Morocco at the Parting of the Ways [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512815399

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MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF THE WAYS

MOROCCO A T THE PARTING OF THE WAYS

A DISSERTATION I N HISTORY PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OP T H E GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

EARL FEE CRUICKSHANK

PHILADELPHIA 193S

Copyright

1935

U N I V E R S I T Y OF P E N N S Y L V A N I A PRESS

Manufactured

in the United States

of

America

PREFACE taken in recent years in the diplomatic background of the World W a r has resulted in a flood of monographic and other literature dealing with a wide variety of subjects. T h e Morocco question, out of which developed two m a j o r international crises in the decade immediately preceding the outbreak of the W a r , has received due attention. The critical study of Moroccan historj·, however, has to date been largely confined to the period since 1900. Investigation of the subject has convinced me t h a t a true appreciation of this important diplomatic question depends upon a knowledge of the history of Morocco during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and particularly the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the foreign powers in Morocco as regards the protection of the subjects of the sultan. I first became interested in Morocco through a study of Spain's role in the negotiations of the period from 1900 to 1905 in connection with a seminar in pre-World W a r diplomacy under the direction of D r . William E. Lingelbach at the University of Pennsylvania. Realizing, however, t h a t materials then available did not permit even an approximately definitive study of this topic, I deemed it advisable to direct my attention for the present to an earlier period and finally settled upon the events associated with the Madrid Conference of 1880. Two years' possession of a Penfield Scholarship awarded by the University of Pennsylvania made it possible for me to c a r r y on researches in all the countries primarily concerned with the Morocco question in that period; namely, Morocco, Spain, E n g land, and France. Before going abroad I had consulted the archives of the United States department of state. At Madrid I managed to gain access to the pertinent diplomatic documents down through the year 1885, found in the Archivo Historico National, the archives of the ministry of state and those of the Spanish H E GREAT INTEREST

ν

MOROCCO AT THE PARTING OF THE W A Y S

Tangier legation (which have been transferred to the presidency of the council of ministers), as well as the archives of the American embassy in that capital. The documents in the American and British consulates-general at Tangier were placed at my disposal. In the Public Records Office at London I found the papers of the foreign office and of the British embassy at Madrid open down through the year 1885. The Layard Paper$ in the manuscripts division of the British Museum yielded a great many letters written by Sir John Hay, British Minister at Tangier. Only at the Quay d'Orsay was I denied access to archival materials. Although the French archives were nominally open down to 1870, I was refused permission to examine documents dealing with the Cape Spartel Lighthouse convention of 1865. Published documentary materials for the French side, however, are not lacking. Shortly after the Madrid conference there appeared a Yellow Book dealing with the question of protection in Morocco, and the first five volumes of the first series of the currently appearing French Documents (covering the period from 1871 to 1885) contain some documents bearing on Morocco. These do not, however, enable one to set forth the complete story from the standpoint of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The material utilized in writing the present monograph represents the smaller part of the total collected. The remainder I plan to incorporate in a book dealing with European imperialism in Northwestern Africa during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The course of my researches has placed me under obligations to many persons. Especially do I wish to express my gratitude to the late Frederick C. Penfield of Philadelphia, who in his munificence created the scholarship which has made possible this study, to my former professor of International Law, the Hon. Roland S. Morris, whose stimulating lectures were in no small measure responsible for my interest in the legal aspects of this work, and to Dr. William E. Lingelbach of the University of Pennsylvania, whose advice and encouragement at every stage vi

PREFACE

have been of the greatest benefit. My success in the Spanish archives would scarcely have been possible without the assistance o£ Walter H. Schoellkopf, secretary of the United States embassy at Madrid. To the Hon. Mr. Maxwell Blake, American diplomatic agent at Tangier, and the Hon. Mr. Hugh Gurney, British consul-general at Tangier, I am grateful for many favors shown me while working in the archives under their control. Dr. Edd Winfield Parks of Cumberland University has read the manuscript of this work and offered criticisms from which I have profited. Finally, I wish to thank the Stanford University Press, the Political Science Quarterly, and F. R. Flournoy of St. Stephen's College for granting me permission to quote certain passages from their publications. E a h l Fee Cruickshank

Vanderbilt University, February 1934..

Nashville

•ii

CONTEXTS Chapter

Page

PREFACE

ν

INTRODUCTION

xi

I. T H E SYSTEM OF NATIVE P R O T E C T I O N E S T A B L I S H E D I N MOROCCO

IS

II. T H E SULTAN ASKS FOR R E L I E F

32

I I I . LOCAL A T T E M P T S TO REMEDY T H E SITUAT I O N FAIL IV. T H E

QUESTION

ENTERS

THE

1

50

INTERNA-

TIONAL F I E L D

97

V. T H E M A D R I D CONFERENCE CONVENES, 1880 VI. T H E R E S U L T S

148 174

BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

202 219

ix

INTRODUCTION T H E V E R Y T H R E S H O L D of Europe, occupying a t e r r i t o r y in the north temperate zone as large as France or Spain, located in an excellent position for commerce, richly endowed by n a t u r e , and with a population of about five millions, the empire of Morocco in 1875 was contributing less to international commerce than the smallest of European kingdoms, and was one of the most backward and least known regions of the world. Over this oriental state reigned despotically its sultan. When not actually campaigning against his turbulent subjects, oppressed for centuries by non-salaried governors, he resided in his various capitals in the interior, remarkably immune to the influence of the foreign representatives in far-away Tangier. Around him, serving as his chief advisers, were men totally ign o r a n t of modern economic and political thought, who steadf a s t l y opposed every suggestion of progress and reform. I t is not surprising t h a t Morocco possessed not a single mile of railway, n o t a single telegraph line, very few roads and bridges worthy of the name, and not a single bank or newspaper. The economic and social life of the country outside the eight p o r t s t h a t had been opened to European traders and residents was quite as it had been for centuries, and among no g r o u p of the native population, save the despised and maltreated Hebrews, did there exist a desire to see it otherwise. So c o r r u p t , inefficient, oppressive, and detested were the sultan's governors t h a t rebellion was chronic. In extensive regions of his realm the authority of the sultan was purely nominal. "Morocco is like a threadbare garment," said a Moorish official to a foreign representative, "if the slightest force is used it will be rent and go to pieces." 1 Though feeble, the sultan's government was considerably better than none at all. Both natives and foreign representatives dreaded to think of what would replace it in the event of its collapse. '

1

Archives of the British Legation at Tangier (hereafter referred to as A.B.L.T.), Hay to Granville, Tangier desp. 48, 11 Jul. 1871. XI

MOBOCCO AT T H E P A R T I N G OF T H E

WAY'S

M o r o c c o , whose pirates down into the opening years of the nineteenth century had roved the A t l a n t i c and the M e d i t e r r a nean, and whose sultan had f o r centuries collected tribute or received " g i f t s " from the leading maritime nations of the world, no longer found itself in a position to cope with the western powers. T w o brief encounters during the course of the nineteenth century had clearh' demonstrated t h a t : a clash with France in 1844, and a brief war with Spain in 1859 and 1860. W i t h o u t a single war vessel and possessing only an antiquated coast defense, the lengthy seaboard of M o r o c c o with its walled ports l a y at the mercy of the guns of foreign warships.

Nor

could Moorish soldiery successfully contend with the superiorly disciplined and armed soldiers of Europe. B v the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Moroccan diplomacy, inured to stern demands, supported by force when necessary, had grown timid, ready to capitulate at the first sign of force. In the art of oriental diplomacy, however—delay, promise-making and the playing off of one foreign power against another—the M o o r s still knew how to p l a y a skilful hand. Indeed, one of the chief reasons why they had succeeded so well in maintaining their independence and withstanding European civilization is found in the rivalries existing among the various European powers which had or believed they had interests in the country. A s late as the period treated in this work, the three powers which alone may p r o p e r l y be said to have had important political interests

in the M o r o c c a n

Empire

were G r e a t

Britain,

France, and Spain. British interests in M o r o c c o 2 were of both an economic and political nature. A l t h o u g h in the period of the 1870's Great Britain e n j o y e d approximately two-thirds of the t o t a l imports and exports of the country, this trade in itself was relatively insignificant, representing but a very small fraction of British world trade. However, in view of M o r o c c o ' s splendid climate and undeveloped resources, there was ample reason f o r the be2

A good statement of British interests in Morocco is found in P r o f e s s o r

F . R . Flournoy's article " P o l i t i c a l Relations of G r e a t Britain with M o r o c c o , 1830 t o 18M," in the Political

Science

Quarterly

xii

( M a r . 1932), X L V I I , 53.

INTRODUCTION

lief t h a t some d a y her economic importance would be v a s t l y g r e a t e r . And since she was n a t u r a l l y so well a d a p t e d to produce f o o d s t u f f s — f r u i t s , cereals, and livestock—and stood in need of such m a n u f a c t u r e s as textiles and hardware, m a n y B r i t i s h merchants e a g e r t y l o o k e d forward to the development of Morocco a s an i m p o r t a n t new market within a few d a y s ' sail from home. D u r i n g the w a r s of the late eighteenth and e a r l y nineteenth centuries, with S p a i n sometimes an enemy, the English learned the importance of nearby Morocco a s a convenient source of cheap food s u p p l y for the British garrison a t G i b r a l t a r . D u r i n g the course of the nineteenth century G i b r a l t a r continued to d r a w a l a r g e portion of its provisions from across the s t r a i t . Of p r i m a r y concern to Great B r i t a i n , however, was the s t r a tegic importance of Morocco, 3 located a s the country is on both the A t l a n t i c and M e d i t e r r a n e a n , its coastline forming the southern shore of the s t r a i t . I t was believed that with certain h a r b o r improvements and fortifications the port of T a n g i e r could be made to command the entrance of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n from the A t l a n t i c side. E s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the opening of the Suez C a n a l in 1869, when the most direct route to India l a y through the Mediterranean, the importance of this position was enhanced as a consideration of B r i t i s h foreign policy. T o insure the s a f e t y of the route to I n d i a it was quite a s essential to keep the S t r a i t of G i b r a l t a r free from the domination of a rival power a s it was to protect the Suez. W h a t government could control the A f r i c a n l i t t o r a l of the s t r a i t more advantageously to B r i t i s h in* This is clearly apparent in the following declaration of S i r John Drummond Hay, made t o w a r d the end of his long period of service as British representative at Tangier: "During the 38 years that I have held my present post, I have regarded my chief duty to be that of a sentinel, who watches over the interest G r e a t Britain must have in the maintenance of the f r e e dom of the Straits, the great highway of commerce to the Mediterranean and to India. The decided policy and action of the British Government both as regards the Dardanelles in 1878 and again as regards the Suez Canal last year, would not, it appears to me, be consistent, if it allowed a Power like France to hold the northern coast of Morocco in the Straits, either by annexing this country o r by taking it under its aegis, which would be in the end equivalent to possession." A.B.L.T., Hay to Granville, Tangier secret desp. 92, 15 Nov. 1883.

xm

MOHOCCO AT T H E PASTING OF T H E WAY8 terests than the sultan's? I t was too feeble to cause serious embarrassment. I t frequently felt the need of British support. I t s legitimate right was unquestioned. I n view of these interests j u s t discussed, together with the presence of the French in Algeria after 1 8 3 0 , G r e a t B r i t a i n had, by 1 8 4 1 , under the direction of L o r d Palmerston, developed a definite Morocco policy which was to be followed with a g r e a t degree of constancy throughout the remainder of the century. I n f a c t it was not finally abandoned until after the formation of the Anglo-French accord of 1904. T h e policy of G r e a t B r i t a i n was very conservative, calling for the maintenance of the

status

quo. I t has been aptly described as follows: Great Britain . . . had definitely adopted the position that Morocco must be immune from encroachment on the part of the other powers and she had strongly deprecated the employment by any foreign power of any coercive weapon against Morocco, such as a blockade. She had virtually promised to Morocco her assistance in case of need,4 but had demanded that Morocco should show herself worthy of British friendship by giving fair treatment to British interests in the country, by according wider facilities for British commerce, and by avoiding occasions for disputes with the foreign powers.6 T h e conciliatory nature of British influence exercised during these years upon Moorish authorities in cases of dispute between Morocco and other foreign powers is evident from the following statement of Sir J o h n Drummond H a y , veteran B r i t ish representative a t T a n g i e r : His Shereefian Majesty knows the deep interest I have never ceased to take in the welfare and prosperity of His Majesty's dominions, and of the maintenance of their integrity and of His 4 On two occasions between the year 1841 and the Conference of Madrid of 1880, Morocco went to war with a European power—France in 1844; and Spain in 1859. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the British representative in each case never ceased to offer conciliatory advice to the Moorish authorities, and while the British government did not actually go to war in defense of Morocco, it did continue to manifest a keen interest in the situation and exerted its diplomatic influence in behalf of the sultan. • F . R . Flournoy, op. ext., p. 53.

xiv

INTRODUCTION

M a j e s t y ' s independence. His Shereefian Majesty has had also unceasing proofs, from the counsels I have offered, when any question has arisen with a Foreign Government or Representative of the anxious desire both of Her Majesty's Government and of myself, as their Representative, that peaceful relations should be maintained, by His Shereefian Majesty acceding to the just demands or wishes of a Foreign Government, and of making concessions, even when the justice of the demands may be of a doubtful character, with the view of avoiding the possibility of a rupture, more especially as His Shereefian Majesty in his wisdom is aware that having no navy and only a small army, as contrasted with that of other Powers, His Shereefian Majesty has not the power to resist aggression, especially on the sea-board. Above all, I have never ceased to urge that the most friendly relations should be maintained with France, His Shereefian Majesty's powerful ally and neighbor, who could at any time march an army of 50,000 men with an irresistible artillery across the frontier. Every reasonable concession, not affecting the integrity and independence of this country, should be made rather than incur the danger of a rupture of relations with that Power. These counsels, as His Shereefian Majesty is aware, I have never ceased to inculcate on the minds of His Majesty's ministers. . . * T h e consistent execution of this policy was g r e a t l y

facil-

itated by retaining the same person as representative a t T a n gier

f o r a period of

forty-one y e a r s — S i r

John

Drummond

H a y . 7 Only twenty-nine years of age when he succeeded his f a t h er at T a n g i e r in 1845, H a y

previously had had

diplomatic

experience under S t r a t f o r d Canning at Constantinople during a very eventful period. A l e r t and able, he was singularly well fitted to fill the T a n g i e r post, possessing a thorough knowledge o f the natives and a perfect mastery of their language. W e l l might H a y at a later date have served his government in a more important country than M o r o c c o , but his was the case of one serving too well, f o r the foreign office came to consider his •Public Records Office (hereafter cited as P . R . O . ) , secret memorandum presented by Sir John Drummond H a y to the sultan, 13 Nov. 1883, enclosed in his despatch to Granville, No. 92, 15 Nov. 1883. * A summary of the career of this British diplomat is found in A of Sir John Hay Drummond

Memoir

Hay by his daughter, Mrs. L . A . E . Brooks. XV

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS

services there indispensable. I t may with t r u t h be said t h a t a f t e r the sultan, and possibly the Shereef of W a z a n , H a y was the most influential public figure in Morocco for almost half a century. Recognition of his unique prestige is seen in the f a c t t h a t for many years he served as representative not only of his own country, but for Denmark, Holland, and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , as well. The powerful influence which he exerted over three consecutive sultans, however, was often misunderstood by jealous colleagues who were wont t o attribute their failures to his alleged hostile intrigues. Even certain of his own enterprising countrymen from time to time attempted unsuccessfully to work against him a t the foreign office, blaming him for the refusal of the Moroccan Government to undertake a policy of reform. H a y won and held the confidence of the Moorish authorities through his policy of square dealing, and he was careful not to abuse or alienate their confidence. In his negotiations he avoided all use of menace or intimidation. His profound understanding of the conditions of the country enabled him to avoid asking the impossible. Persuasion by sound logic and an appeal to long years of disinterested British friendship were his chief instruments of influence. In view of the extraordinary position which he occupied in the country it is not surprising t h a t he was frequently accused of employing his influence in a manner hostile to progress, in the hope of curtailing the influence of other foreign powers. This is f a r from the t r u t h . While he did place political considerations first, in a conservative manner he sought constantly to promote commerce and to f u r t h e r the cause of civilization. I t is a fact t h a t practically every gain of this sort made during his long residence at Tangier was due directly to his efforts. F r a n c e enjoys the distinction of being the first E u r o p e a n power to send a consul t o Morocco, as well as the first to enter into formal t r e a t y relations with t h a t country. Being a maritime nation bordering on the Mediterranean, F r a n c e was n a t u rally interested in the free passage of the strait. H e r commerce, with Morocco in the period under consideration was second only to t h a t of G r e a t Britain. T h e vital interests of F r a n c e in Moxvi

INTRODUCTION

rocco, however, arose from her possession of Algeria a f t e r 1830. Geographically Morocco and Algeria a r e one country, there being no n a t u r a l barrier separating them. R a c i a l l y their people are almost identical. They share the same culture and religion. In view of these circumstances relations between them must alw a y s be very close. Disorders in one easily affect the tranquillity of the other. France early came to realize t h a t the consolidation of her position in Algeria depended to a very considerable degree upon neighboring Morocco. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the power of the sultan over the wild f a n a t i c a l tribesmen of the frontier was little more than nominal. H e repeatedly showed himself powerless to prevent their making raids into Algerine t e r r i t o r y , making common cause with Algerine rebels, furnishing them supplies, or offering them, when defeated, a safe refuge in Moroccan t e r r i t o r y whence they might open fresh a t t a c k s upon the French once their backs were turned. The very uns a t i s f a c t o r y Franco-Moroccan boundary convention of 1845 contributed materially to the complexity of the situation. Under these circumstances it was extremely difficult for F r a n c e permanently to p a c i f y Algeria, and the m i l i t a r y establishment required there, even in time of peace, was very costly. Protests to Moorish authorities evoked only confessions of impotence, and punitive expeditions, expensive and never decisive, were met by protests from Morocco and questions from the other interested powers. Being so vulnerable on her Moroccan side, F r a n c e naturally sought to prevent a n y potential enemy extending its sway over that country. French policy in Morocco a f t e r 1830 was variable, being now conciliatory and sympathetic, and a g a i n harsh and exacting. I t must be admitted that Morocco afforded F r a n c e much provocation. For a half-dozen y e a r s following the disastrous w a r of 1870, the French representative at T a n g i e r worked in close harmony with the British. 8 As late as 1880, it is very doubtful if any * Sir John Hay, writing in 1873, described his relationship with his French colleague as follows: "I am happy to take this opportunity of expressing to your Lordship the great satisfaction I feel at having Mr. Tissot for

xvii

MOEOCCO AT T H E PASTING OF T H E

WAYS

considerable number of Frenchmen looked f o r w a r d to the ultimate subjugation of M o r o c c o by France. T h e French generall y were extremely jealous of British influence at the shereefian court, while they admitted Spain's special interests and were not hostile to Spanish ambitions south of the strait.® T h e position which the French occupied in Algeria made them the special o b j e c t of suspicion on the p a r t of the sultan, Great Britain, and Spain. T h e threefold program of the Spanish nationalists of the nineteenth century called f o r the recovery of Gibraltar, union with P o r t u g a l , and the acquisition of Morocco. Justification of the last point was found in geographical, racial, and historical relationships.

As

some

expressed

it,

"Africa

starts

with

the

Pyrenees." A geological study of the two countries does reveal striking similarities. Citing the close kinship between Moors and Spaniards, many Spaniards insisted that they could civilize their " b r e t h r e n " across the strait more easily than could any other European people, at the same time disregarding the pronounccd religious differences existing between the most fanatical of Catholics and the most fanatical of Moslems. Centuries of tradition a colleague. Instead of meeting as I have had such frequent occasion to deplore on the part of some of my colleagues, with a covert opposition to my efforts to promote the general interests of Europeans in this country and to maintain friendly relations between the Foreign Representatives and this Government, I have found Mr. Tissot always ready to act in concert with me on all matters affecting our common interests and also to facilitate the arrangement of any questions which have occurred between our respective legations or consulates." A . B . L . T . , H a y to Granville, desp. 5, 21 Jan. 1873. During the last years of the Empire also French policy in Morocco had been of a conciliatory nature. N o t e Hay's statement quoted in footnote 78, p. 39. * Ministire des Affairs Etrangöres. Commission de Publication des Documents Relatifs aux Origines de la Ouerre de 1914- Documents Diplomatiques Fransais (1871-1914), (hereafter cited as Doc. Dipl. Fran(.), I" Serie, Tome I I I , Jaurfes to Freycinet, Madrid desp. No. 7, 9 Feb. 1880, doc. no. 19, pp. 17-18. In this despatch the French ambassador reports having assured the Spanish foreign minister, in accordance with his instructions from M. W a d dington, that France would not view with a jealous eye the advance which Spain might someday make in Morocco. This appears generally to have been the attitude of the French government in this period.

xviii

INTRODUCTION and history were appealed to in a further effort to establish the p r i o r i t y of Spanish rights, even if during this long period relations between the two peoples were seldom friendly. T h e exploits of Spanish arms in the heroic age, the last will and testament of Isabella the Catholic, the expeditions of Charles V into North A f r i c a , and the very recent African campaign of 1 8 5 9 - 6 0 were all recounted. All these factors had served to fix the M o o r indelibly in the mind of the Spanish nation. I n f a c t , Spanish national consciousness had been born of the struggles with the Moor. Such considerations as these, however, while convincing enough to the average Spaniard, counted for little when weighed in the scales of nineteenth-century realism, if unsupported by more substantial claims. These, indeed, were not lacking. Spain, like F r a n c e a Mediterranean state, bordering on the s t r a i t , was interested in its free passage. N o t only was she the near neighbor of Morocco to the north, but to the southwest, in the Canaries, as well, and, what is more, for several centuries she had possessed several posts on the northern shore of Morocco. All attempts to develop there important marts had signally failed and they remained mere military posts and prisons—-a drain upon the revenues of the state, and an ever-present reminder of Spanish impotency. T h e strategic importance of Ceut a a t the Mediterranean entrance of the s t r a i t , complementary to Gibraltar, must not be denied. T h e maintenance of order on the frontiers of these posts was a serious problem which frequently vexed Hispano-Moroccan relations. Spain viewed with apprehension the recurrent demand of certain Frenchmen t h a t the Algero-Moroccan frontier be advanced westward along the Mediterranean littoral to the Muluya River. T h i s would extend French influence uncomfortably close to the Spanish holdings. Spain stood ready, therefore, to combat any tendency toward the French annexation of territory on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, and dreaded above all the thought of finding herself hemmed in by F r a n c e on two sides. Despite proximity and various points of direct contact with the Moroccan E m p i r e , all of Spain's attempts to develop im-

xix

MOBOCCO

AT

THE

PARTING

OF T H E

WAYS

p o r t a n t commercial relations with t h a t country had failed. 1 0 In the l a s t quarter of the nineteenth century they were so slight as scarcely t o deserve mention. Certain other f a c t o r s , however, did tend to enhance Spain's position in Morocco. T h e S p a n i s h colon}· in that country, while not what might be termed large, was considerably more numerous than all others combined. These Spanish emigrants, however, were generally drawn from the lowest classes of society and were not such a s would g r e a t l y strengthen Spanish influence. B y the t r e a t y of peace of 1860, Spain exacted a war indemnity of $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , the payment of which was guaranteed by Spanish intervention in the Moroccan customs service from which S p a i n was to receive one-half the total annual revenue. Although by 1880 the total amount of the indemnity had not been extinguished, the original intention to take a d v a n t a g e of this favored position to increase g r e a t l y Spanish influence in Morocco had proved illusory. 1 1 Finally, the " W a r of A f r i c a " of 1859-60, fresh in the mind of the Spanish nation, had created the all but universal belief among S p a n i a r d s that their country was destined some d a y to fulfill a " m i s s i o n " on the opposite side of the strait. T h i s point of view, together with Spanish interests and policy in Morocco, are clearly expressed in the following e x t r a c t form a despatch written by Senor Merry y Colom, Spanish minister a t T a n g i e r from 1860 to 1874, to his chief: 1 2 " T h i s is admitted in the following statement of the Spanish minister at Tangier, made on the eve of the Madrid Conference of 1880: "Our commerce in the kingdom of Morocco today is of no importance. And that is not the worst of it, for do what we may it can never catch up with the figures which English and French commerce attain, because Spain and Morocco are countries of similar production and because our industry can compete neither in price nor in quality with the English and French industry, whose principal articles of import have already established their markets here." Archives of the Spanish Ministry of S t a t e (hereafter referred to as A . S . M . S . ) , Diosdado to the Sp. min. of st., Tangier desp. 7, 14 J a n . 1879. " A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 8, 15 J a n . 1879. Mr. Merry as the Count of Benoniar served his country at the Court of Berlin during the period 1875-1888, where he continued to be consulted on important aspects of Morocco policy. u

XX

INTRODUCTION

I n the eighty leagues of A f r i c a n coastline lying between the Muluya River a n d Cape S p a r t e l lies the f u t u r e of Spain. T o extend our domination over this region has been the policy essentially Spanish, the national policy fed by tradition and history, the policy of loa Reyes Catolicos and of Cisneros, of Charles V, a n d of Charles I I I . 1 3 T h e day will come when our colonies will f r e e themselves, and when it does, Excellent Sir, only in Morocco will Spain find compensation for such an immense loss. If to establish our domination in A f r i c a is for Spain a question of aggrandizement, which nevertheless it would be most imprudent to t r y to realize while we lack the great resources necessary for such an undertaking, to prevent the exclusive domination of Morocco by another nation is for Spain a question of existence. Neither politically nor economically could Spain live if F r a n c e or England should take possession of Morocco. I t is sufficient to examine carefully the geographical map of the Moroccan coast to be convinced of the exactitude of my first statement. W i t h one F r a n c e to the north and another to the south, Spain, enclosed between two French f r o n t i e r s , would cease to be an independent nation. W i t h France or E n g l a n d , which are the two leading maritime powers of t h e world, in L a r a c h e , T a n g i e r , T e t u a n , and Mogador, we would live in a state of p e r p e t u a l blockade. F r o m Larache they would hold in check our arsenal of La C a r r a c a , the very important port of Cadii and our commerce with the Antilles and the Canaries, from Tangier they would dominate the passage of the strait and would close to our ships the entrance of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , f r o m T e t u a n they would threaten M a l a g a , and f r o m Mogador the Canaries. I n no other question of international policy is seen as clearly as in t h a t of Morocco the t r u t h with which Count A r a n d a declared t h a t all diplcmatic questions reduce themselves to questions of g e o g r a p h y . "Charles III, one of Spain's ablest monarchs, ruling in the latter half of thi eighteenth century, is reported to have said: "In any case, if the Turksh empire is ruined in the great revolution which threatens the whole Levajt, without our being able to prevent it, we should then consider acquiring tie coast of Africa which lies opposite Spain on the Mediterranean, before «thers do so, and cause us inconvenience at the strait, with injury to our tranquillity and our navigation and commerce. This is a point inseparable from our interests which should be constantly borne in mind." A.S.M.S., quot«l in report submitted by the Spanish council of state to the ministry of war »n the abandonment or cession of the places of Pefion and Alhucemas, datec 21 Feb. 1870.

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS Spain is an essentially agricultural country which lives f r o m the raw materials which it produces and exchanges. Morocco produces the same products as Spain, and, as I have noticed, the movement of crops is the same; a good crop in Spain always accompanies a good crop in this empire. If France or England, nations more advanced than Spain in agriculture, were to take possession of the fertile plains which extend from Tangier to the banks of the Sebu and the fields of Ducalla, Abda and Shiedma, which if well cultivated might supply E u r o p e with cereals, the English or French agriculturalists established here would produce wheat, barley, maize, olive oil, etc., in immense quantities, and better and cheaper than similar products of Spain. When the Spanish peasants placed their f r u i t s on the market in our eastern ports they would have to stand the competition of the products of Morocco which would be available cheaper in the neighboring Moroccan ports. T h e ruin of our agriculturalists would undoubtedly result. . . . Morocco must some day belong to Spain. As long as it cannot belong to Spain it is necessary that it should belong to no other nation. So strong is my conviction on this point—a conviction based upon my long experience in the affairs of this country—that I believe that the only unquestionable casus belli which Spain has a p a r t from an attack upon the integrity of the nation or the honor of the patria is the case of a power t r y i n g to conquer Morocco. Therefore, we must closely watch the policy which the other nations follow here, and always maintain our diplomatic influence in Morocco at the level necessary to be able to t h w a r t the projects of France or England, and to prevent not only either of these nations establishing themselves here, but even that there be created in this E m p i r e French or English interests of such importance that in the f u t u r e these might impede Spain in realizing her designs in the question of Morocco, which with that of Portugal and Gibraltar comprise the whole international policy of Spain. T h i s was, Excellent Sir, the object of the campaign of Africa, this the idea which determined the d r a f t i n g of the treaties of peace and commerce, and which has served as the norm in the settlement of all grave questions which have risen here d u r i n g the nine years which have intervened between the preliminaries of W a d Ras 1 4 and the present day. . . . 18 14

H e refers here to the preliminaries of peace with Morocco during the war of 1889-60. "A.S.M.S., Merry to the Sp. min. of st., very confld. Tangier desp. 1 Jul. 1869.

xxii

INTRODUCTION I n line with this policy the S p a n i s h legation a t T a n g i e r t o o k p a r t i c u l a r p a i n s t o study M o r o c c o from the m i l i t a r y point o f view. I m p o r t a n t officers of the general s t a f f accompanied M e r r y on his missions to the M o r o c c a n c o u r t in 1 8 6 3 , 1 8 6 4 , and 1 8 6 5 , on which occasions numerous m i l i t a r y maps and descriptions of the c o u n t r y were drawn up and submitted to the m i n i s t r y of war. Likewise the S p a n i s h naval authorities made careful studies of all p o r t s of t h e E m p i r e . 1 6 I f the Eastern question [wrote Merry a little more than a year later] arises again, it is, in my opinion, almost certain that there will also arise questions relative to Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis and Morocco, whose people live in a state of complete barbarism in spite of the veneer of civilization with which Egypt and Tunis try to cover over the incurable gangrene which consumes the Moslem races. E n g land will take E g y p t in order to insure the passage to her immense E m p i r e of I n d i a ; France will unite with Algeria a part of Tunisia; I t a l y will establish herself in the other part and in Tripoli, . . . and Spain, in order to avoid seeing herself enclosed between two frontiers which might smother her, will have perforce to occupy Morocco. . . . Spain is prepared here for every eventuality. I f the European situation hastens the downfall of the Turkish Empire, and on falling it drags down in ruins the old regencies and the Moroccan Empire, we shall be able with all necessary means to take, in the division of the spoils of the Mohammedan dominions, the part which history, geography, and our traditions have assigned to 14 us I n t h e fulfillment of her " m a n i f e s t d e s t i n y " S p a i n had to r e c k on with two o b s t a c l e s : T h e opposition of other powers, p a r t i c u l a r l y G r e a t B r i t a i n , and, equally as serious, her own weakness. F o r several y e a r s following the A f r i c a n war S p a n i s h p r e s t i g e a t t h e M o r o c c a n c o u r t remained a t a high level. T h e n came t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y period ( 1 8 6 8 - 7 5 ) , as a result o f which her influence

everywhere declined. W i t h the r e s t o r a t i o n of the B o u r -

bons in 1 8 7 5 the c o u n t r y found itself heavily burdened with d e b t , e n g a g e d in a civil w a r a t home, and c o n f r o n t e d with revolt in t h e colonies. Obviously S p a i n was f o r the time being a t l e a s t , " Ibid., Merry to the Sp. min. of St., very confld. desp. 213, 14 Oct. 1870,

xxiii

MOBOCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS in no position to embark upon a policy of adventures. Refusing, however, to abandon her dream of Moroccan conquest at some distant date, Spain though occupied at home with the problems of consolidating her dynasty and setting her house in order, continued the policy of closely watching the activities of her rivals in Morocco and of doing all she could to check the growth of their influence1' and to maintain the status

quo.

" Instances of Spanish opposition to improvements in Morocco a p p e a r frequently in the diplomatic correspondence. F o r example, in the year 1870, certain British interests sought to gain the consent of the sultan to the establishment of telegraphic lines in Morocco. T h e Spanish minister feared that such concessions granted to the nationals o f one foreign power would lead to similar demands on the p a r t of others, and that soon foreign powers would find themselves obliged to intervene in the internal affairs of Morocco to defend the interests of their s u b j e c t s . On this occasion he declared, ". . . the Moroccan Government, which has seen us work with determination to prevent F r a n c e and E n g l a n d realizing their desires in 1865, 1866, and 1869, will have at hand arguments drawn from our advice on those occasions, in order not to accede to this pretension." A.S.M.S., M e r r y t o the Sp. min. of st., very confid. desp. 62, 19 Mar. 1870. In 1878, when it was believed that the F r e n c h were seeking a concession for the construction of a line of railway from F e z to the Algerian frontier, the Spanish representative adopted an attitude of hostility toward the alleged p r o j e c t . " A foreign railway line in the interior of Morocco," he stated, "in view o f the conditions existing in this country, signifies nothing more nor less than conquest, and the country which obtained the concession would have to ask that it be permitted t o enter with an army in order to protect the w o r k s ; an army, entering from Algeria, would never be withdrawn. Such a concession we should almost have the right to oppose with force. . . . " A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the S p . min. of st., very confid. desp. 272, 6 Dec. 1878. Spanish opposition to opening up Morocco more freely to foreign commerce is expressed in Diosdado's desp. 1, 14 J a n . 1879, to the S p . min. of st. Similarly, in 1883, when a group of influential British s u b j e c t s formed a company with capital amounting to £1,000,000, intending to regenerate Morocco, the Spanish minister showed himself hostile to the scheme, and helped t o defeat it. In his opinion, in Morocco " . . . foreigners cannot c a r r y out enterprises nor invest their capital as they do in countries more solidly constituted, and which have not renounced, as this one has, the right of jurisdiction over them. E v e r y foreign enterprise of any importance would constitute here, because o f the very f a c t of being absolutely exempt from Moroccan jurisdiction, a state within a s t a t e , " and foreigners would come t o dominate the less civilized state of Morocco, " s o much the more easily in this case under the present circumstances, since . . . day by day it is becom-

INTRODUCTION T h e status

quo was becoming increasingly difficult to main-

tain. T h e g r o w t h of European imperialistic interest and activit y in A f r i c a , especially in the decade of the 1870's and therea f t e r , together with the diminishing authority of the sultan over his subjects, rendered the duration of Moroccan independence highly problematical. Contributing g r e a t l y to the latter condition were the abuses of the system of native protection. In the period f r o m 1875 to 1880 these reached an acute stage of development. T h u s the question was raised: Should measures be adopted by the powers interested in the affairs of M o r o c c o to strengthen the hand of the sultan in order that he might himself maintain the independence of his country? Or, should matters be allowed to d r i f t until

finally

anarchy resulted and forced the

powers to intervene? M o r o c c o found herself at the p a r t i n g of the ways. Perhaps efficacious remedies timely administered would save her f r o m sinking into a state of dependency. H e r fate l a y in the hands of the European powers. T h e present work describes how this critical situation developed, the e f f o r t s that were made to relieve the sultan of his embarrassment, and the results. ing more difficult to uphold the fiction of the autonomy and independence of M o r o c c o . " A.S.M.S., Diosdado t o t h e Sp. min. of S t . , desp. 58, 14 M a r . 1883; desp. 138, 27 June 1883.

xxv

I

THE SYSTEM OF PROTECTION IS ESTABLISHED IN MOROCCO B I G H T O F foreign diplomatic and consular officials in backward, non-Christian countries to extend protection to the natives is one important feature of the system of capitulations or extraterritorial jurisdiction. Protection may be defined as a juridical bond which attaches a subject of one state to another, entitling· him to claim certain rights and privileges enjoyed by the nationals of the second without, however, actually changing his nationality. I t may have as its basis either custom or formal t r e a t y provision. T h i s anomalous arrangement, along with other aspects of extraterritoriality, grew out of the divergence between E u r o pean and non-European laws, religions, and customs. 1 Experience early demonstrated t h a t , in order to shield E u r o p e a n consular agents and subjects, as well as their interests, from inj u r y or destruction in oriental lands, immunity from local j u r isdiction was a necessity. Thus it was t h a t E u r o p e a n consuls in Morocco gradually were granted e x t r a o r d i n a r y privileges and acquired almost complete jurisdiction over the persons and p r o p e r t y of their nationals. T h e exemption of European nationals, alone, from the sult a n ' s authority did not afford sufficient guarantees. I n order to insure the proper exercise of their functions, foreign representatives felt the need of employing natives in various capacities—as interpreters, scribes, guards, and domestics—who were subject to no a u t h o r i t y other t h a n their own. Foreign merchants also required the services of native f a c t o r s or brokers in whose hands money and goods might be entrusted, and who might engage in commercial activity on behalf of their principals unimHE

1 See John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law, II, 898-600, 72744; and also, L. Oppenheim, International Law, 3rd edition, R. F. Roxburgh (ed.), I, 465-67.

1

MOKOCCO A T T H E

PASTING

OF T H E

WAYS

peded by rapacious and hostile local authorities. These native employees not infrequently suffered a t the hands of their fanatical countrymen merely for venturing to serve the despised foreigners. 2 In short, the security of foreign interests necessitated the protection of the native employee as well as t h a t of the foreign national himself. 3 A summary view of the conditions existing in the Empire of Morocco in the nineteenth century will suffice to substantiate this statement. The government of Morocco was certainly one of the worst in the world. Law was based upon the Koran. Only the testimony of Moslems was admitted in the local courts, and the administration of justice was notoriously irregular, partial, and corrupt. The sultan, performing the multifarious functions of chief executive, lawgiver, supreme judge, and high priest, was the complete master of the lives and p r o p e r t y of his subjects. As regards taxation, the country knew no other system than the tyrannical extortion of a hierarchy of greedy governors and subordinate officials. Usually purchasing their positions, these functionaries were expected to replenish their personal fortunes by extorting from those within their jurisdiction as much revenue as possible. The wretched peasants and traders, constituting the g r e a t m a j o r i t y of the population, bore the burden of supporting this ineffective government. And what did they receive in return? Internally, the sultan's government was powerless to afford its subjects adequate protection against lawlessness and abuse; externally, it was equally unable to de1

This necessity is recognized in the following statement by the Spanish minister at Tangier: ". . . If the confidential agents which this legation or our consulates have to employ knew that the Spanish flag would cease to protect them the day they finished the object of their commission, for all the gold in the world Spain would not find any confidential agents in Morocco." A.S.M.S., Merry to the Sp. min. of St., Tangier desp. 18, 24 Jan. 1872. 'Ibid., ". . . The European nations without exception place so much importance upon this privilege and sustain it with such energy that their representatives demand of the government of the sultan solemn and immediate satisfaction if the Moroccan authorities dare to arrest or try to judge one of the Moorish or Jewish servants who are in their service; in a country as fanatical as this one, only thus can be assured respect for those who serve Christian employers. . . ."

2

SYSTEM

OF

PROTECTION

IS

ESTABLISHED

fend their i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t foreigners, s u p p o r t e d try the diplom a t i c or even m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e of their governments. T o esc a p e intolerable conditions, as well as to gain special a d v a n t a g e s , numerous M o r o c c a n s u b j e c t s , both Moslems a n d Jews, eagerly s o u g h t positions in the service of the Christains. W h e r e a s e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l concessions as r e g a r d s foreigners a p p e a r to have been made by the M o r o c c a n government to the s t a t e of P i s a as e a r l y as the f o u r t e e n t h century, 4 the r i g h t of p r o t e c t i o n of native s u b j e c t s was, it a p p e a r s , first formally recognized by the t r e a t y between G r e a t B r i t a i n and M o r o c c o signed a t Fez in the y e a r 1750, and the additional articles agreed upon by the same two powers the following year. 5 T h e p r o t e c t i o n conceded on these occasions, however, was only p a r t i a l , being res t r i c t e d to the exemption of native s e r v a n t s from the p a y m e n t of taxes. Article IV of the t r e a t y of 1750 reads, in p a r t , as follows: . . no E n g l i s h whatsoever or a n y of their s e r v a n t s ( t h o u g h not E n g l i s h ) , shall be liable to p a y the t a x imposed upon the E m p e r o r ' s s u b j e c t s , called the poll t a x . " 6 Article IV of the a d d i t i o n a l articles was still more explicit and extensive, p r o viding " . . . t h a t the Consul and the other B r i t i s h m e r c h a n t s shall be freely allowed to have M o o r s or Jews as their interp r e t e r s a n d brokers, who shall be exempt from all taxes, as likewise all t h e i r domestic s e r v a n t s . " 7 In the British t r e a t y of peace a n d commerce with M o r o c c o signed a t Fez in 1760, one also finds ". . . t h a t the domestic servants of the Consuls, and other s u b j e c t s of his B r i t a n n i c M a j e s t y , of whatever nation they m a y be, either M o o r s or o t h e r s , shall not p a j ' the t a x called the p o l l - t a x , or a n y o t h e r t a x . " 8 T h e same principles were embodied in Articles I I and I V of the British t r e a t y of 1791, but Article V I I went still a step f u r t h e r , conceding native proteges * Budgett Meakin, The Moorish Empire, p. 381. ' T h e Franco-Moroccan treaty signed at Marrakesh in 1767 has sometimes erroneously been cited as the first formal recognition of native protection by Morocco. • L e w i s Hertslet, Treaties and Conventions, I, 96-97. ' Ibid., I, 97-100. • G e o r g e Chalmers, A Collection of Treaties between Great Britain and Other Powers, II, 342-59.

3

MOHOCCO AT T H E PASTING OF T H E WAYS

immunity from Moorish court jurisdiction, equally with British subjects, providing that, "Such causes or differences as may arise in Barbary between the subjects of His Imperial Majesty and English subjects, shall not be decided by the Cadi or Judge of the place, but are to be determined by the Governor of the City, and the English Consul or his Deputy; nor shall an English subject, or one under English protection be obliged on any pretense to present himself before the ordinary magistracy of the country; and all such causes as may arise between English subjects or those under English protection shall be determined by the English Consul or his Deputy alone."® In subsequent British treaties one notes a reduction in the extent of the right of protection. 10 That of the year 1801 reaffirmed the right of a consul to extend protection, but was silent on the matter of servants of British subjects receiving it. 11 And while it continued to exempt British proteges from taxation, the jurisdiction of British consular courts in cases involving native employees under British protection was not restated. In principle, the provisions concerning protection found in the final British treaty of 1856 remained the same. 12 They • H e r t s l e t , op. cit., I, 1X2-24. This r e t r e a t , however, is more a p p a r e n t than real. In all her general treaties with Morocco f r o m 1791 on, G r e a t B r i t a i n included a m o s t - f a v o r e d nation clause, entitling her to all privileges p e r m i t t e d t o any other power. " H e r t s l e t , op. cit., I l l , 17-25. " The reasons f o r this restriction of t r e a t y provisions a r e f o u n d in t h e diplomatic correspondence. A.B.L.T. H a y t o Malmesbury, T a n g i e r desp. 46, 17 May 1859: " W h e n I negotiated the new t r e a t y between G r e a t B r i t a i n a n d Morocco, in 1855, I agreed to limit t h e protection to be afforded by the British Vice Consuls a t the o u t p o r t s t o native d e p e n d e n t s . . . and it was stipulated t h a t the native s e r v a n t s of British s u b j e c t s should be s u b j e c t t o the laws of the c o u n t r y , f o r I then f o r e s a w , if t h e commerce of Morocco w a s t o increase and . . . E u r o p e a n s came . . ., in n u m b e r s to reside, t h a t it would be destructive of t h e S u l t a n ' s independence and also r e n d e r his Government powerless if we h a d stipulated t h a t all the persons employed by British s u b j e c t s should be placed u n d e r B r i t i s h consular p r o tection and j u r i s d i c t i o n , a n d be e x e m p t e d f r o m taxation. I n f a c t , such a system would have formed an Imperium in Imperio." Also n o t e what H a y wrote in the same connection t o L o r d Russell, T a n g i e r desp. 4, 12 J a n . 1860: " I foresaw this evil when I concluded t h e T r e a t y of 1857 and endeavoured to check it by d r a w i n g u p a direct stipulation in point, which I hoped would have set an example to other Foreign G o v e r n m e n t s . " w

4

SYSTEM OF PROTECTION IS ESTABLISHED

wereT however, more specifically stated and, besides, showed a tendency to limit the number of proteges. While the British diplomatic agent at Tangier remained unrestricted in his freedom of selection, the number of proteges t h a t a consular officer might protect was limited to f o u r : an interpreter, a guard, and two domestics. Natives serving as consular agents of Great B r i t a i n were protected, together with their families dwelling under the same roof, but they were not permitted to extend protection to others. 13 I m p o r t a n t , also, in this connection is Article IV of the British convention of commerce and navigation of 1856, which declared t h a t British subjects might appoint natives as brokers, f a c t o r s , or agents (scmsars), but t h a t "those persons who shall be thus employed, and who are subjects of the S u l t a n of Morocco, shall be treated and regarded as other subjects of the Moorish dominions." 14 Here one finds the explicit renunciation of the protection of natives employed by nonofficial British subjects. T h e Spanish t r e a t y of commerce with Morocco of the year 1861 t r e a t s of protection in terms practically identical with those found in the British treaties of 1856, there being no divergence in principle. 15 I t was the French t r e a t y with Morocco made in 1767, t h a t stated the right of protection in its broadest terms. In view of the most-favored-nation clauses found in the treaties of other states with Morocco, the provisions of this t r e a t y are of the greatest significance. 16 Article I I of this t r e a t y contained the following statement: ". . . Those who are in the service of conu

British and Foreign State Papers, XLVI, 176-87.

"Ibid., X L V I , 188-95. M Jerönimo Becker y Gonzalez, Tratados, Convenios y Acuerdos referentes a Marruecos y la Guinea espanola, 59-84, Article I I I and X L V I I . Articles X V and X L I V of this same treaty entitled Spain to claim most-favorednation privileges. Practice gave Spanish consuls and vice-consuls an additional prot6g6 for the custody of the funds of the customs intervention. A.S.M.S., Merry to the Sp. min. of st., Tangier desp. 18, 24 Jan. 1872. " Unlike Great Britain and Spain, France had no general most-favorednation clause in a treaty with Morocco. Loose interpretation of Article V of this treaty, however, supplied this deficiency. Additional articles added to the French treaty in 1824 and 1825 in no way affected the provisions of the treaty of 1767 dealing with the matter of protection.

5

MOROCCO ΛΤ T H E

PARTING OF T H E

WAYS

suis, secretaries, interpreters, brokers or others, as well as in the service of merchants, shall not be hindered in their functions, and those of the country [ p a y s ] will be free from every tax and personal charge. . . . " i r B y way of recapitulation, it should be noted here that the Moorish government by treaty recognized two classes of proteges: those natives employed by diplomatic and consular officers, and those in the service of foreign merchants. The statement of this right was couched in very general terms in the French treaty, there being no restrictions placed upon the number of proteges of either category. Nor was freedom in choosing proteges otherwise limited. Protected persons were to enjoy immunity from taxation and were not to be "hindered in their functions," which implied a certain degree of exemption from local authority. The exemption of proteges from Moorish court jurisdiction on the same basis as foreign nationals, stated in the British treaty of 1791, but subsequently not repeated, and found in neither the French nor Spanish treaties, continued nevertheless to exist in practice. Proteges, moreover, were not required to perform military service. Describing conditions existing at the time of his arrival at Tangier in 1845, the British representative H a y declared that as "very few Europeans . . . resided at the outports, the system of giving protection to the natives was certainly not made an abuse of as it now is, and the Moorish Government may also at that time have overlooked cases . . . from the rarity of their occurrence." 18 In fact, there appears to have existed no question of protection prior to the drafting of the important, British commerical treaty of 1856, which resulted in an appreciable increase in the number of European merchants engaged in trade with Morocco. The relationship between the development of commerce and the extension of the protection system is an obvious one. Demands for commercial reforms on the part of the Europeans from the very beginning, one finds, were met " F. Roi'ard de Card, Traitis de la France avec lex pays de l'Afrique Xord, pp. 320-26. "A.B.L.T., Ilav to Malmesbury, Tangier desp. 1G, 17 May 1859.

6

du

SYSTEM OF PROTECTION

IS ESTABLISHED

by counter proposals for a curtailment of the protection system on the p a r t of the shereefian government. Even before the negotiations for the t r e a t y of 1856 were concluded, H a y reported 1 6 t h a t the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs had announced that as soon as the t r e a t y was drafted the sultan proposed making certain changes in the system of protection. The Moors hoped t h a t the British Government would agree to limit the number of proteges t h a t a consular official might protect to an interpreter and a gatekeeper, all other servants being subjected to the laws of the country. H a y , expressing surprise at this suggestion, asked to be cited a "single case of abuse" of such protection by him or his colleagues. At that time he reckoned the total number of protected persons at not over 400. The Moorish minister held t h a t in recent years some of the consular agents of the coast had granted protection to all sorts of persons, pretending t h a t they were interpreters, servants, or commercial agents, and declared that the sultan's officials were hardly able to perform their police duties for fear of infringing upon the privileges of the consular officers. By 1859 H a y was ready to admit the existence of abuses. In the spring of t h a t year he sent out a circular letter 2 0 to his subordinates on the coast, referring to the complaints of the Moorish government of undue interference with native authorities in exercising legitimate jurisdiction over native subjects. British consuls were instructed to protect only those persons who were entitled to protection under the terms of the British treaty, whether their foreign colleagues observed these limits or not. In cases involving native p a r t n e r s or agents of British merchants when British property was threatened, consuls were authorized, however, to employ their good offices. Also, if they had good reason to believe t h a t the servant of a British subject was being discriminated against merely because of having served a Christian, they were instructed to warn the local authorities t h a t unless justice were done the matter would "Ibid., Hay to Clarendon, Tangier desp. 11, 19 Feb. 1856. "A.B.L.T., enclosed in Hay's despatch to Malmesbury, No. 43, 1 May 1869.

7

MOROCCO

AT T H E

PAETING

OF T H E

AVAYS

be callcd t o the p e r s o n a l a t t e n t i o n of the s u l t a n . In o r d e r t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e desire of t h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t t o u p h o l d t h e independence of the s u l t a n ' s a u t h o r i t y over his own subj e c t s " a t a moment when he h a s m a n y a n d j u s t g r o u n d s t o comp l a i n of t h e u n j u s t i f i a b l e e n c r o a c h m e n t of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s u p o n his p r e r o g a t i v e as a n independent sove r e i g n , " a c o p y of this c i r c u l a r was s u b m i t t e d t o the Maghzen. I n t h i s same y e a r , H a y w r o t e a g a i n u p o n this s u b j e c t , in the following l a n g u a g e : These abuses have been rapidly increasing during the last three years, and will ere long render all Government in this country impossible, unless Foreign Governments impose on their agents such restrictions as will effectively check them. . . . If it becomes an established rule that all Moorish subjects in the employment of Europeans are to be protected by the consulate of the latter, need}' Europeans will flock to this country and earn their livelihood by becoming sleeping partners of Moorish farmers, and, by procuring for the latter the protection of the consulate to which he [sic] is subject, freeing him [iic] from taxation, from military service, and from native jurisdiction. 2 1 T h e F r e n c h and S p a n i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a p p e a r t o h a v e been t h e chief p e r p e t r a t o r s of the a b u s e s r e f e r r e d to. I t was t h e p e r i o d immediately p r e c e d i n g t h e S p a n i s h - M o r o c c a n w a r of 1 8 5 9 - 6 0 , when the relations of these two g o v e r n m e n t s were daily g r o w i n g worse. T h e S p a n i s h d i p l o m a t i c a g e n t a t T a n g i e r s o u g h t t h r o u g h a wide extension of p r o t e c t i o n , especially t o t h e Jews, t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e force of his a r g u m e n t s with t h e M o r o c c a n g o v e r n m e n t . D i s t u r b e d by the c o u r s e of events, the B r i t i s h gove r n m e n t t h r o u g h its minister a t M a d r i d complained of t h e p r a c tice. 2 2 R e a s s u r a n c e s were received, b u t the o u t b r e a k of w a r in O c t o b e r f o u n d the question of p r o t e c t i o n still u n s e t t l e d . W h e n in t h e summer of 1 8 6 0 r e g u l a r d i p l o m a t i c i n t e r c o u r s e between the two g o v e r n m e n t s w a s resumed, one of the first m a t t e r s t o which Senor M e r r y , t h e new S p a n i s h minister a t T a n g i e r , " Ibid., H a y to Russell, desp. 4, 12 Jan. 1860. "Ibid., H a y to Malmesbury, desp. 44, 13 May 1859; A.S.M.S., Merry to the Sp. min. of st., Tangier desp. 10, 26 June 1860.

8

S Y S T Κ.Μ

OF

PROTECTION

IS

KSTAHl.ISHKD

turned his attention was the question of protection. 2 3 A s a result of a careful investigation he found that, down t o the year 1859, the maximum number of Hebrews under Spanish protection in all parts of M o r o c c o had been 90. F r o m M a r c h of that year to the declaration of war in October, 763 more were entered on the consular registers, " i n their greater p a r t , the worst of their class." 24 H i s predecessor had justified this abusive extension of protection on the ground that the French gave protection to all the agents of their merchants, and that the British, as he alleged, afforded irregular protection to l a r g e numbers of natives in the vicinity of T a n g i e r , more especially to the agents of British merchants. 25 M e r r y , whose principal aim was to maintain Spanish prestige and influence in M o r o c c o at the high point that it had attained as a result of the war, was convinced that the retention of this g r e a t number of Jewish proteges would give rise to innumerable difficulties with the M o r o c c a n government. In his opinion the judicious use of protection in special cases with a definite o b j e c t and applied to prominent and influential natives might be of g r e a t value to Spain, but if lavishly and indiscriminately granted its effect would be wasted and its obj e c t defeated. H a v i n g appealed to his government f o r instructions, he was authorized 2 6 to make such revisions in his lists of proteges as he deemed expedient. Within a few months' time the names of more than 800 individuals were crossed off. 27 T h e Moorish government duly expressed its gratitude at this action. In this same period the British minister pressed the sultan to raise the ban on the exportation of wool. T h e latter refused, 23

A.S.M.S., M e r r y to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 10, 26 June 1860.

34

The

figures

given here do not include the members of their

families

who also e n j o y e d protection. " A . S . M . S , M e r r y to the Sp. min. of st„ desp. 131, 30 July 1803: ". . . I found inscribed on the register of prot6g«s of the Consulate General very many H e b r e w s , because Sr. Don Juan Blanco del V a l l e , in order to counterbalance the unlimited extension which the British agents w e r e g i v i n g de and de jure

facto

to protection, and in order to combat the pressure which by this

means they exorcised, f e l t it to be necessary to include in it all that asked f o r it, regardless of their antecedents." " A.S.M.S., royal o r d e r to M e r r y , Madrid, 11 Sept. 1860. 77

Ibid., M e r r y to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 131, 30 Jul. 1863.

9

MOEOCCO AT T H E PAETING OF T H E

WAYS

giving as one of his main reasons the abusive manner in which protection was being extended by foreign merchants, particularly the French.2® Abuses were declared to be increasing in proportion to the extension of trade. Justice was being thwarted, robbery was on the increase, and the a u t h o r i t y of the sultan was consequently being undermined. Commenting upon these charges, the British minister reported t h a t "British Vice-Consuls have in private communications frequently alluded to the pretensions of foreign consular officers, more especially the French, to g r a n t protection without discrimination to every one with whom they may have commercial dealings or who they may choose to call their agents or dependents." 2 8 In view of this situation, H a y asked his government whether, if foreign representatives could not be induced to desist from irregular practices, it would not be necessary for him to claim similar privileges for British subjects, who were already complaining of the difficulties they were experiencing in competing with foreign merchants whose agents enjoyed protection. The most serious aspect of the situation, however, from H a y ' s point of view, was t h a t abusive protection was threatening to defeat British efforts to improve trade and the general condition of affairs in Morocco. In a letter addressed to his minister of foreign affairs a t Tangier a short time before this, the sultan had declared t h a t it would be better to end all trade, thereby discouraging E u r o p e a n s from coming to Morocco t h a n t h a t the "growing evil" should finally destroy all government in the country. No action of a hostile nature, however, was taken a t this time. Instead, the sultan instructed his foreign minister a t Tangier to consult H a y M as to the best course for him to follow in communicating the content of his letter to the other foreign representatives. In view of the crisis existing in Spanish-Moroccan relations, the British minister advised delay. B u t once the situation had cleared up H a y advised the Moroccan minister to issue a circular note addressed to the various " A.B.L.T., Hay to Malmesbury, desp. 46, 17 May 1889. " N o better reply can be made to the charge that the British representatives were guilty of serious abuses of the right of protection than to point to the attitude of the Moroccan government which consistently turned to the British diplomatic agent for advice and support in the matter.

10

SYSTEM

OF

PROTECTION

IS

ESTABLISHED

foreign representatives, exposing the abuses of the system of protection in moderate and friendly terms, and requesting them to refer the m a t t e r to their respective governments in an effort to find the proper remedies. H a y f u r t h e r recommended t h a t the Moorish government should ask each of the foreign consular officials in the country to submit a list of all native subjects to whom he had extended protection. Being on the point of dep a r t i n g for England, the British representative requested t h a t no steps should be taken in this "grave and i m p o r t a n t " matter until a f t e r his return. 2 4 In a personal interview which H a y had at London with L o r d Russell, then foreign minister, the question of irregular and abusive protection was discussed. 30 Emphasizing the i n j u r y resulting to British commerce under existing conditions, H a y requested t h a t he be instructed to demand equal privileges for British nationals if other foreign representatives in Morocco continued their irregular practices. H e expressed serious doubts as to whether the French government were interested in aiding the sultan to strengthen his government or in increasing the commerce of Morocco. In case of expansion of Anglo-Moroccan t r a d e the British public would become more vitally interested in the welfare of t h a t country " a n d therefore they would be more disposed to support His M a j e s t y ' s Government when it was disposed to act energetically to check the ambitious schemes of F r a n c e in t h a t quarter." 3 1 In view of the friendly relations then existing between the governments of F r a n c e and Great Britain, the British representative suggested that it might facilit a t e the solution of the question "if some friendly communication could be made by Your Lordship to the French Government on the s u b j e c t . " At the same time he intimated t h a t if French consular officers and merchants persisted in abusing their protection rights, British subjects, who were f a r more numerous in Morocco, would be permitted to do likewise, and, there" A . B . L . T . , Memorandum of interview between Lord Russell and H a y dated 15 Aug. 1859, on the subject of the latter's desp. 46, 17 May 1859, respecting irregularities of foreign consular officers and merchants in Morocco in the matter of protection. " Ibid., H a y to Russell, Richmond Hill, 16 Aug. 1859.

11

MOROCCO

AT

THE

PARTING

OF T H E

WAYS

f o r e , " B r i t i s h authority would become supreme in M o r o c c o . " U p o n his return to M o r o c c o , H a y succeeded in inducing the sultan to permit the exportation of wool f o r the period of one y e a r , but this concession was made only on condition that the abuses should be discontinued by the French and others who had practised them.32 Meanwhile the government at P a r i s , complying with a request received f r o m London, instructed its representative at T a n g i e r in the desired sense, and the latter assured the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs of his intention t o issue instructions immediately to his subordinates throughout the country to desist from all irregular practices. L i k e his Spanish colleague, however, the French representative was not behindhand in charging H a y with irregularities in the matter of protection. T h i s was the subject of a note submitted to the foreign office by the French

verbale

ambassador. 83

T h i s communication alleged that the British agent had extended protection to whole villages of natives. I n self-defense H a y maintained that

the total

number

of

British proteges

numbered

slightly more than 30 individuals, 34 all of whom had been duly reported to the Moorish foreign minister. A t

the same time

he admitted that he had thousands of friends among the peasa n t r y of northern M o r o c c o , many of whom accompanied him on his frequent hunting parties. Such natives were, however, according to his contention, entirely under Moroccan jurisdiction, being exempt neither f r o m taxation nor the performance of services. F r o m the local governor down, H a y declared, Moorish authorities attributed to him much greater influence with the sultan than he in f a c t possessed, and f o r this reason they respected and feared him. T h e mere knowledge on the p a r t of a Moorish official that a certain peasant was a friend or acquaintance of his sufficed to protect such an individual from injustice. R a r e l y , and only in extreme cases, did he exert his good offices in behalf of an unprotected native. I n reply to a statement of the French ambassador that the right of g i v i n g protection to de" A . B 1 . T . , H a y to Russell, desp. 40 ( ? ) , 15 Ort. 1859. "Ibid., Hay to Russell, desp. 4, 12 Jan. I860. " T h i s figure obviously did not include the families of prot6g£s.

12

SYSTEM

OF

PROTECTION

IS

ESTABLISHED

pendents of F r e n c h s u b j e c t s was not accorded by t r e a t y b u t was one acquired t h r o u g h usage, 3 5 H a y observed: . . . Some years ago when there were very few British merchants and only one or two French merchants [residing in Morocco], these irregularities may have been overlooked, though I am certain that foreign consuls never assumed at that time the right in question for the purpose of controlling or limiting the action or powers of the Moorish authorities as they have done during the last three years, but, be that as it may, what did not then appear to be injurious to the Government of the Country, when there were scarcely ten European merchants on the coast, is far different now that there are upwards of 700 European traders in the Empire. . . . As a check upon the c o n s u l a r officers, the British agent p r o posed t h a t a t each p o r t a list, signed a n d sealed by the consul, of the native s u b j e c t s p r o t e c t e d by him should be annually submitted to the chief M o o r i s h a u t h o r i t y of his place of residence, t h a t a copy of the list should be f o r w a r d e d to his chief a t T a n gier, and t h a t all M o o r i s h s u b j e c t s except those named in t h a t list should be considered s u b j e c t to no o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n t h a n t h a t of the local a u t h o r i t i e s . Despite the r e t r e n c h m e n t s t h a t were made in the system of p r o t e c t i o n d u r i n g the period of 1 8 5 9 - 6 0 , irregularities persisted. T h e decrepit s t a t e of the M o o r i s h government seemed to render abuses inevitable. P r o t e g e s m a n a g e d somehow to secure p r o t e c tion f o r their friends, a n d the S p a n i s h c h a r g e d ' a f f a i r e s in J u l y 1862 predicted the end of the s u l t a n ' s a u t h o r i t y , especially a t T a n g i e r , if such p r a c t i c e s continued. 3 9 Problems of p r o t e c t i o n were also beginning t o give rise to vexatious differences between the v a r i o u s foreign r e p r e s e n t a tives. F o r instance, a Moorish l a b o r e r employed b y a Spanish s u b j e c t did an i n j u r y t o a native l a b o r e r employed by a B r i t i s h s u b j e c t . T h e l a t t e r r e t a l i a t e d by flogging him. N e i t h e r of t h e two natives concerned was entitled to foreign p r o t e c t i o n , yet the 85 Protection by the French treaty of 1767 was conceded to the native servants of consuls and merchants only. M A.S.M.S., Diosdado (eh. d'aff.) to the Sp. niin. of St., Tangier desp. 197, 6 Jul. 1862.

13

MOROCCO AT T H E PABTING OF T H E WAYS

Moorish authorities would not intervene for fear of mixing into the affairs of proteges. The governor of Tangier complained to the Moroccan foreign minister t h a t if this s t a t e of affairs continued he would be compelled to inform the sultan of his inability to govern the province. In the case here cited justice would not have been done had not the Spanish and British ministers made a special effort to come to an understanding. In the handling of this case they mutually declared as a matter of principle t h a t only those natives were to be recognized as proteges who had the right to it by t r e a t y stipulation, and who were directly accorded this status by one of the legations a t Tangier. Should any other nation, however, admit the principle t h a t its proteges could extend protection to others, in turn, both the British and Spanish representatives declared that thcv would have to claim the same privilege. 38 This declaration met with the approval of the Spanish minister of state, who instructed the Spanish charge a t Tangier to bring about a meeting of the diplomatic corps and to point out to them the mutual advantages to be derived from confining protection to these limits. 37 H a y unhesitatingly endorsed this proposal, expressing the belief t h a t the other foreign representatives would do likewise.38 I t was decided, however, to await the arrival of the newly appointed French minister before taking f u r t h e r action. 38 In the spring of 1863, Sir John H a y went on a mission to the Moorish court, then at Marrakesh. 4 0 Among the requests made by H a y in his private interview with the sultan was t h a t British subjects be permitted to rent land from either the Moroccan government or its subjects for the purpose of cotton culture. 41 He emphasized the great profits which Morocco would derive from the development of this new industry. The sultan, however, declined to concede the request, observing t h a t all the " Ibid., royal o r d e r to Diosdado, 227, 30 J u l . 1862. M Ibid., Diosdado to the Sp. rain, of st., desp. 236, 23 Aug. 1862. "Ibid., M e r r y to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 131, 30 J u l . 1863. " A.B.L.T., H a y to Russell, desp. 24, 28 A p r . 1863. 11 I t should be noted t h a t this was t h e period of the American Civil W a r when there was a g r e a t shortage of r a w cotton in E n g l a n d d u e to the Union blockade of the C o n f e d e r a t e ports.

14

SYSTEM

OF

PROTECTION

IS

ESTABLISHED

other foreign representatives at Tangier would claim the same or an equivalent privilege. Since some of them continued to abuse the right of protection, such a concession would surely lead to an extension of the irregularities complained of. Already, he declared, not only his governors in the coastal towns, but also the chiefs in the interior, were complaining of the difficulties they were experiencing in governing his turbulent subjects, in view of the increasing number of proteges. Soon, he predicted, if the evils continued to flourish unchecked, his authorities would find themselves in the anomalous position of having to appeal to foreign tribunals established on Moorish soil to govern Moroccan subjects according to foreign laws and usages. He declared the intention of sending one of the chief officers of his court to Tangier with full power to act in concert with Cid Mohammed B a r g a s h , his foreign minister, in negotiations with the foreign representatives on this question. While expressing his approval of the plan, H a y counseled the sultan as a preliminary measure to issue peremptory orders to the local Moorish functionaries not to molest natives in the employ of E u r o peans. T h e y should be especially careful in dealing with persons of this class, and under no circumstances should the property of foreigners found in their hands be violated. The sultan assured him t h a t adequate measures would be taken to safeg u a r d the interests of Europeans. Before taking leave of the sultan H a y submitted a written declaration setting forth the principles which his government was resolved to observe in the matter of protection. By taking independent action in this way, H a y incurred the hostile criticism of some of his colleagues who favored collective action. 4 2 H a y ' s move was probably inspired primarily by the desire to curry favor with the sultan. Besides, he was willing to make greater concessions in the direction of meeting the desires of the Moroccan government than was either his French or Spanish colleague. 42 Merry, upon hearing of Hay's declaration, expressed regret. In his opinion the importance of the question called for the concerted action of Great Britain, France and Spain. A.S.M.S., Merry to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 131, 30 Jul. 1863.

15

MOROCCO A T T H E

PARTING

OF T H E

WAYS

T h e Spanish minister also p a i d a visit t o the c o u r t of

the

sultan s h o r t l y a f t e r H a y ' s departure. 4 3 A g a i n the question of protection entered into the discussions. Sefior M e r r y the willingness of his government

expressed

to comply with the desires

of the sultan, but at the same time he asked t h a t a Spanish comp a n y be conceded the r i g h t t o g r o w

cotton in the region of

T e t u a n . N o agreement resulted. Soon a f t e r this H a d j i D r i s Ben D r i s , a special agent of the sultan, a r r i v e d a t T a n g i e r with instructions t o open

negotia-

tions with the diplomatic corps in this matter. Meanwhile, however, a fresh dispute had arisen between the Spanish and B r i t ish legations 4 4 which f o r a time threatened to render f u t i l e the proposed negotiations. D u r i n g an absence of Sir John H a y f r o m M o r o c c o the S p a n ish minister, a c t i n g on behalf of a Spanish s u b j e c t , l o d g e d a claim with the M o o r i s h

authorities against a s u b j e c t of

the

sultan, a captain in the M o o r i s h a r m y and a d m i n i s t r a t o r of all the r u r a l p r o p e r t i e s of the sultan in the neighborhood of T a n gier. T h e British charge d'affaires, hearing of the demand, p r o tested that the M o o r in question was a British p r o t e g e , basing this contention upon the f a c t t h a t several months earlier

the

l a t t e r had entered into an a g r i c u l t u r a l p a r t n e r s h i p with him. T h e M o r o c c a n authorities, however, had repeatedly t h a t no employees of the sultan should be g r a n t e d

requested protection,

and this principle had been accepted b y the heads of all the l e g a tions at T a n g i e r . F u r t h e r m o r e , a t the time he first received notice of it, the M o r o c c a n f o r e i g n minister had refused t o r e c o g nize the v a l i d i t y of the p r o t e c t i o n extended in this case.

The

British agent argued t h a t the native was p r o t e c t e d in his p r i v a t e a f f a i r s only, and not as r e g a r d s his responsibilities in the capaci t y of a public servant of the sultan. A d o p t i n g a c o n t r a r y view, M e r r y held t h a t such a distinction could not be maintained in p r a c t i c e . I f the sultan, f o r example, should come to feel t h a t his interests were being defrauded and should decide t o obtain satis" Ibid,, Merry to the Sp. min. of st., confid. desp. 100, 4 June 1863. "Ibid., Merry to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 131, 30 Jul. 1863; desp. 132, 30 Jul. 1863. 16

SYSTEM

OF

PROTECTION

IS

ESTABLISHED

faction of the custodian of his properties, the B r i t i s h agent, he believed, would see himself obliged to intervene in behalf of his associate in order to p r o t e c t his own interests. T h e Spanish minister observed t h a t he might, by making use of the same argument, take over as protege the governor of T a n g i e r or even the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs. M e r r y , with reason, declared that there was little point in entering into fresh agreements with the Moorish government if old established ones were to be so lightly held. Nevertheless negotiations between the Moroccan agents and the Spanish and F r e n c h ministers were entered into and brought to a successful close. T h e results were embodied in two separate but identical notes addressed to the special commissioner of the sultan bv the F r e n c h and Spanish representatives, respectively dated 19 and 2 0 August 1 8 6 3 . 4 5 Subsequently H a d j i D r i s submitted the terms of the agreement to the representatives of Belgium, Sardinia, the United S t a t e s , G r e a t B r i t a i n , and SwedenNorway, requesting their concurrence. All approved, apparently without feeling the necessity of a special reference to their respective governments. 4 " Commenting upon this agreement, M e r r y assured his government t h a t all the interests of Spain were guaranteed, and t h a t in fixing a limit to protection, " . . . we are following the line of political conduct most expedient. . . . All the bases pro" A.S.M.S., Merry to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 153, 27 Aug. 1863. The true character of these instruments should be carefully noted here. In the period of 1877-80, the binding force of these agreements was called into question by the opponents of non-consular protection. Their antagonists on the other hand sought to increase the importance of the notes of 1863 by referring to them as conventions. Their humble origin and nature do not justify a higher term than administrative agreements. Being such, it appears that they might be terminated at the will of either party without thereby giving cause for very serious complain. "Ibid. The British chargS d'affaires, in the absence of his chief, is reported to have replied that he not only accepted these provisions as good, but insisted on the declaration made at Marrakesh in the month of April by Hay, in which the right of protection had been still further restricted. At a later date Hay, leading the party of reform bent upon overthrowing the agreement of 1863, denied that the British government had ever accepted the agreement. Strictly speaking, this was true.

17

MOROCCO AT T H E P A S T I N G OF T H E

WAYS

posed . . . are the fruit of experience in the country and of the study of our interests in the present and f u t u r e . " Wherein did the terms of the agreement of 1863 differ from the system of protection as defined by existing t r e a t y stipulations? 47 I t recapitulated or codified most of what had gone before, modifying certain features, elaborating upon others. Protection was declared to be individual and temporary. I t covered, however, the wives and children of a protege dwelling under the same roof. At most, it was to last during a lifetime. 48 Two classes of proteges were recognized 49 : natives employed by the various legations and foreign consular authorities 6 0 ; and those employed as factors, brokers, or semsars, by foreign merchants for their commercial affairs. T h e quality of merchant was recognized only to one engaged in wholesale importation or exportation, whether in his own name or as the commercial agent of another. The number of native semsars or agents t h a t might be protected was limited to two for each commercial house. In case a house had various branches located in more than one p o r t it was entitled to two for each factory. 8 1 Natives employed by or associated with foreign subjects in agricultural pursuits as herders or farm laborers were not entitled to protection. 8 2 However, in order to safeguard E u r o p e a n p r o p e r t y interests against possible i n j u r y , this class of the sultan's subjects were not to be prosecuted by native authorities without prior notice " S e e the text of this agreement in De Clereq, Recueil des Traitis

de la

France, XV, 472-73. β In the single case of the Benchimol family, which had long supplied the French legation at Tangier its interpreters, protection was to be hereditary. * Note that no mention is made of a third class of prot6g6s existing at this time, but not formally recognized until the convention of Madrid, i.e., natives who received protection in return for special services rendered to the foreign powers. " T h e number of natives that a foreign minister, chargi d'affaires, or consul-general might employ and protect was unlimited by treaty; the British and Spanish treaties, however, limited the number of protected employees of consular officials to one interpreter, a guard, and two domestics. " It will be recalled that the Franco-Moroccan treaty of 1767, which provided for native commercial agents, placed no limitation upon their number. This is not to say that foreign merchants could not engage and protect agriculturalists of the rural districts as their commercial agents.

18

SYSTEM

OF

PROTECTION

IS

ESTABLISHED

to the consular official concerned. T o insure the more efficient operation of the system of protection certain useful regulations were adopted. A list of all his proteges was to be submitted by each consular official to the local authorities, who were likewise to be notified of any changes t h a t might occur in the lists from time to time. E a c h protege was to be supplied with a card of protection bearing his name and indicating the nature of the services which entitled him to enjoy protection. These cards were to be issued only by the legations a t Tangier. 6 3 A systematic a t t e m p t had a t length been made to p u t an end to irregular protection. The effectiveness of the agreement of 1863 depended upon the good faith and vigilance of the foreign representatives a t Tangier. T h e immediate results of the agreement were salutary. Even before its completion, the Spanish minister asked his subordinate consular officers to submit to him their lists of proteges, giving the reason in each case for protection. 6 4 As soon as possible a copy of the agreement was sent to these officials, who were charged with seeing t h a t it was strictly observed, inasmuch as the Spanish government was resolved to execute the pact in complete good faith. T h e y were f u r t h e r instructed to observe closely the conduct of other foreign consuls in this matter and to rep o r t any irregularities without delay. 45 Sir John H a y adopted similar measures. He notified his subordinates of an agreement reached with the Spanish minister, whereby the consular officers of either nation might inspect the protege lists submitted by their colleague to the local governors whenever they chose to do so. They would be justified, moreover, in refusing to acknowledge the right of any other than the local authorities to exercise jurisdiction over Moroccan M The agricultural associates, though not prot£g£s, also were bearers of individual letters issued by consular authorities, who likewise kept the local authorities informed of the nature of their relationship with Europeans. " A r c h i v e s of the S p a n i s h Legation at Tangier (hereafter cited as A . S . L . T . ) , found at present at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Madrid, Merry t o Spanish consuls and vice-consuls in Morocco, circular letter of 21 Jul. 1863. "Ibid., Merry t o Spanish consuls and vice-consuls in Morocco, circular letter of 10 Sept. 1868.

19

MOROCCO A T T H E

P A R T I N G OF T H E

WAYS

subjects whose names did not appear on the lists. The British minister hoped to be able to come to a similar agreement with his other colleagues.56 The Jews were more deeply concerned in the question of protection than any other element of the native population. Endowed with a special aptitude for commerce and cruelly treated by their compatriots, they had a twofold motive for seeking foreign protection. The inevitable result was that they constituted a large percentage of the total number of proteges. The Jewish population of Morocco, variously estimated at from 200,000 to 300,000 souls, was in its greater part descended from Jews expelled from Spain and Portugal at the close of the fifteenth century. Although received and tolerated by the Moors, their position in Moroccan society in the nineteenth century was almost unbearable—this, despite the fact that as merchants and artisans they had made themselves virtually indispensable to the economic life of the country.57 Generally speaking, their situation was not greatly dissimilar to that which their race had occupied in western European countries during the Middle Ages. The fanatical mussulmans hated them for religious reasons and blamed them for many calamities. In commerce they were charged with usury and sharp business practices. Despised even more than Christians, and regarded as little better than beasts, they were compelled to live huddled together in filthy surroundings and degradation in a special quarter of each city called the mellah,68 Nor were they permitted to leave this pre" A.B.L.T., H a y to the British vice-consuls at the western ports, circular letter of 16 Dec. 1863. " Good accounts of the Moroccan Jew are found in the following: F. Ovilo Canales, "Estudios politico-sociales sobre Marruecos," Revista Contemporänea, X X X I I , (1881) 306-30; F. de A . Urrestarazu, " L a cuestion de Marruecos," Revista de Espana, 13 A p r . 1880, No. 291, 303-22; A. Beauniier (French consul at M o g a d o r ) , " L e Maroc," Bulletin de la Societc de Geographie de Paris, X I Y , (1867), 5-51; A.B.L.T., Memorandum by the Rev. Mr. L ö w y , Secretary of the Anglo-Jewish Association; United States Embassy Archives at Madrid (hereafter cited as U.S.E.A.M.), Papers Relating to Foreigners in Morocco, vol. I, Alliance Israelite Universelle, M6moire en faveur des Israelites marocains, addressed to M. de Freycinet, A p r i l 1880. ™ Only at Tangier and Mazagan were they allowed to live scattered among the other inhabitants.

20

SYSTEM

Of

PROTECTION

IS

ESTABLISHED

cinct a f t e r sunset. T o set them still f u r t h e r a p a r t from the moslem population, they were required to wear distinctive dress, nor might they c a r r y an umbrella or cane. Upon passing a mosque or meeting a dervish a Jew was obliged t o remove his shoes. If mounted on horseback he had to dismount. Always the preferred place had to be yielded to the Moor whom he passed in the street. Forbidden to c a r r y arms or to raise his hand against a Moslem, even in self-defense, except in case of violation of his home, the Hebrew was a constant object of abuse and indignity.5® N o r was his testimony legally valid. In case, however, he was invited to make a declaration before a court he was required to p r o s t r a t e himself humbly on the floor. Rarely did he receive justice in disputes with Mohammedans. Suffering severe penalties for their offenses, the Jews saw their persecutors escape with little or no punishment. Even the murder of an Israelite, a not infrequent occurrence, was not severely punished, if at all. According to a popular saying, a Mohammedan might kill as many as seven Jews with impunity. Contrary to what one might suppose, however, the Moroccan Jew did not f a r e so badly in the m a t t e r of taxation. H e paid a direct special t a x called the dchezia, which was levied collectively upon the Hebrew congregation and distributed by the synagogue according to the wealth of its members. Failure to pay, however, might lead the governor to issue orders for the sacking of the mellah. The Jews also were expected to make g i f t s (hadia) to the sultan on the occasions of the four great Moslem festivals. T h e consent of the sultan was necessary for marriage, and a g i f t in proportion to one's wealth was expected in return. A sort of corvee occasionally required Jewish women to make uniforms for the Moorish soldiers without remuneration for their services. " F . de A. Urresterazu, op. cit., pp. 303-22: "It frequently happens, for no reason at all, that they are mistreated by the boys, who stone them, cane them, claw them, bite them, pull their beards and commit upon them a thousand cruelties, without the Jews, strong though they may be, daring even to defend themselves, or to offer any resistance, fearing always . . . that they will be cast into jail for having dared to raise a hand against a son of the Prophet."

21

MOBOCCO A T T H E

PARTING

OF T H E

WAYS

A g r a d u a l amelioration of the position of the H e b r e w s was beginning t o be noticed b y 1875, especially in the p o r t s where contact was made with E u r o p e a n civilization. I t is also true that certain special privileges e n j o y e d b y the Israelites v e r y considerable. Of

these, exemption

from military

were

service

was not the least. M o r e o v e r , subdivided into their c o n g r e g a t i o n s , under the a u t h o r i t y of their rabbis, they e n j o y e d a g r e a t amount of local self-government. T h e s e religious men served as j u d g e s in cases of dispute between their own people, g i v i n g advice, settling disputes, and imposing punishments. T h e y

acted, more-

over, as intermediaries between the H e b r e w population and the local authorities of the sultan, and p r o v i d e d alms and medical assistance

for

their

poor.

They

also

supervised

education.

T h o u g h debarred f r o m e n g a g i n g in agriculture, and not permitted to possess land outside the mellah,

Jews were f r e e t o en-

g a g e in commerce and industry on a f o o t i n g of equality with the Mohammedans. A s f o r the celebration of religious rites b y either Christian or Jew, the sultan of M o r o c c o and his M o h a m medan subjects displayed a g r e a t e r degree of toleration than did some of the c o n t e m p o r a r y governments and peoples of E u r o p e . Jews were allowed t o build synagogues f r e e l y within the

mellah,

nor was a n y opposition encountered in the performance of religious services therein. T h e i r burial rites were celebrated without interruption, and their cemeteries respected. W h i l e the rabbis were permitted freedom in p r o p a g a t i n g their religion among their own people, p r o s e l y t i z i n g a t t e m p t s on the p a r t of the M o hammedans were v i r t u a l l y unknown. 60 I n their oppressed state the Jews of M o r o c c o looked f o r supp o r t t o their fellow Israelites in E u r o p e , with whom they were in regular correspondence, and t o the E u r o p e a n representatives at T a n g i e r . Jewish organizations

at L o n d o n and P a r i s

were

especially active in the work of u p l i f t i n g their less f o r t u n a t e brethren in M o h a m m e d a n lands. A s e a r l y as 1860, the president of the Comite

Consistorial

Israelite

of P a r i s paid a visit to M o -

rocco with the o b j e c t of endeavoring " t o improve the political and social position of his coreligionists who he had heard were • A.B.L.T., Hay to Granville, desp. Ill, 24 June 1880.

22

SYSTEM OF PROTECTION IS ESTABLISHED in a v e r y abject and degraded state." H e sought to induce the sultan to issue firmans freeing them from certain humiliations f r o m which they suffered and insuring the Jewish population of T e t u a n against ill treatment by the Mohammedans when the Spanish evacuated the city. 6 1 T h e result of this mission does not a p p e a r in the diplomatic records of the period. A more notable e f f o r t was made four years later by Sir Moses Montefiore, a British subject. T h i s grew out of an appeal on the p a r t of the M o r o c c a n Jews f o r outside support. In the year 1863 the Spanish receiver in the customs house at Saffi died. I t was suspected that he had been poisoned by Jews. Accordingly, two Hebrews were barbarously executed f o r the crime without the least shadow of proof of guilt being adduced. T w o others were taken into custody and held. F e a r i n g a general massacre, the Jews sent out a cry f o r help. 62 Hence it was that Sir Moses was delegated by the Jewish consistories of Europe to undertake the difficult mission to the sultan's court at Marrakesh. 6 3 Montefiore 6 4 was well qualified for the task. A f t e r

having

amassed a large fortune as a stockbroker in London, Sir Moses retired from business at the age of f o r t y . H e set out to devote the remainder of his life to the welfare of his race. A l r e a d y his philanthropic activities had taken him on long and difficult missions to many lands—Palestine, E g y p t , T u r k e y , Russia, and Rumania. In the year 1840 he succeeded in obtaining from the sultan of T u r k e y a firman placing the Jews of the Ottoman E m pire on an equal f o o t i n g with other alien peoples. Visiting Constantinople again in the spring of 1863, he secured the confirmation

of this edict from a new sultan. When, late in the same

year, Montefiore undertook his Moroccan mission he was in his eighty-first year, but still a man of vigor. B e f o r e setting out from London he enlisted the support of the British

foreign

" Ibid.,

office, and

on

his

way

to

Morocco

passed

H a y to Russell, desp. 154, 2 July 1860. Tetuan was the principal

Moroccan city taken by the Spaniards in the w a r of 1859-60. MArchives

of

the

United

a f t e r cited as A.U.S.C.-O.T.), " A.8.M.S., * Dictionary

States

Consulate-General

at

Tangier

T a n g i e r desp. 16, 10 Jan. 18G4.

M e r r y t o the Sp. min. of St., desp. 227, 20 Dec. 1863. of National

Biography.

23

(here-

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS

through Madrid, obtaining there letters of introduction to the Spanish minister a t Tangier. He arrived a t Tangier toward the close of 1863 and, a f t e r having received promises of s u p p o r t from the Spanish representative, departed in the company of the British consul on the long and hazardous journey to the great) capital of the south. His real objective Sir Moses kept secret; until his arrival at Marrakesh. His companion, the British consul, supposed t h a t he wished merely to thank the sultan f o r the release of the two Jews imprisoned at Saffi, and to petition t h a t Jewish subjects in the f u t u r e be treated with more mercy and justice. 6 5 I t was with some surprise, therefore, t h a t lie learned t h a t Montefiore proposed asking the sultan t h a t in all matters connected with the administration of justice Jews and' Christians might be placed on an equal footing with Mohammedans. Though realizing t h a t such a reform as t h a t proposed: would run counter to deeply-rooted prejudices of the fanatical 1 Moroccan people, the British consul in a strong representation 1 addressed to court authorities, supported the petition of Monte- ; fiore.65 I The mission was successful. On 5 F e b r u a r y 1864, an imperial: edict was issued, ββ directing Moorish officials to see t h a t all Jews residing in the dominions of the sultan should . . . be treated by Our governors, administrators, and all other subjects, in manner conformable with the evenly balanced scales of justice, and that in the administration of the courts of law they [the J e w s ] shall occupy a position of perfect equality with all other people; so that not even a fractional portion of the smallest imaginable particle of injustice shall reach any of them, nor shall they be subjected to anything of an objectionable nature. Neither they [the authorities] nor anyone else shall do them [the J e w s ] wrong, whether to their persons or to their property. Nor shall any trades• A.B.L.T., Hay to Russell, desp. 16, 20 Feb. 1864, enclosing report of. Consul Reade to Hay on the Montefiore mission, dated Marrakesh, 7 Feb.; 1864. This shereefian edict was confirmed in 1874 by the new Sultan, Mnley Hassen. ** A.U.S.E.M., Papers Relating to Foreigners in Morocco, vol. 2, Speech of Iiis Excellency Don Antonio Cdnovas del Castillo, etc. (a pamphlet), Ixmdon, 1880.

24

SYSTEM

OF P R O T E C T I O N

IS

ESTABLISHED

man among them, or artisan, be compelled to work against his will. The work of everyone shall be duly recompensed, for injustice here is injustice in Heaven, and We cannot countenance it in any matter affecting either their [the Jews'] rights or the rights of others, Our own dignity being itself opposed to such a course. All persons in our regard have an equal claim to justice; and if any person should wrong or injure one of them we will, with the help of God, punish him. . . . Concerning the s u l t a n ' s edict, the British minister commented as follows: Taking into consideration the fanatical feelings of the Mohammedans of Morocco, more especially of the inhabitants of the inland towns, I am of opinion that the Sultan could not have granted greater concessions than he has done in this edict, for alleviating the grievances of his Jewish subjects without endangering his own position and, indeed, the safety of the Jews themselves. 65 As a s t a t e m e n t of principles and intentions the edict was all t h a t could have been expected. Ancient a n t i p a t h i e s , however, could not be e r a d i c a t e d f r o m the minds and h e a r t s of a f a n a t i c a l people by the mere flourish of a pen. T h e effectiveness of the decree depended u p o n the degree of earnestness with which the sultan enforced it. W o u l d cases of i n j u s t i c e be called to his a t tention? If so, would he be sufficiently inspired b y the s p i r i t of j u s t i c e to see t h a t persons responsible f o r them were punished? H o w f a r would he be able to go in the direction of defending his Jewish s u b j e c t s without undermining his own p r e s t i g e and j e o p a r d i z i n g their safety? 8 7 F o r m a n y y e a r s the a g e n t s of the foreign powers in M o r o c c o h a d f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n reasons interceded with the local a u t h o r i ties to prevent i n j u s t i c e s t o w a r d individuals of the Jewish race. Some of the representatives were p e r m a n e n t l y i n s t r u c t e d to do so. Despite the f a c t t h a t this p r a c t i c e had h a d the effect of " A.B.L.T., H a y to Russell, desp. 26, 2 May 1864. Before three months had elapsed, H a y reported new acts of tyranny and cruelty against this downtrodden race. H e expressed the belief that the edict had caused considerable dissatisfaction, especially among the governors and chiefs of the interior.

25

MOROCCO AT THE PARTING OF THE WAYS greatly ameliorating the situation in the coastal cities, there were those, among them the Spanish minister, who saw in it a menace to the independence of the country. F o r instance, in the fall of 1863, when Merry, the Spanish agent, learned from an intercepted British despatch of the instructions of L o r d Russell to the British minister at Tangier to use his good offices on behalf of the Hebrew race,*8 he interpreted these instructions to mean that the London Government were seeking to arrogate to their agents the very important right of intermeddling in the administration of justice in Morocco. This, he feared, would effectively place the whole Jewish population of the country under British protection. " I do not need to comment upon the gravity of these facts," wrote the Spanish minister. Soon afterwards news reached him from the Spanish consul at Saffi which seemed to confirm his fears. The consul reported that "other consular agents continue giving protection to whomsoever they please, and their subjects, likewise, to the people of the interior as well as the city, and the English vice-consul is the one who does it most publicly." H e then proceeded to tell how his British colleague had recently intervened in the case of an unprotected Jew not in the service of any European. T o the governor's query concerning his right to interfere, the consular official answered that he was instructed to intervene in order to prevent the commission of injustice. Merry, declaring his determination to allow no other foreign power to enjoy greater privileges in Morocco than Spain, forthwith authorized his consular officers to increase their solicitude in behalf of the Jews, taking advantage of every opportunity to prevent acts of cruelty and barbarism through intervention with the local authorities.' 9 " A.S.M.S., M e r r y to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 228, 21 Dec. 1863. " I n view of the position which Spain occupies in M o r o c c o since

"Ibid.,

the war, it is impossible t o admit that the consuls of other nations should have, with

respect

t o the authorities

of

this

country, rights

which

the

consuls of the Queen lack. . . . A s long as G r e a t Britain maintains the right of

intervening in the administration

of Moroccan justice w i t h respect t o

Hebrews, Spain and the other nations must also exercise the same right. "It

is true that as a result of

this practice the independence of

26

the

SYSTEM OF PBOTECTION

IS E S T A B L I S H E D

While the Moroccan Jews might well benefit from such zealous efforts on their behalf, the above illustration clearly indicates how a spirit of rivalry prevented one foreign representative from taking liberties without all his colleagues doing likewise. Serious danger l a y in the possibility that a misinterpreted action of one representative might lead his colleagues to perpetrate unjustified abuses, or that a minor abuse practised by one might evoke a more serious one by another. The Moroccan government itself lacked the stamina necessary to insure strict observance of treaty stipulations. For several years following the agreement of 1 8 6 3 it appears that Moorish authorities had slight cause for complaint. 10 In 1 8 6 8 Sir John H a y wrote, "Of late years, though the number of European merchants has greatly increased, there has been a considerable reduction in the number of protected Moorish subjects. . . ." 71 H e attributed this fact to the cooperation of the British and French legations in setting a high example for others by carefully supervising the activities of their subordinate consular officials. 72 Besides, they stood together in opposition to a sovereignty of the sultan is lessened; but in this, the traditional policy of Great Britain, so conservative in Morocco, suffers much more than the Spanish policy, since although Spain is very much interested in the territorial integrity of this Empire, she has not such a keen interest as England in seeing Morocco a strong, prosperous, and completely independent country." ™ A.S.M.S., Merry to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 18, 24 J a n . 1872. In this despatch, Merry states that during the eleven and a half years that he had served as Spanish minister at Tangier "there has been neither abuse nor any complaint in the matter of protection on the part of the local authorities." That this is an overstatement, however, is apparent from an examination of his own despatches. At least once, in a note to the Moorish foreign minister, 2 Jul. 1867, he complained of the great extension which some of the foreign agents were giving to protection with the knowledge of the native governors. Declaring that this situation constituted a palpable violation of the regulations of 1863, he advised that no longer would Spanish consuls be required to observe the stipulations of that agreement, but would be authorized to proceed in the matter of protection in the manner which they deemed most expedient for Spanish interests. Apparently, however, this threat was not carried out. ™ A.B.L.T., H a y to Stanley, desp. 41, 22 Sept. 1868. 72 Concerning the recent policy of the French Government In Morocco, Sir John H a y wrote: ". . . the French Government . . . has, of late years,

27

MOROCCO

AT T H E

PARTING

OF T H E

WAYS

new abuse t h a t had recently arisen: the practice of Moroccan subjects returning home as naturalized foreign subjects a f t e r a short period of residence abroad. T h e most serious incident connected with the question of protection arising during the period between the adoption of the agreement of 1863 and the Tangier conferences of 1877 was the Ducally case, which concerned primarily not G r e a t Britain, France, or Spain, but I t a l y . This case illustrates how questions of protection not only could endanger relations between Morocco and the foreign powers, but also how they might give rise to serious difficulties between the European governments represented a t Tangier. L a t e in the year 1869, it was learned t h a t Hamed Ducally, a well-to-do, fanatical, mischief-making Moor of the region of Tangier, was guilty of inciting the wild Anjerine tribesmen to violate the t e r r i t o r y of the Spanish possession of Ceuta. 7 3 Similar occurrences only ten years earlier had been a principal pretext for the Hispano-Moroccan war. Supplied with proof of Ducally's guilt, the Spanish minister demanded his punishment. The Moor was seized and imprisoned at Tangier. Though not himself a protege of any foreign power, his nephew, Mohammed Ducally, had some years before acquired Italian protection. This he had recently lost, however, when a new Italian representative at T a n gier became convinced t h a t he had received it irregularly. Leaving his p r o p e r t y in charge of his uncle, Mohammed went to Florence shortly before the opening of the case, and there became a naturalized I t a l i a n subject. Cid Mohammed Bargash, the Moorish minister of foreign affairs, had been duly apprised of the fact. H e had, however, on acknowledging the communication of the I t a l i a n representative, stated his uncertainty as to whether international law justified the practice of a Moor becoming a naturalized foreign subject a f t e r a few months' residence abroad and returning as such to his native land. Conshown much forbearance in its dealings with the Government of Morocco, and a desire to avoid the commission of any act which might affect injuriously the Sultan as an independent sovereign. . . ." Ibid. " J . B6cker ν Gonzales, Historia de Marruecos, p. 301. Also, A.B.L.T., H a y to Clarendon, desp. 87, 22 Dec. 1869.

28

SYSTEM

OF

PROTECTION

IS

ESTABLISHED

s i d e r i n g the case as possibly a d a n g e r o u s p r e c e d e n t , he reserved m a k i n g a definitive reply f o r a f u t u r e occasion. 7 4 U p o n h e a r i n g of the D u c a l l y case the s u l t a n ordered t h a t he be sent to Fez f o r imprisonment. T h e p r i s o n e r was a c t u a l l y en r o u t e under m i l i t a r y escort when Scovasso, the I t a l i a n repres e n t a t i v e , absent f r o m T a n g i e r on a h u n t i n g expedition, first h e a r d of the s u l t a n ' s o r d e r s . H e was able, nevertheless, t o overt a k e the p a r t y , and t h r o u g h violent speech a n d action t o cause its r e t u r n t o T a n g i e r . 7 5 T h i s p r o c e d u r e , justified by Scovasso on t h e g r o u n d s of defense of a n a t i o n a l ' s p r o p e r t y interests, was considered by B a r g a s h an o u t r a g e a g a i n s t the sovereign r i g h t s of t h e sultan. U n d e r p r e s s u r e f r o m the S p a n i s h government, which demanded t h a t D u c a l l y be sent to Fez in a c c o r d a n c e with the s u l t a n ' s command, B a r g a s h directed l e t t e r s t o the foreign r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p r o t e s t i n g a g a i n s t the high-handed action of the I t a l i a n a g e n t . H a y was of the opinion t h a t if the event were allowed to p a s s without some amends being made t o the M o r o c c a n government it would have the result of f u r t h e r seriously diminishing the s u l t a n ' s p r e s t i g e in the eyes of his s u b j e c t s . T h e F r e n c h minister likewise, held this view. A few d a y s l a t e r , u p o n the express o r d e r s of the sultan, D u c a l l y was sent t o Fez,7® and t h e r e b y the question with Spain was settled. 7 7 Scovasso, however, was very i n d i g n a n t , considering t h e action t a k e n by the M o r o c c a n government, despite his p r o t e s t s to the c o n t r a r y , an insult t o his c o u n t r y . Accordingly he hauled down his flag, suspending all official relations pending i n s t r u c t i o n s from his home government. 7 8 " A . B . L . T . , White ( B r i t i s h charge 4, 19 Jan. 1870.

d'affaires)

to Clarendon, T a n g i e r desp.

"Ibid., H a y to Clarendon, desp. 87, 22 D e e . 1869. ' Ibid., W h i t e to Clarendon, desp. 2, 27 D e c . 1809. 71 This incident w a s particularly e m b a r r a s s i n g in S p a n i s h - I t a l i a n relations, f o r at this very time S p a i n w a s n e g o t i a t i n g f o r an Italian c a n d i d a t e for the Spanish throne and w i s h e d not to displease R o m e . 7

78

Α.Β.Ι,.'Γ., White t o Clarendon, desp. 1, 7 J a n . 1870. In regard to the hauling down of the Italian flag, S c o v a s s o d e c l a r e d to his B r i t i s h colleague that "this w a s not a m a t t e r to which i m p o r t a n c e should be a t t a c h e d as he had not removed his flagstaff, but s i m p l y l o w e r e d his flag as a mark of his dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Moorish minister."

29

MOBOCCO A T T H E

PASTING

OF T H E

WAYS

In the negotiations which followed, extending over a period of several months, the French and British governments cooperated with the Spanish to reach a peaceful settlement of the question, consistent with the dignity of Morocco as a sovereign state. Finally, through the mediation of the Spanish government, 79 the affair was adjusted. I t was agreed that Merry, as mediator, should assure the Moorish government that neither the Italian government nor its representative had wished to act in a manner injurious to the independence of the sultan or to question his right to govern his own subjects, or to interfere in any dispute between Morocco and another power. The Moorish foreign minister was to acknowledge receipt of certain unanswered communications received from the Italian representative months before, without discussing their contents, and was to make suitable proposals for a partition of the property of the two Ducallvs. Friendly relations were resumed, when, in the month of September 1870, an Italian frigate visited Tangier. Salutes were exchanged with the batteries of the town, the Italian flag was hoisted again over the legation, and visits were exchanged by the Italian representative and the Moorish authorities. This case, together with other questions rising out of irregular protection in the period, caused the sultan to direct Bargash to draw up a set of regulations to be observed by foreign agents in Morocco with respect to Moroccan subjects who might have obtained letters of naturalization or passports from foreign governments, or who were in the employment of foreigners residing in Morocco. 8 0 Bargash confidentially submitted to the British and French ministers copies of a set of proposed regulations which had been drafted after previous consultation with Sir John H a y . These embraced all the concessions that had been granted in the treaties between Morocco and the powers, and all arrangements that had subsequently been entered into with the foreign representatives, designed to insure protection to native subjects in charge of property belonging to foreigners, '"Ibid., Hay to Clarendon, confld. desp. 1, 10 May 1870; desp. 3, 17 May 1870; Hay to Granville, desp. 22, 9 Sept. 1870. " Ibid., Hay to Granville, confld. desp. 20, 26 Aug. 1870.

80

SYSTEM OF PROTECTION IS ESTABLISHED

as well. Bargash hoped that these regulations would be adopted and put into force as soon as possible, in order to prevent erroneous conclusions being drawn from the case of Mohammed Ducallv who had finally been declared an Italian subject despite the remonstrances of the Moroccan government. H a y , who approved them, was hopeful that the French and British governments, which had with such success cooperated to combat irregular protection within recent years, might induce the other governments to accept the regulations. 81 The question of naturalization, however, was not settled at this time, on account of divergent views on the subject, and soon a general revival of irregular protection led to more determined measures to bring about a radical revision of the whole system. " Regarding the naturalization abuse, the British minister observed: "If the precedent is accepted that a Moorish subject can, after residing a short time in a foreign country (as has happened in the case of Mohammed Ducally), return to Morocco with letters of naturalization and be acknowledged as a foreign subject by the agent of the Power which granted the letters of naturalization, all Government in Morocco will be destroyed. . . . The Sultan would in a few years be sovereign solely over the labouring and poorer classes. The merchants and traders of his capitals and ports would become foreign subjects and competition might ensue amongst the representatives of the foreign governments who admitted such abuses as to who should collect the greatest number of Moors as the subjects of their respective governments." A.B.L.T.: Hay to Granville, confld. desp. 20, 26 Aug. 1870.

81

II

T H E SULTAN ASKS FOR R E L I E F H E COOPERATION

among the various foreign representatives at Tangier that followed the agreement of 1863 served for several years to check the growth of irregular protection. Commercial expansion during the decade of the '70s, however, brought with it a corresponding increase in the number of natives regularly protected and a revival of abusive protection. B y the year 1876 the situation had become serious. Cid Mohammed Bargash, the Moorish foreign minister, complained to Sir J o h n H a y t h a t the government of Morocco "could hardly go on if protection continued to progress in the same ratio as it has done during the last two years." 1

T

So f a r as the extension of regular protection 2 is concerned, the sultan could not question the right of the foreign powers to g r a n t it, even though it were extended to the point of i n j u r y . H e could only complain of its deleterious effects and request t h a t the right be restricted. On the other hand, in the matter of irregular protection, his right as an independent sovereign to demand the observance of t r e a t y stipulations was incontestable. The chief complaint of the sultan growing out of regular protection concerned semsars, or the native commercial agents of foreign merchants. N o t only was their rapidly increasing number a source of alarm, but also the fact t h a t they were frequently chosen from the wealthy and influential agriculturalists of the interior. 8 In accordance with local usage these Moroccan farmers and herdsmen were subject to call for service as country militiamen or police. In certain rural districts they constituted ' A.B.L.T., Hay to Derby, desp. 74, 27 June 1876. By regular protection is meant that which was conceded in accordance with treaty provisions or agreements. •This practice was not contrary to the provisions of the French treaty of 1767, nor to the terms of the agreement of 1863. It had, however, met with the consistent opposition of the Moorish authorities and had not until recently been greatly resorted to. 2

32

THK

SUI.TAX

ASKS FOR

BELIEF

the sultan's only force f o r maintaining order and enforcing the law. Another serious grievance was t h a t the exemption enjoyed by foreigners and their proteges from the payment of agricultural and gate taxes gave them an unfair advantage in competition with unprotected natives,·4 in addition to the resulting loss of revenue to the t r e a s u r y of the sultan. Since in other Mohammedan lands foreigners and proteges were subjected to these taxes, the sultan felt t h a t they should be required to p a y them in Morocco. Immunity of protected natives from local court jurisdiction not infrequently resulted in a miscarriage of j u s t ice,5 with the result that the prestige of the sultan's government was shaken in the minds of his subjects. The irregularities of the protege system may be grouped under four categories: ( 1 ) the unwarranted extension of protection over certain classes of Moroccan s u b j e c t s ; ( 2 ) irregular exemption from t a x a t i o n ; (3) officious interference in native courts of justice; and ( 4 ) the use of protection regularly obtained as a shield for c o r r u p t practices. I t should be observed first of all t h a t no class of foreign officials in Morocco, from the ministers at Tangier to the natives serving as consular agents in the smaller towns of the coast, was entirely innocent of extending irregular protection to natives in one way or another. As for ministers, charges d'affaires, and consuls-general, although the number of natives they might employ in official or private capacity was unlimited by t r e a t y provision, they sometimes abused their extensive privilege by granting protection in return for only nominal services. Moreover, the practice of g r a n t i n g protection in return for "special services" rendered to a foreign power, sanctioned only by usage, was capable of * In its origin the right of exemption from taxation probably referred only to personal taxes. At least, this was the contention of the British minister. As late as the British treaties of 1856, there were no foreigners engaged in agricultural pursuits in Morocco; hence, tax exemptions prior to that date in practice applied only to personal property. • A.B.I..T., Hay to Granville, com'l desp. 24, 13 Oct. 1880. Semsar» might commit robbery or murder in the interior and still could be arrested only by the foreign consular authority at the port where the merchant employing them resided. Often the port was three or four days distant from the scene of the crime.

33

MOROCCO A T T H E

P A R T I N G OF T H E

WAYS

serious abuse. Since custom placed no restriction upon the number who might for this reason receive protection, and also in view of the fact that the matter was generally left entirely to the discretion of the representatives at Tangier,® the surprising thing is that it was not more abused than it was. The Spanish representative not only claimed the exclusive right of protecting the ministers of the Catholic religion and their interests in Morocco, but also insisted upon granting the native interpreters and servants of churchmen the same degree of protection as those of diplomatic agents. 7 Natives who could be induced to embrace the Roman Catholic faith were likewise extended protection. 8 In general the diplomatic agents at Tangier were much less to blame for irregularities than were the consular agents in the ports to the south. The latter were frequently interested primarily in their private enterprises, receiving little by way of remuneratiorf for their consular services. Though the number of protected natives allotted to them was in most cases limited by treaty,® they were able, nevertheless, sometimes to protect others. Natives acting as foreign consular agents, who were denied the right of protecting their compatriots, occasionally managed to violate this ruling. Another serious irregularity was the abuse of naturalization, 'Sometimes a question of this nature was referred to the home government. For example, in 1876, the Spanish minister at Tangier recommended that special Spanish protection be granted to a Moorish officer of the Ceuta frontier who had j u s t been dismissed "because of the intimate and friendly relations which he has always maintained with the Spanish officials of Ceuta during the nine years he has filled his office." This request was rejected on the ground that protection had been "much abused" of late. If it developed subsequently that he were unjustly persecuted, the Spanish government then would extend him its protection. A.S.M.S., Romea to the Spanish min. of St., Tangier desp., 28 Oct. 1876; royal order to Romea, 6 Dec. 1876. * Ibid., Merry to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 18, 24 Jan. 1872. 'Ibid., Romea to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 125, 10 J u l y 1878; Diosdado to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 63, 5 May 1879. Almost no Mohammedans were converted to the Christian faith in Morocco. •The French treaty of 1767 was exceptional, setting no limit on the number of prot6g6s permitted consular officers.

84

THE

SULTAN

ASKS FOE

RELIEF

referred to previously in connection with Ducally case. 10 Moorish subjects, especially Jews, in the period following the agreement of 1863, began the practice of going to neighboring countries, 11 where, by regular or irregular means, they procured naturalization papers. Provided with these they returned to Morocco claiming exemption from taxation and the jurisdiction of the Moorish authorities. 1 2 Sometimes this practice was resorted to for no other reason than to gain the support of a foreign representative in pressing a claim t h a t had been declared invalid in the Moroccan courts. Quite naturally, the sultan sought to exercise authority over those of his former subjects who returned to reside permanently in their native land. 13 Despite the fact t h a t the agreement of 1863 had limited the number of semsars or native agents t h a t a foreign merchant might protect to two, this limitation was frequently disregarded by the consular agents. Also the term "merchant," though defined in t h a t agreement, continued to be loosely interpreted. Too often, moreover, were the commercial agents selected not from "active persons seeking for remuneration for the services they may render to their employer, but from wealthy merchants or large farmers" 1 4 intent upon f u r t h e r i n g their own private interests. Wealthy subjects of the sultan were willing to pay, and p a y well, for the privileges attending protege status. 10 See pp. 28-30. " Moorish subjects went chiefly to Algeria, Portugal or Italy for letters of naturalization. The British and Spanish governments refused to recognize them as naturalized subjects if they returned to reside permanently in their native land. A few went to the United States (A.U.S.E.M., copy of desp. 353, Mathews to Evarts, Tangier, 28 Feb. 1880); down to 1880, only five had become naturalized subjects in Brazil (A.B.L.T., copy of Rio de Janeiro desp. 66, Ford to Salisbury, 19 Dec. I8T9). Prior to the Madrid conference about twenty had gone to Portugal for this purpose (Documents Diplomatiques, Conferences de Madrid, protocol no. 10, Meeting of 21 June, 67-8).

" A.B.L.T., H a y to Derby, confid. desp. 23, 24 Mar. 1877; H a y to Salisbury, desp. 50, 28 July 1879. 13 A.S.M.S., Merry to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 18, 24 Jan. 1872. Merry, approving this stand, wrote: "Our political interest bids us not to increase the weakness of this Empire which is disintegrating." " A.B.L.T., Hay to Derby, confid. desp. 23, 24 Mar. 1877.

85

MOEOCCO A T T H E

PARTING

OF T H E

WAYS

According to t r e a t y provisions the family of a protected person living under the same roof with him were likewise p r o tected. I t sometimes happened, however, that the term " f a m i l y " was made to include distant relatives residing under the same roof, or adult children living away. Although (mokhalets)

the

native

agricultural

partners

or

associates]

of E u r o p e a n s and proteges were supposed to bei

considered and treated as ordinary s u b j e c t s of the sultan, they' often managed to evade payment of a considerable p a r t of the' taxes due the sultan's government by nominally making overj their p r o p e r t y to their foreign or protected native associates. 1 5 ! T h i s was so profitable an arrangement t h a t they gladly paid: for it.

'

In short, there was a tendency for all natives more or less! closely associated with foreigners or protected natives, official! or unofficial, to receive a greater or less degree of protection. At; every point of c o n t a c t with the E u r o p e a n s the a u t h o r i t y of the! sultan receded.

i

Still another instance of the defrauding of the imperial treas-i ury is found in the evasion of the g a t e t a x levied upon beasts of burden laden with merchandise or produce, one of the i m p o r t a n t sources of revenue of the country. B y 1 8 7 8 the income fromj this source was reported to have fallen off considerably, not only in consequence of the increasing number of proteges, but also because agricultural associates and other M o r o c c a n

subjects

were branding their beasts as if they were the p r o p e r t y

of

"Ibid.,

". . . now there are many persons [foreign subjects] who keep large flocks of cattle, sheep, and camels in the interior, and who are exempted from taxation. It is alleged that some of these persons when they commenced farming had arrived in this country without capital, but by entering into partnership with wealthy farmers, and having the land and cattlej etc., of the latter made over to them in legalized documents, with a secret understanding as to the profits, the Moorish proprietors have been enabled to evade the payment of taxation." The native agricultural associates of natives protected by the foreigr legations at Tangier, alone numbering about 200 in the year 1877, hac paid no agricultural taxes, evading them through their association witl prot6g6s. Ibid., Hay to Derby, confid. desp. 76, 16 Aug. 1877, enclosinj extract from the proc^s-verbal of the meeting of the Tangier diplomats corps of 23 Jul. 1877.

36

THE

SULTAN

ASKS FOR

RELIEF

foreigners,' although no bona fide sale had taken place. Officious interference with native justice was becoming a serious abuse. I t has already been noted t h a t foreign representatives a t Tangier, inspired by humanitarian motives, had for a good many years followed a policy of intervening to prevent injustice to individuals of the Jewish race. Cases of glaring injustice occasionally caused them to bestir themselves in like manner in behalf of the sultan's Mohammedan subjects. Sometimes, as in the case of the British minister, the personal influence of a foreign agent was so strong that a mere word addressed by him to the local authorities was sufficient to insure justice. Private intervention of this sort, for disinterested, humanitarian reasons, was a practice of such long standing and frequency t h a t it might almost be considered a customary right. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the practice was not confined to these limits. Subaltern officials and even native employees of the legations and consulates sometimes presumed to interfere in local court processes, receiving a consideration in return for their pains. P a r t i c u l a r l y grievous were the corrupt practices which the system of protection shielded. Some have already been cited in other connections; for example, in the matter of exemptions from taxation and the interference with the administration of justice. Sometimes the natives were seriously imposed upon by unscrupulous foreigners and proteges. I t was customary for natives to gather a t the markets of the interior to dispose of their produce. The agents of the foreign merchants of the coast were regularly present. Frequently an agent would make a purchase by outbidding his rivals. H e would wait, however, until the close of the day to make a settlement. Then, a f t e r the crowd had largely dispersed, he would examine his purchase and, pretending to find it of inferior quality and not worth the price agreed upon, refuse to make payment. The owner, having lost his chance of sale, and unable to appeal to the authorities of the market for redress against a protege, would be forced to accept considerably less than the amount originally agreed upon. 16 "C. Rolleston, "Today in Morocco," National

37

Review,

17:649-64.

MOROCCO AT T H E PABTING OF T H E WAYS

T h e practice of foreigners or proteges g r e a t l y increasing claims against unprotected Moorish subjects was a common one. 17 Claims t h a t were utterly false were sometimes trumped up. The law of Morocco required all commercial documents to be drawn up by notaries. The integrity of this class of public functionaries does not appear to have been of the highest order. They were sometimes willing, in return f o r a consideration, to d r a f t fraudulent papers showing t h a t one man was indebted to another. A document bearing the signature of two notaries and a cadi had all the appearance of legality. Upon receipt of such a claim the Moorish authorities commonly arrested and imprisoned the victim pending payment of the alleged debt. T h e claimant, being a foreign protege, escaped being confronted with an extortion charge. Sometimes these defrauders selected an old man reputed to be well-to-do. P e r h a p s they even engaged in some minor legitimate transaction with him to give the appearance of legitimacy to their scheme. U p o n the death of the man an exorbitant claim was advanced and the heirs had to p a y the amount demanded from the estate. 1 8 W h y , one may ask, did irregularities and abuses such as these j u s t cited arise and flourish? The Moorish government must share the blame along with the foreigners and their proteges. Local native authorities, invested as they were with great power and free to a remarkable degree from the supervision of the central government, were notoriously c o r r u p t and not above p e r p e t u a t i n g abuses for the sake of personal gain. T h e local authorities, moreover, generally stood in awe of foreign representatives, dreading to incur their enmity. They realized t h a t an " A.S.M.S., Diosdado t o the Sp. min. of St., desp. 273, 13 Dec. 1878; also desp. 42, 28 Mar. 1879. In these despatches the Spanish minister reported that this abuse had reached such proportions that it had become one of the chief causes of the loss of prestige of native authorities. The greater part of the claims submitted to him were, he declared, based upon injustice or insufficient proof. Some foreign agents were reported to be excessively complacent in receiving demands and were accustomed to supporting them vigorously. ° C . Rolleston, op. cit., 17:649-64. Jewish prot£g£s particularly were charged with practices of this kind, and this, naturally, contributed greatly to the insecurity of their position.

38

THE

S U L T A N ASKS FOR RELIEF

insistent representation direct to the sultan against them might lead t o reprimand or disgrace. The Moroccan government in its relations with the foreign powers was exceedingly timid and susceptible to threats, being utterly unable to resist pressure. Various factors serve to explain the irregularities from the s t a n d p o i n t of the foreigners and their proteges. Sometimes such action had as its basis personal friendship or humanitarianism; again it might result from the determination to maintain a position of equality with a rival colleague believed to be guilty of u n w a r r a n t e d practices. T h e extension of protection for the p u r pose of building up political influence within the country probably h a d not been practised to a great extent prior to the Conference of Madrid of 1880. 19 The most common motive a p p e a r s to have been desire for gain. 20 In the absence of reliable statistics on the subject of irregular protection 2 1 it is impossible to assess responsibility exactly among the various powers represented a t Tangier. Probably none of their representatives was entirely guiltless of irregularities in one way or another. B u t whereas some practised them sparingly and within reason, others extended protection recklessly and in an abusive manner. Some of the most flagrant violations were p e r p e t r a t e d by consular officials and natives ema Possibly the practice followed by Spain in 1859 during the months immediately preceding the outbreak of the War of Africa, described in Chapter I, constituted an exception. But, if so, it was of brief duration, as has been shown. " I n a letter written from Gibraltar, 2 Jan. 1870, to the Earl of Clarendon (A.B.L.T.), Hay stated that a Moor "came one day to my office with a bag of gold containing $5,000 and asked if I could appoint him Arabic clerk or interpreter at the mission or at one of the vice-consulates or give him protection in any way and that this money was at my disposal. . . . But [I] did not complain of him to the Moorish Government, as bribery and corruption are not considered an irregularity in Morocco." Also, Mr. Mathews, American consul-general, soon after his arrival at Tangier reported to Secretary of State Fish (A.U.S.C.-G.T., desp. 7, 30 Oct. 1869) that "a few days ago I turned out of my office a Jew who offered me two hundred dollars cash for an American protection. . . ." 31 The lists of protigis submitted by foreign representatives to the Moorish authorities cannot be relied upon to tell the whole story. It was quite possible to submit an apparently regular list and at the same time to extend protection irregularly to others not included.

39

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS ployed in the l e g a t i o n s and consulates. Of all the representatives at T a n g i e r , the British minister was the most zealous opponent of irregular and abusive protection. 2 2 H i s moves were l o y a l l y seconded by his German and Belgian colleagues. 2 3 Duri n g the period 1 8 6 3 to 1 8 7 7 the French 2 4 and Spanish 2 0 ministers also had generally observed the t r e a t y stipulations regulati n g p r o t e c t i o n , and a f t e r Signor Scovasso became the representative of I t a l y a t T a n g i e r in 1 8 6 8 , Italian practice seems to 22 A . B . L . T . , H a y to D e r b y , confitl. d e s p . 76, 16 A u g . 1877. T h e list o l B r i t i s h p r o t e g e s s u b m i t t e d by H a y in t h e T a n g i e r c o n f e r e n c e s of 1877 s h o w e d f i f t y - s i x p r o t e g e s , only t w o of w h o m w e r e a d m i t t e d to be p r o t e c t e d w i t h o u t j u s t i f i c a t i o n by t r e a t y p r o v i s i o n . All t h e o t h e r s w e r e e i t h e r e m p l o y e e s of t h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t o r in t h e s e r v i c e of B r i t i s h officials. T h e B r i t i s h l e g a t i o n e x t e n d e d p r o t e c t i o n t o no c o m m e r c i a l a g e n t s . I n c o m p a r i n g t h i s r e p o r t w i t h t h o s e of t h e o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , it should b e b o r n e in m i n d t h a t G r e a t B r i t a i n e n j o y e d t w o - t h i r d s of t h e c o m m e r c e of M o r o c c o . F o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , H a y listed t w e n t y - e i g h t p r o t e g e s , f o r t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , n i n e , a n d f o r D e n m a r k , seven. 10

Ibid., N o d e f i n i t e n u m b e r of p r o t e g e s w a s given in this d e s p a t c h f o r e i t h e r G e r m a n y o r B e l g i u m ( t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the l a t t e r also r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e i n t e r e s t s of S w e d e n - N o r w a y ) . H a y s t a t e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t n e i t h e r e x t e n d e d p r o t e c t i o n to n a t i v e s n o t a c t u a l l y in t h e i r own p r i v a t e service o r t h a t of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e g o v e r n m e n t s . 24 A . B . L . T . , H a y to D e r b y , confid. d e s p . 23, 24 M a r . 1877. H a y w r o t e t h a t so f a r a s h e w a s a w a r e the F r e n c h m i n i s t e r had n o t e x t e n d e d p r o t e c t i o n in an i r r e g u l a r m a n n e r , " t h o u g h g r e a t l a t i t u d e is given t o the p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d t o M o o r i s h f a r m e r s , in the e m p l o y m e n t of o r in p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h n a t i v e officers of t h e F r e n c h L e g a t i o n who a r e e n g a g e d i n a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r s u i t s , a n d who a r e t h u s , a s 1 u n d e r s t a n d , e x e m p t e d f r o m taxation."

A . B . L . T . , H a y t o D e r b y , confid. d e s p . 76, 16 A u g . 1877. T h e F r e n c h l i s t s s u b m i t t e d a t T a n g i e r in 1877 showed a t o t a l of seventy-six p r o t e g e s . S o m e of t h e s e w e r e a d m i t t e d t o be i r r e g u l a r l y p r o t e c t e d a s s e r v a n t s o r p a r t n e r s of p r o t e g 6 s , f r o m w h o m p r o t e c t i o n w a s a b o u t t o b e w i t h d r a w n . " A . B . L T , H a y t o D e r b y , confid. d e s p . 23, 2+ M a r . 1877. " I h a v e n o r e a s o n to believe t h a t t h e S p a n i s h m i n i s t e r a t T a n g i e r e x t e n d s i r r e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n t o n a t i v e s in t h i s t o w n ; b u t it is r e p o r t e d t h a t S p a n i s h c o n s u l a r officers a t t h e M o o r i s h p o r t s h a v e t a k e n u n d e r t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n a n u m b e r of M o o r i s h s u b j e c t s n o t a u t h o r i z e d by T r e a t y . " A . B . L . T . , H a y t o D e r b y , confid. d e s p . 76, 16 A u g . 1877. T h e n u m b e r of p r o t e g e s a d m i t t e d b y t h e S p a n i s h m i n i s t e r in 1877, 124, w a s t h e l a r g e s t of all. W h i l e s o m e of t h e s e w e r e a d m i t t e d to be e n j o y i n g p r o t e c t i o n t h r o u g h a b u s e s of l o n g s t a n d i n g , it is only f a i r to p o i n t o u t t h a t S p a i n m a i n t a i n e d t h e l a r g e s t c o n s u l a r e s t a b l i s h m e n t of all t h e f o r e i g n p o w e r s r e p r e s e n t e d in Morocco.

40

THE

SULTAN

ASKS FOR

RFXIEF

have become regular, 26 though it had not always been so before. According to Sir John H a y ' s careful report on the subject of irregular protection made at the beginning of the period of agitation for reform, the sultan had strongest grounds for complaint against "those foreign officers who represent countries which have no trade and hardly any residents in Morocco belonging to their respective nationalities." 2 7 H e referred especially to Senhor Cola^o, Portuguese charge d'affaires,28 and 29 30 Mr. Felix A. Mathews, the American consul-general. " A . B . L . T , H a y to D e r b y , eonfid. desp. 23, 24 Mar. 1877. ". . . though Mr. Scovasso has been most strict in the observance of t r e a t y stipulations r e g a r d i n g protection, his predecessors have placed upon the list of I t a l i a n p r o t e c t e d s u b j e c t s a n u m b e r of Moors and J e w s who had no right to protection. I could even mention two cases where p a r t i e s had tried to obtain protection at the British Legation t h r o u g h bribery, and when their applications were r e j e c t e d with indignation they obtained protection of the Italian mission." A.B.L.T., H a y to Derby, confid. desp. 76, 16 Aug. 1877. Scovasso's list showed, in addition to commercial a g e n t s , fifty-eight proteges, of which seventeen were designated as having received i r r e g u l a r protection f r o m his predecessors. * In this connection the Gibraltar Chronicle, 6 A p r . 1880, w r o t e as follows: ". . . W e a r e not a w a r e if the P r i n c e of Monaco has a consul in Morocco, but it is certain if such a consul existed, it would he easy f o r him to have more Moorish proteges than his Sovereign has s u b j e c t s . " » A.B.L.T., H a y t o D e r b y , confid. desp. 23, 24 M a r . 1877. " T h e P o r t u guese c h a r g e d ' a f f a i r e s is also known to extend i r r e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n . " A.B.L.T., H a y to D e r b y , confid. desp. 76, 16 A u g . 1877. A t T a n g i e r alone, Cola^o, the P o r t u g u e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p r o t e c t e d forty-seven natives, only twelve of whom were in the service of his g o v e r n m e n t or himself, the rest being irregularly p r o t e c t e d . P o r t u g a l , however, had practically no t r a d e with Morocco. Colacjo f r a n k l y a d m i t t e d the irregularities, b u t j u s t i f i e d them on t h e g r o u n d t h a t he had simply done as other did. H e declared his willingness to discontinue i r r e g u l a r protection when his colleagues did likewise. " M r . Mathews, n a t u r a l son of a G i b r a l t a r woman and a Spanish d o c t o r ( a political r e f u g e e ) , was born a t T a n g i e r a n d passed his early youth in Morocco. T h e r e he m a s t e r e d the local idioms. While yet a boy he went to the U n i t e d S t a t e s and sometime t h e r e a f t e r served on the U.S.S. Constitution. L a t e r he s p e n t several y e a r s in the F a r W e s t . H e was first a p pointed United S t a t e s consul to Morocco in 1869, but was immediately recalled as a result of a conspiracy a g a i n s t him a t T a n g i e r . When the f a c t s w e r e known at W a s h i n g t o n he was r e s t o r e d t o his position which he continued to fill continuously f o r the next seventeen years. H i s initial s a l a r y w a s b u t $3,000 a y e a r , the lowest of the g r o u p of foreign r e p r e sentatives a t Tangier. In 1882 it was reduced t o $2,000. Some of his colleagues

41

MOHOCCO AT THE PARTING OF THE WAYS T h e dangers which confronted Morocco as a result of protection abuses were indeed grave. The most serious of these was the threat of destruction of the sultan's authority. This, if it materialized, would naturally result in a state of anarchy and probably the destruction of Moroccan independence itself. This danger arose from various sources. The rapidly increasing number of proteges, especially in the ports, was effectively destroying the sultan's control over large groups of his subjects and creating an Imperium in imperio.31 More and more his functionaries were complaining of being unable to perform their police duties through fear of infringing upon the rights of foreigners or proteges. Even in the rural districts the wealthy and influential subjects, upon whom the sultan depended f o r the preservation of order, were escaping from his jurisdiction. His were drawing four and five times as much. Mathews was an attractive, interesting, and good-hearted man. H e enjoyed great popularity, especially among the natives. His home on Mt. Washington, two miles out of Tangier on the Cape Spartel road, which commanded a fine view of the Atlantic, the Strait, and the Mediterranean, was famous locally f o r its hospitality. Mathews frequently entertained his guests by recounting in lively detail his experiences in hunting grizzlies in the Rockies and his adventures along the Mexican border. " A.B.L.T., H a y to Derby, conftd. desp. 23, 24 Mar. 1877. "The United States Consul General, Mr. Mathews, it is alleged, has extended protection, during the few years he has been here, to upwards of 100 wealthy Moorish subjects engaged in mercantile or agricultural pursuits, and yet the United States have no trade, and there is only one United States citizen resident in Morocco." Previously, in his despatch 74, 27 June 1876, Hay had spoken of the increasing abuses, especially on the part of the United States consulgeneral, and in his memorandum of a conversation with the Duke de Decazes at Vichy, 31 A u g . 1876, he stated that "the United States Consul General was selling protection like a tradesman sells his goods." A . B . L . T . , H a y to Derby, confid. desp. 76, 16 A u g . 1877. The list which Mathews submitted in 1877 showed only thirty-seven protected persons throughout the whole Moroccan empire. According to the British representative this list did not even correspond with the list which Mathews had earlier submitted to the local authorities. " A.S.M.S., Merry to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 197, 6 Jul. 1862. " I f an end is not put to this atuse, the day will come when Moroccan authority will not have, especially at Tangier, subjects upon whom to exercise its authority, and this city will be composed of tribes of Arabs and Jews submitted to various jurisdictions, and with the rivalries consequent to this state of things, from which will come forth" grave conflicts.

42

THE

S U L T A N ASKS FOE

BELIEF

revenues were declining as a result of so many of his wealthy subjects having secured, through protection or fraudulent p r a c tices closely related to it, exemption from p a y i n g taxes. And, finally, the prestige of the native courts was being seriously impaired by the officious interference of foreign representatives and proteges, by the frequent escape of protected natives from punishment for their offenses, and by the admission of f r a u d u lent claims pressed on behalf of unscrupulous proteges against unprotected natives. I r r e g u l a r protection was, moreover, a fertile source of disputes between the sultan's government and foreign powers. 32 There existed always the possibility t h a t some designing power might embark upon a policy of aggression against Morocco, resorting to a wholesale extension of protection as a means of increasing its political influence in the country. 3 3 Finall}', from the standpoint of those foreign powers interested in commercial expansion in Morocco, irregular protection was prejudicial, because it gave the sultan a good reason for refusing to make any concessions which might tend to augment the existing evils.34 T h e move on the p a r t of the Moroccan government to find a remedy for existing abuses was due in large measure to the efforts of a new sultan who came to power in 1873. When Muley Hassen 3 5 succeeded his father he was scarcely more than t h i r t y " A.B.L.T., Hay to Derby, confid. desp. 52, 12 June 1874. Hay declared that irregular protection "is a great misfortune . . . and gives rise, not only to numerous abuses but to almost all the differences which have arisen in this country with foreign governments." " A.S.M.S., Merry to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 18, 24 Jan. 1872. "In a country like Morocco whose irremediable disorganization has reached its limit and in which Spain has for the present and for the future so many political interests to maintain and develop, the question of protection is α diplomatic question of greatest importance. The extension of this right can bring about the absorption of Morocco by a Christian Power." " A . B . L T . , Hay to Derby, confid. desp. 23, 24 Mar. 1877. "Irregular protection is a growing evil which is antagonistic to the extension of trade and to British and foreign enterprise for developing the resources of this country, for the Moorish Government views the arrival of every European in Morocco as a fresh souce for vexatious claims, and for diminishing the receipts of taxes due to the Treasury." * The following personal description of the sultan by the British minister may be of interest: "He is a fine looking man about 6.2 in height, slim,

43

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS y e a r s of age. H e a p p e a r s t o h a v e possessed r a t h e r u n u s u a l intelligence a n d e n e r g v , b u t h a v i n g lived all his life s e p a r a t e d f r o m E u r o p e a n influences, a n d being s u r r o u n d e d by t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e a d v i s e r s of his f a t h e r , it would have been s u r p r i s i n g , indeed, h a d he of his own volition t h r o w n his c o u n t r y open t o w e s t e r n civilization. C o g n i z a n t of the weakness of imperial

authority,

M u l e y H a s s e n a t once set o u t t o s t r e n g t h e n it. H i s first few y e a r s as sovereign were devoted, in p u r s u a n c e of this p o l i c y , t o w a g i n g almost incessant w a r f a r e a g a i n s t his rebellious s u b j e c t s . I n 1 8 7 5 , he sent a n u m b e r of M o o r i s h y o u t h s t o t h e B r i t i s h g a r r i s o n a t G i b r a l t a r t o be i n s t r u c t e d in a r m y drill, t h a t t h e y m i g h t serve a s t e a c h e r s of his r e g u l a r a r m y . H e also t o o k i n t o his service B r i t i s h a n d F r e n c h i n f a n t r y a n d a r t i l l e r y officers, p u r c h a s e d q u a n t i t i e s of modern a r m s a n d some a r t i l l e r y pieces, a n d s t r e n g t h e n e d the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s of t h e p o r t of T a n g i e r . T h e active y o u n g s u l t a n did not confine his e f f o r t s to milit a r y m e a s u r e s . Seeing in f o r e i g n c o n s u l a r p r o t e c t i o n a serious e n c r o a c h m e n t u p o n his sovereign a u t h o r i t y , he d e t e r m i n e d

to

c u r t a i l it. I n the s u m m e r of 1 8 7 6 , M u l e v H a s s e n sent Cid H a d j i M o h a m m e d E l z e b d y , his chief t r e a s u r e r , on an i m p o r t a n t mission t o E n g l a n d , F r a n c e , a n d I t a l y , ostensibly to r e t u r n visits m a d e b y t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o his c o u r t t h e p r e c e d i n g y e a r . H i s r e a l motive, however, was t o m a k e direct r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to t h o s e g o v e r n m e n t s u p o n the s u b j e c t of i r r e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n . 3 6 P a r t i c u l a r l y a n x i o u s was t h e s u l t a n to c u r b t h e p r a c t i c e of f o r e i g n m e r c h a n t s c h o o s i n g t h e i r commercial a g e n t s f r o m a m o n g

the

M o o r i s h s u b j e c t s of t h e i n t e r i o r . 3 7 with handsome f e a t u r e s . Expression r a t h e r sad, as if bothered-with a f f a i r s of s t a t e . V e r y intelligent, but very ignorant of E u r o p e and the ways of the civilized world, so I have uphill work in teaching A.B.C. b e f o r e I read a lesson. H e is very dignified but gentle in his m a n n e r . In a p r i v a t e interview I had with H i s M a j e s t y when we were tete-ä-tete, he e n j o y e d a j o k e and we w e r e g r e a t f r i e n d s . " M a n u s c r i p t s Division, British Museum, L a y a r d P a p e r s , vol. L X X V I I I , H a y to L a y a r d , Fez, 23 A p r . 1875. " A.B.I..T., N o t e of Elzebdy to Derby ( c o p y ) , London, 18 J u l . 1876. 17 This p r a c t i c e was not c o n t r a r y to the provisions of the French t r e a t y of 1767, nor to the t e r m s of the agreement of 1863. It had, however, m e t with the consistent opposition of the Moroccan authorities, whose wishes in the m a t t e r had down to this time generally been respected in practice.

44

THE To

the petition

SULTAN

ASKS F O E

RELIEF

of t h e s u l t a n ' s e n v o y , t h e E a r l

of

Derby,

f o r e i g n s e c r e t a r y , replied t h a t t h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t h a d no desire

to

extend

protection

beyond

the

provisions

of

their

t r e a t i e s o f 1 8 5 6 . I t could n o t , however, c o n s e n t t o d e p r i v e B r i t ish m e r c h a n t s o f a n y a d v a n t a g e s c o n c e d e d t o m e r c h a n t s o f a n y other country.39 Upon

the r e q u e s t o f the M o o r i s h e n v o y ,

Sir

J o h n H a y was i n s t r u c t e d t o a s s i s t t h a t g o v e r n m e n t in r e a c h i n g a g e n e r a l s e t t l e m e n t a t T a n g i e r o f c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f the quest i o n o f p r o t e c t i o n . 3 9 A t P a r i s a n d R o m e t h e mission met with n o m o r e t a n g i b l e s u c c e s s t h a n a t L o n d o n . W h i l e a s s e r t i n g his willingness t o c o o p e r a t e in c h e c k i n g i r r e g u l a r D u k e de D e c a z e s o b j e c t e d

protection,

to depriving F r e n c h merchants

the a d v a n t a g e of employing protected native brokers

the of

dwelling

in t h e i n t e r i o r o f t h e c o u n t r y , a p r i v i l e g e which he believed t o be essential t o the p r o t e c t i o n of their interests.40 T h e I t a l i a n eign m i n i s t e r a d m i t t e d

that

t h e s u l t a n ' s r e q u e s t seemed

forquite

m o d e r a t e , b u t a t t h e s a m e t i m e he r e f r a i n e d f r o m m a k i n g a defin i t e r e p l y u n t i l his g o v e r n m e n t h a d a s c e r t a i n e d the views o f t h e o t h e r s u p o n the q u e s t i o n . 4 1 A l t h o u g h t h e E l z e b d y mission f a i l e d t o a c c o m p l i s h a s m u c h as M u l e y H a s s e n h a d h o p e d f o r , it did, h o w e v e r , g i v e him r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s f o r believing t h a t p r o t e c t i o n m i g h t a t l e a s t be r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e t e r m s o f e x i s t i n g a g r e e ments. H e was, moreover, assured of the active c o o p e r a t i o n

of

S i r J o h n H a y , d o y e n o f the d i p l o m a t i c c o r p s a t T a n g i e r . A c c o r d i n g l y B a r g a s h was o r d e r e d t o l a y t h e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e the foreign

representatives

at

Tangier.

On 1 0

March

1877,

a m e e t i n g was held a t his h o u s e , a t which t i m e he r e a d a mem» A . B . I . . T , Derby to Cid Mohammed Elzebdy, London, 3 Aug. 1876. "Ibid., Elzebdy to Derby, London, Η Aug. 1876. Four points were mentioned: (1) Protection should be kept within the bounds of treaty stipulations; (2) only merchants or commission agents carrying on a bona fide trade with Morocco should be entitled to employ semsars; (3) a list of protected semsars should be furnished to the governor of the town where the foreign merchant resided; and (4) every proteg^ should be certified by the foreign representative at Tangier, and him alone. Also, Derby to Hay, 28 Aug. 1876. • A . B . L . T . , Memorandum of Sir John Drummond Hay's Conversation with the Duke de Decazes at Vichy, 31 Aug. 1876. " Public Records Office (hereafter cited as P.R.O.), Rome desp. 308, 28 Aug. 1876.

45

MOEOCCO A T T H E PASTING OF T H E

WAYS

orandum containing twenty demands or propositions setting forth the desires of his master. 4 2 B a r g a s h asked the foreign representatives to discuss the proposals among themselves and to come to an agreement which would restrict protection to the terms of the treaties. He f u r t h e r requested t h a t the understanding reached should be drawn u p in the form of a written agreement t h a t would insure its equal observance by all. 43 The p r o j e c t was favorably received, and it was decided to hold a series of meetings to discuss the matter. These meetings, somewhat delayed on account of several missions proceeding to the court at Fez, were not initiated until the month of July. Meanwhile Sir John H a y , with characteristic energy, threw himself into the work of p r e p a r i n g for the conferences. Interviews held with several of his colleagues, designed to bring about a community of views t h a t would insure the success of the meetings, revealed the fact that in general the German, Belgian, and Italian representatives held views similar to his own, having no objections to the twenty propositions of the Moorish government. 44 The presence of a new French minister 45 at Tangier caused him to feel some uncertainty as to whether France would continue to follow her conciliatory policy of the past several years. In order to insure this, reminding his government of the importance of Anglo-French cooperation in the matter of protection since 1863, H a y strongly urged the foreign office to come to an understanding with the P a r i s government before the opening of the conferences. The British government took u p the matter not only with the " An additional request was made by Bargash, to the effect that no notary public employed as Arabic secretary by foreign diplomatic or consular officers should be permitted to draw up acts as notary, for the protection which he enjoyed would exempt him from the jurisdiction of the cadi, and thus he would be in a position to forge false and illegal documents with impunity. This request was regarded as just by the representatives and forthwith conceded. β A.S.M.S., Romea to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 89, 22 May 1877. ** A.B.I..T., Hay to Derby, confld. desp. 23, 24 Mar. 1877. " His predecessor, M. Tissot, with whom Hay was on the best of terms, had recently been transferred to Constantinople. Later Tissot was to serve his government as ambassador at London.

46

T H E S U L T A N ASKS FOB

RELIEF

government a t Paris, but with all the others represented a t T a n gier,*6 as well, proposing t h a t they adhere to the sultan's p r o p ositions. 47 Almost without exception the replies received were favorable. 4 ® In view of subsequent developments, however, some of these replies merit attention. I t was reported from Rome t h a t the I t a l i a n representative a t Tangier had already been instructed to act with H a y in the matter of foreigners and proteges p a v i n g the agricultural taxes; no other propositions were mentioned. T h e Spanish government declared itself ready to cooperate in ending abuses. The German representative was authorized to support his British colleague. The new French minister was instructed to p u t a stop to any irregularities practiced by his legation. While expressing its approval of most of B a r g a s h ' s demands, the French government at the same time considered it necessary to make reservations concerning certain points. At Lisbon and Washington the British agents had entered complaints based on charges made by H a y against the Portuguese and American representatives. In reply, the P o r tuguese government, promising to see t h a t immediate steps were taken to prevent abuses in the future, assured the British government of its support in the conferences at Tangier. The United States government did not show itself so compliant. A "vague and u n s a t i s f a c t o r y " reply from Secretary E v a r t s to his original communication caused Mr. Plunkett of the British embassy to call a t the state department in person, where he had an interview with Acting Secretary Seward. The latter stated t h a t Mathews, the American representative a t T a n gier, would not be instructed in the desired sense without con44 There were thirteen powers represented at Tangier at this time: Great Britain, Denmark, Holland, and Austria-Hungary were represented by Hay; Belgium and Sweden-Norway had a single representative; the Portuguese agent also served for Brazil; the other nations represented being France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and the United States. " A.B.L.T., circular letter sent by the British foreign office to its representatives residing in the capitals of the powers represented in Morocco, 16 May 1877. β Copies of the replies received were forwarded to Hay by Mr. Tenterten, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, in desps. 27, 13 June 1877, and 87, 25 Jul. 1877, A.B.L.T.

47

MOROCCO AT THE PASTING OF THE WAYS siderable p r i o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a n d e x p r e s s e d t h e o p i n i o n

that

the a c t i o n of the B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o w a r d his A m e r i c a n colleague " h a d n o t been very f r i e n d l y . " T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s dep a r t m e n t of s t a t e , he d e c l a r e d , could n o t concede t o S i r

John

H a y t h e r i g h t of d i c t a t i n g to t h e h i t t e r t h e n u m b e r of his servants. Meanwhile, however, an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the c o n d u c t of M a t h ews was i n s t i t u t e d . H e was asked t o explain t h e c h a r g e s m a d e a g a i n s t him a n d o r d e r e d t o d i s c o n t i n u e w i t h o u t delay a n y irr e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n extended within his j u r i s d i c t i o n . 4 9 T h e A m e r ican

consul-general

in

refutation

characterized

the

charges

b r o u g h t a g a i n s t his a s " a malicious invention . . . u t t e r l y devoid of t r u t h . I n

seeking t o establish his own innocence he

accused his p r e d e c e s s o r of g r o s s i r r e g u l a r i t i e s a n d d e p i c t e d his B r i t i s h colleague as a j e a l o u s meddler, guilt}' of even

more

serious abuses, who was seeking to do him i n j u r y and t o d e s t r o y all commerce in M o r o c c o save t h a t of G r e a t B r i t a i n . A little l a t e r Mathews forwarded to the state department at

Washington

four letters from prominent Moorish personages, including the g r a n d vizir a n d the Shereef of W a z a n , m a k i n g it a p p e a r t h a t the a c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t him were groundless. 5 1 I n o r d e r t o o b t a i n i m p a r t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n as to the f a c t s of the case, the A m e r i c a n consul at G i b r a l t a r was o r d e r e d t o T a n g i e r t o m a k e a t h o r o u g h i n v e s t i g a t i o n . H i s r e p o r t which

exoner-

ated M a t h e w s completely, 5 2 was couched in l a n g u a g e suspiciously resembling t h a t of M r . M a t h e w s . U p o n h e a r i n g of the result of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , H a y declared t h a t M a t h e w s h a d misled his g o v e r n m e n t , b u t considered it n a t u r a l t h a t it

should

believe its own r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in p r e f e r e n c e t o t h a t of f o r e i g n " A . U . S . C . - G . T . , a c t i n g see. of st. S e w a r d t o M a t h e w s , i n s t r . 109, 27 J u n e 1877. 50 Ibid., M a t h e w s t o S e w a r d , d e s p . 247, 30 J u l . 1877. "Ibid., M a t h e w s t o S e w a r d , des]). 254, 15 O c t . 1877. " A r c h i v e s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d e p a r t m e n t of s t a t e ( h e r e a f t e r cited as A . U . S . D . S . ) , S p r a g u e t o S e w a r d , G i b r a l t a r d e s p . 232, 4 Oct. 1877. S p r a g u e w r o t e : " I h a v e not s u c c e e d e d in d i s c o v e r i n g a n y t h i n g w h a t e v e r t o the d i s c r e d i t of M r . M a t h e w s in his c o n s u l a r o r d i p l o m a t i c c a p a c i t y a n d especially a s r e g a r d s t h e c h a r g e of his p r o t e c t i n g u p w a r d s of one h u n d r e d w e a l t h y Moorish subjects."

48

THE

SULTAN"

ASKS

FOR

RELIEF

power. 5 3 A s for the letters submitted by M a t h e w s to the s t a t e department, H a y , in s u p p o r t of his original charges, forwarded t o his government

several others, some by the same

authors

as in the first case, which, while a d m i t t i n g M a t h e w s ' conduct in general to be friendly toward the M o o r i s h people, acknowledged that he had g r a n t e d irregular protection. Closing the incident, the s t a t e department drew up a confidential

report on the investigation. 5 4 T h e charges of the B r i t -

ish minister were dismissed as "wholly u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d , " "partial and d i s i n g e n u o u s , " and their effect, if not their spirit "is eminently unfriendly to Mr. M a t h e w s . " T h e department refused to take further a c t i o n in the matter. 5 0 A s an indication of its g o o d will, the Spanish government, prior to the o p e n i n g of the conferences, instructed 0 6 its minister not only to accept in principle the propositions submitted by B a r g a s h , but also to issue a circular t o the consular officers e x h o r t i n g them to observe closely the terms of e x i s t i n g treaties dealing with this subject. 5 7 " A . B . L . T . , H a y to D e r b y , confid. desp. 115, 23 Nov. 1877; also confid. desp. 116, 3 Dec. 1877. " A . U . S . E . M . , P a p e r R e l a t i n g t o F o r e i g n e r s in Morocco, Vol. I, Confidential R e p o r t of t h e d e p a r t m e n t of s t a t e , 26 J a n . 1878. M U n q u e s t i o n a b l y t h e d e p a r t m e n t m a d e t h e only r e p o r t t h a t it could, u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . O n e c a n n o t , however, r e a d t h e r e p o r t s of t h e B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r in t h i s p e r i o d w i t h o u t h a v i n g serious misgivings as to the innocence of Mr. M a t h e w s . T h e S p a n i s h m i n i s t e r , as well as H a y , r e f e r r e d t o t h e n u m e r o u s i r r e g u l a r p r o t e g e s of t h e A m e r i c a n c o n s u l - g e n e r a l . (A.S.M.S., D i o s d a d o t o t h e S p . min. of St., d e s p . 83, 15 M a y 1880.) Ten y e a r s l a t e r s c a n d a l s g r o w i n g o u t of Mathews* h a n d l i n g of p r o t e c t i o n led to a second i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d his d i s m i s s a l . A t a l a t e r d a t e , however, he w a s reinstated. " A.S.M.S., royal o r d e r to R o m e a , 20 J u n e 1877. "Ibid., Kornea t o t h e Sp. min. of st., desp. 89, 22 M a y 1877. R o m e a , while a d m i t t i n g t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n s received by his legation in the p a s t were sufficient t o e n a b l e him to a c c e p t t h e Moorish p r o p o s i t i o n s , a t first p r o p o s e d t o use S p a i n ' s a c c e p t a n c e of t h e m in b a r t e r i n g w i t h t h e M o r o c c a n g o v e r n m e n t f o r c e r t a i n difficult o b j e c t i v e s f o r which he w a s i n s t r u c t e d to n e g o t i a t e on his mission to F e z in t h e s p r i n g of 1877. This did n o t p r o v e to be necessary, however.

49

III LOCAL ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY T H E SITUATION FAIL T H E R E T U E N of the last of the foreign missions from Fez, by the opening of J u l y 1877, Sir John H a y lost little time in calling together the diplomatic corps. Altogether, nine meetings were held in the period from 9 J u l y t o 10 August. 1 The first three were devoted to certain fresh complaints of the Moroccan government against abuses p e r p e t r a t e d by foreign subjects, which bore little or no relation to native protection. These matters being disposed of in a manner satisf a c t o r y to the sultan's government, 2 B a r g a s h ' s twenty demands were next taken up for consideration. W i t h certain modifications these were to serve as the agenda of the Tangier conferences two years later also, as well as a t the important diplomatic conference a t Madrid in 1880. The first of these demands defined the basis of protection, stating t h a t the conditions upon which it might be g r a n t e d were those stipulated in the British and Spanish treaties of 1856 and 1861, respectively, and in the agreement of 1863. The debate upon this proposition b r o u g h t to light the issue t h a t was to be the most difficult of all those raised in the a t t e m p t s made to reform the system of protection in Morocco: the troublesome question of semsars or native commercial agents. H a y objected to the agreement of 1863, in so f a r as it recognized commercial agents as proteges, though it limited the number to two for each merchant, and he f u r t h e r denied t h a t Great Britain had ever adhered to it. H e proposed to substiPOX

1

Only important extracts from the proces-verbaux of these meetings were included in Hay's eonfid. desp. 76, to Derby, 16 Aug. 1877 ( A . B . L . T . ) ; the writer found their full text in the archives of the United States embassy at Madrid, Papers Relating to Foreigners in Morocco, Vol. I. ' It was agreed that no European family residing at Tangier should be allowed to raise more than two pigs, which animals were particularly offensive to the Mohammedans and Jews of the country. Measures also were adopted to prohibit the usurpation of the lands of the sultan and the cutting down of his forests.

50

ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY T H E

SITUATION

tute f o r it the provisions of the British and Spanish treaties. T h i s arrangement would enable foreign merchants to engage any number of natives as agents in any p a r t of the country; these would remain subject to Moroccan jurisdiction, however, in every matter not directly connected with the interests of their employers. T h e British representative felt that the local authorities would not give grounds f o r complaint because of arbitrary proceedings against the unprotected agents. Since the adoption of the treaty of 1856, Great Britain had not followed the practice of extending protection to native semsars, he argued, yet during this period of twenty-one years only one case of injustice had been called to his attention, and in it the M o roccan government had promptly given full satisfaction. 3 H e expressed the conviction that the removal of protection from semsars,

especially as regards taxation, would strike at the

root of the most serious abuses. Justice, morever, required that foreign subjects should p a y the local agricultural taxes. H a y made a special point of emphasizing the fact that no nation was more interested in the commercial development of Morocco than England. Romea, the Spanish minister, showed himself to be the most determined opponent of H a y ' s point of view. H e declared that he considered the regulations of 1863 neither opposed to the Moorish memorandum, nor injurious to the sultan's government.4 M .

de Vernouillet,

the French

representative,

whose

speech was considerably more conciliatory in tone, saw no inconvenience in annulling the agreement of 1863. Since, however, he was without instructions on this point he declared that it would be necessary f o r him to refer the matter to his govern* A second case of an outrage by α governor upon an agent of a British merchant occurred in 1878. A.B.L.T., H a y to Salisbury, desp. 60, 10 Jul. 1878. 1 In a despatch to the Sp. min. of st., Romea declared the right of protection of »emsar» to be "vital f o r European commerce" and urged him not to adopt the views of H a y , "because it will mortally wound our commerce," by placing the commercial agents at the mercy of the governors and chiefs of the interior who were themselves frequently interested in trade and the rivals of foreign merchants. A.S.M.S., Romea to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 140, 18 Aug. 1877.

51

MOBOCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS ment. H e shared H a y ' s view that two agents were insufficient, especially f o r merchants engaged in the wool trade. B u t he referred in general terms t o the need of adequate security for the interests of foreign merchants, and emphatically declared t h a t the F r e n c h government could never, for instance, recognize the competence of the shräa,^ that is, of the regular local courts, in which Koranic law was applied and only the evidence of Moslems admitted. Scovasso, speaking for I t a l y , declared that it was incumbent upon the European powers to lend Morocco a helping hand in order to lead her slowly, but surely, in the p a t h w a y of civilization. In general he shared the views of his British colleague, but subscribed to the statement of \'ernouillet concerning the jurisdiction of the

shräa.

P r o p o s i t i o n s 2, 3, 4, and 5 dealt with protection as extended by diplomatic and consular officials, being largely a restatement of regulations already in force. Little discussion on these points was necessary, and only minor alterations were suggested. N a t i v e employees of both diplomatic and consular officials were declared exempt from Moorish taxation and law; no limit was placed upon the number of natives that a diplomatic official ' A r t i c l e X I I of t h e F r e n c h t r e a t y of 1767 p e r m i t t e d t h e E m p e r o r of M o r o c c o o r h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in t h e c i t y w h e r e a d i s p u t e a r o s e , t o d e c i d e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n M o r o c c a n a n d F r e n c h s u b j e c t s . In n o c a s e , h o w e v e r , w a s t h e c a d i o r o r d i n a r y j u d g e , w h o p r e s i d e d o v e r t h e shräa, t o d e c i d e a case involving a F r e n c h m a n . T h e B r i t i s h a n d S p a n i s h t r e a ' t i e s of 1856 a n d 1861, r e s p e c t i v e l y , p r o v i d e d t h a t in b o t h c r i m i n a l a n d civil cases b e t w e e n a B r i t i s h o r S p a n i s h s u b j e c t and a Moor, when the plaintiff was British or Spanish a n d the d e f e n d a n t a Moroccan, a Moorish a u t h o r i t y ( g o v e r n o r or cadi) should j u d g e the case, w i t h t h e f o r e i g n c o n s u l c o n c e r n e d h a v i n g t h e r i g h t to a t t e n d t h e h e a r ing. I f , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e p l a i n t i f f w e r e a M o o r a n d t h e d e f e n d a n t B r i t i s h o r S p a n i s h , t h e c a s e c a m e u n d e r t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e f o r e i g n c o n s u l a r officer c o n c e r n e d , w i t h t h e M o r o c c a n a u t h o r i t y h a v i n g t h e r i g h t t o a t t e n d t h e h e a r i n g . I n c a s e of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of e i t h e r p a r t y with the original decision, t h e case might be appealed to the British or S p a n i s h m i n i s t e r a t T a n g i e r , on t h e o n e h a n d , o r t o t h e M o r o c c a n m i n i s t e r of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , on t h e o t h e r , a n d a final decision s h o u l d b e r e a c h e d b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o . I n 1868, H a y m a d e a n a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h t h e s u l t a n w h i c h m o d i f i e d t h i s p r o c e d u r e a s c o n c e r n e d B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s in c a s e s r i s i n g o u t of a c c o u n t s a n d c o m m e r c i a l m a t t e r s . T h e s e w e r e t h e n c e f o r t h t o b e s u b m i t t e d t o a m i x e d c o m m i s s i o n a p p o i n t e d by t h e t w o p a r t i e s .

52

ATTEMPTS

TO R E M E D Y

THE

SITUATION

might p r o t e c t , but consular proteges were r e s t r i c t e d , as in the B r i t i s h and S p a n i s h treaties, to f o u r f o r each c o n s u l a r officer.® In case, however, M o r o c c a n s u b j e c t s were a p p o i n t e d consular a g e n t s , p r o t e c t i o n did not extend beyond their immediate family circle.' T h e G e r m a n and I t a l i a n representatives declared their willingness to concede them one or more p r o t e c t e d s e r v a n t s in case the need was felt. Certain persons, such as sheiks or other employees of the s u l t a n and refugees f r o m j u s t i c e , might not be selected a s p r o t e g e s . P r o p o s i t i o n s 6, 8, 10, and 16 laid down rules g o v e r n i n g the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of p r o t e c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to the sixth demand, foreign representatives were to submit t o the M o r o c c a n minister of foreign a f f a i r s written lists of their p r o t e g e s . H i s response was to be regarded as the confirmation of protection. No person accused of a misdemeanor or crime might be eligible f o r p r o t e g e s t a t u s until his case was settled. At this point two changes were proposed and accepted. In the first place it was agreed t h a t no person convicted of a crime or misdemeanor might be given p r o t e c t i o n until a f t e r the p e n a l t y imposed h a d been satisfied. Secondly, both the F r e n c h a n d S p a n i s h representatives o b j e c t e d to the p r o p o s a l t h a t the response of the M o r o c c a n government might c o n s t i t u t e the confirmation of p r o tection, since the t r e a t i e s p e r m i t t e d freedom of choice. An effort to c r e a t e a means of checking on i r r e g u l a r p r o tection is found in demand 8, which provided t h a t each y e a r the foreign r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t T a n g i e r should present a list of the names of the natives p r o t e c t e d by their respective governments t h r o u g h o u t the dominions of the s u l t a n . T h e s e lists were to be t r a n s m i t t e d to the local a u t h o r i t i e s who would consider as proteges only those persons whose names were included. T h i s plan was unanimously a p p r o v e d . Demand 10 required consular officers t o n o t i f y t h e i r chiefs of changes in their p r o t e g e lists, as well as to submit lists of 'Demand No. 9 .substantially duplicated Xo. 3. In passing, the French minister merely observed that no French treaty or agreement contained such a limitation. 7 Demand No. 11 practically duplicated this provision.

53

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS

their proteges to the local authorities. This arrangement obviously would enable the Moroccan officials to compare the lists submitted by the representative a t Tangier with those submitted locally and, in case of discrepancies, to protest to the foreign representatives at Tangier. T h e plan, however, did not go f a r enough to satisfy Scovasso, the Italian minister, who proposed a still more far-reaching measure requiring t h a t each representative should submit to the conference a complete list of the names of his native proteges, giving the reason in each case why protection had been granted. Since it was the established rule t h a t no consular officer had the right to g r a n t protection without the approval of his chief, every case of protection c o n t r a r y to this practice should be considered as void. The Moroccan authorities would, in t h a t case, be justified in refusing to allow any intervention in behalf of natives whose names were not included in the lists of proteges. L a s t l y , Scovasso sought to eliminate all interference, direct or indirect, official or officious, under whatever p r e t e x t , in native justice. These proposals, like the demands j u s t discussed, were approved, but with the understanding t h a t the conference was not competent to look into or to sit in judgment upon the conduct of any representative. They were regarded as an effective means of striking at existing abuses. T h e sixteenth article of the B a r g a s h memorandum provided t h a t the native agents of foreign merchants, either on the coast or in the interior, were to be supplied with a letter addressed to the local authorities, identifying them as proteges, in order t h a t the interests of their employers might be properly safeguarded. This provision encountered no opposition. Demand 7, which dealt with the n a t u r e of protection, declared t h a t the family and dwelling of a protege were likewise protected. Family was defined as consisting of wives, children, and certain minor relatives living under the same roof. P r o tection was not to be hereditary, but it was agreed t h a t old proteges upon retiring a f t e r a long period of service should continue to enjoy protection. T h e French and Italian ministers each sought to make an exception to the non-hereditary 54

ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY THE

SITUATION

ruling in the case of a single family. T h e principles contained in this demand were assented to. Demands 12 and 13 designated certain classes of Moroccan subjects who might not e n j o y protection. T h e twelfth excluded domestics, farmers, or other natives employed by the interpreters or Arabic secretaries of the foreign legations. In this connection H a y pointed out that the agricultural associates of this class of proteges had down to the present time evaded payment of the agricultural taxes. Some of the foreign legations were treating them exactly like proteges. T h e abuse was threatening to grow beyond bounds, f o r the native farmers were keenly desirous of obtaining protege privileges and were willing to p a y f o r them. A remedy which he proposed was accepted by his colleagues ad

referendum.

T h e thirteenth proposition denied protection to the employees or domestics of ordinary foreign subjects. T h e local authorities were not, however, to be permitted to arrest servants of either foreign nationals or proteges without first notifying the consular authority concerned, unless they were known to be guilty of having killed or wounded someone, or violated his dwelling, in which case they might be arrested at once. I f this occurred the consular authority was to be notified without delay. Propositions 14 and 15, which called f o r a reduction in the privileges enjoyed by semsars as proteges, were the most significant items of the memorandum. T h e y were undoubtedly at variance with demand 1, discussed above, which recognized as one of the bases of the system of protection the agreement of 1863. One of the chief features of this agreement was the recognition of commercial agents as protected persons, without differentiating between their privileges and those enjoyed by official prot6ges. Here the Moroccan demands clearly abandoned the realm of irregular protection and asked f o r a curtailment of an established right. Demand 14 proposed to subject semsars to arrest by native authorities on the same basis as other natives employed by foreigners and proteges

(as discussed above). This

demand

evoked a lively discussion. M . de Vernouillet, French minister,

55

MOROCCO AT T H E PAHTIXG OF T H E WAYS

declared his willingness to permit the arrest by the local authorities of a French subject caught in the act of committing a misdemeanor, provided the miscreant were later delivered up to the French consular a u t h o r i t y ; at the same time, however, he declared his inability to consent to it in the case of commercial agents, for, in his opinion, such a concession would place commercial agents a t the mercy of unscrupulous functionaries, to be arrested upon mere pretext, and robbed, without their being able to establish their innocence. E u r o p e a n commerce in the interior of Morocco would be rendered precarious, if not actually impossible. The Spanish and Italian representatives concurred in this view, the l a t t e r reiterating t h a t the matter was " a question of life or death f o r commerce." Scovasso f u r t h e r adduced various specific reasons why it would be a mistake to concede this demand. In the first place, the commercial agents would have great difficulty in finding witnesses in order to establish their innocence. H e regarded the responsibility of the governors, who often had an interested motive in hindering the activities of the semsars, an insufficient guarantee against injustice. If a commercial agent were actually guilty, proof might be submitted to a foreign consul and justice would be done, but in no case should the native officials be given the power to impede a semsar in his commercial functions. The German minister, who declared his own willingness to accept the proposal as it stood, sought to meet the objections raised by his colleagues by proposing t h a t native governors thought to be guilty of arresting commercial agents upon mere pretext should be brought before a special tribunal at Tangier for trial. Sir J o h n H a y , supporting the original proposal, repeated some of the arguments t h a t he had previously advanced in the debate on demand 1. Again he insisted that there were no real grounds for fearing i n j u r y to commercial interests; and, in order to overcome the misgivings expressed by some of his colleagues, he proposed t h a t the foreign representatives should ask the Moroccan government to make a formal declaration whereby it agreed t h a t in case any Moorish authority should act u n j u s t l y toward a commercial agent the case should be re-

56

ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY T H E

SITUATION

ferred to a tribunal a t T a n g i e r where both the consul of the nation of the merchant concerned and a representative of the accused functionary should be present. If it were found t h a t the native functionary had sought to i n j u r e the interests of the foreign merchant by hindering his agent, the former should be severely punished. After a trial of one year, if this scheme proved unsatisfactory, H a y expressed his willingness to fall back on the agreement of 1863, or to adopt some other suitable arrangement. No greater degree of success was met with in the discussion of the fifteenth proposition. This declared t h a t protection extended over the goods of foreign merchants found in the hands of agents, which were, therefore, inviolable and exempt from all duties. Semsars, however, were required to p a y personal taxes, as well as imposts on their own p r o p e r t y , herds, merchandise, etc. All persons engaged in tilling the soil or stock-raising, foreign subjects and proteges as well as natives, were to be required to p a y the regular agricultural taxes, according to demand 17. Upon paying this t a x to their consuls each year they were to submit an exact statement of all their possessions. A false statement would entail the confiscation of the p r o p e r t y not declared. Although complete exemption of foreign nationals and porteges from all taxation was a t r e a t y right of long standing, the British minister urged acceptance of these new measures. His principal arguments were t h a t at the time the treaties were made no foreigners in Morocco were engaged in agricultural pursuits, hence exemption from these dues, which gave protected persons an unfair advantage over the natives, had not been foreseen or intended. Foreigners in other Mohammedan countries, moreover, paid the agricultural tax, and there seemed to be no good reason why they should not be required to do likewise in Morocco. The formation of agricultural p a r t n e r ships with unprotected natives was a very profitable business for foreigners, and one t h a t was accompanied by much secret corruption. 8 • A.B.L.T., Hay to Derby, confid. desp. 23, 2i Mar. 1877. Concerning this abuse, Hay declared, "As this state of things encourages the natives

57

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS

Romea, finding this proposition contrary to Spanish treaty rights, declared that he would have to consult his government in the matter before agreeing to accept it. In his opinion, if the treaty provisions had intended exemption from personal taxes only, they would have so stated. 9 While the attitude of the French minister was similar to that of his Spanish colleague, Scovasso, speaking for Italy, gave the demand his full support, declaring that "the exemption from taxes in favor of foreign subjects and proteges who are occupied with agriculture is odious to the Moroccans and unjust. We should no longer enjoy exceptions and privileges which place native merchants in an entirely unequal position. . . . We should be satisfied with being treated upon the same footing as the subjects of the country. . . ." He was of the opinion, however, that adequate guarantees should be exacted, and further declared that the Moroccan government in return for such a concession should be required to facilitate the development of agriculture, commerce, and industry. ". . . If we do not dispel the suspicions and fears of this government and people by renouncing certain privileges which we should not have the right to enjoy and do not enjoy in any other country of the Orient, never shall we succeed in inducing the Shereefian government to open its doors to commerce. . . . Morocco will dwell eternally in the status quo." In the opinion of the German minister, acceptance of the seventeenth demand was not only just, but necessary. At this juncture an additional proposal to tax foreign subjects and protected persons, not included in the original Moroccan demands, was advanced by the United States consulto seek f o r protection I am of opinion t h a t t h e proposition of t h e Moorish G o v e r n m e n t ought to be e n t e r t a i n e d , f o r when t h e s u b j e c t s of the S u l t a n become a w a r e t h a t they can not escape t a x a t i o n or the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Moorish authorities by becoming the p a r t n e r s or a g e n t s of E u r o p e a n s , they would no longer have the same motive for seeking protection." ' A.S.M.S., R o m e a to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 140, 18 Aug. 187T. In rep o r t i n g this situation t o his chief, while a d m i t t i n g the j u s t i c e of t h e d e m a n d , Komea contended t h a t if Spain made such a concession she should d e m a n d some compensation in r e t u r n . H e suggested the discontinuance of all shrda jurisdiction in cases involving foreigners and the s u b s t i t u t i o n of mixed tribunals.

58

ATTEMPTS

TO HEMEDY

THE

SITUATION

general. T h i s referred to the gate t a x , which Mathews declared should in j u s t i c e be paid by all persons alike. I t , too, had been the s u b j e c t of connivance and abuse. Y e t because of frequent a l t e r a t i o n s by local authorities, and in order to protect foreign interests against i n j u r y , Mathews recognized the need of a fixed schedule of rates. 1 0 T h e F r e n c h minister placed the blame for the evasions of the g a t e t a x upon its a r b i t r a r y administration. So long as the t a x had remained nominal no one had tried to escape paying it. M o r e recently its a r b i t r a r y increase had even produced revolts in certain districts of the empire. Scovasso, again, favored the proposed

reform, but

observed t h a t

a cargo

which

passed

through the g a t e s of several cities in transit should be required to p a y the t a x but once, upon entering the city of its ultimate destination. T h e attitude of the Spanish representative was the same as t h a t which he had held on other p o i n t s — t h a t is, t h a t the proposal was c o n t r a r y to a t r e a t y right, and he urged his colleagues to limit their discussions to the items of the memorandum. 1 1 S i r J o h n H a y was of the opinion t h a t the payment of the g a t e t a x would be a logical result of the admission of the agricultural t a x . I n return for such a concession, the sultan's government should be required to come to a previous equitable understanding with the representatives of the powers stipulating the amount of the t a x . He expressed the belief t h a t its p a y ment would even prove beneficial to commerce. A t the present time most of the produce of the empire was being transported b y animals belonging to natives. These were hired by foreign merchants who, therefore, paid the t a x indirectly. T h e y should, he argued, view favorably the fixing of a stable and mod10 This tax was levied upon laden beasts of burden upon entering a Moroccan city. In 1877 the tax upon a laden camel, horse, or mule was equivalent to about 20 cents; that upon a donkey cargo, one-fourth as much. 11 A.S.M.S., Romea to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 140, 18 Aug. 1877. Romea proposed asking for an equivalent concession on the part of the Moroccan government, suggesting as a suitable one that foreigners when traveling by land in Morocco should be excused from the obligation of employing a native soldier at a dollar a day, except when an armed companion was considered necessary.

59

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E

WAYS

erate rate. T h e payment of the t a x would end the surreptitious practice of natives making over their beasts of burden to foreigners and sharing with them the profits derived from defrauding the shereefian treasury. Still another extraneous proposal was made by the Italian minister, which called for the right of protected natives engaged in import and export commerce 12 to have equal rights with foreign merchants in employing semsars. At the same time he was quite willing that they, as well as other commercial agents, should p a y taxes. H a y expressed no objection to Scovasso's proposal, feeling t h a t its acceptance would represent a gain f o r commerce. In adopting this attitude, however, H a y was considering the commercial protege not from the standpoint of the extensive privileges t h a t he had enjoyed in the past, but as he hoped his position was about to be defined for the future. No objections were raised by the French and Spanish representatives. R e t u r n i n g to the items of the memorandum, the diplomatic corps adopted without dissension demand 18, concerning officious intervention in native tribunals by proteges in the service of the foreign legations and consulates. In such cases the proteges, rewarded for their services, often made it appear t h a t they were sent by the head of their legation. In the future, Moroccan authorities were to be instructed to permit no such interference. I f , however, a foreign representative felt the necessity of making an unofficial appeal in behalf of an unprotected native, he should address the sultan's foreign minister at T a n gier. I n so doing, if he sent a native employee, he should provide the l a t t e r with a signed document establishing the legitimacy of the mission. The prot£g6s of Italy in the neighborhood of Tangier included a rather large number of natives of this class. According to the explanation offered by Scovasso, they had, for the most part, gained protection as servants of the various states that had united to form the Kingdom of Italy. Following unification the Italian government was able to reduce its representation in Morocco, but the former servants were continued as proWgSs. On the other hand, Hay charged on several occasions that a good many of these Italian prot6g6s had secured protection through bribery before Scovasso's arrival at Tangier.

60

ATTEMPTS TO HEMEDY T H E SITUATION P r o p o s i t i o n 1 9 was a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t abusive n a t u r a l i z a t i o n . T h e s u l t a n was willing to a d m i t t h e r i g h t of his s u b j e c t s t o exp a t r i a t e themselves, b u t insisted t h a t if t h e y r e t u r n e d t o M o r o c co, a f t e r h a v i n g done so, t h e y should be s u b j e c t t o his j u r i s diction. T h i s d e m a n d involved a q u e s t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law u p o n which the p o w e r s themselves held widely v a r y i n g views, e a c h m a k i n g a n d a p p l y i n g within its own b o u n d a r i e s i t s own municip a l laws g o v e r n i n g n a t i o n a l i t y . T h e q u e s t i o n r e d u c e d itself t o these t e r m s : within t h e s t a t e of M o r o c c o s h o u l d t h e law of t h e s t a t e t h a t h a d g r a n t e d n a t u r a l i z a t i o n t o t h e r e t u r n e d M o o r obt a i n , t h r o u g h v i r t u e of e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y r i g h t s , o r should t h e s u l t a n , a sovereign prince, be allowed t o e n f o r c e his own r u l i n g s ? The

German,

British,

and

Spanish

representatives

found

themselves in a p o s i t i o n t o a c c e p t the d e m a n d . T h e s t a t e m e n t of t h e I t a l i a n m i n i s t e r was indefinite, being t h a t his c o u n t r y would observe u s a g e a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l law in t h e m a t t e r . T h e A m e r i c a n , P o r t u g u e s e , a n d F r e n c h a g e n t s were u n a b l e t o a c cede t o t h e d e m a n d , M a t h e w s d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e law of his c o u n t r y f o r c e d him t o consider n a t u r a l i z e d citizens e q u a l w i t h t h e n a t i v e - b o r n . H e could n o t , t h e r e f o r e , d e n y t h e f o r m e r his p r o tection in M o r o c c o . H i s g o v e r n m e n t , however, h a d no desire t o e n c o u r a g e a b u s e within a f r i e n d l y s t a t e , a n d would, he believed, be willing to d e v i a t e s o m e w h a t f r o m t h i s p r i n c i p l e in

actual

p r a c t i c e , especially in cases where n a t u r a l i z e d M o o r s r e t u r n e d t o M o r o c c o to reside p e r m a n e n t l y . I n compliance w i t h the final d e m a n d of t h e m e m o r a n d u m , t h e d i p l o m a t i c c o r p s signed on 10 A u g u s t a collective n o t e a d d r e s s e d to t h e M o r o c c a n f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r . I n it t h e y d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e y h a d been able t o r e a c h an a g r e e m e n t on m o s t of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s s u b m i t t e d f o r t h e i r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , b u t t h a t b e f o r e a definitive rep l y could be m a d e t h e e n t i r e r e s u l t of t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s would h a v e to be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e i r respective g o v e r n m e n t s . U p o n receipt of f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s a second series of m e e t i n g s would be held f o r the p u r p o s e of f o r m u l a t i n g a p r o j e c t in a c c o r d w i t h the Moroccan government regulating protection and eliminating i t s abuses.

61

MOROCCO A T T H E

PASTING

OF T H E

WAYS

In reviewing the work of the Tangier diplomatic conferences of 1877, one is especially impressed by the conciliatory attitude of most of the foreign representatives toward the demands of the sultan. The British minister and his German and Belgian colleagues were willing to accept all the proposals. T h e most serious difference of opinion had developed over the question of commercial agents. Even here the French and I t a l i a n representatives were willing to subject them to taxation, though they were opposed to permitting the Moorish authorities to arrest them. They, likewise, were ready to subject their nationals residing in Morocco to the payment of the agricultural and g a t e taxes, under adequate safeguards. The attitude of the Spanish minister was of all the representatives the most unyielding. 13 H e opposed sacrificing a single t r e a t y advantage without an equivalent compensation. In the question of naturalization, although considerable difference in practice between the various nations was found to exist, all the representatives admitted the existence of abuses and appeared disposed to find a remedy. E a r l y in the year 1878, H a y , whose course in the Tangier conferences of the preceding summer had met with the entire approval of his government, 14 reported t h a t the conduct and language of his French and Spanish colleagues during and since *> A.B.L.T., Hay to Derby, confid. desp. 77, 17 Aug. 1877. H a y , who had received from his government a copy of the instructions of the Spanish minister of state to Romea and found them "most satisfactory," regretted that Romea's attitude in the meetings had not been consonant with them. "Mr. Romea," he wrote, "has been the chief opponent to measures which would tend to correct existing abuses or to accord to the Sultan rights which are enjoyed by all independent Governments." The explanation of Romea's conduct is probably found in the fact that relations between himself and the Moroccan government were far from cordial. His negotiations to secure the fulfillment of Article 8 of the treaty of peace of 1860, calling for the cession of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequena, a point on the southern coast of Morocco, were characterized by the exertion of considerable pressure and bluster, and were at this very time in a critical state. I.ate in the preceding year, various circumstances had seemed to lend color to the fear entertained by the sultan and Bargash that Spain was contemplating an unwarranted attack upon Morocco, and had led to joint representations at Madrid on the part of the British, German, French, and Italian goverments. " A.B.L.T., Derby to Hay, desp. 47, 7 Sept. 1877.

62

ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY T H E SITUATION

the conferences g a v e good grounds for supposing that they had urged their respective governments to maintain in large p a r t the existing system. 1 5 H e felt reasonably sure, however, of the acquiescence of all the other representatives. As soon as Cid Mohammed B a r g a s h returned from an extended leave from T a n gier, the second series of conferences was to be initiated. 1 ® A little later, acting upon instructions from the

foreign

office, 17 H a y made an effort to come to an understanding with his French colleague, with whom he was on very friendly terms. 18 On most points they were able to agree. T h e question of

semsars,

however, proved t o be the chief difficulty. On this point the B r i t ish minister submitted a plan which he hoped the French government would find acceptable. I t s main features were the right of employing as many commercial agents as were necessary, instead of j u s t t w o ; the subjection of agents to t a x a t i o n ; the right of local authorities to arrest them under certain circumstances, but not to t r y them; and certain rules insuring the s a f e t y of foreign p r o p e r t y entrusted in their hands. Vernouillet, however, was pessimistic as to the outcome of the negotiations. E x p r e s s 15

Ibid., Hay to Derby, desp. 2, 2 Jan. 18T8. At the close of 1877, two vexatious cases arose between the French and Moroccan governments over prot6g6s which caused the French charge d'affaires to declare that during the time he had been at Tangier he had not been able to obtain justice for French subjects from the Moorish authorities "and that he was of the opinion that without protection being afforded to natives it would be impossible for Europeans to reside in Morocco." Three months later, Hay expressed the doubt that Morocco would receive any help from Spain and cited recent cases of irregular extension of protection, A.B.L.T., Hay to Derby, desp. 21, 6 Mar. 1878. Concerning the Spanish representative, the British minister wrote in a private and confidential note during this period, as follows: ". . . Romea has gone to Paris, so we will have a little quiet. He is the worst kind of viper Spain has sent to Morocco. I do not expect anything will be done to abolish abuses in irregular protection, so long as Romea rules here, for his only aim has been to create chaos. His employees are selling protection to the highest bidder. His locum tenens, . . . is a good fellow, but hardup for cash, and protection is well paid for." Ibid., Hay to Walsham (British charge d'affaires at Madrid), 18 June 1878. " Ibid., Hay to Derby, desp. 15, 8 Feb. 1878. " Ibid., Salisbury to Hay, desp. 21, 1 May 1878. u Ibid., Hay to Salisbury, confid. desp. 43, 27 May 1878; desp. No. 60, 10 Jul. 1878.

63

MOROCCO A T T H E P A S T I N G

OF T H E

WAYS

ing the belief that neither the most important demands of the sultan nor H a y ' s compromise scheme would receive the approval of certain other governments, he insisted that F r a n c e could permit no other power to enjoy in Morocco greater privileges than herself. He admitted, furthermore, t h a t he had not yet discontinued all irregular protection for the reason t h a t some of his colleagues had not done so. In reporting the result of the conferences to his government, Romea again urged upon it the policy of demanding compensation in return for every concession made. 19 He particularly insisted upon the continuance of protected commercial agents, declaring t h a t the extreme fanaticism of the Moroccans rendered the maintenance of this right essential to commerce. Under no circumstances should the Spanish government allow itself to be misled by the humanitarian and liberal, but mistaken, views of the British minister. The Spanish minister of state was inclined to be even more intransigeant than Romea. He rejected the specific compensations which the l a t t e r had suggested on the ground t h a t these might be obtained through interpretation of existing treaties. In the matter of taxation he felt that the inequalities existing between foreigners and natives were justified in Morocco, for "otherwise it would be impossible in t h a t country of a r b i t r a r y and violent exactions for foreigners to establish themselves . . . ; and we consider too manifest our mission in Africa to renounce a privilege indispensable to the residence of our subjects. . . ." As for proteges, the Spanish government was willing to subject to taxation only semsars employed posterior to the formation of an agreement on this subject. Proteges in the service of the Spanish government, however, should be treated the same as Spanish subjects. I t was considered to be "hardly honorable" to deprive semsars, who had already been gathered under the Spanish flag, of the protection they had hitherto enjoyed. Even this slight concession which the Spanish government was willing to make was considered to be of such importance to Morocco t h a t it was to be made only in return for "real and unquestioned a d v a n t a g e s . " Romea was " A.S.M.S., Romea to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 140, 18 Aug. 1877.

64

ATTEMPTS TO HEMEDY THE

SITUATION

instructed, however, to continue to limit protection to the terms of existing treaties. 20 On Ί 3 M a y the Moroccan foreign minister called a special meeting of the diplomatic corps in order to read to them a shereefian letter complaining of the increasing connivance of f o r eign and Moorish subjects for the purpose of defrauding the government of

revenue from the gate tax. 21 Concerning

the

promise of the foreign representatives that the conferences would be resumed as soon as all the agents received instructions from their respective governments, Bargash observed that over a year had elapsed since he had presented his original memorandum, and asked for an explanation. I t appeared that all were ready to reopen the conferences, with the exception of the representatives of France, Spain, Portugal, and I t a l y . T h e first two were awaiting more explicit instructions, whereas the charge

d'affaires

Portuguese

had received no instructions whatever from

Lisbon. T h e most significant development of the meeting was the change in tone of the language of Scovasso, the Italian representative. Conciliatory and friendly toward Morocco in 1877, he now appeared critical and severe. H e was soon to become the most obstinate of the opponents of reform. Admitting that he was still without instructions from his government, he declared that the Moroccan government could not expect I t a l y to reply to their demands so long as proper attention was not paid to the representations he had made upon matters connected with the interests of Italian subjects. H e would wait, he added, f o r the sultan to improve the harbors on the western coast so as to insure the safety of shipping and to introduce reforms beneficial to European commerce before acceding to the propositions which had been framed solely to benefit the Moroccan government.22 "Ibid.,

royal order to R o m e a , no. 164, 3 N o v . 1877.

21

A . B . L . T . , H a y to Salisbury, desp. 42, 26 M a y 1878.

n

This language was not, however, a surprise t o H a y , who had p r i v a t e l y

written in the month o f M a r c h to the British representative at R o m e concerning Scovasso, as f o l l o w s : " . . . he is veering round again on the subject of protection and will t r y and seduce his government to maintain existing abuses. H e has numerous p r o t i g f e , though his predecessors are t o blame, but he thinks it gives him importance t o have these people under his sway,

65

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E

WAYS

T h e British minister explained to his government Scovasso's change of attitude, as follows: Various trifling occurrences, unnecessary to repeat on this occasion, have given rise to this change, and I am told that he charges the Moorish Government with showing a disposition to listen to my wishes whilst no attention, as he states, is paid his demands. The chief reason, I think, however, is that as there are not more than five bona fide Italian merchants in all Morocco, who carry on a trade with England and France, and as M . Scovasso has a large number of protected Moorish subjects, many of whom are wealthy Mohammedans and Jews, who give him constant motives for differences with this Government, he fears to lose what is called "prestige" and position if irregular protection is withdrawn or modified, and to find that his occupation is gone.23 T h e loss of Scovasso to the g r o u p f a v o r i n g radical reform was soon counterbalanced by a change in Spanish policy. This resulted from two f a c t o r s : the exertion of British influence at Madrid, and the sudden fear on the p a r t of Spain that the Moroccan government was on the verge of collapse. E a r l y in the summer the British charge d'affaires at Madrid, acting upon instructions received from his government, addressed a communication to Silvela, Spanish minister of state, declaring that " H e r M a j e s t y ' s Government would learn with great satisfaction that, with a view to the redress of grievances complained of, H i s Excellency had been directed to act in this matter with Sir John Drummond H a y , who has pursued a course which has met with their entire approval." 2 4 for Italy has little or no interests in Morocco." Ibid., H a y to Paget ( R o m e ) , 19 Mar. 1878. "Ibid., H a y to Salisbury, confid. desp. 43, 27 May 1878. Scovasso was of a high-strung and fiery disposition. While at Tangier he challenged at least one colleague to a duel (which was never fought), and talked of giving a challenge to a second. H i s precipitate action in the Ducally case, described in Chapter I, was characteristic of his behavior. Being extremely sensitive to what he considered a slight or a lack of proper respect for or neglect of Italian interests, it seems quite probable that the dilatoriness of the Moroccan government in failing to give satisfaction f o r some of his frequent demands might have had a good deal to do with his change of attitude. » A.S.M.S., J. Walsham ( B r . ch. d'aff., M a d r i d ) to Silvela, 7 June 1878.

66

A T T E M P T S TO REMEDY T H E

SITUATION

T h i s note was very timely, for at that very moment a Moorish e m b a s s y w a s a t M a d r i d n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t .

Its

p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t w a s t o p e r s u a d e the S p a n i s h g o v e r n m e n t n o t t o i n s i s t u p o n t h e i m m e d i a t e d e l i v e r y b y the s u l t a n of t h e p o r t k n o w n a s S a n t a C r u z de M a r P e q u e n a , s i t u a t e d on t h e

far

s o u t h c o a s t of M o r o c c o . T h e cession h a d o r i g i n a l l y been p l e d g e d b y A r t i c l e 8 of t h e t r e a t y of p e a c e c o n c l u d e d b e t w e e n S p a i n and M o r o c c o in t h e y e a r I 8 6 0 . 2 5 D e s p i t e m u c h s u b s e q u e n t

negoti-

" While the treaty specifically stipulated that the port was to be used as a fishing station, the Spanish hoped to develop there a commercial entrepot which would not only serve as an outlet for the products of the Sus and Wad N'un regions, whose only outlet was the rather distant port of Mogador, Agadir having almost a century earlier been closed by order of the sultan, but eventually it might also serve as the nearest outlet for the reputed wealth of Timbuktu and the Sudan. The Spaniards were spurred on to almost desperate activity when in 1876 the British subject Mackenzie began his operations at Cape Juby, and at the same time the French began seriously to consider the construction of a trans-Sahara railway from Algeria to Timbuktu and penetration to the Niger by way of the Senegal. On his mission to Fez in the spring of 1877, Romea had with the greatest difficulty gained the consent of the sultan to cooperate in sending a joint commission to the Sus coast to locate the exact site of the fifteenth century Spanish fort of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequena (often confused with Santa Cruz de Berberia or Agadir, in that period held by the Portuguese) looking forward to the immediate cession to Spain. But the gaining of the sultan's consent was but half the battle, and not until January 1878 was the commission, aboard the Spanish warship Blaeco de Oaray, able to carry out its expedition. Despite the careful preparatory work of the zealous Spanish consul at Mogador, who headed the expedition, to win over the natives of the region of Ifni, which he knew first-hand, having three years earlier ransomed three Spanish subjects from seven years of captivity in the hands of a Wad Nun chieftain, the result of the expedition was failure. Both the extraordinary roughness of the sea and the hostility of the natives prevented a landing and, therefore, a thorough investigation was impossible. In their report, however, the Spanish members of the commission named Ifni as the true site of the ancient Spanish fort, this place uniting better than any other of the region all the conditions necessary for the projected establishment. Meanwhile public interest was aroused in Spain, especially in the Royal Geographical Society of Madrid, and among the Canary Islanders who saw in the opening of the neighboring trading post a compensation for the loss of their hitherto leading industry, the production of cochineal, which had been killed by the introduction of chemical dyes. Soon three other plausible sites were advanced for Santa Cruz, each having its partisons who warmly defended it in speech and press. (The writer has collected much material on this interesting three-cornered

67

MOROCCO A T T H E

P A R T I N G OF T H E

WAYS

ating, however, it had remained unfulfilled, largely on account of the sultan's insistence that he lacked sufficient control over the natives of the Sus country to make delivery. Because of the uncertainty that reigned concerning the exact location of the place in question, and more particularly because of the unusually disordered condition that had arisen in M o r o c c o

during

the last few months as a result of a general crop failure, with unmistakable signs of famine and pestilence in the offing, the Spanish minister agreed not to press the matter at that time. In a note couched in the usual oriental blandishments, the M o r o c c a n ambassador further asked Silvela 26 to instruct his representative at T a n g i e r t o lend the Moorish government his assistance in the matter of protection. T h e condition of M o r o c c o was truly alarming. A n d it was certainly not to the best interests of Spain, who looked f o r w a r d to realizing ambitions in that country, to do anything at that time to precipitate a crisis. Such a situation would call f o r immediate action on the p a r t of the European powers. Spain, howe v e r — w i t h her dynasty not yet firmly reseated on the throne, having j u s t put down serious insurrections at home and in Cuba, with her finances in a chaotic state—was in no position to assert her rights in the exclusive manner which she felt to be her due. F o r these reasons alone, to say nothing of the almost certain opposition of some of the powers, an attempt to do so would be foolhardy, and certainly contrary to the conservative policy of consolidation initiated and down to that time consistently adhered to by Cänovas del Castillo, the incumbent prime minister and outstanding statesman. Silvela accordingly replied that he had instructed the Spanish minister at T a n g i e r in the sense desired. 27 H e likewise informed the British charge

d'affaires

of the fresh instructions

that had been sent.28 T h e new instructions ordered that the exercise of protection rivalry f o r the opening of the W e s t e r n Sudan, and plans to w r i t e upon it at an early d a t e . ) 2"

A.S.M.S., A b d el K r i m Brischa to Silvela, 8 June 1878.

"Ibid.,

Silvela to A b d el K r i m Brisoha, 12 June 1878.

"Ibid.,

Silvela to Walsham, 17 June 1878.

68

ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY T H E

SITUATION

should be restricted to the narrowest limits of the treaties, and t h a t all irregularities should be ended with a strong hand.2® However, it was stated t h a t if the Moorish government sought to m o d i f y e x i s t i n g treaty stipulations it should say so. In that case Spanish law required the authorization of the cortes. T h e propositions of the B a r g a s h memorandum were taken up, point by p o i n t , and the views of the minister of state on each were indicated. All these were approved with one exception. T h i s was the demand t h a t foreigners and proteges should p a y the agricultural dues, which in Silvela's estimation could not be conceded by a simple declaration or exchange of notes, but only by the formal ratification of the cortes. In commenting on demand 1, which recognized the agreement of 1 8 6 3 as one of the bases of the system of protection, the Spanish foreign minister observed t h a t while this limited the number of protected native

semsars

that might be employed by a foreign merchant to two, it should not be interpreted as placing any limitation upon the number employed without protection. T h e change in Spanish policy toward Morocco was still further accentuated when in the month of October 1 8 7 8 , Romea was replaced at the T a n g i e r legation by Diosdado, 3 0 a man of " A.S.M.S., royal order to Romea, no. 91, 12 June 1878. •"The immediate occasion for the recall of Romea was his failure to enlist the support of his colleagues at Tangier in demanding satisfaction of the Moorish government for the assassination of a Spanish subject employed as a guard at a lazaretto established by order of the Sanitary Council of Tangier, consisting of the heads of all the foreign missions of that place. The real reason for his dismissal, however, was that he was not considered a suitable instrument for forwarding the new conciliatory policy which Spain now chose to follow in Morocco. Diosdado, who had previously served as secretary of the legation at Tangier under Merry during the period 1860 to 1873, known to be well disposed toward the Moroccan government, was asked to accept the post a f t e r he had written a series of articles for La Epoca expressing disapproval of Romea's line of conduct. The policy which he advocated was for Spain to develop her own resources, meanwhile seeking to uphold the independence of the sultan and keeping all other countries out. He accepted the post only on condition that he should be permitted to carry out these views, declaring at the same time that the best policy for the Spanish government to follow was to cooperate with England. Mss. Div., Brit. Mus., Layard Papers, vol. XCV, Hay to Lavard, private, 6 Feb. 1879.

69

MOEOCCO AT THE PARTING OF THE WAYS g o o d f a m i l y a n d i n d e p e n d e n t m e a n s , a n d a n a d v o c a t e of ation. H i s mission h a d a d u a l o b j e c t i v e . H e seek t o m a i n t a i n the status

quo

and to foment g o o d

following a policy f a v o r a b l e to M o r o c c a n (as

in

Spain,'1

the

case

thereby

of

protection)

recovering

were

concili-

was instructed

interests when

identical

the c o n f i d e n c e o f

with

these

those

Morocco

in

S p a n i s h g o v e r n m e n t , a n d r e g a i n i n g the i n f l u e n c e " w h i c h to

to

relations,

of the

belongs

her."32 S h o r t l y a f t e r a s s u m i n g his n e w p o s i t i o n , D i o s d a d o

reported

t o his g o v e r n m e n t t h a t all the m e m b e r s of t h e d i p l o m a t i c who h a d left T a n g i e r

f o r the s u m m e r

had

returned

corps

and

that

" A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 72, 18 M a y 1879; desp. 127, 29 Jul. 1879. In these despatches the new Spanish minister argued that the irregular and abusive extension of protection not only was increasing the influence of other foreign powers in Morocco, which was prejudicial to Spain's ambitions, but that it also was weakening the authority of

the

sultan over his subjects and was tending to provoke anarchy. Spain was not ready to assert herself in Morocco. Note

this extract:

[If

it were

true that protection

was a means

of

increasing the influence of the nation that granted i t ] ". . . to nobody more than to us would it be expedient to confine this right within certain limits, which would not impair our legitimate interests." Ibid.,

Diosdado to the Sp.

min. of St., desp. 195, 12 Oct. 1879. " A very good statement of the new Spanish policy is found in an unusually cordial royal order addressed by the Duke of Tetuan, minister of state, to Diosdado, 7 June 1879 ( A . S . M . S . ) , approving his prosecution of this policy down to that time. Extracts f o l l o w : "Demonstrating Government

the loyalty of

our intentions and the friendly

spirit

to that which

animates us, we seek t o gain their sympathy and to acquire the preponderance and influence in Morocco to which our geographical situation and antecedents give us a right, but we have no interest in weakening the E m p i r e nor in precipitating events with fatal consequences. On the contrary, it is expedient f o r us to defer these." Spain desired to avoid all differences with Morocco and to enable the sultan to establish his authority over his subjects. A s f o r Spain's attitude toward the British minister, the Spanish foreign minister ordered: ". . . it is expedient that you proceed always in accord with him in general matters which may affect the vitality of the E m p i r e . " I n other matters, Diosdado was instructed to act independently, such as energetically demanding respect f o r Spanish frontiers, the fulfillment of agreements concerning the Spanish possessions in A f r i c a , and

protection

of the interests of Spanish nationals. Diosdado was instructed, however, to make it clearly understood to Moorish authorities that cooperation with England did not signify subservience of Spanish policy.

70

ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY T H E

SITUATION

the conferences on protection were about to be resumed. 33 A t the same time, while admitting t h a t his instructions were adequate, he ventured to make some observations, which if approved would help him, he declared, to fulfill one of the principal objects of his mission, " t o aid loyally in the subsistence of the Moroccan government." I t was his opinion t h a t "the most efficacious way of aiding this government, is not only to put all kinds of obstacles in the way of abuses of protection and to restrict its corruptions tolerated by this government, but also to reduce as much as possible the right of protection. And no one can have greater interest in this than we have, because the conservation of this government and this state interests no one as much as Spain." Then, referring to the right to protect semsars, Diosdado asked why Spain, whose commerce in Morocco was not and could never be as great as t h a t of Great Britain, could not afford to renounce this right, accorded not by a t r e a t y , but by a simple agreement, since England was willing to do so. Moreover, despite the definite instructions he had received concerning the payment of agricultural taxes, he considered himself duty bound to express frankly his own opinion in the matter. Soon a f t e r his arrival at Tangier he had required of the consular officials under him a report upon Spanish and other foreign commerce with Morocco during the last five-year period, as well as a statement of Spanish and foreign properties in t h a t country. As a result of these studies, which showed Spain to be lagging f a r behind Great Britain and France, he concluded t h a t it was futile for his country to hope to compete with them commercially. Their industries were already well established and they could undersell the Spanish on the Moroccan m a r k e t ; moreover, since the products of Morocco were practically the same as those of Spain there existed but a slight basis for trade. I t was his opinion t h a t more French and English subjects were likely to become proprietors in Morocco than Spanish 3 4 ; hence, » A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 264, 25 Nov. 1878. " As has been stated in another connection, the Spanish colony was by, far the largest European group resident in Morocco. It, however, was

71

MOROCCO A T T H E P A R T I N G OF T H E

WAYS

to continue the exemption from payment of the agricultural tax, as provided by treaty, was more to their interest t h a n to Spain's. England, however, was willing to surrender the right because she was willing to subordinate her economic interest in Morocco to aiding the sultan's government to exist. W h y should not Spain adopt the British interpretation of their t r e a t y on this point (the text of which was identical with t h a t of S p a i n ) ? This interpretation was t h a t in the clause exempting foreigners from the payment of taxes only personal taxes had been intended, inasmuch as no foreigners were engaged in agricultural pursuits in Morocco at t h a t time. In case the ministry of state could not adopt this interpretation, then the t r e a t y should be formally amended by the Spanish cortes, in order not to give i n j u r y to the sultan's government—the very thing t h a t Spain was seeking to avoid. In brief, Diosdado would have his government adopt completely the views of the British minister, and he hoped to be able to cooperate fully with H a y in an a t t e m p t to strengthen the declining authority of the sultan. Soon a f t e r sending Diosdado to Tangier, the Spanish foreign minister declared to the British minister at Madrid " t h a t the Spanish government was sincerely desirous of enabling the government of Morocco to maintain itself," and t h a t Diosdado had been especially selected to c a r r y out this object. 3 5 Reports received by the foreign office from H a y immediately indicated t h a t the new Spanish minister's conduct was entirely in accord with these assurances. 3 6 H a y , having been confidentially shown the despatch of Diosdado to his government 37 cited above, likewise informed his government t h a t only in the matter of agricultural taxes was there a difference of views. Believing t h a t the Spanish government had been misled by Romea, he urged the British foreign minister to exert his influence a t Madrid to bring about a complete community of views. Influenced by the suggestions of Diosdado and the desires of largely recruited from the lowest classes of society, many being criminals and army deserters. Many others were political refugees. 15 A.B.L.T., Salisbury to Hay, desp. 57, 15 Nov. 1878. "Ibid., Hay to Salisbury, desp. 103, 14 Dec. 1878. "Ibid., H a y to Salisbury, secret desp. 104, 14 Dec. 1878.

72

ATTEMPTS

TO

BEMEDY

THE

SITUATION

the British government, the Spanish minister of state by the close of 1878 had instructed Diosdado not only to accept the Moorish demand in r e g a r d to agricultural taxation, but also to

subscribe

to

Hay's

point

of

view

concerning

semsars.38

Thenceforth, the Spanish government was to f a v o r protection of commercial agents only f o r the p r o p e r t y of foreigners entrusted in their hands, and not f o r their personal

interests.

A g a i n Diosdado was exhorted to do all within his power to contribute toward the preservation of M o r o c c o , "whose ruin or constant decline would be inevitable if the European powers, and Spain, in particular, indiscreetly carried their demands to extremes. W i t h o u t considering the situation in which it finds itself . . . the complete destruction of that empire next to Spain, and the complications t o which the change would surely lead, would injure our interests in a fundamental and extreme manner, hence the necessity of postponing an event of this sort so f a r as is possible." Silvela, reporting the content of these instructions to W e s t , British minister at that court, declared that "under the circumstances in which the Sultan was p l a c e d " it would be " a political error to insist upon such exemptions," and, therefore, Diosdado had been instructed " t o act in this matter in strict conformity with Sir John Drummond H a y ' s views." 39 Thus it is seen that by the opening of the second series of conferences at T a n g i e r the Spanish government had completel y veered round to the English point of view. Regardless of ultimate objectives as regards M o r o c c o , the immediate interests of these two powers were identical. T h e diplomatic conferences 40 of the year 1879 opened in Febr u a r y and extended over a period of three months. T h e long interval lapsing between the first and second series of meetings was due to the turbulent conditions existing in M o r o c c o during a terrible period of famine and pestilence, the absence of vari" A . S . M . S . , Minute of royal order to Diosdado at T a n g i e r , unnumbered, 31 Dec. 1878. » P . R . O . , Sackville W e s t ( M a d r i d ) to Salisbury, desp. 5, 4 Jan. 1879. " The writer

found the complete text

of

the proces-verbaux

of

these

meetings annexed to Diosdado's desp. 195, 12 Oct. 1879, and his desp. 199, to the Sp. min. of St., in the archives of the Spanish ministry of state.

73

MOROCCO AT T H E PASTING OF T H E

WAYS

ous foreign representatives from Tangier a t one time and another, and the dilatoriness of certain of the governments in issuing instructions to their agents. On opening the initial meeting of the series, Sir J o h n H a y submitted two letters recently received from Cid Mohammed B a r g a s h , Moorish foreign minister. 41 Both of these were characterized by greater firmness and independence than was found in the original memorandum of 1877. In one it was declared t h a t the dictatorial language used by some of the foreign consular officers to native functionaries in the administration of justice would no longer be tolerated; the other, without awaiting the reply of the representatives to demand 19, announced t h a t former Moroccan subjects returning home a f t e r having been naturalized abroad would be subjected to the sultan's jurisdiction. In his introductory speech, H a y , as doyen, frankly recognized the wretched condition of Morocco, a t the same time declaring t h a t no European government could wish to perpetuate it. There existed, moreover, a common interest, in view of the geographical position of the country, in seeing Morocco remain a neutral state. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the European representatives to adopt measures conducive to the maintenance and amelioration of the sultan's government, and for the development of the commerce and general progress of the country. In his opinion grave responsibility would be theirs if they failed to strike at the abuses of protection. H a y declared t h a t during the thirty-four years he had served his government in Morocco he had witnessed a g r a d u a l loss of vigor and vitality on the p a r t of the administration. E a c h year it was receding more, especially in and near the p o r t s where foreigners resided. Upon abandoning irregular protection, H a y declared, the representatives should demand real guarantees from the sultan which would insure their former proteges against a r b i t r a r y treatment by the local functionaries. As for semsars, he was convinced t h a t new arrangements might be made which would remove abuses without i n j u r y to foreign trade. Finally, he expressed the hope t h a t the foreign powers would agree to subject their nationals to the 41

Procte-verbal

of the meeting of 21 Feb. 1879.

74

A T T E M P T S TO REMEDY T H E

SITUATION

agricultural tax. As he envisaged the situation, the whole object of the meetings was to end the causes of weakness of the Moroccan government and to give the sultan the force necess a r y to maintain his a u t h o r i t y ; at the same time safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of foreign nationals established there. All the other representatives save the Italian minister expressed themselves either as concurring in these views, or, a t least, willing to consider the question in a conciliatory spirit. Scovasso, taking a c o n t r a r y stand, expressed the opinion t h a t even if the powers did yield to the desires of the sultan the character of his government would not improve. Experience had disillusioned him. The Moroccan government, he held, was ever ready to make fine promises of reforms and improvements in ret u r n for concessions, but invariably it managed to find pretexts for not fulfilling them. Nevertheless, he declared his willingness to assist in preserving the existence of Morocco. In view of Scovasso's emphatic utterances it was highly questionable from the very outset if the second series of conferences would be able to come to a satisfactory agreement on the vital issues under consideration. T h e first thirteen propositions of the Bargash memorandum were, however, accepted a f t e r little discussion. Some slight changes were made for the sake of exactitude or clarity. 4 2 Serious difference of opinion did not arise until the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth proposals, concerning commercial agents, were reached. 43 The original propositions provided t h a t semsars, who were to be supplied with a letter of identification, might not be arrested, ordinarily, without prior notice having been given to the consular authority upon whom they depended. If they killed or wounded someone, however, they might then be arrested without delay. In this latter case, the consular a u t h o r i t y was to be notified at once and might attend the trial " Procis^oerbaux

of the meeting of 8, 5, 10, and 17 Mar. 1879. Since

these demands were adequately summarized in connection with the conferences of 1877, and no new developments of importance occurred at this time, they are not discussed here. " Proces-verbaux of the meetings of 17 and 27 Mar.

75

MOBOCCO AT THE PASTING OF THE WAYS which h a d to be held a t the p l a c e where the consul resided, o r a t T a n g i e r . A l t h o u g h p r o p e r t y e n t r u s t e d to them b y foreign merc h a n t s was t o be exempt f r o m seizure or t a x a t i o n , semsars

were

to p a y t a x e s upon their own p r o p e r t y . Convinced t h a t this p r o j e c t h a d no chance of being a c c e p t e d , H a y had devised a new scheme of his own which he hoped would meet the requirements of all. H e now submitted this t o the conference as a substitute f o r the o r i g i n a l plan. I t p r o v i d e d t h a t a g e n t s should be chosen only f r o m a m o n g the p o p u l a t i o n of the cities or p o r t s , and not from a m o n g the i n h a b i t a n t s of the vill a g e s of the interior. E a c h should c a r r y a document of identification issued b y the legation of his employer's nation. A n imperial edict should be issued o r d e r i n g all M o o r i s h a u t h o r i t i e s n o t t o molest bearers of such documents, or t o meddle with their a f f a i r s . W h e n c h a r g e d with murder, however, a semsar

might be a r -

rested, but no fine o r imprisonment might be imposed b y the authorities of the interior, who could only make the a r r e s t . I n order t o insure s a f e t y of p r o p e r t y , b o t h of the a g e n t and his employer, a list of all p r o p e r t y f o u n d in his possession should be drawn up b y notaries public in the presence of the local g o v ernor, a c o p y of which was to be f o r w a r d e d t o the g o v e r n o r and consul of the p o r t where the m e r c h a n t e m p l o y i n g him resided. T h e g o v e r n o r of the interior w a s t o be held responsible f o r the s a f e t y of this p r o p e r t y . A s f o r the f a t e of the a r r e s t e d a g e n t , he was to be sent to T a n g i e r or t o the p o r t where his p r i n c i p a l resided t o be j u d g e d b y a c o m p e t e n t tribunal, in the presence of the consul concerned. I f found g u i l t y in the opinion of b o t h the consul and the n a t i v e authorities, his a g e n c y was to be withd r a w n and he was to be given over t o the local a u t h o r i t i e s f o r the ends of j u s t i c e . On the other h a n d , if he were found innocent, the m a t t e r was to be called to the a t t e n t i o n of the sultan b y the p r o p e r f o r e i g n representative a t T a n g i e r , and the g o v e r n o r or sheik responsible f o r the false a c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t him must not only b e a r the expense of the t r i a l , b u t also receive f u r t h e r p u n ishment. In case the M o o r i s h a u t h o r i t i e s and the consul were unable t o r e a c h an agreement u p o n the sentence a g a i n s t

an

a g e n t , an a p p e a l was t o be made t o the M o o r i s h foreign minister

76

ATTEMPTS

TO R E M E D Y

THE

SITUATION

t h r o u g h the medium of the foreign representative concerned. A g e n t s , it should be borne in mind, might not be a r r e s t e d b y the native f u n c t i o n a r i e s f o r offenses o t h e r t h a n m u r d e r . O t h e r c h a r g e s b r o u g h t against them were to be referred by the governor of the i n t e r i o r to T a n g i e r , or to the governor of the city wherein the a g e n t ' s p r i n c i p a l resided, the trial t o be held in the presence of a consular officer. Should the sentence prove unsatisf a c t o r y to the l a t t e r an a p p e a l might be made to the M o r o c c a n minister of foreign a f f a i r s . In the m a t t e r of t a x a t i o n , commercial a g e n t s were to p a y the o r d i n a r y local taxes, but t h r o u g h the medium of their princip a l ' s c o n s u l ; they were, however, to be exempt f r o m all a r b i t r a r y fines or impositions levied by the local authorities. H a y himself proposed t h a t these rules should be a d o p t e d originally f o r one y e a r only. If they proved to be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y a t the end of t h a t period, then he would be willing to fall back upon the t e r m s of the agreement of 1863, or rules even more extreme. In commenting upon his p r o j e c t , H a y dwelt a t some length upon the d a n g e r s resulting t o M o r o c c o f r o m the choice of semsars f r o m a m o n g the natives of the r u r a l districts. I n addition to the c o r r u p t p r a c t i c e s a t t e n d i n g the p r o t e c t i o n of wealthy f a r m e r s of the interior, he emphasized the resulting menace to the a u t h o r i t y of the s u l t a n , who depended u p o n this class of s u b j e c t s f o r the preservation of order and the enforcement of his decrees. If the p r a c t i c e were allowed to continue, chaos would certainly result. W i t h fifty B r i t i s h m e r c h a n t s under his j u r i s diction, H a y announced his determination to claim the same r i g h t s f o r them as other foreign representatives p e r m i t t e d their nationals. H a y ' s plan met with the a p p r o v a l of all the representatives except his F r e n c h and I t a l i a n colleagues. 44 T h e G e r m a n and 44

The Italian representative was not as vehement as before in his opposition on this occasion. H e merely stated that merchants had told him that it was desirable to be able to choose agents from among natives living near the markets of the interior. But, he argued, if all the merchants chose their agents from the cities they would find themselves in an equal position and there would be no ground for complaint.

77

MOROCCO

AT

THE

PARTING

OF

THE

WAYS

Portuguese agents declared themselves "completely in a c c o r d " with it. I n the opinion of the Belgian minister it offered " e v e r y guarantee desirable f o r bona fide commerce." Diosdado went a step further, expressing the conviction that protected

semsars

were even detrimental to the best interests of legitimate commerce. T h e prime o b j e c t of the conferences, the French minister contended, in presenting his view, was simply to put an end t o abuses resulting from irregular protection, and to secure the strict and loyal execution of treaties and conventions. H i s g o v ernment had directed him to cooperate with his colleagues toward that end. I t had not, however, authorized him to abandon any of the privileges guaranteed to France by t r e a t y , and especially by the " c o n v e n t i o n " of 1863. T h e r e f o r e , inasmuch as the French treaties placed no such restriction upon the choice of semsars, he was unable to accept H a y ' s proposition restricting the choice of them to the cities and ports. A t the same time, he declared his willingness to subject them to the payment of the agricultural taxes, under certain safeguards, although he insisted that the incentive f o r acquiring protection being thereby removed, abuses would automatically cease, and that there would then be no reason to oppose rural proteges. On the other hand, he contended that such a restriction would cause the ruin of French commerce in Morocco. 4 5 F o r e i g n merchants trading " I t is appropriate at this point to interject a statement concerning the method of carrying on commerce in Morocco in this period. In the walled port towns, which served as point of deposit f o r merchandise and produce, foreign merchants lived secure against the disorder and lawlessness of the interior. Most of their commercial transactions took place in the interior, where, in various local districts of each province, market days were held regularly

each week. A t

these markets, sometimes

four

or five days distant from the nearest port, foreign importations were sold and native goods purchased. On market day all trails led to the market, where the neighboring tribesmen assembled. Arriving, a motley concourse of from five to ten thousand, all well armed, with a large number of laden animals, they pitched their tents and offered for sale or barter the products of their labor. Market day with its jugglers,

snake-charmers,

vendors

of

sweetmeats

and

pastries,

story-tellers, and numerous other diversions, must have been a real event in the dull lives of the rural inhabitants.

78

ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY THE

SITUATION

with the interior felt the need of agents who knew local conditions p e r f e c t l y : the days of markets, distances between them, their exact location, places to sleep with least insecurity, etc. Other important qualifications of agents were responsibility and trustworthiness. Since persons of wealth and standing in a community generally were the most desirable class, the wealthy natives of the interior seemed best to meet all the requirements of g o o d commercial agents operating in the rural districts. H a y ' s argument that the sultan was dependent upon this selfsame class f o r police and military service in the rural districts was, in the opinion of the French minister, one that merited I n many parts of the interior it was exceedingly dangerous f o r a European t o travel, and in no part w e r e they permitted to travel unless attended

by

a native soldier. T h e

practice, therefore, arose of

employing

natives, frequently Jews, as their agents. A s has been stated, under the agreement of 1883 only merchants who imported or exported merchandise were entitled to employ brokers, and the number allowed each was limited to two. When a trader f e l t the need of a f a c t o r or temsar

he made ap-

plication to his consul, indicating the native whom he wished to employ. T h e consul then transmitted

the application to his chief

at T a n g i e r ,

to-

gether with the p r o p e r explanations. I f the application were approved, a certificate or letter of protection was issued by the legation t o the prot6g£, which exempted him f r o m the payment o f taxes and the jurisdiction o f the Moorish authorities, and enabled him t o travel in the interior and there traffic with the natives without molestation. These brokers bore considerable responsibility, often being entrusted with considerable sums of money and merchandise. Accompanied by one or t w o attendants, with tents, utensils, etc., they traveled f r o m market to market, one, t w o or more days' distance apart, through wild country

unprovided

with roads, inns and regular police, inhabited by a semi-barbarous population, exposed to being robbed or even murdered by bandits who sometimes connived with the local chiefs. Generally, however, certificates of

protec-

tion were respected by the local sheiks, who were held responsible by the sultan f o r the security and f r e e d o m of f o r e i g n trade when his authority over them was a reality. P r i o r to the T a n g i e r conferences protection exercised over the commercial agent was unqualified, its real o b j e c t being to secure the money and goods entrusted to him by his employer. Some the U n i t e d

first-hand

observers, like

States consul-general, held that ". . . trade would cease

exist the moment it was known in the interior that the people by f o r e i g n merchants were unprotected. . . .

A

agent

disadvantages

[sic]

protected

is undoubtedly

under

great

merchant not having his

others whose agents are secured against injustices."

Mathews t o Evarts, T a n g i e r desp. 270, 25 Jan. 1878.

79

to

employed

compared

to

A.U.S.C.-G.T.,

MOBOCCO

AT

THE

PARTING

OF

THE

WAYS

c a r e f u l consideration. H e expressed the view, however, t h a t even if p r o t e c t e d the l o c a l n o t a b l e s would continue v o l u n t a r i l y to p e r f o r m this service because their honor and interest would demand it. B e i n g p r o p e r t y owners they would n a t u r a l l y be interested in the m a i n t e n a n c e of law and order. 4 6 W h e r e a s the B r i t i s h minister h a d in mind the interests of the M o r o c c a n g o v e r n m e n t , Y e r n ouillet d e c l a r e d , " A s f o r me, I permit myself t o be guided b y the c o m m e r c i a l interests of F r a n c e . " F r e n c h e x p o r t s , a l t h o u g h less than those of G r e a t B r i t a i n , were, a c c o r d i n g to the F r e n c h a g e n t , unlike the B r i t i s h in t h a t they were of such n a t u r e as to be p r o c u r a b l e only a t g r e a t d i s t a n c e s in the i n t e r i o r where arbitrariness

and

violence,

rather

than

the

sultan's

authority,

reigned. A s f o r M o o r i s h a u t h o r i t i e s being conceded the r i g h t to a r r e s t the a g e n t s of F r e n c h m e r c h a n t s accused of m u r d e r , it w a s impossible f o r the F r e n c h minister t o admit it. S u c h a concession would have the most serious results, in view of the a r b i t r a r y actions of the l o c a l f u n c t i o n a r i e s . I n the m a t t e r of t a x a t i o n , he held the view t h a t " a s p r o p r i e t o r s , the semsars

m i g h t be sub-

j e c t e d to these e x a c t i o n s , but as a g e n t s of o u r m e r c h a n t s t h e y should be i n v i o l a b l e . " H e w a s willing, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e y should p a y the a g r i c u l t u r a l t a x e s . Sir John H a y ' s

r e p l y t o Vernouillet w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d

by

p r a c t i c a l k n o w l e d g e r e s u l t i n g f r o m a l o n g p e r i o d of experience. No

one, he d e c l a r e d , desired more t h a n he t h a t

commercial

a g e n t s should e n j o y the widest g u a r a n t e e s f o r the s a f e g u a r d i n g of l e g i t i m a t e interests e n t r u s t e d to t h e m — b u t g u a r a n t e e s tendi n g t o t h a t end alone, and not those which would f a v o r them p e r s o n a l l y t o the d e t r i m e n t of the M o r o c c a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d , i n d i r e c t l y , to the i n j u r y of commerce itself. H e denied

that

" O n e is t e m p t e d h e r e t o a c c u s e the F r e n c h m i n i s t e r of b e i n g i m p r a c t i c a l in his k n o w l e d g e of M o r o c c a n conditions. T h e t e r m honor, Moorish

chiefs,

seems

naive.

As

for

his

argument

of

applied to local self-interest,

n o t a b l e s w o u l d , no d o u b t , c o n t i n u e to t r y to look o u t f o r Iheir men after

securing

foreign

protection,

as

before, through

the

the

interests

strength

of

a

p e r s o n a l f o l l o w i n g . T h e y w o u l d no l o n g e r , h o w e v e r , b e f o r c e d t o heed t h e o r d e r s of the s u l t a n to a c t f o r the common w e a l . T h i s a r g u m e n t

sounds

a s if it w e r e m o r e a p p l i c a b l e t o E u r o p e a n p e o p l e s t h a n t o t h e s e m i - b a r b a r o u s s u b j e c t s of the s u l t a n .

80

A T T E M P T S TO R E M E D Y T H E

SITUATION

F r e n c h e x p o r t s had t o be procured at markets situated f a r t h e r in the interior than were those of the British. W h i l e

admit-

ting t h a t the French commerce in wool at the moment was g r e a t er than the British, he held that British e x p o r t s of all k i n d s — g r a i n , oil, leather, w a x , gum, e t c . — h a d to be bought at the remote markets of the interior. A l l told, the volume of British exp o r t s was g r e a t e r than the e x p o r t s of all the other nations combined. "Above

all," H a y

pleaded, " l e t us have a government, f o r

without government, commerce is impossible. E s p e c i a l l y let us t r y not to hinder the government, depriving it of those means vital t o its administration, and our commerce will have only t o c o n g r a t u l a t e itself because of it, f o r then we will be in a position to demand of it, with justice, because we will not have deprived it of those means, the cessation of the instability [Je

changer]

which exists t o d a y , and which is so troublesome to commerce. T h a t is the o b j e c t of my proposals. . . . " T h e veteran British statesman closed with a note of warning. I f all f o r e i g n representatives applied the rule of 1863, permitt i n g each merchant to p r o t e c t two semsars,

where would the

p r a c t i c e lead? Surely to a n a r c h y ; and commerce would suffer the consequences. N o t much remained to be said on the subject. D i o s d a d o , supp o r t i n g H a y , repeated that the personal p r o t e c t i o n of

com-

mercial agents was c o n t r a r y to the bona fide interests of commerce, as well as incompatible with the independence of M o r o c c o . H e f u r t h e r expressed the opinion t h a t the M o r o c c a n ment might l e g a l l y a b r o g a t e the agreement of

govern-

1863, once i t

was convinced that its terms endangered M o r o c c o ' s existence. 47 T h e German minister, agreeing that the administration of the c o u n t r y would be seriously compromised if the p r a c t i c e of selecting semsars 17

f r o m the wealthy inhabitants of the rural dis-

Doubtless it could have done so, but the weak and timid

Moroccan

government had no desire t o antagonize the French. A n y w a y , it is difficult to understand what Morocco could have gained f r o m such procedure. This agreement limited French rights in the matter of protection over the p r o visions of the treaty of

1767, which, in case the agreement of

denounced, would come again into f u l l operation.

81

1863 w e r e

MOHOCCO AT T H E

P A R T I N G OF T H E

WAYS

t r i c t s w a s allowed t o c o n t i n u e , s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e s u l t a n m i g h t p u t a n end t o t h e d a n g e r b y p r o h i b i t i n g all s u b j e c t s m o r e o r less d i r e c t l y in his service f r o m a c c e p t i n g a p o s i t i o n as c o m m e r cial a g e n t . 4 8 T h e p r o p o s a l t o subject foreign subjects and proteges t o the payment

of a g r i c u l t u r a l t a x e s m e t with a b e t t e r

reception,49

r e c e i v i n g the a p p r o v a l o f all. Vernouillet, t h e F r e n c h a c c e p t e d it, in view of t h e f a c t t h a t in no o t h e r

minister,

Mohammedan

c o u n t r y were f o r e i g n e r s e x e m p t f r o m p a y i n g this s o r t of

tax.

H o w e v e r , since t h e M o r o c c a n g o v e r n m e n t down t o t h a t t i m e h a d only t a c i t l y a d m i t t e d t h e r i g h t of E u r o p e a n s t o possess i m m o v able p r o p e r t y in the E m p i r e , he p r o p o s e d t h a t it should now be required t o follow t h e e x a m p l e of o t h e r s t a t e s , e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g nizing it, in r e t u r n f o r t h e concession j u s t mentioned. H a y w a s willing t o a d o p t

the s u g g e s t i o n , b u t felt t h a t

the

acquisition

of immovable p r o p e r t y b y f o r e i g n e r s should a l w a y s receive t h e p r i o r c o n s e n t o f t h e M o r o c c a n g o v e r n m e n t , t h a t titles t o p r o p e r t y should follow t h e f o r m s p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e law of t h e c o u n " The view of the United States department of state may be of some interest here. Mr. Mathews in reporting to the state department in 1877, concerning his prot6g6s, mentioned "agents of American citizens." Mr. Everts asked for an explanation (A.U.S.C.-G.T., Evarts to Mathews, instrs. 119, 7 Dec. 1877), declaring: "The policy of this Government for years past has been to withhold its authority to protect in Mohametan countries, any other than citizens of the United States, and persons not citizens, who may be in the actual service of the ministers and consuls. I am aware of no reason why this policy should be deviated from." In a subsequent despatch (Ibid., Evarts to Mathews, instrs. 123, 27 Feb. 1878) he denied the right of an American agent to issue a passport bestowing protection save upon an American citizen, despite the fact that the arguments advanced by Mr. Mathews seemed "plausible." Mathews replied (Ibid., Mathews to Evarts, desp. 276, 29 Apr. 1878) that the document in question was not a passport. The practice had been established by the agreement of 1863 between the French and Moroccan governments, and subsequently adopted by other foreign representatives at Tangier. It was necessary for the protection of foreign commercial interests. Evarts' final instructions (Ibid., Evarts to Mathews, instrs. 129, 27 May 1878) were: " I f , therefore, you believe that the instrument referred to is essential for the safety of trade with the interior, you may issue it accordingly." I t was not, however, to be issued for the protection of the native agent himself, but "solely as a shield to property of American merchants destined for the interior." " Procda-verbal

of the meeting of 1 Apr. 1879.

82

A T T E M P T S TO R E M E D Y

THE

SITUATION

t r y , and t h a t questions rising out of these rights should be determined in accordance with the same. Closely related to this question was t h a t of the g a t e tax. 5 0 T h e proposal t h a t foreign s u b j e c t s and proteges should p a y this t a x did not appear in the original memorandum, but had been first advanced by the American consul-general in the meetings of 1 8 7 7 . Subsequently it had been the s u b j e c t of a special letter addressed by the M o r o c c a n foreign minister to the diplomatic corps. I t was not unanimously agreed t h a t the payment of the t a x should be conceded, but t h a t previously an agreement should be reached with the Moorish authorities as to the amount of the t a x and its mode of collection; nor was the t a x to be increased thereafter save in accordance with a new a r rangement. T h e j u s t n e s s of the sultan's demand denouncing the officious meddling of the native employees of legations and consulates in m a t t e r s of local j u s t i c e was admitted without hesitation. An interesting debate ensued upon the question of naturalization. On this point the diplomatic corps was more evenly divided. In the opposition were found the representatives of P o r t u g a l , the United S t a t e s , and F r a n c e . T h e Italian minister declined to commit himself. T h e Spanish minister argued t h a t it was a sovereign right of the sultan to legislate as he saw fit upon this s u b j e c t , j u s t as other governments of independent countries had the unquestioned right to do. Mathews, American representative, as in 1 8 7 7 , declared his inability to accept the sultan's claim of possessing the right to exercise jurisdiction over former s u b j e c t s who returned to M o r o c c o after having been naturalized abroad, referring to his instructions, which read, " . . .

you will under the T r e a t y of

1 8 3 6 , claim for them [American citizens, whether natives or naturalized] the same privileges and immunities as may be enj o y e d by the citizens or s u b j e c t s of any other Power who also may have been natives of M o r o c c o , unless the Government t o which such citizens or s u b j e c t s may owe allegiance shall have M

Procds-verbal

of the meeting of 5 Apr. 1879.

83

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E

WAYS

a t r e a t y of naturalization." 5 1 H a y briefly observed t h a t while the right of protection was recognized by the Moroccan government in treaties, the right of upholding the foreign naturalization of Moroccan subjects in Morocco was nowhere admitted. The French minister acknowledged t h a t the sultan's complaints were justified. Granting, however, t h a t he could make a t home any laws t h a t he chose, Vernouillet denied that he could change the naturalization law existing within another state without its consent! Demand 19 conflicted with the French naturalization law which did not make provision for the case of a n a t uralized Frenchman returning to reside in his original country. " W e have only one kind of naturalization, and it confers upon naturalized persons all the rights of French citizens without any exception being made of the country wherein they reside." The French government, which would have to amend its law before being able to accept this proposal, was willing to enter into f u r t h e r discussion with the other powers on the subject. The chief opposition was voiced by Cola^o, the Portuguese agent, who also spoke for the Brazilian government. In principle his position was identical with t h a t of his French and American colleagues. As regards the determined stand recently taken by the sultan's government in the matter of naturalization, he declared t h a t it would be held accountable for any injuries sustained by the naturalized subjects of the powers which he represented. Colafo contended t h a t there existed the n a t u r a l right of every man to e x p a t r i a t e himself from a country t h a t mistreated him or wherein he was unable to make a living. Admitting t h a t as a general rule naturalized persons were subject to the laws of the country wherein they resided, he held t h a t there was even less reason to apply this rule in Morocco than in the countries of the Levant because of the greater backwardness of Morocco and the extreme fanaticism of its people. Protection merely supplied to the returned native naturalized abroad those rights which the local authorities were unable to guarantee them, but " A.U.S.C.-G.T., Evarts to Mathews, instrs. 119, 7 Dec. 1877.

84

ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY T H E SITUATION which t h e y h a d a r i g h t to e x p e c t . " I t would n o t be j u s t , " said C o l a f o , " t h a t a m a n , who h a v i n g a c q u i r e d o r developed means of livelihood u n d e r t h e benevolent a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of a f o r e i g n c o u n t r y where he h a d m a d e himself w o r t h y of t h e t i t l e of citizen, u p o n r e t u r n i n g to M o r o c c o a n d r e m a i n i n g u n d e r the p r o t e c t i o n of t h e a d o p t i n g c o u n t r y , should be e x p o s e d to a r b i t r a r i n e s s a n d violence, which, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , a r e t h e p r i n c i p a l a n d

original

c a u s e of p r o t e c t i o n . " M o r o c c a n s u b j e c t s , once h a v i n g legitim a t e l y a d o p t e d a new c o u n t r y , b e c a m e t r u e s u b j e c t s o r citizens of i t , a n d ceased entirely t o be t h e s u b j e c t s of t h e s u l t a n . If these principles were not recognized b y t h e v a r i o u s n a t i o n s , half t h e s u b j e c t s of t h e new world would be claimed b y t h e old. M o r o c c o would lose n o t h i n g f r o m the r e t u r n of h e r f o r m e r s u b j e c t s , he a r g u e d . T h e y g e n e r a l l y e n g a g e d in commerce, helpi n g t h e r e b y to i n c r e a s e the wealth of t h e c o u n t r y a n d the gove r n m e n t ' s income f r o m the c u s t o m s . If M o h a m m e d a n s , t h e y volu n t a r i l y s u b m i t t e d in m a n y m a t t e r s t o k o r a n i c law. J e w s likewise continued to r e s p e c t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e i r r a b b i s . T h e i r residence in M o r o c c o was a positive a d v a n t a g e . A d m i t t i n g , however, t h a t sometimes n a t u r a l i z a t i o n p a p e r s were o b t a i n e d in a f r a u d u l e n t m a n n e r , he condemned all s u c h p r a c t i c e s , a n d in closi n g declared his r e a d i n e s s t o a c t in c o n c e r t w i t h his colleagues t o give t h e M o r o c c a n g o v e r n m e n t all t h e f o r c e a n d l i b e r t y of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n possible. W i t h this, the discussion of t h e B a r g a s h m e m o r a n d u m closed. T h e r e were, however, some a d d i t i o n a l m a t t e r s t o consider. T h e s e h a d been called t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e d i p l o m a t i c c o r p s b y B a r g a s h in two l e t t e r s s u b m i t t e d i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g

the

o p e n i n g of the conferences. I n one of these t h e M o o r i s h minister of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s c h a r g e d t h a t c o n s u l a r officers, when s u b m i t t i n g a c o m p l a i n t t o a M o o r i s h t r i b u n a l a g a i n s t a n a t i v e s u b j e c t on behalf of a n a t i o n a l o r p r o t e g e , o f t e n did not a s k the local a u t h o r i t y t o e x a m i n e t h e c a s e in o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e i t s m e r i t s , b u t i n s t e a d d e m a n d e d t h a t t h e accused be punished f o r t h w i t h , a n d t h a t he be n o t released witho u t t h e i r consent. S u c h p r o c e d u r e could no l o n g e r be t o l e r a t e d , a n d the s u l t a n d e c l a r e d his i n t e n t i o n of i n s t r u c t i n g his g o v e r 85

MOROCCO

AT

THE

PABTING

OF T H E

WAYS

nors in this sense. W h e n a consular official believed he was unable t o receive justice from the local authorities f o r an individual dependent upon his authority, his p r o p e r course was t o c a r r y the matter to the Moorish foreign minister through the medium of his chief. A l l the foreign representatives, admitting the justice of this complaint, agreed to f o r w a r d Bargash their separate replies, at the same time issuing the a p p r o p r i a t e orders to their subordinate consular officers. T h e second letter was of a more general nature, though likewise dealing

with

irregular

protection. 5 2

It

contained

three

points: ( 1 ) since abusive protection was causing g r e a t i n j u r y t o the sultan and his government, he pressed the foreign representatives f o r an early reply to his memorandum of 1 8 7 7 ; ( 2 ) the Moroccan government asked that protection be withdrawn f r o m all persons e n j o y i n g it irregularly, and that in the future the practice of extending protection should adhere strictly to the treaty stipulations; and ( 3 ) the M o r o c c a n government declared its readiness to give written guarantees that no unjust or a r b i t r a r y act would be committed against those thus deprived of irregular protection. Should any such person subsequently be accused of an offense, the consul upon whose authority he had formerly depended was to be notified, in order to insure that justice would be done. T h e dean of the diplomatic corps then read an additional letter from Bargash received after the commencement of the sessions, in which the latter invited the foreign representatives, upon finishing their work and before referring the results to their respective governments, to meet at his house where he might exchange views with them. Just when the conference was at the point of ending, Scovasso arose and declared that he wished to present his general views upon the subject of protection. I t a l y , he stated, was as much interested as any other power, in seeing M o r o c c o remain an independent state, strong and prosperous. H i s government had, moreover, always been ready to cooperate with the other powers t o insure that end. a

Proda-verbal

of the meeting of 16 Apr. 1879.

86

ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY THE

SITUATION

W h a t , he asked, were the causes of the increasing debility of Morocco? Protection, which in his opinion was a comparatively slight cause, was being made to appear a frightful phantom. Proceeding to trace the development of the protection system from its origins to that day, Scovasso advanced the argument that since the French treaty of 1767, which specified the persons who might e n j o y protection, the foreign representatives had gradually extended the limits of protection, with the tacit consent of the Moroccan Government, thereby developing "customary rights," in addition to those found in the treaties. Even the agreement of 1863, which had attempted to check the abuses of protection, had not obliterated these rights acquired through usage. Abusive protection, in the opinion of Scovasso, was even more prejudicial to the foreign powers than to Morocco, because it decreased their moral prestige in the eyes of the Moroccan government. T h e preservation of

this moral prestige, by which

the Italian minister appeared to lay great store, was indispensable both to their personal dignity and to the interests of their nationals. On the other hand, the damage done to the Moroccan government was not derived from the fact that a number of subjects, estimated by him at between 100 and 150, had irregularly been withdrawn from the sultan's jurisdiction, with a possible i n j u r y to the treasury of a few thousand dollars. All told, the number of proteges, regular and irregular, he estimated at no more than 563 (not including their dependents). On the basis of these arguments he arrived at the conclusion that protection was not even a secondary cause of the decadence of Morocco. H a y , he charged, could afford to adopt a more liberal attitude in the matter of reform than his colleagues. T h e British minister had no need to claim the right of customary protection; on the contrary, he might even renounce his treaty rights without danger to the interests of his nationals. " I n fact, his more than intimate relations with the shereefian government, his very long residence in Morocco, his personal qualities and other cir-

87

MOEOCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E AVA YS

cumstances in his favor, which have enabled him to acquire a well-merited prestige, react upon the local authorities in an unbelievable manner, which places him in a position truly exceptional in this country." Scovasso, on the other hand, in order to defend and preserve the interests of his nationals and their dependents, had no choice but to preserve with care both the rights stipulated in the treaties and those developed through custom. Instead of being detrimental, protection, he held, was a positive advantage to Morocco. In those regions of the Empire where European interests were most important the country was richest and most prosperous. W h a t , then, were the real causes of Morocco's decline? He listed four internal causes—inefficient governmental organization; general corruption in all spheres of administration; nonsalaried officers; and insecurity of life and p r o p e r t y and uncertainty of justice. How, he asked, could a country under such circumstances prosper? How could it have the effrontery to ask the foreign powers to surrender privileges indispensable to them? Scovacco saw an attempt to invalidate the right of customary protection in Morocco's demand t h a t the extension of protection be strictly limited to the terms of the treaties. On this point the Italian government could never yield. As defined by Scovasso, irregtdar protection was not t h a t granted without t r e a t y justification, but t h a t obtained by gifts or money, or granted on a wholesale scale, as by the Spanish representative in 1859, or t h a t given to natives employed by merchants who were not engaged in wholesale import and export commerce. A fifth cause of the deplorable state of Morocco he saw in the struggle for influence which went on at Tangier between certain of the foreign representatives, in which amour propre almost always played the principal role. This f a c t o r resulted in occasional bombardments and campaigns, interference with the internal administration of the country, and u n j u s t treatment of the local authorities—all of which injured the prestige of the Moorish government in the eyes of its subjects. 88

ATTEMPTS

TO

REMEDY

THE

SITUATION

T h e B r i t i s h and I t a l i a n ministers held d i r e c t l y o p p o s i t e views as t o the p r o c e d u r e that should be a d o p t e d in e f f e c t i n g an imp r o v e m e n t of c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t i n g in the M o r o c c a n E m p i r e . T h e f o r m e r a d v o c a t e d that the f o r e i g n p o w e r s should take the

first

step, d i s c o n t i n u i n g abusive p r o t e c t i o n , and thereby a f f o r d i n g the sultan

sufficient

throughout

strength

to

establish

his a u t h o r i t y

securely

his realms. Subsequently he was to be induced t o

c a r r y out r e f o r m s . S c o v a s s o , on the o t h e r hand, insisted

that

it behooved the sultan to make the first move. Once he had demo n s t r a t e d his g o o d f a i t h b y c a r r y i n g out various r e f o r m s which insured the s a f e t y of f o r e i g n e r s and their interests in the count r y , the p o w e r s m i g h t then s a f e l y surrender their special ileges which were at present

indispensable. S c o v a s s o

priv-

proposed

t h a t the f o r e i g n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s end their r i v a l r y f o r influence and unite in f o r c i n g M o r o c c o g r a d u a l l y t o a d v a n c e in the p a t h way

of

civilization.

For

the

present

Morocco

would, he

be-

lieved, be satisfied with m e r e l y the removal of abuses. S c o v a s s o closed his l o n g a n d i n t e r e s t i n g speech b y summarizing

the a d v i c e which he d e c l a r e d lie was about

government. I t

should not

from treaty

custom)

or

renounce its r i g h t

to protect

natives

t o g i v e his

(derived

other

than

e m p l o y e d b y the l e g a t i o n s a n d consulates, if such

either those

protection

had been extended within reasonable limits and f o r j u s t cause. 53 It

should retain all p r o t e g e s whose names had been inscribed

as such in the r e g i s t e r of his l e g a t i o n p r i o r to the y e a r 1871. 5 4 T h e I t a l i a n g o v e r n m e n t should claim f o r the n a t i v e merchants under its p r o t e c t i o n

the same r i g h t

of e m p l o y i n g

commercial

a g e n t s as was e n j o y e d b y f o r e i g n merchants. I t should, on the 53

Diosdado summed up his view in regard to the right of

"customary

protection," claimed by the Italian minister, in the f o l l o w i n g w o r d s : ". . . since the origin of these protections is vicious, they cannot be legitimized by the passage of time." A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 218, 16 N o v . 1879. " S c o v a s s o was c a r c f u l to choose a date that would include numerous proteges and

who had been

"who,

because of

granted their

irregular

honorability

protection and

by

his

predecessors

position, justly

merit

the

consideration of the Italian g o v e r n m e n t . " T h e ostensible reason given

for

selecting this date, however, was that the complaints of Morocco

applied

only to the abuses that had arisen during the last seven or eight years.

89

MOEOCCO AT T H E PASTING OF T H E

WAYS

other hand, require all its subjects and proteges to p a y the agricultural and gate taxes due the sultan, provided these were fixed by a previous agreement with the foreign representatives. Whenever the Italian representative considered it necessary, in the interest of his country, to g r a n t special protection to a Moroccan subject, he should first obtain the approval of his home government. T h e German and Spanish agents professed to consider the g r e a t e r p a r t of Scovasso's discourse outside the scope of the conferences. The former was of the opinion t h a t the object of the meetings would be attained by replying to the propositions of Bargash. As it seemed to him, the whole burden of the Italian minister's speech was to demonstrate t h a t commerce could not prosper save with the continuance of abuses complained of by the Moorish government. "As for me," he declared, " I believe t h a t the more strictly and conscientiously the representatives observe the treaties upon this point, the more grounds there will be for hoping t h a t the Moroccan government will open the country to the commerce of E u r o p e and to the influence of civilization." Diosdado observed t h a t neither had the Moroccan government asked for advice, nor had his government authorized him to discuss the interior administration of Morocco. His legation had already erased from its list of proteges the names of all those found there without t r e a t y justification, considering, as it did, t h a t abusive protection was one of the principal causes of the weakness of the shereefian government. Vernouillet, French representative, declaring his intention of confining protection thereafter to the provisions of the treaties and conventions, announced t h a t he, too, had discontinued irregular protection. By way of summary, it may be noted t h a t the T a n g i e r conferences of 1879, like those of two years before, ended without the foreign representatives being able to reach a complete agreement. While a m a j o r i t y of the Moroccan demands had been unanimously approved, yet the French, Italian, Portuguese, and American representatives objected to one or more of the most important points of the original memorandum. T h e Portuguese,

90

ATTEMPTS

TO R E M E D Y

THE

SITUATION

American, and French agents were unable to accept the proposal concerning naturalization, while the Italian minister felt obliged to submit it to Rome for decision. The French and Italian ministers refused to forgo the right of choosing commercial agents from among the rural population or to admit the right of the local authorities to arrest them. Besides, Scovasso advanced a new claim to the vague right of "customary protection" which advocates of reform feared might prove to be a loophole for a multitude of evils. At the same time the Italian minister declined to withdraw protection from those granted it irregularly prior to the year 1871. Throughout the meetings H a y , in striving to bring about the acceptance of all the sultan's demands, had the full support of his Spanish, German, and Belgian colleagues. This group spoke for eight of the thirteen governments represented at T a n gier." In accordance with the request of the Moorish minister of foreign affairs, the diplomatic corps met at his residence on J u l y 19. 58 On this occasion only those propositions over which differences of views had developed in the preceding conferences were discussed. In the m a t t e r of protected commercial agents the H a y substitute proposals were submitted for Bargash's observations. The Moroccan foreign minister raised serious objections to them on the ground t h a t the actions of native semsars, exempt from local jurisdiction, had produced an intolerable state of affairs, and he did not consider that H a y ' s proposals went f a r enough to eliminate abuses. H e even went so f a r as to declare t h a t it would be preferable t h a t commerce should cease t h a n t h a t the authority of the sultan's officers should be destroyed. 57 This " S i r John H a y represented the governments of Austria-Hungary, Denmark, and the Netherlands at Tangier, as well as that of Great Britain. The Belgian minister also represented Sweden-Norway. " A . B . L . T , H a y to Salisbury, desp. 50, 28 Jul. 1879; A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 127, 29 Jul. 1879. For the text of the -prochsverbal of the meeting see Documents Diplomatiques: Conferences de Madrid (hereafter referred to as Docs. Dipl.: Conf. de Mad.), 125-34. 61 The text of this declaration follows: ". . . nous serons dans notre droit en interdisant le commerce, notre premier devoir 6tant de conserver l'au-

91

MOROCCO

AT

THE

PARTING

OF T H E

WAYS

d e c l a r a t i o n f o r e s h a d o w e d a t h r e a t which he was later to e m p l o y a t the conference of M a d r i d . H a y , therefore, withdrew his propositions, 5 8 u p o n the condition t h a t , a f t e r the m a t t e r had been referred to the v a r i o u s g o v e r n m e n t s , r e g u l a t i o n s should be framed by the foreign representatives in concert with the M o r o c c a n government.

Such

r e g u l a t i o n s should insure the s a f e t y of foreign commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s in the interior without i n j u r y or detriment to the government of M o r o c c o . B a r g a s h e x p r e s s e d the willingness of his g o v ernment to enter into such an agreement, which, he hoped, w o u l d place commerce on an equal basis for natives and foreigners alike. B a r g a s h voiced the g r a t i t u d e of his government for the concession made in the m a t t e r of a g r i c u l t u r a l taxes. I n r e g a r d to the condition, however, upon which the F r e n c h minister

had

insisted, c o n c e r n i n g the recognition of the right of foreigners t o hold immovable p r o p e r t y , he demurred. If the

Moroccan

demand r e g a r d i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l t a x e s was well-founded,

there

\vas no reason for m a k i n g c o n d i t i o n s ; if not, he asked t o be shown why it was not. H e a r g u e d , moreover, t h a t the explicit recognition of the right of owning immovable p r o p e r t y would torit§ et Ια t r a n q u i l l i t e d a n s l'F.mpire. I-a tranquillite se conserve sans commerce, elle nc se conserve pas sans autorite." M A c c o r d i n g to a subsequent s t a t e m e n t m a d e bv H a v (A.B.L.T., H a y t o Salisbury, desp. 41, 16 M a r . 1880), be withdrew this p r o j e c t feeling a t the s a m e time t h a t it was sufficient to insure commercial a g e n t s a g a i n s t t h e a r b i t r a r y action of governors in the interior, a n d t h a t any set of r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t might ultimately be a d o p t e d should resemble it. A t t h e same time, he hoped (Ibitl., H a y to Salisbury, desp. 50, 28 J u l . 1879) t h a t the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t could be induced t o agree to some such plan. I t should be m a d e t o see t h a t abuses committed by semsars in the interior w e r e on the increase, and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , the British minister had held in check so f a r as possible the a p p o i n t m e n t by British merchants of native a g e n t s not residents of the ports. British and other foreign s u b j e c t s would in the end r i g h t f u l l y insist upon being placed upon the same footing as the most f a v o r e d nation. "Should the n u m b e r of these agents be increased as they will be t e n - f o l d , if the F r e n c h a g r e e m e n t of 1863 remains in f o r c e and the a g e n t s a r e selected by m e r c h a n t s , as is always the case, f r o m the chief f a r m e r s in the villages, the Bashas and chiefs of the int e r i o r would be powerless to conduct the G o v e r n m e n t of the districts u n d e r their c o m m a n d . "

92

ATTEMPTS

TO

REMEDY

THE

SITUATION

be superfluous, inasmuch as it was a l r e a d y Spanish commercial t r e a t y of Bargash

expressed

s t i p u l a t e d in

the

1861.ίβ

the hope

that

an

understanding

satis-

f a c t o r y t o all would e v e n t u a l l y be reached in the m a t t e r of natur a l i z a t i o n . M o s t of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were a l r e a d y w i l l i n g t o admit the sultan's p o i n t of view. T h e F r e n c h minister r e c o g n i z e d the j u s t i c e of it and had promised to consult his g o v e r n m e n t f u r t h e r . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s agent was not unreasonable in his attitude.

The

representative

of

Portugal

and

Brazil

seemed

most unyielding. T h e M o r o c c a n f o r e i g n minister r e c o g n i z e d t h a t o t h e r nations p e r m i t t e d the return of f o r m e r s u b j e c t s n a t u r a l ized a b r o a d , but also pointed o u t t h a t these persons submitted t o local j u r i s d i c t i o n , not c l a i m i n g the p r o t e c t i o n of f o r e i g n consular officials. O n l y ten y e a r s e a r l i e r the p o w e r s had r e c o g n i z e d the r i g h t of the sultan o f T u r k e y to e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n his f o r m e r s u b j e c t s who returned t o their n a t i v e land.

over

Every

independent n a t i o n , B a r g a s h insisted, had the r i g h t t o e n f o r c e its own laws within its own t e r r i t o r y . N o c o u n t r y should seek t o impose its laws

upon

the independent,

sovereign

state

of

Morocco. F i n a l l y , the M o r o c c a n f o r e i g n minister expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t all the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s save the I t a l i a n a g e n t h a d a g r e e d t o restrain p r o t e c t i o n within the bounds of e x i s t i n g t r e a t i e s agreements. H e

sharply

criticized

Scovasso

f o r the views

and ex-

pressed in his discourse, 6 0 and o p e n l y c h a r g e d t h a t a g o o d m a n y of the I t a l i a n p r o t e g e s had received p r o t e c t i o n w i t h o u t

having

p e r f o r m e d a n y service in return. I t w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t S c o v a s s o ""Hay

in commenting upon Bargash's

reply

said that he was

(Ibid.),

not surprised at this statement, because o f the abuses that had prevailed and the high-handed proceedings of

some o f

the f o r e i g n

representatives.

The

Moroccan government had come to r e g a r d e v e r y f o r e i g n e r who arrived in the country as a new enemy who would ultimately cause it trouble. M a n y Europeans, a f t e r securing the right to purchase land in accordance with the Spanish treaty, subsequently

encroached

upon

the lands of

the

Moorish

government, and because of the protection which they e n j o y e d there seemed to be no very e f f e c t i v e w a y of preventing their doing so. Bargash was reluctant to do anything that would tend to increase the evil. Scovasso was not present at this meeting and took offense because B a r gash attacked him in his absence. H e

replied by letter in equally

language, copies of which he distributed among his colleagues.

93

sharp

MOBOCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS h a d no confidence in his solemn pledge m a d e t o the f o r e i g n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h a t no i n j u s t i c e would be c o m m i t t e d a g a i n s t n a t i v e s f r o m whom p r o t e c t i o n h a d been w i t h d r a w n . So l o n g a s

any

i r r e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n were allowed t o exist, j u s t so l o n g would i n j u r i e s continue. A t t h e close of t h e m e e t i n g a t B a r g a s h ' s house, S i r

John

H a y e x p r e s s e d t h e h o p e t h a t a f t e r t h e r e s u l t s of t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s h a d been r e f e r r e d t o their respective g o v e r n m e n t s a p e r f e c t a g r e e m e n t m i g h t be r e a c h e d a m o n g the H e served notice, however, t h a t

representatives.

when t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s

were

t e r m i n a t e d he would claim f o r t h e f o u r powers which he r e p r e s e n t e d all t h e privileges e n j o y e d b y t h e m o s t f a v o r e d n a t i o n . I n a significant d e s p a t c h r e p o r t i n g t h e m e e t i n g a t t h e residence of Cid M o h a m m e d B a r g a s h , the B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r

made

t h e first s u g g e s t i o n of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference o u t s i d e of M o r o c c o t o consider t h e question of p r o t e c t i o n . 6 1 I n t h i s , he w r o t e , as f o l l o w s : I will not conceal from Your Lordship that I fear t h a t unless a distinct understanding is come to between all the Foreign Governments upon the points still opposed by some of the Representatives and instructions are sent to them, which would lead to a final settlement, it is not probable that f u r t h e r discussion here between the Foreign Representatives or with the Moorish Minister, would alter the views of those R . R . or lead to any beneficial result. I t will, I apprehend, be a very difficult matter also to obtain any satisfactory solution of these questions between H e r M a j e s t y ' s Government and other Governments, but perhaps the appointment of a Commission at some Foreign Court to which the Moorish Government might be invited to send an envoy or commissioner might be a practicable plan of bringing these questions to a conclusion. H e s u g g e s t e d , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t none of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t T a n g i e r should be p r e s e n t , " . . . f o r t h a t would only lead t o a r e p e t i t i o n of t h e a r g u m e n t s a l r e a d y p r e s e n t e d a n d which, f e a r , h a v e been sometimes d i c t a t e d f r o m p e r s o n a l a n d

I

inter-

e s t e d m o t i v e s . " F i n a l l y , he p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e be held a t M a d r i d , b o t h because he a n d D i o s d a d o s h a r e d similar " A.B.L.T., Hay to Salisbury, desp. 60, 28 Jul. 18T9.

94

ATTEMPTS

TO R E M E D Y

THE

SITUATION

views, " a n d as the Spanish people a t t a c h much i m p o r t a n c e t o what passes in M o r o c c o . " 6 2 H e continued, as follows: I freely admit that it may be questioned whether the political or commercial importance of Morocco is sufficient to require the appointment of a special commission to resolve such a question as that of protection elsewhere than in Morocco, but as this country from its position, its extent, climate, and productions must have a great future, when a good Government is established and its resources are developed and as the regulations which it is proposed to establish are intended to remove the baneful effect which the presence of Europeans of late years produced and which has indirectly tended to prevent the extension of commerce by paralyzing the authority of the Sultan, I may be allowed to observe with due deference, that the assembly of a commission to decide on the international regulations between Morocco and other Powers, and which are to become the laws for their future guidance, may be considered as a subject of considerable importance as upon their adoption will depend in great measure the future prospects of this misgoverned and unfortunate country. D u r i n g the m o n t h of A u g u s t 1879, Sir J o h n visited E n g l a n d , a n d h a d interviews a t the foreign office with Salisbury a n d Sir J u l i a n P a u n c e f o t e on the s u b j e c t of i r r e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n in Morocco. 6 3 H a y r e p o r t e d t h a t a deadlock h a d been reached a t T a n g i e r and t h a t there was very little likelihood t h a t the opposition would a l t e r their opinions, "being swayed by personal interest in u p h o l d i n g these abuses." T h e r e f o r e , he repeated the suggestion which he h a d previously made in his d e s p a t c h of 2 8 J u l y , t h a t a conference should be held a t M a d r i d . H e h a d been informed t h a t the sultan was p r e p a r e d t o send an en" This point was certainly true. The situation of Morocco figured much more prominently in the Spanish press and in the debates of the Spanish cortes of this period than in the press and parliamentary debates in England and France. A m o n g the learned societies of the capital, especially the Royal Geographical Society of Madrid, Morocco was a favorite theme. " A.B.L.T., Memorandum of remarks made by Sir J. H. Drummond Hay on the subject of irregular protection afforded by Diplomatic and Consular Officers to natives in Morocco, 16 Aug. 1879, sent by H a y to Pauncefote with a note the following day.

95

MOROCCO AT THE PARTING OF THE WAYS v o y t o represent him a t such a g a t h e r i n g . H a y declared t h a t within recent 3'ears i r r e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n had been g r e a t l y extended a n d it " i s one of the chief reasons why the M o o r i s h government opposes the advent of E u r o p e a n s . " Since the regulations t h a t were to be f r a m e d would become

international

law f o r the g u i d a n c e of diplomatic and c o n s u l a r officers in M o r o c c o , the question was one of vital i m p o r t a n c e to its f u t u r e d e s t i n y , and in H a y ' s opinion deserved the serious consideration of all foreign governments which took an interest in the f a t e of M o r o c c o .

96

IV T H E QUESTION EXTERS T H E INTERNATIONAL F I E L D suggestion of Sir J o h n H a y , the British f o r e i g n office on 7 October 1879 addressed a c i r c u l a r t o its diplomatic agents in the c a p i t a l s of all the c o u n t r i e s represented in Morocco. I n this communication each one was ins t r u c t e d t o ascertain the views of the government t o which he was accredited concerning the convocation of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference on the subject of native p r o t e c t i o n in M o r o c c o . T a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of the weekly reception of the diplomatic c o r p s a t t h e Spanish c a p i t a l by the minister of s t a t e , Sackville W e s t , the B r i t i s h minister, expressed to the D u k e of T e t u a n the s t r o n g desire of his government to reach an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with the other powers upon this question. 1 In the name of S a l i s b u r y he declared t h a t G r e a t B r i t a i n was anxious to s t r e n g t h e n the a u t h o r i t y of the sultan as much as possible as the need of this was becoming increasingly a p p a r e n t . In order t o a t t a i n this end no measure a p p e a r e d to his government to be as efficacious as the f a v o r a b l e settlement of the question of p r o t e c t i o n in an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference held in some E u r o p e a n c a p i t a l , p r e f erably M a d r i d . T h e S p a n i s h foreign minister, "evidently much flattered"2 by the submission of t h e conference p r o j e c t t o t h e S p a n i s h government "in so courteous a m a n n e r , " 3 observed t h a t the views of the S p a n i s h and British governments concerning M o r o c c o were completely in a c c o r d , a n d expressed his a p p r o v a l of the suggestion t h a t the question be taken u p f o r consideration out:TIXG UPON

1

THE

A . S . M . S . , royal o r d e r t o D i o s d a d o , 16 Oct. 1879.

2

T h e S p a n i s h m i n i s t e r o f s t a t e could not but h a v e f e l t g r e a t s a t i s f a c t i o n at t h e p r o p o s a l of M a d r i d as the c o n f e r e n c e c i t y . T h i s w o u l d r e d o u n d t o S p a i n ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e , which h a d been, p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e t h e r e v o l u t i o n of 1868, c o n s i d e r a b l y below par. M o r e o v e r , it m i g h t e v e n b e i n t e r p r e t e d a s a r e c o g n i t i o n of her p r i o r rights in Morocco. A l l this w o u l d t e n d t o a c c r u e t o t h e p o p u l a r i t y of the r e c e n t l y r e s t o r e d d y n a s t y . 3

P . R . O . , W e s t to S a l i s b u r y , eonfid. M a d r i d d e s p . 189, 19 O c t . 1879.

07

MOROCCO A T T H E

PARTING

OF T H E

WAYS

side t h a t country. H e f u r t h e r assured West t h a t the Spanish government would gladly act as host for the conference. 4 The conciliatory policy t h a t Spain had initiated in 1878 with the sending of Diosdado to represent her a t Tangier, and which was clearly manifested by the position taken by him during the conferences of 1879, had continued. His close friendship with Sir J o h n H a y , however, was interpreted by many, who wished to see Spain follow a vigorous and independent policy in t h a t country, as weakness and subserviency. In November 1879, an interesting debate on Spanish policy in Morocco occurred in the Spanish chamber of deputies, 5 between Senor Carvajal,® a brilliant lawyer from Malaga, who had served as minister of state for a time under the Republic, and the Duke of T e t u a n , incumbent foreign minister. The former declared t h a t in the "hour of final rectifications and great solutions" t h a t had arrived for all European peoples, only the Spanish remained uninfluenced and inactive. They, too, he urged, must abandon their lethargic state, for Spain had a great destiny to fulfill. The policy of the present government was one of weakness, concessions and subservience to England, he charged. Having p u t an end to her internal disorders, why did the country not t u r n its attention to questions of an international character? C a r v a j a l advocated close understanding 4 His politeness, however, did not restrain him from expressing surprise that the British government, which professed so much attachment to Morocco's sovereignty, had not found the means of impeding Donald Mackenzie in his activities at Cape Juby. See footnote 25, p. 67. 'Diario de las Sesiones de las Cortes: Congreso, 1879-80, II, 909-10, 102849, 1059-68. "Carvajal's interest in Morocco was not purely patriotic. H e was interested in a trading company which hoped to exploit Santa Cruz de Mar Pequefia, once the sultan could be induced to make the cession. Closely working with him was Prendergast, chief of the commercial division of the Spanish ministry of state, who carried on in that office a nice little intrigue running counter to the new policy which Canovas and Diosdado were seeking to follow in Morocco. The writer's authority for these statements is private correspondence found in the archives of the British legation at Tangier, addressed to Sir John Hay by the English concern Farwood Bros. & Co., which had been approached for capital to finance the scheme, and especially a letter written by Prendergast, dated 22 Mar. 1879, contained in a letter of Farwood Bros. & Co. to Hay, London, 28 Apr. 1879.

98

T H E INTERNATIONAL FIELD

and cooperation with the sister Latin states, which policy, he predicted, would result for Spain in a renaissance of political influence. The p r o g r a m which he hoped Spain would adopt was the well-known nationalist one, including union with Portugal, recovery of G i b r a l t a r , and the fulfillment of her mission in Morocco. On each of these points Spanish interests ran counter to those of Great Britain. In C a r v a j a l ' s opinion, Spain's immediate policy in Morocco should be one of pacific penetration, in order to prepare for asserting in Africa the influence which rightfully belonged to her. " T h e civilization of the Empire of Morocco must flow from Spain. If those who govern us forget t h a t , we shall lose all of our influence in Africa, incurring great responsibility before history." C a r v a j a l charged t h a t Spain, f a r from pursuing such a policy as he outlined, was even then in danger of losing the right of protecting Moorish subjects, a right which he considered indispensable to the lives and p r o p e r t y of Christians residing there. This right, instead of being curtailed, should be more widely extended so as to include all the servants and dependents of Spanish subjects. Spaniards were in t h a t very period immig r a t i n g in large numbers into Algeria instead of Morocco merely because of the inadequate protection afforded in the latter country. Spain was thus losing an opportunity to colonize the l a t t e r country with her own nationals. The minister of state, replying to these charges, denied t h a t the abandonment of the right of protection was being considered. Instead, it was merely a question of correcting abuses t h a t had arisen under the system of protection. Morocco could not, indeed, survive if these were permitted to flourish. As regards Spain's general policy in t h a t empire, she was seeking its symp a t h y and confidence. This, he declared, was in harmony with the general foreign policy of the government of Canovas del Castillo, which sought ". . . to maintain and extend increasingly our relations with foreign powers; reciprocal consideration, irrespective of form of government or relative importance; the development of our material interests by means of as many treaties as possible; a worthy and prudent concentration, in

99

MOROCCO A T

THE

PARTING

OF T H E

WAYS

order to conclude the period of our r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , f r o m which policy we must not deviate unless the independence of the patria, the d i g n i t y of the c o u n t r y , or high interests of s t a t e demand it. T h e present government will ever shun a n y policy of adventures. . . . " In J a n u a r y 1880 Canovas, prime minister and s t r o n g man of the r e s t o r a t i o n period, personally assumed the duties of the ministry of state. 7 T h i s change caused the B r i t i s h minister, whose government was still awaiting the replies of c e r t a i n of the governments addressed in the m a t t e r of the proposed conference, to inquire of Canovas whether the change in the f o r eign ministry would result in a change of M o r o c c a n policy. . . . He assured me emphatically that lie saw no reason for changing it. H e was, he said, as much convinced as ever that Spanish and English interests in that country were identical and that any invasion of the Sultan's right by other European powers could not be considered otherwise than an injurious step to them. He would, therefore, take no step or initiate any policy without being in perfect accord with Her Majesty's Government, and he trusted that the proposed conference on the affairs of Morocco would still further establish this accord. Spain had no intention of recalling Diosdado from Tangier who had been instrumental in bringing about the good understanding at present existing between the two Governments. 8 C a r v a j a l took a d v a n t a g e of the change a t the ministry of s t a t e to interpellate the government a second time concerning its policy with r e g a r d to Morocco.® Good imperialist t h a t he was, he began by d e c l a r i n g t h a t the interest of the whole civilized world was centered upon the continent of A f r i c a . W h y was it t h a t S p a i n , unlike other nations, did not bestir herself ' In December the Duke of Tetuan had been replaced by the Count of Toreno, who held the portfolio of state a little more than one month. C&novas retained this position from 20 Jan. to 19 May, the months (luring which the plans for the conferencc of Madrid were maturing. On the latter date Sefior Don Jos£ Elduayen, Marquis de la Paz, assumed charge. Colecciön Legislative, de Esjpana, vol. 123, 786; vol. 124, pt. 1, 49-56, 585. • P.R.O., West to Salisbury, desp. 21, 27 Jan. 1880. 'Diario de las Sesiones de las Cortes: Congreso, 1879-80, I V , 1769-76.

100

THE

INTERNATIONAL

FIELD

t h e r e ? E a c h }'ear, he declared, 6 , 0 0 0 S p a n i s h s u b j e c t s were p o u r i n g t h r o u g h the p o r t s of Valencia a n d Alicante into A f r i c a ; not t o M o r o c c o where S p a i n ' s t r u e political a s p i r a t i o n s lay, b u t t o the F r e n c h colony of Algeria. W h y not direct this mig r a t i o n t o M o r o c c o and t h u s s t r e n g t h e n S p a i n ' s influence there? Did Canovas know, he asked, t h a t the Spanish minister a t T a n gier h a d communicated t o Spanish consular officers in M o r o c co his intention of renouncing the r i g h t of p r o t e c t i o n ? W a s it t r u e t h a t the Spanish government was determined to follow such a policy? W h a t f o u n d a t i o n was t h e r e f o r the r u m o r t h a t S p a i n was a b o u t to concert with other powers in this m a t t e r ? S p a i n , C a r v a j a l held, could not a f f o r d to renounce this r i g h t , f o r a l r e a d y t h e g r e a t e s t and most horrible atrocities were being committed there u p o n f o r m e r Spanish proteges. 1 0 T h e reply of Canovas del Castillo, high-minded and s t a t e s manlike, merits c a r e f u l analysis. C a r v a j a l , who had no ministerial responsibilities, he said, could a f f o r d to p a i n t roseate pictures concerning Morocco, such as he himself had done in his youth, 1 1 " a n d such as must ever dwell in the h e a r t of S p a n i s h society and the S p a n i s h n a t i o n , a l t h o u g h it m a y be difficult to realize them. . . . " H e even a d m i t t e d t h a t the p a t r i o t i c sentiments expressed by C a r v a j a l s t r u c k a responsive chord in his own h e a r t . However, he, as prime minister and minister of foreign a f f a i r s , had to deal with realities. D e c l a r i n g t h a t S p a i n was determined t o m a i n t a i n her treaty r i g h t s in Morocco, he disclaimed a n y intention of s u r r e n d e r i n g the r i g h t of p r o t e c t i o n . T h e real m a t t e r under consideration was the s u r r e n d e r of cert a i n abusive p r a c t i c e s t h a t h a d developed since the origin of the treaties. C a r v a j a l , it a p p e a r e d , believed t h a t S p a i n alone was i n t e r 10 Recently a party of Moors, refugees from northern Morocco, had arrived at Malaga seeking not personal protection, but territorial protection of Spain for their district. Carvajal, championing their cause in his speech, referred to their efforts as "the crime of having wished to be Spaniards." 11 In 1859, the period of the Hispano-Morocean war, Cänovas had pub-

lished a work, Ajmntes sobre la historia de ilarruecoa, Madrid, 1859, in which he expressed ideas almost identical with those now advanced by Carvajal. It is interesting to note that Cänovas and Carvajal were Andalusians, both from Malaga.

101

MOROCCO A T T H E

PARTING

OF T H E

WAYS

ested in Morocco. I t could not be denied t h a t F r a n c e , E n g l a n d , a n d I t a l y also h a d interests there. H e clearly recognized the community of interests t h a t existed in M o r o c c o , a n d a d v o c a t e d a policy of concerted action as the only p r o p e r course of p r o cedure. W o u l d not C a r v a j a l agree, he asked, that questions in which France, England and Italy are concerned, are questions which need to be looked into and dealt with by the Spanish nation with the most prolonged consideration and deliberate care? Does not the Honorable Deputy understand that while it is not possible at the present day for any single nation in Europe to develop her policy or her aspirations in entire independence, because the modern world does not concede such rights to any nation . . . it would be impossible for us to hope to be permitted to settle the questions concerning Morocco according to our own free will and pleasure ? What nation in the world is allowed to proceed thus, without taking into consideration, either voluntarily on involuntarily, the collateral interests of all the other powers concerned? 12 Is not the question of protection one of those which interests all the powers? If so, it is one of those questions which should properly become the subject of joint discussion and concert among all the interested powers, a method much employed in modern times, and which it is to be regretted does not prevail more extensively, to the entire exclusion of sanguinary conflicts. Since the various foreign powers were exercising t h e r i g h t of p r o t e c t i o n in M o r o c c o as they saw fit, it was necessary t h a t they should come t o a common a c c o r d , in order t o preserve the independence of the c o u n t r y , "whose independence is universally recognized, a n d which is as legitimate as a n y other in the world." H e denounced C a r v a j a l ' s view t h a t p r o t e c t i o n should be g r a n t e d to all who might demand it, a n d declared t h a t if p r o tection continued t o s p r e a d the sultan would find himself before long without a n y subjects. 1 3 " T h i s is what M. Delcass^ attempted to do in 1904-5, refusing to recognize Germany's interests in Morocco. u The United States minister at Madrid expressed views similar to these, as follows: "If Morocco is to be considered and treated as an independent nation, I now fail to see why foreign representatives should have the right of protecting in any way Moorish subjects who are neither in their employ

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a masterful summary,

Cänovas

FIELD c l o s e d his r e p l y in

the

following m a n n e r : T h e S p a n i s h g o v e r n m e n t considers the E m p i r e of Morocco a n i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e ; it considers it within t h e concert of n a t i o n s , b o u n d to us b y t r e a t i e s , with all the duties ( a n d p e r h a p s more because of its special c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) , but also with all the r i g h t s of a n y o t h e r n a t i o n . T h e S p a n i s h g o v e r n m e n t c a n n o t , t h e n , raise a b a n n e r to f o r w a r d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of the i n t e r n a l i n t e g r i t y of t h e M o r o c c a n E m p i r e , p r o m o t i n g by its own action alone, if it were able to do so, t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h a t E m p i r e by m e a n s of a n u n due extension of the so-called r i g h t of p r o t e c t i o n ; a n d it can even less a s c r i b e to every s u b j e c t of the s u l t a n who m a y be more or less d i s c o n t e n t e d with t h a t g o v e r n m e n t — a n d w h a t g o v e r n m e n t does n o t h a v e d i s c o n t e n t e d s u b j e c t s ? — t h e r i g h t of a p p l y i n g to t h e S p a n i s h a u t h o r i t i e s a n d a s k i n g p u r e l y a n d simply to have their t e r r i t o r y a n n e x e d to o u r crown. W h e r e would we a r r i v e , g e n t l e m e n , if in times of c o m p l e t e peace, w i t h t r e a t i e s in f u l l force, p e r f e c t l y obs e r v e d on the p a r t of Morocco, in t h e v e r y f a c e of those n a t i o n s , which, like us, have i n t e r e s t s on the coasts of A f r i c a , a n d which a r e , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , much more p o w e r f u l t h a n ourselves, if we should r a i s e u p o n our r o m a n t i c s o u t h e r n shores a s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t the ind e p e n d e n c e of t h a t n a t i o n which would indeed be a b a n n e r l i f t e d a g a i n s t the r i g h t a n d t h e very existence of all nations ? . . . I do n o t seek to e r a d i c a t e f r o m the b r e a s t of the S p a n i s h n a t i o n a s e n t i m e n t which impels it to t h i n k of w h a t it m i g h t be able to do n o b o d y k n o w s when, a n d u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t nobody can f o r e see t o d a y ; w h a t it could do to effect the d e v e l o p m e n t of its p o p u l a tion, its m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h , its financial resources, of all those r e sources which p e r m i t t h e e x p a n s i o n of a n a t i o n , w h a t , I r e p e a t , it m i g h t be able to do u p o n the n e i g h b o r i n g shores of A f r i c a . I am not s p e a k i n g now for t h e next c e n t u r y , nor f o r a period fifty y e a r s or nor in the service of foreign merchants as agents or brokers. If one such Moor can be 'protected' out from under the jurisdiction of his Government and rendered independent of the laws of his country, then a hundred, a thousand, or a million, or any other number may, and the Emperor be relieved of all his subjects and the trouble of governing them. True, the Emperor might be a happier man to be thus relieved, but why should that happiness be conferred upon him and his burdens assumed by the representatives of other Powers?" A.U.S.E.M., Fairchild to Evarts, Madrid desp. 10, Τ Apr. 1880.

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WAYS

twenty years hence; I speak for the present, for the present government, and for present circumstances . . . and I say that with the existing situation in Europe, in Morocco, and in Spain, given the existence of a state universally recognized as independent, as a friendly state, as a state which at the present time is loyally fulfilling its engagements towards others, we have no other duty to perform nor policy to follow than to act toward Morocco—a relatively weak nation—as we might act toward the strongest power.1,4 These declarations of the premier "produced the best effect in parliament, as well as in the political and diplomatic circles of the capital." 1 5 F u r t h e r insight into Spanish policy is gained from W e s t ' s report of an interview with Cänovas a few days later.1® The latter stated t h a t the Spanish minister a t Tangier seriously doubted whether the preservation of the status quo in Morocco was longer possible. 17 T h e Spanish government, avowed Canovas, was "most anxious" t h a t the independence of the sultan should be preserved. " S p a i n could not, even if she wished it, initiate any policy with regard to the Empire of Morocco which did not coincide with t h a t of H e r M a j e s t y ' s Government, who were more deeply interested in the maintenance of its integrity than any other power, and he recognized more than ever, under present circumstances, the necessity of a cordial understanding between the two governments in the event of certain even14

In this same period the French ambassador reported that Cänovas, rejecting the request of the Moorish chiefs that Spain annex their territories, declared himself to be in favor of the preservation of the status quo in Morocco, but stated that if ever the Empire of Morocco should fall to pieces or if France should extend her Algerian frontier to the Muluya Kiver, "the natural frontier which seems quite predestined for you," Spain would then have to consider whether her interests did not also require her to extend her possessions up to that river. "In a word, Spain does not feel able at the moment to accept the offer made her; but if we should set her the example she would be quite willing to extend her possessions in Morocco." Docs. Dipl. Ρταης., I" Ser., Ill, Jaurds to Freyeinet, confid. desp. 11, Madrid, 23 Feb. 1880, doc. 28, pp. 27-8.

"Documenti Diplomatici: Conferenza di Madrid, Rome, 1880, doc. no. I l l , 6-7, Greppi to the Italian min. of for. aff., Madrid, 14 Feb. 1880. " P.R.O., West to Salisbury, desp. 37, 19 Feb. 1880. 11 A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 218, 16 Nov. 1879.

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tualities a r i s i n g which might require combined a c t i o n . " E x p r e s s ing suspicions of F r e n c h motives in M o r o c c o , especially in connection with her t r a n s - S a h a r a n r a i l w a y p r o j e c t which a p p a r e n t l y would have to cross M o r o c c a n t e r r i t o r y , he emphasized the danger t o Spain of h a v i n g F r a n c e s i t u a t e d t o the n o r t h , a n d to the s o u t h as well. 18 " H e h a d , " he declared, " n o desire t o p r e d i c t , much less to c r e a t e events f o r the sake of dealing with them, but a t the same time events would not be s t o p p e d or the difficulty of dealing with them lessened by indifference to their possibility, and he considered t h a t the time was come when certain contingencies which the m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the S u l t a n ' s Government had given rise to, o u g h t to be t a k e n into consideration by the two Powers most interested in the f u t u r e of M o r o c c o and in the consequences likely to ensue f r o m the system of Government which o b t a i n s in t h a t c o u n t r y . " I n case the p r o j e c t f o r the conference materialized, Canovas p r o p o s e d the a d o p tion of the rule t h a t no question save t h a t of p r o t e c t i o n should be discussed; f o r otherwise, he feared t h a t a general discussion of M o r o c c a n a f f a i r s m i g h t result, similar to Scovasso's discourse in the T a n g i e r conferences of 1879, which might give F r a n c e and I t a l y a p r e t e x t f o r discussing the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Morocco. 1 8 T h i s would raise the question which, if the status quo were to be m a i n t a i n e d , it was desirable to a v o i d : namely, was the sultan able to u p h o l d his a u t h o r i t y t h r o u g h o u t his dominions or n o t ? T h i s was the precise question, however, u p o n which Canovas was most anxious to come t o some u n d e r s t a n d i n g with the B r i t i s h government. 2 0 " K o t e the following extract of a despatch from Diosdado to the Sp. min. of St., 195, 12 Oct. 1879, A.S.M.S.: ". . . to the independent existence of the Moroccan nation not only has the Moroccan government the right, but Spain also has it, for given the proximity of Morocco to our coasts and its exceptional situation on the Strait, any nation in control of it would be in a position to put too much pressure upon us. . . ." " I n a subsequent despatch West stated that Cänovas had again insisted upon this point. P.R.O., West to Salisbury, desp. 47, 1 Mar. 1880. " T h e diplomatic prestige of the British government had been very considerably enhanced by the recent successes of Disraeli, especially at the Congress of Berlin, it should be remembered. Well might Canovas seek an understanding with England.

105

MOROCCO AT THE PARTING OF THE WAYS Thus are the motives of Spanish policy during the period of 1879 and 1880 explained. Contemporaneously, Spain's course baffled some, who accused her of playing the cat to England's monkey in drawing chestnuts from the fire. On the contrary, Spain was following a farsighted policy of self-interest (even if her interests coincided with those of Great Britain for the time being), at the same time seeking to insure her position in Morocco through a close understanding with England upon procedure to be followed in case the authority of the sultan should collapse. By March 1880, the British foreign office had received favorable replies from all the powers addressed in the matter of the proposed conferences.21 Although the Spanish government was advised without delay, the issuance of invitations was postponed for several weeks on account of two questions that arose which threatened to defer the conference until the fall. 22 Canovas expressed regret at this possibility, since he considered that the activities of the French near the Algero-Moroccan frontier rendered an earl}' settlement of the question of protection highly desirable.23 Would the elections about to be held in England bring about a change of government which would affect the Moroccan policy of that country? Great Britain had taken the initiative in moving for a conference. Obviously there would be little point in proceeding with the project if the new government should decide not to support the idea. The new Gladstone ministry, however, chose in this matter to follow in the course of its predecessor. In fact, the Hay-Salisbury policy in Morocco was of just the sort to appeal to M r . Gladstone, who was an outstanding champion of the rights of backward peoples. And since this policy was dictated by broad British interests there appeared to be no reason for reversing it. The other question was, what powers should be invited to participate in the conference? Should only those actually inP.R.O., Salisbury to West, desp. 47, 1 Mar. 1880. "Ibid., West to Salisbury, desp. 65, 5 A p r . 1880; A.U.S.E.M., Fairchild to Evarts, desp. 9, 7 A p r . 1880. n

» P.R.O., West to Salisbury, desp. 65, 5 Apr. 1880.

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terested and represented in Morocco be invited, or should all the g r e a t powers be asked? 2 4 It was finally decided to include all the powers represented at Tangier, 2 5 and all the great powers as well, whether interested in Morocco or not. 2 8 A s a matter of f a c t R u s s i a was the only great power unrepresented. 2 7 T h e f a c t of the calling of an international conference outside of Morocco, in itself, meant the internationalization of the M o r o c * Documents Diplomatiques: Question de Protection (French Yellow Book), Paris, 1880 (hereafter cited as Docs. Dipt.: Quest, de Prot.), doc. no. 13, pp. 30-1, Jaur£s to Ferry, Madrid, 10 Apr. 1880; P.R.O., West to Salisbury, desp. 53, 12 Mar. 1880, also desp. 65, 5 Apr. 1880. " All the powers represented at Tangier participated in the conference save Brazil, which failed to reply to the invitation. Through its representative at Madrid, however, it signified its willingness to adhere to the convention which might be adopted. Docs. Dipl.: Quest, de Prot., doc. no. 26, pp. 51-2, Jaur£s to Frevcinet, Madrid, 16 May 1880; P.R.O., West to Granville, desp. 186, 6 Jul. 1880. " Cänovas expressed the opinion that the "Russian Government ought to be associated with the other European Powers in this question." P.R.O., West to Salisbury, desp. 33, 12 Mar. 1880. The British foreign office solicited Hay's opinion, who saw no objection to inviting Russia. A.B.L.T., Hay to Salisbury, desp. 57, 22 Mar. 1880. He consulted the Moroccan government, however, which readily agreed that Russia should be asked to participate. Ibid., Hay to Salisbury, Fez desp. 78, 19 Apr. 1880. It is reasonable to suppose that the Spanish and British governments might have believed that the conservative Russian government, naturally predisposed toward absolutism, would view favorably the wishes of the sultan. Also, not being familiar with the conditions of Morocco, the Russian delegate would be prone to judge the question on the basis of abstract right. M Upon receiving the invitation the Russian government declared that It had no interest in Morocco and believed, therefore, that it ought not to take any part in the negotiations. However, it reserved the right to adhere to any agreements the plenipotentiaries might reach. When Anally informed of the Madrid Convention of 3 Jul. 1880 by the Spanish government, the Russian government through its representative at Madrid declared in a note of 22 Nov. 1880, and subsequently through M. de Griers, charg6 of the department of foreign affairs at St. Petersburg, in a note addressed to the minister of foreign affairs of Morocco, 4 Apr. 1881, that after examining the proceedings of the conference and the text of the convention, it adhered to the provisions of the latter. "As Russia had been the only great European Power which had not been represented at the Madrid Conference, its adhesion has completed the general sanction given to that pact." A.U.S.E.M., note from Marquis de la Vega de Armijo, Spanish minister of state to the minister of the United States at Madrid, 10 Aug. 1881.

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WAYS

can question. 28 The issuing of an invitation to Russia, which had neither interests nor representative there, constitutes still clearer recognition of the f a c t t h a t the Moroccan question had come under the cognizance of the concert of powers. T h u s the precedent was established t h a t no change in the Moroccan situation might be considered without taking into account the views of all the g r e a t , as well as interested, powers. 29 Formal invitations to the conference were finally issued by the Spanish government through its foreign representatives on 10 April 1880. 30 Meanwhile there were important developments elsewhere. L a t e in the year 1879, Sultan Muley Hassen despatched an embassy to Paris, ostensibly to congratulate President Grevy upon his election. 31 Such a move on the p a r t of the sultan never failed to evoke much speculation as to its possible motives. On this occasion special importance was a t t r i b u t e d to the mission because the sultan selected as its head Cid Ali Mesfeewy, a high personage at court who aspired to the grand vizirate, 32 and because all the foreign representatives a t Tangier, including Sir John H a y , were quite in the dark as to its p u r p o r t . Wild reports circulated. A f t e r the Moorish embassy had passed a full month in the French capital, Lord Lyons, British ambassador, inquired 33 of the foreign minister one day, in an off-hand manner, what the object of the embassy might be. Freycinet's answer seemed evasive and served to heighten the suspicions of the ambassador. He replied t h a t he did not know whether it had any p a r t i c u l a r 28

An earlier step in this direction was the Cape Spartel lighthouse convention of 1865. See artitle by G. H. Stuart, "The International Lighthouse at Cape Spartel," American Journal of International Laim, vol. 2+, pp. 770-76. M Germany, undoubtedly, was entirely within her rights in 1905, in insisting upon an international conference to consider the Moroccan question of that day. 30 A.S.M.S., minute of a royal order to Spanish representatives in the capitals of countries invited to participate in the conference at Madrid, 10 Apr. 1880. 11 P.R.O., Lyons to Salisbury, Paris desp. 1254, 26 Dec. 1879. β A.B.L.T., H a y to Granville, desp. 97, 27 May 1880. " P.R.O., Lyons to Salisbury, confid. desp. 86, 6 Feb. 1880.

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business or not. H e h a d h a r d l y seen Mesfeewv. W h a t was concerning him most was the expense t o his d e p a r t m e n t of lodging and feeding t h e m . " A few d a y s l a t e r De Molins, S p a n i s h a m b a s s a d o r a t P a r i s , in a somewhat p e r t u r b e d f r a m e of mind r e p o r t e d t o M a d r i d 3 5 t h a t while at first sight it seemed t h a t t h e y o u n g republican government of F r a n c e was c e n t e r i n g its a t t e n t i o n exclusively upon internal politics, and while one might suppose t h a t these offered it sufficient p r e o c c u p a t i o n , yet it was an undeniable f a c t t h a t f o r some time F r a n c e h a d been s t r i v i n g to t a k e an active p a r t in e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s , while a t the same time avoiding all complications on the continent. I n s u p p o r t of this s t a t e ment he r e f e r r e d to her present intentions of i n v a d i n g Annum and of manifest tendencies of an a n a l o g o u s c h a r a c t e r with reg a r d to M o r o c c o . H e h a d learned confidentially t h a t the M o o r ish embassy then a t P a r i s had shown itself disposed to enter into n e g o t i a t i o n s of some s o r t , but he was unable to a s c e r t a i n of e x a c t l y what c h a r a c t e r . At a n y r a t e they h a d required the presence of the governor-general of A l g e r i a . H e h a d also been able to learn t h a t F r e y c i n e t h a d a t t e n d e d the conferences and t h a t questions concerning the r i g h t of p r o t e c t i o n h a d been the p r i n c i p a l s u b j e c t d e a l t with. De Molins s h o r t l y a f t e r this went to L o r d L y o n s and made known his uneasiness t o him.3® B y this time r u m o r h a d it t h a t a t r e a t y was being negotiated. D e Molins h e a r d t h a t the alleged t r e a t y would provide f o r a p r o t e c t o r a t e , or f o r p r o t e c tion of some kind, b u t beyond t h a t he was unable to sccure exact i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e S p a n i s h a m b a s s a d o r , who quite recently h a d held the position of minister of s t a t e a t M a d r i d , declared t h a t his government would view with g r e a t a l a r m the establishment b v a n y o t h e r power of control over Morocco. T h e S p a n ish and B r i t i s h a m b a s s a d o r s a g r e e d t o exchange a n y i n f o r m a tion t h a t they were able to f e r r e t o u t concerning the mysterious mission. " T h i s was customary courtesy inasmuch as the sultan always provided for diplomatic guests at his court. " A.S.M.S., De Molins to the Sp. min. of St., Paris desp. 70, 4 Feb. 1880. " P.R.O., Lyons to Salisbury, confid. desp. 86, 6 Feb. 1880.

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OF T H E

WAYS

When Lord Lyons recounted these various rumors to F r e y cinet," the l a t t e r characterized them as being without foundation, ". . . and he authorized me to inform your Lordship positively that there is no question whatever of any kind of French Protectorate or Protection of Morocco"; and t h a t the negotiations in progress related only "to small questions which have arisen between Morocco and Algeria." Baron de Courcel, political director of the foreign office, who chanced to be present, also denied that the rumors had any foundation in fact. These assurances were probably correct. I t appears, however, that the question of native protection was discussed. Upon the return of the mission to Tangier, 3 8 Diosdado reported that he had learned from a trustworthy source that Cid Ali Mesfeewy had asked the French government while a t P a r i s for support in settling the question in a way compatible with the independence of his country. Indeed, it would have been strange had he not done so. Likewise, it was said that the governor-general of Algeria had tried to confer with the Moorish ambassador upon frontier questions but the latter had evaded him by declaring that his master had already sent a special commission to the frontier to enter into discussions with the governor and to ascertain his views. 58 While the sultan's embassy at P a r i s was giving some of the diplomats occasion for perplexity, a Spanish mission visited Fez. Upon receiving extracts from the speech of the Duke of Tetuan in the Spanish cortes, discussed above, Diosdado, feeling t h a t if these liberal views were but called to the personal attention of the sultan it would aid him g r e a t l y in his work "Ibid., Lyons to Salisbury, desp. 98, 7 Feb. 1880. " A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of st., confid. desp. 41, 18 Feb. 1880; also, confid. desp. 45, 22 Feb. 1880. "Doc. Dipl. Franf., Ir' Ser., I l l , Freycinet to Jaur^s, desp. no. 5, Paris, 21 Feb. 1880, doe. no. 26, p. 26. From this despatch it appears that the Moroccan ambassador asked the French government to exert its influence at Madrid to bring about negotiations which would end the Spanish claim to the unceded port of Santa Cruz de M a r Pequefia.

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of fostering good relations between the two countries, proposed to send Rinaldi, his dragoman, on a good-will mission to the court. 4 0 This suggestion met with the approval of the Spanish government. Rinaldi accordingly carried letters addressed to both the sultan 4 1 and his g r a n d vizir. 42 In the letter to the vizir, Diosdado sought to inject some firmness into Moroccan diplomacy in anticipation of the coming conference. T h e solution of the questions under discussion carried with it the f u t u r e of Morocco, he declared. N o t to defend his rights, taking up a stand on the basis of the English and Spanish treaties, 4 3 would be f o r the sultan an abdication more dangerous in its consequences than a disastrous military campaign. Morocco might recover from the l a t t e r , but not from the slow but sure absorption which the extension of protection carried in its trail. While the Spanish government was ready to do its utmost to find a favorable solution for the sultan's problems, their efforts would prove fruitless if the sultan's government did not sustain its rights with the necessary energy. In accordance with oral instructions, Rinaldi also spoke to the sultan of the expediency of the question of protection being settled at an early date, and in harmony with his demands. Upon these Morocco must not yield. Muley Hassen expressed his determination not to compromise, and agreed to recognize as the basis of the system of protection the British and Spanish treaties. 4 4 D u r i n g Rinaldi's s o j o u r n at Fez a shocking a t r o c i t y occurred which brought the Jewish question to the fore and proved extremely injurious to the cause of reform. T h e unenviable position of the Hebrews in Moroccan society, "A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 225, 12 Dec. 1879. "Ibid., draft of letter from Diosdado to Muley Hassen, annexed to his desp. 225, addressed to the Sp. min. of St., 12 Dec. 1879. "Ibid., copy of letter from Diosdado to Cid Alarby Ben Moktsar, annexed to Diosdado's desp. 9, 7 Jan. 1880. " He would obviously have the Moroccan government disavow the principles laid down not only in the agreement of 1863, but also in the French treaty of 1767. 44 This was inconsistent with the first demand of the Bargash memorandum of 1877, which explicitly recognized the agreement of 1863.

Ill

MOROCCO AT T H E PASTING OF T H E WAYS t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of p r o t e c t i o n , 4 5 a n d a t t e m p t s t o i m p r o v e t h e i r l o t , h a v e a l r e a d y been discussed.

early 46

The

shereefian firman, o b t a i n e d in t h e i r behalf by S i r Moses M o n t e fiore in 1 8 6 4 , u n f o r t u n a t e l y w a s n o t r e s p e c t e d . H a r d l y a y e a r p a s s e d w i t h o u t f r e s h J e w i s h a t r o c i t i e s . F o u r t e e n cases a r e rec o r d e d f o r the p e r i o d between t h e i s s u a n c e of the firman a n d t h e C o n f e r e n c e of M a d r i d . 4 7 M e a n w h i l e J e w i s h o r g a n i z a t i o n s o u t s i d e of M o r o c c o , especially t h e A l l i a n c e I s r a e l i t e Universelle of P a r i s , the

Anglo-

J e w i s h A s s o c i a t i o n , t h e B o a r d of D e l e g a t e of A m e r i c a n I s r a e l ites, a n d t h e U n i o n of A m e r i c a n H e b r e w C o n g r e g a t i o n s of New Y o r k , were b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y a c t i v e in e n d e a v o r i n g t o u p l i f t t h e i r less f o r t u n a t e b r e t h r e n of M o r o c c o a n d to i n s u r e t h e i r g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y . A s e a r l y as 1 8 7 7 , Levi A. Cohen of T a n g i e r h a d become a r e g u l a r c o r r e s p o n d e n t of M o n t e f i o r e at L o n d o n . I n 1 8 8 0 he b e c a m e t h e official a g e n t of the societies m e n t i o n e d above, his w o r k c o n s i s t i n g of i n v e s t i g a t i n g all cases of i n j u s t i c e s r e p o r t e d a n d e n l i s t i n g t h e aid of the v a r i o u s f o r e i g n

repre-

s e n t a t i v e s in a n a t t e m p t t o secure j u s t i c e . Meanwhile he was t o keep t h e f o r e i g n J e w i s h societies i n f o r m e d of

occurrences

in M o r o c c o . T h e m u r d e r of a J e w i s h f a m i l y n e a r L a r a c h e in 1 8 7 7 , a n d t h e r o b b e r y of o t h e r s , was a t t r i b u t e d b y t h e o p p o n e n t s of p r o t e c tion r e f o r m t o r u m o r s t h a t p r o t e c t i o n was a b o u t t o be w i t h d r a w n f r o m all H e b r e w s . 4 8

The

B r i t i s h charge

d'affaires,

however,

" T h e extent to which the Jews of Morocco enjoyed protection is suggested by the following excerpt from a despatch of Diosdado: "In the city of Tangier there is not a single Hebrew of position who is not protected. . . ." A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 195, 12 Oct. 1879. " See chapter 1, pp. 20-27. A.U.S.E.M., Papers Relating to Foreigners in Morocco, vol. 1, Memoire en Faveur des Israelites marocains, April 1880, addressed by the Alliance Israelite Universelle of Paris to Freycinet, minister of foreign affairs. The list follows: 1861·, at Saffi, Demnat, and in H a h a ; 1867, at Tetuan; 1872, at Rabat and Larache; 1873, in Ducalla; 1874, in Ben Kaffa and El Habib; 1875, at Saffi; 1876, at Alcazar; 1877, near Larache; 1879, at Larache; and 1880 at Fez. β A.U.S.C.-G.T., Mathews to Evarts, desp. 258, 9 Nov. 1877; A.B.L.T., White (British ch. d'aff.) to Derby, desp. 107, 1 Nov. 1877.

112

THE

INTERNATIONAL

FIELD

a t t r i b u t e d these crimes t o disorders a c c o m p a n y i n g a revolt then o c c u r r i n g in that

district.

Crimes against

the

Mohammedan

p o p u l a t i o n , he averred, were much m o r e numerous, but

these

were never heard of outside the c o u n t r y . T h e r e were no M u s sulman societies a b r o a d to exert influence in their behalf. A c t i n g upon an a p p e a l received f r o m the B o a r d of D e l e g a t e s of A m e r i c a n Israelites g r o w i n g out of

the situation j u s t

scribed, the U n i t e d S t a t e s d e p a r t m e n t of

state instructed

representative a t T a n g i e r , as f o l l o w s : that

deits

while " n o official

interposition in behalf of Israelites who a r e M o o r i s h

subjects

can be sanctioned. . . . Still, there might be cases in which hum a n i t y would d i c t a t e a d i s r e g a r d of technicalities, if y o u r personal influence would shield H e b r e w s

f r o m oppression.

would be no o b j e c t i o n to the exercise of

it in such

There

cases." 4 9

A s a result of these instructions, M a t h e w s became one of

the

most ardent champions of the oppressed Jews of M o r o c c o . In j u s t i c e it must not be supposed t h a t M o o r i s h

antipathy

t o w a r d the Jews was entirely u n p r o v o k e d . T h e Jews were accused, a p p a r e n t l y not without f o u n d a t i o n , of the most nefarious practices. 5 0 E s p e c i a l l y were they p r o n e t o be unscrupulous when they f o u n d themselves p r o t e c t e d b y a f o r e i g n p o w e r . One of the most denounced claims

against

of these p r a c t i c e s was the f a k i n g

unprotected

Moorish

subjects.

A

notable

of in-

stance of this sort was called to H a y ' s a t t e n t i o n e a r l y in 1879. 51 T h e Jewish elders of the c i t v of T a n g i e r placed in the hands of the British minister a letter sent by the chief rabbi of F e z , s t a t i n g that t w o Jews, f o r m e r subjects of the sultan, but the present time F r e n c h citizens, were in the habit of fraudulent notaries, "Ibid., M

documents

purporting

made to

official b y

represent

the bribing

pecuniary

of

claims

at

framing native against

E v a r t s t o Mathews, instrs. 125,20 M a r . 1878.

In this same period the commander-general of Ceuta was complaining

that the J e w s of that place and Melilla w e r e s m u g g l i n g saltpetre and other contraband goods on a l a r g e scale across the f r o n t i e r to the

neighboring

tribes. This tended to create revolts and threatened to disturb the good relations then existing between the Moorish and Spanish officials. M

A.B.I..T.,

Hay

to Salisbury, confid. desp.

H , 3 Feb.

1879; also

re-

f e r r e d to in A.S.M.S., D i o s d a d o to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 23, 21 Jan. 1880.

113

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E

WAYS

wealthy Mohammedan residents of t h a t city. These f r a u d s had been practised to such an extent t h a t a strong feeling of animosity had arisen which caused many innocent Jews to fear a fanatical onslaught upon the whole Hebrew population. T h e Moroccan authorities and elders had made friendly remonstrances to the Jewish rabbis and elders, u r g i n g them to prevent the recurrence of such practises. A t t e m p t i n g to comply, the l a t t e r drew up a document signed by the elders and the chief Jews engaged in commercial relations with the Mohammedans, s t a t i n g t h a t when four or five Jews, whose names appeared among the signers, declared a document to be false, it should be destroyed without reference to a tribunal. Thereupon the two protected Jews had gone to Tangier to appeal to the French representative for support in behalf of their claims. T h e rabbi sought to have the facts placed before him. 52 T h i s situation was doubtless an important element in the psychology of the people of Fez a year later when the horrible murder of Abraham el Alouf occurred. As in the case of most events t h a t occurred in Morocco, it was extremely difficult to secure a reliable account of the incident." A T e t u a n Jew of drunken and quarrelsome reputation, who had served in the French army and obtained French citizenship, had an altercation with a Mohammedan. Blows were exchanged, and perhaps the Jew fired upon his antagonist, though without effect. Other Jews passing were attacked by a crowd of Moslems. All managed to escape save one innocent old man " When Hay approached Vernouillet privately on the subject the latter declared that all Moroccan Jews were rascals and he did not see why any more credence should be given to one than to another. " T h e accounts given by the various foreign representatives in general tallied fairly well, but varied widely in details. Hay's reports (A.B.L.T., Hay to Salisbury, desp. 10, 24 Jan. 1880; desp. 13, 2 Feb. 1880) were based upon letters received from Jewish merchants at Fez; the French minister's report {Docs. Dipl.: Quest, de Prot., doc. no. 1, pp. 11-15, Vernouillet to Freycinet, Tangier, 30 Jan. 1880) had as its basis reports sent by a French agent, an Algerian residing at Fez, and by Captain Erckmann, chief of the French military mission in Morocco. Diosdado's information was derived from a report by his dragoman who was at Fez on a special mission at the time (A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 26, 5 Feb. 1880).

114

T H E INTERNATIONAL

FIELD

who was beaten into a s t a t e of senselessness. Then his body was wrapped in a mat smeared with petroleum and burnt. Most accounts of the incident agreed t h a t he was burnt alive. This terrible incident occurred within sight of numerous persons, quite near the barracks of the askar, the sultan's regular troops. T h e government of the sultan was very slow to act, despite the f a c t t h a t Rinaldi, the Spanish agent, strongly urged the g r a n d vizir to lose no time in seeing that justice was done. Sir John H a y , horrified and chagrined t h a t such an event should occur on the eve of the conference, in an unofficial communication to the vizir, upbraided the Moorish government for its negligence and offered sage advice as to procedure. The guilty should be punished, the family of the murdered man indemnified, and energetic precautionary measures adopted to insure against f u r t h e r outrages throughout the country. Should this a t r o c i t y go unpunished others might well occur elsewhere. At length the vizir, sending for the principal Jews of Fez, announced to them t h a t the sultan had instructed him to give them assurances t h a t energetic steps would be taken to insure the safety of their lives and p r o p e r t y and prevent the recurrence of similar outrages. The widow and children of the assassinated man received $200. I t does not appear, however, t h a t the guilty were punished. Curiously enough, both those who favored and those who opposed protection reforms saw in the burning of the Jew of Fez an i n j u r y to their cause. Captain Erckmann, chief of the so-called French military mission in Morocco, feared that the argument would be used t h a t had the naturalized Jew not felt himself to be under French protection he would never have dared to act in such a r r o g a n t fashion ;54 t h a t the patience of the Moors was exhausted, and soon one might expect massacres throughout the whole empire. H e stated, however, t h a t "the Jews around me do not hold this view, but believe, to the cont r a r y , t h a t the dangers which threaten them would become inevitable if the Moslems were not restrained by the fear of foreign " Doc». Dipl.: Quest, de Prot., doc. no. 1, pp. 11-15, annex to Vernouillet's desp. to Freycinet, Tangier, 30 Jan. 1880.

115

MOROCCO

AT

THE

PARTING

OF

THE

WAYS

intervention." They even considered it likely that if the murdered Jew had enjoyed foreign protection he would not have been burnt. "Perhaps they are not wrong." I t might well be argued, moreover, he declared, that a people who burn alive human beings could not expect to be considered and treated as civilized. This last inference was the one that H a y feared would be drawn from the incident.55 The case would be cited by those opposed to reform as conclusive proof of the danger of curtailing protection. H e believed the crime to be due to the fact that the naturalized Jew had placed himself upon a footing of equality with his opponent. 56 Quite naturally, the Jewish societies exploited the incident to the limit. A badly garbled account of it, contained in a leaer from the secretary of the Anglo-Jewish Association, was published in the London Times,57 with none of the gruesome details omitted. Similar events were declared to be of frequent occurrence throughout the empire, and for that reason the Hebrew population required protection. So long as the existing corrupt government of Morocco endured and the barbarity of the people continued, it was folly to consider reduction of protection. On an important mission to the court at Fez in the spring of 1 8 8 0 , S i r John H a y succeeded in securing, among other things, the consent of the sultan to a plan which he hoped would result in better administration of justice for the Jews.59 His origi" A.B.L.T., H a y to Salisbury, desp. 13, 2 Feb. 1880. " I n case irregular protection were abolished at Madrid, H a y proposed that the representatives of the powers at Tangier should be instructed to present identical representations to the Moorish government regarding the tyranny and injustice suffered by the Jews, stating that the civilized governments would no longer tolerate it. Moreover, the sultan would stand in danger of losing the friendship of these governments if energetic steps were not taken to check it. The foreign representatives should assume the responsibility of keeping the sultan informed as to the situation. A.B.L.T., H a v to Salisbury, desps. 13 and 19, 2 and 10 Feb. 1880. ** London Times, 12 Feb. 1880. M A.S.M.S., Zugasti (Sp. ch. d'aff.) to the Sp. min. of St., Tangier desp. 5, 6 A p r . 1880; A.B.L.T., H a y to Salisbury, Fez desp. 85, 28 Apr. 1880, and others.

" A.B.L.T., H a y to Salisbury, desp. 91, 13 May 1880; also H a y to Granville, desp. 144, 21 Jul. 1880.

116

THE

INTERNATIONAL·

FIEIJ)

nal p r o p o s a l was f o r the sultan to permit the Jewish p o p u l a t i o n of M o r o c c o t o choose deputies of their f a i t h to reside a t c o u r t . T h e s e Jewish r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were t o r e p o r t t o the s u l t a n any case in which his f u n c t i o n a r i e s had either failed or refused to do j u s t i c e . However, when one of the c o u r t secretaries pointed out the d o u b t f u l success of such an a r r a n g e m e n t , due to the f a c t t h a t an accused g o v e r n o r might bribe the g r a n d vizir or other officers a t c o u r t t o prevent the Jewish deputies f r o m b r i n g i n g the m a t t e r t o the notice of the s u l t a n , o r t h a t the l a t t e r might bccome a victim of their revenge, H a y p r o p o s e d instead t h a t the Moorish minister of foreign a f f a i r s a t T a n g i e r should be a p pointed t o receive the complaints. T h i s a r r a n g e m e n t , H a y hoped, would render it unnecessary f o r the Jewish s u b j e c t s of the s u l t a n who were unable to obtain j u s t i c e to a p p e a l to the foreign r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t T a n g i e r or to the Jewish associations, which p r a c t i c e gave rise t o so much officious meddling in the internal a f f a i r s of the c o u n t r y . A n d since the foreign r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a d immediate c o n t a c t with the M o r o c c a n foreign minister, they would be able, whenever it a p p e a r e d to be necessary, to lend the a p p e a l s of the Jews their s u p p o r t . H a y also secured a t Fez s a t i s f a c t o r y settlements in the cases of three m u r d e r e d Jews. In the m a t t e r of p r o t e c t i o n p r o p e r , however, no new development of significance o c c u r r e d . H e merely recommended to the sultan his s u b s t i t u t e p r o p o s a l s f o r B a r g a s h ' s original demands concerning commercial a g e n t s . Certain concessions won by H a y f r o m the sultan on the occasion of his Fez mission a r e indicative of w h a t H a y eventually expected f r o m the s u l t a n as a r e w a r d f o r B r i t i s h s u p p o r t in the m a t t e r of p r o t e c t i o n . T h e s u l t a n consented to enter into negotiations f o r the revision of the B r i t i s h commercial t r e a t y , agreed to permit the e x p o r t a t i o n of beans, maize, and peas, d e p a r t i n g f r o m the established custom of fixing the d a t e a t t h e s t a r t when e x p o r t a t i o n should cease, and promised to t a k e c e r t a i n steps to r e f o r m t h e system of government of Morocco. 6 0 M

Other important points not related to the question of protection were that the sultan agreed to open a new port to trade in the region of Wad

117

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E

WAYS

In close touch with the Jews of Morocco through their corresponding agent, the Hebrew societies increased their activities as the conference approached. The French and English press was well supplied with articles playing up the barbarity of the Moroccans and the inexpediency of reducing the privilege of protection. 61 Scurrilous abuse was heaped upon the British and Spanish ministers 82 for upholding that policy. The American and Italian representatives, as chief defenders of the Hebrews, on the other hand, were extravagantly extolled 63 . Nun. A new mole was to be constructed at Tangier and that at Mogador repaired. On his mission to the court in 1875, Hay had presented Muley Hassen with a telegraph set. In 1880, he presented a heliographic instrument. The sultan was much taken by the latter, and approved the proposal that heliographic communication should be established between Tangier and Gibraltar, agreeing to purchase on his own account the instrument to be installed on the Moroccan side of the Strait. A.B.L.T., Hay to Granville, desp. 99, 28 May 1880. m Ibid.., Hay to Salisbury, desp. 44, 16 Mar. 1880. " Both Hay and Diosdado warmly denied these attacks and in convincing despatches showed how they had consistently exerted their influence in behalf of the Jews. A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 60, 10 Mar. 1880; A.B.L.T., Hay to Granville, desp. 1+4, 21 Jul. 1880. " When, late in March 1880, Scovasso returned to Tangier with increased rank, a f t e r a leave of several months, a large concourse of prot6g6s, principally Jews, "who consider him their principal defender," received him at the pier with a noisy ovation, shouting for the Italian king and his envoy^ (A.B.L.T., Hay to Salisbury, desp. 63, 29 Mar. 1880; A.S.M.S., Zugasti to Sp. min. of St., desp. 2, 30 Mar. 1880; Docs. Dipl.: Quest, de Prot., doc. no. 10, 27-8, Vernouillet to Freycinet, Tangier, 2 Apr. 1880.) Soon afterwards, and before the opening of the Madrid conference, both the Italian and American representatives, in accordance with well-established custom, visited the ports of Morocco in vessels of war, for the purpose of impressing the natives. This move was interpreted as a deliberate demonstration in behalf of the Jews and irregular prot6g£s. (A.S.M.S., Diosdado to the Sp. min. of st., desp. 83, 15 May 1880.) The commander of the American vessel reported that he had taken pleasure in "showing off our flag where it was almost unknown, and impressing this people with the fact that we can protect it." He had thrown his ship open to visitors and was especially careful to see that the guns, arms, etc., were conspicuously displayed. ". . . Intelligent persons in all the ports," he declared, ". . . are unanimous in saying that protection is necessary." As for Mathews, "the Jews worship him." (A.U.S.E.M., Papers Relating to Foreigners in Morocco, vol. 2. Report of Commander Ν. H. Farquhar of the U.S.S. Quinnebaug to Rear Admiral J. C. Howell, Gibraltar, 11 May 1880.)

118

T H E INTERNATIONAL

FIELD

N o t confining their activities solely to writing, Jewish deleg a t i o n s interviewed and memorialized many of the statesmen and diplomats who had to deal with the Moroccan question, including the British representatives at T a n g i e r and Madrid, the French, British and S p a n i s h foreign ministers and officials at the United S t a t e s department of state. In the British house of commons Mr. S e r j e a n t Simon asked the undersecretary for foreign affairs whether, " h a v i n g regard to existing t r e a t y and c u s t o m a r y rights, it is the intention of H e r M a j e s t y ' s government to take any, and what, steps to ensure the s a f e t y of nonMohammedans in M o r o c c o , and their equality before the Law with the other s u b j e c t s of the sultan." 6 4 T h e chief arguments advanced by the Hebrew societies in opposing the threatened limitation of protection were as follows: 6 5 T h e position of the non-protected Hebrews of the interior was intolerable. W i t h d r a w a l of p r o t e c t i o n would expose them more than ever to unjust and tyrannical treatment on the part of the Mohammedan population. T h e mere talk of doing so had resulted in the murder of the Jew at Fez. Protection enabled the Jews to engage in commerce and i n d u s t r y with security. Morocco benefited from this situation since they contributed g r e a t ** Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, London, 1880, vol. CCLII, 1896, 12 June 1880. Sir Charles W. Dilke replied that the British government had frequently instructed Hay to lose no opportunity of urging upon the sultan's government the necessity of extending equal privileges and full religious liberty to all classes of the population. On his recent visit to the court, he stated, Hay had again made representations of this nature. The British government were, moreover, considering the best means of making a joint remonstrance in concert with the other European powers, in order to impress the sultan with the expediency of amending the administration of his government and of granting full civil and religious liberty to all subjects of the empire. • A.U.S.E.M., Papers Relating to Foreigners in Morocco, vol. 1, Alliance Israelite Universelle, Memoire en Faveur des IsraSlites Marocains, Apr. 1880, addressed to Freycinet; Ibid., vol. 2, D r a f t of Memorial to the Foreign Office relating to Protection in Morocco by the Presidents of the Board of Deputies and Council of the Anglo-Jewish Association; A.B.L.T., Memorandum by Mr. Löwy, secretary of the Anglo-Jewish Society, Relating to Foreign Prot6g6s in Morocco, 1879, addressed to Sir John Drummond H a y ; also, London Time», 19 May 1880, contains an account of a reception of a Jewish deputation by Lord Granville and Sir Charles Dilke.

119

MOROCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS ly t o t h e w e a l t h a n d p r o s p e r i t y of t h e cities of the c o a s t . S h o u l d p r o t e c t i o n be removed, c o m m e r c e would be r u i n e d a n d

trading

r e l a t i o n s w i t h E u r o p e would cease. P r o t e c t i o n t o a limited n u m ber of J e w s h a d served t o i n s u r e t h e s a f e t y of n u m e r o u s o t h e r s . T h e f e a r of d o i n g a n i n j u r y t o a p r o t e c t e d J e w h a d served t o s a f e g u a r d m a n y u n p r o t e c t e d ones f r o m h a r m . T h e J e w s , being t h e o n l y element of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of M o r o c c o r e c e p t i v e t o E u r o p e a n civilization, were t h e only i n h a b i t a n t s t h a t could be dep e n d e d u p o n t o s p r e a d it t h r o u g h o u t

the c o u n t r y .

Already,

aided b y t h e Alliance I s r a e l i t e Universelle of P a r i s , t h e y h a d opened schools a t T a n g i e r , T e t u a n , L a r a c h e , Saffi, a n d M o g a dor. " I t

is n o t f o r a n y u n d u e privileges t h a t

protection

is

s o u g h t ; it is s o u g h t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of b r e a t h i n g t h e f r e s h a i r of l i b e r t y a n d of b e i n g p l a c e d on a n e q u a l i t y with t h e i r fellow m e n . " On the o t h e r h a n d , in t h e c a s e of t h e M o h a m m e d a n s , it was held, t h e motive was p u r e l y economic g a i n . I n c l u d e d a m o n g t h e p r o p o s a l s m a d e b y t h e H e b r e w societies t o t h e i r respective g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e : t h a t the question of Jewish w e l f a r e should be considered per sc a t the conference, t h a t t h e c o n s u l a r p r o t e c t i o n of n o n - M o h a m m e d a n s should be secured by t r e a t y , a n d , in o r d e r t o m a k e t h i s the more effective, t h a t cons u l a t e s s h o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d in t h e i n t e r i o r of the c o u n t r y . S p e cial c o u r t s should be e s t a b l i s h e d in which the t e s t i m o n y of H e brews would be received a s valid. T h e imposition of indignities u p o n t h e m should no l o n g e r be t o l e r a t e d . T h e y should be allowed to choose d e l e g a t e s a u t h o r i z e d t o r e p r e s e n t t h e m b e f o r e M o o r ish a u t h o r i t i e s qualified t o i n s u r e t h e m a g a i n s t i n j u s t i c e . 6 6 Seven y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e M a d r i d conference, b e f o r e t h e h u b b u b over t h e q u e s t i o n of p r o t e c t i o n h a d a r i s e n , S i r J o h n H a y , with a r e c o r d of service t o t h e H e b r e w r a c e d u r i n g his t w e n t y e i g h t y e a r s a s B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t T a n g i e r , which should have e n t i t l e d him t o b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d as t h e i r best f r i e n d , h a d o c c a s i o n t o e x p r e s s his views u p o n the J e w i s h q u e s t i o n , which m a y be r e g a r d e d a s his h o n e s t opinion of the m a t t e r . 6 7 E x t r a c t s follow: " S e e the references to the memorials presented to the British French foreign offices by the Jewish organizations, cited above. " A.B.L.T., H a y to Granville, desp. 51, 19 Sept. 1873.

120

and

T H E INTERNATIONAL

FIELD

T h e S u l t a n and his ministers are, I think, desirous of acting with good f a i t h in the fulfillment of their promises which have been made on various occasions regarding the t r e a t m e n t of J e w s , but the Sultan's power of control over some of his governors and fanatical subj e c t s is not always effective, especially when it is discovered t h a t a F o r e i g n Representative had i n t e r f e r e d in a matter of this kind. D u r i n g my long experience in this country I have observed t h a t good offices used in behalf of the J e w s though successful with the S u l t a n and some of his ministers, are invariably followed at no distant lapse of time by the commission of g r a v e r outrages upon this u n f o r t u n a t e race. A Mohammedan f r i e n d in an influential position with this government has assured me privately that the J e w s b r i n g down upon themselves this i l l t r e a t m e n t by i m p r u d e n t language r e g a r d i n g the protection they can obtain through an a p p e a l to the Foreign Governments to the Foreign R . R . at T a n g i e r a n d that the fact of the sultan r e p r i m a n d i n g Iiis officers for their illtreatment of the J e w s , in consequence of r e p o r t s received from Foreign agents at T a n g i e r , ma}· irritate the Governors who bide their time to take their revenge upon the J e w s . Both M r . Tissot [ t h e F r e n c h minister] and I think there is much t r u t h in all this and t h e r e f o r e often hesitate in taking steps which though they might be considered satisf a c t o r y to the Jewish communities in E u r o p e would in reality be i n j u r i o u s to the J e w s of this country. . . . T h e r e is no doubt t h a t acts of t y r a n n y are committed by the authorities in the interior on the J e w s , which it will be very difficult to repress. I am not surprized a t the interest and s y m p a t h y shewn by the Israelite race in E u r o p e to their u n f o r t u n a t e b r e t h r e n in Morocco, but the progress of commerce and civilization, though moving, it must be admitted, a t camel's pace, in Morocco, a r e the best, a n d I may a d d sole radical measures which we can depend upon f o r an amelioration of the lot of these peoples, unless Foreign governments choose to declare t h a t t h e J e w s of this country are their protected subjects, and even then, the M o h a m m e d a n population in the interior might rise some d a y in defiance of the S u l t a n and his authorities a n d massacre the J e w s on account of their emancipation f r o m the Mohammedan rule. D u r i n g my long residence in Morocco very g r e a t changes have taken place as regards the t r e a t m e n t of the J e w s in this country, both by this Government and t h e M o h a m m e d a n population. I remember the time when no J e w w h e t h e r E u r o p e a n or Moorish could

121

MOROCCO AT THE PASTING OF THE WAYS mount an animal in this t o w n and n a t i v e J e w s w e r e compelled to g o b a r e f o o t in the M o h a m m e d a n quarters of the town. E v e n British J e w s w e r e not a l l o w e d to w e a r the high hat of the Christians. T h e r e was not a d a y passed without some J e w or Jewess suffering f r o m the insolence of the M o h a m m e d a n population, but now no J e w takes off his shoes in passing a mosque. T h e y

ride or w a l k where they

please. I have no hesitation in s a y i n g that the Jewish population at Tangier

( c a . 4 , 0 0 0 ) is in e v e r y respect better off than the M o h a m -

medan population and that it is v e r y rare to hear that a J e w has been bastinadoed or even imprisoned, unless it has been on account of a complaint o f

a Jew

or a Christian. T h e y

have no

military

service and p a y a v e r y small tax to the G o v e r n m e n t . A t T e t u a n and the western ports a g r e a t amelioration has also taken place in the state o f the J e w s . I attribute these changes as I have said to the e f f e c t of commerce and c i v i l i z a t i o n , but I may add that ever since m y appointment in M o r o c c o I have taken e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y when I considered the moment f a v o r a b l e to use my good offices in checking acts of oppression or t y r a n n y and w e r e it not that I might a p p e a r to be commending my own conduct, I could recount to Y o u r ship the steps

I

have taken at various

Lord-

times to b r i n g about the

abolition of the humiliating acts to which the J e w s w e r e

formerly

exposed in T a n g i e r , but as I have a l r e a d y stated, I have been caref u l to watch m y opportunities and to avoid as f a r as possible the appearance

of

undue

interference

Sultan and his officers and their

with

the

independence

of

right to g o v e r n their o w n

the sub-

jects. . . . T h e a d v o c a t e s o f r e f o r m 6 8 o f t h e s y s t e m of p r o t e c t i o n w h a t number of

the p o p u l a t i o n m i g h t be w i t h d r a w n

asked

from

the

jurisdiction of the M o r o c c a n g o v e r n m e n t without d e s t r o y i n g the authority

of

the sultan, and w h y

did n o t i n t e r f e r e in b e h a l f

humanitarian

organizations

of t h e M o h a m m e d a n p o p u l a t i o n

of

M o r o c c o whose g r i e v a n c e s w e r e as g r e a t as t h o s e of t h e J e w s . T h e abolition of 1,500 wealthy

irregular

Jews

protection would affect only

(including their families). T h e

about

remainder

of the f r o m 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 t o 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 J e w s not only did not benefit f r o m " A . U . S . E . M . , Papers Relating to Foreigners in Morocco, vol. 1, Memorandum of the Language held to Sir J. H . Drummond Hay by the Rev. A . I.öwy, Secretary of the Anglo-Jewish Association, and Sir J. H. Drummond Hay's Replies.

122

T H E INTERNATIONAL FIELD t h i s i r r e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n , b u t on t h e c o n t r a r y s u f f e r e d f r o m it b e c a u s e of t h e s t r o n g h a t r e d e n g e n d e r e d a m o n g t h e

Moham-

m e d a n p o p u l a t i o n on a c c o u n t of a t t e n d i n g a b u s e s . T h e M o r o c can g o v e r n m e n t h a d p r o m i s e d t h a t in case i r r e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n were d i s c o n t i n u e d consuls m i g h t a t t e n d the t r i a l s of f o r m e r p r o teges t o i n s u r e j u s t i c e . T h i s would i n s u r e J e w s d e p r i v e d of p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t abuses. F u r t h e r m o r e , i r r e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n h a d no legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n , h a v i n g been o b t a i n e d f o r the most

part

t h r o u g h c o r r u p t i o n . I t would be ill-advised a t t h e p r e s e n t time f o r t h e s u l t a n , who was g e n e r a l l y considered t o be p e r s o n a l l y h u m a n e a n d j u s t , t o t r y t o p u t the J e w s on an e n t i r e l y equal f o o t i n g with the M o h a m m e d a n s , o r f o r t h e f o r e i g n p o w e r s t o e x e r t p r e s s u r e u p o n him t o s e c u r e t h a t end. H e would p r o b a b l y s u b m i t , b u t a f a n a t i c a l s p i r i t would seize hold of his o t h e r subj e c t s t h a t would g r e a t l y j e o p a r d i z e t h e lives a n d p r o p e r t y of t h e whole J e w i s h p o p u l a t i o n , a n d t h e s u l t a n would be powerless t o p r e v e n t it. F i n a l l y , if i r r e g u l a r p r o t e c t i o n were given u p the s u l t a n would no l o n g e r h a v e a p l a u s i b l e excuse f o r r e f u s i n g t o c a r r y o u t commercial a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e f o r m s . T h u s it is seen how i n s e p a r a b l y i n t e r t w i n e d was t h e J e w i s h q u e s t i o n with t h a t of p r o t e c t i o n . 6 9 I t a d d e d a n e m o t i o n a l elem e n t t o t h e c o n t r o v e r s y which t e n d e d t o o b s c u r e t h e real issue, s t r e n g t h e n e d the o p p o s i t i o n , a n d did c o n s i d e r a b l e i n j u r y t o t h e c a u s e of r e f o r m . T h e motives of t h e S p a n i s h g o v e r n m e n t in j o i n i n g f o r c e s with t h e a d v o c a t e s of r e f o r m h a v e a l r e a d y been described a t l e n g t h . B r i t i s h a c t i o n in t a k i n g t h e lead in c a l l i n g the c o n f e r e n c e would h a r d l y seem t o r e q u i r e f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n , since it was the logical o u t g r o w t h of t h e p o l i c y followed b y H a y a t

Tangier.

A s t h e c o n f e r e n c e drew n e a r , however, it is evident t h a t B r i t i s h " N o t e the following s t a t e m e n t by M. de F r e y e i n e t : " T h e Israelites a r e directly interested in the question b r o u g h t b e f o r e the Conference, f o r it is to their religion t h a t the g r e a t e r p a r t of the foreign p r o t e g e s in Morocco belong, especially the semsars, and the f a n a t i c a l animosity of which they a r e the o b j e c t is one of the p r i n c i p a l causes which j u s t i f y the necessity of diplomatic protection in f a v o r of those of their coreligionists who place themselves in the service of our m e r c h a n t s . " Docs. Dipl.: Quest, de Prot., doc. no. 27, 52-3, F r e y c i n e t t o J a u r e s , P a r i s , 19 May 1880.

123

MOROCCO AT T H E P A S T I N G OF T H E

WAYS

p o l i c y w a s m i s u n d e r s t o o d in s o m e q u a r t e r s , a n d f a l s e m o t i v e s were a t t r i b u t e d t o it. T h e s e require e x a m i n a t i o n . T h e r e were t h o s e w h o i n s i s t e d t h a t H a y ' s p e r s o n a l influence with t h e s u l t a n w a s o n t h e w a n e , a n d t h a t in o r d e r t o r e s t o r e it he s o u g h t t o c u r r y f a v o r b y s u p p o r t i n g h i s d e m a n d s . 7 0 I t is t r u e t h a t t h e B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r t h o r o u g h l y d e t e s t e d t h e new g r a n d vizir, Cid A l a r b y B e n M o k t s a r , who held his p o s i t i o n b y r e a s o n of r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the s u l t a n , c o n s i d e r i n g him b o t h c o r r u p t a n d i n c o m p e t e n t . 7 1 T h i s f e e l i n g of a n i m o s i t y w a s v e r y p r o b a b l y mut u a l , f o r on h i s mission t o F e z in 1 8 8 0 , H a y h a d t w o v e r y u n p l e a s a n t d i s p u t e s w i t h M o k t s a r over p o i n t s of f o r m a n d etiq u e t t e . W h e n the B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r h i n t e d t o the s u l t a n his o p i n ion of t h e vizir, 7 2 the s u l t a n e x p r e s s e d the h o p e t h a t he w o u l d TO

"The Sultan's court takes little notice of him [Sir John], and does not follow his advice. To reestablish his prestige, he has brought up the present question of protection, he has made himself its advocate; . . . The British Minister wishes to persuade the Sultan and those around him, that Morocco cannot live in peace with other nations, without his good will, he wants to place himself as a protector, to have his own country profit by it hereafter." A.U.S.E.M., Papers Relating to Foreigners in Morocco, vol. 2, Expose of Moroccan Affairs by a Frenchman of several years' residence in Morocco engaged in the Wool Trade, sent by Mr. Sprague (U. S. consul at Gibraltar) to Fairchild, 29 Apr. 1880. ". . . The British Minister at this place . . . sees the diminution of his prestige and of British trade after forty years of steady residence in Morocco. . . ." A.U.S.C.G.T., Mathews to Evarts, desp. 355, 30 Mar. 1880. Hay "wishes to have the upper hand in everything that relates to the Empire to which he is accredited." A.U.S.E.M., Papers Relating to Foreigners in Morocco, vol. 2, Sprague (U. S. consul at Gilbraltar) to Fairchild (U. S. minister at Madrid), 3 June 1880. 71 A.B.L.T., Hay to Salisbury, Fez desp. 85, 28 Apr. 1880; Hay to Granville, desp. 97, 27 May 1880. " On previous visits to court the grand vizir had come to call on Hay. Cid Moktsar at first refused to do so because of his relationship to the sultan. Hav, therefore, refused to visit the vizir unless assured beforehand that his visit would be returned, and asked the sultan to appoint a special officer with whom he might negotiate. Thereupon the sultan ordered Moktsar to agree to return the visit. A.B.L.T., Hay to Salisbury, Fez desp. 76, 18 Apr. 1880. Later a squabble arose over how the vizir was to address Hay in official correspondence, the latter insisting upon the use of his title "sir." Moktsar declined, refusing to give any reason and proposing in its stead "eminent," "worthy" or "distinguished." Hay learned at court that the chief objection

124

THE

INTERNATIONAL

FIELD

i m p r o v e w i t h e x p e r i e n c e . T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , a s e a r l y a s

1880,

no indication t h a t H a y ' s p r e s t i g e with the sultan was declining. T h e i m p o r t a n t s u c c e s s e s of his m i s s i o n t o F e z in 1 8 8 0 i n d i c a t e q u i t e t h e c o n t r a r y . H a d t h i s c h a r g e been m a d e f o u r o r five y e a r s l a t e r it w o u l d h a v e h a d m o r e p o i n t . O t h e r p e r s o n s read i n t o B r i t i s h M o r o c c a n p o l i c y c o m m e r c i a l motives. British commerce, they argued, was suffering seriously f r o m c o m p e t i t i o n , 7 3 a n d H a y w a s s e e k i n g b y s u b t l e

under-

of the vizir to the use of "sir" was that he had heard it signified the same as "Cid," meaning "master," and "as the vizir is an ignorant fanatic he objected to call a Christian" by any such title. Hay then threatened to omit "Cid" from Moktsar's name, or to apply to him the same word that he used in addressing him. The vizir replied that he would not employ any name in addressing Hay, and the latter said that it was immaterial, he would do the same. There the matter dropped. The British minister apologized to Granville for his apparently picayunish conduct, in the following words: ". . . in dealing with Mohammedan functionaries if you give way on matters of etiquette, it leaves a wrong impression in their mind and leads them to suppose that you will admit of neglect and discourtesy in other matters which may affect interests of real importance." A.B.L.T., Hay to Granville, desp. 102, 31 May 1880. It is interesting to note that the opinion of a Frenchman later connected with the legation of his country at Tangier shared Hay's opinion of Moktsar's ability, declaring that the position which he occupied was "very superior to his merits." H. de la Martini^re, Souvenirs du Maroc, 142. 71 Admitting the lack of absolutely accurate commercial statistics for Morocco, it seems to be true that British trade with Morocco was on the decline, both in volume and relatively. Figures found in the Almanack de Ootha show the percentage of Moroccan trade enjoyed by Great Britain as being during the period 1870 to 1885, as follows: 1870, 71.74 per cent; 1871, 67.55 per cent; 1872, 63.36 per cent; 1873, not given; 1874, 69.74 per cent; 1875, 61.98 per cent; 1876, 68.10 per cent; 1877, 58.66 per cent; 1878, the famine year, not given; 1879, 51.53 per cent; 1880, 57.68 per cent; 1881, 55.31 per cent; 1882, 59.83 per cent; 1883, 48.31 per cent; 1884, 63.60 per cent; 1885, 56.97 per cent. During the whole period the average annual percentage of Morocco's total trade enjoyed by Great Britain was 61.02 per cent. The writer has found no evidence to substantiate the charge that the decline of trade was a mainspring of British action. Even if England did enjoy approximately two-thirds of Morocco's combined import and export trade, the total volume of this commerce might almost be termed insignificant. Great Britain's chief interest in Morocco at this time, as has been shown, was political; specifically, the maintenance of the neutrality of the south shore of the Strait of Gibraltar.

125

MOROCCO A T T H E P A S T I N G OF T H E

WAYS

h a n d e d m e a n s t o benefit B r i t i s h c o m m e r c e a t t h e e x p e n s e of o t h e r s . 7 4 I t w a s held t h a t t h e n a t u r e of the t r a d e of

France,

f o r e x a m p l e , w a s d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t of G r e a t B r i t a i n , t h e f o r mer r e q u i r i n g t h e services of n a t i v e a g e n t s in b u y i n g p r o d u c e a t d i s t a n t m a r k e t s of t h e i n t e r i o r , whereas B r i t i s h t r a d e w a s c a r r i e d o n b y r e g u l a r B r i t i s h - b o r n s u b j e c t s ( w h o f o r t h a t reason e n j o y e d e x e m p t i o n s a s f o r e i g n e r s ; most of t h e m n a t i v e s of G i b r a l t a r ) a n d w a s l a r g e l y c o n c e n t r a t e d in the p o r t s . 7 5 I n seeki n g t o remove p r o t e c t i o n f r o m t h e semsars,

Great Britain was

a c c u s e d of a d v o c a t i n g a m e a s u r e t h a t would n o t a f f e c t her int e r e s t s a d v e r s e l y a t all, while a t the s a m e time it would ruin t h e c o m m e r c e of F r a n c e . 7 6 G r e a t B r i t a i n m i g h t g i v e u p e n t i r e l y the r i g h t of p r o t e c t i o n a n d still s u f f e r n o p r e j u d i c i a l c o n s e q u e n c e s 74

Note the following declaration of the American consul-general at Tangier: . . The Moorish Government . . . never thought of . . . raising the question." It had, he charged, originated with Drummond Hay. His "sole object is to have it all his own in Morocco, thus excluding the chance of the propagation of any other commerce but that of the country he represents. . . . Sir John Hay . . . is the moving soul and body of this uncalled for movement on protections . . . thus we must be very suspicious and watchful of all the doings . . . coming from the British side either here or at Madrid. We are their great rivals in commerce, our commerce and manufactures are rapidly wedging and turning aside the British everywhere and it is nothing but natural that they should resort to every device to maintain their supremacy . . . in the most unsuspicious and indirect way." A.U.S.E.M., Mathews to Fairchild, 14 Apr. 1880. " In answer to this argument, Hay reported to the British foreign minister that several British merchants engaged in the Moroccan trade who made large purchases of produce in the interior "have assured me that it is not at all necessary to employ wealthy native farmers or like persons to effect these purchases or that agents should be placed under the jurisdiction of consuls who reside frequently at a distance of four or five days' journey from the site where the purchases are made." They held, however, that if merchants of other countries continued to exercise this privilege, exempt from local jurisdiction and thus enabled to infringe with impunity upon market regulations and to dictate their own prices to sellers, their agents would have to enjoy the same rights or the foreign merchants would be able to monopolize the markets. A.B.L.T., Hay to Granville, desp. 107, 7 June 1880. " T h i s explanation is accepted by M. Andrfi Gourdin in his doctoral thesis at the University of Paris, La politique fran^aise au Maroc, pp. 67-90. The French government both at Tangier and Madrid made use of this argument in seeking to justify the protection of semsars.

126

THE INTERNATIONAL

FIELD

because of the g r e a t personal influence of her representative. 77 T o the former argument, H a y replied, " Y o u are well aware that British merchants purchase wool, grain, oil, oxen, hides, gum, etc., in the interior, in the same manner as the French, and that as to the Italian merchants or those Moorish subjects engaged in commerce who are protected by the I t a l i a n minister, they do not purchase produce to export t o I t a l y , but solely f o r E n g land or France." 7 8 T h e r e is a good deal of truth at the basis of the contention that H a y ' s personal prestige was sufficient to insure the protection of British interests in Morocco. 7 9 I t is erroneous, however, to suppose that this was the mainspring of British policy. I t was merely incidental. W h a t , then, were Great Britain's real reasons? W i t h the reappearance of widespread abuses in the system of protection, accompanying the extension of trade and the influx of Europeans into M o r o c c o , there appeared a real danger that the sultan's authority was about to be subverted. 80 A t the same " A.B.L.T.,

Hay

to D e r b y , desp. 2, 2 Jan.

( F r e n c h chargS d'affaires)

1878: "Count

de

Langier

said that f r o m my l o n g residence and influential

position in this country the authorities took care not to g i v e grounds f o r offense to me and that as t o protection

I might not find it necessary to

a f f o r d it to natives as the authorities would not i n t e r f e r e with persons who w e r e supposed to be connected with British subjects or with m y s e l f . " A l s o , A . B . L . T . , H a y t o D e r b y , confid. desp. 77, 17 A u g . 1877. ™ P . R . O . , F.O. 185, vol. 623, British legation archives at M a d r i d , f r o m and to miscellaneous, H a y ™A.U.S.E.M., Papers sonal Memorandum

of

to Bargash, 31 M a y

the Conference o f

General Fairchild: E x t r a c t : " W . B.

[British])

can get

1880.

R e l a t i n g to F o r e i g n e r s in M o r o c c o , vol. 2, P e r [West]

Madrid

in the h a n d w r i t i n g

today said to me that they

along well enough in Mo.

[Morocco]

without

of

(the any

treaty so long as they had so good a R e p r e s e n t a t i v e there. I think so too f o r Sir D. H .

[Drummond

Hay]

has managed by his long and intimate

relations with the M o o r s to obtain a great ascendancy over them, besides he is backed, in the M o o r s ' mind strength o f

( & in f a c t t o o )

E n g l a n d , so that the B.

[British]

by the g r e a t

are willing

to

military

perpetuate

and increase their influence there to g o almost any length in lessing

[«ie]

the guards which present treaties throw about commerce, k n o w i n g that the f a r t h e r they g o in that direction the b e t t e r w i l l M . [ M o r o c c o ] be pleased, and

feeling certain

[Morocco]

that their own

people

who

reside

or

trade

in

will be f u l l y protected on the personal demand of their

Mo. min-

ister. . . ." " L i t e r a l l y dozens o f references might be listed here t o substantiate this

127

MOROCCO AT T H E PAETING OF T H E WAYS time the Moorish authorities, naturally hostile t o the spread of Christian influence in their c o u n t r y , invariably referred to this situation whenever urged to c a r r y out commercial reforms or to improve the administration of their government. 8 1 T h u s , H a y proposed both to save the c o u n t r y from impending ruin b y the introduction of timely reforms in the system of protection because it was to the interest of Great Britain t o do s o ; and at the same time he hoped his s u p p o r t would merit the g r a t i t u d e of the M o r o c c a n government and deprive it of its stock excuse for not effecting reforms. 8 2 T h e powers might

then,

either

statement. A few will suffice. H a v , addressing the diplomatic corps at T a n g i e r in 1877, d e c l a r e d : " . . . I seek . . . t o restrain the abuses and the extension of these privileges, which are increasing daily, and which will eventually render all government in Morocco impossible, and will cause to be feared the arrival of foreigners, whom the Government of the S u l t a n will regard as enemies coming t o deprive him of his sovereign rights." A.U.S.E.M., P a p e r s R e l a t i n g to Foreigners in Morocco, vol. 1, Procesverbal of the session of 18 J u l y 1877. Again, the y e a r following, H a y declared: ". . . such a state of affairs will eventually r e n d e r it impossible f o r the sultan and his ministers to c a r r y on the government of the country, f o r the action of the native t r i b u nals will be paralyzed by the constant and a r b i t r a r y interference of foreign diplomatic and consular officers. . . ." A.B.L.T., H a y to Derby, desp. 2, 2 J a n . 1878. T h e British minister at the Spanish court d u r i n g the Madrid c o n f e r ence w r o t e : ". . . it a p p e a r e d t o me t h a t the object of the Conference was not so much t o i n t e r p r e t the text of the treaties as to agree upon such modifications of them which, while affording sufficient g u a r a n t e e f o r all legitimate interests would a t the same time relieve the Sultan's Government f r o m the consequences described by Cid Mohammed as so disastrous." P.R.O., (Archives of the B r . legation at M a d r i d ) , West t o Granville, confid. desp. 132, 5 J u n e 1880. " " . . . I f e a r the S u l t a n ' s p r e s e n t advisers are opposed to liberal measures which would encourage the advent t o this country and residence of E u r o p e a n s , especially so long as the existing abuses in i r r e g u l a r protection continue." A.B.L.T., H a y t o Derby, com'l desp. 6, 26 Mar. 1878. The E x c h a n g e Committee of G i b r a l t a r considered i r r e g u l a r and abusive protection "the most p r o m i n e n t obstacle to the f u r t h e r a n c e of E u r o p e a n commercial intercourse with Morocco." A.B.L.T., Memorandum Respecting T r a d e in Morocco, by the E x c h a n g e Committee of G i b r a l t a r , F. F r a n c i a , ehm., 10 J u n e 1880, sent t o the s e c r e t a r y of the colonies to be submitted to E a r l Granville. 82 A n a r g u m e n t f r e q u e n t l y employed by H a y to induce the sultan t o m a k e r e f o r m s is contained in the following despatch f r o m P a l m e r s t o n to H a y ' s

128

THE

INTERNATIONAL

FIELD

through identical or collective notes, firmly, but in friendly manner, induce the sultan to embark upon a policy of reform." 3 H e felt, however, that they should be very careful not to use menacing language which might cause the sultan to act precipitately, introducing premature reforms which through antagonizing f a t h e r who preceded him (1830-45) at T a n g i e r : " N a t i o n s cannot enter into real

friendship

with

each

other

without

that

mutual

intercourse

which

begets kindly feelings on both sides, and the most certain means which T h e E m p e r o r could take t o secure t o himself the support o f E n g l a n d on occasions when he may require it, would be to encourage and f a c i l i t a t e to the utmost the commercial intercourse between his subjects and those of the Queen.

For

thus

the

whole

British

nation

would

grow

t o take

an

interest in the w e l f a r e of T h e E m p e r o r , and the friendship between the t w o countries would rest upon a broader and more solid f o u n d a t i o n . " Desp. 2, 12 Feb. 1841, quoted by F l o u r n o y , op. cit., p. 43. A

notable example of the use of this argument is found in connection

with H a y ' s negotiations at Fez in 1880. Translation of a memorial

drawn

up by the vizir of the language, held t o the sultan and the sultan's replies, H a y t o Granville, com'l desp. 13, 27 M a y 1880. ™ E a r l y in 1878, H a y proposed that he be instructed to visit the sultan's court that spring, a f t e r the diplomatic c o n f e r e n c e had been held on the subject of irregular protection. " I f the suggestions I had made

respecting

taxation and the ill-treatment of commercial native agents in the interior are agreed to, it will be desirable that I should have an opportunity

of

communicating direct with the sultan on that s u b j e c t and to impress upon H i s M a j e s t y that H i s subjects have hitherto sought

for foreign

tion in order to shield themselves f r o m the a r b i t r a r y acts o f his

protecGover-

nors and sheiks and an unjust system o f taxation and imposts and theref o r e to urge that r e f o r m s be introduced into the system of

Government,

if H i s M a j e s t y desired t o prevent a return to protection, and to improve the status of his subjects. . . .

I t appears to me that the present moment

would be favourable f o r endeavouring to induce the Sultan to relax some of the restrictions imposed upon trade and which tend t o check the development of the resources of this country." A . B . L . T . , H a y t o D e r b y , desp. IS, 8 Feb. 1878. " W h e n regulations a r e established f o r the abolition of irregular protection and the Sultan and his Government discover that E u r o p e a n

capital,

industry and enterprize will contribute t o the wealth of the country and not to impoverishing the treasury by claims, or to p a r a l y z e the action and authority

of

Moorish

officers, then, only, d o

I

hope that

trade

will

be

placed on a better f o o t i n g and that the Sultan and his Government

will

be induced to encourage the advent and enterprize of Europeans in

Mo-

rocco." A . B . L . T . , H a y to Salisbury, desp. 50, 28 Jul. 1879. I n June 1880, the British minister w r o t e to his sister concerning M a d r i d conference, as f o l l o w s : " . . .

I had advised that when the

129

the

Powers

MOEOCCO AT T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS

his officials and subjects might result in the overthrow of the government. 8 4 T h e policy of Great Britain in thus moving for the Madrid conference is seen to be entirely consonant with her long-established policy in Morocco. She sought to preserve the a u t h o r i t y of the sultan against danger from within. In return for her assistance she hoped to secure political and especially commercial reforms. I t was a policy designed to serve not only her own interests, but those of the sultan as well, and, in addition, those of all countries interested in developing M o r o c c a n trade and preserving Moroccan independence. T h e instructions issued to the British minister a t M a d r i d for his guidance in the conference were of a very general nature. 8 4 H e was to "be careful to give your support to the policy which has been uniformly followed by Sir John Drummond H a y , " and t o "bear in mind that it is the desire of H e r M a j e s t y ' s Government that the Government of Morocco should be freed from all undue interference on the p a r t of Foreign Representatives, and that the pernicious system of g r a n t i n g foreign p r o t e c t i o n to the subjects of the Sultan, a system highly prejudicial t o the financial

prosperity of the state should be curtailed as f a r as

conceded the just demands of the Sultan, it would be an opportunity for requiring that he should introduce gradually reforms in the maladministration of this country." Mrs. L. A. E. Brooks, A Memoir of Sir John Drummond Hay, p. 323. The promises of commercial and administrative reforms made by the sultan to Hay while at Fez in the spring of 1880 have been noted in another connection. 81 Hay's ideas as to procedure in inducing the sultan to adopt reforms are interestingly developed in his despatch 44 of 16 Mar. 1880, to Salisbury, and despatches 107 and 111 of 7 and 24 June 1880, to Granville (A.B.L.T.). In the last he made the following significant statement: " I t must be borne in mind that however pernicious and detestable the present system is, the Sultan still retains sufficient authority in the greater part of the Empire to maintain order, and to grant redress when applied for by foreign subjects, but that if the downfall of his dynasty was brought about, there is no possible combination that I know of which could replace it and put a stop to the state of anarchy and commission of outrages that will ensue, unless it was [sic] effected by an armed intervention of one or more Foreign Powers which would lead to inextricable difficulties." " P.R.O., Salisbury to West, desp. 47, 1 Mar. 1880.

130

T H E

INTERNATIONAL

FIELD

possible." A s a final instruction, he was charged to keep H a y informed as to the progress of the conference and to consult him upon points where his experience might be of value. T h e instructions carried to the conference by the Sultan's foreign minister were of a similar character. H a v i n g handled the question f r o m the beginning, and being already thoroughly conversant with it in all its ramifications, he was merely instructed to seek to secure the limitation of protection within the bounds of the British and Spanish treat} 7 stipulations. 86 In the case of Spain, which was represented by her prime minister, Canovas del Castillo, no instructions were necessary. T h e policy followed at M a d r i d was that previously developed by Diosdado at T a n g i e r . Baron Calice of the A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n foreign office, when approached by the British ambassador on the subject of the proposed conference, professed to know nothing of the questions to be discussed. Thereupon M r . E g e r t o n began a somewhat detailed discussion but was interrupted by the question whether Germany had objected to the views of Sir John Hay. 8 7 " W h e n I told him that the opposition to them did not come from that source, he said the Austrian Government will be willing to concur in the British minister's views, the more so as he is their own representative. . . . " T h e United States department of state appears to have been more concerned about the charge brought by the British minister at T a n g i e r against their representative than the actual issues of the conference. Convinced of Mathews' innocence, the department declared that it could not permit an investigation on the part of the conference of the past conduct of foreign representatives in M o r o c c o . I t favored, however, the adoption of a M

A . S . M . S . , D i o s d a d o to the Sp. min. of St., desp. 78, 10 M a y 1880. These

instructions w e r e shown confidentially to the Spanish 87

P.R.O., Egerton

(Vienna)

minister.

to S a l i s b u r y , desp. 645, 13 Oct. 1879. T h e

dual alliance between G e r m a n y and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y had been secretly concluded about three weeks earlier. This a p p e a r s to be one of the earliest intimations that the British

government

f u r t h e r in this despatch, " . . .

had of

its existence.

Egerton

wrote

I mention these details of conversation

a f f o r d a slight p r o o f of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g between the A u s t r i a n and man G o v e r n m e n t s . "

131

to

Ger-

MOEOCCO AT T H E PASTING OF T H E AYAYS

rule which would end the "excessive and injurious exercise of protection of natives . . . which is represented as burdensome to the Moorish exchequer and u n j u s t to its government; b u t in reaching a due settlement, regard must be had to the proper maintenance and security of consular establishments in t h a t country and the necessary employment of natives as guards, interpreters, and servants, and in such capacities as may be essential to the proper representation and protection of foreign commercial interests." 8 8 Ever since the installation of the French in Algeria the Moroccan authorities had entertained suspicions, and a t times, fears, of French designs upon their country. The u n s a t i s f a c t o r y delineation of the boundary between the two countries, the inability of the sultan to control his lawless subjects of the frontier, and his powerlessness to expel rebellious Algerian tribesmen from his territory, gave rise to recurrent disputes and hard feelings. For several years preceding the Madrid conference the attitude of the French government had not been unfriendly, but, rather, conciliatory. I t had, in friendly manner, sought the cooperation of the sultan in frontier questions. There were those, however, especially among the French officials of Algeria, who advocated a rectification of the boundary a t the expense of Morocco, in order to give France a frontier t h a t could be more easily defended. Waddington, when minister of foreign affairs, opposed this project on the ground t h a t an uncertain boundary always worked to the disadvantage of the weaker power. 89 As a practical measure some Frenchmen hoped to obtain from the sultan a more formal recognition of the right "A.U.S.E.M., Evarts to Fairehild, eonfid. instrs. 4, 12 Mar. 1880. " Waddington, French minister of foreign affairs, Dec. 1877 to Dec. 1879, wrote: "As a general rule the absence of official boundaries between two states is always to the detriment of the weaker. . . . I shall add that we ought not recognize without evident necessity, the absolute right of the emperor of Morocco over territories where his authority is often no more than nominal, and which we might someday have occasion to claim, especially if the studies of the trans-Sahara railway should result in practical conclusions." H.M.P. de la Martinifere and Capt. N. Lacroix, Documents pour servir a l'etude du Nord-Ouest african, reunis et ridig^s par les ordres de Μ. Jules Cambon, gouverneur gfineral de l'Algirie, I I , 46-72.

132

THE

INTERNATIONAL

FIELD

of pursuing Algerian rebels and pillaging Moorish

tribesmen

into M o r o c c a n t e r r i t o r y and punishing them there.8® A new element had recently been added to the Algero-Moroccan situation. In 1 8 7 9 the F r e n c h government, a f t e r considerable interest had been aroused, especially in Algeria, began seriously to investig a t e the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of the construction of a railway across the S a h a r a from Algeria into western Sudan. T h e best route for the line a p p a r e n t l y lay through districts claimed by the sultan, but over which his a u t h o r i t y was only nominal. T h e extension of the A l g e r o - M o r o c c a n boundary line to the f a r south, where no line had ever been drawn, some believe might afford the F r e n c h the o p p o r t u n i t y of acquiring these coveted districts. T h e r e were, therefore, certain things which the F r e n c h might hope to gain from negotiating with Morocco. W h y should they, then, not demand compensations in return for the surrender of important rights? W e have already seen t h a t the Mesfeewv mission, in its negotiations at P a r i s early in the year 1 8 8 0 , held interviews with the governor general of Algeria. 9 0 Furthermore, the F r e n c h government was not as deeply interested as was E n g land in maintaining the independence of the sultan and the maintenance of the neutrality of the s t r a i t . On the other hand, although the advent of the republicans to full control of the government in F r a n c e in 1 8 7 9 was at once accompanied by a more vigorous policy outside of Europe, 9 1 there is no justification for the assumption t h a t by 1 8 8 0 F r a n c e was determined to acquire the whole of Morocco. F o r several years a f t e r this date F r e n c h policy was inclined to be cautious on account of the susceptibility of public opinion at home. T h e Moors, if inspired by a f a n a t i c a l spirit against Christians, were still capable of p u t t i n g up a determined fight, and the interests of G r e a t B r i t a i n and Spain in the shereefian Empire were not to be lightly ignored. M. de Yernouillet, French minister a t T a n g i e r , undoubtedly influenced by F r e n c h merchants in Morocco, 8 2 appears to have " See supra, pp. 108-110. w E. Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 18701914, pp. 66-83. " The view of the French merchants in Morocco that protected semsars

133

MOEOCCO AT T H E P A S T I N G OF T H E

WAYS

been convinced that the sacrifice of protected commercial agents sooner or later would be the ruin of French commerce in Morocco."93 This view was adopted by Freycinet who, upon first accepting the conference proposal, deemed it "necessary to make at once a special reservation respecting the privileges of the agents employed by French merchants." 84 Later he declared the intention of appointing as representative of France at the conference "a stranger, up to the present, to the question of protections and one who will examine with an open mind the different points submitted to the conference." 95 When the Spanish miniswere indispensable to French commerce is very well expressed in an "Expos6 of Moroccan affairs by a Frenchman of several years' residence in Morocco engaged in the Wool Trade," sent by United States Consul Sprague at Gibraltar to Fairchild at Madrid, 29 Apr. 1880, A.U.S.E.M., Papers Relating to Foreigners in Morocco, vol. 2. In answer to a despatch from Freycinet reporting that sessions of the Madrid conference had been suspended because of a deadlock on the question of semsars, Vernouillet replied, "I thank Your Excellency very much for this communication which is of a nature to calm the fears of our merchants of the coast. They will see in it, in fact, that if the government of the Republic shows itself disposed to accept the demands of the shereefian government in so far as they are legitimate, it is on the other hand firmly resolved to cede no rights which the treaties confer upon us." Docs. Dipl.: Quest, de Prot., doc. no. 80, 112-13. The British minister believed that the French minister at Tangier and his government had been deceived by reports from their merchants, who were, according to Hay, personally interested in retaining wealthy farmers in the interior as agents—not because they could make purchases of produce which native agents, hired and sent from the ports, could not purchase—but because the merchants themselves derived great benefit from becoming partners of these farmers. The latter were accustomed surreptitiously to make over a great part of their cattle, etc., to the merchant, avoiding thereby payment of taxes, obtaining the privilege of being exempted from military and police service, and escaping the jurisdiction of the sultan's authorities. Hay charged that French merchants had enriched themselves by such means and he was not surprised, therefore, that they sought to convince their government that protected agents were indispensable to commerce. A.B.L.T., Hay to Granville, desp. 107, 7 June 1880. "Docs. Dipl.: Quest, de Prot., doc. no. 7, 20-4, Vernouillet to Freycinet, Tangier 18 Mar. 1880. M A.B.L.T., copy of Paris desp. 1155, Lyons to Salisbury, 21 Nov. 1879. " Docs. Dipl.: Quest, de Prot., doc. no. 8, 25, Freycinet to Jaur6s, 19 Mar. 1880.

134

T H E INTERNATIONAL FIELD t e r of s t a t e i n q u i r e d of t h e F r e n c h a m b a s s a d o r w h a t would be t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e F r e n c h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t t h e conference, J a u r e s replied t h a t he would doubtless be m o t i v a t e d b y a s p i r i t of c o n c i l i a t i o n , b u t h i n t e d t h a t because of d a n g e r to F r e n c h commerce he p r o b a b l y would not f a v o r the d i s c o n t i n u a n c e of p r o t e c t i o n of

scmsars."

T h e policy of t h e S p a n i s h g o v e r n m e n t caused t h e F r e n c h considerable w o n d e r m e n t . J a u r e s observed to the S p a n i s h minister of s t a t e t h a t t h e a t t i t u d e of D i o s d a d o was c o n t r a r y t o t h a t of his p r e d e c e s s o r s " w h o h a d a l w a y s considered the i n t e r e s t s of S p a i n a n d F r a n c e i d e n t i c a l in M o r o c c o . " 9 6 T h e F r e n c h minist e r a t T a n g i e r a t t e m p t e d t o explain it on the basis of the diss i m i l a r i t y of t h e c o n d i t i o n s of S p a n i s h and F r e n c h commerce in M o r o c c o , b u t F r e y c i n e t felt this to be only a p a r t i a l e x p l a n a tion. H e s t a t e d t h a t he continued to feel t h a t the g e n e r a l int e r e s t s of t h e two c o u n t r i e s were not different in the necessity of p r e s e r v i n g i n t a c t t h e p r e r o g a t i v e s of t h e i r n a t i o n a l s in t h e shereefian K m p i r e . T h i s f a c t , he believed, would a p p e a r in t h e conference, 8 7 where he hoped the S p a n i s h g o v e r n m e n t would n o t a d o p t the a t t i t u d e of D i o s d a d o . 9 8 T h e a t t i t u d e of t h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t t o w a r d t h e conference p r o j e c t a t t h a t time was expressed in t h e following s t a t e m e n t by F r e y c i n e t : " T h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t on a g r e e i n g t o p r o c e e d a t M a d r i d , in c o n c e r t with the o t h e r i n t e r e s t e d powers, t o a new e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e q u e s t i o n of p r o t e c t i o n in M o r o c c o h a s wished t o give one m o r e p r o o f of the c o n c i l i a t o r y spirit b y which it is a n i m a t e d . " 8 8 B u t on t h e o t h e r h a n d , " . . . it is of the opinion t h a t the s y s t e m of p r o t e c t i o n , f a r f r o m being the c a u s e of t h e weakness of the Shereefian g o v e r n m e n t , is an almost n e c e s s a r y consequence of t h e s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e d f o r E u r o p e a n s b y the n a tive c u s t o m s of a Moslem c o u n t r y . I t h a s shown itself willing t o meet, a s f a r a s possible, the d e m a n d s which have been p r e sented by Cid M o h a m m e d B a r g a s h d u r i n g the conferences held a t T a n g i e r l a s t y e a r . T h e F r e n c h commissioner a t M a d r i d will "Ibid., "Ibid., "Ibid.,

doc. no. 9, 25-6, JaurSs to Freycinet, Madrid, 2+ Mar. 1880. doc. no. 11, 28, Freycinet to Jaurds, 5 Apr. 1880. doc. no. 12, 29, Freycinet to Vernouillet, Paris, 6 Apr. 1880.

135

MOROCCO AT T H E P A B T I N G OF T H E

WAYS

observe the same spirit of moderation in studying the question; but he will be instructed to reserve in an absolute manner those privileges accorded by treaties, the exercise of which, equitably regulated, will cause no i n j u r y to the independence of the sultan, and which are, like t h a t of the semsars, rendered indispensable by the special conditions of French commerce in the Moroccan empire. "®e In his actual instructions to Jaures, 1 0 0 Freycinet held t h a t protection was traditionally accepted as the only safeguard to foreigners in their relations with natives in a Mohammedan country. While admitting the existence of abuses, he stated t h a t the French government had never p a r t i c i p a t e d in these. The rights of F r a n c e to protection under its t r e a t y of 1767 and the agreement of 1863 were indisputable; furthermore, the necessity of protection had been recently established by the murder of the Jew a t Fez. Protection, he observed, was "the consequence of a general situation, and not . . . a cause of weakness for the Shereefian government." He f u r t h e r professed the interest of F r a n c e in the peace of the frontier and the independence of Morocco. T h e question of the protection of native agents constituted for F r a n c e her principal interest in the conference, he added. " T h e special conditions of our traffic with Morocco necessitated the continuation of the privileges of the native courtiers encharged by our merchants with seeking, often a t great distances from the p o r t s , wool which makes up almost all the French exports." Unrepressed violence was characteristic of the interior of the country. Perhaps F r a n c e had already yielded too much by agreeing in 1863 to restrict the number of protected agents allowed each merchant to two. " T h e suppression of these privileges, if it did not entirely ruin our commerce with the interior of the country, would certainly be the source of differences which the Shereefian authorities have every interest in not seeing produced." F r a n c e was willing to agree t h a t semsars and " Ibid., doc. no. 20, 37-8, annex to desp. from Freycinet to Saint-Vallier (at Berlin), Paris, 29 Apr. 1880. A similar statement is found in a desp. from Freycinet to Vernouillet, 21 Apr. 1880, Ibid., doc. no. 16, 34-5. 100 Ibiddoc. no. 23, 40-9, Freycinet to Jaur&s, Paris, 11 May 1880.

136

THE

INTERNATIONAL,

FIELD

other proteges when engaged in a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r s u i t s should p a y the a g r i c u l t u r a l taxes. In r e t u r n f o r this concession, however, she should demand the explicit recognition by the sultan of the r i g h t of E u r o p e a n to possess immovable p r o p e r t y . T h e relationship between the two was evident, and if the Moroccan government refused to accept the one, F r a n c e would r e j e c t the other. As f o r s u b m i t t i n g semsars to native j u r i s d i c t i o n , F r a n c e could accept neither the original demand of B a r g a s h nor the substitute propositions of Sir J o h n H a y . J a u r e s should be on the alert a g a i n s t similar schemes. Whenever the conference beg a n to discuss m a t t e r s outside its scope as agreed upon beforehand, J a u r e s was to plead the necessity of a p p e a l i n g to his government for instructions. 1 0 1 Let us now summarize the position of F r a n c e a t the opening of the conference. A d m i t t i n g the existence of abusive protection, f o r which she disclaimed responsibility, F r a n c e was willing to cooperate with other powers in a d o p t i n g rules t h a t would res t r i c t the exercise of protection to the stipulations of the treaties and the agreement of 1863, and even t o go a step f u r t h e r , conceding the p a y m e n t of a g r i c u l t u r a l taxes, in r e t u r n f o r the recognition of the r i g h t of p r o p e r t y holding. She refused absolutely, however, to compromise on the r i g h t to select agents in the interior and on their immunity f r o m local j u r i s d i c t i o n , holding t h a t these r i g h t s were essential t o her commercial interests. A t the same time she denied t h a t p r o t e c t i o n , if p r a c tised in accordance with the t r e a t y stipulations, was i n j u r i o u s to the a u t h o r i t y of the sultan. F r a n c e was seeking to preserve intact her rights in Morocco. Moreover, since there were certain desiderata which F r a n c e hoped to gain in negotiations with the sultan, why should she surrender such an i m p o r t a n t r i g h t as t h a t of p r o t e c t i n g semsars, without demanding an i m p o r t a n t quid pro quo?102 T h e F r e n c h government also must have realized 101

The content of these instructions was repeated in several subsequent communications to Jaurfes, as follows: Ibid., docs. no. 30, 56, 23 May; no. 33, 58-9, 25 May; no. 39, 64-5, 29 May; and no. 46, 73, 4 June 1880. 1