the Afghanistan War. For years, Obama had been blaming President Bush, but now he might have felt sympathy for the 43rd President of the United States. Moreover, these views questioned the very nature of the Afghanistan War, raising a serious question that had not yet been realised: most probably, the US was in the wrong country, fighting the wrong enemy; fighting a group that in fact was not the enemy, or connected to the enemy. The enemy, Al Qaeda, was in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. Had Obama been mistaken all along by saying that the Afghanistan War was a war of necessity? The Biden camp answered in the affirmative, while the military disagreed. As seen in Chapter 5, the American policy making circle saw the Afghanistan War as a good war and needed resources, so why suddenly did it become controversial? To answer the question, it is important to shed light on Obama’s War Cabinet.

CHAPTER 7 AN INSIDER'S INSIGHT INTO OBAMA'S WAR CABINET

President Barack Obama’s policy making team for the decision to surge (and, in most cases, for the decision to withdraw) could be divided into three: the vice-president/the trusted advisors camp, ‘the outsiders’,1 and the David Petraeus or the military camp. Each made attempts to influence the president and hence the decision to surge. Like many previous presidents, Obama chose a vice-president who was an established Washington insider and well experienced in foreign policy. Joseph Biden was a six-term Senator from Delaware, serving as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations between 2001 and 2003, and again between 2007 and 2009. He twice (unsuccessfully) sought Democratic presidential nomination in 1988 and 2008, and was considered ‘the most trusted voice’ on foreign policy in the Democratic Party in 2001. Biden was a ‘leading liberal hawk’ who supported military interventions for ‘altruistic’ purposes, including nation-building; for example, US involvement in the Balkans in the 1990s and Iraq invasion a decade later. In 2008, as seen in Chapter 5, he asked for a ‘Marshall Plan’ for Afghanistan to make the country ‘self-sustaining’, even though it would take up to a decade. Karzai would perform better if the US provided more resources, troops and a better strategy. The US should commit whatever it took or else history would judge the US harshly if it permitted the hopes of the liberated Afghans to evaporate. He was hopeful that the US would not experience the Soviet fate in Afghanistan, since the former offered ‘a better choice’.2

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His beliefs in 2008, and previously, were consistent with the perspectives the military camp had during the Af-Pak review. But during the Af-Pak review, Biden’s beliefs and images of the Afghanistan War had shifted considerably. The sudden shift was apparently caused by his tour to Afghanistan as vice-president-elect, in which Biden discovered through David D. McKiernan and other US officials that there were no Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan but in Pakistan, and US forces told him they did not know why they fought in Afghanistan. Biden himself was lost on what US objectives in the country were. In the same tour, he seemingly formed a view that it was not just the shortcomings in the Bush Administration’s Afghan policy to blame for the US failure in Afghanistan, but also the ‘incompetence’ and unreliability of President Hamid Karzai and his corrupt government. Back in Washington, his former colleagues, particularly Chuck Hagel, constantly brought to his attention, especially after the 21,000 troops had not produced any results and the military was asking for yet more, that the Afghanistan War was unwinnable and resembled President Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam War.3 Obama ensured Biden played the role of what Bob Woodward described as the ‘devil’s advocate’ in the policy debate by allowing the vice-president to present his opposing views to the military, ask as many questions regarding the proposed counter-insurgency as he could, and be aggressive in his pursuit of a counterterrorism-plus strategy. Like Dick Cheney, Biden formed a foreign policy team, which included a few former and current military generals, to discuss Stanley McChrystal’s options and sharpen its queries. The team, with the assistance of former military general Cartwright, and without the prior knowledge of the Pentagon, produced an alternative military plan to that of McChrystal, recommending that the deployment of 10,000 fighting forces and another 10,000 enablers would suffice. To weaken McChrystal’s assessment further, Biden successfully persuaded US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry to put down his sceptical thoughts on the proposed counter-insurgency strategy in cables. Biden used Eikenberry’s views in the cable time and again to imply that if the US Ambassador to Afghanistan claimed that a counterinsurgency strategy would not work, how on earth were the military still emphatic in their requests?

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Eikenberry’s advice was not ordinary, since he served in the country as US Ambassador. Nor was Douglas E. Lute’s advice – another member of Biden’s foreign policy team. Like McChrystal, Lute had done his research when he was in Afghanistan to write the 2008 report. Like McChrystal, he (with about 25 people working for him) remained in contact with US commanders on the ground, even though this angered the military leaders, Defense Secretary Robert Gates included.4 Biden also made sure he wrote a separate memo to the president before each meeting, outlining his thoughts discussed in detail in Chapter 6. As Chapter 9 indicates, most of these policy suggestions were reflected in the final strategy Obama made. For Obama, Biden played an enormously valuable role in the decision making. Biden argued that he took all these steps – that is, persistently questioning the military plan and its assumptions – to ensure the military did not ‘push’ an inexperienced president.5 It is important to mention, however, that during his 35 years in the Senate the ‘experienced’ Biden had made many ‘poor’ judgments, for example, supporting the Iraq invasion in 2003 or opposing US involvement in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 on the grounds that no ‘vital’ US interests were at stake. At the very least, the invasion of Kuwait had the potential to put in jeopardy Bush Senior’s ‘new world order’ as well as cut US access to oil in the Middle East. The pro-military lobbyists were quick to highlight Biden’s mistaken assumptions, adding that there was no basis for Biden to regard himself as ‘a combination of Henry Kissinger and Carl von Clausewitz’. They urged Obama not to listen to Biden but to accept McChrystal’s request to revive the ‘losing war’ in Afghanistan.6 Obama’s trusted advisors, however, endorsed Biden’s advice. Like many of his predecessors, including Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and Bush Junior, Obama ‘centralised’ policy making within the White House. Like President John Kennedy, who had ‘set up a little state department’ in the White House, Obama established his own foreign policy team made up of his trusted advisors or inner circle. Generally speaking, the members of the inner circle were those who helped Obama during the 2008 election, and Obama appointed them either in the White House or in the National Security Council (NSC). They ‘shared’ many characteristics with Obama. Like Obama, they were relatively young and consequently saw themselves as a

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‘new generation’ in foreign policy. Like Obama, none of them worked previously in the main executive branches of government, but on foreign policy in academia or Congress. And like Obama, they opposed the Iraq War before it began. Most of them were old friends and helped each other to get a position in the Obama team during the presidential campaign and later in the administration. National Security Council Chief of Staff Denis McDonough, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Benjamin Rhodes, National Security Council Chief of Staff Mark W. Lippert, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, Senior Advisors to the President Peter Rouse, Bill Daley and David M. Axelrod and White House Press Secretary Robert L. Gibbs were among those with whom Obama spent plenty of time. After and before a meeting with his Cabinet-level advisors, such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates or National Security Advisor James Jones, and after the morning intelligence briefings in which some of the inner circle were present, too, Obama would ask for McDonough, Lippert and Rhodes’s views on the topics he had already discussed or topics he was likely to discuss. At times, Obama would even discuss with them the options he had in mind for a final decision. While Obama made ultimate decisions, including the decision to surge (and the decision to withdraw), they helped him reach those decisions. In effect, the inner circle, as James Mann concluded, was ‘an extension of the President himself, the Chief Obamian’, and accordingly wielded enormous power in the making of foreign policy.7 Obama’s White House not only tightly controlled every aspect of national security policy, but also interfered in operational details; for example, Lute would continue to monitor the strategy in Afghanistan. But unlike Bush Junior, Obama’s ‘rational’ approach required decisions to be made on the basis of ‘information’ not ‘emotions’. Obama preferred to have a deliberate and highly analytical process in which all contrasting views and options were analysed. The president therefore invited not only his immediate advisors to the decision making, but also career diplomats and experts to directly confront their policy suggestions, disagreements and, at times, themselves in front of the president. Obama did not want to repeat the disorderly decision making process of President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 and Bush in 2002– 3, in

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which both presidents failed to examine the reasoning, assess the consequences and debate the alternatives.8 Indeed, Obama used all the necessary methods9 to minimise the ‘dysfunctional consequences’ of groupthink: conformity or a sense of ‘we can easily’ achieve the objectives. Unlike Bush, he tried to remain neutral between the Petraeus and Biden camps, and encouraged an atmosphere of open debate between the two opposing groups, allowing both groups to question each other’s policy assumptions. He listened to those conflicting policy suggestions and asked probing and detailed questions. He was willing to spend a substantial amount of time to survey all warning signals from the rival groups. Unlike Bush, he rarely stereotyped the views of any of the camp, and often insisted on the consideration of alternatives. When Biden questioned the importance of the Afghanistan War to US national security, he let him speak his reasons. He gave a great deal of attention to avoid Afghanistan turning into another Vietnam, and therefore, as will be seen in the next chapter, imposed a limit (‘caveat’) on the US stay in Afghanistan. He listened carefully to Petraeus’s claim that Afghanistan was vital to US national security, and partly agreed by approving the surge. Time and again, however, he raised questions with regard to the role of Pakistan in the Afghanistan War, allowing for a detailed analysis of the impact of Pakistan in the employability of the new strategy. Whenever he was unsure about an aspect of the policy opinions/assumptions, Obama would consult lower officials as well as experts/trusted associates from outside of the administration, such as former Secretary of State Colin Powell. But to the frustration of the president and his inner circle/trusted advisors, Obama’s ‘multiple advocacy’ approach to policy making led to policy being debated in the media and Congress. Petraeus’s interview in Gerson’s article, McChrystal’s speech in London, Michael Mullen’s statements to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the leaking of some highly classified documents – in all of which the military leaders publicly supported a counter-insurgency strategy, asked for resolve and shunned Biden’s proposed counterterrorism-plus strategy as unworkable – are examples that made the inner circle and the president furious. McDonough and Donilon on several occasions contacted the military leaders to complain that resources and strategies were something the

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president decided, and he was willing to debate them with the military leaders, but it was wrong of the military leaders to publicly lobby for a strategy by giving interviews or leaking documents, such as McChrystal’s assessment, while Obama was carrying out a review to discuss the strategy. It was an attempt to force the president to approve the proposed counter-insurgency strategy. Obama had to have a meeting with Mullen and Petraeus to tell them that he believed the military leaders conducted a subtle campaign in public to, as Woodward revealed, ‘jam him’, adding that he felt ‘disrespected’, ‘trapped’ and ‘boxed-in’. The military leaders did have the right to provide Obama with military advice, but by giving it publicly they undermined Obama’s authority over the military.10 The State Department and the military leaders, on the other hand, complained that the White House launched a subtle campaign against the proposed counter-insurgency strategy and leaked documents, such as Eikenberry’s cables, to weaken the case for more troops. The military leaders were not happy with the cables, written without consultation with McChrystal, being requested by the White House. Moreover, as Gates claimed, some in the White House characterised the military leaders as ‘insubordinate’ and ‘in revolt’, thus turning the atmosphere even more ‘poisonous’.11 Actually, due to the public and adversarial nature of the Af-Pak review and the controversial aspect of the Afghanistan War, both camps used outside actors and Congressional members to maximum effect to weaken each other’s policy suggestions, thus contributing to the split in public opinion. They did so by leaking documents and having their supporters in the media, Congress and think-tanks to lobby publicly for their strategy while the Af-Pak review was being conducted. While, at times, it was hard to distinguish whether Petraeus or Michael Gerson had initiated a particular view, or Biden or David Ignatius, in many cases it was clear that views of certain experts influenced the viewpoints of the policy makers. Frederick Kagan’s article convinced Gates that the US, like the Soviet Union, would not be seen by Afghans as an occupier since the counter-insurgency strategy was designed to protect Afghans, but the Soviets were killing them. George Will’s article strengthened Biden’s conviction that the US was heading towards another Vietnam in Afghanistan. Gordon M. Goldstein’s book, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam, which

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the president and most of the policy makers had read, provoked the Biden camp to question every assumption made by the military, as Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had failed to do in relation to the Vietnam War.12 The outside actors (including members of Congress), whose arguments were elaborated in Chapter 6, were therefore more involved in policy making for the decision to surge than one would generally expect them to be, and consequently played an important part in shaping the discussion and eventually the outcome. Despite assurances from Gates, McChrystal and Petraeus that they would keep their views within the Cabinet and the Pentagon, the military continued with its campaign up to the end of the Af-Pak review and even beyond, as Petraeus found other ways – through hawkish Senators and pro-military experts – to communicate his messages. Sometimes their media campaign was so aggressive that even Petraeus had to tell them to slow down. This ‘adversarial’ nature of policy making undermined the entire decision making process. According to Gates, it turned most attention towards the military aspect of the strategy, failing to discuss in detail the political, diplomatic and civilian part of the strategy. It did not serve the president as it prejudged Obama’s decision, forcing Obama to reach for a compromise. The NSC staff or the inner circle, maintained Gates, could have acted as an ‘honest broker’, but, due to the damaging rift, they defended one group against the other and failed to remain neutral.13 Even though the inner circle and the Biden camp were close to Obama, they (and the president) could not influence the decision entirely in their favour because they faced a very powerful camp: the military. Though Mullen and Gates, as well as Clinton, were superior to him in terms of their bureaucratic positions, in the Af-Pak review the head of US Central Command Petraeus’s say counted the most since he was the expert on strategy and responsible for overseeing the war. After the Vietnam War, especially since the beginning of the 1980s, a counterinsurgency strategy manual was neither published nor taught at West Point, as the US military determined never to engage in guerrilla fighting. But it was, as David Axelrod privately referred to Petraeus, ‘Mr. Counterinsurgency’ who brought the counter-insurgency strategy into

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the Army curriculum. Petraeus himself was influenced by the French expert David Galula and, for referencing purposes, Petraeus always carried a copy of the former’s book entitled Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Galula had fought in several counter-insurgencies and believed that defeating ‘fleas requires draining the swamp that sustains them; defeating insurgencies requires protecting, then wooing or co-opting, the population that sustains the cause’.14 According to Galula, Mao Zedong, the successful Chinese insurgent leader, and numerous studies conducted by the RAND Corporation, the ‘clear, hold and build’ strategy focused on the hearts and minds of the people. The counter-insurgent – who was not just a soldier but also ‘an engineer’, ‘a social worker’ and a ‘school teacher’ – needed to mingle with the population to give them a sense of security and to learn about them and their internal realities. It was then that informed choices could be made, making it possible for the counter-insurgent to win over the population.15 Petraeus learned from these experts, and later became an expert himself when he did his PhD on the counter-insurgency strategy and successfully applied it in Mosul in Iraq in 2006 where none of the other officers had done so, because US Commander in Iraq George W. Casey was against it. After producing considerable improvement in Iraq in 2007, Petraeus believed that bringing security to the Afghan population would bring the same outcome in Afghanistan. Petraeus used his Iraq experience to find solutions to the Afghanistanrelated obstacles, at times, as prominent journalist Chandrasekaran stated, referring to the former more than ‘24 times’ in a single hour. McChrystal similarly relied on his Iraq experience. In a testimony before the Senate, he made it clear that a simple answer to the conflict in Afghanistan was a holistic counter-insurgency strategy. The testimony took place before he carried out his assessment in Afghanistan. It was clear that, like the neoconservatives’ hunt for democracy and free economy which pushed the US into expensive wars, the counterinsurgency strategy became the ideology of the military leaders, which equally required years of nation-building.16 The military leaders must have known that, due to its military nature, the strategy was capable of keeping the military camp central to policy making. So it was not surprising when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen vigorously embraced McChrystal’s assessment.

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Mullen argued, however, that it offered both resources and the necessary strategy, two commodities that Afghanistan had been deprived of for years. Mullen defended the counter-insurgency strategy not only in the Situation Room, but also outside by using social media platforms. Having been ‘emasculated by his two predecessors in the Donald Rumsfeld era’, Mullen wanted to restore the prominence of the chairman’s position. Mullen therefore actively tried to be more effective and bureaucratically prominent in policy making compared to his predecessors from the Bush Administration.17 Perhaps he was more involved in policy making because Gates was not Rumsfeld, and because Gates, too, supported the strategy. Secretary of Defense Gates – a former staffer on the NSC, Deputy National Security Advisor, and CIA Director with ‘a wealth of experience and knowledge in foreign policy’ and national security issues – held both Petraeus and McChrystal in high regard. Gates played a crucial part in Petraeus’s appointment as the Iraq commander in 2006 and McChrystal’s installation in his Afghanistan post in 2009.18 While Gates supported the military camp and most of its arguments, he equally tried to become the middleman by making efforts to keep the White House and the military relationship smooth. To do so, he had to make many concessions during the review. Gates agreed with Obama that the goal to defeat the indigenous Taliban was ambitious and impossible and should therefore be changed to degrade, though he believed that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were inseparable. Gates offered the July 2011 timeframe for US troops to begin to transfer security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in order to begin to withdraw regardless of whether or not the counter-insurgency strategy was working. Gates reduced McChrystal’s proposal for 40,000 to 30,000 troops. Gates also concurred that building a 400,000 ANSF force was unnecessary and undesirable; though Gates believed that the ANSF were the ‘ticket out’ of Afghanistan for the US, and it was essential to spend the resources to build a strong force. Gates admitted that a fully resourced counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan ‘sounded’ a lot like nation-building, and instead it should be a counter-insurgency strategy with a focus on places where the population was most threatened by the Taliban; this seemed to have eliminated the east of Afghanistan from McChrystal’s assessment as an area of operation. Gates

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consented that nation-building was too expensive, and the administration should instead focus on ‘capacity building’, that is, certain ministries and provincial governors with a good record; such focus would negate the good governance and effective ANSF requirements of a counter-insurgency strategy. Gates recognised that building good governance in Afghanistan was against the history of the country, so the US needed to support and build those ministries, provincial governors and existing ‘traditional structures’ that were not corrupt and essential to enable them to achieve their objectives. Gates concurred with Obama that they should not aim for ‘a Western-style democracy’ in Afghanistan since it was neither necessary nor feasible, given Afghanistan’s inherent complexities. As long as there was a government, or any existing traditional structures, which could provide basic services and manage to ‘hold the Taliban at bay’, Gates was content. Finally, Gates agreed that NATO should also increase its share of troops and resources in Afghanistan and take more responsibility for the north and west.19 As will be seen in Chapter 8, these concessions enabled Obama to narrow McChrystal’s original strategy, as Obama managed to apply restrictions on the number of troops, length of their stay, and the goals they were to fulfil. These compromises also gave Gates sway over decision making and, as will be seen in the next chapter, the resulting strategy was consistent with the suggestions offered by Gates. Obama respected Gates a great deal and gave ‘serious’ consideration to the views of his defense secretary. In Obama’s view, Gates kept the NSC together by trying to reduce the tension between the military and the White House. For Obama, Gates had a clear understanding of US national security interests, and, if need be, Gates was willing to compete against the Pentagon bureaucracy. Gates managed to integrate the goals of the Pentagon into US broader national security interests, and, unlike Rumsfeld, Gates refused to be turf-driven. On numerous occasions Gates would protect the turf of other departments, such as the State Department, if he believed it needed protecting. This quality made him liked not just by Bush and Obama, but also by Rice, Clinton and many in Congress.20 Obama also liked Gates’s ‘calm’, ‘low-key’ and balanced manner. Like Obama, Gates was ‘Mr Cool’, and managed to keep his ‘big ego’ in check while being simultaneously forceful. In NSC meetings, Gates (unlike

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Biden) gave importance to when and what to speak, and avoided being emotional or over the top. Both Gates and the president thought alike, as both were influenced by the ‘realist’ world views of Brent Scowcroft. Gates’s ‘mentor’, Scowcroft, who provided foreign policy advice to Obama during the presidential campaign in 2008, was admired by the president. All three were ‘prudent’, ‘pragmatic’ and, at times, ‘accommodationist’. All three had similar outlooks in foreign policy to those of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush. These numerous qualities or characteristics of Gates seemingly brought the defense secretary closer to Obama, even though Gates was not in the inner circle. Obama consistently urged Gates to stay longer in office because Obama needed him. When he left in 2011, Obama bestowed upon him the Freedom Medal. In sum, even though Gates supported McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, he did not agree with all the requests made by McChrystal. He seemed, as he himself agrees, to somehow partly agree with the Biden group, especially on costs and goals. But he had supported a counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq and it had paid off, so he might have believed that it would do the same in Afghanistan which, in his view, had been deprived of a strategy and resources.21 Secretary of State Clinton, on the other hand, did not appear to agree with the Biden camp on any aspects of their policy suggestions. Her unequivocal support of the Petraeus camp during the surge decision raised numerous questions, including whether she could be ‘trusted’, whether she could ever ‘be on the Obama team’, and whether she was not playing for her political future as US president. Woodward asked these questions because Clinton had been Obama’s rival in the Democratic primary campaign, in which she repeatedly called Obama inexperienced in foreign policy, and Obama, likewise, accused her of holding similar ideas about foreign policy that had led to the Iraq War. At times the attacks become personal. ‘Shame on you, Barack Obama,’ Clinton told Obama, accusing him of lying. Samantha Power had to resign after calling Clinton ‘a monster’ who was ‘stooping to anything’. Given all the tension, even animosity, between the Obama and Clinton camps during the campaign, and despite the inner circle’s discontent, Obama selected her as his secretary of state because Obama, akin to Abraham Lincoln, wanted to bring rivals together in the

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Cabinet. Obama believed she would be loyal if she became part of the team. Ultimately, she stood by her husband after the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and could stand by the president, too.22 Obama’s underlying purpose was argued to be purely political, as the appointment made sure there was not another Robert Kennedy in the Johnson presidential term, or Ted Kennedy in the Carter presidential term; both Kennedys were considered a ‘magnet for intraparty opposition to the president’, and both of the above presidents served only one term. As Bobby Kennedy had done, a hypothetical speech by Clinton with a dovish message could equally have attracted many antiwar supporters against the Obama Administration.23 Whatever the reasons for her appointment might have been, the larger-than-life Clinton might not go down in history as one of the greatest, such as George Marshall or Henry Kissinger, because, upon her leaving, she had no signature achievement, no ‘world-historical Clinton Doctrine’, and no diplomatic achievement. Unlike Kissinger, Clinton did not seem to have the trust of the president and never developed ‘warm personal ties’ with him. Similar to Powell and dissimilar to Kissinger, Clinton faced the presence of a powerful vice-president in the White House, who, like Cheney, had a separate power centre on foreign policy and was deeply experienced in it. A combination of these two factors made it at times as difficult for her to convince the White House to listen to her views as it was to deal with foreign governments; she did not even have the power to remove the disobedient Eikenberry because Obama and Biden protected the ambassador.24 She never made a point of her voice being lost and her turf being encroached upon, not even in her memoir, and got along with her job. While she won praises for being a team member, loyal and not standing publicly against the White House, her tendency not to involve herself personally in conflicts prevented her from being an influential voice in decision making. Her quietness, even in her memoir, was most likely due to her alleged presidential plans. For the same reasons, she did not want to be seen to be failing. She charged Richard Holbrooke for the Af-Pak arena to bring about a solution to the conflict, and when there was not much progress, she was reluctant to step in.25 Finally, her inexperience in foreign policy was detrimental to her role in decision making. During her husband’s era, she never sat in NSC meetings, never had security clearance, never managed any part of the

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national security bureaucracy, never had her own national security personnel, and although she travelled with her husband as a First Lady, she could hardly be expected to get involved with foreign governments. She only had a ‘behind-the-scenes role’ in decisions. One domestic decision she oversaw was to pass the universal health care bill that failed.26 While her undeniable support of the military case raised some questions, it is important to state that her beliefs and views during the Af-Pak review were consistent with her foreign policy outlooks during her primary campaign in 2008; McChrystal’s options were not dissimilar to what Democratic presidential candidate Clinton had wanted for Afghanistan, and thus her views were naturally hawkish like the military, and she agreed with the arguments made by the military camp.27 Clinton was willing to support the military’s side, even though her top foreign policy advisors, Jim Steinberg (who, incidentally, was unprecedentedly given a seat in the Principals Committee and at NSC meetings, giving the State Department two voices) and Holbrooke, advised her not to because the mission had an ‘open-endedness’ to it, the military had not provided convincing reasons for the surge, and, like US generals in Vietnam, McChrystal might be back in Washington, DC, after a while and demand yet more troops. They suggested Clinton support the 20,000 option by Biden. She, on the other hand, believed that the 40,000 option would make a difference, and it was important that the US showed ‘resolve’. Indeed, as will be seen in Chapter 8, when Clinton and Gates, the ‘independent power centre’, the ‘unfireable’, showed resolve and supported the military, Obama’s running room was significantly diminished.28 Obama, however, managed to disregard the viewpoints of the outsiders, most of whom had military backgrounds. It does not signify that they had different viewpoints to those of the above two camps; it rather means that their views were heard but hardly listened to. Consequently, they had very limited sway over the decision to surge. One such member was the National Security Advisor (NSA) James Jones. He, together with other military men such as Dennis Blair, is said to have been appointed for political purposes. The military men could provide a ‘cover’ for Obama’s defence and security decisions, offer assurances against the known Republican charges that Democrats were

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weak on national security issues, explain military traditions and costumes to a president who did not know much about them, keep relations between the military establishment and the president smooth, and, if necessary, be a force against the military establishment, especially Jones, who had a reputation for frankness.29 But Jones – a retired Marine general, a former commander, a NATO commander and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s part-time envoy for security in the Middle East – proved to be a weak NSA during the Af-Pak review. Despite his attempts (for example, to put a stop to the military campaign in the media), he failed to be a counterweight to Gates, Mullen and Petraeus the way the president had expected him to be. Jones never became one of Obama’s trusted advisors because Jones and Obama did not know each other personally and only met twice before Jones’s appointment as an NSA; Jones was recommended by foreign policy ‘wise men’, Scowcroft in particular, to Obama. Since Jones was used to a military decision making style in which juniors obeyed seniors, he found it difficult to adapt to the centralised decision making style the ‘lawyer-professor-politician’ president adopted in which the inner circle, as opposed to the immediate advisors, had the most say. As a former military commander, he found it difficult to act like an aide to Obama to fit the inner circle or become responsive to Obama’s decision making style. Consequently, the two barely met. To make matters worse, the inner circle did not treat Jones as an NSA. Examples include cutting Jones’s access to the president; refusing to show Jones the president’s inaugural speech, even though Jones asked for it; preparing memos without Jones’s knowledge; sidelining Jones by often talking to Deputy National Security Advisor Donilon; often staying away from Jones’s strategy briefings; interrupting Jones in meetings to say the NSA was wrong on Obama’s views and thoughts; getting things done by invoking the president; and, according to Woodward, leaking derogatory information about Jones, accusing him of being ‘lazy’, ‘forgetful’ and ‘out of touch’ with the president. Jones repeatedly urged Obama to do something about the inner circle’s contemptuous treatment of him, but Obama was not tough on the ‘mafia’ (the inner circle), and did not take care of the situation. On the contrary, as Mann argued, since Obama really wanted to have a problem-free and ‘smooth’ administration, and Jones’s quarrel with the

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inner circle (and other outsiders who, too, came into conflict with the inner circle) became an impediment to that, Obama eventually had to fire him (and the other outsiders). Being close to a president and his trusted advisors, as well as following his operating style, are two factors that make an NSA effective, but none of the conditions existed in Jones’s case. Consequently, his voice was lost in policy making for the decision to surge, even though his views, especially those regarding the conditions of the counter-insurgency strategy, were more compatible with the arguments made by the Biden camp than the military.30 Jones’s deputy, Thomas Donilon, on the other hand, worked much harder and longer and handled most of the day-to-day issues at NSC. His administrative experience during the Carter and Clinton Administrations made it easier for him to be an aide and receptive to Obama’s operating style. Donilon’s closeness to Biden (he worked for Biden during the primaries in 2008, and previously in 1988 during Biden’s short presidential race), National Security Advisor to Vice-President Antony Blinken (old friend and colleague), White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel (friend for several decades), National Security Council Chiefs of Staff Mark Lippert and Denis McDonough further played to his advantage. Thus, a mixture of giving the highest attention to the president’s instructions, hard work, and his closeness to the president and those close to him turned him into ‘one of my [Obama’s] closest advisors’. By many accounts, Donilon was almost the NSA, and acted like one.31 Dennis Blair – the commander of US Pacific Command, a Rhodes Scholar, a White House Fellow, and a senior military advisor for the NSC – was another outsider and likewise less prominent compared to his deputy Brennan. Like Jones, Blair could not become approachable to Obama’s operating style. As a military man, the intelligent and straightforward Blair spoke what was on his mind, but Obama did not seem to appreciate Blair’s bluntness. After decades of service, Blair could not change his style to please the president. It began to create a distance between the president and him. Another factor was the ambiguous authority Blair’s job carried. His job as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), created during the Bush Junior era, replaced (theoretically) the CIA Director in running the American intelligence community, including briefing the president

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every morning. But the law had left out some grey areas, for example, the extent of the DNI’s authority over the CIA, and the nature of the relationship between the CIA Director and the president were unclear. Was the CIA Director to report directly to the president or to the DNI? While this remained unclear, Blair demanded authority over the CIA’s covert operations – such as the drones – and asked for top US intelligence officials to come from other intelligence agencies, too. But due to his ‘extraordinarily deep institutional knowledge of the White House, Congress, and the CIA’ during the four decades of service in government, and his friendships with some powerful individuals – for example, Nancy Pelosi and his prote´ge´, Emanuel, who had helped him in the CIA appointment – CIA Director Panetta, to Blair’s frustration, successfully defended his turf. Blair and Jones’ relations were amicable, but, as Blair himself admitted, Jones himself was an outsider. The turf battle between Panetta and Blair created obstacles to the smooth running of the administration, and further distanced Blair from Obama.32 The third factor was Brennan. John Brennan was from the outside, but he was another insider. Neither Donilon nor Brennan would have been deputies had the administration been certain that they would secure a Senate confirmation. Due to Donilon’s previous connection to Fannie Mae and Brennan’s reputation for being ‘Bush’s man’, their names were withdrawn from the top positions. They, however, were still treated as if they were the top men, not deputies. Brennan’s office was located less than a minute away from the Oval Office, and so Obama asked Brennan for advice whenever he had questions about intelligence issues. As an ex-CIA specialist on Middle Eastern countries, Brennan was versed not just in intelligence matters, but also in foreign policy issues. Thus, due to his access to Obama and his knowledge in foreign policy, he had more say in intelligence issues than the CIA Director or Blair. For former CIA Director Michael Hayden, Brennan was the actual DNI, not Blair. After the middle of November, the president no longer allowed Blair in NSC meetings for the Af-Pak review, as he was trying to offer policy advice. Yet Brennan remained part of the review up to the end. The relationship between Obama and Blair grew further apart due to the report on the bomber from Yemen (who had attempted to detonate plastic explosives while on-board a US aircraft), which put the blame on the individuals at the National Counterterrorism Center. But Blair

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disagreed and told Obama and Brennan to change it even if it required delaying the timing of a very crucial press conference. To Obama’s frustration, it was altered but Blair was shortly fired.33 Given Holbrooke’s job title (overseeing all the State Department’s work on Afghanistan and Pakistan and coordinating diplomacy with all the regional countries), his almost 50-year experience in American foreign policy (active in the Democratic Party before many Obamians were even born), his accomplishments (notably, bringing an end to the Balkans conflict in the 1990s) and his strong and forceful manner (nicknamed ‘The Bulldozer’), Holbrooke should have been the most effective, but he was not and his voice was lost, even though his beliefs were in sync with the Biden camp (and Obama) over the ‘missingprerequisites-of-counter-insurgency-strategy-and-thus-the-wrongstrategy’, ‘three-Pakistan-related problems’ and ‘Afghanistan-anothergraveyard-another-Vietnam’ arguments. Like Obama and Biden, he was practical, pragmatic, not an ideologist, not a pacifist and believed in the application of military force if the cause was worthy, but did not support costly wars that posed a threat to the US economy, which determined the fall and rise of a nation, and it was no surprise that he found himself naturally in agreement with the Biden camp and in disagreement with McChrystal’s proposal.34 For Holbrooke and his staff and advisors, including Barnett Rubin, there was one remedy for Afghanistan, and that was a regional solution/ peace settlement that gave Afghanistan’s neighbours a stake in the settlement, most crucially Pakistan, which had destabilised Afghanistan thus far.35 But neither did Holbrooke’s possible peace deal receive serious attention during the Af-Pak review, nor did Holbrooke manage to influence the decision in any way or shape. This had a variety of reasons, some relating to Holbrooke himself and others to the numerous impediments to a peace settlement. First, while Obama was in favour of peace talks, Mullen, Petraeus and Clinton thought the Taliban would not negotiate because they had the momentum – the counter-insurgency strategy would first gain momentum and then the US would talk. Panetta, however, thought that the US could not negotiate with the Taliban until it denounced Al Qaeda, or else the US would be dealing with terrorists. Second, Holbrooke’s aggressive campaign against Obama during the 2008 presidential campaign, during which he had called Obama

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‘inexperienced’ and young and destined to fail, was still in the minds of the Obama team, and, in certain cases, had left ‘scars’. For Gates, the ‘team of rivals’ approach worked better between Obama and Clinton compared to lower levels. Third, Holbrooke seemed to be of ‘the wrong generation’ (compared to the inner circle and the president), ‘serving at the wrong time’, as, apart from Clinton, nobody seemed to like him in the administration. McDonough and Rhodes did not like Holbrooke because of his efforts to bring strong foreign policy experts into the Democratic Party around Clinton, and because they thought he leaked sensitive information to journalists. Biden did not like him since the Clinton Administration, thinking of him as egoistic. Jones found Holbrooke ‘unctuous and prolix’ and sympathised with his fellow military friends Lute and Eikenberry, both of whom did not get on with Holbrooke due to his micromanagement of policy. Obama kept a distance from Holbrooke and never granted him oneto-one meetings. His manically intense and ‘in your face’ manner clashed with Obama’s calm and measured demeanour and his famous ‘no drama rule’. On several occasions, Obama wanted to remove him from his post, but Clinton would intervene and save his job. Thus he was left ‘marginalised’ and the ‘odd man out’ among the White House advisors, and it did not take long before an anti-Holbrooke attitude developed in the NSC, to the extent that Holbrooke’s analysis was sometimes left unread in inboxes. Four, Holbrooke was ‘undercut’ not only by the White House, but also by the presidential palace of Arg in Afghanistan. Holbrooke obsessively supported Ashraf Ghani to win during the 2009 presidential election, and this angered Karzai. During the time of the Af-Pak review, the relationship between Holbrooke and Karzai had deteriorated to the extent that Karzai had told his aides he did not want to meet Holbrooke again because he believed the former was interfering in the election. The American Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan was almost barred from seeing the president of the very country he was trying to repair! John Kerry had to be sent to fix the situation and the White House blamed Holbrooke for making a bad situation worse. Obama and his inner circle were aware of his influence in Afghanistan being very limited, but, instead of supporting Holbrooke, the White House did not seem to care about his barring. Holbrooke could credibly

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threaten Milosˇevic´, but with an elected president (Karzai) he could not do so, especially when Obama did not support him. Finally, since Clinton disregarded his advice on Afghanistan and supported the surge, Holbrooke could not make his opposition as publicly obvious as Eikenberry did, and therefore remained quiet and less effective. For those factors, his contribution to the Af-Pak review, notably his goal to make the peace deal with the Taliban a central focus of the review, was limited. The assumption that the Taliban would not negotiate because it had the momentum was taken at face value and was not argued in detail. Out of all the above factors, it was the lack of support from the president that really ‘devastated’ Holbrooke and his strategy.36

CHAPTER 8 THE SURGE DECISION AT THE FORMULATION PHASE, SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER 2009

Obama unprecedently picked Republicans in his cabinet to prove that his war cabinet, unlike the Bush Junior one, would be willing, if necessary, to listen to the views from the opposite party. The Republicans included Defense Secretary Robert Gates, National Security Advisor James Jones, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan. The Obama team therefore did not have a common understanding of how to deal with the world. Furthermore, most of them had limited experience in foreign policy and national security issues, especially those with military backgrounds, as well as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Leon Panetta. Consequently, neither were there Dick Cheney, Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld with a century of experience, nor a neoconservative-type movement with an already-made ideology. This, and his upbringing overseas, gave Obama the confidence to be ‘the main strategist’, ‘the Henry Kissinger’ of his administration. It was Obama’s viewpoints that shaped American foreign policy over the years.1 But, however, Obama found it difficult to make the surge decision the way he desired due to the impact of bureaucratic politics, contrasting beliefs/ideas, and a divided public opinion discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. The views of the Biden camp challenged Obama’s long-held beliefs and

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images of the Afghanistan War: a necessary war for United States (US) national security, which required a ‘comprehensive strategy’ and sufficient resources in order to ‘win’.2 In 2009, the President developed genuine doubts about the Afghanistan War and the suitability of a counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan, finding compelling, if not convincing, the Biden camp’s arguments of ‘Afghanistan-having-minimal-relevance-to-US-nationalsecurity-interests’, ‘missing-prerequisites-of-counter-insurgency-strategy-and-thus-the-wrong-strategy’, ‘Taliban-and-al-Qaeda-not-connected-and-al-Qaeda-would-not-return-if-Taliban-took-over-largeparts-of-Afghanistan’, ‘no-al-Qaeda-in-Afghanistan-and-Taliban-werenot-US-enemy-so-what-were-US-objectives-in-solving-a-civil-war’, ‘geographical-concentration-of-counter-insurgency-strategy-having-aballoon-effect’, ‘three-Pakistan-related problems’ and, to a certain extent, ‘Afghanistan-another-graveyard-another-Vietnam’.3 These arguments are explained in detail in Chapter 6. Obama’s main concern, however, was the costs. He found Stanley McChrystal’s strategy financially, strategically, humanly and politically very costly. Financially, if the surge was authorised, US troop numbers in Afghanistan would stand at around 100,000, costing Obama between 2010 and 2020. The duration the counter-insurgency strategy required roughly $1 trillion, approximately the same as his health care plan. Moreover, $55 billion was needed to establish the 400,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and another $8 billion every year for their salaries. Obama would not commit to a 10-year nation-building project requiring $1 trillion, as such huge spending did not match up with US national security interests and could not be maintained financially. He also had to take other considerations into account, including the dire economic conditions in America. Indeed, as Obama was inaugurated in January 2009, America was amidst the Great Recession, the worse since the Great Depression, a period in which the US economy was in deep crisis; the American economy kept contracting by 6.3 per cent at an annual rate; the stock market dropped from 7,949 to 6,443 points (in March 2009); unemployment kept moving up and the national unemployment rate would eventually reach a record high 10 per cent; numerous financial institutions/big organisations (had) either declared bankruptcy or were bailed out by the government; the US automotive

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industry was in serious financial crisis and Chrysler and General Motors slipped into bankruptcy; and housing prices would continue to plummet. Although different estimates were given, it was approximated that by the end of December 2010 the US had spent between $3 and 5 trillion on the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. By 2009, the spending might have stood at around $2 – 3 trillion in both countries. This was nearly one-third of the US’s overall deficit in 2009: about $9 trillion. For the 2009 fiscal year alone, the US budget deficit increased by a record number of $1.4 trillion. US indebtedness to China had increased from $78 billion in 2001 to over $1.1 trillion in 2011. While US financial muscle and flexibility had been severely weakened by 2009, China’s financial and military capabilities had grown, endangering US supremacy in East and South East Asia. Now the military was demanding an extra $1 trillion, more than what Obama had just obtained for his stimulus package – the sum of $787 billion, the largest in history – from Congress. One more trillion was self-destructive, further threatening to end the US current global pre-eminence. Strategically, the counter-insurgency strategy would have caused the US to be over-involved in the Middle East and Afghanistan at the cost of other regions, such as the Asia-Pacific. He equally did not want a heavy involvement in Afghanistan at the cost of domestic interests such as his health care bill or the rebuilding of America. Obama, as he had promised to the American people, had to fight the causes of the Great Recession to stimulate economic recovery. In addition, Obama had pledged to reform health care, increase tax on the wealthy/decrease tax on the middle class, reduce the federal budget deficit, and reduce unemployment. For all of these domestic initiatives, Obama, as the Biden camp often reminded him, needed the support of Congress, especially for the Affordable Care Act. Humanly, the war could result, as McChrystal and Petraeus admitted, in the loss of thousands of US lives in the first years of their counterinsurgency strategy. August 2009 was already the deadliest month for American soldiers, and more troops meant that Obama would write letters of condolences to many more US families whose loved ones were going to be sacrificed in Afghanistan. As a person, Obama would be ‘haunted’ by yet more human toll. And politically, losing more American lives and treasure in a war, which Obama did not think would end in the foreseeable future, would

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have serious political repercussions. It could cost him his presidency in the 2012 presidential election.4 This point is elaborated below. Obama did not want the counter-insurgency strategy, which necessitated more troops and nation-building but rather a strategy that assisted to improve Afghan governance, increase and revamp the ANSF to join the fight and provide more developmental aid. Obama preferred the mission to be more Afghanised. The President, however, could not act in accordance with his beliefs, even if he was the decider. If he increased troops, he was going to lose the support from the Democrats and ‘47 per cent’ of the American public; if not, he was going to alienate Republicans and many independents and lose the support of ‘49 per cent’ of the Americans.5 The Afghanistan War (and the Iraq War), as Obama and Gates admitted, had ‘left our unity on national security issues in tatters, and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for’ their effort to fight terrorism.6 Obama’s decision therefore carried a significant political risk whichever way his decision weighed in, putting the inexperienced President in a real dilemma.7 Obama, like Shakespeare’s Hamlet, had to think deep to decide to surge or not to surge. Unsure of what to do, the President began consulting those whom he trusted. Colin Powell advised the President that he should listen neither to the left to do ‘nothing’, nor to the right to do ‘everything’. The President should take his time to calculate what decision to make, a decision that would have consequences for his remaining time in office. No nation-building and no counter-insurgency strategy were General George Casey’s, the Army Chief of Staff, and Marine Commandant General James Conway’s short answers.8 While the high-profile military men (including Cartwright and the retired Lute and Eikenberry) did not support McChrystal’s counter-insurgency, how could Obama be hopeful it was the right strategy? What Obama did was to continue to consult experts in order to find answers to some very ‘important’ questions. In doing so, the review lingered, becoming the most protracted and extensive (about ten sessions that took approximately three months) since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. To many, it signalled fundamental uncertainty on the part of the President. Those on the right viewed Obama as ‘weak, naive and feckless’, whereas those on the left perceived him as someone who showed a disheartened ‘buyer’s remorse’. His polling fell during the

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period he was conducting the Af-Pak review; 45 per cent of ordinary Americans compared to 63 per cent from the previous spring, and 22 per cent of Republicans compared to 51 per cent at its peak now approved the president’s handling of the war. His ratings on Afghanistan had sunk much more than his ratings on managing other policies, due to the shift by the Republicans, who were disappointed in Obama’s conducting of the war. They, including Cheney, believed that Obama was ‘dithering’ and delaying at a time when US forces were in danger and the military leaders asked for a sense of urgency.9 Obama felt under pressure, especially when he was accused of putting US forces in danger by delaying the decision, or else Obama might not have used a few sentences of his speech of 1 December 2009 to tell the American public that there was no delay of troops and resources to Afghanistan. While he seemed unwilling to accept the demands of the two sides, he could not afford to say no to any of the sides. Refusing the military requests outright was unwise for numerous reasons. Colonel Tien advised Obama that the tension between the military and the president had reached a point where it was really not easy for Obama to resist his military leaders. Tien had a point because it was Obama, who from the very start wanted to get the Afghanistan campaign right and therefore approved the appointment of McChrystal to carry out the assessment. Now if Obama refused to approve his plan, the possibility was that McChrystal would resign. Since Petraeus was the overall commander and the president was refusing his counterinsurgency strategy, he might also stand down. Surely their resignations would also force Gates to follow his two commanders. Gates had promised McChrystal that he would do his best in the Situation Room to fight the military’s case. This would have been very difficult for Obama to withstand. Some in the White House, Gates revealed, were very worried about the military leaders and Gates ‘quitting’.10 Petraeus was a war hero, who had turned a losing war into a relatively successful outcome in Iraq. He had a lot of supporters not only in the military but also in the media and, of course, Congress. The extraordinarily hard-working Petraeus was described as another General Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘the pre-eminent soldier-scholar-statesman of his generation’, who left America ‘transformed’, ‘The Legend of Iraq’, ‘simply among the very best military leaders of his generation’,

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‘a modern exemplar of the soldier-scholar-statesman and who has exerted a profound influence on the American military establishment’, and a potential future Republican rival to Obama. Such was the status of the ‘clear-thinking, competitive, and politically savvy’ Petraeus that the President faced, and his resignation would have been politically damaging to Obama.11 The argument in favour of Petraeus (and McChrystal) in some sections of the media was that if Petraeus (and McChrystal), after carrying out the assessment in Afghanistan authorised by Washington, thought the proposed counter-insurgency strategy was the answer in Afghanistan, why were the civilian leaders second-guessing him? Gates argued that McChrystal was the most successful counterterrorism strategy practitioner in the world, yet Biden and his camp acted as if they understood the counterterrorism strategy better than McChrystal.12 Another reason was the Gates-Clinton factor. The two – who, according to Gates, had developed ‘a very strong relationship’ and agreed with each other ‘on almost every important issue’ – headed the two giant departments responsible for making US foreign policy, and refusing them would have been politically reckless. Saying no to them and to the military would have meant that if anything went wrong in Afghanistan and Pakistan, then it would have been due to the president’s stubbornness not to surge; a president who had never served in the military; a president who belonged to a political party accused of being passive; and a president, who, as Fareed Zakaria revealed, faced opposition (and even disrespect) from a number of powerful Republicans in Congress just because Obama had a different skin colour. According to an advisor, McChrystal and Petraeus told Obama this is the option: if you support it, you win; if not, you lose. Losing meant a destabilised Afghanistan, in which the achievements the US had made politically, financially and in terms of security would be lost. In the next two or three years, when Obama would be running for re-election, the war could go wrong for a variety of reasons, and most of the Biden group, including the inner circle, even Obama, believed that it would go wrong, or at least be not much improved, regardless of what they did or did not do in Afghanistan. But most fingers would be pointed towards Obama for having refused to surge. As far as the military camp was concerned, losing Afghanistan meant losing Pakistan. The question Petraeus had for the president was: could Obama take the risk?

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No president with common sense could take such a risk. For years, Obama had been accusing the Bush Administration of making a mess of the Afghanistan War through neglect, lack of resources, and a lack of strategies. Obama would try to avoid such an accusation against himself. The only way to bring security, stop the Taliban from taking over the Afghan Government and make a peace settlement with Taliban (considered to be the key for a US exit) was to apply a counter-insurgency strategy. The only person who could trigger the process for the counterinsurgency strategy was Obama. If not, if Obama did not want to approve McChrystal’s requests, Gates told Obama, the president should withdraw US forces altogether because ‘[s]tanding pat, middling options, muddling through’ were alternatives that would put ‘our kids at risk’.13 Penultimately, there was a part of Obama’s beliefs that seemed to agree with the military that the Afghanistan surge could produce similar effects to those it did in Iraq, at least with regard to the establishment of the ANSF, and so could bring US involvement to a responsible end (this point will be explained below). Finally, refusing the military and listening to the Democratic Party or the Biden group or his aides meant opening himself to the familiar Republican criticism that Democrats were not as aggressive about confronting US enemies as Republicans were and therefore would not deploy troops, even if it was necessary. Panetta privately believed that ‘[n]o Democratic President can go against military advice, especially if he asked for it’. Obama should have made the decision within a week. ‘Just do it. Do what they say,’ was his recommendation if Obama asked Panetta, but he never did.14 On the other hand, Obama could not disregard the advice he received from his political advisors and ignore the public opposition of the Democratic Party to the surge. Biden and the inner circle constantly brought to Obama’s attention whether losing his base in the Democratic Party was worth it. Soon Obama was going to launch his health care reform in Congress, which he viewed as ‘the make-or-break legislation for his administration’, and for which he required the support of ‘moderate to centrist Democrats’.15 (Incidentally, for that reason, he also needed the support of the Republican Party and could not say no to the surge.) Moreover, in three years’ time he had another presidential election that required the backing of the Democratic Party. Finally, as

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seen above, he genuinely developed doubts about the counter-insurgency strategy and its suitability for Afghanistan. This was the milieu – a divided America – Obama found himself in during the Af-Pak review! Both sides were emphatic on their strategies. Was he to accept a counterterrorism-plus strategy, a counter-insurgency strategy, or none? Halfway through the review, perhaps realising that Biden and his group seemed not to be succeeding in their efforts to change the military’s mind on its requests, and perhaps failing to develop a clear view on the Afghanistan engagement, Obama stepped in by demanding changes (alternative plans) from the military. Though he did not specify it, in actuality, Obama demanded the application of the Powell Doctrines: clarity of US goals, the duration to achieve them, and a deadline/timeline for an exit strategy. Obama’s demands were consistent with Kerry’s advice, and if these questions remained unanswered, Kerry had warned, the consequence would be a premature withdrawal where the mission remained unachieved. Obama believed that defeating the Taliban was beyond US interests and means, a goal unachievable due to the Taliban being indigenous fighters. Obama came up with a goal: to ‘disrupt’ (or ‘scatter’) the Taliban’s capacity to such an extent that the ANSF could manage security. Moreover, Obama only wanted to secure only those parts (major cities and highways threatened the most) that were necessary to disrupt the Taliban until the ANSF were developed. Changing the goal would also help to shorten duration. Obama criticised McChrystal’s plan for not showing whether in a decade’s time the US would be winning or losing; the plan was open-ended and silent on when to ‘transfer’ to Afghans. He wanted the plan to have an ‘evaluation’ point – that is, show progress or the lack of it – and a date they could begin to ‘transfer’ to the ANSF to allow US forces to withdraw: an exit strategy. The Biden group and its supporters, including John Kerry, were evidently trying to add the ‘transfer’ factor to the counter-insurgency strategy; a factor capable of relieving US soldiers to come back home. To reduce costs and duration, Obama made three more suggestions. First, to enter the surge troops faster so that they could be withdrawn quicker. Second, Obama wanted the mission to be more internationalised, as this way some troops could be provided by the North Atlantic

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Treaty Organization (NATO). Having made the strategy purely Americanised was another shortcoming in McChrystal’s assessment. McChrystal and Petraeus argued that NATO forces did not have the same capabilities as the US forces; they operated under their own rules, so this gave McChrystal less control over them and there was no unity of command. While Obama half-heartedly bought this argument, he knew that NATO forces could still be used as trainers. Third, he told the military that they should reduce the number of the ANSF McChrystal had planned to train because the necessity of 400,000 troops was not made clear to him; the objective of 400,000 ANSF was based on the counter-insurgency strategy maths, not on realities on the ground. Instead, McChrystal should ‘set goals’ on a yearby-year basis. When the military leaders implied that a timeline for the military leaders was difficult to achieve, since war was not a ‘science’ to start and end on one’s schedule, Obama reasoned as follows. While the president did not want Al Qaeda and the Taliban to wait the US out, the US and allies could not also sustain national and international support for the Afghanistan War if he did not specify the time when the unpleasant war could come to an end. A long-term stay in Afghanistan without an end date was to provide the Taliban with more pretexts that the US was planning to permanently occupy the country. Also, the US really could not continue (and sustain) to pay in lives and treasure forever to guard Karzai and Afghanistan. Local/tribal leaders (for Afghans it meant the powerful syndicate) instead should get involved to take control of the security. ‘Transfer’ and ‘deadline’ were something new coming into the 2009 Af-Pak review. From the start of US intervention up to Obama’s announcement of the Af-Pak strategy on 27 March 2009, the idea of when to withdraw US forces was hardly considered. Obama and most of his war cabinet focused on what had gone wrong in the war of ‘necessity’ and how to get them right. Now the tone was different: how to transfer to the Afghans, and to do so at a particular date, and sooner rather than later. Obama expected a plan made by the military to include all the alterations he put forward, but, to his frustration, it was never developed. One plan that the military leaders proposed was the ‘Alternative Mission in Afghanistan’, but Obama rejected it because it

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was not in their national interest to commit to a decade-long war; it still kept 68,000 US troops by 2017, leaving his predecessor far more troops than Obama had inherited. So a disappointed and dissatisfied Obama became more and more involved in the planning of the military decision towards the end than one would expect of a president. Obama himself wrote the ‘clearly defined’ ‘surge’ strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and, as seen in Chapter 7, with the cooperation of Gates, the president was able to apply limits on the strategy’s duration, geography and goals when he announced the surge strategy as part of the Global War on Terror, or what Obama later termed ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ in a speech delivered on 1 December 2009.16 The first clarity Obama brought to the mission was to limit its duration: the 30,000 (þ3,000 enablers) surge troops would begin to withdraw in July 2011 and the majority of US forces by the end of 2014. The second was to drop commitments, that is, creating a ‘democratic government’ or employing a nation-building strategy, which were irrelevant to US national security interests and which the US could not afford to achieve. The third clarity was the goal; it remained the same to the one he (following Bruce Riedel’s review) had announced on 27 March 2009: to ‘disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and its allies in the future’. It was no longer defeating the Taliban to achieve the aforementioned goal. Rather, to meet the goal of disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda, Obama instructed his administration to pursue three objectives in Afghanistan: ‘deny’ Al Qaeda a safe haven; ‘reverse’ the Taliban’s momentum, and deny or ‘disrupt’ its ability to overthrow the government; and strengthen the capacity of the ANSF and Afghan Government to enable them to take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future, which would then relieve US soldiers. These objectives were those proposed by Gates during the Af-Pak review, which later Obama included in the strategy.17 These objectives would be met in three ways: military surge, civilian surge, and working closely with Pakistan, or what was called a ‘diplomatic surge’. The military surge would reverse the Taliban’s momentum and increase the ANSF so that US forces could transfer responsibility to the Afghans.

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The civilian surge would provide ‘technical, human, financial and developmental’ assistance to improve Afghan institutions, especially those who were led by less corrupt ministers and subnational/local structures so that they could provide better governance. The emphasis was on strengthening not a centralised government but local leaders, even if it meant working around Karzai or his central government. The diplomatic surge was to pursue peace talks with the Taliban, encourage economic integration and cooperation between the regional countries and deal with the interrelated regional problems, especially between Afghanistan and Pakistan. NATO states, Russia, China, India, other Muslim countries, and particularly Pakistan, would be approached for their assistance.18 The diplomatic objectives were achievable if Pakistan acted genuinely. In fact, the entire diplomatic surge was aimed at persuading Pakistan to provide genuine support for US Afghan strategy. To obtain its genuine support, the US was to enhance its support to Pakistan to ensure the Pakistani people and Pakistan met their potential. The State Department would launch a new public diplomacy, for example peopleto-people contacts, to challenge the extremist narratives in Pakistan about the US, and to ensure ordinary Pakistanis saw the US as a friend, not an enemy. It was a ‘counter-propaganda plan’, since the Bush Administration had embraced Musharraf but ignored nearly 200 million Pakistanis.19 The two opposing sides (and their supporters), however, made their own interpretations of the decision. The military camp and its supporters thought the end decision supported Petraeus’s counterinsurgency strategy. Petraeus believed that he obtained most of what he had requested, but, to avoid embarrassment, Obama reduced the number by 10,000. Petraeus would have grabbed the ‘surge strategy’ without hesitation if Obama had offered it to him at the beginning of the Af-Pak, since Petraeus could always secure the missing 10,000 troops from NATO.20 The Biden camp and its supporters, on the other hand, thought the end decision did not back up the counter-insurgency strategy. Biden believed the strategy was not aimed at protecting all Afghans but certain provinces, such as Kandahar and Kabul, to prevent the Karzai Government from being toppled by the Taliban until the ANSF were increased.

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Douglas Lute agreed with Biden, adding that Obama ‘fast-forwarded and figured’ Afghanistan would most likely be as bad in 2011 as it was in 2009, yet the President did this 18-month surge to demonstrate that it was not possible to achieve the military objectives. Yes, the surge was expensive, but not so much that the country could not afford it. By 2011, Obama would have given the military camp the opportunity to put its plans in action and the US would not be perceived as having run off the battleground. The president treated the military as another ‘political constituency’ that had to be accommodated, as the review did not add up to the decision. According to Lute, Obama could have said no to the military leaders, arguing that the military had not yet provided him with results of the 33,000 troops the president had deployed early in the year, or simply saying that Obama did not see the situation was deteriorating in Afghanistan.21 The president did not do so for the reasons already explained above and in the previous chapter. Yet there were others who claimed that Obama employed neither a full-on counter-insurgency strategy, nor Biden’s counterterrorism-plus strategy. Rather, he approved a ‘hybrid’: a counter-insurgency strategy in some areas and a counterterrorism-plus strategy in others. The resulting decision was a compromise, a middle way, making both sides happy.22 There were even some who thought it was a counter-insurgency strategy but ‘in a hurry’, or a counter-insurgency ‘equivalent of putting a DVD into a player and fast-forwarding the movie at thirty times its normal rate’, because the strategy required ‘time, patience and lots of troops’, but Obama approved none of them adequately.23 Obama’s statements during the Af-Pak review, as well as his 1 December 2009 speech, nevertheless show that he approved neither a counter-insurgency strategy, nor a counterterrorism-plus strategy, nor some kind of a hybrid strategy. Not just a counter-insurgency strategy but even something less would have required many more troops, who would have had to stay in Afghanistan for at least seven years. Helmand and Kandahar were two out of 34 provinces in Afghanistan in which most of the surge troops were going to be deployed. Even if we accepted that a counter-insurgency strategy was going to be applied in the two intended provinces, the other 32 provinces were not going to experience counter-insurgency operations. Petraeus and McChrystal might have issued orders to pursue a counter-insurgency strategy in ‘the entire theatre’ in Afghanistan,24 but NATO soldiers in those provinces were

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hardly going to follow orders incompatible with their caveats. Two provinces could scarcely make it a hybrid strategy. A counterterrorism-plus strategy required a maximum of 20,000 to 30,000 to remain in Afghanistan but, instead of reducing the 68,000 US troops already there, Obama brought the number to 100,000. For the president, a counterterrorism-plus strategy would have prolonged their stay, and in the long run would have been more expensive. Like McChrystal’s counter-insurgency strategy, a counterterrorism-plus strategy was open-ended. With fewer US troops on the ground, training and increasing the ANSF would have taken many more years; and if one went by Petraeus and McChrystal’s assumption, a counterterrorism-plus strategy would have never enabled bringing about the conditions in which they could increase the ANSF in size and ability. Obama therefore rejected both as strategies.25 Though Obama listened to the technical military terms of counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations, he did not seem to have thought, by the end, in those technical terms. What Obama appeared to have had in mind was that the 30,000 troops would increase the number of US troops in Afghanistan in the short run, but in the long run US forces would stay much shorter because his strategy was designed to Afghanise the mission. It was an ‘escalate-then-exit strategy’.26 The surge would create conditions to train more ANSF, who would take over from US forces. Obama and his aides, as well as Gates, saw the ANSF as their ticket out of Afghanistan (and therefore approved the expensive strategy). He was going to set in motion a strategy to end, or at least limit, US engagement in an ‘endless’ war. Obama had only one objective in mind; everything they did, he asked his advisors a few days before he made the decision, should be focused on how it would help them to thin out their presence in Afghanistan. It was a surge aimed at getting the US out of Afghanistan. That was the main goal! There would be no ‘flexibility’ in July 2011; Obama would only consider how the US would draw down, not if it would draw down. July 2011 would be the beginning of the end of US involvement in Afghanistan, the start of the transition, as the ANSF would take over. The president would not hear anyone saying that they were ‘doing fine’, but they would be ‘better’ to do more. If the advisors disagreed, they should tell Obama there and then, as he did not want them to say one thing to him and another to their organisations or

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the media. Nobody disagreed and the military leaders went on supporting Obama’s decision in their testimonies.27 While Petraeus aimed at winning the war, the non-interventionist Obama worked towards ending the war, as, according to Gates, for the president, ‘it was all about out’. Apparently, Osama bin Laden laid a trap in 2001 and was reasonably confident that he would draw the US into Afghanistan (and other Muslim lands) so that he could bleed America ‘to the point of bankruptcy’. Obama intended to get the US out of the trap, committing to the extent that the American responsibility, capabilities, resources and interests allowed him to do, something his predecessor and the military did not take into account. For Obama, McChrystal’s objectives were way beyond US responsibility, means and interests, failing to appreciate the connection between US national security and its economy. If Obama had the choice, he would not have increased the troops but rather authorised 5,000 to 10,000 troops to train and expand the ANSF.28 Some imply that consideration for his political security in the future did not force the president into the decision, because the president believed in the necessity of the Afghanistan War. The argument that Obama knew that the Afghanistan War was ‘unjust’ and ‘strategically insignificant’, but he still called for increasing the efforts in Afghanistan because he wanted to show he was not a dove or a pacifist, is rejected. If one was to accept this view that Afghanistan was used for political reasons, then the same could be true in relation to Iraq; that is, supporting the Afghanistan War and opposing the Iraq War was all ‘a matter of politics, not principle’. Obama believed ‘in the legitimacy’ and importance of the Afghanistan War from 2002 up to the first year of his presidency, including during the Af-Pak review. Obama believed that if the US did not do the surge and increase its efforts in Pakistan, then Al Qaeda would establish bases in Afghanistan or Pakistan and pose a serious threat to the US. Simply put, it is concluded, Obama meant it when he said he would escalate the war.29 A clear examination, however, shows that while Obama saw the Afghanistan War as a relevant war (not important, though, as I explain below), he did not do so purely because he believed in it. He did so because supporting the Afghanistan War – a war that Bush was accused of having neglected – also brought Senator Obama a great deal of political support from the American people. Gates in his memoir

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revealed that Hillary Clinton and Obama went against the surge in Iraq in 2006 purely for political purposes. If Obama refused the Iraq surge for political purposes, could he (and Biden) not support the Afghanistan War for the same rationales, too? If the President really believed in the Afghanistan War, why was he backing down in the Af-Pak review? To claim he did not take into consideration his political future while making the decision would ignore the endless advice his aides and Biden gave him during the review, particularly the advice on Congress’s eventual response. Gates in his memoir revealed that, unlike President George W. Bush, whom Gates described as a man of ‘character . . . convictions . . . and . . . action’, Obama and his aides gave a great deal of thought to the political implications of presidential decisions, the surge decision included; and this was something for which Petraeus disliked many of Obama’s inner circle and did not give much weight to their politically driven pieces of advice.30 Obama believed in the legitimacy and necessity of the Afghanistan War not up to the first year of his presidency but up to the end of his presidency, January 2017. But not the way the military wanted him: win at any cost. He wanted a smaller presence in Afghanistan with limited objectives compatible to US national security interests; a limited presence to enable the US to hunt terrorism and to strengthen the capacity of the Afghanistan Government to fight the war with the Taliban.31 It is, however, partly accurate to assert that the final decision was consistent with Obama’s beliefs and images of the Afghanistan War. It is partly because the decision was in line with Obama’s beliefs but not the old ones Stephen Wayne referred to (the Afghanistan War was a ‘good’ war and hence more resources were needed to put it right), but the ones Obama developed during the Af-Pak review. As seen above, Obama developed doubts about the Afghanistan War. He nevertheless knew that Afghanistan was relevant in relation to their goal to disrupt, degrade and defeat Al Qaeda; it was relevant for their counterterrorism campaign. He also feared that an Afghanistan overtaken by the Taliban, despite Biden’s argument to the contrary, would prove detrimental to US national security interests, as well as to him and his party’s future political security. But Obama found it difficult to agree with the military that the US would stabilise Afghanistan as the wavering NATO support as well as

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the inherent Afghan complexities, especially the ‘Pakistan problem’, would not allow an end to the ‘civil war’ in Afghanistan. When Obama said that the US would work with Pakistan to go against terrorist sanctuaries, he himself did not believe it would happen. Obama did not believe the strategy would work. In Gates’s words, Obama was ‘outright convinced’ that it would fail. For Obama, the Afghanistan War was an ‘endless’ civil war (no longer necessary or good) and, of course, an endless war by definition could not be won. He wanted to bring an end to a scenario where US forces were involved in fighting a civil war in favour of the Karzai Government against the Taliban. It was an Afghan war and should therefore be fought by the Afghans with light US financial, political and technical support. According to Gates, Obama’s political and philosophical viewpoints conflicted with his own pro-war public rhetoric during the presidential campaign.32 It is asserted that Obama’s decision demonstrated to the US public and Congress that he was now beginning to end the war that had fatigued them, though simultaneously trying to ‘be muscular enough to create a chance to win the war while at the same time keeping the war’s critics acquiescent’.33 During the research for this book, however, I never came across a sentence in which Obama, after becoming president, mentioned the word ‘winning’. Unlike the military, he did not believe that the US would win the way the military believed: defeat the Taliban and establish a stable Afghanistan. For Obama, the definition of success in Afghanistan was handing over responsibility to the Afghans. The war could go on (and he thought it would due to Afghan complexities and the Pakistan problem), or be a stalemate, but as long as the Afghan state, however inadequate, was able to safeguard US national interests (the US and the allies being safe), Obama was more than happy. Unlike Bush, as Gates claimed, Obama was ‘unsentimental and capable of being ruthless’, someone who intellectualised everything and felt little inwardly. Unlike Bush, Obama lacked ‘passion’ about the Afghanistan War and the mission the military forces were fighting for. Unlike the military, Obama did not seem to be concerned about Afghans, their security or their human rights. Nor did he think in moral terms; that is, it was US moral duty to bring about a stable, secure and fully democratic Afghanistan. It is not that he did not desire these fortunes for Afghanistan, but, due to US political and economic realities, as well as Afghanistan’s

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own complexities, including Pakistan’s interference, he saw their achievements as impossible.34 Obama’s views (and of course Biden’s), interestingly, were similar to those of Donald Rumsfeld, whereas Petraeus sounded more like Bush. Obama did not see leaving a stable and secure Afghanistan to be the responsibility of the US. He sounded frustrated when Petraeus suggested that it was. The difference between the president and the military leaders was simple: Petraeus and McChrystal wanted to ‘win’ the war by defeating the Taliban, even if it took another decade,35 whereas all Obama wanted was to end the war by withdrawing,36 though a politically responsible withdrawal. Obama had received good praise from the American public (and arguably won the presidency on his opposition to the Iraq War) for having begun to end the Iraq War, while Petraeus had received praise for having turned a failing war into a relative success. The president and his general therefore saw their success in different outcomes for Afghanistan. The caveat was something that Obama saw as a weapon to bring the Afghanistan War to a responsible end. It was also something that reassured the Democratic Party, his advisors and the public that the commitment was not open-ended. But Petraeus saw the caveat as insignificant because, in mid-2011, troops would be withdrawn on the basis of the conditions (which Obama added due to Petraeus’s insistence)37 in the theatre and if he showed progress, and he was optimistic he would, he would postpone the withdrawal. So all depended on the evaluation of the strategy at the evaluation phase in the 12 months and then in July 2011. The evaluation phase, of course, was directly linked to the implementation phase.

CHAPTER 9 THE SURGE DECISION AT THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE, JANUARY 2010—JUNE 2011

The surge in 2009 had three components to it: military, civilian and diplomatic. Each pillar of the strategy carried numerous assumptions. Most of these assumptions, however, were doubted by the Biden group in 2009. Biden and his group in turn made their own assumptions during the Af-Pak review. Both sides’ assumptions, discussed in detail in Chapter 6, were the direct results of the policy makers’ personal characteristics, notably their personal beliefs, viewpoints, perceptions, past experiences and images of the Afghanistan War. The accuracy or otherwise of these assumptions was directly linked to Obama’s decision to draw down. It will be seen below whether these assumptions proved accurate once they met reality in Afghanistan. As for the military surge, clearing insurgent strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar took longer than Stanley McChrystal had expected. Though with high costs of US lives and treasure, US forces cleared these strongholds, but they held and continued to hold them. There was no prospect of building or, most importantly, transferring them to the Afghans because, as the Biden camp had assumed, the Afghan Government did not provide enough Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (and civil governance); those provided were mostly incompetent and corrupt. Though the military surge was successful in facilitating the conditions to train 79,000 additional ANSF in 2010, bringing the total to 305,000, the ANSF continued to have the numerous shortcomings cited in

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Chapter 6. Their ability to take over and sustain the newly liberated strongholds without US forces was therefore doubted. While President Karzai and perhaps most Afghans would disagree with some aspects of the weaknesses of the ANSF, the assessments claimed that US forces had to be present for years to ensure the Afghans built the areas that US troops cleared.1 As US forces launched their military campaign to clear the Taliban strongholds in the south, the insurgents, against the military’s assumption, infiltrated previously calm parts of Afghanistan, such as the north, north-east and provinces around the south and south-east of Kabul. The infiltration posed a significant threat to the capital and to the highways connecting the capital to the latter provinces. It was insecurity, as opposed to security, that worked like ‘ink blots’ and spread to all parts of Afghanistan.2 Obama’s ‘surge and drawdown’ strategy (the caveat), which demonstrated a lack of resolve from the Obama Administration, was another impediment to the establishment of McChrystal’s objectives, especially preserving the Afghans from the violence perpetrated by the Taliban and others. It negatively affected perceptions in Afghanistan and the region, making the Afghan officials and warlords steal as much as they could because they were unsure of the future. It hurt the possibility of a peace deal with the Taliban since the latter believed the US was on the verge of leaving. It harmed economic confidence because investors would hardly commit to long-term investments in a country whose future security was uncertain. It made friends, including US military leaders in Afghanistan, nervous and confused about US long-term intentions, and foes, the Pakistani Army in particular, bold and aggressive by thinking that the US would leave in July 2011, before securing a stable Afghan Government with competent security forces. In short, the caveat turned every problem into a ‘crisis’, proving detrimental to reversing the sense of doom among the Afghans. Karzai and Afghans continued to criticise the US for failing to provide security to the Afghans.3 The Biden camp had been false to assume the caveat would allow them to accelerate the transfer part of the strategy because it would give the Afghan Government and the Americans a sense of urgency.4 As for the civilian surge, McChrystal’s counter-insurgency campaign focused primarily on 81 out of 400 districts in Afghanistan, most of them in the south, and, due to the lack of human capital and the presence

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of endemic corruption, only ten would receive representatives from the Afghan Government by the end of 2010, and another ten by the end of 2011. McChrystal’s assumption that he had ‘a government in the box, ready to roll in’ proved wrong, owing to the government being ‘illusory’. The Marines in Helmand reportedly did not fail, as they cleared and held areas in Helmand and Kandahar. But the Afghan Government failed because it lacked the capacity and willingness to seize the opportunity the American troops provided to deliver basic services. Providing good governance in those contested areas had been one of the goals of the counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan, but remained unachieved.5 The overall objective of the civilian surge of the suggested counterinsurgency strategy was to improve governance, especially to preserve the Afghans from corruption and criminality in the Afghan Government. But the Karzai Administration continued to suffer from the shortcomings stated in Chapter 6. In fact, corruption increased as Afghanistan in 2010 was ranked as ‘the second most corrupt country’ by the report of Transparency International.6 The poor relationship between the US and, in the words of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the most ‘troublesome’ ally the US had had since WWII, President Karzai is said to be one of the most crucial reasons that little progress was made on the political side of the strategy, markedly on Karzai’s promises to curb corruption. Numerous factors caused the poor relationship, including Karzai’s disagreement with US Afghan policy, including some, if not most, aspects of the military and civilian surges. Incidentally, the disagreement had started in 2005 but became more public during the Obama Administration.7 So the analysis below is also relevant to the Bush Administration’s Afghan policy. To start with, for the ‘pacifist’ Karzai, the roots of the problems did not lie in the Afghan villages and provinces, but over the borders in Pakistan which had the ideological, financial, motivational, political and military centres of terrorism that enabled the infiltration of insurgents into Afghanistan. The US should stop killing innocent Afghans and instead find a strategy to deal with Pakistan’s double game and the sanctuaries. Since the sanctuaries were not addressed, Karzai was ‘outright convinced’ that the strategy would fail. Furthermore, like many Afghans, Karzai feared that eventually the US might ‘sell’ Afghanistan to Pakistan; that is, (like the Soviet Union ‘sold’ the President Mohammad Najibullah Government to Mujahedeen/Pakistan a few decades earlier) America

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would use Afghanistan as a bargaining tool to achieve safety for America, that is, in return for the Taliban/Pakistan’s guarantee that Afghanistan would not become a terrorist base from which another 9/11 might take place.8 Like most Afghans, Karzai clearly seemed to be at a loss to ascertain what the US goal in Afghanistan really was! Americans told Karzai that the Taliban was not their enemy anymore and that Al Qaeda was not present in Afghanistan. If the Taliban was not an enemy, and if there was no Al Qaeda present in Afghanistan, why were American forces in Afghanistan and who were they fighting? For Karzai, especially National Security Advisor Rangin Dadfar Spanta, those Taliban who were killing innocent Afghans, burning schools and destroying crops daily were terrorists. Defeating the Taliban was therefore more important than defeating Al Qaeda, whose very existence Karzai doubted. For Karzai, the Afghanistan War was not an insurgency but a war on terrorism. If the former, then it was an Afghan issue and the US should not be in the country to support one brother against another.9 Karzai continuously pleaded with the US to put a stop to their collateral damage, night raids, American prisons, the use of dogs on patrols, body searches of Afghan women, and other human rights abuses. These highly sensitive issues to Karzai (and Afghans), most importantly collateral damage, became a major source of friction between the Afghan President and the Obama Administration. The Americans consistently told Karzai and the media how sorry they were, that wars had collateral damage, that they worked hard to minimise it and that Karzai should keep quiet. But ‘sorry’ was hardly good enough for the Afghans. Karzai felt that the Afghans wanted answers from him as an elected leader. But the Americans seemed to have been not doing enough, or, as Karzai claimed, not even listening to Karzai. Karzai had raised the issue of collateral damage as far back as 2006, but in view of Karzai nothing effective had yet been done. Karzai had raised the problem of security companies in 2006, but only in 2010 did the US offer a plan to deal with them when the presence of those companies became a crisis. Security firms with about 40,000 personnel had created a parallel structure to the police, yet they were hardly accountable to the Afghan Government. McChrystal said in 2013 that US and coalition forces fought a war almost by themselves, hardly involving the Afghan Government in making – not just in

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Afghanistan but also in Washington – and implementing the strategy. As a result, the Afghan President was sidelined and did not have a meaningful role. Karzai wanted the relationship to be between two sovereign states, and Afghanistan’s interests should be clearly recognised. He wanted the US not only to mention and honour US sacrifices but also to show appreciation for the sacrifices the Afghans, especially their security forces, had made. Tens of thousands of ordinary Afghans and their security forces have lost their lives in the so-called Global War on Terror. But Karzai believed that the US was not mindful of Afghan interests. Karzai wanted to be a partner, not a ‘stooge’ who would keep quiet if the US committed a wrong. Since he felt he was not treated like a partner, Karzai had no choice but to turn to the media and publicly criticise America. The ‘nationalist’ Karzai, who, according to Gates, ‘resented’ the US, was well aware of Afghan history, and sensitive to what was being said about him, specifically by the Afghans. If he did not side with the Afghans on those sensitive issues, he would also have been ranked as another ‘foreign puppet’ like Shah Shujah and Babrak Karmal; the former invited Great Britain in 1839, and the latter the Soviet Union in 1979. In the last years of Karzai’s tenure in office, he clearly made attempts to distance himself from being called an ‘American puppet’.10 In doing so, at times his negative reaction towards the US seemed excessive, but, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, Karzai was not wrong to claim that these human rights abuses strengthened the Taliban and other anti-coalition forces. The presence of warlords (and the powerful syndicate) likewise bolstered the number of Taliban fighters and Karzai put the blame on the US for nurturing the warlordism strategy. To sustain his government, Karzai in the early years of US intervention wanted to use the threat of US forces to have warlords removed, but the Bush Administration, particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, disagreed, telling Karzai to use political appointments and spoils instead of the threat of US troops. Throughout its administration, Bush and his advisors employed the warlord strategy and consequently, by 2010, the Afghan Government was mostly made up of warlords and tribal leaders. In fact, as explained in Chapter 5, by 2011, ‘the powerful syndicate’ had gained enormous influence in all three branches of the state.

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Moreover, being convinced that the US (Holbrooke’s support of Ashraf Ghani) was planning to remove him, Karzai made more deals with many strongmen by offering them a percentage of seats in return for their support for his candidacy in the 2009 presidential election. Thus it was unrealistic and too late in 2010 to (entirely) blame Karzai for the strategy, and, most importantly, to expect Karzai to replace corrupt strongmen and warlords with credible civil servants, especially when he knew he could not have the reliance and support of the Obama Administration. Spanta claimed that they followed a South African model, that is, they aimed for peace, stability and reconciliation as opposed to justice. They had to sacrifice law and order for the sake of stability, as they could not deal with the powerful syndicate. Spanta, however, admitted that the Karzai Government had no real teeth to bring to justice those who had been accused of war crimes and human rights abuses. Karzai and ministers also did not have the power to remove the strongmen. Understanding this reality, McChrystal (and Karl Eikenberry) had no choice but to work with the strongmen in the south, east and north. In the end, the military leaders (and the civilian ones) were unable to ‘protect’ the Afghans from these warlords/strongmen (and the powerful syndicate) and their criminality and corruption; safeguarding the Afghans against all evil forces had been the main objective of McChrystal’s 2009 assessment. Working with these strongmen disappointed the Afghans, who went on believing that the new American leadership in Afghanistan continued to give warlords (and the powerful syndicate) the US Government’s ‘seal of approval’.11 Karzai equally disagreed with the Obama Administration that the solution to curbing corruption lay with himself. Karzai believed that the lack of oversight on large contracts offered by the West, the CIA’s distribution (or bribery) of money to warlords and strongmen as well as money given out by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were the leading cause of corruption. Karzai, however, admitted the presence of corruption, especially petty or bureaucratic corruption, in the Afghan Government, but he could not take a ‘revolutionary’ stance against corrupt ministers or governors since it was not in the interest of the country. The Afghan Government did not have a strong foundation and could easily become unstable by the powerful syndicate. Karzai already struggled to keep a political balance; he could not afford to make more enemies.

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Due to Afghanistan having a high inflation rate, it was unrealistic, however, to expect Karzai to put a stop to petty corruption. If the salary of a civil servant (approximately $100 per month) was not enough to pay for the accommodation alone (about $200–300 per month for a threebedroom house or apartment), how was he meant to provide other basic needs for his family? Instead of understanding Afghanistan and its situation, instead of admitting that corruption was partly the result of certain US strategies, the Obama Administration publicly blamed – and humiliated – Karzai for corruption and lack of effective governance, demanding a change to ‘good governance that was far more complete’, and therefore unrealistic, than the situation in any of the neighbouring countries. Incidentally, Gates and Hillary Clinton privately agreed on the detrimental impact of the CIA bribery policy and raised the issue in several NSC meetings, but to no avail. Karzai had been presumed to be one of the main causes of the problems, including corruption, in Afghanistan and Bush’s close relation with Karzai was one of the reasons that other US policy makers could not pressurise Karzai to bring meaningful reforms, as no one else from the US Government had any ‘real leverage or could speak with authority’. It had been assumed that Karzai had the power and the capacity, but not the willingness. The policy makers, especially Biden and James Jones, assumed that changing the nature of the relationship – that is, Obama being ‘less accessible’, firm and even harsher – would force Karzai to bring reforms. So, whilst the Bush Administration used all carrots and no sticks, the Obama Administration used it the other way around, effectively working not with Karzai but against him. Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s famous words, that with love you could persuade an Afghan to go to Hell, but by force you could not even take him to Heaven, were true to the US–Karzai relationship; the administration’s assumption that pressuring Karzai would change his behaviour backfired since Karzai became resentful of the US and the West’s continued criticism, and instead blamed the US for everything that had gone wrong in Afghanistan, including corruption. Karzai knew that toughening his stance would make him even more popular with the Afghans.12 Karzai did not support the decentralisation component of the strategy. As discussed in Chapter 5, decentralisation assumed that Afghanistan never had an effective central government to provide governance in the rural parts. Many policy makers, especially the Biden

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camp and almost every Western, particularly American, expert on Afghanistan in 2011 wanted its acceleration due to the surge having produced no tangible results. For them, it could also prove to be a quick way out of Afghanistan for US forces. They suggested a variety of decentralised models, ranging from ‘decentralised democracy’ to ‘internal mixed sovereignty’ to a ‘de facto partition of Afghanistan’.13 The importance of decentralisation, however, was overstated and lacked understanding. During the King era (1933–73), used by almost every expert to justify the assumption, there were government or central branches in every district of Afghanistan. True, many decisions were made by the communities or tribal authorities, but if a community could not solve a matter, or if the claimant preferred to take the matter to a branch of government (that is, the police), the matter would become official, no matter how far away the village was located in Afghanistan. In fact, the tribal authority would use central government as a threat to solve a matter in hand. In short, contrary to what experts said, the central government’s authority extended to all parts of Afghanistan14 and Afghans were obedient to its will. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the assumption was correct, and suppose that the Afghans accepted the decentralised model,15 the question is where could the US find that tribal or local authority (for example shuras and jirgas consisting of tribal elders, who in turn were made up of khans, mullahs and landlords) with ‘the popular rule’? The Soviets either killed most of these tribal elders or forced them to flee Afghanistan. Those who had survived the Soviet invasion were forced out of the scene, either by the warlords during the early 1990s, or by the Taliban regime during the late-1990s. In places where the Taliban had control during the surge period, it was only one power that exercised authority: sharia law implemented by a Taliban commander. A Taliban commander was a policeman, a judge and an executor, or, in other words, ‘the tribal authority’. Most Taliban commanders were young men in their late-teens or early twenties, and they believed that their ancestors had not been true to Islam. Instead of having fully followed sharia law, the ancestors had followed the Pashtunwali (the code of conduct for the Pashtun people) and other Afghan traditional rules – given their strict interpretation of Islamic law, they declared incompatible parts of Pashtunwali and other traditional rules to sharia law. Those elderly people who stood against

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their decisions were either silenced or assassinated, particularly in the border areas, both on Pakistan and Afghanistan sides, with the aim ‘to weaken’ the border areas.16 On the other hand, in those places where warlords governed, it was a warlord like a Taliban commander, who had all three separate powers. If more powers were given to these strongmen (high-profile members of the powerful syndicate), it would further distance Afghans from their government. It would be a repeat of 1992–96 in which each warlord controlled his own area with an iron fist and Afghans were left with no choice but to welcome the Taliban to get rid of the abuse and criminality perpetuated by some of those warlords. In fact, Biddle’s internal mixed model was nothing but a repeat of the Mujahedeen era of 1992– 96. If his model was applied, the US would be dealing with a Karzai in every province and district. Blackwill’s model of ‘de facto partition of Afghanistan’ was even more outrageous and impractical and, if applied, to say the least, the bloody experience of the India-Pakistan Partition would be repeated, considering there are non-Pashtuns in the south and east, and Pashtuns in the north and west. It is true that these are only theories advocated by area experts. But, as seen, some of them, such as Biddle, had played important parts in influencing policy makers during the Af-Pak review. It was the theorists who advocated the decentralisation part of the strategy, and the Af-Pak review turned it into a policy. Most Afghans were against these theories. Karzai was sick and tired of these so-called new ideas being experimented with every two or three years in Afghanistan. For Karzai, Afghanistan was not a laboratory in which the US, or theoreticians, tried to experiment with their new ideas. All of these ideas were proposed having US interests in mind. All were made in America without taking account of the realities on the ground. A new idea had to be a new evolution created by the Afghans, not, in the words of former US Ambassador Ronald Neumann, by ‘superficially’ informed experts who tried to re-create a past based on ‘myths’, not reality; a past that they neither understood well, nor could feasibly apply given today’s realities of Afghanistan.17 What Afghanistan needed was a strong and centralised government – with all the necessary governmental tasks in the hands of the central government in Kabul – to curtail the risk of a civil war by keeping a tight control over the powerful syndicate. Empowering ‘a strong centre’

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would keep a close watch on the rural Afghanistan which cared less about human rights and other democratic principles. It would offer decisive action against terrorists. It would make ‘rational investments’ in the national economy. And it would work towards a regional solution, as well as a peace settlement with the Taliban. Biddle himself admitted most of the above advantages of a centralised Afghanistan but believed the US could not achieve them.18 One aspect of the decentralisation was training local forces/tribal leaders to defend their local areas because Obama did not want US forces to play the role of sheriff in every street or village in Afghanistan. But establishing local forces might be quicker and cheaper, and might even have short-term benefits, but they would cause long-term problems, as it did for the President Mohammad Najibullah Government in 1992. Local forces were to be made up of tribes that did not get on with each other (and often consisted of irresponsible men). Empowering these tribes could facilitate conditions in which they would fight with each other once again, forcing ordinary Afghans to join the Taliban. Moreover, they could rob ordinary Afghans on the highway, harass the locals, especially women, marginalise the role of the Afghan National Police, or even, as the General Abdul Rashid Dostum militia had done in 1992, turn against the central government itself, as they would be responsive to their commanders rather than the Interior Ministry. They would further strengthen the presence of the powerful syndicate. Many, including two former Interior Ministers Ali Ahmad Jalali and Mujtaba Patang, argued against them and suggested that they be incorporated into the Afghan National Police.19 Afghans remembered that it was a combination of these militia and Mujahedeen groups that fought with each other, causing the bloody civil war of 1992– 96. The criminality and infighting of these militias and Mujahedeen had appalled the Afghans to the extent that they, especially the Kabulis, welcomed the Taliban, whose chief goal was to cleanse society of all militias and their criminality and abuse. Most Afghans did not want militias anymore, and when it was proposed, it aroused Afghans’ suspicion that the US was up to something. Karzai saw this aspect of the strategy, as well as working with ‘local leaders’, in an attempt to divide Afghanistan into many small states. What Karzai and most Afghans wanted was a well-equipped (including air power and modern weaponry), well-trained and well-entrenched ANSF that

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represented all Afghan ethnicities. (In the long run, Karzai, however, wanted the ANSF shorter in number so that Afghan taxpayers could afford to pay their salaries.)20 Finally, the presence of Holbrooke and Eikenberry added more complications to the relationship. Holbrooke launched a failed coup to replace Karzai with Ashraf Ghani, or at the very least create two governments, one run by Karzai and the other by a ‘Chief Executive’, who would accept all US conditions. Both civilian ambassadors constantly criticised Karzai, treating him with contempt; Eikenberry’s cables, leaked by WikiLeaks, called the Afghan President ‘erratic’, ‘unpredictable’ and ‘delusional’. Gates, Clinton and Michael Mullen were not happy with Eikenberry’s treatment of Karzai and with the ambassador’s constant negativity that the surge was failing, but they could not have him removed, owing to the support he received from the White House. Consequently, as Gates revealed, ‘Karzai had no use for Eikenberry, Holbrooke or Biden, and his relationship with Obama was a distant one’. The one person Karzai liked and respected was McChrystal (and the military camp in general), who tried to listen to the Afghan President’s concerns, but Obama fired McChrystal due to his critical comments about the civilian leadership in Washington, and Biden in particular, even though Karzai made attempts to persuade the American President not to.21 In summary, the above Karzai-American differences and the weakening of Afghan resolve (or waging a psychological war) by threatening that Afghanistan would be plunged into a civil war if it did not accept US demands all made Karzai almost convinced that the US had ulterior motives and in order to keep the war going on to justify its presence, it purposely weakened the Afghan institutions by actively promoting insecurity and corruption. Reports by Afghan sources to the Afghan President added more to his conviction that the violence by the Taliban was ‘in the service of America’. Karzai, in numerous speeches, told Afghans that he had reports that the US and NATO forces aided the Taliban to infiltrate in the previously peaceful parts of Afghanistan such as the north, that containers were being dropped in areas beyond the reach of the Afghan Government and under the control of the Taliban, and that those Taliban who showed a willingness towards reconciliation would suddenly get arrested by the Americans. In short, Karzai found the allies to be not ‘good and honest’

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and he seriously mistrusted their good intentions for Afghanistan. Quoting the British poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, Karzai told The Sunday Times: ‘I met murder on the way’.22 Karzai might have been engaged in a war of words and propaganda with the Obama Administration, or certain US policies and the abovementioned reports might have genuinely made him believe in those conspiracy theories; his speeches, nevertheless, created a very confused environment. Afghans could not differentiate between friends and foes. Like Karzai, Afghans were ‘confused’ and ‘bewildered’ as to whether the US was creating ‘stability’ or ‘instability’ in Afghanistan. As the NBC reporter found out, ‘the mistrust’ was strong and countrywide.23 Despite hundreds of billions of US aid to Afghanistan, many (if not most) Afghans, especially Karzai, still looked at the US with a suspicious eye! Due to all these deep Afghan – American differences and Karzai’s mistrust of US intentions, the troublesome ally Karzai blamed the US more than the Taliban for the violence in his country24 and did not (or, in certain cases, could not) provide the support he was meant to. In a counter-insurgency strategy, the intervening power would be as good as the government it supported and since the Karzai Government remained corrupt (and Karzai himself as unreliable as he had ever been) and the US did not have leverage over him to change his behaviour, the civilian surge for the purpose of improving governance and reducing corruption was doomed to fail.25 In practical terms, this meant that the minimal success in the military surge did not mean a lot, because there was not a civilian government to provide basic services that McChrystal and Petraeus had planned as part of their supposed counter-insurgency strategy. The ‘development’ part of the civilian surge to help governance and consequently security did not produce a great deal either. Holbrooke wanted USAID to focus on agriculture, because 80 per cent of workingage people in Afghanistan were small-scale farmers and because it would help reduce the production of opium. So he employed a programme to help farmers with seeds and fertilisers and USAID took responsibility to build roads so that the crops were delivered to markets; the policy was especially aimed at Helmand and Kandahar. But this as well as other developmental efforts (and reconstruction of Afghanistan as a whole) faced a number of challenges that did not ensure success.

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Firstly, security was the biggest obstacle. As of 2003, at least 387 USAID staff had been killed and 658 wounded in Afghanistan, and the death toll virtually doubled from 29 a month in 2009 to 57 a month in 2010. Lack of security forced the security office in the US Embassy in Kabul to impose strict rules to ensure nobody working for the embassy was killed. This ‘near-zero-risk’ policy prevented diplomats and USAID workers from doing their work effectively, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar. Secondly, relations between Eikenberry and McChrystal, as well as their respective staff, were not good and, generally speaking, the civilian officials from the embassy did not believe in the surge, while the military did. The different viewpoints and the deep divisions remained during the surge period in Afghanistan. Thirdly, bureaucracy in the State Department, including the US Afghan Embassy, made the process of employing civilian staff and then deploying them to the theatre in Helmand and Kandahar very slow and time-consuming. The civilian side should have been ready to provide developmental aid after military operations were over to ensure that the military effort was sustained and built upon. It was important that the Afghans saw their lives as getting better. But, due to the above obstacles, US Afghan Embassy and its USAID branch either delayed or provided in short supply the civilian efforts (and embassy staffers who implemented those efforts). To make matters worse, even though Holbrooke and Clinton talked of improvements in the multifaceted anti-drugs strategy, the facts on the ground showed that the argument did not prove correct; opium production rose after 2010, its traffickers remained as powerful, its shipments carried on and the Taliban continued to benefit from it. This was another wrong assumption Clinton and Holbrooke had made a year-and-a-half ago. Karzai blamed the US for not tackling the (mostly international) mafia who pocketed 98 per cent of the profit, as only one billion out of 68 billion or so went to the Afghans. Karzai implied that the West came across as if it persuaded the growing of the poppy, rather than destroying it. More and more Afghans believed by 2010 that the US was involved in the illicit drug trade.26 The main cause of the failure in security and military surges, however, was again the Pakistani Army’s interference in Afghan affairs. A few decades back, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which coincided with the ousting of the US-backed government in Iran by the

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Islamic Revolution, Pakistan was the closest US ally in the region. Back then, the Indian Government had close relations with the Soviet Union and both supported the communist government in Kabul, whereas Pakistan was an ally to the US in supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen. China, at the time, was not seen by the US as as big a threat as the Soviet Union and China equally saw the Soviet Union as a potential rival. This was one critical factor that brought China and the US closer. Like the US and Pakistan, China contributed to the Mujahedeen fighting in Afghanistan. But three decades later it was India rather than Pakistan (and China) that was a ‘natural if unofficial’ partner to the US. Both India and the US shared common interests. Both combated terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, saw China’s military rise as a threat and kept a close watch on it, shared intelligence and coordinated strategy with each other. The Obama Administration would often consult India for ‘advice, insights and help’ if it had problems with China and Pakistan. The realists in the Obama Administration supported the alliance because they saw India as ‘a counterweight’ to China. The idealists supported the relationship because India was the biggest democracy in the world and could serve as an example for other countries. India– US closeness was reinforced when Obama did not have a stopover in Pakistan on his visit to India in 2010. On the other hand, Pakistan’s support of the Afghan insurgency weakened two main rivals of China, India and the US, and thus China and Pakistan had become natural allies in the first decade of the twentyfirst century. China was willing to call Pakistan ‘its Israel’ and support the latter’s policy in the region, whether it was wrong or right. While China’s policy reinforced Pakistan’s sway in the region, the American presence in Afghanistan weakened it since it strengthened the proIndian government in Kabul, required Pakistan to part with terrorism and nuclear weapons and strengthened the cause of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and other anti-Pakistani insurgents, who used Pakistan’s cooperation with the US as a justification to use violence against the state. Pakistan’s support of terrorism, its nuclear weapons and its strong security forces were its ‘life insurance’ against India. It did not want to relinquish the first two and had no desire to sacrifice the third in a war that was not theirs but one between Al Qaeda and the US.27 For Pakistan, the support of certain radical groups, such as the Taliban or Lashkar-e-Taiba (renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawa), proved to be

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effective in dealing with an Indian threat in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. For example, the militants’ activity in Kashmir forced India to send 500,000 troops into the province in 2002. This way, India’s military was preoccupied within ‘its own borders’ rather than being sent to Pakistan. In Afghanistan, supporting the Taliban ensured the proIndian government remained weak and the insurgency undefeated, keeping Pakistan’s hope alive that one day, when US forces retreated, it would again have a government of its choice in Kabul. In Pakistan, the Army used militarily and politically some of those terrorist groups, or, in the words of Hillary Clinton, ‘poisonous snakes’, to reduce and counter the influence and dangerous beliefs of the Deobandi groups (for example, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), who targeted their violence against the state of Pakistan. Unlike what Petraeus had assumed, the interests of Pakistan – and, to a certain extent, China – therefore clashed with those of the US in Afghanistan and the region, and Pakistani officials continued to argue that until US forces were present in Afghanistan, the war would not end.28 Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani Army continued, and even intensified its efforts, to provide its different types of assistance spelled out in Chapter 4 to the Afghan insurgents and proved once more that it was significant to any outcome in Afghanistan. By mid-2011, the security situation became reasonably better in the south, yet the sanctuary in Pakistan did not make it possible to sustain it. McChrystal admitted in 2013 that the safe haven in Pakistan, which had direct access to the war zone and ineffective and corrupt government in Afghanistan, were two factors that worked against his supposed counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan, and therefore the success of the mission was not assured.29 Biden and his followers had rightly assumed that, without dealing with sanctuaries in Pakistan, it seemed unlikely that the counterinsurgency strategy would succeed to bring an end to the war. But the Obama Administration did not apply more pressure on Pakistan for the possible-worse-scenarios-than-the-current-situation assumption analysed in Chapter 5.30 Pakistan did not agree with the logic that the US presence in Afghanistan ensured stability in Afghanistan, otherwise Pakistan would have never actively undermined US efforts in Afghanistan. The Pakistani Army, the eighth-largest in the world, remained confident that it was able to protect its stability and its nuclear weapons, whether the US was

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present or absent in Afghanistan. But it preferred (actually aimed at) the US to abandon Afghanistan and to leave it to Pakistan. Pakistan was much more secure and in control of the situation during the Taliban rule of Afghanistan (and the time of the Soviet invasion) than it was in 2010 or 2011. If tomorrow a Taliban government took over in Kabul, most insurgent groups in Pakistan could move into Afghanistan, thus leaving Pakistan clear of terrorist groups. That was what happened after the Taliban takeover in 1996, when Pakistan killed two birds with one stone.31 Moreover, in 2010 and 2011, Pakistan indirectly fought a superpower and its 49 allies but if the Taliban took over and the US left, it would be fighting only the regional powers with minimal support to the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban groups. It would resemble a return to the 1990s, and then Pakistan had hardly been as involved as it was in 2010 and 2011. It was true that Pakistan had its own severe problems, such as violent terrorism, ethnic and sectarian violence, shortage of gas/oil/ electricity and a floundering economy, but these problems could not be mended or made worse regardless of what the US did in Afghanistan. Nor did US economic assistance to Pakistan effectively deal with the serious abovementioned threats to Pakistan’s stability, because most US assistance went into the pockets of Pakistani officials, more than half to the wallets of the Army generals. By Clinton’s own admission, the assistance did not work. Since 9/11, the US had provided $13 billion in military aid and $6.6 billion in economic assistance. Equally, praises, criticism and begging – in the past two years, Mullen had made 20 visits to Pakistan, Holbrooke 14, Clinton four, and lowranking officials from Bush and Obama Administrations many dozens more – did not work. It did not even change the calculus of the Army leaders about Afghanistan, leaving the Obama Administration (and, like Bush, Obama himself) frustrated with Pakistan.32 Fortunately for the Army, the Pakistani public overwhelmingly (79 per cent) supported it because it was the only institution that was ‘organised, capable and strong enough’ to hold Pakistan together and able to establish security, which took ‘precedence’ over governance or human rights. The Army therefore exercised considerable control over all sensitive areas of policy and shaped them in accordance with the military’s perceptions of national interests. The Army, which mistrusted

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US intentions, not only supported certain Islamic groups but also fuelled anti-American sentiments through the media by condemning drone strikes and US intelligence operations in Pakistan. The anti-America campaign of the military seemed to have worked, since 59 per cent of Pakistanis in the Al Jazeera-Gallup poll believed that the US was the main threat, with India and Pakistani Taliban representing 18 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. In a 2010 Pew survey, only 17 per cent favoured America. Clinton’s anti-propaganda strategy as part of the diplomatic surge, as Clinton admitted, had not produced any tangible results on the ground.33 Negotiation with the Taliban aspect of the diplomatic surge was likewise hampered by several impediments. Firstly, the Taliban were unlikely to accept the unrealistic US conditions for peace talks – that the Taliban cut ties with Al Qaeda, stop violence against the Afghan state, and accept the Afghan Constitution, including the rights of women and minorities. Equally, the US and the Afghan Government would not accept the Taliban’s preconditions: US forces to leave Afghanistan, the Afghan Constitution to be changed, especially those aspects that dealt with the rights of women and the nature of the Afghan state (Emirate, not Republic) and America to remove the Taliban from the UN blacklist and release their prisoners. The Taliban would then talk, but only to the US, not to its ‘puppet’ government. Karzai, on the other hand, did not trust the US to talk with the Taliban without the presence of representatives of the Afghan Government. It was ironic, as if history was repeating itself. As the Soviet troops were preparing to leave in the late-1980s, President Najibullah declared a National Reconciliation policy and asked the Mujahedeen in Pakistan to join his government. The Mujahedeen argued that it did not want to unite with the puppet government of the Soviet Union. Then and now the Afghan Government’s call for peace was one-way. Then and now the presence of regional and international powers, especially Pakistan, made things complicated. Then and now Pakistan claimed that it had no influence over the anti-government forces. Secondly, and most importantly, Pakistan’s presence and its veto power made the reconciliation process much more complicated, if not impossible. The Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) arrest of Mullah Baradar, who had been negotiating directly with Karzai, was a demonstration that Pakistan would shun any unauthorised negotiation.

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Thirdly, against the wishes of Petraeus and McChrystal, the security situation had not improved and the Taliban still enjoyed momentum in much of the country. Insecurity made reconciliation difficult for most of the moderate Taliban, who were likely to accept women’s rights and abide by the Constitution, because the Afghan Government and the coalition forces could not offer them ‘safety of employment’ and security for their families. Fourthly, Afghans tended ‘to shift’ to the party that they believed would be winning; those who have more weapons, power and dollars often remain winners in Afghanistan. Foes and friends alike took Obama’s caveat as a sign that the US would eventually leave and the Taliban would be the ultimate victor. The Afghan Government remained weak, corrupt and ineffective, and the Taliban unwilling to negotiate. The provision of good governance with a robust and equipped military force was one of the answers, if not the answer. By 2011, as mentioned above, only the Afghan Government and the US made attempts, but the Taliban did not respond. Until and unless the Taliban did not feel they were on the verge of defeat by a strong Afghan Government, negotiating with the Taliban would be fruitless. Some therefore believe that rejecting arrogantly talks with the (weak) Taliban in 2002 to bring them to the government might have been a mistake, as it alienated the group. Fifthly, persuading the hardliners, such as Mullah Omar or Haqqani, to join the government seemed unfeasible. Omar, as Peter Bergen argued, was ‘The Commander of the Faithful’, a leader of all Muslims, a fanatic with ‘significant delusions of grandeur’, and negotiations with such ‘religious fanatics’ did not go well in the past. (Encouraging the defection, reintegration and reconciliation of lower-level Taliban seemed to be fruitless, because they would reconcile themselves three or four times just to claim more financial rewards.) They are not ‘rational realists’ but ‘religious extremists’ whose behaviours are conducted in accordance with their incorrect interpretation of sharia law (as Islam is a peaceful religion but hijacked by these groups in order to achieve their political means). Omar gave up governance but not Osama bin Laden (whom he considered as a ‘guest’ in Afghanistan) in 2001 (and beyond). He never denounced Al Qaeda, even though Saudi Arabia, once the Taliban’s benefactor, repeatedly urged him to do so. Consequently, Saudi Arabia, which could have played a major role, was less willing to

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facilitate the talks; the Saudis would not also take steps to be detrimental to one of its closest allies in the region: Pakistan. Sixthly, there were several independent Taliban groups – the Haqqani network, the Hekmatyar group and the Omar-led organisation – so a settlement with one would not mean a settlement with all. It was not even certain whether a deal with Omar would make his commanders in the south, who led local groups distant from the Quetta Shura, put down their guns. Moreover, none of the groups had any ‘formal structure’ with offices and mailing addresses, making it difficult to know whether a party to negotiation represented a group of insurgents. For example, as the Karzai Government embarrassingly found out, a man posing as the Taliban negotiator turned out to be a shopkeeper in Quetta. Seventhly, even though a deal with the Taliban could not be trusted (as they broke it over and over again in Pakistan, for example, in Swat in 2009), talks had been pursued in Mecca and the Maldives but produced nothing, and one could not be very hopeful that it would do so in the future; especially when the history of negotiation, including the US one, required years, if not decades, but the Obama Administration wanted results in 18 months, treating the peace talks as a shortcut to an exit. Eighthly, a strong party to the negotiation was the Northern Alliance that consisted mostly of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. They had highprofile jobs in the Karzai Government and were against the Taliban reconciliation, especially with hardliners like the Haqqani group, because they believed the Taliban would again persecute them as minorities and lead the country towards another civil war. They even criticised Karzai for calling the Taliban ‘brothers’. For them, the Taliban were terrorists and Afghanistan’s enemy. Karzai, ironically, chose a leading member from the Northern Alliance, former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, as the head of the National Consultative Peace Jirga. Rabbani had been at war with the Taliban since the creation of the latter. His past further added to the complications of the peace process. So did the political, tribal and linguistic conflicts that existed in the National Consultative Peace Jirga under Rabbani. Penultimately, Afghan women and their supporters equally feared the Taliban reconciliation with the Afghan Government. The supporters were found everywhere: the Afghan Government, the Afghan Parliament, Afghan civil society, the Afghan media, the US Government

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US Congress and the US media. Clinton, Nancy Pelosi, John Kerry, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and numerous activists such as Gayle Tzemach Lemmon made it clear that the rights of the Afghan women were never open to negotiation or haggling. So Obama and the realists in his administration (as well as Karzai) were under tremendous pressure not to give away any human rights enjoyed by the Afghan women under the Afghan Constitution, whereas the Taliban did not agree with many of them, believing them to be incompatible with sharia law. Unless the Obama Administration and the Karzai Government were not prepared to accept compromises, negotiating with the Taliban was fruitless. But both governments, due to the pressure, could hardly accept compromises. Finally, the lack of a unified US policy on negotiation with the Taliban and bureaucratic fights between US officials were two other major obstacles to a peace settlement. A clear policy by all US bureaucracies, especially the White House, was not issued or followed. According to Rajiv Chandrasekaran, the CIA and the military saw the Taliban as ‘misogynous, intolerant, ruthless [and] barbaric’ and were psychologically unwilling to negotiate with them. For the military leaders, especially Petraeus, it was too early to talk about reconciliation as they believed that the Taliban first needed to be militarily weakened before talks about reconciliation began. Perhaps the lack of a clear policy made Karzai think that the US, like Pakistan, had the ability to bring the Taliban to the peace table but, like Pakistan, did not want to. Karzai added that those Taliban leaders who showed a willingness to talk were either arrested or killed, but those Taliban leaders who wanted to fight got reinforced by all sides.34 Despite all this, Holbrooke made it easy for the Afghan Government to talk to any Taliban by abolishing constraints imposed by the US Government. Furthermore, Holbrooke made consistent attempts to bring a closer relationship between Islamabad and Kabul so that talks with the Taliban could be facilitated.35 While he was fruitlessly encouraging a warmer relationship between two neighbours, his personal relationship with Kabul and Islamabad, as well as US officials both in Kabul and the White House, kept deteriorating. As seen in Chapter 7, Eikenberry, Douglas Lute and Jones weakened Holbrooke’s standing in Kabul (for example, restricting Holbrooke’s deputies’ ability in Kabul to travel and meet with Afghans)

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and in the White House (for example, Lute and Jones would arrange key NSC meetings when Holbrooke was out of Washington), refusing to provide support for Holbrooke’s diplomatic strategy. Lute and Jones supported negotiation with the Taliban but they wanted Holbrooke replaced by Lakhdar Brahimi, who had the trust of Karzai as well as Iran and Pakistan in a way that Holbrooke did not. A furious Clinton had to interfere to tell Lute and Jones that the US did not ‘outsource’ its foreign policy. The bureaucratic war continued between the two parties, but the White House did not intervene, and sometimes even promoted it. This was an example of what was going on in the White House during the surge while US forces were fighting in Afghanistan. The policy makers of the Obama Administration could hardly win the Afghanistan War, the big war, when it was involved in ‘small wars’ among themselves. Holbrooke was the only actor in the administration who really strove for a peace deal with the Taliban, but for all the factors covered above and in Chapter 7, his hard work produced nothing other than ‘a big zero’.36 Another aim of the diplomatic surge was to achieve a regional solution. The State Department, Holbrooke and his advisor Barnett Rubin in particular, were to persuade the regional powers/neighbours that stability in Afghanistan and the region was good for all. Holbrooke made attempts to get the neighbours to ‘develop strategic partnerships’ to build up infrastructure, increase trade, encourage more investment, and fight the terrorist groups.37 But it was neither the case that Afghanistan’s neighbours supported a US presence in Afghanistan, nor did their conflicting interests allow them to support a peaceful regional solution. Pakistan continued to see its interests in a military victory by the Taliban over the Afghan Government, not in a regional solution. India saw its interests in backing up the Karzai Government and, to the abhorrence of Pakistani officials, continued to increase its influence with Afghan parties. (Incidentally, I discovered no credible evidence to show that India interfered in Pakistan through Afghanistan. I, however, found that both India and Afghanistan worked for a strong and stable Afghanistan – something that the Pakistani Army saw as a threat.) Holbrooke could not persuade India effectively to reduce its heavy involvement, since his portfolio did not include the country. Thus the New Great Game, the ‘regional Cold War’, held on to be alive and well in 2010 and 2011 in Afghanistan.38

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As for Iran, US relations with the country in 2009 and 2010 became even worse over the latter’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and over its crackdown on domestic dissidents. Iran continued to defy ‘the Great Satan’ and the West while it kept interfering in neighbouring states, Afghanistan included. Its interference in Afghanistan was complicated. The Shi’a government in Iran saw its long-term strategic interest in the Karzai Government not in a (radical) Sunni-led Taliban regime, so it provided support, including ‘secret bags’ of US dollars delivered to Karzai’s office – something that Karzai later unashamedly admitted. It equally provided covert support for the Taliban to weaken the US and to eventually force it to leave Afghanistan; President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be pleased to prove to its electorates that wherever the US interfered, it left chaos rather than democracy and stability. Ahmadinejad called Afghanistan ‘occupied’, and perceived US presence in Afghanistan as a real threat to Iran’s national security. Iran worked against the interests not only of the US but also of Saudi Arabia, and both countries carried on their interference. Allegedly, elements from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf States provided financial assistance to the Taliban and other extreme elements, who disapproved of Shi’ism, while Iran supported certain sects of the Shi’a groups to counter the influence of the radical Sunni groups.39 Like Iran, both China and Russia feared a permanent US presence in Afghanistan and they continued to disagree with the US continuous footprint, and both refused to commit militarily. None showed interest in using their weight and influence in the region to put pressure on those who were nurturing terror in Afghanistan against both the Afghans and the coalition forces. On the contrary, they undermined US efforts in Afghanistan; Russia continued to support its proxies in Afghanistan, as well as jostling for influence in the Central Asian states, and China turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s interference and ‘outsourced’ its Afghan policy to Pakistan. Pakistan’s support for the insurgency weakened China’s regional and international rivals: India and the US.40 The Central Asian states, those neighbouring Afghanistan, likewise carried on supporting their respective proxy groups in Afghanistan, while simultaneously benefiting from the US presence and instability. As George Gavrilis stated, Tajik officials, for example, regularly presented international donors with ‘long lists of “win-win” development projects’ that they wanted the US to build on their side of the border.

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In summary, even though the neighbours were eager to ‘talk up solving common problems such as the drug trade, extremism and poverty together, they have each found ways to live with and even profit from Afghanistan’s debilitated state’.41 The outspoken and highly regarded Member of Parliament Ramazan Bashardost claimed that the Afghanistan War had become a ‘milky cow’ for regional countries, so no one really desired to kill the ‘milky cow’.42 A pledge to talk to the neighbours required a huge commitment by the US, but the US saw the dialogue with other governments as ‘politically uncongenial’, ‘insufficiently subservient to American interests’ and, most importantly, practically impossible due to the clashes of interests of the different players within Afghanistan.43 The opposing interests between Iran and Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, and the US and Russia/Iran/Pakistan/China dated back decades and it was unrealistic to assume that they could be solved within 18 months. The State Department had unrealistically assumed to develop a regional solution whereby neighbours, especially Pakistan, focused on economic integration and cooperation.44 While the US failed to persuade neighbours to agree to a regional solution, it similarly could not persuade its NATO allies to contribute in the way they had been expected to do after Obama announced the surge. Dick Lugar complained that the US had contributed $26.2 billion in military and $22.8 billion in non-military assistance from 2002 to 2011, while the rest of the allies only gave $2.6 billion in military and $4.2 billion in non-military for the same period. It was unacceptable for the US to continue to carry ‘the lion’s share’ of the economic and military burden in Afghanistan.45 As demonstrated, almost every assumption made by the Biden camp in the Af-Pak review proved accurate; and almost every assumption the military, as Gates himself would agree,46 had made proved illusory. Would Obama still go ahead and reduce the troop numbers even though conditions on the ground were not favourable?

CHAPTER 10 THE SURGE DECISION AT THE EVALUATION PHASE AND OBAMA'S FORMULATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL DECISION, JUNE 2011

Due to the public nature of the Af-Pak review in 2009 and the overwhelming interest in the Afghanistan War and its political implications for the 2012 presidential election, all those who had been involved in the decision to surge in 2009, especially the Vice-President Joe Biden and US Commander in Afghanistan David Petraeus camps, awaited the decision of 2011 with bated breath. Most of the actors – policy makers, members of Congress or pundits from the media/press, academia and think-tanks, most of whom were the same faces as those from 2009 – remained, intentionally or unintentionally, in one of the two camps in 2011 and thus their assessments (and policy opinions) of the Af-Pak strategy remained as divided as they had been in 2009. The actors once again made attempts through speeches, publications and testimonies, especially to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to influence the decision to draw down by trying to influence the public debate in the way they believed it to be right for US national security interests. Before examining their evaluative output (and policy suggestions), however, it is important to shed light on some domestic (and international) factors, including US economic conditions.

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President Barack Obama had not managed to show improvement in the American economy, forcing 70 per cent of Americans in numerous polls to disapprove of Obama’s handling of the economy and to think that the country was on the wrong track. The high disapproval rating was not surprising, because, ever since Obama became president, the unemployment rate had climbed from 7.6 to 9 per cent, the national debt from $10.6 to $14.6 trillion, the budget deficit to $1,580 billion for 2011–12, US citizens without health insurance to 49.9 million, Americans living below the official poverty line to 46.2 million, or one in six, and mortgages in negative equity to an all-time high. Approximately 60 per cent of participants believed in a June 2011 Pew poll that the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were the leading cause of the United States’ (US) indebtedness.1 Human costs equally concerned Americans. The American combat fatalities rose from 155 in 2008 to 317 in 2009, and 499 in 2010. 499 US soldiers represented an upsurge of 57 per cent over 2009. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had to plead with Congress to be patient over the death tolls (and the economic costs). While the 9/11 attacks killed 2,976 Americans, US military had lost 6,234 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan by 2011. Because of the repetitive combat deployments to war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq in the past decade, the ground forces were nearly ‘broken’. The military families were under enormous stress and consequently ‘junior and mid-level officers [were] leaving the force in large numbers’.2 Due to the increasing financial and human costs, by summer 2011, opinion polls showed that the majority of Americans did not believe the Afghanistan War was worth fighting. For example, only 21 per cent on the Chicago Council on Global Affairs thought that the Afghanistan War was very important; 77 per cent of Americans supported US withdrawal within two years. The Afghanistan War had become increasingly sour because Americans believed the US was not winning. The American public was not against fighting a war but against a war whose results were unclear.3 Public opinion changed not only in America but also in Afghanistan and in the countries of the allies. The continuous failure to deal with the evil forces (including the presence of so many international forces in Afghanistan), mentioned in the Introduction and examined in Chapters 4, 5 and 9, had reduced the support for US troops in Afghanistan. Even though the US spent hundreds of billions in the country, it was yet

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unable to win the hearts and minds of the Afghans, as Afghans’ attitude ranged from ‘wary’ to ‘hostile’.4 In the UK, the war became increasingly unpopular and Prime Minister David Cameron had to announce that, following NATO’s Lisbon Summit in November 2010 – which had decided that US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops would begin to hand security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in 2011 and end their combat mission by the end of 2014 – he would withdraw British forces by 2015, regardless of what the situation was on the ground. Some coalition partners, such as the Netherlands and Canada, even announced an end to their presence in Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011, respectively. And, incidentally, most NATO states continued to apply caveats in their operations.5 The US Conference of Mayors in early June likewise approved its second resolution after the Vietnam War, asking Congress to bring an early end to the Afghanistan War and redirect the money spent over constructions in Kandahar and Helmand towards constructions in America. The media predicted that the argument as to whether the US should rebuild Kandahar or a US city would be likely to dominate the 2012 presidential election. This was a clear political warning to all presidential candidates; whoever presented the Americans with policies to bring US engagement in Afghanistan to a quick though responsible end seemed, in 2011, to be winning more votes. Those Republicans who had a greater stake in the election, including Mitt Romney and Jon M. Huntsman Jr, in early 2011 wanted to hand over security to the Afghans and bring home swiftly the surge troops regardless of the conditions on the ground. Moreover, they supported 2014 as the end withdrawal date set out by the Lisbon Summit.6 As seen in Chapter 9, the Afghanistan War did not turn around the way the military camp had assumed, so Congress had become more and more impatient. In June 2011, the House of Representatives came nearer to passing a resolution to ask the administration to produce a fixed timetable; the vote was 204 to 215, compared to 162 to 260 on a similar resolution the year before. A month later it passed legislation to help raise the American ‘debt ceiling’, cutting the defence budget by $350 billion over ten years.7 Compared to 2009, in 2011, to the surprise of Gates, there were more Republicans who began to worry about the rise in the costs of the

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Afghanistan War in a financially difficult time and consequently supported the Democrats’ stance on the war (hawkish Republicans like John McCain, incidentally, continued to ask for the preservation of the current US military spending). Most of the opposition, however, came from the Democrats. The Democrats had a reason to be fuming since, in the mid-term 2010 election, the Democrats had suffered massive defeats and Republicans had recaptured the majority in the House of Representatives.8 As for the evaluative assessments, Obama again heard opposing suggestions from the two camps and their supporters. The rationales the Biden camp (including the inner circle) and its supporters invoked for opposing the continuation of the current strategy in Afghanistan could be summed up as follows: invoking the false assumptions, the Biden group argued that not enough durable progress had been made so far as the Afghan Government remained corrupt and its ANSF had numerous shortcomings (discussed in Chapter 6). Consequently, the US would not be able to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in most places cleared by the military. Since the Afghan Government lacked the capacity and political will to provide security and civil administration, the counter-insurgency strategy would not produce results even if they continued with it. They questioned how much longer the US needed to stay to keep security. Around the time the administration considered the decision to withdraw, a report by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on Afghanistan was leaked, which had concluded that the Afghanistan War was heading to a stalemate. For the White House, this was another ‘card’ on the surge. According to Gates, the Biden camp, from the moment Obama left West Point on 1 December 2009, began to search for any possible piece of information that could assist it with proving that the Biden camp was right and that the military was wrong on the surge, that the military was not following the president’s instructions and that the war was going from bad to worse. The camp focused majorly on the negative aspects of the strategy. The damaging rift and the suspicion still carried on into 2011. The high costs – an annual spending of around $120 billion on 100,000 US soldiers or one out of every six to seven dollars the US spent on defence, $12 billion on training the ANSF and $5 million on civilian assistance at the expense of cutting civilian assistance to other countries –

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were unjustifiable and irrational. Given US fiscal peril, the US could no longer cut services/programmes, raise taxes, lift the debt ceiling and disregard high US unemployment as well as the slow recovery of the economy to rebuild Afghanistan; especially when the allies were not fully committed and provided nothing compared to the US. As Tim Bird and Alex Marshall noted, the Afghanistan War involved not just ‘mission creep’ but also ‘mission multiplication’, as US objectives had ‘ballooned out of proportion’, turning the goal of containing terrorism into nation-building and the modernisation of Afghanistan. Such expensive focus on Afghanistan posed a threat to US economic powers and it was time Obama did something about it. The Biden camp wanted the Obama Administration to focus on specific goals in Afghanistan essential, sustainable and proportional to US national security interests and to avoid goals that could not be achieved in the first place and, even if they were accomplished, remained fragile and reversible. In terms of what sort of an Afghanistan Obama needed to leave, which was the core focus of the discussion and public debate in 2011, the Biden or pessimistic camp made it clear that, regardless of what strategy the Obama Administration applied, it was ‘unlikely’ for the US to establish a ‘fairly strong’ Afghan state: ‘a self-sufficient, democratic nation that has no terrorists within its borders and whose government is secure from tribal competition’, extremist threats and corruption. Afghanistan’s complexities named in the Introduction would continue to pose a threat to the progress the US had made in the last decade and the future Afghanistan would therefore persist to witness a weak, inept, undemocratic and corrupt government with insufficient ANSF, who would be at (‘civil’) war with the Taliban (and therefore indirectly with Pakistan) and even themselves. They proposed that success in Afghanistan meant having a ‘good enough’ Afghan state capable of holding off the Taliban and Al Qaeda with modest military and financial US support while some ‘messy stalemate’ continued to define Afghanistan’s future. A good enough Afghan state required a fast drawdown in July 2011, leaving between 10,000 and 25,000 troops to carry out counterterrorism operations to put pressure on Al Qaeda in Pakistan and continue to train the ANSF. The ANSF, ‘incompetent’ as they were, would be able to defend the key cities.

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One of the complexities they pointed out was Afghanistan’s dire financial conditions; without international support to Afghanistan, the state deficit would be half of its GDP in 2010, for example; Afghanistan had exports of $2.63 billion but imports of $9.15 billion for the fiscal year 2009/10. It was the $6.17 billion donor inflows that covered the account deficit of 54 per cent of GDP. Taxation could not help the deficit either, as only 8 per cent of Afghanistan’s budget was derived from it. The Biden camp also continued to believe in the arguments of a counterterrorism-plus strategy would reduce worries on the Afghan side that the US was there to occupy the country, compel Karzai to make peace with the Taliban, lessen some source of friction between Pakistan and the US, permit the US to go ‘long’ and sustainable not ‘big’ and unsustainable in light of the Afghanistan War being a ‘marathon not a sprint’, make the US better prepared to react to contingencies/terrorist acts arising from the wider Middle East Africa the Korean Peninsula and Iran, and allow the US to take into account its other domestic and international interests (notably those in the Asia Pacific) since in 2011 Afghanistan absorbed more US economic political diplomatic military and human resources of every sort than it warranted. They further invoked the arguments of ‘Afghanistan having minimal relevance to US national security interests’, ‘Afghanistan did not have the presence of al Qaeda and the Taliban was not an enemy’, ‘Taliban and al Qaeda not connected and al Qaeda would not return if Taliban took over large parts of Afghanistan’, ‘Pakistan being more important to US interests than Afghanistan’, ‘greater US presence would not guarantee a negotiated settlement because Pakistan would increase its support for the Taliban’, the US objective to establish a centralised government and to remake the political security and economic culture of Afghanistan was against the history of Afghanistan and beyond US means and ability, and US geostrategic interests were threatened not only by terrorism but also by many other forces including debt economic competition energy and food prices. Their grounds for the above arguments were essentially the same as those (or similar to those) they had stated in 2009, which are explained in the previous chapters, especially Chapter 6.9 The views of the military camp and those who in their evaluations of the Af-Pak strategy supported the camp could be summed up as follows.

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They wanted a conditions-based and gradual withdrawal, a withdrawal that calculated not only US interests in mind, but also those of Afghanistan. Conditions on the ground – meaning how strengthened the Taliban were, how prepared the ANSF were to take over and how the economic and political growth of Afghanistan was doing – were to be decided on the perceptions of the military leaders. The military leaders believed that Obama should only withdraw a tiny number of the 30,000 troops because a rapid withdrawal would put in jeopardy the progress US civilian and military forces had made in the last 18 months, especially when the Taliban was moving to reconstitute itself after the beating of the past year, trying to regain the momentum they had lost. The districts, which the surge had liberated, would slide back into the hands of the Taliban in the first instance. According to David E. Sanger and his colleagues, the optimistic camp warned against ‘undercutting a decade-long investment by cutting the budget too rapidly’ and against the mistakes made by the US after the Soviets left Afghanistan when it descended into chaos and into the Taliban hands. A premature withdrawal would signal to the Afghans that the US was again abandoning Afghanistan. Instead, they argued that conditions on the ground favoured the continuation of the counterinsurgency strategy for a few more years conducted by more or less the same US number (approximately 100,000) present in Afghanistan until the ANSF could take over. Though ‘slow’ compared to what Washington had expected, the surge strategy was working, as it had managed to clear the southern districts of Nawa, Garmsir, Arghandab and Zhari Amrit. It was slow because the decision to increase troops and money was about two years old, but troops only completed their arrival eight months ago (around late summer 2010) and by the time they were deployed and got used to the environment, more time was taken, but they still managed to clear safe havens in the south. The military or optimistic camp and its supporters urged Obama to give it ‘time’ (a few more years) and ‘patience’ to build on the progress, and to provide a long-term programme, such as signing some kind of strategic partnership with Afghanistan to offer long-term support to the Afghan Government and its security forces beyond 2011 or 2014. They further urged Obama to aim for a fair and reasonably ‘strong’ Afghan state (some lone voices even argued for a democratic

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Afghanistan) capable of protecting its internal security. Such an Afghanistan had numerous advantages discussed under the advantages of a centralised state in Chapter 9. If not, if the US withdrew prematurely and thus accepted defeat, it would have disastrous costs (explained in Chapter 6 under the argument of severe consequences) for the US and allies. Obama would not be judged on ‘how quickly’ he brought troops home but by how Afghanistan ‘did’ once US troops left. They continued to believe in the counterarguments of ‘Afghanistan having compelling relevance to US national security interests’, ‘the Taliban and al Qaeda being connected’, ‘security must be established before long term visions materialised’, ‘US must show resolve’, ‘majority of Afghans supported US presence’ and ‘talking to the Taliban would only produce results when the US was in a position of strength not when the US was heading home’. Their rationales for the above arguments were essentially the same as those they had put down in 2009, which are explained in Chapter 6. They rejected the counterterrorism-plus strategy for the reasons discussed under the counterargument of ‘multiple-anticounterterrorism-plus-rationales’ in Chapter 6.10 The two camps, however, agreed on two policy suggestions. While a small number wanted the US to get tough with Pakistan, most disagreed, asking for continued engagement with Pakistan at all levels for reasons explained in Chapter 5. Secondly, almost all of the above pundits, no matter what views they held, stressed the importance of a peaceful solution to the Afghanistan conflict, be it a regional one or reconciliation with the Taliban. They asked for dialogue with Afghanistan’s neighbours. The question remains as to how Obama responded to yet another divided America.

Obama Formulates the Decision to Withdraw Unlike 2009, the 2011 decision was not about a ‘top-down’ reassessment of the strategy but about the pace of US troops withdrawal, that is, whether Obama approved a slow withdrawal or a steep troop cut. There was another difference to the decision; this time the process was disciplined and unified, since Obama managed to employ a ‘consensus’ model. This model allows a trusted advisor, or the ‘honest broker’, to work to bring every bureaucracy to a strategy that the president

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supported. In 2011, Obama himself was the honest broker. Obama met Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon and US Commander in Afghanistan David Petraeus individually (and later as a group in the three NSC meetings in June) and heard their opinions on the conflicting viewpoints discussed above.11 As far as specific questions were concerned, including the number and time of the withdrawal of the 30,000 (þ3,000) troops, Petraeus, who had met in Afghanistan with his generals, had several options. The ‘most conservative option’ required troops to remain for another two years after July 2011. This plan, said Petraeus, could enable the Afghan Government to extend its authority in all corners of Afghanistan. The ‘most radical option’ demanded the surge forces to leave by July 2012. This option would put at risk the fragile accomplishments the military had made so far in the south. He asked for the middle ground option, which required keeping the majority of the surge troops until November 2012, that is, after the fighting season ended in October, while between 5,000 and 10,000 could be withdrawn by the winter of 2012. This approach, said Petraeus, would provide him with a good opportunity to attain his campaign’s goal, including redeploying some of the surge troops in 2012 to the east to pacify some districts from the Haqqani network.12 Obama had authorised the general to clear those places that he could transfer within the 18-month period. Obama only approved the surge in order to withdraw US forces. Now Petraeus was asking for almost two more years – if counted from December 2009, for another four years. Even then, about 70,000 US troops would remain, while the 30,000 would begin to withdraw. Obama disagreed. His option was to remove 15,000 by the end of 2011 and 18,000 by July 2012. Petraeus stated that Obama’s option would negate his military plan. ‘David, you shouldn’t have assumed I wouldn’t do what I told the American people I would,’ said Obama.13 Mullen spoke that a midsummer withdrawal would require the troops to start packing up late spring, which was before the peak of the fighting season. Clinton and Gates agreed with Mullen. Ironically, so did Donilon, Deputy NSA Denis McDonough and CIA Director Leon Panetta on this particular point. Biden, NSA to the Vice-President Antony J. Blinken, member of the National Security Staff Douglas Lute,

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Deputy NSA for Strategic Communications Benjamin Rhodes and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John O. Brennan, on the other hand, backed up the July deadline.14 Gates then proposed a ‘middle-ground’ suggestion, as he had done for the surge in 2009, which required the troops to return in September. Obama consented and on the evening of 22 June 2011 the president announced from the East Room of the White House that he was going to fulfil the commitment he had announced at the end of 2009; the withdrawal of the surge troops, that is, 10,000 by the end of 2011, 23,000 by summer 2012 and by 2014, following the agreement of the Lisbon Summit, the entire security responsibility, or the combat role, would be transferred to the Afghans and a small number of US troops might remain to conduct counterterrorism operations and train and assist the ANSF.15 Thus Obama managed to accomplish the policy trajectory he set in motion in 2009; Afghanise the mission and gradually bring US involvement to an end! The question is why did Obama act against the advice of the military leaders as well as his top civilian advisors, Clinton and Gates, now but not in 2009? The answer lies in the impact of four significant factors: bureaucratic politics, domestic influences, Obama’s beliefs and images of the Afghanistan War as well as false policy assumptions. Obama was hailed by friends and foes alike, including by Richard Cheney when he made the tremendously risky decision to send American forces to kill Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Obama no longer was assumed as a ‘middle way seeker’, an ‘indecisive’ and ‘back seat’ leader; he was now perceived as ‘a national political leader’. On the other hand, Petraeus’s flawed assumptions had weakened his standing; if Petraeus had produced the same results as he had done in Iraq in 2007, something that Petraeus was confident in 2009 that he would, it might have silenced the Biden camp, Congress, the American public, the critics and consequently Obama. Biden and his group, on the other hand, were right on almost every one of their assumptions, confirming Obama’s beliefs that the Afghanistan War was not winnable and the military’s ‘loftiest ambitions’ were unachievable. Petraeus’s appointment to the top job at the CIA, which removed him from the rank of the military and the Pentagon hierarchy, further damaged Petraeus’s eminence within the Situation Room. Unlike 2009,

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in June of 2011, almost three years into the presidency, Obama was more experienced and had developed greater understanding of the Afghanistan War, and this damaged Petraeus’s position even more. Penultimately, those colleagues who supported Petraeus during the Af-Pak review in 2009 were either gone or on their way out. He had lost McChrystal a year early and Gates was soon to leave. Hawkish Senators like John McCain and Lindsey Graham could hardly influence the media and public opinion, due to poor results in the theatre of war in Afghanistan. Finally, Donilon as the NSA and Panetta as Gates’s successor had a naturally greater say this time. Having achieved some accomplishments in the past 18 months through counterterrorism operations, including the killing of Osama bin Laden, both favoured counterterrorism operations, such as the intensification of unmanned drone strikes. Petraeus, therefore, did not enjoy the bureaucratic position he had had 18 months ago. The numerous documents found from Osama bin Laden’s compound convinced Obama – and the Biden camp, including John Kerry – that Al Qaeda was significantly disrupted and its presence was dramatically reduced in Afghanistan, and, with Osama bin Laden’s death, Al Qaeda was so weakened and ‘within reach’ of being defeated that there was no need to keep a great number of troops in Afghanistan. The rising costs of the war – which, as seen above, had caused significant domestic opposition to the Afghanistan War, to the extent that Obama could ‘lose’ the presidency over it in the next year’s presidential election – were another ‘strategic consideration’ that Obama invoked to take a much more aggressive position. Another important factor in 2011 was that the threat no longer was limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan, since Al Qaeda had proved to be capable of carrying out attacks through its affiliates from other countries (for example, the young Nigerian man trying to blow up a passenger plane headed for Detroit) and from within America (for example, Army psychiatrist Nidal Malik Hasan, who killed 13 people and wounded 32 others). So the US was to focus more on other neglected regions and on security at home, according to Brennan’s new counterterrorism strategy in 2011. In 2011, the Obama Administration also faced numerous other pressing security issues including Iran, North Korea and, most importantly, the

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Arab Spring. Unbelievably for many in the Obama Administration, the costs for maintaining Marine battalions in Nawa and Garmsir were similar to the development aid the US provided to Egypt with a population of some 85 million. It was untrue, when Obama stated in his speech of 22 June 2011, that ‘we are meeting our goals’ and starting the drawdown from ‘a position of strength’. Obama, as well as his supporters such as Kerry, knew through CIA reports and the December 2010 assessment that most US goals in Afghanistan had not been met and the strategy was not working. In reality, the decision for the drastic drawdown was consistent with Obama’s beliefs and images of the US role in the world in general and in the Afghanistan War in particular. Obama did not see military means as the only solution to violent extremism but ‘diplomacy’, ‘strong partnerships’ with allies and Muslim countries (multilateralism/engagement rather than unilateralism), investment in ‘homeland security’ and strengthening American values (by ‘living them at home’). Obama preferred not to get deeply involved in conflicts that engaged ground forces, be they a counterterrorism-plus strategy or counter-insurgency strategy. Instead, he preferred a ‘leading from behind’ approach, for example, in Libya, Iraq (against Islamic State militants) and, to a lesser extent, Syria. When he really had to, he would engage US air power. For the decision to withdraw (and the decision to surge), Obama’s outlook for Afghanistan was more in line with his future Secretary of State Kerry. Kerry wanted to have a ‘good enough’ state in Afghanistan (‘not building a perfect state’) to stop insurgents securing a base from which to launch attacks on the US and the allies, and to keep the gains the US had made. This way, their strategy and resources would match their objectives. Unlike Biden’s statements, Kerry’s statements, however, argued against haste and recommended a responsible withdrawal. So Obama’s direction moved towards achieving such an Afghanistan that Kerry – and those area experts who sided with the Biden camp above, but not at the speed Biden would have wished for – argued for. Changing the goal from a stable and secure to a not perfect state helped Obama to withdraw most of US troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Thus he treated the July 2011 date, as he had aimed at in 2009, as the beginning of the end of the US’s longest war against the Taliban

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(not Al Qaeda, as it would continue) in Afghanistan. The ANSF were becoming a ticket out of Afghanistan for US troops. Meanwhile, for Obama, the US mission in Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011 was never a counter-insurgency strategy, nor did the drawdown decision change it immediately to a counterterrorism-plus strategy. Obama rejected both strategies once again in 2011. Obama’s strategy, if anything, was a pragmatic approach that set in motion a reasonably responsible US withdrawal.16

CHAPTER 11 THE WITHDRAWAL STRATEGY AT THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE AND OBAMA'S FINAL POLICY ALTERATIONS, JULY 2011—DECEMBER 2016

To guide the US–Afghan relationship beyond 2014, the Afghan Government and the US signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement in May 2012.1 The agreement paved the way for the 2014 Bilateral Security Agreement that superseded the existing US Status of Forces Agreement and allowed a small number of US forces to remain in Afghanistan to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and to conduct counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan to deny insurgents sanctuaries. As of 1 January 2015, these anti-terrorism operations were carried out under the umbrella of the NATO-led undertaking of Resolute Support Mission, which replaced the assignment of International Security Assistance Force. In May 2014, Obama clarified his drawdown strategy further: 9,800 US troops to remain for one more year following the end of combat operations in December 2014, that number to be cut in half at the end of 2015 and by December 2016 decreased to a small military presence at the US Embassy in Kabul.2 Meanwhile, US policy makers continued after the drawdown decision to stress that long-term US Afghan strategy had four elements: keep advising, training and assisting the ANSF post-2014; build ‘a long-term

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relationship’ with the Afghan Government and build its ‘capacity in critical areas’; provide support for Afghan reconciliation; promote ‘regional stability and economic integration’, for example, integrating Afghanistan into South Central Asia’s economy.3 According to the International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn on 5 December 2011, the US and the coalition would provide support to Afghanistan throughout ‘the transformation decade’ (2015– 24) to consolidate the security, economic, diplomatic and democratic achievements made by the three surges – military, civilian and diplomatic – so that the Afghans took responsibility for security.4 The US and the allies therefore strongly supported the 2012 Chicago Summit, which agreed on the size, cost and sustainment of the ANSF. According to the summit, the US and coalition states would provide about $4 billion after 2014 each year for the ongoing training, equipping and financial aids for the ANSF. Another $16 billion in aid over the next four years was pledged in the Tokyo Conference in July 2012, covering Afghanistan’s fiscal gap identified by the World Bank. The 2014 London Conference, the 2016 Warsaw Summit, and the 2016 Brussels Summit extended the Tokyo and Chicago pledges to the National Unity Government (NUG) up to 2020.5 At the end of the transformation period, Afghanistan would be assumed to have transformed itself into a self-sustaining country, or what the academic Ashraf Ghani might call ‘a functioning state’6 both militarily and in terms of government. Obama assumed that during the transformation period (and between 2011 to 2015), especially after the end of 2016, the ANSF would be able to self-secure the country and the imperfect Afghan state to provide some form of basic governance to its population in those areas it controlled. Consequently, the US’s main goal would be achieved; Afghanistan would not become a safe haven from where terrorist groups could engineer another 9/11. Obama’s assumption was strengthened when he got a ‘serious partner’,7 a man of great vision, in Kabul: President Ashraf Ghani. The Afghan President (and the Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah) took a number of steps to normalise US– Afghan relations, such as publicly thanking the US for its sacrifices and achievements in Afghanistan.8 President Ghani further pleased the US by producing his government’s strategy, his vision, for Afghanistan, which was similar to Obama’s three-track strategy discussed in Chapter 8. Ghani’s economic policy,

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however, was innovative and ambitious, giving high hopes to everyone, including US officials. Ghani based his plan on utilising Afghanistan’s five opportunities: its strategic location, untapped minerals, water, human resources and existing capital. Afghanistan’s location as the Silk Road would be taken advantage of to connect South Asia, East Asia, West Asia and Central Asia; Asia would transform itself into a continental economic power and Afghanistan a transit country crossed by gas pipelines, transport, fibre optic, and modern telecom and banking services. Afghanistan’s $1 –3 trillion underground resources of iron, copper, gold, metals, lithium, gas, oil and uranium, to name but a few, would transform Afghanistan into an industrial nation. Harnessing its waters and land would turn Afghanistan into a dynamic agricultural country. Ghani’s economic policy would change into capital Afghanistan’s existing wealth, creating hundreds of thousands, if not more, jobs in the private sector.9 Taking advantage of these opportunities as well as introducing a series of reforms/policies to curb corruption, offer effective governance, reduce the role of the powerful syndicate and make peace with the Taliban would not only promote regional stability and economic integration by the end of the transformation decade but also achieve stability: economic development, security (or human safety against most of the evil forces pointed out in the Introduction) and peace. But several challenges lay before the US and the NUG’s civilian, development, security and diplomatic strategies to make Afghanistan stand economically and militarily on its own feet. The presidential candidate Ghani had assumed that the Pakistani Army would abandon its realpolitik calculations if it had a reliable partner in Kabul. He had also presumed that his economic plans would benefit Pakistan and consequently the Pakistani military establishment would help Ghani to break a peaceful settlement with the Taliban. As part of the diplomatic strategy, President Ghani made genuine efforts to deal with the issue of the lack of trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He, for example, took certain steps to curb India’s influence within Afghanistan and signed some projects that clearly benefited Pakistan, such as the TAPI scheme aimed at transferring gas from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, to Pakistan and to India. Even though the unpopular measures cost Ghani an immense amount of political capital at home, including the deterioration of his relations

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with former, yet immensely influential President Hamid Karzai as well as India, the Pakistani Army did not change its strategic calculations and refused to bring the Taliban to the peace table. The Army argued that it did not exert enough influence on the Taliban to do so, yet it managed to run the Taliban insurgency well into 2015 under the name of Mullah Omar who had in fact died in April 2013 in Pakistan. Like Omar, his two predecessors Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour and after Mansour’s killing in May 2016 in American drone strikes in Pakistan, Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, would obey the Pakistani Army and show no interest in negotiation with the NUG. According to Ghani’s political advisor Akram Khpalwak, the NUG in 2015 spoke to regional countries, including China, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, in the hope to dissuade Pakistan to abandon what Ghani called its ‘undeclared state of hostility’ towards Afghanistan and persuade the Taliban to cut a peace deal with the NUG. But none of the countries seemed to have been successful. China, one of the parties to the fourway negotiations, has tremendous influence within Pakistan, but it could not or would not exercise it. On the contrary, Beijing pledged $46 billion to Pakistan to build transport routes to link China possibly to Central Asia and South Asia, challenging the US as the dominant power in the region. Russia, on the other hand, saw the peace talks as ‘useless events’ and refused to join. Instead, it opened direct channels with the Taliban to exchange information on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the north. On the positive side, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar dropped his conditions for peace and joined the NUG. However, having much less than 10 per cent of the overall 40,000-or-so insurgents in Afghanistan under his command, his presence in Kabul did not make a difference as far as peace and security were concerned. In short, despite Ghani’s continuous efforts – including the four-way peace talks as well as faceto-face negotiations between the NUG and the Taliban – the peace talks with the main insurgent group, the Taliban, failed by the end of the Obama Administration and Af-Pak relations were as bad as they had been during the Karzai era.10 For Ghani’s economic plans to succeed, the cooperation of Afghanistan’s neighbours, Pakistan in particular, was essential. But instead of helping Afghanistan become an Asian hub, Pakistan continued with its aggression and ensured Afghanistan remained Asia’s battlefield.

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To implement Ghani’s vision, a relatively effective governance was also a must, but the NUG was nowhere near, due to several factors. Even though a loya jirga and the Afghan Parliament overwhelmingly backed up the security pact because it ensured political, security and economic stability, Karzai publicly refused to sign the contract unless America guaranteed peace and security in Afghanistan. Eventually, the NUG signed it in October 2014, but nothing could be done to restore the economic and security damage caused by the period of uncertainty created by Karzai’s refusal to sign. According to former Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal, the uncertainty cost Afghanistan more than $5 billion.11 The 2014 presidential election plunged the country into yet another period of ambiguity when both leading candidates, Ghani and Abdullah, accused each other of widespread fraud and both declared themselves to be the winners of the presidential election. None of them would concede defeat and Abdullah implied that he would form a parallel government if Ghani were named the winner. Many predicted that the country would once again be pushed into a civil war, guaranteeing ‘a catastrophic ending’ to ‘the US achievements’ in Afghanistan.12 To avoid a wave of unrest, US Secretary of State John Kerry eventually interfered and, in contradiction of the Afghan Constitution and to the dissatisfaction of ordinary Afghans, brokered a power-sharing agreement whereby Ghani became president and Abdullah his chief executive in the new government called the NUG. The election and its chaotic aftermath took almost six months, creating another period of hopelessness and confusion among the Afghans. Instead of focusing on their election pledges, Ghani and Abdullah remained engaged in a protracted bureaucratic battle on practically the 50-50 division of government seats and the distribution of power, leading to ‘loss of public confidence’ and ‘institutional paralysis’. There were substantial delays in introducing the new cabinet and, as a result, acting ministers, governors and ambassadors held key government posts. As an example, the country did not have a defence minister for a year and a half while the Afghan National Army stayed engaged in brutal war with the Taliban. In fact, the biggest challenge to the US and the NUG’s civilian, development, security and diplomatic strategies was to hold the so-called unity between the two rival teams, whose heads had different backgrounds and ideas. Their endless bickering undermined the credibility of the NUG, and ‘risked a political insurgence’, as

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numerous political figures accused the NUG of incompetence and called for a loya jirga or new presidential election.13 Another challenge was the ever-growing presence of the powerful syndicate. Ghani made a similar mistake as the George W. Bush Administration had committed; Bush used certain unsavoury characters for his anti-terrorism war, the presidential candidate Ghani brokered deals with numerous members of the powerful syndicate to secure him more votes. As part of the formation of the NUG, Ghani had to accommodate the Abdullah team, many of whose members again came from the syndicate. Thus the NUG was more or less made up of the same old faces with corrupt and, in some cases, criminal backgrounds. They would prove to be a hindrance to the implementation of Ghani’s political, economic, security, judicial and electoral reforms. Ghani’s apparent micromanagement and trust deficit would equally prove detrimental. With the exception of his inner circle, including National Security Advisor Mohammad Hanif Atmar, Ghani seemingly did not trust his ministers, and unlike Karzai, would micromanage every decision he could possibly do. According to Abdullah, Ghani had consistently broken the terms of the power-sharing agreement. For example, a frustrated Abdullah stated in August 2016 that Ghani was not fit for the presidency because he did not have the patience for discussion. He also revealed that he had not met with Ghani in three months. They were meant to administer the country together, and yet Abdullah could not gain access to the president! Ghani gave the impression that he knew it all. Ghani committed another mistake made by the Bush Administration; in his emphatic and often over-the-top manner, Ghani made unrealistic promises based on his visionary goals to the Afghans. To make matters worse, he gave deadlines to accomplish them. Although worthy ends, they were based on hope,14 optimism and, in Pakistan’s case, false assumptions and thus he failed to deliver on most of them. To the contrary, things went from bad to worse. For example, instead of Kunduz and Badakhshan Provinces being turned into economic hubs, as Ghani had promised, they turned into war zones and were on the brink of being taken by the Taliban. Insecurity became the principal impediment to the NUG’s goals. The insurgency supported from the sanctuary in Pakistan continued to reinforce insecurity. The ANSF remained engaged in fighting with

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numerous insurgent groups, including ISIL, as well as hundreds of foreign fighters pushed into Afghanistan by Pakistan’s so-called antiterrorism war. According to Atmar, the ISIL group in Afghanistan had no connection to the Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi-led ISIL but received support from the Pakistani military establishment. Furthermore, reportedly, more and more ISIL fighters moved into the lawless parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan as they began losing territory in Iraq and Syria. ISIL was a terrorist group that was a more dangerous long-term threat to Afghanistan than the Taliban, due to the group’s attempt to exploit sectarian violence in Afghanistan by blasting Shi‘i mosques and gatherings. Without air support and the necessary weaponry, the ANSF struggled to fight the numerous insurgent groups, notably the Taliban, and more than 100 of its forces were injured or lost their lives every week.15 While the ANSF commendably managed to hold big cities, almost one-fifth of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and roughly half of Afghanistan’s 398 districts remained unsafe and under ‘high’ or ‘extreme’ Taliban threat. In many districts, the capitals were in the hands of the Afghan Government, but the remaining neighbourhoods were administered by the Taliban. In some districts the Taliban fighters outnumbered the ANSF. There was a surge in the insurgents’ terror attacks in Kabul, Nangarhar, Paktia and other large provinces. Many highways became more and more insecure and Afghans travelled with increasing fear. Moreover, there was an upsurge in burglaries and kidnapping. Investors and businesses began to withdraw their family members and their capital, dashing Ghani’s hopes to turn the existing capital into wealth. In short, insecurity intensified, and the insurgency consumed a great chunk of the NUG’s time and attention.16 Despite having a strong political will, and despite introducing a number of reforms, the NUG did not succeed in achieving even ten per cent of its visionary goals by the end of the Obama Administration. It even failed to deliver the very basics: hold the parliamentary and district council elections or issue electronic identity cards; it took the NUG almost two years to appoint an electoral reform commission. Despite Ghani’s commendable efforts to reduce Afghanistan’s dependent economy, Afghanistan continued to have a GDP deficit of more than 50 per cent. Without the international military and civilian aid, Afghanistan would not be able to pay its security forces and civil servants.

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The Afghan’s evaluation of US involvement in Afghanistan by the end of the Obama Administration was extremely critical due to continuous failures of the US to address the causes of the evil forces stated in the Introduction and analysed in Chapters 4, 5 and 9, especially the US keeping quiet about Pakistan’s shelling into Afghanistan and Obama’s dramatic increase of drone strikes. Furthermore, the Afghans also invoked lack of investment in infrastructure, including schooling for girls in faraway provinces to show their dissatisfaction with the US, NATO states and the NUG. Violence against women was another common grievance; many Afghan women, while admitting some progress in the role of women, believed that their role, especially in provinces, was ‘symbolic’. The Afghans had believed that the US and the international community would secure them against all the wicked forces, but such reality by the end of the Obama Administration seemed a distant dream. The combination of these harmful forces had destroyed the chances of peace and security (as well as certainty about the future), allowing momentum once more to sway in the Taliban’s favour.17 In fact, by the end of 2016, US anti-terrorism war had divided Afghanistan into two parts, which were in war with each other. One part was under the Taliban control where they and their foreign supporters had brainwashed the young men into viewing, generally speaking, the urban Afghans as supporters, or the very least, sympathisers of the ‘invading’ powers. Pakistan’s support as well as ineffective governance, poverty, unemployment, lack of education and the Afghans’ sensitivity towards foreigners were factors that had assisted the Taliban and their foreign backers. The other part was under the control of the government in which, generally speaking, rural Afghanistan was perceived as unfriendly and sympathetic to Afghanistan’s ‘enemy’, Pakistan. Consequently, both sides saw each other as ‘traitors’/‘puppets’. On a daily basis, Afghans were killed or injured on both sides either by the Taliban violent attacks, or by the Afghan Government or US anti-terrorism campaigns. The war had even divided families; as TOLOnews reported, a mother lost three sons in the battle; the eldest, a Talib, was killed by the bullets of the Afghan forces and their allies and the two younger sons, from the Afghan National Police, were slain by the Taliban and their allies. She was left with one remaining son, whom she wanted to stay away from fighting and instead get an education – a wish that seemed to

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be unrealistic given the family’s financial difficulties and the country’s violent milieu.18 As far as US national security was concerned, however, the Obama Administration had achieved its goal of 2009; the mission was almost Afghanised and a good enough Afghan state with a messy stalemate managed to hold off the Taliban and ensured that Al Qaeda or ISIL did not establish a permanent base in Afghanistan. America and the allies experienced no major terrorist (Al Qaeda) attacks that had been engineered in Afghanistan. But things were rapidly changing against Obama’s assumption. By 2015, the Taliban insurgency, as well as a rising Al Qaeda and ISIL, again became a serious threat to overthrow the NUG and plot attacks against the US and Europe. In 2016, the Washington Post and the New York Times predicted that many parts would be lost to the Taliban and other insurgent groups, and strongmen would take control of places if things continued the way they were.19 Contrary to Obama’s assumption, a good enough state was seemingly not able to prevent a Taliban takeover and keep the US and the allies safe. Perhaps realising his false assumption and as advised (and even indirectly pressurised) by his military leaders, especially US Commanders in Afghanistan John F. Campbell and John W. Nicholson, Jr (as well as domestic actors), Obama made a number of alterations to his Afghan strategy. In October 2015, Obama announced that he would keep 9,800 troops in Afghanistan throughout 2016, and 5,500 after that. In June 2016, Obama authorised US Air Force and ground troops to join the ANSF to fight the Taliban if deemed necessary. In July 2016, Obama altered the Afghanistan exit plan and announced that 8,400 US troops would remain in Afghanistan by the time he stepped down in early 2017 and it would be up to the next US president to decide their fate in Afghanistan.20 The question was whether President Donald Trump would act differently.

CHAPTER 12 AN INSIDER'S INSIGHT INTO PRESIDENT TRUMP AND HIS ADMINISTRATION

While this chapter provides information about President Donald Trump and his policy makers, the next chapter examines the administration’s Afghan strategy. The chapters are in reverse order because the Trump Administration’s Afghanistan strategy may make more sense in the light of having oneself familiarised with one of the most uncompromising and dividing presidents in the United States (US) history, Trump, his particularities, including his belief system and the context in which he operated in. As will be seen in the next chapter, both Trump’s particularities and the milieu he found himself in impacted his strategy in Afghanistan. The analysis of this and next chapter is limited to the 2016 presidential campaign and Trump’s first 16 months in office, that is, up to May 2018. Borrowing the slogan of his idol Ronald Reagan, the 70-year-old Trump, the oldest president elected in US history, promised to ‘Make America Great Again’, that is, more secure, wealthier and more influential on the global stage. However, many others believed that Trump’s radical ideals were derived from false assumptions and they might make America less safe, less wealthy and less influential.1 Trump’s viewpoints were linked to a number of schools of thoughts, including ‘mercantilism’ or ‘economic nationalism’, populism or Jacksonianism, authoritarianism, conservatism and pragmatism. As the name suggests, the realist theory of mercantilism argues that economic activity should be based within nation’s borders and should be

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employed to primarily build a strong state. For mercantilists, foreign (trade) policy is ‘a series of deals, each divided between a winner and a loser’. The US was meant to win every single deal because it was the strongest party. But in reality, both adversaries and allies ‘ripped off’ the US. A prime example was the early 1990s when America was financially weak due to the burden of winning the Cold War, yet Japan’s economy was booming because during the Cold War period Japan had employed a more mercantilist trade policy while simultaneously benefiting from US security protection. For people like Trump, the Cold War ended and Japan had won because it had eaten US’ ‘economic lunch’. That ‘searing geopolitical event . . . shaped Trump’s thinking’. According to candidate Trump’s ‘combative’, ‘protectionist’ and antifree trade rhetoric, he would liberate America from ‘the infection’ of foreign regulations and influences, including many ‘broken and embarrassing’ multinational trade agreements, which stole millions of US jobs and cost billions of US dollars a year in trade deficit. Instead, Trump promised to make bilateral agreements with states from a position of strength that focused on American interests first.2 Others claimed that candidate Trump was influenced by Jacksonian or nationalistic populist ideals. Today’s Jacksonians supported Israel; parted with political correctness; argued for an aggressive response towards terrorism (though weary of endless wars); opposed talks with Iran and North Korea; felt sceptical about the UN; argued for the restoration of torture and the opening of Guanta´namo; doubted the existence of climate change science; felt suspicious of Wall Street; distrusted the political establishment and the business elites and wanted to have their destiny in their own hands; disliked the left-wing; backed up middle-class entitlement programmes; felt mistrustful of the outside world; opposed voting rights, same-sex marriage, gender equality, ‘soulless globalism’, especially free trade, ‘international alliance’ and ‘the immigration of non-whites’ – they saw immigration as an existential threat to the US. They viewed Islam in ‘deeply xenophobic terms’. For them, ‘Radical Islamic Terrorism’ was at ‘global existential’ war ‘with the JudaeoChristian world’ led by the US. Generally speaking, they thought in ‘apocalyptic’ terms and believed things were really ‘bad’ in America and needed fixing. They shared a ‘1940s view of fortress America’, that is,

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America should be insular and focus on American needs rather than police or build the outside world.3 Trump’s standpoints during the 2016 election were consistent with most, if not all, of these Jacksonian ideals.4 In fact, Trump and his influential Chief Strategist Stephen K. Bannon saw President Andrew Jackson (1829– 37) as their hero and apparently installed a portrait of him in the Oval Office. The selection of far-right figures – such as Bannon, Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Senior Policy Advisor Stephen Miller – to key government positions further justified Trump’s linkage to the Jacksonian principles. Indeed, Trump’s election prompted the Washington Post to write that ‘a populist movement or political insurgency’ was elected to the White House.5 His populist remarks opened Trump to the charge of running a campaign that was both divisive and racist. Hillary Clinton called half of Trump’s supporters a bunch of ‘deplorables’, consisting of ‘racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic – you name it’.6 Obama abhorred Jacksonian views and the cultural left came close to defining them as ‘hate crime’. Trump, who appeared intent on destroying the Obama legacies (described as a commitment to climate change, opening to Cuba, the Iran agreement, a pledge to multilateralism, the Obama Health Care and ending US wars),7 and his populist advisors disagreed. The populist advisors, whom Philip Rucker and Robert Costa called Trump’s ‘intimates’, considered themselves the defenders of the ‘forgotten people’ (the white working class) against the elitist ‘masters of the universe’. For Bannon, their ‘pro-American movement’ constituted the ‘birth of a new political order’. It was part of ‘the global nationalist phenomenon’, as both Europeans and Americans wanted to have back control of their destinies.8 There were others who argued that authoritarianism (some even went as far as fascism) was found in Trump’s approach. While the rest of the world was shocked and alarmed by Trump’s victory, strongmen and nationalist leaders celebrated his ascent to the White House. Trump as the multibillionaire real estate developer was difficult to please because he required not only loyalty but also ‘subservience’. President Trump, the first billionaire president in the history of America, did not pick the individuals who had signed the ‘Never Trump’ letter (below) and insulted (as seen below, even fired) those who disagreed with him or belittled him – something he learned as a young man. He called the

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mainstream media liars/fake news, compared the intelligence behaviours to Nazis, ridiculed Senator John McCain for being captured in Vietnam, accused Hillary Clinton of lying by deleting the emails and referred to the US District Judge James Robert as a ‘so-called judge’. It was argued that some of these characteristics could be loosely associated with dictators. It was unsurprising when the ex-FBI director James Comey compared the president in his book A Higher Loyalty: Truth, Lies and Leadership to a ‘mafia’ don, who ‘never stops talking’ until he ‘pulls all those present into a silent circle of assent’. Like a mafia boss, for Trump ‘it’s all about how do you serve the boss, what’s in the boss’s interests’. However, many others disagreed, claiming that President Trump never did anything in practice, such as ‘cracking down’ on freedom of the press or imprisoning his critics, to show he was akin to Hitler, Mussolini or even Putin. As historian Michael Kazin argued, authoritarianism ‘in rhetoric and style . . . [was] not the same as fascism’.9 While Rebecca Seales claimed that Trump was conservative on several issues, James Kitfield argued that ‘Trump is neither conservative nor neoconservative. Nor is he reliably realist, idealist, or neo-isolationist’. He was not conservative because he ran for the presidency in 2000 through the Reform Party that stood for moderate views but lost the nomination to Pat Buchanan. He was not neoconservative because avoiding ‘a new Cold War’ with Russia and disapproving of spreading democracy were two policy suggestions that would disappoint the neoconservatives. Trump’s aggressive policy towards the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the complex environment of the Middle East (which could put US forces in direct confrontation with Turkish, or even Russian, troops), acting aggressively against China and increasing military spending by around 10 per cent might go against both realist and neo-isolationist instincts.10 For Kitfield and many others, including former president Barack Obama, pragmatism (or what worked) seemed to guide his vision. His remarks to work with Russia and Assad to defeat the common enemy, ISIL, his admittance that the US would not be able to overthrow Assad due to Russian and Iranian support, or his willingness to meet North Korean leader under the right circumstance to defuse tension over North Korea’s nuclear programmes could justify this view.11 Equally, the appointments of Vice-President Mike Pence, White House Chief of Staff Reinhold Priebus (and after July 2017 John

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F. Kelly), Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster and, to some extent, Central Intelligence Agency Director Mike Pompeo gave further credibility to the claim that Trump was a pragmatist. None of the above backed up populist or mercantilist views. Generally speaking, these advisors, since coming into office, supported US security alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); favoured free trade; recognised the risk posed by climate change; preferred an aggressive approach towards terrorism, but did not support torture; stayed away from (Trump’s) controversial comments – such as ‘seizing the oil’ of a sovereign state, bombing the ‘families’ of ISIL or torturing terrorists because they ‘deserved’ it; worked against the notion that the US was at war with Islam; saw Russia and Iran as a threat but apparently were against dismantling the Iran nuclear deal; and trusted the US intelligence community.12 However, criticism of Obama for leading from behind, for failing to enforce the red line, for showing weakness when Russia annexed Crimea, and for not treating/seeing China as ‘a national security and economic threat’ due to China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea, its currency manipulation and its stealing of US trade secrets, to name but a few, proved that Trump might not be as pragmatic (and realist) as Kitfield asserted. So, which school of thought, if any, did Trump belong to? As far as Trump’s foreign policy was concerned, Trump proved to be contradictory, inconsistent, unpredictable, vague, controversial, wrong on facts and even dishonest, making it hard to pinpoint what school of thought, if any, Trump’s beliefs were based on. Trump was on record backing up the Iraq invasion, but during the campaign period he denied his support. More than 120 Republican foreign policy and national security officials and experts signed an open ‘Never Trump’ letter in which they called candidate Trump dishonest because they accepted that viewpoints ‘evolve[ed] over time’, but Trump’s denial was ‘simply misrepresentation’. They also criticised Trump for unclarity of his views, arguing that Trump ‘swings from isolationism to military adventurism within the space of one sentence’. Jeremy Shapiro, research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, wrote that Trump’s policy viewpoints changed with his mood and no one knew for real, including Trump himself, what his policy was. He predicted that ‘[t]he essence of Trump’s foreign policy will be its unpredictability’.13

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David Ignatius and Karen DeYoung, however, asserted that sometimes his extreme and inconsistent rhetoric could be part of what Trump wrote a book on, ‘the art of the deal’ or ‘the FUD Doctrine’, that is, ‘create fear, uncertainty and doubt’. For instance, implying to abandon security alliances was allegedly aimed at pressuring them (allies) to pay their fair share.14 It is also vital to state that Trump’s background and personal characteristics, including his lack of experience in politics, could be blamed for some of the confusion and uncertainty. Candidate Trump never called himself a politician and when President Trump referred to himself as a politician, it came across as if he associated himself with a dirty profession. To give a sporting analogy, Trump wanted to be a professional footballer but refused to play by the rules of the game, making FIFA (the foreign policy fraternity/the mainstream media press) appalled and his (populist) supporters thrilled. For Trump, US politicians such as Clinton and Obama were ‘all talk, and no action’. Politicians, including career diplomats and naive academics, were ‘stupid and incompetent’ and were ‘terrible negotiators’ and, consequently, turned the world into ‘a total mess’ (Afghanistan included). All they worried about was how to learn about nuances and how then to carefully consider them before making a decision. The world was tough and what the US lacked was great negotiators/dealmakers to work out the best deals for the US. Foreign policy was not about experience or academic knowledge, or else Ronald Reagan would have never made a great president. Clinton, however, disagreed, accusing Trump of being delusional and living in his own reality. Comey equally believed that Trump was ‘untethered to the truth’.15 Being ignorant of foreign policy, or being devoid of the nuances that he eagerly dismissed, led him to make foreign policy suggestions (as discussed in the next chapter, including about Afghanistan) that he might have avoided had he known about the details. Citizen/candidate Trump was not well read. He got his information from the cable channels, especially Fox News. These channels at times could be inaccurate. Additionally, Trump apparently did not listen to his immediate advisors (or anyone) but himself because he was very ‘clever’. He single-handedly turned ‘the $1 million’ loan from his father into a company now worth more than ‘$10’ billion or so (independent estimates claim Trump to be worth around ‘$4 billion’). He knew that

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refugees in Europe would pose a national security threat and claimed credits for predicting terrorist attacks by refugees in Europe. According to candidate Trump, he was in ‘perfect health’, as all his life he had stayed away from alcohol, drugs, cigarettes and even coffee – though he apparently loved fast food, hamburgers in particular. Trump believed he was ‘superior in every way’ and possessed boundless confidence in his ability to cut deals that put ‘America First’. According to Trump, a man who could make ‘high-end real estate deals’ could find a solution to all American problems. In the 1980s, he even offered himself as someone who was able to broker a nuclear deal between the US and the Soviet Union.16 Michael Wolff, in his explosive book on Trump Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House, disputed the notion that Trump had a stable mind, but the White House doctor disagreed with Wolff.17 While the Taliban believed that Trump was ‘non-serious’ and said ‘anything that [came] to his tongue’,18 many in the Middle East, however, believed that Trump ‘must be smoking bad hashish to say such crazy things’.19 Trump won the election against the expectation of almost every political pundit, and many could not believe that the American voters elected a candidate who made misogynistic, racist and anti-Muslim comments; someone who apparently did not pay federal tax for most of the past ‘20 years’ and then proudly defended his actions by saying he ‘took advantages of the laws of the nation’.20 So, was the healthy, clever, confident and billionaire Trump an ideologue or a pragmatist? And would his foreign policy be as unpredictable as it was projected? Thomas Wright implied that Trump might not possess a coherent world view as yet. He, however, added that some of Trump’s views were consistent since the 1980s: ‘opposition to America’s alliance relationships; opposition to free trade; and support for authoritarianism’.21 Wright wrote his article in 2016 about candidate Trump, but, as will be explained below, President Trump made a reversal on some of his views, including on at least two of the three Wright named. During his first 16 months in office, it also emerged that it meant a lot to President Trump to distinguish himself from politicians and consequently to come good on his promises, and to do so as soon as was practically possible. President Trump’s signing of an overwhelming number of executive orders within first weeks in office appeared to be

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pointing in the opposite direction to what Shapiro argued about candidate Trump. His action demonstrated that Trump would do his best to keep most of his campaign pledges. It is true that candidate Trump did not put forward detailed proposals or white papers to show how he would implement his campaign pledges, and some of his propositions, such as getting China to wipe out the North Korean leader or having Mexico reimburse the expenses for ‘the wall’ he planned to build on the US southern border with Mexico, sounded even bizarre, but he was serious, or at least wanted to be seen to be serious about achieving them. President Trump sought to be consistent with his election promises, but he complained that the interpretation by the press media and the cultural left claimed otherwise, misrepresenting his views and disregarding his action. In fact, as famously argued, the press took Trump ‘literally’, whereas Trump’s supporters took him ‘seriously, but not literally’. They believed that, when it came to action, President Trump did not ‘flip-flop’ on his election pledges.22 So far, the reader must be both confused and uncertain about Trump’s foreign policy beliefs and (future) direction. This is not unhealthy, as the reader is not alone. Trumpism has confused many foreign policy experts thus far. Trump’s selection of advisors was equally perplexing. Just as Trump’s beliefs were linked to numerous schools of thoughts, so was his choice of advisors, which made the richest cabinet ever in US history. The members of Trump’s foreign policy team came from Congress (Pence, Priebus, Pompeo), the military establishment (Mattis, McMaster, Kelly), the business community (Tillerson), the media (Bannon), Trump’s family (senior advisors to the president’s daughter Ivanka Trump and her husband Jared Kushner) and, apparently, some friends from the outside.23 Their beliefs originate mainly from conservatism (Pence, Priebus, Pompeo and Trump), ideological populism (the intimates and Trump), pragmatism (generally speaking, the military leaders, Pence/Priebus, Tillerson and Trump) and lack-of-foreign-policy(ism) (almost all). Trump’s name is added to every school since he employed elements from all of them and hence it proved hard to explain what Trumpism really was. On a preliminary reading of the Trump phenomenon, however, it seemed that candidate Trump utilised populist ideals (and some

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mercantilist views) to win the election. In the first weeks in the White House, Trump elevated his populist advisors and signed executive orders to turn many of their radical views into policies, making many believe that Trump would follow a nationalist agenda. Apparently, ‘Bannon’s baby’, the immigration executive that banned the citizens of seven (then six after dropping Iraq) predominantly Muslim countries, was not reviewed by the State Department, the Defense Department or the National Security Council’s lawyers.24 One could not miss noticing that the pragmatists, or ‘grownups’, worked hard to persuade Trump to lose the ‘sharp edges’ of his radical foreign policy viewpoints, which they held to have the potential to hurt both US interests and values.25 To some extent, they seemed to succeed, as Trump, towards the end of his 100 days in office, appeared to be slowly moving away from his right-wing agenda to a more pragmatist approach, a more traditional way of viewing the world, at least in the realm of foreign policy. Following a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in April 2017, Trump announced that NATO was no longer ‘obsolete’ because it fought terrorism and paid its fair share and did not ‘outsmart’ the US. Following a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in April 2017, Trump and Xi ‘developed a friendship’ and China was doing its best to dissuade North Korea from abandoning its nuclear programme. (However, in March 2018, Trump introduced tariffs that would include Chinese steel and aluminium. Trump seemed to be acting on his campaign promise to get tough and rewrite trade agreements to re-establish US economic dominance lost to China. But at the same time, and in a dramatic break-through, after extremely tense US– North Korean relations over North Korea’s numerous test-fires of its long-range missile, North Korean leader and Trump were likely to meet by June 2018 to discuss North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. To the pleasant surprise of many, the former in April 2018 announced that his country no longer needed nuclear tests.) Following Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons on a rebel-held town in Syria in April 2017 (and again in April 2018), Trump ordered the launch of missile strikes against a Syrian airbase, adding that Assad would no longer be considered part of Syria’s future. Following Russian’s continuous support of Assad (as well as its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election in

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America), US– Russia relations were at ‘an all-time low’ by the end of Trump’s 15th month in office. And following McMaster’s appointment as NSA, Trump removed Bannon from the National Security Council role in April 2017 and in January 2018 fired him. As will be seen in the next chapter, Trump, in relation to the Afghanistan strategy, listened to the recommendations of his pragmatist advisors rather than those of the intimates.26 However, the continuation of the controversial immigration orders, signing executive orders to revive the Keystone and Dakota Access pipelines/dropping out of the Paris Agreement, launching the ‘Buy American, Hire American’ initiative, sticking to the America First doctrine (the US to primarily and unilaterally pursue its national interests), imposing tariffs on steal and aluminium imports, repealing and replacing Obama Health Care, cutting tax on the middle class ‘bigly’, removing regulations and withdrawing from the Iran deal were some examples to suggest that Trump’s stance on immigration, economy, climate change, Obama Health Care and the Iran agreement remained consistent with populism.27 Trump might continue to receive a warning from his pragmatist advisors of the consequences of pursuing populist ideals. His populist advisors might likewise go on reminding him of the costs of losing his populist base, a base that ensured Trump’s place in the White House. The presence of ideologically driven advisors and pragmatists, as well as his family members, created (and might create in the future) conditions in which rival teams competed (and might compete in the future) for their contrasting viewpoints, and Trump apparently acted (and might act in the future) on both competing pieces of advice. The intense bureaucratic pulling and hauling led (and might lead in the future) to a schism and a recorded number of firings and resignations in his administration, including Tillerson and McMaster. The result was that, after more than 16 months in office, the outside world was still not sure what precisely the White House’s foreign policy was and who exactly was in charge of making foreign policy.28 The combination of Trump’s controversial policies and advisors created considerable opposition both within and outside America. Despite candidate Trump’s belligerent statements against ISIL, the group prayed that the ‘Islamophobic’ Trump got into power, as he would lead the US ‘on a path to self-destruction’ owing to his ‘unstable’,

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‘irrational’ and ‘insane’ characteristics, including his ‘volatile temperament’. Allegedly, observations or moves like insulting Islam, sending new prisoners to Guanta´namo, causing civilian deaths, shutting down Muslims from entering the US, or abandoning the long-held US policy of the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine/moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to the contested city of Jerusalem, to name but a few, not only distanced US allies in Muslim countries, or at least, their populations, from the Trump Administration, but also made it easy for ISIL to justify its ‘bipolar world view, in which the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds . . . [were] engaged in an existential clash of civilisations’.29 Inside America, as explained above, more than 120 Republican experts did not support Trump’s radical views and declared Trump unfit for presidency. The mainstream media press, including the Washington Post, the New York Times and CNN, were critical to the extent that made Trump believe there was a ‘witch-hunt’ against him. The cultural left apparently vowed to oppose any Trump policy derived from his AltRight perspective. Low-rank US officials equally appeared to oppose his views and leaked confidential information to hurt Trump and his senior advisors, including Michael Flynn and Sessions. The American people (and many outside the US) staged numerous protests to show their opposition to Trump’s radical viewpoints/policies. Trump got ‘the lowest approval rating of any incoming president in modern history’. In Quinnipiac University’s pool, Trump’s approval rate stood at 36 per cent. Obama’s approval rate in the first 100 days in office was 59 per cent.30 Approval rates, crowd gatherings, how legitimate his presidential victory was (Trump allegedly lost the popular vote by approximately 3 million) and how much Trump was liked were issues that really mattered to Trump. But he must have been disappointed by the results31 and by the bleak forecast of his foreign policy opinions at the implementation and evaluation stages. Foreign policy experts and the mainstream media predicted that if Trump followed on what Amnesty International called his ‘toxic agenda’ that ‘contradicted international human rights’, his administration – what Comey saw as a ‘forest fire’ that had the potential to cause ‘tremendous damage’ to US interests and to ‘the truth’ – would turn out to be full of problems and surprises. Eliot Cohen’s quote captured almost everyone’s prediction: the Trump Administration might end in ‘substantial domestic

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protest and violence, a breakdown of international economic relationships, the collapse of major alliances, or perhaps one or more new wars (even with China) on top of the ones we already have’. Even nuclear wars, due to Trump’s lack of knowledge of the ‘the geopolitics of nuclear danger’, were predicted. Eventually, it was anticipated that Trump might be impeached under the 25th Amendment. Populist governments, of which there were not many in the world, could tap into people’s anger because they said what people wanted to hear, it was argued, but did not know how to deliver and therefore failed. Trump was warned to face the same fate. His estate agent skills were different from the skills required for making foreign policy, and Trump, who apparently declared bankruptcy six times, might not be able to find a bankruptcy court in the international system to save America. But if Trump adopted a mature, objective and reasonable foreign policy approach that could grasp ‘the subtleties of global politics’, the above predictions may not materialise. In other words, if he allowed pragmatism to guide his vision, he might avoid the foreign policy disasters projected.32 Trump and his supporters, on the other hand, argued that Trump might not meet as much opposition as predicted by their adversary – the liberal left-leaning mainstream media and foreign policy experts – as Trump’s views enjoyed plenty of support within America. These prophecies were all part of the ‘fake news’ that a handful of ‘cosmopolitan elites in the media’ spread against Trump and his far-right supporters as part of a fight. Trump and Bannon told their supporters that, if they wanted the media to give them their country back without a fight, they were mistaken. The ‘incompetent and politically biased’ elites would not succeed, however, as the ‘more frantic’ the elites became, the more powerful the ‘pro-American’ movement would become itself.33 Amidst all that was America’s Afghanistan conflict. Afghans looked to America to bring some kind of an end to their four-decade-long misery, but, thanks to Trump and his radical views, America was at war with itself.

CHAPTER 13 TRUMP'S SOUTH ASIA STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE INITIATION, FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION PHASES, 2016—18

Throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, including the three presidential debates, both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton scarcely mentioned the Afghanistan War. Instead, the focus was on immigration, trade, economy, security alliances, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Syria and, above all, Russia. Even public attitude towards the Afghanistan War in the United States (US) was not as intense as it had been during the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. One of the main reasons for the forgotten nature of the Afghanistan War was that President Barack Obama, by the end of his administration, had decreased US troop levels considerably (less than 10 per cent compared to 2012, that is, about 8,400 US troops compared to approximately 100,000 in 2012) and financial assistance (less than 20 per cent). In addition, because there were other significant threats, including Russia, ISIL, North Korea, and of course, the presence of Trump, whom many foreign policy experts and the mainstream media perceived to be the biggest threat to US national security and economic interests.1

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The choices in Afghanistan for the Trump Administration were whether to accept the call by US top general in Afghanistan John W. Nicholson, Jr, for a few thousand more US troops to be deployed to Afghanistan to assist, train and advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), or to remain with the stalemate. Though there were some anti-Afghanistan engagement voices, a rapidly total withdrawal was hardly a consideration, perhaps, due to avoiding a repeat of Obama’s hasty Iraq withdrawal that, as Trump famously argued, created ‘a huge vacuum’ in which ISIL was born and nurtured. Nicholson also called for a ‘holistic review’ of US relations with Pakistan because Nicholson found it ‘very difficult to succeed on the battlefield when your enemy enjoys external support and safe haven’.2 The sceptical/pessimistic camp, or the area experts argued if the White House and Congress approved the possible surge requested by Nicholson, the Trump Administration would be putting their sons and daughters ‘in harm’s way’, and it would be ‘throwing good money after bad’ in America’s longest war. The possible surge, which would bring US expenses in Afghanistan to approximately $45 billion per year, would be ‘a stopgap measure at best’ since the accomplishments were unsustainable, as, 16 and a half years into Afghanistan, Afghan complexities did not just remain intact but even increased. The Afghan inborn characteristics they invoked were as follows. The National Unity Government (NUG) was ruled by ‘a kleptocratic, dysfunctional governing elite’, threatened by a resilient insurgency, growing opium trade, criminal gangs, increased meddling by Iran, Russia, and especially, Pakistan. It was ‘a corrupt and incompetent excuse’ to claim that the NUG would ‘establish a hold on a seemingly ungovernable country’. In real terms, the US dedicated more money (though estimates vary depending on the source, it is said to be around $150 billion) to the rebuilding of Afghanistan than it did to the reconstruction of Europe after WWII, yet its infrastructure was crumbling, and the NUG was financially and functionally incapable of supporting itself as 70 per cent of Afghanistan’s annual income was provided by America and donor countries. Former US military commanders in Afghanistan made similar claims to those of Nicholson, but they were all deluded assumptions and ‘magical’ thinking, and the US did not achieve what had been promised by the military, a win. The hawkish proponents were false to claim that,

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unless Trump treated the Afghanistan War in the same way as he did the war against ISIL, Afghanistan was at risk of sliding ‘into strategic failure’, because Afghanistan was already a strategic failure. There was an ‘equilibrium’ in the war there. According to Nicholson, only 57 per cent of Afghanistan’s districts were controlled by the NUG as the Taliban made substantial territorial gains and was emboldening. After all these years, the outcome in Afghanistan was still up for grabs. Most Afghan fighters did not remember 9/11 because they were at a young age; they perceived the US as a force of occupation. In a widely quoted open letter to Trump, the Taliban said that they did jihad because their land was occupied by the US and allies and therefore their jihad against ‘occupying forces’ was ‘legitimate religiously, intellectually, nationally and conforming to all other lawful standards’.3 The letter added that it was now Trump’s responsibility to end the ‘quagmire’ of Afghanistan, the fruitless and ‘futile’ engagement that the US was losing despite hundreds of billions of expenditure and thousands of lives. The pessimistic camp agreed that staying in Afghanistan was not working and was unsure how much longer did the US need to remain engaged to verify a simple fact that the war in Afghanistan was ‘a lost cause’. Afghanistan persisted to be a sensitive issue in America and a poll in 2016 found that 78 per cent of Americans had a negative view of Afghanistan as a country. So, an intensification of the war without a valid justification, many warned, could cause political damage to Trump. However, some from the sceptical camp agreed that a military surge could be justified provided it was part of a ‘significantly new strategy’ that dealt with sanctuaries in Pakistan and offered ways to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. If not, it might do nothing but temporarily delay ‘Afghanistan’s descent into further chaos and violence’.4 It is essential to mention that citizen Trump once belonged to the pessimistic camp. Between 2012 and 2014, in a series of widely quoted tweets and comments, Trump expressed his assessments on the Afghanistan War as follows. The US spent billions of dollars, lost thousands of lives and thousands of US servicemen and women came home with serious problems, and yet the ‘ungrateful’ Afghans, who hated America, complained. US forces trained Afghan security forces and yet they killed their trainers. Americans would construct a school today and the insurgent groups would explode it tomorrow. The US

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would start all over again. The Afghanistan War was a ‘waste’ of American money and lives and consequently was not in US national interests. Nor was it wise to admit too many Afghan refugees into America. Trump compared refugees to an ill ‘snake’, which would bite the host, once recovered. The prime example was the terrorist in Orlando whose parents came from Afghanistan. Candidate Trump vowed to avoid what ‘stupid’ European politicians could not: ‘a Trojan Horse’ scenario. Citizen Trump maintained that America could not stay in Afghanistan for ‘200 years’ to keep rebuilding Afghanistan and caring for a ‘crook’ called Karzai. Afghanistan would never become a democracy ‘in 1,000 years’ because it is a tribal system. It made no sense to prolong US involvement. Not ending the foreign policy ‘disaster’ known as the Afghanistan War meant that Obama was lost in Afghanistan; the US needed strong leaders (like Trump himself) who knew what they were doing. As early as October 2015, Candidate Trump in an interview with CNN characterised US intervention in Afghanistan as a ‘terrible mistake’, but a short while later, he claimed that it was Iraq that he referred to as a mistake. Afghanistan was not a mistake for reasons the pro-engagement area experts explained below. One of Trump’s reasons was that the NUG would collapse in ‘two seconds’ after US forces left and hence the US had to stay engaged, even though he hated ‘so much’ remaining involved. Trump’s contrasting views and his comparison of the situation in US inner cities to the status quo in Afghanistan demonstrated that Trump, like Obama, was profoundly ambivalent about Afghanistan; he understood the strategic importance of the country and concurrently saw it as a burden to the US because things in Afghanistan were extremely chaotic and perhaps unresolvable.5 It is also essential to mention that Candidate Trump denounced costly US engagements such as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian programmes and ‘the nation-building business’ and promised to reduce America’s contribution to them considerably and instead spend the money on building infrastructure in America, which the previous administrations had allowed to fall into ‘disrepair’ and ‘decay’. Indeed, as Trump took office, the US owed nearly $20 trillion in national debt. Also, Candidate Trump did not see the US responsible for promoting

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democracy and defending the oppressed. He apparently saw the world as ‘threatening’ and ‘inhospitable’ to those values. Unlike Bush, candidate Trump did not believe the US had ‘a right to lecture’ the world, interfere in foreign affairs of other nations. When American officials did give that right to themselves in the past, they acted ‘arrogantly’. Candidate Trump, who showed a soft spot for authoritarian regimes and strong men, firmly believed that for the past 15 years, if US presidents did not do ‘anything’ in the Middle East and instead went to ‘the beach’, the US would have saved ‘$6 trillion’ and thousands of US lives and the Middle East would have been stable. It was a ‘beauty’ (the biggest mistake) to remove Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi and Hosni Mubarak from power because their removals destabilised the Middle East. The strong men in the Middle East would have ensured that ISIL was never constituted and that the region never fell into the current chaotic situation.6 The optimistic/hawkish camp, or those who argued that Trump should listen to Nicholson and increase US forces, reasoned in the following ways. Yes, the Taliban made some gains, which was understandable taking note of about 125,000 US/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops withdrawal, but they did not take possession of a provincial capital or large population centres. The Taliban faced the ANSF, who were slowly but surely becoming ‘capable and resolute’ and had the admiration and confidence of the majority of Afghans. Regardless of the hardship Afghans faced, 75 per cent of them were content and happy with their lives. Cities still ‘bustle[d]’ and Afghans greatly made use of the unprecedented achievements accomplished during the past 16 years (discussed in the Introduction). While corruption and patronage impaired the provision of offering good governance, ‘[m]acroeconomic management, tax collection, and the budgeting process . . . [had] notable gains’. It was so because Hamid Karzai had gone and the NUG led by President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah was not only a good partner to the US/ NATO but also serious about addressing the causes of corruption. So, things were not as bad in Afghanistan as they seemed from thousands of miles away in Washington, DC. It was true that Afghans were ambivalent about US presence in their country and becoming increasingly disillusioned with America’s inability to deal with the evil

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forces discussed in the Introduction. At the same time, Afghans believed that American presence was ‘the lesser evil’, as the ‘greater evil’ for Afghans was ‘anarchy’.7 Afghans were worried that the US would leave them alone like it did in the early 90s and Afghanistan would again become ‘a pawn’ for regional powers – Afghans would witness another Iraq and Syria. Afghans expected Trump to review Obama’s policies and rectify the shortcomings. They were under the impression that the US and the allies were capable of offering a solution. US anti-terrorism war should be distinguished from US previous wars because the war against violent extremism was ‘generational in duration’. Besides, Afghanistan should be differentiated from ‘other countries’ because Afghanistan was a ‘launch pad’, a ‘key front’, an ‘eastern bulwark’, in the anti-terrorism war throughout ‘the Greater Middle East’ and ‘Central Asia’. It was Afghanistan in which Islamic radicalisation was born and fostered during the Soviet invasion of the country. More than 20 out of 90 groups that the US declared as terrorist had a ‘toehold’ in Afghanistan. Only Afghanistan offered the US ‘a platform’ to fight all these groups. Furthermore, Afghanistan was located next to Pakistan with nearly a 200 million population and about 120 nuclear warheads; the country had the ability to produce 20 nuclear warheads per year, and in a few decades, it could ‘have a nuclear arsenal not only twice the size of India’s but also larger than those of the United Kingdom, China, and France, giving it the third-largest arsenal behind the United States and Russia’.8 The US footprint in Afghanistan not only contributed to stability in Pakistan (to check on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal and to ensure its government did not collapse) but also prevented the intensification of security rivalry in the region, especially ‘the nuclear triangular competition’ among India, Pakistan and China. Preserving a footprint in Afghanistan was ‘the least risky option’ available to the Trump Administration to address the alarming nuclear threats in South Asia. Indeed, to defeat terrorism and ensure regional stability, especially in Pakistan, the US required friends/allies in the Greater Middle East and Central Asia. It was only the NUG that demonstrated to be both a reliable friend and an ally in the region, and most Afghans welcomed a US footprint on its soil. Other countries might not be as welcoming as Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan, Iran and Russia assisted the Taliban with the aim to see the US ‘fail in Afghanistan’.

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So, for the optimistic camp, US strategic interest in Afghanistan was clear; Afghanistan provided ‘a location, and an ally’ for fighting terrorist groups in the Greater Middle East and Central Asia, and consequently was ‘central’ to that war. The hawkish camp strove to persuade Trump to see the Afghanistan War in a new light; the US footprint in Afghanistan (and consequently the Afghanistan War) was linked to US wider war against terrorism, which was deemed to take decades to win. For them, US treasure and blood therefore have not been wasted entirely, and more spending would mean the US would be throwing good money after good money. (Incidentally, the line of reasoning that connected the Afghanistan conflict to the broad US anti-terrorism campaign partly convinced Obama in mid-2016 to abandon his exit plan.)9 A number of (mostly) Afghan experts offered some new perspectives on why Russia and Iran meddled in Afghanistan. For them, the reality appeared to be that Russia and Iran exaggerated the ISIL threat (and US ‘failure’ to defeat terrorism and curb opium production) and used the Taliban as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for numerous purposes, including to hurt/ pressurise the NUG and its NATO/US backers, to have bargaining advantage over America (regarding broader international matters such as Crimea or the Iran agreement), to gain more influence in Afghan affairs and to ‘outdo one another in a regional competition’. In return, the Taliban, who saw their struggle in religious terms and seemingly were not concerned about material gains, provided assurances to their benefactors that ISIL would not secure a toe-hold in Afghanistan, jihadists would not use Afghanistan as a base against the benefactors and the Taliban’s focus would solely be on liberating Afghanistan, not on pursuing Al Qaeda or ISIL’s agenda of spreading radical Islam.10 Or else if Russia and Iran really sought to defeat ISIL, then the obvious choice would have been to support the ANSF. If Russia and Iran truly wanted the Taliban to reconcile with the NUG, then bolstering the Taliban’s military capabilities was the worse obvious option. If Russia and Iran really wanted to defeat terrorism in the region, then spreading rumours that ISIL, in reality, worked for the US with the aim to destabilise Russia, China and Iran were really unhelpful in the ‘New Great Game’ in Afghanistan.11 The optimistic camp accepted that it was essential that the surge was part of an ‘integrated’ military and diplomatic strategy with clear objectives. US goals, in the short run, should be to sustain and build

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upon the progress made until the stalemate was reversed and, in the long term, the US should aim for a secure, stable, peaceful and more prosperous state that could self-sustain its security and carry out governance duties; an Afghanistan that enhanced regional security and did not allow its territory to be exploited as a terrorist base. While a peace settlement was essential with the Taliban to achieve this goal, it was not possible at present owing to the Taliban’s gains and Pakistan’s reluctance to shut down sanctuaries and abandon support to the insurgent groups; sanctuaries in Pakistan were seen to be one of the main hindrances that disallowed the US to achieve stability in Afghanistan and the region. To achieve the short-term goal, the US and allies should aim at providing the ‘right[flexible] authorities’ to US forces and ‘the right capabilities’ to the ANSF to strengthen them and weaken extremist groups, including the Taliban, to the extent that the Taliban changed their ‘strategic calculus’ of winning militarily and thus accept a peace settlement. At the same time, the US should engage regional players, including Pakistan, to support stability in Afghanistan. For the last option, the US and allies should sharpen their ‘incentive, both positives and negatives’ against troublemakers in the region. Some of the pro-engagement experts did not support taking a tough posture towards Pakistan, however, for the same reasons explained in Chapter 5.12 Everyone, however, believed that Trump should support the peace deal with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. There was some disagreement on whether it was Pakistan’s interference (and hence the insurgency) or poor management of governance that fuelled instability in Afghanistan. Some implied the latter for similar reasons invoked in Chapters 5 and 6. Fareed Zakaria and Zalmay Khalilzad, on the other hand, argued that the NUG offered some governance, the ANSF did its best to provide some basic security and the Taliban were not popular, so bad governance, while an obstacle, could hardly be the cause. For Zakaria, the key to the Afghan conflict was in Pakistan. Unless Pakistan were forced to stop its support, the US would witness ‘a strategic collapse’ in Afghanistan and the region and Afghanistan would never see a peaceful day. Zakaria could not understand why the US did not get this simple fact; there was always ‘talk’, but there was never ‘action’.13 Citizen Trump was of a similar opinion.

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In a series of wildly quoted statements about Pakistan, especially from 2010 onwards, Trump stated that the Afghan conflict originated not from Afghanistan but Pakistan since most terrorist groups had their sanctuaries in Pakistan. Pakistani leaders disrespected and betrayed the US by supporting terrorist groups and by harbouring Osama bin Laden, yet the US paid them billions of dollars. Why did the White House not get it straight that Pakistan was not an ally but a state sponsor of terrorism? The US should halt its assistance unless Pakistan handed over Osama bin Laden. Citizen Trump was confident that, if the US took a hard line, bin Laden would be delivered to ‘the White House doorstep very quickly.’ After bin Laden had been killed in Pakistan near the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad, Trump demanded an apology from Pakistan for its betrayal of America by hiding the Al Qaeda leader for years. President Trump continues to hold similar views about Pakistan, as his first 2018 tweet stated that ‘the United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more! [emphasis added]’.14 Trump’s views troubled many in Islamabad, but Afghan officials found them a welcoming development. Many Afghans – including Ghani, Abdullah, Karzai and former intelligence chiefs Amrullah Saleh and Rahmatullah Nabil – hoped that, due to his ‘bold’, ‘blunt’ and ‘masculine’ approach in foreign policy, Trump might force Pakistan to shut the sanctuaries and pressurise the Taliban to make a peace deal with the NUG or face the consequences – they hoped for a repeat of something resembling Bush’s 2001 ultimatum to Pakistan. Many Afghans (and others in the region) saw Trump’s anti-terrorism postures as transparent and honest compared to the ‘vague policies’ the Obama Administration followed which ‘fostered suspicions’ that the US had a ‘self-interested’ and ‘secret agenda’ in the region.15 The hawkish camp went on arguing that Obama’s tendency to impose annual reviews of US progress in Afghanistan and whether it should stay or leave and his ‘publicly-announced withdrawal timelines’ based on the political realities in Washington, DC, not on conditions on the ground, were unhelpful and should be sidestepped – ‘keeping an open-ended troop presence’ could always be used as a ‘bargaining chip’.

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Obama’s micromanagement from the White House as well as his policy of ‘not trying to win’ but of ‘trying not to lose’ should likewise be evaded. Instead, a comprehensive and long-term military, civilian and diplomatic strategy for Afghanistan, which aimed at ‘an enduring partnership’, should be patiently and quietly pursued until the end of the transformation period. The military, political and economic commitments made in the numerous summits should equally be honoured. Ensuring Afghanistan’s security (and Afghan’s needs and aspirations) should also be the key US objective in the US anti-terrorism war, as it was ‘a needed contributor to stability in the region’. But US support must be conditional and the NUG should solve the internal frictions, improve governance, make the ANSF more effective and ‘win public trust’. Afghan leaders should not take the US’s ‘commitment as given under any and all circumstances’. Having said this, some in the optimistic camp asserted that the US should not set up goals too high that it could not realistically achieve. They suspected that the NUG might continue to ‘poorly function’ and the Taliban might not entirely ‘be out of business’ for the foreseeable future.16 US commitment to Afghanistan would make it clear to Afghanistan’s neighbours that the US would not turn its back on the region this time, so it was better they gave up their proxy wars in Afghanistan and aimed for stability. To reassure the Afghan neighbours, however, the US could make a commitment not to use Afghan soils as a base against them under any circumstances. US commitment could also extend to dealing with the neighbours’ legitimate concerns. Khalilzad called on the Trump Administration to disclose the list of Pakistani interests in Afghanistan that Islamabad had provided the US with so that the world saw which interests were legitimate and which were not. Yes, Pakistan sacrificed both blood and treasure in US anti-terrorism war, and yes, Pakistan (and other Afghan neighbours) had some legitimate concerns in Afghanistan (such as terrorism, drugs and refugees) and they should be paid attention to. But that did not give Pakistan (or others) the right to a ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, which it (or they) tried to accomplish by using violence and terrorism.17 All in all, the optimistic camp concluded, provided there was a coherent strategy capable of addressing the root causes of the Afghanistan War and of persuading the American people of the importance of the war

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(something Obama was unable to achieve), Nicholson’s proposal would have both bipartisan support and the backing of the American foreign policy fraternity. Eventually, the benefits of staying in Afghanistan would ‘outweigh’ the costs, as it could bring stability and transformation to the ‘region’s politics and security situation’ and a positive outcome to its antiterrorism war. Trump could do so because his hands were not tied as he did not talk about Afghanistan. But Trump was cautioned against pursuing the ineffective muddlethrough policy. At least 6,700 Afghan forces were killed in 2016 and more than 6,600 lost their lives in 2015. Attacks on a military hospital in Kabul in March 2017 and a military base in the north a month later were two examples in which hundreds of security forces were dead, forcing the Afghan defence minister and army chief of staff to resign. Such losses were unsustainable among the ANSF, which was already overstretched. The hawkish camp also warned against disengagement (or a hasty withdrawal like the one in Iraq in 2011) because it would have massive costs discussed in Chapter 6 under the argument of severe consequences.18 This was public opinion on the Afghanistan War that President Trump must have encountered. The contrasting remarks were also the pieces of advice Trump reportedly received from his advisors during the review on Afghanistan. Apparently, the Pentagon, the State Department, the intelligence community, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford and National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster had similar views to those of the optimistic camp, whereas White House Chief Strategist Stephen Bannon, Jared Kushner and some others found themselves sympathetic with the pessimistic camp.19 On 21 August 2017, Trump announced his administration’s South Asia strategy that covered the Afghanistan strategy. President Trump seemed to have heeded the advice of the pro-engagement area experts explained above as he approved the deployment of more US troops, did away with both micromanagement (as the Pentagon from then, not the White House, was to decide how many troops to be deployed and what authority to be given to them) and setting of public deadlines for troops withdrawals (as only conditions on the ground were decisive factors), warned Pakistan to shut the sanctuaries and abandon its support for the Taliban and the Haqqani network and approached India – a country Trump saw as a close friend in the region – to assist the US in bringing

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stability in Afghanistan by expanding its ties with the NUG, especially its economic assistance. Though Trump did not specify the number because the president does not tend to give away his plans to the enemy, around 4,000 troops were to be deployed. Given Trump’s belief ‘in air power’, he would (and did) boost US planes to ‘bomb the hell out of’ terrorist groups. The air campaign was likely (and did) to cover the ANSF’s fighting against the Taliban, too. Trump might also equip the ANSF with more ammunitions/air power that they badly needed. The objective of the military surge was to compel the Taliban (and indirectly Pakistan) to make a negotiated settlement with the NUG. Trump stated that troops should also come from NATO allies, which already had about 6,000 forces, and NATO responded in November 2017 by announcing that it would send some 3,000 more troops to Afghanistan. NATO’s contribution seemed to address Trump’s concern that the former was not serious about fighting terrorism. His opposition to nation building and his lack of support for democracy seemingly influenced his Afghan strategy as he dropped support for both in Afghanistan. This, as well as his admiration for strong men, could mean that Trump might turn a blind eye to the role the powerful syndicate played in weakening the NUG. As far as building the capacity of Afghan institutions for the purpose of improving governance was concerned, Trump asked more about how US aid was spent and stressed that the NUG should strongly focus on reforms to offer better governance.20 Would Trump’s Afghanistan military, civilian and diplomatic strategy be successful at the implementation and evaluation phases? The NUG faced a lot of challenges; the insurgency supported (even more aggressively) by Russia, Iran and Pakistan – and, according to CIGAR’s report of May 2018, Trump’s military surge had made no diffrence in the theatre of war; infighting between Ghani and Abdullah due to their ‘forced marriage’; internal opposition from many political parties/high-profile Figures (such as Afghan Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum, Ahmad Zia Massoud, the Governor of Balkh Atta Muhammad Nur and, to some extent, Hamid Karzai) due to Ghani’s apparent determination to apply the rule of law and reduce the role of the powerful syndicate; political struggles between political factions for the (the probable) 2019 presidential election and parliamentary and district council elections due to be held in October 2018; and

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insecurity, which was one of the major obstacles to the elections, as, for example, on 22 April 2018, when at least 60 civilians were killed at a voter registration centre in Kabul when an ISIL assailant carried out a suicide attack. Earlier on, in early 2018, the triple terrorist attacks in Kabul took the lives of hundreds of Afghans. Thus, the evil forces that threatened stability in Afghanistan and the region, which I covered in detail in the previous chapters, became even stronger in 2017 and 2018. Ghani – who, like Trump, was accused of running a dictatorship, of acting on emotional impulses, of being overconfident, and of possessing temperament – seemed to be powerless to deal with them for reasons discussed in Chapter 11; and for the same reasons he might not be able to pacify them in the future. It was therefore likely that the NUG would remain ineffective throughout its remaining term in office.21 Furthermore, the possibility of a peace settlement with the Taliban seemed remote, as in March 2018 the Taliban refused to talk with both America and its ‘puppet’, the NUG, even though a few days previously Ghani had made a number of unprecedented concessions, including dropping the US/NUG’s peace preconditions discussed in Chapter 9. The Taliban instead stressed their preconditions discussed in Chapter 9 to be met before they gave up their weapons, and, as the Afghan media reported it widely, on 26 April 2018 declared its annual spring offensive under the name of Al Khandaq.22 The important question in spring 2018 was whether Trump would be able to utilise the harsh options discussed in Chapter 5 if Pakistan continued to play the US. As explained in the previous chapter, Trump has already got a lot on his plate: a possible military conflict with Iran (and now to a lesser extent with North Korea), a similar Cold War-type conflict with an aggressive Russia, a potential trade war with numerous countries, including China, fighting terrorism, especially ISIL in the complex environment of Syria and Iraq, the presence of several (possibly very damaging) investigations into possible links between the Trump campaign team and Russia by numerous bodies (including the Special Counsel Investigation led by Robert Mueller), sex scandals and being engaged in an unwise battle with the mainstream media. So his subsequent policy regarding Pakistan’s continuation of its double game will be made in the milieu Trump finds himself in, both

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domestically and internationally. And the environment he will encounter will in part depend on policy choices he pursues (and on whether he will continue to self-harm with controversial words and deeds). Any undesirable outcome from the conflicts/investigations/ battles mentioned above could damage Trump and his administration’s abilities (as the Iraq war did the Bush Administration) to deal effectively with the ‘Pakistan problem’. Any remarks/moves that disrespected Islam or Muslims could weaken American capabilities to fight its war on ‘Radical Islamic Terrorism’ in South Asia, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As things stood in May 2018, the Trump Administration refused to be fooled by Pakistan and thus seemed to be moving towards taking action against Pakistan for its continuous double-game. The first step the Trump Administration took was to place Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force’s terrorism-financing watch list. Apparently, if by June 2018 Pakistan did not show it truly was on the international community’s side as far as terrorism was concerned, its name would appear on the list.23 Though it was not a tough stance, it was still a welcoming step to address, as Khalilzad succinctly put it, ‘the mother of all problems’24 in the Afghanistan War.

CONCLUSION

Waiting at Hamid Karzai International Airport for the flight to Turkey in 2017, a middle-aged man told me he had sold his business and was heading with his wife and three teenage children to Germany, as Afghanistan had not turned into a peaceful, secure and democratic state but rather a ‘valley of the wolves’ where he and his family no longer felt safe. Like most ordinary Afghans I had spoken to, he bombarded me with questions once I told him I had been in my home country to do research on a book on American foreign policy towards Afghanistan. It was in response to those concerns that I wrote this book. The most important six questions were set out in the Introduction to this book. They essentially asked about what really US Afghan goals were, the reasons for US failures in Afghanistan, especially its inability to improve governance and stop the Pakistani military from supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan and the reasons for the bewildering changes in US Afghan policy over the course of 16-and-a-half years. Through the applicability of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Approach, I have sought to provide answers. The George W. Bush, Barack Obama and now Donald Trump Administrations’ chief ‘goal’ in Afghanistan has been twofold: to ensure Afghanistan did not turn into a terrorist base from which terrorists plotted another 9/11, and to weaken, and eventually defeat, Al Qaeda and later the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Afghanistan and Pakistan to an extent that both were incapable of posing a threat to the US and its allies. Despite the rhetoric, bringing stability, nurturing Western-style democracy, rebuilding the war-shattered Afghan

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infrastructure and establishing an efficient centralised government, though desirable, have not been US goals, because they required a large number of US troops and plenty of US dollars and therefore were beyond US interests and means. However, the Bush and Obama Administrations (and now the Trump Administration) ‘desired’ a relatively peaceful, secure, stable, prosperous and even democratic Afghanistan, because such an Afghanistan was necessary for the achievement of US main goal, and America was willing to help the Afghans to secure such an Afghanistan by providing light political, military, diplomatic and financial assistance. As discussed in Chapters 4, 5, 9 and 11, the commission (and omission) of certain policies by the Bush and Obama Administrations laid the seeds of insecurity, instability, ineffective governance and corruption. Seeing those policies, the Afghans could not ascertain whether the US wanted peace and security or war and insecurity. Most Afghans, including former president Hamid Karzai, concluded that the US had other ulterior motives and thus employed policies capable of keeping the war on to justify its presence. The analysis of the decision making of the six decisions nevertheless indicated that America neither was dishonest nor had evil intentions towards Afghanistan or the region. The Bush and Obama Administrations (and now seemingly the Trump Administration) supported the above controversial policies for two reasons. Firstly, they falsely assumed they were the right policies – as studied in Chapters 4, 9 and 11, both the policy assumptions made by the Bush and Obama Administrations’ were ill-informed, misjudged and derived from rigid ideologies rather than realities on the ground in Afghanistan and therefore the policy choices failed at the implementation phases. Secondly, the contentious policies were cheap – something which the American public demanded. However, the Bush and Obama Administrations (and now ostensibly the Trump Administration), in most cases, did not and would not support Hamid Karzai and later Ashraf Ghani against the criminality of the powerful syndicate because, firstly, the syndicate fought the US antiterrorism war; secondly, bizarre as it might sound, the US did not want to interfere in the day-to-day domestic politics of a sovereign country (Afghanistan). According to US officials, such interference would have made it easier for Al Qaeda and the Taliban to depict the US as an occupier like the Soviet Union, increasing the chances of Afghanistan

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becoming a US quagmire; thirdly, all three administrations concerned assumed that, due to Afghanistan’s inherent complexities, it would be sheer madness to engage American troops and resources in Afghanistan’s centuries-long internal infighting and power struggles to find a solution. Indeed, Afghanistan’s inborn differences significantly affected America’s outlooks and policies towards Afghanistan, especially when it came to dealing with the causes of bad governance. But these differences existed during the 40-year King Zahir Shah era, yet Afghanistan was relatively peaceful and secure and the government less corrupt. The differences have only created obstacles once the regional and international powers exploited them to destabilise Afghanistan for their benefits. Whenever Afghanistan experienced an ongoing uprising in the past 100 years, it received foreign backing, most of the time from its southern and eastern doors – either from British India or Pakistan. Habibullah Kalakani’s uprising against King Amanullah’s Kingdom (1929), the Mujahedeen war against the communist government (1979– 92), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s war against the Burhanuddin Rabbani-led government (1992–6), and the Taliban uprising against the Mujahedeen Government (1994–2001) are the prime examples. Almost always, establishing Islam was the main reason for those risings or wars, and almost always, Islam was used as a pretext rather than a goal. During the 16-and-a-half years of the American intervention, the Inter-Services Intelligence Pakistani, which evidently has a PhD-level knowledge of how to take advantage of Afghanistan’s complexities for Pakistan’s benefit, used the same tactic with the same pretext by exploiting US failures/mistakes (and presence) in Afghanistan. So the problem was not with Afghanistan’s inborn characteristics, but rather with meddling by regional power, especially Pakistan, in Afghan affairs. To be fair to America, despite all of the above shortcomings in American Afghan policy covered in the book, my home country was likely to have been a place that America and the Afghans had initially hoped for – relatively peaceful, progressed, stable, thriving and secure – if Pakistan did not keep the snakes in its safe haven in the tribal areas to which the US’s anti-terrorism war did not extend. As explained in Chapters 4 and 9, both the Bush and Obama Administrations remained hopelessly unable to stop Pakistan supporting a host of terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India as an

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instrument of its foreign policy. Engaging US forces in a war with Pakistan, which I heard from many Afghans as a solution, would have been insane. Pakistan was not Afghanistan or Iraq, as the former possessed nuclear weapons as well as the world’s sixth-largest armed force, nearly one million military and paramilitary personnel. For argument’s sake, if the US had removed the Pakistani Government and defeated the Pakistan armed forces, it would have been unable to establish stability. With around 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan, if the US could not stabilise two provinces of Helmand and Kandahar with a population of approximately two million, how would it stabilise a country of nearly 200 million? According to the counter-insurgency’s maths, America would need to employ approximately four million US forces, close to three times of all its forces (approximately one-and-a-half million) and eight times its Army (nearly 500,000) to do so. It would cost the US $4 trillion annually, nearly seven times more than the US yearly budget allocation to the Defense Department (about $600 billion). So the military option equalled political, military and economic suicide. Obama was not wrong to highlight that that overreach would bankrupt America and bring its empire to an end, just as overreach had ended the previous empires in the twentieth century. The Bush and Obama Administrations refused to put harsher political or diplomatic pressure on Pakistan because for the possibleworse-scenarios-than-the-current-situation assumption explained in Chapter 5. Furthermore, America saw (stability in) Pakistan as more important to US national security than (stability in) Afghanistan for the reasons spelled out in Chapter 6 and would not take any steps to make the already politically unstable Pakistan more unsteady. Bush and Obama kept the relationship with Pakistan cordial (continued engagement), hoping one day that their diplomatic, political and financial support would result in Pakistan listening to America: to fight all terrorist groups in Pakistan, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, and to work towards a stable Afghanistan, as it was good for everyone, including Pakistan. Trump seems to be distancing himself from the continued engagement policy. His promises to end Pakistan’s double-game are a sign he has recognised the mother of all problems in the Afghanistan War, and will likely to lead to peace and security in Afghanistan provided Trump acts upon them.

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As seen during the decision making periods for the six decisions, the initial intervention and the subsequent policy changes did not have to do ‘with some other ulterior motives’ on the US side but mostly to do with ‘the US goal’ and ‘desire’ explained above. The analysis of the six decisions would suffice to invalidate all other possible motives. The fact that the US spent about $6 trillion on the Afghanistan and Iraq wars by 2017 would negate all those arguments relating to financial motive both in Afghanistan (and possibly Iraq). The fact that the financial costs of the two wars posed a strategic threat to the US would void motives concerning ‘other’ strategic interests. The fact that Obama left Iraq and was on the brink of leaving Afghanistan rebutted all those possible motives concerning the US trying to establish ‘permanent military bases’ in Afghanistan. (Though the US, especially the Trump Administration, sees Afghanistan as a strategically important front to fight terrorism in the Greater Middle East, that does not mean that the US is willing to lose trillions of dollars in order to have a few bases in Afghanistan.) As was vividly obvious during policy making for the six decisions, one goal or motive that initially had drawn the US into Afghanistan in 2001 and kept it embroiled in 2018 and beyond was to ensure the US and the allies remained safe. While an analysis of the six decisions found no piece of evidence to support the motives of the conspiracy theories discussed above, it nevertheless shows America to have been naive, ignorant, unclear, lost, arrogant and parsimonious in its dealings in Afghanistan. Those shortcomings in US Afghan strategy made it easy for Iran, Russia and especially Pakistan to ensure that the steady inflow of negative propaganda against the US and the allies was in constant circulation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region, confusing the Afghans as to who Afghanistan’s real friends (and foe) have been. The elements that influenced the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the subsequent decisions were not some ulterior interests but rather bureaucratic politics and personal ties, individual characteristics of policy makers, domestic influences and, most importantly, ‘false policy assumptions’. It is these variables that explain what, why and how US Afghan policy took its different forms over the course of the 16 and a half years – and why the US intervened in Afghanistan in late-2001, why a decade later wanted to exit and why in 2017–18 it decided to stay

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engaged. It was these factors that explain why ordinary Afghans often heard conflicting messages; for example, the military leaders during the Obama Administration described the Taliban as terrorists, but the civilian camp saw them as non-terrorists. The new Afghanistan is like a little baby who has just begun to crawl and it needs the support of an adult to guide it to stand on its own two feet. But that guidance should not be provided in a patronising way, or in a way so as to violate Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the human rights of the Afghans. It should be remembered that tens of thousands of Afghans lost their lives to bring good not just to their country but also to the US and the countries of the allies. Their tremendous sacrifices should be remembered and honoured. Nor should the West judge things in Afghanistan by Western standards: despite neighbours’ hurricane of conspiracy, what has been achieved in Afghanistan so far is a lot, thanks to the tremendous sacrifices made by the US and the allies, as well as the Afghans themselves. Although lack of peace and security has blinded most Afghans to the successes, the reality is that never in the history of Afghanistan has so much been achieved during 16 and a half years. If the achievements are kept and built upon, Afghanistan may transform militarily and economically into a self-sustaining country by the end of the transformation decade in 2024. Ghani’s ambitious strategy to provide the Afghans with economic, political and physical security may meet some success. But the accomplishments are under threat, in particular by those elements supported by the Pakistani Army and intelligence services. It is therefore important to search for a political solution to the Afghanistan conflict. However, finding a political or regional solution, especially one in which Pakistan genuinely participates, looks challenging, if not impossible, at present due to the Durand Line, the Kashmir dispute and the decades-long conflict of interests in the region. Ultimately, the US fight in Afghanistan has been indirectly with the Pakistani Army, or at least with those whom the Pakistani Army supported, including Al Qaeda and ISIL. It is right that the Trump Administration (and NATO) has begun to rethink its policy towards Pakistan and is now considering the harsh measures suggested in Chapter 5. The aim should not be to punish Pakistan or ordinary Pakistanis – the latter have always been friendly,

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hospitable and generous towards the Afghans and Afghanistan (and the international community at large) and there is ample evidence to show that the great majority of Pakistanis condemn terrorism and are themselves victims of it – but to create conditions in which the risks of the Pakistani Army’s support of terrorism outweigh the benefits. Then the military establishment might cease its support of Afghan insurgent groups, as it temporarily did in 2001 when Bush warned President Pervez Musharraf to give up the Taliban or face the consequences and compel the Taliban to join the peace process. Despite its numerous shortcomings, there is no better option than the NUG. It has managed to provide basic services in most provinces in Afghanistan. Its head, President Ashraf Ghani, has shown the political will to tackle Afghanistan’s current problems. The Trump Administration should continue to support the NUG and provide concrete assistance and tangible backing to Ghani with his revolutionary reforms, especially his willingness to deal with corrupt elements in the Afghan state and his readiness to ensure the rule of law applies to everyone equally, including the powerful syndicate. The NUG should continue to receive the necessary resources pledged in the numerous summits up to the end of the transformation period. The aids should have Afghan ownership, but with the necessary safeguards to ensure that money is spent transparently and efficiently. Disconnection in assistance could repeat another 1992 when President Mohammad Najibullah’s Government fell and its security force was dismantled once the Soviet Union stopped its support. Despite their weaknesses, the ANSF are the best and only hope for both the Afghans and the international community, and through their enormous bravery and sacrifices, they have managed, against all the odds, to establish basic security after it was handed down to them. It is also high time the US put some more effort into strengthening the ANSF’s capabilities, including backing up the NUG’s structural reforms of them. The ANSF should be seen not only as part of the defence of the world but also as an independent force against internal and external threats to Afghanistan. Incidentally, the number is nowhere near 352,000, so the presence of a ghost force is a serious problem and should be addressed. Finally, support to the Afghan institutions such as Afghan civil society, free media and human rights groups should be sustained and built upon.

230

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The combination of these policy suggestions would result in ‘a strong Afghan state’ with a strong ANSF equipped with the necessary air and artillery power to defend itself and its regional and international allies, deal effectively with the causes of the ‘evil forces’ stated in the Introduction and instead install peace and security in the minds of ordinary Afghans. Hopefully, then the US need not to keep any presence in Afghanistan (a significant cause of fighting by the Taliban), as the ANSF will conduct counterterrorism operations instead. However, if the Trump Administration did not implement the above policies – especially if Pakistan continued to have a free hand in Afghanistan or if the administration, like its predecessors, aimed for ‘a good enough’ Afghan state defined by a ‘stalemate’ – not much would be changed in Afghanistan regardless of how many more years, decades or even centuries the US and the allies remain in my home country; and US, NATO and Afghan forces as well as Afghan civilians would in all likelihood be losing their lives. Losing the lives of hundreds of Afghans (as well as many US and allied forces) on a weekly basis is unacceptable. The reality is that neither the Afghans, nor the Americans want US forces to remain in Afghanistan. Both nations accept the status quo because they do not have an alternative. Only a strong Afghanistan may fulfil both the Americans and Afghans’ mutual desires.

NOTES

Introduction 1. Andrew E. Kramer, ‘More Afghan Civilians Being Deliberately Targeted, U.N. Says’, New York Times, 15 February 2018; UN News Centre, ‘Afghan Casualties hit high 11,000 in 2105 – UN Report’, 14 February 2016, http://www.un. org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID¼53229#.V8IJCPR4WJI; Emma GrahamHarrison and Rob Evans, ‘Afghan civilian death toll “much higher” than the official estimated’, Guardian, 8 May 2016; ‘UN Data Finds Insurgency More Widespread Than Ever’, Afghan Spirit, 12 October 2015, http://afghanspirit. com/un-data-finds-insurgency-more-widespread-than-ever/. 2. Ashraf Ghani, ‘Transcript of the conversation by President Ghani in the Council on Foreign Relations’, 26 March 2015, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/roadahead-afghanistan/p36304. 3. Letters, ‘Is Afghanistan a Narco-State’, New York Times, 27 July 2008; ‘Afghanistan: The Making of a Narco State’, Rolling Stone, 4 December 2014; Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Pakistan: Friend or Foe in the Fight against Terrorism?’, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 12 July 2016, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/ FA/FA18/20160712/105188/HHRG-114-FA18-Wstate-KhalilzadZ-20160712. pdf; ‘Afghanistan: 43 percent rise in estimated opium harvest’, Al Jazeera, 23 October 2016; Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 124. 4. Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2017’, 21 February 2018, http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_ index_2017; UNCTAD, ‘The Least Developed Countries Report 2017’, 22 November 2017, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ldcr2017_en.pdf. 5. Sayed Haidar Shah Omid, ‘54 Percent of Afghans Live Below Poverty Line: Survey’, TOLOnews, 6 May 2018. 6. ‘Unknown Fate from Nimruz’, TOLOnews, 14 July 2015, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v¼hIxPI77PwkY.

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7. Raziye Akkoc
, ‘Mapped: How many migrants entered the EU and applied for asylum in 2015’, The Telegraph, 4 March 2016; ‘Unknown Fate’. 8. ‘From Words to Action’, TOLOnews, 21 May 2018, http://govmeter.tolonews. com/. 9. Ashraf Ghani, ‘Manifesto of Change and Continuity’, March 2014, http:// www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Ashraf%20Ghani%20 Manifesto.pdf. 10. ‘90min’ [on defence], Ariana Television Network, 19 January 2014, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v¼vKGS7rqLKh0; Rod Nordland, ‘War Deaths Top 13,000 in Afghan Security Forces’, New York Times, 3 March 2014. 11. For the conspiracy claims, see Hamid Karzai, ‘Full transcript of President Karzai’s interview with Aryn Baker from Time Magazine’, 13 May 2012, http:// president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page¼2 (also at http:// content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2116146,00.html); Hamid Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of Interview by President Hamid Karzai with the CNN. Part 1’, 21 May 2012, http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/ FullTranscriptofInterviewByPresidentHamidKarzaiwiththeCNN214201212 3331524553325325.pdf (also at http://situationroom.blogs.cnn.com/2012/ 05/22/wolf-blitzers-interview-with-hamid-karzai/); Malalai Joya and Derrick O’Keefe, A Woman Among Warlords: The Extraordinary Story of an Afghan Who Dared to Raise Her Voice (New York: Scribner, 2009), pp. 233–53, especially 231– 41; Basherahmed Ansari, Afghanistan in the Flames of Oils and Gas (Kabul: Bangah Intesharat Maiwand, 2005); Aubdelmanan Rustayi, The Wars of the Super Powers and the Oil Projects in Afghanistan (2006); Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Connection, and the Road to Afghanistan (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003); Robert J. Lieber, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); ‘Open Jirga 37 Independent Defence’, BBC and RTA, 2 February 2015, http://youtu.be/laDwRJrMiXM; ‘People’s Voice: Kabul Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 23 December 2013, http:// youtu.be/rYn5gUFGBpg; ‘People’s Voice’ [Herat], TOLOnews, 29 April 2013, http://youtu.be/LpgVdIoDYs0; Andy Rowell, ‘“Route to riches: Afghanistan” in energy policy’, Guardian, 2 October 2001; Robert Gates, Hillary Clinton, Bob Woodward, Ahmed Rashid, Kim Baker and Melvyn Leffler equally mentioned how broad these theories were: Robert Michael Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), pp. 477, 559; Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), p. 178; Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), pp. 116–17; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The World’s Most Unstable Region and the Threat to Global Security (London: Penguin, 2009), pp. 251, 287; Kim Baker, ‘Letter From Kabul: Solving Afghanistan’s Problems’, Foreign Affairs, 30 November 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-kabulsolving-afghanistans-problems; Melvyn P. Leffler, ‘September 11 in Retrospect’,

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Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/68201/melvyn-p-leffler/september-11-in-retrospect. 12. Hamid Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with BBC Newsnight’, 3 October 2013, http://president.gov.af/en/news/full-transcriptof-president-karzais-interview-with-bbc-newsnight (also at http://www.bbc.co. uk/news/av/world-asia-24435776/hamid-karzai-speaks-exclusively-to-the-bbcs-yalda-hakim). 13. For an understanding of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Approach from Foreign Policy Analysis, see Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick Jude Haney, Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995); Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 14. Neack, Hey and Haney, Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 106. In his article, ‘Conclusion: reaching foreign policy cases’, Steven L. Lamy gives an ideal framework for learning about the process of foreign policy decision making by dividing the process into four phases: initiation, formulation, implementation and evaluation, in Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, Foreign Policy, pp. 377– 87.

Chapter 1 The Intervention Decision at the Initiation Stage 1. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), p. 128; Bob Woodward, Bush At War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp. 15 – 17. 2. Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: Harper, 2008), pp. 4, 17 – 21. 3. George Tenet and Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), pp. 255– 56, 259; Bush, Decision Points, pp. 135, 137; Philip H. Gordon, ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won?’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 26– 7. 4. Bush, Decision Points, p. 137; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 30 – 1. 5. Robert Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American Foreign Policy: The Limits of Engagement (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012), p. xxi; Gordon, ‘Can the War’; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 30 – 1. 6. Ivo H. Daalder and I. M. Destler, ‘In the Shadow of the Oval Office: The Next National Security Advisor’, Brookings Institution, January/February 2009; Woodward, Bush At War, p. 16; Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006; Gates, Duty, pp. 49, 589. 7. Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011), p. 77; Bush, Decision Points, p. 137; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 30–1; Leffler, ‘September 11’.

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8. Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), p. 342; Richard B. Cheney and Liz Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011), pp. 330–1; Leffler, ‘September 11’. 9. Christine D. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 10. Bush, Decision Points, p. 184. 11. Michael Howard, ‘What’s In A Name?: How to Fight Terrorism’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2002; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 342– 3. 12. George W. Bush, ‘National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service’, 14 September 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf; for Rumsfeld and Shultz’s views/quotations, see Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 32 – 4. 13. Barton Gellman, ‘Broad Effort Launched After ’98 Attacks’, Washington Post, 19 December 2001. 14. E.J. Dionne Jr, ‘Kicking The ‘Vietnam Syndrome’, Washington Post, 4 March 1991. 15. For Rumsfeld’s views (and the quotes), see Known and Unknown, pp. 32 – 4, 282– 3; Woodward, Bush At War, p. 20. 16. For Bush and Tenet’s views/quotes, see Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, p. 155; Woodward, Bush At War, p. 38. 17. Bush, Decision Points, pp. 191, 227; David Loyn, Butcher & Bolt (London: Hutchinson, 2008), p. 293; Leffler, ‘September 11’; Nye, ‘Transformational Leadership’; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 38 – 9. 18. George W. Bush, ‘Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress’, 20 September 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/ bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf; George W. Bush, ‘Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast’, 1 February 2001, http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_ Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf; Bush, Decision Points, pp. 396–7; Leffler, ‘September 11’; Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban (Philadelphia: Da Capo, 2009), pp. 291–4. 19. George W. Bush, ‘Address to the Republican National Convention’, 2 September 2004, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bush record/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf; George W. Bush, ‘The Second Inaugural Address’, 20 January 2005, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_ George_W_Bush.pdf; William McGurn, ‘Bam’s policies leave longing for decisive’, New York Post, 5 September 2013. 20. Paula J. Dobriansky, ‘Democracy Promotion’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58981/paula-j-dobriansky-and-thomascarothers/democracy-promotion. 21. Rice, No Higher Honour, p. 91. 22. George W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan’, 7 October 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/ documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf.

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23. Bush, Decision Points, p. 148. 24. Bush, ‘National Day of Prayer’; Bush, Decision Points, pp. 148– 9; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 69, 72. 25. Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 55; Woodward, Bush At War, p. 96. 26. For the impact of 9/11 and for Bush being decisive, see Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 96, 145, 150, 168; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 53. 27. ‘Post-ABC poll: Terrorist Attacks’, Washington Post, 13 September 2001; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 206–207; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 343. 28. ‘US Congress, a Joint Resolution, Authorization for Use of Military Force’, 14 September 2001, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107sjres23cps/pdf/ BILLS-107sjres23cps.pdf. It is important to mention that while Bush used the term ‘declaration of war’, Congress never declared war in Afghanistan; it only authorised the use of military force against the perpetrators of 9/11. 29. Bush, Decision Points, pp. 134, 139; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 96, 150. 30. Nye, ‘Transformational Leadership’. 31. Bush, Decision Points, pp. 134, 139; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 329– 30, 339. 32. Bush, Decision Points, p. 139. 33. Rice, No Higher Honour; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 1, 10, 337. 34. Gates, Duty, p. 93; Leffler, ‘September 11’; Gordon, ‘Can the War’; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 355– 6; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 10, 218, 318; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 160, 218; Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, pp. 393– 6; Bush, Decision Points, p. 189. 35. Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, pp. 261, 393– 6, 399, 402–4, 408, 413– 14, 425– 7; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 10, 329– 36; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 355– 6; George W. Bush, ‘Address at the Citadel’, 11 December 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/ Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf. 36. For the argument about other threats and what the administration did to defuse them, see Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 105–6, 117; George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress’, 29 January 2002, http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_ Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf; Bush, Decision Points, pp. 43, 151, 164; Rice, No Higher Honour, pp. 80, 88; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 33, 355–6. 37. Feith, War and Decision, pp. 69 – 71. See also Bush, ‘Address to the Joint Session’. 38. Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 171; Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, p. 26; Gates, Duty, p. 93; Meyer is quoted in Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 55; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 330, 339; Leffler, ‘September 11’; Gordon, ‘Can the War’. 39. The CIA, and especially White House counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke, had persistently warned their seniors of possible Al Qaeda attacks, which, according to Clarke, the administration had brushed aside; see Scot J. Paltrow and David S. Cloud, ‘Clarke Insists Bush Ignored Al Qaeda Threat’, Wall Street Journal, 25 March 2004.

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Chapter 2 The Intervention and Counterterrorism Decisions at the Formulation Stage, September 2001–February 2002 1. Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 33, 41; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 346; Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, pp. 261– 3. 2. For the discussion around the Blue Sky plan (and the quotes), see Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, pp. 213, 261– 3, 268– 74, 315. See also Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 48, 51, 53, 76 –7; Gordon, ‘Can the War’. 3. For the discussion around Pakistan (and the quotes), see Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 63; Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2009), pp. 88 – 9; Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, pp. 212, 262– 3; Milton Bearden, ‘Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001, http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyardof-empires. 4. For the argument about the Pentagon’s options (and the quotes), see Bush, Decision Points, pp. 188– 9; Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, p. 270; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 79 – 80, 84; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 359. 5. Woodward, Bush At War, p. 82; Rice, No Higher Honour, p. 88; Bush, Decision Points, p. 189; Loyn, Butcher & Bolt, pp. xxxx, xl. 6. For the second risk and the discussion about the Northern Alliance (and the quotes), see Bush, Decision Points, p. 187; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 35, 340, 343, 347; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 371– 7, 683; Woodward, Bush At War, p. 53; Bearden, ‘Afghanistan’; Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, pp. 213– 14; Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘Flawed Masterpiece’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58022/michael-e-ohanlon/ a-flawed-masterpiece. 7. For propaganda and political aspects of the policy, see Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 92; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 114– 15, 122. 8. For the discussion around the ‘Iraq argument’ and the definition of terrorism, see Feith, War and Decision, pp. 4, 15, 18 –21, 66 – 7, 69 – 71; Bush, Decision Points, p. 189; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 218, 332; Rice, No Higher Honour, p. 86; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 346, 355– 6; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 48 – 9, 83, 85, 88; Leffler, ‘September 11’; Joshua Micah Marshall, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/ joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives; Gordon, ‘Can the War’; Daniel Byman, ‘Should Hezbollah Be Next?’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 59366/daniel-byman/should-hezbollah-be-next. 9. Rice, No Higher Honour, p. 86; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 65. 10. Bush, Decision Points, p. 189; Jones, In the Graveyard, p. 126; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 87 – 8, 122– 4.

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11. For Rumsfeld’s views (and the quotes), see Jim Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004), pp. 54, 363; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 354–5, 368; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 88, 105, 176. 12. Woodward, Bush At War, p. 81. 13. Cheney, In My Time, p. 331; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 81, 84. 14. Feith, War and Decision, pp. 49 – 51, 59; Woodward, Bush At War, p. 88. 15. Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 48 – 9. 16. Bush, Decision Points, p. 189; Woodward, Bush At War, p. 90. 17. Cheney, In My Time, pp. 9, 332– 4; Bush, Decision Points, p. 190; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 91, 122– 8. 18. James Pfiffner, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, Brookings Institution, October 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/10/31-bushpfiffner; Woodward, Bush At War, p. 86. 19. For Bush’s Afghanistan plan, see Bush, ‘Address to the Joint Session’; Bush, Decision Points, p. 194; Cheney, In My Time, p. 337; Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, p. 316; Feith, War and Decision, p. 16; Woodward, Bush At War, pp. 63, 81, 85 – 6, 98 – 9, 101. 20. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 169. 21. Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, pp. 287– 8, 343. 22. Feith, War and Decision, pp. 89, 100, 130– 2. 23. Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, pp. 218, 316; Feith, War and Decision, pp. 98 – 9; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 67. 24. Bush, ‘Address to the Joint Session’; Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan’; Bush, ‘State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress’; Feith, War and Decision, pp. 18, 21, 84; Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, p. 275. 25. Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 114– 20, 124; David Rohde and David E. Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage: How a “Good War” in Afghanistan Went Bad’, New York Times, 12 August 2007; Michael C. Desch, ‘Bush and the Generals’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62616/ michael-c-desch/bush-and-the-generals. 26. Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 315; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’. 27. For the views of and reasoning of Rumsfeld (and the quotes, most of which belong to Rumsfeld) and his civilian advisors (as well as Cheney), see Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 21, 293–5, 297, 353 –7, 360, 372–3, 377, 386–7, 397–8, 403, 682–3; Feith, War and Decision, pp. 20, 100–2, 133–4; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 323, 347; Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman, Afghanistan: To 2015 and Beyond (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), pp. 23, 27; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 137, 201; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 112–13; James Dobbins, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 March 2007, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DobbinsTestimony070308.pdf; Woodward, Bush At War, p. 48; Marshall, ‘Remaking the World’; O’Hanlon, ‘Flawed Masterpiece’; Desch, ‘Bush’; Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 304.

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28. For Bush’s views (and the quotes), see Jones, In the Graveyard, p. 113; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 49 – 51, 94; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. XLIV; Bush, ‘Address at the Citadel’; Bush, ‘State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress’; Bush, Decision Points, p. 207. 29. For Haass, Dobbins and Rumsfeld’s views, see Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 115– 20; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 407– 8, 684; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 28; O’Hanlon, ‘Flawed Masterpiece’.

Chapter 3 An Insider’s Insight into Bush’s War Cabinet 1. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. XLV; Adam Quinn, ‘A House Divided’, Extended review article. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April 2013, pp. 267– 81, p. 269; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. x, 255; Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), pp. 1 – 18. 2. For the reasons why Cheney was influential (and the quotes), see Cheney, In My Time, pp. 140– 2, 151, 242, 305– 6; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 320; John Dickerson, ‘Cheney’s Dreadful Lack of Ambition’, Slate, 21 November 2005; Quinn, ‘A House Divided’, p. 275. 3. Quinn, ‘A House Divided’, p. 277; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 275; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 356. 4. Bush, ‘Address to the Republican’. 5. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 130– 1, 140, 176, 265, 285; Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, p. 204; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 49, 70 – 1, 153; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 238– 9; Quinn, ‘A House Divided’, p. 274. 6. John Ware, ‘Afghanistan: War without an End’, BBC, 2011, http://www. youtube.com/watch?v¼byCH5p_en1A; Marshall, ‘Remaking the World’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 169; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 69 – 70; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 275. 7. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. L, LI. 8. Colin L. Powell and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 351, 399, 414; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 321– 4. 9. The information about Powell’s behaviour comes from Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 322– 4; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 185– 8, 298, 381– 2, 425– 6, 443; Feith, War and Decision, p. 34; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 197; Desch, ‘Bush’. 10. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012), p. 344; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 70; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. L. 11. Cheney, In My Time, p. 197. 12. Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 39 –40, 53 –4, 119, 185. 13. Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 69.

NOTES 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

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53 –58

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Feith, War and Decision, p. 16. Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 58, 196; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 32. Feith, War and Decision, p. 52. Cheney, In My Time, p. 443. Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 54, 55, 121. See also Ware, ‘Afghanistan’; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 68; Quinn, ‘A Divided House’, p. 281. Daalder and Destler, ‘In the Shadow’; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 324; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 69; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 315. For the first obstacle, see Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 326–9; Tenet and Harlow, At the Center, p. 210; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 367; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 69. Quinn, ‘A House Divided’, pp. 276– 7. For the second obstacle, see Gates, Duty, p. 49; O’Hanlon, ‘Flawed Masterpiece’; Daalder and Destler, ‘In the Shadow’; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 316. For the domestic support for the GWOT, see ‘Washington Post-ABC News Poll: State of the Union’, Washington Post, 28 January 2002; ‘Washington PostABC News Poll: Iraq’, Washington Post, 11 February 2003; ‘Washington PostABC News Poll: America at War’, Washington Post, 11 March 2002; Fukuyama is quoted in John Dumbrell, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in James Pfiffner and Mark Phythian, Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives (Collage Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), p. 2. For the final reason, see Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 148, 316; Gordon, ‘Can the War’; Leffler, ‘September 11’. Explained in detail in Chapter 5. Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 22, 112– 13, 251–2, 273; Feith, War and Decision, pp. 24 – 8, 34, 42; Cheney, In My Time, p. 252. Cheney, In My Time, p. 278; Feith, War and Decision, pp. 71, 75; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 347. Feith, War and Decision, pp. 65, 75 – 84. Marshall, ‘Remaking the World’. The neoconservatives’ ideas (and the quotes) are based on Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 52, 76, 115, 200, 210– 13, 231, 238, 256; Dumbrell, ‘The Neoconservative Roots’, pp. 26 – 7, 32 – 4; William Kristol and Robert Kagan, ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52239/william-kristol-and-robertkagan/toward-a-neo-reaganite-foreign-policy; Zalmay Khalilzad and Scooter Libby, ‘Defense Planning Guidance 1992’, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ ebb245/index.htm; Project for the New American Century, ‘Statement of Principles’, 3 June 1997, http://cf.linnbenton.edu/artcom/social_science/ clarkd/upload/PNAC – -statement%20of%20principles.pdf. Cheney and Rumsfeld’s views are derived from Steven Hurst, The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 7; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. XLVI – XLVII; Rumsfeld,

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Known and Unknown, pp. 33– 4, 205, 231– 2; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 333, 374–7; Quinn, ‘A House Divided’, p. 269; Leffler, ‘September 11’; Gordon, ‘Can the War’; Marshall, ‘Remaking the World’; Dumbrell, ‘The Neoconservative Roots’, pp. 29, 35. Nye, ‘Transformational Leadership’; Dumbrell, ‘The Neoconservative Roots’, pp. 29, 33, 35. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 24. Cheney, In My Time, p. 264; Quinn, ‘A House Divided’, pp. 283– 4. Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 48. Nye, ‘Transformational Leadership’; Pfiffner, ‘Policymaking’. See also George W. Bush, ‘Department of Defense Service of Remembrance at the Pentagon’, 11 October 2011, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/ documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf; Dumbrell, ‘The Neoconservative Roots’, pp. 29, 31–2; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 364.

Chapter 4 The Counterterrorism Strategy at the Implementation Stage, 2002–8 1. ‘People’s Voice: Kandahar Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 28 January 2016, http://youtu.be/jRmC4Y18Lnw; Peter Baker and Jon Cohen, ‘Americans Say U.S. Is Losing War’, Washington Post, 13 December 2006; Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Afghan Mission Is Reviewed as Concerns Rise’, New York Times, 16 December 2007; Thom Shanker, ‘2 Commanders Picked to Lead War Efforts Beyond 2008’, New York Times, 24 April 2008; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 204, 231; Bush, Decision Points, pp. 262, 268, 355, 361– 4, 367, 371– 2. 2. For the analysis of the five phases and their impact on the Bush Administration and consequently on the Afghanistan War, see Joseph R. Biden, ‘Iraq: An Update From the Field’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 July 2007, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BidenStatement070719.pdf; Richard G. Lugar, ‘Richard G. Lugar Opening Statement for Hearing on Iraq’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 July 2007, http://www.foreign.senate. gov/imo/media/doc/LugarStatement070719.pdf; Dalia Sussman, ‘Poll Shows View of Iraq War Is Most Negative Since Start’, New York Times, 25 May 2007; Jon Cohen and Dan Balz, ‘Poll: Most Americans Opposed to Bush’s Iraq Plan’, Washington Post, 11 January 2007; David Sanger, ‘“Iraq Pullback”: In White House, Debate Is Rising on Iraq Pullback’, New York Times, 9 July 2007; Bush, Decision Points, pp. 223– 71, 355, 361– 4, 367, 371– 2, 378, 382, 384– 5; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 429, 457, 679– 80, 691– 2, 695, 706; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 370– 405, 413; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ‘Bush Declines to Call Situation in Iraq Civil War’, New York Times, 29 November 2006; Baker and Cohen, ‘Americans Say’. 3. David H. Petraeus, ‘Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 11 September 2007, http://www.foreign.senate.

NOTES

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5.

6.

7. 8. 9. 10.

TO PAGES

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241

gov/imo/media/doc/PetraeusTestimony070911a.pdf; George W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Iraq’, 13 September 2007, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/ Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf; Bush, Decision Points, pp. 378, 382, 384– 5. Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Statement of Ambassador and Special Presidential Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 June 2005, http:// www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KhalilzadTestimony050607.pdf; Condoleezza Rice, ‘Opening Statement by Secretary of State-Designate Dr. Condoleezza Rice’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 18 January 2005, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/RiceTestimony0501181.pdf; Richard G. Lugar, ‘Richard G. Lugar Opening Statement for Nomination Hearing for Zalmay Khalilzad to be Ambassador to Iraq’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 June 2005, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ LugarStatement050607.pdf; Gates, Duty, p. 198; George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address to the 108th Congress, Second Session’, 20 January 2004, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/ Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf; Bush, Decision Points, p. 309; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 412, 419; Paul L. Yingling, ‘An Absence of Strategic Think’, Foreign Affairs, 15 December 2011, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ south-asia/2011-12-16/absence-strategic-thinking. For the claim that the US provided insufficient resources due to the Iraq War (and also for the argument that the Bush Administration admitted that it was not winning), see ‘Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues’, Congressional Research Service, 2 July 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. LVI, 182; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 128, 208– 10, 245– 6; Bush, Decision Points, p. 211; Yingling, ‘An Absence’; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 9, 94, 150, 156–7; Tanner, Afghanistan, pp. 327, 333; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’; ‘The Good War, Still to Be Won’, New York Times, 20 August 2007; Shanker and Myers, ‘Afghan Mission’; Gates, Duty, pp. 198, 200, 202 –3. George W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on Iraq’, 10 January 2007, http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_ Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf; Bush, Decision Points, pp. 359, 363–4, 367; Cheney, In My Time, p. 444; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 691, 694; Gates, Duty, pp. 25, 444. Gates, Duty, p. 14. Ibid., p. 115; Bush, ‘State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress’; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’. Jones, In the Graveyard, p. 246; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 349; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 115– 16. George W. Bush, ‘West Point Commencement’, 1 June 2002, http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_

242

11. 12.

13. 14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

NOTES

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66 –70

Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf; George W. Bush, ‘Address to the United Nations General Assembly’, 10 November 2001, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_ George_W_Bush.pdf. O’Hanlon, ‘Flawed Masterpiece’. See also ‘Open Jirga 37’; Gates, Duty, p. 14; Gordon, ‘Can the War’. ‘Generation Kill: A Conversation with Stanley McChrystal’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/ generation-kill; Bush, Decision Points, pp. 361– 72; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 56. Bush, Decision Points, pp. 361– 72, 371; Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on Iraq’; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 667; Cheney, In My Time, p. 44. For the argument about who had more bureaucratic power during Bush’s second term, see Daalder and Destler, ‘In the Shadow’; Quinn, ‘A House Divided’, p. 11; Jim Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power (New York: Viking, 2012), p. 97; Gates, Duty, pp. 84 – 7, 91 – 2, 98 – 100, 584; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 442– 3, 460. For Pakistan’s national security interests, see Ronald E. Neumann, ‘Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/ hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-getthere; Michael Krepon, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 5 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/ media/doc/Krepon,%20Michael.pdf; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 330; Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Talking Tough to Pakistan’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136696/stephen-d-krasner/ talking-tough-to-pakistan; Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘What engagement with Pakistan Can – And Can’t – Do’, Foreign Affairs, 12 October 2011, http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/136413/christophe-jaffrelot/what-engagement-withpakistan-can-and-cant-do; Amin Saikal, Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq (London: I.B.Tauris, 2014), p. 3; ‘26. Open Jirga: Afghanistan and its Neighbours – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, 11 August 2014, http:// youtu.be/vmBnHjM3Vfo. For the account of how Musharraf and his Cabinet discussed the seven US demands, see Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 28 – 31. See also Daniel Markey, ‘A False Choice in Pakistan’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007, http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/62648/daniel-markey/a-false-choice-in-pakistan; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 63 – 4. For the argument not to push Musharraf ‘too hard’, see Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 85; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 29 – 31, 118, 148– 9, 241; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 64, 195; Jones, In the Graveyard, p. 101; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’. For the American officials’ refusal to accept Pakistan’s support for the insurgency (and the quotes), see Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 260– 1, 266, 278;

NOTES

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

TO PAGES

70 –73

243

Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 118, 236– 41; Anne W. Patterson, ‘Opening Statement For Senate Confirmation Hearing Of Ambassador Anne Patterson’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 20 June 2007, http://www.foreign.senate. gov/imo/media/doc/Patterson-Pakistan070613p.pdf; Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 21 September 2006, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rubin Testimony060921.pdf; Ware, Afghanistan; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 275; Condoleezza Rice, ‘Testimony of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 February 2007, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/ imo/media/doc/RiceTestimony070208.pdf; Krasner, ‘Talking Tough’; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 419, 500; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 688; Bush, ‘State of the Union Address to the 108th Congress’; Richard G. Lugar, ‘Richard G. Lugar Opening Statement for Nomination Hearing’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 15 June 2005, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ LugarStatement050615.pdf. Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 263– 6; Ware, ‘Afghanistan’; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’. ‘Special Interview: Former NDS Chief Rahmatullah Nabil Criticises Govt’s Security Policies’, TOLOnews, 19 May 2017, https://youtu.be/le8FabjJsnw; ‘Secret Pakistan’, BBC, 2011, https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q¼ secret þpakistanþbbc&qpvt¼secretþpakistanþbbc&FORM¼VDRE; Dobbins, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War’; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 265– 7; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 223; Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 335; Loyn, Butcher & Bolt, p. xxxviii; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 689; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’; ‘90 Minutes Third Program EPS 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07,’ Ariana Television Network, 9 December 2013, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v¼Rnc7y1_S3T4. Bush, Decision Points, pp. 212– 16, 499; Cheney, In My Time, p. 499; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 688– 9; Ware, Afghanistan; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 265– 70. Loyn, Butcher & Bolt, P. 261; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 16, 214. For the discussion about how Pakistan lost its influence in Afghanistan (and the quotes), see Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 30, 79, 87. See also Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 302; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 96. For the discussion of Pakistan’s reaction to India’s increasing influence in Afghanistan and the revival of the New Great Game (and the quotes), see Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 229, 286, 290; Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, ‘From Great Game to Grand Bargain’, Foreign Affairs, November/ December 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64604/barnett-rrubin-and-ahmed-rashid/from-great-game-to-grand-bargain; Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007, http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/62270/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 271– 3, 312; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 110, 214; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’; Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 338;

244

25. 26. 27.

28. 29.

30.

31. 32.

NOTES

TO PAGES

73 –77

‘Open Jirga 38 Afghan Peace New Prospects’, BBC and RTA, 16 February 2015, http://youtu.be/EA6eQGG1E0s; ‘Open Jirga 62 Peace Talks – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, 8 February 2016, http://youtu.be/ 6dZ0NbCIgcU; ‘90 Minutes First Program EPS 1’, Ariana Television Network, 29 October 2013, http://youtu.be/MKIrZJjbQcs; ‘90 Minutes Second Program EPS 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07’, Ariana Television Network, 16 November 2013, https://m.youtube.com/watch?v¼BqW6XRjKr2U; ‘90min 5th Program’, Ariana Television Network, 20 January 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch? v¼4QKsLH2v_c8. Dobbins, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War’; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 270– 1; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 110; Yingling, ‘An Absence’. Bush, Decision Points, p. 217. For the role of the ‘safe haven’ in the Afghanistan War, see Gates, Duty, p. 217; Richard G. Lugar, ‘Lugar Says Pakistan Must Adhere to Past Agreements to Fight Terrorism’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 17 May 2011, http:// www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/lugar-says-pakistan-mustadhere-to-past-agreements-to-fight-terrorism; Krasner, ‘Talking Tough’; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, pp. 77 – 8; Loyn, Butcher & Bolt, pp. xxxviii, 306– 8; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp. 688– 9; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 1 – 4, 99 – 104, 216; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 87; Rubin, ‘Still Ours’; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 311– 12; Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 175. ‘Secret Pakistan’; Loyn, Butcher & Bolt, p. 272. Philip H. Gordon, ‘The End of the Bush Revolution’, Foreign Affairs, July/ August 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61734/philip-h-gordon/ the-end-of-the-bush-revolution; Leffler, ‘September 11’. For how Bush continued to talk about his doctrines, see George W. Bush, ‘Remarks on the Global War on Terror: The Enemy in Their Own Words’, 5 September 2006, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/ Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf. For the discussion of the failures in the ‘lead nation’ approach (and the quotes), see Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 173, 239– 43; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 13, 117, 122, 125, 129– 30; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 204. See also James L. Jones, ‘Oral Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 21 September 2006, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/JonesTestimony070308. pdf; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 685; ‘Open Jirga 8 on Corruption – Dr. Ashraf Ghani’, BBC and RTA, 16 July 2013, http://youtu.be/f7FmIMz8K-Y; ‘Open Jirga 36 Narcotics’, BBC and RTA, 12 January 2015, http://youtu.be/ bDtSUgs1Z_Y; ‘People’s Voice: Helmand Residents Share’, TOLOnews, 1 March 2016, http://youtu.be/mUSOe1JEgXA; ‘90min’ [on Defence]. Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’. Many Afghans told me during my ‘over-the-tea’ talks. The point was also confirmed in ‘5. Open Jirga – Afghan President on Governance – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, 29 May 2013, https://www.bing.com/videos/search?

NOTES

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34.

35.

36. 37.

38.

TO PAGES

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q ¼ 5.þOpenþJirgaþ-þAfghanþPresidentþonþGovernanceþ-þBBC þMediaþAction%e2%80%99&view¼detail&mid¼191169FFA7AEE4F 88FBF191169FFA7AEE4F88FBF&FORM¼VIRE; ‘9. Open Jirga 9 – Security Transition – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, 10 July 2103, http://youtu.be/x4MbLZ3xY7o. For the NATO takeover in 2003 and its impact on US effort in Afghanistan (and the quotes), see Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 249– 53; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 150, 155, 219; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 350–4. See also Ann Scott Tyson and Josh White, ‘Gates hits NATO Allies’ Role in Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 7 February 2008; Shanker and Myers, ‘Afghan Mission’; Tanner, Afghanistan, pp. 333, 342; Gates, Duty, pp. 203, 215; James Jones, ‘Oral Statement’; Bush, Decision Points, p. 211; Mann, The Obamians, p. 123. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 74, 134, 177, 182– 7, 195– 205; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 115– 22, 204; Dobbins, ‘Afghanistan’; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 134– 6; ‘The Good War’; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’. For the shortcomings in donors’ assistance, see ‘90 Minutes 4th Program EPS 01’ [on economy], Ariana Television Network, 21 December 2013, http://youtu. be/3-pGbXp3tck; ‘2. Open Jirga – Economy – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, 9 June 2013, http://youtu.be/ZAGzNi5Wy7I; ‘22. Open Jirga – Effectiveness of Development – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, http:// youtu.be/djypJwjwYjo; ‘Open Jirga 33 Independent Afghan Economy’, BBC and RTA, 1 December 2014, http://youtu.be/OqYV-ZG_vmw; ‘People’s Voice: Badghis Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 18 January 2016, http:// youtu.be/uplVeMK7W-s. Bush, ‘Address to the United Nations’. Hamid Karzai, ‘Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS Correspondent Lara Logan’, 4 September 2012, http://president.gov.af/en/ News/13517; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 115– 22, 204; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 74, 134, 177 182–7, 195– 205; Steven Simon, ‘Can the Right War Be Won? Defining American Interests in Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2009, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/can-right-warwon/p19765; Kathy Gannon, ‘Afghanistan Unbound’, Foreign Affairs, May/ June 2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59891/kathy-gannon/ afghanistan-unbound; Dobbins, ‘Afghanistan’; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 134– 6; William Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), p. 65; Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 323; ‘The Good War’; Loyn, Butcher & Bolt, p. xxxviii; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’; Khalilzad, ‘Statement of Ambassador’; ‘People’s Voice: People’s Voice: Paktia’, TOLOnews, 10 June 2013, http://youtu.be/Igj0eWg79Ow; ‘People’s Voice’ [Kapisa], TOLOnews, 25 November 2013, http://youtu.be/sTuIE_zIAc4; ‘People’s Voice: Paktika Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 22 December 2015, http://youtu.be/0qTwQwx60wQ. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 683.

246

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80 –88

39. For failing to provide sufficient number of troops (and the quotes), see Rubin, ‘Still Ours’; Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’. See also ‘Open Jirga 55 Militias and its Impact on Security’, BBC and RTA, 9 November 2015, http://youtu.be/ ZhbK_i4cSc8; ‘People’s Voice’ [Herat]; ‘The Good War’; Loyn, Butcher & Bolt, p. 271; Jones, In the Graveyard, p. 208; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 323; Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 320; ‘Open Jirga 8’. 40. ‘People’s Voice: Ghazni Residents speak out about Their Concerns’, TOLOnews, 12 October 2015, http://youtu.be/BSVAe9R14Gk; Gannon, ‘Afghanistan Unbound’. 41. Hamid Karzai, ‘Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with Newsweek’, 3 January 2012, http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/Transcript ofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithNewsweek1012012201158906553325325. pdf. 42. Experts and US officials’ views are found in Ware, ‘Afghanistan’; Cheney, In My Time, p. 433; Gates, Duty, pp. 115–16; Bush, Decision Points, p. 207; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’; Jones, In the Graveyard, p. 204; Dobbins, ‘Afghanistan’. 43. Bush, Decision Points, p. 207.

Chapter 5 The Counterterrorism Strategy at the Evaluation Stage and Bush’s Tilt towards a Counter-insurgency Strategy, 2007 –8 1. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 29. 2. The Afghan public opinion is based on my ‘over-the-tea’ talks with Afghans, both ordinary and officials, as well as the following sources: ‘Open Jirga 1Security – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, 9 January 2013, http://youtu.be/ 2KMBmnrYROM; ‘14. Open Jirga – Election – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, 10 December 2013, http://youtu.be/wjWgm0dgbeQ; ‘18. Open Jirga with Afghan Presidential Candidates – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, 10 February 2014, http://youtu.be/XxJXEZ8aLoM; ‘People’s Voice’ [Bamyan], TOLOnews, 22 July 2013, http://youtu.be/bJrfXmYWKwU; ‘People’s Voice: Baghlan Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 1 December 2015, http://youtu.be/bai-R945dog; ‘People’s Voice’ [Khost], TOLOnews, 2 September 2013, http://youtu.be/6qSV2viCFSs; ‘People’s Voice: Farah’s Issues Under Discussion’, TOLOnews, 22 September 2015, http://youtu.be/ 9TkcKEuHXNg; ‘People’s Voice: Faryab Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 16 November 2015, http://youtu.be/6p2jCgffpKA; ‘People’s Voice: Takhar Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 6 January 2016, http:// youtu.be/1athc9TdfwE; ‘People’s Voice: Uruzgan Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 21 March 2016, http://youtu.be/NnNkRrqbRCg; ‘People’s Voice: Nimroz Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 29 March 2016, http://youtu.be/voO3bP82QFw; ‘90 Minutes 4th Program EPS 02’ [on economy], Ariana Television Network, 21 December 2013, http://youtu.be/

NOTES

3.

4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

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88 – 91

247

G28xc-qFn3U; ‘90 Min Show#7’ [on corruption], Ariana Television Network, 2 February 2014, v¼TYay11NSIsI&sns¼em. The following sources are consulted for the evaluation: Joe Biden, ‘Afghanistan. Pakistan. Forgotten’, New York Times, 2 March 2008; David Gardner, ‘Bush to pull 8,000 U.S. troops out of Iraq and reveals plans for a “quiet surge” in Afghanistan’, Daily Mail, 9 September 2008; Dan Eggen, ‘Focus Is on Afghanistan As Bush Lays Out Plans’, Washington Post, 10 September 2008; Christopher McGurk, ‘Testimony of Christopher McGurk’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 23 April 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/McGurkTestimony090423a1.pdf; Rubin, ‘Still Ours’; Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’; ‘A Conversation with Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr.’, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 February 2008; ‘The Good War’; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 94; Carlotta Gall and Jeff Zeleny, ‘Obama’s Visit Renews Focus on Afghanistan’, New York Times, 20 July 2008; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. xxxix; Tanner, Afghanistan, pp. 2, 321, 327; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 208, 220– 1; Loyn, Butcher & Bolt, p. 271; Gates, Duty, p. 197; Rubin and Rashid, ‘From Great Game’; Dobbins, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War’; Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 333; Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 131; Shanker and Myers, ‘Afghan Mission’. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, ‘Bush Administration Reviews Its Afghanistan Policy, Exposing Points of Contention’, New York Times, 22 September 2008; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. XLII, xxxix; Biden, ‘Afghanistan’; James Jones, ‘Oral Statement’; Rohde and Sanger, ‘Losing the Advantage’; ‘The Good War’; Dobbins, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War’. Katharine Q. Seelye, ‘Clinton Talks About Stepping Up Effort in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 29 February 2008; Gardner, ‘Bush to pull’; Gall and Zeleny, ‘Obama’s Visit’; Biden, ‘Afghanistan’; ‘A Conversation with Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr.’; Barack Obama, ‘Official Announcement of Candidacy for US President’, 10 February 2007, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ barackobamacandidacyforpresident.htm; Barack Obama, ‘Senate Floor Speech on Iraq War After 4 Years’, 21 March 2007, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/ speeches/barackobama/barackobamasenatefloorspeechoniraqwar4years.htm; Barack Obama, ‘New Hampshire Primary Concession Speech’, 8 January 2008, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamanewhampshireconcessionspeech.htm; Barack Obama, ‘Campaign Policy Speech on Iraq at the Ronald Reagan Building’, 15 July 2008, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamairaqwarreaganbuilding.htm. Biden, ‘Afghanistan’. For the analysis of groupthink, see Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 1 – 13, 175. For the assessment of Bush’s operating style and its impact on decision making, see James Dobbins, ‘Who Lost Iraq?’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62828/james-dobbins/who-lost-iraq;

248

9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

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TO PAGES

91 – 93

Tony Smith, Ludovic Hood and James Dobbins, ‘Losing Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63019/ tony-smith-ludovic-hood-and-james-dobbins/losing-iraq; James Pfiffner, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41: 2 (June), 2011, pp. 244– 62, p. 256; Pfiffner, ‘Policymaking’; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. XLI, XLII; Marshall, ‘Remaking the World’; Gates, Duty, p. 49, 589; Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 135; Saikal, Zone of Crisis, pp. 5 –8, 15 – 59, 143– 77; Steven Hurst, The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 182– 223. Chandrasekaran wrote a bestseller on how unaware Americans were of the way of life in Iraq; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad’s Green Zone (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006). Stephen Biddle, ‘Running Out of Time for Afghan Governance Reform’, Foreign Affairs, 15 December 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136875/ stephen-biddle/running-out-of-time-for-afghan-governance-reform; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 160, 163; Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 323; Seth G. Jones, ‘It Takes the Villages’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010, http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/66350/seth-g-jones/it-takes-the-villages; Jonah Blank, ‘Q&A With Jonah Blank on Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-jonahblank-on-afghanistan; Saikal, Zone of Crisis, pp. 8– 10. Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 160, 163– 5. Said T. Jawad, ‘Hunting Al Qaeda’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62834/said-t-jawad/hunting-al-qaeda. Rubin is quoted in Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 130. Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 131– 3, 161. Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘The Three Futures for Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 15 December 2011, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/201112-16/three-futures-afghanistan; Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Pakistan’; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, pp. 84 – 5; Krasner, ‘Talking Tough’; Jones, In the Graveyard; Peter Tomsen is quoted in Jonah Blank, ‘Invading Afghanistan, Then and Now’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011, http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68214/jonah-blank/invading-afghanistan-thenand-now; C. Christine Fair, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 24 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fair_Testimony.pdf. John F. Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry Opening Statement At Hearing With Secretary Clinton On Afghanistan And Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 23 June 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-kerryopening-statement-at-hearing-with-secretary-clinton-on-afghanistan-andpakistan; Milton Bearden, ‘Obama’s War’, Foreign Affairs, 9 April 2009, http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64925/milton-bearden/obamas-war; Shuja Nawaz, ‘The Pakistan dilemma’, Foreign Affairs, 2 May 2011, http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/67817/shuja-nawaz/the-pakistan-dilemma; Samina

NOTES

16. 17.

18.

19.

20.

TO PAGES

93 – 95

249

Ahmed, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limit in Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ Ahmed%20Testimony.pdf; Blank, ‘Invading Afghanistan’; Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘From Hope to Audacity’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2010, http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/65720/zbigniew-brzezinski/from-hope-to-audacity; Moeed Yusuf, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 5 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ Yusuf%20Testimony.pdf; Markey, ‘A False’; Jaffrelot, ‘What engagement’. Bearden, ‘Obama’s War’; Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 345; Jones, In the Graveyard, p. 323. Fair, ‘Al-Qaeda’; Richard N. Haass, ‘Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-isan-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there; Krepon, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy’; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Ahmed, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy’; Jaffrelot, ‘What engagement’. For the silent surge, see ‘Bush: “Quiet Surge” of Troops Sent to Afghanistan’, Fox News, 9 September 2008; Alex Spillius, ‘President Bush announces “quiet surge” into Afghanistan’, The Telegraph, 8 September 2008; Eggen, ‘Focus Is’; Gardner, ‘Bush to pull’; Gates, Duty, pp. 222– 3; Bush, Decision Points, p. 218; Josh White, ‘A Shortage of Troops in Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 3 July 2008. For the reviews (and the quotes), see Julian E. Barnes, ‘Urgent shift in works on Afghanistan’, Los Angeles Times, 28 December 2008; Schmitt and Shanker, ‘Bush Administration Reviews’; Greg Bruno, ‘Resourcing an Afghan Strategy’, Council on Foreign Relations, 24 January 2009, https://www.cfr.org/expertroundup/resourcing-afghan-strategy; Gates, Duty, pp. 222– 3; Bush, Decision Points, p. 218; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 500– 1; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 40 – 4; Eggen, ‘Focus Is’, Richard G. Lugar, ‘Senator Richard G. Lugar Opening Statement for Hearing on Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2008, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ LugarStatement080131a.pdf; Richard A. Boucher, ‘Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy? “Moving Forward In Afghanistan”’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 March 2007, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ BoucherTestimony070308.pdf; Richard A. Boucher, ‘Testimony Of Richard A. Boucher Assistant Secretary Of State For South And Central Asian Affairs Before Foreign Relations Committee United States Senate’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2008, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/BoucherTestimony080131a.pdf. Cheney, In My Time, p. 501; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 40 – 4; Bush, Decision Points, p. 218; Gates, Duty, pp. 222–3; Schmitt and Shanker, ‘Bush Administration’.

250

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TO PAGES

99 –105

Chapter 6 The Surge Decision at the Initiation Phase 1. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), p. 118. 2. Michael Crowley, ‘Hawk Down’, The New Republic, 24 September 2009, http:// www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down; Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, ‘What Leaving Afghanistan Will Cost’, Foreign Affairs, 9 May 2012, http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137621/gayle-tzemach-lemmon/what-leavingafghanistan-will-cost. 3. Pakistani officials told Gates that ‘Pakistan is the victim of the export of the Afghan Taliban’, Gates, Duty, p. 204. 4. The views of the members of the Biden camp are found in Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 40– 4, 71, 102, 159– 60, 162– 3, 166– 7, 170, 187– 9, 190– 1, 215– 18, 221, 225– 7, 237– 8, 285, 296– 8, 320– 1, 334; Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 118, 123– 6; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, pp. 67, 73; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 230– 4, 237; Karl W. Eikenberry, ‘US embassy cables: Karzai feared US intended to unseat him and weaken Afghanistan’, Guardian, 7 July 2009; Karl W. Eikenberry, ‘Statement Of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 December 2009, http:// www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EikenberryTestimony091209a1.pdf; Simon, ‘Can the Right’; Peter Baker, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for “Surge” in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 5 December 2009; Crowley, ‘Hawk Down’; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 64, 131, 135; Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, Brookings Institution, September/October 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/ 08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon; Gates, Duty, pp. 357, 362, 371–84; Clinton, Hard Choices, pp. 25, 129–49. 5. Ann Scott Tyson, ‘Mullen: More Troops “Probably” Needed’, Washington Post, 16 September 2009; Peter Baker, ‘Obama to Weigh Buildup Option in Afghan War’, New York Times, 31 August 2009; Mann, The Obamians, pp. xx, xix, 14 – 17; Paul Kane, ‘Pelosi: Democrats facing voter “unrest” over war spending, troop increase’, Washington Post, 24 November 2009; John F. Kerry, ‘Testing Afghanistan Assumptions; The Lesson of Vietnam is Don’t Commit without a Clear Strategy’, Wall Street Journal, 27 September 2009; John F. Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry opening statement at hearing on Strategy For Afghanistan’, 16 September 2009, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, http://www.foreign. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KerryStatement090916p.pdf; John F. Kerry, ‘Kerry Opening Statement for Hearing on Afghanistan’s Impact On Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1 October 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/ imo/media/doc/KerryStatement091001a.pdf; John F. Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry Opening Statement At Hearing With Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 December 2009, http:// www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KerryStatement091203a1.pdf; John F. Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry Welcomes President Obama’s New Strategy for

NOTES

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105 –111

251

Afghanistan-Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 27 March 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-kerry-welcomespresident-obamas-new-strategy-for-afghanistan-pakistan; John F. Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry: Pakistan is the core of our challenge’, 9 December 2009, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/ release/chairman-kerry-pakistan-is-the-core-of-our-challenge. Also, the Republican Dick Lugar was sympathetic to the Biden camp; Richard G. Lugar, ‘Opening Statement for Hearing on Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1 October 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/ imo/media/doc/LugarStatement091001a.pdf; John F. Kerry, ‘Opening Statement for Hearing on Afghanistan’, 9 December 2009, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LugarStatement 091209a.pdf. 6. George F. Will, ‘Time to Get Out of Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 1 September 2009; David Ignatius, ‘A Middle Way on Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 2 September 2009; ‘Topic A: Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting?’ Washington Post, 31 August 2009; Tyson, ‘Mullen’. 7. Rory Stewart, ‘Testimony of Rory Stewart’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 16 September 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/StewartTestimony090916p1.pdf; John Mueller, ‘How Dangerous Are the Taliban?’, Foreign Affairs, 15 April 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64932/ john-mueller/how-dangerous-are-the-taliban; Milton Bearden, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1 October 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistans-impact-on-pakistan; Maleeha Lodhi, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1 October 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistansimpact-on-pakistan; Steve Coll, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1 October 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/ hearings/afghanistans-impact-on-pakistan; Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 200. For the prerequisites/conditions of the counter-insurgency strategy, which the Biden camp invoked to justify their arguments, see Simon, ‘Can the Right’; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 151–61; Marc Sageman, ‘Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan and Beyond’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 October 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SagemanTestimony091007p1.pdf; David Galula and John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006); Crowley, ‘Hawk Down’. 8. Bob Woodward, ‘McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure’, Washington Post, 21 September 2009; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 34, 153– 6, 162– 5, 172– 5, 187 – 90, 194, 202 – 27, 269, 296, 299, 339; Robert Michael Gates, ‘Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 December 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-assessing-the-road-ahead; Michael G. Mullen, ‘Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 December 2009, http://www.

252

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11. 12.

NOTES TO PAGES 111 –112 foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-assessing-the-road-ahead; David H. Petraeus, ‘Statement of General David H. Petraeus’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 December 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/PetraeusTestimony091209a1.pdf; Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 December 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-assessing-the-roadahead; Clinton, Hard Choices, pp. 25, 129– 49, 151, 153; Stanley McChrystal, ‘Commander’s Initial Assessment’, 30 August 2009, pp. 1 –1 to 1 – 4, 2 – 3 to 2 – 6, 2 – 8, 2 – 9, 2 – 10, 2 – 11, 2 – 15, http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid¼ST200909 2003140; Stanley McChrystal, ‘General McChrystal Speech’, 1 October 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼F1KGnacqfMc; ‘Generation Kill’; Gates, Duty, pp. 213, 355– 6, 364– 5, 371– 84, 496; Michael Gerson, ‘In Afghanistan, No Choice but to Try’, Washington Post, 4 September 2009; Michael Gerson, ‘Decision Time for Obama’, Washington Post, 30 September 2009; Fred Kaplan, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2013, http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-ofpetraeus; Baker, ‘Obama to Weigh’; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Tyson, ‘Mullen’; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 234– 5; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, pp. 54 – 61; Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 119– 20, 210, 218, 251, 292, 327; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, pp. 78 – 9. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 145, 162, 166, 171, 187, 189–91, 202–3, 296–7. Lindsey Graham, Joseph I. Lieberman and John McCain, ‘Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan’, Wall Street Journal, 13 September 2009; Tyson, ‘Mullen’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 204– 6, 298; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 74; Mann, The Obamians, p. 135. William Kristol, ‘No Will, No Way’, Washington Post, 1 September 2009; Max Boot, ‘Anyone but Karzai?’, Washington Post, 13 February 2009; Gerson, ‘In Afghanistan’; Gerson, ‘Decision Time’; ‘Topic A’. Stephen Biddle, ‘Assessing the Case for War in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 16 September 2009, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/ attachments/Stephen.Biddle.SFRC9.16.09.pdf; John A. Nagl, ‘A “Better War” in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 16 September 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NaglTestimony090916p1.pdf; Peter Bergen, ‘Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan and Beyond’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 October 2009, http://www. foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BergenTestimony091007p.pdf; Thomas R. Pickering, ‘Testimony of Thomas R Pickering’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2008, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ PickeringTestimony080131a1.pdf; Ryan C. Crocker, ‘Countering the Threat of Failure in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 17 September 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/countering-the-threat-of-failure-inafghanistan; Jones, In The Graveyard, pp. 294–5; Barbara Elias, ‘Know Thine Enemy’, Foreign Affairs, 2 November 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/

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articles/65639/barbara-elias/know-thine-enemy; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 54; Kim Baker, ‘Letter From Kabul’; Frederick Kagan, ‘We’re Not the Soviets in Afghanistan; and 2009 isn’t 1979’, Weekly Standard, 21 August 2009, https://www.weeklystandard.com/were-not-the-soviets-in-afghanistan/ article/240775; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’; Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, ‘Flipping the Taliban’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009, http://www.foreign affairs.com/articles/65151/fotini-christia-and-michael-semple/flipping-thetaliban; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 231, 234–7; Mark Moyar, ‘The L-Word in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 15 November 2009, http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/65681/mark-moyar/the-l-word-in-afghanistan; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. XLII.

Chapter 7

An Insider’s Insight into Obama’s War Cabinet

1. The term ‘the outsiders’ are used by Jim Mann, Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 211. 2. For Biden’s views (and the quotes), see Crowley, ‘Hawk Down’; Goldberg, Jeffrey, ‘Letter from Washington: The Unbending’, The New Yorker, 21 March 2005; Biden, ‘Afghanistan’; ‘A Conversation with Senator Joseph R. Biden’; Mann, The Obamians, p. 63. 3. For changes in Biden’s views, see Lawrence D. Freedman, ‘Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts’, Foreign Affairs, September/December 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/65308/christopher-gelpi-peter-d-feaver-and-jason-reifler/paying-thehuman-costs-of-war-american-public-opinion-and-casu; Crowley, ‘Hawk Down’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 37, 71 – 2, 102, 159– 60, 188– 9, 319; Gates, Duty, pp. 336– 7. 4. For the arguments relating to Biden’s active role in policymaking, see Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 160, 166, 235– 8, 254– 5; Crowley, ‘Hawk Down’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p.126; Gates, Duty, pp. 379, 482; Mann, The Obamians, pp. xxi 143, 211, 225. 5. Baker, ‘How Obama’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 159– 60, 166, 310, 324; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 126. 6. Gerson, ‘Decision Time’. See also Gates, Duty, p. 288; Mann, The Obamians, p. 97. 7. For the influence of the inner circle over the President and for Obama centralising policy making, see Mann, The Obamians, pp. xx–xxi, 46, 68–9, 71, 75, 82–3, 132–4, 141–3, 211. See also Michael Hirsh, ‘The Clinton Legacy’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139110/michaelhirsh/the-clinton-legacy; Brzezinski, ‘From Hope’; Gates, Duty, pp. 384–5, 587; Pfiffner, ‘Decision Making’, p. 245; Barack Obama, ‘Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech’, 27 July 2004, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/ speeches/convention2004/barackobama2004dnc.htm. 8. Pfiffner, ‘Decision Making’, p. 249; Gates, Duty, pp. 289, 566, 585– 6; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 157– 9, 173– 7, 197.

254

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117 –121

9. The methods are found in Janis, Groupthink, pp. 1 – 13; Neack, Hey and Haney, Foreign Policy Analysis, pp. 108–109; Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, pp. 72 – 3; Allison, Graham T. and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999), p. 284. 10. For the review being debated in public, see Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 157–9, 172–7, 197; Mullen, Michael G., ‘Statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 21 May 2009, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/MullenTestimony 100518a.pdf; Brett McGurk, ‘Agreeing on Afghanistan’, CNN, 22 June 2011, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/22/agreeing-on-afghanistan/; Michael C. Desch, ‘Obama and His General’, Foreign Affairs, 27 October 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65662/michael-c-desch/obama-and-hisgeneral; Kaplan, ‘The End’; Tyson, ‘Mullen’; Pfiffner, ‘Decision Making’; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 135–6; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 61; McChrystal, ‘General Stanley McChrystal’s Speech’; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Gates, Duty, pp. 367–70. 11. Gates, Duty, pp. 370, 377; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Woodward, Obama’s War, p. 157. 12. Mann, The Obamians, pp. xx, xix, 14 – 17, 135. See also Kagan, ‘We’re Not the Soviets’; Robert Michael Gates, ‘A Balanced Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, January/ February 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m-gates/ a-balanced-strategy; Gates, Duty, p. 360; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Kaplan, ‘The End’; Will, ‘Time to Get Out’. 13. For the continuation of Petraeus’s public campaign and its impact on policy making, see Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 159, 194, 206; Matthew Rosenberg and Peter Spiegel, ‘Top U.S. General Under Fire; Afghan War Strategist McChrystal Summoned to Explain Magazine Comments’, Wall Street Journal, 23 June 2010; Gates, Duty, pp. 368, 384– 8, 557; Michael Hastings, ‘The Rolling Stone profile of Stanley McChrystal that changed history’, Rolling Stone, 22 June 2010; Desch, ‘Obama’; McGurk, ‘Testimony of’. 14. Kaplan, ‘The End’; Mann, The Obamians, p. 121; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 191. 15. Kaplan, ‘The End’; McChrystal, ‘Commander’s Initial Assessment’, pp. 1 – 2, 2 – 4, 2 – 5; ‘Generation Kill’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 75; Jones, In the Graveyard, pp. 151– 62. 16. Frank James, ‘Won’t Measure Afghan Success By “Enemy Killed”: McChrystal’, npr, 2 June 2009; Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 118, 221; Kaplan, ‘The End’; Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 134; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 80, 190, 217– 18; Heather S. Gregg, ‘Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding Counterinsurgency’, Strategic Studies Institute, autumn 2009, http://strategic studiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/09autumn/gregg.pdf; Petraeus, ‘Statement of General’. 17. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 101, 173; Gates, Duty, pp. 87, 100–1. 18. Mann, The Obamians, p. 7; Gates, Duty, pp. 41, 44.

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122 –127

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19. For Gates’ concessions (and the quotes), see Peter Spiegel and Yochi Dreazen, ‘Obama Receives New Afghan Option; “Hybrid” Compromise Would Combine Troops, Trainers to Hold Back Taliban and Boost Local Military’, Wall Street Journal, 12 November 2009; Gates, ‘Afghanistan’; Gates, Duty, pp. 337, 365– 6, 373– 5; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 165, 219, 251– 3; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 128. 20. Clinton, Hard Choices, pp. 24 – 5; John F. Kerry, ‘Kerry on President Obama’s National Security Team Nominations,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 28 April 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/kerry-onpresident-obamas-national-security-team-nominations; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 23, 289– 90; Gates, Duty, p. 92. 21. For the discussion about the qualities for which the president respected Gates, see Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 21 –3, 138, 290; Singh, Barack Obama’s PostAmerican, p. 6; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Gates, Duty, pp. 6, 44, 80, 297–8, 384–5; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 8, 165. 22. For the discussion about the tension between Obama and Clinton (and the quotes), see ‘Hillary Clinton’s a monster: Obama aide blurts out attack in Scotsman interview’, Scotsman, 6 March 2008; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 3 – 5, 89; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 27, 254; Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 13; Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 224– 5. 23. Mann, The Obamians, p. 6. 24. Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘State and Stateswoman: How Hillary Clinton Reshaped U.S. Foreign Policy — But Not the World’, Brookings Institution, 29 January 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/01/29-hillary-clintonstate-ohanlon; Hirsh, ‘The Clinton Legacy’; Gates, Duty, p. 371. 25. Hirsh, ‘The Clinton Legacy’; O’Hanlon, ‘State and Stateswoman’; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 43 – 4. 26. Mann, The Obamians, pp. 43 – 4. 27. Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘Clinton’s Plan for Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 March 2008; Hirsh, ‘The Clinton Legacy’; Gates, Duty, pp. 376, 382. 28. Gates, Duty, p. 289; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 250, 292; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 61; Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 140. 29. Mann, The Obamians, pp. 9, 25, 224; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 36 – 8; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 227. 30. Information on Jones’ ineffectiveness as NSA is found in Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 126– 7, 131– 2, 137– 40, 161, 168– 9, 198; Woodward, ‘Key in Afghanistan: Economy, Not Military’, Washington Post, 1 July 2009; I. M. Destler, ‘Donilon to the Rescue?’, Foreign Affairs, 13 October 2010, https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2010-10-13/donilon-rescue; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 9, 10, 224– 5; Gates, Duty, pp. 290– 2, 376– 7; Daalder and Destler, ‘In the Shadow’; Barnes, ‘Urgent shift’, Los Angeles Times, 28 December 2008. 31. Destler, ‘Donilon to the Rescue?’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 40, 199– 200; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 226– 7; Gates, Duty, pp. 291, 496.

256

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32. For the arguments relating to Blair and Panetta (and the quotes), see Mann, The Obamians, pp. 11, 43, 105, 144, 214– 15. See also Kerry, ‘Kerry on President Obama’s National Security’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 57, 122; Gates, Duty, p. 294. 33. For the arguments relating to the effectiveness of Brennan in decision making, see Mann, The Obamians, pp. 105, 216– 21; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 265. 34. Holbrooke, Richard, ‘The Next President’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63563/richard-holbrooke/thenext-president; Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 222– 3, 225, 231; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 21, 125, 229; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 296. 35. Holbrooke, ‘The Next President’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 225; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 226. 36. For the arguments about the ineffectiveness of Holbrooke in decision making (and the quotes), see Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 91 – 4, 127, 223– 33; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 88, 229. See also Gates, Duty, pp. 287, 296, 350, 358, 384– 5; Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 141.

Chapter 8 The Surge Decision at the Formulation Phase, September –December 2009 1. Mann, The Obamians, pp. xx, 43; Robert Farley, ‘Three Cabinet appointees from opposing party is unmatched’, PolitiFact, 10 February 2009; Hirsh, ‘The Clinton Legacy’. 2. Barack Obama, ‘The War We Need To Win’, 1 August 2007, www. americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobamawilsoncenter.htm; Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, 27 March 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/ remarks-president-a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 3. Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, 1 December 2009, https://obamawhite house.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-wayforward-afghanistan-and-pakistan; Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan’; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 160, 163, 167 – 9, 189 – 90, 207, 216 – 17, 280, 319 – 21; Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 119–21; Mann, The Obamians, p. 140; Gates, Duty, pp. 362, 557; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Kerry, ‘Testing Afghanistan’. 4. For claims on McChrystal’s strategy being financially, strategically, humanly and politically expensive, see Jackie Calmes, ‘Estimate for 10-Year Deficit Raised to $9 Trillion’, New York Times, 25 August 2009; ‘U.S. Budget Deficit Hit Record $1.4 Trillion in 2009’, Fox News, 7 October 2009; Shan Carter and Amanda Cox, ‘One 9/11 Tally: 3.3 Trillion’, New York Times, 8 September 2011; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 167– 8, 251, 263, 280– 1; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Gates, Duty, p. 372; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, pp. 49 – 50; Ezra Klein, ‘Bin Laden’s War Against the U.S. Economy’, Washington Post, 3 May 2011;

NOTES

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6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

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Mann, The Obamians, p. 117; Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’; Brzezinski, ‘From Hope’; Leffler, ‘September 11’; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 86; Haass, ‘Afghanistan’; Petraeus, ‘Statement of General’; James, ‘Won’t Measure’; Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry opening statement at hearing on Strategy for Afghanistan’; Deborah White, ‘President Obama’s Domestic Agenda’, Thought Co, 16 February 2016; Kimberly Amadeo, ‘What Has Obama Done? 13 Major Accomplishments’, the balance, 19 October 2017. Gary Langer, ‘POLL: Obama’s Ratings Slip on Afghanistan’, ABC News, 21 October 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/Politics/afghanistan-abcnews-washington-post-poll/story?id¼8872471; Woodward, ‘Key in’; Dan Balz and Jon Cohen, ‘U.S. deeply split on troop increase for Afghanistan war’, Washington Post, 21 October 2009. Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’; Gates, Duty, p. 369. Langer, ‘POLL’; Balz and Cohen, ‘U.S. deeply’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 175, 311. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 175, 258–60, 311. For the discussion about Obama being uncertain and how it affected his polling, see Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, pp. 3, 73; Langer, ‘POLL’; Balz and Cohen, ‘U.S. deeply’; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’. Gates, Duty, pp. 352, 369; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 319 –20. The description of Petraeus (and the quotes) are derived from the following sources: Mackubin Thomas Owens, ‘All in: the education of General David Petraeus’ by Paula Broadwell and Bernon Loeb, reviewed by Mackubin Thomas Owens, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/137553/paula-broadwellvernon-loeb/all-in-the-education-of-generaldavid-petraeus; Kerry, ‘Kerry on President Obama’s National Security Team Nominations’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 15 – 17. Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 231; Clinton, Hard Choices, P. 133; Gates, Duty, p. 364. For the discussion around ‘another reason’ (and the quotes), see Gates, Duty, pp. 283, 375; Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 25; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 162, 191, 229– 30, 242– 3, 320– 21; Graham, Lieberman and McCain, ‘Only Decisive Force’; Gerson, ‘In Afghanistan’; ‘Topic A’; Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Legacy of Barack Obama’, CNN, 12, 11, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼ LjOYWaxCIM0. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 247; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 52. Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 75; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 118. For the discussion about how Obama managed to clarify goals, shorten duration and impose a deadline (and the quotes), see Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 169, 228–30, 240, 251–3, 264, 270–1, 276–80, 279–80; Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’; Gates, Duty, pp. 363, 379; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 128; Kerry, ‘Testing Afghanistan’; Baker, ‘How Obama’.

258

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141 –147

17. Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’; Obama, ‘Remarks by The President on a New Strategy’; Gates, ‘Afghanistan’. 18. For the objectives of the three surges, see Jacob J. Lew, ‘Deputy Secretary Of State Jacob J. Lew Testimony’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 9 December 2009, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LewTestimony091209a1. pdf; Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’; Mullen, ‘Afghanistan’; Clinton, ‘Afghanistan’; Gates, ‘Afghanistan’; Petraeus, ‘Statement of General’; Eikenberry, ‘Statement Of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry’. 19. Lew, ‘Deputy Secretary of State Jacob J. Lew Testimony’; Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’; Clinton, ‘Afghanistan’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 209. 20. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 332, 338; Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Helene Cooper, ‘Obama Adds Troops, but Maps Exit Plan’, New York Times, 1 December 2009; Max Boot, ‘The Road to Negotiation in Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 October 2010, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/road-negotiationsafghanistan/p23171; Gates, ‘Afghanistan’; Mullen, ‘Afghanistan’. 21. For Biden and Lute’s views, see Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 332, 338; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 137–8; Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry Opening Statement at Hearing with Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen’. 22. O’Hanlon quoted in Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 75; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 128. 23. Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 256. See also Mann, The Obamians, pp. 138–9. 24. Petraeus, ‘Statement of General’. 25. Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’. 26. Baker, ‘How Obama’; Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’. 27. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 301–3, 326– 7; Mullen, ‘Afghanistan’; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Gates, ‘Afghanistan’; Petraeus, ‘Statement of General’. 28. Gates, Duty, p. 557; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 222; Gordon, ‘Can the War’; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, pp. 48, 50, 57 – 8; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 312; Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’. 29. Wayne, Stephen J., ‘Presidential Character and Judgment: Obama’s Afghanistan and Health Care Decisions’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41:2 (June), 2011, pp. 291 – 305, pp. 291 – 2; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 140 – 1; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 86; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 61. 30. Gates, Duty, pp. 96, 349– 50, 376; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 158. 31. Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’. 32. Gates, Duty, pp. 483, 496, 568; Stolberg and Cooper, ‘Obama Adds Troops’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 320; Baker, ‘How Obama’; Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’. 33. O’Hanlon quoted in Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 75; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’.

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259

34. Gates, Duty, pp. 298–9; Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry Opening Statement at Hearing With Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 38. 35. Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 222. 36. Gates, Duty, pp. 229, 557. 37. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 331.

Chapter 9 The Surge Decision at the Implementation Phase, January 2010 – June 2011 1. For the military surge, see Hamid Karzai, ‘Full text of the Interview by President Hamid Karzai with the Russian Media’, 5 May 2012, http:// president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/FulltextoftheInterviewbyPresidentHamidKarzaiwiththeRussianMedia1452012154150781553325325.pdf (also at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v ¼ urTajBzKjuk); Barack Obama, ‘Statement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review’, 16 December 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/ statement-president-afghanistan-pakistan-annual-review; ‘The Afghan War Review,’ New York Times, 16 December 2010; ‘One-year review is mixed on Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy’, Washington Post, 16 December 2010; ‘Pentagon Says Afghan Forces Still Need Assistance’, Washington Post, 10 December 2010; John F. Kerry, Opening Statement, ‘Chairman Kerry Welcomes Progress In Afghanistan, Announce New Oversight Hearings’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 16 December 2010, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/ release/chairman-kerry-welcomes-progress-in-afghanistan-announces-newoversight-hearings; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’; Daniel Feldman, ‘“Afghanistan: Right Sizing the Development Footprint”’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 September 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-rightsizing-the-development-footprint?; Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 141– 3, 246; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 340, 349; Kaplan, ‘The End’; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’. 2. Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, ‘The Case for Continuing the Counterinsurgency Campaign In Afghanistan’, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 16 December 2011, http://www.criticalthreats.org/ afghanistan/kagan-case-continuing-counterinsurgency-campaign-december16-2011; Karen DeYoung, ‘Without large U.S. force after 2014, Afghanistan is headed for civil war, opposition leader warns’, Washington Post, 17 November 2011; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 327; Hamid Karzai, ‘Transcript of the interview by Australian TV (SBS) with H.E. President Hamid Karzai’, 14 February 2012, http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/Transcript oftheinterviewbyAustralianTVwithPresidentKarzai2522012163917955533 25325.pdf (also at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼QkmYVkM_ndU); Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 22; ‘Open Jirga NUG and Security Challenges. Episode 47’, BBC and RTA, 13 July 2015, http://youtu.be/

260

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

NOTES

TO PAGES

150 –152

aPGyBEKOefI; ‘People’s Voice: Wardak Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 29 December 2015, https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q¼%e2% 80%98People%e2%80%99sþVoice%3aþWardakþResidentsþShareþ theirþChallenges%e2%80%99&view¼detail&mid¼812741A62C073C0E18 D1812741A62C073C0E18D1&FORM ¼ VIRE; ‘People’s Voice: Logar Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 9 February 2016, http://youtu.be/ v4iRVO9yzaE. For the impact of the caveat, see Karzai, ‘Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS’; ‘Open Jirga 1’; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Boot, ‘The Road’; David Kilcullen, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 27 July 2010, http://www.foreign.senate. gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan; Ronald E. Neumann, Stephen Hadley and John D. Podesta, ‘Afghan Endgame’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 138215/ronald-e-neumann-stephen-hadley-and-john-d-podesta/afghanendgame; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’; Stephen Biddle, ‘Q&A with Stephen Biddle on Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 11 August 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ discussions/interviews/qa-with-stephen-biddle-on-afghanistan; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 129; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 62; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 75; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 236; ‘2. Open Jirga’. Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation’; Gates, Duty, pp. 571– 2; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’. Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 143; ‘9. Open Jirga 9’; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’; Kaplan, ‘The End’. Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 239; Saikal, Zone of Crisis, p. 11. Hamid Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s interview with IRD’, 5 April 2014, http://president.gov.af/en/news/transcript-of-president-karzaisinterview-with-ird; Hamid Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Washington Post’, 3 March 2014, http://afghanistanembassy. org.uk/english/full-transcript-of-president-karzais-interview-with-washington-post/; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Gates, Duty, p. 470. Many Afghans told me during the ‘over-the-tea’ interviews. See also Karzai, ‘Full transcript of President Karzai’s interview with Aryn Baker’; Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Washington Post’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 165; Gates, Duty, p. 496. Hamid Karzai, ‘Speech by President Hamid Karzai January 11, 2013 Georgetown University Washington, D.C.’, 11 January 2013, http://president.gov.af/en/News/ 16592 (also at https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q¼Speechþ byþ PresidentþHamidþKarzaiþ þGeorgetown þUniversityþWashington &qs ¼n&sp ¼ -1&pq ¼ speech þ by þpresidentþ hamid þ karzai þgeorge town þ universityþwashington&sc¼0-65&sk¼&cvid¼ 43B3CFB117AB 46098C2FAE87E2E9658D&ru¼%2fsearch%3fq%3dSpeech%2bby%2b President%2bHamid%2bKarzai%2b%2bGeorgetown%2bUniversity%

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2bWashington%26qs%3dn%26form%3dQBRE%26sp%3d-1%26pq% 3dspeech%2bby%2bpresident%2bhamid%2bkarzai%2bgeorgetown% 2buniversity%2bwashington%26sc%3d0-65%26sk%3d%26cvid%3d 43B3CFB117AB46098C2FAE87E2E9658D&view¼detail&mmscn¼vwrc &mid¼19FE13A87A01048AB61819FE13A87A01048AB618&FORM¼ WRVORC); Hamid Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with BBC Newsnight’; ‘25. Open Jirga – Legacy of Karzai – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, 13 July 2014, http://youtu.be/WVaz2w9EUqM; Christia and Semple, ‘Flipping the Taliban’. 10. For the arguments about collateral damage, security firms and Karzai avoiding being seen as a stooge, see Hamid Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Hamid Karzai’s Interview with Al Jazeera TV in Doha, Qatar’, 31 March 2013, http:// president.gov.af/en/News/19287; Hamid Karzai, ‘Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Voice of America, English Service’, 14 July 2014, http://president.gov.af/en/news/transcript-of-president-karzais-interview-withvoice-of-america-english-service (also at http://thekabultimes.gov.af/index.php/ interviews/3107-transcript-of-president-karzai’s-interview-with-voice-of-america%2C-english-service.html); Hamid Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Times Now-Indian News Channel’, 27 May 2014, http://president.gov.af/en/news/33340 (also at https://www.bing.com/ videos/search?q¼PresidentþKarzai%e2%80%99sþInterviewþwithþ Times þ Now-Indian þ News%2c&view¼detail&mid¼183971E4FE6A04 C0ABA4183971E4FE6A04C0ABA4&FORM¼VIRE); Hamid Karzai, ‘Transcript of the speech delivered by President Hamid Karzai in the Traditional Loya Jirga’, 17 November 2011, http://afghanistan-un.org/2011/11/transcriptof-the-speech-delivered-by-president-hamid-karzai-in-the-traditionalloya-jirga/; Sherard Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West’s Afghanistan Campaign (London: HarperPress, 2011); Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; ‘Generation Kill’; Gates, Duty, pp. 201– 2, 470. 11. For the arguments relating to the warlord strategy, consult ‘25. Open Jirga’; Ivan Arreguı´n-Toft, ‘Washington’s Colonial Conundrum in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 15 December 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136881/ivanarreguin-toft/washingtons-colonial-conundrum-in-afghanistan; Karzai, ‘Full transcript of President Karzai’s interview with Aryn Baker’; Neumann, Hadley and Podesta, ‘Afghan Endgame’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 86, 262–3; Kim Baker, ‘Letter From Kabul’; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 27; Gannon, ‘Afghanistan Unbound’; Gates, Duty, p. 358. 12. For claims regarding corruption, see Hamid Karzai, ‘Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Danish DR TV’, 2 May 2013, http://president.gov.af/ en/news/20090 (also at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼vbcpQnC1pk4); Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Gates, Duty, pp. 202, 337; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, pp. 37, 71– 2; Biddle, ‘Q&A with Stephen Biddle’; ‘Open Jirga 8’; Kim Baker, ‘Letter From Kabul’; Ryan C. Crocker, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 27 July 2010, http://

262

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14.

15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

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155 –159

www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-inafghanistan; Gates, Duty, pp. 359 –60, 501. Stephen Biddle, ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 10 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate. gov/hearings/steps-needed-for-a-successful-2014-transition-in-afghanistan; Biddle, ‘Running Out of Time’; Blank, ‘Q&A with Jonah Blank’; Jones, ‘It Takes the Villages’; Robert D. Blackwill, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67026/ robert-d-blackwill/plan-b-in-afghanistan; Will, ‘Time to Get Out’; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 219; Gates, Duty, p. 7. The following Afghan sources validate my point: Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar, Afghanistan in the Course of History (Virginia, 1999); Sadeeq Farhang, Afghanistan in the Last Five Centuries (1988); Zahir Tanin, Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century; 1900-1996 (M. Abrahim Shareehi, 2005); Said Abdullah Kazem, Afghan Women Under the Pressure of Tradition and Modernisation (California, 2005). In the King era, the central government did not have plenty of resources and was little responsive for development compared to the Karzai Government. The above Afghan sources give substance to my point. For the argument about the tribal authority, see ‘People’s Voice’ [Kunar], TOLOnews, 9 July 2013, http://youtu.be/8fjZLPbsrBM; ‘Open Jirga – Role of Elders – BBC Media Action’, BBC and RTA, 23 December 2013, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v¼rX86bG8PybI; ‘Open Jirga NUG’. Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Hamid Karzai, ‘President Karzai: Afghanistan not Political Lab for New Experiments by Foreigners’, 21 January 2012, http:// president.gov.af/en/news/6409; Wazhma Frogh, ‘Afghans can’t trust anyone’, Guardian, 22 September 2009. Biddle, ‘Steps Needed’; Biddle, ‘Running Out of Time’; Peter Bergen, ‘AlQaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 24 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate. gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistanand-pakistan; Jawad, ‘Hunting Al Qaeda’; Karzai, ‘Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS’; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Neumann, Hadley and Podesta, ‘Afghan Endgame’. ‘People’s Voice: Kunduz Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 22 February 2016, http://youtu.be/TidDvzkpcsg; ‘People’s Voice [Herat]; ‘People’s Voice: Faryab Residents’; ‘People’s Voice: Baghlan’; ‘People’s Voice: Kandahar’; ‘Open Jirga 55’; ‘Open Jirga 1’; ‘Open Jirga 37’; ‘Open Jirga 62’. Zainab Salbi, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 27 July 2010, http://www.foreign.senate. gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan; Hamid Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Xinhua News Agency’, 31 March 2014, http://afghanistanembassy.org.uk/english/fulltranscript-of-president-karzais-interview-with-xinhua-news-agency/; Hamid

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22.

23.

24. 25. 26.

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159 –161

263

Karzai, ‘Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with Wall Street Journal conducted by Yaroslav Trofimov and Matt Murray’, 15 February 2012, http:// president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithWallStreetJournalconductedbyYaroslavTrofimovandMattMurray 2522012162819915553325325.pdf; ‘Open Jirga 1’; ‘Open Jirga 37’; ‘Open Jirga 55’; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Gates, Duty, p. 559. For the final reason, see Hamid Karzai, ‘Transcript of President Karzai interview with ABC News, Good Morning Program’, 13 October 2009, http://president. gov.af/en/documents?page ¼2; Hamid Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of the Interview by President Hamid Karzai with The Washington Post’, 14 November 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/14/ AR2010111400002.html; Gates, Duty, pp. 481– 2, 484, 489; Eikenberry, ‘US Embassy Cables’; ‘Generation Kill’. Hamid Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with British Newspaper, the Sunday Times’, 27 January 2014, http://afghanistanembassy. org.uk/english/full-transcript-of-president-karzais-interview-with-britishnewspaper-the-sunday-times/; Hamid Karzai, ‘Interview by President Hamid Karzai with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC)’, 6 December 2012, http://president.gov.af/en/News/15454 (also at, https://www.bing.com/videos/ search?q ¼ Interview þ by þ President þ Hamid þ Karzai þ with þ þ NBC& view ¼ detail&mid¼E8EF80C1100C5D7656E6E8EF80C1100C5D7656E6 &FORM¼VIRE); Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s interview with IRD’. Hamid Karzai, ‘Statement by His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the 67th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, 25 September 2012, http://president.gov.af/en/news/13135 (also at, http://afghanistan-un.org/2012/09/president-hamid-karzai-speaks-atthe-united-nations-general-assembly/); Karzai, ‘Interview by President Hamid Karzai with the National Broadcasting Company’. Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 143. Kilcullen, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation’; Kaplan, ‘The End’; ‘90 Min Show#7’. For the development aspect of the civilian surge, see Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 106–8, 176, 204, 218–19; Richard C. Holbrooke, ‘Statement of Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan: Governance and the Civilian Strategy,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 14 July 2010, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ Holbrooke,%20Amb.%20Richard%20C1.pdf; Richard C. Holbrooke, ‘Civilian Strategy for Afghanistan: A Status Report in Advance of the London Conference’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 21 January 2010, http://www.foreign. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HolbrookeTestimony100121p.pdf; Gates, Duty, pp. 380, 476; J. Alexander Thier, ‘Afghanistan: Right Sizing the Developmental Footprint’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 September 2011, http://www. foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-right-sizing-the-development-footprint?; Hastings, ‘The Rolling Stone’; ‘Generation Kill’; Singh, Barack Obama’s

264

27.

28.

29.

30. 31.

32.

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Post-American, p. 82; Karzai, ‘Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with Wall Street Journal’; ‘Open Jirga 33’; ‘Open Jirga 36’; ‘5. Open Jirga’; ‘2. Open Jirga’; ‘People’s Voice: Farah’s Issues’. For the discussion of US-India and Pakistan-China relations (and the quotes), see Mann, The Obamians, p. 189; Jaffrelot, ‘What engagement’; ‘Sweet as can be? Even an all-weather friendship has limits’, The Economist, 12 May 2011; Brzezinski, ‘From Hope’; Clinton, Hard Choices, p.182; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 123. For the discussion why Pakistan supported radical groups, see Krasner, ‘Talking Tough’; Krepon, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy’; Brzezinski, ‘From Hope’; DeYoung, ‘Without Large’; Fair, ‘Al-Qaeda’; Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 178; ‘Open Jirga 62’; ‘26. Open Jirga’. Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington D.C.,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/062211%20Secretary%20Clinton%20Testimony%20for%20SFRC%20 Af-Pak%20Hearing.pdf; Obama, ‘Statement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review’; ‘Generation Kill’; DeYoung, ‘Without Large’; Ahmed, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy’; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 237– 8; John F. Kerry, ‘“Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan”’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 27 July 2010, http://www. foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan; John F. Kerry, ‘Kerry Opening Statement At Hearing Titled “Al Qaeda, The Taliban, And Other Extremist Groups In Afghanistan and Pakistan”’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 24 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate. gov/press/chair/release/kerry-opening-statement-at-hearing-titled-al-qaedathe-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan; Lugar, ‘Lugar Says Pakistan’. Jaffrelot, ‘What engagement’. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Battle for Afghanistan: The Soviets Versus the Mujahideen During the 1980s (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2007); Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Leslie H. Gelb, ‘Joe Biden On Iraq, Iran, China and the Taliban’, Newsweek, 19 December 2011, http://www.newsweek.com/joe-biden-iraq-iran-china-andtaliban-65953; Ahmed, ‘Assessing US Policy’; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Haass, ‘Afghanistan’. ‘Open Jirga 31 New Government’s Challenges’, BBC and RTA, 27 October 2014, http://youtu.be/27bgm63hoFM; Nawaz, ‘The Pakistan dilemma’; Jaffrelot, ‘What engagement’; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Gelb, ‘Joe Biden’; Haass, ‘Afghanistan’; Clinton, Hard Choices, pp. 181– 2; Clinton, ‘Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony’; Krasner, ‘Talking Tough’; Holbrooke, ‘Civilian Strategy for Afghanistan’. For a list of Pakistan’s problems, see Ahmed, ‘Assessing US Policy’.

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33. Ahmed, ‘Assessing US Policy’; Jaffrelot, ‘What engagement’; Krasner, ‘Talking Tough’; Clinton, Hard Choices, pp. 178, 187; Singh, Barack Obama’s PostAmerican, p. 78. 34. The analysis on obstacles to peace talks is based on the following sources: Bergen, ‘Al-Qaeda’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 231– 5; Hamid Karzai, ‘Transcript of interview by President Hamid Karzai with Pakistani Geo TV’, 21 October 2011, http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/Transcript ofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithGeoTV21October_English2410201118171 6563553325325.pdf; Karzai, ‘Full transcript of President Karzai’s interview with Aryn Baker’; Karzai, ‘Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS’; Karzai, ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s interview with IRD’; ‘Open Jirga (Episode 52) National Unity Government Anniversary’, BBC and RTA, 28 September 2015, http://youtu.be/A0XbuIubCpM; ‘5. Open Jirga’; ‘25. Open Jirga’; ‘Open Jirga 31’; ‘Open Jirga 38’; ‘Open Jirga 62’; ‘Open Jirga NUG’; ‘90 Minutes Second Program’; ‘90min 5th program’; DeYoung, ‘Without Large’; Krepon, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy’; Haass, ‘Afghanistan’; Gates, Duty, p. 477; Clinton, Hard Choices, pp. 151, 154 – 62; Clinton, ‘Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony’; Kerry, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation’; Salbi, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation’; Kim Baker, ‘Letter From Kabul’; Boot, ‘The Road’; Kilcullen, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation’; Haass, ‘Afghanistan’; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Lemmon, ‘What Leaving Afghanistan’; Biddle, ‘Running Out of Time’; Biddle, ‘Steps Needed’. For the conditions, see Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan’, 22 June 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-wayforward-afghanistan; Clinton, ‘Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony’; Holbrooke, ‘Civilian Strategy for Afghanistan’. 35. Holbrooke, ‘Civilian Strategy for Afghanistan’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 232. 36. For the way Holbrooke was treated in both Kabul and the White House, see Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 222, 227– 32, 235; Bergen, ‘Al-Qaeda’; Crocker, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation’; ‘Open Jirga 62’. 37. George Gavrilis, ‘Why Regional Solutions Won’t Help Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 18 October 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136598/ george-gavrilis/why-regional-solutions-wont-help-afghanistan; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 226. 38. Gavrilis, ‘Why Regional Solutions’; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 189, 317. 39. For the arguments relating to the role of Iran (and Saudi Arabia), see Barack Obama, ‘First Press Conference on NW Airlines Flight 253’, 28 December 2009, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobama flight253terrorismiranviolence.htm; Barack Obama, ‘Address on UN Security Council Sanctions Against Iran’, 9 June 2010, http://www.americanrhetoric. com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamairansanctions.htm; Matthew Rosenberg, ‘With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan’, New York Times,

266

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46.

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28 April 2013; Jones, In the Graveyard, p. 276; Singh, Barack Obama’s PostAmerican, pp. 12 – 13, 87; Gates, Duty, p. 221; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 227; DeYoung, ‘Without Large’; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Karzai, ‘Transcript of interview by President Hamid Karzai with Pakistani Geo TV’; ‘26. Open Jirga’; ‘90 Minutes Second Program’; Carlotta Gall, ‘Saudis Bankroll Taliban, Even as King Officially Supports Afghan Government’, New York Times, 6 December 2016. Gates, Duty, p. 212; Gavrilis, ‘Why Regional Solutions’; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, P. 227; Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 216. Gavrilis, ‘Why Regional Solutions’. See also ‘90 Minutes Third Program’; ‘90min 5th program’; ‘25. Open Jirga’; ‘Open Jirga 38’; ‘Open Jirga NUG’; ‘Open Jirga 62’. ‘90min 5th program’. Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 227; Krepon, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy’; Haass, ‘Afghanistan’; ‘25. Open Jirga’; ‘Open Jirga 38’; ‘90 Minutes First Program’; ‘90min 5th Program’. Clinton, ‘Afghanistan’. Richard G. Lugar, ‘Lugar Says Obama Lacks Vision of Success in Afghanistan Strategic Value of Long-Term Engagement and Cost No Longer Justified’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/ press/ranking/release/lugar-says-obama-lacks-vision-of-success-in-afghanistanstrategic-value-of-long-term-engagement-and-cost-no-longer-justified; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, p. 241. Gates, Duty, pp. 569– 70.

Chapter 10 The Surge Decision at the Evaluation Phase and Obama’s Formulation of the Withdrawal Decision, June 2011 1. Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, pp. 2, 12 – 13; Helene Cooper, ‘Cost of Wars a Rising Issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels’, New York Times, 21 June 2011; Klein, ‘Bin Laden’s War’; Jeff Zeleny and Jim Rutenberg, ‘Obama Finds Praise, Even From Republicans’, New York Times, 2 May 2011; Mann, The Obamians, p. 2; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 49; David W. Barno, Nora Bensahel and Travis Sharp, ‘How To Cut the Defense Budget Responsibly’, Foreign Affairs, 2 November 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136639/ david-w-barno-nora-bensahel-and-travis-sharp/how-to-cut-the-defense-budgetresponsibly. 2. Matthew Moten, ‘Out of Order: Strengthening the Political-Military Relationship’, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2010, http:// www.cfr.org/polls-and-opinion-analysis/out-order/p22914; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 217, 223; Desch, ‘Bush’; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 66; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 67.

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3. Boot, ‘The Road’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 321; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, pp. 12 – 13, 75 – 6; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, pp. 64 – 6; Mann, The Obamians, p. 217. 4. O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 321; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 75. 5. O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’. 6. ‘Transcript And Audio: Vice Presidential Debate’, npr, 11 October 2012, https://www.npr.org/2012/10/11/162754053/transcript-biden-ryan-vicepresidential-debate; Cooper, ‘Cost of Wars’; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, pp. 65 – 7; Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, ‘Obama Will Speed Pullout from War in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 22 June 2011. 7. Michael Mandelbaum, ‘America’s Coming Retrenchment’, Foreign Affairs, 9 August 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68024/michael-mandel baum/americas-coming-retrenchment; Barno, Bensahel and Sharp, ‘How To Cut’; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, p. 65. 8. Gates, Duty, p. 561; Cooper, ‘Cost of Wars’. 9. For the views of the Biden camp and its supporters, including the inner circle (and the quotes), see Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 321– 2, 327, 330, 324; Bird and Marshall, Afghanistan, pp. 221, 245, 251; Richard N. Haass, ‘The Irony of American Strategy’, Council on Foreign Relations, May/June 2013, http:// www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/irony-americanstrategy/p30534? cid¼rss-fullfeed-the_irony_of_american_strategy-042313; Haass, ‘Afghanistan’; Gates, Duty, pp. 474, 483, 486– 7, 492, 500, 502; John F. Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry Opening Statement At Nomination Hearing For Ambassador To Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 June 2011, http://www. foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-kerry-opening-statement-atnomination-hearing-for-ambassador-to-afghanistan; Kerry, ‘Kerry Opening Statement At Hearing Titled’; Kerry, ‘Getting the transition right’; Richard G. Lugar, ‘Lugar Tells Afghan Nominee U.S. Must Focus Strategy, Defending Vital Security Interests at Less Cost’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 June 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/lugar-tells-afghannominee-us-must-focus-strategy-defending-vital-security-interests-at-lesscost; Lugar, ‘Lugar Says Obama Lacks Vision’; Boot, ‘The Road’; Landler and Cooper, ‘Obama Will Speed’; Cooper, ‘Cost of Wars’; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, pp. 65 – 6, 101, 165; Paul R. Pillar, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ Pillar%20Testimony.pdf; Krepon, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy’; Mandelbaum, ‘America’s Coming’; Brzezinski, ‘From Hope’; Yingling, ‘An Absence’; Kagan and Kagan, ‘The Case’; Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, p. 86. 10. For the views of the military camp (Gates, Clinton and Mullen) and its supporters (and the quotes), see David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, ‘Steeper Pullout Is Raised as Option for Afghanistan’, New York Times, 5 June 2011; Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 322, 324; Gates, Duty,

268

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

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pp. 483, 486– 7, 492, 562– 5; Clinton, Hard Choices, pp. 150– 69; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’; Landler and Cooper, ‘Obama Will Speed’; Fotini Christia, ‘Letter From Kabul’, Foreign Affairs, 26 June 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs. com/features/letters-from/letter-from-kabul; Neumann, ‘Afghanistan’; Crocker, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation’; Salbi, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation’; Neumann, Hadley and Podesta, ‘Afghan Endgame’; Bergen, ‘Al-Qaeda’; Seth G. Jones, ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 10 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/ hearings/steps-needed-for-a-successful-2014-transition-in-afghanistan; Kagan and Kagan, ‘The Case’; DeYoung, ‘Without Large’; Boot, ‘The Road’; James Dobbins, ‘Your COIN Is NO Good Here’, Foreign Affairs, 26 October 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66949/james-dobbins/your-coin-is-nogood-here; Scott Seward Smith, ‘Making Withdrawal Work’, Foreign Affairs, 15 August 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68015/scott-sewardsmith/making-withdrawal-work; Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Why Drones Fail’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 139454/audrey-kurth-cronin/why-drones-fail; David Kilcullen, ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 10 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kilcullen %20Testimony.pdf; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 May 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-anacceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there. Pfiffner, ‘Decision Making’, p. 244; McGurk, ‘Agreeing on’; Sanger, Schmitt and Shanker, ‘Steeper Pullout’; Gates, Duty, pp. 556–7, 562–5; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 323. Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 322– 3; Landler and Cooper, ‘Obama Will Speed’; Gates, Duty, pp. 562– 5. Chandrasekaran, Little America, pp. 323, 325. Gates, Duty, pp. 562– 5; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 326. Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan’; Gates, Duty, p. 564. The arguments about the four factors that influenced Obama’s decision to draw down (and the quotes) are derived from the following sources: Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American, pp. 8, 17, 83; Mann, The Obamians, pp. 214, 310– 13, 316– 19, 323; Sanger, Schmitt and Shanker, ‘Steeper Pullout’; Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 324; Barack Obama, ‘“A New Beginning” Speech at Cairo University’, 4 June 2009, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barack obama/barackobamacairouniversity.htm; Barack Obama, ‘Address to the Nation on the End of Operation Iraqi Freedom’, 31 August 2010, http://www. americanrhetoric.com/speeches/wariniraq/barackobamairaqendofcombatops. htm; Barack Obama, ‘Address on the Death of Muammar Gaddafi’, 20 October 2011, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobama qaddafideath.htm; Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in

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269

Afghanistan’; Obama, ‘Statement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review’; ‘Transcript And Audio: Vice Presidential Debate’; Kerry, ‘Getting the transition right’; Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry Welcomes Progress In Afghanistan’; Kerry, Chairman Kerry Opening Statement At Hearing With Secretary Clinton On Afghanistan And Pakistan’; Gates, Duty, p. 488; Dodge and Redman, Afghanistan, pp. 50 – 1; Zeleny and Rutenberg, ‘Obama Finds Praise’; Landler and Cooper, ‘Obama Will Speed’; Yingling, ‘An Absence’; McGurk, ‘Agreeing on’; O’Hanlon, ‘Staying Power’; Haass, ‘The Irony’; ‘Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 21 January 2010, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/Yemen.pdf; Leah Farrall, ‘How al Qaeda Works’, World Affairs, 30 April 2011, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-alqaeda-works.

Chapter 11 The Withdrawal Strategy at the Implementation Phase and Obama’s Final Policy Alterations, July 2011 – December 2016 1. James B. Cunningham, ‘Testimony of James B. Cunningham’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 July 2012, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/Cunningham_Testimony.pdf. 2. Barack Obama, ‘Statement by the President on Afghanistan’, 27 May 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/27/statement-presidentafghanistan; Mark Landler, ‘U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2014’, New York Times, 27 May 2014; Kevin Sieff, ‘5 harsh truths about the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 29 May 2014; Karen DeYoung, ‘Obama to leave 9,800 U.S. troops in Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 27 March 2014. 3. Cunningham, ‘Testimony of James B. Cunningham’; Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan’; Feldman, ‘“Afghanistan’; Thier, ‘Afghanistan’; ‘Transcript And Audio: Vice Presidential Debate’. 4. Cunningham, ‘Testimony of James B. Cunningham’. 5. Jane Perlez, ‘$16 Billion in Civilian Aid Pledged to Afghanistan, With Conditions’, New York Times, 8 July 2012; Cunningham, ‘Testimony of James B. Cunningham’; Michael R. Gordon, ‘Meeting Afghan Leaders, Donors Pledge Support’, New York Times, 4 December 2014; Tim Craig, ‘U.S. will seek billions more to support Afghan military efforts’, Washington Post, 18 June 2016. 6. Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, ‘Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building’, 2005, odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odiassets/publications-opinion-files/2482.pdf; Gregg, ‘Beyond Population’. 7. Editorial, ‘A Grim Decision on Afghanistan’, New York Times, 15 October 2015. 8. Ashraf Ghani, ‘Congressional Address President Mohammed Ashraf Ghani’, 25 March 2015, http://afghanistan-un.org/2015/03/congressional-addresspresident-mohammed-ashraf-ghani/.

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9. Ashraf Ghani, ‘Inaugural Speech by Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai as the President of Afghanistan’, 29 September 2014, http://www.hpc.org.af/english/ index.php/news/speeches/206-inaugural-speech-by-dr-ashraf-ghani-ahmadzai-asthe-president-of-afghanistan. 10. For the discussion relating to peace talks, see Saeed Shah and Jeremy Page, ‘China Readies $46 Billion for Pakistan Trade Route’, Wall Street Journal, 16 April 2015; Mujib Mashal and Andrew E. Kramer, ‘Russia Pulls Back from Cooperating with U.S. on Afghanistan’, New York Times, 20 February 2016; ‘Open Jirga NUG’; Ashraf Ghani, ‘Transcript of H.E. President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani’s Remarks at Warsaw Summit’, 9 July 2016, https:// afghanembassyturkmenistan.com/transcript-of-h-e-president-mohammad-ashraf-ghanis-remarks-at-warsaw-summit/; Ershad Ahmadi, ‘Kunduz and the Many Failures in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 1 October 2015; Tim Craig and Michael E. Miller, ‘Four-way Talks on Afghanistan Start, with Much to Overcome’, Washington Post, 11 January 2016; Lynne O’Donnell, ‘Afghan warlord changes his conditions for peace with Kabul’, Washington Post, 5 April 2016; Editorial, ‘Nurturing Afghan Peace Talks’, New York Times, 10 July 2015. 11. ‘Open Jirga 27 Election Crisis and its Effect on Economy’, BBC and RTA, 3 September 2014, http://youtu.be/deBcIxTD1L4. 12. Editorial, ‘In Afghanistan, Time for Compromise’, New York Times, 4 September 2014. 13. For the ineffectiveness of the NUG (and the quotes), see Ahmadi, ‘Kunduz and the Many Failures’. 14. Editorial, ‘Afghanistan’s next chapter,’ New York Times, 28 March 2015. 15. ‘TOLOnews 6pm News 30 June 2016’, TOLOnews, 30 June 2016, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v¼dw7n9wP1UuQ; Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Afghan forces suffering too many casualties, says top Nato commander’, Guardian, 2 September 2013; Andrew J. Tabler and Dennis Ross, ‘A Syria Policy for Trump’, Foreign Affairs, 28 November 2016. 16. Editorial, ‘Is the Pentagon Telling the Truth About Afghanistan?’, New York Times, 13 October 2015; Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, ‘Are We Losing Afghanistan Again?’, New York Times, 21 October 2015; ‘People’s Voice: Baghlan Residents’. 17. ‘People’s Voice: Laghman Residents Share their Challenges’, TOLOnews, 15 February 2016, http://youtu.be/XgUZBJt4inI; ‘People’s Voice: Samangan Residents Speak Out About Their Problems’, TOLOnews, 3 November 2015, https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q¼People%e2%80%99s þ Voice% 3a þ Samangan þ Residents þ Speak þ Out þ About þ Their þ Problems %e2%80%99&view¼detail&mid¼8995892D006D1751F74A899589 2D006D1751F74A&FORM¼VIRE; ‘People’s Voice: Takhar’; ‘People’s Voice: Badghis; ‘People’s Voice: Kandahar’; ‘People’s Voice: Logar’; ‘People’s Voice: Kunduz’; ‘People’s Voice: Helmand’; ‘Open Jirga (Episode 52)’; ‘Open Jirga 42’; Byman, Daniel, ‘Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice’, Brookings Institution, July/August 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/

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research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorismbyman. 18. ‘Tolonews 6pm News 08 April 2018’, TOLOnews, 8 April 2018, https://youtu.be/ gPoWYrqRYes. 19. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ‘This is how bad the situation is in Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 26 January 2016; Missy Ryan and Greg Jaffe, ‘Senior U.S. General Wants to Start Striking the Taliban Again’, Washington Post, 14 March 2016; Joseph Goldstein, ‘Afghan Security Forces Struggle just to Maintain Stalemate’, New York Times, 22 July 2015. 20. Barack Obama, ‘Statement by the President on Afghanistan’, 15 October 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/statement-presidentafghanistan; Barack Obama, ‘Statement by the President on Afghanistan’, 6 July 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/06/statementpresident-afghanistan; David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘It’s time to unleash America’s airpower in Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 15 January 2016; Missy Ryan and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ‘U.S. widens war in Afghanistan, authorizes new action against Taliban’, Washington Post, 10 June 2016; Editorial, ‘A Grim Decision’; Joscelyn and Roggio, ‘Are We Losing’; Missy Ryan and Greg Jaffe, ‘Senior US General Wants to Start Striking the Taliban Again’, Washington Post, 14 March 2016; Missy Ryan and Karen DeYoung, ‘Obama alters Afghanistan exit plan once more, will leave 8,400 troops’, Washington Post, 6 July 2016; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ‘Top U.S. general in Afghanistan: ‘A strategic stalemate without end is not the goal of this campaign’, Washington Post, 12 February 2015; Khalilzad, ‘Pakistan’.

Chapter 12 An Insider’s Insight into President Trump and his Administration 1. The First Presidential Debate: Hillary Clinton And Donald Trump (Full Debate) j NBC News’, NBC News, 26 September 2016, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v¼855Am6ovK7s. 2. For the arguments about mercantilism (and the quotes), see Max Fisher, ‘What Is Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy’, New York Times, 11 November 2016; James Kitfield, ‘The Knowns and Unknowns of Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy’, The Atlantic, 19 November 2016. See also Donald Trump, ‘Trump Inauguration Speech (FULL) ABC News’, ABC News, 20 January 2017, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v¼sRBsJNdK1t0. 3. For the arguments about Jacksonian views (and the quotes), see Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, ‘In Trump’s Washington, rival powers and whispers in the president’s ear’, Washington Post, 16 November 2016; Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, ‘Trump’s hard-line actions have an intellectual godfather: Jeff Sessions’, Washington Post, 30 January 2017; Ellen Nakashima and Sari Horwitz, ‘Trump’s pick for attorney general is shadowed by race and history’, Washington Post, 24 December 2016; Mark Landler and Eric Schmitt, ‘H.R. McMaster Breaks

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5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

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With Administration on Views of Islam’, New York Times, 24 February 2017; Peter Baker, ‘Will Trump Take “Brutally Forthright” Advice From McMaster’, New York Times, 25 February 2017; David Von Drehle, ‘Is Steve Bannon the Second Most Powerful Man in the World’, TIME, 7 February 2017; Alison McQueen, ‘Apocalyptic Thought in the Age of Trump’, Foreign Affairs, 20 November 2016. Ibid. See also ‘The Second Presidential Debate: Hillary Clinton And Donald Trump (Full Debate) NBC News’, NBC News, 9 October 2016, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v¼FRlI2SQ0Ueg; ‘The Third Presidential Debate: Hillary Clinton And Donald Trump (Full Debate) NBC News’, NBC News, 19 October 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼smkyorC5qwc; ‘Donald Trump on Foreign Policy’, OnTheIssue, accessed 13 February 2017. Karen DeYoung, ‘Do campaign statements and tweets add up to a Trump foreign policy strategy?’, Washington Post, 28 December 2016; Walter Russell Mead, ‘Andrew Jackson, Revenant’, The American Interest, 17 January 2016. Clinton later apologised for the comments, see Ben Jacobs, ‘Hillary Clinton calls half of Trump supporters bigoted ‘deplorables’’, Guardian, 10 September 2016. Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Legacy Of Barack Obama – Fareed Zakaria’, CNN, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v¼B1Xc_n7pow0. For all the quotes, see Rucker and Costa, ‘In Trump’s Washington’; Rucker and Costa, ‘Trump’s hard-line’. For similar arguments, see also Nakashima and Horwitz, ‘Trump’s pick’; Drehle, ‘Is Steve Bannon’. For the arguments about whether Trump is a dictator or not (and the quotes), see Tom McCarthy and Martin Pengelly, ‘Comey book likens Trump to a mafia boss “untethered to truth”’, Guardian, 13 April 2018; Meghan Keneally, ‘Comey says Trump presidency is a “forest fire” that can cause “tremendous damage”’, ABC News, 15 April 2018; Gideon Rose and Michael Kazin, ‘A Conversation on Trump and American Populism’, Foreign Affairs, 29 December 2016; Matthew Rosenberg, Maggie Haberman and Gardiner Harris, ‘Trump to G.O.P. Gathering: Where’s My C.I.A. Director?’, New York Times, 26 January 2017; Rucker and Costa, ‘In Trump’s Washington’; Kitfield, ‘The Knowns’; Glenn Thrush and Maggie Haberman, ‘Republicans Look to Reince Priebus, Trump’s Chief of Staff, to Bring Stability’, New York Times, 17 January 2017. Rebecca Seales, ‘Eight Ways President Donald Trump will make history’, BBC, 21 January 2017; Kitfield, ‘The Knowns’. See also Joseph A. Mussomeli, ‘Here’s why Trump’s foreign policy terrifies neocons’, Washington Post, 9 June 2016; Stephen Wertheim, ‘Trump and American Exceptionalism’, Foreign Affairs, 3 January 2017. ‘Obama on Trump Pragmatism: ‘That Can Serve Him Well’, ABC News, 14 November 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v ¼ B1PbrYhirU4; Kitfield, ‘The Knowns’; Bob Hennelly, ‘Alternative facts in the Middle East: Obama has left Trump a disaster in Afghanistan’, SALON, 29 January 2017.

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12. For the policy-makers’ views and Trump’s controversial comments (and the quotes), see Fisher, ‘What Is’; ‘The Vice-Presidential Debate: Tim Kaine And Mike Pence (Full Debate) j NBC News’, NBC News, 4 October 2016, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v ¼ mVXqNcW_-HA; Thrush and Haberman, ‘Republicans Look’; Philip Bump, ‘Who is Rex Tillerson, the ExxonMobil chairman who may become secretary of state?’, Washington Post, 11 January 2017; ‘Trump transition: Who is General “Mad Dog” Mattis?’, BBC, 2 December 2016; Baker, ‘Will Trump’; Landler and Schmitt, ‘H.R. McMaster’; Rachael Revesz, ‘Kansas rep Mike Pompeo confirmed as CIA director’, Independent, 24 January 2017; Hennelly, ‘Alternative facts’. 13. For examples of Trump being inconsistent and unclear, see Jeremy Shapiro, ‘What Europe should do about a problem like Trump’, ecfr.eu, 10 November 2016; ‘Open Letter on Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders’, War on the Rock, 2 March 2016; Matt Peterson, ‘Ranked: Donald Trump’s Foreign-Policy Contradictions’, The Atlantic, 19 January 2017; Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig, ‘“People That Hate US”: What can Afghans expect from President Trump?’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 11 November 2016; Fisher, ‘What Is’; Damian Paletta, ‘Clinton vs. Trump: Where They Stand on Foreign Policy Issues’, Wall Street Journal, accessed 10 February 2017. 14. David Ignatius, ‘What President Trump’s foreign policy will look like’, Washington Post, 9 November 2016; DeYoung, ‘Do campaign’. 15. McCarthy and Pengelly, ‘Comey book likens Trump’; ‘The First Presidential Debate’; ‘Donald Trump on Foreign Policy’; Dani K. Nedal and Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Trump Won’t Get the Best Deals’, Foreign Affairs, 31 January 2017. 16. The personal information on Trump (and the quotes) come from Seales, ‘Eight Ways’; ‘How Donald Trump thinks about foreign policy’, Vox.com, 1 November 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v ¼ xpExmP7ZAyQ; ‘Donald Trump on Foreign Policy’; ‘The First Presidential Debate’; Kitfield, ‘The Knowns’; DeYoung, ‘Do campaign’. 17. David Smith, ‘White House doctor says Trump will remain “fit for duty” for years’, Guardian, 16 Jan 2018. 18. Emran Feroz, ‘Trump Inherits the ‘Good War’’, The Atlantic, 16 December 2016. 19. Mara Revkin and Ahmad Mhidi, ‘Why ISIS is Rooting for Trump’, Foreign Affairs, 24 August 2016. 20. ‘Donald Trump on Foreign Policy’; Fisher, ‘What Is’; Mussomeli, ‘Here’s why’. 21. Thomas Wright, ‘The 2016 presidential campaign and the crisis of US foreign policy’, Lowy Institute, October 2016. 22. Van Jackson, ‘Reading Trump’, Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2017. 23. Rucker and Costa, ‘In Trump’s Washington’; Seales, ‘Eight Ways’. 24. Michael D. Shear and Maggie Haberman, ‘Critics See Stephen Bannon, Trump’s Pick for Strategist, as Voice of Racism’, New York Times, 14 November 2016; Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Two theories about why Steve Bannon midwifed such a bad executive order’, Washington Post, 30 January 2017; Rucker and Costa, ‘In Trump’s Washington’; Clark and Ruttig, ‘People That’.

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25. Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Trump’s Luck Year’, Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2018; Mark Landler, ‘Trump Foreign Policy Quickly Loses its Sharp Edge’, New York Times, 10 February 2017. 26. For pieces of evidence that Trump was moving towards a pragmatic approach in foreign policy (and the quotes), see Choe Sang-Hun, ‘“We No Longer Need” Nuclear or Missile Tests, North Korean Leader Says’, New York Times, 20 April 2018; ‘Steve Bannon: The Trump-whisperer’s rapid fall from grace’, BBC, 14 January 2018; ‘President Trump Holds a Joint Press Conference with Secretary General Stoltenberg’, The White House, 12 April 2017, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v¼bzDg7G9c1e8; Janet Hook, ‘Trump Speech to Congress Marks a Shift in Tone’, Wall Street Journal, 1 March 2017; Donald Trump, ‘FULL SPEECH: President Donald Trump Speech to Joint Session of Congress 2/28/217 Trump Live Speech’, 28 February 2017, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v¼S02SNC8xpzU; Tom Phillips, ‘Donald Trump hails friendship with China’s Xi as missiles head to Syria’, Guardian, 7 April 2017; Matthew Chance and Tim Lister, ‘Russia-US ties face long haul to recover from “zero”’, CNN, 7 April 2017. 27. Jon Swaine, ‘US threatens European companies with sanctions after Iran deal pullout’, Guardian, 13 May 2018; Dominic Rushe, ‘Donald Trump signs order for metals tariff plan, prompting fears of trade war’, Guardian, 8 March 2018; ‘Instant View: Trump to Meet North Korea’s Kim’, New York Times, 8 March 2018; Jillian Kestler-D’Amours, ‘One year under Trump: “Attack” on climate change fight’, Aljazeera, 17 January 2018; Donald Trump, ‘President Donald Trump 100 days rally full speech in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 2017’, ABC News, 29 April 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼40iJUAHej14. 28. Chris Graham, ‘“You’re fired!”: Who Donald Trump has sacked and who has resigned during his time as president’, The Telegraph, 28 March 2018; Chris Cillizza, ‘People are leaving the Trump White House in record numbers’, CNN, 13 February 2018; James Mann, ‘Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Team: Built to Fail’, New York Times, 17 December 2016; Thrush and Haberman, ‘Republicans Look’; Kitfield, ‘The Knowns’; Rucker and Costa, ‘In Trump’s Washington’. 29. All the quotes are from Revkin and Mhidi, ‘Why ISIS’. See also Eliot A. Cohen, ‘A Clarifying Moment in American History’, The Atlantic, 29 January 2017; Cohen, ‘Trump’s Luck Year’; Drezner, ‘Two theories’; Rosenberg, Haberman and Harris, ‘Trump to G.O.P.’; Clark and Ruttig, ‘People That’; Kitfield, ‘The Knowns’; Paletta, ‘Clinton vs. Trump’. 30. For the opposition to Trump’s views, see Cohen, ‘A Clarifying Moment’; DeYoung, ‘Do campaign’; Thrush and Haberman, ‘Republicans Look’; Drezner, ‘Two theories’; Rosenberg, Haberman and Harris, ‘Trump to G.O.P.’. 31. Donald Trump, ‘President Trump Holds a Press Conference’, The White House, 16 February 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼Ct0H_ndjavM; Rosenberg, Haberman and Harris, ‘Trump to G.O.P.’ 32. For the argument that US national security interests were argued to be harmed if Trump’s populist agenda transferred to the international realm (and the

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quotes), see Cohen, ‘A Clarifying Moment’; Cohen, ‘Trump’s Luck Year’; Michael Krepon, ‘Trump and the Bomb’, Foreign Affairs, 20 November 2016; Keneally, ‘Comey says Trump presidency’; Amnesty International Reports 2017/2018, ‘The State of the World’s Human Rights’, 27 February 2018, http://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1067002018ENGLISH. PDF; Edoardo Campanella, ‘Will China Trump Trump’, Foreign Affairs, 14 November 2016; McQueen, ‘Apocalyptic Thought’; Wright, ‘The 2016 presidential’; Drezner, ‘Two theories’; ‘Open Letter on Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders’; Nedal and Nexon, ‘Trump Won’t Get’; Mussomeli, ‘Here’s why’; Eileen Sullivan and Deb Riechmann, ‘Unpredictable Trump foreign policy may test U.S. spy alliance’, The Seattle Times, 5 February 2017; Jeffrey A. Stacey, ‘The Trump Doctrine’, Foreign Affairs, 14 November 2016; Francis Fukuyama, ‘Trump and American Political Decay’, Foreign Affairs, 9 November 2016; Richard Fontaine and Robert D. Kaplan, ‘How Populism Will Change Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 23 May 2016. 33. For Trump supporters’ arguments (and the quotes) see Rucker and Costa, ‘In Trump’s Washington’; Rucker and Costa, ‘Trump’s hard-line’. See also Nakashima and Horwitz, ‘Trump’s pick’; Drehle, ‘Is Steve Bannon’; Landler and Schmitt, ‘H.R. McMaster’; Doug Bandow, ‘Trump and U.S. Alliances’, Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2017.

Chapter 13 Trump’s South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan at the Initiation, Formulation and Implementation Phases, 2016 –18 1. ‘The First Presidential Debate’; ‘The Second Presidential Debate’; ‘The Third Presidential Debate’; Greg Jaffe and Missy Ryan, ‘In Afghanistan, Trump will inherit a costly stalemate and few solutions’, Washington Post, 18 January 2017; Gwilym Williams, ‘Trump, Clinton, and future American policy towards Afghanistan’, OAG, 21 September 2016; Group of Experts and Former US Officials on Afghanistan, ‘Forging an Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan’, The National Interest, 14 September 2016. 2. John W. Nicholson, Jr, ‘The Situation in Afghanistan’, The Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 February 2017, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/ media/doc/Nicholson_02-09-17.pdf; ‘The First Presidential Debate’. 3. ‘Time to leave Afghanistan, Taliban tell Donald Trump’, Aljazeera, 25 January 2017. 4. The following sources contain the sceptical camp’s viewpoints (and the quotes, most of which come from the first three references cited). However, the authors of many of these articles did not support the pessimistic views. They, as will be seen below, argued for more troops and capabilities. The sources are as follows: ‘Afghanistan Is Now Trump’s War’, New York Times, 10 March 2017; Josh Rogin, ‘Selling Trump a new Afghanistan commitment’, Washington Post, 26 February 2017; Paul Waldman, ‘War without end: Neither Clinton nor Trump

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knows what to do about Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 6 July 2016; Ed Krayewski, ‘John McCain and Lindsey Graham Push for More Troops in Afghanistan’, reason.com, 14 March 2017; Alex Ward, ‘Afghanistan First? Trump mulls a mini surge for America’s longest war’, Vox, 9 May 2017; Hasib Danish Alikozai, ‘Experts Divided Over Trump Administration Plans for US in Afghanistan’, VOA, 1 February 2017; Shashank Bengali and Sultan Faizy, ‘How Trump will deal with America’s longest war is anyone’s guess’, Los Angeles Times, 19 January 2017; Feroz, ‘Trump Inherits’; Justin Rowlatt, ‘What will Trump do about Afghanistan?’, BBC, 25 January 2017; Hennelly, ‘Alternative facts’; Williams, ‘Trump, Clinton’; James Bennett, ‘Donald Trump has three choices in Afghanistan: stalemate, failure, or sending in more troops’, ABC News, 21 March 2017; Mark Landler, ‘The Afghan War and the Evolution of Obama’, New York Times, 1 January 2017; Editorial Board, ‘Trump Needs an Afghanistan Plan’, Bloomberg View, 10 February 2017; Jeremy Herb, ‘Congress looking for a Trump war plan for Afghanistan’, Politico, 9 February 2017; Seth G. Jones, ‘How Trump Should Manage Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 21 March 2017; Stephen Glover, ‘The war in Afghanistan’s a lost cause. It’s madness for us to send more troops’, Daily Mail, 11 May 2017. 5. For citizen/candidate Trump’s opposing views on the Afghanistan War and his hesitancy about the war, see Donald Trump, ‘Donald Trump on Afghanistan’, The Politics and Elections Portal, accessed 11 February 2017; Donald Trump, ‘President Donald Trump 100 days rally full speech in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 2017’; Donald Trump, ‘TRUMP talking the truth about Middle East!’, my edition, 11 November 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch? v¼k_YdGFvfA8E; Tom LoBianco, ‘Donald Trump backtracks on Afghanistan war: not a mistake’, CNN, 20 October 2016; Jaffe and Ryan, ‘In Afghanistan’; Rowlatt, ‘What will Trump’; Conor Finnegan, ‘After deadly ISIS attack, will Trump send more US troops to Afghanistan?’, ABC News, 10 March 2017; Herb, ‘Congress looking’; Waldman, ‘War without end’; Feroz, ‘Trump Inherits’; Herb, ‘Congress looking’; Tom Hussain, ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan are worried over Trump’s foreign-policy and anti-Muslim rhetoric’, South China Morning Post, 11 November 2016. 6. For Trump’s views on nation-building, strong men and his lack of support for spreading American values (and the quotes), see Karen DeYoung and Philip Rucker, ‘Trump lays groundwork to change U.S. role in the world’, Washington Post, 26 January 2017; ‘Donald Trump on Foreign Policy’; ‘The First Presidential Debate’; ‘The Second Presidential Debate’; ‘The Third Presidential Debate’; ‘How Donald Trump would promote stability in the Middle East’, Fox News, 1 May 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼8Cr3aPe3QnU; Trump, ‘TRUMP talking the truth’; Ignatius, ‘What President’; Max Fisher, ‘What Is’; Wertheim, ‘Trump and American Exceptionalism’; Ignatius, ‘What President’; Clark and Ruttig, ‘People That’; Seales, ‘Eight Ways’. 7. Pamela Constable and Syed Salahuddin, ‘Afghans Hope – and worry – that Trump will shake things up’, Washington Post, 23 January 2017.

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8. Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘Will Pakistan soon Have the World’s Third-Largest Nuclear Arsenal?’, The Diplomat, 31 August 2015. 9. Landler, ‘The Afghan War’. 10. Ahmadzai and Wahaj, ‘What Afghans’; Dawood Azami, ‘World powers jostle in Afghanistan’s new “Great Game”’. BBC, 12 January 2017; Jaffe and Ryan, ‘In Afghanistan’; Worden, ‘How to Stabilize’. 11. Ibid. 12. Many signatories to the letter entitled ‘Forging an Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan’ did not support a hard-line approach towards Pakistan. 13. ‘U.S. Options in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hudson Institute, 13 April 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v ¼ rtgMHVFfjQE; Fareed Zakaria, ‘The key to solving the puzzle of Afghanistan is Pakistan’, Washington Post, 8 October 2015. 14. For citizen/President Trump’s views on Pakistan, see Saba Aziz, ‘Pakistan-US war of words over Donald’s Trump’s tweet’, Aljazeera, 2 January 2018; Douglas Busvine, ‘Trump and Modi will be “best friends”: advisor to U.S. presidentelect’, Reuters, 10 November 2016; ‘Donald Trump on Foreign Policy’; ‘Donald Trump on Afghanistan’; Jaffe and Ryan, ‘In Afghanistan’. 15. Clark and Ruttig, ‘People That’; Jaffe and Ryan, ‘In Afghanistan’; Busvine, ‘Trump and Modi’; Ahmadzai and Wahaj, ‘What Afghans’; Constable and Salahuddin, ‘Afghans Hope’. 16. Jones, ‘How Trump’; Editorial Board, ‘Trump Needs’. 17. ‘U.S. Options in Afghanistan and Pakistan’. 18. Most of the (unreferenced) quotes in the section on optimistic viewpoints are from the open letter entitled ‘Forging an Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan’. The 19 signatories were former US civilian and military officials in Afghanistan as well as ‘Afghanistan scholars’. They included James Allen, David Barno, John Campbell, Ryan Crocker, James Cunningham, James Dobbins, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Robert Finn, Marc Grossman, Seth Jones, Zalmay Khalilzad, Clare Lockhart, Stanley McChrystal, Ronald Neumann, Michael O’Hanlon, David Petraeus, Bruce Riedel, David Sedney and Earl Anthony Wayne. Optimistic or hawkish views could also be found in John McCain and Lindsey Graham, ‘John McCain and Lindsey Graham: Why we need more forces to end the stalemate in Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 13 March 2017; Barnett R. Rubin, ‘The Art of the Deal in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 1 February 2017; Simon Tisdall, ‘Afghanistan is the dirty little secret of the US presidential campaign’, Guardian, 27 October 2016; Rogin, ‘Selling Trump’; Waldman, ‘War without end’; Fariba Pajooh, ‘Trump policy on Afghanistan still not clear’, UPI, 2 March 2017; Finnegan, ‘After deadly’; Editorial Board, ‘Trump Needs’; Scott Worden, ‘How to Stabilize Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 26 April 2017; Jones, ‘How Trump’; Herb, ‘Congress looking’; Davood Moradian, ‘The mistakes Trump should not repeat in Afghanistan’, Aljazeera, 22 January 2017; Bengali and Faizy, ‘How Trump’; Aziz Amin Ahmadzai and Ziauddin Wahaj, ‘What Afghans Expect from Donald Trump’,

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19.

20.

21.

22. 23. 24.

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The Diplomat, 21 November 2016; David Wood, ‘Afghanistan Is All Ready To Be Donald Trump’s First Foreign Policy Disaster’, Huffpost, 27 November 2016; Jaffe and Ryan, ‘In Afghanistan’; Clark and Ruttig, ‘“People That Hate US”; Samuel Ramani, ‘What a Trump Presidency Would Mean for Afghanistan’, The Diplomat, 2 August 2016; Rowlatt, ‘What will Trump’; Shawn Snow, ‘President Trump and the War in Afghanistan: What You Need to Know?’, The Diplomat, 21 November 2016; Alikozai, ‘Experts Divided’; Zakaria, ‘The key to’. Jeremy Herb, ‘Five key pieces of Trump’s Afghanistan plan’, CNN, 22 August 2017; Michael R. Gordon, ‘Trump Advisors Call for More Troops to Break Afghan Deadlock’, New York Times, 8 May 2017; Ryan and Jaffe, ‘U.S. poised’; Chris Graham, ‘Donald Trump ‘weighing up troop surge’ for Afghanistan amid ‘split in White House’, The Daily Telegraph, 9 May 2017. For Trump’s Afghanistan strategy, see Donald Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia’, The White House, 21 August 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/; ‘Trump rules out Afghan troops withdrawal’, BBC, 22 August 2017; Robin Emmott, ‘NATO to send more troops to Afghanistan after U.S. shift’, REUTERS, 8 November 2017; ‘Donald Trump on Afghanistan’. For the ‘challenges’ the NUG faced, see ‘Tolonews 6pm News 02 May 2018’, TOLOnews, 02 May 2018, https://youtu.be/_09ZAy8fSgU; ‘Afghanistan: Kabul voter centre suicide attack kills 57’, BBC, 22 April 2018; Pamela Constable, ‘Afghans, fearing more insurgent violence, feel abandoned by struggling government’, Washington Post, 11 February 2018; ‘TOLOnews 6pm News 28 April 2017’, TOLOnews, 28 April 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch? v¼KJpZ1sBKlog; ‘Karzai Slams Govt, Threatens To Oust U.S From Afghanistan’, TOLOnews, 15 April 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch? v¼p-aCnsIy4Cw. ‘Afghan Taliban Cool To Ghani Peace Offer While UN, 20 Countries Support It’, RFE/RL, 1 March 2018. Salman Masood, ‘At U.S. Urging, Pakistan to Be Placed on TerrorismFinancing List’, New York Times, 23 February 2018. ‘U.S. Options in Afghanistan and Pakistan’.

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INDEX

Abdullah, Abdullah, 3, 186, 213 Abizaid, John, 70 Afghan National Army (ANA), 77, 108, 189 Afghan National Police (ANP), 76, 77, 108, 158, 192 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), 2, 3, 6, 82, 101, 105, 108, 121– 2, 133, 135, 138– 42, 144– 5, 149– 50, 158, 159, 174– 6, 178, 181, 184– 6, 190–1, 193, 210, 213, 215–6, 218– 20, 229– 30 Afghanistan achievements in, 5, 63, 70, 137, 186, 189, 213, 228 Afghan-US relations, see Karzai; Ghani asylum seekers from, 3 civil war in, 1, 32, 110, 158 civilian casualties in, 2 corruption in, 2 – 3, 76 – 7, 79 – 80, 83 –6, 108, 151, 154– 5, 159– 60, 176, 187, 213, 224 economy of, 3, 77, 87, 92, 186, 191 employment in, 2– 3, 6, 86 – 7, 192 ‘inherent characteristics’ (‘complexities’) of, 6, 45, 80, 102, 112, 122, 147, 177, 210, 225

opium production in, 2 – 3, 77 – 8, 80, 83, 101, 160–1, 171, 210, 215, 218 Parliament of, 77, 83, 85, 167, 189 Pashtunwali in, 156 powerful syndicate in, 2, 79 – 80, 83 – 7, 92, 140, 153– 4, 157– 8, 187, 190, 220, 224, 229 reconstruction of, 78 – 80, 83, 87 – 8, 92, 154, 160– 1, 169, 192, 210, 224 shortcomings within the ANSF of, 101 shortcomings within the government of, 101 Soviet invasion of, 75, 104, 110, 113, 118, 153, 156, 161, 165, 178, 214, 224, 229 threats to, 1 – 2, 173 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 170 Akhundzada, Mawlawi Hibatullah, 188 Al Qaeda, 2, 15 – 8, 20 – 1, 23, 25 – 32, 34– 40, 42, 45– 6, 63 – 6, 69 – 70, 73, 75, 84, 88 – 9, 100, 103– 7, 109–12, 114, 121, 129, 133, 140–1, 145– 6, 152, 162, 165– 6, 176, 182, 184, 193, 215, 217, 223–4, 228 Albright, Madeleine, 168

INDEX al-Maliki, Nouri, 109 Amanullah, King, 225 America (United States) conspiracy theories relating to, 4 – 5, 9, 74, 160, 227– 8 constitution of, 15, 17 domestic economy of, 129, 133– 4, 145, 173, 176, 198, 206, 209 employment in, 133–4, 173, 176 motives (goals) in Afghanistan of, 4, 5, 40, 43, 84, 122, 139, 141, 151, 159, 176, 183, 193, 215, 218, 224, 227 poverty in, 173 US-Afghan and other foreign relations, see Bush Administration; Obama Administration; Trump Administration; see also Bush; Obama; Trump Amnesty International, 207 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), 58 Arab Spring, 183 Armitage, Richard role in decision making of, 52 – 3 views on the GWOT of, 31, 52 – 3 Assad, Bashar al-, 200, 205 Atmar, Mohammad Hanif, 190, 191 Australia, 78 Axelrod, David M., 105, 116, 119 see also ‘inner circle’ axis of evil, 59, 65 Badakhshan, 190 Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al-, 191 Balkans, 113, 129 Baloch, 4, 72 Bannon, Stephen K., 199, 204– 6, 208, 219 see also policy making; populism (Jacksonianism) Baradar, Mullah, 165 Bashardost, Ramazan, 171 belief system and personal images, see individual policy makers, views on

307

Bergen, Peter, 166 Biden group members of, 99, 105, 115 views on the drawdown strategy of, 175– 7 views on the surge strange of, 99 – 105 Biden, Joseph domestic factors and, 134, 138 role in decision making of, 113– 15, 123– 4, 137, 139, 159, 172, 183 views on the Afghanistan War of, 88, 112, 117– 19, 132– 3, 146, 148 views on the drawdown strategy of, 175– 7, 181– 2 views on the GWOT of, 88 –9, 114 views on the Iraq War of, 88 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 102– 3, 163 views on the surge strategy of, 99 – 105, 106, 108, 111, 123, 142– 3, 149– 50, 155– 6, 171 Bilateral Security Agreement, 185 bin Laden, Osama, 19, 20, 34, 35, 36, 145, 166, 181, 182, 217 Bird, Tim, 92, 176 Blair, Dennis role in decision making of, 125, 127– 9, 133 views on the surge strategy of, 105– 11 Blair, Tony, 1 Blank, Jonah, 93 Blinken, Antony J., 105, 127, 180 Bonn Conference, 34 Bosnia, 43, 78 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 169 Brennan, John O. role in decision making of, 127– 9, 132 views on the drawdown strategy of, 175– 7, 181– 2 views on the surge strategy of, 99 – 105

308

AMERICA

IN

Brussels Summit (2016), 186 bureaucratic politics, see individual policy makers, role in decision making of Bush, George H. W., 19, 23, 30, 42, 48, 50, 53 – 4, 56, 88, 115, 123 Bush (George W.) Administration anti-drugs policy of, 76 – 7 coalition and, 35 – 7, 40, 42 – 3, 46, 78 economic policy of, 79 – 81, 87, 92 false policy assumptions of, 8, 21, 30, 62, 64 – 7, 72, 75 – 8, 80 –1, 88, 90 –1, 93– 4, 224– 5, 227 GWOT strategy of, 38– 9, 41 – 2 ‘light footprint’ (counterterrorism) strategy of, 44 – 6, 67, 76, 81, 89, 90 ‘quiet surge’ by, 94– 5 relations with Iran, 32, 35, 59, 64, 73, 75, 83, 93 relations with Pakistan, 68, 69 – 70, 93, 142, 225– 6 relations with Russia, 25, 30, 32 –3, 40, 45, 65 tilt to the counter-insurgency policy by, 95 – 6 ‘transformation’ plan and, 44, 66 warlord strategy of, 32 –3, 46, 76, 80, 91, 101 Bush, George W. decision making style of, 89 –91, 115– 17, 133, 146 doctrines of, 16 – 17, 20 – 21, 23, 27 –9, 41, 52, 55, 58, 68, 75 – 6 domestic factors and, 22 – 4, 25 – 7, 62 –3, 94 response to 9/11 (and fear of further attacks) by, 15, 24 – 27 role in decision making of, 16, 41, 48, 55, 59 – 60, 67 views on NATO of, 78 views on the Afghanistan War of, 1, 32, 147– 8

AFGHANISTAN views on the counter-insurgency strategy (nation building) of, 66 – 7, 96 views on the counterterrorism (light footprint) strategy of, 44, 46 – 7, 67, 81 views on the GWOT of, 15 –18, 28, 36, 213 views on the Iraq War of, 39, 64 – 5 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 71, 74, 217, 229 views on terrorism of, 18, 20 – 1 Cameron, David, 174 Campbell, John F., 193 Canada, 78, 174 Cantor, Eric, 112 Card, Andrew H., 15, 37 – 8 Carter, Jimmy, 115, 124, 127 Cartwright, James, 105, 114, 135 Casey, George W., 120, 135 Central Asian States role in America’s Afghanistan War of, 30, 40, 73, 170– 1, 186, 187, 214, 215 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 16, 24– 30, 32 – 4, 36, 38 – 41, 62, 67, 75, 121, 127– 8, 132, 154– 5, 168, 175, 180– 1, 183, 201 Chamberlin, Wendy, 69 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, 120, 168 Chicago Summit (2012), 186 Cheney, Richard domestic factors and, 24 –5, 63 personal beliefs of, 58 role in decision making of, 39, 48 – 52, 54 – 7, 67, 114 views on the Afghanistan War of, 39, 136 views on the counterterrorism strategy of, 45 – 6, 81, 95 views on the GWOT of, 17, 20, 34, 37 – 8, 58 – 9

INDEX views on the Iraq War of, 39, 59 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 32, 71 China role in America’s Afghanistan War of, 4, 65, 73, 94, 103, 134, 142, 162– 3, 170–1, 188, 200– 1, 204– 5, 208, 214– 15, 221 Clinton, Bill/Clinton Administration, 19, 20, 29, 31 – 32, 43, 119, 122– 5, 127, 129– 31, 137, 159, 161, 164– 5, 168– 9, 180, 202 Clinton, Hillary role in decision making of, 119, 122, 123– 5, 130, 132, 137, 155, 159, 169, 181 views on the Afghanistan War of, 100, 109– 10, 125, 209 views on the drawdown strategy of, 177– 9, 180 views on the GWOT strategy of, 88 –9 views on the Iraq War of, 89, 146 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 163 views on the surge strategy (to include counterterrorism and counter-insurgency strategies) of, 105– 12, 123, 130 views on Trump of, 199, 200, 202 CIGAR, 220 Cohen, Eliot, 207 Comey, James, 200, 202, 207 Congress role the drawdown decision of, 172– 5, 181 role in the GWOT strategy of, 23 –4, 62 –4, 70, 88, 94, 96 role in the surge decision of, 99, 104– 5, 111–12, 116–20, 134, 136– 8, 146–7, 168 role in Trump’s South Asia strategy of, 210

309

see also Kerry; Graham; McCain; Pelosi conspiracy theories, 4 – 5, 9, 74, 159, 160, 227 Council on Foreign Relations, 201 counter-insurgency strategy, 66 – 7, 77, 95 –6, 100– 2, 106– 111, 117–20 see also individual policy makers, views on the counter-insurgency strategy of counterterrorism (-plus) strategy, 7, 33, 46, 65 – 7, 77 – 8, 90, 105– 8, 137, 184, 230 see also individual policy makers, views on the counterterrorism strategy of Daley, Bill, 116 Defense Department (Pentagon), 18, 23, 25 –6, 29, 31 –2, 34, 38– 41, 43– 4, 46, 50 – 3, 56, 57, 70, 76, 94, 114, 119, 122, 181, 205, 219, 226 Defense Planning Guidance, 58 Denmark, 78 Dobbins, James, 47, 89 Donilon, Thomas E. role in decision making of, 127– 8 views on the drawdown strategy of, 175– 7, 180, 182 views on the surge strategy of, 99 – 105 Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 158, 220 Dubs, Adolph, 1 Dunford, Joseph, 219 Durand Line, 68, 103, 228 Eikenberry, Karl role in decision making of, 114– 15, 118, 124, 130 –1 views on the counterterrorism strategy of, 81 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 70

310

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views on the surge strategy of, 99 –105, 135, 154, 159, 161, 168 Emanuel, Rahm, 95, 105, 111, 116, 127– 8 see also ‘inner circle’ false policy assumptions, see Bush Administration, false policy assumptions of; Obama Administration, false policy assumptions of; Trump Administration, false policy assumptions of Feith, Douglas role in decision making of, 40 – 1, 51, 53, 56 views on the counterterrorism strategy of, 43 views on the GWOT strategy of, 34 –5, 37 see also Neoconservatives Finn, Robert F., 81 Fire and Fury, 203 Fleischer, Ari, 46 Flynn, Michael, 207 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), 8 Foreign Policy Decision Making Approach (FPDM), 8, 223 France, 65, 78, 214 Galula, David, 102, 120 Gates, Robert role in decision making of, 67, 115, 118– 19, 121– 3, 125–6, 137, 141– 2, 159, 182 views on the Afghanistan War of, 123, 135 views on Bush and Obama of, 16, 146– 7 views on the drawdown strategy of, 177– 9 views on the GWOT strategy of, 64 –5, 91

AFGHANISTAN views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 109– 10, 175, 180– 1 views on the surge strategy of, 105– 12, 121– 3, 136, 138, 144, 155, 171 Germany, 65, 76, 78, 223 Gerson, Michael, 117, 118 Ghani, Ashraf economy policy of, 186– 7, 228 obstacles to the economic policy of, 3, 187– 91, 220– 1 peace talks of, 187– 8 reforms by, 190, 229 relations with India of, 187–8 relations with Pakistan of, 187 relations with the US of, 130, 154, 159, 186, 213 views on US anti-drugs policy of, 77 Gibbs, Robert L., 116 Graham, Lindsey role in decision making of, 111, 182 views on the drawdown strategy of, 177– 9 views on the surge strategy of, 105– 12 Great Britain/British Empire, 74, 78, 104, 153 groupthink, 90, 117 Guanta´namo, 198, 207 Gulf States, 170 Gulf War, 19, 23, 39, 115 Gwadar, 4 Haass, Richard N., 43, 47 Hadley, Stephen, 56, 57, 62, 67 Hagel, Chuck, 114 Haqqani network and Jalaluddin Haqqani, 2, 61, 69 – 70, 81, 92, 106, 166– 7, 180, 219, 226 Haqqani, Siraj, 70 Hazaras, 167

INDEX Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 61, 70, 167, 188, 216, 225 Helmand, 75, 143, 149, 151, 160– 1, 174, 226 Hezb-e-Islami, 2, 61 Hezbollah, 37 Holbrooke, Richard C. role in decision making of, 124, 129– 31, 154, 159, 168– 9 views on the peace talks of, 168 views on the surge strategy of, 125, 160– 1 Hurst, Steven, 91 Hussein, Saddam, 21, 39, 57, 59, 62, 65, 213 Ignatius, David, 118, 202 India role in America’s Afghanistan War of, 4, 29, 33, 45, 68, 71 – 3, 86, 93 –4, 102–3, 106, 142, 162– 3, 165, 169– 71, 187– 8, 214, 219 ‘inner circle’ members of, 115– 16 role in decision making of, 116– 19, 123, 126– 7, 130, 139, 146 views on the drawdown strategy of, 175– 7 views on the surge strategy of, 99 –105 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 46, 80, 82, 185 Iran role in America’s Afghanistan War of, 4, 33, 45, 64, 72, 73, 75, 83, 93, 103, 109, 169, 170– 1, 177, 200, 210, 214– 15, 220, 227 see also Bush Administration; Obama Administration; Trump Administration; relations with Iran of Iraq, 34 – 40, 59, 109, 111, 120, 183, 210, 212, 219, 227

311

Iraq War impact on the Afghanistan War of, 61 – 7, 73, 75 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 2, 188, 191, 193, 200– 1, 206–7, 209– 11, 213, 215, 221, 223, 228 Islamiyah, Jemaah, 37 Italy, 34, 78 Jalali, Ali Ahmad, 158 Jamaat-ud-Dawa, 162 Japan, 23, 76, 198 Jawad, Said T., 91 Johnson, Lyndon, 64, 104, 114, 116, 119, 124 Jones, James role in policy making of, 125– 7, 130, 133, 168 –9 views on the Afghanistan War of, 89 Jones, Seth, 42, 76 Kagan, Frederick, 118 Kalakani, Habibullah, 225 Kandahar, 75, 142, 143, 149, 151, 160–1, 174, 226 Karmal, Babrak, 153 Karzai, Hamid relations with the Bush Administration of, 5, 151 relations with India of, 72– 3, 102, 169 relations with Iran of, 170 relations with the Obama Administration of, 5, 130– 1, 151, 155, 159, 189 relations with Pakistan of, 169, 188 views on the conspiracy theories of, 4, 159– 60, 224 views on corruption of, 154– 5 views on US anti-drugs policy of, 161 views on US decentralisation strategy of, 155– 8

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views on US human rights abuses of, 152– 3 views on US motives (goals) of, 7, 152 views on US Pakistan policy of, 151– 2 views on US peace talks of, 168 views on US support for militia of, 158– 9 views on US warlord strategy of, 84, 153– 4 Kashmir, 68, 71, 73, 94, 163, 228 Kayani, Ashfaq Parvez, 109 Kelly, John F., 201, 202 see also pragmatism and policy making Kennedy, John F., 115, 119 Kerry, John role in decision making of, 4, 105, 130, 182– 3, 189 views on the drawdown strategy of, 175– 7, 182–3 views on the surge strategy of, 99 –105, 139, 168 Khalilzad, Zalmay role in decision making of, 56, 63, 70 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 70, 92 – 3, 218, 222 views on the counterterrorism strategy of, 81 views on US engagement in Afghanistan of, 210– 19 Khan, Ghaffar, 74, 155 Khan, Wazir Akbar, 74 Khodaidad, General, 77 Khpalwak, Akram, 188 Kissinger, Henry, 53, 55, 57, 115, 124, 132 Kitfield, James, 200– 1 Kosovo, 43, 78 Kunduz, 2, 190 Kushner, Jared, 204, 219

AFGHANISTAN Lashkar-e-Taiba, 71, 94, 162 Lavoy, Peter, 111 Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach, 168 Levin, Carl, 105 liberal peace theory, 92 Libya, 35, 183 Lieberman, Joseph I., 112 Lippert, Mark W., 116, 127 see also ‘inner circle’ Lisbon Summit, 174, 181 London Conference (2014), 186 Ludin, Azizullah, 86 Lugar, Dick, 171 Lute, Douglas E. role in decision making of, 95, 115, 116, 130, 168 –9 views on the drawdown strategy of, 180– 1 views on the surge strategy of, 99 – 105, 135, 143 Mann, James, 52, 116, 126 Mansour, Mullah, 93, 188 Marshall, Alex, 92, 176 Marshall Plan, 80, 89, 113 Massoud, Ahmad Shah, 72 Massoud, Ahmad Zia, 220 Mattis, James, 201, 204 see also pragmatism and policy making McCain, John role in decision making of, 182 views on the drawdown strategy of, 175, 177– 9 views on the surge strategy of, 105–12 views on Trump’s South Asia strategy of, 213– 19 McChrystal, Stanley, 99, 101, 108– 9, 111, 114– 5, 117–23, 125, 129, 133–40, 143 –5, 148– 52, 154, 159–61, 163, 166, 182 McDonough, Denis, 116, 117, 127, 130, 180 see also ‘inner circle’

INDEX McGovern, Jim, 105 McKiernan, David D., 74, 95, 99, 114 McMaster, H. R., 201, 204, 206, 219 see also policy making; pragmatism McNeill, Dan, 78 mercantilism, 197– 8 military (Petraeus) camp members of, 99, 111, 113 views on the drawdown strategy of, 177– 9 views on the surge strategy of, 105– 12 Miller, Stephen, 199 see also policy making; populism (Jacksonianism) Mueller, Robert, 221 Mujahedeen, 1, 21, 110, 151, 157– 8, 162, 165, 225 Mullen, Michael G. role in policy making of, 117– 19, 120– 1, 126, 159 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 69, 94 – 5, 164 views on the Afghanistan War of, 64, 89 views on the drawdown strategy of, 177– 9, 180 views on the surge strategy of, 99 –105, 129 Musharraf, Pervez, 31– 2, 48, 52, 68, 69 – 72, 89, 91, 142, 229 Nabil, Rahmatullah, 217 Najibullah, Mohammad, 1, 151, 158, 165, 229 National Consultative Peace Jirga, 167 National Counterterrorism Center, 33, 128 National Security Council (NSC), 16, 17, 26, 28 – 9, 31, 33, 34, 39, 41 – 2, 49 – 51, 54, 56 – 7, 62, 67, 90, 93, 115– 16, 119, 121– 2, 124, 125, 127– 8, 130, 155, 169, 180, 205– 6

313

National Unity Government (NUG) see Ghani NATO DDR, 76 internal fractions within, 65 ‘lead nation’ approach by, 76 role in America’s Afghanistan War of, 35, 64, 65, 69, 73, 75, 77 – 8, 79, 82 – 4, 87, 91 –3, 95, 103, 105– 6, 122, 139– 40, 142– 4, 146, 159, 171, 174, 185, 192, 201, 205, 213, 215, 220, 228, 230 shortcomings within the Afghan engagement of, 77 – 8 Neoconservatives members of, 56 role in decision making of, 56 – 7, 67 views of, 57 – 8 Netherlands, 78, 174 Neumann, Ronald E., 81, 157 NGOs, 78– 9, 83, 154 Nicholson, John W., Jr, 193, 210 Nixon, Richard, 48 – 9, 115, 123 North Korea, 59, 182, 198, 200, 204–5, 209, 221 Nur, Atta Muhammad, 220 Obama Administration Af-Pak strategy of, 91, 99 anti-drugs strategy of, 161 drawdown strategy of, 179– 84 decision to delay US exit of, 193 development policy of, 164 false policy assumptions of, 100, 102– 6, 109– 11, 115, 117, 119, 131, 149– 51, 155– 6, 161, 163, 171, 174– 5, 181, 186, 193, 210, 224– 5, 227 military policy of, 150– 1 peace talks (diplomatic policy) of, 165– 9 relations with Iran of, 109– 10, 170– 1, 177, 199, 182

314

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relations with Pakistan of, 75, 92, 93, 94, 163– 4 relations with Russia of, 92, 142 surge strategy of, 141– 2 warlord strategy of, 153– 4, 157, 190 Obama, Barack decision making, style of, 115– 18 doctrine (foreign policy approach) of, 183– 4, 192 domestic factors and, 135– 9, 146, 146, 173, 175– 9 health care by, 133, 134, 138, 206 legacies of, 199 role in decision making of, 90, 113, 115– 19, 132, 122– 5, 127, 133, 136– 9, 180, 181– 2 views on the Afghanistan War of, 6, 7, 8, 88 – 9, 145, 147, 112, 133– 5, 145–7, 181, 183 views on the counter-insurgency strategy of, 135, 144– 5 views on counterterrorism (-plus) strategy of, 144– 5 views on the drawdown strategy of, 179– 81, 183– 4 views on the Iraq War of, 62, 89, 99 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 117, 133, 147, 164, 147 views on the surge strategy of, 139– 42 Omar, Mullah, 38, 70, 107, 166– 7, 188– 9 Operation Enduring Freedom, 40, 45 Pakistan Afghan policy of, 2, 3, 6, 30, 31, 33, 68 –76, 102–4, 109–10, 151, 162– 5, 167, 168, 169, 171, 176, 187– 8, 191, 192, 210, 216– 18, 219– 22, 224– 7, 228–30 Army of, 69, 70, 71, 103, 163– 4, 169, 187– 8 India policy of, 71 – 3, 163

AFGHANISTAN internal problems of, 164 nuclear weapons in, 29, 68, 93, 162, 214 relations with China, 162, 163, 170 see Bush Administration, relations with Pakistan of; Obama Administration, relations with Pakistan of; Trump Administration, relations with Pakistan of; see also Bush, views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan; Obama, views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan; Trump, views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan Panetta, Leon role in decision making of, 128, 132, 182 views on the drawdown strategy of, 180, 182 views on the surge strategy of, 129, 138 Pashtunwali, 91, 156 Patang, Mujtaba, 158 Patterson, Anne, 69 Pelosi, Nancy, 105, 128, 168 Pence, Mike, 200, 204 see also pragmatism and policy making Perle, Richard, 56, 57 Petraeus, David role in decision making of, 67, 96, 99, 114, 117– 21, 126, 136–7, 173, 181– 2 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 109– 11 views on the Afghanistan War of, 61, 105– 12, 148 views on the drawdown strategy of, 173, 177– 9, 180– 2 views on the Iraq War of, 66 views on the surge strategy of, 105– 12, 142 Pfiffner, James, 90

INDEX populism (Jacksonianism) and policy making, 197– 9, 201, 202, 204– 6, 208 Pompeo, Mike, 201, 204 see also pragmatism and policy making Powell, Colin doctrines of, 43 – 4, 50, 52, 124, 139 domestic factors and, 51 role in decision making of, 16, 31, 50 –4 views on coalition of, 35 – 6 views on Iraq of, 35 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 30, 31, 69 views on the counterterrorism strategy of, 42 – 3, 45, 47 views on the GWOT strategy of, 31, 35 – 8 views on the surge strategy of, 117, 135 Power, Samantha, 123 pragmatism and policy making, 197, 200– 1, 203, 204– 6, 208 Priebus, Reinhold, 200, 204 see also pragmatism and policy making public opinion (debate) (Afghan) evaluation of the GWOT strategy and, 82 – 8, 173, 192 evaluation of America’s Afghanistan War during the making of Trump’s South Asia policy and, 210– 19 evaluation of the GWOT and, 88 – 94 evaluation of the surge strategy during the making of the drawdown strategy and, 118, 173– 9 evaluation of US policy during the making of the surge strategy and, 99 –112, 173– 4 the making of the GWOT strategy and, 22 – 4

315

Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and, 92 – 4 see also individual policy makers, domestic factors and Putin, Vladimir, 25, 30, 200 Quetta Shura, 167 Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 167, 225 RAND Corporation, 101, 120 Rashid, Ahmed, 68, 69, 89 Rashidi, Mobarez, 77 RAW (Indian secret agency), 72 Reagan, Ronald, 18, 49, 50, 56, 57, 59, 115, 197, 202 Resolute Support Mission, 185 Rhodes, Benjamin, 116, 117, 130, 181 see also ‘inner circle’ Rice, Condoleezza role in decision making of, 38, 49, 54 – 5, 56, 67, 95, 122 views on Pakistan’s role in America’s Afghanistan War of, 69 views on the counterterrorism strategy of, 43, 46, 63 views on the GWOT strategy of, 17, 21, 34, 38, 55, 59 Riedel, Bruce, 141 Romney, Mitt, 174 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 60 Rouse, Peter, 116 Rove, Karl, 23 Rubin, Barnett, 92, 129, 169 Rumsfeld, Donald personal beliefs of, 58 role in decision making of, 16, 40 – 1, 49 – 51, 53 – 6, 67 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 69, 71 views on the Afghanistan War of, 45, 80, 148 views on the counterterrorism strategy of, 43 – 6, 66 – 7

316

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views on the GWOT strategy of, 17 –20, 25 –6, 31 – 7, 58 – 9 views on the Iraq War of, 59, 64 views on the warlord strategy of, 32, 46, 72, 153 Russia role in America’s Afghanistan War of, 4, 30, 32, 33, 40, 45, 65, 72 – 3, 142, 170– 1, 188, 210, 214– 15, 220, 227 see also Bush Administration; Obama Administration; Trump Administration; relations with Russia of Saikal, Amin, 91 Saleh, Amrullah, 217 Sanger, David E., 178 Saudi Arabia role in America’s Afghanistan War of, 65, 73, 166, 170, 188 Scowcroft, Brent, 55, 57, 123, 126 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 64, 105, 112, 113, 117, 172 Sessions, Jeff, 199, 207 see also populism (Jacksonianism) and policy making Shah, King Zahir, 6, 34, 40, 225 Shelton, Henry H., 19, 31, 32, 38 Sherzai, Gul Agha, 33 Shujah, Shah, 74, 153 Shultz, George, 18 Silk Road, 187 Spain, 78 Spanta, Rangin Dadfar, 152, 154 State Department, 31, 34, 36 – 8,43, 45, 50, 51, 53 – 4, 67, 71, 76, 93, 115, 118, 122, 125, 129, 142, 161, 171, 205, 219 Status of Forces Agreement, 185 Steinberg, Jim, 125 Stoltenberg, Jens, 205 Strategic Partnership Agreement, 185

AFGHANISTAN Syria, 2, 35, 59, 75, 109, 110, 183, 191, 205, 209, 214, 221 Taliban categories of, 87, 166– 7 goals of, 61, 211, 215 legal system of, 86, 156 number of, 110 origins of, 6, 86, 91, 153, 157 peace talks with, 165– 9 relations with 9/11 of, 17 relations with Al Qaeda of, 21, 100, 121, 177, 179 relations with Pakistan of, 30, 31, 68, 70 – 1, 74, 102– 3, 106– 7, 164 TAPI scheme, 187 Tehrik-i-Taliban, 162– 3 Tenet, George role in decision making of, 16, 40 – 2, 48 views on the GWOT strategy of, 20, 25 – 7, 28 – 31, 34, 38 views on the Iraq War of, 37 Tillerson, Rex, 201, 204, 206 see also pragmatism and policy making Tokyo Conference, 76, 186 Trump Administration false policy assumptions of, 220– 1 relations with China of, 205 relations with India of, 219 relations with Iran of, 198, 199, 200– 1, 206, 215, 220– 1 relations with Pakistan of, 217 relations with Russia of, 200– 1, 205– 6, 210, 221 South Asia strategy of, 219– 20 views on US engagement in the Middle East of, 212– 13 Trump, Donald America First doctrine of, 203, 206 decision making style of, 206 domestic factors and, 206– 8, 221

INDEX fascism and, 199– 200 origins of personal beliefs and images of, 197– 206 roles in decision making of, 202, 204– 5, 206 views on NATO of, 205 views on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan of, 217 views on the Afghanistan War of, 211– 12 views on the Iraq War of, 212 Trump, Ivanka, 204 Turkey, 188, 200, 223 United Kingdom, 5, 76, 174, 214 United Nations (UN), 2, 3, 17, 35, 37, 65, 76, 93, 106, 165, 198 USAID, 160, 161 Vietnam War/Vietnam syndrome, 19, 44, 52, 53, 64, 114, 119, 174

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Warsaw Summit (2016), 186 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 15, 21, 25 – 7, 34 –5, 37, 42, 62, 75 Wilson, Woodrow, 57, 59 Wolff, Michael, 203 Wolfowitz, Paul role in decision making of, 56 – 8 views on the counterterrorism strategy of, 43 – 6 views on the GWOT strategy of, 34 – 5 views on the Iraq War of, 35 see also Neoconservatives Woodward, Bob, 30, 34, 114, 118, 123, 126 Yemen, 18, 34, 100, 106, 128 Zakaria, Fareed, 137, 216 Zakhilwal, Omar, 189 Zedong, Mao, 120