Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe 9780773587748

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mugabe and the politics of security in zimbabwe

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Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe

abiodun alao

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

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©

isbn 978-0-7735-8774-8 (EPDF) Bibliothèque nationale du Québec

McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Alao, Abiodun Mugabe and the politics of security in Zimbabwe / Abiodun Alao. Includes bibliographical references and index.

History.

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This book is dedicated to the memory of the late Olajide Aluko, the first professor of international relations in sub-Saharan Africa, my teacher, my benefactor, and my friend.

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Contents

Preface ix Acronyms and Abbreviations

xvii

Introduction 3 1 Determining Antecedents

12

2 Zimbabwe’s Defence Institutions: The Politics of Creation and Intervention 35 3 Mugabe and the Politics of Domestic Security

69

4 Contending with Allies, Rivals, and Critics: Mugabe’s Security Relations with Zimbabwe’s Immediate Neighbours 106 5 Mugabe and the Politics of External Military Engagement 140 6 Between East and West: Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s Security, and Non-African Countries 169 7 Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s Security, and International Organizations 195 Conclusion Notes 227 Bibliography Index 281

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Preface

Just as I was completing the writing of The Tragedy of Endowment, my book on natural resources and conflict in Africa, Zimbabwe got into the news for all the very wrong reasons: acrimonious racial relations, controversial elections, economic hardship and massive inflation, intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), suspension from the Commonwealth of Nations, alleged human rights violations, and so on. A colleague who knew of my interest in Zimbabwe during my previous life as a doctoral student at King’s College London in the late 1980s asked me the extent to which all these developments were predictable when, in 1980, the country’s independence was received by the world with euphoria. This got me thinking seriously about the situation in Zimbabwe immediately after I completed The Tragedy of Endowment. By the end of 2008, Zimbabwe’s situation seemed to have worsened: economically, inflation had further increased, reaching one of the highest of any country in recorded history; politically, the possibility of a government of national unity to bring together the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (zanu-pf), and the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (mdc), had dimmed; and socially, tension was rising among the population. A major cholera epidemic compounded the problem, claiming up to three thousand lives. All this had put a lot of pressure on the country and on the government of President Robert Mugabe. On the whole, in the context of local and international developments, it seemed clear by the end of 2008 that the days of President Mugabe as the sole determinant of all aspects of Zimbabwe’s affairs were numbered and that those numbers were very few indeed. By February 2009, a chapter

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closed in the history of the Southern African nation, if not in practice at least in theory, with Mugabe’s acceptance of the inclusion of the opposition mdc in the government and the swearing in of his arch enemy, Morgan Tsvangirai, as prime minister. The closure of this chapter thus calls for an in-depth examination of different aspects of Mugabe’s twenty-eight years of sole power in the Southern African nation – an examination that will continue once he finally leaves office. This book, which looks at the way Mugabe handled the country’s security during this period, is one attempt at this. But the subject of security in Zimbabwe is extraordinarily complex, involving virtually all other subjects, including politics, economics, ethno-racial relations, and even property rights. Things are never as they seem on the surface as every political development in the country has security implications, and every security issue has social, economic, and political undertones. However, it would seem that the complexities surrounding the politics of security in Zimbabwe have arisen out of three main factors: (1) the nature of the country’s emergence, especially the war of liberation and the local and international politics that underscored its prosecution and resolution; (2) the policies adopted by its “inheritance elites,” that is, those who took over political governance after independence; and (3) the country’s location at the centre of a region that, for a long time, had a string of peculiar security features. All three considerations, however, have one thing in common: their bearing on national security under President Robert Mugabe – the central figure in the politics of security in Zimbabwe. Throughout the first twenty-eight years, Zimbabwe’s security regime was analyzed largely through the prism of the war of liberation. Even after the direct security legacies of the war had been addressed, disagreements continued over the extent of the role the war should play in national thinking and consciousness. Broadly speaking, the debate put the Mugabe government, which believed that the war should be the main yardstick for measuring patriotism, on a collision course with those who felt that it should not. Further, the Mugabe administration believed that the nation should be in perpetual debt to the zanu-pf due to its “sacrifice” in liberating the country, while there were others who believed that the party’s rejection in plebiscites was a clear indication that it should be demystified and become aware of the need to moderate its expectations. These positions, as I show later, are crucial factors in understanding the politics of security in Zimbabwe.

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The way President Mugabe has handled the country’s security situation has attracted considerable public interest, and the conclusion often reached is that he started “well” as a “conciliatory” leader but later “changed” to become one of Africa’s “most brutal” or, put more mildly, “most controversial,” leaders. However, a close look at the security situation in Zimbabwe since independence shows this to be a weak thesis. Indeed, all the key security issues that gave Mugabe the “pariah” image he later acquired had occurred earlier but were ignored due to prevailing international politics, overlooked due to a reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe, or pardoned because it was thought that Zimbabwe had peculiar problems that made some forms of “excess” understandable. For example, the clampdown on the mdc and its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, had an antecedent in the browbeating of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (zapu) and Joshua Nkomo; the allegation of illegal exploitation of resources during the intervention in the drc was similar to the smuggling allegations levelled against the Zimbabwean army during its involvement in Mozambique; the use of security forces to intimidate supporters of the mdc had a close resemblance to the dispatch of the 5th Brigade into Matabeleland; the major disagreement with Britain over the Whitehall’s reactions to Zimbabwe’s land policy was simply an updated and expanded version of Mugabe’s reaction to Britain’s objection to Harare’s detention of those alleged to have destroyed the Zimbabwe Air Force planes in July 1982. Consequently, the post-2006 developments in Zimbabwe attracted international concern not because they were different in intent (or even in extent) from those ignored in the past but, rather, because the nature of international involvement in national governance had changed to allow for greater criticism of actions hitherto considered to be the “internal affairs” of developing countries. In short, Mugabe did not change his domestic and external security strategies; what changed was the way in which the international community interpreted and evaluated them. Indeed, throughout his first twenty-eight years as leader, Mugabe’s main objective was always to exploit every domestic and subregional security opportunity to consolidate his grip on power, while continuing to exploit the legacies of the past to satisfy his desires in the present. Again, a close look at many of Mugabe’s policies and actions clearly shows this. For example, the tactical compromise adopted towards the whites shortly after independence, which saw him grant

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a number of security concessions to them; the alliance with zapu, which saw the late Joshua Nkomo and a few other zapu members invited to join the first cabinet; the brutal suppression of the Matabeleland unrest; the forceful occupation of white farms; the intimidating posture taken towards the mdc; the intervention in Mozambique; and the controversial involvement in the drc war might all seem diverse on the surface, but they were all part of Mugabe’s determination to take advantage of the past in order to ensure a tight grip on national security. Mugabe realized that the recent past could be twisted and exploited to his advantage. Thus, if those who suffered during the 1986–91 Matabeland unrest later became beneficiaries of the lands acquired from white Zimbabweans, it was because they changed their stances to be in line with Mugabe’s; and if beneficiaries of past favours later fell on hard times, it was because they slipped down Mugabe’s loyalty scale. It is necessary to explain from the outset what this book is not. It is not a study of Zimbabwe’s politics since its independence, of the country’s diplomacy, or of the personality of Robert Mugabe. Nor is it an attempt to document what went on with the country’s economy. My objective is much narrower. I simply attempt to analyze the intricate politics that governed Zimbabwe’s internal and external security dynamics between 1980 and February 2009. I offer a nuanced review of what happened with regard to Zimbabwe’s security and a discussion of what we may be missing in our analysis of Mugabe and his policies. I also attempt to consider the international responses to some of Mugabe’s policies compared to those of some other African leaders who attained a similar level of controversy about the same time – like the late Sani Abacha of Nigeria and Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d’Ivoire. My objective is twofold: first, to present an exclusive study of security during the first twenty-eight years of post-independence Zimbabwe, thereby adding to the growing literature on the country; and, second, to assess the impact of the “past” on the “present” of Zimbabwe, more so now that a complex tapestry of hopes and fears, dreams and desires, seems to govern the political and security situations in that country. A West African writing on Southern Africa has both advantages and limitations. While I may not have experienced most of the occurrences discussed in this book, and while gaining access to some information that may have been easily attained by a “home” scholar may have been difficult, I am able to detach myself from some of the more

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sentimental and emotional aspects of the situation. More important, I have the opportunity to draw parallels between a number of tendencies: between Zimbabwe and West African countries; between how the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) and the Southern African Development Community (sadc) react to security challenges emanating among their member states; and between how external actors like the Commonwealth of Nations, the United Nations, Britain, and the United States respond to situations in West Africa that are similar to those in Southern Africa. Also, on a somewhat personal note, publishing this book has taken me back to my roots after almost two decades of roving around the African continent. After my PhD dissertation on Zimbabwe, I remained committed to Southern Africa, publishing my first book on the region. Geographically, my books then began a clockwise move: first to West Africa, then to East Africa, and then to broader continental issues. Thematically, I first looked at dissidence and rebellion, then switched to civil wars, then turned to security sector reform, then to anti-colonial agitations, and recently to the politics of natural resource management. Returning to Zimbabwe after a long break, I was overwhelmed at the enormous number of brilliant studies on the country that have appeared on library shelves over the last two decades. I can only hope that scholars who have remained consistently committed to Zimbabwe and its politics will welcome the return of a “prodigal son.” I thank all those who have encouraged my interest in Zimbabwe over the years. These include Dr Barrie Paskins, who supervised my doctoral dissertation at King’s College London; Professor Lawrence Freedman, who, as head of the war studies department, showed enormous kindness to me; professors Jack Spence and James Mayall, who examined my dissertation and have remained very good friends; and Professor Terence Ranger, who allowed me to attend his weekly seminars on Zimbabwe at St Anthony’s College, Oxford, in the late 1980s. Sincere gratitude also goes to the “African Community” at King’s College London’s war studies department, especially Funmi Olonisakin, Kayode Fayemi, Jimi Peters, Ade Ajibade and Juliet Ukabiala. Others who have assisted include professors A.G. Adebayo, Ademola Popoola, Sola Akinrinade, and Layi Abegunrin. Thanks, too, to the late Tajudeen Abdulraheem, Chris Alden, Okey Ibeanu, Ekaette Ikpe, Funmi Vogt, Kunle Lawal, Catherina Hall-Martin, Penda Diallo, Deji Ebo, Godwin Murunga, Alade Fawole, Jide Akanji,

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and Abubakar Momoh. I must also thank my former student and friend, Edefe Ojomo, who agreed to read the entire manuscript. I hope she will keep all my careless mistakes our “little secret.” I also owe a lot to Jacqueline Mason of McGill-Queen’s University Press for all her assistance. Many friends have also been helpful, and again Funmi Olonisakin’s name comes up as a consistent and reliable friend and colleague. To be added are Bayo Bello, Dotun Adeniyi, Suleman Baba Ali, Doyin Sheyindemi, Segun Obafemi, Christie Adejoh, Abiodun Onadipe, and Abubakar Danlami Sule. It is, of course, inevitable for a bit of nepotism to creep into one’s acknowledgments, and the customary reason for gratitude to one’s spouse must, in this case, be expanded. My wife, Ronke, read the draft of this book and offered valuable suggestions. I thank her. Our children, Fiyinfolu and Ajibola, obviously bore the brunt of my labours. I apologize to them for my seeming negligence and thank them for tolerating a father who, when he’s not away from home, is always in front of the computer. Thanks as always to all my siblings – Olufemi, Kayode, Funmi, Folasade, and Olusayo – for making the word “siblings” ever so meaningful. But above all, the greatest thanks must go to the people of Zimbabwe for their friendship and hospitality during my visits to their country. I do not mention the name of any Zimbabwean in these acknowledgments. Apart from the fact that the sensitive positions of a few of them caution against mentioning them by name, I also do not want to paint them with the brush of association, especially as they may not share some of my views. But I must say that I found Zimbabweans to be very wonderful people. A story that illustrates the depth of affection I received during my visits should be related here. Sometime in April 1990, a bit late into the night, the vehicle in which I was travelling from Masvingo to Harare developed a mechanical fault. It soon became clear that there was no way it could make it to Harare that night. When other passengers got to know that I was a visitor conducting research in the country, they unanimously agreed that I should be the person to get on board any vehicle that might stop to pick up stranded passengers. The first to stop could only take one person, and I was allowed to go with it. The other stranded persengers told the driver that I was a visitor conducting a study of Zimbabwe and that I needed all the assistance he could give. That was all that the driver needed to hear to go beyond the call of duty. We arrived in Harare very late indeed, and

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he insisted on dropping me in front of my apartment in the Mount Pleasant suburb of Harare instead of at the motor park, where he dropped off other passengers. At the end of the journey, I offered him money – my transport fare – but he would not have it, offering me instead a brotherly hug. After we embraced, he entered his vehicle and drove off. I do not know the driver or any of the other people who assisted me on that day, and I will probably never see any of them again. But this type of friendship and affection attended my visits to and stay in Zimbabwe. Abiodun Alao

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

afz anc aps au bmatt bsap chogm consas ecwas frelimo

Air Force of Zimbabwe African National Congress Assembly Points African Union British Military Advisory and Training Team British South African Police Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Constellation of Southern African States Economic Community of West African States Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) imf International Monetary Fund jhc Joint High Command mdc Movement for Democratic Change mpla People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola – Partido do Trabalho) ndp National Democratic Party oau Organization of African Unity pac Pan Africanist Congress pfz Police Force of Zimbabwe pta Preferential Trade Agreement renamo Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) rpf Rwandan Patriotic Front rsf Rhodesian Security Forces sadc Southern African Development Community

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xviii

Acronyms and Abbreviations

sadcc sadf udi un undp unita

Southern African Development Coordination Conference South African Defence Force Universal Declaration of Independence United Nations United Nations Development Programme União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) unhcr United Nations High Commission for Refugees zanla Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army zanu Zimbabwe African National Union zanu-pf Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front zapu Zimbabwe African People’s Union zdf Zimbabwe Defence Force zdi Zimbabwe Defence Industry zimofa Zimbabwe-Mozambique Friendship Association zipra Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army zna Zimbabwe National Army zum Zimbabwe Unity Movement

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mugabe and the politics of security in zimbabwe

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Africa

ZA MBIA

Zimbabwe

a

rib

MASHONALAND WEST

ke

Ka

M OZ AM B I Q UE

MASHONALAND CENTRAL

La

Chinhoyi

Bindura Harare Marondera

MASHONALAND Z I MB AB W E EAST

Lupane

MIDLANDS

MATABELEAND NORTH

Gweru

Bulawayo

BOTSWA N A International Boundary Provincial Boundary National Capital Provincial Capital

Mutare

MANICALAND

Masvingo

MASVINGO Gwanda

MATABELEAND SOUTH

M OZ AM B I Q UE 0 0

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SOU T H AF RI CA

100 km 100 mi

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Introduction

Although all African countries faced diverse security challenges at the time of independence, those that emerged out of wars of liberation often found themselves in a more difficult situation. Issues like rebuilding infrastructure destroyed in the course of the war, restructuring a collapsed economy, managing the consequences of small arms proliferation, catering to the affairs of those demobilized after the war, and meeting expectations that could have been heightened as a result of war are some of the post-independence concerns that confronted Africa’s “liberated” countries. These problems were further compounded for Southern African countries as the nature of their societies made many of their wars of liberation similar to civil wars. Furthermore, until the attainment of majority rule in South Africa, these countries had to contend with the destabilizing activities of South Africa’s apartheid regime. Consequently, the security challenges “liberated” countries in Southern Africa had to face immediately after independence included managing inter- (and sometimes intra-) ethnic relations, ensuring racial harmony, creating a new national army, establishing a new police force, and managing relationships with neighbouring countries that may have adopted controversial policies during the course of the liberation struggles. Many of these countries found it difficult to deal with all these situations, and, in cases such as Angola and Mozambique, not long after independence the wars of liberation resulted in bitter civil conflicts. Of all the liberated countries in Southern Africa, Zimbabwe’s position is unique as it was the first country to become independent through an internationally guided, even if British-managed, transitional program. Namibia and South Africa were to follow much later

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in 1990 and 1994, respectively. At its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was widely seen as a beacon of hope in a troubled region. With apartheid in South Africa then attracting global condemnation, the civil war in Angola being influenced and shaped by the Cold War, and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance [renamo]) proving itself to be one of the world’s most brutal insurgent forces, a multi-racial Zimbabwe, emerging from a carefully guided democratic transition, was a breath of fresh air and a model for a peacefully multi-racial Namibia and South Africa. Initial signs showed that these expectations were not misplaced: the elections in Zimbabwe had won international recognition; the new leader, Robert Mugabe, had given a warm assurance that the Marxist rhetoric of the liberation war years would be put aside for the sake of national reconciliation and that there would be a place for white minorities in the new nation. So thrilled was the world that even the former white minority leader, Ian Smith, who had earlier described Mugabe as the “Apostle of Satan,” found the latter’s immediate postindependence reactions and speeches temperate and responsible.1 The composition of the first government was multi-ethnic, multiracial, and multi-party, with representatives from the minority Ndebele ethnic group and from the white population.2 Even in the management of security, Mugabe made concessions many had considered unthinkable. For example, he invited Lieutenant General Peter Walls, the commander of the Rhodesian security apparatus, to remain in the country and to help to build a new national army. Ken Flower, the head of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (cio) and the founder of renamo, was also invited to stay on as head of the intelligence services. Indeed, Ken Flower was later to describe Mugabe, who offered him a job immediately after Zimbabwe’s independence, as “conciliation personified.”3 Zimbabwe, since independence, has undergone major changes that have significantly altered its security configurations and, to an extent, those of the entire region. The interconnection between politics and security has meant that events have often been complex. For example, the effort to address the proliferation of weapons brought about by the war of liberation evoked the arms cache controversy; the creation of the new national army brought on the crisis that surrounded the activities of the North Korean 5th Brigade, which operated in Matabeleland; almost two decades later, the dwindling powers of the ruling party and the unexpected, albeit

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initially informal, alliance between the opposition party (the mdc) and the minority whites introduced a nihilistic dimension to the land ownership controversy; and the attempts to ensure an effective grip on the machinery of government resulted in an infringement on the powers of the judiciary. The same applies to Zimbabwe’s external relations: outside involvement in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs reminded observers of the comprehensive external intervention in the country’s liberation struggle. The sour relations with Britain in the early 2000s raised issues relating to the nature of British colonialism and the perceived duplicity in the Universal Declaration of Independence (udi), while the recent boisterous display of camaraderie with China was seen as an update of the Sino-Zimbabwe African National Union (zanu) friendship that had existed during the war of liberation. On the external front, the initial problem of destabilization activities emanating from apartheid South Africa diminished after President F.W. de Klerk introduced his own version of perestroika, and it ultimately disappeared with the ascension to power of President Nelson Mandela. But if this meant an end to South Africa’s destabilization of Zimbabwe, it also introduced an era of subtle and sometimes open rivalry between the two countries. When there were concerns that the unfolding insecurity in Zimbabwe could have consequences for South Africa’s security, the authorities in Pretoria became increasingly concerned with developments in Zimbabwe. Also, the immediate post-independence military engagement in Mozambique, which received global understanding (if not endorsement), was replaced almost two decades later with a controversial military engagement in the drc. Even domestic security issues had significant external implications. For example, the land ownership controversies greatly affected the relationship between Zimbabwe, on the one hand, and Britain and (to an extent) the United States, on the other, while the controversial handling of Zimbabwe’s 2004 elections resulted in the country’s suspension from the Commonwealth of Nations (hereafter referred to as the Commonwealth). The more controversial 2008 elections again made Zimbabwe a topic of global discussion, and its political situation was brought up during the 2008 African Union Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Egypt. It was ironic that the floors of the Commonwealth and the African Union, which had witnessed extensive discussions regarding the liberation of Zimbabwe, were to serve as venues for members to

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meet and discuss what many saw as the excesses of one of their own. An analysis of these and other events shows the shifting nature of the politics of security in Zimbabwe since the country’s independence and the consequent need for a detailed study of the subject. With the independence of Namibia and the attainment of majority rule in South Africa, time now seems ripe for a proper assessment of the wars of liberation in Southern Africa and of how the countries in the region have performed in the years following independence. While conceding that these wars bequeathed a number of security concerns to the countries, questions still remain as to the extent to which the political instability in some of them was a legacy of the wars or the consequence of the political and economic mismanagement of post-independence leaders. To an extent, it is possible to explain some of the post-independence security challenges of Angola and Mozambique as externally sponsored/created.4 But the same cannot be said of Zimbabwe, whose immediate and longterm security challenges were the product of reactions to internal developments (albeit initially exploited by apartheid South Africa). Furthermore, while the problems confronting other liberated countries in Southern Africa ended, or were significantly reduced, after the end of apartheid in South Africa, Zimbabwe’s security challenges continued long after – to the point at which they became the most important in the region. Zimbabwe’s peculiarity in this regard reveals three phenomena: (1) the role of “personality” in the politics and diplomacy of security; (2) the shifting nature of local alliances; and (3) the intricate politics of external involvement. With regard to the role of “personality,” most of the attention focuses on Robert Mugabe, the country’s first post-independence leader: first as prime minister and later as president.5 Of all the Southern African leaders who took over the mantle of administration in their respective countries after the wars of liberation, Mugabe has been the longest in office; while two, Samora Machel and Augustino Neto (of Mozambique and Angola, respectively) died in office, the other two, Nelson Mandela and Sam Nujoma (of South Africa and Namibia, respectively) voluntarily retired from power.6 As I show throughout this book, the implications of Mugabe’s long stay in power are of considerable significance in explaining the nature of the security problems that have confronted Zimbabwe. With regard to the shifting nature of local alliances, political networking and alliances in Zimbabwe changed several times during

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the past decade – far more than in any other Southern African country. The zanu-zapu alliance that was put together during the latter part of the liberation war collapsed, and both sides contested elections separately. Then both parties again came together after independence only to separate a few years later. This separation brought zapu closer to the white minority, which had all along remained the country’s sole voice of opposition. The re-alliance between zanu and zapu, which led to the merging of the two parties in 1987, altered the balance of politics in Zimbabwe. This balance later suffered another realignment with the formation of the mdc, which forged an informal alliance with the white population. These shifting alliances, among other things, are crucial to understanding the politics of national security in Zimbabwe and perceptions of external military engagement. The politics of external involvement in Zimbabwe’s security is crucial to appreciating Mugabe’s strategy. Indeed, no African country not engaged in a full-scale civil war has received the kind of attention that Zimbabwe has received from the Western media, especially during the land invasion and the 2008 elections. While dictators have always featured in African politics, reactions from Western media and governments have always been sporadic and uncoordinated. Even President Sani Abacha of Nigeria, despite the population and wealth of the country, did not receive the kind of attention from the Western media that they have given to Mugabe.7 The extent of this interest in Mugabe and Zimbabwe has now, somewhat simplistically, added a racial dimension to the politics of media and security in that country as it has been alleged that the special interest of the West (especially of Britain and the United States) came about because of the alleged threats to whites inherent in Mugabe’s land acquisition policy. As I show later, all these issues were dominant in shaping the politics of security in Zimbabwe in the period between its independence in April 1980 and the February 2009 agreement between the zanu-pf and the mdc. Different aspects of Zimbabwean security have been brilliantly discussed in recent literature. Among scholars addressing this area are Norma Kriger, who looks at the emergence of guerrillas and “war veterans” in Zimbabwean society;8 Martin Rupiya and Knox Chitiyo, who look at the politics surrounding the military integration exercise and post-independence security sector reform;9 Ngwabi Bhebe, who addresses the roles of various actors (especially soldiers)

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in the Zimbabwean liberation war;10 Terence Ranger, who, among many others, assesses the link between the past and recent security developments in Zimbabwe and the history of human rights;11 David Moore, whose interests cut across issues such as democracy, political stability, and land politics;12 Brian Raftopolous, who focuses on politics, security, and development,13 and who, with Alois Mlambo, has recently edited a book that focuses on the evolution of Zimbabwe from precolonial times to 2006;14 Jocelyn Alexander, who looks at the link between land and security;15 Zvakanyorwa Wilbert Sadomba, who has written a detailed work on war veterans;16 and Sam Moyo, who looks at land and its link with security.17 All these scholars, as well as several others, have tried to explain the complex and interwoven nature of the politics of security in Zimbabwe. However, it needs to be pointed out at the outset that Zimbabwe has some peculiarities that must be taken into consideration when writing about it. explaining understandable

“ confusions ”

It is necessary to provide some background in order to explain the various potential sources of confusion in this book. The first involves the use of names. Throughout its history, Zimbabwe has had various names: “Southern Rhodesia,” “Rhodesia,” “Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,” and, finally, “Zimbabwe.”18 I use three names – “Rhodesia,” “Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,” and “Zimbabwe” – interchangeably, depending on which name was used during the period under discussion. The renaming of towns shortly after independence in 1980 is another source of confusion. For issues before independence, I use the old names; for issues after independence, I use new names (upon first usage I indicate the old name in parentheses). The vicissitudes of the political situation in Zimbabwe are such as to make the acronyms/abbreviations used for political parties potentially confusing. For example, “zapu” may, depending on context, also be “zapu-pf” or, occasionally, just “pf,” while “zanu” is used by two different parties – one led by Robert Mugabe and one led by Ndabaningi Sithole. Ordinarily, it would have made sense to differentiate between the parties by using the designation “zanu-pf” for the Mugabe-led group, but this would be confusing as there is also a united zanu-pf. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, I restrict party names to “zanu”

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9

and “zapu.” Unless otherwise stated, “zanu” refers to the Mugabe-led group while “zapu” refers to the Nkomo-led group. A second potential area of confusion relates to sources. I have relied on both published sources and interviews. The published sources are taken from books and journal articles on the broad subject of defence and security in Zimbabwe and the entire Southern African subregion. I also rely on articles from local newspapers as well as parliamentary Hansards. It needs to be noted that newspapers published inside Zimbabwe, and inside some other Southern African countries, are rich sources of information on defence and security even if a number of constraints make it difficult for some of them to be very critical. The oral interviews were conducted during my visits to Zimbabwe and in the United Kingdom. While I sought and obtained formal interviews with a number of people, including senior military officers and serving politicians, I also conducted a number of “informal” interviews, which were granted on the condition that the interviewees not be identified. I understand the circumstances that made this necessary and have done everything possible to ensure that such sources have not been divulged. chapter outline

The remainder of this book is divided into seven chapters. In the first chapter I provide historical background, discussing the issues that form the foundation of defence and security in post-independence Zimbabwe. Among these are the nature of the relations between the dominant ethnic groups, the peculiarities of colonial rule and the security legacies it bestowed on post-independence Zimbabwe, the politics of the war of liberation, and the international efforts to achieve eventual independence. I also discuss, albeit briefly, the personality of Robert Mugabe and how it is reflected in the management of security. I conclude by identifying the major security issues that arose as a result of the peculiar nature of the liberation war and its resolution. In the second chapter I discuss Zimbabwe’s defence and security institutions. I look at the creation of national armed forces and the police, examining the challenges encountered in the process and how these were addressed. I also offer a detailed discussion of how these defence institutions were designed to be aligned with Mugabe’s political interests. I look at the extent to which

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pre-independence ethno-racial and ethno-political divisions in the army have been factors in determining post-independence politics within the armed forces. Finally, I consider the politics surrounding the demobilization exercise and how this was to serve as an antecedent to the larger security problems that emerged with the activities of the war veterans. In the third chapter I offer a detailed discussion of the key domestic security issues that have confronted Zimbabwe since its independence. Among these are the immediate post-independence security problems such as the politics surrounding the recovery of firearms. I look at the arms cache controversy, the unrest in the Matabele province, the unleashing of the 5th Brigade, and the security of whites under black majority rule. I also discuss the security issues generated by the controversy over land, including the activities of the war veterans. Finally, I touch on how the government used security apparatus in its relations with the opposition political parties, especially the mdc. In the fourth chapter I discuss Zimbabwe’s complex security relations with its immediate neighbours. I examine the extent to which the stances of neighbouring countries in the pre-independence zanu-zapu rivalry played a role in Mugabe’s immediate policies and how the perception of threats emanating from them has changed over time. I pay specific attention to the relationship with the Republic of South Africa, from the destabilization activities fomented against Zimbabwe by apartheid South Africa up to the post-apartheid rivalry between Harare and Pretoria. I also discuss the arrest of South African mercenaries whose purpose was to topple the government of Equatorial Guinea and the security implications of this for Zimbabwe. Finally, I address how neighbouring countries have reacted to the unfolding security situation in Zimbabwe, including the land controversy, the human rights situation, and the relationship between the zanu-pf and the opposition mdc. In the fifth chapter I look at Zimbabwe’s involvement in the civil wars in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo. I assess the background of the wars’ domestic and regional contexts, and investigate the extent to which Zimbabwe’s involvement in them was motivated by genuine threats to its national security or something else. I also discuss the domestic and international reactions to Zimbabwe’s involvement in the two wars and how Mugabe reacted to calls for a peaceful negotiation to these conflicts.

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Introduction

11

In the sixth chapter I discuss how Zimbabwe has handled the security aspects of its relationship with key countries outside Africa, especially the United Kingdom, the United States, the former Soviet Union (later Russia), and China. I examine how Mugabe was able to strike a balance between an offer of financial assistance from the West (especially immediately after independence) and an ideological fraternity with the East. I also discuss how an increasing wedge between Mugabe and the West sent him deeper and deeper into the hands of the East, especially China. Finally, I consider how the relationship between Mugabe’s Zimbabwe and the West worsened over the land issue and the conduct of elections, and how China entered the picture through the gap created by the exit of the Western world. In the seventh chapter I investigate Mugabe’s relationship with five international organizations: the Southern African Development Community (sadc), the Commonwealth, the African Union, the United Nations, and the European Union. I discuss how each organization reacted to the unfolding security situation in Zimbabwe and how Mugabe, in turn, responded. I then show how these organizations responded to similar issues across the African continent. In the concluding chapter I reassert my central arguments and hazard a look at the future of defence and security in Zimbabwe.

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Determining Antecedents

Zimbabwe has always lived close to its past, especially on issues relating to politics and security. Consequently, the politics of the country’s security between independence in April 1980 and the signing of the agreement between zanu-pf and the mdc in February 2009 can only be understood against the background of the intense diplomatic and military conditions that combined to give birth to the country. This chapter sets out to provide a panoramic survey of these conditions. My central argument is that most of the defence and security issues in Zimbabwe have their roots in the country’s history and the ways in which President Robert Mugabe has exploited past legacies. political economy of colonial rule and its legacies for post - independence security

Historically, Rhodesia was no ordinary colony. Its origin combined imperialism and personal ambition, both of which were manifest in John Cecil Rhodes of the British South Africa Company.1 Believing that the area had abundant gold reserves and having a passionate interest in expanding Britain’s imperial spread, Rhodes had, by 1887, prevailed upon the high commissioner of the coast to sign a treaty with the ruler of the area known as Matabeleland. However, while one may concede that Rhodes’s involvement was key to the establishment of a British connection with the area later known as Rhodesia, the general atmosphere of this historical period should also be taken into consideration. This was the period of the European “scramble” for colonies in Africa, and supremacy in Southern Africa

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was a cardinal British imperial ambition. Thus, Rhodes’s personal goals were in line with the overall imperial objectives of his homeland, Britain.2 Cecil Rhodes’s invading force was brutal, and this was to be a key theme throughout the entire era of colonial domination in what later came to be known as Zimbabwe. The motive of the invading force was conveyed in a much-quoted letter written by one W.A. Jarvis, an adventurer friend of Cecil Rhodes, to his mother: The last thing to do is to wipe them all out as far as one can – everything black … I hope the natives will be pretty-well exterminated … There are about 5,500 niggers in the district [Gwelo] and our plan of campaign will probably be to proceed against this lot and wipe them out then move on towards Bulawayo, wiping out every nigger and every kraal we find. And then you may be sure there will be no quarter and everything black will have to die3 The “blacks” that dominated the area that eventually became known as Zimbabwe were mainly from two major ethno-linguistic groups. These were the Shona-speaking people known as the Shonas and the Ndebeles.4 There is a tendency to see the Shonas as a monolithic ethnic group, but this is not the case. The Shonas appear to be a conglomerate of different units, including the Karangas, the Zezurus, the Ndaus, the Korekores, and so on. It is not unusual for many of these units to quickly come together when vital national politics requires a measure of solidarity. However, since the middle of the 1970s, intra-ethnic squabbles emerged as an important factor in Shona politics. This continued, albeit subtly, after independence, and the politics of balancing the forces along sub-ethnic divisions has become common in post-independence Zimbabwean politics. Presently, the Shonas comprise about 70 percent of the Zimbabwean population. The Ndebele people, on the other hand, migrated to their present abode as a result of the Mfecane.5 They defeated the group of Shona people known as the Kalangas, who inhabited the portion of modern-day Zimbabwe that the Ndebeles now occupy. Over the years, the Kalangas were assimilated into the Ndebele community, and, in post-independence Zimbabwe, they are regarded as Ndebeles. Historically, the Ndebeles were a strong and warlike people, and they brought to the area knowledge of the military

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Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe

innovations they had acquired during the Mfecane.6 They comprise about 20 percent of the population of present-day Zimbabwe. In the recent past it was common for scholars to highlight only tension, war, and destruction when speaking of the inter-group relations between the Shonas and the Ndebeles in precolonial Zimbabwe. According to this interpretation, the “warlike” Ndebele people were always oppressing the “peaceful” or “cowardly” Shona people. Stafford Glass, for example, paints an image of a “degenerate Mashona … subjected to constant Ndebele raids.”7 However, it is now clear that such statements furnish a pretext for colonialism without doing justice to historical evidence. That there were occasional tensions is not in dispute; what is in dispute is the nature and extent of such tensions. Indeed, there are clear indications that there was some form of friendship and understanding between the two groups, evidenced in their coming together to fight the British in 1896.8 The process of establishing imperial control over the area now known as Zimbabwe conformed to the pattern of other British colonial acquisitions in Africa, and it involved two stages. The first was the signing of a “treaty” with the local ruler, purportedly committing him to open his territory to the British market and/or to accept Christianity in exchange for guns and ammunition. These treaties were often written in the English language, which the local ruler did not understand. This meant that he had to make do with often distorted translations. When he discovered the inequality embedded within the treaty and attempted to repudiate it, the second stage was triggered: usually a full-scale war euphemistically termed an “expedition.”9 In the Zimbabwean case, stage one was the 1888 “treaty” with Lobengula, the king of the Ndebele, in which he allegedly conceded all lands (even those outside his jurisdiction) to Rhodes; stage two was the 1896 war against the Shona and the Ndebele peoples. It was not long before the settlers defeated the combined resistance of the Shona and Ndebele peoples – thanks largely to their military superiority. However, what is important for my purposes is the fact that the victory that resulted in the occupation of the area later known as Rhodesia was achieved by a settler army rather than by a force sent directly from Britain. This had profound consequences for the future of Rhodesia as it produced in the settlers an air of defiance and confidence. Thus, despite Britain’s explicit regulations and directions, the settlers’ perception of local factors dominated the development of events Rhodesia.

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Determining Antecedents

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With the defeat of the Shona and Ndebele resistance in 1896, the settlers implemented a scheme that was to determine the shape of the country to the present day. This involved establishing a stratified society based on the white exploitation of the indigenous population. Most of what happened after independence was rooted in this period and was the product of an ideology of white supremacy. The policies (or lack thereof) of the settlers and the reaction of the indigenous inhabitants combined to determine the peculiar legacy that colonialism handed down to present-day Zimbabwe. It is impossible here to fully discuss what imperialism meant to the people of Zimbabwe, but I now offer some thoughts.10 Because Zimbabwe was a settler colony, the pattern of its colonial domination was different from that of most other colonial acquisitions. This pattern involved the establishment and maintenance of political, economic, and social structures predicated upon racial domination. These structures stripped the local populace of any social, political, and/or economic rights and put their fate in the hands of a white settler regime that was not only racist but also fundamentally authoritarian. The situation that obtained in the country during this period is aptly summarized as follows: It was a social structure in which 8 million “vote-less” blacks scratched out a living at subsistence level or below it, while 250,000 whites – barely 3% of the population – enjoyed a privileged existence that is said to have included, among other things, the highest per-capita number of private swimming-pools in the world … The white minority owned more than half of the country’s available land, and virtually all of its business and industry. Education, health care, housing, were all segregated, with whites enjoying opportunities equivalent to those in Western Europe or the United States. Blacks were confined by law to black urban township, barren rural “tribal trust-lands” or the workers quarters of the white commercial farms on which the World Bank found more than half of black children undernourished. There was no minimum wage until 1979, when it was set at $20 per month.11 It was the local population’s objection to this oppression that fed the nationalist activities in the country. The Ndebele–Shona uprising of 1896–97 remains extremely important in the historical consciousness of Zimbabwe: even more than a

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Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe

century after its end, it remains a reference point against which all armed struggles – national and partisan – are measured. The armed struggle known as the First Chimurenga was organized by the local population and directed against the colonialists. Although ultimately unsuccessful, this struggle gave the Ndebele-Shona their own heroes and demonstrated their will to resist foreign domination.12 This will to resist continued even after the formal establishment of colonial rule. the politics of nationalism and its consequences for post - independence security

After the suppression of the Shona-Ndebele uprising of 1896-97, the effectiveness of colonial rule in Rhodesia depended on the ability of white colonialists to induce black Africans to believe in their invincibility. This invariably resulted in early African organizations in Rhodesia accepting white rule as inevitable and infused in them the desire merely to improve their position within the existing socioeconomic structure. This policy continued until the late 1950s, when a new phase of militancy emerged due to the demand for decolonization. The first political party of consequence in Rhodesia during this phase was the African National Congress (anc), founded in September 1957 by the late Joshua Nkomo.13 The anc attacked racist laws and demanded reform, and, in response, the government banned it in February 1959. However, the party re-emerged in 1960 as the National Democratic Party (ndp), which, for its part, was banned in December 1961, but not before it had internationalized the Rhodesian struggle. The party reappeared eight days later as the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (zapu). Although at formation zapu was the only liberation movement of significance in Rhodesia, some elements during the ndp days had become disenchanted with Nkomo’s leadership. In 1963, these dissidents defected from zapu to form a new political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (zanu), under the leadership of Ndabaningi Sithole. Because of the significance of this split to later discussions, I briefly address it here.14 What may seem to be the first cause of dissension occurred after the ndp agreed to the proposals of the 1961 London Constitutional Conference, according to which fifteen out of the sixty-five available parliamentary seats were allocated to blacks. Many ndp members reacted angrily to this arrangement, and the executive of the party

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Determining Antecedents

17

was forced to revisit the decision. Although the arrangement was later dropped, the fact that it had been accepted in the first place left some of the party members doubting the ability of Nkomo to provide the radical leadership that many expected. When the ndp metamorphosed into zapu, the grounds for further dissension increased. A group in zapu alleged that Nkomo spent too much time abroad canvassing for the nationalist cause rather than staying inside Rhodesia in order to lead it.15 This group of dissidents had other grievances against Nkomo’s personality and style. He was accused of misleading his executive by making arbitrary decisions (some of which, it was claimed, turned out to be wrong) without discussing them with those whom they would affect. Ndabaningi Sithole, who led the breakaway group, described Nkomo as “weak, cowardly, evasive and corrupt.”16 What is important here is not whether or not these allegations were valid; what is important is the fact that some members of the party felt the need to dissent and did so relentlessly. The divide between the zapu and zanu, and the events that followed in the pre- and postindependence years, necessitates some reflection on the role of ethnicity in the zapu split of 1963. By the time the two parties had fully developed, it became clear that zapu was dominated by the minority Ndebeles and that zanu was dominated by the Shonas. This outcome, which was to play a significant role in the history of the country, makes it logical to deduce that the split was a direct result of ethnic differences. However, it would appear that ethnicity played a minimal role at that stage of the Zimbabwean struggle. While one may not entirely rule out the possibility that some people wanted to break up the party for ethnic reasons, it appears that the split was based more on differences of principle. In fact, the leader of the defectors, Ndabaningi Sithole, had dual ethnicity (Shona father, Ndebele mother).17 In the end, however, zapu emerged as a party dominated largely by the Ndebele people and zanu emerged as a party mostly dominated by the Shona people.18 Internal tensions soon emerged within zanu, and, in 1974, its new chairman, Ndabaningi Sithole, lost the leadership of the party to Robert Mugabe. It was Mugabe who led the party during the major part of the liberation war, through the negotiations, to independence in 1980. Nkomo retained his leadership of zapu, which he led into independent Zimbabwe.19 The personalities of Nkomo and Mugabe invariably affected the way in which they were perceived and, as fundamental issues began to emerge on the road to the birth of Zimbabwe, the differences between

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Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe

these leaders became apparent. These differences determined how they were assessed by the whites, whose future in the country was a crucial factor in the outcome of the struggle. Although it remains controversial, the verdict of the whites was that Nkomo was essentially a man of compromise, while Mugabe was too radical: Mugabe was the black nationalist whom they feared and hated most.20 In post-independence Zimbabwe, the impact of the zapu/zanu split had a powerful effect on defence and security dynamics. In fact, the consequences of this split played the greatest role in determining and rationalizing actions in post-independence Zimbabwe. While the African nationalists in Rhodesia were still coming to terms with the split, the white leadership was enmeshed in a plan that, like the zanu/ zapu split, was to become a major landmark in the country’s history, with a strong impact on post-independence activities. This was the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (udi) of 1965. In March 1962, a new political party, the Rhodesian Front, was formed by the whites, and in December of the same year, Winston Field, the party’s candidate, became the prime minister. From its inception, the Rhodesian Front was committed to the entrenchment of white supremacy without the involvement of Britain, and it did not fail to make it clear that it would not hesitate to declare independence unilaterally if it considered this to be necessary. In April 1964, Ian Smith, who was the treasury minister in Field’s government, became the new prime minister,21 and, on 11 November 1965, he issued the udi. The declaration immediately became a significant event in the country’s history, and the domestic and international reactions to it were to have strong implications both before and after independence. The udi is one of the best documented aspects of Zimbabwean history.22 The initial reactions to the udi were predictable. Britain saw it as an act of rebellion against the Crown and a stain on its imperial trusteeship, while African countries called on Britain to do everything possible to bring down Smith’s illegal regime, even if it involved the use of force. Within Rhodesia, the nationalist movements became convinced of the need for armed struggle. Britain chose the sanction approach in dealing with the rebellion in Rhodesia, but this failed woefully due to the cushion effect provided by South Africa, the competitive character of the international market, and the uncoordinated and, some would say, insincere method of application.23 With the failure of sanctions, the British government intensified negotiations. There were two major discussions between

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Determining Antecedents

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Ian Smith and British prime minister Harold Wilson: in December 1966, on board the British warship the hms Tiger, and in October 1968, on board the hms Fearless. Nothing significant came from these discussions, and, if anything, they manifested Britain’s weakness in dealing with Smith. In fact, after the hms Fearless talks, Smith was confident enough to rule out a majority rule in his or his children’s lifetimes.24 Whatever the reasons behind its policy, Britain’s refusal to use force was opposed by the Commonwealth countries, to which three of Rhodesia’s neighbours (Tanzania, Botswana, and Zambia) belonged. Indeed, it is ironic that the Commonwealth was to feature prominently at a later stage of the country’s history for altogether different reasons. To most African-Caribbean members of the Commonwealth, the way to resolve the udi was straightforward: press Britain to use force in Rhodesia and/or extend sanctions to include South Africa and Portugal (which was then administering neighbouring Mozambique). Britain’s decision not to use force brought into question the genuineness of its intention to bring down Smith’s rebellion. This led to two members of the Commonwealth, Ghana and Tanzania, breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain, although they did not go so far as to leave the Commonwealth.25 With the benefit of hindsight, it is now plausible to argue that, if Britain had used force or the threat of force to bring down the Smith rebellion, the casualty figures of the war of liberation might have been far fewer. But this will forever remain merely a tantalizing conjecture. James Callaghan, who was the chancellor of the exchequer during that period, wrote several years later that he regretted Britain’s decision not to use force to bring down Ian Smith’s rebellion.26 For his part, Ian Smith never regretted his actions.27 The perceived connivance of Britain in Smith’s rebellion was to become a major reference point in later years, when the relationship between Britain and Mugabe turned sour. The udi had a remarkable effect on some of the issues I discuss in this book. First, in an attempt to contain the security problems that it created, the Rhodesian army strengthened its defence force.28 In later years, this put the Rhodesian army in an advantageous position regarding the creation of a new national army. Second, the udi increased the racial tension between whites and blacks and made race a significant issue in post-independence Zimbabwe. However, the most immediate impact of the udi was on the Africans in Rhodesia – the people most affected by the declaration, which, along with the

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Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe

critical international reactions to it, motivated them to intensify the armed struggle. the war of liberation and its effects on post - independence politics

Zimbabwe’s war of liberation has attracted the attention of many scholars,29 and the reader may turn to them for issues not covered in this book. Both zanu and zapu had military wings that engaged the government security forces in a protracted war for more than a decade. zanu had the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (zanla), while zapu had the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (zipra).30 These military wings, like the political parties with which they were associated, were founded largely along ethnic divisions. zipra, like zapu, drew its combatants from the Ndebele ethnic group, while zanla, like zanu, drew its combatants largely from the Shonas. This introduced the first major complication of the war because, despite the apparent unanimity of purpose in fighting a common enemy, the ethnic factor was sometimes so strong that considerable energy was dissipated by inter-group fighting. No fewer than three factors affected the working relationship between zanla and zipra during the war, and these were to substantially affect post-independence Zimbabwe. First were the differences between the sponsoring political parties, with zanu supporting zanla, and zapu supporting zipra. Since the split of 1963, each party perceived the other as a rival, and this percolated into their respective fighting wings.31 A less fundamental cause of discord was the source of external support, a factor that had considerable influence on the military strategies adopted by both sides. China supported zanla, while the Soviet Union supported zipra.32 This invariably injected the Sino-Soviet rivalry into the conflict. This ideological rivalry spilled over into determining which approach to guerrilla warfare was most appropriate for the Rhodesian situation. zanla chose the Chinese Maoist approach to guerrilla insurgency, while zipra opted for the Soviet approach.33 Inevitably, there was controversy over which approach was superior.34 Other countries that supported zanla and zipra were North Korea and Cuba, respectively. The third and final controversy arose over which group was contributing most to the struggle. Naturally, each side felt that it was doing more for the struggle than the other. I do not explore this controversy except

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to say that, during the war, each side had its day against the Rhodesian forces and each side, within its ability and resources, contributed to the struggle. As such, both can claim credit for the pressure that drove Ian Smith to the negotiating table. An attempt was made to unite the two guerrilla forces and thus to consolidate efforts and resources against the Rhodesian army. This found expression in the formation of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (zipa) in November 1976.35 In the end, the experiment failed due, largely, to the activities of the politicians who felt slighted by zipa’s attempt to marginalize them. This was exacerbated by mutual distrust on the part of the guerrillas and the differences in their military tactics, outlooks, and philosophies. Because so much has been written on the liberation war I need provide only a brief summary.36 The Zimbabwean war of liberation, also called the Second Chimurenga,37 may be divided into three phases: (1) the period shortly after the introduction of the udi (1965-66) until about 1968; (2) the period between 1968 and 1972; and (3) the decisive period between 1972 and 1979. Violent reaction to the udi could be said to have started immediately after its pronouncement. There were some strike actions, which were either foiled or had very little effect. After these proved ineffective, the Africans took to acts of sabotage.38 However, not much success attended the initial efforts of the guerrillas to rid the country of minority rule. This was due to faulty planning, internal bickering among the guerrilla groups, a lack of coordination, and the superior counter-insurgency skill of the minority regime. Considerable problems ensued from the fact that the guerrillas were fighting for and among people who were unaware of what guerrilla warfare demanded of them. For example, it was not unusual for the people to give up guerrilla activists during the mildest interrogation, a fact that highlights one of the initial failures of the guerrillas. It appears that, at this stage, the revolutionaries expected the people to automatically accept the role expected of them, without making any effort to educate them or to win them over. These guerrilla failures resulted in government complacency, and the national security forces received a vote of complete confidence. Military expenditure accounted for only 8 percent of the national budget in 1972, despite a similar insurgency that was holding down 150,000 government troops in the neighbouring Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique.39 The tide of the war changed towards the end of 1972 when the liberation movements began making more efforts to educate the local

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Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe

populace as to the necessity of the struggle. The escalation of the guerrilla struggle from 1972 onwards can also be traced to a number of other factors, one of them being the conclusion of the Douglas Home/ Ian Smith Agreement under which majority rule was to be introduced sometime around 2015. The agreement bred doubts in the minds of African leaders as to whether the British government had any intention of securing majority rule in the foreseeable future. Thus, they opted to fight for independence. Second, the visit of the Pearce Commission in 1972 to determine the acceptability of the Home/ Smith Agreement was accompanied by an unprecedented mobilization of the people. The agreement was rejected, but the political consciousness of the people was considerably increased. Thus, they became aware of the need to protect the guerrillas among them, and this helped to escalate the guerrilla struggle beginning in late 1972. By 1975, the impact of the guerrilla war on the security forces had become pronounced. The independence of Mozambique under the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique [frelimo]) spelled strategic disaster for the minority regime in Rhodesia as it exposed the entire length of the thirteen hundred-kilometre eastern border to possible guerrilla infiltration.40 Within the first few months of 1976, at least thirty whites were killed, with the number rising to over two hundred by the following year. It was this alarming rate of white civilian casualties that aroused the government from its complacency towards the guerrilla insurgence. Part of the manifestation of this new resolve to deal with guerrilla insurgents involved cross-border attacks on neighbouring countries, especially Mozambique. The most blatant of these, which occurred in August 1978, involved the killing of more than six hundred people in a single raid on a un-recognized refugee camp in Nyadzonya, Mozambique.41 Such cross-border raids, which resulted in considerable loss of life and property, could be regarded as a manifestation of the sacrifices that the countries in the region paid for the independence of Zimbabwe. the politics of regional involvement in the zimbabwean struggle and the implications for post - independence security

A discussion of why and how Zimbabwe’s neighbours got involved in its struggle for independence is essential to understanding the security

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Determining Antecedents

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policy options that an independent Zimbabwe adopted towards them. As soon as Zimbabwe’s black neighbours obtained their independence, they saw it as essential to their foreign policy to declare a stand on the Rhodesian issue. The impact of this was quite pronounced as there were many international fora within which they could express their position, given that they were all members of the United Nations as well as of the Organization of African Unity (oau), which was formed in 1963. However, the forum most exploited over the Rhodesian issue was the Commonwealth, of which most of the neighbours in question were members, as, all along, Rhodesia had been regarded as a British problem.42 The Portuguese coup of 1974 had a considerable effect on events in Southern Africa.43 With regard to the politics of security, the most significant of these was that it precipitated the independence of Angola and Mozambique. The significance of this is twofold. First, it increased the number of neighbours that could support Zimbabwe’s nationalists in their struggle to end minority rule, thus exposing Rhodesia to undisturbed guerrilla insurgency from Mozambique. Second, the newly independent countries embarked on the implementation of mandatory economic sanctions, which had been ignored by the Portuguese colonial administration. Furthermore, the two new countries joined the Frontline States, a loose association formed in November 1974 by Botswana, Tanzania, and Zambia to assist in Southern Africa’s wars of liberation. What tied these countries together was their proximity to the theatre of conflict, a proximity that ruled out indifference as an option in reacting to events in the subregion.44 From its inception, the Frontline States, and its judgments on issues in the subregion, commanded the attention and respect of all international organizations. As would be expected, they were all actively involved in the Rhodesian crisis.45 But the apparent unanimity of intention among the Frontline States should not obscure the obvious differences among its members as to how best to resolve the Rhodesian problem. The leaders of these countries disagreed in their perception of the Zimbabwean liberation leaders. Another source of disagreement was the internal composition of the respective states as well as their ideological orientations and perceptions of the situation in Southern Africa. Two of these countries (Zambia and Mozambique) took steps that openly displayed their preference for different sides of the liberation movements in Rhodesia. Zambia supported Joshua Nkomo’s zapu and offered zipra, the

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party’s military wing, military bases within its territory. It is worth noting that President Kaunda and Nkomo had been long-standing friends and colleagues, dating back to the days of the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.46 Something else that could have determined President Kaunda’s choice was his relationship with, and perception of, Robert Mugabe. It was well known that President Kaunda and Mugabe did not get along well during the liberation war. It is on record that Mugabe once described Kaunda as an “enemy of the Zimbabwean struggle.”47 Accounting for this antipathy was the fact that Kaunda, who was considered reasonably conservative, could not countenance the radicalism often espoused by the zanu leader. In addition to these differences was the complication that emerged between the two leaders over the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, the zanu chairman, in Zambia.48 Mozambique, on the other hand, supported zanu for various reasons, ranging from ideological factors to personal considerations as well as historical circumstances. Both zanu and frelimo, the ruling party in Mozambique, espoused similar ideological convictions in that both were socialist parties. Although zapu also laid claim to socialism, its claim was considered weak when compared to that of zanu, whose brand was perceived to be similar to that of the frelimo government in Mozambique. This ideological similarity invariably resulted in close personal relationship between President Machel and the zanu leadership.49 Equally important was the Mozambican perception of zapu’s commitment to the struggle in Zimbabwe. At the beginning of the Zimbabwean struggle, frelimo was more in tune with zapu. The two parties were backed by the Soviets, as opposed to the Chinese-sponsored zanu.50 However, it was alleged that frelimo was forced to switch its support to zanu because the Mozambican government officials believed that the leadership of zapu was not doing enough to motivate their forces for an effective campaign against the minority government.51 For instance, while zapu failed to respond to frelimo’s request to send guerrillas to the Tete Front for training before the war in northeast Rhodesia, zanu requested to be allowed passage into Rhodesia through Tete.52 The final reason for the Mozambican switch of support from zapu to zanu is historical. The Shonas (the dominant ethnic group in zanu) formed about 11 percent of the Mozambican population. Thus, support for zanu could be expected to result in the appeasement of the Shona population inside Mozambique. This could be regarded as the African variant of the “kith-and-kin” factor.

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Other members of the Frontline States also took sides, but not as demonstratively as did Mozambique and Zambia. For example, Botswana appeared more inclined towards zapu. Some of the guerrillas that were later taken for training to Zambia came in through Botswana. This zapu-Botswana friendship could have been fostered by ethnic considerations,53 not to mention the personal friendship between Nkomo and Seretse Khama, the president of Botswana.54 However, it should be noted that the differences within the Frontline States regarding the future of Zimbabwe did not affect the group as a working team, even if there were minor cases of backstabbing and, occasionally, blurred diplomacy. One example of the latter is the August 1978 secret meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, between Nkomo, Kaunda, and Smith. Colin Legum believes that the economic and military pressures on Rhodesia and Zambia made both Smith and Kaunda realize they had a mutual interest in finding a solution to the Rhodesian problem.55 “Tiny” Rowland, the head of the Lonrho multinational, exploited this situation and arranged a meeting between Nkomo, Smith, and Kaunda in Lusaka.56 The arrangement later got the backing of Nigeria, which had by then diverted enormous foreign policy attention towards the region.57 The circumstances surrounding the meeting were enough to make those not invited suspect foul play. Nkomo did not inform Mugabe, despite the fact that, together, they had formed the Patriotic Front. Smith did not inform Muzorewa, Sithole, or Chirau, in spite of their close association; while Kaunda did not mention the meeting to other members of the Frontline States. The only outsider present was Nigeria’s foreign minister, Joseph Garba. The meeting reached gridlock, and it became necessary to bring in Mugabe, who was later invited to Lagos, Nigeria, where he was informed about the meeting. As would be expected, Mugabe refused to have any dealings with Smith.58 This deepened the suspicion, which was to increase after independence, between Mugabe and Nkomo, and between Mugabe and Kaunda. Another neighbouring country whose role in the politics of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle is worthy of note is South Africa. The dominant position of South Africa in Southern Africa is well established, and all the countries in the region had very little choice but to accord it recognition (albeit often grudgingly). In order to appreciate South African-Zimbabwean relations in Zimbabwe’s post-independence era, it is necessary to survey South Africa’s involvement in the Rhodesian issue after the udi. Although South Africa and Rhodesia had always been close, the udi functioned to bring them even closer. When Rhodesia announced

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the udi, South Africa, given Rhodesia’s economic and military dependence on it, had every opportunity to prevent the document’s success. However, although South Africa was against the udi because it considered it to be rash,59 it also had a vested interest in making sure that un-imposed sanctions did not work, lest such sanctions be used against it over its apartheid policy. Nevertheless, Hendrik Verwoerd, the South African prime minister, saw the need to act with caution. He thought about the effect South Africa’s deep involvement would have on a republic that was then striving to win respectability in the wake of the Sharpeville massacre;60 consequently, he decided on a policy of non-interference. Thus, South Africa did not recognize the independence declared by Ian Smith.61 Despite this non-recognition, South Africa could not have been more supportive of Rhodesia. Throughout the struggle, South Africa continued to trade with Rhodesia with ever greater vigour. It cushioned Rhodesia’s financial burden by freely exchanging its rand for Rhodesian dollars, a step that assisted in maintaining Rhodesia’s credit position. South African businesspeople also established dummy corporations whose only functions were to conceal the Rhodesian origin of imports and the destinations of exports. Many South African corporations, some large enough to be classified as multinationals, penetrated the Rhodesian economy.62 The sanctions also led to closer ties in terms of capital imports from South Africa as well as an increase in the transfer of technology and managerial know-how. By 1980, when Zimbabwe became independent, about 40 percent of its manufactured exports went to South Africa while about 90 percent of its exports passed through the apartheid government’s transport system. During the same period, about forty thousand Zimbabweans worked in South Africa.63 This created an economic dependence from which independent Zimbabwe found it difficult to disentangle itself, and which had inevitable security implications. When the war in Rhodesia started, South Africa felt obliged to assist the Rhodesian government for four main reasons: (1) to express its sentiment for the white Rhodesian cause; (2) to ensure that the tripartite solidarity of white rule in the region (South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies) was not destroyed by a guerrilla victory;64 (3) to respond to internal political demands from whites at home; and (4) to prevent a guerrilla success, which would encourage the oppressed blacks inside South Africa to contemplate similar action. These political considerations qualified Rhodesia for South

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African assistance. Initially, that assistance was covert, but in September 1976 Vorster publicly acknowledged the presence of South African forces in Rhodesia.65 From 1976, South Africa wrote off half of the Rhodesian defence bill,66 and it was believed to have spent an estimated us$300 million to assist Rhodesia in the war against the Zimbabwean guerrillas.67 As it turned out, circumstances forced South Africa’s policy in Rhodesia to change: the Portuguese Empire crumbled, black regimes professing Marxist ideology took power in Angola and Mozambique, and guerrilla movements were intensifying their efforts in Rhodesia and Namibia. All this offered Cuba the pretext to interfere in the affairs of the region. Vorster saw that Ian Smith’s white minority regime was ultimately doomed and that South Africa’s unqualified support for it would be unwise. As Jack Spence succinctly puts it: “white rule in Rhodesia was expendable if the price was a breathing space for South Africa.”68 South Africa thus advised Smith to embark on negotiations with the moderate elements of the black nationalists in Rhodesia. Initially, Smith was intransigent, and Vorster exploited some of his leverage with him, especially in terms of Rhodesia’s dependence on South Africa’s oil and other essential imports. Later, Operation Polo, a military arrangement under which South African military personnel were secretly supplied to Rhodesia, was terminated. This reduced Smith’s air-strike capacity by half,69 and, as Christopher Fox later argued, South Africa, which was Rhodesia’s lifeline, became its nightmare.70 Smith then realized the danger and folly of continuing the war without full South African support, and he agreed to soft-pedal his position on negotiations. A decade later, Smith, who considered the South African factor more important than the guerrilla factor, said: “we were never beaten by our enemies; we were betrayed by our friends.”71 Indeed, it is ironic that it was South Africa, white Rhodesia’s closest ally, that complemented the activities of the guerrillas and the Frontline States in forcing Ian Smith into the series of negotiations that ultimately resulted in Zimbabwean independence. Mugabe and other guerrillas were to seize the opportunity this offered. Many controversial things happened during the war of liberation. For example, there were allegations, often unsubstantiated, of backbiting, intra-party intrigues, and alleged killings among the guerrillas – sometimes with the involvement of host states Mozambique and Zambia. These were to be factors in the post-independence

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period, and they serve to underline the role of personalities in the politics of Zimbabwe’s security. mugabe and the politics of the zimbabwean struggle

Most of those who have commented on the affairs of post-independence Zimbabwe believe that many of Mugabe’s actions as leader (and hence affecting the country’s security) are coloured by aspects of his past.72 It is to these that I now briefly turn. Robert Gabriel Mugabe was born in Kutama, about one hundred kilometres from Harare, in February 1924. He was a devout Roman Catholic, largely as a result of the influence of his mother. His father, Gabriel, left home to live in Bulawayo when Robert was still young. This put an enormous burden on Robert’s mother, but it also resulted in the establishment of an affectionate relationship between her and her son. Growing up, the young Mugabe was said to be supremely selfconfident, never seeking compromise on issues about which he was convinced he was right. Heidi Holland quotes James Chikerena, someone who grew up with Mugabe and who was to play a very important role in the affairs of Zimbabwe: If anyone argued with him while herding … Robert [would] simply detach himself from the group, selecting his own beasts from the herd and driving them into the hills far away from the other boys. He never sought reconciliation or compromise in an effort to fit in with those around him. His standard response to criticism was to warn that he would get even someday.73 From a very early age, Mugabe was known to have loved reading, and he started his early education in Kutama, later attending St Francis Xavier College, where he qualified as a teacher in 1945. He obtained a scholarship to attend the prestigious University of Fort Hare, the same university attended by several others people who were to play prominent roles in the effort to rid Southern Africa of colonial rule.74 It was from this university that he obtained what was to be the first in the series of degrees he was to acquire. In 1957, he moved to Ghana, which had only recently become independent, and it was there that he met and married Sarah (Sally) Hayfron, a teacher in the school at which he taught in 1961. They later had a male child named Nhano. Shortly afterwards, Mugabe

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went back home and showed a great commitment to the liberation struggle in what was then Rhodesia. By that time, zapu had been banned and zanu had been formed as a rival organization. In 1964, Mugabe and others were arrested and detained by the Rhodesian government. It was in 1966, while Mugabe was still in detention, that his son Nhano died. Mugabe was denied permission to attend his son’s funeral or to stand with his wife during their period of grief, despite all the appeals to the Rhodesian government. It is believed that this was to have a lasting impact on his life. In 1974, Mugabe was released from detention to attend settlement talks, and, within three years, he was able to gain control of zanu and its military wing zanla. Although there were internal revolts within the party against Mugabe’s leadership, these were crushed due to his grip on zanla. Throughout the time he held control over the liberation struggle, he remained focused and showed great determination, something that was immediately noticed by all those with whom he had to negotiate. the politics of independence and the attendant implications for post - independence security

By 1976, Rhodesia was high on the global political agenda as the international attention directed towards it had increased considerably. This took off in 1976, with the involvement of former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, and ended in 1979 with the Lancaster House Agreement. The details of the diplomatic efforts at resolution have again been well documented.75 The Geneva Conference on Rhodesia commenced in October 1976, but by January 1977 it had collapsed due to irreconcilable differences between the warring sides. Although the conference faltered, some developments that were consequent upon it turned out to be very important to the resolution of the war. For instance, on the eve of the conference, the presidents of the Frontline States achieved some measure of unity between the two major liberation movements (zapu and zanu), which led to the birth of the Patriotic Front (pf) on 9 October 1976. The alliance was not completely perfect, but it was sufficiently strong to withstand the pressures of that period. Second, the Geneva Conference afforded white Rhodesians the opportunity of getting to know Robert Mugabe, and their impression of him was immediate and negative.

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The collapse of the Geneva initiative was followed in 1977 by the Anglo-American proposals. These, like the preceding Geneva effort, also failed, and the failure drove Ian Smith, in 1978, to come up with what he described as the “Internal Settlement” to end the Rhodesian crisis. This arrangement was made between Smith and the leaders of the three internally based nationalist movements in Rhodesia (led by Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Jeremiah Chirau, respectively). These were people whom Smith considered to be “moderates.” In a way, the roots of this Internal Settlement could be traced to the Geneva summit, during which Smith had carefully assessed all the nationalist leaders and decided that all but Mugabe were people with whom he thought he could do business. Nkomo was particularly strong in his consideration; however, shortly after the meeting, zipra soldiers shot down a civilian jet, killing all on board.76 Smith thus thought it would be difficult to convince the whites that Nkomo deserved their confidence. In January 1978, Smith announced his Internal Settlement proposals, under which he agreed to hand over power after negotiating with some internally based political parties. He expected certain advantages to attend this “power transfer.” For a start, he thought his country would be recognized and sanctions upon it removed. Furthermore, he believed that the liberation war, or at least the internal tension that had assisted guerrilla incursions, would end. The Internal Settlement Constitution conceded a dominant position to the whites for at least the first ten years. In the ensuing elections, the party led by Abel Muzorewa won the majority of seats and the clergyman became the first (and only) prime minister of the hyphenated state of ZimbabweRhodesia.77 In the end, the Internal Settlement did not realize any of the expectations Smith had desired. The sanctions were not lifted, the “new” country was not recognized, and internal tension continued to sustain the guerrilla incursion – which, by this time, was biting the government harder than ever. This was the situation when the Conservative Party took over in Britain. The new government, headed by Margaret Thatcher, was ready to recognize the Internal Settlement Administration of Abel Muzorewa. In fact, the party’s campaigns had indicated as much.78 However, external pressure and, possibly, a deeper understanding of the problem, forced Thatcher to change her position. The 1979 Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, provided the venue for a significant exchange of views on the future

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of Rhodesia. The conference was a decisive meeting, and for the first time in the history of the Rhodesian crisis, there seemed to be a near unity of minds. In the end, it was agreed that there would be a constitutional conference in London to which all the parties to the dispute would be invited. A subcommittee set up to work out the details of the arrangement came up with five objectives to guide further constitutional discussions. These were: (1) genuine majority rule, (2) participation of all the parties involved, (3) the urgency of such a settlement, (4) a democratic constitution safeguarding the interest of the “minorities,” and (5) free and fair elections supervised by the British government, with representatives from other Commonwealth countries. All these paved the way for the Lancaster House Conference.79 The Lancaster House Conference had a good chance of success. Apart from the achievements of the Lusaka meeting, there was another factor that pointed to a successful conference: it seemed that, by 1979, both the pf and the Rhodesian government had grown weary of the war. Against this background, any solution that did not stray too far from the principles for which they had fought would at least be objectively considered. Although the guerrillas had succeeded in preventing the Muzorewa regime from establishing an effective government and had encircled most of the major cities, the Rhodesian forces still possessed enough strength to deal decisively with the Frontline States and thus affect the lifeline of the guerrillas.80 The Lancaster House Conference brokered an agreement whereby black majority rule was to be accepted within a year. The government was to be fashioned after the British type of parliamentary democracy, with twenty seats reserved for the white minorities in a hundred-seat parliament. All these conditions were to remain unaltered for a period of ten years. The Lancaster House Agreement was not the type of deal that Nkomo and Mugabe wanted, and both of them, especially Mugabe, were ready to reject the proposals on the grounds that the concessions expected of them were too great.81 However, pressure that Mugabe could not afford to ignore came from unexpected quarters. When Mugabe announced his dissatisfaction with the constitutional proposals and expressed his readiness to continue the war, President Samora Machel of Mozambique immediately sent a special envoy to London to inform Mugabe that he should swallow the pill of the Lancaster House Agreement, no matter how bitter, because Mozambique could not afford to go on providing a base for zanla activities.82 Mugabe had no choice but to capitulate, and the agreement was sealed.83 However,

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resentment towards some of the clauses continued, and, after Mugabe assumed power, redressing crucial aspects of the agreement was a cardinal objective of his government. Under the Lancaster House Agreement, responsibility for the independence of Rhodesia was given back to Britain, and Lord Christopher Soames, a former cabinet minister and ambassador to France, was appointed as the governor who was to supervise the transitional period to majority rule. He was given considerable powers, and, when necessary, he sought and obtained more powers to cope with the enormous responsibility involved in arranging peaceful elections.84 A Commonwealth “Monitoring Force” was sent to assist in maintaining order,85 while another Commonwealth Observer Team assisted in supervising the elections.86 As would be expected, Lord Soames fell out several times with the nationalists, who, on many occasions, alleged his connivance in election malpractice.87 As Norma Kriger notes, the election result caught the contestants and observers unaware, with the possible exception of zanu-pf.88 Based largely on wishful thinking, each contestant (and his external supporters) thought he would carry the day. Nkomo thought there would be a hung Parliament under his leadership, calculating that his party would “sweep Matabeleland[,] divide the Midlands, and win several seats in Mashonaland[,] including Salisbury,” and then form a coalition with Muzorewa, whom he calculated would win between twelve and fifteen seats.89 With South African support, the Rhodesians thought Muzorewa would either win or lead a coalition government with Nkomo and the whites. Muzorewa, for his part, thought he would win outright. Britain, according to Kriger, seemed closer to the mark, as it thought that Mugabe would win the largest number of seats but not a majority.90 The pf alliance of zanu and zapu (formed shortly before the Geneva Conference) could not survive for long, and, in spite of pressure from several oau member states and the Frontline States, zanu opted to contest the elections as a separate party. The numerical advantage of the Shonas was believed to have been the motivating factor for this decision as it almost guaranteed that the party would win the elections, independent of zapu. The party won fifty-seven out of the eighty seats meant for the blacks, while zapu (which retained the name “Patriotic Front” for the election), won twenty seats. Muzorewa’s United African Nationalist Council (uanc) won the remaining three seats. One distinct feature of the voting was the

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ethnic bias. The Ndebeles voted for zapu, while the Shonas voted for zanu. This pattern of electoral support also coincided with the operational area of zanla and zipra during the liberation war. The Rhodesian Front party of Ian Smith occupied the twenty seats that the Lancaster House Agreement reserved for whites. The ethnic and racial features of the voting were to become major issues after independence, not least in defence and security matters. The new prime minister, Robert Mugabe, formed a national government with representatives from the major political parties. Joshua Nkomo declined the largely ceremonial office of president but accepted, in its stead, the office of minister of home affairs. Some other zapu and Rhodesian Front members were also invited into the new government.91 Although the desire of the new government to ensure some form of maximum participation cannot be underestimated, the policy of reconciliation embarked upon by Mugabe immediately after independence was also a policy of prudence. This is because anything to the contrary could have caused despondency, especially among the whites, who, at that time, controlled the economy.92 conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of the internal and external considerations that determined the birth of Zimbabwe, the intent being to provide a background for a discussion of the politics of security. As mentioned, most of the security issues that emerged are traceable to three factors: (1) the war of liberation, especially the ethno-racial composition of the war; (2) the country’s geo-political location in the heart of the Southern African subregion; and (3) the way the government managed the situation. The extent to which the Mugabe administration had room to manoeuvre was reduced by the constraints introduced by the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement. First, it imposed a type of government that many of the guerrillas did not like. Thus, what operated during the early years was a mixture of “Westminster institutions of Parliament and cabinet with the Marxist instruments of committees and politburo.”93 Second, it imposed a tenyear mandatory moratorium on any alteration of the Constitution. This put a major restriction on any initiative by the new government. The pattern of voting also created its own implicit constraints. Although zanu won a convincing fifty-seven seats out of the eighty seats allocated to the blacks, the fact that the pattern of voting showed

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enormous ethnic bias affected the government’s manoeuvrability. In order to avoid the allegation that its policies were partial towards a particular ethnic group, the Mugabe government had to tactfully consider all options. Yet another constraint emerged out of the conflict between expectation and reality. The new government had to contend with the expectation of many black Zimbabweans, who believed that, with independence, there should be an urgent “Zimbabweanization” of all facets of the society. What they failed to consider, of course, was the reality that the inherited structures were too entrenched to allow for their easy removal. Finally, there was the constraint of finance, which obviously had implications for everything in the new country, including defence and security. The government had to contend with postwar reconstruction with a treasury that had been depleted by the war. Clearly, certain constraints reduced the extent to which the new government could function. Efforts were made to remove these and to create more room for manoeuvrability. And it was within this framework that the government faced the first, and arguably the most important, defence and security legacy bequeathed by the liberation war: the need to establish institutions to manage national security, especially the integration of the armed forces.

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Zimbabwe’s Defence Institutions: The Politics of Creation and Intervention

Any attempt to appreciate the complexities surrounding the politics of internal and external security of any African country must take into consideration the activities of that country’s defence forces, especially the national army, the police, and the intelligence services.1 There are two major reasons for this. First, more often than not, these are the institutions used (or misused) by incumbent governments to bring down the opposition and to intimidate the population. It is thus necessary to understand the extent to which they relate to the population and to investigate whether they have served national interests rather than just the selfish interests of the political elites. Second, it is the duty of these institutions to meet the external and domestic security challenges that confront the state, a task that makes it necessary to understand the extent to which they are equipped to advance national interests. The importance of understanding defence forces is even more pronounced in the case of Zimbabwe, whose birth circumstances created peculiar security challenges and where the distinctions between the political and the military elites were extremely blurred at the time of independence. In this chapter, my objective is to discuss the establishment and early development of Zimbabwe’s defence institutions, tracing their birth and development, examining their doctrines, and analyzing the background to their involvement in politics. I look carefully at the way President Mugabe managed the defence institutions during the period between April 1980 and February 2009, and I advance three central arguments. The first is that, throughout the period under study, the Zimbabwean defence and security institutions blurred the distinction between “regime” security and “national” security.

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This may be because the nature of the war of liberation and the close links among the guerrillas during that war made the separation between the “military” and the “political” particularly difficult, with many of those in the military remaining active political players and vice versa. Second, I argue that the Zimbabwean defence institutions were Mugabe’s greatest tool for ensuring his effective hold on power. Finally, I contend that some of the security issues that became particularly important in Zimbabwe, like the controversies surrounding the activities of the “war veterans” and the use of the defence forces to address domestic security issues (both discussed in detail in the next chapter), emerged because of the way the Mugabe government managed the defence and security forces. the birth and development of the zimbabwean defence forces

The Zimbabwean defence forces consist mainly of the Zimbabwe National Army (zna) and the air force, although both institutions have several established and ad hoc divisions within them. For its part, the zna, at its birth, was somewhat unusual. Although there would eventually be military formations that were similarly odd, notably in Namibia and South Africa, the zna was an amalgam, bringing former enemies and rivals into a national force. The Lancaster House Agreement, which brokered the country’s independence, did not go into detail regarding the establishment of the zna. It simply provided for a ceasefire and the temporary cantonment of the armed groups that fought in the war. Although one of the nationalist movements, zapu, clamoured for a full discussion of military issues, Lord Carrington, who chaired the meeting, preferred to leave the matter for the incoming government. Nevertheless, there was a clear understanding that the new zna would be composed of members of the three armed forces (zanla, zipra, and the Rhodesian Security Forces) that fought in the war. But even if the Lancaster House Agreement did not go into technical details regarding major security decisions, steps to determine the future of defence and security in Zimbabwe were commenced almost as soon as the agreement was made.2 In December 1979, when he came to assume office as the governor general who would guide the emergence of the new country, Lord Soames was accompanied by an advance party of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, whose mandate was to monitor

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the ceasefire and to maintain contact with the command structure of all the armed factions. It is widely believed that creating a new defence force was one of the most important defence and security challenges that confronted the Mugabe administration. Before looking at the military integration exercise, however, it is necessary to get a picture of the various security forces at the time of independence. According to Martin Rupiya, at the time of the Lancaster House Agreement, the Rhodesian Security Forces (rsf) consisted of a “gathering of the Mozambique Resistance Nationale at Odzi, a French Foreign Legion contingent masquerading as Independent Company, and South African forces operating as independent units or integrated as ‘volunteers’ within rsf units”;3 Abel Muzorewa had control over the Security Force Auxiliaries, which numbered about twenty thousand; Mugabe had over sixteen thousand zanla guerrillas in the Assembly Points (aps), with an “estimated one third of his force instructed not to enter Assembly Points … but to bury their arms and melt in with the local population.”4 Mugabe was also believed to have had control over five hundred regular frelimo troops and an unspecified number of Tanzanian soldiers. Nkomo, for his part, had about 5,500 cadres in the aps, together with South African anc cadres, with a smaller group in the Bulawayo area. There was, in addition, a force of between six and eight thousand zapu cadres still poised across the Zambian border.5 Again, shortly before independence, many white officers and regimental sergeant majors resigned and took many items of value (such as the private regimental institutional funds available to each unit) with them when they went to South Africa. Word also filtered through that the South African Defence Force would accord preferential treatment to those who could be recruited from Zimbabwe.6 This was the picture at the time the integration exercise was to begin. The process of establishing the zna, especially the technical details, has received considerable attention.7 I thus limit my discussion to the long-term political issues that played a role in the establishment of the force. The bulk of the military integration exercise was undertaken by the British Military Advisory and Training Team (bmatt). This team initially comprised fifty-eight officers, experienced non-commissioned officers (ncos), and field commanders, but the number was to increase to 150 by September 1980. bmatt used a number of criteria, including level of education, to separate the guerrillas according to those with sufficient ability to go into an officer cadre and those who were

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to be made ncos. The senior officer cadre was trained at the Staff College, middle-level officers were trained at Gweru Military Academy, and the ncos were sent to Balla-Balla and Llewellin training camps. On the whole, sixty-five thousand soldiers from the three factions were available for integration, while thirty thousand former combatants were slated to be demobilized. One of the government’s earliest defence decisions involved the announcement that the zna would be between thirty and thirty-five thousand strong, made up of four infantry brigades and two specialist units (commando and parachute regiments). The infantry brigades were to be supported by a signal corps, an engineers corps, a pay and administration corps, a medical corps, and a logistics corps.8 In the process of forming the new zna, the Mugabe administration made a number of concessions to its former “enemies” (the rsf) and its former “rivals” (zipra). With the rsf, the administration invited Lieutenant General Peter Walls, the commander of the Combined Operation and head of the Rhodesian Army to remain as the army commander of the new zna. It also allowed the former members of the rsf who wanted to remain in the army to retain their old ranks, despite the fact that many of them allegedly gave themselves accelerated promotions shortly before independence. For zipra, the government ensured some form of parity among the first set of Zimbabwean officers appointed in the country. Rex Nhongo (later to become Solomon Mujuru) and Lookout Masuku, former heads of zanla and zipra, respectively, were made lieutenant generals. Their deputies, Josiah Tungamirai and Jevan Maseko, became major generals. This created a sort of parity between zanla and zipra at the apex of the zna. However, a close look at these decisions shows that they were more pragmatic than they were indicative of openness and fairness. For example, the government had no choice but to make concessions to the rsf. First, the new army was to be woven around conventional soldiery, an area in which Mugabe’s zanla guerrillas were largely inexperienced. This made it imperative for the new administration to put aside any historical differences. Second, all the structures to be used by the new zna belonged to the rsf, an advantage the government could not ignore. Third, it was suspected that giving some form of recognition to the Rhodesian Army would discourage its members from sabotaging the installations around which the new zna was to be built.

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The concessions granted to zipra can also be explained on the grounds that the force, though numerically smaller than zanla, was more experienced in conventional soldiery. The Mugabe administration could have felt that it would be advisable to have on board a guerrilla force with some knowledge of conventional soldiery and thus hope to prevent a situation that would have made the new army completely beholden to the former Rhodesian Army. Second, Mugabe would not want to give any indication that he was willing to ditch zapu so soon, especially as many African countries considered the decision to fight the election separately as not being in the spirit of the efforts that led to the formation of the pf. It is important to point out that many of these countries were giving particular attention to how the Mugabe government would address the formation of the army, regarding this as an indication of how the administration would accommodate zapu.9 The first set of military appointments showed that Mugabe wanted to hold on to control of the military. He needed Walls to stabilize the situation, especially as there were rumours that a military coup was being planned to overthrow his government. Mugabe took the rumours seriously, and they became a major factor in his thinking as he prepared to assume office. It was even believed that he appealed to the British government to allow Lord Soames to stay on for an extra year to dissuade possible coup plotters.10 Although there could have been those who wanted to plot a coup, at least two factors would have made this unattractive. First was the resounding nature of zanu-pf’s political victory at the election, which clearly showed that the party had enormous popularity in the country. Second was the nature and extent of international involvement in the elections and the immediate recognition that was given to the new government by external actors. In addition to his perceived role as a stabilizing element, Lieutenant General Walls was to supervise the return of South Africa’s war materials, which had been lent to Rhodesia in the last few months of the war. However, the reality was that, although Walls held a high position, he was not that powerful. By the time he assumed office, Walls realized that he faced considerable challenges. First, he was unable to develop any form of camaraderie with the former guerrilla commanders, who, unlike Mugabe, had not forgiven him for the role he played during the war of liberation. Decisions were often taking place over his head at the Joint High Command (jhc), which was responsible for the technical aspects of the integration exercise. Mugabe, who

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doubled as minister of defence, encouraged the commanders to take advantage of having direct access to him (Mugabe). Further worsening the situation for Walls was the fact that even the whites considered him a sellout.11 Despite the concessions granted to both the Rhodesian Army and the former zipra, some of the early policies adopted by the Mugabe administration showed signs that the new prime minister was determined to hold tight to issues concerning the country’s defence forces. For example, before the integration of forces commenced, the government disbanded segments of the rsf that it considered unacceptable. Among these were the Selous Scouts, the Security Force Auxiliaries, and the Guard Force. This raised a little dust, especially as the Lancaster House Agreement had recognized all three fighting forces (rsf, zanla, and zipra) as units with legitimate claims to incorporation into the zna. However, the government justified its action on the grounds that the disbanded units were mere ad hoc forces, “established for a specific purpose, [and, unlike the rsf, were] never meant to be of a permanent nature.”12 This was not convincing to some of the members of the Rhodesian Front Party, one of whom argued that both zanla and zipra were “ad hoc forces” established “for the specific purpose” of overthrowing the government of the day, and, since the task had been accomplished, should be disbanded. In addition to disbanding ad hoc units of the Rhodesian Army, the administration did not extend parity between zanla and zipra beyond the rank of general. Of the eight new brigadiers, zanla had five; it also had eleven of the seventeen new colonels.13 The formation and early development of the zna suffered a number of political hiccups, three of which are of particular importance. The first was the discovery of arms caches in a number of locations. These caches, widely believed to have been made by zapu, affected the trust between zanu and zapu, resulting in the removal of key zipra leaders from the jhc, especially the Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa.14 Details of the arms cache controversy are discussed in the next chapter, but it is important to point out here that the political fallout also resulted in the removal of Joshua Nkomo from government and the breakdown in the relationship between zapu and zanu. From this moment, Mugabe’s grip on the zna was out in the open. The second political hiccup in the army establishment process involved a number of armed clashes that occurred between zanla and zipra during the integration exercise in Entumbane.15

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The clashes, discussed at some length later in this chapter, were so extreme that the government had to rely on former members of the rsf and flying war planes to bring them under control. Apart from the destruction that resulted from these clashes, what was particularly disturbing, at least from the military integration point of view, was that some of the units involved had already been integrated and, as such, were expected to show signs of harmony and camaraderie. A judicial panel of inquiry, headed by Justice Enoch Dumbutshena, was set up to investigate the clashes. The third hiccup was that the effects of the clampdown resulting from the arms cache incident and the clashes led to a situation in which some zipra combatants who had already been integrated into the zna deserted, thus laying the foundation for dissident forces (see chapter 3). Something else that reflected the determination of the Mugabe administration to act outside the box in the management of the zna could be seen in the role external actors played in its establishment and early development. Again, while it was widely believed that only bmatt could manage the integration of the new zna, the Mugabe administration found ways of diluting the monopoly of the British by bringing in soldiers from North Korea and China, former supporters from the liberation war era. Of the two countries, it was North Korea with which Mugabe had the most controversial relationship. The reason for this controversy did not concern the training team itself (although it, too, was significant) but, rather, the activities of the brigade it trained. When the Zimbabwean government invited a North Korean military team to train a special unit of the zna,16 different reasons were given for the invitation, ranging from the desire to increase Zimbabwe’s deterrent posture towards South Africa and the intention to suppress internal dissident to the wish to assist Mozambique against renamo,17 not to mention the interest in creating an elite unit outside the command structure of the regular armed forces. But, contrary to what is often assumed, the 5th Brigade was not the first unit of the army whose creation stemmed from questionable or unclear motives. From the beginning, ad hoc creation had been part of the Zimbabwean military establishment. For example, as early as August 1980, a people’s militia was created primarily to protect party officials. This unit was also drawn from former guerrillas. The arrival the North Koreans caused controversy in Zimbabwe, especially among politicians. This was heightened by the secrecy that

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shrouded the event. North Korea had supported Mugabe during the liberation war, and “secretly” inviting the country into Zimbabwe to train a section of the army evoked concern, which was further fuelled by the composition of the brigade that was being trained. The origin of Zimbabwe’s invitation to North Korea to train a special unit of the zna may be rooted in the government’s decision to create a special presidential guard due to its belief that there had been attempts to assassinate Prime Minister Mugabe. In October 1980, Mugabe visited North Korea, where it was believed that the decision to invite the Koreans to train Zimbabweans might have been taken. Not long after the visit, 1,065 North Korean instructors arrived in Zimbabwe to establish an armoured regiment known as the 5th Brigade. Virtually all the members of the army selected for the brigade were drawn from among former zanla guerrillas.18 To expect that the army of a foreign country that had been clearly partisan during the liberation struggle could train a unit of the zna, especially a unit with such exclusive membership, and not attract negative attention would be unreasonable. Opposition came first from Parliament, where zapu and the Rhodesian Front opposed the entire scheme. They suspected that the exclusivity of the membership of the brigade might indicate hidden motives. Moreover, many of the parliamentarians argued that North Korea had no history of successful military operations to warrant its invitation into Zimbabwe to train the army.19 The government provided “explanations” to address these two issues. First, it argued that the brigade was almost exclusively zanla because, after the formation of the first four brigades, only zanla guerrillas were left.20 Thus, there was no alternative but to put them all in the same brigade. Compelling as this argument might seem on the surface, it was not politically expedient, especially considering the role the brigade was later to play in Zimbabwe’s political history. As for the choice of the North Koreans, despite the opposition’s claim that North Korea had no history of military success, the government claimed that it had a right to invite any country it deemed fit. Militarily, the deal looked good during the initial stages. The North Koreans came with equipment, including t-54 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery valued at z$12.5 million, all unconditional gifts to Zimbabwe. However, what imprinted the name of the North Koreans upon the minds of Zimbabweans was the political rather than the military aspects of the invitation. It would appear that,

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from the outset, Prime Minister Mugabe did not leave members of the 5th Brigade in any doubt as to what their role would be in ensuring the country’s security. Although it was not explicitly stated, there are strong reasons to believe that the activities of the brigade would be politically motivated. For example, the local name of the brigade, Gukurahundi,21 which expresses the political undertone of the arrangement, was officially given to the brigade by Mugabe when he handed a flag to its first commander, Perence Shiri, at the brigade’s passing-out parade in Nyanga.22 During the parade, Mugabe also made it clear that part of the brigade’s duty was to address “internal enemies,” especially those who had not done well in the general election and who had allegedly resorted to banditry.23 Although no names were mentioned, many Zimbabweans thought that the prime minister had the zapu and its leadership in mind. The 5th Brigade performed its most controversial assignment during the dissident operations in Matabeleland, which are discussed in the next chapter. Here, it is enough to say that the activities of the brigade were controversial and that many unarmed civilians were known to have been killed and otherwise maltreated at the hands of its members. It was this that gave rise to the greatest criticism, and many Ndebeles despised the 5th Brigade. Both zapu and white parliamentarians were vociferous in their call for the abrogation of the agreement with the North Koreans. In fact, zapu described the brigade as a “private army.” Even though this might be an overstatement, the exclusivity of the brigade’s membership as well as its activities in Matabeleland during the dissident operation cannot be denied. The military verdict of the arrangement was that the ability of the North Koreans had been greatly overestimated. After almost a year of training, the 5th Brigade looked technically bad, undisciplined, low in morale, and hopeless with regard to the sort of counter-insurgency operations it was meant to tackle.24 Its ability to effectively suppress internal dissidents was equally in doubt. There was also the problem of a lack of uniformity with other units of the armed forces. Apart from having undergone different training, it was provided with different weapons (ak-47s instead of the standard nato rifles used by other sections of the army trained by the British). The oddness of this was obvious as the whole point of the integration exercise was to eliminate the differences that had arisen from different forms of military training. Other brigades looked at the 5th Brigade with either jealousy (because of the “preferential treatment” it received from the

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government) or with hatred (because of its “pride”).25 The North Koreans made very few friends among civilians and they also had communication problems.26 The British military advisers made no objection to North Korea’s involvement in the training of Zimbabwean troops, and the commander of the training scheme noted that dual training was not likely to have much effect on the soldiers. In the end, however, the North Koreans were sent back home, and the 5th Brigade was sent to the bmatt for retraining. But while the integration exercise was going on, a major problem emerged in the relationship between the Mugabe administration and Lieutenant General Peter Walls. This was to lead to the latter’s dismissal as the chairman of the jhc and his expulsion from Zimbabwe. The circumstances surrounding this are somewhat confusing, but on 18 July 1980, Walls announced his intention to retire from the army effective in September of that year. The reason he gave was that he had had enough of the military, but there was speculation about other motives. For example, he was said to have fallen out of line with the government and with other members of the jhc. Many also speculated that he was unhappy with the rapid drop in his popularity among some of the white soldiers, especially the Selous Scouts, who were disbanded shortly before the integration commenced.27 Yet others attributed his decision to retire to unfulfilled personal ambition, for it was said that he desperately wanted to be promoted to the position of full general, and Mugabe’s refusal prompted him to reconsider his stay in the army.28 Controversy entered the story when, in an interview with the bbc, Walls disparaged Mugabe’s election victory, spoke condescendingly of black rule, and warned that a civil war in Zimbabwe was a “distinct possibility.”29 He also said that he had personally written a letter to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher urging her to disallow the election that had brought Mugabe to power. The interview surprised many people, and the government’s reaction was swift. Nathan Shamuyariya, then minister for information, condemned his remarks in Parliament and, a few days later, announced that the government had documentary evidence of Walls’s involvement in a planned military coup codenamed Operation Quartz. Operation Quartz turned out to be very controversial. The plan was first made public by London’s Daily Express on 14 August 1980 and was reported in the Zimbabwean Herald the following day. Apparently, this was when most Zimbabweans, possibly including

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those in the government, became aware of the plan. According to the Daily Express, military units would take over the key buildings in Salisbury (Harare) and, at the same time, attack Mugabe’s aps. This scheme, if true, is rather confusing. It was allegedly not to be a military takeover but the establishment of “a new political alliance.”30 One wonders why the emergence of a political alliance should manifest itself in such a potentially explosive way. It was also said that Lord Soames and the British had some inkling of it but that they could not do anything to stop it. However, it was apparently called off three hours before it was due to begin for reasons that remain as unclear as the plan itself.31 Walls denied any knowledge of a coup but declared that he would do everything possible “to halt or reverse the progress of Marxism” in Zimbabwe.32 As a further punishment (apart from his expulsion) and as a preventive measure, the government gazette of 26 September 1980 made an amendment to the emergency power (maintenance of law and order) regulation, which empowered the president to prohibit a citizen from returning to Zimbabwe. The government was blunt about the intention of this amendment, which, according to Mugabe, “[did] not encompass anybody else other than General Walls.”33 It was an open secret that, even before the Lancaster House Conference, Walls had begun to stray from being an apolitical soldier. Throughout the life of the last government he was wont to dabble in politics to a degree that was quite unprofessional for a military officer of his status. Just two weeks before the elections, he assured two separate gatherings – one of businesspeople and one of joint operation commanders – that there would never be a Marxist government in Zimbabwe. Given the declared Marxist orientation of the Mugabe administration, it was obvious that a serious falling out with the new government was only a matter of time. The Walls crisis had two major effects on the integration exercise. The first was that it contributed to the mass exodus of white officers (over 250 resigned) from the army, most of whom migrated to South Africa. However, it must be noted that defection to South Africa was not necessarily evidence of solidarity with Walls as South Africa had made many tempting offers to the soldiers. This exodus to South Africa was to affect the relationship between the two countries for years to come. The second effect of the crisis involved how to fill Walls’s seat as the chairman of the jhc. The late Solomon Mujuru was believed to have wanted the job, but his inexperience and his

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former status as the zanla commander probably hampered his chances. Lieutenant General Maclean, the army commander, noted that he could not take the job because he considered himself “too outspoken.” But even if this had not been the case, he would have been unacceptable because many people believed that he could not instill the necessary discipline in the different wings. Initially, finding a capable replacement proved difficult, and, at one point, it was speculated that Mugabe was contemplating inviting a general from the Nigerian army to take the position.34 In the end, however, Alan Page, the secretary of defence, acted as chairman for some time before Emmerson Mnangagwa, minister of state for defence in the Prime Minister’s Office, took over. It was Mnangagwa who saw the military reorganization to its conclusion. The entire post-independence military reorganization in Zimbabwe generated considerable political issues. This should not be surprising as the three armed units involved in the exercise were political armies that had fought in pursuit of particular political ideals. Thus, in bringing them together, it was to be expected that there would be a considerable number of power plays. This was all the more inevitable as each of the three parties had to make do with a compromised version of the political objectives that had motivated it to take up arms. During the liberation war, the three armies had different views on how to constitute the armed forces in post-independence Zimbabwe. Ian Smith, for example, believed that any peace settlement that included incorporating the guerrillas into the army would not work. In a bbc radio interview on 26 September 1977, he said: “There isn’t such a thing as guerrilla armies. If we look at them, they are a bunch of people who had very little training, who don’t acknowledge commands and operate in individual units.”35 He concluded that the guerrillas would have to lay down their arms, return to civilian life, and, if they so desired, then enlist as raw recruits in the zna. The position of Mugabe’s zanu was that the new army should be composed exclusively of members of the guerrilla forces.36 According to Norma Kriger, the British would have liked to disband all the armies and form a new army, but this was politically unacceptable to all sides. According to her, “the Rhodesian delegation privately raised the issue of British assistance for guerrilla demobilization but Britain knew this would be unacceptable to the guerrilla parties who would not give up their armies as long as the Rhodesian forces existed.”37 Only zapu appeared to have supported the merger of the three fighting forces.38

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The basic political questions raised by the integration exercise were: (1) What sort of political control would be required to keep cohesion and discipline in the armed forces? and (2) how would the new army be able to purge itself of the fundamental differences that had characterized the relationship between the different units during the war? There was also the question of how much money could be allotted to the integration exercise and national defence at a time when most Zimbabweans expected the physical and economic reconstruction of the society to take priority over every other consideration.39 The political dimension to the military integration exercise was extremely complex as it was characterized by three interwoven “battlefronts,” all existing simultaneously. The first of these fronts was between the two former guerrilla units, on the one hand, and the Rhodesian Army, on the other; the second was between zanla and zipra; while the third was between zanla and the Rhodesian Army, on one side, and zipra, on the other. The first of these political “battlegrounds” – between the two guerrilla units and the old Rhodesian Army – arose because of the advantages that the former believed the members of the latter enjoyed in the creation of the new zna. As was noted earlier, the military integration exercise was an attempt to move towards having a uniform conventional army. The fact that the Rhodesian Army had all along been practising conventional soldiery made it the nucleus around which the zna was to be built. This was further reinforced by the fact that the Rhodesian Army’s infrastructure was located inside Zimbabwe. The Mugabe government realized the significant role the old Rhodesian Army could play in the establishment of a conventional army and, therefore, granted it considerable concessions. First, as noted earlier, all the members of the former Rhodesian Army who decided to stay on in the new army were allowed to retain their former ranks. Second, certain aspects of the initial retraining of the guerrillas were carried out by members of the old Rhodesian Army. This created the impression that there was a hierarchical relationship between the units.40 Apart from this, considerable “take-off” advantages accrued to the former members of the Rhodesian Army due largely to the guerrillas’ lack of conventional military knowledge. The guerrillas had to learn how to work with an unfamiliar infrastructure, a disparity in salary scales, formal ranks, and so on. These conditions further repressed them, resulting in a situation in which they had to seek clarification from the Rhodesian Army. All this gave the latter an inestimable advantage, which it did not hesitate to exploit. Many

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guerrillas found it difficult to understand how people who had fought against black majority rule could, after independence, become the main beneficiaries of what they (the guerrillas) had fought for. After some time, however, the guerrillas grasped the intricacies of the system to the point at which they were able to turn the tables against the former members of the Rhodesian Army. The second political battleground (between zanla and zipra) involved an extension of the rivalry that had characterized the relationship between these two military wings and their sponsoring political parties before independence. In the post-independence era, the first manifestation of this rivalry had to do with the creation of the zna. The rivalry reached an alarming height with a series of armed clashes between the two military wings, claiming about five hundred lives and leaving more than a thousand injured. These armed clashes were, in many ways, disasters waiting to happen. By the end of 1980, only fifteen thousand of the estimated sixtyfive thousand guerrillas had been trained. The rest retained their arms at the aps. Towards the end of 1980, the jhc decided to transfer the guerrillas from the cramped camps to low-cost housing near Harare and Bulawayo. Thus, twelve thousand armed guerrillas were distributed equally between these two towns. This uncoordinated transfer of armed men to over-crowded townships increased the likelihood of violence. The first of these clashes occurred in Bulawayo in November 1980. zipra alleged that, after a zanu party rally in a Bulawayo suburb (during which there allegedly occurred angry denunciations of zapu and its leadership), a shot was fired into the zipra camp at nearby Entumbane. zipra fired back into the neighbouring zanla camp, and the clash in Entumbane was under way. When the news reached the camps in Harare, similar disturbances broke out, although on a much smaller scale. Officers of both sides later placated the fighters and arranged a ceasefire. Another clash in February 1981 was particularly significant. Again, what actually happened is shrouded in controversy, but it began with a disagreement between zipra and zanla at Ntabazinduna camp near Bulawayo before spreading to Entumbane, where the earlier uprising had occurred. The conflict soon spread to Connemara Barracks near Gweru. zipra forces had moved out of their camps in Essexvale and headed for Bulawayo to assist their colleagues. Armed personnel carriers and other heavy ammunition were used in the march to Bulawayo. The prime minister was forced to use white-led

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troops to quell the uprising. In the end, some of these armoured vehicles were destroyed and about two hundred people lost their lives.41 Apart from the scale of the casualties, another alarming thing about the clash was that it involved three of the fourteen battalions that had already been integrated.42 This was particularly disturbing for the government, and it accepted the Justice Dumbutshena Panel’s recommendation that these battalions be disbanded. Perhaps there is a historical explanation for the recurrent clashes between zipra and zanla. Most of the guerrillas at the integration camps had been born shortly before 1963 – after the zanu-zapu split. The indoctrination to which they were exposed, and to which they were very receptive, involved the “holier-than-thou” propaganda espoused by their respective leaders. This propaganda eulogized the actions of one group while simultaneously casting aspersions on the actions of the other. This led the guerrillas to believe that nothing good could come from the policies of the other party. This situation was to adversely affect all efforts to bring the armies together, both during and after the liberation war.43 Although the clashes impeded the reorganization efforts, they turned out to have unintended positive consequences for the government. First, it made the government accelerate general disarmament; second, the jhc began operating more as a team;44 and third, his use of the white-led units gave Mugabe the assurance that members of the former Rhodesian Army could be relied upon to bail the administration out of any crisis situation.45 The extent to which a concerted zipra-Ndebele plot had fomented the clashes, especially the second Entumbane riot, was mildly controversial. There was no suspicion that either Nkomo or the zapu leadership had anything to do with the riots, which were generally believed to be isolated guerrilla actions. Indeed, it was due largely to the efforts of Nkomo, Masuku, and the former head of zipra military intelligence, Dumiso Dabengwa, that the zipra forces were calmed down.46 However, the mutual accusations that followed the arms cache controversy (see chapter 3) introduced another dimension into the Entumbane story. A zanu parliamentarian, Muroyiwa, accused zapu of being behind the Entumbane riots, alleging that zapu had, in concert with zipra soldiers, planned them. Part of the plan, according to him, was that, on the day of the disturbance, zapu supporters in Entumbane were to play their radios very loudly in order to identify their homes and thus keep them safe from the rioting

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zipra forces. In many respects, it looked like the Zimbabwean equivalent of the biblical “Passover.” This, however, was denied by zapu.47 The last political battlefront involved the alleged ganging-up of the former Rhodesian Army and zanla on the former zipra forces in the zna. There is some evidence to support the allegation that, in the early years of the zna, both the Rhodesian Army and zanla were too close for zipra’s comfort. zipra believed that, soon after independence, the government relied on the former Rhodesian Army, whose officers had direct access to the prime minister and influenced him to make decisions that were detrimental to it. zipra had some reasons to suspect conspiracy for, although it was not often mentioned, some zipra military units – the air force and the intelligence unit – were not considered for integration into the zna. At independence, there were two “air forces” in Zimbabwe, owned by the Rhodesian and zipra forces, respectively. Any realistic assessment of the situation would agree that the Rhodesian Air Force was more sophisticated than was zipra’s and that, as such, it should form the nucleus of the zna. However, zipra argued that it would have been better treated with regard to the formation of the new air force had zanla not introduced old rivalries into its formation.48 Further, the government refused to consider zipra’s intelligence unit. zipra saw these omissions as a joint conspiracy between zanla and the former Rhodesian Army.49 Furthermore, zipra believed that the invitation Prime Minister Mugabe extended to the white-led Rhodesian Army to assist in the suppression of the Entumbane riot (which resulted in considerable zipra casualties), and the ease and enthusiasm with which the former Rhodesian forces carried out this assignment, were clear manifestations of their “anti-zipra” solidarity. Apart from these conflicts, another political issue that emerged during this period was the controversy over the discovery of the arms caches in some parts of the country. This discovery of arms that had allegedly been cached by zapu led to a situation in which some of zapu’s military and political leaders were punished for complicity. This resulted in tension within the ranks of the zipra troops who had recently been integrated into the zna, resulting in many of them deserting. The creation of the Air Force of Zimbabwe (afz) was far less controversial than was the creation of the zna. Right from independence, it seemed clear that a new national air force would have to be built from the remnants of the Rhodesian Air Force. However, because zanu guerrillas had little experience in air warfare and because the

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formation of the zna was considered more urgent, the attention given to the formation of the afz was considerably limited during the early years. Something else that may have led to the delay was the fact that zipra, the zapu military wing, was better organized than zanla with regard to air warfare, and the government may have wanted to wait for a time when the command and control of such a force did not fall to zipra. The first major step towards developing the new national air force involved the purchase of air-to-ground aircraft worth us$45 million from Britain in September 1981, along with an invitation to friendly countries like Nigeria and Mozambique to assist in training the its members. However, a major incident that was to change the shape of the afz occurred in July 1982, when there was a major attack on the Thornhill Air Force Base in Gweru, which led to the destruction of many of the newly acquired planes. This was a major setback, and the government, from this point on, began to take the development of the afz seriously. The government’s intention to ensure effective control of the afz can be seen in the calibre of individuals seconded to administer it. The first Zimbabwean commander of the afz was Josiah Tungamirai, who was seconded from his position as deputy commander of the army. Although he was able to reduce some of the excesses of the government, things changed when he retired (which many people believed he was forced to do) and he was replaced by Perence Shiri, who had attained national recognition as the commander of the 5th Brigade. On the whole, within a year of the independence of Zimbabwe, the foundations of the main defence institutions had been laid and some of the issues that were later to be exploited by the Mugabe administration had shown initial signs. With the structures in place to develop the defence forces, the Mugabe administration confronted another issue that was also to become very controversial – the demobilization exercise. the demobilization exercise

The manner in which Zimbabwe went about demobilizing was crucial to a number of subsequent security developments, as evidenced in the activities of the “war veterans.” The circumstances necessitating demobilization were clear. First, the integration exercise brought together those who fought (or claimed to have fought) in the war of liberation with very little regard for their physical condition or state

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of health, thus they were not all fit enough to stay mobilized. Second, there was an extra-military consideration for the demobilization exercise: sixty-six thousand troops would be an unnecessary burden on a very weak economy. Against this background, a demobilization directorate was established in June 1981 and charged with the task of reducing the size of the zna from sixty-five thousand to forty-one thousand troops by 1983. Demobilizing troops from African armies has always been a very sensitive issue. Being a member of the armed forces confers a certain “prestige,” which members are usually not willing to give up, especially given the uncertainties that await them outside the barracks. Second, a successful military coup (which could occur anytime) could bring members of the armed forces to the corridors of power.50 Certain peculiarities compound the problem in the case of Zimbabwe. Some people joined the struggle not so much due to their conviction of the need to remove the minority regime as due to their desire for the “benefits” that were thought to be awaiting them as members of the forces after independence. This accounts for those who joined the guerrilla ranks in Mozambique and Zambia during and immediately after the Lancaster House Agreement. Thus, convincing this category of guerrillas to demobilize voluntarily is a daunting task. Additionally, the Mugabe government had to be careful to avoid being accused of favouritism by zipra forces, even for actions that it may have taken with wholly honourable intentions. At the same time, the government faced the pressure of expectation from former zanla troops who felt that it was time they started reaping the fruits of their labour. Here it has to be pointed out that, by the time the demobilization exercise began, a group had emerged within zanu that was critical of what it regarded as Mugabe’s “soft” approach towards Nkomo and his conciliatory attitude towards the whites. All this made the demobilization effort in Zimbabwe particularly difficult. Demobilization created considerable dissatisfaction in Zimbabwe, largely because expectations could not be met and alliances between the guerrillas and the party leadership could no longer be sustained. To explain this, it is necessary to take a close look at how the demobilization exercise was undertaken. The first thing the government did to facilitate voluntary demobilization was to announce what it called a “demobilization package.” This was a program to assist those who were to be demobilized, and it consisted of four main

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elements: (1) further education, (2) technical training, (3) business advice, and (4) a demobilization allowance.51 Further education was meant particularly for those below the secondary school level as well as those who wanted to continue the studies they had abandoned for the cause of liberation. The technical training element of the package was designed for those interested in starting a new career upon leaving the armed forces. A number of technical colleges were established to provide crash programs for these ex-soldiers. Some of the former guerrillas took courses in automobile engineering, welding, and other technical and commercial courses; some attended teacher training courses; while others were trained as nurses and medical assistants. Special centres were set up to train a number of former soldiers as custom and immigration officers. The demobilization package also provided business advice and assistance to discharged soldiers, especially those seeking employment or wishing to be selfemployed. This was regardless of whether or not they had benefited from the education and training programs. Soldiers were encouraged to pool their earnings into cooperative ventures to enable them to embark upon small-scale ventures by themselves. But it was the demobilization allowance that was regarded as the most attractive part of the demobilization package. All the soldiers who opted for voluntary demobilization were promised a monthly allowance of Z$185.00 (about US$150) for a period of two years. This was sufficient to keep many of the unmarried guerrillas happy for some time, and it was why the government thought many of them would be encouraged to demobilize. Each soldier leaving the army under the demobilization program was entitled to the demobilization allowance, regardless of whether or not he took advantage of the education, training, or business parts of the package. Despite all these incentives, however, the government’s program for encouraging voluntary demobilization was not very successful as many of the excombatants were unwilling to risk certainty for uncertainty.52 The demobilization exercise was not immune from the internal political wrangling that influenced most major policy decisions. For example, when the demobilization burden became too much for the government to handle, a group of officers in the armed forces initiated a scheme known as Occupy, Feed, Learn, and Earn. The aim of the scheme, according to its founders, was to engage former combatants in productive activities. The group drew up a list of sixteen agricultural and industrial activities that could provide jobs for discharged

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soldiers. The officers appeared to have carried out considerable feasibility studies, with promises of financial assistance from a number of countries, including Britain, the United States, Holland, and Denmark. However, all these offers were dependent on the scheme’s receiving the approval of the home government. In the end, the Zimbabwean government turned down this project allegedly because the major organizers were people who had military connections with Abel Muzorewa. For instance, the chairman, Colonel Colin Zastle, was the former deputy commander of the Security Force Auxiliaries – the force that was created to keep Muzorewa in office – while John Hughes, who conducted most of the feasibility studies for the scheme, had a strong connection with many of the officers of that unit. Mugabe’s dislike for the Auxiliaries was widely known, and, as noted earlier, the group was among the first military units to be disbanded when he assumed office. Besides, the government felt that the scheme might provide a political assembly point for opponents of the government. Of all the aspects of the post-independence military reorganization in Zimbabwe, it was the demobilization exercise and the treatment accorded to former guerrillas that opened the government to the most justifiable criticism. The complaints arising from the demobilization exercise are complex and multidimensional. For a start, many ex-zipra guerrillas argued that they suffered more than did their zanla counterparts and that more of them were involuntarily demobilized. Statistically, more zanla troops were demobilized, but this may not give the full picture since there were more zanla troops than zipra troops. When one considers the proportional representation, the ex-zipras appear to have been more affected than the zanlas, a situation that caused fundamental disaffection in subsequent years. The second set of complaints came from all those who were demobilized, regardless of the side to which they belonged. Many complained about their demobilization payment, which they said was either inadequate or not received. Many also complained about the treatment they received with regard to their plans to return to civilian life. The complaint that the demobilization payment was inadequate rested on the argument that the extended family system invariably brought huge responsibilities that the amount given could not sufficiently address. Thus, many of the ex-combatants wanted an increase in the allowance and an extension of its two-year duration. Although some people did not receive their demobilization money,

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the chief of army staff, Major General Zvinavashe, claimed that most of those in this category had not completed the necessary forms,53 and that, because of this, there was no way for the government to know that they existed. Nevertheless, it is equally fair to say that, even after the affected people had regularized their demobilization papers, it took quite a while before things were put in order. The treatment of ex-combatants has been one of the most controversial issues in post-independence Zimbabwe, with many Zimbabweans arguing that the government signed these people out of the military without doing nearly enough to integrate them back into society.54 Most of the efforts the government made in this regard were either inadequate or completely ineffective. Finding a home in neither a civilian nor a military community made things extremely difficult for many ex-combatants. After many of the ex-combatants completed the crash training program, the Public Service Commission could not give them jobs because they did not possess the ordinary-level certificate. Privatesector and other establishments refused them jobs on the same grounds. This caused considerable frustration among ex-combatants, one of whom said: “Most of us had grade 7 before we went into the bush. Now we are being scolded and denied jobs because we don’t have O-level certificate. Where do we get it from?”55 Another was more emotional: “It pains us to see our mates who remained to finish their education. They now have good jobs while we have nothing. Everywhere we apply for jobs we are being reminded that we don’t have the necessary qualification. Our school mates now make fun of us and sarcastically thank us for making their good life possible.”56 Most of the ex-soldiers felt that they were being refused by the new social order that they had fought so bravely to create. They objected to numerous other things, such as being identified as people needing rehabilitation, as though they were cured lunatics or handicapped people. In the words of one of the soldiers: “people treat us as if we are sick and need a doctor – in fact, it is the society that is sick and needs to be rehabilitated.”57 This situation could have been averted if the government had educated the rest of society regarding the discharge of ex-soldiers, many of whom, in fact, believed that the government was part of a wider “conspiracy” against them. One had this to say: During the war, we were together with some of the Ministers of today … They would come and talk to us to keep the struggle

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going … But since 1980, we have not seen them again. We gave them the power, and now they don’t come to see us. They may find it embarrassing to be seen with people like us now.58 The anger of the former war combatants continued until 1991, when about twenty thousand of them came together to establish the War Veterans Welfare Organization. This organization later entered into discussions with the government concerning how to bring about a better welfare package for its members. The activities of this group and the role it played in the politics of security in Zimbabwe are discussed in greater detail in chapter 3. By the mid-1990s, it was clear that the government had lost its grip on the problems posed by the rehabilitation of the war veterans and was looking for a way of diverting the attention of the people to other sources of aggression. Even former zanla members criticized the government over the management of the affairs of those former combatants who could not make it into the zna. For example, the former 4th Brigade commander, Brigadier Gibson Mashingaidze, himself a veteran, was unequivocal in his criticism of the government for reneging on promises made to the combatants in Mozambique and Zambia during the war. During the burial of war veteran Piniel Takaendesa, who died of injuries he sustained during the war, Brigadier Mashingaidze said: Everyone suffered during the war on the understanding that we would be rewarded with a better life when we won our independence … But some people now have ten farms to their names, luxury yachts and have developed fat stomachs when excombatants … live in abject poverty … Is this the zanu (pf) I trusted with my life? Is this the same party which promised to care for us in old age? Is this the zanu (pf) that coaxed us into joining the war to liberate Zimbabwe?59 In response to the growing concerns of ex-combatants, the government came up with a number of policies that were either poorly coordinated or cumbersome. For example, an amount of money was put aside for the welfare of the former combatants, but this was very badly managed and allegations of serious corruption were made against senior zanu party officials.60 With the initiative completely lost, the government started looking for any opportunity to divert the

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criticism to another subject. As I show in the next chapter, the land question was a ready subject to be exploited. For now, I turn to the establishment of the Zimbabwean police force. the police force of zimbabwe

The reorganization of the Police Force of Zimbabwe (pfz) commenced after the 1980 general elections. As with the army, there were several reasons for police reorganization in a post-independence Zimbabwe. Apart from serving as a precaution against the anticipated domestic disturbance after independence, there were also political and professional reasons for the establishment of the pfz. First, the war of liberation had blurred the distinction between the police and the army. Instead of staying exclusively with its domestic security role, the police had become involved in curbing military insurgent activities.61 Thus, upon independence, it was obvious that reorganization was necessary to bring it back to its proper policing role: ensuring domestic security. Yet another notable reason that rendered reorganization inevitable was the fact that the Rhodesian Police Force (then confusingly referred to as the British South African Police [bsap]) was unacceptable to the new government for obvious reasons: it had been “on the other side” during the war of liberation, so it would be difficult for the new government to leave domestic security solely in its hands. Although there was very little doubt that the bsap was an effective and dedicated police force, the answer to the fundamental question “dedicated to what system?” made the force, as it then existed, totally unacceptable to the new government in Harare. As with the creation of the zna, the government wanted to integrate the bsap and members of the liberation movement to form the new Zimbabwean police force.62 Thus, the present pfz is an amalgamation of the old bsap and some guerrillas who volunteered to join the force. The exact number of those from the bsap and those from the former guerrilla ranks is not available, but most of the guerrillas who joined the pfz had had some experience with police duties during the liberation movement. This made their adaptation to their new roles easier than it would otherwise have been. Britain again assisted in the establishment of the pfz as some Zimbabwean police officers went to Britain for short training programs, while Scotland Yard sent Deputy Assistant Commissioner Thomas Harrison (of the Personnel and Training Department) and

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Sergeant Colin Macdonald (deputy commandant of the Uniform Training School at Hendon) to Zimbabwe to advise the government on police organization.63 Another country that assisted in this regard was Pakistan.64 The exercise did not involve the type of problems that occurred with the integration exercise in the zna, and it was not disrupted by cases of armed clashes, such as those in Entumbane. This may be attributed to the lesser degree of complication involved in the exercise, which was likely due to the government’s presumption that the police are subordinate to the military. In Africa, because of their monopoly on the use of force, the military is always regarded as deserving of greater attention than the police. The reorganized pfz has two arms: the Special Police Constabulary and the Police Support Unit. The latter operates nationwide, while the constabulary functions as its local affiliate – a part-time, voluntary force with full police powers. There are other units, like the Special Intelligence Unit, known as the Police Internal Security and Intelligence Unit, which allegedly played an unimpressive role during the crisis in Matabeleland.65 There is also the Central Intelligence Organization (cio), a unit that has also played a controversial role in the political history of Zimbabwe.66 The cio, which was the main intelligence unit, was the product of the minority regime. During the war, it was the main organization used to torture black liberation fighters. As with other institutions, so with the cio: the Mugabe administration preserved the structure left behind by the Smith regime and asked some key actors to stay back and assist in strengthening it. Over time, however, more former guerrillas entered the establishment and, as is discussed later, the cio become a key tool in the hands of the government. Though not as controversial as the army reorganization, the police reorganization encountered several problems, the first of which had to do with personnel. As would be expected, after independence, many of the well trained bsap officers left the services of the Zimbabwean government, most of them for South Africa. This affected the reorganization as it robbed the new force of many professionally trained men.67 The unit of the police most affected by this mass exodus was the Criminal Investigation Department, and this is believed to have affected the quality of the unit’s investigations.68 The prejudice of the Zimbabwean people against the police was also a problem. Many people were not able to forget the atrocities perpetrated against them by

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the police during the liberation war. This prejudice manifested itself quickly because, unlike the army, the police were in constant contact with the people. Also, during the reorganization, and for some time afterwards, the new police wore the same uniform as did the disbanded bsap. Thus, an average Zimbabwean would not easily recognize that there had been a transformation in the police force. Closely related to this was the problem that emerged out of the general misconception many Zimbabweans had about independence. Some had either an inflated or a totally misguided conception of what the new dispensation meant. Many felt that majority rule meant complete freedom from law and order. Since “their party” was either in power or part of the coalition government, they felt that independence had taken care of all forms of punishment for any offence that might have been committed.69 Most important, there was a fundamental personality clash in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which controlled the police, between Minister Joshua Nkomo of zapu and his deputy, Tarisai Ziyambi, who was a zanu hard-liner. The deputy minister appeared to have wielded greater influence than Nkomo, and he virtually usurped the function of the minister. Although, when the issue was raised in Parliament, Nkomo initially denied that his deputy was wielding greater powers than himself, the rivalry between them later became public knowledge. This occurred when Nkomo publicly confessed that, all along, he had been a figurehead in the ministry, especially in matters relating to police affairs.70 This personality clash brought the entire creation and early development of the pfz into the intricate network of domestic politics. A possible reason for zanu’s interference in the affairs of the pfz had to do with the fact that police duties were considered very sensitive, and many members of the ruling party felt that it was necessary to keep a close watch on Nkomo’s activities in the ministry. This was considered all the more necessary because many zanu members believed that Nkomo opted for the office of minister of home affairs because of its link with the police. Apart from placing an assertive deputy under Nkomo, another step taken to weaken his position in the office involved the transfer of the cio from the central police structure to the Prime Minister’s Office. Nkomo was removed from the office in January 1981, and Herbert Ushewokunze, another strong zanu member, was transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs from the Ministry of Health. Under him, as was the case with those who succeeded him, the politicization of the pfz continued.

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It is now necessary to look at how Mugabe used the police. The police force in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe has always been part of the structure used to ensure his self-perpetuation. Just as with the zna, so with the pfz: Mugabe has ensured that the control of the police remains in the hands of trusted zanu members. The current head of the pfz is Augustine Chihuri, an old and trusted ally of President Mugabe. With his control of the police, Mugabe has been able to carry out most of the repressive policies that have kept him in office. In all the major political controversies that have emerged, the pfz is alleged to have supported the ruling party against the opposition.71 On the whole, although the police reorganization in Zimbabwe was relatively easy to effect, there are reasons to believe that it was nonetheless difficult for the new force to contend with some of the complex domestic security problems that emerged between 1980 and 2009. This inability stemmed from the relative inexperience of the members of the new force and the incursion of intricate domestic politics into its operations. zimbabwe defence institutions and alignment with national politics

As with most constitutions in Africa, the Zimbabwean Constitution makes the president of the country the commander-in-chief of the defence forces. This gives President Mugabe complete control of and authority over the armed forces, although there is a minister who assists in running them. Also involved in the administrative management of the security forces is the Ministry of Defence, which is divided into two departments: the Zimbabwe Defence Force (zdf) Headquarters and the Permanent Secretary with Civilian Staff. The zdf is headed by the chief of defence staff, who is the most senior serving officer in the defence force and is also the principal military advisor to the government on all matters pertaining to strategy and military operations. He is also the main advisor on defence policy formulation. The permanent secretary handles all issues relating to the administrative management of the ministry and is, with the chief of defence staff, one of the main advisers to the minister of defence.72 While there have been many occupants of the Office of the Permanent Secretary, many fewer people have occupied the Office of the Chief of Defence Staff, with the late General Vitalis Zvinavashe being the officer who stayed longest in that position.

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Right from the time of independence, Prime Minister Mugabe made it clear that he would maintain a grip on all affairs relating to national security. The first indication of this was that he appointed no substantive minister of defence but, rather, combined the position with his role as prime minister. A trusted and loyal lieutenant, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was made the deputy minister of national security.73 With this, Mugabe was well situated to oversee all security decisions in the country. Although in theory the Constitution is supposed to handle all issues relating to defence, with Parliament having a major role to play in key issues such as the organization, administration, discipline, and budget of the defence forces, the situation in Zimbabwe, as indeed in many African states, displays a major gap between the ideal and the real. Since the establishment of the zdf, two crucial questions have attracted concern: (1) to what extent does behaviour parallel past divisions? and (2) to what extent has the zdf stayed out of local politics? Although most of the zipra-zanla divisions have been eliminated, especially as the pool of those who joined after the war of liberation is fast draining, some hold that residues of this division still remain. Some ex-zipra guerrillas in the army maintain that they are sometimes discriminated against with regard to the granting of promotions and that the allocation of responsibilities during external military engagements (see chapter 6) has never been to their advantage. However, while divisions along the pre-independence divide may be receding, other divisions have emerged between the senior officers and the rank and file, especially since 1998, when access to and distribution of the “proceeds” from Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war in the drc further widened them. Since 1993, the pay and living conditions of the military have deteriorated, and, due to a lack of proper accommodation, up to 40 percent of military personnel have to live outside the barracks. The salaries of all security forces were doubled at the beginning of 2002, but many interpreted this gesture as an attempt by the government to buy the loyalty of the military in the face of impending elections. Right from its formation, the extent to which the zdf could be effectively outside of politics has been a crucial issue. Because of the circumstances of its formation and the historical links between politicians and the military during the struggle for independence, the activities of the defence forces have always been influenced by politicians. Indeed, as far back as 1990, General Vitalis Zvinavashe confirmed

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that it would not be possible for Zimbabwe to have a completely apolitical army until all those who shared the “bush” experience had completely disappeared from the political and military scene.74 The reality of this became clear when political opposition against President Mugabe and the ruling party, especially from the mdc, resulted in the leadership of the military declaring that it would not recognize, respect, or even salute any president who did not share with them the war of liberation experience, regardless of whether such a person won elections. This declaration was made by General Zvinavashe in January 2002, and, possibly to give the impression that it was backed by the consensus of the security forces, he made it in the company of the commanders of the army, air force, prisons, and the much-dreaded chief of the cio. All these individuals were comrades in arms of Robert Mugabe, and their stance sent a clear message to the leader of the mdc, Morgan Tsvangirai, who spent his younger days furthering his studies rather than joining the liberation struggle. Indeed, as I discuss later, a central issue that continues to plague the security dynamics in Zimbabwe is how the armed forces have been used to advance the political agenda of Robert Mugabe and the ruling party, zanu-pf. From the time the Unity Accord was signed uniting zanu and zapu in 1987, the “Zanuization” of the zna began in earnest. Former zipra elements in the army realized the futility of launching any opposition, especially as those they could have looked to for encouragement, like Dumiso Dabengwa, seemed to have been browbeaten into conformity and had joined the government. Even after the signing of the Unity Accord, preferential treatment for former zanla guerrillas in the zna continued with regard to issues relating to appointment and promotion. This, however, lessened over time, especially as new recruits enlisted in the army. For example, after the Unity Accord, all the commanding officers were former zanla combatants, and, as old zanla officers retired from the army, they were replaced by new, equally trusted, zanla officers. A major example, as noted earlier, was the retirement of Josiah Tungamirai (an officer considered by many to be very professional) from the head of the air force. He was replaced by Perence Shiri, who headed the 5th Brigade, which operated in Matabeleland. With this appointment, the headship of the army and that of the air force fell into the hands of trusted allies of Robert Mugabe, and this was to remain the case throughout much of Zimbabwe’s political history.

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After the effective removal of zapu as a political force, the Mugabe administration tightened its grip on the army. The first opposition party that emerged after the eclipse of zapu, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (zum) under the leadership of Edgar Tekere, did not have much political clout, and the government did not have to consider unleashing the military might of the state to deal with it. Indeed, the influence of Tekere and his party, as I discuss in the next chapter, did not spread beyond Manicaland and some local support from Mutare. There was also no external sympathy for the party. Consequently, it was easy for the government to dismiss it as constituting mere entertainment value. In any case, the fact that Tekere had been a member of the ruling party meant that caution would be exercised in deciding to use force against him. There has been considerable academic interest in the politicization of the zna. According to Knox Chitiyo, this seems to have come in three phases.75 The first may be said to have started with the Entumbane riots and lasted until around 1998. This was the first major development that reminded members of the zna of old allegiances and old divisions. The second phase started around 1998, with the deployment of the zna in the drc (see chapter 5). This deployment generated considerable public debate, and even segments of the armed forces openly discussed its pros and cons. Indeed, there were segments of the armed forces that openly expressed their disagreement with the engagement. To address this, the government embarked on the process of reassessing loyalty within the military. A number of people considered vocal in their opposition were quietly removed from the army, while senior officers were “bought” with juicy contracts in the drc. During this period, the first set of anti-government officers was removed from the military. The third phase came after 2000. This time, the government tried to get the armed forces into all segments of society, and virtually all parastatals in the country had members of the armed forces (retired or serving) on their boards. When the mdc emerged to offer a major challenge to the Mugabe administration, the government saw the need to unleash its security institutions. This was most effective. Indeed, during the election period, there were cases in which the top echelon of the armed forces openly declared that the army would not accept any person other than Robert Mugabe as their commander-in-chief. Specifically, army top brass told the rank and file that they were not allowed to join the opposition party.

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There was a belief that reacting to the mdc created a dilemma for members of the zna. While some key members of the zna were solidly behind Mugabe, there were also those who believed that the president’s time was up and that he should step aside. The comparatively organized nature of the activities of the mdc (compared to those of zum), the extent of the international condemnation of Mugabe’s activities, the depression in the national economy, and the massive social unrest in the country made the army realize the need to modify its loyalty to Mugabe. It is believed that some members of the army considered planning an exit strategy for Mugabe that would be acceptable to all the sides. Indeed, by 2003, there had been rumours of attempts by the army to replace Mugabe with a more acceptable member of zanu. What exacerbated this tendency was the fact that the army had become far more diluted than it had been when it had been created immediately after independence. With the inclusion of younger officers who did not share the war of liberation experience, Mugabe’s grip extended only to the top echelon of the zna. Realizing that the president had no control over the younger elements in the zna, the senior officers, in turn, tightened their grip on the newer members, and this explains the intimidating utterances they made during the election period. After the loss of the 2000 referendum, the ruling party strengthened its alliance with the security sector and resuscitated the wartime alliance between the zanu political/civilian leadership and the military leaders through an eight-member council, Dare Re Chimurenga. By 2008, the jhc, comprised of Mugabe, his vicepresidents, and the security chiefs, was directing national policy.76 Because of the nature of the economy and the political situation, the government immediately began using the zna for non-military assignments, including the distribution of agricultural rations. By the time the economic condition began to take its toll on the military, the level of discipline in the zna had understandably weakened, and soldiers began to engage in unruly behaviour. In November 2008, several soldiers were arrested following an attack on money changers, and, a week later, soldiers from Cranborne Barracks, wearing camouflage, staged an impromptu protest and were joined by hundreds of civilians at the corner of Robert Mugabe Street and Fourth Street in the heart of Harare. Tensions boiled over when, after having stood in a queue all day, around fifty troops were denied money from banks. The soldiers went on another looting spree in the city, and fighting ensued between them and the police. It is believed that the soldiers

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were from the presidential guard, and they were allegedly heard singing the songs of the opposition mdc party and making the openhanded mdc salute. The catalyst for the military’s lack of discipline was an acute shortage of cash caused by hyperinflation. The soldiers, unable to withdraw their salaries from the banks, resorted to robbery. It is believed that most of the soldiers involved in these episodes were privates and corporals, the lowest ranks in the zna. Also important in explaining the protest is the fact that many of these junior zna members believed that senior zna officers were embezzling money that was meant to be their salaries. Needless to say, the political influence over the military and vice versa generated significant security problems. By the beginning of 2008, there were clear indications that there were problems within the zna, and all efforts by the government to conceal them failed. At the main military barracks, King George VI, there had begun to be calls for Mugabe to leave office. In December 2007, Defence Secretary Trust Maphosa was forced to confess to the parliamentary Committee on Defence and Home Affairs that “the soldiers [were] disgruntled over poor salaries.” In March 2008, for the second time within a month, Mugabe announced a 754 percent salary hike for soldiers. At the beginning of the month, Mugabe had increased zna salaries from Z$300 million per month to Z$1.7 billion. While these increases had a minimal impact due to the rate of inflation, senior officers were being showered with high salary packs and top-line cars to ensure their loyalty. To a large extent, Mugabe administered the defence forces of Zimbabwe to suit his personal interests and did not always adhere to the Constitution. For example, while Zimbabwe’s Constitution makes it clear that serving military officers are prohibited from taking part in active politics, Mugabe ensured that key positions in the zna were held by card-bearing members of his ruling party. The jhc was important to Mugabe’s strategy for controlling the defence forces. Originally, the jhc had been established by the Rhodesian government to confront guerrilla insurgence. The government retained the jhc from independence through to February 2009, and its functions were determined by President Mugabe. Although, over time, membership of the command changed, Mugabe ensured that it consisted only of timetested loyalists extracted from the zna and the zpf. While it is impossible to discuss the profile of all those who occupied positions in the jhc, its membership at the time Mugabe agreed

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to share power with the mdc can be briefly identified. At the head was Emmerson Mnangagwa, considered by some to be Mugabe’s heir apparent, a veteran of the war of liberation who had held various ministerial positions under Mugabe. He received military training in China and Egypt, was born in the central region of Zvishavane, and is from the Karanga subgroup of Zimbabwe’s majority Shonas. The second notable member of the jhc was Constantine Chiwenga, the commander of the zdf. He joined Mugabe in Mozambique for the independence struggle, then, in 1980, joined the army and rose swiftly through the ranks.77. The third notable member of the jhc was Perence Shiri, air marshal and commander of the afz. He is said to be a cousin of Mugabe and, as noted earlier, shot into notoriety for his role in leading the 5th Brigade in the early 1980s. The fourth member of the jhc was Lieutenant General Philip Sibanda, the army commander who played a crucial role in setting up the “Green Bomber” squads of the zanu-pf Youth League. He was also said to command vicious little subunits of the Green Bombers and was allegedly responsible for intimidating the population in the wake of the 2002 farm invasions. The prisons commissioner, Major General Paradzai Zimondi, ordered his officers to vote for Robert Mugabe in the 2008 poll, adding that he would resign if the opposition won the elections. At a ceremony to confer new ranks on senior officers, Zimondi said he would only support the leadership of Mugabe. Zimondi was one of the armed forces chiefs who, on the eve of the 2002 presidential elections, announced that he would not recognize the presidency of anyone who had not participated in the country’s 1970s war of independence. The role of the armed forces in advancing the interest of the Mugabe administration has been widely documented. Indeed, there is really no doubt that the security apparatus was used to intimidate those opposed to the Mugabe administration. Para-military forces like prison services also joined in the suppression, which also included the intelligence services. So profound was the extent of the abuse of the security apparatus that the Global Political Agreement that brought in a government of national unity in 2009 specifically recommended the need for security-sector reform. However, this was later rejected by zanu in December 2009, when it declared: “zanu (pf) as the party of revolution and the people’s vanguard shall not allow the security forces to be the subject of any negotiation for a so-called security sector reform [because] the security forces are a product of the national liberation struggle.”78

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An issue that always comes to the fore in discussions of the Zimbabwean defence establishment is the allegation of corruption against the officers and the rank and file. This occurred even at the early stages of the formation of the armed forces, although it was not as common then as it was in later years. Martin Rupiya points out that parliamentary debate noted suspect accounting procedures as early as 1981. For example, a company called jmm Holdings made a us$7 million profit from March to July 1980 from rations supplied to the army at a cost of us$11 million. The company had won a tender to supply rations at us$3.00 per person per day, when the lowest bidder had offered us$1.31 per person per day. When this was discovered and the government was forced to grant another contract, the same set of directors allegedly used another company and quoted us$1.90.79 The allegations were to become more serious when the zna went into Mozambique and the drc. The corruption in the zdf extended beyond the security forces to other agencies linked to the defence establishment. For example, the Zimbabwe Defence Industry (zdi), which is responsible for weapons manufacturing, got entangled in an international controversy when, in 1997, a ship carrying a zdi consignment of 32,398 eightyone-millimetre mortar bombs went missing, allegedly on its way to Sri Lanka. The arms were meant for the Sri Lankan army under a us$6 million government-to-government deal. The story, however, became complex when investigations that the vessel, Stillius Limasol, which was supposed to be carrying the consignment, did not appear on the list of registered vessels. One explanation was that the vessel had been intercepted by the Tamil Tigers, who were fighting for an independent homeland, but this did not stick. In the end, officials of the Sri Lankan government accused senior officers in the Sri Lankan army and the zdi of arranging the disappearance of the vessel in order to defraud the government. It is important to note that the zdi denied the charge.80 Apart from this, senior officers of the security forces are believed to have been involved in corruption and were constantly bribed by the leadership in exchange for their patronage. conclusion

In looking at the evolution of Zimbabwe’s security forces and the way Mugabe uses these institutions, a number of things stand out. First, Mugabe has always ensured that all key institutions are held by trusted and loyal friends, most of whom share the war of liberation

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experience with him. Very rarely does he tamper with the hierarchical structure of these institutions, ensuring that those in the upper echelons are well looked after and that minor misdemeanors are overlooked if they do not threaten his hold on power. In turn, these key individuals ensure that those who are promoted to senior positions, even if they do not share the war of liberation experience, are loyal and trusted officers. With this, the loyalty of the security institutions to Mugabe is guaranteed. Second, Mugabe has always ensured that the balance of the command structure is tilted in favour of former zanla guerrillas. This was a strategy adopted right from the commencement of the integration exercise. When Mugabe realized that some form of parity should be attained between former zanla and former zipra members in the command structure of the military, he did this by making a strong zanla officer the head and a weak zipra officer close to retirement the deputy. Thus, the hold of former zanla officers on the defence institutions remains a constant feature of the Mugabe presidency. Third, throughout the period in which Mugabe held complete control of the affairs of Zimbabwe, a constant issue in the management of the armed forces was the subtle rivalry between the Karanga sub-ethnic group of the Shona (from whence came key officers) and the other sub-ethnic groups of the Shona. As a consequence of this rivalry, Mugabe spent much of his time balancing the politics and intrigues that existed between Shona two sub-ethnic groups. Fourth, in order to guarantee their loyalty, Mugabe always ensured that senior officers of the armed forces had uncontrolled access to wealth and opportunities. On the whole, it can be seen that the Zimbabwean defence institutions have been at the centre of the politics of security in the country and that they were established and developed within the wider framework of Mugabe’s self-perpetuation agenda. As the years went by, and as the political situation in the country became more complex, the activities of the defence forces became more controversial. Nowhere is this more clear than in the affairs surrounding domestic politics, which is the focus of the next chapter.

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Mugabe and the Politics of Domestic Security

All through the first three decades of post-independence Zimbabwe, domestic security was the most controversial and arguably the most important issue in the country. This could not have been otherwise because key issues – especially ethno-racial relations and the extent of the society to withstand the structural change that came with the transfer of power – were all woven into domestic security. Consequently, domestic security is the subject that has attracted the greatest scholarly attention, with the key areas of interest being the Matabeleland unrest, the land question, and the human rights violations that came with the suppression of political opposition. At independence, several factors pointed to a difficult period ahead for domestic security in Zimbabwe, most of these being connected to the war of liberation. First, the country had to confront the consequences of war, but, in its case, these were even more pronounced than usual because the liberation war also had elements of a civil war. Second, what the Lancaster House Agreement provided as a legal framework for a stable society was an ideal – the attempt to turn it into a reality tested the endurance of all parties. Third, the racial make-up of the country made it vulnerable to potential destabilization and domestic unrest, a situation that was all the more difficult due to the presence of South Africa as a neighbour. Many white Rhodesians who migrated to South Africa left Zimbabwe with the sole purpose of causing unrest in the new country. In short, it was clear at independence that the basic dynamics necessary to harmonious interpersonal and intergroup relations had been significantly weakened and that the new government had to take domestic

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security seriously. Over time, more complex issues emerged to test the fabric of the society. My objective in this chapter is to identify and discuss the major domestic security issues that emerged between independence in 1980 and February 2009 and how President Mugabe handled them. The main issues are diverse, and they include the initial security challenges that befell the country after independence, especially the management of illegal firearms; the management of intergroup relations between the main ethnic groups, which resulted in the Matabeleland unrest; the safety of the white minority under black majority rule; the activities of the “war veterans” and the land-seizure controversies; the security problems that emerged as a result of the political opposition posed by the mdc; the use of state apparatus to handle domestic security issues; and the security considerations involved in the mdc/zanu-pf negotiations. All these issues are interconnected, and they all reflect the consistency of Mugabe’s strategy for addressing security. meeting the immediate security legacies of the war of liberation

Immediately after the war of liberation that preceded Zimbabwe’s independence, a number of domestic security challenges plagued the country. Perhaps the most profound of these was the number of firearms in the possession of unauthorized holders. Basically, the proliferation of firearms in Zimbabwe took place in four ways. First, as the war became intense and civilian casualties began to increase, many white families obtained guns, which they considered necessary for self-defence. After independence, many of these people held on to their weapons to ensure their safety during a period they considered to be particularly unstable. Second, many of the guerrillas did not surrender their weapons during the disarmament exercise. It is alleged that these arms were occasionally used to intimidate civilians.1 Third, there were arms in the hands of guerrillas who either voluntarily demobilized or who were forced to demobilize by the government. This category of people held on to their weapons for two reasons: (1) as a memento of their sacrifice in the war that liberated their country and/or (2) as a necessary tool to assist in local intimidation and the committing of crimes.2 Finally, there were the disbanded members of the Muzorewa’s Security Force Auxiliaries,

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most of whom left the armed forces and refused to hand in their weapons. They may have refused either so that they could use their weapons for the oppression of civilians or for self-defence in the event they were persecuted for their pre-independence support of an unpopular leader. To address the problem of arms proliferation, the Zimbabwean Parliament passed the Firearms Recovery Act, under which the government gave a general amnesty to all holders of unlicenced arms if they would hand them in within five months, after which it became an offence to hold on to them. The minimum punishment for the offence was five years imprisonment.3 All the licences issued by the previous administration were revoked, and those who possessed weapons under this relaxed arrangement were ordered to submit them and to reapply for a new licence. The law was widely publicized, with posters and pamphlets distributed in the Shona, Sindebele (the Ndebele language), and English languages. The Ministry of Home Affairs liaised with the Ministry of Information to publicize the law through the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation. When the bill was under consideration in Parliament it seemed that, in principle, there was no objection to the idea of firearm recovery as all members conceded that the situation needed to be brought under control. However, as was to be expected, this unity did not go beyond acceptance in principle. Subtle protests were evident in the ways that white parliamentarians reacted to some of the clauses in the bill, especially the clause making it mandatory for those who already had such weapons to reregister them. Most argued that the arms that were causing problems in the country were illegally rather than legally owned. Thus, they argued that there was no need for a reregistration exercise. However, when it became clear that their argument would not succeed, they insisted on receiving compensation for arms seized in the reregistration process. The government rejected this on the technical ground that compensation would only be possible in cases that involved the forceful acquisition of property and that, given the provisions of the Firearms Act, this would not be a case of forcible seizure as new licences would be issued if considered necessary. As far as the government was concerned, the process was one of correcting what it considered to be an old wrong. Closely related to this was the disquiet experienced by whites over the possibility of losing the arms they had in their possession for what they claimed were games purposes. Many of them claimed that they had

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been in possession of these weapons for more than forty years and that, having a nostalgic and aesthetic attachment to them, they wanted to keep them as mementos. The government, however, insisted that all weapons be subjected to reregistration and that licences be reissued only if the government considered it necessary. Another issue that made the Firearms Act very controversial involved the mandatory five-year jail term for its contravention. Some argued, quite logically, that the stipulation of a mandatory jail term tied the hands of the judge and gave no room for discretion. Since, during the bill-drafting stage, it is not always possible to envisage all the circumstances that would relate to a particular offence, many thought that a jail term that did not allow for individual discretion was unfair. Ultimately, the provisions of the Firearms Act addressed most of the considerations that had prompted people to acquire arms and took care of those who might want to retain them. Anybody caught with unregistered arms was punished, depending on the time of their manufacture. For arms manufactured before January 1900, the culprit was liable to a fine of Z$200, one year imprisonment, or both. For arms manufactured on or after 1 January 1900, the punishment was a jail term not exceeding ten years but not less than five years, a fine of Z$10,000, or both. In the prosecution of an offence under the law, until the contrary was proven, it was assumed that the firearm in question had been manufactured on or after 1 January 1900. On the whole, it may be concluded that the government, understandably and quite genuinely, wanted to control the quantity of arms in circulation but that its attempt to do so met with little success. In fact, at the expiration of the five-month ultimatum, the government announced that less than 25 percent of the arms believed to be in circulation had been recovered and subsequently extended the amnesty by one month. This extension made little to no impact. The effort to recover firearms did not succeed, possibly because many people, especially among the white population, did not have sufficient confidence in the government’s ability to control anticipated violence in an independent Zimbabwe.4 This category of people believed that the most effective insurance for personal safety was the retention of personal weapons. The second possible reason for the failure of the exercise was that many people felt that the retention of arms was necessary in order to deal with local terrorism. The failure of the effort to recover firearms could also be linked with other

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domestic security issues that emerged during this time, the most significant of which was the arms cache controversy. Apart from the Firearms Recovery Act, there were other major pieces of security legislation enacted to address the consequences of the war of liberation. The most striking thing about the security legislation during the early years of post-independence Zimbabwe was the retention of some of the laws that had sustained Ian Smith’s minority regime. It is ironic that the new government had to retain some of the laws against which it had taken up arms in the first place. However, this may not be as much of a contradiction as it appears. The tense situation that emerged after the war made it necessary for the government to promulgate certain laws to meet certain exigencies. But the extent to which these laws were appropriately applied depends largely on individual perception. Further, the government continued to use these laws long after the initial security challenges that may have justified their retention had disappeared. Immediately after independence, the government sought from Parliament regulations that would classify the country as being under a state of emergency and thus enable it to enact legislation unilaterally. These regulations first emerged in the country’s politics in 1965, when Ian Smith introduced them as part of an effort to get over the challenges to the Universal Declaration of Independence. They remained in force throughout the thirteen years in which Rhodesia was under the udi and the short period of the Muzorewa administration. The Mugabe administration argued that the circumstances of the period required it to possess extraordinary powers and that these could only be granted under the emergency powers dispensation. It further argued that ordinary legislation would be inadequate and would contradict its “human rights policies.”5 Over the years, the government requested an extension of these powers every six months (the duration of each extension). The request for extension was always based on the country’s security situation, notably the problems arising from the military integration exercise, the difficulties encountered in recovering weapons from unauthorized holders, the dissident activities in Matabeleland, the renamo incursion, and the security threat posed by apartheid South Africa. It was only in 1990 that the emergency law was terminated. Indeed, it appears that extraordinary powers were needed to address some of the issues mentioned, though arguably not all. For

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example, the Matabeleland unrest and some of the problems that attended the integration exercise required such powers; however, renamo activities (discussed in chapter 5) did not. When the government first requested state-of-emergency powers in July 1980, the request was unanimously granted. All members of Parliament conceded that the government needed such powers to cope with the problems it confronted.6 However, in making that concession, some mps made it clear that it would be the last time they would ever support such a request. Given this, subsequent extensions of emergency powers became a very controversial issue in Parliament. The members of the Rhodesian Front were always the most consistent opponents of the legislation. Even Ian Smith, who initiated and sustained it for more than fifteen years, was vehement in his opposition, arguing that the circumstances that made it inevitable for him to initiate state-of-emergency legislation no longer existed and, thus, that there was no need for its retention. He justified the initial introduction of emergency powers in 1965 as a way of meeting prevailing exigencies, noting that this procedure would be followed by any government that found itself in a similar situation. In particular, he noted that Britain used similar laws in dealing with the problems posed by Northern Ireland.7 zapu’s position was somewhat inconsistent and seemed to be a reaction more to the vicissitudes of politics than to the real security situation. When its alliance with zanu was effective, zapu stood by the government to ensure the easy passage of the emergency powers bill. However, after the split with zanu, and especially when the emergency powers were targeted towards the Matabeleland unrest, zapu changed its position and joined members of the Rhodesian Front to raise fundamental objections to these powers and how they were being used. As it turned out, “the marriage of convenience” between zapu and the Rhodesian Front on this issue was ineffective as the zanu majority in Parliament was always sufficient to pass the bill. The government’s emergency powers enabled it to pass a number of pieces of legislation without going through Parliament. The most important and perhaps most controversial of these was the Law and Order Maintenance Act. First promulgated by the Smith regime, this legislation had many tentacles, ranging from the banning of political meetings to detention without trial. The government used this act on a number of occasions, and it always brought considerable opposition as many people were detained without trial or re-detained after

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having been released by the court.8 Another law that emerged thanks to the government’s emergency powers was the Indemnity and Compensation Act, which also had its antecedents in the defunct Rhodesia. This act gave security officers immunity from claims for damages brought by victims. It had been in existence on and off, having been scrapped at independence but renewed in 1982. Two years later, it was finally struck out by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court.9 A third piece of significant security legislation that emanated from the government’s emergency powers was the Forfeiture of the Enemy Property Act. Gazetted on 25 December 1981, this act empowered the minister of home affairs to confiscate all the property of anyone whom he believed to be “an enemy of the State.” A “custodian of enemy property” was appointed by the Public Service Commission, and a person whose property had been confiscated was allowed thirty days to lodge an appeal to a three-person tribunal. This legislation was enacted at a time when the government realized that South Africa was using a fifth column in its efforts to destabilize Zimbabwe (see chapter 4). The legislation was perceived to be targeted towards those believed to be serving as agents of the Republic of South Africa. Finally, there was the Imposition of Control on Political Meeting Act. Under this act, which was enacted on 15 October 1981, political parties wishing to hold meetings or processions were required to apply for police permission seven days in advance (as opposed to the usual two days). It must be noted that opposition to the state-of-emergency powers was not restricted to Parliament. The issue attracted considerable opposition among intelligentsia in the country,10 with many people arguing that the state of emergency was maintained not because of the security problems in the country but because it enabled the government to clamp down on its opposition. Many argued that all the issues that the state-of-emergency powers sought to handle could be addressed effectively by ordinary legislation. However, to some, the state of emergency was not the problem; rather, the problem was the “brutal” way it was being enforced by the security forces. Another major argument against the state-of-emergency powers was that the government used them to pass laws that were unrelated to security. Many believed that the government had only used security considerations to obtain these powers, which it then used to bypass the legislature. Indeed, one could argue that certain laws that

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were enacted had nothing to do with security. For example, in 1981, emergency powers were used to amend the Precious Stone Act as well as other acts, like the Family Planning Service Act; the Vocational Education and Training Act, 1978; the Price Stabilization Order No 925; the Liquor Act; the Control of Non-Residential Rent Act; and a host of others. By January 1984, emergency powers had been used thirty-four times, and in only five of these instances were they related to security. Thus, it would appear that the allegation of indiscriminate use is valid. In fact, the minister for home affairs acknowledged as much and said that he would persuade his colleagues to be more discreet in their use of emergency powers.11 A major test of this use came when a major controversy emerged over the discovery of arms caches in some parts of the country. the arms cache controversy

While the government was still contending with the recovery of firearms in the immediate post-independence setting, secret arms caches were discovered in areas of Bulawayo. This discovery, which was first announced in February 1982, ended up as leading into one of the most controversial domestic security issues in Zimbabwe during its first decade. In the first place, it led to Nkomo’s being dismissed from Mugabe’s administration and a breakdown in Zimbabwe’s coalition government. It also marked the beginning of a chain of security problems that engulfed the entire country and, subsequently, brought Zimbabwe back into the limelight of international attention. The story of the arms caches is complex, and the complete story may never be known. However, it is now possible to trace the roots of the crisis to the conclusion of the Lancaster House Agreement and zapu/zanu relations immediately after independence. As noted in chapter 2, the fragile peace that existed after the Lancaster House Agreement made several elements of both zanla and zipra reluctant to hand over their weapons during the integration exercise. Most of the guerrillas believed that the uncertainty of the period demanded their alertness. Thus, many of them hoarded arms so that they would be ready to meet any emergency that might result from the elections. Further, the state of zanu-zapu relations immediately after independence led many guerrillas to believe that there was a need to store arms. This situation can only be understood by considering the relationship between the two parties within

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the immediate post-independence period. Nkomo’s relationship with Mugabe after independence was not particularly cordial. He believed that the election that had brought Mugabe to power had been neither free nor fair; however, in the interest of the country, he agreed to serve in the resultant cabinet.12 Mugabe offered him the largely ceremonial office of president, but Nkomo declined on the grounds that, throughout pre-independence negotiations, he had persistently fought against a constitution that created the category of ceremonial president. He also declined the offer because accepting it would have reduced him to being a mere announcer of official positions – positions that, in reality, might well have been against his personal principles.13 Consequently, he opted for the office of the minister of home affairs. In January 1981, he was removed from the Ministry of Home Affairs and made the minister of public services, but he declined this position and was subsequently made a minister without a portfolio. This was considered by many people in Zimbabwe to be a demotion.14 The major arms cache discoveries were made on two sites – (1) Ascot farm near Bulawayo and (2) Hampton Ranch in the Midlands, not far from Gweru. Both sites were owned by a private company called Nitram, which Nkomo had helped to set up shortly after independence.15 The arms discovered at the Ascot farm included sam-7 missiles, more than 2,000 semi-automatic guns, 75 grenade launchers, 20 anti-aircraft missiles, 26 mortars, 100 machine guns, and nearly 400 landmines. At the Hampton Ranch, about fifty kilometres southwest of Gweru, the caches contained more than 600 rifles, 240 ak-47 rifles, 8 sam-7 missiles, 20 landmines, 5,000 slab tnt, 15  light machine guns, 200,000 rounds of ammunition, 10 rpg-7 rocket launchers, 200 rounds of rp7-7 ammunition, and 2 Tokun pistols.16 These were the two most publicized discoveries, although the government announced further discoveries at the Castle Arms Hotel in Bulawayo (also part of zapu property). The government claimed that this cache contained “communication equipment capable of monitoring or jamming army and police communications within a range of 100 kilometers.”17 Finally, on 15 July 1982, during the parliamentary debate on the renewal of the state of emergency, the minister of home affairs disclosed further discoveries.18 The administration interpreted the discovery as an attempt by zapu to overthrow the government. It was alleged that the party had established links with the South African government in a joint plot. Peter Walls, then living in South Africa after his expulsion from

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Zimbabwe, was said to have participated in this attempt to overthrow the Mugabe administration. Walls emphatically denied this allegation,19 and the Mugabe government produced nothing to support it. The first step the government took was to expel Nkomo and a number of zapu ministers from their public positions. Those affected by the expulsion were: Nkomo; Josiah Chinamano, minister of transport and vice-president of zapu; Joseph Msika, minister of national resources and water development and secretary general of zapu; and Jim Mtuta, deputy minister of mines. Two weeks after the expulsion, Lieutenant General Lookout Masuku (the former zipra commander) and Dumiso Dabengwa (the former chief of security of zipra), were also arrested and detained. All the property and companies owned by zapu were confiscated by the government, regardless of whether or not arms were found on them.20 It was further alleged that the arrested zipra leaders had been recruiting guerrillas for secret training in South Africa and had been in contact with the Soviet Union’s kgb to plan against the government. When the case came up in court, the two zipra officials were ordered to be released for lack of evidence, but they were immediately redetained under the emergency power laws.21 In particular, the government held Dumiso Dabengwa responsible for being the coordinator of the caching process. Mugabe accused him of having connived with the Zambian government to ensure that zipra arms transferred from the country were given to zapu instead of to the government’s armoury. It was for this reason that the government decided that Dabengwa had to remain in custody despite the court’s instruction that he be freed. The government claimed that it had withheld some information from the court for “security reasons” and that it was on the basis of this information that it held on to Dabengwa. As I discuss in chapter 4, this was one of the issues that aggravated the not-so-cordial relationship between Zambia and Zimbabwe. Mugabe said that, when he confronted the Zambian government regarding its complicity, it claimed that it had thought that Dabengwa was acting for the Zimbabwean government.22 However, no reason was given for the continued detention of Lookout Masuku. Possibly he was held under the “common purpose” rule.23 Dumiso Dabengwa denied Prime Minister Mugabe’s allegations emphatically, adding that he went to Zambia at the government’s bidding with a plane ticket handed to him by the government and

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bearing a letter signed by Mugabe. He stressed that an ex-zanla officer went to Mozambique with a similar letter. The letters were to ensure the evacuation of arms from these countries to Zimbabwe. Dabengwa explained that, unlike zanla weapons, which went straight to zanla camps, zipra weapons came by train and were received by representatives of zipra, zanla, and the Rhodesian Army. The arms were then taken to Llewellyn Barracks, where the Rhodesian Army commander told those who had come to receive them that the storage area at the barracks could not contain the weapons. He said the commander later told them that, since the integration exercise had not commenced, each side could keep its weapons. The Rhodesian Army commander was said to have further suggested that the best place to store the zipra weapons was at the Gwai River camp, which was a zipra ap, and the arms were subsequently taken there. Thus, he knew nothing about the caching of arms.24 The zapu Central Committee argued that the government simply wanted to build a case against the party. For its part, the committee based its arguments on a number of grounds. First, it claimed that the administration of the army and responsibility for former combatants and their weapons lay with the jhc and not with any political party. Second, it argued that the sites on which the bulk of the arms were found was not owned by zapu per se but by a cooperative union established after the war by former party combatants.25 Third, while not denying that zapu guerrillas could have cached arms, it argued that zanla had its own caches. Nkomo personally denied having any knowledge of the sites where the arms were cached, but he argued that, if the two sites (Ascot and Hampton) were among the places used by zapu for caching arms, then the government, or (as some ex-zipras believed) members of the Rhodesian Intelligence, had transported more arms to them in order to present the misleading impression that zapu was planning a large-scale war. Nkomo also objected to the procedure used to make the caches known to the public. He argued that, as a cabinet minister, he ought to have been invited to explain the caches before the discovery was made public.26 Fearing for his personal safety under the government clampdown, Nkomo fled across the border into Botswana, and five days later he arrived in London. There are two main theories about the arms cache crisis. The first, prevalent among zanu members, is that the discovery genuinely

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surprised Mugabe and zanu, undermining whatever trust they might have had in Nkomo. The caches were interpreted as proof that Nkomo’s zapu was bent on launching a coup sometime in the future. The second theory is that the existence of the arms caches had been widely surmised,27 and thus the discovery of such caches should not have been a surprise to the zanu leadership. According to this theory, zanu simply decided that the time was ripe for Nkomo to be thrown out of the government in order to consolidate zanu power and force the pace of the “zanu-ization” of Zimbabwe, leading eventually to a de facto one-party state. This, as one would expect, was the zapu position.28 It is possible that, to varying degrees, both theories are correct. For one thing, the discovery of such large caches definitely adversely affected the trust that should exist between parties in a coalition government. Even given that both sides were thought to have cached arms in order to meet any possible fallout from the election, zanu was not likely to have thought that the zapu cache would be of such magnitude, especially given zanu’s invitation to zapu to join the government – an invitation that many zanu members considered to be extremely magnanimous. However, the second theory, that the cache issue was exploited to consolidate zanu power, could be considered likely because, all along, zanu had been suspicious of zapu and expected some mischief from its members. Mugabe had in fact said that the incorporation of zapu into the government did not change this perception. He once declared that it would be foolish to expect that somebody who had always opposed you could become your friend as soon as he joined forces with you.29 So it would seem that the discovery of arms caches may not have come as a complete surprise. The theory that the major objective of the arms cache controversy was to put Nkomo’s head on the block and thus pave the way for the creation of a one-party state may also have some truth to it as the speed with which the government dismissed Nkomo (and others) may be seen to suggest that the decision to do so was premeditated. Many believe that the government knew about the arms caches long before it announced their discovery.30 However, when they were first discovered, the government believed that Nkomo had not outlived his usefulness: integration was still going on and Mugabe did not know what the reaction of zipra guerrillas would be if Nkomo were to be punished. Thus, the government opted to wait for a more

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favourable time to deal with the arms cache issue, and February 1982 was considered perfect. The integration of the armed forces was over, and the Entumbane experience had given Mugabe the confidence he needed to deal with the issue. He could also count on the support of the white commanders of the former Rhodesian African Rifles and the white-piloted air force to deal with any problem that might emerge. It is notable that, just as the arms cache crisis had its antecedents in pre-independence armed clashes, so it was extended to one of the most controversial events in post-independence Zimbabwe: the unrest that engulfed Matabeleland between 1982 and 1987. the matabeleland unrest 31

The Matabeleland unrest is a subject that has been extensively discussed in several academic and policy papers. This unrest consisted of a set of civil disturbances that engulfed Zimbabwe’s Matabele province – the province occupied by the Ndebeles – between 1982 and 1987. During this period, “the dissidents” – a complex amalgam of disaffected ex-combatants, disillusioned radicals, and common criminals – waged a campaign of killing, terrorism, and economic sabotage to undermine the government of Robert Mugabe.32 The government reacted in various ways that were not only controversial but actually created more problems than they solved. The Matabeleland unrest occupies a unique place in the history of post-independence Zimbabwean security because, more than any other legacy of the liberation war, it highlights the major politico-military variables that emerged during the birth of Zimbabwe.33 The Matabeleland unrest can only be understood in the context of the political, economic, social, and, most important, military situation in Zimbabwe during that period. The political element can be traced back to the Lancaster House Agreement, when many Ndebele people felt that the Shonas would attempt to steamroll them. Right from the formation of the Patriotic Front and the joint presentation of a single negotiating body at the Geneva and Lancaster House conferences, many Ndebele people had hoped that the parties (zanu and zapa) would contest the elections together, with Nkomo as the leader and Mugabe as his deputy. It is not clear what could have been the source of this idea of a joint ticket or an arrangement that would see Mugabe serving as a deputy to Nkomo. Possibly, the people reasoned

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that Nkomo’s long service to the liberation cause would make Mugabe concede the leadership to him.34 When zanu decided to contest the elections alone, many Ndebele people felt betrayed. When offices were shared after independence, zapu got four of the twentytwo ministerial seats and two of the thirteen deputy-ministerial seats. Many zapu members considered this disproportionate. Thus, from the outset, many Ndebele people believed that their party was entering into the new country as a junior partner to a party whose intentions were unclear. The corollary to this was that, ironically, throughout the war many members of zanu believed that they were fighting alone while zapu was inactive. Thus, zanu’s reason for contesting the elections separately was “to show the world who had actually been doing the fighting.”35 This was the situation at independence, but it was swept under the carpet by zapu’s acceptance of the invitation to join the newly formed government. After independence, the relationship between the Shonas and the Ndebeles appeared stable, if not particularly cordial, and the chain of events that was to lead to the crisis soon began. Many Ndebele people argued that not much had been done to pacify their “injured” feelings over the decision of zanu to contest the election separately from zapu. Many believed that, had the prime minister worked as enthusiastically to win their support as he did to win that of the whites, things would have been different. It is, indeed, the case that the prime minister did far more to mend fences with the whites than with the Ndebeles; but this would appear to have been an effort to woo the whites, who still controlled the economy, and to assure them of their safety under the new dispensation rather than to slight the Ndebeles. Although no serious security problem emerged in Zimbabwe until 1982, as early as June 1980 – two months after independence – there were indications that zanu and zapu had begun to fall out. In a speech to Parliament on 26 June 1980, Prime Minister Mugabe accused zipra of undermining his government.36 This charge was officially denied by Nkomo, who, in turn, accused Mugabe of being responsible for “atrocities worse than any committed by the former regime.”37 Nkomo dropped another bombshell on 12 August 1980 when he said that an entire trainload of zanla arms brought in from Mozambique disappeared overnight after arriving in Zimbabwe.38 This was later denied by the government. Although nothing came of these accusations and counter-accusations, they indicate that, as early

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as June 1980, relations between the two partners in the coalition government had gone sour and that an open manifestation of this was just a matter of time. The prevailing economic and social conditions also exacerbated the crisis. The expectations that people had of independence gradually began to appear to be unfulfilled, not so much because the government was not trying to meet them as because most people had misguided ideas about what independence meant. Economic hardship was most prevalent in Matabeleland, which was adversely affected by the racial land distribution during the minority regime.39 This was hard on the agricultural sector, but non-agricultural sectors did not fare much better. Although there had been a considerable increase in the wages of Zimbabweans, the cost of living had also gone up. Clearly, a number of those who took part in the dissident operation did so for economic reasons. However, what was most crucial to the Matabeleland crisis was the situation in the military between the period of independence and the start of dissidence in 1982. Many former zipra officers objected to the administration of the army and very much wanted to rectify the situation. The second Entumbane crisis was a major turning point in this regard for two reasons. First, it resulted in the first en masse desertion of ex-zipra combatants from the zna; second, it revealed to those ex-zipra combatants who chose to remain in the zna the dangers involved in any attempt to seek redress through revolt.40 Thus, at the time the Matabeleland unrest began, pent-up emotions were waiting to erupt. What triggered the actual unrest was the discovery of the arms cache and the punishment meted out by the government in response. When the arms cache issue first came up, the general opinion in Matabeleland was predictable. As noted earlier, many Ndebele people believed that both zanla and zipra had hidden arms and that the government’s claim that only zipra caches were “discovered” was a clear pretext for getting rid of Nkomo. Many of them also argued that, despite the “discovery,” the onus was on the government to prove that there was a plot to overthrow Mugabe.41 When the government dismissed Nkomo and others, many Ndebele people – both inside and outside the zna – interpreted this as a clear indication that they were being flushed out of the government. When Masuku and Dabengwa were detained, these fears seemed to be confirmed. The expulsion of Nkomo, Chinamano,

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Msika, and Mtuta from the government was seen as a move to deprive them of proper representation, while the detention of Masuku was seen as robbing them of their main voice in the military. As was mentioned earlier, some of those who stayed back after Entumbane did so largely because of the respect and admiration they had for Nkomo, Masuku, and Dabengwa. However, what seemed to have most affected the ex-zipra guerrillas was the confiscation and freezing of the accounts of zapu companies. In fact, any attempt to consider the Matabeleland unrest must give special attention to this issue. Many ex-zipra guerrillas had invested their money in some of these companies, especially nitram (a company set up to promote the welfare of zipra excombatants), while some of those who opted for demobilization worked on zapu-funded farms after investing their demobilization gratuities into business ventures. Thus, the government’s confiscation of these companies meant a loss of investment for those soldiers who had shares in them as well as a loss of investment and/or jobs for the ex-guerrillas working on the farms. Many argued that the across-the-board confiscation of these properties (running into dozens) was unjustified, especially as arms were discovered on only two of them. Their disenchantment prompted mass desertion from the zna, which was deemed the most appropriate way of expressing their opposition to the government. The Entumbane experience, during which many zipra soldiers were killed, had taught them the dangers involved in any attempt to revolt from within the army. And, since the dismissals and detentions that followed the discovery of the arms caches provided a disenchanted operational base for them, many zipra soldiers deserted and joined the dissidents. By June 1982, the number of deserters was put at 2,700, and by August it had increased to about 4,300.42 The disturbances began in the early months of 1982.43 The dissidents embarked on an extensive campaign of murder, mutilation, kidnapping, and other acts of terrorism. Although there is little doubt that the unrest was started by ex-zipra troops, other groups later joined in the mayhem. The dissidents may be divided into three categories: (1) the ex-zipra; (2) the South African-sponsored “Super zapu” believed to made up mostly of the disbanded Security Force Auxiliaries of Bishop Muzorewa; and (3) the common bandits, to whom the new order was anathema, either because they had expected too much from independence or because their social attitude simply

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moved them towards such tendencies.44 However, it is interesting to note that these groups of dissidents did not work together – something that can no doubt be attributed to their lack of common purpose. In fact, the ex-zipras and the Super zapu occasionally skirmished with each other when they met in the bush.45 The initial targets of the dissident attacks were zanu party leaders in Matabeleland. Between September 1983 and May 1984, thirty-two top zanu officials in Matabeleland were killed.46 As time went on, and as participants in the crisis became more diversified, they became less discriminating in their selection of targets. The result was that anybody who was identified as having sympathy for zanu became a victim. Inevitably, innocent people with no particular political leanings became victims. What brought international attention to the dissidents was the kidnapping and subsequent murder, in July 1982, of ten foreign tourists in the Bulawayo province. Three British tourists were also killed in August 1982 while visiting Nyanga, a tourist attraction on the eastern border. Again, zipra dissidents claimed responsibility for the incident. The worst incident, however, occurred in Esigodini, where dissidents murdered sixteen white missionaries. The source of the weapons the dissidents used depended on their group. The largest group (the disaffected ex-zipra) got their weapons mainly from undiscovered arms caches,47 and they also seized them from the armoury and from captured Super zapu. For their part, the Super- zapu used unsurrendered arms and arms from South Africa, while the common criminals used the arms they kept back after the liberation war, along with easily available weapons such as machetes. The military operation during the period of dissident activities brings back memories of the strategies used in the war of liberation, but this time the roles were reversed. In one of the bitter ironies of Zimbabwean politics, it was now the turn of the zna to adopt the military strategies of their erstwhile enemy (the Rhodesian Army) against former comrades, while the dissidents used the tactics they had adopted against the former Rhodesian Army during the liberation war. The first strategy adopted by the dissidents was to blend in with the people living in areas in which they were accepted. In fact, most of them returned to areas in which they had operated during the liberation war and exploited the prevailing disillusionment to forge a fairly coherent political opposition. Another military operation that brings back memories of the liberation war involved the timing of the dissidents’ offensives, which were

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mostly carried out during the rainy season. This was akin to the guerrilla strategy employed during the liberation war, when they took advantage of the green vegetation to launch attacks. Thus, just as the Rhodesian Army had to contend with increased guerrilla attacks during the pre-independence period, so the zna had to cope with increased dissident operations in the post-independence period. All this put government forces at a disadvantage, and they had to resort to some of the old strategies that the Rhodesian Army had used against the guerrillas during the war. For instance, placing an entire area under curfew for allegedly supporting the dissidents was precisely the sort of thing the Rhodesian Army used to do. Also, the government forces reactivated what, during the liberation war, had been referred to as “pseudo operations.” Under this practice, the Rhodesian Army impersonated the guerrillas and begged the local population for food and assistance. If these were granted, the army would come back a few hours later to punish them for assisting the guerrilla cause. Before discussing the government response to the crisis, it is necessary to consider how it perceived the situation. The government believed that the dissident operation was sponsored by Nkomo and other zapu members who felt aggrieved by its reaction to the arms cache controversy.48 This led to the government’s first question about the Matabeleland crisis: to what extent was the zapu leadership responsible for the activities of the dissidents? The government believed that zapu leaders, especially Nkomo and Dabengwa, had some control over most, if not all, of the dissidents, and its attitude towards these people (especially Dabengwa) was guided by this belief. It is worth noting, however, that the government had no reliable evidence to link either of these two men to the dissident operations.49 Even now, the degree of influence Nkomo and Dabengwa had over the dissidents is not certain. Some think that the dissident activities started soon after the zapu leaders were punished over the arms cache and that it ended when they were reintegrated into the political scene of the country.50 This, however, does not take into account the multiple factors that triggered the crisis. There were suppressed emotions before the dismissal of the zapu leaders, and the arms cache only provided a pretext for their expression. The fact that the operation ended after Nkomo and the others were reintegrated into national politics could be attributed to one of two possibilities: either (1) the incorporation of Nkomo into the scheme of things eased the disenchantment that the dissidents had exploited among the Ndebeles or

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(2) the dissidents were genuinely impressed with the Unity Accord and wanted to give peace a chance.51 Along with believing that dissident operations were linked to zapu, the government also believed that the Ndebele people gave the dissidents succor, its basic argument being that dissidence could not occur in a vacuum. This belief is controversial. For reasons of ethnicity and a belief in the “justness” of their cause, it is possible that many Ndebele people supported the dissidents but not necessarily their methods. Besides, although it was indeed the case that many of the dissidents obtained food and other materials for survival from the local people, more often than not these items were obtained by force.52 The government reacted in a variety of ways – army sweeps, curfews, and detentions – all of which led to considerable human rights violations as many civilians who had nothing to do with the operation suffered. The government’s military operation was the most controversial of its responses to the crisis. The general belief is that the entire operation was carried out by the predominantly Shona 5th Brigade. This is wrong but understandable since the military operation with which the entire period of unrest is mostly identified was carried out by the 5th  Brigade. However, the first military operation in Matabeleland, code-named Operation Octopus, was led by Lieutenant Colonel Lionel Dyke, formerly of the Rhodesian Army, who was the commander of the 1st Parachute Battalion. Other units that operated in the province during the period included the 2nd Parachute Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Tom Simpson, and the 1st Commando Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Allan Shaw and Lieutenant Colonel Fitzgerald (formerly of the Grey Scouts). All these were units led by white Rhodesians. One reason the government initially depended on former members of the Rhodesian Army was that, at the time the crisis erupted, there seemed to have emerged within zanla ranks a group called the “Tongogara group.”53 This group, in the spirit of Josiah Tongogara, favoured closer ties with zipra. The emergence of this group indicated that the government should exercise caution in sending any black force to Matabeleland. The government’s eventual decision to depend on the 5th Brigade could have been for either or both of two reasons: (1) because it had succeeded in neutralizing the emerging Tongogara group in the zna or (2) because it feared that it was becoming dangerously dependent on former Rhodesian units (having relied on them at Entumbane and in the earlier stage of the dissident operations in Matabeleland).

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It would appear that the government exercised considerable restraint in unleashing the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland. It is not clear if this was due to internal purification in the zna or the anticipated condemnation that its activities would generate in the region.54 But there is evidence that there had been a warning that the brigade would be deployed if the dissident operations did not stop.55 However, it must be added that the warning was directed at the dissidents and not at the ordinary Ndebele civilians who bore the brunt of the brigade’s activities. The decision to send in the predominantly Shona 5th Brigade was predicated on the belief that sending members from other brigades would have resulted in a situation in which ex-zipras (from these brigades) would have to fight against their colleagues who had deserted to become dissidents. It was thought that this would not be effective; consequently, the government saw fit to rely on the zanladominated 5th Brigade. But the controversial activities of the 5th Brigade were to bring the government before the tribunal of world opinion. The brigade carried out its operation in Matabeleland with such remarkable ruthlessness that it earned particular notoriety. It would appear that the brigade treated all the people in Matabeleland as dissidents or supporters of dissidents, and there were many allegations of atrocities levelled against it, including accusations of rape, flogging, and murder. Many said that, apart from the brutality, members of the brigade used their activities as a cover to promote political support.56 The Matabele people have not forgotten the activities of the 5th Brigade, and, despite the euphoria associated with the Unity Accord, they are not in a hurry to forget.57 The 5th Brigade arrived in Matabeleland in 1982 and immediately began its repressive activities. A typical operation upon its arrival in any village was to bring out a list of army deserters: the Ndebele people described these lists as “death lists.” The failure or inability of the people to provide satisfactory answers as to the whereabouts of those named in the lists attracted terrible punishments. It was believed that many civilians were killed during this process.58 At the beginning, it was not clear to what extent the government supported the activities of the 5th Brigade. The Reverend Canaan Banana, the president of independent Zimbabwe and theoretically the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, did not rule out the possibility that civilians had been maltreated, but he hastened to add that neither he nor Prime Minister Mugabe, who was also the minister of

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defence, had ordered this. He also said that some things were done without their knowledge but that, once information about this came to their knowledge, they were immediately rectified.59 However, many people believed that, even if the government had not given the 5th Brigade instructions to carry out some of its activities, it did not do much to discourage it.60 In fact, the pronouncements of some ministers and parliamentarians could have served to reinforce the actions of some overzealous members of the brigade. For example, Nyazika, a zanu parliamentarian, suggested that members of the brigade operating in Matabeleland should be given a “bush allowance.”61 Enos Nkala, then minister of state for defence, was the most prominent Ndebele man in the zanu party, and his dislike for Nkomo was never hidden.62 Some of his utterances certainly could have encouraged over-eager members of the 5th Brigade towards extremism. For example, he allegedly told crowds in Matabeleland during the crisis that, if they continued to support dissidents and zapu, they would die or be sent to prison.63 Indeed, many Ndebele people continue to bear intense hatred for Nkala due to his activities during the Matabeleland crisis.64 Still, such injudicious statements on the part of parliamentarians could hardly account for all the activities of the 5th Brigade. Other considerations – such as a general lack of discipline, drunkenness, and boredom – played some part in its excesses during the Matabeleland operation. As might be expected, Parliament became the venue for the exchange of heated arguments between zanu and zapu members, with white members taking the side of zapu. While zanu accused zapu of encouraging the dissidents and serving as their public relations arm, zapu, for its part, berated zanu for unleashing the 5th Brigade and creating a reign of terror in Matabeleland. Predictably, Nkomo was at the forefront of the effort to give publicity to the brigade’s activities, and he did this relentlessly until he finally had to flee the country.65 Many Ndebele people believed that they suffered more at the hands of the 5th Brigade than they did at the hands of the dissidents. Indeed, some argued that the soldiers knew where the dissidents were but were afraid to chase them, preferring instead to concentrate their efforts on civilians.66 Of all the activities of the government during the first decade of independence, none brought more criticism and condemnation than its handling of the Matabeleland unrest. The Association of Catholic Bishops of Southern Africa led this criticism with an international press

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conference. Minister of Information Nathan Shamuyariya reacted by calling the press conference “irresponsible and propagandistic.”67 Mugabe referred to its condemnations as false allegations from a “sanctimonious prelate,” while the journalists who publicized it were called “reactionary foreign journalists and a band of Jeremiahs.”68 Despite these condemnations of the association’s comments, they turned out to have a positive effect. A few days after the press conference, the 5th Brigade was withdrawn from Matabeleland, and its troops (trained earlier by the North Koreans) were sent back to a British training team for retraining. There was also domestic opposition to the handling of the Matabeleland crisis. Senator Garfield Todd, who was a respected voice of reason in Zimbabwe, gave a subtle but blunt indictment of the activities of the soldiers in Matabeleland, saying that the way the government had gone about handling the Matabeleland problem “had done the country’s image no good.”69 Nobody, not even the zanu hardliners in the Senate, challenged him.70 It is difficult to know the exact number of people who died as a result of the activities of the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland, but figures up to twenty thousand have been claimed.71 After intense negotiations, zanu and zapu signed the Unity Accord in December 1987.72 The main outcome of the accord was the merging of the two political parties, which led to zapu’s re-admittance into the corridors of power. Another important element of the accord involved the granting of amnesty to all the dissidents in the bush, provided they gave themselves up within a stipulated period.73 Interestingly, all that the Unity Accord offered with regard to the dissident issue had been proposed more than four years earlier on the floor of Parliament. Senator Oatt of the Rhodesian Front had made a speech on 15 March 1983, in which he suggested the need to set up an impartial commission of inquiry, the withdrawal of the 5th Brigade form Matabeleland, the reincorporation of zapu into government, and the granting of amnesty to the dissidents.74 All these suggestions, which attracted such unfavourable comments while he delivered his speech, were adopted by the government four years later.75 The Unity Accord eventually solved the dissident problem. The amnesty was accepted by about 135 dissidents who came out of hiding, and it was astonishing to discover that such a small number of people could have brought such untold hardship to the country for more than five years. Another source of surprise was the relatively

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organized command structure among the dissidents, a far cry from the disorganized gang of bandits the government and many others had expected. As part of the amnesty deal, Mugabe (who had become president) freed seventy-five members of the security force who were serving jail terms for murder. The dissidents who killed the missionaries in Esigodini were also granted unconditional freedom.76 But the release of these people brought with it much criticism, and many felt that they needed psychiatric treatment before they could be released back into society. Thus, unlike the post-civil war situation in Nigeria, and more like the amnesty offer given to the renamo dissidents in Mozambique, general amnesty in Zimbabwe meant general amnesia. Some of the dissidents who surrendered misconstrued the government’s gesture and drew up a list of demands, the rejection of which threatened to make them go back into the bush. Their demands included a return of all confiscated zapu property, their total reintegration into society, the release of all political detainees, the release of all dissidents captured before the amnesty, and the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from Mozambique.77 The government, assisted greatly by the support of zapu, was magnanimous in its handling of the initial excesses of the returning dissidents. Thus, although the government did not give in to any of these requests, it did succeed in defusing tension. Initially, it was thought that the reintegration of the dissidents into society would be a thorny issue, as many of their victims might seek revenge. This, however, turned out to be an unnecessary fear, and their reabsorption was relatively smooth. By 1990, some of them had started representing their constituencies in the newly merged party constituted by zanu and zapu – the United zanu-pf National People’s Organization.78 Although the signing of the Unity Accord seemed to mark the end of hostilities between the two black political parties in Zimbabwe, some of the issues between the blacks remained, with key individuals from Matabeleland raising crucial questions as to the activities of the military, especially the 5th Brigade. Other security questions were raised about the persecution of individuals and groups that opposed the government. For example, Archbishop Ncumbe, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Matabeleland, who was for a very long time the most consistent critic of Mugabe’s public and private life, had started off by criticizing the government’s activities in Matabeleland. He was arrested and detained several times by the government before he was forced to step down as archbishop following

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an apparent sex scandal.79 In addition to these security concerns, there remained the issue of the minority whites, whose safety under black rule had always been a core issue in Zimbabwean politics. security of whites under black majority rule

The safety of the minority whites under black majority rule was a fundamental issue in all the negotiations preceding independence. Under the Lancaster House Agreement, the whites seemed to have achieved the best that a constitution could offer in terms of their safety. What remained to be seen was whether these constitutional provisions would be respected by black Zimbabweans. Between 1980 and 1990, there appeared to be no evidence that whites were marked down for reprisals by black Zimbabweans over their activities under the former minority regime. Although there were cases of threats and the actual murder of whites during this period, these seemed to be more a matter of general instability than of retaliation for old wounds. This position is all the more plausible when one considers that some of the whites who were kidnapped and killed were visitors. In fact, so secure were white Zimbabweans that most of the security comments made by white parliamentarians did not concern their own safety but, rather, that of the average Ndebele.80 This condition can be attributed to the conciliatory policy of Robert Mugabe and the desire of most Zimbabweans to forgive and forget the past.81 Apart from an obvious interest in keeping the war-torn country intact, Mugabe had other reasons for wanting to keep the white minority secure. The first reason was largely economic. At independence, the white minority still controlled the economy, and the bureaucracy and other professional sectors of society also had a significant percentage of whites in sensitive positions. Thus, the government took a special interest in guaranteeing the safety of this significant minority population. So important was this consideration that the finance minister once threatened to call for the deportation of Ian Smith if he kept spreading alarm and despondency among the whites.82 The second reason for keeping the white minority safe had to do with international public relations. Any indication of white insecurity would attract considerable attention from the outside world, especially if there should be any evidence of retaliatory action, so the government was very careful to prevent this. Mugabe was particularly concerned

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with ensuring the security of whites as it was common knowledge that he was the leader they most hated and feared, many of them anticipating problems living under his leadership. There was, however, one exception to Mugabe’s protection of whites; but, here again, this may not have involved an action that specifically targeted the white population. This occurred when, after the destruction of thirteen air force planes at the main base in Thornhill, six senior white officers in the afz were detained by the government. The deputy commander of the air force, Air ViceMarshall Hugh Slatter, was arrested and tortured. Mugabe did not deny that the air force officers were tortured: “Unfortunately, our interrogators used irregular methods. We admit they were irregular. They did use torture.”83 For most of the first decade following independence, the greatest threat to white Zimbabweans was the general domestic insecurity that emerged with the activities of the dissidents. As soon as the unrest broke out, whites became targets of attack largely as a means of blackmailing the government. The dissidents considered it expedient to attack whites not out of a desire for retaliation but because they were an Achilles’ heel that could be exploited to make the government comply with dissident demands. For example, the practice of stipulating conditions for the release of captives (as happened in the case of the tourists in Bulawayo) put the government in a “no-win” situation. The government could either concede to the demands of the dissidents so that their victims would be spared or it could refuse to concede and the victims would be killed, thus revealing to the rest of the world that all was not well in Zimbabwe. The most celebrated case of white insecurity before the Matabeleland unrest involved the killing of a white farmer named Gerald Adams in August 1980. What made this case outstanding was not the murder per se but the person charged with the murder and how the case was eventually resolved. Edgar Tekere, the secretary-general of the ruling zanu party and minister for manpower development, was arrested and charged (along with seven of his body guards) with killing Gerald Adams. This created considerable problems for the government. Although Mugabe had declared at the outset that his government would not interfere with the course of the law, the timing of the murder did not permit him to abide by this well intended statement. The military integration exercise was in progress at the time, and it was thought that some guerrillas who held Tekere in high esteem were

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likely to cause trouble if he and others were not released. In addition, many of the civilians saw no reason for detaining Tekere. Most of them appeared to have seen the issue from a simple political perspective: the whites had killed them like flies during the war, without ever being tried; why then should their minister (who fought to liberate them) be arrested and tried for killing one old white man? In the end, Tekere was freed. Although it was confirmed that he knew about the death of Gerald Adams (he had never denied it), he was released under the provision of the Indemnity and Compensation Act, 1975 (passed by the Smith regime). The act provided that government leaders who were acting to suppress terrorism could not be prosecuted for offences committed in the process of doing so. A Zimbabwean writer uses a string of paradoxical epithets to describe the entire Tekere episode: It was a trial of seven million people; it was a trial of one man. It was a trial of a government; it was a trial of one cabinet minister. It was a test of the Zimbabwean justice; it was a test of the Rhodesian law. Everything about it was political; nothing about it was political. It was the old order trying the new order; it was the new order trying the old order. Everything about it was criminal; nothing about it was criminal. A white man has been murdered; a black man has not murdered him. The defendant was a hero; the defendant was a bandit. Many people hated him; many people loved him. It was an age of racial polarization; it was an age of racial reconciliation. In short, it was everything.84 The Tekere episode was a watershed in Zimbabwean politics. It was unprecedented for a cabinet minister to be detained for some days over the murder of a white. The fact that the legal clause that freed Tekere had been established by Ian Smith made it difficult for whites to complain about the outcome of the incident.85 Between 1982, when the dissident operation started, and December 1987, seventy-three white commercial farmers and their families were killed. This led to a reduction in the number of commercial farms in Matabeleland from more than one thousand in 1980 to 630 in December 1987.86 One of the most publicized white fatalities during the crisis was the murder of Republican Front senator Paul Savage, his daughter Colleen, and a family visitor from Britain, Sandra Bennett. Betty Savage (Paul Savage’s wife) was seriously wounded

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when about twenty armed dissidents attacked their home on 4 April 1984.87 There were other noted cases, such as the case of the foreign tourists and the Esigodini massacre. As a result of renewed violence, white farmers met on 21 March 1982 in Nyamandhuru district and decided to form their own militia. Before this development, individuals had taken personal measures to ensure their safety. But the arrival of the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland created some technical difficulties for the whites in their fight against the dissidents. Before the arrival of the brigade it had been relatively easy for the whites to identify the dissidents by the weapons they carried. Since most of the dissidents were armed with weapons cached at the end of the liberation war, most of which were of Eastern European origin, these were easily identifiable. But when the 5th Brigade came in with their North Korean weapons, the identification of groups based solely on the type of weapons they used became difficult. The migration of whites from Zimbabwe during the early years following independence had a peculiar characteristic. As already noted, many who feared for their safety left Zimbabwe for South Africa immediately after independence. However, a critical look at the migratory pattern of whites during this period shows other considerations apart from fear for their personal security: equally important was the fear of a fall in their economic standard of living. Right after independence, when it was obvious that post-independence Zimbabwe would plunge into economic difficulties because of the effects of postwar reconstruction, many whites moved to South Africa, which had a buoyant and stable economy. However, at the end of 1984 and in early 1985, the South African economy dipped to its lowest level since the Depression of the 1930s, leading to severe devaluation of the rand, and whites started returning to Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean chief immigration officer reported that, between July 1984 and June 1985, more than three thousand whites returned to Zimbabwe. This figure only accounts for those arriving at Harare Airport and does not include people who entered the country through other border posts. However, when one considers the fact that, by July 1984, when the whites started returning, the security situation in Zimbabwe had not improved, the significance of the fear of personal safety in their earlier decision to emigrate depreciates. In essence, I contend that the twin considerations of fear for personal safety and fear of economic insecurity security were jointly responsible for the exodus of whites from Zimbabwe immediately after independence.

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Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe

On the whole, it would appear that race relations in Zimbabwe were initially quite good, with old animosities stemming from years of oppressive rule being forgotten. The general breakdown of law and order in Zimbabwe made no distinction between races. However, when another round of instability emerged during the activities of the war veterans, the safety of the white population once again became a crucial security issue. With regard to security, all this reflects the growing impact of a dwindling economy. of economics and domestic security

An analysis of the politics of domestic security in Zimbabwe would be incomplete without a discussion of the country’s economic realities. While, at the time of independence, the war of liberation had weakened the economic base, the effects of this were cushioned by the extent of the external affection that greeted independence. By the end of the decade, however, the reduction in the extent of external support and the consequences of economic mismanagement had brought the Zimbabwean economy to a precarious position, such that the term “economic structural adjustment program” entered the country’s vocabulary. By the early 1990s, drought and the rising cost of living had worsened the situation and had further increased the levels of inequality and poverty in the country. While initially the population tried to eke out a living amidst difficulties, and many young Zimbabweans started migrating to neighbouring countries, those who were either too old or who had no skills to sell outside Zimbabwe decided to stay back and fight it out with the government. There are four ways in which the economic situation in Zimbabwe affected domestic security during this time. First, those who could not eke out a living put pressure on the government. To an extent, this accounted for the emergence of the war veterans (see below). These people felt that their past had conditioned their present and that the government should cater to them because they had made sacrifices for the nation. Second, the economic situation resulted in the emergence of restive youths who exploited the opportunity that was created by the land-seizure policies (see below) to create security challenges for the country. It is believed that some of those who took part in the land-seizure were jobless youths who were vulnerable to manipulation. Third, the downward plunge in the economy led to food riots led by the labour unions. This, in turn, led to the intense activities of the

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Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, which resulted in the formation of the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change. Fourth, the economic situation and the way it was exploited by the opposition provided the government with an opportunity to implement unpopular policies to deal with that opposition. Perhaps the most notable example of this is Operation Murambatsvina, which, in 2005, saw the demolition of informal settlements in Harare and the displacement of about 700,000 people. But the downward plunge in the economy was worsened by President Mugabe’s decision to grant a huge financial concession to the war veterans, who threatened to hold his government hostage. In short, although drought and the failed promises of external partners, especially Britain, were crucial factors in the downward plunge of the Zimbabwean economy, there were also fundamental problems of poor management, and this must be put at the feet of the Mugabe administration. The economic situation was also connected to another security issue under the Mugabe administration. This was the extent to which youths in the country, possibly reacting to economic pressures, had become involved in security calculations. Indeed, youth issues have always been a factor in Zimbabwe, even during the war of liberation, and it has always been exploited to suit the advantage of key stakeholders. It would appear that Mugabe wanted to create a division among the youths. For example, he employed youths in the vanguard of security, and some of his repressive methods set this group against other youths, such as university students, who were arrested, detained, and tortured. But perhaps the most important manifestation of the inextricability of economic realities and security may be seen in the activities of the war veterans and the farm seizures. the land question

The numerous controversies surrounding land undoubtedly comprise some of the most profound domestic security issues that confronted the Mugabe administration. A number of reasons account for the primacy of this problem. First is the emotive role land has always played in African societies, especially in the case of Zimbabwe, where the war of liberation had been fought largely around the issue of land. Second is the fundamental compromise that was reached on the issue of land during the Lancaster House Agreement and the various controversies that later emerged regarding the obligations of

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key signatories. Third is the extent to which the Mugabe administration was willing to exploit land in its bid to address crucial political issues that emerge in its attempt to hold on to power. Fourth is the willingness of various interest groups in the country to blackmail the government through manipulating the sentimental attachment to land. Under the Lancaster House Agreement it was agreed that the racial imbalance in the land structure would remain for a decade and that land could only be taken from whites on a “willing-buyer-willingseller” basis. This meant that white farm owners were not to be pressured into selling land and that they were also to determine the price of their land. Once this was enshrined in the agreement, white farmers jacked up their prices, putting land outside the reach of the average Zimbabwean. It was also agreed that the British government would financially assist the process of purchasing lands from whites for eventual redistributions among blacks. This was contrary to the position of black Zimbabweans during the liberation war, but the government nevertheless accepted these stipulations, waiting anxiously for the expiration of the Lancaster House Agreement. By the dawn of the 1990s, there was a real demand and need for land redistribution in Zimbabwe. By this time, it was obvious that the structures inherited at the time of independence were clearly untenable and unsustainable and that the uncooperative attitude of white farmers, who initially exploited the clauses of the Lancaster House Agreement, further compounded the problems for the Mugabe government. But other developments, like drought and the International Monetary Fund’s (imf’s) structural adjustment program, added another layer to the land problem. With the expiration of the Lancaster House Agreement, the government came up with the Land Acquisition Act, 1992, which empowered it to forcefully acquire land after the payment of compensation (although, theoretically, white farm owners were allowed to challenge the amount the government was willing to pay). Then came the government’s “fast track” land policy, which was as controversial as its other policies. The security dimension of the land question came to a head when the war veterans entered the equation through their forceful occupation of white farm lands. Shortly before the expiration of the Lancaster House Agreement, in 1988, war veterans from both zanu and zapu came together to form the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association.88 This was the first organization that

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brought people with military experience together without making any distinction between the zanu and the zapu. The war veterans had been betrayed and neglected by politicians from both political parties, and this was a much stronger bond between them than any previous attachment. Indeed, the head of the war veterans who played an important role in the farm occupation saga, Chenjerai Hunzvi was a former member of zipra. A major landmark in the farm occupation came in 1997, when the war veterans pressured President Mugabe to make significant concessions. Mugabe was held hostage at the zanu-pf building, and he was allegedly warned that he would be removed from power if he did not accede to their request. Under duress, he committed to giving Z$50,000 to each of the war veterans. This came at an enormous cost to the economy, especially as it was unbudgeted. However, in doing this, Mugabe succeeded in turning the war veterans from a hostile community into allies, ready and willing to do whatever was in line with zanu-pf interests. In February 2000, the land politics in Zimbabwe entered a new phase when the ruling zanu-pf lost a national referendum.89 Although the referendum was on constitutional reform, land issues played an important part in the government’s campaign and the subsequent outcome. The government based its campaign for a “Yes” vote for constitutional reform on the need to acquire more power in order to complete its land reforms. It claimed that it intended to acquire approximately 5 million hectares of the 12 million currently being held by whites.90 However, the opposition argued that the referendum was a ploy to divert attention from the political situation in the country and that the land acquisition process was being managed by a government department whose competence and independence were widely questioned.91 The opposition further argued that the referendum “was bad in law and calculated to sabotage [the] country’s economic prospects.”92 The referendum did indeed bring together an unlikely alliance – white farmers and radical black politicians, both united in their opposition to Mugabe’s continued stay in power. The outcome was a defeat of the government – the first in its twenty years in power. With this, Mugabe and the ruling zanu-pf realized that the parliamentary elections, which were three months away, could not be taken for granted. As a result, from the moment of the electoral defeat, the government brought the land issue more fully into political view.

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Once the government lost the referendum, there was a massive increase in the activities of the war veterans, with more violence being employed in the bid to forcefully take over white farmlands. Although the war veterans had been active in Zimbabwe before the referendum and had, indeed, been campaigning for land reform, the increase in their activities and level of violence after the defeat of the government were viewed by many as a ploy by Mugabe to intimidate the opposition ahead of the May 2000 elections. It was also seen as a way of breaking the alliance between the opposition mdc and white farmers. Mugabe openly supported the takeover of the farms, even after the country’s High Court declared the occupation illegal.93 By the end of March 2000, the situation was such that many believed Zimbabwe was on the road to anarchy. On 6 April 2000, the first white farmer gave up his land and migrated to Australia;94 on 15 April 2000, the first white farmer became a casualty. By the end of May 2000, the government had produced a list of the first 804 farms that were to be seized without compensation.95 The situation continued to deepen racial tensions within the country, and the consequent food crisis further exacerbated the unstable political situation. Although, in May 2004, Mugabe conceded that some mistakes had been made during the land controversy,96 he maintained that he had no regrets. Understanding the events in Zimbabwe between March and April 2000 is a difficult task. It was alleged that government and army trucks were used to transport the war veterans to white farms and that the government kept them supplied with food while they were there.97 Having lost the referendum, Mugabe and his party seemed to have lost their cloak of invincibility, thereby placing future elections in doubt. Thus, the takeover of the farms was almost certainly designed to intimidate white farmers and to browbeat them into conformity. It was also clear that most of those who took part in the seizure of the farms were not actual war veterans as many of them were too young to have participated in a war that had ended twenty years before.98 Obviously included in the group were party thugs loyal to Mugabe and the zanu-pf party. It was ironic that Mugabe, who became the champion of the landless, had been forced a few years earlier to act on the land issue. Indeed, there were those who opposed Mugabe politically but nevertheless supported the forceful occupation of land.99 Many black Zimbabweans wanted land, and few were interested in how land

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redistribution would come about. The zanu-pf saw land as a rallying point to whip up support. Indeed, the party had run the campaign for the 2002 election on the key issue of land as that was the only subject around which emotions could be roused. This was why the government termed the entire land occupation exercise the Third Chimurenga.100 Indeed, it is important to point out that the actions taken against some white farm owners had racial undertones. The frustration felt by black Zimbabweans at the racist behaviour of some of the white farmers cannot be ignored. While some of the whites were kind and considerate to their black staff, there were those who treated their employees no better than chattels.101 By early 2003, another phase in the Zimbabwean land saga seemed to have emerged, with Zimbabwean elites, especially those close to Mugabe, allegedly driving landless black Zimbabweans out of the lands they occupied.102 At one stage, there was infighting within zanu-pf, with some war veterans and even ministers and members of Parliament accusing other top party members of colluding with white farmers to frustrate the forceful occupation of their farms. A prominent example of this may be found in the case made against Vice-President Joseph Msika and Home Affairs Minister John Nkomo for allegedly supporting a white farmer named Stewart, whose farm War Veteran Secretary of Security Mike Moyo claimed had been given to both himself and to zanupf’s Harare provincial vice-chairman Chris Pasipamire. The farm, known as Mayfield Farm, is in Mazowe. Moyo specifically accused Msika of using the power of the state to prevent his taking over of the farm. This, Moyo said, was an act of corruption that the war veterans found unacceptable. Faced with serious economic difficulties, Zimbabwe began to modify its position by the middle of 2005. Indeed, government officials like vice-presidents Joseph Msika and Joyce Mujuru pointed out that the war against white farmers was over and that farmlands were to be given to farmers on a ninety-nine-year lease.103 Indeed, the governor of the country’s Reserve Bank, Gideon Gono, added that white farmers would be provided with guarantees of uninterrupted tenure backed by government security forces.104 There are serious controversies regarding the extent to which Mugabe’s land policies have been responsible for the economic collapse of Zimbabwe. These were further heightened in March 2009 by Mahmood Mamdani’s article “Lessons of Zimbabwe.”105

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Mamdani compares Mugabe’s position on land to the late Idi Amin’s expulsion of Indian Asians from Uganda, arguing that many Zimbabweans would see Mugabe’s land policy as marking the “dawn of true independence.” Mamdani also sees the entire land controversy as being more between urban-based groups (opposed to the president but supported by the West) and peasants (supported by zanu). This position elicited the expected response from many scholars on Zimbabwe.106 Mamdani’s position has some strengths, even if its weaknesses are equally evident. For example, his argument that Mugabe’s policy on land has its supporters across the continent, especially in Southern Africa, is valid. He is also correct when he says that there may be those who consider Mugabe’s policy as a form of “liberation.” However, what seems to be one of the central points of his argument – that Mugabe’s main supporters are rural dwellers and that his main opponents are urban elites – is questionable. Equally questionable is his endorsement, albeit subtle, of Mugabe’s position. Apart from Mamdani, there has emerged a set of scholars that is also raising fundamental questions about the extent to which Mugabe’s land policies are detrimental to Zimbabwe’s long-term economic interests. One such scholar is Ian Scoones, who identifies what he calls “five myths” about Zimbabwe’s land crisis: (1) that land reform has been a total failure, (2) that its beneficiaries have been top officials of the ruling party, (3) that there is no investment in the new settlements, (4) that agriculture is in ruins, and (5) that the rural economy has collapsed.107 What all this points to is that, while further studies need to be conducted in order to assess all the ramifications of Mugabe’s land policy, what seems to be beyond doubt is that most of his policies were ad hoc and that they were taken to ensure his perpetual hold on power, especially against the growing power of the mdc. the mdc , mugabe , and domestic security

Once the government was able to intimidate zapu into signing the Unity Accord there was no major domestic opposition to zanu until the mdc arrived on the Zimbabwean political scene. Although the zum of Edgar Tekere came in between, it had very little impact and it was not long before Mugabe’s prediction that zum would soon zoom into extinction was realized. As for the mdc, when it was first formed

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the government considered it to be of mere entertainment value and expected that it would be eclipsed, just as had been the case with previous opposition parties. However, the party grew stronger, and when the government realized that it could not be wished away, it made concerted efforts to suppress the new opposition. A number of domestic and external considerations favoured the emergence of the mdc. First, the party came on the scene at a time when local Zimbabweans were becoming dissatisfied with Mugabe’s administration, and any political party with a reasonable level of coordination and organization was bound to gain recognition, if not support, from the population. Second, the white population of Zimbabwe, which had lost considerable political power, still held on to economic power and was willing to support any credible political party that could challenge Mugabe: the mdc filled the bill. Third, unlike zum, the mdc was well organized and its support cut across Zimbabwe’s ethnic and social divides. It thus had a chance of wrestling power from Mugabe. The fact that the mdc had links with the labour union in the country further extended its support base. Fourth, the international climate was not favourable to leaders with questionable democratic credentials, and Mugabe was thus under pressure to organize credible elections. All these considerations worked against Mugabe and the zanu party. The first hint the government received of the strength of the mdc was the loss of the 2000 referendum. The mdc had campaigned with the white minority party against the government and won. This alliance revealed to the Mugabe government the dangers of an alliance between the white opposition and the mdc, and from that moment, it decided to do everything in its power to break the growing strength of the mdc. In 2005, the mdc broke into two factions, with Morgan Tsvangirai continuing to lead the bigger of these (and Arthur Mutambara leading the other). In a recent book, Tsvangirai indicates that the zanu-pf made efforts to infiltrate the mdc and to reduce its ability to provide a credible opposition to the Mugabe government.108 Mugabe used a number of methods to incapacitate the mdc and its leaders, and many of these are already well known. Given that the mdc had already spread across the country, the Mugabe regime realized that a mixture of brute force and a divide-and-conquer strategy was needed in order to force the party into conformity. However, the mdc realized that the government would employ precisely this

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strategy and was therefore prepared for it. Unlike previous political opposition parties, the mdc was encouraged by the implicit endorsement of the international community. In considering the response of the Mugabe administration to the emergence of the mdc, there can be no doubt that the government focused all the efforts of the security apparatus against it. As noted in the last chapter, the zna and the police took sides with the government, with senior police and military officers standing up to say that they would not recognize any president other than Mugabe. However, another security agency whose role in the suppression of the mdc is profound is the Green Bombers (see chapter 2). Indeed, opposition to the government has always been victimized. During the zum days, a prominent zum member, Patrick Kombayi, was attacked and shot. A senior cio officer and a zanu-pf youth leader were convicted of attempted murder, but within hours of the Supreme Court’s dismissing their appeal, Mugabe granted them presidential pardons. Kombayi remained crippled for life and died in 2009 from complications as a consequence of the attack.109 The first election that was conducted after the formation of the mdc was won by the ruling zanu-pf amidst allegations of brutality against the leadership and membership of the mdc. The alleged irregularities and brutality in the elections were to result in the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth (see chapter 6). The same method was employed in the 2008 elections, in which opposition supporters were brutalized and the military made it clear that it would not support the victory of the opposition mdc. It was, indeed, the suppression of opposition supporters that resulted in the withdrawal of the mdc from the run-off conducted after the first election. Discussions that ultimately resulted in the formation of a joint national government between zanu and the mdc were delayed and almost cancelled because of the disagreements between the two parties regarding control of the security apparatus. The mdc leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, refused the position of prime minister unless he was given control of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which controlled the police. Already, Mugabe had made it clear that he would maintain control over the zna. Although it was not clearly stated, one of the reasons the mdc insisted on controlling the police was that the police force was the strongest institution used to suppress opposition party members. Indeed, just a few weeks before the official commencement

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of the new government, many key members of the mdc were still being held in custody.110 conclusion

Domestic security would appear to be the main excuse Robert Mugabe used to hold on to power throughout the period from independence to the signing of the agreement with the mdc in February 2009. It is thus not surprising that the key issues that delayed the signing of the agreement with the mdc – and that, indeed, still remain contentious – were those surrounding the management of domestic security. While some of the challenges that emerged during this period were not deliberate creations of the Mugabe administration, virtually all were exploited by the government to ensure the consolidation of its power. However, of all the domestic security issues that emerged between independence and the signing of the agreement between zanu-pf and the mdc, three key issues clearly reflect the extent to which Mugabe was determined to exploit domestic security to his advantage. These are the use of the Gukurahundi in Matabeleland, the use of the security forces to suppress opposition, and the exploitation of the land issue to resuscitate Mugabe’s dwindling political fortune. In all cases, the politics of domestic security combined with other issues – such as the downward plunge of the economy, the complex composition of the country, the legacies of the war of liberation, and so on – to determine Zimbabwe’s relationship with its immediate neighbours. It is to this relationship that I turn in chapter 4.

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4

Contending with Allies, Rivals, and Critics: Mugabe’s Security Relations with Zimbabwe’s Immediate Neighbours Right from Zimbabwe’s independence, Mugabe had realized the need to put his relationship with his country’s immediate neighbours under close watch, and, throughout the period from independence to the signing of the agreement with the mdc in February 2009, this remained a crucial aspect of his security diplomacy. Similarly, these neighbouring countries had to factor the vicissitudes of political and security developments inside Zimbabwe into their own security calculations. It is in the context of this mutual desire to ensure the close monitoring of developments that both Zimbabwe and its neighbours existed throughout the period under discussion. Here I focus on Zimbabwe’s immediate neighbours: Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia. The security contents of Zimbabwe’s relationship with the subregional organization, the Southern African Development Community (sadc), I discuss in chapter 7. My central argument is that Mugabe’s perception of threats from Zimbabwe’s immediate neighbours were determined by two primary factors: (1) the politics of subregional involvement in Zimbabwe’s independence struggle and (2) the subregional reactions to the uncertainties that characterized Zimbabwe’s domestic situation, especially during issues like the farm invasion, the opposition mounted by the mdc, and the controversies surrounding democratic elections and human rights violations. The first factor prevailed during the period immediately after independence, when Mugabe was still consolidating his grip on power, and the second prevailed after he had consolidated that grip and was trying to ensure perpetual dominance. These two factors resulted in Mugabe’s relationship with his immediate neighbours oscillating between different

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tendencies, with, at different times, neighbouring countries being considered as allies, rivals, and/or critics. It is ironic that a single country could be considered all of these, depending on changing leadership and/or the shifting nature of its attitude towards the political situation in Zimbabwe. In what follows I first look at Zimbabwe’s general policy governing its relationship with its immediate neighbours before examining in detail its relationship with South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique, respectively. ambitions and constraints in zimbabwe’s relationship with its immediate neighbours

From independence, Mugabe wanted Zimbabwe to be a key player in its geopolitical neighbourhood, especially with regard to issues pertaining to security. In his calculations, two credentials qualified Zimbabwe to play this role. The first was the country’s economic strength at the time of independence. And indeed, at its birth, Zimbabwe had the most advanced economy in the region outside South Africa. Somewhat ironically, the efforts to overcome the sanctions that followed the udi resulted in a diversified economy, which, at independence, yielded one of the best economies on the continent. Politically, there was relative stability as most of the problems anticipated at independence were easily resolved, and all efforts by the new government to establish a stable society received considerable international sympathy. Also, the efforts of black-ruled countries in the region gained a stronger voice. It would thus appear that all that Zimbabwe needed in order to manifest its “leadership” potential was relative peace and stability. In Mugabe’s thinking, the second credential that qualified Zimbabwe to play a prominent role in Southern Africa was the fact that the country was the first in the region to attain independence through the combination of armed struggle and round-table diplomacy. Although it was envisaged that South Africa and Namibia were soon likely to follow this route, the fact that Zimbabwe preceded these countries was, in Mugabe’s calculations, a unique distinction that qualified Zimbabwe for recognition and respect. But while these credentials placed Zimbabwe at an advantage, there were also a number of considerations that Mugabe considered as obstacles to the realization of his desire for subregional dominance. Four of these are particularly important. The first obstacle

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was the domineering influence of the Republic of South Africa, which Mugabe realized would always stand the way of Zimbabwe’s gaining regional leadership. Although immediately after independence Zimbabwe sought to assert some authority, Mugabe knew that any advance it made would be lost as soon as South Africa abolished apartheid and won international respectability. In short, Mugabe realized that there was a limit to Zimbabwe’s rise, with its domineering southern neighbour overlooking developments in the region. As I show later, this obstacle was to be one of Mugabe’s most difficult challenges, both during the apartheid era and afterwards. The second obstacle to subregional dominance involved the challenge of being landlocked, which placed Zimbabwe at the mercy of its two coastal neighbours, South Africa and Mozambique. Although Zimbabwe had always maintained a good relationship with Mozambique, the activities of the Mozambican dissident movement renamo (to be discussed in the next chapter) frustrated exports and imports through the country, leaving Zimbabwe to rely on South Africa. Being landlocked put a considerable strain on Zimbabwe’s economic activities, with considerable implications for the country’s manuoeuvrability in regional politics. There were also attendant economic and financial challenges to being landlocked as it cost more to get goods into and out of the country through Southern African ports. The third obstacle to subregional dominance arose out of the nature of the liberation struggle, during which some neighbouring countries supported Joshua Nkomo’s zapu against Mugabe’s zanu. As I have shown, although there was some form of understanding between these two political parties at the time of independence, their relationship was still predominantly characterized by mutual suspicion. Also, since some of the neighbouring countries that had supported zapu during the liberation war had also provided military bases for the party and its armed wing, Mugabe had to consider the possibility of arms infiltration from these countries. This resulted in a major constraint on the prominent role Mugabe had hoped to play in regional diplomacy. The final obstacle, which is somewhat tied to the third, was a result of the geographical and ethnic make-up of Zimbabwe, with some of the country’s main ethnic groups being closely affiliated to those across the border. Indeed, all the main ethnic and racial groups in Zimbabwe have close links across the borders: there are Ndebele people across the border in Zambia, Shonas across the border in

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Mozambique, and whites across the border in apartheid South Africa. Consequently, key domestic issues could easily have wider regional implications – to the detriment of the evolution of a strong regional policy. It was against this background that Mugabe had to pursue Zimbabwe’s security relationships with its immediate neighbours, of which South Africa was the most powerful and the most important. zimbabwe’s relationship with south africa

Of all its neighbourly relationships, Zimbabwe’s relationship with South Africa was undoubtedly the most complex, and it has attracted considerable attention. Even before independence, Zimbabwean liberation movements believed that South Africa would pose the greatest security problem to their new country. This was due to their conviction that the regime in Pretoria would not take kindly to the loss of an ally in Rhodesia. The fact that, at the time, South Africa showed great interest in ensuring a victory for Bishop Abel Muzorewa must have further convinced Zimbabwe’s liberation fighters that Pretoria was not interested in their victory. Still, what was most indicative of the prospect of an uneasy relationship with South Africa was its policy towards its other black-ruled neighbours. Thus, in a number of ways, Harare was not surprised by the ill-feeling that characterized the relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa, especially for most of the first decade following the former’s independence. Broadly speaking, between Zimbabwe’s independence in April 1980 and February 2009, the country’s relationship with South Africa underwent four different phases: phase 1 occurred between Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 until the attainment of majority rule in South Africa in 1992; phase 2 occurred during the period covering the independence of South Africa and Zimbabwe’s involvement in the drc; phase 3 covered the period of obvious rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe over the drc; while phase 4 saw South Africa deeply involved in the efforts to address Zimbabwe’s domestic political and security challenges. All these phases are discussed below. Phase 1: The Inseparable Divorcées Phase This was the phase immediately after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, and it lasted roughly until South Africa’s attainment of independence. As noted in chapter 1, prior to Zimbabwe’s independence,

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both Rhodesia and South Africa operated somewhat as “Siamesetwins.” This cordiality was the outcome of historical ties that had been strengthened by the pursuit of similar racial and ideological policies. But Zimbabwe’s independence after the liberation war introduced a completely new dimension to this relationship.1 For South Africa, the special circumstances under which it gave preferential consideration to the minority regime in Rhodesia ceased to exist after 1980, so it felt that the new country could and should be treated the same way as were other black neighbouring countries.2 This was all the more so because of the obvious hatred South Africa had for Robert Mugabe and what Pretoria believed Zimbabwe’s new ruling party stood for.3 What its relationship with South Africa should look like presented a serious dilemma for Zimbabwe at independence. Rhodesia’s historical relationship to and ideological similarity with South Africa had combined with geographical and economic considerations to create a state of economic dependence on that country. For example, South Africa was independent Zimbabwe’s largest market in Africa, just as Zimbabwe was South Africa’s. Similarly, Zimbabwe had the largest South African investment in the continent.4 Zimbabwe also inherited a debt of Z$38 million, consisting of loans that South Africa had given to the Smith government to prosecute the war.5 All this resulted in a situation in which a variety of formal and informal interactions between Zimbabwe and South Africa became inevitable.6 However, following independence, Zimbabwe needed to change its policy towards the minority regime in Pretoria in order to keep in line with the policy of most African countries as well as to demonstrate its rejection of apartheid.7 Thus, for Zimbabwe, independence introduced a conflict between old historical and economic ties with South Africa and new political and ideological antipathies. Mugabe’s attitude towards South Africa was pragmatic. While not leaving anyone in doubt that he was in support of blacks in South Africa, he ruled out any use of his country as a military base. He cancelled all sporting links with South Africa, which pained the latter because this was a tradition that went back to 1905. From independence, it seemed inevitable that Zimbabwe would have security problems with South Africa. For a start, Mugabe, conscious of his country’s potential and the people’s expectations, was determined to provide leadership to other black Southern African countries, many of whom saw in him a messiah who would secure

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their freedom from South African hegemony. This expectation was to reduce South Africa’s influence over most African states. Attendant on this was the prevailing regional politics at the time of Zimbabwe’s independence. Zimbabwe entered the Southern African scene at a time when two regional economic groupings, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (sadcc) and the Constellation of Southern African States (consas), were engaged in stiff competition.8 At independence, Zimbabwe had the option of joining either of these rival economic unions, and apparently both organizations had considerable interest in receiving Zimbabwe. For the sadcc, having Zimbabwe would have meant having as a member a black country with considerable economic power. This would be in addition to the fact that Zimbabwe’s membership would give the sadcc an ideological focus since all its members were opposed to apartheid. On the other hand, if Zimbabwe decided to join consas, South Africa would be glad to have in its group a country with enormous legitimacy within the region – a country that was also the recipient of good will from all over the world. In the end, Zimbabwe joined the sadcc, further fanning the embers of potential tension in Zimbabwe-South Africa relations. Another reason that the tension between the two countries was predictable had to do with their divergence over apartheid. Zimbabwe made it clear from the outset that it would be unequivocal in its condemnation of apartheid. Although South Africa was already used to incessant criticism, there was always a limit to the condemnation that it was willing to tolerate from its neighbours. In particular, South Africa did not take kindly to criticism from Zimbabwe because of the potential impact that criticism could have on its black population. Since Zimbabwe had recently thrown out a white minority regime through armed struggle, South Africa wanted to prevent Mugabe’s comments from encouraging blacks inside South Africa to attempt a similar revolt. The best way to do this, the South African leadership thought, was to suppress and/or blackmail Zimbabwe. South Africa’s immediate response to Mugabe’s election victory was firm but cautious. On 4 March 1989 (the day the election results were released), President P.W. Botha warned: “any neighbour which allows his territory to be used against South Africa and its interest [will] bear the full brunt of the Republic’s strength.”9 Although this appears to be a general statement (no country is specifically mentioned), its timing made the intended recipient of the sentiment

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obvious. South Africa understandably disapproved of Mugabe’s victory; nevertheless, it shied away from sounding a note of complete hostility because it feared the reaction of the international community. The enormous goodwill that greeted the Lancaster House proceedings and Mugabe’s victory ruled out any violent opposition that South Africa may have contemplated. Furthermore, the ghost of the misadventure in Angola, where South Africa had unsuccessfully intervened against the victorious People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, still haunted the republic.10 The legacies of the war of liberation made Zimbabwe highly vulnerable to South Africa’s destabilization activities. However, despite that vulnerability, Zimbabwe was lucky in one fundamental respect: unlike Angola and Mozambique, the orderly process of the transfer of power in Zimbabwe made it easier for it to avoid some of the issues that would have made it more vulnerable to external destabilization. Although no transfer of power is infallible, Zimbabwe owed much to the Lancaster House Agreement, which enabled it to avoid the kinds of consequences that South Africa was able to exploit with regard to the liberation wars in Angola and Mozambique. The first fallout from Zimbabwe’s liberation war that South Africa was able to exploit involved those former members of the old Rhodesian Army who took up employment in South Africa after Zimbabwe’s independence. Among these were members of the Selous Scouts, one of the military units that had been disbanded after independence. As I show later, these people constituted one of the greatest security risks to Zimbabwe in its relations with South Africa, primarily because they had all the requisite skills to successfully attack Zimbabwe. For example, they had received military training, they had adequate knowledge of operational terrains, and, most important, they were willing to obey if ordered to attack. In fact, some of them, on leaving for South Africa, promised to come back and attack Zimbabwean interests.11 Apart from those fighting units that had been disbanded, the white members of the former Rhodesian Army continued to desert the zna during its early years. Although official records do not reveal the precise number of those who left, it appears that the number was quite substantial. Closely related to this group were those who stayed back after independence to provide much needed intelligence reports to South Africa. After independence, Zimbabwe retained the services of some white officers in the armed forces, many of whom were in sensitive

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units like the cio and military intelligence. Zimbabwe’s reasons for doing this could have been part of the new government’s general conciliatory efforts or its intention to respect professionalism, especially in fields in which there were too few black Zimbabweans to provide the required expertise. Whatever determined this policy option, it was later discovered that the situation was exploited by South Africa as many of those who stayed back to work for the cio and some other arms of the security forces also worked as agents for the South African government. There were also other disbanded armed units, especially the Muzorewa Auxiliaries, that were open to creating security problems for the Mugabe administration if they could get a dependable source of military assistance, and South Africa was a likely source for such assistance. As noted earlier, there were incontrovertible links between the South African leadership and Abel Muzorewa, who controlled the Security Force Auxiliaries, and this provided a valid threat to Zimbabwe’s security. Immediately after independence, many members of the Security Force Auxiliaries fled to South Africa, and, although the exact number is not known, Mugabe put it at five thousand,12 while other sources put it at fifteen hundred.13 Added to this was the domestic tension in Matebeleland. Since internal dissident operations was one of its most effective tool of regional destabilization, the opportunity offered by the dissident operation in Matabeleland was a temptation too difficult for South Africa to resist. Finally, there was that section of the old Rhodesian society that had neither military nor intelligence connections but that considered the new order in Zimbabwe repugnant and was bent on getting even with its leaders. Most of these people went to South Africa after Zimbabwean independence, where they remained opposed to the new order and displayed a readiness to do anything to bring it down. This group of people were derisively known as the “When We Were Tribe.”14 It is difficult to establish the various degrees to which these people constituted a threat to Zimbabwe. But it was clear that they exerted an adverse influence on the already anti-Mugabe feelings in the South African leadership. Also, the fact that they could be used in any way possible by those who did not wish Zimbabwe well was sufficient to make them a factor worth noting in any consideration of South Africa’s exploitation of the problems precipitated by the Zimbabwean liberation war. In short, Mugabe’s victory left many embittered groups, both inside and outside Zimbabwe, whose help

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would facilitate apartheid South Africa’s ability to exploit the former Rhodesia. Before going on to discuss nation-to-nation relations, it is necessary to note how, not long after independence, the publics in both countries perceived each other as a “threat.” This illustrates the extent to which public opinion was a factor in policy formulation and implementation. In South Africa, a public opinion poll conducted in 1982 recorded that more than 70 percent of whites answered “Yes” to the question: “Do you consider Zimbabwe a threat to this country?”15 Although no similar opinion poll was carried out in Zimbabwe, there is palpable evidence to deduce that the feeling was mutual.16 Some scholars believe that apartheid South Africa’s reasons for wanting to destabilize Zimbabwe were not straightforward. One such scholar, Geldenhuy, notes: The possible objectives of destabilizing Zimbabwe are not as easy to discern as in other cases. Zimbabwe does not support “terrorists” in the same way as Angola and Mozambique. It does not come into Communist spheres of influence like Angola and Mozambique, and Zimbabwe openly maintains economic ties with South Africa. True, Zimbabwe is avowedly hostile to apartheid and has declared solidarity with anc and swapo. The only discernable objective of destabilizing Zimbabwe could be to prevent it from being economically strong enough to reduce its economic ties with South Africa to an insignificant level and militarily strong enough to deter the republic … A Zimbabwe that is economically vulnerable and closely tied to South Africa, and domestically faced with political disaffection, unrest, and violence, may be an appealing scenario to South African decision makers favoring destabilization.17 The above succinctly explains South Africa’s reasons for destabilizing Zimbabwe. A point that needs to be stressed, however, is the extent of Mugabe’s anti-apartheid rhetoric and the interpretation given to it by the “South African decision makers favouring destabilization.” Although, since independence, Zimbabwe had ruled out the possibility of its territory’s being used as a base for attacking South Africa, it nevertheless believed that it should be more vociferous than other states in its condemnation of South African

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apartheid. The Mugabe administration always went a step further than any other in its criticism. Zimbabwe believed it owed this to weaker states in the region. Expectedly, South Africa used this as a reason to classify Zimbabwe as an enemy state and to justify whatever course of action it desired to take. For example, Magnus Malan, the minister of defence and obviously one of the decision makers who favoured destabilization, once accused Zimbabwe of effectively declaring war on South Africa and of exporting revolution and tension to the republic: While Mr. Mugabe leaves no stone unturned in accusing South Africa of destabilization, and other horrendous deeds, his country’s official policy includes moral, political and financial support for the anc … clandestine military support and help, as well as transit facilities … The number of terrorist acts that could be traced back to Zimbabwe had increased by 52% last year, compared with 1986 … the weapon cache found in the Broedersroom raid … had been brought in through Zimbabwe.18 To prove that Mugabe was determined to stand up against South Africa, Malan quotes Mugabe’s 1986 speech on the anniversary of Soweto Day. The president of Zimbabwe was quoted as having said, inter alia: “The only language the Boers will understand is the language of gun [sic]; a bullet for a bullet. They will understand that very easily. The Boers are afraid to die. They fear death. The more of them you kill, the nearer you get to your goal.”19 General Malan then concluded his speech by saying: “If this is not a declaration of war [then] I would want to know how you declare war.” I quote Malan extensively because his words constitute one of the most direct charges made by the South African leadership against Zimbabwe in the years immediately after independence. Although South Africa was used to criticism, it was only willing to tolerate so much from its neighbours. Any criticism that encouraged domestic insurrection inside South Africa was unacceptable. In fact, the Mugabe speech given at the Soweto anniversary was more aggressive than any ever made by South Africa’s neighbours. And, when one considers the temperament of the South African leadership during the Botha years, one can see how such statements could “anger” the country. Zimbabwe persistently denied giving military bases to either the anc or the Pan Africanist Congress

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(pac), and the South African government was never able to provide any evidence to the contrary. Two other South African desires are worthy of mention. The first was the desire of the apartheid regime to frustrate the activities of the sadcc. As it was obvious that Zimbabwe was destined to play a key role in the affairs of that organization, the South African government decided to raise the stakes involved in Zimbabwe’s making any deep commitment to it. The second desire was to prevent Zimbabwe from being a successful model for a multi-racial South Africa. South Africa calculated that a Zimbabwe that was successful in its economic and inter-race relations would give the lie to its apartheid philosophy. All this made it necessary for South Africa to destabilize Zimbabwe. Two basic factors assisted South Africa in its exploitation of Zimbabwe’s liberation war legacies. The first was Zimbabwe’s deep economic reliance on South Africa. The efforts to beat the sanctions that came after the Universal Declaration of Independence tied Rhodesia’s economy to that of South Africa. Although efforts were made after independence to reduce these ties, South Africa’s grip on the Zimbabwean economy was still sufficiently strong to allow it to tighten the screws on Harare. Table 4.1 indicates the extent of South Africa’s grip on the Zimbabwean economy: Apart from trade, there were several other ways that South Africa could make things difficult for Zimbabwe. For example, there were more than seven thousand Zimbabweans working in South Africa with permits, while up to 100,000 were working without permits.20 If these people were to have been repatriated, Zimbabwe would have faced serious social and economic problems. South Africa could also have cancelled the Preferential Trade Agreement (pta). This agreement had been in operation since the time of Ian Smith, and it was one of the things that sustained his rebellion. The cancellation of this agreement would be to the obvious detriment of Zimbabwe’s industries – especially textiles, clothing, footwear, and furniture.21 Also, South Africa could have withdrawn the locomotive engines on loan to Zimbabwe. This would have aggravated Zimbabwe’s already serious transportation problem.22 Further, South Africa’s enormous military strength was considered sufficient to engage the military might of all the countries in the subregion combined. In considering the ways in which South Africa destabilized Zimbabwe during the year immediately after independence, it is

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Table 4.1 Zimbabwe’s trade with South Africa and Britain Exports

1965

1980

1984

1986

South Africa

9.0%

22.6%

18.3%

12.4%

Britain

21.9%

6.9%

12.8%

13.3%

Imports

1965

1980

1984

1986

South Africa Britain

22.9%

32.0%

19.3%

15.3%

30.4%

10.0%

12.0%

10.9%

Source: James Barber, “Zimbabwe: The Southern African Setting,” World Today 44, 10 (1988), 171.

necessary to distinguish between two phenomena: (1) cases in which South Africa itself engaged in destabilization activities and (2) cases in which South Africa used proxies to carry out its destabilization activities. It is also important to distinguish between instances in which South Africa’s involvement was proven and cases in which it was merely suspected. The purpose of making these distinctions is not to prove that any of the allegations of destabilization made by Zimbabwe were false – in virtually all cases they were justifiable – rather, the intention is to put the security dimensions of the link between Zimbabwe and South Africa in proper perspective. South Africa’s destabilization of Zimbabwe manifested itself in five different ways: (1) direct military attack, (2) economic sabotage, (3) sponsorship of dissident activities, (4) use of fifth columns, and (5) sponsorship of renamo, the Mozambican dissident group. Direct military raids were carried out against Zimbabwe on a number of occasions for the ostensible reason of wanting to “destroy anc bases” or to show the Zimbabwean government the consequences of hosting South African outlawed organizations. On economic sabotage, apart from the threat to abrogate the pta and the withdrawal of the locomotive engines mentioned above, South Africa expelled its Zimbabwean migrant labourers. As Zimbabwe had little time to prepare for the return of these people, no adequate arrangements could be made, with the result that some of them found it necessary to resort to unlawful ways of making a living. The use of Zimbabwean fifth columns was a major strategy employed by apartheid South Africa. In most cases, these fifth columns consisted of former white Rhodesians who stayed in the

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country after independence. The first act that could be traced to South Africa in this regard occurred sometime in December 1980, when arms worth Z$250,000 were stolen from the Cranborne Barracks in Harare. Zimbabwe accused South Africa of taking these weapons. Evidence made available by Paul Moorcraft indicates that the action was carried out by ex-Rhodesian soldiers who joined the South African Defence Force (sadf). This was said to have been sanctioned by their immediate superiors, if not by the army command in Pretoria.23 Although the evidence supplied in Moorcraft’s study argues that the action was largely a freelance operation, the fact that it was carried out by former members of the Rhodesian Army – who were then serving South Africa’s interests – and that some members of the sadf knew about the operation make it worth noting. The explosion at the Inkomo Barracks is the second piece of “evidence” that the Harare government documented with regard to South Africa’s employment of fifth columns. In August 1981, armaments worth Z$36 million were destroyed in an explosion at Inkomo Barracks near Harare. Police investigations into the case led to the arrest of one Captain Frank Gericke, a former member of the Rhodesian Army who stayed in the zna as the commander of the Corps of Engineers. The investigation was still in progress when he was released from prison by a South African agent who was then serving as a detective in the Zimbabwean police force. Captain Gericke later reappeared in South Africa as a member of the sadf.24 Another explosion that would have eliminated the Zimbabwean leadership almost in its entirety occurred in December 1981. An incendiary device was timed to explode when the zanu central committee was supposed to be meeting at party headquarters. However, the meeting had to be delayed because Mugabe and some of his ministers (who were supposed to be at the meeting) had to attend another meeting to discuss the arrangements for the visit of President Machel, which was scheduled to take place later that week. When the bomb went off it killed six people and injured more than a hundred. The explosion was traced to former members of the Rhodesian regiments serving in the sadf.25 Similarly, the Thornhill explosion of July 1982, which almost destroyed Zimbabwe’s air strike capability, was linked to South Africa. Although it is now believed that the six officers arrested in connection with that explosion may not have been involved, sources indicate that this act was carried out by

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ex-Rhodesian Special Air Service officers serving in the sadf, with some internal cooperation.26 The assassination of Joe Gwabi, the anc representative in Harare in August 1981, introduced a wider subregional dimension to South Africa’s destabilization of Zimbabwe. The authorities in Harare believed that the assassination was organized by Geoffrey Price, a former member of the rsf who stayed back after independence to head Mugabe’s personal security team. He was said to have recruited two members of the South African Intelligence Service – Colin Evans and Philip Hartlebury. The two recruits were caught, but Price escaped to South Africa.27 However, the incident that removed any doubts that Zimbabwe might have had about South Africa’s using elements of the former Rhodesian Army to destabilize Zimbabwe came to light in August 1982, when some former Rhodesian Army officers who had joined the 5th Reconnaissance Regiment of the sadf went on a sabotage mission inside Zimbabwe. They were ambushed by members of the zna and three of them were killed. The chief of the sadf, General Constand Viljoen, confirmed their affiliation with the sadf and identified them as Sergeant David Berry (formerly of the Rhodesian Special Air Service) and sergeants John Wessels and Robert Beech (both of the former Rhodesian Light Infantry).28 General Viljoen claimed that these people were in Zimbabwe on an “unauthorized mission,” but he assured countries in the region that, in the future, “personal emotions would have to be taken into consideration … before a soldier [would be] posted to a particular area.”29 For a long time, the possibility of South Africa’s involvement in the arms cache controversy (see chapter 3) was not considered. Later, it was suggested that, in 1980, South African agents in the new Zimbabwean cio might have encouraged the cache, only to tip off the government in an attempt to precipitate a civil war. Dumiso Dabengwa specifically mentions that the Rhodesian cio performed a most discredited role in the arms cache controversy.30 Table 4.2 shows some of the costs to Zimbabwe of South Africansupported destabilization. Throughout the period under study, Zimbabwe was conscious of its vulnerability to South Africa. This continued until the ascendancy of F.W. de Klerk finally reduced the degree of threat. During the period under study, Zimbabwe addressed the threat posed by South

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Table 4.2 Costs to Zimbabwe of South African-supported destabilization from 1980 to 1989 (at average annual exchange rates) us $

million

Additional freight costs Locomotive hire from South African Transport Services

824 25

Truck losses/costs

7

Fuel losses/pipeline costs

6

Sabotage (quantified)

91

Sabotage (estimated)

30

Refugee maintenance

8

Additional defence costs

1,853

Total

2,844

Source: Johnson and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism.

Africa in three basic ways: (1) by building a strong defence force, (2) by bringing any perceived threat from South Africa to the focus of international opinion, and (3) by pursuing a “compromised” policy with South Africa with regard to the liberation movements opposed to the republic. All these were employed equally. Apart from Angola – which had been engaged in a civil war for over a decade – Zimbabwe had the largest and best equipped military force among the Frontline States. As of 1985, the total number of those under arms in Zimbabwe was over forty thousand. Zimbabwe never hid the fact that its large army was a reaction to South Africa’s hegemony in the region. During the integration exercise, the desire to build a large force was linked to the threat of South Africa. Mugabe specifically said that the creation of an extra brigade was a reaction to this threat.31 While I do not suggest that Zimbabwe would not have maintained a well equipped army even if the South African threat had not existed, it must be conceded that South Africa’s destabilization policy necessitated the establishment of a large armed force as well as military expenditure on a scale that Zimbabwe would not likely have otherwise contemplated. The second major way that Zimbabwe responded to the South African threat was through its readiness to alert the world to it. Between Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 and the ascendancy of F.W. de Klerk as South Africa’s president, hardly any Zimbabwean

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official addressed the international community without using the phrase: “the fear of destabilization by South Africa.” In this way, Zimbabwe was able to keep the world aware of its peculiar disability vis-à-vis South Africa. Any warning from South Africa that Zimbabwe should stop “supporting dissidents or face the consequences” was always used by Zimbabwe to alert the world that South Africa was merely manufacturing a pretext to justify an attack. Zimbabwe’s third reaction to the South African threat was to pursue “compromised” diplomacy towards issues considered as core to South African security. Such issues included the provision of military bases for the anc and other military units opposed to South Africa. Given Pretoria’s warning to its neighbours about the consequences of providing military bases for the anc, Zimbabwe had learned to be careful. Upon gaining independence, Zimbabwe categorically stated that it would not provide military bases for any armed opposition against South Africa. The Mugabe government decided to limit commitment to the liberation cause to the fulfilment of its financial obligation to the oau Liberation Committee. This policy was reiterated on several occasions by key government officials. Mugabe himself bluntly stated that his country was “simply not strong enough to give bases … since there would be reprisal attacks from South Africa.” It would appear that the anc appreciated this peculiar problem under which Zimbabwe was operating as it never officially expressed any form of disappointment with regard to Zimbabwe’s stand on the issue. In short, Mugabe’s attitude towards South Africa was pragmatic. He was close but not friendly. He even cancelled a sporting link that had been a tradition between his country and South Africa since 1905.32 Zimbabwe’s relations with South Africa were intricate. For one thing, it is possible that Mugabe successfully realized some of his domestic security objectives with South Africa’s unwitting assistance. The “threat from South Africa” could, in some cases, have been used to justify actions that the government would have taken even if the threat had not existed. For example, one can argue that, even if South Africa had not been sensitive to the provision of military bases to the anc, Harare might still not have granted them. This is because Mugabe would have been apprehensive about the domestic security implications of such action. The presence of an armed force that was outside the command structure of the country’s army would have been a serious security risk, and it is not likely that

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Zimbabwe would have taken it. This would have been all the more difficult given (1) the ongoing military integration exercise and (2) the domestic tension engulfing Matabeleland. Another reason that Zimbabwe may not have easily provided military bases for the anc involves the ideological differences between zanu (the ruling party in Zimbabwe) and the anc of South Africa. zapu had cultivated very cordial relations with the anc – both of them being Soviet sponsored – while zanu was closer to pac.33 With the deepening of tensions between zanu and zapu, all the strings in the web of pre-independence external alliances came into play. The new government in Harare could have reasoned that, if anc guerrillas were provided with military bases inside Zimbabwe, they could join up with their old ally (zapu) to attempt to destabilize the country. Thus, even without the threat of reprisal attacks from South Africa, the provision of military bases for the anc would still have presented Harare with huge problems. The tremendous fortification of Zimbabwean security presents yet another example of what Mugabe may have done with or without the South African threat. While this was no doubt a response to South Africa’s threat, it was also effective insurance for the preservation of the authority of the incumbent government. As of 1984, Zimbabwe was committing 6.5 percent of its gross domestic income to defence, far above the 3.5 percent average for all developing nations. The same applied to other arms of domestic security. The Ministry of Home Affairs (which handles the police) had its budget increased by 37 percent between 1980 and 1981, and between 1983 and 1984, with the police budget itself rising by 35 percent during the same period. It was easier for Harare to justify this expenditure as a response to South Africa’s destabilization activities than as an attempt to shore up the incumbent government. Again, it is alleged that the “siege” situation under which South Africa put Zimbabwe was used to disallow the luxury of Zimbabwean opposition parties, which South Africa might have been able to exploit in order to foment trouble. It also provided the perfect excuse for the retention of emergency powers. In many respects, Zimbabwe used the threat of South Africa to justify its actions. Although it is acknowledged that a South African threat did indeed exist, it is equally acknowledged that this was exaggerated to justify the government’s self-serving actions.

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On the whole, Zimbabwe was able to develop a coherent policy that addressed all the constraints attending its relationship with South Africa. Elements of this policy include condemnation of apartheid and strong rhetorical support for the South African liberation movements, on the one hand, and practical co-existence with South Africa, on the other. This relationship subsequently deteriorated, but the Mugabe government never changed these features of its foreign policy. In June 1982, the Zimbabwean government broke off diplomatic relations with South Africa but kept open its trade mission in Johannesburg. The immediate reason that Zimbabwe gave for the rupture was that South Africa was using its mission in Harare to recruit Zimbabwean whites for the destabilization of Zimbabwe. However, a more important reason emerged in a later statement made by Mugabe, who said that his government would have “no political and diplomatic relations with South Africa until apartheid is eradicated.”34 Ten days later, South Africa’s foreign minister “Pik” Botha announced the withdrawal of his diplomats from Harare, and the diplomatic missions in the two countries were replaced by trade missions. The reason given for the diplomatic break appeared to be “ready-made,” waiting to be employed whenever the country considered itself prepared to take such a step. It is likely that, after Zimbabwe began to develop after independence, the country felt it was time to draw a clear distinction between economic dependence and political antipathy. At this point it is appropriate to comment on Zimbabwe’s seemingly contradictory position on the debate over the imposition of sanctions on South Africa. Zimbabwe had to take a position between what was desirable and what was feasible. The country had made it clear that it supported sanctions as the only non-violent way to make South Africa abandon apartheid; however, it also insisted that these sanctions had to be carried out by countries that had economic weapons they could use against South Africa – that is, they had to be carried out by the capitalist world, not by Zimbabwe.35 The controversy over sanctions had a domestic dimension. The white members of the Zimbabwean Parliament believed that, in order to avoid a counter-action from South Africa, Zimbabwe should not spearhead any call for sanctions against that country. This position was well articulated in their 23 July 1986 motion in Parliament.36 Information Minister Nathan Shamuyariya defended the government’s position, arguing that South Africa had already

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“embarked on sanctions against Zimbabwe” in the form of a higher tariff and the blocking of Mozambican routes.37 Another minister – Emmerson Mnangagwa – accused the white members who brought the issue to Parliament of deliberately causing mischief due to the timing of the motion.38 He believed that the white members brought it up at that particular time to give the impression that the country was divided on an issue that was affecting the future of the entire region.39 In the security sphere, it must be conceded that the ZimbabweanSouth African relationship also had many complexities, the details of which may not be known to those outside the top echelons of both governments. For example, it was believed that military contacts between both countries were taking place while politicians and media were at loggerheads. It was later confirmed that, in May 1984, Lieutenant General P.W. van der Westhuizen, the head the sadf military intelligence, visited Harare in plainclothes for talks with his Zimbabwean counterpart, Major General Vitalis Zvinavashe.40 In fact, Mugabe later confirmed in Parliament that permission was given to army and police commanders to meet their South African counterparts for discussions, either in Zimbabwe or in South Africa.41 Zimbabwe’s minister of state for defence, Emmerson Mnangagwa confirmed that there were routine meetings between local police and military commanders along the Limpopo River, which formed a common boundary between Zimbabwe and South Africa. Thus, although Harare banned all forms of political contact, with the press in both countries in perpetual conflict, security contacts between these two “enemies” carried on. However, with the attainment of black majority rule in South Africa, the relationship between Harare and Pretoria moved to a second phase. The Superficial Camaraderie Phase The moment South Africa attained majority rule, Mugabe realized that the monopoly Zimbabwe had enjoyed as the favourite Southern African country would soon come to an end. He also realized that a subtle rivalry would soon develop between his country and South Africa. This was also the thinking of most people in Zimbabwe. For example, an economist with the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, Mike Humphrey, noted even before the independence of South Africa: “Within the region, our major competitor is South

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Africa … The time we have got left until South Africa gets a settlement, we have got to use it to get our industries much more competitive and much more efficient.”42 For most of the first few years of black majority rule in South Africa, Mugabe maintained an outward posture of friendship while diplomatically getting ready for some form of inevitable clash between the two countries. There is also evidence to show that Mugabe was envious of the global admiration that the new president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, was receiving from across the world. In short, the moment black majority rule came to South Africa and the authorities in Harare were convinced that the apartheid era had gone for good, Mugabe and his government expected to see new security challenges, especially as a new country with greater claim to subregional leadership than Zimbabwe had now emerged. There were no serious security concerns between Zimbabwe and South Africa by the time of the latter’s independence. The period that F.W. de Klerk administered the country had created a gap between the extreme policies of the Botha administration and Mandela’s ascension to power. Consequently, all the key security problems that characterized the Botha era had been largely eliminated by the time de Klerk left office. Although there was still an explosion in Zimbabwe during the time of de Klerk’s leadership in South Africa, even Mugabe was cautious about putting the blame on South Africa. For its part, post-apartheid South Africa did not accord any special recognition to Zimbabwe immediately after the attainment of majority rule. Harare was treated like other neighbouring country with whom the new South Africa expected friendly relations. There was also no evidence that South Africa thought that Harare would want to contest regional hegemony with it. However, once the euphoria of majority rule in South Africa elapsed, the era of superficial camaraderie in Zimbabwe-South Africa relations also elapsed, and issues again focused on subregional politics. It was thus not surprising that, when the relationship between the two countries edged towards open hostility, the reason had to do with wider subregional issues. The Obvious Rivalry Phase The issue that brought out the obvious rivalry between Zimbabwe and South Africa concerned the former’s intervention in the drc

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under the auspices of the sadc. Although this is discussed at some length in the next chapter, the intervention, as it relates to the relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa, is relevant here. From the moment Zimbabwe decided to intervene, it realized that the only opposition that could carry any weight would come from South Africa. Mugabe’s strategy was to ensure that South Africa was in an uncomfortable position to criticize Zimbabwe over the drc, and this was the reason he intervened through the sadc. Although Mandela’s government was completely opposed to Mugabe’s policies in the drc, it did not want to come down forcefully on its neighbour. This was both to ensure that the facade of friendly and united regional policy was displayed to the outside world and also because to openly oppose Mugabe would have been too much as Zimbabwe was already showing serious signs of political and economic decline. What both countries did, however, was to reduce, at least superficially, the differences between them, even though it was obvious that these were becoming much more pronounced. This phase in relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa also affected their respective domestic situations, especially as it coincided with the land-seizure controversy in Zimbabwe. Realizing the growing differences between both countries, opposition parties in both used the farm seizures as an opportunity to attract sympathy. Members of the anc who had disagreements with the Mbeki administration used the opportunity to openly support the Mugabe landseizure policy while criticizing their own government for not doing the same, while the informal link between the mdc and the anc government was further strengthened thanks to the Mbeki administration’s not supporting a similar policy in South Africa. It is ironic that it was this that was to lead to the next phase in South AfricaZimbabwe relations. The Arbiter Phase By the time the domestic political situation in Zimbabwe attained the level of major subregional concern, South Africa had to come in as the only country that was acceptable to both the Mugabe administration and the opposition mdc. Consequently, President Thabo Mbeki led the effort to bring both sides together. While, as a good neighbour, South Africa was deeply interested in bringing political stability to Zimbabwe, it was also concerned about the implications

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of an unstable Zimbabwe. Already many Zimbabweans had moved into South Africa as illegal immigrants, and xenophobic sentiments had already begun to emerge. When the sadc asked Mbeki to try to bring Mugabe and his mdc opponent together to discuss the future of the country, the offer was welcomed. Mbeki succeeded in bringing the two sides together, and agreements were reached. Opinions are divided on how Mbeki handled Mugabe regarding the impasse in Zimbabwe. While most people agreed that Mbeki’s task was a particularly difficult one, the general opinion seems to be that he was too soft on Mugabe, thus endorsing the latter’s dictatorial rule. This did not give Mbeki much support, especially as it was speculated that he was inclined to support a fellow guerrilla leader (Mugabe) against a trade union representative that he (Mbeki) was also fighting back in South Africa. However, while Mbeki may have been fighting Mugabe with soft gloves, key South Africans were not so gentle in their criticism of Mugabe. The leader of the anc, who was also considered as president-in-waiting, Jacob Zuma, clearly criticized President Mugabe and his cabinet of inflicting hardship on their people. Apart from Zuma, other major critics included Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu, and the president’s brother Moeletsi Mbeki. Mandela, in fact, described the situation in Zimbabwe as a “failure of leadership.” Of all these people, however, Archbishop Desmond Tutu was perhaps the most critical of Mugabe, openly calling on the Zimbabwean president to resign – a call Mugabe dismissed as the ranting of a little bishop. It would appear that Mugabe exploited Mbeki’s goodwill considerably until, somewhat unexpectedly in September 2008, Mbeki had to leave office. However, while there can be very little doubt that Mbeki was soft on Mugabe, the context in which he conducted his efforts at mediation should be noted. First, he had to consider Mugabe’s regional and national reputation and, thus, could not deal with him as an ordinary ruler of little consequence. He also realized that Mugabe had considerable domestic support from the zna. Indeed, Mbeki made it clear that even members of the opposition told him that they still wanted Mugabe around as a stabilizing force for the military.43 Also, he had to contend with internal wrangling within both the zanu-pf and the mdc, the domestic political realities in Zimbabwe, and an international community that was hostile to Mugabe and expected Mbeki to come up with a solution to dealing with Mugabe’s excesses. Ironically, the support given by the international community to the

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mdc made things even more difficult for Mbeki. While he would have naturally wanted to be on the side of the West in calling for human rights and democracy, he also had to contend with a region that increasingly saw the mdc as a Western stooge. Mbeki thus had to strike an uneasy balance. While he realized that the balance of logic and fairness tilted towards the mdc, political realities and expediencies favoured zanu.44 Again, while popular support, even within South Africa, was against Mugabe, a victory for the mdc would have meant the end of a political party that had shared the liberation war experience with the anc. Mbeki could thus have sent a message across the region indicating that the era of the demystification of liberation war leaders had begun with the emergence of popular democracy. But, more important, Mbeki found himself torn between the desire for achieving Africa’s political and economic stability, for fighting imperialism but supporting pan-Africanism, and for respecting a new global order that encouraged democracy.45 But the politics of South Africa’s involvement in Zimbabwe’s affairs over the issue of land and the relationship between the ruling zanu party and the mdc was a complex one indeed. On the issue of land, it is believed that the South African government owed a debt of gratitude to Mugabe, the make-up of which was known only to the leadership of the anc and the Mugabe government. This is because Mugabe had wanted to come up with a major position on land much earlier than he did, especially given that Britain’s new Labour government reneged on the promise made by the Thatcher administration to support the land reform process. It was, however, said that he was restrained by the black leaders in South Africa who thought that any such step would frighten white South Africa into hanging on to power. Mugabe was said to have acquiesced and only moved against the whites after black majority rule had been safely consolidated in South Africa. This, in a way, also explains why President Mbeki was reluctant to condemn Mugabe’s excess. Another major security issue that tied Zimbabwe and South Africa together involved the arrest of seventy men, most of whom carried South African passports, who were accused of attempting to overthrow the government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea. The arrested people included Simon Mann, a former British sas officer. However, what brought the incident wider publicity was the inclusion of Mark Thatcher, the son of former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, in the plot. The

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men were arrested in Zimbabwe as they were apparently planning their attack on Malabo in order to overthrow Mbasogo. Although the arrest gave Mugabe the moral high ground in asserting that Britain was interested in overthrowing governments in Africa, there were a number of other fundamental issues. First, there were issues as to what the team could be charged with, especially as the government wanted to find offences other than misdemeanours under firearms control and immigration laws. Indeed, Foreign Minister Stanislaus Mudenge noted that Zimbabwe would seek the “severest punishment … including capital punishment.”46 Although Mark Thatcher was able to escape jail, others were sentenced to various jail terms. While Zimbabwe’s relationship with South Africa was complex, its relationship with Zambia was less difficult, even if equally controversial. zimbabwe ’ s relationship with zambia

Mugabe’s relations with Zambia between independence and the incorporation of the mdc into the Zimbabwean government had three phases: (1) the tactical ambiguity phase, which came between independence and the signing of the Unity Agreement with zapu in 1987; (2) the relatively harmonious phase, which came between the Unity Agreement and the farm seizures; and (3) the openly critical phase, which occurred between the farm seizures and the signing of the agreement with the mdc. The Tactical Ambiguity Phase As discussed in chapter 1, Zambia supported Joshua Nkomo’s zapu during the war of liberation. After independence, the relationship between Zimbabwe and Zambia was not particularly cordial. Some domestic issues that emerged shortly after independence might have led to this cold relationship. For example, Zambia was indicted by the Zimbabwean government for complicity in the arms cache controversy – as Mugabe specifically mentioned Zambia as the external link for the arms cache strategy – while Botswana figured prominently in the Matabeleland unrest. Both tangible and intangible evidence seem to support the contention that this was a “not too cordial” relationship. For example, while presidents Machel and Nyerere (of Mozambique and Tanzania, respectively) received their invitations to visit Zimbabwe shortly after independence, the invitation to President

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Kaunda of Zambia was belated. When at last he was invited, unlike with Machel and Nyerere, Matabeleland and other places where Nkomo had supporters were not included in his itinerary. It is not certain if this was by accident or by design, but it is worthy of note. The significance of this visit to Zimbabwe-Zambia relations was clearly stated when a Zimbabwean government spokesman said that the communiqué signed between the countries in January 1981 would usher in “a new era of cooperation between [them].”47 A defence protocol was signed between Zimbabwe and Zambia in January 1981, according to which all zapu war materials still in Zambia would be delivered directly to the Zimbabwean government. When at last Mugabe decided to visit Zambia – again somewhat belatedly – President Kaunda seized the opportunity to put the facts straight regarding the role he had played in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle. He said that Zambia had not supported the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe for the sake of one leader (apparently referring to Nkomo) but for all the people of the country. These gestures seemed to have satisfied Harare, and a cordial relationship emerged between the two countries. In fact, so cordial has this relationship been that President Kaunda was even said to have suggested a merger with Zimbabwe.48 Nothing has come of this, and it is likely that nothing will come of it, but it is worthy of note. There is, however, another framework within which Mugabe’s relations with Zambia could be considered. Since Zambia had shown a willingness to recognize the situation in Zimbabwe and was ready to formulate policies and take actions to ease the tension between the two countries, Zimbabwe did not, and in fact could not, exacerbate any tensions. This is because, apart from being a neighbour, Zambia accounted for 40 percent of Zimbabwe’s total electricity supply through the Kariba Dam. Besides, both Zimbabwe and Zambia had a common enemy (South Africa) towards whom they had an avowed repugnance. Thus, whatever role the colonial past might have played in Zimbabwe-Zambia relations, the South African threat factor brought both together into one fold. This became clear in May 1981, when both countries made a joint decision to launch a radio venture for an anti-apartheid broadcast to South Africa. The Reconciliatory Phase By the time the Mugabe government was able to get zapu to join a government of national unity, Mugabe realized that there was really

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no basis for Zimbabwe to be concerned about any major security challenge coming from Zambia. The strategy Mugabe adopted towards Zambia was typical of the attitude adopted towards countries that were close to zapu during the liberation war. Once he was convinced that the country had clearly shown that it recognized that zanu and Mugabe were in control of affairs in Zimbabwe, relations between the two eased. It was also during this era that Kaunda left office and was replaced by Frederick Chiluba, with whom Mugabe was able to develop a warm relationship. The Openly Critical Phase The relationship between Mugabe and the Zambian leadership changed when the political situation in Zimbabwe became a regional issue. During the period when the domestic security problem inside Zimbabwe involved farm seizures, Zambia did not take a stand. Possibly because Zambia realized the sensitivity of the problem, especially given the nature of the international reaction to Mugabe, it steered clear of the controversy. However, when the main security situation in Zimbabwe changed to the way President Mugabe was treating political opposition, Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa took a very tough stance, calling Zimbabwe a “regional embarrassment.” Mwanawasa also took his opposition to Mugabe to the African Union. Although obviously Mugabe would have preferred it had none of his neighbours taken a tough stance against him, he was not particularly worried about Zambia. He knew that as long as he had South Africa’s support, any other opposition in the region was not likely to have any serious impact. This aside, he realized that the Zambian leadership was not in any position to back up its criticism with any action that could be detrimental to Zimbabwean security. Another neighbour that had a similar, even if slightly more difficult, relationship with Mugabe was Botswana. zimbabwe ’ s relationship with botswana

In the case of Botswana, as in the case of Zambia, Mugabe’s security strategy had three phases: (1) the phase during which both sides suspected each other and the relationship was cold; (2) the phase during which there was a positive shift, and both countries put behind the animosity of the first phase; and (3) the phase during

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which both countries resumed their intense disagreement. Each of these brought with it security considerations for Mugabe. The Mutual Suspicion Phase While Zimbabwe’s relationship with Zambia never came to open confrontation, its relationship with Botswana, its southwest neighbour, was slightly more difficult. During the liberation war, Botswana appeared to support zapu more than it did zanu. At independence, as was the case with its attitude towards Zambia, Harare’s attitude towards Botswana was not as warm as was its attitude towards Tanzania and Mozambique. However, what complicated the issue in Botswana’s case was the fact that, while Zambia was ready to cooperate and to readjust its policy to suit the prevailing realities in Zimbabwe, Botswana continued with its “open-door” policy towards zapu. In fact, Botswana was alleged to have offered military bases at Pikwe for the “Super zapu.”49 The truth of the situation is difficult to ascertain. Botswana emphatically denied that it was providing military bases or any form of assistance to dissidents operating in Zimbabwe. What seems beyond dispute, however, is the fact that many zapu loyalists who fled Zimbabwe during the Matabeleland uprising became refugees in Botswana. In fact, the zapu leader himself, Joshua Nkomo, fled to Botswana before leaving for Britain. One cannot rule out the possibility that some of these refugees engaged in dissident activities against Zimbabwe. However, there is no concrete evidence that the Botswana government gave any official endorsement of the actions of these refugees. The refugee issue is one of the most recurrent in Botswana politics, and it was the one that brought the country into conflict with many of its neighbours. Because of its strategic location in the subregion, Botswana has had the misfortune of hosting refugees from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. This earned the country international recognition from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (unhcr). The standard conditions Botswana set for those under its refugee umbrella were: (1) they should not embark on any attack against their home state, (2) they should not abscond from their camps, and (3) they should respect Botswana laws. These conditions appear to be quite in order, but the Botswana police and army were incapable of enforcing strict compliance with these regulations. Thus, some refugees occasionally embarked on activities that contravened the conditions of their status. On many occasions

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they used Botswana to launch attacks on their home states. The result was that, besides the obvious economic implications of hosting refugees, there emerged for Botswana a security issue as the problems from which the refugees fled were visited on Botswana by their home countries. During the liberation war in Zimbabwe, Botswana served as a refugee camp for many Zimbabweans who had been displaced by the war. These people were repatriated after independence. However, when the dissident operation commenced in Matabeleland, Botswana gave asylum to many Zimbabweans who fled their country. All the Zimbabweans who went to Botswana during the renewed violence were lodged at the Dukwe camp, near Francistown in Eastern Botswana.50 Some of these were ex-zipra combatants and former members of the Muzorewa Auxiliary. It is very likely that it was while they were in this camp that they were infiltrated by South Africa and encouraged to form the Super-zapu, a group that caused considerable havoc in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe complained to Botswana that most of the refugees at the Dukwe camp were dissidents. Initially, Botswana denied these allegations, and the divergence of opinion over the status of the residents at the Dukwe camp marked the beginning of the tension between the two countries.51 This tension reached a critical level on 8 November 1983 when the zna penetrated a few kilometres into Botswana and entered the border town of Matengwe. The troops were accompanied by helicopters and spotter planes, whose purpose was to hit the bases of “dissidents” and “anti-government” guerrillas operating in Botswana.52 On 20 December 1983, a Zimbabwean soldier was shot dead by members of the Botswana army after he allegedly pursued dissidents about three kilometres inside Botswana. This resulted in an emergency meeting between the Zimbabwean and Botswana officials at Plumtree, Zimbabwe, on 22 December 1983. The issue was resolved amicably, and from then on it appeared that both sides were able to better understand one another’s positions on the issue. By the end of July 1984, Botswana had repatriated more than twelve hundred Zimbabweans from Dukwe camp. Of this number, about three hundred were said to be former zipra combatants.53 It seems clear from available evidence that Botswana was not interested in harbouring Zimbabwean dissidents. South Africa’s penetration of the refugee camps was not known to Botswana authorities. When this was confirmed, these people were repatriated. What the Botswana

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government seemed unready to accept was the Zimbabwean government’s claim that most of the people at the Dukwe camps were dissidents. In the end, it was proved that some were. Throughout the crisis, Mugabe treated the issue with considerable calm but not with levity. While the tension lasted, there was no strong criticism of the Botswana government. This was very unlike the type of attitude that characterized Zimbabwe’s relationship with South Africa. The Zimbabwean government seemed to believe that Botswana would not deliberately harbour known armed opposition groups against it. All it appears the Zimbabwean government wanted to do was to force Botswana to be more circumspect in its refugee policy. Mugabe described the entire issue as “a small problem.”54 He blamed South Africa for sponsoring the dissident movement that operated out of Botswana in order to create a hostile relationship between Zimbabwe and Botswana.55 The killing of the Zimbabwean soldier in Botswana noted above was the nadir in Botswana-Zimbabwe relations, and, afterwards, both Harare and Gaborone made conscious efforts towards reconciliation. Delegations led by Daniel Kwelagobe (Botswana’s minister of public service and information) and Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe’s security minister) met in what turned out to be a watershed in Botswana-Zimbabwe relations. Zimbabwe assured Botswana that the army and the air force would be under strict instructions not to violate the Botswana border, while Botswana, in turn, promised to close down the bases that harboured Zimbabwean dissidents. A list of dissidents was given to Botswana, and these people were subsequently repatriated to Zimbabwe. There was another interesting consideration involved in the repatriation episode. The post of the oau secretary-general became vacant in 1982, and Botswana’s minister for foreign affairs, Archie Mogwe, wanted to run for the seat. Part of the deal for the return of the dissident to Harare was that Zimbabwe would support Mogwe’s candidacy.56 Generally speaking, Mugabe was most concerned about Botswana during this phase for two reasons: (1) Botswana was believed to have gone further than Zambia in its alleged support for the zapu cause, especially given its alleged support for dissidents; and (2) unlike Zambia, which had a relatively weak economy, Botswana’s economy was one of the strongest in the region. Thus it was strategic for Zimbabwe to take any threat from Botswana seriously but to be quick to shift policies once Gaborone showed a willingness to change.

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The Relatively Harmonious Phase Just as in the case of Zambia and Zimbabwe, the tension between Botswana and Zimbabwe improved after it became clear that zapu was no longer a domestic security threat. The desire to ensure friendly relations with Gaborone was further enhanced by the fact that both countries were members of the sadc and of the Commonwealth (at least until Zimbabwe was suspended and later withdrew). Once the security problem emanating from the hosting of dissidents was removed, both countries explored ways of ensuring cordial relations, with many Zimbabweans travelling to and living in Botswana, which was one of the most economically viable countries in Southern Africa. But this relatively harmonious phase did not last long before tensions again emerged. As Alden and Ansseuw note, Botswana’s diplomacy became somewhat confused as the “forthright position of criticizing the demise of the rule of law” in Zimbabwe became less straightforward. In public, Botswana showed some sympathy for Mugabe over his policy on land reform, and it seemed to join other African countries in putting the blame on colonialism and the peculiar way it manifested itself in Zimbabwe. Indeed, Botswana joined South Africa in an attempt to remove Don Mckinnon, who was then known for his hard stance on Zimbabwe, as the Commonwealth’s secretary-general.57 Botswana also joined other sadc members in condemning the decision taken at the Abuja Summit, which endorsed Zimbabwe’s continued suspension.58 It would appear that what accounted for Botswana’s later-stage criticism of Mugabe was not his attitude towards land but, rather, his attitude towards domestic opposition. Indeed, at the beginning of the land controversy in Zimbabwe, the Botswana president noted: “Land reform needed to be done in Zimbabwe. But now it is just a question of doing the right thing in a wrong way … Even the good things that are coming out of Zimbabwe are overshadowed by the acts of lawlessness”59 By 2005, Botswana was particularly supportive of Zimbabwe in the international arena regarding the land issue, and Botswana’s president visited Mugabe in August 2006, at which time he praised Mugabe’s land distribution policies.60 Alden and Ansseuw believe that contributing to this surprising shift in position was “the emergence of a local reaction to events in Zimbabwe, tempered by the experience with Zimbabwean migrants and the influence of ideas from neighboring states.”61 Botswana also

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had to contend with migration. As is often the case, migrants were initially welcome, but, with an increase in their population, complaints began to emerge, especially regarding their working for lower wages than local Botswana people. Some of them were also accused of criminal activities. The Openly Critical Phase The last phase in the Zimbabwe-Botswana relationship came after the domestic situation inside Zimbabwe forced Botswana to take a position on the policies of the Mugabe government. Indeed, unlike any other country in the region, Botswana clearly stated that it was against what it saw as Mugabe’s dictatorial tendencies. The president of Botswana, though not openly supporting the mdc, was critical of Mugabe’s policies. It is also important to point out that Botswana had a stable democracy and found Mugabe’s sit-tight policy somewhat difficult to countenance. President Ian Khama declared openly that he would not recognize the 2008 election in Zimbabwe, claiming that the Mugabe regime was just “limping along and [that] there [was] a real danger that the whole thing could collapse.”62 President Khama was to maintain the same position when he sided with the winner of the Ivorian election, Allassane Quattara, and invited him to visit Botswana. Just as in the case with Zambia, so in the case with Botswana: Mugabe was disappointed and Zimbabwe angrily described the latter’s action as “extreme provocation” designed to “pick a quarrel with Zimbabwe.” Zimbabwe also accused Botswana of training a rebel army to help Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai overthrow Mugabe. A WikiLeaks report shows that Botswana actually took Mugabe’s objection to its criticism seriously and that the country actually sought weapons from the United States in order to prepare for possible war with Zimbabwe. The Botswana Defence Forces deputy chief, Major General Tlhokwane, met defence officials at the American embassy in Gaborone in July 2008 to request arms, including antitank missiles, helicopter gunships, and short-range air defence systems. This request was, however, turned down in order to prevent an arms race in the region. Generally speaking, Mugabe knew that nothing serious could come out of Botswana’s diplomatic condemnation of his action, especially as the country was not a time-tested friend, as was Mozambique.

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zimbabwe ’ s relationship with mozambique

Between independence and 2009, Zimbabwe’s security relationship with Mozambique was very important. Although a major aspect of the relationship between the two countries is discussed in the next chapter, I note here that the relationship had two phases: (1) one in which the two countries openly displayed a friendship that bordered on an alliance and (2) one that saw Mozambique maintain a respectable distance from Zimbabwe. Phase One: The Era of Boisterous Camaraderie As I discuss in chapter 1, Mozambique was Mugabe’s strongest regional supporter during Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. Consequently, after independence Mugabe was favourably disposed towards Maputo and suspected no threat from Mozambique. However, what made the relationship even more cordial was the common threat the two countries faced in the Rhodesian-formed and Mozambican-based dissident movement renamo. As a demonstration of its friendship, Zimbabwe named one of Harare’s major streets after Mozambique’s former president Samora Machel. By the time the political situation in Zimbabwe became tense and the country had become engaged in a controversial intervention in the drc, Mozambique saw the need to adjust its policy towards its western neighbour. Phase Two: The Period of Intentional Indifference Once the domestic situation in Zimbabwe became difficult, Mozambique’s policy towards Harare became somewhat cautious. While Maputo was never at any time openly critical of Mugabe, it did not support him while he was being criticized for his domestic and subregional policies. Having come out of a bitter civil war that had its origin in its involvement in the war in a neighbouring country, Mozambique saw the need for some form of caution with regard to Zimbabwe. Apart from this, Mozambique was already winning accolades for sustaining its democracy and good governance. Indeed, its former president was later to win the coveted Mo Ibrahim Award for good governance. To now be seen openly fraternizing with a government whose credentials were questionable was seen as not

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being in line with Mozambique’s growing democratic reputation. At the same time, however, it did not want to join Mugabe’s growing list of critics. Mugabe might have been slightly disappointed with Mozambique for not showing greater support while his domestic policies were being criticized. Specifically, there was no support for Mugabe’s farm invasion policy. However, it would appear that, since Joaquim Chissano left office in 2005 as Mozambican president, the crop of leaders with whom Mugabe had fraternized during his war of liberation days had left the Mozambican leadership coterie, and another set, less inclined to celebrate the heroic past, had assumed power in Maputo. Although, historically, both Mozambique and Zimbabwe have been close, and independent Zimbabwe’s relatively strong economy had endeared Harare to Maputo, there has been a reduction in Zimbabwe’s influence over Mozambique since the end of apartheid and South African independence. Maputo seemed to have realized that a more powerful country, which could be of more economic benefit to Mozambique than Zimbabwe, had emerged and had to be shown more consideration than the latter. From this moment, Mozambique began to subtly criticize those of Zimbabwe’s policies that were considered unacceptable to Maputo. The fact that Mozambique’s economy improved immediately after South African independence further confirmed Maputo’s subtle shift in allegiance. The first expression of open disagreement between Mozambique and Zimbabwe on the issue of security came with Mugabe’s controversial intervention in the drc in 1998 under the auspices of the sadc. Mozambique felt that the intervention was illegal and inappropriate, and the country joined South Africa in calling for the removal of Mugabe from key positions in the security protocol of the sadc. While, of course, Mugabe would have interpreted Mozambique’s position as indicating a new low in their relationship, he was, nevertheless, willing to go ahead, especially as he would have realized that Maputo was not likely to go any further in its objection to his intervention. Another issue that created subtle concerns involved the treatment of Zimbabweans on the Mozambican border. Because of the downward plunge in the Zimbabwean economy, the historical migration of Mozambicans to Zimbabwe had, by 2003, reversed, with Zimbabweans now going into Mozambique in

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search of a better life. Many of these people complained of being treated harshly by Mozambican immigration officials.63 Mozambique’s position on the controversy over land in Zimbabwe was complex. Again, like most Southern African countries, Mozambique appreciated the complicated nature of Zimbabwe’s problem over land and believed that Mugabe had no choice but to make fundamental decisions about its acquisition. However, the situation again turned out to benefit Mozambique as it openly welcomed whites who left Zimbabwe and, indeed, offered them land, especially in Manicaland. conclusion

In this chapter I show that Zimbabwe’s immediate neighbours had inextricable links with its security even before independence, and Mugabe gauged his perception of the degree of threat from these countries according to how his past alliances with them might determine his present relationships. For their part, Zimbabwe’s immediate neighbours struck a policy balance that took into account internal developments within Zimbabwe, respect for sovereignty, the protection of their borders, and the desire to appear outwardly friendly despite internal concerns. However, while issues in the relationships between Zimbabwe and some of its immediate neighbours were handled without much recourse to military engagements, Mugabe intervened militarily in the affairs of two of his neighbours – Mozambique and the drc. The politics and diplomacy of these involvements are the topic of the next chapter.

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Mugabe and the Politics of External Military Engagement

Undoubtedly, one of the most controversial security issues in postindependence Zimbabwe was the country’s involvement in the civil wars fought in its immediate environs. More than fifteen of the first twenty-eight years after independence saw Zimbabwe’s physical presence in civil wars in two countries: first in Mozambique, where, between 1980 and 1983, Zimbabwe was involved in the war between the rebel group Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (renamo) and the central government under the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (frelimo); and second in the Democratic Republic of Congo, between 1998 and 2001,1 where there was a multidimensional civil war that saw as many internal participants as it did external sponsors.2 Although by 2008 Zimbabwe’s interventions in both wars had ended, the consequences continued to affect not only the country’s security calculations but also its national economy. The politics of this involvement highlights key aspects of Robert Mugabe’s security strategy in Zimbabwe and the region. This chapter carefully examines these two external engagements, situating the discussion within both national and regional politics. I specifically look at the reasons (both declared and implied) for the interventions, the activities of Zimbabwean defence forces during the course of their interventions, and the outcomes of the two engagements. I also look at the reactions – domestic and external – to the intervention and how the government in Harare responded to these. My central argument is that the two engagements, despite the gaps in their occurrence and the apparent difference in their objectives, fit into Mugabe’s strategic desires. Indeed, while not denying the importance of national security considerations, I argue that both

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engagements were also influenced by domestic considerations, including the desire to suppress growing opposition in parts of the country (in the case of the Mozambican intervention) and the expectation of deriving personal financial gains for political and military elites (in the case of the drc intervention). Finally, I contend that the involvement in both cases further fuelled the emergence of a military-economic complex that developed around the elites of the ruling zanu-pf, with tentacles spreading to every aspect of the Zimbabwean economy. military engagement in mozambique

Not long after its independence, a bitter civil war broke out in Mozambique between the government and the renamo rebels. A lot has been written about this war, and there is no point in my going into any details.3 Suffice it to say that the war emerged out of Mozambique’s war of liberation and was exploited by the apartheid regime in South Africa and the minority regime in Rhodesia to destabilize Mozambique and to prevent it from supporting liberation causes in South Africa and Rhodesia. At its peak, the war was rated as one of the most brutal in post-independence Africa, with the rebel movement perpetrating some of the most heinous crimes against civilians in Mozambique and disrupting vital economic activities both locally and in neighbouring countries, especially Zimbabwe. Before going into the reasons for Zimbabwe’s intervention in Mozambique, it is necessary to explain the Zimbabwean connection to the birth of renamo. This organization was formed by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization, which was then under Ken Flower, to serve as a fifth column inside Mozambique – specifically to destabilize and sabotage the activities of the frelimo government and its support for Zimbabwean liberation. It was also thought that renamo would be able to spy on the zanla guerrillas then operating against the Rhodesian minority regime from Mozambique. Thus, throughout the life of the minority regime in Rhodesia, the government supported and sustained renamo in its destabilization of Mozambique and its espionage work with regard to zanla. When the minority regime in Rhodesia collapsed, renamo came under South African control, and it was during this time that it proved particularly relevant to Pretoria’s design to destabilize the countries in the region.4 By the time renamo became fully active

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as a regional destabilization tool, Ken Flower himself had begun to wonder whether his organization had not created a “monster that was beyond control.”5 In one of the ironic twists of Southern African politics, independent Zimbabwe became a target of the “monster” its predecessor (Rhodesia) had created. renamo became a security problem to Zimbabwe in three ways. The first arose out of the refugee problems created by the war. This started almost immediately after renamo began its operations inside Mozambique, but it was not until much later that the gravity of the situation dawned on Zimbabwe, when the number of refugees became difficult for the country to manage. Mozambican refugees found it relatively easy to enter and settle in Zimbabwe as the vicissitudes of colonial division meant that those who lived on the borders of the two countries shared a language and culture. The second security problem renamo created for Zimbabwe arose out of the organization’s operations against Mozambican economic targets relevant to the Zimbabwean economy. From 1982, renamo started destroying all the major economic links between Mozambique and landlocked Zimbabwe. Most affected were the Beira and the Maputo ports in Mozambique, which lead to the Zimbabwean border town of Mutare. These links served as the fulcrum of the Zimbabwean economy. For example, the pipelines that carry oil to Zimbabwe originate in Beira and pass through the Zimbabwean border town of Mutare. renamo attacks on the port of Beira started in 1984 and continued throughout the organization’s existence, resulting in enormous loss of fuel for Zimbabwe (See Table 5.1). As I show later, the protection of this route was a major reason for the zna’s involvement in Mozambique. In 1985, Prime Minister Mugabe made clear his government’s intention to protect these routes: “Whatever it costs us to safeguard those routes is money well spent. If those routes cease to function … the alternative is for us to divert our goods through South Africa. And the alternative we cannot countenance. And so we are committed to defending those routes.”6 Apart from these direct economic consequences, there were less quantifiable economic consequences of renamo attacks on Zimbabwe. For example, most of the farmers operating along the border with Mozambique were forced to abandon their farmlands in search of safety. This automatically caused a reduction in

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5

2

4

24

16

51

Year

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

Total

11,026,495

2,846,669

5,226,797

1,141,232

1,235,739

576,058

Diesel in Litres

2,986,743

731,613.44

1,404,130.97

224,968.60

444,058.76

181,972.24

Value in Z$

7,251,976

1,193,609

3,906,889

1,922,333

Nil

229,145

Petrol in Litres

Source: Martins and Johnson, South Africa and Its Neighbours, 9.

Number of Sabotage

Table 5.1 Fuel losses through renamo sabotage, 1984–88

1,700,312.89

348,614.92

873,229.49

414,431.62

Nil

64,036.86

Value in Z$

616,732

562,234

54,498

Nil

Nil

Nil

Jet A-1 Litres

168,520.19

155,754.58

12,765.61

Nil

Nil

Nil

Value in Z$

4,855,576.90

1,235,982.94

2,290,126.07

639,400.22

444,058.76

246,009.10

Total Value Z$

2,524,899.90

642,710.64

1,190,865.50

332,488.11

230,910.55

127,924.73

Total Value US$

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Zimbabwe’s food production capacity and imposed further damage on the economy. In addition, most of the national parks along the border with Mozambique, which generated revenue for the country, had to be closed down for security reasons. The impacts of renamo’s economic sabotage become clearer when we consider that Zimbabwe’s cardinal foreign policy objective was to reduce and ultimately eliminate all forms of dependence on apartheid South Africa. Being landlocked, reducing dependence involved Zimbabwe’s use of Mozambican ports for the transportation of its goods. This option was jeopardized by renamo. Before Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia in 1976, its railway and ports handled 90 percent of Rhodesian trade. This was reduced to nothing with the border closure. But the borders were reopened with Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, and three years later, Mozambique accounted for 53 percent of Zimbabwean transportation. However, by 1987, the direct traffic to Mozambican ports had fallen to 8.7 percent as a result of renamo activities. The forced dependence on South Africa, caused by renamo activities, generated enormous financial problems. For example, the use of the Maputo port through Chicualacuala in preference to Durban would have saved Zimbabwe Z$100 million a year in reduced freight costs.7 The third security problem renamo created for Zimbabwe relates to the organization’s attack on individual Zimbabweans. There were cases of looting, kidnapping, killing, rape, and mutilation. Zimbabweans were looted in order to obtain commodities needed by renamo in Mozambique, while they were kidnapped to be used as forced labour.8 Although it was initially thought that attacks on Zimbabwean civilians began when Harare committed troops to support Mozambique’s leadership against renamo, it was later shown that they had started long before this and only escalated after Zimbabwean troops became involved.9 After 1987, it became official renamo policy to attack Zimbabwean civilians. Those most affected were those living in such border towns as Chiredzi, Chipinge, Chimanimani, and Mudzi. The operations were conducted mainly at night, when dissidents, operating in units of between ten and twenty, attacked villages and disappeared before dawn.10 It is difficult to determine the exact number of those who fell victim to renamo operations, but Zimbabwean authorities estimated that some sort of renamo incident occurred every second day.11 Before considering

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how the Zimbabwean government reacted to renamo activities, it is necessary to discuss why renamo decided to attack Zimbabwe. It is believed that renamo’s first incursion into Zimbabwe took place in June 1987, when it invaded Rushinga district and captured seventy Zimbabwean civilians, twenty-nine of whom were later found dead. Harare immediately set up a joint operation council in Rushinga. At this stage, the Zimbabwean government was not that bothered, with the minister of home affairs assuring the population that the situation was completely under control. Later, the government used this incursion as a reason to renew a state of emergency. renamo’s activities increased, and between June 1987 and April 1989 alone, the organization killed 335 civilians and wounded 280. It also abducted 667, of which 446 were still missing mid-1989.12 During the same period, Zimbabwe lost twenty-two soldiers and killed twenty-nine renamo dissidents.13 There seem to be three interrelated reasons why renamo launched an all-out attack on Zimbabwe: (1) the desire to express anger at its expulsion from Zimbabwe after independence; (2) South Africa’s instruction to attack economic installations that could adversely affect the economy of the sadcc in general and Zimbabwe in particular; and (3), the declared reason, Zimbabwe’s decision to get militarily involved on the side of the frelimo government against renamo. It is difficult to tell when each of these became a reason in renamo’s calculation. Indeed, given that the “official declaration of war” against Zimbabwe came long after the country had become a target of renamo activities, it is possible that renamo attacked Zimbabwean interests before looking for particular reasons to do so. The reactions of the Mugabe government to the problems created by renamo were three-pronged: (1) the extension of an invitation to international agencies to assist in the support of the refugees created by renamo activities, (2) direct military involvement, and (3) economic assistance to aid Mozambicans affected by the crisis. The seeking of international assistance to solve the refugee problem was the easiest response option. Initially, there were some difficulties in the management of the Mozambican refugees, and the Zimbabwean government decided to repatriate these people, whom it described as “aliens.” The Zimbabwean minister for home affairs, Dr Simbi Mubako, said that the refugees would be deported in order to “control [the outbreak of diseases and [to] maintain [the] standard of living for Zimbabweans already overstretched by the food crisis.”14

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However, Area District Administrator Kanyan doubted the efficacy and wisdom of the repatriation: “The method of repatriation is a theory that does not hold water. Take them to the border post and in two weeks time you will see them back.”15 Kanyan’s position succinctly explains Zimbabwe’s dilemma in handling the refugee crisis. In 1983, Harare invited the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (unhcr) to assist in taking care of the renamo refugees in Zimbabwe, and, in 1984, the unhcr established four camps in Zimbabwe to cater for the Mozambican refugees in Manicaland and Mashonaland east. By the end of 1984, 12,187 of the estimated 45,000 Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe had moved into the camps.16 By mid-1986, the figures had doubled, and, by April 1990, there were an estimated 83,000 Mozambican refugees in the unhcr camps in Zimbabwe.17 These may be broken down as follows: Manicaland had 40,000 refugees in the Tongogara Camp and 14,000 in the Nyagambe Camp; Mashonaland had 26,000 refugees in the Mazoe Camp and 3,000 in the Nyamakati Camp.8 The government further encouraged other international and indigenous voluntary organizations, like Save the Children and World Vision, to assist in taking care of the Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s relationship with the refugees at the unhcr camps, however, encountered problems when it was alleged – with some justification – that some of the people in the camps were, in fact, renamo dissidents disguised as refugees. This led to the slogan “Refugee by day, renamo by night.” The Zimbabwean government believed that some renamo raids carried out at night were in fact carried out by the refugees from the camps. This charge was denied by the unhcr office in Harare, which claimed that it screened all those accepted as refugees.19 The truth of the matter is difficult to determine, but it is possible that some of those at the camps had questionable identities. In a fluid situation in which more than sixty thousand people are being screened, such mix-ups are unavoidable. To prevent any further infiltration, the Zimbabwean cio became very active in the refugee camps.20 Partly as a result of this, the Mugabe administration decided to take drastic measures against Mozambican refugees in 1987. More than ten thousand refugees, virtually all coming from the unhcr camps, were repatriated to Mozambique, in the process of which fifteen of them died.21 By 1990, however, the problem between the government and the refugees had been resolved, with the Mozambican

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refugees in Zimbabwe having been settled in camps where, apart from receiving the support of international agencies, they became beneficiaries of the sophisticated Zimbabwean social service, which assisted the needy without questioning their national origin. But another problem similar to the refugee problem emerged shortly afterwards. Many renamo sympathizers crossed the border into Zimbabwe without settling in the refugee camps. They were unknowingly employed by prosperous farmers (mostly whites) as labourers and gardeners on their estates. The strategy of these dissidents was to gain employment, abscond, and come back later, armed with their knowledge of the farms, to loot and cause carnage. For security reasons, Harare was thus forced to warn farmers in these areas to stop employing Mozambicans. This proved ineffective because white farmers alleged that black Zimbabweans were not interested in the tea and coffee planting business. This was denied by Zimbabwean agricultural officials, who alleged that the white farmers sought cheap labour and that, since they were prepared to work for nothing other than food, Mozambicans were preferred. In any case, farmers became more circumspect in their employment of Mozambican migrant labourers. Zimbabwe’s second response to the problem caused by renamo was the creation, in April 1986, of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique Friendship Association (zimofa). This was an economic assistance program through which the zna and civilians contributed economic aid to assist Mozambican victims of renamo activities. The campaign started after Zimbabwean troops reported the impact of hunger on Mozambican civilians in the regions they patrolled. The government publicized and supported the program, and a lieutenant colonel in the zna, Clement Gava, was made the chairman. Within three months of the formation of zimofa, Zimbabweans, with remarkable enthusiasm, contributed more than us$40,000 to the scheme. Many Zimbabweans had been touched by the gesture of the Mozambicans during Zimbabwe’s war of liberation, when, monthly, they contributed a day’s wage towards the liberation of Zimbabwe. At the first zimofa launching, the Samora Machel Scholarship was inaugurated to offset tuition and boarding fees for Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwean schools.22 zimofa also coordinates support from other organizations both inside and outside Zimbabwe for the sustenance of Mozambicans. This collaboration proved very successful, and, in 1987, the Commercial Grains Producers Association, a

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mostly white organization representing large-scale farmers, donated a Z$30,000 truckload of corn to Mozambique.23 Interestingly enough, it is speculated that the generosity of most of these local entrepreneurs towards Mozambicans had hidden motives. It was said that the white farmers coupled their gifts with an appeal to international donors to buy food from them for hungry Mozambicans. It was also speculated that most of the donors were intent on ingratiating themselves with a Mozambican government that was fast opening up to private foreign investment. Many Zimbabwean businesspeople allegedly wanted to explore the Mozambican market. The risks were quite high, but, as a Zimbabwean businessman was quoted as saying, “the guy who gets in while the bullets are flying will make the bundle.”24 Zimbabwe was later to put this lesson to use during its intervention in the drc. Of all the methods employed by the Zimbabwean government in dealing with the renamo problem, the military dimension was by far the most prominent and controversial. Indeed, not many people were as aware of the economic and financial involvement as they were of the military involvement. The zna first got into the conflict in 1983, with the basic aim of protecting the economic routes from Mozambique to Zimbabwe, especially the Beira corridor. About a thousand troops were sent, and these increased to about three thousand in 1984. By 1986, Zimbabwe’s military commitment had become extensive as troops committed to the campaign increased to about twelve thousand. Rather than merely protecting the trade routes, the zna got involved in a full-scale war with renamo, alongside the Mozambican army. It is not exactly clear why Zimbabwe changed its policy, but it could be for either or both of two reasons. First, it could be that Zimbabwe felt that route protection would have to be permanent to be effective, and, coupled with its belief in its newly formed army, it might have decided to uproot renamo once and for all. Second, it could be that there had been renewed calls for assistance from the Mozambican government urging Zimbabwe to transform its involvement from defensive to offensive. Once Zimbabwe’s involvement increased, however, Mugabe gave assurance of his commitment, both in terms of his appreciation of Mozambique’s support during Zimbabwe’s liberation war and of his refusal to succumb to pressure from South Africa. For example, during the rally to commemorate the death of the Mozambican president Samora Machel, Mugabe said:

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In as much as they [the people of Mozambique] made our national struggle for liberation their own so shall we make their struggle for consolidation of their independence our own … [I]n no case shall Zimbabwe allow the mnr [renamo] to take full control of Mozambique. The defence of Zimbabwe’s sovereignty is the defence of Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, for if the present Mozambican Government’s sovereignty is anyway overthrown so shall our own.25 There was, however, a belief that there were divisions, both within the cabinet and among the top echelon of the military, regarding the extent to which Zimbabwe should go in its military commitment to Mozambique. While no member of the cabinet actually opposed military assistance, some, including Deputy Prime Minister Simeon Muzenda and Security Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, disapproved of a situation in which Zimbabwe would have to inherit Mozambique’s security problems. They were also believed to have become impatient with the weakness of the Mozambican military. As for the Zimbabwean military, both the army and the air force commanders were believed to have had subtle disagreements with the situation. Army Commander Solomon Mujuru supported a deep involvement, while Air Force Commander Josiah Tungamirai suggested the need for caution.26 The joint military offensive against renamo achieved reasonable success but fell short of completely defeating the movement. The turning point in the involvement came in 1985, when a former Rhodesian cio officer acquainted with renamo operations led a paratrooper unit of the zna in an assault that captured the renamo headquarters of Casa Banana.27 With the cio’s assistance in the capture of Casa Banana, it may be said that something “positive” came out of its remaining in Zimbabwe after independence. Some of the Mozambican towns that had fallen under renamo control were also recaptured and brought under central control. These included Sena, Mutara, Vila Nova, Bade, and Vilacara.28 The joint operation also succeeded, to a large extent, in protecting the oil pipeline from Beira to Mutare and the rail line from Maputo to Chicualacuala.29 A number of other trade routes that had not been put to effective use because of renamo activities were also reactivated. To enhance the performance of the Mozambican troops in the war, the Zimbabwean government coordinated an arrangement

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through which the British advisory team that was retraining the zna also trained Mozambican troops. This scheme started in February 1986, and the initial training took place at the Battalion Battle School in Nyanga, northern Zimbabwe. The initial set consisted of sixty junior officers. By May 1987, annual intake had reached 360, and by the second half of 1991, an entire brigade, including 134 officers, had been trained.30 Apart from this, the zna also started running courses at Nyamapanda Training Centre in the Sofala province of Mozambique. In 1987, the Tanzanian army got involved in the combined military operation, alongside the Zimbabweans and the Mozambicans, against renamo. When the Tanzanians first arrived, it was said that they would stay only six months, but they ended up staying about two years. While in Mozambique, they were deployed to the north to protect the Nacala railway line. The British government gave the Tanzanian contingent £500,000 for transport and communication equipment.31 Although this effort did not defeat renamo, it went down in African military history as the first time that three national armies worked together without problems. zna operations in Mozambique, however, did face problems that affected the chance of effectively defeating renamo. One of these related to the fact that the zna was a conventional force fighting a largely guerrilla army. It was ironic that the zna, itself largely comprised of former guerrillas who had only recently transformed themselves into conventional fighters, found itself at a disadvantage operating against guerrilla forces. This resulted in counter-insurgency later being incorporated into Zimbabwean military training.32 A second problem had to do with boredom. It was reported that many of the soldiers got bored due to sustained absence from home. The London Observer quoted a zna soldier as saying: “I fought for the liberation of my country [that is understandable] now I have to fight for Mozambique, but what for?”33 This was compounded by the reports many of them heard about the attitude of their landlords at home. Their absence from home had resulted in a situation in which many of them had fallen behind in their rent payments, and landlords were beginning to threaten their families with eviction. This no doubt adversely affected the morale of the soldiers and thus reduced their commitment to the war against renamo.34 Finally, a scandal emerged over the activities of zna officers inside Mozambique. It was alleged that many top zna officers who had

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participated in the Mozambican operation had taken part in extensive smuggling and poaching.35 Although both the zna and the Mozambican forces worked together without any open friction, there was some tension between them. For example, the zna tended to look down on the Mozambican National Army because not only was it ill-equipped and unable to contribute much to the Zimbabwean offensive against renamo but it was also unable to hold on to the military gains made by the Zimbabwean contingent. Thus, some of the towns and camps captured by the zna were recaptured by renamo. One such was the Casa Banana camp. This weakness on the part of the Mozambican forces is said to have exhausted the goodwill of the Zimbabwean contingent. When the zna was called in once more to assist in the recapture of the Casa Banana camp, the request was turned down.36 It was also reported that some members of the Mozambican force were, for whatever reason, soft on renamo dissidents. Paul Moorcraft records a “frequently told, if possibly apocryphal story” of a zna officer who captured the same renamo prisoner on two successive days. The disconcerted Zimbabwean was later told that the frelimo soldier to whom the prisoners were handed was their uncle!37 At one stage, it was believed that members of the zna operating in Mozambique began placing personal safety before their commitment to the war and so started moving in convoys. Zimbabwe’s military involvement in Mozambique was later to become a controversial foreign policy problem, which many people viewed as “Zimbabwe’s Vietnam.” At one stage, the war in Mozambique was costing the Zimbabwean government about us$60 million annually.38 As would be expected, Zimbabwe suffered military casualties. The exact figures were never released, for obvious security reasons, but both Mugabe and the minister of defence maintained that the figures were not significant.39 Also accounting for Zimbabwe’s decision to fight renamo was the government’s perception of the latter’s activities and the wider geo-strategic considerations that underlined them. Harare saw renamo as a part of South Africa’s wider coalition to destabilize Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Thus, it was considered advisable to join forces with the Mozambican troops to destroy renamo once and for all. Minister of Political Affairs Maurice Nyagumbo, a powerful member of the zanu Central Committee, said: “Once the Mozambican regime falls, we will be the next. We will be attacked

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by the same dissidents.”40 As already noted, the survival of the frelimo government in Mozambique was of vital importance to the Zimbabwean government. The inability of Samora Machel to contain renamo dissidents thus obliged Zimbabwe to send in reinforcements. In its perception of Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war against renamo, Harare tended to de-emphasized its involvement in the formation of renamo. More often than not, that involvement was portrayed as a benevolent gesture to assist a neighbour and friend in trouble and an attempt to safeguard mutual trade routes. There were few references to the fact that renamo was a creation of the Zimbabwean liberation war. In fact, on one occasion, Zimbabwean minister of defence, Enos Nkala, said that, as soon as Mozambican forces were able to carry on with the war, the Zimbabwean contingent would pull out. This raises the following question: if the Zimbabwean trade routes had not been threatened and the Mozambicans had not requested help, would Zimbabwe have helped Mozambique in any case simply because renamo was, in a way, Zimbabwe’s creation? One of the very few occasions when this line of thought was expressed occurred when Colonel Gava, the chairman of zimofa, addressed an aid ceremony in January 1987. He clearly pointed out that renamo was the result of Mozambique’s support of Zimbabwe during the latter’s war of liberation. He concluded that it would have been a “social sin” had Zimbabwe not assisted Mozambique in its fight against renamo.41 No other policy maker in Zimbabwe was as blunt on this issue as was Gava. This invariably leads to a consideration of how Mozambicans see Zimbabwe’s involvement in their war against renamo. From available evidence, it seems certain that the government of Mozambique was appreciative of Zimbabwe’s financial and military assistance. This is evident in all the public statements made by the government in Maputo.42 However, a school of thought later emerged among Mozambicans who were highly critical of Harare’s involvement in their war against renamo. Their criticism had more to do with political sentiment than military considerations. They were convinced that the Zimbabwean leadership encouraged the Mozambican leadership to be intransigent with regard to opening a dialogue with renamo. These critics believed that the only solution to the renamo problem involved a dialogue with the government and an effort towards establishing a multi-party government in Mozambique. This, they argued,

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was being blocked by Harare’s advice to Maputo. And they were aggravated by the fact that Zimbabwe, which was encouraging Mozambicans to insist on a one-party state, was itself not practising one-party rule. Finally, these people were said to be quick in their recollection that renamo had been created by Zimbabwe’s liberation war.43 Zimbabwe’s involvement in Mozambique was therefore seen as a double-edged sword. However, if Zimbabwe’s involvement in Mozambique generated controversies, its subsequent involvement in the drc generated far greater ones. military engagement in the democratic republic of congo

Even before the deposition and subsequent death of its despotic ruler, Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire (later to be renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo) showed every sign of a country on the verge of collapse. The economy was weak, the military incompetent, and the extensive border shared with many other countries made it vulnerable to the consequences of any political instability within them. The ultimate end came for the regime when, after the infamous genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (rpf) and its Ugandan allies supported a rebellion organized by Laurent Kabila to remove the government of the ailing President Mobutu. It was, however, not long before the alliance that had brought Kabila to power fell to pieces, with the new leader falling out with his Ugandan and Rwandan sponsors, and with the two sponsors having major disagreements over policies to be adopted in the drc. The immediate antecedent to Zimbabwe’s intervention was a call that President Laurent Kabila made to the sadc to ask for its assistance in defending his government against attacks from Uganda and Rwanda. The drc, which by then had only just joined the sadc, appealed to the organization’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security during its Victoria Falls meeting of August 1998 for assistance, specifically to end the rebellion of the Rally for Congolese Democracy and the invasion by Uganda and Rwanda. The call was made under Article 5(3) of the sadc Protocol. As soon as the organization received the request, it set up a committee of foreign ministers from Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to launch an investigation into the matter. The details of these are discussed in chapter 7, but three members of the sadc – Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe – intervened in the war on the side of the Kabila government.

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Several studies discuss the motives of the countries that intervened in the drc war. Here, I focus on Zimbabwe’s motives. Although Harare has always given its main motivation for intervening in the drc as the need to protect a weak country from ambitious neighbours, a number of more important reasons have been uncovered. These come under two main umbrellas: political and economic. The main political reason for Harare’s involvement had to do with the determination of the Mugabe administration to demystify the reputation being attributed to both President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda as the new African leaders around whom the future pattern of leadership on the continent would be woven.44 Mugabe particularly wanted to ensure this because he, too, had for some time held such a position. On the economic front, Gerard Prunier identifies a number of considerations. First is the fact that of all the countries that intervened in the war, Zimbabwe was the most disadvantaged economically as it had neither the oil wealth of Angola nor the mineral resources of Namibia. Furthermore, unlike these other countries, there were no security considerations underlining Zimbabwe’s need to intervene in the drc. Two main motivations have, however, been identified. First, Zimbabwe had invested a lot of money in the conflict – allegedly up to $200 million in support of the Kabila regime.45 This was apart from a military equipment order of up to $140 million that the Zimbabwe Defence Industry had received from the Kabila government.46 Second, following the November 1995 Land Reform, not enough money had been coming in from agriculture, and the government needed money to meet the well organized opposition coming from the mdc.47 From the outset, Zimbabwe wanted to ensure that the war in the drc paid for itself and that it would bear no financial burden for its commitment to it. To ensure this, in September 1998 Zimbabwe signed an agreement with Gécamines (a state-owned mining company in the drc) whereby 37.5 percent of the latter’s benefits were earmarked to finance Zimbabwe’s army expenditures in the drc. For a number of reasons, not the least being that Gécamines was already in financial difficulties, this arrangement was not beneficial to Zimbabwe, and a number of new arrangements were made. These included concessions to the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority and a gift to Harare of 500,000 hectares of good quality fallow farmland in Katanga.

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By the end of 1999, Zimbabwe had an estimated eleven thousand troops in the drc. Most of these were involved in the defence of military and economic centres, especially the mineral-rich regions of Katanga and Mbuji-Mayi. The Zimbabwe government estimated that the involvement cost $3 million a month. At this time, the inflation rate was running at about 57 percent and unemployment was above 50 percent. There were, however, conflicts with the figures as internal government documents estimate that the cost of the war was around $27 million – nine times the $3 million per month publicly declared to the imf. So far from strengthening the army, the engagement in the drc seems to have further weakened it, especially as its exposure of wealth and corruption weakened the army’s esprit-de-corps. domestic and external reactions to external military engagements

For a number of reasons, these external military interventions later became major political issues in Zimbabwe. In the case of Mozambique, most of the reasons are intermixed and can only be understood in the context of the intricate intergroup dynamics in the country. The renamo-affected parts of Zimbabwe are inhabited by the Udau-speaking people of the Shona ethnic group, and they had not always been supportive of the Mugabe administration. Ndabaningi Sithole, who was replaced by Mugabe as the zanu leader in 1963, came from this region, and, despite his loss of support in most of the areas of the Shona community, many Ndau people remained loyal to him as well as to his zanu Ndoga party. The differences between Mugabe and the people in the eastern province of the country assumed a new dimension when Edgar Tekere, the most prominent member of the cabinet from the eastern province, was expelled from zanu. Many people in the region interpreted this as the latest in Mugabe’s politics of discarding lieutenants after he had used them to his own advantage, often against their own people. When Tekere eventually founded his own party (the Zimbabwe Unity Movement), it gained the strongest ethnic support from the Ndaus and other groups in the eastern province. Apart from these political differences, the Ndau people also believed that the Mugabe administration had not been particularly sympathetic towards their cause over the issue of land. The radical

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redistribution of land promised by the ruling party during the liberation war did not materialize for most of the first decade, and, as Manicaland was one of the areas most affected by the colonial policy of land acquisition, many in this region did not understand why the government would not carry out the promise it made during the war. These were the undercurrents that determined how these people reacted to how the government handled the renamo conflict. The people in Manicaland opposed the method the government adopted in fighting renamo, and they remained the most persistent critics of government policy. To a large extent, the two political parties with ethnic roots in this region (zanu Ndoga and zum) were used to express this opposition, for which there were many reasons. First, some of the people genuinely felt that the decision to become militarily involved in the war was ill-advised. Many argued that the decision was a manifestation of Mugabe’s obvious disregard for the considerable loss of life that could result among the Ndau people as a result of the counter-reaction from renamo and that Mugabe would not have adopted the same policy if another ethnic group had been involved. Some also argued that the renamo problem was a political problem, which, like the Matabeleland crisis, manifested itself in a military way. They thus believed that the Mugabe government ought to have seen, from the Matabeleland unrest, the folly of employing a military solution to a political problem. The hardship to which the zna subjected the people presented yet another source of opposition and anger. The creation of military zones, the imposition of curfews on some areas, and other military activities to which the region was subjected created restraints on daily activities. Some also complained that the treatment of Mozambican refugees – whom many considered as brothers and sisters – was not good enough. All the political parties in the country had, at one time or another, reasons to object to one aspect or the other of the government’s handling of the renamo problem. Apart from the zanu Ndoga and zum, even zapu had problems with the zanu party over its handling of this problem. Throughout the time of the Matabeleland unrest, zapu remained critical of the government’s activities against renamo, although, understandably, the activities of the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland made the renamo crisis a secondary issue in zapu’s consideration. But their opposition to the government resulted in the creation of a sort of consortium of the oppressed between the Ndebele people and the Ndau-speaking people on the eastern border.

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However, when the Unity Accord was signed, and zapu rejoined the government, the party automatically became part of the decision to employ military means to fight renamo. From this time onwards, zapu was no longer vocal in its condemnation of adopting a military solution to the renamo problem. However, another form of opposition emerged, as zapu and zipra began to complain, albeit discreetly, that the zna was partial in its selection of soldiers sent to the front against renamo. It was alleged that more former zipra soldiers than former zanla soldiers were sent to the front (and therefore suffered more causalities). This, however, was neither proved nor made an official complaint.48 The response to the renamo issue was not a major concern to whites in Zimbabwe. While they opposed the dissident activities of the organization, they also disapproved of the government’s military reaction to it (although it was never made a major political issue by either the Rhodesian Front or, later, the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe). The government dismissed Ndabaningi Sithole and Edgar Tekere’s criticism of its handling of the crisis. It further alleged that renamo and Sithole’s Ndoga party had signed a “friendship and cooperation agreement” in August 1986. Thus, in the government’s view, the three parties (zanu Ndoga, zum) and renamo were in an unholy alliance to destabilize Zimbabwe and Mozambique. However, it appeared that the Mozambican government was too preoccupied with its war to become concerned with local Zimbabwean bickering over the politics of its critics. Finally, as mentioned in chapter 3, it was alleged that Harare used the renamo issue to extend state-ofemergency regulations – a move that quite likely had to do with self-preservation. The reaction to Zimbabwe’s involvement in the drc obviously had different dimensions. While the crux of the criticism had to do with the justifications for the country’s involvement in the Congo, it later became focused on allegedly fraudulent mining deals in the drc. For example, a vocal independent mp, Margaret Dongo, raised the issue and demanded an explanation from the government regarding whose interests the alleged deals were meant to serve.49 Broadly, opposition to involvement in the drc came mainly from the mdc and from various politically uncommitted individuals who objected to external military engagements. These people based their position on a number of grounds. They believed that Zimbabwe’s

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involvement in the drc was adding to the economic problems at home and that opposition to its involvement on the part of Western economic powers was adding to its mounting economic woes. Criticisms of the drc intervention were also coming from within the ruling zanu-pf, with the chief whip, Moses Mvenge, accusing the government of misplaced priorities. Apparently referring to the aids situation, with the scourge claiming up to twelve hundred lives each week, Mvenge claimed that the death rate in Zimbabwe was higher than that in any war and that the government did not seem to realize that “the war back home [was] more serious than the war in the drc.”50 By the time the mdc gained ground in Parliament, opposition to the involvement in the drc became more intense and more organized. The mdc members of Parliament argued against the involvement along expected lines. First, they held that the engagement was not constitutional as it had been undertaken without parliamentary endorsement. Specifically, an mdc representative, Tendai Biti, argued that Mugabe’s decision to send troops to the drc was more “fitting monarchical prerogatives than presidential responsibilities.”51 There were also concerns that the government was supporting an undemocratic leader who attained office through armed force. The mdc also condemned the secrecy surrounding the intervention. It argued that, to “the extent that those troops [were] there on tax-payers money, surely the government ha[d] an obligation to disclose … information … particularly [when] such information [did] not affect the integrity of the actual military operations.”52 The issue of corruption was also a factor in the mdc’s opposition. As Tendai Biti further noted: How do we go to bed with a clean conscience when we spend $6 billion on defense when … hospitals have no syringes, no aspirins, it is sin and yet we spend $6 billion on the drc and pretend in this House that we are driven by a decency or by patriotic feelings. There is nothing patriotic about placing our people in an invidious position where poverty stinks … The drc is a costly mistake for this country, it is a mistake that should not have been made in the first place, it is a foreign policy blunder, it is a fiscal irresponsibility and we should be able in this House to say so.53

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Biti went on to suggest a way forward from what he saw as a major but avoidable blunder: What is the way forward? There is a simple way forward: there is nothing wrong with any decent human being standing up and saying, “I made a mistake” and withdrawing our troops … The level of corruption that is associated with our participation in the drc, in a country that is already reeling under very heavy corruption, is not worth it. Let us pull out of that one area and reduce the level of corruption. It is corrupting our people, it is destroying the souls of some of the best Zimbabweans that we have.54 Another set of reactions from the domestic population came from the country’s civil society groups. In a joint press release made in October 1998, representatives of five major civil society groups in Zimbabwe came out to challenge the country’s intervention in the drc on four main grounds.55 First, they held that, contrary to the Constitution, the government had not gained the support of Parliament. They also insinuated that the intervention did not have the support of all the members of the cabinet. Second, they held that the intervention was not justifiable because it did not satisfy the terms of Section 96 of the Zimbabwean Constitution, which gave as the grounds for external intervention the need to deal with a situation that was prejudicial to the security of Zimbabwe. They argued that the situation in the drc did not fulfill this condition. Third, the groups questioned the moral grounds for supporting a leader (Kabila) who had been accused of gross human rights violations. Citing reports from the un Special Rappoteur to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the groups opined that any support for Kabila from Zimbabwe would be an implicit endorsement of brutality. Finally, they identified the Zimbabwean economy as being too weak to enable the country to engage in an adventurous foreign policy. Apart from condemning the intervention, these groups also criticized the secrecy surrounding the activities of the zna, complaining that no one in the country knew the exact number of Zimbabwean troops engaged in the drc. The press, too, was critical of the intervention, sometimes tying it to other domestic developments in the country and even in the

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military. For example, in January 1999 an independent newspaper, the Standard, reported that twenty-three officers had been arrested in December 1998 for plotting to overthrow Mugabe. They were said to have accused the leadership of being more interested in pursuing business interests in the drc than in the welfare of the soldiers who were fighting there. The government’s reaction was swift. The journalists were arrested and detained, and Minister of Home Affairs Dumiso Dabengwa said that a law might have to be enacted to protect soldiers against “bad press.”56 With regard to international reactions to Zimbabwe’s external military engagements, there seemed to be considerable international sympathy for its intervention in Mozambique. Indeed, a number of countries openly assisted in arming the Zimbabwean security forces who were operating in Mozambique. There were a number of reasons for this. First, it was widely accepted that renamo was a brutal insurgent movement and that any attempt by any country to assist in ending its operations would not be condemned by the international community. Second, and closely related to the first reason, was the fact that renamo was linked to apartheid South Africa, a country whose pariah status was a subject of international concern. Third, it was globally recognized that Zimbabwe’s interests were threatened by the activities of renamo, thus Harare’s sending forces to Mozambique to end this threat was seen as a legitimate act of national self-defence. Finally, the government that invited Zimbabwe into Mozambique was a recognized government, which had the constitutional right to invite any allies into its country. For these reasons, Zimbabwe’s involvement in Mozambique was not condemned. Indeed, the British Military Advisory Team, which assisted in building the zna, even helped to train the Mozambican army to meet the military exigencies posed by the renamo rebels. The same cannot be said about Zimbabwe’s intervention in the drc, which was particularly controversial. The bulk of criticism came from the United Nations, where many key members as well as the secretariat believed that Zimbabwe’s intervention was motivated by the desire to benefit from the drc’s abundant natural resources. Indeed, as I discuss in chapter 7, the extent of Zimbabwe’s external involvement in the drc was to be the source of a major un investigation into that country’s civil war.

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politics of dialogue to end intervention

One issue that remained contentious during the period of Zimbabwe’s interventions in Mozambique and the drc was the possibility of conducting dialogues to end the conflicts. Zimbabwe was deeply involved in the politics associated with attempting to find a diplomatic solution to these conflicts. At the time of Zimbabwe’s intervention in Mozambique, Mugabe believed very strongly that the only option open to the Mozambican leadership was military action. There were three interrelated reasons for this belief, the first of which was that any such dialogue would presuppose an acceptance of renamo’s legitimacy. Zimbabwe saw renamo as a bunch of armed bandits with no political focus, no aspirations, and no legitimacy. It remained, in the Zimbabwean perspective, one of South Africa’s tools for regional destabilization. The second reason for Zimbabwe’s policy had to do with the belief that any dialogue between the frelimo government and renamo would give South Africa the much needed opportunity to penetrate the internal administration of Mozambique. Zimbabwe believed that any such negotiation would transform renamo into Pretoria’s mouthpiece. Thus, holding a dialogue with renamo would amount to helping South Africa to achieve one of its regional ambitions.57 The final reason that Zimbabwe objected to any negotiations with renamo was that such a process, once it began, would always be exploited by renamo to make further demands, with the intent of flushing frelimo out of office. Mugabe himself confirmed in the Zimbabwean Parliament that he had warned the Mozambican leadership about this. He said he had illustrated to President Samora Machel the scenario that would develop if there were to be a dialogue with renamo. This scenario, according to Mugabe, would unfold like the parable about the Arab man, his camel, and the tent: The Arab man and his camel decided to rest for the night after a long journey. The man pitched a tent, and put the camel outside it. But it was cold outside and the camel wanted to be accommodated in the tent, and it asked first just to be allowed to put his nose inside the tent because it was cold. The Arab man said “No” but later gave in. Later the camel said, “just my head,” and then “my first leg,” “both legs,” etc. The Arab man was complaining

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all the time, but he was giving in all the time, until in the end the camel was fully in the tent and it threw out the Arab man.58 It can also be argued that Harare’s decision on the issue of dialogue had some relation to Mugabe’s domestic stance. He believed that Harare should never engage in a dialogue with any rebel movement (no matter how strong). This is evident in the way he handled the dissent in Matebeleland (see chapter 3). It would appear that Mugabe succeeded for a long time in convincing the Mozambican leadership that talks with renamo should not be contemplated. President Machel was believed to have been more receptive to this advice than his successor, Joachim Chissano. Machel refused to deal directly with renamo, preferring instead to talk to South Africa, which he identified as renamo in disguise. This was what drove him into signing the Nkomati Accord with South Africa. After Machel’s death, Mugabe made a “you-will-notwalk-alone” commitment to the new Mozambican leader, Joaquim Chissano. As Chissano was at the fore of some of the decisions taken during the Machel administration, he promised to continue with the hard-line policies of his predecessor regarding direct dialogue with renamo. In this, of course, he had the support of the Zimbabwean leader. In November 1986, Mugabe declared: “The survival of Mozambique is our survival. The fall of Mozambique is our fall … all and one stand together, all and one fight together.”59 In January 1987, both leaders met in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, where they engaged in an extensive discussion of the issue of Zimbabwe’s continued military support. During the meeting, Mugabe not only promised to maintain his troops in Mozambique but also to increase them. There was another meeting in Beira, Mozambique, in June 1988, which, like the preceding one, was concerned mainly with the renamo issue and Zimbabwe’s continued support. By the end of 1988, the Mozambican leadership had a change of heart with regard to the best approach to the renamo problem. The reason for this change centred on the inability of the military option to bring the desired peace. It had become clear to the government in Mozambique that it had neither the military nor the economic capacity to continue the war. Government soldiers had not been paid for months, and, beyond the Beira corridor, there was really no place in Mozambique that was safe. Even the capital, Maputo, was being threatened by renamo. Thus, the

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Mozambican leadership began considering the possibility of engaging in a dialogue with renamo. Mozambique’s change of heart, the Zimbabwean leadership’s inherent (though unacknowledged) belief that renamo could not be defeated military (at least not easily), and the increase in calls from within Zimbabwe to disengage militarily from Mozambique all forced the Mugabe administration to consider the possibility of a dialogue. It was obvious from the outset that Zimbabwe would play a major role in any dialogue between renamo and the frelimo government. This was because of the extent of Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war and because Zimbabwe was the obvious choice of the frelimo government as an observer (should one be required) in any peace deal. Mugabe also knew that frelimo could not negotiate well with renamo and that the Mozambican government needed strong support. Thus, when the peace meeting in Rome between renamo and the frelimo government began, Zimbabwe was not only a factor but also an interested observer in the deliberations. Mugabe’s decision to intervene in the search for dialogue was supported by the innermost sector of the government. In the first meeting between Mugabe and renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama, which took place in Malawi, Mugabe did not involve any of his Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff.60 He was accompanied only by the minister of state for national security and the acting minister of defence. This meeting was facilitated by the Malawian leader Hasting Banda and was also supported by the Lonrho conglomerate’s Tiny Rowland. The initial meeting between the two went quite well, and Mugabe conceded afterwards that the renamo leader struck him as “a man with some ideas.”61 During the deliberations, the issue that brought Zimbabwe’s name to the fore was the country’s military involvement in the Mozambican civil war. When the frelimo government named Zimbabwe as its recommended observer in the conflict, renamo understandably objected on the grounds that Zimbabwe had taken a deep interest in the war. However, the issue that was most controversial was the position of the troops that Zimbabwe had committed to the war. renamo insisted that the troops would have to leave the country before any meaningful dialogue could begin. Both the Mozambican and the Zimbabwean governments objected to this condition, and, in the end, it was agreed that Zimbabwean troops would be restricted to the trade routes linking Mozambique with Zimbabwe. This was

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to be the first phase of the gradual withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from Mozambique. For Zimbabwe, too, the withdrawal of troops had a number of advantages. By the early 1990s it had become clear to senior members of the zna, and possibly to the government, that the war against renamo was unwinnable; thus, a face-saving device was needed to enable Zimbabwean troops to get out of Mozambique.62 Apart from being tied down militarily, Zimbabwe could not afford the economic and political costs of the war in Mozambique. After the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops, there came a new phase in Zimbabwe’s involvement in Mozambique. According to Ulf Engel, key Zimbabwe security officials, especially Emmerson Mnangagwa and Sydney Sekeremayi, continued to ensure that regular meetings were held to see that the peace process stayed on track.63 At the signing of the peace agreement, Mugabe made a speech that indicated a major shift in his earlier position on renamo: Today is not the day of judgment. It is a day of reconciliation. Today is not the day when we should examine who was right and who was wrong. Today is the day when we must say we are all right. Both are right in being parties to the process.64 The situation in the drc was significantly different from that in Mozambique, due largely to the nature of the conflict and to the nature and extent of external involvement. The fact that some countries, rightly or wrongly, interpreted their involvement in this war as a pursuit of their national interest meant that the politics of dialogue would be complex. Mugabe’s stance on the calls for dialogue to end the conflict in the drc was always that the two countries that had intervened in the conflict without having been officially invited to do so by the drc government – Uganda and Rwanda – should leave. As far as Mugabe was concerned, the situation in the drc arose largely due to the unwarranted intervention of these two countries external military engagements and the emergence of a military - economic complex among zimbabwe ’ s ruling elites

What is often considered a turning point in the politics of security in Zimbabwe is the country’s involvement in external military

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engagements, especially in the drc. As noted in chapter 2, this resulted in one of the attempts at “politicizing” the zna. Even before official criticism from the United Nations (see chapter 7) regarding the involvement of the zna and civilians in illicit trade in the drc, there had even been rumours that the military and top zanu party members were deeply involved in illegal business deals in the drc. There is no doubt that the involvement in the drc significantly altered the nature of the military-economic situation among the Zimbabwean elite. For example, Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa confirmed that he had introduced several Zimbabwean businesspeople to Congolese officials, and he declared that there was “a deliberate effort to push Zimbabwean business interest[s] into Congo.”65 Another government spokesman, Philip Chiyangwa, confirmed that one of the reasons Zimbabwe was keen to get into the drc was that it had missed other lucrative opportunities in the region. Citing the Mozambican civil war, to which Zimbabwe had earlier committed troops,66 Chiyangwa claimed that, despite his country’s sacrifice, it was South Africa, fighting on the side of the rebels, that enjoyed the gains at the end of the war.67 He thus made it clear that the drc was not to constitute a repeat experience. Indeed, with regard to Zimbabwe’s involvement in the drc, Michael Nest notes that the government “prodded … an initially private sector to establish commercial units and engage in business, while rich entrepreneurs with close links to the zanu pf inner-circle did business in the drc using military personnel as a cover to avoid Congolese customs.”68 What is noticeable about Zimbabwe’s business deals in the drc is that it did not concentrate only on natural resources but, rather, on a wide range of sectors, including transportation, banking, and defence. Further to this, two minerals that caught Zimbabwe’s interest were cobalt and copper. Inevitably, it became clear that key Zimbabwean politicians and military officers had been involved in extensive business deals in the drc. Zimbabwe’s former information minister, Chen Chimutengwende, denied President Mugabe’s involvement in the drc’s business sector but maintained that there was nothing wrong with ministers and politicians being involved in government or party-owned companies, or even their own companies, in order to do business in the drc. Some of the people thought to have been involved in these deals include President Mugabe himself; Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, who, though he denied personal

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involvement, confirmed that he might have introduced businessmen to Congolese ministers; and Army Commander General Vitalis Zvinavashe.69 Apart from key politicians and senior military officers, other ranks of the armed forces were also encouraged to profit from the conflict in the drc. A zna officer, Colonel Tshinga Dube, stated on national television: “there are fortunes to be made in the Congo … so why rush to conquer the rebels?”70 It seems to be the general consensus that Zimbabwe did not derive much economic benefit from the drc, even if individuals did. Nest attributes this to a number of factors, including the inefficiency of the drc banking sector, which made simple payments difficult; the refusal of the Congolese to pay their debt to Zimbabwean firms; and the weak and corrupt drc legal system, which made it almost impossible for Zimbabweans to ensure that their contracts with the Congolese were enforced.71 To get around the problem, Zimbabwe focused its interest on a sector of the economy that could make quick profits, would not be subject to competition, and could easily produce the commodity involved: the diamond market. While, initially, there were rumours of financial deals, especially involving diamonds, the Zimbabwean government openly confirmed joint business ventures with the Congolese government in September 1999, when Minister of Defence Moven Mahachi (a close ally of Mugabe) confirmed that these ventures, which included diamonds and gold, would pay for military operations in the drc. The minister justified the joint ventures by saying that they would lighten the burden on Zimbabwe’s national treasury. He also said that the name of the company that had been formed to undertake this business venture was Osleg and that it would work alongside Comiex, a private company owned by the drc military.72 The companies’ operations were complex: they were granted licences to sell diamonds and gold and were to have four offices staffed by military officers. They were to buy minerals from small-scale producers and sell them at the Kinshasa Precious Mineral Market, either by public tender or by auction. Shortly after this, the Kabila government allocated more than half a million hectares of farming land to Zimbabwe’s Agricultural and Rural Development Authority. This venture, which the chairman of the state-run agency, Joseph Made, confirmed would create “enormous business opportunities for Zimbabwean companies,” involved the production of crops such as soya beans and maize as well as livestock.73

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From the outset, it was clear that the joint venture would probably not be as lucrative for the Zimbabwean government as officials indicated. This was because both land and diamond ventures required initial funding of about us$50 million, which the government could not afford. conclusion

In this chapter I show that there are connections between Zimbabwe’s intervention in Mozambique and its intervention in the drc, despite the gap in the time of their occurrence. Both interventions are compatible with Mugabe’s self-preservation strategies, even if in different ways. In the case of Mozambique, there was a genuine need for intervention as the activities of the renamo dissidents actually threatened the governments in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In this case, Mugabe’s desire for the self-preservation of his administration is compatible with the preservation of the nation. There was, of course, disagreement over some of the methods used by the intervening force, but most people agreed that it was necessary to take serious action against renamo. The intervention in the drc, however, was more complex, and self-preservation is believed to have played a far more dominant role than it did in Mozambique. First, this intervention created, at least initially, a diversion from domestic socioeconomic challenges. Second, it provided opportunities for senior members of the armed forces, especially those who had been loyal to Mugabe since the war of liberation and early post-independence days, to personally profit from the drc’s wealth of natural resources. Third, it gave the government an opportunity to divert the energies of the military towards an external engagement and therefore avoiding the possibility of an internal insurrection. Fourth, it gave midlevel officers in the armed forces the opportunity to make financial gains – admittedly at a much lower scale than that enjoyed by the very senior officers – from the drc in a way that would ensure that they were indebted to the Mugabe administration. Fifth, it gave Mugabe an opportunity to militarily confront the presidents of Rwanda and Uganda, who were seen by the world as leading a crusade against dictatorship, and providing another idea about what regional governance should mean, thus ensuring his own regional relevance. Finally, it provided Mugabe’s cronies the opportunity of making personal financial gains from the entire enterprise.

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Evidence shows that, since independence, Mugabe has used Zimbabwe’s external military involvements to increase his influence in the region as well as to enrich himself and his cronies. His justification for this is that he has had to ensure the security of his country, and sometimes of the region, from external threats. Indeed, Mugabe has always presented himself as something of a Southern African Messiah. While regional and national exigencies have influenced the nature of perceived security threats, Mugabe has ensured that they have never superseded his political interests.

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6

Between East and West: Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s Security, and Non-African Countries This chapter looks at how certain non-African countries have featured in Zimbabwe’s security considerations. This discussion is necessary because these countries were active in the global politics that gave birth to Zimbabwe and have subsequently been involved in the complex politics that characterized the country’s security affairs between independence in April 1980 and February 2009. It is thus important to know how Mugabe was able to strike a balance between the conflicting ideologies that led to his assumption of power and how he has been able to continue to do so after independence. Specifically, I identify four countries that have been crucial to Zimbabwe’s security: Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union (later Russia), and China. This chapter departs from the preceding ones in that it moves from the politics of security inside Zimbabwe to assess how non-African countries reacted to Zimbabwe’s security concerns and how, in turn, Zimbabwe responded to this reaction. Broadly, my central argument is that Mugabe’s relationship with these key global actors was characterized by his desire for selfperpetuation. Consequently, domestic issues were the key determinant of his relationship with these countries. While, in the background, there may have been some economic considerations, these were secondary to Mugabe’s desire to ensure his grip on domestic security. It was the extent to which these countries were willing to accommodate Mugabe’s desire to hold on to power that determined his relationship with them, not any appreciation of what economic advantages they might bring. I also argue that there are considerable inconsistencies in the ways in which these countries related to Mugabe, especially once they became critical of actions to

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which they had earlier expressed indifference. This exposes elements of national interest that, ironically, turned out to be in Mugabe’s favour as their inconsistency was interpreted as evidence that he was being unfairly targeted by sections of the international community. I contend that, in opposing Mugabe with such vehemence, some of these countries actually assisted him in advancing his objectives. opportunities and challenges in zimbabwe ’ s relationship with non - african powers

In its relationship with non-African powers, Zimbabwe, at independence, encountered both opportunities and constraints, and these were to become more complicated in later years. As noted in chapter 1, the process of the country’s birth brought together “revolutionary militancy” (supported by the East) and “round-table diplomacy” (supported by the West). This meant that the country had to engage in a balancing act right from the time of independence. Again, while the Mugabe administration would have realized that Zimbabwe’s inherited structures were deeply rooted in capitalism, which aligned the country to the West, the military assistance that won its independence and the doctrine that sustained its struggle aligned it mainly with the Eastern Bloc (i.e., China, Yugoslavia, and Romania). Throughout the period under study, balancing these West-East pulls characterized the relationship between Mugabe and Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, and China. A major opportunity Zimbabwe had at the time of independence, and one that it effectively exploited, was international goodwill. Both the West and the East claimed victory for Zimbabwe’s independence, even if for different reasons and on different scales. With this goodwill, Zimbabwe became the beneficiary of considerable assistance, both economic and diplomatic, from every side to which it turned. Mugabe enjoyed this privilege until both internal and external policies brought it to an end. Another opportunity that Mugabe enjoyed at the time of his country’s independence involved the nature of global politics, which allowed for minimal interference in what was deemed the “internal affairs” of other countries. For most of the first decade of his rule, Mugabe was able to consolidate his policies and to embark on some of his more controversial activities with very minimal outside interference. Of course, circumstances later changed.

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What was a major challenge from the outset was the extent to which Mugabe needed external assistance from these four countries in order to address Zimbabwe’s war-torn economy. Because, as of the time of Zimbabwe’s independence, China had not assumed the reputation it now has as one of the world’s strongest economies, Zimbabwe had to rely almost exclusively on the West for the bulk of the financial assistance that saw it through the most difficult postindependence period. Within this context, the constant realization that money could only come from the West meant that there was a limit to Mugabe’s manoeuvrability with certain of these key countries. The subsequent involvement of the imf in the economies of many African states through the introduction of structural adjustment plans also meant a major reduction of Zimbabwe’s ability to operate actively on the international stage. Two global developments emerged to which Mugabe had to respond, and both were to have an impact on the politics of security in Zimbabwe. The first was the end of the Cold War. The period of the war of liberation and most of the first decade of independence were Cold War years. While the Cold War had a string of disadvantages, it served the interests of most African leaders either because it provided them with a shelter through one or the other Cold War belligerent or because their domestic policies were covered under an informal rule that classified certain activities as “internal affairs” against which external interference was informally prohibited. With the end of the Cold War, a number of “values” that had hitherto been granted superficial recognition – like democracy and human rights – began receiving serious attention. Indeed, this process saw a number of African leaders – who had historically exploited the “incumbency advantage” to win elections – lose their positions. Zimbabwe had to adjust to this situation as key aspects of Mugabe’s policies, which had been excused or overlooked under the old order, now began to receive attention. Adjustments, however, turned out to be very difficult in some cases, and countries that wanted to impose their values on Mugabe and Zimbabwe eventually had to make major decisions about the relationship. The second global development to which Mugabe had to respond involved the emergence of new economic powers, notably Brazil, Russia, India, and China – often collectively referred to as bric. Indeed, very few collections of countries (operating individually)

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have held the world with an admixture of consternation and admiration as much as have these four. The extent to which, within a relatively short period, they have transformed their respective economies and extended their reach across the world have been subjects of intense interest.1 While some see the rapid economic development of these countries as providing a possible template for other developing countries, some caution against this.2 For Mugabe and the politics of security in Zimbabwe, the emergence of these countries is important. While at independence the bulk of Zimbabwe’s financial assistance came from the West, with the East relevant only ideologically, China’s emergence as a new source of economic power gave Mugabe options. China’s emergence was also to be a major factor in the politics of the Western countries, especially Britain. security relations between zimbabwe and britain : the swing of the pendulum

As noted in chapter 1, nationalists in Rhodesia were aware that Britain was not happy with Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence. However, the manner in which Britain attempted to resolve the crisis made most of them consider it an accomplice in Smith’s rebellion. The nationalists did not believe that there was any special reason why Britain could not use force to bring down what even Whitehall considered a rebellion against the Crown. This remained the position of Zimbabwean nationalists for most of the period of the liberation struggle. The Lancaster House Conference did not change this belief because many believed that Britain’s sudden change of heart (which led to the conference) was occasioned not so much by a genuine desire for the freedom of the black population as by a fear of guerrilla threats to British interests in Rhodesia. At one point Mugabe allegedly told the British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington: “it was we who … liberated Rhodesia – you are simply intervening now to take advantage of our victory.”3 Second, and again as noted in chapter 1, the outcome of the Lancaster Conference was not exactly what the nationalists wanted, and they believed that it had been forced on them by Britain in order to perpetuate some sort of neocolonialism. Certain stipulations, like a British-style parliamentary democracy and the ten-year term of the Lancaster Agreement, were particularly antithetical to the principles the guerrillas supported. In short, at independence, although Britain

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was not really considered an enemy, neither was it seen as a friend to the nationalists – at least not in the way China, North Korea, or even Yugoslavia were. It is somewhat ironic that not only did Mugabe fail to officially perceive Britain as a threat but that he also put the most delicate, and arguably the most important, of his defence problems – the military reorganization exercise – into British hands. Even the retraining of the 5th Brigade, which was initially handled by the North Koreans, was later entrusted to the British Military Advisory and Training Team. Although Britain had promised, as part of the Lancaster House Agreement, to assist in Zimbabwe’s military reorganization, certain other factors may have influenced Mugabe’s preference for Britain. First, no other power had both a clean slate and the financial wherewithal to undertake the task. For their obvious partisan positions in the liberation struggle, both China and the Soviet Union would have been unacceptable, even if they had been willing to undertake the role, while countries like India and Nigeria would find the financial burden of the venture difficult to bear. Apart from this, Mugabe saw the need to keep in line with other African Commonwealth countries, especially as the armed forces of his immediate neighbours had been largely British-trained and equipped. The second reason for Mugabe’s choosing Britain involved Zimbabwe’s desire to be involved with a country that had some leverage over South Africa. He clearly realized how sensitive the integration exercise might be, and he must have envisaged South Africa’s attempting to exploit the situation to destabilize Zimbabwe. Britain was considered capable of preventing this. However, although Britain was charged with the most important security role after independence, Mugabe remained cautious enough to ensure that it was not allowed to have exclusive control over the establishment of the new national army. It was within this context that Mugabe diluted Britain’s role by extending an invitation to the North Koreans to come in and train the 5th Brigade. Right from the early years of Zimbabwe’s independence, British commitment to Zimbabwe’s security has been significant. For example, in March 1980, the British government provided £75 million in training and aid to the Mugabe government. Also, that same year, Mugabe turned down a deal for Soviet hardware that had been brokered by Nkomo.4 Then, in 1981, British Aerospace sold eight Hawk jets to Zimbabwe for £20 million.5 This practice continued

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throughout the 1980s. Britain also benefitted from the initially difficult relationship between Mugabe and the Soviet Union (discussed later) with regard to arms sales. For example, in 1982, after he had negotiated the purchase of mig–29 fighters from the Soviet Union, Mugabe turned the deal down. Britain immediately offered Mugabe Harrier and Hawk jets, which led him to cancel a £400 million order from the Soviet Union. This sale of arms continued for most of the first decade of Zimbabwe’s independence. Some Zimbabwean officers were also sent for military training to British military institutions. Again, as noted in chapter 5, Mugabe was also instrumental in the British training of Mozambican forces involved in the war against renamo. In short, there was no doubt that Mugabe trusted that Britain would not do anything to adversely affect Zimbabwe’s security interests. In the first place, it would have been difficult, in the early stages, for Britain to encourage insurrection in the army. This was not only because Britain itself was responsible for the integration exercise and, as such, would not have wanted any disruption of the process, but also because any idea of a coup at the early stages of Zimbabwe’s existence was not viable, especially as most of the senior members of the armed forces were loyal to Mugabe. This situation would later change. But even at this early stage, the importance Mugabe attached to domestic security and the divergence between Zimbabwe and Britain with regard to key democratic and human rights issues had begun to show. Although dependent on Britain for key aspects of his military reforms, Mugabe did not allow Britain to exploit this privileged position to meddle with Zimbabwe’s domestic security. This is illustrated by the six white air force officers who were accused of sabotage at Zimbabwe’s main air force base in Gweru in July 1982 (see chapter 2). After having been arraigned before a court, they were acquitted on technical grounds; however, the government redetained them under the emergency law. The British government accused Zimbabwean authorities of torturing white officers. Both Mugabe and Thatcher traded public denunciations as Zimbabwe accused Britain of meddling in its internal affairs. The issue attracted more concern from Harare when the Irish prime minister, Garret Fitzgerald, raised the incident during Mugabe’s visit to Dublin.6 There were also calls from Britain to withdraw British aid to Zimbabwe Mugabe later made an official statement in which he accused Britain of blackmail and hypocrisy. He wondered why Britain showed

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such concern for human rights when white officers were arrested yet did nothing for black nationalists who had languished for more than a decade in Ian Smith’s jails. He also reminded the British government that Zimbabwe was paying millions of dollars in pensions to people “who spent their lifetime working for the udi against majority rule.”7 He called Britain’s bluff, saying that the threat of withdrawal of financial aid would not make his government succumb to blackmail. In a public denunciation that could be described as Mugabe’s most critical condemnation of British interference in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs during the early years, Mugabe commented: We cannot because a person is of British stock, where such a person is a threat to our security[,] fear to arrest him because to do so is to provoke Margaret Thatcher and her government. My government is not made of that weak steel … If that aid is given to us so that we don’t exercise our right as a sovereign state, a sovereign right in defense and protection of our security, and not arrest those we believe to be security risk[s], then that aid can go.8 Some months afterwards, the six officers were released, and they left Zimbabwe for Britain. Another issue that could have caused tension between Zimbabwe and Britain concerns their obvious divergence over the issue of apartheid in South Africa. Britain’s position on apartheid was rooted in what Zimbabwe saw as two contradictory tendencies: condemnation of racial discrimination and the desire to maintain financial investments in the structures that sustained apartheid. The British position was based on the argument that only persuasion could make South Africa change its racial policies. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, was more forceful in its calls for sanctions and other hardliner measures against South Africa. However, both Britain and Zimbabwe understood this fundamental divergence in their positions and seemed to have agreed to disagree. There was no evidence that Mugabe ever thought of the possibility of Britain’s conniving with the apartheid regime in South Africa to undermine Zimbabwe’s security. It was, indeed, Mugabe’s belief that, if Britain could not prevent apartheid South Africa from attacking Zimbabwe, it would at least not offer it any assistance. Nor was Whitehall likely to allow

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any South African interference in Zimbabwe without at least offering official condemnation. After the establishment of the zna, the relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe went on as usual, with Britain’s refusing to interfere in Mugabe’s handling of Zimbabwe’s internal affairs. Indeed, there was no strong criticism from Britain over Mugabe’s clampdown on zapu and the activities of the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland. Britain also continued to be Zimbabwe’s main arms supplier. Apart from this, Britain supported the 1981 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, where up to us$630 million in aid was pledged. Furthermore, the first phase of land reform in the 1980s was partially funded by Britain, which also successfully resettled about seventy-one thousand families out of the targeted 167,000. Britain also supported Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war against renamo in Mozambique, and the moment it became clear that the Mozambican national army was not strong enough to confront the dissidents, Whitehall and Harare arranged for bmatt, then based in Zimbabwe, to train Mozambican forces. Indeed, British prime minister Margaret Thatcher met with Mozambican president Joachim Chissano in Nyanga. Ironically, the first indication of a possible shift in Britain’s attitude towards Mugabe’s security activities came not because of his domestic actions but, rather, because of his military involvement in the drc. In August 1998, British foreign minister Peter Hain declared that the British government was considering a change in policy regarding equipments sale for “aggressive ends.”9 This, however, did not come about. Indeed, in January 2000, the Blair administration pushed through licences for controversial arms sales to Zimbabwe.10 Against public opinion and the advice of his foreign secretary, the prime minister pushed through a deal that allowed British Aerospace to sell spare parts for Hawk fighter jets to Zimbabwe. This was roundly criticized, especially as it was argued that Hawk fighter jets could be used for bombing raids in the drc, thus contravening the British and European Union code of conduct on arms sales. By May 2000, changes in British-Zimbabwean policy had begun. That month, British foreign minister Robin Cook announced that Britain would refuse all licence applications for exports of arms and ammunition to Zimbabwe. This was extended to all licences for spare parts in connection with previous contracts.11 To follow up on this, the secretary of state for international development suspended

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the department’s support for Land Rovers for the Zimbabwean police, including the supply of the remaining 450 vehicles. Less than two weeks later, the foreign secretary announced that all extant licences would be revoked. At the time of this announcement, goods for only one of the licences granted for Hawk spare parts had been delivered: the other five were returned unused. From this period, the relationship between Zimbabwe and Britain began to sour. It was also at this stage that the domestic situation in Zimbabwe entered the equation. Mugabe’s continued clampdown on the opposition had extended to the elites, and this resulted in a growing informal alliance between opposition elites and white farm owners. As discussed in chapter 3, the Mugabe administration’s determination to break this alliance led to tacitly encouraging war veterans to take over white farms. Although the farm seizure was largely a domestic affair, Britain entered the equation because of its role during the discussions that had resulted in Zimbabwe’s independence. The Mugabe administration believed that Britain was encouraging dissent in Zimbabwe and that, due to its opposition to Mugabe, it was deliberately refusing to continue its promised compensation for land reforms. As noted in chapter 3, it was convenient for the Mugabe administration to blame its farm seizures on Britain’s refusal to keep its promise. The Zimbabwe government said that it had received only £40 million between 1980 and 1996 and that a mission sent by Prime Minister John Major to evaluate Zimbabwe’s position (after the £40 million provided under the Thatcher administration had been exhausted) recommended that further funding be given to Zimbabwe to complete its land reform programs. Not long after, Tony Blair became prime minister and Whitehall repudiated all British commitments to land reform in Zimbabwe. In November 1997, Claire Short, the newly appointed secretary of state for international development, wrote her much-quoted letter to the Zimbabwean government, in which she notes: I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe … We are a new government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and, as you know, we were colonized, not colonizers.12

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Given the British government’s reneging on its Lancaster House commitments, Harare felt that it had no option but to implicitly endorse the forceful occupation of white farms. This, it was thought, would either force Britain to reconsider its stand and to again support land reform or bring home to Whitehall the domestic implications of a major revolt. Why Britain pulled out of the land deal is a subject of interest for many scholars, and various interpretations have been proffered. For example, Stoneman and Bowyer–Boyer believe that Britain found Zimbabwe’s desire to oblige it to pay for confiscated land objectionable.13 The position put forward in the media was that land acquired from whites was only given to Mugabe cronies. Another explanation concerns Zimbabwe’s lack of transparency. For his part, Moyo attributes the withdrawal of funds to donors’ objections to Zimbabwe’s involvement in the drc.14 The relationship between Zimbabwe and Britain reached an alltime low during the farm occupation controversy. Whitehall believed that, by endorsing the forced occupation of white farms, Mugabe and his zanu party were moving the country towards anarchy. It also believed that Zimbabwe was clamping down on political opposition through the illegal use of its security forces. This was an era of blametrading between the two countries. Britain believed that Mugabe was responsible for the situation, while Harare was of the opinion that Britain, by reneging on its promise to support land reform, was responsible. It seems that Whitehall believed that Mugabe used Britain’s reneging on its promise as an excuse to justify his clampdown. It was at this point that Britain began to take a hard line towards the Mugabe administration. About two hundred British troops who had remained in Zimbabwe since independence as members of a military advisory team were withdrawn after the farm seizures.15 Britain claimed that it could not justify any form of military link with Zimbabwe if the latter’s defence force was intimidating its population. From this moment, Mugabe began to seriously suspect that Britain was either organizing a military invasion of his country or encouraging insurrection within the zna. At every opportunity, Mugabe drew attention to the possibility of a British-sponsored invasion or coup. For example, during the cholera outbreak,16 the Mugabe administration blamed Britain for using the situation as an opportunity to rally opposition against Zimbabwe. Indeed, Harare alleged that Britain was trying to use the cholera epidemic to gain Western support for a

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military invasion.17 While the possibility of a British military invasion of Zimbabwe seemed far-fetched, there were indeed indications that Britain was considering other means of removing Mugabe from power. Indeed, much later, British chief of defence staff Lord Guthrie confirmed that, on a number of occasions, the possibility of toppling Mugabe had been suggested to him but that he had always insisted upon caution.8 After he left office, Tony Blair specifically stated that Mugabe should be removed from power, but he did not say that this should be done through military means.19 Three other things that Mugabe felt Britain was doing to undermine his hold on power were: (1) tightening its economic grip on Zimbabwe, (2) supporting groups that opposed him, and (3) using the British press to criticize him. Also, while not denying the obvious depressed state of the Zimbabwean economy, Mugabe argued that this was caused more by the sanctions imposed by Britain and its allies than by his own economic policies. Mugabe realized that, while not much could be done to prevent any kind of support from going to the opposition mdc, other pro-democracy and human right groups in Zimbabwe could be denied access to British funding. To ensure this, the government repressed the activities of Zimbabwean civil society. Finally, Mugabe believed that Britain encouraged other European Union and Commonwealth countries in their criticism of his government. The relationship between Mugabe and Tony Blair eventually reached the level of public denunciation, and this continued even after Blair was replaced as prime minister by Gordon Brown. Again, throughout the campaign for the March 2008 elections in Zimbabwe, Mugabe and the zanu-pf targeted Britain as a country determined to interfere in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs, and the opposition mdc was widely portrayed as a puppet of the British government. After the elections, Britain was convinced that Mugabe had lost, and Whitehall saw the delay in releasing the results as providing time for him to falsify figures so that he could hold on to power. This unease in British-Zimbabwean relations was to continue until the signing of the agreement between zanu-pf and the opposition mdc. In looking at the security aspect of Britain’s link with Zimbabwe, one may reach a number of conclusions. First, the past was always used to justify the present. Throughout the difficult periods of the relationship it was very convenient for Mugabe to accuse Britain of wanting to “re-colonize” Zimbabwe with the assistance of “unpatriotic” Zimbabweans who wanted to “sell” their country. This stance,

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predicated on the role Britain played in its implicit endorsement of Ian Smith’s rebellion, was designed to whip up the sentiment of the war of liberation period. It was convenient for the Mugabe administration to ignore the fact that, after independence, his government had given Britain a major security assignment without considering Britain’s connivance with Smith’s minority regime. In short, alleging British “re-colonization” was a convenient way of concealing Zimbabwe’s fundamental problems of mis-governance. Having said this, there can be no doubt that Britain’s interest in Zimbabwe’s affairs changed dramatically after Mugabe challenged the interests of white farmers – a fact that introduces racial sentiments into British diplomacy with Zimbabwe. The conviction with which Britain conducted its anti-Mugabe stance raises a number of questions regarding whether this stance was purely based on Britain’s desire to see democracy entrenched in Zimbabwe. For example, it was alleged that attempts were made to withhold grants promised to Malawi if it did not swing the sadc meeting (of which Malawi was chair) towards an anti-Mugabe position. Also, the president of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, confirmed that he had been “bullied” by British foreign secretary Jack Straw (after an earlier call from Baroness Amos) to take positions that were anti-Mugabe. Mugabe used Britain’s position to bring other African countries and other anti-Western countries over to his side. He hoped that the label “neocolonialism” would bring together countries opposed to different aspects of British policies. For example, during the Rome Conference on Food, Mugabe specifically included the sentiments of other countries in his public denunciation of Britain: “The voice of Mr Bush and the voice of Mr Blair can’t decide who shall rule in Zimbabwe, who shall rule in Africa, who shall rule in Asia, who shall rule in Venezuela, who shall rule in Iran, who shall rule in Iraq.”20 Another strategy Mugabe employed was to attempt stirring up patriotic emotions within the United Kingdom against the Blair administration. It was quite common for Mugabe to describe Blair as Bush’s “errand boy” and to say that the British people really should attempt to obtain “independence” from the United States. While he probably did not expect this to have any impact on the British populace, he clearly intended to deride the British leadership. While the full details of the relationship between Mugabe and the British leadership may not be known for some time, there are now

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indications that aspects of it were more complex than were publicly expressed. In correspondence released to the London newspaper the Independent under the Freedom of Information Act, it was revealed that, shortly after he assumed office as British prime minister, Tony Blair secretly courted Mugabe in an effort to win lucrative trade deals for Britain. Blair in fact wrote a personal letter to Mugabe congratulating him on his role in unifying Africa and helping to improve relations between the continent and Britain. Mugabe was further congratulated on being leader of the oau, and arrangements were begun to bring the two leaders together. While contact between leaders is to be expected, what many found curious was that the boisterous display of friendship between Blair and Mugabe came at the same time that Mugabe was being intensely criticized for human rights abuse in Zimbabwe. Before the proposed meeting between the two leaders could occur, a Foreign Office briefing to Blair argued that the advantages of meeting with the African president outweighed human rights concerns. In a letter dated 11 June 1997 the Foreign Office urged the prime minister to accede to Mugabe’s request for an official visit to Downing Street. The memo reads: This may be a useful opportunity for an exchange of views in advance of chogm [the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting]. After South Africa, Zimbabwe is the most important country in southern Africa to us both commercially and politically. Despite domestic criticism arriving from recent financial scandals, and his failure so far to respond to renewed serious allegations by Zimbabwean ngos of his involvement in atrocities in Matabeleland in the early 1980s, Mr Mugabe remains a senior African and Commonwealth figure with whom there would be advantage in establishing early close relations. We recommend that the Prime Minister sees him if his programme permits.21 The Prime Minister’s Office wrote back to the Foreign Office to say that Blair could not make the date suggested by Mugabe. A second Foreign Office letter urged Blair to hold the meeting in September. But Blair’s commitments again prevented the two leaders from meeting. Britain’s position on Mugabe resulted in criticism from South Africa. Indeed, it reached the stage at which the secretary general of the ruling African National Congress, Kgalema Motlanthe, accused Britain of frustrating President Mbeki’s peace initiative and Prime

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Minister Blair of trying to claim moral superiority by taking a hardline approach to Mugabe. The latter is a reference to Britain’s opposition to Mugabe’s participation in the eu-au meeting in Portugal in December 2007.22 Another tricky relationship was that between Zimbabwe and the United States. It is to this that I now turn. mugabe , the united states , and zimbabwean security

Just as with Britain, so with the United States: Zimbabwe’s relationship with it at the time of independence was extremely cordial. Like other Western countries, the United States saw the diplomatic resolution of the Zimbabwean independence struggle as a victory for diplomacy over militancy. Again, it was hoped that a similar approach could work for Namibia and apartheid South Africa. In March 1981, the American government pledged $225 million over a three-year period towards Zimbabwe’s postwar reconstruction, the distribution and development of land, and the development of skilled workers. Also, by the end of the 1986 financial year, the United States had contributed $380 million to Zimbabwe in the form of grants, loans, and loan guarantees. The United States also offered its support during the military integration exercise. Indeed, some senior officers of the zna went on training missions to American military institutions. However, contrary to what is often assumed, the United States became concerned about unfolding security developments in Zimbabwe much earlier than did Britain or any Western European country. For example, as early as July 1986, as a result of what it deemed Zimbabwe’s uncivil and undiplomatic statements and actions in the United Nations and elsewhere, the US government decided to discontinue future bilateral aid to Zimbabwe. However, aid programs previously agreed upon were not affected, nor were regional development programs. It was Harare’s handling of the Matabeleland unrest that attracted considerable condemnation. However, full programming was restored in 1988. Again, contrary to what is often believed, the United States was involved in Mugabe’s diplomacy regarding dialogue with the renamo rebels in Mozambique. Indeed, after Mugabe’s initial meetings with the renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Davido also travelled to Malawi, where he

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met Dhlakama, and later to Mozambique, where he met President Chissano. At both meetings, he encouraged dialogue and compromise. Indeed, by April 1995, plans were being made for Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen to meet Dhlakama.23 As was the case with Britain, so with the United States: a new phase entered Mugabe’s relationship with the latter when aspects of Zimbabwe’s domestic security became issues of international concern. Here, again, the main issues were the combination of the forceful takeover of land and the repression of political opposition, especially the mdc. Once the land seizure began, it attracted American criticism and condemnation. Further, the United States held that the allegation of rigged elections levelled against Mugabe was one of the major sources of insecurity in the country.24 Unlike Britain, however, the United States was believed to have considered negotiating with key members of the Mugabe government, offering to pay them off in exchange for their leaving power. The US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Jendayi Frazer, was alleged to have discussed with some key members of Mugabe’s administration the possibility of accepting payment for relinquishing power. This offer was apparently refused, and Mugabe’s response was to allege that George W. Bush and Tony Blair were supporting the mdc in an attempt to bring about another round of “colonization” in Zimbabwe. But, while Britain never made its desire to strike the Zimbabwean economy obvious (although sanctions and the suspension of aid were directed to that end), the United States did. For example, in testimony given in 2005 to the US Senate regarding the Zimbabwe Democracy Act (sanction and regime change legislation), Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker said that it was important to “separate the Zimbabwean people from zanupf.” He specifically said that “the United States should make [Zimbabwe’s] economy scream,” concluding with the hope that the senators would “have the stomach for what [they had] to do.”25 Mugabe’s response to American criticism was to say that George Bush, who was president during the entire difficult period of American-Zimbabwean relations, was an ally of Tony Blair and that the two of them were acting like Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini, respectively.26 At every opportunity he had to address an international gathering, Mugabe criticized Bush for attempting to interfere in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs.

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But many people in Africa questioned the extent of Western opposition to Mugabe during the period of the controversy between him and the West. First, there was the question of who should champion the call for removing African leaders from power. While there were people in Africa who felt that Mugabe should relinquish power, the West’s persistent call for the same thing created aversion, especially given that the same people now calling for the removal of Robert Mugabe had supported some of Africa’s most brutal dictators – like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and, even more gallingly, Ian Smith of Rhodesia. There were also those who wondered whether any African leader had called for the removal from office of any incumbent European leader. Second, there was the question of rigged elections. Many argued that the whole issue, which Britain and the United States raised against Mugabe, should not be overstretched. For example, the 2008 election that Mugabe claimed to have won, and that the West condemned on the grounds that it was neither free nor fair, was no different from the elections in Nigeria and Kenya that were held around the same time and that the West recognized. These sorts of issues gave Mugabe the opportunity to claim that he was being targeted because of his policy on white farms and that the whole issue of rigged elections was a charade to cover up the obviously racist motives of the United States and Britain. Third, there was the question of whether the West was strengthening Mugabe. Many thought that the West, through its actions, was feeding Mugabe’s obduracy because, once the stand-off started, Mugabe came under pressure from his party and the army leadership not to capitulate. This began a “blinking competition,” and obviously the Zimbabwean people were the victims. The United States’s objection to Mugabe’s policies first revealed itself in the wake of the war veterans’ takeover of white farms. Washington was convinced that these actions had the implicit endorsement of Mugabe’s government, and the White House was explicit in its condemnation. Once criticism became more vocal and was extended to the hard stance Mugabe had taken towards the opposition mdc, Mugabe immediately put the United States in the same boat as Britain. He knew that there was no way he could convince the United States to take a different position, and he made no special effort to appease the country. Specifically, the United States was opposed to Mugabe’s using his security forces to intimidate the opposition.

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Mugabe knew what to expect from the Bush administration when Condoleezza Rice identified Zimbabwe as one of the six pillars of “Evil” during her appearance at her Senate confirmation hearings to become secretary of state.27 This drew an angry response from Mugabe, who described Rice as a “slave” who had to “echo her master’s voice.”28 The American government came up with the Zimbabwe Democracy Bill in March 2001. In a way, this document may be regarded as a bid to bring about a regime change in Zimbabwe. The bill called for a travel ban and the freezing of foreign assets belonging to Mugabe, his family, and top government officials.29 Other aspects of the bill involved denying international loans and credits to Zimbabwe, calling on the country to respect existing titles to ownership of property, and demanding it to withdrawal its troops from the drc. Bush included Zimbabwe among his “six outposts of tyranny.” Despite this, during 2002, the United States provided more than $150 million in humanitarian assistance (including $111 million in food aid) to Zimbabwe. Key American officials were openly critical of the Zimbabwean president. For example, Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a New York Times op-ed on 24 June 2003, wrote: “President Mugabe and his Politburo colleagues have an absolute monopoly of coercive power, but no legitimacy or moral authority.” He pledged increased US assistance to Zimbabwe only once “the president [was] gone.”30 Reacting to the Zimbabwe Democracy Bill, Mugabe again played the race card. He argued that the United States was motivated by racism and that at no point during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle did the United States support the war of liberation or contemplate drafting a bill against the Rhodesians who overthrew the Constitution through a declaration of unilateral independence. He also noted that the “right-wing” senators working with the opposition mdc were also those who kept the Rhodesian minority regime in power. In 2005, two American delegations visited Zimbabwe: one consisted of senior staffers from the US House of Representatives International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, the second consisted of the ambassador of the World Food Program. According to Scott Morgan, the meetings had dissimilar results. The congressional mission argued that lumping all the members of the government into the same group would result in there being no motivation for any official to change either her/his behaviour or Zimbabwe’s current

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direction. In contrast, Ambassador Hall concluded that the officials in Harare were uncooperative and that issues like triple-digit inflation, a high rate of hiv/aids, high unemployment, a failed harvest of maize (the main staple of the Zimbabwean diet), and a harsh political crackdown were clear impediments to the establishment of socioeconomic and political stability.31 Certain aspects of Zimbabwe’s security relations with the United States remain shrouded in confusion. For example, it has now been reported that the United States donated equipment worth $88,332,609 to the azf in 2003. This was just months after Mugabe won a controversial election that international observers insisted was inherently flawed.32 By 2007, many in the United States believed that the world was not taking the Zimbabwean situation seriously and that those who should be fighting Mugabe were doing so with kid gloves. For example, in its editorial of 14 February 2007, the Financial Times notes: The persistence of the crisis has dulled international senses to the looming danger that it could yet get far worse. South African and other regional leaders remain reluctant to weigh into issues that Mr Mugabe has cleverly manipulated around race. And there are signs in Europe of weakening resolve to isolate his regime. The United Nations has itself dropped attempts at promoting a more orderly post-Mugabe transition.33 Brett Schaefer identified a list of things the American government should consider in handling Zimbabwe. These include: strengthen and expand US sanctions, push for stronger international sanctions, press African nations to condemn Mugabe, and prepare for a postMugabe transition.34 A major accusation against the West, particularly Britain, is that it utilizes a “double standard” in dealing with Mugabe, especially with regard to democracy and human rights abuse. Basically, the accusation is that, even under the post-Cold War dispensation, Britain and the United States tolerated individuals whose human rights records were similar to those of Mugabe and had overlooked equally faulty elections in other African countries. Here again, parallels have been drawn with Nigeria (i.e., the nullification of the 12 June 1994 election conducted by the regime of President Ibrahim Babangida)35 and the activities of General Sani Abacha (especially the hanging of the

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writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni leaders who were fighting for the rights of Nigeria’s oil-producing regions). After the nullification of the Nigerian election result, the United States’s first reaction was to impose sanctions on the Nigerian military. The Clinton administration invoked Section 212 (f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to deny entry into the United States of senior Nigerian government officials and others who formulated, implemented, or benefitted from policies impeding Nigeria’s transition to democracy. The United States also suspended all military assistance and banned the sale and repair of military goods and refinery services to Nigeria. It also immediately cancelled the $11 million assistance package to Nigeria’s Ministry of Health as well as all government-to-government military assistance and training; it expelled the Nigerian military attaché in Washington as well as recalled his opposite number in Lagos; and it terminated other development assistance (except for humanitarian aid channelled through ngos).36 Although Britain too condemned the nullification of the election, it, like other European countries, continued arms sales to Nigeria. After Sani Abacha assumed power, Britain and the United States made efforts to mend the fence, provided he took concrete steps towards democracy in Nigeria. Reconciliation was still being considered when Abacha executed the Ogoni activists. Their hanging received global condemnation, and the United States immediately recalled Ambassador Walter Carrington from Nigeria. Britain also joined other countries in imposing sanctions on the Abacha regime. Britain and the United States certainly had different responses to both Mugabe and Abacha. It is thought that Britain was tough on Mugabe because he had taken policies against white farmers in Zimbabwe, whereas Abacha’s brutality was at least in line with British interests due to his support for Shell Oil. Although this is valid, it does not take into consideration Nigeria’s and Zimbabwe’s relationships with Britain at the time. Beyond extending condemnation and imposing mild sanctions, there was very little Britain could do against the Nigerian junta as it had nothing with which to threaten Abacha. This notwithstanding, it is certainly true that Nigeria’s oil supply to Britain could have given the country another reason for caution. With regard to Britain’s relationship with Zimbabwe, the latter was looking to Britain to fulfill a pledge. This gave Britain far more scope for effective action than it had in the case of Nigeria.

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Finally, it is also interesting to note how Abacha and Mugabe responded to British and American attitudes towards their respective domestic policies. While Abacha made very few pronouncements, Mugabe verbally confronted both countries, which, of course, further aggravated the relationship between them and Zimbabwe. However, while Mugabe remained critical of Britain and the United States and how they influenced the politics of security in Zimbabwe, he cherished his relationship with China. This is the subject of the next section. mugabe , zimbabwe , and china : the steadfastness of a trusted friend

The country that remained most loyal and most committed to Mugabe and his government throughout the period under study was China. This relationship had its roots in the support given to Mugabe and his zanu nationalist movement during the period of the independence struggle. After independence, Mugabe relied on the West for financial support and on China for ideological comradeship. Attempts were made to ensure that both lines of friendship were kept intact. Indeed, China was not allowed to play any major role in the military integration exercise, largely because Harare realized that the structures inherited from the Rhodesian Army – and, indeed, the military structures of most African countries – were more in line with Western military patterns. Again, China could have been excluded because of the cost of such an enterprise – cost that, at the time, China may not have been in a position to undertake. However, in order to ensure that communist ideology was infused into the new army, the North Koreans were brought in to assist in the establishment of the 5th Brigade. Once the government stabilized, and the zna was formed, Zimbabwe’s security relations with China continued along friendly lines, with China establishing close trading links with Zimbabwe and the latter relying on China for the supply of some military materials.37 While its antipathy towards the Soviet Union continued, Zimbabwe became much closer to some other members of the Eastern Bloc, notably China, Yugoslavia, and Romania. China, in particular, seemed determined to maintain its influence in the country. After its miscalculation in Angola, where it had supported the losing National Front for the Liberation of Angola, China wanted to regain a positive

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image in Southern Africa, and its support for zanu brought this opportunity. After Zimbabwean independence, China donated more than $12 million at zimcord – a fund-raising exercise organized by the Zimbabwean government shortly after independence.38 When Mugabe visited China in June 1981, an additional $1 billion was given as agricultural aid. It is important to note here that Chinese diplomacy has not been one of unreserved generosity. Apart from attempting to counter Soviet influence in the region, China also needed some specific commodities from Zimbabwe, such as chrome. When, at last, the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe decided to improve their relationship, there was no complaint from China. Other members of the Eastern Bloc with whom Zimbabwe had warm relations were Yugoslavia and Romania. In fact, Yugoslavia replaced the weapons lost during the explosion at the Inkomo Barracks (see chapter 4). The deposed leader of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, was honoured with Zimbabwe’s “Freedom of the City” award. Both of these countries had a long history of friendship with zanu, dating back to the liberation war. However, there is no evidence that there was a defence agreement among these countries against any attack, direct or indirect, from the Soviet Union. It is likely that Zimbabwe kept these friendships for two reasons: (1) to enhance its commitment to socialism and (2) to show its appreciation of their past support, which was being regularly updated with generous loans and aid.39 When the relationship between Mugabe and the West became tenuous, the need arose to be closer to China, especially with regard to economics and security. China got deeply involved in resource extraction, especially coal and ferrochrome, and became involved in infrastructure projects such as roads, mobile telephone networks, and the production and distribution of energy.40 Certainly, criticism from the West and from major international organizations pushed Zimbabwe closer to China, which provided the necessary backup that Mugabe needed in order to prevent the passing of any major un Security Council resolution against the country. While diplomatic assistance from Beijing was tolerated, albeit reluctantly, by the international community, controversy arose when it was revealed that Zimbabwe had ordered, and that China had supplied, arms and ammunitions. A Chinese ship, Au Yue Jiang, was discovered carrying arms to Zimbabwe. Among the arms on board the ship were an estimated 3 million rounds of ammunition and several

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thousand mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. Given Mugabe’s repressive use of government security apparatus, it was obvious that the imported Chinese arms would be used to further repress the Zimbabwean opposition. When news of the shipment reached the international community, South African dockworkers refused to allow the ship to dock as they knew that its contents would be transported to landlocked Zimbabwe. Ultimately, the ship had to return to China. Beijing argued that the order for the weapons had been made before the political crisis in the country began and that Zimbabwe was not under any form of un arms embargo. This argument did not, however, convince those who saw the Chinese action as an implicit endorsement of autocracy in Zimbabwe. China also argued that its policy in Zimbabwe had been implicitly endorsed by the African Union. It held that if the au criticized Zimbabwe, then China would do the same. Of course, many Western countries believed that this position was just an excuse for Beijing to exercise a policy that it wanted to pursue. China’s policy towards Zimbabwe was similar, in many respects, to its policy towards Sudan, where another controversial African leader, Omar Bashir, had been at the centre of global attention, especially that of the un Security Council. Here again, Beijing protected Bashir from key Security Council sanctions. What seemed to underline Chinese diplomacy in Zimbabwe was the desire to make economic headway while pursuing a policy of “non-interference” in the country’s internal affairs. Unfortunately, the West was in no position to criticize this policy because it was the same one that it had adopted over the years. Interestingly, the country that was most envious of China’s relationship with Zimbabwe, but that nevertheless occasionally joined Beijing in defending that country on the floor of the United Nations, was the Soviet Union (later Russia). mugabe , zimbabwe , and the soviet union : from recalcitrance to cooperation

A major perceived threat to Zimbabwean security during the early years of independence came from the Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree, some East European countries. This was because these countries had supported zapu during the liberation struggle. The Soviet Union was zapu’s strongest ally during the war, and its opposition

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to Mugabe and zanu was obvious. In fact, when Mugabe was about to leave Maputo for Rhodesia at the end of January 1980 for the independence election, ambassadors of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia in Mozambique boycotted the send-off ceremony organized by the Mozambican government. When he won the elections, he retaliated by not inviting these countries to Zimbabwe’s independence ceremony. Thus, Zimbabwe’s relationship with the Soviet Union started off on a cold note. The situation was such that negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries took almost a year to complete. The first finance minister of Zimbabwe, Enos Nkala, bluntly stated that the Soviet Union would not be allowed to open an embassy “until it [made] certain pledges.”41 In an interview with the London Observer on 9 March 1980, Mugabe subtly displayed his antipathy towards the Soviet Union. With respect to China, Yugoslavia, and Romania, he said: “we will continue to maintain and deepen our alliances with those who have been our truest friends.” While, with regard to relations with the Soviet Union, he said: “we will not deny them the right to come to a better relationship, but at the same time, we cannot prompt them if they don’t want to be our friends.”42 This indicates that Zimbabwe’s degree of intimacy with the Soviet Union depended, to a large extent, on the relationship between zapu and zanu. zapu reacted angrily to Mugabe’s initially cold attitude towards the Soviet Union. The party argued that, as long as Zimbabwe had diplomatic relations with the United States and not with the Soviet Union, any claim it made to being non-aligned would be “a disgraceful self-contradiction”. Full diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and the Soviet Union were, however, established on 18 February 1981, after intensive negotiations, which, according to the Zimbabwean foreign minister, “involved a wide-ranging review of past relations.”43 In June 1981, four diplomats from the Soviet Union came to Harare to set up an embassy. The final terms of the agreement called for the Soviet Union to cut all ties with zapu. In a relevant clause, it was stated that neither of the two countries would “enter into an agreement or negotiation or arrangement with any organization without prior consultation and [the] explicit approval of each government.”44 This clause was understood to be aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from giving aid to zapu.

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The perception of threat from the Soviet Union can be explained in a number of ways, all of which were linked to the external politics during the time of Zimbabwe’s liberation war. Of all the countries that supported zapu during that war, the Soviet Union was the most formidable, and this was corroborated by some of its activities following Zimbabwe’s independence. Shortly after independence, the Soviet Union was said to have continued sending consignments of arms to zapu through Zambia.45 This was not unknown to the Mugabe government, and Mugabe believed that the arms were meant to assist zapu in any future insurrection against zanu.46 Also, for some months after Zimbabwe became independent, the Soviet Union continued to treat zapu with a courtesy reserved only for sovereign nations. For example, zapu continued to have an “embassy” in Moscow. It was only during the negotiations preceding the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries that this “embassy” was closed down. Finally, during the court proceedings against zipra guerrillas over the arms cache, it was alleged that one of the accused persons, Dumiso Dabengwa, had been in constant touch with the Soviet kgb. While none of this proved that the Soviet Union was trying to destabilize Zimbabwe, it is fair to argue that it provided justifiable grounds for concern. Still, since the normalization of relations between the two countries, things remained cordial. The establishment of this cordial relationship underscores the influence of internal politics on Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. Once Mugabe became convinced of a complete break in the Soviet relationship with zapu, Zimbabwe’s relationship with the Soviet Union took a turn for the better. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia continued to be tactful with regard to the controversy surrounding land tenure as well as with regard to the struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe. It made no criticism of Mugabe throughout this entire period, even if it offered him no official endorsement. Russia joined China in vetoing un Security Council resolutions that were detrimental to the Mugabe administration. In the 2008 resolution, the Russian foreign minister specifically noted: “Zimbabwe did not pose a threat to regional, let alone international, peace and security and therefore did not warrant adoption of un sanction”.47 The Sino-Russian position on the subject of Zimbabwe has always frustrated Britain and the United States. The close relationship that now exists between the Mugabe administration and Russia is the result of similar ideology rather

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than of genuine Russian support for Mugabe’s policies. Zimbabwe’s ostracization by the West, which resulted in its “Look East” policy, occurred just as Russia was becoming deeply interested in African markets. Zimbabwe is particularly important to Moscow’s strategy because it is able to supply Russia with uranium and coal. In October 2006, Moscow signed six agreements with Harare – in the power, aviation, and mining sectors – worth $300 million. It was widely speculated that Mugabe was thinking of discussing the possibility of Russia’s stationing troops in Zimbabwe.48 Such a military dispatch, were it ever agreed upon, would likely consist of a small, symbolic force whose purpose would be to deter any external attempt to overthrow Mugabe. One country that does not fit easily within the East/West division, but with which Zimbabwe had to effect a security policy during its early years of independence, is Israel. Zimbabwe had inherited a position that had been maintained by most of the members of the old Organization of African Unity, which forbade the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.49 Mugabe had another reason to be cautious about Israel: it had close diplomatic and military links with apartheid South Africa. Israel came to the fore of security considerations when Bishop Abel Muzorewa, after a “Bible Study” trip to that country, arrived back in Zimbabwe and criticized Harare’s stance on Israel. He also called for the immediate establishment of diplomatic links with Israel. In response, Bishop Muzorewa was detained, although he was released shortly afterwards. The remarkable thing about Mugabe’s stance on Israel is that it did not evoke any major domestic reaction, either from zapu or from the whites. The minor issue raised by Bishop Muzorewa soon died down, and, after his release from detention, he never again made any serious call for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. Israel alone may not have been a threat to Zimbabwe, but it could have become a threat had it, for example, liaised with Muzorewa to cause problems for the Mugabe administration. There could be no doubt (at least during the early years of independence) that Muzorewa, though a politically spent force, could still work up some nuisance value. Thus, if Muzorewa were flirting with Israel, then Israel needed to be watched. Another indication that Israel needed to be watched was the March 1988 confession of renamo’s former head of information in Europe, Paulo Oliveira, that Israel had assisted in training renamo dissidents.50 This is believed to

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have greatly improved the tactics used by the rebels.51 Also, it was quite possible to think that Israel might capitalize on the tension between Zimbabwe and South Africa (see chapter 5). Besides, with regard to Israel, as far as Zimbabwe was concerned, “the friend of my enemy is my enemy.” conclusion

President Mugabe was (and is) determined to hold on to power in the face of any form of external threat. His perception of the degree of external threat (or friendship) is determined more by the strength of his grip on domestic security than by any possible diplomatic consideration. For example, Mugabe’s perception of threat from the Soviet Union was greater when there was conflict in Matabeleland, and his perception of threat from Britain was greater during the farm invasions. Similarly, Mugabe’s friendship with China increased because China ensured that the loyalty it showed to zanu during the war of liberation deepened through its continued financial support and tacit encouragement of his domestic security policies. President Mugabe’s role in determining Zimbabwe’s response to non-African countries and organizations indicates that there really is no distinction between “Zimbabwe” and “Mugabe.” However, his impact on external security in Zimbabwe may be better appreciated when one considers his relationship with key international organizations. This is the topic of chapter 7.

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Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s Security, and International Organizations

As noted in chapter 1, Zimbabwe’s independence owes a lot to the collective goodwill of many international organizations. Indeed, the effort to liberate the country and other dependent countries in the region was the antecedent of one of the regional organizations that was to play a prominent role in the affairs of Southern Africa.1 It is, however, one of the greatest ironies of post-independence Zimbabwe history that virtually all the key international organizations that played a role in the birth of the country had, by the end of the second decade of its independence, become concerned about President Robert Mugabe’s management of affairs, especially domestic security and external military engagement. In this chapter, I look at five major organizations: (1) the Southern African Development Community (sadc); (2) the African Union (au) and its predecessor the Organization of African Unity (oau); (3) the Commonwealth; (4) the United Nations (un); and (5) the European Union (eu). While Zimbabwe belonged to the first four, the fifth, for a whole range of reasons, has been connected with the affairs of most African countries. One thing that stands out about this list of organizations is the cross-cutting nature of their membership. For example, four of Zimbabwe’s immediate neighbours all belong to the four organizations to which Zimbabwe also belonged.2 This meant that the same issues that underlined the bilateral relationship between Zimbabwe and these countries (see chapter 4) often emerged within the politics of these organizations. In this chapter I discuss how these organizations have reacted to the changing nature of domestic and regional security issues involving the Mugabe administration and how, in turn, Mugabe has

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reacted to their policy positions. I put forth three interrelated arguments. The first is that Mugabe’s relationship with key international organizations from 1980 to 2009 was determined more by whether they were willing to tolerate his domestic and external policies rather than by his own willingness to adhere to their principles. My second argument is that, while it was possible for the Mugabe administration to have its way during the early years, largely because of concessions for the circumstances of the country’s emergence, things ultimately changed when Mugabe’s domestic and regional activities continued to cause international concern. My third argument is that Mugabe prioritized the “importance” of these organizations according to the extent that the concepts of “race” and “Pan-Africanism” could be exploited to justify his domestic policies. Having realized that what was of most interest to these organizations were (1) his position on farm seizures and (2) the issue of democracy and human rights violations, Mugabe played the “race” and the “anti-imperialist” cards. He attempted, for example, to play the Commonwealth and the eu against African countries and organizations, while also attempting to play the Pan-Africanist card to unite members of African-based organizations behind his cause. international organizations and the changing stance on domestic politics

Virtually all international organizations have undergone significant changes in the last three decades, and this has affected how they have reacted to domestic policies in developing societies. Broadly, two main reasons account for the changes that have occurred in their approach to political developments in Africa. The first is the end of the Cold War, which had coloured the politics of global diplomacy for several decades. The organization most affected by the end of the Cold War was the un. Indeed, after the Cold War, key issues, which had been difficult to solve due to super-power rivalries, became amenable to solution. Consider, for example, the Angolan crisis.3 Apart from the un, another organization whose policies towards developing nations were changed as a result of the end of the Cold War was the eu. Again, the organization realized that the best way to advance the interest of democratic values was to support the un and to provide encouragement to those countries in the developing

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world that were moving towards multi-party democracies. Specifically, the eu maintains: “democracy and human rights are universal values that should be vigorously promoted around the world.”4 The eu believes that “effective work on poverty alleviation and conflict prevention and resolution [were important in themselves], in addition to being valuable bulwarks against terrorism.”5 In line with this, the eu has developed cooperation agreements with many African states; indeed, as of 2010, only six African countries did not have agreements with the eu.6 Specifically, the eu has current projects in Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru, Mutare, and Masvingo. The second reason that these organizations changed their policies has to do with the fact that some of the primary reasons for their formation had disappeared, and they realized that they either had to readjust to global changes or lose their relevance. The organization that seemed to be most affected most by these changes was the sadc, an organization that was formed largely as a means of fighting apartheid South Africa’s economic domination of the region. Once apartheid ended and South Africa gained independence, it became necessary for the sadc to turn its attention to issues like domestic security, democracy, and human rights. New structures were established to address regional security and, increasingly, the organization began towing the same line as its West African counterpart, the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas). The same tendency may be seen in the oau, which realized that, with the end of colonialism in Africa, its relevance was becoming limited. One of the central issues that united African countries for most of the first three decades of independence was the desire to eradicate colonialism. With the end of colonial rule in the continent, it was necessary to shift focus. The end of the Cold War also signalled the need for change, and the only logical direction for the oau was to move towards the path of multi-party democracy, economic development, and regional integration. When the oau eventually metamorphosed into the au, these values were given prominence.7 The same thinking was behind the Commonwealth’s change of direction.8 With the independence of Namibia and South Africa, the Commonwealth felt that it had completed its task of imperial trusteeship and that new challenges were needed to ensure its continued relevance. Zimbabwe was caught between all these changes, and, as new developments began to alter the positions of these various organizations, the country was forced to adjust to changes whose course and

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pace it could neither control nor alter. Zimbabwe and its leadership were forced to devise strategies that would enable them to continue holding positions that protected their interests but that ran counter to the new directions in which these organizations were moving. The first organizations to be encountered in this bid to strike a balance between the changing approach of international organizations and Zimbabwe’s static approach to domestic and regional politics was the sadc. mugabe , zimbabwe security , and the sadc

From the moment the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (sadcc), the precursor of the sadc, was formed, Mugabe saw it as a tool to be used in his struggle against apartheid. Although Zimbabwe’s membership in the organization did not bring about any aggressive policy towards the apartheid regime, the fact that Zimbabwe found itself in the midst of nations facing similar military and economic threats was enough for it to pledge its commitment to the organization. Consequently, throughout the period the sadcc was committed to the independence struggle in South Africa, it earned Mugabe and Zimbabwe’s greatest commitment. Another reason Mugabe got on well with the sadcc during the early years was that he was able to dominate its affairs, albeit in a subtle way. Even though, as shown in chapter 4, there were issues between Zimbabwe and some of the other countries, these were largely bilateral and they tried not to bring it to the level of the sadcc. Even after the independence of both Namibia and South Africa removed the unifying force behind the sadcc, the euphoria that all its members experienced due to the conviction that its two new members would enhance regional economic growth overshadowed any proper scrutiny of the internal affairs of member states. For Mugabe, the main advantage of the sadcc during Zimbabwe’s early years was that it could be used to gain additional protection from South Africa’s destabilization activities, especially in the area of economic liberation. Indeed, there was a link between the sadcc’s activities and Zimbabwe’s efforts to fight the blackmail coming from its dependence on South African ports. The organization was considered by Harare as the economic wing of the Frontline States, which was fighting the various security ramifications of South Africa’s destabilization policies. Within this framework, Mugabe remained

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committed to the sadcc but was careful not to stretch rhetorical condemnation to a level that would have attracted a physical response from apartheid South Africa. Cracks began to emerge in Mugabe’s relationship with the sadcc shortly after South Africa became independent. With its sophisticated economy, it military strength, its population, and the affection that greeted its birth, South Africa inevitably displaced Zimbabwe as the regional power centre. The affection that greeted Nelson Mandela’s release from prison and his subsequent election as the president of South Africa also meant that he would overshadow Mugabe in the affairs of the sadcc. Mugabe’s resentment of this was to be one of the most important determinants of Zimbabwe’s security links with the sadc. Broadly, four security issues were relevant to bringing the sadc into Zimbabwe’s considerations: (1) renamo activities, (2) the intervention of Zimbabwe in the drc, (3) the controversy surrounding the land question, and (4) the disputes surrounding the elections and the attendant allegations of human rights abuses. The renamo issue was the first security issue that connected Zimbabwe’s security to the sadc, and the fact that Zimbabwe’s position concurred with the sadc’s meant that there was no controversy. The sadc realized that renamo wanted to wreck the economy of key black countries in the region at the insistence of South Africa; indeed, it was for this reason that the sadc was established in the first place. Throughout the time Zimbabwe was militarily engaged in Mozambique, it got all the diplomatic support it required from the sadc. Indeed, the sadc was thankful to Zimbabwe for committing troops to the venture. This was, however, where the consensus ended, and most other issues that connected Zimbabwe with the sadc were subjects of controversy. The second security issue – Zimbabwe’s intervention in the drc – was far more controversial than was the renamo issue. The situation in the drc was particularly complex, and the justification for and circumstances of Zimbabwe’s involvement in the conflict were controversial. The drc had joined the sadc during the course of its conflict. This enabled the country to invoke the sadc treaty, which qualifies a member for assistance if it faces external challenge. Since drc president Laurent Kabila interpreted the conflict in his country as an attempt by his former allies (Rwanda and Uganda) to take control of the drc and its enormous resources, he sought sadc

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assistance to fight this aggression. The interpretation of this clause remains a matter of opinion, especially with regard to the extent to which there was an actual an external aggression against the drc. In August 1998, Zimbabwe announced, on behalf of the sadc, that a decision had been taken to send troops to the drc to support the beleaguered Laurent Kabila. Zimbabwe’s defence minister, Moven Mahachi, claimed that the decision was “unanimous” and that it was targeted at Uganda and Rwanda. Further, in a televised broadcast on 18 August 1998, Mugabe announced that the decision would be enacted at the “soonest” opportunity. It is important to note that the defence ministers meeting over the matter took place in Harare and was attended only by the defence ministers from Angola, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Five other countries were represented by more junior ministers, while South Africa was represented by its acting high commissioner to Zimbabwe. Even at this stage it was suspected that Zimbabwe was trying to get the sadc to pursue an agenda that served its own interest. In the first place, there were serious doubts as to whether the Council of Defence Ministers had the right to commit the organization to a military engagement without the endorsement of the sadc Council of Heads of State and Governments. The rush between the time the decision was taken by the defence ministers and Mugabe’s broadcast to the nation raised questions as to whose interests it was serving. It should not be taken as a mere coincidence that all the countries that later intervened in the drc had been fully represented at the sadc by their ministers. Furthermore, with regard to the claim that the decision had been unanimous, as it later transpired South Africa and Botswana had both opposed it. Finally, as of the time the decision to intervene was taken, a verification mission comprised of four sadc ministers was still in the drc attempting to ascertain the extent to which Kabila’s allegations against Rwanda and Uganda were correct. In short, when Zimbabwe decided to intervene in the drc, there were serious concerns that its intentions were coloured by expectations of personal advantage. Once Zimbabwe and other countries had sent troops into the drc, there was little the sadc could do except to have key members (like South Africa) openly declare that they would not be jumping on the bandwagon. SADC’s intervention in the drc may be compared to ecowas’s intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. After bitter civil conflicts had engulfed the two West African nations, ecowas, which, like the

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sadc, had originally been formed to address economic issues – dispatched a regional peacekeeping mission to both countries. While, as with the sadc and the drc, there was no complete agreement among ecowas members regarding the decision to send troops, all recognized that the situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone required urgent attention.9 ecowas was able to have considerable success in these interventions because the country that served as the regional hegemon, Nigeria, supported the initiative. This was not the case with the sadc’s intervention in the drc, where the military power, South Africa, was against the intervention. Second, the extent of personal economic interests in the ecowas intervention cannot be compared with that of the sadc’s intervention in the drc. Although allegations later surfaced that there could have been personal economic interest on the part of some West African leaders, these surfaced long after the intervention had begun and were not its primary motivation. This was not the case with the sadc’s intervention in the drc, where, from the outset, the motivation had been questionable. Finally, ecowas, unlike the sadc, had a clear mandate that legitimized its intervention. While controversies continued over the drc involvement, Zimbabwe’s domestic issues began to feature prominently in the sadc agenda. The first was the issue of land. While to a large extent the sadc recognized the farm seizures as an internal affair of Zimbabwe, it was also worried that its consequences could affect developments in other countries. For this reason, the sadc, while not criticizing Mugabe openly, privately cautioned him regarding the consequences of his actions. Also, because the farm seizures did not violate any known sadc clause all the organization could do was to issue informal notes of caution. Mugabe’s strategy was to keep the sadc officially out of the land controversy issue. Although he knew that he had sympathy from Namibia and Angola, Mugabe would not want the criticism that would have almost certainly come from Botswana and South Africa to be expressed on the floors of the sadc. It was thus in his best interest to ensure that discussion remained informal. This sort of relative indifference from the sadc did not apply to the issue of elections and human rights in Zimbabwe. The sadc charter specifically recognizes democracy as one of the values it holds in enormous esteem, and the constant calls by the opposition mdc for the sadc to call Mugabe to order could not be perpetually

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ignored. The sadc had no choice but to discuss the Zimbabwe situation. Also, the fact that the election controversy, unlike the land acquisition controversy, could have resulted in civil war and/or created a massive refugee crisis also meant that there was a limit to which Mugabe could prevent its discussion on the floor of the sadc. Again, the divisions within the sadc meant that it could not come up with a united decision against Mugabe regarding the alleged election irregularities and human rights abuses. It would appear that Mugabe realized all along that the sadc would not impose any serious sanctions, even if its individual members might be critical. Also, given the wider criticism Mugabe was receiving from organizations such as the eu and the Commonwealth, the sadc had not wanted to exert additional pressure that might have given the impression that Mugabe was completely “friendless.” A comparison of how ecowas addressed the situation in Côte d’Ivoire with the way the sadc addressed the situation in Zimbabwe may be in order here. Although the contexts are slightly different, some parallels can be drawn. After an election that had widely been considered to be free and fair, Allassane Quattara, the opposition leader in Côte d’Ivoire, defeated the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo. However, as in the case of Zimbabwe, the sitting president refused to vacate office, with his supporters both inside and outside the military taking laws into their own hands and closing all the country’s borders. ecowas subsequently decided to apply the provisions of Article 45 of the ecowas Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in order to impose sanctions on Côte d’Ivoire as well as to suspend it from all ecowas decision-making bodies. It also suggested that “legitimate force” could be used if Gbagbo continued his intransigence. The continued presence of Gbagbo as president forced ecowas to involve the un Security Council. The subsequent French military mission, which ultimately removed Gbagbo from power, received ecowas’s tacit endorsement. However, although ecowas maintained an unequivocal position on Côte d’Ivoire, there was at least one dissenting voice. President Yahyah Jammeh of Gambia distanced himself from the ecowas position and refused to attend the summits on Côte d’Ivoire, claiming that ecowas had ignored the constitutional legality of Côte d’Ivoire’s victory “because of pressure from some Western powers whose vested interests in the natural resources of Côte d’Ivoire [was] an open secret.”10

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This shows a remarkable difference between ecowas and the sadc, which dithered over how to ensure that the electoral wishes of Zimbabweans were respected. A number of reasons account for the differences in the positions of these organizations with respect to similar issues. First, ecowas, unlike the sadc, was more experienced in conflict management and, after having experienced bitter civil conflicts that emerged as a result of bad governance, was not ready to allow any of its members to back policies that were flagrantly opposed to the wishes of the population. This was particularly the case with Côte d’Ivoire, which had been at the forefront of regional attention for more than a decade. Given its relative stability, the sadc could afford to slap any of its erring members on the wrist. Second, Mugabe was too strong for the sadc to handle and, given the support the organization believed he had from his military, there was very little that could be done to him. Also, unlike in the case of ecowas with regard to Gambia, with the organization having only one dissenting voice, quite a number of sadc countries supported Mugabe. Third, the position of the hegemons in both regions affected the decisions ecowas and the sadc could take. With ecowas, Nigeria was clearly against Gbagbo (and its president was actually the ecowas chairperson during the period of the election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire), while South Africa, the sadc’s undisputed leader, was ambivalent with regard to Zimbabwe. mugabe , african union , and zimbabwe ’ s security

The main security issues that brought Zimbabwe to the attention of the sadc – involvement in the civil wars in Mozambique and the drc and the domestic issues surrounding the farm seizures and suppression of democratic agitations – were not issues that featured very prominently in the affairs of the Organization of African Unity or even those of its successor organization, the African Union. Indeed, it was not until the au summit of December 2008, after the mdc had withdrawn from the run-off and Mugabe had won unchallenged that these issues became dominant in au deliberations. There are a number of possible reasons for the au’s initial lack of interest. First, external intervention in Mozambique was something that had the implicit endorsement of the oau, especially since the Mozambican rebel group, renamo, was widely regarded as a continental embarrassment, and any assistance for hapless Mozambique was

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particularly welcomed. This meant that Zimbabwe’s intervention in the Mozambican civil war was, as far as the oau was concerned, a commendable action. With regard to its intervention in the drc, the situation was somewhat more complex. The external intervention in the conflict divided the African continent, and the au was reluctant to condemn any of the countries involved. Consequently, Mugabe, as well as most of the other leaders who intervened in the war in the drc, escaped with very mild (or no) criticism from the au. When the domestic security situation in Zimbabwe first started showing signs of difficulties – with the forceful occupation of white farms – the au did not give any serious indication of wanting to be critical of Mugabe. It is likely that the relative indifference of the au was predicated upon the wide condemnation coming of Mugabe coming from Western countries, especially Britain and the United States. It is an unwritten rule among African leaders that they close ranks the moment any of them is subjected to any form of nonAfrican vilification. While it was possible that many of members of the au disagreed with Mugabe’s policies, the nature and extent of Western criticism made it difficult for them to be seen to be in the same boat with external critics of an African “brother.”11 So, quite unwittingly, the Western world ensured continental support for Mugabe. Although a number of African countries accepted the expelled white farmers into their countries and gave them land to farm, they did not criticize Mugabe. Also, it is important to note that there were many people across the African continent who supported Mugabe and saw him as a radical leader who dared to defy the West. Mugabe, for his part, did all he could to reinforce the image of himself as a champion of the African cause, fighting against attempts by Western “colonialists” to take over land in Zimbabwe. It is also important to point out that land is undoubtedly the most important natural resource in Africa. Its importance is not only economic but also social, spiritual, and political. Among other things, it is considered as the place of “birth,” the place where the ancestors are laid to “rest,” the place that the “creator” designated to be passed down to successive generations, and the final “resting place” for every child born upon it. Consequently, every society in Africa sees land as a natural resource that is held in trust for future generations, and the sacredness of this trust is what lies behind most of the conflicts over land in the continent. Many people across Africa thus saw Mugabe’s cause as just.

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This perception changed, however, after it became clear to many African countries that Mugabe’s attempt to suppress internal political opposition had wider security implications. Once this became obvious, the advantage Mugabe had exploited dissipated, and many African countries realized that they could not be indifferent to the developments in Zimbabwe. From late 2007, Zimbabwe began to feature in the discussions of the au. This reached its peak when the situation in the country dominated the au’s deliberations at the Cairo Conference in December 2008. At the Egypt Summit, African countries were divided into three groups: (1) those that were openly opposed to Mugabe and called for tough sanctions against him, (2) those that were concerned about developments in Zimbabwe and felt that the situation should be addressed before it exploded into something more serious, and (3) those that believed that Mugabe was not out of order and that he should be left alone to manage the affairs of his country. To a large extent, the reactions of some of the countries reflected their own domestic situations. One of the most vociferous calls for Mugabe to leave office came from Kenyan prime minister Ralia Odinga, who himself had been cheated of victory in a controversial election and had only been brought back to power through a controversial power-sharing deal. Odinga said that the au should send a peacekeeping mission to Zimbabwe to monitor the election, arguing that the au would be setting a dangerous precedent if it accepted Mugabe as the duly elected president of Zimbabwe.12 Even Mozambique was believed to be somewhat sympathetic to those who opposed Mugabe. While it did not openly criticize Mugabe, it agreed to host some of the white farmers who had left that country. Another country that had historically supported Mugabe and his zanu-pf, Tanzania, also condemned the violence in Zimbabwe without strongly criticizing Mugabe and his government. Angolan president Dos Santos, a known ally of Mugabe, urged the Zimbabwean leadership to end the violence. But Mugabe had other supporters as well. For example, Namibia did not criticize the violence in Zimbabwe. And Gambia and Equatorial Guinea openly supported Mugabe. This should not be surprising, especially as both Gambia and Equatorial Guinea were being criticized for suppressing democracy. At one stage, there were calls for some form of military intervention in Zimbabwe. However, au chairman and Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete Rweyemamu said that sending peacekeeping troops

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to Zimbabwe or removing Mugabe by force were not options as this would not have been acceptable to South Africa, the regional military power. In the end, at its July 2008 meeting in Cairo, the au recognized Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe but said that au observers had concluded that the election process had fallen short of the organization’s standards. The au attempted to placate the situation, but it offered no serious condemnation. Nor, significantly, did it offer any endorsement. At the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting in Egypt, the au called for a government of national unity and suggested that the sadc facilitate it. This was the best Mugabe could have expected, and it is not surprising that he expressed no objection to it. Mugabe’s main strategy towards the au involved playing the PanAfricanist card. He calculated, quite correctly, that the au would most likely take its cue from the sadc, and the moment he succeeded in dividing the sadc, it became difficult for the au to come up with any coherent policy against his administration. While Mugabe realized that the au was of very little relevance compared to other organizations, he still felt strongly that he needed its support in order to give the impression that he had African backing against the “imperialist” onslaught of Western countries. With the au having shown a certain amount of understanding, the race card became a strong factor in dealing with organizations that had a diverse membership, like the Commonwealth. mugabe , zimbabwe ’ s security , and the commonwealth

The Commonwealth, like other organizations, was extremely well disposed towards Zimbabwe for most of the country’s first decade. It saw the new country as a symbol of its decolonization strategy and as an indication that Namibia and South Africa might soon be added to the list of cases in which diplomacy triumphed over militancy. Like the sadc, Mugabe did not, at the time of independence, envisage any serious problems with the Commonwealth. Apart from the fact that the organization was the main diplomatic battleground for the struggle for Zimbabwe’s independence, Zimbabwe seemed to have some affection towards the British monarch, Elizabeth II, who was the head of the organization, even if it had disagreements with successive prime ministers in Whitehall. Furthermore, it would appear that the Commonwealth showed considerable sympathy

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towards Zimbabwe as it did not criticize any of Mugabe’s more controversial policies. For example, it did not criticize his handling of the affairs in Matabeleland. The relationship between the Commonwealth and Zimbabwe continued to be so cordial that a decisive meeting – a meeting that reordered the priorities of the organization – took place in Harare. Because the declaration that came out of this meeting, known widely as the Harare Declaration, was important to the future of Zimbabwe’s relationship with the Commonwealth, a brief discussion of it is necessary. Although the declaration did not specifically address security, all the issues that it does address are at the root of conflicts among member states. Specifically, the Harare Declaration updated the principles that formed the basis of the Commonwealth. The organization was to “apply those principles in the contemporary situation as [it] prepare[ed] to face the challenges of the 1990s and beyond.” With the end of the Cold War, the organization realized that the international environment had changed and that it must react accordingly. Consequently, the Commonwealth leaders came up with the following desiderata: • the protection and promotion of the fundamental political values

of the Commonwealth; • democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect

national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government; • fundamental human rights, including equal rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless of race, colour, creed or political belief; • equality for women, so that they may exercise their full and equal rights; • provision of universal access to education for the population of our countries; • continuing action to bring about the end of apartheid and the establishment of a free, democratic, non-racial and prosperous South Africa; • the promotion of sustainable development and the alleviation of poverty in the countries of the Commonwealth through: – a stable international economic framework within which growth can be achieved; – sound economic management recognizing the central role of the market economy;

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– effective population policies and programmes; – sound management of technological change; – the freest possible flow of multilateral trade on terms fair and equitable to all, taking account of the special requirements of developing countries; – an adequate flow of resources from the developed to developing countries, and action to alleviate the debt burdens of developing countries most in need; – the development of human resources, in particular through education, training, health, culture, sport and programmes for strengthening family and community support, paying special attention to the needs of women, youth and children; – effective and increasing programmes of bilateral and multilateral cooperation aimed at raising living standards; • extending the benefits of development within a framework of respect for human rights; • the protection of the environment through respect for the principles of sustainable development enunciated at Langkawi; • action to combat drug trafficking and abuse and communicable diseases; • help for small Commonwealth states in tackling their particular economic and security problems; • support of the United Nations and other international institutions in the world’s search for peace, disarmament and effective arms control; and in the promotion of international consensus on major global political, economic and social issues.13 Even after the Harare Declaration, Mugabe continued to champion the cause of the Commonwealth, invoking the wrath of the organization on erring members. For example, after the Abacha administration’s execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in Nigeria, Mugabe was highly critical of the Nigerian government, specifically warning the country that it was headed towards complete confusion.14 Mugabe’s relationship with the Commonwealth changed as a result of a combination of events that occurred simultaneously in Zimbabwe, Britain, and within the Commonwealth. First, within Zimbabwe, domestic pressure was mounting on the Mugabe administration, and the mdc, which for years had been uncoordinated, was beginning to come up with coherent opposition. Consequently, Mugabe began to implement policies that went against the Harare

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Declaration, including a clampdown on racial and political minorities. It was around this time that the Mugabe government began making more demands on the British government to finance the land acquisition exercise. Within Britain, the key country in the Commonwealth, a Labour government had taken over and was determined to ensure that proper explanations were provided for its financing the farm seizures in Zimbabwe. Within the Commonwealth there had emerged a very strong team that was determined to ensure that democracy and good governance were able to thrive in Africa. For example, South Africa had become a key member of the organization, and Nigeria had shed the military dictatorship that had resulted in its suspension from the Commonwealth. These countries were at the forefront of what could be called the African democracy brigade within the Commonwealth, and they were encouraged and supported by countries like New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. There is also no doubt that Zimbabwe’s problem with the Commonwealth was connected with the larger problem that the Mugabe administration had with the British government. For its part, Britain was determined to ensure that the Zimbabwean issue remained at the top of the Commonwealth agenda. Two domestic security issues put Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth on a collision course. These were the farm invasion issue and Mugabe’s stand on democracy and human rights. The Commonwealth’s position on the land issue was that the Mugabe government had to respect property rights. The Commonwealth believed that the whole issue was degenerating into a security problem because of the government’s support for farm occupation. With regard to democracy and human rights, the Commonwealth believed that Mugabe was falling short of the Harare Declaration and that, through peaceful negotiation, Zimbabwe had to be made to fall in line. In this context, representatives of the Zimbabwean government met members of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group in Abuja in September 2001, where it was agreed that Harare would stop the violence on the farms, prevent the invasion of further farms, stop the suppression of the opposition, and uphold human rights. The situation was still fluid when the 2002 election was held. The Commonwealth sent observers to Zimbabwe and their verdict was that the elections had been marred by the violence that had occurred in the run up. Specifically, there were complaints about the activities of paramilitary youth groups that had apparently intimidated

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opponents of the ruling party, especially the mdc. In its conclusion, the Commonwealth noted that “the elections did not adequately allow for a free expression of will by the electors” and that they were in violation of fundamental Commonwealth values and principles,15 most notably those set out in the 1991 Harare Declaration. Political and security developments in Zimbabwe continued to occupy the attention of the Commonwealth, and, despite the fact that global attention was being focused on the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, Commonwealth members kept developments in Zimbabwe at the top of their agenda. A three-person committee comprising John Howard (of Australia), Olusegun Obasanjo (of Nigeria), and Thabo Mbeki (of South Africa) was set up to look at the situation in Zimbabwe and to investigate the extent to which the country had violated the Harare Declaration. Zimbabwe was found to have violated the declaration by holding elections that had been neither free nor fair. Consequently, the country was suspended from the Commonwealth for one year. The committee, however, also recommended that the Commonwealth should assist Zimbabwe with its land reform program and promote national reconciliation, particularly between the mdc and zanu-pf. The Commonwealth also had another group working on the Zimbabwe problem. This consisted of a high-level delegation of heads of state and a six-nation committee charged with suggesting ways to improve the political situation in Zimbabwe. The committee comprised South Africa, Australia, Canada, India, Jamaica, and Mozambique. This group recommended that Zimbabwe repeal legislation that limited freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly; end the harassment of opposition and civil society groups; and cooperate with Commonwealth observer teams. Zimbabwe’s suspension was renewed for another year, and in December 2003 Mugabe withdrew the country from the Commonwealth. But the Zimbabwean situation was difficult for the Commonwealth, and it brought out differences between African and NonAfrican members of the organization. For example, the decision to extend the suspension of the country was not unanimous, with several African countries arguing for Zimbabwe’s reinstatement. This was violently opposed by British prime minister Tony Blair, who described the suggestion as “defending the indefensible.”16 The cause

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of those advocating a soft approach was not helped by the increase in farm seizures, the expulsion of foreign aid agencies, and the violent suppression of dissent. Again, the sympathy that South African president Thabo Mbeki was believed to have had for President Mugabe (see chapter 4) may have been played out in Commonwealth diplomacy. Indeed, it was widely believed that Mbeki was extremely reluctant to endorse Zimbabwe’s initial suspension from the organization, and he suspected that Secretary General Don McKinnon was behind the plan. At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (chogm) in Abuja in December 2003, Mbeki attempted to ensure that McKinnon did not get re-elected, and he encouraged the Sri Lankan foreign minister to run, even though it was the convention that a serving secretary general would not be challenged if he or she chose to serve for a second term. The effort to remove McKinnon failed as Mbeki was only supported by eleven members. McKinnon received forty votes, including eleven from Africa. The timing of the Commonwealth’s controversial relationship with President Mugabe should be seen within the context of the organization’s relationship with another African leader, Sani Abacha of Nigeria. Abacha’s falling out with the Commonwealth is similar to Mugabe’s. While Abacha attempted to metamorphose from a military president to a civilian president, Nigeria engaged in gross human rights violations. The Commonwealth’s immediate cause for concern, however, was the hanging of writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists who had fought Shell Oil’s environmental atrocities in Ogoniland. The killing of the Ogoni activists, which was carried out despite global appeals, occurred during the Commonwealth conference in Auckland, New Zealand. The Commonwealth, whose secretary general at the time was, ironically enough, Nigerian Emeka Anyaokwu, immediately suspended Nigeria. Table 7.1 offers a comparison between how the Commonwealth managed Mugabe and how it managed Abacha. The security situation in Zimbabwe continued to attract the interest of the Commonwealth even after the country had withdrawn from the organization. Another organization that continued to take an interest in Zimbabwe’s security issues during the period under study was the un.

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Table 7.1 Comparing the Commonwealth’s reactions to two recalcitrant members: Mugabe and Abacha Subject

Mugabe

Abacha

Cause of friction

(i) Faulty election (ii) Intimidation of opposition (iii) Violation of property rights

(i) Human rights violations (ii) Hanging of Ogoni 9 activists agitating for better treatment of Nigeria’s oilproducing regions.

Immediate Commonwealth response

Setting up of committee to investigate and report back to the chogom

Setting up of committee to investigate and report back to the chogom

Punishment

Initial suspension for one year, which was later renewed for another year

Initial suspension for one year

Position of the Secretariat

Forceful and unequivocal, with the secretary general widely believed to be against President Mugabe

Forceful and unequivocal but with the secretary general in a difficult position because of his being a Nigerian

Position of members

Members somewhat divided, with most black members showing understanding, if not outright support, for Mugabe, and with many of the white members openly opposed.

Members mostly united in their criticism of action, especially as they saw the hanging of the Ogoni activists during a Commonwealth conference (despite the organization’s appeals for clemency) as an act of defiance against the organization

Response of leaders

Focussed attacks on Britain and other white members of the organization, with accusations of racism

Focused attacks on key African leaders, especially President Nelson Mandela, as well as prominent countries such as Canada

Final situation

After suspension was renewed, Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth and established a national unity government

Abacha died, and democracy returned to Nigeria. The suspension lifted shortly after the government that took over from Abacha gave a clear indication of wanting to return the country to democratic rule.

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mugabe , the united nations , and zimbabwe ’ s security

For most of the first twenty-eight years of Zimbabwe’s independence, two key security issues caught the attention of the un: (1) Zimbabwe’s external military engagements, especially in the drc; and (2) the domestic security issues arising from the farm seizures and the suppression of democratic opposition. As noted in chapter 5, Mugabe’s decision to intervene in the drc brought with it major criticism. The un’s position was that Zimbabwe’s intervention had more to do with greed than it did with any major threat to its own security or even with a desire to protect the Kabila regime. The un panel that was set up to investigate the allegation of illegal exploitation of mineral resources in the drc was unequivocal in its criticism of senior military officials in Zimbabwe. Ironically, at the un, Zimbabwe’s domestic security matters attracted more attention than did its intervention in the drc, and this played to Mugabe’s advantage. Key Security Council members such as Britain, France, and the United States were opposed to Mugabe’s policies and to his use of force against the opposition. For their part, the Soviet Union and China were willing to tolerate Mugabe’s activities. And this is how things played out in the un Security Council, even if the permanent members, especially China, were tactful in their voting pattern. The initial position of some Security Council members, especially those opposed to Mugabe, was to impose a trade embargo on Zimbabwe. However, this idea was dropped after it was argued that this would harm civilians without affecting the elites, who were its main targets. In 2008, the United States came up with another round of proposals, which included an arms embargo, the appointment of a un mediator, and travel and financial restrictions against Mugabe and thirteen of his top military and government officials. All fifteen Security Council members issued a statement criticizing pre-election violence in Zimbabwe and concluded that it was impossible to hold a free and fair election in that country. At one stage, diplomacy in the Security Council became complicated, and this, too, was to Mugabe’s benefit. While China was preparing to host the Olympic Games, it was forced to be careful with regard to how it tolerated the human right abuses of its African allies. It was cautious about being at the forefront of countries openly supporting Mugabe.

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It was at this time that Russia decided to step up and defend Mugabe on the floor of the Security Council. In July 2008, when the United States tabled its proposal against Mugabe’s government, Russia voted against it. Russia’s ambassador to the un, Vitaly Churkin, argued that sanctions exceeded the Security Council’s mandate. Once Russia had taken this stand, China supported it, arguing that sanctions would impede South Africa’s mediation efforts. The United States, not unexpectedly, was disappointed with this position, especially as an African country on the Security Council, Burkina Faso, had supported it. The US ambassador to the un, Zalmay Khalilzad, was particularly scathing in his remarks, especially as Russia had, during the meeting of the Group of 8 industrialized nations that same week, supported a joint statement criticizing the situation in Zimbabwe. Earlier, during the 62nd Session of the un General Assembly in September 2007, both Bush and Mugabe traded words on the issues of democracy, natural resource governance, and global security. Bush asserted that Mugabe’s regime was tyrannical and an “assault on his people.” Mugabe replied that the root of the problem was land and that Bush’s and British prime minister Gordon Brown’s sense of human rights precluded Zimbabwe’s right to God-given resources. He then launched a personal attack on Bush, saying that his hands “drip[ped] with the innocent blood of many nationalities … [in] Iraq [and] Afghanistan.” At one stage, Mugabe was almost certain that the Security Council would not be able to pass any major resolution against his government. In fact, the country’s ambassador to the un, Boniface Chidyausiku, made it clear that he was sure that China and Russia would veto any hostile proposal coming from the United States or Britain. In his relationship with the un, Mugabe realized that, because of Russia’s and China’s support, there would be no effective sanctions against Zimbabwe. Although, unlike with the Commonwealth, he could not openly confront the un, thanks to Russia and China, he did not need to fear it. Another organization that he could not openly confront was the eu. mugabe , the european union , and zimbabwe ’ s security

Most of the nations that formed the eu, like most other countries, were happy at the independence of Zimbabwe, and they extended their friendship towards the country. While there were very few

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security links between the eu countries and Zimbabwe, the economic links were impressive, and both the eu and its members gave considerable economic assistance to the Southern African country. The turning point in the relationship came when the farm seizures began in Zimbabwe. The eu was critical of this action and was in no doubt that the entire occupation of white farm lands had implicit government support. Britain ensured that Zimbabwe’s situation remained the focus of discussion at the eu and ensured that the organization moved against the Mugabe administration. In February 2002, the eu imposed sanctions on the Mugabe regime. The main grounds for this decision were: politically motivated violence, absence of free and fair elections, lack of free media, absence of an independent judiciary, and the illegal occupation of firms. The sanctions, which were initially for a year, were renewed due to what the eu saw as Zimbabwe’s lack of progress on these issues. By 2008, the eu was openly calling for Mugabe to go, insisting that his increasingly authoritarian rule was unfair to the Zimbabwean people. In December 2008, Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana noted that “the time had arrived to put pressure on Mugabe to step down.” French president Nicholas Sarkozy, whose country held the eu presidency during the period, also said that Mugabe should step down because “Zimbabwe ha[d] suffered enough.”17 There was, however, no agreement on further actions, especially as some key members of the eu, including Solana, were against further sanctions against what was seen as an already ruined economy.18 Another country within the eu that was critical of Mugabe was Italy. Indeed, Italy recalled its ambassador from Zimbabwe and called on other eu countries to do the same. This, it believed, would indicate the “firmness and disapproval that [was] shared by the international community.”19 conclusion

Three main issues brought Zimbabwe to the attention of certain international organizations: (1) its position on property rights, particularly as these related to land owned by minority whites; (2) its attitude towards democracy and human rights, especially as this related to the treatment of the opposition; and (3) its involvement in external military engagements, particularly with regard to the illegal exploitation of mineral resources in the drc

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Generally speaking, Zimbabwe’s relationship with international organizations and extra-African powers had three distinct phases, each of which was connected to Mugabe’s perception of threat. The first phase occurred during the decade immediately after independence and its main determinants were the role certain countries played in the politics of Zimbabwe’s independence struggle and the extent to which these countries could assist Zimbabwe’s battered economy. The second phase occurred a decade or so after independence and lasted through the land issue. During this phase, Mugabe’s diplomacy was determined by the willingness of certain countries to assist him in consolidating his grip on power and by the limitations on the ability of external powers to interfere in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs. The third phase occurred after the land issue and Mugabe’s suppression of political opposition. The changing nature of global politics between independence and the signing of the power-sharing agreement between zanu-pf and the mdc in February 2009 is worth remembering, as it was the main thing that altered the relationship between Mugabe and the international organizations discussed here. For most of the first decade after Zimbabwe’s independence, the time-honoured stance of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries was widely recognized, and the Mugabe administration exploited this for quite some time.

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Conclusion

Essentially, this book is about three things. First, it is about how “personality” entered into the politics of security in an African country – a country whose birth displayed political intricacies at national, regional, and global levels and whose struggle for independence was as much about personality as it was about principle. Second, it is about how the past can be twisted and exploited by elites to justify their actions with regard to internal and external security challenges as they attempt to hold on to political power. Third, it is about how global developments can affect a government’s attitudes towards its domestic situation, indicating that, over a period of time, similar sets of developments can attract different sets of responses. While it is widely recognized, especially in Africa, that the political management of state affairs often resides with the head of government, the powers wielded by such leaders vary from country to country and reflect the extent of democracy in any given country, the complexities of its socio-politico-economic situation, global politics, and the personality of individual leaders. For most of the first three  decades of post-independence Zimbabwe, the central figure in the management of national security was Prime Minister (later President) Robert Mugabe. Indeed, more than any leader of a “liberated” country in Southern Africa, Mugabe’s grip on national security was the most extensive and arguably the most complex. His desire for dominance extended into southern Africa, where he tried to influence wider regional security, despite the fact that Zimbabwe’s domestic security issues were often the main subject of regional concerns. But Mugabe is a difficult person to analyze. What appears to be a common mistake is the tendency to use a singular occurrence or

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just one phase of his administration to arrive at conclusions about him. Right from the time of he assumed office, all his policies were geared towards ensuring his grip on political power, which he calculated could only be done effectively by maintaining an effective grip on security. Although it was initially thought that his grip would be reduced when those who shared the liberation war all retired from the military, the carefully managed succession arrangement, which ensured that only trusted officers were given senior positions in the armed forces, has ensured that Mugabe’s control of the latter continued. Mugabe’s effective grip on Zimbabwe’s security apparatus raises a number of questions, the most important of which concerns how he was able to maintain it over such a long period of time. There are a number of reasons for this. The first reason has to do with the enormous respect he wielded within the zanu party and how he was able to transfer that respect into post-independence Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s strong determination, intellectual ability, and uncompromising attitude won him considerable respect within zanu. His reputation for taking issues seriously and only coming to a decision after careful thought made his party members cautious about opposing his views. Mugabe quickly consolidated this image immediately after independence, with the result that many of his views remained unchallenged. The second reason involves Mugabe’s ability to exploit the international sympathy that greeted Zimbabwe’s attainment of independence in order to win initial concessions. Then, having done this, he began the process of arrogating to himself yet more powers, until he was fully in control of Zimbabwe’s security apparatus. Mugabe calculated, quite correctly as it turned out, that the euphoria that greeted Zimbabwe’s independence and his own assumption of power would make the world hesitant to criticize his early domestic policies, especially if he did nothing major to alter the racial balance in the country. During this period, Mugabe was able to consolidate his grip on power, which he subsequently used to his personal advantage. The third reason that Mugabe was able to maintain power rests on his ability to link his personal political survival to that of senior officers and top politicians who had the ability to sustain his rule. All through the twenty-eight years between independence and the signing of the shared-power agreement with the mdc, Mugabe ensured that all his top military officers were kept happy, especially through hefty pay packages and land allocation. Even when

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domestic resources were dwindling, appeasement continued at the expense of the national economy and through external military engagements. This enabled senior officers of the army and the police to remain comfortable under Mugabe, and it shows why they ensured he would have no opposition. The fourth reason for Mugabe’s grip on security affairs has to do with the fact that he gained it at a time when the distinction between the “military” and the “political” wings of the zanu party was blurred. At independence and for the first few years afterwards, it was very easy for zanu to exercise effective control over the military because they were interwoven, both having shared in the liberation war experience. By the time those who had not shared that experience with Mugabe started attaining higher ranks in the military, the pro-Mugabe structure of the armed forces had long been solidified. From independence until the power-sharing agreement with the mdc, key positions in the armed forces and the police were held by loyal party members. Finally, Mugabe was able to use state apparatus to intimidate and browbeat opposition into conformity. As shown in the preceding chapters, all those who emerged to challenge Mugabe’s effective grip on political and security affairs bore the brunt of the government’s military might. This was what happened to Joshua Nkomo’s zapu and to Edgar Tekere’s zum. Indeed, it was the brutal effort to suppress opposition that attracted international attention to developments in Zimbabwe. The mdc was the first opposition party that survived Mugabe’s intimidation. One reason for this involved the timing of its emergence – a period during which the Zimbabwean economy was weak and the government had limited opportunity to manoeuvre. Another reason involved the fact that the mdc, unlike zapu, was not rooted in the liberation war. Consequently, the allegiances that might have frustrated the organization had it been tied to the past were absent. The third reason involved the determination of the mdc leadership. Unlike the leadership of zapu, which fled the country, the mdc leadership stayed and confronted the regime. The final reason for the mdc’s success involved the extent of international sympathy it received, especially from the West. This provided it with resources that it could use to counter some of the government’s propaganda. Obviously, power elites in Zimbabwe formed a strong and coherent group that was bounded not only by their desire to ensure

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effective control of the country but also by their shared past. This explains why it took quite a long time for effective opposition to take hold. In short, Mugabe’s elite dominance was made possible by two factors: (1) the war of liberation and (2) Mugabe’s personality. Mugabe’s dominance was unwittingly encouraged by the international community, which, for a long time, turned a blind eye to much of what it later condemned. However, it would be inaccurate to conclude that Mugabe’s grip on Zimbabwe’s security was always a negative thing. For most of the first decade after independence, there was a general feeling that Mugabe’s grip on security was both understandable and necessary, especially given the challenges the country was facing. And, indeed, many of his policies were successful. For example, despite hiccups in the military integration exercise, it was largely successful. Bringing together under a single command armed groups that had for decades operated as rivals was not in easy task. However, as time went on, and as Mugabe began exploiting national security issues to perpetuate his grip on power, his justifications for so doing became more difficult to sustain. The second issue this book raises concerns how the past can be twisted and exploited by elites to justify their actions and to hold on to power. Throughout the period under review, one of Mugabe’s major strategies was to use “history” to justify his actions. The two historical phenomena that Mugabe most exploited were colonialism and Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. With regard to colonialism, it was clear that Mugabe dismissed the criticisms of black Zimbabweans by categorizing them as coming from those who had formed alliances with white Rhodesians. It was common to dismiss such black Zimbabweans as “betrayers” while, at the same time, stirring up “patriotic” sentiments by reminding others of a bitter past. Mugabe also used the legacy of colonialism to respond to criticisms from foreign countries. Britain and the United States were constantly reminded of the role they had played in sustaining Ian Smith’s rebellion. Mugabe often insisted that these countries were attempting to “re-colonize” Zimbabwe, using black Zimbabweans as stooges. This approach whipped up patriotic sentiment at home and drew sympathy from those countries who had tense relationships with Britain, the United States, and various eu countries. With both Britain and the United States being involved in a string of outside military

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engagements, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mugabe correctly calculated that this line of argument would get sympathizers. With regard to the war of liberation, which, of course, is recognized as the most important historical event in Zimbabwe, Mugabe and the zanu-pf made it the sole determinant for gauging “patriotism.” Thus, the zanu-pf was presented as Zimbabwe’s key liberator, a position that conferred upon it the role of custodian of national values – values that were not to be “polluted” by “ingrates” who had not made any sacrifice for the nation and who wanted to “reap” what they had not “sown.” Thus, the zanu party saw its agenda as an extension of the national agenda, a tendency best exemplified by its equating the party-led farm invasion with a continuation of the Chimurenga. The international criticism of Mugabe over some of his policies after 1999 raises a number of questions about international responses to political developments in Africa. As I argue in this book, Mugabe did very little after 1999 that he had not done before, and many of the Western countries that condemned his later policies knew this. For example, Britain knew about Mugabe’s excesses against zapu and the Ndebele people during the early 1980s but chose not to take a strong stand against Mugabe. Indeed, Britain’s former Africa minister Peter Hain alluded to this as late as September 2008 when he warned Tsvangirai about making a deal with Mugabe, citing the agreement Mugabe signed with Nkomo. Hain noted that Mugabe “effectively swallowed [Nkomo’s] party up and killed a lot of his followers.”1 This raises the crucial question of racial bias on the part of the West as it is clear that the West took the affairs of Zimbabwe seriously only after the interests of its white population were threatened. There were also clear cases of a double standard in the ways that key Western countries like Britain and the United States dealt with Zimbabwe during the period under study, and these were specifically targeted against Mugabe and key members of his government. First, the electoral malpractices that characterized Mugabe’s elections were no worse than those that characterized elections in other African countries, which the eu and the United States chose to overlook. Mugabe’s human rights records were no more appalling than those of Sani Abacha in Nigeria, whose actions only attracted global condemnation after he executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other Ogoni activists. Further, in 1999, both Britain and the United States vetoed

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Zimbabwe’s annual application to the imf on the grounds that the country had sent troops to the drc and that it was too poor to embark on external military engagements. However, that same day, the imf approved Rwanda’s and Uganda’s applications, despite the fact that they, too, were in the drc (in fact, they got their earlier than Zimbabwe) and were also poor. This has led many to conclude that the main issue behind British and American policies in Zimbabwe is land and the racial politics underlining its management. Consequently, the hypocritical and sanctimonious pronouncements of the West seem to have been coloured by less than altruistic considerations. However, while Britain and the United States may be accused of having a double standard, China, too, may be accused of hypocrisy, as its concern to have Zimbabweans resolve their own differences without external intervention is just a cover to ensure that Mugabe continues policies in Zimbabwe that are in Chinese interests. Of all the security issues that emerged during the period between independence and the signing of the power-sharing agreement between the zanu-pf and the mdc, three were particularly controversial: (1) the land issue; (2) the management of domestic opposition, especially that coming from other political parties and white Zimbabweans; and (3) the external military engagement in the drc. Indeed, most other security issues are somehow linked to these three. And, of these, the land issue, because of its extensive domestic and international implications, is the most important. The subject is emotional, and interpretations of it will no doubt remain controversial for some time to come. There can be no doubt that land was a crucial factor in the war of liberation, as most black Zimbabweans found living in a situation in which whites held most of the land completely unacceptable and were quite willing to embark on forceful redress. For most of the early years of Zimbabwe’s independence, people were willing to wait for redress because of the extent of support from the international community, the relative strength of the economy, the preoccupation with other challenges, and the expectation that the government would address the land question once it was free of some immediate issues. However, by the time the economy began its downward plunge and the extent of international sympathy, both for land reform and other social developments, had waned, the government suddenly found itself faced with the strongest political opposition it had ever faced. Just about this time, too, even some of its supporters were determined to vent their dissatisfaction, despite

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most of them not being willing to join the opposition mdc. This was especially the case with the war veterans. Mugabe’s way of addressing domestic political opposition was controversial. It was relatively easy for him to handle criticism from white Zimbabweans, as he could dismiss this as coming from those who still clung to the old Rhodesian days and were unwilling to accept black rule. Addressing black opposition was, however, more difficult. Once he realized that he could not impugn opposition activities by alleging racism, he was left with insisting that they were either stooges for foreign governments or acting in partnership with whites who wanted to bring back the Rhodesian days. Creating a mechanism for dealing with opposition from black Zimbabweans thus gave the Mugabe administration some challenges. The three black political parties that emerged after independence – zapu, zum, and the mdc – all had their supporters physically assaulted by members of the security forces. It is interesting to note Mugabe’s timing with regard to discarding former allies. Mugabe constantly formed ephemeral alliances to satisfy security and political needs. For example, during the war for independence, he formed an alliance with zapu, only to discard it shortly before independence. Immediately after independence, when national politics was mired in uncertainty, he re-established an alliance with zapu and extended the hand of friendship towards former white Rhodesians. This, again, was of short duration as zapu was removed from government due to its alleged involvement in the arms cache controversy (see chapter 3). As noted earlier, Mugabe was able to contain his security challenges until the emergence of a relatively strong political opposition in the form of the mdc. The emergence of the mdc would not have affected Mugabe and the ruling party had it not been for its alliance (initially informal) with the white farmers. Mugabe realized that this alliance had to be broken, and the only issue that could get the population on his side was the land issue. In short, it was the alliance between the mdc and the white farmers that led to the farm seizures. The main external security issue that dominated attention was Zimbabwe’s involvement in the drc. Here, the widely held opinion was that Mugabe got involved more for economic than for political reasons. The politics of security also surfaced in the power-sharing agreement between the mdc and zanu as the control of key defence and

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security portfolios became a major issue. Although the mdc wanted to gain as much as possible from zanu, it was also realistic and cautious. It knew that Mugabe and zanu would fight to ensure continued control of key appointments in the armed forces and that the government would not compromise on any issue of substance as far as security was concerned. The mdc was cautious because, due to the extent of his political and diplomatic knowledge, it did not want Mugabe to be completely out of the picture. The mdc realized that Mugabe’s sudden departure would cause significant difficulties, especially since key people in the country’s security apparatus looked to him for leadership. The future of defence and security in Zimbabwe will no doubt be intertwined with domestic, rather than with regional or global, politics. Indeed, with the withdrawal from the drc, there is really nothing tying external politics to Zimbabwe’s security. One key domestic issue that is likely to attract security attention relates to the politics of succession within zanu. Although it is not known when Mugabe will eventually relinquish power, it is inevitable that there will be a need to consider his successor. At whatever stage zanu-pf decides to find this person, domestic security issues will emerge as there will no doubt be divisions between those who want the party to continue with its hard-line stance and those who want a change. Something else that seems likely to alter the dynamics of the security situation in Zimbabwe is the politics of diamond mining. The country’s diamond deposit is mainly in Chiadzwa in the Marange district of eastern Zimbabwe. Already, members of Zimbabwe’s security forces have been accused of being deeply involved in the mining. Generally speaking, the politics of diamond mining is likely to affect domestic security in at least four major ways. First, there is the connection between diamond extraction and human rights violations. Already allegations of human rights abuses have been levelled against the army and the police. There is the possibility of this continuing, with serious implications for domestic security. Second, with diamond mining comes corruption. Again, allegations of corruption have already been levelled against senior officials of the ruling party. And it is likely that others not within the ruling party will also be the recipients of such allegations, with considerable implications for domestic security. Further, such corruption will no doubt heighten the stakes for national politics, with efforts to ensure political control of the state and, hence, control of the diamond deposits,

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increasing significantly. Third, there is the nature and extent of international interest in Zimbabwe’s diamond mines. Judging by the experiences of other African countries, the discovery of mineral resources almost always comes with immediate external interest. Indeed, there are already emerging foreign interests in Zimbabwe’s diamond mines, especially from countries like China. This will have a significant impact on domestic security. Finally, again judging from what has happened in other African countries, there is likely to be a clash between “local claim” and “national interest,” with local communities in the diamond-producing region clashing with the central authority, which will want to control the resource in the name of “national interest.” While we cannot know for certain how any of these issues will manifest themselves, we can know for certain that the future of the politics of security in Zimbabwe will continue to be linked to the politics surrounding the ownership, management, and control of natural resources and how this connects with the politics of power.

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Notes

introduction

1 For Ian Smith’s opinion of Mugabe after their first meeting, see Blair, Degrees in Violence, 13. 2 Mugabe’s main opponent, Joshua Nkomo, was offered the powerful position of minster of home affairs, and three other members of his zapu party were given cabinet positions. The whites got two cabinet positions: David Smith became the industries and commerce minister, while the leader of the Commercial Farmers’ Union, Denis Norman, was appointed the agriculture minister. 3 Flower, Serving Secretly, 273. 4 Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (renamo) in Mozambique was externally created, while União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (unita) in Angola was externally sponsored. 5 In 1987, Zimbabwe altered the Lancaster House Agreement, which imposed a parliamentary constitution on the country, and the late Reverend Canan Banana, the first president, stepped aside for Robert Mugabe to assume the position of executive president. 6 Mandela retired after spending a term as president and was replaced by Thambo Mbeki, while Nujoma retired after more then fifteen years and was succeeded by Hifikepunye Pohamba in March 2005. 7 Although attention was focused on Nigeria and Abacha during the execution of environmentalist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa, this was very brief. 8 Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans; Kriger, Zimbabwean Guerrilla War. 9 Chitiyo and Rupiya, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s Political History.”

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Notes to pages 8–13

10 Bhebe and Ranger, Soldiers in Zimbabwean Liberation War; Bhebe and Ranger, Societies in Zimbabwean Liberation War; Ranger, Historical Dimensions. 11 Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia; Ranger, Peasant Consciousness; Ranger and Bhebe, Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War; Ranger et al., Violence and Memory. 12 Moore, “Zimbabwe People’s Army.” 13 Raftopoulos, “Beyond the House of Hunger”; Raftopoulos, “State in Crisis”; Raftopoulos, “Nation, Race, and History”; Raftopoulos, “Unreconciled Differences.” 14 Raftopolous and Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe. 15 Alexander, Unsettled Land; Alexander, “Dissident Perspectives”; Alexander, “Squatters.” 16 Sadomba, “War Veterans.” 17 Moyo, “Economic and Social Implications”; United Nations Development Programme, Land Acquisition Process; Moyo et al. Fast Track Land Reform. 18 “Southern Rhodesia” was used between 1896 and 1964. After the breakup of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1964, when Rhodesia became Zambia, the prefix “Southern” was dropped. During the brief period of the internal settlement administration of Bishop Abel Muzorewa between 1978 and 1980, the compromise name “Zimbabwe-Rhodesia” was adopted. At independence in 1980, it became Zimbabwe. chapter one

1 No single individual in the imperial history of Southern Africa has received more attention from scholars than John Cecil Rhodes. For more on Rhodes, see Rotberg, The Founder; and Davidson, Cecil Rhodes. 2 For more on this, see Robinson and Gallager, Africa and the Victorians. 3 Quoted in Samkange, “History of Zimbabwe,” 245–6. 4 For more about the Shona people, see Beach, Shona and Zimbabwe. 5 Mfecane is the Zulu word used to describe the violent military outburst that engulfed the whole of Southern Africa in the nineteenth century. It was one of the greatest military occurrences in the subregion in that century, during which Shaka, the Zulu king, embarked on a remarkable series of conquests to form a large kingdom that was to

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6 7 8

9

10

11 12 13

14 15

16 17 18

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last for sixty years after his assassination in 1828. The Ndebele leader who emerged during this turmoil was Mtwalikizi, and he led his people away from the war zone to a place they named Bulawayo, which translates as “the place of the persecuted.” Bulawayo remains the capital of the Ndebele people. For more on the Mfecane, see Omer-Copper, Zulu Aftermath. For more on the Ndebele people, see Lye, “Ndebele Kingdom.” Glass, Matabele War, 5–6. This was quite different from the experience in several parts of Africa, where precolonial disagreements among indigenous groups caused some to connive with the colonial government against their opponents. For example, the establishment of British imperial rule in some parts of Yorubaland in Western Nigeria was facilitated by the efforts of Yoruba ethnic groups against their neighbours. Examples of this sequence abound, including Aboh and Opobo and other Delta provinces of present-day Nigeria and the Bugandas in Uganda. For more on the Nigerian experience in this regard, see, Ikime, Fall of Nigeria. A comprehensive study of this may be found in Macara, “Rhodesia.” Another relevant study may be found in Catholic Institute for International Relations and the International Commission of Jurists, Racial Discrimination. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Zimbabwe, 17. For a detailed discussion, see Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia. The antecedent of the anc was the City Youth League (cyl), which was formed by James Chikerena, George Nyandoro, and Edison Sithole in 1953. See Nkomo, Story of My Life, 109–19; Shamuyariya, Crisis in Rhodesia, 173–93. Some examples – probably coincidental – may support this allegation. For example, when the anc was banned in 1959, Nkomo was away in Cairo. Again, when zapu was banned and its executive members were detained in 1962, he was away in Lusaka, Zambia. Drum (magazine), Lagos, October 1963, 59. See Sithole, “Ethnic Factor.” The place of ethnicity in the Zimbabwean liberation war is a controversial issue, and, despite the fact that the war is over, it appears that it will continue to be so for some time to come. For more on the issue, see Sithole, Zimbabwe.

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19 There were some other political parties that emerged at one time or another on the road to the birth of Zimbabwe. I disregard most of them because of their limited relevance to this study. Where necessary, I mention the names of these parties and provide explanations in endnotes. More detailed information on these disregarded parties may be obtained from most books that deal with the political background to the birth of Zimbabwe. 20 White Rhodesians had so imbibed the government’s propaganda that they believed that a Mugabe victory would mean an end of life for them in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Front circulated propaganda indicating that Mugabe had said that, if he were to be in control of the government: “all children from the age of 7 years shall be placed under military training … all churches will be turned into barracks, concentration camps, and dancing hall” (Church Times, 22 February 1980). During the campaign for the 1980 general election, the term used by whites was “abm” – “Anybody but Mugabe.” See New Africa, April 1980, 7. 21 For more on Ian Smith, see Joyce, Anatomy of a Rebel; and Berlyn, Quite Man. These books, although biased, provide a copious amount of information on the personality of Ian Smith. 22 There is scarcely a scholarly work on the history of Rhodesia after 1965 that has not devoted considerable attention to the udi. The most comprehensive, however, is Good, udi. 23 Though Britain recommended sanctions, it rejected Lord Caradon’s proposals for the appointment of a un commissioner for sanctions. Britain abstained from a Security Council resolution in September 1972, which criticized the United States for lifting the embargo on the importation of chrome to Rhodesia. It was established in 1979 that, a decade earlier, British oil companies had admitted to government ministers and civil servants that they used South African and Mozambican subsidiaries to provide oil to Rhodesia, which kept the illegal regime going. See Stoneman, Zimbabwean Inheritance, 14. 24 See Verrier, Road to Zimbabwe, 160. 25 For more information on the position of Ghana during the Rhodesian crisis, see Aluko, “Role of Ghana.” On the crisis that attended Commonwealth relations as a result of the Rhodesian crisis, see Akinrinade, “Africa and the Commonwealth,” chaps 2 and 4 (esp. chap. 2 on the period before 1972). 26 Callaghan, Time and Chance, 145.

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27 Even years after independence, Ian Smith continued to maintain that he was right to impose the udi and its racist policies. In a speech delivered to third-year political science and administrative studies students at the University of Zimbabwe in October 1996, he maintained he was right with regard to both the udi and racial discrimination. Apparently, the students, most of whom had not been born during the period, let him get away with this. His easy ride was, however, condemned by Zimbabwe’s national newspaper, the Herald. See Herald (Harare), 25 October 1996. 28 The defiant outlook of the Rhodesian state at the time of the udi is worth noting. The Rhodesian Defence Force already had a significant arms stockpile, which it had accumulated in the days of the Federation of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Indeed, Southern Rhodesia controlled the armoury of the federation, to the serious objections of Malawi and Zambia. 29 There has been an upsurge of new books on the war of liberation in Zimbabwe. Some of these are the personal memoirs of some of the dramatis personae, and they provide invaluable information with regard to some of the hitherto unknown aspects of the war. See, for example, Ellert, Rhodesia Front War. Other earlier studies on the war include Martins and Johnson, Struggle for Zimbabwe; and Gann and Henriksen, Struggle for Zimbabwe. 30 Occasionally, the acronym zpra is used to describe the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army; I, however, use zipra. 31 In my interviews with many of the ex-combatants during my field trips to Zimbabwe, I was surprised at the ease with which the guerrillas from both sides attributed their strained relationship during the war to “the politicians.” 32 The Chinese involvement in the intricate politics of Southern Africa during the Cold War era has not received sufficient attention from scholars. This shows the danger of looking at issues in the region exclusively in the context of the super-power rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States or in the context of the commercial interests of the Western capitalist world. The Chinese involvement has been considerable and deserves better treatment. On the Soviet involvement, see Mayall, “Soviet Union”; and Kempton, Soviet Strategy, esp. the chapter on zapu. 33 For more on the zanla link with Marxist-style guerrilla warfare, see Pandya, Braamfontein.

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34 For example, after zipra and the anc of South Africa jointly launched an unsuccessful attack on Rhodesia in 1964, zanla issued a lengthy release the purpose of which appeared to be to teach zipra how best to go about guerrilla warfare. 35 The idea of the formation of zipa was championed by the presidents of the Frontline States because they believed that it would free the Zimbabwean liberation cause from what they saw as its worst defect – factionalism arising from ethnicity. A second major source of the formation of zipa involved the activities of zanla leader Josiah Tongogara and zapu vice-president Jason Moyo. The two met several times to discuss the feasibility of such an arrangement. It was thus painful that neither of them lived to see the country become independent and their cherished desire realized. Moyo was killed by a parcel bomb shortly after zipa was formed, while Tongogara died in a car crash a day before the cease-fire that eventually led to independence. 36 Works on the Zimbabwean war of liberation include academic books and memoires written by some of those who took part in it. A recent memoire is Chung, Relieving the Second Chimurenga. Two academic books are Bhebe and Ranger, Soldiers in Zimbabwean Liberation War; and Bhebe and Ranger, Society in Zimbabwean Liberation War. 37 “Chimurenga” is the Shona word for resistance. Zimbabweans take the war of liberation to be the Second Chimurenga. The first was the war fought to prevent the establishment of imperial control in the nineteenth century. 38 These acts were scattered all over Rhodesia. Between November 1965 and July 1966, there were eighty incidents involving sabotage (twenty attacks on the railway, twenty-three attempts to interfere with essential services, thirty-two petrol bomb attacks, and five attacks involving explosives). Between the pronouncement of the udi and 10 February 1966, there were thirty-six cases of malicious damage to crops (compared with three cases in the previous year) and seven cases of attacks on animals (there had been none the previous year). All these were believed to be responses to the broadcast made by black nationalists from Dar-es Salam and Lusaka. 39 During this period, the Rhodesians always overplayed guerrilla incompetence, terming it the “Kaffir factor.” See Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 125. 40 On the strategic implications of the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique for developments in Rhodesia, see Akinrinade, “Mozambique and the Commonwealth.”

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41 For more on the Nyadzonya raid, see, Stiff, Selous Scouts. 42 The neighbours actually saw the Rhodesian crisis as a British problem. In fact, President Nyerere made it clear that all they were trying to do was to deliver Smith to Britain in order to allow the latter to perform its legitimate role in Rhodesia. See Observer (London), 7 March 1976. 43 For information on the impact of the Portuguese coup on Southern Africa, see Seiler, Southern Africa. 44 There is, however, an exception to this situation. Nigeria, which does not share boundaries with any of the dependent countries, was coopted into joining the Frontline States. This was in recognition of the role the country had played in the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa. 45 For a detailed account of the role of the Frontline States in the liberation of Zimbabwe, See Thompson, Challenge to Imperialism. 46 For expressions of this friendship and camaraderie, see Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free. 47 Legum, Southern Africa, 12. 48 Herbert Chitepo was once chairman of zanu and Zimbabwe’s first solicitor. He was killed in a bomb explosion on 18 March 1975 in Lusaka, Zambia. The assassination became a very controversial issue, and it affected the relationship between the Frontline States and the Zimbabwean liberation movements. The Zambian government claimed that he was a victim of regional feuding within zanu between the Karangas and the Mayinkas (both Shona sub-ethnic groups). On the basis of this allegation, the Zambian government jailed many zanla guerrillas. zanla, on the other hand, charged that the Zambian government was responsible for the murder because Chitepo and zanu were obstructing its detente with South Africa and Rhodesia. Ten years later, a third explanation emerged when David Martins and Phyllis Johnson argued that Chitepo was killed by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (see Martins and Johnson, Chitepo Assassination). This seems now to be accepted as the correct version, especially as it has been confirmed by Ken Flowers, the late head of the Rhodesian Intelligence Organization, in his celebrated book, Serving Secretly. 49 It is, however, believed that Machel felt more at home with guerrillas like Josiah Tongogara, the zanla commander, than with the intellectual Mugabe. 50 The Sino-Soviet rivalry introduced an interesting division into the Southern African liberation politics. The movements supported by the

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51 52 53 54

55 56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

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Soviet Union described themselves as “authentic” while those supported by China were tagged as “non-authentic.” This was the position of people like Martins and Johnson in Struggle for Zimbabwe, 14–19. Ibid. Some people in Botswana have historical links with the Ndebele people. Nkomo mentioned in his autobiography that he once lived in the same hall of residence as did the president of the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa. See Nkomo, Story of My Life, 35. See Legum, Battlefront of Southern Africa, 111. Lonrho has enormous investments in Southern Africa, ranging from farms and mines to numerous other businesses. In fact, the company owns the oil pipeline from the Mozambican port of Beira to Harare in Zimbabwe. A new phase of radical foreign policy began in Nigeria in 1975, when a new military government, the Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo, took over in the country. The new government directed significant foreign policy attention towards Southern Africa and was instrumental in the mpla’s assumption of power in Angola. For more on Nigeria’s role in Southern Africa’s affairs during the period of the liberation struggle, see Aluko and Shaw, Nigeria and Southern Africa. Two members of the deal have written their accounts of what transpired at the meeting. See Nkomo, Story of My Life, 188–91; and Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering, 45–92. On the day the declaration was made, South Africa prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd was said to have observed privately: “I have offered advice to three Rhodesian Prime Ministers, the first two were wise enough to take it.” See Good, udi, 21. The Sharpeville massacre occurred in 1960 and involved the brutal repression by apartheid forces of blacks who were demonstrating against pass laws. Sixty-nine people were killed and 180 wounded. Most of the victims were women and children. Dr Verwoerd issued a lengthy press statement to clarify South Africa’s position on sanctions. See Metrowich, South Africa’s New Frontier, 65–79. Such companies included: Charter Consolidated, Hullet Sugar Corporation, Rhodesia Steel Sales Company, and Rhodesia Eagle Insurance. Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 297.

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64 Rhodesia was very important in this tripartite network for two reasons. First, South Africa did not have much respect for the Portuguese soldiers; second, Rhodesia was believed to have a more permanent stake in the region than the Portuguese, who could withdraw if the going got too tough for them. 65 The involvement was not only to assist the Rhodesians but also to enable the South African troops to gain bush experience. The then prime minister, John Vorster, was said to have included his son in the contingent. See Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 127. 66 See Gregory, “Zimbabwean Elections,” 18. 67 See Leonard, South Africa at War, 183–5. 68 Spence, “South Africa’s Military Relations,” 297. 69 Callinicos, Southern Africa, 15. 70 See Ford, “South African-Rhodesian Relations.” 71 Ibid. 72 See, for example, Holland, Dinner with Mugabe. 73 Ibid, 7. 74 Established in 1916, Fort Hare University is the oldest historically black University in Southern Africa. Among the African leaders who attended it are Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Chris Hani, Mangosuthu Buthelezi (South Africa), and Seretse Khama. 75 Virtually all the literature concerning the events leading to the birth of Zimbabwe devote considerable attention to the diplomatic manoeuvrings involved. See, for example, Verrier, Road to Zimbabwe, 186–201; and Meredith, Past Is Another Country. 76 What incensed the white Rhodesians was the allegation that some of those in the plane survived the crash but were later killed by the zipra guerrillas who first got to the scene of the accident. This was denied by zipra. The white Rhodesians were also incensed when Nkomo chuckled over the shooting. He told a bbc reporter, who asked what weapon had been used to shoot down the plane, that the zipra guerrillas had used a “stone.” He later regretted the interpretation given to his comment. See Nkomo, Story of My Life, 167. 77 Five political parties contested the election. These were: the United African National Congress of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, which won fifty-one seats; the Zimbabwean African National Union of Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, which won twelve seats; and the United National Federal Party of Chief Kayisa Ndiweni, which won nine seats. The Zimbabwe United People’s Organization of Chief Jeremiah Chirau

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80 81

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84 85 86 87

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and the National Democratic Union of Henry Chiota did not win any seats. See Akinrinade, “Africa and the Commonwealth,” 143–4. For a detailed account of the “behind-the-scenes” diplomacy of the Lancaster Conference, see, Akinrinade, “Africa and the Commonwealth,” 148–52. See Legum, Battlefronts of Southern Africa, 127. Some of the clauses that the guerrillas found objectionable were: the one that forced the incoming government to leave the Constitution unaltered for ten years, the one that reserved twenty seats for the whites, and the one that forced a parliamentary system of government on Zimbabwe. Indeed, Mugabe was not in support of any negotiation with the Rhodesians. He saw the successful completion of the armed struggle as an essential part of the process of establishing a new society. See Smith and Simpson, Mugabe, 152; and Meredith, Mugabe (2007), 2. This was apparently done with enormous sadness as Mugabe was said to have been close to tears when he learned that Machel had told him to sign the accord. See Smith and Simpson, Mugabe, 153. For Lord Soames’s account of his role in Rhodesia’s transition, see Soames, “Rhodesia to Zimbabwe.” Countries that formed the force included Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Kenya, and Fiji. For more on the activities of these two teams, see Rice, “Commonwealth Initiative.” zanu was particularly vehement in its criticism of Lord Soames, especially after he banned one of the party’s leaders, Enos Nkala, from campaigning. Mugabe himself later confessed that, initially, he had not trusted Lord Soames but was later to discover that he was not only trustworthy but “fondly loving as well.” See Smith and Simpson, Mugabe, 210. Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans, 46. Ibid. Ibid. The two whites were David Smith (commerce and industries) and Dennis Norman (agriculture), while the zapu appointees were Nkomo himself (home affairs), Joseph Msika (natural resources and water development), Clement Muchachi (public works), and George Silundika (post and telecommunications).

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92 It is believed that, when Mugabe was assuming office, President Samora Machel of Mozambique specifically warned him to tone down his Marxist rhetoric. Specifically, he was said to have told Mugabe that he should not do anything that would scare the whites away. See Meredith, Mugabe (2007), 9. 93 Evans, Gukurahundi, 3. chapter two

1 There are other institutions that are often used in national security, including immigration, custom and excise, intelligence, and so on. 2 This advance mission was code-named Operation Agila. 3 See Rupiah, “Demobilization and Integration.” 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 I have discussed this process in Alao, “Metamorphosis of the Unorthodox.” There have, however, been studies that have focused more on other technical details of the process. Some of these were written by officers who took part in the exercise and they include: Bailey, “Operation Agila”; and Boys, “bmatt Zimbabwe.” Norma Kriger has also provided accounts of the exercise. See Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans, 29–31. 8 Chitiyo and Rupiya, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s Political History.” 9 During my visit to Zimbabwe shortly after the integration exercise, I was informed that observers within the subregion were looking at the parity that would be reflected in the upper echelon of the new zna. This was also confirmed in a personal interview with the former Nigerian high commissioner to Zimbabwe, Alhaji Lami Metteden, who had previously acted as the secretary general for the oau Liberation Committee. 10 See Meredith, Mugabe (2007), 14. 11 A popular saying among the whites during this period was “Balls to Walls.” 12 See Hansard (Zimbabwe), Prime-Minister’s Question Time, 30 May 1980, cols. 403–6. 13 The zanla brigadiers were Sheba Gava (later to become Sheba Zvinavashe), Dominic Chinenga, Edzai Chanyinka, Frederick Mutanga, and Agnew Kambeu. See Evans, Gukurahundi.

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Notes to pages 40–4

14 At that time Masuku was a lieutenant general in the army in his capacity as the former head of zipra (the armed wing of zapu), while Dabengwa was the former head of the zapu intelligence wing. 15 Two clashes took place in Entumbane. The first was in November 1980 and was allegedly sparked by a comment made by a radical zanu leader, Enos Nkala, who said that the party would deliver a blow against zapu. This clash lasted two days. The second occurred in February 1981 and was particularly serious as it spread to Glenville and Connemara in the Midlands. 16 It was not known when exactly this deal was struck, but it is likely that it was during Mugabe’s visit to North Korea in October 1981. 17 When the troops first arrived, training was carried out on the eastern border of the country. This gave rise to the speculation that they might be sent to Mozambique to assist Machel against renamo. This speculation was proved wrong when the training base was changed. 18 These were the troops stationed at the Tongongara ap. 19 Herald (Harare), 21 October 1981. 20 Ibid., 28 December 1981. 21 “Gukurahundi” is a Shona phrase, which, literally translated, means “the wind that blows off the shaft from the real substance.” 22 Zimbabwean Defense Force Magazine, 1, 1 (1982). 8. 23 Ibid. 24 Despite the high number of troops in the brigade’s unit in Matabeleland, they could not trace the six tourists abducted by dissidents on 22 June 1982 (see following chapter for details). Also, the brigade embarrassed the government in October 1982, when its men “arrested” the queen’s flight aircraft, which Princess Anne was due to use on her Zimbabwean visit. The aircraft, which had diplomatic permission for reconnaissance, landed at an airstrip near the brigade’s headquarters and was detained on the ground for six hours. 25 When I was in Zimbabwe, I came across a story in one of the magazines that was full of praise for the ruggedness and physical strength of the members of the brigade. The article cited the performance of the brigade on the anniversary of independence, when some of its members broke cement blocks with their bare hands. I later asked a member of the zna who was an ex-zipra to validate this claim. He dismissed the performance as a public relations gimmick, saying that the blocks had been previously broken and neatly packed together to trick the audience. Thus, all the five brigade members did was use their hands to separate already-broken blocks. However, I confirmed from

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Notes to pages 44–9

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27

28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39

40

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an independent reliable source that the blocks were, in fact, intact and that the five brigade members could lay claim to some strength. The cooks and stewards attached to them complained of being overworked, and they were alleged to have beaten up civilians. The corpse of a white man was also allegedly discovered very near their camp. See African Confidential 26, 16, 14 August 1982, 8. It was once reported that General Walls visited the camp of the Selous Scouts shortly before their disbandment, and the soldiers were said to have been rude and insulting, calling him a “sellout.” This was the belief of people like Martin Meredith. See Times (London), 21 September 1980. See Times (London), 11 August 1980. See Daily Express (London), 14 August 1980. The original reporter in the Daily Express, John Ellison, subsequently said that the key facts of the story had been distorted by the Zimbabwean Parliament and that Operation Quartz was not a coup d’état but a contingency plan to protect a possible coalition government. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, June 1981, p. 30904. Hansard (Zimbabwe), 25 September, col. 894. See Sunday Telegraph (London), 7 September 1980 Burchett, Southern Africa Stands Up, 238. This position was often repeated after independence. Whenever the white parliamentarians got too critical about anything they perceived as being unfair to white members of the rsf, Mugabe was always quick to remind them that they had the Lancaster House Agreement to thank for their remaining in the army at all. Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans, 43. Various discussions held with former zipra officers between February and May 1990. This should not be misinterpreted to mean that Zimbabweans underestimated the military problems succeeding their independence. However, the natural tendency to expect that defence spending should be scaled down in favour of economic development was strong among many Zimbabweans. The training was another aspect the guerrillas resented. Many of them complained that the sessions were often very brutal. I learned this from discussions with former guerrilla members. For Prime Minister Mugabe’s account of the clashes, see Hansard (Zimbabwe), 12 February 1981, cols. 1923–6. For Nkomo’s, see Nkomo, Story of My Life, 219–23.

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Notes to pages 49–53

42 The affected battalions were: the 1/2, the 1/3, and the 4/1. 43 I owe this point to Professor Ngwabi Bhebe of the Department of History, University of Zimbabwe, who made it in a discussion I had with him during my first visit to Zimbabwe. Professor Bhebe has been engaged in ongoing research on the pre-independence military formations of zanu and zapu. 44 Before this, many members of the jhc were not attending meetings regularly, and the acting chairman of the committee, Allan Page, was not particularly clear about his duties. 45 Some months earlier, it was rumoured that many whites, especially senior military and police officers, were toying with the idea of allying with Nkomo’s force against Mugabe. 46 Prime Minister Mugabe believed that zapu had nothing to do with the revolt. See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 12 February 1981, col. 1925. 47 See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 2 February, 1982, col. 1129. However, I could not get any evidence to support this “radio-playing” claim during my visit in March 1990. It is thus possible, especially when the timing of the allegation is taken into consideration, that this zipra “Passover” story was just one of the strange rumours one could expect in a generally confused situation. 48 Discussion held with a former zipra officer. 49 According to zipra members, both the rsf and zanla had different reasons for being against zipra’s intelligence and air force wings. zipra alleged that members of the rsf were opposed to the incorporation of these two zipra wings because it would obstruct its desire to control these two vital areas of state security. zanla was alleged to have objected on security grounds. 50 In most cases, those being demobilized belonged to the ranks that do not assume office in the event of a successful coup. However, the assumption of office by Samuel Doe, a staff sergeant in the Liberian Army in 1980, introduced a new dimension to the link between coup plotting and military ranks. However, even when demobilized people cannot assume political office, the possible exploitation of nepotism that could follow a successful coup makes demobilization an unattractive option. 51 A Zimbabwean army source. 52 There were cases of ex-guerrillas who took advantage of the package and handled their demobilization payment well. For example, some zipra ex-combatants came together in 1983 and formed the “AllAre-One” Cooperative, with Z$45,000. By 1989, the cooperative had

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Notes to pages 55–8

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63 64 65 66

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a turnover of over Z$3.7 million, and it was judged the best-run service cooperative in the country. See African Concord (Lagos), 1 October 1990, 23. Personal interview with Major General Zvinavashe, the Chief of Staff (General) of the zna, held in his office at King George VI Barracks, Harare, Zimbabwe, 21 March 1990. Discussions held in Zimbabwe See Moto Magazine (Harare), June 1982, 16. Ibid. Moto Magazine (Harare), June 1982, 16. Ibid. Herald, 5 December 1996. For example, President Mugabe’s brother-in-law, Reward Marufu, was allegedly awarded about us$70,000 on the basis of a “scar on his left knee” and “ulcers,” adding up to 95 percent disability. See Meredith, Mugabe (2007), 137. In fact, as far back as 1979, the police had been brought under “Combined Operations” with the army. This was one of the exigency steps taken by Ian Smith to address the increasing wave of guerrilla insurgency. During the war, the liberation movements had some law enforcement capacity in the form of police forces and law courts that ran the affairs of the “liberated territories.” Some of these police officers had professional training, mostly from Eastern Europe. Daily Telegraph (London), 19 March 1980. Financial Times (London), 30 July 1982. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Zimbabwe, 46. The cio was quite unpopular, especially among the opposition parties. The opposition attributed many disappearances to the cio, which it always denied. Bishop Muzorewa, who was once detained by the police, said that he was often tempted to refer to the cio as the “Criminal Idiotic Organization.” See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 26 July 1983, col. 786. By 1985, of the two thousand white police officers, only about a hundred remained in the service of the pfz. See African Confidential, 27 March 1985, 4. The chairman of the Detainee Review Tribunal, S.K. Chihambakwe, complained about the level of professionalism in police investigations. He said that there were “too many inexperienced people in the police … [and that their] investigations, more often than not [were] very poor.” See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Zimbabwe, 47.

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Notes to pages 59–67

69 The first minister of home affairs in Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo, specifically mentioned this as part of the problems his ministry was faced over the police reorganization. See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 14 October 1980, col. 1110. 70 When the Ministry of Home Affairs presented the 1980 Appropriation Bill to the Senate, a white senator asked Nkomo why his deputy made the ministry’s key policy statements and not him (Nkomo), the substantive head of the ministry. Nkomo claimed that all was well and that his deputy’s making such statements had to do with the division of labour in the ministry. See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 14 October 1980, cols. 1112–17. This could either be a way of maintaining coalition camaraderie or an indication that the crisis had not reached a critical level. However, several months later, after he left the cabinet, Nkomo confessed that, all along, he had been a figurehead in the ministry. See Nkomo, Story of My Life, 219. 71 Most of the parties in opposition have had cause to condemn the actions of the police. Nkomo did as much during the Matabeleland unrest; Muzorewa did so on several occasions, especially when he was detained after his controversial trip to Israel (see chapter 5); and Tekere was unequivocal in his condemnation of the activities of the police during the 1990 election. 72 For a discussion on the structure of the Zimbabwean defence force, see Nyambuya, “National Defense Force.” 73 Emmerson Mnangagwa was among the guerrilla fighters who launched the first attack on Rhodesian installations at the beginning of the war. The attack failed, and he and others were sentenced to death. He, however, escaped the gallows because of a faulty medical examination that categorized him as being under-aged. 74 Personal interview with the author, held at King George V Barrack, Harare, Zimbabwe, 15 March 1990. 75 Discussion with Knox Chitiyo, September 2011. 76 See Nyakudya, “Security Sector Reform.” 77 Chiwenga was one of the first to raise his hand when Mugabe asked, “Who wants a white farm?” He was also the one who declared, even before the 2002 presidential elections, that his forces would accept no outcome other than a Mugabe victory. Both he and his wife are among those barred from travelling to Europe and the United States. 78 http//www.nation.co.ke (20 December 2009). 79 Discussion with Martin Rupiya, July 2010. 80 Zimbabwe Independent, 19 March 2004.

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chapter three

1 A senator from Matabeleland brought a story to the Senate about a soldier who was in the habit of intimidating civilians with his gun. Luck ran out on him when the civilians devised a plan to overpower him and shoot him with his own gun. 2 Generally, demobilization in African countries has always resulted in problems relating to the control of firearms. After the Nigerian civil war, demobilization resulted in a massive proliferation of firearms in unauthorized hands. The crime rate increased, and the government was forced to introduce Decree No. 47 (Robbery and Firearms Special Provision Decree, 1970) to meet the increase in armed robbery and other forms of violence that followed the civil war and demobilization. For a discussion of this decree, see Shyllon and Obasanjo, Demise of the Rule of Law. 3 See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 30 June 1981, cols. 152–62. 4 Discussions held with white Zimbabweans between February and May 1990. 5 For a detailed account of the reasons given for the need to acquire state-of-emergency powers, see the speech of the minister of home affairs in Hansard (Zimbabwe), 23 July 1980, cols. 1104–10. 6 For the reasons precipitating the reactions to the first State of Emergency in post-independence Zimbabwe, see Hansard (Zimbabwe), 28 July 1980, cols. 1095–9. 7 See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 20 January 1982, col. 1254. 8 What made the use of this power more controversial was that most of those detained or redetained after court exoneration were not in the zanu party (e.g., Dumiso Dabengwa, during the arms cache, and the six air force officers detained after the Thornhill Air sabotage incident). 9 The case that finally nailed shut the coffin lid of this law was Dennis Rhodes Granger v. the Minister of State, Judgment No. sc 83/84 of 1984. 10 I discovered the aversion of many lecturers at the University of Zimbabwe to the legislation. I discussed the legal implications of the regulation with a lecturer at the Faculty of Law who, for obvious reasons, chose to remain anonymous. He informed me that the consensus among the lecturers in the faculty was that the law had outlived its usefulness and should be abrogated. In fact, one of the senior lecturers was still in detention under this regulation when I was in Zimbabwe in 1990.

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20 21

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See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 18 January 1984, col. 100. See Nkomo, Story of My Life, esp. chaps. 19 and 20. Ibid., 213. I was informed during my field trip to Zimbabwe that the “demotion” caused considerable intergroup tension. It was said that, after Nkomo was made a minister without portfolio, many Shona people made fun of the Ndebeles, saying that their leader was a “minister without job.” Immediately after independence Nkomo made a number of significant purchases, especially farm lands. He claimed that the purchases were made to provide jobs for zipra guerrillas who would not be able to be integrated into the new national army. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, June 1982, 31,550. Nkomo singled out this particular equipment in The Story of My Life. He claimed that the equipment consisted of camera parts and X-ray equipment for dental surgery, which the German Democratic Republic had given to zapu to assist the liberation cause. See Nkomo, Story of My Life, 225. See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 15 July 1982. Three days later, through his lawyer, Lieutenant General Walls denied that he had arranged or attended any meeting between Nkomo and the officials of the South African Security Force. He also denied allegations that he had planned or was taking part in any activity detrimental to the Zimbabwean government. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, June 1982, 31,551. In all, about fifty-two zapu properties, worth about Z$20 million, were confiscated by the government. The zipra commanders were charged but acquitted on 27 April. They were swiftly rearrested under the emergency power regulations. In March 1986, when Masuku’s health was failing, he was released. He died the following month. Dabengwa was released in December 1986. See “Prime Minister Question Time,” in Hansard (Zimbabwe), 13 July 1983, cols. 395–6. “Common purpose” gained currency during the controversial trial of the “Upington 12” in South Africa. The twelve were sentenced to death in May 1988 for the murder of a municipal policeman in the Upington township of Paballelo. Although it was not established that these people killed the policeman, it was said that they threw stones at his house, an act that Justice Basson believed showed they had a common purpose with those who killed the officer. Interview with Dumiso Dabengwa, Harare, 25 July 1991.

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Notes to pages 79–81

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25 Financial Times (London), 16 February 1982. 26 Going by Nkomo’s account, he had met Mugabe on the morning the announcement was made and had not been asked to defend himself against the allegations. Later in the afternoon, he claimed that he had travelled in the same plane to Bulawayo with Emerson Mnangagwa (the security minister), and again the issue was not raised. On arrival in Bulawayo, Mnangagwa was said to have gone straight to the Ascot Farm, where he had called a national press conference to announce the cache. See Nkomo, Story of My Life, 224. 27 This is largely true. In fact, Africa Confidential had, as far back as June 1981, stated: “there are numerous caches of arms throughout the country particularly in the Ndebele country.” See Africa Confidential 22, 13 (1981): 5. 28 See Africa Confidential 23, 5 (3 March 1982). This position was still prevalent in Matabeleland during my visit in March 1990. Those with whom I discussed the issue insisted that caching of arms was widely practised by both zapu and zanu. One of them described the entire practice as “a permitted offence.” When I asked if any of them could tell me any of the sites the zanla used to cache arms, one of them simply retorted: “How can we know? Ask them, and if they are honest enough with you, they will tell you where they kept them.” 29 Herald (Harare), 19 February 1982. 30 There is even documentary evidence to this effect in African Contemporary Record 14 (1981–82): B863–9. It was reported that the government discovered a zapu arms cache carried in from Zambia through Chirundu. These arms, according to the report, were removed without any official announcement. It was said that, when zapu discovered this, it stopped carrying arms in through Chirundu. 31 A condensed version of this section is included in Alao, Brothers at War. 32 The term “dissidents” seems to be used more for the people who unleashed this terror on Matabeleland than for “bandits.” Even government officials referred to them as “dissidents.” This is in contrast to the situation in Mozambique, where anti-government troops were described as “bandits” until recently, when efforts at resolving the war forced the government in Maputo to use milder terms to describe renamo. The term “dissident” (as opposed to “bandit”) presupposes that there is some justification for dissent. It is not known to what extent the Zimbabwean government believed that the actions of those who took up arms in Matabeleland were justified.

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Notes to pages 81–5

33 The Matabeleland crisis has been given considerable scholarly attention. In fact, it could be described as the most studied of all the defence legacies of the war of liberation. See, for example, Hodder-Williams, “Conflict in Zimbabwe”; and Rich, “Zimbabwe.” 34 Some people in Matabeleland even told me that there was a written agreement between Nkomo and Mugabe to this effect and that Josiah Tongogara was a witness to it. Although it is now known that no such agreement ever existed, the fact that some Ndebele people believed it, and that it affected their expectation in the newly independent country, makes it an issue worth noting. 35 This was declared by Dr Sydney Sekeremayi, minister for national security, and a top member of zanu in an interview with Moto. See Moto (Zimbabwe), October 1982, 33. 36 See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, June 1980, 30,903. 37 Nkomo’s speech, delivered at the burial ceremony of zipra nurse Jane Matiba, would remain a significant document for future researchers working on the zanu/zapu split in post-independence Zimbabwe. See Sunday Mail (Harare), 6 July 1980 38 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, June 1980, 30,903. 39 For more on this, see Hodder-Williams, “Conflict in Zimbabwe.” 40 An ex-zipra combatant who is still in the army told me that, after Entumbane, he felt convinced that total confusion was a distinct possibility. According to him, many of those who stayed back did so because of pressure from Nkomo, Masuku, and Dabengwa. He said that, after the conflict, many ex-zanla combatants were in the habit of threatening another ruthless suppression if soldiers from zipra dared to embark on another revolt. It is only fair to add that this was denied by an ex-zanla officer with whom I discussed the matter. 41 See African Confidential 23, 11 (26 May 1982): 6. 42 These figures are from Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, July 1983, 32,241. 43 The time usually regarded as the beginning of the dissidence is early 1982. However, Wilf Mbaya, a South African-based Zimbabwean journalist with the Johannesburg Star, claims that the dissident operation had begun in May 1980. See Wilf Mbaya, “Ndebele Rebellion Gathering Force,” Johannesburg Star, 23 July 1980. 44 I am aware that an attempt has been made to add a fourth category – zna pseudo-operation – to the group of dissidents. These were members of the zna who were alleged to have taken part in dissident activities either to discredit zapu or possibly just for the fun of it.

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Notes to pages 85–7

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46 47

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50

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Although I heard this from a number of sources, I could not find any corroborating evidence. The only place where the allegation has been documented is in Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 305. He cites South African sources. While one may not categorically dismiss this claim, its authenticity may be questioned. After the unrest ended, many of the ex-zipras who accepted the government’s amnesty said in interviews that there was no working relationship between them and the “Super zapu.” In fact, some of the ex-zipra dissidents claimed that some of the weapons they used to prosecute their dissident operations were captured from the Super zapu. According to them, they fought the Super zapu because they could not countenance its receiving arms from South Africa to fight against Zimbabwe. Whether or not this was a mere pretext or a genuine intention to shun South Africa is unclear. Ministry of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, Zimbabwe. A number of the dissidents who later gave themselves up confirmed that some of the weapons they used had been left in the bush after the war. See Herald (Zimbabwe), 31 May 1988. This could be seen in virtually all the statements made by the prime minister in Parliament during the period of the dissident operation (especially the one made on 13 July 1983). Throughout the unrest, the government claimed that it had “proof” linking Nkomo to the activities of the dissidents, but this was never disclosed. The only proof that could be used was the evidence of Sango, the man who led the killing of the six tourists. Sango claimed in court that Nkomo had instructed him to kill the tourists. However, the court believed that Sango was an unreliable witness who was in the habit of changing his evidence at will. For example, at one point, he said that the tourists were alive and were still living in Zambia, when, in fact, they had been killed more than six months earlier. A lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe with whom I had informal discussions said that these two reasons were enough to confirm that the zapu leadership controlled the dissidents. Other discussions I had with a range of people gave the impression that this position was widely shared. Most of those who took advantage of the amnesty said that they stopped their dissident operations for the second reason. However, this does not make the first reason any less valid. When the prime minister was asked what the punishment would be for somebody who, under duress, gave food to the dissidents, he said that

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the circumstances would be understood. However, the circumstances under which the assistance was given seemed not to make any difference to the soldiers operating in the region. Discussion with former zanla guerrilla. Before the brigade actually got to Matabeleland, its reputation was already well known throughout Zimbabwe. In fact, when the white farmers were told on 21 January that the brigade was on its way, one of them was said to have stormed out of the meeting and to have said: “They must be crazy to do this.” See Guardian (London), 13 February 1983. For an example of such a warning, see Herald (Harare), 14 June 1982. Some people said that the 5th Brigade members asked for their party membership cards. Those who had zanu membership cards were said to have been left untouched. This, like other such allegations, was denied. Many Ndebele people with whom I spoke during my first visit to Zimbabwe claimed that their suffering at the hands of the 5th Brigade was extreme. They said the brigade killed, raped, flogged, and stole. One of them described it as exercising a “scorched earth policy.” An old teacher who was in Bulawayo during the unrest summed it up by saying: “Young man, it was a most bitter experience.” I did not come across any official figures for those who were killed during the period by members of the 5th Brigade. The Matabele people did not keep accurate records, and a reliable figure may never emerge. For example, Reverend Banana said that neither he nor the prime minister gave orders that shops in the region should be closed down. He said that when the information got to him, he immediately ordered the reopening of the shops. Personal interview. I got this impression from informal discussions with many people during my first trip to Zimbabwe between February and May 1990. Hansard (Zimbabwe), 22 August 1984, col. 1,087. Bush allowance was the additional pay given to soldiers during operations. During the 1980 elections, Lord Soames had to ban Nkala from campaigning due to the incendiary nature of his campaign. Meredith, Mugabe: Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for Zimbabwe, 66 Nkala stayed on in the Mugabe cabinet until he was found guilty of corruption by the Sandura Commission of Inquiry, which investigated the Willowgate scandal, and he was forced to resign. Many Ndebele people with whom I spoke said a lot of unprintable things about him with regard to his activities during the unrest. They claimed that he carried out the “killing of his own people” with an enthusiasm that

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Notes to pages 89–90

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66 67 68 69 70

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often embarrassed his mentor, Mugabe. They felt that Mugabe used him against his own people, and they wondered why this master whom he served with such religious devotion could not save him from the clutches of Justice Sandura over the Willowgate scandal. On one occasion, he made a ridiculous mistake. He called a press conference during which he announced that members of the brigade had killed Mr Josiah Gumede (the president of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia when Muzorewa was prime minister) and his family. However, a few days later, Gumede emerged safe and sound. This became the evidence the government used to show that most of the alleged activities of the 5th Brigade were not factual. Discussion with people in Bulawayo. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, July 1983, 32,242. Ibid. See Senate Hansard (Zimbabwe), 3 March 1983; Herald (Zimbabwe), 4 March 1983. Another “unusual” thing about Senator Todd’s mild criticism was that it was widely reported by the Herald (the government’s newspaper), which, only the previous day, had described the foreign press’s reporting as a “smear campaign.” For more on the Gukurahundi activities in Matabeleland, see Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe. For more information on the accord, see: Chiwewe, “Unity Negotiation”; Mutasa, “Unity Accord”; Nkomo, “Significance of the Unity Accord”; and Mugabe, “Unity Accord.” Many of the dissidents actually thought that an amnesty would follow an accord between zanu and zapu, and they had planned to give themselves up during it. This could be understood from an interview some of them granted before the signing of the accord. See Charles Rukuni, “Gwasela: Bandit or Dissident?” African Concord, 24 September 1987. See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 15 March 1983. This was published in the Herald (Zimbabwe), 16 March 1983. His words were quite prophetic: “Strong-arm tactics by the 5 brigade will only serve to exacerbate, rather than cure the situation.” In February, one of the expelled ministers, Josiah Chinamano, had suggested that unity with zanu would be a good idea. However, he did not make the same type of extensive suggestions as did Senator Oatt. See Hansard (Harare), 2 February 1983, col. 1,173.

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Notes to pages 91–8

76 At the time, they had not been formally charged but some had been arrested. 77 The condition of the withdrawal of troops from Mozambique raised a fundamental question as to whether there was any link between the dissidents in Matabeleland and the renamo dissidents in Mozambique. However, I did not find any evidence of a working relationship between the two groups. I believe that the Zimbabwean dissidents merely included this condition to attract the sympathy of a group of people who, at that time, were becoming somewhat critical of Zimbabwe’s military presence in Mozambique. 78 Two of the former dissidents who came to represent their constituencies, Never Maziri and Phumuza Ndlove, spoke to Parade magazine. See Parade, February 1990, 18–20. 79 Archbishop Ncumbe spoke against Mugabe for having had children with his secretary while his late wife, Sally, was still alive. Ncumbe, however, was forced to resign when a camera installed in his house recorded him having sexual relations with a woman, an action that runs contrary to the chastity vow taken by Roman Catholic priests. While many Zimbabweans believed that he was guilty of the act, most believed that he had been set up by the government intelligence unit. The publicity given to the action and its regular showing on government-owned Zimbabwean Television seem to give credence to government interest, if not involvement. 80 See Hansard (Zimbabwe) for the entire period of the dissident operation in Matabeleland. 81 Most of the whites with whom I spoke in Zimbabwe had few or no complaints about their security under the government of Robert Mugabe. In fact, almost all of them were satisfied. 82 See Financial Times (London), 9 July 1981. 83 Holland, Dinner with Mugabe, 37 84 See Matatu, “Trial of a Minister,” 13. 85 In one of the ironies of Zimbabwean politics, Tekere was to align with Ian Smith to run against Mugabe in the April 1990 presidential election. He lost. 86 These were the figures given by Ted Kirby, the president of the Matabeleland branch of the Commercial Farmers Union. See New York Times, 21 December, 1987. 87 Those found guilty of the murder were later hanged. One of them was Phineas Ndlove, who was believed to have led the attack. 88 For a detailed study of the war veterans, see Sadomba, War Veterans.

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Notes to pages 99–101

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89 The referendum has its roots in the Constitutional Commission set up by the government in May 1999 to gather the views of the people on a new constitution. It was to submit a report to the president within six months. The draft was submitted on 29 November 1999 and was gazetted on 2 December 1999. 90 On the first day of the two-day referendum, the state-owned Herald wrote a front-page editorial comment entitled “Let Us All Vote for Land, Peace and a Democratic Future.” See Herald (Harare), 12 February 2000. Indeed, the issue divided the newspapers in the country, with the Herald supporting the government and other newspapers, like the Zimbabwe Independent and the Standard, supporting the opposition. 91 Discussions held with Zimbabwe’s opposition members (April 2000). 92 Zimbabwe Independent (Harare), “Let Us Vote ‘No’ to Dictatorship” (editorial), 11 February 2000. 93 There seems to be a disagreement within the zanu-pf over land occupation. For example, the home affairs minister declared on 10 March 2000 that farm occupation had served its purpose and should end. Mugabe, however, contradicted him by declaring that the occupation must continue. 94 bbc News, 6 April 2001. 95 New Vision (Kampala), 3 June 2000. 96 In an interview he granted to Sky Television on 24 May 2004, Mugabe conceded that some mistakes had been made, but these, according to him, did not affect the principle behind the action, and he added that he had no regrets. 97 Meredith, Mugabe (2002), 167. 98 I am aware of the Mujibars, the young intelligence gatherers who took active part in the war of liberation; however, most of those who took part in the land-invasion exercise were too young to have been Mujibars during the war 99 A list of those who benefited from the forceful acquisition of land shows a number of people known for their radical socio-economic and political views. 100 “Chimurenga” is the Shona word for “struggle,” and it has been used in Zimbabwean history to describe the war against foreign control. The First Chimurenga was the war fought to resist the establishment of imperial control; the Second Chimurenga was the war of liberation that resulted in the political independence of the country in April 1980. 101 Personal discussions.

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Notes to pages 101–10

102 See African Confidential 44, 4 (21 February 2003). 103 The timing was also strategic as the government wanted to give the land before seed-bed preparation at the end of June. 104 Christopher Thompson, “Return to Hell,” London Line (London), 2 June 2005. 105 Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe.” 106 A number of Zimbabwean scholars took the unusual step of writing a joint response to Mamdani’s position. This was due as much to the controversial nature of his position as it was to his stand as a leading African political scientist and the possible impact his views may have had if not given a vigorous response. See “Re: Lessons of Zimbabwe,” March 2009, at http://concernedafricascholars.org/bulletin/82/ scarnecchia-etal/. 107 Scoones, New Start for Zimbabwe. 108 See Tsvangirai, with Bango, At the Deep End. 109 Meredith, Mugabe (2002), 93. Kombayi was also a controversial figure and a former supporter of zanu who had allegedly intimidated opposition while he was in the zanu-pf. 110 In fact, seven key members of the mdc, including Gandhi Mudzingwa (an adviser to the mdc leader) and Chris Dhlamini (the head of security for the party), were still facing charges for an alleged bomb plot. chapter four

1 It should be mentioned that, for South Africa, there was a distinction between independence for Zimbabwe under black majority rule and independence for Zimbabwe under majority rule led by Robert Mugabe. It is quite possible, and in fact likely, that if Bishop Muzorewa, whom South Africa supported, had won the independence elections, the relationship between the two countries would have been different. South Africa did not support majority rule in Zimbabwe; however, if it were inevitable, then it preferred that the country not be led by Mugabe. 2 Before Zimbabwe became independent, South Africa’s relationship with its neighbours showed a clearly identifiable pattern. It had entered the Angolan war against the mpla government; it was illegally occupying Namibia; and it was not at peace with Mozambique, which had not yet been effectively destabilized. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland had been effectively silenced.

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Notes to pages 110–15

253

3 Like the white Rhodesians, the white population in South Africa believed that zanu was a party with extreme Marxist views. 4 Patel, “No Master,” 18. 5 Ibid. 6 These have manifested themselves in many ways, the most pronounced of which is the flow of tourism between the two countries. For example, in 1982, 62,006 South African tourists visited Zimbabwe with a declared spending of Z$7,242,500. 7 The Organization of African Unity, as far back as its creation in 1963, recommended a complete boycott of apartheid South Africa. Although most members adhered to this, countries like Ivory Coast and Malawi established close contact with South Africa. 8 consas was launched in November 1979 by South African prime minister Botha, and it was aimed at strengthening the economic link between South Africa and Southern African states. This immediately caught the interest of key Western multinational corporations in South Africa. 9 Facts on File, March 1980, 161. 10 For more on this, see Burchett, Southern Africa Stands Up. The first part of the book deals with Angola. 11 I have had discussions with many white officers of the Rhodesian Army who went to South Africa after Zimbabwean independence, and many confirmed that it was their intention to attack Zimbabwe at the slightest opportunity. 12 See “South Africa Sabotage Exposed,” Herald (Harare), 28 August 1981. 13 Legum, Battlefronts of Southern Africa, 252. 14 These people were so called because of their quick tendency to make nostalgic references to their “good old days” in Rhodesia. It is said that every statement they uttered began with “when we were in Rhodesia.” See Washington Post, 30 October 1983. 15 Jaster, “South Africa and Its Neigbours,” 14. 16 While I was in Zimbabwe, I discovered that many Zimbabweans saw South Africa as a threat. When the nuclear capability of the country was confirmed, there was an opinion survey conducted by Moto (a respectable magazine in Zimbabwe), and this perception of threat was confirmed. 17 Jaster, “South Africa and Its Neigbours.” 14. 18 From an untitled document found at the Southern African Research and Document Centre in Harare. Interested researchers may find this in the files on Zimbabwe.

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Notes to pages 115–20

19 Ibid. 20 Figures obtained from Barber, “Zimbabwe,” 171. This migrant-worker link is not limited to Zimbabwe. All the Southern African countries – except Tanzania (which stopped in 1961), Zambia (1966), and Angola (1975) – have this link with South Africa. Money earned by these migrant workers forms a significant percentage of the foreign exchange earnings of these countries. South Africa has always blackmailed these countries by threatening to expel their migrant labourers. Sometimes these threats were carried out, as happened with regard to Mozambique soon after independence in 1975, when more than fiftythousand Mozambicans were expelled from South Africa. 21 Shortly after Zimbabwe’s independence South Africa threatened to terminate this agreement. The reason given was that the special circumstances that justified the initial signing of the agreement no longer existed. The threat was later withdrawn, and the agreement extended “until further notice.” 22 This was actually carried out, and Zimbabwe was faced with serious problems, which necessitated a visit to South Africa by Zimbabwean government officials. 23 Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 311n. 24 See Martins and Johnson, “South Africa and Its Neigbours,” 11 (of section on Zimbabwe). 25 Ibid. 26 Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 305. 27 The court dismissed the charge of espionage against the two people, but they were detained under the emergency powers. The authorities in Harare later said that South Africa appealed to them on three occasion to release the two men in exchange for 115 Angolan prisoners. This deal was said to have been rejected. See Martins and Johnson, Destructive Engagement, 48. 28 This was the only case in which South Africa acknowledged its association with those accused of destabilization. Zimbabwe believed that South Africa did this because it was being pressured by the families of the victims who wanted to secure the release of the bodies for burial. 29 Legum, Battlefronts of South Africa, 253. 30 Personal interview with Dabengwa, 25 July 1991. Joseph Hanlon and Paul Moorcraft had earlier speculated about the involvement of the Rhodesian cio in the caching controversy. See Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbour, 183. 31 Daily News (Gaborone), 14 September 1987.

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Notes to pages 121–33

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32 See Meredith, Mugabe. 33 It should be remembered that, as far back as 1963, the anc and zapu had jointly launched an unsuccessful military attack on Rhodesia. 34 Africa Research Bulletin, 1–31 April 1980, 5671. 35 See Mugabe, “Struggle for Southern Africa.” 36 See Hansard (Zimbabwe), 23 July 1986, col. 500. 37 Ibid., cols. 504–7. 38 The motion was tabled at a time when, within the period of two weeks, the prime minster was to attend a number of international engagements during which the issue of sanctions against South Africa were to be discussed. He was to meet with the oau (in four days), the minisummit of the Commonwealth leaders, and was to host the NonAligned Movement, of which Mugabe was to become chair. 39 Hansard (Zimbabwe) 23 July 1986, col. 508. 40 Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 6 October 1984. 41 Legum, Battlefronts of South Africa, 350. 42 John Morrison, “Zimbabwe in Fear of South African Democracy,” Weekly Mail, 12–19 April 1990. 43 Mbeki made this known during the African Union Special Representatives Meeting in Cairo, Egypt, in August 2010, which I attended. 44 Raftopoulos, “Global Political Agreement.” 45 Habib, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy.” 46 Available at http:English.peopledaily.com.cn/20040/11/eng.20040311_ 137130slitml. 47 Africa Research Bulletin, February 1981, p. 5,800 (emphasis mine). 48 President Mugabe made this known in response to questions in the Zimbabwean Parliament. See Hansard, 9 April 1986, col. 1949–50. 49 Africa Now (London), December 1983, 25. 50 The Dukwe camp was one of the three camps established by the unhcr during the Zimbabwean liberation war. It is about 320 kilometres from Bulawayo. 51 The chairman of the Botswana People’s Party (one of the three parties in the Botswana Parliament), Dr Knight Maripe, confirmed while on a visit to Zimbabwe that the refugees at the Dukwe camps were not dissidents. Later, on 26 March 1983, the Botswana minister of public service and information, D. Kwelagobe, gave a detailed explanation of Botswana’s stand on the issue in the Botswana Parliament. He confirmed that Botswana was not harbouring dissidents and went on to blame the Zimbabwean press for making remarks that could strain relations between the two countries.

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Notes to pages 133–40

52 Botswana had made previous accusations about Zimbabwean incursions into its territory. In April 1981, the Botswana government claimed that some veterinary officials had been abducted by the Zimbabwean army but were later released. Again, in October, the government claimed that the Zimbabwean army crossed its borders and beat up a village headman who refused to give information about Zimbabwean dissidents. It was, however, the Matengwe incident that was confirmed by Harare. 53 See Herald (Harare), 17 July 1984. 54 See “Botswana Not Co-operating on Dissidents.” Herald (Zimbabwe), 24 December 1983. 55 See “Super zapu Strategy explained,” Herald (Zimbabwe), 21 November 1983. 56 Botswana fulfilled its own side of the deal, but the oau election ended in a stalemate. When, later, the election came up, Mogwe had withdrawn his intention to contest. 57 Alden and Ansseuw, Land, 165–6. 58 Ibid., 166. 59 Ibid., 169. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 See “Botswana: Khama Set to Win Elections, Vows Not to Recognise Mugabe as Zimbabwe President,” Zimbabwean, 17 October 2009. 63 Discussions with Zimbabweans resident in South Africa. chapter five

1 Although the engagement officially ended in November 2001, troop withdrawal lasted until 2002. This explains why some studies record 2002 as a withdrawal date. 2 The civil war in the drc was multidimensional. At one stage in the war, there were up to ten interrelated conflicts occurring simultaneously. These were: the Congolese government versus assorted rebel groups; the Rwandan government versus the Congolese government; the Rwandan government versus Rwandan insurgents; the Ugandan government versus Sudan-supported rebels; the Ugandan government versus the Congolese government; the Ugandan and Rwandan governments versus the Zimbabwean and Angolan governments; Rwandanbacked Congolese rebels versus Ugandan-backed Congolese rebels; the Ugandan government versus the Rwandan government; the Burundian

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Notes to pages 141–5

3

4

5 6 7 8 9

10

11 12 13 14

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government versus the Burundian rebel factions; the Angolan government versus unita and anyone who supported unita; Mai Mai elements versus the Rwandan government and Rally for Congolese Democracy; the Sudanese government versus the Ugandan government. For more on the civil war in Mozambique, see, among others, Vines, renamo ; Legum, Battlefronts, 245–52; and Fauset, “Roots of Counter-Revolution,” 108–21. There is a point that, as yet, remains blurred as regards the state of affairs of renamo after Rhodesia ceased its support. The impression given by Ken Flower is that there was an orderly transfer of power from renamo to South African authorities. This claim, however, was not corroborated by renamo documents uncovered during the raid on the organization’s Gorongosa Headquarters. One of the documents mention a difficult phase during the transition period. Flower, Serving Secretly, 262. Herald (Harare), 10 August 1985. These figures were given by Transport Minister Simbarachi Mumbengegui. See Parade Magazine, September 1989, 18. Vines, renamo , 62. In my interviews during the field trip to Zimbabwe, many people in the border towns asserted that renamo attacks on civilians predated the zna’s commitment of troops to action in Mozambique. But each interviewee added that the attacks escalated astronomically thereafter. renamo activities against Zimbabwean civilians has one intriguing factor. The dissidents were said to be distributing leaflets that these gave details of their reasons for attacking Zimbabwe to the people in the area. They were also in the habit of telling their Zimbabwean victims that their attacks on Zimbabwe would stop when Harare stopped taking sides in Mozambique’s civil war. During my visit to Chiredzi and Chipinge (two of the affected towns) in February 1990, some of those with whom I spoke confirmed the issue of the distribution of leaflets, but I was unable to actually see any. They also confirmed that dissidents made it clear that they were attacking Zimbabwe because the country had taken sides in their civil war. The first targets in any raid were often the village administrator (if he had not run away) and those with any links to him. Vines, renamo , 62. Ibid., 245. Ibid. Moto, April 1984, 16.

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Notes to pages 146–51

15 Ibid. 16 These figures are from an unpublished article entitled “Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum.” It was made available to me by the unhcr office in Harare. 17 These figures were obtained from Moshood Olatokunbo, the program officer of the unhcr in Zimbabwe. Interview conducted in April 1990. 18 Figures supplied by the unhcr office in Zimbabwe. 19 Interview with Moshood Olatokunbo, April 1990. 20 Vines, renamo, 64. 21 A unhcr source. 22 Godfrey Karoro, “Zimbabwe Found Strength Fraternal Ties,” African Concord (magazine), December 1986, 1. 23 See “History Spurs Zimbabwean Solidarity,” New York Guardian, 28 January 1987. 24 Ibid. 25 Engel, Foreign Policy, 238. 26 I got this feeling from many zna officers with whom I discussed zna activities in Mozambique. 27 Vines, renamo, 61. 28 See Sunday News (Gaborone), 15 February 1987. 29 By December 1987, the government claimed that the Beira corridor had become operational by day. See Herald (Harare), 23 December 1987. 30 Engel, Foreign Policy, 239. 31 See Financial Gazette, 27 November 1987. 32 In my discussion with Major General Zvinavashe, he confirmed that counter-insurgency is now being taught extensively in Zimbabwean military institutions. He did not say when this was included in the curriculum, but he confirmed that it was a reaction to regional events and developments. 33 Observer, (London) 16 November 1986. 34 This information was given in an interview granted by Colonel Clever Chiramba, the ag commander of the 3rd Brigade of the zna, to Moto magazine. 35 The zna officer who first made this allegation, Captain Nleya, was mysteriously killed. This made many people believe that some well connected individuals could have been behind the deal. Between February and May 1990, when I was in Zimbabwe, the mysterious death of Captain Nleya was the subject of much public interest.

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Notes to pages 151–7

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36 Some Zimbabwean army officers with whom I discussed the issue denied that this affected their working relations with the Mozambicans – a relationship that they claimed was mutually beneficial. This is possibly correct, but, even in their discussions, their rating of the Mozambican army was not heavily veiled. However, it is not very clear whether this affected the relationship of the two forces at the front. 37 Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 291. 38 Herald (Harare), 27 August 1988. 39 Ibid., 18 April 1988. 40 African Concord, 16 April 1987, 25. 41 See “History Spurs Zimbabwe’s Solidarity,” New York Guardian, 28 January 1987. 42 During my visit to Zimbabwe in July 1991 I had an extensive – albeit informal – discussion with a diplomat in the Mozambique Embassy, Paulo Tembe. He confirmed his government’s appreciation of Zimbabwe’s involvement in its war against renamo. 43 I owe this information to Kabiru Yusuf, a freelance journalist who has visited Mozambique several times and has travelled extensively in the Southern African region. He said he gathered these feelings from discussions with a wide range of Mozambicans. I do not take this position as infallible, but it is something that subsequent researchers of the Zimbabwean involvement in the renamo war might want to investigate. 44 Around the early 1990s, there were comments in several circles that a new crop of leaders was unfolding in Africa with the emergence of young leaders in countries like Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. It was expected that these younger people would succeed where their predecessors had failed. In some circles, therefore, there was a subtle rivalry between the old order and the younger generation, with the latter considering the former too conservative and the former considering the latter too ambitious. 45 Colins, “Southern Africa.” 46 Pruinier, “Economic Dimension,” 110. 47 Ibid. 48 Opinion seems to differ on this, even among former members of zipra. Some believed that the old zanla/zipra divisions had nothing to do with those sent to the border to fight renamo, while some did not. As the list of those sent to the front is not available, all I can do is to mention this allegation as one upon which future researches might throw more light.

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Notes to pages 157–66

49 Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, “Enough for Our Need, Not Enough for Our Greed,” New Vision, 26 October 1998. 50 See “Protest in Zimbabwean Parliament against drc Involvement” at http://www.afrol.com/News/zim041_drc_parliament.httm. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 These groups were: Zim-Rights, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, Legal Resources Foundations, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, and amani Trust. 56 Meredith, Mugabe (2007), 149. 57 It should be mentioned that one of the reasons Zimbabwe was engaged in the war against renamo was to fight against South African destabilization (see chapter 4). Zimbabwe believes that if renamo succeeds in Mozambique, it could open the way for South Africa’s further destabilization of Zimbabwe. 58 Hansard (Zimbabwe), 9 April 1986, cols. 1958–9. 59 Evans, “Security Threat.” 60 See Chan, Life of Power. 61 Ibid. 62 A senior officer of the afz told me in an informal interview in 1990 that the war against renamo was unwinnable and that it would be in the country’s best interest to look for a face-saving way of getting out of Mozambique. 63 Engel, Foreign Policy, 260. 64 Hum, Ending Mozambique’s War, 137. 65 Engel, Foreign Policy, 260. 66 Zimbabwe was actively involved in the war between the frelimo government and the renamo rebels in Mozambique. For most of the first decade, commitment to the war in Mozambique was Mugabe’s main foreign policy agenda, especially as the war was seen as part of the wider efforts by apartheid South Africa to destabilize the region. For more on Zimbabwe’s involvement in Mozambique’s civil war, see Alao, Brothers at War. 67 Report of the Security Commission of the Great Lakes. 68 Nest, “Ambitions.” 69 See Meredith, Mugabe (2007), 149. 70 Ibid. 71 Nest, “Ambitions.”

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Notes to pages 166–78

261

72 See, “Zimbabwe Army in Congo Diamond Deals, available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/455882.stm. 73 See news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/462957.stm. Joseph Made was later to become the minister for agriculture. chapter six

1 For more on the overall activities of bric, see Alden, China in Africa; Rotberg, China into Africa; Taylor, China and Africa; Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy; Raine, China’s African Challenges; Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, Brazil as Economic Superpower; Winters and Yusuf, Dancing with Giants; Letiche, Russia Moves; Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development, Globalisation and Emerging Economies; Sujatha, bric Economies. 2 For example, as recently as June 2011, American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared during a visit to Lusaka, Zambia, that the United States is disturbed at the way China is going about its activities in Africa and that it has started discussing with Beijing what it sees as the negative consequences of Chinese policies in the continent. This was widely reported in Nigerian newspapers. See Nigerian Tribune (Lagos), 12 June 2011. 3 Meredith, Mugabe (2007), 8. 4 See Guardian (London), 11 June 1980. 5 Emily Mitchell, “uk Arms Exports to Zimbabwe,” available at http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/publications/countries/zimbabwe0900.php. 6 Thatcher later said that she did not ask the Irish prime minister to raise the issue during an official visit. 7 See Herald (Harare), 26 September 1983. See also Hasu Patel, “No Master, No Mortgage, No Sale: The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe,” Working Paper, Centre for Research, Documentation and University Exchange, (Nairobi) No. 2, May 1987. 8 Herald (Harare), 26 September 1983. 9 Mitchell, “uk Arms Exports.” 10 Guardian, 20 January 2000. 11 See British Hansard, 3 May 2000, col. 150. 12 http://maravi.blogspot.com/2007/03/zimbabwe-claire-shorts-letternov-5th.html 13 Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 11.

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Notes to pages 178–85

14 Ibid. 15 After the mdc began negotiating its entrance into discussions with zanu there were calls for the troops to come back into Zimbabwe to give assurance to the mdc that Mugabe would not use the military against its leadership. These calls were, however, turned down. 16 There was a major cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe, which began around 2008 and continued into 2009. While there is no reliable source indicating the number of victims, it is possible that up to three thousand people died. It also ignited a major national and regional emergency as there were fears that it would spread to neighbouring countries. The general impression was that the outbreak could not be separated from the country’s economic situation. 17 This Day (Lagos), 9 December 2008. 18 According to Lord Guthrie, the reason for his position was purely political: he said that he felt that it would gain him domestic support. He also said that Britain was worried about what South Africa’s reaction might be to a British military intervention in its backyard. See news.bbc.co/uk/2/hi/100737.stm. 19 See Daily Telegraph (London), 22 July 2009. 20 Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4349042.stm . 21 http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/33863/blair-secretly-courtedmugabe-to-boost-trade-.html. 22 See Mlambo and Raftopolous, “Regional Dimensions.” 23 Chan, Mugabe. 24 Mugabe was to get an opportunity to return the criticism regarding controversial elections after the Gore/Bush debacle in 2001. Indeed, Mugabe openly stated that George Bush came to power as a result of rigged elections. 25 Democracy Now, 1 April 2005. 26 See www.aceand history.com.seflnews.viewnes.cgi/67815. 27 See http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/powell21.12256.html. The others are Cuba, Burma, North Korea, Iran, and Belarus. 28 Ibid. 29 Key among those targeted for the US/British intention were: Constantine Chiwenga, the commander of the zna; Augustine Chihuri, the police chief; Perence Shiri, the air force chief; Happyton Bonyongwe, the chief of the cio; Gideon Gono, the Central Bank governor; Emerson Mnangagwa, the rural housing minister; and George Charamba, Mugabe’s spokesman.

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30 Colin Powell, “Cash Offer to Oust Mugabe in Zimbabwe,” New York Times, op-ed., 24 June 2003. 31 Scott Morgan, “usa to Reassess Relations with Zimbabwe Again,” Zimbabwe Report, 3 September 2005. 32 Nkatazo, “US Government sponsored Zimbabwe Army.” 33 Editorial, “Crunch in Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, 14 February 2007. 34 Schaefer, “Crisis in Zimbabwe.” 35 This election was won by Moshood Abiola, a business magnate from the southwest part of the country. To this date, no reason has been given for the nullification. 36 See details in Soremekun, “International Dimensions.” 37 Jeuck, “Arms Transfer to Zimbabwe.” 38 For more on zimcord, see Zimbabwe, Let’s Build Zimbabwe Together. 39 In an agreement signed in Salisbury on 15 December 1981, Yugoslavia promised to build a $420,000 trade union college for Zimbabwe. Romania also gave $60,000 worth of aid to increase food production in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government has always tried to demonstrate its appreciation, no matter how difficult. For example, Harare allegedly owed “Air Zimbabwe” $3.3 million for sending seventy representatives to President Tito’s funeral in Yugoslavia, while forty representatives accompanied President Banana on a state visit to Romania. See Newsweek, 6 October 1980, 32. 40 See Mung, “Chinese Migration,” 96. 41 Financial Times (London), 22 April 1980. 42 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 22 June 1980, 30,377 (in both cases, emphasis mine). 43 Africa Diary, 30 April-6 May 1980, 10,506. 44 Africa Research Bulletin, February 1981, 5,977. 45 African Contemporary Records, 14 (1981–82): B863-9. 46 Ibid. 47 Chigora and Goredima, “Zimbabwe,” 194 48 See http://denfordmagora.blogspot.com/2009/01/russian-soldiers-tomove-into-zimbabwe.html. 49 For more on this, see Peters, Israel and Africa. 50 See Keesing’s Record of World Events 35, 4, 36,608. 51 See African Analysis: The Fortnightly Bulletin on Financial and Political Trends 11, 28 November 1986.

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Notes to pages 195–215

chapter seven

1 This is the case with the sadc, which, to a very large extent, grew out of the Frontline States, which collated a regional response to apartheid South Africa. 2 These countries are Botswana, South Africa, Mozambique, and Zambia, all of which belong to the sadc, the Commonwealth of Nations, the oau/au, and the un. 3 In September 1993, the un Security Council passed Resolution 864, which imposed sanctions on unita and prohibited the sale of weapons or fuel to the organization. Much more important, however, was the Clinton administration’s issuing of Executive Order 12865 on 23 September 1993, which described unita as an organization threatening US foreign policy objectives. 4 See eu website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/ index_en.htm 5 Ibid. 6 These are largely North African countries: Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. See ibid. 7 Makinda and Okumu, African Union. 8 Shaw, “Commonwealth(s).” 9 For a whole range of reasons that has been widely recorded, countries like Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire were against the dispatch of a military force. 10 Available at http://www.africanews.com/site/list_message/32613. 11 I thank Funmi Olonisakin for drawing my attention to this point. 12 This Day (Lagos), 9 December 2008. 13 Harare Declaration, declaration adopted by the Heads of Government Meeting, London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1991. 14 Ken Saro-Wiwa was the Nigerian civil rights and environmental activist who was killed by the Abacha administration in Nigeria for championing the cause of the Ogonis in the country’s oil-producing region. He and eight others were hanged during the Commonwealth Conference in Auckland, New Zealand. This was despite appeals from the Commonwealth that these people be spared. This was to lead to Nigeria’s suspension from the Commonwealth. 15 Commonwealth News Release, 19 March 2002, Meeting of Commonwealth Chairperson Committee on Zimbabwe. 16 Guardian (London), 2 September 2002. 17 Daily Mail (London), 8 December 2008.

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18 This Day (Lagos), 9 December 2008. 19 Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7481857.stm. conclusion

1 Times (London), 12 September 2008.

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Sujatha, B., ed. bric Economies: Opportunities and Challenges (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Hyderabad: icfai University Press, 2006. Sukume, C, and S. Moyo. “Farm Sizes, Decongestion, and Land Use: Implications of the Fast-Track Land Redistribution Programme in Zimbabwe.” aias mimeo, 2003. Taylor, I. China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. Thompson, C. Challenge to Imperialism: The Front Line States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe. Boulder, co: Westview, 1986. – “Return to Hell,” London Line, 2 June 2005. Tsvangirai, M., with T.W. Bango. At the Deep End. Much Wenlock: Eye Publishers, 2011. United Nations Development Programme. The Land Acquisition Process in Zimbabwe 1997/8. Harare: undp Resource Centre, 1998. Vambe, M., ed. The Hidden Dimensions of Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe. Harare/Pretoria: Weaver Press/African Institute of South Africa, 2008. Verrier, A. The Road to Zimbabwe, 1890–1980. London: Jonathan Cape, 1986. Vines, A. renamo : Terrorism in Mozambique. London: James Currey, 1991. Winters, A., and S. Yusuf. Dancing with Giants: China, India, and the Global Economy. Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2007. Zhao, S., ed. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour: New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. Zimbabwe. Let’s Build Zimbabwe Together: zimcord . Salisbury: Government Press, 1981. Zimbabwe Human Rights Association. Choosing the Path to Peace and Development: Coming to Terms with Human Rights Violations of the 1982–87 Conflict in Matabeleland and the Midlands Province. Harare: zhra, 1999.

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24864_ALAO.indb 280

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Index

Abacha, Sani, xii, 7,186–8, 208, 211, 212, 221, 227n7, 264n14 Abiola, Moshood, 263 Abuja, 135, 209, 211 Adam, Gerald, 93, 94 African Union, xvii, 5, 11, 131; and Zimbabwe’s Political Crisis, 190, 195, 203–6, 255, 264n7, 272 AFZ. See Armed Forces for Zimbabwe) Alden, Chris, xiii, 135, 256, 261n1, 267 Alexander, Joyce, 8, 228n15, 267, 268, 276, 277, 278 Amos, Baroness, 180 Angola, xvii, xviii, 3, 4, 6, 21, 23; ease of resolution of conflict after end of Cold War, 200; encouragement of Mugabe to end domestic violence, 227n4, 234n57, 252n2, 253n10, 254n20, 256n2, 257n2; impact of independence on Zimbabwe’s liberation war, 27, 112, 114, 120, 188, 196; position on war in DRC, 201; support for Mugabe’s stance on DRC, 205

24864_ALAO.indb 281

Ansseuw, 135, 256 Anyaokwu, Emeka, 211 Armed Forces of Zimbabwe, xvii, 50, 51, 66, 93, 260n62 Ascot Farm, 77; discovery of arms, 79, 245 AU. See African Union Au Yue Jiang, 189 auxiliaries: control of by Muzorewa, 37; disbandment, 40; participation of dissident in Matabeleland, 54, 70, 84; support from apartheid South Africa, 113 Banda, Kamuzu, 163 Barber, James, 117, 254, 268 Bennett, Sandra, 94 Berry, David Sergeant, 119 Bhebe, Ngwabi, 7, 228n10, 232n36, 240n43, 267, 268, 274 Biti, Tendai, 158 Blair, Tony: allegation by Mugabe of re-colonization, 181, 182, 183; public denunciation by Mugabe, 180; removal of Mugabe from power, 176, 177, 179

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282

Index

BMATT. See British Military Advisory Training Team Botha, P.W, 111, 125 Botha, Pik, 123, 253n8 Botswana: escape of Nkomo into, 79; membership of Frontline States, 19, 23; position on SADC intervention in DRC, 200, 234n53, 255n51, 256n52, 264n2; support for ZAPU, 25; relationship with Zimbabwe, 106, 107, 129, 131–6 Britain, xi, xii, 5, 7, 12–14; colonization of Zimbabwe, 18–19; and the Internal Settlement Administration, 32; and Lancaster House Agreement, 46; Nkomo’s escape to, 169, 170, 172–88; and police reform in Zimbabwe, 74, 94, 97, 117; trade with Zimbabwe, 128 129, 132; position on military integration in Zimbabwe, 51, 54; purchase of air-to-ground missile from, 57; relationship with Zimbabwe, 192, 194, 204, 208, 209, 212–15, 220, 221, 222, 230n23, 233n42, 236n85, 262n18; and UDI, 30 British Military Advisory Training Team, xvii, 37, 41, 44, 176, 237n7, 268 British South African Company, 12 Brown, Gordon, 179, 214 Bulawayo, 13, 28, 37, 48, 76, 77, 85, 93, 197, 229n5, 245n26, 248n57, 249n66, 255n50 Bush, George W., 180; criticism by Mugabe, 183, 185; and imposition of sanction on Mugabe, 214, 262n24

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Callaghan, James, 19 Canada, 209, 210, 212 Carrington, Lord, 36, 172 Carrington, Walter Amb., 187 Casa Banana, 149, 151 Castle Arms Hotel, 77 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 189 Chicuacuala, 144, 149 Chidyausiku, Boniface, 214 Chihuri, Augustine, 60, 262 Chikerena, James, 28, 229 Chiluba, Frederick, 131 Chimanimani, 144 Chimurenga, 16, 21, 64, 101, 221, 232n36, 251n100, 269, 273, 275 Chimutengwende, Chen, 165 China, 5, 11, 20: invitation to train Zimbabwe soldiers, 66, 169, 170–3, 188–92, 194, 213, 214, 222; support for Mugabe’s intransigence, 225, 234n50, 261n1, 267, 274, 275, 276, 277, 279; support for ZANU, 41 Chinamano, Josiah, 78, 83, 249n75 Chipinge, 144, 257n10 Chirau, Jeremiah, 25, 30, 235n77 Chiredzi, 144, 257n10 Chissano, Joaquim, 138, 162, 176, 183 Chitepo, Herbert, 24, 233 Chitiyo, Knox, 7, 63, 227n9, 237n8, 242n75, 269 Chiyanwa, Philip Churkin, Vitaly, 214 CIO, 4, 58, 59, 104, 113, 119, 146, 149, 241n66, 254n30, 269n29 Cohen, Herman, 183 Commonwealth, ix, xiii, xvii, 5, 11, 19; Botswana and South Africa’s attempt to remove Mckinnon as

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Index

Secretary General, 173, 179; conference in Lusaka, 31; encouragement from Britain to be critical of Mugabe, 181, 195, 196, 197, 202, 206–12; link with Lancaster House Agreement, 32; monitoring force for 1979 election, 36, 104; refusal to use force against UDI, 23, 30; relationship with Mugabe, 214, 230, 232, 236, 255n38, 264nn1–2, 264n8, 264nn13–15, 267, 271, 273, 277, 278; suspension of Zimbabwe’s membership, 135 Commonwealth Monitoring Force, 36 Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, 124 Cote d’Ivoire, xii, 202, 203, 264n9 Crocker, Chester, 183 Cuba, 20: in Angola, 262n27; support for ZIPRA, 27 Dambengwa, Dumiso, 40; alleged involvement in arms cache, 79; belief in South Africa’s involvement in arms cache, 160; explanation in arms cache, 83, 84, 86, 119; as Minister of Home Affairs, 192, 238n14, 243n8, 244n21, 244n24, 246n40, 254n30; removal from JHC, 49; role in quelling Entumbane riot, 62, 78 Davido, Jeffery, 182 De Klerk, F.W., 5, 119; reduction of threats over ascendancy, 120, 125 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), ix, 10, 140, 153;

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283

Zimbabwe’s military Engagement in, 157, 165, 166, 256n2, 257n2, 261n72, 270, 274 Denmark, 54 Dhlakhama, Afonso, 163, 182, 183 Dongo, Margaret, 157 Dube, Tshinga, 166 Dukwe Camp, 133, 134, 255n50 Dumbutshena, Enoch, Justice, 41, 49 Dyke, Lionel, Lt. Colonel, 87 Egypt, 5, 66, 205, 206, 255, 264 Entumbane, 40, 48–50, 58, 63, 81, 83, 84, 87, 238n13, 246n40 Equatorial Guinea, 10, 128, 205 Esigodini, 85, 91, 95 European Union, 11, 176, 179, 195, 214 Evan, Colin, 119, 237n93, 260n59, 270 Fearless, HMS, 19 Field, Winston, 18 Fitzgerald, Garret, 174 Flower, Ken, 4; invitation to join Mugabe’s government, 141; formation of RENAMO, 142; confirmation of brutality of RENAMO, 227n3, 233n48, 257n4, 270 Frazer, Jendayi, 183 FRELIMO, xvii, 22, 24; alliance with ZANU, 37, 140, 141; destabilization by RENAMO, 145; peace meeting with RENAMO, 260n66; support from Mugabe, 151, 161, 163; weakness to fight RENAMO, 152 Frontline States, 23, 25, 27; involvement in the independence

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284

Index

struggle, 29; role in the independence of Zimbabwe, 31, 32, 120, 198, 232, 233, 264n1, 273 Gambia, 202, 203, 205 Garba, Joseph, 25, 234, 271 Gbagbo, Laurent, xii, 202, 203 Gericke, Frank, Captain, 118 Ghana, 19, 28, 230n25, 268 Glass, Straford, 14, 229n7, 271 Gono, Gideon, 101, 162 Green Bombers, 66, 104 Gukurahundi, 43, 105, 237n93, 237n13, 238n21, 249n71, 269, 270 Gwabi Joe, 119 Gweru Military Academy, 38 Hampton Ranch, 77, 79 Harare Declaration, 207–10, 264n13 Harrison, Thomas, 57 Hartlebury, Philip, 119 Hayfrom, Sarah (Sally), 28 Holland, 54 Holland, Hendi, 28, 235n72, 250n83, 271 Home, Douglas, 22, 268 Humphrey, Mike, 124 Hunzvi, Chenjerai, 99 IMF, xvii, 98, 155, 171, 222 India, 102, 171, 173, 210, 267, 275, 279 Inkomo Barracks, 118, 189 Internal Settlement Arrangement, 30, 228n18 Jamaica, 210 Jammeh, Yahaya President, 202 Javis, W.A., 13

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Kabila, Laurent, 153, 154, 159 166, 199, 200, 213 Kagame, Paul, 154 Kalanga, 13 Katanga, 154, 155 Kaunda, Kenneth, 24; involvement in secret discussion with Ian Smith, 130; involvement in Zimbabwe’s independence struggle, 25; visit to Zimbabwe, 131, 233n46, 272 Khalilzad, Zalmay, 214 Khama, Ian, 136, 256 Khama, Seretse, 25, 235n74 Kissinger, Henry, 29 Kombayi, Patrick, 104, 252 Korekore, 13 Kriger, Norma, 7, 32, 46, 227n8, 236n88, 237n7, 239n37, 272 Kutama, 28 Kwelagobe, Daniel, 134, 255n51 Lancaster House Agreement, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 40, 45, 52, 69, 76, 81, 92, 97, 98, 112, 172, 173, 178, 227n5, 239n36 Land Acquisition Act, 1992, 98 Legun, Colin, 25, 233n47, 234n55, 236n80, 253n13, 254n54, 255n41, 257n3, 272 Lobengula, 14 Macdonald, Colin, Sergeant, 58 Machel, Samora, 6, 24; encouragement by Mugabe not to negotiate with renamo, 162, 233n49, 236n83, 237n92, 238n17; instruction to Mugabe to accept Lancaster House Agreement, 118, 129, 130; invitation to visit

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Index

Zimbabwe, 137, 147, 148, 152, 161; support for ZANU, 31 Maclean, Sandy, Lt. General, 46 Made, Joseph, 166, 261n73 Mahachi, Moven, 166, 200 Major, John, 177 Malan, Magnus, 115 Malawi, 163, 182, 189, 231n28, 253n7 Mamdani Mahmood, 101, 102, 252, 272 Mandela, Nelson, 5, 6, 125, 126; criticism of Mugabe domestic’s policy, 199, 212, 227n6, 235n74; reaction’s to Zimbabwe’s involvement in DRC, 127 Mann, Simon, 128 Maphosa, Trust, 65 Maseko, Javen, 38 Masuku, Lookout: detention of, 78; promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, 38; removal from Joint High Command, 40 Matabeleland, 4, 10, 12, 32, 43, 58, 62, 69, 70, 73, 74, 81–91, 93, 94, 95, 103, 113, 122, 129, 130, 132, 133, 156, 176, 181, 182, 194, 207, 229, 238n24, 242n71, 243n1, 245n28, 245n32, 246nn33–34, 248n54, 249n71, 250n77, 250n80, 250n86, 269, 271, 277, 279 Mazoe, 146 Mbasogo, Nguema Obiang, 128, 129 Mbeki, Moeletsi, 127 Mbeki, Thabo, 126–8; efforts to resolve Zimbabwe crisis, 181, 210; membership on Commonwealth Committee,

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285

211; opposition to McKinnon as Commonwealth Secretary General, 227n6, 235n74, 255n43, 257 Mbuji, Mayi, 155 Mckinnon, Don, 135, 211 MDC, ix, x, xi, xii, xvii, 5, 7, 10, 12, 62–6, 70, 100, 102–6, 126, 127, 128, 129, 136, 154, 157, 158, 179, 183, 184, 185, 201, 203, 208, 210, 216, 218, 219, 222, 223, 224, 252n110, 262n15, 276 Mfecane, 13, 14 Mkapa, Benjamin, 180 Mlambo, Alois, 8, 228n14, 262n22, 273, 276 Mnangagwa, Emmerson, 46; as Chair of the Joint High Command, 61; as Deputy Minister of National Security, 66, 124, 134; meeting with Botswana authorities, 149; meeting with Mozambican authorities, 165, 242n73, 245n26, 262n29; and the war in Mozambique, 164 Moorcraft, Paul, 118, 151, 232n38, 234n63, 235n65, 247n44, 254n23, 254n26, 254n30, 259n37, 273 Moore, David, 8, 228n12, 273 Moyo Jason, 232n35 Moyo, Jonathan, 8, 178 Moyo, Mike, 101 Moyo, Sam, 269n17, 274, 279 Mozambique, xi, xii, xvii, xviii, 3, 5, 6, 10, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24; alleged disappearance of ZANLA weapons transferred to, 91, 106, 107, 108, 109, 112, 114, 129,

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286

Index

132, 136, 137–9; assistance in training Zimbabwe Air Force, 52, 56, 66, 67, 79, 82; civil war and Zimbabwe’s involvement, 155, 157, 160–4; efforts to resolve the civil war, 167, 176; meeting with Margaret Thatcher, 182, 183, 191, 199, 203, 205, 210, 227, 232n40, 237n92, 238n17, 245n32, 250n77, 252n2, 254n20, 257n3, 257nn9– 10, 258n16, 258n26, 259n42, 259n43, 260n57, 260n62, 260n64, 260n66, 264, 267, 269, 271, 279; relationship with Zimbabwe, 140–2; support for ZANU, 25, 27; support for ZIPRA, 31, 37, 41, 51; Zimbabwe’s military engagement in, 144, 146–53 Msika, Joseph, 78; alleged support for white farmer, 236n91; expulsion from government, 84, 101 Mtuta, Jim, 78; expulsion from government, 84 Mudenge, Stanislaus, 129 Mudzi, 144 Mugabe, Nhano, 28 Mugabe, Robert, ix, x, xi, xii, 1, 2, 3, 4; accepts the torture of Air Vice Marshal Slatter by Security agents, 97; accusation of brutality, 83, 88; accusation by Magnus Malan, 118; accuses Botswana of supporting dissident forces, 133, 134; accuses Dabengwa of complicity in the arms cache, 79, 80, 81; arrest of Archbishop Ncumbe, 92; assumption of the Leadership of

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ZANU, 18; assumption of office as Prime Minister, 34, 35, 36, 37; birth and personality, 29, 30, 31; commitment of security in the hands of Britain, 175; comparism with Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire, 203–6; comparism with Sani Abacha, 213–14; concedes that mistakes were made over land controversies, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107; concessions made in the formation of the army, 39; condemns journalists over Matabeland unrest reports, 91; criticism of Blair and Bush, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185; criticism from President Ian Khama, 137; desire to demystify Kagame and Museveni, 155, 156, 158; desire to make Zimbabwe key subregional actor, 108, 109, 110; determination to protect trade routes with Mozambique, 145; disagreement with President Mwanawasa, 132; disagreement with South Africa over DRC, 127; dismisses Nkomo from government over arms cache, 77, 78; early relationship with Kaunda, 25; ensuring that the military serves his personal interest, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 76; escapes bomb explosion, 119, 120, 121; and the establishment of 5th Brigade, 44; and the establishment of the police force, 61; exoneration by President Banana, 90; extension of invitation to Peter Walls and Ken

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Index

Flower, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17; and General Peter Walls, 45, 46; immediate response from South Africa to electoral victory, 112, 113, 114, 115; initial conciliatory policy towards whites, 93; initial relationship with Mozambique, 138, 139, 140, 142; intention to hold grip on national security, 62, 63; invitation to Kenneth Kaunda to visit Zimbabwe, 131; involvement in peace negotiation between RENAMO and Mozambican government, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172; and Matabeleland unrest, 82; MDC’s reaction to troops deployment into DRC, 160, 161; military strength at the time of military integration, 38; and Operation Murambatsvina, 98, 99; opposition to dialogue with RENAMO, 163; perception of the white population about personality, 19, 24; pragmatism in relations with South Africa, 111; preindependence view on the future composition of the army, 47; preservation of the structures left by Rhodesians in the CIO, 60; under pressure from war veterans, 100; reaction to Britain’s criticism of detention of white Air Force officers, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180; reaction to call for dialogue with RENAMO, 162; reaction to Lord Carrington, 173, 174; reaction to RENAMO activities, 146, 148, 151, 154;

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287

reactions to the rumours of coups, 40, 41; recognition of inability to confront South Africa, 122, 123; refusal of the military to accept any other Commander in Chief except, 64, 65; refusal to have anything to do with Ian Smith, 27, 28; rejection of offer by former auxiliaries to assist in demobilization, 58; relationship with African Union, 207–11; relationship with China, 191–3; relationship with Commonwealth, 212; relationship with European Union, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 227n2, 227n5, 230n20, 233n49, 235n72, 236nn82–3, 236n87, 237n92, 237n10, 238n16, 239n37, 239n41, 240nn45–6, 241n60, 242n77, 245n26, 246n34, 248nn63–4, 249n72, 250n79, 250nn82–3, 250n85 251n93, 251nn96–7, 252n101, 252n1, 255n32, 255n35, 255n38, 255n48, 256n62, 260n56, 260n66, 260n69, 261n3, 262n15, 262n21, 262nn23–4, 262n29, 263n30, 268, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278; relationship with Soviet Union and later Russia, 194, 195, 196; relationship with SADC, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202; relationship with South Africa over Zimbabwe’s domestic crisis, 128, 129, 130; resolution of tension with Botswana, 135, 136; terminates relationship with South Africa,

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288

Index

124, 125, 126; relationship with United Nations, 215–16; unhappiness with the terms of Lancaster House Agreement, 32, 33; usage of North Korea in the integration exercises, 42, 43; usage of whiteled troops to quell riots, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54; view of Condoleeza Rice, 186, 187, 188–90 Mujuru, Joyce, 101 Mujuru, Solomon: membership in the Joint High Command, 45; position on Zimbabwe’s military involvement in Mozambique, 149; promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, 38 Museveni, Yoweri, 154 Mutambara, Arthur, 103 Muzanda, Simeon, 149 Muzorewa, Abel, 25, 30; “Bible Study” visit to Israel, 228n18, 235n77, 241n66, 242n71, 249n65, 252n1; and Lancaster House Agreement, 32, 37, 54; link with auxiliaries, 70, 73, 84, 109, 113; link with apartheid South Africa, 133, 193; as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 31 Mvenge, Moses, 158 Mwanawasa, Levy, 131 Nacala, 150 Namibia, 3, 4, 6, 27, 36, 107, 132; intervention in DRC, 154, 182, 197, 198, 200; non-criticism of Mugabe’s domestic policy, 206, 252n1, 269; refugees going to Botswana, 153; and SADC’s intervention in DRC, 201, 205

24864_ALAO.indb 288

Ncumbe, Archbishop, 91, 250n79 Ndau, 13, 155, 156 Ndelebe, 4, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23, 43, 49, 71, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 108, 156, 221, 229nn5–6, 234n53, 244n14, 245n27, 246n34, 246n43, 248n57, 272 NDP, xvii, 16, 17 Neto, Augustino, 6 New Zealand, 209, 211, 236n85, 264n10 Nigeria, xii, 7, 25; and Commonwealth, 221, 227n7, 229nn8–9, 233n44, 234n57, 237n9, 243, 261, 264, 267, 271, 278; democracy and human rights, 201; elections in, 186; importance to ECOWAS, 203; involvement in meeting to resolve Zimbabwe’s independence, 46; nullification of election, 187; post civil war situation, 173, 184; role in Cote d’Ivoire crisis, 208–12; speculation on being involved in military integration, 51; training of members of air force, 91 Nitram, 77 Nkala, Enos, 89; as Minister of Defence, 191; position on Zimbabwe’s relations with former Soviet Union, 236, 238, 248; role in Matabeleland crisis, 152 Nkomati Accord, 162 Nkomo, John, 101, Nkomo, Joshua, xi, xii, 9, 16; on activities of 5th Brigade, 101, 108, 118, 129, 130, 132, 173; and arms cache controversy,

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Index

81–84; and independence election, 33, 37; involvement in quelling Entumbane riots, 52, 59; leadership of the ANC, 17; leadership of ZAPU, 18; link with Soviet Union, 189, 219, 221, 227, 229, 234n54, 234n58, 235n76, 236n91, 239n41, 240n45, 242nn69–70, 244n12, 244nn14–15, 244n17, 244n19, 245n26, 246n34, 246n37, 246n40, 247n19, 249n72, 275; as Minister of Home Affairs, 76–81; and Matabeleland unrest, 86, 89; number of troops under control of, 40, 49; participation in secret meeting with Smith, 30; perception of by Ian Smith, 31; perception of by white Rhodesians, 23; position on Lancaster House Agreement, 32; support from Zambia, 24, 25 North Korea, 4, 20, 41, 42, 43, 44, 95, 173, 188, 238n16, 238n27, 262 Northern Island, 74 Ntabazinduna Camp, 48 Nujoma, Sam, 6, 227 Nyadzonya, 22, 233n41 Nyagambe, 146 Nyagumbo, Maurice, 151 Nyamakati Camp, 146 Nyanga, 43, 85, 150, 176 Nyerere, Julius, 129,130, 233n42 Oatt, Senator, 90, 249 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 210; membership of Commonwealth Committee, 234n57, 243n2, 278 Operation Murambatsvina, 97, 268, 273, 275, 279

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289

Operation Octopus, 87 Operation Quartz, 44, 239n31 Organisation of African Unity, xvii, 23, 32; change of focus after decolonization, 203–4; and the Frontline States, 134; race for Secretary General, 181, 195, 197; and Zimbabwe, 237, 253n7, 255n38, 256n56, 264 Osleg, 166 Page, Allen, 46, 240 Pasipamire, Chris, 119 pfz, xvii, 57–60, 241n67 Portugal, 19, 182 Powell, Colin, 185, 262n27 Prunier, Gerard, 185, 262, 263 Quattara, Alhassene, 136, 202 Raftopolous, Brian, 8, 228n4, 262, 273, 276 Ranger, Terence, xii, 8, 228nn10– 12, 232n36, 243n9, 267, 268, 274, 276, 277, 278 RENAMO, xvii, 4, 41, 73, 74, 91; amnesty offer to, 108, 117; meeting with Zimbabwe government, 193; relationship with Israel, 199, 203, 227n4, 238n17, 245n32, 250n77, 257nn3–4, 257nn9–11, 258n20, 258n27, 258nn42–3, 259n48, 260n57, 260n60, 260n66, 279; sponsorship by South Africa, 137, 140– 53, 155–7, 160–4, 167, 174, 176, 182 Rhodes, John Cecil, 12, 13, 14 Rhodesian Front, 18; on Matabeleland unrest, 157;

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290

Index

opposition to emergency laws, 90; and Renamo, 230n20; and UDI, 33, 40, 42, 74 Rice, Condoleezza, 185 Romania, 170, 188, 189, 191, 263n39 Rowland, Tiny, 25, 163 RSF, xvii, 37, 38, 40, 41, 119, 239n36, 240n49 Rupiya, Martin, 7, 37, 67, 227, 237, 242, 269 Russia, 11, 169, 170, 171, 190, 192–3; relationship with Mugabe, 214, 261n1, 263n48, 269, 272, 275, 279. See also Soviet Union Rwanda, xvii, 153, 154, 164, 167, 199, 200, 222, 256n2, 257n2 SADC, xiii, xvii, xvii, 11, 106, 111; establishment of, 116, 126, 127; protocol, 180, 195, 197–203; and Zimbabwe, 294, 264n1; and Zimbabwe’s political crisis, 135, 138, 145, 153 SADCC. See SADC SADF, xviii, 118, 119, 124 Sadomba, Wilbert, 8, 228n16, 250n88, 277 Savage, Betty, 94 Savage, Colleen, 94 Savage, Paul, Senator, 94 Savage, T., 276 Scotland Yard, 57 Schaefer, Brett, 186, 263n34, 278 Sekeremayi, Sydney, 164, 246n35 Selous Scout, 40; disaffection with General Walls, 112; disbandment, 44; employment in South Africa, 233n41, 239n27, 278

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Sese Seko, Mobutu, 153, 184 Shamuyariya, Nathan, 44; on General Walls, 90; reaction to Catholic Bishops’ criticism, 123; on Zimbabwe’s breaking of relationship with South Africa, 229, 278 Shiri, Perence, 43; assumption of office as Head of Air Force, 62, 66; and 5th Brigade, 51; membership in the Joint High Command, 262n29 Shona, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 24, 32, 33, 66, 68, 71, 81, 82, 87, 88, 108, 146, 155, 228, 232n37, 233n48, 238n21, 244n14, 251n100, 268 Short, Claire, 177, 261n12 Sibanda, Philip, Lt. General, 66 Simpson, Tom, Colonel, 87 Simpson, 236, 278 Sithole, Ndabaningi, 8, 16; and formation of ZANU, 17; and Internal Settlement Plan, 155, 157; removal as ZANU leaders, 25; secret meeting with Smith, 30; and ZANU Ndoga, 229n13, 235n77, 278 Smith, Ian, 4, 18; introduction of Internal Settlement Proposals, 33, 46, 58, 73, 74; opposition to Emergency rule legislation, 92, 94, 110, 116 172, 175, 180, 184, 220, 227n1, 230n21, 231n27, 233n42, 236nn82–3, 236n87, 236n91, 241n61, 250n85, 268, 272, 278; secret meeting with to discuss future of Rhodesia, 26, 27; and South Africa, 30; and UDI, 19, 21, 22, 25

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Index

Soames, Christopher, Lord, 32; appointment as Governor of Rhodesia, 36, 39, 45, 236n84, 236n87, 248n62, 278 Solana, Javier, 215 South Africa, xvii, xviii, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 18–19; and arms cache, 84–5; and the Commonwealth over Zimbabwe, 214, 230n23, 232n34, 233n48, 234n54, 234nn59–61, 235nn64–5, 235nn67–8, 235n70, 235n74, 244n19, 244n23, 246nn43–5, 252nn1–3, 252nn6–8, 252nn11– 12, 252nn15–17, 254nn20–2, 254n24, 254nn27–9, 255n38, 255nn41–2, 255n45, 256n63, 257n4, 260n57, 260n66, 262n18, 264nn1–2, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 278, 279; defection of former Rhodesian officer to, 57, 58; departure of Rhodesian police officers to, 69, 73, 75, 77–8; and Matabeleland unrest, 95, 106– 35; relationship with Zimbabwe, 138, 141–5; and SADC, 203, 206, 207, 209–211; support for RENAMO, 148, 151, 160, 161, 162, 173, 175, 176, 181, 182, 186, 190, 193, 194, 197, 198– 201; support for Smith, 32, 36, 39, 41, 45; and UDI, 25–7 Soviet Union, 11, 20; relationship with Zimbabwe, 194, 213, 231n32, 234n50, 273; support for ZIPRA, 78, 179, 170, 173, 174, 188, 190–202. See also Russia Spence Jack, xiii, 27, 235n68, 278

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291

Sri Lanka, 67, 211 Stillius Limasol, 67 Straw, Jack, 180 Takaendesa, Piniel, 56 Tamil Tigers, 67 Tanzania, 19, 23, 37, 129, 132, 150; British gift to army, 153, 180, 205, 254n20 Tekere, Edgar, 63; criticism of Government’s handling of RENAMO, 219, 242n71, 250n85; and the murder of Gerald Adams, 102, 155, 157; and ZUM, 93–4 Thatcher, Margaret, 30, 44, 128, 174–7, 261n6 Thatcher, Mark, 128–9 Tiger, HMS, 19 Tongogara Camp, 146 Tongogara, Josiah, 87, 232n35, 233n49, 246n34 Tsvangirai, Morgan, x, xi, 62, 103– 4; and MDC, 136, 221, 252n108, 279 Tungamirai, Josiah: on civil war in Mozambique, 149; commander of Air Force, 51; promotion to Major General, 38; retirement, 62 Tutu, Desmond, Archbishop, 127 UDI, x, xiii, xviii, 5, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26 Uganda, 102, 153–4; involvement in DRC war, 164, 167, 179, 200, 222, 229n9, 256n2, 257n2, 259n44 UNDP, xviii, 279 UNHCR, xviii, 132, 146, 255n50, 258n16

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292

Index

UNITA, xviii, 227n4, 257n2, 264n3 United Nations Organisation, xiii, xviii, 11, 23; on Congo civil war, 160; criticism of Zimbabwe’s involvement in DRC, 165, 182, 186, 190, 195, 208, 213, 228n17, 279; involvement in Zimbabwe’s independence, 159 United States, xiii, 5, 7, 11, 54, 136, 169 170, 180, 182–8; criticism of Russia and China over Zimbabwe, 204, 210, 213–14; relationship with Zimbabwe, 191, 192; and the United Nations, over Zimbabwe, 220, 221, 222, 230n23, 231n32, 242n77, 261n2, 271 Ushewokunze, Herbert, 59 Van der Westhuizen, P.W. Lt. Gen, 124 Verwoerd, Hendrik, 26, 234n59 Viljoes, Constand, 119 Walls, Peter, Lt. General, 4, 38–40; allegation of attempt to overthrow Mugabe, 237n11, 239n27, 244n19; criticism of Mugabe, 45; expulsion from Zimbabwe, 77–8; and military integration exercise, 44 Wiwa, Ken Saro, 187, 208, 211, 221, 227n7, 264n14 Yugoslavia, 170; replacement of destroyed weapons, 191, 263n39; and Zimbabwe’s independence, 173, 189 Zambia, 19, 23–5; Dabengwa’s visit over arms transfer, 106, 107, 108, 129–36; relationship

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with Zimbabwe, 153; and SADC, over DRC, 192, 200, 228n18, 229n15, 231n28, 233n46, 233n48, 245n30, 247n49, 254n20, 261; and Zimbabwe’s independence, 27, 30, 37, 52, 56, 78 ZANLA, xviii, 20; and arms cache, 79, 82–3; and demobilization, 56; and ex-combatants, 61, 62, 68, 76; formation, 29; and Matabeleland crisis, 87, 88, 141, 157, 231n33, 232nn34–5, 233nn48–9, 237n13, 240nn48– 9, 245n28, 246n40, 248n53, 259n48; and military integration, 42, 46–52; Mugabe’s acceptance of leadership, 31, 33, 36–40; and politics of integration, 54 ZANU, ix, x, xviii, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17–18; and armed clashes, 52, 56; and the arms cache, 85; assassination of Chitepo, 29; and the birth of ZANU PF, 32; and demobilization, 59–60; and dissident activities, 89–91; and Edgar Tekere, 156–8; electoral victory, 39, 40, 46; and 5th Brigade activities, 93, 98, 99–105; idea about a new army, 48–50; and independence election, 33; and the land crisis, 108, 118, 122, 127, 128, 131, 132, 141, 151, 155; and the police, 62, 64; politicization of the army, 66, 70, 74, 76, 79–82; pre-independence link with China, 191–202; preindependence link with Russia, 194, 205, 210, 216, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 233n48, 236n87, 238n15, 240n43, 243n8, 245n28, 246n35,

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Index

246n37, 248n56, 249n73, 249n75, 251n93, 252n109, 253n3, 262n15, 272, 273, 275; and RENAMO, 165, 178, 179, 183, 188–9; split with ZAPU, 20; and ZANLA, 24 ZANU PF, ix, x, xviii, 7, 8, 10, 12, 32, 62, 70; and the AU, 210; and Britain, 205; and the Commonwealth, 216, 221, 222, 224, 251n93, 252n109, 273; and intervention in the DRC, 165, 179; and MDC 99–101, 127, 141, 158; and the war veterans, 103–5 ZAPU, xi, xii, xviii, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16; and armed clashes, 59; and the arms cache, 82, 84–99; and the creation of the police, 62–3; formation, 17; and the formation of the Patriotic Front, 32–3; and the Frontline States, 29; and the inpendence election, 36, 39, 40, 42, 43, 46, 48–51; leadership by Nkomo, 18, 20; links with Russia, 193, 219, 221, 223, 227n2, 229n15, 231n32, 232n35, 236n91, 238nn14–15, 240n43, 240n45, 244n17, 244n20, 244n25, 245n30, 246n37, 246n44, 247n45, 247n50, 249n73, 255n33, 256n55; links with Zambia, 156– 7; and Matabeleland unrest, 102, 108, 122, 129–35; position on RENAMO, 176, 190–2; and the Unity Accord, 74, 76–80; and the War of Liberation, 23–5 Zastle, Colin Colonel, 54 Zezuru, 13 Zimbabwe Democracy Act, 183 Zimbabwe’s Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, 166 Zimondi, Paradzai, 66

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293

ZIPRA, xviii, 20; and arms cache controversy, 82–5; dissidents in Botswana, 157, 192; establishment, 23; and integration, 47–51; and Matabeleland unrest, 87, 88, 99, 133; political issues in integration, 54, 61, 62, 63, 68, 76, 78–80; shooting down of civilian plane, 33, 36, 38–41; support from Russia, 231n30, 232n34, 235n76, 238n14, 238n25, 239n38, 240nn47–9, 240n52, 244n15, 244n21, 246n36, 246n40, 247n45, 259n48; support from Zambia, 30 Ziyambi, Tasisai, 59 ZNA, xviii, 36–8; demobilization, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 83, 84; desertion of Ex ZIPRA, 85–8; desertion of former White Rhodesians, 118–9; entering into Botswana territory, 142, 147–8; establishment, 40–2; involvement in DRC, 159, 160, 164, 165, 166, 176, 178, 182, 188, 237n9, 238n25, 241n53, 246n44, 257n9, 258n26, 258nn34–5, 262; involvement of North Korea, 46–8; and Matabeleland unrest, 104, 112; political background in establishment, 50, 51, 52; and RENAMO, 149, 150, 151, 156–7; sabotage by South Africa, 127, 133 ZUM, xviii, 63, 64, 102, 103, 104, 156, 157, 219, 223 Zuma, Jacob, 127 Zvinavashe, Vitalis, 55; on demobilization, 60, 61, 62, 124; meeting with South Africa, 166; and Zimbabwe’s involvement in DRC, 237n13, 241n53, 258n32

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