The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe: From Mugabe to Mnangagwa [1st ed.] 9783030477325, 9783030477332

Citation preview

AFRICAN HISTORIES AND MODERNITIES

The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe From Mugabe to Mnangagwa Edited by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni · Pedzisai Ruhanya

African Histories and Modernities Series Editors Toyin Falola The University of Texas at Austin Austin, TX, USA Matthew M. Heaton Virginia Tech Blacksburg, VA, USA

This book series serves as a scholarly forum on African contributions to and negotiations of diverse modernities over time and space, with a particular emphasis on historical developments. Specifically, it aims to refute the hegemonic conception of a singular modernity, Western in origin, spreading out to encompass the globe over the last several decades. Indeed, rather than reinforcing conceptual boundaries or parameters, the series instead looks to receive and respond to changing perspectives on an important but inherently nebulous idea, deliberately creating a space in which multiple modernities can interact, overlap, and conflict. While privileging works that emphasize historical change over time, the series will also feature scholarship that blurs the lines between the historical and the contemporary, recognizing the ways in which our changing understandings of modernity in the present have the capacity to affect the way we think about African and global histories. Editorial Board Akintunde Akinyemi, Literature, University of Florida, Gainesville Malami Buba, African Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin, South Korea Emmanuel Mbah, History, CUNY, College of Staten Island Insa Nolte, History, University of Birmingham Shadrack Wanjala Nasong’o, International Studies, Rhodes College Samuel Oloruntoba, Political Science, TMALI, University of South Africa Bridget Teboh, History, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14758

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni Pedzisai Ruhanya Editors

The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe From Mugabe to Mnangagwa

Editors Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni Archie Mafeje Research Institute University of South Africa Pretoria, South Africa

Pedzisai Ruhanya University of Johannesburg Johannesburg, South Africa

African Histories and Modernities ISBN 978-3-030-47732-5    ISBN 978-3-030-47733-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Getty images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Zimbabwe’s sole political leader since independence in 1980, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, lost power after a military coup in 2017. For a fortnight in November 2017, the coup was, for some observers in the academy and media and for many Zimbabwean citizens, indeterminate and imbued with potential for the emergence of a political leadership that would reform the authoritarian and divisive nationalist politics that had come to define the Zimbabwean state. Zimbabwe’s once efficient public service provision, effective state bureaucracies and large formal sector had disintegrated significantly in the two decades preceding the coup. This decline was a consequence of marked economic regression and rising state corruption. For many, the 2017 coup opened up possibilities for economic turnaround and regeneration of state institutions. This insightful edited volume by Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya comes three years after the coup. It assesses the degree to which the various openings that the coup created were indeed opportunities for real political and economic reforms. Are the politics and governance of the post-coup ZANU PF administration, led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, radically different from that of the ZANU PF government that Mugabe headed? Have the values and practices of what Ndlovu-Gatsheni has elsewhere referred to as ‘Mugabeism’ atrophied? Why is Zimbabwean politics locked in interminable transitions? These are only a few of the critical questions this book addresses. Linda Thomas-Greenfield and Bruce Wharton’s “Zimbabwe’s Coup: Net Gain or No Gain?” (2019) has endeavoured to evaluate the fate of the v

vi 

FOREWORD

reform agenda following the 2017 coup. In the broader literature, Clayton Thyne and Jonathan Powell’s “Coup d’État or Coup d’Autocracy: How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008” (2016), Ozan Varol’s The Democratic Coup d’État (2017), Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans’ “Coups and Democracy” (2014) and Paul Collier’s “In Praise of the Coup” (2009), among others, debate and reach some varying conclusions about the impact of coups on political processes such as democratisation. For example, whereas Collier is in praise of the coup for being a means of liberating an oppressed people from dictatorship, Thyne and Powell warn that in fact, personal dictatorships and misrule have often been post-coup outcomes. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s book adds to the aforementioned literature. Like Thyne and Powell’s work, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s study is not in praise of the coup, and, similar to Thomas-Greenfield and Wharton, they strike a pessimistic tone with regard to the extent of political reform since the 2017 coup. However, two crucial points distinguish Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s study from competing works focusing on Zimbabwe’s post-coup politics. The first is that it surpasses other studies in terms of scope. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya have assembled an ambitious book, which examines how post-coup national politics interacts with, and is shaped by, themes such as nationalism, political economy and gender. The result is a rich appraisal of politics after the coup that is usefully historicised, incorporates political economy and pays notable attention to gender, which so inscribed politics before and during the coup. The 2017 coup represents a departure from some of the politics of old because it was Zimbabwe’s inaugural coup, impacting civil–military relations for years to come, but a significant part of subsequent politics has deep historical roots that this book enables the reader to grasp. A second point that distinguishes Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s book is that it foregrounds arguments by young and older Zimbabwean scholars about their distressed country’s politics. In recent years, academic interest in coups and military rule has declined in African Studies, owing to the marked reduction in the frequency of coups and also because intellectual fashions come and go. Nonetheless, coups continue to occur and, as the recent case of Zimbabwe shows, their incidence is not the preserve of countries with a history of successful coups. The study of coup motivations, dynamics and consequences

 FOREWORD 

vii

remains an important and productive intellectual pursuit, even if it has gone out of fashion for some scholars. This book, with its focus on postcoup politics, substantiates my point through its remarkable range of insightful contributions. St Antony’s College, Oxford Blessing-Miles Tendi

Acknowledgements

This book is founded upon the collective efforts of its editors and contributors. As editors, we appreciate the commitment and cooperation of all contributors to this project, and therefore take this opportunity to thank them most sincerely. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni would like to thank Professor Tshilidzi Marwala (Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg) for facilitating his 2019 Visiting Professorship at the Johannesburg Institute of Advanced Study (JIAS) and Dr Bongani Ngqulunga (Director of JIAS) for accepting him as Visiting Professor at the institute, which enabled completion of this book project. Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni also extends thanks to Professor Mandla Makhanya (Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of South Africa), under whom he works, for giving him time off to work on this book project. The editors also extend their thanks to Professor Blessing-Miles Tendi (University of Oxford) and Mr Siphosami Malunga (Executive Director of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa) for contributing foreword and postscript respectively.

ix

Contents

1 Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe: From Robert Gabriel Mugabe to Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa: A Repetition Without Change  1 Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya Part I Colonialism, Nationalism and Political Culture  23 2 The Political Culture of Zimbabwe: Continuities and Discontinuities 25 Rudo Gaidzanwa 3 The Zimbabwean National Question: Key Components and Unfinished Business 51 Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 4 Opposition Politics and the Culture of Polarisation in Zimbabwe, 1980–2018 85 Zenzo Moyo 5 Understanding Zimbabwe’s Political Culture: Media and Civil Society117 Stanley Tsarwe

xi

xii 

Contents

Part II Identity, Militarisation and Transitional Politics 133 6 The Identity Politics Factor in Zimbabwe’s Transition Politics135 Bekezela Gumbo 7 The Ethnicization of Political Mobilization in Zimbabwe: The Case of Pro-Mthwakazi Movements155 Samukele Hadebe 8 The Militarisation of State Institutions in Zimbabwe, 2002–2017181 Pedzisai Ruhanya Part III Social Media, Democracy and Political Discourse 205 9 The Media and Politics in the Context of the “Third Chimurenga” in Zimbabwe207 Philip Pasirayi 10 Social Media and the Concept of Dissidence in Zimbabwean Politics221 Shepherd Mpofu and Trust Matsilele 11 The Tabloidization of Political News in Zimbabwe: End of Quality Press?245 Wellington Gadzikwa Part IV Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation Restore Legacy 273 12 Primitive Accumulation and Mugabe’s Extroverted Economy: What Now Under the Second Republic?275 Toendepi Shonhe

 Contents 

xiii

13 The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe299 Sylvester Marumahoko and Tinashe C. Chigwata 14 Misogyny, Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy331 Lyton Ncube 15 Foreign Direct Investment in the Post-Mugabe Era359 Mkhululi Sibindi  Postscript: A Tale of Broken Promises389 Siphosami Malunga Index399

Notes on Contributors

Tinashe C. Chigwata  is a senior researcher at the Dullah Omar Institute for Constitutional Law, Governance and Human Rights at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. He obtained a PhD in Public Law from the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. His other qualifications are an MPhil in Local Government Law (University of the Western Cape) and a BSc (Honours) in Administration (University of Zimbabwe). His current research interests are in the areas of local government law, decentralisation and constitutional law. Dr Chigwata has extensive experience working in both the public and private sectors in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Wellington Gadzikwa  is a lecturer in Journalism and Media Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. He has been a senior lecturer at Harare Polytechnic Division of Mass Communication (thirteen years), Information Officer-Ministry of Information (six  years). He is a media analyst and consultant, and had published four books on the media as well as various articles in academic journals and chapters in books. He completed his PhD at UNISA in 2018. Rudo  Gaidzanwa is Professor of Sociology at the University of Zimbabwe. She specialises in social policy, land and gender studies and has published on gender and land, extractivism and social policy. She is also a gender and human rights activist. Her publications include Images of Women in Zimbabwean Literature (1985), Speaking for Ourselves: Masculinities and Femininities amongst University of Zimbabwe Students xv

xvi 

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

(ed., 2001) and A Beautiful Strength: A Journal of Eighty Years of Women’s Rights, Movements and Activism in Zimbabwe since 1936 (co-edited with I.  Matambanadzo, 2017). She is former Dean of the Faculty of Social Studies at University of Zimbabwe (2008–2012) and a former Dean of the College of Social Sciences at Zimbabwe Academy of Sciences. She served on the Presidential Land Committee in Zimbabwe in 2003 and as the Coordinator of Affirmative Action Programme at the University of Zimbabwe, as well as lead researcher for the WoMIN and Centre for Natural Resource Governance Study on Gendered Extractive Activities in Zimbabwe, 2017. Bekezela  Gumbo  is currently a DPhil student at the Centre for Africa Studies at the University of the Free State. His research interests include politics of transition, political institutional engineering for sustainable political stability and socioeconomic and human development in Southern Africa. He serves as a principal researcher at Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, an independent research institute in Zimbabwe. As an undergraduate, he studied political science, and his Master’s degree is in International Relations from the University of Zimbabwe. Samukele  Hadebe is a senior researcher at Chris Hani Institute, Johannesburg. He holds a doctorate in Linguistics awarded jointly by the University of Zimbabwe and the University of Oslo. He was the chief editor of the Ndebele dictionary Isichazamazwi SesiNdebele (2001). The subjects of his publications include language planning, translation, literature, nationalism and labour issues. He has worked as a university lecturer, a senior civil servant and in civil society organizations. Siphosami  Malunga is the Executive Director of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and a human rights lawyer with extensive experience in justice and governance in Africa. He took the helm at OSISA in August 2013; having previously worked with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the senior governance advisor and regional programme manager in the Regional Bureau for Africa. He managed UNDP’s democratic governance programme for Africa, providing policy analysis and intellectual leadership to governance advisors in UNDP’s Africa offices. Malunga joined the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the UN’s Transitional Administration in East Timor in 2000 as an advisor to the transitional minister of justice, and later as senior defence trial attorney with the UN Serious

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

xvii

Crimes Tribunal. Between 2003 and 2006 he worked with the UN in Afghanistan to rebuild the justice sector, before moving to UNDP’s Governance Centre in Oslo, where he led UNDP’s effort to integrate conflict prevention in democratic governance policy and programming. In 2008, he moved to Johannesburg to work in UNDP’s East and Southern Africa office until 2011. Malunga earned his LLB at the University of Zimbabwe in 1994 and a Master’s in International Law (Cum Laude) from the University of Oslo, Norway, in 2007. He is a regular contributor, writer, commentator and contributor to leading continental and global publications on political, social and economic issues in Africa. Sylvester Marumahoko  is a Global Excellence and Stature Scholar with the School of Post Graduate Studies (Research and Innovation) at the University of Johannesburg in South Africa. He obtained a PhD in Public Law from the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. His other qualifications are MPhil in Local Government Law (University of the Western Cape), MSc in Rural and Urban Planning (University of Zimbabwe), MPA (University of Zimbabwe) and BSc (Honours) in Politics and Administration (University of Zimbabwe). His current research interests are in the areas of electoral reform in Southern Africa (with a special focus on Zimbabwe), constitutional law, the civil society–state relationship and intergovernmental relations. Dr Marumahoko has extensive experience working in both the public and private sectors in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Trust  Matsilele recently completed his PhD at the Department of Communication Studies, University of Johannesburg. He studied Zimbabwe’s social media dissidence with an interdisciplinary approach that encompassed media, anthropology and history. Matsilele’s research interests include the use of social media by voices on the margins, the use of artificial intelligence and big data in contemporary newsrooms and whistleblower citizen journalism. Zenzo Moyo  is a South Africa-based Zimbabwean researcher, who has practised both as a school teacher and as a university lecturer. Dr Moyo completed his MA (2013) and PhD (2018) in Development Studies at the University of Johannesburg. His PhD thesis was on state–civil society relations, and how these have moderated processes of democratisation in Zimbabwe. One of his recent publications is a 2018 article titled ‘“What

xviii 

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Would We Be Without Them?” Rural Intellectuals in the State and NGOs in Zimbabwe’s Crisis-Ridden Countryside”, which is based on his MA research and was published by the Critical Sociology Journal. Currently, Dr Moyo works as a researcher at the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection in Johannesburg. His research interests are in civil society, social movements, democracy, African and opposition politics, human rights and the links between education and development. Shepherd Mpofu  holds a PhD in Media Studies from the University of the Witwatersrand and is currently a Senior Lecturer in Communication Studies at the University of Limpopo. He is a former Global Excellence Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg. His research and teaching interests are in media and identity, politics, digital media, citizen journalism and comparative media systems. He is currently working on two books, on social media and identity in South Africa and diasporic media and identity in Zimbabwe. Lyton  Ncube is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Communication Studies Department, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He holds a PhD in Cultural and Media Studies from the Centre for Communication Media and Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal (2015). Lyton Ncube’s Doctoral thesis shows the nexus of football, power, identity and development discourses in modern Zimbabwe. Using Zimbabwe’s two prominent football clubs, Dynamos FC and Highlanders FC, the study demonstrates how football is intricately intertwined with the daily exigencies of existence of the people of Zimbabwe. His research interests are in the political economy of the media, critical theory, cultural studies and the sociology of sport, particularly the nexus of football, nationalism and social identities. Sabelo  J.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni is Research Professor and Director of Scholarship in the Department of Leadership and Transformation in the Principal and Vice-Chancellor’s Office at the University of South Africa (UNISA) and is also the 2019 Visiting Professor at the Johannesburg Institute of Advanced Study at the University of Johannesburg. He holds a DPhil in Historical Studies from the University of Zimbabwe. He has taught at the University of Zimbabwe, Midlands State University, Monash University (South Africa/Australia), the Open University (United Kingdom, UK) and the University of South Africa. He is a member of the Academy of Science of South Africa, a Fellow of the Centre of African Studies in the Netherlands and a Research Associate

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

xix

of the Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies at the Open University; he is also highly rated as a social scientist by the National Research Foundation of South Africa. He has published over 100 academic works, including seven sole-authored books, and seven edited volumes. His latest major publications are books entitled Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization (2018) and Decolonization, Development and Knowledge in Africa: Turning Over a New Leaf (2020, forthcoming). Philip  Pasirayi  is a Zimbabwean human rights activist and researcher. He holds a DPhil in International Development from the University of Oxford (UK). His research interests are in media, democracy, governance and human rights. He is currently working as Executive Director of a local Zimbabwean NGO, the Centre for Community Development in Zimbabwe, based in Harare. Pedzisai Ruhanya  is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the University of Johannesburg’s School of Communication, Faculty of Humanities. He is the director of the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (ZDI). He studied journalism, sociology, human rights and media and democracy at the Universities of Zimbabwe, Essex (UK) and Westminster (UK). Toendepi Shonhe  is a political economist and Research Fellow at Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, University of South Africa. He holds a Master’s in public policy management from the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa and PhD in Development Studies— Agrarian Relations from the University of KwaZulu Natal. His research interest is in agrarian change and economic development. He recently published a book on reconfigured agrarian relations in Zimbabwe. His current research work focuses on the agrarian transition in Zimbabwe as well as land reform, food security and capital accumulation in Africa. Mkhululi  Sibindi is a doctoral student in International Business, Economics and Trade at the University of South Africa. He completed his MBA at Zimbabwe Open University. His academic and professional engagements have included appointments at Richfield Graduate Institute (South Africa) Trust Academy (Bulawayo). He currently serves as Senior Lecturer at Richfield Graduate Institute of Technology in Pretoria. He is a specialist in international capital flows, expansion strategies and multinational firms’ heterogeneity. His research interests focus on developing markets, with specific emphasis on Africa. He is expert in advanced econometrics and quantitative research.

xx 

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Stanley Tsarwe  is a senior lecturer in Journalism and Media Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. He holds a PhD in Journalism and Media Studies from Rhodes University, South Africa. He also holds an MA in Journalism and Media Studies from the same institution. He has research interests in media and democracy; African radio and democratisation; and media, conflict and peace in Africa.

List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 12.1 Fig. 12.2 Fig. 12.3 Fig. 12.4

A systems analysis of identity politics in Zimbabwe transition politics139 Conceptualising identity politics as a dominant political culture in Zimbabwe 144 Zimbabwe trade 1995–2016. Notes: Imports, exports. (Source: Simoes 2018) 288 Balance of payments developments: 2009–2017. (Source: RBZ 2018) 289 Diamond exports and imports from partners for Zimbabwe, 2000–2016. (Source: Various Sources, Adopted from TMALI, UN COMTRADE) 290 Interconnectedness of Africa’s Regional Economic Blocks. Notes (Abbreviations): AMU, Arab Maghreb Union; CEMAC, Central African Economic and Monetary Community; CMA, Common Monetary Area; CEN-SAD, Community of Sahelo-Saharan States; CEPGL, Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries; IOC, Indian Ocean Commission; IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on Development; MRU, Mano River Union; SACU, Southern African Customs Union; WAEMU, West African Economic and Monetary Union; WAMZ, West African Monetary Zone. * Members of CEN-SAD. (Source: Ncube and Mokoti (2019), figure updated from UNESC (2009), Economic Development in Africa 2009: Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Development. United Nations publication. Sales No. E.09.II.D.7. New York and Geneva) 291

xxi

xxii 

List of Figures

Fig. 14.1 Fig. 14.2 Fig. 14.3 Fig. 14.4 Fig. 14.5 Fig. 14.6 Fig. 14.7

Demonstrators gathered outside State House after the long march to and from the Highfields suburb. (Source: Author) 340 A manipulated WhatsApp picture of Grace Mugabe bent over, General Chiwenga fucking from behind. (Source: WhatsApp meme) 345 A tweet allegedly from the ZANU–PF handle claiming that there was no coup, but military action that aimed to help Mugabe, who had been taken advantage of by his wife 349 Tweet by prominent Zimbabwean musician Mapfumo suggesting that Grace’s character had triggered Operation Restore Legacy. (Source: Thomas Mapfumo’s Twitter handle) 350 Trevor Ncube’s tweet, sarcastically commending Grace’s contribution in the downfall of her husband. (Source: Trevor Ncube’s Twitter handle) 351 A manipulated WhatsApp image of Robert Mugabe blaming a miserable-looking Grace for their demise. (Source: WhatsApp meme)352 A WhatsApp meme that trended on 24 November 2017, on the inauguration of President Emmerson Mnangagwa. (Source: WhatsApp meme) 353

List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 12.1 Table 15.1 Table 15.2

Results of the top three candidates in presidential elections conducted between 1990 and 2018 Land grabs in Zimbabwe Taxonomy of market failures impeding internationalization Trade policy objectives

100 286 371 377

xxiii

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe: From Robert Gabriel Mugabe to Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa: A Repetition Without Change Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya

It would seem that the age of revolutions is over, to be succeeded by the age of transitions. These transitions were expected to be less violent than revolutions; liberal democracy was expected to enable peaceful change. Illiberal regimes are worse off. The authoritarian of Egypt, Algeria, Zimbabwe and Sudan have witnessed military interventions in transitional politics. Military forces embody violence, and their political interventions tend to block rather than enhance transitions. This book is about the problematic history of Zimbabwe and its politics of transition. At least six problematic transitions have been discernible in the country, something

S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (*) Archie Mafeje Research Institute, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa P. Ruhanya University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_1

1

2 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

that led Thandika Mkandawire (2016) to write of ‘transition overload’. The first was the decolonisation transition of 1980, which was expected to deliver a sovereign Zimbabwe inhabited by free citizens who would enjoy restored land that had been stolen by white settler colonisers. The reality is that the land remained in the hands of minority white citizens, and at the end of two years’ independence (in 1983), Zimbabwe plunged into Operation Gukurahundi, which left over 20,000 mostly Ndebele-speaking people dead as a ‘party-state’ and ‘party-nation’ was constructed (Kriger 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a). During the second transition, white dominance in the economy was dismantled. This entailed affirmative action, indigenisation and deracialisation of the economy, which took place in an environment of constraint that was based on an unwritten policy of reconciliation and the regulatory framework of the Lancaster House Constitution. For an agreed period of ten years (1980–1990), the Zimbabwean government could not amend the constitution. The third transition involved economic liberalisation. This began in 1990 in accordance with the demands and conditions of the notorious Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Mlambo 1997). This neo-liberal transition not only destroyed the progress that had been made in the social spheres of education and health, but also provoked protests from workers and students who were hard hit by a combination of retrenchment, withdrawal of subsidies on basic commodities and privatisation. The fourth transition was the agrarian transformation that took place under the banner of the Third Chimurenga and the radical Fast-Track Land Reform Programme, which was meant to deliver land to Zimbabwe’s landless black people. The consequence of this was the collapse of the national economy, partly because the implementation of land reform was chaotic and partly because it led to Zimbabwe being ostracised by the international community (Moyo and Yeros 2005; Alexander 2006; Sadomba 2011). The fifth transition was democratisation, which was fought for under the leadership of the labour movement (the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions), the National Constitutional Assembly and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) with the overarching themes of democracy, constitutionalism and human rights. The culmination of its partial success was the Inclusive Government of 2009–2013. The challenges of this period were highlighted in The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement by Brian Raftopolous (2013). Michael Aeby (2015) depicted this period, in which a ‘power-­sharing’

1  INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 

3

government was in charge, as ‘Zimbabwe’s gruelling transition’. This was not only because of the politically complex situation that was carried over into it, but also because of the attempts being made behind the scenes by the ruling party to outmanoeuvre the opposition. Violence decreased and the economy stabilised slightly, but power did not shift from the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). If anything, ZANU–PF used the five years of the government of national unity to recover and consolidate its power, and in the 2013 elections the party emerged stronger and in charge of government once more. The sixth and the latest transition, at the time of writing (2020), was the so-called ‘military-assisted transition’ of November 2017, which led to the fall from power of the long-serving president Robert Gabriel Mugabe, paving the way for the rise to power of Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa (International Crisis Group 2017; Moore 2018; Rutherford 2018). Mugabe died in Singapore on 6 August 2019; he was buried at his rural home in Zvimba district of Mashonaland West province. This book is an attempt to comprehend the difficulties that surround successful political transition in Zimbabwe, with the primary focus on understanding political cultures and the role of the military in civilian politics, as well as how the Mnangagwa regime remains entangled in so-called Mugabeism. This is a term used to describe a nationalist matrix of power that is underpinned by party-state and party-nation constructions, and is held hostage by those who claim to have liberated the country from colonialism (see Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni 2009b, 2012b, 2015). It is clear that the political, economic and social quagmire in Zimbabwe since political independence was attained, which deepened in the 2000s with the long presidential incumbency of Mugabe and the ‘repetition without change’ represented by the ascendance to power by Mnangagwa on the back of a military coup, require proper framing and historical contextualisation. The situation is caused by a complex political culture, which has arisen through the entanglement of many different strands: the physical conquest of settler colonialism, the Cold War’s ideological inflexibilities, African nationalist patriarchal models of liberation (Campbell 2003), regimental/warrior traditions that lead to the prosecution of a liberation war, and the postcolonial legacy of personality cults and their gerontocratic tendencies, excluding women and young people, and indeed all those who are deemed to have not participated in the liberation struggles, from the corridors of power and ownership of strategic resources (see Hammar et al. 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a; Tendi 2010).

4 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

The concept of entanglement, as articulated by Sarah Nuttall (2009: 11), ‘is a means by which to draw into our analysis those sites in which what was thought of as separate—identities, spaces, histories—come together or find points of intersection in unexpected ways’ and ‘It is an idea which signals largely unexplored terrains of mutuality, wrought from common, though often coercive and confrontational, experience.’ For Zimbabwe, Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopolous (2003: 17) highlighted the entanglement of historicised and racialised assertions of land reclamation not only with technocratic and ahistorical liberal notions of private property protection, but also with developmentalism and notions of good governance on the one hand and emergent forms of indigenous nationalism underpinned by national sovereignty on the other. With specific reference to current politics in Zimbabwe, one can posit a Mugabe–Mnangagwa entanglement at a basic level. The Mnangagwa regime is a direct child of Mugabeism; indeed, Mugabeism is its recurrent theme. What emerged as the ‘Second Republic’ is deeply interpellated by the immanent logics (even the poverty of logics) of Mugabeism (for details of Mugabeism see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009b, 2012a, 2015). Mnangagwa is Mugabe’s political protégé. This Mugabe–Mnangagwa entanglement is clearly manifested in the contradictory political discourses of Operation Restore Legacy, which was used to legitimise the military coup of November 2017, and the mantra of ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’, which purported to be setting out a new politics that was predicated on neo-liberalism and market-determined economic logic. The elephant in the room of Zimbabwe’s transitional politics is the nationalist matrix of power (otherwise known as Mugabeism) that is partly built on the colonial legacy of violence and authoritarianism and was partly invented by nationalists to safeguard postcolonial power. At least ten interrelated and overlapping coordinates for ZANU–PF’s nationalist matrix of power are discernible: • The invention of a ‘party-state’ and a ‘party-nation’ (see Kriger 2003); • Pedagogical ‘Chimurenga’ nationalism backed up by a constructed ‘patriotic history’(Ranger 2004); • Reduction of elections to a mere ritual to validate legitimised power; • Assumed warrior tradition cascading from anti-colonial liberation wars and the privileging of the gun as the guardian of attained power; • Executive lawlessness known as ‘kutonga’ (to rule, not to govern); • Neo-traditional patriarchal political culture of gerontocratic rule;

1  INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 

5

• Naturalised and routinised rule by violence and coercion; • Practices of sorcery, witchcraft and poisoning of enemies and competitors; • The fetishising of academic qualifications to reinforce the right to political office; • Securocracy, plutocracy and predatory state politics based on primitive accumulation (see Shumba 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2019). This is the political terrain within which the Mnangagwa regime has emerged and finds itself. How do we make broader sense of it? Where does the potential for people’s freedom lie? In considering these questions, we have to reflect deeply on the legacy of the liberation struggles and their implications for freedom. The sociologist Roger Southall, in Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa (2013), posited that the liberation movements of southern Africa moved into government by embodying the hopes of those who supported them both domestically and internationally, but their performance in governmental terms was deeply disappointing. Michael Neocosmos’s Thinking Freedom in Africa: Towards a Theory of Emancipatory Politics (2016) provides the most extended critique of national liberation politics. The liberation movements were clear on what they were against (anti-racism, anti-­ colonialism and anti-imperialism) and very unclear on what they were for. Neocosmos (2016) was very critical of the idea of attainment of freedom under the aegis of the state. This is why he concluded that the politics of the liberation movements ‘was based on a contradiction that it found impossible to overcome: the struggle for freedom was a struggle not only against the colonial state, but to a certain extent against the state itself, like all struggles for freedom; yet at the same time freedom was said to be attainable only under the aegis of an independent state, as it had been frustrated by colonial domination’ (Neocosmos 2016: 130). Even such luminaries of the liberation movements as Joshua Nkomo, who led the Zimbabwe African People’s Union and commanded the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army, expressed disappointment with the performance of liberation movements in government. ‘Freedom Lies Ahead’ is the title of the concluding chapter of Nkomo’s autobiography, Nkomo: The Story of My Life (1984). In this chapter, Nkomo, who after death was declared by ZANU-PF as the ‘Father of Zimbabwe’, reflected deeply on liberation and freedom in Zimbabwe while taking advantage of a life in exile in the United Kingdom. He posited that ‘The hardest lesson

6 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

of my life has come to me late. It is that a nation can win freedom without its people becoming free’ (Nkomo 1984: 245). Most, if not all, former colonies gained ‘political independence’ one after another as the ‘physical empire’, with its direct colonial administration (direct juridical administration), was universally condemned after the end of the Second World War in 1945. The key signatures of this political independence became a new national anthem, a new flag, the faces of black/African leaders in parliament, the faces of black/African prime ministers or presidents at state house, the changing of countries’ names (with the exception of South Africa) to the vernacular and admission of the newly ‘sovereign’ states into the lowest echelons of the United Nations (Meredith 1984; Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni 2012b). Yes, the elites in charge of the state gained the freedom to accumulate resources ahead of everyone else, through a process known as bureaucratic state parasitism. Yes, Nkomo was correct: freedom of the state did not automatically translate into freedom for the people. What eventually happened in Zimbabwe under Mugabe is well articulated by Issa G.  Shivji (2003: 15): ‘National question turns into state-building. Nation-building is substituted by party and party by leader, the founder of the nation.’ Mugabe and his wife (Grace Mugabe), as the first family, ended up being the centre of national politics. This is a bane of, if not the underside of, the decolonisation of the twentieth century. Neo-colonialism exacerbated the lack of freedom for both the state and the people in Africa, and on another level, it gave some African leaders an excuse to blame external factors for their failure to deliver freedom. This was articulated by Kwame Nkrumah in Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (1965): The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. […]. Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. (Nkrumah 1965: ix–xi)

Blaming and railing against imperialism became a key trope of Mugabeism. Nkomo also reflected on the problem of neo-colonialism as

1  INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 

7

he meditated on questions of liberation and freedom in Zimbabwe. But his take was different from Mugabe’s: I refuse to accept that we cannot do better than we have so far done, or to reach for the easy excuse that all our mistakes are simply a colonial inheritance that can conveniently be blamed on the invaders. Of course our history has made us what we are, and the recent period of that history was distorted first by the influence of remote empires, then for ninety years by direct colonial rule. It is up to us to do better now. (Nkomo 1984: 245)

Like the Mugabe regime, the Mnangagwa regime is using the discourse of sanctions to justify all its limitations. Indeed, sanctions must be removed because they always hurt the poor and they also give failing regimes a convenient excuse to blame external factors. It would seem Nkomo again had a different take: he strongly believed that African leaders were duty bound to deliver freedom to the people even within the constraining environment of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. Nkomo rejected easy excuses for the non-delivery of freedom and services to the people. He suggested that ‘African leaders must improve their record of human rights, and African peoples too must have greater regard to their responsibilities’ (Nkomo 1984: 247). Nkomo (1984: 252) concluded his autobiography with a positive note: ‘It is not too late to change all that, to muster the collective energy of our people and build the new Zimbabwe we promised through all those long years of suffering and struggle.’ Perhaps Nkomo was able to reflect on liberation and freedom in Zimbabwe in these terms because he was not in power! But his meditations indicated the strong potential for reconstituting the political and transcending the scourge of Mugabeism. Mugabeism itself failed to rise above intolerant and repressive political cultures of Rhodesian settler colonialism. Instead of breaking with colonial settler traditions of brutality and repressive political practices, Mugabeism innovated and ‘improved’ on the Rhodesian settler colonial Leviathan, adding the logic of governance by military operations, with devastating implications for democracy, human rights and people’s freedoms (see Rupiya 2005). To racism and patriarchy, Mugabe added tribalism. What emerged was a complex ‘securocratic state’ with a party, military and parasitic business complex at its helm (a Chimurenga aristocracy in power) (see Shumba 2018). The ‘right of conquest’ that was used by Rhodesian settler colonialists was succeeded by

8 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

Mugabeism’s mantra of ‘I died for you’ (by ‘right of liberating you’), which became the main basis of his claim for leadership of Zimbabwe. Mugabeism’s political longevity was predicated on the strong nationalist–military alliance that was forged during the anti-colonial armed liberation struggle (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006). In fact, Mugabe was installed at the helm of ZANU–PF by the military during the course of the liberation struggle (Sadomba 2011). However, as noted by Norma Kriger (2003), the nationalist–military alliance was always unstable and tension-­ ridden, with those in uniform and those who were demobilised (the war veterans) making continuous demands on the civilians in power. Throughout the postcolonial period, the guerrilla veterans and ZANU– PF colluded with and manipulated each other to build power and privilege in the army, police and bureaucracy, and among workers (Kriger 2003). Liberation war discourse united the civilian leadership and the guerrilla veterans, although ‘war credentials’ became a site of contestation—being bestowed and taken away depending on one’s fall from political grace with ZANU–PF. The paradigmatic case was that of Joice Mujuru, who rose to the level of vice-president of the country on the basis of strong liberation credentials and being a woman. In 2014, Joice Mujuru was politically disparaged and removed from power and the party in a whirlwind of political events, with Grace Mugabe accusing her of plotting to unseat Robert Mugabe. Joice Mujuru’s liberation credentials were questioned and rubbished as she was thrown into political oblivion. This sheds light on the political context of the military coup that culminated in the fall of Mugabe and the rise of Mnangagwa to power in 2017. By the time of the military coup, Mnangagwa had been enduring verbal assaults from Grace Mugabe for some time. He had survived poisoning; he had been expelled from the government; his long political career was hanging by a thread. By the time the coup took place, Mnangagwa was in exile in South Africa. From there, he gave Mugabe a warning, indicating that something was being organised: I will go nowhere. I will fight tooth and nail against those making mockery against ZANU-PF founding principles. You and your cohorts will instead leave ZANU-PF by the will of the people and this we will do in the coming weeks. (Mnangagwa 2017)

1  INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 

9

The November 2017 Military Coup and the Rise of Mnangagwa to Power In an ironic political twist, the veteran leader of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe, who had been in power since 1980, was removed from office by his own military. For over thirty-seven years, Mugabe had ruled Zimbabwe in alliance with the military, but he finally became the victim of what he had created. The coup was distinctive because of the political discourse of its organisers and practitioners, who were at pains to make the military takeover constitutional. For example, on 13 November 2017, when the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Constantine Chiwenga, called for a press statement surrounded by ninety senior military and security officers, following the expulsion of Mnangagwa from government and party, the Zimbabwean constitution was quoted widely. Section 212 in particular was used to explain the intervention of the military in civilian politics. Secondly, and ironically, those who were staging the military coup continued to express their loyalty to Mugabe. Thirdly, participants harked back to the anti-colonial liberation history, and defined military intervention in politics as part of a patriotic duty to protect this history’s legacy (Chiwenga 2017; Raftopolous 2019). While the broader context of the military intervention was the liberation struggle and postcolonial history, the immediate terrain was factionalism and ructions within ZANU–PF, pitting the Lacoste faction against the G40 faction.1 Mnangagwa’s liberation war credentials were useful in attracting the army and war veterans to his camp. The G40 became ‘criminals around the president’, who were blamed for the deteriorating security situation as well as the social and economic meltdown by those who had staged the military coup. In announcing the military coup, Major General Sibusiso Moyo carefully crafted his language to speak of calming a degenerating political, social and economic situation, as well as propping up the authority of the president and buttressing his constitutional roles (Raftopolous 2019). 1  The Lacoste faction supported Emerson Mnangagwa. It wanted Mugabe to be succeeded by Mnangagwa who was one of the two deputy presidents of Zimbabwe. It was not clear who the G40 supported as successor to Mugabe. It was composed of what could be termed the ‘Young Turks’ within ZANU-PF. These were a younger generation of politicians without liberation credentials. But they had managed to form a close circle around Mugabe and Grace Mugabe. Its most vociferous member was Professor Jonathan Moyo who was opposed to Mnangagwa succeeding Mugabe. Grace Mugabe openly sided with the G40. Immediately before the military coup of November 2017, Professor Moyo openly put forward the name of Sydney Sekeramayi as the senior ZANU-PF politician to succeed Mugabe. But Sekeramayi never rose to the occasion.

10 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

Brian Raftopolous (2019) summarised the three-pronged strategy that aimed to finish off what the military coup had set in motion, removing Mugabe and putting Mnangagwa in power. The first element entailed avoiding any reference to a military coup, maintaining that Mugabe remained the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and seeking the High Court to constitutionalise the takeover. The second involved mobilisation of the civilian population by war veterans to give the takeover popular support. The third was to give a constitutional veneer to the military intervention through the use of ZANU–PF party processes and procedures. This entailed convening a ZANU–PF Central Committee meeting on 13 November 2017, at which the military were thanked for bringing stability to the party and to government. As noted by Raftopolous (2019: 7), the Central Committee took several decisions, including the formal expulsion of twenty members of the G40 faction from the party, removing Mugabe from the position of president and first secretary of the party and recommending his resignation as state president, relieving Grace Mugabe of her post of secretary for the Women’s League, removing Phelekezela Mphoko from his position of vice-president, bringing back into the party all those who had been pushed out by the G40 and, finally, electing Mnangagwa as new interim president of ZANU–PF and nominating him as candidate to fill the vacancy of state president. At parliamentary level, the ZANU–PF Parliamentary Caucus began to move the process of impeachment of Mugabe on 20 November 2017, and the process was put in motion in parliament the next day. Mugabe was left with no option but to write a letter of resignation on 21 November. This paved the way for the inauguration of Mnangagwa as new state president on 24 November.

The Mnangagwa Regime: Second Republic or Repetition Without Change? For a Zimbabwean people who had endured Mugabeism for over thirty-­ seven years, the military coup and the ascendance to power of Mnangagwa brought hope that life would be different; and inevitably, Mnangagwa tried to position his regime as a force for change. In his first presidential address, Mnangagwa made a number of pledges. The first was that he would put Zimbabwe on a path to economic recovery by promoting a market economy that was predicated on attracting foreign investment and ensuring its safety. Indeed, changes were made to the indigenisation legislation. The second was to compensate white farmers who had lost land

1  INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 

11

under the radical land reform programme. The third was to return Zimbabwe to the ambit of international community (re-engagement). The fourth was to be a president of all Zimbabweans (nation-building and national healing). The fifth was to deal decisively with corruption (see Raftopolous 2019). The main hurdle for Mnangagwa was to gain full legitimacy as the state president of Zimbabwe. This meant he had to call for national elections. His advantage was that the opposition was in disarray, rocked by factionalism following the death of Morgan Tsvangirai on 14 February 2018. The key disadvantage was that ZANU–PF was also in disarray. But Mnangagwa had no option but to organise elections if he was to ‘move beyond the shadow of the coup and seek a new legitimacy through an election that was perceived to be peaceful and credible’ (Raftopolous 2019: 18). The elections were held in July 2018, with Mnangagwa facing the youthful Nelson Chamisa of the MDC Alliance in the presidential contest. Mnangagwa emerged the winner with 50.6 per cent, while Chamisa had 44.3 per cent. While the campaign period was very peaceful, on 1 August 2018, the military shot and killed six protesters in Harare who were protesting over the delayed announcement of presidential results. Secondly, Chamisa and his party disputed the results of the presidential elections and built a case that was heard at the Constitutional Court. The court upheld Mnangagwa as the winner, but Chamisa’s challenge raised the long-­standing question of political legitimacy that has been haunting Zimbabwe since 2000. But what really dented the image of the Mnangagwa regime, which was desperate for international engagement, was the killing of civilians by the army in Harare. This meant that the ‘second republic’ was born with what could be termed a very bad birthmark. What made matters even more complicated was that it was not clear who deployed and ordered the military to intervene in civilian political protest. Was the ‘second republic’ a military junta, where political disputes would always be resolved through violent military intervention? Mnangagwa was forced to institute a Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances of 1 August in order to deal with the regime’s image, but like all government instituted commissions its outcomes were disappointing, and its value was not clear. It was purely and simply a public relations exercise. As the Mugabe regime was, Mnangagwa’s regime is besieged by numerous challenges. The pledge to put Zimbabwe on an economic recovery and growth path predicated on a neo-liberal framework has provoked social turmoil, which manifested itself in a second round of public protest in 2019. Once again, the army had to intervene with its usual violence

12 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

following an increase in the price of petrol. The health sector is characterised by strikes. The regime’s monetary policy and overall macroeconomic turnaround strategy, predicated on notions of ‘austerity for prosperity’, appear to be the previous regime’s structural adjustment programme, and its problems, in another guise. The second challenge is the long-standing one of national healing and national unity. The consequences of Operation Gukurahundi are haunting the Mnangagwa regime, and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission has not resolved anything, while Mnangagwa dithered when given an opportunity to apologise for the Gukurahundi atrocities. He seems to be fast losing the opportunities that were offered him by popular antipathy towards Mugabe. The third serious challenge cascades from the regime’s failure to successfully return Zimbabwe to the ambit of the international community. Violence and intolerance of political dissent has escalated since Mnangagwa came to power, and democratic reforms are nowhere to be seen. The fourth challenge is the continuing tensions within ZANU–PF, emanating from the factional conflicts that rocked the Mugabe regime. What is particularly dangerous is that since the removal of Mugabe the security sector has not been free of tensions and the ripple effects of factionalism (see Raftopolous 2019). It would seem that Mnangagwa is busy consolidating his personal power and has not committed himself to any reform agenda, including what he promised in his first presidential national address. Zimbabwe is not yet beyond Mugabeism; indeed, Mnangagwa seems to be a poor copy of Mugabe. By bringing the military directly into civilian political structures, Mnangagwa has not demilitarised the state; instead he has deepened militarisation. The military is now officially part of political culture. This book grapples with the question of political culture(s), the so-called national question, the consequences of a militarised politics, patriarchal and sexist tendencies, gridlocked and blocked democratic transitions, challenges of economic recovery and growth, and many other problems, all of which rocked Mugabeism and are being repeated under the Mnangagwa regime.

Organisation of the Book The chapters in this book are grouped in four sections: Part 1, Colonialism, Nationalism and Political Culture; Part 2, Identity, Militarisation and Transitional Politics; Part 3, Social Media, Democracy and Political Discourse,’ and Part 4, Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation Restore Legacy. Together they constitute a transdisciplinary academic study of the gridlocked and problematic transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa, which has turned out to be nothing but repetition without

1  INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 

13

change. Chapter 2 is by Rudo B.  Gaidzanwa—a leading Zimbabwean sociologist and feminist. She explores the complex issue of political cultures in Zimbabwe and explains their entanglement with colonialism, nationalism, patriarchy and sexism. At the centre of the chapter are issues of hegemony and resistance as well as discontinuities and continuities. Chapter 3 is by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni. It explores the perennial and complicated ‘national question’ and how it sits at the centre of complex political cultures. Embodied by the national question are a key set of issues that Zimbabwean citizens have to prioritise in their current struggles for transition, inclusivity, equality, prosperity, democracy and development; the connections, disconnections, gaps and opportunities among these in terms of citizen priorities and contemporary civil society advocacy for democracy and development; the constitutive parts of some ‘big ideas’ that would help civil society and citizens to coalesce towards a common agenda for democracy and development; and finally, the practical intervention mechanisms and strategies needed in order to develop a national consensus/common vision/agenda among Zimbabweans that is built around identified citizen demands, priorities, ideals and aspirations, including those being articulated in the ongoing citizen protest movements. Chapter 4 is by Zenzo Moyo. It studies the key question of political cultures, and posits that if democracy is indeed about opening closed political systems, then opposition politics becomes the avenue by which participation, inclusivity and accountability can be realised. Together with other aspects of civil society, opposition parties are responsible for creating and developing public opinion, which in turn feeds into the political culture of a society. In developing states, especially those whose organic development has been disrupted by both colonialism and anti-colonialism struggles, the exercise of opposition politics faces an extra burden—that is, justifying its connection with the often exclusive politics of liberation. The chapter delineates political cultures that have fashioned the repertoire of opposition politics since independence was attained in Zimbabwe, and demonstrates how these cultures, together with the construction of a party-state, have combined and broadened, in the process perpetuating themselves. Part 1 is completed by Stanley Tsarwe, who takes the question of political cultures into the domain of media and society. Chapter 5 broadly examines how Zimbabwean political practices over many years have shaped the country’s current democratic institutions, values and practices, with a particular focus on relationships between the state, civil society and the

14 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

media. Deploying the notion of political culture, the chapter examines the state of civil society and its role in Zimbabwe’s transition to democracy. It views the media as part of civil society, sketching its development and current state as a stakeholder in democratic transition. At the centre of the discussion are the practices and political values that have arguably contributed to a narrowing democratic culture over the years. It boldly argues that this can be located in the centralist tendencies of the state, the limited involvement of diverse civil society groups, a restrictive media environment and the conflation between state and party politics. Part 2 opens with Bekezela Gumbo’s interrogation of the role of identity politics in Zimbabwe’s transitional politics. Chapter 6 offers a conceptual construction of the three group identifiers upon which identity politics has manifested as a dominant political culture, positing that the past and future of transition lie in its nature and extent and how it is harnessed and utilised in the transition process. Gumbo maps out three basic clusters that seem to vary as national transition questions bedevil the nation from time to time. These three overriding ‘group-coalescing’ and/or ‘group identifier’ strands are racist nationalism, the politics of tribal/ethnic hegemony and the politics of liberation entitlement. It is Gumbo’s thesis that these three group identifiers have nurtured and prolonged the existing political culture in Zimbabwe, which has in turn shaped political transition in the country. Chapter 7 is by Samukele Hadebe, who posits that the ethnicisation of politics in Zimbabwe has reached levels that both academics and policymakers continue to ignore—at great peril to the stability and even territorial integrity of the country. Hadebe gives a historical context of ethnic rivalry and conflict in Zimbabwe, with a particular emphasis on the ethnicisation of liberation movement narratives in the first instance, and also delves deeply into perception of the pro-Mthwakazi movements. The author is of the view that it is useful to try and understand how these groups perceive issues, as their perceptions have a material basis. Like Gumbo, Hadebe is concerned with exploring political mobilisation on ethnic and regional grounds, and the possible implications for Ndebele-­ speaking communities in particular and Zimbabwean politics in general. Part 2 closes with Pedzisai Ruhanya’s examination of the challenges brought about by the militarisation of state institutions. Militarism has become a political culture in Zimbabwe in the same way as politicised ethnicity. Chapter 8 posits that the overthrow of President Robert Mugabe cannot be explained adequately by the combined military intervention

1  INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 

15

and public protests in November 2017. The story is more complex than this, and requires careful analysis of the distinct and organised militarisation of key state institutions from 2002 to 2017 that facilitated Mugabe’s fall. Ruhanya deploys the competitive authoritarian analytic lens to understand events, while at the same time critiquing it for not enabling him to fully address the distinct role of the military and its liberation connection to the ruling elites. Ironically, the politicisation of the military that served Mugabe well from 1980 until November 2017 was the same infrastructure that devoured him. He unwittingly constructed a de facto military state led by a de jure civilian authority under his authoritarian tutelage. The chapter shows that when military interests were threatened by Mugabe and his wife, the security apparatus played its hand to block the rise of dynastic and familial politics. Four zones in which power was contested were calculatedly infiltrated by the military, thereby capturing both party and state over the long term. The roles of the media, judiciary, electors and legislature are examined. Part 3 opens with Philip Pasirayi’s analysis of the intersections of media and politics during the ‘Third Chimurenga’ in Zimbabwe. This issue was introduced in Part I by Stanley Tsarwe—who explored the entanglement of media, society and political culture. Chapter 9 specifically explores the hidden strategies of media control that were deployed by ZANU–PF during the violent seizure of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe from 2000. The media was central in the ruling party’s efforts to justify this controversial exercise. In the state media, this land redistribution was justified as the ‘Third Chimurenga’, meaning the third and final phase of the war against colonial rule in which land was a central grievance. The chapter explores how Professor Jonathan Moyo, the newly appointed Minister of State for Information and Publicity, managed to manipulate journalists from the state press through meetings, money, threats to jobs, and the creation and dissemination of content via routine briefings, which resulted in a committed, self-policing journalistic team and a pliant state press. At the centre of the chapter are the media briefings that were held by Moyo with journalists and editors from the state press, which were a kind of political re-­ education that explained what constituted the ‘national interest’ and how this was supposed to be framed in the state media. Moyo established a hard-working and hands-on style of management, and considered history and culture to be an important part of the media. The chapter gives an insight into the inner workings of the ZANU–PF media machine, showing how it was carefully designed both institutionally and ideologically to

16 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

achieve set objectives from the perspective of hybrid regimes, and the means and mechanisms of media control in these contexts. Chapter 10 by Shepherd Mpofu and Trust Matsilele looks at social media and the concept of dissidence in Zimbabwean politics. Their departure point is that most media studies in Zimbabwe since 2000 have tended to focus on questions about politics and the economy, with much emphasis on how the media, both private and public, mediated state–opposition– civil society relations. The focus has seen a dramatic shift following the Arab Spring uprisings, from 2010 onwards, which saw social media being credited for the toppling of most of the North African strongmen. Mpofu and Matsilele posit that these reports failed to appreciate the human and social relations constituted by the social media. Their argument pivots on the relations between online and offline worlds, and the chapter demonstrates how relations since 2000 have been mischaracterised because of a failure to appreciate the anthropological view of state–opposition–civil society relations. The authors note that social media comments were not protests, juvenile insults as some scholars have argued, but rather dissidence. This dissidence, they argue, has a history and is part of Zimbabwean cultural expression that has simply morphed into social media as forms of mediation and dariro (playground) have changed over time. Social media, the authors say, is the same as other cultural gatherings where dissidence has been allowed in Zimbabwean society. While focusing on the period post-2013, they draw strong connections with earlier periods to demonstrate the long-running thread of dissidence. Part 3 closes with Wellington Gadzikwa’s exploration of the ‘tabloidisation’ of political news in Zimbabwe and the question of press quality. Chapter 10 posits that the media is indispensable to the functioning of a democracy as it is the pre-eminent vehicle for public debates in the modern public sphere(s). The conduct of the press and the ethical virtues it projects are directly linked to its ability to enhance democracy. In Zimbabwe, after more than two decades of political turmoil and unprecedented economic decline, journalistic standards have plummeted for various reasons. The author argues that this decline in standards has taken place owing to a process of tabloidisation of the mainstream broadsheet newspapers. This tabloidised media negates the natural function of the media in terms of democracy through diversion, trivialisation and sensationalisation of important issues. The core argument of this chapter is predicated on a qualitative content analysis of and in-depth interviews about the media coverage of the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from

1  INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 

17

ZANU–PF.  Three national dailies with different owners, The Herald, Daily News and Newsday, are studied, from October 2014 to January 2017. The chapter reveals the stark reality that news outlets have been contaminated, and are now championing a tabloid news agenda that is inimical to rational political debate and needs a serious rethink if it is going to be restored to its previous function. Part 4 opens with a chapter by Toendepi Shonhe that uses documentary and historical data analysis to reveal how primitive accumulation configures economic development under neo-liberalism and proposes an inclusive transformative social policy to attain development from below. Chapter 12 demonstrates empirically how the disarticulated pattern of accumulation configures periphery economies, such as Zimbabwe, subsidising capital by exporting wealth. This aids the further development of the centre at the expense of the periphery. Shonhe posits that the ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ economic development path exposes the structurally disarticulated economy to intensified removal of its productive capacity by global monopoly capital, through financialised capital accumulation. Inviting speculative monopoly capitalism, unaccompanied by a conscious attempt to reverse uneven development in the periphery, deepens extroverted economic development, Shonhe argues. The new ruling class imposed by the military coup is inclined towards promoting global capital interests, which perpetuate imperialism and dependency. In alliance with monopoly finance capital, the ruling class extracts considerable profits by intensifying the extraction of natural mineral and agricultural resources, adding surplus value, royalties and rents, and interest on loans that undermine sovereign accumulation. By opening Zimbabwe for business, under the disguise of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), but without a deliberate plan to reverse uneven development, the ruling capitalists have become an extension of global capital, if not captured agents of the latest form of imperialism. Opening Zimbabwe for business therefore allows the transference of surplus value through international trade, unequal exchange in trade and unequal rewards. Chapter 13, by Tinashe C. Chigwata and Sylvester Marumahoko, reiterates the point that Zimbabwe has gone through serious political, economic and social challenges for over two decades. Once known as the shining light of Africa, the country has dominated international headlines for the wrong reasons. In November 2017, Zimbabwe experienced a radical change to the constitutional and political order, bringing to an end the Mugabe era. Chigwata and Marumahoko benchmark Mnangagwa’s

18 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

regime on his promises to reform the political, economic and social fabric of the country, including government, which is characterised by corruption, among other forms of abuse of public power. At an international level, President Mnangagwa has initiated efforts to end Zimbabwe’s isolation from the international family of nations. For Chigwata and Marumahoko, the key question is whether the idea of a new Zimbabwe is possible. If so, under what conditions can Zimbabwe be reborn again? Their chapter posits that the fall of Mugabe is only the first step towards building a new Zimbabwe, and argues that the overriding task is to dismantle the Mugabe system of governance that epitomises not only the public sector but also non-state sectors. With the right kind of leadership, Zimbabwe has the potential to set the development and democratic pace on the African continent. Chapter 14 is by Lyton Ncube. It focuses on how Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy reflected misogyny, sexism and hyper-­ masculinity. Ncube posits that Zimbabwean political culture is punctuated by (hetero)gendered traditions and tendencies, and as such pivots on the construction of hegemonic masculinity. This reproduces and reinforces male-gendered domination, gender exclusion, sexism and misogyny. Theoretically, the chapter is guided by Raewyn Connell’s hegemonic masculinity concept. Hegemonic masculinity refers to ‘the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’ (Connell 2005: 77). The chapter therefore explores gendered and sexist discourses that manifested and played out both in the streets and digital spaces during Operation Restore Legacy. Empirically, it reflects on the political fates of female political figures such as Joice Mujuru and Grace Mugabe. Chapter 15 by Mkhululi Sibindi draws the book to a conclusion. It deals with the Mnangagwa regime’s drive to bring Zimbabwe back to the ambit of the international community. This re-engagement question is examined from the specific vantage point of the endeavours made to attract FDI in the post-Mugabe era. Sibindi argues that given the nature of Zimbabwe’s economic and political scenarios there is no doubt that the political competence of the new Zimbabwe government will be measured on how a failed economy can be returned to productivity. In this context, the new government has made an effort to reach international communities in search of FDI.  What Sibindi examines is the compatibility of

1  INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 

19

Zimbabwean economy as an FDI host market. Central to his discussion is the realisation of what FDI is and motives of multinational enterprises (MNEs), which are agents of FDI. In view of MNEs’ motives, the discussion illuminates the path dependency of investment motives from FDI and aspects in host markets that influence the decision to invest in a specific host market, together with the role of government in the internationalisation process.

Going Forward A regime born of a military coup, even if it attempts to ‘civilianise’ itself through appointing an unelected civilian figure as president and organising elections (post facto) to cover its illegitimate footprints, remains a progeny of violence. The civilianisation process has seen key military figures, including the Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army, changing military fatigues for civilian designer suits to assume political and government positions. The implication of all this is the direct and open invasion of the political by the military. Thus, despite the elections of 2018, Zimbabwean politics has remained volatile and characterised by intrigues, plots and counter-plots within the ruling party. The political culture has become even more complex and violent. A number of writers in this volume therefore wrestle with the fundamental question of the political culture of Zimbabwe and its sub-questions of identity, militarism, patriarchy, masculinity, sexism and disdain for democracy and human rights. These were the hallmarks of Mugabeism. What is emerging clearly is that the Mnangagwa regime is a product of this political culture, and because of this genealogical affinity it is very difficult for the so-called Second Republic to make a clear break with Mugabeism. The very act by Mnangagwa of moving the old politicians who were Mugabe’s lieutenants for over thirty-seven years into the headquarters of ZANU–PF to continue with the administrative aspects of the party, and to plot its future political strategy, indicates beyond reasonable doubt that genuine democratic reforms are not on the horizon for the Mnangagwa regime. Worse still, it is under the Mnangagwa regime that the military has formally and overtly asserted its authority in the party and government. On an economic level, the regime’s acceptance of a crude neo-liberal framework reminiscent of the notorious Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s and 1990s reveals desperation, and surrender to

20 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

the mantra of market forces as the silver bullet for economic recovery and economic growth. On a political level, the way the Mnangagwa government has handled political and social protest has amounted to scoring an own goal. Using the military to deal with civil disputes at a time when the country’s citizens and the wider world have questions about the nature of the Mnangagwa regime—particularly whether it is a military junta masquerading as a civilian government—is a sign of folly, if not a failure to cover up the influence of the military on governance issues. Having come to power at a time when previous ways of thinking about progressive governance (ranging from Marxism and Third World nationalism to neo-­ liberal visions) have become obsolete, the Mnangagwa regime is bound to fall into repetition on all fronts. It is indeed not clear whether we are seeing old wine in new goatskins or new goatskins containing old wine.

References Aeby, M. 2015. Zimbabwe’s Gruelling Transition: Interim Power-Sharing and Conflict Management in Southern Africa. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Basel. Alexander, J. 2006. The Unsettled Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893–2003. Oxford: James Currey. Campbell, H. 2003. Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of Patriarchal Model of Liberation. Trenton: Africa World Press. Chiwenga, C. 2017. Press Statement: In Defence of the Nation’s Founding Values, Gains of Independence. The Herald, November 15, 2017. Connell, R. 2005. Globalization, Imperialism, and Masculinities. In Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities, eds. M. S. Kimmel, J. Hearn, and R. Connell, 71–89. Thoudsand Oaks: Sage. Hammar, A., and B.  Raftopolous. 2003. Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation. In Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State, and Nation in the Context of Crisis, ed. A. Hammar, B. Raftopolous, and S. Jensen, 1–41. Harare: Weaver Press. Hammar, A., B.  Raftopolous, and S.  Jensen, eds. 2003. Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis. Harare: Weaver Press. International Crisis Group. 2017. Zimbabwe’s ‘Military-assisted Transition’ and the Prospects for Recovery. Africa Briefing, 134. Kriger, N. 2003. Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980–1987. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Meredith, M. 1984. The First Dance of Freedom: Black Africa in the Post-War Era. London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd.

1  INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 

21

Mkandawire, T. 2016. Zimbabwe’s Transition Overload: An Interpretation. Unpublished Paper. London School of Economics and Political Science. Mlambo, A.S. 1997. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme: The Case of Zimbabwe, 1990–1995. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications. Mnangagwa, E.D. 2017. Press Statement: Mnangagwa Speaks. Bulawayo News 24, November 8, 2017. Moore, D. 2018. A Very Zimbabwean Coup: November 13-24, 2017. Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 97: 1–29. Moyo, S., and P. Yeros. 2005. Land Occupations and Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Towards the National Democratic Revolution in Zimbabwe. In The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America, ed. S.  Moyo and P. Yeros. London: Zed Books. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2006. Nationalist-Military Alliance and the Fate of Democracy in Zimbabwe. African Journal of Conflict Resolution 6: 49–80. ———. 2009a. Making Sense of Mugabeism in Local and Global Politics: ‘So Blair, Keep Your England and Let Me Keep My Zimbabwe. Third World Quarterly 30 (6): 1139–1158. ———. 2009b. Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State. Bern/Oxford: Peter Lang. ———. 2012a. Fiftieth Anniversary of Decolonization in Africa: A Moment of Celebration or Critical Reflection? Third World Quarterly 33 (1): 71–89. ———. 2012b. Rethinking Chimurenga and Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A Critique of Partisan National History. African Studies Review 55 (3): 1–26. ———., ed. 2015. Mugabeism? History, Politics, and Power in Zimbabwe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2019. ZANU-PF Matrices of Power: Towards Understanding the Opaque Inner Workings of ZANU-PF Regime: Implications for Democracy. Unpublished Paper Presented Under Panel VII-0-26: Pathways to Sub-Sharan African Democracies: Prospects for South Africa and Zimbabwe at 62nd Meeting of African Studies Association (ASA), Boston, November 22, 2019. Neocosmos, M. 2016. Thinking Freedom in Africa: Towards a Theory of Emancipatory Politics. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Nkomo, J. 1984. Nkomo: The Story of My Life. London: Methuen. Nkrumah, K. 1965. Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: PANAF. Nuttall, S. 2009. Entanglement: Literary and Cultural Reflections on Post-­ Apartheid. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Raftopolous, B. 2019. Zimbabwe: Regional Politics and Dynamics. In Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ranger, T. 2004. Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies 30 (2): 215–234.

22 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA

Rupiya, M. 2005. Zimbabwe: Government Through Military Operations. Africa Security Review 14 (3): 1–15. Rutherford, B. 2018. Mugabe’s Shadow: Limning the Penumbra of Post-Coup Zimbabwe. Canadian Journal of African Studies 52: 53–68. Sadomba, Z.W. 2011. War Veterans and Zimbabwe’s Revolution: Challenging Neo-­ colonialism and Settler and International Capital. Harare/Oxford: Weaver Press/James Currey. Shivji, I.G. 2003. The Ride, the Fall and the Insurrection of Nationalism in Africa. Unpublished Keynote Address Delivered at the CODESRIA East African Regional Conference, Addis Ababa, October 29–31. Shumba, J.M. 2018. Zimbabwe’s Predatory State: Party, Military and Business. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Southall, R. 2013. Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa. Oxford/Pietermaritzburg: James Currey and University of KwaZulu-­ Natal Press. Tendi, B.M. 2010. Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: Politics, Intellectuals and the Media. Oxford: Peter Lang.

PART I

Colonialism, Nationalism and Political Culture

CHAPTER 2

The Political Culture of Zimbabwe: Continuities and Discontinuities Rudo Gaidzanwa

Introduction Pye and Verba (1965) defined political culture as the totality of basic values, feelings and knowledge that underlie the political process in a specific country or environment. The manner in which citizens interact with and experience governance institutions shapes their participation in civic and political affairs. Thus the beliefs, opinions, emotions and experiences of citizens, residents and members of communities are shaped by the behaviours of governance institutions at all levels. When governance structures are remote and inaccessible, citizens may become alienated from them, resulting in disconnection between the governed and the governors. In some instances, governance structures and personnel may be authoritarian, coercive and intolerant of dissent, also resulting in the alienation of citizens from their governments. Such governance systems generate dissent, protest and opposition, resulting in their destabilization, as well as that of the structures and societies concerned. Ideally, citizens desire the freedom to engage with those who preside over their governance systems

R. Gaidzanwa (*) Department of Sociology, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_2

25

26 

R. GAIDZANWA

and structures, in order to influence policies, programmes, change and decisions that are made on behalf of citizens. Ideally, societies with responsive political and social systems and structures that accommodate citizens’ opinions and ideas will generate and promote a positive political culture. Political culture in Zimbabwe has been influenced since 1893 by British colonization. The British imposed their preferred governance models on the colonized peoples who inhabited the territory that was named Southern Rhodesia and subsequently Rhodesia. In the era preceding colonialism, the political cultures of native peoples were varied. The Ndebele people operated under a monarchical system (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008), while the Shona and related peoples had a less centralized system, which comprised chiefs and headmen and headwomen as their political authorities. The Shona chiefs were drawn from selected families and clans, and they administered the law with the aid of elders who were selected for their expertise in and knowledge and experience of Shona culture and its laws and customs. Collectively, the chiefs, elders and representatives of clans and families managed decisions agreed by their Dare, the group of elders and advisors that counselled the chief. In this way, the culture of political representation based on family and clan ensured that decisions taken by the collective representative body were acceptable to a majority of those who were subjected to their clan’s laws, rules, customs, structures and institutions. This system attempted to avert tyranny by individual chiefs and afforded the common people some control over their society and the administration of justice. Ndebele political culture was different from that of the Shona people because the Ndebeles, who had originated from Zululand, had a monarchy presided over by a king who was at the pinnacle of the political system (Cobbing 1983). The next tier of authority after the monarch comprised privileged older males who were chiefs from various clans, who exerted authority on a daily basis at village level. The authority of the chiefs was hereditary, since holders of authority had to be born in the patrilineage of chieftainship and could pass on their titles to their male progeny. The Ndebele chiefs were members of a council, the Imbizo, which exercised collective authority over matters affecting clans and families and advised the king. Women, except those born into or related to royalty, captives and other subordinate groups who were assimilated into the polity and society occupied the bottom of the hierarchy, removed from the centres of power.

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

27

Colonisation and Domestication of the Traditional Authorities After Military Defeat: Ndebele and Shona Groups’ Experiences In 1888, Cecil John Rhodes and his colonists of the British South Africa Company travelled to what is now Zimbabwe to search for minerals, land and other resources. They deceived Lobengula, the illiterate Ndebele king, into signing the Rudd Concession, which gave the colonists prospecting rights to minerals such as gold. The economic activities of the colonists inevitably generated conflicts with the local people, resulting in armed confrontations. The colonists triumphed over the Ndebele and Shona groups who, lacking equal or superior weaponry, were overpowered and dispossessed of their land. The settlers set up a new polity and established a political culture that constructed the natives as subjects of the colonial order rather than citizens on a par with the white population. Despite resistance by the locals in 1890, in which the Ndebele and Shona collaborated against the settlers under the leadership of the spirit mediums Nehanda and Kaguvi, who were executed after their capture, the Shona and Ndebele peoples were finally conquered and subordinated to settler authority.

Exclusion of Blacks After Sidelining and Undermining the Shona, Ndebele and Other Groups The settler government imposed a political culture and system of government that was undemocratic, and in the process subordinated both the Shona and the Ndebele chiefs and their peoples. The Ndebele kingdom was eradicated: its monarchy was disbanded and the king ‘disappeared’. The settler regime passed legislation that allowed their appropriation of the lands of the conquered Shona and Ndebele peoples. The settlers designated what they termed ‘tribal areas’ and ‘reserves’ that were to be occupied by the colonized peoples, while the settlers took the fertile, well-watered and desirable land throughout the territory that was renamed Rhodesia, after their leader. The regime invited more settlers from outside, and thereafter, successive settler regimes passed legislation, including the Land Apportionment Act (1930), the Native Land Husbandry Act

28 

R. GAIDZANWA

(1951) and the Land Tenure Act (1969), all of which monopolized for the white population the best agricultural land. In the twentieth century, the native peoples continued to resist the settlers, peacefully and sporadically at first and then by military means when negotiations failed to resolve their problems. Peaceful resistance by the natives was accomplished through organized political protest mainly under the leadership of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), founded in 1961, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), founded in 1963. However, peaceful native resistance to the white settler regimes failed to bear any fruit until both ZANU and ZAPU resorted to armed resistance through guerrilla warfare. ZAPU, led by Joshua Nkomo, operated from Zambia while ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe, operated from Mozambique. The war for national liberation was fought largely in rural Zimbabwe by guerrillas, with assistance from the peasantry and urban-­ dwellers who provided cash, food and other necessities. The support of frontline states, comprising Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique, and other African states further afield was key in enabling these liberation movements mount the war. With support from the peasantry and other sections of the black populations, the spirit mediums and the majority of traditional structures and authorities, in the late 1960s and 1970s, the war for national liberation forced the settler regime into negotiations with the nationalists in ZAPU and ZANU and their armed wings, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), respectively. The war for national liberation took a heavy toll on black and white populations and forced the settler government to negotiate a settlement with African political leaders in 1979, resulting in the attainment of independence in 1980.

Political Culture and Practices Under Colonialism: Economic and Political Marginalization of Blacks and Domestication of the Traditional Authorities The colonial era and the dominant white political culture were informed by a fear of communism, the need to prevent black economic, political and social empowerment and the achievement of universal adult suffrage. Joshua Nkomo, one of the leading black nationalists, wrote in his biography (2001) about his family’s experience during the colonization of Zimbabwe, noting that blacks, through the Native Land Husbandry Act

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

29

(1951), were forced to move to areas designated ‘native reserves’, where they could occupy land but could not possess its freehold. Nkomo (2001: 65) also noted that black people were not allowed to own urban land in colonial Zimbabwe, but could only lease it. This ensured that blacks could not develop significant livestock and crop holdings in rural areas and that an African urban middle class would not emerge. The blacks lived under the control of white Native and District Commissioners, who had the power to limit black livestock holdings, decide the acreage planted to maize and levy heavy taxes on blacks, thereby limiting their capacity to accumulate wealth and challenge white rule. The white farmers’ unions demanded and secured the criminalization of black farmers’ production of Virginia tobacco, which earned higher export prices, and only allowed black farmers to grow Turkish tobacco for local consumption. In many rural areas, traditional authorities, chiefs and headmen, virtually all male, lost the support of the black population during the colonial period. De Valk and Wekwete (1990) argued that blacks in colonial Zimbabwe perceived most chiefs and headmen to be tools of colonial local government. Thus, resistance was played out at the local level through struggles around soil conservation, livestock control, land use and land tenure issues, resulting in the destruction of most local government infrastructure, such as dip tanks, schools, clinics and bridges, during the war of resistance. De Valk and Wekwete (1990) also noted that attempts by the colonial government to use the black traditional leadership to advance colonial political projects, culture and practices generated massive resistance from the bulk of the black rural and urban populations. In many rural areas, the native authorities chose to side with the nationalists and liberation forces to resist colonial rule by disobeying directives to control livestock numbers through culling, to rotate the use of land in the native farming areas and to dig contour ridges as required by the soil conservation authorities. The white Rhodesian political culture accommodated intra-racial competition, though the conservative and racist parties such as the Rhodesian Front, the primary white party, continued to dominate the political landscape before as well as after 1965, when Rhodesia adopted the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The white moderate, liberal parties and politicians, and religious and cultural groups such as the Quakers that stood up against all-white governments, comprised a minority of the white population, so they had scant effect on the political culture and policies of the Rhodesian Front. The white moderate groups were sidelined,

30 

R. GAIDZANWA

lampooned and demonized for supporting more equitable black political representation. After UDI, until 1980 when independence was attained, the black population was accorded token parliamentary representation despite comprising the majority of the population. In colonial Zimbabwe, there were separate voters’ rolls by race, with the whites represented and registered on the A voters’ roll with 80% weighting, this being based on higher income, property holding, education and other requirements, while black voters, comprising the bulk of the population, were confined to the B roll and only 20% weighting: owing to racial discrimination, most black people had lower incomes, property holding and education than whites. The limited role that blacks played was not likely to change the culture of exclusion and the disproportionately high political representation of whites. It was clear that blacks would remain marginal to the politics of their country unless drastic change occurred to transform the political system and culture, which was based on racial and class discrimination. After UDI, the culture of white dominance and black marginalization through separate and unequal rights with respect to land, education, civil and political rights, especially the franchise, did not change. Colonial political culture extolled the virtues of pioneering, of hewing a country out of ‘the bush’ and constructing a civilized prosperous society to replace the backward and barbaric societies that the ‘pioneers’ had encountered. There was a sprinkling of white liberals, but they were hopelessly outnumbered by the die-hard white nationalists and could not threaten the majority. In colonial Zimbabwe, the majority of white citizens agreed with or tolerated the racist political culture despite its exclusionary aspects. The white liberal opposition and all manner of dissenters and radical politicians of the left were pilloried and labelled ‘nigger lovers’, ‘kaffir lovers’ or other racially charged epithets. Those who dissented from the Rhodesian Front’s politics were exiled, deported or hounded out of colonial Zimbabwe, examples being Bishop Dodge and Doris Lessing, the author of the classic The Grass Is Singing, who was declared a prohibited immigrant in 1956. She was only able to return to Zimbabwe after independence in 1980. Maenzanise (2008) also noted that Bishop Lamont, a Roman Catholic bishop, was accused of siding with and/or failing to report the presence of ‘terrorists’, the term used to refer to the liberation fighters. He was deported in 1976. Other liberal whites emigrated from Zimbabwe to the USA, Europe and elsewhere, some of them returning after independence.

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

31

Lowry (2007) observed that many white Rhodesians regarded African disaffection to be agitated by external forces, implying that the oppressed black populations of colonial Zimbabwe had no real grievances. The displacement of black people, especially those who occupied lands that were desired by white enterprises and individuals for settlement, was common. Moore (2005) documented the struggles of the Tangwena people to retain their ancestral lands in Gaerezi, which the colonial regime desired for settlement. Their forcible displacement was well publicized internationally, generating animosity towards the Rhodesian regime.

Resistance to Colonization by the Black Populations Significant resistance to the white regime and its policies gathered steam from the 1940s onwards as blacks realized that the white regimes were determined to retain a racially discriminatory governance system. ZAPU, led by Joshua Nkomo, and ZANU, led by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and later Robert Mugabe, were the major parties that spearheaded the resistance to settler rule. Under threat of economic sanctions from Britain, the Rhodesian regime refused to institute a racially just system that would, over an agreed period, guarantee the adult black population the franchise. Instead, the regime unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965. Marginal representation of the black populations in the legislature, the judiciary and politics continued until independence was attained after a brutal armed struggle. For resisting colonialism, the leaders of the black political parties and prominent dissenters, such as Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe, Josiah Chinamano and his wife Ruth, were incarcerated in detention camps in isolated areas. Such camps included Gonakudzingwa (the place of exile) and Whawha prison, which were intended to minimize the nationalists’ contact with and influence over their supporters and the general populace. Luminaries of the liberation struggle who were detained in these camps included, from ZAPU, Naison Ndlovu, Sikhanyiso Ndlovu, Jane Ngwenya, Thenjiwe Lesabe, Paul Mukondo, Daniel Madzimbamuto, Joshua Nkomo and Joseph Msika, Nkomo’s deputy. Both Nkomo and Msika became vice-presidents in independent Zimbabwe. Members of ZANU who were detained included Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, who became the first President of independent Zimbabwe, Edgar Tekere, Leopold Takawira, Maurice Nyagumbo and Simon Muzenda, who became vice-president.

32 

R. GAIDZANWA

After these nationalist politicians had been incarcerated, a guerrilla war ensued: the black population considered their options for peaceful resistance to have run out. There were differences between resistance groups and among the small white minority that supported the struggle for national liberation about the political options available to resist the white regime under Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front. Both ZANU and ZAPU organized guerrilla armies, ZANU’s army, ZANLA, operating mostly from bases in Mozambique, and ZAPU’s army, ZIPRA, operating from Zambia and Botswana. The brutal guerrilla war resulted in the displacement of millions of black people, who were herded into crowded, fortified camps named keeps or protected villages under the watch of the Rhodesian army and security personnel. A significant proportion of the young black people who did not join the guerrilla forces either moved to the towns or remained in the villages, from which they often provisioned the guerrillas with food, clothes and intelligence on Rhodesian army movements, usually under threat of death if discovered by the white army or other security personnel. This relationship between the populace, especially the peasants who lived in the operational areas, and the guerrillas and spirit mediums who provided advice and encouragement was to confer electoral advantages to ZANU and ZAPU in rural areas before and after independence. Significant resistance to the white regime and its policies gathered steam as blacks realized that the whites were determined to retain the racially discriminatory system. The peasantry were caught between the forces of the Rhodesian regime and those of the liberation armies, which expected and extracted support from them. Peasants attracted violence from both Rhodesian government and guerrilla forces if they did not comply with demands for information about enemy movements. The liberation forces frequently demanded food from the peasants, and sometimes sex from young women in the villages. Thus, the relationships between the peasantry and the two forces on the ground were fraught with contradictions. Villagers simultaneously supported and feared the guerrillas and the violence they exercised over those whom they considered to be disobedient or suspected of being spies of the Rhodesian regime or enemies of the struggle. The peasantry also resented and feared the reprisals that could be exacted on them by Rhodesian government forces if they were found to be ‘running with and aiding and abetting the terrorists’,

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

33

phraseology often deployed by the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation in its descriptions of those who supported the black guerrillas. Marginal political representation of the black population in the legislature, the judiciary and politics continued during the years of the war for national liberation, until independence was finally attained after a brutal armed struggle. The war for national liberation only ceased after a settlement was negotiated at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 between Britain and Zimbabwe’s nationalist parties. The Lancaster House Agreement resulted in a ceasefire, and the subsequent election was won by ZANU under Robert Mugabe. Racially driven political, social and economic culture, based on the exclusion of the majority population, had failed to build a viable nation that was inclusive of all race, gender, ethnic and class groups. The brutal war for national liberation that ensued wounded the different groups and left a troubling legacy in a divided nation. The political culture that developed during the war, especially under ZANLA and ZANU, also influenced post-independence Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe’s Political Culture After Independence Under the rule of ZANU, Zimbabwe’s political culture developed in the shadow of and reacted to Rhodesia’s racially, culturally and politically exclusionary culture, characterized by predatory and separatist ethnic, cultural, economic and political institutions and arrangements. There were continuities between the Rhodesian and Zimbabwean political cultures because an overbearing and intolerant state was retained. This was dominated by one party, which considered itself to be the legitimate representative of the majority despite the racial, class, gender and other cleavages that continued to exist within the population. No radical changes occurred in the political culture save for the Africanization of the civil service, the emigration of whites who feared the ‘black peril’ and the marginalization of whites that took place in countries ‘to the north of us’, as indicated by many whites who fled the ‘black peril’ of independence shortly after 1980. In organizing the ruling party, ZANU jettisoned the spirit mediums and traditional leaders who had partnered with them during the war and adopted the model of the mainstream Christian churches, characterized by two male-dominated wings, the main and youth wings, and a women’s wing.

34 

R. GAIDZANWA

Attempts at Promoting Racial and Ethnic Harmony In 1975, during the struggle for national liberation, ZANU had split into ZANU (PF) and ZANU (Ndonga). At independence, ZANU–PF took a conciliatory tone, lauding the participation and sacrifices made by diverse people of all races, ethnicities and cultures as they fought for the independence of Zimbabwe. For example, Guy Clutton Brock, a white supporter of the liberation struggle, had his ashes interred at the National Heroes’ Acre in Harare after his death in 1995. The only other non-black person to be honoured and buried as a national hero was Kantibhai Gordanbhai, a Zimbabwean of Asian origin. Despite these attempts to foster class, racial and ethnic harmony through recognition of the heroism of all Zimbabweans, the cleavages between racial, ethnic and gender groups have continued to simmer, and at times they have exploded into violence as state functionaries, in collaboration with the leading lights of the dominant party, ZANU–PF, attempted to retain control of the narrative and control of the state. These episodes have continued to take place after independence. They are discussed here in the context of the political culture that has been developed and embraced by ZANU–PF.  Ethnic-based and other confrontations are placed in the context of the Gukurahundi massacres (1983–7), during which the Zimbabwean army and other state organs, at the behest of Mugabe and his security and military chiefs, are held by the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission to have killed over 20,000 people of Ndebele origin.

Resistance by Urban Populations A major problem for ZANU-PF after independence has been its inability to capture the support and loyalty of urban populations, which have questioned ZANU politics and culture, particularly its command orientation and desire to control rather than engage the population democratically. Urban-dwellers in Zimbabwe have traditionally belonged to diverse parties, and to a range of religious, political and other formations and organizations. Because of this background, they have been ready to query political, social and other initiatives suggested and championed by ZANU-PF. In addition, urban areas are heterogeneous and have diverse populations that encompass the country’s different ethnic, professional, political and social groups. Attempts by ZANU-PF to exert control over

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

35

urban populations without their consent have led to resistance and violence, resulting in ZANU abandoning urban areas, which have voted consistently for independent or opposition candidates since independence. Thus, ZANU -PF has concentrated its efforts on winning hearts and minds in rural areas, where people have less access to consistent and reliable information: television and other media that could potentially alienate them from ZANU are scarce. The discussion of Operation Murambatsvina later in this chapter will address this issue. ZANU–PF influences and appeals to a small section of the urban populace, consisting mainly of liberal, middle-class, black elites who were marginalized by colonialism and racism. At independence, the old black professional elites were largely sidelined by ZANU-PF, and new black elites linked to ZANU-PF nationalists emerged. These new, predominantly male, elites accessed the civil service, parastatal bodies and the private sector. A small section of these ambitious young businessmen and women, and ‘dealers’ who were striving for wealth, also accessed ZANU to facilitate and monopolize significant business opportunities, favoured access to tenders and other routes to wealth accumulation. This was evident in the so-called Willowgate scandal, in which political elites accessed scarce cars that had been assembled by a state-controlled entity and then illegally re-sold them at huge profits to the public. The exposure of this corruption dented the credentials of the ‘revolutionary party’, as ZANU was called. Other exposures regarding preferential elite access to land and other scarce goods and resources exposed ZANU’s hypocrisy, given its radical rhetoric about justice and equality. The new political culture privileging these elites generated a rift between the people and ZANU. However, the urban poor and working classes who had to toil and scrimp for survival quickly found out that they could not depend on ZANU-PF, since the party failed to implement policies that could grow the economy and deliver jobs, especially to those who were unskilled and had little schooling. A significant proportion of working people in urban areas aligned themselves with the  Movement for Demopcratic Change (MDC) which ZANU-PF referred to as a ‘sell-out’ party.1 The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was held by ZANU–PF to lack the ‘correct’ ideological orientation, while rural areas were declared to be and constructed as ZANU–PF territory and a no-go area for the MDC and 1  ZANU-PF termed the MDC a ‘sell-out’ party due to its urban black and white support base. ZANU-PF has a predominantly rural support base.

36 

R. GAIDZANWA

other opposition parties. In 2020, ZANU-PF remains a party with a predominantly rural following, mired in semi-feudal relations with the rural populace. ZANU- PFsecures the votes of the rural poor through food aid and agricultural support, this including bags of fertilizer, seed and other requirements. In exchange, the rural poor are expected to vote for ZANU– PF and participate in party activities, while traditional leaders benefit from ZANU–PF’s largesse in the form of houses, cars, agricultural supplies and salaries. ZANU–PF has captured and exercises control over the political choices and behaviour of the black rural poor, arguing that it has a compact with rural people, forged through the war of national liberation, in which the gun continues to lead politics. This privileged place for ZANU–PF in the politics of post-independence Zimbabwe has cemented and consolidated the party’s dominance over rural inhabitants in the three Mashonaland provinces and, to a lesser extent, in Masvingo and Midlands provinces. Matebeleland South and North have been alienated from ZANU–PF because of the Gukurahundi massacres.

Resistance to ZANU–PF Hegemony and Gukurahundi Atrocities The rivalry between ZANU- PF and ZAPU and their forces resulted in confrontations and clashes between their forces at Entumbane in Bulawayo after independence. This rivalry continued, despite attempts to integrate the warring forces with the aid of the British Military Assistance Team. Cameron (2017) accessed documents dating from January to April 1983 that showed the British government desired to safeguard its strategic, political and economic interests in Zimbabwe and other parts of Southern Africa rather than safeguarding, securing and protecting the people, who were casualties of the violence unleashed against them by the Fifth Brigade in Matebeleland and the Midlands at the behest of Zimbabwe’s government. The government had mounted a military operation that resulted in the deaths of over 20,000 people, in what is known as the Gukurahundi (which can be translated as the rain that sweeps away the chaff), directed against what was characterized as insurgency against the state. The declassified documents also showed that the Thatcher government wanted to prevent an exodus of Zimbabweans to the United Kingdom. Cameron also deduced that Mugabe, then President of Zimbabwe, needed white business and other critical communities to stay in the country to enhance its economic stability.

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

37

Thus, there appears to have been a convergence of interests between the top echelons of the British and Zimbabwean governments in downplaying or minimizing the magnitude of the Gukurahundi atrocities. Cameron indicated that the British diplomat and ambassador in Harare, Robin Byatt, did not fully disclose to Western diplomats the background to these events. Apparently, Byatt chose to boycott a meeting that had been convened with the Canadian embassy on 11 March 1983, in Harare, to exchange data on the atrocities. Cameron concluded that Byatt’s sole concern in reporting the violence was the safety and security of the white communities in the affected areas. Cameron concluded that, as a result of Byatt’s reports, the British continued to render military assistance to Zimbabwe by training Fifth Brigade personnel, including forty-three trainees under the British Military Assistance team at Inkomo Barracks. In addition, Mugabe was awarded an honorary degree by the University of Edinburgh in 1984 as a result of considerable lobbying by Lord Carrington, who served as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs between 1979 and 1982. He was an important player in the Lancaster House negotiations around Zimbabwe’s independence in 1979. Cameron also noted that the commander of the Fifth Brigade, Colonel Shiri, was offered a place at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London in 1986. In response to Cameron’s publication, the British government condemned the brutal and criminal suppression of the populations in Matebeleland and the Midlands, indicating that the United Kingdom government supported a process of truth and reconciliation, as envisaged in the 2013 constitution of Zimbabwe. The Gukurahundi massacres and their aftermath inflicted grave injuries on Zimbabwean society, creating widespread mistrust, fear and dread. It divided the country and the wounds inflicted on the bereaved families in Matebeleland and the Midlands have not been healed. There is still need for truth and reconciliation to ensure that the vengeful politics of the early 1980s can be exorcised from the Zimbabwean political arena. The events around Gukurahundi, in which men, women and children were killed simply because of their ethnic identity, have to be resolved through a process that is acceptable to those who were subjected to violence, ranging from murder and rape to beatings and verbal and other intimidation and terror. The Gukurahundi episode set a negative precedent because interrogation, denunciation and truth-telling have not occurred. Beyond the statement by Mugabe that it was a ‘moment of madness’, not much has been

38 

R. GAIDZANWA

done, and many of the families of the Gukurahundi victims have never been able to secure justice for their relatives and families. This precedent indicates that people who commit atrocities can get away without punishment and victims of injustice are not likely to secure justice from state or society. Thus, such events might be repeated as long as the culture of impunity persists. While ZANU–PF and other groups have put the Gukurahundi massacres behind them, the events have created resentment in Matebeleland and the Midlands over decades. The Rhodesian Front governments violated the rights of black people, and this fuelled the war for national liberation. As long as the suppressed anger remains unaddressed, Zimbabwe cannot function as a cohesive nation with shared goals and aspirations. The experience of colonial violence demonstrates that violations of black people by white governments created lasting resentment, and there is no reason to believe that the populations of Matebeleland and the Midlands will be content to tolerate the political culture of violence and impunity that was exhibited through the Gukurahundi events and the near-silence in their aftermath. Robert Mugabe’s remark is not sufficient to assuage the anger, grief and resentment.

The Post-colonial State’s War on Women: Operation Clean-Up (1983) Apart from the Gukurahundi massacres, which targeted predominantly Ndebele people, a significant proportion of whom supported ZAPU, led by Joshua Nkomo, the ZANU-led government, headed by Mugabe, also showed considerable hostility towards urban women in 1983, through what it termed Operation Clean-Up. This state violence against women related to their freedom of movement and association. The initiative entailed the use of violence against unaccompanied women and their arrest and incarceration in remote locations, on suspicion that they were engaged in acts of prostitution. The attacks against predominantly black working-class women who were found outside their homes in the evenings were carried out by the police and the army. Women and ‘vagrants’ were taken to police stations and prisons in various parts of Zimbabwe, having been stopped and questioned. They were required to show that

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

39

they were ‘honest’ people of ‘good morals’ by producing their marriage certificate, failing which they were taken to ‘minda mirefu’, the ‘long fields’ that were earmarked for the resettlement of people who were moved from crowded towns after independence, for ‘rehabilitation’. Gaidzanwa (1983) criticized the hostile and misogynistic political culture of ZANU– PF that these events indicated. These assaults against women and the poor, especially in urban areas, were intended to displace them from towns, where there was more freedom from control by the state, and hand them over to the traditional authorities who controlled the rural areas. Urban areas were perceived by the state to be nests of opposition politics and feminist activism, necessitating the disruption and demonization of the women involved. The Women’s Action Group, which comprised women of all races, was targeted for vilification, the state’s view being that these ‘middle class women were misleading and defending prostitutes’ and therefore deserved to be castigated and denounced. This stigmatization of and violence against poor, black, urban women was an exercise that was deliberately mounted to intimidate and discipline them by limiting their freedom of movement and association. The moral justification for this was questionable, and indicated the continuation by a black government that touted its liberation credentials of colonial thinking about black women: that they were immoral and required elite male control, defining them as ‘prostitutes’ if they moved about in public and on the streets of towns and cities after dark. Gaidzanwa (1992: 115) also drew attention to the divisive ways in which women were classified either as respectable or unrespectable, creating divisions between them and weakening their political activities and potential collective action. Thus, black women’s struggles against the gender politics and gender cultures of the patriarchal state and the classes that buttressed this state and its violence against black women, needed to be sustained. There was a glaring absence in Zimbabwe of cultural and political practices that promoted and secured the freedoms of all Zimbabweans regardless of race, class, culture and ethnicity. The gendered political culture of ZANU–PF was similar to that of the Rhodesian Front, which marginalized black women in many areas of politics and public life.

40 

R. GAIDZANWA

The Revolt of War Veterans against ZANU–PF Over Their Unpaid Pensions and Compensation (1996–7) ZANU–PF collided with war veterans over their unpaid pensions and compensation after months of protests. Wilfred Mhanda (2011), himself a war veteran, stated that the war veterans were incensed after suspicions were raised about the War Victims’ Compensation Fund being looted by undeserving senior politicians, military and business leaders, who were paid for non-existent injuries, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, nightmares and material losses, despite some not even having participated in the war of national liberation, while war veterans, many wallowing in destitution in rural areas, had not been compensated for their service and injuries. The protests resulted in a judicial commission being set up to investigate this abuse of the war victims’ fund. Mugabe was compelled to accede to lump sum payments of Z$50,000 (US$4300) to each veteran and monthly pension payments of Z$2000 (US$174). These payments were unbudgeted, and Mhanda (2011) noted that, in addition to cash settlements, the veterans demanded land and immediate settlement of their claims for compensation for injuries or disability under the War Victims’ Compensation Fund. Given that most of the veterans had struggled for the previous seventeen years with no compensation, there was much sympathy for their plight, although no compensation was paid to the families of the veterans who had died in the struggle for independence. The political culture that developed during the struggle for national liberation was characterized by authoritarianism and opportunism by a significant section of the senior political class, and this was clearly exposed by the debacle involving war veterans’ compensation demands. It was clear that the elitist culture of the politicians and others in the top echelons was still a problem for ZANU and the general populace after independence.

Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Remove the Rubbish) Colonial governments often moved the black populations of Zimbabwe whenever they were perceived to be standing in the way of a particular project. The Mugabe regime adopted the same modus operandi, displacing populations that were inconveniently located at specific political moments, an example being in 2005 when an election was due. By this time, urban populations had in general grown tired of the Mugabe regime and its

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

41

oppressive rule, so urban voters were consistently voting for opposition parties, such as the MDC. The Mugabe regime dealt with this by implementing an operation that was named Operation Murambatsvina (Remove the Rubbish), also officially known as Operation Restore Order. Operation Murambatsvina was described as an exercise to sanitise cities that had become disfigured by slum dwellings and unplanned settlements, which posed a threat to people’s health. It was presented as a slum-clearance measure to prevent the spread of vermin, disease and disorder. In the middle of winter, the state deployed bulldozers and other machinery to destroy the dwellings of about 700,000 people. Given that the MDC’s support base was located in the towns, it was quite clear that Operation Murambatsvina was actually intended to undermine and disperse those populations that supported and voted for the opposition party. To a large degree, the urban poor were moved to rural areas, where their votes for the MDC were likely to be diluted by those for ZANU–PF, Mugabe’s party, if indeed they were registered to vote in the rural constituencies to which they were unceremoniously moved without notice. Operation Murambatsvina disenfranchised the black, urban poor in the same way that Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front had disenfranchised the majority of black people before independence by imposing property qualifications that excluded them from voting. Clearly, then, the political culture of the Rhodesian Front, which aimed to exclude or brutalise those sections of the population that did not support the ruling party or actively opposed it, continued after independence.

Racial Tension and Class Confrontations Over Land: Hondo Yeminda (the War Over Land) Race- and class-based confrontations occurred between the state and white farmers over land, and the farmers were violently dispossessed of the land they held and worked. These ‘land wars’ were related to unresolved issues that dated back to the colonization of Zimbabwe. The British South Africa Company suppressed the Ndebele in 1893 and the Shona in 1897–8, then forcibly moved them into ‘native reserves’ that were specially created. Palmer and Parsons (1977) documented the progressive encroachment on the lands held by both Ndebele and Shona peoples in colonial Zimbabwe. Grievances over the appropriation of natives’ land

42 

R. GAIDZANWA

finally resulted in the war for national liberation, which eventually resulted in independence in 1980. However, resentment over colonization, racism and the mistreatment of black populations during the colonial era remained. Inequalities in access to land were resented, and this resulted in further tension: white farmers retained control over the best urban residential land, farmland and water and other resources after independence. Calls for land reform were made by various black lobby groups. When reform was slow, and failed to address the land hunger that persisted, particularly in rural Zimbabwe, white-held farmland was invaded by black war veterans. Racial inequalities in landholding persisted until the year 2000, when calls for a new constitution resulted in the production of a draft. This contained a clause that allowed the state to compulsorily acquire land from large-scale commercial farmers, the majority of them being white. The state was expected to pay only for improvements that had been made to the land rather than the value of the land itself. In reaction to the vote that rejected the proposed constitution, perceived to have been instigated after campaigns led by opposition parties and whites, war veterans occupied white-owned land throughout Zimbabwe, pushing the country into crisis. The referendum results were ignored and in April 2000, parliament amended the constitution, allowing the state to compulsorily acquire commercial farmland, as suggested by the draft. The parliamentary vote resulted in what was termed the ‘Third Chimurenga’ (third war for liberation) and ‘hondo yeminda’ (land war) in reference to widespread occupations of land previously held by white farmers. The hondo yeminda was part of a political wave driven by injustices from the colonial past that had remained unresolved after independence. The land invasions by war veterans resulted in agricultural productivity plummeting and Zimbabwe’s economy drastically deteriorating. In addition, the Mugabe regime had also alienated various class, ethnic, racial, gender and other groups through discrimination and poor economic management and governance. As a result, some elements of the population felt marginalized, and migration escalated after 2000 as Zimbabweans departed to search for better lives elsewhere. In the meantime, the MDC gained traction and became popular in the towns where ZANU–PF failed to make headway, as urban housing needs were not easily met owing to the relatively high cost and low availability of residential land. ZANU–PF was unable to redistribute this land as it was controlled by local authorities, so the party had no incentives to persuade urban working and middle-class people to vote for them.

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

43

Operation Makavhotera Papi? (2008) Operation Makavhotera Papi? (2008) was presented in the form of a question that can be loosely translated as Operation for whom did you vote? This was a result of ZANU–PF losing the 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections. Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC presidential candidate, beat Robert Mugabe, while ZANU–PF lost the parliament to the MDC, winning only 94 of the 210 parliamentary seats. Sokwanele (It is enough), an organization that monitors human rights violations and comments on social and political issues, including the conduct of elections, noted that ZANU–PF lost despite the gerrymandering of constituency boundaries, electoral fraud and widespread voter intimidation, violence and some murders, especially in rural areas. Sokwanele also argued that Tsvangirai’s win occurred in spite of all the hurdles placed in the way of the MDC by ZANU–PF. Despite Tsvangirai’s win, a recount that took over a month (with no independent observers present) announced that he had not garnered an absolute majority, necessitating a run-off. Operation Makavhotera Papi?, fronted by the military and other uniformed forces, was unleashed on the opposition and voters deemed to be sympathetic to the MDC, resulting in Tsvangirai’s withdrawal from the run-off to stop the violence that had been unleashed on voters. Operation Makavhotera Papi? claimed over 500 lives, and thousands were tortured during the ‘election’, in which Mugabe ran and ‘won’—the sole candidate for the presidency! However, the Southern African Development Community declined to recognize him as the duly elected president, preferring to broker the formation of a government that shared power between the MDC and ZANU–PF. The utilization of military and other security personnel in election and governance-related issues therefore became institutionalized, generating ominous and problematic dynamics for future political power struggles within and outside ZANU–PF. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) between ZANU-PF and the two MDC parties, one led by Tsvangirai and the other by Mutambara, underpinned the Government of National Unity. Although the GPA was supposed to produce a new constitution that would transform the politics of Zimbabwe by eroding the coercive power of ZANU- PF and enable other political parties and players to participate in politics if adopted by all Zimbabweans, the sustained violence by ZANU-PF controlled security personnel against the supporters of the two MDC signatories of the GPA, led by Tsvangirai and Mutambara, poisoned the atmosphere and militated against the production of a document that would be acceptable to all parties and their

44 

R. GAIDZANWA

supporters against the production of a document that would be acceptable to all parties and their supporters. The militarized violence unleashed by ZANU–PF also portended future power struggles within and outside ZANU–PF, as the securocrats and military personnel, a significant proportion in post since the liberation war days, moved to the centre of political activities. In retrospect, it is notable that Rhodesian governments utilized the police and military to suppress dissent, while allowing the politicians to handle broad governance issues. However, in ZANU–PF, the security and military elites moved to the centre of governance, and by 2008 and 2012, when elections were held, they played a central role, enabling Mugabe to be ‘re-elected’ against the will of the people. The post-independence ZANU–PF governments led by Mugabe, like the white-led governments before independence, failed to unite the nation’s various racial class and ethnic groups because of their divisive political cultures. In contrast to the Rhodesian governments, which had at least managed to unite most of the white population through racist and unequal distribution of resources, such as land, in their favour, the post-­ independence government of Mugabe failed to manage its differences with other races and non-ZANU–PF politicians, and unite the blacks. Instead, Mugabe and ZANU–PF tormented, violated and discriminated against those groups, parties and politicians that questioned their rule. Mugabe fell out with politicians such as Ndabaningi Sithole, Joshua Nkomo and Edgar Tekere, all of whom were his former comrades in arms during the struggle against colonialism. Unlike Ian Smith, most of whose white allies stood with him to the end, Mugabe, at various points during his rule, fell out with a significant proportion of his comrades and marginalized them, in order to achieve unquestioned hegemony over ZANU–PF. Thus, the post-independence era in Zimbabwe has been dogged by a culture of racism, ethnic and class discrimination, and intolerance by the ruling classes. In the wake of the displacement of white farmers, who were critical to the colonial economy, the economic deterioration that was experienced, especially after the hondo yeminda and Operation Makavhotera Papi?, speaks to the problems caused by the ZANU-inspired political culture that continues to afflict the country. The racist colonial political culture has been replaced by an oppressive, hegemonic political culture privileging ZANU–PF over other parties. The prevalent culture, characterized by class discrimination and poverty, has created social, economic and political strife. The land invasions by war veterans and other groups

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

45

were also fuelled by the growing chasm between the privileged sections of the black and white races. Increasing poverty, especially among the black majority, generated resentment against the Mugabe regime and its poor management of the economy. Thus, the colonial governments failed to democratize Zimbabwe and create a nation in which people could thrive regardless of their race, class, ethnicity and gender. The post-­independence government of Mugabe also failed to foster economic, ethnic, gender and political democratization, resulting in a ‘soft coup’ against Mugabe by his comrades in arms from the liberation struggle. In contrast, Ian Smith, the iconic Prime Minister of Rhodesia who is still celebrated by sections of white Rhodesia, never had to suffer the ignominy of betrayal by his key henchmen, and the majority of the white population admired and agreed with him. Smith bemoaned what he perceived to be his betrayal by the British and other Western regimes, but in contrast Mugabe felt betrayed by his comrades, such as Emmerson Mnangagwa, whom he sidelined and victimized. This resulted in Mnangagwa fleeing for his life through Mozambique, to seek refuge in South Africa. Mnangagwa returned to lead the coup that dislodged Mugabe from power in 2017, after thirty-seven years of iron-fisted rule—deposed by colleagues from his own party in the same way that he had colluded to depose Ndabaningi Sithole, the previous leader of ZANU. In addition, Mugabe had also lost the presidential election in 2008 and relied on the army to subvert the will of the Zimbabwean people and restore him as president. The debt he owed the military and security elites was to be repaid through the coup against him in 2017, which ushered in a new political culture of brazen militarization. This proved to be difficult to circumvent or confront in the wake of the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2018. ZANU–PF, under its new militarized leadership, has retained its stranglehold on black rural populations, especially in the provinces of Mashonaland, Manicaland and the Midlands. These rural populations are relatively isolated, impoverished and vulnerable to punishment by the state and/or ZANU–PF-aligned chiefs, headmen and supporters if they decline to vote for the correct party. In rural areas, it is more difficult for the opposition to have a viable presence because of the patronage relationship between the chiefs, headmen and ZANU–PF. However, the party can only access rural Matebeleland populations through former ZAPU sections of the party, owing to the problems arising since the Gukurahundi massacres. In the other provinces, chiefs are the ‘enforcers’ for ZANU–PF, and are rewarded through access to executive powers over their people;

46 

R. GAIDZANWA

this enables them to police dissenters. In August 2018, chiefs were given state-funded cars even though most chiefs cannot drive! However, despite these arrangements, the Matebeleland provinces remain relatively more open to other political parties, such as the MDC and other smaller groups.

Militarization, Securitization of Resources and the Coup Against Mugabe in 2017: The Development of a Militarized Political Culture in Zimbabwe While Rhodesia was in a state of civil war between 1970 and 1980, the Rhodesian military was not able to take over the state and its institutions. However, in post-independence Zimbabwe, the constant reliance by the Mugabe regime on the security and military elites to keep the populace in line had the unintended effect of placing these personnel in contexts where they were constantly interacting with civilians, governance institutions and business structures. Mugabe’s government also deployed the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to help the Kabila regime repel rebels. Through such actions, Mugabe inadvertently facilitated the ZNA’s involvement in diamond mining and smuggling. The elites in the ZNA, police and intelligence were drawn into diamond mining through their exposure to mining in the DRC, where they collaborated with both the Kabila regime and the rebels in looting diamonds. By the time diamonds were discovered in Marange, eastern Zimbabwe, the ZNA, police and intelligence were already well versed in the practices and conventions around diamond mining in the DRC. However, in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, the security for diamond extraction is usually the responsibility of the private mining and security concerns that have licences to mine diamonds. This arrangement reduces the risk that locals and women in particular will be abused, since private security actors are less likely to expect the state and legal systems to support them when they commit violent acts near the mines. On the other hand, state and military agents and security personnel can invoke defence of the state and its interests as a shield to hide acts of violence.

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

47

Operation Hakudzokwi (Operation No Return) Human Rights Watch (2009) reported that in 2008, in the Marange area in eastern Zimbabwe, the military and security forces mounted Operation Hakudzokwi (Operation No Return), to violently drive out alluvial diamond panners from the Marange diamond fields. In 2016, the Alternative Information and Development Centre described the gruesome mass murders, beatings and maimings that had occurred, and stated that hundreds of panners had been beaten and gunned down by the security forces, both police and military. The takeover of the diamond fields by Zimbabwean military and security took place in the wake of the Government of National Unity that was formed with the MDC. The Human Rights Watch report documented the use of child labour and violence against villagers in Chiadzwa by ZANU–PF operatives. Operation Hakudzokwi was estimated to have resulted in the deaths of over 200 people. Physical and sexual violence against women and girls by the police, soldiers and diggers was also rampant. The seizure of diamond fields and the killings, beatings, torture arrests and harassment of villagers, male and female, who were panning diamonds occurred during an economic crisis that was characterized by hyperinflation, high unemployment, widespread food insecurity and poverty. The Human Rights Watch report suggested that the state allowed the military to rotate army brigades in Marange to ensure that they could all benefit from the diamond trade, thus earning their loyalty as well as that of senior ZANU–PF personnel. The report also pointed out that instead of seeking aid, the power-sharing government formed in 2009 could harness the diamond income that was being stolen through illegal mining and smuggled out of the country. The report suggested that Zimbabwe could generate as much as US$200 million per month if Marange diamonds and other minerals were managed in a more transparent and accountable manner to fund an economic recovery programme, which would benefit ordinary villagers. Prior to his resignation, Mugabe indicated that at least US$5 billion in diamond revenue was never accounted for. Historically, state security has not been involved in Zimbabwean mines, whether securing or participating in mining or benefiting from mining proceeds. However, in the Marange area, securitization was accomplished through the declaration of the diamond fields as ‘protected areas’ under national security legislation, thereby securing state protection. The diamonds in Marange were securitized but the people there were not secure.

48 

R. GAIDZANWA

Instead, they were rendered more vulnerable, since their livelihoods were disrupted by mining activities that were taking place on their farmland and near their homes. The Protected Places and Areas Act (1959) requires the Marange people to procure clearance letters from the police every month to access their homes and move around their village, effectively curtailing their freedom of movement. On the other hand, the diamond mine personnel and military and security operatives were able to move around freely even before they had relocated and resettled the villagers who were displaced. The military diamond miners’ rights were prioritized over those of the villagers, who lost their freedom of movement, their grazing lands and their livelihoods. Saunders (2009) observed that the Zimbabwean military and security elites in the police, army and intelligence have diversified their activities beyond diamond mining and have ventured into mining gold, chromite and other minerals. They can convert their skills in securing obedience from local populations, gained during the war for national liberation, into enforcing the obedience of villagers and local communities to further their mining interests. The experience of security and military elites in the DRC has inevitably impacted on the state in Zimbabwe. Through their access to diamond-­ related income, they have developed aspirations to control economic, social and political power from extractive resources. Increasing their off-­ budget resources has enabled them to fund their political interests, rendering them less reliant on political patronage. They are able to finance and influence political players, election results and political events through the creation and support of a new political culture that is aligned to their interests. They are therefore more empowered against other blocs that have traditionally controlled Zimbabwe’s politics and economics. In effect, they have been able to create a militarized political and economic culture that is more aligned to their aspirations and interests. The militarization and securitization of extractive resources, as this example has shown, has multiplied the opportunities for gendered and sexualized physical violence against women and girls, and generalized violence against civilians. Thus, Zimbabwe’s traditional mining culture is being transformed into one that is based on the power of political, military and security participants, whose interests are varied and whose model is based on the securitization and militarization of extractive resources. The new political culture pits military elites against poor civilians, commercial and industrial players, and other civilians who have traditionally

2  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ZIMBABWE: CONTINUITIES… 

49

participated in mining and commercial activity. In Zimbabwe, the militarized independence struggle sowed the seeds of militarization in politics and the economy. The security and military elites are now firmly ensconced in mining activities. This new culture is being extended into the commercial agricultural sector, with the military venturing into what is called command agriculture for food security. Militarized agriculture brings the military into increased contact with women, who provide the bulk of the casual, seasonal and permanent labour in planting, weeding and harvesting crops, and are vulnerable to sexual and physical violence by men who are steeped in militaristic and masculine cultural values that privilege male domination over women, disempowered men and children and other disadvantaged groups. Clearly, this negatively affects women’s everyday and working lives.

Conclusion The Political Culture of Zimbabwe Zimbabwe’s political culture is being transformed through the increased involvement of military and security sector players in agriculture, mining, politics and other sectors of the economy. The militarization and securitization of economic activities is, in turn, transforming the form and content of the economic and political cultures. This development will most likely generate new types of conflict and more competition between civilian, business, military and security elites, who are also increasingly major players in sectors of the economy where they have not been traditionally involved. This development presages a shift in the cultures and practices around conducting business in these sectors. There is a need to determine how the norms of business and entrepreneurship will continue to be respected under these conditions. In addition, there is the formal involvement by Zimbabwe’s military and security elites as politicians, ministers and functionaries in the state sector. This consolidation of securocrats in the economy, politics and other sectors of life points to the transformation of political life and culture in the country. There is clearly a need to determine the trajectory of these developments and their impact on Zimbabwe’s political cultures, as well as the prospects for economic, social and political democracy under these conditions.

50 

R. GAIDZANWA

References Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC). 2016. On Marange Atrocities. Anhui and Jinan Mining in Marange. http://annual2016.tni.org/ corporate-power/ Cameron, H. 2017. The Matabeleland Massacres: Britain’s Wilful Blindness, The International History Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/0707533 2.2017.1309561 Cobbing, J.R.D. 1983. The Ndebele State. In Before and After Shaka, ed. J.B. Peires. Grahamstown: ISER. De Valk, P., and K.H.  Wekwete. 1990. Challenges for Local Government in Zimbabwe. In Decentralising for Participatory Planning: Comparing the Experiences of Zimbabwe and Other Anglophone Countries in East and Southern Africa. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company. Gaidzanwa, R.B. 1983. Operation Clean-Up in Historical Perspective. New York: Mimeo ———. 1992. The Politics of the Body and the Politics of Control: An Analysis of Class, Gender and Cultural Issues in Student Politics at the University of Zimbabwe. Zambezia XX (ii): 15–33. ———. 2001. Masculinities and Femininities at the University of Zimbabwe: Student Perspectives and Responses Through the Affirmative Action Project. In Speaking for ourselves: Masculinities and Femininities Amongst Students at the University of Zimbabwe. Harare: UZ Publications. Human Rights Watch. 2009. Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe. New York: H.R.W. Lowry, D. 2007. The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca.1920s–1980. Cold War History 7 (2): 169–194. https://doi. org/10.1080/14682740701284108. Maenzanise, B. 2008. The Church and Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle. Methodist History 46 (2): 68–86. Mhanda, A. 2011. Dzino: Memories of a Freedom Fighter. Harare: Weaver Press. Moore, D.S. 2005. Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in Zimbabwe. Durham: Duke University Press. Nkomo, J.M. 2001. The Story of My Life. Harare: Sapes Books. Palmer, R., and N. Parsons, eds. 1977. The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pye, L. and Verba, S. (eds) 1965. Politicsal culture and political development: Studies in political development. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Saunders, R. 2009. Geologies of Power: Blood Diamonds, Security Politics and Zimbabwe’s Troubled Transition. In Legacies of Liberation: Post-Colonial Struggles or a Democratic Southern Africa, ed. M.  Clarke and C.  Bassett. Fernwood/Johannesburg: HSRC Press.

CHAPTER 3

The Zimbabwean National Question: Key Components and Unfinished Business Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni

Introduction The concept of the ‘national question’ is an embodiment of key and complex issues to do with nation-making, state-making, liberation, reconstitution of the political, rights, entitlements and freedoms. Thus, this chapter delineates the key issues that define or underpin Zimbabwean citizens’ struggle for an inclusive, democratic and developed Zimbabwe—the key citizen ideals, priorities and aspirations constitutive of what is known as the national question. At a secondary level, the chapter outlines the key process(es) through which Zimbabweans can package these ideals, priorities and aspirations into a national common vision/agenda for the national struggle for democracy and development.

S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (*) Archie Mafeje Research Institute, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_3

51

52 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

Background Zimbabweans, working collectively and individually, have undoubtedly played a critical role in spearheading the struggle for liberation from colonialism, democracy, equality and national development across space and time. However, the ability of ordinary citizens to shape the national political discourse and development paradigm as well as to effectively mobilize themselves and others for democracy and development has been constrained by the lack of a common vision or national agenda crystallizing around the ‘big idea’ that captures the nation’s struggles and aspirations. The lack of this big idea among citizens in particular has become more apparent post-Mugabe than ever before, as civil society has not only struggled for relevance but also struggled to connect itself to the broader Zimbabwean society and ongoing community struggles in various parts of the country. These struggles include public sector strikes against poor working conditions and even non-payment of wages, as well as urban residents’ protests against poor service delivery that have been organized sporadically since the fall of Robert Mugabe. Prior to this, the hashtag or social media protests took Zimbabwe by a storm from late 2015; and the urban citizen protests and demonstrations against deteriorating economic conditions, corruption, rent-seeking behaviour by the state and government officials’ intransigency and profligacy, which have come to characterize life in Zimbabwe, began before November 2017. All these citizen protests and movements were demonstrating some potential of citizen assertiveness and helping to profoundly reconfigure Zimbabwe’s political landscape.

Mapping the Contours of the Zimbabwe National Problem National questions, national visions and national agendas are inherently contested, and there is always need for a proper understanding of a country’s contextual challenges and opportunities in order to create an inclusive national vision. The most important step in civil society attempts to craft a common national agenda is to understand the nature of Zimbabwe’s political, economic and social challenges: the Zimbabwe Problem. Zimbabwe is a country undergoing various incomplete transitions that have produced a complex and multi-layered crisis of governance and contestations over resource ownership and distribution, nation-state building,

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

53

citizenship and belonging, as well as inclusive and sustainable development. As Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopolous (2003) correctly note, the Zimbabwe crisis is not about a single issue rooted in a one-off event or single historical trajectory, but a ‘mixture’ of ‘historicized and racialised assertion of land restitution and justice’; ‘ahistorical, technocratic insistence on liberal notions of private property’, ‘development’ and ‘good governance’; ‘a new form of ‘indigenous, authoritarian nationalism (based around claims of loyalty and national sovereignty)’, ‘a non-ethnicized, “civic” nationalism (grounded in liberal democratic notions of rights and rule of law)’; ‘a radical, Pan-Africanist anti-colonial, anti-imperialist critique of “the West”’; ‘a “universalist” embrace of certain aspects of neo-­ liberalism and globalization’; ‘a monopoly claim over the commitment to radical redistribution’; and ‘a monopoly claim over the defence of human rights’ (Hammar and Raftopolous 2003: 17). Another important point to understand is that there is a core set of complex, overlapping and contested citizen priorities that need to be packaged into the national agenda. This core set of citizen issues, priorities and concerns cannot be understood through some simplistic treatment of the Zimbabwean experience as something defined through chronological, linear time frames in which the ‘colonial’, ‘anti-colonial nationalist struggle’ and ‘postcolonial’ interludes are separate episodes with temporal moments of ruptures and discontinuities. To define a broadly inclusive national agenda around which the nation can be galvanized, it is critical to approach the Zimbabwean experience as a continuum of separate, distinctly different historical episodes. Such an approach enables a global and more nuanced analysis of the set of issues that need to be resolved, prioritized and processed when crafting an inclusive national agenda. This approach puts the future in the same ‘duration’ as the past and the present, and creates more space for an inclusive citizenship. This kind of approach is particularly important in the light of what Hammar and Raftopolous describe as the ‘unfinished business’ of the nation that cuts across the colonial, anti-colonial nationalist struggle and postcolonial Zimbabwe, at one level, and the important continuities that can be missed in a simple chronological and linear analysis that emphasizes discontinuities, at another level. The cross-cutting national issues include what Horace Campbell dubs ‘the patriarchal model of liberation’ that silences ‘her story’ and privileges misogynistic and masculinist traditions (Campbell 2003); the subordination of civil society to nationalism that is intolerant of dissent and plurality; the struggle for civil and political

54 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

liberties that were only partially realized in 1980 and have suffered reversal since then; and the continuum of violence as a political tool since the time of colonial conquest. The key contested but cross-cutting national issues discernible in Zimbabwe’s overlapping historical phases of development can be summarized into ten categories. The first is the popular struggles to gain national sovereignty and territorial integrity free from colonialism and imperialism. The second is the expectation of the return of land that was appropriated by colonial settlers and its equitable distribution among indigenous people. The third is liberation of women from patriarchy, sexism and neo-­ traditionalism. The fourth is the achievement of civil and political liberties, which were denied under colonialism. The fifth is the building of cordial society–state relations mediated by the rule of law and constitutionalism and predicated on equitable access to strategic resources. The sixth is the setting afoot of legitimate, responsive and representative governance that delivers services. The seventh is the constriction of inclusive national development propelled by economic growth that is capable of alleviating poverty, disease, ignorance and unemployment. The eight is the introduction of democracy, social peace, human security, and equal rights. The ninth is the eradication of violence and impunity, and the tenth is the liberation of peasants and workers from poverty, disease and ignorance (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).

Framing the National Issues in Zimbabwe Historically, it has always been difficult for nation-states to define a common national agenda and vision because of class, ethnic, gender, partisan and generational cleavages. The situation is compounded by the very fundamental question of what is ‘national’, which is inherently and highly contested. Even the very term ‘nation’ carries two meanings—it is a reference to the people within a state and the nation-state itself as a construction by the elites—but these are highly contested constructions (Billing 1995: 24). What often escape the minds of analysts is that the very ‘creation of the nation-as-people’ and ‘nation-as-states’ has never been ‘a harmonious process, in which a traditional “ethnie” grows from small shoot into the full flower of nationality, as if following a process of ‘natural’ maturation’ (Billing 1995: 27). Michael Billing explains that the interrelated processes of creating a ‘nation-as-people’ and a ‘nation-as-state’ are always mediated by conflict

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

55

and violence because ‘a particular identity has to be imposed’, and ‘one way of thinking of the self, community and indeed of the world has to replace other conceptions, other forms of life’ (Billing 1995: 27). It is within this conflictual and violence-laden discursive terrain of nation and state formation that national questions, national visions and national agendas are crafted, defined, named and imposed on society by those who emerged victorious and powerful (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). The situation becomes even more complex in places such as Zimbabwe and other postcolonial African states, where the nation and state are deliberately conflated to the detestable extent that the president (understood in patriarchal terms as the father of the nation) becomes the state on the one hand and the national question is reduced to race and ethnic questions on the other hand (Prah 2006). With specific reference to Zimbabwe, national questions, national visions and national agendas were initially imagined, crafted and named in the context of an anti-colonial struggle. This anti-colonial struggle was itself a contested terrain in which even the naming of the imagined postcolonial sovereign nation-state provoked contestations. As Enocent Msindo correctly noted, by the early 1950s the Zimbabwean political scene was dominated by ethnic-based societies such as the Kalanga Cultural Society, Matebeleland Home Society, Monomotapa Offspring Society, and many others (Msindo 2007: 273–296). National consciousness was being formed, even though the African National Congress had been in existence since 1934 (Ranger 1970). What also needs to be understood is the notion of nation-state and citizenship that developed under colonial rule, which has continued to have an important bearing on postcolonial attempts to define national visions and agendas. Mahmood Mamdani’s work is insightful on this as he aptly explains the nature of the colonial nation-state and ‘how the subject population was incorporated into—and not excluded from—the arena of colonial power’ (Mamdani 1996: 15). Mamdani’s central point is that citizenship was ‘a privilege of the civilized; the uncivilized would be subject to an all-round tutelage’. The third is that ‘a propertied franchise separated the civilized from the uncivilized’, making it impossible for those considered uncivilized to enjoy and civil and political rights (Mamdani 1996: 15 & 17). Even the educated and urban-based ‘natives’ ‘who were exempt from the lash of customary law’ were not included in urban civil society—rather, ‘they languished in a juridical limbo’ (Mamdani 1996: 18). The consequence of all this was the construction of a

56 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

bifurcated colonial state characterized by ‘two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority’ with ‘urban power’ speaking ‘the language of civil society and civil rights’ (direct rule through use of civil protected rights) and ‘rural power’ speaking that of ‘community and culture’ (indirect rule enforced through invented tradition) (Mamdani 1996: 18). Mamdani’s discussion of the colonial state can be easily extended to the question of how people have been incorporated into the arena of postcolonial power and who defines national interests, national visions and national agendas within a context characterized by Luise White (2015) as ‘unpopular sovereignty’, which was not only the hallmark of Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence but also describes the Harare regime Emerson Mnangagwa that came to power at the end of 2017. The reality of colonial bifurcated citizenship had deep implications for the character of the anti-colonial nationalist liberation struggles. In the first place, the struggles of the colonized subjects became ranged against both ‘customary authorities in the local state and against racial barriers in civil society’ (Mamdani 1996: 19). The anti-colonial struggle was in a way a struggle for inclusion into civil society that was ring-fenced by race and privilege. What was being created is what Mamdani terms ‘an indigenous civil society’ (Mamdani 1996: 20). This struggle could not be achieved without deracialization of the state. The third moment of development of civil society was that of political independence, which produced a deracialized state without a deracialized civil society that continued to protect colonially accumulated privileges. The state pushed the agenda of deracialization of civil society through such initiatives as Africanization, affirmative action and indigenization projects. This agenda united ‘the victims of colonial racism’ (Mamdani 1996: 20). As Mamdani (1996: 20–21) puts it, ‘To the victims of racism the vocabulary of rights rang hollow, a lullaby for perpetuating racial privilege.’ The rupture between state and civil society came during the fourth moment of redistribution of resources, which became imbricated in regional, partisan, class, ethnic, gender and even familial cleavages. Mamdani argues that the fourth moment that brought civil society into existence became ‘the moment of the collapse of an embryonic indigenous society, of trade unions and autonomous civil organizations, and its absorption into political society’. He elaborates: It is the moment of the marriage between technism and nationalism, of the proliferation of state nationalism in a context where the claims of the state—

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

57

both developmentalist and equalizing—had a powerful resonance, particularly for the fast-expanding educated strata. It is the time when civil society-based social movements became demobilized and political movements statized. (Mamdani 1996: 21)

Mamdani’s analysis helps us to comprehend the limits in current efforts to build a common national vision in postcolonial Africa, especially those related to the continued rural–urban divide. According to Mamdani, the rural sector remained excluded from the mainstream colonial state and its associated privileges and rights, administered under decentralized authoritarianism of invented ‘traditional administrative’ authorities. The postcolonial African state generally failed to integrate the rural sphere in its postcolonial reform agenda, focusing more on deracializing the central state without detribalizing the local state. The democratization agenda was never extended to the rural sector, and there continued to be a disconnect between rural and urban sectors in the civic movement’s struggles for democratization across the continent. In the case of countries such as Zimbabwe, where the anti-colonial liberation war was fought in the rural areas, the liberation struggle failed to deliver liberation to the peasants. Analysis of the liberation struggle by scholars such as Norma Kriger has shown that the liberation war and its legacy actually helped to entrench authoritarianism and marginalization in rural areas. Where the traditional chief used tradition and custom to enforce authoritarian local rule; the guerrillas and party cadre used claims of revolution and development to justify authoritarianism. Consequently, rural masses have remained subjects rather than citizens even after bearing the brunt of the anti-colonial armed liberation struggle. Given this background, it is important for civil society efforts to deal with the national question and craft a national agenda for democracy and development to be anchored not only on the critical questions of decolonization, deracialization, democratization, de-­ patriarchalization, and deimperialization, but also on the often neglected issues of the continued rural–urban divide and the marginalization of rural masses as a class from the both the national discourse and the nation-state.

The Nationalist Framework of a Common Vision Any attempt to develop a common national agenda needs to start with a nuanced analysis of the anti-colonial nationalist struggle that gave birth to Zimbabwe and Zimbabwean identity, because it helped to define the set of

58 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

issues and core values that continue to shape Zimbabweans’ present and future struggles for an inclusive citizenship. While the anti-colonial struggle was characterized by ambiguities, contradictions and ambivalences (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya 2011), it was the most certain in terms of shaping a common foundation, a common purpose, a shared legacy, common identity, belonging and a national vision and agenda. Terence Ranger reinforces this point, arguing that the sequence of nationalist thought and organization from the Bantu Congress of the 1940s and early 1950s through the revived mass nationalist parties of the late 1950s and early 1960s and into guerrilla war is crucial for contemporary debate about democracy in Zimbabwe (Ranger 1997). Brian Raftopolous also emphasizes the significance of Zimbabwean nationalism in the building of a common national vision. He correctly notes that ‘Nationalism, as a mobilizing ideology, has had a powerful presence in Zimbabwean history’, although ‘we now have a more complex picture of nationalism, reflecting both its resonance and its uneven differential presence’ (Raftopolous 1995: 115). Most of the economic, political and social issues that dominated national discourse and struggles in the 1990s and 2000s, and even 2020, are traceable historically to the colonial and anti-­ colonial politics of the 1960s and 1970s. The national agenda for the anti-colonial struggle was not just to defeat colonialism and construct an independent Zimbabwe, but also very much a struggle for democracy and human rights that were denied by the colonial state. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Zimbabwean national question was understood as a colonial question and a struggle for a birthright. This articulation of the national question was encapsulated by anti-­ colonial grievances of early nationalist leaders and their followers. As a colonial question and a struggle for birthright, it was eloquently expressed in the intellectual writings of early nationalists such as Ndabaningi Sithole (1959), Nathan Shamuyarira (1965), Eshmael Mlambo (1972) and Enoch Dumbutshena (1975). Sithole articulated this nationalist understanding of the national question when he argued that African nationalism was against European domination but not against the ‘white man’. He elaborated that the basic constitutive elements of African nationalism included the ‘African’s desire to participate fully in the central government of the country; his desire for economic justice that recognizes fully the principles of “equal pay for equal work” regardless of the colours of the skin; his desire to have full political rights in his own country; his dislike for being treated as a stranger in the land of his birth; his dislike for the laws of the

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

59

country that prescribe for him a permanent position of inferiority as a human being’ (Sithole 1959: 37). This amounted to a liberal nationalist and inclusivist articulation of the national question in which the educated black elites used the evidence of education to claim inclusion within the colonial society as equal citizens. The early articulations of the national question emphasized the notion of ‘partnership between people of all races without which there can be no peaceful progress in this country’. There was emphasis on the non-racial orientation of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) and its ‘complete loyalty to the Crown as the symbol of national unity’. The SRANC also emphasized that it was opposed to tribalism (SRANC 1979: 3). This is why this first mass nationalist political formation, formed in 1957, tried to define the national question in terms of seeking ‘national unity’, ‘true partnership regardless of race, colour and creed’ and ‘a complete integrated society, equality of opportunity in every sphere and the social, economic and political advancement of all’. While the National Democratic Party (NDP) that succeeded the SRANC was more radical in its demands and defined itself as ‘a political party initiated and led by Africans’ and dedicated to ‘the struggle for, and attainment of freedom for African people of Southern Rhodesia’ (Nyangoni and Nyandoro 1979: 21), the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) that succeeded the NDP committed themselves to fight for ‘one man one vote as the basis of government’. In its Policy Statement of 21 August 1963, ZANU committed itself to building what it termed ‘The ZANU State’, predicated as nationalist, democratic, socialist, pan-Africanist; based on the rule of law, separation of powers; unity, non-racialism and indivisible state principles (ZANU 1963). At its Inaugural Congress of 12–13 May 1964 held in Gwelo (now Gweru), the founder president, Ndabaningi Sithole, asserted that ZANU ‘stands for democracy, socialism, nationalism, one man one vote, freedom, Pan-Africanism, non-racialism and republicanism’ (Nangana and Nyandoro 1979: 75). Almost throughout the whole African continent, gaining civil and political rights was a constitutive part of the anti-colonial nationalist struggle. This point is captured well by the Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake, who has strongly argued that the language of the nationalist movement was the language of democracy, as displayed in the writings of the key nationalist intellectual leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah (I Speak of Freedom); Nwafor Orizu (Without Bitterness); Jomo Kenyatta (Facing

60 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

Mount Kenya); Odinga Odinga (Not Yet Uhuru); Julius Nyerere (Freedom and Development); Leopold Senghor (African Socialism); Amilcar Cabral (Unity and Struggle); and Frantz Fanon (The Wretched of the Earth). African nationalism denounced the violation of dignity of the colonized, the denial of basic rights, the political disenfranchisement of the colonized, racial discrimination, lack of opportunity and equal access, and economic exploitation of the colonized. In the words of the celebrated African nationalist leader and theoretician of the anti-imperialist struggle, Amilcar Cabral: We are fighting so that insults may no longer rule our countries, martyred and scorned for centuries, so that our peoples may never be exploited by imperialists not only by people with white skin, because we do not confuse exploitation or exploiters with the colour of men’s skins; we do not want any exploitation in our countries, not even by black people. (Cabral 1972)

Explaining the people’s aspirations in fighting against colonialism, Cabral clarified that we should ‘always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in anyone’s head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children’ (Davidson 1979: 45). At the centre of the struggle were issues of belonging, citizenship, resource ownership, and sovereignty. Later were added such aspirations as socialism as part of the horizon of the struggle (Zeleza 2003). The optimism and certainty of the vision was shared throughout the continent. As Mahmood Mamdani reminisces about the age of African nationalism, ‘We were against monarchy, against dictatorship, against neo-colonialism, against imperialism. And we were for socialism, sometimes for democracy, but always for socialism. Socialism had become a language in which we spoke to one another’ (Mamdani 2010). The people were mobilized around the vision of a more democratic and inclusive socio-economic dispensation where citizens had equal opportunities to prosper, irrespective of differences of race, ethnicity, gender and ancestry (Ake 2000: 46). Those involved in the anti-colonial struggle were easily accepted as ‘freedom fighters’, despite some of their wartime excesses as documented by Kriger for Zimbabwe’s Mtoko District. Democracy meant freedom. Democracy was a solution to minority rule and its denial of civil and political rights. Socialism meant equitable distribution of resources and inclusive development. It was a solution to economic and social problems of

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

61

inequality, poverty and underdevelopment. Liberation meant the rebirth of a nation in which those who have for centuries been reduced to ‘colonial subjects’ are politically reborn as ‘sovereign citizens’ (Mamdani 1996). While the anti-colonial nationalist struggle was basically a struggle for democracy and inclusive citizenship, Stephan Mair and Masipula Sithole explain how often there was lack of internal democracy during the liberation struggle and how colonial authoritarianism became entrenched in the nationalist struggle, reproducing itself within the nationalist movement through violent and intolerant cultures (Mair and Sithole 2003). Zimbabwean nationalism often emphasized monolithic unity at all costs, did not tolerate pluralism, celebrated ‘commandism’ and sought to subordinate all social movements to its imperatives. Even simple ‘disagreement could mean death’ (Ranger 2003: 2). How the immanent logic of colonialism impinged on anti-colonial nationalism, in the process reproducing not only authoritarian practices but also tribalism and racism is important to emphasize because it continued into the postcolonial practice of politics and governance.

The Postcolony of Zimbabwe With the attainment of political independence, the key issue about the national question became that of nation-building and state-making. Anti-­ colonial nationalism had to be transformed into a new framework for national patriotism (Kaunda 1975). Unity was desperately needed for the postcolonial nation and state to emerge, and black people had to be united if a new nation had to be born. Ethnicity had always worked against unity in the past. Zimbabwe, like other postcolonial societies, was constituted by a kaleidoscope of different ethnic and racial groups. Trying to impose national unity by force of arms resulted in the commission of atrocities in Matebeleland and the Midlands regions barely two years into independence (CCJP and LRF 1997). An unwritten policy of reconciliation was proclaimed in 1980 as part of allaying the fears of whites. Lack of unity also had implications for economic development. Between 1982 and 1987, efforts were expended on dealing with what was referred to as the ‘dissident’ problem, which in reality meant military conquest of Matebeleland and the Midlands regions where the opposition PF–ZAPU continued to enjoy political support. Only the signing of the Unity Accord on 22 December 1987 brought to an end the low intensity war that cost the lives of over 20,000 Ndebele-speaking civilians.

62 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

The post-1980 national question also entailed de-racialization and Africanization processes to create advancement opportunities for the previously marginalized African groups. More importantly, the new government had to begin to deliver services and development as part of its fulfilment of the liberation war promises. People expected a better economic and social life as well as a democratic environment different from that which they endured under the colonial regime. The national question could then be rendered from the people’s perspective as the ending of poverty and underdevelopment imposed on the African people by ninety  years of colonial rule; and the bridging of the gap between the poor, as the formerly colonized, and the rich, who were mainly the former colonizers, in terms of equitable wealth redistribution, increasing income and opening opportunities. This entailed deracialization of the patterns of ownership of productive property. The people also expected sustained economic growth and sustainable development as well as entrenching democracy and the ensuring of greater participation of the people in the system of governance. While there were indeed commendable efforts at delivery of services in the spheres of education and health, there was more of continuity in terms of politics of repression and authoritarianism. This is why Ibbo Mandaza characterized the Zimbabwean state of the 1980s as a ‘schizophrenic’ one (Mandaza 1986: 1–18). While trying to uplift the previously impoverished black people, the same state tended to repress them politically speaking. But the first decade of independence was the most progressive in terms of service delivery. The Willowgate Scar Scandal, however, indicated where the country was going. The ZANU–PF political elite that had presented itself as committed socialists concerned with welfare of the people, had started ‘chewing’ the Leadership Code. White colonial primitive accumulation was succeeded by black primitive accumulation. James Muzondidya has correctly described the postcolonial project reform process as follows: While at independence in 1980, the ZANU-PF government committed itself to establishing a more cohesive nation-state based on democracy, reconciliation, social justice and equality, and tried to transform and democratize the structure of governance in urban and rural areas through decentralization of powers and resources to local authorities, its post-­ colonial project of building a just, equitable and non-racial society was not achieved in the 1980s and the foundation for a truly democratic order was not laid. (Muzondidya 2011: 8)

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

63

What was laid was an authoritarian political system carrying over from the Rhodesian Front to ZANU–PF but hiding behind a facade of constitutional democracy (Ncube 1991). From the late 1980s onwards, Zimbabwe went on a downward spiral characterized by increased authoritarianism and corruption. By this time, what constituted the national question had become highly contested, as ZANU-PF as a government had revealed its true character of being violent, corrupt, unaccountable, arrogant and dictatorial. The introduction of executive presidency seems to have marked the beginning of Zimbabwe’s overt descent towards authoritarianism and open corruption. The Lancaster House Constitution began to undergo constant amendments. The Leadership Code was abandoned. A drive towards a one-party state was attempted forcefully. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was introduced despite opposition from workers, students and progressive intellectuals. Despite ZANU–PF’s attempts to use violence and other means to control and dominate society while proscribing democratic spaces, its ideas and ‘national visions’ were always contested, and the national question continued to be articulated around questions of democracy, freedom and inclusive development. As Muzondidya notes: Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the government struggled to impose itself and its political ideals on the nation. Its power continued to be challenged by a number of groups and individuals who felt excluded from both the national project of development and the structures of political and economic power. Such challenges ensured that there were always spaces in which the state’s unpopular policies could be questioned, and that democratic tendencies were able to coexist with authoritarianism, uneasily. (Muzondidya 2009: 200)

In direct response to ZANU PF’s attempts to continue centralizing power and entrench dictatorship through an unaccountable system of governance centred on the Executive Presidency, from the mid-1990s the national question was mainly articulated in terms of constitutionalism. The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and other civil society organizations, including the critical main labour union at the time, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), began to demand a new people-driven constitution to replace the Lancaster House Constitution that had undergone a catalogue of amendments. The principle of

64 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

separation of powers was heavily compromised by a powerful and interventionist executive arm of the government. It was, therefore, not surprising that the 1990s became dominated by a new articulation of the national question in terms of democratization and human rights discourses. The formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999 was a culmination of the crystallization of democracy and human rights demands that emerged in the 1990s and the realization that Zimbabwe needed a strong opposition with the potential of unseating ZANU–PF.  ZANU–PF had allowed the democracy and human rights aspect of the national question to fall off the national radar as it pushed more for regime security at whatever cost. Increasingly, democracy and human rights began to be castigated as alien ideas. The national question in postcolonial Zimbabwe also continued to be articulated around questions of economic justice. In the face of a crisis of livelihoods in the late 1980s and economic structural adjustment in the 1990s, Zimbabwe’s rural and urban communities increasingly began to (re)organize themselves into powerful social movements that demanded increased state protection from the growing hardships, better access to health, education, jobs and business opportunities, and called for increased public consultation in policy formulation (Murisa 1996: 16). From the late 1980s, students mobilized themselves into a powerful social force that led opposition to authoritarianism, one-party state, corruption and government neglect of workers and women’s rights. Pushed by the militant workers suffering from the effects of ESAP and increasingly resorting to strikes, from the mid-1990s, ZCTU increasingly transformed into a formidable labour movement that pushed for radical activism and a dual agenda against political authoritarianism and neo-liberalism (Matombo and Sachikonye 2010: 109–130; Bond and Saunders; Sutcliffe 2013). From the late 1980s, there also emerged a new type of women’s social activism that brought together women from diverse social and racial backgrounds and challenged the state for its limited commitment to ending women’s subordination and exploitation in society (Raftopolous and Alexander 2006: 40; Kanji and Jazdowska 1993: 11–26). The social activism of the 1990s, as some analysts have noted, reached fruition between 1996 and 1998, when the constellation of social movements drawing their constituents from labour, women, youth, students, intellectuals and the unemployed collectively grouped into a shared struggle under the National Constitutional Assembly (McCandless 2011; Matombo and Sachikonye).

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

65

During the same period, frustrated black business persons began to push both government and white capital to create more opportunities for their members through their own pressure groups, such as the Affirmative Action Group, the Indigenous Business Development Council and the Indigenous Business Women Organization (Muzondidya 2009: 191–192; Maphosa 1998: 176–98). The thousands of war veterans who had been demobilized at independence in 1980 also regrouped and mobilized their members under the weight of the economic and social burdens of the 1990s. This turned into one of the most powerful social movements in the 1990s and extracted serious concessions from government, including the 1997 financial payouts that resulted in the October 1997 currency crush. Frustrated with the government’s slow pace of land reform and confronted by diminishing access to land, demographic pressures, deteriorating productivity of available land and generalized decline in sources of income, the rural population, including both peasants and war veterans, from the late 1990s also increasingly applied underground social pressure, including land occupation, to force land redistribution onto the policy agenda (Moyo 2007). What is clear from this discussion is that throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the national question in Zimbabwe continued to revolve around the central issues of democracy, accountability, freedom and rights; political and economic justice, including redistributive justice; economic and political equality; and inclusive citizenship. In the 1990s, there was a constellation and national convergence of social forces around these issues mainly because civil society was able to articulate them as the national agenda in a coherent rather than disjointed manner. The intensified pressure mounted on the state by these social forces from the mid-1990s drove the government into panic mode, and forced it to make major concessions. The unbudgeted 1997 payout of compensation and pensions to war veterans, for instance, was a panic reaction by a government that could not withstand their pressure. The decision by government to embark on a constitution-making process in 1999, in a move designed to deflate social movement pressure by taking away the initiative from the NCA, was a major concession and climb-down, and an indication of the government’s acknowledgement of the collective power of the social forces represented by the NCA. Its hijacking and cooption of the peasant-war veteran land occupation movement from 2000 was similarly done in an attempt to deal with pressure from this powerful social movement that was articulating a common vision and national agenda.

66 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

Defining Post-2000 Zimbabwean National Issues The key issues of democracy, accountability, freedom and rights, political and economic justice, economic and political equality, and inclusive citizenship that have been contested and remained central to the debate about the national question in Zimbabwe throughout the country’s history have not been successfully resolved, and have continued to shape people’s struggles around the country. However, since 2000 some of these issues have become prominent while others have mutated and began to express themselves in slightly different issues; yet they are still part of the same unresolved challenges. For instance, from 2000 onwards the opposition MDC party and a significant number of citizens centred the national agenda debate around the issue of democracy and human rights—an issue that had also defined Zimbabwean citizens’ struggle during the anti-­ colonial struggles from the 1950s. They used these democracy and rights discourses to critique ZANU–PF’s nationalist discourse of liberation, which they criticized for being ‘top-down, centralized, always trapped in a time warp’. Just like the nationalist discourse before it, the MDC–civil society national agenda discourse castigated ZANU–PF governance for its lack of justice, equality and inclusivity, and for being based on patronage and cronyism. Another key issue on the national agenda in the post-2000 period was the regular deployment of violence by ZANU–PF to deal with political opponents, an issue that had also defined the national agenda during colonial rule when nationalists managed to mobilize not only citizens but also the international community against the Rhodesian government’s use of violence against blacks. Under pressure from opposition, ZANU–PF responded by mobilizing its structures of violence and even bragging of its violent history, in the process inviting regular military forces and militias to be partisan in defence of the regime (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 49–80). Post-2000 elections were marred by violence, and political violence reached its peak during the presidential election run-off of June 2008 (Masunungure 2009: 79–97). The question of political violence and repression increasingly came to occupy a central place in the national agenda debate because it was a question that had haunted postcolonial Zimbabwe since the time of Operation Gukurahundi in the 1980s. Raftopolous summarizes the core issues well when he writes that:

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

67

From the late 1990s Zimbabwe entered a period that has come to be known generally as the ‘Crisis in Zimbabwe.’ The crisis became manifest in multiple ways: confrontations over land and property rights; contestations over the history and meanings of nationalism and citizenship; the emergence of critical civil society organizations campaigning around trade union, human rights and constitutional questions; the restructuring of the state in more authoritarian forms; the broader pan-African and anti-imperialist meanings of the struggle in Zimbabwe; the cultural representations of the crisis in Zimbabwean literature; and the role of Robert Mugabe. (Raftopolous 2009: 201–202)

While the Global Political Agreement of 2008 and the Inclusive Government of February 2009 tried to address issues of violence on the national agenda, the issue of democratic reform continued to be a contested national agenda issue that was never successfully resolved (Raftopolous 2013a: xv). ZANU–PF continued to resist any changes that threatened its continued prolongation in power and the perquisites that power brought, while the opposition parties and a number of civil society organizations (CSOs) pinned their hopes of democratic reform on a new ‘people-driven constitution’ (Masunungure and Shumba 2012: xiv). The constitution-making process thus became another theatre of struggle for opposition parties and civics, on one hand, and ZANU–PF, on the other. The national question during this period, as Raftopolous correctly notes, continued to be entangled in ‘conflicting notions of change’ itself (Raftopolous 2013a: xv).

Post-July 2013 Contours of the National Question The fundamental question that has been asked about the post-31 July 2013 phase is whether the national question and national agenda need to be redefined. Did the contours, essence and meaning of the national question undergo a paradigm shift after 31 July 2013 to the extent that it warrants redefinition? To scholars such as Brian Raftopolous, ‘the events of 31 July 2013 represented not simply a return to certain continuities of ZANU(PF) rule, but also a reconstitution of the political terrain in Zimbabwe, particularly around the immediate future of opposition politics in the country, and the possible implication of the Zimbabwean experience for regional politics’ (Raftopolous 2013: 972). According to Raftopolous, the post-31 July 2013 period marked ‘the end of an era’:

68 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

It is fair to conclude that the politics of political and civic opposition that emerged in the late 1990s and continued through the first 13 years of the 2000s has come to an end in its current form. The political and economic conditions that gave rise to its emergence have changed substantially and the social forces that have emerged […] pose new challenges for party and civic organization and mobilization. (Raftopolous 2013: 986)

Raftopolous’ views are buttressed in the writings of Cornelius Ncube, who also argues about the limits of the democracy and human rights discourse as a citizen-mobilizing ideology. For him, the outcome of the 2013 elections marked the ‘end of an era for human rights discourse’: The strategy of the previous opposition to discredit the ZANU-PF regime’s legitimacy in nearly every post-2000 election carried weight because of the latter’s complicity in human rights abuses and violations. The peacefulness of the 2013 elections and the absence of gross human rights abuses by ZANU-PF not only during these elections but since the formation of the coalition government in 2009 seem to have diminished the effectiveness of the rights-based discourse as a tool to make morally and politically based demands of or claims against the state. (Ncube 2013: 100–101)

Ncube goes on to add that the efficacy of deploying ‘human rights discourse to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the ZANU-PF regime’ was curtailed by the 2013 developments, and civic groups had to rethink the articulation between rights and redistribution questions. At regional and international level, the limits of the democracy and human rights discourse as a mobilizing discourse were also exposed when both the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union not only endorsed the election outcome but also gained an opportunity to disengage from their decade-long engagement on the Zimbabwe national question after the adoption of a new constitution and the holding of the July 2013 elections. The SADC Election Observation Mission (2013) not only endorsed the election outcome but also declared that ‘a new chapter in the process of consolidation of democracy in the Republic of Zimbabwe [had] been opened’. The opposition parties’ and citizens’ post-2000 ‘dry’ democracy and human rights discourse also seemed to have lost its mobilizing currency within the international community, when most Western governments started to reengage the ZANU– PF government after the adoption of the 2013 constitution and the holding of relatively violence-free elections in the country.

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

69

From this analysis, it is clear that the post-2000 democracy and human discourse that failed to effectively integrate other critical issues of economic rights and justice, livelihoods and other socio-economic rights issues within the broader national agenda discourse had lost its appeal for Zimbabwean citizens by the turn of the first decade of the twenty-first century (Manheru 2013). The reconfiguration of Zimbabwe’s political economy in the 2000s, the deterioration of economic and social conditions, and increased hardships on the part of citizens led to a process of reconfiguration of citizen priorities, where issues of livelihoods and socio-­ economic rights came to occupy centre stage in the national agenda debate. As Morgan Tsvangirai clearly summed up the issue in his post-2013 election interview: […] In the early to late 1990’s a human rights agenda was at the forefront, no doubt about it, but in a continent … facing other crises, obviously the focus will change, depending on the crisis. And it puts the human rights agenda at the bottom of priorities. (Raftopolous 2013)

Since the July 2013 elections, there has been community apathy to politics and civic activism, which has been caused by political disillusionment over the outcome of the elections and the mounting social and economic hardships. Citizens disenchantment and apathy to politics worsened soon after the July 2013 elections even within a context of deepening economic challenges and social hardships. The broad sense is that citizens are not interested in secular politics because it does not deliver results. A growing number of people are turning to their community organizations, such as churches, burial societies and informal residents’ groupings whenever they need to deal with problems as a collective. All this calls for the civic movement to rethink its structures and forms of interventions within this new context, and there is a need for broad-­ based approaches that also place emphasis on economic governance issues, including corruption, social services delivery and the enjoyment of all human rights, that is civil political, social and economic (Raftopolous 2013). Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros’ Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America (2011) argues for a broad national vision that calls for restructuring ‘the apparatus of the state in the name of the oppressed’, as demanded and fought for by social forces in civil society (Moyo and Yeros 2011: 13). In their analysis, the national question is also broadened beyond the traditional political

70 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

economy articulation as an economic question. It is an open call for rethinking nationalism itself as the discursive terrain within which national agenda and vision has been crafted to make it reconnect social justice redistributive agendas with democratic and human rights as well as feminist and womanist agendas. The ongoing citizen protest movements being coordinated by social media activists (hashtag activists) and community leaders seem to have made this vital connection with changes in Zimbabwe’s political landscape and citizen priorities and concerns.

The Hashtag Civic Movements and the Countdown to the Fall of Mugabe A lot has been said about the causes and motivation for the ongoing citizen protest action. The explanations have ranged from spontaneous revolts to organic citizen protest action to external conspiracy theories. Those in government who have obviously been shaken by and worried about the protests have contemptuously sought to dismiss them in public by depicting them as products of machinations by the Zimbabwean government’s enemies, especially the United States and French governments, who have been accused by the government of funding the protests. Those outside government who have been critical about the transformative potential of the protests have depicted them as spontaneous actions ignited by government recklessness. In these critics’ view, like other protests before them, the current protests are bound to wilt as soon as the government manages to introduce cosmetic reforms and partially address some of the popular grievances that led to the initial protests, such as the government’s unilateral promulgation of Statutory Instrument 64, which banned the importing of a number of goods that are used in households and traded in the informal sector, such as coffee creamers, camphor creams, white petroleum jellies, body creams, baked beans and potato crisps, among many other items. Others who see some politically transformative potential in these protests have explained the July stay away or #zimshutdown and the series of demonstrations that immediately preceded it and those that came afterwards as spontaneous and rootless acts by a new generation of social movement activists mobilizing angry citizens to protest against unpopular government decisions and policies, such as the banning of the importation of essential household goods and increased corruption by the police.

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

71

Those who have tried to offer a more nuanced analysis of the ongoing citizen protests have projected them as more than spontaneous outbursts of popular anger. They have instead viewed them as an organic political process resulting from long-term evolving processes on the Zimbabwean political landscape in the post-July 2013 period of citizen disillusionment with both the state and organized politics. The various developments in this evolutionary political processes period, as Zimbabwean political analyst Simukai Tinhu has explained, include the lone protests of the likes of Itai Dzamara and his Occupy Africa Unity Square colleagues (Tinhu 2016). They also include the uncoordinated and sporadic strikes, demonstrations and acts of defiance by various groups and communities that have taken place. Since 2013, various communities and groups across Zimbabwe’s urban and rural communities have been engaged in nascent social movement-­ building processes through their activities exhibiting some levels of collective defiance of authority, reclamation of socio-economic rights and recreation of independent livelihoods in ways that challenge the power of the state and its domination of their lives. The youth and unemployed in the main urban centres of Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru and Mutare, for instance, have increasingly engaged in a collective drive for autonomy and recognition by trading in undesignated parts of the city, setting up their own business stalls, operating unregistered taxis that do not pay tax to the government and refusing to pay for unsatisfactory services, such as unreliable electricity and water. They have also consistently and collectively resisted government attempts to clamp down on their informal activities. Throughout 2014 and 2015, citizens in various parts of the country organized themselves to protect their socio-economic rights and livelihoods. Examples of such action included protests by the Matobo villagers of Maleme against the takeover of their community land by a senior government official and the Masvingo Vegetable Vendors’ protest against the municipal hiking of trading licence fees, which forced authorities to reverse unpopular decisions. University lecturers, students and general staff at the University of Zimbabwe also went on strike, resulting in the university’s temporary closure after violent clashes between students and riot police. Residents in the key towns of Harare, Bulawayo and Chitungwiza organized against pre-paid meters, while their counterparts in smaller towns such as Kwekwe joined calls for a rates boycott against poor service delivery. These community protest actions all indicate a renewed public interest in community activism and CSO community mobilization, which seemed

72 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

to have disappeared over the previous few years. Through their actions could be easily dismissed as ‘the rumblings of the street’, these groups were actually engaged in a kind of social protest politics—which are an important resource for social movement-building. The second phase, according to the political evolution school, took the form of social media activism, in which a group of tech-savvy youths started using the internet as a launch pad for attacks on Mugabe’s regime towards the end of 2015. The most prominent and successful of these social media activists was the youthful pastor Evan Mawarire, who, through his videos and hashtag #ThisFlag, and the use of Facebook and Twitter, generated popular support among citizens, reaching out to thousands of disenchanted Zimbabwean citizens locally and abroad. Ongoing street demonstrations, including rioting and demonstrations in Beitbridge, public rioting in Harare and the mass stay away (#zimshutdown) in urban areas during July, and the Movement for Democratic Change–Tsvangirai-­ led mass demonstrations in the streets during August constitute the third phase in this political continuum (Tinhu 2016). Following this logic, there was little spontaneity in the current wave of protests, because they were a result of natural progression in the country’s politics. In the words of Simukai Tinhu: In reality, importation ban through Statutory Instrument 64/2016 and the numerous police roadblocks were just triggers, not causes. In particular, #zimshutdown2016 was a paroxysm in what could be considered a third wave phenomenon in protest politics. In other words, the protests should be seen as part of the continuum of a new kind of politics that is increasingly taking centre-stage on the nation’s political landscape. (Tinhu 2016)

From the discussion here, it is clear that after years of bottling up their anger and trying to cope with their growing daily hardships, Zimbabwean citizens had been pushed to the edge by the prevailing hardships, and found the courage and motivation to take to the streets to express their discontent. The list of their grievances included unpaid public-sector wages, proliferating corruption, declining living standards and police injustice. For instance, the delays in payment of civil servants in June 2016 led to a widespread strike of teachers, health workers and other civil servants. The July riots in Beitbridge were also sparked by the government’s promulgation of Statutory Instrument 64, which banned the importation of a number of products that were lucratively traded in the informal sector.

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

73

The unilateral ban, coming at a time when 90% of the population was reportedly surviving on the critically important informal market, could not have caused worse outrage. As Ian Scoones rightly points out, the informal sector is the economy today: it cannot be ignored or wished away. It is what the 90% live on, and policies that upset and disrupt it are bound to be resisted (Scoones 2016). The protests in Harare were similarly started by taxi operators protesting against the abuse of road blocks by police, who aimed to extort money from taxi drivers.

Towards an Unclear Political Future The ruling party, opposition and organized civil society groups were all caught unprepared by the non-partisan citizen protests that erupted in July 2016. What surprised many people about these protests was not just their spontaneity and their sudden eruption after a period of general citizen apathy to political action in the post-July 2013 period and relative political quietness in the country, but also the high levels of popular support for the protests. Since the outbreak of these citizen protests, the Zimbabwean political landscape has been reconfigured profoundly, and there has been raging debate about the causes and motivation of the protests, their forms of collective mobilization and organization, their connections and linkages with mainstream civil society, the opportunities, challenges and risks created by these protests, and their potential for engineering political and social change in Zimbabwe. The citizen movements, especially hashtag movements, have successfully utilized social media to break the restrictions on political mobilization in the closed political space of Zimbabwe. The way in which social media activism has been used to mobilize and organize protests has opened a new frontier of activism and collective mobilization. The very fact that the hashtag movements have been able to translate online mobilization into street demonstrations reveals the power of social media in politics and the challenges faced by dictatorial regimes in controlling cyberspace. Through cyberspace, those Zimbabweans in the diaspora and inside Zimbabwe have been able to connect and strategize. The influential role that social media has played in a context where there has been a vast spread of internet use in Zimbabwe, primarily on smartphones, has created a huge potential for further mobilization of citizens for collective action (Magaisa 2016; Mlilo).

74 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

The ongoing civil protest movements have not only constituted a renewed threat to ZANU–PF’s hegemonic rule but also contributed to renewed citizen reassertiveness. Commenting on the protests during the earlier phase of July 2016, Brian Raftopolous (2016b: 6) argues that the current citizen protest movement is different to earlier forms of civic activism in that it did not appear to be driven by any specific party or civil society organization. The citizen protest movements have operated fluidly, mobilizing citizens through web-based hashtag movements, such as #ThisFlag and Occupy Africa Unity Square, and operated through no known or recognized public leaders, except for a few individuals who occasionally spoke on behalf of the movements. The success of the citizen protest movement has largely been based on the fact that it is rooted in disaffection with the status quo, rather than any particular party loyalty. To a large extent, the protests have been non-partisan and this has made them much more popular on the ground, gaining support from across the political divide, and making it more difficult for the state to contain or dismiss on a political basis. For instance, Evan Mawarire’s #ThisFlag movement managed to bring together Zimbabweans who held varying political views to speak out against bad governance and state injustices with one voice. Mawarire’s flag campaign was built around the national flag rather than any political party ideology. His profile also helped to appear to be an authentic voice against injustices and corruption at a time when a growing number of Zimbabweans have lost faith in politicians. The failure by political parties to deliver on public expectations has seriously undermined popular confidence in political parties, the state and its institutions. Many people across the country have lost confidence in political parties and have increasingly sought advancement of their collective interests through social movements, such as community clubs and churches. The fluid organizational networks and mobilization structures of the citizen movements and their utilization of social media, particularly the use of Facebook, Twitter, Viber, Snapchat, Instagram and WhatsApp to communicate real-time information, has helped the movements reach a wider social base. The citizen movements have had a mass appeal mainly because they speak to issues of real contemporary concern to Zimbabwean citizens: corruption, repression and a lack of economic opportunity, particularly among youth and urbanites. While the politics of despair and desperation has galvanized citizens into action, by focusing on topical and pertinent issues such as the crisis, corruption and neglect of social services, citizen

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

75

activists keep the torch alight. The emphasis of the citizen movements on poverty; injustice and corruption and the daily suffering of the people, including even those in the security sector, might end up winning them over onto the side of the people against a failing regime. What is provided by citizen movements is the return of people power. Notwithstanding the opportunities created and the success of the citizen movements, their potential for facilitating democratic transition has remained restricted by a number of challenges. These include over-­reliance on social media rather than community structures. As Blessing–Miles Tendi cautiously warns in his widely circulated think-piece written in July 2016, social media activism can never substitute for organized political activity on the ground (Tendi 2016). In his view, if the current citizen movements, especially social media activists, want to make a successful contribution to political change in Zimbabwe, they need to work in sync with traditional civil society groups who have structures and leaders in the communities that can be relied on to mobilize and organize citizens even when the state blocks social media spaces. While traditional civil society is currently crippled by a lack of funding, social media activists’ reliance on low-cost mobilization and organizational processes makes it possible to run sustainable programmes together. Another glaring gap in the new citizen movement is its limited social support base. The hashtag movement’s activist base is mainly made up of young middle-class urbanites in Zimbabwe and others in the diaspora. Hashtag activism has not reached older generations in the same manner that it has the young because these generations are not accustomed to engaging through multiple social media routes, in the same manner that the young are doing. Moreover, although a significant number of Zimbabweans are engaging in this way, a significant number of the poor and unemployed do not have unlimited access to internet and social media because of the high costs of these services, especially after the recent government directive to mobile services to suspend mobile data promotions. The main limit of the new citizen movements are their urban concentration. Most of the significant protests that have occurred since July 2016 have been in the main towns of Harare and Bulawayo, while others such as Gweru, Mutare, Masvingo and Kwekwe have experienced little action. Mass protest action has not reached the rural areas, where two-thirds of the population lives, except for isolated protests by villagers against expropriation of their land by private developers. Only 34% of Zimbabwe’s population is classified as urban by the World Bank. This is far less than

76 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

Tunisia where the Arab Spring started, where 68% is urban. Social media use is less widespread in the rural areas. As a result, Zimbabwe’s rural youth have played a marginal role in online activism, despite their numerical majority. It is therefore important for new citizen movements to forge strategic partnerships with traditional civil society in order to develop presence in communities. Traditional CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) have established structures in both urban and rural communities that are effective citizen mobilization. Another key challenge that has weakened ongoing protest movements is the absence of a broad and inclusive political strategy and a unifying ideology among the key leaders. As critics have noted, ongoing citizen activism in Zimbabwe has no well-crafted political agenda or common vision beyond wanting to see Mugabe out of power. Mawarire, for instance, has insisted that his activism is not aimed at regime change but at making the government accountable through redressing the numerous economic problems facing the country. Some activists, especially those under the banner of Tajamuka, are openly calling for Mugabe to go. While #ThisFlag movement is non-violent in its approach, the #Tajamuka/ Sesijikile movement is confrontational and the leaders mostly use marches and demonstrations to pressure government into acting on their demands. #Tajamuka/Sesijikile is also clear that it wants President Robert Mugabe to step down. The leading activists have no consensus about who would lead a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe and what that leadership’s agenda should be. More critically, the new citizen movement’s agenda has focused on urban grievances, such as industrial jobs and improved social delivery services. They have rarely included rural people’s grievances, and there is little connection between rural and urban struggles. Rural people also have grievances against the government, but they have different demands and priorities from their urban compatriots. The new civic activism in Zimbabwe has thus came to resemble what Partha Chatterjee (2004: 4) has described as ‘the closed association of modern elite groups, sequestered from the wider popular life of communities, walled up within enclaves of civic freedom and rational law’. It is therefore critical for the new citizen movements to work with traditional CSOs and CBOs to build a common civic agenda that infuses rural grievances into a broad national agenda. This could help to broaden the social base of the new movements and create a broad coalition that has greater political transformative powers.

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

77

The citizen movement is also primarily focused on socio-economic issues and policy issues such as import bans and bond notes rather than governance politics. As Chloe McGrath (2016) argues, this is a difficult space to inhabit. While this positioning strategically disables ZANU–PF and Mugabe from flagging the regime-change accusation, it limits the political potentiality that citizen movements will produce concrete change in a country where a change in the governance culture is needed in order to address socio-economic rights. Successful citizen movements in other parts of the world, such as Latin America, have sought to fight on all fronts rather than just one (Earl 2008). Strategic alliances are needed between traditional civil society organizations focusing on governance issues and citizen movements to ensure that the new agenda pushes both socio-­ economic rights and governance issues as a complete demand for basic citizenship rights. Without such an alliance and a strategy that seeks to fight the state on all fronts, it is easy for the state to isolate and divide the citizen movements by pretending to accommodate softer issues (socio-­ economic rights) while ignoring governance issues. The main challenge to a coordinated civil society struggle for democratic change, however, is that there is an apparent disconnect between the new citizen protest movements and traditional civil society. While the new movements being coordinated by hashtag activists and community leaders seem to have made the vital connections with Zimbabwe’s political landscape and citizen priorities and concerns, traditional civil society organizations have remained locked in the civil and political rights paradigm and struggled to capture the nation’s aspirations or develop effective strategies to connect civil society democratization agendas with ongoing community struggles around livelihoods. A number of traditional CSOs seem to have reached organizational stagnation owing to a lack of ideas, lack of funding since 2013 and limited connections with the new social bases, which include vendors, resettled peasant farmers, artisanal and small-scale miners, Zimbabwean diaspora labour migrants and the millions of unemployed youths and school dropouts who have come to numerically dominate the country’s urban landscape. They have also struggled to relate to the new generation of citizen movement leaders and their movements, which seem to be able to mobilize communities for action without structures and funding. Rather than welcoming these citizen protests and seeing them as an opportunity to scale up their community mobilization efforts, most CSOs have viewed

78 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

them and their leaders as competitors seeking to render traditional CSOs irrelevant in the ongoing struggles for democratization. Given all the challenges outlined here, there is a strong possibility that the current citizen movements will come and go, and civil society will not be able to seize on the current moment to translate citizen displeasure with a dictatorial and failing regime into concrete politics capable of delivering democratic change (Ncube 2016). One can even speak of CSOs failing to capitalize on the Gramscian interregnum, in which the new is slowly coming to the fore and the old is taking time to die. In this political vacuum, elements of the establishment, such as the military, might take advantage of the situation and entrench themselves in strategic positions of power (Youde 2016: 1; Pinto 2016; McGrath 2016: 1). The experiences from countries that underwent the Arab Spring, such as Egypt, where civic protests did not deliver democratic change but military rule, show that those men and women who wield the monopoly of violence often take advantage of power vacuums to deliver repetition without change. At the conceptual and theoretical level, the hashtag movements speak directly to the will to live as opposed to the will to power as a driver of politics. The Zimbabwean problem emanates from the fact that ‘the political’ is understood from a Machiavellian perspective of the will to power (Machiavelli 1992). The reduction of the political to the will to power constitutes the original corruption of the political as a totality involving the distortion of its noble vocation and essential function (Dussel 2008: 3). According to the leading decolonial theorist and philosopher of liberation Enrique Dussel, the original and noble vocation of politics was founded on the will to live, not the will to power (Dussel 2008). In this original conception, ‘Politics is above all that action that aspires towards the advancement of the life of the community, of the people, of humanity’ (Dussel 2008: 61). In the corruption of the political, the will to live is ‘negated by the Will-to-Power of the powerful’ (Dussel 2008: 78). But ‘Politics, as consensual and feasible Will-to-Live, should attempt through all means to allow all members to live, to live well, and to increase the quality of their lives’ (Dussel 2008: 85). When the political is corrupted, power is understood as a ‘thing, an object at hand, or a well-bound package’ that has to be conquered, taken and then retained by all means necessary (Dussel 2008: 131). The fundamental consequence of this is that it gives rise to incorrect conceptions of power as something readymade and available for conquest and retention.

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

79

Within this context of corrupted power, it is important to focus on changing people’s lives, their cultures (ways of doing things) and institutions rather than on taking over political power. When politics is reduced to a narrow and violent road, a movement that is preoccupied with taking control of already corrupted institutions and power structures will not benefit the political community or the citizens. It will simply result in what Frantz Fanon calls ‘repetition without change’, borne out of a skewed definition of the national question (Fanon 1968). In order to achieve the kind of transformation that gives citizens equal opportunities for inclusive development and prosperity, Zimbabwe needs to redefine, reconstitute and reconfigure the political from its framing around the will to power into a new direction that privileges the people’s will to live. As veteran nationalist and president of ZAPU Dumiso Dabengwa remarked, ‘the national question that has bothered each one of us is how to do we transform Zimbabwe from a pseudo-democracy to a real democratic nation-state’ (Dabengwa 2011: 4). In his words, ‘we need to change the system first and foremost, more than we just need to change the person’ (Dabengwa 2011). Without a radical change of the conception, constitution, and configuration of the political that has a profound effect on Zimbabwe’s political practices, we will remain with pseudo-­ democracy backed up by a facade of constitutionalism. The drive for a new inclusive constitution that gathered momentum towards the end of the 1990s and was further boosted during the course of the Inclusive Government was one indicator of the quest for changing the foundation of the political in Zimbabwe. Now that Zimbabwe has a new constitution, CSOs need to focus on breathing life into it by ensuring that its provisions are operationalized. There are also many other areas where civil society can actively play a role in pushing for the transformation of Zimbabwe to ensure that the national question is addressed. The focus areas include contributing towards social cohesion in a country that is emerging from high levels of polarization; putting pressure on government to stamp out corruption; agitating for implementation of the findings of the land audits; and focusing on the topical issues of employment and devolution of power. Focusing on these tangible issues will certainly give the struggle for democracy and human rights content and will free civil society organizations and their funding agencies from the regime change agenda. This democratic build-up did not culminate in a democratic transition. Rather, the gridlocked politics produced a military coup that materialized in November 2017.

80 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

Conclusions While the military coup of November 2017 was greeted with popular support by a people desperate for the end of Mugabeism, it did not lead to the refounding of national politics through rescuing the emancipatory aspects of liberation and decolonization. The military takeover’s notion of restoring legacy had nothing to do with this, but had everything to do with who captured the state. What the ordinary citizens expected at a minimum was the implementation of the new constitution by whoever was taking over from Robert Mugabe. Of course, because Zimbabwe is a former settler colony with its unfinished business of decolonization, it would make a lot of sense for any reform agenda to deliberately combine entrenchment of human rights and redistributive justice as part of a struggle for liberation and freedom. This has to be done concurrently with genuine and honest dealing with the past, allowing acknowledgement of wrongdoing to enable healing, reconciliation and the emergence of new humanity. Rewriting inclusive histories that privilege both ‘his’ and ‘her’ stories and all marginalized narratives as part of nation-building and the establishment of a new method of living together is urgent. For a country that has experienced massive movement of people to other countries, rethinking belonging and citizenship is imperative, including a redefinition of being Zimbabwean beyond the current diaspora, veteran and born-free groups. Like other postcolonial states, Zimbabwe has to rethink its ideological compass beyond Mugabeism—which largely became a vague and emotional railing against the West bereft of any democratic content.

References Ake, C. 2000. The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA Book Series. Billing, M. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage Publications. Sutcliffe, J. 2013. The Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1980–2012. http://www.eir.info/2013/03/07/the-labour-movement-in-zimbabwe-1980-2012/ Campbell, H. 2003. Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of Patriarchal Model of Liberation. Trenton: Africa World Press. Cabral, A. 1972. Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts. New  York: Monthly Review Press. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation. 1997. Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: Report on the Disturbances in Matebeleland and the Midlands, 1980–1989. Harare: CCJP and LRF.

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

81

Chatterjee, P. 2004. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. New York: Columbia University Press. Dabengwa, D. 2011. The National Question in Zimbabwe: How Far Towards Its Resolution. Paper presentation delivered at SAPES Trust, Harare, Zimbabwe, November 20. Davidson, B. 1979. Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral. New York: Monthly Review Press. Dumbutshena, E. 1975. Zimbabwe Tragedy. Nairobi: East African Publishing House. Dussel, E. 2008. Twenty Theses on Politics: Translated by George Ciccariello-Maher. Durham/London: Duke University Press. Fanon, F. 1968. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. Hammar, A., and B.  Raftopolous. 2003. Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation. In Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis, ed. A. Hammar, B. Raftopolous, and S. Jensen. Harare: Weaver Press. Kanji, N., and N. Jazdowska. 1993. Structural Adjustment and Implications for Low Income Urban Women in Zimbabwe. Review of African Political Economy 56: 11–26. Kaunda, K. 1975. The Future of Nationalism. In Readings in African Political Thought, ed. G.C.M. Mutiso and S.W. Rohio. London: Heinemann. Machiavelli, T.N. 1992. The Prince: Dover Thrift Editions. New  York: Dover Publications, INC. Mair, S., and M. Sithole. 2003. Zimbabwe: Blocked Democracies: A Case Study of Zimbabwe. Harare: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. McGrath, C. 2016. What Everyone’s Getting Wrong About Zimbabwe’s ThisFlag Movement. Available in: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/21/whateveryones-getting-wrong-about-zimbawes.... Accessed 1 Sept 2018. Mamdani, M. 2010. Remarks on Receipt of Honorary Doctorate at Addis Ababa University. Unpublished Speech, University of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 24. ———. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late of Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mandaza, I. 1986. Introduction: Political Economy of Transition. In Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980–1986, ed. I.  Mandaza. Dakar: CODESRIA. Manheru, N. 2013. Zim: Keeping the Eye on the Ball. The Herald, August 30. http://www.herald.co.zw/zim-keeping-the-eye-on-the-ball/. Accessed 5 Oct 2018. Maphosa, F. 1998. Towards a Sociology of Zimbabwean Indigenous Entrepreneurship. Zambezia 25: 2. Masunungure, E.V., and J.M. Shumba, eds. 2012. Zimbabwe: Mired in Transition. Harare: Weaver Press.

82 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

Masunungure, E.V. 2009. A Militarized Election: The 27 June Presidential Run-­ Off. In Defying the Winds of Change, ed. E.V.  Masunungure. Harare: Weaver Press. Matombo, I., and L.  Sachikonye. 2010. The Labour Movement and Democratization in Zimbabwe. In Trade Unions and Party Politics: Labour Movements in Africa, ed. B. Beckman, S. Buhlungu, and L. Sachikonye. Cape Town: HSRC Press. McCandless, E. 2011 Transforming and Preventing Polarization by Embracing Strategy Dilemmas: An Outsider View on Lessons from Zimbabwe. April, 20. Solidarity Peace Trust. http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1042/ transforming-and-preventing-polarization/ Mlambo, E. 1972. The Struggle for a Birthright. London: C. Hurst. Moyo, S., and P. Yeros. 2011. Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America. London/New York: Pluto Press. Moyo, S. 2007. History and Role of Social Movements. Paper presented at a WB/ SADC/SARPN Regional Course on Land Redistribution Workshop, July 12. Msindo, E. 2007. Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, 1950 to 1963. Journal of African History 48: 273–296. Muzondidya, J. 2011. Zimbabwe’s Failed Transition? An Analysis of the Challenges and Complexities in Zimbabwe’s Transition to Democracy in Post-2000 Period. In Zimbabwe in Transition: A View from Within, ed. T.  Murithi and A. Mawadza. Johannesburg: Jacana Media. ———. 2009. From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980–1997. In Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Times to 2008, ed. B. Raftopolous and S. Mlambo. Harare/Johannesburg: Weaver Press & Jacana Media. Ncube, C. 2013. The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: End of an Era for Human Rights Discourse? Africa Spectrum 48 (3): 100–101. Ncube, W. 1991. Constitutionalism, Democracy and Political Practice in Zimbabwe. In The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate, ed. I. Mandaza and L. Sachikonye. Harare: SAPES Books. ———. 2016. After Plan (D)emo, What Is Plan (E)vent? Available in Newzimbabwe.com. http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news/printVersion. aspx?newsID=30699. Accessed 1 Sept 2018. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2009. Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State. Oxford/Bern: Peter Lang. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J., and James Muzondidya, eds. 2011. Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism? Rethinking Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe. Oxford: Peter Lang. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2006. Nationalist-Military Alliance and the Fate of Democracy in Zimbabwe. African Journal on Conflict Resolution 6 (1): 49–80.

3  THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONAL QUESTION: KEY COMPONENTS… 

83

Pinto, T. N. 2016. After Mugabe’s Gone: Three Paths for Zimbabwe. Available in Newzimbabwe.com. http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news/printVersion. aspx?newsID=29654. Accessed 1 Sept 2018. Prah, K.K. 2006. The African Nation: The State of the Nation. Cape Town: The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society. Raftopolous, B. 1995. Zimbabwe: Race and Nationalism in a Postcolonial State. Harare: SAPES Trust. Raftopolous, B. 2016a. This Time the Uprising in Zimbabwe Is Different – But Will It Bring Regime Change?, July 13. https://theconversation.com/ this-time-the-uprising-in-zimbabwe-is-different-but-will-it-bring-regimechange-62447 ———. 2016b. The Persistent Crisis of the Zimbabwean State. Available: http:// www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1738/the-persistent-crisis-of-the-Zimbabweanstate/2016/09/01. Accessed 1 Sept 2018. ———. 2013a. An Overview of the GPA: National Conflict, Regional Agony and International Dilemma. In The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement, ed. B. Raftopolous. Harare: Weaver Press. ———. 2013b. The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era. Journal of Southern African Studies 39 (4): 971–988. ———. 2013c. Zimbabwean Politics in the Post-2013 Elections Period: The Constraints of ‘‘Victory.” http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1703/ Zimbabwean-politics-in-the-post-2013electi…. Accessed 5 Oct 2018. ———., ed. 2013d. The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement. Harare: Weaver Press. ———. 2009. The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998–2008. In Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, ed. B. Raftopolous and A. Mlambo. Harare/Johannesburg: Weaver Press & Jacana Media. Raftopolous, B., and K. Alexander, eds. 2006. Reflections on Democratic Politics in Zimbabwe. Cape Town: IJR. Ranger, T.O. 1970. The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898–1930. London: Heinemann. ———. 1997. Leaving Africa: Making and Writing History in Zimbabwe. Unpublished Valedictory Lecture, Monomotapa Crowne Plaza, Harare, Zimbabwe, June 19. Ranger, T. 2003. Introduction to Volume Two. In The Historical Dimensions of Democracy and Human Rights in Zimbabwe: Volume II: Nationalism, Democracy and Human Rights, ed. T. Ranger. Harare: Weaver Press. Scoones, I. 2016. Riots in Zimbabwe: Don’t Mess with the Informal Sector. Zimbabweland, July 11. https://zimbabweland.wordpress. com/2016/07/11/riots-in-zimbabwe-dont-mess-with-the-informal-sector/ Shamuyarira, N. 1965. Crisis in Rhodesia. London: Andre Deutsch. Sithole, N. 1959. African Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

84 

S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI

Southern Rhodesia African National Congress. 1979. Statement of Principles, Policy and Programme, Salisbury 1957. In Zimbabwe Independence Movement: Select Documents, ed. C. Nyangoni and G. Nyandoro. London: Rex Collings. Tendi, B.-M. 2016. Why a Hashtag Isn’t Enough for a Revolution in Zimbabwe. Available: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/15/why-a-hastag-isntenough-for-a-revolutionin-z.... Accessed 1 Sept 2018. Tinhu, S. 2016. 2016—Year of Failed Uprisings? The Zimbabwe Independent, July 22. White, L. 2015. Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press. Youde, J. 2016. New Protests: Where Is Zimbabwe Headed? Available in Newzimbabwe.com: http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news/printVersion. aspx?newsID=30293. Accessed 1 Sept 2018. ZANU. 1963. ‘Zimbabwe African National Union: Policy Statement, Salisbury, 21 August 1963.’ In W. Nyangoni and G. Nyandoro (eds.). Zimbabwe’s Liberation Movements: Documents. London: C. Hurst, pp. 60-65. Zeleza, P.T. 2003. Rethinking Africa’s Globalization: Volume 1: The Intellectual Challenges. Trenton: Africa World Press. Zimbabwe African National Union. 1979. Policy Statement, Salisbury, 21 August 1963. In Zimbabwe Independence Movements, ed. C.  Nyangoni and G. Nyandoro. London: Rex Collings.

CHAPTER 4

Opposition Politics and the Culture of Polarisation in Zimbabwe, 1980–2018 Zenzo Moyo

Introduction The importance of opposition politics in consolidating democracy in post-­ colonial African states has often been erroneously reduced to political parties. The outcome of this mischaracterisation has been the development of a “politics of opposition”, where every policy proposal, developed either by the ruling party or by the opposition, is opposed not for what it is, but for where it comes from. The agenda of opposition politics becomes less about democratic governance and opening up closed political systems, and more about contesting for state power at all costs. Opposition parties, broadly defined as organised political associations of people working together to compete for political office by offering alternative hegemonies to that of the ruling party, should be appreciated for providing an organised platform where “hard politics” can be practised. However, it should also be appreciated that these parties do not offer the entirety of opposition politics.

Z. Moyo (*) Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA), Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_4

85

86 

Z. MOYO

The experiences and influence of African opposition political parties cannot be properly understood without paying attention to the role and impact of other sources of political opposition (Olukoshi 1998). Many other stakeholders, such as civil society, universities (students and academics), research institutes, media and even dissidents within the ruling elite contribute to oppositionist politics, and this fact needs to be acknowledged. As will be shown in this chapter, civil society and opposition parties’ operational spaces often intersect in developing countries to create political cultures that have come to define societywide  political engagements. This is eloquently elucidated by Dolo (2006), who says: Both NGOs and opposition parties engage a populace that has often been excluded from the social and political mainstream seeking to assert their interests or even provide services to them that the government is either incapable of and/or unwilling to provide. Their mutual emphases on erecting structures that foster public deliberation, problem solving, and participatory governance make these social and political actors allies in the prosecution of democracy.

The practice of democracy, presently hegemonic and often invoked as an unproblematic exercise, is what undergirds the practice of opposition politics. Many political theorists and writers (e.g. Shils 1968; Olukoshi 1998; Nkiwane 1998; LeBas 2006) have strongly argued that the exercise of opposition politics serves to deepen and strengthen democracy. The existence of opposition politics in and of itself creates an expectation among citizens that whatever grievances they may have will be better articulated by those in the opposition. Teshome (2009), writing specifically about opposition parties in Africa, argues that a true democracy is where the ruling elite has an effective opposition, since opposition provides vital competition on policy and ideological alternatives. Indeed, if democracy is about opening closed political systems, then the practice of opposition politics becomes the avenue by which participation, inclusivity and accountability can be realised. Together with other aspects of civil society (e.g. intelligentsia, media, non-governmental organisations), opposition parties are responsible for creating and developing public opinion, which in turn feeds into the political culture of any society. In developing states, especially those whose organic development was disrupted both by colonialism and anti-colonialism struggles, the exercise of opposition politics faces the extra burden of justifying its connection with

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

87

the often exclusive politics of liberation. Thus, this chapter seeks not only to delineate political cultures that have fashioned the repertoire of opposition politics in Zimbabwe, but also to show how these cultures—polarisation and the construction of a party-state—have combined and broadened, in the process perpetuating and sustaining themselves.

Development of a Political Culture: Tending Towards Polarisation Zimbabwe is one of the many African countries that are still led by nationalist parties.1 In most such countries, the environment where opposition politics is practised has been deliberately configured to make it difficult for political opposition to thrive. In order to maintain or bypass this obstacle, several cultures have been developed by political protagonists. The most encompassing and far-reaching of these in post-independence Zimbabwe is that of polarisation. As this chapter discusses, many political alliances that were formed; results of elections since 1980; and the general practice of opposition politics attest to the predominance of this culture. This is not to say that polarisation and its vagaries emerged post-independence, for it can be traced back to the epoch of colonialism. It only means that post-independence political players have deemed it fit to maintain the existence of polarised politics and expand its utility for their own sustenance. Simply put, polarisation has been deployed as a mobilisation strategy by the political elite, who, in doing so, have managed to ring-fence the particularities of their politics to portray them as significantly different from that practised by adversaries. But what do we mean by political polarisation? Polarisation can be understood to mean the “widening of political and social space between claimants in a contentious episode and the gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors towards one, the other or both extremes” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 322). In addition, as LeBas (2006) observes, where polarisation occurs as a social phenomenon, processes of inclusion and exclusion are emphasised through the intensification of the boundary between them, which makes it possible to identify actors in terms of us versus them. Within this binary setup, other cleavages that define a society recede in importance, while the division on which polarisation is based expands to organise almost all social 1  African countries still led by liberation movements include Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola.

88 

Z. MOYO

interactions. Many political issues in society are constructed and defined in binary terms of whether you are with us or with them. Those who fail to find their way into the binary tension do not survive for long. In essence, polarisation is crystallised when societal groups build alliances with other groups that espouse similar ideas, in the process consciously creating boundaries to ensure the exclusion of those whose ideas are interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as contrary to their own. “Political polarisation therefore collapses complex interactions between political actors into a simple battle between two groups, whereupon an uncritical consensus develops within either of the groups” (Moyo 2018: 86). This uncritical consensus in turn develops more polarising ideas, hastening a culture that frames a society in binary terms. LeBas (2011) observes that polarising ideas are chosen because they serve instrumental functions for elites in these groups. This is more so for opposition groups, who may find it useful to define exclusively what sets them apart from those in power. Even though this may be harmful in the long run, in the short term it is useful because it maintains discipline and internal cohesion. McCandless (2012) elucidates on this strategic use of polarisation by some social movements in Zimbabwe, who faced dilemmas of whether to prioritise political or economic rights, and whether to work with the government or donors in order to broaden their prospects for transformation. These dilemmas became the bedrock of polarisation. And as it turned out, instead of leading to transformative change, the strategy expanded the phenomenon of polarisation in terms of time, strength and structure. McAdam et  al. (2001: 322) emphasise that political polarisation “hollows-­out” the moderate centre, silences neutrals and impedes the reconstitution of previous coalitions, sometimes violently. Two distinct and dominant groups become discernible. Because political polarisation is issue-based, these groups do not necessarily have to be of equal influence. Thus, it does not matter even if one is disproportionately larger than the other in terms of size, since the major determinant is not numerical, but how entrenched their positions and counter-positions are. As this chapter states, the phenomenon of polarisation has been deliberately institutionalised in Zimbabwe as a political strategy by the ruling classes as well as those in opposition groups. Polarisation by and of itself creates cleavages, and in turn these divisions buttress polarisation (Moyo 2018). Minor differences in a polarised environment almost always balloon beyond proportion, and it becomes difficult to control their domino effect since even minor differences between

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

89

protagonists are made to fit into an existing polarisation dialectic. Thence, where polarisation has been institutionalised, opposition politics turns into politics of opposition. This means that even the best ideas proposed by a political adversary, whether in the ruling class or opposition elite, are rejected not because of their value proposition, but because they are interpreted within the polarisation dialectic. Protagonists in a polarised relationship often elaborate themselves in terms of personnel, and as they do so, internal uncritical consensus on ideas develops. The alliances that were formed in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2018 have more often than not defaulted to the polarisation dialectic. Having said this, it is important to emphasise that polarisation as a political strategy does not completely close off the existence of other political assemblages that are not defined by the polarisation dialectic. Moyo (2018) illustrates this subtle position. The existence of two distinct adversaries, Group A and Group B, does not necessarily preclude the formation of other protagonists that we can call Group C+. The polarisation phenomenon simply means that the role that C+ plays will dissipate because A and B will appropriate most of the political space available in the polity. The result, over time, will be that C+ will either disappear into oblivion, continue to subsist a miserable life or gravitate towards either A or B, unless it becomes popular enough to take over the position held by either A or B. The culture of political polarisation in Zimbabwe has gone through several distinct phases, three of which are worth noting. Between 1980 and 1987, the polarisation tension was defined more by ethnicity, regionalism, centricism and the desire by the Zimbabwe African National Union– Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) to subordinate or control all political formations and civil society (Raftopoulos 2004). For the decade between 1988 and 1999, the dialectic was mainly between the ruling party and some strong aspects of civil society, which included labour, students and the human rights movement. These organisations stepped into the arena of opposition politics at a time when opposition parties were at their weakest, while the ruling nationalist party’s unbridled dominance was on the rise (Mlambo 2014). After 2000, the tension was between the ruling party, together with a small section of civil society on one side, and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and a broader group of civil society organisations on the other. In all these three phases, which will be further discussed, the opposition had to contend with a complex

90 

Z. MOYO

party-state system, another culture that the ruling party had instituted since independence. Its reach and effects are explained in the next section.

The Creation of a Party-State: Landscape for Opposition Politics In interrogating the exercise of opposition politics in any given country, one must examine the nature, composition and the role of the state in shaping the landscape in which politics has to be exercised. The role of the state is mainly defined by its ideological orientation, which is to say whether it gravitates towards Marxist or liberal ideas. The most salient difference between Marxists and liberals in their interpretation of the state is in relation to their interpretation of its role in adjudicating universal societal interests. Marxists’ views are based on a belief that, even though it may not be absolute, the state works mainly for the interests of the ruling or capitalist class by virtue of the ruling class’ control of state institutions (Moyo 2018). Femia (1987: 28), interprets a Gramscian conceptualisation of the state by characterising it as a “complex of political and theoretical activit[ies] by which the ruling classes not only justify and maintain their domination, but also succeed in obtaining the active consent of the governed”, in the process accounting for its hegemony. Thus, for Marxists, the structure of the state and its various institutions are instruments that ruling classes use to accomplish their ends, albeit in some instances managing to harness the active participation of the dominated. The hegemony of the ruling elite, therefore, is constructed through a careful balancing of coercion and consent, with the ultimate objective being to accumulate and consolidate power (Moore 2008; 2014). In contrast, liberals (e.g. Locke, Weber and de Tocqueville) hold the view that a state is a neutral entity made up of a set of independent and autonomous institutions such as the executive, judiciary and the legislature. Its neutral character, according to liberal thinkers, should help the state to adjudicate fairly all competing interests that define society. Chipkin (2012: 4–5) asserts that, in liberal terms, the state should “provide a neutral framework with which different conceptions of good life can be pursued”. Chipkin further alleges that the fulcrum of a liberal state is a bureaucracy that can be organised autonomously from the egocentric interests of any social class or group of individuals, therefore making it a

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

91

reliable instrument to guarantee the autonomy of institutions such as parliament, the executive and the judiciary. How do these two almost contradictory conceptions of the state interpellate the practice of opposition politics in developing countries such as Zimbabwe? After attaining independence, many developing countries, including Zimbabwe, adopted a hybrid role for the state, where dominant liberal practices interwoven with some aspects of Marxism guided the new ruling elite. However, once these nationalist parties tasted the power of authority, they abandoned the Weberian notions of state in order to gain unfettered access to state structures, which led to the blurring of lines between party and state. This resulted in the parameters of the ruling party penetrating those of the state, leading to what some theorists (e.g. Zolberg 1966; Widner 1992; Moore 2003; Southall 2016; Shumba 2018) have characterised as a party-state. In analysing the emergence of the party-state phenomenon in West Africa, Zolberg (1966: 124) defines it as a “party-­ dominant” as opposed to a “government-dominant” system of governance. Many state structures, including parliament, the executive and the judiciary become extensions of the ruling party. In a party-state, even though there may be occasional attempts by the bureaucracy to portray a separation between state and party, it is always difficult to succeed “because in the eyes of the population it is impossible to be loyal to two modern chiefs”, since most senior bureaucrats are always senior members of the ruling party (Zolberg 1966: 126). To this end, as Moyo (2018) argues, the public service gets overwhelmed by the political, as state institutions such as the police, the courts, public media and the army become partisan, and those who attempt to resist this co-optation are pushed out of the system. The description of a party-state as outlined here is linked to a relatively new political framing known as Mugabeism. In his book Mugabeism? History, Politics and Power in Zimbabwe, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) describes Mugabeism as a degenerated nationalism where a single individual and his political party try to symbolise a nation, albeit with no coherent ideological content. In the context of Zimbabwe, Mugabeism involves processes that consistently worked to delegitimise all other political actors that threatened Mugabe’s power, and was practised mostly as the politics of survival and opportunism during a crisis (Moyo 2018). This is what this chapter refers to as a party-state culture, which contextualises the environment in which opposition politics have been practised since 1980. The nationalist government that came into power at independence

92 

Z. MOYO

sought to create a party-state from the onset. Senior party members were deployed to lead and staff all state institutions that mattered. This meant not only that institutions were to be attuned to serve the narrow interests of the ruling party, but also that any opposition party in existence at the time, or still to be formed, would find it very difficult to operate, since the political landscape was to be deliberately and progressively configured to respond mainly to the interests of those in power. For example, the longest serving Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe (Godfrey Chidyausiku) was a former ruling party deputy minister. The longest serving Police Commissioner (Augustine Chihuri) and all army and air force commanders since independence were members of the ruling party. The neutrality of the state in the execution of its duties is not possible if all decision-makers within the bureaucracy are linked to one political party. This portended a skewed engagement between those in power and those in opposition politics, as will be outlined next.

Political Players and Relations Post-Independence (1980–1990) Upon winning elections in 1980, ZANU–PF purported to form an inclusive government by including members of the Patriotic Front–Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF–ZAPU) in the new cabinet. In ZANU–PF’s terms, all of its political adversaries were to become its allies simply because the ruling party had undertaken a hegemonic construction project that was designed to consolidate its newly found power. The language of reconciliation dominated every sector of the post-colony state, and this was reflected in Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s 1981 New Year’s Eve speech, in which he declared to the nation that “our new nation now demanded of us either as individuals, or communities, a single loyalty that is a proper and logical manifestation of our national unity and spirit of reconciliation” (Moyo 1993: 7). PF–ZAPU, the largest opposition in the country at the time, and some major aspects of civil society responded positively to this call and submitted themselves wholly to the new ruling elite. PF–ZAPU became part of the “inclusive government” and some of its senior members, including its president, Joshua Nkomo, were appointed into cabinet. There were other smaller opposition political parties that were not invited into the inclusive government. These included the Abel Muzorewa-­ led United African National Council (UANC), which had won only three

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

93

parliamentary seats in the 1980 elections and none in subsequent elections. There was also ZANU–Ndonga (led by the nationalist Ndabaningi Sithole), which did not win any seats in the 1980 or 1985 elections, but was to win one seat in its tribal stronghold of Chipinge in 1990, two in 1995 and one in the 2000 elections. It is likely that these two opposition parties and other smaller ones were not invited into the new government by Mugabe because their support base was insignificant enough to be of no trouble in the hegemony building project that ZANU–PF was about to start. Furthermore, in the eyes of ZANU–PF, the UANC and ZANU-­ Ndonga had discredited themselves by participating in a compromised internal arrangement with the Rhodesians in 1979, which was subsequently overruled by the Lancaster House negotiations later that year. However, and as observed by Raftopoulos (2004), before long it became clear that ZANU–PF’s policy of reconciliation and its attendant hegemony building project were to be based on the subordination and control of opposition parties and civil society. The success of this project was to depend not on the ruling party’s ability to fulfil the objectives of the liberation struggle, but on the co-optation, and then confrontation, of those who had the potential to resist the ruling party’s hegemony. As early as 1982, contradictions began to emerge between ZANU–PF and PF– ZAPU.  A “discovery” of military arms was made at PF–ZAPU-owned properties in February 1982, which led to the immediate arrest of senior PF–ZAPU leaders, and the party’s members in cabinet were expelled. In retaliation to this ill treatment of their revered leaders, some ex- Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZAPU’s military wing) combatants, who had been commissioned into the post-independence armed forces, deserted, some of them retaining their weapons. They went back into the bush, albeit as an unstructured and unorganised army. This provided an excuse for the party-state to deploy a specially trained-for-purpose army unit, tagged the Fifth Brigade, which was deployed exclusively in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions of the country—where PF–ZAPU had significant influence and support. This military operation was christened gukurahundi, a derogatory Shona adjective for the “first spring rains that clean-up the veld-chaff after a long dry spell” (Todd 2007: 356). If anything, the objective of the operation was in its name, to clean up what the ruling elite interpreted as dirt in PF–ZAPU strongholds. This army unit, trained by North Koreans, operated outside normal army structures and its commander, Perence

94 

Z. MOYO

Shiri,2 reported directly to Mugabe. In concert with other historians, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002) interprets gukurahundi as a legacy of historical antagonisms between the Shona and Ndebele, as well as antagonisms between ZAPU and ZANU politicians that dated back to the 1963 split, and the legacy of mistrust between liberation armies of these political parties.3 Coltart (2016) argues that gukurahundi had political rather than military objectives. Mugabe and his party had desired a one party-state system even before he assumed power. He therefore targeted ZAPU and its supporters because they stood in the way of fulfilling this objective. Serious human rights abuses, including the massacre of over 20,000 civilian members of the Ndebele ethnic group, were committed by this heavily armed military brigade, which was unleashed for more than four years to chase fewer than 400 dissidents (CCJP 2007; Alexander et  al. 2000; Coltart 2016). For all intents and purposes, gukurahundi portended political polarisation between those in power and those who offered the best challenge to that power. In December 1987, gukurahundi came to an end after PF–ZAPU capitulated, ostensibly to achieve an end to the senseless killing of innocent civilians in its name. A Unity Accord was signed by both ZANU–PF and PF–ZAPU from which emerged a purportedly “new party” that has come to be known as ZANU–PF, a name no different from that of the victor. As expected, the signing of the agreement ended the military campaign against PF–ZAPU and the people of the Midlands and Matabeleland (Raftopoulos 2004; Kriger 2006). It also ended the history of opposition between these two nationalist parties, not least the Ndebele and Shona divide as well as regional exclusivity. The result of PF–ZAPU’s capitulation and the subsequent signing of the Unity Accord led to the emasculation of the only opposition party of note in the country, and it became clear that the unity agreement was meant to control and subordinate opposition politics. This is true because thereafter, and not for lack of trying, it took the country over a decade to fashion an opposition party that was capable of seriously challenging the nationalist party. 2  Perence Shiri was promoted to Air Force of Zimbabwe Commander in 1992, and in 2017 participated in the military coup that deposed Mugabe; he was rewarded with a ministerial position in 2018. For more about the military coup, see Chap. 8 in this volume. 3  For more on gukurahundi, see CCJP and LRF (1997), the first comprehensive report to be produced after the disturbances; also see CCJP (2007); Alexander, McGregor and Ranger (2000); Eppel (2004); Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002; 2012); Cameron (2018); Doran (2017).

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

95

Talk about institutionalising a one-party-state, which had been long proposed within ruling party circles, gained momentum after the signing of the Unity Accord (Moyo 2018). Some of the ruling party’s senior members, including its legal affairs secretary at the time, Edson Zvobgo, even suggested that it was possible to sneak in such a system without altering the constitution simply through winning all seats in the next elections, which were due in 1990 (Doran 2017).4 In fact, the dissolution of PF– ZAPU between 1987 and 1989 robbed the country of the only organised opposition party that could challenge the ruling party’s hegemony, and in parliament all but one seat belonged to the “new” ruling party (Sachikonye 1991; Moyo 1993; Muzondidya 2009). Even though it consolidated the ruling party’s hegemony, the signing of the Unity Accord in itself failed to end political polarisation in the country. Moyo (1991) posits that the signing of the Accord in 1987 gave leaders a false expectation that unity, for them more important than democracy, would be achieved. Overt in this flawed logic was a threat of violence to any political formation that sought to wrestle power away from the nationalist party, as would be attested not only by the violence meted out on human rights and civil society activists and MDC members a decade later, but also the blatant threat from commanders of the armed forces, who openly declared that the office of the president in Zimbabwe was a straitjacket reserved for those who participated in the liberation struggle, and that they would never salute (read allow) any president who did not have liberation struggle credentials (Nehanda Radio 2009; The Zimbabwean 2011; Gagare 2017). This self-allocated power by the military commanders made them into king-makers, as will be shown. Since the signing of the Accord, the politics of the nationalist parties has come to be used to produce insiders and outsiders in Zimbabwean politics (Kriger 2006; Dorman 2006), in itself a perpetuation of the polarisation dialectic. Thus, towards the close of the first decade when civil society in the form of labour and students’ movements took up the oppositional role to challenge the ruling class on several grounds, which included corruption, the de facto one-­ party state,5 and the liberal trajectory the state had increasingly adopted, 4  Legally, owing to the constitutionally enshrined ten-year embargo on altering the constitution, it would have been difficult to implement the one-party system before the expiry of the ten years. Thus, ensuring that the ruling party won all seats outright would have been the shortest route to achieve the goal. 5  For more on the one-party-state system that was almost instituted in Zimbabwe, see Mandaza and Sachikonye (1991).

96 

Z. MOYO

this exclusionary and polarising liberationist language re-emerged. It was to be expanded further around 1999 when the MDC, a very formidable opposition party, was formed, which will be discussed later in the chapter.

Civil Society and Opposition Politics In relative terms, the labour movement and the student movement were the most developed aspects of civil society during the first decade of independence. They both grew and consolidated with massive assistance from the party-state. However, their relationship with the ruling class has been a chequered one, which portends for an interesting examination. Owing to space limitations, this chapter will confine its interrogation of civil society to just two—the labour movement and the students’ movement. The Workers’ Movement The labour movement submitted itself to the new dispensation in 1981 when fifty-two labour unions belonging to disparate federations were brought together by ZANU–PF to form one federation, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).6 Two members of ZANU–PF, Alfred Makwarimba and Albert Mugabe,7 were elected president and secretary-­ general, respectively. The ruling party had already started to consolidate its project of party-state building, and by deploying ZANU–PF cadres to lead the federation meant ZCTU had to develop a close relationship with the emerging party-state. This helped to keep labour, a potential source of opposition politics, on a tight leash. The influence that these party deployees soon exacted within the labour movement can be exemplified by the following message to workers in 1981 given by Albert Mugabe: Strikes do more harm than good. We do not need to retard economic progress by arranging strikes… There are some bad eggs in the union movement… There are some people in the movement who go out looking for difficulties and try to be difficult. We will watch them closely and discourage striking as much as we can. (Saunders 2001: 139) 6  The fifty-two unions were organised under six different federations, with the National African Federation of Unions (NAFU) and the African Trade Union Congress (ATUC) being the most dominant. NAFU was linked to ZAPU while ATUC was closer to ZANU (Sachikonye 1995: 132). 7  Albert Mugabe was a brother of President Robert Mugabe.

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

97

Of course, it cannot be denied that the close relationship that developed between labour and the new government also came with some benefits for the workers, notably within the legal framework, where several Acts beneficial to the workers were enacted. These included the 1980 Minimum Wages Act, which permitted government to periodically set minimum wages for workers, the Employment Act of 1980 and the Employment (Conditions of Service) Regulations of 1981, which protected workers against arbitrary dismissal. Thus, for at least the first five years post-independence, the labour movement marched in unison with the new ruling class, and supported almost all the projects that the new ruling elite instituted. This was to change towards the end of the decade, as will be discussed later in the chapter. The Student Movement The student movement, another potential source of opposition for any government, had a similar genesis to that of the ZCTU.  Zeilig (2006: 108) describes the life of Zimbabwean students who were at tertiary institutions in the early years of independence as state-privileged owing to their “rarefied and privileged existence”. Zeilig (2007) argues that students were the most pampered section of post-colony society, who were being educated to run the new bureaucracy; therefore it was paramount that their grooming was to be in tandem with the agenda of the ruling party. In reciprocation, their activism was in most cases geared to support the ruling party’s programmes and, as the ruling elite would have put it, to consolidate the gains of independence. In the period between 1980 and 1988, university students and the party-state developed cordial relations, and students took every opportunity available to show that they were marching in step with the ruling party. They held several demonstrations to prove this, one of which supported the party-state’s 1983–1987 heavy clampdown in Matabeleland. This was in spite of the fact that this violated innocent civilians’ human rights. Some students even requested to be trained and armed to go and fight the “dissident epidemic” in Matabeleland (Dorman 2001: 75). This was very uncharacteristic of university students, who should be critical of power. However, it was also understandable in the sense that the student movement in Zimbabwe had strong historical connections with the ruling party that had developed during the liberation struggle.

98 

Z. MOYO

Why Civil Society and Party State Relations Soured The support that the ruling party gained from civil society in general, and students and workers in particular, in the early years of its rule was not undeserved. The new party-state massively expanded the provision of social services to many people who had previously been discriminated against. It invested in education and health, and tried its best to effect the vision of education and health for all by 2000. Poor students went to universities and tertiary institutions without any need to pay tuition; in fact, they received subsistence grants and student loans from the party-state. Enrolments at schools and tertiary institutions increased massively. For example, enrolment at the only university in the country at the time, the University of Zimbabwe, rose from 1481 to 7699 students between 1980 and 1988, an increase of 420 per cent (Zeilig 2006). Comparable growth also happened in teacher training colleges, where figures for trained teachers rose from 18,483  in 1979 to 60,886  in 1989 (Kanyongo 2005; UNESCO 2001). Treatment and medical care in clinics and hospitals was at the expense of the party-state. These gains were assisted by the rapid economic growth experienced in the first two years of independence, which, according to Muzondidya (2009), averaged 12 per cent per annum. There was also massive external funding that propped up the new government. In a sense, it was clear that the ruling party was committed to instituting a “developmental state”, based on inclusivity and social justice (Muzondidya 2009: 174). Thus, in return, the emerging civil society, intelligentsia, workers and students, with the exception of those affected by gukurahundi in Matabeleland and Midlands, felt indebted to the party-­ state, and the hegemony-building project of the ruling class was enhanced. The period between 1987 and 1989 was a busy one in Zimbabwe politically. First, the Unity Accord was signed in December 1987 after a protracted negotiation process. As outlined earlier, the extermination of PF–ZAPU created a huge vacuum in opposition politics. This also meant that the other side of the political polarisation dialectic was left unoccupied. However, this was not the case for long, since the cordiality between the party-state and the students and workers came to an end at around the same time. This disengagement led to serious confrontation between civil society and the party-state. Students and workers embarked on intermittent demonstrations. These became an open challenge to the party-states’ growing hegemony, after enjoying unbridled ascendance since independence. Both labour and students, taking advantage of the political

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

99

liberalisation brought about by the cessation of hostilities between ZANU–PF and PF–ZAPU (Saunders 2001), became both the de facto voice of the opposition and the edifice that occupied the other side of the polarisation boundary vacated by PF–ZAPU.  This makes it possible to argue that even at its strongest and most persuasive moment, the practice and dynamism of hegemony always opens itself up to challenge and resistance (Guha 1997), almost as if it is digging its own grave. In Zimbabwe, as the dominance of the ruling class grew, the deputies created in anticipation of a united post-colony became the disrupters of that dominance. Thus, in the second decade after independence, these two major aspects of civil society offered a spirited and militant political opposition to the party-­ state. They did so with no significant support from weak opposition parties, which is the subject of the next section.

Weak Opposition Party Politics in Zimbabwe Upon stumbling across Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) figures, which indicated that 118 political parties had registered to participate in the 2018 harmonised elections, someone not so well versed with politics in Zimbabwe would be forgiven for thinking that the country is a thriving democracy. Forty-eight of these political parties went on to participate in the harmonised elections, with forty-one of them being first time participants. The presidential race, even more out of step with past trends, was contested by twenty-three aspirants. These figures, juxtaposed with previous trends, are astounding. In parliamentary elections between 1980 and 2013, fewer than ten political parties participated in each election, with the exception of 2008 when the number rose to fifteen. For the presidential polls between 1990 and 2013, the highest number of participants was five candidates, in the 2002 and 2013 elections. The absurd 2018 figures are not a reflection of a tolerant political system, but one that lacks regulation in the registration of political parties, possibly to benefit the incumbent, who has unfettered access to state institutions and funding. One only needs to call for a press conference and announce the formation of one’s party. Therefore, they register with ZEC only for the purposes of participating in electoral processes. This registration is a mere formality that is made even easier by the Electoral Act’s (Chapter 2: 12 of 2004) very loose description of a political party, which defines it as “an association of persons the primary object of which is to secure the election of one

100 

Z. MOYO

or more of its members to a local authority or parliament, or to secure the office of president, or to campaign for a specified result at a referendum” (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 2018). This very elastic definition contextualises the emergence of many political parties in the build-up to elections, more so in the 2018 context. However, as will be seen in Table 4.1, the presence of these parties has not disrupted the status quo owing to the entrenched polarisation phenomenon that hollows the middle by recognising only two dominant sides of the dialectic, as contextualised earlier. Zimbabwe’s 1990 presidential elections, the first after the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987, had only two candidates, the then incumbent, Robert Mugabe, and challenger Edgar Tekere, leader of the newly formed Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). The eccentric Tekere, a veteran Table 4.1  Results of the top three candidates in presidential elections conducted between 1990 and 2018 Election Year

Winner results

1990

Robert Mugabe (ZANU–PF) 2,026,976 83.05% Robert Mugabe (ZANU–PF) 1,404,501 92.76% Robert Mugabe (ZANU–PF) 1,685,212 56.2% Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) 1,195,562 47.9% Robert Mugabe (ZANU–PF) 2,110,434 61.09% Emerson Mnangagwa (ZANU–PF) 2,456,010 50.67%

1996

2002

2008a

2013

2018

Vote share

Second-placed results

Vote share

Third-placed results

Vote share

Edgar Tekere (ZUM)

None

413,840 16.95% Abel Muzorewa (United Parties) 72,600 4.8% Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC) 1,258,401 42% Robert Mugabe (ZANU–PF) 1,079,730 43.2% Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) 1,172,349 33.94% Nelson Chamisa (MDC-Alliance) 2,151,919 44.4%

Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU Ndonga) 36,960 2.44% Wilson Khumbula (ZANU-Ndonga) 31,368 1% Simba Makoni (MDK)b 207,470 8.3% Welshman Ncube (MDC) 92,637 2.68% Thokozani Khupe (MDC-T) 45,513 0.9%

Table compiled by the author These results are for the first round only

a

Simba Makoni contested the election as an independent candidate, but was endorsed by the Arthur Mutambara-led MDC. This explains the source of the 8.3 per cent of the vote, which was roughly equivalent to the seats that were won by Mutambara’s MDC b

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

101

nationalist and former secretary-general of ZANU–PF, had been fired from the ruling party (in 1988) for his consistent criticism of the party, and for openly challenging the party’s desire to establish a de jure one-­ party state. He, together with other senior ZANU–PF members, such as Byron Hove and Sydney Malunga, had become an opposition within the ruling party. Although other opposition parties existed throughout the 1980s, their influence was very insignificant. For example, there was the UANC, which was perpetually hamstrung by the stigma of Muzorewa’s participation in the 1979 internal settlement. There was also ZANU– Ndonga, which, in addition to its tainted image after partaking in the internal settlement, was also incapacitated by the absence of its leader, Ndabaningi Sithole, who had been holed up in self-imposed exile in the United States since 1983 (Nkiwane 1998). Thus, between 1988 and 1990, Tekere, with solid revolutionary and nationalist credentials, joined forces with the resurgent labour and student movements to challenge the political monopoly of the ruling party. Together, they spoke and mobilised against corruption (for example the Willowvale Motor scandal),8 against the de facto one-party state and against the impending Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank had recommended for the Zimbabwean government and was due to be implemented from 1990. In 1989, Tekere, who had consummated his sacking from ZANU–PF by forming his own party, indicated his intention to challenge Mugabe in the 1990 elections. University students, who had transformed from being admirers of the ruling party to become not only an irritation to the party-state, but also a serious opposition force, openly mobilised for Tekere and ZUM. Considering that it was formed just a year before elections, and that it was up against a formidable system, ZUM’s performance was significant as it managed to partake in both the presidential race, as well as in 107 of the 120 contested parliamentary constituencies. It went on to win 20 per cent of the presidential vote and two parliamentary seats (Dorman 2001; Nhema 2002; Nkiwane 1998). Interestingly, and relevant to this chapter, ZUM failed to consolidate its position and did not survive to the next election because it soon split into two, with the seceding faction calling itself the Democratic Party (DP). The DP argued that Tekere was autocratic and had personalised the party. Nkiwane (1998: 101) argues that the collapse of ZUM was almost 8

 For more on the Willowvale Motor scandal see Coltart (2016: 185–187).

102 

Z. MOYO

inevitable because the party was formed on the backdrop of a very strong “dose of Tekere’s personal convictions”, which were not likely to be sustainable in the long run especially in the context of losing an election, and more so in a party-state system the ruling party had created. Several other smaller parties existed between 1990 and 1995. They included Ian Smith’s Conservative Alliance, formed way back in 1984 and formally disbanded in 1992. There was also the Forum Party, formed in 1993 and led by former Chief Justice, Enoch Dumbutshena. The Forum Party also suffered internal divisions in the build-up to the 1995 elections, and split; it did not survive beyond these elections. Another promising opposition party was the United Parties (UP), formed in 1994 as an attempt by several parties, including ZUM, UANC and some members of the Forum Party, to fashion a united alliance to proffer a challenge to the party-state in the 1995 elections. This was never to materialise, since UP withdrew from the elections citing an uneven electoral environment.9 A post facto analysis of the political environment in the first two decades of independence shows that the polarisation culture, intertwined with the caprices of a party-state, made sure that opposition parties remained weakened, while the dominance of the ruling party was enhanced as its unfettered access to state resources increased. The withdrawal by some opposition parties from participating in elections was a sign of discontent with this party-state complex that had always benefited the ruling party. With no serious challenge in 1995, ZANU–PF won all parliamentary seats save for three, one of which was won by an independent candidate who had just been expelled from ZANU–PF. ZANU–Ndonga won the other two, while the UANC did not even participate. The result of the 1996 presidential election was also a one-sided affair, with the ZANU–PF candidate winning a landslide victory, garnering more than 92 per cent of the votes amid massive discontent within the population, epitomised by an eight-week strike in June 1996 by teachers, nurses, doctors and other public servants, who were joined by students, human rights groups and churches (Zeilig 2007). In terms of opposition parties, it is safe to conclude that the ruling party was navigating in easy waters between 1990 and 2000. This is even clearer when one looks at Table  4.1, which is a collation of presidential results between 1990 and 2018. However, in terms of broader opposition politics, the ruling class met a formidable

9

 See Nkiwane (1998: 99–103) for a detailed discussion of these opposition parties.

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

103

challenge in the form of civil society, which is the subject of the next section.

Broadening a Counter-Hegemony and Consolidation of Oppositional Politics Even though the period between 1990 and 2000 had weak opposition political parties, it was probably the bedrock of contemporary opposition politics, and it witnessed the deepening of the polarisation culture. Civil society, now broadened by the development of independent media, human rights movement (which included organisations such as Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Human Rights NGO Forum and Women of Zimbabwe Arise; see also Chap. 5 in this volume) and the constitutional movement, on various matters met the party-state head on. Civil society became the fulcrum of a counter-hegemonic block that occupied the other side of the polarisation boundary. ZCTU led this initiative. The 1991 events in neighbouring Zambia, where the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, a party formed out of a labour federation, had provided an example of how workers can stand up against a liberation movement in a quest to champion multi-­ partyism (Chanda 1995; Tsvangirai 2011). First, the labour movement in Zimbabwe, irritated and bleeding owing to the deleterious effects of the ESAP introduced in 1990, moved towards militant agitation. As a consequence of market deregulation that dismantled all state-imposed market controls, increased imports from external manufacturers and targeted expenditure within the public sector (all being IMF-recommended liberal policies), many companies had closed down, and over 25,000 workers had been retrenched as early as 1992 (Kanyenze et al. 2011; Mlambo 2014). By 1994, public expenditure on health care had dropped by 39 per cent from 1990 levels, while per capita expenditure declined from Z$58 in 1990 to Z$36 by the end of 1995. This exacerbated avoidable deaths, which resulted in what were derogatively called “ESAP deaths” (Moyo 2018: 119). Between 1991 and 1997, over 50,000 people in the manufacturing sector lost their jobs, and ZCTU’s membership slumped from 1,5 million to 1 million (Southall 2017). All these losses, which affected poor workers and students the most, irreversibly strained the relations between the party-state and the suffering population. Because there were no strong opposition parties to lead resistance against this assault on the poor, running battles escalated between

104 

Z. MOYO

developed aspects of civil society and the party-state. Not surprisingly, the state responded with violence to genuine disgruntlement from organised society. This served to draw human rights, labour and student activists closer to each other. One expression of this common victimhood was the 1997 formation of a constitutional movement, organised under the banner of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). It came about after an acknowledgement by civil society that a solution to the suffering perpetrated by the ruling elite could only be achieved if, and only if, the existing constitutional dispensation negotiated by a few elite politicians at Lancaster House in 1979 was dismantled.10 There was also a regional conjuncture in the mid-1990s when other countries in Southern Africa, such as Botswana, South Africa and Namibia, were involved in what were considered to be progressive constitutional-making processes (Sachikonye 2011). Many human rights organisations, religious groupings, student and youth groups, women’s organisations and workers unions became part of this movement. Thence, the issue of the constitution became a non-political way of talking about the exercise of politics (Dorman 2003: 849; Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004: 359). As argued by Moyo (2018), the NCA became the confluence for topical issues such as democracy, the land question, human rights, women’s rights and a people-driven constitution-­ making process, all packaged as intertwined and synonymous with constitutionalism. Between 1997 and 2002, more human rights organisations came into existence, swelling the ranks of the counter-hegemonic movement. One of these organisations was the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP), flagged here because it has a bearing later. When all these organisations were being formed, it is important to note that their friends and foes were already predetermined. Most were formed to agitate against the state, which had become even more draconian. In 1999, these counter-hegemonic organisations, including the NCA, organised a National Working People’s Convention (NWPC), at which a resolution was taken to form an opposition political party, the only way to challenge state power. Thus, as a fulfilment of that NWPC resolution, on 11 September 1999, the MDC was born into a polity that had already been mobilised, and counter-­hegemonic sentiments were very strong. One of the key figures in the formation of the party, and its former secretary general, opined: 10   Interviews with Takura Zhangazha, 3 September 2015, Harare; Tendai Biti, 25 November 2015, Harare; and David Coltart, 14 December 2015, Bulawayo.

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

105

The MDC was born out of our struggles to achieve a new constitution in Zimbabwe. So the NCA was key in the formation of the MDC… The MDC would be created normatively out of the NWPC held on 26 February 1999. The NWPC was a gathering of civic organisations. The MDC was born out of civic society. So the question “what is the MDC” becomes relevant because the MDC becomes an acknowledgement by civil society that the battles which we were fighting, whether they were for constitutional reform or for better wages, or for better laws … were not sufficient unless we had political reform. This is why resolution number 11 of the NWPC is a resolution that now says we as the civic societies are now acknowledging that all these things that we are talking about, we will not achieve them unless we have political reforms and therefore we need a political party or movement.11

Myths, realities and peer pressure dissuaded the MDC from relating to any other organisation that had a relationship with the ruling party (Moyo 2018). This was part of the deployment of polarisation politics as a strategy to define territory. This also explains the MDC’s good performance in the 2000 parliamentary elections, held just nine months after its formation. Beyond 2000, the MDC as an opposition party continued to share cordial relations with these civic organisations for many more years to come, and it served to organise post-2000 Zimbabwean political society into a polarisation dialectic that pitted ZANU–PF and its allies against the MDC and its allied civil society groups. Because of the dominance of polarisation, these respective civic organisations felt compelled to protect ZANU–PF and the MDC at all times from both real and imagined enemies. Meanwhile, between 1997 and 2000, the party-state, aware of the threat to its hegemony posed by civil society, had moved to occupy the civil society space through sponsoring the formation and co-opting of some civic organisations. This led not only to the crystallisation of the polarisation phenomenon, but also to violence directed towards those perceived to be occupying the other side of the dialectic (Moyo 2018). In 1997, the party-state wooed the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) to its side by awarding war veterans gratuities. In 1998, ZANU–PF also engineered a split within the labour movement. Some members of ZCTU broke away to form the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU). In the same year, some members of the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union (ZINASU), also broke away  Interview with Tendai Biti, 25 November 2015, Harare.

11

106 

Z. MOYO

allegedly at the instigation of the party-state to form a rival union, the Zimbabwe Congress of Students’ Union (ZICOSU). Thus, for every political organisation formed in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, prevailing culture demanded that it be either pro-ruling party or pro-MDC.  This also explains why all the parliamentary election results between 2000 and 2018 were dominated by only these two political parties. No other party could muster more than two constituencies, except in 2008 when the Mutambara-led MDC won ten seats, which it failed to retain in the next election. However, it should be noted that despite this, there were instances when organisations belonging to the two different blocs were forced to work together for the benefit of their membership. This was more so for membership-based organisations, such as the workers’ and the students’ movements. For example, both ZCTU and ZFTU are members of the tripartite negotiating forum, representing workers. According to the deputy secretary general of the ZFTU, “in most issues there was encouraging convergence and congruence between us [ZCTU and ZFTU], although sometimes we got the perception that our colleagues [ZCTU] held the view that we must change the broader political set up first”.12 This was also the case with the student movement. For example, during the tenure of the 2009–2013 unity government, students were invited to parliament by the portfolio committee on higher education to discuss issues that were affecting students. The two federations had to meet to craft a common position before they went to meet the committee.13 Such meetings, however, were at executive level and not at grassroots level. What is central to this chapter’s argument is a delineation of the politics that perpetuated the polarisation culture even beyond the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord, which was supposed to achieve unity by negating polarisation. From the foregoing, it is undeniable that the politics of the 1990s was defined by polarisation between civil society and the party-­ state. Events that took place, such as the workers’ and students’ strikes, demonstrations, stay-aways and court challenges, interrupted the dominance of one party in Zimbabwean politics, but did not quite bring change in terms of who governed the country, portending a case where the old 12   Interview with Noah Gwande, deputy secretary general of ZFTU, 28 October 2015, Harare. 13   Interview with Blessing Vava, former spokesperson of ZINASU, 24 July 2015, Johannesburg.

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

107

seemed to be dying, but the new could not yet be born (Gramsci 1999), a phenomenon that persisted for many more years. Later in the 1990s, another tendency towards broadening the phenomenon of polarisation emerged. This was the cloning or doubling-up of civil society organisations. For example, the existence of ZNLWVA, which had drifted closer to the ruling party, was countered by the formation of the ZLP, a group viewed as part of the counter-hegemonic movement. The students’ movement fed into the dialectic by breaking into two groups— ZINASU and ZICOSU. The labour movement was no exception, since the ZFTU emerged to counter the politics of the ZCTU. As these binaries developed, the hollowed centre was not only sustained, but broadened as well, making it near impossible for a third alternative to survive in that binary space. Thence, new labour federations and students unions that were formed could not survive in their own right (Moyo 2018). Furthermore, in 1999, as the party-state took up the NCA’s challenge and created a state-sponsored Constitutional Commission, animosity between the state and the counter-hegemonic civil society increased. The NCA refused to be part of this Commission, and thus two parallel constitutional processes were instituted, buttressing the polarisation culture, which at that point cut across society, including media, religious organisations and the economy. The result of these parallel constitutional processes was that they cancelled each other out, and upon conclusion, neither of them produced a product that could be universally accepted. In pursuance of the polarisation culture, between 1997 and 2008, civil society was virtually divided into two distinguishable formations—those who were closer to the ruling party, and advanced pro-hegemonic politics, and those more aligned to the new opposition party (MDC), professing counter-hegemonic policies (Ncube 2010). As a result of this polarisation culture, which has persisted up to 2018, other important national questions that fell outside the major thrusts of these two groupings were peripheralised, which impoverished the country’s politics. For example, within the pro-hegemonic cluster, the over-dominance of redistributionist and nationalist rhetoric relegated issues of democracy, human rights and democracy to the periphery, while within the opposition alliance, socio-­ economic issues that would have rebounded from a resource redistributive policy thrust were missed as the preoccupation became more about respecting property rights, free and fair elections and good governance rhetoric framed within neo-liberal standards. Peripheralising of other important questions was also noted by Raftopolous and Phimister (2004),

108 

Z. MOYO

who argued that civil society from the counter-hegemonic bloc concerned itself more with ensuring the fulfilment of liberal objectives, while also cognisant of the bourgeois nature of such politics. The pro-hegemonic bloc endorsed the radical ruling party’s transformational policies, while also cognisant of their democratic deficits. Both blocs did not take time to self-criticise, and therefore some important questions that were mutually despised by the two blocs suffered the most. The whole  objective of a party-state as discussed earlier, is to create institutions that are responsive to interests of the ruling elite. The blurring of lines between the party and the state suggests some kind of inclination towards structural permanency, where those running the state envisage themselves staying in power whether they are popular or not. Thus, when an office as important as that of a chief justice is held successively by people who are loyal to one political party by virtue of them being senior members of that party, or when police commissioners and commanders of the military are appointed not on the basis of their professionalism, but because they belong to the ruling party, then one should not be in doubt about the intentions of those in power. In Zimbabwe, there are also pieces of legislation that inevitably impact more negatively on opposition activists than on the ruling class. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA [2007, Chapter 11:17]) enacted in 2002 is a perfect example. Its administration and enforcement resides with the police, whose head and several other line managers are loyal members of the ruling party. POSA is a piece of legislation that infringes on several people’s freedoms, including the freedom of assembly, association and the right to liberty. This Act has been extensively abused by the police to deny those in the counter-hegemonic bloc the right to hold political gatherings, including some campaign rallies. In some instances, opposition politicians have been arbitrarily arrested, detained without trial and tortured by the police. Some have been denied food, legal representation and even medical attention during detention. The anti-riot, and law and order sections of the police have been notorious for all these malfeasances. There have also been accusations from the opposition bloc that such kind of ill treatment is always directed to the opposition side of the polarisation dialectic.14 14  See for example, a skewed police report (ZRP 2007) that concluded opposition forces were responsible for political violence in 2007. It does not accuse any pro-hegemonic organisation of any form of violence. See also Amnesty International (2000, 2008a, b) for violence committed against counter-hegemonic activists by state-linked institutions.

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

109

The 2008 presidential elections resulted in a stalemate. No outright winner could be determined and a run-off had to be conducted. This run-­ off was never to be, since the three-month inter-election period witnessed the worst violence since the time of gukurahundi. The ruling class was not about to give away its power, and predictably so. The gravity of the violence, targeted mainly at those suspected to have voted for the opposition, forced Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC president, to withdraw from the run-­ off just five days before the election. Human Rights Watch (2011) and Amnesty International (2013) show that the violence was organised and led by the party-state, and more than 200 people were killed, 5000 beaten and tortured, and 36,000 people were displaced. According to Timberg (2008) and Shumba (2018), the security forces, through the Joint Operations Command, planned all the violence during the inter-election period. Over 200 senior army officials directed militias, police, secret state agents and war veterans in the execution of the plan to beat and kill MDC activists and supporters with the intention of depleting their number (Timberg 2008). The uniformity and pattern of the violence indeed confirmed centralised planning and organisation (Masunungure 2009). This buttresses the point that state security agents chose to be partisan in order to preserve the status quo. In November 2017, owing to the self-bestowed role of king-makers, the military commanders forced the long serving president, Robert Mugabe, to retire, and in his place installed Emmerson Mnangagwa (see Chaps. 8 and 13 in this volume). No official structure, national, regional or global, dared to call the process a coup. Most celebrated, and argued that the army had done well. But what this misplaced show of might (by the military) demonstrated was where real political power is located. The military was allowed to choose who should be the president of the country, and was also permitted to strengthen its influence by deploying some of its senior members in the ruling party structures and cabinet. The very act of the military involving itself in internal leadership succession issues of the ruling party confirms the workings of a party-state. Moving forward, it will be very difficult for any civilian leader to do anything that is not in agreement with the desires of the military.

110 

Z. MOYO

Conclusion The blurring of lines between state institutions and the ruling party has continued even beyond Mugabe’s ouster in 2017. Thus, when the MDC announced that it was going to challenge the election results proclaimed by the ZEC chairperson, Justice Priscillah Chigumba, those not familiar with the workings of the party-state would have raised their hopes. However, those who believe in a Marxist interpretation of the state would have foretold with certainty the outcome of such an electoral challenge. A reflection on the November 2017 “constitutional coup” would have made reaching such a prediction quite easy. The party-state complex and the polarisation culture in Zimbabwe have fed into each other to advantage the ruling party. The gukurahundi disturbances, the 2008 violence and electoral outcomes provide a basis for such an argument. The conduct of ZEC, the military and the Constitutional Court with regard to the 2018 elections portends the endurance of the party-state culture. Thus, Marxists’ views that the state is an instrument of accumulation for the ruling class may be on point in Zimbabwe. Earlier, this chapter argued that the state and the ruling party in Zimbabwe are coalesced to an extent that it becomes impossible to delineate where the party ends and where the state begins. State structures, especially the police, the army, the secret service, state media, the electoral bodies and courts, have all been accused of malfeasance by those in opposition politics. Evidence of this is in the violence, overt or subtle, that has been directed at members of the opposition. The polarisation between the ruling class on one side and the counter-hegemonic bloc on the other has developed in an environment where the ruling party became delegitimised (Raftopoulos 2003). However, even though the old seemed to be dying, the new could not yet be born because the counter-hegemonic bloc failed not only to negotiate its connection with the country’s history and socio-­ economic issues, but also to sufficiently deal with the powerful effects of an ever-strengthening party-state complex.

References Alexander, J., J.  McGregor, and T.  Ranger. 2000. Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the “Dark Forests” of Matabeleland. Oxford: James Currey. Amnesty International. 2000. Press Release: Politically Motivated Violence Deliberately Targeting Opposition Political Activists and Farming Communities

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

111

in Rural Areas. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/ politically-motivated-violence-deliberately-targeting-opposition-political-activists. Accessed 2 Aug 2016. ———. 2008a. Zimbabwe: A Trail of Violence After the Ballot. London: Amnesty International Publications. ———. 2008b. Zimbabwe: Time for Accountability. London: Amnesty International Publications. ———. 2013. Zimbabwe Human Rights Agenda for the Government, 2013–2018. London: Amnesty International Publications. Cameron, H. 2018. The Matabeleland Massacres: Britain’s Wilful Blindness. International History Review 40 (1): 1–19. CCJP. 2007. Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A Report on the Disturbances in the Matabeleland and the Midlands. London: Hurst and Company. CCJP & LRF. 1997. Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980–1989. Harare: CWP and LRF. Chanda, D. 1995. The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy in Zambia: Some Lessons in Democratic Transition. In Democracy, Civil Society and he State: Social Movements in Southern Africa, ed. L.  Sachikonye, 114–128. Harare: SAPES Trust. Chipkin, I. 2012. The Politics of Corruption: Two Competing Definitions. Long Essay No. 13. Public Affairs Research Institute. https://47zhcvti0ul2ftip9rxo9fj9-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/ u p l o a d s / 2 0 1 7 / 0 5 / PA R I - L . E . 3 - T h e - P o l i t i c s - o f - C o r r u p t i o n Two-Competing-Definitions-Oct-20121.pdf. Accessed 20 November 2017. Coltart, D. 2016. The Struggle Continues: 50 Years of Tyranny in Zimbabwe. Johannesburg: Jacana Media. Dolo, E. 2006. Opposition Parties: Benefits and Challenges in Building Sustainable Democracy. The Perspective. Available from: http://www.theperspective.org/ articles/1020200602.html. Accessed 20 Aug 2018. Doran, S. 2017. Kingdom, Power, Glory: Mugabe, ZANU and the Quest for Supremacy, 1960–1987. Johannesburg: Sithatha Media. Dorman, S.R. 2006. Post Liberation Politics in Africa: Examining the Political Legacy of Struggle. Third World Quarterly 27 (6): 1085–1101. Eppel, S. 2004. ‘Gukurahundi’: The Need for Truth and Reparation. In Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, ed. B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage, 43–62. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Femia, J. 1987. Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gagare, O. 2017. Army Commanders Now Trust Me. Zimbabwe Independent, June 23. Available from: https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/06/23/ army-commanders-now-trust/. Accessed 20 Nov 2017.

112 

Z. MOYO

Gramsci, A. 1999. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, eds. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: ElecBook. Guha, R. 1997. Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Human Rights Watch. 2011. Perpetual Fear: Impunity and Cycles of Violence in Zimbabwe. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/03/08/perpetual-fear/impunity-and-cycles-violence-zimbabwe. Accessed 25 Nov 2017. Kanyenze, G., T. Kondo, P. Chitambara, and J. Martens. 2011. Beyond the Enclave: Towards a Pro-Poor and Inclusive Development Strategy for Zimbabwe. Harare: Weaver Press. Kanyongo, G.Y. 2005. Zimbabwe’s Public Education System Reforms: Successes and Challenges. International Education Journal 6 (1): 65–74. Kriger, N. 2006. From Patriotic Memories to Patriotic History in Zimbabwe, 1990–2005. Third World Quarterly 27 (6): 1151–1169. LeBas, A. 2006. Polarisation and Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe. Comparative Politics 38 (4): 419–438. ———. 2011. From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratisation in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Masunungure, E.V. 2009. A Militarised Election: The 27 June Presidential Run-­ off. In Defying the Winds of Change: Zimbabwe’s 2008 Election, ed. E.V. Masunungure, 79–97. Harare: Konrad Adenauer Foundation. McAdam, D., S. Tarrow, and C. Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. New York: Cambridge University Press. McCandless, E. 2012. Polarisation and Transformation in Zimbabwe: Social Movements, Strategy Dilemmas and Change. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-­ Natal Press. Mlambo, A.S. 2014. A History of Zimbabwe. New York: Cambridge University Press. Moore, D. 2003. Zimbabwe’s Triple Crisis: Primitive Accumulation, Nation-State Formation and Democratisation in the Age of Neo-Liberal Globalisation. African Studies Quarterly 7 (2&3): 33–51. ———. 2008. Coercion, Consent, Context: Operation Murambatsvina and ZANU–PF’s Quest for Hegemony. In The Hidden Dimensions of Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe, ed. M. Vambe, 25–39. Harare: Weaver Press. ———. 2014. Coercion, Consent and the Construction of Capitalism in Africa: Development Studies, Political Economy, Politics and the ‘Dark Continent’. Transformation 84: 106–131. Moyo, J. 1991. The Dialectics of National Unity and Democracy in Zimbabwe. In The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate, ed. I. Mandaza and L. Sachikonye, 83–102. Harare: SAPES. Moyo, J.N. 1993. Civil Society in Zimbabwe. Zambezia XX: 1–13.

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

113

Moyo, Z. 2018. Civil Society, the State and Democracy in Zimbabwe, 1988–2014: Hegemonies, Polarities and Fractures. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Johannesburg. Muzondidya, J. 2009. From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980–1997. In Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008, ed. B. Raftopoulos and A.S. Mlambo, 168–201. Harare: Weaver Press. Ncube, C. 2010. Contesting Hegemony: Civil Society and the Struggle for Social Change in Zimbabwe, 2000–2008. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2002. The Post-Colonial State and Matabeleland: Regional Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations, 1980—2002. Ourselves to Know: 17–38. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237426294_The_post-colonial_state_and_Matebeleland_Regional_perceptions_of_civil-military_relations_1980-2002. Accessed 3 Aug 2016. ———. 2012. Rethinking Chimurenga and Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A critique of partisan national history. African Studies Review 55 (3): 1–26 ———. 2015. Introduction: Mugabeism and Entanglements of History, Politics and Power in the Making of Zimbabwe. In Mugabeism? History, Politics, and Power in Zimbabwe, ed. S.J.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 1–25. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Nehanda Radio. 2009. Generals Salute Mujuru, not Tsvangirai? Available from: http://nehandaradio.com/2009/08/12/generals-saluted-mujuru-not-tsvangirai/. Accessed 16 Sept 2016. Nhema, A.G. 2002. Democracy in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Liberalisation. Harare: University of Zimbabwe. Nkiwane, T.C. 1998. Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe: The Struggle within the Struggle. In The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa, ed. A.O. Olukoshi, 91–112. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Olukoshi, A.O. 1998. Economic Crisis, Multipartyism, and Opposition Politics in Contemporary Africa. In The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa, ed. A.O. Olukoshi, 8–38. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Raftopoulos, B. 2003. The State in Crisis: Authoritarian Nationalism, Selective Citizenship and Distortions of Democracy in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis, ed. A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos, and S. Jensen, 217–241. Harare: Weaver Press. ———. 2004. Unreconciled Differences: The Limits of Reconciliation Politics in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, ed. B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage, viii–xxii. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Raftopoulos, B., and I. Phimister. 2004. Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion. Historical Materialism 12 (4): 355–382.

114 

Z. MOYO

Rich-Dorman, S. 2001. Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Oxford. ———. 2003. NGOs and the Constitutional Debate in Zimbabwe: From Inclusion to Exclusion. Journal of Southern African Studies 29 (4): 845–863. Sachikonye, L.M. 1991. The Context of the Democracy Debate. In The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate, ed. I.  Mandaza and L.M. Sachikonye, 43–60. Harare: SAPES. ———. 1995. State and Social Movements in Zimbabwe. In Democracy, Civil Society and the State: Social Movements in Southern Africa, ed. L.M. Sachikonye, 129–161. Harare: SAPES. Sachikonye, L. 2011. Zimbabwe’s Constitution-Making and Electoral Reform Processes: Challenges and Opportunities. A Draft paper prepared for the conference on “Legitimacy of Power—Possibilities of Opposition” organised by Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University and CMI.  Available from: http://www.cmi.no/file/?1324. Accessed 18 Jul 2016. Saunders, R. 2001. Striking Ahead: Industrial Action and Labour Movement Development in Zimbabwe. In Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe, 1980–2000, ed. B.  Raftopoulos and L. Sachikonye, 133–173. Harare: Weaver Press. Shils, E. 1968. Political Development in the New States. The Hague: Mouton. Shumba, J.M. 2018. Zimbabwe’s Predatory State: Party, Military and Business. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu Natal. Southall, R. 2016. The New Black Middle Class in South Africa. Johannesburg: Jacana Media. ———. 2017. Flight and Fortitude: The Decline of the Middle Class in Zimbabwe. Unpublished manuscript. Teshome, W. 2009. Opposition Parties and the Politics of Opposition in Africa: A Critical Analysis. International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 3 (7): 1624–1638. The Zimbabwean. 2011. Army General, Nyikayaramba Vows Not to Salute Tsvangirai. The Zimbabwean, May 29. Available from: http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/05/army-general-nyikayaramba-vows-not-to-salute-tsvangirai/ Accessed 16 Sept 2016. Timberg, C. 2008. Inside Mugabe’s Violent Crackdown. Washington Post, July 5. Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/04/AR2008070402771.html Accessed 16 Jul 2016. Todd, J. 2007. Through the Darkness: A Life in Zimbabwe. Cape Town: Zebra Press. Tsvangirai, M. 2011. Morgan Tsvangirai: At the Deep End. Johannesburg: Penguin Books.

4  OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF POLARISATION… 

115

UNESCO 2001. The Developments in Education: The Educations System at the End of the 20th Century, 1990–2000. National Report for the Republic of Zimbabwe. UNESCO International Bureau of Education. Widner, J.A. 1992. The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From “Harambee!” to “Nyayo!”. Berkeley: University of California Press. Zeilig, L. 2006. ‘Increasing my Value Proposition to the Struggle’: Arthur Mutambara and Student Politics in Zimbabwe. African Sociological Review 10 (2): 94–115. ———. 2007. Revolt and Protest: Student Politics and Activism in Sub-Saharan Africa. London: Tauris Academic Studies. Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. 2018. Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] (Act No. 25 of 2004). https://www.zec.org.zw/pages/electoral_act. Accessed 30 Nov 2017. Zolberg, A.R. 1966. Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company. ZRP. 2007. Opposition Forces in Zimbabwe: A Trail of Violence—1 January 2007 to 15 March 2007. Available from: http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/ zrp_trail_violence_070401.pdf. Accessed 16 Aug 2016.

CHAPTER 5

Understanding Zimbabwe’s Political Culture: Media and Civil Society Stanley Tsarwe

Introduction How can Zimbabwe build sustainable democratic institutions, practices and values that can become integral to its political culture? This chapter looks at the dominant political culture that has evolved over the years in pre- and post-independence Zimbabwe and how this culture is responsible for the state of civil society, the media and the limited level of democratic consolidation. Such practices, the chapter argues, have contributed to a narrowing democratic culture over the years. More specifically, this chapter seeks to achieve the following three objectives. First, it attempts to define and apply the problematic notion of political culture in the context of pertaining Zimbabwean political values. Secondly, it seeks to examine the state of civil society and its role in Zimbabwe’s transition to democracy. Thirdly, viewing the media as part of civil society, the chapter broadly sketches out the development and current state of the media in Zimbabwe as a stakeholder in democratic transition.

S. Tsarwe (*) Department of English, Journalism and Media Studies Section, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_5

117

118 

S. TSARWE

While Zimbabwe has successfully established universal suffrage and holds periodic elections, as most African countries have, there has been deep scepticism about the country’s levels of democratic deepening—particularly around core democratic values such as respect for human rights, freedom of the press, tolerance of alternative political views, free and fair elections, and good governance. It argues that this can be located in centralist tendencies inherited by the post-colonial government from the white colonial regime, limited involvement of diverse civil groups in civic and political processes, a restrictive media environment and conflation between the state and party politics. The biggest obstacle to democratic deepening in Zimbabwe has roots in undemocratic practices that were inherited by the post-colonial government, where elite continuity continues to dominate the country’s political landscape, and in strategic institutions such as the media (see Sparks 2009; Moyo 2004; Tsarwe and Mare 2019a; Mano 2016). In Chap. 1 of this book, make reference to “the postcolonial legacy of personality cults and their gerontocratic tendencies, excluding women and young people, and indeed all those who are deemed to have not participated in the liberation struggles, from the corridors of power and ownership of strategic resources” (p. 2). They later argue that the political elites in charge of the post-colonial state gained the freedom to accumulate resources ahead of everyone else through the process they aptly paraphrase as “bureaucratic state parasitism”. This was functionalised through a systematic and well-oiled scheme of patronage that the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) elite would exploit for personal political mileage. As McGregor puts it, “Zimbabwe inherited from the Rhodesian era powerful, centralized state bureaucracies, staffed by colonial-era personnel” (2002, p. 12) who, with time, became functionaries of the Zimbabwe African National Unity– Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) through widened networks of patronage. The chapter begins by acknowledging that understanding the relations between state, media and civil society is key in explaining the current levels of democratic deepening in any democracy, including Zimbabwe. Since attaining independence from British colonial rule four decades ago, in 1980, Zimbabwe has been governed by a ZANU–PF-led government, and arguably, as the governing party, ZANU–PF has been an influential agent in the development of particular political values. Noting that the concept of political culture is difficult to pin down, with others stating that “political culture remains a suggestive rather than a scientific concept” (Chilton 1988, p.  420), this chapter does not necessarily concern itself

5  UNDERSTANDING ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL CULTURE: MEDIA AND CIVIL… 

119

with a deep conceptual analysis of exactly how political culture should be defined. However, an attempt is made to conceptualise it at a level of detail that is adequate for studying the state of Zimbabwe’s democratic deepening.

Understanding Political Culture Political scientists, social scientists and historians alike have all attempted to define the concept of political culture with little or no success, and “thirty years of definitions and theoretical criticisms have now passed without the earlier promise of the concept being redeemed” (Chilton 1988, p. 420). Almond’s (1956, p. 396) initial formulation defined political culture as the “particular pattern of orientations to political action”. Successive revisions and re-definitions have also yielded an understanding of political culture as “the spirit of public institutions, political passions of the citizenry, goals articulated by the political ideology, and both formal and informal rules of the political game” (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, p. 26 cited in Camara 2008). With more contemporary research, the definition continues to drift away from earlier individual behaviourist studies, which were underpinned by survey-based research on individual attitudes, to a more collective understanding of political culture as a process in which “political meaning is constructed in the interplay between the attitudes of individual citizens and the language and symbolic systems in which they are embedded” (Da Silva et al. 2015, p. 1). Back in 1963, two political scientists, Almond and Verba (1963), conducted a study examining the political cultures associated with five democratic countries: Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States. They identified three basic types of political cultures, which can be used to explain why people do or do not participate in political processes (Chilton 1988), naming these as: (1) parochial political culture, (2) subject political culture and (3) participant political culture. Parochial political culture was identified in Mexico, where citizens are mostly uninformed and unaware of their government and take little interest in the political process. Subject political culture was identified in Germany and Italy, where citizens are somewhat informed and aware of their government and occasionally participate in the political process. Lastly, participant political culture was identified in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, where citizens are informed and actively

120 

S. TSARWE

participate in the political process (Formisano 2001; Chilton 1988; Gendzel 1977). While Almond and Verba’s (1963) theory classified different countries according to observed political cultures in those democracies, the reality is that such a classification might not necessarily fit precisely when applied to different contexts, particularly one such as Zimbabwe whose political history and genealogy may be fundamentally different from the Western democracies where these theories were originally premised. It might be the case that some democracies will not fit perfectly into these classifications—at least if they are transplanted wholesale in their original formulations. Some democracies may straddle two or all three of these classifications, or perhaps not fit into any of them. For example, while Zimbabwe may share with Mexico a parochial political culture, as the majority of its poor and marginalised citizens are mostly uninformed and unaware of their government and take little interest in the political process, it might also make sense to classify Zimbabwe under subject political culture, as its citizens are somewhat informed and aware of their government and occasionally participate in the political process, during periodic elections, for example. Therefore, Almond and Verba’s (1963) classifications should not be taken as hard and fast classificatory categories without some modifications to suit context. The same may be true of a number of countries that are still experiencing challenges as they negotiate democratic transition. While a number of scholars have offered different theoretical and methodological approaches to understanding political culture, this study nevertheless uses Almond and Verba’s (1963) deployment of the concept as a heuristic lens through which to view the nature and configuration of political culture in Zimbabwe. Having inherited an undemocratic governance system from the white colonial regime that gave way to independence in 1980, and despite garnering majority support in elections, the ZANU–PF government made little effort to democratise the state, its practices and its institutions. This is ironic given that the spirited bush war culminating in Zimbabwe’s independence was primarily against despotism, racism, inequality and disenfranchisement of political and civic rights of the black majority by a white minority. Zimbabwe’s post-colonial government failed to transcend the intolerant and repressive political cultures of the Rhodesian settler regime. Using “Mugabeism” as a conceptual lens with which to describe former President Robert Mugabe’s cult-like political culture, argue that “instead of breaking with colonial settler traditions of brutality

5  UNDERSTANDING ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL CULTURE: MEDIA AND CIVIL… 

121

and repressive political practices, Mugabeism ‘innovated’ and ‘improved’ on the Rhodesian settler colonial Leviathan, adding the logic of ‘governance by military operations’ with devastating implications for democracy, human rights, and people’s freedoms”. As Chikerema and Chakunda (2014) argue, democratic decay, political violence and intolerance, and a culture of impunity characterised by electoral fraud have been the defining features of Zimbabwe’s political landscape since independence. As will be seen in subsequent sections of this chapter, the government—in the fashion of most post-colonial African governments—sought to control civic groups through legislation, registration and various other measures that would enable the regime to know what was going on in these organisations (Makumbe 1998a). On the other hand, and in direct opposition to the increasing pressure to deliver an alternative to a deteriorating economy and widespread corruption by government officials, the state responded to criticism by legislating repressive media laws that were roundly accused of stifling dissent, alternative views and freedom of the press (Moyo 2009). In Zimbabwe, the de facto political culture adopted by President Mugabe after independence was general intolerance to alternative political views. Naturally, opposition politics was viewed as lacking credibility, as Mugabe’s regime consistently labelled opposition politicians as “Western-backed mercenaries”. In addition, there has been a constant deployment of legal and extra-­ legal means to silence and censor the media—particularly private media—viewing these as enemies of the state (Moyo 2009; Chuma 2008). It is arguable that this has resulted in limited democratic consolidation since independence, as critical institutions, such as a private media capable of providing checks and balances on state power, are weakened by repressive laws and state censorship. More of these issues will be discussed in due course. Civil Society and Democratisation in Zimbabwe The concept of civil society originated in Western literature in the writings of Hegel, Gramsci and Marx (Mayhew 1997; Geremek 1992). This is, however, not to imply that the notion of civil society is alien to Africa, or that there has never been a civil society on the continent (Makumbe 1998a). Responding to Darnolf’s (1997) claims that in Africa “a differentiated civil society in which individuals organize themselves outside the family and articulate interests to the state does not, to any large degree,

122 

S. TSARWE

exist” (p. 21), Makumbe (Makumbe 1998a) argues that the African experience of civil society is largely focused on the people’s struggle against despotic rulers, repressive regimes and governments that violated both their individual and their collective rights. Evidence can be drawn from student movements in South Africa in the 1960s and in Zimbabwe’s preand post-independence societies, as well as the role of the media (as part of civil society) in both these eras of democratic transition (see Makunike 2015; Mlambo 1993, 2013; Tengende 1994; Zeilig 2007, 2008). It is on the basis of this formulation that this chapter advances arguments for the role of civil society in the democratic deepening in Africa, while arguing that the diminishing exuberance of civil society in Zimbabwe is a cause for concern, as it has direct implications on the level of democratic deepening there. However, as this study argues, a formerly vibrant Zimbabwean student activism movement progressively weakened and fizzled out, initially in response to pressing economic deterioration in the early 1990s, and more directly as a result of state action, and repressive legislation promulgated by the government to suppress dissent and active political participation (Makunike 2015; Makumbe 1998a). While Zimbabwean civil society has played a significant role in the liberation struggle against British colonial rule, and since independence, this study acknowledges, as Makumbe (1998a) does, that it is unfair to expect African civil society to develop in the same way as Western liberal democracies. The chapter discusses these issues later. More urgently, a key question at this juncture, before turning to the state of civil society in Zimbabwe, is about what civil society is, and how Zimbabwean civil society has been influenced by, and in turn has influenced, the country’s prevailing political culture. Jürgen Habermas (1989) developed an enduring and popular political theory (albeit gaining an equal share of criticism) examining the nature of modern public spheres. His thesis includes one of the most articulate understandings of civil society. He posits that civil society is a sphere composed of non-state private individuals who, through their ability to exercise free will and reason, have the capacity to critique public authority (Habermas 1986), and in this way contribute to democratic deepening. These individuals are necessarily non-state actors and non-political, and act autonomously outside state influence and within the confines of the unwritten rules of rational debate. More specifically, Habermas describes civil society as “composed of more or less spontaneously engaged associations, organisations and movements that, attuned to how social problems

5  UNDERSTANDING ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL CULTURE: MEDIA AND CIVIL… 

123

resonate in the private life spheres, distil and transmit such reactions in amplified to the public sphere” (148). In this understanding, even though these public discourses are initiated by loose coalitions of private and autonomous individuals and associations, they carry with them the public voice and public sentiments. With the increase in mass media during the twentieth century, these public discourses are connected to the state and political authorities—a process that in liberal theory is the sine qua non of modern democracy. The underlying assumption in this line of thinking is that power is diffused evenly in different social and political strata, and that it is accessible to all, including individual citizens who are willing to exercise their rational capacity to debate matters of governance. However, the challenge that could face this liberal understanding of civil society is the question about what happens in societies such as Zimbabwe where power is concentrated in the state and political elites, with little of it exercised by private, autonomous individuals. In most African countries—and indeed Zimbabwe—the post-colonial government has sought to control civic groups through legislation, registration and various other measures, which enable the regime to know what is going on in these organisations (Makumbe 1998a; Diamond 1997). Africa has a history of state censorship of the media, repressive media laws, limited and constricted scope for civic and political freedoms, and a general centralisation of power within the state. In the context of civil society participation in democratic processes, Makumbe (1998a), avers that there is a range of intractable problems bedevilling the growth of a vibrant civil society in Zimbabwe—and this is the case in most African countries. The first of these problems relates to the narrow institutional surface area offered by pre- and post-colonial governments for meaningful contact and deliberative dialogue with civil society. In contemporary Zimbabwe, the limited space for engagement between government and ordinary members of society manifests in a constant feeling that policy formulation lacks civic and participatory consultations, while relations between civil society and security services remain very fragile. Secondly, civil society organisations in Africa are often crippled by problems of poverty, corruption, nepotism, parochialism, opportunism, ethnicism, illiberalism and willingness to be co-opted by state power and external agents (Diamond 1997 cited in Makumbe 1998a). For example, the vibrant labour movement that gave birth to popular politics and the emergence of the biggest opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, has not been sustainable as most workers faced retrenchment during the

124 

S. TSARWE

unpopular early 1990s Economic Structural Adjustment Programme enforced by the Bretton Woods institutions (Makunike 2015; Makumbe 1998a). In addition to the dearth of organised labour movements, the popular student-based political activism coterminous with the 1960 nationalist movements against the colonial regime fizzled out in the face of crushing economic conditions, rendering political activism secondary to the more pressing and immediate struggles of daily survival. Thirdly, civil societies in Africa are not capable of sustaining themselves without the support of either the state or foreign international donor funds, and governments often take the opportunity to either manipulate or muzzle them. This became clearly apparent at the time when Mugabe’s ZANU–PF regime increased pressure on numerous alternative labour movements, including teachers’ representative bodies, medical professionals’ bodies, independent churches and a number of grassroots bodies, and they increasingly began to drift towards the government, while others that were more sympathetic to the government were formed. University students were closely tied to the national liberation movements and the African struggle against colonial oppression from the 1960s onwards, as part of the nationalist onslaught on colonial rule. However, post-colonial African governments were intolerant of the same student movements in which the nationalist movements had strong representation. This led to the emergence of powerful alternative politics and grassroots resistance, challenging the colonial state hegemony. While some of these groups have shaped the nature and state of democratic deepening in Zimbabwe, their vibrancy has severely dwindled since 1980, resulting in the state regrouping its hegemonic machinery and imposing an overbearing presence on all socio-political, economic and cultural spheres, effectively crowding out the deliberative space. The effect has been a decreasing interest in political participation by ordinary Zimbabweans, voter apathy during elections and a general disengagement from all civic processes. In the 1990s, two developments further complicated government–student relations. The first was the deteriorating economic fortunes that directly affected student welfare, forcing students to join organised workers under the leadership of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (Makunike 2015; Chibango and Kajau 2010; Zeilig 2007). The second was the unpopular University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 1990, which gave excessive powers to government-appointed vice-chancellors to discipline both students and lecturers (Makunine 2015; Chibango and Kajau 2010; Zeilig 2007; Ngara 1995). The relationship between the

5  UNDERSTANDING ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL CULTURE: MEDIA AND CIVIL… 

125

government and students (and their culture of resistance) soured towards the close of the 1980s, because of growing public corruption and the ruling party’s insistence on establishing a one-party state (Makunine 2015; Makumbe 1998a). In the next section, we take a look at the media in Zimbabwe as part of civil society, and observe how it has contributed in the democratisation process against the backdrop of repressive media laws and the struggle for economic survival. The Media as Part of Zimbabwean Civil Society The role of the media in modern democracies has been extensively discussed in contemporary literature. The key thrust has been that traditional mass media and more contemporary digital media technologies play a critical role in promoting civic engagement and participation within modern democracies (Papacharissi 2010; Dahlgren 2009; Buckingham 2000; McChesney 1999). Most of this literature originally focused on the traditional mainstream press (including newspapers, radio and television) and later on networked digital media technologies (the internet, social media and mobile phones) as necessary in fostering open political debates and the exchange of policy ideas, unhindered by political and corporate elites. Central to this thesis is the necessity for these media to be free from any influence by corporate and political elites, so they achieve their objective of deepening democracy. While these claims have been central in media and democracy literature, they have recently been facing fierce criticism because of the rise of the partisan press, including Robert McChesney’s critique of how corporate and political elites use the media to sustain their power and interests (1999). Despite these criticisms, the media and democracy thesis still holds some sway in scholarly writing, and that is acknowledged here. This section is premised on the argument that an independent and free media—with particular reference to traditional mainstream media and the internet—is still, and may continue to be, a necessary ingredient in contemporary democracies despite the criticisms levelled against it. The argument will be used to assess Zimbabwean media’s level of independence, freedom and ability to mediate a democratic space for public political engagement. It is noteworthy that when Zimbabwe became independent, the country inherited a fairly diverse media landscape characterised by a vibrant state-owned media and a blossoming private press, reflecting the existing

126 

S. TSARWE

economy that was dominated by private white capital (Chuma 2008). However, since 1980, the new government has revived authoritarian control of the public media (both print and electronic) for political reasons, muzzling the press’ civic role of providing oversight of political authorities. In Chap. 9 of this book, Pasirai raises the argument that the Zimbabwean government has used state media as a resource to enhance the ruling party’s dominance. Pasirai argues that, as in colonial days, public media entrenched the ruling party’s hegemonic power and vilified prodemocracy activists and opposition parties. More succinctly, he discusses how Professor Jonathan Moyo, the newly appointed Minister of State for Information and Publicity, managed to manipulate journalists from the state press through meetings, money, threats to jobs and by creating and disseminating content via routine briefings, which resulted in a self-policing journalistic team and a pliant state press. We now direct our focus on two critical strategies that the government has traditionally used to prevent the media from effectively performing its civic functions. The first is the co-option of the media onto the government’s post-independence development agenda by encouraging mainstream media to adopt a developmental journalism approach. This emphasised supporting the ruling elite rather than guarding against power abuse. While the approach partly helped to facilitate public knowledge and support of the post-colonial state’s developmental policies and strategies (Mafunda et al. 2012), the increased centralisation of media ownership by the government played out badly, as it hindered true criticism of the government when it was necessary. In this way, mainstream media, particularly public media, played a lapdog role, incapable of standing at a critical distance from political authorities. Besides introducing significant ownership and editorial changes (which mostly involved the replacement of critical white editors with black editors who were willing to toe the government’s line) in the public print and broadcasting sector, the government maintained the state monopoly in broadcasting as well as the repressive legal infrastructure that had been used by the colonial regime (Saunders 1999; Chuma 2008; Ndlela 2008). Rønning and Kupe (2000) see this as creating tension between a “democratic” (as reflected in the Lancaster Constitution) and an “authoritarian” impetus (inbuilt inherited restrictive laws), which undermined the diversity and pluralism of political opinion in the Zimbabwean mainstream public sphere. They also argue that the co-existence of authoritarian state control of the public media and the relative freedom enjoyed by private media created a dual legacy of

5  UNDERSTANDING ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL CULTURE: MEDIA AND CIVIL… 

127

authoritarianism and democracy (Tsarwe and Mare 2019a; Tsarwe 2019). In a political context such as Zimbabwe, where the government wields enormous power over control and ownership of the media (Mare 2013), political elites seek control of the media in order to influence news and opinions in their own interests, and in the process trample its normative roles. The second strategy is the passing of a number of repressive media laws and the establishment of statutory regulatory bodies alongside them. Examples of these laws include the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act of 2004. However, following the ascendancy of Emmerson Mnangagwa as president after the military coup in 2017, most of these laws have now been repealed, being replaced in 2019 with equally controversial bills that continue to impose limitations on constitutionally provided freedom of access to information, freedom of the media and freedom of speech. For example, AIPPA was repealed and replaced by three bills: the Freedom of Information Bill, the Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill and the Data Protection Bill. These laws have largely been condemned by many elements of both media and civil society. Passed in 2001, the BSA, among other things, places excessive powers in the hands of the Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, who in consultation with the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe is the ultimate licensing authority. Criticism has not only been levelled against the powers given to the Minister of information, but also the fact that the authority has gone for a number of years without a board, and without proper explanation from government. It has also hindered the licensing of community radio stations—an unresolved issue that has been at the centre of public and civil society concern for decades in the country. On the other hand, POSA (passed in 2002), is the colonial era Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), created to restrict freedom of expression, movement and assembly. In its present state in independent Zimbabwe, the law criminalises anyone who undermines or makes “any abusive, indecent, obscene or false statement about or concerning the President or an acting President, whether in respect of his person or his office”. The law has been a major block to the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. The proposed bills that have repealed these laws remain antithetical to free speech and free media. In summary, the Freedom of Information Bill

128 

S. TSARWE

sets out the procedure for access to information held by public institutions or information held by any person, the scope of limitations on the right of access to information, the rights of third parties, the role of principal officers and information officers of entities in its implementation, procedures for internal and court appeals in respect to requests for access to information and the time limits within which these processes must be carried out. While Section 3(b) and 5 of the Bill seek to cultivate a culture of voluntary disclosure of information by public entities and statutory bodies, these seemingly progressive sections are frustrated by Section 5, which imposes a duty on such bodies to produce a written information disclosure policy. It thus compels public institutions to designate information officers, that is, organisational officers, responsible for the handling and processing of requests for public information. Unfortunately, the Bill is silent on the practical steps necessary to enforce or strengthen these voluntary disclosure mechanisms. In addition, the Bill states that requests for such information should be made only in writing. The Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill seeks to regularise the establishment of the Zimbabwe Media Commission, as outlined in Chapter 12 of the Constitution. According to this, the Media Commission is one of the country’s independent commissions set up to support freedom of the media. However, the Bill has been accused of bestowing wide discretionary powers on the minister over the Commission, thereby compromising the independence of the Commission as spelt out in the Constitution. In addition, the Media Institute of Southern Africa Zimbabwe has also cited that Section 10 (4) of the Media Commission Bill allows for the possibility of police involvement in Commission investigations, arguing that this allows the criminalisation of communication activities.1 The third bill, the Personal Information/Data Protection Bill, seeks to govern the processing of personal information by private and public bodies. It also prevents the unauthorised use, collection and processing of identifiable personal data (TechZim 2015). To implement this law, the Data Protection Authority of Zimbabwe is to be established. As with most of the bills cited here, one problem that has been raised is the power invested in the president in the appointment of board members in consultation with the minister. For civil society and the media, this is a cause of concern mainly because of the high levels of scepticism about government 1  See http://crm.misa.org/upload/web/misa-zimbabwe-commentary-on-the-zimbabwe-media-commission-bill-2019.pdf.

5  UNDERSTANDING ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL CULTURE: MEDIA AND CIVIL… 

129

appointments, which are usually viewed as political in nature. Many Zimbabwean media scholars have argued that the passage of the laws was designed to silence critical private media, to inhibit media development (especially in the electronic media sector) and to increase the influence of the Minister of Information and Publicity on mediated communication in the country (Chuma 2008; Moyo 2009). The consequence of these forms of restrictive government intervention is a media that is polarized and largely limited in its ability to engage in the fair, balanced and objective public discourses necessary for deepening democracy. As a result, and more appropriately, the Zimbabwean media system fits into a model termed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as a polarised pluralist model. The notion of political pluralism is largely attributed to their comparative study of media systems in Western and Southern European countries. They describe a polarised pluralist media model as largely characterised by a high degree of political parallelism and relatively low levels of journalistic professionalism, with the state playing a central, interventionist role (Chuma 2008; Mare 2013; Muneri 2012). As stated earlier, the impact of this is that the media falls short of its civic role of deliberating on matters of national importance, choosing rather to align itself with dominant centres of power. The polarization of Zimbabwean media is aptly described by Muneri (2012), who observes that it is divided along party lines, with government-owned media fully supportive of the ruling party and privately owned newspapers leaning towards opposition political figures and issues.

Conclusion This chapter seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it defined and applied the notion of political culture in the context of Zimbabwean political values. Secondly, it examined the state of civil society and its role in Zimbabwe’s transition to democracy. Thirdly, and viewing the media as part of civil society, it broadly sketched the development and current state of the media in the country as a stakeholder in democratic transition. The chapter made the case that the narrowing democratic culture can be located in centralist tendencies inherited by the post-colonial government from the white colonial regime, the limited involvement of diverse civil society in civic and political processes, a restrictive media environment and the conflation of the state and party politics. Overall, the biggest obstacle to democratic deepening in Zimbabwe has its roots in undemocratic

130 

S. TSARWE

practices inherited by the post-colonial government, with an elite continuing to dominate the country’s political landscape, as well as strategic institutions such as the media.

References Almond, G. 1956. Comparative Political Systems. Journal of Politics 18 (3): 391–409. Almond, G., and S.  Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Buckingham, D. 2000. The Making of Citizens. Young People News and Politics. London: Routledge. Camara, M. S. 2008. Media, Civil Society, and Political Culture in West Africa. Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 29 (2): 210–229. Chibango, C., and G.  Kajau. 2010. Voice of the Voiceless—Student Activism in Zimbabwe, 23. Harare: Silvera House Social Series No. Chikerema, Fidelis, and V.  Chakunda. 2014. Political Culture and Democratic Governance in Zimbabwe. Journal of Power, Politics & Governance 2 (1): 55–66. Chilton, Stephen. 1988. Defining Political Culture. The Western Political Quarterly 41 (3): 419–445. Chuma, W. 2008. Mediating the 2000 Elections in Zimbabwe: Competing Journalisms in a Society at the Crossroads. Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 29 (1): 21–41. Da Silva, Filipe Carreira, Terry N. Clark, and Mónica Brito Vieira. 2015. Political Culture. In The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication, ed. Mazzoleni Gianpietro, 1st ed. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Dahlgren, Peter. 2009. Media and Political Engagement: Citizens, Communication, and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Darnolf, Staffan. 1997. Democratic Electioneering in Southern Africa: The Contrasting Cases of Botswana and Zimbabwe. Goteborg: Goteborg University Press. Dawson, R., and Prewitt, K. 1969. Political socialization. Boston: Little, Brown Diamond, L. 1997. Civil society and the development of democracy. Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones. Madrid, Estudio Formisano, R. P. 2001. The concept of political culture. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 31 (3): 393–426. Gendzel, Glen. 1977. Political Culture: Genealogy of a Concept. Journal of Interdisciplinary History xxvIIm (2): 225–250. Geremek, Bronislaw. 1992. Civil Society then and Now. Journal of Democracy 3 (2): 3–12.

5  UNDERSTANDING ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL CULTURE: MEDIA AND CIVIL… 

131

Habermas, J. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. 1986. The new obscurity: The crisis of the welfare state and the exhaustion of utopian energies: Translated by Phillip Jacobs. Philosophy & Social Criticism 11 (2): 1–18. Mafunda, E., B.  Albin, and K.  Hjelm. 2012. Differences in Health and Illness Beliefs in Zimbabwean Mean and Women with Diabetes. The Open Nursing Journal 6 (1): 117–125. Makumbe, J.W. 1998a. Is There a Civil Society in Africa? International Affairs 74 (2): 305–317. Makunike, B. 2015. The Zimbabwe Student Movement: Love-Hate Relationship with Government? Journal of Student Affairs in Africa 3 (1): 35–48. Mano, W. 2016. The State and Public Broadcasting: Continuity and Change in Zimbabwe. In Global Media and National Policies, The Return of the State, ed. T. Flew, P. Iosifidis, and J. Steemers. London: Palgrave Mcmillan. Mare, A. 2013. New Media, Pirate Radio and the Creative Appropriation of Technology in Zimbabwe: Case of Radio Voice of the People. Journal of African Cultural Studies 25 (1): 30–41. Mayhew, Leon H. 1997. The New Public. Professional Communication and the Means of Social Influence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McChesney, R. W. 1999. The new global media. Nation, 269 (18): 11–15. Mcgregor, J. 2002. The Politics of Disruption: War Veterans and the Local State in Zimbabwe. African Affairs 101 (402): 9–37. Mlambo, A.S. 1993. Student Protest and State Reaction in Colonial Rhodesia: The 1973 Chimukwembe Student Demonstration at the University of Rhodesia. Journal of Southern African Studies 21 (3): 473–490. ———. 2013. Student Activism in A Time of Crisis—Zimbabwe 2000—2010: A Tentative Exploration. Journal of Contemporary History 38 (1): 184–204. Moyo, Dumisani. 2004. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Change Without Change? Broadcasting Policy Reform and Political Control. In Media, Public Discourse and Political Contestation, ed. Henning Melber, 12–28. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute. Moyo, D. 2009. Citizen Journalism and the Parallel Market of Information in Zimbabwe’s 2008 Election. Journalism Studies 10 (4): 551–567. Muneri, C.T. 2012. Negotiating Cultural Identity in the Struggle for Democracy in Zimbabwe: Post-Colonial Transitions and Endurance. A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Communication at The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, July 2012. Ndlela, N.M. 2008. ‘Journalism practice and the dynamics of change in Norway’, Paper presented at the Nordic Media Theory Conference, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism and Oxford University, Department of Scandinavian

132 

S. TSARWE

Studies, Oxford,7-8 November. Retrieved on the 23rd of October 2010 from http://www.reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/documents/nordic.../Ndela.doc Ngara, E. 1995. The African University and Its Mission. Maseru (Lesotho): Institute of Southern African Studies. Papacharissi, Z. 2010. A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. Sparks, C. 2009. South African Media in Transition. Journal of African Media Studies 1 (2): 195–220. Rønning, H. & T. Kupe. 2000. The Dual Legacy of Democracy and Authoritarianism. In De-Westernizing Media Studies, ed. J. Curran and M. Park, 157–177. London: Routledge. Saunders, R. 1999. Dancing out of tune: A history of the media in Zimbabwe. Harare: Edwina TechZim. 2015. Understanding Zimbabwe’s Draft Data Protection Bill. https:// www.techzim.co.zw/2015/11/understanding-zimbabwes-draft-data-protection-bill/#.V7LHgJh97IU. Accessed 12 Nov 2019. Tengende, N. 1994. Workers, Students and the Struggles for Democracy: State– Civil Society Relations in Zimbabwe. PhD, Roskilde University, Denmark. Tsarwe, S. 2019. Searching for Elusive Journalism Values in the Era of Fake News: A Qualitative Study on the Experiences of a Blogging Community in Zimbabwe. Communicare 38 (1): 16–36. Tsarwe, S., and A. Mare. 2019a. Journalistic Framing of Electoral Conflict in a Politically Fragile Society: A Comparative Study of the Zimbabwean Weekly Press. African Journalism Studies 40: 18–35. https://doi.org/10.108 0/23743670.2019.1570297. Zeilig, L. 2007. Revolt and Protest, Student Politics and Activism in Sub-Saharan Africa. London/New York: Tauris Academic Studies. ———. 2008. Student Politics and Activism in Zimbabwe: The Frustrated Transition. Journal of Asian and African Studies 43 (2): 215–237.

PART II

Identity, Militarisation and Transitional Politics

CHAPTER 6

The Identity Politics Factor in Zimbabwe’s Transition Politics Bekezela Gumbo

Introduction Identity politics was an inalienable and continuous political strand in Zimbabwe’s political economy and society in the past, continues to be so in the present and will be so in the foreseeable future. It has been tightly networked, determined and preconditioned across regional and generational divides. Although the subject has not been 2020 given much attention in the mainstream literature, it should be noted that key transition questions that have successively beset the nation since decolonisation in 1980, such as the liberation question (1950s–1980), the nation-building question (1980–1987), the land reform question (1980–2001), the democratisation question (1999–2020) and the post-Mugabe power transition question (2013–2017), have been heavily punctuated and defined by identity politics. It has become more of a defining culture for the social, economic and, more importantly, political past, present and future. Thus, the history of transitions in Zimbabwe can best be described as identity politics tuned into a dominant political culture. With guidance

B. Gumbo (*) Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_6

135

136 

B. GUMBO

from David (Easton, 1957) systems theory, it can be stated that identity politics has been the most dominant political environment, responsible for influencing inputs (demands and supports), outputs (policies, programmes) and feedback from the political system. As shall be revealed in this chapter, identity politics in Zimbabwe has historically been a three-pronged phenomenon. This appears in three basic clusters that seem to vary as differing national transition questions bedevil the nation. These three group-coalescing and/or group identifiers are racial nationalism, the politics of tribal/ethnic hegemony and the politics of liberation entitlement. These have nurtured and prolonged Zimbabwe’s political culture, in turn shaping its successive political transitions. The ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) has been at the centre of the alternation, cross-­ pollination and metamorphosis of these three filaments of identity politics, and has embedded them in the country’s dominant political culture. This chapter interrogates the identity politics factor in post-colonial Zimbabwe and its role in shaping the political economy. It offers a conceptual construction of the three group identifier threads around which identity politics has manifested as a dominant political culture. The chapter posits that the past and future of transition in Zimbabwe lie in the nature and extent of identity politics, and how this is harnessed and utilised in the transition process.

Identity Politics: What Are Its Political Strands? Identity politics as a determining political culture in Zimbabwean history cannot be fully understood without exploring what identity politics really is and what constitutes its fundamental tenets and/or strands. The term, when it first appeared in humanities literature used by Anspach (1979: 765), referred to ‘social movements which seek to alter the self conceptions and societal conceptions of their participants’. Two tenets defining identity politics here are that it is the coalescing of a group of people into a single unit or social group, and secondly that this single unit creates and recognises its own common identity based on a particular political identifier strand, fighting for others in society to respect, understand and recognise the unit that is created around it. Life within this unit is therefore shaped by the dictates of this overriding identifier, which ties group members together.

6  THE IDENTITY POLITICS FACTOR IN ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION POLITICS 

137

Identity politics, in other words, should be understood as politics based on certain identities that are in turn the result of a particular group identifier. It is an attempt to defend, promote and empower a certain group of people who exist as an organised unit with a certain shared identity and come as such to take up positions of power in politics and economics. Ford (2005: 53) notes that identity politics is ‘a political orientation built around a (pre-existing) social identity’ and that ‘identity comes before the politics: we begin with identities whose shape and character are, or at least could be, pre-political and then we opt to get political about them’. It is built around a pre-existing social reality common to group members, and they use this common reality to organise and/or orient themselves for political purposes. This pre-existing reality constitutes what has been problematised here as group identifier strands, and it can present itself in the form of shared history, language, religion, ethnicity, skin colour or suffering that is uniform among group members. Arthur (2004: 1) lists the following as popular group identifier strands that usually metamorphose into dominant political cultures: activities based on the shared experiences of members of a specific social group (often relying on shared experiences of oppression) … include not only those organized around sexual and gender identities, but also around such identities as race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and disability.

Identity, once established and entrenched within a group in a society, is used as a norm that determines political choices, reactions of the group concerned and its interactions with outsiders (Ford 2005; Bernstein 2005; Arthur 2004). It thus becomes an overriding political culture that can be used to predict political behaviour, justify policies, predict political options and reactions, and ultimately shape socio-economic and political development in a country dominated by that particular group. In contemporary politics, identity politics has become the general framework for key contestations, and ethnic, sectarian, religious and national identities have become dominant group identifiers undergirding ̇ the overriding political culture in societies (Inac and Unal 2013: 1). Identity politics has become a dominant political culture across the world, instances including ‘separatist movements in Canada and Spain, and violent ethnic and nationalist conflict in post-colonial Africa and Asia, as well as in the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe’ (Bernstein 2005:47).

138 

B. GUMBO

Identity Politics Shapes Transition Politics: Easton’s Systems Theory The role of identity politics in transitions is best understood in terms of David Easton’s systems theory. According to this theory, transition is an outcome of a political system resulting from the system’s processing of inputs (demands and support) from the environment (society) into outputs (government policies, decisions and programmes) and feedback (reactions) from the environment (society) (Easton 1957: 384). Easton (1957: 386) notes that: demands have their birth in two sectors of experience: either in the environment of a system or within the system itself … in the environment we have such systems as … culture … social structure and demography. Each of these constitutes a major set of variables in the setting that help to shape the kind of demands entering a political system … The members of every society act within the framework of an ongoing culture that shapes their general goals, specific objectives and procedures that members feel ought to be used.

In this context, identity politics has emerged as a dominant political culture in Zimbabwe, constituting the environment within which the political system and/or process operates. It serves as the environment that Easton envisioned as a key determinant of the kind of inputs channelled into the political system, the kind of gate-keeping done within the system to determine the entry of inputs into the processing machinery of the political system, and the kind of outputs and outcomes from the system. Identity politics conditions the hearts and minds of society, and forms the political system to the extent that outputs, inputs and feedback cannot be the way they are without the kind of coaching that identity politics imposes. Figure 6.1 provides a diagrammatic and contextualised illustration of the role of identity politics as an environment that shapes outcomes of the political system on selected but key transition questions and contestations in Zimbabwe.

6  THE IDENTITY POLITICS FACTOR IN ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION POLITICS 

139

Inputs Outputs Demands Decisions/Policies

1. Nation building 2. Shona ethnic hegemony 3. Land (1950s2000s)

Political System

4. Democracy and economic Recovery (1999-2018)

1. ZANU-PF Government

5. Power transition Support

2. Political Institutions populated with ZANU-PF supporters and sympathisers

1. Successive ZANU-PF electoral victories

1. Majority rule & Lancaster House Constitution 2. Gukurahundi Operation 3. First Track Land Reform Programme 4. 2008 June election rerun violence 5. Indigenisation and economic empowerment policy 6. 2013 Constitution 7. 2017 Coup d’etat

2. Apathy and rise of MDC

8. 1 August 2018 post election violence

Environment Identity Politics Racist Nationalism Politics of Shona ethnic hegemony Politics of liberation entitlement

Fig. 6.1  A systems analysis of identity politics in Zimbabwe transition politics

Identity Politics: A Dominant Political Culture in Zimbabwe There are three key political strands upon which identity politics has been nurtured in Africa: racial nationalism, tribal and/or ethnic hegemony and religious sectarianism. Although religious sectarianism has not been a problematic group identifier in the Zimbabwean body politic, key political

140 

B. GUMBO

contestations have been punctuated and symptomised by three popular group identifier tenets: i. racial nationalism; ii. politics of tribal/ethnic hegemony; iii. politics of liberation entitlement. Together, these make up the essence of identity politics in post-colonial Zimbabwe, which has become a domineering political culture steering the course of political transition in the country. Identity politics so construed shapes, nurtures and defines all other political cultures in Zimbabwe. We now discuss the conceptual construction of these three group-coalescing identifiers and illustrate how they have metamorphosed into rigid political cultures that have defined, shaped and predicted political transitions in the Zimbabwean political economy. Racial Nationalism This is another group-coalescing and/or political orientation that uses race as a political strand, uniting group members into a single movement or unit that competes for political, social and economic resources in a society. This is a more cross-cutting political organisation magnet, which in most cases cuts across tribal or ethnic groups since skin colour is shared by many linguistic and ethnic groups. Nationalism in Zimbabwe was and still is typified by what Taylor (1989: 414) describes as shared experiences of colonial subjugation and social exclusion of certain (black/African) members of a group. This is what united black nationalist movements in Southern Africa during the decolonisation movement, doing the same among settlers resisting decolonisation (Kriger 1999). For instance, it was possible for nationalists in Zimbabwe to gain assistance from Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania because the politics of decolonisation were based on racial nationalism—the fight for majority rule advocated by leaders of political parties populated by black people in a society dominated by black majorities, against minority rule by white people in a society with few white people. Songs of decolonisation struggles, such as the famous ‘dubulibhunu’ (shoot the whites) song that reverberated across all nationalist movements in Southern Africa, served as a pointer to the fact that nationalism in the region had strong racial foundations. This foundation and/or inclination was also evident in the emphasis on African people and nationals of African

6  THE IDENTITY POLITICS FACTOR IN ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION POLITICS 

141

origin as the main political strand that identified membership of nationalist political parties, illustrated in the names of nationalist political parties such as Zimbabwe’s African People’s Union and African National Union, the African National Congress and Kenya’s African National Union. It cannot be denied that most of these African National political parties transmogrified from trade unions that previously championed labour rights and demands peculiar to African workers. Labour was racially stratified and nationalists’ political movements born out of such organisations were inescapably prone to remain racially organised. This racial nationalism defined transition trajectories after colonial rule came to an end, in terms of policies, nation-building, political contestations and development. Politics of Tribal and/or Ethnic Hegemony  This is political coalescing and/or orientation based on ethnic and/or tribal distinctiveness. It is usually based on a shared language and/or claims of a shared historic nationality that existed before the status quo, and ties group members into a single unit that competes with and is strongly opposed to others within the society. This kind of politics has led to the proliferation of ethnic or tribal political parties, such as the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963, which was dominated by Shona-speaking tribes, as a breakaway from the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which continued after 1963 to be populated by Ndebele-speaking tribes (Sithole 1979; Moore 2014). The undergirding norm has been the propagation and prolongation of Shona hegemony in all spheres of life versus Ndebele ethnic politics of repulsion and animosity. State policies, decision-making, allocation of political posts, political contestations and transition trajectories in these political systems have reflected subservience to the whims of tribalism or ethnic politics. Politics of Liberation Entitlement  This post-colonial group was based on shared liberation history or what has been termed patriotic history, a political strand that ties group members into a single unit that fights to promote, defend and prolong the liberation legacy against ‘others’. The Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) has been the creator and beneficiary of this style of identity politics since the 1990s. The patriotic history narrative depicts ZANU–PF (united with its liberation war veterans) as the sole giver and guarantor of independence and sovereignty in Zimbabwe, which is constantly threatened by imperialist forces (Tendi 2010). This form of identity politics metamorphosed from

142 

B. GUMBO

the cross-pollination between three political factors: the racial nationalism and tribalist/ethnic-hegemony politicking described above and domestic pressures and/or shocks posed by post-independence generation frustrations over human development failures of nationalist governments. As Onslow notes, the politics of liberation entitlement centres on the following: importance of personality, ethnic and clan politics which helped to shape the liberation movement during the struggle for independence … [and] … the role of ‘armed struggle’... These formative attitudes and experiences forged political cultures which have continued to play out in the domestic political arena post-independence’ (2011: 2).

It is a simultaneous consolidation of the past liberation history and use of history to repel threats of erosion posed by the future. A group of nationalists who participated in the liberation struggles leading to the decolonisation of countries in Southern Africa have created an identity narrative that gives them entitlement to the state, power, resources and destiny of the post-independence state against threats of transition caused by post-independence demographic transformations (Raftopoulos 2010: 202). Political contestations, key national questions and political transition have been punctuated by contestations between the ‘liberation entitlement’ stock-holder group and the post-independence generation, with the former importing and deploying their founding racial nationalism and tribalism politics. Identity politics has been a constant factor throughout post-colonial politics in Zimbabwe to the extent that it has become a dominant political culture determining the distribution of resources, a defining political culture since the decolonisation of Zimbabwe and a guiding culture in most political contestations and controversies. To restate the thesis of this chapter, the political economy reveals that identity politics as a dominant political culture has been based on three fundamental ‘group-coalescing’ identifiers: racial nationalism, politics of tribal/ethnic hegemony and politics of liberation entitlement. These three factors have defined almost every sphere of life in Zimbabwe, and all critical junctures for transition have been captured in this web of identity politics.

6  THE IDENTITY POLITICS FACTOR IN ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION POLITICS 

143

History of Transition in Zimbabwe: From Racial Nationalism to Politics of Liberation Entitlement In Zimbabwe, political transition from the settler state to a black majority-­ governed state has been an interplay of identity politics founded on racial nationalism, tribal/ethnic hegemony politics (Sithole 1979) and the politics of liberation entitlement. The analysis presented in this chapter attempts to give a concise overview of how these three factors have played, and still play, a decisive role in transition politics. Identity politics as a political culture has indeed determined political transition trajectories. The state media have been instrumental in creating, transforming and sustaining the dominant political culture that has kept ZANU–PF in power. Figure 6.2 lays out a conceptual framework that summarises identity politics and its overriding role in key national transition questions from independence till 2020. The identity politics of early nationalist movements and/or political parties combined racial nationalism and the politics of tribal/ethnic hegemony. At its inception in the 1950s, nationalism was organised around race—the desire to end colonial subjugation and establish black majority rule. Political parties such as the 1957–1959 Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC), and its successors, the 1960 National Democratic Party and ZAPU, appealed more to cross-cutting group identifier filaments such as a shared history of colonial oppression, sameness of skin, a traceable history of common nationality and panAfrican claims of the historical inheritance of the country from shared forefathers. These political parties had a multi-ethnic executive membership and were led by Joshua Nkomo, who came from a Ndebele ethnic minority. Such a situation has become close to impossible today, because of the political culture of Shona ethnic hegemony cultivated by the postindependence government. The cross-cutting nature of identity politics as a political culture of that time was portrayed in the branding of the movements and the policy positions of those parties that assumed advocacy for all black people against white domination—racial nationalism. Emphasis was placed on ‘African Nationals’ or ‘African People’ as a key political group, and their identity was propagated by SRANC and ZAPU.  In addition, Nkomo, the then President of SRANC, gave the following pan-African policy response to the Land Husbandry Act enacted by the settler government in 1951:

144 

B. GUMBO

Zimbabwe -Identity Politics in Transition

Racism Nationalism (Blackness vs Whiteness)

Tribalist ethnic politicking (Shona vs Ndebele)

Politics of liberation entitlement (Liberation vs postindependence generation

1. The liberation and /or decolonisation struggle against white minority rule was racist from the start

1. The nationalist movements and parties were punctuated by tribalism and ethnic exclusionary politics

1. Electoral contestations from 2000-2013 have been punctuated by anti-whiteness and reverence of the liberation struggle rhetoric

ie “Zimbabwe African nationals/peoples” being a defining feature for membership to nationalist movements.

ie The 1963 ZAPU splits, the Shona-Ndebele interparty conflicts such as the battle of eNtumbane

ie ZANU PF has branded the opposition parties as conduits of white settlers and surrogates of the West

2. Electoral contestations from 1980-1987 were founded on tribal and ethnic exclusionary politics

2. The land redistribution program was characterised by entitlement of ‘liberation’ group to the spoils.

2. Land redistribution policy pitched on racist frameworks and execution plans ie Lancaster house constitution protected whites for ten years postindependence by precluding land reforms, the First Track Land Reform Program delved deeper into racism 3. Post-2000 electoral contestations punctuated by anti-white racist rhetoric from the ruling ZANU-PF

ie ZANU-PF 1980-87 election slogan such as “Pasi na Joshua Nkomo” 3. Post-conflict political transformation and state building policy had serious subservience to tribal and/ or ethnic exclusionary politics ie ZANU-PF government Gukurahundi massacres in Matebeleland and Midlands in 1983-1987

ie most fertile land were given to ZANU-PF and veterans of the liberation war. 3. Political transition has been enchored on the liberation struggle hyrachy of entitlement Ie the military of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF have vowed to ensure that presidency is reserved for the liberation struggle elite

Fig. 6.2  Conceptualising identity politics as a dominant political culture in Zimbabwe Any act whose effects undermine the security of our small land rights, dispossess us of our little wealth in form of cattle, disperse us from our ancestral homes in the reserves and reduce us to the status of vagabonds and a source of cheap labour for farmers, miners, and industrialists—such an Act will turn African People against society to the detriment of the peace and progress of this country (Phimister 1993: 227–228).

6  THE IDENTITY POLITICS FACTOR IN ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION POLITICS 

145

This designation of the ‘African People’ as a defining identity of nationalists made it easier for black nationalism to resonate with pan-African movements led by black African Americans, such as Martin Luther King Jr in the United States. To buttress the assertion that Zimbabwean nationalism in its pre-1963 form was based on black skin rather than narrow ethnic politics, Martin Luther King Jr expressed this when he noted the following about SRANC: Although we are separated by miles, we are closer together in mutual struggle for freedom and human brotherhood … there is no basic difference between colonialism and segregation … our struggles are not only similar; they are in a real sense one (Sibanda 2005: 41)

This recognition would have been difficult if the nationalists had been embroiled in narrow tribal ethnic politics. The telos of the struggle was to fight the ‘white man’, and songs such as ‘dubulibhunu’ resonated across tribal and ethnic divides. The role of race as a group identifier was evident in the emphasis on ‘African Nationals’ as the main population represented by SRANC, while genuine transition did not require the exclusion of ‘European nationals’ from Rhodesia. Thus, the personality cult built around the leading nationalist of the time—Joshua Nkomo as ‘Father Zimbabwe’—illustrated the cross-cutting nature of the foundation of nationalism. The nationalist unity politics of 1975–1977 that led to the formation of the failed Zimbabwe People’s Army were an attempt to return nationalist movements to this holistic and/or cross-cutting identity politics that had been eroded (Moore 2014). The 1963 split in ZAPU that gave birth to a Shona-dominated ZANU led by Ndabaningi Sithole was an important event that indicates how tribalism and ethnicity became deeply embedded within nationalism (Sithole 1979). It was a turning point in pan-African nationalism. Original pan-­ African nationalism based on black racism broke into its constituting pieces. Transition from tribal/ethnic fragmented identities that had been promoted by colonial divide-and-rule policies to a united African Peoples identity crumbled at this point, and has failed to rise again. There emerged a political culture that evolved around tribal and/or ethnic segmentation, particularly using linguistic difference as a key identity upon which political organisation and liberation struggle was built. The immediate post-split ZAPU–ZANU inter-party conflict in Harare, Gweru, Bulawayo and other areas took clear tribal and/or ethnic

146 

B. GUMBO

dimensions. Later splits, including the one that resulted in the formation of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, also indicated how ethnicity was defying the attempts to forge a transition in nationalist identity politics (Moore 2014). This had consequences for the political trajectory of the state thereafter. Sithole (1979) described these splits as ‘struggles within struggles’, and they should be understood as a point in time where identity politics based on tribalism conditioned the political direction of the nationalist movement, which had the possibility of giving birth to a Zimbabwe that was more united than it is today. Some researchers have found that the colonial government and the Cold War policy of the United States influenced the ZAPU split, weakening the party and preventing the possibility of a Soviet-backed political grouping from getting to power in Southern Africa (Moore 2014). However, this study contends that post-­ independence realities have proved that these factors merely added more fuel to the already simmering conditioning power of tribal politics. Instead of using messages that united, the nationalist political parties that participated in the 1980 general elections used racist and tribal messages, and sloganeering such as ‘pasi na Nkomo’ (down with Nkomo), ‘phansi lo Robert Mugabe’ (down with Robert Mugabe) and down with the whites (Cliffe et al. 1980). These messages brewed animosity among supporters of the main contenders PF–ZAPU, and ZANU–PF. Instead of transforming political contestations into more accommodative politics, electoral contestation in this period failed to go beyond the African misconception of a political opponent as an enemy. Societies were engulfed in tribal exclusionary identity politics, to the extent that Ndebele- and Shona-­ speaking populations were made to perceive each other as worse enemies than their former colonial masters had been (Cliffe et al. 1980; Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni 2009). At independence, the black majority government was faced with key political transition questions, such as nation-building to move national politics from racial or tribal animosity to a rainbow nation focused on developing the whole nation as a single people, and land re-distribution to ensure fairness in land ownership and control. This was re-stated in the 4 March 1980 inauguration speech of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, when he noted that: Surely this is now time to beat our swords into ploughshares, so we can attend to the problems of developing our economy and our society… I urge you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a new pledge to forget

6  THE IDENTITY POLITICS FACTOR IN ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION POLITICS 

147

our grim past, forgive others and forget. Join hands in a new amity and together as Zimbabweans trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism, and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we reinvigorate our economic machinery (www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/mugabe-onreconciliation).

However, as shall be noted here, tribal/ethnic politics of exclusion and racial political culture stood in the way of this transition in the political culture of the state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). The post-independence reconciliation and transformation of the dominant racial and tribalist political culture to a ‘Zimbabwean’ identity promised by the black majority government of Mugabe turned out to be a mere political gimmick. Although the racial hegemony identity politics sponsored by the settler government was abandoned, the government revived Shona hegemony, tribal/ethnic-­ based political culture, as a replacement. Zimbabwe missed a critical juncture to transition to multi-partyism, and to the creation of a political system based on tolerance of political differences and on the importance of being Zimbabwean over being Shona or Ndebele, black or white. The events that followed the independence of Zimbabwe from Britain in 1980 illustrated that ZANU–PF had no political culture capable of ushering in institutional and social changes that would ensure national unity transcending tribal/ethnic hegemony politics, and had no plans beyond public rhetoric (Sithole and Makumbe 1997). Independence meant that racial nationalism was over; tribal/ethnic exclusionary politicking was intensified. The Shona–Ndebele linguistic differences led the country into seven years of chaotic conflicts that claimed around 20,000 people from the Ndebele minority, who were killed by ZANU–PF’s Shona-dominated North Korean-trained army—the Fifth Brigade—in a government programme code-named Gukurahundi (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation 1997; Tendi 2011; Onslow 2011; Moore 2014). In pursuit of this policy, ‘most leading personalities of PF-ZAPU and the former ZIPRA [Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army] were sacked from government and from the national army, while others were detained’ (Sithole and Makumbe 1997: 134). Although the programme was officially aimed at tracking down and capturing ‘dissidents’ in Matabeleland and Midlands, the actual plan turned out to be an enforcement of the Shona hegemony identity politics or a Shona-ruled one party state.

148 

B. GUMBO

The 1980 and 1985 election results proved that PF–ZAPU was a Ndebele ethnic minority party and ZANU–PF a Shona ethnic majority party, whereas the whites kept their racial identities because these parties enjoyed loyal support in the Matabeleland and Mashonaland regions respectively (Sithole and Makumbe 1997: 127). The ruling party’s pursuit of a one-party state policy and commitments by the then prime minister to assimilate or crush PF–ZAPU was tantamount to threatening the Ndebele ethnic minority with extinction. Thus, Mugabe even justified killing civilians by the Fifth Brigade, arguing that it was not easy to differentiate them from dissidents (Tendi 2011). Although PF–ZAPU and ZANU–PF tried to end this tribal ethnic politics through a 1987 Unity Accord, which saw PF–ZAPU being assimilated into ZANU–PF and Joshua Nkomo, its leader, being made Mugabe’s deputy in a one-party state (Onslow 2011; Dzimiri et al. 2014: 219), the roots had gone too deep to the extent that it has persisted to date. It can be argued that ZANU–PF engaged PF– ZAPU after it had confirmed that the politics of Shona ethnic hegemony that it had been cultivating for seven years had been successfully established and was ready to show its intended benefits. Today, the idea of having a Ndebele president in Zimbabwe is, in reality, unthinkable. The years of ZANU–PF rule have entrenched Shona hegemony as a dominant political culture to the extent that the highest political office a Ndebele minority can dream of is being appointed by a Shona-speaking leader to serve as his or her vice-president. Even the main post-independence opposition political party that claims to be a doyen of democracy, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), has religiously followed this undemocratic political culture as if it set in stone. Political attitudes, beliefs, choices and preferences have been modelled by post-independence tribalist ethnic identity politics in such a manner that a political party fielding a president who is not from the Shona-speaking ethnic majority effectively gives victory to its closest contender. The formation of the MDC in 1999 and the subsequent rise in its political support across the country created feelings of optimism, particularly regarding the possibility of transformation in the three group identifiers that have sustained identity politics as a dominant political culture. In the language of systems theory, the formation of MDC in 1999 can be conceptualised as the reaction of the environment to the outputs of the ZANU–PF dominated political system and a formidable factor in the political environment that was capable of causing major changes in the dominant political culture. First, MDC had a sphere of support and

6  THE IDENTITY POLITICS FACTOR IN ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION POLITICS 

149

organisation that included the white population. It was believed that this would transform Zimbabwe’s racial nationalism into a multi-racial nationalism based on Zimbabwean nationality rather than black race. Secondly, it was thought that the MDC would transform the politics of Shona hegemony into equality-based inter-tribal and inter-ethnic political organisation and representation. Thirdly, it was believed that MDC, with its leadership composed of post-independence politicians, would create a new political culture that could break away from the traditional politics of liberation entitlement that had been the order of the day in ZANU–PF policies and programmes, such as the land redistribution policy and the leadership succession debates. To a great extent, the expected changes did not materialise. Instead, racial nationalism and the politics of liberation entitlement became stronger and a formidable force against the MDC challenge. The system became more resilient to changes imposed by the environment. Political contestation was typified by racial nationalism and the politics of liberation entitlement, and statements by leading personalities in the political system pointed to this fact. For instance, at the ZANU–PF December 2000 congress, President Mugabe noted that ‘The only white man you can trust is a dead white man … our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man, our real enemy… The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans. Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans…’ (Mugabe 2000 in Newsweek 16/11/2017). These sentiments accurately captured the essence of racial nationalism as a political culture nurtured and sponsored by ZANU–PF.  It assumed that black Zimbabweans were more ‘Zimbabwean’ than white Zimbabweans, and the latter should be treated as enemies by the former. The Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) introduced in 2001 was seen by some as a ZANU–PF government response to MDC’s cross-cutting organisation, which saw many white Zimbabweans supporting and joining the opposition. The fact that MDC opposed the manner in which the programme was imposed and spoke out against brutality unleashed against white farmers in the process saw ZANU–PF creating a picture of MDC as the puppet of white Zimbabweans and an imperialist project of the West. Mugabe commented on the ongoing FTLRP in the ZANU–PF congress held in December 2003: ‘Let Blair and the British government take note and listen. Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans. Our people are overjoyed. The land is ours. We are now the rulers and owners of Zimbabwe’ (ibid).

150 

B. GUMBO

From the revival of racial nationalism in the early 2000s came the politics of liberation entitlement as a corollary political culture, to assist in resisting threats of political transition posed by MDC and other forces in civic society and media. ZANU–PF and its liberation war veterans created this group identifier in such a way that it appeared to be a pillar of ZANU– PF nationalism, operating side by side with anti-white racism against the winds of change. The politics of liberation entitlement was manifested through a political culture that sought to reserve powerful political positions and the national honour of being accorded the status of national hero for former fighters and/or participants in the liberation war that ended in 1979. Powerful units of the political system, such as the military and state-controlled media, have been used to implant this culture in the hearts of Zimbabweans. The electorate has been reminded that this group identifier strand is held in high esteem before most contested elections. For instance, in the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections, the then Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, gave a media briefing at which he said: We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organizations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost, in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people (Zvinavashe in NewYork Times, 11/01/2002).

This was repeated by Major General Martin Chedondo, who addressed Second Brigade soldiers in 2012 before the 2013 elections: We cannot be seen supporting a political party that is going against the ideals of a nation, which came by as a result of a liberation struggle, which saw many of the country’s sons and daughters losing their lives. As soldiers we must support ideologies that we subscribe to, I for one will not be apologetic for supporting Zanu-PF because I was part of the liberation struggle… (Chedondo in The Herald, 08/05/2012).

6  THE IDENTITY POLITICS FACTOR IN ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION POLITICS 

151

Robert Mugabe echoed these sentiments in past elections, with the intention of making people conceive of his main opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai, and anyone else without ‘liberation struggle credentials’, as unqualified for presidency. ZANU–PF and its war veterans were entitled to rule and determine who would rule. When the country missed political transition after the contested March 2008 presidential election results led to a violence-ridden re-run in June of the same year, President Mugabe noted: The war veterans came to me and said, ‘President, we can never accept that our country which we won through the barrel of the gun can be taken merely by an ‘X’ made by a ballpoint pen. ‘Zvino ballpoint pen icharwisana ne AK? (Will the pen fight the AK rifle?) Is there going to be a struggle between the two? Do not argue with a gun (Mugabe in The Herald, 23/06/2008).

These sentiments indicate that the only possible political transition could come from ZANU–PF liberators who were entitled to rule. In addition to the above two strands in the dominant political culture in Zimbabwe, ZANU–PF has created and nurtured a political template and/or narrative that makes subservience to Shona ethnic hegemony a ubiquitous political norm, particularly in terms of determining the hierarchy of political leadership. The MDC did nothing to alter this in its organisational formation and the allocation of powerful decision-making positions. The Shona ethnic group or tribe must rule, and choose who among its rival Ndebele tribe should give assistance services as a vice-­ president. This in part explains Thokozani Khuphe’s failure to succeed Morgan Tsvangirai as leader of the main opposition after the latter’s death on 14 February 2018. It was politically unpalatable and unwise to choose her over Nelson Chamisa or anyone else, because the dominant Shona hegemony meant that her succession would politically disadvantage the party in the 2018 elections. This would have been worse given that the main political contender in the race for presidency, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, represented Shona hegemony. The succession of President Mnangagwa after a military assisted palace coup that deposed Mugabe was made possible by the dominant political culture conceptualised in this study. Being a key player in the formation and implementation of the two key group identifiers of identity politics

152 

B. GUMBO

championed by the ZANU–PF elite, Mnangagwa had no compunction in eliminating Obert Mpofu, a member of the Ndebele ethnic group from the ‘presidium’ (the top three executive positions), despite the fact that he had remained the most senior minister and never used his power to benefit after Mnangagwa’s self-imposed exile. The system that was heavily influenced by tribal/ethnic hegemony and the politics of liberation entitlement made it unthinkable for Mpofu or any other aspirant to seize the opportunity and fill the power void that had arisen. The same strands in identity politics explain the war on the pro-Mugabe faction that was linked to Grace Mugabe, the former president’s wife. They were accussed of eroding the liberation struggle legacy since they were a ‘generation forty’ typified by the deficiency of liberation struggle credentials. The ‘generation forty’ was defined by Mnangagwa (2017) as ‘minnows who have no liberation credentials’. Thus, the coup d’état was code-named Operation Restore Legacy. What legacy was it other than the desire to naturalise power transition within the liberation struggle elite? Robert Mugabe’s successors being his wife and members of the ZANU–PF faction associated with her posed a threat that power would be handed over to someone with no liberation struggle history.

Conclusion It can be stated that identity politics is a dominant political culture in Zimbabwe and it is a key determinant of political transition post-Mugabe. The three political strands and/or group identifiers, racial nationalism, the politics of Shona tribal hegemony and the politics of liberation struggle entitlement, will continue to define the kind of transition to come in the near future. These three strands of identity politics exist inseparably from one other and they shape the major outcomes of the political system. The ruling ZANU–PF stands to benefit from this political culture, and any political attempt to dismantle this rigid barrier to political transition should direct its energies towards removing these three political strands of identity politics. It will be after this takes place that inter-ethnic equality, equitable allocation of political goods and consensual democracy will be a possibility.

6  THE IDENTITY POLITICS FACTOR IN ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION POLITICS 

153

References Anspach, R.R. 1979. From Stigma to Identity Politics: Political Activism Among the Physically Disabled and Former Mental Patients. Social Science & Medicine 13A: 765–773. Arthur, M.M.L. 2004. Identity Politics. Accessible online at: http://www.glbtqarchive.com/ssh/identity_politics_S.pdf Bernstein, M. 2005. Identity Politics. Annual Review of Sociology 31 (2005): 47–74. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation. 1997. Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980–1988. New York: Columbia University Press. Cliffe, L., et al. 1980. Nationalist Politics in Zimbabwe: The 1980 Elections and Beyond. Review of African Political Economy 18 (May–August): 44–67. Dzamiri, P., et  al. 2014. Naming, Identity, Politics and Violence in Zimbabwe. Studies of Tribes and Tribals 12 (4): 227–238. Easton, D. 1957. An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. World Politics 9 (3): 383–400. Ford, R.T. 2005. Political Identity as Identity Politics. UNBOUND 1 (53): 53–57. Inac, H., and F. Unal. 2013. The Construction of National Identity in Modern Times: Theoretical Perspective. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3 (11): 223–232. Kriger, N. 1999. The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and National Identity. In Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, ed. T. Ranger and N. Bhebe. Oxford: James Currey. Mnangagwa, 2017. Former Vice President Mnangagwa Flees, Threatens to Unseat Mugabe. https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/emmerson-mnanagwaflees/4106641.html Moore, D. 2014. The Zimbabwean People’s Army Moment in Zimbabwean History, 1975–1977: Mugabe’s Rise and Democracy’s Demise. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 32 (3): 302–318. Mugabe, 2000. The White Man is Our Real Enemy:’ Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe in Quotes. https://www.newsweek.com/best-quotes-robert-mugabezimbabwecoup-713072 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2009. Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State. Bern: Peter Lang. News24. 2017 November 8. Full Statement: ‘I’m Not Going Anywhere... Zanu-PF Is Not Your Personal Property, Mnangagwa Tells Mugabe (Online). Accessible online at: https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/full-statementim-not-going-anywhere-zanu-pf-is-not-your-personal-property-mnangagwatells-mugabe-20171108 Onslow, S. 2011. Zimbabwe and Political Transition. Accessible online at: http:// eprints.lse.ac.uk/43645/1/Zimbabwe%20and%20political%20transition.pdf

154 

B. GUMBO

Phimister, I. 1993. Rethinking the Reserves: Southern Rhodesia’s Land Husbandry Act Reviewed. Journal of Southern African Studies 19 (2): 227–228. Raftopoulos, B. 2010. Becoming Zimbabwe. A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008. Harare: Weaver Press. Sibanda, E.M. 2005. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1961–87: A Political History Of Insurgency In Southern Rhodesia. Trenton: Africa World Press. Sithole, M. 1979. Zimbabwe Struggles Within the Struggle. Salisbury: Rujeko. Sithole, M., and J.  Makumbe. 1997. Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU (PF) Hegemony and Its Incipient Decline. African Journal of Political Science 2 (1): 122–139. Taylor, C. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press. Tendi, B.-M. 2010. How Intellectuals Made History in Zimbabwe. London: Africa Research Institute, Counterpoints. Tendi, 2011. Robert Mugabe and toxicity history and context matter. https:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00344893.2011.596439?src=recsy s&journalCode=rrep20

CHAPTER 7

The Ethnicization of Political Mobilization in Zimbabwe: The Case of Pro-Mthwakazi Movements Samukele Hadebe

Introduction The bruised and polarised relationship between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups is deeply rooted in the annals of history, which makes it a protracted social conflict. (Muchemwa 2015)

The unforeseen but inevitable military intervention—unforeseen by many including President Robert Mugabe who trusted the military’s loyalty, yet inevitable in the sense that the military had already been overreaching and dabbling in party politics as witnessed when it thwarted opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai from taking power—in Zimbabwe’s political landscape coincided with the heightening of politicization of ethnic identities, especially in the Matabeleland provinces of Zimbabwe. Understandably, the challenge is not only about how to reverse direct military meddling in politics but also how to address the upsurge of pro-­Mthwakazi ethnic

S. Hadebe (*) Chris Hani Institute, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_7

155

156 

S. HADEBE

consciousness. Prolonged economic stagnation, delayed democratic transition and unresolved national healing questions have collectively given fertile ground to political groups on the fringes to embark on ethnic mobilization calculated to break up the country. This chapter demonstrates that the ethnicization of politics in Zimbabwe has reached levels that both academics and policymakers continue to ignore at great peril to the country’s territorial integrity. It is imperative that Zimbabwe should address perceived ethnic marginalization, unequal development and restitution for injustices of the past. While there is no obvious nexus between the military and ethnic factors, however, both are likely to be dominant themes in Zimbabwe’s political discourse for the foreseeable future. Analysis of the ethnicization of political mobilization in Zimbabwe, particularly by the pro-Mthwakazi movements, is fraught with contradictions and contestations that further complicate the country’s embattled democratic discourse. However, the democratization discourse within a human rights framework has largely eschewed overt reference to ethnic politics, notwithstanding its subtle but profound influence. Even advocacy for a devolved local governance system, which was predominantly a Matabeleland agenda, was stealthily couched in order to deny the ethnic political undertones that motivated it in the first place. In the mainstream, ethnic consciousness and its politicization is roundly denounced if not denied, since its ugly reality remains a national embarrassment. Yet it is undeniable that pro-Mthwakazi ethnic mobilization ostensibly against the state is, in fact, targeted against Shona people collectively for their perceived ethnic chauvinism and triumphalism, which is characterized by, among other things, economic, political and cultural hegemony in post-­colonial Zimbabwe. The focus by many scholars has largely been on ‘decolonization politics, democracy and land politics, and this has left another important aspect of Zimbabwe’s conflict conundrum unattended and still unaddressed’ (Muchemwa 2015: 2). For example, since 2000, there has been an upsurge in pro-Mthwakazi formations, with the following being among those emerging: Patriotic Union of Matabeleland, Matabeleland Freedom Party, Mthwakazi Liberation Front (MLF), Mthwakazi Liberation Organisation, Mthwakazi Republican Party (MRP), 1893 Mthwakazi Restoration Movement, Mthwakazi Human Rights Restoration Movement (MHRRM), Umhlahlo Wesizwe sikaMthwakazi and Ibhetshu Likazulu, all more or less intent on secession. Moreover, there have been three claimants to the defunct Ndebele throne; with one even hoisting a ‘Mthwakazi’ flag and demanding occupation of the State House residence in Bulawayo, while another claimant’s coronation had to be stopped by a Zimbabwean court in 2018.

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

157

It could be argued, and convincingly so, that prolonged economic stagnation, delayed democratic transition and unresolved national healing questions have collectively given fertile ground to groups on the fringes of Zimbabwe’s political landscape that aim to embark on ethnic mobilization, calculated to break up the country in pursuit of justice. In a way, the twin unacknowledged malaises in Zimbabwe’s politics; the roles of ethnic politics and the military in the configuration of Zimbabwean political landscape, have become too visible for anyone to pretend that they do not matter much. In an ironic turn of historical events, the direct military intervention in Zimbabwe’s political landscape coincided with the heightening of politicization of ethnic identities, especially in the Matabeleland provinces of Zimbabwe. Calls for an independent Mthwakazi state and efforts to install a Ndebele king became fervent particularly from 2017. While there is no obvious nexus between the military and ethnic factors, however, both are likely to be dominant themes in Zimbabwe’s political discourse for the foreseeable future unless both trends are consciously arrested. Undoubtedly, Zimbabwe’s discourse on democratization in the not so distant future may likely be dominated by the challenges posed by direct military meddling in politics on the one hand, and the upsurge of pro-Mthwakazi consciousness characterized by secessionist tendencies on the other. Since this discussion is not about the role of the military in Zimbabwean politics but on the ethnicization of political mobilization, particularly by pro-Mthwakazi groups, any reference to the military will only be made in so far as it relates to the subject under scrutiny. Similarly, the ethnicization of political mobilization is not confined to pro-Mthwakazi groups only, but cases elsewhere will only be discussed if they influence the phenomenon of pro-Mthwakazi consciousness and the politicization of ethnicity. The chapter gives a historical context of ethnic rivalry and conflict in Zimbabwe. A particular focus is the ethnicization of liberation movement narratives. Furthermore, the chapter characterizes ethnic politics in Zimbabwe from the viewpoint of pro-Mthwakazi movements. It is useful to try and understand how these groups perceive issues since they are partly the focus of this analysis. Lastly, the chapter explores political mobilization on ethnic and regional grounds and its possible implications for the Ndebele-speaking communities in particular and Zimbabwean politics in general.

158 

S. HADEBE

The Historical Context of Ethnic Rivalry and Conflict in Zimbabwe Writing on the troubled relations between the Ndebele and Shona in contemporary Zimbabwe, Muchemwa (2015: 1) states that ‘The bruised and polarised relationship between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups is deeply rooted in the annals of history’, hence premising this discussion on the presupposition that the upsurge of pro-Mthwakazi groups is informed by the historical context of ethnic rivalry and even conflict between the Ndebele and Shona groups. The dominance in literature of Ndebele and Shona relations could create a certain false impression to a non-­ Zimbabwean reader, that these two are the only ethnic groups in the country. While Zimbabwe is multilingual and multicultural, the Ndebele and Shona seem to dominate both the historical and political space, leaving aside the whites, who, regardless of their tiny numbers, occupy a disproportionate space in the history of the country. Disparate linguistic and cultural groups such as the Tonga, Venda, Sotho, Kalanga, Nambya, Ndau and many others are subsumed within the Ndebele and Shona dichotomy in the ethnic narratives. From a linguistic level, the Hwesa, Barwe and Ndau people are marginalized owing to their forced assimilative relationship with Shona (Sithole 2018), and the same could be said of speakers of Kalanga, Tonga or Sotho in relation to Ndebele, for example. We will not dwell here on who constitute the Ndebele as this has been dealt with by many writers already (see Hughes and van Velsen 1954; Omer-Cooper 1966; Cobbing 1976; Ranger 1999), of course without reaching a consensus (Hadebe 2006). Similarly, it does not advance my argument to delve into whether or not the Ndebele constitute an ethnic group. Ethnicity itself as a concept is elusive and not easy to grapple with, since it is ‘both amorphous and imbued with doses of subjectivity’ (Mabhena 2014: 2). Actually, according to Seymour-Smith (1986: 116), ethnicity ‘may be objective or subjective, implicit or explicit, manifest or latent, acceptable or unacceptable to a given group or category of people’. Therefore, it suffices for this discussion to acknowledge that there is currently a Ndebele ethnic sentiment that has been subject to explicit political mobilization attempts by pressure groups and political formations, especially the pro-Mthwakazi movements. Employing the designation Mthwakazi in this discussion is in no way a political statement that acknowledges the rights of the imagined nation or

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

159

its claim to independence, but merely utilizes the nomenclature that the relevant groups under discussion prefer for their envisaged project. Of course, the term has become culturally and politically loaded. In essence, it is synonymous with ‘amahlabezulu’, originally referring to people collectively under the Ndebele kings without delineating their ethnic origins, either as abeZansi (from the south), abeNhla (those from the north) or abakaMambo (those previously ruled by Mambos). Notably, these various political and pressure groups have a fuzzy conceptualization of Mthwakazi and even have no consensus on its geographical demarcation. However, their convergence seems to be on the shared desire for self-determination of the Ndebele people, perhaps culminating in an autonomous state. Undoubtedly, this ethnic political mobilization is a Ndebele response to perceived Shona domination, although the degenerating economic conditions in the country could be the underlying root cause. But it would be untrue to suggest that the pro-Mthwakazi sentiment is a post-­ independence phenomenon or even to posit that ethnic rivalry between Ndebele and Shona groups is new. The rivalry and conflict pre-date the colonial era, when the pre-colonial Ndebele kingdom tended to have an aggressive posture owing to its military prowess. It is also an undeniable fact that Ndebele warriors looted cattle, grain, young men and women from neighbouring Shona chiefdoms in the same way they extended that aggression towards groups in Botswana and Zambia, not to mention the numerous battles against the Afrikaner and African communities across the Limpopo during the Ndebele people’s troubled journey to Zimbabwe. It is a fact that the majority of people who constitute the Ndebele today became such as a result of that nation-building programme, painful though it might have been. It is equally true that economic benefit and political power rather than ethnic hatred against the targeted groups could have motivated Ndebele aggression. However, the resultant ethnic hatred and backlash for which the Ndebele kingdom paid heavily, and for which Ndebele people continue to pay, cannot be ignored. For example, some Shona and Tswana chiefs cooperated with British South African Company mercenary forces in the destruction of the Ndebele kingdom while Kalanga chiefs opted for neutrality. The Ndebele as a people underwent terrible subjugation after two genocidal wars by the British imperialists, and little sympathy came their way then or does so today. Of significance is the justification used by the invading colonial forces, whose pretext was the protection of Shona from ‘marauding’ Ndebele raiders (see Warhurst 1973; Smith 1998; Guzura and Ndimande 2015).

160 

S. HADEBE

While it has been noted that many lies were told by colonial invaders, this pretext has had a profound impact on the relations of Ndebele and Shona. The colonial rulers were keen to keep the two groups divided by competition and mistrust (Kavanagh 2014). Even when Africans in general realized the limitations of this division and rivalry, it has not been easy to stamp it out. It permeated the social, economic and political lives of Africans in colonial times. It even became a destabilizing factor for the trade union movement (see Mothibe 1996) and later on the nationalist movement. Furthermore, it is unfortunate that in Zimbabwe, history and memory have been used and abused for sectarian interests. Of course, history is not neutral and might never be, but there are instances of manipulation that have detrimental effects on human progress. Recorded Ndebele history has fared no better. According to Hadebe (2006: 53), ‘This distortion of Ndebele history, which began with some colonial historians, has persisted in independent Zimbabwe. Some history textbooks continue with the colonial stereotyping of the Ndebele.’ This claim is substantiated by Lindgren (2002: 146): ‘The old, colonial image of the Ndebele as cruel warriors is still evident in some of these Zimbabwean schoolbooks, not always in words but often in pictures.’ Notable cases are Garlake and Proctor (1985) and Parsons (1985). Therefore, from a Ndebele point of view, not much truth is known about the Ndebele people’s history. According to one historian who has written much on Ndebele, ‘The most outstanding feature of contemporary written evidence for early Ndebele history is that none of it was penned by an Ndebele person’ (Rasmussen 1978: 163). Of course, this has changed since independence. It is evident that colonial writers, be they historians or novelists, ‘painted a bad picture of the Ndebele in order to justify the invasion and ultimate destruction of the Ndebele state in spite of the many peace efforts that Lobhengula had done to avoid war with the British’ (Hadebe 2007: 10). While most of these distortions, especially on Ndebele and Shona relations, have largely been proven false, nonetheless, the negative stereotypes of Ndebele people as ‘savages, lazy, thrifty and uneducated’ continue unabated particularly in social media. Contrary to challenging these stereotypes, Kavanagh (2014), in his self-published Zimbabwe: Challenging the Stereotypes, actually reinforces them. For example, in spite of historical evidence to the contrary, Kavanagh (2014: 100) condescendingly writes that:

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

161

The children of Mthwakazi, of Lobengula and Mzilikazi, wake up to find that, having been the lords of Zimbabwe before the coming of the whites and consistently treated as superior to the Shona by the whites during the colonial era, they are now to be ruled by the descendants of those they once ruled and whom they and their colonial masters traditionally regarded with contempt.

In a manner typical of all his forebears, Kavanagh reinforces the white paternalistic view that saw everything African through a tribal prism. It would seem that the past is not only seen from the context of the present, but is also exploited to justify and confirm present circumstances. In any event, the ‘biography of any nation is written backwards from the now’ (Anderson 1991: 204); hence the contestations in Zimbabwe’s historiography. The Ethnicization of Liberation Movement Narratives Another aspect of Zimbabwean history that is not only contested but is also a major source of grievance and sense of collective injustice is the memory of the liberation struggle. It has been observed that ‘Inasmuch as history is the property of victors’ (Chomsky 1979: 1), so is memory. This has been said in the context of Zimbabwe’s official narrative of the liberation legacy that belittles and marginalizes the roles of both the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZPRA), and by extension the contribution of Ndebele-speaking communities (Hadebe 2016). For the record, while the British brokered the Lancaster House Agreement, brought about a ceasefire and subsequent elections that facilitated the transfer of power; it ironically denied the freedom fighters their deserved military victory. American diplomat Andrew Young proudly confirmed that it was a victory for the West, having ‘curtailed at least temporarily the trend toward growing dependence on Soviet military aid to bring about African liberation’ (ZCP 2018: 3). Without a military victory, the contribution of armed conflict and the respective roles of ZPRA, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), Rhodesia Security Forces and other armed groups would be difficult to ascertain. It would seem that the victorious parties have their stories positively remembered and told, while those of political losers, such as ZPRA, are either forgotten or distorted. Although the victorious party, the

162 

S. HADEBE

Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) led by President Robert Mugabe won power through the British supervised elections and not through a military victory, its official narrative, especially its ‘patriotic history’ (Ranger 2004:505, 2010: 218) has emphasized and perhaps even magnified ZANLA’s military effort as having been the decisive factor. Undoubtedly, that aggravated the frustration of not only many ex-ZPRA fighters and ex-ZAPU supporters, but the generality of Ndebele people who largely supported the war effort under the aegis of ZAPU and ZPRA. Since ZANU–PF’s politburo is responsible for conferring hero status on deceased liberation veterans, the dominant perception from the Ndebele region is that former ZPRA and ZAPU heroes and heroines are deliberately marginalized as a calculated move to erase their contribution from memory. This perception grew strongly when Lt General Lookout Masuku was denied hero status in 1986, and Joshua Nkomo had this to say to about 20,000 mourners who attended Masuku’s funeral: ‘He is not being buried at the Heroes’ Acre. But they can’t take away his status as a hero. You don’t give a man the status of a hero. All you can do is recognise it. It is his’ (Nkomo 1986). Of course, that was in the context of a conflict between ZAPU and the ZANU–PF government, and although some things changed after the 1987 Unity Agreement, perceptions of marginalization of memory linger on. For example, the perceived snubbing of ZPRA heroes continued even two decades after the Unity Accord, as testified by a statement by the ZAPU president, Dumiso Dabengwa, in 2013 at the burial of Retired Colonel Richard Dube (Gedi Ndlovu) in Bulawayo’s Lady Stanley cemetery: We don’t doubt that he was a national hero and was meant to be honoured by the country for the work that he did [… judging from past experiences with what we had seen in the case of Thenjiwe Lesabe, Swazini Ndlovu and earlier Lookout Masuku, it was a waste of time to hope that as ex-ZPRA he would have been granted the befitting national hero status (Bulawayo News 24, 2013).

The public broadcaster, the main purveyor of Zimbabwe’s ‘patriotic history’, is seen as the main culprit in this alleged marginalization of ZPRA war memory. The liberation war of the late 1960s to the 1970s has generally been seen as a continuation of the anti-colonial resistance and wars by both Ndebele people (in 1893 and 1896–7) and Shona people (in

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

163

1896–7). To the consternation and frustration of some Ndebele people, only the Shona first Chimurenga is publicized, and the liberation war that brought independence is portrayed as the second Chimurenga, fought by ZANU/ZANLA and by implication the Shona people. The two brutal wars, known as Imfazo, waged by the Ndebele at the onset of colonization, are barely mentioned, and when they are, they are subsumed under the Chimurenga that began after both Ndebele wars of resistance. The many military leaders that led the Ndebele war effort and died either on the battlefield or after being sentenced by victorious colonists are rarely recognized, as the Shona war leaders Nehanda and Kaguvi have been recast to monopolize that space. It should be borne in mind, however, that this apparent ethnicization of liberation struggle narratives has a background. Mobilizing for the war and waging it transformed not only the two major liberation parties, ZAPU and ZANU, but further entrenched a culture of violence as an instrument of politics. Zimbabwe’s story was not going to be the same. The war itself had many incidents that widened the rift between ZAPU and ZANU, further worsening ethnic relations as both ZPRA and ZANLA’s recruitment (intentionally or otherwise) tended to be regionally based. Numerous attempts to mend the relations and in some cases train and fight as one force had in some instances disastrous consequences, if massacres in Mgagao (Tanzania) or Mboroma (Zambia) or even the Zimbabwe People’s Army experience in Mozambique, are put into context. ZPRA and ZANLA cadres fought each other openly in foreign countries and did not even shy away from doing so within Zimbabwean borders still controlled by their common enemy. Embarrassing as it was, this reality has to be confronted without prejudice if one is to understand the politics of armed struggle in Zimbabwe. In a free Zimbabwe, both ex-ZPRA and ex-­ ZANLA cadres seem to underplay that ugly history, and have conveniently forgotten about it. Why do we bring it up here? To explain that competition for power between ZPRA and ZANLA did not suddenly intensify after the Lancaster House Agreement, as Joshua Nkomo seems to imply (Nkomo 1984: 200), and that ethnic rivalry is not gone. Equally important is the reality of cached arms in some ZAPU properties and allegations of a planned military overthrow of the ZANU–PF government. To the disservice of former ZAPU supporters and Ndebele people in general, ZAPU/ZPRA leaders have maintained their claim of innocence in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Ironically,

164 

S. HADEBE

many Ndebele people still hold on to the ZAPU/ZPRA leaders’ claims to innocence. As both sides to the conflict seem to be sworn to silence since the Unity Accord, the veracity of allegations of a coup remain difficult to ascertain. ZPRA’s sacrifice and contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe has largely remained an untold story. Perhaps it is no exaggeration that in the country’s ‘patriotic history’ or in the Second Chimurenga annals, it is the victorious ZANLA and ZANU–PF self-praise narratives that predominate. Indeed, while the whites Alexander in Zimbabwe have been described as ‘orphans of the empire’ (Alexander 2004: 193) one may perhaps describe the Ndebele as Zimbabwe’s ‘step-children’. The question of belonging has been very controversial for both whites and Ndebele people in independent Zimbabwe, which has often displayed bouts of fierce but narrow and exclusive nationalism. While the largely pro-Shona narratives of the country’s liberation draw on aspects of Zimbabwean history, they are also influenced by war propaganda, partisan bias, glorification of individual members of the ruling elite and public policies pursued by the government at any given period. Songs sung during the war by ZANLA guerrillas and celebratory songs after independence have dominated state radio and television stations, thus carrying the ZANU–PF/ZANLA side of the story of liberation. Simultaneously there has been a concerted effort to de-legitimize and peripherize ZPRA from the new ZANU–PF reconstructed liberation war history (Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni 2006). Consequently, ZPRA songs were hardly played on radio and television during the early years after independence up to 1987. All these perceived biased narratives of the liberation struggle have helped to create institutionalized memories of collective hurt or a perceived sense of injustice among some Ndebele people, whose support from pro-Mthwakazi movements is perhaps a disguised longing for vengeance. Characterization of Ethnic Politics from Pro-Mthwakazi Perceptions It is important to attempt to understand how the pro-Mthwakazi groups themselves conceive of ethnic politics and political mobilization solely on ethnic grounds. In available sources, the different groups vary in their philosophical grounding, apart from grievances. Some have websites and even online newsletters, while others have barely any sources accessible to the public. But generally, their views are carried by media outlets—print,

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

165

radio and online. Some few others have been partly researched and are cited in academic works. What interests us in this discussion is not just the ethnicization of political mobilization, which in any case could be prevalent across the board, but the openness about and acknowledgement by the pro-Mthwakazi groups about the ethnicization of politics. For example, the underlying conviction shared perhaps by all these groups is their perception that Zimbabwean politics is ethnically based in favour of the Shona speakers, to the disadvantage of the minority Ndebele speakers.  erceived Unequal Development P Perhaps the perceived unequal development of Zimbabwe’s provinces is one overarching problem, especially with socio-economic stress caused by severe job losses. Unequal development of infrastructure and public services such as schools, hospitals and roads was a deliberate colonial policy that favoured white areas rather than the so-called African reserves. It is an underdevelopment legacy throughout colonial Africa, as the urban areas have better facilities than rural ones, and within the urban areas the high-­ density African townships were much more deprived than the glamorous leafy low-density suburbs. While the economic divide that was characteristic of the enclave economy persists, the post-independence Zimbabwe government has made significant strides in improving the lives of the black majority and building infrastructure in rural areas. With the near collapse of the Zimbabwean economy, however, most developmental strides have been reversed. But since the economic decline has affected the whole country, how do we account for the different reaction by pro-Mthwakazi groups? Such feelings probably derive Gukurahundi is a Shona word literally referring to a heavy rain that washes away chaff but in this context the term referred to the ethnic cleansing of Ndebele people from perceptions ingrained during the Gukurahundi days. Government propaganda at that time claimed that the Matabeleland region would be left behind in terms of development owing to dissident activities. Indeed, there was much destruction of government infrastructure, public facilities and private property. Schools were burnt down, buses and shops were destroyed, and skilled personnel such as teachers were targeted. While these acts of economic sabotage had an impact on the general level of development in the region, the speeches by people such as the then Minister Enos Nkala sank into the psyche of the Ndebele people. The propaganda that was espoused by ministers such as Nkala was to the effect that the Zimbabwean government intended to impoverish and

166 

S. HADEBE

starve the Ndebele out of existence so that their provinces could be repopulated by the Shona. Starvation was also used during Gukurahundi as a weapon of war. Hence, when pro-­Mthwakazi activists talked about the under-development of the region, they would be merely invoking memories that the same government once claimed to pursue the policy of underdeveloping Matabeleland. Whether indeed the ZANU–PF government ever toyed with the idea of depopulating the Ndebele-speaking areas will never be known, but suffice to say there remain perceptions to that effect in sections of the Ndebele community.  erceived Discrimination in Employment and Promotion P Unlike in colonial times, there is no law or official policy that discriminates against the employment or promotion of Ndebele-speaking people either in the civil service or in the private sector, yet this is one area of grievance. Perceptions of job discrimination are not confined to Mthwakazi activists but have also been noted by researchers. The Minorities At Risk (MAR) project notes that ‘There is massive unemployment and general social destitution in the area. Furthermore, although there are no restrictions to high office, civil servants in Matabeleland are disproportionately Shona, and do not even speak Ndebele’ (Zimbabwe Review 2008). Notably, the MRP has been very vocal on the jobs issue and has highlighted a number of cases, including the eviction of Shona-speaking teachers in Lupane, demonstrating against employment patterns at KFC in Bulawayo in 2017 and Pick and Pay in Bulawayo in July 2018, and against the election of a Shona-speaking mayor for Bulawayo in September 2018. A number of Mthwakazi groups, including MRP, Ibhetshu Likazulu and 1893 MHRRM, marched against the same tendency at Egodini Mall in Bulawayo. Accordingly, Mabhena writes that ‘the hegemony of the Shona people in Zimbabwe has been largely influenced by ethnicity and the quest to dominate Matabeleland politically, socially and economically’ (Mabhena 2014: 1). It would seem that one of the key motivations for a devolved system of local governance was the desire to protect local jobs for local people. MAR quotes the Research and Advocacy Unit as saying: There is a Shona presence in Matabeleland, and many Ndebele speak Shona. In Bulawayo, about 80% are Ndebele but many of the businessmen and Government posts are Shona. There was a large movement of Shona to Matabeleland in the 1980s and into the 1990s. There is a certain amount of

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

167

ethnic tension due to this. The majority of Ndebele over Shona in part of the country is diminishing. Large numbers of the Ndebele youth are ­migrating to South Africa. The proportion of elderly in the rural areas is increasing (Zimbabwe Review 2008: 46).

Indeed, few adults in Matabeleland who lived through the Gukurahundi period would not understand Shona, but that actually aggravated ethnic tensions as the largely Shona civil service, especially the police, maintain their Shona mother tongue in Matabeleland. That behaviour is perceived as the conqueror’s arrogance and a source of bitterness, and hence a mobilizing force for Mthwakazi activists. True, there is to a large extent arrogance and triumphalism on the part of some Shona-speaking officials, but there are also some who had had no opportunity to learn Ndebele, Kalanga, Nambya or Tonga. Linguistically speaking, the dominant group hardly has a motivation to learn the languages of the dominated, and in the Zimbabwean context, since Shona is now literally spreading throughout Zimbabwe and understood to an extent by even non-Shona people, this limits the chance that Shona speakers will learn other languages.  eacher Deployment and Failure Rate T The three provinces of Matabeleland; that is Bulawayo Metropolitan, Matabeleland South and Matabeleland North, have some of the country’s Ordinary level examinations are taken after four years of secondary education in Zimbabwe. One can proceed to train as a teacher or nurse of police after passing ordinary level examinations. There are a number of possible reasons to account for the deteriorating educational performance, including socio-economic decline and the abject poverty of many households. The high levels of school dropouts and migration of both pupils and teachers to better prospects in South Africa has not made the situation any better. But what seems to irk the Ndebele community is what they perceive as the deliberate deployment of Shona teachers who cannot utter a Ndebele word to teach beginner classes at primary schools. There has developed an unfortunate belief that Shona teachers generally do not take their work seriously if deployed in Matabeleland. As mentioned earlier, MRP has been most vocal on this issue, particularly after their campaign at Makuzeze school in Lupane district. The ignominious failure rate in schools is therefore largely blamed on Shona-speaking teachers, who are seen as agents for the cultural annihilation of the Ndebele. With a high failure rate, very few Ndebele speakers make it to colleges and universities

168 

S. HADEBE

in the region, which are numerically dominated by the majority Shona— further aggravating ethnic animosity. Unfortunately, this matter has been debated in public forums and also dominates social media, creating a hostile learning environment. Pupils go to class with an attitude that their Shona-speaking teachers are not helpers but destroyers, while similarly the affected teachers cannot be comfortable in a hostile environment where they are viewed with suspicion and mistrust. But most significant is poor performance in the sciences and mathematics, which excludes many learners from certain career paths. Because the government has largely been insensitive to these community concerns, pro-Mthwakazi activists have seized on them as confirmation of an ulterior agenda against Ndebele people.  inguistic, Cultural and Religious Aspects L The job opportunities issue and language matters have been a rallying point for pro-Mthwakazi groups, which unfortunately the government has not attended to. Ethnic rivalry has not spared the churches, where factions have arisen on ethnic lines. But it is in fact in traditional religion that ethnic conflict primarily continues to simmer. The Njelele shrines, which have courted political controversy since the anti-colonial wars of 1894 and 1896–7, have continued to be controversial throughout the liberation war to the post-independence era. While Zimbabweans generally profess Christianity, traditional religion still holds sway for many, especially among politicians who tend to frequent shrines as elections approach. The rituals conducted by some Shona speakers and especially ZANLA war veterans at the Njelele shrines have been perceived as sacrilegious by local communities. However, these Shona traditionalists claim dominion over the whole of Zimbabwe, including the shrines, and therefore do not feel obliged to follow local protocols that are held in great awe. As recent as July 2018, there were reports of a bombing inside one of the sacred Njelele shrine and suspicions point to people linked to government who could easily access explosives. That many artisanal miners within the locality have access to dynamite does not seem to have been considered by a community used to witnessing violations of their holy places. This has a precedent, in that during Gukurahundi there was an attack on the same Njelele shrine and the destruction of many religious paraphernalia, such as clay pots, and the assaulting of shrine keepers who are normally revered in the community as rainmakers. Such religiously significant issues have been utilized by the activists to buttress their claim that the Shona

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

169

government will stop at nothing to destroy everything in Matabeleland and usurp the cultural history for its hegemonic agenda. MRP, Ibhetshu Likazulu and the Matojeni Cultural Association were some of the organizations that were at the forefront of mobilizing against what was clearly seen as a religious affront by local communities. While the culprits have yet to be arrested and identified, the assumption is that it could be either state agents or Shona people, which means the same thing for communities whose main source of information on this matter is pro-Mthwakazi activists.  he Humiliating Unity Accord of 1987 T While the ruling party and government usually cite the Unity Accord between Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU and Robert Mugabe’s ZANU–PF as having set the tone for national reconciliation, some people still perceive the agreement as a source of Ndebele humiliation. For example, the Unity Day holiday celebrated annually on 22 December has since 2015 been converted by Ibhetshu Likazulu to commemorate the thousands of Ndebele people who perished during the Gukurahundi terror. The state has obviously been uncomfortable with this twist by Mthwakazi radicals, and in 2016 tried to block the public event at Stanley Square, Makokoba, in Bulawayo. Mbuso Fuzwayo, the secretary-general of Ibhetshu Likazulu, had to seek a court injunction that allowed the event to proceed, to the chagrin of the police. Both the MRP and MLF are strong critics of the Unity Accord as a sell-out document. Of all the pro-Mthwakazi movements, it would appear that Ibhetshu Likazulu has been the most effective and consistent in its message and activities, and hence attracts sizeable audiences in its non-partisan gatherings. The organization has gained public sympathy for its call for justice for Gukurahundi victims and its commemorative events of the same, including memorial lectures about ZPRA/ZAPU and Ndebele icons such as Lookout Masuku. Notably, Ibhetshu Likazulu seems to focus mainly on those iconic figures who perished during the Gukurahundi, such as Masuku and Jini Ntuta. It also commemorates the memory of the bombings at Mkushi and Freedom Camps in Zambia, where ZAPU mass graves are not given the same attention as ZANLA’s in Chimoio and Nyadzonia in Mozambique. It is as if Ibhetshu Likazulu is stoking the conscience of the ruling party for its selective memory of the fallen heroes. But the organization goes even further, and commemorates annually the Mgagao Massacre—where ZANLA guerrillas with the support of the then host

170 

S. HADEBE

Tanzanian soldiers and Chinese instructors massacred without warning their ZPRA brethren. Although the event was deemed to be the result of partisan rivalry, it also smacked of ethnic conflict. The ZANLA and ZPRA camp commanders happened not only to be both Shona but were also cousins, or so some eyewitnesses say. Drawing on all this background, the commemorations by Ibhetshu Likazulu despise and dismiss the Unity Accord as nothing but a smokescreen by the dominant Shona government to destroy the Ndebele people by non-military means, such as economic emasculation and joblessness. It is on these platforms that the other pro-Mthwakazi groups that are directly partisan, unlike Ibhetshu Likazulu, get an audience for their highly inflammatory condemnation of the government, the ruling party and Shona people in general. Ironically, while the majority of the pro-Mthwakazi formations draw their grievances from post-independence nation-building politics, those pursuing the revival of the Ndebele monarchy seem to discount, if not totally omit, the colonial period, liberation struggle and postindependence conflict from their narratives, and focus on the perceived right to Ndebele statehood.  erceived Ethnicization of Party Politics P Whether by design or general incapacity, the political leaders from Matabeleland who are part of the ruling ZANU–PF, mainly through the Unity Accord, have been perceived as weak and ineffective by some among the Ndebele populace. They are perceived as incapable of addressing the developmental challenges of the Ndebele region even if they hold seemingly powerful ministerial positions. It is therefore argued that because they are of Ndebele origin they have less power than their Shona counterparts. Perhaps the only two powerful ministers from the region who wielded considerable power were Enos Nkala and Jonathan Moyo. However, these two were originally ZANU–PF members who were never perceived as pro-Ndebele by their very allegiance to the Shona party ZANU–PF and not ZAPU. Similarly, the main opposition MDC party has had its internal challenges, leading to splits, and two of these splits had ethnic overtones. The pro-Mthwakazi activists, some of whom were at one time or another members of the opposition MDC, are convinced that ethnicity underlined oppositional politics. It is perhaps with that belief, rightly or wrongly, that these activists convince themselves that ethnic mobilization for political goals is what the dominant Shona groups are doing.

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

171

Obviously, the competition for positions is tougher both in the ruling ZANU–PF and opposition MDC, so fractionalization on regional and ethnic lines would not be unusual. Moreover, some pro-Mthwakazi activists complain that Ndebele people have so far held the deputy presidency in both parties but never that of president. If the ethnic factor were to be applied, and considering that Ndebele people are barely 20% of the population, then even that high position would be impossible to attain. Political Mobilization on Ethnic and Regional Appeal As already alluded to, the pro-Mthwakazi movements have not attracted a critical mass, yet their activities and messages should be ignored. For instance, MRP activists demonstrated against President Mnangagwa at a church service in Bulawayo, attracting police wrath and arrests in the process. Later on, they successfully thwarted the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) public consultations in Bulawayo and Lupane. The MRP went on to field local council and parliamentary candidates and contested the 2018 elections in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands. The MRP in particular has gained visibility, and is also pursuing constitutional means towards the Matabeleland solution, whereas the other groups may not be similarly thinking of such non-violent means as electoral contest. For its participation in the 2018 elections, the MRP has in fact come under a barrage of criticism for perceived betrayal of the Mthwakazi cause, especially from MLF president Churchill Guduza. He argues that pro-Mthwakazi movements should focus on the pursuit of independence for their separate nation and not endorse the Zimbabwe state by seeking political office through Zimbabwean elections. So what exactly are the areas that appeal for pro-Mthwakazi movements? Focusing on the perceived marginalization of the Ndebele-speaking regions has some appeal for many people. It not only draws attention to the supposed unequal development and lack of infrastructure but also to the perceived marginalization of Ndebele people in jobs and in high positions, especially in Matabeleland. With Zimbabwe’s high levels of unemployment, the issue of job discrimination tends to heighten ethnic anger, but not yet at the levels of xenophobia witnessed in South Africa. Because of the inept handling of the emotive issue of Gukurahundi by the government, this issue remains a fertile ground for ethnic mobilization among the Ndebele. Some activists have even composed songs that depict Shona people as killers of Ndebele people. By appearing to criminalize

172 

S. HADEBE

debate around Gukurahundi, as seen in the banning of Maseko’s painting Sibathontisele, the government has inadvertently inflamed feelings of collective hurt and injustice that are being repeatedly exploited by the activists. What is more troubling is that the collective anger is now intergenerational, as most of these activists were not even born during the Gukurahundi period. Suppressed anger and frustration from generation to generation has the potential for violent explosion, particularly towards unsuspecting and unprepared targets. Closely linked to the emotive Gukurahundi issue is the anger towards the constitutionally enshrined NPRC. This is the successor organization to the Organ for National Peace and Reconciliation, itself a product of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) between ZANU–PF and the MDC factions. It is doubtful that when the GPA negotiators were talking about dealing with political violence they even considered Gukurahundi. Therefore, in its design and composition, the NPRC has no capacity to address this issue. Having realized this shortcoming, pro-Mthwakazi activists, with the tacit support of many in Matabeleland, disrupted consultative meetings in Bulawayo and Matabeleland North. Interestingly, the MRP activists argued during their disruptions that as the commission was made up almost entirely of Shona people, with only one Ndebele commissioner, Leslie Ncube, it was not possible to hear Ndebele people’s grievances against the Shona Gukurahundi killers. Indeed, that argument sounded reasonable, and many people were sympathetic to it, but the commission did not dare to say that Gukurahundi was not part of its terms of reference. Overlooking the grievances in this area created a rallying point for pro-Mthwakazi activists. To his credit, President Mnangagwa has on different occasions, albeit belatedly, met Matabeleland Collective (a loose coalition of civil society groups), former ZPRA veterans and Matabeleland chiefs, and in all three encounters the Gukurahundi issue was discussed. This gesture by a head of state would have been inconceivable under Robert Mugabe; although like his predecessor, Mnangagwa has not apologized for Gukurahundi. Last but not least, the activists appeal to the historical justification that there was an independent Ndebele state prior to colonial conquest. The unification of Ndebele country and its provincialization was an administrative arrangement of the colonial government that took place without consent of the conquered. They argue that Mashonaland was occupied separately in 1890 and Matabeleland in 1893, with the Union Jack being raised on two separate occasions to mark British occupation. Similarly, at

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

173

decolonization, Solomon Mujuru, the ZANLA commander, hoisted the Zimbabwe flag in Harare to mark the country’s independence while simultaneously Lookout Masuku, the ZPRA commander, did the same in Bulawayo. They further draw appeal from the unfortunate reality of a divided liberation movement, this initially being based on strategy and personalities but eventually on ethnic dimensions as well. The historical justification has a strong appeal even to elderly people who remember the Matabele Home Society of the 1940s and Chief Khayisa Ndiweni’s federal project of the late 1970s. The various but unsuccessful attempts to install a Ndebele king resonates with the historical justification and the sacralizing of the Mthwakazi nation as rooted in a glorious past and deserving legitimacy. More-so, the ‘prince’ Bulelani Lobhengula Khumalo’s claim is not only supported by most Khumalos but by a significant number of chiefs as well. Of course, the persistent fractionalization of the Khumalo clan saw a court challenge from an earlier aspirant, Peter Zwide Khumalo, while some sections of the clan shifted loyalty to Bulelani’s elder brother, who was emerging as a rival for the throne as well. The disparate efforts by Mthwakazi groups seemed to converge on a desire for the coronation of Bulelani. Even MRP, which is supposedly republican, was very outspoken in support of the coronation. Indeed, there are many contradictions within the pro-Mthwakazi movement, which has suffered fractionalization for personal rather than ideological differences. Possible Options for Addressing Ethnic-Based Political Mobilization Writing on poor race relations in Rhodesia, Warhurst (1972: 6) had this to say: ‘The tragedy of modern Rhodesia is that races are so concerned with promoting their own sectional interests that they ignore the hopes and fears of the other group.’ We may as well substitute Zimbabwe for Rhodesia and ethnic groups for races, and realize the truism of that observation both yesterday and today. Indeed, the poor race relations in Rhodesia and the exclusive focus on sectional interests led to a conflagration in the form of a protracted guerrilla insurgency that cost many lives, both black and white. Surely, that blight in the country’s unenviable group relations should not be allowed to repeat itself; more so, if one considers the chilling prediction that ‘ethnicity and identity conflicts will be the dominant forms of violence and war in the coming years’ (Makaya 2005:

174 

S. HADEBE

15). It is imperative that responsible stakeholders, including the government, realize the imminent risk to the country’s stability when sections of society are aggrieved by perceived ethnic marginalization. In the following sections, we consider some ways that in which these grievances could be addressed, in order to avert the ethnic conflict characteristic of most civil wars in the underdeveloped world in general, and in Africa in particular. I mplementation of Constitutional Provisions for Devolution To their credit, the people of Zimbabwe collectively conceded to the devolution clause in the Constitution of Zimbabwe (as amended in 2013), knowing full well that it had long been the desire of people from Matabeleland. The option of a devolved system of local government, itself a compromise from a federal system, was meant to peacefully address the developmental challenges and grievances over resources allocation. Of course, devolution is not a panacea, especially in its watered down form as enshrined in the Constitution. Nevertheless, it would have gone a long way towards increasing citizen participation and decision-making in their local affairs. It has the potential to inculcate a sense of belonging and feeling of worthiness that are currently missing from the majority jobless and angst-ridden Ndebele youths. From 2013 to 2018, the ZANU–PF government literally did nothing to implement devolution of power, and instead proposed amending the Constitution to erase devolution before implementing any aspect of it. In an ironic twist, Vice-President and Justice Minister Mnangagwa was perceived as anti-devolution, and yet in 2018 as president he not only campaigned on devolution ticket but also confirmed it in his inauguration speech. It is without doubt that the implementation of devolution would lessen the ethnicization of politics in Matabeleland.  n Effective and Resourced NPRC to Address Gukurahundi A The NPRC was instituted for other matters than Gukurahundi justice, but as the situation has shown, it should address Gukurahundi in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. This might mean amending the constitution to extend its tenure and its powers to address and settle the sensitive matter. It is an opportunity that should not be missed, and communities ought to be prepared for the pain they would have to go through before true healing begins. But for true justice and possible forgiveness between the two antagonistic ethnic groups, the NPRC should hear grievances dating back to the pre-colonial Ndebele aggression against Shona chiefdoms. Most

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

175

Ndebele people have dismissed this proposition out of hand, believing it to be a pretext to avoid Gukurahundi. There are no living survivors from that period, but the hurt and humiliation lingers on, and will do so unless it is also acknowledged and atoned for. No one reminds us better of this deep-seated anger by some Shona people against the Ndebele than Muponde (2004), in his analysis of leading Zimbabwean writers—notably Solomon Mustswairo (Mutswairo 1983), Dambudzo Marechera (1978) and Patrick Chakaipa (1958). He concludes: ‘These xenophobic musings in Zimbabwean literature are important to consider in any discussion of the attempted ethnic cleansing in Matabeleland after 1980. There is a way in which the attempted genocide in Matabeleland was viewed as “pay-­ back” time by the Shonas’ (Muponde 2004: 189). Indeed, there is no way of avoiding the need to heal ‘the memory of past victimhood’ by the Shona that was perpetrated by the pre-colonial Ndebele state.  ffirmative Action to Compensate for Setbacks in Matabeleland A Undeniably, the Matabeleland provinces lag behind partly because of the post-independence conflict, which not only led to massive loss of lives but also devastated economic livelihoods. A proper addressing of the Gukurahundi legacy could perhaps bring about a compensatory fund and affirmative action for seriously affected communities, households and individuals. Part of the affirmative action programmes should focus on education and training. The effective way to empower communities is to give them education, and Ndebele communities desperately need that support to escape from a cycle of poverty and joblessness. In most developing economies, it is the public sector that tends to be the biggest employer, and Zimbabwe is not an exception. Affirmative action in recruitment for training as teachers, nurses, police officers, prison staff, immigration and customs personnel would go a long way in this regard.  conomic Development, Rebuilding Infrastructure and Job Creation E Perhaps none of the options so far proposed would make any sense or even have an impact as long as Zimbabwe remains in the economic doldrums. The need for sustainable economic growth and the creation of decent jobs is a necessity for stabilizing the country economically and politically. The country needs a facelift in infrastructure development and the provision of affordable and reliable social services to the majority, including rural communities. One may recall that when the majority of people could get decent employment and life was relatively good for many households,

176 

S. HADEBE

there was less ethnic consciousness—particularly in terms of political mobilization.  lurality in Remembrance of Liberation Legacy P A seemingly minor and cost-free option is allowing a plurality of voices in remembrance and celebration of the liberation legacy and other contested memories. It is no longer necessary in a supposedly constitutional democracy to have the state guiding citizens on who its heroes and heroines are, and how they should be remembered. Once different communities are freed to commemorate their icons, with time the memories of them would cease to be rallying points for anger and a desire for vengeance. For example, in September 2017, the Zimbabwe Republic Police personnel made news by blocking prayers at Bhalagwe. Images of police officers kicking Dumiso Dabengwa’s candles at the memorial site became a hit on social media, and infuriated Ndebele people worldwide. In 2018, the government (now under Mnangagwa) allowed activists to visit Bhalagwe more than once, and visiting the memorial site ceased to be newsworthy. Furthermore, there is no reasonable justification why people should not be permitted to lay flowers on Lookout Masuku’s grave on Heroes Day. Even the renaming of places, especially streets, in memory of the revered heroes/heroines from the region could ameliorate the bottled-up anger. Flexibility around some of these seemingly small issues could go a long way in healing individual communities and eventually the nation.  onstitutional Clause on Exit Referendum C Perhaps it is time that Zimbabwe considers a constitutional clause on an exit referendum once in every thirty or so years, as is the case in some progressive multiethnic countries. The exit clause has actually been proved to prevent rather than foster secession, as seen in Canada with Quebec and in the United Kingdom with Scotland. One advantage of the exit clause is that those needing to exercise it have no reason to opt for violent divorce, as was the case for Eritrea, South Sudan, the Saharawi Democratic Republic and many others. Such an exit clause could serve more as a deterrent so governments did not promote what has been referred to as ‘internal colonialism’ (Mabhena 2014) or excesses such as Gukurahundi or other forms of ethnic chauvinism, which make some communities feel less Zimbabwean.

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

177

Conclusion The likely risks from the ethnicization of political mobilization should not just be a cause of concern to the government of Zimbabwe, but to all stakeholders—even beyond the Ndebele and Shona people. Be that as it may, the government is still expected to play a leading role in helping the country to address these political fissures, which run along ethnic lines. Currently, as already discussed, the government of Zimbabwe has a dismissive if not arrogant posture towards the perceived grievances emanating from Ndebele-speaking regions. This indifference is in itself a threat to the stability of the country, as Bamfo (2012: 37) has noted about African countries in general: ‘Ironically, secession is one threat which few African governments want to acknowledge exists because it implies giving tacit recognition to the most reprehensible behaviour any group or a region can perpetrate against the state.’ He further demonstrates that most governments are ill-prepared for secessionism. While pro-Mthwakazi movements may not pose any security threat to the establishment, assuming that this is the government’s assessment, ignoring issues raised continues to stoke frustration and desperation, which in the long run could reach untenable levels. Unequal development of regions and perceived job discrimination is a grievance that could be addressed by appropriate policy changes, including deliberate affirmative action. The issue of perceived linguistic marginalization is a sensitive and potentially explosive matter that also could be addressed by appropriate policy changes with minimal costs, if any. It is a normal expectation by all citizens in an independent country to be able to freely use their languages and occupy any posts they like, as long as they have the requisite qualifications, skills and experience. When all is said and done, the elephant in the room remains the unresolved Gukurahundi issue. As Murambadoro and Wielenga (2015) state, if Gukurahundi is not acknowledged it will hamper any possible reconciliation process in Zimbabwe. They even go on to suggest that perhaps Zimbabwe needs to shift from ‘state security’ to ‘human security’, to facilitate reconciliation. Such adjustments would facilitate the work of organs such as the NPRC.  But most importantly, the people of Zimbabwe in general and those from Ndebele-speaking areas specifically should find ways of ensuring that Gukurahundi does not repeat itself, and that its memory is not used for political mobilization. While justice for the victims is indeed overdue, using the episode politically is another matter

178 

S. HADEBE

altogether. Most of the pro-Mthwakazi grievances are genuine, although few people might agree with their approach and intended outcome. In a worst case scenario of an ethnic conflagration, there are hardly any spoils or victors, and hence the need to take seriously any tendencies towards the ethnicization of politics.

References Alexander, K. 2004. Orphans of the Empire: An Analysis of Elements of White Identity and Ideology Construction in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, ed. B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage. Harare: Weaver Press. Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Bamfo, N. 2012. The Menace of Secession in Africa and Why Governments Should Care: The Disparate Cases of Katanga, Biafra, South Sudan, an Azawad. Global Journal of Human Social Sciences, Sociology, Economics & Political Science, Volume 12, Issue 10, Version 1.0, pp 37–48. Bulawayo News24. 2013. ZIPRA Hero Snub Triggers War of Words. Bulawayo 24 News, October 21. Chakaipa, P. 1958. Karikoga Gumiremiseve. Salisbury: Longman. Chomsky, N. 1979. Introduction. In Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, ed. R. Sayigh. London: Zed Press. Cobbing, J. 1976. The Ndebele Under the Khumalos 1820–1896. Unpublished Thesis, Lancaster University. Garlake, P., and A.  Proctor. 1985. People Making History, Book 1. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House. Guzura, T., and J.  Ndimande. 2015. Highlanders Football Club and Ndebele Identity Among Fans in Zimbabwe. Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences VI (4, Quarter IV): 1–23. Hadebe, S. 2006. The Standardisation of the Ndebele Language Through Dictionary-­ Making. Oslo: The Allex Project. ———. 2007. The Significance of Ndebele Historical Fiction. In Zimbabwe Transitions: Essays on Zimbabwean Literature in English, Ndebele and Shona, ed. Mbongeni Z. Malaba and Geoffrey V. Davis. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi. ———. 2016. Challenges in Memorializing ZPRA legacy. Presented in Politics of Armed Struggle in Southern Africa Conference, 23–25 November 2016. University of Witwatersrand Hughes, A.J.B., and J. van Velsen. 1954. The Ndebele. In Ethnographic Survey of Africa: Southern Africa, ed. H.  Kuper et  al. London: International African Institute.

7  THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN ZIMBABWE… 

179

Kavanagh, R.M. 2014. Zimbabwe: Challenging the Stereotypes. Harare/ Johannesburg/Cairo/London: Themba Books. Lindgren, B. 2002. The Politics of Ndebele Ethnicity: Origins, Nationality, and Gender in Southern Zimbabwe. Uppsala: Uppsala University. Mabhena, C. 2014. Ethnicity, Development and the Dynamics of Political Domination in Southern Matabeleland. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science. 19 (4): 137–149. Accessed 27 Aug 2018. Makaya, T. 2005. The Impact of Social Interactions on Ethnic Identity Perceptions: The Case of Shona and Ndebele Migrants Living in Johannesburg, South Africa. MA Thesis. Forced Migration Studies, University of Witwatersrand. Marechera, D. 1978. The House of Hunger. London: Heinemann. Minority Rights Group International. 2008. Zimbabwe Overview . http://www. minorityrights.org/. Accessed 14 Aug 2018. Mothibe, T.H. 1996. Zimbabwe: Working-Class Nationalism (1957–1963). Zambezia XXIII (2): 157–180. Muchemwa, C. 2015. Building Friendships Between Shona and Ndebele Ethnic Groups in Zimbabwe. PhD Thesis, Durban University of Technology. Muponde, R. 2004. The Worm and the Hoe; Cultural Politics and Reconciliation After the Third Chimurenga. In Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, ed. B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage. Harare: Weaver Press. Murambadoro, R., and C.  Wielenga. 2015. Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: The Conflict Between a State-centred and People-centred Approach. Strategic Review for Southern Africa 37 (1): 32–52. Mutswairo, S. 1983. Chaminuka: Prophet of Zimbabwe. Washington: Three Continents. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2006. Nationalist-Military Alliance and the Fate for Democracy in Zimbabwe. African Journal on Conflict Resolution 6 (1): 49–80. Nkomo, J. 1984. Nkomo: The Story of My Life. London: Methuen. ———. 1986. Joshua Nkomo Address at the Funeral of Lookout Masuku, Bulawayo, April 12. Omer-Cooper, J.D. 1966. The Zulu Aftermath. London: Longman Group Ltd.. Parsons, N. 1985. Focus on History, Book 1. Harare: College Press. Ranger, T. 1999. Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ranger, T. 2004. ‘Nationalist historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: The struggle over the past in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies 30 (2): 215–234. Ranger, T. 2010. Constructions of Zimbabwe, Journal of Southern African Studies 36 (1): 505–510. Rasmussen, K. 1978. Migrant Kingdom: Mzilikazi’s Ndebele in South Africa. London: Rex Collins.

180 

S. HADEBE

Seymour-Smith, C. 1986. Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology,. London/ Basingstoke. Sithole, E. 2018. Identity consciousness among the Ndau people in Zimbabwe: unravelling mysteries, misconceptions and justifications, African Identities 16 (4): 412–428. Smith, N.J. 1998. Theorizing Discourses of Zimbabwe, 1860 – 1900: A Foucauldian Analysis of Colonial Narratives. Durban: University of Natal. Warhurst, P.R. 1972. The History of Race Relations in Rhodesia. http://digital. lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/pp15–19 Warhurst, P.R. 1973. The History of Race Relations in Rhodesia. Zambezia, 3.i: 15–19. Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway in 2011. http://digital.lib.msu.edu/ projects/africanjournals/. Accessed 27 Aug 2018. Zimbabwe Communist Party. 2018. 2018 Election: What happened? What next? ZCP Bulletin, Volume 1, Number 3.

CHAPTER 8

The Militarisation of State Institutions in Zimbabwe, 2002–2017 Pedzisai Ruhanya

Introduction On 21 November 2017, Zimbabwe’s founding President, Robert Mugabe, was ousted after 37 years at the helm. Mugabe later died in Singapore on 6 August 2019; he was buried at his rural home of Zvimba in Mashonaland West Province. Mugabe’s fall followed succession battles that pitted him, his wife Grace Mugabe and a group of young generation party cadres known by the name Generation 40 (G40) on one hand against veterans of the liberation struggle fronted by now-President Emmerson Mnangagwa, known as Team Lacoste, on the other. At the centre of bringing Mugabe’s presidency to an end was the army, which for decades had helped him to remain in power. In the last days of party succession infighting, the military used their liberation wartime credentials and the umbilical cord that connected them to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZAPU) parties to align with Mnangagwa to defeat Mugabe.

P. Ruhanya (*) University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_8

181

182 

P. RUHANYA

The events leading to the resignation of Mugabe renewed an interest in studying the competitive nature of authoritarian regimes. Having survived every election since independence through the use of methods such as manipulation, coercion and rigging, Mugabe was pressured to resign by an amalgamation of disparate voices, with the top leadership of the military—from the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the wartime military wings of ZANU and ZAPU respectively—playing decisive roles. Among the other forces that participated in the overthrow of Mugabe were the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), civil society, the ruling ZANU–PF, parliament and citizens through mass protests. The media, through their framing and representation of Mugabe as a tyrant who overstayed his welcome, were complicit. This broad constituency was coordinated by Mugabe’s traditional supporters, the war veterans, who argued that Mugabe was being arm-twisted by elements in the G40 faction, owing to his advanced age. The military intervened in ZANU–PF factional fights under the guise of national security through an operation codenamed Operation Restore Legacy. The judiciary gave its support for a military coup, as well as nullifying the ousting of Emmerson Mnangagwa by Mugabe. This study argues that the militarisation of key state institutions through the placement of members of the army, especially veterans of the liberation struggle, in important positions of authority facilitated the coup. The military factor in events leading to 15 November 2017 is not largely flagged up in terms of how competitive authoritarian regimes operate. The efficacy of the military and its liberation war credentials in the Zimbabwe transition was enabled by an arguably lapdog media, which did not investigate and expose the partisan military involvement in public affairs in the lead-up to the coup.

Zimbabwe’s Competitive Authoritarian System Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but the elections in which they participate are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favour of the incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair (Levitsky and Way 2010).

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

183

It is largely the electoral aspect of this that has left many regimes endorsing authoritarian states as largely democratic. This view is supported by Howard and Roessler (2006: 365), who posit that “these regimes feature regular, competitive elections between a government and an opposition, but the incumbent leader or party typically resorts to coercion, intimidation, and fraud to attempt to ensure electoral victory”. Schedler (2002: 15) warns against an obsession with elections as a measure for democracy, postulating that most scholars who follow this route seem to forget that the modern history of representative elections is a tale of authoritarian manipulations as much as it is a saga of democratic triumphs. In this case, elections occasionally result in a “liberalizing electoral outcome”, which often leads to a new government that is considerably less authoritarian than its predecessor. This kind of system leaves us with competitive authoritarianism, which is a hybrid regime type including both democracy and authoritarianism, leading to a whole suite of supposedly democratic institutions, such as the judiciary, legislature and executive, which are in fact seldom democratic. This is what Diamond (2008) describes as pseudo-democracy, as the system is not entirely democratic as well as not entirely authoritarian, while Schedler (2002) describes it as the foggy zone between wide and liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism. In Zimbabwe, this hybrid system became more visible in the events leading up to the coup that pressured Mugabe to resign. Four fundamental state institutions—media, legislature, judiciary and the electoral system—were demonstrably captured by factions aligned to now-President Mnangagwa and military interests, and were thus used as zones of ZANU– PF/military politicking.1 The capture was either direct, through rapid recruitment of security sector personnel by those institutions, or indirect, through patrimonial recruitment enforced in these institutions. This military strategy was sophisticated and clandestine to the extent that an outsider analysis might arguably fail to capture the essence of military recruitment and the appointments that were made in public political arenas. For example, the government encouraged its troops to attend university studies to ensure they passed the meritocracy test.2 the situation was even worse with Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) agents as they are hard to separate from civilians. Many appointments of what people 1 2

 This is a specific and main theme identified across primary and secondary data.  Interviews, Bulawayo Province, 29 July 2017.

184 

P. RUHANYA

think to be civilians are but recruitment of intelligence services into public institutions. The media in general, the African Union, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the international community failed to understand the complex nature of the military before the coup.

Authoritarian Erosion and Internal Contradictions in ZANU–PF Stepan submits that the study of authoritarian breakdown and overthrow must not focus on the final collapse of authoritarian regimes but must take into consideration the “incremental process of authoritarian erosion” and the opposition’s contribution to it. Stepan further calls for an understanding of the dynamic relations between five groups of people, namely: 1) the core supporters of the regime (who find that their political, economic or institutional are best served under the status quo); 2) those in charge of the coercive apparatus that maintains the regime in power; 3) the regime’s passive supporters; 4) the regime’s active opponents; and 5) the regime’s passive opponents.

Stepan (2001) presents two scenarios that show how these groups are likely to react in a strong authoritarian regime and in a weakening authoritarian regime. For the core group of regime supporters in a strong authoritarian regime, authoritarian rule is a timely shield against danger and provides much-needed patronage. The military and security officials will identify with and safeguard the interests of a strong authoritarian regime, concluding that national security requires the armed forces to run government. They will participate in institutions and political processes that directly and indirectly serve the interests of the regime. The opposition will be demobilized, fearful of the coercion that can be unleashed against them. However, in a weakening or eroding authoritarian regime, all these groups will act and think in different ways. The core group of supporters will start to fragment. Some will realize that the continuance of authoritarianism is not in their best interests, and will move towards overt or covert opposition. Examining post-independence Zimbabwe elections results between 1980 and 1996, Sithole (2000) and Sithole and Makumbe (1997) trace authoritarian erosion in ZANU–PF, arguing that the ruling party was

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

185

experiencing a gradual decline in elite cohesion. Sithole (2000) further asserts that this phenomenon was precipitated by the decline in elite cohesion because of opposition to the party’s desire to constitute a one-party state. Fierce critics of a one-party state, such as Edgar Tekere, were fired from ZANU–PF in 1987, leading to the formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement in 1989; this contested general and presidential elections in 1990. The decline in elite cohesion persisted, with growing criticism and challenges within the party. Of importance was Margaret Dongo’s challenge and subsequent winning, as an independent candidate, of the Harare South constituency by-election in 1995. This led to more former ZANU–PF members standing as independent candidates, and even winning against party candidates. Further, Sithole argues that elite fragmentation continued to grow as manifested in former ZANU–PF secretary for legal affairs in the political bureau Eddison Zvobgo’s calls for the re-democratisation of the Zimbabwe constitution, with particular reference to powers of the executive. In 1998, Dzikamai Mavhaire, the ZANU–PF Member of Parliament for Masvingo Central, said during a parliamentary debate that “Mugabe must go”, leading to his suspension from the ruling party for two years. However, it should be noted that although there were instances of a lack of elite cohesion, internal dissenting voices and the emergence of opposition parties challenging the status quo, this did not substantially weaken ZANU–PF. The emerging opposition could not mount a serious challenge to the ruling party’s growing hegemonic grip on Zimbabwean politics. This could have been because the internal challenges and contradictions did not affect ZANU– PF support, particularly among the state’s security and coercive apparatus, and mainly among the military, thanks to its connections with ZANU–PF through the liberation struggle.

Elite Fragmentation in Women’s and Youth Leagues Owing to the succession challenges in ZANU–PF, internal fissures, elite fragmentation and splits appear to be a noteworthy feature of Zimbabwe’s political transition. As observed in this chapter, a critical element that has kept the ZANU–PF regime solid has been its capacity to thwart internal dissent and the central role Mugabe played as the glue holding the party together. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) submit the significance of elite defection, splits and internal fissures, considering them essential in most transitions from authoritarianism to democratisation. These fissures in

186 

P. RUHANYA

ZANU–PF threatened military elites and their factional interests, as well as their liberation values if they were to be vanquished. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 16) observe that in cases of elite disintegration during transitions, there is usually a gap between hard-liners and soft-­liners that arises among authoritarian regime elites. Usually there is a struggle between defenders of the status quo (hard-liners) and those turned reformers (soft-liners), because soft-liners develop an “increasing awareness that the regime they helped to implant, and in which they usually occupy important positions, will have to make use… of some degree or some form of electoral legitimation.” This notion is also supported by Linberg (2009), who developed the following causal chain: the more internal party fragmentation, the higher the costs of repression and the higher the chances of defection (exit) and the more probable the possibility of defeat of the hegemonic political party.

O’Donnell, Schmitter and Lindberg’s analysis can be aptly employed to explain the outcome of the March 2008 general election in Zimbabwe. In the run-up to it, ZANU–PF was engulfed in factionalism and elite fragmentation, culminating in a debilitating campaign called “bhora musango”. The outcome of this campaign was the first acknowledged electoral defeat for Zimbabwe African National Union-Patrioc Front (ZANU–PF), with the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai polling 47.87%, Mugabe 43.24% and Simba Makoni 8.31%. The Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC–T) won 100 seats to ZANU–OF’s 98 and MDC–Mutambara’s 10. Following this electoral defeat, in his address to the politburo, Mugabe fumed; We went to the elections completely unprepared, unorganized and this against an election-weary voter. Our structures went to sleep, were deep in slumber in circumstances of an all-out war. [The structures] were passive; they were lethargic, ponderous, divided, diverted, disinterested, demobilised or simply non-existent. It was terrible to see the structures of so embattled a ruling party so enervated. As leaders, we all share the blame: from the national level to that of the branch chairman. We played truant; we did not lead, we misled; we did not encourage, rather we discouraged; we did not unite, we divided; we did not inspire, we dispirited; we did not mobilise, we demobilised. Hence the dismal result we are landed with.

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

187

To insulate the party from this trend, ZANU–PF coined the message “bhora mughedhi” for the 2013 general election. However, at the beginning of 2017, the Women’s and Youth Leagues of ZANU–PF that appeared to be at the vanguard of the party, following the fall-out with veterans of the liberation struggle and the sacking of senior party leaders such as former Vice-President Joice Mujuru in 2014 and sustained efforts to force Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa out, there were suspensions and incessant fights in the two wings. At the height of these power struggles, Mnangagwa was dismissed from both party and state on 6 November, and went into brief exile in South Africa. Before Mnangagwa’s dismissal, the arbitrary expulsion and suspension of members sympathetic to him were the order of the day, as ZANU–PF prepared for an extraordinary congress in December 2017. However, following the military coup, that extraordinary congress turned into Mnangagwa’s coronation as leader of both party and state with key military personnel as part of his ascending team.

Comparative Analyses of Elite Incohesion in ZANU–PF Although divisions have always been present in ZANU–PF, the magnitude of elite incohesion and fragmentation in 2008 was exceptional for six reasons. First, it had previously been on a smaller scale in terms of geographical location, in a constituency such as Manicaland or Harare. Second, previous elite fragmentation had been supported by large numbers, but individuals were opposed to the status quo in terms of, for example, a single member of the politburo. Third, previous rifts and elite incohesion had not permeated the internal core support base of the party, thereby failing to gain traction. Fourth, and most importantly, the issues of succession and factions were not as pronounced as they became. Fifth, although elite fragmentation has always been present, the centre was able to weather the storm. Those fomenting fragmentation were excluded, while others hesitated to join them. Six, previous elite fragmentation had taken place during a period of de facto one-party state. Even though expelled officials went on to form opposition parties, they could not mount formidable challenges to ZANU–PF hegemony. However, the discord in the Women’s and Youth Leagues threatened the heart and soul of ZANU–PF in five respects. First, the fragmentation

188 

P. RUHANYA

was national, with pockets of vehement resistance to Mugabe’s rule in all ZANU–PF provinces. Second, it was supported by vast majorities nationally, leading to the suspension and expulsion of senior ZANU–PF officials across the country. The expulsion of Vice-President Joice Mujuru and votes of no confidence in all but one provincial executive committee in the run-up to December 2014 and to Mnangagwa at the November 2017 congress buttresses this point. Third, the elite incohesion cut across all organs of the party, from the politburo, Women’s League and Youth League to cell committees. Furthermore, owing to party–state conflation, elite incohesion affected the external organs that had always been the shock-troops of ZANU–PF, such as the state bureaucracy and the coercive apparatus of the state, including war veterans and party youth militia. Thus, elite fragmentation was not only a preserve of ZANU–PF but transcended into state institutions. Fourth, owing to Mugabe’s advanced age, succession was consuming the attention of both the party and the state; it had become an overarching national question. Fifth, one common feature of elite fragmentation under Mugabe had been the inability of the centre to hold and its incapacity to stamp authority within the party. That the party’s dirty linen was being washed in public and it had become fashionable to contradict Mugabe and his decisions made it clear that the centre was indeed brittle.

Lack of Elite Consensus in the Security Apparatus? The state security apparatus has always been the bulwark of ZANU–PF support owing to the politico-military nexus. The coercive apparatus, including war veterans, had been at the forefront of aggressively campaigning for ZANU–PF rule. In 2000, the army declared that the office of president was a straitjacket office, whose incumbent must satisfy certain attributes—chief among them participation in the liberation war. The military had always been the defender of last resort when ZANU–PF faced external threats. It did so effectively in November 2017 when Mugabe and his faction were toppled. According to the military, he was surrounded by criminals, and they wanted to restore his legacy and that of the war of liberation. Alexander and Tendi (2008) note that since 2000,

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

189

Zimbabwe’s state has been described as increasingly “militarised”, with military men being appointed in key positions throughout the state, and an expanding range of decisions and actions being taken by the military, from political strategy to the formulation and implementation of agrarian and economic policy.

This militarisation has taken two forms: the militarisation of ZANU–PF itself, by deploying army personnel in the commissariat of the party, and the militarisation of the state, in the form of the deployment of military personnel to state institutions, such as state-owned enterprises and the national prosecuting authority. President Mugabe’s essential skill was in practising Machiavellian politics to secure ZANU–PF’s hegemony by creating interdependence between three institutions: the party, the military and the state. This relationship was the backbone of his rule. Nonetheless, the hostilities, contradictions and fragmentation in the security apparatus of the state, mainly around the issue of succession, coupled with the incapacity of the centre to hold, were ZANU–PF’s litmus test and the principal driver towards its fragmentation, which could lead to a possible electoral loss. It can be argued that ZANU–PF was stronger in 2008 even though it lost the general election than it had been in its fractured state before the military coup. The discord and elite incohesion manifested in the contretemps between Mugabe and war veterans had the effect of weakening ZANU– PF, leading to Mnangagwa’s failure to win the presidency decisively in the July 2018 election. During his last days, Mugabe accused the military of interfering in ZANU–PF internal politics on the succession issue during the 2015 ZANU–PF conference in Victoria Falls. This revealed the long-­ held view that Mugabe, the civilian nationalist, had uneasy relations with military veterans of the struggle that dated back to the bush war of the 1970s. In March 2017, a faction close to Mugabe complained that the military had been involved in supporting a faction aligned to Mnangagwa in the Masvingo provincial chairperson election. That election was nullified on the grounds of bad weather, which deterred some party supporters from voting, but a re-run ensured victory for Mnangagwa’s candidate. In 2017, personal attacks on Mugabe, the patron of the war veterans, by the association’s leadership, such as Jabulani Sibanda, the former chairperson of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association, Christopher Mutsvangwa, the current chairperson, Victor Matemadanda, the association’s secretary general, and the firing of Mutsvangwa from

190 

P. RUHANYA

cabinet were indicative of growing dissent within the security establishment. In addition, derogatory attacks by war veterans and some sections of ZANU–PF youth wing on Grace Mugabe, and their ousting and vote of no confidence in former Vice-President Mphoko and former ministers associated with G40, such as Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwawo, indicated the magnitude and unprecedented extent of elite fragmentation.

Grassroots Incohesion: Grace Mugabe at the Centre The entry of Grace Mugabe into mainstream ZANU–PF politics in 2014 arguably heralded the summit of elite incohesion and fissures in all organs of the party, including the Women’s League that she led before her expulsion in November 2017. Her entry into politics coincided with unprecedented purging and expulsions from ZANU–PF. Her demeanour and the inference that she was in complete charge of both the party and the state, without any constitutional legal basis upon which to exercise such powers, was the seedbed for chaos and anarchy in all the organs and structures of the ruling party. Grace’s meddling in party structures arguably fuelled and accelerated elite incohesion and popularized the politics of dissent within ZANU– PF. Members were fired more for disrespecting Grace Mugabe than for infringing the party constitution. More importantly, Mugabe had always prevailed, gluing ZANU–PF together by playing factions against each other. However, with the entry of Grace Mugabe into politics, her husband was forced to become a faction leader. The dissent among war veterans, the Youth League, the Women’s League and some vigilante groups associated with ZANU–PF indicated resistance to the capture of the party and the state by Mugabe and his wife. Statements by war veterans such as Jabulani Sibanda that ZANU–PF had suffered a “bedroom coup” were a result of Grace Mugabe’s ubiquitous political interference in party affairs beyond her realm as secretary of the Women’s League. The hierarchical set-up in ZANU–PF was distorted, with Grace assuming a position superior to that of second secretaries. When Mphoko once stated he was subordinate to Grace Mugabe, Christopher Mutsvangwa criticised him, stating that the vice-president “respects the marriage certificate more than he respects the Constitution. We are an elected constitutional republic.”

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

191

The central argument here is that the higher the elite incohesion and internal fragmentation among party elites, the more likely it was that the military, with its interests in the survival of ZANU–PF and their economic interests, would intervene against Mugabe. Internal fragmentation, elite incohesion and defections from ZANU–PF increased as Zimbabwe moved inexorably towards the 2018 election, which would have a potential impact on the party’s electoral chances. The situation could threaten military interests and their hegemonic capture of state power.

State-Controlled Media’s Capture by Military Interests As argued by Levytsky and Way, the media is always one of the targets of a competitive authoritarian regime because it is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can be the regime’s possible downfall, while on the other hand it can be a tool for maintaining power through propaganda that decimates the opposition’s political appeal to the electorate. Apart from reliance on repressive legislation such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, Broadcasting Services Act, Interception of Communications Act, and the Public Order and Security Act, among others, the ZANU–PF government has maintained a military presence among the top leadership positions of the national broadcaster—the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) and the Zimbabwe Newspapers Group (ZIMPAPERS), among others. The placements are not meant to transform military actors into civilians; on the contrary, it is meant to militarise civilian spaces. In the lead-up to the coup, this infrastructure helped the military to control the narrative driven in the state media and influence how the private and alternative media reported events. A cursory look at the military architecture within the state media shows that in 2009, eight senior security sector members were appointed by the then Minister of Information and Publicity, Webster Shamu, onto media-related boards. Among the retired security sector officials appointed were: Brigadier-General Epmarcus Kanhanga (ZIMPAPERS), Retired Colonel Rueben Mqwayi, Brigadier-General Elasto Madzingira (both BAZ), Brigadier-General Benjamin Mabenge, Major-General Gibson Mashingaidze (both Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings), Brigadier-General Livingstone

192 

P. RUHANYA

Chineka (Transmedia), Brigadier-General Collin Moyo (Kingstons) and Colonel Claudius Makova (New Ziana).3 Denis Magaya, a son of ZANLA High Command member Comrade (Cde) Arthur Magaya, was a short-lived ZBC board chair in 2014 alongside such members as Professor Charity Manyeruke, a University of Zimbabwe Dean of Social Studies linked to the security sector and a close ally to the former first lady, Grace Mugabe, and Cleopatra Shingirai Matanhire-Mutisi, the wife of Brigadier-General Francis Mutisi, among others.4 The message appears clear: military interests need to be protected in all key areas of state power, and the media is one of them. As a result, state-controlled media have been very vibrant in diverting attention from the decay in the political economy that is causing poor economic performance and severely affecting the social wellbeing of Zimbabweans, instead laying blame on the targeted sanctions imposed by certain western countries on key ZANU–PF leaders. This study argues that on 13 November 2017, when the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) commander, Constantine Chiwenga, issued a statement that ordered ZANU–PF to stop purging veterans of the liberation struggle, he was indeed interfering in the public affairs of the state, contrary to the provisions of the constitution, something that the media did not expose. Chiwenga said: Let us begin by quoting the Constitution of this country particularly the preamble which speaks of “Exalting and extolling the brave men and women who sacrificed their lives during the Second Chimurenga/Umvukela and national liberation struggles and honouring our fore bearers and compatriots who toiled for the progress of our country.”5

The statement shows the competitive authoritarian nature of the regime in Zimbabwe, as argued by Levitsky and Way (2010). The media failed to pick up that the army general was contradicting himself by appearing to be following constitutional dictates while he was violating Zimbabwe’s constitutional democracy by dabbling in partisan politics. Furthermore, on 15 November, the military spokesperson Major-General Sibusiso Moyo  The Zimbabwean, 7 October 2009.  See The Herald, 17 February 2014. New board for ZBC announced. Available at: http:// www.herald.co.zw/new-board-for-zbc-announced/. 5  Statement by Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander, Constantine Chiwenga, issued on 13 November 2017. Accessed at: www.nehandaradio.com on 15 January 2017. 3 4

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

193

addressed the nation through ZBC Television (ZBC TV). He noted that: “to the media, we urge you to report fairly and responsibly”.6 ZBC TV would have reported fairly and responsibly if it had properly characterized what had happened as a military coup.

Private Media and Coverage of the Military Coup The collusion of the media stretched beyond the purview of the state to private media. Deliberate mischaracterisation of the coup or the failure to properly interpret the events that led to the ousting of President Robert Mugabe demonstrate this. Private media, like their counterparts in the state, shied away from calling the military intervention a coup, which played into the military narrative of targeting criminals around the Mugabes. NewsDay reported on 16 November that the intervention by the military was ephemeral, which was meant to pacify the regional and international communities that feared a full-blown military coup.7 The article also focused on the military takeover being bloodless, and hoping this trend continued. This missed a major element of the coup, which was the deliberate disregard of the country’s constitution—as this places deployment of the military in the hands of the president. The report by NewsDay was not surprising: the owner and publisher of the paper, Trevor Ncube, appeared on Twitter during the military takeover romanticising the coup. For example, on 21 November, the day Mugabe resigned, he tweeted that: Zimbabwe National Army is not a mercenary army. They will be going back to the barracks. Where they belong. #Zimbabwe.

Ncube continued tweeting: We did this!! Nobody helped us. Our recent history has taught us that we are our own liberators. Starting from the bottom we can rebuild Africa’s bread-basket again. Let’s do this thing!!

6  Full statement delivered on ZBC TV on 15 November 2017 by Major-General Sibusiso Moyo. Accessed at: www.ewn.co.za on 15 January 2017. 7  See NewsDay, 16 November 2017, “Military takeover should be temporary”. Available at: https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/military-takeover-temporary/.

194 

P. RUHANYA

One could argue that the newspaper took its cue from its publisher, who openly supported and embraced the military’s takeover without any scrutiny of its legal and constitutional roles in Zimbabwe’s constitutional democracy. The constitution forbids the military from interfering in the public and civilian affairs of the state, such as soldiers patrolling in the streets without the authority of the president, and arresting citizens, which is the role of the police. Once a leading critic of the government, on 21 November the Daily News led with the headline “Mugabe resigns as President of Zimbabwe”. The story focused on the impeachment process as the reason for his resignation. The story did not investigate the complex reasons for his ousting, such as his loss of control of the coercive and repressive apparatus that was running the country unconstitutionally. Therefore, the impeachment process was a legitimation process of a coup that the media was not articulating. The media failed to read the hybrid nature of this competitive authoritarian system, as argued by Levitsky and Way (2010) when they submitted that these regimes set up a whole range of democratic institutions but systematically undermine them resulting in unfair competition. The diaspora radio and website Nehanda Radio focused on Mugabe being under house arrest.8 Interestingly, the article did not mention the nature and character of the coup, but focused on the rationale the army gave for its coup, dubbed Operation Restore Legacy. This platform is usually critical of ZANU–PF and the state apparatus that has helped to perpetuate ZANU–PF rule, and yet when the coup took place, it gave a voice to the army, thereby rationalising the military takeover. The failure to fulfil a watchdog and investigative role demonstrates the collusion of the private media in endorsing the coup. Another publication worth mentioning is the Daily Telegraph, a British independent newspaper. This, just like Zimbabwe’s domestic publications, tried to portray the removal of Mugabe as positive. In its 15 November article,9 the newspaper carried an article under the headline “Zimbabwe Crisis”:

8  See Nehanda Radio, 15 November 2017, “Mugabe ‘under house arrest’ after army takeover”. Available at: http://nehandaradio.com/2017/11/15/mugabe-house-arrestarmy-takeover/. 9  See Daily Telegraph, 15 November 2017, “Zimbabwe crisis: ‘Moment of hope’ as Robert Mugabe’s iron grip on power evaporates”. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2017/11/14/tanks-seen-heading-towards-zimbabwe-capital-harare/.

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

195

Moment of hope’ as Robert Mugabe’s iron grip on power evaporates. The headline demonstrates the editorial bias which attempted a coup as a necessary intervention. The editorial bias received endorsement of the British Foreign Minister, Boris Johnson, who took a swipe at Mugabe’s authoritarianism calling the transition facilitated by the coup as “potentially a moment of hope”.

Military Seizure of the ZANU–PF Party Internal Electoral Processes It is submitted that when looking at Zimbabwe’s military assisted transition, we have to factor in how intra-party electoral and succession dynamics were mediated. The capture of the ZANU–PF electoral system by securocrats’ interests saw the outcome being manipulated through actions and a lack of action by the security sector before, during and after the coup. Whereas broadly ZANU–PF was capturing national electoral processes, that assisted the military. It is this environment that Donno (2013) observes to be electoral authoritarianism, in which political offices are filled through multiparty elections, but the electoral playing field is skewed in favour of the ruling party. Capturing this political arena gives the system the necessary security of continuity, despite opposition electoral pressure. The strategy for capturing the electoral process was executed through use of the security sector as a key part of campaign teams; deployment of retired securocrats and war veterans to install an environment of fear and sabotage; pre-election military terror campaigns or operations meant to tweak voting patterns and choices; the issuing of televised press statements by army generals during the run-up to elections with the intention of reminding the electorate that voting ZANU–PF was better than assuring punitive consequences of voting for the opposition; and populating state institutions responsible for administering elections with securocrats and their loyalists, capable of sacrificing professionalism for loyalty to ZANU–PF. The military has directly and indirectly taken charge of the election processes and made it very hard for anyone not aligned with it to win presidential office. This was part of ZANU–PF’s philosophy. Meredith (2007: 1) observes Mugabe making this concession in one of his speeches: “our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer – its guarantor. The people’s votes

196 

P. RUHANYA

and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins.” It is the very system that Mugabe constructed that led to his downfall. Literature on electoral processes in Zimbabwe show that after the security sector successfully installed Robert Mugabe as leader of ZANU–PF, all elections that followed have been militarised.10 In 1980, the governor of Zimbabwe–Rhodesia had initially expressed the view that elections might not be conducted in some ZANU–PF strongholds owing to violence perpetrated by ZANLA forces during campaigns, only to change this decision a few days later.11 ZIPRA forces were not immune from doubling as campaign teams for Joshua Nkomo.12 This created a culture that allows securocrats to influence election results. The security sector that installed Robert Mugabe after capturing ZANU went on to force PF–ZAPU into the 1987 Unity Accord after it had been satisfied that the CIO, 5th Brigade and other militia had implemented their assigned campaign strategy across ZAPU strongholds.13 Following the ZANU–PF militarized campaigns in Matabeleland before the 1985 election, the estimated number of deaths amounted to over 10,000; and these were carried out in a style later used in the 2008 presidential run-off elections.14 This legacy will always remain in the minds and hearts of Zimbabweans as they approach elections, and it has been often invoked to instil fear and influence the electorate’s choices. The retired security sector and war veterans have been a very important agent in enhancing the capture of the electoral process and ensuring the continuity of the securocratic state. They have helped to pursue and enhance military capture of the electoral process in the following ways: they can use violence and threats, forcing a sell-out label on opposition members and supporters in door-to-door ZANU–PF campaigns; being 10  This was a general theme across the interviews held. It simply indicates that the military has been in use in all elections in which ZANU–PF has been involved. Interviews, July– August 2017. 11  See Nehanda Radio, 24 December 2013. Joshua Nkomo letter to Robert Mugabe from exile in the United Kingdom. Available at: http://nehandaradio.com/2013/12/24/ joshua-nkomo-letter-to-robert-mugabe-from-exile-in-the-uk/. 12  Interviews revealed that ZIPRA forces were key campaign teams for PF–ZAPU, and to date it has been pivotal in Matabeleland as part of ZANU–PF war veteran campaign machinery. 13  Interviews, July–August 2017. 14  See Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland & Midlands 1980–1989, compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation, September 2001.

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

197

scattered across the country’s communities, they can indoctrinate, monitor and spy on citizens at household level; they convince the grassroots to perceive them as ZANU–PF creators, kingmakers and fathers of the army; they capture and use public resources (schools, government aid and projects, local government infrastructure) to further ZANU–PF political interests; they preside over ZANU–PF capture of government food handouts, using them in “food-for-a-vote” campaigns in hunger-stricken villages; and they undermine traditional leaders at kraal head level, frogmarching them to vote for ZANU–PF.15 Under such circumstances, election results are predictable before the election takes place. The electoral process is thus captured. Memories of pre-election ZANU–PF military exercises, such as Operation Gukurahundi (1983–7) land reform (2000), Operation Murambatsvina (2004) and Operation Makavhoterapapi (2008), are still fresh in the minds of victim communities. The clampdown on vendors that coincided with voter registration in Harare in 2017 was another example; it must be understood as a political strategy of sabotaging opposition strongholds rather than an attempt to clear the streets. These so-­ called military operations have had a clear long-term strategy of rigging the electoral environment in that they have all been strategically timed, before contested presidential elections; they were targeted in areas where ZANU–PF performed dismally in the previous election; and violence was used without mercy and judicial remedies. Electorates and presidential candidates have been continuously reminded and assured—always as presidential elections approach—of a repeat of similar operations and/or worse if ZANU–PF loses the presidential election. The 2008 run-off elections provide the clearest example of the gun being used to protect the vote. But it is also important to look at the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections, when the ZDF commander, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, released a press statement to the state media: We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organizations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost, in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, 15  Interviews, July–August 2017. See also The Guardian, 22 June 2008. “This is no election. This is a brutal war.” Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/ jun/22/zimbabwe1.

198 

P. RUHANYA

s­ overeignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people.16

This statement demonstrates the conflation between the party and the state and the party and the military. Zvinavashe’s press release set the stage for future overt military interventions in the country’s political life. Major-­ Generals Douglas Nyikayaramba, Martin Chedondo and Zimbabwe Prison Service Retired Major-General Paradzai Zimondi, among others, in many instances before the 2008 June presidential elections sent similar threats to the electorate and those with presidential ambitions. Mugabe also issued a solidarity statement that clearly toed the line drawn by the securocrats in one of his addresses in the same period: The war veterans came to me and said, “President, we can never accept that our country which we won through the barrel of the gun can be taken merely by an ‘X’ made by a ballpoint pen.” Zvino ballpoint pen icharwisana ne AK? (Will the pen fight the AK rifle?) Is there going to be a struggle between the two? Do not argue with a gun.17

Major-General Douglas Nyikayaramba recently emerged to be a spokesperson of the ZANU–PF military electioneering team. During the Government of National Unity (GNU) era, he was chosen to represent a military presence in the constitution-making committee, and he advocated for a constitutional clause that would ensure Mugabe was “president for life”. He told the nation: I am in ZANU–PF and ZANU–PF is in me and you can’t change that… Truly speaking, I am ZANU–PF and ZANU-PF is in me and you can’t change that … I am sure everyone, including yourself, has now woken up to realise that he (Tsvangirai) is not the right candidate … The bottom line is that I will not surrender; I will not salute someone like that personally…

16  See Zimbabwe: Press Freedom, 16 January 2002. Available at: https://www.africa.upenn. edu/Urgent_Action/apic-011602x.htm. 17  See President Mugabe’s statement, The Herald, 23 June 2008.

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

199

What he (Tsvangirai) is saying is nonsense. We are dealing with a national security threat…18

When the country was bracing itself for the watershed 2018 elections, in the previous September, a serving Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) Major-General, Douglas Nyikayaramba, commandeered chiefs assembled at Four Brigade in Masvingo to ensure that President Robert Mugabe won the 2018 elections. He unequivocally stated: Did anyone ever say to a traditional chief that you are old, leave the chieftainship for me? That is unheard of. What will happen to the chief’s aides? We need to remind each other. No chief was voted for. No son has ever ordered his father to step down from his role as leader of the family, so the same applies to our case with President Mugabe. That is what we should remind each other when we meet. Whites want divide-and-rule, and they saw that Mugabe is the nerve centre of the country. Let us not sell the country for the love of sugar. We are here to strengthen the relationship between chiefs, the President and the army.19

Militarising the election environment means that the results do not indicate the people’s democratic choice but rather expresses their choice of life over death. No matter how independent the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) might try to be, if the context of the electoral process is not liberated from military capture, elections will remain neither free nor fair. Election-based transition that is contrary to military interests is impossible. ZEC is among the most politicized bodies in Zimbabwe, with its administration infiltrated by un-uniformed agents of the security sector and its political agents. In 2002, an ex-colonel in the ZNA, Sobuza Gula-­ Ndebele, was appointed to chair the Election Supervision Commission (ESC), while Brigadier-General Douglas Nyikayaramba was ESC Chief Executive Officer, and this military-led team presided over the running of the first contested presidential elections after the Unity Accord. He was later promoted to Attorney General in 2008—a move seen as a direct reward for the 2002 election services.

 See Financial Gazette, 18 July 2011.  See Pindulanews, 12 September 2017.

18 19

200 

P. RUHANYA

The Militarized Judiciary and Its Role in the Coup The judiciary at all levels is expected to be active in setting a clear demarcation between the political terrain and the military topography, and reprimanding security personnel for crossing from the latter to the former. However, owing to its capture by securocrats’ interests, the judiciary has failed to play its constitutional role of oversight through judicial activism; it only acts when cases have been brought to it. In addition, many politically charged cases that have been brought to the judiciary have been clearly stage-managed by ZANU–PF so that the judiciary causes inaction or action that furthers its interests.20 The judicial system has been captured by military interests through the recruitment of military personnel, ZANU–PF agents and loyalists, which has meant the system has lost its credibility in the public domain. Capture of the state judiciary intensified simultaneously with the emergence of MDC as a serious threat to ZANU–PF’s political hegemony. The ZANU–PF military operation Fast Track Land Reform Programme, in 2000, which targeted white commercial farmers whom the government believed to be financial and electoral aids of the newly formed MDC, led to outright judicial capture by military interests. This led to the resignation of then Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay, Nicholas McNally and David Bartlett, among others, from their posts after the security sector allowed war veterans to enter and dance on Supreme Court tables.21 Commenting on the same issue, and displaying his disregard of the courts, President Mugabe had the following to say: “The courts can do whatever they want, but no judicial decision will stand in our way. They are not courts for our people and we shall not even be defending ourselves in these courts”22 20  In Jealousy Mbizvo Mawarire v Robert Gabriel Mugabe NO, Morgan Richard Tsvangirai NO, Arthur Guseni Oliver Mutambara, NO, Welshman Ncube and the Attorney General (SC 146/13, CCZ 18/13), Mr Mawarire successfully filed an application seeking an order directing the president to proclaim the elections to be held (after amendment) by 25 July, and the Constitutional Court ruled in his favour. It had always been ZANU–PF’s desire to have early elections before electoral reforms, whereas opposition parties in the GNU wanted them to take place after electoral reforms agreed in the Global Political Agreement (2008) had occurred. Mawarire was either sent by ZANU–PF or his actions were encouraged by ZANU–PF to secure a winning strategy. 21  See www.pindula.co.zw/. 22  See NewsDay, 20 September 2016. “The abusive relationship between the Executive and Judiciary”. Available at: https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/09/abusive-relationshipexecutive-judiciary/.

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

201

In 2005, when High Court Justice Tendai Uchena’s ruling allowed Roy Bennet—an imprisoned opposition Member of Parliament—to contest elections in prison, Robert Mugabe dismissed the decision as “stupid” and the justice concerned reversed the judgement. From 2000 onwards, Mugabe used his party’s militarised patronage network to populate the judiciary bench with his Trojan horse judges at a time when a critical land reform case was before the courts. It was through the work of these judges, with the help of Constitutional Amendment Number 17 Act (2005) introducing section 16B in the constitution, that the illegal farm grab exercise and violation of property rights were legalized, despite the SADC Tribunal ruling declaring those actions illegal (Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. et al. v. Republic of Zimbabwe). The previous Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku (former ZANU–PF MP and Deputy Minister), Justice Guvava (his niece), Justice Charles Hungwe (ZANLA war veteran and one of the founders of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association), current Chief Justice Luke Malaba (beneficiary of the land reform), former Judge President Rita Makarau (former non-­ constituency Member of Parliament appointed by the president) and current Judge President George Chiweshe (a Retired Brigadier-General, Chair of ZEC during disputed 2008 elections) were among other justices who found their way to the judicial system through the patronage network resulting in de facto capture of the system by security sector interests.23 The judiciary has demonstrated too much ineptitude when it comes to cases that involve the vested interests of ZANU–PF’s securocratic system. It must be remembered that war veterans were key architects of the farm invasion in the early 2000s, and putting war veterans on the judicial bench was a clear indication that ZANU–PF will do anything to protect the security sector even if it violates the constitution. In reference to a recent dismissal of the case challenging the adoption of bond notes, Alex Magaisa, a Kent University legal expert, aptly sums up the decay in the judiciary as follows: “Taking matters to Chiweshe’s court is like goats taking a petition

 See www.pindula.co.zw/.

23

202 

P. RUHANYA

to a hyena!”24 The Campbell case was another example of this. Similarly, during the 2016 national demonstrations by social movements and opposition parties calling for electoral reforms, the High Court declared the violent clampdown by the police on peaceful demonstrations on 26 August unconstitutional. Mugabe, at a ZANU–PF youth rally captured on national television, criticized the court ruling as “reckless disregard to peace”.25 The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 1) Bill, 2017 has allegedly been part of Mnangagwa’s efforts to capture the judiciary in light of indications that he has become the stronger champion of military interests when compared with his G40 counterparts aligned to Grace Mugabe. The disruptions that occurred during the appointment process of new Chief Justice Luke Malaba are believed to be part of Mnangagwa’s state capture calculations, as he preferred his former comrade in arms— retired Brigadier-General Judge President George Chiweshe instead of Justice Malaba, who has a history of making unpredictable court rulings and is sympathetic to G40. It is believed that by putting Justice Chiweshe in charge of the Constitutional Court, Mnangagwa wanted to insulate his future actions from being declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in the event that he took over power from Robert Mugabe. Thus, Hofisi and Feltoe argue that there exists a theory espousing that: amendment of section 180 to give the President the sole discretion in appointing the Chief Justice was to enable the President to appoint Justice Chiweshe who has a liberation war background and strong ties with the military… It seeks to get rid of the public advertisements and interviews in respect of the three senior positions of Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and Judge President of the High Court. These appointments are to be made by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. Section 339(2) of the Constitution defines the phrase “after consultation” as requiring the proffering of views which are not binding on the appointing authority…The amendment proposes a return to the provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution (as amended), which scholars noted was “legally opaque” and only allowed for appointment of persons acceptable to the government.

24  See “About George Chiweshe-Pindula, Local Knowledge”. Available at: www.pindula. co.zw/index.php?title=George_Chiweshe. 25  See Human Rights Watch, 6 September 2016.

8  THE MILITARISATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2002–2017 

203

So the military man—Mnangagwa—was working tirelessly to ensure that the military regained its control over the judiciary and, fortunately enough for him, parliament rubberstamped his plans. It came as no surprise when, in November 2017, High Court Judge George Chiweshe, a military man, made two rulings: the first legitimised the military coup as constitutional and the second the dismissal of Mnangagwa by Mugabe as unlawful. Mnangagwa had therefore both legal legitimacy from the court and political legitimacy from ZANU–PF processes after the party had fired Mugabe and installed him as leader of the party and consequently the government. The complex relationship between the military and the judiciary and their civilian handlers in ZANU–PF under Mnangagwa escaped media scrutiny and exposure, leading to the coup and its aftermath.

Conclusion Hybrid regimes as defined by Levitsky and Way (2010) place the civilian authority at the centre of running the state. However, this chapter argues that such an explanation is not adequate in explaining specific contexts such as Zimbabwe. While Zimbabwe has certain aspects that suit the descriptive character of hybrid regimes, the military factor and its liberation history stand apart. Whereas most hybrid regimes are led by civilian authorities with an undoubted control of state institutions, this study has shown that the civilian authority in Zimbabwe is arguably de jure but in practice the military runs the affairs of the state. The clash between Mugabe’s interests and those of the military elites in planning his succession, which led to the fall of Mugabe, shows that the military had control over key civilian institutions that administers the affairs of the state. Contrary to assertions by Haggard and Kauffman that in dominant-party rules “militaries that intervene in politics can return to the barracks; the raison d’être of political parties is to rule” (1995: 269), some key military personnel have joined the civilian government following the November 2017 military coup to consolidate power through military influence. Therefore, in the case of Zimbabwe, the military has a ubiquitous role in the political and public affairs of the state. Its history with ZANU–PF and PF–ZAPU as former liberation movements has allowed soldiers to use their coercive influence to determine the politics of both party and state.

204 

P. RUHANYA

References Alexander, J., and Tendi, B.M. 2008, A Tale of Two Elections: Zimbabwe at the Polls in 2008. Concerned Africa Scholars, Bulletin, No. 80, Winter. Diamond, L. 2008. Democracy in Retreat, (online). Available at: https://www. realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/03/democracy_in_retreat.html. Accessed 2 Feb 2018. Donno, D. 2013. Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal of Political Science 57 (3): 703–716. Haggard, S., and R.  Kaufman. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Howard, M.M., and P.G.  Roessler. 2006. Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal of Political Science 50 (2): 365–381. Levitsky, S., and L.  Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lindberg, S. 2009. In ‘A Theory of Elections as a Mode of Transition’, in Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition, ed. Staffan Lindberg. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Meredith, M. 2007. Mugabe: Power, Plunder and the Struggle for Mugabe’s Future. New York: Perseus. O’Donnell, G., and P.C.  Shmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Schedler, A. 2002. The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections. International Political Science Review 23 (1): 103–122. Sithole, M. 2000. Zimbabwe: The Erosion of Authoritarianism and Prospects for Democracy. In The Uncertain Promise of Southern Africa, ed. Y.W. Bradshaw and S.N. Ndengwa. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indianapolis University Press. Sithole, M., and J.  Makumbe. 1997. Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU Pf Hegemony and Its Incipient Decline. African Journal of Political Science 2 (1): 122–139.

PART III

Social Media, Democracy and Political Discourse

CHAPTER 9

The Media and Politics in the Context of the “Third Chimurenga” in Zimbabwe Philip Pasirayi

This chapter explores the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) media strategies during the “Third Chimurenga” in the early 2000s. The media was central in the ruling party’s violent seizure of white-owned farms starting from 2000. In the state media, this controversial exercise was justified as the “Third Chimurenga”, meaning the third and decisive phase of the war against colonial rule during which land was a central grievance. I explore how the party’s media strategy under the newly created Department of Information and Publicity was re-geared in line with the party’s hegemonic ambitions and hybrid politics. I discuss how Jonathan Moyo, the newly appointed Minister of State for Information and Publicity, managed to manipulate journalists from the state press through meetings, money, threats to jobs, and creating and disseminating content via routine briefings, which resulted in a committed, self-policing journalistic team and a pliant state press. I conducted interviews with selected journalists and editors from the state press to discuss media briefings that were held by the Department of Information and the framing of

P. Pasirayi (*) Centre for Community Development in Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_9

207

208 

P. PASIRAYI

the land issue in the state press. The land issue was the primary theme of the “Third Chimurenga”. I show how Moyo established a hardworking and hands-on style of management, and considered history and culture to be an important part of what he was addressing. This chapter contributes to a Zimbabweanist literature on the media and political science literature in what are known as hybrid regimes, where the media plays a central part in regime legitimation and/or survival. Although ZANU–PF’s interference in the operations of the state media started in the 1980s and 1990s, the new measures that were introduced by the Ministry of Information and Publicity in 2000 under Moyo were designed to entrench the party’s control over the state media in new ways. While Chiumbu and Moyo (2009) acknowledge ZANU–PF’s media strategies, such as institutional re-gearing, the use of incentives and the cultivation of loyalty to control public media, they do not provide details of how this was achieved. I build on this and other works, and my interviews with state and party elites and journalists, to interrogate the relationships between state and party elites and journalists, the political and ideological means of political control focusing on institutional arrangements, media briefings that were conducted by the Ministry of Information and Publicity with journalists and editors, amounted to political re-education about what constituted the national interest, and the payment of money to a cabal of journalists that was assigned to do clandestine media work in support of the regime. This chapter draws on Zimbabwean state media policies and practices to give insight into the workings of the media in what I argue should be seen or conceptualised as a hybrid regime. The media is a key arena of contestation in these regimes alongside the electoral, judicial and legislative arenas (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Hybrid regimes, also known as competitive authoritarian regimes, emerged in the post-Cold War context in Africa. These regimes blend authoritarianism with democratic practice (Diamond, 2002). Diamond argues that in the contemporary era “democracy is the only broadly legitimate regime form” and political regimes are under pressure from international and domestic constituencies “to adopt – or at least to mimic – the democratic form” (Ibid: 24). Hybrid regimes are pseudo-democratic in that, though they are characterised by multi-party electoral competition and functioning legislatures, judiciaries, a strong civil society and a critical media, these mask the reality of authoritarianism and are intended to legitimate power (Ibid.). Andreas Schedler (2010: 70) notes that hybrid regimes “have set up the full panoply of

9  THE MEDIA AND POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “THIRD… 

209

liberal-democratic institutions” but specialise in their manipulation to consolidate power and achieve undemocratic objectives. However, for some hybrid regimes there is also a genuine concern for legitimacy that influences their strategic approach or intervention, including in the media. I argue that it is this concern for legitimacy that drives political executives in hybrid regimes to consider “hidden” strategies, such as press briefings, money, bribery and other options, as opposed to direct censorship of the media. In the literature, Zimbabwe under ZANU–PF is regarded as a hybrid regime. Levitsky and Way (2010) note that Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980 when it was already a hybrid regime, suggesting that its predecessor, the Rhodesian state, was a hybrid system as well. It is therefore important for scholars interested in the Zimbabwean media to look at how state media policy and practices have been re-geared to suit the interests of the ruling party’s hybrid politics. This is especially the case because the media mirrors the political system within which it exists. Many studies on the media in Zimbabwe do not acknowledge that ZANU–PF is running a hybrid system that influences the party’s strategic choices and interventions, including in the media. While ZANU–PF still used heavy-handed means to control the media, which are widely acknowledged in the literature, the party also devised hidden ways of controlling the press. While hybrid regimes use coercion particularly when their hold on power is threatened, it is also crucial to explore the non-coercive strategies of media control, as opposed to censorship, newspaper shutdowns and the incarceration of critical journalists. Political executives in hybrid regimes prefer strategies such as institutional re-configuration, patronage and the forging of manipulative ties with journalists because they may be more effective in creating and sustaining legitimacy. The strategies of the Ministry of Information and Publicity under Moyo demonstrate a new media regime with its own style of management that was different from the earlier period. There emerged a highly complex politics that shaped media practice which involved material incentives and threats but also the committed participation of journalists from the state-controlled media in defending the “Third Chimurenga”. The lesson that we can draw from these shifts in state media policy and practice is that hybrid regimes cannot afford to be rigid: they have to be continuously introspective and devise new strategies for prolongation of their rule. If they do not do this, that is, re-invent themselves, they run the risk of crumbling. This study therefore adds to our understandings of hybrid

210 

P. PASIRAYI

regime renewal and persistence. Let us now consider some of the strategies that ZANU–PF implemented in the media. Despite his recent arrival in ZANU–PF and his history of criticising the party, Minister Moyo was considered to be key in the ruling party’s new media strategy. Journalists and editors from the state-controlled media described him as a hands-on, hard-working and articulate minister in contrast to his predecessors. Moyo embarked upon the propagation of patriotic history. He wrote articles under different pseudonyms, such as Mzala Joe in the Sunday News, Nathaniel Manheru in The Herald and Lowani Ndlovu in the Sunday Mail. When asked about his approach towards the media and his work ethic and philosophy, this is what Minister Moyo said: I believe modestly that what I did have [when I was the Minister of Information and Publicity from 2000 to 2004], as I still do, is that, if you make me the minister responsible for cleaning your toilets, I make sure that I keep them clean all the time. I also think that there are people, when they have their jobs they try to discharge those jobs to the best of their ability. I did not take through the Ministry of Information and Publicity and my position as Minister as a status position. I took it as a job. When I was appointed to this position, I rolled up my sleeves and got down to some serious work. I worked for 17 hours a day and slept only for 4 hours and you would come to Munhumutapa [the government building] at 2 am and find us there. With that sort of commitment and dedication, when it shows results people then start saying you are getting too powerful but I will be trying to do my job. I will be trying to make sure that whatever I do, I get results. If I needed assistance of the police to get something done, I would do that. If I needed the Ministry of Finance to support us, I would go. If I needed Air Zimbabwe to give us Boeing 767 to go and pick up our stranded Warriors [the Zimbabwe national football team] at Johannesburg airport in South Africa to take them to Seychelles, I would organise that. That’s what information is all about; it’s not just about press conferences. (Interview with Jonathan Moyo, April 2013, Harare)

The new hybrid media system that ZANU–PF was designing required a new set of ideas, policies and institutions in response to the shifting politics. But while the new political context required new approaches, it must be emphasised that the strategies that were deployed by ZANU–PF in the media were also informed by the past, including some of the strategies that were used by the colonial authorities in Rhodesia to control the media and justify authoritarian practices. This chapter gives an insight into some of

9  THE MEDIA AND POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “THIRD… 

211

the characteristics of the new hybrid media system. I reflect on some of the media control strategies that were deployed by the Ministry of Information consistent with this. The Ministry of Information devised a range of strategies to control the state press. Following his appointment as the Minister of Information and Publicity in 2000, Jonathan Moyo immediately purged senior journalists and editors in the state media on the pretext that they had “overstayed”; he considered these editors irrelevant to the new ZANU–PF media agenda and the party’s legitimation needs. In their place, Moyo appointed loyalists who were ready to toe his line. This appointment of loyalists to key positions was crucial in safeguarding ZANU–PF interests. A senior journalist who had worked for the main state-controlled daily newspaper, The Herald, in the early 2000s had this to say: “Journalists working for the state media who did not toe the party line [ZANU–PF] were either purged or demoted whilst young journalists with little experience in the newsroom were promoted to editors. This was meant to ensure a pliant media that was always ready to defend and regurgitate the ZANU–PF ideological position” (Interview, 13 March 2013, Harare). Bright Matonga, who was Moyo’s deputy at the Information and Publicity Ministry said: When Moyo came in [as Minister of Information and Publicity] in 2000, some of the journalists in the state media had “overstayed”; they didn’t toe the line so you wanted people that you could tell what to do. Editors were removed from the state media then we brought in a young crop of journalists that was hungry for success, hungry for promotion, hungry for identification and journalists we could tell what to do. We basically told them that we were in a war zone and you follow the command. We were defending the country and the media is the first and last line. (Interview with Bright Matonga, April, 2013, Harare)

Minister Moyo forged manipulative ties with journalists from the state media, whom he asked to carry out clandestine media work. These journalists were part of Moyo’s core team; they were proud to be associated with the minister. Moyo created commitment among journalists via his own work ethic and an elaborate project that involved incentives and threats. Forging close ties with journalists was a form of political control. The journalists testified to these Machiavellian strategies. A senior journalist from The Herald who was part of Moyo’s team stated that:

212 

P. PASIRAYI

We worked closely with Prof Moyo on a number of media projects which had nothing to do with our daily newsroom work. But he contacted us directly and bypassed the editors. We could meet during odd hours to work on different media projects that he gave us. We were paid handsomely for doing this work. We don’t know where he was getting the money but I can tell you that we were paid good money. You need to understand that this is the time that Moyo came in as Minister of Information and unlike previous ministers such as Mai [Mrs] Mujuru and Chen Chimutengwende, who, if I may say, took a bystander role in terms of being active and manipulating the media or in being interested in the actual content of the newspaper. Moyo came with a different approach. As an intellectual and a political scientist, Moyo had a certain way of influencing the ideological direction of the paper without physically being present at The Herald. For example, he is the only minister, if my memory serves me well, who held on a weekly basis no less than seven press briefings. Naturally if you are a journalist and your own minister is having such kind of press briefings, it means he will dominate the content of the media. You had to align yourself with him and his views. (Interview with an informant, March 2013)

Moyo managed to create an ethos where journalists wanted to please him and to be on his team when he served as Minister of Information and Publicity. He managed to build a committed team of journalists whose responsibility was to ensure that the regime’s new media agenda was successful. A senior journalist from The Herald who worked closely with Minister Moyo stated: I would pride myself as one of the few journalists that Moyo started having an interest in working with when he became minister. He approached PD [Pikirayi Deketeke] who was the news editor of the Sunday Mail then with a view of recruiting journalists that were to work for a website that was called zimday.com and I am one of the journalists that were recruited and given the task of recruiting the other three journalists, Munyaradzi Huni, Innocent Gore and Itai Musengeyi. We then held meetings with Moyo sometimes going into the wee hours. What was the strategy we were going to take? We said we were not going to only rely on The Herald and the Sunday Mail but also on the Internet and we had to establish multi-­ dimensional internet sites where we could write stories that were positive about the government without revealing our identity. Where he [Moyo] got the funding I don’t know but I can tell you confidently that we were paid handsomely and there were some stories that were plucked from our website that got published in The Herald, but very few people knew that we were

9  THE MEDIA AND POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “THIRD… 

213

the ones who wrote those stories. There were other stories that were also quoted outside the country. So that was one area where Moyo would work directly with journalists without involving the editors. He would also sometimes call a journalist directly and say that he wanted a particular story to come out and how he wanted it written. It was then the duty of the journalist to go and brief the editor to say that the Minister has called me and said that this story must find its way in the paper or give it prominence. I think the problem that Ray Mungoshi [who was editor of The Herald] faced is that he sought to challenge this interference. Moyo was not amused by that and Mungoshi was sacked. (Interview with a senior journalist at The Herald, Harare, March 2013)

Moyo also held routine media briefings with journalists and editors where he lectured them on what constituted the national interest and how this was to be framed in the news. While media briefings are standard procedure that underline state–media relations in most countries, Moyo’s routine meetings with journalists and editors from the state media constituted political re-education sessions. The journalists were told to be patriotic and this meant defending the ruling party’s interests. George Charamba, who served as the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity as well as Presidential Spokesperson, said that the media briefings were intended to orientate journalists “on the subconscious side of the state” and what constituted national interests (Interview with Charamba, March 2013). He also revealed that the media briefing meetings were also about material that was not for publishing. Charamba stated that: The briefings with journalists were meant to keep the media in touch with the state and decisions of the state. They were an outreach by government to media houses. But briefings are not just about material that is publishable [my emphasis]. They are also a way of anticipating policies. This is why the Americans have got what they call the deep backgrounder, when you are taken in for a briefing session which doesn’t originate any copy. The idea is to put you in touch with the subconscious side of the state [my emphasis] so that when policies eventually begin to unfold you are informed of these policies so that you know how you can use your journalism to promote them. (Interview with George Charamba, March 2013)

The media briefings organised by the Department of Information and Publicity were thus critical platforms that state officials used to develop a

214 

P. PASIRAYI

clear media agenda. What we learn from these media briefings is that media control in hybrid contexts is not always direct. The media briefings that were organised by the Department of Information and Publicity were a hidden way of controlling media content in the state press. We can see that the media briefings by the Information Ministry were an instrument of political control that shaped the framing of news in the state press. A senior journalist from The Herald who participated in the media briefings stated that: “You could easily tell the importance of certain issues or topics with the emphasis that Prof. Moyo or Charamba placed on these issues during the briefings. As a journalist your work was simple; to go back to the newsroom and try as much as possible to reflect these views in your story. You were always under pressure to reflect these views and making sure that you do not distort or misrepresent the Minister’s views” (Interview with senior reporter from The Herald, 23 March 2014). A senior journalist from The Herald who also took part in the media briefing meetings confirmed this view: Moyo would talk directly to journalists and he would also give us the background as to why some of the decisions in government were taken and why certain policies were adopted and from that perspective they were some kind of re-education for journalists, especially those from the state media, as to what were the real national interests of our country. Most journalists that were working for the state media felt that they really should defend government policy. There are so many things that we discussed during the media briefings but you must also understand that some of the issues, in my view, were conspiracies. The Minister [Moyo] gave us background on a number of government policies and the reasons why certain decisions were taken. We were told what was going on in ZANU–PF and government, the issues that were being debated and as a paper we then took decisions based on this as to how we should frame our news stories in The Herald. They [ministry officials] had a certain way of explaining things to us which informed us how they wanted these issues to be covered. After these media briefings it was clear how the officials wanted us [at The Herald], to write our stories and represent certain issues. When you are addressed by George Charamba, the Permanent Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson, you would assume that what he was saying was a reflection of President Mugabe’s views. So you would try as much as possible to reflect these views in your story. (Interview with informant, March 2013)

9  THE MEDIA AND POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “THIRD… 

215

The lectures to journalists and editors on the national interest were a subtle form of political control. Jonathan Moyo also developed a number of means of manipulating journalists via meetings, by using money and threatening jobs. These strategies exerted pressure on journalists to exercise self-censorship. Some editors from the state press said they were worried about what would happen to them “the morning after publishing of the newspaper” if they had misrepresented or distorted the government position (Interview with a reporter from The Sunday Mail, Harare, March 2013). The journalists said that they knew what was permissible or publishable in the political environment in which they operated, which meant they exercised self-­ censorship with little direct interference from the state officials. The former editor of the Sunday Mail, William Chikoto, explained: People say all sorts of things about how the two [Professor Jonathan Moyo and George Charamba] edited the papers, about this and that; there was nothing like that. You made the decisions yourselves; what to run, what not to run, but what then happens is when you published a story, the feedback comes the next moment, the morning after publication of the newspaper, isn’t it? So there was no instruction to editors. I remembered during my editorship, Jonathan Moyo only came once into the Sunday Mail newsroom when he was on a tour to familiarise himself with our work as the minister responsible. He would not come into the newsroom [and] neither would Charamba. There was nothing like that. Much of our contact with them was during the media briefings but when the story comes you would have to make the decision as the editor on what comes out and what doesn’t. There was a lot of self-censorship, but for us what made it easy was that there was a lot of conviction about the ideological position that we were supporting. So when you are editing, you are doing your best to be as professional as you can in defending that position. There was also an attempt [by journalists] to bring in some things that were not true, that could not be substantiated, so your job as the editor was to fight as much as possible to remove that. I remember one encounter that I had with a Minister then, he had given a story to a journalist which I edited in line with our editorial policy. When the story came out, the Minister confronted me. He said I was not editing the story but that I was editing him. You know those kinds of things. But the point is who are you editing, the story or the source? We were editing the story and not people and really the relationship sometimes would get nasty but we were doing our best. But the point is, if you did not have an ideological conviction of the whole question of land reform and the way it was carried out you would not survive. I think this is why we had some ­journalists

216 

P. PASIRAYI

leaving because they could not withstand the pressure. (Interview with William Chikoto, March 2013, Harare)

The editor of The Herald, Pikirayi Deketeke, drew a distinction between Moyo’s regime of media control and that of the Rhodesians. He explained: This whole issue of saying government-controlled media is misplaced. During the Rhodesian era you would see the Rhodesia Herald with blank pages where stories would have been pulled out because they had to go to the Ministry of Information somewhere in the Prime Minister’s office and censored. This is what we call control. Government is the main source of the information that happens in the country. The purpose of the Minister of Information is to meet the media to get an understanding of what is going on in government and you find this even in the UK when Tony Blair [former UK Prime Minister] was at the war front, he would move with journalists and brief those journalists about British foreign policy towards Iraq and to date it still happens. So it does not denote control. (Interview with Deketeke, March 2013, Harare)

There are variations in patterns of media regulation in authoritarian and hybrid regimes. The Rhodesian state was authoritarian, and as such it built a repressive apparatus to silence the media through direct censorship, deportations and incarceration of journalists. In Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front, media control was achieved through outright censorship, whereby regime censors were dispatched to the newsrooms to pull out stories deemed unpalatable before newspapers were published. While authoritarian rulers can afford to act in this way, the situation is different in hybrid regimes where legitimacy is desired. Authoritarian rulers do not greatly care about legitimacy; they do care about holding on to power. Their main goal is to retain power regardless of what means or methods they use to do so. While politics and institutional pressures produced a loyal and self-­ censoring body of editors and journalists, they were not the only factors that shaped news framing in the state press in Zimbabwe post-2000. Journalists and editors had agency and often shared the ideological views of the state and party officials. As noted above, some journalists said that they defended land reform out of ideological conviction and real belief in the political project, not only because of political pressure exerted by Moyo and Charamba and other state officials. One of the journalists, Lovemore Mataire, said: “Look, my mother and father met in Mozambique

9  THE MEDIA AND POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “THIRD… 

217

[during the liberation war in the 1970s]. They were ZANLA [Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army] cadres. I was born in Mozambique during the liberation war. I consider myself a product of Chimurenga for which land was a central grievance. How else was I supposed to interpret ‘Fast-Track’ Land Reform? I played my part to defend the revolution [land reform] through writing” (Interview with Lovemore Mataire, April 2013, Harare). We can see in this case that it was not only political pressure that influenced the journalist’s framing of the land issue, but also family experiences and ideological understanding. This was thus a highly complex politics that shaped media practice, involving material incentives and threats, and also the committed participation of journalists for whom ZANU–PF’s “Third Chimurenga” was a valuable extension of the struggle launched in the 1970s. The journalists and editors often defended the land issue on ideological grounds. William Chikoto, who served as editor of the Sunday Mail from 2001, stated that: “Yes there was a lot of self-censorship but for me and Pikirayi [editor of the state-run weekly newspaper The Herald] what made it easy for us was that ideological conviction about land reform. If you did not have an ideological conviction of the whole question of land reform and so on you would not survive. I think this is why you had some journalists leaving. For us the advantage was that we had worked with editors such as Charles Chikerema, whose ideological position on the whole thing [of land reform] was clear” (Interview with William Chikoto, April 2013, Harare). Chikerema was a former editor of the Sunday Mail and The Herald, an avowed communist who was well known for his criticism of ZANU–PF for abandoning the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The editor of The Herald, Pikirayi Deketeke, also stated that ideology was important in the interpretation of the land issue in the state-controlled press. He explained that: The public [state-controlled] media’s interpretation of Fast Track land reform was driven by the ambitions of the liberation struggle and the expectations of the majority of our people. I remember, as a young journalist, being labelled all sorts of names working with Charles Chikerema, who was the editor then, and he was being labelled as a socialist who was out of his time and so on, because he had been defending certain values that he thought were important and others were trying to adopt Western liberal ideology and values. So interpretation of land reform was guided by patriotism and the national interests. What does my mother expect? What does a villager in Murewa expect? What does a worker in Highfield expect? What

218 

P. PASIRAYI

are people’s expectations? Is it access to good health, housing, a better wage, a better income and how do you juxtapose those interests with the interests of foreign capital especially Western capital that was responsible for colonialism. So we took a position, we have always been aligned with the majority views. (Interview with Pikirayi Deketeke, March 2013, Harare)

The journalists and editors from the state press said that patriotic journalism was guided by their own understanding of professional interests as well as the interests of their audiences. They questioned the notion of professional journalism, which they equated to European or Western standards, which were at odds with African values. They argued that journalism “does not exist in a vacuum” but that it needs to serve the communities where it operates. They argued that the patriotic journalism that they practised was responsible because it spoke to “the ideals and aspirations of Africans”, according to Deketeke. When probed further to clarify what he understood by professional journalism, Deketeke said that: A journalist does not exist in a vacuum. The views of a European journalist towards land reform [in Zimbabwe] would be different from the view of an African journalist because we all belong to different families, our communities and our culture; there is an ideological setting to what we do as professionals. There was an element of pure reportage—what was going on which we can probably classify as professional but there was a second role which was the ideological inclination of this whole issue. As professional journalists, we owe it to our readers not just to write stories that do not address their concerns or those of the communities that we belong to. Journalism is not just like pumping water […] but even with water you will have to treat it first before giving it to people and that is where the ideology comes in. Some might see it as subjective and so on but in our view it was really a question of interpreting what was going on and what it meant to ordinary people. Professionalism does not exist in a vacuum. The question of land reform was bigger than ZANU–PF; it was bigger than sloganeering for ZANU– PF. It is only that ZANU–PF was the party that championed land reform, but it is a question that was there long before people were segmented into either ZANU–PF, MDC [Movement for Democratic Change] and so on. My own mother will tell you stories about how black people watched helplessly when white people took their land. So those are issues that are at the core of families and our people and absolutely have nothing to do with sloganeering for ZANU–PF.  If we identified with a patriotic cause that was being championed by ZANU–PF, yes, there is that coincidence but what guided us was the national interest which should be the case with any professional journalist. (Interview with Deketeke, March 2013, Harare)

9  THE MEDIA AND POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “THIRD… 

219

The views by Deketeke demonstrate the use of the idea of the national interest in justifying the framing of the land issue in the state press. But added to that is a kind of specific culturalist (or Africanist) argument and the influences of the specific history of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle in justifying patriotic journalism. We can see the echoes of these practices in the post-independence one-party states where partisan or biased media coverage that was in favour of the nationalist leaders in these regimes was justified in terms of national interests. Unlike in authoritarian regimes, where media control is achieved through direct censorship and other repressive strategies, hybrid regimes prefer hidden strategies of control to evade criticism and achieve legitimacy. In this chapter, I have discussed the political and institutional means and mechanisms of media control that were deployed by the Information and Publicity Ministry in Zimbabwe post-2000. I have demonstrated that Minister Jonathan Moyo developed a highly complex and sophisticated set of rules and politics that guided the party’s new media strategy. As we have seen, Moyo developed a sophisticated mechanism to control the state media that blended coercive and hidden strategies. I have demonstrated that media control was not achieved entirely through heavy-handed means. While he purged journalists who did not toe his line, Moyo also developed a number of methods to manipulate journalists via meetings, money and threatening jobs, and created and disseminated content via briefings with journalists and editors. He developed a hands-on style of management and managed to build a self-policing journalistic team that was proud of and endeavoured to reflect his and other ZANU–PF officials’ views in the news. These hidden strategies were effective means of media control consistent with ZANU–PF’s hybrid politics.

References Chiumbu, S., and D. Moyo. 2009. Re-gearing Policy and Propaganda in Crisis Zimbabwe. In The Power of Communication: Changes and Challenges in African Media, ed. K.S. Orgeret and H. Ronning. Oslo: Academic Press. Diamond, L.J. 2002. Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 21–35. Levitsky, S., and L. Way. 2002. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65. ———. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schedler, A. (2010). Authoritarianism’s Last Line of Defense. Journal of Democracy 21 (1): 69–80.

CHAPTER 10

Social Media and the Concept of Dissidence in Zimbabwean Politics Shepherd Mpofu and Trust Matsilele

Introduction There has been no area in Zimbabwe’s political, social and economic life that has received more scholarly attention than the media. Most of the studies, post-2000, have tended to focus on political economy questions, showing how the media, both private and public, mediated state opposition and civil society relations. Following the successes of the Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa from 2010, there has been an observable shift in focus, with much emphasis on social media effects, specifically on political mobilisation against hegemonies (Willems 2019; Matingwina 2018; Mutsvairo 2016; Mutsvairo and Sirks 2015; Mare 2014; Moyo 2011; Atton and Mabweazara 2011; Moyo 2009). This chapter argues against

S. Mpofu School of Language, Media and Communication, University of Limpopo, Polokwane, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] T. Matsilele (*) Department of Media Studies and Public Relations, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_10

221

222 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

the techno-determinism that has occupied much of the scholarship around the effects of social media since 2010, while advocating for a more nuanced explanation to cyber-cultures, which are context specific. This study builds on Gabriella Coleman’s seminal work on hacktivists and trolls, and on Malcolm Gladwell’s loose network theory, which encourages the critical reading of each context without extolling technologies in instances where social media mediates revolutions. Methodologically, this is a qualitative content analysis study that theoretically employs the public sphere. The study uses the period between 2013 and 2019 with a bias towards leading “dissidents” of the period: Baba Jukwa, Evan Mawarire and Tajamuka. These cases help to explain the concept of dissidence in the public sphere, which in Zimbabwe’s Shona culture is known as dariro (playground). As already stated, in this chapter we make an attempt to move away from techno-deterministic biases as we try to give a more nuanced, context-­specific narrative that explains the nature, shape and character of social media dissidence in Zimbabwe. This chapter heavily leans on Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s chapter (Chap. 3), which addresses the national question. At the core of our argument is the view that Zimbabwe’s social media dissidence is a result of a lack of cohesion around the national question. Like Gladwell (2010) and Aouragh and Alexander, this study employs anthropological lenses to understand other contributing factors in social media-driven revolutions as it traces dissident moments, led predominantly by youths, beginning with the mystery figure of Baba Jukwa in 2013 and climaxing in 2016 with #Tajamuka and #ThisFlag movements. Beyond 2016, these movements continued and newer ones emerged, such as #BusStopTV and Comic Pastor. For more on the political culture that has shaped Zimbabwe for the past 100  years, see Chap. 2, which deals with the political culture of Zimbabwe. Unlike in North Africa, Zimbabwe’s social media dissident moments are ephemeral and fleeting, failing to unseat hegemonic actors. This failure to transform via social media uprisings could add another layer to what the introductory chapter alludes to when articulating the concept of transition overload. However, our central aim is to demonstrate how relations post-2013 have been mischaracterised, with a failure to appreciate the anthropological view on state opposition–civil society relations. Theoretically, this work contributes to the growing body of literature that rebels against general scholarship on social media studies, which climaxed with the characterising of the Egypt uprising as the ‘Twitter Revolution”. Such studies (techno-deterministic) ignore local contexts as they try to extol technologies.

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

223

Conceptually, we argue that what we are seeing on social media are not protests, juvenile insults as some scholars have argued, but rather dissidence. This dissidence has a history and is part of Zimbabwean cultural expression that has simply morphed into the social media sphere as a way of mediation known as dariro. We characterise social media as dariro, as we do other cultural gatherings where dissidence was allowed in Zimbabwean society, just as it was allowed in coffee houses and theatres in Jürgen Habermas’ public sphere. While our focus looks at the period since 2013, we make strong connections to earlier periods to demonstrate this long-running thread of dissidence. To discover what we are seeing on social media, we employ a reconfigured public sphere theory, a qualitative methodology and online ethnography technique. We borrow our conceptualisation from Matsilele’s (2019) seminal study on dissidents in Zimbabwe.

Social Media and Dissidence For centuries, dissidents have existed on the margins because media gatekeepers kept them out of public discourse, considering them to be anathema to national development and cohesion. However, their importance has always been in invoking national consciousness even though they were subjected to marginalisation. With the advent of social media, this has changed: dissidents can effectively maximise their agency without professional gatekeepers. Social media also allows them to do what is often regarded as dangerous in the offline zone, with their propagation of political dissidence reaching larger audiences and creating bonds at the speed of light, a factor that gives governments headaches. For Zimbabwe, the term dissidence has a very specific social, historical and political association: dissidents are seen as rebels or enemies of the state. To label someone as a dissident is to paint them as justifiably deserving of violent repression by the state. Therefore, this chapter examines how Zimbabwean dissidents have been using social media and how the government and the ruling party have been responding to this. The chapter explores how social media dissidents are shaping the national discourse as they dissent from official power structures. First, an exploration of how social media has been used for political mobilisation purposes is crucial in order to locate the phenomenon of dissidence. Writing on elections, Davies (2014) observes that social media allows political actors, particularly smaller parties or less well-known

224 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

candidates, to circumvent mass-media filters to get their messages across. This enabling capacity brings some equilibrium between players of all sizes when it comes to engaging in civic discourse and political and public debates. This means that, beyond the ballot box and traditional party rallies, political parties and citizens can debate manifestos, national agendas and policies in the social media sphere as a collective or on different platforms. These multiple sites are what Bosch (2010) considers to be multiple spheres and discursive arenas. Another consequent advantage that comes with social media use by small actors is that some of the debates taking place are carried forward to the mainstream media, by journalists who generate content from these platforms (Davies 2014). This, to a great extent, has been the approach adopted by most social media dissidents in Zimbabwe to advance narratives in the public sphere. Most of the narratives in the public sphere, save on social media, do not go far in challenging and exposing state actors, even though they have passing moments of sensationalisation, as Gadzikwa (dealing with the tabloidisation of political news) argues in Chap. 11 of this book. As alluded to earlier, these effects of social media have seen extensive study, while several developed countries have seen the increased use of social media (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, etc.) arguably translating to enhanced political fortunes for particular actors. The success of social media use in elections has received attention in Canada (Dumitricia), Sweden (Gustafsson 2012), Denmark (Andersen and Medaglia 2009) and in the United States (USA) (Banda 2010; Mascaro and Goggins 2011), with scholars arguing that the use of social networking sites is contributing to voting patterns. Davies asserts that the network effects of social media, amplifying as they do the transmission of a political message through social connections, make social media a valuable part of an election campaign. The debate about “fake news” and the 2016 US elections continues to rumble on. The question of whether or not Russia used fake news and hackers to influence elections in the USA and in Europe is being taken seriously by investigators, although the evidence is inconclusive. It is not fake news, however, to argue that President Donald Trump campaigned outside traditional media predominantly through his Twitter handle. Though one cannot conclusively attribute his victory to his social media activities, social media did play a part (Kellner 2016). How big or how small a part it is difficult to say. Unlike Canada, Sweden, Denmark and the USA, Zimbabwe is still largely rural (the World Bank estimated it at 67.62% rural as of 2015),

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

225

with a large percentage of its population not online. These factors limit the penetrability of social media. That said, the country has seen improved use of information and communications technology, “with 6900km optic fibre connections, three major mobile service providers, high literacy rate of 98 % and high mobile network subscription” (Masuka et al. 2016, 2). These statistics, of course, need to be taken with a pinch of salt. Just because there is a huge volume of data usage, coupled with mobile penetration currently in the region of 96%, does not automatically indicate that the use is geographically or demographically widespread. The matter is complicated, for instance, by multiple ownership of mobile lines, dormant SIM cards and so on. Generally, accurate data is hard to come by (Masuka et al. 2016). Research conducted by Masuka et al. (2016) indicates, however, that high literacy rates across the country have influenced higher percentages of mobile ownership, even among smallholder farmers concentrated in rural areas. These factors help to demonstrate the extent to which social media power can be imagined. Given the foregoing, this chapter looks at how social media dissidents are shaping political discourse within Zimbabwe. We argue that dissidence has not only taken different forms but has also tended to inhabit what we call unlikely sites, hidden or invisible, and accidental sites. These are sites where dissidence is either disguised or accidental; there is little to identify it outright as dissidence or, indeed, to suggest its motives. It is hardly articulated as dissidence and its objectives are often silent, understated or only hinted. These unlikely and accidental sites range from domestic to public spaces, and from intellectual spaces to political ones. They draw in scholars, writers, musicians, artists, activists and politicians, causing a cacophony of voices that is a central feature of dissidence in Zimbabwe. These hidden sites allow the flourishing of subaltern voices, including the arts, music, comedy and literature. Dissidence is not only touched by— and drawn to—sites of power, but is also distinctly shaped by those who disrupt power precisely because power regards them as inconsequential. At any rate, it appears that the literary arts and music in Zimbabwe have been a site of hidden dissidence. This chapter addresses three specific forms of dissidence: Baba Jukwa, #ThisFlag Movement and #Tajamuka/#Sesijikile.

226 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

Method and Theory We used qualitative methodology in conducting this research (Snape and Spencer 2003, 17; Strauss and Corbin 1994, 10). The research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. This rejects the linear model of communication and neglect of the human experience (Du Plooy 2009, 35). Qualitative methods can be used “to obtain the intricate details about phenomena such as feelings, thought processes, and emotions that are difficult to extract or learn about through more conventional research methods” (Strauss and Corbin 1994, 11). To understand the phenomenon of social media dissidence in Zimbabwe, we employed the virtual ethnography data collection method. Bowler (2010, 1270) says that “online ethnography refers to a number of related online research methods that adapt to the study of the communities and cultures created through computer-mediated social interaction”. Since understanding how particular cultures of the internet interact with the already existing political dissidence, culture in Zimbabwe is at the centre of this study. We felt that a kind of online ethnography would be an appropriate way to gather data from Facebook and Twitter. In gathering this data, we had to be interact with cases being investigated, what is often regarded as lurking. By interacting, we mean liking, retweeting, sharing and responding to some of the posts that were shared by these dissidents. This study employs the public sphere as a theoretical entry point through which the quotidian work of social media dissidents can be understood. The public sphere is a normative fit because it deals effortlessly with issues of democracy, public engagement and participatory politics—issues that are currently central to debates about the Zimbabwean polity. Habermas, Lennox and Lennox posit that “by public sphere, we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed”. Mpofu (2014) and Castells go further, elucidating that public sphere is not just a space for social interaction but is a space for cultural and communicative release and debate. It is through the public sphere that decisions of the state are influenced, shaped and negotiated. Through such a public sphere, access is purportedly guaranteed to all citizens. But how is a public sphere configured? Is it possible to guarantee access to all? How and in what sense? Habermas et al. answer this: A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body, they then behave

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

227

neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy.

Hence, citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion; that is, “with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions—about matters of general interest”. Dean (2003, 95) asserts that “the public sphere is the site and subject of liberal democratic practice”, and that “it is that space within which people deliberate over matters of common concern, matters that are contested and about which it seems necessary to reach consensus”. Habermas (1962) investigates the ways in which a new public sphere emerged during the time of the Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions, and how this promoted political discussions and debates (Kellner 2000). The public sphere made it possible to form a realm of public opinion that opposed state power and the powerful interests that were coming to shape bourgeois society. The public sphere thus presupposed freedom of speech and assembly, a free press and the right to freely participate in political debate and decision-making, elements of liberal democracy. Castells (2010) notes that the public sphere is an essential component of socio-political organisation because it is the space where people come together as citizens and articulate their autonomous views to influence the political institutions of society. Gerhards and Schäfer (2010) suggest that the public sphere serves as a forum to communicate, collectively, relevant issues, allows citizens to be informed about critical societal developments and allows them to observe and keep a vigilant eye on political, economic and other elites.

Tracing the Dissident Trope 2000–2010 The term dissident was used in pre-independence Zimbabwe to refer to the military organisation of native Zimbabweans who participated in the armed struggle against the white minority regime of Ian Smith. The term enjoyed usage among Rhodesian soldiers, politicians, and the Information Ministry, as an epithet for guerrillas fighting for land, equality, justice and dignity (Matsilele 2019). As noted, the dissident was a nullified person or a non-person. The term enjoyed further popular usage in post independence Zimbabwe, mostly towards Patriotic Front– Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF–ZAPU) combatants who had resisted or were falsely

228 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

alleged to have resisted demobilisation and integration into the new Zimbabwean army by Robert Mugabe’s governing Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). The characterisation of these combatants normalised and justified the Gukurahundi genocide that left in excess of 20,000 people, most of whom were Ndebele-speaking and therefore suspected to be PF–ZAPU supporters, dead (Mpofu 2014; Coltart 2017). The term disappeared from the state media for about a decade until the late 1990s. At the turn of the millennium, Zimbabwe was gripped by its first ever, and very serious, food riots. Morgan Tsvangirai, a trade unionist with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), persuaded workers across the country’s cities to stage a mass stay away from work. This was an immense success (Raftopoulos 2000). Tsvangirai quit the labour union and formed a party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). It was the first mass opposition to challenge post-1987 ZANU–PF power, with a strong urban base among workers and with a vanguard of University of Zimbabwe students. The label of dissident resurfaced and was applied to Tsvangirai, his supporters, University of Zimbabwe students’ pro-­ democracy organisations, white commercial farmers and indeed anyone perceived to be against the status quo (Mazango 2005; Townsend and Copson 2005, 6). From the government’s perspective, these groups of people were “traitors or sell-outs, puppets of the West and agents of regime change”, while viewing itself and its support base as “sons of the soil patriots, revolutionaries and liberators” (Hwami 2012, 12). The period 2000–2010 is characterised as a decade of crisis because of a series of political and economic crises that bedevilled Zimbabwe, beginning with the food riots in 1999, followed by the ZANU–PF government’s loss of the Constitutional Amendment vote in 2001. The government smarted under this loss, leading the military to declare that no one who had not fought in the war of independence would be a leader of Zimbabwe. This was in apparent reference to Tsvangirai. The irony is that Zvinavashe was in effect saying that only those who were once dissidents in the parlance of the Rhodesian government could become President of Zimbabwe. The term had come full circle. Past dissidents could rule Zimbabwe, but not current ones. Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), an umbrella body of students from the country’s universities and colleges, was one of the first organisations to be marked as a dissident body by the government functionaries and the police at the turn of the century. Traditionally, ZINASU

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

229

membership is drawn from public universities and colleges, with the University of Zimbabwe, the oldest in the country, playing a leading role and providing most of its prominent leadership. However, it is a democratic body. With the economic situation worsening at the turn of the millennium, the government struggled to pay student grants/loans (Hwami 2012). This led to a cycle of student protests across country’s universities but centred on the University of Zimbabwe. This coincided with the formation of the MDC. But the government did not think there was any coincidence; rather, they pronounced that the pro-democracy movements were part of a sinister plot of regime change that was taking place because of the bilateral dispute. Public media rhetoric, and by ZANU–PF politicians during rallies, ramped up the discourse of “sell-­ outs” and “puppets”. Perhaps the government’s pronouncement was not merely paranoia. Another big shaper of post-1980s politics was the ZCTU, until the late 1980s a tripartite alliance partner of the ruling ZANU–PF: the labour body participated in ZANU–PF central committee meetings and defended the government agenda. The late 1980s saw tensions sharpen when the government accepted the structural adjustment programmes cocktail ordered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The programme led to massive job losses and the decimation of domestic industries as Zimbabwe opened its doors to competition from the developed world and the trickle-down neoliberal free market. This situation would worsen by the turn of the new millennium. Indeed, by that time the good relations between ZCTU and the government had all but ended, as the government started barring the labour body from protesting without police clearance. To some extent, one can argue that laws introduced earlier in the decade of crisis were meant to cripple ZCTU’s operations; that is, to stop it morphing into a dissident body. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA), for instance, was one such law that was promulgated to undermine ZCTU, and indeed anyone who wanted to strike and protest for purposes of registering discontent, which the government feared would make it look bad. ZCTU would, just like ZINASU, have strong links to the main opposition party MDC, seeing the labour-backed party as a platform from which to renegotiate workers’ interests. ZCTU also had strong ties to the MDC as the top tier of its former leaders had been instrumental in the formation of MDC: these included former ZCTU President Gibson Sibanda, who went on to become the inaugural deputy president of the MDC, and former Secretary

230 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

General of ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai, who became MDC’s inaugural President. The nexus between ZCTU and MDC would also mean that the labour body would be targeted just as ZINASU was for “selling out” the government. ZCTU would compete with ZINASU, the MDC and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) to be labelled puppets of the West and agents fighting for regime change. Some of their members would also face arbitrary arrest and torture in police cells. Some of the accusations that the MDC was a foreign-funded puppet party were true. However, this was not a serious accusation since ZANU– PF and indeed the Zimbabwean government itself routinely enjoyed foreign funding—something revealed by the current finance minister, Mthuli Ncube. The MDC, initially backed by internal financing, would later get financial support from overseas pro-democracy initiatives. Mugabe referred to the MDC in the following terms: The MDC should never be judged or characterised by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent high-density lumpen elements. It is much deeper than these human superficies; for it is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule. MDC is as old and as strong as the forces that control it; that converges on it and controls it; that drives and direct; indeed, that support, sponsor and spot it. It is a counterrevolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday. (Hwami 2012, 8)

The NCA is another organisation to impact post-2000 Zimbabwean politics. This started as a constitutional lobby group fighting the government’s unilateral constitution-making mandate. It has now morphed into a political party. The NCA campaigned against the government-proposed constitution of 1999 and handed ZANU–PF its first electoral defeat in 2000. The NCA would continue to fight for a people-­driven democratic constitution and constitution-making process during the decade of crisis. The government labelled the leading NCA figure during this period, Lovemore Madhuku, as a dissident who was bent on enriching himself. President Mugabe went to the extent of insinuating that when NCA coffers ran dry, Madhuku went on the streets to provoke the police to suffer police brutality, and in return got more funding for his lobby group (Mlambo 2006). NCA leadership, just like that of ZINASU, MDC and

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

231

ZCTU, was subjected to state-sponsored violence, unlawful and indiscriminate arrests, and disruption of the organisation’s activities through legal and extra-legal interventions. Lastly, Zvakwana/Sokwanele, a social movement that mostly worked online without clear leadership, and targeted President Robert Mugabe’s “continued misrule”, was another important organisation to be considered in the dissident category. Sokwanele, which means “enough is enough” in Ndebele, was the name adopted, says Talbot (2009, 1), by this “Zimbabwean pro-democracy website whose bloggers last year (2008) published accounts of atrocities by Robert Mugabe’s regime and posted Election Day updates describing voter intimidation and apparent ballot stuffing”. This social movement engaged in ad hoc and ephemeral activities, from printing newsletters and pamphlets to distributing red cards and used condoms as a way of fomenting dissidence against the Mugabe regime (Anderson 2012). Zvakwana was an interesting forerunner to social media dissidence, utilising blogs at a time when Zimbabwe was still poorly connected to the internet, smartphones were unheard of in the country, phone lines cost more than US$300 and social media as we know it today was still in its infancy. As such, it utilised both online and offline channels. Its audience was small, fragmented and localised. The publication on its website of details of government “atrocities”, although reaching an insignificant audience, was a sign of things to come with Baba Jukwa. For more on these dissident moments, refer to Chap. 4, dealing with polarisation in Zimbabwe.

Social Media Dissidence in Perspective As we argued earlier, dissidence involves throwing power into disarray; disorientating it. How does one manage to do this? In this section, we try to link this question with the chronology of social media dissidence. Where and when did social media dissidence commence? What was its nature and character? How did it evolve and how does it express itself today? These are some of the questions we now briefly examine. For this task, we find Gabriella Coleman’s seminal work Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous especially useful. It appears that dissidence in the social media sphere has evolved together with the development of related technologies. This point has already been emphasised in our study of the technical history of networks and social media. The earliest forms of social media dissidence were not taken seriously, being dismissed as the

232 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

work of hacktivists and trolls with too much time on their hands. More recently, however, there seems to have been widespread panic at their work, with governments, continental institutions and policymakers up in arms at different forms of cyber-wars and cyber-criminals. In other words, social media did not immediately begin by throwing power into disarray; this is a quality it has taken on as it has become more ubiquitous, accessible and global. Let us consider trolling, for instance. This notion is described as targeting people and organisations, the desecration of reputations and the spreading of humiliating information (Coleman 2014). Coleman (2014) observes that it is a multifarious activity that flourishes online and boasts a range of tight-knit associations, a variety of genres and a small pantheon of famed individuals. Should we believe that trolls emerge organically only from computer keyboards and smartphone keyboards? One view is that trolling as a behaviour emerges offline, is facilitated, renegotiated and extended online, and then continues offline, in a ceaseless back-and-forth exchange. In fact, the origin of trolling extends far beyond the genesis of the internet, taking root, as Coleman intimates, in the vagaries of myth and oral culture. Today’s trolls, who in the past could have been characterised as tricksters, or those imbued with the capacity of disorientating power, share a few characteristics, such as a preoccupation with messing with power, defying norms and bending rules. Set against the concepts of dissidence and social media, trolling seems to be a key aspect of social media dissidence. The practice of trolling was already common in the hacker underground movement of the 1980s. However, hackers operated in different contexts. They traced themselves back to so-called phone phreaks (Coleman 2014, 35). These were people who illegally entered the telephone system by recreating the audio frequencies used by the system to route calls (Coleman 2014, 35). However, the end of the analogue phone network spelled the end of the golden age of phreaking. The proliferation of computer networks marked the beginning of new modes of trolling, particularly by giving rise to the hacker underground, which peaked in the 1990s. Many of these hackers were mischief-makers, gadflies and merry wanderers around the network. As the internet spread from academic and military circles in the late 1970s, it mushroomed to include hundreds of lists with spirited and, at times, ferocious discussions (Coleman 2014, 39).

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

233

It is in mailing lists, also known as listservs, where the term trolls first came into common usage (Coleman 2014). It “referred to people who did not contribute positively to discussions, who argued for the sake of arguing” (Coleman 2014, 39). Their sole intention was to confuse and disturb the logical flow of a conversation. With the 1990s boom in mailing lists, there was an observable surge in lists that encouraged unrestrained free speech and, indeed, were celebrated for it. The genesis of popular internet trolling can be traced to 4chan and 2chan image boards in Japan. 4chan was popular for its extreme permissibility—making questions of free speech largely irrelevant—which was fostered by a culture of anonymity embraced by its users (Coleman 2014). As Coleman further argues, much of the material was designed to be shocking to outsiders, a discursively constructed border fence meant to exclude the uninitiated. It was on 4chan that Anonymous grew. By 2006, this name was commonly used by participants. The primary ideal of Anonymous, of course, is anonymity. Hence, “The posts on 4chan have no names or any identifiable markers attached to them. The only thing you are able to judge a post by is its content and nothing else” (Coleman 2014, 47). It is out of Anonymous that certain social media dissidents would emerge, among them: Mohamed Bouzizi, Nawaat, Chelsea Manning and WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange (Coleman 2014). Manning and Assange would become popular and be punished for their dissidence after hundreds of thousands of United States (US) cables were published, with most exposing the dark secrets of US operations in Iraq (Coleman 2014). Manning was condemned to a military prison for espionage after she disclosed to WikiLeaks nearly 750,000 classified and diplomatic documents. She was slapped with a 35-year sentence, only to have this commuted during President Barack Obama’s last days in office. In April 2019 Assange’s asylum was withdrawn and he was arrested; currently (June 20) he’s in HM Prison Belmarsh and on trial. Anonymous would go on to actively participate in the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, publishing information that would fuel anger and resentment towards the strongmen of the North African region. In the Zimbabwean context, there have been some dissidents who have challenged the ZANU–PF government. In some cases, they have been violently suppressed, while in other cases, such as that of Baba Jukwa, the dissidents responsible have never been found. In the next section, we present data and analyses relating to three dissidents in Zimbabwean politics: Baba Jukwa, #ThisFlag Movement and #Tajamuka/#Sesijikile.

234 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

Data Presentation and Discussion Baba Jukwa Typology Information scraped from the page indicates that the Baba Jukwa Facebook page went live on 22 March 2013. The owner of the page described himself/herself as a “Concerned father, fighting nepotism and directly linking the community with their leaders, government, Members of Parliament and ministers”. No Zimbabwean citizen answering to the name or surname “Baba Jukwa” has been traced, and therefore this appears to have been an avatar for an anonymous user or users. However, in a post of 29 March 2013, Baba Jukwa claimed once to have worked for the feared Central Intelligence Organisation. He also claimed to be a ZANU–PF insider. The mystery surrounding Baba Jukwa led the government to float names, of which many were of journalists operating from outside the country, with the exception of Edmund Kudzayi, who was arrested for being Baba Jukwa. To demonstrate his influence, by the end of 2013 his page has over 350,000 followers. This followership rattled the government as it went on to propose a bill (the Cybercrime Bill) that communications scholars and civil society allege is meant to clamp down on oppositional voices, with a fully fledged ministry whose responsibility is monitoring social media. Baba Jukwa’s posts not only focused on exposing events that were unfolding within “his” “evil” party ZANU–PF and in government, but also on profiling events that he believed helped to build the standing of the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, in the 2013 elections. As we will see, Baba Jukwa claimed that he wanted Tsvangirai’s party to win elections in order to save ZANU–PF from evil. For this reason, Baba Jukwa followed the Movement for Democratic Change’s party events and posted pictures that portrayed Tsvangirai’s growing support base. For instance, on 20 July 2013, Baba Jukwa wrote on his wall that “Tsvangirai takes the lead as Mugabe takes the road”. The post, one could argue, was meant to boost morale in MDC–T’s support base and avoid the voter apathy that is prevalent in most countries under dictatorships, as elections are viewed to be foregone conclusions. The same could be said of Baba Jukwa’s selective use of categories, such as prefixing names of Members of Parliament with “Hon” for “Honourable”. On 20 July 2013, Baba Jukwa said, “Hon Chamisa, the MC is taking to the stage to entertain the crowds,” a post that also indicates immediacy. He is there where the action is, and not just

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

235

a keyboard warrior. Baba Jukwa adds, “with this crowd, it’s no surprise why Mugabe is having headaches over the elections”. The use of “Hon” in this instance lends credence to the legitimacy of Chamisa and the MDC–T, which he deliberately denies those in ZANU–PF.  Below, we presents these categories of content from Baba Jukwa to show the nature of his dissidence: Type of content

Example 1

Example 2

Example 3

Baba Jukwa-­ sourced news/ Official updates Crowd-­ sourced news [Baba Jukwa curated]

Baba Jukwa tells the nation that he will announce electoral results of 31 July 2013. This was posted on 30 July 2013

“Tsvangirai agent attempts to bribe Baba Jukwa again” posted on [posted May, year not given]

“Airforce of Zimbabwe helicopters grounded at Manyame airforce base” posted on

“The anonymous whistleblower is Driving Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Insane”. Baba curated this news article that appeared on www.wikileaks-forum. com “Zimbabwe electoral fraud unearthed” This post was sourced online and has no traceable date

“Anonymous whistleblower is driving Zimbabwe’s Mugabe insane” [posted 19 July 2013]

Reports on Chiadzwa diamond looting by Minister Obert Mpofu. [posted 12 June 2013]

Urgent appeal from Kennedy Masiye [posted 16 October 2016.]

Vendors run for dear life after seeing Tsvangirai’s face. This news was sourced from myzimbabwe.co.zw. [posted 19 July 2013]

Crowd sourced news [not curated]

As the table above demonstrates, Baba Jukwa’s page contained, in the main, three types of content. The first type is uncurated crowd-sourced news (Baba Jukwa simply forwarded the news, without editing, checking or endorsing it). The second type is curated crowd-sourced news (that is, Baba Jukwa appears to have curated the news). The third type is Baba Jukwa-sourced leaks. Content like this, in a post 9/11 world order, can only be posted by someone who is dissenting against the system and intends to throw power into disarray. This is even more dangerous in countries such as Zimbabwe, with a known history of meting brute force on dissidents, their supporters and even ethnic belonging. The next dissidence type we discuss is that of Pastor Evan Mawarire with the #ThisFlag movement.

236 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

#ThisFlag Typology #ThisFlag was begun in April 2016 by Evan Mawarire, a 41-year-old Zimbabwean pastor who appeared, with a Zimbabwean flag draped around his neck and shoulders, in a video posted on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. The movement is active on Facebook and Twitter. On Twitter, the campaign operates under several handles, such as #ThisFlag and E Mawarire @PastorEvanLive. On Facebook, the movement uses the names Evan Mawarire and This Flag/Ifulegi Leyi/Mureza Uyu. The movement uploads self-made videos of Zimbabweans venting against the state, and sometimes trolling it. The rallying call is around the significance of the national flag, which they say originally represented noble values such as shared prosperity, democracy and the country’s potential in agriculture and mining, but has now been soiled and inverted by ZANU– PF. The posts are made by users who mostly reveal their true identities. For instance, Mawarire, unlike Baba Jukwa, has a traceable biography, a factor that points to his distinct mode of dissidence. Unlike Baba Jukwa, Mawarire had a face and real experiences that resonated with citizens. His painful realities reflected the challenges that most ordinary citizens were facing, and these challenges became the message for recruiting thousands of Zimbabweans both online and offline, whether on university campuses or street corners. Mawarire’s movement operated with no budget as it was practically a no cost campaign: all that he and his followers needed to mobilise Zimbabweans across the world was a smartphone. This meant the government could not easily claim that he was being funded by the West, which had a regime change agenda. His dissidence rattled the government, with President Mugabe warning Mawarire never to return to Zimbabwe at a national event in 2015; by this time he had already fled into exile. There are three types of content on #ThisFlag’s page: calls to action, protests and trolling. The content on Mawarire’s Twitter and Facebook accounts, as on Baba Jukwa’s Facebook page, intends to throw power into disarray by asking uncomfortable questions, employing tactics that are difficult to censor or prohibit (that is, actions that can only be censored at great reputational cost to the regime) and encouraging followers to bypass traditional gatekeepers by self-recording and uploading content that makes the government look incompetent or just plain bad. The content on Mawarire’s #ThisFlag page is also meant to inspire courage against tyranny without engaging in open combat. Unlike Baba Jukwa and

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

237

Tajamuka, who call for physical confrontation with the state, Mawarire opts for a more Martin Luther King approach—confronting power through peaceful means and powerful oratory, which mobilises citizens to courageously confront, question and expose the hypocrisy demonstrated by powerful elites. Below illustrates the types of dissidence expressed by Mawarire. Type of content

Example 1

Example 2

Example 3

Protest

Mboko (then vice-president) Buda Muhotera (24 June 2016) Let’s gather to honour Dzamara Notice to sue police over malicious arrests (23 March 2018)

We don’t want them (Bond Notes) debate with Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor (10 June 2016) Shut down Zimbabwe (5 July 2016) Celebrating blockage of Beitbridge border (1 July 2016)

Another rant against Mugabe. There will be more no doubt. (1 June 2016) Undenge must go (2 July 2016) Profiling National Electoral Reform Agenda demonstration (26 August 2016)

Call to action Trolling

The origin of flags seems to have been “to rally the community to ceremonies of religious worship” (Partridge 1966, 16). Conventionally, however, national flags function to symbolically distinguish countries and to stimulate the patriotism of the citizens of those countries. Citizens have used their flag to draw attention to the contested question of patriotism in Zimbabwe. ZANU–PF has historically monopolised patriotism, assuming for itself the power to name patriots and shame “sell outs”. By appropriating the flag, Mawarire threw ZANU–PF’s monopoly of patriotism into doubt. Mawarire’s preferred style for doing this was to focus on what one could call authentic and everyday bread-and-butter grievances, which millions of Zimbabweans could relate to across political, class and even racial divides. Another signal feature of #ThisFlag is its claim to moral superiority and what one could call moral understatement. Mawarire casts himself as a cross between Desmond Tutu and a modern-day Martin Luther King, a preacher of conscience who is reluctantly driven to rebel by a superior moral code. Like Martin Luther King, Mawarire is a preacher and a minister of religion who has taken on the dominant political system of his country and exposed its deepest civil contradictions. Even his delivery in his signal video post contains something of the African American civil rights preacher, down to the gospel of nonviolence and sacrifice. A third

238 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

communicative device used by #ThisFlag, as we have pointed out, is its drawing on the politics of feeling—in this case of feeling angry and betrayed. Not only are feelings hard to deny, but social media is perhaps the single most optimum device for tapping into feelings and emotion. In the video, Mawarire not only mentions his utter helplessness regarding his failure to pay school fees for his two daughters, but also uses specific body language to embody the helplessness. For instance, he pauses and sighs often, gathers the flag in his hand and looks at it longingly. At moments he appears as if he is about to burst into tears. This embodied communication means that the video is powerful political communication rather than a mere transcription, manifesto or collection of typed words. What Mawarire is not able to say (or claims he is unable to say) is articulated by his silences, pauses, sighs and gazing on the flag. The use of feeling to persuade, it seems, is an avenue of communication that is uniquely available to social media dissidence because of the unique aesthetic and technical features of social media itself.

#Tajamuka/Sesjikile Typology “Tajamuka” is a Shona colloquialism translated to mean “we object”, “we reject” or “we have rebelled”. Their political communication is often prefaced with “Hatichada” (“We no longer going to obey”) and “Hatichatya” (“We are not afraid any more”). We argue that the concept of rebellion has a strong resonance with dissidence, as both dissidents and rebels understand themselves to be challenging dominant and hegemonic networks of power. As alluded to earlier, the organization exposes names and information to the public, with the intention of making the authorities uncomfortable. Names of alleged perpetrators, confidential details and regular updates of individuals suspected of being behind abductions are sometimes included. The point of this is apparently to protect activists from being harmed should the abductors be identified in time. It is a way to let the perpetrators know that the world knows, as it were. The Tajamuka campaign comprises the youth wings of various political parties (with the main exception of the ruling ZANU–PF, of course) and civic society organisations, churches, youth movements’ informal sector pressure groups, and labour and student movements. #Tajamuka uses Twitter and Facebook. The page has an image of Linda Masarira holding a Zimbabwean flag, another (anonymous) activist dressed in a T-shirt marked “Mugabe must go” and a picture of picketing citizens. Linda Masarira has now

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

239

joined a fully fledged political party, and is now the spokesperson of a faction of the MDC–T led by Thokozani Khupe. The table below gives an illustration of the type of content promoted by this type of dissidents. Type of Example 1 content

Example 2

Example 3

Leaks

Tajamuka/Sesjikile @ TajamukaZW 11 September 2016 More ALERT! Last night #ZanuPF youth thugs in 4 trucks went around terrorising residents in Epworth, targeting #Tajamuka activists leaving #Tajamuka member Silvanhos Mudzviva in hospital after being tortured by State agents (15 September 2016) Vafundisi vudzai vanhu kuti nyika yaparara (pastor tell people that our country is now on its knees) Zimbabwe yese tauriranai kuti mbavha nemhondi kuti hazvivhoterwi

Tajamuka/Sesjikile @ TajamukaZW 31 August 2016 More Update: Police arresting innocent bystanders in the CBD whom they suspect as being violent protesters #ZimShutDown

@ZimMediaReview 13 September 2016 More A face many won’t forget: Asst Comm Makedenge, responsible for arrests, torture of many journalists, activists.

Expose ZANU PF thugs broke into Thandiwe Ncube’s house and beat her up

Call to action

Tiri kuti kubva iye zvino ZRP inofanirwa kundosunga vanhu varikutorera vana veZimbabwe mari nezvekutengesa (23 June 2016)

ALERT! #Tajamuka activist Silvanos Mudzova has just been taken from his home by 6 armed state agents in Harare. (14 September 2016) We are now seeking answers from AFRIMEXBANK AND IMF regarding any information that can help us ascertain the value of the Bond Note. (6 November 2016)

Tajamuka curates different kinds of content on its page, such as videos of Tajamuka members, crowdsourced videos, posters and “email bombing” campaigns. As alluded to earlier, the organisation exposes names and information to the public, with the intention of making the authorities uncomfortable. The other type of content represented here is calls to action. This is what distinguishes #Tajamuka from other dissidents in that they led at such frontline actions. This might also be the reason that Linda Masarira poured so much scorn on Mawarire for not being seen on the streets—where Tajamuka was very active. A final example involves an email

240 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

bombing campaign of a banking institution that was linked to the bond notes that the Zimbabwe government was about to print. Tajamuka espouses open defiance and, on some occasions, physically challenges the law and order apparatus; it says that it does not heed what it regards as illegitimate laws. This has seen its members being frequently arrested, beaten and detained by police. The major events that Tajamuka has participated in were the demonstrations against the continued stay of the then Vice-President Phelekezela Mphoko at the Rainbow Towers. This was the place where the then Vice-President Mphoko had been living for over five hundred days. The protest was a demonstration of disapproval over the government’s excessive spending on luxuries for members of the executive.

Conclusion If dissidents are individuals or collectives who actively challenge an established doctrine, policy or institution, then Baba Jukwa challenges corruption and abuse of power, ZANU–PF (which is an established institution) and state-sanctioned violence; Mawarire challenges economic malaise and political and constitutional delinquency, invoking the betrayal of those who died fighting for independence (we argue he challenges established institutions), while Tajamuka challenges constitutional delinquency, draconian laws (such as POSA), corruption and so-called state capture (we argue that Tajamuka challenges established doctrine that is enforced in part by the legal architecture). From the outset, this chapter has attempted to demonstrate the continuation of dissidence moments that can be traced back to Mbuya Nehanda, King Mzilikazi, Chief Mapondera and Chaminuka. Their principles continue to rise up whenever there is a requirement to demand restorative justice, acting through a pastor, educated youths or anonymous figures. Because these are mediums working through selected agency, they can decide to conceal themselves but still drive their point home. The anonymous dissident does not reveal his or her identity, literally manifesting as an anonymous actor, playing in the shadows. Perhaps the most famous global example is the Anonymous movement. Others, such as WikiLeaks, start out anonymously before revealing themselves. The likes of Edward Snowden are outed without their consent. In Zimbabwe, the example of an anonymous dissident is Baba Jukwa. Dissidents can operate as a collective, such as the Occupy Movement or, again, the Anonymous movement. The Zimbabwean example is Tajamuka, a youthful outfit made up of individuals from

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

241

different political parties, religious formations and civic groupings. In Zimbabwe’s history, we are always reminded of how Shonas or Ndebeles rebelled as a collective, and it seems this is what is happening with #Tajamuka. Lastly, we argue that Mawarire challenges economic malaise and political and constitutional delinquency, referring to the betrayal of those who died fighting for independence. By invoking the dead, Mawarire is appealing to a higher conscience, and at the same time is invoking the place occupied by the departed dissidents, as if to say we will continue fighting even at the cost of our own lives until you give us what you need. This is demonstrated throughout his overarching message: “Hatichada Hatichatya”.

References Andersen, K.N., and R.  Medaglia. 2009. The Use of Facebook in National Election Campaigns: Politics as Usual? In International Conference on Electronic Participation, 101–111. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. Anderson, P.S. 2012. US Support for Democracy in Authoritarian Regimes. Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC. Atton, C., and H.  Mabweazara. 2011. New Media and Journalism Practice in Africa: An Agenda for Research. Journalism 12 (6): 667–673. Banda, F. 2010. Citizen Journalism & Democracy in Africa. An Exploratory Study, 1–93. Grahamstown: Highway Africa. Bosch, T. 2010. Digital Journalism and Online Public Spheres in South Africa. Communicatio: South African Journal for Communication Theory and Research 36 (2): 265–275. Bowler, G.M., Jr. 2010. Netnography: A Method Specifically Designed to Study Cultures and Communities Online. The Qualitative Report 15 (5): 1270. Castells, M. 2010. The Information Age. Media Studies: A Reader 2 (7): 152. Coleman, G. 2014. Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous. London/New York: Verso Books. Coltart, D. 2017. The Struggle Continues: 50 Years of Tyranny in Zimbabwe. Auckland: Jacana. Davies, H. 2014. Social Media and Personal Relationships: Online Intimacies and Networked Friendship. Information Communication and Society 17 (2): 279–281. Dean, J. 2003. Why the Net Is Not a Public Sphere. Constellations 10 (1): 95–112. Du Plooy, G.M. 2009. Communication Research: Techniques, Methods and Applications. Cape Town: Juta and Company Ltd.

242 

S. MPOFU AND T. MATSILELE

Gerhards, J., and M.S.  Schäfer. 2010. Is the Internet a Better Public Sphere? Comparing Old and New Media in the USA and Germany. New Media & Society 12 (1): 143–160. Gladwell, M. 2010. Small Change. The New Yorker 4 (2010): 42–49. Gustafsson, N. 2012. The Subtle Nature of Facebook Politics: Swedish Social Network Site Users and Political Participation. New Media & Society 14 (7): 1111–1127. Habermas, J. 1962. English translation 1989. The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society, p. 52. Hwami, M. 2012. Settlers, Sell-Outs and Sons of the Soil: The Creation of Aliens in Zimbabwe and the Challenge for Higher Education. Cultural and Pedagogical Inquiry 4 (1): 4–26. Kellner, D. 2000. Globalization and New Social Movements: Lessons for Critical Theory and Pedagogy. na. ———. 2016. American Nightmare: Donald Trump, Media Spectacle, and Authoritarian Populism. Vol. 117. Springer: The Netherlands. Mare, A. 2014. Social Media: The New Protest Drums in Southern Africa? In Social Media in Politics, 315–335. Cham: Springer. Mascaro, C.M., and S.P. Goggins. 2011. Brewing Up Citizen Engagement: The Coffee Party on Facebook. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Communities and Technologies (pp. 11–20). ACM, June. Masuka, B., T. Matenda, J. Chipomho, N. Mapope, S. Mupeti, S. Tatsvarei, and W. Ngezimana. 2016. Mobile Phone Use by Small-Scale Farmers: A Potential to Transform Production and Marketing in Zimbabwe. South African Journal of Agricultural Extension 44 (2): 121–135. Matingwina, S. 2018. Social Media Communicative Action and the Interplay with National Security: The Case of Facebook and Political Participation in Zimbabwe. African Journalism Studies 39 (1): 48–68. Matsilele, T. 2019. Social Media Dissidence in Zimbabwe. Unpublished Doctoral dissertation. University of Johannesburg. Mazango, E. 2005. Media Games and Shifting of Spaces for Political Communication in Zimbabwe. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 2: 33–55. Mlambo, A.S. 2006. The Zimbabwean Crisis and International Response. Journal for Contemporary History 31 (2): 54–77. Moyo, D. 2009. Citizen Journalism and the Parallel Market of Information in Zimbabwe’s 2008 Election. Journalism Studies 10 (4): 551–567. Moyo, L. 2011. Blogging Down a Dictatorship: Human Rights, Citizen Journalists and the Right to Communicate in Zimbabwe. Journalism 12 (6): 745–760. Mpofu, S. 2014. Public and Diasporic Online Media in the Discursive Construction of National Identity: A Case of ‘Zimbabwe’. Unpublished Doctoral dissertation. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

10  SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DISSIDENCE IN ZIMBABWEAN… 

243

Mutsvairo, B. 2016. Digital Activism in the Social Media Era. New York: Springer International Publishing. Mutsvairo, B., and L.A. Sirks. 2015. Examining the Contribution of Social Media in Reinforcing Political Participation in Zimbabwe. Journal of African Media Studies 7 (3): 329–344. Partridge, A.C. 1966. The Story of Our South African Flag. Cape Town: Purnell. Raftopoulos, B. 2000. The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe. Labour, Capital and Society/Travail, capital et société, pp. 256–286. Snape, D., and L.  Spencer. 2003. The Foundations of Qualitative Research. In Qualitative Research Practice, ed. J. Ritchie and J. Lewis. London: SAGE. Strauss, A., and J. Corbin. 1994. Grounded Theory Methodology. Handbook of qualitative research 17: 273–285. Talbot, D. 2009. Dissent Made Safer-How anonymity technology could save free speech on the Internet. Technology Review, p. 60. Townsend, J., and R.W.  Copson. 2005. Zimbabwe: Current Issues. Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service, March. Willems, W. 2019. ‘The Politics of Things’: Digital Media, Urban Space, and the Materiality of Publics. Media, Culture & Society, p. 0163443719831594.

CHAPTER 11

The Tabloidization of Political News in Zimbabwe: End of Quality Press? Wellington Gadzikwa

Introduction The media is indispensable to the functioning of a democracy as the pre-­ eminent vehicle for public debates in the modern public sphere(s). The conduct of the press and the ethical virtues it projects are directly linked to its ability to enhance democracy. In Zimbabwe, after more than two decades of political turmoil and unprecedented economic decline (Raftopoulous 2009), journalism standards have plummeted owing to various reasons (Media Ethics Committee 2002; Mano 2005; GPA 2008; VMCZ 2013; IMPI 2014). This chapter argues that the decline in the standards of journalism is due to a process of tabloidisation of the mainstream broadsheet newspapers. This tabloidisation has been defined as “the tendency by all the media to adopt tabloid-style to reduce critical arguments to mere rhetoric” (Thusu 2007: 8). A tabloidised media negates the natural function of the media in terms of its democratic influence through diversion, and the trivialisation and sensationalisation of

W. Gadzikwa (*) Department of English, Journalism and Media Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_11

245

246 

W. GADZIKWA

important issues. Through a qualitative content analysis and in-depth interviews of the media coverage of the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) by the three national dailies, The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay from October 2014 to January 2017, this chapter reveals the stark reality that broadsheet newspapers, whoever their owners, have been contaminated, and now champion a tabloid news agenda that is inimical to rational political debate. This attitude needs a serious rethink if the media is going to function properly again.

Background to the Media Standards Debate After the 31 July 2013 harmonised elections, the Minister of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services, Jonathan Moyo, bemoaned the state of the media in Zimbabwe, characterised by what he described as artificial divisions created by polarisation. Moyo lamented that the media failed to report socio-political and economic developments in the country, alleging: We have a media that is principally useless. If you rely on it for information about the state of the country, you will be by choice putting yourself among the ignorant; you won’t know what is really going on by reading the media. (The Herald, Friday 2 January 2015)

In light of these sentiments, Moyo commissioned the first ever national inquiry into the state of media, the Information and Media Panel of Inquiry (IMPI). The mandate of IMPI was to promote and elevate the standards of media practice. The inquiry reflected a general concern from government that the media was not functioning according to societal expectations. The concerns of failure by media to meet these expectations were taken to be representative of overall perceptions of the state of the media. The IMPI sought to: inquire into the integrity and adequacy of news and information in relation to the needs of or on; the economy, national interest, national security, politics, national processes such as referenda, elections, constitutional exercises and inquiries, citizenry, both rural and urban as well as local and diaspora, rights and justice, global issues, gender and marginalised groups. (IMPI 2014)

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

247

Similar concerns over the perceived decline of standards of journalism were also shared by media civic organisations and media academics, especially with regard to a lack of adherence to ethical journalism practices (Media Ethics Committee 2002; GPA 2008; VMCZ 2013; MMPZ 2014). The other concern involved vindictiveness on the part of owners who dictate editorial content, resulting in unethical practices (Mano 2005). In light of these concerns, the IMPI findings demonstrated that polarisation has resulted from the media failing to create an ideal public sphere where issues affecting society can be debated and discussed objectively. In particular, IMPI noted that: misrepresentation, which is often coupled with sensational headlines has become an unfortunate phenomenon of Zimbabwe’s journalism and a cause for constant frustration among newspaper readers who have sadly come to a realisation that the stories appearing on front pages of Zimbabwe’s various newspapers do not always bear any resemblance to the sexy headlines below which they are printed. (IMPI: 198)

From this quote, it is possible to argue that the decline in journalism standards goes beyond media polarisation and points towards the tabloidisation of the press. Polarisation of the media simply resembles the politics of the day. The media is bound to take opposing positions, which does not necessarily curtail a strong and vibrant public debate since politics is about ideological contests. This chapter seeks to go beyond polarity as the main cause of the decline in journalism standards in Zimbabwe by extending it to the damaging process of the tabloidisation of the press. As noted earlier, polarisation does not necessarily lead to a decline in standards if media practitioners support their ideas with facts. What is critical in the Zimbabwean setting is assessing why standards of journalism are described as declining albeit in a polarised environment. This research seeks to establish whether or not tabloidisation is the reason for the decline in journalism standards, in terms of truth-telling, accuracy, independence, fairness, impartiality, humanity and accountability, through an analysis of the coverage of selected events, such as the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government. This study focuses on three national daily newspapers in Zimbabwe from the three leading newspaper stables across the ownership divide: The Herald (state-controlled newspaper, Zimpapers), Daily News (privately owned, Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ) and NewsDay (privately owned, Alfa Media Holdings

248 

W. GADZIKWA

(AMH). The three newspapers extensively covered the Joice Mujuru story. An assessment of this coverage will allow conclusions to be drawn about whether or not the decline in journalism standards can be attributed to tabloidisation.

The Expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and Government Joice Teurai Ropa Mujuru (born Runaida Mugari on 15 April 1955) is a liberation war heroine in Zimbabwe’s war of independence. She was married to Solomon Mujuru (a war hero and army general) until his death in 2011. Joice Mujuru served in the ZANU–PF government in various capacities, including being a cabinet minister until she was appointed the first female Vice-President in independent Zimbabwe in 2004. This was a milestone for all women in the political arena. Mujuru was perceived by many to be former President Robert Mugabe’s natural successor. In April 2015, she was expelled from the ruling ZANU–PF, in which she was the Second Secretary, on charges of plotting to topple Mugabe from power. The allegations against her made by ZANU–PF were as follows: • plotting to unconstitutionally remove former President Robert Mugabe from power; • causing divisions and orchestrating factionalism in the ruling ZANU–PF; • creating competing centres of power in the party; • corruption and extortion; • criminal abuse of office; • providing leadership for the regime change agenda. (The Herald, 3 April 2015) The expulsion of Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government was extensively covered by the mainstream print and electronic media. Her expulsion presents an opportunity to assess whether or not the selected newspapers adhered to broadsheet journalism or adopted tabloid journalism styles in their coverage. From analysis of this, it is possible to establish whether or not the media is undergoing the damaging process of tabloidisation, which in itself would point to a decline in standards of journalism (Bird 1992; Sparks 2000; McNair 2001).

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

249

Tabloids and Tabloidisation A discussion of the tabloidisation of the press requires an understanding of the meaning of the term “broadsheet journalism” as opposed to “tabloid journalism”. Broadsheets are newspapers in a large format, which are written and distributed for a national audience on the basis of a national news agenda (Franklin et al. 2005) Broadsheets value a traditional mix of politics and diplomacy with sport on the back pages. Their major aim is in-depth and comprehensive coverage, which is written using moderate and emotionally controlled language (Ibid: 30). They tend to lead on an issue or the substantive consequences of a story rather than the first-hand human interest approach employed by tabloids. As such, broadsheets are more text heavy than the pictorial tabloids, and they are less inclined to use more unconventional reporting practices such as door-stepping or paying for stories. The character of broadsheet news coverage, the papers’ tone and the characteristics of their readers, who are the more affluent groups in society, have resulted in them being regarded by both journalists and readers as the epitome of journalistic excellence (Franklin et al. 2005: 29–30). The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay can be classified as representatives of typical broadsheet newspapers in Zimbabwe. In this regard, they should be measured by the high standards associated with broadsheet newspapers and as the epitome of journalistic excellence.

Tabloid Journalism Any discussion of tabloidisation naturally calls for an in-depth understanding of the nature of tabloids and tabloid journalism. Sparks (2000) defines that the tabloid is a from marked by two major features: it devotes relatively little attention to politics, economics, and society and relatively much attention to (...) sports, scandal and popular entertainment; it devotes much attention to the personal and private lives of people, both celebrities and ordinary people, and relatively little to political processes, economic developments, and social changes. (2000: 10)

250 

W. GADZIKWA

Another tabloid critic, Bird (2000), further defines tabloid journalism as the storytelling news style which focuses more on personalities, dominant usage of visual images, and preference for sensationalism instead of analysis and rational descriptions, techniques such as dramatisation, photo-­enhancements and re-enactments. (2000: 215)

From the definitions proffered by Sparks (2000) and Bird (2000), it follows that tabloid journalism is closely related to topics such as sensational crime stories, astrology, television, gossip columns about personal lives of celebrities and sports stars, and junk food. Tabloid journalism is also associated with tabloid-size newspapers, but the terms “tabloids”, “supermarket tabloids”, “gutter press” and “rag” refer to the journalistic approach of such newspapers rather than the size. It is important to note that the term “tabloid” is used more often as a concept than in physical reference to the more compact size of tabloid newspapers. Örnebring and Jönsson (2004) argue that the tabloid press is synonymous not only with a specific paper format but also with a certain way of selecting and presenting news. From the very beginning, the tabloid press was criticised for sensationalism and emotionalism, for oversimplification of complex issues, for pandering to the lowest common denominator and sometimes outright lies. (2004: 287)

From this quote, it is clear that some of the distinguishing characteristics of tabloid styles and techniques include sensationalisation, fake news, deception, heightened emotionalism, obscenity, disregard for media ethics, especially privacy, and more visual imagery. Of particular note is that the content of tabloids is usually meant to cater for a section of the audience that does not need or demand serious content (Bird 1992). The success of tabloids over the years (mainly in the Western world), with its focus on meeting the needs of individuals as consumers, is interpreted as a sign that it may contribute very little or nothing to the life of citizens (Sparks 2000). Tabloid journalism has also been described as showing the changing journalistic mood, which has seen the news media become part of the entertainment industry rather than a forum for informed debate about issues of public interest (Franklin 1997). The confusion of broadsheet and tabloid subjects has led to fears that broadsheet journalism and tabloid

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

251

journalism will become indistinguishable, this resulting in dumbing down or tabloidisation (McNair 1998). Tabloidisation is considered to be a contamination that leads to a decline in journalism standards when the quality press adopts tabloid styles in their news writing and presentation (Esser 1999; Franklin 1997; Bird 2000; Sparks 2000). Tabloids are known for pandering to the lowest common denominator, that is trivialisation and sensationalism, concentrating more on scandals, news of shock value, and gossip and infotainment (Örnebring and Jönsson 2004). The centrality of the role of media in politics, especially the traditional role of informing citizens about public affairs, is seriously threatened if the quality media becomes tabloidised. The media has an indispensable role in not only informing but also interpreting societal issues. More critically, the media is also a source of definitions about reality, and its conduct must always be brought under public scrutiny, especially in terms of objectivity and impartiality. The conversion of news into entertainment rather than a forum for informed debate about important issues that concern the public has been described as the net effect of tabloidisation (Franklin 1997; Thusu 2007; Johansson 2007; Olkonen and Vilma 2011).

Tabloidisation, Media and Democracy A well-functioning democracy relies on citizens who are well informed politically, with the media playing a central role that connects state and society (Klein 2000). A tabloidised media negates this important role because it cannot “input”, publishing facts and opinions that are socially relevant, a form of warning system of developments in society that indicates changes in consensus, problems, people and decisions, or provide “output”, in which the public is informed of political decision-making processes and their results (Ibid: 177). Tabloidisation threatens democracy, inhibiting its proper functioning by failing to give critical information and knowledge that the public need to exercise their rights as citizens (Sparks 2000). The relationship between the media and politics is crucial as it links important interdependent institutions in society—media and politics. Citizens need objective information from the media for them to fully participate in socio-political affairs. Tabloidisation of political coverage in political campaigns works against democracy and the media’s role in

252 

W. GADZIKWA

providing political information that allows citizens to participate meaningfully in politics (Landmeier and Daschmann 2011). It can also lead to disenchantment with politics if it affects the quality press.

Tabloidisation Indicators In order to analyse whether or not the coverage of the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government by the newspapers selected can be attributed to tabloidisation, it is critical to discuss the indicators that are used to measure or detect tabloidisation. This can be quantified in many ways. A quantitative study of the changes in British newspapers from 1952 to 1997 by McLachlan and Golding (2000) brought to the fore some of the tabloidisation indicators, such as fewer international news stories, an increase in pictures and decrease in text, upsurge of human interest/entertainment stories and a decrease in political and parliamentary news stories. Some of the indicators that have been suggested include de-­ contextualisation and the personalisation and simplification of complex issues. This leads to limitations on the ability of the reader to comprehend the issue presented (Boykoff 2008; Bird 1992, 2000; Calabrese 2000). Other indicators include the promotion of emotion in news by exploiting human tragedy, replacing significant news with trivia, putting more weight on banalities and bizarre rarities, and less weight on in-depth analysis and political debate (Bakkes 1999). Tabloidisation is also marked by the visual composition of the newspapers, such as a dynamic layout meant to attract readers, especially on the front page, easy readability, striking appearances, simplified journalism, sensationalisation and the use of bold types, colour and imagery. There is also a decrease in text, more visual photographs, tables and diagrams, all of which lessen the amount of the text (Sparks 2000; Schonbach 2000). Tabloidisation results in an overall decrease in journalistic standards, punctuated by a decrease in hard news, such as politics and economics, and an increase in soft news, such as sleaze, scandal, sensation and entertainment (Esser 1999).

Methodology and Theoretical Framework As indicated earlier, this study was necessitated by ever-growing concerns about the decline of journalistic standards in Zimbabwe. A critical investigation of the root causes as well as the symptoms of the decline was carried out through the analysis of stories focusing the depiction of Joice Mujuru

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

253

in The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay. These three newspapers were selected because they covered the story extensively and on a daily basis. They also come from the country’s three main newspaper stables, and thus are representative of the national print media landscape. The analysis of stories from these newspapers is sufficient to reach a conclusion on whether the Zimbabwean “quality” press is undergoing the damaging process of tabloidisation or not. The specific objectives of the study were to: • examine whether the framing of Mujuru’s expulsion from ZANU– PF in selected newspapers was based on factual or sensational reporting; • establish forces motivating the tabloidisation of political news and discourses in contemporary Zimbabwe; • examine the standards of journalism in Zimbabwe, focusing on the framing of Mujuru’s expulsion from ZANU–PF in selected newspapers. In examining whether or not the decline in journalism performance and standards in Zimbabwe can be attributed to tabloidisation, four questions were asked; • How did The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay frame the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government? • To what extent was the expulsion of Joice Mujuru sensationalised in the selected newspapers? • What are the main forces leading to the dearth of serious/factual reporting and exacerbation of tabloidisation of political news in Zimbabwe? • Which of the three papers best illustrates the worst effects of tabloidisation, and why? To fulfil the aims of the study, a qualitative research methodology was employed. A qualitative methodology enables the collection of a lot of data, capturing all elements of an event to allow for a full description (Becker 1996; Sandelowski 2000). Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted to either confirm or invalidate the findings from the qualitative content analysis (textual) of the newspaper articles and also to establish the motivating factors of tabloidisation of political discourse in the selected

254 

W. GADZIKWA

newspapers. Qualitative content analysis was instrumental since it is “an approach of empirical, methodological analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytic rules and step by step models without rash quantification” (Mayring 2000: 2). The sample size consisted of 222 newspaper articles and 19 in-depth interviews with key informants. The period of the study covered early October 2014 to January 2017, when the factional fights in ZANU–PF were becoming intense. During this time, Mujuru was the vice-president, was expelled from the party and formed her own political party as an opposition leader. The study was underpinned by an eclectic three-pronged theoretical framework informed by media framing theory, agenda-setting and the concept of the public sphere. The analysis of frames in news stories is critical because they present a persistent pattern of cognition, interpretation and presentation of selection, emphasis and exclusion by which media discourse is organised for the construction of social reality (Goffman 1974; Gitlin 1980; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Entman 1993; McQuail 1994; Tankard 2001; Butler 2009). Framing analysis is critical when analysing news articles in terms of tabloidisation. This is because tabloidisation is characterised by declining standards of journalism through the adoption and spill over of tabloid formatting to the quality press, the conversion of news into entertainment (Esser 1999; Turner 2004; Sparks 2000; Franklin 1997), the prevalent use of simplistic language and a dynamic layout of content (Bird 2000). All these processes involve a form of framing in the writing of the news. Furthermore, frames in news are important because they may affect learning and evaluations of issues and events, and this has an effect at individual and societal levels. At individual level, they may result in altered attitudes about a particular issue, mainly based on exposure to certain frames, while at societal level they contribute to the shaping of social processes, such as political socialisation, decision-making and collective actions (De Vreese 2005). Through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a representative story for each frame from the selected newspapers was analysed. CDA allowed study of the language and power in terms of discourse and ideology. The assumption was that the news stories contained political goals or agendas that were biased towards a particular ideology, especially in terms of choices of quotes used, naming of sources, perspective from which the story was written and what was omitted, which all formed the overall

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

255

portrayal by the story and the resultant frame (Johnstone 2008). In doing CDA, the context was identified as critical with regard to three levels: macro, meso and micro. The micro-level allowed for the examination of issues at the time when the stories were written. At meso-level, focus was on the context of the production and reception of the stories, while micro-­ level allowed for analysis of the actual words used in the stories, in terms of the linguistic devices used to depict the ideas (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 1996; Richardson 2007). A representative story was selected for analysis to reveal the salient aspects of each frame using four categories, namely words and symbols, preferred meanings, omission analysis and limiting debate, and integrating it with other stories that conformed to the frame. The analysis of the article would reveal or identify the kinds of words and symbols associated with the treatment of Mujuru at a particular historical moment. Preferred meanings—which would reveal the intended meanings that a particular newspaper sought the audience to consider as natural or the only possible interpretation of a story—were also considered. Omission analysis assumes that a story is a construction that privileges certain meanings and not others. The gist of this is to explore what is left out or remains unsaid, or is silenced or prevented from manifesting because of a choice of particular words and symbols, rather than others that would have created possible alternative meanings. The implication that a story can say more from what it does not openly narrate than what it says directly suggests that particular ways of reporting can limit debate of other possible views of the same story. This phenomenon of limiting debate implies a deliberate critique of what could have been left out in the story in its framing. The study established the following frames from the selected newspapers: putschists cabal, traitor/economic saboteur, incompetent/simpleton, corrupt, false war legend, regime change agent, greedy, cruel stepmother, sympathetic, victim, brave leader, mature leader, counter-­ frame, grand coalition, moderate frames.

Key Findings Tabloidisation has been attributed to the increasing commercialism and commercialisation of the media sphere, dumbing down to appeal to targeted audiences, prioritising profits over public service quest, abandoning journalistic standards and emphasising more attractive, entertaining stories while marginalising objective journalism and critical issues (Franklin

256 

W. GADZIKWA

1997; Barnet 1998; Esser 1999; Sparks and Tulloch 2000; McNair 2001; Harris 2006). Technological advances that allow journalists to produce stories within a short period of time, which compromises their ability to check facts, coupled by reliance on entertainment-oriented public relations-generated content, have also been given as reasons for the trend towards tabloidisation (Barnet 1998). Instead of reactivating and reinvigorating the public sphere with new information, technology has fuelled tabloidisation by eroding the role of media as watchdog. The net result is a debasement of the standards of journalism by diminishing the capacity of civil discourse (Sparks 2000). In the United States of America (USA), tabloidisation has been caused by the internationalisation and deregulation of media ownership and content. The result is that there is a prevalence of free market and profit-­ oriented owners who pursue whatever sells (Sparks 2000). Such a scenario results in the subordination of news values to commercial values (Schudson 1995). The control of editorial policies by owners such as Rupert Murdoch on the UK Sun, as well as mergers and takeovers in the late 1980s, also led to newspapers considering financial aspects above anything else (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995). The spread of tabloidisation is a reflection of a situation where the “bad” is pushing out the “good” (Williams 2003: 30). Owing to tabloidisation, news stories are now “bright, light and trite”, shorter with more pictures, simpler and less wordy; and there has been a rise of what is described as sound bite journalism, where more pictures and entertainment get more priority over serious newspapers, prestigious news bulletins and current affairs programmes (Williams 2003: 231). Tabloidisation has also seen a retreat in investigative journalism, with a shift towards “soft” and “light” news (Franklin 1997: 4).

Media Framing of Joice Mujuru The Herald Frames In the analysis of The Herald articles, it was discovered that the newspaper was entirely negative and reproachful in its framing. Also revealed were predominantly derisive and pejorative frames, which reflected the factional and power struggles within the party at the time. These frames included the putschists cabal frame, in which Mujuru was depicted as leading a cabal seeking to oust former President Mugabe from power through

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

257

alleged assassination plots by her allies, such as Rugare Gumbo, Didymus Mutasa and Nicholas Goche. These allegations were also emphasised in other frames, such as traitor/economic saboteur. In this frame, Mujuru was accused of betraying both the president and the country by associating with what were perceived to be the enemies of the country identified as Britain, the European Union and the USA. Furthermore, Mujuru was framed as a simplistic thinker who could not handle issues to do with statecraft, a corrupt person who abused her position in government to further the business interests of her family, an agent of regime change who colluded with hostile Western countries against ZANU–PF and a greedy and cruel stepmother, who enjoyed the suffering of children sired by her late husband with other women by refusing to execute General Mujuru’s will. In the false war legend frame, Mujuru was described as an impostor riding on a stolen image of war heroics to catapult herself into various beneficial positions in ZANU–PF and the government. All these frames were interconnected as they reinforced each other with overlapping aspects, but the most common thread is that they served to amplify that Mujuru wanted to take over power at all costs, and should be ejected and rejected by ZANU–PF supporters. Joice Mujuru was framed in this way because of The Herald’s position in Zimbabwean politics as a willing tool and mouthpiece of the ruling ZANU–PF. The newspaper was controlled by the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services through the permanent secretary, who claimed to speak on behalf of the President. Through the 51% shareholding that the Zimbabwean government has in Zimpapers (the publishers of The Herald), successive information ministers have exercised direct editorial control, especially since 2000 when the information ministry was brought under the Office of the President. The Herald is deployed as an attack dog against the perceived machinations of a Western-inspired regime change agenda since the country embarked on the Land Reform Programme in 2000. It is The Herald that defines the preferred Zimbabwean position every time and it has no restrictions in terms of circulation in the country, while other newspapers are regarded as opposition and are “banned” in ZANU–PF rural strongholds. Therefore, the newspaper has considerable influence in ZANU–PF politics, and once it said Mujuru was a traitor, ZANU–PF supporters merely accepted the dominant reading. The other basis for the negative framing was that The Herald reportage was hijacked by a faction that wanted Mujuru to be eliminated from

258 

W. GADZIKWA

ZANU–PF by any means necessary. The Minister of Information at the time, Professor Jonathan Moyo, dictated the framing of Mujuru through negative images. From the qualitative analysis of the actual stories, it became clear that The Herald was considered to be the willing tool of a faction in ZANU–PF that was able to amplify Mujuru’s alleged flaws to justify rejecting and ejecting her. The negative images given by the official newspaper were meant to make readers view her as a political villain and not the victim of political machinations involving succession battles within ZANU–PF. The framing also sought to justify her expulsion in the public eyes. Again, this demonstrates that tabloidisation has the potential to corrupt media practice and also highlights that the potential dangers of trivialising stories of huge political significance are phenomenal if objectivity is replaced by subjectivity (McNair 2001). In this study, The Herald is probably the worst example of a platform for mass deception and character assassination, using brazen and unethical practices that bordered on belittling the intelligence of its readers. Daily News Frames In contrast to The Herald’s malignant regime of negative images of Mujuru, the Daily News framed her expulsion from ZANU–PF and the government by adopting a basically sympathetic framing, which led to blind support for her. In the sympathetic frame, Mujuru was presented as a defenceless widow deserving public sympathy after what was described as a brutal ousting from ZANU–PF by powerful forces led by former President Mugabe and his wife. The Daily News sought to portray her as a victim of ZANU–PF conflict. In an effort to prop her up as a viable political alternative, the Daily News portrayed Joice Mujuru as a new, brave and formidable leader who could challenge President Mugabe politically. Linked to this perceived bravery, Mujuru was portrayed as a moderate and mature leader with qualities that showed experience, maturity, moderation, reconciliatory and a developmental disposition, who was therefore worth considering as a viable opposition leader. The Daily News also sought to defend Mujuru by countering the pejorative framing by The Herald in the counter-frame. The fight over the expulsion of Mujuru from ZANU–PF became a battleground between the two publications, with much disregard of media ethics and the need to offer meaningful debate to their readers. Finally, through the use of a grand coalition frame, the Daily News tried to push for the formation of a coalition of opposition

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

259

political parties, led by either Joice Mujuru or Morgan Tsvangirai. that would challenge ZANU–PF and dislodge former President Mugabe from power. Analysis of the stories showed that they were designed to endear Mujuru to the reader. The frames overlapped and reinforced each other, as they were not confined to a single story but intersected in almost all the stories. The most common thread was that of the victim, serving to amplify sympathy for Mujuru as an unfortunate defenceless widow and victim of President Mugabe and his wife, especially after the death of her husband. The Daily News also sought to portray her as a political giant who could wrestle power from Mugabe. Overall, the framing of Mujuru by the Daily News was sympathetic. In a bid to sympathise with her, the Daily News resorted to tabloid styles, and concentrated on reacting to what The Herald was writing about her instead of telling readers whether or not she was guilty of the charges laid against her. The Daily News’ framing presented a different kind of tabloidisation by pushing at all costs the image of a brave leader who was ready to challenge President Mugabe and needed readers’ sympathy. The Daily News only provided information that sought to exonerate Mujuru of the corruption allegations, but failed to openly critique her capabilities in terms of leadership and economic programmes. The newspaper maintained a blind hero-worshipping style, trying to whip up support for her as someone who opposed ZANU–PF and expending its energies on a possible coalition between Mujuru and Morgan Tsvangirai. It thus relied on stereotyping, which extolled one side of the story at the expense of the complicated image of a human being. NewsDay Frames NewsDay framed the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and the government by vigorously attempting to set an agenda that presented Mujuru as a moderate leader who would be acceptable to Zimbabweans. This was buttressed by framing her as a victim to be sympathised with. This kind of framing was akin to campaigning for her without really informing readers who she was and what she had to offer politically. Analysis of the NewsDay stories revealed three main mutually reinforcing frames. The first was the moderate leader frame, in which Joice Mujuru is presented as a viable political alternative to Mugabe. A moderate leader is someone who is amenable to the growth of business and accepts Western investment without any preconditions.

260 

W. GADZIKWA

The second is the sympathetic frame, its main thrust being to elicit sympathy for Joice Mujuru by portraying her as a defenceless widow who was persecuted for no justifiable cause by her rivals in ZANU–PF.  The third is the victim frame, which emphasised the perception of Mujuru as a victim of factional politics in ZANU–PF. She was portrayed as vulnerable, especially when her husband General Solomon Mujuru was no longer there to protect her. The portrayal of Mujuru as a victim was linked to the overall framing of her as worth sympathising with, and also as a moderate leader who was being punished for entertaining hopes of becoming the President of Zimbabwe. It is important to show that the study argued that these frames were not confined to a single story but intersected in almost all of them. The sympathetic and victim frames were specifically deployed to buttress the moderate leader frame, which sought to convince readers and citizens that Joice Mujuru was a leader for the future who could appeal to them mainly because she had the liberation war credentials that were lacking in long-­ time opposition leader, MDC–T (Movement for Democratic Change– Tsvangirai (faction)) leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. Despite the pronouncement that NewsDay sought to present facts in an objective manner, this coverage showed that the newspaper had abandoned its commitments in favour of sensation as a survival technique, to capture reader attention and sell copies (McNair 2001). The result of such an approach is the creation of emotion around the vulnerability of Mujuru after the death of her husband and dissemination of the belief that she was being persecuted because she had ambitions to be the president. The other stereotype that NewsDay peddled was that Mujuru was an economic messiah for Zimbabwe, which indicates de-contextualisation and the personification of a complex issue (Bakkes 1999).

Tabloidisation of Coverage The Herald The results of the content analysis of the stories demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that The Herald employed tabloid reporting styles, such as subjectivity, sensationalism, use of large photographs, manipulation, use of unidentified, fictitious and low credibility sources, publishing of falsehoods, emotionally appealing language and extensive descriptions, editorialising of news stories, printing of unconfirmed gossip and outlandish

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

261

claims, dramatisation, distortion, exaggeration, trivialisation, simplification and personification in its coverage of the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF. In the corrupt frame, The Herald resorted to plagiarism and printing outright lies, in an effort to make sure that Mujuru was seen as undesirable and unfit to be a member of the party. Again, in the putschists cabal, the newspaper resorted to innuendo and fictitious sources to allege that Mujuru’s allies were plotting to assassinate President Mugabe, to the extent that they were planning such activities and could possibly manipulate the security of the country. The failure of the smooth implementation frame, The Herald trivialised and exaggerated the facts, and presumed readers would be gullible enough to believe that Mujuru was entirely responsible for the collapse of all government-owned businesses in the country and the failure of the smooth implementation of the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation blueprint. The Herald’s frames, such as putschists cabal, traitor/economic saboteur, incompetent/simpleton, corrupt, false war legend, regime change agent, greedy and cruel stepmother, contain tabloid styles that point towards the damaging process of tabloidisation (Turner 2004; Bakkes 1999). The findings of the study show that The Herald was undergoing a process of tabloidisation and was drifting away from the expectations of a serious broadsheet journalism newspaper. The adoption of tabloid journalism techniques by broadsheet newspapers is considered to be associated with the decline in journalistic standards (Bek 2004; Conboy 2005; Glynn 2000). The confusion of broadsheet and tabloid subjects is associated with fears that broadsheet and tabloid journalism will become indistinguishable, resulting in dumbing down or tabloidisation (McNair 1998). This seems to be the case in The Herald’s coverage of the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government. The subjectivity and sensationalism exhibited by The Herald reflected the control of editorial content by forces outside the newsroom, who dictated the official position, regardless of the facts on the ground. The content of the stories did not reflect the abilities of its journalists but what the wielders of power dictated in terms of official correctness. Tabloidisation was beyond the control of the professional journalists who worked at The Herald, and reflected the conversion of the newspaper into a lapdog by those who exerted editorial control in pursuit of factional politics in ZANU–PF.

262 

W. GADZIKWA

Daily News The Daily News coverage was characterised by the use of tabloid formatting and styles, such as the use of unidentified sources, sensational wording, speculation and editorialising, and the use of colour pages with photographs larger than the stories. These modes of representing Mujuru were found to be misleading to the readers because the attention-getting headlines, focused on the individual rather than the subject matter, and there was less weight on in-depth analysis and political debate (Bakkes 1999; Schonbach 2000). The Daily News did not rise above an attempt to oppose The Herald’s framing of the Mujuru ouster, but failed to provide alternative perspectives that could enable citizens to make informed political decisions on what Mujuru had to offer as a politician. Just as in the case of The Herald, the Daily News was undergoing the damaging process of tabloidisation. The implication for democracy is that with the kinds of framing seen in the Daily News, democratic debate on issues that affect people is limited, and sometimes even omitted and ignored. Thus, democratic expectations of the media in the creation of a rational public sphere necessary for an enlightened and informed citizenry are undermined. The overly sympathetic framing of Mujuru by the Daily News predisposed it to focus more on eliciting sympathy for her as a victim. The study discovered that this frame of victimhood obscured real issues, such as accusations of plotting to assassinate President Mugabe, corruption and extortion, and working against the interests of ZANU–PF by leading divisive factional politics that bordered on regime change. This encouraged a de-contextualised portrayal of Mujuru and a projection of her individualism by entirely focusing on her person instead of the allegations she was facing in ZANU–PF (Bird 2000; Bakkes 1999). Such attributes of the newspaper demonstrate that it adopted tabloid rather than broadsheet journalism formats, therefore confirming the argument that the Daily News was undergoing the process of tabloidisation (Bird 1992; Franklin 1997). The implication is that informed debate was stalled if not obfuscated. The depiction of Mujuru as a victim who deserved sympathy was also a result of the polarity that exists in the Zimbabwean media. The Daily News fixated readers on a few themes that were a form of political jingoism, and the end result was the trivialisation of the allegations that Mujuru was facing in ZANU–PF.

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

263

NewsDay NewsDay attempted to frame Mujuru in a different way, by depicting her as a moderate leader who could deliver Zimbabwe out of its economic quagmire. The drive to push for the acceptance of Mujuru as an acceptable and moderate leader by NewsDay led it to resort to tabloid styles such as subjectivity and emotionalism, as it actively tried to elicit sympathy (Bakkes 1999; Franklin 1997) for her by depicting her as a defenceless innocent widow who was being ruthlessly crushed for being ambitious enough to dream of leading the country. These frames were meant to naturally predispose readers to understand Mujuru’s plight from a single perspective. The stories were not incisive enough to give citizens the power to make decisions based on a full understanding of who Mujuru really was politically, and thereby took a plunge into the tabloidisation of news (Esser 1999; Sparks 2000). In this regard, NewsDay actually succeeded in closing off debate on critical national themes, of democracy, rule of law, land and corruption, and failed to set an inclusive transformative agenda. The desire by NewsDay to project Mujuru as a moderate leader who could challenge for political power predisposed it to focus more on eliciting sympathy for her without telling its readers why they should support her and what she had to offer to the electorate. NewsDay also did not provide information on whether Mujuru was not guilty of all the charges that were levelled against her but instead sought to set an agenda and give her momentum that would allow her to challenge for political office. The portrayal of Mujuru by NewsDay also meant that more focus was on her as an individual than on the alternatives she could offer or on qualifying the perceived moderate nature of her leadership (Bird 2000; Bakkes 1999). It seems that NewsDay presented a narrow definition of her moderate views. These are only defined in terms of perceived links with Western countries, which are presumed to offer more viable economic options to Zimbabwe than Chinese investment. Furthermore, the moderate nature of Mujuru was expressed to satisfy the interests of big business only; the assumption was that with economic growth everything would fall into place. This is rather fallacious. Again the assumption and perception that Mujuru was a moderate had no basis in fact as she had not proved this in practice, since she had only been deputising for Mugabe during her stay in government—unless NewsDay intended to insinuate that she was leading a parallel government.

264 

W. GADZIKWA

Forces Behind the Tabloidisation of Political News in Zimbabwe The analysis of The Herald revealed that the dearth of serious news was attributed to a desire to concentrate on what sells or what readers feel about a subject. Such an approach points towards sensational news, which favours the exciting over the factual (Franklin 1997). The media in Zimbabwe is gravitating towards tabloid journalism owing to the cut-­ throat competition with online publications in a shrinking economy. As a result of this competition, newspapers have resorted to sensationalism as a way to attract readers to buy copies. The publishing of sensational news that titillates the mind is the result of a media that is operating in an economy where the marginal propensity to spend is fast diminishing, resulting in fierce competition for readers by selling sensation (Esser 1999). Another exceptional factor that promotes the tabloidisation of political discourse in the case of The Herald was the allegation that the newspaper was being manipulated by political forces or a faction of ZANU–PF, which dictated the editorial direction with utter disregard for journalistic ethics. This was done to smear Joice Mujuru’s character by any means, including the publishing of falsehoods. The hijacking of editorial control by a faction allegedly led by the so-called Team Lacoste, allegedly headed by Emmerson Mnangagwa, used the Zimpapers stable, including The Herald, to fight Jonathan Moyo, who was believed to front another faction called Generation 40 (G40) in the ZANU–PF succession matrix. Another cause of the tabloidisation of the Zimbabwean press was the polarisation of the press along political lines, which resulted in the publication of half-truths, conjectures and innuendos as all the newspapers sought to fulfil their own objectives, these being set by forces outside the newsrooms. Media polarisation has been defined mainly along political lines, with the private and state-owned media holding entrenched positions reflective of a polarised society, especially after the Land Reform Programme and the emergence of the MDC as a major threat to ZANU–PF’s political and economic hegemony in 1999 (Chari 2009; Raftopoulous 2009). The net effect of this media polarisation is the sacrifice of objectivity as the newspapers seek to reinforce their chosen position (MMPZ 2002). While the polarisation of the media has for over two decades been identified as one of the major causes of tabloidisation, sensationalism, corruption and political interference have been identified as the other root causes.

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

265

Media corruption has seen journalists coming directly under the control of powerful politicians (VMCZ 2013; IMPI 2014). The result of corruption in the media is that there is a concentration on trivial matters rather than the conduct of powerful figures. As a result, the media’s role as the Fourth Estate is compromised and its general failure to unpack concrete material issues becomes apparent. In the case of The Herald, Mujuru is rejected outright, while in the Daily News a sympathetic frame is used to project her as a victim of the succession battle in ZANU–PF even after she was expelled from the party. The study also found out that the poor remuneration of most journalists in the country increased their vulnerability to manipulation by politicians, thus compromising their role in terms of reporting political issues. The media ends up being a mere mouthpiece for politicians’ views, instead of a watchdog acting on behalf of society. The Herald, NewsDay and the Daily News, whether by default or design, are undergoing the damaging process of tabloidisation. Tabloidisation by its nature negates the efficient functioning of the mediated public sphere by working in opposition to the creation of “general truths, general principles which would guide the formulation and implementation of the necessary regulation of social life” (McNair 2001: 39).

Tabloidisation of Political News in Zimbabwe: The Worst Case Scenario The study has established that all the selected newspapers are undergoing the damaging process of tabloidisation in terms of political news reporting. The Herald presents the worst case scenario, followed by the Daily News and NewsDay respectively. Tabloidisation of political news at The Herald manifests itself in targeted character assassination and the demonisation of perceived political foes from a political faction that has hijacked editorial control. The result of such assassinations and smear campaigns is the printing of gossip and fake stories, especially with regard to Mujuru (Bird 2000; Sloan 2001). The Herald has lost any kind of relevance in its political stories, which are written in a brazen propagandist manner that is even worse than that of tabloids, which openly admit they spice up issues to provide readers with relaxation or simply give people what they want (Sparks 2000). The conversion of The Herald into a war zone for competing political factions in ZANU–PF is the major reason for the

266 

W. GADZIKWA

tabloidisation of its political reporting. While tabloids use attention-seeking and entertaining stories to sell copy (Franklin 1997), this does not seem to be the case for The Herald, which has had a strong market presence in Zimbabwe since 1897, and still has the support of loyal advertisers who seem unmoved by the editorial content. The tabloidisation of political news by The Herald stems from the hijacking of editorial content by a faction of ZANU–PF. This was epitomised by the coverage of Joice Mujuru, when Jonathan Moyo was in control of the editorial angle. When Moyo lost control, being moved to another ministry, he immediately became a target of the entire Zimpapers group, as the so-called Team Lacoste allegedly fronted by Mnangagwa used the papers to advance its interests against the G40 faction. The hijacking of editorial control took place through former media and information permanent secretary George Charamba, who was openly rebuked by the First Lady Grace Mugabe for writing “useless stories” and for fighting Jonathan Moyo through the Zimpapers stable (“Prof Jonathan Moyo is clean—First Lady”, Sunday Mail, 30 July 2017). It therefore follows that the way in which The Herald dramatises factional fights conforms to the description of tabloidisation by Franklin (1997: 19), who argues that “news media has become part of the entertainment industry rather than being a forum for informed debate about important issues of public concern”. The Herald thus represents the worst in terms of tabloidisation of the political story, and the resultant tabloidisation by the Daily News and NewsDay is in response to the framing of Mujuru by The Herald. The tabloidisation that manifests in the Daily News and NewsDay is motivated by commercial motives to survive in a declining economy and an attempt to offer an alternative voice, albeit in support of a perceived political ally. However, the two newspapers fail to provide alternatives beyond the stereotype that whoever opposed Mugabe could offer solutions to the country’s economic and political challenges. They seem to enjoy peddling subjective stereotypes, and in the process fail to offer alternative views that can enhance public understanding. With the exception of its counter-frames in which it exposed the fallacies in The Herald’s framing of Mujuru, especially the corrupt frame, the Daily News is the direct opposite of The Herald in terms of sensationalisation and trivialisation in its reportage of Joice Mujuru. NewsDay, though marked by a desire to prop up Mujuru using sensationalism and tabloid formatting, tried to be less tabloid in its approach by revealing the bad side

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

267

of Mujuru, especially showing that she has some cruel and corrupt tendencies. It is the contention of this study that developing countries such as Zimbabwe, which have been bedevilled by close to two decades of political and socio-economic challenges, need a press that can promote robust debate and produce quality news, especially in terms of political reporting, so that citizens can hold informed views and make meaningful contributions. The research has demonstrated that readers are clear about their expectations from broadsheet newspapers and demand better and more analytical content that does not drift towards infotainment. This means that the media should not continue to offer such a disservice to readers. If citizens are to rely on social media for information, as alluded to by respondents, then the mainstream press would become irrelevant in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, newspapers seem to have been hijacked, whoever owns them, and have virtually abdicated their roles of being watchdogs and as the Fourth Estate.

Conclusions on the Tabloidisation of Political News in Zimbabwe The research has established that in the coverage of the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government, The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay departed from objective journalism by focusing on reporting political statements without providing a balanced analysis of material realities in the country. The newspapers concentrated more on issues that were meant to appeal to the human instinct for entertainment rather than information, as with typical tabloid newspapers (Brookes 2000). In this sense, they continually undermined the readers’ intelligence, and wittingly or unwittingly assisted in maintaining the situation that has reduced the country to a place of tears and silence. The framing of Mujuru by the three newspapers also points to a lack of publication of serious and accurate information that enables citizens to make informed political choices. This could possibly lead to apathy about politics and have the net effect of destroying the public sphere of rational debate (McNair 2001). Furthermore, the reportage examined has the potential to lead to mass cynicism about political news: some respondents indicated that they no longer believed what was published by the three newspapers. Ordinary

268 

W. GADZIKWA

readers continually questioned the authenticity of the reportage on the Mujuru issue, especially focusing on why she had not been charged with treason—something that the newspapers did not question. Readers believed that the media could be playing games, as previously all other political leaders who had been accused of treason, such as Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU–Ndonga and Morgan Tsvangirai, were arrested and charged. The study established that the newspapers simply wanted to push sales by writing about the allegations that Mujuru was facing. One frightening aspect is the perception by readers that all the newspapers under study are partisan, and the only place to look for information is social media. In such a scenario, the media ceases to function as a public sphere and thus becomes irrelevant to society. Broadsheets in Zimbabwe are adopting tabloid styles, and seem to fulfil the pejorative sense of tabloid formatting in being very casual, concise and sensationalist in both tone and language (Conboy 2005; Sampson 1996). In the final analysis, The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay are fast drifting away from broadsheet journalism, which should inform the public by using serious language and tone (McLachlan and Golding 2000). Tabloidisation is not good for democracy, and the newspapers studied here took fixed positions that did not lead to enlightenment of the citizens. Democracy relies on citizens who are well informed in political terms, and this can be made possible by the media. Without such knowledge, citizens may fail to exercise their democratic rights, which in Zimbabwe has seen citizens voting without choosing by focusing on individual cultic leaders instead of candidates’ economic and political programmes. This study has demonstrated that the Zimbabwean media is not providing citizens with critical information about politicians’ programmes but focuses more on personalities as either the problem or the solution. This leads citizens to continue to invest in personalities as opposed to their programmes of action. The Zimbabwean media scene seems to conform to an assertion by Sparks quoted in (Williams 2003), that “while there may be more information as well, public understanding is declining. Public ignorance and apathy is growing as the seriousness, challenging and truthful is being pushed aside by the trivial, sensational, and vulgar and manipulated” (2003: 230). What this suggests is that tabloids and tabloidisation have the potential to further dilute the already unstable public sphere, as noted by Mabweazara:

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

269

in Zimbabwe the prospects of readers becoming less interested in conventional hard news, and less critical of the techniques typical of the tabloid style, is glaringly significant. (2005: 32)

A media that is tabloidised does not promote the consolidation of a democratic culture. Tabloids have no obligations to promote debate on serious issues, as they enjoy “themselves stirring up one-sided prejudices, encouraging half-truths and intolerance among other ills” (Sampson 1996: 48). Such a description fits very well how The Herald, NewsDay and Daily News framed the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from ZANU–PF and government. In light of the undeniably damaging process of the tabloidisation of political news, it would be prudent for the three newspapers to do some self-examination and rededicate themselves to ethical and objective journalism in order to earn respect from readers as the watchdogs of society, distancing themselves from such vested interests as politicians and political parties. There is also a need for The Herald, Daily News and NewsDay to wean themselves from their current polarisation and sensationalisation, as the contemporary challenges are not permanent. Readers will continue to demand objective information in order to be able to make informed decisions in matters such as elections and other important societal matters. Another compelling requirement is to insulate the public media, such as The Herald, from direct control of government ministers by re-­establishing a buffer zone between it and the government if it is to be rescued from the trend towards tabloidisation. This study is not exhaustive in terms of tabloidisation in Zimbabwe, and future research must extend the study to include other media, such as radio and television magazines and even documentaries, since tabloidisation occurs in all forms of journalism (Bek 2004; Conboy 2005; Glynn 2000). Such research would enable a comprehensive understanding of the nature and extent of the tabloidisation of the media in Zimbabwe. Further studies also need to done in terms of how the media can be rescued from the damaging trend towards tabloidisation that is currently manifesting itself in political news reporting.

References Bakkes, P. 1999. Fra varesamfum till informasjonmfunn, Oslo Solum quoted in Pensar A. 2006 Displaying Tabloidisation—An Analysis of Dagens Nyheters Media Coverage on the School Shootings of Dumblane and the School Hostage

270 

W. GADZIKWA

Drama of Beslan, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University Cpaper. Available at www.stasvet.su.se/mediarum/mediaandpolitics2/pdf/cpapers.pensarpdf. Accessed 27 Mar 2015. Barnet, S. 1998. Dumping Down or Reaching Out. In Politics and the Media: Harlots and Prerogatives at the Turn of the Millennium, ed. J. Seaton, 75–90. London: Blackwell. Becker, H.S. 1996. The Epistemology of Qualitative Research. In Ethnography in Human Development: Context and Meaning in Social Inquiry, ed. R.  Jessor, A. Colby, and R.A. Shweder, 53–71. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bek, G. 2004. Research Note: Tabloidisation of News Media: An Analysis of Television News in Turkey. European Journal of Communication 19 (3): 371–387. Bird, S. Elizabeth. 1992. For Inquiring Minds: A Cultural Study of Supermarket Tabloids. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Bird, S.E. 2000. Audience Demands in a Murderous Market: Tabloidisation in the US Television News. In Tabloid Tales: Global Debates over Media Standards, ed. C. Sparks and J. Tulloch. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Blumler, J.G., and M.  Gurevitch. 1995. The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge. Boykoff, M.T. 2008. The Cultural Politics of Climate Change Discourse in the UK Tabloids. Political Geography 27: 544–569. Brookes, R. 2000. Tabloidisation, Media Panics, and Mad Cow Disease. In Tabloid Tales: Global Debates over Media Standards, ed. C.  Sparks and J.  Tulloch, 195–210. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Butler, J. 2009. Frames of War: When Life Is Grievable. London: Verso. Calabrese, A. 2000. Political Space and the Trade in TV News. In Tabloid Tales: Global Debates over Media Standards, ed. C.  Sparks and J.  Tulloch, 43–62. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Caldas-Coulthard, C., and M. Coulthard. 1996. Texts and Practice: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Routledge. Chari, T. 2009. Ethical Challenges Facing Zimbabwean Media in the Context of Internet. Global Media Journal. (African edition) 3 (1): 46–79. Conboy, M. 2005. Tabloid Britain: The Construction of a Community Through Language. London: Routledge. De Vreese, C.H. 2005. Framing Europe, Television News and European Integration. Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers. Entman, R. 1993. Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication 43 (4): 51–58. Esser, F. 1999. Tablodisation of News. European Journal of Communication 14 (3): 291–324. Franklin, B. 1997. Newszak and News Media. London: Arnold.

11  THE TABLOIDIZATION OF POLITICAL NEWS IN ZIMBABWE: END… 

271

Franklin, B., M. Hamer, M. Hanna, M. Kinsey, and J.E. Richardson. 2005. Key Concepts in Journalism Studies. London: Sage. Gamson, W.A., and A. Modigliani. 1989. Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach. American Journal of Sociology 95: 1–37. Gitlin, T. 1980. The Whole World Is Watching. Berkeley: University of California Press. Global Political Agreement (GPA). 2008. Article 19. Harare. Glynn, K. 2000. Tabloid Culture: Trash Taste, Popular Power, and the Transformation of American Television. London: Duke University Press. Goffman, E. 1974. Frame Analysis. New York: Free Press. Harris, N.R. 2006. Tabloidisation in the Modern American Press: A Textual Analysis and Assessment of Newspaper and Tabloid Coverage of the “Runaway Bride” Case. Unpublished MA Thesis, Georgia State University. Information and Media Panel of Inquiry (IMPI). Report on the Official Inquiry into the State of the Information and Media Industry in Zimbabwe, April– December 2014. Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services. Johansson, S. 2007. Reading Tabloids: Tabloid Newspapers and Their Readers. Huddinge: Sodertotom Academic Studies. Johnstone, B. 2008. Discourse Analysis. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. Klein, N. 2000. No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies. London: Flamingo. Landmeier, C., and G.  Daschmann. 2011. The Tabloidization of Supraregional German Quality Newspapers. In Krise der Leuchttürme öffentlicher Kommunikation [A Crisis in the Lighthouses of Public Communication], ed. R. Blum, H. Bonfadelli, K. Imhof, and O. Jarren, 177–191. Mabweazara, H. 2005. Taking the Gap. Rhodes Journalism Review 25: 32. Mano, W. 2005. Press Freedom, Professionalism and Proprietorship: Behind the Zimbabwean Media Divide. In Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Special Issue- November 2005, 56–70. London: University of Westminster. Mayring, P. 2000. Qualitative Content Analysis Forum. Qualitative Social Research 1 (2): 1–10. McLachlan, S., and P.  Golding. 2000. Tabloidisation in the British Press: An Investigation into Changes in British Newspapers 1952–1997. In Tabloid Tales: Global Debates over Media Standards, ed. C.  Sparks and J.  Tulloch, 75–89. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. McNair, B. 1998. The Sociology of Journalism. London: Arnold. ———. 2001. News and Journalism in the UK. London: Routledge. McQuail, D. 1994. Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Media Professionalism and Ethics in Zimbabwe. 2002. A Report Based on the Inquiry Carried Out by the Media Ethics Committee Commissioned by the

272 

W. GADZIKWA

Department of Information and Publicity in the Office of the President and Cabinet of the Republic of Zimbabwe, February 2002. MMPZ. 2002. Media Under Siege: Report on the Media Coverage of the 2002 Presidential and Mayoral Elections in Zimbabwe, Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe, Harare. Olkonen, L., and L.A. Vilma. 2011. Managing Mental Standards with Corporate Citizenship Profiles. Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organisation Studies 16 (1): 13–20. Örnebring, H., and A.M.  Jönsson. 2004. Tabloid Journalism and the Public Sphere: A Historical Perspective on Tabloid Journalism. Journalism Studies 5 (3): 283–295. Raftopoulous, B. 2009. The Crisis in Zimbabwe 1998–2008. In Becoming Zimbabwean: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008, ed. B. Raftopoulous and A.S. Mlambo, 201–232. Harare: Weaver Press. Richardson, J. 2007. Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Sampson, A. 1996. The Crisis at the Heart of our Media. British Journalism Review 7 (3): 42–51. Sandelowski, M. 2000. Focus on Research Methods: Whatever Happened to Qualitative Description? Research in Nursing and Health 23: 334–340. Schonbach, K. 2000. Does Tabloidisation Make German Local Newspapers Successful? In Tabloid Tales: Global Debates over Media Standards, ed. C. Sparks and J. Tulloch, 63–74. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Schudson, M.S. 1995. The Power of News. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sloan, B. 2001. “I Watched a Wild Hog Eat My Baby” – A Colourful History of Tabloids and Their Cultural Impact. Amherst: Prometheus Books. Sparks, C. 2000. The Panic over Tabloid News. In Tabloid Tales: Global Debates over Media Standards, ed. C. Sparks and J. Tulloch, 1–40. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Sparks, C., and J.  Tulloch, eds. 2000. Tabloid Tales: Global Debates over Media Standards. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Tankard, J.W. 2001. The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing. In Framing Public Life, ed. D.S.  Reese, O.H.  Gandy, and A.F.  Grant, 95–106. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum. Thusu, D.K. 2007. News as Entertainment. London: Sage. Turner, G. 2004. Understanding Celebrity. London: Sage. Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe (VMCZ). 2013. The State of Journalism Ethics in Zimbabwe. Harare: VMCZ. Williams, K. 2003. Understanding Media Theory. London: Arnold.

PART IV

Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation Restore Legacy

CHAPTER 12

Primitive Accumulation and Mugabe’s Extroverted Economy: What Now Under the Second Republic? Toendepi Shonhe

Introduction The ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ economic development path exposes the structurally extroverted economy to an intensified dispossession of reproductive capacity by global monopoly capital through financialised primitive capital accumulation. Inviting in speculative monopoly capitalism, if unaccompanied by a conscious attempt to reverse uneven development in the periphery, lends itself to the intensifying of disarticulated economic development. The new ruling class imposed through a military coup is inclined towards promoting global capital interests, thereby perpetuating imperialism and dependency. In alliance with monopoly finance capital, this ruling class will extract substantial profits by intensifying the extraction of natural mineral and agricultural resources in the form of surplus value, royalties, and rents and interest on loans, thereby undermining sovereign accumulation.

T. Shonhe (*) Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Relations, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_12

275

276 

T. SHONHE

By opening Zimbabwe for business, in the guise of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), without a deliberate plan to reverse uneven development, the ruling capitalists have become an extension of global capital, if not captured agents of the latest form of imperialism. Opening Zimbabwe for business transfers surplus value through international trade, unequal exchange and unequal rewards. This chapter reveals how the disarticulated pattern of accumulation configures periphery economies such as Zimbabwe to subsidise capital by exporting wealth, furthering the development of the centre at the expense of the periphery. Mnangagwa’s intentions to open Zimbabwe for business, disadvantaging national interests, is clear. What would an alternative Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) government have meant? Could there have been a different narrative? What economic developments could reverse Zimbabwe’s current economic crisis and allow inclusive economic development? This chapter reveals how Zimbabwe’s future economy may take shape, using a political economy lens. The nexus between politics, policy and economic development trajectories is revealed. The chapter proposes transformative social policies, and inclusive policies in which development counteracts primitive capital accumulation. The end of the Mugabe era on 17 November 2017 gave Zimbabwe an opportunity for a fresh start. The ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ plan signalled a new dawn in which the country’s economy was opened up to international investment, property rights and human rights were observed, and government policy was more consistent—and therefore business confidence was restored. A vital part of this was the need to eradicate illegitimacy from the state through the holding of a free and fair election that was monitored by the international community. This was expected to reverse the militarism epitomised by the 17 November 2017 coup, which gave birth to President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s pseudo-civilian government. Ostensibly, this new dawn expressed a clean break with the repressive Mugabe regime and its associated redistributive policy agenda, which included land and indigenisation laws that forced foreign-owned companies to cede majority ownership to Zimbabweans, and had therefore scared away investors since 2000. The new economic development plan resembled the neo-liberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of 1991, its second phase—the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic Transformation (ZIMPREST) (1996–2000), the Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) I and II, implemented by the Government

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

277

of National Unity (GNU), and the Medium Term Economic Development Plan (2009–2013). The latter policies were marred by power contestation between the MDC formations that were part of the GNU and the Zimbabwe African National Unity–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), as the latter was known to be highly intransigent (Bracking and Cliffe 2009). What does all this mean for Zimbabwe’s economic development plan? How would it impact on different interest groups and the citizenry in general? The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) defines the new development plans as: Opening up of the economy to business is therefore the most sustainable cure for the major challenges the country is facing. Opening Zimbabwe for business means attracting investment, foreign and domestic, that is required to increase production, jobs, fiscal space, exports and eventually the happiness index for Zimbabweans. It moves the economy beyond stabilisation. Opening up the economy also calls for local business to improve on their efficiencies and competitiveness in order to brace for competition from foreign investors. (RBZ 2018, 5)

The chapter relies on documentary and historical data analysis to reveal how primitive accumulation will configure economic development under neo-liberalism, and proposes an inclusive transformative social policy that would be attained through development from below. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: ‘The State and Development in Africa‘ provides the background to the economic development in Africa, while ‘Primitive Accumulation and Renewed Rush for African Resources‘ discusses primitive capital accumulation, the conceptual framework applied in this chapter. ‘Zimbabwe’s Extroverted Economy‘ outlines how Zimbabwe’s disarticulated economy configures trading patterns, detailing how unfair trading patterns undermine domestic economic development. In ‘The National Question, Sovereign Accumulation and Regional Integration‘, it is illustrated how the national question may be resolved through sovereign accumulation and regional integration under introverted economic development. ‘Inclusive Social Development‘ discusses prospects for inclusive economic development through the designing and implementation of a transformative social policy. This section also critiques the MDC policy proposals. ‘Conclusion‘ presents some concluding remarks.

278 

T. SHONHE

The State and Development in Africa (Mis-) Understanding the African State Debate on the state and development in Africa is split between the possibility of a developmental state and its impossibility on the basis of lack of capacity, character or political will by African leaders (Mkandawire 2001a). As a result, and based on the later assumptions, African nations are encouraged to reduce the size of government, privatise their economies, adopt good government practices, democratise and create an environment conducive for investment (ibid). These prescriptions are based on the Golden Straitjacket proposed by Friedman, on which today’s neo-liberal economic orthodoxy is based. This one-size-fit-all prescription stipulates that: a country needs to privatize state-owned enterprises, maintain low inflation, reduce the size of government bureaucracy, balance the budget (if not running a surplus), liberalize trade, deregulate foreign investment, deregulate capital markets, make the currency convertible, reduce corruption and privatize pensions. (Friedman 2000)

For Mkandawire (2001), a combination of pessimism associated with state incapacity and optimism for the possibility of an array of proposed changes is self-contradictory. Indeed, the debate on African states has been on what ought than what is. It has concentrated on some conjunctural circumstances which are treated as if they are structural and intrinsic to African societies, while Africa is treated as homogeneous, leading to the proverbial throwing away of the baby with the bath water (ibid). Eurocentric epistemology characterises African governments as corrupt, inept and unable to foster development (Diamond 1988; Chazan 1994; Chabal 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999). For Cox and Negi (2010, 71), the dominant view is that political institutions are deficient and sub-Saharan Africa is: [a] landscape of weak if not failed states, tribalism and civil war, and a sharp disjuncture between the formal character of whatever democratic institutions exist and how politics is conducted in practice. The result of this, it is claimed, is the material backwardness of sub-Saharan Africa: a failure to develop. These views are extraordinarily rife. They have, in turn, found their way into more academic understandings. The state and its relation to society emerge as the central problem: the argument is that given the state’s weak-

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

279

ness and the vacuity of representative institutions we should not expect anything other than developmental failure.

On the contrary, as Cox and Negi (2010) argue, Africa has weak and undemocratic states because of the failures of capitalist development. These include dispossession of their means of reproduction—including land—leading to their conversion into labour. Moreover, as Mamdani (1996) contends, colonialism created a bifurcated state made up of a privileged white class in the modern centres and a weakened African class in the rural areas. This structural framework perpetuated uneven development and injustice, and drove political instability. The argument as advanced by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992, 29), is that there is a stable correlation between ‘social and economic development and political stability’. These structures undermined Africans and advanced minority European settler accumulation. Under conditions of indirect rule, then, accumulation finds it difficult to establish roots, even though externally owned funding may trigger some limited element of them. The absence of labour and land markets therefore undermines Africans’ accumulation in bifurcated states created by colonialism (Mamdani 1996; Saul and Leys 1999). Moreover, the persistence of tribal land tenure systems, in which chiefs allocate land to married males, preclude private title to land and undermine accumulation (Mamdani 1996). In Zimbabwe, this system persists, and the small-scale resettled land has been added into the communal area belonging to traditional leaders. While the fast-track land reform of 2000 eradicated inequalities in land ownership, land tenure systems remain a subject of policy debate. Chabal and Daloz (1999), and also Cox and Negi (2010, 74), suggest that a narrative dominates in Africa where the absence of representative institutions leads public officials to treat the state as a private resource, resulting in ‘corruption, nepotism, downright fraud and diversion of resources’ intended for the building of state institutions and expected to aid effective development. Mkandawire (2001a) adds that by the 1990s, the African state was being demonised for its ‘weaknesses, its over-­ extension, its interference with the smooth functioning of markets, its repressive character, its dependence on foreign powers, its ubiquity, its absence, etc’. The state had become “the ‘rentier state’, the ‘over-extended state’, the ‘parasitical state’, the ‘predatory state’, the ‘lame Leviathan’, the

280 

T. SHONHE

‘patrimonial state’, the ‘prebendal state’, the ‘crony state’, the ‘kleptocratic state’, the ‘inverted state’, etc”. In the end, lack of development is seen as a consequence of the absence of state institutions capable of driving a developmental agenda. An associated ill is the pervasiveness of patrimonialism, where personal networks with clients established through kinship, communal affiliation and ethnicity are deployed by state officials to maintain legitimacy and power, in return for the distribution of largesse (ibid), incorporating traditional leaders in patrimonial networks (Mamdani 1996). As a result, some writers have concluded that the Asian model, in which economic planners are shielded and given latitude to plan and implement policies, and there is extended coordination of economic policies, is beyond the scope of African governments (Lewis and Stein 1997). All this is contrasted with a developmental state that is undergirded by an ideology that is developmentalist, focusing on achieving high rates of accumulation and industrialisation (Mkandawire 2001). As opposed to a ‘soft state’ (Myrdal 1967, 1118), a developmental state ought to be a ‘strong state’ capable of delivering an ‘ideological hegemony’ that derives its legitimacy from its ability to promote sustainable development, economic growth and structural change in the productive system at domestic and global level (Mkandawire 2001). The challenge with defining developmental states based on their performance is that some countries may be affected by exogenous factors that they may be unable to resist, leading either to stagnation or to regression. The world systems theory explains how the developed nations have tended to configure developing nations in fashions intended to resolve their own crises (de Janvry 1981). This has been a source of opposition to state intervention in favour of market-­ driven development. As Mkandawire (2010) explains, the general attitude towards African governments has many angles and explanations. First, ideologically, neo-­ liberalism came to prominence on the back of the rise of neo-conservative movements in many developed countries. It was later adopted by funding institutions and donor countries. Secondly, globalisation has forced structural changes by countries to ensure that market forces are at the centre of planning, forcing governments to retreat from market intervention. Thirdly, this coincided with changes in attitudes towards so-called Third World countries, which combined to lend credence to the vision of government failure in the periphery. At a number of crucial moments,

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

281

Zimbabwe has appeared unsure of which ideological orientation is driving the developmental project. Critiquing Zimbabwe’s Economic Development Trajectory As Masaka (2013) observes, to describe Zimbabwe’s economy as socialist in the 1980s or a free market in the 1990s is to offer a false dichotomy. Economic planning has swung back and forth between intervention and free market, but there has ‘always been a mix of the two in practice’. Politics has also been of influence (Sachikonye 2002) in defining the utility of economic development strategies (Masaka 2013). At independence, in 1980, Zimbabwe maintained a planned economy that had been introduced by the Ian Smith government after the imposition of sanctions and the subsequent Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, targeting inclusion of the Black majority. Whereas a nationalist/social-welfarist policy framework was adopted (Muzondidya (2009) in the first decade, those that followed consisted mainly of free-market policies. As Masaka (2013) argues, the welfarist policy resulted in a better economic performance and improved the standard of living of ordinary people when compared with the later free-market policies of the 1990s. Free-market policies implemented from 1991 included ESAP, in which reforms included ‘liberalisation of the economy and privatisation of government-­controlled or owned companies’ (Masaka 2013, 319), with catastrophic consequences on the economy (Sachikonye 2002). Despite a high performance between 1991 and 1996, possibly resulting from pre-1991 economic policies, the effects of a series of counterproductive and damaging policies under ZIMPREST, which took over from ESAP, resulted in some negative effects, including ‘continuous currency devaluation, wage declines, massive retrenchments, rising rates of unemployment, and widespread deindustrialization’ (Masaka 2013, 321). An attempt to return to centralised economic planning after 1997 was half-hearted. Moreover, as Moyo and Yeros (2007), reveal, the land reform included tenacious efforts towards radicalisation yet was compromised by allowing capital space and therefore allowing some land to remain in the hands of international and domestic capital. Heterodox economic planning from 2005 to 2018 resulted in a mixture of redistributive and indigenisation policies on one hand and the acceptance of neo-liberalism on the other. The introduction of STERP under the reconstruction and neo-liberal reform agenda had positive economic growth outcomes,

282 

T. SHONHE

but this was supported by political stability under the GNU.  Thus, the wider context of the post-coup ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ introduced after November 2017 must be brought to bear if its implications are to be understood. Arguably, there were three epochs of imperialist penetration in Africa. As Harvey (2005) explains, the first (1875–1945) was the period referred to as ‘the rise of bourgeois imperialism’, characterised by monopoly capitalism and the outflow of capital as the developed nations opened up the interior of Africa through trade, infrastructural development, and creating mines and manufacturing centres. The period was characterised by plunder and violence, which was aimed at subjugating Africans into circuits of exchange that were dominated by capital from the centre (Kemp 1967). The second phase, from the end of the Second World War, steered the continent towards a new era of rising African nationalism and a shift of the centre from Britain to the United States of America (Zack-Williams 2013). The third phase, from the late 1970s until the 1990s, saw the triumph of neo-liberalism and the implementation of institutionalised Structural Adjustment Programmes in all African countries (ibid). For Zimbabwe, despite opposition by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, ESAP was introduced in 1991, bringing with it a raft of economic policy revisions that limited government involvement in various economic activities (Stoneman 1981). By 2015, neo-liberalism is epitomised by the export of finance capital (Amin 2015) and globalised capital flows. The development of the African states did not reverse the tide of imperialism and its interference in African domestic affairs (Zack-Williams 2013). Even though the American military was unchallenged, China established economic interests, characterised in Africa by a lack of concern for human rights abuses (ibid). For many African leaders, this presented an alternative to democratic procedures that accompanied aid and trade from the West. However, as Mkandawire (2001) posits, the failure of structural adjustment programmes compels us to revisit the efficacy of neo-liberalism in Africa, with the Bretton Woods institutions recognising the importance of state intervention and resource distribution beyond ensuring the existence of a conducive business investment environment. Efforts towards nation-building and development in Zimbabwe have not been able to eliminate some of the vices constructed by colonialism. Indeed, the leaders have held on to some of them and developed a post-colonial ideology from the ashes of colonial ideology to advance their personal interests (Ekeh 1975).

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

283

Arguably, there cannot be a one size fits all solution. As Ha-Joon Chang (2007) observes, Japan would not have developed into a motor industry powerhouse had government intervention been shunned. The government kicked out General Motors and Ford in 1939 and directed the Bank of Japan to bail out Toyota in 1949 (ibid). Today, Japanese motor cars are commonplace and a preferred brand in many parts of the world. Moreover, some theorists have concluded that post-Second World War development approaches have failed to work in Africa. For instance, Matthews (2004), agreeing with N’Dione (1994), suggests that these must be rejected because they do not take African cultural values and perspectives into account. As N’Dione et  al. (1997) observe, these assumptions are not universal. As a result, ‘the poor remain poor, inequities persist and grow more stark, and aspirations to a better future remain, for the most part, only aspirations’ Matthews (2004, 382). Berg (2007, 541) also suggests that viewing Africa’s development from the ‘Western window’ renders analysis distorted and flimsy because it lacks cultural relativism, ‘greatly simplifies and mis-represents the diverse cultures and histories of the continent’. Moreover, Berg (ibid), 552) posits that ‘Development, in some cases, acts as the avenue for capitalist exploitation and neo-imperialist motives’, as the next section discusses.

Primitive Accumulation and Renewed Rush for African Resources Zimbabwe’s development plan after the November 2017 military coup and the pronouncement of the ‘Open for Business’ policy, is best understood from the dialectical and historical materialism perspective. Such an approach allows us to bring into play social science, power relations, gender, generational differences and ecology, exploitation, racism, sexism, militarism and imperialism (de Janvry 1981). Contradictions between the centre and the periphery resulting from capitalism’s failure to self-sustain create the need for a continual expansion of the sphere of circulation, through the incorporation of pre-capitalist areas in search of cheap labour and cheap raw materials (Marx 1977). This is a consequence of the heterogeneity of the world economic system, where capital accumulation in the periphery is configured to resolve the crises of the centre and manifests in the dialectic between production and circulation (de Janvry 1981).

284 

T. SHONHE

Primitive capitalism is, as Arendt (1968, 28) puts it, ‘the original sin of simple robbery’. It is carried out in two main forms: on one hand, at the production site—through the exploitation of labour that is paid below a level sufficient for labour’s social reproduction (Moyo et al. 2012)—and through commodity marketing through mispricing and under-invoicing. For Moyo et al. (2012, 185), the developed countries exploit the peripheries ‘either directly or indirectly, the net effect being a systematic transfer of surplus value, far beyond the initial investment’ through the ‘repatriation of profits, interest payments, and dividends, monopoly rents, as well as unequal exchange’. Amin (2011, 52) therefore concludes that, in the main, primitive accumulation habitually finances the rich, while the poor majority carry the burden, even though the former solely benefit, as ‘It continues today’. The scramble for African resources is 1884 in full swing and is characterised by concentration and centralisation of capital in the centre, but this originated in the 1890s by way of dispossession of the means of reproduction. The 2016 Want to Want report (2016), The New Colonialism, observes that: The continent of Africa is today facing a new colonial invasion, no less devastating in scale and impact than that which it suffered during the nineteenth century. As before, the new colonialism is driven by a determination to plunder the natural resources of Africa, especially its strategic energy and mineral resources.

In this phase, all facets of production are controlled at the centre through finance capital. In agriculture, this is achieved through the extension of credit, contract farming and joint ventures channelled through international finance. As Amin (2015) observes, input financing characterises the upstream while global commodity chains characterise the downstream of the international finance circuits. Land is grabbed for capitalist investment, alienating Africans and converting them into workers, constituting the recolonisation of Africa. This has been observed by scholars to lie at the heart of imperialist practices, and therefore to underline the need to create a counterbalance; the objective of this is to create an alternative globalisation movement (Luxemburg 1968). The Analytical Report of the Land Matrix II (2016) reveals that of the 1004 ‘land deals’ that had been signed, 422, covering an area of 10 million hectares, were in Africa. Of these, 32% were in agro-fuels, compared with 45% of those in Europe and 50% of those in the Americas, and 39% were in food crops. Land Matrix (2018) data shows that

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

285

since 2008 a total of 352,677 hectares had been contracted out under lease agreements between the government of Zimbabwe and some newly settled A2 (medium-scale) farmers on one hand and some Chinese, Mauritius, Germany, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Russian nationals and transnational corporates on the other hand. Table 12.1 shows the nature of land grabs since 2008. Under the ‘Open for Business’ mantra, the Zimbabwean President has offered land for the construction of a golf course to the United States President, Donald Trump (Report Focus News 2018). This is illustrative of the reversal of land reform and a confirmation of how international capital continues to grab resources in Africa. In mining, unequal trade is also common. Unfair pricing is used to siphon surplus value to the metropoles, where the mining companies are headquartered. The 2016 Want to Want report reveals that 101 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange have mining operations in 37 sub-Saharan African countries and control over US$1 trillion worth of African natural resources. These companies are mostly involved in gold, platinum, diamonds, copper, oil, gas and coal, whose extraction has seen Britain aiding and abetting the extraction of US$192 billion from Africa as surplus value, through tax evasion, illicit financial flows and the unaccounted cost of adapting to climate change (Hilary 2016). In Zimbabwe, the companies include Anglo American, Caledonia Mining, Mwana Africa Plc, Vast Resources, Sable Mining Africa Ltd, Premier Africa Minerals Ltd and Aquarius Platinum Ltd. Chinese companies, such as the Anjin diamond mining company, have also been involved in diamonds, while others have been engaged in gold and platinum mining. Zimbabwe exports stood at US$2.7 billion in 2016, and its top exports were gold (US$896 million), raw tobacco (US$383  million) and diamonds (US$206  million), most of which were destined for South Africa. These natural resources are mainly exported in raw form and are semi-processed in South Africa before being exported to developed countries. The mining sector also experienced conspiratorial and fraudulent accumulation by a capitalist class comprising some mining companies, public officials and bureaucrats, who connived to line their pockets using revenue from the sale of minerals (TMALI forthcoming). Bracking and Sharife (2014) established that besides conventional corruption carried out by politicians, mispricing by corporates involved in mining and the export of minerals has been responsible for the siphoning of national wealth to developed countries, such as the United States of America, Switzerland, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Illicit financial flows commonly

[2013] Concluded [2013] In (contract signed) operation (production) Concluded Start-up phase (contract signed) (no production)

Mauritius, Zimbabwe

China, Zimbabwe China, Zimbabwe

China

[2012] Concluded [2010] In (contract signed) operation (production)

[2013] Concluded [2014] In (contract signed) operation (production) [2011] Concluded In operation (contract signed) (production) [2014] Concluded (contract signed)

Source: Extracted from Land Matrix, 2018

Amatheon Agri Holding N.V., Zimbabwean Farmers (5) Anhui State Farms Group, Ministry of Defence Hubei Province Lianfeng Overseas Agriculture Development Co., Ltd (Hubei Lianfeng), Lianhua company Anhui Tianrui Environmental Technology Co. Ltd Sunbird Bioenergy Africa Limited, Government of Zimbabwe Total

Implementation status

[2008] Concluded [2008] In (contract signed) operation (production)

Negotiation status

Germany, Zimbabwe

United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, Zimbabwe South Africa, Zimbabwe

Dubai World Africa Services, Renaissance Group, Charles Davy

Afrifresh, Smallholders

Investor country

Investor name

Table 12.1  Land grabs in Zimbabwe Nature of the deal

352,677

40,000 Lease/ concession

3228 Lease/ concession

10,000 Lease/ concession 685 Lease/ concession

900 Lease/ concession

7864 Lease/ concession

290,000 Outright purchase

Contract size

Food crops, non-food agricultural commodities corn (maize), tobacco Cassava (maniok)

Corn (maize), soya beans, wheat Livestock, non-food agricultural commodities tobacco

Livestock and corn (maize), fruit, peas, pepper, potatoes, apple, seed production, soya beans, tea, tomatoes, vegetables, banana Corn (maize), grains, soya beans, wheat

Tourism

Intention/crop

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

287

take place through tax avoidance, tax evasion, trade invoicing, transfer pricing and trade-based money laundering (the African Union High Level Panel), as well as the unofficial repatriation of funds to the mother country or offshore accounts. The Global Financial Integrity group estimates that Zimbabwe has lost about US$12 billion from 1993 to 2013 to illicit financial flows, while other losses were also experienced in wildlife, fisheries and timber (TMALI forthcoming). In the absence of concerted efforts towards curbing illicit flows, the ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ paradigm is a mere extension of imperialism that fast-tracks the transfer of commodities and surplus value to the centre. It leads to extroverted economies that are structured to service the needs of the external world, something to which we turn to in the next section.

Zimbabwe’s Extroverted Economy At the global commodity exchange level, surplus value is transferred to the centre through loans, unequal exchange in trade and unfair pricing, triggering the development of disarticulated economies in the periphery (de Janvry 1981). There is a tendency by the centre to manipulate international commodity prices, relying on unequal trade and non-equivalent exchange. As Ha-Joon Chang (2007, 281) remarks: While they were imposing free trade on weaker nations through colonialism and unequal treaties, rich countries maintained rather high tariffs, especially industrial tariffs, for themselves.

The developed countries take advantage of material discrepancies between production and market prices and the unequal rewards for rendered labour with the different productivity levels inherent in the ultimately traded commodities. Under contract farming, for instance, the production and commodity circulation processes are captured by international corporates who occupy the commodity value chains. The production and circulation of raw tobacco mainly produced by smallholder farmers, making up 14% of total exports for Zimbabwe, second only to gold (32%), serves to illustrate how the input and output markets are captured by monopoly capital. Arguably, the input market is captured through the provision of contract farming, which includes farming inputs and labour costs at a premium, directing the farming system, packaging and delivery of the tobacco to the contract auction floors and its pricing.

288 

T. SHONHE

For instance, of the 188.9 million kg of tobacco delivered to the auction floors in 2017, 157 million kg (84%) were sold under contract farming, at an average price of US$2.98/kg (TIMB 2018). Chinese markets accounted for 33%, Far East (48%), Africa (21%) and European Union (17%) of the exported value of US$904.4 million, averaging US$4.96/kg (ibid). The tobacco pricing structure is configured to ensure that a meagre US$2.98/kg is transferred to the farmer, whereas, after a process that cost +/−US$0.40c, the semi-processed commodity is exported at double the price (US$4.96/kg) (MN interview 2017). Moreover, the price of the processed and packaged tobacco cigarettes rises to +/−US$60/kg, with some brands imported back into Zimbabwe as finished products. In the mining sector, much of the processing of diamonds and platinum happens in South Africa, while it is exported as raw ore from Zimbabwe. Under neo-­liberalism, Zimbabwe will not achieve substantial development of its home market, thereby perpetuating a disarticulated economy in which the country exports its produce and consumes imports that are secured at far higher prices (see Shivji 2009), thus resulting in trade deficiencies—as shown in Fig. 12.1. From 2007, the country’s imports were more than its exports, thereby weakening its capacity to fund its external obligations in terms of foreign currency supply, a situation that worsened with the introduction of a surrogate bond introduced on 28 November 2016. The RBZ (2018) monetary statement for the first quarter observed that the current account and the overall balance of payment have been in deficit for the

Fig. 12.1  Zimbabwe trade 1995–2016. Notes: Imports, exports. (Source: Simoes 2018)

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

289

2625 1313

0 –1313 –2625 –3938

2009

2010

Current Account

2011

2012

Capital Account

2013

2014

2015 2016

Financial Account

2017

Overall Balance

Fig. 12.2  Balance of payments developments: 2009–2017. (Source: RBZ 2018)

period 2009–2017, as shown in Fig. 12.2. An all-time overall balance of payment deficit of −US$1313 billion was reached in 2017. In 2017, Zimbabwe’s export earnings stood at US$3519.7 billion against an import bill of US$4.81 billion. Imports mainly consist of refined petroleum accounting for US$735.9 million (15%), consumption goods for US$1055.9 billion (22%), capital goods for US$802.6 million (17%) and merchant imports for US$2641.9 billion (55%), including packaged medicaments (RBZ 2018). These commodities are mainly for consumption, yet the country exports raw materials for processing to other countries. No wonder unemployment has become endemic. As Fig. 12.3 shows, Zimbabwe imports more gold than it exports, even though it is the most exported commodity for the country. As a result of this extroverted trading imbalance, the economy can neither create jobs in the home market nor generate demand for locally produced goods. There exist no forward and backwards linkages associated with value addition that can generate sovereign accumulation.

T. SHONHE 700000000

700000000

600000000

600000000 500000000

500000000

400000000

400000000

300000000

300000000

200000000

200000000

100000000

100000000 0 2000

Trade Value (Imp) US$

Trade Value (Exp) US$

290 

0 2002

2004

2006

2008

Zim Exp

2010

2012

2014

2016

-1E+08 2018

Imp from Zim

Fig. 12.3  Diamond exports and imports from partners for Zimbabwe, 2000–2016. (Source: Various Sources, Adopted from TMALI, UN COMTRADE)

The National Question, Sovereign Accumulation and Regional Integration There is an outstanding agenda of nationalism, involving the forces of imperialism, neo-colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013) and rampaging primitive capital accumulation through the capital’s latest weapon, which involves export monopoly finance (Moyo et al. 2012). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) maintains that the national question involves the challenges around nation-building, creation of state institutions, poverty alleviation and decreasing unemployment. For Moyo (2007) the land question, a critical dimension of the agrarian question, and national development are central to the resolution of the national question. Developing an egalitarian society at home and pan-African unity at continental level is therefore critical for the advancement of the national project and the African national question (Nkrumah (1965). As the Ghanaian socialist path pushed by Nkwame Nkrumah revealed, predicting such reforms for an economy that is not self-sufficient is faulty. There is need for sovereign accumulation in which national development is driven from below, relying on African resources. The 2017 Global Financial Integrity report revealed that illicit flows over the period 2005–2014 stood at US$2 trillion. Fraudulent transfer of resources from Africa undermines the continent’s capacity to develop the home economy. Combined with the disarticulated structural issues emanating from unfair exchange, the lack of an African integration in economic development, including trade, potential economic development is

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

291

Fig. 12.4  Interconnectedness of Africa’s Regional Economic Blocks. Notes (Abbreviations): AMU, Arab Maghreb Union; CEMAC, Central African Economic and Monetary Community; CMA, Common Monetary Area; CEN-SAD, Community of Sahelo-Saharan States; CEPGL, Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries; IOC, Indian Ocean Commission; IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on Development; MRU, Mano River Union; SACU, Southern African Customs Union; WAEMU, West African Economic and Monetary Union; WAMZ, West African Monetary Zone. * Members of CEN-SAD. (Source: Ncube and Mokoti (2019), figure updated from UNESC (2009), Economic Development in Africa 2009: Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Development. United Nations publication. Sales No. E.09.II.D.7. New York and Geneva)

undermined. As shown in Fig.  12.4, for Zimbabwe, while some fragmented platforms exist, the country’s economic trade is mainly linked to the Common Market for East and Southern Africa and the Southern Africa Development Committee. The same applies to Malawi and Zambia. This tends to limit the benefits from inter-Africa trade and therefore perpetuates the country’s extroverted trading, benefiting developed countries. Africa’s sovereign accumulation positioning will trickle down to Zimbabwe’s own progress. The ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ approach is misinformed and lacks ideological clarity, and as such is the epitome of

292 

T. SHONHE

the anti-nationalism emphasised by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013). As Ha-Joon Chang (2007, 282) observes, while the developed countries pursued globalisation policies from the 1950s and there is a claim that developing countries lagged behind, This story misrepresents the process of globalization among the rich countries during this period. These countries did significantly lower their tariff barriers between the 1950s and the 1970s. But during this period, they also used many other nationalistic policies to promote their own economic development – subsidies (especially for research and development, or R&D), state-owned enterprises, government direction of banking credits, capital controls and so on. When they started implementing neo-liberal programmes, their growth decelerated. In the 1960s and the 1970s, per capita income in the rich countries grew by 3.2% a year, but its growth rate fell substantially to 2.1% in the next two decades.

To this extend, the ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ plan, consolidates rather than resolves the national question, itself the basis of the liberation struggle (Moyo and Yeros 2007). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 52) concludes that: The attempts by African leaders to implement their individual national projects reveal poor conceptualisation, preference for top-down and authoritarian approaches within postcolonial states that were not fully decolonised and indigenised. The acceptance of the Westphalian template for the postcolonial state reinforced continued subjection of Africans to Euro-American global imperial designs including using the same institutions they deployed to colonise Africa. What is needed, are African institutions anchored on African histories, cultures and values that are not alienating to the African majority.

The ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ development plan is therefore ideologically bankrupt, poorly conceptualised and negates the objectives of the liberation struggle born out of the national question and the national project. Neo-liberalism and its vices undermine sovereign accumulation, while the workings of international capital at a global scale capture commodity circuits in a fashion that exports surplus value to the developed centres, on a magnitude that only regional integration is capable of reversing. This is achieved by, as Gumede (2018, 3) proposes, radical ‘delinking from the global system’ and ‘resistance against

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

293

imperial forces and ideologies’. This means that development in Zimbabwe must be inclusive and from below.

Inclusive Social Development Engendering inclusive development in national development is central to sovereign accumulation and the resolution of the national question. Mkandawire (2001) proposes that Africa must rely on a transformative social policy to fulfil the nation-building project. Transformative social policy is grounded in ‘the norms of equality and social solidarity…. these norms serves many functions: production, protection, reproduction, redistribution and social cohesion or nation building’ Adesina (2009). For Mkandawire (2001), and Gumede (2018), a transformative social policy aimed at fostering production, redistributive and protective roles is vital for national development. Gumede (2018) also agrees with Adesina (2009) that a transformative social policy involves the improvement of human wellbeing and the transformation of social institutions, social relations and the economy. As such, there is a need to link social policies to economic policies, acknowledging the role of politics, shifting power relations, differentiated access to resources and ideological orientation in economic development issues (Gumede 2008; Mkandawire 2001). Transformative social policy ought to touch on the social and national questions and citizen participation, and therefore bring about inclusive development (Gumede 2018). In this regard, ideology and structure are central to the establishment of a developmental state (ibid). In peripheral disarticulated economies such as Zimbabwe (Shonhe 2018), achievement of inclusive transformative development requires the implementation of a transformative social policy where citizen participation is prioritised. Extroverted trading of primary commodities from mining and agricultural activities, a common feature in African economies, undermines possibilities for inclusive development. Zimbabwe’s ‘Open for Business’ plan is devoid of a transformative social plan, and has therefore been captured by the elite, being designed to consolidate unfair trading, unfair treaties and the export of jobs to the centre. Gumede (2018, 124) observes: Most discourses on development have been framed around getting Africa to be formed in the image of the West, both economically, politically and socially. Economically, the various economic policies that have been adopted since independence have largely reflected the version of development that

294 

T. SHONHE

the West prescribes either directly or through international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

By playing to the whims of international capital for the purpose of attracting FDI, the Zimbabwean government falls squarely into the trap of a vicious circle of primitive accumulation orchestrated through the workings of finance capital. Gumede (2018) identifies a lack of progress in the unification of Africa and the persistence of African leaders’ externally oriented and subservient attitudes towards Western dictates, and suggests that imperial powers and designs are assisted by the manner in which their thoughts remain caged by Eurocentrism. Zimbabwe’s developmental prospects are also complicated by the absence of an alternative economic development narrative from social and opposition movements. For instance, the MDC policy proposals have more points of similarity with than differences from those of the ruling ZANU–PF, as both have neo-­ liberal inclinations.

Conclusion The introduction of ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ combined with the erasure of redistributive policies negatively affects the resolution of the national question and the implementation of an inclusive and transformative social economic development policy. The government’s quest to attract FDI has the effect of propelling primitive capital accumulation, undermining the home economy and sovereign accumulation. The export of raw commodities by extroverted economies has the effect of exporting job opportunities to developed economies and therefore undermines inclusive development. Extroverted natural resource extraction also attracts environmental damage and expunges possibilities for sustainable development. Zimbabwe needs a radical transformative inclusive social policy to be designed and implemented. African leaders continue to be guided by Western ideology in policy-­ making. Yet such an ideology is intended to advance neo-colonialism and to configure capitalist production in order to help resolve over-/under-­ accumulation in the centre. More recently, Western countries have increased their investment pledges into Africa, with China announcing a US$60 billion financial support package for the continent. Fortunately, many of these countries show reluctance in extending financial assistance to Zimbabwe on the basis of past performance, notwithstanding the

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

295

Mnangagwa-led government’s relentless effort towards international capital. These investment initiatives should be assessed from the point of view of primitive capital accumulation, in which cheap labour, cheap raw materials and surplus value are exported to world’s developed centres. The question that remains unanswered is whether African leaders are aware of the potential negative effect of exposing their economies to primitive accumulation and international capitalism, and are willingly participating, or whether they are acting out of ignorance, guided by Western ideology.

References Adesina, J.O. 2009. Social Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Glance in the Rear-­ View Mirror. International Journal of Social Welfare 18: S37–S51. Adesina, J.O., 2010. Rethinking the social protection paradigm: Social policy in Africa’s development. Promoting Resilience through Social Protection in SubSaharan Africa’. Dakar, Senegal, pp.28–30. ———. 2015. Return to a Wider Vision of Social Policy: Rereading Theory and History. South African Review of Sociology 46 (3): 99–119. African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity May 2013. Illicit Financial Flows and the Problem of Net Resource Transfers from Africa: 1980-2009. Joint report of African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity. Center for International Policy, Washington, DC, USA Amin, S. 2002. Africa Living on the Fringe. Monthly Review 53: 41–50. ———. 2011. National States: Which Way Forward? In Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America, ed. S. Moyo and P. Yeros, 325–344. London/New York: Pluto Press. ———. 2015. Contemporary Imperialism Monthly Review 67 (3): 23–36. New York. Arendt, H. 1968. The origins of totalitarianism: Imperialism (Vol. 2). New York, USA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Berg, E. 2007. Post-Development Theory in Africa. Peace Review 19 (4): 541–554. Bracking, S., and L. Cliffe. 2009. Plans for a Zimbabwe Aid Package: Blueprint for Recovery or Shock Therapy Prescription for Liberalization? Review of African Political Economy 36 (119): 103–113. Bracking, S., and K.  Sharife. 2014. Rough and Polished: A Case Study of the Diamond Pricing and Valuation System. Leverhulme Centre for the Study of Value Working Paper Series. Chabal, P. 1998. A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa. International Affairs 74 (2): 289–304. Chabal, P., and J.-P. Daloz. 1999. Africa Works. Oxford: James Currey. Chang, H.J. 2007. Bad samaritans: Rich nations, poor policies, and the threat to the developing world (p. 16). New York: Random House Business.

296 

T. SHONHE

Chazan, N. 1994. Engaging the State: Associational Life in Sub-Saharan Africa. In State Power and Social Forces, ed. J. Migdal, A. Kohli, and V. Shue, 255–292. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cox, K.R., and R. Negi. 2010. The State and the Question of Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Review of African Political Economy 37 (123): 71–85. de Janvry, A. 1981. The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Diamond, L. 1988. Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope. In Democracy in Developing Countries. Vol. 2: Africa, ed. L. Diamond, J. Linz, and S.M. Lipset. London: Adamantine. Ekeh, P.P. 1975. Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement. Comparative Studies in Society and History 17 (1): 91–112. Friedman, T. 2000. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York: Random House. Gray, A.M., and D. Birrell. 2013. Transforming adult social care. Policy Press. The University of Chicago Press Books, USA. Gumede, V. 2008. Public Policy Making in a Post-Apartheid South Africa—A Preliminary Perspective. Africanus. Journal of Development Studies 38 (2): 7–23. Gumede, V. 2018. Illicit Financial Flows in Southern Africa: Exploring Implications for SocioEconomic Development. Vusi Gumede Academy and Research. https:// www.vusigumede.com/content/VUSIGUMEDE%202018/papers/IFFs%20 in%20Southern%20Africa%20-%20draft%20paper.pdf Hardt, M., and A. Negri. 2000. Empire: The New World Order. Cambridge MA: Empire Harvard University Press. Harvey, D. 2005. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hilary, J. 2016. The New Colonialism. Britain’s Scramble for Africa’s Energy and Mineral Resources. War on Want, London, United Kingdom. https://waronwant.org/sites/default/files/TheNewColonialism.pdf Kemp, T. 1967. Theories of Imperialism. London: Dennis Dobson. Lewis, P., and H.  Stein. 1997. Shifting Fortunes: The Political Economy of Financial Liberalisation in Nigeria. World Development 25 (1): 5–22. Luxemburg, R. 1968. The Accumulation of Capital. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Marx, K., 1976. Preface and Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Foreign Languages Press. ———. 1977. Theory of Revolution. Vol. 1. trans Monthly Review Press. Masaka, D. 2013. Pitting Market Economy Against Planned Economy: A False Dichotomy in Zimbabwe (1980–2011). Journal of Black Studies 44 (3): 314–329. Matthews, S. 2004. Post-Development Theory and the Question of Alternatives: A View from Africa. Third World Quarterly 25 (2): 373–384.

12  PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND MUGABE’S EXTROVERTED ECONOMY… 

297

Mkandawire, T. 2001a. Thinking About Developmental States in Africa. Cambridge Journal of Economics 25 (3): 289–313. ———. 2001b Social Policy and Development Programme. Paper Number 7. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. ———. 2010. On tax efforts and colonial heritage in Africa. The Journal of Development Studies 46 (10): 1647–1669. Moyo, S. 2007. Land in the Political Economy of African Development. Alternative Strategies for Reform. Africa Development XXXII (4): 1–34. © Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2007 (ISSN 0850-3907). Moyo, S., and P.  Yeros. 2007. The Radicalised State: Zimbabwe’s Interrupted Revolution. Review of African Political Economy 111: 103–121. Moyo, S., P.  Jha, and P.  Yeros. 2012. Imperialism and Primitive Accumulation: Notes on the New Scramble for Africa. Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy 1 (2): 181–203. Muzondidya, J. 2009. From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980–1997. In Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008, ed. B. Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo, 167–200. Harare: Weaver Press. Myrdal, G. 1967. The soft state in underdeveloped countries. Ucla L. Rev., 15, p. 1118. N’Dione, E.S. 1994. Re’inventer le pre’sent. Quelques jalons pour l’action. Dakar: ENDA/GRAF Sahel. N’Dione, E.S., P.  De Leener, J.  Perier, M.  Ndiaye, and P.  Jacolin. 1997. Reinventing the Present: The Chodak Experience in Senegal. In The Post-­ Development Reader, ed. M. Rahnema and V. Bawntree, 364–376. Cape Town: David Philip. Ncube, G., and T. Mokoti. 2019. Regional Economic Integration and Capital Flows in the SADC Region. The Research Bulletin 32 (1). Research and Financial Stability Department, Bank of Botswana. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2013. Revisiting the National Question and Rethinking the Political Plan of Africa in the 21st Century. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies  – Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity 8 (2): 32–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/18186874.2013.861100. Nkrumah, K. 1965. Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons. Report Focus News. 2018. Emmerson Mnangagwa Offers Donald Trump Victoria Falls Golf Course. https://reportfocusnews.com/2018/09/25/emmersonmnangagwa-offers-donald-trump-victoria-falls-golf-course/. Accessed 26 Sept 2018. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2018. Monetary Policy Statement. Enhancing Financial Stability to Promote Business Confidence.

298 

T. SHONHE

Rueschemeyer, D., E.H. Stephens, and J.D. Stephens. 1992. Capitalist development and democracy. Cambridge: Polity. Sachikonye, L.M. 2002. Whither Zimbabwe? Crisis & Democratisation. Review of African Political Economy 29 (91): 13–20. Saul, J.S., and C. Leys. 1999. Sub-Saharan Africa in Global Capitalism. Monthly Review 51 (3): 13–30. Shivji, I.G. 2009. Accumulation in an African Periphery. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd. Shonhe, T. 2018. Reconfigured Agrarian change in Zimbabwe. Langaa Research & Publishing Common Initiative Group. Simoes, A.J.G. 2018. The Observatory of Economic Complexity. https://atlas. media.mit.edu/en/visualize/line/hs92/show/zwe/all/all/1995.2016/. Accessed 27 Sept 2018. Stoneman, C. 1981. Zimbabwe’s Inheritance. Vol. 1. London: Macmillan. Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI) (forthcoming). Illicit Financial Flows in Southern Africa, The Case of the Mining Sector. TIMB. 2018. Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board Annual Report for 2017. United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESC). 2009. Africa Review Report on Mining. Economic Commission for Africa. Sixth Session, October. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Zack-Williams, A. 2013. Neo-imperialism and African Development. Review of African Political Economy 40 (136): 179–184.

CHAPTER 13

The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe Sylvester Marumahoko and Tinashe C. Chigwata

Introduction Zimbabwe has gone through deep political, economic and social challenges for close to three decades. Once known as the shining light of Africa, Zimbabwe is now often known for dominating international headlines for the wrong reasons. In November 2017, the country experienced a radical change to the constitutional and political order, which brought an end to former President Robert Mugabe’s 37-year reign. Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was once Mugabe’s right-hand man, assumed leadership of both the country and the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). He was reelected in the July 2018 harmonised elections, although under disputed circumstances. The removal of Robert Mugabe has provided the country an opportunity to

S. Marumahoko (*) School of Post Graduate Studies (Research and Innovation), University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, South Africa T. C. Chigwata Dullah Omar Institute for Constitutional Law, Governance and Human Rights, University of the Western Cape, Bellville, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_13

299

300 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

break from the past, and hopes have been raised for the birth of a new Zimbabwe. This chapter explores some of the measures that the administration post-Mugabe should implement to set the country on a new path. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is not to argue for a particular political formation or political leaders to govern. Rather, its objective is to explore whether the idea of a new Zimbabwe is possible and what it would take to realise this objective. Before discussing the prospects for this desired state of affairs, it is important to examine the current situation, which is explored in the first part of the chapter. A brief overview of the fall of Mugabe and rise of Mnangagwa is then provided to show how a leader who commanded respect beyond the shores of our continent could exit in such an undignified manner. The core section is dedicated to a discussion of the prospects for a new Zimbabwe, and concluding remarks end the chapter.

The Zimbabwean ‘Problem’ The Zimbabwean problem is multifaceted, including economics, governance, politics and humanitarian issues (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 124). The problem is attributed to different sources, depending on where one is sitting or whose interests one serves. The colonial legacy, including the authoritarian colonial state and its institutions, as well as its policies, which significantly damaged the well-being of the black population, is often cited as one of the sources of this problem (Muzondidya 2009: 167–168). Raftopoulos (2009: 201) attributes the Zimbabwean problem partially to the political legacies of African nationalist politics. Imperialism, including the restrictive measures (perceived by some as sanctions) imposed on Zimbabwe by western countries, is often cited by the ruling party and its sympathisers as the major source of the problem (Government of Zimbabwe 2013: 8). On the other hand, another group, largely constituted by the opposition, some western countries, a section of civic society and some scholars, attributes the Zimbabwean crisis to the ruling elite in ZANU–PF. They often cite bad policies, corruption and economic mismanagement by ZANU–PF as some of the major causes. Putting this blame game aside, it is clear that the Zimbabwean problem is the outcome of a variety of factors. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 100) argues that the contribution of the ruling elite to the problem should not be ignored. What was its contribution to the Zimbabwe problem and how did the problem evolve?

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

301

Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980 after a protracted armed resistance against British colonial rule. A constitution negotiated at Lancaster House by the British government, Rhodesian minority government and the liberation movements paved the way for independence (Marumahoko 2018: 16). While conserving white freedoms and benefits, the Constitution provided a foundation for constitutionalism in post-­ colonial Zimbabwe by, among other things, guaranteeing individual rights, the independence of the judiciary and multiparty democracy (Muzondidya 2009: 172). The first democratic elections of 1980, held under the regime of the Lancaster House Constitution, were won by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. Bourne (2011: 103) argues that ZANU was ‘structured as a Marxist party, with a politburo, and top-down organization reflecting the tenets of “democratic centralism”’. He further contends that ‘Mugabe was highly dependent on the military leaders’ of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, the military wing of ZANU during the liberation struggle. These leaders continued to play a critical role during Mugabe’s days in power, and they ultimately shaped his removal close to three decades later. The ZANU-led government adopted a development paradigm that centred on rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement. A number of pro-poor policies were adopted, which impacted positively on the delivery of public and social sectors such as education, health and sanitation (Muzondidya 2009: 168–169; Bourne 2011: 111). Boosted with political power and a strong economy, backed by productive agriculture, mining and manufacturing, the government had the necessary instruments to transform the lives of the majority of Zimbabweans who were at the receiving end of colonial policies. The period 1980–1990 is generally regarded as a decade of social progress. While advancing welfare programmes, ZANU did not lose sight of the need to entrench its power amid the strong competition that was coming from the Joshua Nkomo-led Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) party. The Prime Minister’s Directives on Decentralisation of 1984 and 1985, which provided for the establishment of various vertical state organisation structures, were used by ZANU to consolidate its hold on political power. The roles of the party and state were fused through bodies that were formed according to these Directives (Muzondidya 2009: 178; Bourne 2011: 218). At around the same time, a confrontation with ZAPU took place in the Matabeleland provinces and some parts of Midlands, ZAPU’s strongholds. The military deployment to solve what Muzondidya

302 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

refers to as a ‘political problem’ in these provinces, dominated by Ndebele-­ speaking people, resulted in the loss of human life and property (Muzondidya 2009: 179, 185). Peace was restored when ZAPU merged with ZANU in 1987 to form ZANU–PF under an agreement called the Unity Accord. This effectively ended competitive politics, so the political hegemony of ZANU–PF was unchallenged. As a result, and according to some scholars, Zimbabwe became de facto a one party state, where opposition and criticism had no role (Bourne 2011: 120; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 118). The appetite of some of the ruling elite not just for political power but also for private accumulation grew. Corruption cases of a grand nature that rocked the country, such as the Willowgate Scandal of 1988, attest to this. Constitutional amendments that were instituted towards the end of the first decade of independence ensured that the executive, in particular the President, could not be effectively checked by oversight institutions such as parliament. In the second decade of independence, ‘many things began to go seriously wrong’, overshadowing positive developments in the country (Bourne 2011: 126). The foundation for this situation had been set in the first decade. Corruption became widespread, poverty deepened, politics of patronage began to flourish, and labour strikes and food riots became the order of the day (Raftopoulos 2009: 203–204). The World Bank-backed Economic Structural Adjustments Programme (ESAP), which the government adopted in the 1990s, failed to arrest the deteriorating economic and social situation (Muzondidya 2009: 188). Instead, owing to market liberalisation, privatisation and the reduction of government expenditure through the removal of government subsidies on food, health and education, the socio-economic gains recorded in the first decade began to be eroded. People lost their jobs, prices rocketed, companies closed and corruption gained momentum. It was no wonder that ESAP was nicknamed ‘Extreme Suffering for African People’ (Bourne 2011: 127). Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni (2003: 122) argues that the adoption of ESAP not only proved that the ZANU–PF government had abandoned the people but also that the political leadership, which had proclaimed itself socialist at independence, had easily turned capitalist. Conversely, Bourne (2011: 127) claims that the regime’s attitude towards limiting the landscape for political participation, especially from opposition parties and alternative sources of power, did not change. Legislative amendments, incentives and sanctions were some of the many strategies that were utilised towards this end (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 123). However, with the right political and

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

303

economic direction, this state of affairs could have been rescued as the economy had not reached the life support stage. The ingredients for a full-­ blown crisis were brewing as Zimbabwe approached the new millennium (Raftopoulos 2009: 201–203). Disagreeing with the direction that ZANU–PF was taking, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed in 1999 from a conglomeration of labour, student and civic groups. The party, which mobilised on democratic principles, would later drive ZANU–PF to the limit, forcing the ruling party to embark on drastic measures to stay in power. The opposition was easily branded a creation of the west and an enemy of the state that needed to be extinguished by whatever means possible. The third decade of independence is often described as the crisis decade, when the political and economic situation spilled out of control. Key questions around the role of the state, land and property rights, political and civil liberties, economic direction and the central role of the former President, Robert Mugabe, came to the forefront (Raftopoulos 2009: 201). Raftopolous (2009: 202) contends that ZANU–PF ‘drew on a combination of revived nationalism that privileged its role in the liberation of the country, prioritized the centrality of the fight for land, and demonized all those outside the selective “patriotic history” it espoused’. It adopted the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in early 2000, under which land in the hands of white farmers was taken without compensation and redistributed to blacks as a way of addressing inequalities in land ownership. Britain and some other western countries responded by imposing restrictions on Zimbabwe, as they considered the programme to be an unlawful deprivation of property rights. ZANU–PF has argued since then that these are not restrictions but actually illegal economic sanctions that hurt ordinary citizens the most (Government of Zimbabwe 2013: 8, 12). The question of whether these are restrictions or sanctions again depends on which side of the fence one is sitting on. What is not in dispute is that, after the programme was imposed in the early 2000s, the economy, which was already struggling, descended to crisis levels characterised by hyperinflation, low agricultural and industrial productivity, a ballooning informal sector and a gross domestic product that had shrunk by 50% as of 2008 (Government of Zimbabwe 2013: 8). Facing an international barrage of criticism regarding its human rights record, among other issues, Zimbabwe walked out of the Commonwealth in 2003. Relations with other international organisations and multilateral finance institutions soured, marking the beginning of Zimbabwe’s

304 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

international isolation. With the MDC posing a serious threat to ZANU– PF’s political hegemony, especially after taking control of urban local government, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 104) contends that ‘regime security was often given priority at the expense of human security’. Bourne (2011: 162) establishes that the ‘state could no longer provide many of its citizens with food, basic services, a guaranteed rule of law, and socio-economic as well as civil and political rights’. Gubbay (2016: 13) notes that the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary, the bedrock of the rule of law and constitutionalism were compromised in many respects. The failure by the judiciary and parliament to effectively exercise their designated constitutional role facilitated the abuse of executive power (Hatchard et  al. 2004: 314). The Government of National Unity (GNU), established in 2009 and constituted by ZANU–PF and the two MDC formations, following the disputed elections of 2008, rescued this situation. The fourth decade of independence began when Zimbabwe was being governed by the GNU. The GNU managed to stabilise the political and economic situation as food, among other things, began to be more widely available in shops. The adoption of a multicurrency regime anchored on the United States (US) dollar contained inflation. Public service delivery in areas such as water, sanitation, health and education improved (Bourne 2011: 226). The GNU also successfully steered the adoption of the first home-grown Constitution, which is pregnant with promise for a better life for ordinary citizens. The adoption of the new Constitution did not solve the Zimbabwean problem, however. Soon after the 2013 harmonised elections, which were won by ZANU–PF and brought an end to the GNU’s tenure, the situation began to regress. The stagnant economy, which is perhaps the biggest challenge confronting the political leadership in Zimbabwe since the 2013 elections, shows that it takes more than electoral votes, whether genuinely acquired or not, to fix bread and butter issues. The developments after the removal of Robert Mugabe from office in November 2017, to be discussed in the next section, support this thesis.

The Fall of Mugabe and the Rise of Mnangagwa On 21 November 2017, President Robert Mugabe handed in his resignation letter to Jacob Mudenda, the Speaker of the National Assembly. Earlier on, the military had taken over the country and confined the President to his residence, claiming that it had been forced to intervene in civilian affairs in order ‘to pacify a degenerating political, social and

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

305

economic situation in [Zimbabwe] which if not addressed may result in violent conflict’ (Jordan 2017: 1). Its publicly stated objective was to ‘address the human security threats in the country’ (Jordan 2017: 1; Jongwe 2018: 1). The events that culminated in Mugabe’s resignation were welcome for some while for others they were unacceptable and frightening in a constitutional democracy. Whichever side one is on, the question that begs an answer is whether the events fall into the narrative of a national democratic project or a military takeover. Some say the events had no bearing as the president voluntarily gave notice of his resignation in terms of section 96 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Huffingtonpost 2017: 1; VOA 2017: 1). In democracies, leaders leave office when they have lost the support of the people. The president’s departure from office was endorsed by the leaders of the opposition, ordinary citizens and the international community. However, the status of the departure was cast wide open when Mugabe later made an about-turn and insinuated that a military coup, and not voluntary resignation, was the reason he vacated office so suddenly. This has prompted some to reexamine the circumstances. It seems there are merits to Mugabe’s claim that he left office owing to a military coup. His ousting had some of the characteristics of coups seen across the world, although it was celebrated by citizens and was not criticised by the international community. First, the army moved tanks  and other military vehicles and gun-wielding soldiers to strategic places around the country, which is often the case when mounting a military coup. The parliament building was barricaded, the police disarmed and the president confined to his residence. Secondly, the military placed some of Mugabe’s ministers and strong supporters under house arrest. Thirdly, a senior military official broadcast live on radio and television, reassuring citizens that the military had not seized political power but were taking measures to restore normality in accordance with the Constitution. The Constitution of Zimbabwe vests the power to deploy the military in the President and not the army commanders, as happened during the measures that culminated with Mugabe’s ousting. In addition, there are special circumstances under which the army can be moved from the barracks. One of these circumstances relates to disasters. In this case, however, there was no disaster to attend to, nor was there a humanitarian crisis. The country was not at war with a foreign power and parliament had not approved the deployment of the army.

306 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

A related question is why the events were happening 37  years after independence, and where they were taking the country. It has been suggested that one of the reasons that explains Mugabe’s unceremonious departure from office is that he had lost the support of the army and the influential war veterans that had propped up his rule for close to four decades (Kwaramba 2017: 1; Rupiya 2012: 13). Another reason is perhaps that Mugabe had incensed the army and the war veterans by procrastinating about the question of who would succeed him in the party and government. This saw the emergence of two factions in ZANU–PF, the so-called G40 and Lacoste factions, each vying to take over (Chirimambowa 2016: 1). The situation was compounded by the emergence of Grace Mugabe, the first lady, as a formidable voice in the ruling party, close or working with the G40 factions. She appeared to have sidelined the war veterans and the commanders of the army, who were historically considered the vanguard of the ruling party (Chirimambowa 2016: 2; Kwaramba 2017: 1). Mugabe helped to seal his own fate by appearing to suggest that he would prefer his wife to take over from him. This brought him into conflict with the army and the war veterans who preferred Emmerson Mnangagwa, one of Mugabe’s vice-­presidents. In the end, Mugabe lost the battle to shape the succession debate. There are a few lessons that can be drawn from this. One of them is about the danger of concentrating too much power in one person at the expense of institutions. Another is that sitting presidents need to avoid overstaying their welcome. Yet another is that leadership should always change hands. It should be acknowledged, however, that not everything about Mugabe was bad. The strong education system that Zimbabwe is often acclaimed for is largely attributed to ZANU–PF policies and Mugabe in particular. The idea of land reform, which many criticise Mugabe for, was not bad in itself, but it could have been handled better. Finally, Mugabe cannot be blamed for everything that has gone wrong in Zimbabwe. All Zimbabweans, particularly those who were governing with him, must take equal blame and acknowledge their mistakes and wrongdoing. Even ordinary citizens must take a portion of the blame: it is often said that the people deserve the government they every nation has the government it deserves. History the world over has proved that people power can remove governments that no longer serve their interests. Even so, the removal of Mugabe may have been necessary, but did it mark the beginning of a new era for Zimbabwe?

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

307

With Mugabe gone, his former vice-president and close collaborator, Emmerson Mnangagwa, took the reins of power in both the government and the ruling party in November 2017. He announced himself on the political scene as a reformist who was prepared to redefine the political and economic trajectory of the country. He nonetheless appointed a cabinet that primarily constituted ministers from the previous government to take charge until the July 2018 harmonised elections, raising early questions about his intentions to change. He declared that ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ and initiated the process of international reengagement. President Mnangagwa introduced a raft of measures, which included anti-­ corruption initiatives, to ensure effective, clean and accountable government. The political environment improved, to the extent that opposition political parties largely freely mobilised. Even though the electoral environment improved in general, the question remains whether this improvement was enough to guarantee an undisputed election outcome. The outcome of the July 2018 harmonised elections, in which Mnangagwa was reelected, was disputed by the MDC, giving rise to a legitimacy deficit. In his inauguration speech, Mnangagwa declared the ‘dawn of the “Second Republic”’ in Zimbabwe. The stated strategic vision of Mnangagwa’s government was for Zimbabwe to become a middle-income country by 2030. He initially appointed a refreshed cabinet and retired a number of senior bureaucrats who had been in government for decades. The government announced a number of reforms to address the economic challenges. However, ever since his reelection on 30 July 2018, the economy is threatening to descend to the 2008 crisis levels with clear indications that the market lacks confidence and trust in the new government. Prices are rocketing, fuel is in short supply and companies are struggling to access foreign currency to enable production. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 128) argues that the economy will not ‘be solved by populist rhetoric, devoid of pragmatism’. The question, therefore, is what it would take to fix the Zimbabwean problem. The question is dealt with in the next section.

Fixing the Zimbabwean Problem Zimbabwe is endowed with a rich natural and human resource base that gives it an advantage over its regional and international counterparts (see Government of Zimbabwe 2013: 16). Bad governance that has given rise to political, economic and humanitarian problems requires urgent fixing, however (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 100). According to Smith (2007: 6),

308 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

there are four sets of attributes that require reform if good governance is to be brought about: constitutional, political, administrative and public policy. He argues that at ‘the constitutional level good governance requires changes that will strengthen the accountability of political leaders to the people, ensure respect for human rights, strengthen the rule of law, and decentralize political authority’. When it comes to political action and organisation, Smith states that ‘three attributes of good governance are common to the governance agendas of most aid agencies; political pluralism, opportunities for extensive participation in politics, and probity and incorruptibility in the use of public powers and offices by servants of the state’. Turning to administration, he argues that ‘good governance requires accountable and transparent public administration; effective public management, including a capacity to design good policies as well as to implement them’. In this section, we discuss six interventions that cut across these attributes and have the potential to make a positive impact on Zimbabwe. Building Trust and Confidence Public trust and confidence are key indicators of a functional government and good governance (Chanley et al. 2000: 239). When people have confidence in government institutions, they are more likely to support government policies, comply with the laws and pay taxes, among other responsibilities. In Zimbabwe, public trust and confidence in government institutions has been on a downward spiral in both the Mugabe and Mnangagwa era. The decline appears to be linked to people’s disappointment in government, its inefficiency, ineffectiveness, inability to fight corruption, disputed elections, negative perceptions of the economy and an increase in their knowledge of how the government works, among other issues. In the ensuing paragraphs, we recommend reforms in democratic and administrative processes as some of the ways in which public trust and confidence can be restored. Democratic Processes Good governance denotes in part that governance processes, procedures and structures are democratic (Smith 2007: 4). The departure of Mugabe presents a real opportunity for the country to redeem public trust and confidence. One of the ways in which this can be achieved is by opening up political processes. This entails breaking from a past in which

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

309

opposition politics was criminalised and frowned upon, and when those who led opposition endured harassment and intimidation, thereby closing the space for the democratic exchange of ideas. According to Osaghae (1999: 9), one of the crucial elements for assessing democratisation is the existence of pluralism and multipartyism. This relates to the existence of an environment that encourages competitive politics in which the opposition parties have a fair chance of coming to power. Although the political environment improved after the fall of Mugabe, the motivation for liberalisation is inadequate, in the sense that it appeared to have been pressured by external actors rather than being driven by a shared genuine desire for reform. Although external pressures are crucial for the establishment of democracy in countries previously under authoritarian rule, such pressures are motivated more by the need for such countries to entrench their interests  (Smith 2007: 272). Thus, the desire to reform should be locally shared and driven, with international actors merely taking a supporting role. Reforms should, for instance, target institutions that administer elections or play a facilitative role in that regard, given that Zimbabwe has a long history of contested electoral processes and outcomes (Kambale (2012: 1; Rupiya 2012: 9; Southall and Slabbert 2018: 1). Public media reforms are also important in the context of enhancing democratisation and increasing public trust and confidence in government (African Network of Constitutional Lawyers 2012: 4). Finally, it has been observed that the reform of the Public Order and Security Act will go a long way towards fostering a healthy political environment, as the legislation tramples upon fundamental freedoms relating to association and assembly, among others, that are entrenched in the Constitution (Human Rights Watch 2013: 2). Politically, the legislation is out of sync with the pledge by Mnangagwa to do things differently. Administrative Processes Good governance is not only about democratic governance processes but also about efficient and effective administrative systems (Smith 2007: 4). Such systems were largely absent at all levels of government during the latter half of Mugabe’s rule. Thus, it is crucial that the new government, post-Mugabe, should undertake extensive administrative reforms to improve efficiency and effectiveness. At the heart of the reforms is  the need to refine the way in which government agencies work. This can be achieved by, among other things, professionalising human resource management, changing organisational structures and reviewing governance

310 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

procedures. It is important that government agencies attract and retain public servants with the right skills, qualifications and dedication if service delivery is to improve. Professionalisation should be at the centre of the new recruitment and selection policy. Recruitment and selection should be preceded by rigorous job analysis (Ashraf 2017: 1). There is a need for the new administration to set up good succession planning in public service. Jarvalt (2007: 8) notes that viable succession planning needs to be accompanied by a training policy that motivates employees, heightens their organisational awareness, offers promotion opportunities, promotes common civil service culture and increases the skill base. The question of reducing the number of government employees will also need to be addressed, given that the civil service is bloated—to the extent that around 90% of the revenue collected by government goes towards meeting its salary obligations. The size of the civil service could be reduced by, among other strategies, eliminating ghost workers, verifying that civil servants on the payroll are actually working, laying off contract workers, voluntary retrenchments, early retirement, recruitment freezes and the closing of government agencies whose functions can be efficiently performed by the private sector (Lienert 1998: 6). To its credit, the Mnangagwa administration has already laid off a few senior government officials. These retrenchments, however, need to be based on performance evaluations and other verifiable considerations. Currently, it is hard to tell what the criteria for the retrenchments are, leading critics to speculate that they are targeting bureaucrats who are perceived to be sympathetic to Mugabe. The remuneration of government employees ought to be addressed as part of the administrative reforms. This entails reviewing the current remuneration policy, enhancing transparency and improving the ability of government to recruit and retain individuals with skills that are in short supply. A good remuneration policy needs to be guided by fiscal realities, competences, meritocracy, the penalisation of poor performers, the scarcity of certain skills and experience, and the elimination of salary gaps for comparable jobs; among other considerations (Lienert (1998: 7). It is also important that the efficiencies of government agencies are reviewed as part of the administrative reforms that are meant to improve service delivery.

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

311

Getting the Most Out of Limited Public Resources Corruption In Zimbabwe, corruption is prevalent across all sectors, manifesting itself mainly through bribery, extortion, nepotism, patronage and grand venality, among other forms of abuse of power. The  Corruption Index for 2018 ranked Zimbabwe 157 out of 176 countries which were surveyed. It is estimated that Zimbabwe is losing US$1 billion annually to corruption to the detriment of economic and social development (Takawira 2017: 204). Corruption is harmful as it often increases the cost of doing business, dissuades foreign direct investment, distorts the financial and economic environment, undermines human capital development, creates inequalities in opportunities available to citizens and business actors, leads to inefficiencies in public service delivery and often results in poor allocation of resources, among other negatives (Mugova 2017: 1; Wafawarova 2015: 1). Thus, the fight against corruption is perhaps the biggest challenge confronting the post-Mugabe administration. The Zimbabwe AntiCorruption Commission (ZACC) faces a plethora of challenges that undermine its ability to fight corruption effectively. The challenges include political meddling, a lack of operational independence, the politicisation of corruption cases, a shortage of skilled staff and lack of sufficient resources. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), which prosecutes corrupt suspects, is grappling with similar challenges. In the first quarter of 2018, the Prosecutor-General issued a statement bemoaning the lack of political will, human capacity and financial support as the reasons most corruption cases were not being prosecuted (Hodzi 2018: 1). In response to the inability of the ZACC and NPA to contain corruption, President Mnangagwa established a special anti-corruption unit in his office responsible for investigating and prosecuting corruption cases. It remains to be seen whether this unit will bring dividends in the war against corruption. Corruption in Zimbabwe is now so entrenched that only genuine anti-­ corruption efforts anchored on key strategies have better prospects of containing it. A multi-actor and sectoral approach, whereby financial institutions, audit firms, anti-corruption agencies and tax authorities work in collaboration to prevent, detect, investigate and respond to corruption, is necessary. Without close collaboration and coordination between the agencies responsible for the identification, investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, the war against corruption is unlikely to be won any time soon. The recovery of proceeds of crime is an important aspect of

312 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

anti-corruption initiatives throughout the world. There is, therefore, a need for Zimbabwe to set up or strengthen a specialist asset recovery agency responsible for tracing the proceeds of corruption, securing freezing orders, and confiscating and forfeiting assets. The courts play an important role of ensuring that those that steal from the poor are jailed. Currently, the judiciary faces a number of challenges that constrains its ability to deliver justice, such as lack of sufficient resources and corruption within its judicial ranks. Stiffer penalties for offenders can be an effective deterrent of corrupt behaviour. The existing penalties provided in law are not harsh enough to realise this objective. It has also not been uncommon for high-profile corrupt suspects or individuals to receive preferential treatment during investigation, prosecution and sentencing. There have been a number of arrests and prosecution of senior bureaucrats, politicians and other influential people in the post-Mugabe era, but the rate of arrests and prosecution does not mirror the deep state of corruption. The fact that there have been no significant successful prosecutions and that arrests and investigations are widely perceived to be selective continues to raise questions about the genuineness of anti-corruption efforts under the ‘Second Republic’ (Mahere 2019: 1). Resource Wastage The wastage of public resources is one of the challenges that the new administration needs to overcome. While an appetite for wasting resources is common throughout public services, including in state-owned enterprises and local government, it can be easily identified at high levels of government. President Mnangagwa has followed in the footsteps of Mugabe, whose cabinet was often criticised for being disproportionate to the size of the country and the state of the economy. On 8 November 2019, Mnangagwa announced the appointment of six new ministers and five new deputy ministers. At 25 ministers, 18 deputy ministers and 10 provincial ministers, the cabinet is now bigger than the one he inherited. He has also created an additional ministry (that of National Housing and Social Amenities). All ministries have permanent secretaries, principal directors, departmental directors and other senior staff, whose employment comes with hefty remuneration packages. Given that some of the ministries have identical responsibilities and functions, the duplication of roles and resource wastage is ubiquitous. The creation of non-essential top government positions, excess ministries and expendable departments is associated with a spike in travel and subsistence allowances,

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

313

supererogatory travelling, unnecessary events and unimportant international travelling (Langa 2015: 1; Magaisa 2018a: 4). This resource wastage, which a struggling economy cannot bear, could be contained by making cabinet leaner, and abolishing unnecessary senior positions, ministries and departments. In addition, it would help to do away with unnecessary travel, reduce the number of delegates when travelling locally and abroad, and consume locally produced goods and services. It is also important that through its oversight function, parliament should hold the executive accountable for resource wastage, among other forms of unsound or uneconomic usage of resources.  ublic Procurement Process P The public procurement process is one of the most critical governance process, in which development plans are translated into action in monetary terms. The importance of this process for national development in Zimbabwe is recognised in the 2013 Constitution, which requires that public funds be spent transparently, prudently, economically and effectively. Besides these general principles of public finance, the Constitution (section 315) requires the public procurement process to ensure that it is transparent, fair, honest, cost-effective and competitive. It singles out joint ventures, contracts for the construction and operation of infrastructure and facilities, and concessions for mineral and other rights as state contracts whose negotiation and performance requires strict regulation (see section 315(2) of the Constitution). This constitutional framework is there to ensure that Zimbabwe gets the most out of its public procurement processes. During the Lancaster House constitutional order, it was recognised that Zimbabwe did not always get the most out of its public procurement processes. More than six years into the new constitutional regime, the situation has not changed at all levels of government, and procurement is often being used to benefit a few key players, usually along political, social and economic lines (Chigudu 2014: 21). The practice of contractors being paid for goods and services they have not delivered remains common. In other cases, some contractors provide substandard work and get paid for it, while others inflate prices above the market rates, usually in connivance with government officials. There is evidence of some contractors who have been given government contracts despite lacking the requisite capacity to deliver them. Thus, value for money has not been achieved in a significant number of contracts which have been awarded, and the overall implication is that a significant quantity of public funds

314 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

continues to be lost through the public procurement process (Chigudu 2014: 23). Building a new Zimbabwe requires that there should be a change in how the public procurement process is utilised. If it is used for the public good, it has the potential to drive economic growth and social development. A Culture of Constitutionalism A new Zimbabwe needs a culture of constitutionalism, which is the centrepiece of any constitutional democracy, to develop. Constitutionalism requires the limitation of state power through a constitution or other mechanisms, to protect the citizens against arbitrary rule (Okoth-Ogendo 1993: 66). The key ingredients of constitutionalism are supremacy of the constitution, a Bill of Rights, separation of powers, democratic and accountable governance, independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. All these key principles of constitutionalism are captured in the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe. Thus, the foundation upon which a culture of constitutionalism can be built upon is already there. What is required is the creation of a conducive environment for this culture to thrive. While the full implementation of the Constitution is perhaps the starting point for the culture to develop, a change in political culture is essential given that the politics of independent Zimbabwe has been toxic. Rule of Law The starting point for setting Zimbabwe back on the right path is respect for the rule of law (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 129). This is important as the rule of law is the bedrock of any democratic society, which includes different dimensions of justice. The rule of law is a complex principle that requires the strict observance of constitutional and legislative rules, which can only flourish in an environment where the independence of the judiciary is protected and promoted. Gubbay (2016: 1) states that if a certain piece of legislation is required to give effect to a constitutional principle, goal or vision, such legislation should be enacted expeditiously, because without it that principle, goal or vision will not be realised. Once the relevant pieces of legislation are in place, he states that a climate of legality becomes important because without it laws are meaningless (Gubbay 2016: 1). The rule of law also requires an impartial and independent judiciary to oversee a legal framework that is known, clearly formulated, stable, predictable and applied uniformly. These principles provide a ‘basis for

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

315

“legitimate expectations” on the part of the citizens. The rule of law, thus, guarantee that citizens know what obligations are imposed by the law, and can expect these obligations to remain unchanged until the law is changed’, but not in a retroactive manner (Smith 2007: 78). On the economic side, it is highly unlikely that an investor, especially an international one, will invest in a country where the legal framework is not predictable and respected, where the judiciary fails to implement the legislative framework fairly and where court decisions are not respected. Black markets, tax evasion and financial irregularities, which are common in Zimbabwe, are all symptoms of a market that lacks trust and confidence in the existing formal legal governance architecture. Thus, the rule of the law is not only important to protect and promote political rights but also economic development. In countries in transition such as Zimbabwe, the rule of the law is particularly crucial to ‘help establish a clear break with the past, and new political culture in which all participants respects the law’ (Smith 2007: 81).  espect for State Institutions R Respect for state institutions is a fundamental feature in a constitutional democracy. Evidence in independent Zimbabwe, where the executive neutralised other arms of government, demonstrates that imbalance of power among the different arms of government is bad for democracy. The executive easily conducted its activities as it pleased with little or no oversight from other arms of government (Veritas 2016: 2). This unequal balance is one of the sources of many problems experienced after the first decade of independence. Modern constitutions are increasingly making provisions for independent constitutional commissions to strengthen democracy by, for example, complementing the role of the traditional arms of government. The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, for instance, shares governmental power not just among the three arms of government (executive, parliament and judiciary), but also makes provision for the establishment of several independent commissions supporting democracy. The commissions include the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, Zimbabwe Gender Commission and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission. The Constitution also makes provision for the Office of the Auditor General, ZACC and the NPA.  It becomes important for these arms of government and constitutional bodies to respect each other’s functional terrain while cooperating with one another to avoid repeating the mistakes of yesteryear. The decision of President Mnangagwa to

316 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

establish a prosecutorial unit in his office has raised questions about whether the executive is not encroaching on the terrain of the NPA to the detriment of oversight. The same argument can be used in relation to the continued use of the President’s power under the Presidential (Temporary Measures) Act to make law, an area reserved for parliament. Thus, respect for state institutions is necessary for a new Zimbabwe, otherwise it remains the old one.  edefining the Relationship Between the State and Its Citizens R A new Zimbabwe is possible, but not without redefining the relationship between the state and its citizens. The state has obligations to its citizens inasmuch as the citizens have a role to play in a democratic society. The state is there to serve. It, therefore, follows that the delivery of public and social services to the people by the state is not a favour but an obligation. The relationship between the state, on one hand, and citizens, on the other hand, should be seen from the perspective of the fundamental human rights that are inalienable to every human being. Human rights ‘are claims to entitlements that are held to be morally defensible regardless of the law in any particular sovereign state. Rights claim that others should act in a particular way, or refrain from acting in ways which restrict the enjoyment of what is claimed’ (Smith 2007: 45). The respect, protection and promotion of human rights is a fundamental virtue of any democratic society (Smith 2007: 4). The state has a role to mediate relations between citizens to ensure that both individual and group rights are respected. Access to water, housing and sanitation are important socio-economic rights that should be protected and promoted by all tiers of government and their agencies as well as by constitutional bodies. The cholera outbreak of September 2018, which affected many and resulted in several deaths, shows that the government, at all levels, is failing to fulfil these rights. Yet the Constitution obliges the government to promote and protect these rights and to ensure that they are realised in practice. Thus, unless there are radical improvements in how the state delivers key public and social services, it will be a long time before a real new Zimbabwe can be realised. Economic Reforms Zimbabwe is in the grip of an economic crisis that has persisted for close to three decades. The crisis, which can be traced back to the Mugabe era,

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

317

manifests among other aspects in high unemployment rate, liquidity challenges, a dwindling formal sector, corruption, heavy local and foreign debt, shortage of foreign currency and a lack of foreign direct investment. These problems have persisted in the ‘Second Republic’ under the Mnangagwa administration, dampening the euphoria and enthusiasm that accompanied Mugabe’s ousting (Moulds 2017: 1). Economic reforms are necessary if the new administration wants to restore the country to its former glory as a regional economic powerhouse. Mnangagwa’s Transitional Stabilisation Programme, an economic blueprint, carries a number of austerity measures to arrest some of the economic challenges. For instance, it provides measures to reduce the fiscal deficit, address debt challenges, and curb corruption and other rent-seeking behaviours (Government of Zimbabwe 2018: 11, 17, 18, 21). The economic reforms are yet to make a meaningful impact, partially because they lack effective implementation. The biggest culprit is the government, which continues to disrespect its own laws, policies and programmes. For instance, unbudgeted, unauthorised spending and overspending are still common (Mhlanga 2019: 1). The executive continues to spend resources outside the parameters approved by parliament. Such ill-disciplined fiscal behaviour has caused economic problems, such as hyperinflation, which have hit the poor the hardest in a country where unemployment is high and xtreme poverty is endemic. The absence of meaningful social safety nets exacerbates the plight of the poor. A number of factors need to be considered if economic reforms are to succeed, such as securing buy-in from ordinary citizens, opposition political formations, the business sector and the major international actors, including banks and other financial institutions. Furthermore, the government needs to address the contradictions in the ideologies underlying economic reforms. For example, although the country has pledged to liberalise the economy, key resource allocation systems remain centrally controlled, particularly by the executive. This could explain why efforts towards reforming the economy have thus far failed to deliver the desired dividends. Currency Reforms Zimbabwe has been operating a multicurrency regime, with the dominant currency being the US dollar since 2009. In 2016, the government introduced bond notes, a surrogate currency, with the stated objectives of incentivising exports, addressing cash shortages and preventing export of the US dollar at the expense of the local economy. The bond notes, which

318 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

were said to be backed by hard currency under the Afreximbank facility, were pegged at 1:1 with the greenback. In short, the bond notes were said to be redeemable in exchange for US dollars. Initially, this arrangement worked until the government started to introduce more bond notes to the market to fund its expenditure (Magaisa 2018a: 3). Eventually, the bond notes lost value against the US dollar, resulting in the latter disappearing from formal channels and trading on the parallel market at high rates. In October 2018, the government introduced new monetary and tax regime measures, which included the provision of the opening of foreign currency accounts. These operated in parallel with the Real Transfer Gross System (RTGS)/bond notes accounts. On 24 June 2019, the government announced that foreign currency was no longer legal tender in Zimbabwe, making the RTGS dollar/bond notes the only acceptable medium of exchange for local transactions. On 7 November 2019, government announced that it was replacing the RTGS dollar with the Zimbabwe dollar. Although the country has tried to address the problem of shortage of foreign currency by banning local purchasers from using hard currency, the problem persists. Most local businesses and service providers have continued indexing prices to the US dollar. The situation is made worse by a lack of consistency in the application of the policy. For instance, the government has allowed mining companies and non-governmental organisations to continue doing business, including the payment of salaries, in US dollars. The government is also undermining its own policy. At ports of entry, the government policy that customs duty for car imports is made in US dollars and not the local currency has been retained. The adoption of about five currency regimes in less than three years shows that there is confusion and a lack of know-how. Unfortunately, the Zimbabwe dollar continues to lose value daily, impacting negatively on its buying power. The potential solution to the currency crisis that is unfolding lies in a full return to the multicurrency regime in which the Zimbabwe dollar has no role. This is required until the economic fundamentals are in place for the country to adopt its own currency. These include an increase in exports and therefore an improved ability to generate enough foreign currency to cover the country’s major needs.  isposal of Non-Performing State-Owned Enterprises D Zimbabwe has many state-owned enterprises (SOEs), established to advance government policy in areas such as the provision of public infrastructure and services such as water, energy, telecommunications,

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

319

transportation, health and education, to mention just a few. Almost all SOEs have not performed well ever since the economic situation took a downturn. In 2016, for example, the Auditor General reported that 15 SOEs faced collapse as they were in untenable financial positions (2016: 2). The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority and its subsidiaries, National Railways of Zimbabwe, Grain Marketing Board and TelOne were some of those that were reported to be on the brink of collapse owing to a deplorable financial situation (Majaka 2017: 1; Auditor-General 2016: 2). In the post-Mugabe era, the government needs to put in place policies that promote good corporate governance in these organisations. A critical part of realising this objective is ensuring that skills, competency and experience constitute the main basis upon which people are appointed to senior positions in these SOEs rather than patronage, as has been the preferred practice. Given this background, the new administration should also consider privatising some of the SOEs (Majaka 2017: 1). Investment There is no doubt that real economic development will not be realised in Zimbabwe unless there is tangible foreign direct investment. If the country is to attract investment, it is crucial that it reviews its investment policy, which under Mugabe was primarily anchored on the Look East policy. Adopted by Mugabe after western governments imposed restrictions on Zimbabwe, the policy seeks to expand bilateral and trade relations and offer priority to investors from the Far East countries. Chinyama (2015: 1) argues that the Look East policy often benefited China more than Zimbabwe, given that China has access to Zimbabwe’s abundant natural resources at low cost. He further argues that most of the investments China made in Zimbabwe have not generated meaningful employment opportunities, as Chinese companies bring their own workers (Chinyama 2015: 1). Other concerns are that local employees are paid wages that are below those stipulated by the government and that Chinese companies do not often place premium on environmental impact assessment (Chinyama 2015: 1). As a result, many of the development projects established by the Chinese were undertaken at the expense of environmental preservation. Since Mugabe, President Mnangagwa has tried to reach out to western countries for investment. In this regard, he has sent ministerial delegations to engage with their governments and to participate in platforms for investment, such as the World Economic Forum. In addition, the Mnangagwa government has amended the Indigenisation and Economic

320 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

Empowerment Act and adopted the motto ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ in a bid to attract investment. Real investment has not been forthcoming despite all these spirited efforts, because the rhetoric has not translated into real action. Zimbabwe’s human rights and rule of law records seem to be the major stumbling block. The disputed election of Mnangagwa has come with legitimacy deficiencies. Magaisa (2018b: 4) argues that Mnangagwa’s administration needs to fix this deficit through engaging the opposition, particularly Nelson Chamisa’s MDC, and undertaking serious political reforms. Without this, it is highly unlikely that investors will invest in Zimbabwe in the near future. While foreign investment is necessary, it is also important that the new administration improves the environment for local investment, as charity begins at home. For example, the new administration can promote local investment by reducing taxes, eliminating red tape in the approval of investment projects, reviewing the procedures for doing business and providing various incentives.  he Stimulation of Local Production and the Role of the Reserve Bank T Zimbabwe has been struggling to manage its imports bill, with imports significantly greater than exports. The implication is that more foreign currency goes, adversely affecting the balance of payments. To make matters worse, the majority of the imports are on consumption and not production goods and services. This means that the foreign currency is being spent on goods that do not generate additional foreign currency. As a result, the country the country is struggling to mobilise enough foreign currency to meet its needs. In the absence of sufficient foreign currency, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has been allocating foreign currency to different sectors depending on priority considerations. The challenge is that some of the key sectors have not always been able to access the foreign currency they need to enable the production of goods and services. The result is often that there are shortages of certain goods and services which has a knock-on effect on price increases. The role of the RBZ in the allocation of foreign currency is also inefficient and provides room for rent-seeking. It is a mere attempt to address the symptom of the problem rather than being the long-term solution to foreign currency shortages—which lies with increasing local production and increasing exports (Magaisa 2018a: 3). Local production can be stimulated in various ways, including the provision of incentives to local industries. Until Zimbabwe begins to rely on its local industries, particularly for

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

321

consumption goods, the balance of payments and therefore foreign currency shortages will remain a big problem. The role of the RBZ in quasi-­ fiscal activities is also problematic, and takes it away from its core function of setting monetary policy. Each time the bank is involved in quasi-fiscal activities, from the days of Mugabe when the RBZ Governor was Gideon Gono, the result has often been that the inflation rate increases and debt balloons, among other challenges. Unfortunately, those in power have turned a blind eye to this lesson from the past. Vertical Power-Sharing Like most post-colonial African governments, the ZANU–PF-led government inherited a system of government that concentrated governmental powers and resources at the centre. This centralisation of governmental powers continued as Zimbabwe walked into independence, giving rise to an over-centralised system of government. Hatchard et al. (2004: 20) contend that this system gave ‘little or no space for alternative challenges, questions or control’ at both vertical and horizontal levels. The responsiveness and accountability of the government were, therefore, compromised. The problems that Zimbabwe has experienced since 2000 can partially be attributed to the nature of this system. Building a new Zimbabwe will require the dismantling of this system and its replacement by a form of government in which governmental powers are shared at multiple levels. According to Manor (2013: 32), if this multilevel system of government is to work well, key ingredients must be in place. First, substantial powers must be devolved to democratic subnational units. Secondly, substantial resources must be devolved to subnational level. Thirdly, mechanisms that promote the horizontal accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives as well as the downward accountability of elected representatives to the citizens are required. If these ingredients are in place, such a system of government has the potential to deliver development, democracy and peace (Chigwata 2018: 4–6).  he Democratic Benefit T Vertical power-sharing can deepen democracy in many ways. The organisation of government at multilevel levels creates multiple opportunities for political participation whether directly or through representatives (Smith 2007: 156). Citizens are likely to participate more when government is physically closer to them. Civil society activities are often

322 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

stimulated when governmental powers and resources are injected into subnational and local arenas in order to influence decisions over the use of such resources (Manor 2013: 33). Smaller political parties and independent candidates, who often  face difficulties in competing for political power at the national level, have a higher chance of succeeding at subnational and local level when the political costs of mobilisation tend to be low (Chigwata 2018: 5). The overall effect of this is that the democratic pluralism that lubricates a democratic society is promoted. Citizens are also more likely to hold public officials accountable at subnational or local level owing to the closer proximity of government. A multilevel system of government reduces the concentration of power at central level and the powers given to subnational governments can be effective in checking central government and preventing the arbitrary exercise of power (Hatchard et al. 2004: 187). This vertical separation of powers can go a long way towards complementing the horizontal separation of powers, involving the role of the judiciary, parliament and independent constitutional commissions (Chigwata 2018: 4–5). Thus, vertical power-sharing has the potential to enhance participatory, responsive and accountable governance in Zimbabwe.  he Development Benefit T Alongside its democratic benefits, vertical power-sharing also has the potential to engender development as public resources and power are diffused closer to the people. This enables the easier provision of public goods and services in line with local needs and preferences. The result is often that the government’s responsiveness is improved (Manor 2013: 33). With decentralised governmental powers and resources, citizens in different parts of the country can define and lead their own developments. Some provinces are endowed with a variety of natural resources, yet the level of development in these provinces does not mirror this rich resource base. This imbalance can be attributed partially to the centralised approaches of exploiting natural resources, which have defined resource extraction and utilisation since independence at the expense of local communities. Real vertical power-sharing will ensure that local communities have direct access to the resources within their respective communities, so they can define their own development. Development projects led by the people themselves are likely to be more sustainable than those imposed by central government. Another benefit associated with vertical power-sharing is that it encourages competition, innovation and experimentation

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

323

among subnational and local governments, which may result in the development of superior public policies that can make a positive impact on development objectives.  eeping the Nation Together K For a while, Zimbabwe has been polarised primarily along political lines. This polarisation is beginning to adversely impact national integration and peace. Signs of one of the most dangerous forms of polarisation, ethnic polarisation, are also emerging. The key question is what will keep the national together. Vertical power-sharing can be a potential solution, given that it creates an environment that allows geographically concentrated groups to determine and shape those issues that immediately affect their lives (Chigwata 2018: 5). The potential for this is high in countries where ethnic groups are geographically concentrated in certain areas, such as Zimbabwe, where almost everyone has a province and local authority area that they call home. Most minority ethnic groups, such as the Ndebele, Venda and Tonga, are geographically concentrated in certain provinces, usually along border areas. Even the subethnic groups of the dominant Shona are geographically concentrated in certain areas. This concentration of ethnic groups, especially in border areas, increases the risk for secession. However, the potential for this can be neutralised by real vertical power-­ sharing, which creates an environment where local interests can be accommodated ‘within the stability of a strong central authority’ (Hatchard et al. 2004: 185). The resultant multilevel system of government prevents a winner takes all situation, since political power can still be exercised not just at national but also at subnational and local levels (Manor 2013: 33). Vertical power-sharing has a high chance of accommodating a diversity of interests. Thus, governmental powers and resources should be diffused not only to subnational governments but also to the people. Lessons from the past show that Zimbabwe needs to do away with an over-centralised system of government. The big advantage is that the 2013 Constitution, while not perfect, provides a foundation upon which a devolved system of government can be built. This shift towards a devolved system of government ‘is premised on the fundamental belief that once they are entrusted with their own destiny through the medium of popular local democratic institutions, human beings can govern themselves in peace and dignity in pursuit of their collective well-­being’ (Hatchard et  al. 2004: 185). Zimbabwe has much to gain if it adopts a devolved system of government which can be accommodated in a unitary form of

324 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

government. It should, however, be acknowledged that a multilevel system of government requires significant state capacity, which is currently not available (see Manor 2013: 32). Nevertheless, the absence of significant state capacity should not be the reason why centralisation should be adopted, as a capacity-building process can run parallel to the process of devolution. International Integration Ever since Zimbabwe embarked on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in the early 2000s, its relations with multilateral institutions and western countries have been sour. It has defaulted on several of its debt obligations. The country has isolated itself from the west preferring to engage with the east. As a result, and unlike some of its African counterparts, Zimbabwe has not been able to access financial support from the multilateral institutions and to attract significant budgetary support from the western countries. Yet the country badly needs a cash injection to stimulate its faltering economy. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 128) argues that ‘[i]n this century of globalisation, it is impossible for any nation, including the developed West, to try and isolate itself even in a “splendid isolation” fashion from the complex web and framework of the international community’. Even the eastern countries that Zimbabwe has been dealing with for the past two decades do business with the west. Zimbabwe does not have the luxury to choose which countries to deal with given its precarious economic situation. Thus, ‘the way forward for Zimbabwe lies in returning to the diplomatic chessboard and to bargain from within, rather than to adopt a belligerent stance against the international community’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 129). Zimbabwe has no choice but to reenter the international family of nations by normalising relations with multilateral institutions and the west. The settling of debt obligations and improving its human rights record are some of the many measures that can have a positive impact on Zimbabwe’s relations with international actors.

Conclusion Zimbabwe has experienced several decades of political and economic challenges that can largely be attributed to the political and economic choices of the ruling elites. Very few in the ruling ZANU–PF or close to the party are willing to acknowledge their role in or take the blame for Zimbabwe’s

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

325

economic and political crisis. Some of them attribute the economic crisis to sanctions or restrictions imposed on Zimbabwe by the west, thereby choosing to ignore the impact of corruption and mismanagement, among other ills, that have bedevilled the country for several decades. The country is endowed with rich resources, both natural and human, that are needed to reboot economic development. In 2013, Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution that is progressive in many respects and provides a foundation for Zimbabwe to move forward. According to Ndlovu-­Gatsheni ( 2003: 129) What the country has been lacking is ‘a flexible, malleable and visionary leadership capable of charting a new dispensation not clouded in bankrupt ideologies, but consonant with the prevailing local, regional and international developments’. The fall of Robert Mugabe in November 2017 provided an opportunity for the country to break from its ugly past and set a new development path. Mugabe’s successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa, announced himself on the international stage as a reformist willing to change the political and economic course that has led the former bread basket of Southern Africa to a basket case. He announced the birth of a ‘Second Republic’ characterised by clean governance, an open business environment and widened scope for the exercise of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The change process has, however, been slow and painful, making it indistinguishable from the old dispensation. Unless the new administration begins to walk the talk of change, Zimbabwe will remain a basket case. What is required is a governance culture where political, private and individual interests do not thrive at the expense of the public good.

References ANCL. 2012. National Study on Access to Information in Zimbabwe, Department of Public Law, University of Cape Town, 1–60. Ashraf, J. 2017. Examining the Public Sector Recruitment and Selection, in Relation to Job Analysis in Pakistan. Journal of Cogent Social Sciences 3 (1): 1–11. Auditor-General. 2016. AG Report 2015 on Parastatals and State Enterprises. At https://www.auditorgeneral.gov.zw/downloads/category/2-parastatals. Accessed 24 Nov 2019. Bourne, R. 2011. Catastrophe: What Went Wrong in Zimbabwe? London: Zed Books.

326 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

Chanley, V.A., T.J. Rudolf, and W.M. Rahn. 2000. The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government: A Time Series Analysis. Public Opinion Quarterly 64: 239–256. Chigudu, D. 2014. Public Procurement in Zimbabwe: Issues and Challenges. Journal of Governance and Regulation 3 (4): 21–26. Chigwata, T.C. 2018. Provincial and Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: An Analysis of the Law, Policy and Practice. Cape Town: Juta. Chinyama, G. 2015. Look East Policy Remains a Mirage. Available at https:// www.thestandard.co.zw/2015/02/15/look-east-policy-remains-mirage/. Accessed 7 Nov 2019. Chirimambowa, T.C. 2016. Succession Politics in Zimbabwe: Grace Mugabe and the End of the Patriotic History. At http://www.salo.org.za/wp-content/ uploads/2015/02/DO1of20161.pdf. Accessed 20 Nov 2019. Government of Zimbabwe. 2013. Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-­ Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) “Towards an Empowered Society and a Growing Economy”, October 2013–December 2018. Government of Zimbabwe Transitional Stabilisation Programme Reforms Agenda. 2018 October–2020 December. Towards a Prosperous & Empowered Upper Middle Income. Society by 2030, Harare, 5 October 2018. Gubbay, A.R. 2016. The Progressive Erosion of the Rule of Law in Independent Zimbabwe. The Third International Rule of Law Lecture: The Bar of England and Wales. 9 December 2009. 1. http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/ media/100365/rule_of_law_lecture__agubbay_091209.pdf. Accessed 24 Nov 2019. Hatchard, J., et al. 2004. Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the Commonwealth: An Eastern and Southern African Perspective. Cambridge: University Press. Hodzi, K. 2018. The Prosecutor General’s Speech (Guest of Honour) at the Occassion of the Mutare Anti-Corruption Commission Court. https://jsc.org.zw/jscbackend/upload/Publications/prosecutor%20general%20speech.pdf. Accessed 8 July 2020. Huffington Post. 2017. Reports-Military Coup Is Underway in Zimbabwe. At https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/11/14/reports-military-coup-isunderway-in-zimbabwe_a_23276882/. Accessed 17 June 2018. Human Rights Watch. 2013. Race Against Time: The Need for Legal and Institutional Reforms Ahead of Zimbabwe’s Elections. Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch. Jarvalt, J. 2007. What Does Professionalisation of Public Service Mean to Estonian Top Officials? Paper presented at the University of Tartu, Estonia. Jongwe, F. 2018. Ex-Zimbabwe Leader Mugabe Calls Ouster ‘Coup de’tat’. At https://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1857953/zimbabwe-politicsmugabe-politics/. Accessed 25 Oct 2019.

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

327

Jordan, N. 2017. This Is a Historic Moment for Zimbabwe. At https://www. timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-15-this-is-an-historic-moment-for-zimbabwe/. Accessed 17 Oct 2019. Kabemba, C. 2004. An Assessment of Zimbabwe’s Election Administration. In Negotiating the Impasse: Challenges and Prospects for Democratisation in Zimbabwe, ed. W. Olaleye. Johannesburg: EISA. Kambale, P. 2012. The Contribution of Electoral Management Bodies to Credible Elections in West Africa. In Electoral Management Bodies in West Africa: A Comparative Study of the Contribution of Electoral Commissions to the Strengthening of Democracy, ed. I.  Madior Fall et  al. Johannesburg: Open Society Foundations. Kwaramba, F. 2017. Army to Decide Mugabe Successor. At https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/07/23/army-to-decide-mugabe-successor. Accessed 17 Aug 2019. Langa, V. 2015. Mugabe’s Bloated Cabinet Blamed for Cash Crunch. At https:// www.thestandard.co.zw/2015/12/20/mugabes-bloated-cabinet-blamed-forcash-crunch/. Accessed 18 Nov 2019. Lienert, L. 1998. Civil Service Reform in Africa Mixed Results After 10 Years. Available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/ CAFRAD/UNPAN010695.pdf. Accessed 12 Sept 2018. Mabaye, T.M. 2005. Land Reform in Zimbabwe: An Examination of Past and Present Policy, Shortcomings and Successes and Recommendations for Improvement. At https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/Land%20 Reform%20in%20Zimbabwe.doc. Accessed 1 Dec 2019. Magaisa, A. 2018a. Big Saturday Read: Mending a Broken Economy. alexmagaisa. com. Published 15 Sept 2018. ———. 2018b. Big Saturday Read: Mnangagwa-Political Reformer or Master of Tokenism. alexmagaisa.com. Published 29 Sept 2018. Mahere, F. 2019. We Were Promised Change – But Corruption and Brutality Still Rule in Zimbabwe. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/19/corruption-brutality-zimbabwe-emmerson-mnangagwaprotesters. Accessed 20 Nov 2019. Majaka, N. 2017. 15 Parastatals Face Collapse. Available at https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/06/27/15-parastatals-face-collapse. Accessed 2 Dec 2019. Manor, J. 2013. Understanding Decentralisation: Key Issues for Successful Design. In The Imperative of Good Local Governance: Challenges for the Next Decade of Decentralisation, ed. J.  Ojendal and A.  Dellnas. New  York: United Nations University Press. Marumahoko, S. 2018. The Constitutional Processes in Kenya and Zimbabwe: A Comparative Perspective. Strategic Review of Southern Africa 40 (2): 16–33.

328 

S. MARUMAHOKO AND T. C. CHIGWATA

Mbizwo, A. 2017. Zimbabwe’s Mnangagwa Appoints Army Boss as ZANU– PF Vice President. At https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/12/23/ zimbabwes-mnangagwa-appoints-former-army-boss-as-ZANU–PF-vicepresident_a_23315847/. Accessed 18 Nov 2019. Mhlanga, B. 2019. Govt Squanders US$10,6 Billion. At https://www.newsday. co.zw/2019/11/govt-squanders-us106-billion/. Accessed 20 Nov 2019. Moulds, J. 2017. These Charts Show the Economic Challenges Facing Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe. Available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/ these-charts-show-the-economic-challenges-facing-zimbabwe-post-mugabe/. Accessed 19 Sept 2019. Mugova, S. 2017. The Impact of Corruption and Lost 15 Billion on Zimbabwe’s Economy. Available at https://www.news24.com/MyNews24/the-impact-ofcorruption-and-lost-15-billion-on-zimbabwes-economy-20170321. Accessed on 10 Nov 2019. Muzondidya, J. 2009. From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980–1987. In Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, eds. B, Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo. Harare: Weaver Press. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2003. Dynamics of the Zimbabwe Crisis in the 21st Century. African Journal on Conflict Resolution – ACCORD 2003/1: 99–134. Newsday. 2012. We Have Failed to Run Parastatals. At https://www.newsday. co.zw/2012/07/2012-07-04-we-have-failed-to-run-parastatals/. Accessed 15 Aug 2019. Okoth-Ogendo, H.W.O. 1993. Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political Paradox. In Constitutionalism and Democracy, Transitions in the Contemporary World, ed. D. Greenberg, S. Katz, M. Oliviero, and S. Wheatley. Oxford: OxfordUuniversity Press. Osaghae, E. 1999. Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Faltering Proposals, New Hopes. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 17 (1): 5–24. Raftopoulos, B. 2009. The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998–2008. In Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, eds. B, Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo. Harare: Weaver Press. Rupiya, B. 2012. The Military Factor in Zimbabwe’s Political and Electoral Affairs. At http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/The%20Military%20 Factor%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf. Accessed 17 Sept 2019. Samaita, K. 2019. Zimbabwe Fires 211 Doctors and Hires New Ministers. At https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2019-11-10-zimbabwefires-211-doctors-and-hires-new-ministers/. Accessed 2 Dec 2019. Smith, B.C. 2007. Good Governance and Development. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Southall, R., and V.Z. Slabbert. 2018. How and Why ZANU–PF Won the 2013 Elections. Strategic Review for Southern Africa 35 (2): 135–151.

13  THE IDEA OF A NEW ZIMBABWE POST-MUGABE 

329

Takawira, T. 2017. Corruption and Bad Policies Repel Foreign Capital and Cause Domestic Capital to Flee: Is Jovanovic Right? International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues 7 (5): 204–215. The Institute for Social Accountability. 2012. Oversight Role of Parliament. Nairobi: The Institute of Social Accountability. The World Bank and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes. 2009. Stolen Asset Recovery: Towards a Global Architecture for Asset Recovery. A Policy Note Will Be Presented as a Consultative Draft at the United Nations Convention Against Corruption Third Conference of States Parties Held in Doha, Qatar, from 9–13 November 2009. Veritas. 2016. Executive Powers. Available at http://www.veritaszim.net/ node/2074. Accessed 21 Nov 2019. Vines, A. 2017. What Is the Extent of China’s Influence in Zimbabwe? Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42012629. Accessed 19 Sept 2019. VOA. 2017. Even After Ouster, Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Hogs the Headlines. At https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/rober t-mugabe-inter view-utterances/4303256.html. Accessed 18 Aug 2019. Wafawarova, R. 2015. Anti-Corruption-Reality or Rhetoric. At https://www.herald.co.zw/anti-corruption-reality-or-rhetoric/. Accessed 18 Nov 2019.

CHAPTER 14

Misogyny, Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy Lyton Ncube

Introduction This study demonstrates the (hetero)gendered nature of Zimbabwean politics. It discusses the ways in which politics in contemporary Zimbabwe is complicit in the construction of hegemonic masculinity, in the process reproducing and reinforcing male-gendered domination, gender exclusion, sexism and misogyny. Theoretically, the study is guided by Raewyn Connell’s (1987, 1995) hegemonic masculinity concept. Hegemonic masculinity refers to ‘the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’ (Connell 1995: 77). Zimbabwe is a signatory to the Southern African Development Community protocol on Gender and Development, which is committed to achieving gender equality and equity through the development and L. Ncube (*) Communication Studies Department, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_14

331

332 

L. NCUBE

implementation of a gender-responsive legislation, policies and programmes. In addition, Zimbabwe has a quota system for women aimed at increasing female representation and participation in political parties and parliament. Section 124(b) of Zimbabwe’s 2013 constitution reads: for the life of the first two Parliaments after the effective date, an additional sixty women members, six from each of the provinces into which Zimbabwe is divided, elected through a system of proportional representation based on the votes cast for candidates representing political parties in a general election for constituency members in the provinces.

Regardless of efforts to promote female participation in the public sphere, misogyny is rife in political discourse. Gender relations in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, remain largely biased against women. Despite their seemingly high demographic numbers, women’s participation in decision-making remains glaringly low (Gudlanga 2013; Mutopo and Chiweshe 2014). Male dominance is not only a sexual and social problem but also a political problem, which is directed at maintaining existing power relations that subordinate women (Gudlanga 2013: 151). Significant studies have examined gender and politics in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe (Gaidzanwa 1985; Chitando and Mateveke 2012; Gudlanga 2013; Mutopo and Chiweshe 2014; Tendi 2016). The main focus of these studies is the nexus of government gender policies and female participation in politics. However, studies from ‘below’ making thick descriptions (see Geertz 1973) of the general public’s views and attitudes towards women manoeuvring into traditionally perceived male-­ dominated domains are scarce. The study analyses political banter, including songs, chants, slogans, placards, posters and WhatsApp memes directed at former first lady Grace Mugabe during Zimbabwe’s November 2017 military coup, codenamed Operation Restore Legacy.

Background and Context Since its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has been ruled by male presidents only. These include former presidents Canaan Banana, Robert Gabriel Mugabe and the incumbent Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. This creates an impression that the presidency is a male domain. A golden moment for Zimbabwean women was when prominent politician Joice Teurairopa Mujuru served as one of Mugabe’s deputies both in the

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

333

Zimbabwe African National Unity–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and in government between 2004 and 2014. With age taking its toll on Mugabe, Mujuru was touted as one of the front runners to succeed Mugabe and potentially the first female president. However, her bid to succeed Mugabe suffered a major knock in December 2014. This period was defined by an ugly political succession war within the ruling ZANU–PF.  Press reports suggested that Mujuru and then Minister of Defence Emmerson Mnangagwa were embroiled in bitter factional struggles in an attempt to succeed President Mugabe. Eventually, Mujuru was dismissed from both the party and government. Mujuru’s major rival Mnangagwa replaced her both in the party and in government (Tendi 2016). However, Mujuru’s demise is incomplete without mentioning the role played by a fellow woman—Grace Mugabe, wife of the former president. Grace Mugabe formally joined politics in August 2014, assuming leadership of the powerful and vocal ZANU–PF Women’s League. Her decision to join politics triggered extensive media coverage amid speculations that she was preparing to succeed her ageing husband (Chibuwe 2016). Upon assuming the Women’s League position, Grace boasted at a number of ZANU–PF rallies that she was now the ‘no-nonsense referee’ in the party. True to her words, she showed ruthlessness in officiating at ZANU–PF factional battles, with yellow and red cards being regularly flashed. Mujuru became the first major political casualty to be jettisoned from the field of play by the no-nonsense referee. Prior to the December 2014 ZANU–PF congress, Grace embarked on nationwide rallies dubbed ‘Meet the People’. During the rallies, she lambasted Joice Mujuru, raising unfounded allegations that she was lazy, corrupt, a gossiper, a factional leader and plotting to usurp Mugabe from power (Chibuwe 2016; Tendi 2016). In essence, Grace Mugabe sought to exert moral authority by questioning Mujuru’s moral decency and her suitability as a political leader (Tendi 2016). Such accusations precipitated the suspensions and dismissals of nearly 200 top party and government officials, including Mujuru (Chibuwe 2016). Grace paved the way for Mnangagwa to the presidency by facilitating the removal of Mujuru, but their alliance was short lived as factionalism resurfaced in the post-Mujuru era. Two rival factions, Lacoste and Generation 40 (G40), allegedly fronted by Mnangagwa and Grace Mugabe respectively, became embroiled in bitter battles to succeed Robert Mugabe. ZANU–PF commissar Saviour Kasukuwere, Professor Jonathan Moyo and Mugabe’s nephew Patrick Zhuwawo were reportedly Grace’s key

334 

L. NCUBE

allies. Using similar methods to those that helped to jettison Mujuru, Grace embarked on nationwide ‘Youth Interface’ rallies. These were pregnant with venom and openly denounced Vice-President Mnangagwa, accusing him of fanning factionalism and plotting to dethrone Mugabe through unorthodox means. President Mugabe dismissed Mnangagwa from both the government and party on 5 November 2017, accusing him of disloyalty, deceitfulness, disrespect and unreliability (Machivenyika 2017), when Mnangagwa’s key ally, General Chiwenga, was in China on official duties. Upon his return, Chiwenga issued a statement declaring that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), major stockholders in the ruling ZANU–PF, were not happy with purges against cadres who had liberation credentials (Chidza 2017). To be precise, the military were not happy that ‘counter-revolutionaries’ around Mugabe had hijacked state and party power (Ankomah 2018). Chiwenga underscored that the ZDF were ready to intervene if such purges were not reversed. It is important to note that the military made their move after the Zimbabwe Republic Police had attempted to arrest Chiwenga at Robert Mugabe International Airport upon his return from China. For General Chiwenga and some of his top allies in the army and ZANU, it was now therefore a do or die mission; it was either Mugabe or them. Consequently, on 14 November, there were reports that heavy military equipment had been moved and placed in strategic areas in and around Harare (Ankomah 2018; Asuelime 2018). In the early hours of the 15th, the military through Major-General Sibusiso Moyo announced Operation Restore Legacy via the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (Ankomah 2018; Asuelime 2018). This military intervention culminated in the resignation of President Robert Mugabe, opening the door for the return of his former ally turned opponent Emmerson Mnangagwa from exile in South Africa as the president-­designate (Asuelime 2018). However, before Mugabe’s resignation, the military and war veterans mobilized members of the public to march in solidarity with Operation Restore Legacy. Thus on 18 November 2017, thousands of Zimbabweans marched in Harare and other towns and cities, calling for Robert Mugabe to quit. During public demonstrations, the first lady Grace Mugabe became a target of sexist and misogynistic vitriol. This study explores gendered and sexist discourses that manifested and played out both in the streets and digital spaces during Operation Restore Legacy. The military announced the end of Operation Restore Legacy on 18 December 2017, so events beyond that date will not be analysed.

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

335

Literature Review: Gendered Zimbabwean Public Sphere Studies on gender and politics in Zimbabwe have been a focus of academics over time. Some literature suggests that the Zimbabwean political landscape is highly gendered and biased against women (Gaidzanwa 1985; Mutopo and Chiweshe 2014; Chikafa 2014; Gudlanga 2013; Tendi 2016; Ncube 2018). While women generally outnumber their male counterparts, their participation in public affairs remains limited (Gudlanga 2013; Mutopo and Chiweshe 2014). Male dominance is not only a sexual and social problem but also a political problem directed at maintaining existing power relations that subordinate women (Gudlanga 2013: 151). While there is a growing literature on gender and politics both in colonial and post- colonial Zimbabwe (Gudlanga 2013; Tendi 2016), most of these studies have a bias towards the interface between gender policies and female participation in politics and the economy. Studies paying particular attention to ‘ordinary’ people’s views and attitudes towards female participation in politics are few and far between. Literature also shows that in pre-colonial Zimbabwe women were to an extent not only confined to the public sphere but also actively participated in it (Gudlanga 2013). For example, some women were chiefs, arbitrators in courts, village elders, leaders in wars and spirit mediums. Zimbabwean women had power and were recognized in their traditional society as exemplified by mbuya Nehanda, a legendary figure who played a significant role in the history of the liberation of Zimbabwe (Gudlanga 2013). However, women’s participation in politics and the public sphere declined during the colonial period, as capitalism strengthened patriarchy by according men more elaborate citizenship rights (Barnes 1999; Nhongo-­ Simbanegavi 2000; Gudlanga 2013). Studies also show that African women participated in the liberation struggle both as armed combatants within the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, and as rural supporters who provided local groups of guerrilla fighters with information and logistical support as well as domestic services such as cooking and laundry (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000; Ranchod-Nilsson 2006; Gudlanga 2013). For example, ZANLA had female instructors, including Joyce Mujuru, while ZIPRA had female instructors such as Molly Mpofu, who trained ZIPRA combatants at their

336 

L. NCUBE

base in Zambia (Gudlanga 2013). Apart from these high-ranking female cadres, both ZANLA and ZIPRA had a lot of women who were fighting as part of their armies inside the country (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000; Gudlanga 2013). However, struggles for gender equity ensued in post-independence Zimbabwe. The newly born Zimbabwe nation struggled to chart a course for gender policy and practice (Ranchod-Nilsson 2006). For instance, several women participated in the liberation struggle in various significant ways, but there was no concrete commitment from the ZANU–PF government to transform gender relations or improve women’s circumstances (Ranchod-Nilsson 2006). Joice Mujuru was the only woman who made it into Mugabe’s male-dominated cabinet. Away from politics, there have been publications focusing on Zimbabwean women’s struggles with patriarchy in areas such as the music industry (Mhiripiri 2011; Chitando and Mateveke 2012; Ngoshi and Mutekwa 2013) and football fandom (Chiweshe 2014; Ncube 2014; Chikafa 2014; Ncube and Chawana 2018). Such studies show that not all women have submitted to patriarchy, but some devise various strategies to claim space and express their artistic talents (Chitando and Mateveke 2012). Focusing on the Mbare Chimurenga choir musical group, Ngoshi and Mutekwa (2013) contend that women are used to articulate propaganda, conformity with and submission to current power structures. However, Tendi (2016) warns that when writing about gender and politics, we must be wary of reproducing gender as a binary system that depicts women as passive actors or even simply as victims. He cites the case of Grace Mugabe, who invoked gendered discourses to her own benefit. She repeated many of the sexualized slurs against Mujuru (Tendi 2016). This study builds on this vast body of literature, contributing to the debate on gender and politics in Africa and Zimbabwe. Focusing on a topical subject, Operation Restore Legacy, the study’s uniqueness lies in the endeavour to capture and critically theorize views from below. Operation Restore Legacy is yet to be interrogated through gender lens.

Theoretical Context: Hegemonic Masculinity Raewyn Connell’s (1987, 1995) hegemonic masculinity concept provides a useful framework for understanding intersections of hegemonic masculinity, sexism and misogyny in Operation Restore Legacy. Our focus is on the demonization of Grace Mugabe during the period under study, and

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

337

we discuss attitudes and practices in Zimbabwe that promote gender inequalities, sexism and misogyny in the political arena. The concept of hegemonic masculinity has been used in gender studies since the early 1980s to explain men’s power over women (Jewkes et al. 2015). Connell (2005: 77) contends that hegemonic masculinity is ‘the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’. Gee (2009) avers that Connell based her notion of hegemonic masculinity on Gramsci’s (1971) hegemony theory. Hegemony is a position of dominance attained through relative consensus rather than regular force (Gramsci 1971). Hegemony addresses the relations of societal power, ideology and the domination of ‘common sense’, the taken-for granted, what appears natural or normal (Hearn 2012). It highlights domination and degrees of consent, whether contingent or backed by force. The societal consensus is one that is built among those who benefit from the promotion of masculinity, as well as many of those who are oppressed by it, notably women (Jewkes et al. 2015). Hegemonic masculinity is, as much for women as for men, a cultural ideal of manhood, which is rewarded by women’s interests, attentions and efforts to replicate this ideal in their male relatives and associates (Jewkes et al. 2015). Using the case of Grace Mugabe, the study benefits from the concept in demonstrating violence and sexual assault visited upon women aspiring for presidency in contemporary Zimbabwe. Hegemony ‘involves persuasion of the greater part of the population, particularly through the media, and the organization of social institutions in ways that appear “natural”, “ordinary”, “normal”’ (Donaldson 1993: 645). The study demonstrates how politics in Zimbabwe serves as a site where spatial arrangements of domination are produced, reinforced and naturalized. Critically, it demonstrates how political discourse serves as a strategic vehicle through which particular conceptions of gender are manifested as natural or commonsensical and are reproduced for a large audience. Gruneau and Whitson (1993: 192) argue that historically constituted male dominated spaces ‘assume considerable importance in a changing world where traditional places and times for men’s exclusive association are disappearing’, resulting in many men experiencing ‘a loss of control’. Politics in Zimbabwe remains one of the exclusive male domains. An analysis of chants, talks, posts and digital media memes targeting Grace

338 

L. NCUBE

Mugabe during Operation Restore Legacy can show us how politics functions as a vital cog in the country’s hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity is grounded in the feminist perspectives of male social dominance and patriarchy (Connell 1987; Graham 2014; Peled 2016). All men benefit from patriarchy (Connell 1995). In essence, in a patriarchal society, women are generally placed in a subordinate position, and men tend to dominate the economy, politics and the family. Although men are structurally related to women in a superior position and inherently benefit from the patriarchal dividend, they do have a choice about whether or not actively to occupy oppressive positions vis-à-vis women and other men or to resist these (Jewkes et al. 2015). This choice may be highly constrained owing to a lack of exposure to other ideas and information, but it is ultimately still a choice (Jewkes et  al. 2015). The study demonstrates how male dominance in politics is even naturalized by some members of the general public in Zimbabwe. Connell and Messerschmitt (2005) argue that there can be more than one hegemonic masculinity within a society. Various masculinities are in existence at any given moment (Connell 1995). These include hegemonic masculinities, subordinated masculinities, marginalized masculinities, complicit masculinities and protest masculinities (Connell 2000: 30). The hierarchy of masculinities is an expression of the unequal shares in privilege held by different groups of men (Connell 1995). Hegemonic masculinity is the most respected, desired and dominant form of masculine identity for a given culture or subculture (Gee 2009). While hegemonic masculinity is often seen as a ‘configuration of gender practice’, it is sometimes presented as a cultural ideal or an aspiration that only limited numbers of men can practise (Connell and Messerschmitt 2005: 849) or even one that can never be fulfilled. For instance, working-­ class men in poor African countries cannot be regarded as hegemonic, as they do not perceive themselves to be ‘in power’ (Jewkes et  al. 2015). Flood (2002) highlights two interrelated notions of hegemonic masculinity: first, as a particular configuration of gender practice related to legitimizing male authority, and second, as a description of the type of masculinity that is culturally valued in a given society. Spandler and McKeown (2012) assert that the reproduction of dominant gender relations is complex and subtle. The study shows how hegemonic masculinity operates and legitimizes male authority in subtle but complex ways, while marginalizing women with aspirations for the highest political office. The study also demonstrates how hegemonic masculinity is valorized especially in contexts

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

339

where male dominance is exhibited against women perceived as politically ambitious who are viewed as working to subvert the traditional gender order. Critically, the study demonstrates how analysed posters and chants conflate hegemonic masculinity with heterosexuality and virility. Hegemonic masculinity, just like any other social identity, changes over time and across cultures (Connell and Messerschmitt 2005; Graham 2014). According to Connell (1995), hegemonic masculinity is not permanent and is always prone to contestation at any given moment in society. However, regardless of such shortcomings, the concept is persuasive in discussing Zimbabwean politics as a collision point for hegemonic masculinity, sexism and misogyny.

Methodology The study is qualitative. It employs an explanatory case study design to examine intersections of political discourse, sexism, hegemonic masculinity and misogyny during Operation Restore Legacy. A case study is a qualitative inquiry that aims at gaining an in-depth conception of a given situation and the meaning that the situation has for the parties involved (Yin 2011). Case studies are usually preferred ‘when how or why questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-­ life context’ (Yin 2011: 1). Data was collected especially through ethnographic methods, using observation that enabled the researcher to make ‘thick descriptions’ (see Geertz 1973) of the phenomenon under investigation. On 18 November 2017, Zimbabweans from all walks of life took to the streets in most of the country’s towns and cities calling for Robert Mugabe to resign. My participation in this historic demonstration provided me with an opportunity to reflect on the gendered nature of Zimbabwe’s political space. I was an observer as participant in arguably the largest demonstration that took place in Harare on this particular day. Upon arrival from Gweru (my home), I joined fellow demonstrators at Robert Mugabe Square, which is nearer to the ruling ZANU–PF headquarters. We embarked on an approximately 10 kilometre walk to Zimbabwe Grounds, in the high-density suburb of Highfields, where politicians from across the political divide addressed a bumper crowd. After the address, we marched back to Harare’s Central Business District and proceeded to State House, where we hoped to gain access to Robert Mugabe. However, the military denied this, so we proceeded to Mugabe’s private residence in Borrowdale.

340 

L. NCUBE

Though most of the data was collected during the Harare demonstration, the process begun on my trip to the capital from Gweru. On our way, songs and discussions revolving around Zimbabwe’s political situation dominated, with Grace Mugabe being the main target of sexist ridicule. However, episodes worth thick descriptions were evident on our way to and from Zimbabwe Grounds. I paid close attention to misogynistic and sexist banter directed at Grace Mugabe and its possible symbolic meanings. My specific focus was on songs, chants, slogans, dances, placards and posters. I used my mobile phone to capture both visual and audio material worthy of analysis. During the march, casual conversations with fellow demonstrators also ensued. Purposive sampling was used to select material for analysis (Fig. 14.1).

Fig. 14.1  Demonstrators gathered outside State House after the long march to and from the Highfields suburb. (Source: Author)

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

341

Besides this data obtained through fieldwork, I also took an interest in WhatsApp memes that ridiculed Grace Mugabe during the period under study. Papacharissi (2002) contends that online platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs and online newspapers, offer citizens a public space to produce public opinion. Thus, it was critical to subject these memes to semiotic and qualitative content analysis. Findings are presented in two groups.

Findings ‘General Chiwenga give us a boob-less commander-in-chief’ This study demonstrates that Grace Mugabe was subjected to misogynistic and sexist vitriol during the course of Operation Restore Legacy. Chants, songs and slogans openly denounced Grace, accusing her of harbouring presidential ambitions and straying into a heterogendered male space. A sexist song sung by demonstrators, together with escorting members of the military, supports my observation: General Chiwenga tipeiwo Commander mukuru (General Chiwenga, give us a commander in chief) Tipeiwo commander (Give us a commander) Commander asina mazamu (A boob-less commander in chief) Commander Mnangagwa (Commander in chief Emmerson Mnangagwa)

Susan Rakoczy contends: Sexism is prejudice plus power directed against women, undergirded by the structures of patriarchy. Based on the Latin for ‘father’, pater, it literally means the rule by a father or fathers. In patriarchy, the male is the norm and women are understood to be inferior in every way: biologically, ­intellectually, anthropologically, socially. Women—all women, every woman—are inherently of lesser value than any male human being. (Rakoczy 2004: 10)

The song quoted can be understood in a specific context. Zimbabwe’s president doubles as the Commander in-Chief of the country’s Defence Forces. The country’s military is an integral part of ZANU–PF’s architecture, though it does not conventionally appear as a formal part of the party’s structure. On the eve of Operation Restore Legacy, General

342 

L. NCUBE

Chiwenga stated that the Defence Forces were major stockholders in the ruling ZANU–PF party, so they were intervening to deal with ‘counter-­ revolutionary’ elements that had infiltrated the party (Chidza 2017). Mnangagwa had already been sacked, and speculations were rife that Grace was set to succeed her husband,1 assuming the powerful position of Commander in-Chief of the Defence Forces. In essence, upon joining politics in August 2014, Grace Mugabe had to battle media rumours and speculation that she wanted to succeed her husband (Ankomah 2018). This was coupled with claims that she had instigated a ‘bedroom coup’, usurping her ageing husband’s power to run affairs of the state and ZANU–PF.  This bedroom coup talk is credited to Jabulani Sibanda, a former leader of the war veterans. In 2014, Sibanda, one of Mujuru’s perceived allies, bemoaned that Grace had staged a bedroom and boardroom coup to control the party and government (Matenga 2014). However, Sibanda was denounced by opponents, largely perceived as Mnangagwa sympathizers, who described his comments as treasonous. Incidentally, in November 2017, some of those people who had denounced Sibanda were shouting ‘bedroom coup!’. If the speculation that Grace would become president came to pass, army generals (predominantly male), including Chiwenga, would salute and take orders from a female commander in-chief. And in the song quoted, ZANU–PF members, the army and some members of the general public expressed resentment of the idea of a female president. It appears, the area of discomfort was mazamu/breasts, key features of womanhood. Studies on gender demonstrate that the female body remains a site of contestation. In most cases, misogyny manifests through vilification of female body parts. For instance, in Zimbabwean football stadia, sexist songs revolve around female body parts, such as buttocks and breasts (Chiweshe 2014; Ncube and Chawana 2018). In this case, the country’s president should be a man—without boobs. The demonstrating public also sang and chanted ‘Upresident hausi hwemhuri hwekusiirana’ (presidency is not a family inheritance). Some of the demonstrators shouted, ‘No to Mugabe Dynasty, Grace Stop It’. I submit that such chants were motivated because by this point some 1  However, addressing a press conference at his Borrowdale residence on the eve of the 30 July 2018 disputed Zimbabwe national elections, Robert Mugabe dismissed allegations that he wanted to hand over power to Grace. He said he wanted Sydney Sekeramayi, his former Minister of Defence, to succeed him.

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

343

Zimbabweans hated Robert Mugabe and no longer wanted to be reminded of his 37-year tyrannical rule. During his presidency, Mugabe and his wife had gained a voluminous record of human rights violations, corruption and profligacy in the midst of glaring poverty, with most Zimbabweans living below the poverty line. Moreover, Grace’s ascendancy to the presidency meant a continuation of Mugabeism even in the aftermath of the unpopular dictator. Some members of the demonstrating crowds waved placards bearing pictures of Mnangagwa and shouted, ‘Bring back VP Mnangagwa’. Some chanted, ‘Mnangagwa is our true liberator and hero, Grace you are a nuisance’. Slogans were chanted, such as ‘Pamberi ne Garwe redu woye (Forward with our crocodile). Songs praising Mnangagwa were composed. For instance, people sang: Mnangagwa ingwena (Mnangagwa is a crocodile) Mnangagwa ingwena (Mnangagwa is a crocodile) Tinodawo ngwena yedu itungamire (We want our crocodile to lead the nation) Mnangagwa ndibaba vedu (Mnangagwa is our father)

Mnangagwa’s supporters call him Ngwena/Garwe or crocodile. He earned this nickname during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle when he was a member of the so-called crocodile gang, which was famous for bombing petrol tanks in the industrial area of Southerton in Salisbury (now Harare). Some also say he earned the title from his shrewd tactics, which were similar to those of a crocodile, in outmanoeuvring opponents. Importantly, demonstrators demanded for the appointment of Mnangagwa as president, and not Grace. As argued by Rakoczy (2004), in patriarchal establishments, fathers are legitimized as natural rulers while women are viewed are treated as inferior. Chakona (2011: 14) argues that ‘the term patriarchy refers to autocratic rule by the male head of a family but now it broadly refers to social systems in which power is primarily held by adult men’. Patriarchy is an ideology that idolizes men and minimizes the role of women (Chitando and Mateveke 2012). Indeed, Zimbabwe remains patriarchal, as observed during Operation Restore Legacy. Grace Mugabe was also mocked as ‘Gucci Grace’, arguably for her expensive taste in fashion, which further strained an already ailing Zimbabwean purse. She was equated to Marie Antoinette, the last Queen of France before the 1789 French Revolution that ousted King Louis

344 

L. NCUBE

XVI. I observed that the angry demonstrators pinned all economic problems recurring in Zimbabwe on Grace. Some expressed that Grace spent taxpayers’ money on luxuries in Dubai, Malaysia, Singapore, London and elsewhere. However, it is critical to note that the angry demonstrators overlooked the fact that Zimbabwe’s economic problems went far beyond Grace Mugabe’s expensive lifestyle. The post-2000 period in Zimbabwe is largely regarded in academic circles as the ‘crisis’ decade (Hammar and Raftopolous 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). Name calling and infantilization were also rampant, with Grace being labelled ‘Marujata’, or a talkative village girl. In what can be viewed as a denouncement of female leadership, some (including women) chanted ‘No to petticoat’ (leadership). This reinforces the patriarchal philosophy that women should be confined to the domestic arena. Grace was also vilified and framed as a prostitute. People sang: Taramba kutongwa nehure (we can’t be ruled by a prostitute) VaChiwenga, taramba kutongwa nehure (General Chiwenga we can’t be ruled by a prostitute) Grace uyu ihure (Grace is a prostitute) Hatitongwe nehure isu (We can’t be ruled by a prostitute)

From my conversation with some of the participants, I gathered that Grace was labelled a prostitute owing to allegations that she had become so powerful that she could seduce men on two fronts: in terms of money and physically. The demonization of Grace as a prostitute also partially arose from allegations that she cheated with a lot of men (see Vambe 2014). For instance, there were rumours that she had had an adulterous relationship with prominent businessman and ZANU–PF politician James Makamba. He told the media in 2018 that he had fled Zimbabwe and lived in self-imposed exile, fearing that President Mugabe could kill him over suspicions that he was dating his wife (Mabhena 2018). Moreover, the lampooning of Grace as prostitute was also informed by the fact that it is widely acknowledged she started dating and had children with Robert Mugabe while she was still married to Stanley Goreraza; and Mugabe was still married to Sally, who was on her death bed. It is relevant to note that in patriarchal heteronormative societies such as Zimbabwe, men deliberately associate infidelity with women (Ncube and Chawana 2018). There is a tendency to conveniently pretend that women are the only prostitutes, exonerating their male counterparts from such vilification. In fact, in

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

345

patriarchal societies men are hailed as ‘mabhuru’ (bulls), legitimizing infidelity. Finally, the quoted song appeals to General Chiwenga to redeem the people. It appears they cede their agency to him because he was the main face of Operation Restore Legacy, which had engineered the downfall of the feared and disliked Mugabe couple. Moreover, as Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces, Chiwenga could implement their wishes through deployment of the military, as he had already done. Misogyny and sexism targeting Grace was not only confined to physical spaces but also cascaded into digital sites. Her fall from political grace became a topical subject on most digital social platforms including Twitter, WhatsApp and Facebook. Fig. 14.2 illustrates this assertion.

Fig. 14.2  A manipulated WhatsApp picture of Grace Mugabe bent over, General Chiwenga fucking from behind. (Source: WhatsApp meme)

346 

L. NCUBE

The manipulated picture shows connections of political power, sex and domination. It insinuates that by ‘capturing’ the Executive, Grace had ‘fucked’ her opponents, presumably Mnangagwa and Chiwenga. However, Chiwenga launched Operation Restore Legacy, which ruined and subsequently ended Grace’s political career. This was a way of ‘counter-fucking’ and taming Grace, as reflected in the statement ‘He who fucks last fucks the hardest!’. This was assumed to be the ‘hardest fuck’ Grace had to endure in her life, and symbolises the punishing penises that women must endure (Miller 2014). Sex is often an instrument of domination, and it is as such that it is inseparable from political discourses, which are underpinned by power and domination (Ngoshi and Mutekwa 2013). From the picture, the sex scene and position are worthy thick descriptions. From the background and furniture, it appears the sexual act took place in an office (presumably the President or an army general’s office). This mirrors a power contestation unfolding at the time. Grace’s machinations had already claimed Mnangagwa’s political scalp, and Chiwenga was likely to be the next victim. Thus, he had to counter-fuck Grace before it was too late. To cement that this was not a pleasurable sexual act, in the image General Chiwenga performed the act in his military beret, to underline his superiority as the Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces and army general. The sex position (dog style) depicted also deserves examination, with Grace bending over, Chiwenga thrusting violently behind her. This position allows uninterrupted penetration. Grace is supposed to be experiencing how it feels when ‘real men fuck’. However, Miller (2014: 101) contends that ‘the point is to exaggerate sexual copulation to ridiculous proportions’. This is testified by the portrayal of Chiwenga smiling, an affirmation of performing aggressive masculinity. However, Grace’s face shows misery, shock, trauma and pain. The picture suggests that Grace had never anticipated such humiliation in her political career or life. Viewed through the hegemonic masculinity lens, Chiwenga demonstrated what ‘real men’ do to enforce male dominance and force women into submission. Whitehead (2002) asserts that masculinity is connected to dominance, and the sexual act of intercourse with women is seen symbolically as a powerful confirmation of this connection. Hegemonic masculinity is enforced through a demonstration of virility and libido (Hunter 2005; Stern and Buikema 2013; Graham 2014). Fucking Grace also signifies rape because Operation Restore Legacy was not by mutual consent. For example, in the former Yugoslavia (see Mostov 2000), in the midst of the war, women became rape victims because soldiers believed that this

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

347

was the best way to humiliate their male opponents. In this case, raping Grace was communicating to Robert Mugabe that control was being exercised over him and his wife. Ngoshi and Mutekwa (2013) argue that the female body has always been cast as nurturing, providing sexual pleasure. The fecund female body is often exalted as a metaphor for the authoritarian creed. Moreover, ‘nations consist of sexed and gendered beings, and so the trinity of nation, sexuality and gender cannot be separated when attempting to understand the objectification of women and the exploitation of the female body in the service of particular political creeds and national ends’ (Ngoshi and Mutekwa 2013). According to Mbembe (2006: 163), ‘power dons the face of virility’, owing to the sexualized and gendered nature of political power in which domination is masculinized and subordination is feminized (cited in Ngoshi and Mutekwa 2013). Some of the WhatsApp memes insinuated that Chiwenga was a real man, so his name should be emblazoned in all male lavatories. It can be deduced from this that Chiwenga had done what most men and some women aspire—show power and demonstrate it. This supports the argument by Jewkes et  al. (2015) that hegemonic masculinity is as much for women as for men a cultural ideal of manhood, and both men and women in society aspire to replicate it. Chiwenga was celebrated as a symbol of hegemonic masculinity arguably for successfully taming the ‘deviant’ Grace, who had to an extent transgressed patriarchal norms. In traditional Shona and Ndebele cultures in Zimbabwe, married women and respectable women are not supposed to challenge their husbands in public, but Grace Mugabe challenged her husband and everyone in ZANU–PF, which contradicts male dominance as espoused in Connell’s hegemonic masculinity concept. ‘Like Jezebel, Grace Authored the Downfall of her Husband’ The study shows that some of the chants and slogans demonized Grace Mugabe by framing her as the evil and unpopular Jezebel, King Ahab’s wife. In the Old Testament, in 1 Kings Chapter 21, King Omri fixed a marriage for his son and successor, Ahab, to Jezebel, a queen of Baalism from North Mesopotamia in Tiberius, near the Red Sea. Jezebel brought the worship of Baal to the Israeli kingdom, contrary to Israel’s worship of Yahweh. During Ahab’s reign, Jezebel persecuted the prophets of Yahweh. She controlled King Ahab to the extent that she planned the assassination of Naboth to get his vineyard, Jezreel (field of blood). Some of the

348 

L. NCUBE

protestors expressed that Grace had become powerful and evil as Jezebel did. For instance, in conversations some cited incidents such as the displacement of poor villagers from Manzou farm in Mazowe area on the instructions of Grace, who subsequently turned the place into a wildlife and mining area. The comparison between Grace and Jezebel was also motivated by accusations that Jezebel manipulated Ahab, and in the process contributed to the ending of his reign, largely because she was older than he was. In this instance, Grace was accused of taking advantage of Robert Mugabe largely because she was so much younger: when they married, she was 31; her husband was 72. Just like Jezebel, Grace Mugabe was accused of authoring her husband’s downfall. In this narrative, Operation Restore Legacy was an intervention to save the country since King Ahab (Robert Mugabe) was no longer in the driving seat, but instead an ambitious Jezebel (Grace Mugabe). Just like Jezebel, Grace had become feared and untouchable. Critically, King Ahab was dethroned and killed by King Jehu of Damascus at a time when Jezebel had no son to take up the Omride throne. Likewise, the protesting public in Harare expressed the feeling that Mugabe was ousted at a time when Grace’s sons were still young to dream of succeeding their father. It was alleged that Grace had become the de facto President of Zimbabwe, as demonstrated by the manner in which she publicly denounced senior government officials, including Vice-President Mnangagwa. The general sentiment was that Grace had captured the Executive, so she had to be stopped before she further debased state power. For example, Fig. 14.3 shows a tweet from 15 November 2017 that was purportedly posted under the official ZANU–PF Twitter handle, suggesting that Operation Restore Legacy had been motivated by the desire to deal with criminals (G40 members) and a woman (Grace) who were taking advantage of an aged Mugabe. On the same day (15 November 2017), screenshots of a tweet by United States of America-based Zimbabwean musician Thomas Mapfumo trended on WhatsApp. The tweet also insinuated that Grace’s behaviour triggered the chaos that resulted in the military intervention (Fig. 14.4). Mapfumo’s tweet constructed Grace as somebody who lacked wisdom and composure. Consequently, her character made the situation untenable. Grace was therefore supposed to shoulder the blame for actively contributing to the ousting of her husband from the presidency. This is because Grace had threatened patriarchy by venturing into a perceived

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

349

Fig. 14.3  A tweet allegedly from the ZANU–PF handle claiming that there was no coup, but military action that aimed to help Mugabe, who had been taken advantage of by his wife

masculine space. ‘Historically-constituted male dominated spaces assume considerable importance in a changing world where traditional places and times for men’s exclusive association are disappearing’, resulting in many men experiencing a loss of control’ (Gruneau and Whitson (1993: 192). Some of the tweets mockingly thanked Grace for assisting Zimbabweans in removing Mugabe. An example was posted by Trevor Ncube on 15 November 2017 (Fig. 14.5). Trevor Ncube is the chairperson of Alpha Media Holdings, publisher of Zimbabwe’s vibrant daily newspaper NewsDay and two weeklies, The Standard and The Independent. Grace’s contribution to the fall of Mugabe was applauded, albeit in a satirical manner. Since 2000, especially since the arrival of the Movement for Democratic Change in the political arena,

350 

L. NCUBE

Fig. 14.4  Tweet by prominent Zimbabwean musician Mapfumo suggesting that Grace’s character had triggered Operation Restore Legacy. (Source: Thomas Mapfumo’s Twitter handle)

opposition groups had tried in vain to remove Mugabe from power without success. However, Grace’s actions chronicled earlier, especially the accusations that she had captured the Executive, triggered Operation Restore Legacy. Some of the memes featured both Robert and Grace Mugabe. However, they were sympathetic to Robert Mugabe while vilifying the figure of Grace. An example is Fig. 14.6. The image depicts a shabbily dressed, hopeless and worried Grace seeking refuge from her equally disgraced husband. The image is a mockery of the usually neatly and expensively dressed former first lady. In the image, Mugabe blames Grace for their miserable situation. ‘I told you, leave Mnangagwa alone, but you persisted’, Mugabe is saying. However, Grace

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

351

Fig. 14.5  Trevor Ncube’s tweet, sarcastically commending Grace’s contribution in the downfall of her husband. (Source: Trevor Ncube’s Twitter handle)

is defensive (perhaps Zimbabweans’ general view of her). In the picture, she challenges her husband to think about their next destination since they have lost power. Mugabe’s supposed utterance that he had warned Grace not to continue fighting Mnangagwa is gendered. It creates an impression that there was no way a woman would prevail in a power contest with a man. Hegemonic masculinity should be viewed as a particular configuration of gender practice related to legitimizing male authority (Connell 1995; Flood 2002). However, Mugabe’s statement here can be historicized and contextualized in his long-time relationship with Mnangagwa, who had worked as his assistant from the days of the liberation struggle. In that respect, Mugabe was aware Mnangagwa had the potential to remove him from power, since he knew his strengths and weaknesses.

352 

L. NCUBE

Fig. 14.6  A manipulated WhatsApp image of Robert Mugabe blaming a miserable-looking Grace for their demise. (Source: WhatsApp meme)

Grace’s presumed response ‘Robert STOP IT’ humorously reminds people of the days when Grace earned the moniker ‘Dr STOP IT’ during her ‘Meet the People’ and ‘Youth Interface’ rallies. During these events, Grace vilified her opponents, and those accused of transgressing ZANU– PF ideology were warned to ‘STOP IT’, or else she would flash a red card. With Operation Restore Legacy emasculating Grace’s powers, her fall from political grace triggered social media delight. Siziba and Ncube (2015) contend that satirical social media memes can be read as a form of weapon by the weak and oppressed, who cannot ordinarily openly mock the figure and person of the President of Zimbabwe (Fig. 14.7). The study shows that just like other WhatsApp memes trending during this period, Grace was depicted as dejected and traumatized. Contrastingly, Robert is imagined as smartly dressed and looking relaxed. Such images are a complete reversal of the powerful Grace Mugabe that Zimbabweans

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

353

Fig. 14.7  A WhatsApp meme that trended on 24 November 2017, on the inauguration of President Emmerson Mnangagwa. (Source: WhatsApp meme)

had become accustomed to. It appears she struggled to accept the reality that somebody other than her husband was now the President of Zimbabwe. From the satirical memes portraying a powerless Grace, it can be deduced that she was being reminded that guns wielded by soldiers during Operation Restore Legacy were real instruments of power and not the regular verbal insults she used during ZANU–PF rallies. Foucault (1980) contends that power is seen in its external form at the point where it is in direct and immediate relationship with that we can provisionally call its object, its target, its field of application; that is, where it installs itself and produces its real effects.

Conclusion This study’s major conclusion is that hegemonic masculinity, sexism, and misogynism were strongly discursive during Operation Restore Legacy. Despite efforts to redress gender imbalances, Zimbabwe remains patriarchal. Women’s participation in the public sphere, politics, and strategic managerial positions, among other things, remains limited. Using the case of Grace Mugabe, we see that the view that women should be restricted to the private sphere persists. Male-gendered domination and a perpetuation

354 

L. NCUBE

of gender exclusion are evident. By the time Mugabe was ousted from office, his wife Grace had become a powerful and feared figure who was running the party, state and government. She was set to succeed an ageing Mugabe and extend Mugabeism. Critically, Grace was on the verge of making history by becoming the first female President of Zimbabwe, albeit through unpopular and undemocratic methods. However, the military, through Major-General Sibusiso Moyo, declared Operation Restore Legacy in November 2017, claiming that they were dealing with ‘counter-­ revolutionary’ elements that were destabilizing the ruling ZANU–PF and government. The study submits that at subtext level, military intervention was motivated by the desire to thwart the political dreams of a courageous and ambitious woman who was on the verge of breaking into a traditionally male domain. Apart from the military and ZANU–PF politicians, some members of Zimbabwean society who participated in demonstrations that called for Mugabe to stand down denounced Grace’s presidential dreams. It was evident that these people were hostile to the idea of female leadership in general. The study indicates that in terms of female participation in the public sphere in general and in politics in particular, Zimbabwe is still prejudiced by a gendered, phallocentric, sexist and misogynistic society. Critically, the chapter widens scholarship on gender and politics in Africa, illuminating the gendered dimensions of African political spaces. Politics and state political institutions in Zimbabwe are constructed as masculine domains, which are seen as naturally controlled and led by males.

References Ankomah, B. 2018. Old Wine in a New Bottle? New African. January. Asuelime, E. 2018. A Coup or Not a Coup: That Is the Question in Zimbabwe. Journal of African Foreign Affairs 5 (1): 5–24. Barnes, T.A. 1999. We Women Worked So Hard: Gender, Urbanisation and Social Reproduction in Colonial Harare, Zimbabwe, 1930–1956. Portsmouth: Heinemann. Chakona, L. 2011. Fast Track Land Reform Programme and Women in Goromonzi District, Zimbabwe. MA Thesis, Rhodes University, SA. Chibuwe, A. 2016. The Herald and Daily News’ Framing of the Leaked Zimbabwean Draft Constitution and Vice President Joice Mujuru’s Fall from Grace. International Journal of Communication 10: 1660–1676. Chidza, R. 2017. Chiwenga Calls Mugabe to Order. Newsday, November 14, 2017: 1.

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

355

Chikafa, R. 2014. Zimbabwean Female Audiences: Negotiating Engendered Spaces in the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In African Football, Identity Politics and Global Media Narratives, ed. T. Chari and N.A. Mhiripiri, 106–120. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chitando, E., and P.  Mateveke. 2012. Challenging Patriarchy and Exercising Women’s Agency in Zimbabwean Music: Analysing the Careers of Chiwoniso Maraire and Olivia Charamba. Muziki 9 (2): 41–52. Chiweshe, M. 2014. One of the Boys: Female Fans’ Responses to the Masculine and Phallocentric Nature of Football Stadiums in Zimbabwe. Critical African Studies 6 (2-3): 211–222. Connell, R.W. 1987. Gender and Power. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ———. 1995. Masculinities. Berkeley: University of California. ———. 2000. The Men and the Boys. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. ———. 2005. Globalization, Imperialism, and Masculinities. In Handbook of Studies on Men & Masculinities, ed. M.S. Kimmel, J. Hearn, and R.W. Connell, 71–89. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Connell, R.W., and J.W. Messerschmitt. 2005. Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept. Gender and Society 19: 829–859. Donaldson, M. 1993. What Is Hegemonic Masculinity? Theory and Society 22 (5): 643–657. Flood, M. 2002. Between Men and Masculinity: An Assessment of the Term ‘Masculinity’ in Recent Scholarship on Men. In Manning the Next Millennium: Studies in Masculinities, ed. S.  Pearce and V.  Muller, 203–213. Perth: Black Swan. Foucault, M. 1980. Power/Knowledge. Brighton: Harvester Press. Gaidzanwa, R.B. 1985. Images of Women in Zimbabwe Literature. Harare: College Press. Gee, S. 2009. Mediating Sport, Myth, and Masculinity: The National Hockey League’s ‘Inside the Warrior’ Advertising Campaign. Sociology of Sport Journal 26: 578–598. Geertz, C. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New  York: Basic Books. Graham, L. 2014. But I’ve Got Something that Makes me Different’: Young Men’s Negotiation of Masculinities. South African Review of Sociology 45 (3): 1–19. Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Gruneau, R., and D. Whitson. 1993. Hockey Night in Canada: Sport, Identities and Cultural Politics. Toronto: Garamond Press. Gudlanga, E. 2013. Shutting them out: Opportunities and Challenges of women’s Participation in Zimbabwean Politics-a Historical Perspective. Journal of Third World Studies 30: 151–170.

356 

L. NCUBE

Hammar, A.B., and B.  Raftopolous. 2003. Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation. Harare: Weaver Press. Hearn, J. 2012. A Multi-Faceted Power Analysis of men’s Violence to Known Women: From Hegemonic Masculinity to the Hegemony of Men. The Sociological Review 60 (4): 589–610. Hunter, M. 2005. Cultural Politics and Masculinities: Multiple Partners in Historical Perspective in KwaZulu-Natal. Culture, Health & Sexuality 7 (4): 389–403. Jewkes, R., et al. 2015. Hegemonic Masculinity: Combining Theory and Practice in Gender Interventions. Culture, Health & Sexuality 17 (2): 112–127. Mabhena, C. 2018. James Makamba Nearly Killed Over Grace Mugabe Affair. ZWNEWS, June 10, 2018. Available at: https://zwnews.com/ mugabe-makamba-dating-grace-mugabe/ Machivenyika, F. 2017. VP Mnangagwa Fired from Government. The Herald, November 6, p. 1. Matenga, M. 2014. ‘We Reject Bedroom Coup’ Jabulani Sibanda. Newsday, October 27, p. 1. Mbembe, A. 2006. On the Postcolony: A Brief Response to Critics. African Identities 4 (2): 143–178. Mhiripiri, N.A. 2011. ‘Welcome Singing Sungura Queens’: Cultural Studies and the Promotion of Female Musicans in a Male-Dominated Zimbabwean Music Genre. Muziki 8 (1): 103–119. Miller, K. 2014. On that Island of Broken Penises. Caribbean Quarterly 60 (4): 101–105. https://doi.org/10.1080/00086495.2014.11672538. Mostov, J. 2000. Sexing the Nation/Desexing the Body: Politics of National Identity in the Former Yugoslavia. In Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation, ed. T. Mayer, 89–110. London: Routledge. Mutopo, P., and M. Chiweshe. 2014. Large-Scale Land Deals, Global Capital and the Politics of Livelihoods: Experiences of Women Small-Holder Farmers in Chisumbanje, Zimbabwe. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies 9 (1): 84–99. Ncube, L. 2014. The Beautiful Game? Football, Power, Identities and Development in Zimbabwe. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Centre for Communication Media and Society, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. ———. 2018. Highlander Ithimu Yezwelonke’: Intersections of Highlanders FC Fandom and Ndebele Ethnic Nationalism in Zimbabwe. Sport in Society 21 (9): 1364–1381. Ncube, L., and F.T.  Chawana. 2018. What Is in a Song?: Constructions of Hegemonic Masculinity by Zimbabwean Football Fans. Muziki. https://doi. org/10.1080/18125980.2018.1503560.

14  MISOGYNY, SEXISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY IN ZIMBABWE’S… 

357

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2009. Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist? Trajectories on Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Post-Colonial State. Oxford/Bern: Peter Lang AG International Academic Publishers. Ngoshi, H.T., and A. Mutekwa. 2013. The Female Body and Voice in Audiovisual Political Propaganda Jingles: The Mbare Chimurenga Choir Women in Zimbabwe’s Contested Political Terrain. Critical Arts 27 (2): 235–248. Nhongo-Simbanegavi, J. 2000. For Better or Worse? Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle. Harare: Weaver Press. Papacharissi, Z. 2002. The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere. New Media & Society 4: 9–27. Peled, I. 2016. Visualising Masculinities, the Gala, Hegemony and Mesopotamian Iconography. Near Eastern Archaeology 79 (3): 158–165. Rakoczy, S. 2004. In Her Name: Women Doing Theology. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Ranchod-Nilsson, S. 2006. Gender Politics and the Pendulum of Political and Social Transformation in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies 32 (1): 49–67. Siziba, G., and G. Ncube. 2015. Mugabe’s Fall from Grace: Satire and Fictional Narratives as Silent Forms of Resistance in/on Zimbabwe. Social Dynamics 41 (3): 516–539. https://doi.org/10.1080/02533952.2015.1106124. Spandler, H., and M. McKeown. 2012. A Critical Exploration of Using Football in Health and Welfare Programs: Gender, Masculinities and Social Relations. Journal of Sport & Social Issues 36: 387–409. Stern, E., and R.  Buikema. 2013. The Relational Dynamics of Hegemonic Masculinity among South African Men and Women in the Context of HIV. Culture, Health & Sexuality 15 (9): 1–15. Tendi, M.B. 2016. State Intelligence and Politics of Zimbabwe’s Presidential Succession. African Affairs 22 (1): 203–224. Vambe, L. 2014. Grace Mugabe: Trophy Wife’s Adulterous Relationships with 5 Men. Zimbabwe News, May 24, 2016. Available at: http://www.thezimbabwenewslive.com/health-fitness-19718-grace-mugabe-trophy-wifes-adulterousrelationships-with-5-men.html Whitehead, S.M. 2002. Men and Masculinities: Key Themes and New Directions. Cambridge: Polity. Yin, R.K. 2011. Qualitative Research from Start to Finish. New  York: The Guilford Press. Zimbabwe’s Constitution of 2013.

CHAPTER 15

Foreign Direct Investment in the Post-Mugabe Era Mkhululi Sibindi

Introduction Given the nature of Zimbabwe’s economy and politics, there is no doubt that the political competence of the new government (November 2017) will be measured on how it returns a failed economy to productivity. In this context, the new government has made an effort to reach out to the international community in search of foreign direct investment (FDI). This chapter examines whether the Zimbabwean economy is a compatible FDI host market. Central to the discussion is defining what FDI is and the motives of multinational enterprises (MNEs), which are agents of FDI. In view of MNEs’ motives, the discussion extends to illuminate the decision to invest in a specific host market, together with the role of government in the internationalization process (Sibindi 2019). Documented evidence suggests that the flow of FDI and the selection of probable host markets is informed by the motives of MNEs, which are informed by transaction cost theory (the essence of the firm). In this view,

M. Sibindi (*) Business Management, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_15

359

360 

M. SIBINDI

transaction cost creates path dependency, with host market selection revolving around the size of the economy, size of supporting industry, consumer index, and infrastructure and capital market development. This chapter assesses if Zimbabwe can advance MNEs’ objectives. The discussion revolves around three major academic disciplines: political economy, international trade, and economics and business. The demise of Robert Mugabe as a President of the Republic of Zimbabwe brought with it a wave of political and economic optimism. In his 37  years at the helm, President Mugabe led Zimbabwe to political, social and economic deadlock. His economic policies outright destroyed an economy that was once referred as the bread basket of Africa (Mlambo 2017). There is no doubt that Mugabe’s political disaster had a causal impact on the economy of the country. In the first ten years of independence, Mugabe, a former guerrilla fighter, emerged without a clear economic philosophy, combining communist and capitalist principles as a matter of convenience rather than a matter of principle (Kanyeze , Chitambara and Tyson 2017). The economy remained stable in the first decade of Mugabe’s rule, but strains of economic decay and mismanagement started to emerge as it drew to a close (Sachikonye 2016). In response, the government adopted an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), which endeavoured to reposition the economy according to the new economic equilibrium and was strongly supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Nyabereka 2017). The first ESAP, which had a lifespan of five years, targeted to transform the economy towards a market-driven philosophy, promoting higher growth and poverty reduction through four fundamental paradigm shift approaches. First, the adjustment programme proposed the reduction of parastatal and fiscal budgets, spending and deficits. Second, it proposed liberalizing trade regulations and the foreign exchange system. Third, it suggested that Zimbabwe should carry out domestic deregulation. Fourth, it suggested that as sustaining a skill base is key to economic growth, it recommended the establishment of training programmes for vulnerable societies. Despite heavy financial backing from the World Bank and the IMF, which amounted to US$ 400 million a year for two years, there were no significant results, although there was a slight relaxation of trade policies and improvement in production exports; there was also evidence of slight improvement in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors. The IMF audit

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

361

committee concluded that ESAP had had no substantial results in employment creation and poverty alleviation. It reduced government spending by less than 5%. After the demise of ESAP in 1998, the economic situation took an unprecedented nosedive between the years 2000 and 2008 (Kavila and Le Roux 2016). Manufacturing was at its lowest, most industries closed and inflation skyrocketed to more than 89.7 sextrillion % at its peak, probably the worst inflation record in the recent past and arguably the worst in world economic history—even compared with the Weimar Republic (Reckendrees 2015; Stolper 2017) and Yugoslavia (Lyon 1996). In the closing stages of 2008, the government introduced the Zimbabwean dollar and introduced a multicurrency, of which the American (US) dollar emerged as a major medium of exchange (Mlambo 2015). The economy seemed to stabilise, but the central bank had no control of money supply, hence economic intervention policies (monetary policy) were both not feasible and ineffective. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the introduction of the multicurrency economy was able to stop inflation, the economic fundamentals were not adjusted to stimulate growth. Industries were not resuscitated, infrastructure continued to become more dilapidated, and the decay of corruption and economic mismanagement was not arrested. Many controversial indigenization laws were passed. After five years, US dollars became scarce, and their limited circulation and liquidity problems had an impact on an already fragmented economy (Nyabereka 2017). On the political scenario, the landscape rapidly changed as well. Quite unexpectedly, in November 2017 internal squabbles within Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) forced Robert Mugabe to fire his deputy Emmerson Mnangagwa, who self-exiled in South Africa. In his absence, the military rolled out tanks (in what was later known as Operation Restore Order) and besieged Harare, and finally Mugabe fell from grace. Mnangagwa emerged as a leader of ZANU–PF and the President of Zimbabwe. Although he won general election in 2018, narrowly defeating Nelson Chamisa of the Movement of the Democratic Change Alliance, his legitimacy was a subject of debate around political and legal circles. However, on 24 August 2018, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe dismissed claims that the election process had flawed and unanimously declared Mnangagwa as the winner. The fall of Mugabe and the ascendancy of Mnangagwa as the new president signalled a new era in Zimbabwe’s political and economic landscape.

362 

M. SIBINDI

Nevertheless, the new government faced a problem synonymous with most developing economies: an acute shortage of national saving to finance investments. The country is in perennial need of foreign investment to stimulate economic growth. Consequently, in order to fix the economy and stimulate growth, members of the new government have undertaken global tours to promote Zimbabwe as a potential investment destination. In this endeavour to stimulate FDI, many economic and political analysts have examined a series of aspects that are intertwined in international economics, business and trade. The overarching objective of this chapter is to explore these. In this context, we focus on four fundamental aspects of FDI. The first section defines FDI and the motives of MNEs (agents of FDI). The second section explores the determinants of FDI in host markets. The third section explores the role of government in international business. The fourth section explores the response of the government to market failures.

What Is Foreign Direct Investment? Perhaps the most confusing aspect of FDI is a definition of the term. In most cases, political and economic commentators confuse foreign aid and FDI. For this reason, it is imperative to explore the fundamental aspects that distinguish them. Foreign aid is a form of aid from a donor organization that has no commercial or profit objectives. Most sources of foreign aid are non-­ governmental organizations that are involved in charity work (Nwaogu and Ryan 2015). Quite frequently, they have a specific function, and the aid is distributed to particular communities through community networks and leadership (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim 2014). This type of funding seemingly confuses many economic analysts, who assume that MNEs blindly invest in a particular host market simply because there is a shortage of capital or the government is making an effort to attract FDI. FDI has been defined by a series of seminal and contemporary studies as follows. The IMF (2011) regards it as a classification of international investment that reflects the purpose of a firm established in one economic market in acquisition of control in a firm established outside the country of its origin. Subsequently, the IMF regards the firm as a channel of direct investment in the host market, whereas the domestic firm is considered to be a direct recipient (Aregbeshola 2014). Likewise, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2009) says FDI

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

363

“reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy (‘direct investor’) in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor (‘direct investment enterprise’)”. This hypothetical framework points out long-term vested interests as well as underlining the presence of a lengthy commercial bond between the enterprise and the investor with regard to ownership and control of the investment in the host market (Aregbeshola 2014). Furthermore, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 1999: 4) describes FDI as “an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity (the foreign investor or parent enterprise) of one country in an enterprise (foreign affiliate) resident in a country other than that of the foreign investor”. The IMF (2015) asserts that FDI is considered to occur in the following form as equity capital, reinvested earnings and other capital: • Equity capital is regarded to be the monetary value of the currency injection of an MNE investment in capital structure (ordinary share) of the enterprises; this transaction occurs through merger and acquisition. An injection of capital worth more than 10% of ordinary shares or control stake in an enterprise is mostly regarded as a lever of power over the activities of the enterprise. • Studies define retained earnings as a fraction of disposable profits, not given to shareholders as dividends but instead reinvested as a form of capital either to pay debts or to revamp the firm core activities or both. As such, retained earnings are considered to be part of the shareholders’ equity. From a financial viewpoint, retained earnings indicate the performance of a business as a going concern. • Other forms of direct investment capital are considered to be shortand long-term debt and borrowing, which entails financial instruments such as debt securities, credits and a suppliers’ network between foreign associates and direct investors. The investing firm might also avail itself of assets and machinery that is used for productive purposes. Understanding Sources of FDI This section highlights the nature and motivations of MNEs.

364 

M. SIBINDI

Consistent with the discussion in the next section, FDI is considered to be an investment of more than 10% of ordinary stock from an organization resident in one economic market to an enterprise resident in another market (the host market). In this view, MNEs are business entities that are governed by the theory of the firm, which borders on Corse’s seminal work on transaction cost theory (1937) and conclusions drawn by Williamson (1990, 1995, 2010, 2015). Therefore, it is imperative to highlight underlying concepts of the theory of the firm and transaction costs. The Nature of MNEs There is a consensus among economists and business scientists that the ultimate goal of a firm is to make a profit and to enhance shareholder equity. In order to gain an insight into the behaviour of MNEs as they endeavour to create variables that promote and sustain investment in host countries, we have to explore their ultimate objectives. According to Coase (1937), Augier and Teece (2009) and Williamson (1998) a firm is a black box of decision that optimises resource allocation to maximise profits. The theoretical concept of a black box not only defines the relationship between risk and return, but it also explains factors that attract capital movement, those risk factors created by both macroand micro environmental factors that influence international capital. The theory of the firm as expounded by Coase (1937, 1998) asserts that every firm exists to maximise profits, a point echoed by Baumol (1958) and Stevens (2018). In the concept of profit maximization, firms measure where the optimal level of profits is achieved. The assumption is that they adjust the marginal cost of production to the marginal revenue. The relationship between the two will inevitably give a distance between extra cost and extra revenue, which will define profit margins and hence confirm the theory of the firm. Furthermore, according to Camilleri (2018), firms in a monopolistic competition are nothing but agents that are aiming to increase the value of return. Pitelis and Teece (2009) augment the concept, indicating that a typical firm’s overriding objective is to achieve maximum returns. This chapter assumes that the objectives of MNEs are fundamental in investment trends and subsequent micro-level mechanisms that attempt to achieve set objectives within a specified trading period.

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

365

Motives of MNEs According to Ghauri (2018), understanding MNE motives allows a detailed insight regarding the pattern and selection of host markets. MNEs invest in different markets for different motives and rationales; in this understanding, the motivation behind FDI is not exclusive. Without a doubt, the motives of MNEs are deemed to affect investment patterns and the subsequent behaviour of multinational firms in offshore markets. Furthermore, evidence from various studies indicates that MNEs’ motives change over time and are determined by internal variables, such as firm structure and key competencies, as well as aspects of individual host markets (Dunning 2015). Literature in this field agrees that firm motivation has a direct impact on FDI patterns and host market selection (Teece 2014). MNEs select host markets that are conducive to business objectives or where business and political risks can be easily mitigated, and/or where business opportunities can be exploited. In an attempt to examine the relationship between MNEs’ motives and the selection of host markets in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, this discussion uses Dunning’s classical eclectic model as the lens through which to view the linkages between MNEs’ motives and host markets. Cantwell and Verbeke (2017) assert that the most-cited influential taxonomy of multinational motives is advocated by Dunning: the OLI model (or eclectic theory); therefore, Dunning’s work is the overriding principle of our analysis. The eclectic model asserts why a firm decides to invest in those global markets in which it will be most able to sustain its investments: this involves ownership advantage (O), location advantage (L) and internationalization advantage (I). Resource-seeking, in this context the focal motive for outward FDI, enhances a firm’s strategic objectives by accumulating and employing a specific category of resources that are either not available in domestic markets (raw materials or natural resources) or are accessible at a cost-effective rate in host markets. These can include, for instance, labour or energy. The resource-seeking motive is regarded as a pull factor from host markets. Consideration by MNEs will take into account pricing and the availability of production factors. Owing to economic failure and the current performance of Zimbabwe’s economy, production factors are both scarce and expensive. For instance, most fuel and energy is imported, primarily from South Africa, so it would be difficult for MNEs to select the country as a

366 

M. SIBINDI

possible FDI destination given the challenges around transaction costs, which might undermine the theory of the firm that governs the essence of MNEs (Sibindi 2019). In market-seeking, MNEs invest in a host economy to enhance their strategic objectives by exploiting the prospects granted by the size of the economy. A number of objectives are influential in this decision. MNEs invest in host markets to serve potential customers and suppliers in foreign markets. They might attempt to develop goods and services in line with host market demands, effectively reducing the transaction cost by eliminating the cost of serving a market from their country of origin. In the recent past, MNEs have invested in a market as a strategic move to control entry and exit barriers (Dunning 2015). Notwithstanding the fact that most products consumed in Zimbabwe are imported from South Africa, MNEs have not begun to occupy the market so they can reduce transaction costs. There are a number of reasons that might contribute to this, but the most obvious one is the size of the economy, which is determined by support industries in terms of both suppliers and customer network. Over the years of record hyperinflation, Zimbabwean industries have depleted to nothing. Despite the small size of the economy, the country’s purchasing power parity is the lowest in the world, and it has been regarded as one of the worst performing economies in the world between 2004 – 2009 and 2018 to present. The current state of the economy is not encouraging for any MNE. Efficiency-seeking is a dual approach in which market- and firm-level aspects are deemed to be interdependent. In the first strand, MNEs take advantage of costs and the convenience of particular factors in different host markets. In the second strand, they exploit economies of scale, scope and supply, as well as consumer taste in host markets. This links firm-­ specific aspects and market-level considerations. Taking this into account, from a firm-level perspective, conditions in Zimbabwe are not conducive for MNEs to profitably exploit business opportunities. A number of aspects are influential in this regard, including the factors already discussed that will increase transaction costs. Estimates of these costs might eliminate the suitability of a particular destination.

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

367

Host Market Determinants of FDI This section links country or market variables that are favourable to outward FDI.  A number of studies are presented to illuminate the linkage between firm heterogeneity and aspects of a host market. Establishing this link allows an insight into how MNEs select possible host markets. According to Alfaro (2017) and Sibindi (2019), market size is important in host market selection; this buttresses the concept that a huge market enhances the efficiency of resource utilization and the exploitation of economies of scale. For instance, numerous empirical studies assert that there is a causal linkage between the size of a market and the volume of inward FDI. This is reinforced by evidence from classic and contemporary empirical literature. In the recent past, emperical studies have established that there is a causal relation between population, market size and inward FDI. Likewise, a series of recent studies has established that gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate is a substantial explanatory variable; however, total GDP is not. This indicates that the size of a host market’s national income is insignificant, hence increases might not be too relevant to FDI decisions or MNEs’ growth prospects. In the context of firm motivations we have already explored, it can be deduced that market size is fundamental to FDI. Zimbabwe’s market size is very small, with a population of at most 16 million signifying that the total market size is smaller. Prospective MNEs will face challenges of resource utilization. In addition, macro-economic indicators suggest that the Zimbabwean economy has no stability or economic growth. Unemployment is very high, with national statistics indicating than more than 80% of the able-­ bodied population is unemployed. Economic indicators already mentioned suggest that from the perspective of MNEs, the country would not be a competitive investment destination. According to Aregbeshola (2014), existing studies about the significance of trade openness to inward FDI are inconclusive. Trade openness is measured in two ways: first, by the impact of imports on the value of GDP; secondly, by the contribution of exports to overall GDP. Inward FDI is inclined towards the tradable sector of a host market’s exposure to global trade, which must be considered when an investment decision is made. The whole argument hinges on the “tariff-jumping” assumption: MNEs decide to invest in a host market either through a subsidiary or a

368 

M. SIBINDI

merger or both, if they face a challenge in exporting their products to prospective markets. In contrast, exporting MNEs may select to invest in a host market since trade imperfections cause transaction costs. Consequently, when MNEs invest in host markets that they have been serving through exports, they reduce transaction costs significantly (Mourao 2017). Despite the fact that a considerable number of Zimbabwe’s consumer goods and other commodities are imported from neighbouring countries, mainly South Africa and Botswana, MNEs from these countries are seemingly reluctant to invest in Zimbabwe such that they could service the market and reduce transaction costs. There are a number of reasons for this. As noted, the economic situation in Zimbabwe is not conducive to any business, whether a domestic or multinational firm. Consequently, in view of the challenges in the economic environment, MNEs apparently find no reason to invest in a host market where they would be most unlikely to recoup both transaction costs and sunk costs. A surge of recent literature regards wages and other labour costs as one of the aspects that is most important in the volume and direction of FDI. This assumption is validated by the fact that labour costs influence the cost of production, and is supported by proponents of both the dependency hypothesis and the modernization hypothesis, even though the viewpoints of these two schools of thought tend to contrast. Nevertheless, despite being postulated in both theoretical and empirical studies, there is no substantial evidence of the causal relationship between inward FDI and wage ratio in host markets. Furthermore, a number of empirical studies cast doubt on the substance of the relationship between wages and inflows of FDI in host markets. Deng and Yang (2015) conclude that a higher wage ratio in the host market discourages potential investors. In addition, according to Anyanwu (2015), the nexus between wage rates and inward investment is inconclusive; the study concludes that MNEs are motivated by skills competency in host markets. In view of the political stability of host markets, many studies are inconclusive about whether the political stability of host markets has an impact on inward FDI flows. Circumstantial evidence indicates that if a prospective host market has the potential to increase the return on foreign investment for MNEs, the investment trends both in terms of volume and direction are far less affected by the political instability of the host nation. This scenario is more pronounced in the mining industry if a host nation has significant resources to exploit, but if there is political insecurity MNEs

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

369

use their size to reduce the risk—by using their own security services and developing their own infrastructure (Lindberg and Sverrisson 2016). In the context of Zimbabwe’s economic, business and economic environment, government intervention through policy regulation has been one of the biggest setbacks to international investment. In a series of trade regulations, the Zimbabwean government passed controversial indigenous laws that allowed at least a 51% controlling stake for black Zimbabweans. Such policies create a degree of uneasiness for existing foreign investment and make it difficult for such a destination to be attractive to future FDI.

The Role of Government in Business Internationalization In an attempt to gain insight into the roles of the Zimbabwean government, this discussion embraces two approaches. First, the discussion considers a neoclassical theory of competitive general equilibrium theory (Arrow-Debreu 1954). Second, traditional market failure arguments are examined, concurrently with an outline of the type of intervention undertaken by the government to encourage inward FDI.  The section disregards both outward FDI and exports, as does the rest of the chapter. In the discussion about market failure, we detail some of the existing studies that argue for a broader response to business internationalization by the government. This embraces both firms’ needs and the requirement to guarantee that they have the right incentives when they undertake essential adjustments to macro-environmental changes, owing to trade investment liberalization and other aspects of globalization. According to the neoclassical Arrow-Debreu (1954), and Kurz (1974), the theory of the perfectly competitive general equilibrium economy asserts that the market comprises entities who are motivated by self-­ interest, firms that exist to maximize wealth and individuals who exist to maximize utility, engaging in the production, exchange and consumption of products and services. Through this interaction, they provide an allocation of resources that mutually beneficial. An efficient allocation of resources synchronizes the utility-maximizing options for consumers with the profit maximization option for firms. Market equilibrium determines the optimum quantity of goods that are produced and consumed. Through this process, firms maximize social welfare. In this argument, an individual can be better off without at the same time making another individual

370 

M. SIBINDI

worse off (welfare economics): in such a process, the allocation of resources is Pareto-efficient. Conversely, in reality, markets might not be perfectly competitive and might not produce an efficient allocation of resources. Deviation from the norm is called market inefficiency. This is caused by certain traits of goods and services, such as the existence of externalities or public goods, and factors in the market, for instance monopoly, oligopoly and inadequate information. This discussion assumes that government intervention might neither hinder nor enhance multinational activity and FDI. A common justification for government intervention is the supposition that there is a market inefficiency owing to a lack of information or that it is either inaccurate or incomplete, which hampers market players’ ability to access information, and affects its cost. Market inefficiency in both resource and goods markets hinders the process of internationalization and FDI, since prospective market players (buyers and sellers) need complete information about potential investments, suppliers, customers and prices and quantity of goods traded. The interaction between buyers and sellers is enabled through a system that results mostly in small and valued short-term transactions, because of the uncertainty and unreliability of buyers and sellers (Besedes and Prusa 2004; Christodoulopoulou 2010). Consequently, a poor match will terminate a relationship, whereas an excellent match between market players will enhance mutual benefits. In effect, even though they only have a modest value, small orders play an essential role in creating trade flows (Harris and Moffat 2011). A major factor here is that entering a foreign market, especially a developing economy such as Zimbabwe’s, involves huge sunk costs for the initial investment. To mitigate costly and abortive investment, small orders give a strong indication to a prospective investor that the market is sustainable and beneficial. Table 15.1 shows market failures that impede the internationalization of business. The argument that small orders indicate a sustainable future investment is reinforced by Besedes and Prusa (2004) in an empirical study that uses data from in US firms concluded that “many trade relationships start small but those that start large have a longer duration. The more reliable the supplier, the greater the fraction of trade that starts large. Relationships involving more reliable suppliers have a longer duration. The data indicate the chance of a trade relationship ending is highest during the first few years (i.e. the learning phase) and a small fraction of relationships end even after the supplier has proven to be successful.”

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

371

Table 15.1  Taxonomy of market failures impeding internationalization Type Market failure owing to imperfect markets Imperfect information Asymmetric information Financial barriers Missing markets Appropriability failure Barriers to entry and exit Sunk costs Institutional failure: government Public good argument Institutional failure: networks Group formation

Systemic failure Bounded rationality and path dependency

Description

Firms using inaccurate or incomplete information to assess costs and benefits of international production Costs of acquiring information make it more available to some than others, leading to adverse selection and/or moral hazard Firms without sufficient collateral or track record have less access to finance There is no market for externalities; public good elements; extreme cases of asymmetric and imperfect information Problems with the enforceability of property rights, especially over knowledge and technology Irreversibly fixed costs of internationalization result in entry and exit being costly undertakings

In situations where the government has a comparative advantage in supplying a good or service (usually information)

Networks may not possess the right portfolio of skills, information and knowledge, and membership rules may exclude some firms Lead firms to make sub-optimal choices of technology to which they may become locked in

Source: Harris and Robertson (2002)

Booth di Giovanni (1998) argues from a government perspective that search models cannot inform investment policies with regard to the existence or otherwise of market failures. The discussion hinges on the following aspects. First, firms may lack appropriate facts, and the existence of uncertainty does not translate to the existence of market inefficiency but rather indicates information is costly. This does not mean that there is no justification for government intervention, assuming that the government understands the economic benefits of information in the firm’s decision-­ making process, (e.g., by internationalizing). Casson (1999) and Buckley (2014) augment this standpoint, and assert that in this position the

372 

M. SIBINDI

government has a comparative advantage in information; based on this (instead of market failure), it has a rationale for intervention. Secondly, a large fraction of poorly informed decisions leading to investment demise are likely to be related to optimal search behaviour. It is arguable that information costs leading to irregular results is one of the aspects of the market, and they are not necessary as a selection device (for promoting the fittest firms). In this instance, information cost provide enticements for knowledge and innovation, which is key to the system of diversified construction upon an evolutionary interpretation of the market. Thirdly, search theory exploration indicates that in general firms ought to commit more resources to pre-internalization and information collecting where risk is high, as is probable in global markets. Consequently, collecting information is expensive, and when firms do not wholly engage, it might be that they simply have incomplete information about the market and might overlook prospects for internationalization (both firm-level prospects, such as profit growth, and gains for the whole economy). For this reason, we can be sceptical about defining this scenario as market inefficiency, but it might motivate government intervention. For instance, the government is a prospective beneficiary if knowledge is provided that can enhance transactions in the market, when gains are made by all parties involved. In this view, the government reduces market inefficiency through the provision of appropriate information. As to the cost of irregular information, access to efficient and suitable information and consultancy services is particularly significant for smaller firms, for whom the price of information access and absorption are higher (Harris 2011). Conversely, the irregular provision of information potentially exists for all firms across the board. Harris (2011) argues that moral hazard challenges arise after a contractual agreement has been concluded. Both entities cannot completely guarantee that contractual agreements will be properly fulfilled, leading to a chance that one of the parties will default. Agreements may be intended to transfer the higher risks from one entity to the other, but the costs of arranging, observing, implementing and enforcing frequently lead to some difficulties occurring (the incomplete contract dilemma). Financial obstacles are deemed to be an aspect of market inefficiency. This is caused by the challenge in persuading prospective lenders or equity providers to fund the internationalization process. In most instances, this is caused by inadequate collateral or historical background to mitigate risks related to the enterprise’s business objectives. In this view, global

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

373

markets are imperfect, and asymmetric information risk and uncertainty prevalence are very high (Harris and Moffat 2011). Furthermore, high entry costs are often related to high-risk failure and small firms being unable to proceed or failing to invest in global markets. Consequently, the problem arises that financial institutions and firm shareholders opt for a short-term approach (importantly so when it comes to problems of corporate governance, adverse selection, moral hazard and principal–agent issues). This obstacle seems to be an institutional failure, therefore appearing to be a rationale for the government to intervene (government guarantee, export credit loans) or endeavouring to deliver missing market factors, such as encouraging (through tax concessions) suppliers of equity (Buckley 2014; Harris and Moffat 2015). In rare instances, the consequences of irregular information might be that buyers and sellers may not agree on the right transaction value—as certain categories of information have an aspect of public good that the markets alone (without government intervention) might not be able to supply. These are dependable and unbiased sources, such as those developed via international embassy links and other government networks and connections, which are created through governments’ short- and long-­ term relationships with global investors (Buckley 2014). In addition, increased globalization exposes multinational firms to trends in global products. Therefore, systems development technology links MNEs with consumer choices, needs and wants, thereby eliminating information asymmetries in the market. This is a positive technological spillover. Nonetheless, such externalities and spillovers will not be paid for by the market, and this might be concluded to be a missing market factor (Sibindi 2019). Implementation failure arises when pioneering (comparable category) ventures (that are a requirement for inflowing investment) do not yield the essential property rights. If information is released formally or pirated, it ceases to be private and becomes public knowledge. Once this is diffused, property rights frequently become challenging to implement. The challenge is partially one of synchronization: the firm’s knowledge (merged into a new niche product market) about a particular product might need to be divulged (or it is not feasible for a firm to prevent disclosure). The wholesaler and retailer may not synchronize efficiently, while allowing the producer to recover the cost of research and development (innovation cost). However, this might lead to a disincentive to internationalize for multinational firms, and regulations and institutions such as patenting and

374 

M. SIBINDI

licensing bodies cannot be adjusted if they only have authority in one terrain; to ensure perfect property rights, therefore, there is a reason for the government to intervene (Harris and Moffat 2015). According to Casson (1999), the authority or government cannot implement property rights fully but it can appropriate using other alternatives, such as taxation, so there is a direct correlation between governments’ investment provision activities that are funded from taxation and the flow of inward FDI. Obstacles to entry and exit are largely the result of the substantial sunk costs related to the internationalization process. Sunk costs include the cost of information about demand conditions in global markets, the cost of developing a distribution network, the cost of product modification for different markets and the cost of complying with regulations in host markets (including dealing with social and business ethics differences). These costs may be repeated in full if a multinational firm opts to exit a foreign market for any amount of time. The presence of just a few players in the market can reduce competition, and this has a direct bearing on market efficiency and customer welfare. The objective of government intervention is to reduce such obstacles through the establishment of information services and/or through funding the sunk costs involved in entry and exit. However, it is also possible that funding certain sub-groups in the market may bring about obstacles to MNEs’ entry in host markets and might influence the decision to exit host markets for example, if a government funds underperforming firms, or if government subsidy leads to displacement (Hilber and Voicu 2010). A government becomes an obstacle to firms and markets when it has a comparative advantage in supplying information about goods and services, and publics utilities that enhance firm level competitiveness, but fails to supply both information to firms and public goods. An example is public goods that enhance firms’ performances and may be used by more than one firm, yet this free use produces a very low level of demand and thus low utility and production, to the disadvantage of society. Quality standards information and an institutional legal framework are aspects that are essential in globalization and FDI.  Therefore, host governments have a role to promote the profile of their respective countries, and can also seek to enhance inflows from global markets through bilateral trade agreements and investment policies (Bathelt and Li 2013; Hilber and Voicu 2010). Searching for information frequently rests on the presence and proximity of business contacts and global networks and alliances that enhance the

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

375

accessibility of information and the knowledge of global markets. Networks are assumed to be key to the internationalization process, as the acquisition of empirical knowledge about global markets is an integral part of entry into and sustainability of outward investment. Access to and interactions with prospective players in the market enable multinational firms to acclimatize, and to adjust their business culture in host destinations. According to this understanding, the motive behind government intervention is to access networks of prospective global business partners (Harris and Moffat 2011; Harris 2011; Hilber and Voicu 2010). Furthermore, network failures occur because technological knowledge is defined as tacit knowledge that cannot be easily diffused. This is arguable: networks are fundamental in the internationalization process as diffusion depends on individual contact. Developing an international network provides a link to FDI and the transfer of tacit knowledge, hence reducing problems related to multinational firms with restricted competencies and therefore restricted financial forecasts. Teece and Al-Aali (2011) argue that even support from networks in information provision, duplication and simulation is not easy, particularly if productive knowledge is embodied in a firm’s dynamic proficiencies. According to Teece (2014), a network may increase the resource base of a firm in the following ways. First, it enhances the firm’s receptive and competitive aptitude, therefore influencing its internal competences. Secondly, the type of alliance has an effect on the category of information and knowledge to which the firm has access, such that innovation and diffusion translate into shared activity; networks are key to the innovation process. A network failure occurs when loosely connected firms have an overlapping technological base, or when the network leads them in the wrong direction. Government support with regard to information provision might be a feasible remedy for this (Teece and Al-Aali 2011; Teece 2014). Lastly, there is an aspect of systematic failure that takes place at the highest level, which encompasses the entire technological system. “Thus, while individual, firm competence is the central basis of innovative performance, firms operate within ‘systems of innovation’ which integrate their activities with those of other organizations” (Dodgson and Bessant 1995). In this view, firms are located within specific national and regional technological processes that comprise different capabilities, networks and entities, which together define the framework in which the firm operates (Jones et al. 2011; Peiris et al. 2012).

376 

M. SIBINDI

According to Myrdal (1957) and Hirschman (1958), these structures are also on an accumulative returns, path dependency course, with different (unequal and deviating) results across regions and nations. These aspects have been discussed in detail as “cumulative causation models” and have been further augmented by adding regional context (Dixon and Thirlwall 1975). The concepts operate under cumulative returns with virtuous circles of spread and reaction, but can fail if system players (firms, institutions and networks) reach an operational deadlock either because of old technology or if they obstruct diversity and growth creation, for instance by hindering the genesis of new branches in the industry (Hilber and Voicu 2010). Processes are extremely multifaceted, and involve, for example, financial, educational, science and technology systems in a particular region. These directly influence the operating environment of the firm. Furthermore, a firm is also exposed to qualitative aspects, such as culture and legal statutory framework, which are difficult to quantify, but may obstruct or enhance the firm’s objectives (McCombie 2017). Harris and Moffat (2011), argue that in terms of government mitigating systematic failure, the common theme is the need to create variety and to increase connectivity in these technological systems. If market failure is threatened, responsible governments respond by adjusting trade policies. After the demise of Robert Mugabe, the government mooted a new political and economic agenda. As a result of this, a trade policy framework has been provided that determines the flow of outward investment to South Africa. According to trade policy and strategic framework document (2019), the overarching objective of Zimbabwe’s trade policy is to achieve sustainable GDP by efficiency gains from trade through the improved allocation of efforts across markets to accelerate economic growth. As such, the trade policy provides a platform for the increased mutual benefit of intra-regional trade. Therefore, it is necessary for trade integration to be complemented by sectoral cooperation and greatly improved policy harmonization programmes that address real economic capacity limitations. The trade policy agenda also respond to Economic Partnership Agreements between European Union (EU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. As partnership agreements establish a sequence of incompatible trade regimes between EU states and SADC members, deeper regional integration will probably be destabilized. Current trade policies assume wide-range engagements with global

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

377

Table 15.2  Trade policy objectives Ultimate Economic Objective: Increase sustainable GDP and GDP growth by • Efficiency gains from trade, through improved allocation of effort across markets; • Enabling more firms to take successful advantage of export market opportunities in pursuing their business growth and development goals; • Upgrading innovation, quality, design, management through enhanced exposure to international marketplaces and best practice Intermediate objectives: a) To increase the efficiency of international markets and marketplaces, both by reducing barriers to trade and investment and by addressing market failures that would otherwise inhibit access to international marketplaces, such as trade fairs; b) To ensure that firms, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), have access to efficient information and advisory services relating to business opportunities in overseas markets; c) To raise the level of international marketing and export competencies among firms across a wide spectrum of exportable goods and services sectors; d) To facilitate access to networks of business contacts in overseas markets, especially for SMEs; e) To raise awareness about international trade and investment among firms across a wide spectrum of sectors, and encourage more firms to take an active approach to exploiting overseas market opportunities; f) To reduce procedural barriers to exporting, and promote efficient procedures and best practice in trade transaction information management; g) To strengthen institutional links for international business, such as bilateral links among business communities, chambers of commerce, and providing bilateral channels for networking and information, etc; h) To enhance the “country image” of the country in overseas markets as a supplier of goods and services; to raise the profile of national suppliers overseas Source: Booth di Giovanni (1998)

trading blocs to enable the easy flow of trade, investment and multinational activity. Booth di Giovanni (1998) provides a theoretical framework that fosters understanding of government response to market failure. Table 15.2 highlights the important fundamental traits of trade promotional objectives for the United Kingdom government, but they are still applicable in Zimbabwe’s trade policy scenario at the time of writing. Zimbabwe’s trade policy augments the assertion by Jones et al. (2011) that this method is directed towards supporting and aiding firms who intend to invest in the country. With this realization, the criticism of an incremental approach to multinational promotion is validated by observing that MNEs that are born global and target international niches are probably better informed about

378 

M. SIBINDI

market traits than multinational firms. This is largely because MNEs internationalize incrementally, whereas born global firms in knowledge-based markets have more access to the shared intellectual capital that is embedded in the international industry. Perhaps the challenge that born global firms face revolves around the developing of new products for multiple markets and the cost of research and development. Furthermore, their products have short lifecycles, and given their more multifaceted offerings they are high-risk investments (Vasilchenko and Morrish 2011; Morrish and Jones 2013). Morrish and Jones (2013), augment this position, and argue that firms that take advantage of trade promotion from the government or from bilateral agreements adopt easily and sustain their investments much longer. Furthermore, the type of information that multinational firms require is more specific, and it is contended that trade policies should seek more relevant and user-friendly information for multinational firms on which to base their decisions. There is also a concern that trade policies should support research and development, access to venture investments and support in developing international business and political networks. In a nutshell, it is argued that trade policies need to adopt a more inclusive approach that priorities international business in a more comprehensive sense than internationalization, and also identify aspects that sustain investment, including leverage, and harness human capital and financial and knowledge resources. Another aspect that is highlighted by Bell et al. (2001) is the importance of a domestic firm network that contributes to the decision to enter international markets and to sustain investments. This network includes domestic contacts. This assertion is reinforced by a series of studies that have emphasized the importance of interpersonal relationships in the internationalization process. Most relationships formed in international business are more probably formed at home than abroad. These contacts enhance the decision-making of an investing firm and enable an appropriate market entry selection strategy (Vasilchenko and Morrish 2011; Morrish and Jones 2013). According to Yakop and Bergeijk (2011), the government has a dual role in enabling the internationalization of business. The first is to intervene in market failures and the second is to ensure multinational firms gain the right incentives as they adjust to globalization. According to Harris and Li (2012), the government fails to ensure multinational firms receive the correct incentives if they implement unsuitable macro-economic

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

379

policies; for instance, the overvaluation of exchange rates after trade liberalization. Trade regulations that endeavour to alleviate against the shortrun influence of liberalization might have negative consequences, and result in pervese reduction of MNEs activities in host markets. (Heydon 2012). In this regard, the assumption is that multinational firms make micro-­ level decisions to internationalize operations not only because of business prospects but also from many other perspectives. These are path dependent on aspects such as government trade objectives, bilateral trade agreements between governments, regional trade objectives and institutional arrangements. In this chapter, we have highlighted aspects of government intervention that determine the process of internationalization and multinational firm behaviour, as decisions that build on variables to sustain investment are upheld. As a result, this section has discussed market failure considerations for governments, which intervene principally to enhance multinational activity in international markets. Without a shadow of doubt, there are certain aspects of international business that require government support. Nonetheless, because of multinational firms’ different needs, government support needs to be flexible, reflecting firms’ heterogeneous nature. There is criticism, however, that trade policies are not adequately geared to born global firms and not adequately flexible to include different sub-­ groups of firms with different motivations for FDI. In most circumstances, changes in trade regulation as a result of criticism highlight the different resources that are available for different multinational firms. In this view, the motivation of trade policy is to ensure that multinational firms get the right incentives. This indicates the need for regulations that enable multinational firms to obtain those things (i.e., absorptive capacity and dynamic capabilities) that reduce sunk costs and sustain investment. Despite resurgent efforts by the government of Zimbabwe to adjust trade policies and lure FDI to what they have termed a new Zimbabwe, the intended objective is seemingly eluded. From a political perspective, Zimbabwe is still treated with a shadow of scepticism. There is no guarantee that the new government, which has shown no willingness to improve the institutional framework, will return the country to the rule of law and widespread respect of property rights. From a business and economic perspective, Zimbabwe is still not a first destination choice for investment. The government is incapable of supplying public goods that are fundamental for firm-level endeavours.

380 

M. SIBINDI

Furthermore, those aspects that are known to induce inward FDI are very low in Zimbabwe, the size of the economy is small, supporting industries have collapsed and the financial system is in serious intensive care.

Capital Market and Inward FDI This section highlights the financial procedures of FDI in terms of mergers and acquisitions. The discussion enhances our understanding of the linkage between FDI and stock markets. A series of studies assume that there is a causal relationship between stock market growth, the financial system and FDI inflows. According to Aregbeshola (2014) the stock market has a positive indication on the direction of FDI in host destinations. With this realization in mind, this section attempts to understand the compatibility of the Zimbabwe stock market with inducing inward FDI. The fundamental difference between a domestic firm and a multinational firm is the transfer of investment from the country of origin to the host destination. The global concept of FDI is a category of cross-border investment, in which an investor resident in one country establishes a lasting interest and significant degree of influence over an enterprise in another country. Ownership of 10% or more of the voting power in an enterprise in one economy by an investor in another economy is evidence of such a relationship (OECD 2015). FDI is a key factor in global economic integration, opening up more investment opportunities (Kantarelis 2008). According to the World Investment Report (2015), investment is transferred through geographical boundaries by means of mergers and acquisitions. In legal terms, these are two different things: a merger is a combination of two separate entities of which the target firm ceases to exist, while an acquisition is a total takeover of the target firm by the buying firm, its stock, assets and liabilities (Gitman 2014). From a commercial perspective, merger and acquisition results in the consolidation of assets and liabilities under one firm, hence only a faint line distinguishing the two. In this view, there is a lack of academic work that explores the environment and aspects that lead to firms’ investment options. According to Walsh (1989), mergers and acquisitions result in firm synergy, which is a creation of a whole that is greater than the simple sum of its parts. A series of recent studies assert that both acquisitions and mergers result in two types of synergy, namely financial synergy and operational synergy, creating value in the process. According to Gitman (2014),

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

381

financial synergy is a combination of a firm with an excess of cash (or slack) and a firm with a high returns project; this can yield a payoff in terms of higher value of the combined firm. As a result, synergy is most likely to increase when a bigger firm acquires smaller firms or when publicly traded firms acquire private businesses (Kumar 2008). The most apparent benefit of financial synergy is the improvement of debt capacity, because when two firms combine their earnings and cash flows these are stabilized and predictable, hence giving the combined firms a greater aptitude to borrow and improve working capital, which they could not have attained as single entities (Beron and Groh 2014). The borrowing power of a combined firm also creates tax benefits through higher cash flows or the lower cost of capital for the combined firm. Furthermore, tax advantages can arise through the manipulation of taxation statutes or from the use of net operating losses to shelter revenue. Thus, a profitable entity that acquires a less viable firm may exploit net operating losses to lessen the tax load. Alternatively, an entity that can increase its depreciation after either merger or acquisition will begin with taxes and create its value. From an operating synergy perspective, value is created by either an increase in income or an increase in growth or both. Operating synergies can be classified into four categories. First, economies of scale may arise from merger or acquisition, allowing the combined firm to become more cost efficient and profitable. Second, a combined entity can determine both supply schedules and pricing strategy using the levers of reduced competition, which should increase both revenue and profitability margins. Third, the combination of different strategic units and functions of business will increase in better-quality output and greater quantity. Fourth, a combined firm uses its higher capital gearing to modify old products and invent new product lines, thus creating new markets and developing existing ones (Devigne et al. 2016; Gitman et al. 2015). In the context of Zimbabwe, the literature reviews other macro-­ economic factors, such as the size of the economy, infrastructure and industry. In addition, the financial sector in Zimbabwe is in serious distress, with many banks suffering from a crisis in viability. This also applies to the stock market, which was temporarily shut down during the height of inflation in 2008. With the advent of a multi-currency regime, the stock market was resuscitated, but it has not shown any signs of recovery. This certainly has negative aspects for any MNEs that intend to invest in Zimbabwe.

382 

M. SIBINDI

Conclusion This section outlines conclusions around four substantive issues: • the nature of FDI and motives of MNEs; • aspects of host market that determine FDI; • government roles in FDI and international business; • mergers and acquisitions. In the first section, we discussed a wide range of literature on the nature of FDI and the motives of MNEs based on the theory of the firm, considering the general objectives of business from a wide range of perspectives. In the theory of the firm, the firm is the black box of decision-making that attempts to maximise resources allocation with the ultimate objective of profit-making. This being the case, we outlined the process of business internationalization and the relevance of MNEs’ objectives and motives in the selection of volume and direction of FDI. The essence of understanding this anchors on the fact that firm objectives and motives have a causal explanation in the selection of a possible host market. In the second section, we discussed literature on the internationalization process, with particular reference to host market aspects and the determination of FDI. The literature reviewed in this section details those host market aspects that are most favourable in enhancing the strategic position of MNEs. The literature reviewed casts doubt on the strategic fitness of Zimbabwe as an investment destination. Evidence entailing the dependency on firm motives and host market conditions indicates that firm-level decision-making selects host markets that are compatible with their business objectives. The literature points to other aspects that determine internationalization such as industry sector, size of firm and agglomerations/network and international exposure among firm executives, but more evident is the important role of tacit knowledge creation and acquisition in both microand macro-environment level of the firm. In addition, we reviewed recent economic models that emphasize the significance of sunk cost and variety in productivity (heterogeneity across firms). The mitigation of entry costs requires a sufficient knowledge base and complementary assets and resources, more specifically human capital and research and development that enhance absorptive capacity. Thus, having different knowledge

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

383

resource bases relates to differences in innovation ratio, and other aspects of aggregate productivity determine productivity differences between firms. The last section addressed market inefficiency arguments for government intervention in view of business internationalization. The primary objective of this intervention is to motivate firms to invest in host markets. Certainly, there are certain aspects of global markets that require government intervention through trade promotion and bilateral agreements. Nevertheless, because of the heterogeneity of multinational needs, recent scholarship casts doubt upon the flexibility of government support. Criticism that policy alone does not address the fundamental issues that drive inward FDI is evidenced. A fundamental aspect that is prominent in this literature review revolves around aspects that impede the internationalization process. These are a result of such factors as market inefficacy or are caused by firms’ absorptive capacities and dynamic capabilities. In this instance, government policies that promote trade enable multinational firms to improve firms’ absorptive capacities and dynamic capabilities.

References Anyanwu, J.C., and N.D. Yameogo. 2015. FDI To Africa: Regional Comparison. African Development Bank, 345–365. Alfaro, L. 2017. Multinational Activity in Emerging Markets: How and When Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Growth? In Geography, Location, and Strategy, 429–462. Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited. Aregbeshola, R.A. 2014. Foreign Direct Investment and Institutional: New Granger Causality Evidence from African Countries. South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 17 (5): 544–546. Arrow, K.J., and G. Debreu. 1954. Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 265–290. Augier, M., and D.J. Teece. 2009. Dynamic Capabilities and the Role of Managers in Business Strategy and Economic Performance. Organization Science 20 (2): 410–421. Bathelt, H., and P.F.  Li. 2013. Global Cluster Networks—Foreign Direct Investment Flows from Canada to China. Journal of Economic Geography 14 (1): 45–71. Baumol, W.J. 1958. On the Theory of Oligopoly. Economica 25 (99): 187–198. Bell, J., R. McNaughton, and S. Young. 2001. ‘Born-again global’firms: An extension to the ‘born global’phenomenon. Journal of International Management 7 (3): 173–189.

384 

M. SIBINDI

Besedes, T., and T.J. Prusa. 2004. Surviving the US Import Market: The Role of Product Differentiation (No. w10319). National Bureau of Economic Research. Booth di Giovanni, H.1998. Note on Application of Theoretical “Search Models” to Trade Promotion Issues, unpublished Department of Trade and Industry, London. Buckley, P.J. 2014. Forty Years of Internalisation Theory and the Multinational Enterprise. Multinational Business Review 22 (3): 227–245. Buckley, P.J., S. Elia, and M. Kafouros. 2014. Acquisitions by Emerging Market Multinationals: Implications for Firm Performance. Journal of World Business 49 (4): 611–632. Camilleri, M.A. 2018. Pricing and Revenue Management. In Travel Marketing, Tourism Economics and the Airline Product, 155–163. Cham: Springer. Cantwell, J., and A.  Verbeke. 2017. The JIBS 2016 Decade Award: A Quarter Century of Culture’s Consequences: A Review of Empirical Research Incorporating Hofstede’s Cultural Values Framework. Journal of International Business Studies 48 (1): 10–11. Casson, M. 1999. The Organisation and Evolution of the Multinational Enterprise: An Information Cost Approach. MIR: Management International Review 39: 77–121. Christodoulopoulou, S. 2010. The Effects of Multilateral Trade Liberalization on the Extensive and the Intensive Margins of Trade. MPRA Paper 29169: 1–53. Coase, R.H. 1991. “The nature of the firm 1937.” The Nature of the Firm. Origins, Evolution, and Development, 18–33. New York: Oxford. Coase, R. 1998. The New Institutional Economics. The American Economic Review 88 (2): 72–74. Deng, P., and M. Yang. 2015. Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions by Emerging Market Firms: A Comparative Investigation. International Business Review 24 (1): 157–172. Dixon, R., and A.P. Thirlwall. 1975. A Model of Regional Growth-Rate Differences on Kaldorian Lines. Oxford Economic Papers 27 (2): 201–214. Devigne, D., S. Manigart, and M. Wright. 2016. Escalation of Commitment in Venture Capital Decision Making: Differentiating Between Domestic and International Investors. Journal of Business Venturing 31 (3): 253–271. Dodgson, M., and J.  Bessant. 1995. Effective Innovation Policy, Draft to Be Publisher by Routledge. Australian National University and University of Brighton. Dunning, J.H. 2015. Reappraising the Eclectic Paradigm in an Age of Alliance Capitalism. In The Eclectic Paradigm, 111–142. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Ghauri, P.N. 2018. Multinational Enterprises and Sustainable Development in Emerging Markets. In Global Phenomena and Social Sciences, 21–36. Cham: Springer.

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

385

Gitman, L. 2014. Principle Of Managerial Finance (eleven). Pearseon Addison Wesley. Gitman, L.J., M.D.  Joehnk, and R.  Billingsley. 2015. PFIN 4. Mason: Cengage Learning. Harris, R., and C. Robinson. 2002. Research Project on DTI Industrial Support Policies. DTI Final Report Ref: SEC Research 01ITT (SEC01), Department of Trade and Industry, London. Harris, R. 2011. Models of Regional Growth: Past, Present and Future. Journal of Economic Surveys 25 (5): 913–951. Harris, R., and J.  Moffat. 2011. Plant-Level Determinants of Total Factor Productivity in Great Britain, 1997–2006. ———. 2015. Plant-Level Determinants of Total Factor Productivity in Great Britain, 1997–2008. Journal of Productivity Analysis 44 (1). ———. 2015. Total Factor Productivity Growth in Local Enterprise Partnership Regions in Britain, 1997–2008. Regional Studies 49 (6): 1019–1041. Heydon, K. 2012. The Political Economy of International Trade. The Ashgate Research Companion to International Trade Policy, pp.29–46. Hilber, C.A., and I. Voicu. 2010. Agglomeration Economies and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment: Empirical Evidence from Romania. Regional Studies 44 (3): 355–371. Hirschman, A.O. 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development  (No. 04; HD82, H5). International Monetary Fund. 2011. Statistics Department. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2010 34. International Monetary Fund. 2015. Statistics Department. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2014 38. Jones, M.V., N. Coviello, and Y.K. Tang. 2011. International Entrepreneurship Research (1989–2009): A Domain Ontology and Thematic Analysis. Journal of Business Venturing 26 (6): 632–659. Kantarelis, D. 2008. Internalization of Costs, Liability and Negligence, Performance and Reliance. International Journal of Law and Management. Kanyenze, G., P.  Chitambara, and J.  Tyson. 2017. The Outlook for the Zimbabwean Economy. Supporting Economic Transformation. London. Kavila, W., and P. Le Roux. 2016. Inflation Dynamics in a Dollarised Economy: The Case of Zimbabwe. Southern African Business Review 20 (1): 94–117. Kumar, N. 2008. Internationalization of Indian Enterprises: Patterns, Strategies, Ownership Advantages, and Implications. Asian Economic Policy Review 3 (2): 242–261. Kurz, M. 1974. Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium of an Exchange Economy with Transaction Cost. International Economic Review 15: 699–717. Lindberg, S., and Á. Sverrisson, eds. 2016. Social Movements in Development: The Challenge of Globalization and Democratization. London: Springer.

386 

M. SIBINDI

Lyon, J. 1996. Yugoslavia’s Hyperinflation, 1993–1994: A Social History. East European Politics and Societies 10 (2): 293–327. Mawdsley, E., L. Savage, and S.M. Kim. 2014. A ‘Post-Aid World’? Paradigm Shift in Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation at the 2011 Busan High Level Forum. The Geographical Journal 180 (1): 27–38. McCombie, J.S. 2017. Trade and Regional Development. The International Encyclopedia of Geography. Wiley Online Library. Mlambo, A.S. 2015. Mugabe on Land, Indigenization, and Development. In Mugabeism?, 45–59. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mlambo, A.S. 2017. From an Industrial Powerhouse to a Nation of Vendors: Over Two Decades of Economic Decline and Deindustrialization in Zimbabwe 1990–2015. Journal of Developing Societies 33 (1): 99–125. Mourão, P. 2017. Surviving in the Formula One Circus. In The Economics of Motorsports, 203–238. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Morrish, S.C., and R.  Jones. 2013. The Role of Entrepreneurial Marketing Orientation on Entrepreneurial Networks and Internationalisation Opportunities. In ICSB World Conference Proceedings, Vol. 2, No. 2, p.  1, International Council for Small Business (ICSB), January. Myrdal, G. 1957. Economic Theory and Under-Development Regions. London: Gerald Duckworth. Nwaogu, U.G., and M.J.  Ryan. 2015. FDI, Foreign Aid, Remittance and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Review of Development Economics 19 (1): 100–115. Nyabereka, M.C. 2017. An Exploration of the Effects of Structural Adjustment and BRICS Engagement on Development in Zimbabwe Over the Periods 1991–1995 and 2009–2013. Politikon 44 (1): 111–131. OECD Investment policy reviews. 2009. OECD Policy Framework for investment assesment: Vietnam. OECD. OECD Investment policy reviews. 2015. OECD Policy Framework for investment assesment: Nigeria. OECD. Ollivaud, P., and D. Turner. 2015. The Effect of the Global Financial Crisis on OECD Potential Output. OECD Journal: Economic Studies 2014 (1): 41–60. Peiris, I.K., M. EM Akoorie, and P. Sinha. 2012. International Entrepreneurship: A Critical Analysis of Studies in the Past Two Decades and Future Directions for Research. Journal of International Entrepreneurship 10 (4): 279–324. Pitelis, C.N., and D.J. Teece. 2009. The (New) Nature and Essence of the Firm. European Management Review 6 (1): 5–15. Ray, K.G., and S.G. Ray. 2014. Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions: Modelling Synergy for Value Creation. In Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Reckendrees, A. 2015. Weimar Germany: The First Open Access Order That Failed? Constitutional Political Economy 26 (1): 38–60.

15  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA 

387

Sachikonye, L.M. 2016. 9 Structural Adjustment. Social Movements in Development: The Challenge of Globalization and Democratization, p. 176. books.google.com Sibindi, M. 2019. Internationalisation Theories and Outward Foreign Direct Investment: The Case of South African Multinational Firms. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of South Africa, Pretoria. Stevens, D.E. 2018. Social Norms and the Theory of the Firm: A Foundational Approach. Cambridge University Press. Stolper, G. 2017. German Economy, 1870–1940: Issues and Trends. Vol. 12. London: Taylor & Francis. Teece, D.J. 2014. The Foundations of Enterprise Performance: Dynamic and Ordinary Capabilities in an (Economic) Theory of Firms. The Academy of Management Perspectives 28 (4): 328–352. Teece, D.J., and Abdulrahman Al-Aali. 2011. Knowledge Assets, Capabilities, and the Theory of the Firm. Handbook of organizational Learning and Knowledge Management 2: 505–534. UNCTAD. 1999. Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment. New York and Geneva: United Nations publication. UNCTAD. 2015. World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance. United Nations Publications Customer Service 253. Vasilchenko, E., and S. Morrish. 2011. The Role of Entrepreneurial Networks in the Exploration and Exploitation of Internationalization Opportunities by Information and Communication Technology Firms. Journal of International Marketing 19 (4): 88–105. Walsh, J.P. 1989. Doing a Deal: Merger and Acquisition Negotiations and Their Impact Upon Target Company Top Management Turnover. Strategic Management Journal 10 (4): 307–322. Williamson, O.E. 1990. A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic Organization. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/ Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 61–71. ———. 1995. Hierarchies, Markets and Power in the Economy: An Economic Perspective. Industrial and Corporate Change 4 (1): 21–49. ———. 1998. Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It Is Headed. De Economist 146 (1): 23–58. ———. 2010. Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression. American Economic Review 100 (3): 673–90. ———. 2015. Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression. 2009. Yakop, M., and P.A. van Bergeijk. 2011. Economic Diplomacy, Trade and Developing Countries. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 4 (2): 253–267. Zimtrade. Trade policy, 2019. Zimtrade Policy Framework: Harare. Zimtrade.

Postscript: A Tale of Broken Promises Siphosami Malunga

A Tale of Broken Promises: Zimbabwe After Mugabe For millions of Zimbabweans, who had suffered political repression and economic deprivation and decline during the preceding 40 years, Mugabe’s removal was a much-needed relief. Little did it matter that it was his comrades, with whom he had killed thousands, stifled dissent, closed the democratic space and plundered the economy and public purse who removed him, under the banner of the ironically titled Operation Restore Legacy. He was the head of the Zimbabwe African National Unity–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) system, and as such, his exit was seen by many as providing an opportunity for change. For that reason, rallied by the army generals who were seeking but struggling to “constitutionally” remove Mugabe, thousands of Zimbabweans came out to the streets to send a message to Mugabe “to leave and leave now”. Thus, they “sanitized” the coup. After his removal, the generals summoned Mugabe’s former deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, back from exile to take over. Mnangagwa had dramatically fled the country weeks earlier after being fired by Mugabe, claiming that he feared for his life after an alleged poisoning attempt.

© The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2

389

390 

S. MALUNGA

After taking control of the ruling party and reversing all of Mugabe’s decisions and dismissals that had affected Mnagangwa’s faction, the generals took their plan to Parliament, forcing Mugabe to buckle and resign. Mnangagwa was inaugurated as President on 27 November 2017 with promises to bring in political and economic reforms. At his inauguration, attended by foreign diplomats and opposition leaders, Mnangagwa promised to undo the disastrous results of Mugabe’s 40-year rule. He promised to fix the ruined economy and open the long isolated and ostracised country for business and investment. He promised to restore and respect democracy, to repeal draconian laws, to restore the rule of law, to fight corruption, to revisit compensation to white farmers for land, to re-engage the international community and most importantly to respect the will and voice of the people, which, he argued was the voice of God. To that end, he promised to provide the people with the ultimate opportunity to decide on the future political leadership of the country via free, fair and peaceful elections. Individually and taken together, what Mnangagwa promised was exactly what the country needed, and what it had been denied by Mugabe and ZANU–PF for decades. Two years after Mugabe was deposed, with Zimbabweans worse off than they were during the worst of Mugabe’s equally disastrous rule, it is clear that Mnangagwa’s is a tale of broken promises. So what went wrong?

False Expectations, False Change To start, post-Mugabe Zimbabwe was a proverbial house built on sand. Driven by Mugabe’s henchmen, who had been the architects and implementers of his disastrous policies in the previous four decades, it was not really the change that Zimbabweans and the world thought it would be. It was triggered by and aimed to settle an internal ZANU–PF factional fight (between the Generation 40 (G40) faction, led by Grace Mugabe, and Lacoste, led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, inside ZANU–PF. It was and had never been a people’s project and certainly never ideologically founded or spurred on by a genuine desire for real political and social change. To that extent, little should have been expected from the coup. This alone easily explains why it delivered nothing in resolving Zimbabwe’s long-term crises and instead dug the country into a deeper hole. The so-called new dispensation has been a catalogue of failure since November 2017, failing the several tests it faced.

  Postscript: A Tale of Broken Promises 

391

Failed Political Reform The first test for the post-coup regime was openness to political reform. Under Mugabe, ZANU–PF had shown extreme political intolerance. In the 1980s, seeking a one-party state, Mugabe, with Mnangagwa as his security minister, had massacred thousands of supporters of the opposition party Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), forcing its leader Joshua Nkomo to capitulate and join a unity government under ZANU–PF. In the 1990s, Mugabe had violently suppressed all signs of internal and external opposition, sending gunmen to shoot and kill opponents in the Zimbabwe Unity Movement. In 2000, his ego dented by the loss of the constitutional referendum, and fearing that he would lose the parliamentary election to the new Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Mugabe had deployed party youths and war veterans to violently attack white farmers and farm workers perceived to be supporters of the new opposition party. In 2008, with clear signs of having lost the presidential election to Morgan Tsvangirai in the first round, he resorted first to rigging, then violence, to win the run-off from which Tsvangirai ended up withdrawing. When Mnangagwa took over in 2017, all eyes were therefore on how his regime would treat the opposition. Never mind that Mnangagwa had been Mugabe’s mastermind and enforcer of violence against the opposition, going back to 1980. As security minister, he had directed the intelligence aspects of the Gukurahundi operation that left 20,000 civilians dead. In 2000, 2002 and 2008, he had also played a key role in election-­ related violence directed at MDC officials and supporters. He was considered a key architect of the closed political space in Zimbabwe, an idea that went back decades. To many, it was therefore unreasonable to expect any meaningful change in political tolerance after the coup. Yet, aware of his own dubious credentials and also to curry favour with his western backers and funders, especially the United Kingdom, Mnangagwa promised to open the country up not just for business but also politically. In a public relations stunt, he publicly visited sick MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai and offered government support for his medical treatment as well as the transfer of his official state-purchased residence, which Mugabe had refused to hand over. He even tolerated criticism in the media and from civil society on historically taboo subjects, such as Gukurahundi. To cap it all, he even “joined” social media.

392 

S. MALUNGA

The period between the coup and elections in July 2018 saw a marked and unprecedented improvement and opening up of political, civic and media space. But purges of G40 elements, Mnangagwa’s erstwhile nemesis, continued, with selective arrests and prosecutions. There were still bans on protests, arbitrary arrests, the abuse of power and authority, and regular violations of constitutional and human rights that targeted activists.

Fixed and Flawed Elections The second major test was the general election in July 2018. Seen as being central to restoring democracy after the coup, there was little doubt that the post-coup elections would need to pass the free, fair and peaceful test. Previous elections in Zimbabwe had been bloody, with outcomes contested. In 2008, because of the violence, the continental and global community had refused to sign off the presidential elections, forcing Mugabe into a coalition government with Morgan Tsvangirai. In the 2013 election, although it had been peaceful, the manipulation of the roll of voters, which was withheld by the electoral commission until election day, again undermined the legitimacy of Mugabe’s victory. In 2018, Mnangagwa was therefore aware that if anything was needed to gain internal and external legitimacy as part of his open for business mantra, delivering free, fair and peaceful elections was the silver bullet. Despite their promises, Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF resorted to tried and tested tactics. They retained the tainted and discredited Zimbabwe Election Commission and Secretariat, considered by many as lacking independence and made up of security and intelligence personnel. Again, as in previous elections, the commission failed to release the voters roll on time and in a searchable format, and even then it was plagued with irregularities. As in previous elections, ZANU–PF leaned on the army—whose mere presence especially in rural areas intimidated voters. It also manipulated the government’s agricultural subsidy scheme to “buy” the rural vote. As in previous years, ZANU–PF and Mnangagwa monopolized the state media in their electoral campaign, denying equal and fair play to the opposition. With the Mugabe era draconian laws on access to information and protection of privacy, and on public order and security, still firmly intact, the pre-election environment and playing field was far from being level. The operational conduct of the election, including the tabulation, transmission and announcement of elections results, pointed to a rigged process. With the closeness of the results between Mnangagwa and his

  Postscript: A Tale of Broken Promises 

393

opposition challenger, Nelson Chamisa—with Mnangagwa receiving just over the 50% required—no wonder the outcome was disputed and challenged in court. The Constitutional Court ruled in favour of Mnangagwa but failed to give its reasons for almost 18 months, further entrenching partisan perspectives.

Leopards Can’t Change Their Spots Mnangagwa’s third test involved human rights. As he had played a central role as Mugabe’s right hand, in the gradual and systematic erosion of citizens’ rights for the preceding 40 years, many were sceptical that he and ZANU–PF would miraculously begin to respect human rights. The sceptics were right. Shortly after the July election, in response to public protest against delays in announcing election results, Mnangagwa deployed the military—who shot and killed six unarmed civilians and injured scores more. These killings, conducted in full view of election observers and international media, cemented the scepticism about any post-Mugabe change by Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF. As damage control, Mnangagwa commissioned an international commission of enquiry led by former South African President Kgalema Motlanthe, but it was made up of regime-sympathizing local commissioners whose work was carefully choreographed. In a further clear sign that little had changed, despite recommendations by the Motlanthe Commission to hold military officers to account responsible for the killings, Mnangagwa instead promoted the commander of the unit responsible, while other perpetrators remained untouched. There would be further failures. In January 2019, when citizens who were angered by the sudden increase in the price of fuel took to the streets, Mnangagwa again deployed the army against them. What followed was a military operation conducted under cover of an internet shutdown in which grave violations, beatings, torture, rapes and plunder were carried out against innocent civilians. Mnangagwa would later boast that he had deployed the army to deal with protesters after giving instructions to use a “special whip laced in salty water”. After the protests, thousands of civilians were arrested and tried in unfair and fast-tracked trials, while hundreds were sentenced to many years in prison. Again, in August 2019, with the country and citizens facing dire social and economic conditions, the opposition MDC called for nationwide mass protests. Complying with the public order and security law, it sought

394 

S. MALUNGA

police authorization for the protests, which was denied. On the day, riot police unleashed an orgy of violence against peaceful protesters, beating and arresting many. Throughout Mnangagwa’s rule, the government has continued to selectively target critics, labour, human rights and political activists for intimidation, harassment, abduction, arrests, detention, torture and killings. In many instances, it has relied on pseudo-elements in the security sector or party youth wings to carry out these heinous crimes. Fearing an uprising similar to those in Sudan, Egypt and Algeria, the government has resorted to selective abductions of critics who lead or call for citizen action, in order to spread fear and deter citizens from protesting. Most recently, the leader of the striking hospital doctors’ union, Peter Magombeyi, was abducted, detained for five days, tortured and then dumped in the outskirts of Harare. The government claimed that a shadowy “third force” was involved. Other critics calling for accountability for Gukurahundi atrocities, including activists such as Zenzele Ndebele, Thandekile Moyo and Mkhululi Hanana, have also been intimidated, followed and threatened by unidentified individuals. In an unprecedented surge of intolerance, the government has also resorted to abducting, beating and torturing human rights activists, such as Tendai Mombeyarara of the Citizens Manifesto and Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe, which is led by Obert Masaraure. Samantha Kureya, “Gonyeti”, a comedian, and Ian Makiwa, “Platinum Prince”, a musician, have also been abducted, beaten and tortured for satirical and musical productions that were deemed inflammatory and offensive to Mnangagwa and the regime. Some have not been so lucky. Blessing Toronga, an MDC political activist, was abducted from his house in Glen Norah Township in Harare by unidentified men after the protests on 24 January 2019. His body was found in an advanced state of decomposition in March this year. As Mugabe did in the 1980s, Mnangagwa has relied on trumped-up treason charges against perceived critics and opponents. Victims include Morgan Tsvangirai, Welshman Ncube and others in 2000, those involved in the MDC ’17 Petrol Bomb Case in 2015 and MDC deputy president Tendai Biti in 2008. In 2019 alone, the government has charged seven civil society activists with treason, continued to prosecute Pastor Ivan Mawarire, for Mugabe-era treason charges, and charged several MDC politicians, including Job Sikhala, Joana Mamombe and Ostallos Siziba, with treason. Undoubtedly, on this score Mnangagwa has not only proved sceptics right, but has matched Mugabe in many respects.

  Postscript: A Tale of Broken Promises 

395

A Corrupt and Predatory Elite The third major test for Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF was their policy and attitude to corruption, bad governance and poor leadership. When he took over from Mugabe, Mnangagwa promised to open the country, isolated for many years, for business. He promised to fight corruption and to ensure the rule of law. Corruption, bad governance and poor leadership have been at the centre of Zimbabwe’s political, economic and social problems for the past 40 years. Under Mugabe, a politically connected and predatory elite, comprising ruling ZANU–PF officials, their families and friends, prioritised the personal accumulation of wealth over public interest and service. This elite has been involved in high-level corruption scandals since 1980. It has siphoned off billions of dollars, abused public resources and enjoyed impunity from any form of accountability. Almost all Mugabe’s ministers have been at one time or another been implicated in corruption. Mnangagwa’s commitment to addressing corruption, bad governance and poor leadership was therefore in the spotlight. His choice of ministers, his attitude towards corrupt elites and his appointment of capable leadership were objects of scrutiny. In all these aspects, he failed dismally. He appointed and retained corrupt cabinet ministers—some of whom, in yet another public relations stunt, he has now sought to arrest. He set up an anti-corruption unit in his office, which has delivered nothing. He has allowed powerful elites connected to him, such as Kuda Tagwirei’s Sakunda, to retain monopolistic control of the country’s lucrative fuel supply contract. He has allowed the use of the Reserve Bank for preferential access to foreign currency exchange for connected elites, which it expatriates, launders or sells on the black market at a premium in a system of arbitrage. He has allowed the plunder of US$3 billion from the “command agriculture” subsidy scheme, most of which has found its way to Sakunda. As the country faces a severe public service crisis in the water, energy, health and education sectors, Mnangagwa has presided over declining and deepening social conditions. Poor governance and leadership tied to corruption have seen his ministers preoccupied with lining their pockets and diverting public resources to their personal upkeep and benefit rather than addressing the multiple crises the country faces.

396 

S. MALUNGA

A Failed Economy Mnangagwa’s greatest test was the extent to which he would be able to fix Zimbabwe’s ruined economy. His inability to do so has been his most epic failure. In the main, wages have lost all value and purchasing power owing to the disastrous economic policies of Mthuli Ncube, Mnangagwa’s Minister of Finance. Ncube was initially feted as a professor from Oxford and a former African Development Bank Chief Economist, but he was also previously founder and owner of a failed Zimbabwean bank, Barbican, who has banned the use of foreign currency exchange, reintroduced the discredited Zimbabwe dollar, introduced an extortionate transactional tax on electronic transactions and allowed activities at the Reserve Bank that have been condemned by the International Monetary Fund. In the past six months of 2020, in the latest budget announcement the finance minister has been accused of embarrassingly cooking the national accounting books by understating the contributions of China by over US$100 million. The disastrous economic policies and the accompanying corruption have seen doctors and nurses go on strike for months because of poor wages and working conditions: no hospitals have adequate equipment, medicines or medical supplies. The government response has been to abduct leaders of doctors’ or teachers unions and to fire all doctors. Living conditions have deteriorated for the majority of citizens to levels worse than during the Mugabe era, with power blackouts for days and shortages of fuel, banknotes, medicines and other basic needs. Inflation has shot up in the third quarter of 2020. In June 2020, the government banned the use of foreign currency, deepening the hardship but proclaiming the return of a robust national currency. In November 2019, the government introduced new bank notes but the release was marred by another corruption scandal in which hundreds of thousands of dollars surfaced on the black market when the maximum permitted withdrawal is $200. The Final Test  Mnangagwa’s last test will be whether and how long he can hold on to power in the context of the continuously deteriorating conditions in the country. There is an overwhelming consensus that the situation seems to have reached breaking point. Whatever the plan for removing Mugabe may have been for the coup comrades, it is hard to imagine that this is what was agreed or expected. It is possible that the plotters

  Postscript: A Tale of Broken Promises 

397

collectively underestimated what was required to fix Zimbabwe. They assumed that they could continue to fudge their way forward by stifling dissent, stealing elections, printing money, recklessly spending state funds and plundering the economy without consequence. If that is the case, they were wrong. In removing Mugabe, they promised and offered people change. They managed to temporarily persuade and gain the support of erstwhile detractors, such as the United Kingdom, and the sceptical support of many Zimbabweans. In two short years, they have squandered it all: the hope, the goodwill, the promise, the trust. They have also lost the trust of their own supporters and each other. They have run out of excuses. The sanctions excuse, used effectively by Mugabe, has lost its shine: it no longer cuts it as Zimbabweans realize that ruling elites continue to plunder and live large while they suffer. But can Mnangagwa still salvage the situation or will it roll on towards a cliff edge? The former looks unlikely, in the light of honest reflection on the past two years, a realization that there are simply no more cards for him or ZANU–PF to play, when it comes to fudging the economy and politics, and also that relying on coercion will soon stop working. The hardline ruling party in Ethiopia, EPRDF, came to a similar conclusion after many years of relying on repression: it realized that there was a real chance of losing everything. If Mnangagwa and his comrades reach this epiphany, they may yet survive and play a part in creating a different future. At almost 80 years old, having served for almost 60 years in government and having orchestrated and watched Mugabe being humiliated, it can be assumed that Mnangagwa would want a different fate. This would ideally involve an inclusive negotiated process to address the country’s political, economic and social problems, preferably moderated by an external actor. Recently South Africa has hinted that it is losing patience with the crisis, which may signal its willingness to mediate. If Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF have no answers, neither it seems does the MDC, which has shown hesitation and ambiguity in its intentions. While the deteriorating economic conditions provide the typical context for popular uprisings of the kind seen in which ruling parties were ousted in Egypt, Tunisia and more recently Bolivia, Algeria and Sudan, this is unlikely to happen on its own. Besides, it is hardly a viable strategy. The MDC will have to be more deliberate and intentional. Doing nothing is as bad as Mnangagwa waiting and hoping nothing will come of the decline. If a negotiated solution is preferred, the MDC will have to push for one. If a popular uprising is desired, it will have to lead and direct

398 

S. MALUNGA

it. A spontaneous, leaderless, uprising by frustrated and angry citizens is also likely. This was the case in Egypt and to a great extent Algeria and Sudan. This option is what both Mnangagwa and the MDC should be worried about, as it places both outside the game.

Revolving Coup Door? In the meantime, it is an open secret that there are disagreements at the highest levels inside government and ZANU–PF. It is conceivable that the prevailing situation is not the one envisaged by those soldiers drafted into the coup who are now worse off than during the Mugabe era. There are reports that junior officers are suffering squalid and dehumanizing living and working conditions. If the state of ordinary Zimbabweans is a measure, this is unsurprising. There is talk of another coup. Experience from elsewhere shows that once it has been opened, the door leading to military overthrow of a government is hard to close. To that extent, whether it is another coup or increased citizens’ agitation, not just for change but for survival, Zimbabwe seems headed for a major confrontation. Rather than wait for it to happen and try to pick up the scattered pieces afterwards, the Southern African Development Community, led by South Africa (which has much to lose), the African Union and international bodies need to refocus their spotlight on Zimbabwe once again. But this time, they must ensure that the political change will genuinely reflect the will of the people and not the small and predatory elite that now fights over the country’s decaying carcass.

Index

A AAG, see Affirmative Action Group Abel Muzorewaled United African National Council (UANC), 92 Abuse of power, 240, 311, 392 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), 127, 191 Accumulation configures periphery economies, 17, 276 Accusations, 108, 203, 262, 333, 348, 350 regime-change, 77 Accusing, 8, 341 denounced Vice President Mnangagwa, 334 Activism judicial, 200 ongoing citizen, 76 political, 124 radical, 64 social, 64 vibrant Zimbabwean student, 122 Activists citizen, 76

counter-hegemonic, 108 leading, 76 pro-Mthwakazi, 166, 168–172 student, 104 vilify prodemocracy, 126 Administration direct colonial, 6 direct juridical, 6 new, 310, 312, 317, 319, 320, 325 post, 300 post-Mugabe, 311 transparent public, 308 Administrative reforms, 310 extensive, 309 Adoption, 68, 201, 254, 261, 302, 304, 318 Adult suffrage universal, 28 Adulterous relationship, 344 Affirmative action deliberate, 177 entailed, 2 Affirmative Action Group (AAG), 65 Affirmative action programme, 175

© The Author(s) 2020 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2

399

400 

INDEX

Africa colonial, 165 colonise, 292 development, 283 postcolonial, 57, 137 shining light of, 17, 299 sovereign accumulation positioning, 291 state, 28, 55, 57, 85, 278–282 state and development in, 277–283 sub-Saharan, 278 African American, 145, 237 African countries, 87, 87n1, 118, 123, 177, 282, 286 and control, 286 poor, 338 African National Congress (ANC), 55, 141 African National Union dominated Zimbabwe, 145 ruling Zimbabwe, 118, 181, 299 African Nationals, 141, 143, 145 African Network of Constitutional Lawyers, 309 African Socialism, 60 African Trade Union Congress (ATUC), 96n6 African Union, 68, 184, 398 African Union High Level Panel, 287 Africanist, 219 Africanization, 33, 56 Africanization processes, 62 Africans accumulation in bifurcated states, 279 alienating, 284, 292 and opposition politics, 86 civil society, 122 communities, 159 continent, 18, 59 continental level, 290 cultural values and perspectives, 283

disaffection, 31 domestic affairs, 282 economies, 293 experience of civil society, 122 governments, 121, 124, 177, 278, 280, 321 histories, 292 integration in economic development, 290 journalist, 218 leaders, 6, 7, 278, 282, 292, 294, 295 liberation, 161 misconception, 146 national question Nkrumah, 290 nationalism, 58, 60, 282 nationalist patriarchal models of liberation, 3 nationalist politics, 300 nations, 278 natural resources, 286 opposition, 86 political leaders, 28 political spaces, 354 reserves, 165 resources, 277, 283–287, 290 societies, 278 states, 28, 55, 57, 85, 278–282 struggle, 124 subjugating, 282 townships, 165 undermined, 279 values, 218 women, 335 workers, 141 Africans People, 7, 59, 62, 141, 143–145 Afrikaner and African communities, 159 Air force, 92 Air Force of Zimbabwe Commander, 94n2

 INDEX 

Air Zimbabwe, 210 Ake, Claude (political scientist), 59, 60 Alexander, J., 2, 94, 94n3, 188 Alexander, K., 64, 164 Alfa Media Holdings (AMH), 247–248 Newsday/Southern Eye, 247 Alfaro, L., 367 Algeria, 1, 394, 397, 398 Allegations, 163, 164, 248, 257, 259, 262, 264, 268, 333, 342n1, 344 Alliances nationalist-military, 8 political, 87 united, 102 Allies, 44, 86, 92, 105, 192, 257, 261, 266, 334, 342 America tabloidisation, 256 Americans black African, 145 dollar, 286, 304, 317, 318, 361 military, 282 Amnesty International, 108n14, 109 Anglo American, 286 Angola, 87n1 Anonymous movement, 240 Anti-colonial nationalist struggle, 53, 57, 59, 61 Anti-corruption initiatives, 307, 312 Anti-devolution, 174 Anti-imperialism, 5 Anti-imperialist meanings, 67 Anti-nationalism, 292 Anti-racism, 5 Antoinette Marie, 343 Anyanwu, 368 APN, see African Peacebuilding Network Arab Spring, 16, 76, 78, 221, 233 Aregbeshola, 362, 363, 367, 380 Armed resistance, 28 protracted, 301

401

Army mercenary, 193 national, 147 new Zimbabwean, 228 organized guerrilla, 32 trained, 147 unorganised, 93 white, 32 ASSAf, see Academy of Science of South Africa Assange, Julian, 233 Assassinate, 261, 262 Assassination plots alleged, 257 Assassinations, 257, 258, 265, 347 Assault, 8, 39, 103 sexual, 337 Associated Newspapers, 247 Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ), 247 Asuelime, 334 Atrocities, 12, 36–38, 61, 231, 394 Attorney General, 199, 200n20 ATUC, see African Trade Union Congress Auditor General, 315, 319 Augier, M., 364 Authoritarian erosion and internal contradictions, 184–185 Authoritarian erosion and internal contradictions in ZANU PF, 184–185 Authoritarian manipulations, 183 Authoritarian nationalism, 53 Authoritarian practices, 61, 210 Authoritarian regimes, 182, 184, 186, 208, 219 competitive, 182, 191, 208 Authoritarian rule, 184, 309 Authoritarian rulers, 26 Authoritarian states, 126, 183 Authoritarian tutelage, 15

402 

INDEX

Authoritarianism closed, 183 competitive, 183 decentralized, 57 electoral, 195 increased, 63 political, 64 regimes blend, 208 B Bantu Congress, 58 Barriers to entry and exit, 366 BAZ, see Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe Bekezela Gumbo’s interrogation, 14 Beliefs fundamental, 323 real, 216 unfortunate, 167 Bifurcated states, 279 Bill of Rights, 314 Billing, Michael, 54 Bills controversial, 127 import, 289 third, 128 Binary setup, 87 Bishop Dodge, 30 Bishop Lamont, 30 Biti, Tendai, 104n10, 394 Black people impoverished, 62 young, 32 Black political parties, 31 Black populations, 28–33, 40, 42, 300 oppressed, 31 Blacks, 2, 6, 27–33, 35, 36, 38–40, 42, 44, 45, 59–62, 65, 66, 120, 126, 141, 143, 145–147, 149, 165, 173, 218, 230, 300, 303, 315, 364, 369, 382, 395, 396

enfranchised, 41 Boob-less commander-in-­ chief, 341–347 Book Mugabeism, 91 Botswana, 28, 32, 46, 87n1, 104, 141, 159, 368 Boundaries, 43, 87, 88, 99, 103 geographical, 380 Bretton Woods institutions, 124, 282 Brian Raftopoulos’ book, 2 Bribery, 209, 311 Bright Matonga, 211 Bring back VP Mnangagwa, 343 Britain, 31, 33, 147, 257, 282, 303 aiding, 286 British brokered Lancaster House Agreement, 161 British colonial rule, 118, 122, 301 British Foreign Minister, 195 British foreign policy, 216 British government, 36, 37, 149, 301 British imperialists, 159 British independent newspaper, 194 British newspapers, 252 British occupation, 172 British South Africa Company, 27, 41 British supervised elections, 162 Broadcasting, 126 Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ), 127, 191 Broadcasting Services, 127, 246, 257 Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), 127, 191 BSA, see Broadcasting Services Act Building trust and confidence, 308–310 Bulawayo, 36, 71, 75, 145, 156, 162, 166, 169, 171–173 Bulawayo metropolitan, 167 Bulawayo News, 162 Bulawayo’s Lady Stanley, 162

 INDEX 

Bureaucracy, 8, 90–92, 118, 188, 227, 278 new, 97 Bureaucrats conniving, 286 senior, 91, 307, 312 Business international economics, 362 internationalization/ internationalisation, 369–380, 382, 383 objectives, 365, 372, 382 opportunities, 35, 64, 365, 366 paradigm, 287 parasitic, 7 plan, 276, 292, 293 prospects, 379 scientists, 364 By-election, 185 C Cabinet minister, 248, 395 Cabral, A., 60 Cadres deploying ZANU-PF, 96 ex-ZANLA, 163 high-ranking female, 336 young generation party, 181 Calabrese, A., 252 Caledonia Mining, 286 Cameron, H., 36, 37, 94n3 Campaign door-to-door ZANU-PF, 196 email bombing, 239 food-for-a-vote, 197 militarized, 196 period, 11 pre-election military terror, 195 rallies, 108 smear, 265 teams, 195, 196, 196n12

403

Campaigning, 188, 259 critical civil society organizations, 67 Canada, 137, 176, 224 Candidates independent, 102, 185, 322 parliamentary, 171 presidential, 43, 197 right, 198 Capacity-building process, 324 Capital direct investment, 363 domestic, 281 foreign, 218 global, 17, 275, 276 human, 311, 378, 382 international, 286, 292, 294, 295, 364 market and inward FDI, 380–381 movement, 364 nation’s, 282 shared intellectual, 378 subsidise, 276 working, 381 Capital accumulation financialised primitive, 275 primitive, 275–277, 290, 294, 295 Capitalism, 17, 275, 282–284, 335 international, 295 Capitalist philosophies, 360 Cases basket, 325 charged, 200 critical land reform, 201 CCDZ, see Centre for Community Development in Zimbabwe CCJP, 61, 94, 94n3 CCMS, see Centre for Communication Media and Society CCZ, 200n20 Ceasefire, 33, 161 Central Committee, 10 Central committee meetings, 10, 229

404 

INDEX

Central Intelligence Organisation (CIOs), 183, 196, 234 feared, 234 Central issues, 65 Central point, 55 Central stage, 69, 72 Centralisation, 126, 284, 321, 324 general, 123 Centrality, 251, 303 Centralization increased, 126 Centralized state bureaucracies, 118 Centre competing, 248 developed, 292, 295 hollowed, 107 main urban, 71 manufacturing, 282 moderate, 88 modern, 279 nerve, 199 Challenges address debt, 317 alternative, 321 contemporary, 269 contextual, 52 court, 106, 173 economic, 69, 307, 317, 324 formidable, 187 internal, 170, 185 law, 240 liquidity, 317 major, 277 moral hazard, 372 new, 68 political, 266 social, 17, 52, 299 socio-economic, 267 unresolved, 66 Champion multi-partyism, 103 Championed labour rights, 141 Character assassination, 258, 265

Chedondo, Martin (Major General), 150, 198 Chief Justice former, 102 longest serving, 92 Chief Mapondera, 240 Chiefs aides, 199 commandeered, 199 modern, 91 traditional, 57, 199 Chieftainship, 26, 199 Chigwata, Tinashe Carlton, 17, 18, 321–323 China on official duty, 334 Chinamano, Ruth (wife), 31 Chineka, Livingstone (Brig-­ Gen), 191–192 Chinese companies, 286, 319 instructors, 170 investment, 263 markets, 288 CIOs, see Central Intelligence Organisation Circumstantial evidence, 368 Citizen displeasure, 78 Citizen re-assertiveness renewed, 74 Citizenry general, 73 informed, 262 Citizens alienation of, 25 angry, 70, 398 arresting, 194 enlightened, 262 equal, 59 free, 2 galvanized, 74 guiding, 176 individual, 119, 123

 INDEX 

informing, 251 marginalised, 120 mobilize, 66, 75 new, 75–77 ordinary, 52, 80, 236, 303–306, 317 picketing, 238 sovereign, 61 television reassuring, 305 voting, 268 white, 2, 30 Citizenship bifurcated, 56 disenchantment and apathy, 69 inclusive, 53, 58, 61, 65, 66 Citizenship rights, 335 basic, 77 Civic activism, 69, 74 new, 76 Civic organisations, 68, 105, 247 respective, 105 Civics movement’s struggles, 57 processes, 124 society organizations, 238 Civil disputes, 20 Civil liberties, 303 Civil society activists, 95, 394 activities, 95, 321, 394 allege, 234 allied, 105 an indigenous, 56 and democratisation in Zimbabwe, 121–125 and opposition politics, 96–99 deracialized, 56 differentiated, 121 efforts, 57 emerging, 98 state of, 14, 117, 122, 129 strong, 208

405

traditional, 75–77 urban, 55 Civil society groups organized, 73 traditional, 75, 77 Civil society organizations (CSOs), 63, 67, 71, 74, 76–79, 89, 107, 123 community mobilization, 71 Civil society organizations/civil society organisations (CSOs) free, 79 traditional, 76–78 Civilian authorities, 203 de jure, 15 Civilianisation process, 19 Civilianise, 19 Civilians designer, 19 handlers, 203 innocent, 94, 97, 393 members, 94 Class discrimination, 30, 44 Climate change, 286 Coalitions grand, 255, 258 political, 76 possible, 259 Cobbing, J., 26, 158 Codification, 127 Cold War, 3, 146 Coleman intimates, 232 Colonial authoritarianism, 61 authorities, 210 conquest, 54, 172 domination, 5 era, 28, 42, 118, 127, 159, 161 era Law, 127 historians, 160 ideology, 282 image, 160 inheritance, 7

406 

INDEX

Colonial (cont.) invaders, 160 legacy, 4, 300 nation-state, 55 oppression, 124, 143 rulers, 160 settlers, 7, 54, 120 stereotyping, 160 subjects, 61 subjugation, 141, 142 writers, 160 yesteryear, 230 Colonial masters, 161 former, 146 Colonial rule defined transition trajectories post, 141 direct, 7 Colonial state bifurcated, 56 hegemony, 124 Colonial Zimbabwe, 29–31, 41 Colonialism defeat, 58 internal, 17 new, 284 resisting, 31 Colonies former, 6 Colonisation/colonization, 26–28, 31–33, 41, 42, 163 Colonists, 27 victorious, 163 Colonized peoples, 26, 27 Colonizers former, 62 Colony, 6 former settler, 80 Comic Pastor, 222 Commander asina mazamu, 341 Commander Defence Forces, 341, 342, 345 Commander Defense Forces and army, 346

Commander in-chief, 341–347 Commander in-chief boobless, 341 Commander mukuru, 341 Commodity circulation processes, 287 Commodity marketing, 284 Commodity value chains, 287 Common civil service culture, 310 Commonwealth, 37, 303 Community-based organizations (CBOs), 76 Comparative analyses of elite dis-­ cohesion in ZANU-PF, 187–188 Competitive general equilibrium economy, 369 Conflict armed, 161 ethnic, 168, 170, 174 nationalist, 137 pre-date, 159 protracted social, 155 Conflicting notions of change, 67 Conflicts generated, 27 Conflictual, 55 Congo, 46 Connell’s hegemonic masculinity concept, 18, 331, 336, 347 Constitution, 2, 9, 37, 42, 43, 63, 67, 68, 79, 80, 95, 95n4, 104, 105, 128, 174, 185, 190, 192–194, 198, 201, 202, 230, 301, 304, 305, 309, 313–316, 325, 332 new, 42, 43, 68, 79, 80, 105, 304, 325 Constitution of Zimbabwe, 37, 174, 305, 314, 315 vests, 305 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment, 202 Constitution-making process, 65, 67, 104, 230 Constitutional Amendment Number, 201

 INDEX 

Constitutional amendments, 302 Constitutional clause, 176, 198 Constitutional Court, 11, 110, 200n20, 202, 393 Constitutional delinquency, 240, 241 Constitutional exercises, 246 Constitutional Lawyers, 309 Constitutional legal basis, 190 Constitutional order, 227, 313 Constitutional processes, 107 Constitutional republic elected, 190 Constitutional roles, 9, 194, 200 designated, 304 Constitutional veneer, 10 Constitutionalise, 9 Constitutionalism, 2, 54, 63, 79, 104, 301, 304, 314–316 Contemporary Zimbabwe, 123, 158, 253, 331, 337 Context, 8, 9, 14, 16, 18, 34, 46, 55, 56, 69, 73, 79, 91, 100, 102, 117, 120, 123, 127, 129, 138, 157–163, 165, 167, 199, 203, 207–219, 222, 232, 233, 254, 255, 282, 309, 332–334, 336–339, 341, 359, 362, 365, 367, 369, 376, 381, 396, 397 Continuous currency devaluation, 281 Continuous demands, 8 Continuum, 53, 54, 72 Contradictions, 5, 32, 58, 93, 156, 173, 184–185, 189, 283, 317 civil, 237 Control a loss of, 337, 349 authoritarian state, 126 direct, 269 exerting, 34 little, 339 livestock, 29 loss of, 39, 194, 337 lost, 266

party’s, 208 political, 208, 211, 214, 215 taking, 79, 304, 390 undoubted, 203 Corruption allegations, 259 and extortion, 248, 262 included, 95 increased, 70 open, 63 proliferating, 72 Corruption cases, 302 prosecuting, 311 Corruption Index, 311 Counter-fuck Grace, 346 Counter-fucking, 346 Counter-hegemonic, 103, 104, 107, 108n14 bloc, 108, 110 Counter-hegemony, 103–109 Counter-plots, 19 Counter-positions, 88 Counter-revolutionary elements, 342, 354 Countering, 258 Country coup, 305 Courted political controversy, 168 Courts appeals, 128 declaration, 201 ruling, 202 Credit, 172, 174, 284, 292, 310, 363, 373 banking, 292 Criminal abuse, 248 Criminal Law, 127 Criminalisation/ criminalization, 29, 128 Criminalizing debate, 171–172 Criminals, 37, 188, 193, 248, 348 around the president, 9

407

408 

INDEX

Crisis blown, 303 economic, 47, 228, 276, 316, 325 in Zimbabwe Coalition, 67 multi-layered, 52 political, 325 viability, 381 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 254, 255 Cross-pollination, 136, 142 Crude neo-liberal framework, 19 Cultural relativism, 283 Culture cyber, 222 given, 338 guiding, 142 of polarisation in Zimbabwe, 85–110 ongoing, 138 oral, 232 particular, 226 Cumulative causation models, 376 Currency crisis, 318 crush, 65 dominant, 317 hard, 318 injection, 363 local, 318 regimes, 318 surrogate, 317 surrogate bond, 288 Currency reforms, 317–318 required, 318 Cybercrime Bill, 234 Cyberspace, 73 D Data presentation and discussion, 234–238

Data Protection Authority of Zimbabwe, 128 Data Protection Bill, 127, 128 David Easton’s systems theory, 138 Debt securities, 363 Decentralisation, 301 Decentralization, 62 Decentralize, 308 Decision-makers, 92 Decisions contacts enhance, 378 court, 200, 315 informed, 251, 269, 372 informed political, 262 judicial, 200 managed, 26 micro level, 379 powerful, 151 unpopular, 71 unpopular government, 70 Defenceless, 263 Defenceless widow, 258, 260 unfortunate, 259 Degenerating, 9, 159, 399 Degree high, 129 large, 41, 121 significant, 380 Deimperialization, 57 Deindustrialization, 281 Demobilisation resisted, 228 Democracy consolidation of, 68, 117, 121, 269 constitutional, 2, 63, 176, 192, 194, 304, 314, 315 contemporary, 13, 58, 125 deepen, 86, 321 deepening, 118, 119, 122, 124, 125, 129 enhancing, 309 entrenching, 62 internal, 61

 INDEX 

issues of, 16, 65–67, 104, 107, 226, 262 liberal, 1, 53, 122, 123, 183, 227 modern, 123, 125 multiparty, 301 pseudo, 79, 183, 208 strengthen, 86, 315 thriving, 99 Democracy and Political Discourse, 12 Democratic Change, 78, 123, 186 Democratic Party (DP), 101 Democratic transition, 12, 14, 75, 79, 117, 120, 122, 129 delayed, 155, 157 Democratic triumphs, 183 Demonized Grace Mugabe framing, 14 Demonstrations historic, 339 intermittent, 98 largest, 339 mass, 72 national, 202 ongoing street, 72 peaceful, 202 public, 334 Demonstrators angry, 344 fellow, 339, 340 Development capital market, 360 capitalist, 276 critical societal, 227 human, 142 human capital, 311, 378, 382 inclusive, 17, 63, 79, 277, 293, 294 inclusive transformative, 17, 277, 293 infrastructural, 282 organic, 13, 86 payments, 289 political, 137

409

positive, 302 social, 311, 314 substantial, 288 sustainable, 53, 62, 280, 294 uneven, 17, 275, 276, 279 Development approaches, 283 Development benefit, 322 Development discourses, 293 Development goals, 377 Development objectives, 323 Development paradigm, 52, 301 Development plans, 277, 283, 292, 313 new, 276, 277 Developmental challenges addressing, 170, 174 Developmental disposition, 258 Developmental strides, 165 Developmentalism, 4 Developmentalist, 57, 280 Displacements of black peoples, 31, 32 Disrespecting Grace Mugabe, 190 Disrupted consultative meetings, 172 Dissidence fomenting, 231 hidden, 225 long-running thread of, 16, 223 political, 223, 226 Dissidence in Zimbabwean Politics Shepherd Mpofu and Trust Matsilele, 221–244 District Commissioners, 26 Dominance male, 332, 335, 339, 346, 347 male social, 338 unbridled, 89, 98 white, 2, 30 Dominant liberal practices interwoven, 91 Dominant political culture, 14, 117, 135–144, 148, 151, 152 Double-edged sword, 191

410 

INDEX

Dubai, 344 Dussel, Enrique (Liberation), 78 Dynamic layout, 252, 254 Dynamic proficiencies, 375 Dzikamai Mavhaire, 185 Dzimiri, 148 E Easton’s Systems Theory, 138–139 Eclectic model, 365 classical, 365 Economic blueprint, 317 Economic choices, 324 Economic conditions, 52, 68, 124, 159, 393, 397 Economic culture, 33, 48 Economic deadlock, 360 Economic decline, 16, 165 unprecedented, 245 Economic development alternative, 294 domestic, 277 inclusive, 276, 277 introverted, 277 potential, 290 real, 319 Economic development issues, 293 Economic development path, 17, 275 Economic development plan, 277 new, 276 Economic development strategies, 281 Economic development trajectories, 276, 281–283 Economic growth expected sustained, 62 rapid, 98 sustainable, 175 Economic growth outcomes positive, 281 Economic malaise, 240, 241 Economic meltdown, 9

Economic messiah, 260 Economic Partnership Agreements, 376 Economic planners, 280 Economic planning, 281 centralised, 281 Economic powerhouse, 317 Economic progress, 96 Economic quagmire, 263 Economic recovery path, 11 Economic sanctions, 31 illegal, 303 Economic situation, 9, 229, 303–305, 319, 361, 368 precarious, 324 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), 63, 64, 101, 103, 124, 276, 281, 282, 302, 360, 361 adopted, 360 neo-liberal, 276 Economic trajectory, 307 Economics, 48, 137, 249, 252, 300, 360, 362, 370 Economies of scales, 366, 367, 381 Economists, 364 Economy declining, 266 developed, 294 developing, 175, 362, 370 disarticulated, 17, 275, 277, 287, 288, 293 enclave, 165 extroverted, 17, 275–298 failed, 18, 359, 396–398 faltering, 324 fragmented, 361 host, 366 local, 317 multicurrency, 361 planned, 281

 INDEX 

political, 69, 135, 136, 140, 142, 192, 221, 276, 360 shrinking, 264 socialist, 281 stagnant, 304 strong, 301 Education, 2, 30, 59, 62, 64, 98, 106, 167, 175, 301, 302, 304, 306, 319, 395 Egypt, 1, 78, 233, 394, 398 Egypt uprising, 222 Eighty Years, 397 Election environment, 199 Election interview, 69 Election outcome, 68 undisputed, 307 Election results parliamentary, 106 presidential, 151 securocrats influence, 196 Election Supervision Commission (ESC), 199 Elections competitive, 183 contested, 150, 309 democratic, 301 disputed, 304, 308, 320 early, 200 free, 68 free and fair, 107, 118, 276 general, 146, 186, 187, 189, 332, 361, 392 harmonised, 99, 246, 299, 304, 307 influence, 196, 224 multiparty, 195 national, 11, 342n1 next, 95, 101, 106 parliamentary, 45, 99, 105, 106, 391 periodic, 118, 120 provincial chairperson, 189 representative, 183

411

winning, 92 Elite Fragmentation in Women and Youth Leagues, 185–187 Elite groups modern, 76 Elites authoritarian regime, 186 corporate, 125 educated black, 59 political, 35, 62, 87, 118, 123, 125, 127 Emergence, 67, 68, 80, 91, 100, 123, 124, 185, 200, 264, 306 Employment Act, 97 Employment creation, 361 Employment opportunities, 319 Employment patterns, 166 Endeavour of Foreign Direct Investment, 362 Enemies of the struggle, 32 Energy collective, 7 direct, 152 strategic, 284 Enforcement, 108, 147 Entrench authoritarianism, 57 Entrench dictatorship, 63 Environment conducive, 314 conducive business investment, 282 constraining, 7 democratic, 62 economic, 311, 368, 369 hostile, 168 hostile learning, 168 open business, 325 operating, 376 polarised, 88, 247 restrictive media, 14, 118, 129 Environmental damage, 294 Environmental preservation, 319 ESAP, see Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

412 

INDEX

ESAP deaths, 103 ESC Chief Executive Officer, 199 Ethnic chauvinism, 176 perceived, 156 Ethnic cleansing, 165, 175 Ethnic consciousness, 155, 156, 176 Ethnic majority, 148 Ethnic majority party, 148 Ethnic minority party, 148 Ethnic origins, 159 Ethnic overtones, 170 Ethnic political undertones, 156 Ethnic politics narrow, 145 narrow tribal, 145 tribal, 147, 148 Ethnic segmentation, 145 Ethnicism, 123 Ethnicity, 34, 39, 45, 60, 61, 89, 139, 145, 146, 157, 158, 166, 170, 173, 280 politicised, 14 Ethnicization, 14, 155–180 Euro-American global imperial designs, 292 Eurocentric epistemology, 278 Eurocentrism, 294 Europe, 30, 224, 284 European domination, 58 European journalist, 218 European nationals, 145 European settler accumulation, 279 European Union (EU), 257, 288, 376 European Union and SADC countries, 376 Evaluations, 254, 310 Extreme Suffering for African People, 302 Extroverted natural resource extraction, 294

F Facebook, 72, 74, 224, 226, 234, 236, 238, 341, 345 Facing Mount Kenya, 59 Faction leader, 190 Factional politics, 260, 261 leading divisive, 262 Farmers black, 29 resettled peasant, 77 smallholder, 225, 287 white, 10, 29, 41, 42, 44, 149, 303, 390, 391 white commercial, 200, 228 white racist commercial, 201 Fast Track Land Reform, 217, 279 Fast Track land Reform Program (FTLRP), 2, 149, 200, 303, 324 Fast-tracks, 287 Father Zimbabwe, 5, 145 Fathers, 55, 197, 199, 216, 234, 341, 343, 348 FDI, see Foreign Direct Investment FDI and stock markets, 380 FDI decisions, 367 FDI inflows inward, 380 Fight corruptiom, 308, 311, 390, 395 Fighting constitutional lobby group, 230 guerrillas, 227 Finance export monopoly, 290 public, 313 Finance capital, 17, 275, 282, 284, 294 Financial assistance, 294 Financial Gazette, 199n18 Financial institutions, 311, 317, 373 international, 294 Financial irregularities, 315 Financial obstacles, 372

 INDEX 

Financial payouts, 65 Financial support package, 294 Financial viewpoint, 363 Force Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, 187 Forced assimilative relationship, 158 Forced Morgan Tsvangirai, 109 Forced Robert Mugabe, 361 Forced structural changes, 280 Forces armed, 9, 93, 95, 184 external, 31 formidable, 149 guerrillas, 32 imperial, 293 imperialist, 141 inimical, 230 invading colonial, 159 main, 253 meting brute, 235 mobilizing, 167 political, 264 powerful social, 64 regular, 337 regular military, 66 social, 64, 65, 68, 69 Foreign Aid, 362 economic commentators confuse, 362 Foreign associates, 263 Foreign currency, 288, 307, 318, 320, 395, 396 shortage of, 317, 318, 321 Foreign currency accounts, 318 Foreign currency shortages, 320, 321 Foreign currency supply, 288 Foreign debt, 317 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) agents of, 19, 359, 362 defined, 362 direction of, 368, 380, 382 financial procedures of, 380

413

nature of, 382 outward, 365, 367, 369 search of, 18, 359 volumes and direction of, 368, 382 Former President Mugabe, 256, 258, 259 Former President Robert Mugabe, 120, 248, 299, 303 Former secretary general, 101, 104 Fraudulent transfer of resources, 290 Fraught, 32, 156 Free speech, 127, 233 unrestrained, 233 Freedom attainment of, 5, 59 civic, 76 fundamental, 309 guaranteed, 127 people’s, 5, 7, 108, 121 political, 123 presupposed, 227 struggles for, 5 white, 301 Freedom Camps, 169 Freedom fighters, 60, 161 Freedom lies ahead, 5 Freedom of assembly, 108, 127, 227 Freedom of expression, 127 French governments, 70 French revolutions, 227, 343 Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), 146 Fucking Grace, 346 Funding enjoyed foreign, 230 massive external, 98 Funding agencies, 79 Funding institutions, 280 G Gadzikwa, Wellington, 16, 224

414 

INDEX

Gaidzanwa, Rudo, 39, 332, 335 Gedi Ndlovu, 162 Gender, 12, 18, 33, 34, 39, 42, 45, 54, 56, 60, 137, 246, 283, 331, 332, 335–339, 347, 351, 353, 354 equality, 331 equity, 336 examined, 332 exclusion, 18, 331, 354 identities, 137 inequalities, 337 Gendered beings, 347 Gendered Zimbabwean, 335–336 Gendzel, 120 General Chiwenga, 334, 341, 344–346 General Lookout Masuku, 162 Generations new, 70, 77 Geographical demarcation, 159 Geographical location, 187 Ghana socialist path, 290 Global commodity chains, 284 Global Financial Integrity (GFI), 287, 290 Global Political Agreement (GPA), 43, 67, 172, 200, 245, 247 negotiators, 172 Globalization, 53, 292, 369, 374, 378 increased, 373 GNU, see Government of national unity GNU and Zimbabwe African National Unity Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 277 Golden Straitjacket, 278 Golding, P., 252, 268 Goods consumer, 268 essential household, 70 markets, 370

political, 152 produced, 289, 313 supplying, 379 Goreraza, Stanley, 344 Governance accountable, 314, 322 agendas, 308 bad, 74, 307, 395 castigated ZANU-PF, 66 clean, 325 corporate, 319, 373 culture, 77, 325 democratic, 85, 309 formal legal, 315 local, 156, 166 participatory, 86 progressive, 20 representative, 54 system of, 18, 62, 63, 91 Governance issues economic, 69, 77 ignoring, 77 Governance politics, 77 Government accountable, 307 agencies, 309, 310 aid, 197 alternative MDC, 276 appointments, 129 arms of, 315 black majority, 146, 147 building, 210 bureaucracy, 278 central, 58, 322 civilian, 20, 203 coalition, 68, 392 colonial, 29, 40, 45, 146, 172 employees, 310 failure, 280 food handouts, 197 functional, 308 functionaries, 228

 INDEX 

fund, 374 gender policies, 332 government perspective, 371 host, 374 in FDI and International Business, 382 inclusive, 2, 67, 79, 92 institutions, 308 involvement limiting, 118, 129, 282 levels of, 309, 312, 313 manages, 70 ministers, 269 nationalist, 91, 142 networks, 373 new, 18, 62, 93, 97, 98, 126, 183, 307, 309, 359, 362, 379 new Zimbabwe, 18 of Zimbabwe, 177, 286, 300, 303, 307, 317, 379 parallel, 263 permitted, 97 policies, 138, 214, 276, 308, 318, 383 positions, 19, 215, 312 post-colonial, 118, 120, 123, 129, 130 post-independence Zimbabwe, 165 posts, 166, 309 power-sharing, 2, 47 practices, 278 pre-and post-colonial, 123 promulgation, 72 propaganda, 165 pseudo-civilian, 276 recent, 75 recklessness, 70 resisted, 71 response, 149, 377, 396 responsible, 376 role of, 19, 359, 362, 369–380 roles, 382

415

settler, 27, 28, 143, 147 subnational, 322, 323 subsidies, 302, 374 support, 375, 379, 383, 391 western, 68, 319 white, 29, 38 Government expenditure, 302 Government infrastructure, 165 local, 29, 197 Government intervention, 283, 369–375 restrictive, 129 Government of national unity (GNU), 3, 43, 47, 198, 200, 277, 282, 304 Government officials denounced senior, 348 senior, 71, 310, 348 Governmental powers concentrated, 321 decentralised, 322 Governors, 25, 196 Grace Mugabe’s case, 353 Grace’s actions, 350 Grace’s ascendancy, 343 Grace’s behaviour, 348 Grace’s character, 350 Grace’s contribution, 349 commending, 351 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 303, 367, 376 growth, 367 growth rate, 367 sustainable, 376 value of, 367 Gubbay, Anthony (Chief Justice), 200, 304, 314 Guerrillas, 8, 28, 32, 33, 57, 58, 164, 169, 173, 227 fighter former, 360 fighters, 335 warfare, 28

416 

INDEX

Gukurahundi, 12, 34, 36–38, 45, 66, 93, 94, 98, 109, 110, 147, 165–169, 171, 172, 174–177, 228, 391, 394 christened, 93 H Habermas, J., 122, 223, 226, 227 Hackers, 224, 232 underground, 232 Hacktivists, 222, 232 Harare demonstration, 340 Harare regime, 56 Harris, N.R., 256, 370, 372–376, 378 Hashtag activism, 75 Hashtag activists, 70, 77 Hegel, 121 Hegemonic agenda, 169 machinery, 124 networks, 238 Hegemonic masculinity concept, 18, 331, 336, 347 conflate, 339 construction of, 18, 331 Hegemony alternative, 85 cultural, 156, 169 economic, 264 ethnic, 14, 34, 136, 139, 140, 142, 143, 147, 148, 151, 152 growing, 98 ideological, 280 political, 200, 302, 304 ruling party’s, 93, 95 theory, 337 tribal/ethnic, 14, 136, 140, 142, 143, 147, 152 Hegemony building project, 93, 98 attendant, 93

Herald’s position in Zimbabwean politics, 257 High Court, 9, 202 High Court Judge, 203 High literacy rates, 225 Historical inheritance, 143 History annals of, 155, 158 country’s, 66, 110 cultural, 156, 169 economic, 361 inclusive, 80 known, 235 long, 309 modern, 183 political, 120 postcolonial, 9 recent, 193 reconstructed liberation war, 164 shared, 137, 143 technical, 231 traceable, 143 violent, 66 Host Markets Determinants of FDI, 362, 367–369 Human rights activist, 394 fundamental, 316, 325 organisations, 104 Human rights abuses, 68, 94, 282 gross, 68 Humanity/humanities, 78, 136, 247 new, 80 Husband ageing, 333, 342 disgraced, 350 late, 257 I Identity common, 58, 136

 INDEX 

conflicts, 173 defining, 136, 145 ethnic, 37, 148, 155, 157 fragmented, 145 group-coalescing, 14, 136, 140, 142 masculine, 338 national, 137 particular, 55 shared, 137 social, 137, 339 Identity politics conditions, 138 cross-cutting, 143, 145 defining, 136 ethnic, 148 filaments of, 136 nature and extent of, 136 racial hegemony, 147 role of, 14, 138 sustained, 148 tribal exclusionary, 146 Identity Politics Factors, 135–154 Identity politics in Zimbabwe Transition Politics, 139 Identity Politics Shapes Transition Politics, 138–139 Ideologies bankrupt, 325 developed post-colonial, 282 particular, 55 political, 119 repulsive, 230 transgressing ZANU-PF, 252 unifying, 76 Imbizo, 26 IMF, see International Monetary Fund Imperialism bourgeois, 282 global capital interests perpetuating, 17, 275 Imperialist, 60, 141, 149, 159, 283, 284

417

penetration, 282 IMPI, see Information and Media Panel of Inquiry Impunity, 38, 54, 121, 395 Independence attained, 209, 301 attainment of, 28 country’s, 173 decade of, 62, 96, 302–304, 315 hard-won, 150, 197 Mugabe, 360 operational, 311 Indigenous Business Development Council (IBDC), 65 Indigenous Business Women Organization (IBWO), 65 Inform investment policies, 371 Information asymmetric, 373 complete, 59, 370 critical, 251, 268 humiliating, 232 inadequate, 309, 370 incomplete, 372 irregular, 372, 373 minister of, 127, 129, 191, 210–212, 216, 258 new, 256 objective, 251, 269 personal, 128 political, 252 public, 128 publishing, 233 quality standards, 374 real time, 74 supply, 374 valued, 338 Information and Broadcasting Services, 246 Information and Media Panel of Inquiry (IMPI), 245–247, 265 findings, 247

418 

INDEX

Information and Publicity ministry, 211, 219 Information and Publicity ministry in Zimbabwe post, 219 Information Bill, 127 Information Bill sets, 127 Infotainment, 251, 267 Infrastructure public, 318 rebuilding, 175 repressive legal, 126 Infrastructure development, 175 Interception of Communications Act (ICA), 191 International Crisis Group, 3 International Development, 325 International engagement, 11 International finance, 284 International finance circuits, 284 International integration, 324 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2, 101, 103, 229, 294, 360, 362, 363, 396 International niches, 377 International reengagement, 307 International stage, 325 Internationalization, 19, 256, 359, 365, 369–380, 382, 383 Internationalization advantage, 365 Internet, 72, 73, 75, 125, 212, 226, 231–233, 393 Internet use, 73 Interregnum new, 78 Intervention mechanisms, 13 Interventions legal, 231 necessary, 195 overt, 198 witnessed military, 1 Investors direct, 363 foreign, 277, 363

global, 373 potential, 368 prospective, 370 Israel’s worship, 347 Israeli kingdom, 347 J Johannesburg airport in South Africa, 210 Joice Mujuru coverage of, 266 expulsion of, 16, 246–248, 252, 253, 259, 261, 267, 269 lambasted, 333 portrayed, 258 Joint Operations Command (JOC), 109 Jomo Kenyatta, 59 Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, 169 Journalism broadsheet, 248–250, 261, 262, 268 independent, 35 investigative, 256 objective, 255, 267, 269 patriotic, 218, 219 professional, 218, 261 simplified, 252 sound bite, 256 tabloid, 248–251, 261, 264 Journalists and editors, 15, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 215–219 committed participation of, 209, 217 critical, 209 manipulating, 215 orientate, 213 professional, 218, 261 purged, 219 purged senior, 211

 INDEX 

recruiting, 212 selected, 207 senior, 211–214 young, 211, 217 Judicial Service Commission, 202 Judiciary, 15, 31, 33, 90, 91, 182, 183, 200–203, 208, 301, 304, 312, 314, 315, 322 independent, 314 Justice economic, 58, 64–66 redistributive, 65, 80 restorative, 240 social, 62, 70, 98 Justice & Peace, 196n14 K Kalanga Cultural Society (KCS), 165 Kaleidoscope, 61 Kanhanga, Epmarcus (Brigadier-­ General), 191 Kenya, 141 Khupe, Thokozani, 239 Khuphe, Thokozani, 151 King, 26, 27 King Ahab’s wife, 347 King, Jr. Martin Luther, 145 King, Martin Luther, 237 approach, 237 Kingmakers, 95, 109, 197 Knowledge empirical, 375 firm, 373 private, 373 productive, 375 public, 126, 373 tacit, 375, 382 technological, 375 Kriger for Zimbabwe’s Mtoko District, 60

419

L Labour cheap, 144, 283, 295 included, 89, 276 resurgent, 101 unions, 63, 96, 228 Labour movement, 2, 96, 97, 103, 105, 107, 123, 124 formidable, 64 Lancaster Constitution, 126 Lancaster House, 37, 93, 104, 301, 313 Lancaster House Agreement, 33, 161, 163 Lancaster House Constitution, 2, 63, 202, 301 negotiated, 301 Lancaster House negotiations, 37, 93 Land ancestral, 31 audits, 79 community, 71 deals, 284 grabs, 285, 286 issue, 208, 217, 219 lost, 10 markets, 279 occupation, 65 occupied, 31 ownership, 146, 279, 303 politics, 156 question, 104, 290 reclamation, 4 redistribution, 15, 65, 149 reform question, 135 restitution, 53 restored, 2 small-scale resettled, 279 tenure issues, 29 urban, 29 use, 29 watered, 27

420 

INDEX

Land Apportionment Act, 27 Land Husbandry Act, 143 Land reform championed, 218 defended, 216 fast track, 217 Land Reform Programme, 257, 264 radical Fast-Track, 2 Land Tenure Act, 28 Land tenure systems tribal, 279 Landscape economic, 361 for opposition politics, 90–92 urban, 77 Language body, 238 controlled, 249 polarising liberationist, 96 shared, 140 Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), 127 Laws better, 105 constitutional, 240 customary, 55 draconian, 240, 390, 392 illegitimate, 240 inherited restrictive, 126 passed controversial indigenous, 369 rational, 76 repressive, 121 repressive media, 121, 123, 125, 127 rule of, 53, 54, 59, 263, 304, 308, 314–315, 320, 379, 390, 395 Leaders black/African, 6 brave, 255, 259 citizen movement, 77 civilian, 109 community, 70, 77, 398

factional, 333 former, 229, 342 former war veterans, 342 formidable, 258 incumbent, 183 individual cultic, 268 intellectual, 59 key ZANU-PF, 192 mature, 255, 258 moderate, 259, 260, 263 political, 28, 150, 170, 197, 268, 300, 308, 333 recognized public, 74 revered, 93 senior party, 187 senior PF-ZAPU, 93 settler, 27 veteran, 9 Leadership association’s, 189 black traditional, 29 civilian, 8 clear, 231 female, 344, 354 intellectual, 59 no to petticoat, 344 political, 151, 302, 304, 390 top, 182, 191 visionary, 325 Legacy dual, 126 restoring, 80 shared, 58 underdevelopment, 165 Legal circles, 361 Legal constraints, 227 Legal expert, 201 Legal framework, 97, 314, 315 institutional, 374 Legal Resources Foundation, 147 Legally opaque, 202 Legislating, 121

 INDEX 

Legislation indigenisation, 10 passed, 27 responsive, 332 tramples, 309 Legislative amendments, 302 Legislative arenas, 208 Legislature, 15, 31, 33, 90, 183, 208 Legitimacy deficiencies, 320 deficit, 307 legal, 203 new, 11 political, 11, 203 sustaining, 209 Legitimate regime form, 208 Legitimizing, 338, 351 infidelity, 345 Lesabe, Thenjiwe, 31, 162 Liberalization, 2, 99, 281, 302, 309, 369, 379 trade investment, 369 Liberalizing electoral outcome, 183 Liberals parties, 29 thinkers, 90 trajectory, 95 white, 30 Liberation armies, 32, 94 connection, 15 country’s, 164 exclusive politics of, 13, 87 fighters, 30 forces, 29, 32 legacy, 141, 161, 176 national, 5, 28, 32–34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 48, 105, 124, 192 of Zimbabwe, 164, 335 politics of, 13, 14, 87, 136, 140–152 question, 135

421

values, 186 Liberation credentials, 39, 152, 334 strong, 8 Liberation entitlement centre, 142 politics of, 14, 136, 140–152 stock-holder group, 142 Liberation history, 9, 142, 203 shared, 141 Liberation movements divided, 173 former, 203 narratives ethnicization of, 14 national, 124 Liberation Movements in Power, 5 Liberation struggles anticolonial nationalist, 56 armed, 8, 57 credentials, 95, 151, 152 elite, 152 entitlement, 152 history, 152 legacy, 152 narratives, 163 Liberation war anti-colonial, 4, 57 background, 202 credentials, 9, 182, 260 discourse, 8 heroine, 248 promises, 62 veterans, 141, 150 Liberation wartime credentials, 181 Limitations real economic capacity, 376 Limited democratic consolidation post-Zimbabwe, 117 Limited involvement, 14, 118, 129 Limited numbers, 338 Literature contemporary, 125 contemporary empirical, 367

422 

INDEX

Literature (cont.) humanities, 136 on electoral processes in Zimbabwe, 196 political science, 208 recent, 368 review, 335–336, 381, 383 Logic flawed, 95 immanent, 4, 61 logical flow, 233 logical manifestation, 92 market-determined economic, 4 political continuum, 72 settler colonialism’s, 7 London Stock Exchange (LSE), 286 Long presidential incumbency, 3 Long serving president Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 3, 109 Long-term debt, 363 Louis XVI, ousted King, 343–344 LRF, 61, 94n3 LSE, see London Stock Exchange M Mabenge, Benjamin (Brig-Gen), 191 Machiavellian strategies, 211 Madzingira, Elasto (Brig-Gen), 191 Marauding Ndebele raiders, 159 Marginal political representation, 33 Marginal representation, 31 Marginalisation alleged, 162 black, 30 perceived, 171 perceived ethnic, 156, 170–171, 174 perceived linguistic, 177 political, 28–31 Marginality, 30, 31, 33, 76, 264, 364 Marginalized African groups, 62

Marginalizes, 161 Marumahoko, Sylvester, 17, 18, 301 Marxist interpretation, 110 Marxist party, 301 Marxist-Leninist ideology, 217 Marxists, 90, 110 Masculinities, 338 complicit, 338 hyper-, 18 marginalized, 338 performing aggressive, 346 subordinated, 338 Mashingaidze, Gibson (Major-­ General), 191 Matabeleland agenda, 156 Matabeleland and Midlands regions, 93 Matabeleland chiefs, 172 Matabeleland Collective, 172 Matabeleland Freedom Party, 156 Matabeleland North, 167, 172 Matabeleland provinces, 155, 157, 175, 301 Matabeleland provinces lag, 175 Matabeleland region, 165 Matebeleland Home Society (MHS), 55 Matsilele, Trust, 223, 227 on social media, 16 Mawarire, Evan (Pastor), 72, 74, 76, 222, 235–241, 394 Media and Broadcasting Services, 257 Media discourse, 254 Media ethics, 250, 258 Media Ethics Committee, 245, 247 Media Framing of Joice Mujuru, 256–260 Medium Term Economic Development Plan, 277 Members of Parliament (MPs), 234 and ministers, 234 Meredith, M., 6, 195

 INDEX 

Michael Neocosmos’ Thinking Freedom, 5 Militarized Judiciary, 200–203 Military -assisted transition, 3, 195 action, 191, 349 architecture, 191 arms, 93 beret, 346 campaign, 94 circles, 232 conquest, 61 coup code, 332 coup of November, 4, 80 defeat, 27 deployment, 301 equipment heavy, 334 factor, 182, 303 fatigue changing, 19 influence, 203 interests, 15, 183, 191–193, 199, 200, 202 involvement partisan, 182 junta, 11, 20 junta masquerading, 20 leaders, 163, 301 politicking, 183 prison, 233 prowess, 159 recruitment, 183 Military coup, 3, 4, 8–10, 17, 19, 79, 80, 94n2, 127, 182, 187, 189, 193–195, 203, 275, 283, 305, 332 full blown, 193 Military elites, 44, 46, 48, 49, 186, 203 threatened, 186 Military intervention combined, 14 inevitable, 155 inevitable direct, 155

423

Millennium, 228 new, 229, 303 Miller, K., 346 Minimum Wages Act, 97 Minister articulate, 210 current finance, 230 former ruling party deputy, 92 new, 312 powerful, 170 provincial, 312 senior, 152 Minister of Information and Publicity, 129, 191, 210–212 on mediated communication, 129 Minister of Media, 246 Ministerial delegations, 319 Ministries excess, 312 fully fledged, 234, 239 Ministry of Finance, 210 Ministry of Information, 208–211, 213, 216, 257 Ministry of Information and Publicity, 208–210, 213 Ministry officials, 214 Minorities, 2, 29, 32, 60, 120, 141, 143, 147, 148, 165, 227, 279, 301, 323 Minorities At Risk (MAR), 166 Minority ethnic, 143, 148 Minority ethnics groups, 323 Minority Ndebele speakers, 165 Minority regime, 227 Misogynistic, 39, 53, 340, 341, 354 Misogynistic vitriol, 334 Misogyny, 18, 331–354 Misogyny manifests, 342 Mkandawire, Thandika, 2, 278–280, 282, 293 MN interview, 288

424 

INDEX

Mnangagwa, Emmerson (Commander in-chief, Justice Minister, President), 45, 109, 127, 181, 182, 187, 267, 276, 299, 306, 307, 325, 332, 334, 341, 353, 361, 389, 390 administration, 310, 317 and military interests, 202 candidate, 10, 189 claimed, 346 coronation, 187 dismissal, 187 dismissed, 187 era, 308 failure, 189 government, 20, 319 ingwena, 343 liberation war credentials, 9, 182, 260 ndibaba vedu, 343 pictures, 343 regime, 3–5, 7, 10–12, 18–20 regime desperate for international engagement, 11 regime’s acceptance of crude neo-liberal framework, 19 regime’s failure, 12 regime’s monetary policy, 11 rule, 320, 390, 394 state, 11, 12, 172, 182, 187, 202, 307, 392 sympathisers, 342 Mobile penetration, 225 Mobile phones, 125, 340 Modern constitutions, 315 Modernization hypothesis, 368 Moffat, J., 370, 373–376 Money extort, 73 laundering based, 287 lenders, 372 supply, 361

Morrish, S., 378 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 2, 35, 64, 72, 89, 123, 148, 182, 186, 218, 228, 234, 260, 276, 303, 349, 391 -Mutambara, 186 activists, 95 Alliance, 361 factions, 172 formations, 105, 148 inaugural President, 230 policy, 277, 294 president, 11, 43, 109, 229, 394 Movement for Democratic Change formations, 64 Movements and activism in Zimbabwe, 76 Moyo, Collin (Brig-Gen), 192 Moyo, Jonathan (Minister, Prof), 15, 92, 95, 210–216, 219, 246, 258, 264, 266, 333 Moyo, Sibusiso (Major General), 2, 9, 69, 281, 284, 290, 292, 354 Mozambique, 28, 32, 45, 87n1, 141, 163, 169, 216, 217 Mphoko, Phelekezela (Vice President), 10, 190, 240 Mpofu, Molly, 335 Mpofu, Obert, 152 Mpofu, Obert (Minister), 152 Mpofu, Shepherd, 16, 228 Trust Matsilele on social media, 16 MRP activists, 171, 172 Msika, Joseph, 31 Msindo, E., 55 Mthwakazi activists, 166, 167 flag, 156 groups, 166, 173 Human Rights Restoration Movement, 156 Liberation Front, 156

 INDEX 

Liberation Organisation, 156 nation, 173 radicals, 169 Republican Party, 156 Restoration Movement, 156 state, 157 Mthwakazi Republican Party (MRP), 156, 166, 167, 169, 171–173 Muchemwa, C., 155, 156, 158 Mudenda, Jacob, 304 Mugabe Dynasty, 342 Mugabe must go, 185, 238 Mugabe regime, 7, 11, 12, 40–42, 45, 46, 231, 276 repressive, 276 Mugabe resigns, 194 Mugabe, Albert, 96, 96n7 Mugabe, Grace (First Lady, wife), 266, 332, 334 Mugabe, Robert (President, Prime Minister), 8, 9, 14, 28, 31, 33, 38, 43, 52, 67, 76, 80, 92, 96n7, 100, 109, 120, 146, 151, 152, 162, 169, 181, 193, 195, 196, 201, 202, 228, 231, 248, 299, 301, 303, 304, 325, 333, 334, 339, 342–344, 347, 348, 350, 352, 360, 361, 376 and Mnangagwa era, 308 and war veterans, 189 authoritarianism, 195 central role, 44, 185, 393 claim, 305 days, 10 days in power, 301 defeat, 181 deposed, 94n2, 151 deputy, 148 dethrone, 334 era, 17, 276, 316, 392, 394, 396, 398 era manifests, 316–317

425

Extroverted Economy, 275–295 facilitated, 15 fellow woman Grace, 333 fired, 203, 389 former President, 120, 152, 248, 258, 259, 299, 303, 332 Grace, 333 helping, 52 interests, 203 ministers and strong supporters, 305 nephew Patrick Zhuwawo, 333 ouster, 110 presidency, 181 pressured, 183 regime, 72, 121, 231 reign, 299 removal of, 12, 194, 306 removing, 9, 10, 349, 396, 397 resignation, 305, 334 rule, 188, 309, 360 served, 15 statement, 351 succeed, 333 successor, 152, 325 system, 18 toppled, 188 unceremonious departure, 306 Mugabe-Mnangagwa entanglement, 4 Mugabeism culture, 3, 7, 19, 120 endured, 10 mantra, 8 rocked, 12 Mugova, S., 311 Mujuru, Joice (Vice-President) allies, 261 and Chen Chimutengwende, 212 and votes, 188 exonerate, 259 expulsion framing of, 253 expulsion of, 248, 258 flaws alleged, 258

426 

INDEX

Mujuru (cont.) frame, 263 framing of, 253, 258, 259, 262, 266, 267 jettison, 334 moderateness of, 258–260, 263 ouster, 262 perceived bravery, 258 plight, 263 politician Joice Teurairopa, 332 portrayal of, 260, 262, 263 project, 263 propping, 9 Solomon, 173, 248, 260 Multinational enterprises (MNE) and investment decision, 367 born global, 377, 378 decision, 366, 367 exporting, 368 internationalize, 378 investment in capital structure, 363 motives and host market, 365 motives and selection of host markets, 365 motives change, 365 motives of, 359, 362, 365–366, 382 objectives, 364, 382 objectives and motives, 382 prospective, 367, 368 Zimbabwe, 360, 365, 366, 368 Multinational firm’s heterogeneity, 379 Multiparty, 195, 208, 301 Multipartyism, 309 Mutare, 71, 75 Mutekwa, A., 336, 346, 347 Mutisi, Francis (Brigadier-­ General), 192 Mutopo, P., 332, 335 Mutsvairo, B., 221 Mutsvangwa, Christopher, 189, 190

Muzondidya, James, 62 Muzorewa’s participation, 101 N Naison Ndlovu included, 31 Nambya, 158, 167 Namibia, 46, 87, 104 Nation born Zimbabwe, 336 developed, 280, 282 developing, 280 divided, 33 host, 368 imagined, 158 international family of, 18, 324 new, 61, 92 postcolonial, 61 rainbow, 146 separate, 171 Nation building, 6, 10, 61, 80, 135, 141, 146, 159, 170, 282, 290, 293 Nation building question, 135 Nation-as-people creation of the, 54 Nation-as-states, 54 Nation-state cohesive, 62 imagined postcolonial sovereign, 55 real democratic, 79 Nation-state building, 52 National African Federation of Unions (NAFU), 96 National agendas common, 52, 54, 57 crystallizing, 52 debate, 66, 69 discourse, 66, 69 inclusive, 53 National anthem new, 6 National Assembly, 304

 INDEX 

National audience, 249 National broadcaster, 191 National common vision/agenda, 51 National consciousness, 55, 223 National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), 2, 63–65, 104, 105, 107, 230 coffers, 230 leadership, 230 National convergence, 65 National Democratic Party (NDP), 59, 143 National development, 52, 223, 290, 293, 313 inclusive, 54 National discourse, 57, 223 dominated, 58 National economy, 2 National embarrassment, 156 National event, 236 National flag, 74, 236, 237 National healing, 10, 12, 155, 157 National hero, 34, 150, 162 National hero status, 150, 162 National honour, 150 National Housing and Social Amenities, 312 National income, 367 National inquiry first ever, 246 National integration, 323, 324 National interests, 15, 56, 150, 198, 208, 213, 215, 217–219, 246, 276 real, 214 National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), 12, 171–172, 174–175, 177, 315 National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), 189, 311, 315, 316 National Question in Africa, 69 National radar, 64 National Railways of Zimbabwe, 319

427

National saving, 362 National security, 47, 182, 184, 246 National security threat, 199 National statistics, 367 National television, 202 National transition questions, 14, 136, 143 nature of, 14 National unity, 3, 12, 59, 61, 92, 147 National visions common, 57, 58 inclusive, 52 National wealth, 286 National Working People’s Convention (NWPC), 104, 105 Nationalism anticolonial, 61 civic, 53 degenerated, 91 exclusive, 164 multiracial, 149 racial, 136, 139–152 revived, 303 Nationals of African origin, 141 Native Land Husbandry Act, 27, 28 Native peoples, 26, 28 Native populations, 27 Natives, 26, 28, 29, 41, 55, 227 Natural maturation, 54 Natural mineral, 17, 275 Natural progression, 72 Natural resources, 284, 286, 294, 322, 365 exploiting, 322 Natural rulers, 343 Natural successor, 248 Nature bourgeois, 108 chaotic, 2, 147 competitive, 182 competitive authoritarian, 192, 194 complex, 184

428 

INDEX

Nature (cont.) crosscutting, 143, 145 gendered, 331, 339, 347 grand, 302 heterogeneous, 379 hybrid, 194 Ncube, Cornelius, 68 Ncube, Leslie, 172 Ncube, Lyton (Doctoral), 18, 335, 336, 342, 344 Ncube, Mthuli, 230, 396 Ncube, Trevor, 193, 349, 351 Ncube, Welshman, 63, 200n20, 394 Ndau people, 158 Ndebele -speaking areas, 166, 177 -speaking civilians, 61 -speaking communities, 14, 157, 161 -speaking people, 2, 166, 302 -speaking tribes, 140 and Shona, 27, 41, 94, 146, 160, 177 and Shona dichotomy, 158 and Shona groups, 27, 158, 159 and Shona in contemporary Zimbabwe, 158 and Shona people, 41, 162, 170, 177 and Shona relations, 158, 160 chiefs, 26, 27 commissioner, 172 communities, 166, 167, 175 country, 172 cultures, 347 humiliation, 169 icons, 169 king resonates, 173 minority, 147, 148 monarchy, 170 origin, 34, 170 people by nonmilitary, 170

people’s grievances, 76, 172 people’s history, 160 person, 160 point, 160 populace, 170 president in Zimbabwe, 148 region, 162, 170 response, 159 speakers, 146 statehood, 170 war effort, 163 warriors, 159 wars of resistance, 163 word, 167 youth, 167, 174 Ndebele aggression, 159 pre-colonial, 174 Ndebele history, 160 early, 160 Ndebele kings, 27, 157, 159, 173 illiterate, 27 Ndebele people, 26, 27, 38, 159, 160, 162–165, 168–172, 175, 176 infuriated, 176 Ndebele state independent, 172 pre-colonial, 175 Ndebele statehood, 170 Ndiweni, Khayisa (Chief), 173 Ndlovu, Sikhanyiso, 31 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J., 2–6, 8, 13, 26, 54, 55, 58, 66, 91, 94, 146, 147, 164, 222, 290, 292, 300, 302, 304, 307, 314, 324, 325, 344 Nehanda Radio, 95, 194 Nelson Chamisa’s Movement, 361 Neo colonialism, 6, 7, 60, 290, 294 Neo-imperialism, 7 Neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, 278 Neo-liberal inclinations, 294 Neo-liberal visions, 20

 INDEX 

Neo-liberalism, 4, 17, 53, 64, 277, 280–282, 288, 292 Neo-traditional patriarchal, 4 Neo-traditionalism, 54 Neoclassical, 369 Neocosmos, M., 5 Nepotism, 123, 234, 279, 311 Network failure, 375 Networks analogue phone, 232 computer, 232 customer’s, 366 developing distribution, 374 domestic firm, 378 global, 374 international, 375 organizational, 74 patrimonial, 280 personal, 280 political, 378 widened, 118 New Zimbabwe Post-­ Mugabe, 299–325 News conversion of, 251, 254 fake, 224, 250 hard, 252, 269 replacing significant, 252 sensational, 264 soft, 252 News articles, 254 News bulletins prestigious, 256 Nexus, 156, 157, 230, 276, 332, 368 politico-military, 188 Nkala, Enos (Minister), 165, 170 Nkiwane, T.C., 86, 101 Nkomo, Joshua, 5–7, 28, 29, 31, 38, 44, 92, 143, 145, 146, 148, 162, 163, 169, 196, 301, 391 Nkrumah, K., 6, 59, 290 Non-governmental organisation, 86, 318, 362

429

Non-military, 170 Non-partisanships, 73, 74, 169 Non-payment, 52 Non-racialism, 59 Non-Shona people, 167 Nonviolence, 237 North Africa, 221, 222 North African, 16, 233 North Koreans, 93 North Mesopotamia, 347 NPRC resourced, 174–175 NWPC resolution, 104 Nyerere, Julius, 60 Nyikayaramba, Douglas (Brigadier-­ General), 198, 199 Nyikayaramba, Douglas (Major Generals), 198, 199 O O’Donnell, G., 185, 186 Obama, Barack, 233 Objectivity, 251, 258, 264 Obligations debt, 324 external, 288 salary, 310 Oblivion, 89 political, 8 Occupy Africa Unity Square, 71, 74 Occupy Movement, 240 Odinga Odinga, 60 OECD, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Open for Business policy, 283 Opening Zimbabwe for business, 17, 276, 277 Operating synergies, 381 Operation Gukurahundi, 2, 12, 66, 197 Operation Makavhoterapapi, 197

430 

INDEX

Operation Murambatsvina, 35, 40–41, 197 Operation Restore Legacy in November, 354 launched, 346 triggered, 350 Opportunism, 40, 91, 123 Opposition activists, 108 alliance, 107 bloc, 108 civic, 68 covert, 184 effective, 86 elite, 89 emerging, 185 forces, 101, 108n14 largest, 92 leader, 234, 254, 258, 260, 390 leader MDC longtime, 260 main, 151, 170, 229 MP imprisoned, 201 PF-ZAPU, 61 political, 86, 87, 99 politicians, 108, 121 strong, 64, 103 weak, 99–103 Opposition parties formidable, 96 new, 107, 391 new vibrant, 123 organised, 95 strong, 103 use, 182 weak, 99–103 Opposition politics contemporary, 103 exercise of, 13, 86, 90 faces, 13, 86 labelled, 121 practice of, 86, 87, 91 repertoire of, 13, 87

Oppositional politics, 103–109 underlined, 170 Optimum device, 238 Oratory powerful, 237 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 362, 380 Organisational awareness, 310 Organisations/organization autonomous civil, 56 civic, 68, 105, 247 counter-hegemonic, 104 cross-cutting, 149 donor, 362 important, 231 included, 103 international, 303 membership-based, 106 political, 106, 140, 145, 149 pro-democracy, 228 pro-hegemonic, 108n14 religious, 107 socio-political, 227 top-down, 301 women’s, 104 Organizational processes, 75 Organizational stagnation point, 77 OSISA, see Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa Outbursts spontaneous, 71 Outcomes intended, 178 Over-extension, 279 Overlapping technological base, 375 P Pan-African claims of historical inheritance, 143 nationalism, 145 policy response following, 143 Pan-Africanism, 59 Pan-Africanist, 59

 INDEX 

anti-colonial, 53 Parliament, 6, 10, 42, 43, 91, 95, 100, 106, 182, 203, 302, 304, 313, 315–317, 322, 332, 390 building, 305 Parliamentary debate, 185 Parochial, 119, 120 Parochialism, 123 Patriarchal dividend, 338 establishments, 343 model, 3, 53 Patriarchy legitimacy of, 18, 331, 337 strengthened, 335 threatened, 348 Patriotic Union of Matabeleland, 156 Patriotic-Front Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU) capitulation, 94 combatants, 227 crush, 148 engaged, 148 force, 196 main contenders, 146 strongholds, 93 supporters, 228 Paul, Mukondo, 31 Perceived ethnicization of party politics, 170–171 Perceived jobs discrimination, 177 Perceived male-dominated domains, 332 Perceived political ally, 266 Perceived snubbing, 162 Percentages, 22 Perceptions dominant, 162 negative, 308 of job discrimination, 166 pro-Mthwakazi, 164–171

431

Peripheralising, 107 Personal Information/Data Protection Bill, 128 Police arresting, 108, 171, 194, 240 brutality, 230 cells, 230 clearance, 229 commissioners, 108 injustice, 72 involvement, 128 officers, 175 officers kicking Dumiso Dabengwa’s candles, 175 riot, 71, 394 roadblocks, 72 wrath, 171 Policies bad, 300 changes, 177 colonial, 165, 301 debate, 279 deliberate colonial, 165 economic, 189, 280–282, 293, 360, 396 economic intervention, 361 editorial, 215, 256 formulation, 64, 123 free-market, 281 implementing unsuitable macro-­ economic, 378–379 inclusive, 276 inclusive transformative social economic development, 17, 277 indigenisation, 281 issues, 77 land redistribution, 149 nationalistic, 292 official, 166 one-party state, 148 political, 6

432 

INDEX

Policies (cont.) post-colonial state’s developmental, 126 pro-poor, 301 professing counter-hegemonic, 107 proposal, 85, 277, 294 pursued globalisation, 292 radical ruling party’s transformational, 108 recommended liberal, 103 redistributive, 107, 276, 294 regulation, 369 selection, 310 training, 310 unpopular, 63 welfarist, 281 written information disclosure, 128 Policy agenda, 65, 376 associated redistributive, 276 Policy Statement, 59 Policymakers, 14, 156, 232 Political assemblages, 89 Political association, 85, 223 Political associations organised, 85 Political culture and practices, 28–31 based, 147 complex, 3, 13 defined, 25, 119 defining, 142 dominant white, 28 forged, 142 new, 45, 48, 149, 315 observed, 120 of Zimbabwe, 19, 25–49, 222 overriding, 137 positive, 26 repressive, 7, 120 undemocratic, 148 Political debate, 125, 227, 252, 262 rational, 17, 246 Political differences, 147

Political disaster, 360 Political discourses contradictory, 4 national, 52 Political disenfranchisement, 60 Political disillusionment, 69 Political disputes, 11 Political dissent, 12 Political dreams, 354 Political economy decay, 192 Political economy lens, 276 Political engagements, 86, 125 Political environment, 102, 136, 148, 215, 307 healthy, 309 Political events, 8, 48 Political executives, 209 Political fates, 18 Political field, 148 Political figures, 129 female, 18 Political filaments continuous, 135 main, 141, 151 Political formations, 59, 89, 95, 158, 317 particular, 300 Political fortunes, 224 Political game, 119 Political gatherings, 108 Political giant, 259 Political gimmick, 147 Political jingoism, 262 Political landscape, 29, 52, 70–73, 77, 92, 118, 121, 130, 155, 157, 335 Political landscape post, 71 Political legacies, 300 Political liberties, 54 Political longevity, 8 Political mobilization ethnic, 159 ethnicization of, 155–178

 INDEX 

explicit, 158 Political news, 16, 224, 245–269 Political office, 5, 85, 171, 195, 263 highest, 148, 338 Political opinion, 126 Political opponent, 66, 146 Political order, 17, 299 Political organisation, 106, 140, 145 ethnic, 149 Political organisation magnet cross-­ cutting, 140 Political parallelism, 129 Political participation, 124, 302, 321 active, 122 Political parties, 31, 46, 59, 74, 85, 86, 91, 92, 94, 99, 100, 103–106, 108, 140, 141, 143, 146, 148, 150, 186, 203, 224, 230, 238, 239, 241, 254, 259, 269, 307, 322, 332 Political party ideology, 74 Political passions, 119 Political players and relations post-­ independence, 92–96 Political polarisation, 87–89, 95, 98 portended, 94 Political potentiality, 77 Political power real, 109 seized, 305 Political practices, 7, 13, 39, 79 repressive, 121 Political processes, 25, 118–120, 129, 184, 249, 308 organic, 71 Political purposes, 137 Political quietness relative, 73 Political representation equitable black, 30 high, 30 Political rights paradigm, 77 Political scalp, 346

433

Political scene, 55, 307 Political science, 208 Political scientists, 59, 119, 212 Political set, 106 Political socialisation, 254 Political space, 89, 158, 339, 354, 391 closed, 73 Political stability, 279, 282, 368 sustainable, 175 Political strata, 123 Political strategy, 19, 88, 89, 189, 197 inclusive, 76 Political system closed, 13, 85, 86 dominant, 237 dominated, 148 Political template, 151 Political trajectory, 146 Political transition missed, 151 predicted, 140 shaped, 14 Political transition post-Mugabe, 152 Political transition questions, 146 Political turmoil, 16, 245 Political values, 14, 117, 129 particular, 118 Political villain, 258 Politicians elite, 104 nationalist, 32 powerful, 265 radical, 30 Politicisation/politicization, 15, 155–157, 311 Politicking tribal/ethnic exclusionary, 147 tribalist/ethnic-hegemony, 142 Politics accommodative, 146 advanced pro-hegemonic, 107 anti-colonial, 58

434 

INDEX

Politics (cont.) civilian, 3, 9 clan, 142 competitive, 302, 309 complex, 209, 217 concrete, 78 contemporary, 137 country’s, 72, 107 current, 4 ethnicization of, 156, 174, 178 exercise of, 104 familial, 15 functions, 338 gridlocked, 79 hard, 85 hybrid, 207, 209, 219 internal, 189 joining, 342 militarised, 12 national, 6, 80, 146 national liberation, 5 nationalist, 300 nationalist unity, 145 new, 4 of opposition, 85, 89 organized, 71 participatory, 226 partisan, 192 polarised, 87 popular, 123 post-colonial, 142 post-independence nation-­ building, 170 powerful alternative, 124 predatory state, 5 regional, 67 secular, 69 shifting, 210 transform, 43, 149 transitional, 1, 4, 14 tribal, 146 tribal-ethnic hegemony, 14, 136, 142, 143, 147

tribal/ethnic, 147 tribal/ethnic-hegemony, 14, 136, 142, 143, 147 tribalism, 140, 142 Politics and Power in Zimbabwe, 91 Politics of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement, 2 Polity, 26, 89, 104, 226 new, 27 Population/populations bodied, 367 civilian, 9 main, 145 rural, 45, 65 speaking, 146 urban, 29, 34–36, 40 white, 27–29, 44, 45, 149 Post-Cold War context, 208 Post-independence conflict, 170, 175 demographic transformations, 142 domestic political arena, 142 emerged, 87 era, 44, 168 generation, 142 generation frustrations, 142 government, 44, 45, 143 politicians, 149 realities, 146 state, 142 tribalism, 148 Zimbabwe, 3, 36, 46, 87, 117, 165, 184, 227, 336 Post-independence opposition main, 148 Post-independent one-party states, 219 Post-Mugabe economy, 12 power transition question, 135 Post-Second World War (PWWII) development approaches, 283 Postcolonial

 INDEX 

interludes, 53 legacies, 3, 118 project, 62 project reform process, 62 reform agenda, 57 Postcolonial Zimbabwe, 53, 64, 136, 140, 156, 301, 332, 335 haunted, 66 Poverty abject, 167 alleviation, 290, 361 glaring, 343 reduction, 360 Power ageing husband’s, 342 amid, 301 attained, 4 centralizing, 63 collective, 65 colonial, 55 consolidate, 90, 203, 209 contest, 351 contestations, 277, 346 corridors of, 3, 118 corrupted, 78, 79 devolution of, 79, 174 discretionary, 128 disorientate, 232 disrupt, 225 economic, 63 evaporates, 195 executive, 45, 304 foreign, 279, 305 imperial, 294 in, 338 legitimate, 208 legitimised, 4 lost, 351 maintaining, 191 nationalist matrix of, 3, 4 people’s, 75, 306 personal, 12

435

postcolonial, 4, 56 public, 18, 308 ruling party’s hegemonic, 126 rural, 56 self-allocated, 95 separation of, 59, 64, 314, 322 simmering conditioning, 146 societal, 337 substantial, 321 threatened Mugabe’s, 91 throwing, 231, 232 transformative, 76 urban, 56 usurp, 333, 342 voting, 380 will to, 78, 79 wrestle, 95, 259 Powerful forces, 258 Powerful Grace Mugabe Zimbabweans, 352 Powerless Grace, 353 Practices of sorcery, 5 Practitioners, 9, 247 Pre-election ZANU-PF military exercises, 197 Premier Africa Minerals Ltd and Aquarius Platinum Ltd., 286 Presidency deputy, 171 executive, 63 President country’s, 342 elected, 43, 96 female, 333, 342, 354 former, 120, 152, 248, 256, 258, 299, 303, 332, 333 incumbent, 188, 332 male, 332, 333, 342, 354 new, 361 power, 316 President of SRANC, 143 Presidential address Mnangagwa, 10 Presidential Spokesperson, 213, 214

436 

INDEX

Presidium, 152 Press briefings, 209 conferences, 99, 210, 342n1 free, 227 gutter, 250 partisan, 125 private, 125 state-controlled, 217 tabloid, 250 Prime Minister’s Directives, 301 Primitive accumulation black, 62 configures, 17 Primitive capitalism, 284 Privileges misogynistic, 53 Pro-hegemonic bloc, 108 Pro-hegemonic cluster, 107 Pro-Mthwakazi activists complain, 171 consciousness, 157 movements, 14, 155–178 Pro-Ndebele, 170 Profit growth, 372 Profit margins, 364 Profit maximization option, 369 Profitability margins, 381 Profligacy, 52, 343 Progressive constitutional-making processes, 104 Progressive multiethnic countries, 176 Projects developmental, 281 envisaged, 159 federal, 173 hegemonic construction, 92 hegemony-building, 93, 98 imperialist, 149 indigenization, 56 national democratic, 305 political, 29, 216 Proliferation, 56, 140, 232

Prolongation, 67, 140, 209 Promotion multinational, 377 opportunities, 310 Propagation, 140, 210, 223 Protests civic, 78 current, 70 current citizen, 74 initial, 70 isolated, 75 lone, 71 organized political, 28 provoked, 2 public, 11, 15, 393 significant, 75 social, 20, 72 student, 229 urban residents, 52 Protracted guerrilla insurgency, 173 Protracted negotiation process, 98 Provinces, 36, 45, 46, 155, 157, 165–167, 174, 175, 188, 301, 302, 322, 323, 332 Provincial executive committee, 188 Provincialization, 172 Provoked social turmoil, 11 Proximity closer, 322 Pseudo-democracy, 79, 183 Public administration, 308 Public advertisements, 202 Public broadcaster, 162 Public consultations, 64, 171 Public corruption growing, 125 Public debate, 16, 224, 245, 247 Public deliberation, 86 Public discourses, 123, 223 objective, 129 Public event, 169 Public media reforms, 309 Public media rhetoric, 229

 INDEX 

Public opinion, 13, 86, 226, 227, 341 Public order, 392, 393 Public Order and Security Act (POSA), 108, 127, 191, 229, 240, 309 Public policies, 164, 176, 308, 334 superior, 323 Public procurement process, 313–314 Public resources, 197, 322, 395 limited, 311–314 Public sphere ideal, 247 mediated, 265 modern, 16, 122, 245 new, 227 rational, 262 unstable, 268 Publishing of falsehoods, 260, 264 Pye, L., 25 Q Quakers, 29 Qualitative methodology, 223, 226, 253 Qualitative methods, 226 Qualitative research methodology, 253 Quasi-fiscal activities, 321 Quebec, 176 Queen, 343, 347 R Race black, 145, 149 presidential, 99, 101 Racial backgrounds, 64 Racial barriers, 56 Racial discrimination, 30, 60 Racism anti-white, 150

the victims of colonial, 56 Racist, 14, 29, 30, 44, 146, 201 foundation, 141 identities, 148 Racist nationalism founding, 142 transform Zimbabwe’s, 149 Radicalisation, 281 Rainbow Towers, 240 RBZ Governor, 321 RBZ in quasi-fiscal activities, 321 Re-education, 15, 208, 214 sessions, 213 Re-enactments, 250 Real investment, 320 Real Transfer Gross System, 318 Real Transfer Gross System (RTGS), 318 Rebels, 46, 222, 223, 237, 238 Rebuild Africa’s bread-basket, 193 Reclamation, 4, 71 Recolonisation, 284 Reconciliation national, 169 post independence, 147 Reconciliatory, 258 Reconfiguration, 69 Reconfigure, 52, 79 Reconstitute, 79 Reconstitution, 51, 67, 88 Reconstruction, 281, 301 Recruiting, 212, 236 Recruitment, 163, 175, 183, 184, 200, 310 new, 310 Red cards, 333, 352 distributing, 231 Red sea, 347 Redistribution questions, 68 Redistributive policy thrust, 107 Redress gender imbalances, 353 Reduction, 4, 78, 302, 360, 379

437

438 

INDEX

Reduction of elections, 4 Reform agenda, 12, 57, 80 neo-liberal, 281 Reformist, 307, 325 Reforms constitutional, 105 cosmetic, 70 economic, 316–317, 390 electoral, 200, 202 political, 105, 320, 391–392 Refounding, 80 Regime censors, 216 Regime change, 76, 77, 79, 228–230, 236, 248, 255, 257, 261, 262 Regime change agenda, 79, 236, 248, 257 Regime change agent, 255, 261 Regime legitimation, 208 Regimes civilian, 182 dictatorial, 73 eroding authoritarian, 184 feature, 183 malignant, 258 new constitutional, 313 new media, 209 regimes set, 194 repressive, 122 security, 64, 304 strong authoritarian, 184 supporters, 184 weakening authoritarian, 184 white, 31, 32 Region, 61, 93, 141, 148, 162, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171, 176, 177, 225, 233, 376 speaking, 171, 177 Regionalism, 89, 147 Registration, 99, 121, 123 voter, 197 Regulations necessary, 265

strict, 313 Rehabilitate, 147 Rehabilitation, 39, 301 Relations causal, 367 complicated government-­ students, 124 cordial society-state, 54 dynamic, 184 entertainment-oriented public, 256 ethnic, 163 normalising, 324 party state, 98–99 poor race, 173 post-independence, 92 social, 16, 293 state media, 213 troubled, 158 unenviable groups, 173 Religious sectarianism, 139 Religious worship, 237 Repatriation, 284 unofficial, 287 Republic, 190 Second, 4, 10–12, 19, 218, 275–298, 307, 312, 317, 325 Republicanism, 59 Research contemporary, 119 survey-based, 119 Research and Advocacy Unit, 166 Research institutes, 86 Research methods, 226 Reserve Bank, 395, 396 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), 277, 288, 289, 320, 321 Reserves, 27, 95, 144, 150, 165 native, 28, 29, 41 Resettlement, 39, 301 Resign, 182, 183, 194, 339, 390 Resignation, 10, 47, 182, 194, 200, 304, 305, 334

 INDEX 

voluntary, 305 Resignation letter, 304 Resignation President Robert Mugabe, 334 Resistance anti-colonial, 162 generated massive, 29 grassroots, 124 groups, 32 indicated, 190 peaceful, 28, 32 peaceful native, 28 Resist colonial rule, 29 vehement, 188 Restitution, 53, 156 Retired Brigadier General, 201, 202 Retired Brigadier General Judge President, 202 Retired Colonel Richard Dube, 162 Retired Colonel Rueben Mqwayi, 191 RF, see Rhodesian Front Rhetoric populist, 307 public, 147 Rhodesia modern, 173 renamed, 27 substitute, 173 Rhodesia Herald, 216 Rhodesia Security Forces, 161 Rhodesia Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 29, 56 Rhodesian army, 32 Rhodesian army movements, 32 Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation, 33 Rhodesian era, 118, 216 Rhodesian Front (RF), 29, 30, 32, 38, 39, 41, 63, 216 Rhodesian government, 32, 44, 228 Rhodesian government’s use of violence, 66

439

Rhodesian minority government, 301 Rhodesian regime, 31, 32 Rhodesian settler colonial Leviathan, 7, 121 Rhodesian settler colonialism, 7 Rhodesian settler colonialists, 7 Rhodesian settler regime, 120 Rhodesian soldiers, 227 Rhodesian state, 209, 216 Rhodesians, 7, 29, 31, 33, 93, 120, 121, 209, 216, 301 white, 29, 31, 45 Richardson, J., 255 Right of conquest, 7 Right of liberating you, 8 Rights basic, 60 civic, 120 civil, 56, 237 civil protected, 56 claim, 316 collective, 122 colonists prospecting, 27 counterhegemonic bloc, 108 democratic, 268 discourses, 64, 66, 68 economic, 69, 88 equal, 54 individual, 301 political, 30, 55, 58–60, 77, 304, 315 small land, 144 unequal, 30 women’s, 64, 104 Rights rang, 56 Rioting, 72 public, 72 Rival union, 106 Rivalry ethnic, 14, 157–161, 163, 168 partisan, 170 Rivals, 151, 173, 260, 333, 339

440 

INDEX

Robert Mugabe International Airport, 334 Robert Mugabe Square, 339 Robert Mugabe’s ZANU PF regime, 124 Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF, 169 Robert STOP IT, 352 Roessler, G., 183 Role of Government in Business Internationalization, 369 Roman Catholic, 30 Rootless acts, 70 Roots, 118, 129, 148, 159, 232, 252, 264 establishing, 279 Royalties, 17, 26, 275 Ruhanya, P, 14, 15 Rule analytic, 254 autocratic, 343 black majority, 143 direct, 56, 279 dominant party, 34, 203 gerontocratic, 4 guaranteed, 304 indirect, 56, 279 informal, 119 late Mugabe’s despotic, 122 legislative, 314 local, 57 minority, 60, 141 perpetuate ZANU-PF, 194 policies, 145 routinised, 5 tyrannical, 343 white, 29 Rule Zimbabwe, 228 Rulers, 149, 160, 216, 343 despotic, 122 Ruling capitalists, 17, 276 Ruling class, 17, 44, 88–90, 95–99, 102, 108–110, 275 new, 17, 97, 275

Ruling classes use, 90 Ruling elite, 15, 86, 90–93, 97, 104, 108, 126, 164, 300, 302, 324, 397 new, 91, 92, 97 Ruling party circles, 95 insistence, 125 ruling party ZANU-PF, 33 Rulings, 203 unpredictable court, 202 ZANU-PF headquarters, 339 Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 118, 152, 170, 171, 181, 182, 229, 238, 248, 257, 294, 299, 324, 333, 334, 339, 342, 354, 395 Run-off elections, 197 presidential, 196 Run-up, 150, 186, 188, 195, 197 Rural masses, 57 Rural people, 36, 76 Rural strongholds, 257 Russia, 224 Russian nationals and transnational corporates, 286 Rutherford, B., 3 S Sabelo, J., 13 Sable Mining Africa Ltd, 286 Sabotage, 195 economic, 165 Sabotaging opposition strongholds, 197 Sachikonye, L., 64, 95, 95n5, 96n6, 104, 281, 360 Sacralizing, 173 Sacrifice, 34, 164, 237, 264 Sacrilegious, 168

 INDEX 

SADC, see Southern African Development Community Sadomba, Z.W., 2, 8 Saharawi Democratic Republic, 176 Salisbury, 343 Sally, 344 Sam, Moyo, 69 Samir, 382 Sampson, A., 268, 269 Samukele Hadebe, 14 Sanctions, 7, 31, 192, 281, 300, 302, 303, 325, 397 Sandelowski, M., 253 Sanitation, 301, 304, 316 SAPs, see Structural Adjustment Programmes Saviour Kasukuwere, 190, 333 Scandals, 35, 101n8, 249, 251, 252, 395, 396 Schizophrenic, 62 Schmitter, 185, 186 Scholars, 16, 57, 67, 112, 129, 156, 183, 202, 209, 223–225, 234, 284, 300, 302 communications, 234 Scholarship general, 222 Schonbach, K., 252, 262 Schudson, M.S., 256 Scoones, I., 73 Scotland, 176 Secession, 156, 176, 177, 323 Secessionism, 177 Second Chimurenga annals, 164 Second Chimurenga/Umvukela and national liberation struggles, 192 Second Chimurenga/Umvukela and national liberation struggles and honouring, 192 Second Secretary, 190, 248 Second World War, 6, 282 Sectors broadcasting, 126

441

electronic media, 129 financial, 381 formal, 317 informal, 70, 72, 73, 238, 303 non-state, 18 private, 35, 166, 310 public, 18, 52, 72, 103, 175 rural, 57 social, 301 tradable, 361 urban, 57 Security apparatus, 15, 188–190 Security establishment, 190 Security forces, 47, 109 Security officers, 9, 195 Security officials, 184 Security organizations, 150, 197 Security personnel, 32, 43, 46 reprimanding, 200 Security sector, 12, 49, 75, 183, 191, 192, 195, 196, 199–201, 394 Security sector personnel, 183 Security threat, 177, 199, 305 Securocracy, 5 Securocrats, 44, 49, 194–196, 198, 200 retired, 195 Segregation, 145 Self conceptions, 136 Self-censorship, 215, 217 exercised, 215 Self-determination, 159 Self-imposed exile fearing, 344 Semi-processed commodity, 288 Senghor Leopold, 60 Sensationalisation, 16, 224, 245, 250, 252, 266, 269 Sentiments counter-hegemonic, 104 ethnic, 158 general, 348 pro-Mthwakazi, 159 public, 123

442 

INDEX

Separation horizontal, 322 vertical, 322 Settler regime, 27, 28, 120 white e, 28 Settler rule, 31 white, 230 Settlers, 2, 3, 7, 27, 28, 31, 54, 80, 120, 121, 141, 143, 147, 230, 279 set, 27 Sex, 32, 346 Sex scene, 346 Sexism, 13, 18, 19, 54, 283, 331–359 Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy, 331–359 Sexist banter, 340 ridicule, 340 tendencies, 12 vitriol, 341 Sexual copulation, 346 Sexualized slurs, 336 Seychelles, 210 Seymour-Smith, 158 Shona and Ndebele peoples, 27 and Tswana chiefs, 159 chiefs, 26 colloquialism, 238 conquered, 27 culture, 26, 222 dichotomy, 158 dominant, 151, 170, 323 ethnic hegemony, 143, 148, 151 mother tongue in Matabeleland, 167 party ZANU PF, 170 relations, 158, 160 speakers, 165, 168 speakers learning, 167

teachers, 167 traditional, 347 traditionalists claim dominion, 168 tribal hegemony, 152 war leaders Nehanda and Kaguvi, 163 Shona chiefdoms, 174 neighbouring, 159 Shona government dominant, 170 Shona groups, 27, 158, 159 dominant, 170 Shona Gukurahundi, 172 Shona hegemony dominant, 151 entrenched, 148 identity politics, 147 represented, 151 Shona hegemony tribal/ethnic, 147 Shona people, 26, 41, 156, 162, 163, 166, 169, 170, 172, 175, 177 depict, 171 Shona-Ndebele, 147 Shona-speaking leader, 148 tribes, 140 Shonhe, T., 17, 293 deepening extroverted economic development, 17 Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP), 276, 281 Sibanda, Gibson former ZCTU President Gibson, 229 Sibanda, Jabulani, 189, 190, 342 denounced, 342 Sibindi, M., 18, 359, 366, 367, 373 Significant resistance, 31, 32 Simon, Muzenda, 31 Sirks, L., 221 Sithole, Ndabaningi founder president Reverend, 31

 INDEX 

included, 31 nationalist Reverend, 58, 93 Situated activity, 226 Sixty women members, 332 Slabbert, Z., 309 Sloan, B., 262 Sloganeering, 146, 218 Slogans, 332, 340, 341, 343, 347 Smallholders, 225, 287 Smokescreen, 170 Snapchat, 74 Social Amenities, 312 Social base, 74, 76 limited, 77 Social bases new, 77 Social changes, 73, 147, 249, 390 Social conditions, 69, 395 Social destitution general, 166 Social empowerment, 28 Social fabric, 18 Social interactions, 226 computer-mediated, 226 Social media activism, 72, 73, 75 activists, 70, 72, 75 activities, 224 and dissidence, 223 dissidence, 222, 226, 231–233, 238 dissidents, 222–226, 233 effects, 221 memes, 352 platforms, 345 protests, 52 social media dissident moments, 222 spaces, 75 trolling, 232 uprisings, 222 use, 76, 224 utilized, 73 Social movement building, 71, 72 Social movement building processes, 71

443

Social movements civil society-based, 57 powerful, 64, 65 Social policy inclusive transformative, 17, 277 radical transformative inclusive, 294 transformative, 17, 276, 277, 293, 294 Social problems resonate, 123 Social progress, 301 Social quagmire, 3 Social safety nets exacerbates, 317 Social Sciences, 283 Social scientists, 119 Social services, 69, 74, 98, 316 delivery, 69 reliable, 175 Social Studies, 192 Socialism, 59, 60 Socialist, 59, 62, 217, 281, 290, 302 Societal issues interpreting, 251 Society -media, 251 barbaric, 30 bourgeois, 227 burial, 69 civic, 105, 150, 238, 300 civilized prosperous, 30 colonial, 59, 61 complete integrated, 59 democratic, 314, 316, 322 egalitarian, 290 embryonic indigenous, 56 ethnic-based, 55 given, 338 manifests, 123 media and civil, 117–132 misogynistic, 354 non-racial, 62 organised, 102 patriarchal, 338, 345 patriarchal heteronormative, 345

444 

INDEX

Society (cont.) polarised, 264 political, 56, 105 postcolonial, 65 recede, 87 traditional, 335 vulnerable, 360 Socio-economic gains, 302 Socio-economic rights, 69, 71, 77 important, 316 Socio-economic rights issue(s), 69 Socio-economic stress, 165 Socioe-conomic issues, 77, 107, 110 Sociologist Roger Southall, 5 SOEs, see State owned enterprises Soil conservation, 29 Soil patriots, 228 Sokwanele, 43, 231 Soldiers addressing Second Brigade, 150 host Tanzanian, 169–170 machine gun-wielding, 305 Solidarity, 198, 334 Solomon, Mustswairo, 175 Songs of decolonisation struggles, 141 Songs sung, 164 Sotho, 158 in relation to Ndebele, 158 South Africa and Botswana, 368 and Namibia, 104 South African, 393 South Sudan, 176 Southern Africa, 5, 36, 68, 104, 128, 141, 142, 146, 291, 325 Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC), 68, 201, 284, 291, 376 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 43, 68, 184, 201, 331, 376, 398 countries, 376 Election Observation Mission, 68

members, 376 Tribunal ruling, 201 Southern European, 129 Southern Rhodesia, 26, 59 Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC), 59, 143, 145 Sovereign state, 6 particular, 316 Sovereignty international, 6 national, 4, 53, 54 unpopular, 56 Soviet military, 161 Spain, 137 Spandler, H., 338 Sparks, C., 118, 248–252, 254, 256, 263, 265, 268 Spatial arrangements, 337 Speakers, 158, 165, 167, 168, 304 Spearheading, 52 Spontaneity, 73 little, 72 SRANC, see Southern Rhodesia African National Congress State autonomous, 159 central, 57 crony, 280 current, 14, 117, 129, 366 deracialized, 56 developing, 13, 86 developmental, 98, 278, 280, 293 failed, 278 fractured, 189 frontline, 28 governed, 143 hijacked, 334 independent, 5 inverted, 280 kleptocratic, 280 liberal, 90 local, 56, 57 monopoly, 126

 INDEX 

nationalism, 56 non-performing, 318–319 officials, 213, 215, 216, 280 over-extended, 279 parasitical, 279 patrimonial, 279 postcolonial, 38, 80, 118, 126, 292 prebendal, 280 predatory, 5, 279 rentier, 279 securocratic, 7, 196 settler, 143 soft, 280 strong, 280 undemocratic, 279 State for Information and Publicity appointed Minister of, 59, 126, 207 State institutions fundamental, 183 populating, 195 State media policy and practices, 209 State opposition civil society relations, 16, 222 mediated, 16 State organisation, 301 State parasitism bureaucratic, 6, 118 State policies, 140, 148 State power debased, 348 opposed, 227 State president, 10, 11 new, 10 State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 189, 278, 292, 312, 318, 319 Statement false, 127 political, 158, 267 solidarity, 198 Stereotypes negative, 160 subjective, 266 Stereotyping, 160, 259

445

Stern, E., 346 Stevens, Douglas E., 364 Stiffer penalties, 312 Stranded Warriors, 210 Strategic alliances, 77 Strategic objectives, 266 firm, 365 Strategic resources, 3, 54 corridors of power and ownership of, 118 Strategies assigned campaign, 196 clear long-term, 197 critical, 126 hidden, 15, 209, 219, 225 macroeconomic turnaround, 11 market entry selection, 378 mobilisation, 87 new, 209 new media, 210, 219 non-coercive, 209 party’s media, 207 repressive, 219 three-pronged, 9 winning, 200 Strauss, A., 226 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), 2, 12, 19, 229, 282 Struggles anti-colonial, 55, 56, 58, 60, 66 anti-colonialism, 13, 86 anti-imperialist, 60 armed, 31, 33, 142, 163, 227 current, 13 mutual, 145 nation’s, 52 national, 51 ongoing, 78 people’s, 66, 122 popular, 54 shared, 64 urban, 76 Struggles within struggles, 146

446 

INDEX

Student grants/loans, 229 Studies on gender and politics in Zimbabwe, 335 Study case, 339 comparative, 129 earlier individual behaviourist, 119 empirical, 367, 368, 370 qualitative content analysis, 222 quantitative, 252 seminal, 223 series of, 378, 380 university, 183 Sub-groups, 374, 379 Subculture, 338 Subservience, 140, 151 Subsistence grants, 98 Succeed Robert Mugabe, 333 Success of social media use in elections, 224 Succession debate, 149, 306 dynamics, 195 issue, 109, 189 planning, 310 Successor, 143, 152, 172, 248, 325, 347 Sudan, 1, 394, 397, 398 Support freedom, 128 Support government policies, 308 Support ideologies, 150 Support industries, 366 Support research, 378 Supporters ex-ZAPU, 162 former ZAPU, 163 passive, 184 rural, 335 traditional, 182 white, 34 Supposition, 370 Supreme Court, 92

Supreme Court tables, 200 System centralisedcentralized, 26 competitive authoritarian, 182–184, 191, 194 devolved, 174, 323 devolved local governance, 166 discriminatory, 32 discriminatory governance, 31 economic, 6, 283 effective administrative, 309 electoral, 183, 195 farming, 287 federal, 174 financial, 380 foreign exchange, 360 formidable, 101 gender as a binary, 336 government dominant, 91 hybrid, 183, 209 judicial, 200, 201 key resource allocation, 317 monarchical, 26 one-party, 95 one-party state, 63, 64, 95, 101, 125, 148, 185, 187, 219, 391 over-centralised, 321, 323 productive, 280 social, 26, 343 strong education, 306 symbolic, 119 technological, 375, 376 technology, 376 telephone, 232 unaccountable, 63 undemocratic governance, 120 warning, 251 women quota, 332 System of government, 27, 321–324 Systems Analysis of Identity politics in Zimbabwe, 139

 INDEX 

T Tabloid journalism styles adopted, 248 Tabloid-size newspapers, 250 Tabloidisation, 16, 224, 245–269 Tabloidization of political news in Zimbabwe, 245–269 Tabloids adopted, 248, 262 critic, 250 employed, 260 journalism techniques, 261 newspapers, 249, 250, 267 pictorial, 249 style, 245, 250, 251, 259, 261, 263, 268, 269 supermarket, 250 Tactics, 236, 392 shrewd, 343 Tajamuka campaign, 238 Tajamuka challenges, 240 Tajamuka curates, 239 Tajamuka espouses, 240 Tajamuka members, 239 Tajamuka/Sesjikile typology, 238–240 Takawira, Leopold, 31 Tanzania, 28, 87n1, 141, 163 Taxation, 374 statutes, 381 Taxes avoidance, 287 evasion, 286, 287, 315 heavy, 29 load, 381 reducing, 320 Taxonomy, 365 of market failures impeding internationalisation, 371 Taxpayers, 344 Taylor, C., 141 Teacher deployment, 167–168

447

Team Lacoste, 181, 264, 266 Techno-determinism, 222 Techno-deterministic biases, 222 Technocratic, 4, 53 Technocratic insistence, 53 Technological advancements, 256 Technological process regional, 375 Technological spillover positive, 373 Technologies contemporary digital media, 125 contemporary networked digitalbased media, 125 extolling, 222 Teece, D.J., 364, 365, 375 Tendencies centralist, 14, 118, 129 corrupt, 267 democratic, 63 elite continuity, 118 gerontocratic, 3, 118 secessionist, 157 Tendi, B.M., 3, 75, 141, 147, 188, 332, 333, 335, 336 Tendi, Blessings-Miles, 3, 75, 141, 147, 148, 188 Tenets fundamental, 136 identifier, 140 Tengende, N., 122 Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), 286, 287, 290 The political and economic conditions, 68 Theoretical context, 336–339 Theoretical framework, 252–255, 377 Theoretician, 60 Theorists political, 86

448 

INDEX

Theory competitive general equilibrium, 369 eclectic, 365 firm, 364, 366, 369, 382 liberal, 123 media framing, 254 neoclassical, 369 network, 222 popular political, 122 reconfigured public sphere, 223 systems, 136, 138–139, 148, 280 Third Chimurenga, 2, 15, 42, 207–219 Third World, 20, 280 Threats blatant, 95 external, 188 human security, 305 major, 264 renewed, 74 repel, 142 resisting, 150 TIMB, 288 Timberg, C., 109 Tinhu, S., 71, 72 Tinodawo ngwena yedu itungamire, 343 Tipeiwo commander, 341 TMALI, 286, 287, 290 Tobacco raw, 286, 287 Towns country’s, 339 main urban, 75 Townsend, J., 228 Toyota, 283 Trade deficiencies, 288 economic, 291 flows, 370 free, 287

global, 367 integration, 376 inter-Africa, 291 international, 17, 260, 276 invoicing, 287 liberalization, 379 liberalize, 278 openness, 367 regimes, 376 relations, 319 relationship, 370 relationships start, 370 unequal, 286, 287 union movement, 160 unionist, 228 value, 17, 276 Trade policies agenda, 376 framework, 376 relaxing, 360 Trade promotion fr0m, 378 Trade regulations, 369, 379 liberalizing, 360 Trade unions, 56, 67, 141, 160 black, 230 Transgressed patriarchal norms, 347 Transition agrarian, 2 based, 199 blocked democratic, 12 decolonisation, 2 economic liberalisation, 2 forge, 146 incomplete, 52 military-assisted, 3, 195 naturalise power, 152 neo-liberal, 2 overload, 2, 222 peaceful, 1 politics, 135–152 process, 14, 136 Transition in political culture, 147

 INDEX 

Transition trajectories, 140, 141 determined political, 143 Transitional Stabilisation Programme, 317 Transmedia, 192 Transmission, 224, 392 Transnational corporates, 286 Transportation, 319 Trevor Ncube’s Tweet, 351 Tribal distinctiveness, 140 Tribal political parties, 140 Tribal prism, 161 Tribal stronghold, 93 Tribal/ethnic hegemony, 14, 136, 142, 143, 147, 152 Tribalism, 7, 59, 61, 140, 142, 145, 147, 278 animosity, 146 Tribe, 140 rival Ndebele, 151 Trickle-down neoliberal, 229 Tripartite negotiating forum (TNF), 106 Trojan horse, 201 counterrevolutionary, 230 Trump, Donald, 224, 286 Truth, 37, 160, 264 general, 265 Tsvangirai, Morgan, 11, 43, 69, 103, 109, 151, 186, 198, 199, 200n20, 228, 230, 234, 259, 260, 268, 391, 392, 394 party, 234 portrayed, 234 quit labour union, 228 Tsvangirai, Morgan Richard((Leader), 11, 43, 69, 103, 109, 151, 198–200, 228, 230, 234, 259, 260, 268, 391, 392, 394 Tswana chiefs, 159 Tulloch, J., 256 Tunisia, 76, 233, 397

449

Turkish tobacco, 29 Tutu, Desmond, 237 Twitter Revolution, 222 Tyranny, 26, 236 U UANC, see United African National Council UJ, see University of Johannesburg Umbilical cord, 181 Umhlahlo Wesizwe, 156 Unauthorised spending, 317 UNCTAD, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Under-invoicing, 284 Underdeveloped world, 174 Underdevelopment, 61, 62, 165 Understanding collective, 119 comprehensive, 269 ideological, 217 intersections, 336 liberal, 123 nationalist, 58 public, 266, 268 sources of FDI, 363–364 Zimbabwe’s political culture, 117–130 Unemployment decreasing, 290 massive, 166 Unequal development of regions and perceived jobs discrimination, 177 perceived, 165–166 supposed, 171 UNESCO, 98 Unfinished Business, Sabelo, 51–80 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 29, 30, 56, 281

450 

INDEX

Unilaterally declared independence (UDI), 31 Union Jack, 172 Unions, 29, 56, 63, 67, 96, 96n6, 104, 106, 107, 141, 160, 228, 230, 394, 396 UNISA See University of South Africa United African National Council (UANC), 92, 93, 101, 102 United Arab Emirates, 286 United Kingdom (UK), 5, 36, 37, 119, 176, 216, 286, 377, 391, 397 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 291, 363 United Parties (UP), 102 United States (US) and French governments, 70 cables, 233 Cold War policy, 146 dollars, 286, 304, 317, 318, 361 elections, 224 firms, 370 United States President, 286 Unity agreement, 94 emphasized monolithic, 61 government, 106, 391 pan-Africa, 290 Unity Accord, 61, 94, 95, 98, 100, 106, 148, 162, 164, 196, 199, 302 humiliating, 169–170 Unity Day, 169 Universal suffrage established, 118 Universalist, 53 University of Zimbabwe (UZ), 71, 98, 228, 229 students, 228 University of Zimbabwe Dean of Social Studies, 192

University/universities campuses, 236 country’s, 228, 229 Kent, 201 lecturers, 71 public, 229 Unpopular UZ Amendment Act, 124 Unprecedented nosedive, 361 Unresolved national healing questions, 155, 157 US, see United States V Values basic, 25 commercial, 256 core, 58 democratic, 118 exported, 288 lesser, 341 noble, 236 right transaction, 373 shock, 251 Vambe, L., 344 Vasilchenko, E., 378 Vast Resources, 286 Veterans deceased liberation, 162 former ZPRA, 172 guerrilla, 8 stop purging, 192 Viber, 74 Vice-Chancellor, 124 Vice-president, 8, 10, 31, 148, 151, 174, 188, 240, 248, 254, 306, 334, 348 former, 187, 190, 307 Vice-President of Zimbabwe, 31, 248 Vicious circle, 294 Victim communities, 197

 INDEX 

frames, 260 next, 346 rape, 346 Victimhood common, 104 the memory of past, 175 Victorious emerged, 55 Victors, 94, 161, 178 Victory electoral, 183 ensured, 189 landslide, 102 Vigilant eye, 227 Vilification, 39, 342, 344 Villagers, 32, 47, 48, 71, 75, 217 poor, 348 Villages hunger stricken, 197 protected, 32 Vindictiveness, 247 Violence and intolerance of political dissent, 12 attracted, 332 political, 66, 108n14, 121, 172 sanctioned, 240 sponsored, 231 use of, 38, 66 worst, 109 Violence ridden re-run, 151 Violent clashes, 71 conflict, 305 divorce, 176 explosion, 172 military intervention, 11 repression, 223 Violent seizure, 15 ruling party’s, 207 Virginia tobacco, 29 Virility, 339, 346 power dons the face of, 347

451

Virtual ethnography, 226 Virtuous circles, 376 VMCZ, 245, 247, 265 VOA, 305 Voluminous record, 343 Voluntary disclosure mechanisms, 128 Vote amid, 102 cast, 332 electoral, 304 people’s, 95 presidential, 101 Voters black, 30 election-weary, 186 separate, 30 Voting, 41, 189, 195, 268, 380 Voting patterns, 224 tweak, 195 Vulnerability, 260, 265 W Wafawarova, R., 311 Wages better, 105, 218 public-sector, 72 rates, 368 ratio, 368 set minimum, 97 Walsh, J.P., 380 War all-out, 186 anti-colonial, 168 brutal, 33, 163 brutal guerrilla, 32 civil, 46, 174, 278 credentials, 8, 9, 182, 260 genocidal, 159 guerrilla, 32, 58 legend false, 255, 257, 261 low intensity, 61

452 

INDEX

War (cont.) political succession, 333 propaganda, 164 respectively, 28 spirited bush, 120 zone, 211, 265 War veterans former ZANLA, 168, 201 gratuities, 105 Waste, 162 Waters easy, 102 Weak opposition party politics in Zimbabwe, 99–103 Weapon, 93, 166, 290, 352 Weaponry superior, 27 Weber, 90 Weberian, 91 Welfare customer, 374 economics, 370 social, 369 student’s, 124 Well-oiled scheme, 118 West Africa, 91 West bereft, 80 Western capital, 218 Western countries, 192, 263, 294, 300, 303, 319, 324 hostile, 257 Western democracies, 120 Western ideology, 294, 295 Western inspired regime change agenda, 257 Western liberal democracies, 122 Western liberal ideology and values, 217 Western literature, 121 Western standards, 218 Western window, 283 Western world, 250 Western-backed mercenaries, 121 Westphalian template, 292 WhatsApp, 74, 348

memes, 332, 341, 345, 347, 352, 353 Whawha prison, 31 Whims, 140, 294 White areas favoured, 165 White capital, 65 private, 126 White minority, 120, 227 small, 32 White nationalists die-hard, 30 White-owned farms, 15, 207 Whitehead, S.M., 346 Whites colonial, 62, 118, 120, 129 liberal, 30 man, 58, 145, 149 moderate groups, 29 paternalistic, 161 people, 141, 218 petroleum jellies, 70 settler colonisers, 2 Whitesliberal opposition, 30 Wife former president’s, 152 WikiLeaks, 240 founder, 233 Willems, W., 221 Williams, K., 256, 268 Williams, Zack, 282 Williamson, O.E., 364 Willowgate Scandal, 35, 302 Willowgate Scar Scandal, 62 Willowvale Motor, 101 Woman, 8, 333, 336, 341, 348, 351 ambitious, 354 Women ambitious, 254 aspiring, 337 circumstances, 336 depicts, 336 force, 346

 INDEX 

manoeuvring, 332 marginalizing, 338 married, 347 minimizes, 343 participation, 332 subordinate, 332, 335 young, 32 Women and Youth Leagues of ZANU-PF, 187 Women of Zimbabwe Arise, 103 Women’s League, 10, 188, 190 vocal ZANU-PF, 333 Work academic, 165, 380 charity, 362 clandestine media, 208, 211 daily newsroom, 212 equal pay for equal, 58 government agencies, 309 seminal, 222, 231, 364 substandard, 313 Workers contract, 310 ghost, 310 militant, 64 organised, 124 poor, 103 renegotiate, 229 World Bank (WB), 2, 75, 101, 224, 229, 294, 302, 360 World Investment Report, 380 World systems theory, 280 World War II, 6, 282, 283 X Xenophobic musings, 175 Y Yahweh, 347 Years independence, 2 Years post-independence, 97

453

Young, Andrew (American diplomat), 161 Youth Leagues, 185–188, 190 Youths, 64, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 104, 167, 174, 188, 202, 222, 240, 391 youth wings, 33, 190, 238, 394 YouTube, 224, 236 Yugoslavia, 361 former, 346 Z Zambia, 28, 32, 103, 141, 159, 163, 169, 291, 336 neighbouring, 103, 159 ZANU-led government, 38, 301 Zanu-Ndonga, 93, 101, 102, 268 ZCP, 161 Zimbabwe and civic society organizations, 238 and South Africa, 286, 288 and Zimbabwean identity, 57 capital city, 17, 276, 360 Competitive Authoritarian System, 182–184 Crisis in, 67, 103 critiquing, 281–283 development plan, 283 developmental prospects, 294 discourse on democratization, 157 dollar, 318, 396 dominant political culture in, 117–130, 135, 138–142, 144, 151, 152 economy; small market size, 281 ethnicization of political mobilization in, 155–178 export earnings, 289 exports, 286 Father of, 5 flag in Harare, 173 fled, 344

454 

INDEX

Zimbabwe (cont.) founding President, 181 free, 163 Global Political Agreement, 43, 67, 200n20 gruelling transition, 3 haunting, 11 historiography, 161 history, 160 imports, 289 independence, 33–34, 37, 120 independent, 31, 58, 127, 160, 164, 248, 314, 315 industries, 229, 320, 366 is Open for Business' plan signals, 276 isolation, 18 journalism, 219, 245, 247 liberation struggle, 219, 343 media in, 117, 125, 209, 246, 264, 269 military, 49, 195 Mtoko District, 60 open, 276 Operation Restore Legacy, 4, 18, 331–354, 389 particular, 354 political culture in, 14, 26, 46, 120, 129, 136 politics, 98 population, 29, 31, 40, 42, 367 postcolonial, 53, 64, 66 postcolonial government, 118, 120, 123 postcolonial states, 80 pre-independence, 227 president doubles, 341 problem, 52, 300 provinces, 155, 157, 165 reconfigure, 52, 69 relations, 158, 303, 316, 319, 324 restoring, 392

return, 10, 12 ruled, 9 rural, 28, 42 self-published, 160 shaped, 222 Shona culture, 222 sovereign, 2 state, 171 stock market, 380 students, 228 studied, 16 trade, 288 trade policy, 376, 377 transform, 79, 149 transition, 14, 117, 129, 135–152 transition politics, 139 vests, 305 vibrant, 122, 349 violating, 192 war, 248 Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and ZPRA camp commanders, 170 cadres, 163, 217, 336 commander, 170, 173 forces, 196 guerrillas, 164, 169 High Command member Cde Arthur Magaya, 192 in Chimoio and Nyadzonia in Mozambique, 169 recruitment, 163 victorious, 161, 163, 164 war veteran, 168, 201 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 28, 59, 140, 301 and ZANLA, 33 new, 35, 45 politicians, 94 State, 59 Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF), 8

 INDEX 

-led government, 118, 321 architecture, 240, 341 Central Committee meeting, 10, 229 commissar Saviour Kasukuwere, 333 conference, 189 congress, 96, 149, 187, 188, 228, 333 creators, 141, 197 drive, 33, 63, 74, 237, 303 elite, 35, 44, 45, 62, 92, 118, 152, 164, 185–191, 208, 300, 302, 324, 395, 397 faction, 9, 10, 12, 101, 152, 172, 182, 183, 186, 188–190, 254, 258, 260–262, 264–266, 306, 333, 390 fights, 77, 141, 150, 182, 230, 240, 254, 258, 264, 303, 390, 395 former, 201 former party, 185 founder principle, 8 glued, 185 government, 44, 62, 68, 149, 162, 163, 166, 174, 191, 228, 233, 248, 302, 336 government response, 149 government’s loss, 228 handed, 152, 209, 219, 230 hegemonic rule, 74 hegemony, 36–38, 187 in selected newspapers, 248, 253 insider, 234 liberators, 151 litmus test, 189 Member of Parliament for Masvingo Central, 185 members, 101, 170, 185, 190, 342 military electioneering team, 198 military operation Fast Track Land Reform Programme, 200 military politicking crusade, 183

455

monopoly of patriotism, 237 MP former, 201 narrative depicts, 141 nationalism, 136, 143, 147, 149, 150, 164 new, 164, 211 Parliamentary Caucus, 10 party and government, 169, 306, 333, 342 party processes and procedures, 10 philosophy, 195, 210 pitted, 105, 181 pitting, 9 policies, 149, 306 policies and Mugabe, 306 policy of reconciliation, 93 politburo, 162, 186–188 politician James Makamba, 344 politics, 190, 257 portraying, 260, 353 power, 228 president, 10, 96 processes, 203 provinces, 188 rallies, 229, 333, 352, 353 regime, 12, 19, 42, 64, 68, 77, 120, 124, 185, 191, 209, 210, 219, 229, 257, 262, 302, 391, 393 regime’s legitimacy, 68 Robert Mugabe, 8, 43, 92, 120, 146, 151, 152, 162, 169, 196, 228, 248, 299, 303, 304, 333, 339, 344, 361 rule, 67, 148, 188, 194 ruling, 152, 170, 171, 182, 229, 238, 248, 257, 294, 324, 333, 334, 339, 354, 395 securocrats system, 44, 195, 196, 200 self-praise narratives, 164 Shona dominated North Korean, 147

456 

INDEX

Zimbabwe (cont.) strongholds, 93, 196, 197, 257 succession matrix, 264 support, 185, 188 supporters, 257 terms, 63, 64, 141, 151, 182, 187, 247, 257, 259, 265, 354 unseating, 64 voting, 189, 195 war veteran campaign machinery, 196n12 youth rally, 202 youth wing’s derogative attacks, 190, 238 ZANLA side, 164 Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party ruling, 195, 342 Zimbabwe African People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), 335 Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), 5, 28, 31, 32, 36, 38, 45, 59, 79, 93–95, 96n6, 140, 143, 145, 146, 161–164, 169, 170, 181, 182, 196, 301, 302, 335, 391 and ZANU politicians, 94 and ZPRA leaders, 163, 164 Dumiso Dabengwa, 79, 162, 176 heroes, 162 major liberation parties, 163 mass graves, 169 military wing, 93, 182 president, 162 properties and allegations of planned military overthrow, 164 split, 146 strongholds, 196 Zimbabwe Amendment, 124, 202 Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), 311, 315

Zimbabwe Arise, 103 Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), 191, 192, 334 Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television (ZBC TV), 193 Zimbabwe Coalition, 103 Zimbabwe Commander, 94n2 Zimbabwe Congress of Students’ Union (ZICOSU), 106, 107 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), 2, 63, 64, 96, 97, 103, 105–107, 124, 228–231, 282 membership, 96 Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), 9, 150, 192, 192n5, 197, 334 commander, 192, 197 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), 99, 100, 110, 199 chairperson, 110 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act, 99, 100, 199 Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, 319 Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), 105–107 Zimbabwe Gender Commission, 315 Zimbabwe Grounds, 339, 340 Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, 315 Zimbabwe is Open for Business, 4, 17, 275, 276, 282, 287, 291, 292, 294, 307, 320 Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP), 104, 107 Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill, 127, 128 Zimbabwe musician Mapfumo, 348, 350 Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), 46, 193, 199

 INDEX 

Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), 105, 107, 189, 201 Zimbabwe National Students’ Union (ZINASU), 105, 228 membership, 103 Zimbabwe Newspapers Group (ZIMPAPERS), 191 Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), 163 Zimbabwe People’s Army failed, 145 Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), 5, 28, 32, 93, 147, 161, 182, 196, 196n2, 196n12, 335–336 forces, 196 former, 147 Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZPRA), 105, 189, 201 and ZANLA cadres, 163 and ZANLA’s recruitment, 163 Zimbabwe Prison Service Retired Major General Paradzai Zimondi, 198 Zimbabwe Programme for Economic Transformation (ZIMPREST), 276, 281 Zimbabwe Republic Police, 176, 334 Zimbabwe Review, 166, 167 Zimbabwe Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 1–20, 332 Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) formed, 100, 185, 391 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 196 Zimbabwean black, 149, 369 body politic, 139 borders, 163 citizens corruption, 74 constitution, 9 context, 167, 233 court, 156

457

crisis, 300 diaspora labour migrants, 77 dollar, 361 economy, 19, 165, 359, 367 elections, 171 experience, 53, 67 flag, 236, 238 football stadia, 342 government, 2, 37, 70, 101, 126, 165, 230, 257, 294, 369 government’s enemies, 70 history, 58, 136, 161, 164 identity, 57, 147 mainstream, 126 media, 125, 129, 209, 262, 268 media scene, 268 media scholars, 129 media system, 129 media’s polarization, 129 military, 47, 48 nationalism, 58, 61, 145 nationality, 149 native, 227 newspapers, 129, 253, 257, 264 ordinary, 124, 236, 304, 398 pastor, 236 people, 10, 45 politics; dissidence in, 16, 221–241 Politics Shepherd Mpofu, 221–241 polity, 226 President, 286 President Robert Mugabe, 14, 76, 96n7, 109, 120, 162, 181, 193, 199, 248, 299, 303, 334 problem, 78, 300, 304, 307–324 prodemocracy website, 126 schoolbooks, 160

458 

INDEX

society, 16, 37, 52, 223, 354 values, 150, 197 white, 149 women, 332, 335 women’s struggles, 336 Zimbabwean citizens defined, 51, 66 disenchanted, 72

Zimbabwean Civil Society, 122, 125–129 Zimbabwean Literature, 67, 175 Zimbabwean National Question, 51–80 Zimbabweanist literature, 208 ZNA, Sobuza Gula-Ndebele, 199 Zululand, 26