Method, Intuition, and Meditation in Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy [1 ed.] 1527515052, 9781527515055

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Method, Intuition, and Meditation in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy

Method, Intuition, and Meditation in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy By

Stanley Tweyman

Method, Intuition, and Meditation in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy By Stanley Tweyman This book first published 2023 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2023 by Stanley Tweyman All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-1505-2 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-1505-5

To the memory of my parents, Fay and David Tweyman ʬ ”ʦ They lived for their children

…I should never advise anyone to read it [the Meditations] excepting those who desire to meditate seriously with me, and who can detach their minds from affairs of sense, and deliver themselves entirely from every sort of prejudice. I know too well that such men exist in a very small number. But for those who, without caring to comprehend the order and connections of my reasonings, form their criticisms on detached portions arbitrarily selected, as is the custom with many, these, I say, will not obtain much profit from reading this Treatise (From Descartes’ Preface to the Reader, M 40; CSM 11, 8). …[M]y writing took the form of Meditations rather than that of Philosophical Disputations or the theorems and problems of a geometer; so that hence I might by this very fact testify that I had no dealings except with those who will not shrink from joining me in giving the matter attentive care and meditation. (From Descartes’ Replies to the Second set of Objections, M 103; CSM 11, 112)

CONTENTS

Introduction ............................................................................................. viii Chapter 1 .................................................................................................... 1 The Method of Geometry and the Method of the Meditations Chapter 2 .................................................................................................. 15 The First Meditation: Beginning the Quest for the First Principles of Human Knowledge through the Senses Chapter 3 .................................................................................................. 34 Descartes Proofs of His Existence Chapter 4 .................................................................................................. 49 Knowing God through Meditation Chapter 5 .................................................................................................. 76 God, Mathematics, and Clear and Distinct Ideas Chapter 6 .................................................................................................. 97 Descartes’ Knowledge of God in the Fifth Meditation and the Divine Guarantee Epilogue.................................................................................................. 112 Selected Bibliography ............................................................................ 121

INTRODUCTION

In the Rules for the Direction of the Understanding (the Regulae), Descartes develops a method of inquiry, which is modelled on the method utilized in Mathematics (Arithmetic and Geometry). As a result, commentators generally are of the opinion that it is this method which Descartes utilizes in the Meditations. Nowhere in the Meditations does Descartes explain the method he uses in this work. It is typically taken for granted that the method of the Meditations is the method of Mathematics, with commentators attempting to identify and analyze mathematical-type demonstrations in this work, e.g. in proving his existence as a thinking thing, and proving the existence of God in the third and fifth meditations. In the Preface to the Principles of Philosophy, he refers to the subject concerned with discovering the first principles of human knowledge in the Meditations as ‘metaphysics’. Although he does not set out the method of the Meditations in the Meditations itself, Descartes does explain the method that he uses in the Meditations in his Replies to the Second Set of Objections. He calls this method ‘analysis’, and its primary function is to enable the mind to grasp the first principles of human knowledge, i.e. what must be known before anything else can be known. Given that these principles are first principles, they cannot be conclusions of deductive arguments (if they were, they would not be first); and further, in order to be first principles, they must be self-evident (if they depended on other premises, they would be dependent on these other premises to be known, and they would not be first). Descartes urges throughout the Meditations, and in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, when discussing the method he employs in the Meditations, that the difficulty metaphysics encounters in the search for the first principles of human knowledge stems from the fact that we are greatly influenced by the senses-we are affected by what our senses reveal to us, what we are taught by parents, teachers, and friends, what our imagination is able to conjure up, etc. But the first principles of human knowledge can only be grasped through our innate ideas-ideas which contain no empirical content, and which are given to us by God. The object of Descartes’ method in the Meditations is to remove all sensory prejudice, to bring the mind to a state of indifference regarding the solution to a metaphysical problem (this is the true starting point of metaphysics), and to

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guide our attention to the innate idea(s), through which the first principles of human knowledge can be grasped. As we move through the Meditations, we will learn that some metaphysical first principles are grasped through the faculty of intuition, e.g. the necessary connection between thought and existence in the Cogito ergo Sum. A common misconception in the literature on the Meditations is that Descartes holds that all metaphysical first principles are known through intuition. We will come to see that, although intuition is the cognitive faculty employed to grasp certain first principles, which involve grasping the necessary connection between two innate ideas which are necessarily connected, when he comes to know God in the third and fifth meditations, he insists that this knowledge is obtained through meditation / contemplation, not through intuition. We will learn that meditation has a contemplative / aesthetic component to it, which operates in selected instances, when he attempts to know God through a single innate idea-in the third meditation, the single innate idea is the idea of the self, which contains within it the idea of God; in the fifth meditation, the single innate idea is the idea of God. My study of the Meditations covers the first five meditations. In particular, I seek to understand Descartes’ method of ‘analysis’, and the role this method plays in discovering the metaphysical first principles of human knowledge. The method of ‘analysis’ only has application in his Meditations, and once these first principles are known, the method of ‘analysis’ has no further application. Descartes insists that this method is more certain than the method utilized in Geometry: we will examine why holds this position in the next chapter of this book. Early in the Meditations, Descartes introduces the deceiving deity, who he regards as his creator. He is particularly concerned about the deceiving deity in regard to mathematics: God may have so created him that he will always err in his mathematical calculations, and he will not know that he is being deceived. Accordingly, in the third meditation, he poses the following challenge to himself: in order to remove the hyperbolic doubts which he has introduced, ‘I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths, I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything’. It is in the third meditation that Descartes attempts to disprove the deceiving deity hypothesis, when he establishes that a veracious God created him. In the second meditation, Descartes has been able to establish one truth, namely, the necessary connection between thought and existence, articulated in the dictum, Cogito ergo Sum. In the second paragraph of the third meditation, he reflects on this knowledge, and asks, what it is that

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rendered him certain of this truth? He answers that it is the clarity and distinctness of the Cogito ergo Sum, which assures him of its truth. However, he is reluctant at this point to generalize from this truth and its clarity and distinctness, to holding that all clear and distinct conceptions must be true. The literature on the Meditations is generally agreed that the truth of all clear and distinct conceptions is established, once he establishes the existence of a veracious God as his creator in the third meditation. However, this runs counter to what Descartes tells us in the third and fifth paragraphs in the Synopsis to the Meditations: he insists that his proof that all clear and distinct ideas are true has been established in the fourth meditation. We will examine his proof in the fifth chapter of this book. In the Meditations, Descartes is also concerned with deception, which is not brought about through a deceiving deity. In this regard, he introduces the evil genius hypothesis in the first meditation: “I shall then suppose [that] some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me…” While there is no doubt in the Meditations at which points in his analysis he is dealing with the topic of God, the situation is very different in regard to the evil genius. Descartes does not refer to the evil genius beyond the second meditation, and at no time in his analysis, does he indicate at which point he has dealt with this hypothesis. In fact, I will show that the text supports two different interpretations of the evil genius, and I will establish how each is dealt with by Descartes. In making my way through the Meditations, I have purposely avoided making critical comments on Descartes’ philosophy, in order not to interrupt the flow of my interpretation of the text. In other words, my first order of business in this book is to attempt to understand Descartes’ teachings in the Meditations. But, of course, this is not to say that critical comments should not be included. I decided that these comments are best placed after the exegetical or interpretive study has been completed. My critical comments appear in the Epilogue, where I have selected two topics for discussion: (1) Arnauld’s charge that Descartes’ reasoning in the third meditation regarding the existence of a veracious God and the truth of clear and distinct ideas is circular; and (2) evaluating how successful Descartes has been in the third meditation in proving that a veracious God is his creator, insofar as he is a thinking thing, through his claim that the idea of God is ‘like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work; and it likewise not essential that the mark shall be something different from the work itself’. In light of my interpretation of how Descartes gains knowledge of God through his method of ‘analysis’, I show that Descartes’ reasoning is not circular. However, I do show that Descartes has not been successful in

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establishing that he has been created by a God who cannot be a deceiver. As a result, we will see that the level of certainty that Descartes seeks in his pursuit of metaphysical first principles, through his method of ‘analysis’, cannot proceed beyond the second meditation. Descartes’ famous dictum, Cogito ergo Sum (I think, therefore, I am) does not appear anywhere in the Meditations On First Philosophy. Despite this, the literature generally refers to the Cogito ergo Sum, as though it does appear in the Meditations. I follow the literature on this point, except where it is inappropriate to do so, particularly in the context of Descartes’ proofs of his existence in the second meditation. Further, the literature usually uses the term, the Cogito, as a shorthand reference to Cogito ergo Sum. I have done the same throughout this book. ******** In this book, I incorporate some previously published material, with permission, from articles which appeared in the Southern Journal of Philosophy: In Chapter 3, “Descartes' 'Demonstrations' of His Existence”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 23, Number 1, Spring 1985, pp. 101-110; In Chapter 5, “Truth, No Doubt: Descartes' Proof That What He Perceives Clearly and Distinctly Must Be True”. Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 19, Number 2, July 1981, pp. 237- 258; In Chapter 6, Descartes' Knowledge of God in the Fifth Meditation”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 26, Number 2, Summer 1988, pp. 263-275. I have also incorporated some previously published material in Chapter 4 from an article, which appeared in Studia et Collectanea Cartesiana: “Deus ex Cartesio”, Studia et Collectanea Cartesiana I, 1979, pp. 167-182. So far as I have been able to determine, this journal is no longer publishing articles on Descartes’ philosophy. I have also incorporated some previously published material in the Epilogue, from my article, “Descartes’ Failure in the Third Meditation to Prove that God Created Descartes”, selected for inclusion in Aftershocks: Globalism and the Future of Democracy. This volume contains selected papers presented at the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI) XVI International Conference, The University of Zaragoza, Spain, July 2-5, 2019. The volume was published, March 2021. I am indebted to Harry G. Frankfurt, in his book Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, Bobbs-Merrill company, Inc. 1970, for making me realize that there is more to the first meditation than first meets the eye.

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I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Jordan Nusbaum, who helped with updating the bibliography, an earlier version of which appeared in my In Focus edition of the Meditations On First Philosophy. ******* All passages quoted from Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy are taken from my edition of the Meditations: René Descartes, Meditations On First Philosophy In Focus, Edited and with an Introduction, by Stanley Tweyman, First published in 1993 by Routledge, London and New York. The translation of the Meditations in my In Focus edition, is by Elizabeth Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, in two volumes, Cambridge at the University Press, 1967. I have also included the corresponding references from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, in two volumes, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, and Sydney, first published 1984, reprinted 1988. Quotations are cited as M, followed by the page number(s) in my In Focus edition; and by CSM, followed by the volume and page number(s), when providing the corresponding volume and page(s) in the Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch edition. When quoting passages which are not included in my In Focus edition of the Meditations, but which are included in the Haldane and Ross edition, I cite the Haldane and Ross reference as HR, followed by the volume number, and the page number(s). The Cottingham. Stoothoff, Murdoch references remain, as I explained above. This book is dedicated to my wife, Barbara; our daughter, Justine; our son-in-law, Tzvi; and our grandchildren, Kessem, Jonah, and Ethan. Stanley Tweyman University Professor York University Toronto, Ontario, Canada

CHAPTER 1 THE METHOD OF GEOMETRY AND THE METHOD OF THE MEDITATIONS

Introduction The goal of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy is to discover the first principles of human knowledge, that is, what must be known before anything else can be known. In the Preface to the Principles of Philosophy (HR I, 211; CSM II, 186), he refers to this area of inquiry as metaphysics. If we are to understand Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, it is important to understand his methodology in this work. In light of the fact that, throughout his writings, he refers to mathematics, and to the method of mathematics, as a model for learning, many commentators regard Descartes as utilizing the method of mathematics in the Meditations. At one time, I held this view, as well. Part of the difficulty in understanding Descartes’ method in the Meditations stems from the fact that nowhere in this work does he reveal the method that he is utilizing. He does employ hyperbolic doubt, especially in the first meditation; but this type of doubt, although part of his methodology in this work, cannot explain his method throughout the meditations. What changed my mind about Descartes’ method in his Meditations is his explanation, in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, of the method he utilizes in this work (he calls this method ‘analysis’), and the contrast he draws between this method and the method of mathematics (which he calls ‘synthesis). Descartes urges in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections that the search for the first principles of human knowledge in the Meditations encounters difficulties which are never faced by the geometer: all difficulties in metaphysics originate through the influence of the senses, which prejudices the mind into believing that certain empirical ideas are the true metaphysical ideas, and which prevent us from focusing our attention on the true metaphysical innate ideas, e.g. of the self and of God, through which the first principles of metaphysics can be grasped.

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In this chapter, I will examine Descartes’ method of ‘analysis’, which will provide insight into how he proceeds in his search for the metaphysical first principles of human knowledge in his Meditations, and why he rejects ‘synthesis’ as the method for the search for metaphysical first principles. Further, in a letter dated April 15, 1630, Descartes wrote to Marin Mersenne, informing him that he has discovered how to demonstrate metaphysical truths “in a way that is more evident than the demonstrations in Geometry”. I will seek to understand this claim, in the context of his discussion of the methods of analysis and synthesis. ******** In a letter to Marin Mersenne, dated April 15, 1630, Descartes writes that he thinks he has discovered how to demonstrate metaphysical truths in “a way which is more evident than the demonstrations of geometry.” When commenting on the nature and scope of the method Descartes develops in the Regulae, L.J. Beck writes: “The object of Cartesian methodology is to extend the method used in the mathematical sciences [detailed in the Regulae] to all other branches of knowledge, including, of course, metaphysics and the other philosophical sciences.”1

Although this view is widely held among Descartes scholars, I will show that it is mistaken. E. M. Curley2 also quotes the passage from Descartes’ letter to Mersenne about demonstrating metaphysical truths, but Curley suggests that this passage reveals that Descartes abandoned, or at least came to attach less importance to, the method advocated in the Regulae. Curley writes: I suggest that sometime around 1628 Descartes came to feel that pyrrhonian scepticism was a more dangerous enemy than scholasticism, and came to feel the force of sceptical arguments which cut against both his own position in the Regulae and that of the scholastics.3

I will show that Curley misrepresents Descartes’ attitude toward the method he develops in the Regulae. 1 L. J. Beck, The Method of Descartes, A Study of the Regulae (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1952), page 13 2 E.M Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978. 3 Curley, pg. 37-38.

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Descartes does not discuss the method he utilizes in the Meditations in the Meditations itself. In fact, the method of the Meditations is not set out in any of Descartes’ works. Rather, he introduces and discusses the method of the Meditations in only one place, namely, in a portion of the Replies to the Second Set of Objections (M 101-104; CSM II, 110-113). In the present chapter, I will show that the method which Descartes utilizes in the Meditations is not the method he develops in the Regulae, and that this method has application only in his quest for the first principles of metaphysics in the Meditations. Once he grasps the self-evident first principles of metaphysics, the method utilized in the Meditations has no further application. In the first and third meditations, Descartes questions the reliability of mathematics: in both meditations, his concern with mathematics stems from God's infinite power, and the fact that God might be a deceiver. Now, given that the Regulae accepts the certainty of mathematics, and that the whole of mathematics is subjected to doubt in the Meditations, it appears that Descartes has utilized a method in the Meditations different from the mathematical-type method developed in the Regulae. On this interpretation, when Descartes writes to Mersenne that he has discovered how to demonstrate metaphysical truths in a way which is more evident than the demonstrations of geometry, this is an indication that the method advocated in the Regulae is not the method that he is using in the Meditations. The first edition of the Principles of Philosophy appeared in 1644, well after Descartes had worked on the Regulae, and completed the Meditations (first edition of the Meditations, published in Latin, in 1641). In the Preface to the Principles of Philosophy (HR I, 211; CSM I, 186), he recommends studying the basic logic of the Regulae before we apply ourselves to metaphysics, the subject matter of the Meditations. It is clear, therefore, that the logic developed in the Regulae has an important role to play in Descartes' overall philosophic scheme, and, it would appear that the importance of the Regulae is not diminished by the doubts raised about mathematics in the Meditations. Furthermore, since he does not intend to abandon the method of the Regulae when he utilizes hyperbolic doubt in the Meditations, we can conclude that his remark to Mersenne that he has discovered how to demonstrate metaphysical truths in a way which is more evident than the demonstrations of geometry is not directed against the teaching of the Regulae. Since the reliability of mathematics is not established until he deals with the truth of the clear and distinct in the Meditations, the discussion in the Regulae of mathematics as the model for learning is, at most, provisional. And, the provisional character of mathematics is never

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removed in the Regulae. Given that the reliability of mathematics is established in the Meditations, we should ask what a mastery of the Regulae provides, without the advantage of the teaching of the Meditations. That is, granting the provisional character of mathematics in the Regulae, and the method developed from mathematics in this work, we must know the epistemic status of any solution which has been arrived at through the method taught in the Regulae. In this regard, Descartes' comments on the atheist in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections are instructive: That an atheist can know clearly that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, I do not deny, I merely affirm that, on the other hand, such knowledge on his part cannot constitute true science, because no knowledge that can be rendered doubtful should be called science. Since he is, as supposed, an atheist, he cannot be sure that he is not deceived in the things that seem most evident to him . . . and though perchance the doubt does not occur to him, nevertheless it may come up, if he examines the matter, or if another suggest it; he can never be made safe from it unless he first recognizes the existence of a God. (HR II, 39; CSM II, 101)

The atheist can believe that s/he knows, but without a knowledge of God, s/he cannot know that s/he knows (Descartes' expression on this is “such knowledge on his part cannot constitute true science”). The paradigm for knowledge in the Regulae is mathematics; for Descartes, the distinguishing features of such knowledge are its clarity and distinctness. In the fifth meditation, he notes the following of the clear and distinct in mathematics: . . . the nature of my mind is such that I could not prevent myself from holding them to be true so long as I conceive them clearly; and I recollect that even when I was still strongly attached to the objects of sense, I counted as the most certain those truths which I conceived clearly as regards figures, numbers, and the other matters which pertain to arithmetic and geometry, and, in general, to pure and abstract mathematics. (M 81; CSM II, 45)

Without a knowledge of God, a solution reached by utilizing the method of the Regulae can yield, at most, the highest mode of psychological assurance of which we are capable. The conclusion will be irresistible, considering the evidence presented; nevertheless, nothing put forth in the Regulae can assure us that what we perceive clearly and distinctly is true. The Regulae makes it clear that the mathematician is satisfied with the state of mind and level of certainty found in mathematics. The provisional character of the method developed in the Regulae can only be removed when Descartes has successfully established that whatever is perceived clearly and distinctly is

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true. And this, he tells us in the Synopsis to the Meditations, has been established in the fourth meditation: . . . it is requisite that we may be assured that all things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are true in the very way in which we think them; and this could not be proved previously to the Fourth Meditation. (M 42; CSM II, 9) In the fourth Meditation it is shown that all these things which we very clearly and distinctly perceive are true. . . (M 43; CSM II, 9)

In one passage in the Regulae, Descartes explains the role of the Regulae in regard to the pursuit of indubitable knowledge. It is a rather lengthy passage, but important enough for our purposes to be quoted extensively. This method of ours resembles indeed those devices employed by the mechanical crafts, which do not need the aid of anything outside of them, but themselves supply the directions for making their own instruments. Thus if a man wished to practise any one of them, e.g. the craft of a smith, and were destitute of all instruments, he would be forced to use at first a hard stone or a rough lump of iron as an anvil, take a piece of rock in place of a hammer, make pieces of wood serve as tongs, and provide himself with other such tools as necessity required. Thus equipped, he would not then at once attempt to forge swords or helmets or any manufactured article of iron for others to use. He would first of all fashion, hammer, anvil, tongs, and the other tools useful for himself. This example teaches us that, since thus at the outset we have been able to discover some rough precepts, apparently the innate possession of the mind, rather than the product of technical skill, we should not forthwith attempt to settle the controversies of Philosophers, or solve the puzzles of the Mathematicians, by their help. We must first employ them for searching out with our utmost attention all the other things that are more urgently required in the investigation of truth. (HR 1, 25-26; CSM 1, 31)

From this passage, we learn that in the Regulae, mathematics is treated as the object of study, utilized to discover, and develop, the elements of the innate mathematical methodology which Descartes discovers in himself. No solutions to philosophical problems are attempted in this work. Rather, by making mathematics the object of study in the Regulae, he is seeking a full understanding of how best to direct his reason if he is to discover the truth. This explains why, in the Preface to the Principles of Philosophy, he urges that the Regulae should be studied before we undertake to study metaphysics in the Mediations. The passage where this is revealed in the

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Preface to the Principles of Philosophy appears at the point where Descartes sets out the order which should be followed in our self-instruction: [After forming for ourselves a code of conduct,] we should likewise study logic-not that of the Schools, because it properly speaking is only a dialectic which teaches how to make the things that we know understood by others-but the logic that best teaches us how best to direct our reason in order to discover those truths of which we are ignorant….Then when he has acquired a certain skill in discovering the truth in these questions, he should begin seriously to apply himself to the true philosophy, the first part of which is metaphysics, which contains the principles of knowledge, amongst which is the explanation of the principle attributes of God, of the immateriality of our souls, and of all the clear and simple notions which are in us. (HR I, 210-211; CSM I, 186)

We cannot study metaphysics without first understanding how to best direct our reason in the discovery of truth: hence, the need for studying the Regulae before studying the Meditations. But the method for discovering metaphysical truths is not the method utilized by the geometer. Metaphysical truths for Descartes are first principles, or as he refers to them in the passage quoted above from the Preface to the Principles of Philosophy, “the principles of knowledge”. First principles cannot be conclusions of geometric-type demonstrations. In fact, the principles of knowledge, being first principles, cannot be conclusions of any argument. Therefore, a geometric or deductive-type demonstration is ruled out in the case of metaphysical first principles. According to the third meditation, geometric-type demonstrations will always be susceptible to doubt, until we know that God exists and is not a deceiver. On the other hand, as we will see in later chapters, the Meditations reveals that knowledge of indubitable metaphysical principles can be had-in particular, knowledge of the self as res cogitans, and knowledge of God-without the need for the divine guarantee. Accordingly, Descartes realizes that he must develop a method of establishing metaphysical truths, which is more certain than the method of demonstrating geometric truths: geometric-type demonstrations can be considered knowledge, only after the divine guarantee is achieved: metaphysics is possible, only if at least some metaphysical knowledge can be had without the divine guarantee.

The Similarities and Differences between Metaphysics and Geometry At this stage, we are able to understand that, given the nature and importance of metaphysical knowledge for Descartes, it could never have

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been his intention to apply the method of Geometry developed in the Regulae to the Meditations. Both metaphysics and geometry utilize first principles (or axioms in Geometry). Descartes' analysis of the similarities and differences between metaphysics and geometry in regard to their respective first principles is to be found in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections (M 101-104; CSM II, 110-113). He points out that the first principles of geometrical proofs “harmonize with the use of our senses, and are readily granted by all. Hence, no difficulty is involved in this case, except in the proper deduction of the consequences. But this may be performed by people of all sorts, even by the inattentive, if only they remember what has gone before…” (M 102; CSM II, 111). In other words, no special method is required in order to learn the first principles of geometry, because sensory prejudice is never an impediment to learning in geometry. Once we are presented with the geometric first principles and understand them, we will accept them as true. And once they are accepted as true, we are able to deduce the theorems which follow from them. He calls the method of deduction utilized in geometry, ‘synthesis’. Metaphysics, on the other hand, lacks this advantage: … [Nothing] in metaphysics causes more trouble than the making the perception of its primary notions clear and distinct. For though in their own nature they are as intelligible as, or even more intelligible than those geometricians study, yet being contradicted by the many preconceptions of our senses to which we have since our earliest years been accustomed, they cannot be perfectly apprehended except by those who give strenuous attention and study to them, and withdraw their minds as far as possible from matters corporea1. Hence if they alone were brought forward, it would be easy for anyone with a zeal for contradiction to deny them. (M 102-103; CSM II, 111)

To apprehend the first principles of metaphysics, a unique method is required, which Descartes, in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, calls ‘analysis’. Analysis shows the true way by which a thing was methodically discovered and derived, as it were effect from cause, so that, if the reader care to follow it and give sufficient attention to everything, he understands the matter no less perfectly and makes it as much his own as if he had himself discovered it. But it contains nothing to incite belief in an inattentive or hostile reader; for if the very least thing brought forward escapes his notice, the necessity of the conclusion is lost; and on many matters which, nevertheless, should be specially noted, it often scarcely touches, because they are clear to anyone who gives sufficient attention to them. (M 101-102; CSM II, 110)

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Geometry, with its method of synthesis, does not encounter these problems: Synthesis contrariwise employs an opposite procedure; one in which the search goes as it were from effect to cause (though often here the proof itself is from cause to effect to a greater extent than in the former case). It does indeed clearly demonstrate its conclusions, and it employs a long series of definitions, postulates, axioms, theorems and problems, so that if one of the conclusions that follow is denied, it may at once be shown to be contained in what has gone before. Thus the reader, however hostile and obstinate, is compelled to render his assent. Yet this method is not so satisfactory as the other and does not equally well content the eager learner, because it does not show the way in which the matter taught was discovered. (M 101-102; CSM II, 110-111)

Whereas obstinacy and hostility will not be impediments to grasping first principles in geometry (sensory prejudice is not an issue here); obstinacy and hostility will prevent the reader from grasping the first principles in metaphysics, given that the goal of the method of analysis is to guide the mind to the point where we are able, without the influence of sensory prejudice, to attend to the innate ideas, which form the basis of metaphysical first principles. In the penultimate paragraph in the first meditation, Descartes urges that the true starting-point in the quest for metaphysical first principles is indifference: “That is why I consider that I shall not be acting amiss, if, taking of set purpose a contrary belief, I allow myself to be deceived, and for a certain time pretend that all these opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at last, having thus balanced my former prejudices with my latter [so that they cannot divert my opinions more to one side than the other], my judgment will no longer be dominated by bad usage or turned away from the right knowledge of the truth.” (M 49; CSM II, 15) A full discussion of how Descartes achieves indifference will be explained in the next chapter. At this point in our study, it is clear that there must be a genuine willingness on the part of the reader to be guided by the teachings of the Meditations, and that there must be a proper preparation of the mind culminating in indifference, in order to be able to grasp the innate ideas, which constitute the basis of the metaphysical first principles. In Geometry, our understanding can often be assisted with diagrams and other empirical markings. But, in metaphysics, empirical ideas can never be the basis for knowledge, as empirical ideas never possess the content needed to form the basis of metaphysical knowledge. In the search for knowledge of metaphysical first principles, the reader must attempt to free her/himself of sensory prejudice, and to apprehend the very same innate ideas with which Descartes is dealing. However, this can be difficult, given the strong influence of sensory prejudice. Ideas of God, for

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example, obtained from reading, from conversations with parents and/ or friends, and/or from one’s own imagination, etc., will always be false ideas, and can never reveal the true nature of God. The ideas required in the pursuit of metaphysical first principles are the innate ideas which God has given to us. …[N]othing in metaphysics causes more trouble than the making the perception of its primary notions clear and distinct. For, though in their own nature than are as intelligible as, or even more intelligible than those the geometricians study, yet being contradicted by the many preconceptions of our senses to which we have since our earliest years been accustomed, they cannot be perfectly apprehended except by those who give strenuous attention and study to them, and withdraw their minds as far as possible from matters corporeal. Hence if they alone were brought forward it would be easy for anyone with a zeal for contradiction to deny them. (M 102103; CSM II, 111-112)

With the method of analysis, there is always an aspect of self-discovery, in which the reader is involved with the very same innate ideas with which Descartes is dealing: “Analysis shows the true way by which a thing was methodically discovered and derived…so that, if the reader care to follow it and give sufficient attention to everything, he understands the matter no less perfectly and makes it as much his own as if he had himself discovered it. (M 101; CSM II, 110) It is this method-the method of analysis-to which Descartes is referring in the letter to Mersenne. Notice that in his comment to Mersenne, he says that he thinks he has discovered a way to demonstrate metaphysical truths in a manner which is more evident than the demonstrations of geometry. He is not saying that he has discovered a method for demonstrating any truth in a way which is more evident than geometry. It is in metaphysics that demonstrations are more evident than those in geometry, because, as we have seen, metaphysics must provide knowledge of first principles regarding the self and God, without the assistance of the divine guarantee, whereas in all other areas of knowing, including geometry, the divine guarantee will be required. Descartes points out in the Replies to the Second Set of Objection that “I have used in my Meditations only analysis, which is the best and truest method of teaching.” (M 102; CSM II, 111) In a second passage in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, he writes: “…[M]y writing took the form of Meditations rather than that of Philosophical Disputations or the theorems and problems of a geometer; so that hence I might by this very fact testify that I had no dealings except with those who will not shrink from joining me in giving the matter attentive care and meditation” (M 103; CSM

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II, 112). He tells us that synthesis “though it very suitably finds a place after analysis in the domain of geometry, cannot so conveniently be applied to these metaphysical matters we are discussing” (M 102; CSM II, 111), given that synthesis cannot be of assistance in eliminating sensory prejudice, nor direct the attention to the appropriate metaphysical ideas. Analytic demonstrations are designed to guide the mind, so that all sensory prejudice preventing us from grasping the innate ideas involved in understanding metaphysical first principles will be removed, and the first principles themselves can be grasped by the mind. An analytic demonstration, therefore, is, as it were, a process of 'reasoning up' to first principles, the upward movement taking place as prejudice is removed, indifference is achieved, and our attention is focused on the pure or innate ideas which constitute the metaphysical first principle. Accordingly, when, in the case of an analytic demonstration, Descartes speaks about drawing conclusions or concluding a first principle (e.g., at M 51; CSM II, 17, he writes: “So that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, we must come to the definite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it”), he is not speaking of drawing a conclusion in a deductive argument. To draw a conclusion when employing analysis is tantamount to acknowledging that he is now able to grasp the truth of a metaphysical first principle. It is not the case that whenever Descartes speaks of grasping a metaphysical first principle that he intends that this involves intuition4. Intuition typically involves two relata, which are necessarily connected, for example, thought and existence; 1+1=2. As we will learn when we come to study the third and fifth meditations, when Descartes is concerned to gain knowledge of God, this knowledge is obtained by meditation, not by intuition, inasmuch as only one idea is involved (in the third meditation, his attention is on the idea he has of himself, which idea is able to provide knowledge of God as his creator; in the fifth meditation, attending to the idea of God reveals that necessary existence is not a predicate, but an essential feature or attribute of God). Mathematics involves two cognitive 4

In Rule III of the Regulae, Descartes provides an explanation of intuition: “By intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgement that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand. Or, what comes to the same thing, intuition is the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs from the light of reason alone…Thus each individual can mentally have intuition of the fact that he exists, and that he thinks…(HR 1, 7; CSM 1, 14)

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faculties-intuition and deduction. Metaphysics also involves two cognitive faculties-intuition and meditation. Meditation becomes particularly prominent, when Descartes is concerned with knowing God in the third and fifth meditations.

The Method of ‘Analysis’ in the Meditations The value of our present discussion is that it shows, at least in a general way, the type of proof of metaphysical principles we should expect to encounter in the Meditations, and the type of proof of metaphysical principles which we should not expect. We should not expect deductive proofs of first principles; although we will encounter some deductive proofs when involved with the method of analysis in his quest for first principles. That is, the method of analysis can utilize deductive proofs, if these can assist in removing sensory prejudice, and direct the attention to the appropriate innate ideas, in the effort of apprehending a first principle.5 But, so far as the Meditations is concerned, the first principle itself will never be a conclusion of a deductive proof: it will always be known by intuition or meditation. It is important to realize that the letter to Mersenne is in no way referring to the Regulae. Metaphysics utilizes the method of analysis. And it is this method of proof which is more evident than geometric demonstrations. Geometric demonstrations reveal the logic of the proof being presented, and show how one proposition follows from others. The concern in such proofs, therefore, is with what follows from what. Analysis, on the other hand, is not concerned to show what follows from what, but is designed to eliminate the influence of sensory prejudice, to bring the mind to a point of indifference, and to guide the reader’s attention to discover the innate ideas, through which metaphysical first principles are known. It is through analytic-type proofs that the reader is brought to understand that this conviction, especially regarding knowledge of the self as a thinking thing and knowledge of God, “is so strong that we have no reason to doubt concerning that of the truth of which we have presented ourselves, there is nothing more to enquire about; we have here all the certainty that can reasonably be desired … We have assumed a conviction so strong that nothing can remove it, and this persuasion is clearly the same as perfect certitude.” (HR II, 41; CSM II, 103) This is what Descartes had in mind in the letter to Mersenne.

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This will become evident when we discuss the third meditation.

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Descartes urges in the Preface to the Principles of Philosophy that we should study the Regulae before undertaking a study of the Meditations, and we have learned that the concern in the Meditations with deception in mathematics does not in any sense refute or nullify the worth of the mathematical-type method developed in the Regulae. Just like the atheist who, without a knowledge of God, lacks 'true science,' so the philosopher will lack 'true science' if s/he solves problems using the method of the Regulae, before gaining a knowledge of God. The Regulae does not provide the method which Descartes uses in the Meditations. The value of studying the Regulae is that it teaches us about the nature of knowledge, about the cognitive faculties through which knowing is possible, and about how to proceed systematically in the pursuit of knowledge. The Regulae does not raise and address the sceptical objections introduced in the Meditations, and, therefore, the Regulae must await the proof in the Meditations of the indubitability of mathematics, and of the clear and distinct generally. A discussion of the intricacies of this investigation is set out in the chapters that follow. In Geometry, the focus is on deductive proofs of theorems. In the Meditations, the discussions and proofs put forth are the means by which sensory prejudice is removed to the point of indifference, and the attention is directed to the relevant innate ideas, which form the basis of metaphysical first principles. The goal of the Meditations is to guide the reader to move beyond the written word and to attend to the metaphysical innate ideas, through which metaphysical knowledge can be obtained. The method of ‘analysis’ enables the latter; ‘synthesis’ enables the former, namely, the focus on deductive proofs of theorems. Descartes points out in the Replies to the Second Set of objections that in geometry, no difficulty is involved in apprehending the relevant ideas, which provide the basis of geometric proofs. But, apprehending these geometric ideas, cannot provide geometric knowledge: the latter can only be obtained through the relevant geometric demonstrations. For example, focusing our attention on an isosceles triangle will not provide knowledge that the base angles of an isosceles triangle must be equal. This knowledge can only be establish through deduction. In metaphysics, on the other hand, the teachings of the Meditations can remove sensory prejudice, assist in achieving a state of indifference regarding solutions to metaphysical problems, and guide the attentive mind to the relevant metaphysical ideas. At this point, through intuition or meditation, the first principles of metaphysical knowledge can be grasped. The analytic method of the Meditations is not a formal rule-oriented method like the deductive method of geometry, or the Hypothetico-Deductive

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Method of the empirical sciences. The method of analysis in metaphysics is Descartes’ teachings in the Meditations.

Consequences of Our Study in This Chapter on the Relationship between the Regulae and the Meditations A number of consequences follow from the view of the relationship between the Regulae and the Meditations detailed here, and developed in the chapters that follow. First, in accordance with the account presented here, the Meditations performs a dual function-this work enables us to grasp the truth of all metaphysical first principles (what must be known before anything else can be known) as well as providing an analytic-type proof of the reliability of mathematics, once the truth of clear and distinct ideas is established in the fourth meditation. Since the Regulae is based on a mathematical model, Descartes can now be confident that when the method of the Regulae is utilized and leads to ideas (conclusions) which are clear and distinct, the conclusions can be accepted as true. Although we are instructed to study the Regulae before we study the Meditations (for the reasons set out earlier), it is only after we study the Meditations that the method of the Regulae can be used to arrive at 'true science’. A second consequence which follows from our study is the exposure of a misinterpretation of Descartes' philosophy, which is virtually universal-a misinterpretation which Descartes has, in fact, helped to promulgate. In light of the emphasis on the method of mathematics in the Regulae, it is easy to conclude that Descartes regards all learning along the lines of a deductive system. Rule I certainly lends itself to such an interpretation. For example, he writes, . . . there is nothing more prone to turn us aside from the correct way of seeking out truth than this directing of our inquiries, not towards their general end, but towards certain special investigations. (HR 1, 2; CSM 1, 9)

Or again: Hence we must believe that all sciences are so inter-connected, that it is much easier to study them all together than to isolate one from all the others. If, therefore, anyone wishes to search out the truth of things in serious earnest, he ought not to select one special science; for all the sciences are conjoined to each other and interdependent. (HR 1, 2; CSM 1, 10)

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It is tempting to hold that the interdependence and interconnectedness of which he speaks is logical in nature, as it is in a deductive or axiomatic system. However, at least insofar as the Meditations is related to the other branches of learning (physics, medicine, mechanics, and morals), the first principles of knowledge in the Meditations are not related logically to these other fields. It is rather that we must know the first principles of metaphysics before we can proceed in these other areas, and not that these first principles are premises in certain logical deductions. The connections between thought and existence, my existence and God's existence, etc., which are revealed in the Meditations, are not the first premises from which the physics begins.

CHAPTER 2 THE FIRST MEDITATION: BEGINNING THE QUEST FOR THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE THROUGH THE SENSES

Introduction In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes sets out to discover the first principles of human knowledge, that is, what must be known before anything else can be known. In the Preface to the Principles of Philosophy, he refers to the subject concerned with the quest for these first principles as ‘metaphysics’ (HR I 211, CSM I, 186). This enterprise takes place in two phases. Granted that these first principles are derived either from the senses or from reason, he examines each of these faculties, in order to determine whether one faculty or the other can provide these first principles. The examination of the senses as possibly providing the first principles takes place in the first meditation. Once this effort fails, Descartes, in the subsequent meditations, attempts to establish that the true first principles of human knowledge are provided by reason. My efforts in this chapter will be to understand his quest for first principles through the senses, as developed in the first meditation. Given that the principles he is seeking are first principles, which are self-evident, no proof is possible for them. A first principle cannot be the conclusion of an argument, for if it were, then the principle(s) upon which it depends would be first. In the case of the first principles which are established in the second and subsequent meditations, these principles are typically articulated by Descartes, e.g. the necessary connection between thought and existence in the second meditation, and he then attempts to guide us to the innate ideas through which we are able to understand that the first principle is true. This is carried out through the method of ‘analysis’, which he explains in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections. I have already elaborated on this method in the previous chapter.

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The quest for first principles in the first meditation, although also utilizing the method of ‘analysis’, is carried out very differently from his search for first principles in subsequent meditations, where the focus is on reason. In subsequent meditations, Descartes knows the first principle that he is attempting to establish, and through the use of the method of analysis, guides us, through the elimination of sensory prejudice, to grasp the necessary connection between the relata involved in the first principle. But, in the first meditation, the putative first principles are not even mentioned. Furthermore, given that all of the first principles involved in the first meditation will be shown to be dubitable, it is clear that whatever relata are involved in a putative first principle, the method of analysis utilized in the first meditation cannot take the same form as it takes in subsequent meditations: Descartes’ task in the first meditation is not to establish that the relata are necessarily connected, but rather to establish that the connection of the relata involved in the putative first principles in the first meditation, having been shown to be dubitable, cannot be the foundation of truth. The first meditation will establish that the senses cannot be the source of the first principles of human knowledge, and this is very different from subsequent meditations, where he will establish that reason is the source of the first principles of human knowledge. The main function of the method of analysis in the first meditation is to rid the mind of sensory prejudice, to lead the mind to a state of indifference regarding the solution to a metaphysical topic, and to gain understanding that the senses cannot provide the first principles of metaphysics.

The General Upheaval of All His Former Opinions Early in the first meditation, Descartes informs us that he will “seriously and freely address myself to the general upheaval of all my former opinions” (M 46; CSM II, 12). In the next paragraph, he elaborates on this, insisting that reason persuades him that he ought no less to withhold his assent “from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly to be false”. In other words, he will treat as false all of his former beliefs, except those which are indubitable and certain. But he will not examine each of his beliefs, since this would be an endless undertaking. Rather, he tells us that he will examine the principles upon which his former beliefs are based: And for that end it will not be requisite that I should examine each in particular…for owing to the fact that the destruction of the foundations of necessity brings with it the downfall of the rest of the edifice, I shall only

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in the first place attack those principles upon which all my former opinions rested. (M 46; CSM II, 12)

This passage provides us with an important insight as to how he will deal with first principles in the first meditation. First principles are guides, regarding which of his beliefs should be accepted into consciousness as true, and which should be rejected. Now, when instances of beliefs accepted into consciousness through a putative first principle are shown to be dubitable and uncertain, then these beliefs will be regarded as false; the principle through which these beliefs are admitted into consciousness will be rejected; and all of the beliefs admitted into consciousness through this principle will also be rejected. Accordingly, he will begin by examining instances of beliefs countenanced by a putative first principle, with a view to determining whether these beliefs are dubitable and uncertain. Therefore, Descartes holds that, in his first meditation, he has developed a means for rejecting the first principles utilized in sense perception. The key features he will utilize are dubitability and uncertainty, and the doubt utilized is hyperbolic, inasmuch as all beliefs countenanced by a putative first principle will be rejected and treated as false, provided that any beliefs countenanced by this principle can be shown to be dubitable. The logic of his method in the first meditation can now be understood. Descartes urges that beliefs which are dubitable and uncertain, and the first principles through which these beliefs are admitted into consciousness, are to be rejected. Therefore, dubitability and uncertainty are sufficient conditions for rejecting beliefs, and the first principles through which these beliefs were originally admitted into consciousness. Whereas Descartes regards all beliefs which are shown to be dubitable and uncertain to be false, at no point in the first meditation does he insist that indubitability and certainty are able to assure him that a belief or first principle is true. His investigation in the first meditation is confined to sensory beliefs which are dubitable and uncertain. The connection between indubitability and truth is examined by Descartes in Meditations II through V. But why are dubitability and uncertainty adequate for regarding a belief to be false, but indubitability and certainty not adequate for holding a belief to be true? Dubitability and uncertainty are sufficient for rejecting beliefs and putative first principles. However, indubitability does not guarantee that the belief and first principle are true because, according to Descartes, a belief or first principle which is indubitable may yet be false, or, at least, suspected of being false: we will learn that this is a fundamental concern about mathematical claims-they appear to be indubitable, but can be suspected of being false. Descartes deals with mathematical claims later in the first meditation and in the third meditation. Dubitability is a sufficient

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condition for regarding a belief as false, and, therefore, for rejecting a belief; indubitability is a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition, for regarding a belief as true. What more is needed in order to show that a belief or first principle is true will be examined throughout the remainder of this book. Through the employment of hyperbolic doubt in the first meditation, Descartes has the means to reject empirical beliefs and putative first principles; but he does not yet possess the means to accept a first principle as true.

The Attack on Those Principles Upon Which All His Former Beliefs Are Based Although he informs us that he will begin the first meditation by attacking those principles upon which all his former opinions rested, no first principles are articulated in this meditation. Further, there is no text in Descartes’ writings which explains this omission; so we are left to figure this out from other things which he says. I turn to this problem now. It is clear that, although critically examining putative first principles which guide the senses is Descartes’ aim at this point in the first meditation, it is also clear that the consideration of such principles, even if he were to know what these principles are, would not, in and of themselves, be able to instruct him as to whether the beliefs which rest upon these principles, and the principles themselves, should be accepted. Putative first principles must be tested for reliability, and Descartes correctly recognizes that only a critical assessment of beliefs countenanced by a particular principle can inform him of the reliability of the putative first principle. His attention, therefore, at least initially, must be on those beliefs which are countenanced by a putative first principle. Once again, if the beliefs countenanced by a putative first principle are shown to be dubitable and uncertain, then the principle which countenanced those beliefs will be treated as dubitable and uncertain, as will all beliefs which fall under this principle. But how to grasp the principles which guide the senses? At each stage of his investigation in the first meditation, beliefs will be grouped according to a set of common features, for example, those dealing with perceptions of objects which appear to be very far away or hardly perceptible, or those dealing with perceptions of objects which appear to be parts of Descartes’ body, or very close to him spatially. The principle in each case will articulate the common features which this group of perceptions shares. Once any of the beliefs admitted through a principle can be shown to be dubitable and uncertain, the principle will be rejected, as well as all beliefs accepted through this principle. His examination of the

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beliefs countenanced by these principles will proceed dialectically: he will begin with beliefs which are accepted without any critical analysis; once these beliefs are shown to be dubitable and uncertain, he will proceed to a subsequent putative first principle, guided by the fact that the new principle will not be subject to the same difficulties through which his critical examination has enabled him to cast doubt on the previous principle. But why does Descartes not articulate the first principles with which he will be dealing in the first meditation? Given the absence of textual evidence to guide us, we are unable to know with certainty the answer to this question. One possibility (the one I will defend here) is that the articulation of the principles is not essential, at least not at the outset of the investigation, given that his critical examination will always be at the level of the empirical examples which fall under the principle. In other words, it is examples covered by a principle that Descartes seeks to examine critically. Once he establishes that errors in the examples covered by a principle either have occurred or may occur, he will then reject all instances covered by this principle, and the putative first principle itself. The articulation of a putative first principle in and of itself never reveals whether the principle leads to indubitable and certain knowledge. This can only be determined by scrutinizing the examples or instantiations which fall under the principle. Sensory prejudice and dubitability must be exposed by examining the empirical data in particular instances: the rejection of a first principle will follow, once we determine that the examples lack epistemic indubitability and certainty. Therefore, although Descartes explains at the end of the second paragraph of the first meditation that “owing to the fact that the destruction of the foundations brings with it the downfall of the rest of the edifice, I shall only in the first place attack those principles upon which all my former opinions rested”, he, in fact, focuses on examples which fall under a putative first principle, when searching for indubitability and certainty. It is from the examples falling under a first principle that the first principle can be constructed. The main point here is that once the first principle is learned from the instances or examples he offers, no further instances or examples which fall under this principle need be examined: all will be treated as equally dubitable and uncertain.

The General Upheaval of Descartes’ Former Beliefs So, where to begin? He holds that, given that it is the senses generally that he will be examining in the first meditation, he cannot, at the outset, make any distinctions within perceptions, so far as their reliability is concerned. At this stage, he must regard all perceptions as reliable: “All that

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up to the present time I have accepted as most true and certain I have learned either from the senses or through the senses” (M 46; CSM II, 12). He then immediately points out that it is sometimes proved to him that the senses are deceptive, and, therefore, what they convey is, at least at times, dubitable. The evidence for this pertains to the fact that he has made mistakes concerning perceptions which are ‘hardly perceptible’ or ‘very far away’: in fog, in heavy rain, in snowstorms, etc., our perceptions tend to be untrustworthy, as are our perceptions which inform us of objects in the distance. He is making the point that when perceptions which are hardly perceptible are subsequently seen more clearly, and/or when distant objects are seen up close, a more accurate perception of the object is obtainable, which, therefore, reveals the unreliability of those perceptions which are ‘hardly perceptible or very far away’. Two questions arise at this point: 1) what is the principle that Descartes is attacking? And 2) where should the argument proceed from here? Regarding the first question, it should be noted that he is not attacking the principle directly; his attack centers around instances which are countenanced by the principle. The instances cited which render the principle dubitable and uncertain pertain to perceptions which are hardly perceptible or very far away. But the initial principle he is seeking has application under any, or all, perceptual situations, although it is in those instances when perceptions are hardly perceptible or very far away that the difficulties with the principle are revealed. In short, the first principle must acknowledge no restrictions on our ability to employ our senses to arrive at the truth of what is perceived. The first principle in question, then, must hold that ‘the senses always represent reality accurately’. Regarding the second question, we need to ask how Descartes moves beyond this first principle? The fact that the senses do not always accurately represent reality when involved with objects which are hardly perceptible or very far away, leaves it open that it may still be the case that indubitability and certainty in perception are obtainable when objects are highly perceptible and near at hand. The second principle Descartes considers, therefore, is ‘perceptions are reliable when they pertain to objects which are highly perceptible and near at hand’. On this point, he writes: But it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things which are hardly perceptible, or very far away, there are yet many others to be met with as to which we cannot reasonably have any doubt, although we recognize them by their means. For example, there is the fact that I am here, seated by the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and other similar matters. (M 46; CSM II, 12-13)

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Matters pertaining to his body are the best examples of perceptions in this category, and Descartes inquires whether deception is possible regarding these perceptions.

Madness As a first step, he raises, and immediately rejects, the hypothesis that he is mad. And how could I deny that these hands and this body are mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to certain persons, devoid of sense, whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by the vapours of black bile, that they constantly assure us that they think they are kings when they are really quite poor, or that they are clothed in purple when they are really without covering, or who imagine that they have an earthen ware head or are nothing but pumpkins or are made of glass. But they are mad, and I should not be any less insane were I to follow examples so extravagant. (M 46; CSM II, 13)

According to this passage, madness is characterized as pertaining to those individuals whose brains generate a given reality which has no basis in fact, and this same individual is incapable of establishing that the belief in question has no basis in fact. The mad person has no way of establishing that their brain-generated perceptions are in conflict with the perceptions, experienced by those who are not mad, which inform them of reality, because these individuals are incapable of accurately experiencing perceptions which inform us of reality. The mad person is unaware of the perceptions which can inform us of reality, or at least, the mad person cannot distinguish between mind-generated perceptions, and those perceptions originating through the senses. Accordingly, the mad person is deluded, rather than suffering from illusion, as was the case with individuals in regard to objects which are hardly perceptible or very far away. The perceptions of the person who is mad are like the perceptions of those who are not mad, when the latter experience perceptions which are highly perceptible and close at hand. While the person who is sane is able to compare and contrast competing perceptions, for example, perceptions of objects which are hardly perceptible or very far away, with perceptions which are highly perceptible and near at hand, in an effort to try to arrive at an understanding of the actual state of affairs, the mad person is unable to distinguish between perceptions generated by the mind and those originating in reality. So, the problem with the second principle, ‘perceptions are reliable when they are highly perceptible and near at hand’, is that it would require Descartes to acknowledge that all of the mad person’s perceptions, at least those which

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present themselves as highly perceptible and near at hand, are true, which they obviously are not. Therefore, the features ‘being highly perceptible’ and ‘near at hand’ cannot be reliable guides to truth. And, of course, unlike those who are mad, Descartes is confident that he is not mad, because he regards himself at this stage of the inquiry as capable of distinguishing between, and among, competing perceptions of reality, as to which are reliable, and which should be rejected.

Dreaming / Waking Establishing that he is not mad when he is awake, by contrasting himself with delusional mad individuals, does not establish that he is not mad, and that his perceptions are reliable. For he must still consider dreaming, and the delusional state in which he is placed when dreaming. He urges that in dreams, he represents to himself “the same things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are insane in their waking moments…[I]n dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream” (M 4647; CSM II, 13). Descartes’ point here is that when he is asleep and dreaming, there are no indicators available to him to confirm that he is dreaming. Whether he is awake or dreaming, he typically believes that he is awake, even though there are times when he will be asleep and dreaming. And, in the absence of indubitable criteria for determining when he is awake and when he is asleep and dreaming, there can be no indubitability and certainty to claims of being awake or dreaming. The state of mind while dreaming is like the state of mind of the mad person: in both cases, the delusional state is regarded as reality. Why does Descartes insist that ‘there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep’, and why he is almost ‘capable of persuading [himself] that [he] now dreams’? His point is that if there were indicators at his disposal enabling him to distinguish wakefulness from sleeping, then he could use these indicators to determine, at any given moment, whether he is awake, or asleep and dreaming. But such indicators are not available to him: he always regards himself as awake, even if at times, including the present time, he is dreaming. Therefore, from an epistemological point of view, the waking / dreaming distinction cannot be sustained: at any given moment, he may be awake, or he may be asleep and dreaming, but he has no indicators or tools to determine whether he is awake, or asleep and dreaming. And, in the absence of any means of

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determining whether he is awake or asleep, all perceptions of objects must be regarded as suspect, given that whatever perceptions of objects he selects for consideration, he cannot rule out that these are experiences obtained while dreaming. …I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream. Now let us assume that we are asleep and that all these particulars, e.g. that we open our eyes, shake our head, extend our hands, and so on, are but false delusions; and let us reflect that possibly neither our hands nor our whole body are such as they appear to us to be”. (M 47; CSM II, 13)

Accordingly, for the purpose of further investigation in the first meditation, he opts for the position that, at any given moment of consciousness, he may be dreaming, and that whatever he is currently experiencing, should be considered as delusional and false.

Can There Be Truth In Dreams? Descartes now explores whether there can be some truth about reality in dreams: [W]e must at least confess that the things which are represented to us in sleep are like painted representations which can only have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true…For, as a matter of fact, painters, even when they study with the greatest skill to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary, cannot give them natures which are entirely new, but merely make a certain medley of the members of different animals… (M 47; CSM II, 13)

Could it be that the components of dreams were learned from his perceptual contact with reality, even though he cannot determine when he is in contact with reality? If he can answer this affirmatively, then he can be confident that the components of the objects in our dreams have a counterpart in reality. The principle involved here would be that ‘the components of our dreams correspond to reality’. However, this principle cannot be shown to be reliable, because it presupposes that the mind cannot produce some new perception or awareness on its own, but can only reproduce the perceptions it passively receives. Descartes allows that there may be instances in which the mind has invented something “so novel that nothing similar has ever

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before been seen, and that then their work represents a thing purely fictitious and absolutely false…” (M 47; CSM II, 13). He now inquires whether there can be truth in perception, even if he is dreaming, and the perceptions he is experiencing are generated by his mind? The principle he is seeking at this stage should be able to provide knowledge of reality, despite the fact that he has assumed that he is dreaming, and that his mind, through its own creative powers, may be generating perceptions, which have no counterpart in the external world. He has now moved from seeking a knowledge of particular existents, to asking whether the senses are bound by features which hold of objects generally. In other words, are there necessary features of perceptions (features without which an object cannot be perceived or thought), which are also necessary features of objects (features without which objects, if there are any, cannot exist)? If there are such features, then, despite his doubts that at any given moment his senses are in contact with objects in reality because he may be dreaming, and / or that his mind, through its own creative powers, is generating perceptions which have no counterpart in the external world, he can be confident that the necessary features of his perceptions generally must also be necessary features of external objects, even though he cannot know which external objects exist, or even whether he is currently in contact perceptually with external objects.

Metaphysical Features of Objects and Mathematics The features that Descartes is seeking are the metaphysical features of objects in the Aristotelian sense, namely, those features which hold of objects generally, and without these features, objects cannot exist. He lists the following metaphysical features of objects: To such a class of things pertains corporeal nature in general, and its extension, their quantity or magnitude or number, as also the place in which they are, the time which measures their duration, and so on. (M. 4748; CSM II, 14)

It is in virtue of these metaphysical features of objects that he is able to draw a distinction between the empirical sciences and the a priori sciences. That is possibly why our reasoning is not unjust when we conclude from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine and all other sciences which have as their end the consideration of composite things, are very dubious and uncertain; but that Arithmetic, Geometry and other sciences of that kind which only treat of things that are very simple and very general, without taking great trouble to ascertain whether they are actually existent or not,

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contain some measure of certainty and an element of the indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three together always form five, and the square can never have more than four sides, and it does not seem possible that truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity. (M.48; CSM II, 14)

The empirical sciences seek to understand ‘composite things’, that is, items consisting of contingent parts, and we can never be certain that we have grasped all the parts, and / or properly understand the relation of the parts to one another. Hence, the empirical sciences are always ‘very dubious and uncertain’. The a priori sciences, on the other hand, “arithmetic, geometry and other sciences of that kind”, only treat of things that are very simple and general, without taking great trouble to ascertain whether they are actually existent or not. By telling us that the a priori sciences only deal with objects which are’ very simple’ and ‘very general’, he intends that the component parts of mathematical objects are necessarily connected (hence, their simplicity), and that what is learned of an individual mathematical object holds of all mathematical objects of that type (hence, their generality). For example, when he considers an isosceles triangle, and establishes that its base angles must be equal, this holds for all isosceles triangles. This explains why Descartes insists in the passage under consideration that in Arithmetic and Geometry, the mathematician does not have to take “great trouble to ascertain whether the items being studied are actually existent or not”. Since what is learned holds for all mathematical objects of that type, e.g. isosceles triangles, it follows that, even if no isosceles triangle exists at the present time, or if the mathematician is unaware of any isosceles triangles existing at any given time, if, and when, an isosceles triangle does come into existence, it must have the same features and relations of its parts as the isosceles triangle he is currently considering in thought. Finally, in regard to the passage we are considering, Descartes attempts to provide a criterion of certainty and indubitability in regard to mathematics, at least insofar as the first meditation is concerned. He urges that there appears to be no possibility of delusion in the case of mathematics: “For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three together always form five, and the square can never have more than four sides, and it does not seem possible that truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity or uncertainty”. Prior to dealing with mathematics, his main concern was that he is unable to determine whether he is awake or asleep, and that, therefore, he is unable to determine whether a particular sense experience is occurring while he is awake (which might be reliable) or while asleep and dreaming (which will be delusional). But, in the case of mathematics, Descartes urges that whether he is awake or asleep and dreaming, his calculations are the

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same. Therefore, mathematics is not affected by the dreaming / waking issue, given that the same conclusion is always arrived at, irrespective of his state of mind. It is interesting to note that he selects as his examples fairly simple mathematical claims (2 + 3 = 5; the square can never have more than four sides) rather than more complicated mathematical calculations, where errors are more likely to occur. This can be explained by recognizing that, in the next stage of his analysis, when the possibility of God as a deceiver is contemplated, even these fairly elementary mathematical calculations will be rendered dubitable. Therefore, if fairly elementary mathematical calculations can be shown to be dubitable, Descartes need not concern himself at this point with more complicated calculations. At this stage in the first meditation, mathematical objects are the only ones in regard to which there appears to be no possibility of deception or delusion. Hence, the next principle which Descartes entertains is ‘the mathematical sciences are free from deceit and are indubitable’. The upshot of the analysis of mathematics thus far must be that, while he is not certain if any mathematical objects exist in reality, he can be confident that if any mathematical objects do exist in reality, they must possess exactly the same features as the mathematical objects which are thought, or dreamed about when he is asleep.

Reasons to Doubt that Mathematics Is Indubitable Descartes now raises a number of problems pertaining to the issue of indubitability and certainty in mathematics, which challenge the very foundation of mathematics, and the view that the senses are able to provide the first principles of human knowledge. He provides five arguments against the indubitability of mathematics. In the first argument, he is concerned with the view that God may have brought it to pass that there is no external world; nevertheless, God has given Descartes perceptions which he believes correspond to physical objects in the external world: …I have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an all-powerful God existed by whom I have been created such as I am. But how do I know that He has not brought it to pass that there is no earth, no heaven, no extended body, no magnitude, no place, and that nevertheless [I possess the perceptions of all these things and that] they seem to me to exist just exactly as I now see them? (M 48; CSM II, CSM II, 14)

But why does it matter to the truth of a mathematical claim whether objects exist with relations which correspond to the relations expressed

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in the mathematical claim or equation? To answer this, we must recall that the first meditation in its entirety is concerned with whether the senses are able to provide the indubitable first principles of metaphysics, through which he can have knowledge of the external world. The assumption with which the first meditation begins is that the external world exists. Therefore, the view of mathematics in the first meditation must take into account what he believes that the senses reveal to him, namely, physical objects and the relations of their parts to each other, and the relation of a given object to other objects. An example is in order. When he thinks of an isosceles triangle, he finds that he must think that its base angles are equal. On the account of mathematics in the first meditation, he must be confident that if there is an isosceles triangle in realty, it has the same features as the isosceles triangle he is entertaining in thought. As Descartes points out, the mathematician need not locate, or even know, that an isosceles triangle exists in reality: the requirement for knowledge in this instance is that the mathematician is confident that there are objects in reality, and that if one or more of them has the shape of an isosceles triangle, it will possess features which correspond to the features thought in the idea of an isosceles triangle. This is Descartes’ point in the following passage: “…Arithmetic, Geometry and other sciences of that kind which only treat of things that are very simple and very general, without taking great trouble to ascertain whether they are actually existent or not (my italics), contain some measure of certainty and an element of the indubitable” (M 48; CSM II, 14). The portion of this passage which I have italicized makes it clear that the mathematician does not need to undertake an empirical investigation to establish that objects and relations exist which correspond to his thoughts regarding mathematical objects. Rather, the mathematician must be confident that such empirical objects may, or do, exist. Truth in mathematics, on this account, is truth by correspondence. But, if there are no physical objects to which mathematical objects/ equations either do, or can, correspond, then mathematics cannot be held to be true and indubitable, for mathematics would not be true of anything. In Descartes’ second argument, he questions whether the mind is trustworthy when it engages in mathematical reasoning. The issue here is, in part, whether he can be deceived by God (presumed at this point to be his creator) in regard to matters which he thinks he knows best, for example, adding 2 and 3, or counting the sides of a square? The relevant passage in the first meditation regarding the possibility of divine deception is this: “And, besides, as I sometimes imagine that others deceive themselves in the things which they think they know best, how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I add two and three, or count the sides of a square,

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The relevance of a deceiving deity to this discussion is brought into sharper focus in Principle V of the Principles of Philosophy than occurs in the first meditation; “…[W]e have been told that God who created us can do all that He desires. For we are still ignorant of whether He may not have desired to create us in such a way that we shall always be deceived, even in the things that we believe ourselves to know best; since this does not seem less possible than our being occasionally deceived, which experience tells us is the case” HR 1, 220; CSM 1, 194). In this passage, Descartes is saying that, even in the case of elementary mathematical claims which he thinks he knows best, God could have created him in such a way that he may be deceived into thinking they are true, when, in fact, they are false, and we would never be aware of the deception which is present here. In his third argument against certainty in mathematics, he urges that the dubitability of mathematics can be established, even without factoring in divine deception. Once again, we need to turn to Principle V: “One reason [to doubt proofs in mathematics] is that those who have fallen into error in reasoning on such matters, have held as perfectly certain and self- evident what we see to be false…” (HR 1, 220; CSM 1, 194). He is arguing that the confidence in mathematical reasoning (without the benefit of the teaching of the Meditations, and especially without the divine guarantee) derives from the state of mind experienced when engaging in such reasoning, namely, psychological irresistibility. However, this state of mind obtains not only when his reasoning is correct, but also when his reasoning is erroneous. Therefore, in and of itself, mathematics is unable to provide a test or criterion of the truth of its claims, but must ultimately rely on the state of mind which accompanies mathematical reasonings, which is unreliable, given that the identical state of mind obtains with both correct and incorrect reasoning. In Descartes’ fourth criticism (provided in the first meditation, but omitted in Principle V), he asserts that, even if God is not responsible for the deception he experiences in mathematics, what cannot be denied is that the presumed goodness of God does not prevent him from being deceived on various occasions. But possibly God has not desired that I should be thus deceived, for He is said to be supremely good. If, however, it is contrary to his goodness to have made me such that I constantly deceive myself, it would also appear contrary to His goodness to permit me to be sometimes deceived, and nevertheless I cannot doubt that He does permit this. (M 48; CSM II, 14)

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Hence, even if we assume that God is good, this alone cannot be the basis of confidence in mathematical reasoning. This is, of course, a matter with which Descartes will have to deal, in the third, fourth, and fifth meditations, when he deals with God and deception. In Descartes’ final criticism regarding truth in mathematics, which appears in the first meditation (M 48-49; CSM II, 14-15) and in Principle V, he addresses possible alternative accounts of how he came to be-by fate, by accident, by a continual succession of antecedents, or by some other method. In other words, can his concern with deception in mathematics be removed by dropping the hypothesis that God created him, and resorting to a non-theistic account of how he came to be? Descartes’ replies in the first meditation in this way: “[S]ince to err and deceive oneself is a defect, it is clear that the greater will be the probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is the Author to whom they assign my origin the less powerful” (M 4849; CSM II, 14)

A somewhat clearer account of his position on this matter can be found in Principle V: And if we think that an omnipotent God is not the author of our being, and that we subsist of ourselves, or through some other, yet the less perfect we suppose the author to be, the more reason have we to believe that we are not so perfect that we cannot be continually deceived. (HR 1, 220, CSM 1, 194)

In other words, given that only an omnipotent divine cause of Descartes’ existence can guarantee that he will not be deceived in mathematics, any alternative causal attempt at explaining his existence necessarily involves a cause which is not omnipotent, and which, therefore, possesses finite power. And, Descartes insists, a non-infinitely powerful cause of his existence would lack the power to prevent him from being deceived in mathematics. This completes our focus on Descartes’ discussion in the first meditation regarding deception in mathematics. At this point, he is confident that there is nothing in his former beliefs which is indubitable and certain. As a result, he now also realizes that the first principles he is seeking cannot be associated with the senses: To these reasons I certainly have nothing to reply, but at the end I feel constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt…for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered… (M 49; CSM II 14-15)

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The Deceiving Deity and the Evil Genius But his examination of deception through the senses is not yet complete. His concern now is that his former beliefs about the empirical world may return and dominate his mind. How to prevent this? Descartes explains: But it is not sufficient to have made these remarks, we must also be careful to keep them in mind….That is why I consider that I shall not be acting amiss, if, taking of set purpose a contrary belief, I allow myself to be deceived, and for a certain time pretend that all these opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at last, having thus balanced my former prejudices with my latter[so that they cannot divert my opinions more to one side than to the other], my judgment will no longer be dominated by bad usage or turned away from the right knowledge of the truth….I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of all truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me…(M 49, CSM II, 15)

The true starting point of metaphysics is indifference. This is accomplished by counterbalancing his former empirical prejudices with the hyperbolic doubts generated in the first meditation. Nevertheless, he requires a shorthand method of sustaining this counterbalancing measure, as he cannot repeatedly review the arguments against the senses put forth in the first meditation. To accomplish this, he posits the evil genius hypothesis. I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me. (M 49; CSM II, 15)

It is important to realize that the evil genius hypothesis is not the same hypothesis as the hypothesis of a deceiving deity. Descartes introduces two deceivers in the first meditation-a deceiving deity and the evil genius. Accordingly, he must deal with two possible deceivers. The problem, then, is to figure out why two deceivers are introduced in the first meditation. Of the evil genius and deception, Descartes writes: I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful that deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sounds, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things; I shall remain obstinately

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attached to this idea, and if by this means it is not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of any truth, I may at least do what is in my power [i.e. suspend my judgment], and with firm purpose avoid giving credence to any false thing, or being imposed upon by this arch deceiver, however powerful and deceptive he may be. (M 49-50; CSM II, 15)

At this early stage, all deception originating from God regards God as Descartes’ creator: the deception generated by the evil genius is not regarded as stemming from the evil genius as his creator. The deception arising from the evil genius has its source outside of Descartes’ mind, resulting in ‘illusions and dreams’ regarding the external world, which includes his body; whereas divine deception stems from God’s desire to create Descartes’ mind in such a way that Descartes is constantly being deceived, particularly regarding mathematical reasoning. The deceiving deity hypothesis holds that God created Descartes, whereas the evil genius is able to manipulate Descartes’ beliefs, even in dreams, and even though the evil genius did not create Descartes. In a subsequent chapter, we will learn that the evil genius hypothesis is amenable to two different interpretations, and I will address how Descartes deals with each interpretation. But, already at this stage, it is important to note that nowhere in the Meditations does Descartes refute the hypothesis of the evil genius, as a being existing outside of him. The last sentence in the last passage quoted above from the first meditation (M 49-50; CSM II, 15) gives us a clue as to how he will ultimately deal with the evil genius hypothesis: if he is unable to arrive at the knowledge of any truth, ‘he will suspend his judgment, and with firm purpose avoid giving credence to any false thing, or being imposed upon by the evil genius’. There is no expectation on Descartes’ part that he will be able to refute the existence of the evil genius. And our subsequent analysis will bear this out. There is an additional difficulty with the evil genius hypothesis, which does not occur with the hypothesis of the deceiving deity: Descartes informs us that he will establish that God exists as his creator in the third meditation, whereas the evil genius is not mentioned beyond the second meditation, and Descartes never explicitly references where, in the Meditations, he deals with this hypothesis. Hence, the task that lies ahead is to determine where, in the Meditations, he deals with the evil genius hypothesis, and to determine how he deals with this hypothesis. For Descartes, God, as his creator, is central to his search after truth: he insists, therefore, that he must establish the God exists as his creator, and that God cannot be a deceiver, if he is to be able to eliminate his doubts and gain knowledge. In the last sentence of the fourth paragraph of the third meditation, he writes: “…[I]n order to be able to remove it, I

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must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything”. Scholarship on Descartes’ Meditations is generally agreed that, once Descartes has established the existence of God who is not a deceiver in the third meditation, he can undertake to emerge from the state of doubt, which began in the first meditation. Since Descartes seeks knowledge through clear and distinct ideas, commentators hold that the truth of the clear and distinct generally has been established in the third meditation, once he proves the existence of a veracious God. But this is not Descartes’ view of the matter. In two passages in the Synopsis to the Meditations, he insists that the truth of the clear and distinct has been established, not in the third, but in the fourth meditation. …[I]t is requisite that we may be assured that all the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly in the very way in which we think them; and this could not be proved previously to the Fourth Meditation. (M 42; CSM II, 9) In the fourth meditation it is shown that all these things which we very clearly and distinctly perceive are true, and at the same time it is explained in what the nature of error or falsity consist. (M 43; CSM II, 11)

In our study of the Meditations, we will have to locate in the fourth meditation where it is that Descartes proves that all clear and distinct ideas are true, and we will have to uncover his analytic proof for this.

The Plan of This Study My plan is to follow Descartes in his efforts to establish the truth of the clear and distinct, which involves proving the existence of a veracious God as his creator, and proving the truth of all clear and distinct ideas. In addition, we will, of course, have to deal with the evil genius hypothesis, and to do this, we must determine how Descartes addresses the hyperbolic doubts raised in the first meditation. As we have seen in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, he insists that, in the Meditations, he is not utilizing the method employed by the mathematician-he calls this method of inquiry ‘synthesis’-but rather a method, which he calls ‘analysis’. Analysis has two functions: to assist Descartes in the removal of sensory prejudice to the point of indifference, and to lead the mind to the point where he is able to grasp the ideas which constitute the first principles of human knowledge.

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In the current chapter, we have seen that the senses are unable to provide the first principles of human knowledge. But, what the first meditation does accomplish through the method of analysis is the removal of sensory prejudice, and his arrival at a state of indifference, so that in subsequent meditations, the upward reasoning movement to grasp the first principles of human knowledge is rendered possible. At the end of the first meditation, through hyperbolic doubt, and especially after introducing the hypothesis of the evil genius, Descartes is rendered indifferent, through the elimination of sensory prejudice: in subsequent meditations, he will turn to reason in his quest for the first principles of human knowledge.

CHAPTER 3 DESCARTES’ PROOFS OF HIS EXISTENCE

Introduction In the second meditation, Descartes begins his inquiry into whether reason is able to provide the metaphysical first principles of human knowledge. At the outset, he reminds himself of his failure in the first meditation to establish that the senses can provide the first principles of human knowledge: I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false; I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me. I consider that I possess no senses; I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement, and place are but the fictions of my mind. What, then, can be esteemed as true? Perhaps nothing at all, unless that there is nothing in the world that is certain. (M 50-51; CSM II, 16)

In the third paragraph of the second meditation, he offers his two ‘analytic’ proofs of his existence. Descartes mentions nothing about the nature or structure of analytic proofs in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, when he sets out the method he employs in the Meditations. Hence, the two analytic proofs of his existence in the second meditation provide the first insight into the nature, and structure, of such proofs. He also offers a proof of his existence in Principle VII of the Principles of Philosophy. Once I unpack Descartes’ two analytic proofs of his existence in the second meditation, I will turn to the proof of his existence in Principle VII. At that point in our study, I will determine whether the proof of his existence in Principle VII is another instance of an analytic proof. I will also show how the proofs of his existence in these two works are connected.

The Two Analytic Proofs of His Existence in the Second Meditation In the previous chapter, we learned from the Replies to the Second Set of Objections that Descartes’ method in the Meditations-he calls it

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‘analysis’-is unique, in that it is designed to rid the mind of sensory prejudice, bring the mind to a point of indifference, and direct his attention to those innate ideas, which will enable him to discover the first principles of metaphysics. What Descartes does not discuss in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections is the nature and structure of the proofs which he utilizes in the context of the method of analysis. Accordingly, we must turn to the Meditations-in the first instance, to the second meditation-to understand how, in the context of the method of analysis, he provides proofs of his existence. In the second meditation, he puts forth two analytic proofs of his existence-the first based on the notion of ‘persuasion’, and the second based on the notion of ‘deception’: But I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something. But there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, whoever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something. (M 51; CSM II, 16-17)

The ‘persuasion’ analytic proof has the following structure: he affirms something that he cannot doubt-that he was persuaded of something; he then attempts to affirm in thought both that he was persuaded of something and that he does not exist; by finding a repugnancy between these two thoughts (i.e., he cannot affirm in thought both that he was persuaded of something and that he does not exist), he concludes that his initial thought is necessarily connected with the denial of the second: if he was persuaded of something, then he must exist. A similar situation obtains in regard to his ‘deception’ analytic proof: he affirms what he cannot doubt-that he has been deceived about something; he then attempts to affirm in thought both that he was deceived about something and that he does not exist; by finding a repugnancy between these two thoughts (i.e. he cannot affirm in thought both that has deceived about something and that he does not exist), he concludes that his initial thought is necessarily connected with the denial of the second: if he is deceived about something, then necessarily he exists. The analytic proofs of his existence accord with what Descartes explains in Replies to the Second Set of Objections, namely, these proofs involve mental experiments on the part of the reader, involving specific relata as set out by Descartes in the Meditations (e.g. persuasion and existence; deception and existence). Accordingly, these proofs require that we be fully attentive to the teachings of the Meditations, and that we have

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no hostility to the subject matter under investigation. And, finally, if we follow Descartes’ teachings regarding analytic proofs and perform the requisite mental experiments, we ‘understand the matter no less perfectly and make it as much our own as if we had discovered it’. Once his two analytic proofs have been put forth, he asserts: “So that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, we must come to the definite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or mentally conceive it” (M 51; CSM II, 17). The reference to a conclusion in this passage is not to a conclusion of a syllogistic-type argument. Rather, he means that he is able to assert that he exists in light of the analytic demonstrations, which have revealed the necessary connections between being persuaded about something and existing, and between being deceived about something and existing. He now goes on to inquire about his nature: But I do not yet know clearly enough what I am, I who am certain that I am; and hence I must be careful to see that I do not imprudently take some other object in place of myself, and thus that I do not go astray in respect of this knowledge that I hold to be the most certain and most evident of all that I have formerly learned. (M 51; CSM II, 17)

This passage is not easy to understand. In asking what he is, he warns against imprudently taking some other object in place of himself. However, given that he does not yet know what he is, it is puzzling to understand how he can be certain that he has not confused himself with some other object. When we engage in conceptual analysis, we should be able to identify typical instances of the kind of object into whose nature we are inquiring, and then seek to discover its essential features. However, since Descartes denies that he has any knowledge of himself at this stage, he cannot be proposing to analyze the self as he would, for example, analyze the concept of a chair or table. I will now explain how he gains a knowledge of the self. In his attempt to determine with certainty what he is, Descartes tells us that he will review his former opinions about himself, and reject those which “might even in a small degree be invalidated by the reasons which I have just brought forward, in order that there may be nothing at all left beyond what is absolutely certain and indubitable” (M 51; CSM II, 17). He begins the examination into his previous beliefs about himself by dividing these beliefs into two classes-those beliefs about himself which appear to depend upon the body, and those which appear to depend upon the soul. Those which he formerly held to depend upon the body he rejects at this stage;

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But what am I[?] … Can I affirm that I possess the least of all those things which I have just said pertain to the nature of body? I pause to consider, I revolve all these things in my mind, and I find no one of which I can say that it pertains to me. (M 52; CSM II, 19)

This claim that he is unable to affirm that he possess any of the things he has mentioned which pertain to the nature of body is a result of a series of analytic proofs, in which he affirms that he exists, and denies that he has a body or bodily parts. He finds that if he thinks that he exists and denies that he has a body, or various bodily parts and features, he is still able to think that he exists. Therefore, he concludes that neither having a body, nor having any bodily features, are essential to his essence. This, of course, is in contrast to the two analytic proofs of his existence, already examined, in which he establishes that his existence is necessarily connected to being persuaded about something, and to being deceived about something. He now turns to the attributes of the soul, in order to determine if there is any one of these attributes which is his essential self: Let us pass to the attributes of the soul and see if there is any one which is in me? … What of thinking? I find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just when I think; for it might possibly be the case if I ceased entirely to think, that I should likewise cease altogether to exist. I do not now admit anything which is not necessarily true … (M 52-53; CSM II, 18, italics added to the text).

The analytic demonstration which reveals his nature as a thinking thing takes the same form as the analytic demonstrations which he employed to prove that he exists. He begins with what he cannot doubt-that he exists. He then attempts to affirm in thought both that he exists, and that he does not think. By finding a repugnancy between the affirmation of his existence and that he does not think (i.e., he cannot affirm in thought both that he exists and that he does not think), he concludes that his initial thought is necessarily connected with the denial of the second, namely, if he exists, then he must think. I realize, of course, that this formulation of the analytic demonstration of the necessary connection between thought and existence runs counter to accepted interpretations of Descartes: it is typically granted that the necessary connection discovered is between thought and existence (articulated in the dictum, Cogito ergo Sum), and not between existence and thought. Nevertheless, as I have now shown, in the case of the second meditation, the certainty of his existence is discovered before he comes to know that thinking is his essential feature. Accordingly, in the Meditations, the

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connection which is initially discovered is between existence and thought, and not between thought and existence. This reading of the second meditation explains how he can be certain that ‘he has not imprudently taken some other object in place of himself’. Given the necessary connection between existence and thought, to think of himself as existing is already to think of himself as thinking-even if he is not yet aware of the necessary connection between his existence and thinking. Similarly, given the necessary connection between figure and extension, and motion and duration, when we think of something moving and of something figured, we are already thinking the passage of time and that the object is extended respectively, even if we are not attending to these features. Therefore, when Descartes asks what he is, now that the knows that he exists, he is asking for the feature or features which are inseparable from his awareness of his existence-what must also be thought when he thinks of his existence. It is clear that in asking what he is, he is not engaging in what we would refer to as conceptual analysis. We are now able to explain why he says: “I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just when I think; for it might possibly be the case if I ceased entirely to think, that I should likewise cease altogether to exist.” The formulation Cogito ergo Sum employed in the Principles and elsewhere is useful to show the sufficiency of thinking to existence-if I think then I must exist. The Cogito ergo Sum, however, cannot be used to show the necessity of thinking to existing-which is (at least part of)1 what the passage under consideration is asserting-for it would involve denying the antecedent. On the other hand, once it is recognized that, at this stage in the Meditations, the connection being affirmed is between existence and thought, we understand that the necessity of thinking to existing is established through modus tollens. Now, it is true that Descartes says that ‘it might possibly be the case that if he ceased entirely to think, that he should likewise cease altogether to exist’. And it is also true that normally where something is claimed to be a necessary condition for the existence of something else, the words ‘might possibly’ would not be included: if thinking is a necessary condition of his existence, then if he ceases to think, he must cease to exist. However, we must consider that, at this point, he has not established that his essence is only to think, or that insofar as he thinks, he cannot also be corporeal. Descartes urges, both in the second meditation and in the Replies to Objections III2, that knowing that he exists as a thinking 1

What more is being considered will be discussed later in this paragraph. In the second meditation, he writes: “I am not a collection of members which we call the human body … But perhaps it is true that these same things which I supposed were non - existent because they are unknown to me, are really not different from

2

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thing is not a proof that he is not corporeal. His proof for this appears in the sixth meditation. If his essence is to some extent also corporeal, then, perhaps, insofar as he is a body, he can continue to exist, even though all thinking has ceased. This explains why at this point, he speculates, rather than asserts, that the cessation of thought might bring it about that he will cease ‘altogether’ to exist. If he is more than a thinking thing, then his nonthinking nature may continue, even if he ceases to exist as a thinking thing.

Descartes’ Method of Proof of his Existence in Principle VII The first six principles of the Principles of Philosophy deal with what can be doubted, and, at the beginning of Principle VII, Descartes enumerates the extent of his doubt, while at the same time proving that this doubt cannot extend to the self, insofar as he thinks: While we thus reject all that of which we can possibly doubt, and feign that it is false, it is easy to suppose that there is no God, nor heaven, nor bodies, and that we possess neither hands, nor feet, nor indeed anybody; but we cannot in the same way conceive that we who doubt these things are not; for there is a contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does not at the same time as it thinks, exist. And hence this conclusion, I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain of all that occurs to one who philosophizes in an orderly way. (HR I, 211; CSM 1, 194-195))

In the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, he defends the Cogito ergo Sum as a first principle of his philosophy in the following manner: But when we become aware that we are thinking beings, this is a primitive act of knowledge derived from no syllogistic reasoning. He who says, I think, hence I am, or exist, does not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but, by a simple act of mental vision, recognizes it as if it were the self which I know. I am not sure about this; I shall not dispute about it now; I can only give judgment on things that are known to me. I know that I exist, and I enquire what I am, I whom I know to exist. But it is very certain that the knowledge of my existence taken in its precise significance does not depend on things whose existence is not yet known to me; consequently it does not depend on those which I can form in imagination” (M 53; CSM II, 18). Similarly, in the Replies to the Third Set of Objections, he writes: “A thing which thinks, he says, may be something corporeal; and the opposite of this has been assumed; not proved. But really I did not assume the opposite, neither did I use it as a basis for my argument; I left it wholly underdetermined until Meditation VI, in which its proof is given.” (HR II, 63; CSM II, 123)

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Chapter 3 a thing that is known per se. This is evident from the fact that if it were syllogistically deduced, the major premise, that everything that thinks is, or exists, would have to be known previously; but yet that has rather been learned from the experience of the individual – that unless he exists he cannot think. For our mind is so constituted by nature that general propositions are formed out of the knowledge of particulars. (HR II, 38; CSM II, 100)

Nevertheless, in Principle X, he does allow that certain concepts and principles are needed, if we are to understand the Cogito ergo Sum, and he includes within his list ‘in order to think we must be’: And when I stated that this proposition I think, therefore I am is the first and most certain which presents itself to those who philosophise in orderly fashion, I did not for all that deny that we must first of all know what is knowledge, what is existence, what is certainty, and that in order to think we must be, and such like; but because these are notions of the simplest possible kind, which of themselves give us no knowledge of anything that exists, I did not think them worthy of being put on record. (HR I, 222; CSM 1, 196)

Frans Burman was troubled by these two passages3, and requested an explanation from Descartes which would show their compatibility. He provides Burman with the following account: Before this inference, ‘I think therefore I am’, the major ‘whatever thinks is’ can be known; for it is in reality prior to my inference, and my inference depends on it. This is why the author says in the Principles that the major premise comes first, namely, because implicitly it is always presupposed and prior. But it does not follow that I am always expressly and explicitly aware of its priority, or that I know it before my inference. This is because I am attending only to what I experience inside myself – for example, ‘I think therefore I am’: I do not pay attention in the same way to the general notion ‘whatever thinks is’. As I have explained before, we do not separate out these general propositions from the particular instances; rather it is in the particular instances that we think of them. (CB, 4)

Descartes is adamant that the Cogito ergo Sum is not derived from a syllogism with the major premise ‘everything that thinks exists’, and equally adamant that the principle ‘everything that thinks exists’ is presupposed in the Cogito ergo Sum. His account of this in the conversation 3

References to Descartes’ Conversation with Burman are taken from the edition prepared by John Cottingham, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. References will be presented by CB followed by the page number.

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with Burman focuses on the difference between an implicit and an explicit awareness. When the Cogito is first discovered, we have an implicit awareness of the principle ‘everything that thinks exists’, but not an explicit awareness; subsequent to the discovery of the Cogito, the awareness of this principle is (or can be) explicit. Presumably, however, even if he had had an explicit awareness of the principle ‘everything that thinks exists’ prior to discovering the Cogito, this would not alter his claim, in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, that the Cogito is a first principle derived from no syllogistic reasoning. I now propose to show why this must be the case. In the first chapter, I provided a detailed explanation, developed from the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, of Descartes’ method of ‘analysis’, which he utilizes throughout the Meditations; and of the method of ‘synthesis’, which is employed in Geometry. The impression we obtain from that discussion is that a demonstration or proof employing the analytic mode of proof can never be either identical to, or similar to, a demonstration where the method of synthesis is involved. The move from what is implicitly involved in a conception to what is explicitly involved in that conception is not a move from analysis to synthesis. Descartes intends the procedure of each to be self-contained, and not to lead to the other, depending upon the amount of implicit and explicit knowledge involved. What is now required is to show why analysis cannot lead to synthesis, even if all implicit knowledge is rendered explicit. To help us with this, we need to recall the two analytic proofs of his existence, which were discussed earlier in this chapter. In each of these proofs, Descartes utilizes thought experiments, in order to establish the inseparability between the thought of being persuaded of something and existing, and the thought of being deceived about something and existing, by affirming the first relatum in each case, simultaneously denying the second, and finding that, by doing so, he can no longer think the first relatum. In short. an ‘analytic demonstration’, if properly attended to by the reader, will make it appear as though the reader has discovered the matter in question by her / himself: the analytic proof is designed to guide the reader’s attention to the relevant ideas, so that the appropriate necessary connections and impossible connections can be intuited. At no point is there a geometric-type demonstration involved in the analytic proof or demonstration. The necessities and repugnancies which the analytic demonstration reveals can only be appreciated by entertaining the very ideas of which the analytic demonstration speaks, and apprehending intuitively the impossibilities and necessities. The demonstration is not a substitute for the intuition, nor, for that matter, can it be accepted without the intuition. As a result, the connections which analytic demonstrations are designed to reveal do not follow as conclusions from the premises of the

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demonstration. To hold otherwise is to confuse analytic demonstration with synthetic demonstration-the method of proof in metaphysics with the method of proof in geometry. An analytic demonstration is designed to reveal necessary connections between ideas, for example, between persuaded of something and existence, and between doubting and existence. The account I have offered of analytic demonstrations in the second meditation accords with Descartes’ discussion of necessary connection in the Regulae. In Rule XII, he says that a connection between ideas is necessary “when one is so implied in the concept of another in a confused sort of way that we cannot conceive either distinctly, if our thought assigns to their separateness from each other. Thus, figure is conjoined with extension, motion with duration or time, and so on, because it is impossible to conceive of a figure that has no extension, nor of a motion that has no duration”. (HR I, 42-43; CSM 1, 45-46) In this passage, the test of necessity is identical to that employed in the second meditation: affirm in thought the first conception (for example, figure, motion) and at the same time deny the second (for example, extension, duration); in those cases where the denial of the second carries with it the inconceivability of the first, the first is necessarily connected to the second.

The Methods of Proof of Descartes’ Existence in the Second Meditation and in the Seventh Principle Although I have now shown that the conclusion in an analytic demonstration is not dependent on premises in the way the conclusion in a synthetic demonstration is logically dependent on premises, I have yet to explain why, in Principle X and in the Reply to Burman, Descartes holds that the major premise ‘whatever thinks, exists’ is involved (at least implicitly) in arriving at the knowledge of his existence. First, it is important to note that, whenever Descartes allows that the major premise ‘whatever thinks, exists’ is involved in arriving at the knowledge of his existence, including in his reply to Burman, his reference is always to the Principles Of Philosophy, and not to the Meditations.4 Alternatively, whenever he maintains, as he does in Replies to the Second Set of Objections, that his existence has not been syllogistically deduced, but is apprehended in a simple intuition, the reference is always to the second meditation. In other words, Descartes’ intention is to call attention to different kinds of proofs of his existence in these two works. We know, from the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, that the method employed 4

See Principle X and the Reply to Burman (CB, 4), quoted earlier in this chapter.

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in the Meditations is analysis: the non-syllogistic type of proof employed to prove his existence in this work. On the other hand, the Principles Of Philosophy utilizes the method of synthesis, in which deductive reasoning is utilized. We learn this in the conversation with Burman, when Descartes makes clear that his method in the Principles is not analysis, but synthesis: “In the Principles [the author’s] purpose is exposition, and his procedure is synthetic”. (CB, 12)

André Gombay and John Cottingham on the Methods of ‘Analysis’ and ‘Synthesis’ André Gombay and John Cottingham understand that Descartes’ method in the Principles of Philosophy is synthesis, but they insist that there is no substantial difference between synthesis and analysis, despite Descartes’ insistence that the opposite is the case. I will now examine Gombay and Cottingham’s arguments on Descartes’ proofs of his existence, to determine whether either commentator has provided a compelling argument for minimizing the differences between analysis and synthesis in Descartes’ philosophy. Gombay explains the discrepancy between the second meditation and the Principles of Philosophy on the matter of major premise in this way: [In the second meditation] the thought of the proposition ‘Whatever thinks, is’ did not occur; however, ‘analytic’ proof proceeds by displaying precisely what did occur; hence that proposition is not part of one ‘analytic’ proof of ‘I am’. Descartes’ answer is not simple-minded autobiography, but autobiography qua demonstration.5

Hence, according to Gombay, when Descartes rejects the need for the major premise in arriving at ‘I am’, as he does in regard to the second meditation, he does so because at the time he was not thinking this proposition. On the other hand, had Descartes been thinking it at the time ‘I am’ was arrived at, it would have been included in the ‘demonstration’, and ‘I am’ would have been arrived at deductively. This leads Gombay to conclude that there is no substantive difference between an analytic and synthetic demonstration: We are told that the Meditations were written in the ‘analytic’ mode: plagiarizing the first sentence of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, we might construe Descartes as saying that the Meditations will be understood 5

André Gombay, “ ‘Cogito Ergo Sum’: Inference of Argument?” in Cartesian Studies, edited by R.J. Butler, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972, p. 71-88. The passage cited appears on page 86.

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Chapter 3 only by someone who feels as though he himself has had the thoughts which are expressed in them. Yet insofar as anything in the Meditations is recognizably a piece of argumentation-say the third paragraph of Meditation Two-it scarcely measures up to the general claims made in the Reply on behalf of the ‘analytic’ mode of proof. There is of course the quasi-historical setting, the narrative in the first person, the frequent selfaddressed questions: but it is difficult to regard these as anything more than stylistic deviations from the pattern of proof which Descartes calls ‘synthetics’. I do not deny that there might be ways of leading a person to see ‘how things stand’, which are not those of deductive demonstration; but I do not discern any of these anywhere in the Meditations; and I can conceive of none that might accomplish what ‘analysis is said to accomplish’. (Butler volume, page 86)

Now, if Gombay is correct, then the plausibility of the points being argued here, namely, that the major premise is totally irrelevant to Descartes’ proof of his existence in the Meditations, and that the method of proof in the Meditations is non-syllogistic in nature, is considerably weakened. On Gombay’s account, ‘whatever thinks, is’ is implicit in the demonstration in the second meditation, and sense can be made of this only if it is regarded as the major premise of the relevant syllogism. Therefore, to make my case against Gombay, I have to show that Descartes’ procedure in the Principles is different from his procedure in the Meditations, and at the same time, it must be shown why the major premise is relevant to the procedure in the Principles, and in no way relevant to the procedure in the Meditations. We saw earlier in this chapter that, in his conversation with Burman, Descartes’ holds that the method he employs in the Principles is synthesis. Gombay is, therefore, correct about this. Synthesis is the method Descartes advocates for demonstrating what we already know. For this reason, it can be used by the geometer. He explains this point in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections: …[T]he primary notions that are the presuppositions of geometrical proofs harmonize with the use of our senses, and are readily granted by all. Hence, no difficulty is involved in this case, except in the proper deduction of the consequences. (M 102; 111)

On the other hand, metaphysics, the subject matter of the Meditations, encounters difficulties in making its first principles clear and distinct, which explains why the method of analysis must be employed when we begin the study of metaphysics. The relevant passage (examined in the previous chapter) is, once again, in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections:

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On the contrary, nothing in metaphysics causes more trouble than the making the perception of its primary notions clear and distinct. For, though in their own nature they are as intelligible as, or even more intelligible than those the geometricians study, yet being contradicted by the many preconceptions of our senses to which we have since our earlier years been accustomed, they cannot be perfectly apprehended except by those who give strenuous attention and study to them, and withdraw their minds as far as possible from matters corporeal … This is why my writing took the form of Meditations rather than of Philosophical Disputations or the theorems and problems of a geometer. (M 102-103; CSM II, 111)

Once the first principles of metaphysics are seen clearly and distinctly through the method of analysis, the metaphysician can proceed with deductions (as the geometer proceeds with deductions) through the method of synthesis. We now know, from Principle X and the Conversation with Burman, that Descartes insists that the demonstration of his existence in Principle VII involves the major premise “in order to think we must be” or “whatever thinks is”. Therefore, when he tells us in Principle VII that there is a ‘contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does not at the same time as it thinks exist’, he must mean the logical contradiction contained within in the following argument: Whatever thinks exists I think ‫ ׵‬I do not exist.

What is interesting in this argument for our purpose is that there is no concern with a proof for the major premise, ‘whatever thinks exists’, and no proof in the first six Principles that his essence is to think (the minor premise in this argument). In the Principles, the discussion pertaining to himself as a thinking thing appears in Principles VIII and IX, i.e., this discussion appears after the proof of his existence. In other words, the Principles treats ‘whatever thinks exists’ as being already known; similarly, that Descartes’ essence is to think is taken for granted in the Principles. That both of these matters are countenanced in the Principles can be explained by noting that, in the Preface to the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes urges that the Meditations should be read and understood before attempting to read the Principles6. In light of his analytic proofs in the second meditation, we have 6

“Then, finally, when it appeared to me that the preceding treatises [including the Meditations] had sufficiently prepared the mind of readers to accept the Principles of Philosophy, I likewise published them…That is why it is better to read beforehand

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seen why Descartes holds that his essence is to think. What must now be addressed is why he insists that the Meditations has prepared the reader to accept the major premise ‘whatever thinks exists’-a premise which nowhere appears in the Meditations. In fact, given his assertion that only analysis was used in the Meditations, no major premise could have there been employed in establishing his existence. To understand the role of the second meditation in providing the major premise ‘whatever thinks exists’, we must understand the key steps in this meditation. Thus far, we have seen that (i) Descartes provides two analytic proofs of his existence, the first based on the fact that he was persuaded of something, and the second based on the fact that he has been deceived; and (ii) that he employs the method of analysis to establish that his existence is necessarily connected to thinking. In the third step, he attempts to elucidate what it means to say that he is a thinking thing: But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (M 54; CSM II, 19)

His analytic proofs of what it is to be a thing which thinks take the same form as his previous proofs in the second meditation: if he affirms that he is a thing which thinks and denies that he is a being who doubts, or understands, etc., then he can no longer think that he is a thing which thinks. As he states this in the paragraph following the passage quoted above: “Is there likewise any one of these attributes which can be distinguished from my thought, or which might be said to be separated from myself?” (M 54; CSM II, 19) Although he began the second meditation by affirming the necessary connection between being persuaded of something and existing, and being deceived about something and existing, by the third stage of the second meditation, Descartes realizes that when he offered his two analytic demonstrations in the first stage of the second meditation, the first relatum in each demonstration-‘being persuaded of something’; and ‘being deceived about something’-is nothing but a mode of thought. Accordingly, in place of ‘I was persuaded of something’ and ‘I was deceived about something’, he can now substitute ‘that I think’. We are able to see, therefore, that by the end of the third stage of the second meditation, Descartes has come to understand that if he thinks then he exists (Cogito ergo Sum).

the Meditations which I have written on the same subject, in order that it may be properly understood.” (HR 1, 212; CSM 1, 187)

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I will now show how Descartes moves from “if I think then I exist’ to ‘Whatever thinks exists”, the major premise in his deductive proof of his existence in Principle VII. In the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, he explains that “whatever thinks exists’ has been “learned from the experience of the individual-that unless he exists, he cannot think. For our mind is so constituted by nature that general propositions are found out of the knowledge of particulars” (HR II, 38; CSM II,100). In other words, once the inseparability of thought and existence is intuited in his case in the second meditation, the general proposition can then be inferred. It is in this manner, then, that Descartes is able to approach the Principles of Philosophy with a major premise for the syllogism in Principle VII. It is clear at this point that Gombay has misrepresented Descartes on the methods of analysis and synthesis, by obscuring the differences between them. Contrary to what Gombay argues, analysis and synthesis are two distinct methods, the former not utilizing premises and conclusions, while the latter method does utilize premises and conclusions. Analysis proceeds by eliminating sensory prejudice, thereby rendering the mind indifferent, and leading the attention to the ideas involved in the self-evident first principle. Synthesis begins with a major premise and reasons down to a conclusion. Descartes’ ‘proofs’ of his existence in the Meditations and the Principles of Philosophy can only be understood by grasping this distinction in the two methods he employs in the Meditations and the Principles‘analysis’ in the Meditations, ‘synthesis’ in the Principles of Philosophy. John Cottingham also attempts to minimize the differences between analysis, and Descartes’ proclaimed utilization of the method of synthesis in the Principles of Philosophy. Cottingham writes: It seems that for any argument one may proceed in two ways: start from basic axioms and work “downwards”, unravelling the consequences that follow, or alternatively, start from some complex proposition, and ask how it can be proved, climbing “upwards” until one reaches unassailable axioms. Yet this hardly shows that there are two logically distinct patterns of argument involved…[T]he distinction seems to boil down to nothing more than a contrast between moving “downwards” from axioms to a desired result, and moving “upwards” from a given proposition until we reach the axioms that generate it. At this point, one begins to suspect Descartes’ triumphant proclamation of his “new method” involves more

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What I have shown is that Descartes’ method of analysis is involved exclusively with the quest for first principles in the Meditations: it is employed by Descartes to remove sensory prejudice, which prevents the mind from attending to, and grasping, the self-evident first principles of metaphysics. At least in regard to the analytic mode of proof of his existence in the second meditation, this prejudice is not removed by proceeding “upwards” from some conclusion or other, but rather by getting the reader to grasp certain necessary connections between ideas, for example, between being persuaded of something and existing, and being deceived about something and existing. Since no arguments (premises and conclusions) are involved, analysis cannot differ from synthesis simply in terms of the ‘direction’ of the inquiry. Synthesis does involve deductive arguments, and, as we have seen, the major premise of the deductive argument in Principle VII, ‘Whoever thinks exists', is arrived at with the assistance of the analytic mode of proof in the Meditations. However, the mind must be properly prepared in order to grasp the self-evidence of these premises. Descartes is adamant that this preparation involves the removal of prejudice, arriving at a point of indifference, and directing attention to the innate ideas with which he is dealing. The removal of this prejudice cannot be accomplished simply by following the argument from its conclusion to its premises. By the time the premises are formulated, all prejudice must have been removed. For Descartes, more is involved in accepting a first principle than having it brought forward. On Cottingham’s interpretation, this, by itself, would be adequate.

7

John Cottingham, A History of Western Philosophy 4 – The Rationalists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Reprinted in my In Focus volume on the Meditations on First Philosophy, (See M 149).

CHAPTER 4 KNOWING GOD THROUGH MEDITATION

Introduction In this chapter, I propose to analyze Descartes’ two proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation, with a view to determining the role that each of these proofs plays in leading Descartes to a knowledge of God as his creator. I will show that, while each proof contributes to leading him to a knowledge of God, nevertheless, Descartes accepts (1) that neither proof actually establishes that God is the cause of his existence, and (2) that, ultimately, his knowledge of God is obtained through meditation, rather than through argumentation. ***** I begin by pointing out that there is an evident incongruity between certain matters which Descartes discusses in the first meditation and his treatment of God in the third meditation. I propose to show what this incongruity is, and to explore the reasons which would keep it from bothering Descartes-my position being that Descartes himself was aware of the incongruity. In the case of the first meditation, I single out two items for discussion: (a) Descartes makes it clear at the outset that the purpose of the Meditations is to establish a “firm and permanent structure in the sciences” (M 45; CSM II,12); to accomplish this he proposes to “to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted” (M 45; CSM II, 12); and to this end, he proposes that he will withhold assent except where his beliefs are “certain and indubitable.” (M 46; CSM II, 12) To assist him in withholding assent in regard to those matters which can be doubted, he introduces the hypothesis of the evil genius who “has employed his whole energies in deceiving me.” (M 49; CSM II, 15) (b) As he progresses through the first meditation, Descartes arrives at a consideration of mathematics, and he finds that, even here, there is

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opportunity for doubt. The reasons he offers for doubting mathematics include, that it may be that there are no existents to which mathematical statements can correspond, and yet a deceiving deity has caused him to believe that there are such existents; or it may be that a deceiving deity, in creating him, has so put him together that he is constantly making errors in his mathematical reasonings, and he is unable to detect these errors.1 In addition, he points out that, even if he does not ascribe the possible deception in mathematics to a deceiving deity, he can still rule out mathematics as certain and indubitable, inasmuch as he must admit that, at least on some occasions, he has erred in his mathematical reasonings. In the paragraph following these considerations, he expresses his most fundamental concern about who created him: There may indeed be those who would prefer to deny the existence of a God so powerful, rather than believe that all other things are uncertain. But let us not oppose them for the present, and grant that all that is here said of a God is a fable; nevertheless in whatever way they suppose that I have arrived at the state of being that I have reached-whether they attribute it to fate or to accident, or make out that it is by a continual succession of antecedents, or by some other method-since to err and deceive oneself is a defect, it is clear that the greater will be the probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is the Author to whom they assign my origin the less powerful. (M 48-49; CSM II, 14)

Given that the likelihood of deception is inversely related to the amount of power in his creator, it follows that the concern with errors stemming from his own nature will subside if and only if he can establish that he was created by a veracious all-powerful being. In the third meditation, Descartes picks up on this issue once more as a challenge to the principle of clarity and distinctness. He speaks there of the possibility that “a God might have endowed me with such a nature that I may have been deceived even

1

“But how do I know that He has not brought it to pass that there is no earth, no heaven, no extended body, no magnitude, no place, and that nevertheless, they seem to me to exist just exactly as I now see them? And, besides, as I sometimes imagine that others deceive themselves in the things which they think they know best, how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined? But possibly God has not desired that I should be thus deceived, for He is said to be supremely good. If, however, it is contrary to His goodness to have made me such that I constantly deceive myself, it would also appear to be contrary to His goodness to permit me to be sometimes deceived, and nevertheless I cannot doubt that He does permit this. (M 48; CSM II, 14)

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concerning things which seemed to me most manifest.” (M 59; CSM II, 25)2 And he puts to himself the following task: “… I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything.” (M 60; CSM II, 25)

The Proofs of God’s Existence in the Third Meditation I turn to the proofs of the existence of God in the third meditation to determine whether the proofs accord with the two considerations we have just examined. As I mentioned at the outset, I will show that such an accord does not obtain. In the first proof, Descartes shows that only God could have created his idea of God; and in the second proof, he argues that God is the cause of his idea of God, and the cause of Descartes, as a thinking thing, the one who has the idea of God. I do not propose to examine the proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation in their entirety; in fact, the discussion of one central item in these proofs will suffice for our purposes. The one I have selected is the analysis centering around the distinction between objective and formal reality. Descartes argues that ideas, when regarded as representations of things, differ in terms of the amount of objective reality they contain: ideas representing substances contain more objective reality than ideas of modes, and the idea through which we apprehend God has more objective reality than those through which finite substances are represented. Granting that “there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect,” (M 63; CSM II, 28) and that “in order that an idea should contain some one certain objective reality rather than another, it must without doubt derive it from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as this idea contains of objective reality” (M 64; CSM 1, 28-29) he goes on to prove that only God could have given him the idea of God (in the first proof of God’s existence); and that only God could have created him, insofar as he is a thinking thing (in the second proof of God’s existence). Now, for the point I am going to make, it is not necessary to enter into a detailed analysis of what he means by objective and formal reality, nor need we raise the question as to whether the principle which the 2

This passage actually covers both possibilities, viz. that a deceiving deity intentionally created him so as to err, and that although his capacity to be deceived was not intentionally given by his creator, his nature is such that he cannot prevent his being deceived.

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argument utilizes-that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in the effect-is indubitable, and, therefore, acceptable.3 Rather, I will examine the acceptability of the calculus which this argument evidently requires-the calculus involved in deciding what can, and cannot, be posited as a possible cause of an idea with a certain objective reality. To decide this question, I want to return to Descartes’ doubts regarding mathematics. One of the reasons given for doubting mathematics is the possibility that God might have endowed him with such a nature that he may be deceived, even regarding those matters which appear to him most manifest. In the first meditation, the examples he uses are adding two and three and counting the sides of a square, or judging “of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined.” (M 48; CSM II, 14) In other words, he worries that he is erring in cases where simple calculations are made, and he claims that only by proving the existence of a veracious God who created him can such concerns be removed. The task of deciding what can be regarded as the cause of the objective reality of a certain idea involves a number of calculations, namely, the precise amount of objective reality an idea possesses, the precise amount of formal (or eminent) reality causal candidates possess, and a comparison involving the amounts possessed by each. Such calculations appear to be on a par with, if not more difficult than, counting the sides of a square, or adding three and two; and consequently, Descartes should have rejected such a procedure as an acceptable approach to a knowledge of God’s existence. In short, this proofs for God’s existence contain a procedure which has, in fact, been rejected by Descartes, in that it is subject to hyperbolic doubt. Now, it might be suggested that this criticism fails to take into account the fact that Descartes’ attack on mathematics concerns a conception 3

Nevertheless, if we do inquire into the principles which the argument employs, we can find them to be unacceptable in terms of the rigor demanded by Cartesian doubt. For example, the principle ‘that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in the effect’ is accepted within the proof without any concern for the fact that it relies on a mathematical conception as to how things come to be, and yet the reliability of mathematics is one of the matters to be settled by the proof of God’s existence. The distinction between formal and objective reality is also central to the proof, and it too falls short of the indubitability which is regarded by Descartes as essential to acceptability. The distinction between formal and objective reality requires that we have an understanding of how effects are brought about, even before we are acquainted with any actual case of a causal relation, and that some causal knowledge can be obtained a priori. This position is, to say the least, highly doubtful.

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of mathematics which is not pure, whereas the idea of God in the third meditation is one which has no empirical content,4 and that consequently, the idea of God is not subject to hyperbolic doubt as the conception of mathematics in the first meditation is shown to be. In certain passages5, Descartes makes it plain that the divine guarantee does not apply to what is perceived through the pure intellect directly, but only to guarantee the conclusion of a demonstration, the premises of which were perceived clearly and distinctly, but are no longer before the mind. Nevertheless, this move appears unable to resolve the problem, inasmuch as when not attending to the proof of God’s existence, he must recall that he once saw the relevant calculations clearly and distinctly, as well as the other steps involved in the proof, and this would lead to a charge of circular reasoning, if the proof is itself to guarantee the reliability of memory. I submit, therefore, that on either interpretation of the divine guarantee, the calculus involved in the proofs for God’s existence is subject to doubt, and the proofs themselves appear to fall short of Descartes’ requirement of indubitability and certainty.

The Strength of the Proofs of God’s Existence in the Third Meditation There is, in fact, something odd in attempting to prove that the cause of the existence of one of my ideas is also the only way to account for my existence, the one who possesses this idea. For example, I am willing to allow that certain observations of tables are causally relevant to my having an idea of a table, without at the same time granting that these observations are causally relevant to my existence. We must, therefore, ask under what conditions the causal account for the existence and conservation of an idea would also be allowed as revealing the cause of the one who has this idea. As a first step toward answering this question, it might be suggested that the cause of an idea would also be regarded as the cause of the conceiver of this idea if and only if it can be shown that having this idea is essential to being the type of conceiver one knows is actually the case. On this suggestion, it would have to be established that being a thinking thing has, as an essential component, having the idea of God. The connection between being a thinking thing and having the idea of God 4

This is a position which has been defended by Harry G. Frankfurt in his Dreams, Dreamers, and Madmen (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970). See especially Chapter 7. 5 See, for example, the discussion of the divine guarantee in the fifth meditation.

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would be a necessary connection. As Descartes points out in the twelfth rule of the Regulae, a connection is necessary “when one is so implied in the concept of another in a confused sort of way that we cannot conceive either distinctly, if our thought assigns to them separateness from each other” (HR1, 42; CSM 1, 45) Is the connection between being a thinking thing and having the idea of God for the single causal account we are seeking on a par with the connection between, for example, figure and extension, motion and duration? I think not; for although figure cannot be distinctly thought without also thinking extension, and motion cannot be distinctly thought without also thinking the passage of time, there is no necessity in thinking that whatever caused the first idea must also have caused the second idea with which it is necessarily connected. That is, acknowledging the inseparability of figure and extension, and motion and duration, does not also require acknowledging that the cause of a particular figure is also the cause of the extension which makes the figure possible, and that the cause of a particular motion is also the cause of the passage of time without which the motion could not occur. Descartes must, therefore, be intending that the connection between the idea of the self as a thinking thing and the idea of God is different from the connection, e.g. between figure and extension, motion and duration, in which two relata which are necessarily connected. His account of the connection between the idea of the self and the idea of God will be detailed later in this chapter, when we examine the last three paragraphs in the third meditation. At this point in our inquiry, I will investigate whether the two proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation succeed in establishing that God created Descartes as a thinking thing, leaving aside all criticisms and concerns related to these proofs. The first proof does not prove that God created him. For it is concerned with the objective reality of the idea of God, and therefore, even if treated as sound, it proves, at most, that a being exists who possesses formally all that the idea of God possesses objectively; that is, the first proof, at most, establishes that God created the idea of God which Descartes possesses, without establishing how it is that Descartes came to exist. Descartes speaks of God as “a substance that is infinite [eternal, immutable], independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself and everything else, if anything else does exist, have been created.” (M 66; CSM II, 31) With the inclusion of the ‘creator’ aspect of God, it might seem as though the first proof does prove that God created him. And, yet, I maintain that, at most, the first proof establishes that God is the cause of the idea of God, and not the cause of the conceiver of this idea. This is easily explained. For Descartes does not deal with all the features cited in the idea

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of God in the first proof. He is certainly entitled to enumerate a variety of perfections of God as found in the idea of God, and to deal with these on a selective basis, as he deems most profitable to the investigation. Accordingly, if we look at the latter part of the first proof, we notice that it focuses on infinitude, omniscience, etc.; that is, the earlier perfections cited in the above quoted passage. We will learn that it is left to the second proof to develop the ‘creator’ aspect of God. He explains the advantage of dealing with the attributes of God on a selective basis in the Replies to the First Set of Objections: But it is just as when gazing at the sea, we are said to behold it, though our sight does not cover it all, nor measures its immensity; if indeed we view it from a distance in such a way as to take in the whole with a single glance, we see it only confusedly, as we have a confused image of a chiliagon, when taking in all its sides at the same time; but if from near at hand we fix our glance on one portion of the sea, this act of vision can be clear and distinct, just as the image of a chiliagon may be, if it takes in only one or two of the figure’s sides. By similar reasoning I admit along with all theologians that God cannot be comprehended by the human mind, and also that he cannot be distinctly known by those who try mentally to grasp Him at once in His entirety, and view Him, as it were, from a distance. … But those who try to attend to His perfections singly, and intend not so much to comprehend them as to admire them and to employ all the power of their mind in contemplating them, will assuredly find in Him a much ampler and readier supply of the material for clear and distinct cognition than in any created things. (HR II, 17-18; CSM II, 81)

Descartes understands that the first proof does not establish that God created him. Notice his remarks at the conclusion of the first proof: To speak the truth, I see nothing in all that I have just said which by the light of nature is not manifest to anyone who desires to think attentively on the subject; but when I slightly relax my attention, my mind, finding its vision somewhat obscured and so to speak blinded by the images of sensible objects, I do not easily recollect the reason why the idea that I possess of a being more perfect than I, must necessarily have been placed in me by a being which is really more perfect; and this is why I wish here to go on to inquire whether I, who have this idea, can exist if no such being exists. (M 68; CSM II, CSM II, 32-33)

That God created him is, therefore, left to the second proof of God’s existence in the third meditation. Does it succeed in this? He begins by setting out the following alternatives as to how he came to exist: that he is the cause of himself, that he was caused by his parents, that he was caused by some other source less perfect than God, that God created him.

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He rules himself out as the cause of his existence on two grounds: if he were the author of his own existence, he would have bestowed upon himself every perfection of which he is able to conceive, and he realizes that this task is beyond him; and secondly, even if he is eternal, he requires to be conserved from moment to moment, and introspection reveals no such power of conservation. Looking beyond himself for a causal account of his existence as a thinking thing, he rules out that he was caused to exist by a being less perfect than God: Possibly, however, this being on which I depend is not that which I call God, and I am created either by my parents or by some other cause less perfect than God. This cannot be, because, as I have just said, it is perfectly evident that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect; and thus, since I am a thinking thing, and possess an idea of God within me, whatever in the end be the cause assigned to my existence, it must be allowed that it is likewise a thinking thing and that it possesses in itself the idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God. We may again inquire whether this cause derives its origin from itself or from some other thing. For if from itself, it follows by the reasons before brought forward, that this cause must itself be God; for since it possesses the virtue of selfexistence, it must also without doubt have the power of actually possessing all the perfections of which it has the idea, that is, all those which I conceive as existing in God. But if it derives its existence from some other cause than itself, we shall again ask, for the same reason, whether this second cause exists by itself or through another, until from one step to another, we finally arrive at an ultimate cause, which will be God. (M 70; CSM II, 34)

This argument fails in its effort to prove that God is the cause of Descartes’ existence, and proves, at most, that God is the cause of his idea of God. Although the argument begins with the recognition of the self as a thinking thing and as possessing the idea of God, when the argument proceeds to posit a perfect being as the cause of his existence, it does so solely in virtue of the analysis of objective and formal reality, which requires that the original cause of an idea possess formally that which the idea possesses objectively. But, in the third meditation, he acknowledges that he is a finite existent6. Therefore, in light of the fact that he is a finite existent, there is no basis for concluding that he was caused by an infinitely powerful being: according to Descartes, a finite effect only requires a finite cause. To 6

For although the idea of substance is within me owing to the fact that I am a substance, nevertheless I should not have the idea of an infinite substance-since I am finite-if it had not proceeded from some substance which is veritably infinite.” (M 67; CSM II, 31)

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establish that God is not only the cause of his idea of God, but also the cause of the self as a res cogitans who possesses the idea of God, requires establishing that the idea of God is inseparable from the idea of the self as a thinking thing in some special sense, such that to know that God created his idea of God, he also knows that God created him, qua thinking thing. At this stage of the third meditation, he has not addressed this issue: I will show how he deals with this matter later in this chapter. But, for now, we begin to understand more fully the role of the arguments for God’s existence in the third meditation. The first argument, which focuses on the idea of God, enables him to direct his attention to this idea, and it prepares the mind for assenting to the claim that God is the cause of his idea of God. This preparation takes the form of eliminating all putative causal candidates, with the exception of God. In the light of his epistemological doubts regarding his creator, he is led to see that more than what he has argued in the first proof is required, for he must establish that God is also his creator. The second argument prepares the mind for apprehending the causal connection between God and the self, by forcing his attention on the self as a thinking thing possessing the idea of God, and by turning his mind away from all putative causal candidates, other than God. At the end of the first argument, the attention is on God as the cause of the idea of God; and at the end of the second argument, the attention is on God as the cause of the self qua thinking thing, who has the idea of God. However, as we have seen, at the crucial point in the second argument, where it is to be established that God is the cause of the self as a thinking thing who has the idea of God, the argument falls short, inasmuch as it cannot establish the causal connection between God and the existence of the finite self as a thinking thing, using the concepts of objective and formal reality. What these arguments do accomplish is that they bring his attention to the point where he now understands the limitations of his two arguments in the third meditation, to establish that God is the cause of Descartes, insofar as he is a thinking thing. These arguments have assisted in the elimination of sensory prejudice, and moved Descartes to the point where the need for grasping the connection between the ideas of the self and the idea of God is most strongly felt. Therefore, despite the fact that he treats these arguments as though they have established God as the cause of his idea of God and as the cause of himself, as a thinking thing7, he, in fact, realizes that more needs to be done, before he can know with certainty the relation of God to his idea of God and to his existence as a thinking thing. 7

“..[W]e must of necessity conclude from the fact alone that I exist, or that the idea of a Being supremely perfect-that is of God-is in me, that the proof of God’s existence is grounded on the highest evidence” (M 71; CSM II, 35)

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This is evidenced by the fact that the third meditation does not end after the second proof is put forth, but progresses, in the last three paragraphs, to introduce a new route8 for gaining a knowledge of God in relation to the existence of the self, as a thinking thing. Descartes’ causal arguments in the third meditation involving objective and formal reality, if accepted, establish that God is the cause of his idea of God. These arguments do not establish that God is also the cause of Descartes, the one who possesses the idea of God, any more than knowing that a certain table caused my idea of a table can also account causally for my existence, the one who possesses the idea of the table. At the end of the first argument, the attention is on God as the cause of the idea of God; and at the end of the second argument, the attention is on God as the cause of the idea of God, and as the cause of the self, qua thinking thing. However, as we have seen, at the crucial point in the second argument, namely, where it is to be established that God is the cause of the self as a thinking thing who possesses the idea of God, the argument falls short, inasmuch as the argument cannot establish, by utilizing the features of objective and formal reality, that the cause of the idea of God is also the cause of Descartes as a thinking thing, the one who possesses the idea of God. Nevertheless, the second proof, through this shortcoming, guides Descartes as to what he still has to establish, namely, he requires an indubitable approach which will enable him to establish that God is the cause of the idea of God and that God is the cause of himself, insofar as he is a thinking thing.

Moving Beyond the Two Proofs of God’s Existence in the Third Meditation When we learn the cause of one or more of our ideas, we do not typically conclude that the cause of our idea(s) is also the cause of the knower, who possesses the idea(s). Nevertheless, as already pointed out, it is important to take note of what the second argument of God’s existence in the third meditation does, in fact, accomplish: it brings the attention to the point where prejudices have been eliminated, and the need for grasping the relation between the idea of God and the idea of the self is highlighted, such that knowing that God is the cause of the idea of God, Descartes also knows that God is the cause of Descartes, qua thinking thing, the one who possesses the idea of God. Now, reasoning cannot assist Descartes here: the shortcoming of the two proofs, especially the second proof, reveals this. It is at this stage that he realizes that argument(s) must give way to some other 8

To be discussed shortly

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mode of knowing, detailed in the last three paragraphs of the third meditation, if he is to know that God is the cause of his idea of God, and the cause of the self, as a thinking thing. In seeking to understand this mode of knowing, through which he attempts to establish that God is the cause of his idea of God and the cause of his existence as a thinking thing, I begin with the penultimate paragraph of the third meditation: And one certainly ought not to find it strange that God, in creating me, placed this idea within me to be like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work; and it is likewise not essential that the mark shall be something different from the work itself. For from the sole fact that God created me, it is most probable that in some way he has placed his image and similitude upon me, and that I perceive this similitude (in which the idea of God is contained) by means of the same faculty by which I perceive myself-that is to say, when I reflect on myself I not only know that I am something incomplete and dependent on another…But I also know that He on whom I depend possesses in himself all the great things toward which I aspire…And that not indefinitely or potentially alone, but really, actually, and infinitely; and that thus He is God. (M 71-72; CSM II, 35, italics added)

In this passage, the idea of God is characterized to be ‘like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work’, and that ‘it is likewise not essential that the mark shall be something different from the work itself’. He also explains that he comes to grasp the singularity of the idea of the self and the idea of God ‘when he reflects on himself’. Now, there are two possible explanations through which we can attempt to understand Descartes’ approach in the last three paragraphs of the third meditation-either he intuits the causal relation between God and the self as a thinking thing; or this causal relation is known through meditation-the hypothesis that I will argue Descartes intends. I will begin with the intuition hypothesis, and show why this cannot be what Descartes has in mind here. I will then turn to the meditation hypothesis. Intuition: I want to examine critically whether, when Descartes comes to understand that the idea of God is contained in the idea that he has of himself as a thinking thing, that this is nothing more than a further instance of intuition, that is, that he intuits the singularity of the idea which reveals the self as a thinking thing and God as his creator. Now, this cannot be the case for two reasons. First, in Rule III of the Regulae, when he explains intuition, the examples he offers all involve two distinct ideas: “Thus each individual can mentally have intuition that he exists, and that he thinks; that the triangle is bounded by three lines only, the sphere by a single superficies, and so on”

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(HR 1, 7; CSM 1, 14). But, in the case of the idea of the self and of God, Descartes insists that only one idea is involved, which rules out intuition as the cognitive faculty involved in knowing that God is the cause of Descartes’ idea of God and the cause of Descartes’ existence as a thinking thing. Second, the language that he employs in gaining an understanding involved in knowing God in relation to knowing the self as a thinking thing is not the same as the language involved, for example, in mathematics. Intuition in the case of mathematics enables him to grasp necessary connections between relata. Once again, turning to Rule III, where he establishes that 2 and 2 amount to the same as 3 and 1, he reveals the role of intuition: “For example, consider this consequence: 2 and 2 amount to the same as 3 and 1. Now we need to see intuitively not only that 2 and 2 make 4, and that likewise 3 and 1 make 4, but further that the third of the above statements is a necessary conclusion from these two”. (HR 1, 7-8; CSM 1, 15). But, when discovering the relation between the idea of God and the idea of the self, Descartes insists on becoming aware of the relation ‘when I reflect on myself’, and that it is ‘not essential that the mark shall be something different from the work itself’ (M.71; CSM II, 35). The awareness of God and the awareness of the self are both achieved through the idea that he has of himself as a thinking thing. In other words, his knowledge of the idea of the self as a thinking thing and the idea of God as his creator cannot be obtained through intuition-the connection in this case does not involve two different ideas. Meditation: In the passage in the Meditations currently under consideration, Descartes tells us that when God created him, it is most probable that in some way He has placed his image and similitude upon him, and that ‘he perceives this similitude (in which the idea of God is contained) by means of the same faculty by which he perceives himself’, i.e. when he reflects on himself. When Descartes reflects on himself to learn about the singularity of the idea of the self and the idea of God, he is engaged in a cognitive / aesthetic approach to gaining knowledge, not an intuitive approach. In the final paragraph in the third meditation, he expands on the manner in which he comes to understand God through his idea of God: “But before I examine this matter with more care, and pass on to the consideration of other truths which may be derived from it, it seems to me right to pause for a while in order to contemplate God Himself, to ponder at leisure His marvelous attributes, to consider, and admire, and adore, the beauty of this light so resplendent, at least as far as the strength of my mind, which is in some measure dazzled by the sight, will allow me to do

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so. For just as faith teaches us that the supreme felicity of the other life consists only in this contemplation of the Divine Majesty, so we continue to learn by experience that a similar meditation, though incomparably less perfect, causes us to enjoy the greatest satisfaction, of which we are capable in this life”. (M. 72; CSM II, 35-36)

In this passage, he speaks of meditation / contemplation / pondering / considering / admiring / adoring / God. His approach in regard to the idea of God is meditative/ contemplative/ aesthetic; not intuitive / demonstrative. Intuition enables the mind to grasp the necessary connections and necessary repugnancies between relata. Meditation enables the mind to contemplate / reflect upon / ponder / certain individual ideas-in this case, the idea of the self as a thinking thing-with a view to better understanding the content of this idea, and, therefore, of acquiring a better understanding of the nature of God, as Descartes creator. Once again, we come to appreciate Descartes’ point in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, that by using the method of ‘analysis’, ‘we understand the matter no less perfectly, and make it as much our own, as if we had discovered it for ourselves’. A teacher (Descartes) can instruct us how to employ the method of analysis; but the teacher’s knowledge cannot be grasped by others, unless we engage in the identical mental process, which, in the case of the idea of the self and the idea of God, is meditation.

Distinctions of Reason / Clarity and Distinctness The idea of the self as a thinking thing and the idea of God–these are contained in a single innate idea. The test of the inseparability of these ideas can be understood by examining Descartes’ discussion of ‘Distinctions of Reason’. In Principle LXII of the Principles of Philosophy, he writes: Finally, the distinction of reason is between substance and some one of its attributes without which it is not possible that we should have a distinct knowledge of it, or between two such attributes of the same substance. This distinction is made manifest from the fact that we cannot have a clear and distinct idea of such a substance if we exclude from it such an attribute; or we cannot have a clear idea of the one of the two attributes if we separate from it the other.

The distinction of reason involved with the idea of the self and God (as the mark of the workman imprinted on his work) is the latter type described in this passage: the idea of the self as a thinking thing and the idea of God as the creator of the self are attributes of the same substance. Descartes insists that we cannot have a clear and distinct idea of the self as a thinking thing

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or of God as Descartes’ creator, if we attempt to separate one of these ideas from the other by thought through a distinction of reason. We learned earlier when focusing on Descartes’ proofs of his existence in the second meditation that where a connection between ideas is necessary, for example, between being persuaded of something and existing, the test of necessity involves affirming the first relatum (being persuaded of something) and denying the second (that I exist), the result being that we are no longer able to conceive of ourselves as being persuaded of something. But, in the case of the self and God, Descartes understands that he is a thinking thing before he knows that he was created by God. Therefore, at the point where he learns that God is his creator, his idea of himself becomes clearer and more distinct than when he knows only that he exists as a thinking thing. The better the understanding that Descartes has of the self as a thinking thing, which includes knowing that God is his creator, the greater the clarity and distinctness of the idea of the self. Clarity and distinctness, therefore, are variable features of innate ideas, which can increase at the point where he gains a greater understanding of himself as a thinking thing. The first instance in the Meditations of Descartes achieving greater clarity and distinctness in regard to his idea of himself as a thinking thing occurs when he learns what it is to be a thinking thing, namely, a thing “which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels” (M 54; CSM II, 19). Two paragraphs later, he goes on to say that “from this time I begin to know what I am with a little more clearness and distinction than before…” (M 54; CSM II, 20) Similarly, once he realizes, through meditation, that the idea of God is contained within the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing, his idea of himself as a thinking thing becomes clearer and more distinct than before he obtained this knowledge. Descartes does not discuss the meaning of clarity and distinctness in the Meditations. He does, however, explain these concepts in the Principles of Philosophy. In Principle XLV, he writes: I term that clear which is present and apparent to an attentive mind, in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength. But the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear.

‘Clarity’ concerns the handle, hold, or grasp, that the mind has on its ideas. The greater the mind’s grasp of its ideas, the clearer the conception. The grasp that the mind has regarding its ideas is a function of the removal of sensory prejudice from the mind, and the mind’s ability to focus on, or be attentive to, its ideas. ‘Distinctness’ concerns the degree of completeness

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that the mind has in regard to the content of its ideas. Since innate ideas have fixed content, and empirical ideas have variable content, it follows that only in regard to our innate ideas can we hope to achieve total or complete distinctness. Descartes insists that he can easily fall into error, if an idea is clear but not distinct: this would be the case, for example, if he attends to the idea of himself as a thinking thing, and regards this as a complete awareness of the self, without understanding that the idea of God as his creator is contained within this idea of himself as a thinking thing, as well. As Descartes puts it in the last sentence in Principle XLVI: “…[P]erception may be clear without being distinct, and cannot be distinct without also being clear”. That is, the mind can be attentive to a perception (Descartes’ example is a severe pain), and yet be mistaken about some aspect of its content (the severe pain is usually confused by the sufferers with the obscure judgement that they form upon it nature, assuming as they do that something exists in the part affected, similar to the sensation of pain of which they are alone clearly conscious). But, if we have accurately grasped the content of a perception (distinctness), then the perception must also be clear. In the second meditation, at the point where he recognizes the various modes of thinking, namely, doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, refusing, imagining, and feeling, he comments on this new knowledge by asserting: “From this time I begin to know what I am with a little more clearness and distinction than before” (M 54; CSM II, 20). Similarly, when he realizes that the idea of God is contained in the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing, the idea that he has of himself becomes clearer and more distinct.

Acquiring Knowledge of the Self and of God Through Meditation It is in the last three paragraphs of the third meditation that Descartes begins to understand, through meditation, that the idea of God is contained within the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing. He begins the antepenultimate paragraph of the third meditation by inquiring into the manner in which he has acquired his idea of God. (M 71; CSM II, 35). After ruling out that he has acquired this idea through the senses, and also ruling out that the idea of God is a fiction of his mind, given that it possesses a fixed nature, he concludes that “consequently the only alternative is that it is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me” (M 71; CSM II, 35). To this point, he has regarded the idea of God as an idea separate from all his other ideas, including his idea of himself as a thinking thing. What guides the meditative process is his attempt to grasp the relationship that

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exists between the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing and his idea of God: it is through an understanding of this relationship that he will come to understand that God is not only the cause of his idea of God, but also the cause of himself, as a thinking thing. What does meditating reveal? It reveals that the idea of God which he possesses is not an idea which is separate from the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing: the idea of the self and the idea of God are, in some important sense, the same idea. He regards the idea of God ‘to be like the mark of the work man imprinted on his work; and it is likewise not essential that the mark shall be something from the work itself’. In the Replies to the Fifth Set of Objections, he clarifies the sense in which the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing contains within itself the idea of God as his creator. When you ask, whence I get my proof that the idea of God is, as it were, the mark of the workman imprinted on his work, and what is the mode in which it is impressed, what is the form of that mark, it is very much as if I, coming across a picture which showed a technique that pointed to Apelles alone as the painter, were to say that that inimitable technique was, so to speak, a mark impressed by Apelles on all his pictures in order to distinguish them from others, but you replied with the questions: ‘what is the form of that mark?’ and ‘what is its mode of impression?’ Such an enquiry would seem to merit laughter rather that any reply (HR II, 221; CSM II, 256).

For Descartes, to have the idea of the self is to have the idea of God in that thought. The idea of God stands to the idea of the self as a thinking thing in a manner analogous to the relation between a painter’s technique and works of art which result from this technique. Accordingly, the idea of God is contained in the awareness of oneself as a thinking thing in a manner analogous to the way in which the observation of a painting reveals the content of the painting and the technique of the artist who created that painting. He insists that knowing the cause of the technique of a painting is also to know the cause of the painting: Apelles’ technique in a painting reveals Apelles as the artist, who created the painting. Similarly, he insists that, once he knows that the idea of God is ‘like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work’, he knows that God is also the cause of the self, as a thinking thing. Meditating on the idea of the self is the mental analogue to observing a work of art. Just as observation can reveal both the content of a painting and the artist’s technique involved in creating the painting, so meditation can reveal the content of the idea of the self, and God’s mark or technique in creating Descartes as a thinking thing. The technique of a painting is inseparable from the painting of which it is the technique;

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similarly, the idea of God, as ‘the mark of the workman imprinted on his work’, is inseparable from the idea of the self as a thinking thing. In short, the cause of the technique is identical to the cause or creator of the work of art: therefore, to establish the cause of the technique is also to establish the cause of the work of art, or in the case of the self, the cause of Descartes as a thinking thing.

How Descartes Arrives at the Knowledge of the Singularity of the Idea of the Self and the Idea of God If Descartes were fully convinced that the proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation have established both that God is the cause of his idea of God and the cause of himself as a thinking thing, then the third meditation would have ended, once the two proofs of God’s existence had been put forth. But, we need to recall two things. First, both proofs involve calculations in terms of objective and formal reality, and Descartes has cast doubt on the reliability of all calculations, pending proof that a veracious God exists as his creator. Hence, these proofs are subject to hyperbolic doubt. And, second, even if we factor out Descartes’ concern with the reliability of calculations until he can prove that a veracious God exists as his creator, the proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation cannot, through calculations focusing on objective and formal reality, prove that God is the cause of Descartes, insofar as he is a finite thinking thing. I argued earlier in this chapter, that there is something odd in attempting to argue that the cause of one of my ideas is also the cause of my existence, the one who has this idea; and I argued further that, if such an approach is to succeed, there would have to be a special relationship between this idea and the knower, such that if we know the cause of this idea, we will also know that the same cause is the cause of the existence of the knower. Now, Descartes holds that such a special relation does exist between the idea of God and the idea of the self, as a thinking thing; but that this special relation cannot be established through reason. Accordingly, the limitation of argumentation on the topic of God has now been put into focus, and, as a result, he understands that he must adopt a new approach, if he is to prove his divine origin. This new approach leads him, in the first instance, to meditate, or reflect, on the nature of his idea of himself and his idea of God. In the antepenultimate paragraph in the third meditation, he rules out that either of these ideas is empirically based, or that either is a fiction of his mind. He concludes that the idea of God is innate in him, “just as the idea of myself is innate in me” (M71; CSM II, 35).

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He now understands the need for grasping the nature of the singularity of the idea of God and the idea of the self, in order to know that God is the cause of his existence as a thinking thing. In attempting to understand how Descartes arrives at the knowledge of this connection, it will be helpful to begin with a passage in which he calls attention to the fact that finitude can only be understood in the light of the infinite: … I see that there is manifestly more reality in infinite substance than in finite, and therefore that in some way I have in me the notion of the infinite earlier than the finite-to wit, the notion of God before that of myself. For how would it be possible that I should know that I doubt and desire, that is to say, that something is lacking to me, and that I am not quite perfect, unless I had within me some idea of a Being more perfect than myself, in comparison with which I should recognize the deficiencies of my nature? (M 67; CSM II, 31)

This passage, which occurs in the course of the first proof of God’s existence in the third meditation, is of interest here, in that it enables him to understand the importance of the connection of the idea he has of the infinite to his awareness of himself as a finite being: he now understands that an awareness of the idea of the infinite is necessary in order for him to be aware of himself as a finite being. In other words, at this stage of his inquiry, he finds that if he affirms that he is a finite being, and at the same time denies that he has an awareness of the infinite, then he can no longer think of himself as a finite being (this is a further example of an analytic-type demonstration). By the third meditation, he finds that his awareness of himself as a finite being is inconceivable without an awareness of the infinite; accordingly, he holds that the two ideas are inseparable (in the manner akin to figure and extension, motion and duration). Within the context of the first proof for the existence of God, and especially at the point where he realizes that in some way his awareness of the infinite is required in order to understand his finite nature, his argument is epistemological in nature, and not ontological: he now realizes how his understanding of himself as a finite being is made possible through his idea of the infinite God. Descartes does not regard his argument here as insight into the causal relation between himself as a thinking thing and God-this must await the act of meditation / reflection, which follows the completion of the second proof of God’s existence, at the point where he realizes that the second proof, as was equally the case with the first proof, can, at most, establish that God is the cause of his idea of God, but that it cannot establish that God is the cause of himself, insofar as he is a thinking thing. In short, at this stage, his awareness of the infinite does not enable him to know that God is the cause of his existence as a finite thinking thing. Because he has not yet grasped

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how his awareness of God is contained within the idea he has of himself, he writes, at this point, as though the idea he has of God is an idea separate from the idea he has of himself as a thinking being. Once both proofs of God’s existence have been put forth, his mind has been unprejudiced to the point where he now understands that he must go beyond arguments, if he is to establish that God is the cause of his existence, insofar as he is a thinking thing: the relation between the idea of the self as a thinking thing and the infinite God as his creator cannot be established through an argument utilizing considerations of objective and formal reality. But this shortcoming in the second proof in the third meditation points him in the direction he must now pursue, namely, he must find a non-argumentative means of establishing that the infinite God is the cause of his idea of God, and that this infinite God is the cause of his existence as a thinking thing. And, he now realizes that it is through an act of meditation, and not through reasoning, that a fuller appreciation of the relation between the idea of the self and the idea of the God can be grasped: for he now recognizes that the idea of God is God’s ‘mark’ imprinted on his mind, which is apprehended through the same idea as that through which the self is known. Accordingly, at this point, he understands that not only could he not know himself as a finite being, unless the thought of the infinite was inseparably connected with the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing, but also that he could not exist as a finite being unless an infinitely perfect God exists as the cause of his existence. It is important to understand that grasping the causal relation between God and the self as a thinking thing does not require an additional argument – only the requisite act of meditation.9 The important epistemic point in this is that, once he becomes aware of the inseparability of the idea of God, as the mark of the workman imprinted on his work, and his idea of himself as a thinking thing, he 9

On this point, Descartes writes toward the end of the third meditation: For from the sole fact that God created me it is most probable that in some way He has placed His image and similitude upon me, and that I perceive this similitude (in which the idea of God is contained) by means of the same faculty by which I perceive myself – that is to say, when I reflect on myself, I not only know that I am something [imperfect], incomplete and dependent on another, which incessantly aspires after something which is better and greater than myself, but I also know that He on whom I depend possesses in Himself all the great things towards which I aspire [and the ideas of which I find within myself], and that not indefinitely or potentially alone, but really, actually and infinitely; and that thus He is God (M 71-72; CSM II, 35) It is when he reflects or meditates on himself as a thinking thing that he learns that God is his creator. Once he learns this, the proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation are no longer needed.

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concludes that he also knows that God is his creator, in the same manner that, once we discover that the technique of a painting is the technique employed by Apelles, we also know that Apelles has created this particular painting. The certainty of God’s existence stems from the fact that to know God only requires understanding oneself as a thinking thing. The consequence of this is obvious: once Descartes apprehends the self correctly, he already knows that God exists as his creator, and needs no further proof of this. But, why is this the case, that is, why does he regard the act of meditation regarding the self and God to be trustworthy?

Why Descartes Regards the Act of Meditation Regarding the Self and God to be Trustworthy When Descartes discovers the necessary connection between thought and existence in the second meditation, he finds that he can trust this connection, because both thought and existence are self-referential, that is, it is his thought and his existence to which he is attending, and not a copy, or representation, of his thought and of his existence: “What of thinking? I find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just when I think… (M 52-53; CSM II, 18) Therefore, there is no concern here with deception, namely, as to whether what he is thinking corresponds to what he is thinking about: there is a transparency in this case, given that the relata are self-referential. In telling us that the idea of God is contained in the idea he has of himself, and that this idea is like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work, Descartes is, once again, attempting to avoid the problem of correspondence. That is, if all that he finds in the idea of the self is selfevident, and if he finds that the idea of God is contained in the idea of the self in a non-copy manner, as the technique of a painting is found in the painting, then he would have us believe that he must accept that he was created by God. For Descartes, to have the idea of the self as a thinking thing is to have the idea of God in that thought. However, even if the awareness of God is achieved through meditating on the awareness he has of himself as a thinking thing, this does not, by itself, prove the truth of the relation between the self and God, and of the claim that God is his creator; for there remains the question-the same as that raised in regard to his awareness of himself as a thinking thing-whether what is thought accords with what is thought about. This problem does not arise in the case of the self. When he discovers the necessary connection between thought and existence in the

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second meditation, he finds that he can trust this connection, because it is his thought and his existence to which he is attending, and not a copy or representation of his thought and his existence. Therefore, there is no concern here as to whether what he is thinking corresponds to what he is thinking about. But this appears to be different from his awareness of God through the idea of the self as a thinking thing. To show that the awareness of the self and God through the idea of the self as a thinking thing is certain and indubitable, it would have to be shown that the awareness of God through the awareness of the self is like the awareness of the self: there must be no distinction between what he is thinking, and what he is thinking about. But how, in the case of God, can this be upheld? I will now show how Descartes deals with this issue. The basis of my explanation revolves around the passage, quoted above from the Replies to the Fifth Set of Objections, in which, through an illustrative analogy, he clarifies his position that the idea of God is ‘as it were, the mark of the workman imprinted on his work’10. In this passage, he urges that the idea of God stands to the idea of the self in a manner analogous to the relation between a painter's technique and works of art which result from this technique. Accordingly, the idea of God is contained in the awareness of oneself as a thinking thing in a manner analogous to the way in which the observation of a painting contains within itself the technique of the artist who created the painting. Just as observing the painting aids in apprehending the technique through which the painting has come to be, so by meditating on the self as a thinking thing, he comes to understand the only way in which he could have come to be. Therefore, when apprehending God within the awareness of the self, there is no basis for a distinction between what he is thinking, and what he is thinking about: the awareness of God’s technique apprehended through the idea of the self as a thinking thing is God’s technique in creating Descartes, and not a copy of God’s technique in creating Descartes, in the same way that, when apprehending the technique in a painting, there is no basis for a distinction between what is apprehended and what the apprehension is about. The 10

When you ask whence I get my proof that the idea of God is, as it were, the mark of a workman imprinted on his work, and what is the mode in which it is impressed, what is the form that mark, it is very much as if I, coming across a picture which showed a technique that pointed to Apelles alone as the painter, were to say that the inimitable technique was, so to speak, a mark impressed by Apelles on all his pictures in order to distinguish them from others, but you replied with the questions: ‘what is the form of that mark?’ and ‘what is its mode of impression?’ Such an enquiry would seem to merit laughter rather than any reply. (HR II, 221; CSM II, 256)

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technique that an artist employs in creating a painting is not a copy of the artist’s technique; rather, it is the artist’s technique in creating the painting. Similarly, the idea of God which Descartes discovers through meditating on the idea he has of himself is not a copy of God’s mark or technique; rather it is God’s mark or technique. Again, here, therefore, there is no basis for a distinction between what he apprehends about God in the idea of the self, and what this apprehension is about. It is in this way, according to Descartes, that indubitability pertains to the awareness of God in the awareness of the self. Once the idea of God is recognized as God’s ‘mark’ or a ‘stamp’, which is inseparable from the idea of the self, he claims to know that God exists, with the same certainty as he knows that the self exists, and he requires no further ‘proof’ of God's existence. Further, just as to know the cause of the technique of a painting is also to know the cause of the painting, so Descartes insists that, by knowing that God is the cause of his idea of God, he also knows the cause of himself as a thinking thing, the one who has the idea of God. To know the cause of the technique by which a given object is created is ipso facto to know the cause of the object created. Descartes’ insistence on meditation in seeking a knowledge of the cause of the self as a thinking thing leads him to understand that his idea of the self and his idea of God are the same idea, related as the technique of a painting is related to the painting of which it is the technique. No argument can reveal this: he now understands that the knowledge of God’s causal relation to the self as a thinking thing can only be grasped through meditation.11 It should not be thought that Descartes holds that all knowledge of God is obtained in this meditative / aesthetic manner. We learn this from two passages in which he establishes that God cannot be a deceiver, the first passage is to be found in the last sentence in the penultimate paragraph in the third meditation, and the second in the second paragraph in the fourth meditation. Descartes’ approach to gaining knowledge that God cannot be a deceiver proceeds in the following manner. To establish that God may be a deceiver requires being able to think of the idea of God and the idea of deception simultaneously. To establish that God must be a deceiver, that is, that the notion of deception is necessarily connected with the idea of God, requires finding that the effort of thinking God while denying that He is a deceiver results in the fact that God can no longer be thought. And, in order to maintain that God cannot be a deceiver, it must be the case that, given the idea he has of God and his idea of fraud and deception, there is a necessary repugnancy between these two ideas: “all contradictoriness or impossibility is constituted by our thought, which cannot join together ideas which 11

I will assess Descartes’ defense in the final chapter.

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disagree with each other”. (HR II, 46, CSM II, 108). An examination of his idea of God and fraud and deception reveals such a necessary repugnancy: …I recognize it to be impossible that He should ever deceive me; for in all fraud and deception some imperfection is to be found, and although it may appear that the power of deception is a mark of subtility or power, yet the desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or feebleness, and accordingly cannot be found in God. (M 73; CSM II, 37)

Similarly, at the end of the third meditation, he speaks of God as that being “who possesses all those supreme perfections of which our mind may indeed have some idea but without understanding them all, who is liable to no errors or defect [and who has none of all those marks which denote imperfection]” (M 72; CSM II, 35). He then points out: “From this it is manifest that He cannot be a deceiver, since the light of nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarily proceed from some defect.” (M 72; CSM II, 35). Accordingly, through the necessary repugnancy which Descartes discovers between the idea of God and the ideas of fraud and deception, he concludes that it cannot ever be the case that God is a deceiver. Descartes is here involved in thought experiments, once again employing the method of analysis, in which he actively seeks to determine the modality that exists between his idea of God and the idea of fraud and deception. In this case, he is involved in intuiting which ideas are necessarily connected, and which are necessarily repugnant. It follows from this that when, in the first three meditations, God is spoken of as a deceiver, what is before the mind cannot be the true idea of God, for if what was before the mind at that point were the true idea of God, then the repugnancy between this idea and fraud and deception would have been apprehended. From our discussion, we are able to conclude that Descartes’ causal knowledge in the third meditation-that God is the cause of his idea of God, and that God is the cause of his existence, as a thinking thing-is obtained through meditating on the idea of the self; but that his knowledge that God cannot be a deceiver is obtained through intuition, because this knowledge cannot be obtained by meditating on the idea of the self, but only by intuiting the relation, or better, repugnancy, between his idea of God and his idea of deception.

A Difficulty in the Third Meditation Resolved The interpretation put forth here regarding Descartes’ knowledge of God in the third meditation can assist with understanding something

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which he asserts in the bridging paragraph, which connects the first proof of God’s existence in the third meditation with the second proof in this meditation. In the bridging paragraph, he write: To speak the truth, I see nothing in all that I have just said which by the light of nature is not manifest to anyone who desires to think attentively on the subject; but when I slightly relax my attention, my mind, finding its vision somewhat obscured and so to speak blinded by the images of sensible objects, I do not easily recollect the reason why the idea that I possess of a being more perfect than I, must necessarily have been placed in me by a being which is really more perfect; and this is why I wish here to go on to inquire whether I, who have this idea, can exist if no such being exists.(M 68; CSM II, 32-33)

In this passage, he urges that, following his first proof that God is the cause of his idea of God, he finds that, once he becomes less attentive to the steps involved in the proof, and is, once again, influenced by his senses, he cannot easily recall why only God could have caused his idea of God. He then proposes that it is because of this difficulty, that he will go on to inquire whether he who has the idea of God can exist if there is no God. Now, the following criticism might here be proposed. If a lack of attention and reverting back to the senses hinder Descartes from recalling the reasoning in his first proof that God is the cause of his idea of God, then a lack of attention and reverting back to the senses, should these occur, will equally hinder him from recalling the reasoning in the second proof as well, namely, why God is the cause of the idea of God which Descartes possesses, and the cause of Descartes, the one who possesses the idea of God. Nevertheless, Descartes does not appear to be bothered by this, and simply carries on with his second proof. The account presented here regarding the manner in which Descartes seeks a knowledge of God in the third meditation can explain his lack of concern with this issue pertaining to his second proof. He tells us that the second proof of God’s existence is needed to counter the inattention and sensory prejudice, which have returned following his presentation of the first proof. But, once the second proof has been presented, he realizes that he must now undertake to meditate on how the idea of God is related to the idea of the self. Since his knowledge of God is ultimately based on meditation, the arguments put forth in the two proofs in the third meditation are no longer needed. These arguments guide him to the point where he realizes that the arguments must give way to meditation, and that, therefore, he need no longer focus his attention on the two arguments he has provided. Once Descartes understands the relationship of the idea of God to the idea

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of the self, the proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation are no longer needed for knowing God.

The Nature of the Analytic Proofs of God’s Existence in the Third Meditation I want now to address the method of analysis, which Descartes utilizes in the third meditation. Since the Cartesian analytic method is designed to remove sensory prejudice to the point of indifference, so that the primary notions of metaphysics can be apprehended clearly and distinctly, the method of analysis must have the role of rejecting claims (this is particularly evident in the first meditation, but also evident in subsequent meditations.). Further, analysis must also direct the mind to the appropriate primary notions, once the manifold prejudices have been removed. Second, since the foundation of certainty for Descartes is to be found in the certainty of the metaphysical first principles, it follows that, prior to apprehending these first principles, any argument which he employs as a means to assist in apprehending the primary notions, especially those which are deductive, will lack perfect certainty. For this reason, deductive arguments, which are presented in the context of his method of analysis prior to knowing that God is his creator, will fall short of demonstrative certainty, and this would include the proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation. The sceptical arguments employed by Descartes in the first meditation are also ones which fall under the rubric of the method of analysis, and two comments that he makes in the Replies to Objections, regarding arguments in the first meditation, should be borne in mind in reading subsequent meditations, as well, especially in regard to the proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation. In the first comment, which appears in the Replies to the Third Set of Objections, he mentions that the arguments employed in the first meditation “were provided by me only as possessing verisimilitude.” (HR II, 60; CSM II, 121) In other words, the arguments have the appearance of being sound, but are not sound: the arguments are rhetorical and didactic, with a view to persuading us of the matter which Descartes wants us to accept. And, in his second comment, in the Replies to the Fifth Set of Objections, he urges that what is false may be employed in directing the mind toward its primary notions: “(F)alsities are often assumed instead of truths for the purpose of throwing light on the truth: for example, Astronomers imagine the existence of the equator, the zodiac, and other circles in the heaven, while Geometricians attach new lines to given figures, and Philosophers frequently act in similar fashion. But the man who describes this as having recourse to an artifice, eagerness for verbal trickery,

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and seeking evasions, and declares that it is unworthy of philosophical candour and the love of truth, manifests that he at least has no desire to make use of philosophical candour or to employ any argument other than rhetorical humbug.” (HR II, 206; CSM II, 242) For Descartes, such usage is justified, provided that the one who employs such arguments knows the primary notions, and is using these arguments in the context of the method of analysis, in order to enable others to apprehend the primary notions, as well. The two proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation prepare the mind for the act of meditation, which is needed if the idea of the self is to reveal God as the cause of Descartes’ existence, but, as previously established, these proofs should not be regarded as sound. In light of the above, I would urge that the proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation should not be assessed in terms of validity and soundness: they are to be assessed solely in terms of whether or not they are able to turn the attention to the connection between the idea of the self and the idea of God. In both the first meditation and at the beginning of the third meditation, Descartes raises doubts about calculations, even those which are very simple, and yet, we find that calculations, through considerations of objective and formal reality, are involved in the proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation. We can now understand why he proceeds in this manner. Inasmuch as the proofs are not sound demonstrations, they will fall short of perfect certitude. Nevertheless, we learn from the fifth meditation, that of all claims to know which are made prior to the verification of the principle concerning clarity and distinctness in the fourth meditation, those of mathematics appear to possess the highest level of certainty, and, therefore, to be the most persuasive of all the approaches that can be attempted. And even although I had not demonstrated this, the nature of my mind is such that I could not prevent myself from holding them to be true so long as I conceive them clearly; and I recollect that even when I was still strongly attached to the objects of sense, I counted as the most certain those truths which I conceived clearly as regards figures, numbers, and the other matters which pertain to arithmetic and geometry, and, in general, to pure and abstract mathematics. (M 81; CSM II, 45)

Accordingly, in using the particular proofs which we find in the third meditation, Descartes regards himself as employing the most persuasive

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type of arguments at his disposal, which will assist him in gaining a knowledge of God in relation to the self through meditation.12

12

In order not to interrupt the exegetical flow of my study of the Meditations on First Philosophy, I have not included any critical comments at this point. My critical comments appear in the Epilogue.

CHAPTER 5 GOD, MATHEMATICS, AND CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS

Introduction Descartes’ Regulae teaches that, of all the sciences, only Arithmetic and Geometry are free from any taint of falsity or uncertainty. It is no small surprise, therefore, that, in the first and third meditations, he argues that mathematics can be regarded as dubitable. In this chapter, I propose to examine Descartes’ concern with mathematics in the Meditations, in an effort to determine how he establishes the truth of the principle regarding clarity and distinctness. In the previous chapter, I showed how Descartes deals with the hypothesis of a deceiving deity. I will conclude the current chapter by showing how Descartes deals with the hypothesis of the evil genius.

Descartes’ Concern with Mathematics The aim of the Meditations, as Descartes reveals in the opening paragraph of this work, is to establish a “firm and permanent structure in the sciences.” The starting point of this process requires that we “ought no less carefully to withhold [our] assent from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to [us] manifestly to be false….” (M 46; CSM II, 12). Mathematics is subjected to doubt in the first meditation (M 48; CSM II, 13-14.) In the synopsis to the first meditation, he emphasizes that it is an empiricist approach to knowing which this meditation is examining critically. Accordingly, we can say that what is being doubted is an empiricist account of mathematics1-the truth value of mathematical statements is tied 1

An excellent defense of the empiricist nature of mathematics in the first meditation is provided by Harry Frankfurt in his book Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).

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to the existence of physical objects, the existence of which can be doubted. The Regulae, on the other hand, is concerned with mathematics as a purely intellectual discipline. As such, nothing said in the first meditation is in conflict with the position taken in the Regulae that mathematics is indubitable and true. With the hyperbolic doubts raised in the first meditation, sensory prejudice will have been removed, his mind will be rendered indifferent to solutions regarding metaphysical topics, and all sensory concerns will have been set aside. We find that mathematics is, once again, subjected to doubt in the third meditation. The doubt itself is raised subsequent to Descartes’ realization that clarity and distinctness are the features which assure him of the truth of the Cogito: In order to try to extend my knowledge further, I shall now look around more carefully and see whether I cannot still discover in myself some other things which I have not hitherto perceived. I am certain that I am a thing which thinks; but do I not then likewise know what is requisite to render me certain of a truth? Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly could be false… (M 59; CSM II, 14)

The concern he is expressing is not one in regard to the first truth which he discovers, the Cogito ergo Sum, but rather with whether there can be other matters which are conceived with a like clarity and distinctness, and yet are false. In other words, he hesitates to generalize from the features, clarity and distinctness, which made him certain of the truth of the Cogito to the presence of these elements in other matters as an equally reliable assurance of their truth. It is in the light of this that he raises his concern regarding mathematics: But when I took anything very simple and easy in the sphere of arithmetic and geometry into consideration, e.g., that two and three together made five, and other things of the sort, were not these present to my mind so clearly as to enable me to affirm that they were true? Certainly if I judged that since such matters could be doubted, this would not have been so for any other reason than that it came into my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a nature that I may have been deceived even concerning things which seemed to me most manifest. But every time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought, I am constrained to confess that it is easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence. (M 59-60; CSM II, 15)

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We must get clear on the reason for doubt in the case of mathematics. The passage quoted lends itself to two interpretations: a) either God has so constituted him that matters which are not clear and distinct are mistakenly interpreted as being clear and distinct, and, therefore, he is misled into believing that what is false is true; or b) he is not mistaken about the clear and distinct, but these features are not entirely reliable as signs of what is true, inasmuch as God has so constituted him that certain matters which are false will, or must, present themselves with great clarity and distinctness. That these are the only plausible alternatives is seen from the fact that Descartes’ entire concern here is with the connection between what is regarded as a clear and distinct conception and the truth value of that conception. Accordingly, error or deception can only enter at two pointseither in the assessment of a conception as clear and distinct, or in the alleged connection between this conception as clear and distinct and an assigned truth value. If a) is the correct interpretation, then he will have to find a means for distinguishing those conceptions which are clear and distinct from those which are not. A number of passages prove that this is not Descartes’ problem. First, we should recall that the mind has been without prejudice since the end of the first meditation; hence, there is no longer a problem as to whether what is being conceived is clear and distinct: with all prejudice removed, what appears clear and distinct is clear and distinct. He makes this point to Gassendi in the Replies to the Fifth set of Objections. Gassendi had written to Descartes that “there may very well be no better Rule obtainable” (HR II, 151; CSM II, 193) than Descartes’ rule concerning clarity and distinctness, but he doubts the reliability of the Rule, inasmuch as different people may disagree about what is clear and distinct, even to the point of facing death for their convictions (HR II, 152; CSM II, 193). And he concludes by asking Descartes “to propound a method which will direct us and show us when we are in error and when not, so often as we think that we clearly and distinctly perceive anything.” (HR II, 152; CSM II, 194-195) Descartes replies: I do not question what you say next, viz., that it is not so much a question of taking pains to establish the truth of the rule, as of finding a method for deciding whether we err or not when we think that we perceive something very clearly. But I contend that this has been carefully attended to in its proper place where I first laid aside all prejudices [Meditation I, my addition], and afterwards enumerated all the chief ideas, distinguishing the clear from the obscure and confused. (HR II, 214; CSM II, 250)

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Therefore, once all prejudice has been removed, the issue is no longer whether what is being conceived is clear and distinct. Descartes makes the same point in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections: No difficulty is caused by the objection that we have often found that others have been deceived in matters in which they believe they have knowledge as plain as daylight. For we have never noticed that this has occurred, nor could anyone find it to occur with these persons who have sought to draw the clearness of their vision from the intellect alone, but only with those who have made either the senses or some erroneous preconception the source from which they derived that evidence. (HR II, 42; CSM II, 104; italics in text omitted)

I want now to present texts which will establish that b) is the correct interpretation of the passage in question. To show that b) is what Descartes intends, the following conditions would have to be satisfied. Those conceptions which are clear and distinct, but suspected of being false, must present themselves with a clarity and distinctness resembling those conceptions which are known to be true. Hence the mind's receptivity to both sets of conceptions will be the same. Nevertheless, in those cases where the conceptions are clear and distinct but suspected of being false, the hypothesis of the deceiving deity generates doubts based on the constitution of our minds, which this hypothesis cannot do with respect to those conceptions which are clear and distinct, which are indubitable, and which are known to be true. The first passage relevant to our analysis is that immediately following the one under discussion: And, on the other hand, always when I direct my attention to things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly I am so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break into words such as these: Let who will deceive me, He can never cause me to be nothing while I think that I am, or someday cause it to be true to say that I have never been, it being true now to say that I am, or that two and three make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I see a manifest contradiction. (M 60; CSM II, 25)

What Descartes has done here is to group conceptions known to be clear and distinct and true (“He can never cause me to be nothing while I think that I am, or someday cause it to be true to say that I have never been, it being true now to say that I am”) with those of mathematics (e.g. 2 + 3 = 5) which he maintains can be doubted. In directing his attention to these, he finds that all are equally received by the mind: seeking to deny such matters results in a ‘contradiction’. What he means by a ‘contradiction’ in this context will be examined later in this chapter.

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In concluding his concern with mathematics, he urges that only through a knowledge of a veracious God can he remove these doubts, which have been generated by the hypothesis of a deceiving deity: And certainly, since I have no reason to believe that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I have not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all, the reason for doubt which depends on this option alone is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical. But in order to be able altogether to remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything. (M 60; CSM II, 25)

It might seem from what is said here that the hypothesis of the deceiving deity is regarded as a challenge to the truth of all matters conceived clearly and distinctly, including the Cogito. That this is not the case can be seen from the Replies to the Second Set of Objections. At one point in this reply, Descartes sets out when persuasion is tantamount to perfect certitude: To begin with, directly we think that we rightly perceive something, we spontaneously persuade ourselves that it is true. Further, if this conviction is so strong that we have no reason to doubt concerning that of the truth of which we have persuaded ourselves, there is nothing more to enquire about; we have here all the certainty that can reasonably be desired. What is it to us, though perchance someone feigns that that, of the truth of which we are so firmly persuaded, appears false to God or to an Angel, and hence is, absolutely speaking, false? What heed do we pay to that absolute falsity, when we by no means believe that it exists or even suspect its existence? We have assumed a conviction so strong that nothing can remove it, and this persuasion is clearly the same as perfect certitude. (HR II, 41; CSM II, 103)

He then goes on to ask whether such perfect certitude does exist, and after ruling it out in the case of sensory conceptions, he concludes that “if, then, any certitude does exist, it remains that it must be found only in the clear conceptions of the intellect.” (HR II, 42; CSM II, 104) But in locating this perfect certitude, he is careful to point out that it obtains only with respect to some clear perceptions of the intellect: “But of these [i.e., the clear perceptions of the intellect] there are some so evident and at the same time so simple, that in their case we never doubt about believing them true; e.g. that I, while I think, exist; that what is once done cannot be undone, and other similar truths, about which clearly we possess this certainty.” (HR II, 42; CSM II, 104) The Cogito, therefore, possesses perfect certitude, but

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certain other matters apprehended clearly and distinctly do not share this status, inasmuch as he can at least suspect that they possess an ‘absolute falsity’, that is, even though he is unable to discover any falsity in them, he can suppose that God knows that they are false. Mathematical propositions are the clear and distinct perceptions with which Descartes is here chiefly concerned. If we allow that a deceiving deity created us, then we need not accept that what presents itself to us as clear and distinct is, without exception, true: in some cases, it may be that it is precisely what is false which is seen by the mind to be clear and distinct, and yet the mind lacks the capacity to detect this falsity. Descartes’ point, for reasons to be examined shortly, is that no similar scenario is possible with respect to the Cogito, or the axiom ‘what is once done cannot be undone, and other similar truths’. We can now see that b) is the correct interpretation of the passage under consideration in the third meditation. Therefore, even if he holds to a purely intellectual view of mathematics, he can, through the hypothesis of a deceiving deity, render this area of inquiry dubitable. I now propose to examine why Descartes holds that some clear and distinct perceptions, for example, Cogito ergo Sum, escape all hyperbolic doubt, but that other clear and distinct perceptions, especially in mathematics, can be doubted. I will begin our investigation with a consideration as to why Descartes holds that the denial of the clear and distinct is self-contradictory.

The Denial of the Clear and Distinct is Self-Contradictory At the beginning of the third meditation, Descartes tells us that clarity and distinctness are the features of the Cogito which assure him of its truth, although, as we have learned, with the aid of the hypothesis of a deceiving deity, he hesitates to generalize the connection between clarity and distinctness and truth. In the previous chapter, I explained what Descartes means by clarity and distinctness. I now turn to an additional feature of the clear and distinct, mentioned early in the third meditation, that the denial of such conceptions is ‘contradictory.’ And, on the other hand, always when I direct my attention to things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly, I am so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out into words such as these: Let who will deceive me, He can never cause me to be nothing while I think that I am, or someday cause it to be true to say that I have never been, it being true now to say that I am, or that two and three make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I see a manifest contradiction. (M 60; CSM II, 25)

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In the case of certain conceptions, particularly mathematical ones, this contradiction is not adequate to ensure the truth of what is being conceived, in light of his concern with divine deception: But when I took anything very simple and easy in the sphere of arithmetic and geometry into consideration, e.g. that two and three together made five, and other things of the sort, were not these present to my mind so clearly as to enable me to affirm that they were true? Certainly if I judged that since such matters could be doubted, this would not have been so for any other reason than that it came into my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a nature that I may have been deceived even concerning things which seemed to me most manifest. But every time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought, I am constrained to confess that it is easy to him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence. (M 59-60; CSM II, 25)

I will now explain what Descartes means when he asserts that the denial of a clear and distinct conception is a ‘contradiction,’ while also explaining why this feature of contradictoriness is not regarded as an indubitable sign of truth in the case of some clear and distinct conceptions, particularly in mathematics, but it is held to be an indubitable sign of truth in the case of the Cogito ergo Sum. Does Descartes mean that the denial of conceptions which are clear and distinct is logically self-contradictory, in the sense that the denial is an assertion of the form (P • ~P)? From certain things which he says, it can be shown that this is not his meaning. In providing the evidence for this claim, I will focus on the Cogito ergo Sum which, as we know, is clear and distinct. I begin with the following passage from the Replies to the Sixth Set of Objections: It is indeed true that no one can be sure that he knows or that he exists, unless he knows what thought is and what existence is…It is altogether enough for one to know it by means of that internal cognition which always precedes reflective knowledge, and which, when the object is thought and existence, is innate in all men…When, therefore, anyone perceives that he thinks and that it thence follows that he exists, although he chance never previously to have asked what thought is, nor what existence, he cannot nevertheless fail to have a knowledge of each sufficient to give him assurance on this score.(HR II, 241; CSM II, 285, italics in text omitted).

In this passage, (see also HR 1, 222; CSM 1, 196) he maintains that ‘thought’ and ‘existence’ are among those notions ‘of the simplest possible

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kind’ which must be known, if the Cogito ergo Sum is to be understood and regarded as certain. Therefore, for Descartes, ‘thought’ and ‘existence’ are not identical concepts in the way in which, for example, ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried male’ are conceptually identical. The conceptual identity of the latter two concepts accounts for the contradiction involved in the denial of ‘All bachelors are unmarried males.’ But ‘thought’ and ‘existence’ are not conceptually identical. Therefore, although the denial of the Cogito ergo Sum may be false, even necessarily false, the denial is not self-contradictory. We conclude from this that, either Descartes did not understand that his position on ‘thought’ and ‘existence’ should have kept him from claiming that a contradiction results if the Cogito is denied; or, by a ‘contradiction’ in this context, he means something different from what is meant when we say that the denial of a sentence such as ‘All bachelors are unmarried males’ is a contradiction. I will now establish that it is the latter disjunct which Descartes supports.

‘Contradiction’ in the Denial of the Cogito ergo Sum In the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, immediately following his claim that some clear and distinct perceptions of the intellect, including the Cogito ergo Sum, possess a perfect certitude, he writes that their perfect certitude is found in the fact that “in their case we can never doubt about believing them true.” (HR II, 42; CSM II, 104) What follows are his reasons for this claim: For we cannot doubt them unless we think of them; but we cannot think of them without at the same time believing them to be true, the position taken up. Hence we can never doubt them without at the same time believing them to be true; i.e. we can never doubt them. (HR II, 42; CSM II, 104)

If this argument is set out in more rigorous form, which includes providing the premise which Descartes has omitted, what he means when he says that the denial of the Cogito ergo Sum is a contradiction will become evident. The passage quoted actually contains two arguments (Hypothetical Syllogisms; the second argument also being an Enthymeme, for which I provide the missing minor premise): I.

If the Cogito ergo Sum is doubted, then it is thought. If the Cogito ergo Sum is thought, then it is believed to be true. Therefore, if the Cogito ergo Sum is doubted, then it is believed to be true.

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If the Cogito ergo Sum is doubted, then it is believed to be true. (The conclusion of the first argument is the major premise of the second argument.) If the Cogito ergo Sum is believed to be true, then it cannot be doubted. (This is the missing minor premise, which I have added.) Therefore, if the Cogito ergo Sum is doubted, then it cannot be doubted.

According to these arguments, the contradiction is not in the proposition, Cogito ergo Sum, or more precisely, in its denial. It is the effort or activity of denial of the Cogito ergo Sum which is self-contradictory. An effort or activity would be self-contradictory, if seeking to engage in it, resulted in engaging in the opposite effort or activity. And Descartes maintains that this is precisely the situation with the Cogito ergo Sum: if we begin by trying to doubt it, we find that we cannot doubt it. We can schematize exactly what Descartes means by contrasting these statements: (1) The [denial] of the Cogito ergo Sum is self - contradictory. (2) The [denial of the Cogito ergo Sum] is self-contradictory. In each sentence, the accent falls on the bracketed portion. It is clear from Descartes’ argument, that (1) is what he intends to convey, since this withholds the claim of self-contradiction from the denial of the proposition Cogito ergo Sum, namely, I think but do not exist, and locates the contradiction in the act of denying the Cogito ergo Sum. It is (2) which Descartes rejects, in that it ascribes the contradiction to the proposition through which the Cogito ergo Sum is denied, namely, ‘I think but do not exist’, which cannot be self-contradictory, because ‘thought’ and ‘existence’ are not synonyms. Descartes’ position regarding the contradiction involved in the effort of denying the Cogito ergo Sum can be developed further by examining his views on ‘necessary connections’, as presented in the Regulae. In Rule XII, he cites as examples of simple natures which are necessarily connected ‘figure and extension’, ‘motion and duration’, and ‘7 and equals (4 + 3)’. A connection between simples is necessary “when one is so implied in the concept of another in a confused sort of way that we cannot conceive either distinctly, if our thought assigns to them separateness from each other.” (HR 1, 42; CSM 1, 45) In the Principles of Philosophy, the effort to assign separateness to what is necessarily connected is called a ‘distinction of reason’ (Principle LXII). There can, of course, be difficulty in deciding whether items can be conceived distinctly when they are regarded as separate, and to assist with this, Descartes offers the following test (which

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we have already encountered in an earlier chapter when dealing with the his proof of his existence): affirm in thought the first conception (for example, figure, motion, 7) and at the same time deny the second (for example, extension, duration, and equals the sum of 4 and 3); in those cases where the denial of the second carries with it the inconceivability of the first, the first is necessarily connected to the second, and where the denial of the second does not carry with it the inconceivability of the first, the first is not necessarily connected to the second: “Thus figure is conjoined with extension, motion with duration or time, and so on, because it is impossible to conceive of a figure that has no extension, nor of a motion that has no duration.” (HR 1, 42; CSM 1, 46) Descartes’ notion of a necessary connection between simple natures, therefore, does not require that one thought be conceptually identical to another as is the case with ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried male’, but rather that one thought be a sine qua non for thinking the other. Now, when two ideas are inseparable in the manner specified, it follows that when the first is thought, the second is also before the mind, although we may not be aware of this. The more prejudiced the mind, the less likely that it will be able to apprehend what is necessarily connected with what: “…[M]any things are often necessarily united with one another, though most people, not noticing what their true relation is, reckons them among those that are contingently connected. As examples, I give the following propositions: ‘I exist, therefore God exists’; also ‘I know, therefore I have a mind distinct from my body’, etc.” (HR 1, 43; CSM 1, 46) He insists, therefore, that to know what simple natures are necessarily connected does not require that we bring ideas together in the intellect. For, once the mind has been freed of prejudice, we need only be attentive to the simple natures before the mind, in order to determine which are necessarily connected. In light of this account of necessity, we can understand why necessary connections between simple natures are such that any effort to think the denial of the connection results in a contradiction of the effort. To attempt to doubt or deny the connection requires affirming in thought the first idea while at the same time denying the second one. However, since the simple natures are inseparable, we always find this to be an impossible task: once we deny the second idea, we find that we cannot think the first. Therefore, if we begin by trying to doubt these connections, we find that we cannot doubt them-either the second is thought while the first is thought, or the first cannot be thought. To think the first, therefore, requires thinking the second, at the same time. (In the case of a ‘distinction of reason’ there is no effort to doubt the connection between the simple natures, but only to direct the attention

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to the first idea and not to the second one. For example, we distinguish motion from duration by a distinction of reason if we attend to the idea of motion and not to that of duration - at the cost of ‘distinctness’ or completeness; but this is altogether different from the other case where we attempt to doubt the necessary connection between motion and duration by affirming the former and denying the latter.)

Why the Hypothesis of the Deceiving Deity is Able to Challenge the Truth of Mathematical Statements, but Cannot Challenge the Truth of the Cogito ergo Sum Why is the hypothesis of the deceiving deity regarded as a source of doubt in the case of mathematical statements, and yet is not regarded as a source of doubt in the case of the Cogito ergo Sum? By the end of the fourth paragraph of the third meditation, Descartes realizes that the clear and distinct conception of the Cogito ergo Sum makes it impossible for him to affirm that he thinks while denying that he exists, and that the same impossibility pertains to mathematical statements, which are also clear and distinct (e.g. it is equally impossible for him to think a set of 5, and deny that the set of five equals a set of 3 and a set of 2). And yet, the former escapes all doubt, and the latter does not. To explain this, we must consider the fundamental difference which obtains between the Cogito ergo Sum on the one hand, and mathematical and other clear and distinct conceptions on the other. When I think that 5 = (2 + 3) or that motion is necessarily connected with duration, I find that I cannot think otherwise. Similarly, when I think that thought and existence are necessarily connected, I find that I cannot think otherwise. Now, to doubt, through the hypothesis of the deceiving deity, that 5 = (2 + 3), or that motion is necessarily connected with duration, requires considering that the deceiving deity has so constituted my mind, that although I cannot think these connections other than the way I am thinking them, what I am thinking is false. But how could this be? Under what circumstances would it be false that 5 = (2 + 3), and that motion is necessarily connected with duration? It would be false that motion is necessarily connected with duration, provided that something could move, even though time did not pass; similarly, it would be false that 5 = (2 + 3), provided that there could be a set of two and a set of three which do not equal a set of five. In short, Descartes’ concern with clear and distinct conceptions is that his way of thinking may not represent the way these items are actually related-however their relation has been brought about-and yet he cannot help believing that they are always related as he finds he must think them. That this is precisely his concern in

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the third meditation can be learned from the fact that after he has established that what is perceived clearly and distinctly is true, he maintains that it is this problem which need no longer concern him: “But now…because I can draw the idea of something from my thought, it follows that all which I know clearly and distinctly as pertaining to this object does really belong to it…” (M 81-82; CSM II, 45) In the case of the Cogito ergo Sum, I intuit that thought and existence are necessarily connected, and, according to Descartes, I need not have, or better, I cannot have, any doubts regarding this connection of the sort which arise in the case of mathematics. For with the Cogito ergo Sum, the connection thought is the connection thought about: it is the actual relation between the items involved which is being intuited, when we think the connection between thought and existence: “What of thinking? I find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just when I think; for it might possibly be the case if I ceased entirely to think, that I should likewise cease altogether to exist.” (M 52-53; CSM II, 18) Therefore, his reason for distinguishing the Cogito ergo Sum from other matters which are clear and distinct, and are found to have relata which are necessarily connected, is that only in the case of the Cogito ergo Sum are we apprehending the items about which we are thinking, and, therefore, only in this case is the clarity and distinctness of the necessary connection between thought and existence an indubitable guarantor of the truth of this connection. For doubting here requires believing that the connection between thought and existence is not as I intuit it, even while I am intuiting it. And Descartes insists that such doubt is not possible: when the mind is freed of prejudice, what presents itself as clear and distinct is clear and distinct. The additional feature with respect to the Cogito ergo Sum is that the necessary connection intuited is the actual connection with which thought is concerned. Hence, not only can I not doubt what I am intuiting, I also cannot doubt the truth of what I am intuiting. With mathematical statements on the other hand, to know that the connection intuited is the actual connection, and therefore, to know that the intuited connection is true, requires knowing that the way in which thought apprehends the connection between the items involved is the way that the items must always be connected. And to know this, more is involved than the knowledge that the denial of mathematical statements which are clear and distinct is a contradiction, in the manner explicated earlier. Although Descartes makes the point at the end of the fourth paragraph of the third meditation that, without a knowledge of a veracious God as his creator, he can never be certain of anything, we have seen that

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his knowledge of himself as a thinking thing can be known prior to his knowledge of God as his creator. Mathematics also involves clear and distinct ideas, and it is in regard to these clear and distinct ideas that Descartes claims, in the Synopsis to the Meditations, that the truth of clear and distinct ideas was established not in the third, but in the fourth meditation. …[I]t is requisite that we may be assured that all things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are true in the very way in which we think them; and this could not be proved previously to the Fourth Meditation. (M 42; CSM II, 9) In the Fourth Meditation it is shown that all these things which we very clearly and distinctly perceive are true… (M 43; CSM II, 11)

In the previous chapter, I provided a detailed analysis of the manner in which Descartes establishes the existence of God as his creator, and that God is not a deceiver. I now turn to the fourth meditation in order to show how Descartes establishes that all clear and distinct ideas are true.

Establishing That What He Perceives Clearly and Distinctly Must be True That God exists and is not a deceiver is held by Descartes in the third meditation to be that which must be known, if what is perceived clearly and distinctly can be regarded as true. It would seem, therefore, that the truth of the principle concerning clarity and distinctness has been established at the end of the third meditation, in light of the fact that it is in the third meditation that Descartes establishes that God created Descartes and that God cannot be a deceiver. Nevertheless, we are told in the Synopsis to the Meditations that it is in the fourth meditation that this principle has been established. In our effort to understand the manner in which Descartes proceeds in the fourth meditation, it is important to point out that, in addition to a knowledge of the self in the Cogito ergo Sum, and a knowledge of God, Descartes considers a knowledge of the truth of the principle concerning clarity and distinctness to be a first principle in metaphysics. Therefore, the principle concerning clarity and distinctness must in the end be shown to be intuitively certain; in accordance with the method of analysis, the arguments presented are designed to unprejudice the mind, and to bring the attention to the point where the relevant connections between primary notions can be intuited. We are informed in the Synopsis to the Meditations that the principle concerning clarity and distinctness has been established “at the

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same time [as] it is explained in what the nature of error or falsity consists.” (M 43; CSM II, 11) Now, in seeking to account for error in the fourth meditation, he isolates the will and the understanding as the faculties from which error can arise: error, we are told, stems from assenting to matters which are not perceived clearly and distinctly: When then come my errors? They come from the sole fact that since the will is much under in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it to things which I do not understand: and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error and sin, and chooses evil for good, or the false for the true…. But if I abstain from giving my judgment on anything when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly and am not deceived. (M 77; CSM II, 40-41)

In the third meditation, he questions the truth of clear and distinct ideas (except for the Cogito), because of a concern with a deceiving deity. His concern is that, perhaps, he has been created by God in such a way that he cannot but think certain ideas as necessarily connected, and yet the items thought are not connected in the way he finds he must think them. Once he knows that God exists and is not a deceiver, he knows that his faculty of judgment, if used correctly, cannot lead him to error and deception. Since the doubt regarding clear and distinct ideas was generated by the concern with a deceiving deity, once he knows that God exists and is not a deceiver, he presumably knows that the correct use of the faculty of judgment is to assent only to what is clear and distinct. But if this is all that he requires to know in order to establish the truth of the principle regarding clarity and distinctness, then the truth of this principle has been established by the end of the third meditation. That he devotes an additional meditation to this principle indicates that establishing the truth of the principle regarding clarity and distinctness requires knowing more than that he was created by an all-powerful veracious God. The passage we examined above in which error is held to consist in assenting to what is not perceived clearly and distinctly, and truth is said to consist in assenting only to what is perceived clearly and distinctly, does follow from his analysis in the third meditation. That is, if his only doubt regarding a knowledge of truth and the source of error is whether God can be a deceiver, then once he knows that God cannot deceive, he knows both that truth is found in the clear and distinct, and that error is found in the obscure and confused. However, since knowing that an all-powerful veracious deity exists who created him is not sufficient to establish the truth of the principle of clarity and distinctness, it follows that the analysis we have examined thus far in the fourth meditation, although it serves to clarify

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the faculties which are involved in truth and error, cannot be considered a ‘proof’ of the source of truth and error. His analysis shows how truth and error arise, provided the principle of clarity and distinctness is a reliable source of truth; however, the reliability of this principle has yet to be established. But what more does Descartes insist that he must know before the principle in question can be accepted as true? Since he already knows that he was created by God, insofar as he is a thinking thing, it cannot be his causal origin which must be established. The intellect is God's product; but the ideas to which he finds he must assent-those which are clear and distinctcould have been given to him by the evil genius. This, I submit, is the lingering concern which carries the investigation of the truth of the principle of clarity and distinctness beyond the third and into the fourth meditation: He has still to know the cause of his clear and distinct ideas. The causal origin of the clear and distinct and its bearing on the truth of these ideas is investigated by Descartes in the last paragraph of the fourth meditation, in the portion of the passage I have italicized below: …[I]t seems to me that I have not gained little by this day's Meditation, since I have discovered the source of falsity and error. And certainly there can be no other source than that which I have explained; for as often as I restrain my will within the limits of my knowledge that it forms no judgment except on matters which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can never be deceived; for every clear and distinct conception is without doubt something, and hence cannot derive its origin from what is nought, but must of necessity have God as its author-God, I say, who being supremely perfect, cannot be the cause of any error; and consequently we must conclude that such a conception is true. (M 79-80; CSM II, 43)

In the fifth meditation, Descartes writes that “I have already fully demonstrated that all I know clearly is true” (M 81; CSM II, 45), and in the portion of the passage I have italicized above, we find his analytic demonstration of the truth of the principle of clarity and distinctness, which I will now detail. From the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, we know that an analytic-type demonstration is designed to bring the attention to the point where all prejudices have been removed, so that the necessary connection between the relevant innate ideas can be intuited: Descartes insists that its special value lies in the fact that, if the reader follows the analytic demonstration and attends sufficiently to it, it will appear as though the reader has discovered the particular matter on her / his own. Our treatment

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of the analytic demonstration employed in the fourth meditation must accord with these points. The analytic demonstration is designed to guide the reader’s attention to the relevant ideas, so that the appropriate impossible connections and necessary connections can be intuited. The repugnancies and necessities which the demonstration points out can only be appreciated by entertaining the very ideas of which the demonstration speaks, and apprehending intuitively the impossibilities and necessities. The demonstration is not a substitute for the intuition, nor for that matter can it be accepted without the intuition. As a result, the connections which the analytic demonstration is designed to point out do not follow as conclusions from the premises of the demonstration. To hold otherwise is to confuse ‘analytic demonstration’ with ‘synthetic demonstration’-the method of proof in metaphysics with the method of proof in geometry. We know from Descartes’ analytic demonstration of the nondeceiving nature of God that in all fraud and deception there must be some imperfection. As a result, for a clear and distinct perception to be deceptive, insofar as its causal origin is concerned, it would have to derive from some imperfect source. Therefore, when he uses the word ‘nought’ in his analytic demonstration of the truth of the clear and distinct (“for every clear and distinct conception is without doubt something, and hence cannot derive its origin from what is nought, but must of necessity have God as its author”) we can take this to mean a cause which falls short of supreme perfection. Descartes’ analytic demonstration of the truth of the principle of clarity and distinctness is analogous to his analytic demonstration of his existence in the second meditation. The demonstration in the second meditation begins with some matter which he cannot doubt (that he was persuaded of something; that he has been deceived about something), and his demonstration in the fourth meditation begins with what he also cannot doubt-‘that every clear and distinct conception is something [real]’. In the case of his existence, he then attempts to affirm in thought the matter which he cannot doubt (that he was persuaded about something; that he was deceived about something) and his non-existence; in the fourth meditation, we find him attempting to affirm that every clear and distinct conception is something real, and that it derives from some imperfect cause. In both the second and fourth meditations, he finds a repugnancy between the ideas involved-being persuaded and non-existence, being deceived and nonexistence, being real and coming from an imperfect source. In each case, he then concludes (intuits) that his initial thought is necessarily connected with the denial of the second. Accordingly, in the case of the fourth meditation, he intuits that the clear and distinct is necessarily derived from God whom

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Descartes knows cannot be a deceiver. This, then, is Descartes’ analytic demonstration of the truth of the principle of clarity and distinctness-a principle whose truth is known intuitively.

The Evil Genius Hypothesis Having learned how Descartes establishes the truth of the principle concerning clarity and distinctness, we are now in a position to return to the evil genius hypothesis, with a view to determining the manner in which he deals with this hypothesis. We have seen from our study of the first meditation that Descartes is intent on showing that two different hypotheses-that of a deceiving deity, and that of an evil genius-stand as obstacles to gaining knowledge. Accordingly, each must be dealt with, for until this is done, the reliability of reason remains suspect; that is, only in this manner can Descartes show that reason is able to set up canons for its own trustworthiness. In the previous chapter, we learned how Descartes establishes that God is his creator, qua res cogitans, and how he establishes that God cannot be a deceiver. The lingering concern in the present chapter is to determine how he deals with the evil genius hypothesis. In the course of our discussion, I will show that this hypothesis is amenable to two different interpretations. Therefore, we will have to deal with both interpretations. A number of commentators have held that the indubitability of the Cogito ergo Sum destroys the hypothesis of the evil genius, since the demon was imagined to possess full powers of deception. For example, L.J. Beck writes: “The force of the hypothesis of the Malignant Spirit breaks on the rock of the Cogito. The recognition of one truth as indubitably true, and selfevidently so, gives a rational conviction which is sufficient to destroy the hypothesis once and for all. The Cogito destroys the very basis of the postulate of an all-powerful deceiving being”2 Similarly, Marthinus Versfeld states: “His [i.e. the evil genius’] essence was to possess full powers of deception. Without that he is nothing. The evil genius, then, disappears with the affirmation of the Cogito”3. The proof of Descartes’ existence as a thinking thing is established in the second meditation, when he begins his quest for at least one thing which can withstand his hyperbolic doubt; for no matter how much he doubts his former beliefs, he cannot at the same time doubt his existence. Now, since Descartes’ existence is not called into question in the first 2 3

L. J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes, Oxford, 1965, p. 143. M. Versfeld, An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes, London, 1940, p. 49

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meditation, the extent of the deceptive powers there attributed to the evil genius is in no way affected by the Cogito, and consequently, the recognition of the Cogito does not, by itself, disprove this hypothesis. It is also abundantly clear that in the first meditation Descartes already possessed the knowledge of one truth, namely, that by suspending his judgement he cannot be imposed upon by the evil genius. Therefore, if any truth indubitably known were sufficient to shatter the evil genius hypothesis, then Descartes already possessed a knowledge of it before he came to the Cogito. Besides, Descartes’ usual mode of speaking about the evil genius does not support the view being examined: he typically speaks of the evil genius as employing his whole energies in deceiving him (M 49; CSM II, 15), and not as necessarily possessing full powers of deception. As such, it is a nonsequitur to conclude that the recognition of the Cogito disproves the hypothesis, for the evil genius may not be able to deceive him in regard to this matter, and yet be able to do so in regard to others. The recognition of the Cogito shows a limit to the power of the evil genius, but it does not disprove the existence of the evil genius. Putting the matter generally, we can say that what Descartes wants to know is not only whether the evil genius possesses full powers of deception, but also whether the evil genius possess any powers of deception, and it simply will not do to try to answer this latter question with a reply to the former. Therefore, to disprove this hypothesis, more is needed than the certainty of his existence. Two passages from the text support this interpretation: But there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning who employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing as long as I think I am something. (M 51; CSM II, 17; italics not in the text) But what am I, now that I suppose that there is a certain genius which is extremely powerful, and if I may say so, malicious, who employs all his powers in deceiving me. (M 52; CSM II, 18)

The italicized portion of the first passage is significant because, being spoken at the point at which Descartes first recognizes the indubitability of his existence, it confirms the continued viability of the evil genius hypothesis. The second passage is important, in that it appears after the recognition of the Cogito, when Descartes is concerned with making the self an object of thought, in order to determine what he is, now that he knows that he exists. Yet, even here, he is still entertaining the possibility of being deceived by the evil genius.

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From the fact that the existence of a veracious God has been established, it does not follow that there is no possibility of deception. Descartes realizes this early in the fourth meditation: And no doubt respecting this matter would remain, if it were not that the consequence would seem to follow that I can thus never be deceived; for if I hold that all I possess from God, and if He has not placed in me the capacity for error, it seems as though I could never fall into error… [but] experience shows me that I am nevertheless subject to an infinitude or errors. (M 73; CSM II, 38)

Accordingly, it is at this point in his inquiry that he will deal with the evil genius hypothesis-the second hypothesis which he utilizes as an obstacle to knowing; and, in fact, the hypothesis that has sustained his suspense of judgment-and he must do so in such a way that this hypothesis will never again threaten his knowing anything. Since the fourth meditation is largely concerned with discovering the nature and source of error, it is through an examination of this topic that Descartes’ treatment of the evil genius is revealed. On the nature of deception and error, Descartes writes: Whence then come my errors? They come from the sole fact that since the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand; and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error and sin, and chooses the evil for the good, or the false for the true. (M 77; CSM II, 40-41)

Concerning the source of error, he asserts: But if I abstain from giving my judgment on anything when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly and am not deceived. But if I determine to deny or to affirm, I no longer make use as I should of my free will, and if I affirm what is not true, it is evident that I deceive myself. (M 77-78; CSM II, 41)

In addition, this knowledge of the source of error can be immunized from hyperbolic doubt: He [i.e., God] has at least left within my power the other means, which is firmly to adhere to the resolution never to give judgment on matters whose truth is not clearly known to me; for although I notice a certain weakness in my nature in that I cannot continually concentrate my mind on one single thought, I can yet, by attentive and frequently repeated meditation, impress it so forcibly on my memory that I shall never fail to recollect it

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whenever I have need of it, and thus acquire the habit of never going astray. (M 79; CSM II, 43)

I mentioned earlier that the evil genius hypothesis is amenable to two different interpretations. The usual interpretation of the evil genius is the one put forth by scholars such as Beck and Versfeld, namely, that Descartes has postulated the evil genius as existing independently of himself. The text, however, can also support an alternative interpretation: if the synopsis of the first meditation (M 41; CSM II, 9) is read in conjunction with the concluding paragraphs of the first meditation, it becomes clear that the evil genius embodies those very functions which Descartes attributes to hyperbolic doubt, namely, the ability to unprejudice the mind, and to set the mind on the path of acquiring knowledge. Accordingly, the evil genius can also be regarded as personifying his hyperbolic doubts-a device equally effective as that of postulating the existence of a malignant being, in that both help to emphasize the present uncertainty of his opinions. Since the evil genius hypothesis is amenable to these two interpretations, it is important to discover how Descartes deals with each. At this stage of the argument, however, the indubitability of the Cogito is no more able to destroy the personification view than it is able to destroy the postulational view. The ‘personification view’ of the evil genius will be destroyed when the continued viability of hyperbolic doubt is removed, and this requires more than the Cogito, as it is apprehended in the second meditation. If Descartes intended to postulate a being existing independently of himself when he introduces the evil genius, then in dealing with such a being, he has but two alternatives: he must show that such a being cannot exist; or if he cannot do this, he must establish that, even if such a being does exist, the evil genius is rendered irrelevant to Descartes’ argument. Now, the most that has been accomplished through gaining knowledge of the source of error is to find a way of immunizing himself from the evil genius, if such a being exists. For he now knows that, so long as he does not extend his will beyond his understanding, he cannot be imposed upon by such a being. Nowhere in the Meditations, however, does Descartes establish that if God exists, the evil genius cannot exist. In other words, Descartes has not established that the universe cannot be dualistic, which is what is required if the non-existence of the evil genius is to be established. On the other hand, if the evil genius is regarded as the personification of Descartes’ hyperbolic doubts, then this hypothesis will be destroyed only when the purpose for the doubt itself is removed. As we have seen, hyperbolic doubt is introduced in the first meditation to prevent Descartes from assenting to matters which are dubitable, while he is ignorant of how to distinguish the true from the false. Since knowledge of how to make this

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distinction between the true and the false is obtained in the fourth meditation, hyperbolic doubt need no longer be employed. Thus, at the beginning of the fifth meditation he writes: Now (after first noting what must be done or avoided, in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth) my principal task is to endeavor to emerge from the state of doubt into which I have these last days fallen. (M 80; CSM II, 44)

Having now shown that God exists and cannot be a deceiver, and having also shown that the evil genius hypothesis will never again be troublesome, the reliability of reason has been established, for Descartes can now accept the general rule that whatever is perceived very clearly and very distinctly is true: In the fourth meditation it is shown that all these things which we very clearly and distinctly perceive are true… (M 43; CSM II, 11)

Thus, when he asserts in the third meditation that his acceptance of this rule depends only on proving that God is not a deceiver, this must be considered a stage in his argument, and not his final pronouncement on the subject.

CHAPTER 6 DESCARTES’ KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN THE FIFTH MEDITATION AND THE DIVINE GUARANTEE

Introduction The preceding chapters have been concerned to explain Descartes’ use of the method of analysis in the first four meditations. The chief function of his method of analysis is to unprejudice the mind to the point of indifference, so that he can direct his attention, through meditation or intuition, to the relevant innate idea (in the case of meditation), or innate ideas (in the case of intuition), through which the metaphysical first principle can be known. In the fifth meditation, Descartes is, once again, concerned with God. Now, although it might be thought that the proofs dealing with God in the third meditation have removed all prejudice affecting our understanding of the idea of God, this is not, in fact, his position. At one point in the fifth meditation, he asserts that “being accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence, I easily persuade myself that the existence can be separated from the essence of God, and that we can conceive God as not actually existing” (M 82; CSM II, 46). He then goes on to explain: “But, nevertheless, when I think of it with more attention, I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its having three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a triangle, or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley... (M 82; CSM II, 46). And, after he has offered his analytic demonstration of God’s existence in the fifth meditation, he explains: “And as regards God, if my mind were not pre-occupied with prejudices, and if my thought did not find itself on all hands diverted by the continual pressure of sensible things, there would be nothing which I could know more immediately and more easily than Him. For is there anything more manifest than that there is a God, that is to say, a Supreme Being, to whose essence alone existence pertains?” (M 84; CSM II, 47).

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We learn, therefore, that the proof of God’s existence in the fifth meditation is in line with analytic proofs of first principles in previous meditations, through which the mind is freed of sensory prejudice, and is led to the point where he is able to grasp the first principle in question. It should also be recalled that when he comments on the Meditations in the Preface to the Principles of Philosophy, he makes it clear that this work contains the first principles of human knowledge “amongst which is the explanation of the principal attributes of God” (HR I, 211; CSM I, 186). Since no first principle can be the conclusion of a deductive argument, it follows that, ultimately, Descartes’ knowledge of God in the Meditations must be intuitive, or meditative, rather than deductive.

The Proof of God’s Existence in the Fifth Meditation Despite all that has been said above, most who comment on the argument for God’s existence in the fifth meditation regard it as a deductive argument. For example, E.M. Curley1 interprets Descartes as arguing in the following manner: (1) I have ideas of things which, whether or not they exist, and whether or not I think of them, have true and immutable natures or essences. (2) Whatever property I perceive clearly and distinctly as belonging to the true and immutable nature of something, I have an idea that really does belong to that thing. (3) I have an idea of God as a supremely perfect being. (4) I perceive clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the true and immutable nature of a supremely perfect being. (5) A supremely perfect being really does exist. (6) Therefore, God exists.

The manner in which Descartes introduces his proof of God’s existence in the fifth meditation appears to lend itself to the interpretation that knowledge of God's existence is deductive. For the argument for God’s existence begins by noting the success which is possible in arithmetic and geometry, by attending to certain innate ideas, and demonstrating (in the ‘synthetic’ sense of demonstration) certain features contained in these ideas: … I discover in myself an infinitude of ideas of certain things which cannot be esteemed as pure negations, although they may possibly have no existence outside of my thought, and which are not framed by me…but 1

E. M. Curley,1 Descartes Against the Skeptics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978; pages 141-142.

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which possess natures which are true and immutable. For example, when I imagine a triangle, although there may nowhere in the world be such a figure outside my thought, or ever have been, there is nevertheless in this figure a certain determinate nature, form, essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented, and which in no wise depends on my mind, as appears from the fact that diverse properties of that triangle can be demonstrated, viz. that its three angles are equal to two right angles, that the greatest side is subtended by the greatest angle, and the like … (M 81; CSM II, 44-45).

Nevertheless, a close examination of his procedure in the fifth meditation reveals that he holds that knowledge of God is meditative, rather than demonstrative. Descartes emphasizes that, once he knows that a veracious God exists as his creator, the acceptability or truth of the conclusion of a demonstration is assured, provided that the steps in the demonstration are seen clearly and distinctly: …I can…demonstrate various properties pertaining…to the triangle, and these must certainly be all true since I conceive them clearly. Hence they are something and not pure negation; for it is perfectly clear that all that is true is something, and I have already fully demonstrated [in the fourth meditation] that all that I know clearly is true. (M 81; CSM II, 45)

Once he knows that a veracious God exists as his creator, it is the clarity and distinctness of the conception which assures him of a certain truth in arithmetic and geometry. A synthetic demonstration can assist him in seeing what is necessarily connected to what, but it is the clarity and distinctness of the conception (conclusion) which assures him of its truth. When relating this discussion which focuses on arithmetic and geometry to the idea of God, he emphasizes the importance of clarity and distinctness, for he now knows, from what he learned in the fourth meditation, that the clear and distinct must be true: But now, if just because I can draw the idea of something from my thought, it follows that all which I know clearly and distinctly as pertaining to this object does really belong to it, may I not derive from this an argument demonstrating the existence of God? (D 81-82, CSM II, 45)

It is true that this passage refers to a ‘demonstration’ for the existence of God. However, to interpret this as referring to a deductive or synthetic-type argument, as opposed to an analytic-type demonstration, would be to beg the question at this point. Since Descartes recognizes two types of demonstrations-those which are analytic, and those which are synthetic- we

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can only decide on the type of demonstration involved, once his argument has been analyzed and understood.

Descartes’ Analytic Proof of God’s Necessary Existence Descartes’ ‘demonstration’ of God’s existence in the fifth meditation is contained in the following paragraph: It is certain that I no less find the idea of God, that is to say, the idea of a supremely perfect Being, in me, than that of any figure or number whatever it is; and I do not know any less clearly and distinctly that an [actual and] eternal existence pertains to this nature than I know that all that which I am able to demonstrate of some figure or number truly pertains to the nature of this figure or number, and therefore, although all that I concluded in the preceding Meditations were found to be false, the existence of God would pass with me as at least as certain as I have ever held the truths of mathematics (which concern only numbers and figures) to be. (D 82; CSM II, 45)

It is important to note that, in this passage, where his ‘demonstration’ of God’s existence is provided, he gives no indication that a deductive or synthetic-type argument is involved: he is saying that the clarity and distinctness present when he apprehends eternal existence in regard to the nature of God is at least as great as the clarity and distinctness contained in the truths he is able to demonstrate in arithmetic or geometry. He is attempting to focus our attention, so that we will understand that, if clarity and distinctness are the mind’s signs of truth in regard to demonstrations in arithmetic and geometry, then the same sign of truth applies to the idea of God and eternal existence. We cannot accept claims of mathematics, because we see mathematical ideas and relations clearly and distinctly, and not accept the knowledge of God's eternal existence, given that this knowledge possesses at least as much clarity and distinctness as that possessed by the mathematical claims. Although this passage purports to provide a ‘demonstration’ that God necessarily exists, the nature of this demonstration has yet to be explained. The central point in the demonstration involves seeing clearly and distinctly that eternal existence pertains to the nature of God. How does Descartes establish the clarity and distinctness of this conception? It might be suggested that establishing that eternal existence pertains to the nature of God follows the same analytic-type procedure that we learned he employs in the second meditation, in establishing the necessary connection between being persuaded of something and existence, and being deceived about something and existence. In an analytic demonstration, two relata are

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involved: Descartes affirms the first in thought and denies the second. If the denial of the second relatum involves the inconceivability of the first, then the relata are inseparable and are necessarily connected. I will now show that Descartes’ ‘demonstration’ of the necessity of God’s existence does not take the same form as the demonstration of his existence in the second meditation. We have already learned in the fifth meditation that, by attending to the idea of God, Descartes apprehends clearly and distinctly that an actual and eternal existence pertains to God’s nature. In clarifying his ‘demonstration’ of this connection, he writes: This indeed is not at first manifest, since it would seem to present some appearance of being a sophism. For being accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence, I easily persuade myself that the existence can be separated from the essence of God, and that we can thus conceive of God as not actually existing. But, nevertheless, when I think of it with more attention, I clearly see that existence can be no more separated from the essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a [rectilinear] triangle, or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley, and so there is not any less repugnance to our conceiving a God (that is, a Being supremely perfect) to whom existence is lacking (that is to say, to whom a certain perfection is lacking), than to conceive of a mountain which has no valley. (M 82; CSM II, 45-46)

While we know that, in an analytic-type demonstration of the sort that we saw in the second meditation, two relata are involved, the passage quoted above reveals that the thought involved here of God’s nature and God’s necessary existence does not involve two relata: all that is involved is the thought of the idea of God. It belongs to God’s essence that God exists necessarily: necessary existence is not a predicate pertaining to God’s nature; rather, necessary existence is contained within the essence of God. Accordingly, the relation of God’s necessary existence to God’s essence is analogous to what Descartes discovered in the third meditation concerning the awareness of the self as a thinking thing and the awareness of God, namely, that only one idea is involved. Therefore, in the fifth meditation, it is through meditating on the idea of God (he says ‘when I think of it with more attention…’) that he comes to understand that necessary existence cannot be separated from the essence of God, that the idea of the nature of God contains within itself the awareness of God’s necessary existence. Necessary existence is an essential perfection of God, and not a predicate, similar to the manner in which the awareness of a valley is related to the awareness or idea of a mountain.

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The attempt to distinguish the idea of God from God’s necessary existence is carried out through a ‘distinction of reason’. Distinctions of Reason are discussed by Descartes in Principle LXII: Finally the distinction of reason is between substance and some one of its attributes without which it is not possible that we should have a distinct knowledge of it, or between two such attributes of the same substance. (HR 1, 245; CSM 1, 214)

In the case of God’s necessary existence, the distinction of reason is between substance (the essence of God) and one of God’s essential attributes (necessary existence). In Principle LXII, he explains that “this distinction is made manifest from the fact that we cannot have a clear and distinct idea of such a substance if we exclude from it such an attribute. (HR 1, 245; CSM 1, 214). In the case of distinctions of reason, there is no actual separation of one item from another. Rather, through a distinction of reason, he is able to focus on the substance–the idea of God-with the exception of the essential feature, necessary existence, that he attempts to exclude from it. By doing so, he finds that he cannot have a clear and distinct idea of God. The discovery of God’s necessary existence in the fifth meditation is largely a continuation of the contemplative/ meditative procedure that he began in the last three paragraphs of the third meditation, and which was discussed earlier in this book.

Why Descartes’ Proof of God’s Necessary Existence Cannot be a Synthetic-Type Proof Despite what has been presented here, it might be argued that Descartes is offering a synthetic-type demonstration of God's existence, which reads something like the following: Premise 1: All which I know clearly and distinctly as pertaining to an object does really belong to it. Premise 2: I know clearly and distinctly that eternal existence pertains to the nature of God. Conclusion: Therefore, God exists. I will now show that this cannot be what Descartes intends. First, when Descartes discusses synthetic-type mathematical demonstrations, he is explicit that no proposition linking the clear and distinct to truth is included as a premise. The demonstration is put forth, that is, each step must be seen clearly and distinctly, and the conclusion must be

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seen clearly and distinctly. The mind’s signs of truth-clarity and distinctness-are conceptual, and not propositional. Thus, when he speaks of the atheist mathematician in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections (HR II, 39; CSM II, 101), his point is not that the atheist mathematician is unable to include a premise in the demonstrations-that whatever is perceived clearly and distinctly must be true-which the theist can include, thereby giving the latter a confidence which the former cannot have. His claim here is that, without the knowledge that God exists and is not a deceiver, the atheist mathematician cannot be certain that s/he is not being deceived, even if the premises and conclusions of the proofs are apprehended clearly and distinctly. Similarly, in the case of metaphysics, Descartes does not intend for the statement ‘whatever is perceived clearly and distinctly must be true’ to serve as a premise in his proofs. His goal is to obtain a guarantee of the connection between the clear and distinct and truth-a guarantee provided by God. Accordingly, if there is no reason to include a premise regarding clarity and distinctness and truth in mathematical proofs, there appears to be no reason, as well, to include such a premise in metaphysical proofs. To help confirm this consideration, I call attention to the synthetictype demonstration that God necessarily exists, which Descartes provides toward the end of his Replies to the Second Set of Objections: the argument consists of two premises ‘To say that something is contained in the nature or concept of anything is the same to say that it is true of that thing’ (Definition IX); ‘But necessary existence is contained in the concept of God’ (Axiom X) and a conclusion ‘Hence it is true to affirm of God that necessary existence exists in Him, or that God Himself exists’. ‘Whatever is perceived clearly and distinctly must be true’ is nowhere to be found in Descartes’ demonstration. These concepts are discussed in the Seventh Postulate (HR II, 55; CSM II, 116). In the second place, we know that the Meditations is seeking the first principles of human knowledge. In the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, he discusses the need for the method of analysis in the Meditations, so that the mind can be freed of prejudice, and the first principles of knowledge can be apprehended. Descartes is adamant that at no point in the Meditations does he use synthesis or the deductive method of the geometer: … I have used in my Meditations only analysis, which is the best and truest method of teaching. On the other hand, synthesis, doubtless the method you here ask me to use, though it very suitably finds a place after analysis in the domain of geometry, nevertheless cannot so conveniently be applied to these metaphysical matters we are discussing. (M 102; CSM II, 112)

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The first principles discovered in the Meditations are self-evident, and are known either through intuition or meditation. It is, therefore, important to note that when Descartes, in the Fifth Postulate of Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God And The Distinction Between Soul and Body, Drawn Up In Geometrical Fashion, discusses the proof of God’s existence in the fifth meditation, he emphasizes that it is self-evident that God exists necessarily; that God’s necessary existence is known through ‘contemplation’ and ‘reflection’; and ‘without any train of reasoning’: Fifthly, I require my readers to dwell long and much in contemplation of the supremely perfect Being. Among other things they must reflect that while possible existence indeed attaches to the ideas of all other natures, in the case of the idea of God that existence is not possible but wholly necessary. For from this alone and without any train of reasoning they will learn that God exists, and it will not be less evident to them than the fact that the number two is even and number three odd, and similar truths. (HR II, 55; CSM II, 115)

There are a number of passages in Descartes’ Replies to his readers where he does speak of ‘whatever is perceived clearly and distinctly must be true’ as a major premise of a deductive argument. For example, in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, he writes: My major premise was as follows-that which we clearly understand to belong to the nature of anything can truly be affirmed of that thing. Thus, if to be an animal belongs to the nature of man it can be asserted that man is an animal: if to have its three angles equal to two right angles belongs to the nature of the triangle, it can be asserted that the triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles: if existence belongs to the nature of God, it can be affirmed that God exists, etc. But my minor premise was yet existence does belong to the nature of God. Whence it is evident that the conclusion must be drawn as I drew it: hence it can be truly affirmed of God that He exists.... (HR II, 45; CSM II, 106-107)

It is important to note (confining ourselves for a moment to the geometric illustration) that the proof or demonstration that the three angles of a triangle equal to two right angles is not contained in this passage. We would have to read Euclid, and not Descartes, if we want to study the relevant synthetic geometric demonstration. All that Descartes has provided, in argument form, in the passage quoted from Replies to the Second Set of Objections, is the reason why the Euclidean demonstration can be accepted with total confidence. Similarly, when, in the passage under consideration, Descartes speaks of a major premise and a minor premise, he is not providing a geometric-type demonstration that God exists, any more than he is in this

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passage providing a geometric proof about the relation between the three angles of a triangle and two right angles. To learn about triangles, we have to read Euclid: to learn about God’s nature and necessary existence, we must be guided by the Meditations-in this case the fifth meditation. And, once we have studied the Meditations, and we have grasped, through meditation, the inseparability of God’s essence and God’s existence, we will know the necessity of God’s existence. No further proof of the sort suggested by Curley earlier in this chapter is required for this knowledge.2 Subsequent to his meditating on the idea of God, which reveals that necessary existence cannot be separated from the essence of God, he raises a possible objection to his analysis: But although I cannot really conceive of a God without existence any more than a mountain without a valley, still from the fact that I conceive of a mountain with a valley, it does not follow that there is such a mountain in the world; similarly, although I conceive of God as possessing existence, it would seem that it does not follow that there is a God which exists; for my thought does not impose any necessity upon things, and just as I may imagine a winged horse, although no horse with wings exists, so I could perhaps attribute existence to God, although no God existed (M 82; CSM II, 46).

He responds that a sophism is concealed in this objection: …[F]rom the fact that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that there is any mountain or any valley in existence, but only that the mountain and the valley, whether they exist or do not exist, cannot in any way be separated one from the other. While from the fact that I cannot conceive God without existence, it follows that existence is inseparable from Him, and hence that He really exists; not that my thought can bring this to pass, or impose any necessity on things, but, on the contrary, because the necessity which lies in the thing itself, i.e. the necessity of the existence of God determines me to think in this way. For it is not within my power to think of God without existence (that is of a supremely perfect Being devoid of a supreme perfection) though it is in my power to imagine a horse either with wings or without wings… [W]hatever proof or argument I avail myself of, we must always return to the point that it is only those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly that have the power of persuading me entirely (M 82-84; CSM II, 46-47)

2

E. M. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 141-42.

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In this passage, he explains that he has succeeded in establishing, through his clear and distinct idea of God, that God necessarily exists: he finds that necessary existence (‘a supreme perfection’) is inseparable from God (‘a supremely perfect Being), and that he has already established, in the fourth meditation, that whatever he perceives clearly and distinctly must be true. This explains why the proof of God’s existence in the fifth meditation could not have been offered in an earlier meditation: Descartes had not yet established that ‘whatever he perceives clearly and distinctly must be true’.

The Divine Guarantee Explained in the Fifth Meditation The fifth meditation deals with two matters-the analytic proof of God’s necessary existence, and the divine guarantee. Having completed the former, I turn to the discussion of the divine guarantee in the fifth meditation. I cited passages earlier which show that it is a mistake to hold that Descartes believes that he has shown that ‘whatever is perceived clearly and distinctly must be true’ in the third meditation, that is, once he has established that God is his creator and that God is not a deceiver. At the end of the fourth paragraph of the third meditation, he does say that, in order to remove his concerns regarding the clear and distinct, he “must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything.” The knowledge that God exists and is not a deceiver, which he apprehends in the third meditation, can reveal that he was created by God and, therefore, that he must be constituted in such a way that he is able to arrive at knowledge of the truth. Nevertheless, the third meditation provides no assurance that the clear and distinct ideas to which he must give his assent were created by God. In the previous chapter, we learned that Descartes maintains that he has established that God created his clear and distinct ideas in the fourth meditation. This explains why, on two occasions in the Synopsis Of The Following Meditations, he states that it is in the fourth meditation, and not in the third, as is usually presumed, that he has established that whatever is perceived clearly and distinctly must be true.3 Without the knowledge that God, who cannot be a deceiver, created all clear and distinct ideas, he must consider the possibility that these ideas were 3

“In addition to this it is requisite that we may be assured that all the which we conceive clearly and distinctly are true in the very way in which we think them; and this could not be proved previously to the Fourth Meditation” (M 42; CSM II, 9). “In the fourth Meditation it is shown that all these things which we very clearly and distinctly perceive are true …” (M 43; CSMII, 11).

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given to him by the evil genius, or by some other finitely powerful cause intent on deceiving him. However, given that God is his creator as well as the creator of all clear and distinct ideas, he concludes that when he assents only to those ideas which he perceives clearly and distinctly, he cannot be mistaken. Since synthetic-type demonstrations consist of premises, each of which must be perceived clearly and distinctly, and a conclusion which the premises assist us in seeing clearly and distinctly, it follows that his knowledge at the end of the fourth meditation extends to the premises and conclusions of a demonstration while he is attending to them, and perceives them clearly and distinctly. The early paragraphs in the fifth meditation represent his initial attempts in this work at acquiring such intuitive and demonstrative knowledge in mathematics. Toward the end of the fifth meditation, he raises a concern, particularly in regard to demonstrative knowledge. When he is attending to the premises and conclusion involved in a demonstration, he has total assurance that, if each step is seen clearly and distinctly, then the conclusion must be true. However, he now finds that he often recalls the conclusion of the argument, and remembers that he once did apprehend the premises supporting this conclusion clearly and distinctly. At this time, however, he cannot call these premises to mind: Thus, for example, when I consider the nature of a [rectilinear] triangle, I who have some little knowledge of the principles of geometry recognize quite clearly that the three angles are equal to two right angles, and it is not possible for me not to believe this so long as I apply my mind to its demonstration; but so soon as I abstain from attending to the proof, although I still recollect having clearly comprehended it, it may easily occur that I come to doubt its truth, if I am ignorant of there being a God. (M 85: CSM II, 48)

The divine guarantee in this case is not in regard to memory: Descartes is not claiming that those who know that God exists and is not a deceiver can have greater confidence in their memories of past demonstrations than those who lack this knowledge of God. In the passage immediately following the one quoted above, he continues: For I can persuade myself of having been so constituted by nature that I can easily deceive myself even in those matters which I believe myself to apprehend with the greatest evidence and certainty . . .. But after I have recognized that there is a God-because at the same time I have also recognized that all things depend upon Him, and that He is not a deceiver, and from that have inferred that what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true-although I no longer pay attention to the reasons for

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While he attends to a demonstration, each step of which is perceived clearly and distinctly, he finds that he is compelled to give his assent, and this compulsion is regarded as entirely reliable, provided that he has a knowledge of a veracious God as his creator. On the other hand, when he attends to the conclusion of such a demonstration, without the advantage of having the premises clearly and distinctly before his mind, the opportunity for doubt presents itself anew: for now, he can at least raise the question, which he could not, when attending to the demonstration in its entirety, as to whether he should have full confidence in demonstrative proofs. And his answer is that he can, and should, have such confidence, regardless of whether he is currently attending to each step of the proof: because God is his creator and the creator of all clear and distinct ideas, no reason can be brought forth which could ever place such demonstrations in doubt. And this same knowledge extends likewise to all other things which I recollect having formerly demonstrated, such as the truths of geometry and the like; for what can be alleged against them to cause me to place them in doubt? Will it be said that my nature is such as to cause me to be frequently deceived? But I already know that I cannot be deceived in the judgement whose grounds I know clearly. Will it be said that I formerly held many things to be true and certain which I have recognized to be false? But I had not had any clear and distinct knowledge of these things, and not as yet knowing the rule whereby I assure myself of the truth, I had been impelled to give my assent from reasons which I have since recognized to be less than strong than I had at the time imagined them to be. What further objection can then be raised? That possibly I am dreaming…or that all the thoughts which I now have are no more true than the phantasies of my dreams? But even though I slept the case would be the same, for all that is clearly present to my mind is absolutely true. (M 85-86; CSM II, 48-49)

In short, Descartes maintains that the very same evidence which enables him to have complete confidence in demonstrations which contain only what is now being perceived clearly and distinctly also enables him to have complete confidence in demonstrations which are not now being perceived clearly and distinctly, provided that he recalls that they were once so perceived. He no longer has any reason to doubt the intellect, when it assents only to what is perceived clearly and distinctly, and he no longer has any reason to doubt the clear and distinct to which the intellect gives its assent.

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Accordingly, he no longer has any reason for doubting any demonstration which contains only those matters which are perceived clearly and distinctly. Descartes is sometimes regarded as holding that the divine guarantee does not extend to what is now being perceived clearly and distinctly, but only to the memory of clear and distinct perceptions, in particular, the premises of demonstrations which are no longer before the mind. Two passages are usually quoted to make this case: Thirdly, when I said that we could know nothing with certainty unless we were first aware that God existed, I announced in express terms that I referred only to the science apprehending such conclusions as can recur in memory without attending further to the proofs which led me to make them. (Taken from Replies to the Second Set of Objections, HR II, 38; CSM II, 100) For first, we are sure that God exists because we have attended to the proofs that established this fact; but afterwards it is enough for us to remember that we have perceived something clearly, in order to be sure that it is true; but this would not suffice, unless we knew that God existed and that He did not deceive us. (Taken from Replies to the Fourth Set of Objections, HR II, 115; CSM II, 171)

What Descartes says in these two passages is not consistent with what he says in the third meditation. Early in the third meditation, he writes: I am certain that I am a thing which thinks; but do I not then likewise know what is requisite to render me certain of a truth? Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which I state… (M 59; CSM II, 24)

He goes on in the third meditation to point out that mathematical claims are also perceived clearly and distinctly, and yet he can doubt their truth, because God may be deceiving him. And, finally, regarding the truth or falsity of the clear and distinct, he insists that in order to remove his doubts regarding divine deception, he “must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths, I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything” (M 59; CSM II, 25). So, what are we to make of all this? First, from our study in earlier chapters, we know that Descartes’ knowledge of his existence as a thinking thing does not require knowledge of God and the divine guarantee, because in regard to the Cogito ergo Sum, the problem of correspondence does not arise: what he is thinking is identical to what he is thinking about,

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and, therefore, there is no possibility of error here. Further, once he grasps, through meditation, the manner in which the idea of God is contained in the idea of the self as the mark of the workman imprinted on his work, he holds that he requires no further proof of God’s existence as his creator. Therefore, Descartes makes two claims-one about the existence of the self as a thinking thing, and the other about a veracious God as his creator-which do not require the divine guarantee. Second, we have seen that when Descartes first introduces the need for knowing that a veracious God exists as his creator early in the third meditation, he does not confine his concern to mathematical proofs, the premises of which are either before the mind, or have been forgotten. In fact, the examples that he introduces in the fourth paragraph of the third meditation, “two and three together made five, and other things of the sort”, are instances which are known through intuition, and not through mathematical proofs or deduction. Accordingly, it is clear that Descartes is as concerned with divine deception regarding mathematical claims that are intuited, as he is with divine deception regarding mathematical demonstrations. And, finally, when he establishes in the fifth meditation that the divine guarantee extends to deductive mathematical proofs, where he recalls that the premises were seen clearly and distinctly, this should be regarded as an extension of the need for the divine guarantee, rather than the sole application of the divine guarantee. To sum up: we have learned that there are instances when Descartes’ account of the clear and distinct and certainty appears to lack consistency. The first occurs in the third meditation when he proclaims that “without a knowledge of these two truths [namely, that God exists as Descartes’ creator, and God is not a deceiver] I do not see how I can ever be certain of anything”. We have seen that there are, in fact, two truths, Descartes’ existence as a thinking thing, and the existence of a nondeceiving God as Descartes’ creator, which do not require any guarantee, beyond the clarity and distinctness of the conceptions involved. And the second instance of inconsistency is in his account of the extent of the need for the divine guarantee, which is involved when intuiting mathematical equations; when deducing conclusions from premises which are before the mind; and when deducing conclusions from premises, in cases where the premises supporting the conclusion are no longer before the mind, but which he recalls seeing clearly and distinctly. I suggest that to get a comprehensive understanding of Descartes’ views on the divine guarantee in the context of his theory of clear and distinct ideas and certainty, it is best to regard his thoughts in the meditations as developing, rather than as inconsistent. In this way, we will

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be able to obtain a unified view of the role of the divine guarantee in the context of clear and distinct ideas. That is to say, what Descartes knows about the relevance of clear and distinct ideas and certainty, when he learns that his essential being is existing as a thinking thing, cannot, at that point, also enable him to know how the clear and distinct relates to knowledge of God, and to mathematical intuitions and deductions. Throughout the Meditations, Descartes’ understanding of the role of God in regard to his existence, and in regard to his knowledge through his clear and distinct ideas, is developing, as he obtains a better understanding of himself, as a thinking thing. The comprehensive view of the divine guarantee, and the clear and distinct, can only be obtained at the end of the Meditations.

The Significance of the Fifth Meditation Commentators generally are baffled by the inclusion of the material on God in the fifth meditation: they regard the third meditation as offering all that Descartes needed to present on this topic. My study in this chapter reveals that the fifth meditation does make a significant contribution to his knowledge of God in two respects. First, while the discussion of God in the third meditation is concerned with God in relation to Descartes’ existence as a thinking thing and the truth of clear and distinct ideas, the fifth meditation is concerned with understanding, through meditation, the relation of God’s essence to God’s necessary existence. In fact, the reflections in the fifth meditation should be regarded as a continuation of the meditation on his idea of God, which he began in the last three paragraphs of the third meditation. We have seen that the knowledge of God’s eternal and necessary existence is achieved through meditating on the idea of God, and not through intuition or argumentation. Second, the fifth meditation connects the divine guarantee regarding what is immediately intuited or demonstrated, to mathematical demonstrations in which the premises, once seen clearly and distinctly, are no longer before the mind, but he recalls having seen the premises clearly and distinctly. By the end of the fifth meditation, the divine guarantee is shown to extend to all of his clear and distinct ideas, with the exception of his knowledge of his existence as a thinking thing, and his knowledge of God as his creator (each of which, we learned earlier, can be known without the divine guarantee). Therefore, the fifth meditation makes a significant contribution to Descartes’ understanding of the divine nature and the divine guarantee, beyond what he established in the third and fourth meditations.

EPILOGUE

There are two topics that I have not addressed in this book thus far: (1) the charge made by Arnauld and others that circular reasoning is involved in Descartes’ attempt to establish the existence of God in the third meditation; and (2) providing a critical response to Descartes’ efforts, in the third meditation, to know God through meditating on his awareness of himself as a thinking thing. I will conclude my study of the Meditations by examining each of these topics.

Arnauld’s Charge of Circular Reasoning, and Descartes’ Response to Arnauld’s Charge Preliminary Remarks In approaching the charge of circular reasoning, I propose to proceed in the following manner. I will begin by setting out Arnauld’s charge that Descartes’ reasoning is circular, and I will detail Descartes’ response to Arnauld. I will then address the controversy by showing how my analysis of the third meditation can assist in settling the dispute between Descartes and Arnauld. It is my view that Arnauld has not succeeded in establishing that circular reasoning is involved in Descartes’ efforts here. But, it is also my view that Descartes failed to provide a response to Arnauld’s charge of circular reasoning, which reveals, and incorporates, the full impact of his method of ‘analysis’, and the role of ‘meditation’, when establishing the existence of God as Descartes’ creator in the third meditation. As a result, Descartes’ response to Arnauld’s charge does not accurately reflect his approach to establishing God’s existence in the third meditation.

Arnauld’s Charge of Circular Reasoning By reflecting on the Cogito ergo Sum, Descartes seeks to determine what it is that convinced him of its truth. His considered view is that in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could

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even happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems to me that I can establish as a general rule that all things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly are true. (M 59; CSM II, 24)

He is not questioning whether the Cogito is perceived clearly and distinctly, nor whether the Cogito is true. In this passage, he hesitates to generalize from the certainty of the truth of the Cogito because it is seen clearly and distinctly, to holding that whatever is perceived clearly and distinctly is true, in light of the fact that he does not yet know whether there is a God who is deceiving him. As we have seen, he insists that “in order to be able altogether to remove it [i.e. his doubts about the clear and distinct, other than the Cogito ergo Sum] I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything”. (M 60; CSM II, 25) Arnauld argues that such an attempt on Descartes’ part is circular, for the very criterion employed in proving God’s existence is to be guaranteed by the proof itself: The only remaining scruple I have is an uncertainty as to how a circular reasoning is to be avoided in saying: the only secure reason we have for believing that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, is the fact that God exists. But we can be sure that God exists only because we clearly and evidently perceive that; therefore prior to being certain that God exists, we should be certain that whatever we clearly and evidently perceive is true. (HR II, 92; CSM II, 150)

Descartes’ Response to Arnauld’s Charge of Circular Reasoning In responding to Arnauld’s charge, Descartes insists that “we are sure that God exists because we have attended to the proofs that established this fact, but afterwards it is enough for us to remember that we have perceived something clearly in order to be sure that it is true, but this would not suffice, unless we knew that God existed and that he did not deceive us.” (HR II, 115; CSM II, 171)1 1

Descartes’ position is also offered in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections, where he maintains that the persuasion attending some matters seen very clearly and very distinctly, especially the Cogito ergo Sum, is tantamount to perfect certitude.

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However, Descartes would still have a problem answering Arnauld’s charge of circular reasoning, because the premises involved in the deductions of God’s existence in the third meditation depend on memory, at least when he is not attending to these proofs. And, he, obviously, cannot use the memory of having seen the proofs of God’s existence clearly and distinctly to guarantee other deductions, where he recalls having seen the premises clearly and distinctly, given that, as we learned in the last chapter, it is the divine guarantee which enables him to have confidence in these demonstrations. In one passage in the third meditation relevant to this point, which immediately follows his first proof for the existence of God, he asserts: To speak the truth, I see nothing in all that I have just said which by the light of nature is not manifest to anyone who desire to think attentively on the subject; but when I slightly relax my attention, my mind, finding its vision somewhat obscured and so to speak blinded by the images of sensible objects, I do not easily recollect the reason why the idea that I possess of a being more perfect than I, must necessarily have been placed in me by a being which is really more perfect…(M 68; CSM II, 32-33)

Descartes now ends up in the unsatisfactory position of involving his memory, which is ‘somewhat obscured and so to speak blinded by the images of sensible things’, in providing a demonstration of God’s existence, which guarantees the truth of all clear and distinct conceptions, when the premises are recalled, but no longer before the mind. The same problem arises with the second proof of God’s existence: when he is not attended to the proof, he must rely on his memory that he saw each step of the proof clearly and distinctly. Accordingly, if this is all that Descartes has to offer As a result, the truth of such matters cannot be doubted. There are other matters, however, which are perceived very clearly and distinctly so long as we attend to the reasons leading us to them, “but since we can forget those reasons and yet remember the conclusions deduced from them, the question can be raised as to whether we can entertain the same firm and immutable certainty as to these conclusions, during the time that we recollect that they may have been deduced from first principles that are evident; for this remembrance must be assumed in order that they may be called conclusions.” (HR II, 42-43; CSM II, 104-105) He answers that ‘those possess it who, in virtue of their knowledge of God, are aware that the faculty of understanding given by Him must tend toward truth…But the subject has been so clearly explained at the end of the fifth Meditation that there seems to be nothing to add here” (HR II, 42-43; CSM II, 104-105). In other words, Descartes holds that the divine guarantee covers conclusions of demonstrations, when the premises of the argument are no longer before the mind, but we recall that the premises in the deduction were seen clearly and distinctly.

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regarding the divine guarantee pertaining to the clear and distinct, then his effort has failed: he would need to have confidence in the proofs of God’s existence, when the premises of these proofs are not before his mind, in order to have confidence in other proofs, when he recalls having seen the premises for these proofs clearly and distinctly. However, he cannot have confidence in the proofs of God’s existence, when he recalls having seen the premises clearly and distinctly, given that he does not yet know that God exists. The memory of having seen the premises in the proofs of God’s existence is employed to guarantee other proofs, where the premises are recalled as being clear and distinct. However, since nothing guarantees the proofs of God’s existence, where the premises are recalled as being clear and distinct, but are not actually before the mind, Descartes has no basis for accepting as reliable, premises of other proofs, which are recalled as being clear and distinct.

A Way to Avoid Arnauld’s Charge of Circular Reasoning Descartes has a way to avoid Arnauld’s charge of circular reasoning. We have learned in our study of the Meditations that Descartes regards his existence as a thinking thing, and the existence of God as Descartes’ creator, as self-evident metaphysical first principles. As such, he holds that, in his Meditations, neither of these claims can be established through deductive arguments. We learned in the fourth chapter, when examining the proofs of God’s existence in the third meditation, that Descartes acknowledges that reason is unable to establish knowledge of God which can provide the foundation he is seeking for accepting all clear and distinct ideas as true. The knowledge of God’s causal relation to Descartes’ idea of God and to his existence as a thinking thing is ultimately meditative / contemplative / aesthetic, rather than intuitive / demonstrative. On my interpretation, the arguments for God’s existence in the third meditation have two functions: they help to remove sensory prejudice, in order for the mind to arrive at a state of indifference; and they guide the mind to the point where, through meditating on the idea of himself as a thinking thing, he comes to understand that the idea of God is contained in the idea of the self ‘to be like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work’. Underlying my interpretation is the view that the arguments for God’s existence in the third meditation are not demonstrations of the sort discussed in the Regulae, i.e., necessary inferences from other matters themselves known intuitively. The conclusion that God is his creator does not follow from the premises of Descartes’ argument in the way in which a theorem follows from the premises in a demonstration. The arguments only lead Descartes to the point where he

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can, through meditation, grasp the connection between the idea of the self and the idea of God, ultimately recognizing that the idea of God is contained within the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing, as the mark of the workman imprinted on his work. I examined at length in the fourth chapter that Descartes holds that the certainty of God’s existence is like the certainty of his existence as a thinking thing: in both cases, the problem of correspondence does not arise, inasmuch as what he is thinking is identical to what he is thinking about. Therefore, Descartes insists that doubt cannot arise about his existence as a thinking thing, nor can doubt arise about the existence of God as his creator, as the mark of the workman imprinted on his work. The knowledge of Descartes’ existence as a thinking thing is grasped through intuition; the knowledge of God as Descartes’ creator is grasped through meditating on the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing. Descartes omits all of this in his reply to Arnauld-especially, that the knowledge of God as his creator is a self-evident metaphysical first principle learned through meditation, and not through reason. If this had been emphasized by Descartes in his reply to Arnauld, when the latter charged him with circular reasoning, the charge of circular reasoning would have been fully addressed, and refuted.

A Lingering Concern The lingering concern, of course, is why Descartes failed to bring this up, when replying to the Arnauld’s charge of circular reasoning? There is no text which can assist us in answering this; but I remain confident, from the texts that I have cited from the Meditations and Replies to Objections, that Descartes is committed to the view that knowledge of God as Descartes’ creator is ultimately based on meditation / reflection, and not on reasoning; and that, therefore, the charge of circular reasoning does not apply to his efforts to establish the truth of clear and distinct ideas. Unfortunately, Descartes reveals none of this in his attempt to reject Arnauld’s charge of circular reasoning. Descartes’ critics were not provided with two key elements essential to understanding his Meditations on First Philosophy-the role of meditation, and his method of ‘analysis’, which he utilizes in discovering the self-evident first principles of metaphysics. The absence of emphasis on ‘meditation’ and the method of ‘analysis’ in metaphysics has misled his critics into thinking that the Meditations utilizes ‘synthesis’, the method of Geometry, and that intuition and deduction-the cognitive faculties involved in Geometry-are the only cognitive faculties utilized in this work.

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Assessing Descartes’ Approach in the Third Meditation to Knowing God Through Meditation Descartes holds knowledge of God’s existence to be a metaphysical first principle, and that God is known through contemplation or meditation, not through intuition. His meditative treatment of God as a first principle appears in the last three paragraphs in the third mediation, in which he speaks of the idea of God as “innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me”, and that God has placed this idea within him “to be like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work; and it is likewise not essential that the mark shall be something different from the work itself” (M. 71; CSM II, 35). As we saw earlier in the Replies to the Fifth Set of Objections, he attempts to clarify the latter, by explaining that his idea of God stands to the idea he has of himself as the technique of a painting stands to the painting of which it is the technique. Now, when he discovers the necessary connection between thought and existence in the second meditation, he finds that he can trust this connection, because the relata involved are self-referential, that is, it is his thought and his existence to which he is attending, and not a copy or representation of his thought and his existence: “What of thinking? I find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just when I think…I am, however, a real thing and really exist; but what thing? I have answered: a thing which thinks.” (M 52-53; CSM II, 18) Therefore, there is no concern here as to whether what he is thinking corresponds to what he is thinking about. In telling us that the idea of God is contained in the idea he has of himself, and that this idea is like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work, Descartes is, once again, attempting to establish that the problem of correspondence does not arise. That is, if all that he finds in the idea of the self as a thinking thing is paradigmatic and not a copy of anything, and if he finds that the idea of God is contained in the idea of the self in a non-copy manner, as the technique of a painting is found in the painting, then Descartes would have us believe that he must accept that he was created by God. I will now show that he is not convincing here. An illustration (adapted from Descartes) will be helpful at this point. An art forger masters the technique employed by Apelles, and produces a counterfeit painting that deceives the art world. The fact that the technique of the artist is in the painting, and not simply represented in the painting, does not prevent the forgery from occurring. In short, self-reference in the painting does not guarantee truth about the artist, or the technique used to produce the painting. Now, Descartes discovers what he regards as God’s

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mark imprinted on the idea he has of himself. Why should he trust what he finds? It cannot be because he has ‘proved’ that the objective reality of the idea of God could only have come from God (who possesses formally what the idea of God possesses objectively), given his doubts about mathematical calculations. He tells us that the idea of God is like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work; hence, for Descartes, the idea of God is selfreferential, as the technique of a painting is self-referential. That is, the technique of the painting is in the painting, and the idea of God is in Descartes, qua thinking thing. Regarding his treatment of the existence of the self in the second meditation, inasmuch as it is his thought and his existence which he intuits, he concludes that, whatever further he intuits as necessarily connected with the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing is necessarily true, as well. It is in this spirit in the second meditation that he concludes that, insofar as he is a thinking thing, he is “a thing which doubts, understands, affirms, denies, will, refuses, which also imagines and feels” (M. 54; CSM II, 19). In the third meditation, he holds that he has, once again, added to his knowledge of himself, once he discovers the idea of God in the idea he has of himself. The difficulty with this defense of the idea of God and its accompanying awareness of God as Descartes’ creator is that Descartes cannot establish that the idea of the self which he has, and its accompanying awareness of the idea of God, were not given to him by the evil genius, or by a deceiving deity, rather than by a veracious God. Regardless of the origin of the idea he possesses of himself, he still has the problem, which he cannot solve within his philosophical framework, of establishing that he was created by God, and not by the evil genius, or a deceiving deity. The proofs of God’s existence are themselves based on calculations and, therefore, are dubitable in the way that mathematics is regarded as dubitable in the first and third meditations; hence, they cannot be of assistance here. And, the fact that Descartes finds the idea of God in the same idea through which he knows himself as a thinking thing, helps him not at all: he still must prove that the idea of the self and the idea of God were created by a non-deceiving God, and this he cannot do in a manner which carries with it indubitability and truth: it may be the case that the self which Descartes intuits, which has within it an idea of God as Descartes’ creator (which he discovers through meditation/ contemplation in the third meditation), was given to him by the evil genius, or a deceiving deity. He has no means of ruling this out. I will now explain. If Descartes was created by the evil genius or a deceiving deity, he can still accept that he exists as a thinking thing. Deception is not possible here, because his awareness of his existence as a thinking thing with its

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attendant modes of thought is not a copy of anything. In short, the knowledge he intuits of himself in the second meditation is free from all doubt and uncertainty, no matter who, or what, created him. But when he proceeds in the third meditation with his inquiry into the existence and nature of God, he cannot establish claims about God with indubitability and certainty. It is true that the non-referential character of the idea he has of himself is sufficient to convince him that he is a thinking thing (res cogitans). He informs us that he finds within the awareness of himself, the idea of God as his creator (as the technique of a painting is in the painting), and this persuades him that he was created by God. However, whereas the idea of the self involves no reference beyond Descartes, and hence is self-referential and indubitable, his idea of God purports to provide knowledge of God, who Descartes holds is his creator. Notice that in the passage which I quoted earlier from the Fifth Set of Objections, he speaks of “coming across a picture which showed a technique that pointed to Apelles alone as the painter…”(HR II, 221; CSM II, 256; my italics). The technique discovered in the painting points to the artist, Apelles, whose technique is already known by Descartes. The success of this process requires that one already knows the essentials of Apelles’ technique in producing a painting; otherwise, the forgery would be taken to be an authentic work of art. Now, to deem Descartes’ approach acceptable, prior to giving his attention to the idea of God which he finds in himself, he would already have to know God’s technique when God creates anything, including Descartes. But, Descartes claims to learn God’s technique in creating him from the idea of God, which he discovers through meditating on himself as a thinking thing. The Apelles illustration works, because he has prior knowledge of the technique employed by Apelles, so that the technique found in the painting can be compared to the technique he knows is Apelles’ technique. But since Descartes does not have prior knowledge of God’s technique in creating Descartes, or for that matter in creating anything at all, he cannot hold that it is indubitable that the idea of God was given to him by God. The idea that he has of God could have been given to him by the evil genius, or a deceiving deity. Descartes has no way of ruling out these alternatives, as the source of his creation. Accordingly, he also cannot accept as reliable the repugnancy he intuits between the idea of a supremely perfect being and deception. A deceiving genius might have so constituted him that he cannot but think that God is the cause of his existence and that the cause of his existence cannot be a deceiver. The self’s existence is indubitable and true (for the reasons discussed earlier), but claims to know the cause of the self and its non-deceiving nature through the idea of God can be subjected to

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doubt. Further, since Descartes’ demonstration in the fourth meditation of the truth of the principle concerning clarity and distinctness depends upon a knowledge of God as his creator and as not being a deceiver, it follows, from the considerations put forth above, that he has also been unsuccessful in establishing the truth of this principle. ************ The main lesson that this study on Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy has provided is that Descartes insists that the Meditations is to be studied, not as containing a series of arguments in the synthetic mode of proof (the Meditations is not a logical work akin to Euclid’s Elements), but rather (a) as containing guidance to help rid the mind of sensory prejudice, (b) to bring the reader to a point of indifference, and (c) to direct our attention to the true innate ideas, through which we can attend to the first principles of human knowledge. The arguments in this work are regarded by Descartes as heuristic or didactic devises, not as logical arguments. The metaphysical truths that Descartes holds we must know can only be grasped by the mind through intuition (knowledge of the existence of the self as a thinking thing, in the second meditation) or through meditation (knowledge of God as the creator of the self as a thinking thing in the third meditation; knowledge of God as a necessarily existent Being in the fifth meditation). Accordingly, critical logical analyses of the arguments in the Meditations are all predicted on a misinterpretation of Descartes’ intent in writing this work.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Alanen, Lilli. Descartes’s Concept of Mind. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003. Almog, Joseph. What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Ariew, Roger. Descartes and the Last Scholastics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. —. René Descartes: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000. Ariew, Robert, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell, editors. Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Ariew, Robert, and Marjorie Glicksman Grene. Descartes and His Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections and Replies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Armstrong, David M. The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press, 1999. Arnauld, Antoine, translator. On True and False Ideas: New Objections to Descartes’ Meditations and Descartes’ Replies. Lewiston: Mellon Press,1990. Baier, Annette. The Commons of the Mind. Chicago: Open Court, 1997. Beck, Leslie John. The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. —. The Method of Descartes: A Study of the Regulae. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952. Baker, Gordon, and Katherine Morris. Descartes’ Dualism. New York: Routledge, 1996. Barbone, Steven, Lee Rice, and Shirley Samuel, translator. Principles of Cartesian Philosophy with Metaphysical Thoughts. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998. Beyssade, Jean-Marie. Descartes au fil de l’ordre. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2001. Billie, Christopher. A Guided Tour of Rene Descartes’ “Meditations on First Philosophy.” Mountain View: Mayfield, 1989.

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Bonnen, Clarence A., and Daniel E. Flage. Descartes and Method: The Search for a Method in the Meditations. New York: Routledge, 1999. Bordo, Susan R. The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. Braider, Christopher. The Matter of Mind: Reason and Experience in the Age of Descartes. University of Toronto Press, 2012. Brandhorst, Kurt. Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Vol. 1. Edinburgh University Press, 2010. Broadie, Frederick. An Approach to Descartes’ Meditations. London: Athlone Press, 1970. Broughton, Janet. Descartes’s Method of Doubt. Princeton University Press, 2002. Carriero, John. Between Two Worlds: A Reading of Descartes’s Meditations. Princeton University Press, 2009. —. Descartes and the Autonomy of the Human Understanding. London: Routledge, 1990; new edition 2016. Champigny, Robert. Sense, Antisense, Nonsense. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1986. Charpentier, Thomas Victor. Essai sur la méthode de Descartes. Delagrave, 1869. Christofidou, Andrea. Self, Reason, and Freedom: A New Light on Descartes’ Metaphysics. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013. Cottingham, John. Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes’s Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2008. —. Descartes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. —, editor. Descartes. Oxford University Press, 1998. —. Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian, and Psychoanalytic Ethics. Cambridge University Press, 1998. —. The Rationalists: A History of Western Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. —, editor. Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartes’ Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. —, editor. René Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, with Selections from the Objections and Replies. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Crane, Tim, and Sarah Patterson, editors. History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge, 2000. Cunning, David. Argument and Persuasion in Descartes’ Meditations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

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Curley, Edward M. Descartes Against the Skeptics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. Daniel, David Mills. Briefly, Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. London: SCM Press, 2006. Davies, Richard. Descartes: Belief, Skepticism, and Virtue. New York: Routledge, 2001. Dicker, Georges. Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; second edition 2013. Doney, Willis. Eternal Truths and the Cartesian Circle: A Collection of Studies. New York & London: Garland, 1987. —, editor. Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968. Duncan, Steven M. The Proof of the External World: Cartesian Theism and the Possibility of Knowledge. Cambridge: James Clarke, 2008. Feinberg, Joel, editor. Reason and Responsibility. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 1989. Flage, Daniel E., and Clarence A. Bonnen. Descartes and Method: A Search for a Method in Meditations. London: Routledge, 1999. Frankfurt, Harry G. Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes’ “Meditations.” Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970; first revised edition. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008. Garber, Daniel. Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Gaukroger, Stephen, editor. The Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. Gennaro, Rocco, and Charles Huenemann, editors. New Essays on the Rationalists. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Gombay, André. Descartes. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. Gouhier, Henri. La pensée métaphysique de Descartes. Paris: Vrin, 1968. Grünbein, Durs, and Michael Eskin. Descartes’ Devil: Three Meditations. First English edition. New York: Upper West Side Philosophers, Inc., 2010. Gueroult, Martial. Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons. Paris: AubierMontaigne, 1953; second edition, 1968. Gueroult, Martial, and Roger Ariew, translator. The Soul and God: Descartes’ Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. Hausman, David B., and Alan Hausman. Descartes’ Legacy: Minds and Meaning in Early Modern Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.

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Heffernan, George, editor and translator. René Descartes’ Regulae Ad Directionem Ingenu: Rules for the Direction of Natural Intelligence. Amsterdam: Rodopi,1998. Hintikka, Jaakko, and Unto Remes. The Method of Analysis. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974. Hooker, Michael, editor. Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Katz, Jerrold J. Cogitations: A Study of the “Cogito” in Relation to the Philosophy of Logic and Language and a Study of them in Relation to the ''Cogito.” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Kenny, Anthony. Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy. New York: Random House, 1968. Leflevre, R. La Métaphysique de Descartes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959; second edition, 1966; third edition, 1972. Lennon, Thomas M., editor. Cartesian Views: Papers Presented to Richard A. Watson. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2003. Lennon, Thomas M., John M. Nicholas, and John W. Davis, editors. Problems of Cartesianism. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982. MacDonald, Paul S. Descartes and Husserl: The Philosophic Project of Radical Beginnings. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. Mackenzie, Patrick T. The Problems of Philosophers: An Introduction. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1989. Malcolm, Norman. Dreaming. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Marion, Jean-Luc. Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Marion, Jean-Luc, and Christina M. Gschwandtner, translator. On Descartes’ Passive Thought: The Myth of Cartesian Dualism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018. Marion, Jean-Luc, and Jeffrey L. Kosky, translator. On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism: The Constitution and the Limits of Onto-theo-logy in Cartesian Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Martin, J. (abbé). Descartes. Première Méditation, avec une notice biographique et une étude sur la philosophie de Descartes. Paris: Poussielgue, 1882. Merrylees, William A. Descartes: An Examination of Some Features of His Metaphysics and Method. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1943. Miles, Murray. Insight and Inference: Descartes’s Founding Principle and Modern Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

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Naaman Zauderer, Noa. Descartes’ Deontological Turn: Reason, Will, and Virtue in the Later Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Nadler, Steven. The Philosopher, the Priest, and the Painter: A Portrait of Descartes. Princeton University Press, 2013. Reuter, Martina, and Frans. Svensson. Mind, Body, and Morality: New Perspectives on Descartes and Spinoza. Milton: Routledge, 2019. Rodis-Lewis, Genevieve, editor. Méthode et métaphysique chez Descartes: Études en français. New York and London: Garland, 1987. Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg, editor. Essays on Descartes’ Meditations. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. Rosenthal, David M. Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987; second edition, 2000. Rozemond, Marleen. Descartes’ Dualism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. Rubin, Ronald. Silencing the Demon’s Advocate: The Strategy of Descartes’ Meditations. Stanford University Press, 2008. Scholl, Ann. Descartes’s Dreams: Imagination in The Meditations. New York: P. Lang, 2005. Schouls, Peter A. Descartes and the Possibility of Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. —. The Imposition of Method: A Study of Descartes and Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Sepper, Dennis L. Descartes’ Imagination: Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. Serrus, Charles. La Méthode de Descartes et son application à la métaphysique. Paris: Alcan, 1933. Sesonske, Alexander, and Noel Fleming, editors. Meta-Meditations: Studies in Descartes. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1965. Smith, Norman K. Studies in Cartesian Philosophy. London: Macmillan, 1902; reprint, New York: Russell & Russell, 1962. Soffer, Walter. From Science to Subjectivity: An Interpretation of Descartes’ “Meditations.” New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. Sutton, John. Philosophy of Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Tweyman, Stanley. Descartes and Hume: Selected Topics. Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1989. —. An Edition of Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy in Focus, Together with Critical Introduction. London and New York: Routledge, 1993; 2nd edition, Ann Arbor, Michigan: Caravan Books, reissued by

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Articles Abraham, William E. “Disentangling the ‘Cogito’.” Mind 83, no. 329 (1974): 75–94. Alanen, Lilli. “Reconsidering Descartes’s Notion of the Mind-Body Union.” Synthese l06, no.1 (1996): 3–20. —. “Self-Awareness and Cognitive Agency in Descartes’s Meditations.” Philosophical Topics 44, no. 1 (2016): 3–26. Aldrich, Virgil C. “Descartes’ Method of Doubt: An Interpretation and Appreciation.” Philosophy of Science 4, no.4 (1937): 395–411. [Commemorative lecture]. Allaire, Edwin B. “The Circle of Ideas and the Circularity of the Meditations.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/ Revue canadienne de philosophie 5, no. 2 (1966): 131–53.

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Dietl, Paul J. “The Feasibility of Hyperbolical Doubt.” Philosophical Studies 20, no. 5 (1969): 70–73. Dilley, Frank B. “Descartes’ Cosmological Argument.” Monist 54, no. 3 (1970): 427–40. Dixit, Shriniwas. “Descartes’ Dogmatism.” Philosophical Quarterly (India) 22 (1949–50): 175–78. Donagan, Alan. “Descartes’ ‘Synthetic’ Treatment of the Real Distinction Between Mind and Body.” In Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays, edited by Michael Hooker, 186–96. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Doney, Willis. “The Cartesian Circle.” Journal of the History of Ideas 16, no. 3 (1955): 324–38. —. “Curley and Wilson on Descartes.” Philosophy Research Archives 6 (1980): 55–74. —. “Descartes’ Conception of Perfect Knowledge.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 8, no. 4 (1970): 387–403. —. “The Geometrical Presentation of Descartes’ A Priori Proof.” In Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays, edited by Michael Hooker, 1–25. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Dore, Clement. “Descartes’ Meditation V: Proof of God’s Existence.” In The Existence and Nature of God, edited by A. J. Freddoso, 143–60. London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983. Dorter, Kenneth. “First Philosophy: Metaphysics or Epistemology?” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/ Revue canadienne de philosophie 11, no 1 (1972): 1–22. —. “Science and Religion in Descartes’ ‘Meditations’.” Thomist 37, no. 2 (1973): 313–40. Draseke, Johannes. “Zu Rene Descartes’ cogito ergo sum.” Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 32 (1919–20): 45–55. Dreisbach, Donald F. “Circularity and Consistency in Descartes.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 1 (1978): 59–78. Dreyfus, Ginette. “Discussion sur le ‘cogito’ et l’axiome ‘pour penser il faut être’.” Revue internationale de philosophie 6, no. 19 (1952): 117–25. Drury, Shadia B. “The Relationship of Substance and Simple Natures in the Philosophy of Descartes.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 4 (1978): 37–58. Dupre, Louis. “Alternatives to the Cogito.” The Review of Metaphysics 40, no.4 (1987): 687–716. Dyksterhuis, F. J. “La méthode et les essais de Descartes.” In Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais, 21–44. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1950.

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Elliot, Robert, and Michael Smith. “Descartes, God and the Evil Spirit.” Sophia 17, no. 3 (1978): 33–36. Erde, Edmund L. “Analyticity, the Cogito, and Self-Knowledge in Descartes’ Meditations.” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6, no. 1 (1975): 79–85. Evans, J. L. “Error and the Will.” Philosophy 38, no. 144 (1963): 136–48. Fafara, Richard J. “An Eighth Set of Objections to Descartes’ ‘Meditations’?” The Modern Schoolman 57, no. 1 (1979): 25–44. Farkas, Viorica. “Dreaming in Descartes à la Wilson.” Philosophy Research Archives 11 (1985): 111–25. —. “Epistemic Appraisal and the Cartesian Circle.” Philosophical Studies 27, no. 1 (1975): 37–55. Feldman, Fred. “On the Performatory Interpretation of the Cogito.” Philosophical Review 82, no. 3 (1973): 345–63. Ferguson, Lynd. “Multi-Media ‘Meditations’.” Teaching Philosophy 5, no. 4 (1982): 301–09. Ferraiolo, William. “Individualism and Descartes.” Teorema 16, no. 1 (1996): 71–86. Field, Richard W. “Descartes’ Proof of the Existence of Matter.” Mind 94, no. 374 (1985): 244–49. Flage, Daniel E. “Descartes’ Cogito.” Historical Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1985): 163–78. —. “Descartes on Causation.” Review of Metaphysics 50, no. 4 (1997): 841– 72. —. “Descartes’ Ontological Argument in Meditation V.” In “Descartes’ Meditations: New Approaches,” guest editor Stanley Tweyman. Special issue, The European Legacy 27, no. 3–4 (May–June 2022): 335–47. —. “Descartes and the Real Distinction Between Mind and Body.” The Review of Metaphysics 68, no. 1 (2014): 93–106. Flew, Antony. “Philosophical Doubt and Cartesian Certainty.” In An Introduction to Western Philosophy, 302–30. Indianapolis: 1971. Foti, Veronique. “The Functions and Ordering of the Theistic Arguments in Descartes’ ‘Meditations’.” Auslegung 4, no. 1 (1976): 7–20. Foucault, Michel. “A Return to Descartes’ First Meditation.” In Between Foucault and Derrida, edited by Christopher Penfield, Yubraj Aryal, Vernon W. Cisney, and Nicolae Morar, 101–3. Edinburgh University Press, 2016. Frankfurt, Harry G. “Descartes on the Consistency of Reason.” In Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays, edited by Michael Hooker, 26–39. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

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Grimm, Robert. “Cogito, ergo sum.” Theoria 31, no. 3 (1965): 159–73. Groarke, Leo. “Descartes’ First Meditation: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22, no. 3 (1984): 281–301. Grondin, Jean, and Lukas Soderstrom. “Descartes: First Philosophy According to the Cogito.” In Introduction to Metaphysics: From Parmenides to Levinas, 107–21. Columbia University Press, 2012. Guerin, Michel. “Le malin génie et l’instauration de la pensée comme philosophie.” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 79, no. 2 (1974): 145–76. Guéroult, Martial. “Le cogito et l’ordre des axiomes métaphysiques dans les Principia philosophiae Cartesianae de Spinoza.” Archives de Philosophie 23, no. 2 (1960): 171–85. —. “De la méthode prescrite par Descartes pour comprendre sa philosophie.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 44 (1962): 172–84. Guery, Françoise. “Descartes et la Méditation.” Revue Philosophie de la France et de L’Étranger 190, no. 2 (2000): 169–174. Gut, Przemysáaw. “The Epistemic Significance of Current Clear and Distinct Perceptions in Descartes’ Epistemology.” Roczniki Filozoficzne/ Annales de Philosophie/ Annals of Philosophy 68, no. 2 (2020): 87–118. Hanfling, Oswald. “Can There be a Method of Doubt?” Philosophy 59, no. 230 (1984): 505–11. Harries, Karsten. “Irrationalism and Cartesian Method.” Journal of Existentialism 6, no. 23 (1966): 295–304. Harrison, Jonathan. “The Incorrigibility of the Cogito.” Mind 93, no. 371 (1984): 321–35. Hartnack, Justus. “A Note on the Logic of One of Descartes’ Arguments.” International Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 2 (1975): 181–84. Hatfield, Gary. “Descartes’ Meditations as Cognitive Exercises.” Philosophy and Literature 9, no. 1 (1985): 41–58. —. “The Senses and the Fleshless Eye: The Mediations as Cognitive Exercises.” In Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 45–79. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. Haugeland, John. “Mind Embodied and Embedded.” Acta Philosophica Fennica 58 (1995): 233–267. Hauptli, Bruce W. “Doubting ‘Descartes’ Self-Doubt’.” Philosophy Research Archives 6 (1980): 402–26. —. “Frankfurt on Descartes: Consistency or Validation of Reason.” International Studies in Philosophy 15, no. 1 (1983): 59–70.

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Hulbert, Mark. “Descartes’ Direct Realism and the Third Meditation.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 31, no. 1 (1993): 33–43. Humber, James M. “Clarity, Distinctness, the Cogito and ‘I’.” Idealistic Studies 17, no. 1 (1987): 15–37. —. “Descartes’ Ontological Argument as Non-Causal.” The New Scholasticism 44 no. 3 (1970): 449–59. —. “Doubts about Descartes’ ‘Self-Doubt’.” Philosophical Review 87, no. 2 (1978): 253–58. —. “Recognizing Clear and Distinct Perceptions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41, no. 4 (1980–81): 487–507. Hunter, J. F. M. “The Difference Between Dreaming and Being Awake.” Mind 92, no. 365 (1983): 80–93. Idomboye, D. F. “Descartes and his Clear and Distinct Ideas.” Cahiers philosophiques africains (1974): 25–35. Imlay, Robert A. “Descartes’ A Priori Proof for God and the Second Set of Objections to the Meditations.” The Modern Schoolman 63, no. 2 (1986): 111–18. —. “Descartes’ Ontological Argument.” The New Scholasticism 43 (1969): 440–48. —. “Descartes’ Ontological Argument: A Causal Argument.” The New Scholasticism 45, no. 2 (1971): 348–51. —. “Descartes’ Two Hypotheses of the Evil Genius.” Studia Leibnitiana 12, no. 2 (1980): 205–14. —. “Dieu, solipsisme et probabilité dans les Méditations de Descartes.” Studia Leibnitiana 20, no. 1 (1988): 80–86. —. “Intuition and the Cartesian Circle.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 11, no. 1 (1973): 19–27. Immerwahr, J. “Descartes’ Two Cosmological Proofs.” The New Scholasticism 56, no. 3 (1982): 346–54. Ishiguro, Hide. “The Status of Necessity and Impossibility in Descartes.” In Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 459–71. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. Jardine, David W. “Piaget’s Clay and Descartes’ Wax.” Educational Theory 38, no. 3 (1988): 287–98. Jennings, Jerry L. “The Fallacious Origin of the Mind-Body Problem: A Reconsideration of Descartes’ Method and Results.” The Journal of Mind and Behavior 6, no. 3 (1985): 357–72. Johnston, J. M. “Cartesian Lucidity.” Filosofia 19 (1968): 663–70. Karachevtseva, Larysɚ Mykolaivna. “Reason and Madness in the Structure of the Cartesian Cogito. Three Interpretations of Rene Descartes’ Meditation.” Studia humanitatis (Moscow) 1 (2013).

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Stevens, John C. “Unknown Faculties and Descartes’ First Proof of the Existence of God.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 16, no. 3 (1978): 334–38. —. “Why Descartes’ Belief That He Is Not Perfect Can’t Be Wrong.” The Personalist 58, no. 2 (1977): 134. Stone, Jim. “Cogito Ergo Sum.” Journal of Philosophy 90, no. 9 (1993): 462–68. —. “Dreaming and Certainty.” Philosophical Studies 45, no. 3 (1984): 353– 68. Stoner, Samuel A. “The Moral Formation of Descartes’ Meditations.” In “Descartes’ Meditations: New Approaches,” guest editor Stanley Tweyman. Special issue, The European Legacy 27, no. 3–4 (2022): 321– 34. Stout, A. K. “The Alleged ‘Petitio Principii’ in Descartes’ Appeal to the Veracity of God.” Travaux du IXe Congrès International de Philosophie 1 (1937): 125–31. —. “The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes.” Mind 38, no. 151 (1929): 330– 42. —. “Descartes’ Proof of the Existence of Matter.” Mind 41, no. 162 (1932): 191–207. Stout, Rowland. “Descartes’s Hidden Argument for the Existence of God.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 6, no. 2 (1998): 155–68. Streenivasa Iyengar, K. R. “The Nature of Descartes’ Method.” Travaux du IXe Congrès International de Philosophie 20, no. 36 (1937): 15–20. Stuart, James D. “Descartes’ Proof of the External World.” Historical Philosophical Quarterly 3, no. 1 (1986): 19–28. —. “The Role of Dreaming in Descartes’ ‘Meditations’.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 21, no. 1 (1983): 97–108. Stubbs, A. C. “Bernard Williams and the Cartesian Circle.” Analysis 40, no. 2 (1980): 103–108. Suter, Ronald. “The Dream Argument.” American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976): 185–94. —. “Sum is a Logical Consequence of Cogito.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32, no. 2 (1971): 235–40. Thomas, Bruce M. “Abstraction and the Real Distinction Between MindBody.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 1 (1995): 83–102. —. “Assertion and Conception in Descartes.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1994): 163–78. —. “Cartesian Epistemics and Descartes’s Regulae.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1996): 433–449.

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Thomas, Janice. “Descartes’ Trust of Clear and Distinct Perception.” Ratio Bristol 24, no. 1 (1982): 83–86. —. “Does Descartes Think Minds Are Substances?” In The Minds of the Moderns: Rationalism, Empiricism, and Philosophy of Mind, 12–20. McGill: Queen’s University Press, 2009. Thomas, L. E. “Waking and Dreaming.” Analysis 13 (1953): 121–37. Thornton, Mark T. “Cartesian Pains.” In Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Georges J. D. Moyal and Stanley Tweyman, 35–64. New York: Caravan Books, 1986. Tichy, P. “Existence and God.” Journal of Philosophy 76, no. 8 (1979): 403–20. Timoner, K. I. “Descartes’ Use of Some Historical Elements of the Demonstrations in the Meditations.” Dialogue: Journal of Phi Sigma Tau, Milwaukee Wisconsin 23, no. 1 (1980): 14–21. Timmermans, Benoît. “The Originality of Descartes’s Conception of Analysis as Discovery.” Journal of the History of Ideas 60, no. 3 (1999): 433–47. Tlumak, Jeffrey. “Certainty and Cartesian Method.” In Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays, edited by Michael Hooker, 40–73. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. —. “Squaring the Cartesian Circle.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 3 (1978): 247–57. Turbayne, Colin Murray. “Analysis and Synthesis.” In The Myth of Metaphor, 228–53. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962; revised edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Tweyman, Stanley. “Certainty in Descartes’ Philosophy.” Diálogos 111 (2022): 99–116. —. “Competing Views on the Connection Between Thought and Existence in Descartes and Hume.” International Readings on Theory, History, and Philosophy of Culture 18 (2003): 177–187. —. “Descartes’ ‘Demonstrations’ of his Existence.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 1 (1985): 101–10. —. “Descartes’ Failure in the Third Meditation to Prove that God Created Descartes.” Selected for inclusion in Aftershocks: Globalism and the Future of Democracy. This volume contains selected papers presented at the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI) XV1 International Conference, The University of Zaragoza, Spain, July 2–5, 2019. Published March 2021. —. “Descartes’ Knowledge of God in the Fifth Meditation.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 2 (1988): 263–75.

156

Selected Bibliography

—. “Descartes’ Meditations: New Approaches - Introduction.” In “Descartes’ Meditations: New Approaches,” guest editor Stanley Tweyman. Special issue, The European Legacy 27, no. 3–4 (May–June 2022): 219–26. —. “Descartes’ Non-Mathematical Method in his Meditations On First Philosophy.” Selected for inclusion in the Proceedings of the XXX1 International Conference on Multidisciplinary Studies, Luxembourg University, November 2022. —. “Descartes’ Second Meditation and Seventh Principle.” In Descartes and Hume: Selected Topics. Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1989. —. “Descartes’ Syllogistic Proof of His Existence and the Cogito.” Diálogos: The Journal of Philosophy of the University of Puerto Rico 38, no. 82 (2003): 109–20. —. “Deus ex Cartesio.” Studia et Collectanea Cartesiana 1 (1979): 167– 82. —. “Hume and the Cogito Ergo Sum.” In “The End of Myth: Philosophy vs. Rhetoric.” Special issue, The European Legacy 10, no. 4 (2005): 315–28. —. “The Idea of God’s Existence in Descartes’ Third Meditation.” Diálogos: The Journal of Philosophy of the University of Puerto Rico 40, no. 84, (2004): 71–76. —. “The Ontology of Communication: Case Studies in the Philosophy of Rene Descartes and in the Philosophy of David Hume.” International Readings in the Theory, History, and Philosophy of Culture 6 (1968): 77–88. This volume has been prepared by the St. Petersburg Branch of the Russian Institute for Cultural Research of the Russian Federation Ministry of Culture, and by The Philosophical and Cultural Research Centre “EIDOS” (St. Petersburg Association of Scientists and Scholars). —. “Professor Cottingham on Descartes’ Methods of ‘Analysis’ and ‘Synthesis.’” In The Routledge Philosophy in Focus Volume, Rene Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, edited and with an Introduction by Stanley Tweyman, November 1993. —. “Reasoning and Meditation in Descartes’ Third Meditation.” In “Descartes’ Meditations: New Approaches,” guest editor Stanley Tweyman. Special issue, The European Legacy 27, no. 3–4 (May–June 2022): 300-309. —. “Reflections on an Exegetical Effort.” Aetas del V Congreso “Cultura Europa.” 2000: 659–62. —. “The Reliability of Reason.” In Cartesian Studies, edited by Ronald J. Butler, 122–36. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972. —. “Truth, No Doubt: Descartes’ Proof that the Clear and Distinct Must be True.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 2 (1981): 237–58.

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—. “The Two Truths that Descartes Discovers in His Meditations on First Philosophy that Do Not Require the Divine Guarantee.” Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on Interdisciplinary Studies, Ghent (December 2021). Reprinted in European Journal of Social Sciences, 2022-03-30, 5 (1), 1-11. Unger, Peter. “Our Knowledge of the External World.” American Philosophical Quarterly Mon. Oxford (1970): 40–61. Van Cleve, James. “Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, no. 1 (1983): 35–45. Van de Pitte, Frederick P. “Descartes on Analogy and Other Minds.” International Studies in Philosophy 7 (1975): 89–110. —. “Intuition and Judgment in Descartes’ Theory of Truth.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 26, no. 3 (1988): 453–70. Vendler, Zeno. “Descartes’ Res Cogitans.” In Res Cogitans: An Essay on Rational Psychology, 144–205. Ithaca: Cornell, 1972. Vernon, Thomas S. “Descartes’ Three Substances.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 3, no. 3 (1965): 122–26. Vial Larrain, J. de D. “Cogito, ergo sum.” Cuadernos di filosofía 16 (1976): 17–34. Vignoles, P.H. “À propos de la première Méditation de Descartes.” Cahiers philosophiques 8 (1981): 87–108. Villanueva, Enrique. “A Cognitive Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.” Ludas Vitalis 4, no. 7 (1996): 131–39. Vision, G. “Cogito per cogitationem, ergo sum.” Philosophical Forum 11, no. 4 (1980): 340–62. Wachbrit, Robert. “Dreams and Representations: A New Perspective on Dreaming and Cartesian Skepticism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 2 (1987): 171–80. Wagner, Steven I. “Descartes’ Arguments for Mind-Body Distinctness.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43, no. 4 (1982–83): 499– 517. —. “Descartes’ Cogito: A Generative View.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1, no. 2 (1984): 167–80. —. “Descartes’ Wax: Discovering the Nature of Mind.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1995): 165–83. Wahl, Russel. “What Can I Perceive to be True?” History of Philosophy Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1995): 185–94. Walczak, Monika. “Epistemic Functions of Intuition in Descartes.” Roczniki Filozoficzne/ Annales de Philosophie / Annals of Philosophy 68, no. 2 (2020): 43–62.

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Walsh, William H. “The Limits of Reason: Descartes and Cogito Ergo Sum.” In Metaphysics, 84–97. London: Routledge, 1963. Walton, Douglas. “Performative and Existential Self-Verifyingness.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/ Revue canadienne de philosophie 16, no. 1 (1977): 128–38. Watling, John. “Doubt, Knowledge and the Cogito in Descartes’ Meditations.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 20 (1986): 57– 71. Watson, John. “The Cartesian Cogito Ergo Sum and Kant’s Criticism of Rational Psychology.” Kant–Studien 2, no. 1–3 (1898): 22–49. Watson, Richard A. “The Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 1, no. 2 (1963–64): 177–97. —. “Descartes Knows Nothing.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1, no. 4 (1984): 399–411. Weinberg, Julius R. “Descartes and the Distinction of Mind and Body.” In Ockham, Descartes, and Hume: Self-Knowledge, Substance, and Causality, 71–82. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977. —. “The Sources and Nature of Descartes’ Cogito.” In Ockham, Descartes, and Hume: Self-Knowledge, Substance, and Causality, 83–91. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977. Welbourne, M. “Cartesian Madness.” Analysis 40 (1979–80): 48–50. Wells, Norman J. “Descartes’ Uncreated Eternal Truths.” The New Scholasticism 56, no. 2 (1982): 185–99. Wilbur, J. B. “The Cogito, an Ambiguous Performance.” In Cartesian Essays, edited by B. Magnus and J. B. Wilbur, 65–76. The Hague: Mouton, 1969. Williams, Bernard. “The Certainty of the Cogito.” Cahiers de Royaumont 4 (1962): 40–57. Williams, Michael. “Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt.” In Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 117–39. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. Wilson, Margaret D. “Can I Be the Cause of My Idea of the World? (Descartes on the Infinite and Indefinite).” In Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy, 108–25. Princeton University Press, 1999. —. “Cartesian Dualism.” In Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays, edited by Michael Hooker, 197–211. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. —. “Confused Ideas.” Rice University Studies 63 (1977): 123–37. —. “Descartes: The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness.” Noûs 10, no. 1 (1976): 3–15.

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—. “Skepticism Without Indubitability.” The Journal of Philosophy 81, no. 10 (1984): 537–44. Witcraft, Kelly A. “Cartesian Meditations on the Human Self, God and Indubitable Knowledge of the External World.” Indian Philosophical Quarterly Supplementary Volume 15 (1988): 1–19. Wolz, Henry G. “The Double Guarantee of Descartes’ Ideas.” Review of Metaphysics 3, no. 4 (1950): 471–89. —. “The Function of the Will in Descartes’ Proofs for the Existence of God.” The New Scholasticism 20, no. 4 (1946): 295–322. Wong, David B. “Cartesian Deduction.” Philosophy Research Archives 8 (1982): 1–19. Woolhouse, Roger. “Descartes and the Nature of Body.” British Journal of the History of Philosophy 2, no. 1 (1994): 19–33. Wright, J. N. “The Method of Descartes.” Philosophical Quarterly 5, no. 18 (1955): 78–82. Yandell, David. “Did Descartes Abandon Dualism: The Nature of the Union of Mind and Body.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7, no. 2 (1999): 199–217. Yost, R. M., and Donald Kalish. “Miss Macdonald on Sleeping and Waking.” Philosophical Quarterly (India) 5, no. 19 (1955): 109–24. Yrjönsuuri, Mikko. “The Scholastic Background of ‘Cogito Ergo Sum’.” Acta Philosophica Fennica 64 (1999): 47–70. Zhang, Weite. “Descartes’ Metaphysical Doubts about Clear and Distinct Perception.” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 12, no. 1 (2017): 151–81.