Meditations on First Philosophy, Bilingual Edition (English and Latin Edition) [Bilingual ed.] 0268013802, 9780268013806

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Descartes

Meditations on First Philosophy Meditationes de prima philosophia A Bilingual Edition

René Descartes

“This is the first bilingual Latin-English edition of the Meditations with its ‘Letter of Dedication’ to the Sorbonne theology faculty, ‘Preface to the Reader,’ and ‘Synopsis.’ Descartes’ Latin and the English version appear on facing pages, and the English paragraphs are numbered for ease in reference . . . includes an interesting scholarly introduction on Descartes’ life and writings, a comprehensive Latin index, and a brief bibliography.” —Choice “The editor’s introduction to this welcome volume provides a wealth of scholarship that is enough to stimulate the student’s interest in other works by Descartes.” —Teaching Philosophy GEORGE HEFFERNAN is professor of philosophy at Merrimack College. University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, IN 46556 •undpress.nd.edu Cover design: Margaret Gloster

Meditations on First Philosophy

Edited and Translated by George Heffernan

Meditations on First Philosophy Meditationes de prima philosophia A Bilingual Edition

René Descartes Edited and Translated by

George Heffernan

ISBN-13: 978-0-268-01381-3 ISBN-10: 0-268-01381-0

Descartes_pod_cover.indd 1

3/26/13 10:09 AM

MEDITATIONES DE PRIMA PHILOSOPHIA MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY

Rene Descartes

Meditationes de prima Philosophia Meditations on First Philosophy A BILINGUAL EDITION Introduced, edited, translated and indexed by George Heffernan

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS NOTRE DAME

University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 www.undpress.nd.edu All Rights Reserved Published in the United States of America Copyright © 1990 by University of Notre Dame Reprinted in 2003, 2007, 2013

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Descartes, René, 1596–1650. [Meditationes de prima philosophia. English & Latin] Meditations on First Philosophy = Meditationes de prima philosophia / René Descartes ; edited, translated and indexed by George Heffernan. — Bilingual ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-268-01380-2 (alk. paper) ISBN 0-268-01381-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-268-16110-1 (web pdf) 1. First philosophy—Early works to 1800. 2. God—Proof, Ontological—Early works to 1800. 3. Methodology—Early works to 1800. 4. Knowledge, Theory of—Early works to 1800. I. Heffernan, George. II. Title. III. Title: Meditationes de prima philosophia. B1853.E5H44 1990 194—dc20 89-40751 ∞ This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Meinen Kollegen, den Mitgliedern des Philosophischen Seminars der Universite de Notre Dame du Lac, gewidmet: Denn was konnte unwissender sein als zu glauben, man wisse das, was man nicht weiiS? Und was konnte unphilosophischer sein als zu meinen, man sei philosophisch, wenn man es nicht ist?

CONTENTS

Introduction to this Edition

Meditationes de prima philosophia Meditations on First Philosophy Sapientissimis clarissimisque viris To those most wise and distinguished men Praefatio ad lectorem Preface to the reader Synopsis sex sequentium Meditationum Synopsis of the following six Meditations

56 57 60 61 70 71 78 79

Meditatio I. De iis quae in dubium revocari possunt 86 Meditation I. Concerning the things that can be called into doubt

87

Meditatio II. De natura mentis humanae: quod ipsa sit notior quam corpus

98

Meditation II. Concerning the nature of the human mind: that it be more known than [ the ] body Meditatio III. De Deo, quod existat Meditation III. Concerning God, that he exist Meditatio IV. De vero & falso Meditation IV. Concerning the true and the false

99 118 119 150 151

Meditatio V. De essentia rerum materialium;

& iterum de Deo, quod existat

168

Meditation V. Concerning the essence of material things; and again concerning God, that he exist

169

Meditatio VI. De rerum materialium existentia,

& reali mentis a corpore distinctione

184

Meditation VI. Concerning the existence of material things, and the real distinction of the mind from the body

185

Index

219

Selected Bibliography

247

Introduction to Rene Descartes'

Meditationes de prima philosophia

Descartes' Youth, Education and Early Years

Rene Descartes , the celebrated "Continental rationalist" and arguably the very first philosopher to try to realize the ideal o f epistemic fo undationalism by grounding the theory of "ra­ tionality" rigorou sly and systematically in the notion of "evi­ dence" , was born on March 3 1 , and baptized on April 3 , 1 5 9 6 , at La H aye ( now "Descartes" ) , near Tours , France . Although he had the adva ntage of being born into an old and well­ established family - his father Joach im , for example, was a parliamentary counsellor at Rennes - , so that he would never h ave to earn a living , he also had the disadvantage of having shaky health a s a child - as a student at La F leche, fo r exam­ ple, he was to receive special permission to "lie in" until quite l ate in the day - , so that he would l ater report that doctors did not even expect him to live long enough to reach adulthood . While the exact dates are n o t known with a n y real reliabili­ ty , Descartes attended the Jesuit "College Royal" at L a Fleche in Anjou from 1 606 to , probably , 1 6 1 4 , motivated by , as he would put it in the Discours de la ml:thode, the desire to ac­ quire "a clear and assured knowledge of all that which is use­ ful for life" ( "une connaissance claire et assuree de tout ce qui est utile a la vie" [I, § 6] ) . In the "First Part" of the Discours , 1

2

Introduction

which also contains a highly interesting 'portrait of the philosopher as a young man' , Descartes prai sed the school it­ self as "l'une des plus celebres ecol es de l'E urope" ( § 6 ) , yet blamed some of the things that he claimed to h ave learned there, including "that philosophy provides the means to speak seem­ ingly truly a bout all things and to let oneself be admired by the less wise" ( "que la philosophie donne moyen de parler vraisem­ blablement de toutes choses , et se faire admirer des mains sa­ vants" [ § 7 ] ) . It was at La Fleche , by the way , that Descartes also acquired that proficiency in the Latin language which was later to make it possible for him to write his m ajor philosophi­ cal works i n that medium , that i s , the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, the Meditationes de prima philosop hia and the Prin­

cipia philosophiae. One event in particular cannot but h ave made a deep im­ pression on the young Descartes during his schooldays at La Fleche. For the "College" had been founded in 1603 / 04 by King Henry IV of France ( 1 5 8 9-1610 [a convert to Catholicism (159 3lJ) , who on April 1 3 , 1 5 9 8 , had issued the E dict of Nantes , thereby giving the Huguenots ( F rench Protestants ) equal po­ litical rights with the C atholics , but by no means guaranteeing them unqu alified freedom of religious worship . On May 14 , 16 1 0 , Henry was assassinated by a fanatical C atholic. On June 4 of that year the dead King's heart was ritually transferred to the college at La Fleche . On June 6 , 1611 , there were ceremo ­ nies a t the s chool commemorating the anniversary of that oc­ casion. In that connection there took place the recitation of a memorable poem - " On the Death of King Henry and on the Discovery of some New Planets or Stars Revolving around Jupiter , made the previous Year by Galileo . . . " - marking both the death of the Founding K ing and some of the astro­ nomical adv ances of G alileo Galilei ( 1564- 1 6 42 ) , who in 1 6 1 0 had published Sidereus nuncius ("The Starry Messenger") , recording his discovery of four satellites revolving around the planet Jupiter . Already the signs seemed to indicate that Des­ cartes woul d live during a time of substanti a l religious as well

Introduction

3

a s scientific - and that meant philosophical - change and,

maybe, even of progress. But at the time one j ust could not yet know whether , as there had been a Renaissance and a Refo r­ mation , there would also be an E n lightenment , that is , an Age of Reason . To conclude his fo rmal education Descartes took a bac­ calaureat as well as a licence in law at the University of Poiti­ ers ( November 9-10 , 1 616 ) . One of the most important things that Descartes appears to have learned during his academic edu­ catio n , however , was precisely the lesson expressed by Sene­ ca's ironic remark that "non vitae, sed scholae discimus" (Epistu­ lae ad Lucilium , CVI , 12 ) . Disillusioned by theoretical studies to the point of despairing of the originally sought "clear and a ssured knowledge" - " . . . de penser qu'il n'y avait aucune doctrine dans le monde qui fut telle qu'on m'avait auparavant fait esperer . . . " (Discours, I , § 6) - , and resolving henceforth to turn his attention to himself and to the world in order to find such knowledge - " . . . de ne chercher plus d'autre science que celle qui se pourrait trouver en mo i-meme, ou bien dans le grand livre du monde . . . " ( ibid . , § 14 ) - , he left France and embarked on his travels in 16 1 8 . The first place he went was Holland , where he became acquainted with the respected mathematician Isaac Beeckman , who got him interest­ ed in m athematical as well as in scientific and philosophical matters. There D escartes also composed his first work , a short trea­ tise on music, namel y , the Compendium mus icae ( December , 1618 ) , which remained unpublished during his lifetime.

Descartes' Dreams and Philosophical Mission

Now this was the time of The Thirty Years' War ( 1618-1648 [cf. Discours , I I , § 1: " . . . I'occa sion des guerres qui n'y sont pas encore finies . . . "] ) , and the C atholic Descartes , still in Holland, first joined the forces of Prince Maurice of Nassau ( he did so under an assumed name, "M. du Perron'' , "Perron"

4

Introduction

being the n ame of a s mall fief th at he owned in Poitou ) . But then , h aving traveled to Germany , Descartes was associated with the army of Duke Maximilian I of Bav aria . In 1619 he went to Frankfurt to attend the coronation o f King Ferdinand of Bohemia as Kaiser Ferdinand II of the Heiliges Romisches Reich Deutscher Nation ( August 2 8 ) . The official festivities of this occasion lasted from July 20 to September 9. Upon trying to return to Bavaria, he found himself held up by the bad weather of the approaching winter , and on November 10 he was stay­ ing in the now famous poele or "stove-heated room" somewhere , probably , i n the vicinity of Ulm on the Danube River ( cf. Dis­ c ours, I I , § 1: "J'etai s a lors en Allemagne . . . " ; cf. ibid. , III , § 6 ) - with no one and nothing between him self and his pen­

sees ( ibid . ) . I t was then and there that Descartes had a vision o f a new mathematical , scientific and philo sophical system . According to his biographer, Adrien Baillet (La vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes [Paris : Horthemels, 1691; Hildesheim: Olm s , 1972 (Photo­ graphic Reprint!] , Book I, Chapter 1 [ supposedly based on material fro m Descartes' early notebooks] ) , Descartes had following a day of very intense philosophical meditation which left him in a state of great mental agitation ( " . . . j'etais rem­ pli d'enthousiasme . . . ") - three consecutive dreams in one night ( November 10-11) , dreams that he regarded a s h aving been sent by God and that he would understand as having be­ stowed a sense o f philosophical mission on his life . While the details o f the dreams are not unimportant , let it suffice here and now to note that the question tha t was put to Descartes in the dreams - more precisely , in the last one - was : "Quad vitae sectabor iter?" ( "What way of life shall I fo llow ? " ) The same dream provided its own answer , to wit : "E st et non . " ( "It is and it is not . " ) Descartes interpreted the question as being one concerning what ought to be the "occupation" of his own fu­ ture life , and the answer as being that he ought to pursue truth and to avoid fal sity in the sciences : " . . . je pensai que je ne pouvais mieux que de continuer en celle-la meme ou je me trou-

Introduction

5

vais , c'est-a-dire , que d'employer toute ma vie a cultiver ma rai­ son , et m'avancer , autant que je p ourrais, en la connaissance de la verite . . . " (Discours , III , § 5 ; cf. ibid . , I, § 3 ["la recherche de la verite"] ) . Having made a vow in connection with his three dreams, Descartes probably fulfilled it by going to Italy and making a pilgrimage to the shrine of the V irgin at Loretto sometime during the next few ye ars.

Return to France and Years in Paris: Descartes and Mersenne

Having left the military, Descartes returned to France in 1622, spending some time during the years immedia tely fo llowing in Pari s , but also traveling extensively in Germany , Holland and Italy ( rema ining in the l atter country from S eptember , 1 6 23 , to May , 162 5 ) . From 1625 to 1 62 7 Descartes lived in Paris and was involved in various circles literary and learned . It was then a n d there t h a t F r i a r Marin Mersenne , a Franciscan ( 15 8 8 - 1 64 8 ) , was one of his intim ates . When Descartes moved from France to Holland at the end of the decade 1620- 1 63 0 , Mersenne w a s to function as a kind o f 'philosophical agent' for him , corresponding with him on philosophical topics , acting as an interm ediary between him and other philosophers and helping him to get his works publ ished and recognized - fo r example, the Meditations on Firs t Philosophy.

The Regulae ad directionem ingenii

Toward the end of that decade , in the years 1 627-1628 , Des­ cartes was writing his first important work, the Regulae ad direc­ tionem ingenii or Rules for the Direction of the Mind ( Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol . X , p p . 359-4 6 9 ) , a text whose basic pro­ gram consists of extending geometrical algebra into a sapien­ tia universalis ( "universal wisdom") capable of encompassing all of the sciences . Anticipating the fo undationalist preoccu-

6

Introduction

pation with the connection between evidence , on the one hand , and truth, o n the other hand, which would come to be so charac­ teristic of h i s later writings , the author of the Regulae defines "scientia" ("knowledge in the strict sense of 'science' " ) as "cog­ nitio certa et evidens" ("certain and evident cognition" [emphasis added]) and proposes that one believe only those things which are "perfectly known and cannot be doubted" (Regulae, II , § 1 ) . While it was , among other things , Descartes' interest in ex­ ploring new ways of knowing such as "intuitus" ("intuition" [cf. Regula e , III , § § 4-5 ff. , etc . ] ) and "inductio" ("induction" [cf. ibid., VII , § § 4-5 , 7, XI , § 2, etc.]) - which had been rela­ tively neglected due to the traditional Scholastic preference for the "deductio" ("deduction" ) more fitting both to the "disputa­ tio" ("disputation") of the quaestiones disputa tae or quaestiones quodlibetales and to the "interpretatio" ("interpretation") of the textual commentaries ( Francis Bacon [ 1 56 1 - 1 626] had just pub­ lished the Instauratio magna [ 1 6 05], Vol . II of which was the Novum organum [ 1 62 0 ] , Bk. II of which organon, in turn , in­ troduced the new meth od of induction into the explanation of nature) - that motivated his concern with the problem of evi­ dence, this topic did remain, nonetheless, rather underdeveloped in this work ; for example , the turn of phrase "clare et distincte intellegere" ( "to intellect clearly and distinctly") - which ex­ plicitly and thematically lets "clarity" and "distinctness" as dyadic modes of evidence occur together as members of a pair and which was later to become the sta ndard Cartesian terminolo­ gy - is to be found at only a single locus therein (Regula e , XI , § 2 ) . Indeed , the Regulae were kept remarkably free of those very features which would come to be regarded as peculiarly characteristic of the fully developed Cartesian position on the rel ationship between evidence and truth . First and fo remost l acking in this early work is in particular perh aps the view that it would turn out to be God wh o would h ave to fulfill the epistemic fu nction of guaranteeing the universality and neces­ sity of the connection between the clarity and distinctness o f perceptions , o n the o n e hand , and the certa inty of them , o n

Introduction

7

the other h and (on Deus in the R egulae, see III , § 9 , XII , § § 1 7 a n d 20 [ ? ] , and XIV, § 1 ) . In the fall of 1 62 8 Descartes visited Holland - seeing, fo r example, Beeckman at Dordrecht - , and in the spring of 1 629 he took up permanent residence in Franeker ( later Amsterdam and then Leiden ) in the same country , where no l ater than the winter of 1 6 28-1 629 he formula ted the "last" version of the Rules for the Direction of the M ind. The R ules were neither completed ( only 21 of the projected 36 regulae are given [cf. R egulae, VIII , § 7, and XII , § 27 ] ) nor ever published during his lifetime .

"The Hidden Life" in Holland: Scholarly Interests in Physiology and Anatomy

During the early years of the decade 1 63 0 - 1 640 Descartes v isited various universities in Holland and thus made the ac­ quaintance of many di stinguished mathematician s , doctors of medicine and philosophers. One of his most highly cultivated interests became the study of physiology and anatomy . Indeed , for a while he resided in the K alverstraat - that i s , the "street of calves" - (Amsterdam ) , where he could both regularly wit­ ness the activity of the butchers and purchase as many animal carcasses as he needed fo r the dissections that he deemed in­ dispensable to his scientific investigations. The result was a first­ hand knowledge of the phenomena which could never have been gained by reading books on the subjects - although he did not at all neglect to study what Vesalius ( e . g . , De humani corporis fabrica libri septem [ 1 543 ] ) and other leading researchers in the field had written on these topics - as well as a firm convic­ tion that any and every theory a bout such matters ultimately had to be confirmed by experience and experiment before it could ever h ave any chance at all of being regarded as true. Of course, some people were so resentful of his 'hands on' approach to the things themselves that they found fault with his activi-

8

Introduction

ties by accu sing him of "going through the v illages to see pigs killed" ( cf. Baillet , La vie de Descartes , I, p p . 196-197). Descarte s would live in Holland until 1649 and change his d a dress frequently . The relatively tolerant intellectual at­ mosphere o f the Protestant country may have motivated the former , and the desire for the tranquility and solitude of the withdrawn life , the latter . Indeed , all indications are that Des­ cartes desired very much to live , a s a matter of habit , accord­ ing to the motto "Bene vixit , qui bene latuit . " , in other words, "(S )he has l ived well , who has been hidden well . " ( See "Letter to Mersenne" [April l?l, 1634] . The locus classicus for the say­ ing appears to be Ovid's Tristitiae , 3 , 4 , 25 ; the reference to E picurus' m axim "Lathe biosa s . " or "Live hiddenly . " is obvi­ ous [ see H. Usener , Epicurea , Fragment 5 5 1 ] . ) For Descartes , in any case , philosophy always seemed to remain something that he him self preferred to do essentially alone ( cf. , e . g . , Dis­ cours , 11, § 1 [" . . . seul . . . "] ff. , Medita tiones , I, § 1 [" . . . solus secedo . . . "] , III, § 1 [" . . . meque solum al­ loquendo . . . "] ff. , etc. ) .

"Le Traite du monde" Already by 1629 Descartes' interests in mathematics , science and philosophy had led him to form the idea for a comprehen­ sive treatise which "instead of explaining only one phenome­ non" would "explain all of the p henomena of nature - that is, all of physics" ( "Letter to Mersenne" [November 13 , 1629]). In other words , his intention was to develop a cosmology found­ ed on a physics of such universal validity that it could explain things as apparently diverse as in animate objects and human beings . By 1633 Descartes was ready to publish the whole work, only parts of which , n amely , the beginning - Le monde o u l e Traite d e la lumiere , that is, The World o r The Trea tise o n Ligh t ( Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol . XI , p p . 3 ff. ) - and the end - Le Traite de f'homme, that i s , The Treatise on the Human Being ( ibid., pp . 119 ff. ) - , have survived , under the title "Le

9

Introduction

Traite du monde", that is, The Treatise

the World. (The

on

section, by the way, incomplete physiological essay that it would remain, represented the very first scholarly attempt

last

functions of the human body in

to explain the

explicitly materialistic and

manner.

mechanistic

of Galileo by the

formal condemnation

thoroughly

a

)

and

the in Rome

However,

Inquisition

(June 22, 1633) for that scientist's having adduced evidence

Dialogo sopra

the

co e copernicano (1632) for

superiority

the

of the Copernican

precisely, for

more

-

over the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic Weltbild

having argued that the earth moves both by rotating and

by

sun

revolving around the

caused

-

on

authority

axis

its

consis­

Descartes,

"provision­

tent with the extremely prudential maximes of his al morality" based on obedience to the

in

ptolemai­

i due massimi sistemi de/ mondo,

of the Church

" and o f the State ( cf. the "morale par provision of Discours,

III, §

[especially

1 ff.

et aux coutumes en

§ 2:

de mon

et me

i o ns les plus moderees,

sent

commun ement

ceux ti on s

.

.

.

que ma

en

propre raison

the 'powers

p l a ns to publ i sh

other th a n the

la

mon

d octri ne of

of a summ a ry of

never

a

of the

vey's

[1578-1657]

Discours

sur

peut

mes

one

it

in

of

the very

.

.

.

circulatione

can

of the

earth. Although

be found

especially

pare

and

sanguinis

things

his lifetime, something

com

[1628]

ac­

traite was no thing

the

Exercitatio anatomica de motu

animalibus de

f

mes

by deciding to abandon

the movement

o

sur

pensees" (Discours, VI,§

were' ,

published

"per­

to

defer

guere moins

After all,

(to which

to

vivre."] ),

ne

tha t

certain parts

Part"

en­

suivant les opin­

plus eloignees de l'exces, qui fus­ pratique par les mieux senses de

The World.

Le monde was then

anatomicae

autre c hose,

himself had explained in

th a t Descarte s

in

les

dont l'autorite

th a t i s, to

guinis

et

res;ues

lesquels j'aurais

avec

s o n n e s,

en toute

gouvernant,

lois religion

aux

d'obeir

laquelle Dieu m'a fait la grace d'etre instruit des

fan ce ,

1 ),

etait

"La premiere

pays, retenant constamment

.

in

the

"Fifth

William cordis

Exercitationes

.

.

[1649]).

Har­

et san­

duae

10

Introduction The Disco urs d e la methode

Yet in his commitme nt to the the oretical life as being the hap­

py life Descartes was nothing if not "resolute" (cf. Discours, III, § 3: "Ma seconde maxime etait d'etre le plus ferme et le plus

resolu en mes actio ns que je pourrais , et de ne sui vre pas moins constamment les opinio ns l es plus douteu se s , lorsque je m'y ser ­ ais une foi s determine , que si el les eussent ete tres assurees ."), and on June 8, 1637, he published - for reasons th at a re best set forth in th e "Sixth Part" of the same (i.e. , he coul d not h a ve kept h i s th oughts on 'l a recherch e et l a conn a i ssance de la n a­ ture' or on "la physiq u e" ['research in physics'] secret without v i o l a t i n g th e l aw concern i ng th e comm on good of hu m a nity ["san s pe c h er gran d e m e nt contre l a l oi qui n ous oblige a procu rer , autant qu'i l est en n ous, le bien genera l de tous l es h o m m es" !§ 2; cf. §§ 3-4l]) -

h i s first work, the

Discours de

la verite

la me th o de pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher dans Les sciences or Discourse on the Method ducting one's Reason and

of rightly

of Seeking the Truth in

( th e correctl y a b brev i a ted E ngl is h ti tle of

wh ic h

Con­

the Sciences can

only be

V ol . VI , pp. 1-78]), th a t modern m a ste rpiece of self-effacement a n d dis­

"Discourse on THE Method" [Oeuvres de Descartes,

sembl a n ce ,

togeth er with La dio p tr i q ue or The Optics

tig a ting the

p rin cipl e s of refraction [ibid.,

pp. 81-228]), Les

(inves­

meteores o r The Meteorology (inc l u d ing

l ess con troversial [ibid.,

m a teri a l fro m Le monde on such t opics a s rain bows

pp.

231-366 ff.]) a n d La geometrie or The Geometry ( l ayi ng the fou n d a tion s for a n a lytic geom etry [ibid .,

p p.

369- 485 ff.]). One

might d e scribe th e " d e s s e i n " (Discours, I,§ 5) of th e meth od o­ l ogic a l intro d u ction as b eing , in general, a protreptic

-

in

other

word s , a n exh orta tion to th e re a der to do phil o sophy -

a nd

a s express i n g , in p a rti c u l a r , the dem a n d th a t 'les h ommes de h o n sen s ou de l a r a i so n' or 'th e h u m a n bein gs of good sense or

of re a so n' ( cf. ibid ., I,§ 1 ff., II,§ 1, etc. ), to whom

it

is

a d d ressed , do n a tu r a l p h i l o soph y by applying "l a lumiere n a tu r el le " (I, § 15)

or

"l a r a i son n a t u relle " (VI, § 11)

to

the

study

Introduction

11

o f "the book of nature" ( cf. Galileo , II saggiatore [ 1 6 23 ] : na­ ture or the universe apprehended as a text "written in the lan­ guage of m athematics") and, especially , by engaging in obser­ vations and performing experiments ( "experiences" : cf. Discours , V I , almost passim, especially § 8 [". . . a cause d'une infinite d'experiences dont j'ai besoin . . . " ] ) in order to explicate "the grand book of the un iverse" - instead of merely trying to interpret it as it was "understood" (lucus a non lucen­ do) in , and filtered through , the great books of the ancients . This periagogical intention of the Discours also helps to explain , incidentally , why the author chose to write it not in Latin , but rather in French ( it wa s , after all , at that time highly unusual to do philosophy "en langue vulgaire" ) : "Et si j 'ecris en fran­ s;ais, qui est la langue de mon pay s , plutot qu'en l atin , qui est celle de mes precepteurs , c'est a cause que j 'espere que ceux qui ne se servent que de leur raison naturelle toute pure, jugeront mieux de mes opinions , que ceux qui ne croient qu'aux livres ancien s . " ( V I , § 1 1 )

The Rules Regulating the Relationship between Evidence and Truth

As far a s philosophy has been concerned , of course, the methodological considerations contained in the Discours de la methode presented not as a traite ("Letter to Mersenne" [ M a r c h ( ? ) , 1 6 3 7)) , but r a ther o n l y "co m m e une histoire . . . ou . . . comme une fable" ( Discours , I , § 5) turned out to be much more important th a n the "specimen essays" ("Qui sont des essais de cette methode") . The author of the Discours, seeing the lack of progress in past philosophy , that is , "qu'elle [philosophy l a ete cultivee par les plus excel­ lents esprits qui aient vecu depuis plusieurs siecles , et que nean­ moins il ne s'y trouve encore aucune chose dont on ne dispute, et par consequent qui ne soit douteuse" ( I , § 1 2) , rendered a devastating j udgment on "la philosophie" of his time ( ibid.) : " . . . je reputais presque pour faux tout ce qui n'etait que -

-

12

Introduction

vrai semblable ." In other words, "philosophy"

thing a n d everything other than "science"

had become defined

as

as

any­

"cer­

tain and evident knowledge" by the author of the Regulae. addition, due to the foundational function

of philosophy

in

In

re­

lation to the other sciences, the condition of the latter could not possibly be any better than that of the former: "Puis, pour les autres sciences, d'autant

qu'elles

je jugeais qu'on

de la philosophie,

fondements

qui rut solide, sur des

leurs

empruntent ne

fermes."

si peu

principes rien

bati,

(Discours,

which he regarded as representing the best a spects of three arts or sciences, name­ ly, logic, geometrical a n a lysis and algebra (Discours, II, § 6), I,§ 13) Taking as his

model those

avoir

pouvait

things

Desca rtes proposed to reform phil osophy (cf. by ref a shioning it into a rigorously regulated

ibid., II,§§

(i. e.,

1-3)

rule-governed)

a cti vity which would be capable of resulting in corresponding­ true

ly rigorously regulated and, therefore,

propositions -

gi ven , of course, sound foundations of the deepest

fondements" As

ibid., II,§ 2, IV,§ 1,

see

a matter of fact,

sen se

etc. ).

on "les

(

finding a foundation for epistemically basic that it would

the task of

knowledge which could be so not make any

sort

to demand

something

tal than it is almost as old as Western

even

more

fundamen­

philosophy itself.

Already

in the Politeia, for example, Plato lets the interlocuters engage

supposedly

in a dialogue about, inter alia, the

dence ( since th e re

light of

as

a

was

506

metaphor for evidence [cf.

the Sun" lJ) , but rather "the Good"

or

e- 5 09

certain trop e s of his

e

d

certain

eth o d e"

rect

ly

con

in

rules, w

Accompanied by or "the

for example, "the Good"

-

repl a c ed

Image

l"The

by God -

,

stands

Descartes

tradition.

Accordingly,

m

gets

Good"

the

firmly in this

own

c

"the idea of the Good"

( c f.509 d-511 e ["The Image of the Line"] ). form of

presupposition­

knowledge, which is ultimately not evi­ no Greek word for it, one resorted to

l e s s beginning of all

the "Second more

hi ch h t

d ucti n g

e

aut

the

Part"

exactly, h

or

of

"les

claims to

reason

and

the

Discours

a

r

e

present­

principales regles

(have) follow(ed)

investigating

de

la

in "cor ­

the truth

in the

In troduction

13

sciences" (cf. Discours, ' I ntroductory Remarks', and Medita­ tiones, "Pra efat io ad lectorem", § 1) , t he se rule s being four in number (cf. § § 7-10): "Le premier [i.e., la premiere regle] etait de ne recevo ir jamais aucune chose pour vraie, q ue je ne la con­ nusse evide mm en t etre telle: c'est-a-dire d'eviter soigneusement l a pr ecipita tion et la prevention; et de ne comprendre r ien de pl us en mes j u geme nt s , que ce qu i se presen t era i t si clairement et s i distinctement a m on e spri t , que je n ' eu sse aucune occa­ sion de l e m ett r e en doute." (See ibid.,§ 7; t h e second rule has to do with division , the third wit h order a n d the fourth with enumeration.) In other wor d s , this first rule - n ever to accept anyth i n g a s true th a t o n e does n o t evidently k n o w to be su ch, th at i s , n ever to i nclude a nyth ing i n one's judgments that would n ot presen t itsel f so cl e a rly and so d i sti n ctly that it cou l d not be d oubted - i n ti m a te ly l inks e vi d ence, knowledge and tru th . Th u s i t h a s a l so u su a l l y been take n wi t h out very much doubt to be t h e m o st import a n t rul e that De scartes ever formulated. After a l l, w h a t i s, for example, "le premier pri ncipe de la phi l osoph ie" bei ng sought by Descartes, to wit,". . . je pense, doncje suis . . . "(ibid., IV,§ 1 [cf.§ 3]; cf. Meditationes de prima philosophia, II, § 3 [". . . ego sum, ego ex­ isto . . . "] , § 6 [" . . . e go sum , ego exi sto . . . "],III,§ 9, etc., and Principia philos ophiae, I,§ 7 [" . . . ego cogito, ergo su m .

.. "],§10[" . . . egocogito,ergosum . . . "],etc.), other th a n a j u d g m e n t expres sing a fa ct whi ch i s so clearly and

d i sti n ctly p erceived , or so evi dentl y i n tu i ted, tha t it i s absolutely i m p o ssi b l e to doubt t h e tru th of i t ? Ay , ci ple

there's the ru b , for th i s suppo sedly self-suffici ent first prin­

of Des c a rtes' n ew system of p h i l o sophy really does noth­

i n g m o r e th a n to ph enomeno n ,

represen t a pa rti cu l a r i n sta n ce

a n d it i s a ctu a l ly th e l a tter -

of

a universal

them a ti zed i n th e

m idst of the "premieres medita ti on s . . . metaphysiques" (IV, § 1 ) of the "Fou rth P a rt" on the exi stence of God a n d of th e h u m a n sou l a s

"les fon d ements de s a metaphysiq u e" ('In troduc­

tory Rem a rks' ) -

much

m ore th a n th e former wh i ch ought to

com m a n d t h e epistem i c i n terest of

th e rea der a s well a s , for th at

14

Introduction

matter , of the author of the Discours: "Apres cela , je con sider­ ai en general ce qui est requis a une proposition pour etre vraie et certaine; car, puisque je venais d'en trouver une que je savais etre telle , je pensai que je devais aussi savoir en quoi consiste cette certitude . Et ayant remarque qu'il n'y a rien du tout en ceci: je pense, done je suis, qui m'assure que je dis la verite , sinon que je vois tres clairement que , pour pen ser ' il faut etre : je j ugeai que je pouvais prendre p our regle generate [this em­ phasis adde d] , que les choses que nous concevons fort claire­ ment et fort distinctement, sont toutes vraies; mais qu'il y a seule­ ment quelque difficulte a bien remarquer quelles sont celles que nous concevons distinctement ." ( IV , § 3) In other words , "a general rule" is set up expressing the possibility of making an inference from a past or present experience of a relationship between clarity and dis tinctness and certainty in one given case to future experiences o f the connection between evidence and truth in many - indeed , in all - other case s . (One notes, in passing, tha t Descartes himself does not really seem to appreciate fully the subtlety of the problem of induction with which he is here being confronte d . For the question is whether, respec­ tively , how one can justifiably infer from the accepted fact that clarity and distinctness here and now assure certainty in this case in particular to the supposed fact that evidence would al­ ways and everywhere insure truth in all cases in general . ) Now part of wha t the passage j ust quoted means is that the most im­ portant rule to be formulated in the Disco u rs is not at all la premiere regle de la methode of the "Second Part" of that writ­ ing. As a matter of fa ct, the truly crucial epi stemic rule is not even mentioned , let alone laid down in any canonical way, in that part of the book. On the contrary , while the normative rule of the method of the "Second Part" says that one should resolve never to accept anything as true that one would not evi­ dently know to be so or that one should resolve never to judge about anything that would not present itself so clearly and so distinctly that there could be no doubt about it, the descriptive rule govern ing the relationship between evidence , on the one

Introduction

15

hand , and truth , on the other h an d , of the "Fourth Part" says something significantly different , to wit, that the things which one perceives very clearly and very distinctly are all true in the sense - to anticipate what will follow - tha t they must neces­ sarily be true and cannot possibly be false . ( It would seem to go hand in hand with this distinction that neither the fact that Je pense, done je suis. nor the proposition th at "]e pense, done je suis." is meant to provide the p rimary and ultimate founda­ tion for Descartes' philosophy , for the evidence itself by means of which one intuits th at from the fact that "I [am] think[ing]" it follows and, therefore , can be i nferred that "I am" has to be epistemically more ba sic than the mere obta ining of the state of affairs or the truth of the j udgment. That is , f o r the consis­ tent and consequent foundationalist - i . e . , for someone like Descartes - , if the inference is supposed to be validated by evi­ dence , then the question quickly b ecomes: But what validates the evidence itself , e . g . , what guarantees that it is genuine and not deceptive ? [On thi s remark cf . , e . g. , Meditationes, III , § 9 , where the "lumen naturale" !"natural light"l is explicitly described as being more epistemically basic than the cogito it­ self . ] ) As far as the rel ationship between the two rules is con­ cerned , moreover , it is surely the case that neither "the general rule of truth" - as it will be called in the Meditationes - would follow from the methodological rule or procedural recommen­ dation , nor vice versa . Furthermore, the distinction between the first rule of the method and the general rule of evidence and truth was so obvi­ ous to Descartes himself that he was even convinced that he had to go so far as to offer the reader some kind of j ustification for the posited universal and necessary connection between clar­ ity and distinctness , on the one hand , and truth , on the other hand - wh ich he did then try to do in the f o llowing way ( em­ phasis adde d ) : "Car, p remierement, cela meme que j 'ai tantot pris pour une regle, a savoir que !es choses que nous concevons tres clairement et tres distinctement, sont toutes vraies, n 'est assure q u 'a cause que Dieu est OU existe, e t q u 'il est un etre

16

Introduction

parfait, et que tou t ce qui est en nous vient de lui. D 'oit il suit que nos idees O U notions, etant des choses reelfes, et qui Vien­ nent de Dieu, en tout ce en quoi elles sont claires et distinctes, ne peuvent en cela etre que vraies . En sorte que, si nous en avons assez souvent qui contiennent de la faussete , ce ne peut fare que de celles qui ont quelque chose de confus et obscur, a cause qu'en cela elles p articipent du neant, c'est-a-dire , qu'elles ne sont en nous ainsi confuses , qu'a cause que nous ne sommes pas tout parfaits . E t il est evident q u 'il n 'y a pas mains de repugnance que la faussete ou !'imperfection procede de Dieu, en tant que telfe, q u 'il y en a que la verite O U la perfection proceJe du neant. Mais si nous ne savions point que tout ce q ui est en nous de reel et de vrai, vient d 'un etre parfait et infini, pour claires et distinctes q ue fussent nos idees, nous n 'aurio ns aucune raison qui nous assur!it qu 'elles eussent la perfection d 'etre vraies." (Dis­ cours, IV, § 7) In other words , what is supposed to assure hu­ man and , therefore , imperfect beings that their clear and dis­ tinct perceptions are veridical, in the sense that the truth of ideas is understood to be one of these ideas' perfections, is the al­ leged fact th at they have these , as they have everything else that they have, from God , who is supposed to be a perfect being. On the other hand , it would be contradictory to think of falsi­ ty or imperf ection , as such , as coming from God . For Descartes , then, God , who is epistemically more basic than , because the source of , 1 ight or evidence ( cf . M editationes, IV, § 1 3, VI , § 15, etc. [he too employs light as a metaphor for evidence , the word "evidentia" occurring , as it doe s , only a single time in this work (Oeuv res de Descartes, Vol . VII , p. 4)] ) , is, in a certain sense , suppo sed to play pretty much the same epistemic role that "the Good" , which was epistemically more basic than , be­ cause the source of, light ("evidence" ) , was meant to do for Plato in his account of the reliability of the claim of what purports to be knowledge really to be such .

Introduction

17

The Problem of "The Cartesian Circle"

Naturally it would onl y be a m a tter of time before the more systematic version of this position would cause readers of the Medita tio n es to object that De sca rtes is here arguing in a cir­ cle , viz., by first m a k i n g use of certain clear and distinct ideas o r perception s in p a rticul ar to attempt to establish the truth of the claim th at God exists, a n d by then turning around and

appealing to God to tr y to substantiate the cl a i m th at all clear and distin ct ideas or perceptions in g e nera l a re true (where "first" a n d "th en" are t o be u n d erstoo d first and foremost not tem­ pora l l y , but rather l og i c ally ) - after all, who woul d there be to guarantee the truth of those cl e a r and distinct ideas or per­

ce p ti o n s wh ich one needs i n o rd e r 'to rea ch God' epistemically i n the first p l a ce ? At l e a st th i s seems to be one of the more com­ m on l y a cce pted way s of st a ti n g the supposed problem of "the Cartesia n ci rcl e". It s h ou ld be obviou s to everyone , by the way, that there is indeed a ci r cl e here. Actually, th e only se ri ou s ques­ tion can be

w h et h e r it i s a circulus vitiosus

or a merely benign

one. E ve n n owada ys , because it i s e asily and often forgotten

that Descartes was n ot only "the father of modern ph ilosophy " , but also "the child of medieval

p h i losop hy ", it is n ot ge n era lly

appreciated that and h ow he could sim u l tan eou sly have been with respect to things epistemic so enligh tened as to

wonder

about an answer to the question con ce rn i ng the con necti on be­ twee n evidence and truth, yet so u n e n l igh t en ed as to wa nt to

q uite literally -

explain this connection by c a l l i ng deus

ex

machina

i n a p peal i n g to God as the

for the

one who would

guarantee that wh a tever on e pe rcei ves cl early a nd d i sti n ctly mu st

necess a r i l y be true a n d c a nnot p o ssib ly be fa l se. Yet a ga i n , m aybe a very good way h a s n ever yet been tri e d -

to a rt i cu la t e

Ca rtesi a n c i rcle" wou l d be to u se

the

but still

one

which

the acuteness of "the

judici a l case th a t Kant

e m pl oys i n order to point out where the "Zirkel" ("circle") in one version of the correspon d en ce th eory of truth lies (he is not t a lking a b o u t Desca rte s h ere): ".

.

.

es verha l te si ch m i t jen er

18

Introduction

Erklarung der Wahrheit eben so , wie wenn jemand vor Gericht eine Aussage tue und s ich dabei auf einen Zeugen berufe, den n iemand kenne, der sich aber dadurch glaubwiirdig machen wolle, daR er behaupte, der , welcher ihn zum Zeugen auf­ gerufen , sei ein ehrlicher Mann . " (Immanuel Kant's Logik . Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen [Akademie-Ausgabe, Vol . IX], p . 50 ) I n other words , i t i s a s i f someone would give testimony in court and in doing so would a ppeal to a witness whom no­ body would know but who would want to make himself credi­ ble by asserting that the one who called him to witness were an honest man. Mutatis mutandis , Descartes would be the one testifying and his God would be the witness . Wryly remarking that "the accusation was indeed founded", K ant says that it is "impossible" for any "human being" to solve the problem represented here (ibid.). One reason why the example illustrates the difficulty so nicely is that - and this is a fact which is not generally recognized - there are certain profound things which evidence as a legal phenomenon and evidence as an epistemic phenomenon have in common. Finally , quite regardless of an answer to the question as to whether the Cartesian circle is a v icious one or not, there can be no doubt that, in letting the connection between evidence , on the one hand , and truth , on the other hand, hang by the threateningly thin thread of the veracitas Dei, the Cartesian kind of foundationalism commits the epistemically countersensical mistake of trying to found the v alidity of evidence on or to ground it in something - or , better , someone - other than evidence itself while the whole time not adequately attending to the fact th at, whatever - or , again , whoever - else this might be, he, she or it would h imself, herself or itself have to be given , respectively , had in evidence. In other words, the Cartesian foun­ dationalist's self-imposed dilemma is to find a foundation for evidence, which foundation would not itself be evidence - and to be sure, in the face of the critique which might argue that there neither is nor can be any other way to validate evidence except by a ppealing to other , more and better evidence .

Introduction

l9

In any case , a considerable difference between the epistemic position of the R egulae and that of the Discours lies in the fact that, whereas in the fo rmer clarity and distinctness as mem­ bers of a p a ir of evidence concepts play no systematic role in the truth problematic , in the l atter clarity and distinctness func­ tion as criteria of truth in connection with the veracitas Dei. Still , even in the Discours Descartes - despite his acute aware­ ness of the necessity of providing a justification for the general rule of evidence and truth - does not ( certainly not expressis verbis) claim to try "to demonstra te" , that is , "to prove" , the validity of that rule.

Descartes' Family

From 1638 to 1640 Descartes lived mainly in the country­ side of northern Holland ( near Santpoort), primarily because he could better pursue "the search for truth in the sciences" there than in , for example , "the air of Paris" with its "innumerable distractions" ( "Letter to Mersenne" [May 17 , 1638]). But although he pre{erred a philosophical life of solitude, Descartes did not always remain absolutely a lone in his personal life . For while living in the city of Amsterdam he had entered into a rela­ tionship with his servant, Helene , and together they had had a baby daughter, Francine ( conceived on October 15, 1634 [ac­ cording to a note of her father] , born on July 19 , 1635 , and baptized [in the Reformed Church ] on August 7 of that year); they now came to live with him . I t appears that Descartes in­ tended to let his daughter be educated in France , but the girl fell ill and then died of a fever on September 7, 1640 . Again according to his biographer, this represented the heaviest loss of Descartes' entire life (cf. Baillet, La vie de Descartes, II, pp. 89 f. ; his father died on October 17 of the same year [his mother had died while he was still an infant (on May 13 , 159 7lJ). On the other hand, there is no evidence that this experience caused any significant interruption of his philosophizing - something easier to understand when seen in the light of one ( an obvious-

20

Introduction

ly Stoic one ) of the principles of practical re ason set down in the "Third Part" of the Disc o u rs ( § 4 ) : "M a troisieme maxime etait de tac h er toujours plutot a me vai ncre q ue la fortune , et a ch a n ger mes desirs que l'o rdre du mon de ; et generalement , de m'accou tumer a croire qu'il n'y a rien qui soit entierement en n otre pouvoi r , que nos pen sees , en sorte q u ' apres que nous avons fai t n o tre mieux , tou c h ant les ch o ses q u i nous sont ex ­ terieure s , tout ce qui m anque de nous reu ssi r est , au rega rd de nou s , abso lument imp ossibl e . " I n oth er words , one ought to accustom o neself to th e fact that o n ly on e's own though ts , but n e ve r , h owever , the vagari es o f fo rtu n e , a re u n der on e 's own con tro l . The Medita tiones de prima philosophia

It wa s j u st in th ese y e ar s , from 1 6 3 8 to 1 64 0 , that Desca rtes wrote wh a t turned out to be both h i s magnum opus a n d - a r­ guably th e most celebrated work of ea rly modern philosophy , n amel y , the Medi tationes de p ri m a p hilosoph ia

or Meditations by Apri l , 1 640 ) . A s fa r as one can tell , the Meditatio nes trace thei r begi n nings

on First Ph ilos op h y ( completed

lost , wh ich dealt k n o w ledge o f G od a n d of t h e sel f

back to a small "Traite de metaphysique" , n ow with the ac quisition of the as the only

way to discover th e fo u n dati on s o f physi cs a n d on

wh i ch Desca rt e s wor k e d du ri ng the fi r st n i n e m onth s of h i s stay i n Holland in 1 6 2 9 ( "L etter to M e r sen n e " [Ap ril 1 5 , 1 63 0];

cf. "Letter to M ersen n e " [ Novem ber 2 5 , 1 6 3 0] ) . On e m igh t t a k e the "Fou rth Part" of th e Discou r s o f 1 6 3 7 to represent a r eport on th e content of the " T raite " . Th en , from before N ovem ber ,

1 6 3 9 , to M arch , 1 6 4 0 , Desca rte s

wa s

wri ti ng a n "E ssa i de

m et a physiq u e" ( cf. , e . g . , "L ette r to Mersenne " [N ovem ber 1 3 ,

1 6 3 9] a n d "L ett e r to Mersenn e " [ M a rch 1 1 , 1 640] ) expa n d ing on th i s p a r t o f th e Dis c o u rs ( cf.

M edita tio nes , "Pra efa ti o a d

l ecto re m " , § 1 ) , wh ich gradu a l ly beca me m u ch cl oser i n si ze to th e M ed ita tio n e s th a n to th a t secti on of th a t

k.

wor

Origi­

n a l l y Desca rtes h a d e v en referred to th e n ew composi tion

as

Introduction

21

the "Metaphysics", but i t was eventually decided that "the most fitting title is 'Medita tio ns on First Philosophy' , because the dis­ cussion is not restricted to God and the soul , but rather treats of all those first things in general which are to be discovered by philosophizing. " ( "Letter to Mersenne" [November 11, 1640) ) Indeed , the revisions of the titles of the individual "Meditationes" which were sent b y Descartes to Mersenne ( cf. "Letter to Mersenne" U anuary 28 , 1641]) indicate that the 'origi­ nal' headings patently displayed the character of the M edita­ tiones as a work both o n metaphysics or "first philosophy" and on mathematics and physics ( cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics , 1 004 a 1 ff. , 1026 a 20 ff. , etc . ) . I n 1641 the first e dition o f the Medita tiones de p rima p hilosophia ( Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol . VII , pp. 1-90 ) , together with the first six sets o f Objectiones e t respo nsiones or Objections and Responses ( ibid. , pp. 91-447), was published in Paris by Michael Soly ( August 2 8 ). This edition carried the subtitle "In qua Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demon­ stratur" ( "In which the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul are Demon strated" [formally-grammatically , "qua" !"qui , quae , quod"l is here feminine, singular and ablative , so it refers unambiguously not to "Meditationes" lplurall , but rather to "prima philosophia" ! singularlJ ) . Due to some disappoint­ ment on Descartes' part with the original publisher the second edition of the Medita tiones , together with all seven sets of the Objectiones et responsiones ( ibid. , pp. 91-561) and the Epistola ad P. Dinet or Letter to Father Dinet ( ibid. , pp. 563-603 ) , was published in 1642 in Amsterdam by Louis E lzevir ( containing some minor corrections of the text of the first edition , so that the text of the second edition has e stablished itself as the stan­ dard one ) . T his edition bore the more accurate subtitle "In qui­ bus Dei existentia , et animae humanae a corpore distinctio, demonstrantur" ( "In which the Existence of God and the Dis­ tinction of the Human Soul from the Body are Demonstrated" [here the "which" is plural l"quibu s"l , so it refers, again unam­ biguously , not to "prima philosophia" , but rather to "Medita-

22

Introduction

tiones"]). On the relationship between the real distinction of the soul and of the mind from the body , on the one hand , and the immortality of the soul and of the mind, o n the other hand, the reader should consult especially what Descartes says about Meditations II and VI in the "Synopsis sex sequentium Meditationum" ( "Synopsis of the following six Meditations") - which precedes the actual Meditationes themselves and which contains philosophically valuable overviews of what is mainly supposed to happen in each one of them . The Meditationes proper were introduced by, in addition, both a so called 'Dedica­ tory Epistle' addressed ( to) "Sapientissimis Clarissimisque Viris Sacrae Facultatis Theologiae Parisiensis Decano & Doctori­ bus . . . " ( "To those Most Wise and Distinguished Men , the Dean and D octors of the Sacred F acuity of Theology at Paris"), in which D escartes almost obsequiously solicited their care , patronage and defence for his teachings by doing his best to let the work seem to be first and foremost one by a "Christia n philosopher" ( § 3 [". . . Christianis Philosophis . . . "]) and, thus , of a Christian apologetic nature ( without, however , ever receiving the so eagerly sought "Approbation of the Doctors" after all [compare the title-pages of the editions with each other]) , a n d a "Praefatio ad Lectorem" ( "Preface t o the Reader"), i n which he spoke princip ally to certain objections that had been r aised against h is position on the n ature or essence of the hu­ man mind a s consisting only in i ts being a thinking thing ( § 3) and against his primary argument for the existence of God ( § 4), both of which had been topics of "Part Four" of the Discours . Partially due t o the fact that they are nowadays o n e o f the most commonly read philosophical texts of all , it is often ig­ nored that the Meditationes were simply not addressed to every­ one , or even , for that m atter, to very many readers. On the con­ trary, they were meant to be read by, because they can be understood by , only a very few readers, that is, by those who would be ready, willing and able to fulfill certain hermeneuti­ cal presuppositions: " . . . sed ita ut nullum vulgi plausum, nullamque Lectorum frequentiam expectem : quin etiam nullis

Introduction

23

author sum ut h aec legant , nisi tantum iis qui serio mecum meditari , mentemque a sensibus , simulque ab omnibus praejudiciis , abducere poterunt ac volent , quales non nisi ad­ modum paucos reperiri satis scio . " ( "Praefatio" , § 6) In a word , the author of the Meditationes demanded unconditionally that the readers "seriously meditate" along with h im . Indeed , a s far as philosophical literature i s concerned , the Meditationes are in terms of both form and content sui generis, and this makes it all the more difficult to find an answer to the question about how to understand them adequately. The Meditationes proper consist of six intimately related sets of cogitations, each one of which sets is itself designated as a "Meditatio" ( "Meditation"), entitled ( I) "De iis quae in dubi­ um revocari possum" ( "On the things that can be called into doubt"), ( II ) "De natura mentis h umanae: quod ipsa sit notior quam corpus" ( "On the nature of the human mind : that it be more known than [the] body"), ( III) "De Deo , quod existat" ( "On God, that he exist") , ( IV) "De vero et fa lso" ( "On the true and the false"), ( V) "De essentia rerum materialium ; & iterum de Deo , quod existat" ( "On the essence of material things; and again on God, that he exist") and ( VI) "De rerum materialium existentia , & reali men tis a corpore distinctione" ("On the ex­ istence of material things, and on the real distinction of the mind from the body"). Just a glance at this 'table of contents' would suffice to convince one that the M editationes represent the ex­ ecution of a meditative-methodological , internalist and foun­ dationalist project aimed at determining whether , after every­ thing that can possibly be doubted for "reasons valid and meditated upon" (Meditatio I , § 10 ["propter validas & medita­ tas rationes"]) has been , there is anything at all that may be regarded as certain and indubitable, and if so , what it as well as the evidence fo r it m ight be ( cf. , e . g . , "Synopsis'', § 1, etc . ) . Briefly, what i s being sought i s - t o employ the metaphor o f the Archimedean fulcrum b y which Descartes seemed t o b e so charmed - a "punctum . . . firmum & immobile" (Meditatio I I , § 1), or better, what are being sought are 'fundamen-

24

Introduction

ta . . . certa & inconcussa' ( cf. "Synopsis " , § 1 , Meditatio I , § § 1-2, II , § § 1 and 4 , etc. ) . Prima facie, the most fundamental foundation of all turns out to be " . . . Ego sum, ego ex­ isto . " ( Meditatio I I , § 3 [cf. ibid. , § 6: " . . . E go sum , ego existo . . . "] ) , which according to Descartes is something that follows from " . . . cogito . . . " ( cf. ibid. , Meditatio III , §§ 2 , 9 , etc . ) . Still , the "seriously meditating" reader will not overlook the fact that the "lumen naturale" or "natural light [of reason) " is considered to be more epistemically basic than even the "cogito" ( see a gain Meditatio III , § 9). Yet having thus established , in spite of the hyperbolic destruction of his beliefs in all other things , the existence of his own self ( Meditatio I I , § 3 ) , Descartes proceeds with the process of reconstruction by doing the same for the existence of God ( III, § 22) and for that of the material things of the external world ( VI , § 1 0 ) , so that as a result the reader is treated to a Cartesian epistemic epic , that is, a different version , marred merely by some cosmetic inadequacies, of the account of the creation of the world and of everything in it according to Genesis - this reason for there being exactly six meditations seems to be as good as any and better than most ( but , unlike God , Descartes h ad on the seventh day to entertain questions about whether wh at he had so crea­ tively written was "good" or not ) . .

.

The Attempt to Demonstrate the Connection between Evidence and Truth

Epistemically speaking, then , the core concern of the Medita­ tiones is more or less identical to that of the "Fourth Part" of the Discours , namely , it is the universality and necessity of the connection between the clarity and distinctness or evidence of perceptions , on the one hand , and the certainty and truth of them , on the other hand - a topic which now gets systemati­ cally raised to the level of a 'quod est demon strandum' at the beginning and a 'quod erat demon strandum' ( 'Q . E . D .') at the end . As a matter of fact , any and every attempt to evaluate the

Intro d uction

25

success or failure o f D e sca rte s' ep i stem ic fou ndationali sm is necessarily inadequate if it doe s no t recogn ize th at the first and foremost th esis of it is that th e g e neral ru le of tr uth , namely , that all tho se things which one cl e arly an d di st inctly perceives are true in that mode in which o n e cle arly and di stinctly per ­ ceives them , gets "demon stra ted" or "proved " . ( In passi ng , it is worth n o ting th at perhaps the m a in r ea s o n why Desca rtes i s never - i . e . , either in the M edi ta ti o nes or a nywh ere el se able to take the co n tr a r y modes of evi dence , n a me ly , vagu e­ ness and ob scurity , ev en n ea rly a s seriou sly a s h e d oes c l a rity and distinctness is tha t , wh i l e th e l a tt er appea r to contri bu te to the p rese rv ation of the re l a ti o n s h ip between evi den ce a n d truth , th e former seem t o j eop a rd i ze t h i s con n ecti on . ) F or h a d , i n deed , tri ed to esta b­

w h e rea s the auth o r o f the Discours

l i sh cl a rity a n d distin ctness as c ri te ria o f tru th by offeri ng a t l e a st a kind of a rg u m en t for th e cl a i m th a t , gi ven th e tru th ful­ ness o f God as wel l a s G od' s rel a t i on sh ip to h u m a n bei ngs a s th e creator of their nature , a l l tho se things which on e ( very) cl e a rl y and ( very ) dist inctly percei ve s m u st necessa rily be true and cannot p ossibly be fal se , the author of th e M edita tiones boldl y announces

from th e very s ta rt that he inten d s rigorou s­

l y "to prove" ("Synopsis" , §

2 [ " Prae te rea

u t sciamus ea o m n ia q uae cla re &

vero requiri etiam

dis tinc te in telligim us,

m o d o q u o ilia inte lligimus , e s s e Medita tio n em p ro ba r i n o n p o tu i t p ro b a tur ea o m n ia q uae cla re &

vera :

.

q u od ante

eo

ipso

q uartam

. . "] a n d § 4 ["In qua rta, dis ti nct e percip imus, e sse

. . " ] ) or "to d e m on str a te" ( M ed i ta ti o V, § 6 [" . . . & j a m f u se d em o n s t r a v i i l l a om n i a q u a e d a r e c ogn osco esse

vera

.

vera . "] ) preci sely the v a l i d i ty of th i s cl a i m ,

one

wh ich i s n ow

form u l a ted , a n d exp ress is ve rbis d escri bed , a s "th e genera l rule of truth" (cf. Med i tatio III , § 2 [". . . pro regul a generali . . . , i l l u d o m n e esse veru m , q u o d va l d e d a r e & d i stin cte percipi o. " !emph a si s a d d e d ) ] , a n d V, § 1 5 [ " A tq u i n u l l a ex i i s d a re & d is­ t i n cte percepe r a m , s e d hujus regu lae verita tis ign a ru s ob a l i a s c a u s a s forte cred i d era m , q u a s po stea m i n u s fi rm a s esse detexi. " !emph a s i s a d d ed ) ] ) . O b viou sly p a r t of wh at a l l of th i s m ea n s

26

Introduction

is that - n ote the extreme cau ti on th at i s exercised by Des­ c arte s i n thi s matter at the beginning o f Meditatio III ( " . . . ac

proinde j am vide o r . . . posse s tatuere . . . " [ empha sis ad­ ded beca u s e , at this po i n t , not ye t ha ving "demon strated " or "proved" it, h e i s n ot ju stified in say ing anything more than that " . . . and so I now seem to be a b le to establ ish , as a general rul e , that a ll that which I very cl e arly an d di stinctly perceive i s true . "] ) - the actua l ' demon stration ' of or 'proof' for t h e va ­

l idity of "th e general ru le of truth " m u st be r egarded a s h aving been co m p lete d sometime a n d s omewh ere in the cou rse of Meditatio I V (which r ep r e sen t s a n appl i cati on of A ugu sti ne ' s [354-430) theory of evil [cf. , e . g . , Confessiones , Bk . VII l"Unde est m a l um ? " or "Wh erefrom is ev i l ? ")] to th e problem of error a n d fa l sity [ cf. "Synops i s " , § 4] ) . A n d th a t i s ju st th e way i t h ap­

pens , for in the fi n a l paragraph ( 1 7 ) of t h a t Medi tati o Desca rtes writes the fol l owing a b o u t th e "ca u sa errori s & fa l si t a ti s " : "Et s a n e n u l l a a l i a esse po t es t a b ea q u a m expl i cu i ; n a m q u oties vol u n t a tem i n j u d i ci i s ferend i s i ta contineo , u t a d ea t a n t um se extend a t q u a e i l l i d a re & d i stin cte ab i n tel l ectu exh i bentur , fieri p l a n e n o n potest u t errem , q u i a om n i s cl a ra & d i sti n cta p er ce p ti o p r o cu l d u b i o e s t a l i q u i d , a c proi n d e a n i h i lo esse n on potest, sed necessario D eu m a u th orem h a bet , Deu m , i nqu a m , i l i u m su m m e p erfectu m , q u ern fa l l a cem esse repugn a t ; i deo­ q u e procu l d ubio est vera . " In other word s : Every cl ea r a n d d is ­ ti n ct percep tion i s s o m e t h i ng ( th a t i s ) . Bu t so m eth i ng ( th a t

is )

ca n n ot co m e from n oth i n g ( wh i c h is no t) , bu t ra ther only from

God , who i s the a u th o r of e very th i ng ( th a t is ) . Y et God i s a p erfect bei n g , whom i t contra d i c ts to be d e cepti ve ( m ore ex­ a ctl y , G od could be , b u t d oes n o t wa n t to b e , a deceiver [cf.

M ed i ta ti o I V , § § 2- 3 ! "po sse fa l l ere" versu s "vell e fa l l ere "lJ) . Th erefore , every clear a n d d i stinct percep ti on i s true (cf. M ed ita­ t i o V , § 15 ) . ( T h i s a rgu ment presu pposes fa m i l i a ri ty wi th , a n d a ccepta n ce of, the Sch o l a stic theory of the transcendentia ["tran­ scend en t a l s"] :

E n s et

b o n um co n vertu n tu r. E n s et

verum con­

vertu ntur. "Bei n g a n d th e g ood a re con verti bl e . " "Being a nd

the tru e a re converti b l e . " E very c l e a r a n d d i sti n ct perception

In troduc tio n

27

is someth in g ; therefore , e v ery cl e ar and di stinct perception is also something good an d tru e . Etc . [Cf. , e . g . , Meditatio V , § 6 . ] ) Thu s , u s i ng essentia lly o nly six loci from th e ninety ( Oeuvres de Desca rtes )

pages o f t h e M edi ta ti o nes , th e preceding para ­

graph has summarized the m a i n stati on s a lo ng the way to the 'demonstration' of or 'p roof' for th e validity o f Descartes ' "gener ­ al rule of truth " . Once again , for purely h erm eneu ti cal rea sons i t is di fficul t to u n derst a n d h ow a nyon e c oul d

even

wa nt to try

to reg a rd a nyth i n g but th e suppo sed dem o ns tratio of the va ­ l i dity o f thi s rule a s being th e

m o st

b a sic a spect of Desca rtes '

a cco unt of t h e foun dation s of th e th eory of epi stem ic ration al ­ i ty. On the con trary , j u dged a cco rd i n g to th e cri teri a of th i ngs epi stemic , th e M edi ta tio nes succeed or fa i l depen d i ng on whethe r D e sca rtes d oe s o r do e s n o t "d em on stra te " or "prove " t h a t there i s a u n i v er s a l a n d n ece s s a ry con n ection between the evi den ce o f p er ce p ti o n s , on th e on e h a nd , a n d th e certa i n ty of

th em , on th e other h a n d , th a t i s , th a t th ere e xi sts su ch a rela­ tion shi p between their c l a rity a n d d i sti n ctn ess , on the on e h a n d, a n d their tru t h , on th e o t h er h a n d .

A n E p i stemic Theod icy and a Theological Theory of Evi d en ce Now for a n

a ttem p t a t a n a n swer

to th e qu esti on a s to

wh eth er th e m a i n e p i s tem i c a rgu ment o f th e M editatio nes i s c i rcu l a r o r n ot : Th a t i s , o n e c a n kn ow th a t w h a te v er o ne c lea rly a n d d i st i n ctly perce i ve s i s tru e , i f , a n d on ly i f , on e i s certa i n th a t God exi sts a n d th a t h e i s n ot a d eceiver . A n d one ca n know th a t God e x i sts and th a t h e is not a d eceiver , i f , a n d only if , one i s cert a i n t h a t wh a tever o n e cl e a rly a n d d i sti n ctly perceives i s tru e . ( He re i t i s well worth rem em beri ng th a t th e pu rported 'demon str a ti o n ' o f or 'p roo f' for th e va l i d i ty of "the genera l rule o f truth " i s s u p p o sed to o ccu r i n M ed i ta ti o IV , i . e . , righ t be­ tween th e fi rst p roof fo r the exi sten ce of God i n

M ed i ta t i o III

and th e second proo f for the exi s ten ce o f God in Med i ta ti o V.

28

In trod uc tion

The alleged proof for the claim th at God

cannot

be

a

deceiver

is to be

foun d in Meditatio I, § 1 0 , III, § 38 , IV , §§ 2, 8 and 15. ) Not only is thi s argu ment circular , but Descartes himself ap­

pears to sa y i mpl i citly th at it whether he

might be such ( of course,

just

"intended" to do so or not

ed, anoth er i ssu e ) , and to be sure ,

is,

book i tsel f . Th e rea son l ies in th e o f th e roots o f

th e M editationes a re

More ex a ctly ,

th e opi n i on

crea tes -

regard­

Bible.

to be found in the

th at all of

things which God

those

beings a n d their cognitive facu l ­ be good and cannot possibly be bad i s t a ken righ t ou t of Genesis ( Ch . I , passim [" A nd God saw that it ( i . e . , wh a t God h a d j u st crea tedl wa s good . ] " ; cf. Medi tatio human

m u s t n ecessa ri ly

ties -

I, §

i n cl u ding

both

hermeneutically

the very first page of the fact that more than a few

on

est

9 : "Veru m t a m en i n fixa qu aedam

a

i o , D eu m e s se qui potest omni a , & su m crea tu s .

bonus .

.

. " ).

.

.

At

.

Th i s

.

.

.

supposed

to

God

dou bt wh ether

were

precisely

pen to th em i f they ea t of the forbidden

con fl i ct between th e two

n o t th e fo rm e r

Of c o u rse ,

on

, they

( Genesis , Chs. II-

between th e fa l l

good

between

h a n d , a n d t h e serpen t 's a ccount, ing a

in the fact that

really good

in

the

sense

account

con fronted with God's

k n owl edge o f t h e d i stin ction

su mme

of all those

good, better or best for of what will then hap­

th a t G od w ou l d tru ly know wha t i s them , for ,

source

t o be good too. Indeed, the

la p se of the fi rst h u ma n beings con sists

they d a re

d i citur enim

.

m ean s tha t God, as the

th i ngs wh i c h a re good , i s

opin­

quo talis , qualis existo ,

Deu s .

.

meae menti vetu s

the

fruit of the

other

tree

on the

and ev il , hand,

of

one

be­

there

prefer to beli ev e the latter ,

surely

I I I [there is

a

difference

of th e first huma n beings and their first si n] ) .

i n the Meditationes i t

is

precisely

God that Descartes

to m a ke h i s 'dem on stra ti on'

of

a n d distin ct h u m a n

or

' proof for

perceptions f u nction.

and,

the perfection

th erefore , t h e goodn ess of

needs in order

the truth of all

clear

The point is that,

j u st

a s fo r th e h u m a n bein g to be d eceived implies mp e o f o r th a t bei n g ( M ed i ta ti o I , §10 , and IV , § 8), too for God i

erf

cti

n

so

be

a deceiver

IV , § §

would

2 a n d 1 5 ).

enta i l imperfection

S o wh ile

one

cannot

on ex

to

' G od s part

pect

him

to

(Medi tatio doubt

seri -

Introduction

29

ously either the divine perfection or goodness , since this is sup­ posed to be a book not in theology, but rather in philosophy ( cf. 'Dedicatory Epistle' , §§ 2, 6 , etc . ) , it is legitimate to ask where the argument for the perfection or goodness of God is supposed to be fo und in it. A close look reveals, however , that here there isn't even any indisputable argument for God's good­ ness (on the "bonitas Dei" cf. Meditatio I, § 9 , VI , § § 1 6 , 1 8 and 22-23 ) , let alone fo r God's perfection ( cf. ibid. , "Synop­ sis" , § 3 , Meditatio III , § § 25 , 29 , IV , § § 4 , 1 7 , and V, §§ 7-8) - on the contrary. As a matter o f fact , to concentrate on the weaker of the two , the goodness of God is something that Des­ cartes takes as an article of faith from the Bible - and for grant­ ed ( indeed , at least partially out of fear of the charge of asebeia he shrinks back from the epistemic scenario of the worst of all impossible worlds in Meditatio I by substituting the "genius malign us" [commonly called "the evil genius" , but more ac­ curately described as "the deceitful genius" - after all , this figure has an epistemic , not ain im\moral , role to play in the argu­ ment; on the other han d , isihe does remind one of Iago] for a 'Deus deceptor' [ § § 9- 1 2 jcf. II , § § 3 , 6 and 9 , III , § 4 , VI , § 7 , etc . ) ] ) . Now there i s only a single place i n the Meditationes where the word "circulus" is used in the logica l sense ('Epistle' , § 1 ) , and that is in connection with the apologetic problem of how best to demonstrate to unbelievers that God exists. In that place , Descartes says : "Et quamvis omnino verum sit , Dei ex­ istentiam credendam esse, quoniam in sacris scripturis docetur , & vice versa credendas sacras scripturas , quoniam habentur a Deo ; quia nempe, cum fides sit donum Dei , ille idem qui dat gratiam ad reliqua credenda , potest etiam dare, ut ipsum ex­ istere credamus; non tamen hoc infidelibus proponi potest, quia circulum esse judicarent . " In other words , one cannot argue to unbelievers that the existence of God is to be believed in be­ cause it is taught in Sacred Scripture and , vice versa , that Sacred Scripture is to be believed in because it is from God , since they would judge it to be a circle. Obviously they would not be the only ones, for this is a circle fo r anyone , believer as well as un-

30

Introduction

·

believer , who makes u se of the n a tural l ight o f rea son ( a point which Descartes, who is h ere trying to present an argument for the interpretation that the M edita tio nes represent an exercise in Christian a p o l o get i c s , i s carefu l n ot to mention explicitly , let alone to emphasize ) . But wo u l d it not al so , by the same token, b e a circ l e i f someone were to bel ieve th at Go d i s good because ( s )h e had read i t i n the Bible a n d , vice ve rsa , t h a t the Bible is good ( e . g . , r el i a b l e a s a s ou r ce o f knowledge about God ) be­ ca u se it i s from G o d ? O n e m ight t h i n k t h at it very well woul d be a circl e . ( S u r e l y it d o e s n ot ch a nge a nyth i ng essenti a l h e r e to say that this h a s b e en th e tra d i ti on a l way to look at these th i n gs . ) Non eth eless , i n l i eu of a ny apt a rgu m en t for th e good ­ n es s of God , this i s e x a ctly wh a t the " Ch ri st i a n Ph i l osopher " D es c a r te s ( see agai n 'E pistl e', § 3 ) bel i e ves in h i s capacity a s t h e a u th o r o f th e Meditati o nes . Th erefore , i n so fa r a s the

'dem onstra tion' of or 'proo f fo r "th e gen e ra l ru l e of tru th " in th e Medita tio nes d epen d s on De s ca rt es ' bel i ef i n the good ness - to b r a c k et t h e p er fe c t i o n ( the l a t ter , for wh i ch , aga i n , there of God , i s n o c ogen t a rgumen t either , en ta i l s th e form er ) for wh i ch b e l ief, i n tu rn , th ere i s n o a rgu men t th a t is n ot pa­ ten tl y ci rcu l a r , the j usti fication of the ru l e itself m u st be j u dged to b e co r re s p o n d i n g ly c i rcu l a r . O r to p u t i t som ewh a t d i ffer­ en tl y : The m a i n ep i ste m i c a rgu m e n t of th e M edita tio nes i s cir­

cu l a r a t wo rst, a n d at b e s t i t rests o n a ten et o f fa ith ( n a tu ra l ly ,

both o f these th i n g s a r e p o s si bl e ) . Th rough ou t th i s obj ection to the p r o c e d u re in th e M edi ta tio nes , the qu estion h a s n ever

been wheth er it i s tru e th a t Go d i s good a n d p erfect , bu t ra ther o n l y wheth e r or n o t D e sc a rtes h a s sh own th a t a n d h ow th e be­ l i ef t h a t G o d i s

good or perfect c a n be j u sti fi ed ra tion a l ly in the

context of t h e qu est for t a l th a t i t

would

a fo u nd a ti on of kn o wl edge so f un d a m en­

not m a ke a ny sen se

to dem a n d

som eth i ng m ore

epi stem ical ly b a sic th a n it. In a word , the m a i n top ic of the whole

Meditationes i s

-

a n d here

is whe re

Med i tati o VI with t h e sys­

tem a ti c d i st i n ct i o n between th e "l u m en

trin a

n a tu r a e '

or

'tea ch i ng of n a tu re '

as

( th e re i n l i e s the ep is tem ic "C a rte s i a n

n a tu r a l e " a n d

th e 'do c­

r a d i ca l ly d i fferent d u a l i s m " [th e exi stence two

Introductio n

31

of the external world cannot be demonstrated or proved , either, without presupposing the epistemic reliability of God \cf. the syllogism in § l OlJ ) sources of knowledge about things comes into play ( cf. , e . g . , § § 6-7 and 1 1 - 1 5 ) - the relationship be­ tween the h uman being with his or her cognitive capacities and functions , on the one h and, and the God who created that be­ ing with th ose capacities and functions ( from the beginning , God is the creator of the human being: I , § 9), on the other hand. And as a solution to this philosophical problem of an epistemic theodicy (i.e. , how to reconcile the apparent contradic­ tion between the goodness and perfection of the creator God with respect to cognitive matters and the weakness and imper­ fection of the created human being in the same respect [cf. again Meditatio I , § 9 , and VI , § § 1 6 , 1 8 and 22-23 \the book ends with a very strong statement to the effect that human life is prone to errors and that human nature is weak: ". . . fatendum est humanam vitam . . . saepe erroribus esse obnoxiam , & naturae nostrae infirmitas est agnoscenda . ")] ) Descartes presents what is substantially "a theological theory of evidence" - amaz­ ingly , "Deu s" is mentioned a total of 1 70 times in the book ( once even in the plural [Meditatio V , § 1 1 ] ) . The Objectiones e t responsiones

Importantly , the last remark of the "Prefa ce to the Reader" is to the effect that the reader should not pass j udgment on the M editation es until ( s )he would h ave read carefully all of the "Objection s and Responses" . In fact , during the time between the completion of the manuscript and the publication of the Meditationes Descartes let his opus circulate a mong his friends, requesting comments , criticisms and suggestions for improve­ ments . Also , Descartes sent a copy of the manuscript to Mer­ senne and a sked him to get even further reactions , preferably of distingu ished theologians and philosophers . Indeed , the author wanted the critics to make as many and as strong ob­ j ections as possible , for he hoped "that, as a result , the truth

32

Introduction

will stand out all the better" ( "Letter to Mersenne" Uanuary 28 , 1 64 1 ]) . The "First Objections" were done by a Catholic theologia n , Johannes Caterus , w h o w a s also at the s a m e time the pastor of the church of St. Laurens at Alkmaar ( Holland). Asked by fellow priests who were , in tum , friends of Descartes to take on the task , Caterus obliged , but preferred to remain anony­ mous ( "Letter [from Descartes] to Mersenne" [December 24 , 1 640]), so the "Objections" as well as the "Replies" were ad­ dressed to the priests as agents. Despite the fact that in the first edition the "Second Objec­ tions" were attributed to "theologians and ph ilosophers" , they were mainly the work of Mersenne himself. The "Th ird Objections" were submitted by the E nglish philosopher Thomas Hobbes ( 1 588- 1 679 [from 1 640 to 1 65 1 i n Paris fo r daring to try "to teach political ph ilosophy t o speak E nglish"]), whose materialism m ade his theism suspect. Un­ fortunately , Descartes does not seem to have taken Hobbes' criti­ cisms very seriously . The "Fourth Objections" , in the case of which the objector and the respondent communicated with each other via Mer­ senne, were put together by the French theologian and logician Antoine Arnauld ( 1 6 1 2- 1 694) , who had just ( 1 64 1 ) become Doctor theologiae at the Sorbonne and who would go on to such achievements as the Grammaire generale et raisonnee ( 1 660 [with Claude Lancelot]) and La logique ou /'art de penser ( 1 662 [with Pierre Nicole] ) . The "Fifth Objections" , which are approximately exactly a s long a s the M editationes themselves and which consist virtual­ ly of a textual commentary on them , came from the philosopher Pierre Gassendi ( 1 592- 1 655). What made Gassendi such a sharp critic was that , quite independently of his role in this connec­ tion , he was trying to defend a moderate empiricism and scep­ ticism by appropriating ancient Greek , especially Epicurean , sensualism and atomism (cf. Syntagma philosophicum [ 1 658]). It may be common nowadays to classify modem philosophers

Introduction

33

as "Continental rationa lists" ( Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza ) , on the one h and, and a s "British empiricists" ( Locke , Berkeley and Hume) , on the other hand , but Gassendi defies stereotyp­ ing . In so far as these designations mean anything at all , he would be a "Continental empirici st" . In 1 64 4 Gassendi him­ self published the Disq uisitio metaphysica seu dubitatio nes et instantiae a dversus R e nati Cartes ii metaphysicam et respon­ sa , in other words, his obj ections ( 1 64 1 ) to the Medita tiones , Descartes' responses and his, G assendi's, responses to the responses ( 1 642 ) . It is too bad tha t Descartes declared the lat­ ter to be unworthy of a detailed reply ( "Letter to Clerselier" Uanuary 1 2 , 1 646] ) . The "Sixth Objections" were , like the second set , from Mer­ senne , but , unlike them , they were apparently merely collect­ ed by him. The "Seventh Objections" were drawn up by the mathema­ tician Pierre Bourdin ( 1 5 9 5- 1 6 5 3 ), a Jesuit , and represented , given Desca rtes' hope to win the support of the Society for his teachings , a big disappointment for him in terms of both charita­ ble interpretation and philosophical quality : "I have never seen a piece of writing so full of faults" ("Letter to Mersenne" [March , 1 642] ) . I n the "Letter to Fa ther Dinet" Descartes related his reac­ tion to Bourdin's objection s . The Jesuit Dinet was connected to Bourdin as well as to Descartes, for he was both the former's superior in the Society and had been one of the latter's profes­ sors at La Fleche. As far as the circula rity of the foundation alist argumenta­ tion of the M editationes goes , the objectors do not seem to have been able to convince Descartes of anything important ( cf. , e.g. , "Second Objections" [ Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol . VII] , pp. 1 24-1 25 and 1 26 , versus "Second Respon ses" [ibid . ] , pp . 1 40- 1 4 1 and 1 43 - 1 46 , and "Fourth Objections" [ibid. ] , p . 2 1 4 , versus "Fourth Responses" [ibid. ] , pp. 245-24 6 ) . I n this respect, there is unfortunately a noticeable tendency both in the "Ob­ jections" and in the "Responses" to prefer to discuss subordinate

34

Introduction

issues, for example, the temporal problem of how it is that one can still be sure of the certainty of a perception even when one no longer enjoys the 'live' clarity a nd distinctness of it , instead of concentr ating on the real , logical difficulty , namely , what it is that gu arantees the relationship between the evidence and the truth of perceptions . For these are obviously two different things.

The Condemnation of the Cartesian Philosophy

By the early years of the decade 1 640- 1 650 , when he was living first near Leiden and then near Alkmaa r , it had become adequately transparent to everyone who had taken the time and made the effort to read his writings that Descartes' philosophy, with its emphasis on the primacy and ultimacy of experience over author ity , represented something not only untraditional , but also antitraditional - in a word , "antischolastic" . One of h is opponents was Gisbertus Voetius ( 1 58 9 - 1 676), an influential minister and a professor of theology at the Univer­ sity of Utrecht as well as, at that time, the rector of the school , who in writings from 1 642 to 1 643 attacked the Cartesian philosophy fo r its alleged atheistic and sceptical tendencies. As a result, on March 16 , 1 642, the Cartesian ph ilosophy was con­ demned and forbidden to be taught in the following pronounce­ ment issued by the Academic Senate of the University of Utrecht: " . . . se [ i . e . , the professo rs] rejicere n o v a m ista m Philosophia m : primo , quia veteri Philosophiae, quam Acade­ miae toto orbe terrarum hactenus optima consilio docuere, ad­ versatur , ejusque fundamenta subvertit ; deinde , quia juventu­ tem a vetere & sana Philosophia avertit, impeditque quominus ad culmen eruditionis provehatur : eo quad , istius praesump­ tae Philosophiae adminiculo, technologemata , in auctorum libris professorum que lectionibus & disputationibus usitata , perci­ pere nequit ; postremo , quad ex ea dem variae ' falsae & absur­ dae opiniones partim consequantur , partim ab improvida juven­ tute deduci possint , pugnantes cum caeteris disciplinis &

Introduction

35

fa culta tibu s , atque inprimis cum orth o d o x a Theolo­ gia . . . . Censere igitur ac statuere, omnes philosophiam in hac Academia docentes in posterum a tali instituto atque in­ cepto abstinere debere, contentos modid libertate dissentien­ di in singularibus nonnullis opinionibus, ad aliarum celebri­ um Academiarum exemplum , hie usitata : ita ut veteris & receptae philosophiae fundamenta non l abefactent , & in eo etiam atque etiam laborent, ut Academiae tra nquillitas in om­ nibus sarta tecta conservetur. " ( Oeuvres de Descartes, Vol . VII , pp . 5 9 2-5 9 3) In other words , Descartes' philosophy was con­ demned fo r three reasons: ( 1) It was supposed to be opposed to the traditional philosophy and to undermine its foundations; ( 2) it was supposed to lead the youth away fr om the tradition­ al philosophy ( "corru pting the youth" [cf. Plato's Apology of Socrates] ? ) , and even to render it incomprehensible to them ; and ( 3 ) it was supposed to lead to false and absurd opinions , meaning , apparently, 'opinions conflicting with "orthodox The­ ology [i.e. , Philosophy]" ' . But what i s a t issue here i s precisely the rel ative truthfulness or falsity of the traditional versus the new philosophy , that is, whether it makes any sense at all to adhere blindly to the tradi­ tional philosophy regardless of its scientific value compared with that of the new philosophy . Thus , in the statement issued , aca­ demic tranquility was judged to be a higher good than the truth . In this respect , those who fo rmul ated the condemnation pro­ foundly missed the point. In 1 64 3 Descartes did write a n "Epistola ad Voetium" or "Letter to V oetius" ( Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol . VIII / 2 , pp . 1 - 1 94 [cf. his "Lettre apologetique aux Magistrats d'Utrecht" or "Defense Letter to the Magistrates of Utrecht" [June 1 6 , 1 645l, ibid. , pp . 283-3 1 7] ) in which he responded that the attacks on his teachings were untenable , but this was - of course in vain . For at about the same time the Magistrates of Utrecht issued an edict (June 1 2 , 1 645) prohibiting anything to be pub­ lished pro or contra Descartes' ph ilosophy . Thus did one try to silence him.

36

Introduction Correspondence with Elizabeth: Les passions de l'ame

In 1 643 Descartes began a lengthy and fa mous correspon­ dence with the young Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia ( who was the daughter of King Frederick of Bohemia ["The Winter King"] and who had gone with her family into exile in Holland after the Battle o f the White Mountain on November 8 , 1 620 [her dates are 1 6 1 8- 1 6 8 0] ) . It was by wondering how the soul can be ruled by the body in the light of the fact that they seem to have nothing in common that Elizabeth got interested in the passions . So she asked Descartes to explain "the manner of [the soul's] actio ns and passions in the body" ( "Letter to Descartes" Uune 20, 1 643] ) . In her questions the Princess articulated some major difficulties with his position on the relationship between the mind and the body - she was not satisfied with his vague and obscure initial 'explanation' that the body causes the soul to h ave feel ings and pa ssion s , and the soul causes the body to move ( by means of an inexplicable "union" between the body and the sou l ) - , and in his detailed answers Descartes provid­ ed much valuable info rmation about his philosophy of mind. Another topic o f the correspondence was the explanation o f the relation between reason and the passion s . Elizabeth ulti­ mately dem anded that Descartes give "a defi nition of the pas­ sions , in order to make them well known" ("Letter to Descartes" [September 1 3 , 1 645] ) . It was then that Descartes wrote a short "treatise on the passions" , which he presented to Elizabeth in 1 64 6 . Some of Descartes' though ts on this subject were later included in the final work of his to be published in his own life­ time , Les passions de l'ame or The Passions of the Soul ( 1 64 9 [Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol. XI , pp . 291-497] ) , a sweeping trea­ tise on physiology, psychology , ethics and much more . The Principia ph ilosophiae

In 1 644 Descartes published the Principia philosophiae or Principles of Philosophy ( Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol . VIII / l ,

In troduc tion

37

pp . 1 - 3 29 ) , a compre h en s ive pre sent ation o f his philosophi ­ c a l and scie ntific sy ste m th at he p l anned a s a un iversity text ­ book which would riva l the traditional scholastic manuals based on the wr i ti ng s of Ari s to tle and T hom a s Aq uina s ( origi nally i t was to be entitled the "Summa p h ilos ophiae" ["Letter to Con­ stan ti j n Hu ygen s" Uanuary 3 1 , 1 6 42 l ] ) an d wh ich wou ld , he hoped , even tually even render th em superf l uo u s a nd obsolete . The work co n ta i n s fou r p a rt s ( d i v i ded i n to altogether 5 04 ar ­ ticle s ) , n am el y , "On th e Principl e s of H u m a n K nowledge " , "On

P ri n ci p l e s of Material Th ings" , "On the V i si bl e W orl d" and the Earth " . O ri gi n ally two mo re pa rts were pl a n ned , n a me­ l y , on p l a n t s a n d a n i m a l s a n d on th e h u m a n bei ng , bu t th ese were n ever fi n i shed . I n t e resti ngl y , th ere is a l ot of ma teri a l i n the

"On

th e Princip ia th at r e p r e sen t s a p u bl i ca ti on , a fter a l l , of stuf f

w h i ch Desca rtes h a d o n ce wri tten for the u npu bl i sh ed , beca use u n p u b l i s h a b l e , Le m o nde . From an epistemic st a n dpoi n t , th e "Fi rst Pa rt " of th e Prin­ ci p ia ( " De p rinci pi i s co gn i t i o n i s h u m ana e " ) , wh i ch sets ou t "les pr i ncipes de la conn a issa n ce" -

that i s , "l a prem i e re

philosophie

l a m et a p hysi q u e " ( "L etter of th e A u th or" / 'Preface to IX / 2 , pp . 1 - 20] , p . 1 6 ) - according to Desc artes i n a m a nner very d i ffer­ ent from th a t of t h e M edita tio nes , exh i bi ts all of th e pecu l i arly OU

•

•

•

the French Edition' [ O e u v res d e Desca rtes , V ol.

characteristic featu res of his

m a j o r work on th e sa me topi c , a nd

then some . In re g a rd to of

" l e s p ri n c i p e s "

tru th ,

on t h e

".

qu'i l y

.

.

the connection between th e evi dence of th e Princip ia , on th e on e h a n d , a n d th eir

other h a n d , i n p a rticu l a r D esca rt es wri tes : a u n D i eu , q u i e st a u teu r de tou t ce qu i est au

m on d e , et q u i , et a n t l a s o u rce de toute verite ,

n'a poi n t

n otre en tend ement de te l l e n a t u re q u'il se pu i sse tromper a u

cree

juge­

m e n t q u ' i l fa i t d e s ch o ses d on t i i a u n e percepti on fort d a i re et fort d i sti n cte . " ( "L et ter of the A u thor " / 'Prefa ce to the French E d i ti o n ' , p .

1 0 ) In r e g a r d to th e c on n ection between evi d en ce

a n d tru th i n gen er a l h e s a ys : "Pri m u m Dei a ttri bu tu m qu od hk ven i t i n con s i d e r a t i o n e m , est , q u o d si t su m m e vera x , & d a tor o m n i s l u m i n i s : a d eo u t p l a ne rep ugnet ut n os fa l l a t

, si ve

ut

38

Introduction

proprie ac p ositive sit causa errorum , quibus nos obnoxios esse experimur. Nam quamvis forte posse fallere nonnullum ingenii argumentu m apud nos homines esse videatur , nunquam certe fallendi voluntas nisi ex malitia vel metu & imbecillitate procedit, nee proinde in Deum cadere potest. . . . Atque hinc sequitur, lumen naturae, sive cognoscendi facultatem a Deo no­ bis datam , nullum unquam objectum posse attingere , quod non sit verum , quatenus ab ipsa attingitur, hoc est , quatenus dare & distincte percipitur . Merito enim deceptor esset dicendus , si perversam illam ac falsum pro vero sumentem nobis dedis­ set. Ita tollitur summa illa dubitatio , quae ex eo petebatur, quad nesciremus an forte talis essemus n aturae , ut falleremur etiam in iis quae nob is evidentissima e sse videntur . Quin & aliae omnes dub itandi causae , prius recensitae, facile ex hoc princi­ pio tollentur . . . . C ertum autem est , nihil nos unquam fal­ sum pro vero admissuro s , si tantum iis assensum praebeamus quae dare & distincte percipiemus . Certum, inquam , quia , cum Deus non sit fallax , facultas percip iendi quam nobis dedit, non potest tendere in falsum ; ut neque etiam facultas assentiendi , cum tantum ad ea quae dare percipiuntur se extendit. Et quam­ vis hoc null a ratione probaretu r , ita omnium animis a n atura impressum est, ut quoties aliquid dare percipimu s , ei sponte assentiamur , & nullo modo possimus dubitare quin sit verum . " ( Principia p hilosophia e , I , § § XXIX ["Deum non esse errorum causam . "] , XXX ["Hine sequi omnia quae d are percipimu s , vera esse, a c tolli dubitationes ante recensitas . "] and XLIII ["Nos nunquam fall i , cum solis dare & distincte perceptis assen­ timur . "] ) In other word s , just as in the Discou rs ( in a very rudimentary fashion ) as well as in the M edita tiones ( in a high­ ly developed form ) , the argument of the Principia for the posi­ tion that all those things which one clearly and distinctly per­ ceives must necessarily be true and cannot possibly be false would look something like this: It is God who has given the human bein g those cognitive faculties which are by nature so constituted that, if ( s )he clearly and distinctly perceives some­ thing, then ( s)he must , that i s , cannot do otherwise than to ,

Introductio n

39

judge that it b e true ( cf. Medita tiones , IV, § 1 0 , and V , § § 6 and 1 4 ) . But God is not, and cannot possibly be, a deceiver ( cf. again ibid . , IV , § § 2-3 ) . Therefore , whatever the human being clearly and distinctly perceives is also true, and to be sure, in that mode in which ( s )he clearly and distinctly perceives it. ( Although this argument might or m ight not be sound , it most certainly is not - as some critics, who do not believe that Des­ cartes' account of evidence and truth should be taken serious­ ly , would h ave it - patently absurd ; on the contrary , there is a profound affinity between the kind of thinking about the rela­ tionship between God as the creator and the human being as one of God's creatures - God being the maker of the human being, including that b eing's cognitive faculties - which lies at the basis of it and some positions in contemporary cognitive theory , e . g . , "proper functionali sm" . ) So this is what must be recognized as remaining constant both in the transition from the Discours to the M editatio nes and in the transition from the M edita tion es to the Principia . The Definition o f "Clear Perception" and of "Distinct Perception"

Of course , in order to find out what has ch anged in the tran­ sitions from the ones to the others , one has to notice that what the author of the Discours and the Meditatio nes had neglected to do , and precisely what the author of the Principia tries to do , is to define the concepts "clear perception" and "distinct perception": "Quin & permulti ho mines nihil plane in tota vita percipiunt satis recte , ad certum de eo judicium ferendum . Ete­ nim ad perceptionem , cui certum & indubitatum judicium possit inniti , non modo requiritur ut sit clara , sed etiam ut sit distinc­ ta. Claram voco illam , quae menti attendenti praesens & aperta est: sicut ea dare a no bis videri dicimus , qua e , oculo intuenti praesentia , satis fortiter & aperte ilium movent. Distinctam au­ tem illam, quae , cum clara sit , ab omnibus aliis ita sej uncta est & praecisa , ut nihil plane aliu d , quam quod clarum est , in

40

Introduction

se continea t . . . . Atque ita potest esse clara perceptio , quae non sit distincta ; non a utem ulla distincta , nisi sit clara . " ( Prin­ cipia , I, § § XL V ["Quid sit perceptio clara , quid distincta . "] and XL VI [ " . . . ostenditur , claram esse posse perceptionem , etsi non sit distinct a ; non autem distinctam , nisi sit clara . "] ) In other words , the criteria of clarity are "presence" and "open­ ness", and the criteria of distinctness are "separateness" and "pre­ cision" . Thus it is possible for a p erception to be clear without being distinct , but impossible for a perception to be distinct without being clear (a good example is pain : see ibid. , § § XL VI and LXVII-LXIX [cf. Medita tiones , VI , § 7 (" . . . nam quid dolore intimius esse p otest?"IJ ) . Yet the careful and cautious reader will recognize almost at first sight th at what is p rovided here amounts at the very most, on a loose construction , to definitions of the modes of evidence "clarity" ( "praesens & aperta") and "distinctness" ( "sejunc­ ta . . . & praecisa" ) . Once agai n , one might, as a matter of fact , even w ant to argue - with promising prospects of suc­ cess - that , on a strict construction , Descartes is here not at all defining "clarity" and "distinctness" per se , but rather only the concepts "clear percep tion" an d "distinct perception". Yet for the present purpose s one does not have to make anything out of thi s . More importantly , what is certain a n d indubitable is that one does not find any definition o f the concept of "evidence" itself in these paragraphs of the Principia ; nor does one find anything of the sort in any of the other paragraphs of this work. At this poin t , it almost goes without saying th at to define the modes of evidence "clarity" and "distinctness" is not the same thing as to define the concept of "evidence" itself, no more than to define the modes of evidence "v agueness" and "obscurity" would be to do so . Therefore , Descartes has no definition and, for th at matter , no definite description - of "evidence" itself at all here.

Introduction

41

The D evelopment of Descartes ' Position on the Rela tion s h ip between Evidence and T ruth

So to j u d ge o n the b a sis of the ev i dence presented by a co­ herent a n d contextu alizing re adi n g o f the R egulae ad di rectio­ nem ingeni i , the Dis c o u rs de la m hhode , the M edit atio nes de p rima philo s op h ia a n d the Princip ia philosop hiae , one m ay say

that the m a ture C a rte sian positio n on th e ep i stem ic relation ­ ship between evidence , on the one h a nd , a nd truth , on the other h a n d , i nv o l v e s th e fo l l owi n g , rel a ti vely stra igh tforward E nt ­ s tehu ngsgeschic h te : F i r s t o f a l l , i n th e R egu lae o f 1 62 8 - 1 629 a l l knowl e d ge is u n d e r stood to be certa i n a n d "evi d en t " cogni ­ tion , wh i l e the con cept s of evi dence "cl a rity " a n d "d i stin ctness " , as mem bers o f an exp l i ci t l y a n d t h em a ti ca l ly pa i red dya d , pl ay n o r e a l l y s i g n i fi c a n t ro l e i n the tru th prob l em a ti c ; th en , i n t h e

Disc o u rs of 1 6 3 7 cl a r i ty a n d d i sti n ctn ess a re system a ti ca l ly p a i red off a s b e i n g -

the veracita s Dei

-

w i th , of cou rse , i n d i sp en sa bl e h elp from

the criteri a of truth , wh i l e no cl a i m i s m a de ,

exp ressis verbis , to th e e ffect th a t a j u sti fi ca ti on i n the sen se of a

'demon stration' o r 'pro o f i s b ei ng propo sed of or for the

a n d necessity of th e ru l e- govern ed con necti on be­ tween evi d en ce a n d tru th ; n ex t , in th e M edita tiones of 1 6 4 1 - 1 6 4 2 it is exp l i c i tl y a n d th e m a t i ca l l y a sserted at a n u m­ u n i versa l i t y

ber of pl a ce s tha t the general rule of truth ,

n a m ely ,

th a t a l l those

th i n gs wh i c h one c l e a r l y a n d d i sti n ctly percei ves a re a l so tru e , a n d to be su re , i n th a t m o d e in wh i ch one c l ea r ly a n d d i sti n ct ly perceives th em , w i l l be , re s pecti ve ly , h a s been or

" pr o ved "

of

a l l cl e a r a n d

once a g a i n by appea l i ng

-

d i sti n c t

o f t h e v a l i d i ty of th e

to

"d em on stra ted "

Deus a s

pe r cepti on s a n d th u s a s

s a i d ru l e -

,

th e

a u th or

t h e gu a ra ntor d efi n i­

w h i l e , n oneth el ess , no

tion s of th e b a s i c co n c epts of evi d en ce , n a m e ly , "cl a ri ty " a nd " d i stin ctn e s s " the m sel v e s , a re prop osed ; fi n a l ly , in th e

of 1 644 cl a r ity

i a of tru th , i t i s a l l eged l y s h o wn God -

Principia

a n d d i sti n ctness a re l a i d down a s supposed criter­ yet aga i n wi th ref eren ce

to

th a t wh a tever i s c l e a rly a n d d i sti n ctly perceived i s a l so

tru e , a n d -

a t best -

t h e m o d e s o f evi d ence "cl a ri ty " a n d "di s -

42

Introduction

tinctness" or - at least - "cl e ar p ercep tion " a nd "distinct per ­ ception" are defined , w h il e even here no definition of "evidence " itsel f is ever given .

Wh at Is Missing: A Defi n ition of "E vidence "

Therefo r e , one result o f all o f th i s i s the i n sigh t th at that philosop h e r who h a s so mehow m a n aged to persu ade a l most everyone to a ssociate h i s n a m e with th e d i scu ssion a bou t the

conn ecti on b etween cl a ri ty a n d d i sti n ctness , on th e on e h a n d , a n d certa i n ty on t h e other h a n d , a n d , th erefore ,

mutandis

-

-

m utatis

, with th e a ttempt to find a n a n swer to th e qu es­

tion con cern i n g the rel a ti o n sh ip b etween evi d en ce , on th e on e h a n d , an d truth , on th e other h a n d , simply d oes n ot seem

to

h a ve r e cogn i z ed th e i m porta n ce o f a t l ea st proposi ng a d efi n i­ tion of the con ce p t of "evidence" itsel f . Ph i l o soph i ca l ly , th en , one i s j u st p l a i n l eft wonderi ng a b ou t wh a t exa ctly evidence itsel f i s su p p osed to b e i n a l l of th i s - a ga i n , th e word "evi d en­ ti a " does n ot occu r ev en o n ce i n the M edita tiones proper . Obvious ly there i s a n i n ti m a te connection between the project o f grou n d i n g evi d en ce i n , or o f fou n d i ng it on , som eth ing or someone su p posedly m ore epi stem ica l ly ba sic th a n - a n d , there­ fore, other th a n - i t i t s e l f, on th e on e h a n d , a n d th e fa i l u re to ta ke evi d en ce seriou s l y enou gh p h i l o soph i ca l ly to defi n e i t i t­ sel f a t a l l , o n the other h a n d . Som ehow evi d en ce wa s j u st not held to be s u fficien tly p ri m a ry or u l ti m a t e to wa rra n t working o u t conceptu a l l y wh a t i t m ay prop erly be ta ken to be . O n e got i n terested i n e s t a b l i sh i ng a b a si s for k n owl e dge , a ba si s- m ore­ b a si c- t h a n - wh i ch - n o n e- c a n- be- b a sed - a n d th a t b a si s wa s sup­ posed to b e n ot evi d e n ce , bu t r a th er som eth i ng or som eone d i fferen t fro m ev i d e n c e O f c ou r se th e q u esti on i s wh eth er , e p i stem ica l l y spe a ki n g , such a n enterpri se m a kes a ny sen se a t a l l , o r w h e t h e r i t d o e s n o t , i n fa ct , represen t som eth i ng totally a n d cou n te rsen sica l ly c i r cu l a r . T h e a n swer th a t one gi ves to .

th i s qu esti o n

wi

ll

,

,

in tu rn , p retty m u ch d eterm i n e wh a t one

th i n k s of th e M e dita tio n e s de p rima p h ilos op hia a s a n essay i n ep i stem i c foun d a ti o n a l i sm .

43

In tro duc tion

The French Translatio n of the

and of

Principia

the Medita tiones

In the sam e year as th e a ppearan ce of th e Principia Descartes visited his p a trie France a fter an a b sence o f more t h an fifteen years . There he met th e Abbe

C l a u d e Pi cot , a n

ol d

friend who

now undertoo k , with D e sca rte s ' a p prov a l , to ren der th e Prin­ cipia i n t o French . The tra n sl a ti on appea red i n 1 64 7 ( Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol. IX / 2 , pp . 1 -3 2 5 ) , an d Descartes even wrote

an i m po r t a n t p h i l o so p h ical i n trod u cti on ( "L ettre de } 'a u teu r "

o r P r e fa c e ) t o a cco m p a n y i t up o n pu bl ica ti on . "

"

T h e re o n e fi n d s , a m o ng oth er th i ngs , a n ow fa m ou s d escrip­ t i o n o f th e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p h i l o soph y ( "Or ce sou vera in b i en , co n s i d e r e p a r l a r a i s on n a tu r el l e s a n s l a l u m i ere d e l a foi , n 'est a u tr e ch o se q u e l a con n a i s s a n ce de l a verite pa r

ses

prem i eres c a u se s , c ' e s t- a - d i re l a S age sse , d on t l a Ph i l osoph ie est l 'etu d e . " [ p . 4 ) ) a n d i t s con stitu en t d i scipl i n es ( p . 1 4 ) " A i n­ :

si tou te l a p h i l o soph i e e st com m e u n a rbre , don t les ra cin es sont la m et a p h y s i q u e , le tro n c est la p hysiq u e , et l es bra n c h es qu i

sorten t de ce tron c soot tou tes l es a u tres scien ces , qu i se red u isent

a troi s p r i n cipa l e s , a s a v o i r l a m e d eci n e , l a m ech a n iq u e

et

la

m o r a l e , j 'en ten d s l a p l u s h a u te et l a pl u s parfa i te m ora l e , q u i , presu p p osa n t u n e e n t i ere co n n a i s s a n ce d e s a u tres sci en ces , est le dern i er d e gr e de l a sa ge s s e

i s , the

st u dy

. "

In o th er

of, or the strivi ng a fter ,

w ord s , ph i l osophy ,

w i sd om ,

i s l i ke

a

roots a re m et a p h y s i c s , wh o se t ru n k i s ph ysi cs bra nches a r e a l l t h e o t h er science s , wh i ch m ay be n a m el y ,

m ed i c i n e ,

th ree p r i n ci p a l

on es ,

i ty .

t h e m et a p h o r v i v i d l y

T h e e n d of

tree ,

a n d wh ose

red u ced to

m ech a n i cs a n d m ora l­

re ca l l s both th e begi n n i ng

of th e " S i xt h P a rt" of th e Disc o u rs a n d Gen e sis , I -III .

pre ser v a ti on

c i n e m a y co n tr i b u t e to ' th e

th at

whose

M edi­

of h ea l th , th a t i s , the

h i gh e st good a n d th e fo u n d a ti on of a l l of th e oth er good s in th i s l i fe' ( Di s c o u rs , VI , § 2 :

"

.

.

.

l a con serv a ti on de l a sa n t e ,

l a q u el l e est s a n s d o u te l e prem i er b i en et le fo n d em en t de tou s l e s a u tres b i en s de cett e v i e .

.

. " ) , a n d m ech a n i cs

m igh t even

44

Introduction

promise to make human beings "the masters and possessors of nature" ( ibid. : ". . . et ainsi nous rendre comme maitres et possesseurs de la nature.") , but will the science of morality really provide hu man beings with the fr uits of the tree of philosophy in the fo rm of genuine knowledge of the distinction between good and evil? In addition , Descartes approved a French translation of the Meditation es de prima philosoph ia which had been prepared by Louis-Charles d'Albert, Due de Luynes ( 1 620-1 690) . In 1 647 it was published as the Meditations mhap hysiques touchant la premiere philosop hie . . . ( Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol . IX / 1 , pp . 1 -72) , together with a French version of the first six sets of "Objectiones et responsiones" ( ibid. , pp . 73-244) done by Descartes' disciple Claude Clerselier ( 1 6 1 8 - 1 6 84) . In 1 644 a Latin version of the Discours de la mhhode ( Oeuvres , Vol . VI , pp . 540-5 8 3 ) and the first two Essais (ibid. , pp. 5 8 4-72 0) , translated by E tienne de Courcelles, had been published in Amsterdam. Just as much as he wanted there to be French translations of his Latin works , Descartes wanted there to be Latin transla­ tions of his French ones . Like all of his seventeenth-century scho­ larly contemporaries - for example, Thomas Hobbes (who published the Latin De cive in 1 64 2 , the English Leviathan in 1 65 1 , the E nglish Philosophical Rudiments concerning Govern­ ment and Society [= "On the Citizen"] in that same year , the Latin Levia than in 1 66 8 , etc . ) - , Descartes realized that La­ tin was unquestionably the principal language of the mundus doctorum and that publication in this medium was the best way to insure th e ur iversal accessibility of one's writings. The Comments on a certain Broadsheet

On September 6 , 1 647, Descartes was awarded a pension by Louis XIV, the King of France. In December of that same year Descartes wrote Comments on a certain Broadsheet ("Notae in programma quoddam"; published in January , 1 648 [Oeuvres

In troductio n

45

de Descartes , Vol . VIIl / 2 , pp. 3 3 5 -3 6 9 ) ) , directed against cer­ tain - less innatist-idealist and m ore empiricist-materialist interpretations of his positions o n the nature of thought and on the relationship between it and sensation by his fo rmer fol­ lower Henricus Regius (cf. Explica tio mentis humanae [Decem­ ber , 1 647) : . . . all thought is derived from sensation . . . ' ) . In fact, i t w a s Regius who , i n h i s capacity as a professor o f medi­ cine at the U niversity of Utrecht, had undertaken to teach Des­ cartes' philo sophy there, and in p rovocatively doing so had ap­ parently helped - no/ens volens - to provide the occasion for the condemnation of Descartes' philosophy by that school . During the winter of 1 647- 1 64 8 Descarte s was working on a treatise on physiology. Although it was never completed , it did get published posthumously - by Clerselier with his edi­ tion of the Traite de l'homme in 1 6 64 - under the title "Descrip­ tion du corps humain" or "Description of the Human Body" ( Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol . XI , pp . 223 ff. ) . '

The "Conversation with Burman"

From November 1 644 to the summer of 1 649 - except for one other visit to France in 1 647 - Descartes lived at Egmond­ Binnen in H olland . It was there that on April 1 6 , 1 64 8 , Des­ cartes was interviewed by the young Dutchman and student of theology Frans Burma n ( 1 628-1 679 [in 1 66 2 ff. profe ssor of theology at the University of Utrecht] ) , who put to him very many questions concerning the Discours, Meditationes and Prin­ cipia . The interviewer took detailed notes on Descartes' answers , and the result was the "Responsiones Renati Des Canes ad quas­ dam difficultates ex Meditationibus eju s , etc. ab ipso haustae" or "Conversation with Burman" ( Oeuvres de Descartes , Vol . V , pp . 1 44 - 1 7 9 ) . Thi s piece of writing represents a valuable source for a scertaining what Descartes thought about his own scientific and philosophical achievements at thi s point in his life ,

46

Introduction

and it is especially important for the interpretation of the Medita­ tiones . Descartes' Death in Stockholm

In Febru ary of 1 649 Descartes received an invitation to the royal court at Stockholm fr om Queen Christina of Sweden ( 1 626- 1 6 8 9) , who , h aving both corresponded with him and read the Principia as well as other things by him , was so im­ pressed by his work as to ask him to come to her country in order to instruct her in philosophy . After long hesitation and with much reluctance - he thought of Sweden as being, among other thing s , "a country of bears among the rocks and the ice" ("Letter to Brasset" [April 23 , 1 6 49]) - Descartes finally got under way in September of that year . Having arrived in Stock­ holm on October 1 , h owever , Descartes ended up spending a miserable autumn during which he was engaged in mostly un­ philosophical activities , for example , writing a pastoral come­ dy ( lost) and - disputably - verse to celeb rate the Queen's birthday ( December 1 8 ) and the Peace of Westphalia ( treaties for which had been signed on October 24 , 1 648) - the ballet La naissance de la paix was danced on December 1 9 of that year and rediscovered in 1 920 - , etc. Thus it was only in Janu­ ary of the fo llowing year that Descartes was at last able to take up the task of instructing the Queen in philosophy. Unfortunate­ ly fo r him , she required him to attend to her regularly at five o'clock in the morning , thereby profo undly disturbing his life­ long establi shed sleeping patterns ( as an adult still adhering to the habits formed in his youth at La Fleche, he usually rose at about eleven o'clock - a preference which he regarded as be­ ing very conducive to philosophizing). Descartes presented the Queen with the statutes of an Academie des Sciences ( Febru­ ary 1 ) , very quickly contracted pneumonia ( February 2 ) , and died at Stockholm on February 1 1 , 1 65 0 . In a way , it was an ironic , but fitting fate fo r a m a n who had once tried to excu se what he considered to be the super­ ficiality of his treatment of the argument(s ) for the existence

In tro duc tion

of God in the "Fourth Part" o f th e Disco u rs by saying

47

that it

was meant to b e "a boo k where I had wanted th at even the wom­ en would be able to u n der stand s o meth ing" ( "un l ivre , ou

j ' ai

voulu que l e s femmes m emes pu i ss en t entendre q uelque chose " ["Letter to Vatier" !Fe bru ary 2 2 , 1 6 3 8 1] ) . Today , D e scarte s' body

lies i n the chu rch

o f Sa int-Germ ain­

des-Pre s , P a ri s .

La rech erch e d e la verite La

recherche de la

verite

par la lumiere natu relle

or

for Truth by means of the Na tu ra l Ligh t ( Oe uvres de

The Search Descartes ,

Vol . X , pp . 4 9 5 - 5 2 7 ) - wh o se d a te o f co mposi tion i s q u i te u n certa i n -

rem a i n ed a n i n co mp l ete work wh i ch wa s n ot pu b­

l i sh e d d u ri n g Desca rte s ' l i feti m e . T h e m a i n i d ea of th e piece i s th a t "th i s l ight a l o n e , with ou t a ny h elp from rel igi on

or

ph i l osoph y , determ i n e s wh a t op i n i ons a good m a n shou l d h old o n a n y m a tter th a t m a y occupy h i s th ough ts , a n d penetra tes

i n to the s e c r et s of th e m o s t reco n d i te sci en ces " ( ibid . , p . 495 ) . Light b e i n g both for the ep i s tem i c tra d i ti on of W estern ph i l osophy i n gen e r a l a n d for h i m i n p a rti cu l a r a m etaph or for

evidence , R en e Desc a r tes was cert a i n ly a a s h i s wh o l e l i fe

h um anly

po ssi b l e

l ets i ts e l f be ch a ra cteri zed a s

th e

p u r s u i t o f cl a ri ty a n d d i sti n ctn ess

oth er work represen ts h i s k i n d o f the

ph i l o soph er , i n so far

l i fe m ore

a s pu re a s -

typi ca l ly

a n d no th a n do

M e dita tio nes de p rima p h ilo s o p hia.

On the P resen t E d i tion The

present

edition

of

the

M edi ta tio nes

de

p rima

philo s op h ia / M e d ita tio ns on Firs t Philo s op hy deri ves i ts

fi c a tion first

a n d forem o st from th e fa ct th a t i t

gu a l L a ti n - E ngl i sh

ed i ti o n e ver

in tra n sl a ti n g h a s been to

is

ju sti­

th e first bil i n­

to b e pu bl i sh ed . N ext , th e a i m

ach ieve

a

version

wh i ch would be both

a s l i ter a l a s p o s s i b l e a n d a s l i ber a l a s n ece s s a r y .

Th en , th ere

48

Introduction

was need of an index which would be far more comprehensive , in terms of breadth as well as of depth , than any other index in any other edition of the work. Finally , there had to be an introduction that would offer philosophically more and better contextual ization of the text of the M edita tiones . The two models for this edition have been : Rene Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosop hia. Meditationen uber die Grundlagen der Philosophie ( Philosophische Bibliothek Band 250 a ) . Auf Grund der Ausgaben von Artur Buchenau neu her­ ausgegeben von Liider Gabe. Durchgesehen von Hans Gunter Zekl. Hamburg: Felix Meiner , 1 977. And : Rene Descartes , Meditationes de Prima Philosophia. Meditationen uber die Erste Philosophie. Lateinisch I Deutsch ( Universal-Bibliothek Nr. 2 8 8 8 ) . O bersetzt und herausgegeben von Gerhart Schmidt. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun. , 1 9 8 6 . The edition and the translation are of : Rene Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, Oeuvres de Descartes, Vol. VII , pp. 1 - 9 0 . Ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J . Vrin , 1 9 83 (First Edition: 1 904 ) . The new, revised edition of the original series ( 1 3 volumes) , which appeared at the turn of the century (Paris : L. Cerf , 1 8 97- 1 9 1 3) , is: Oeuvres d e Descartes. Publiees p a r Charles Adam & Paul Tannery. Paris: Librairie Philosop hique J. Vrin and Le Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1 964-1 976 ( 1 3 Volumes: 1 - 1 1 conta in Descartes' writings , 12 contains Adam's Vie et oeuvres de Descartes , and 1 3 con tains biographical material , correspondence and indices). This edition has been reprinted. Some slight improvements on this text had to be made for example , in the middle of p. 23 ( I . 1 2) "quum" should be "cum", at th e top of p. 2 8 (II . 1 -2) "imanatione" should be "im­ aginatione" , at the bottom of p. 43 ( l. 2 8 ) "posset" should be "posse" , etc. Whenever and wherever it wa s necessary , such changes have been marked by the use of square brackets ( " [ . . . ] ") . The regu lar numbers in , again , the same kind of brackets th at have been inserted into the Latin text refer to the pagination of the Adam and Tannery edition. The regular num-

Introduction

49

hers i n , yet again , th e sa me kind o f brackets t h at stand at the beginning o f every p ara gra ph o f the E ngl ish t ext are not in the Latin text; they have been a dded for the assista nce of those who p refer to cite an d to qu o t e th e M edita tio ns according to Medi­ tation and p aragraph ( " § " ) . C omp ared with doing so by giving

most cases the much more exact w ay to refer to D e sca r tes ' text . I n a ddi ­

the pages of the Adam a nd T a nnery edition , th is is in

tion , a m in i m a l amou nt of o ther m a teri a l a i med at fill i ng in

some of the gaps left b y th e conse rv ati ve tr an sl ati ng h a s been added i n the English tr a n sl a tion by m ea n s of still another , fin al , use of the square b r a ckets . It h a r d l y needs to b e menti o n ed th a t th e p resen t e d i ti on of

th e text of t h e M edita tio nes de p rima p h ilosophia does n ot represent a critical o n e , w h i ch re m a i n s a desidera tum . I f t h e tra n sl a tion h a s a n y m eri t a t a l l , i t wi l l prob a bly be d ue to a l l th a t t h e t r a n s l a t o r h a s l e a r n ed from th e foll owing ver­ sion s of the

M edita tio n es :

R en e De sca rtes ,

Philosophy , The Philo sophica l

i nto

E n gl i s h by E l i z a b eth S .

S.

on

Fi rst

H a l d a n e a n d G . R . T . R oss . I n

Two Vo l u m es . C a m b r i dge : C a m b ri dge

I , pp . 1 3 1 - 1 9 9 ( T ra n s l a to r H . ) ; R en e D e sc a rtes , M ed ita tio ns

( ff. ) .

M editations

Wo rks of Desca rtes . R en dered

Vol .

U n i versity Press , 1 9 1 1

o f t h e M editatio nes : E . on

Fi rs t

Philosophy

Whic h The E xistence of God A n d The Dis ti nction

from t he Body A re Dem o ns tra ted . T ra n sl a ted

o f the

In

Soul

from th e L a tin

by D o n a l d A . Cress . In d i a n apol i s , I n d i a n a : H a ckett Pu bl i sh­ i n g Com p a ny , Inc . , 1 9 7 9 ; a n d R e ne Desca rtes , M editations on F i rs t P h ilo s oph y , The Ph ilosop h ica l Writi ngs o f Desca rtes . Tr a n s l a ted by J o h n C o tti n gh a m , R obert Stooth o ff a n d Duga ld M u rd och . Vo l u m e s 1- 1 1 .

C a m br i dge : C a m b ri dge U n i versi ty

Pr e ss, 1 9 8 4 ( V ol. 11 )-

I ) . V ol . II , pp . 1 - 62 ( Tra n s­ C o tti ngh a m ) . H ere th e tra n sl a ti on s

1 9 8 5 ( V ol .

l a tor of the M edita tio n e s : o f Buchen a u ( e t

a l. )

a n d S ch m i d t too sh ou l d n ot on ly be m en­

tioned , but a l so e m p h a s i z e d stron gly .

A s for th e E ngl i sh ver­

s i on s : H a l d a n e's tr a n sl a ti o n h a s s erved th e pu rpose for

wh ich

i t w a s d o n e , th a t i s , to m a ke th e w o rk o f A d a m a n d Ta n n ery 's ed i ti o n s a v a i l a b l e i n so m e schol a rl y form to

E ngl i sh

rea d ers

at

50

Introduction

the beginning of this century ; Cress' translation appears to be the most straightforward of the th ree ; on the other hand , Cot­ tingham's translation m ight just be the most elegant - his Des­ cartes' Meditations rea d as if they had been written fo r a re­ cent number of a philo sophical journal , and a first-class one at that . Through out, the tra nslator of this translation has tried to translate that which Descartes does appear to have written in the Medita tiones , and - whenever and wherever there hap­ pens to be a significant difference between the two things not that wh ich he might seem to have meant. In fact , because one of the m ain goals of a bilingual edition should be to present the translation as an aid to a better understanding of the origi­ nal than would be possible in a monolingual edition , the present English text attempts to translate not only the sense , but also the gramm ar itself of the original , for example, by adhering rather rigorously to even the very punctuation of the Latin text - at least as far as possible. Of course, it does not really mat­ ter very much to the present reader whether that punctuation was Descartes' own - that is something for the philologists and palaeographers to determine. The point is that it is the punc­ tuation that ( s)he will be looking at in trying to decide whether the translator has left "the same th ing" standing in the E nglish version as there was in the Latin original . In other word s , although the Latin colons a n d semicolons , fo r example, do not have precisely the same grammatical functions as the E nglish ones , holding the units of sense demarcated by the fo rmer con­ stant as far as possible makes it much easier for the student of the text to find the way back from the English translation to the Latin original - discrete philosophical statement by dis­ crete philosophical statement. Thus retaining the punctuation of the Latin text as far as possible also bestows a remarkable meditative fluency on the philosophical argument of the En­ glish version which would be simply unachievable if the "nor­ mal" gramm atical rules were followed . Besides , Descartes' sen­ tences just don't run on that much. In general , then , the passive

In troduction

51

h a s been tra n slated a s p a ssive, the subjunctive a s subjunctive , the logical connectives a s logical connectives , etc. , except when and where to do so would have become altogether too clumsy . Naturally this goes very much against the Zeitgeist , for the democratization and the universalization of the English language seem to entail that fewer and fewer fo rms a ssume more and more mean ings . So everything is put into the active, the indica­ tive, etc. - more and more senses being indicated by fewer and fewer signs peculiar to them . Thu s it is a commonplace to pick up even The New York Times and to read such things a s : "If Ronald Reagan still was the President of the United States of America . . . " . The fewer people there are who , while they do speak English , have taken the trouble to learn Latin or Ger­ man or other languages that appreciate the difference , say, be­ tween the o ratio recta and the oratio obliqua , the worse this situation is going to get . So caveat lector: It has not been one o f the aims of the present translation to attem pt to convey the impression that Descartes' Meditationes would - or even should - h ave been written in English ; rather , on the contrary , one goal has been to make an extended effort at awakening in the reader something very much like the feeling which a Latin speak­ ing reader would have had upon studying the edition of the Meditationes that Adam and Tan nery published in 1 904 - to the extent, of course, that this is, hermeneutically speaking, still possible at all in the present time and under the present circum­ stances . It will not be easy reading, and it will not be to the taste of many . Thus, depending on the many and different criter­ ia that can be set up fo r making judgments about such things , this translation does not necessarily claim to be a very "good" one, even less a "better" one tha n any others , and most cer­ tainly not "the best" - whatever "the best" is supposed to mean here - tran slation of Descartes' M editationes . It i s , however , guaranteed to be accurate in a way different from the ways in which any of the other translation s of this work are. Through­ out, higher value has consistently been placed on the Nachvo/1ziehbarkeit - that i s , 'the fo llowability with u nderstanding' -

52

In troduction

of th e tran sl ation . N atur ­ th ing to h av e done , for wh ile o n e strives to achieve the sta n da r d s of Will i a m of Moerbeke , one very m u ch drea d s h av i ng a tra n sl a ti on j udged by such h igh of the origi nal than on the e l eg a n ce ally this is a lso quite a d a n gerou s

criteria . The p resent t r a n s l a t o r h a s foll o wed the lea d of Buchenau ( e t a l. ) - w ith ver y few excepti on s - a n d C re ss i n tra n slating

o n l y the c l a ssic L a ti n text o f th e M edita tio n es . On the other h a n d , Co tt i n g h a m a n d Sch m i dt a l so give n u m erou s selecti on s i ndicating so m e of the d i fferen ce s b etween th e La ti n a n d the Fre n ch vers ion s . ( H a l d a ne's vers i o n

i s a tru ly polygl ot one , with

n o system a tic a ttempt to l et th e re a der know wh a t i s goi ng on . ) The Fren ch tran sl ati on i s , h a vi ng been publ i sh ed wi th Descartes ' per so n a l a p prov a l , re a so n a bl y a c cu r a te . A l th ough Ba i l l et , the ph i l o soph e r ' s b i o gr a ph er , th ough t th a t De sca rtes h a d ta ken the opport u n ity of th e French ed iti on "to re tou ch h i s origin a l work" , there a ppe a rs to be n o j u sti fi ca ti o n wh a tsoever for

a ttri bu ti ng

g r e a t e r a uth o r i ty to the Fren ch v er si o n th a n to th e L a ti n origi­

n a l . Wh a t i s deci sive is t h a t it i s cert a i n th a t Desca rtes person a l ly c o m p o sed t h e L a t i n tex t o f th e

M e dita ti o n es , wh i l e th e a n swer

to the q u e s t i o n a bout w h i ch c h a nge s for the

Fren ch text i s t h o r o u gh ly o b scu re . Besi d es , a gl a n ce a t

the French tr a n s l a ti o n s h ows th a t th e t h e L a t i n o r i gi n a l

a r b i tra ry . M o st

d i fferen ces between

i t a nd

a re s o m a n y a n d s o co n si d era bl e th a t vi rtu­

a l l y a n y selection wou l d

wh i ch

he himself m ay h a ve m ade

n ecessa ri ly h a ve

to

b e very l i m ited a nd

l i kely , it wou l d a l so d i m i n i sh a ny in cl i n a tion

th e r e a der

m i gh t a l rea dy

h a ve

to go person a l ly a n d

to

get the oth e r version in ord er to comp a re th e on e presen ted h e re with i t .

S i n ce e a s y to u n d e r s t a n d i n stru cti on s

h a ve been pl a ced a t

th e h e a d o f t h e I n d e x , i t i s n ot n e ce s sa ry to com m ent on i t h ere oth er t h a n to p o i n t o u t th at i t wa s c omp i l ed w i t h o u t a n y h e l p a t a l l fro m a co mpu ter . i n s trum e n tarium fo r t h e

better

by a h u m a n bei ng

M ay i t

serve

as

an

u n d erst a n d i ng of Desca rtes '

p h i l o sop h i c a l p o s i t i o n s a n d a rgu m en ts in th e M editationes .

Introduction

53

In thanksgiving , the following institutions and individuals should be mentioned ( affiliations are, unless noted otherwise, with The Department of Philosophy of The Un iversity of Notre Dame) : Prof. Dr . Karl Ameriks helped in his usual manner , that i s , by knowing just plain everyth ing. Jon Beane put the Latin text into the computer . The Depa rtment of Philosophy of The University of Bonn very generously permitted the editor-and­ translator to work there as a Visiting Teacher and Researcher , with all privileges, during the summer semesters of 1 988 and 1 98 9 : Dr. H ubertus Busche, Dr. Eduard Gerresheim and Dr. Dieter Loh mar were especially accommodating . Prof. Dr . Cor­ nelius F. Delaney read the translation and convinced the trans­ lator to translate in such a way that the text would not have to be "re-translated" into English after having been "translat­ ed" out of Latin. Prof. Dr. JoAnn Della Nev a of The Depart­ ment of Romance Languages and Literatures of The Universi­ ty of Notre Dame checked the modernization of the orthography of the French quotations in the Introduction . Prof. Dr. Mic Det­ lefsen provided constant moral support by arguing persuasively that it is indeed a fallen world - although he was never able to explain in any convincing way why it insists so much on drag­ ging others down with it. John Ehm ann , Administrative Director of The University of Notre Dame Press , was patient and en­ couraging beyond the bounds of reasonable expectation . Prof. Dr. Richard Foley recognized, independently of how the present finished product has tu rned out, the importance of there being an edition of the M editationes of this kind when he peer­ reviewed the original proposal submitted to The University of Notre Dame Press . Pro f. Dr. Alfred J. Freddoso was always there to say how he would ( have) translate( d) it. The Office of Advanced S tudies at The University of Notre D ame, under the direction of Prof. Dr. Robert E . Gordon , provided a Jesse H . Jones Faculty Research Travel Award fo r the summer o f 1 988 . The Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts at The Univer­ sity of Notre Dame, under the di rection of Prof. Dr. Nathan

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Introduction

0. Hatch , o ffered a Summer Stipend for the summer of 1 9 8 7 . Margaret J a siewicz o f the stenopool o f The C ollege o f Arts and Letters at The University of Notre Dame put the English trans­ l ation and the Index into the computer . Prof. Dr. Lynn S. Joy read, and commented on, the Introduction . Dr . Michael Kremer had interes ting ideas on the problem of logical circularity in Descartes' argument. Karen Kuss a ssisted Jon Beane. It was very enlightening to talk with Dr. Tad Schmaltz of The Department of Philosophy of Duke University about many of the philosophi­ cal matters discussed in the Introduction . The Index was com­ p iled in Jul y , 1 9 8 9 , in Cambril s , Spain , at the home of Herr Rudolf and Frau Teresa Schmickler of Cologne , Germany; their daughter, D r . med . M ireya Schmickler of The University of Cologne , h elped out in many different ways . Throughout the entire project Prof. Dr . Gerhart S chmidt of The Department of Philosophy of The University of Bonn was of invaluable as­ sistance in the solution of all kinds of technical and philosophical problems: His edition of the Meditationes and the present one enjoyed a common conception during the editor-and-translator's time as his Wissenschaftlicher Mita rbeiter ( 1 983-8 6 ) . Eric Wat­ kins assisted in the same way as Tad Schm altz . I alone am responsible for any errors that might remain . May the readers be kind enough to point them out to me , thereby making their own contribution to the improvement of the edition . The book is dedicated to my colleagues, the members of The Department of Philosophy of The University of Notre D ame. They and I both know why .

Universite de Notre D ame du Lac March 1 99 0

G eorge Heffernan

RENATI

DES-CARTES , MEDIT ATI ONES D E PRIMA

PHILOSOPHIA, IN QUA DEi EXISTENTIA ET ANIMAE IMMORTALITAS DEM ONSTRATUR.

PARISIIS , Apud MIC HAE LEM SOL y ' via Iacobea , sub signo Phoenicis . M . D C . XLI .

Cum Privilegio, & Approba tione Doctorum.

RENE

DESCARTE S , MEDITATIONS ON FIRST

PHILO SOPHY , IN WHICH THE E XISTENC E O F GOD AND THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL ARE DEMONSTRATED.

PARIS , B y MICHAEL S o LY , James Street , under

the sign of the Phoenix . 1 641 .

With the Privilege, & the Approba tion of the Doctors.

RENA TI

DES-CARTE S , MEDITATIONES De Prima PHILOSOPHIA , In quibus Dei existentia, & animae

humanae a corpore distinctio, dem onstrantur. His adjunctae sunt variae o bjectiones docto­ rum virorum in istas de Deo & anima demonstratione s ; Cum Responsionibus Authoris.

Secunda editio septimis objectionibus antehac non visis aucta. Amstelodami,

Apud Ludovicum Elzevirium . 1 642 .

RENE

DESCARTES , MEDITATIONS On Firs t PHILOSOPHY , In which the existence of God, & the distinction of the human soul from the body,

are demonstrated. To which have been added various objections of learned men against these demonstrations concerning God and the soul; With the Responses of the A u thor.

Second edition, enlarged by the previously unpublished seventh objections. Amsterdam, By Ludwig Elzevir. 1 6 42 .

SAPIENTISSIMIS CLARISSIMISQUE VIRIS

SACRAE FACULTATIS THE OLOGIAE PARISIENSIS DECANO & D O C T O RIBUS

RENATUS DES CA RTES S . D.

Tam just a causa me impellit ad hoc scriptum vobis offeren­ dum, & tam justam etiam vos ha bituros esse confido ad ejus deffensionem su scipiendam , postquam instituti mei rationem intelligetis , ut nulla re mel ius illud hie possim commendare , quam si quid in eo sequutu s sim paucis dicam. Semper existimavi duas quaestiones , de Deo & de Anim a , praecipuas esse e x i i s q u a e Philosophiae potius quam Theolo­ giae ope sunt demonstrandae: nam quamvis nobis fidelibus ani­ mam humanam cum corpore non [2] interire, Deumque existere, fide credere sufficiat, certe infidelibus nulla religio , nee fere etiam ulla moralis virtu s , videtur posse persuaderi , nisi prius illis ista duo ratione naturali probentur: cumque saepe in hac vita majora vitiis quam virtutibus praemia proponantur , pauci rectum uti­ li praeferrent , si nee Deum timerent , nee aliam vitam expec­ tarent. Et quamvis omnino verum sit, Dei existentiam creden­ dam esse , quoniam in sacris scripturis docetur' & vice versa credendas sacras scripturas , quoniam habentur a Deo ; quia nempe , cum fides sit donum Dei , ille idem qui dat gratiam ad

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TO THOSE MOST WISE AND DISTINGUISHED MEN, THE DEAN AND THE D O CTO RS

OF THE SACRED FACULTY OF THEOLOGY AT PARIS, RENE DESCARTES SAYS "GREETINGS'' .

[ 1 . ] So just a cause impels me to offer thi s writing to you , and I trust that you too are going to have such a just one for taking up its defence after you will have understood the reason fo r my undertaking , that I could here commend it by no better means than if I were to say with a few words what I have pur­ sued in it. [2 . ] Of the questions th at need to be demon strated by philosophy rather than theology I have always thought that two , about God and about the soul , are foremost . For although it might suffice fo r us faithful to bel ieve by faith that the human soul does not perish with the body and that God exists , it cer­ tainly seems that no religion - nor almost even any moral virtue - can persuade unbelievers unles s these two things were first proved to them by natural reason . And since in this life greater rewards often be offered to vices than to virtues , few people would prefer what is right to what is useful if they did not fear God or expect another life . And although it might be quite true that the existence of God is to be believed in because it is taught in the Holy Scriptures and - vice versa - that the Holy Scriptures are to be believed in because they are had from God ­ because since faith be a gift of God , he, the same one who gives the grace to believe the other things , can of course also give

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reliqua credenda , potest etiam dare , ut ipsum existere creda­ mus ; non tamen hoc infidelibus proponi potest , quia circulum esse judicarent. Et quidem animadverti non modo vos omnes aliosque Theologos affi.rmare Dei existentiam naturali ratione posse probari , sed & ex sacra Scriptura inferri , ejus cognitio­ nem multis , quae de rebus creatis habentur, esse faciliorem , at­ que omnino esse tam facilem , ut qui illam non habent sint cul­ pandi. Patet enim Sap . 1 3 ex his verbis: Nee h is debet ignosci. Si enim tan tum potuerunt scire, ut possent aestimare saeculum, q uomodo h ujus dominum non facilius invenerunt? Et ad Rom . cap . I , dicitur illos esse inexcusabiles . Atque ibidem etiam per haec verba: Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis, videmur admoneri ea omnia quae de Deo sciri possum, rationibus non aliunde petitis quam ab ipsamet nostra mente posse o stendi . Quod idcirco quomodo fiat, & qua via Deus facilius & certius quam res s aeculi cognoscatur , non putavi a me esse alienum inquirere . Atque qu antum ad animam , etsi multi ejus naturam [ 3 ] non facile investigari posse j udicarint, & nonnulli etiam dicere ausi sint rationes humanas persuadere illam simul cum corpore in­ terire, solaque fide contrarium teneri , quia tamen hos condemnat Concilium Lateranense sub Leone 1 0 habitu m , sessione 8 , & expresse m andat Christianis Philosophis ut eorum argumenta dissolvant , & veritatem pro viribus probent, hoc etiam aggre­ di non dubitavi. Praeterea , quoniam scio plerosque impios non aliam ob cau­ sam nolle credere Deum esse , mentemque humanam a corpore distingui, quam quia dicunt haec duo a nemine hactenus potuisse demonstrar i : etsi nullo modo iis assentiar , sed contra rationes

Letter

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it to us in order that we might believe that he exists - , this still cannot be p roposed to unbelievers because they would j udge that it is a circle . And I have surely noticed not only that you and all the other theologians affirm that the existence of God can be proved by natural reason , but also that it is inferred from the Holy Scriptures that the cognition of him is easier than many cognitions which are had of created things , and that it is in­ deed so easy that those people who do not h ave it be at fault. For this is obvious from these words in Wisdom , chapter 1 3 : "Nor should it be fo rgiven them . For if they have been able to know so m uc h that they could va lue the world, why have they not more easily found its Lord?" And in To the R omans , chap­ ter 1 , it is said that these people are "inexcusable" . And in the same place , by these words , " . . what is k nown of God is manifes t in them . . " , we also seem to be warned that all the things that can be known about God can be shown by reasoning drawn from nowhere else than from our mind itself. Therefore I have not thought it to be alien to me to inquire into how this might be done, and by which way G od might be cog­ nized more easily and more certainly than the things of the world. [3 . ] And as for the soul , even if many people may have judged that its nature cannot easily be investigated , and even if some people may have even dared to say that human reasoning per­ suades us that it perishes together with the body and that the contrary is held by faith alone , because the Lateran Council held under Pope Leo X in Session 8 condemn s these people and expressly m andates to Christian philosophers that they should dissolve the arguments of them and prove the truth according to their abilities, I have still not hesitated to attempt this too . [ 4 . ] Moreover , because I know that most impious people do not want to believe that there is a God and that the human mind is distingui shed from the body for any other reason than be­ cause , they say , these two things h ave hitherto been able to be demonstrated by no one - even if I would in no way assent to them , but rather would I - on the contrary - think that almost .

.

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fe re omnes , quae pro his quaestio nibus a magnis viris allatae sunt , cum s atis intelliguntur ' vim demonstrationis habere pu­ tem , vixque ullas dari posse mihi persuadeam , quae non prius ab aliquibu s aliis fuerint inventae : nihil tamen utilius in Philosophia praestare posse existimo , quam si semel omnium optimae studiose quaerantur , tamque accurate & perspicue ex­ ponantur , u t apud omnes constet in posterum eas esse demon­ strationes . Ac denique, quoniam nonnulli quibus notum est me quandam excoluisse Methodum ad quaslibet difficultates in scientiis resolvenda s , non quidem novam , quia nihil est veri­ tate antiquius, sed qua me saepe in aliis non infoeliciter uti vider­ unt , hoc a me summopere flagitarunt: ideoque officii mei esse putavi nonnihil hac in re conari . [4] Quicquid autem praestare potui , totum in hoc Tractatu con­ tinetur . Non quod in eo diversas omnes rationes , quae ad ea­ dem probanda afferri possent, colligere conatus sim , neque enim hoc videtur operae pretium esse , nisi ubi nulla habetur satis cer­ ta ; sed prim as tantum & praecipuas ita prosecutus sum , ut jam pro certissimis & evidentissimis demonstrationibus illas ausim proponere . Addamque etiam tales esse , ut non putem ullam viam humano ingenio patere , per quam meliores inveniri un­ quam possint: cogit enim me causae necessita s , & gloria Dei , ad quam totum hoc refertur, ut h ie aliquanto liberius de meis loquar quam mea fert consuetudo . Atqui quantumvis certas & evidentes illas putem , non tamen ideo mihi persuadeo ad om­ nium captu m esse accommodatas : sed , quem admodum in Ge­ ometria multae sunt ab Archimede , Apollonio , Pappo , aliisve

Letter

6S

all the arguments that have been brought forward fo r these ques­ tions by great men then have the fo rce of demonstration when they are satisfactorily understood , and I might hardly persuade myself that any arguments can be given wh ich had not been fo und earlier by some others - , I still think that nothing more useful can h ave priority in philosophy than if once and fo r all the best of all the argu ments be i nquired into studiously and be set out so accurately and perspicuously that in posterity it might be a constant fo r all people that they are demonstrations . And finally, because some people t o whom i t i s known that I have developed a certain method for resolving whatever difficul­ ties there are in the sciences - surely not a new method, for noth­ ing is older than the truth , but one wh ich they have seen me often use not infelicitously in other things - strongly urged this of me, therefo re I have thought it to be my d uty to attempt to accomplish something in this matter . [5. ] Furthermore, whatever I have been able to achieve is all contained in this treatise. Not that I had attempted to collect in it all the different arguments which could be put for­ ward to prove the same things , for except where none is held to be certain enough this does not seem to be worth the effort. Rather have I pro secuted only the first and fo remost arguments , so that I would now dare to propose these as very certain and very evident demonstrations . And I would even add that these demonstrations are such that I would not think that there is any way open to the human mind by which better ones could ever be found. For the necessity of the cause and the glory of God - to which this whole thing is referred - here force me to speak about the things that pertain to me somewhat more free­ ly than my custom brings me to do . Yet however much certain and evident that you will I m ight think these demonstrations to be , I still cannot therefore persuade myself that they have been accommodated to the capacity of all people. Rather , just as in geometry many demonstrations have been written by Ar­ chimedes , Apollonius , Pappus and others which , even if they be held by all people to be evident and also certain because they

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scriptae , quae, etsi pro evidentibus etiam ac certis ab omnibus habeantur, quia nempe nihil plane continent quod seorsim spec­ tatum non sit cognitu facillimum , nihilque in quo sequentia cum antecedentibus non accurate cohaereant, quia tamen longius­ culae sunt, & valde attentum lectorem desiderant , non n isi ab admodum p aucis intelliguntur: ita , quamvis eas quibus hie utor , certitudine & evidentia Geometricas aequare , vel etiam super­ are, existimem , vereor tamen ne a multis saris percipi non pos­ sint , tum quia etiam longiusculae sunt, & a liae ab aliis pen­ dent, tum praecipue quia requirunt mentem a praejudiciis plane liberam , & quae se ipsam a sensuum consortia facile subducat. Nee certe plures in mundo Metaphysicis studiis quam Geometri­ cis apti reperiuntur. Ac [5] praeterea in eo differentia est , quod in Geometria , cum omnibus sit persuasum nihil scribi solere , de quo cert a demonstra tio non habeatur , saepius in eo peccant imperiti , quod falsa approbent, dum ea videri volunt intelligere, quam quod vera refutent: contra vero in Philosophia , cum credatur nihil esse de quo non possit in utramque partem dis­ putari, pauci veritatem investigant , & multo plures, ex eo quod ausint optim a quaeque impugnare , famam ingenii aucupantur . Atque ideo , qualescunque meae rationes esse possint , quia tamen ad Philosophiam spectant, non spero me illarum ope mag­ num operae pretium esse facturum , nisi me patrocinio vestro adjuvetis. Sed cum tanta inhaereat omnium mentibus de ves­ tra Facultate opinio , tantaeque sit authoritatis SORBONAE nomen , ut non modo in rebus fidei nulli unquam Societati post sacra Concilia tantum creditum sit quam vestrae, sed etiam in humana Philosophia nullibi major perspicacia & soliditas , nee ad ferenda judicia major integritas & sapientia esse existimetur ; non dubito quin , si tantam hujus scripti cura m suscipere dig-

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indeed contain nothing at all which - regarded with respect to itself- would not be very easy to cognize and nothing in which consequent things would not accurately cohere with antecedent one s , becau se they are somewhat long and require a very at­ tentive reader , are still understood by only very few people: so also , even if I would consider the demonstrations that I use here to equal or even to surpass geometrical ones with respect to certitude and evidence , I still fe ar that they could not satisfac­ torily be perceived by many people, both because they too are somewhat long and some depend on others and above all be­ cause they require a m ind fully free from prejudices and one that might easily withdraw itself from the company of the senses. Certainly not more p eople are found in the world fit for metaphysical studies than for geometrical one s . And moreover, there is a difference in that in geometry , since all people have been persua ded that u sually nothing is written of which a cer­ tain demon stration not be had , the inexperienced people err more often in that they would accept false things while they want to seem to understand them than in that they would re­ ject true things : but in philosophy , on the contrary , since it is believed that there is nothing that could not be disputed on either side , few p eople investigate the truth and m any more pursue fame of m ind from thence that they would dare to attack whatever optimal things there are. [ 6 . ] And therefore whatever the quality of my arguments might be , because they have to do with philosophy I still do not expect that I am going to accomplish very valuable work by means of them unless you would support me by your patronage . But since there is so great an opinion of your Faculty in the minds of all people and the name of the "SORBONNE" is of so great authority that not only in matters of faith no soci­ ety after the S acred Councils has ever been believed so much as yours, but also in h uman philo sophy there is nowhere else thought to be more perspicacity and solidity nor more integri­ ty and wisdom in rendering j udgment , I do not doubt that if you would deign to give so much care to this writing - name-

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nemini, pri m o quidem , ut a vobis corrigatur: memor enim , non modo hum anitatis, sed maxime etiam inscitiae meae, non affirmo nullos in eo esse errores; deinde , ut quae vel desunt , vel non satis absoluta sunt, vel majorem explicationem desider­ ant, addantur , perficia ntur , illustrentur, aut a vobis ipsis , aut saltem a me , postquam a vobis ero admonitus; ac denique , ut postquam r ationes in eo contentae, quibus Deum esse, men­ temque a corpore aliam esse probatur, ad earn perspicuitatem erunt perdu ctae , ad quam ipsas perduci posse confido , ita [ 6 ] nempe ut p r o accuratissimis demonstrationibus habendae sint , hoc ipsum declarare & publice testari velitis : non dubito , in­ quam , quin , si hoc fiat , omnes errores, qui de his quaestioni­ bus unquam fuerunt, brevi ex hominum mentibus deleantur . Veritas enim ipsa facile efficiet ut reliqui ingeniosi & docti ves­ tro judicio subscribant ; & authoritas, ut Athei , qui scioli ma­ gis quam ingeniosi aut docti esse solent, contradicendi animum deponant , a tque etiam ut forte rationes, quas ab omnibus inge­ nio praeditis pro demonstrationibus haberi scient, ipsi propug­ nent, ne non intelligere videantu r . Ac denique caeteri omnes tot testimon iis facile credent , nemoque amplius erit in mundo , qui vel Dei existentiam , vel realem humanae animae a corpore distinctionem au sit in dubium revocare. Cujus rei quanta esset utilitas , vos ipsi , pro vestra singu lari sapien tia , omnium op­ time aestim are potestis ; nee deceret me vobis, qui maximum Ecclesiae C atholicae columen semper fuistis , Dei & Religionis causam plu ribus hie commendare. [7]

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ly , first, i n order that i t might b e corrected b y you , for , remem­ bering not o nly my hum anity , but also , maximally , my ignor­ ance , I do n ot affirm th at there are no errors in it, the n , in or­ der that the things th at are lacking or are not satisfactorily absolute or require more explication might be added , perfect­ ed or illustrated either by you yourselves or at least by me, af­ ter I will have been warned by yo u , and finally, in order th at , after the arguments contained in it , by mea ns of which it is proved that there is a God and th at the mind is other than the body , will h ave been led through to that perspicuity through to which , I am confident, they can be led , so that thus they might of course be held to be very accurate demonstrations, you might want to declare and to attest publ icly to this very thing - , I do not doubt, I say , that if this were to happen , then all the errors which there have ever been on these questions would soon be deleted from the minds of human beings . For the truth itself will easily effect that the other ingenious and learned people would subscribe to your judgment, and authority will easily effect that the atheists , who are usually more pretenders than ingenious or learned , would lay down the spirit of contradic­ tion and also that they themselves would perhaps fight for these arguments , which they will know to be held to be demonstra­ tions by all people gifted of mind , so that they might not seem not to understand the arguments. And finally , all the other peo­ ple will easily believe so many testimonies and there will be no one in the world any longer who would dare to call into doubt the existence of God or the real d istinction o f the human soul from the body. By virtue of your s ingular wisdom you can esti­ mate best of all yourselves how great be the u tility of this mat­ ter . Nor would it become me to commend to you , who have always been the greatest pillar of the Catholic Church , the cause of God and religion with any more words here.

PRAEFATIO AD LECTOREM Quaestiones de Deo & mente human a jam ante p aucis atti­ gi in Dissertatione de Methodo recte regendae ratio nis & veri­ tatis in scien tiis investigandae, gallice edita anno 1 637, non qui­ dem ut ipsa s ibi accurate tractare m , sed tantum ut delibarem , & ex lectorum j udiciis addiscerem qua ratione postea essent tractandae . Tanti enim momenti mihi visae sunt, ut plus una vice de ipsis agendum esse j u dicarem ; viamque sequor ad eas explicandas tam parum trit a m , atque ab usu communi tam remota m , ut non utile putarim ipsam i n gallico & p assim ab omnibus legendo scripto fusius docere , ne debiliora etiam inge­ nia credere possent earn sibi esse ingrediendam . Cum autem ibi rogassem omnes quibus aliquid in meis scriptis reprehensione