Measuring China's Military Might [1 ed.] 9781614702252, 9781608768462

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CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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MEASURING CHINA'S MILITARY MIGHT

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CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY China in World Affairs V. Clarence (Editor) ISBN: 1-56072-359-9 China's Relations with Japan in an Era of Economic Liberalisation Dong Dong Zhang (Editor) ISBN: 1-56072-625-3 Bicoastal China: A Dialectical, Paradigmatic Analysis Peter Kien-hong Yu ISBN: 1-56072-640-7

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Crisis and Reform in China E. Bliney ISBN: 1-56072-416-1 The Political Dynamics of Hong Kong Under the Chinese Sovereignty Jermain T.M. Lam ISBN: 1-56072-806-X US China Policy: Interest Groups and Their Influence H. Comet 2001. ISBN: 1-59033-044-7 FDI in China: Contributions to Growth, Restructuring and Competitiveness Jiang Xiaojuan 2003. ISBN: 1-59033-894-4 China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers Shirley A. Kan (Editor) 2003. ISBN: 1-59033-758-1

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Government and Market in China: A Local Perspective Jian Zhang 2004. ISBN: 1-59033-883-9 China’s Telecommunications Reforms: From Monopoly towards Competition Yunxiang (Scott) Guan 2007. ISBN: 1-59033-540-6 China and Antiterrorism Simon Shen (Editor) 2007. ISBN: 1-60021-344-8 Congress and US China Policy Jian Yang 2008. ISBN: 1-56072-844-2

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China-U.S. Economic and Geopolitical Relations Jerald D. Finn (Editor) 2008. ISBN: 978-1-60456-052-7 Education in China James U. Landowe (Editor) 2008. ISBN: 978-1-60456-309-2 Trade Barriers and China Martha B. Kessler 2008. ISBN: 978-1-60456-686-4 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Ronald O’Rourke 2008. ISBN: 978-1-60456-709-0 Is China A Threat to the U.S. Economy? Craig K. Elwell, Marc Labonte and Wayne M. Morrison 2008. ISBN: 978-1-60456-843-1 2008. ISBN: 978-1-61668-067-1 (E-book)

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China: Has the Last Opportunity Passed By?! Guang Wu 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-538-1 Human Rights in China Lee R. Massingdale (Editor) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-116China's Foreign Policy and Soft Power Influence Alice V. Monroe (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60692-994-0 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-791-5 (E-book) China and the U.S.: Comparing Global Influence Thomas Lum, Christopher M. Blanchard, Nicolas Cook and Kerry Dumbaugh 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60692-995-7

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Business, Finance and Economics of China Lian Guo and Fai Zong (Editors) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-299-1 China's Agricultural Modernization Russell H. Jeffries (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-088-6 China’s Political and Economic Transformation: Theory and Case Studies Rongxing Guo 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-321-4 Measuring China's Military Might Samuel E. Fleischer (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-846-2

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Thirty Years of China’s Economic Reform: Institutions, Management Organizations and Foreign Investment Yue Wang and Prem Ramburuth (Editors) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-908-7 The Chinese Economy Benjamin A. Tyler (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-937-7 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-648-2 (E-book)

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The Rhetoric and Reality of Culture-Led Urban Regeneration: A Comparison of Beijing and Shanghai, China Jun Wang and Shaojun Li 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-686-3 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61728-257-7 (E-book)

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MEASURING CHINA'S MILITARY MIGHT

SAMUEL E. FLEISCHER EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

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Copyright © 2010 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers‘ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works.

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Measuring China's military might / editor, Samuel E. Fleischer. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 9H%RRN 1. China--Armed Forces. 2. China--Defenses. 3. China--Military policy. 4. China--Military relations--United States. 5. United States--Military relations--China. I. Fleischer, Samuel E. UA835.M43 2010 355'.033251--dc22 2009049868

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CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

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Chapter 2

xi China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O’Rourke Military Power of the People‘s Republic of China 2009 Office of the Secretary of Defense

1 39

Chapter Sources

129

Index

131

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PREFACE In the debate over future U.S. defense spending, including deliberations taking place in the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a key issue is how much emphasis to place on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years. China's naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including programs for anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, aircraft, submarines, destroyers and frigates, patrol craft, and amphibious ships. This book focuses on the potential implications of China's naval modernization for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. Moreover, China's new phase of military development is discussed, by articulating roles and missions for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that go beyond China's immediate territorial interests. This book consists of public documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access. Chapter 1 - In the debate over future U.S. defense spending, including deliberations taking place in the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a key issue is how much emphasis to place on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years. Observers disagree on the issue, with some arguing that such programs should receive significant emphasis, others arguing that they should receive relatively little, and still others taking an intermediate position. The question of how much emphasis to place in U.S. defense planning on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many programs associated with countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy‘s budget.

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xii

Samuel E. Fleischer

China‘s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including programs for anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, aircraft, submarines, destroyers and frigates, patrol craft, and amphibious ships. In addition, observers believe that China may soon begin an aircraft carrier construction program. China‘s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, and training, and exercises. Although China‘s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China‘s naval capabilities in recent years, observers believe China‘s navy continues to exhibit limitations or weaknesses in several areas. DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China‘s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. DOD and other observers believe that, in addition to the near-term focus on developing military options relating to Taiwan, additional goals of China‘s naval modernization effort include improving China‘s ability to do the following: assert or defend China‘s claims in maritime territorial disputes and China‘s interpretation of international laws relating freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (an interpretation at odds with the U.S. interpretation); protect China‘s sea lines of communications to the Persian Gulf, on which China relies for some of its energy imports; and assert China‘s status as a major world power, encourage other states in the region to align their policies with China, and displace U.S. regional military influence. A decision to place a relatively strong defense-planning emphasis on countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years could lead to one more of the following: increasing activities for monitoring and understanding developments in China‘s navy, as well as activities for measuring and better understanding operating conditions in the Western Pacific; assigning a larger percentage of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet; homeporting more of the Pacific Fleet‘s ships at forward locations such as Hawaii, Guam, and Japan; increasing training and exercises in operations relating to countering Chinese maritime antiaccess forces, such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations; and placing a relatively strong emphasis on programs for developing and procuring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapons. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Preface

xiii

Chapter 2 - China‘s rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with growing global influence has significant implications for the Asia-Pacific region and the world. The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China, and encourages China to participate responsibly in world affairs by taking on a greater share of the burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system. The United States has done much over the last 30 years to encourage and facilitate China‘s national development and its integration into the international system. However, much uncertainty surrounds China‘s future course, particularly regarding how its expanding military power might be used. The People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries – an approach that China refers to as preparing for ―local wars under conditions of informatization.‖ The pace and scope of China‘s military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and farreaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces. China‘s ability to sustain military power at a distance remains limited, but its armed forces continue to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare, that are changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the AsiaPacific region. The PLA‘s modernization vis-à-vis Taiwan has continued over the past year, including its buildup of short-range missiles opposite the island. In the near-term, China‘s armed forces are rapidly developing coercive capabilities for the purpose of deterring Taiwan‘s pursuit of de jure independence. These same capabilities could in the future be used to pressure Taiwan toward a settlement of the crossStrait dispute on Beijing‘s terms while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict. This modernization and the threat to Taiwan continue despite significant reduction in cross-Strait tension over the last year since Taiwan elected a new president. The PLA is also developing longer range capabilities that have implications beyond Taiwan. Some of these capabilities have allowed it to contribute cooperatively to the international community‘s responsibilities in areas such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter-piracy. However, some of these capabilities, as well as other, more disruptive ones, could

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allow China to project power to ensure access to resources or enforce claims to disputed territories. Beijing publicly asserts that China‘s military modernization is ―purely defensive in nature,‖ and aimed solely at protecting China‘s security and interests. Over the past several years, China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond China‘s immediate territorial interests, but has left unclear to the international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA‘s evolving doctrine and capabilities. Moreover, China continues to promulgate incomplete defense expenditure figures and engage in actions that appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies. The limited transparency in China‘s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by creating uncertainty and increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. The United States continues to work with our allies and friends in the region to monitor these developments and adjust our policies accordingly.

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In: Measuring China‘s Military Might Editor: Samuel E. Fleischer

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Chapter 1

CHINA NAVAL MODERNIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NAVY CAPABILITIES-BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

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Ronald O’Rourke SUMMARY In the debate over future U.S. defense spending, including deliberations taking place in the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a key issue is how much emphasis to place on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years. Observers disagree on the issue, with some arguing that such programs should receive significant emphasis, others arguing that they should receive relatively little, and still others taking an intermediate position. The question of how much emphasis to place in U.S. defense planning on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many programs associated with countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy‘s budget. China‘s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including programs for anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles

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(LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, aircraft, submarines, destroyers and frigates, patrol craft, and amphibious ships. In addition, observers believe that China may soon begin an aircraft carrier construction program. China‘s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, and training, and exercises. Although China‘s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China‘s naval capabilities in recent years, observers believe China‘s navy continues to exhibit limitations or weaknesses in several areas. DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China‘s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. DOD and other observers believe that, in addition to the near-term focus on developing military options relating to Taiwan, additional goals of China‘s naval modernization effort include improving China‘s ability to do the following: assert or defend China‘s claims in maritime territorial disputes and China‘s interpretation of international laws relating freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (an interpretation at odds with the U.S. interpretation); protect China‘s sea lines of communications to the Persian Gulf, on which China relies for some of its energy imports; and assert China‘s status as a major world power, encourage other states in the region to align their policies with China, and displace U.S. regional military influence. A decision to place a relatively strong defense-planning emphasis on countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years could lead to one more of the following: increasing activities for monitoring and understanding developments in China‘s navy, as well as activities for measuring and better understanding operating conditions in the Western Pacific; assigning a larger percentage of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet; homeporting more of the Pacific Fleet‘s ships at forward locations such as Hawaii, Guam, and Japan; increasing training and exercises in operations relating to countering Chinese maritime anti-access forces, such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations; and placing a relatively strong emphasis on programs for developing and procuring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapons. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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INTRODUCTION

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Issue for Congress In the debate over future U.S. defense spending, including deliberations taking place in the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a key issue is how much emphasis to place on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years. Observers disagree on the issue, with some arguing that such programs should receive significant emphasis, others arguing that they should receive relatively little, and still others taking an intermediate position. The question of how much emphasis to place in U.S. defense planning on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many programs associated with countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy‘s budget. In terms of potential impact on programs and spending, the Navy might have more at stake on this issue than the Army and Marine Corps, and perhaps at least as much, if not more, than the Air Force. Decisions that policymakers make on the issue of how much emphasis to place on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces could significantly affect the future size, composition, and capabilities of the Navy; Navy funding requirements; and the shipbuilding industrial base.

Scope, Sources, and Terminology This report focuses on the potential implications China‘s naval modernization for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress on China‘s military power,1 and published reference sources such as Jane’s Fighting Ships. For convenience, this report uses the term China‘s naval modernization to refer to the modernization not only of China‘s navy, but also of Chinese military forces outside China‘s navy that can be used to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based air force aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars for detecting and tracking ships at sea.

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China‘s military is formally called the People‘s Liberation Army, or PLA. Its navy is called the PLA Navy, or PLAN, and its air force is called the PLA Air Force, or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the Second Artillery Force.

BACKGROUND Overview of China’s Naval Modernization2

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Date of Inception Observers date the beginning of China‘s naval modernization effort to various points in the 1990s.3 Design work on some of China‘s newer ship classes appears to have begun in the later 1980s.4 Some observers believe that China‘s naval modernization effort may have been reinforced or accelerated by a 1996 incident in which the United States deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups to waters near Taiwan in response to Chinese missile tests and naval exercises near Taiwan. Elements of Modernization Effort China‘s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including programs for anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, submarines, destroyers and frigates, patrol craft, amphibious ships and craft, mine countermeasures (MCM) ships, and supporting C4ISR5 systems. In addition, observers believe that China may soon begin an aircraft carrier construction program. Some of these acquisition programs have attracted particular interest and are discussed in further detail below. China‘s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, and training, and exercises. Limitations and Weaknesses Although China‘s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China‘s naval capabilities in recent years, observers believe China‘s navy continues to exhibit limitations or weaknesses in several areas, including

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capabilities for sustained operations by larger formations in distant waters, joint operations with other parts of China‘s military, C4ISR systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), MCM, and a dependence on foreign suppliers for certain key ship components. DOD states that

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As China‘s capabilities for local and regional operations have increased in certain areas since 2000, a number of limitations appear to have persisted. The PLA has developed new doctrine for joint warfighting and implemented organizational changes, such as including service commanders on the Central Military Commission, to facilitate the transition to a more ―joint‖ force. However, joint integration still lags. Similarly, PLA air and amphibious lift capacity has not improved appreciably since 2000 when the Department of Defense assessed the PLA as capable of sealift of one infantry division. Likewise, China‘s current ability to deliver about 5,000 parachutists in a single lift (less if equipment is carried at the same time) is similar to previous assessments. China‘s at-sea replenishment has improved with experience since 2000, but the PLA Navy today remains limited by a small number of support vessels – much as it did then. In 2000, the Department of Defense projected aerial refueling as an operational capability by 2005. Today, while China has a few aerial refueling aircraft, it does not have the number of tankers, properly equipped combat aircraft, or sufficient training to employ this capability for power projection.6

Reasons for Modernization Effort DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China‘s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. ASBMs, attack submarines, and supporting C4ISR systems are viewed as key elements of China‘s emerging anti-access force, though other force elements – such as ASCMs, LACMs (for attacking U.S. air bases and other facilities in the Western Pacific), and mines – are also of significance. DOD and other observers believe that, in addition to the near-term focus on developing military options relating to Taiwan, additional goals of China‘s naval modernization effort include improving China‘s ability to do the following:

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assert or defend China‘s claims in maritime territorial disputes7 and China‘s interpretation of international laws relating freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (an interpretation at odds with the U.S. interpretation); protect China‘s sea lines of communications to the Persian Gulf, on which China relies for some of its energy imports; and assert China‘s status as a major world power, encourage other states in the region to align their policies with China, and displace U.S. regional military influence.

The three additional goals above are potentially significant for at least three reasons. First, they imply that if the situation with Taiwan were somehow resolved, China could find continuing reasons to pursue its naval modernization effort. Second, they would imply that if China completes its planned buildup of Taiwan-related naval force elements, or if the situation with Taiwan were somehow resolved, the composition of China‘s naval modernization effort could shift to include a greater emphasis on naval force elements that would be appropriate for supporting these additional goals, such as aircraft carriers, a larger number of nuclear-powered attack submarines, serial production of destroyers, underway replenishment ships, and overseas bases or support facilities. Third, these additional goals suggest that even if China‘s military were never to engage in combat with an opposing military, China‘s military forces, including in particular its naval forces, would still be used on a day-to-day basis to promote China‘s political position in the Pacific. This would create an essentially political (as opposed to combat-related) reason for the United States or other countries to maintain a competitive presence in the region with naval and other forces that are viewed by observers in the Pacific as capable of effectively countering China‘s forces.

Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) China is deploying large numbers of theater-range ballistic missiles8 capable of attacking targets in Taiwan or other regional locations. Although ballistic missiles in the past have traditionally been used to attack fixed targets on land, DOD and other observers believe China is developing anti-ship

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ballistic missiles (ASBMs), which are ballistic missiles equipped with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) capable of hitting moving ships at sea. Observers have expressed strong concern about this development, because such missiles, in combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to attack aircraft carriers and other U.S. Navy ships operating in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. Due to their ability to change course, MaRVs would be more difficult to intercept than non-maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicles. DOD states that:

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China is developing an ASBM based on a variant of the CSS-5 MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] as a part of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and when incorporated into a sophisticated command and control system, is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean.9

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) Among the most capable of the new ASCMs that have been acquired by the PLA Navy are the Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn (carried by China‘s four Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyers) and the SS-N-27 Sizzler (carried by 8 of China‘s 12 Russian-made Kilo-class submarines). China‘s large inventory of ASCMs also includes several indigenous designs. Submarines Types Acquired in Recent Years China‘s submarine modernization effort, which is producing a significantly more modern and capable submarine force, has attracted substantial attention and concern. China by the end of 2006 completed taking delivery on eight Russian-made Kilo-class non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs) that are in addition to four Kilos that China purchased from Russia in the 1990s. China also has recently built or is building four other classes of submarines, including the following: 

a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) design called the Jin class or Type 094;

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a new nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) design called the Shang class or Type 093;10 a new SS design called the Yuan class or Type 041 (or Type 039A);11 and another (and also fairly new) SS design called the Song class or Type 039/039G.

Along with the Kilo-class boats, these four classes of indigenous submarines are regarded as much more modern and capable than China‘s aging older-generation submarines. At least some of these new submarine designs are believed to have benefitted from Russian submarine technology and design know-how. China‘s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. China‘s eight recently delivered Kilos are reportedly armed with the highly capable SS-N-27 Sizzler ASCM. In addition to other weapons, Shang-class SSNs may carry LACMs. Although ASCMs are often highlighted as sources of concern, wake-homing torpedoes can also be very difficult for surface ships to counter. Although China‘s aging Ming-class (Type 035) submarines are based on old technology and are much less capable than China‘s newer-design submarines, China may decide that these older boats have continued value as minelayers or as bait or decoy submarines that can be used to draw out enemy submarines (such as U.S. SSNs) that can then be attacked by more modern PLA Navy submarines.

Submarine Acquisition Rate and Potential Submarine Force Size Table 1 shows actual and projected commissionings of Chinese submarines by class since 1995, when China took delivery of its first two Kiloclass boats. The table includes the final nine boats in the Ming class, which is an older and less capable submarine design. As shown in Table 1, China was projected to have a total of 28 relatively modern attack submarines – meaning Shang, Kilo, Yuan, and Song class boats – in commission by the end of 2007. As shown in the table, much of the growth in this figure occurred in 20042006. The figures in Table 1 show that between 1995 and 2007, China placed into service a total of 38 submarines of all kinds, or an average of about 2.9 submarines per year. This average commissioning rate, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steady-state submarine force of 58 to 88 boats of all kinds, assuming an average submarine life of 20 to 30 years.

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Excluding the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia, total number of domestically produced submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2007 is 26, or an average of 2.0 per year. This average rate of domestic production, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steady- state force of domestically produced submarines of 40 to 60 boats of all kinds, again assuming an average submarine life of 20 to 30 years. As shown in Table 1, only three of the submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2007 are nuclear powered. If the mix of China‘s submarineproduction effort shifts at some point to include a greater proportion of nuclear-powered boats, it is possible that the greater resources required to produce nuclear-powered boats might result in a reduction in the overall submarine production rate. If so, and if such a reduced overall rate were sustained indefinitely, it would eventually result in a smaller steady-state submarine force of all kinds than the figures calculated in the preceding two paragraphs. Photos published on the Internet have suggested to some observers that China has launched and perhaps completed (if perhaps not officially placed into service) higher numbers of Jin-, Shang-, and Yuan-class submarines than shown in Table 1.

JL-2 SLBM on Jin-Class SSBN Each Jin-class SSBN is expected to be armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).12 DOD estimates that these missiles will enter service in 2009 or 20 10,13 and that they will have a range of 7,200 kilometers (about 3,888 nautical miles).14 Such a range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack  

targets in Alaska (except the Alaskan panhandle) from protected bastions close to China;15 targets in Hawaii (as well as targets in Alaska, except the Alaskan panhandle) from locations south of Japan; Table 1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings Actual (1995-2006) and Projected (2007-2010)

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1 2

1 1g 1g 1g

1 1 n/af n/af n/af n/af n/af n/af n/af

1 4 3

1

1 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a

2 3 3 2e

1 1 1

Cu mulative total for modern attack boatsc

1d 1d

Cu mulative total for all types shown

1 1 2 2

Annual total

2d

Ming (Type 035) SSb

Kilo SS (Russianmade) Yuan (Type 041) SSa

Shang (Type 093) SSN

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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Song (Type 039) SS

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3 1 2 3 2 1 3 1 2 4 7 7 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

3 4 6 9 11 12 15 16 18 22 29 36 38 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

2 2 2 3 5 5 7 7 9 13 20 27 28 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2008-2009, and previous editions. Note: n/a = data not available. a. Some observers believe the Yuan class to be a variant of the Song class and refer to the Yuan class as the Type 039A. b. Figures for Ming-class boats are when the boats were launched (i.e., put into the water for final construction). Actual commissioning dates for these boats may have been later. c. This total excludes the Jin-class SSBNs and the Ming-class SSs. d. First four boats, commissioned in the 1 990s, are to be refitted in Russia; upgrades are likely to include installation of SS-N-27 ASCM. e. No further units expected after the 12th and 13th shown for 2006. f. A total of five Type 093 boats has been expected, but Jane‘s Fighting Ships 20082009 states that production of the two Type 093 boats shown in the table may be followed by production of a modified evolutionary SSN design possibly known as the Type 095 class. g. A total of five or six boats is expected, with boats entering service at two-year intervals. (DOD stated in 2008 that up to five might be built. [2008 DOD CMP, p. 25])

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targets in the western half of the 48 contiguous states (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) from mid-ocean locations west of Hawaii; and targets in all 50 states from mid-ocean locations west of Hawaii.

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Aircraft Carriers After years of debate and speculation on the issue, observers now believe that China may soon begin an aircraft carrier construction program. Observers believe that China may complete the unfinished ex-Russian carrier Varyag, which China purchased in 1998, and place it into service in the near future, possibly as an aviation training ship. Observers also believe that China may build one to six new carriers in coming years. Chinese officials have begun to talk openly about the possibility of China operating aircraft carriers in the future. China reportedly has begun training its first 50 fixed-wing carrier aviators, has been in negotiations with Russia to purchase up to 50 Russianmade carrier-capable Su-33 fighter aircraft, and may be developing indigenous carrier- capable fighters. DOD states that: China has an active aircraft carrier R&D [research and development] program. The PRC shipbuilding industry could start construction of an indigenous platform by the end of this decade. China may be interested in building multiple operational aircraft carriers with support ships in the next decade. The PLA Navy has reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 pilots to operate fixed-wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. The initial program, presumably land-based, would be followed in about four years by ship-borne training involving the ex-VARYAG, which was purchased by a Chinese company from Ukraine in 1998.16

Observers have speculated on the potential size and capabilities of newconstruction Chinese aircraft carriers. Given the technical challenges involved in building and operating carriers, China might elect to begin by building conventionally powered carriers of perhaps 40,000 to 70,000 tons displacement, and then progress to construction of larger and possibly nuclearpowered ships. Some observers have speculated that China‘s first aircraft carriers might displace between 60,000 and 70,000 tons. The Varyag has an estimated full load displacement of about 58,500 tons. A carrier with a displacement closer to 40,000 tons would be capable of operating a modest number of VSTOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) aircraft, but would not likely be able to operate CTOL (conventional takeoff and landing) airplanes. A carrier with a displacement closer to 70,000 tons could support a larger air wing, and would more likely be able to operate CTOL airplanes. For comparison, the U.S. Navy‘s LHA/LHD-type amphibious assault ships, which resemble medium-sized aircraft carriers, displace roughly 40,000 tons and are limited to VSTOL aircraft operations.

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The Navy‘s Midway (CV-41), Forrestal (CV-59), and Kitty Hawk (CV-63) class conventionally powered carriers, none of which is still in service, had displacements of 69,000 to 85,000 tons, and could operate large numbers of CTOL airplanes. The Navy‘s current Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers displace about 100,000 tons and can operate large numbers of CTOL airplanes.17 Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwanrelated conflict scenarios, they are not considered critical for Chinese operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within range of land-based Chinese aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China would build and operate carriers primarily because of their value in other kinds of operations that are more distant from China‘s shores. Chinese aircraft carriers could be used for power-projection operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing U.S. forces. Chinese aircraft carriers could also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as anti-piracy operations), and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Politically, aircraft carriers could be particularly valuable to China for projecting an image of China as a major world power, because aircraft carriers are viewed by many as symbols of major world power status. In a combat situation involving opposing U.S. naval and air forces, Chinese aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable to attack by U.S. ships and aircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert U.S. ships and aircraft from performing other missions in a conflict situation with China.

Surface Combatants China since the early 1990s has purchased four Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia and deployed nine new classes of indigenously built destroyers and frigates (some of which are variations of one another) that demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navy surface combatant technology. China has also deployed a new kind of missile-armed fast attack craft that uses a stealthy catamaran hull design. Sovremenny-Class Destroyers China in 1996 ordered two Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia; the ships entered service in 1999 and 2001. China in 2002 ordered two additional Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia; the ships entered service in 2005 and 2006. Sovremenny-class destroyers are equipped with the SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCM, a highly capable ASCM. DOD stated in 2007 that the two ships delivered in 2005-2006 ―are fitted with anti-ship cruise missiles

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(ASCMs) and wide-area air defense systems that feature qualitative improvements over the [two] earlier SOVREMENNYYclass DDGs China purchased from Russia.‖18 In light of these improvements, DOD refers to these two ships as Sovremenny II class destroyers.19

Five New Indigenously Built Destroyer Classes China since the early 1990s has built five new classes of destroyers, one of which is a variation of another. Compared to China‘s 14 remaining older Luda (Type 051) class destroyers, which entered service between 1971 and 1991, these five new destroyer classes are substantially more modern in terms of their hull designs, propulsion systems, sensors, weapons, and electronics. A key area of improvement in the new destroyer designs is their anti-air warfare (AAW) technology, which has been a significant PLA Navy shortcoming. Like the older Luda-class destroyers, these new destroyer classes are armed with ASCMs. Table 2 summarizes the five new classes. As shown in Table 2, China to date has commissioned only 1 or 2 ships in each of these five classes, suggesting that at least some of these classes might have been intended to serve as stepping stones in a plan to modernize the PLA Navy‘s surface combatant technology incrementally before committing to larger-scale series production of destroyers.20 The Luhu-class ships reportedly were ordered in 1985 but had their construction delayed by a decision to give priority to the construction of six frigates that were ordered by Thailand. The Luhai-class ship is believed to have served as the basis for the Luyang-class designs. Compared to the Luhai, the Luyang I-class ships appear stealthier. DOD stated in 2008 that the Luyang I design is equipped with the Russian-made SA-N-7B Grizzly SAM and the Chinese-made YJ-83 ASCM.21 The Luyang II-class ships appear to feature an even more capable AAW system that includes a Chinese-made SAM system called the HHQ-9 that has an even longer range, a vertical launch system (VLS), and a phased-array radar that is outwardly somewhat similar to the SPY-1 radar used in the U.S.-made Aegis combat system.

Table 2. New PLA Navy Destroyer Classes Class

Type

Number

Hull

In service (actual or

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name built Luhu 052 2 Luhai 051B 1 Luyang I 052B 2 Luyang II 052C 2 Luzhou 051C 2 Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2008-2009.

number(s) 112, 113 167 168, 169 170, 171 115, 116

projected) 1994, 1996 1999 2004 2004, 2005 2006, 2007

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DOD stated in 2007 the Luzhou-class design ―is designed for anti-air warfare. It will be equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 SAM system controlled by the TOMBSTONE phased-array radar. The SA-N-20 more than doubles the range of current PLA Navy air defense systems marking a significant improvement in China‘s ship-borne air defense capability.‖22 If one or more of these destroyer designs (or a successor design) are put into larger-scale production, it would accelerate the modernization of China‘s surface combatant force.

Four New Indigenously Built Frigate Classes China since the early 1990s has built four new classes of frigates, two of which are variations of two others, that are more modern than China‘s 29 remaining older Jianghu (Type 053) class frigates, which entered service between the mid-1970s and 1989. The four new frigate classes, like the new destroyer classes, feature improved AAW capabilities. Unlike the new destroyer designs, some of the new frigate designs have been put into largerscale series production. Table 3 summarizes the four new classes. Table 3. New PLA Navy Frigate Classes

Class name

Type

Jiangwei I Jiangwei II Jiangkai I Jiangkai II

053 H2G 053H3 054 054A

Number built or building 4 10 2 4

Hull number(s) 539-542 between 521 and 567 525, 526 530 (lead ship), 529, n/a

In service (actual or projected) 1991-1994 1998-2005 2005 2007-2008

Source: Jane‘s Fighting Ships 2008-2009

Construction of Jiangwei I-class ships appears to have ceased. It is unclear whether construction of Jiangwei II-class ships will continue after the 10th ship.

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The Jiangkai I-class ships feature a stealthy design that somewhat resembles France‘s La Fayette-class frigate, which first entered service in 1996.23 The Jiangkai II-class ships are a modified version of the Jiangkai Iclass design that features a VLS system for its SAMs. One observer stated in 2008 that ―construction of the Jiangkai II-class frigates, armed with vertically launched HQ-7 missiles, continues and these [ships] look to be the mainstay of the fleet as the 1970s-vintage Jianghu class are phased out or adapted for Coast Guard use.‖24 Another observer similarly stated in 2007 that a total of 28 to 30 Type 054A frigates ―are believed scheduled‖ for production to replace China‘s older-generation frigates.25

Fast Attack Craft As an apparent replacement for at least some of its 190 older fast attack craft, or FACs (including 37 armed with ASCMs), China in 2004 introduced a new type of ASCM-armed fast attack craft, called the Houbei (Type 022) class, that uses a stealthy, wave-piercing, catamaran hull. The Houbei class is being built in at least six shipyards. Forty were in service as of 2008, and a total of as many as 100 might be built.26

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Amphibious Ships Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship China has built the lead ship of a new class of amphibious ships called the Yuzhao or Type 071 class. The design has an estimated displacement of 17,600 tons, compared with about 15,900 tons to 16,700 tons for the U.S. Navy‘s Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships, which were commissioned into service between 1985 and 1998, and about 25,900 tons for the U.S. Navy‘s new San Antonio (LPD- 17) class amphibious ships, the first of which was commissioned into service in 2006. The first Type 071 ship entered service in 2008. The Type 071 design features a hull with clean, sloped sides—a design that resembles the hulls of modern western amphibious ships and appears intended to reduce the ship‘s visibility to radar. Some observers believe that China might build a total of four to six Type 071 ships. Reported Potential Type 081 Amphibious Ship China reportedly might also begin building a larger amphibious ship, called the Type 081 LHD, that might displace about 20,000 tons. Such a ship

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might have, among other things, a greater aviation capability than the Type 071 design. Some observers believe China may build a total of three or more Type 081s.

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Potential Roles for Type 071 and Type 081 Ships Although larger amphibious ships such as the Type 071 and the Type 081 might have some value for conducting amphibious landings in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, some observers believe that China would build and operate such ships more for their value in conducting other kinds of operations that are more distant from China‘s shores. Larger amphibious ships can be used for conducting not only amphibious landings, but for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as antipiracy operations), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). (Some countries are acquiring larger amphibious ships as much, or more, for these kinds of operations as for conducting amphibious landings.) Politically, larger amphibious ships can also be used for naval diplomacy (i.e., port calls and engagement activities). Other New Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft Aside from the Type 071 and Type 081 projects, China between 2003 and 2005 commissioned into service three new classes of smaller amphibious ships and landing craft. Each type was built at three or four shipyards. Between these three other classes, China commissioned into service a total of 20 amphibious ships and 10 amphibious landing craft in 2003-2005. Additional units in some of these classes are possible. China also has numerous older amphibious ships and landing craft of various designs. Change in Amphibious Lift Capability Since 2000 Although China in recent years has deployed new amphibious ships and craft, DOD states that ―PLA air and amphibious lift capacity has not improved appreciably since 2000 when the Department of Defense assessed the PLA as capable of sealift of one infantry division.‖27 Maritime Surveillance and Targeting Systems China reportedly is developing or deploying maritime surveillance and targeting systems that can detect U.S. ships and submarines and provide targeting information for Chinese ASBMs and other Chinese military units. These systems reportedly include land-based over-the-horizon backscatter

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(OTH-B) radars, land-based over-the-horizon surface wave (OTH-SW) radars, electro-optical satellites, radar satellites, and seabed sonar networks.

Operations Away from Home Waters Chinese navy ships in recent years have begun to conduct operations away from China‘s home waters. Although many of these operations have been for making diplomatic port calls, some of them appear to have been for other purposes. In November 2004, for example, a Han-class SSN was detected in Japanese territorial waters near Okinawa.28 DIA states that, as part of the same deployment, this submarine traveled ―far into the western Pacific Ocean.... ‖29 Press reports state that the submarine operated in the vicinity of Guam before moving toward Okinawa.30 As another example, on September 9, 2005, China deployed a fleet of five warships ... near a gas field in the East China Sea, a potentially resource-rich area that is disputed by China and Japan. The ships, including a guided-missile destroyer, were spotted by a Japanese military patrol plane near the Chunxiao gas field, according to the [Japan] Maritime Self-Defense Forces.31

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Another press report stated: China said on Sept. 29 [of 2005 that] it has sent warships to the disputed East China Sea, a day ahead of talks with Japan over competing territorial claims in the gas-rich waters. ―I can now confirm that in the East China Sea, a Chinese reserve vessel squadron has been established,‖ foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a regular briefing.... No details were given on the size of the squadron or the area it will patrol. The establishment of the squadron follows China‘s creation of two naval groups in the Bohai Sea and Yellow Sea off the northern China coast, the agency said.32

On October 26, 2006, a Song-class SS reportedly surfaced five miles away from the Japanhomeported U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63), which reportedly was operating at the time with its strike group in international waters in the East China Sea, near Okinawa. According to press reports, the carrier strike group at the time was not actively searching for submarines, and the Song-class boat remained undetected by the strike group until it surfaced and was observed by one of the strike group‘s aircraft.33 The

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Chinese government denied that the submarine was following the strike group.34 In December 2008, China deployed two destroyers and a support ship to waters off Somalia to conduct anti-piracy operations. According to one source, this was only the third deployment of Chinese naval ships into the Indian Ocean in more than six centuries.35 U.S. officials stated that they welcomed a Chinese contribution to the current multi-nation effort to combat piracy off Somalia. China is also building port facilities that may support Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean, along the sea line of communication linking China to Persian Gulf oil sources. One press report in 2005 stated: China is building up military forces and setting up bases along sea lanes from the Middle East to project its power overseas and protect its oil shipments, according to a previously undisclosed internal report prepared for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. ―China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China‘s energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives,‖ said the report sponsored by the director, Net Assessment, who heads Mr. Rumsfeld‘s office on future-oriented strategies. The Washington Times obtained a copy of the report, titled ―Energy Futures in Asia,‖ which was produced by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. The internal report stated that China is adopting a ―string of pearls‖ strategy of bases and diplomatic ties stretching from the Middle East to southern China.... 36

An August 2008 press report stated: Is China marking space for itself in Myanmar‘s Coco Islands again? India is suddenly up and alert after senior Chinese naval officers recently visited the islands to ―upgrade‖ facilities there. On June 25, according to reports reaching India, in an unpublicised visit, a Chinese naval delegation led by Col Chi Ziong Feng, accompanied a Myanmarese delegation headed by Brig Gen Win Shein, into the Coco Islands. According to sources, Brig Gen Shein is commander of Ayeyarwaddy (Irrawaddy) naval headquarters, which controls the island.

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According to sources monitoring developments, China decided to help Myanmar upgrade systems in the island. Myanmar would increase its naval troop strength on the island, while China would help in building two more helipads and storage systems for arms. What was of greater interest to India was that China reportedly agreed to ―upgrade‖ communication facilities on the island.37

Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities are sometimes compared by showing comparative numbers of U.S. and Chinese ships. Although numbers of ships can be relatively easy to compile from published reference sources, this article does not present comparisons of such figures, because they are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities, for the following reasons:

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



A fleet‘s total number of ships (or its aggregate tonnage) is only a partial metric of its capability. Other important factors contributing to a navy‘s capability include types of ships; types and numbers of aircraft; the sophistication of sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, and networking capabilities; supporting maintenance and logistics capabilities; doctrine and tactics; the quality, education, and training of personnel; and the realism and complexity of exercises. Given these other significant contributors to naval capability, navies with similar numbers of ships or similar aggregate tonnages can have significantly different capabilities, and navy-to-navy comparisons of numbers of ships or aggregate tonnages can provide a highly inaccurate sense of their relative capabilities. Total numbers of ships of a given type (such as submarines, destroyers, or frigates) can obscure potentially significant differences in the capabilities of those ships, both between navies and within one country‘s navy. Differences in capabilities of ships of a given type can arise from differences in factors such as sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, networking capabilities, stealth features, damage-control features, cruising range, maximum speed, and reliability and maintainability (which can affect the amount of time the ship is available for operation). The potential for obscuring differences in the capabilities of ships of a given type is particularly significant in

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

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



assessing relative U.S. and Chinese capabilities, in part because China‘s navy includes significant numbers of older, obsolescent ships. Figures on total numbers of Chinese submarines, destroyers, and frigates lump older, obsolescent ships together with more modern and more capable designs. A focus on total ship numbers reinforces the notion increases in total numbers necessarily translate into increases in aggregate capability, and that decreases in total numbers necessarily translate into decreases in aggregate capability. For a Navy like China‘s, which is modernizing in some ship categories by replacing larger numbers of older, obsolescent ships with smaller numbers of more modern and more capable ships, this is not necessarily the case. China‘s submarine force, for example, has decreased in total numbers, but has increased in aggregate capability, because larger numbers of older, obsolescent boats have been replaced by smaller numbers of more modern and more capable boats. For assessing navies like China‘s, it can be more useful to track the growth in numbers of more modern and more capable units. This article report shows numbers of more modern and more capable submarines, destroyers, and frigates in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3, respectively. Comparisons of numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take into account maritime-relevant capabilities that countries might have outside their navies, such as landland-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), -based anti- ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based air force aircraft armed with ASCMs. This is a particularly important consideration in comparing U.S. and Chinese military capabilities for influencing events in the Western Pacific. The missions to be performed by one country‘s navy can differ greatly from the missions to be performed by another country‘s navy. Consequently, navies are better measured against their respective missions than against one another. This is another significant consideration in assessing U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities, because the missions of the two navies are quite different.

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POTENTIAL OVERSIGHT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS China as a Defense-Planning Priority

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In U.S. defense planning and programming, including the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), how much emphasis should be placed on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years? As stated at the outset, in the debate over future U.S. defense spending, including deliberations taking place in the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a key issue is how much emphasis to place on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years. Observers disagree on the issue, with some arguing that such programs should receive significant emphasis, others arguing that they should receive relatively little, and still others taking an intermediate position. The question of how much emphasis to place in U.S. defense planning on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many programs associated with countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy‘s budget. In terms of potential impact on programs and spending, the Navy might have more at stake on this issue than the Army and Marine Corps, and perhaps at least as much, if not more, than the Air Force. Statements from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other DOD officials suggest that the QDR may place a relatively strong emphasis on programs for supporting current combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as programs for conducting irregular warfare (e.g., counterinsurgency operations) in coming years, and relatively less emphasis on programs relating to possible conventional conflicts between states. This has suggested to some supporters that the QDR may place relatively less emphasis on, among other things, programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years. Secretary Gates addressed the issue, particularly as it regards the Navy, in an April 17, 2009, speech at the Naval War College, stating: some people may think I am too consumed by the current wars to give adequate consideration to our long-term acquisition needs. In this respect, the lessons of the last few years have implications for all Defense programs:

• Lessons about preparing for the kinds of war we are most likely to face and not just the kinds we are best-suited to fight;

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Ronald O‘Rourke • Lessons about the limits of technology when faced with the fog, friction, and ugly realities of an unpredictable battlefield; and • Lessons about our internal processes, and where they may come undone when faced with unexpected contingencies, evolving requirements, and the prolonged strains of persistent conflict. Not to mention the ability of an agile adversary to get inside our ponderous decision and acquisition cycle. All of this goes far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan – it goes to the heart of maintaining a defense posture rooted in real-world scenarios with real-world assessments of our capabilities and, perhaps most important, our limits, both institutionally and operationally. As I‘ve said before in other settings, the responsibility of this Department first and foremost is to fight and win wars – not just constantly prepare for them. Now, even with this in mind – and perhaps especially with this in mind – we cannot ignore the risks posed by the military forces of other state actors. This is a particularly salient issue for this group, as the weight of America‘s conventional and strategic strength has shifted to our air and naval forces.... Where the trend of future conflict is clear, I have made specific recommendations. For example, I hope to accelerate the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy‘s big, blue-water surface combatants. As we saw last week, you don‘t necessarily need a billion-dollar ship to chase down a bunch of teenage pirates. The size of the ship in such cases is less important than having Navy SEALs onboard. To carry out the missions we may face in the future – whether dealing with non-state actors at sea or near shore, or swarming speedboats – we will need numbers, speed, and ability to operate in shallow waters. We also must examine our blue-water fleet and the overall strategy behind the kinds of ships we are buying. The need to show presence and project power from a piece of sovereign territory called a United States Navy ship will never go away. But we cannot allow more ships to go the way of the DDG-1000 – where since its inception the projected buy has dwindled from 32 to three as costs per ship have more than doubled. One of the things that I am recommending in this budget is to upgrade and build more Arleigh Burke destroyers, still a best-in-class ship that has been the workhorse of the U.S. surface fleet for nearly two decades. And a ship that has proven that it can be upgraded rapidly with new capabilities and technologies. The United States must not take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in programs, platforms, and personnel that will ensure that we remain preeminent at sea. But rather than go forward under the same assumptions that guided our shipbuilding during the Cold War, I believe we need to develop a more rigorous analytical framework before moving forward

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy … – the type of framework that will be provided by the Quadrennial Defense Review. That is one reason I delayed a number of decisions on programs such as the follow on manned bomber, the next generation cruiser, as well as overall maritime capabilities. The purpose was to develop an analytical construct through which we can more precisely determine what will be needed in coming years. To determine what kind of tactics and strategies future adversaries, both state and non-state actors, are likely to pursue. In this respect, it is important to keep some perspective. For example, as much as the U.S. Navy has shrunk since the end of the Cold War, in terms of tonnage, its battle fleet, by one estimate, is still larger than the next 13 navies combined – and 11 of those 13 navies are U.S. allies or partners. In terms of capabilities, the over-match is even greater. No country in the rest of the world has anything close to the reach and firepower to match a carrier strike group. And the United States has and will maintain eleven until atleast 2040. I might also note that we have a number of Expeditionary Strike Groups and will in the not-too-distant future will be able to carry the F-35. Potential adversaries are well-aware of this fact, which is why, despite significant naval modernization programs underway in some countries, no one intends to bankrupt themselves by challenging the U.S. to a shipbuilding competition akin to the Dreadnought arms race prior to World War I. Instead, we‘ve seen their investments in weapons geared to neutralize our advantages – to deny the U.S. military freedom of movement and action while potentially threatening our primary means of projecting power: our bases, sea and air assets, and the networks that support them. This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers and other large, multibillion dollar blue- water surface combatants – where the loss of even one ship would be a national catastrophe. We know other nations are working on ways to thwart the reach and striking power of the U.S. battle fleet – whether by producing stealthy submarines in quantity or developing anti- ship missiles with increasing range and accuracy. We ignore these developments at our peril. The Royal Navy‘s greatest defeat in World War II – the sinking of the capital ships H.M.S. Repulse and the brand new Prince of Wales by Japanese aircraft just days after Pearl Harbor – was due in part to a command with little appreciation for air power, and in particular the threat posed by a single, air-delivered torpedo. I have also directed the QDR team to be realistic about the scenarios where direct U.S. military action would be needed – so we can better gauge our requirements. One of those that will be examined closely is the need for a new capability to get large numbers of troops from ship to shore – in other words, the capability provided by the Marine Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. No doubt, it was a real strategic asset during the first Gulf War to have a

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flotilla of Marines waiting off Kuwait City – forcing Saddam‘s army to keep one eye on the Saudi border, and one eye on the coast. But we have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious action again. In the 21st century, how much amphibious capability do we need? Overall, we have to consider the right mix of weapons and ships to deal with the span of threats we will likely face. The goal of our procurement should be to develop a portfolio – a mixture of weapons and capabilities whose flexibility allows us to respond to a spectrum of contingencies on and beyond the horizon.38

The Department of the Navy, in discussing its proposed FY2010 budget, states that the budget ―reflects lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, while also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world, now and in the future. The recommendations [in the budget] are the product of a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements, risks and needs, and represent those things that are truly necessary for current and future missions.‖39 The Department states that it ―is committed to providing naval forces with an inherent ability to quickly maneuver and engage our country‘s adversaries, whether they are conventional blue water based navies or unconventional terror based organizations,‖40 and that the budget ―ensures that our contemporary wartime requirements receive steady long-term funding similar to our conventional modernization programs.‖41 The Department also states that The ability to operate freely at sea is one of the most important elements of joint and interagency operations, and sea control requires capabilities in all aspects of the maritime domain, including space and cyberspace. The growing number of nations operating submarines is among the most significant challenges to our ability to exercise sea control. We will not permit an adversary to impede the United States and our allies from freedom to maneuver on the seas and access to vital sea-lines of communication and commerce. The Department‘s ability to overcome challenges to access while simultaneously projecting and sustaining power ashore is the basis of our combat credibility.42

Those who argue that relatively less emphasis should be placed on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years could argue one or more of the following:

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Preparing for a potential conflict over Taiwan years from now might be unnecessary, since the situation with Taiwan might well be resolved by then. It is highly unlikely that China and the United States will come to blows in coming years over some other issue, due to the deep economic and financial ties between China and the United States and the tremendous damage such a conflict could inflict. Placing a strong emphasis on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces could induce China to increase planned investments in its own naval forces, leading to an expensive U.S.China naval arms race. Far from coming to blows, Chinese and U.S. naval forces in coming years can and should cooperate in areas of common interest such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations, anti-piracy operations, and other maritime-security operations.

Those who argue that relatively more emphasis should be placed on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years could argue one or more of the following:

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Not preparing for a potential conflict over Taiwan years from now could make such a conflict more likely by emboldening China to use military force to attempt to achieve its goals regarding Taiwan. It might also embolden China to use its naval forces more aggressively in asserting its maritime territorial claims and its interpretation of international laws relating freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (an interpretation at odds with the U.S. interpretation). China‘s naval modernization effort may be driven more by internal Chinese factors than by external factors such as U.S. decisions on defense spending. To the extent that China‘s naval modernization effort might be influenced by U.S. decisions on defense spending, a decision to not emphasize programs for countering improved Chinese military forces might encourage China to continue or even increase its naval modernization effort out of a belief that the effort is succeeding in terms of dissuading U.S. leaders from taking steps to prevent a shift in China‘s favor in the balance of military forces in the Western Pacific.

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Even if China and the United States never come to blows with one another, maintaining a day-to-day presence in the Pacific of U.S. naval forces capable of successfully countering Chinese naval forces will be an important U.S. tool for shaping the region—that is, for ensuring that other countries in the region do not view China as the region‘s emerging military leader (or the United States as a fading military power in the region), and respond by either aligning their policies more closely with China or taking steps to improve their own military capabilities that the United State might prefer they not take, such as developing nuclear weapons. Placing a relatively strong emphasis on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces does not preclude cooperating with China in areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations, anti-piracy operations, and other maritimesecurity operations.

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Potential Navy-Related Program Implications What are the potential Navy-related program implications of placing a relatively strong emphasis on countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years?

Potential Implications in General A decision to place a relatively strong defense-planning emphasis on countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years could lead to one more of the following: 

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increasing activities for monitoring and understanding developments in China‘s navy, as well as activities for measuring and better understanding operating conditions in the Western Pacific; assigning a larger percentage of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet (and, as a result, a smaller percentage to the Atlantic Fleet); homeporting more of the Pacific Fleet‘s ships at forward locations such as Hawaii, Guam, and Japan; increasing training and exercises in operations relating to countering Chinese maritime anti-access forces, such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations;

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placing a relatively strong emphasis on programs for developing and procuring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapons for defeating Chinese anti-access systems.

Actions Already Taken The U.S. Navy and (for sea-based ballistic missile defense programs) the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have taken a number of steps in recent years that appear intended, at least in part, at improving the U.S. Navy‘s ability to counter Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities, including but not limited to the following:   

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increasing antisubmarine warfare (ASW) training for Pacific Fleet forces; shifting three Pacific Fleet Los Angeles (SSN-688) class SSNs to Guam; basing all three Seawolf (SSN-21) class submarines – the Navy‘s largest and most heavily armed SSNs – in the Pacific Fleet (at KitsapBremerton, WA); basing two of the Navy‘s four converted Trident cruise missile/special operations forces submarines (SSGNs) in the Pacific (at Bangor, WA);43 assigning most of the Navy‘s ballistic missile defense (BMD)-capable Aegis cruisers and destroyers to the Pacific – and homeporting some of those ships at Yokosuka, Japan, and Pearl Harbor, HI; increasing the planned procurement quantity of SM-3 BMD interceptor missiles; developing and procuring a sea-based terminal-defense BMD capability as a complement to the Aegis BMD midcourse BMD capability; and expanding the planned number of BMD-capable ships from three Aegis cruisers and 15 Aegis destroyers to more than 3 Aegis cruisers and all Aegis destroyers.44

In addition, the Navy‘s July 2008 proposal to stop procurement of Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers and resume procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers can be viewed as having been prompted in large part by Navy concerns over its ability to counter China‘s maritime anti-access capabilities. The Navy stated that this proposal was driven by a change over the last two years in the Navy‘s assessment of threats

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that U.S. Navy forces will face in coming years from ASCMs, ballistic missiles, and submarines operating in blue waters. Although the Navy in making this proposal did not highlight China by name, the Navy‘s references to ballistic missiles and to submarines operating in blue waters can be viewed, at least in part, as a reference to Chinese ballistic missiles (including ASBMs) and Chinese submarines. (In discussing ASCMs, the Navy cited a general proliferation of ASCMs to various actors, including the Hezbollah organization.)45

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Highly Capable Ships and Aircraft An emphasis on acquiring highly capable ships could involve maintaining or increasing funding for procurement of aircraft carriers, attack submarines, and cruisers and destroyers. Capabilities to emphasize in procurement of cruisers and destroyers would include BMD, AAW, and ASW. An emphasis on procuring highly capable aircraft could involve maintaining or increasing funding for a variety of naval aviation acquisition programs, including F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-35C strike fighters, EA18G Growler electronic attack aircraft, E-2D Hawkeye early warning and command and control aircraft, the P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), and the Navy‘s Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS program) program.46 Pacific Fleet’s Share of the Navy The final report on the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed the Navy ―to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence.‖47 The Navy will meet the 2005 QDR directive of having six CVNs in the Pacific when the Carl Vinson (CVN-70)—the CVN currently undergoing a mid-life refueling complex overhaul (RCOH) at Newport News, VA— completes its RCOH and post-delivery work and is then shifted to San Diego. As of February 2009, 52% or 53% of the Navy‘s submarines (depending on whether SSBNs are included in the calculation) were homeported in the Pacific. The Navy can achieve the 2005 QDR directive of having 60% of its submarines in the Pacific by assigning newly commissioned submarines to the Pacific, by moving submarines from the Atlantic to the Pacific, by decommissioning Atlantic Fleet submarines, or through some combination of these actions. According to one 2008 press report, the Navy plans to have 60% of its SSNs in the Pacific Fleet by 2010.48

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As part of a ―strategic laydown analysis‖ that the Navy performed in support of its January 2009 proposal to transfer a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) to Mayport, FL,49 the Navy projected that of its planned 313ship fleet, 181 ships, or 58% (including six of 11 CVNs), would be assigned to the Pacific Fleet.50

Homeporting Pacific Fleet Ships in Forward Locations Navy ships homeported in Japan include an aircraft carrier strike group consisting of a CVN and 11 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates; an amphibious ready group consisting of three amphibious ships; and additional mine countermeasures ships. Navy ships homeported at Guam include three Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarines and a submarine tender. Navy ships homeported in Hawaii include 15 Virginia (SSN-774) and Los Angles class SSNs, and 11 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. A 2002 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report discussed the option of homeporting as many as 11 SSNs at Guam.51

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Fleet Architecture—Larger vs. Smaller Ships Should the Navy shift over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture featuring a reduced reliance on larger ships and an increased reliance on smaller ships? Some observers, viewing the anti-access aspects of China‘s naval modernization effort, including ASBMs, ASCMs, and other anti-ship weapons, have raised the question of whether the U.S. Navy should respond by shifting over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture featuring a reduced reliance on carriers and other large ships and an increased reliance on smaller ships. The question of whether the U.S. Navy concentrates too much of its combat capability in a relatively small number of high-value units, and whether it should shift over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture, has been debated at various times over the years, in various contexts. Much of the discussion concerns whether the Navy should start procuring smaller aircraft carriers as complements or replacements for its current large aircraft carriers. Supporters of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue that that the Navy‘s current architecture, including its force of 11 or 12 large aircraft carriers, in effect puts too many of the Navy‘s combat-capability eggs

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into a relatively small number of baskets on which an adversary can concentrate its surveillance and targeting systems and its anti-ship weapons. They argue that although a large Navy aircraft carrier can absorb hits from multiple conventional weapons without sinking, a smaller number of enemy weapons might cause damage sufficient to stop the carrier‘s aviation operations, thus eliminating the ship‘s primary combat capability and providing the attacker with what is known as a ―mission kill.‖ A more highly distributed fleet architecture, they argue, would make it more difficult for China to target the Navy and reduce the possibility of the Navy experiencing a significant reduction in combat capability due to the loss in battle of a relatively small number of high-value units. Opponents of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue that large carriers and other large ships are not only more capable, but proportionately more capable, than smaller ships, that larger ships are capable of fielding highly capable systems for defending themselves, and that they are much better able than smaller ships to withstand the effects of enemy weapons, due to their larger size, extensive armoring and interior compartmentalization, and extensive damage- control systems. A more highly distributed fleet architecture, they argue, would be less capable or more expensive than today‘s fleet architecture. Opponents of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue could also argue that the Navy has already taken an important (but not excessive) step toward fielding a more distributed fleet architecture through its plan to acquire 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), which are small, fast surface combatants with modular, ―plugandflight‖ mission payloads.52 The issue of Navy fleet architecture, including the question of whether the Navy should shift over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture, was examined in a report by DOD‘s Office of Force Transformation (OFT) that was submitted to Congress in 2005. OFT ‘s report, along with two other reports on Navy fleet architecture that were submitted to Congress in 2005, are discussed at length in another CRS report.53

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY FOR FY2010 The Navy‘s proposed FY2010 budget was submitted to Congress in early May. The FY2010 defense authorization and appropriation bills may be marked up in June and July.

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APPENDIX. PRIOR-YEAR LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY FY2009 FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001)

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House The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-652 of May 16, 2008) on H.R. 5658, stated the following regarding the development of an anti-air warfare target for simulating Threat D, which some press reports suggest might be a term that refers to an ASCM with a flight profile similar that of the SS-N-27 Sizzler:54 The committee is pleased to note the anticipated source selection for the development of a Threat D missile target development program in the summer of 2008. The committee remains concerned that the estimated initial operating capability of such a target in 2014 creates substantial risk during the interim period. The committee encourages the Secretary to accelerate the target development program to the maximum extent practicable. In addition, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to notify the congressional defense committees in writing if the estimated initial operating capability of the Threat D target is delayed more than 90 days or if the costs associated with such program exceeds 10 percent of programmed funding. The committee further directs the Secretary to provide such notification within 30 days, along with the reasons for such delay or cost overrun and a mitigation plan consisting of actions that could restore the program to its original timeline. (Page 204)

FY2008 FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1585/S. 1547/H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181) House Section 1244 of the House-reported version of the FY2008 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1585) stated:

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Ronald O‘Rourke SEC. 1244. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE STRATEGIC MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. It is the sense of Congress that—

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(1) United States military war-fighting capabilities are potentially threatened by the strategic military capabilities and intentions of the People‘s Republic of China, as demonstrated by— (A). the October 2006 undetected broach of a Chinese SONG-class diesel-electric submarine in close proximity of the USS Kitty Hawk in international waters; and (B). the January 2007 test of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, posing a potential threat to United States military assets in space; (2) it is in the national security interests of the United States to make every effort to understand China‘s strategic military capabilities and intentions; and (3) as part of such an effort, the Secretary of Defense should expand efforts to develop an accurate assessment of China‘s strategic military modernization, particularly with regard to its sea- and space-based strategic capabilities.

Senate The Senate-passed version of the FY2008 defense authorization bill (S. 1547; S.Rept. 110-77 of June 5, 2007) did not contain a provision analogous to Section 1244 of the House-passed version of H.R. 1585 (see above). Conference The conference report (H.Rept. 110-477 of December 6, 2007) on H.R. 1585 did not contain a provision analogous to the Sec. 1244 of the Housepassed version of H.R. 1585. The conference report stated: The conferees note China‘s continued investment in strategic military capabilities that could be used to support power projection and access denial operations beyond the Asia Pacific region, and the lack of transparency surrounding the strategic military capabilities and intentions relating to China‘s military modernization. The Pentagon‘s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) found that China is at a strategic crossroads and that, ―of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States.‖ The conferees note that during the last year, China demonstrated such potential, including the October 2006

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broach of a Chinese SONG-class diesel-electric submarine in close proximity to the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier in international waters and the January 2007 test of a direct ascent anti-satellite missile against a Chinese weather satellite in low-earth orbit. The conferees encourage the Secretary of Defense to expand efforts to develop an accurate assessment and understanding of China‘s strategic military modernization and strategic intentions, particularly with regard to its sea- and space-based strategic capabilities. (Page 1031)

H.R. 1585 was vetoed by the President on December 28, 2008. A new bill, H.R. 4986, was passed with changes that took into account the President‘s objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585. The President‘s objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585 did not relate to the passage quoted above. H.R. 4986 was signed into law as P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008. Except for the changes made by Congress to take into account the President‘s objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585, H.Rept. 110-477 in effect serves as the conference report for H.R. 4986.

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1

U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009. Washington, 2009. (Hereafter 2009 DOD CMP. Editions for earlier years cited similarly.) 2 Unless otherwise indicated, shipbuilding program information in this section is taken from Jane’s Fighting Ships 2008-2009, and previous editions Other sources of information on these shipbuilding programs may disagree regarding projected ship commissioning dates or other details, but sources present similar overall pictures regarding PLA Navy shipbuilding. 3 China ordered its first four Russian-made Kilo-class submarines in 1993, and its four Russianmade Sovremennyclass destroyers in 1996. China laid the keel on its first Song (Type 039) class submarine in 1991, its first Luhu (Type 052) class destroyer in 1990, its Luhai (Type 051B) class destroyer in 1996, and its first Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G) class frigate in 1990. 4 First-in-class ships whose keels were laid down in 1990 or 1991 (see previous footnote) likely reflect design work done in the latter 1980s. 5 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 6 2009 DOD CMP, p. viii. 7 For more on this topic, see CRS Report RL3 1183, China’s Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Kerry Dumbaugh et al. 8 Depending on their ranges, these theater-range ballistic missiles can be divided into short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, respectively). 9 2009 DOD CMP, p. 48. See also p. 21. 10 Some sources state that a successor to the Shang class SSN design, called the Type 095 SSN design, is in development.

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11

Some observers believe the Yuan class to be a variant of the Song class and refer to the Yuan class as the Type 039A. 12 2009 DOD CMP, p. 24. 13 2009 DOD CMP, pp. 24 and 48. 14 2009 DOD CMP, p. 25 (Figure 6), 48, and 66 (Figure 22). 15 A map published by DOD (2009 DOD CMP, p. 25 [Figure 6]) shows a range ellipse for the JL2 which, upon inspection, appears to show the missile as having a range of no more than about 6,600 kilometers, rather than the 7,200 kilometers indicated in the legend to the map and elsewhere in the DOD report. In addition, the JL-2 range ellipse appears centered on a launching point that is more or less west of Shanghai and perhaps 200 statute miles inland from the sea. This combination of apparent range and launching point appears to be why the map shows the JL-2 as having sufficient range to attack only the western half of the Aleutian island chain and perhaps the western coast of mainland Alaska (the section of Alaska‘s coast that is directly opposite the Russian coast). A similar map appeared in the 2008 DOD CMP. A missile with a range of 7,200 kilometers that is launched from an ocean location close to China‘s eastern coast would have sufficient range to attack all of Alaska except the Alaskan panhandle. 16 2009 DOD CMP, pp. 48-49. In another part of the report (page 40), DOD states: China has an aircraft carrier research and design program, which includes continued renovations to the former Soviet Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier VARYAG. Beginning in early 2006 with the release of China‘s Eleventh Five Year Plan, PRC-owned media reported high-level government and military official statements on China‘s intent to build aircraft carriers. In December 2008, China‘s Ministry of National Defense spokesman Senior Colonel Huang Xueping said ―China has vast oceans and it is the sovereign responsibility of China‘s armed forces to ensure the country‘s maritime security and uphold the sovereignty of its coastal waters as well as its maritime rights and interests,‖ and added that China is ―seriously considering‖ adding an aircraft carrier to its fleet, because ―the aircraft carrier is a symbol of a country‘s overall national strength, as well as the competitiveness of the country‘s naval force.‖ This was preceded by a November 2008 statement by the Director of the Ministry of National Defense, Foreign Affairs Office, Major General Qian Lihua, that ―having an aircraft carrier is the dream of any great military power,‖ and ―the question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier.‖ China continues to show interest in procuring Su-33 carrier-borne fighters from Russia even though the ex-VARYAG aircraft carrier has yet to complete refurbishment at Dalian shipyard. In October 2006, a Russian press report suggested early-stage negotiations were underway for China to purchase up to 50 such aircraft at a cost of $2.5 billion. However, there has been no announcement of a contract for the aircraft. The PLA Navy has reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 navy pilots to operate fixed- wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. The program was reported to be four years long and would be followed by ship-borne training involving the ex-VARYAG. Analysts in and out of government project that China will not have an operational, domestically-produced carrier and associated ships before 2015. However, changes in China‘s shipbuilding capability and degree of foreign assistance to the program could alter those projections. The PLA Navy is considering building multiple carriers by 2020. 17 Additional points of comparison include the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (commissioned in 2001), which has a displacement of about 42,000 tons, and aircraft carriers that the United Kingdom and France plan to commission into service between 2014 and 2016, which are to have displacements of 65,000 to 70,000 tons. The Charles de Gaulle can operate an air wing of about 36 aircraft, the future UK and French carriers are to operate air wings of about 40 to 45 aircraft, and the U.S. Navy‘s Nimitz-class carriers can operate air wings of 70 or more aircraft. 18 2007 DOD CMP, p. 3. The DOD report spells Sovremenny with two ―y‖s at the end.

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2008 DOD CMP, p. 2. One observer says the limited production runs of these four designs to date ―might be financially related, or may relate to debate over what ships should follow the Type 051C air defence and Type 052C multi-role classes, or that once the Type 054A [frigate design] is accepted as the future missile frigate design, three or four of the major warship shipyards will all be assigned to construction of this design, delaying a future CG/DDG class.‖ (Keith Jacobs, ―PLANavy Update,‖ Naval Forces, No. 1, 2007: 24.) Another observer stated I 2007 that ―It looks like [the] 052C [class] was stopped for a few years due to [the] JiangNan relocation [and the] sorting out [of] all the issues on [the] 052B/C [designs]. (―2018— deadline for Taiwan invasion?‖ a September 22, 2007, entry in a blog on China naval and air power maintained by an author called ―Feng,‖ available online at http://china-

pla.blogspot.com/2007/09/2018-deadline-for-taiwan-invasion.html.)

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2007 DOD CMP, pp. 3-4 22 2007 DOD CMP, p. 3. 23 France sold a modified version of the La Fayette-class design to Taiwan; the six ships that Taiwan built to the design entered service in 1996-1998. 24 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2008-2009, p. 30 (Executive Overview). This source similarly states on page 133: ―Under construction at two shipyards, it is likely that this design will be built in sufficient numbers to replace the ageing Jianghu class frigates.‖ 25 Keith Jacobs, ―PLA-Navy Update,‖ Naval Forces, No. 1, 2007: 26. 26 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2008-2009, p. 30 (Executive Overview) and p. 141. One observer stated in 2007 that: ―In addition to the Houbei class, one observer stated in 2007 that China in 2005 ordered 24 to 30 Molniya-class ASCMarmed fast attack craft from Russia. The Molniya class is an upgraded version of the Russian Tarantul-class design that might be armed with four SS-N-22 ASCMs. The first four, according to this observer, were to have been delivered by late-2007 or early-2008.‖ (Keith Jacobs, ―PLA-Navy Update,‖ Naval Forces, No. 1, 2007: 27.) 27 2009 DOD CMP, p. viii. 28 Mark Magnier, ―China Regrets Sub Incident, Japan Says,‖ Los Angeles Times, November 17, 2004; Martin Fackler, ―Japanese Pursuit Of Chinese Sub Raises Tensions,‖ Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2004: 20; Kenji Hall, ―Japan: Unidentified sub is Chinese,‖ NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), November 12, 2004. See also 2006 DOD CMP, pp. 1112. 29 Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record [before the] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005, p. 16-17. See also Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement For the Record [before the] Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 March 2005, p. 17. 30 Timothy Hu, ―Ready, steady, go ... ,‖ Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 13, 2005: 27; ―China Sub Tracked By U.S. Off Guam Before Japan Intrusion,‖ Japan Times, November 17, 2004. 31 Norimitsu Onishi and Howard W. French, ―Japan‘s Rivalry With China Is Stirring A Crowded Sea,‖ New York Times, September 11, 2005. See also ―Japan Upset Over Chinese Warships Near Disputed Area,‖ DefenseNews.com, October 3, 2005. 32 ―China Sends Warships to East China Sea,‖ DefenseNews.com, September 29, 2005. 2006 DOD CMP, p. 2, states that in the Fall of 2005, ―PLA Navy vessels trained their weapons on Japanese Self Defense Forces aircraft monitoring Chinese drilling and survey activity in the disputed area.‖ 33 Bill Gertz, ―China Sub Secretly Stalked U.S. Fleet,‖ Washington Times, November 13, 2006: 13; Philip Creed, ―Navy Confirms Chinese Sub Spotted Near Carrier,‖ Navy Times.com, November 13, 2006; Bill Gertz, ―Defenses On [sic] Subs To Be Reviewed,‖ Washington Times, November 14, 2006; En-Lai Yeoh, ―Fallon Confirms Chinese Stalked Carrier,‖

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NavyTimes.com, November 14, 2006; Bill Gertz, ―Admiral Says Sub Risked A Shootout,‖ Washington Times, November 15, 2006; Jeff Schogol, ―Admiral Disputes Report That Kitty Hawk, Chinese Sub Could Have Clashed,‖ Mideast Starts and Stripes, November 17, 2006. 34 Associated Press, ―China Denies Reports That Sub Followed Kitty Hawk,‖ NavyTimes.com, November 16, 2006. A shorter version of the same story was published as Associated Press, ―China Denies Sub Followed A Group Of U.S. Warships,‖ Asian Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2006: 11. 35 Andrew S. Erickson and Juston D. Mikolay, ―Welcome China to the Fight Against Pirates,‖ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2009: 36. 36 Bill Gertz, ―China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes,‖ Washington Times, January 18, 2005, p.1. The report stated that China is: • operating an eavesdropping post and building a naval base at Gwadar, Pakistan, near the Persian Gulf; • building a container port facility at Chittagong, Bangladesh, and seeking ―much more extensive naval and commercial access‖ in Bangladesh; • building naval bases in Burma, which is near the Strait of Malacca; • operating electronic intelligence-gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal and near the Strait of Malacca; • building a railway line from China through Cambodia to the sea; • improving its ability to project air and sea power into the South China Sea from mainland China and Hainan Island; • considering funding a $20-billion canal that would cross the Kra Isthmus of Thailand, which would allow ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca and permit China to establish port facilities there. According to the article, The Pentagon report said China, by militarily controlling oil shipping sea lanes, could threaten ships, ―thereby creating a climate of uncertainty about the safety of all ships on the high seas.‖ The report noted that the vast amount of oil shipments through the sea lanes, along with growing piracy and maritime terrorism, prompted China, as well as India, to build up naval power at ―chokepoints‖ along the sea routes from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea.‖ China ... is looking not only to build a blue-water navy to control the sea lanes, but also to develop undersea mines and missile capabilities to deter the potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, including the U.S. Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan,‖ the report said.... ‖The Iraq war, in particular, revived concerns over the impact of a disturbance in Middle Eastern supplies or a U.S. naval blockade,‖ the report said, noting that Chinese military leaders want an ocean-going navy and ―undersea retaliatory capability to protect the sea lanes.‖ China believes the U.S. military will disrupt China‘s energy imports in any conflict over Taiwan, and sees the United States as an unpredictable country that violates others‘ sovereignty and wants to ―encircle‖ China, the report said. See also Edward Cody, ―China Builds A Smaller, Stronger Military,‖ Washington Post, April 12, 2005, p. 1. 37 Indrani Bagchi, ―China Eyeing Base in Bay of Bengal?‖ Times of India, August 9, 2008, posted online at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/China_eyeing_base_in_ Bay_of_Bengal/articleshow/3343799.cms 38 Source: Text of remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, April 17, 2009. 39 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009) p. 1-1. 40 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009) p. 4-4.

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Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009) p. 5-1. 42 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009) pp. 1-3 to 1-4. 43 For more on the SSGNs, see CRS Report RS2 1007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 44 For more on sea-based BMD programs, see CRS Report RL33745, Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense— Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke 45 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32 109, Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 46 The Navy is currently developing a stealthy, long-range, unmanned combat air system (UCAS) for use in the Navy‘s carrier air wings. The demonstration program for the system is called UCAS-D. The subsequent production version of the aircraft is called N-UCAS, with the N standing for Navy. Some observers, including analysts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), believe that N-UCAS would be highly useful, if not critical, for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces. N-UCASs, they argue, could be launched from a carrier shortly after the ship leaves port in Hawaii, be refueled in flight, and arrive in the Taiwan Strait area in a matter of hours, permitting the carrier air wing to contribute to U.S. operations there days before the carrier itself would arrive. They also argue that N-UCASs would permit Navy carriers to operate effectively while remaining outside the reach of China‘s anti-access weapons, including ASBMs. (Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program: A New Dawn For Naval Aviation?, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, 2007. 39 pp. [CSBA Backgrounder, May 10, 2007]. The authors briefed key points from this document on July 11, 2007, in room S-211 of the Capitol.) Another observer states that China‘s deployment of ASBM‘s and supporting surveillance and targeting systems ―argues for a stealth long-range attack aircraft as part of the [carrier] airwing to provide more flexibility on how we employ our carriers.‖ (James Lyons, ―China‘s One World?‖ Washington Times, August 24, 2008: B1 47 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006. (February 6, 2006) p. 47. 48 Mike Barber, ―Navy‘s Fast-Attack Submarine Signals News Mission In Pacific,‖ Seattle PostIntelligencer, February 1, 2008. 49 For more on this proposal, see CRS Report R40248, Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 50 Source: Slide entitled ―Strategic Laydown Summary,‖ in Navy briefing entitled ―Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL, dated November 18, 2008, and presented to CRS on December 5, 2008. For more on the Navy‘s proposed 313-ship fleet, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 51 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force, Washington, CBO, 2002. (A CBO Study, March 2002), 41 pp. 52 For more on the LCS, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O‘Rourke. 53 See CRS Report RL33955, Navy Force Structure: Alternative Force Structure Studies of 2005—Background for Congress, by Ronald O‘Rourke. The functions carried out by OFT have since been redistributed to other DOD offices. 54 See ―United States: The Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile Threat,‖ Stratfor.com, April 18, available online at http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united_states_supersonic_anti_ship_missile_threat Tony Capaccio, ―Navy Can‘t Test Defense Against China‘s Sizzler,‖ Until 2014,‖ Bloomberg.com, April 3, 2008; Chris Johnson, ―Navy Issues Draft Request For Threat-D

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Target Development,‖ Inside the Navy, July 30, 2007; Chris Johnson, ―Industry Day Planned To Develop Threat-D Target For Ship Tests,‖ Inside the Navy, July 9, 2007; and Chris Johnson, ―Pentagon: Lack Of Threat-D Target Hinders Testing For New Vessels,‖ Inside the Navy, January 22, 2007. See also the transcript of the March 12, 2008, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the posture of the Pacific Command.

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Chapter 2

MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2009 Office of the Secretary of Defense

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY China‘s rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with growing global influence has significant implications for the Asia-Pacific region and the world. The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China, and encourages China to participate responsibly in world affairs by taking on a greater share of the burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system. The United States has done much over the last 30 years to encourage and facilitate China‘s national development and its integration into the international system. However, much uncertainty surrounds China‘s future course, particularly regarding how its expanding military power might be used. The People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, highintensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries – an approach that China refers to as preparing for ―local wars under conditions of informatization.‖ The pace and scope of China‘s military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons,

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Office of the Secretary of Defense

continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces. China‘s ability to sustain military power at a distance remains limited, but its armed forces continue to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare, that are changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region. The PLA‘s modernization vis-à-vis Taiwan has continued over the past year, including its buildup of short-range missiles opposite the island. In the near-term, China‘s armed forces are rapidly developing coercive capabilities for the purpose of deterring Taiwan‘s pursuit of de jure independence. These same capabilities could in the future be used to pressure Taiwan toward a settlement of the cross-Strait dispute on Beijing‘s terms while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict. This modernization and the threat to Taiwan continue despite significant reduction in cross-Strait tension over the last year since Taiwan elected a new president. The PLA is also developing longer range capabilities that have implications beyond Taiwan. Some of these capabilities have allowed it to contribute cooperatively to the international community‘s responsibilities in areas such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter-piracy. However, some of these capabilities, as well as other, more disruptive ones, could allow China to project power to ensure access to resources or enforce claims to disputed territories. Beijing publicly asserts that China‘s military modernization is ―purely defensive in nature,‖ and aimed solely at protecting China‘s security and interests. Over the past several years, China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond China‘s immediate territorial interests, but has left unclear to the international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA‘s evolving doctrine and capabilities. Moreover, China continues to promulgate incomplete defense expenditure figures and engage in actions that appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies. The limited transparency in China‘s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by creating uncertainty and increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. The United States continues to work with our allies and friends in the region to monitor these developments and adjust our policies accordingly.

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

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AAV: AEW&C: AIP: APEC: ARATS: ARM: ASAT: ASEAN: ASEM: ASBM: ASCM: C4ISR:

Amphibious Assault Vehicle Airborne Early Warning and Control Air Independent Propulsion Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait Anti-Radiation Missile Anti-Satellite Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Anti-Ship Cruise Missile ASM: Air-to-Surface Missile Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance CAD/CAM: Computer-Assisted Design/Manufacturing CCP: Chinese Communist Party CMC: Central Military Commission CNA: Computer Network Attack CND: Computer Network Defense CNE: Computer Network Exploitation CNO: Computer Network Operations CNP: Comprehensive National Power CONUS: Continental United States DDG: Guided-Missile Destroyer DOD: Department of Defense DTL: Defense Telephone Link EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone EMP: Electro-Magnetic Pulse EU: European Union EW: Electronic Warfare FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation FFG: Guided-Missile Frigate FTA: Free Trade Agreement GAD: General Armament Department GDP: Gross Domestic Product GEO: Geosynchronous Orbit GPS: Global Positioning System GSD: General Staff Department

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Office of the Secretary of Defense HA/DR: Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief ICBM: Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement IMF: International Monetary Fund IOC: Initial Operational Capability IRBM: Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile LACM: Land Attack Cruise Missile LEO: Low Earth Orbit MaRV: Maneuvering Re-entry Vehicle MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MIRV: Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles MND: Ministry of National Defense MR: Military Region MRBM: Medium-Range Ballistic Missile MRL: Multiple Rocket Launcher NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer NGO: Non-Governmental Organization NM: Nautical Mile OECD: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development OMTE: Outline of Military Training and Evaluation OTH: Over-the-Horizon PAP: People‘s Armed Police PBS C: Politburo Standing Committee PLA: People‘s Liberation Army PLAAF: People‘s Liberation Army Air Force PRC: People‘s Republic of China SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization SEF: Straits Exchange Foundation SESS: Space Event Support Ship SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SS: Diesel-Electric Attack Submarine SRBM: Short-Range Ballistic Missile SSBN: Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine SSN: Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UCAV: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle UHF: Ultra High Frequency UN: United Nations UNCAR: United Nations Conventional Arms Register UNFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

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United States Dollars Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

CHINA’S EVOLVING MILITARY CAPABILITY

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Since the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) submitted its first report pursuant to Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, China has made considerable progress toward building and fielding credible and capable military power. The Department‘s understanding of China‘s military power has improved over the reporting period, but much remains to be learned about China‘s national and military strategies, progress and trends in its military modernization, and the related implications for regional security and stability. China has improved modestly the transparency of its military and security affairs, but until it begins to view transparency less as a transaction to be negotiated and more as a responsibility that accompanies the accumulation of national power, the insights reflected in this report will remain incomplete, bridged only by assessment and informed judgment. Several of these insights are highlighted below: 

Defense Budget Outpacing Economic Growth. China‘s sustained economic growth, from a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $1.95 trillion in 2000 to a projected $4.19 trillion in 2008 (in 2008 USD) has enabled China to focus greater resources on building, equipping, and training the PLA without overwhelming the economy. One measure of increasing resourcing for the PLA is the official budget, which has more than doubled from $27.9 billion in 2000 to $60.1 billion in 2008 (in 2008 USD). The budget, however, does not capture the totality of military expenditure. Despite persistent efforts by the United States and others to gain greater clarity from China, or to improve estimates in the absence of such clarity, the Department of Defense‘s understanding of the resources, funding streams, and accounting mechanisms used to guide investment in the PLA has not improved measurably.



Strengthened Deterrent and Enhanced Strategic Strike. Since 2000, China has shifted from a largely vulnerable, strategic deterrent based on liquid-fueled, intercontinental-range ballistic missiles

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(ICBMs) fired from fixed locations to a more survivable and flexible strategic nuclear force. The introduction of two new classes of ICBMs, the DF-31 and DF-31A, both road-mobile, solid-propellant systems (the latter capable of targeting any location in the continental United States) reflects this shift. While there is no evidence that China‘s doctrine of ―no first use‖ has changed, the fielding of these forces, along with a projected new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)/ submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 2009-20 10 enabling a credible sea-based deterrent, will give China‘s leaders greater flexibility and options for strategic strike than previously available. While U.S. strategic forces still far outnumber those of China, China would be able to inflict significant damage on most large American cities with these survivable systems. 

Improving Anti-Access/Area-Denial Capabilities. Since 2000, China has expanded its arsenal of anti-access and area-denial weapons, presenting and projecting increasingly credible, layered offensive combat power across its borders and into the Western Pacific. China has or is acquiring the ability to: 1) hold large surface ships, including aircraft carriers, at risk (via quiet submarines, advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, or anti-ship ballistic missiles); 2) deny use of shore-based airfields, secure bastions and regional logistics hubs (via conventional ballistic missiles with greater ranges and accuracy, and land attack cruise missiles); and, 3) hold aircraft at risk over or near Chinese territory or forces (via imported and domestic fourth generation aircraft, advanced long-range surface-to-air missile systems, air surveillance systems, and ship-borne air defenses). Advances in China‘s space-based reconnaissance and positioning, navigation, and timing, as well as survivable terrestrial over-the-horizon targeting, are closing gaps in the creation of a precision-strike capability.



Regional Conventional Strike. Since 2000, China has continued its build-up of conventional ballistic missiles, building a nascent capacity for conventional short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) strikes against Taiwan into what has become one of China‘s primary instruments of coercion, not only of Taiwan but of other regional neighbors. In 2000, China‘s SRBM force was limited to one ―regimental-sized unit‖ in southeastern China. China has expanded the force opposite Taiwan to

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seven brigades with a total of 1,050-1,150 missiles, and is augmenting these forces with conventional medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) systems, such as the anti-ship ballistic missile, and at least two land attack cruise missile (LACM) variants capable of ground or air launch. Advanced fighters and bombers, combined with enhanced training for nighttime and overwater flights, provide the PLA with additional capabilities for regional strike or maritime interdiction operations. 

Competing for Dominance of the Electromagnetic Spectrum. The 2000 edition of this report observed that China is ―working to ameliorate weaknesses in C4I training and plac[e] increased emphasis on ‗electromagnetic warfare‘ to degrade or destroy enemy operational systems.‖ At that time, the PLA‘s electronic warfare (EW) systems were derived mostly from a combination of ―1950s-1980s technologies.‖ By the 2006 edition of this report, China‘s investments in advanced EW programs had given the PLA Air Force ―technological parity with or superiority over most potential adversaries.‖ By improving space-based and terrestrial C4ISR and by moving communications infrastructure to fiber, China is hardening its own capabilities while making gains in developing weapon systems (e.g., counterspace, computer network operations, and anti-radiation systems) to deny these capabilities to others. The 2004 introduction of the PLA concept of ―local wars under conditions of informatization‖ has guided development in this area, positioning the PLA to contest electromagnetic dominance in the early phases of future campaigns.



Persistent Limitations. As China‘s capabilities for local and regional operations have increased in certain areas since 2000, a number of limitations appear to have persisted. The PLA has developed new doctrine for joint warfighting and implemented organizational changes, such as including service commanders on the Central Military Commission, to facilitate the transition to a more ―joint‖ force. However, joint integration still lags. Similarly, PLA air and amphibious lift capacity has not improved appreciably since 2000 when the Department of Defense assessed the PLA as capable of sealift of one infantry division. Likewise, China‘s current ability to deliver about 5,000 parachutists in a single lift (less if equipment is carried at the same time) is similar to previous assessments. China‘s at-

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Office of the Secretary of Defense sea replenishment has improved with experience since 2000, but the PLA Navy today remains limited by a small number of support vessels – much as it did then. In 2000, the Department of Defense projected aerial refueling as an operational capability by 2005. Today, while China has a few aerial refueling aircraft, it does not have the number of tankers, properly equipped combat aircraft, or sufficient training to employ this capability for power projection.

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

Shifting Dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. Since 2000, there have been two peaceful political transitions on Taiwan and a gradual and steady maturation of Taiwan democracy. While Beijing‘s strategy toward Taiwan appears to have shifted from seeking an early resolution of the Taiwan issue to one of preventing Taiwan‘s de jure independence, by force if necessary, Beijing‘s objective of unifying Taiwan with the Mainland has not changed. Since 2000, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has continued to shift in Beijing‘s favor, marked by the sustained deployment of advanced military equipment to the Military Regions opposite Taiwan. In the 2002 report, the Department of Defense assessed that Taiwan ―has enjoyed dominance of the airspace over the Taiwan Strait for many years.‖ This conclusion no longer holds true. With this reversal, China has been able to develop a range of limited military options to attempt to coerce Taipei.

1. UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY ―China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China have become increasingly closely connected with the international community. China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China.‖ ―World peace and development are faced with multiple difficulties and challenges. Struggles for strategic resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance have intensified.‖ – China’s National Defense in 2008

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Overview People‘s Republic of China (PRC) leaders have outlined national strategic objectives in a series of ―white papers‖ on China‘s foreign policy, national defense, and arms control. However, such documents offer only limited insights on the motivations behind the objectives, or the specific strategies to achieve them. The linkages between the occasional strategic pronouncement and actual policy decisions in China are not apparent, especially during periods of crisis. As a result, the study of PLA views on grand strategy remains an inexact science. Still, it is possible to make some generalizations about China‘s strategy based on tradition, historical pattern, official statements and papers, and emphasis on certain military capabilities and diplomatic initiatives.

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Strategy with Chinese Characteristics PRC strategy is one of maintaining balance among competing priorities for national economic development and sustaining the type of security environment within which such development can occur. China‘s leaders describe the initial decades of the 21st Century as a ―20-year period of opportunity,‖ meaning that regional and international conditions will generally be peaceful and conducive to China‘s rise to regional preeminence and global influence.

LEADERSHIP GUIDANCE ON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY When analyzing China‘s foreign and security policy, Chinese strategists and analysts occasionally cite guidance from former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s: ―observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.‖ This guidance reflected Deng‘s belief that China‘s foreign policy and security strategy had to reinforce its core national interest of promoting domestic development by avoiding foreign risk, high-profile international engagement or provocations, or pretenses of international leadership. Some

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analysts see Deng‘s guidance as prescribing deliberate efforts to conceal intentions and capabilities. As China‘s global interests and influence have expanded in recent years, its diplomatic and military presence and engagement have become more visible and active to the world. PRC President Hu Jintao‘s own ideological formulation – ―Harmonious World,‖ which emphasizes ―diversity‖ and ―equality‖ in international relations along with traditional PRC foreign policy dictums of ―noninterference‖ and the ―democratization of international relations‖ – was endorsed at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007. Hu‘s ―Harmonious World‖ formulation reflects an evolution in the general tone and conduct of China‘s foreign and security affairs in recent years, but likely has not completely superseded Deng‘s thinking. PLA leaders and strategists often discuss China‘s strategy in terms of building ―comprehensive national power‖ (zonghe guoli ). Comprehensive national power (CNP) is the concept by which China‘s strategic planners use qualitative and quantitative variables to evaluate and measure China‘s standing in relation to other nations. CNP incorporates both soft, internally oriented indicators of strength (e.g., economic prosperity, domestic cohesion, and cultural influence) and hard, externally oriented measures (e.g., the size of a state‘s nuclear arsenal, territory, military capability, diplomatic influence, economic influence, and international prestige). As evidenced by the composition of CNP, there is a tendency among China‘s strategists to perceive a link between the internal and external dimensions of strength and weakness. This indicates that China‘s decisionmakers might see internal turmoil as an invitation to hostile external forces or possibly as the work of such forces. China‘s leaders may also perceive external challenges as connected to domestic enemies.

Insights on China’s Strategy and Priorities China‘s leaders appear to have adopted a set of enduring strategic priorities, which include perpetuating Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, sustaining economic growth and development, maintaining domestic political stability, defending China‘s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and securing China‘s status as a great power. Less clear are the specific strategies and plans Beijing has developed to achieve these objectives, the decisionmaking structures that guide strategy development and execution, and the

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manner and direction in which these priorities may adjust in response to changes in the security environment. Regime survival and the perpetuation of CCP rule shape the strategic outlook for China‘s leaders and drive many of their choices. As a substitute for the failure of communist ideology to unify the population and mobilize political support, Party leaders have relied on economic performance and nationalism as the basis for regime legitimacy. However, each contains risks that may undermine political control. For example, while China‘s leaders have stoked nationalist sentiment to manipulate public opinion, deflect domestic criticism, or bolster diplomacy, they are aware that protests can be difficult to control once begun and could easily turn against the state itself. Similarly, China‘s rapid economic growth – vital to the success of the CCP strategy – has led to increased economic inequality and dislocation, official corruption, and environmental degradation. The ongoing impact of the international financial downturn may provide an opportunity to gauge more clearly China‘s strategy and priorities, and to see if and how each is modified by this event. China‘s leaders have reaffirmed and continue to support ―reform and opening,‖ which began in 1978 as the fundamental basis for China‘s overall strategy and policy. However, two central perceptions increasingly appear in senior PRC leadership statements and commentary, suggesting a growing recognition that the process of ―reform and opening‖ has engendered several contradictions and challenges: 



First, reforms have enabled China to experience rapid growth in economic, political, and military power, but have also led to significant new challenges to internal stability. Official commentary on the 6th Plenum of the 16th CCP Party Congress in October 2006 stated that ―economic restructuring and social transformation‖ produced a corresponding increase in ―factors of uncertainty‖ in China‘s domestic stability. Second, reforms have increasingly propelled China into a global security environment in which external events can no longer be isolated from their effects on China‘s internal situation, and vice versa. Official PRC media and policy documents continue to assess that ―peace, development, and cooperation have become the trend of the contemporary era... making the external environment generally favorable to our country‘s development.‖ However, there is growing acknowledgement that external challenges, including regional and

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Office of the Secretary of Defense great power relations, cross-Strait relations, and nontraditional security threats have the potential to influence the Mainland‘s future.

These dual perceptions have led Party leaders to conclude that, through 2020, they should focus on managing or exploiting external tensions, especially with the great powers, to maintain an environment conducive to China‘s development. As former State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan explained in November 2005:

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―It is necessary to exert the greatest efforts to avoid becoming the focal point of major international conflict, reduce external pressures and obstructions to the development of our country, [and] create favorable external conditions for China to achieve its planned development goals.‖

This does not mean that China‘s leaders are exclusively inward-focused. Beijing‘s growing regional and, to a lesser extent, global economic stature partly drive a more active external posture in which it demonstrates a willingness to assert its interests while taking on a more active role in resolving disputes and promoting regional cooperation. Beijing continues to threaten the use of military force to compel settlement of the Taiwan dispute if force is deemed necessary, and to take steps to assert rights in the South China Sea that other regional countries do not accept. China has increased the scope of its participation in United Nations (UN) peace operations and continues to expand foreign military sales and training of foreign officers. These trends indicate that Beijing‘s methods of asserting and protecting its interests are increasingly diverse and that it is prepared to employ a variety of cooperative and coercive approaches to achieve its objectives.

Resource Needs as a Factor in China’s Strategy As China‘s economy grows, dependence on secure access to markets and natural resources, particularly metals and fossil fuels, has become an increasingly significant factor shaping China‘s strategic behavior. Although China is expected to continue to rely on coal as its primary fuel source, consumption of petroleum and other liquid fuels will likely grow significantly, due in large part to growth in the transportation sector. China plans to increase natural gas utilization from three percent to eight percent of total consumption by 2010. Similarly, China plans to build some 40 1,000megawatt nuclear power reactors by 2020, increasing nuclear power from two to six percent of total electricity output.

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China currently consumes approximately 7.85 million barrels of oil per day. By 2015, China‘s oil consumption could rise to 10-12 million barrels per day. In May 2008, China became the world‘s second-largest importer of crude oil, surpassing Japan. China currently imports over 53 percent of its oil (around 4.04 million barrels per day in 2007). China imports about 46 percent of its imports from the Middle East, 32 percent from Africa, and 5 percent from East Asia. In 2008, Saudi Arabia was China‘s largest supplier at about 725,000 barrels of oil per day. Saudi Arabia is followed by Angola at about 596,000 barrels of oil per day, and Iran at about 425,000 barrels of oil per day. The vast majority of its imported oil is carried on ships transiting through the Malacca or Lombok/ Makkasar Straits.

Figure 1. China‘s Critical Sea Lanes. Like many other industrialized East Asian countries, China is heavily dependent upon critical sea lanes for its energy imports. Over 80 percent of China‘s crude oil imports transit the Strait of Malacca.

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In 2004, China began building a strategic petroleum reserve. It completed the construction of the first phase in 2008, which provides a capacity of 100 million barrels—the equivalent of 25 days of China‘s current annual net oil imports. The second phase is planned to add 200 million barrels, for a total of around 42 days of net oil imports projected for 2015. After 2010, work on the third phase may increase net storage capacity to approximately 500 million barrels. But, without significant improvements to China‘s transportation and distribution networks, gross storage capacity may prove insufficient to cushion severe disruptions. In the last decade, China has pursued long-term supply contracts with a diverse range of supplier nations including Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Oman, Russia, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Venezuela. In 2006, China‘s top three suppliers were: Angola (16 percent), Saudi Arabia (16 percent), and Iran (12 percent). In 2007, six percent of China‘s crude oil imports came from Sudan. Currently, slightly over half of China‘s imported oil comes from the Middle East and almost a quarter is imported from Africa.

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CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES China‘s use of force in territorial disputes has varied widely throughout history. Some disputes led to war, such as China‘s border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. A contested border with the former Soviet Union during the 1 960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In more recent cases, China has been willing to compromise with and even offer concessions to its neighbors. Since 1998, China has settled eleven land territorial disputes with six of its neighbors. Several disputes continue over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and ownership of potentially rich, off-shore oil and gas deposits. The East China Sea contains approximately 7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and up to 100 billion barrels of oil. Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved should separate the EEZs, while China claims an Extended Continental Shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench (which almost reaches Japan‘s shore). In June 2008, China and Japan signed an agreement to temporarily shelve the EEZ dispute and develop jointly the Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field. China and Japan continue to dispute possession of the nearby Senkaku Islands. In December 2008, two PRC surface ships intruded on waters surrounding the islands, but withdrew after Tokyo lodged an official protest with Beijing.

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On December 31, China and Vietnam signed a treaty demarcating their land borders. The treaty followed a ten-year process of implementing a 1999 agreement. However, the treaty did not address the sea border, which remains disputed. The South China Sea plays an important role in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia security considerations. Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil through South China Sea shipping lanes, which provide 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel island groups – claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba in the Spratly Islands, also claims all four island groups in the South China Sea. In December 2007, China announced the establishment of a city administration, ―Sansha City,‖ to assert ―indisputable sovereignty‖ and jurisdiction over the islands of the South China Sea ―and the adjacent waterways,‖ prompting street protests in Vietnam. In October 2008, China and Vietnam released a joint statement that pledged to ―gradually advance the negotiations on demarcation of these maritime zones and ... jointly exploit the zones.‖ While China and India have improved bilateral relations, tensions remain along their shared 4,057 km border, most notably over Arunachal Pradesh. In June 2008, PRC troops entered more than a kilometer into the northernmost point of India‘s Sikkim state. PRC soldiers, in May, had threatened to demolish stone structures in the area. In May 2008, India‘s Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee visited the PRC and signed a Memorandum of Understanding to expand bilateral military cooperation. Following local elections in November 2008, Mukherjee stated that Arunachal Pradesh is ―an integral part of India.‖ A spokesman for the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the statement. China has also pursued equity positions in a variety of overseas energy assets and investments, although these remain small compared to PRC demand and investments by the international oil majors. China‘s national oil companies have invested in oil ventures (oilfield development, and pipeline and refinery projects) in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Nigeria, Sudan, and in over 20 other countries in North Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and North America.

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Maritime Claims Brunel China Malaysia Phillipines Spratty Islands Vietnam

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Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Figure 2. China‘s Disputed Territories While not exhaustive, three of China‘s major ongoing territorial disputes are based on claims along its shared border with India and Bhutan, the South China Sea, and with Japan in the East China Sea.

Factors Shaping Pathways to China’s Future Since initiating ―reform and opening‖ in 1978, China has made tremendous economic progress and has overcome many developmental challenges. In 30 years, these reforms have lifted hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty, improved domestic stability, expanded China‘s interconnections with the rest of the world, and increased China‘s influence in international affairs. China continues to face many problems, but the accomplishments of China‘s leaders in these areas are impressive. The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China. There are forces – some beyond the control of China‘s leaders – that could reinforce a relatively inward focus on national strategy, but could also divert China from a peaceful pathway. Which pathway China pursues, or finds itself upon, will be determined in large part by the choices China‘s leaders make.

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These choices are influenced by a set of drivers and inhibitors that will both enable and constrain their ability to achieve their objectives.

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Economics Continued economic development, central to China‘s emergence as a regional and global power, remains the foundation of the Party‘s popular legitimacy and underwrites its military power. Since 1978, China‘s economic growth has improved the quality of life of its citizens, has garnered support for the Party, and has contributed to regional and global economic growth. In contrast, economic shocks, like the current global financial crisis, might place political stress on the Chinese system. As many China analysts have noted, underlying weaknesses (e.g., undervalued currency, non-performing loans, inefficient state-owned enterprises, and economic disparity between urban and rural areas) threaten continued economic growth. Economic shocks, setbacks, or even modestly slower growth could lead to higher unemployment, inflation, and significant unrest, potentially giving rise to greater reliance on nationalism to maintain popular support for the Party. Unexpected increases in resource demand, global resource shortages or price shocks, restricted access to resources, or shrinking demand for labor and manufacturing, could also impact China‘s strategic outlook and behavior, and might force China‘s leadership to re-examine its resource allocation priorities, including those for the military. Demographic Pressures Demographic stresses will increase in the future, creating a structural constraint on China‘s ability to sustain high growth rates. Between 2000 and 2030, over 400 million people – a population greater than the entire United States – will transition from the countryside into urban areas. As a result of this shift, China‘s leaders will face challenges in terms of job creation as well as satisfying housing and infrastructure needs. Some estimates suggest that China is expected to account for half of global building construction during that period. China‘s population is also aging rapidly; China‘s population of 146 million senior citizens will increase to an estimated 290 million by 2025. Accommodating the needs of a large senior citizen population will present challenges to the CCP‘s ability to maintain economic growth, growing defense budgets, and perhaps domestic stability. Domestic Political Pressures A successful Beijing Olympics and perceptions of a competent PLA response to the Sichuan earthquake gave Party leaders and the PLA a boost in

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the eyes of the public. China‘s state-run media, for example, popularized images of Premier Wen Jiabao‘s trip to Sichuan to survey the damage and console the victims. However, reports of shoddy construction and corruption related to schools that collapsed in Sichuan as a result of the earthquake soon elicited an outpouring of popular criticism. The Party‘s decision to suppress reports of melamine in China‘s milk during the Olympics produced additional public condemnation. More broadly, Party leaders are increasingly confronted with popular demands for improved government responsiveness and accountability. The public debate, including in online forums, regarding the melamine issue and the government‘s delay in publicizing it are some evidence of greater public space for discussion of such issues. However, the government continues to limit sharply the scope of such debates. How China‘s leaders choose to address these challenges will affect their ability to maintain domestic stability and their monopoly on political power. While preserving one-party rule, Beijing has enacted administrative reforms and expanded avenues for expert – and occasionally public – input as evidenced by the emergence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) throughout China focused on addressing the concerns of the population. China‘s leaders have also launched a major personnel reform program aimed at improving communication between central leaders, local cadres, and urban and rural workers with grievances. A stated primary objective of this program is to defuse ―inner contradictions among the people.‖ However, overt acts of dissent remain criminalized, media and the internet are tightly controlled, independent trade and labor unions are suppressed, ethnic Tibetan and Uighur minorities are repressed, and religious groups not recognized by the regime continue to be harassed. The Party is wary of unsanctioned organizations in China, even if nonpolitical, fearing these organizations could facilitate organized opposition.

Corruption Despite efforts to curb official corruption in China, it remains pervasive, structural, and persistent due, in part, to the high degree of state involvement in the economy and the weakness of the rule of law. In June 2008, the CCP Central Committee announced a 5-year anticorruption campaign. Several procuratorates used mass text messaging with reward offers starting at $440 for tips leading to a conviction, which led to a doubling of corruption investigations within weeks. Also in 2008, dozens of officials were removed from their posts for misconduct associated with earthquake relief efforts.

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In 2001, 65 percent of embezzlement cases involved multiple officials, indicating the activity of independent networks of elites colluding at the expense of the state. China‘s National Audit Agency uncovered $170 billion of misappropriated and misspent public funds between 1996 and 2005, and academic research estimates that the direct costs of corruption in 2003 amounted to as much as $86 billion (three percent of GDP), an amount that was more than double China‘s announced defense budget for that year. Corruption directly affects the PLA; bribery for advancement and promotion, unauthorized contracts and projects, and weapons procurement are all identified by the PLA as corruption problems. Beijing‘s response has focused on the use of criminal prosecution to deter illicit behavior. Half of provincial transportation chiefs in China have been sentenced to jail terms (some have been executed) for corruption. In July 2007, the Director of China‘s Food and Drug Administration was executed for taking bribes to approve fake drugs.

Environment China‘s economic development has come at a significant environmental cost. Acceptable air quality for the Beijing Olympics could only be achieved by shutting down much of nearby industry and local traffic. A 2007 World Bank report estimated that air and water pollution costs China almost six percent of its GDP annually, and contributes to increasing levels of cancer, lung disease, and other ailments. China‘s leaders are concerned that these environmental problems could undermine regime legitimacy by threatening China‘s economic development, public health, social stability, and international image. In 2006, China‘s top environmental official, Zhou Shengxian, announced that there had been 51,000 pollution-related protests in 2005 (almost 1,000 per week). Pollution and deforestation in China have worldwide implications. China may have overtaken the United States as the world‘s largest emitter of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Japan and South Korea both suffer from acid rain produced by China‘s coal-fired power plants and yellow dust storms that originate in the Gobi desert. Cross-Strait Dynamics Despite a reduction in tensions following the March 2008 election and May 2008 inauguration of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, a potential military confrontation with Taiwan and the prospect of U.S. military intervention remain the PLA‘s most immediate military concerns. China‘s current strategy toward Taiwan appears to be one of preventing any moves by

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Taipei toward de jure independence, rather than seeking near-term resolution. A perceived shift in military capabilities or political will on either side, or a change in the internal political landscape on Mainland China or Taiwan, could cause Beijing to calculate its interests, and its preferred course of action differently.

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Regional Concerns With China close to, or an interested party in, many of the world‘s ―flashpoints‖ (e.g., Taiwan, North Korea, the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku Islands, Afghanistan, and Pakistan), China‘s leaders hope to avoid regional instability spilling across China‘s borders and thereby interfering with economic development or domestic stability. Changes in regional security dynamics could lead to shifts in China‘s military development and deployment patterns, likely with consequences for neighboring states. Examples of such changes from Beijing‘s perspective include disruptions on the Korean Peninsula (e.g., a North Korean collapse); democratic revolutions in Central Asia, which Beijing would perceive as posing near- term and long-term security challenges; a downturn in relations with Japan; and perceived threats to China‘s ability to access foreign resources and transport them back to China.

Looking to the Future China‘s current strategy is to manage external tensions to assure an environment that is conducive to economic development. This strategy appears to be accepted widely by Beijing‘s foreign and security policy establishment. However, differences of opinion within China occasionally surface, particularly in academic circles, about how China can achieve these goals and how it can best prevent conflict with its neighbors and the United States over time. Some prefer the traditional strategy of Deng Xiaoping: avoid leadership roles and seek to avoid having China being burdened with excessive international responsibilities by those who are trying to encourage China to play a more active and constructive role in addressing regional and international problems. Another group believes that such passivity is untenable as China‘s power grows. This group asserts that China should work actively to cooperate with regional actors and the United States not only to increase Chinese influence, but also to reassure neighbors and more distant great powers that China‘s rise will not pose a destabilizing threat to their security.

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Still others believe that China needs to be tougher and more assertive in protecting its interests by countering perceived efforts by the United States to bully China or constrain its influence in relation to actors such as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia. These discussions, however, appear to remain largely on the margins. Absent a perceived challenge to the legitimacy and authority of the CCP, a fundamental shift in China‘s strategy is unlikely to occur prior to the 2012 18th Party Congress, which should install the next, and fifth, generation of Party leaders.

2. CHINA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

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―The army must provide an important force guarantee for the Party to consolidate its governance status, provide a powerful security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunity for national development, provide effective strategic backing for the safeguarding of national interests, and play an important role in preserving world peace and promoting common development.‖ – PRC President Hu Jintao

Overview PLA theorists have developed a framework for doctrine-driven reform to build a force capable of fighting and winning ―local wars under conditions of informatization.‖ Drawing upon foreign military experiences, particularly U.S.-led campaigns up to and including Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Soviet and Russian military theory, and the PLA‘s own combat history, China is transforming across the whole of its armed forces. The pace and scale of these reforms are broad and sweeping. However, the PLA remains untested in modern combat. This lack of operational experience complicates outside assessment of the progress of China‘s military transformation. The same applies to China‘s internal assessments of its own military capabilities, in which China‘s civilian leaders must rely upon the advice of operationally inexperienced commanders or from ―scientific‖ combat models divorced from the realities of the modern battlefield.

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Military Strategic Guidelines China does not publish equivalents to the U.S. National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, or National Military Strategy. Outside observers therefore have few direct insights into the strategic concepts motivating China‘s force build-up, the leadership‘s thinking about the use of force, and contingency planning that shapes the PLA‘s force structure or doctrine. Analysis of authoritative speeches and documents suggests China relies on a body of overall principles and guidance known as the ―National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period‖ (xin shiqi guojia junshi zhanlüe

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fangzhen -

) to plan and manage the

development and use of the armed forces. While referenced and summarized in the 2008 Defense White Paper, the PLA has not made the contents of the ―Guidelines‖ available for outside scrutiny. Academic research suggests that the current ―Guidelines‖ most likely date to 1993, reflecting the impact of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union on PRC military- strategic thinking. Recent revisions to the ―Guidelines‖ likely reflect updates of China‘s perceptions of its security environment and the character of modern war, integrate lessons learned from China‘s military modernization, and emphasize building forces to win ―local wars under conditions of informatization.‖ The operational, or ―active defense,‖ (jiji fangyu ) component of the ―Guidelines‖ posits a defensive military strategy in which China does not initiate wars or fight wars of aggression, but engages in war only to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Once hostilities have begun, according to the PLA‘s Science of Campaigns (2000), ―the essence of [active defense] is to take the initiative and to annihilate the enemy.... While strategically the guideline is active defense, [in military campaigns] the emphasis is placed on taking the initiative in active offense. Only in this way can the strategic objective of active defense be realized [emphasis added].‖

INFORMATIZATION The concept of ―informatization‖ emphasizes the effects of modern information technology on military decision and weapons employment cycles. The term officially entered the PLA‘s lexicon in 2002 when then-

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CCP General Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin referred to the concept as necessary for the PLA‘s rapid modernization and for enabling Integrated Joint Operations in a speech before the 16th Party Congress. Jiang‘s address recognized that moving China‘s military on a path toward informatization would require integrating the entire PLA with common information systems as well as forcing a new organizational model for warfighting. The PLA formally institutionalized the concept in 2004. Recent PLA analyses of U.S. and coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have re-emphasized the importance of informatization and joint operations. For example, PRC official media cited an analyst from China‘s National Defense University as saying that ―the greatest lesson learned from the war [in Iraq] was the importance of information warfare.‖ The PLA is attempting the concurrent pursuit of ‗mechanization‘ (equipment acquisitions) and ‗informatization‘ (networking of equipment). As a consequence, and in recognition of the high costs of force-wide refitting with state-of-the-art weapons systems, the PLA is selectively acquiring new generation technologies in some areas while deferring new acquisitions in others in favor of upgrading older, but capable, systems for networked operations. PLA studies of informatization and observations of recent U.S. and Coalition military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have informed an ongoing debate within the PLA about the PLA‘s traditional ground combat focus on attrition and annihilating the enemy. A new model using ―information-plusfirepower‖ considers ground forces as integrated within a joint force focused on rapid occupation of key strategic targets and on stabilization of the battlefield. It is unlikely that this debate has influenced authoritative PLA operational guidelines, but it may do so in the future. In addition to developing the capacity to ―annihilate‖ opposing forces, the PLA is exploring options for limited uses of force. PLA campaign theory defines these options to include ―non-war‖ uses of force – an extension of political coercion. The 1995 and 1996 amphibious exercises and missile firings in the Taiwan Strait are examples of ―non-war‖ uses of force. Other options for limited uses of force include air and missile strikes, targeted attacks against adversary leaders, and sabotage. The PLA is developing and implementing a supporting doctrine for ―active defense‖ warfare and new operational methods across the various services.

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Naval Warfare The naval component of ―active defense‖ is termed ―Offshore Active Defense.‖ The PLA Navy has three main missions: resist seaborne aggression, protect national sovereignty, and safeguard maritime rights. PLA Navy doctrine for maritime operations focuses on six offensive and defensive campaigns: blockade, anti-sea lines of communication, maritime-land attack, anti-ship, maritime transportation protection, and naval base defense.

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Ground Warfare Under ―active defense,‖ ground forces are tasked to defend China‘s borders, ensure domestic stability, and exercise regional power projection. PLA ground forces are transitioning from a static defensive force allocated across seven internal MRs – oriented for positional, mobile, urban, and mountain offensive campaigns; coastal defense campaigns; and landing campaigns – to a more offensive and maneuver-oriented force organized and equipped for operations along China‘s periphery. China‘s ground forces are placing emphasis on integrated operations (especially with aviation forces), long-distance mobility, ―quick tempo‖ operations, and special operations. Their reforms are modeled on Russian doctrine and U.S. military tactics. The ground forces appear to be leading the PLA‘s effort to experiment with ad hoc, multi-service, joint tactical formations to execute integrated joint operations.

OFFENSE AS DEFENSE Beijing‘s definition of an attack against its sovereignty or territory is vague. The history of modern Chinese warfare provides numerous case studies in which China‘s leaders have claimed military preemption as a strategically defensive act. For example, China refers to its intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953) as the ―War to Resist the United States and Aid Korea.‖ Similarly, authoritative texts refer to border conflicts against India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969), and Vietnam (1979) as ―SelfDefense Counter Attacks.‖ This logic suggests the potential for China to engage in military preemption, prevention, or coercion if the use of force protects or advances core interests, including territorial claims (e.g., Taiwan and unresolved border or maritime claims). Chinese strategic-level military theory establishes seemingly contradictory guidance: ―strike only after the enemy has struck,‖ and ―seize

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the initiative.‖ Of note, China‘s 2008 Defense White Paper features a slightly different construction: ―Strategically, [the PLA] adheres to the principle of...striking and getting the better of the enemy only after the enemy has started an attack [emphasis added].‖ Yet, the authoritative work, Science of Military Strategy, makes it clear that the definition of an enemy strike is not limited to conventional, kinetic military operations. Rather, an enemy ―strike‖ may also be defined in political terms. Thus: ―Striking only after the enemy has struck does not mean waiting for the enemy’s strike passively...It doesn’t mean to give up the ―advantageous chances‖ in campaign or tactical operations, for the ‘first shot’ on the plane of politics must be differentiated from the ‘first shot’ on that of tactics...

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If any country or organization violates the other country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to ‘fire the first shot’ on the plane of tactics [emphasis added].‖ These passages illustrate the ambiguity of PRC strategic thinking as well as the justification for offensive – or preemptive – military action at the operational and tactical level under the guise of a defensive posture at the strategic level.

PLA RESERVE FORCES AND CHINA’S MILITIA The PLA reserve is a key component of China‘s national defense. During peacetime, the National Defense Reserve conducts training and maintains social stability. During wartime, PLA reserve units may be transferred to active duty as directed by national mobilization orders. In 2008, the total strength of the PLA reserve was estimated at over 500,000. The PLA reserve is striving to become a more professional force by strengthening recruitment, training, and infrastructure. Professionalization will also require more emphasis on the development of PLAAF, Navy, and

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Second Artillery Corps reserve units and combat support units, which will probably come at the expense of traditional ground combat units. China‘s militia system provides a large pool of personnel for national defense. All PRC males between the ages of 18 and 35 not currently serving in the military are technically part of the militia system. Many members of the militia do not belong to organized units, and China‘s 2004 Defense White Paper claimed that ten million people were organized into militia units. China‘s 2008 Defense White Paper indicates that these numbers will decrease to 8 million by the end of the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010). During wartime, militia may be mobilized to support the war effort within their home province. The functions of militia vary from locality to locality, covering diverse tasks such as air defense, emergency response, and technical support which can include technical maintenance and repair, as well as computer network operations.

Air Warfare The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is converting from a limited territorial defense force to a more flexible and agile force able to operate off-shore in both offensive and defensive roles, using the U.S. and Russian air forces as models. Mission focus areas include: strike, air and missile defense, early warning and reconnaissance, and strategic mobility. The PLAAF also has a leading role in the ―Joint Anti-Air Raid‖ campaign, which appears to form the basis for much of China‘s planning for anti-access and area-denial operations. Underscoring the ambiguity of offense and defense in PLA theory, the Joint Anti-Air Raid campaign is strategically defensive in nature, but at the operational and tactical levels, it calls for attacks against adversary bases and naval forces. Space Warfare PLA strategists see space as central to enabling modern informatized warfare; indeed, a 2003 analytic article in the PLA‘s leading journal was entitled ―Control of Space is Decisive in Modern High-Tech Informatized Warfare.‖ That said, China does not appear to have a dedicated space campaign; rather, space operations form an integral component of all campaigns. The PLA‘s military theoretical journal China Military Science argues that ―it is in space that information age warfare will come into its more intensive points.‖ Specifically, space-based Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is important to enable and coordinate joint operations and win

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modern wars. Accordingly, the PLA is acquiring technologies to improve China‘s space- based C4ISR. A PLA analysis of U.S. and Coalition military operations reinforced the importance of operations in space to enable informatized warfare, claiming that ―space is the commanding point for the information battlefield. Battlefield monitor and control, information communications, navigation and position, and precision guidance all rely on satellites and other sensors.‖ Concurrently, China is developing the ability to attack an adversary‘s space assets. PLA writings emphasize the necessity of ―destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy‘s reconnaissance/ observation and communications satellites,‖ suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among initial targets of attack to ―blind and deafen the enemy.‖ The same PLA analysis of U.S. and Coalition military operations also states that ―destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors ... will deprive the opponents of initiatives on the battlefield and [make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.‖ PRC military writings also discuss the importance of space warfare for its supposed psychological impact on the will of the adversary to fight. In a PLA National Defense University book, Joint Space War Campaigns (2005), author Colonel Yuan Zelu writes: ―[The] goal of a space shock and awe strike is [to] deter the enemy, not to provoke the enemy into combat. For this reason, the objectives selected for strike must be few and precise ... [for example], on important information sources, command and control centers, communications hubs, and other objectives. This will shake the structure of the opponent’s operational system of organization and will create huge psychological impact on the opponent’s policymakers.‖

The January 2007 test of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon demonstrates that the PLA‘s interest in counterspace systems is more than theoretical. In addition to the ―kinetic kill‖ capability demonstrated by the ASAT test, the PLA is developing the ability to jam, blind, or otherwise disable satellites and their terrestrial support infrastructure.

Integrated Network Electronic Warfare PRC military writings highlight the seizure of electromagnetic dominance in the early phases of a campaign as among the foremost tasks to ensure

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battlefield success. PLA theorists have coined the term ―integrated network electronic warfare‖ (wangdian yitizhan ) to describe the use of electronic warfare, computer network operations, and kinetic strikes to disrupt battlefield network information systems that support an adversary‘s warfighting and power projection capabilities. PLA writings on future models of joint operations identify ―integrated network electronic warfare‖ as one of the basic forms of ―integrated joint operations,‖ suggesting the centrality of seizing and dominating the electromagnetic spectrum in PLA campaign theory.

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Toward a Comprehensive View of Warfare Over the past two decades, PRC civilian and military strategists have debated the nature of modern warfare. These debates draw on sources within the PLA strategic tradition and its historical experiences to provide perspective on the ―revolution in military affairs,‖ ―asymmetric warfare,‖ and ―informatized‖ war. Such debates highlight China‘s interest in non-kinetic means of warfare and the increased role of economic, financial, information, legal, and psychological instruments in PLA theory and war planning. Underscoring a comprehensive, multidimensional view of warfare, the PLA Academy of Military Science text, Science of Military Strategy, notes that ―war is not only a military struggle, but also a comprehensive contest on fronts of politics, economy, diplomacy, and law.‖

EVOLUTION OF JOINT OPERATIONS A primary objective of China‘s military modernization program is to develop the capacity for ―Integrated Joint Operations.‖ Launched initially in 1985, the evolution toward joint operations has been marked by three distinct conceptual phases: Collaborative Joint Operations, Coordinated Joint Operations, and Integrated Joint Operations. 

Collaborative Joint Operations: Sparse information is available on the PLA‘s first iteration of joint operations. It likely featured service elements acting independently, in different battle spaces, with different objectives, whose results were only indirectly mutually beneficial.

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

Coordinated Joint Operations: Coordinated Joint Operations entails two or more theater service elements operating in an independent but coordinated and mutually-supporting manner toward a common objective under a unified theater commander. The PLA publication Science of Military Campaigns (May 2000) suggests that at the time of publication, this model had been adopted into formal instruction blocks at PLA professional military education institutions.

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Integrated Joint Operations: The content of Integrated Joint Operations has yet to be formally defined, remains largely an aspiration, and will likely continue to be so until at least 2010. Integrated Joint Operations appears to include integration of all service elements through a common network under the leadership of a unified commander.

Obstacles. China‘s military leaders recognize and acknowledge that one of the primary obstacles to Integrated Joint Operations is that many PLA commanders have little or no training for, or experience operating in, a joint environment. An April 2008 directive from the CMC stressed the development of competent commanders for joint operations as the ―...major priority among priorities.‖ Other problem areas identified by the PLA include: command staff, organizing joint tactical corps, regional cooperative training, multi-service coordination training, civil-military and reserve/militia integration, insufficient preparation of small units to perform independent tasks, and lower-echelon leadership initiative. Efforts to Improve. To rectify these deficiencies, the PLA launched enhanced training and professional military education, war simulations, and exercises. Since September 2007, the PLA has conducted at least 18 joint exercises including SHARP SWORD 2007, JOINT-2007, WARRIOR-2007, and WARRIOR- 2008. Particular areas of focus included intelligence acquisition, joint command and control, and joint logistics. In 2008 alone, PLA publications described at least four integrated joint operations exercises. Beyond the scope of training and exercises, the PLA‘s joint force development may have improved due to experience gained from PLA operations in 2008 to support internal disaster relief missions, including the winter storms of February 2008 and the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Both of these missions may have involved the establishment of joint

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command posts and inter-service cooperation and coordination for extended periods of time under real world conditions. In 2003, the CCP Central Committee and the CMC approved the concept of ―Three Warfares‖ (san zhong zhanfa ), a PLA information

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warfare concept aimed at influencing the psychological dimensions of military activity: 

Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy‘s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.

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Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China‘s military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China‘s interests.

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Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China‘s military actions.

The concept of the ―Three Warfares‖ is being developed for use in conjunction with other military and non-military operations. For example, China has incorporated the concept of Legal Warfare into its attempts to shape international opinion and interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea away from long-accepted norms of freedom of navigation and territorial limits toward increased sovereign authority out to the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, the airspace above it, and possibly outer space.

Secrecy and Deception in PlA Military Strategy PRC military writings point to a working definition of strategic deception as ―[luring] the other side into developing misperceptions ... and [establishing for oneself] a strategically advantageous position by producing various kinds of false phenomena in an organized and planned manner with the smallest cost

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in manpower and materials.‖ In addition to information operations and conventional camouflage, concealment, and denial, the PLA draws from China‘s historical experience and the traditional role that stratagem and deception have played in Chinese doctrine. In recent decades, there has been a resurgence of the study of classic Chinese military figures Sun Zi, Sun Bin, Wu Qi, and Shang Yang and their writings, all of which highlight the centrality of deception. There is a contradiction between the tendencies of China‘s military establishment, which favors excessive secrecy, and the civilians‘ stated goal of reassuring neighbors and existing powers about the peaceful nature of China‘s development of greater influence on the world stage. This is especially true in an integrated global economy, which depends upon transparency and the free flow of information for success. The CCP‘s own institutional emphasis on secrecy could also lead to miscalculation or misunderstanding by outsiders of China‘s strategic intentions. Conversely, overconfidence among China‘s leaders in the uncertain and unproven benefits of stratagem and deception might lead to their own miscalculation in crises. In addition, the same skills commanders use against adversaries might also be used to slow – or cover up – the revelation of bad news internal to the PLA. Excessive reliance on secrecy and/or deception, therefore, may serve to confuse China‘s leaders as much foreigners about China‘s capabilities, doctrine, and strategic environment.

Asymmetric Warfighting Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War and Operation ALLIED FORCE (1999) PLA military strategists have underscored the urgency of building force structure, strategies and tactics around new or unexpected capabilities. They also have emphasized developing innovative strategies and tactics to employ with existing technologies and weapon systems in order to level the playing field against technologically superior opponents. An article published in the Liberation Army Daily in 1999 posits: ―[A] strong enemy with absolute superiority is certainly not without weakness.... [our] military preparations need to be more directly aimed at finding tactics to exploit the weaknesses of a strong enemy.‖

Elements of China‘s approach to asymmetric warfare can be seen in its heavy investment in ballistic and cruise missile systems; undersea warfare

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systems, including submarines and advanced naval mines; counterspace systems; computer network operations; special operations forces; and the ―Three Warfares‖ concept.

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PRC Debates on Future Military Strategy China‘s economic growth and development is increasingly dependent upon sustained international stability and secure access to foreign markets and resources. In recognition of these dependencies, PRC military and civilian strategists have begun to discuss the role of the armed forces in protecting and advancing China‘s broader political and economic interests. The extent to which these considerations shape China‘s current defense policy and force planning is not known. However, it is increasingly apparent that these concerns influence China‘s thinking about defense planning at the highest levels. In a speech at the March 2008 National People‘s Congress, CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Caihou stated that ―[China‘s] armed forces shoulder great responsibility for safeguarding the state‘s sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and for building a well-off society in an all-around way.‖ China‘s 2006 Defense White Paper states explicitly in its description of the security environment that ―security issues related to energy, resources, finance, information and international shipping routes are mounting.‖ Similarly, the 2008 Defense White Paper asserts that ―struggles for strategic resources, strategic locations, and strategic dominance have intensified.‖ It defines as among the PLA‘s primary tasks, ―upholding national security and unity, and ensuring the interests of national development.‖ Within the armed forces themselves, military strategists have begun shifting the focus of ground force operations from regional defense toward ―trans-regional mobility,‖ which would entail constructing task-organized mobile combat units, improved air-ground integrated operations, long-distance maneuver, strategic lift, expeditionary logistics, rapid assaults, and special operations. Increased PLA participation in overseas peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief also suggests that the ground forces may become more involved in limited expeditionary operations in the future. The PLA appears to be examining how to translate these new missions and tasks into doctrine, resource allocation, force structure changes, and contingency planning. For example, there appears to be an emerging debate within the Navy over future naval strategy.

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Figure 3. The First and Second Island Chains. PRC military theorists conceive of two island ―chains‖ as forming a geographic basis for China‘s maritime defensive perimeter.

PRC President Hu Jintao called China a ―sea power‖ and advocated a ―powerful people‘s navy‖ to ―uphold our maritime rights and interests‖ during a speech at a Navy CCP Congress in 2006. Other PRC leaders, PLA Navy officials, government writings, and PLA journals have argued that China‘s economic and political power is contingent upon access to and use of the sea, and that a strong navy is required to safeguard such access. Some PLA Navy thinkers, perhaps reflecting these arguments, have posited an alternative to the ―Offshore Active Defense,‖ which emphasizes coastal defense operations within the first island chain and a focus on Taiwan contingencies. The new concept, called the ―Far Sea Defense,‖ emphasizes multidimensional precision attacks beyond the first island chain and operations outside of China‘s claimed 200 nautical mile EEZ to defend PRC national interests, adding a layer of strategic depth within which to defend China‘s coastline. Proponents of this strategy assert that China requires a greater number of large- and medium- size warships, carrier-based aviation, improved C4ISR, and more long-range support vessels. The PLA Navy is considering building multiple aircraft carriers and associated ships by 2020. However, some

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Chinese scholars have raised concerns regarding this approach, arguing that it may lead to confrontation with other nations. Regardless of whether or not China decides to pursue Far Sea Defense, China‘s thinking appears to be gradually moving toward a strategic concept that considers defense of maritime interests, in addition to defense of homeland, as drivers for force modernization. The PLA‘s new missions are also driving internal discussions about the future of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). An article from July 2008 argues that ―in the wake of constant extension of our national interests, the change in our peripheral security environment and the struggle in air and space is getting more acute, the strategic needs that national interests impose on air security are also increasing.‖ The article highlighted new or expanded missions that will affect the PLAAF in the future: 

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



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Control the airspace over China‘s territory, maintain air surveillance over China‘s maritime interests, defend against ―foreign harassing attacks from space,‖ and protect China‘s national dignity, sovereignty, rights, and interests. Provide air security for China‘s overseas investment, communications and transport, scientific survey, and other efforts related to China‘s economic modernization. Prepare for Taiwan contingencies; support operations against separatists, terrorists, and other criminal forces; maintain China‘s territorial integrity and social stability; and protect Chinese citizens and property. Defeat enemy‘s air capabilities, ensure China‘s air defense, and contribute to integrated joint operations during wartime.

3. FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS ―[The PLA] has formulated in a scientific way strategic plans for national defense and armed forces building and strategies for the development of the services and arms, according to which it will lay a solid foundation by 2010, basically accomplish mechanization, make major progress in informatization by 2020, and by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st Century.‖ – China’s National Defense in 2008

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Overview China‘s leaders have stated their intentions and allocated resources to pursue broad-based military transformation that encompasses force-wide professionalization; improved training; more robust, realistic joint exercises; and accelerated acquisition and development of modern conventional and nuclear weapons. China‘s military appears focused on assuring the capability to prevent Taiwan independence and, if Beijing were to decide to adopt such an approach, to compel the island to negotiate a settlement on Beijing‘s terms. At the same time, China is laying the foundation for a force able to accomplish broader regional and global objectives. The U.S. Intelligence Community estimates China will take until the end of this decade or longer to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size adversary. China will not be able to project and sustain small military units far beyond China before 2015, and will not be able to project and sustain large forces in combat operations far from China until well into the following decade. The PLA continues to face deficiencies in inter- service cooperation and actual experience in joint exercises and combat operations. Recognizing these shortcomings, China‘s leaders stress asymmetric strategies to leverage China‘s advantages while exploiting the perceived vulnerabilities of potential opponents using so-called ―Assassin‘s Mace‖ programs (e.g., counterspace and cyberwarfare programs).

Anti-Access/Area-Denial Capability Developments As part of its planning for a Taiwan contingency, China is prioritizing the development of measures to deter or counter third-party intervention in any future cross-Strait crisis. China‘s approach to dealing with this challenge appears to be reflected in a sustained effort to develop the capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that might deploy (anti-access) or operate (areadenial) within the western Pacific. In this context, China‘s anti-access/areadenial forces increasingly overlap, providing multiple layers of offensive systems utilizing the sea, air, space, and cyber-space.

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Figure 4. Schematic Diagram of Missile Flight Trajectory with Terminal Guidance. This is a graphic of the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile‘s use of mid-course and terminal guidance to strike an aircraft carrier used in a 2006 article from the Second Artillery Engineering College.

POTENTIAL FOR MISCALCULATION As the PLA modernizes, three misperceptions could lead to miscalculation or crisis. First, other countries could underestimate the extent to which PLA forces have improved. Second, China‘s leaders could overestimate the proficiency of their forces by assuming new systems are fully operational, adeptly operated, adequately maintained, and well integrated with existing or other new capabilities. Third, China‘s leaders may fail to appreciate the effects of their decisions on the security perceptions and responses of other regional actors. Analyses of current and projected force structure improvements suggest that China is seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered capability reaching out to the ―second island chain.‖ One area of investment involves combining conventionally-armed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) based on the CSS-5 (DF-21) airframe, C4ISR for geolocation and tracking of targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships. As described in an authoritative 2004 article for

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the Second Artillery Corps, the ASBM could employ ―terminal-sensitive penetrating sub-munitions‖ to ―destroy the enemy‘s carrier-borne planes, the control tower and other easily damaged and vital positions.‖ This capability would have particular significance, as it would provide China with preemptive and coercive options in a regional crisis. PRC military analysts have also concluded that logistics and mobilization are potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the requirements for precision in coordinating transportation, communications, and logistics networks. To threaten regional bases, logistics, and support infrastructure, China could employ SRBM/MRBMs, ground-launched LACMs, special operations forces, and computer network attack (CNA). Strike aircraft, when enabled by aerial refueling, could engage distant targets using air-launched LACMs equipped with a variety of terminal-homing warheads. China‘s emerging local sea-denial capabilities – mines, submarines, maritime strike aircraft, and modern surface combatants equipped with advanced ASCMs – provide a supporting layer of defense for its long-range anti-access systems. Acquisition and development of the KILO, SONG, SHANG, and YUAN-class submarines illustrates the importance the PLA places on undersea warfare for sea denial. In the past ten years, China has deployed ten new classes of ships. The purchase of SOVREMENNYY II-class DDGs and indigenous production of the LUYANG I/LUYANG II DDGs equipped with long-range ASCM and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, for example, demonstrate a continuing emphasis on improving anti-surface warfare, combined with mobile, wide-area air control.

BUILDING CAPACITY FOR CONVENTIONAL PRECISION STRIKE Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) (< 1,000 km). As of September 2008 the PLA had 1,050-1,150 SRBMs and is increasing its inventory at a rate of over 100 missiles per year. The PLA‘s firstgeneration SRBMs do not possess true ―precision strike‖ capability; later generations have greater ranges, improved accuracy, and a wider variety of conventional payloads, including unitary and submunition warheads. Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) (1,000-3,000 km). The PLA is acquiring conventional MRBMs to increase the range to which it

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can conduct precision strikes, to include targeting naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from China‘s shores. Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs). The PLA is developing airand ground-launched LACMs, such as the YJ-63 and DH-10 systems for stand-off, precision strikes. As of April 2008 the PLA had 150-350 DH-10 ground-launched cruise missiles. Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs). According to DIA estimates, the PLA has a small number of tactical ASMs and precision-guided munitions, including all-weather, satellite- and laser-guided bombs, and is pursuing improved airborne anti-ship capabilities.

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Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). The PLA Navy has or is acquiring nearly a dozen ASCM variants, ranging from the 1950s-era CSSN-2 to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22 and SS-N-27B. The pace of ASCM research, development and production – and of foreign procurement – has accelerated over the past decade. Anti-Radiation Weapons. The PLA has imported Israeli-made HARPY unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and Russian-made anti-radiation missiles (ARM), and is developing an ARM based on the Russian Kh-31P (AS-17) known as the YJ-91. Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions. The PLA is deploying the A- 100 300 mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL) (100+ km range) and developing the WS-2 400 mm MRL (200 km range). The air and air defense component of anti-access/ area-denial includes SAMs such as the HQ-9, SA-10, SA-20 (which has a reported limited ballistic and cruise missile defense capability), and the extended-range SA-20 PMU2. Beijing will also use Russian-built and domestic fourth-generation aircraft (e.g., Su-27 and Su-30 variants, and the indigenous F-10 multi-role fighter) to compete for local air dominance. The PLA Navy would employ Russian Su30MK2 fighters, armed with AS-17/Kh-31A anti-ship missiles, and FB-7 fighter- bombers for maritime interdiction. Acquisition of an air refueling platform like the Russian IL-78 would extend operational ranges for PLAAF and PLA Navy strike aircraft armed with precision munitions, thereby increasing the threat to surface and air forces, bases, and logistics nodes distant

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from China‘s coast. Additionally, acquisition and development of longer-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and UCAVs, including the Israeli HARPY, expands China‘s options for long-range reconnaissance and strike. A final element of an emerging area anti-access/ anti-denial strategy includes the electromagnetic and information spheres. PLA authors often cite the need in modern warfare to control information, sometimes termed ―information blockade‖ or ―information dominance,‖ and to seize the initiative as a critical function in the early phases of a campaign. China is improving information and operational security. It is also developing electronic and information warfare capabilities, as well as denial and deception strategies. China‘s ―information blockade‖ likely envisions employment of military and non-military instruments of state power across all dimensions of the modern battlespace, including outer space.

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Strategic Capabilities China has made steady progress in recent years in developing offensive nuclear, space, and cyber warfare capabilities – the only aspects of China‘s armed forces that, today, have the potential to be truly global. However, there is little evidence that China‘s military and civilian leaders have fully thought through the global and systemic effects of the use of these capabilities.

Nuclear Forces China is both qualitatively and quantitatively improving its strategic missile forces. China‘s nuclear arsenal currently consists of approximately 20 silo-based, liquid-fueled CSS-4 ICBMs; solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-3 1 and DF-3 1A ICBMs, which were deployed respectively in 2006 and 2007; approximately 20 liquid-fueled, limited range CSS-3 ICBMs; between 15 to 20 liquid-fueled CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles; CSS-5 roadmobile, solid-fueled MRBMs (for regional deterrence missions); and JL-1 SLBMs on the XIA-class SSBN (although the operational status of the XIA is questionable). By 2010, China‘s nuclear forces will be comprised of DF-31 and DF31As; enhanced CSS-4s; CSS-3s; CSS-5s; and JIN-class SSBNs, each carrying 12 JL-2 SLBMs. The addition of nuclear-capable forces with greater mobility and survivability, combined with the ballistic missile defense countermeasures China is researching – including maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MaRV), multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV),

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decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and ASAT weapons – will strengthen China‘s deterrent and enhance its strategic strike capabilities. New air- and ground-launched cruise missiles that could potentially perform nuclear missions would similarly improve the survivability, flexibility, and effectiveness of China‘s nuclear forces.

Figure 5. Conventional Anti-Access Capabilities The PLA‘s conventional forces are currently capable of striking targets well beyond China‘s immediate periphery. Not included are ranges for naval surface- and subsurface-based weapons, whose employment at distances from China would be determined by doctrine and the scenario in which they are employed.

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The introduction of more mobile systems will create new command and control challenges for China‘s leadership, which now confronts a different set of variables related to release and deployment authorities. For example, the PLA has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea and the PLA Navy has no experience in managing a SSBN fleet that performs strategic patrols. Of note, recent missile force training, as described in China‘s state-owned press, has included scenarios in which missile batteries lose communication links with higher echelons and other situations requires commanders to choose alternative launch locations. This training may provide limited insights into how the PLA may be seeking to address this issue. China‘s 2008 Defense White Paper states that the Second Artillery Corps: 1) sticks to China‘s policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons, 2) implements a self-defensive nuclear strategy, 3) strictly follows the orders of the CMC, and 4) takes as its fundamental mission the protection of China from any nuclear attack. The 2008 Defense White Paper also states that ―if China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the Second Artillery Force [sic] will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack against the enemy either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services‖ [emphasis added]. This implies nuclear missions may be assigned to the PLAAF, in addition to the PLA Navy. PRC military writings suggest that additional missions for China‘s nuclear forces include deterring conventional attacks against PRC nuclear assets or conventional attacks with WMD-like effects, reinforcing China‘s great power status and increasing its freedom of action by limiting the extent to which others can coerce China with nuclear threats. Given the above missions for China‘s nuclear forces, the conditions under which China‘s ―no first use‖ policy applies are unclear. The PRC government has provided public and private assurances that its ―no first use‖ policy has not and will not change. PRC writings indicate internal PLA support for this policy. Nevertheless, periodic PRC military and civilian academic debates have occurred over whether a ―no first use‖ policy supports or detracts from China‘s deterrent, and whether or not ―no first use‖ should remain in place. Questions also continue regarding whether or not a conventional strike on China‘s strategic forces would nullify China‘s ―no first use‖ pledge. These debates add a further layer of ambiguity to China‘s strategic intentions for its nuclear forces.

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Figure 6. Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles China is capable of targeting its nuclear forces throughout the region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer systems, such as the DF-31, DF31A, and JL-2, will give China a more survivable nuclear force.

Space and Counterspace China‘s space activities and capabilities, including ASAT programs, have significant implications for anti-access/area-denial in Taiwan Strait contingencies and beyond. Many of China‘s space programs, including the manned program and the planned space station, are run by the PLA. China views the development of space and counterspace capabilities as bolstering national prestige and, like nuclear weapons, demonstrating the attributes of a great power.

ADVANCES IN C4ISR China‘s military strategists have identified reliable, survivable, interoperable, and integrated C4ISR systems as essential for coordinating

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joint operations and for engaging successfully on the modern battlefield. Establishing modern C4ISR, in short, is a central task to accomplish China‘s objective to build forces to fight and win ―local wars under informatized conditions.‖ Consequently, China is acquiring advanced land, air, sea, and space-based C4ISR capabilities to enhance battlefield awareness; identify, track, and engage military targets deep into the western Pacific Ocean; and, streamline supply and logistics functions. The objective of the C4ISR network envisioned by the PLA appears to focus on theater-level integration of campaign and tactical command networks as a means to fuse communications, intelligence and reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, and early warning systems. Through improvements in command and staff training, the PLA is seeking to increase battlefield commanders‘ abilities to employ automated, decision-support systems in a dynamic combat environment, including what PLA theorists term as a ―complex electromagnetic environment.‖

Reconnaissance China is deploying advanced imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems with military applications. Examples include the Yaogan-1, -2, -3, -4, and -5, the Haiyang-1B, the CBERS-2 and -2B satellites, and the Huanjing disaster/environmental monitoring satellite constellation. China is planning eight satellites in the Huanjing program that are capable of visible, infrared, multi-spectral, and synthetic aperture radar imaging. In the next decade, as Beijing fields a more robust constellation of reconnaissance satellites, it probably will employ commercial satellite imagery to supplement existing coverage. Navigation and Timing China is pursuing multiple possibilities for satellite navigation independence. Currently, the PRC uses the U.S. global positioning system (GPS), Russia‘s GLONASS, and its own BeiDou-1 (regional) systems for navigation. The BeiDou-1 system consists of three satellites and serves both civil and military purposes. The Beidou-1 system will be replaced by a BeiDou-2 system (expected to be operational in 2011) that will become a regional complement to the worldwide BeiDou-2/Compass system expected to be operational in 2015-2020.

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Manned Space and Lunar Programs China successfully performed its first space walk in September 2008 from the Shenzhou-VII, which was preceded by the October 2007 launch of its first lunar orbiter, the Chang‘e-1. China‘s goals are to have a manned space station and to conduct an unmanned lunar landing and return mission by 2020. The manned space program probably benefits PLA weapons development programs. 

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

Rocket and control system capabilities required for the Shenzhou-VII mission may have applications for ballistic missile development. During its mission, the Shenzhou-VII deployed the Banxing-1 (BX1), a small imaging satellite, which successfully positioned itself into an orbit around the orbital module. The stated purpose of this technology is to monitor instrumentation in space and detect malfunctions. Further applications could support counterspace activities.

Communications China uses commercial, consortium, and civil communications satellites (COMSATs) for both regional and international telecommunications, to include satellite television, internet, and telephony. Along with regional development of related technologies, China has recently entered the world market by exporting COMSATs and infrastructure to Venezuela and Nigeria. In April 2008, China launched its first data-relay satellite, the TianLian- 1. Small Satellites Since 2000, China has launched a number of small satellites, including oceanographic research, imagery, and environmental research satellites. China has also established small satellite design and production facilities and is developing microsatellites – weighing less than 100 kilograms – for remote sensing, and networks of imagery and radar satellites. These developments could allow for a rapid reconstitution or expansion of China‘s satellite force in the event of any disruption in coverage, given an adequate supply of boosters. Beijing‘s effort to develop small, rapid-reaction space launch vehicles currently appears to be stalled.

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ASAT Weapons In January 2007, China successfully tested a direct-ascent ASAT missile against a PRC weather satellite, demonstrating its ability to attack satellites in low-Earth orbit. The direct-ascent ASAT system is one component of a multidimensional program to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by potential adversaries during times of crisis or conflict. China‘s nuclear arsenal has long provided Beijing with an inherent ASAT capability. Ultra High Frequency (UHF)-band satellite communications jammers acquired from Ukraine in the late 1990s along with probable indigenous systems give China the capacity to jam common satellite communications bands and GPS receivers. In addition to the direct-ascent ASAT program (see above), China is developing other technologies and concepts for kinetic and directed-energy (e.g., lasers, high-powered microwave, and particle beam) weapons for ASAT missions. Citing the requirements of its manned and lunar space programs, China is improving its ability to track and identify satellites – a prerequisite for effective, precise counterspace operations. Information Warfare There has been much writing on information warfare among China‘s military thinkers, who indicate a strong conceptual understanding of its methods and uses. For example, a November 2006 Liberation Army Daily commentary outlines: ―[The] mechanism to get the upper hand of the enemy in a war under conditions of informatization finds prominent expression in whether or not we are capable of using various means to obtain information and of ensuring the effective circulation of information; whether or not we are capable of making full use of the permeability, sharable property, and connection of information to realize the organic merging of materials, energy, and information to form a combined fighting strength; [and,] whether or not we are capable of applying effective means to weaken the enemy side’s information superiority and lower the operational efficiency of enemy information equipment.‖

The PLA is investing in electronic countermeasures, defenses against electronic attack (e.g., electronic and infrared decoys, angle reflectors, and false target generators), and Computer Network Operations (CNO). China‘s CNO concepts include computer network attack (CNA), computer network exploitation (CNE), and computer network defense (CND). The PLA has

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established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, and tactics and measures to protect friendly computer systems and networks. In 2005, the PLA began to incorporate offensive CNO into its exercises, primarily in first strikes against enemy networks.

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Power Projection – Modernization beyond Taiwan China continues to invest in military programs designed to improve extended-range power projection. Current trends in China‘s military capabilities are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances, and could provide China with a force capable of conducting a range of military operations in Asia well beyond Taiwan. Given the apparent absence of direct threats from other nations, the purposes to which China‘s current and future military power will be applied remain uncertain. These capabilities will increase Beijing‘s options for military coercion to press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes in its favor. Some PLA analysts have explored the geopolitical value of Taiwan in extending China‘s maritime ―defensive‖ perimeter and improving its ability to influence regional sea lines of communication. For example, the PLA Academy of Military Science text Science of Military Strategy (2000) states: ―If Taiwan should be alienated from the Mainland, not only [would] our natural maritime defense system lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to outside forces, but also a large area of water territory and rich resources of ocean resources would fall into the hands of others.... [O]ur line of foreign trade and transportation which is vital to China’s opening up and economic development will be exposed to the surveillance and threats of separatists and enemy forces, and China will forever be locked to the west of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific.‖

The related desire to protect energy investments in Central Asia and land lines of communication could also provide an incentive for military investment or intervention if instability surfaces in the region. Disagreements with Japan over maritime claims in the East China Sea and with several Southeast Asian claimants to all or parts of the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea could lead to renewed tensions in these areas. Instability on the Korean Peninsula likewise could produce a regional crisis.

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Figure 7. Regional Conventional Missiles China is capable of employing land-based ballistic and cruise missile systems to support a variety of regional contingencies.

Analysis of China‘s weapons acquisitions also suggests China is looking beyond Taiwan as it builds its force. For example, new missile units outfitted with conventional theater-range missiles at various locations in China could be used in a variety of non-Taiwan contingencies. Airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) and aerial-refueling programs would permit extended air operations into the South China Sea and beyond. Advanced destroyers and submarines reflect Beijing‘s desire to protect and advance its maritime interests up to and beyond the second island chain. Expeditionary forces (three airborne divisions, two amphibious infantry divisions, two marine brigades, and about seven special operations groups) are improving with the introduction of new equipment, better unit-level tactics, and greater coordination of joint operations. Over the long term, improvements in China‘s C4ISR, including space-based and over-the-horizon sensors, could enable Beijing to identify, track, and target military activities deep into the western Pacific Ocean.

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India China has deepened its ties with India through increased trade, high-level dialogues, and an improved military-to-military relationship. China and India agreed to boost trade from $11.4 billion in 2007 to $40 billion in 2010, and they have held several rounds of dialogue over disputed territorial claims. Sino-Indian defense ties were institutionalized in 2007 with the establishment of an Annual Defense Dialogue and by conducting three bilateral defense exercises since 2007. However, the PLA remains concerned with persistent disputes along China‘s shared border with India and the strategic ramifications of India‘s rising economic, political, and military power. The PLA has replaced older liquid-fueled nuclear- capable CSS-3 IRBMs with more advanced solid- fueled CSS-5 MRBMs in Western China, and may possibly be developing contingency plans to move airborne troops into the region. Russia Beijing continues to view Moscow as its closest international partner, yet remains concerned that Russia‘s long-term interests do not correspond with China‘s. Sino-Russia bilateral cooperation continues on many international issues, especially in Central Asia where the two jointly manage the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Despite this cooperation, Russia resents and fears China‘s rise, while PLA strategists view Russia as a potential long-term military challenge. China refused to endorse Russian military activity in Georgia in 2008. Several air and ground units stationed in the Lanzhou, Beijing, and Shenyang Military Regions, in addition to its conventional missile and strategic deterrent forces, could be used in Russia contingencies. Central Asia China‘s primary interests in Central Asia are centered on building regional influence, obtaining natural resources and energy, and countering support for China‘s Uighur separatists. Beijing has reached agreements with many Central Asian governments to build the infrastructure necessary to transport resources into western China, such as a pipeline that will stretch from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into China. Beijing has also conducted bilateral and multilateral exercises with SCO member states to enhance China‘s influence within the SCO and to build cohesive regional opposition to Uighur activities. Internal security forces in Xinjiang could be used in Central Asian contingencies, and army aviation and trans-regional mobility operations could be applied to rapidly deploy combat power to the region in a crisis.

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4. RESOURCES FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION ―We need to build an innovative system of defense science and technology ... that integrates military and civilian scientific-technological resources, and that organically integrates basic research, applied R&D, product designing and manufacturing, and procurement to technologies and products so as to create a good structure under which military and civilian high technologies are shared and mutually transferable.‖ – PRC President Hu Jintao

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Overview Sources for PLA modernization include domestic defense expenditures, indigenous defense industrial development, dual-use technologies, and foreign technology acquisition – all of which are driven by the performance of the economy. As China‘s defense industries develop, the PLA is relying on acquisition of foreign weapons and technology, primarily from Russia, to fill near- term capability gaps. China also harvests spin-offs from foreign direct investment and joint ventures in the civilian sector, technical knowledge and expertise of students returned from abroad, and state-sponsored industrial espionage to increase the level of technologies available to support military research, development, and acquisition. Beijing‘s long-term goal is to create a wholly indigenous defense industrial sector able to meet the needs of PLA modernization and to compete as a top-tier producer in the global arms trade. China is already competitive in some areas, such as communications, with leading international defense firms.

Military Expenditure Trends On March 4, 2008, Beijing announced a 17.6 percent increase in its military budget to approximately $60 billion. China‘s military budget doubled between 1989 and 1994, and almost doubled again between 1994 and 1999. The 2005 military budget was almost ten times the 1989 military budget. If these trends continue, China‘s military budget for 2009 will nearly double the 2005 figure.

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China continues a two-decade trend of double digit percentage annual increases in its military budget. These increases surpass the percentage increases of its overall economic growth. Analysis of 1996- 2008 data indicates that China‘s officially disclosed defense budget grew at an average of 12.9 percent in real terms over the period, while GDP grew at 9.6 percent. It is unclear if China‘s military budget will be supplemented to recoup costs incurred during the 2008 snow storm operations, domestic suppression operations in Tibet, rescue, recovery and rebuilding after the Sichuan earthquake, and for security operations supporting the 2008 Summer Olympics. It is also unclear if, or how, the international financial downturn will affect the relative priority China‘s leaders will give to the military budget in the face of possible declines in China‘s economy and the resulting reduction in the government‘s tax revenue.

Figure 8. PRC Military Budget and Estimated Expenditures, 1996 - 2008 The graphic depicts China‘s official military budget since 1996 and associated DoD estimates of actual military expenditures. DoD estimates include projected expenses for strategic forces, foreign acquisitions, military R&D, and paramilitary forces. All figures are in 2007 U.S. dollars.

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Estimating China’s Actual Military Expenditures The Department of Defense estimates China‘s total military-related spending for 2008 to be between $105 billion and $150 billion, using 2007 prices and exchange rates. Estimating actual PLA military expenditures is a difficult process due to the lack of accounting transparency and China‘s still incomplete transition from a command economy. Moreover, China‘s published military budget does not include major categories of expenditure. China‘s legislature does not have an oversight process for the PLA budget. Although academic experts and outside analysts may disagree about the exact amount of military expenditure in China, almost all arrive at the same conclusion: Beijing significantly underreports its military expenditures. The United States and other countries have for many years urged China to increase transparency in military spending. In September 2008, China submitted an annual report on its military expenditure to the UN Secretary General. While the decision to resume reporting of military expenditure data to the United Nations indicates an interest in appearing to be more transparent, China‘s use of the Simplified Reporting Form instead of the UN‘s Standardized Reporting Form suggests China‘s leaders have not yet committed fully to the idea of military transparency as a confidence-building measure. Increased investment in domestic military production and foreign acquisitions has accelerated modernization in each military service, as evidenced by:        

New generations of survivable nuclear armed ballistic missiles, both land- and sea-based; Domestic production of advanced short- and medium-range conventionally armed ballistic missiles; Advanced attack and ballistic missile submarines and associated weaponry; Advanced Russian aircraft and precision weaponry for the air and naval air forces; Domestic development of the multi-role F-10 fighter aircraft; Advanced Russian and domestic versions of modern guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), frigates, and amphibious landing craft; Modern, long-range, and mobile air defense systems; and, Programs to increase professionalism and quality of life for military personnel.

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Notes: 1. Personnel expenses cover salaries, allowances, food, clothing and bedding, insurance, welfare benefits and pensions for officers, non-ranking cadres, enlisted men, and contracted civilians. 2. Training and maintenance expenses cover troop training, institutional education, and running and development of daily work and activities. 3. Equipment expenses cover R&D, procurement, maintenance, and transportation and storage of weaponry and equipment. Figure 9. PRC Submission to United Nations on Military Expenditures, 2007 In September 2008, China submitted a report to the United Nations on defense expenditures. While it provides some new insight into funding for active, reserve, and militia forces, China‘s use of the Simplified Reporting Form indicates Beijing is not yet fully committed to the idea of transparency as a confidence-building measure.

China’s Advancing Defense Industries Since the late 1990s, China‘s state-owned defense and defense-related companies have undergone broad-based transformation. Beijing is improving business practices, streamlining bureaucracy, shortening development timelines, boosting quality control, and increasing production capacity for military orders. Beijing is also emphasizing integration of defense and nondefense sectors to leverage the latest dual-use technologies and the output from China‘s expanding science and technology base. Augmented by direct acquisition of foreign weapons and technology, these reforms have enabled China to develop and produce advanced weapon systems such as missiles, fighter aircraft, and warships.

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Increasing Efficiency and Capacity China‘s 2006 Defense White Paper notes that the output value, added value, and gross revenue of defense-related science, technology, and industry increased by 24.3 percent, 20.7 percent, and 21.6 percent, respectively, in 2005. A similar analysis was not included in the 2008 Defense White Paper. Through at least the 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010), China‘s defense-related industries will continue to reap benefits from:     

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

Transfers of technology and skills from foreign joint ventures; Increased government funding for research, development, and procurement; The manned space flight program, including its vessels and tracking stations; Legal and illegal acquisition of foreign military and dual-use technology; Increased partnerships with academic institutions, which improve student recruitment and technical training for existing staff; and, Overseas training and experience gained by an increasing number of scientists, engineers, and managers returning to China.

Civil-Military Integration Development of innovative dual-use technology and an industrial base that serves both military and civilian needs is among the highest priorities of China‘s leadership. PRC President Hu Jintao expressed in his political report to the CCP‘s 17th Party Congress: We must establish sound systems of weapons and equipment research and manufacturing ... and combine military efforts with civilian support, build the armed forces through diligence and thrift, and blaze a path of development with Chinese characteristics featuring military and civilian integration.

China‘s defense industry has benefited from integration with China‘s rapidly expanding civilian economy and science and technology sector, particularly elements that have access to foreign technology. According to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), China‘s research and development (R&D) spending has increased at an annual rate of 19 percent since 1995 to reach $30 billion in 2005, the sixth highest in the world. The OECD assessed that while China has significantly invested in

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R&D, human resources, and R&D infrastructure, China still has ―a long way to go‖ to build a mature national innovation system. Progress within individual defense sectors appears to be linked to the relative integration of each – through China‘s civilian economy – into the global production and R&D chain. For example, the shipbuilding and defense electronics sectors, benefiting from China‘s leading role in producing commercial shipping and information technologies, have witnessed the greatest progress over the last decade. Information technology companies, including Huawei, Datang, and Zhongxing, maintain close ties to the PLA and collaborate on R&D. Commercial off-the-shelf technologies, such as computer network switches and routers, increasingly provide the PLA with state-of-the-art telecommunications equipment. In contrast, enterprises producing high-performance computers, advanced applications software, and specialized top-end semiconductors/ microprocessors – essential to defense microelectronics, but with limited or no counterpart in the PRC civil-industrial sector – have experienced slower progress. The aviation and ordnance sectors have similarly suffered from a lack of spin-on benefits in some critical areas, despite partnerships between foreign multinational corporations and domestic industry.

Figure 10. Annual Real GDP and Growth of China‘s Military Budget, 1997 - 2008. Before 2003, and again starting in 2006, China‘s official military budget grew at a higher percentage rate than China‘s real GDP.

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Figure 11. Regional Military Spending, 2008. This graphic compares China‘s official and DoD -estimated military expenditures with that of other regional militaries. Military expenditures are derived from government sources. Of note, Russia‘s budget data grew significantly over the period of review between the 2008 and 2009 editions of this report. All figures are in 2007 U.S. dollars.

Figure 12. Select PLA Modernization Areas, 2000 – 2008 This graphic compares the expansion of modern operational systems within the PLA in 2000, 2004, and 2008.

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Sector-by-Sector Analysis Progress across China‘s defense industry sectors has been uneven. Production trends and resource allocation appear to favor missile and space systems, followed by maritime assets (both surface and sub-surface), aircraft, and ground force materiel. In all areas, however, China is increasing the quality of its output and surge production capabilities.

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Missile and Space Industry China produces a broad range of sophisticated ballistic, cruise, air- to-air, and surface-to-air missiles. Many of China‘s primary SRBM and MRBM final assembly and rocket motor production facilities have received upgrades over the past few years, increasing production capacity. In addition to supplying China‘s military, complete systems and missile technologies could also be marketed for export. Surge production for these systems could result in a significantly higher output of SRBMs and perhaps double the number of MRBMs per year. China‘s space launch vehicle industry is expanding to support satellite launch services and the manned space program. Shipbuilding Industry China operates a vibrant and globally competitive shipbuilding industry. China is the 2nd largest shipbuilder in the world, having surpassed Japan in 2008. Shipyard expansion and modernization have increased China‘s shipbuilding capacity and capability, generating benefits for all types of military projects, including: submarines; surface combatants; naval aviation, including initiatives for aircraft carriers; and amphibious/sealift-airlift assets. China continues to rely on foreign suppliers for some propulsion units and, to a lesser degree, fire control systems, cruise missiles, ship-to-air missiles, torpedo systems, sensors, and other advanced electronics. Modular shipbuilding techniques will allow China to spread production across multiple locations, increasing both efficiency and output. China has already demonstrated an ability to surge submarine and amphibious production. Armament Industry China‘s ground force modernization includes production of new tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. There have been advances in almost every area of PLA ground forces with new production capacity to accommodate surge requests. China‘s reliance on foreign partners to fill gaps in critical technical capabilities could still limit actual surge output.

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Aviation Industry China‘s commercial and military aviation industries have advanced from producing direct copies of early Soviet models to developing and producing indigenous aircraft. These include improved versions of older aircraft and modern fourth generation fighters. China‘s commercial aircraft industry has imported high-precision and technologically advanced machine tools, electronics, and other components that can also be used in the production of military aircraft. However, China‘s ability to surge production in the aircraft industry will be limited by its reliance on foreign sourcing for aircraft engines and avionics, as well as the availability of skilled personnel and facilities. Foreign Technology Acquisition Key areas where China continues to rely most heavily on foreign technologies include: guidance and control systems, turbine engine technology, and enabling technologies such as precision machine tools, advanced diagnostic and forensic equipment, applications and processes essential to rapid prototyping, and computer-assisted design/ manufacturing (CAD/CAM). China often pursues these foreign technologies for the purpose of reverse engineering. Russia in recent years has been China‘s primary weapons and materiel provider, selling Beijing advanced fighter aircraft, missile systems, submarines, and destroyers. Relying on Russian components for several of its production programs, China purchased production rights to Russian weapon designs and is negotiating the purchase of several advanced systems. Additionally, Russia cooperates with China on technical, design, and material support for numerous weapons and space systems. Israel previously has supplied advanced military technology to China, but recently reformed its export control regime through the passage of a Defense Export Control Act in July 2007 and the adoption of implementing regulations in December 2007. Since 2003, China has been pressuring the European Union (EU) Member States to lift the embargo on lethal military sales to China that the EU imposed in response to China‘s 1989 crackdown on Tiananmen Square demonstrators. In their Joint Statement following the 2004 EU-China Summit, European and PRC leaders committed to work towards lifting the embargo. Although the issue officially remains on the EU agenda, there is no consensus among the EU Member States on lifting the embargo any time in the near future. China continues a systematic effort to obtain dual-use and military technologies from abroad through legal and illegal commercial transactions.

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Many dual-use technologies, such as software, integrated circuits, computers, electronics, semiconductors, telecommunications, and information security systems, are vital for the PLA‘s transformation into an information-based, network-enabled force. Several high-profile legal cases highlight China‘s efforts to obtain sensitive U.S. technologies (e.g., missile, imaging, semiconductor, and submarine) illegally by targeting well-placed scientists and businessmen.

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LOGISTICS REFORM Over the last decade, the PLA has improved its capability to support operations within its borders and along its periphery. Frequent training in mobility operations; improvements to command, control and coordination; and standardization of warehouse systems have strengthened the PLA‘s overall ability to mobilize and support local military operations. Integration of automated logistics systems into PLA command and control systems and civil logistics capabilities into military support systems will further improve the PLA‘s logistics capability. The absence of a true expeditionary logistics capability, however, will limit the PLA‘s ability to project and sustain military operations at locations distant from the mainland. First among these limitations is the capability to transport and sustain more than one division of ground troops and equipment by sea or air. The PLA Navy‘s total amphibious lift capacity has been estimated to be one infantry division of approximately 10,000 troops and equipment at one time. Likewise, if all large transport aircraft in the PLAAF were operational and rigged for parachute drop, China could deliver about 5,000 parachutists in a single lift – less if equipment is carried at the same time. PLA in-flight refueling capability is also limited and can support only small numbers of fighter aircraft. Although the PLA Navy has gained some proficiency with underway replenishment and sustainment of long distance deployments, this capability remains limited by the PLA‘s small numbers of support ships. The PLA‘s force projection capabilities will remain limited over the next decade as the PLA replaces outdated aircraft and maritime vessels and adjusts operational doctrine to encompass new capabilities. These changes will require tailored logistics equipment and training that will take time and funding to develop. Although foreign-produced or civil sector equipment and maintenance parts may help to fill near-term gaps, continued reliance

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on non-organic assets will hinder PLA capabilities to sustain large-scale operations. Current and former senior U.S. intelligence officials continue to cite China as posing a growing threat to national security due to China‘s sustained efforts to obtain U.S. technology illegally. Many of the technologies identified during investigations into the illicit operations of PRC-based entities publicized within the last year involve sensitive military systems or programs, such as military source code, night vision equipment, cruise missile technology, and dual-use systems and components for radar and communications equipment. According to a 2008 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) statement, PRC intelligence services ―pose a significant threat both to the national security and to the compromise of U.S. critical national assets,‖ and concluded that these services ―will remain a significant threat for a long time.‖ The U.S. intelligence community has noted that, of all foreign intelligence organizations attempting to penetrate U.S. agencies, China‘s are the most aggressive.

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Looking to the Future: Trends and Projections China‘s National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006- 2020), issued by the State Council in February 2006, seeks to transform China into an ―innovation- oriented society by 2020.‖ The plan defines China‘s science and technology focus in terms of ―basic research,‖ ―leading-edge technologies,‖ ―key fields and priority subjects,‖ and ―major special items‖ – all of which have military applications.

Basic Research As part of a broad effort to expand basic research capabilities, China identified five areas that have military applications as major strategic needs or science research plans requiring active government involvement and funding:     

Material design and preparation, Manufacturing in extreme environmental conditions, Aeronautic and astronautic mechanics, Information technology development, and Nanotechnology research.

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In nanotechnology, China has progressed from virtually no research or funding in 2002 to being a close second to the United States in total government investment.

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Leading-edge Technologies China is focusing on the following technologies for rapid development: 

Information Technology: Priorities include intelligent perception technologies, ad hoc networks, and virtual reality technologies;



New Materials: Priorities include smart materials and structures, hightemperature superconducting technologies, and highly efficient energy materials technologies;



Advanced Manufacturing: Priorities include extreme manufacturing technologies and intelligent service robots;



Advanced Energy Technologies: Priorities include hydrogen energy and fuel cell technologies, alternative fuels, and advanced vehicle technologies;



Marine Technologies: Priorities include three-dimensional maritime environmental monitoring technologies, fast, multi-parameter ocean floor survey technologies, and deep-sea operations technologies; and,



Laser and Aerospace Technologies are also high priorities.

Key Fields and Priority Subjects China has identified certain industries and technology groups with potential to provide technological breakthroughs, remove technical obstacles across industries, and improve international competitiveness. Specifically, China‘s defense industries are pursuing advanced manufacturing, information technology, and defense technologies. Examples include radar, counter-space capabilities, secure C4ISR, smart materials, and low-observable technologies. Major Special Items China has also identified 16 ―major special items‖ for which it plans to develop or expand indigenous capabilities. These include core electronic

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components, high-end universal chips and operating system software, very large-scale integrated circuit manufacturing, next-generation broadband wireless mobile communications, high-grade numerically controlled machine tools, large aircraft, high- resolution satellites, manned spaceflight, and lunar exploration.

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STATUS OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER DEVELOPMENTS China has an aircraft carrier research and design program, which includes continued renovations to the former Soviet Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier VARYAG. Beginning in early 2006 with the release of China‘s Eleventh Five Year Plan, PRC-owned media reported high-level government and military official statements on China‘s intent to build aircraft carriers. In December 2008, China‘s Ministry of National Defense spokesman Senior Colonel Huang Xueping said ―China has vast oceans and it is the sovereign responsibility of China‘s armed forces to ensure the country‘s maritime security and uphold the sovereignty of its coastal waters as well as its maritime rights and interests,‖ and added that China is ―seriously considering‖ adding an aircraft carrier to its fleet, because ―the aircraft carrier is a symbol of a country‘s overall national strength, as well as the competitiveness of the country‘s naval force.‖ This was preceded by a November 2008 statement by the Director of the Ministry of National Defense, Foreign Affairs Office, Major General Qian Lihua, that ―having an aircraft carrier is the dream of any great military power,‖ and ―the question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier.‖ China continues to show interest in procuring Su-33 carrier-borne fighters from Russia even though the ex-VARYAG aircraft carrier has yet to complete refurbishment at Dalian shipyard. In October 2006, a Russian press report suggested early-stage negotiations were underway for China to purchase up to 50 such aircraft at a cost of $2.5 billion. However, there has been no announcement of a contract for the aircraft. The PLA Navy has reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 navy pilots to operate fixed-wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. The program was reported to be four years long and would be followed by shipborne training involving the ex-VARYAG. Analysts in and out of government project that China will not have an operational, domesticallyproduced carrier and associated ships before 2015. However, changes in China‘s shipbuilding capability and degree of foreign assistance to the

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program could alter those projections. The PLA Navy is considering building multiple carriers by 2020.

5. FORCE MODERNIZATION AND SECURITY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT ―Anything that is conducive to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations should be energetically promoted; anything that is detrimental to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations must be firmly opposed.‖ – PRC President Hu Jintao, Speech at the Forum Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Issuance of ―Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,‖ 31 December 2008

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Overview The security situation in the Taiwan Strait is largely a function of dynamic interactions among Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. The PLA has developed and deployed military capability to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion if necessary. PLA improvements pose new challenges to Taiwan‘s security, which has historically been based upon the PLA‘s inability to project power across the 100 NM Taiwan Strait, natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan‘s armed forces‘ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention. Despite positive public statements about the Taiwan Strait situation from top leaders in Beijing following the election of Taiwan President Ma Yingjeou, there have been no signs that Beijing‘s military dispositions opposite Taiwan have changed significantly. It remains to be seen how the PLA responds to PRC President Hu Jintao‘s call for confidence-building measures across the Strait. Taiwan has taken important steps to build its war reserve stock, as well as improve its joint operations capability, crisis response, and officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. These improvements have, on the whole, reinforced Taiwan‘s natural defensive advantages in the face of Beijing‘s continuous military build-up. Taiwan is also focused on creating an allvolunteer military and reducing its active military end-strength from 275,000 to 200,000 – or possibly 180,000 – personnel, while maintaining its defense

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budget at three percent of its GDP. Under this plan, the cost difference of a smaller force will free up resources to increase volunteer salaries and benefits. The U.S. Government opposes unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by either side, and calls for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act [Public Law 96-8, (1979)], the United States has helped to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to support Taiwan‘s self-defense. In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense, through transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces and global force posture realignments, is maintaining the capacity to defend against Beijing‘s use of force or coercion against Taiwan.

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Beijing’s Strategy in the Taiwan Strait Beijing appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes the trend of cross-Strait relations continues toward unification and the costs of a conflict outweigh the benefits. In the near term, Beijing‘s objective appears to be focused on preventing Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence through a strategy that integrates political, economic, cultural, legal, diplomatic, and coercive military instruments of power. Although Beijing professes a desire for peaceful unification that would allow Taiwan to retain a high degree of autonomy, the PLA‘s deployment of SRBMs, enhanced amphibious warfare capabilities, and modern, advanced long-range anti-air systems across the Strait from Taiwan underscores that Beijing remains unwilling to renounce the use of force. The circumstances under which the Mainland has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island‘s declarations of political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and Beijing‘s view of Taiwan‘s relations with other countries. These circumstances, or ―red lines,‖ have included:      

Formal declaration of Taiwan independence; Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence; Internal unrest on Taiwan; Taiwan‘s acquisition of nuclear weapons; Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross- Strait dialogue on unification; Foreign intervention in Taiwan‘s internal affairs; and,

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Foreign troops stationed on Taiwan.

PLA PLANNING FOR TAIWAN CONTINGENCIES

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The concepts detailed in Chapters Two and Three would shape the PLA‘s use of military force against Taiwan. In any contingency, Beijing would face the dual challenge of degrading Taiwan‘s will to resist while deterring or countering intervention by third parties. Numerous PRC statements describe the United States as the most likely third country to intervene, as well as the most difficult military force to counter. Therefore, it is logical that Beijing would require its military planners to assume and address U.S. military intervention in any Taiwan Strait contingency.

Figure 13. Taiwan Strait SAM & SRBM Coverage This map depicts notional coverage based on the range of the Russian-designed SA-20 PMU2 SAM system and the CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBMs. Actual coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites. If deployed near the Taiwan Strait, the PMU2‘s extended range provides the PLA‘s SAM force with an offensive capability against Taiwan aircraft.

Furthermore, Article 8 of the March 2005 ―Anti-Secession Law‖ states that Beijing may use ―non- peaceful means‖ if ―secessionist forces... cause the

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fact of Taiwan‘s secession from China;‖ if ―major incidents entailing Taiwan‘s secession‖ occur; or if ―possibilities for peaceful reunification‖ are exhausted. The ambiguity of these ―red-lines‖ enhances the credibility of Beijing‘s deterrence and allows it the flexibility to determine the nature, timing, and form of its response. Added to this ambiguity are political factors internal to the regime that could affect Beijing‘s decision calculus.

Beijing’s Courses of Action against Taiwan The PLA is capable of increasingly sophisticated military action against Taiwan. Some analysts hold that Beijing would first pursue a measured approach characterized by signaling its readiness to use force, followed by deliberate buildup of force to optimize the speed of engagement over strategic deception. Others contend that it is more likely that Beijing would sacrifice preparations in favor of surprise to force rapid military and/or political resolution before other countries could respond. If a quick resolution is not possible, Beijing would seek to:

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Deter potential U.S. intervention; Failing that, delay intervention and seek victory in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; or, Fight to a standstill and pursue a political settlement after a protracted conflict.

Maritime Quarantine or Blockade Although a traditional maritime quarantine or blockade would have greater impact on Taiwan, it would also tax PLA Navy capabilities. PRC military writings describe potential alternative solutions – air blockades, missile attacks, and mining – to obstruct harbors and approaches. Beijing could declare that ships en route to Taiwan must stop in mainland ports for inspection prior to transiting to Taiwan ports. Beijing could also attempt the equivalent of a blockade by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches to ports, in effect closing port access and diverting merchant traffic. The PLA employed this method during the 1995- 96 missile firings and live-fire exercises. There is risk, however, that Beijing would underestimate the degree to which any attempt to limit maritime traffic to and from Taiwan would trigger countervailing international pressure and military escalation.

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Limited Force or Coercive Options Beijing might use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, likely in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan‘s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear on Taiwan and degrade the populace‘s confidence in the Taiwan leadership. Similarly, PLA special operations forces that have infiltrated Taiwan could conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

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FACTORS OF DETERRENCE Several factors may deter China from taking military action against Taiwan. First, China does not yet possess the military capability to invade and conquer the island, particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Moreover, an insurgency directed against any PRC presence could tie up PLA forces for years. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would also affect the interests of Japan and other nations in the region that advocate a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait dispute, and would likely result in a fundamental re-ordering of the East Asian security architecture. Beijing would also have to factor in its calculus the potential political and economic repercussions of a military conflict with Taiwan. China‘s leaders recognize that a war could severely retard economic development. Taiwan is China‘s single largest source of foreign direct investment, and an extended campaign would wreck Taiwan‘s economic infrastructure, leading to high reconstruction costs. International sanctions could further damage Beijing‘s economic development. A conflict would also severely damage the image that Beijing has sought to project and would undermine the goodwill Beijing has attempted to build through its ―Harmonious World‖ campaign leading up to and following its successful hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. A conflict could also trigger domestic unrest on the mainland, a contingency that Beijing appears to have factored into its planning. Finally, China‘s leaders recognize that a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would lead to a long-term hostile relationship between the United States and China – a result that would not be in China‘s interests.

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Air and Missile Campaign Limited SRBM attacks and precision strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities, could support a campaign to degrade Taiwan‘s defenses, neutralize Taiwan‘s military and political leadership, and possibly break the Taiwan people‘s will to fight. Amphibious Invasion Publicly available PRC writings describe different operational concepts for amphibious invasion. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air and naval support, and electronic warfare. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan‘s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets and/or the entire island. The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-held islands such as the Pratas or Itu Aba. This invasion would demonstrate military capability and political resolve while achieving tangible territorial gain and simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation includes significant, if not prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize the Taiwan populace and generate international opposition. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, defended offshore island such as Mazu or Jinmen is within China‘s capabilities. Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military maneuvers. Success depends upon air and sea superiority, rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies on shore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would strain China‘s untested armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with China‘s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency (assuming a successful landing and breakout), make amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. Taiwan‘s investments to harden infrastructure and strengthen defensive capabilities could also decrease Beijing‘s ability to achieve its objectives.

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6. ANNUAL UPDATE ―The future and destiny of contemporary China is more and more closely linked to the future and destiny of the world. China’s development cannot be done without the world, and the world’s development needs China.‖ – PRC President Hu Jintao

Developments in China’s Strategy 

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China‘s State Council published the White Paper on China’s National Defense in 2008 on January 20, 2009. Consistent with previous editions of the White Paper, the 2009 version exhibits limited improvements in transparency and openness. China refused to support Russia‘s effort to use the August 2008 SCO Summit in Dushanbe to endorse Moscow‘s invasion of Georgia and subsequent recognition of the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. From August 8-22, 2008, China hosted the Olympic Games, enhancing China‘s international prestige and strengthening domestic support for the CCP. To maintain security throughout the Games, the PLA dispatched 87,000 police officers and 12,000 police vehicles in Beijing and Tianjin from July 21 to August 25. The PLA also deployed 34,000 soldiers, 122 military aircraft, and 33 ships, as well as surface-to-air missiles and radars. Militia and PLA reserve units mobilized to assist in providing security for event venues. In December 2008, the PLA Navy deployed two destroyers and one supply ship to the Gulf of Aden to conduct counter-piracy escort and patrol operations. Outside of occasional ship visits, this represents the PLA Navy‘s first operational deployment beyond the immediate Western Pacific region. In March 2008, the United States and China completed installation of a Defense Telephone Link (DTL), establishing direct communications between the Department of Defense and China‘s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Secretary Gates completed the first DTL call to PRC Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie in April 2008.

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Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait 

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Since the election of President Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008, the security situation in the Taiwan Strait has entered a period of relaxing tensions. Both Beijing and Taipei have emphasized enhancing peopleto-people contacts and expanding economic ties. However, to date, there have been no meaningful actions on the part of the Mainland to reduce its military presence directly opposite Taiwan. Preceding the March 2008 Taiwan Presidential election, PRC rhetoric appeared to signal a greater willingness by Beijing to consider the use of limited force to prevent independence. Although tensions decreased after the election of Ma Ying-jeou, there have been no signs that Beijing‘s military dispositions opposite Taiwan have changed significantly. In a statement after the March election on Taiwan, PRC President Hu Jintao proposed that the Mainland and Taiwan ―build mutual trust, lay aside disputes, seek consensus and shelve differences, and create a win-win situation‖ to secure peace and promote the ―peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.‖ In a signal of his openness to the overture, newly elected Taiwan President Ma referenced Hu‘s statement during his inaugural address. In June 2008, Taiwan‘s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China‘s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) reinstituted semi-official bilateral exchanges after a nine-year hiatus. The first round of dialogue centered on noncontroversial issues: regular direct weekend cross-Strait charter flights and increased mainland tourism to Taiwan. The dialogue did not address sensitive political subjects such as sovereignty and Taiwan‘s international space. ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan in November 2008 to sign agreements on cross-Strait flights, direct maritime shipping, mail service, and food safety with his SEF counterpart, P.K. Chiang. The main opposition party on Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party, protested against Chen‘s visit to Taiwan. On December 31, 2008, PRC President Hu Jintao gave a speech commemorating the 1979 ―Message to Compatriots in Taiwan‖ in which the PRC abandoned the idea of ―armed liberation‖ in favor of ―peaceful liberation.‖ Hu‘s speech outlined six points that would

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Office of the Secretary of Defense govern future cross-Strait relations including cross-Strait military confidence-building measures and negotiation of a peace agreement.

Developments in the Size, Location, and Capabilities of PRC Military Forces China‘s long-term, comprehensive transformation of its military forces is improving its capacity for force projection and anti-access/area-denial. Consistent with a near-term focus on preparing for Taiwan Strait contingencies, China continues to deploy many of its most advanced systems to the MRs opposite Taiwan. China describes operating under ―informatized‖ conditions, improving ―integrated joint operations,‖ and preparing for warfare in a ―complex electromagnetic environment‖ as the primary objectives for the PLA‘s build-up.

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On May 12, 2008, an earthquake measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale struck Sichuan province in southwestern China. The death toll likely exceeded 80,000 and severely damaged infrastructure, including roads and dams. China quickly mobilized rescue and relief efforts that included deployment of many senior civilian and military leaders and disaster management personnel to affected areas. According to PRC press, 20,000 military and armed police had arrived in Sichuan within ten hours of the earthquake, and eventually 139,000 PLA and PAP troops were involved in rescue and recovery efforts. Although the PLA demonstrated the ability to deploy thousands of troops to the affected regions quickly, it had difficulty providing logistics support, leaving many troops in the field without the necessary equipment and supplies to conduct an effective disaster relief operation. Nearly 50,000 militia and PLA reserve forces also supported relief efforts. Militia and reserve units transported supplies into and evacuated the wounded from the disaster area. In January and February 2008, Beijing mobilized military assets, including militia and reserve units, to help with relief during a snow storm that crippled large swaths of eastern China. Newly appointed Nanjing Military Region Commander Lieutenant General Zhao Keshi characterized the effort as similar in nature to a wartime environment with a multi-tiered command system and sustained joint logistics.

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Ballistic and Cruise Missiles China has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. It is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. 

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The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, such as the domestically produced ground-launched DH- 10 LACM; the domestically produced ground- and ship-launched YJ-62 ASCM, the latter of which is outfitted on the domestically produced LUYANG II-class DDGs; the Russian SS-N-22/ SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is outfitted on China‘s SOVREMENNYYclass DDGs and acquired from Russia; and the Russian SS-N27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCM, which is outfitted on China‘s Russian-built KILO-class diesel electric submarines. The PLA recently completed an upgrade to the ground-launched YJ62 ASCM. The new variant, the YJ-62C, has a range of more than 150 NM. According to press reports, the PLA Navy has deployed 120 YJ-62Cs to naval bases in Fujian province, across from Taiwan. By September 2008, the PLA had deployed between 1,050 and 1,150 CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBMs to units opposite Taiwan. It is increasing the size of this force at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year, including variants of these missiles with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads. China is developing an ASBM based on a variant of the CSS-5 MRBM as a part of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and when incorporated into a sophisticated command and control system, is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean. China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic missile force by adding more survivable systems. Most notably, the road-mobile, solidfueled, nuclear-capable DF-31 ICBM was deployed in 2006, and the longer-range DF-31A was deployed in 2007. The DF-31A, with a range of 11,200 km, can target any location in the continental United States (CONUS). China is also developing a new SLBM, the JL-2, for eventual deployment aboard up to five new JIN-class (Type 094) SSBN, which the Department of Defense assesses will achieve Initial Operational

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Office of the Secretary of Defense Capability (IOC) by 2009- 2010. The missile has a range of at least 7,200 km and would provide China its first credible sea-based nuclear strike capability once it becomes operational.

Naval Forces China‘s naval forces include some 75 principal combatants, over 60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and approximately 70 missile-equipped patrol craft. 

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China has an active aircraft carrier R&D program. The PRC shipbuilding industry could start construction of an indigenous platform by the end of this decade. China may be interested in building multiple operational aircraft carriers with support ships in the next decade. The PLA Navy has reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 pilots to operate fixed-wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. The initial program, presumably land-based, would be followed in about four years by ship-borne training involving the ex-VARYAG, which was purchased by a Chinese company from Ukraine in 1998. The PLA Navy is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with Sky Wave and Surface Wave OTH radars, and is developing missiles with improved range and accuracy. OTH radars improve long-range targeting and could be used in conjunction with overhead imagery from satellites to assist in locating targets at great distances from PRC shores for its next generation anti-ship missiles. Two new SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack submarines (S SN) and one JINclass (Type 094) SSBN have entered service alongside four older HAN-class SSNs and China‘s single XIA-class SSBN. China has an estimated 13 SONG-class (Type 039) diesel-electric attack submarines (SS) in its inventory. The SONG-class SS is designed to carry the YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) ASCM. The follow-on to the SONG is the YUAN-class SS. The first unit is already in fleet service and the second is conducting sea trials. Based on German diesel engine purchases, China may plan to construct 15 additional YUAN-class submarines. The YUAN-class SS are armed similarly to the SONG-class SS, but also include a possible air independent propulsion (AIP) system.

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Press reported on construction of a new PLA Navy base on Hainan Island. The base appears large enough to accommodate a mix of attack and ballistic missile submarines and advanced surface combatant ships. The port, which has underground facilities, would provide the PLA Navy with direct access to vital international sea lanes, and offers the potential for stealthy deployment of submarines into the deep waters of the South China Sea. The PLA Navy recently received several new domestically produced surface combatants. These include two LUYANG II-class (Type 052C) DDGs fitted with the indigenous HHQ-9 long-range surface-toair missile (SAM); two LUZHOU-class (Type 051 C) DDGs equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 long-range SAM; and four JIANGKAI IIclass (Type 054A) guided missile frigates (FFG) to be fitted with the medium-range HHQ-16 vertically launched naval SAM currently under development. These ships reflect the leadership‘s priority on an advanced anti-air warfare capability for China‘s naval forces, which has historically been a weakness of the fleet. China is continuing construction of its new HOUBEI-class (Type 022) wave-piercing catamaran hull missile patrol boat. More than 40 of these units have already entered service. Each boat can carry up to eight YJ-83 ASCMs. China launched the 10,000-ton ANWEI-class hospital ship in October of 2008. In addition to providing the PLA with an at-sea medical capability, the ANWEI-class may help support Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/ DR) efforts in Asia. In May 2008, PRC naval militia forces (commercial fishing vessels, referred to as a Militia Offshore Support Detachment) purportedly refueled and supplied two PLA Navy warships operating at sea in a designated sea area off the coast of Zhejiang. The militia provided ammunition and other stores in addition to fuel. The extent to which Militia Offshore Support Detachments could provide logistics and sustainment support to PLA Navy vessels at distances from China remains unknown.

Air and Air Defense Forces China bases 490 combat aircraft within un-refueled operational range of Taiwan, and has the airfield capacity to expand that number by hundreds. Many of these aircraft are upgrades of older models; however, newer and more advanced aircraft make up a growing percentage of the inventory. Although

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the PLA Navy could use aircraft to strike surface ships, it lacks the numbers of aircraft and operational ranges necessary for aerial combat over blue water. The vast majority of PLA Navy tactical aircraft for aerial combat consists of older F-7/FISHBED and F-8II/FINBACK interceptors. These interceptors do not possess the range to conduct aerial combat far from their airfields. To conduct long-range over water combat, the PLA Navy has one Su-30MK2/ FLANKER regiment consisting of just 23 aircraft. 

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The modernized FB-7A fighter-bomber augments other multi-role and strike aircraft, such as the F-10 and Su-30MKK, already deployed with China‘s air forces. China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted from the Russian Tu- 16) with a new variant which, when operational, will be armed with a new long-range cruise missile. The PLAAF has received eight battalions of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU-2 long-range (200km) SAM systems since 2006. The SA-20 system reportedly provides limited ballistic and cruise missile defense capabilities. Russian press reporting suggests another eight battalions could be delivered within the next two years. China‘s aviation industry is developing several types of AEW&C aircraft. This includes the KJ-200, based on the Y-8 transport, for AEW&C as well as intelligence collection and maritime surveillance, and the KJ-2000, based on the Russian A-50 airframe. Press reporting indicated that China remains interested in procuring Su-33 carrier-borne fighters from Russia. Additionally, Russia and China reportedly re-started negotiations for China‘s purchase of 34 IL-76 transport aircraft and four IL-78 aerial refueling tankers. While the two sides agreed to the sale for $1 .045 billion in 2005, Russia has refused to deliver the planes, citing higher manufacturing costs and concern that China‘s defense industries may reverse-engineer the aircraft for indigenous production. Russia is attempting to increase the contract to $1.5 billion. China has no other source for large aircraft to augment Chinese military AEW&C capabilities.

Ground Forces The PLA has about 1.25 million personnel in its ground forces, with approximately 400,000 based in the three MRs opposite Taiwan. China is upgrading these units with modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Among the new capabilities acquired by PLA ground forces are the

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approximately 200 Type 98 and Type 99 third generation main battle tanks primarily deployed to units in the Beijing and Shenyang MRs, a new generation amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), a 130 km-range 12-tube 200mm multiple rocket launch system, and the 6-tube 400-mm multiple rocket launcher system reportedly capable of a 200 km-range.

Developments in PLA Doctrine 

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In July 2008, the PLA promulgated the 7th revision of the Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE), the authoritative guide to how the PLA organizes, implements, and evaluates training. In 2008, over 150 PLA units were involved in testing and validating the draft OMTE, which became standard across the entire force in early 2009. The new OMTE emphasizes realistic training conditions, training in electromagnetic and joint environments, and integrating new and high technologies into the force structure. The latest revision codifies new training requirements for antiterrorism operations, HA/DR, and international peacekeeping. As part of the PLA‘s emphasis on improving the combat readiness through rigorous and realistic training, the new OMTE also standardizes methods, procedures, and training using opposition forces, referred to as BLUEFOR. BLUEFOR units appear to be semipermanent, incorporate multiple services and arms, and mimic foreign tactics and command procedures. Drawing on analysis of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and internal PRC studies of informatization, the PLA is debating changes in ground force combat models. The PLA traditionally defined the basic pattern of ground war as massive attacks aimed at destruction and attrition. A new model, using ―information-plusfirepower,‖ considers ground forces as integrated within a joint force focused on rapid occupation of key strategic targets and stabilization of the battlefield. A PLA publication stated that, ―rapid occupation and stable control have become the basic role of the army in operations in the information age.‖ September and October 2008 respectively, the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) organized two exercises, LIBING-2008 and LIANHE2008, each of which involved elements from different MRs. Training between MRs is unusual and highlights PLA efforts to

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Office of the Secretary of Defense improve mobility and enhance training realism by forcing units to operate on unfamiliar terrain. Both exercises also emphasized command training necessary for effective combined-arms and joint operations, as stipulated in the new OMTE.

Developments in PRC Efforts to Develop, Acquire, or Gain Access to Advanced Technologies That Could Enhance Its Military Capabilities 

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According to a 2008 FBI statement, PRC intelligence services ―pose a significant threat both to the national security and to the compromise of U.S. critical national assets.‖ This statement concludes that these services ―will remain a significant threat for a long time.‖ The U.S. intelligence community noted that, of all foreign intelligence organizations attempting to penetrate U.S. agencies, China‘s are the most aggressive. Shu Quansheng, a naturalized U.S. citizen who worked as a physicist in the United States, pleaded guilty to violating the Arms Export Control Act by providing the PRC with information on the design and development of a fueling system for space launch vehicles. Chi Mak, a PRC national, acknowledged being placed in the United States for more than 20 years to conduct espionage against the United States, providing sensitive plans for U.S. Navy ships, submarines, and weapons to the PRC. In March 2008, he was sentenced to twenty-four and a half years in prison by a federal judge.

Challenges to Taiwan’s Deterrent Forces There were no armed incidents in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in 2008 and the overall situation remains stable, as it did in 2007. However, China‘s military build-up and the deployment of advanced capabilities opposite the island have not eased. Taiwan recently reversed the trend of the past several years of declining defense expenditures; it is also modernizing select capabilities and improving its overall contingency training. The balance of forces continues, however, to shift in the Mainland‘s favor.

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Taiwan continues to bolster its defense by strengthening its crisis management structure, instituting military personnel reforms, improving its joint capabilities, and modernizing its equipment. Consistent with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8 (1979), the United States continues to make available defense articles, services, and training assistance to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability.

Developments in China’s Asymmetric Capabilities

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Space and Counterspace Capabilities China is rapidly improving its space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and communications capabilities, allowing for greater military support from space. In parallel, China is developing a multidimensional program to improve its capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space- based assets by potential adversaries during times of crisis or conflict. Although China‘s commercial space program has utility for non-military research, it demonstrates space launch and control capabilities that have direct military application. 

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China conducted 11 space launches in 2008, putting 15 satellites in orbit Included in this number are four new remote sensing satellites: Yaogan-4, Yaogan-5, Huanjing- 1 A, and Huanjing-1B; the Shenzhou-VII manned spacecraft along with its accompanying small satellite, Banxing-1; three communications satellites; and, two meteorological satellites. In April 2008, China successfully launched its first data relay satellite, TianLian-1. According to PRC news broadcasts, TianLian- 1 was initially tasked to support the launch of Shenzhou-VII manned space mission, increasing surveillance and control coverage of the manned spacecraft‘s path from 12 percent to roughly 60 percent. China began development and testing of the Long March V rocket, the world‘s largest. Intended to lift heavy payloads into space, it will more than double the sizes of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) payloads that China can place into orbit. To support these new rockets, a launch facility near Wenchang on Hainan Island began construction in 2008.

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The Chang‘e-1 lunar probe, launched in late 2007, continued to operate successfully with a controlled orbit. Chang‘e-2 will launch in 2009 to conduct a lunar surface survey. China plans to land a lunar rover on the moon in 2012. China‘s leaders remain silent about the military applications of China‘s space programs and counterspace activities.

Cyberwarfare Capabilities In 2008, numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. Government, continued to be the target of intrusions that appear to have originated within the PRC. Although these intrusions focused on exfiltrating information, the accesses and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct computer network attacks. It remains unclear if these intrusions were conducted by, or with the endorsement of, the PLA or other elements of the PRC Government. However, developing capabilities for cyberwarfare is consistent with authoritative PLA military writings on the subject. Publicized 2008 attacks by suspected PRC actors include:

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In April 2008, Indian Government officials confirmed that its Ministry of External Affairs‘ computer network and servers were the victims of intrusions that appeared to originate in China. In May 2008, the Belgian Government reported that it had been targeted by PRC hackers multiple times. In May 2008, U.S. authorities investigated whether PRC officials secretly copied contents of a U.S. Government laptop during a visit to China by the U.S. Commerce Secretary and used the information to try to penetrate into Commerce computers. The investigation is ongoing.

SPECIAL TOPIC CHINA’S GLOBAL MILITARY ENGAGEMENT ―Actively participating in international and multilateral affairs and undertaking corresponding international obligations to play a constructive role will be more conducive to the enhancement of China’s influencing power in the world.‖ – Liu Jianfei, Theorist and Scholar, CCP Central Party School

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Overview Since 2002, the frequency and scope of PLA interactions with foreign militaries have increased to include joint exercises, peacekeeping operations, and HA/DR. China‘s global military engagement seeks to enhance its national power by improving foreign relationships, bolstering its international image, and assuaging concerns among other countries about China‘s rise. The PLA‘s global activities also contribute to its transformation through the acquisition of modern weapons, improved operational experience, and professionalization due to access to critical management practices, operational doctrine, and training methods. The Department of Defense oversees U.S. defense contacts with the PLA to ensure that exchanges and interactions with PRC entities comply with legislative requirements, provide clear benefit to the United States, encourage transparency, consider political and military sensitivities in the region, and mitigate security risks.

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Traditional Military Diplomacy Prior to stepping down in March 2008, General Cao Gangchuan visited at least 24 countries during his five years as China‘s Minister of National Defense. His replacement, Liang Guanglie, conducted more than 20 high-level meetings with foreign counterparts and delegations in 2008. Such visits and exchanges provide China with opportunities to increase military officers‘ international exposure, communicate China‘s positions to foreign audiences, better understand alternative world views, and advance foreign relations through interpersonal contacts and military assistance programs. PLA travel abroad, occurring with increased frequency in concert with China‘s more activist global profile, enables China‘s military officers to observe and study foreign military command structures, unit formations, and operational training. In 2005, the PLA sent 100 delegations abroad. In 2007, an 86-day cruise took a naval task force through three oceans to four European countries. Such diplomatic voyages within and beyond Asia have steadily increased since 2002. In 2008, the PLA maintained a regular presence in 96 countries with at least 267 attachés posted abroad, compared to 201 attachés posted in 2002 and 220 posted in 2005. In addition to managing daily defense affairs with their respective countries, PRC attachés promote China‘s defense policies, collect

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information on political and security affairs, manage security assistance programs, and arrange and escort visiting delegations. China also hosts foreign military officers as students in its military academies. In October 2008, nearly 200 foreign military students from over 60 countries observed the PLA exercise QIANFENG 2008, which reportedly involved an armored brigade conducting an offensive maneuver in a mountainous area. QIANFENG 2008 was the first PLA exercise that was open to observation by foreign military students. The number of countries with defense attachés in Beijing is also increasing. In 2008, 94 countries had military attachés in Beijing. This represents a significant increase from 2006, when 79 countries had military attachés in China.

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Joint Exercises PLA participation in bilateral and multilateral military exercises is increasing. The PLA derives political benefit from these exercises both in terms of increased influence and enhanced ties with partner states and organizations. These exercises also contribute to PLA modernization by providing opportunities to improve capabilities in areas such as counterterrorism, mobility operations, and logistics. The PLA gains operational insights by observing tactics, command decision making (including commander profiling), and equipment use by more advanced militaries. Such exercises also expose the PLA to military personnel from other countries, who may hold other values or view the world differently. Many of the PLA‘s exercises with foreign militaries are categorized as counterterrorism exercises even if they depict scenarios that hold little bearing on actual counterterrorism operations. Beijing has held such exercises bilaterally with Russia, India, Pakistan, Thailand, and multilaterally with the SCO and the various countries that participated in AMAN-07. 

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In 2004 and 2006, the PLA participated in exercises in Pakistan, which provided the PLA opportunities to train in a mountainous region outside China. In 2007 and 2008, PLA Special Operations Forces conducted exercises with the Thai military, focusing on hand-to-hand combat and underwater operations.

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PEACE MISSION 2005 was a joint exercise held in China with Russia and observers from SCO member and observer states. Participants conducted off-shore blockades, paradrops, airfield seizures, and amphibious landings. Russian forces included strategic bombers, and advanced early warning, transport, refueling, and fighter aircraft along with modern naval vessels. PEACE MISSION 2007 was a multilateral exercise held with the SCO in Russia. The exercise established several notable firsts for the PLA, including China‘s first out-of-country deployment of combat aircraft. PEACE MISSION 2007 likely tested the PLA‘s logistics and mobility requirements for long-range deployments. In 2006, China and the United States conducted a two-phased joint maritime search and rescue exercise—one phase in China and the other in the United States. This was the first such exercise between the two militaries.

Between 2002 and 2007, the PLA participated in at least 14 maritime search and rescue exercises with foreign militaries, including two each with Australia, Great Britain, India, and Pakistan. These exercises provided opportunities to improve humanitarian support operations, a prominent objective outlined in China‘s 2006 Defense White Paper. According to China‘s 2006 Defense White Paper, the PLA sent observers to military exercises held by Turkey, Thailand, Pakistan, India, Australia, and the United States. PRC analysts concluded from these opportunities that logistics and mobilization are potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare, requiring precisely coordinated transportation and communications. Knowledge gained from observing military planning and execution techniques may lead to improvements in PLA logistics and force planning, as well as improvements to the PLA‘s ability to cooperate with other countries multilaterally in addressing such issues as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, UN peacekeeping, and other international efforts. In addition to participating in other nations‘ exercises, China invited foreign military observers and resident military attachés to observe PLA exercises on at least six occasions since 2003. Inviting foreign military observers to attend PLA exercises enables China to project an overall national image of ―peaceful development,‖ and increased transparency.

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In WARRIOR-2007, 55 observers from 35 countries, including the United States, witnessed a Shenyang Military Region live-fire exercise. In September 2008, over 110 observers from 36 countries, including the United States, witnessed the culmination of LIBING 2008. This was the largest number of foreign visitors ever invited to observe a PLA exercise.

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Peacekeeping Operations Prior to 2002, Beijing limited its participation in UN peacekeeping operations based on its long-stated policy of non-interference in other countries‘ internal affairs (its participation from 1991-1993 in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia being a major exception). Participation in UN peacekeeping operations can serve multiple objectives, including demonstrating support for international stability in troubled regions, improving China‘s international image, providing opportunities to initiate and expand intelligence collection, and enhancing relationships in the affected areas. Since 2002, China‘s contributions to UN-sponsored peace operations have climbed to over 1,800 on duty with a total contribution of over 10,000 personnel deployed to 18 missions. The contributions have included engineering, logistics, and medical troops, and are evolving to include combat troops and senior officers. China provided several rotations of over 100 police officers to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Beijing also has demonstrated a willingness to deploy personnel on missions where conditions are not completely secure. After the death of a Chinese peacekeeper in Lebanon during the summer of 2006, for example, the PLA increased its troop contributions to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL). In November 2007, Beijing deployed over 300 engineers to support the African Union- UN Mission in Darfur. In June 2007, the PLA conducted its first peacekeeping work meeting to discuss how to effectively organize, train, manage, and rotate China‘s peacekeepers.

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Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief In the last decade, the PLA increased its participation in international HA/DR missions. Since 2002, the PLA has contributed to ten emergency relief operations in fourteen countries in China‘s immediate region. PLA involvement in international HA/DR missions appears to be driven by a desire to be perceived as a responsible global power. In 2004, China was criticized for its slow response to the Indian Ocean tsunami and initial pledge of only $2.6 million in aid. Subsequently, China offered a total of over $170 million in assistance, including $19.5 million through the UN. However, it is unclear how much pledged assistance China actually delivered. According to the Director of the Ministry of National Defense, Foreign Affairs Office, Major General Qian Lihua, PLA peacetime training includes rescue and assistance missions. In May 2008, the PLA deployed its national rescue team to the Sichuan Province in response to a devastating 8.0 magnitude earthquake. PRC press reported that the team experienced significant difficulties due to equipment shortfalls and command and control problems. The PLA‘s HA/DR capability remains limited, but China is seeking to collaborate with regional partners to improve its HA/DR capabilities. China and Indonesia drafted the ―Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum General Guidelines on Disaster Relief Cooperation‖ to steer the development of Standard Operating Procedures for future HA/DR operations, which were adopted in July 2007. China also proposed a standard operating procedure for disaster relief cooperation for the armed forces of the member states of ASEAN+3.

Arms Sales Beijing conducts arms sales and training both to enhance foreign relationships and to generate revenue to support its domestic defense industry. China‘s arms sales range from small arms and ammunition to joint development or transfer of advanced weapons systems. Chinese companies sell primarily to developing countries where China‘s low-cost weapons sales serve both commercial and strategic purposes. For example, China maintains strong and longstanding military- technical cooperation with Pakistan, which includes both arms sales and defense industrial cooperation. With other countries of strategic importance to China, such as Iran and Sudan, arms sales

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and other security assistance deepen developing ties and balance PRC energy imports. As PRC arms have become less competitive compared to more sophisticated systems sold by Western or Russian suppliers, arms sales have declined in importance to Beijing as a tool of influence. Nonetheless, arms sales continue to play an important role in China‘s efforts to influence cashstrapped countries—many of which do not have access to other sources of arms and are willing to trade quality for lower cost. As the quality of PRC arms improves, Beijing may be able to wield arms sales a competitive tool of influence again. From 2003-2007, China sold nearly $7 billion worth of conventional weapons systems worldwide. China‘s primary customer for conventional weapons has been Pakistan. Sales to Islamabad include JF-17 aircraft, JF-17 production facilities, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, ASCMs, missile technologies, small arms, and ammunition. Sales to other countries include fighter, transport, and jet trainer aircraft, tanks, air defense equipment, rockets, military vehicles, patrol boats, missiles and missile technology, and small arms and ammunition. Protesting disclosure of U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan, China did not provide an official record of its arms sales to the UN Conventional Arms Register (UNCAR) from 1996-2007. However, in September 2007, China‘s Foreign Ministry announced that Beijing resumed its reporting on conventional arms imports and exports to ―demonstrate China‘s positive attitude on enhancing military mutual trust with various countries in the world.‖

Arms Sales to Areas of Instability Several PRC entities continue to provide arms to customers in unstable regions. 

Zimbabwe: In March 2008, South African dockworkers refused to unload a PRC cargo ship carrying 70 tons of small arms and ammunition destined to support President Mugabe‘s ZANUPF Party, which is waging a violent campaign of intimidation against prodemocracy advocates. China initially defended the shipment, but with mounting international pressure, off-loaded nonmilitary cargo in Angola, after which the ship returned to China with its remaining military cargo.

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Figure 14. PRC Worldwide Arms Sales Customers, 2003 – 2007 Pakistan was China‘s largest customer for conventional arms; Sudan was second.

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Iran: China supported UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835. However, concerns remain regarding China‘s enforcement of existing laws regarding arms sales to Iran. A number of transfers to Iran have resulted in U.S. trade penalties and sanctions against entities in China. Some weapons that PRC entities supplied to Iran were found to have been transferred to terrorist organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a serious issue that the United States continues to monitor.

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Sudan: The PRC government has at times used its influence with the Sudanese government to address in a positive way international concerns over Darfur, yet has also continued to provide political support for Khartoum. China sells arms to Sudan despite the passage of UN Security Council resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005), both of which call for the prevention of the transfer of arms to Darfur. The PRC argues that arms sales constitute part of normal commercial relations, and that the arms supplied by Chinese companies were not meant for use in Darfur. Between 2004 and 2006, China made up an average of 90 percent of small arms sales to Sudan.

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As China‘s regional and international interests expand and grow more complex, the PLA‘s international engagement will expand, especially in the areas of peace operations, HA/DR, and joint exercises. In addition to furthering PLA modernization, the focus of these engagements will likely remain on building China‘s political ties, assuaging fears about China‘s rise, and building China‘s international influence, particularly in Asia. However, the sale of arms by PRC entities to states of concern and unstable regions are disruptive to regional and global stability.

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APPENDIX: CHINA AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces China Total Taiwan Strait Area 1.25 Personnel (Active) 440,000 million 18 8 Group Armies 19 8 Infantry Divisions 24 11 Infantry Brigades 4 1 Mechanized Infantry Divisions 5 1 Mechanized Infantry Brigades 9 4 Armor Divisions 8 3 Armor Brigades 2 2 Artillery Divisions 17 6 Artillery Brigades 3 3 Airborne Divisions 2 2 Amphibious Divisions 3 3 Amphibious Brigades 6,700 2,800 Tanks 7,400 2,900 Artillery Pieces

Taiwan Total 130,000 3 0 8 0 3 0 5 0 5 0 0 3 1,100 1,600

Note: PLA active ground forces are organized into Group Armies. Infantry, armor, and artillery units are organized into a combination of divisions and brigades deployed throughout the PLA‘s seven MRs. A significant portion of these assets are deployed in the Taiwan Strait area, specifically the Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan MRs. Taiwan has seven Defense Commands, three of which have Field Armies. Each Army contains an Artillery Command roughly equivalent to a brigade plus.

Figure 15. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces

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Figure 16. Major Ground Units Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces China Taiwan Aircraft Total Within range of Taiwan Total 1,655 330 390 Fighters 645 160 0 Bombers/Attack 450 40 40 Transport Note: The PLAAF and the PLA Navy have approximately 2,300 operational combat aircraft. These consist of air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, fighter- bombers, and bombers. An additional 1,450 older fighters, bombers and trainers are employed for training and R&D. The two air arms also possess approximately 450 transports and over 100 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with intelligence, surface search, and airborne early warning capabilities. The majority of PLAAF and PLA Navy aircraft are based in the eastern half of the country. Currently, 490 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan without refueling. However, this number could be significantly increased through any combination of aircraft forward deployment, decreased ordnance loads, or altered mission profiles.

Figure 17. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces

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Figure 18. Major Air Units Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces China Taiwan Total East and South Total Sea Fleets 27 17 4 Destroyers 48 39 22 Frigates Tank Landing Ships/ Amphibious 27 25 12 Transport Dock 28 23 4 Medium Landing Ships 54 32 4 Diesel Attack Submarines 6 1 0 Nuclear Attack Submarines 70 55 59 Coastal Patrol (Missile) Note: The PLA Navy has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia. After years of neglect, the force of missile-armed patrol craft is also growing. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the East and South Sea Fleets would be expected to participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The North Sea Fleet would be responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coast, but could provide mission- critical assets to support other fleets.

Figure 19. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces

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Figure 20. Major Naval Units Inventory of PLAAF Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers System 2008 SA-20 (S-300PMU2) 32 SA-20 (S-300PMU1) 64 SA-10B (S-300PMU) 32 HQ-9 64 KS-1A 60 HQ-6 30 CSA-1 and variants 400 Figure 21. Inventory of PLAAF Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers

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China's Missile Inventory CSS-2 CSS-3 CSS-4 DF-31 DF-31A CSS-5 CSS-6 CSS-7 DH-10 JL-2

China’s Missile Force Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Launchers 15-20 5-10 15-20 10-15 20 20