Jihadi Operational Art: The Coming Wave of Jihadi Strategic Studies

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Jihadi Operational Art: The Coming Wave of Jihadi Strategic Studies Dima Adamsky

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National Security Studies Program, The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs , Harvard University , Cambridge, MA, USA b

Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies , The IDF , Israel Published online: 07 Jan 2010.

To cite this article: Dima Adamsky (2009) Jihadi Operational Art: The Coming Wave of Jihadi Strategic Studies, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1080/10576100903400548 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100903400548

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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:1–19, 2010 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online DOI: 10.1080/10576100903400548

Jihadi Operational Art: The Coming Wave of Jihadi Strategic Studies

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DIMA ADAMSKY National Security Studies Program The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Harvard University Cambridge, MA, USA; Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies The IDF, Israel

Western scholars of jihadi strategic studies traditionally concentrate either on ideological-strategic or on tactical questions. This intellectual disposition overlooks operational art—an important layer of knowledge between strategy and tactics. Despite the absence of the term from classical jihadi literature, the discourse in the Salafi jihadi strategic studies community is replete with discussions related to it. Neither “small strategy” nor “grand tactics,” operational art is a separate domain of knowledge. It serves as a framework for formulating principles of war, concrete fighting doctrines and integrates ends, methods, and means across all spheres of war-fighting. This article contributes to the Western scholarly understanding of Salafi strategic behavior by outlining a research program that will follow this overlooked development in jihadi military thought.

Two scholarly communities work today on a genre of literature defined as “jihadi strategic studies.”1 The first community consists of jihadists who are focusing on a practice-oriented doctrinal literature on military affairs. The second community comprises non-jihadi academics (from here on “Western” scholars) who decipher the nature of the Islamic way of war by inquiring into the intellectual activity of the jihadists. Both communities are evolving simultaneously. The Western scholars try to assure that their research agenda covers the intellectual dynamic of the jihadists and reflects their debates, although there are methodological and research disagreements peculiar to the Western scholars. It is probable that the latter community might be unaware of some issues debated by the jihadists.

Received 30 January 2009; accepted 7 May 2009. This article is based on the research project conducted under the auspices of the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies. I am grateful to the head of the Dado Center, BG Itai Brun, for his intellectual inspiration and stimulating remarks. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Assaf Moghadam of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point for his invaluable advice, guidance, and thoughtful suggestions. Address correspondence to Dima Adamsky, National Security Studies Program, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street, E201, Mailbox 32, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

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Most of the literature produced by these two communities relates to the following three topics: the traditional Islamic vision of war, jihadist strategy, and tactical issues arising from operational experience. The Western security studies lexicon would categorize this literature as dealing with ideology, (grand) strategy, and tactics. Given such classifications, one thing seems puzzling: Why is there no literature on what Western security studies terminology defines as operational art? This term stands for a mechanism or process that integrates ends, methods, and means across all spheres and levels of waging war. Either the jihadists do not discuss the subject and consequently this absence is reflected by the Western scholars or, although the jihadists do discuss the topic, Western scholars overlook their debate. Available sources support the latter hypothesis; while jihadi scholars recently started systematic self-education in military affairs, most Western scholars traditionally focus either on strategy or tactics,2 and therefore tag available jihadi sources in a binary manner overlooking operational art respectively. This article argues that as a result of operational conditions under which Salafi jihad operates today, and because of the maturation of jihadi military thought, a notion of operational art might have penetrated military theory and the practice of Salafi jihad, or will do so in the near future. This article hypothesizes about the next wave of jihadist literature and generates a set of research questions related to the hypothesis. It does not predict the future operational behavior of the jihadists, but suggests a way to analyze it. It contributes by rereading the existing material more thoroughly and deciphering it in an alternative manner. The article aims to identify caveats in our knowledge about jihadi military thought and suggests future avenues for research. Analytical traps confront the culturally insensitive observer who tries to uncover foreign ways of war. Explanations of jihadi strategic behavior through application of Western security studies terminology might be an analytically irrelevant attempt bordering on mirror imaging. However, this is an important debate to engage, while being aware of this precaution. If the basic assumption of this article is correct, then in the following years a new wave of knowledge will originate in the jihadi strategic studies community. If indeed jihadi military thought is evolving and operational art is emerging, then ignoring them will have serious analytical and practical consequences. Critique or support offered to this article might clarify whether there is a real or an imagined elephant in the room.

Core Debates of Jihadi Strategic Studies Schisms among jihadi “embattled scholars” are not a new phenomenon. Historically, Muslim jurisprudence has been engaged in polemics over several questions of waging jihad that informed mujahidin.3 These classical doctrinal polemics underwent some metamorphosis, but can be still found in the current jihadi discourse.4 The three current rifts—the tension of pragmatists versus dogmatists; the question of a centralized versus decentralized jihad; and the tension between foot-soldiers and the strategic leadership—establish intellectual prerequisites for the emergence of an operational art in the global jihadi strategic community. Since its establishment Al-Qaeda has been experiencing disunity over immediate goals and long-term strategy. The “planners” faction aimed at building an effective irregular military organization that would employ guerrilla and asymmetric tactics to achieve its goals. The “propagandists” faction wanted to establish Al Qaeda as a global brand to urge radical Salafi groups worldwide to join the caravan of violent resistance.5 When Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) political and ideological leaders delegate certain authorities

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and responsibilities to low-level operatives, differences in personal preferences between the leadership and operatives produce serious tensions related to targeting, means, ways, and areas of operations. These internal schisms produce serious obstacles to maximizing the operational efficiency of the global Salafi jihad movement.6 Western literature reflects on the clash between dogmatists and pragmatists in relation to the global jihad. One group of Western scholars identifies non-instrumental components of AQAM, whose operational behavior is expressionist and not filtered through organized planning. It envisions the global jihadi community as a group engaged in quintessential violence for its own sake, non-instrumental, irrational, a “process and not progress” oriented, obsessed with the martyrdom culture and driven by religious fanaticism and dogmatism. Consequently, AQAM’s conduct is seen as dysfunctional, operationally controversial, and strategically inconstant.7 An alternative approach describes AQAM’s choices as instrumental, efficiency oriented, and guided by a rational and long-term strategy that organizes behavior to reach a common goal. A growing number of protagonists of this analysis argue that Salafi jihadists fit means of violence to the ends of ideology in an efficient and rational way,8 and that a separate genre of strategic literature informs jihadi operational thinking and behavior.9 Such perceptions of jihad reflect an actual rift in the “jihadi strategic studies” community between religious ideologists pursuing theological purity and military strategists pursuing military utility.10 An additional tension exists between different levels in the chain of jihadi command. Dogmatic, “process oriented” foot soldiers irritate instrumental and pragmatic “end oriented strategists,” especially when their actions (inspired by the martyrdom culture) reduce the attractiveness of AQAM to potential members of the resistance. Since there is no archetype of lower rank mujahidin, foot soldiers do not connect between their actions and the strategic goals of the resistance for several reasons: mujahidin can be dogmatists, for whom an individual act of violence is a form of worship; or, they might behave this way because lacking a commander’s guidance they act on the first operational opportunity. The foot soldiers can subscribe to the same beliefs as strategists, but being isolated from the leadership they lack a systemic mechanism to deduce concrete operational targets from generic ideological goals. Not all soldiers of the jihadi movement are dogmatic, just like not all strategists are pragmatic. A tension between non-instrumental-expressionist fighters and proponents of rational operational behavior cannot be paralleled with the split between strategists and foot soldiers.11 One of the most debated topics related to internal discord in AQAM is the issue of the leaderless jihad.12 Some Western scholars argue that the global Salafi movement emerges as a bottom-up social movement network13 and preserves both its effectiveness and instrumentalism while being leaderless.14 An alternative explanation holds that AQAM is centralized enough in order to employ both top-down and bottom-up operational conduct depending on the leadership’s strategic choice.15 Western debate on this topic mirrors the jihadi discussion about two conflicting recommendations of how to hinder “utility of force.” One possibility is to elevate operational effectiveness by strengthening the discipline and tightening command and control. An alternative recommendation calls for a decentralized structure, in which large numbers of jihadists operate simultaneously and command and control is maximally loosened to diminish the operational signature against potential attack.16 This call for decentralization resonates with the self-perception as a movement with centralized decisions and diffused execution.17 Indications suggest that this process of decentralization is taking place already. Western scholars, and most notably Brynjar Lia, provide convincing arguments that the global Salafi jihad community over the past years has been evolving toward “smaller, more autonomous

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and decentralized organizational structures.”18 Al-Suri is probably the most representative jihadi military intellectual who promoted this decentralized war-fighting philosophy. Lia, the importance of whose scholarship is hard to overestimate, has done the most thorough analyses of the intellectual history of al-Suri’s ideas.19 Al-Suri suggests that the mode of jihad based on “centralized, hierarchical, regional secret organization has outlived its role” because it became easily targeted by the enemies of the resistance. Increasing decentralization diminishes operational vulnerability of the command and control structures,20 and preserves strategic asymmetry: the jihadi community can identify the enemy’s centers of gravity, while the enemy is less effective in this realm.21

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Why is a Concept of Operational Art Relevant to Mujahideen? If collective use of force should be orchestrated in order to attain the goals of the resistance,22 then decentralized jihad might be a double-edged sword. As an amorphous movement, jihad is a difficult target for its enemies. However, without effective command and control, it lacks guidance, situational awareness, and the ability to coordinate priorities and actions toward a synergetic effect. If jihadists acquire attributes of organization to increase efficiency, they will become an easy prey. AQAM operates like an “imagined jihadi community” that shares a distinct strategic culture, global narrative, and common warfare necessities.23 Intentional absence of a unitary command structure, however, makes it impossible to develop coherent strategic and operational plans.24 Willfully or inadvertently, the jihadi community will seek a self-regulating mechanism to resolve this tension between “survival” and “utility.” To control motivated members of the decentralized caravan in the absence of a rigid command structure requires a common body of doctrinal knowledge, or what is known in the West as “operational art.” An introduction of operational art could potentially provide equilibrium between these conflicting demands and secure utility of force. One might expect the global jihadi community today to seek common generic postulates for operations to effectively steer the decentralized caravan. Tactical excellence does not automatically transform into strategic success.25 To be strategically instrumental, the use of force on the tactical level needs to be channeled through some kind of intermediate “mechanism.” The repertoire of forms for this mechanism spans a diverse continuum: it can be an established planning authority in a strictly hierarchical organization or, at another extreme, it can simply emerge, like an invisible hand in economics.26 Operational art is a generic term of reference for this mechanism. It is an intermediate layer of knowledge that links wider strategy and discrete tactics and guarantees utility of force. It is an application of creative imagination by commanders to design campaigns, organize and employ military forces. Operational art stems from strategic requirements; it determines theory (methods and concepts), preparation (training), and practice (planning and command) of operations. In an ideal form it should determine character, means, and directions of all tactical activity and establish tasks for specific battles to achieve strategic goals.27 Although it is usually associated with a particular level of war in inter-state warfare,28 generating and employing principles of operational art are not limited to big conventional militaries. A movement might be even more compelled than an organization to have a joint frame of conceptual reference. Given the hybrid nature of today’s warfare,29 it will be more precise to think about operational art as a process through which amorphous ideological goals and strategic inspirations transform into concrete tactical plans. Operational art manages all the combat activity in a given theater of military operations directed toward the achievement of a common goal.30 It produces “the same outcome in different ways

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in different environments” and “ensures that tactical actions are consistent with the logic inherent in the strategic aim.”31 It is applicable in any kind of modern warfare, to any fighting entity, big or small, hierarchical or decentralized. Operational art is neither a “small strategy” nor “grand tactics,” but a separate sphere of knowledge that has three generic expressions: it is a framework for formulating principles of war and producing concrete fighting doctrines; it is a conceptual mechanism that enables the interpretation of strategic goals and translation of them into tactical actions; and it is a sphere for conducting discourse—an exchange of ideas between commanders and subordinates, which generates shared understanding of the strategic situation, the operational problem associated with it, and its tactical resolution.32 Commanders utilize operational art when they vaguely understand requirements, pursue conflicting goals, or face ill-defined problems.33 It is an art in a sense that it is not a science. It demands creative thinking beyond the realm of tactical, physical combat. It takes an abstract ideological objective or generic strategic directive and gives “it enough structure so that further planning can lead” to useful tactical action. Planning demands for operational art and tactics are different; the former contains more of the cognitive elements of architecture design, whereas tactical engagement planning relies more on the cognitive functions of engineering science.34 Operational art is a relatively new concept compared to strategy and tactics. Examples of generalship on an operational level have been manifested in different periods of military history, but operational art as a distinct approach began to receive professional attention only in the twentieth century.35 The adoption and understanding of the term “operational art” have varied across militaries internationally. However, fighting entities have identified it as a response to similar shifts in the nature of war: when it became impossible to attain strategic goals through one decisive battle, but only through the overall impact of encounters diffused in space and time; the battle area expended in depth, breadth, time, and dimensions, but was still linked by a unifying intent; significant command authority was delegated to numerous subordinate tactical leaders and this demanded new levels of command organization and planning; new tools of war impacted the ways of fighting. In most historical cases the emergence of operational art was associated with a serious military setback that motivated intensive adaptive learning. The theoretical activity usually focused on a study of the nature of the war in the current phase, from which militaries distilled the requirements of modern campaigning. The emergence of operational art was also accompanied by a process of disciplined learning and emulations of successful concepts from abroad. The ability to approach the questions of warfare in a strategic, scientific, and systematic manner was an intellectual prerequisite for the introduction of operational art.36 As an independent body of knowledge that “resolves the tension between formulation of strategy and planning for its implementation,”37 operational art is precisely what decentralized jihad might be looking for right now. Applying the terminology of Isserson to the “decentralized moment” of global jihad, operational art would be a procedure to aggregate simultaneous or subsequent effects, generated by diverse sources of power across the spread of dimensions.38 Shared notions of operational behavior and principles of war can significantly elevate the utility of the jihadi force application. It will substitute command and control, which rests on structured bureaucracy with a coherent doctrinal program.39 The jihadi strategic community today operates under circumstances comparable to the shifts in the nature of war outlined earlier and therefore might develop a similar intellectual dynamic. Serious setbacks already motivated jihadists to embark on conceptual learning and to digest lessons learned from and about apostates.40 While similarity in physical conditions is obvious, the following sections will illustrate that intellectually the jihadi community is also moving toward introducing operational art into its discourse. The following analysis

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is based on several primary sources, primarily the works of Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam Nasar, best known as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, and Abu Bakr Naji. Each has produced an opus magnum considered to have significant impact on the intellectual state of mind of the current and subsequent generations of jihadists and is a milestone in the development of jihadi military thought.41

Supporting Evidence

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Evolution in Jihadi Strategic Thought Historically, operational art originated as a product of evolution in strategic military thought. Although the jihadi community lacks a “formalized command structure to devise strategy,” its strategic discourse and military ideology have been evolving over the years.42 Although military strategy as a management concept in the Western sense “has not always played a significant role in jihadists’ thinking,” ample empirical evidence indicates that AQAM’s leadership considers it an important prerequisite for its enterprises.43 AQAM is receptive to changes in the operational environment and its thinking about how to channel the repertoire of the resistance efforts and optimize the application of military tools is constantly evolving.44 Interpretations of Quranic texts distinguish between “jihad” as a grand strategy for power application and “jihad” as a military strategy, which is an application of force in a particular theater or campaign. The conceptual relationship between these two is very similar to Western strategic thought: to be effective, the logic of military force application should be deduced from a grand strategy. The Quran and Sunna regulate the relationship between higher-order causes of Allah and concrete war goals, in a very similar manner to the dictums of Clausewitz.45 In addition to the direct references to Clausewitz,46 a more Clausewitzian-like approach to violence has been evident among jihadi military intellectuals in recent years. Jihadi theoreticians who took a critical look at the misfortunes of the previous campaigns attributed them to the triple deficit of a long-term strategic vision, clear military strategy, and systematic analysis of the operational environment to support the planning process.47 Victories in many engagements were not aggregated and translated into victory in the war.48 Lia brilliantly demonstrates al-Suri’s command to attain ideological goals only through subordination of “mercilessness violence” to a “long-term strategy.”49 Al-Suri points out that military successes not translated into political objectives are useless.50 Recent combat experiences demonstrated to the jihadi leadership that the success of grand strategy depends on the “utility of force”—the ability to orchestrate military actions for the sake of strategic objectives.51 This realization prompted further calls from jihadi scholars to subordinate all operational activities to the common goal,52 to establish systematic long-term strategic planning and to develop military strategy that will accumulate and exploit the results of the previous stages of the campaign.53 The production of AQAM’s operational intelligence demonstrates this search for a maximum “utility of force.”54 The logic of the targeting priorities demonstrate very systemic, systematic, and multidimensional approaches to warfare. An enemy is envisioned as a “system of systems” with several interrelated centers of gravity that should be targeted according to a specific rationale. AQAM’s strategic behavior seems more instrumental; grand strategy guides violent means to attain tangible political objectives. The current generation of the mujahidin analyzes changes in warfare techniques more maturely, compared to previous Muslim fighters. Jihadi strategic thought is becoming more organized and comprehensive

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and is evolving into a stand-alone analytic framework that can be used as practical tool for effective operational planning.55 Historically, the instrumental vision of military strategy as a management tool is usually followed by a demand for military science—a distinct discipline that condenses the array of factors to a set of principles that regulate and inform the approach to operations.56 Modern Muslim military theoreticians have already tried to apply the scientific approach to conventional warfare by merging non-Islamic military principles and several Quranic maxims of the conduct of war.57 Today, a growing number of jihadi sources represent a shift toward a methodical-scientific approach to military affairs.58

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A Need to Produce a Military Science and Theory The introduction of military science is a prerequisite for operational art, and can be indicative of its emergence. When a community of fighters constantly deals with growing conceptual difficulties related to warfare management, it might be naturally encouraged to approach warfare in an orderly manner. The intellectual history of military thought elsewhere demonstrates that “learning” fighting communities have responded to this awareness by formulating military theory and science. It is not surprising that members of the jihadi community seek a theoretical method to inform their military practice. Jihadi military theoreticians recently diagnosed a critical number of conceptual problems, which pushed them to formulate a systematic approach to generating military knowledge. Lia and Hegghammer coined the term “jihadi strategic studies” to identify this genre, describing it as “secular in style, analytical in its approach and pragmatic in its conclusions.”59 Although a minority, these scholars are “emblematic of the rise of a new generation of jihadi strategic study writers.”60 Since these “embattled scholars” emphasize the importance of studying the phenomenon of war in tandem with practicing jihad one can define them as “jihadi defense intellectuals.”61 The classical jihadi library lacks works to guide operational thinking professionally. The writings by Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abul Ala Maududi, Abdullah Azzam, S. K. Malik, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, and others primarily remain on the philosophical, ideological, and grand-strategic level or focus on techno-tactical issues. They do not provide jihadi cadres with a methodology for producing military theories, or scientific tools for organizing concrete operational behavior.62 The Quranic philosophy regulates the relationship between war and policy, outlines the causes and objectives of war, and systemizes prescriptions and proscriptions for Muslims in combat.63 However, these fundamental norms of Muslim warfare are less relevant for producing a “concept of victory” at any given operational stage. For this goal the jihadi strategic community needs military science and a theory of war. The Quranic philosophy of war will, of course, inform and condition this science, but is not sufficient in itself. Quran, Hadith, and Islamic military jurisprudence are comparable to such regulations as the Geneva or Hague conventions.64 The war philosophy outlined in these sources and further developed by such Islamic scholars as Ibn Khaldun is more comparable to the works of Thomas Hobbes65 than to the principles of war discussed by Clausewitz or Jomeni, let alone works by Liddell-Hart, Tukhachevski, or Due. Although Islamic war doctrine is textually grounded at the level of philosophy of war and grand strategy,66 Muslim military thought and legal Islamic codes fall short of outlining how Muslim army commanders should conduct their battles in terms of strategy, operations, tactics, and military organization.67 Although Islamic classical texts normatively condition operational behavior,68 Islamic military jurisprudence cannot be compared to specific operational doctrines such as German Blitzkrieg, Soviet

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Deep Battle, or American Air-Land Battle, let alone to specific operational manuals a la the USFM-105. Theological in its self-perception, the Islamic war philosophy is not dogmatic in its approach. Quranic texts demonstrate that it is divine and thus static in essence, but evolutionary and flexible in form and application. There is an allowance for conceptual maneuvering as far as use of force is concerned.69 Theological, fatalistic, and divinely guided,70 Islamist war philosophy still leaves ample space for operational creativity and rational planning. It does not oppose the development of a “theory of victory” for the sake of force utility. For that reason jihadi strategic scholars urge mujahidin to master military science.71 A necessity to teach its members how to theorize about applications of jihad became apparent to strategists of AQAM, when they realized that ulema cannot contribute to military education beyond being the “guardians of the sharia.”72 They believe that academic methods and military science that produce practical principles of war will improve operational execution and facilitate utility of force.73 The jihadi doctrinal jargon already utilizes the term “military science.” It is listed as one of the necessary fields of knowledge for mujahidin to possess in order to carry out resistance operations effectively.74 The Al Qaeda training manuals routinely utilize this term and emphasize the need to base planning and execution of operations on a “professional, almost scientific approach.”75 The “jobs opening lists” of AQAM indicate the same “scientific” tendency in military affairs.76

Al-Suri’s Double Contribution Al-Suri’s unprecedented contribution to the jihadi community goes beyond providing an operational program for global resistance. He introduced a methodology and established a precedent of systematic theory-making in jihadi military affairs. Al-Suri demonstrated how to apply logical reasoning, conduct historical analysis, utilize secular knowledge, and emulate professional military ideas of non-Muslims in order to produce a coherent “operational theory of victory.” In his writings he constantly advances along two lines: he demonstrates the methodology of military analysis and formulates a current operational theory of victory. In Western terms, he introduced the notion of operational art into jihadi military theory and demonstrated its practical application. In the philosophy of science, the scientific method refers to the techniques for investigating phenomena in order to acquire new knowledge. It requires collecting data, and formulating and testing hypotheses. Al-Suri’s reasoning uses a very similar logic. According to him, the mechanism of military operations or what al-Suri defines in other places as the operational method needs to be based on military theory.77 He suggests distilling it through inductive-empirical reasoning and deductive-abstract conceptualization.78 Both kinds of reasoning elaborate on lessons learned from operational experience, comparative studies of warfare and conceptual exchanges with other mujahidin. According to Al-Suri, this military-theoretical interpretation aimed to produce a new “theory of victory” should be conditioned by, and necessarily deduced from, Sharia proscriptions or prescriptions.79 Al-Suri formulates the concept of operations for the resistance movement precisely, according to the methodology described earlier. He analyzes modes of action of the three schools of war-fighting80 to deduce current transformations in the nature of war. This serves as a basis for distilling a new “theory of victory,” which outlines how to operate and organize the fighting force. He supports his theory with ample argumentation to assure that principles of war and methods of engagement are in accord with operational realities.81

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Al-Suri concludes that decentralization is a method of survival for the jihadi movement, in light of operational threats. A method of persistence for this decentralized movement is an adaptation of a common organizing concept, referred to in other places as a concept/method of operation.82 He outlines his “theory of victory” in a clear and laconic way: a concept of operations and force build-up should rest on the basic postulate—a method of operation and not an organization for action.83 The organizational theory that underlies this concept of operations calls for independent formation and activation of resistance units without any command and control links to the center.84 A decentralization method facilitates coexistence of strategic homogeneity and operational diversity.85 This unifying concept of operations links different theaters under one rationale and transforms decentralized tactical efforts into a coherent strategic phenomenon, wherever and however the mujahidin act. To merge individual resistance into a strategic phenomenon al-Suri suggests basic principles to inform fighters’ (individuals, cells, or units) preparation, guide them to the areas of operation, direct them to prioritized targets, and provide them with a concept of how to engage these targets. The leaderless jihad guided by common operational art will have a greater synergetic impact and strategic effectiveness than ever before. Moving away from organizational structures and toward organizing concepts will enable the members of the jihadist caravan to generate the similar operational effects and to direct them at the same goals, but through deferent means and in diverse settings. Autonomous tactical parts will generate the strategic whole without a hierarchical command and control structure.86 A common goal, combat doctrine, and educational program bond the resistance.87 This “glue” of a decentralized movement, as Lia defines it,88 would be termed “operational art” and “operational cognition” in Western military terminology. Divine in Essence, but Analytical and Systematic in Form Military science and generic principles of war, its intellectual product, demand a strategic approach and systematic mode of thinking. The approach is strategic because it must consider the moves of other players to formulate principles of war; it is systematic since it entails an orderly, disciplined, and methodical manner of thought. Although divine factors inform the Quranic war fighting doctrine,89 the Clausewitzianism in the Islamic way of war is manifested in a strategic-analytical approach toward the opponent and in the regulatory relationship between ideological ends and military means. The history of Soviet military science resonates with the current stage of jihadi military thought. Both jihadi and Soviet military theoreticians merge(ed) pragmatic orientation with a strong theological foundation and share(ed) a belief that scientific theory should regulate strategic behavior. According to the Quranic view, war is the cause of God controlled and conditioned by his word “from its conception till culmination.”90 This mode of thought is very similar to that of the first generation of Soviet military theoreticians. The latter were determined to produce unique military science that was believed to have uncovered a master key to military reality. They believed that a theory of victory could be deduced from the scientific laws of dialectical materialism and postulates of Marxism–Leninism.91 Jihadi strategic scholars manifest a similar approach when constructing an Islamic theory of war.92 Since the postulates of war philosophy come from the Quran and Sunna, they are considered truth revealed by God. By definition military science and theories of victory deduced from this philosophy are infallible.93 In his path-breaking work Assaf Moghadam demonstrates that the Salafi jihad is best described as a religious ideology that informs strategic behavior.94 Raymond Ibrahim continues this line of thought in the realm of military

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science to point out that the conceptual foundations of Islamic war doctrines are theological and thus believed to be immutable.95 Armed with the laws of dialectical materialism or with the laws of the Quran, Soviet and jihadi military scholars share a sense of scientific omnipotence in military affairs. Although the Quranic philosophy of war demands a total application,96 the jihadists’ approach to campaigning is intellectually dynamic and not theologically pre-determined. In the “game theory” manner, they manifest a high aptitude for mature strategic analysis and envision warfare as a competitive interaction, where success in making choices depends on the choices made by opponents.97 Western social sciences would qualify this thinking style as “strategic.” As far as a systematic approach is concerned, one of the principles of war as outlined in the Quran is patience and perseverance. It implies “being thorough,” and not rushing, both in thought and deed. This norm of war “entails a systemic as opposed to sporadic mode of thinking and action.”98 Examples of a systematic approach in recent jihadi strategic analysis are ample. AQAM trains its members along the lines of a coherently formulated doctrine, which would be qualified as methodical and systematic in Western professional communities.99 Although works of al-Suri and Naji have different focuses, they are examples of systematical thinking since they deal with mechanisms that translate combat effects of the lower order into higher-level military goals. The Concept of “Art” The jihadi approach to operational art resonates with the intellectual history of military organizations that adapted an “operational mind-set.” Although jihadists somehow connect strategy and tactics, it is not clear to what extent they envision this process as a standalone theoretical paradigm. Since patterns of thought exist regardless of one’s awareness of them, operational art can exist as a mental phenomenon in the mindset of any pragmatic and creative fighter. It is not that fighters “do not speak the word but rather that they do not link or practice war in operational terms, or do so only in vague or ephemeral ways.”100 Similar to military organizations elsewhere, intellectual and conceptual processes regarding operational art might evolve intuitively as opposed to consciously in the jihadi community.101 As a learning community, jihadists have started to think about military affairs in a systematic and scientific manner and approach operational planning methodically; a current lack of awareness and theoretical deficit might be a question of time. Similar to their non-Muslim counterparts, jihadi scholars envision the management of war, particularly in the operational sphere, as art. Malik refers to the military campaigns undertaken by Muhammad as demonstrations of the “Quranic art of war.”102 For Naji, generating principles of warfare in terms of military science and operating according to them is a manifestation of the same art.103 Al-Suri refers to the theory of (guerilla and jihadi guerilla) warfare as art. According to him, understanding theories of war is the most important art among the military sciences. Since the jihadi military bookshelf lacks these kind of studies, he urges to develop this extremely important project104 —an explicit call to codify principles of war and theories of jihadi operational art. Operational art demands a gift, as do other arts. Jihadi understanding of operational skills involves an element of talent105 in addition to formal education and their understanding of commanders’ genius is reminiscent of Clausewitz. Although most terrorist skills can be acquired through training and preparation, al-Suri emphasizes a talent or a gift for this sort of craftsmanship.106 This manifests understanding of operational art in terms similar to the West. Non-jihadi strategic studies present operational art as design, in contrast to tactical planning that is presented as engineering. Lia, in his fundamental biography of al-Suri, calls

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him an “architect”—a term used in Western military literature to connote a commander who executes operational art (as opposed to a tactical commander, who is more like an engineer).

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Principles of Warfare Military science inquires into the nature of war and produces generic principles of warfare. Operational art utilizes this product creatively in order to design combat operations. In a leaderless movement pragmatic foot-soldiers might pursue a serious thinking process to compensate for the lack of organizational functions associated with the operational level. This process might lead toward formulating shared principles of warfare. As long as these debates about abstract principles of military art do not contradict the Sharia, they are legitimate and assist pragmatic, decentralized tacticians to regulate strategic ends and tactical means.107 Judging by recent empirical evidence, the jihadi community has started employing conceptual mechanisms to distill the pros and cons of particular tactical acts along the aforementioned lines. Targeting priorities and choosing means for attacks were debated by using principles of warfare as a frame of reference. Jihadists are seeking a yardstick to estimate the operational efficacy and religious appropriateness of their activities and plan them according to the logic and concepts of the higher order.108 It seems that jihadists are establishing a scheme to distill this kind of knowledge. The term “military principles” is already part of the jihadi lexicon.109 Jihadi scholars urge mujahidin to conduct their operational planning and execution according to the principles of warfare and military theories, whether imported from non-Muslim military art, the Muslim military library, or self-produced.110 Jihadi scholars acknowledge that military theory and principles of war are appropriate only for the particular strategic moment. Changes in operational circumstances and the strategic environment demand a reformulation of the theory of victory and military doctrine.111 Al-Suri calls to innovate operational methods,112 a phenomenon that has been already observed in the jihadi community, although primarily on tactical or strategic levels.113 Emulating Non-Muslims and Learning Military Theory The jihadi community systematically studies Western military literature not only to get intelligence for operations.114 This learning also provides a source of professional knowledge for jihadi military theoreticians. The jihadi scientific approach to military art is informed by theoretical learning and importing knowledge from apostates and believers alike.115 Jihadi scholars elaborate on the leading theoretical works on the military art in order to evaluate the basic postulates of warfare and make strategic behavior more effective.116 Jihadists borrow insights from non-Muslim military thought, which offers practical solutions to questions related to strategic planning, operational art, and “management of tactical violence.”117 They demonstrate a mature understanding and wise analytical application of professional terminology.118 Jihadi scholars hold that non-Muslim sciences and military art in particular, can serve as legitimate sources of practical knowledge, as long as they do not contradict Sharia.119 Particularly, it is allowed to “absorb a great deal of modern military science at the operational level without sacrificing its own distinctive features and fundamental principles.”120 As in other historical cases in which Muslim militaries have imported doctrinal knowledge

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from infidels,121 AQAM does not mechanically absorb concepts from non- Muslim military theoreticians,122 but adapts their ideas to its strategic culture.123 The intellectual conduct of jihadists resonates with Soviet military science in the 1920s, when, despite ideological dogmatism, the Soviets adopted professional ideas from “bourgeoisie” military theory.124 Non-Muslim military education recognizes that training and doctrine on the operational level should be taught as separate bodies of knowledge. Jihadi doctrinal writings related to training activities also manifest the emergence of operational cognition. Despite a lack of a common approach, similar dictums start to frame the training and preparation curriculum of “operative jihadi cells.”125

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Discourse and Design A mode of warfare suggested by the proponents of decentralized jihad126 favors a “mission oriented command” or “maneuver warfare,” as it is known in the Western military lexicon.127 Although these two modes stem from different strategic imperatives, their modus operandi are very similar. Both delegate authority to the tactical level and emphasize operational effects and psychological aspects of warfare over attrition. Those operating on the tactical levels are “granted both the right to exercise their own initiative, adapt to the situation, and seize the opportune moment.” Mission-type orders reveal how the purpose of each operation fits into the plans of higher commanders.128 Jihadi scholars emphasize the importance of a mechanism for interpretation of a commander’s intent for those engaged in planning of operations.129 The Western literature on civil–military relations uses the term discourse for an intellectual interaction between political-strategic and military-operational echelons. An exchange of ideas between the two produces a design for the future campaign—one of the products of operational art, which is translated into a tactical plan.130 This model could be applied to almost any strategic entity that uses lower order military means to attain higher order conceptual ends. The Salafi strategic community lacks a bureaucratic element to provide a medium for discourse and channel strategic directives through the chain of command. Jihadi Webdiscussion groups substitute forums of General Staff/Joint Chiefs of Staff for conducting strategic discourse. They debate statements of the leadership, fatwas on operational and strategic issues, and questions of military theory.131 Insights from these discussions inform cadres on the ground and enable commanders to “realize the current hopes of the ummah” and craft operations accordingly.132 Conceptual cohesion in this kind of communication is low and the spectrum of conclusions is wide and thus counterproductive.133 Jihadists are already engaged in relatively orderly discussions about prioritizing threats and identifying targets.134 Jihadi intellectuals emphasize the need to consult learned cadres before making decisions, but acknowledge that sometimes the ulama and high command are not available to provide guidance. Given a lack of strategic communication they suggest an auto-deductive methodology for prioritizing a targeting agenda to produce concrete guidelines for operational planning.135 Islamic war philosophy is contradictory136 and the flexibility of interpretation within several legal schools leaves enormous space for intellectual maneuver.137 It is unclear which dictums will be chosen to inform choices.138 Usul al fiqh, a study of Islamic jurisprudence with a codified procedure of legal interpretation (ijtihad), might be relevant in terms of its unparalleled methodology for generating knowledge. In theory, this methodology could be applied to operational planning. Both activities are based on deductive reasoning and distill the particular from the general. Ijtihad is applicable to the problem framing stage, when jihadists formulate operational problems, desired achievements, and the general mission.

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Even if not divided into such precise stages, this process probably occurs in the mind of each pragmatic fighter, influenced by cultural and ideational inclinations. Although mujahidin possess a range of views on military affairs, it might be possible to outline some conceptual similarities and continuities across several jihadi entities.

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Conclusion Both Western and Salafi jihadi strategic studies communities concentrated until recently either on philosophical-strategic or tactical questions of the Islamic way of war. Recently, the Salafi jihadi community has started to incorporate new spheres of professional knowledge and has adapted a more disciplined and systematic approach to military thought. Jihadi military theorists started to suggest a comprehensive theoretical scheme with regard to how to connect between the ideological ends and means of war. The intellectual products generated by this activity can be defined in Western military lexicon as operational art par excellence. Dictums of the jihadi defense intellectuals are analogous to lessons on defense analysis and doctrinal writing in staff and command academies elsewhere beyond the Muslim world. Although the Western term operational art does not exist in classical jihadi literature, discussions related to it are currently underway in the jihadi community. They are an outgrowth of the tendency to think about warfare in a “scientific” way. A community of embattled jihadi defense intellectuals functions as an informal think tank and substitute professional hierarchical military staffs. They disseminate information to the global movement to assure that it is “fighting intelligently towards a shared goal.”139 Among other products, they introduce principles of operational art that inform planning and execution of operations. Introduction of operational art as a separate body of professional knowledge might provide the decentralized jihadists with more than pure survival panacea. If this tendency preserves the momentum, then a common operational consciousness informed by shared military theory might coordinate the decentralized jihadi movement in a way consistent with the leadership’s strategic vision. It is unclear how influential these ideas are, given the questionable doctrinal discipline of the diffused movement. It appears that jihadi military theoreticians emulate their apostate colleagues to resolve terminological and conceptual gaps in Islamic military science. The “Darwinian learning process” currently underway in the jihadi strategic community140 might eventually import the concept of “operational art” from the West and introduce it into the military theory and practice of the Salafi jihad. Such an intellectual focus might enable producing disruptive military innovations, which originate in this sphere of thinking about warfare. Operational art could become a sphere for the jihadists to maximally utilize their combat potential, operational unpredictability, and military genius. The ability to anticipate conceptual innovation in jihadi military thought is of unquestionable importance. The Western academic community should establish a research program to closely follow the emergence of jihadist operational art.

Notes 1. The term introduced by Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004), pp. 355–375. 2. Edward Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War,” International Security 5(3) (Winter 1980), pp. 61–79.

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3. Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), especially pp. 10–14. 4. Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, eds., Fault Lines of Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures within and around Al-Qaida (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2009); Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaida and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage, 2007); Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Tail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002); The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), especially chap. 3. 5. Vahid Brown, ed., Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qaida 1989–2006 (West Point, NY: CTC Press, 2007); Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 6. Moghadam and Fishman, eds., Fault Lines of Global Jihad; Joe Felter, ed., Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qaida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities (West Point, NY: CTC Press, 2006). 7. Jeffery B. Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda’s Warfare: Function, Culture, and Grand Strategy,” in Magnus Ranstrop, ed. Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps, and Future Direction (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 127–164. Reuven Paz, “Middle East Islamism in the European Arena,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 6(3) (September, 2002); Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey, John R. Schindler, and Jim Lacey, The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp. 42–44; Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering Al-Qaeda: Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestion of Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002); Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006); Lee Harris, Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History (New York: Free Press, 2004). 8. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Michael Scheuer, Through Our Enemy’s Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam and the Future of America (New York: Potomac Books, 2007); Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (New York: Potomac Books, 2007); Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Martha Crenshaw, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay,” Security Studies 16(1) (January 2007), pp. 133–162. 9. Lia and Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies”; Jarret M. Brachman and William McCants, Stealing Al-Qaida’s Playbook (West Point, NY: CTC Press, 2006); Steven Brooke, “Jihadist Strategic Debates before 9/11,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (2008), pp. 201–226. 10. Brynjar Lia, “Abu Musab al Suri’s Critique of Hard Liner Salafists in the Jihadist Current,” CTC Sentinel 1(1) (2007), pp. 1–4; Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda’s Warfare.” 11. The Terrorist Perspective Project, pp. 45–52. 12. Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, “Does Osama Still Call the Shots? Debating Containment of al Qaeda’s Leadership,” Foreign Affairs 87(4) (July/August 2008), pp. 163–166; and also see Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,” Foreign Affairs 87(3) (May/June 2008), pp. 133–138. 13. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 14. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 15. Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs 86(3) (May/June 2007), pp. 24–40. 16. TPP, pp. 118–119. 17. Ibid., pp. 31–37. 18. Lia, “Doctrine,” p. 532. 19. Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 3. 20. Ibid., pp. 27–28.

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21. The motto nizam, la tanzim (order, method, arrangement, system, regulation, as opposed to organization) presents this idea in a condensed way. See Lia, “Doctrine,” pp. 532–533; Umar Abd al Hakim Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1355–1428; TPP, pp. 129–131. 22. Jeni Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting: The Bosnia Precedent,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (2008), pp. 813–814. 23. Jeffrey B. Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda’s Warfare: Function, Culture and Grand Strategy,” in Magnus Ranstorp, ed., Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 127–164. 24. Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting,” p. 817. 25. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness: The First World War (Allen & Unwin, 1989); Military Effectiveness: The Second World War (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1991). 26. Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 16–20. 27. “Operativnoe iskusstvo,” Voennyi Entziklopedicheskii Slovar’ (Moscow: Ministerstvo Oborony RF, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 220–221; “Operational Art,” in JP 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 17 October 2008. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new pubs/jpl 02.pdf 28. “Operational Level of War,” in JP 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 17 October 2008. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ jel/doddict/ 29. Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly 51(1) (2009), pp. 34–40. 30. B. J. C. McKerchrer and Michael A. Hennessy, The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War (London: Praeger Press, 1996), p. 4. 31. Ketti Davison, “From Tactical Planning to Operational Design,“ Military Review (October 2008), pp. 37–38. 32. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (The United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Version 1.0, 28 January 2008), pp. 15– 16. 33. “Operational Design,” p. 34. 34. Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, pp. 13–14; Ketti Davison, “From Tactical Planning to Operational Design,” Military Review (October 2008), p. 33. 35. Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War,” pp. 176–177. 36. Consider the introduction of operational art as a distinct concept in the American, German, Russian, Soviet, British, French, and Canadian militaries. See McKerchrer and Hennessy, The Operational Art; also see Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (Washington: Unites States Army, 2005). Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London: Frank Cass, 1997). 37. Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, pp. 15–16. 38. G. S. Isserson, Novye formy bor’by (Moscow: Voengiz, 1940). 39. TPP, pp. 156–157. 40. AFGP-2002–003251, Abu Huthayfa “A Memo to the Honorable Sheikh Abu Abdullah” (20 June 2000), Harmony Database, p. 39. Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony docs.asp. The nizam, la tanzim doctrine, for example, rests on lessons learned from operational setbacks. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 6–7, 27; Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1357, 1359, 1363, 1367–1368, 1378; David Cook, Paradigmatic Jihadi Movements (New York: West Point Press, 2006). 41. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 1–28; TPP, pp. 117, 156–157; Jim Lacey, The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp. 48, 162; Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30(1) (2007), pp. 1–14. 42. Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting,” pp. 810–812; 817–818. 43. TPP, pp. 75, 114–137.

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44. Ryan Thornton, “Changing the Game: Assessing al Qaeda’s Terrorist Strategy,” Harvard International Review 27(3) (2005), pp. 35–37. 45. S. K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War (Wajidalis Lahore: Associated Printers and Publishers, 1979), pp. 27–35, 44–55, 143; Naji demonstrates a similar awareness. Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which Umma Will Pass (translated by William McCants, 2006) (Cambridge, MA: The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies), pp. 16–17; 28–30. 46. TPP, pp. 129–130. 47. AFGP-2002-600080, “Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in Syria,” Harmony Database; Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 83. 48. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1357, 1359. Among the rest, this happened due to a failure in training in the field of doctrine and concepts. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1358–1359. By “concept” he probably means here “concept of operations” (fikrat amal), to judge by analogy from p. 1365. 49. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p. 3. 50. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1363–1367; AFGP2002–600080, pp. 3–12. 51. Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting.” 52. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1405. 53. Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 21. 54. Gaetano Joe Ilardi, “Al Qaeda’s Operational Intelligence—A Key Prerequisite to Action,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31(12) (December 2008), pp. 1072–1107. 55. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1379–1387; Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 41; Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda’s Warfare,” p. 128; Cook, Understanding, p. 151. 56. Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (London: Oxford University Press, 1992). 57. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, pp. 63–71. 58. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 26–27. 59. Lia and Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies,” p. 355. 60. Lia, “Doctrine,” p. 536. 61. TPP, p. 119. 62. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Peirre Milelli, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Random House, 2007); Lacey, The Canons of Jihad; William McCants, Military Ideology Atlas (West Point: CTC, 2006); David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 93–110; “The Recovery of Radical Islam in the Wake of the Defeat of the Taliban,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15(1) (2003), pp. 33–40; Mary R. Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History; Walid Phares, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Richard Bonney, Jihad: From Quran to bin Laden (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 199–224; TPP, pp. 119, 138–139. 63. T. P. Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror and Peace in the Quran and in Islam: Insights for Military and Government Leaders (Carlisle, PA: The Army War College Foundation Press, 2004), pp. 41–91; Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, pp. 52–55. 64. For example, see Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), especially pp. 3–42; Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Understanding the Quran: Themes and Style (London: Taurus Publishers, 2001), especially chap. 5. 65. Khadduri, pp. 70–72. 66. Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader. 67. Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror and Peace in the Quran and in Islam, pp. 275–277. 68. Youssef Aboul Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, October 2004).

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69. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 3. 70. Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda’s Warfare,” pp. 142–143. 71. Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 37. 72. TPP, p. 203. 73. Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 28–29. 74. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1379. 75. Ilardi, “Al Qaeda’s Operational Intelligence,” p. 1073 and footnote no. 8, p. 1094. 76. Harmony Disharmony database. Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony docs.asp 77. Al-Suri differentiates between combat doctrine and military theory. Al-Suri, Da’wat almuqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1394–1396. 78. Ibid., pp. 877–878, 1355. 79. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1355. 80. Ibid., pp. 1356–1366. 81. Ibid., pp. 1359–1361, 1365. 82. Ibid., p. 1396. 83. Ibid., p. 1405. 84. Ibid., pp. 1406–1407. 85. Ibid., p. 1398. Al-Suri uses the model of the Sufi orders as a frame of reference for his theory of victory and uses the same word used for Sufi orders—tariqah—order, method, and way. The words nizam and tariqah are synonyms and can both be translated as method (Al-Suri, Da’wat almuqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1398). Lia suggests that this is not coincidence because similar to the Sufi orders this model combines a mass following with a decentralized structure (Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p. 445). This is not surprising, given that al-Suri was brought up in North-Western Syria, one of the centers for the Naqshbandiyya order. Itzchak Weismann, The Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide Sufi Tradition (London: Routledge, 2008); Itzchak Weismann, Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus (London: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004). 86. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1373, 1378–1387, 1390–1391, 1393–1397, 1405, 1409. 87. Ibid., p. 1407. 88. Lia, “Doctrine,” p. 533. 89. Joseph C. Myers, “The Quranic Concept of War,” Parameters (Winter 2006–2007), pp. 108–121. 90. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, pp. 142–143. 91. I. E. Shavrov and N. I. Galkin, Metodologiia voenno-nauchnogo poznaniia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977). 92. Stout et al., Terrorist Perspectives Project, pp. 38–39. 93. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War. 94. Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al-Qaeda, Salafi Jihad and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). 95. Raymond Ibrahim, “Studying the Islamic Way of War,” National Review Online, 11 September 2008. 96. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 97. 97. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1366, 1423; Stout et al., Terrorist Perspectives Project, pp. 130–131; Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 37–38; Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 65. 98. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, pp. 67–68. 99. Lacey, The Canons of Jihad, pp. 138–146; Ilardi, “Al Qaeda’s Operational Intelligence”; Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader. 100. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy and History (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 175.

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101. Truls Hallberg Tonnesson, “Training on a Battlefield: Iraq as a Training Ground for Global Jihadists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2008), pp. 543–562. 102. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 145. 103. Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 28–30, 43. 104. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1424. 105. Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 23. 106. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1402. 107. AFGP-2002-003251, Abu Huthayfa “A Memo to the Honorable Sheikh Abu Abdullah,” (20 June 2000), Harmony Database, p. 39. 108. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 20–23. 109. TPP, pp. 125–127. 110. Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 19–22, 23, 28, 30; Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1373–1374. 111. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1368–1369, 1373–1374, 1405, 1408. 112. Ibid., p. 1409. 113. Calvert Jones, “Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffusive Transnational Network,” Review of International Affairs 19(4) (December 2006), pp. 555–569; TPP, p. 119. 114. Stout et al., The Terrorist Perspectives Project, pp. 74–79, 62–85, 114–137; Ilardi, “Al Qaeda’s Operational Intelligence,” pp. 1072–1107. 115. TPP, pp. 119–120; AFGP-2002-003251, Abu Huthayfa, “A Memo to the Honorable Sheikh Abu Abdullah” (20 June 2000), Harmony Database, p. 14; Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 23–24. 116. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1361, 1368; Lacey, Canons of Jihad, p. 61. 117. Stealing Al-Qaida’s Playbook, especially pp. 3–10; Lia, “Doctrines,” pp. 527–528; Cook, Understanding, pp. 151–152. 118. Imperial Hubris, pp. 101–102; Sarah Zabel, The Military Strategy of Global Jihad (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2007). TPP, p. 99. 119. Qutb, Milestones, p. 75; Lia, “Doctrines,” p. 522; Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 28. 120. Emphasis mine. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 3. 121. Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth Pollack, “Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries,” in Emily Goldman and Leslie Eliason, The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 63–93; Edmund Bosworth, “Armies of the Prophet: Strategy, Tactics and Weapons in Islamic Warfare,” in Bernard Lewis, ed., Islam and the Arab World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976). 122. TPP, pp. 125–132. 123. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1370. 124. Condoleezza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 648–677. 125. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1356, 1365, 1394, 1396, 1403, 1414–1428; Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 60; Brynjar Lia, “Dotrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2008), pp. 518–542. Tonnessen; Petter Nesser, “How did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2008), pp. 234–256. Architect, pp. 23–24, 26. 126. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah. 127. TPP, pp. 118–119. 128. Martin van Creveld, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994), pp. 3–7. 129. Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 16–17.

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130. Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, pp. 13–15; Kobi Michael, “The Dilemma Behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-Military Relations: The Discourse Space Model,” Armed Forces and Society 33(4) (2007), pp. 518–546. 131. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. 109–125; Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 12–17; Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1397. 132. The Canons, pp. 148–161. 133. TPP, pp. 137–138; Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting,” p. 824. 134. Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting,” pp. 814–815. 135. Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 25–27, 40, 42, 50–51; Al-Suri, Da’wat almuqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1390, 1392, 1393. 136. Aboul Enein and Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare, pp. 1–3. 137. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Power, eds., Islamic Legal Interpretation and Their Fatwas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Majid Khadurri, Islamic Jurisprudence: Shafii’s Risala (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 295–304 and also Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, pp. 34–38 and 102–103. 138. See discussion at the MESH project, following Raymond Ibrahim’s post, “Islamic War Doctrines Ignored,” Middle Eastern Strategy at Harvard. Available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/05/islams war doctrines ignored/ 139. William McCants, “Al Qaida Strategic Thinking and Its Implications for US Policy,” Security Studies Program Seminar, MIT, 15 May 2007. 140. TPP, pp. 120–121.