Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence: Ideological Foundations and Operational Methods 3031247434, 9783031247439

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Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region

Ferdinand J. Haberl

Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence Ideological Foundations and Operational Methods

Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region Series Editor Almas Heshmati, Jönköping University, Jönköping, Sweden

This Scopus indexed book series publishes monographs and edited volumes devoted to studies on the political, economic and social developments of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Volumes cover in-depth analyses of individual countries, regions, cases and comparative studies, and they include both a specific and a general focus on the latest advances of the various aspects of development. It provides a platform for researchers globally to carry out rigorous economic, social and political analyses, to promote, share, and discuss current quantitative and analytical work on issues, findings and perspectives in various areas of economics and development of the MENA region. Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region allows for a deeper appreciation of the various past, present, and future issues around MENA’s development with high quality, peer reviewed contributions. The topics may include, but not limited to: economics and business, natural resources, governance, politics, security and international relations, gender, culture, religion and society, economics and social development, reconstruction, and Jewish, Islamic, Arab, Iranian, Israeli, Kurdish and Turkish studies. Volumes published in the series will be important reading offering an original approach along theoretical lines supported empirically for researchers and students, as well as consultants and policy makers, interested in the development of the MENA region.

Ferdinand J. Haberl

Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence Ideological Foundations and Operational Methods

Ferdinand J. Haberl Documentation Center Vienna, Austria

ISSN 2520-1239 ISSN 2520-1247 (electronic) Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region ISBN 978-3-031-24743-9 ISBN 978-3-031-24744-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For my loving parents, my wonderful wife and my perfect son. I am forever grateful.

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 5

2

Strategic Intelligence Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 What is Intelligence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Definition of (Jih¯adi) Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Strategic Intelligence Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The (Jih¯adi) Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 8 9 11 13 19

3

Collection Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Human Intelligence (HUMINT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal Al-Balawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Covert Intelligence Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1 The Recruitment Process—Target Identification . . . . . . . 3.5.2 The Recruitment Process—Asset Development . . . . . . . 3.5.3 The Recruitment Process—Asset Recruitment . . . . . . . . 3.5.4 The Recruitment Process—Testing and Training an Asset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.5 The Recruitment Process—Managing Assets . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Signals Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 Imagery Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 Surveillance Drones, UAVs and Drone Counter Measures . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21 21 25 27 32 37 38 39 39

Intelligence Analysis and “Lessons Learned” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Intelligence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53 53 55 56

4

40 41 42 43 45 48

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5

6

7

Contents

The Three Levels of Jih¯adi Warfare—The Interrelation of Jih¯adi Operational Art and Jih¯adi Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Three Levels of Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 The Strategic Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 The Operational Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.3 The Tactical Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Operational Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The “Urtext” of Jih¯adi Intelligence Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Why History Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 The IS’ Amniyat and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The Lord of the Shadows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 The Dawah Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Religion Inside Saddam Hussein’s Intelligence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Internal Control and Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4 The Hisbah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Intelligence in Ba’athist Iraq and Its Influence on the Islamic State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 The Special Security Organization—Jihaz Al-Amn Al-Khass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 The People Who Loosen and Bind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 The Emni Officers, the Intelligence Council and the Shura Council (as of Early 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 The Shura, Media and Military Councils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.1 The Shura Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.2 The Media Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.3 The Military Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 The Long Arm of the STASI and the KGB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8 Paying Tribute to Saladin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9 Intelligence in the Ancient Near East—The Early Influence of the Assyrians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.10 Persian Intelligence Traditions and Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The First Islamic State and Its Intelligence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 The Rightly Guided Caliphs (Rashidun) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1 The Caliph Ab¯u Bakr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.2 The Caliph Umar Ibn Al-Khatt¯ab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.3 The Caliph Muᶜa¯ wiyah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.4 The Caliph Yazid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.5 The Caliph ‘Abd Al-Malik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.6 The Governor Al-Hajjaj . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.7 The Caliph Al-Walid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57 57 57 58 58 60 62 63 63 65 70 74 75 76 78 79 82 86 87 91 91 92 94 97 100 102 106 108 115 119 123 123 124 125 126 127 129

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7.1.8

The Abbasid Muslim Empire and the Peak of the Postal System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.9 The Fatimid Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.10 The Mamluk Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.11 Byzantine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Why the “Urtext” Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

9

129 131 132 134 134 136

Jih¯adi Intelligence and Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 The Intelligence Cycle and Organisational Learning . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.1 Knowledge Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.2 Knowledge Acquisition via Intelligence Assets, Informants and Operatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.3 “Vicarious Learning” and Jih¯adi Intelligence Organisations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Knowledge and Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.1 Information Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.2 Interpretation of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.3 Storage of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.4 Incremental Learning and Transformational Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.1 Organisational Structure and Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.2 Information Sharing and Decentralisation . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.3 Organisational Culture and Learning New Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.4 Operational Environment and Learning New Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 The Collocation of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 Theoretical and Practical Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.1 Practical Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.2 Theoretical Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 Real-Life Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7 Intelligence Collection and Institutional Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.8 Why Institutional Learning Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

137 140 142

Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 The Counterintelligence Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 Counterintelligence Apparati and Internal Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 “Spy Versus Spy” and Espionage Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 Deception and Denial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6 Taqiyya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 Deceptive Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7.1 Camouflage and Concealment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

179 181 185 186 192 193 194 195 195

143 145 150 153 153 154 154 155 156 158 160 162 162 163 163 164 167 169 173 174

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9.7.2 Demonstration and Diversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7.3 Disinformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7.4 Spoofing and Mimicry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7.5 Conditioning and Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7.6 Display and Decoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7.7 Knowing the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7.8 Denial and Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8 Keeping Secrets and Concealing Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8.1 Compartmentalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8.2 Secret Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8.3 Local Networks and Public Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8.4 Territorial Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9 The Basis of All Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

196 197 198 198 199 200 202 204 205 208 209 210 212 214

10 Encryption and Secret Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 The Roots of Jih¯adi Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 Electronic Encryption, Safe Communication, and OpSec . . . . . . . 10.2.1 The Snowden Leaks and Jih¯adi Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3 Communication Through Video Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 Communication by Phone and Walkie Talkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4.1 Telecommunication Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5 Communication by Dead Drops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 Communication by Code Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.7 Communication via Carrier Pigeons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.8 Invisible Ink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

217 220 222 224 225 226 227 228 230 230 232 233

11 Counterfeiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 The Different Kinds of Counterfeit Passports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 Safe Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 The Jihaz Al-Amn Al-Muwahhad (PLO) and Counterfeiting . . . . 11.4 Counterfeiting and Propaganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

235 237 239 241 242 242

12 Safe Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1 A Prerequisite for Intelligence Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2 Osama Bin Laden’s Safe House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

245 248 249 252

13 Covert Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 The Jih¯adi Rationale Behind Covert Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2 The Emni and Covert Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3 Assassinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

253 255 257 258 263

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14 Economic Warfare and Destabilisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1 Large-Scale Destabilisation Through Economic Terrorism . . . . . . 14.2 Egypt as an Economic Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.3 The Ideological Basis of Economic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4 Targeting Investments and Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5 Attacking Foreigners and Tourists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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265 267 269 271 273 275 277

15 The Elimination of the Greyzone as a Jih¯adi Covert Operation . . . . 281 15.1 The Alienation of Muslims (Propaganda) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 16 Jih¯adi Intelligence Activities in the Digital Realm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.1 Operational Art in Cyberspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.2 Cyber-Attacks and Cyber-Disruption—A Natural Fit . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 Cyber-Espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.4 Psychological Operations in Cyberspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

289 291 293 298 302 306

17 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

Chapter 1

Introduction

“Allah’s messenger said, he whom death overtakes while he is engaged in acquiring knowledge with a view to reviving Islam with the help of it, there will be one degree between him and the Prophets paradise.”1

Terrorists spy before they terrorise. They track and observe their targets. They collect intelligence about their enemy’s vulnerabilities from publicly available information and by eliciting secrets from unwitting sources.2 Indeed, observations are an integral part of warfare and soldiers have been on the lookout for their enemies since the first ever wars. Thus, for as long as there have been conflicts among human beings. In the twenty-first century, the violent Jih¯ad has tragically become the new normal and will most likely continue to be, but the importance of knowing the enemy remains a key factor. Militant Islamic groups, as well as Jih¯adi “lone wolves” that may have been inspired by them, continue to fight their perceived archenemies and many have embarked on a journey toward destruction, death and suffering in what is believed to be the will of Allah and the path of the Prophet Muh.ammad. This book aims to provide a comprehensive review on how Jih¯adi intelligence and counterintelligence activities are established, conducted and what their ideological origins are. In the first chapter, a definition of what intelligence—as well as Jih¯adi intelligence—is will be provided followed by the second chapter describing the relevant collection sources Jih¯adi intelligence services are utilising. The third chapter will assess the analytical approaches of Jih¯adi intelligence services prior to discussing the three levels of Jih¯adi warfare (fourth chapter), the “Urtext” of Jih¯adi intelligence culture (fifth chapter), which naturally transitions to the sixth chapter on historic origins found in the first Islamic State established by the Prophet Muhammad. How Jih¯adi intelligence services acquire knowledge, store it and learn from their intelligence failures will be elaborated upon in the seventh chapter, which will be followed by a section on the counterintelligence activities of Jih¯adi groups, as they constitute an architectural cornerstone of a movement’s structural integrity (eight chapter). 1 Muhammad ibn ᶜ¯Is¯ a at-Tirmidh¯ı (88); also see “The Encyclopedia of Islam”. New Edition. Brill, . Leiden. Bd. 8, 834 (S.ah.¯ıh.). 2 Padilla (2005).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_1

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2

1 Introduction

Encryption methods as well as secret communication will be touched upon in the ninth chapter, while intelligence related topics on counterfeiting (tenth chapter), safe houses (eleventh chapter), covert operations (twelfth chapter), economic warfare (thirteenth chapter) and Jih¯adi intelligence activities in the digital realm (fourteenth chapter) will each be discussed in separate chapters of this book leading up to a conclusion summarising findings and underlining the importance religion and the life and battles of the Prophet Muhammed play in what could be termed “Jih¯adi intelligence culture”. Much like the Prophet himself once launched (intelligence) operations against the Quraiš, Jih¯adi groups have found their own enemies and are fighting them fiercely. In achieving their distorted goals, these Jih¯adi groups use a variety of military tactics and strategies, which are largely rooted in a unique Jih¯adi intelligence culture. Indeed, intelligence efforts are essential in asymmetric warfare. This is not only true for today’s Jih¯adi groups, but was also clearly demanded in the al-S¯ıra an-Nabawiyya (the biography of the Prophet Muh.ammad) and the Ah.a¯ d¯ıth. The Prophet placed a prime value on a well-functioning intelligence service. Much like intelligence operations of today, the Prophet Muh.ammad’s intelligence activities could be divided into basic categories, namely actively collecting secrets or passively protecting secrets, more commonly referred to as intelligence and counterintelligence.3 Jih¯adi groups utilise similar intelligence and counterintelligence methodologies, in both real-life battlefields and in cyberspace, which can commonly also be found within governmental security services and which are connected to the doctrines established by Muh.ammad. One of the groups, who has particularly embraced this rich history, is the Islamic State (hereinafter: IS), regardless of its loss in manpower and territory.4 In terms of its organisational structure, the group differs from similar Jih¯adi groups by running a highly potent intelligence apparatus, which utilises the experience of former intelligence operatives from the Ba’athist Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein. This intelligence service, known as “Amniyat”,5 engages in operations similar to most governmental intelligence services. However, monitoring and identifying opponents, eliminating them and avoiding infiltration has furthermore been institutionalised and merged with various other aspects of this Jih¯adi statebuilding project like propaganda, information campaigns6 and their overall military management. While some scholars may argue that such an in-depth exploration and explanation of Jih¯adi military management and intelligence capabilities might be irrelevant or bordering on mirror imaging, one must admit that the first security organisations historically emerged in the Near East. It was there where they influenced the destinies of empires, kings and warlords over a millennium, and this rich inheritance is not only of historiographical relevance, but has further found its way into the operational realities of Jih¯adi groups. This work thus aims at providing a thorough 3

Rodgers (2008), p. 79. Haberl (2019). 5 Also known as “Amni” or “Emni”. 6 Raouf Mahmoud (2014). 4

1 Introduction

3

contextualisation of the ideological drivers and stimuli, which is an aspect of the study of Jih¯adism that has so far not been explored in great detail and which will allow us to define the phenomenon of Jih¯adi intelligence in greater detail and to understand its meaning. Both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda (hereinafter: AQ) have been selected as the main subjects of the featured case studies, due to the central role intelligence operations possess in both organisations. Well-established centralised or decentralised internal structures have also been key considerations, while both groups have broadly published their intelligence doctrines, manuals and approaches in their respective magazines, manuals or in cyberspace. However, Jih¯adi groups commonly learn from each other and share their knowledge and lessons learned online. This even includes a certain, perhaps involuntary yet existent, exchange of knowledge between Sunni and Shia groups with respect to their intelligence methods and intelligence services. The stakeholders of a conflict commonly collect, analyse and act on the use of information, which can be considered the “general importance of knowing”, as stated by Keegan.7 Governments have many branches, institutions and systems that help them “know”. However, in many cases, government intelligence is not only restricted to mere “knowing” as it ties in with international relations, defence, national security or—most controversially—covert operations or economic warfare.8 Moreover, intelligence as a permanent governmental institution only dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century in the West.9 Still, European intelligence cultures were preceded by the traditions of the Roman armies, who used to collect information through their scouts and speculatores or by the intelligence activities of the Norman and Angevin kings, amongst other ancient and medieval sources.10 However, collecting information has always been an important asset to governments in both peacetime and war. In addition, in the ancient Near East, intelligence activities have been observed as early as the Assyrian Empire. In fact, the first intelligence organisation already emerged in the ancient Near East,11 at a time when Western intelligence can be considered to have been unorganised and not necessarily in accordance with any overall governmental strategies. Indeed, the history of intelligence has been influenced by the rich inheritance left by the Assyrian Empire, which built one of the earliest structured intelligence organisations after the Babylonians and ancient Egyptians.12 If we wish to understand what intelligence means to the Jih¯adi movement, we must first understand the origins of its intelligence culture and the actors and agents that played key roles in this culture. Some Jih¯adi covert operations, methodologies or even its most recent intelligence history may appear familiar and Western, but the Islamic World, which includes the Jih¯adi interpretation of Islam, does not share the 7

Keegan (1987), p. 325. Hermann (1996), p. 1. 9 Ibid, p. 9. 10 Ibid, p. 9. 11 Dvornik (1974), p. 3. 12 Ibid, p. 13. 8

4

1 Introduction

same religious traditions or history. Thus, ideological, religious and historic roots of a Jih¯adi intelligence culture need to be traced back to the times of the Prophet Muh.ammad and even further back to the ancient Near East or Arab tribes that lived in a time now referred to by Muslims as J¯ahil¯ıyah (Ignorance).13 Jih¯adi intelligence largely follows the rules and regulations set forth in the Qur’¯an, the Ah.a¯ d¯ıth and the Sunnah14 in order to develop intelligence practices. These intelligence operations will be mentioned throughout this work, because Jih¯adi groups have connected them to a large variety of different aspects of their intelligence activities. As such, this “First Islamic State” is a highly relevant influencer and ideological beacon of the Jih¯adi intelligence culture. This approach nonetheless legitimises practices and constitutes the fundamentals and starting point of a “Jih¯adi intelligence culture”, as illustrated by one of the most infamous Jih¯adi fighters, Osama bin Laden: “Had these rulers read the Qur’an and Prophet Muh.ammad’s traditions, and had they learned lessons from them—which is what we should do—this would have become very clear to them in several texts.”15

This work also intends to contribute to our understanding of Jih¯adi- or rebel governance and shed light on some Jih¯adi initiatives intended to maintain public order16 —this is especially true with respect to IS’ Caliphate and the importance of intelligence in its administration. The role of religion in the Jih¯adi form of governance—of which intelligence and security activities are clearly a part—is another question the following research intends to address. In this regard, it is particularly relevant to look at the phenomenon of “Jih¯adi operational art” and to what extend religious elements as much as Islamic cultural heritage are used in order to legitimise certain actions, administrative power and violence. Studying the related structures, approaches and operational art will not only enhance our perception of Jih¯adi groups, but further allow for a better understanding of rebel governance in general17 —a topic that has so far remained under-researched in social sciences.18 Furthermore, holistically understanding the organisational structures of the Islamic State—but also various other Jih¯adi groups—might have direct implications on counterterrorism legislation, policy and military or security operations.19 This is particularly relevant since non-state actors, including Jih¯adi groups, are likely to continue improving their intelligence capabilities, which might include human intelligence, technical aspects of intelligence and those aspects of the cyber-realm. Indeed, much like their governmental counterparts, these non-state actors recruit intelligence sources or perform surveillance operations in order to facilitate their activities and avoid detection.20 13

Beeston (1976), p. 7. Al-Asmari (2009), p. 10. 15 Lawrence (2005), p. 228. 16 Donker (2018), pp. 3–8. 17 Kraushaar (2018). 18 Watts (2014). 19 Ibid. 20 Coats (2018). 14

References

5

While this exploration into the origins of Jih¯adi intelligence culture must at times involve a certain curiosity and fascination with its historical aspects, we must not confuse an appreciation of history with a critical analysis and certainly a condemnation of present Jih¯adi activities. In this book, the (ancient) past and the present are oftentimes compared and occasionally this important distinction might not be entirely obvious due to the comparative nature of the text. Thus, the author finds it necessary to clearly underline his critical position and condemnation of Jih¯adism, terrorism and violence. Lastly, this book refers to certain terrorist organisations and to separate institutions or branches that were set up within them as well as to individuals who run or ran them. Counterterrorism operations are oftentimes as dynamic as the groups they are targeting are. Consequently, some individuals may not hold these positions anymore and may have been killed or might have gotten arrested. Some institutions and intelligence services may have changed their structure or may not exist anymore in the described form as they might have been forced to alter their modus operandi. Hence, the author would like to caution the reader—especially in such a dynamic field of research—to understand the relevant sections as examples and case studies and not as an up-to-date assessment. Albeit these examples have been collected with great care and were accurate at the time of writing it is almost impossible to cover the speed in which events unfold in an academic publication like this very book.

References Al-Asmari AA (2009) Arab Islamic concept of intelligence in the case of fatah paramilitary. Brunel University Beeston AFL (1976) Warfare in Ancient South Arabia, Studies in Old South Arabian Epigraphy Series 3. London Coats DR (2018) Worldwide threat assessment of the US intelligence community. Statement for the Record. Accessed online: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/ 2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf Donker TH (2018) Verwaltung sticht religion. In: Kraushaar W (2018) Rebellenherrschaft. Mittelweg 36. Zeitschrift des Hamburger Instituts für Sozialforschung Dvornik F (1974) Origins of intelligence services. Rutgers University Press Haberl F (2019) The retreat into the desert—the new paradigms of Jih¯adi Covert action, subversion and intelligence operations. Studies in Jih¯adism. Berlin, Logos Verlag Hermann M (1996) Intelligence power in peace and war. Cambridge University Press Keegan J (1987) The mask of command. Penguin, London Kraushaar W (2018) Rebellenherrschaft. Mittelweg 36. Zeitschrift des Hamburger Instituts für Sozialforschung, pp 3–86 Lawrence B (2005) Messages to the world: the statements of Osama Bin Laden. Verso Publishing Padilla J (2005) Al Qaeda answers CIA ’s hiring call. LA Times Raouf Mahmoud M (2014) Islamic State intelligence network stifles resistance, Al-Monitor—the Pulse of the Middle East. Accessed online: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/ islamic-state-intelligence-temple-mount-gaza-egypt.html

6

1 Introduction

Rodgers R (2008) Fundamentals of Islamic asymmetric warfare: a documentary analysis of the principles of Muh.ammad, Edwin Mellen Pr. Watts C (2014) The U.S. Can’t Destroy IS-Only IS can destroy IS: the unfortunate merits of the ‘Let Them Rot’ Strategy. FPRI Blog

Chapter 2

Strategic Intelligence Background

Abstract Intelligence agencies as permanent government institutions have existed in the Western world only since the second half of the nineteenth century. Intelligence gathering however has always been an important asset for governments in both peacetime and wartime. In the ancient Near East, intelligence activities can be observed as early as the Assyrian Empire and, in fact, the first intelligence organisations emerged in this very region. Intelligence itself is based on information, while information is the arrangement of structures around data. What intelligence can mean to a government is not much different from what it means to Jih¯adi groups. However, Jih¯adi intelligence may not necessarily serve a (self-proclaimed) government like the Islamic State or a group exercising certain territorial control, but rather may in fact benefit a much more decentralised and non-territorial cell structure, whereas the importance of doctrines, ideology and operational art must be underlined. In contrast to a governmental version of the intelligence and its affiliated concepts, we can see a very clear differentiation when it comes to the realms of ideology and operational art. Keywords Intelligence definition · Strategic intelligence · Intelligence cycle · Jih¯adi intelligence cycle “Any organization that desires to raise the flag of Islam high and proud, must gather as much information as possible...”—al-Qaeda Manual1

Before one continues to embark on an exploration of the realms of Jih¯adi intelligence, it is important to specify exactly what we are discussing. One needs to answer the following questions first and foremost: What is intelligence? How is intelligence collected? How does the collected information become an analytical product? And, most importantly, how can the answer to these questions be applied to Jih¯adi groups or nay, can they even be applied to Jih¯adi groups? Or must one think of a new intelligence paradigm that considers the unique features of the Jih¯adi subculture, with its own analytical biases and its own operational doctrines? 1

Al-Qaeda (2004).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_2

7

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2 Strategic Intelligence Background

2.1 What is Intelligence? The stakeholders of a conflict or a bilateral interaction collect, analyse and act on the use of information, which can be considered the “general importance of knowing”, as stated by J. Keegan.2 Governments have many branches, institutions and systems that help them “know things”, although in many cases, governmental intelligence is not only restricted to mere “knowing” as it ties in with international relations, defence, national security or—most controversially—covert operations, economic warfare or sting operations.3 Moreover, intelligence as a permanent governmental institution only dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century in the Western world.4 Still, European intelligence cultures are preceded by the traditions of the Roman armies, who used to collect information through their scouts and speculatores or via the intelligence activities of the Norman and Angevin kings, amongst other ancient and medieval sources.5 Collecting information has always been an important asset to governments in both times of peace and war. In the ancient Near East, intelligence activities can be observed as early as in the Assyrian Empire. Indeed, the first intelligence organisation first emerged in the ancient Near East,6 at the same time when Western intelligence could still be considered unorganised and not necessarily in accordance with overall governmental strategies. Indeed, the history of intelligence has been influenced by the rich inheritance left by the Assyrian Empire, which built one of the earliest structured intelligence organisations after the Babylonians and ancient Egyptians.7 What intelligence can mean for a government does not vary significantly from the meaning it has for Jih¯adi groups. Intelligence itself is based on information, whereas information is the positioning of structures around data. Intelligence professionals consider unstructured data as much as factual information to be “raw intelligence”, which needs to be put into context in order to give it the desired meaning. This task is normally done by analysts or subject matter experts, who frame the extracted facts as much as other pieces of intelligence from different sources in order to predict a future outcome of an event.8 While it is a common misconception that intelligence is merely of military nature and limited to the movement of troops or military decisionmaking, intelligence may also provide information with respect to cultural, social or environmental aspects. 2

Keegan (1987), p. 325. Hermann (1996), p. 1. 4 Ibid. p. 9. 5 Ibid. p. 9. 6 Dvornik (1974), p. 3. 7 Ibid. p. 3. 8 Marks (2010). 3

2.2 The Definition of (Jih¯adi) Intelligence

9

Jih¯adi groups have shown interest in more than just the military aspects of intelligence—no matter how dominant that aspect is. They have also focussed on economic or cultural aspects in order to engage in economic warfare and in order to understand the cultural setting of their adversaries better. Indeed, many different kinds of intelligence have emerged over the years and are often in accordance with technological or geopolitical developments. Some of them, such as financial intelligence (FININT), measurement and signature intelligence are (MASINT) or medical intelligence (MEDINT), are not highly relevant to Jih¯adi intelligence. Others such as human intelligence (HUMINT) or open source intelligence (OSINT) are, however, of more imminent concern to Jih¯adi operatives. The function of intelligence within a state is different from most other governmental functions such as defence, agriculture or infrastructure. An intriguing similarity to Jih¯adi groups could also be observed within the Islamic State, in which the security apparatus Emni had been disconnected from all other “governmental” functions. Indeed, most intelligence activities can be considered secret and confidential while governments aim to hide certain activities, strategies and information from other governments. Jih¯adi groups—like most illicit terrorist groups—have a natural interest in hiding their activities too in order to remain operative. As such, the field of intelligence studies is comparatively new and has only just become widely explored by scholars after the end of the Cold War. Previously, some states even denied the existence of their secret intelligence services, most famously the British MI6 and even declared that reporting the colour of the carpet at MI6 would be a breach of the Official Secrets Act.9 Unsurprisingly, the history and methodologies of various governmental security services, but also that of how non-state actors like Jih¯adi groups have copied, adapted and merged these methodologies, is highly understudied in comparison to less secretive branches of government or non-state actors.10 This is particularly relevant when it comes to the intelligence activities of Jih¯adi groups, especially since commonly accepted definitions of intelligence, which would incorporate all the aforementioned aspects, have not yet been achieved and do not include non-state actor intelligence paradigms or the specifics of Jih¯adi intelligence.

2.2 The Definition of (Jih¯adi) Intelligence “Definition of Espionage: It is the covert search for and examination of the enemy’s news and information for the purpose of using them when a plan is devised.”11 —Ali Mohamed.

9

Jones (2014). Lowenthal (2009), p. 1. 11 Post (2004), p. 92. 10

10

2 Strategic Intelligence Background

Thanks to particularly the large scope of varying activities, intelligence services attempt to establish a definition of intelligence. Due to the different approaches and perspectives governments have selected, this has proven to be a difficult task, as the definition would have to encompass all of its activities and also consider all the different actors who utilise intelligence and conduct intelligence operations. In 1949, Sherman Kent, one of the founding fathers of strategic intelligence, referred to strategic intelligence as follows: “Strategic intelligence is the knowledge upon which our nation’s foreign relations in war and peace, must rest.”12

More in-depth definitions of intelligence and the intelligence paradigms have emerged over the years. In 1958, the CIA attempted its own approach at defining the term and published this attempt in its “Studies in Intelligence” journal under the fitting pen name R. A. Random: “Intelligence is the official, secret collection and processing of information on foreign countries to aid in formulating and implementing foreign policy, and the conduct of covert activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy.”13

Building on the work of R. A. Random, M. T. Bimfort has assessed that the CIA’s definition may be flawed in a number of ways. Firstly, the acquisition of intelligence may be performed for a government in a sometimes highly unofficial fashion. Secondly, he assesses secrecy not to be a universal attribute due to the overt reporting at that time. Thirdly, the focus on foreign countries and foreign policy is considered rather narrow- And fourthly, M. T. Bimfort suggests that one must clearly state the difference between the terminology “secret” and “covert”, perhaps replacing the latter with “non-attributable”.14 He then concluded by proposing the inclusion of the element of counterintelligence, which had been missing entirely from R. A. Random’s definition and providing his own definition: “Intelligence is the collecting and processing of that information about foreign countries and their agents which is needed by a government for its foreign policy and for national security, the conduct of non-attributable activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy, and the protection of both process and product, as well as persons and organizations concerned with these, against unauthorized disclosure.”15

While this definition may come close to a holistic description of governmental intelligence, it certainly does not cover or define Jih¯adi intelligence in a sufficient manner. To begin, Jih¯adi intelligence may not necessarily serve a (self-proclaimed) government like the Islamic State or a group exercising certain territorial control, but rather may in fact benefit a much more decentralised and non-territorial cell structure. Secondly, Jih¯adi intelligence has a foreign and regional focus and aims at collecting information on adversaries but also on regional actors. A third aspect is 12

Bimfort (1995). Random (1993). 14 Ibid. p. 76. 15 Bimfort (1995). 13

2.3 The Strategic Intelligence Landscape

11

that, in most cases, Jih¯adi groups launch terrorist attacks for the sole purpose of them being attributable to them and in order to achieve propagandistic goals. Fourthly, the importance of doctrines, ideology and operational art has not yet been mentioned. Although these elements may not be of significant relevance to governmental intelligence services, they do play a key-role for Jih¯adi intelligence and must hence be included in a definition of Jih¯adi intelligence. “Jih¯adi intelligence is the collecting and processing of information about national and regional actors and adversaries and their agents based on radical Islamic military doctrines, which is needed by a group for its internal security, the conduct of terrorist activities to facilitate the implementation of religious goals and ideologies, the avoidance of strategic and tactical surprises and the protection of Jih¯adi operatives, processes and intelligence products.”

2.3 The Strategic Intelligence Landscape Strategic intelligence allows both governments and Jih¯adi actors to forecast and predict the future. M. Lowenthal argues that avoiding (strategic) surprises must be the foremost goal of intelligence, and thus, it continuously assesses threats, potential enemies, hostile events and international developments that could jeopardise the security landscape. Indeed, as different as intelligence agencies, cultures and approaches may seem, the tasks of avoiding surprises and assessing potential threats could be regarded as the lowest common denominator that also extends to Jih¯adi intelligence.16 In order to achieve this, intelligence analysts are given unique access to information based on clandestine sources. In addition, Jih¯adi actors maintain clandestine sources and agents while also conducting espionage operations in order to obtain relevant information. “The Organization’s [al-Qaeda] command needs detailed information about the enemy’s vital establishments, whether civilian or military, in order to make safe plans, reach firm decisions, and avoid surprises.”17

Some may regard intelligence as merely secret information, but it needs to be stated that, at least according to a definition outlined by M. Lowenthal, intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of decision-makers and has thus been collected in order to meet these needs.18 As such, one can say that all intelligence may be information, but not all information is intelligence. Indeed, the decision-maker actively influences intelligence and ideally provides direction for the intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination according to what has been termed the “intelligence cycle”. When it comes to Jih¯adi groups, we can either find this guidance in the form of actual leadership—as in the case of Ali Mohamed, who is listed in the al-Qaeda 16

Lowenthal (2009), p. 1. Post (2004), p. 12. 18 Lowenthal (2009), p. 1. 17

12

2 Strategic Intelligence Background

manual (see relevant section)—or in collection guidelines (derived from the knowledge of operational art), which may, i.e. suggest the launching of economic attacks19 against an adversary based on the example provided by the Prophet Muh.ammad. The relationship the Prophet Muh.ammad had with the tribes of the Quraiš, or with the Jewish tribe Ban¯u al-Nad.¯ır,20 illustrates his focus on economic topics in warfare and peace. Consequently, as IS’ Dabiq magazine21 for instance published collection guidelines that are tailored toward economic targets (see chapter: Operational Art). Based on the understanding that decision-making actively influences intelligence, one can assess that most intelligence agencies exist in order to avoid strategic surprises, to provide long-term expertise, to support the decision-making process and to ensure the secrecy of information, information needs and methodologies. These items are commonly referred to as “counterintelligence”.22 We can find all of these functions within the conceptualisation of Jih¯adi intelligence. Intelligence services commonly also provide long-term expertise. Providing longterm expertise that can outlast the legislative period of a policy-maker can be regarded as an important factor of governmental intelligence; yet, since most Jih¯adi organisations do not necessarily operate in legislative terms (aside from those that have transcended from Jih¯adi organisations into political parties such as Hezbollah, Fatah or Hamas), this factor appears to be less relevant to Jih¯adi intelligence concepts.23 Supporting the decision-making process is certainly an intelligence task also practised by Jih¯adi groups, since the need for a tailored and timely intelligence that provides background information, insights, risks, benefits or warnings is also crucial to the Jih¯adi cause.24 Lastly, holding secrets, deception, denial and counterintelligence are essential tasks of most governmental intelligence agencies.25 However, counterintelligence is even more important to Jih¯adi intelligence than to its governmental counterparts, since secrecy ensures the operational and strategic survival of a Jih¯adi groups. A leak in information or espionage penetration may cause significant damage inside a government’s security structure, but such an incident would hardly jeopardise the survival of most states. The central role of counterintelligence in the Jih¯adi subculture illustrates its vital importance and constitutes the basis upon which all other activities rest.26

19

IS (2016), Foreword. p. 5. Al-Qaeda (2016), pp. 27–31. 21 Dabiq was first published in July 2014 as an online magazine used by IS for the purposes of radicalisation, recruitment, spreading propaganda and for instructional purposes. 22 Lowenthal (2009), p. 1. 23 Lowenthal (2009), pp. 1–5. 24 Ibid. pp. 1–5. 25 Ibid. pp. 1–5. 26 Haberl (2016a). Also see: Haberl (2016b). 20

2.4 The (Jih¯adi) Intelligence Cycle

13

According to Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for Guerrilla Warfare,27 the: “…call for a pure Islamic system free from defects and infidel elements, one based on the book (the Qur’¯an) and the Sunnah” requires “Creating an Islamic intelligence service. This will have the task of oversight over recruitment of individuals and of protecting the organisation from being penetrated. It will also set the security plans for individuals, the leadership, and installations.”28

With respect to governmental intelligence, the intelligence landscape has undergone significant changes and developments since the end of the cold war, which has led to once secret information now being accessible. An analysis of the intelligence methodologies prior to and after the end of the cold war has shown that the ratio of open-to-secret information has changed drastically. However, there are still governmental secrets worth pursuing for intelligence purposes. This may at times also include allied states that conduct friendly relations with each other.29 Nonstate actors like Jih¯adi groups have also managed to adapt to this new intelligence landscape and had played a significant role in the cold war as well. Secret intelligence in one form or the other, with all its different cultures, names and approaches is as old as government itself. Information collection and analysis are integral parts of a state’s effort to avoid strategic surprises, whereas the pursuit of secret information is the mainstay of intelligence activity within the realms of governmental intelligence.30 In sum, intelligence can be considered to be “the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analysed and provided to policy-makers; the product of the process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.”31

2.4 The (Jih¯adi) Intelligence Cycle Governmental intelligence is normally produced in a five-stage process, commonly referred to as the intelligence cycle:

27

Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (born in 1972; died in 2004) is also known as Abu Hajr. He commanded al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia after he had succeeded Khaled Ali Hajj in March 2004. Al-Muqrin had previously trained with Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin wrote “A Practical Course for Guerrilla War”, which has frequently been compared and mentioned together with Abu Bakr Naji’s “Management of Savagery”. Both books have significantly influenced Al Qaeda’s approach to guerrilla warfare. 28 Al-Qaeda (2009), pp. 94, 109. 29 Reuters (2018). 30 Haberl (2016a). Also see: Haberl (2016b). 31 Lowenthal (2009), p. 8.

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2 Strategic Intelligence Background

This ever-spinning cycle encompasses five main elements, generally identified to be (1) direction, (2) collection, (3) processing, (4) analysis and (5) dissemination.32 In order to arrive at a targeted intelligence product, the consumers of intelligence provide the intelligence service with direction, which consequentially leads to a definition of requirements, which in turn triggers the collection element. What follows are the stages of analysis and dissemination, whereas the finished intelligence product may, at this stage, integrate with other intelligence reports from other sources or agencies. The final result is ultimately supposed to be a fusion of different collection disciplines and an assessment that helps in the decision-making process.33 Although the “intelligence cycle” is commonly seen as a feature of governmental security services, one can clearly identify similar approaches within the context of Jih¯adi intelligence. In fact, the Islamic State has issued guidelines on intelligence and espionage, something that indicates that Jih¯adi groups also follow a specific intelligence cycle unique to the Jih¯adi subculture. The first stage of the intelligence cycle—direction—helps identify requirements. At this stage, areas in which intelligence can make a significant contribution and what certain priorities will end up being are decided upon. It may also encompass the specification of collection requirements or a consideration of what type of intelligence might be the most useful or appropriate for the task at hand.34 Since intelligence capabilities are always limited—and that is the case in both Jih¯adi and governmental contexts—priorities must be set. Making these decisions among alwaysconstrained collection capabilities is key, especially since Jih¯adi groups face even greater limitations than governments with regard to their collection and analytical capabilities.

32

Stark (2016). Browning (1997). 34 Lowenthal (2009). p. 8. 33

2.4 The (Jih¯adi) Intelligence Cycle

15

Inspire magazine35 No. 14 offers a very detailed overview and insight into what can be interpreted as the stages of the Jih¯adi intelligence cycle (nay, the Jih¯adi tactical intelligence cycle, to be correct), seeing as how tactical intelligence appears to tower over strategic intelligence (STRATINT). Indeed, tactical approaches with respect to the directions, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination are very common within the more abstract spheres of Jih¯adi operational art, but are also indicative of other non-state actors and terrorist organisations such as i.e. the FARC36 or the IRA.37 However, while prioritising tactical intelligence, Jih¯adi groups also consider strategic intelligence, as the example of al-Qaeda’s focus on long-term economic damage illustrates, but their unique version of the Intelligence cycle can nonetheless best be illustrated at the tactical level. In the 14th issue of Inspire magazine, the Jih¯adi intelligence cycle is not actually depicted as a cycle per se, but rather as a list of different stages of what al-Qaeda has termed to be an “intelligence operation”.38 Although the stages are labelled successively from stage A to stage D, one must also consider the “introduction” of this very list and the “lessons learned” from previous operations, which are not considered stages by the Jih¯adi group, but which clearly have a significant effect on the group’s intelligence cycle. As such, they do in fact constitute stages and contain ideological and historic justifications for the “intelligence operation”. An assassination, in the case of al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine: “The disbelievers and Mushrikin had tried to assassinate the prophet in many different ways. They chose to assassinate him by an individual approach…They also resorted to assassinate him using a group. An example is when a group of Jews wanted to throw a huge stone at the prophet while he was sitting, but Allah saved him… By the grace of Allah all of these attempts were futile.”39

After having placed the ideological foundation right in the introduction, the authors (referred to as the “External Operation Team”) continue on with Stage A, which is called “Specifying the Target”. Similar to governmental intelligence agencies, the authors consider the first stage—direction—to be highly relevant due to its guiding effect on later stages of the cycle and on the tactical or strategic outcomes. “The size of operation mainly depends on the type of target…Selecting a target for assassination, is divided into two categories; assassinating a target in order to achieve either strategic or tactical goals.”40

Stage B also mirrors governmental approaches and is called “collecting information” by the Jih¯adi authors. One can recognise a prioritisation of intelligence 35

Inspire was first published in June 2010 as an online magazine used by al-Qaeda for the purposes of radicalisation, recruitment, spreading propaganda and for instructional purposes. 36 Gentry & Spencer (2010). 37 Ilardi (2010). 38 Al-Qaeda (2015). pp. 64–71. 39 Ibid. p. 64. 40 Al-Qaeda (2015), pp. 64.

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2 Strategic Intelligence Background

collection over direction and analysis at this juncture. It is a trade-off and cause for frequent tension over the allocation of resources.41 “This is the most important stage in your operation. Your choice of strategy will be selected basing on the information at hand. The acquired information will direct you to opt the best and effective technique and path for your operation.”42

The intelligence sources considered by the “External Operation Team” are either based on the discipline of open source intelligence (OSINT), which has been further specified to consider general means of communication, newspapers, magazines or television and Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), “…—especially the social media where one can very much benefit from [sic].”43 Furthermore, HUMINT is suggested at this stage and the authors advise the reader to gain “access to the target’s friend, close person or a neighbor [sic].”44 Lastly, it is suggested that the target should be observed so as to acquire critical information. In this regard, the Jih¯adi operative is advised to “blend-in with the environment or camouflage himself during the process.”45 Jih¯adi operatives have replaced what the stage of “Analysis” is within the governmental version of the intelligence cycle with “Generating a plan”. In addition, what government security might see as the “Analytical Product” has been termed a “plan” by the Jih¯adi group. Nonetheless, the two outcomes are rather similar, as the “External Operation Team” proposes the following: “A plan is generated basing [sic] on the information at hand and the capabilities available [sic].”46

Whereas the Jih¯adi concept of an intelligence cycle falls short of a proper intelligence analysis and analytical tradecraft, one can still recognise an effort to process and understand the information available, then place it into a larger context. Furthermore, a certain strategic and analytical layer has been added, because the entire “intelligence operation” is looking to assassinate prominent individuals from various backgrounds in economy, military or politics so as to achieve the strategic goal of destabilising America’s society and economy. As such, the analytical element is not necessarily a stage in the Jih¯adi intelligence cycle itself, but rather part of the “introduction”, laying down the ideological groundwork. One must also visit sub-chapter “Specifying the target”, since the latter stage requires no less than prior analysis and specific subject matter knowledge: “And our war with America will be prioritized by targeting its economy; and we will select targets by prioritizing economic personalities.”47 41

Lowenthal (2009), p. 55. Al-Qaeda (2015), pp. 64. 43 Ibid. p. 64. 44 Ibid. p. 66. 45 Ibid. p. 68. 46 Ibid. p. 66. 47 Ibid. p. 66. 42

2.4 The (Jih¯adi) Intelligence Cycle

17

Stage D appears to be split into two sub-stages, namely “Preparing for the Operation” and “Executing the Operation”. The preparation on an operation includes choosing and acquiring weapons and a certain amount of training with the respective weapons. Most of this stage consists of a high level of tactical value and thus, once again illustrates the tactical nature of the Jih¯adi intelligence cycle. Consequently, these stages contain “processing and exploitation of information” as much as “consumption of information” in order to reach a tactical decision. However, the authors stress that, at this stage, spiritual preparation should also be considered. Thus, the re-manifestation of ideological beliefs and operational art is already part of the picture prior to the “intelligence operation” being carried out. Consequently, critical viewpoints or contradicting information, both of which could have found their way into the rather rudimentary analytical part of the intelligence cycle, are eradicated again by the Jih¯adi interpretation of Islam, which ultimately either ends in martyrdom or in the operative’s retreat from the area of operation: “So it is important for the brother to increase in worship and remembrance to what Allah has promised for the Martyr in His path. Contemplating on the great role he is playing for the Ummah. And remembering that he is a building block in the revival of the Khilafa, returning its glory and strengthening the religion.”48

The stages of the intelligence operation outlined by the “External Operation Team” appear to end here, climaxed by martyrdom. There are no further stages or steps since the main goal has been achieved though martyrdom. In the case of a government, one would continue here with the stages of “feedback” or “dissemination” and ultimately start over with the stage of “direction” based on the newly found information.49 These last stages of “feedback”, namely “dissemination” and to a certain extent “direction”, have in fact been taken over by the publication of “lessons learned” in various Jih¯adi materials. These “lessons learned” are frequently published on most Jih¯adi operations and—although highly biased—continue to feed back into the cycle as they provide a form of framework and point of reference. They allow for the dissemination of findings, i.e. the analytical conclusion that adversaries can also be harmed at an economic or societal level as well as which individuals need to be targeted in order to achieve a certain economic, political or societal outcome (see chapter: Covert Operations).

48 49

Ibid. p. 69. Lowenthal (2009), p. 56.

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2 Strategic Intelligence Background

Jih¯adi intelligence is based on a unique version of the already established concept of the intelligence cycle. Jih¯adi operatives have embraced and adapted the specific stages of said framework. For example, the San Bernardino 2015 shooters Syed Farook und Tashfeen Malik appear to have executed their attack—termed a “covert intelligence operation by al-Qaeda”50 —according to the five steps of the Jih¯adi intelligence cycle without even having targeted an individual, but rather a group of people.51 In addition, some version of the Jih¯adi intelligence cycle with respect to the IS-offshoot JKBW has been published by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi based on a conversation the researcher had with a Jih¯adi intelligence operative: “The office [of the JKBW security apparatus] concerned with intelligence: Not an absolutely secret office, for it was the first information centre and from it went forth information to the first and last office. It was responsible for submitting documented information and with witness testimonies if possible: documented, found on Google, recorded or photographed. And here appeared the extent of the force of the case and the decision after that went back to the Emir of the general security office: determining and deciding the case at the time and arrest.”52 —Anonymous JKBW intelligence operative statement.53

In contrast to a governmental version of the intelligence cycle, we can see a very clear differentiation when it comes to the realms of ideology and operational art. These stages would normally not directly influence a governmental intelligence cycle. However, the Jih¯adi version is overshadowed by specific ideological motivators and justifications. These ideological elements are not only used to infuse operational art into the cycle, but also to connect an individual with the cycle and its goals at the stage of “direction” while re-establishing Jih¯adi doctrines after the analytical stage. This is termed “making a plan”. 50

Al-Qaeda (2016), pp. 27–31 but also the “Just Terror” publications of IS (2015), Just Terror. In both cases, amongst other publications, the terminology used oftentimes mimics the language of governmental instituions. 51 Rosenfeld (2015). 52 Al-Tamimi (2018). 53 Ibid.

References

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The presence of ideology at this stage should not only be understood as a herald of impending martyrdom, but also as a mechanism that actually renders both analytical reasoning and possibly contradicting information (which could have come up in the research phase) meaningless. Indeed, this is the stage where the governmental intelligence cycle and the Jih¯adi intelligence cycle appear to be the most different. This is where we come to see the true uniqueness of the Jih¯adi subculture and its intelligence activities.

References Al-Qaeda (2004). Military studies in the Jih¯ad against the Tyrants. This Al-Qaeda source will be cited as: Post JM (ed) (2004) Military Studies in the Jih¯ad against the Tyrants. USAF Counterproliferation Center. Accessed online: http://www.au.af.mil/au/cpc/assets/alqaedatrainingman ual.pdf Al-Qaeda (2009) A practical course of guerrilla war (by Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin). This Al-Qaeda source has been cited as: Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009) A practical course of Guerrilla War. Translated by Norman Cigar, published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency. Washington Al-Qaeda (2015). Inspire no. 14. Al-Qaeda (2016) Inspire no. 15. Professional Assassinations Al-Tamimi A (2018) ‘Islamic State’ in south Syria/an inside Look at its Internal Security Apparatus. Accessed online: http://www.aymennjawad.org/21513/islamic-state-in-south-syria-an-ins ide-look-at Bimfort MT (1995) A definition of Intelligence. CIA Historical Review Program Browning S (1997) Understanding non-western cultures: a strategic intelligence perspective. USAWC Strategic Research Project, pp 1–27 Dvornik F (1974) Origins of intelligence services. Rutgers University Press Gentry JA, Spencer D (2010) Colombia’s FARC: a portrait of insurgent intelligence. Intell Nat Secur 25:453–478 Haberl F (2016a) The art of darkness—ideological foundations and present implications of Jih¯adi counterintelligence, counterespionage, denial and deception culture. MA Thesis. University of Vienna Haberl F (2016b) The art of darkness—ideological foundations and present implications of Jih¯adi counterintelligence, counterespionage, denial and deception culture. J Intell Propaganda Secur Stud 10(1):145–165 Hermann M (1996) Intelligence power in peace and war. Cambridge University Press Ilardi GJ (2010) IRA operational intelligence: the heartbeat of the war. Small Wars Insurgencies 21:331–358 IS (2015) Dabiq no. 12 IS (2016) Dabiq no. 14 Jones L (2014) The time when spy agencies officially didn’t exist. BBC, accessed online: http:// www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29938135 Keegan J (1987) The mask of command. Penguin, London Lowenthal MM (2009) Intelligence—from secrets to policy. CQ Press Marks RA (2010) Spying in America in the post 9/11 World. Praeger, pp 1–153 Post JM (ed) (2004) Military studies in the Jih¯ad against the Tyrants. USAF Counterproliferation Center. Accessed online: http://www.au.af.mil/au/cpc/assets/alqaedatrainingmanual.pdf Random RA (1993) Intelligence as a science. Stud Intell 2(2):76. Accessed online: https://www. cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a08p_0001.htm

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Reuters (2018). Austria calls on Germany to clarify spying allegations. Accessed online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-germany-spying/austria-calls-on-germany-toclarify-spying-allegations-idUSKBN1JC0RU Rosenfeld E (2015) NBC News reports identity of suspected San Bernardino attacker. CNBC. Accessed online: https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/02/authorities-responding-to-reports-of-massshooting-in-san-bernardino-california-nbc-los-angeles.html Stark B (2016) The intelligence cycle: an introduction to direction, collection, analysis & dissemination of intelligence. Published on Intelligence 101. Accessed online: http://www.intelligence 101.com/an-introduction-to-the-intelligence-cycle/

Chapter 3

Collection Sources

Abstract When Jih¯adi groups gather intelligence, they usually prefer human sources (HUMINT). Such HUMINT is obtained from information that comes from humans. It is a fairly inexpensive method of gathering information and also the oldest in human history. Jih¯adi groups also make considerable use of open-source information, as many intelligence requests can be answered using this discipline. In addition to this collection of open-source intelligence, Jih¯adi groups have conducted clandestine HUMINT activities (i.e. recruitment of assets) as well as Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) via balloons or other affordable devices and vehicles, and especially the Islamic State has used Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance purposes and offensive attacks much like this would be done by some governmental institutions. Keywords Human intelligence · HUMINT · Open source intelligence · OSINT · Covert intelligence sources · Intelligence assets · Asset recruitment · Signals intelligence · Imagery intelligence · Surveillance drones · UAVs · Drone counter measures

3.1 Human Intelligence (HUMINT) “The Prophet said, “Who will bring me the information about the enemy?” Az-Zubair the spy responded, “I will.” The Prophet said, “Every prophet had a disciple and my disciple is Az-Zubair.””1

When Jih¯adi groups collect intelligence, they commonly favour human sources. Such HUMINT is derived from information obtained from humans. It is a rather inexpensive collection method and also the oldest one in human history. It requires sources that need to be convinced to share their knowledge on certain circumstances.2

1 2

Al-Bukhari Vol. 4(99). Hermann (1996), p. 61.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_3

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It requires sources that can be understood as being on a scale ranging from nonsensitive sources, like travellers or experts, to sensitive sources, who may hold specific and highly relevant information on a subject.3 Interviews with refugees, travellers or local sources can lead to passively finding out what a population knows about a certain situation, whereas casual contacts may be asked to deliver specific information in order to fill some knowledge gaps. In the realms of Jih¯adi intelligence, we can observe both approaches. IS, for instance, has built up significant HUMINT networks, but also interrogated travellers, potential recruits and want-to-be citizens of its IS-Caliphate arriving from Turkey4 aside from trying to place high-level spies: “A week before I defected, I was sitting with the chief of the Amn al-Khariji, Abu Abd Rahman al-Tunisi. They know the weak point of the FSA. Al-Tunisi told me: ‘We are going to train guys we know, recruiters, Syrians… Take them, train them, and send them back to where they came from. We’ll give them $200,000 to $300,000. And because they have money, the FSA will put them in top positions.”5 —IS intelligence operative.

The same strategy has been pursued with respect to proclaimed adversaries in Europe. During the 2015 influx of migrants into Europe, a Syrian teenager who had fought with IS for two years before to his arrival in Germany tried to gather intelligence on potential targets in Berlin.6 The IS intelligence operative collected intelligence on potential targets, including the Brandenburg Gate and Reichstag and passed this information along to his contacts within the group.7 IS has indeed prepared intelligence operatives to enter Europe under the cover of asylum seekers and instructed the operatives on how to avoid detection, pass police interviews and gain refugee status in Europe.8 Within the group’s controlled territory, children have come to be trained to act as messengers or spies.9 Indeed, after having attended Islamic State schools, which themselves place significant attention on military training, boys are allotted roles and allocated to duty stations. These roles commonly involve tasks for which children are better suited than adult soldiers or operatives.10 Initially, however, children are trained as intelligence operatives, instructed to provide information on family members, friends or neighbours, should such people not conduct themselves in manner properly conforming with the laws of the “Caliphate”.11 Intelligence-related roles (especially with regard to providing information on their social networks) are regarded as entry-level positions from which boys can be moved into other tasks with 3

Ibid. 61. Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). 5 Weiss (2017). 6 Deutsche Welle (2016). 7 Kammergericht Berlin (2016). 8 Bewarder and Flade (2016). 9 Montgomery (2014). 10 Benotman and Malik (2016), pp. 1–83. 11 Horgan and Bloom (2015). 4

3.1 Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

23

more responsibility. However, once they enter the ranks of being active soldiers for the “Islamic State”, often joining the frontlines, they are also trained in gathering intelligence on adversaries.12 While IS has used children for espionage purposes, other Jih¯adi groups like al-Qaeda have tried to place high-level spies into roles at the earlier stages of the group’s existence. The Australian convert Willie Brigitte, who had undergone Jih¯adist training in Pakistan and Afghanistan, for example, not only facilitated the acquisition of Belgian passports for the two assassins who killed Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Afghan Northern Alliance warlord,13 but also attempted to gather intelligence himself. After getting married to Melanie Brown in 2003, an Australian woman employed by the Army,14 who also then converted to Islam, he aggressively sought information on the Army’s equipment and operations, which included detailed enquiries regarding the Pine Gap joint defence facility. Melanie Brown never ended up making any classified information available to him and only shared information that was not considered substantially secret. Furthermore, she decided to destroy her notebooks documenting her time spent in the Australian Army in East Timor for security reasons.15 Consequently, Willie Brigitte failed to convince a source to expose secret information to him, despite him trying to recruit a source based on emotions, love and what some intelligence services have termed a “honeypot” or “honey trap”. This terminology, however, primarily refers to seduction as a classic intelligence technique, utilising male and female agents trained to seduce intelligence sources and gain secretive information by means of sexual or emotional manipulation.16 Convincing sources to reveal information can take place in a variety of different levels ranging from those who provide information for patriotic reasons, those who seek a financial incentive or those who might cooperate with intelligence services for ideological reasons. For example, in 2014, a female FBI translator holding a top-secret security clearance embarked on a journey to Syria in order to marry the infamous German Jih¯adi Denis Cuspert,17 who at the time was closely linked to IS. As a German “activist” tasked with recruiting more German Jih¯adis, it is assumed that there was a connection to IS’ security apparatus Emni.18 Still, these casual sources or subject matter experts are not trained intelligence officers who permanently operate under assumed identities in order to recruit or run agents. They also are not defectors or high-level agents placed in influential positions from where they could spy on their own country or provide information from within a clandestine organisation or competing intelligence agency.19 The most valuable 12

Benotman and Malik (2016), pp. 1–83. Jackson (2004). 14 Ibid. 15 Miranda (2015). 16 Knightley (2010). 17 Glover (2017). 18 Deutsche Welle (2014). 19 Hermann (1996), p. 63. 13

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HUMINT source is hence a long-serving agent that can provide detailed information or copy relevant documents. Al-Qaeda’s Ali Mohamed may be a good example in this regard, because he managed to infiltrate the CIA, FBI and Fort Bragg over an extended period of time.20 However, the identification and resulting recruitment of sources may take a long time and communication with their controllers may ultimately be limited.21 As a result, this kind of reporting might be rather cumbersome and slow, while the inherent risk of the source fabricating reports or acting as a double agent (one that could provide deceptive materials or penetrate the intelligence service they are supposedly working for) always exists.22 In the case of Jih¯adi groups, the spies Ali Mohamed (see chapter: Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed) and Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi23 are rather infamous. The German military counterintelligence Agency (MAD) has uncovered 20 Islamists—allegedly Jih¯adis—who have tried to join the German armed forces. The agency has reported that it has put another 60 suspects under surveillance. The MAD has also announced that a large number of applicants were only interested in shortterm employment, asking to be trained in the use of heavy weaponry.24 While this might indicate that certain applicants might have planned to use the received military training in order to fight in Syria, the intelligence value of theoretically having such Islamists inside the German Armed Forces certainly cannot be underestimated. In 2005, the CIA had a similar experience, when up to 40 possible terrorists attempted to infiltrate the agency within a few short months.25 For Jih¯adi groups, this kind of HUMINT collection is the most important since they cannot rely on satellites or SIGINT as much as governments can. Indeed, when it comes to governments, human sources have recently lost some of their importance to intelligence agencies due to technical collection methodologies.26 The same cannot be said for non-state actors who heavily rely on human networks and human sources.27 Furthermore, human espionage supports other collection disciplines. Bugging devices, for instance, need to be placed and positioned by human sources while decoding cyphers may be aided by copies of the code obtained from a secret source. Also, HUMINT may be the only collection source capable of acquiring certain technologies, IT infrastructure, software, relevant equipment or manuals, as was the case with Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed (Ali Mohamed), who acted as a spy for al-Qaeda. Indeed, what would emerge from the information Ali Mohamed went on to acquire ended up having far-reaching consequences—especially due to the fusion of intelligence, ideology and operational art. 20

Wright (2007), p. 180; see also: Post (2004). Hermann (1996), p. 65. 22 Ibid, p. 65. 23 Gorman et al. (2010). 24 Die (2016). 25 Padilla (2005). 26 Hermann (1996), p. 65. 27 Reuter (2015). 21

3.2 Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal Al-Balawi

25

3.2 Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal Al-Balawi The Camp Chapman (FOB Chapman)28 attack was a suicide attack against the CIA facility inside the Camp on December 30th, 2009. The attacker, Humam Khalil AbuMulal al-Balawi, had been exposed to the Jih¯adi cause very early in life29 and became a famous contributor to the online al-Hesbah forum,30 while also running his own Jih¯adi blog.31 Al-Balawi used the nom de guerre “Abu Dujana al-Khurasani”32 and aside from describing his Jih¯adi career online, he also claimed to have fought in Afghanistan and promoted others to join in acts of violence.33 “… If he dies in the Cause of Allah, he will grant his words glory that will be permanent marks on the path to guide to Jih¯ad, with permission from Allah.”—Al-Balawi.34

Furthermore, he tried to boost the image of Ayman al-Zarqawi—who was in fact from the same city of Zaraq—after al-Qaeda had launched an attack in the Jordanian capital Amman in 2005.35 Indeed, al-Balawi and his online alter ego Abu Dujana had become the most widely known al-Qaida virtual Jih¯adists by 2007.36 He was consequently arrested in January, 2009, held for three days and then turned into an agent loyal to the US and Jordan in late 2007 at the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (Da’irat al Mukhabarat),37 which is a close ally of the US intelligence community.38 During his interrogation, al-Balawi was threatened with jail time and banned from practising medicine. He was also told that if he would cooperate, none of this would happen and his family would be left alone. The General Intelligence Directorate believed they had successfully turned him into a double agent,39 which sparked the interest of the CIA, which believed he might be useful in locating al-Qaeda’s cadres and core leadership.40 After having maintained a close connection to the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, Al-Balawi was believed to have reformed41 and, thus, was invited to share urgent information with US intelligence officials on the location of Ayman 28

FOB: Forward Operating Base. A FOB is a secured forward operational level military position that supports overall strategic and tactical objectives. 29 Warrick and Finn (2010). 30 Ibid. 31 NPR (2010). 32 Denver Post (2010). 33 Nasaw (2010). See also: The Telegraph (2010). 34 Ibid. Telegraph article. 35 Warrick (2012), p. 38. 36 PBS Newshour (2010). 37 Windrem and Engel (2010). 38 For relevant research on the subject see: Yitzhak (2016). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2016. 1121038. 39 Green (2010). 40 The Telegraph (2010). 41 Nasaw (2010).

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al-Zawahiri.42 The Jordanian intelligence officers functioned as if they were fully convinced that he was working with them while the CIA was hoping for vital intelligence on Ayman al-Zawahiri. He was then brought to FOB Chapman on the restive border to Pakistan so that arrangements could be made with respect to him infiltrating the al-Qaida there in Afghanistan.43 A Jordanian report concludes that he was an “informant, who offered dangerous and important information, which the authorities said they had to take seriously”. Since the CIA had come to trust Al-Balawi, Jordanian intelligence ultimately vouched for him and thus, he was not thoroughly searched prior to entering FOB Chapman.44 Indeed, the Jordanian report also mentioned that although he was not recruited as an active agent of the Jordanian intelligence Directorate or the CIA, he was “a trusted source who went onto the base without inspection”.45 The car he and Arghawan, the Afghan chief of the camp’s external security,46 were in was waved through three checkpoints before arriving at its destination far inside the base.47 Not only Al-Balawi’s Jordanian handler Ali bin Zeid, but also the CIA had worked with him previously and he had, in fact, provided highly useful information for counterterrorism operations.48 Thus, 16 intelligence operatives were waiting for him near a building set up for his debriefing.49 Throughout this entire venture, and prior when he fought in Afghanistan, AlBalawi provided different cover stories to the Jordanian authorities, to his wife (who thought he had travelled to Pakistan), or his family (who believed he was in Turkey and planning to study medicine in the US), while his brother thought he had gone to Gaza.50 Ultimately, Al-Balawi would end up in FOB Chapman, where he detonated a bomb that was sewn into his vest, killing seven CIA operatives, his Jordanian handler, an Afghan national working for the CIA, the Afghan driver and himself.51 Al-Balawi’s suicide attack was not only a significant setback for the CIA’s operations against al-Qaeda,52 the incident also seen as a small victory for al-Qaeda, which did not hesitate to use it for its propaganda, while also demonstrating to the CIA just what al-Qaeda is capable of.53

42

Green (2010). Nasaw (2010). 44 Oppel et al. (2010). 45 UPI (2010). 46 Warrick (2012), pp. 166–167. 47 Warrick (2012), p. 170. 48 Von Marschall (2010). 49 Warrick (2012), p. 197. 50 Farrell (2010). 51 Ibid. 52 Gorman (2010). 53 Entous (2010). 43

3.3 Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed

27

3.3 Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed “The prophet–Allah bless and keep him—had local informants in Mecca who told him everything,….”—Ali Mohamed in his al-Qaeda Training Manual.

One remarkable example of Jih¯adi espionage/HUMINT activity might be the alQaeda double agent Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed (Ali Mohamed), a former major in Egypt’s army intelligence unit,54 who managed to penetrate the CIA. Ali Mohamed, moreover, was not only relaying military documents to Egyptian Islamic Jih¯ad and later to al-Qaeda, he also used the collected information—and most likely also his covert operations training—to write the manual “Military Studies in the Jih¯ad Against the Tyrants”, which would later become one of al-Qaeda’s most important training publications. He wrote it in the 1980s and most intriguingly, aside from focusing on tradecraft and practical advice in insurgency warfare and intelligence operations, he also included large sections that are mainly concerned with the warfare principles of the prophet Muh.ammad, the Sunnah and the Ah.a¯ d¯ıth. Indeed, Ali Mohamed took great inspiration from the battles of Muh.ammad and found them to be useful in order to create common principles, in order to legitimise espionage operations and in order to justify the honourable role of the spy in wartime: “Spying on the enemy is permitted and it may even be a duty in the case of war between Moslems and others. Winning the battle is dependent on knowing the enemy’s secrets, movements, and plans. The prophet—Allah bless and keep him—used that method. He would send spies and informants. Perhaps, he—Allah bless and keep him—even went himself as in the major Badr attack.”—Al Qaeda manual.55

While serving as an intelligence officer in an Egyptian special forces unit, he was tasked with the recruitment and training of intelligence assets,56 but also occasionally arranged for the personal protection details of Egyptian diplomats abroad.57 This brought him to the US in order to continue his military training at Fort Bragg. His activities as a double agent started after he had travelled to the US, was approached by the CIA and began to work with Ayman al-Zawahiri, who at this time was not yet declared an enemy of the US and engaged in recruiting fighters who would join him—and indirectly also the US during the cold war—in fighting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Furthermore, Ali Mohamed helped al-Zawahiri enter the US with a fake passport to begin with. Zawahiri, who himself at a very young age used to be the leader of a clandestine group in Egypt, a situation that allowed him to gain years of experience in how to utilise intelligence, ultimately motivated Ali Mohamed to penetrate the Central Intelligence Agency.58 According to D. Temple-Raston’s research, he 54

Wright (2007), p. 180. Post (2004). 56 Counter Terrorism Center (2008). 57 Waldman et al. (2001). 58 Al-Zayyat (2004), p. 18. 55

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consequently ended up simply offering his services to the CIA’s Egyptian station chief and was hired as a “junior intelligence officer”.59 When tasked with infiltrating a mosque with assumed connections to Hezbollah, he revealed himself to the Imam as a spy, which was, however, recognised by a fellow CIA asset who was also present in the mosque at that time. As a consequence, he was naturally dismissed from the CIA, but managed to enlist in the Special Forces at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after his activities at the CIA had concluded.60 This meant that a man who had aligned himself with alQaeda’s Egyptian Islamic Jih¯ad predecessor in the same year61 was now serving in an American Army uniform alongside the same special forces units that would, in an ironic twist, later engage in hunting down al-Qaeda in its Afghan stronghold.62 During his time at paratrooper classes at Fort Bragg, Mohamed started to search for information that could contain useful intelligence. He managed to steal military manuals related to unconventional warfare, which he would later pass on to al-Qaeda after his tour with the special forces had ended.63 Aside from training materials on how to set booby traps and build IEDs, he also advised al-Qaeda on how to communicate via dead drops and in a coded fashion allowing them to avoid surveillance.64 He went on to recommend private PO boxes in order to anonymise communication, which is actually a rather common method of secure communication inside Jih¯adi groups, something that had also been recommend by an al-Qaeda’s military thinker, Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin. While stationed at Fort Bragg, he also acquired unclassified maps of Afghanistan, which were passed on to Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Muj¯ahid¯ın leader at that time, after he had returned to Afghanistan in 1988.65 Some other documents acquired by Ali Mohamed included operation manuals for a number of different weapons, which included assault rifles and anti-tank weapons, top secret special forces training manuals, US warship docking locations in the Persian Gulf, a Joint Chiefs of Staff Warning Order intended for military command centres, the White House, the Defence Intelligence Agency, US Embassies in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Saudi Arabia as well as documents that identified the location of some special forces units in December of the same year.66 Ali Mohamed’s activities did not end there. On weekends, he would go on trips to New Jersey or New York in order to liaise with members of an Egyptian Islamic Jih¯ad cell, to whom he handed over sensitive materials.67 During these trips, he

59

Temple-Raston (2007). Wright (2007), p. 180. 61 Counter Terrorism Center (2008). 62 Ibid. 63 National Geographic (2012), min. 12:23. 64 Ibid. min. 21:56. 65 Lance (2009), p. 43. 66 USA v. Omar Abdel Rahman et al. (1995a). See also: Lance (2009), pp. 55, 545. 67 Miller et al. (2002), p. 143; see also: Lance (2009), p. 47. 60

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stayed at the home of his trainee El Sayyid Nosair, who would later become associated with the notorious al-Farouq Mosque in Brooklyn.68 The mosque used to cooperate with the Maktab al-Khadamat, an office established in 1984 by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam, which raised funds for and recruited the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan. Ali Mohamed used to train key members of the cell connected to the first World Trade Centre bombing and the terror cell, which had planned to blow up the UN headquarters in New York and the surrounding bridges and connecting tunnels to Manhattan. In addition to the military training provided by Ali Mohamed, he passed on stolen training materials to the Egyptian Islamic Jih¯ad.69 Indeed, in 1989, El Sayyid Nosair screened US military training videos that featured Ali Mohamed in the Al-Kifah Center in Jersey City70 and during Mohamed’s first visit to the Al-Kifah Center, he left training manuals stolen from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at the centre’s disposal.71 Ali Mohamed also provided classified US Army manuals and training in various disciplines at the al-Farouq Mosque while having instructed several members at a shooting range on Long Island.72 In November of 1990, his student El Sayyid Nosair put the training he received into action and disguised himself as an Orthodox Jew in order to gain access to a speech held by Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of the Jewish Defence League, whom he had planned to assassinate.73 When the police raided Nosair’s house a day after the shooting, investigators confiscated two boxes of classified military documents, which Ali Mohamed had acquired while being stationed at Fort Bragg.74 During his time in the US Special Forces, he also frequently and independently visited Afghanistan in order to fight against the Soviets and teach selected Jih¯adis, including Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Saif alAdel and the attackers of the two US embassies in Africa.75 In fact, Ali Mohamed trained terrorist cells and worked for al-Qaeda, with information that he had previously stolen from the CIA or from the special forces in the US. He remained in contact with Jih¯adi fighters in Afghanistan throughout the 80s and in 1990, while having trained Jih¯adis in intelligence collection, unconventional warfare (which included hijacking, assassinations, suicide attacks, kidnapping and improvised explosive devices).76 In this regard, he and Abd Al-Aziz al-Muqrin would become some of al-Qaeda’s most influential military thinkers and strategists. 68

Counter Terrorism Center (2008). Egyptian Islamic Jih¯ad, also known as or “Tanzim al-Jih¯ad”, is an Egyptian Islamist terrorist organisation, which has been active since 1980. It has oftetimes been considered an affiliate of al-Qaeda. 70 USA v. Omar Abdel Rahman et al.(1995b), p. 14249. 71 Ibid, p. 14249. 72 Benjamin and Steven (2003), pp. 4–6. 73 Specter (1990). 74 National Geographic (2012). min. 12:23. 75 PBS Frontline (2005). 76 Wright (2007), p. 181. 69

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In 1990, he also attempted to infiltrate the FBI by attempting to gain employment as a translator. After the FBI initially turned him down, he provided information on a local document-forging ring linked to Hamas.77 Intriguingly, his work with the FBI does not appear to have been significantly affected by the police raid of Sayyid Nosair’s apartment in November 1990, after the Jih¯adi had assassinated the American-Israeli Orthodox rabbi Meir Kahane. Indeed, although 47 boxes of evidence were confiscated in Sayyid Nosair’s apartment, which included documents that Ali Mohamed had obtained in Fort Bragg, the FBI does not appear to have connected the dots.78 Surprisingly, these boxes even contained copies of his training video, which featured his photograph on the actual cover.79 “I received a call from an FBI agent who wanted to speak to me about the upcoming trial of United States v. Abdel Rahman80 I flew back to the United States, spoke to the FBI, but didn’t disclose everything that I knew. I reported on my meeting with the FBI to Abu Hafs and was told not to return to Nairobi.”81

When Ali Mohamed became an FBI informant, Osama bin Laden gained important insights into the agency’s attempts to infiltrate al-Qaeda.82 In the same time period, Ali Mohamed repeatedly travelled to Afghanistan in order to train terrorist cells, which allegedly amounted to 58 journeys despite him still being monitored by the CIA.83 Ironically, he actually managed to train al-Qaeda generals in intelligence warfare while being under surveillance himself, which led some commentators to consider him highly capable or to figure him to possibly be sponsored by the CIA as part of a covert operation against the Soviet Union.84 “In 1995, I obtained a copy of the co-conspirator list for the Abdel Rahman trial. I sent the list to el Hage in Kenya, expecting that it would be forwarded to bin Laden in Khartoum.”—Ali Mohamed Trial.85

In the summer of 1991, Ali Mohamed received the order to assist Bin Laden in his relocation from Afghanistan to the Sudan.86 He consequently managed to transfer Bin Laden and a group of more than 2.000 mujahidin from Kabul to Khartoum via Peshawar and Karachi.87 After having successfully executed this operation, he remained in Khartoum to establish training camps intended to focus on weapons 77

Miller et al. (2002), p. 144. Lance (2009). Ch. 6. 79 Ibid. Ch. 6. 80 Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman has commonly been known as “The Blind Sheikh”. He served a life sentence for seditious conspiracy. Abdel-Rahman was furthermore accused of leading the militant movement Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (“The Islamic Group”). 81 USA v. Ali Mohamed (2000). 82 Ibid. 83 Andrew and Berens (2001). 84 Counter Terrorism Center (2008). 85 Ibid. 86 Lance (2009), p. 123. 87 Weiser (2000). 78

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training, improvised explosive devices, kidnappings, urban warfare and counterintelligence.88 The training he provided to al-Qaeda further included surveillance, codes (and code breaking) and organisational training on how to establish cell structures.89 As a result, bin Laden and Ali Mohamed managed to create cells in Tanzania and Kenya, which he recommended be funded through fishing and car businesses. After having established these cover businesses in Africa, he relocated to Afghanistan where he continued to train members of al-Qaeda, one of thing being L’Houssaine Kherchtou. He was sent by al-Qaeda commander Abu Hafs to be trained together with Anas al-Liby and Saif al-Liby in an advanced course on surveillance, which was held in Bin Laden’s own house in Peshawar, Pakistan.90 In 1993, Ali Mohamed was questioned by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police after a member of al-Qaeda attempted to enter the US with Mohamed’s driving licence and a fake ID. Remarkably, Ali Mohamed admitted to having travelled to Vancouver in order to help al-Qaeda members to enter the United States. This incident, however, does not appear to have caused any consequences. Furthermore, he was not concerned about being arrested per se, but that the interview with the police might affect his chances of gaining employment as an FBI interpreter.91 Ali Mohamed also worked as a spy for Osama bin Laden and, in addition to teaching the associated techniques to his fellow Jih¯adis, conducted surveillance operations on his own accord. In late 1993, bin Laden approached him again and asked him to conduct surveillance on possible American, French, British or Israeli targets in Nairobi.92 After photographing the US Agricultural Office, the French Embassy, the USAID building, the French Cultural Center and the US Embassy—and after having developed the photographs in the Nairobi apartment of L’Houssaine Kherchtou—Ali Mohamed presented his findings to Bin Laden.93 The US Embassy was ultimately selected as a target by Bin Laden, who identified the best spot for destroying the building with a bomb (in 1998) based on the photographs taken by Ali Mohamed. Afterwards, Bin Laden’s spy was sent to Djibouti in order to conduct similar surveillance on the US Embassy there as well as on several French military bases.94 Most importantly, Ali Mohamed conducted a very detailed level of surveillance, which was based on the aforementioned intelligence cycle: “In late 1993, I was asked by bin Laden to conduct surveillance of American, British, French, and Israeli targets in Nairobi. … I took pictures, drew diagrams, and wrote a report. Khalid al Fawwaz paid for my expenses and the photo enlarging equipment. … I later went to

88

Engelberg (2001). USA v. Ali Mohamed (2000), p. 27. 90 USA. v. Usama Bin Laden et al. (2001a). 91 Ibid. 92 USA v. Ali Mohamed (2000), p. 27. 93 USA. v. Usama Bin Laden et al. (2001b), p. 1188. 94 USA v. Ali Mohamed (2000), p. 27. 89

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Previously, Ayman al-Zawahiri had tested Ali Mohamed’s qualifications and skillset by giving him an assignment. Prior to relocating to the US, Ali Mohamed had worked as a security advisor for EgyptAir after his career in the military had ended. Zawahiri consequently decided that an appropriate assignment might be to write a detailed report on the security preparations of Cairo airport.96 Furthermore, when he was later tasked with surveillance operations, he provided reports and imagery intelligence while also having served as a liaison to the Sudanese intelligence service on behalf of Osama bin Laden. The Sudanese intelligence service, according to a statement by Ali Mohamed, was involved in providing security for the camps in the Sudan and for bin Laden himself.97 On 7 August, 1998, al-Qaeda carried out the bombing of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Darussalam, which killed hundreds and wounded thousands. After the attacks had been executed successfully, Mohamed had made arrangements to relocate to Afghanistan. However, before he could depart, he was required to appear before a grand jury in New York98 and was secretly arrested after perjuring himself on 10 September 1998.99 In mid-May of the following year, he was indicted with respect to training members of al-Qaeda and on five counts of conspiracy.100 After Ali Mohamed pled guilty to his involvement in the 1998 Embassy bombings and had not yet been sentenced, he was moved into the custody of the US government at an undisclosed location.

3.4 Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) “Using this public source openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80% of information about the enemy.”—Al Qaeda Manual.101

Jih¯adi groups make significant use of open source information in order to plan attacks, engage in economic warfare and apply a strategic framework to their actions. While the utilisation of open source information for intelligence purposes has been around for a long time, it has only recently become a separate intelligence discipline. Being able to operate on a maximum amount of open source information normally holds a value for anyone involved in a certain situation and thus, open source intelligence (OSINT) is not only relevant for intelligence operatives, but also applies 95

Counter Terrorism Center (2008). National Geographic (2012), min. 9. 97 Counter Terrorism Center (2008). 98 USA v. Ali Mohamed (2000), p. 29. 99 Weiser (2000). 100 USA v. Ali Mohamed (2000). 101 Post (2004). 96

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under most circumstances, ranging from strategic to tactical applications. This form of intelligence collection can provide very general information like country studies, maps or satellite imagery, but also more technical information on the applicable operational environment. Indeed, there is a significant tactical advantage when it comes to OSINT and many intelligence requests can be addressed by using this discipline. Al-Qaeda’s spy Ali Mohamed, who wrote the “Al-Qaeda manual”, provided the aspiring Jih¯adi spy with a variety of different sources of intelligence, 20% of which he classified as “Secret Sources” and 80% of which he considered to be “Public Sources”.102 However, he stressed the importance of OSINT—ironically—by quoting Allen Dulles, the former director of the CIA.103 The most important—yet non-exclusive—terrain for OSINT are large groups of people, such as populations, that are subject to a flow of information, local news or propaganda.104 Also, military divisions, such as the US Army’s 10th Mountain Division, have started to incorporate ad hoc OSINT cells in Afghanistan, which were tasked with tracking propaganda offline or on the Internet, via radio broadcasts, or on local television.105 These efforts of collection on behalf of the 10th Mountain Division were followed by a daily analytical product, which explained media sources and analysed content.106 A similar approach could be observed during the Mumbai attacks in 2008, where the attackers heavily relied on OSINT found via Twitter or other online sources. This OSINT even included maps and real-time information. The Indian government actually attempted to shut down certain Twitter streams, fearing that this very information might be that used by the terrorists themselves.107 Also in Iraq, the 101st Airborne Division ran an OSINT cell in order to monitor the reactions of local civilians in the news media, a tactic also practised by IS. Most particularly, IS has advertised that it uses the Internet and open sources to gather intelligence on possible assassination targets (see Jih¯adi intelligence cycle).108 An example can be found when looking at Islamic State-affiliate Jaysh Khalid bin alWaleed (JKBW), which was formed in May of 2016. When researcher Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi managed to contact a member of the group via Facebook, his contact would routinely erase the messages the two exchanged. However, when the internal security apparatus of JKBW arrested him for being in touch with Al-Tamimi, some messages had not yet been erased, allowing JKBW to view them. No significant information was exchanged between the researcher and the member of JKBW, and thus, the Jih¯adi ended up being released from the group’s prison. After the JKBW had collapsed, Al-Tamimi was contacted again on Facebook by a former operative of JKBW, who told him: “I used to arrest your friends… And I was

102

Post (2004). Ibid, p. 87. 104 Draeger (2009a). 105 Ibid, pp. 39–45. 106 Ibid, pp. 39–45. 107 Beaumont (2008). 108 Al-Qaeda (2016), pp. 27–31. 103

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entrusted to follow your portfolio and the portfolio of all you were contacting.”109 The JKBW security apparatus member would later summarise the analytical conclusion the JKBW had arrived at with respect to the researcher Al-Tamimi himself: “All his works and publication were monitored, and his account was tracked along with comments in any place in order to reveal at the time a considerable number of the masses and soldiers he was exploiting to extract and take information, but they were exonerated of most of the accusations for many reasons, among them the fact that the security judge was not convinced he was an intel guy affiliated with the Mossad. But the security apparatus was not convinced otherwise and remained hostile to all following him or contacting him and that was for reasons: among them, for instance, the cases of Abu Hazim and Abu Qasura, in which it appeared that he was exploiting them and their families to extract information and write press articles.”110

Open source intelligence efforts may also focus on television, radio, antennae and newspapers, allowing for a very timely incorporation of the latest findings. Intelligence digests it into the intelligence cycle.111 Al-Qaeda had already utilised the power of open source information prior to 9/11. In November, 1991, a Jih¯adi attacker connected to al-Qaeda dressed up as a journalist and stabbed the former king of Afghanistan Muh.ammad Zahir Shah in his villa in Italy.112 After the failed assassination attempt, al-Qaeda’s intelligence operative Ali Mohamed went to Italy in order to investigate what had gone wrong and to provide some lessons learned to his supervisors within the Jih¯adi group. He heavily engaged in OSINT collection and consequently acquired newspaper articles, which were later translated by L’Houssaine Kherchtou in Kenya.113 In order to gather information, Jih¯adi groups are recommended to use source likes magazines, publications, periodicals and official printed matter. Ali Mohamed assesses in his guidelines on OSINT that analysing newspapers, magazines, official or political publications, TV and the radio can provide information on the travel plans of presidents, ministers and commanders. Furthermore, he elaborates that the following—and highly relevant—information can be acquired via open sources: – “Names and photographs of government personalities, police commanders, and security service personnel – Major political decisions and topics being discussed in policy meetings – Future policy agendas and general directives – Present and future enemy capabilities – Diplomatic news bilateral strategies – Tourism hotspots and the seasonal peaks of tourism in certain areas – Vacant positions that can be useful in order to gather intelligence – Practical information with regards to operations 109

Al-Tamimi (2018). Published on www.aymennjawad.org, Ibid. 111 Mercado (2008). 112 USA. v. Usama Bin Laden et al. (2001). 113 Ibid, p. 1152. 110

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– Political positions on Islam – Visual and audible elements – Interior of governmental institutions and organisations”114

Similar sources of intelligence may also be selected by governmental entities. In this regard, the data processed by OSINT collectors and analysts is also based on public and largely open sources, with newspapers being a very common source of information. This also means that OSINT can provide intelligence elements with a broader picture of a situation, but it may not always allow for an efficient intelligence product due to a lack in details. However, for a more detailed perspective, clandestine sources can provide more specific data, which, in return, also comes with the trade-off of having to use, train and place covert agents in addition to actually financing operations. Covert sources usually gather key missing pieces, but in order to understand the meaning of a certain piece of clandestine information, it must be contextualised and matched with what is already known or with what can be learned from public sources.115 Combining clandestine and open sources thus offers an almost complete picture of a situation and the synergy of both will achieve adequate results.116 Also, OSINT is comparatively speedy and, according to G. Hribar et al., allows for a “quick, accurate and real-time decision” to be made. Indeed, in times of crisis and when fast decision-making is required, intelligence analysts and decision-makers often first turn to the Internet or television.117 This is because commanders in the field need information fast so that military operations can be adjusted.118 Osama bin Laden not only made use of television in order to collect information, but also studied a large variety of open sources—and Western literature—so as to make decisions.119 However, an inherent advantage of OSINT lies in the number of open source information producers, like bloggers, reporters, journalists or think-tanks, all of which are more numerous and happier to share information publicly than intelligence analysts.120 This means that judgement calls need to be made. Still, OSINT collection is much less expensive than clandestine methods of collection. In addition, the necessary computer software is comparatively affordable, if not free or available online, while the necessary information can be accessed from mostly free sources like libraries, archives or the Internet. Consequently, OSINT can also provide a wider perspective than covert sources while not being limited with respect to data storage.121 OSINT has become an important intelligence collection discipline, because it can be practised anytime, anywhere 114

Post (2004), pp. 88–89. Loch (2008). 116 Hribar et al. (2014). 117 Draeger (2009a). 118 Ibid, pp. 39–45. 119 CIA (2017). 120 Hribar et al. (2014). 121 Draeger (2009b). 115

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and in any way, something that can be of a great advantage for Jih¯adi groups. Indeed, as early as in 2007, Palestinian Jih¯adis used google maps to identify Israeli targets.122 Also, according to J. Sims, an adversary’s reaction to OSINT can sometimes be even more revealing than clandestine operations, seen from the vantage point of counterintelligence.123 Since propaganda and intelligence have been fused by Jih¯adi groups—especially inside IS’ Emni organisation—OSINT provides an advantage in that it can be shared for the purpose of achieving propagandistic goals, which renders it to be a highly valued commodity. In this regard, it helps to create trust amongst governmental intelligence agencies who also share OSINT with each other. For Jih¯adi groups, it may turn out to be a welcome propaganda material that does not reveal any clandestine sources. Indeed, OSINT intelligence products or intelligence reports are widely shared over the Internet so as to achieve certain goals. In the case of IS, for example, the group appears to have tried to forge closer connections with the Kurdish Jih¯adi group Ansãr al-Islãm and has, thus, published an extensive analysis on the group and its past operations. Intriguingly, the wording and writing style of these reports tend to mimic a highly formal governmental style before Jih¯adi operational arts get introduced: “… the fertile earth was prepared and tilled by the scholars of Ahlus-Sunnah, while its seeds were watered with the blood and sweat of both the regional tribesman and the youth of the Muslim Ummah.”124 —Al-Risalah Magazine.125

Of all intelligence disciplines, and with respect to the types of data that OSINT can access, imagery intelligence products have turned out to be highly useful. According to W. Draeger, imagers and videos, but also satellite imagery like made possible by Google Earth, provide great visualisation, are commonly free and are highly sought after by military commanders. Indeed, this is mainly due to their tactical value and the possibility to identify people, buildings or objects, whereas videos are useful in providing additional understanding and insight.126 Furthermore, OSINT works best when combined with other intelligence disciplines, like HUMINT, where it can be used in interrogations or in order to confirm other findings.127 Indeed, social media sites provide detailed biographies on individuals, which can immediately and without much prior experience, be accessed:

122

Levinson (2007). Sims (2009). 124 Jabhat al-Nusra (2017). . 125 Al-Risalah was first published in July 2015 as an online magazine used by the AQ-affiliated Al-Nusra Front (later: Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, which merged with the Ansar al-Din Front, Jaysh alSunna, Liwa al-Haqq and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement and thus established Tahrir al-Sham in 2017) for the purposes of radicalisation, recruitment, spreading propaganda and for instructional purposes. 126 Draeger (2009b). 127 Ibid, pp. 39–44. 123

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“The one gathering information with this public method is not exposed to any danger whatsoever. Any brother can gather information from those aforementioned source.”128 —Al-Qaeda Manual.

IS, being another example, makes heavy use of social media for its propaganda, but the group’s awareness of the possible pitfalls of this media might further support the above argument, especially since the group has issued a ban of social media for Jih¯adi fighters so as to avoid infiltration by security services. Thus, they seem to be fully aware of social media intelligence.129

3.5 Covert Intelligence Sources Aside from open source intelligence collection, Jih¯adi groups have engaged in clandestine HUMINT activities. This type of intelligence is mainly collected from human sources and by using covert espionage techniques, whereas what would professionally be termed an “asset” or an “agent” is commonly referred to as a “spy”. However, clandestine methods are not limited to just the collection of intelligence, but also involve couriers, secure communications or support personnel (i.e. access agents). Large intelligence networks can also consist of multiple levels of agents and assets and are commonly organised according to a cell system that is rather limited in sharing information (for the purpose of operational security) and in order to reduce the risk of discovery. Al-Qaeda has established two categories of information relevant to the group that can only be collected by means of clandestine HUMINT activity. The first one includes information about government personnel, officers, important personal details, schedules and families. The second one includes information on critical infrastructure, TV stations, buildings, establishments or military installations. The group has summed up the relevant sources for both kinds of information as follow: – “Secret audio/video recordings – Photography – Interrogations of individuals – Stolen documents – Information obtained by drugging individuals – Surveillance and observation – Recruited individuals”130

Ali Mohamed proposes collecting the relevant clandestine HUMINT by means of either surveillance, observations, theft of documents, interrogations, excitement, drugging or the recruitment of agents.131 Especially Al-Qaeda’s and Ali Mohamed’s 128

Post (2004). Dearden (2017). 130 Post (2004), p. 90. 131 Ibid, p. 93. 129

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take on the recruitment, testing, management and termination of agents can also be found in various government intelligence services. Indeed, the fact that al-Qaeda has dedicated a lot of attention to these aspects of HUMINT truly reflects a great understanding of the complexities and psychology involved when building up relationships with an agent.132

3.5.1 The Recruitment Process—Target Identification The recruiting process for acquiring an asset/agent commonly begins with the identification of a target for whom the recruiter believes to have access to relevant information, which will be followed by selecting a promising approach method. In this regard, Jih¯adi and governmental approaches do not divert much and appear to be rather identical. Although governmental intelligence services may focus on diplomats, attachés or intelligence professionals (amongst other high-level targets for recruitment) and in order to acquire detailed and specific information, al-Qaeda has not suggested similarly important targets. In fact, their candidates for recruitment appear to be rather low-level targets, which one would rather associate with sources relevant to internal security and of importance in gaining an overview of the local (counter) intelligence landscape. These candidates may, however, be key assets if one aims to control and monitor the population or if the goal lies in vetting potential Jih¯adi recruits. Hence, al-Qaeda considers smugglers, political asylum seekers, adventurers, people who work in hotels or restaurants, people in need and border guards, airport employees or seaport workers to be extremely important candidates worthy of recruitment. Also, most of Al-Qaeda’s potential recruits are likely of a tactical value and do not appear to be strategically placed high-level assets such as diplomats or high-ranking military officers. Intriguingly, however, al-Qaeda also provides a list of types of agents who are allegedly preferred by the CIA, which in turn does include foreign officials, political dissidents, officials with lavish lifestyles (or a weakness for women), students, soldiers on a mission abroad or intelligence officials.133 Since this information appears to be of rather minimal counterintelligence value (most of the listed targets can hardly be found inside a Jih¯adi group, with the exception of intelligence officials and perhaps operatives abroad), and since it does not correspond with the recruitment methods outlined by Ali Mohamed, it is difficult to assess as to why al-Qaeda felt the need to include this information. Jerrold M. Post et al. assess that such publications may be a mere demonstration of the “breadth of their sources”—presumably for propagandistic purposes.134 This, again, illustrates the close connection of intelligence and propaganda in the Jih¯adi realm, but also how willing Jih¯adi groups are 132

Ibid, p. 103. Post (2004), p. 99. 134 Ibid, p. 99. 133

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to learn from their enemies, adversaries and from fellow terrorist groups at all stages of the intelligence cycle.

3.5.2 The Recruitment Process—Asset Development Al-Qaeda outlines stages that allow for the development of assets and range from “finding an asset” to the “termination an asset’s service”. In most governmental cases, an asset will not be approached directly by intelligence operatives, since there will be a developmental phase preceding the recruitment pitch in which one would aim to learn more about the prospect asset.135 Also, when it comes to Jih¯adi groups, alQaeda recommends that consideration be given to the financial conditions of a person, his family, his friends, his views on the government, but also his weaknesses and strengths.136 The asset will be continuously evaluated while being under surveillance and observation so that more aspects of the life of the individual can be learned before an operative decides to risk approaching the target.137 After this cultivation stage, a relationship will be established under a certain cover and disguised as a meeting with a different purpose. Ali Mohamed suggested using distant family relations as a cover.138 Indeed, professional meetings will eventually develop into more personal meetings, which will ultimately lead to the development stage of an asset.139 In addition to exploiting family connections, either tribal relations or developing friendships through workers’ unions can aid this phase, as recognised by Ali Mohamed. However, the al-Qaeda manual specifically stresses that the development of such a friendship needs to appear “unpretentious and unplanned”.140

3.5.3 The Recruitment Process—Asset Recruitment After finding, evaluating and approaching an asset, recruitment follows as the next stage in this process. It can be done in a direct manner and may involve proposing an employment opportunity for a Jih¯adi intelligence service with an agreed-upon payment. In some cases, however, this approach may not work and could induce antipathy and resentment. This holds true for Jih¯adi groups and governments alike. Hence, recruitment can also be indirect and information can be obtained from the asset without the target explicitly being aware of his role as an agent. Al-Qaeda

135

Ekpe (2007). Post (2004), p. 100. 137 Ibid, p. 100. 138 Post (2004), p. 100. 139 Ibid, p. 100. 140 Ibid, p. 100. 136

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proposes that this be achieved via gifts, emotional engagement and by attempting to solve professional or private problems the target may have.141 In any case, it is not uncommon for intelligence services to draw the asset into increasingly treasonous activities, rendering it harder and harder for the asset to withdraw or evade the control of the intelligence operative. It is considered important for the case officer to offer money as a means of compromising the prospective agent. In the case of Jih¯adi groups, the mere association or participation with such an illicit organisation may serve this very purpose. Additionally, compromising information coming in the form of photographs or personal data can be collected on the assets in order to compromise them or increase the grip an intelligence organisation may have over the respective agent.

3.5.4 The Recruitment Process—Testing and Training an Asset Testing an asset can provide certainty that the person in question is not an agent for an adversarial intelligence service or under surveillance. At this stage, al-Qaeda has assigned its assets certain tasks in order to test their ability, loyalty or dependability.142 In most cases, the intelligence organisation may already have certain information on a particular circumstance, yet tasks the potential asset with obtaining it. If the asset ends up providing information that does not match with existing information, then this may indicate unreliability or an attempt to deliberately mislead Jih¯adi handlers. In addition, the recruits are checked against biographical files or databases, which are of considerable great counterintelligence value. It is not just governmental services that make use of such databases.143 IS has actually established a highly sophisticated bureaucracy, which can aid this very purpose.144 Furthermore, al-Qaeda suggests three more means for testing the recruit other than requesting specific information. First, monitoring the recruit while working covertly. Second, overpayments can be made deliberately in order to test a recruit’s trustworthiness. And thirdly, providing the asset with a chance to place misinformation.145 Before an intelligence asset gets assigned, some training may be necessary in order to carry out a clandestine collection task. Covert communication skills are commonly some of the first elements of the intelligence module taught to a new asset, but other relevant aspects include training with the use of recording material or photography. The choice may also be made to not have the asset trained whatsoever and then handlers may rely on the agent’s instincts, talents or background.146 141

Ibid, p. 100. Ibid, p. 101. 143 Reuter (2015). 144 Callimachi (2018). 145 Post (2004), p. 102. 146 Ibid, p. 101. 142

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The transfer of captured information is also taught and al-Qaeda has devoted specific attention to dead drops when it comes to passing along information, but the transfer of information may also be carried out via couriers or electronic means (see chapter: Encryption and Secret Communication). Ali Mohamed has also stressed the aspects of concealment and disguise (which IS later made use of), but also the importance of secrecy and hiding information, which are tasks commonly associated with the counterintelligence aspect of managing agents.147

3.5.5 The Recruitment Process—Managing Assets Managing assets has been described by al-Qaeda as the skill of blending the professions of a spy, a psychiatrist and an interrogator. In this regard, Ali Mohamed presents two approaches of how Jih¯adi intelligence operatives may decide to handle an asset. Viewpoint one involves maintaining a strong personal relationship with the asset to increase motivation and in order for the asset to feel a need to cooperate and please a person he shares emotional ties with. However, al-Qaeda appears to have had the experience that removing barriers between agents and supervisors may lead to the asset asking for things that were not agreed upon. Hence, Ali Mohamed suggests proceeding with caution in this regard. Viewpoint two is consequently far less personal and emotional and supports the idea that a superior should treat an asset in a rough manner and push an agent to his/her limits. al-Qaeda suggests achieving this through harshness, cruelty and threats,148 although intriguingly Ali Mohamed himself believes that a Jih¯adi group should be able to combine the two approaches and put special emphasis on the connection between intelligence work and Islam itself: “The agent may be treated in a careful Islamic manner, while the managing brother appeals to the agent’s conscience and his Islamic association with the work for majestic Allah’s religion.”149

Despite the fact that Ali Mohamed suggests that one “lure an agent with money and presents, and [to] uses cruelty and kindness when appropriate”,150 he also explains that an agent’s assignment may be terminated if the recruitment mission ends, if his job situation changes, if he actually requests the termination (specific conditions for such a request are not given) and, most importantly, if the asset fails to conclude the counterintelligence measures and/or take the necessary security measures.151

147

Ibid, p. 101. Ibid, p. 102. 149 Ibid, p. 102. 150 Ibid, p. 102. 151 Ibid, p. 102. 148

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3.6 Signals Intelligence Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) has become one of the most prolific collection methods and sources of intelligence. Despite the availability of large-scale online collection programmes like PRISM or XKeystore,152 some aspects of SIGINT still depend on physical access to certain devices or infrastructures, like wires or telephone lines that need to be tapped or intercepted.153 This intelligence collection method has become a common practice since the American Civil War and no later than with the interception of telephone lines during the First World War’s trench warfare.154 During the 1950s, Soviet communications were tapped by the allied forces and after that, underwater cables were tapped during the Cold War.155 Moreover, the true real value of SIGINT started at the beginning of the century with the introduction of radio and the resulting possibilities of intercepting radio signals. With the even wider use of radio communication during World War II, SIGINT analysis grew considerably in importance, seeing a rise in coded information and the deciphering of such coded information. The Cold War played host to the introduction of even greater electronic communication methods. With that, the importance of SIGINT increased even more as the Cold War opponents endeavoured to continuously monitor each other. Ultimately, SIGINT combined with imagery intelligence (IMINT) would lead to the first intelligence satellites.156 Whereas both sides attempted to detect their enemy’s military installations and potential troop movements, SIGINT has still seen considerable growth outside the Cold War context due to the multiplication of communication technologies, something that has created numerous traditional and modern methods of interception.157 SIGINT has been part of the information technology revolution and most of it is now linked to mobile phones, computers and electronic communications.158 As such, SIGINT has seen sub-divisions into communication intelligence (COMINT), which deals with communication interception, deciphering codes and electronic intelligence (ELINT), which rests its focus on non-communications emissions.159 Hezbollah, for instance, has developed significant SIGINT capabilities160 and its personnel achieved the triangulation of the positions of IDF cell phones already in 2006.161 Much like as is the case with governments, Hezbollah’s SIGINT section is 152

Dorling (2013). Hermann (1996), p. 67. 154 Thurbon (1977). 155 Woodward (1988). 156 Hermann (1996), p. 68. 157 Ibid, p. 68. 158 Ibid, p. 68. 159 Hermann (1996), p. 69. 160 Zitun (2016). 161 Lambeth (2011) 153

3.7 Imagery Intelligence

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also highly secretive and little is known about it162 aside from some occasional reports on its capabilities. These capabilities have continuously improved since 2006, which is also due to the increasing support in equipment and technologies from Iran.163 ,164 Indeed, Hezbollah’s successes in its war against Israel are largely based on its intelligence service and Iranian intelligence support and training.165 Hezbollah’s tactical intelligence even included knowledge on specific IDF commanders, IDF routes and tactics166 while its external intelligence service has primarily focussed on identifying targets and trajectory algorithm selection for the group’s rocket stockpile.167 Consequently, Hezbollah’s foreign intelligence network in Israel has put special emphasis on identifying the targets for rockets or UAV attacks.168 ,169

3.7 Imagery Intelligence Observations are an integral part of warfare and soldiers have been on the lookout for their enemies for as long as there have been conflicts among mankind. It is only natural that one would try to increase once vision and thus, improve observations. Hence, what started with climbing higher grounds in order to increase one’s perspective moved along to the point of technical improvements with the introduction of balloons during the American Civil War or the Boer war.170 In fact, photography replaced sketching and was consequently used as early as during the American Civil War, where experimental cameras were mounted on balloons.171 The following developments resulted in the first spy planes getting introduced to the battlefield during World War I, which became a major element of battlefield intelligence. During World War II, imagery intelligence also covered the enemy’s homeland and turned out to be a vital part of the allied troops’ intelligence superiority.172 However, the special applications developed during the Cold War allowed for the clandestine overflying of targets and, although intelligence had to be gathered this way for the first ten years of the Cold War (i.e. by utilising the famous U-2 aircraft and the downing of one in Russia 1960), ultimately resulted in the development of espionage satellites.173 162

Saab and Blanford (2011). Blanford (2011). 164 Haberl (2016a). Also see: Haberl (2016b). 165 Catino. 166 Exum (2006). 167 Devenny (2006). 168 Blanford (2010). 169 Haberl (2016a). Also see: Haberl (2016b). 170 Mead (1983), Ch. 3 and 4. 171 Infield (1970), pp. 19 and 31. 172 Hermann (1996), p. 72. 173 Ibid, p. 73. 163

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With the emergence of this technology, large portions of the enemy’s heartland could be seen regularly and reliably without facing the risk of spy planes getting shot down.174 Satellite imagery gradually achieved broader acceptance among politicians and within the intelligence community, particularly since the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 confirmed that they were operations taking place above national airspace.175 Satellites can yield great technical values for intelligence services, which may offset their large costs. However, satellites would not have become such an important asset to imagery intelligence if it were not for the more recent development in highresolution photography and the reduced size of cameras.176 Timeliness, which was a delaying factor during the Cold War, has now been replaced by instantaneous satellite-to-satellite relay or satellite downlink, which enables military commanders to utilise images on an ad hoc basis.177 This ad hoc need for imagery information has fuelled the development of battlefield drones and eventually found its way into the private sector as well, where companies such as Google provide satellite imagery. Although it is not live, it still comes in a fairly up-to-date fashion. This “quantum leap” in intelligence capabilities is now already available for non-state actors and Jih¯adi groups as well. IS has also used balloons to collect intelligence.178 The group has designed their own surveillance balloons made of children’s toy balloons floating along with cameras attached in order to gain military intelligence. Ironically, these balloons were made of “Dora the Explorer” balloons,179 bearing the face of the American cartoon character. While reports on such methods may illustrate a certain level of pragmatism, IS fighters have also shot down blimp-like surveillance airships in Iraq. IS has released images of the wreckage of the surveillance aerostat, which provided real-time video surveillance from a high altitude in order to locate improvised explosive devices.180 Hence, such captured equipment may be used against the group’s adversaries or inspire IS engineers to develop their own unmanned aerial vehicles. Lastly, such an intelligence trophy may also reveal a certain modus operandi or sensitive technologies to a Jih¯adi entity. This information could at the very least be used to develop countermeasures.

174

Ibid, p. 74. Ibid, p. 74. 176 Ibid, p. 75. 177 Ibid, pp. 76–77. 178 Sanchez (2016). 179 Ibid. 180 Defence Blog (2018). 175

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3.8 Surveillance Drones, UAVs and Drone Counter Measures Intelligence services have become known for utilising unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance purposes and in order to launch offensive attacks. Drone technology was weaponised by IS throughout 2016181 and tutorials on how to fly drones have appeared on the telegram channels called “Islamic State” (al-dawla al-isl¯amiyya) around the same time.182 In 2018, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that 13 IS drones were even used offensively since IS has fitted them with small bombs and thus, managed to attack Russian bases in Syria.183 However, IS is not the only non-state actor who has either utilised drone technology or at the very least—as is the case with al-Qaeda—has shown a high level of awareness for adversarial UAVs and consequently, issued relevant counterintelligence guidelines. Especially Hezbollah’s fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles have become a significant threat to Israeli security since November of 2004, whereas the civil war in Syria has enabled the group to improve, develop and test drones.184 However, the group deployed the first Iranian-made Mirsad-1 military-grade surveillance drone in 2004 and managed to survey the Israeli city of Nahariya for a timeframe of 18 min. Despite the short airtime, this incident marked the first time a non-state actor was able to utilise UAVs against a government. The establishment of this precedent for nonstate actors/Jih¯adi groups would further lead to the Hezbollah’s 2012 deployment of an Iranian Ayoub UAV deep into Israel, successfully surveying Israel’s nuclear weapons manufacturing sites for several hours.185 Two years later, in 2014, the group managed to utilise an unmanned aerial vehicle ˇ ˇ (UAV/drones) in order to attack the Gabhat Fatah aš-Š¯am (former Gabhat an-Nus.ra) in Syria, killing more than 20 fighters.186 This attack, in fact, constitutes the first time a non-state actor managed to carry out an armed drone attack and also the first time one non-state actor directly utilised this technology in order to launch an attack on another non-state group.187 Hezbollah, moreover, prefers cheaper and commercially available drones and has thus far created a fleet of such cheap, yet armed UAVs, in order to deploy them to Syria. In August of 2016, Hezbollah issued a video188 of a commercially available quadcopter the group had armed with explosives, successfully bombing an adversarial target in Syria.189

181

Lohlker (2018) Speckhard and Almohammad (2017). 183 CNN (2018). 184 Plaw and Santoro (2017). 185 Ibid. 186 Sterman (2014). 187 Bunker (2015). 188 PressTV (2017). 189 Plaw and Santoro (2017). 182

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Especially al-Qaeda appears to have grown accustomed to the threat posed by Predator and Reaper drones—commonly referred to as “spy planes”—and has consequently adapted its countermeasures. The constant threat of airstrikes has forced the group to change its tactics from evading toward more active measures over the last decade. When the first counterterrorism drone strikes hit the Arabian Peninsula, alQaeda started to experiment with camouflage measures. These counterintelligence efforts were featured in instructional videos containing topics such as assembling a blanket, which would absorb the fighter’s body heat, thus reducing the infrared signature needed for precise drone strikes.190 The group’s efforts were properly exposed in 2013, when counterdrone manuals were found in Mali, which illustrates how well al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (hereinafter also AQIM) had manged to adapt to the reality of drone warfare.191 The 22 steps guide appears to have been used in order to train militants, but to the outside observer, it clearly illustrates how the group’s anti-drone operations and drone evasion strategies have developed:192 1.

“It is possible to know the intention and the mission of the drone by using the Russian made “sky grabber” device to infiltrate the drone’s waves and the frequencies. The device is available in the market for $2,595 and the one who operates it should be a computer know-how.

2.

Using devices that broadcast frequencies or pack of frequencies to disconnect the contacts and confuse the frequencies used to control the drone. The Mujahideen have had successful experiments using the Russian-made “Racal.”

3.

Spreading the reflective pieces of glass on a car or on the roof of the building.

4.

Placing a group of skilled snipers to hunt the drone, especially the reconnaissance ones because they fly low, about six kilometres or less.

5.

Jamming of and confusing of electronic communication using the ordinary water-lifting dynamo fitted with a 30-m copper pole.

6.

Jamming of and confusing of electronic communication using old equipment and keeping them 24-h running because of their strong frequencies and it is possible using simple ideas of deception of equipment to attract the electronic waves devices similar to that used by the Yugoslav army when they used the microwave (oven) in attracting and confusing the NATO missiles fitted with electromagnetic searching devices.

7.

Using general confusion methods and not to use permanent headquarters.

8.

Discovering the presence of a drone through well-placed reconnaissance networks and to warn all the formations to halt any movement in the area.

9.

To hide from being directly or indirectly spotted, especially at night.

10. To hide under thick trees because they are the best cover against the planes. 11. To stay in places unlit by the sun such as the shadows of the buildings or the trees. 12. Maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts. 13. Disembark of vehicles and keep away from them especially when being chased or during combat. 14. To deceive the drone by entering places of multiple entrances and exits. 15. Using underground shelters because the missiles fired by these planes are usually of the fragmented anti-personnel and not anti-buildings type. 190

Burgers and Romaniuk (2017). Ibid. 192 Ibid. 191

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16. To avoid gathering in open areas and in urgent cases, use building of multiple doors or exits. 17. Forming anti-spy groups to look for spies and agents. 18. Formation of fake gatherings such as using dolls and statutes to be placed outside false ditches to mislead the enemy. 19. When discovering that a drone is after a car, leave the car immediately and everyone should go in different direction because the planes are unable to get after everyone. 20. Using natural barricades like forests and caves when there is an urgent need for training or gathering. 21. In frequently targeted areas, use smoke as cover by burning tires. 22. As for the leaders or those sought after, they should not use communications equipment because the enemy usually keeps a voice tag through which they can identify the speaking person and then locate him.”193

These 22 steps built on al-Qaeda’s early efforts, which primarily utilised camouflage and attempted to avoid tactics due to the group’s failure in jamming GPS signals of Predator and Reaper drones.194 Al-Qaeda has also tried to influence the drone’s infrared chips, but ultimately lacked the technological capabilities and thus, did not manage to develop working counterelectronic devices.195 However, the group successfully managed to deploy weather balloons and remote-controlled planes in order to monitor and predict the flight paths drones.196 Although these efforts were of little success, al-Qaeda managed to hack the video feed of Predator and Shadow drones in Iraq in 2009 with a commercially available software tool called “Skygrabber”.197 Once the surprisingly unencrypted signal had been intercepted, the group tried to tamper with the drones through the feed. However, the US military updated its encryption technology soon thereafter.198 Inspired by its success, al-Qaeda even opened online discussion groups aiming at crowdsourcing-specific technical details on drone signals and homing beacons in order to counter drone attacks. The group even rewarded the best suggestions financially although most of them were of little help or effectiveness.199 Abu Ubayda Abdullah al-Adam, AQ’s alleged former head of intelligence provided some useful advice, but his approaches appear to have been flawed, since he himself was killed by a drone strike in 2013.200 As a result, and due to the lacing technical capabilities, al-Qaeda continues to largely focus on avoidance tactics and on targeting the HUMINT networks upon which its adversaries rely. The same can also be said for IS and its territory, where— upon arrival to Raqqa—the Islamists were immediately ordered to close the window blinds in their homes based on the assumption that, “there were traitors who had 193

The Telegraph (2013) Sinai (2015). 195 Rassler (2017). 196 Burgers and Romaniuk (2017). 197 Al-Jazeerra (2009). 198 Ibid. 199 Rassler (2017). 200 Roggio (2013). 194

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placed electronic chips in the buildings to direct the missiles and, therefore, it was dangerous to look outside. They told us that a building with 70 recruits had been bombed before…”, according to a report by M. Suc.201 Indeed, precise information on enemy positions is paramount when launching drone strikes in rural areas and even more so in an urban environment where collateral damage might be more significant.202 Hence, al-Qaeda has established special units responsible for detecting spies, while the Lashkar-e-Khorasan and Saif ul-Furqan attempted to execute accused spies who may have exposed the location of militants within a day after a drone strike.203 Such informants are then publicly killed in order to discourage others from doing the same thing, namely a highly effective operational security doctrine that is not only rooted in Jih¯adi operational art, but arguably also the most successful drone countermeasure.204 Furthermore, IS has also exercise strict control over communication technologies, including banning cell phones and communication devices or related activities in fear of drone strikes: “When the Belgian Mohamed Abrini visited Abdelhamid Abaaoud in Syria while preparing the attack of November 13, he spent only one day with his childhood friend. “He was suspicious of everything”, said Abrini. “I came with a cell phone and he feared that he could be “droned”. The other soldiers of the Caliphate had the GPS antenna removed from their mobiles. “The satellite packages [had also] been prohibited in the houses of the members of the Islamic State “, said a telecommunications engineer who worked for the terrorist organisation. From now on, “in Raqqa, Jih¯adists must use the Internet cafes where everything is under control” and where communication can be subjected to counterintelligence efforts.205 Lastly, in early 2015, IS considerably strengthened counterintelligence practices and internal security, which according to General C. Gomart, the Director of the French Military Intelligence (DRM), led to the streets of Raqqa being covered by a “fabric that prevented our satellites and aircrafts from seeing what was underneath… a technique to dissimulate the image sensors”.206

References Al-Jazeerra (2009) US spy drone videos ‘hacked;. Accessed online: https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/americas/2009/12/2009121801911884934.htm Al-Qaeda (2016) Inspire no. 15. Professional Assassinations Al-Tamimi A (2018) ‘Islamic State’ in south Syria/an inside Look at its internal security apparatus. Accessed online: http://www.aymennjawad.org/21513/islamic-state-in-south-syria-an-ins ide-look-at Al-Zayyat M (2004)The road to al-Qa’ida: the story of Bin Laden’s right hand man. Pluto Press Andrew M, Berens MJ (2001) Terrorists evolved in US. Chicago Tribune, 11 December 2001. No Online Source available 201

Suc (2017). Burgers and Romaniuk (2017). 203 Krech (2014). 204 Burgers and Romaniuk (2017). 205 Suc (2017). 206 Ibid. 202

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Speckhard A, Yayla AS (n.d.). The ISIS Emni: The Inner Workings and Origins of ISIS’ s Intelligence Apparatus. Accessed Online: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-emni-theinner-workings-and-origins-of-isiss-intelligence-apparatus/ Specter M (1990) Jewish leader Kahane slain in New York. Washington Post. Accessed online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/06/jewish-leader-kahane-slain-innew-york/c9745d90-58e4-4352-9fab-074007f09bd9/ Sterman A (2014) Hezbollah drones wreak havoc on Syrian rebel bases. Times of Israel. Accessed Online: http://www.timesofisrael.com/Hezbollah-drones-wreak-havoc-on-syrian-rebel-bases/ Suc M (2017) Révélations sur les services secrets de l’Etat islamique. Mediapart. Accessed online: https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/180817/revelations-sur-les-ser vices-secrets-de-l-etat-islamique Temple-Raston D (2007) The Jih¯ad next door. Public Affairs. p 83 The Telegraph (2010) Profile: Jordanian ‘triple agent’ who killed CIA agents. Accessed online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/04/afghanistan-cia-bomber-triple-agent The Telegraph (2013) Al-Qaeda’s 22 tips for dodging drone attacks: the list in full. Accessed online: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9886673/Al-Qaedas-22-tips-fordodging-drone-attacks-the-list-in-full.html Thurbon MT (1977) The origins of electronic warfare. RUSI J 122(3):57 UPI (2010) Report: attacker was informant, not spy. UPI. Accessed online: https://www.upi.com/ Top_News/World-News/2010/01/06/Report-Attacker-was-informant-not-spy/63581262791294/ USA v. Ali Mohamed (2000) Life imprisonment. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y., October 20. Accessed online: https://cryptome.org/usa-v-mohamed.htm USA v. Ali Mohamed (2000) Plea Hearing S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y., October 20 USA v. Omar Abdel Rahman et al. (1995a) Testimony of Colonel Norvell Bonds DeAtkine, July 13. S(5) 93 Cr. 181 (MBM) USA v. Omar Abdel Rahman et al.(1995b) Testimony of Khaled Ibrahim, July 13. S(5) 93 Cr. 181 (MBM) USA v. Usama Bin Laden et al. (2001a) Remarks of Patrick Fitzgerald. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y, p 1152 USA v. Usama Bin Laden et al. (2001b) Testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y., February 21, p 1139ff Von Marschall C (2010) Doppelagent Al Balawi: Der Täuscher. Accessed online: https://www.tag esspiegel.de/politik/cia-doppelagent-al-balawi-der-taeuscher/1658762.html Waldman P, Gerald S et al (2001) The infiltrator: Ali Mohamed served in the U.S. Army- And bin Laden’s circle. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 26, 2001. Source not available online Warrick J, Finn P (2010) Suicide bomber who attacked CIA post in Afghanistan was trusted informant from Jordan. Washington Post. Accessed online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/the-triple-agent-the-final-days-of-the-suicide-bomber-who-attackedthe-cia/2011/06/22/AGIKZppH_story.html?noredirect=on Warrick J (2012) The triple agent. Vintage Books, New York Weiser B (2000) Informer’s part in terror case is detailed. New York Times. Accessed online: https:// www.nytimes.com/2000/12/22/nyregion/informer-s-part-in-terror-case-is-detailed.html Weiss M (2017) How ISIS picks its suicide bombers. The Daily Beast. Accessed online: https:// www.thedailybeast.com/how-isis-picks-its-suicide-bombers Windrem R, Engel R (2010) Jordanian double-agent killed CIA officers. NBC News. Accessed online: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34687312/ns/world_news-south_and_central_a sia/t/al-qaida-double-agent-killed-cia-officers/#.XVPEny17FTY Woodward R (1988) Veil: the secret wars of the CIA 1981–1987. Headline Paperback, pp 555–576 Wright L (2007) The looming tower. Penguin Yitzhak R (2016) The war against terrorism and for stability of the Hashemite Regime: Jordanian intelligence challenges in the 21st century. Int J Intell Counter Intell 29(2):213 Zitun Y (2016) A Peek inside the IDF 8200’s Combat Intelligence Unit. Ynetnews. Accessed online: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4862586,00.html

Chapter 4

Intelligence Analysis and “Lessons Learned”

Abstract State intelligence agencies tend to place great emphasis on their analytical skills. The Jih¯adi version of analysis, however, is overshadowed by specific ideological motivators and justifications rooted in operational art. These ideological elements are specifically used to associate a person with the Jih¯adi intelligence cycle and its goals. Still, we can also observe how attempts are made to thoroughly understand an opponent’s weaknesses and strengths in tandem with ideological biases, without paying much attention to analytical craft. Intelligence analysts sometimes reach conclusions that turn out to be inaccurate, which is commonly referred to as “intelligence failure” or “post-mortem” and becomes a “lesson learned”. Intelligence failures and misjudgements are an inevitable part of intelligence. Jih¯adi organisations learn not only from their analysis of past operations and events, but also from history, culture and ideology, which can be considered “operational art”. Keywords Intelligence analysis · Lessons learned · Intelligence Failure · Post-Mortem · Analysis

4.1 Intelligence Analysis Intelligence analysis can be seen as the application of cognitive methods in order test hypotheses within an intelligence organisation.1 Those tasked with the analysis of intelligence must frequently make their decisions based on incomplete and uncertain information.2 Thus, intelligence analysis is trying to reduce ambiguity within ambiguous circumstances. Government intelligence services tend to put great emphasis on their analytical capabilities, which ranges from academic engagement and the study of intelligence analysis to the process for recruiting analysts who commonly come from a large variety of different professional and lingual backgrounds in order to benefit the quality of the analytical product.3 Intriguingly, the Islamic State had actually banned 1

Hayes (2007). Hedley (2005). 3 For relevant publications on the subject of intelligence analysis see: Marrin (2017). or see: Marrin (2012). 2

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all “Western” subjects from the curricula of the schools in its territory.4 This ban has included history, arts, politics, biology and foreign languages. It consequently illustrates the priorities of the group rather well, which focus on simplified maths, Koran exegesis, and the history of the Caliphate.5 This approach is rather fascinating seeing as how the Emni had been desperate to recruit foreigners for the sake of their language skills and the ability to blend in lingually, and how the group strictly refrains from teaching any foreign languages. The only explanation for such an approach may be found when looking at IS’ ideology and operational art. The Jih¯adi version of analysis is overshadowed by specific ideological motivators and justifications rooted in operational art. These ideological elements are not only used to connect an individual with the Jih¯adi intelligence cycle and its goals, but also heavily affect the analytical stage. Introducing ideological elements shouldn’t merely be regarded as a heralded form of martyrdom, but also as a mechanism that dramatically affects analytical reasoning and the biases of the Jih¯adi intelligence analyst or decision-makers. Whereas the governmental intelligence cycle introduces analytical tools such as structured analytic techniques6 or the study of various analytical methodologies7 and biases8 in the pursuit of an accurate analytical product, we cannot observe similar tendencies with respect to the modus operandi of Jih¯adi groups. Moreover, we can observe attempts to thoroughly understand an adversary’s weaknesses and strengths in tandem with ideological biases without devoting much attention to the analytical tradecraft. In 2003, the Jih¯adi publication “Jih¯adi Iraq—Hopes and Risks” was published by Global Islamic Media and includes an analysis of the weaknesses of the Western coalition that had invaded Iraq.9 B. Lia, who has written about “Jih¯adi Strategic Studies”10 in great detail, points to a footnote in the document that states: “A draft of this research was written in the month of Aylul (September), but circumstances did not permit its release until now”.11 Indeed, this footnote would truly indicate strategic analytical capabilities and approaches while Lia assess that several people might have been involved in writing the document. Based on his assessment of the different writing styles and quality of writing in Arabic, he determines that names are spelled inconsistently and that’s there a highly varying quality in the case studies.12 The analysis itself focuses on the strength and weaknesses within a general geopolitical context, whereas the Jih¯adi author also proposes analytical tools for his analysis and draws applicable lessons from the analytical product. A frequent author of the Global Islamic Media has been Abu ‘Ubayd al-Qirshi, who published analysis on comparative leadership structures, knowing the enemy, psychological profiles of 4

Reuter (2015), p. 263. Ibid, p. 263. 6 Heuer (2008), pp. 1–6. 7 Marrin and Clemente (2006). 8 Gentry (2017). 9 Lia and Hegghammer (2004), pp. 642–665. 10 Ibid, pp. 355–375. 11 Ibid, pp. 355–375. 12 Ibid, pp. 355–375. 5

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adversaries, warfare doctrines, intelligence agencies and on the lessons learned— post-mortems—from specific operations such as taking hostages in the Moscow theatre or experiences gathered by observing the modus operandi of other groups and their adversaries.13

4.2 Lessons Learned Intelligence analysts sometimes arrive at conclusions that are proven to be inaccurate, which is commonly referred to as an “intelligence failure” or “post-mortem” and will become a “lesson learned”. Intelligence failures and miscalculations are an inevitable part of intelligence. Indeed, nobody can be right all the time and it would be un reasonable to assume that a person can be. As long as tactical or strategic surprises can occur, intelligence failures are likely to happen in the process. And thus, lessons learned are also an integral part of Jih¯adi intelligence. Previous failures in attacks and battles need to be scrutinised and their impact is analysed so as to take lessons from them. These lessons learned are widely distributed in Jih¯adi publications. This aspect of intelligence is as true for governmental services as it is for non-state actors. Intriguingly, the study of intelligence failures has thus far been the most advanced section of the scholarly discipline. The intelligence community and non-state actors naturally both try to learn from their failures. Various scholarly inquiries have even aimed at understanding the phenomenon of intelligence failures better, but has definitely concluded that they cannot be avoided,14 and are indeed quite natural.15 For Jih¯adi groups and intelligence services, the lessons learned can be of significant value outside the academic debate. Such post-mortems can in fact produce procedural, organisational or tactical improvements, because prior failures have become part of the organisational learning process (See following section on Institutional Learning). Indeed, in the intelligence community, and especially after the 9/11 intelligence failure, one can now observe networks that connect all intelligence agencies with political decision-makers or the ministry of defence in order to share the lessons learned.16 The former Acting Director of Central Intelligence, John McLaughlin, also established the Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis, which can be regarded as the most intensive undertaking and endeavour aimed at learning from the lessons of the past.17 According to S. Marrin, many imperfections in the intelligence process are based on an unavoidable trade-off and balance between structure and processes. The only way to improve intelligence assessments lies in understanding these trade-offs and consequently either fine-tuning the balances or creating new ways of conducting intelligence operations that avoid existing trade-offs.18 Jih¯adi group publications 13

Ibid, pp. 355–375. For a detailed discussion on intelligence failures see: Kuhns (2003). 15 Betts (1978), pp. 61–89. 16 Hedley (2005). 17 Marrin (2004a). 18 Marrin (2004b). 14

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commonly act as a similar device for sharing information on lessons learned amongst different entities of the group. They aim at identifying shortcomings, trade-offs and tactical mistakes. They ultimately advise Jih¯adi group members and followers of the Jih¯adi subculture on how not to conduct certain operations. Al-Qaeda and IS provide rich examples for this very awareness of the past and previous mistakes. In fact, their publications can, at times, be considered a compendium of errors and a continuing examination of operations in order to learn from previous failures, vulnerabilities and mistakes. This process allows the groups to profit from them and have a positive impact on the structure and effectiveness of those organisations still learning. Lastly, Jih¯adi organisations not only learn from their analysis of previous operations and events, but also from history, culture and ideology, which is often seen as “operational art”. While post-mortems can have a very important impact on the Jih¯adi analytical capability in a tactical sense, these groups rely significantly on operational art, as the analytical documents “Jih¯adi Iraq—Hopes and Risks” acknowledge. These documents also point out the organisational unity and leadership while proposing the Jih¯adi movement be more focused on clear and accurate objectives so as to create unity and in order to overcome the lacking leadership through an underlying framework, namely that of operational art.19

References Betts RK (1978) Analysis, war, and decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable. Wolrd Politics 31(1) Gentry JA (2017) The intelligence of fear. Intell Nat Secur 32(1):9–25 Hayes J (2007) Analytic culture in the U.S. Intelligence community, Chapter One. Working definitions. History staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency Hedley JH (2005) Learning from intelligence failures. Int J Intell CounterIntelligence 18(3):435–450 Heuer RJ (2008) Taxonomy of structured analytic techniques. Phearson Kuhns WJ (2003) Intelligence failures: forecasting and the lessons of epistemology. In: Betts RK, Mahnken TG (eds) Paradoxes of strategic intelligence: essays in honor of michael I. Handel. Frank Cass, pp 80–97 Lia B, Hegghammer T (2004) Jih¯adi strategic studies: the alleged Al Qaida policy study preceding the Madrid Bombings. Stud Conflict Terrorism 27(5) Marrin S (2004a) CIA’s Kent School: improving training for new analysts. Int J Intell CounterIntelligence 16(4) Winter 2003–2004a, 609–637 Marrin S (2004b) Preventing intelligence failures by learning from the past. Int J Intell CounterIntelligenceOnline) Journal Homepage: STEPHEN MARRIN 174(17):885–607 Marrin S (2012) Is intelligence analysis an art or a science? Int J Intell CounterIntelligence 25(September):529–545 Marrin S (2017) Understanding and improving intelligence analysis by learning from other disciplines. Intell Nat Secur 32(5):539–547 Marrin S, Clemente JD (2006) Modeling an intelligence analysis profession on medicine. Int J Intell CounterIntelligence 19(4) Reuter C (2015) Die schwarze Macht: Der »Islamische Staat« und die Strategen des Terrors. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 19

Lia and Hegghammer (2004), pp. 355–375.

Chapter 5

The Three Levels of Jih¯adi Warfare—The Interrelation of Jih¯adi Operational Art and Jih¯adi Intelligence

Abstract Jih¯adi intelligence and the three levels of Jih¯adi warfare are based on and guided by the concept of “operational art”. Wars are generally conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, taking into account both irregular wars and bilateral conflicts, while operational art is commonly seen as the connecting element between these three levels. Keywords Strategic warfare · Operational warfare · Tactical warfare · Operational art “And here we are again, history repeating itself, the heads of kufr once again using the same ways in the war against Islam but in new forms. As the Quraiš, the head of kufr at that time, fought the Muslims … The same applies to the head of Kufr in our times, America and the West, fighting the Muslims by all means and methods.”1 —Al-Qaeda Inspire Magazine.

5.1 The Three Levels of Warfare Jih¯adi intelligence and the three levels of Jih¯adi warfare are based on and guided by operational art. Wars are generally fought on a strategic, operational and tactical level, taking both irregular wars and bilateral conflicts into consideration,2 whereas operational art is commonly regarded as uniting element between these three levels.

5.1.1 The Strategic Level The strategic level of warfare applies to all forms and types of conflict. It involves strategic concepts, preparations and guidance for a conflict and the overall leadership of the armed forces ensuring that strategic objectives can be achieved. As such, the strategic level of warfare defines and supports a broader policy. In its core, it directly 1 2

Al-Qaeda (2016), pp. 27–28. Franz (1983), pp. 2–12.

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relates to the outcome of a conflict.3 Usually, modern conflicts are either won or lost at the strategic level and not necessarily on the operational or tactical levels.4

5.1.2 The Operational Level The operational level (not to be confused with operational art) can be ranked one level below the strategic level and is mainly concerned with the employment of military forces within the theatre of operations so as to achieve the strategic goals by conducting military campaigns.5 Such campaigns consist of a series of connected military operations that aims towards achieving a common objective.6 At the operational level, military commanders design and coordinate the exploitation of tactical events in accordance with the overall campaign objectives.7 The location and timing of such an operational campaign can be based on strategic objectives, threats, geographical boundaries, economic constraints or opportunities, the cultural circumstances, military resources or on a variety of other objectives that may present themselves to the military commander.8

5.1.3 The Tactical Level A campaign’s operations are made up of engagements or battles that constitute the tactical—and lowest—military level. The tactical level translates combat power into success on the battlefield thanks to advantageous actions and military management. Thus, tactics concern the details of engaging in combat and can easily be affected by possible changes, alterations or countermeasures in the battlefield environment.9 These three levels of warfare and the associated operational art are highly dependent on an interrelation of information since all of operational, tactical or strategic decision-making will take place independently at each level, all of which requires intelligence. However, Jih¯adi intelligence services learn, survive and operate in a different manner than their Western counterparts would. They combine their, tactical, operational and strategic means with ideology when it comes to operational thinking and the strategic or tactical planning. When looking at operational art inside the Jih¯adi community, one must consider that irregular warfare commonly includes an ideological element and unconventional 3

Betts (1978). Millett and Murray (1988). 5 Luttwak (1981). 6 Betts (1978). 7 Ibid, pp. 61–89. 8 Hosmer (1988). 9 USAF (1997). 4

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methods, all of which are a core pillar of the Jih¯adi doctrine on operation art and also serve as defining factors of the tactical, strategic and operational levels. All three serve a key purpose for intelligence services as well. Furthermore, one can clearly distinguish tactical intelligence and operational intelligence as part of the Jih¯ad intelligence phenomenon when it comes to either intelligence analysis or the gathering of information. The strategic level can be recognised in the Islamic State’s Shura Councils. The IS’ security service (Emni) shelters the operational and tactical levels with respect to Jih¯adi intelligence. It has established an operational level on top of its hierarchical structure, known as “Emir of the security division for a region”. At the same time, one can see that the tactical level is located at the bottom of the totem pole. It is divided into “Secret service and information cells” and “economic and property value cells”. At each level, there is a Sharia judge who maintains military unity amongst the different levels.10 With respect to Jih¯adi groups and how operational art interrelates with the strategic and tactical levels, particularly the operational level is of great importance although the boundaries of these levels of Jih¯adi warfare are blurry and might not always correspond with the levels of command structure. This is especially true with respect to most Jih¯adi groups since a rigid command structure appears to be absent in most cell-structured groups such as Al-Qaeda. Also, within much more structured Jih¯adi organisations such as the Islamic State or Hezbollah, one can see a Jih¯adi-specific approach towards operational art when comparing them to their Western adversaries. In both cases, distinct strategic and tactical necessities with respect to culture, narrative and common warfare are shared,11 but the absence of a command structure renders it impossible for Jih¯adi groups to develop coherent strategic and operational plans.12 Operational art is known to create equilibrium between such conflicting demands, bridging gaps in the command structure and securing utility of force.13 This intermediate layer of knowledge consequently links a broader strategy with tactics, which ultimately ensures utility on all levels of war via a commander’s creative imagination with respect to designing campaigns. As such, operational art in Western military terms is rooted in strategic requirements, which in turn determine the theory, training and command of operations.14 It has a direct effect on the character, means and directions of all tactical activity and strategic goals.15 Most Western military systems can track their operational art doctrines back to the Napoleonic Wars and to Prussian military management, where Carl von Clausewitz would serve as a primary example. In this doctrinal system, the strategic level normally consists of the highest military commanders, the operational level (again, 10

Reuter (2015b) Cozzens (2007), pp. 127–164. 12 Adamsky (2010). 13 Ibid, p. 5. 14 Ibid, p. 5. 15 Ibid, p. 5. 11

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not to be confused with operational art) usually contains the theatre command entities while the tactical level concerns everything below the theatre command. Each of these levels of war is concerned with strategic planning, which would normally involve analysing a situation based on available intelligence, estimating capabilities and devising various courses of action. Each level also implements an overall strategy, which has to be re-evaluated constantly due to the dynamic nature of conflict. Above these strategic, operational and tactical levels, one can find the separate sphere of operational art felt to be a framework for formulating principles and for establishing doctrines in the form of a conceptual mechanism, which allows for the translation of strategic goals into tactical actions.16 While Carl von Clausewitz may have provided this sphere of knowledge in the Western world, the Qur’¯an, the Ah.a¯ d¯ıth and the Sunnah can be seen as regulators of the interrelation between divine causes and concrete goals of war, as D. Adamsky has profoundly assessed in his study on “Jih¯adi Operational Art”.17 This sphere of knowledge for operational art needs to be prepared and infused into the fighting forces. Since distributing publications and propaganda is commonly done by the intelligence elements and services of Jih¯adi groups (as is the case with AQ or IS, amongst others), Jih¯adi intelligence plays a significant role in the Jih¯adi utilisation of operational art and the interrelation and interplay that has been created.

5.2 Operational Art The overall framework for all three levels of warfare and the intelligence capabilities required at all levels can be found in the concept of operational art. Whereas prominent Jih¯adi military thinkers and strategists such as Abu Musab al-Suri, Abu Bakr Naji or Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin provide some rudimentary military instructions, it remains highly relevant to observe that the Jih¯adi movement shares a distinct strategic culture, global narrative and common warfare necessities.18 Despite this unity, it is important to denote that there are no global command structure and no commonly developed plans, strategies and tactics.19 According to D. Adamsky, “…the absence of a rigid command structure requires a common body of doctrinal knowledge, or what is known in the West as operational art”.20 Operational art is an independent domain of knowledge, which provides a framework for formulating principles, doctrines and methods of warfare.21 In fact, operational art, according to D. Adamsky, is an “intermediate layer of knowledge that links wider strategy and discrete tactics and guarantees utility of force”. As such, creative 16

Ibid, p. 6. Naji (2006). 18 Cozzens (2007). 19 Mitchell (2008). 20 Ibid. 21 Adamsky (2010), p. 6. 17

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imagination is applied so as to conduct military operations and strategic requirements go to determine methods and concepts, preparation, planning and command.22 Indeed, it defines the means of tactics geared towards achieving strategic common goals,23 which produces the same outcomes in different ways and in different environments.24 In this regard, tactical actions are consistent with the grand strategic aim in any different form of modern warfare.25 Importantly, operational art should not be considered either a proper strategy or a proper tactic, but must be seen as a separate layer of knowledge, which acts as a framework for formulating doctrines as a conceptualisation enabling the transition of strategic goals into tactical actions. It finally acts as a platform upon which commanders and subordinates can achieve shared understanding of the strategic state of play, an associated tactical problem and an appropriate resolution.26 Thus, operational art can substitute command and control if there is a coherent doctrinal programme.27 Indeed, if the logic of military action is deduced from a grand strategy in order to be effective, then (according to D. Adamsky) the Qur’¯an and Sunnah regulate this relationship between higher causes and tangible war goals.28 However, it must be made clear that the Islamic philosophy and history of warfare and intelligence, the life of the Prophet Muh.ammad, the early Caliphs, and the ancient origins of intelligence in the Near East cannot be seen as the sole source and influence of intelligence systems created by Jih¯adi groups. They do indeed dramatically inform and condition this conceptualisation of intelligence.29 The doctrines outlined in these sources, which are further developed by military strategists and Jih¯adi scholars, concern the Qur’¯anic view that war is God’s will and thus, controlled and shaped by his word “from its conception till culmination”.30 Since the Jih¯adi philosophy of war, as much as a Jih¯adi conceptualisation of intelligence, can be distilled from the Qur’¯an and Sunnah, it can be understood as the ultimate truth revealed by Allah. Thus, these conceptualisations are infallible31 and can be regarded as religious ideology that informs strategic behaviour,32 whereas Islamic war doctrines and approaches to intelligence have theological origins and are hence considered to be unchangeable.33

22

Ibid. Adamsky (2010). 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Thronton (2005). 29 Khadduri (1955). 30 Malik (1979). 31 Ibid. 32 Moghadam (2008). 33 Ibrahim (2008). 23

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Consequently, it is imperative to study the cultural, historical and religious heritage of the Arabian Peninsula in order to holistically comprehend today’s Jih¯adi intelligence culture. We must divert our attention away from present warfighting conceptualisations for a brief moment and focus on historic events that still hold the power to influence present Jih¯adi intelligence activities. And it is especially publications like the one that featured the excerpt below—attributed to Al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine—that illustrate how important a role operational art plays within the Jih¯adi subculture.

References Adamsky D (2010) Jih¯adi operational art: the coming wave of Jih¯adi strategic studies. Stud Conflict Terrorism 33(1) Al-Qaeda (2016). Inspire no. 15. Professional Assassinations Betts RK (1978) Analysis, war, and decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable. Wolrd Politics 31(1) Cozzens JB (2007) Approaching Al-Qaeda’s warfare: function, culture and grand strategy. In: Ranstorp M (ed) Mapping terrorism research: state of the art. Routledge, Gaps and Future Direction Franz WP (1983) Maneuver: the dynamic element of combat, military review Hosmer BC (1988) Operational art: the importance of the operational level of war. Phalanx, September 1988, pp 1–6 Ibrahim R (2008) Studying the Islamic way of war. National Review Online. Accessed online: https://www.nationalreview.com/2008/09/studying-islamic-way-war-raymond-ibrahim/ Khadduri M (1955) War and peace in the law of Islam. The Johns Hopkins Press, pp 3–42 Luttwak EN (1981) The operational level of war. Int Secur 5(3):61–79 Malik SK (1979) The Quranic concept of war. Associated Printers and Publishers Millett AR, Murray W (1988) Lessons of war. The national interest, Winter 1988–1989, Allen & Unwin, pp 83–95 Mitchell J (2008) The contradictory effects of ideology on Jih¯adist war fighting. Stud Conflict Terrorism 31(9):817 Moghadam A (2008) the globalization of martyrdom: Al-Qaeda. Johns Hopkins University Press, Salafi Jih¯ad and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks Naji AB (2006) The management of savagery: the most critical stage through which Umma will pass (translated by William McCants, 2006). The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, pp 16–17 and 28–30 Reuter C (2015b) The terror strategist: secret files reveal the structure of Islamic State. Der Spiegel. Accessed online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-str ucture-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html Thronton R (2005) Changing the game: assessing al Qaeda’s terrorist strategy. Harv Int Rev 27(3):35–37 USAF (1997) College of aerospace doctrine, research and education (CADRE), air and space power mentoring guide, vol 1. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB

Chapter 6

The “Urtext” of Jih¯adi Intelligence Culture

Abstract Religion and ideology have found their way into the Islamic State’s intelligence structures. If we are to understand what this means to the movement and its operational art, we must first understand the origins of its intelligence culture and the actors and agents who played a key role in that culture. Indeed, some covert operations, methods or even the recent history of Jih¯adi intelligence may seem familiar and Western, but the Islamic world, which includes the Jih¯adi interpretation of Islam, does not share the same religious and military traditions or history with the West. Therefore, the ideological, religious and historical roots of a Jih¯adi intelligence culture must be traced back to the time of the Prophet Muh.ammad and even further back to the ancient Near East. Keywords ISIS’s Amniyat · Dawah Offices · Saddam Hussein’s intelligence services · Internal control · Surveillance · Hisbah · Ba’athist Iraq · Special security organisation · Emni officers · Shura council · Media council · Military council · STASI · KGB · Saladin · Ancient near east · Assyrians · Persian intelligence traditions “If a piece of rope is lost between here [Basra] and Khurasan, I would know the person who took it.”—Ziyad ibn Abi1

6.1 Why History Matters If we wish to understand what intelligence means to the Jih¯adi movement and its operational art, we must first understand the origins of its intelligence culture and the actors and agents that played key roles in this culture. Indeed, some Jih¯adi covert operations, methodologies or even its most recent intelligence history may appear familiar and Western but the Islamic world, which includes the Jih¯adi interpretation of Islam, does not share the same religious and military traditions or history with the West. Thus, ideological, religious and historic roots of a Jih¯adi intelligence culture 1

Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 166.

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need to be traced back to the times of the Prophet Muh.ammad and even further back to the ancient Near East or Arab tribes that lived in a time now referred to by Muslims as J¯ahil¯ıyah (Ignorance).2 If we desire to comprehend how Jih¯adi groups utilise intelligence today, and perhaps how they will do so in the future, we must understand its cultural origins, which are not rooted in the Western world’s renaissance or reformation, as these very events have directly and indirectly—over the years—shaped, transformed and altered our Western ideas of intelligence.3 Jih¯adi traditions, ideology and present approaches towards intelligence are derived from the intelligence activities of the Prophet Muh.ammad himself and from the earliest intelligence activities practised in the ancient Near East, which naturally influenced the Prophet Muh.ammad’s conceptualisation of intelligence.4 However, the legacy of the Prophet Muh.ammad, the Sunnah, Hadith or the early Arab tribes are by no means the sole drivers, although they are clearly a key driver for Jih¯adi culture, which is something Jih¯adi groups themselves frequently refer to in various publications and for various reasons, namely in order to gain religious legitimisation and justification. Thus, understanding the context of early Arab and Islamic Intelligence culture can enhance our understanding of Jih¯adi security culture today and provide the prerequisite for any future engagement with Jih¯adi groups. Furthermore, many regions and societies in other parts of the world other than the Islamic State’s or al Qaeda’s operational territories automatically inherit an Islamic intellectual and intelligence legacy—not always derived from recent history—but rooted in strong pre-Islamic influences. K.C. Gustafson has explored a similar approach, and the importance of his scholarship is hard to overestimate. Though Gustafson has focused his attention on the influence that the cultural and philosophical origins Byzantine empire has had on the present Russian Security and Intelligence apparatus, he does provide a take that can serve as a great point of reference for the focus one must put on Jih¯adi intelligence too: “But as biblical scholars and palaeographers seek the ‘urtext’ as they trace their work’s history, so in the field of intelligence and security we can seek some original source of behaviours that predate any future evolutions”.5 A Jih¯adi intelligence culture is certainly not bound solely by its pre-Islamic heritage or the influence of the Prophet Muh.ammad. At different stages of the Jih¯adi history, varying movements were directly or indirectly exposed to foreign influences in Egypt, Syria or Saudi Arabia amongst others, while they cooperated or received direct or indirect training and/or support from various actors like the US during the Cold War.6 Today we can find examples of this foreign influence. An intriguing example is surely the Ba’athist influence on IS, which will be explored within this work. Indeed, with respect to the Islamic State, it must be recognised that the upper echelons of the group’s leadership are comprised of former Iraqi intelligence officers 2

Beeston (1976), p. 7. Gustafson (2010). 4 Dvornik (1974). 5 Gustafson (2010). 6 Riedel (2014). 3

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who have not only added elements of the Ba’athist culture under Saddam Hussein but also inherited elements of other intelligence cultures as well.7 This is another element we must consider aside from the religious and cultural origins if we wish to engage in the phenomenon of Jih¯adi intelligence. Aside from the influence of colonial powers, foreign training or national intelligence history that has influenced Jih¯adi group intelligence activities, the underlying culture of Jih¯adi intelligence dates back over centuries and features the Prophet Muh.ammad himself as a “master of intelligence in war”.8 However, the intelligence activities of Qahtani tribes in the first half of the seventh century and even before the rise of Islam itself must be considered, because they influenced the approaches chosen by the Prophet Muh.ammad.9 Indeed, the early Arab tribal conceptualisation of intelligence during wartime and peacetime can be seen as the model of the intelligence methodologies of the Prophet Muh.ammad,10 which in turn are now frequently quoted by the Islamic State. Indeed, as Jih¯adi fighters aim to walk in the footsteps of the Prophet Muh.ammad,11 his methods have become doctrines and serve as tactical, strategic, ideological and cultural guidelines for various Jih¯adi groups. Looking at more recent developments within the realms of Jih¯adi intelligence, we can gain a more detailed understanding of the human agents who are behind these institutions, the secret power brokers and those who silently operate in the shadows. It’s a clandestine circle that has the power to influence the leadership and the masses through those means and in secret. They are those who go by the name ahl al-hall wa-l-aqd,12 which translates to “people who loosen and bind”.13

6.2 The IS’ Amniyat and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq The Islamic State’s internal intelligence structure14 is comprised of 1500 men,15 some of which are former Iraqi intelligence officers who have brought their training in either the Iraqi Secret Police (Amn or Mukhabarat), the Iraqi Military Intelligence (Estikhbarat) or the Ba’ath Party’s Militia (originally founded as the Haras al-Qawmi) with them and added it to IS’ intelligence structure, the aforementioned “Emni”. The name “Emni” itself has its origins in the word “emniyyah”/”amniyat”, which is rooted in the Arabic word meaning “trust”, and can be understood as “gained intelligence”. As the name suggests, the Emni is tasked with collecting internal and 7

Sassoon (2011). Gabriel (2007), p. xviiif. 9 Beeston (1976), p. 7. 10 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 90. 11 The Qur’¯ an, S¯urah al-Ah.z¯ab. 33:21. 12 Al-Asmari (2009). 13 Lawrence (2005), p. 21. 14 Also known as Emni or Amni. The word “Amniyat” means “security”. 15 Taylor et al (2016). 8

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external intelligence on Iraq, Syria and elsewhere as well as gathering information on everybody who lives or enters the controlled territories of the Islamic State. It is also responsible for distributing propaganda or conducting covert operations.16 With this in mind, the Emni officially carries out the following tasks: 1.

“Enabling IS to overtake certain regions based on the gathered intelligence

2.

Providing vetting and security clearances for new Jih¯adis who appear without a reference

3.

Analysing gathered information

4.

Distributing IS propaganda both online and offline

5.

Conducting covert operations abroad

6.

Recruiting new fighters and agents

7.

Deploying spies and running espionage operations

8.

Providing internal security through counterintelligence and by monitoring the logistics and support networks

9.

Serving as a liaison with agents and officers from rivalling Jih¯adi groups, territories or even governmental intelligence actors such as the Syrian Intelligence Service under Bashar al-Asad

10. Taking over critical and lucrative clandestine operations such as antiquities trade, assassinations, kidnappings and bartering for hostages.”17

Even with the influx of foreign fighters, almost all of the leaders of the Islamic State are former Iraqi officers.18 Within IS’ hierarchy, an admission to the Emni is the greatest achievement an IS fighter can hope for due to the increased authority, power and status. That is of course aside from the financial incentive19 —a characteristic the Emni shares with most security services in the Arabian Peninsula.20 Furthermore, in many aspects the inner workings of the Emni closely resemble the centralised structure and detailed intelligence hierarchy of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi intelligence apparatus. This is not that surprising as it was in fact envisioned and designed by a former intelligence colonel from Saddam Hussein’s Army named Haji Bakr, while the Emni’s headquarters in the Syrian town of al-Bab21 are run by former Ba’athists who learned their tradecraft and executed intelligence operations in Saddam Hussein’s totalitarian government.22 Ayad al-Jumaili from Fallujah could be seen as one example,23 a man who prior to joining IS served as an intelligence officer in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.24 At the peak of his IS career, he acted as the second in command of his group and served 16

Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). Speckhard and Yayla (2016). 18 Sly (2015). 19 Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). 20 Sassoon (2011). 21 John (2016). 22 Sly (2015). 23 Also known as Ayad Hamid al-Jumaili and Abu Yahya. 24 Coles and Parker (2015). 17

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the self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, to whom he answered directly, as the Minister of War.25 He allegedly also oversaw the Emni, which would also explain why he reported directly to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.26 However, according to an official Iraqi intelligence statement, he was killed in the region of al-Qaim by an Iraqi air strike in March of 2017.27 The activities and agendas of the former Iraqi Ba’athist28 intelligence officials included everything from interrogations, managerial experience within intelligence organisation,29 smuggling expertise (which was developed in the 1990s in order to avoid sanctions)30 to tactics and battle planning,31 intelligence collection methodologies32 and counterintelligence practices33 amongst other elements of intelligence tradecraft. Indeed, the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime and intelligence apparatus, the disbandment of the Iraqi military & security institutions after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the following insurgency, which has led to a marginalisation of Sunni Iraqis by the new Shiite-dominated government, can be considered the soil for what has become the Islamic State and its shadowy intelligence institutions.34 In fact, some of these developments appear to be the result of what was termed a de-Ba’athification law in 2003 under Iraq’s American Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, a law that barred former officers from government employment, denied pensions, but allowed them to keep their guns.35 These disbanded Ba’athist officers and intelligence officers from the Amn, Mukhabarat, Estikhbarat or Party Militia would later emerge to become key players in various insurgency groups and terrorist organisations.36 Interestingly, according to B. Fishman, some of them had originally fought against the Islamic State’s predecessor al-Qaeda in Iraq under the banner of Abu Musab alZarqawi’s Awakening Movement, but were left with no choice other than to switch sides after the US troops withdrew from Iraq in 2007.37 This, in turn, led the Iraqi government to abandon them.38 In addition, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s 2011 attempt to once again purge the government of former Ba’athists, including those that were actually rehabilitated by the US government, left some officers with no choice other than opting for the Islamic State. Within the Islamic State and under

25

Maher (2017). Coles and Parker (2015). 27 Reuters (2017). 28 Sly (2015). 29 Reuter (2015a). 30 Sly (2015). 31 Ibid. 32 Reuter (2015a). 33 Haberl (2016a). 34 Weiss (2015). 35 Marr (2017). 36 Rayburn (2014). 37 Fishman (2009). 38 Ibid. 26

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the guidance of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,39 these former intelligence officers would become architectural cornerstones of the group. Brig. Gen. Hassan Dulaimi, a former intelligence officer in Saddam Hussein’s Estikhbarat, who briefly served as the police commander in Ramadi after his removal from the Army, describes a particularly fitting situation that one of his former colleagues found himself in. He described the case of a former intelligence officer in Baghdad who lost his job in 2003 and now serves as the Islamic State’s leader (wali) in the Anbar town of Hit. Dulaimi explained that the sole reason for his colleague to join the Islamic State was rooted in the monetary incentive, which further attracted a very high number of former intelligence officers and key military leaders. In fact, he portrayed them as the best officers in the former Iraqi intelligence and military apparatus, which explains the strength of the Islamic State in intelligence matters and on the battleground.40 Indeed, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani (born as Fadel Ahmad Abdullah al-Hiyali), the Islamic State deputy in Iraq and Abu Ayman al-Iraqi,41 one of the highest-ranking military commanders in Syria, were both former Iraqi officers. Thus, the Emni clearly draws and heavily relies on the intellectual capital of the former Iraqi regime and its intelligence services.42 Local activist media has issued reports stating that the Emni was primarily made up of former Iraqi intelligence operatives.43 The Emni operatives are commonly grouped by nationality into discrete celllike units whose members may oftentimes only meet briefly prior to their departure to Europe, as confirmed by the Algerian IS operative Adel Haddadi, who himself entered Europe as a refugee, but was actually arrested in an Austrian refugee camp.44 Once such units have established themselves abroad, the operational planning begins. The case of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who established an IS cell in order to carry out attacks45 confirms that such operational planning also includes intelligence collection and running networks of scouts. These scouts travel across Europe on a mission to feed information on potential terror attack targets back to the head of the Emni cell.46 Contact and communication with the scouts are commonly conducted via Facebook messaging, with fake Facebook profiles having been set up in order to ensure comparatively safe communication.47 39

Also known as Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Al-Husseini Al-Qurashi, Abu Du’a, Abu Duaa’, Amir alMu’minin, Awwad, Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, Commander of the Believers, Commander of the Faithful, Ibrahim, Ibrahim ‘Awwad, Ibrahim ‘Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai’, Ibrahim ‘Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al Samarrai, Ibrahim al-Badri, Ibrahim Awwad, Ibrahim al-Badri, Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Muh.ammad al-Badri al-Samarrai, The Believer, The Invisible Sheikh. 40 Sly (2015). 41 Also known as Abu Abdul Salem, Abu Ayman Abu Muhannad Iraqi, Abu Muhannad al-Suweidawi, Abu Muhanedal-Sweidawi, Adnan Latif Hamid al-Sweidawi. 42 TSG IntelBrief (2014a). 43 Neurink (2015). 44 Callimachi (2016). 45 Connett (2015). 46 Van Vlierden (2018). 47 Ibid.

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Organigram Source Almohammad, A. H. & Speckhard (2017)48

The IS security landscape reportedly consists of four different branches, namely the Amn Al-Askari (military intelligence), the Amn Al-Dawla (counterintelligence service), the Amn al-Dakhili (which can be compared to an interior ministry’s security section, ππφwhich is tasked with maintaining security for various cities),49 48 49

Almohammad and Speckhard (2017). Suc (2017).

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and he Amn Al-Kharji (responsible for covert operations outside the Islamic State’s controlled territory), whose operatives are sent abroad in order to conduct espionage or in order to prepare terrorist attacks.50 This also included any territory in Syria, which was controlled by the FSA or by Assad’s military forces.51 The latter two departments intriguingly also echo the commonly known internal versus external organisational and institutional separation of various security services around the globe.52 However, IS’ system has been organised in accordance with the regional structures of the mukhabarat and in line with traditional Arab security services.

6.3 The Lord of the Shadows Iraqi Army Intelligence colonel Haji Bakr (also known as Samir Abd Muh.ammad al-Khlifawi) headed the IS Military Council and until his killing in 2014 oversaw intelligence operations in Syria.53 He played a key role in establishing the Emni Intelligence Service and consequently transferred the skills he gained while working in the Iraqi weapons development and in the intelligence/military apparatus of Saddam Hussein’s Air Defence.54 According to Hisham al-Hashimi, Haji Bakr (aka Colonel Samir) was a nationalist career soldier stationed at the Habbaniya Air Base, while research conducted by R. Barrett indicates that he was a secularist Ba’athist who often attracted criticism for lacking a proper beard and lacking of strict observance of religious practices.55 While in the Iraqi air force, he was responsible for supplies and was considered highly intelligent, firm and a remarkable logistician. It was felt that he nonetheless turned bitter and was unemployed after the US had dissolved the Iraqi military.56 Much like several other IS cadres and future IS leaders, he spent time in US custody between 2003 and 2010.57 Indeed, after the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allied forces, Haji Bakr was imprisoned alongside future Islamic State leaders like Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi and self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.58 After his release from American captivity, he became a senior leader in the Dawlat al-ᶜIr¯aq al-ᵓIsl¯amiyyah (Islamic State of Iraq, which would later become the adDawlah al-Isl¯amiyah f¯ı ‘l- ᶜIr¯aq wa-sh-Sh¯am or Islamic State) and led the military

50

Ibid. Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 A brief description of the Emni can also be found in Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 54 TSG IntelBrief (2014b). 55 Barrett (2014), p. 24. 56 Thomas-Noone (2015). 57 Barrett (2014), p. 25. 58 Al Arabiya (2014a). 51

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council after the death of Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi,59 who had also previously served as a police brigadier general in Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime.60 After he had organised an internal purge and some targeted assassinations within IS, he managed to solidify al-Baghdadi’s claims to power, which would ultimately lead to the proclamation of the Islamic State.61 In 2012, he organised the IS takeover of parts of Syria, which he achieved partially by utilising his experience and connections as a former intelligence officer. In fact, he and several other former Iraqi intelligence officers devised an intelligence system strongly modelled upon the Iraqi intelligence apparatus—yet following the Jih¯adi interpretation of Islam. Haji Bakr documented these efforts on handwritten organisational charts and systematically outlined how the Islamic State’s powerbase could be expanded.62 Internal and external covert operations as well as the utilisation of intelligence to control, terrorise and monitor the population were also favoured methodologies of use.63 This could be done through a multilayered composition of intelligence institutions, departments, actions and responsibilities, some of which he adopted from the Iraqi intelligence system under Saddam Hussein while others were newly created for the war-torn environment in Syria.64 His plans were later carried out by the IS in great detail,65 as an organigram that has been translated and published by C. Reuter illustrates.66

Organigram Source Reuter (2015b).

Religion and ideology have truly found their way into the structures of the Islamic State’s intelligence service. Haji Bakr’s documents spend due attention illustrating 59

Roggio (2014). Roggio (2008). 61 TSG IntelBrief (2014b). 62 Reuter (2015b). 63 Ibid. 64 Roggio (2014). 65 Reuter (2015b). 66 Ibid. 60

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the connection between culture, religion and intelligence through the envisioned establishment of a sharia judge in the security department on a regional level, on a district level as the head of prisons, and interrogations as well as in the district’s security department.67 At the district level, he additionally deems the position of a “Head of the Security Base and Trainer of the Sharia Judges in Court and Security Questions Relating to the local secret service” to be important.68 Furthermore, one can find a “Head of Prisons and Interrogation Specialists” at the regional level, seeing as how the Emni also runs its own prisons, which are located in rather unusual places.69 In Aleppo, one prison could be found in the cellar below the ophthalmological hospital, while in Tabqa, the secret prisons were located below a large tower at the entrance of the city or in a candy factory. In Raqqa, a prison is located near the football stadium while eyewitness reports (according to M. Suc), these facilities held people who were accused of having too much money or of taking drugs, but there were plenty of inmates who had actually had no idea why they had been brought there.70 Indeed, the prisoners had been blindfolded when they were moved inside these facilities and afterwards they were interrogated by anonymous “hooded men”.71 The questions asked, especially those with respect to foreign detainees, commonly dealt with their reasons for their having come to the Islamic State.72 Such questions, rooted in suspicion and fear or infiltration, are also echoed in the overall and decentralised structure of the Islamic State’s organisations.73 The internal structure of Haji Bakr’s intelligence service also includes specialists in technology, weapons and interrogation, whereas economic and property value cells and secret information cells have been created in order to penetrate entities such as financial institutes, schools, day-care centres, the media or transportation.74 This structure, however, has certainly not appeared out of nowhere. In fact, a similar system of omnipresence had been in place in Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus. Consequently, and aside from achieving an omnipresence of intelligence in the territories controlled by the Islamic State, this system further enables the group to keep an eye on its own fighters and Emirs. Haji Bakr suggested that two Islamic intelligence services operate in a parallel fashion. In order to achieve this goal, a general intelligence department would then have to report to the “Security Emir” of a region, who in turn oversees the deputy Emirs of individual districts. The head of the secret spy cells and the district’s “intelligence service and information manager” report to each of the deputy Emirs, whereas 67

Ibid. Ibid. 69 Suc (2017). 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 68

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73

the local spy cells report their findings to the district Emir’s deputy. In sum, in Haji Bakr’s intelligence system, no-one can be trusted and everyone spies on everyone else. Aside from deploying and running intelligence elements, the Emni also engages in assassinations while recruiting operatives in foreign countries and amongst the large number of Syrian refugees. This is especially relevant when it comes to Turkey, where Emni agents observed and photographed a suspicious IS member on a recreational break in Sanliurfa and discovered that he was meeting members of the opposition in a coffee shop. Once the alleged traitor had returned to Syria, he was arrested, interrogated, shown the photograph of his meeting with the opposition, and ultimately executed.75 Aside from aspect such as these, which are significant for counterintelligence purposes (see chapter: Counterintelligence), the Emni also collects intelligence on the activities of various opposition groups or silences critical voices and adversaries in Turkey. Indeed, a minimum of four Syrian opposition leaders who openly voiced their concerns with regard to IS activities have been assassinated in Turkey by Emni operatives.76 While lower-level operatives of each of the four branches are commonly Syrian, their supervisors and chiefs mostly tend to be from different countries. In fact, the chiefs of the amniyeen are frequently of Palestinian origin and from Gaza, while the service’s heads are commonly from Iraq. Intriguingly, factionalism and infighting could also be observed, although it is not clear if the national origin of the relevant chiefs somehow plays into this aspect or if the Emni can also be compared to most governmental bureaucracies and their internal fighting in this regard. “They don’t like each other. When I used to train the amniyeen [Emni], my friends from the military [Amn Al-Askari] used to tell me, ‘So now you are working for the kufar?’”77 —Abu Khaled (Former Emni operative).

One reoccurring friction point on bothering the inside and outside of the organisation appears to be with the amn al-Dawla, which is responsible for counterintelligence and for detecting foreign intelligence operatives, intercepting communications and for running IS’s detention programmes. The infamous masked British Jih¯adi named Mohammed Emwazi, who the media affectionately called “Jih¯adi John”, was in fact also a member of the Amn al-Dawla security branch.78 The former intelligence operative Abu Khalled confirms that when an operative of these four branches is at work, that operative prefers to remain masked. Nonetheless, Emwazi’s identity was ultimately confirmed, because an informant for a regional administration managed to obtain unedited footage of the Briton running around Raqqa unmasked.79 With regard to executions, it was also the central administration of the Diwan al-Amn that issued a notification addressed 75

Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). Yayla and Speckhard (2016). 77 Weiss (2017b). 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 76

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to all provinces requesting that Jordanian pilots be killed in the same manner as Muadh al-Kasesbeh, a Jordanian pilot who had been burned alive.80 This Diwan exists at the provincial level and can exercise control over provincial affairs based on regional circumstances. In Ninawa, for example, monitoring Internet shops and their customers has been made a priority since and shop owners were tasked with copying ID documents so that they could be verified by the local intelligence diwan upon request.81

6.3.1 The Dawah Offices Along the same lines, the Emni considered opening “Dawah” offices as a way to establish local spy cells and use religion and ideology for their security and intelligence purposes.82 Haji Bakr’s gradual infiltration is achieved by opening Dawah offices (Islamic missionary centres) and recruiting those who come for the lectures on Islamic life, law and religion. Thus, Haji Bakr connected religion with intelligence, whereas the faithful Muslims who visit the Dawah are instructed to spy on their fellow citizens.83 In usual strategic fashion, the Emni and its mother organisation IS first opened these offices in areas they planned to attack or invade. Some of the recruited spies and intelligence sources were as young as 16 and instructed to report on powerful families. They were to present the Emni handlers with details on an individual’s income, other compromising information, and in particular, Sharia violations, which could be used for the sake of blackmail.84 The Emni also requested its Dawah spies to penetrate competing groups and rebel brigades. They were to gather information on the political stance of their leaders, officers and members. The information gathered could ultimately enable covert operations and the assassination of future emerging leaders opposed to the Islamic State.85 Haji Bakr’s Emni, aside from resorting to assassinations, has also aimed to marry it’s Dawah teachers to the daughters of local powerful and well-known families so that they could secretly be influenced without their knowledge.86 Through these means of secret infiltration, subversion of society espionage and surveillance, kidnappings and murder, the Emni have paved the way for the Caliphate under al-Baghdadi.

80

Al-Tamimi (2015). Ibid. Specimen 1E. 82 Reuter (2015a). 83 Ibid. 84 Speckhard and Yayla (2016). 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 81

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6.3.2 Religion Inside Saddam Hussein’s Intelligence Services Almost contradictory to the system devised by Haji Bakr, Saddam Hussein’s intelligence apparatus assigned a subordinate role to religion for a number of reasons. One may be that Saddam Hussein was not particularly religious himself (until his last years) and according to the former CIA analyst John Nixon, who debriefed him after his capture by US troops, this was for personal reasons and not connected to the way he used to structure and run his regime.87 Further, Saddam Hussein, throughout his political career, had an inherent distrust of competing elites,88 often political Islamic movements,89 and consider them a danger to his regime,90 since he feared a potential Islamic revolution similar to the one that had overthrown the Shah in Iran in 1979.91 When he structured his security apparatus, he did so with the Coup d’état of 1968—also known as the 17 July Revolution—in mind, which he witnessed as a Deputy Secretary of the emerging head of state, Ahmed Hassan al-Bark,92 and which prompted him to grow suspicions of his own security services.93 In fact, the coup of 1968 only succeeded because contributions were made by the security services as Abd ar-Razzaq an-Naif, the deputy head of military intelligence, and Ibrahim Daud, the head of the Republican Guard, had lost faith in the long-term outlook of then Prime minister of Iraq Tahir Yahya.94 However, according to C. Coughlin, the coup d’état leader al-Bakr had actually planned to liquidate both of them during, or after, the revolution.95 According to J. Nixon, who debriefed Saddam Hussein after his capture, the Coup d’état of 1968 significantly formed his worldview. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the former military intelligence general Abd ar-Razzaq an-Naif was fatally wounded in an assassination attempt ordered by Saddam Hussein on July 9th, 1978, as he left the Intercontinental Hotel in London’s Park Lane.96 Lastly, although the officer corps of the security apparatus remained predominantly Sunni,97 the Ba‘athist ideology emphasised Arab nationalism and thus, the religious distinction between Sunnis and Shi‘as was reduced, which also enabled the security services to recruit key personnel from clans loyal to Saddam Hussein.98 Despite the minor role of religion in Saddam Hussein’s regime and despite the observation that no Qur’¯an was found in Haji Bakr’s luggage at the time of his death, 87

Nixon (2017), p. 11. Ibid, p. 11. 89 Ibid, p. 12. 90 Ibid, p. 12. 91 Ibid, p. 12. 92 Sassoon (2011), p. 95. 93 Ibid, p. 95. 94 Coughlin (2005), p. 55. 95 Ibid, p. 55. 96 Honigsbaum (2005). 97 Dawisha (2009), p. 142. 98 Sassoon (2011). 88

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it still remains exegetical that the intelligence structure he envisioned included two Sharia judges, a trainer of the Sharia judges in the security department, the head of security base and the interrogation department at the district level, and one Sharia judge in the security department at the regional level.99 T. J. Donker has assessed that Jih¯adi groups attempting to establish governmental structures within the realms of rebel governance have shown a surprising level of pragmatism with regard to maintaining public order.100 Intelligence activities are part of said public order and security as well as a functioning legal system and Sharia judges. With regard to rebel governance an omnipresent security service as envisioned by Haji Bakr can clearly be seen as the backbone of other public services like water, health care, education, legislation or banking. In fact, T. J. Donker further theorises that Jih¯adi groups operating Syria did rather well in providing such public services by utilising religion as a driving force in order to achieve their goals.101 The same can be said for the pragmatic Haji Bakr.

6.3.3 Internal Control and Surveillance The Emni use the Islamic religion and ideology in order to gain traction and in order to gain acceptance within a Muslim society.102 An omnipresent security apparatus where mistrust would rule and everyone would keep an eye on everyone else could establish much-needed control over society, according to Haji Bakr’s plans. In Bakr’s vision of the Emni intelligence service, it would install a state of fear, uncertainty and a climate in which nobody would know whether he or she was spied upon or not and if so, by whom.103 This thorough system of internal surveillance and infiltration of all the groups opposing them was further confirmed by a captured IS dossier of documents found in Aleppo, which contained detailed lists on informants who penetrated other rebel groups or government militias. The Emni also managed to identify spies working for Assad’s intelligence service and stressed the directive to strategically marry into powerful and influential clans and families before the impending attacks on villages, which would guarantee loyalty and allegiance.104 In addition to these strategic marriages, paid informants were placed in villages before invasions in order to gather information on the political and ideological positions of the inhabitants. Since the group managed to get its hands on some of Saddam Hussein’s former government IT databases and thus, on the personal information of the Iraqi people,

99

Reuter (2015b). Donker (2018), pp. 58–86. 101 Ibid. 102 Speckhard and Yayla (2016). 103 Ibid. 104 Reuter (2015b). 100

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this task could be further streamlined105 and IS was able to merge historical records with their own. After this bureaucratic categorisation, the Emni ordered the detention or assassination of those who were identified as enemies of the Islamic State.106 Anonymous security officers, reportedly of Iraqi nationality as well, ensure the interrogations or detentions of suspected security threats.107 Particularly this structured management of internal security not only closely matches the workflow of the former Iraqi security apparatus, but also reflects Saddam Hussein’s approach of instilling terror amongst the population in order to guarantee and preserve absolute power within the security circles and leadership elite. In the Iraqi regime under Hussein, surveillance and an omnipresent security service were a means of terrorising the population. This is how obedience was ensured. It was a system that was rapidly and very effectively adopted by the Islamic State’s intelligence culture.108 Through running local HUMINT networks—much like in Saddam Hussein Iraq— the Emni tries to gather intelligence on a target town and its inhabitants. Aside from establishing who actually lived there the Emni also tried to establish who was in charge or which families were powerful or religious. They also segregated the people according to the Islamic school of religious jurisprudence they adhered to, tried to establish how open a village was towards democratic ideas, counted the number of mosques and investigated the imam, his wives and his children.109 Other relevant information and intelligence gathering tasks included the imam’s sermons, whether he was open to the Sufi110 or whether he opposed the Assad regime. Most importantly for the Emni was to answer the question on where he stood on matters of Jih¯ad but Haji Bakr was also interested in the Imams income, where it came from and who appointed him.111 Much still needs to be learned about Haji Bakr, the man who would go down in history as the architect of the Islamic State’s intelligence apparatus Emni. Still, due to the Ba’athist mindset of secrecy, and the secretive and private nature of intelligence itself, much may never become known and hence, disappear into the thick and shadowy fog of intelligence history. However, if we desire to understand the environment and culture that influenced Haji Bakr and the entire creation of the Emni, we can also look at Iraq’s former security apparatus under Saddam Hussein. Clearly, it is warranted to assess this influencer and key driver of Jih¯ad intelligence while perhaps venturing even further back in history to find the “urtext” of a Jih¯adi intelligence culture.

105

Nance (2015). Speckhard and Yayla (2016). 107 Reuter (2015a). 108 Reuter (2015a). 109 Reuter (2015b). 110 For relevant research on the connection between Sufism and Jih¯ adism in Iraq see: Jordan (2019). 111 Ibid. 106

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6.3.4 The Hisbah “You are requested to transport the prisoner described above to … the Ministry of the Hisbah, Nineveh Province, Tel Kaif Sector … as soon as possible, and hand over the prisoner and all the reports, observations and documents related to him as well as his belongings and personal possessions.”—IS Hisbah Police report.112

The Hisbah has often times been mistaken with the Emni and although it is, in fact, not an official branch of the secret service, its role in the Jih¯adi intelligence landscape still needs to be briefly visited. Especially because the Emni has focused its intelligence collection requirements on the religious aspects of a society, the Hisbah must also be mentioned here. The Islamic State’s Hisbah has been run much like a diwan (ministries/departments) and was immediately established once the Caliphate had been proclaimed. Although it is commonly presumed that the Hisbah acts as the Islamic State’s “Islamic police”, A. Jawad argues against making this association, because the Islamic police actually answers to the Diwan al-Qada wa al-Madhalim (i.e. the juridical department). The Hisbah may well work outside this hierarchy in cases of referral to the judiciary A. Jawad concludes that this does not render it a de facto Islamic police.113 In any case, aside from this administrative aspect, the Hisbah also engages in intelligence-related tasks, making it worth looking at the Hisbah’s structure114 :

Organigram Source Al-Tamimi (2018a).

In this organigram, the administrative and financial official engages in intelligence-related tasks. This is because the position is responsible for the administration inside the Hisbah. With regard to its centres, this position is responsible for 112

Callimachi (2018). Al-Tamimi (2018a). 114 Ibid. 113

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gathering and preparing monthly reports with respect to its jurisdiction within the wilaya. This also includes cooperation with other administrative officials, finding appropriate bases and preparing them, distributing statements (which can be interlinked to intelligence and counterintelligence-related activities), and most importantly “providing the Diwan with copies of communications with the Hisbah of the wilaya from other parties”.115 When taking a closer look at the Hisbah, we can find even more intelligence-related tasks within Hisbah centres, their structure and field procedures.116

Organigram Source Al-Tamimi (2018a)

Although the Hisbah overseers and the Shari’i closely coordinate with regard to the adoption of field procedures, we must also consider that it is particularly the field teams and investigation teams that resolve cases of condemned acts and which gather intelligence on those under suspicion.

6.4 Intelligence in Ba’athist Iraq and Its Influence on the Islamic State In analysing the intelligence structures of the Islamic State, it is important to look at what the Iraqi intelligence culture and its history was. Although the rather secularist Ba’ath party appears to be at odds with the Islamic State, they overlap with regard to securing the submission of the people, then exercising control through fear and terror. Indeed, upon closer inspection, the two entities share a variety of traits and a very similar approach towards internal security. Hence, it is highly relevant to briefly touch on the structures, organisation, history and methodologies of the Iraqi Intelligence “institutions of fear”, as K. Makiya had coined them in his book “The Republic of Fear”.117

115

Ibid. Ibid. 117 Makiya (1998), ch. 1. 116

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These institutions would not actually cooperate much, but rather would be in competition with each other and monitor each other’s activities. The four main security agencies in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq actually overlapped with respect to their jurisdictions and were structured in a way where they would monitor each other to ensure that no organisation or man could become too strong and actually pose a threat to the regime (1968–2003). This is something we can also digest from Haji Bakr’s intelligence structure and IS’ Emni. The oldest Iraqi intelligence agency, dating back to the British mandate in 1921, was the Al-amn al-am. According to J. Sassoon, it ended up being the Al-amn al-am, and the thwarted coup d’état under its chief officer Nadhim Kazzar, that prompted Saddam Hussein,118 who acted as vice-president at the time of the plot, to rethink his strategies for the security apparatus.119 In any case, the Al-amn al-am can be considered the internal secret service that monitored domestic minorities, opposition groups and Iraq’s border. Since it also took on border patrol duties, the Al-amn alam was heavily involved in illegal economic activities, smuggling and the black market.120 With respect to IS, we can observe that it is this very knowledge of bootlegging, smuggling and illegal trade that led former Iraqi intelligence officers (i.e. Haji Bakr who effectively established the Emni) to take over logistics and supply chains for the Islamic State.121 Intriguingly, economic pragmatism trumps IS religious interpretations of Islam, which becomes particularly obvious with regard to pre-Islamic antiquities, which IS marked for destruction, while Babylonian or Roman coins, which can be sold on the black market, are subject to less scrutiny. In practice, the group has mainly destroyed large and immovable monuments, while quietly smuggling ancient artefacts over the border to Turkey or Iraqi Kurdistan.122 Indeed, the group is reported to have made about $100 million per year by smuggling looted antiquities out of its controlled areas and selling them on illicit international markets.123 The reported swiftness of these smuggling operations of plundered antiquities flowing out of IS’ Caliphate can surely be connected to the smuggling experience gained by former Iraqi intelligence officers, who were known for having taken part in illicit trade operations in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The Al-istikhbarat al-askariyya was the military intelligence service, and it mainly focused its attention on collecting information of military significance with respect to Iraq’s neighbouring countries and the Kurdish territories in the North. Indeed, in Kurdistan, the Al-istikhbarat al-askariyya had unlimited authority and responsibility to fight to Kurdish insurgency, which consequently allowed its members to gain some

118

Al-Tikriti (1982), pp. 91–161. Sassoon (2011), p. 95. 120 CIA (1985), pp. 16–19. 121 Sassoon (2011). 122 Weiss (2017b). 123 Faucon et al. (2017). 119

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experience in fighting insurgencies as much as understanding their organisational traits.124 Saddam Hussein’s fear of enemy infiltration was reflected in this service, and it became a mirroring image of his fears of a coup d’état. This fear was particularly reflected in the operations and structure of the service. Saddam Hussein ordered the Al-istikhbarat al-askariyya to place informers in every military unit down to battalion level in order to have an eye on each and every soldier or officer who might be plotting against him.125 Since the Iraqi Air Force, in which Haji Bakr served as a Colonel, was the aerial warfare service branch of the Iraqi Armed Forces, and thus responsible for monitoring international borders and conducting aerial surveillance,126 it can be assumed that this doctrine might have affected his views on intelligence culture and the structure of intelligence services, especially since at least some of the Iraqi Emni officers who have been in charge of IS interrogations were former intelligence officers of the Iraqi security landscape much like Haji Bakr.127 Since the intelligence services in Iraq cooperated and competed at the same time and in various ways, the influence of other—and even more powerful—services must not be underestimated. The Iraqi Intelligence Service, the jihaz al-mukhabarat alIraqiiyya, for example, can be dated back to the origins of the Ba’ath party and was originally created as the party’s security wing, called jihaz hunain. Consequently, the jihaz al-mukhabarat al-Iraqiiyya can be considered a more political body that monitored the activities of certain party members in addition to running foreign intelligence operations against other services.128 Moreover, the chief concerns for the jihaz al-mukhabarat al-Iraqiiyya were the alignment with party guidelines and the political—vice versa military—aspects of the Iraqi intelligence landscape. Lastly, the Jihaz al-amn al-khass had the function of a “Special Security Organization”, having been set up by Saddam Hussein himself. In order to perform as his eyes and ears, it was thus the most powerful of the four services with the furthest reaching jurisdiction and it directly reported to Saddam Hussein himself.129 In addition to these four main services, smaller units such as the al-amn al-askari (military security) were set up to detect embezzlement or dissent within the army. Another example of a smaller and less dominant secret service in Iraq would be the Ba’ath Party’s shubat al-istikhbarat al-askariyya, which was tasked with monitoring and overseeing the employees of the other intelligence services. The latter acted like any normal party section, but was additionally integrated into Iraq’s intelligence community.130 In any case, while all of these security organisations were tasked with gathering information through monitoring, surveillance, and a large network of informers, the Jihaz al-amn al-khass was clearly the most powerful and influential 124

Sassoon (2011), p. 96. Iraq Survey Group (2004). 126 Cooper (2003). 127 Orton (2016), p. 52. 128 Makiya (1998), p. 15. 129 Sassoon (2011), p. 97. 130 Ibid, p. 97. 125

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until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.131 Moreover, its methodologies can still be seen today when examining the IS Emni. Reuter also wrote on the subject of internal surveillance with regard to the Islamic State: “The agents were supposed to function as seismic signal waves … sent out to track down the tiniest cracks, as well as age-old faults within the deep layers of society—in short, any information that could be used to divide and subjugate the local population”. This collection of information allows the security apparatus to establish who are local elites, how influential individuals made their money and which pieces of information could be used in order to blackmail somebody into compliance, as illustrated by a member of the (now dissolved) Khaled Bin Al-Walid Army (JKBW) IS-offshoot Jih¯adi organisation:132 “The method of obtaining the information derived from more than 40 hidden soldiers (general Muslim populace) working for the interest of the Dawla, spread in all the villages and areas inside the Yarmouk Basin. And some of them are well-known because of their mistakes at the time they were recruited with the office for specific assignments as their affair was exposed.”—JKBW security operative.133

6.4.1 The Special Security Organization—Jihaz Al-Amn Al-Khass In order to understand the intelligence services of Jih¯adi groups like IS—in particularly the Emni—it is imperative to look at the institutions, which have influenced, shaped and formed them. One significant contributor in terms of organisational culture, intelligence methodologies and intelligence tradecraft was the former Iraqi Jihaz al-amn al-khass. The Jihaz al-amn al-khass consisted of eleven departments, which were mostly tasked with monitoring the employees of various other Iraqi institutions, both inside and outside the Special Security Organization (SSO). As mentioned previously, this meant that everyone was watching everyone—a system very similar to the one devised by Haji Bakr. Indeed, SSO files include many examples of employees being monitored, arrested or punished.134 The internal paranoia and rather random punishments apparently reached their peak in 1985 when some SSO departments were given the authority to imprison any employee for seven days if the director felt that a job was not carried out properly.135 A similar “legal autonomy” can be detected within the Islamic State’s Emni, where security Emirs are watch by supervising Emirs in case “they don’t do their job well”.136 131

Sassoon (2011), p. 99. Weiss (2017b). 133 Al-Tamimi (2018b), Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis. Published on www.aym ennjawad.org. 134 Sassoon (2011), p. 104. 135 Ibid, p. 104. 136 Reuter (2015b). 132

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Aside from the omnipresent monitoring conducted by the Jihaz al-amn al-khass, the service also aimed at rewarding its employees and providing them with a variety of benefits. Many employees, for instance, were granted land, houses or loans, while others saw their monthly rent paid for them.137 Also education, a university degree or, on a smaller scale, even free cigarettes were some of the perks SSO employees enjoyed.138 On the flipside, removal of these benefits was frequently used as a punishment.139 This carrot-and-stick system ensured that those who supported the regime and sided with the leadership would be looked after. In this regard, the impact of the sanctions on Iraq and the resulting poverty played into the regime’s hands as the population became more and more dependent on the government’s support and benefits.140 Indeed, the rewards for supporting the system were enticing and led to a large number of people supporting and complying with the imposed rules, regulations and omnipresence of security services. The exact same approach can be witnessed when looking towards the Islamic State’s intelligence structure. Much like employment at the SSO in Iraq was considered an important step towards climbing upwards to the country’s elite, the Islamic State’s Emni constitutes the highest echelons of power and influence in the Islamic State ecosystem.141 Indeed, joining IS already comes with a large number of benefits since members are entitled to free medical treatment in the Caliphate and abroad. Reports of one fighter who suffered from cancer in fact indicate that the group’s paid for his chemotherapy in Turkey, including his hotel.142 As was the case with the SSO, such benefits are also used to keep the members in line and to create leverage. This is because anyone who is wanted by the group or who turns his/her back on the Caliphate will have all property and assets seized. One former fighter, for example, reported that the building belonging to someone accused of working for the regime in the city of al-Bab was seized, while a notice of eviction was issued informing everybody living in said house that they have to leave within 24 h.143 However, being allowed to join the Emni will have a positive impact on further incentives and may spare the member such unfortunate treatment, as illustrated in the accounts of one former IS intelligence operative: “I rented a house, which was paid for by IS…It cost $50 per month. They paid for the house, the electricity. Plus, I was married, so I got an additional $50 per month for my wife. If you have kids, you get $35 for each. If you have parents, they pay $50 for each parent. This is a welfare state”.144 —Abu Khaled.

137

Sassoon (2011), p. 107. Ibid, p. 107. 139 Ibid, p. 107. 140 Ibid, p. 215. 141 Reuter (2015a). 142 Weiss (2017b). 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 138

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Much like the Emni, the SSO also had to conduct some of its operations in hostile environments and war-torn regions. This is because the Kurds in Northern Iraq took up most of the security forces’ attention, especially in 1980.145 The civil war against the Kurds was the main battlefield from which the SSO derived most of its real-world experience in following and arresting suspects, investigating cases or executing opponents in the pursuit of intelligence and power.146 For Haji Bakr and his former colleagues from the Iraqi intelligence community, the environment and battlefields may have changed, yet the Kurdish enemy and the resulting intelligence operations against this adversary have remained. We can assess that the former intelligence officers from Iraq may have found an opportunity to continue their line of work by joining IS and may even be able to reuse former sources and intelligence techniques they had perfected during the conflict with the Kurds in Northern Iraq. In other words, their governing body may have changed, but the battlefield remains the same. In this regard, the SSO has heavily relied on Human intelligence (HUMINT). Thus, recruiting and handling informers and agents were the prime intelligence collection activity of the SSO. With respect to the associate workflow of the Jihaz al-amn al-khass, two reports would come to be written by an agent’s handler based on the information received, then forwarded to headquarters in order to be reviewed.147 The informers themselves, who provided the basis for these reports, came from all walks of life, socio-economic levels and educational backgrounds. Their handlers put great emphasis on drawing them from all religions, nationalities or political movements.148 While some were threatened to become informers by the SSO, others could be persuaded by the monetary benefits offered by the handler or based on a grudge against a friend of a neighbour who the security service actively exploited. In many cases, influencing a potential informer also included threatening his family.149 The influence of the SSO was based primarily on its ability to use gathered intelligence against its enemies and on controlling the information landscape. Interestingly, the SSO concluded that cultural awareness, a solid education and a certain level of specialisation were essential in order to penetrate parts of the society, cells or enemies.150 With respect to the internal training, every member of the SSO received a course in hasana amniyya, which translates to “security awareness”, which covered information security and counterintelligence. The courses were held by an internal Special Security Institute and further allowed for a specialisation on physical security, personnel security, search techniques and interrogation methods.151 In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq—interestingly enough, much like in the Soviet Union— people were encouraged to send pieces or letters of opinion to the newspaper, 145

Sassoon (2011), p. 115. Ibid, p. 115. 147 Ibid, p. 123. 148 Ibid, p. 123. 149 Ibid, p. 123. 150 Woods and Lacey (2007). 151 Sassoon (2011), p. 109. 146

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which was regarded as an important source of data regarding economic, social and cultural developments.152 The same can be observed when looking at the publications managed by AQ like the Inspire magazine, where such messages are presumably censored and posted under the section: “Inspire Feedback—A Chance for the World to Respond”.153 Education was another area in which the SSO exercised its great amount of power and control. In this regard, the SSO was responsible for the appointment of primary school teachers to university professors, who had to be in line with the worldview of the Ba’ath party and the security services. With that, the SSO dictated the curriculum of Iraq and consequently managed to exercise a certain level of indoctrination, penetrating every aspect of life in Iraq. For example, the al-amn officers in charge of delivering the payment to informers also delivered the mayor’s salary.154 In the territories controlled by the Islamic State, economic & property value cells and secret information cells penetrate financial institutes, schools, day care, the media and transportation, thus entering most walks of life as well.155 In sum, the omnipresence of the Emni has led to the establishment of a surveillance state where everyone spies on everyone and where the main goal appears to be monitoring the population based on the gathering of information or mere terror. This approach and understanding of intelligence was in fact also shared by Saddam Hussein, who believed that informers should be everywhere and reportedly responded to an increase of stolen cars with the question as to why there were not enough agents amongst car dealers who could then report on stolen cars.156 Indeed, in an authoritarian system like Iraq, every citizen was forced or persuaded to become an informer since not reporting any suspicious act was considered to be a crime. The society was in fact brainwashed into believing that only the vigilance of citizens, informers and agents would keep the state safe and guard it from possible plots.157 Indeed, the amount of power the SSO had been equipped with must have been “intoxicating” due to its omnipresence and influence over the Iraqi society and competing security organisations, intelligence services or entities that were not related to the government.158 Consequently, adding religion and ideology to this existing intelligence system and the resulting possibility of punishing Sharia violations or the implementation of laws through fatwas, the power and leverage an intelligence service like the Emni can actively exploit increases drastically. In addition to this dramatic increase in power and might, linking intelligence to religion and ideology allows the organisations to legitimise and indeed justify violence, suppression or other various atrocities while already creating a situation of axiomatic and irrevocable moral high ground. 152

Ibid. 124. Al-Qaeda (2010). Inspire no. 2. p. 9. 154 Sassoon (2011), p. 125. 155 Reuter (2015a). 156 Sassoon (2011), p. 127. 157 Ibid, p. 127. 158 Ibid, p. 109. 153

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Most important of all, controlling an intelligence service and applying ideological justifications for its operations provide the intelligence body—and the elites who run it—with unequivocal influence, might and power.

6.4.2 The People Who Loosen and Bind The Iraqi regime and its intelligence services managed to remain in power for more than thirty years as a result of instilling fear and ubiquitous unpredictability within the population. Indeed, according to J. Sessoon, the security organisations in Iraq were “as much a state of mind as the instrument of state terror”. Installing fear and putting it into the hearts of the population was the fundamental condition for success and control.159 This fear was cultivated in the media and clearly illustrated to the population that dissent would not be tolerated.160 Mass-mediated trials and public executions of alleged spies161 created an atmosphere of insecurity throughout the country in which the regime’s security apparatus could thrive.162 In order for fear to be truly omnipresent, it must utilise random force and the citizens never knew who might inform who about whom or who might consequently disappear and get arrested.163 As a result, Saddam Hussein and his regime encouraged a culture of violence that had a significant effect not only on the intelligence services, but also on the society at large and led to various violent assaults against minorities like Shi’is or Kurds.164 The Islamic State clearly utilises the same modus operandi and spreads fear throughout the population by either executing alleged spies,165 throwing accused homosexuals off tall building,166 or by executing people of other faiths in gruesome manners.167 Publishing this reign of terror in its magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah, or simply by spreading videos and imagery of these events on its social media channels168 in the same manner Saddam Hussein’s Iraq used to televise trials, is also common practice.169 Classifying the society was the prerequisite of controlling it in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, as much as it is the case in the territories controlled by the Islamic State. In fact, bureaucratic documentation has become a means of control for Jih¯adi groups 159

Deletant (1996), p. xiv. Sassoon (2011), p. 196. 161 Makiya (1998), pp. 47–52. 162 Sassoon (2011), p. 196. 163 Ibid, p. 197. 164 Ibid, p. 197. 165 ISIS (2017). Rumiyah, Issue no. 8. 166 Mostafa (2017). 167 IS (2015). Dabiq no.12. 168 IS (2019). 169 Makiya (1998). 160

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like IS.170 Also under Saddam Hussein, paperwork and bureaucratic workflows were created for every possible occasion such that citizens could be categorised and monitored by the Iraqi security services.171 In this fashion, as much information as possible could be gathered on a person and in particular, on the candidates who joined the SSO and their family. This body of bureaucracy acted as a reference and guideline, also for possible demotions or promotions.172 Personal files on people were the most powerful sources of information and routinely consisted of a sixteen page questionnaire on family, financial, professional and personal matters. In addition to these topics, the prospective applicant also had to answer questions regarding his hobbies, possible enemies, political opinions, religious beliefs, trips abroad, assets and even regarding his/her favourite brands of liquor, in case the applicant disclosed that he/she consumed alcohol and attended night clubs. The same was the case for brands of cigarettes, should the applicant have been a smoker.173 In line with the training, the Iraqi intelligence services provided the leaders of the Islamic State Intelligence with, the Emni has also created a bureaucratic body of paperwork, personal files and lists on the fighters that join them, including cover letters, the level of religious knowledge, former military training, letters of reference from other Jih¯adis, and even contact details or information on the applicant’s hobbies.174 Having learned their tradecraft in Saddam Hussein’s totalitarian state, the Emni elite headed by haji Bakr has again managed to turn a security apparatus against the people and utilise an intelligence system to increase their influence and enhance their powerbase.

6.5 The Emni Officers, the Intelligence Council and the Shura Council (as of Early 2019) The leadership in Iraq under Saddam Hussein and its various security services, most notably the SSO, delivered the message that power was absolute and irreversible, and that any form of opposition or dissent would not be tolerated.175 Sadly, today we can witness a revival of the power-hungry security apparatus that once terrorised the Iraqi people through surveillance, abductions and assassinations or via an omnipresent bureaucracy. Whether former intelligence officials from Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime adhere to IS ideology or are only part of it so as to extend, maintain or regain power is a subject to debate. It’s most likely it is a blend of both reasons. According to A.S. Hashim, “One could still argue that it’s a tactical alliance…A lot of these Ba’athists are not interested in IS running Iraq. They want to run Iraq. A lot of the few the 170

Sassoon (2011), p. 206. Ibid, p. 201. 172 Ibid, p. 202. 173 Ibid, p. 105. 174 Reuter (2015b). 175 Sassoon (2011), p. 216. 171

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Jih¯adists with this Leninist mindset that they’re useful idiots who we can use to rise to power‚176 However, what can be said for sure, is that Haji Bakr, at the time of his killing by Syrian rebels in January 2014, was not in possession of a Qur’¯an or any religious items of note.177 Moreover, he carried the blueprints of the Islamic State’s security apparatus and power structure, which may indicate where his priorities were at. On the other hand, L. Sly argues in her article that it may indeed be Jih¯adis who are exploiting the desperation and misery of former intelligence officials, who by now may have become radicalised within the Islamic State or inside prison prior to joining Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s movement.178 In any case, when the United States dismantled the army, they did not de-Ba’athify the minds of the former officers, but merely took away their source of income and left them with no other option than the Islamic State and the intelligence apparatus it provides. A subcommander of the Security and Intelligence Council (Emni/amniyat), one who significantly facilitated the expansion of IS’ powerbase, has been Abu Safwan al-Rifai. We can observe that the Security and Intelligence Council has not only been established to protect Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s powerbase, eliminating rivals to the self-proclaimed Caliph, ensuring his security, and thwarting plots against him, but also plays a vital role in asserting control within IS-controlled territory.179 This is partially achieved through the Security and Intelligence Council’s network of branches throughout the Caliphate. Especially at the foundation, it controls about 20 people, all the while expanding rapidly under subcommander Abu Safwan al-Rifai. This expansion has partially been possible due to the assassination of defectors and elimination of challenges to IS’ central authority from regional leaders or religious authorities.180 Al-Rifai himself was previously an officer in the Iraqi military regime and, unsurprisingly, he worked closely with Haji Bakr (Samir al-Khlifawi).181 Haji Bakr, Adnan al-Suwaydawi and Abd al-Rahman al-Qaduli were all intelligence officers in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (except al-Qaduli,182 who had been a physics teacher and fought and trained alongside Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998183 ). They would later emerge to be the key-personnel leading IS’ expansion into Syria between 2012 and 2013, which was immediately followed by the establishment of the IS security apparatus.184 The only one without this intelligence background was Al-Qaduli, who in turn was tasked with setting up a security unit called amniyat (col. Emni), which was in charge of the protection of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and with the effective enforcement of his orders. The Emni had initially been a small 176

Sly (2015). Reuter (2015b). 178 Sly (2015). 179 Barrett (2014), p. 31. 180 Reuter (2015a). 181 Orton (2016), pp. 50–60. 182 Weiss (2017a). 183 Halpern (2015). 184 Orton (2015b). 177

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organisation, said to control less than 30 men, but the organisation quickly expanded its operations into all areas of the IS-controlled territory. Al-Rifai, who at that time acted as al-Qaduli’s deputy, can largely be credited for this process.185 Abdul Wahid Khutnayer Ahmad is assumed to have been another influential member of the Security and Intelligence Council.186 Commonly known under the nom de guerre Abu Lu’ay, Khutnayer—much like many other IS commanders—he was detained in an American facility.187 Khutnayer did not only act as a member of the intelligence council,188 but also IS’s Minister of General/Public Security.189 Amongst the Amn al-Dawla (State Security) run by IS and the group’s amniyat (security units), we can find the Amn al-Dakhili branch, which can be considered the equivalent of an interior ministry, according to an IS defector. The Amn al-Dakhili is indeed in charge of maintaining and providing the internal security of each city under IS control.190 Since this is most likely the branch of IS security apparatus to be overseen, which Khutnayer controlled, this rendered him to be somewhat of an Interior Minister.191 Within an intelligence system, internal security is commonly linked to counterintelligence branches—which is the same for governments and paramilitary groups alike—and in IS’ case, their system is modelled significantly on the former Iraqi regime.192 Abdul Wahid Khutnayer Ahmad allegedly served in Saddam Hussein’s military. More importantly, however, he is said to have been involved in illicit foreign trade during the sanctions in the 1990s.193 Such a task was commonly reserved for intelligence operatives—regime elements,194 and thus it should not be a surprise that he further worked together with Bashar al-Hamadani (also known as Abu Mohamed), the former Iraqi Minister of Prisons. In this capacity, Khutnayer was charged with exporting vegetables from Iraq while Bashar al-Hamadani imported and sold cars.195 In early 2019, it appeared as though the Intelligence and Security Council has been run by Iyad Hamid Khalaf al-Jumaili. Another former Iraqi intelligence officer from Fallujah, al-Jumaili has been in charge of the amniyat, tasked with internal security and counterintelligence.196 Al-Jumaili also served as the head of the Security and Intelligence Council, a position previously held by Adnan al-Suwaydawi (Abu Muhannad al-Suwaydawi or Haji Dawood), the head of the Military Council until his death in May of 2015.197

185

Barrett (2014), p. 31. Ibid, p. 32. 187 TSG IntelBrief (2014a). 188 Barrett (2014), p. 31. 189 Lister (2014). 190 Weiss (2017b). 191 Orton (2016). 192 Hassan and Weiss (2015). 193 Ibid, p. 211. 194 Orton (2015a). 195 Moubayed, pp. 110–111. 196 Coles and Parker (2015), last visited: 27 February 2023. 197 Al-Tamimi (2016). 186

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When Adnan al-Suwaydawi was killed, Abd al-Rahman al-Qaduli took over his position on an interim basis. When Abd al-Rahman al-Qaduli had to replace the head of the Military Council, Fadel al-Hiyali, who was killed in August, 2015, amniyat leadership was handed over to al-Jumaili.198 It was al-Jumaili who gave the orders for barbaric executions and subsequent retribution videos in June of 2015199 —presumably for the sake of deterring espionage. Included amongst his savagery was burning men alive, drowning men in a cage and beheading prisoners with explosive collars.200 With respect to security Emirs, Abu Luqman al-Suri201 deserves mentioning since he held various intelligence-related position in the group, especially in the city of Raqqa, where he was born in 1973. He is widely believed to have studied law prior to being conscripted to the Syrian military, where he climbed to the rank of an intelligence officer and first lieutenant in the military intelligence unit.202 While teaching Arabic, he was slowly radicalised between 2005 and 2010, was ultimately arrested and detained in 2010, serving his prison sentence at the infamous Sednaya Prison,203 the government’s prison for religious militants.204 He was released from Sednaya at the beginning of the Syrian uprising.205 Prior to and after the uprising had begun in 2011, the Assad regime decided to release not only him and some other future IS commanders, but also hundreds of Islamists from this very prison.206 Amongst its prisoners, this notorious institution housed Salafists harbouring strong resentments against the Assad regime.207 They hoped that these fundamentalists would give the relatively peaceful protest a violent image, which would have ultimately allowed the Assad regime to present itself as an ally in the war against terrorism and enable it to crush the protests with impunity.208 According to defectors, the regime did everything it could to achieve this goal and thus even facilitated the fundamentalist’s work logistically and financially and created armed brigades.209 One of these released prisoners was Abu Luqman al-Suri who would rise to become a senior IS commander and reportedly oversaw the group’s oil trade and

198

Ibid. Ibid. 200 Ibid. 201 Also known as ‘Ali al-Hamud, ‘Ali Derwish, ‘Ali Musa al-Shawagh, Abdullah Shuwar alAujayd, Abdullah Shuwar, al-Aujayd, Abu Ayyub, Abu Luqman al-Sahl, Abu Luqman al-Suri, Al-Hamoud Ali, Ali al-Hamoud al-Shawakh, Ali Awas, Ali Hammud, Ali Mousa al-Hawikh, Ali Musa al-Shawakh, Ibrahim al-Shawwakh, Muh.ammad ‘Ali al-Shawakh. 202 Almohammad and Speckhard. 203 Ibid. 204 Weiss (2015). 205 Ibid. 206 Orton (2016), p. 58. 207 Orton (2014). 208 Barabandi and Thompson (2014). 209 Sands et al. (2014). 199

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smuggling business.210 In mid-year 2015, and in his role as the governor of Aleppo, Abu Luqman simultaneously acted as the security Emir for the Syrian territories, thus also making him responsible for aspects related to foreign fighters. In 2014, he was appointed the chief interrogator in Raqqa followed by becoming the Emir of the same region, which included the responsibility of publicising propagandistic aspects of IS military campaigns and the beheading of hostages.211 ,212 In the same year, he managed to climb the IS ranks and was made a member of the provincial governing council chaired by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. When he became the Emir of Raqqa,213 he was then tasked with all matters related to executing hostages and transferring prisoners to different locations.214 ,215 In late-2014, as a security measure, he also changed his name after having been reported dead in the media.216 After his reappointment as the governor of Raqqa in mid-2015,217 he acted as the de facto overall security Emir of the group and managed a detention facility for foreign IS recruits who had refused to take part in fighting.218 ,219 He was also in charge of coordinating and recruiting covert operatives, who mere mainly dispatched to Iraq.220 In early 2017, Abu Luqman al-Suri has allegedly been promoted to head the Emni as its Wali (director) in Syria and Iraq.221 According to IS defectors, he even ended up on a shortlist to become the deputy to the self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.222 In fact, he has also been believed to be the acting second in command of the group and was allegedly killed in an air strike in 2018, although this information has not been confirmed by IS.223

6.6 The Shura, Media and Military Councils 6.6.1 The Shura Council A former prominent and mercurial figure in the Emni leadership and organisation has been Abu Muh.ammad al-Adnani al-Shami (also known as Taha Subhi Falaha) who, as a former member of the Shura Council, assigned the chiefs to the four branches 210

Faucon and Albayrak (2014). United Nations Security Council (2016). 212 US Department of the Treasury (2015b). 213 US Department of the Treasury (2015a). 214 Burke (2017). 215 Callimachi (2018). 216 Bradley (2016). 217 United Nations Security Council (2016). 218 Almousa (2015). 219 Intelligencebriefs (2018). 220 Ibid. 221 Almohammad and Speckhard. 222 Demeter (2015). 223 Ebraheem (2018). 211

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of the Emni and named the chief of staff for IS military management. Reportedly, al-Adnani did not need to consult with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi before replacing or firing people, although it can be reasonably assumed that the Shura council at least rubber-stamped such decisions. He allegedly divided his time between Raqqa and al-Bab (the city that hosted Emni headquarters) always travelling in an inconspicuous car and with a personal security detail that tried to operate clandestinely and without raising much attention.224 Previously, Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi’s two deputies could also be found in the Shura council, namely Abu Muslim al-Turkmani (Fadil Ahmad Abdallah al Hayyali, deceased in Iraq on August 18th, 2015) and Abu Ali al-Anbari (deceased in Syria in March 2016). Abu Muslim al-Turkmani was essentially second in charge and responsible for the administrative matters in Iraq. Abu Ali al-Anbari was responsible for the IS administration and operations in neighbouring Syria.225 Intriguingly, both of them used to be Iraqi Ba’athists and active in Saddam Hussein’s party.226 Abu Muslim al Turkmani was from north-Western Iraq and allegedly served in Saddam Hussein’s military as a senior special forces officer and operative of military intelligence.227 Before 2003, he appears to have worked as a physics teacher and as an activist for the Ba’ath party and he was supposedly shortly a member of Ansar al Islam after 2003.228 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s former second deputy, who was also a member of the Shura council, used to be Abu Ali al-Anbari. Some accounts also stated that he was head of the Intelligence and Security Council,229 which was formerly headed by Abu Arkan al-Ameri. The Council consisted of a maximum of eleven members.230 Abu Muslim al-Turkmani and Abu Ali al-Anbari were both members of the Shura council aside from Amr al-Absi (also known as Abu al-Atheer or Amru al Absi al Shami, head of the media), Abu Ayman al-Iraqi (head of the military council) and Abu Muh.ammad al-Adnani al Shami.231

6.6.2 The Media Council Amr al-Absi led the media council, which heavily delves into also conducting intelligence-related tasks due to the distribution of propaganda intended to deter espionage, and can be held responsible for some of IS’ worst atrocities.232 Also 224

Weiss (2017b). Barrett (2014), p. 28. 226 Ibid, p. 28. 227 Ibid, p. 28. 228 Ibid, p. 28. 229 Ibid, p. 28. 230 Ibid, p. 28. 231 Ibid, p. 30. 232 Loveluck (2016). 225

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known as Abu al-Atheer al-Absi or simply Atheer, he was one of IS’ most influential drivers in the creation of its Caliphate and also played a significant role in the Syrian uprising of 2011. By late 2014, and after having been a long-serving member of the Shura council, Atheer was appointed head of the IS media council.233 He was killed by a US air strike in March 2016 and replaced by IS Syria governor Abu Muh.ammad al-Adnani.234 Another former detainee of the Sednaya prison who received amnesty from the Assad regime in 2011 was Amr al-Absi, a person already known to be an extremist even according to the standards of the notorious Sednaya prison, which itself is infamous as a breeding ground for radicalisation.235 Once freed, al-Absi did exactly what the regime felt he would. However, in 2012 he set up the Katibat Usood al-Sunna (KUS) insurgent group in Homs, which initially called itself “Islamic State”.236 The groups would later merge with his brother’s group, called Majlis Shura Dawlat alIslam (MSDI), which had already pledged allegiance with al-Qaeda237 under Atheer’s leadership.238 The new network spanning from Homs to Aleppo was renamed alMajlis Shura Mujahideen (MSM)—the name of one of IS’s predecessors—which at this time remained loyal to the al-Qaeda offshoot Jabhat al-Nusra.239 However, Jabhat al-Nusra (lead by Abu Muh.ammad al-Jolani) increasingly pushed for independence and in late 2012, Samir al-Khlifawi (the IS spymaster Haji Bakr) attempted to bring the group back under IS control. After these efforts had failed, Haji Bakr began recruiting several Jabhat al-Nusra commanders while a number of foreign fighters decided to defect to IS prior to the public schism of the two groups.240 Intriguingly, being a former military intelligence officer in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Haji Bakr had in fact directed the expansion of IS into Syria in accordance with the practice of somebody who had been trained by the KGB.241 He established competing lines of authority, various levels of compartmentalisation, an omnipresent intelligence network where spies would spy on spies, and he arranged for the elimination of perceived competitors or adversaries inside and outside of IS.242 Inside the Jabhat al-Nusra group, he ensured that a number of individuals shifted their loyalties directly to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and abandoned al-Jolani. Due to Haji Bakr’s influence, Atheer opted for Baghdadi and ultimately ensured that another individual ready

233

Barrett (2014), p. 52. Weiss (2017b). 235 Weiss (2015). 236 Orton (2016). 237 SyrianDaysOfRage [pseudonym] (2012). 238 Kirkpatrick (2012). 239 Orton (2016). 240 Ibid. 241 Orton (2015b). 242 Reuter (2015b). 234

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to abandon al-Jolani, namely the former Chechen and US-trained special reconnaissance and intelligence operative Tarkhan Batirashvili (Abu Umar al-Shishani),243 would do the same shortly prior to April 2013.244 The temptation for Tarkhan Batirashvili may, however, also have been of a pragmatic nature, since he was immediately appointed to be the northern commander for IS, with authority over all forces in Aleppo, Raqqa, Latakia and the North of Idlib. This came only one month after he had defected from Jabhat al-Nusra.245 By late 2013, he had climbed the IS ranks even further and became the Emir for northern Syria and was given command over the fighters from Chechnya.246 Together, they formed the backbone of Haji Bakr’s KGB-inspired plan to undermine the internal structures of Jabhat al-Nusra. As a consequence, the entire infrastructure of the group defected.247 This plan devised by Haji Bakr did not only dramatically benefit IS it also forced Jabhat al-Nusra to begin again from scratch.248

6.6.3 The Military Council The military council actively drives campaigns in order to win territory for the Caliphate and to defend the territory it has already conquered. Naturally, the military council is connected to various intelligence activities. It can be assumed that the head of this council has been Abu Ahmad al-Alwani (Waleed Jasem Mohammed al Alwani),249 who—much like his fellow IS commanders—was an Iraqi Ba’athis and served as an officer in Saddam Hussein’s army.250 He was reported to be the head of IS’s military council in November 2014,251 which would be a logical progression since he previously acted as the council’s chief of staff.252 Before joining the Military council, he oversaw the group’s activities in the Diyala province in Iraq.253 He was

243

Also known as Abu Hudhayfah, Abu Umar, Abu Umar al-Shishani, Chechen Omar, Omar alShishani, Omar Shishani, Omar the Chechen, Omer the Chechen, Tarkhan Batirashvili, Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili, Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batyrashvili, Umar Shishani, Umar the Chechen. 244 Orton (2016). 245 US Department of the Treasury (2013). 246 Leigh (2013). 247 Orton (2016). 248 Ibid. 249 Also known as Abu Ahmed al-Alwani, Waleed Jassem al-Alwani, Walid Jasim al-Alwani, Waleed Jasem Mohammed al Alwani. 250 Barrett (2014), p. 32. 251 Ibid, p. 31. 252 Al Arabiya (2014b). 253 Ibid.

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reportedly killed by coalition air strikes in late 2014,254 but these statements have not been confirmed.255 Another member of the Military Council, perhaps its former head, was Abu Muhanad al-Sweidawi (Adnan Latif Hamid al-Sweidawi aka Abu Ayman al Iraqi), who served as a Colonel in Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi air defence intelligence unit in addition to having been a close ally of the former Iraqi Ba’ath party leader Izzat al Douri. Intriguingly, Abu Muhanad al-Sweidawi, Haji Bakr and Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi all graduated from the same Iraqi military academy.256 Indeed, he has been described as having been especially close to the Jordanian Jih¯adi Abu Musab alZarqawi and the former IS top commander and former head of the military council, Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi. He was allegedly a childhood friend of the latter, a plausible statement since the two are both from the Anbar province, the same clan as Al-bu Swda, roughly of the same age and all graduates of the same Iraqi military academy.257 By 2014, he was in charge of operations in Western Syria, acted as the governor of al Anbar—an obvious choice, since he was a member of the Al-bu Swda clan of the Dulaim, the most influential tribe in Anbar Province258 —and gained an infamous reputation for his utilisation of violence and brutality.259 The Al-bu Swda clan was instrumental in the insurgency against the US forces in Iraq and thus, it is also no surprise that al-Sweidawi had fought in both the first and second battles of Fallujah. In addition, he was the mastermind of the 2013 Abu Ghraib prison break.260 After Haji Bakr and Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi had been killed in 2014, al-Sweidawi became the head of the military council.261 After his death, the role was taken over by senior IS commander Abu Ali alAnbari, a former major general in the Iraqi military who hails from the province of Anbar.262 Al-Anbari was killed together with 14 other IS fighters in December 2015.263 The head of the military council was not known as of 2019, but it was strongly felt that Abu Yusaf, a high-level security commander, could have taken over command.264 A Washington Post interview with Abu Yusaf reveals that his name is the nom de guerre of a 27-year-old European Islamist, who was born in Morocco, trained as an engineer265 and joined IS in 2013.266 254

Coles and Parker (2015), last visited: 15 June 2016. Ibid. 256 Hubbard and Schmitt (2016). 257 Ibid. 258 NBC News (2014). 259 Barrett (2014), p. 32. 260 The National (2015). 261 Hubbard and Schmitt (2016). 262 Weiss (2017a). 263 Qassim (2015). 264 Washington Post (2014b). 265 Mekhennet (2017). 266 Washington Post (2014a). 255

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However, Abu Yusaf may in fact also be dead and his predecessor could have been the same person who was the former security chief in Aleppo, who carried the nom de guerre Abu Ubaida al-Maghribi (born as Mohamed Amine Boutahar), and who was also of Moroccan origin. He was reported to be a European of Moroccan descent from Denmark, in his twenties, and trained as an engineer.267 This security chief, named Abu Ubaida al-Maghribi, was beheaded in 2014, as the Islamic State suspected him of passing along information to the British MI6.268 To this end, a report by the Moroccan news outlet Alyoum24 stated, “Ubaida Almaghribi, who is originally from Morocco, and served as the head of intelligence services of the IS organisation in Aleppo, Syria, was beheaded after being accused of reporting information on the activities, movements and plans of IS to the UK”.269 In any case, the powers allotted to the executed security chief Abu Ubaida alMaghribi reached beyond the mere supervision of prisons and he had a deputy who was responsible for this very task, named “Abu Maryam”, while every IS prison also had its own chief.270 According to a journalist working for Het Laatste Nieuws, who talked with German Jih¯adist Nils Donath,271 who worked for IS’s Emni in a prison in al-Bab city, Abu Ubaida al-Maghribi was arrested in April of 2014 on the orders of Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, who was the governor of Aleppo at the time.272 Soon thereafter, Abu Ubaida al-Maghribi was shot to death in the IS security department and his body was allegedly thrown in a well.273 A man sporting the nom de guerre “Abu Mohamed Franzi” (according to a journalist working for the Belgian newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws) succeeded Abu Ubaida al-Maghribi as the IS security chief of Aleppo.274 He had previously served as a bodyguard for Abu Omar al-Schischani, the former leader of “Katibat al-Muhajireen”, who also acted as the military commander of IS.275 It is indeed likely that this “Abu Mohamed Franzi” was the very same person as “Abu Mohamed al-Faransi”, who acted as the prison chief in Sheikh Najjar and is also known under his birthname Salim Benghalem.276 In addition to Abu Suleyman al-Firansi,277 he has been considered to be the mastermind behind the 2015 terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo and the 2015 attack at the Bataclan concert hall in Paris,278 which would also be a plausible 267

Morocco World News (2014). Ibid. 269 Ibid. 270 Harkin (2015). 271 AFP (2016). see also: Van Vlierden (2017). 272 Ibid. 273 Van Vlierden (2017). 274 Ibid. 275 Ibid. 276 Ibid. 277 Also known as Abdelilah Himich, Abu Souleymane, Abu Souleymane al-Faransi, Abu Souleymane the Frenchman, Abu Sulaiyman al Fransi, Abu Sulaiyman, Abu Sulayman al-Faransi, Abu Suleiman, Abu Suleyman, Abu Suleyman al-Faransi. 278 Huffington Post (2018). 268

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connection due to the IS security apparatus’ focus on covert operations.279 Salim Benghalem was killed in an air strike in late 2017.280 In sum, we can certainly begin explaining Jih¯adi intelligence with an assessment of some influential Jih¯adi operatives and institutions, but we must not end it here. We cannot conclude any historiographical assessment of a Jih¯adi intelligence culture here with just the IS security service and its having been heavily influenced by the former intelligence officers of Ba’athist Iraq. In fact, one must venture further into the history of an Islamic Intelligence culture and explore the drivers that influenced it. Intriguingly, many questions in the paperwork issued by the Iraqi SSO, used by its officers, and which are now being recycled by the Islamic State’s intelligence organs were exactly the same as those found on the personnel forms used by East Germany’s STASI.281

6.7 The Long Arm of the STASI and the KGB Intelligence structures that were developed and spread during the Cold War and throughout the countries of the former Soviet Union still influence the intelligence activities of IS. This is because Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party ideology was based on socialism and as such, the obvious alliance the country sought out during the Cold War was with the Soviet Bloc and East Germany.282 Aside from economic modernisation and defence, as much as technological capabilities,283 the Ba’ath regime had to rely on the Communist bloc for intelligence training, equipment and cooperation.284 Indeed, Erich Honecker had personal ties with left-leaning leaders of states like South Yemen, Syria, and Iraq at the time and was closely connected to Saddam Hussein.285 These states were also the first to accredit DDR representatives.286 These alliances led to a variety of bilateral cooperation and liaisons. Especially with respect to their internal security landscape, the Iraqis persistently requested intelligence assistance from East Germany.287 However, this cooperation also came with advantages for East Germany. From their perspective, international recognition by countries like Iraq would lead to economic benefits, which ultimately led to increased foreign policy relations with Iraq.288 Indeed, the East Germany’s plans seemed to work out. In the hopes of gaining Russian support (in the crisis with 279

Wege (2018). Fournier (2018). 281 Sassoon (2011) 282 Sassoon (2014), pp. 4–23. 283 Ibid, pp. 4–23. 284 Ibid, pp. 4–23. 285 Schmeidel (2008). 286 Ibid, pp. 153–154. 287 Sassoon (2014), p. 5. 288 Scholtyseck (2003). 280

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Iran) over navigation rights in the Shatt al-‘Arab in early 1969, Iraq became the first country to officially recognise East Germany, which was announced on May 10th, 1969.289 Until the 1970s, the relations between Iraq and the Communist bloc resulted in increased military aid and support for the Ba’athist strategy and its plans to build a modernised Iraq.290 Indeed, Iraq became the largest recipient of arms from the USSR between 1974 and 1978.291 With this influx of weapons came an influx in intelligence cooperation and training. The East German STASI was charged with providing intelligence support soon after the coup d’état in 1968.292 According to a report published by J. Sassoon based on a meeting held between General al-‘Ani and Colonel Wagner in September of 1969, the STASI concluded: “The Iraqi security apparatus is in no way up to the challenges and tasks of the new regime. So far, the security apparatus was exclusively content with monitoring political parties in the country, like the Ba‘ath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party. There was no department within the security directorate concerned with espionage and diversionary activities by imperialist countries against Iraq.”293

Furthermore, the Iraqi security service identified shortcomings in the training of officers, in running secret observations, in using secret ink, running intelligence operations, decoding encrypted communications, and in using surveillance devices.294 Although initially hesitant to fulfil the Iraqi requests, the East Germans ultimately agreed to train up to eight Iraqi security officers for a maximum period of eight weeks.295 This German commitment towards training Iraqi intelligence officers continued throughout the 1970s and the intelligence cooperation was further extended by commercial and technical aid.296 However, the liaison deteriorated in the late 1970s and ultimately the execution of 21 communists in May 1978, on charges of subversion by the Ba’ath regime marked a turning point in the East German/Iraqi relationship.297 Indeed, according to J. Sassoon, the Iraqi leadership continued to separate the country from the communist bloc. This may partially have been due to the competition between the ideologies of communism and the Ba’athist world view, but also because of Saddam Hussein’s realisation that the communist party managed to attract more young people and intellectuals than the Ba’ath party.298 As such, communism had started to become a direct threat to Saddam Hussein’s claims to power. He even went as far as to order assassinations of critics abroad, which did indeed alarm 289

Sassoon (2014), p. 6. Smolansky and Smolansky (1991). 291 Ibid, pp. 28–29. 292 Sassoon (2014), p. 6. 293 Ibid, p. 6. 294 Ibid, p. 6. 295 Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (1969). 296 Sassoon (2014), p. 9. 297 Ibid, pp. 10. 298 Ibid, pp. 9. 290

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the German STASI. As a consequence, the East German counterintelligence Colonel Reiner Wiegand later admitted to ordering a series of operations targeted at protecting Iraqi dissidents living in East Germany. Indeed, the Iraqis were determined to eliminate any opposition inside Iraq and abroad, and299 according to J. Sassoon, these assassinations did in fact alter the East German policy towards the Ba’ath regime than such things had with respect to the Soviet Russia.300 However, according to the findings of J. Sassoon, the intelligence cooperation between the STASI and Saddam Hussein were comparatively limited and less intensive than commonly thought when compared to other intelligence operations.301 Still, the STASI supported Iraqi intelligence during the early 1970s. Although this cooperation was not deepened, largely due to East Germans becoming aware of the true nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime, they provided the foundation stone of what would become the SSO and the entire Iraqi intelligence community. As such, Haji Bakr originally learned his trade and approach to intelligence from the DDR right in his early years at the start of his career with the Iraqi intelligence apparatus tradecraft. Since Iraq sent its first and second delegations tasked with intelligence cooperation to East Germany in 1970 and 1972, and since the STASI sent some specialists to conduct counterintelligence operations at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad,302 it can be assumed that those Jih¯adis who set up the Emni received up-to-date training from the East Germans when they started their careers in the Iraqi Intelligence Service. This training of Iraqi intelligence officers continued in the 1970s, but stopped by the end of the decade and when the SSO was founded.303 Moreover, regardless of how long the training lasted, we must remember the initial analysis and assessment of Iraq made by STASI officers, which concluded: “So far the security apparatus was exclusively content with monitoring political parties in the country… There was no department within the security directorate concerned with espionage and diversionary activities…”304

Consequently, the STASI found itself in the position of reshaping and restructuring the existing Iraqi intelligence landscape. Thus, it shouldn’t surprise us that Iraq’s security apparatus under Saddam Hussein were remarkably similar to those of the STASI. Both of them aimed at gathering as much information on as many citizens as possible. Both of them created what would later be termed a surveillance state through an extensive network of informants. The STASI and the Iraqi intelligence apparatus resorted to indoctrinating the youth and schoolchildren so that they would turn out to be better potential recruits. Neither hesitated to infiltrate religious institutions, educational institutions, professional organisations, workplaces and the private lives of most of their citizens. 299

Koehler (1999). Sassoon (2014), p. 12. 301 Ibid, p. 12. 302 Ibid, p. 23. 303 Ibid, p.23. 304 Sassoon (2014), p. 6. 300

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Exercising control over all spheres of culture and lifestyle choices was the main goal of both Iraqi intelligence services and the STASI, both of which adhered to a very tight and holistic ideology. Both institutions also shared an increasing paranoia towards anything foreign and against any internal threat, opposition or dissidence. To wrap things up, both regimes banned applicants from their security apparatus and ruling from the elite who had relatives abroad.305 Undeniably, the STASI played a key—albeit brief—role in the establishment of Saddam Hussein’s intelligence apparatus and arguably equipped the Iraqi intelligence officers with the framework they needed to ensure the survival of Saddam’s regime until the invasion of the US-led troops in 2001. This very knowledge, which was transferred and infused from Germany (and indirectly from the Soviet Union), enabled Jih¯adi intelligence operatives working for IS to establish their own intelligence service, which, unsurprisingly, bares a very close resemblance to the institutions that were established and trained in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

6.8 Paying Tribute to Saladin It would be rather short-sighted to stop this investigation into the origins of a Jih¯adi intelligence culture at this late juncture without considering some of its most dominant role models. History has a great influence on present-day developments in the Jih¯adi community. Today, the Islamic State’s executions of captured enemies, and the beheadings of prisoners, provide a striking similarity to Saladin’s order to behead the Knights of the Templar after the Battle of Hattin.306 In fact, Jih¯adis fighting for the Islamic State have compared themselves and their warring tactics (which are understood as war crimes in the modern day and age) to Saladin, who shed Muslim blood during the conquest of Egypt and Syria.307 Indeed, intelligence activities conducted in early Mesopotamia and by the ancient Arab tribes are an integral part of the cultural heritage of the Arabian Peninsula.308 We must not fall victim to the flawed assumption that these historic events might only be relevant in the realms of some niche academic existence. According to the accounts of J. Nixon, Saddam Hussein valued them greatly, although he was not an intellectual, but: “…he believed the world needed to know Iraq’s history, all the way back to Mesopotamia, to understand that the things he did were what he had to do, because of who he was and where he had come from.”309

305

Ibid, p. 23. Chism (2019), pp. 167–183. 307 Sekulow et al. (2014), p. 37. 308 Al-Asmari (2013), pp. 89–115. 309 Nixon (2017), p. 105. 306

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As fate would have it, Saddam Hussein felt a strong kinship with the great warrior Saladin, who led the Muslim military campaign against the Crusader states in the Levant. Also, Saladin utilised intelligence capabilities in most of his battles, for instance when he withdrew from a joint attack on Kerak and Montreal due to an intelligence report.310 Then again, he also faced various threats from within the territory he controlled. Particularly the Fatimids started plotting against him in order to restore their past glory.311 Rashid ad-Din Sinan, who served as the grand master of the Assassins of Syria, did not forgive Saladin for having replaced the Fatimids of Egypt and in response, they launched an assassination attempt on him in 1175.312 However, Saladin’s counterintelligence detected the thirteen Assassins before they carried out their attack by Nasih al-Din Khumartekin.313 A second unsuccessful attempt on his life was made a few days after he besieged the fortress of A’zaz.314 On one occasion, Saladin had chalk and cinders spread outside his tent at the gates of the besieged city of Masyaf in order to detect footsteps.315 With respect to intelligence gathering and strategic intelligence, Saladin’s secret services reported the planned raid of Syria by the Crusaders.316 He further avoided getting intercepted by the same enemy by spending one journey taking a desert route across the Sinai Peninsula to Ailah at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba.317 Although Saladin became a famous historic figure and role model due to his conquest of Syria, for defeating the Zengid army, for becoming Sultan of Egypt and Syria, and for commanding the Ayyubid army—which defeated the Crusaders at the Battle of Hattin in 1187—intelligence still played a major role in his battles and daily life. Indeed, he avoided an assassination attempt by a group of Egyptian soldiers and Emirs thanks to his intelligence chief Ali ibn Safyan.318 On the other hand, Saladin never refrained from having assassinations carried out or done himself. For example, he had reportedly assassinated the former Egyptian vizier Shawar319 and personally executed prisoners of war.320 For today’s Jih¯adi groups, Saladin’s ways of gruesomely utilising certain military tactics in his battles provide justification and legitimisation to their actions.321 Due to the nature of Saladin’s battles being waged in defence of the Muslim homeland as well as his use of the term Jih¯ad, L. Napoleoni argues that he laid an important 310

Iltumish (2011), pp. 128–134. Ibid, pp. 128–134. 312 Lane-Poole (1906), p. 138. 313 Ibid, p. 139. 314 Ibid, pp. 144–146. 315 Ibid, pp. 149–150. 316 Lyons and Jackson (1982). 317 Lane-Poole (1906), p. 167. 318 Lyons and Jackson (1982), p. 34. 319 Ibid, p. 28. 320 Ed-din et al. (2004). 321 Chism (2019), pp. 167–183. 311

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foundation for the terrorist tactics that are now practised in the Middle East.322 While this conclusion might be considered far-fetched by some scholars, Saladin’s role in history and in the wars that were fought in the name of religion undeniably resonate within the Jih¯adi community. While his legacy is complex, it has left lasting impressions regardless and in particular his depiction as a pan-Islam unifier and a defender of the Muslim homeland against the Crusaders. This has naturally been embraced by the Jih¯adi audience. Consequently, Abu Bark al-Baghdadi—the self-proclaimed Caliph of the Islamic State—has mentioned Saladin and described him as the “conqueror of al-Quds and the breaker of the cross”, which refers to the Kurdish Islamic leader’s defeat of the crusading forces.323 Intriguingly, it appears that by invoking Saladin—a Kurd—the Emni’s propaganda department aimed at establishing a role model for today’s Kurds in order to instigate them against Western forces, which the Emni has also termed as the “Crusaders” in the region.324 Although they’ve gained the reputation of being inherently anti-Kurdish, IS has not only recruited Kurds, but also directed messages towards this audience.325 The cultural heritage of the Islamic world is deeply interconnected with intelligence, covert operations and secret activities. Still, one need look further than history of Saladin’s style of management and the battles he waged for inspiration, as the influence of the Assyrians, the Persians or the Byzantines also flow into the sphere of influence. As was already mentioned, it should come as no surprise that the creator of the Iraqi intelligence and espionage apparatus—Saddam Hussein—felt a very strong kinship with Saladin, who only managed to remain in power and survive attempts at his life thanks to his secret services and spymasters. It also needs to be mentioned that the origins of an Islamic intelligence culture are certainly older than the history of Saladin and his battles. Saladin launched his battles within a cultural setting of intelligence that ranges back further to the earliest approaches to intelligence in the ancient Near East and to the role intelligence played in forming empires, kings and the beliefs of the region.

6.9 Intelligence in the Ancient Near East—The Early Influence of the Assyrians “Well, my witch, who art kindling fire every ‘two-hours’ journey’ and who art sending out thy messenger every ‘four hours’ journey’, I know thee and I will post watchmen in order to protect myself.”—Assyrian Magic Text.326

322

Napoleoni (2010). Salih (2016). 324 Ibid. 325 Al-Tamimi (2017). 326 Fries (1904), p. 117 ff. 323

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The earliest influencers from the Ancient Near East play a role in that they not only had an impact on the Prophet Muh.ammad’s intelligence apparatus, they are also part of what could be called Islamic intelligence heritage. Although it sometimes believed that intelligence and all its facets are modern creations, one must recognise that their history can be traced far back into the past. This history, especially when it comes to the Assyrian intelligence apparatus, influenced the way intelligence operations and institutions were established by the Prophet Mohammed, and as a result, it is still relevant today when studying Jih¯adi intelligence culture, as they have also become part of Jih¯adi operational art and cultural heritage. Intelligence organisations first emerged in the Ancient Near East,327 the cradle of culture, civilisation and organisations, which bore close resemblance to what would be considered a state or government today. The rich and influential inheritance left by the Assyrian Empire, which built one of the earliest intelligence systems, has had an immense impact on the construction of political spheres while providing the cultural soil from which future empires and (religious) leaders would grow to the historic strength known today.328 For the first time in human history, those cultures and their intelligence services embarked on paths towards the idea of universal empires and hereditary monarchies, in which royalty and power would be brought into close proximity to divinity and divine authority.329 With the craving for power and influence, came expansion. With expansion came war, taxation, and the need for sophisticated and fast information services, which were originally established by the Babylonians and then adapted by the Assyrians.330 While the Egyptians had established early intelligence disciplines prior to the Babylonians, who in turn immensely influenced the Assyrians, it appears reasonable to establish the beginning of the first proper, structured and well-organised Asiatic intelligence in Assyria at the time when ancient Egypt had assumed the role of a conqueror during the reign of the Babylonian king Kadashman-Enlil. This has been established in writing in the Tell-el-Amarna letters, some of which were sent from Babylonia and were meant to assess the political climate in Egypt. Some were meant to secure information on the habits of the Pharaoh and his closest confidants.331 Solid communication was paramount and highly valued by the Babylonian kings. Thus, building roads and establishing messaging systems between Larsa and Babylonia were the first steps towards establishing sophisticated intelligence networks. The Babylonians ultimately shared some of their diplomacy experiences and intelligence gathering capabilities, communication networks and information exchange with the Assyrians. They, in turn, later realised that the defence and safety of their Assyrian empire depended on reliable information.332 Consequently, it should not surprise anyone that the Assyrian conqueror Tiglath-pilesner considered a proper 327

Dvornik (1974), p. 3. Ibid, p. 3. 329 Ibid, p. 3. 330 Dvornik (1974), p. 3. 331 Ibid, p. 218. 332 Ibid, p. 16. 328

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system of roads in order to foster communication and the sharing of information to be an invaluable condition for success.333 The main Assyrian communication routes followed the great rivers and ultimately ended at the Persian Gulf, from where Assyrian boats would sail to India, Arabia or Egypt.334 These developments would later turn out to be predecessors of the bar¯ıd postal system. Indeed, along the routes leading to the Persian Gulf, a royal postal service was established in order to provide rapid communication of intelligence from all corners of the Assyrian Empire. According to F. Dvornik, this communication system appears to have been completed in the age of Assurbanapal, who is said to have crushed an Ethiopian revolt, which had already progressed to Memphis, the ancient capital of Aneb-Hetch.335 F. Dvornik further concludes that important information—i.e. regarding Ethiopian revolts—was transmitted via fire signals along the roads, which were erected at fixed distances. Simultaneously, a fast postal messengers were dispatched to transmit more detailed news from one corner of the empire to the other, as one Assyrian magic text indicates.336 “She is at home in all lands, she passes over all mountains, she walks in the streets, she enters the houses, she infiltrates the fortresses, she is present in all market places. Her quick feet are admired and dreaded.”337

According to F. Dvornik, this magic text dealing with protection against the magic of the witch can either be interpreted as an admiration felt for this royal postal institution or may also indicate an expression of fear.338 Could it be, that those secret agents tasked with transmitting the news, travelling day and night in order to provide their king with up-to-date information on his battles, wars and upcoming revolts, had also taken over the task of a secret police force? This claim might truly be hard to verify. However, the king’s messengers had become the eyes and ears of the monarchy and the step towards expanding their espionage activities from the enemies of the divinely appointed sovereign towards the average Assyrian population would have been a very small one.339 In fact, not much information has been preserved on the Assyrian internal security apparatus, but one can at least turn to the activities of Assyrian agents at the frontlines of the empire today, in order to verify their efficiency and influence:

333

Ibid, p. 17. Ibid, p. 17. 335 Ibid, p. 19. 336 Fries (1904), p. 117. 337 Ibid, p. 117. 338 Dvornik (1974), p. 20. 339 Ibid, p. 20. 334

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“With reference to what the king wrote saying ‘Send out Spies’, I have sent them out twice; some came back and made reports detailed in the letter to the effect that five enemy lieutenants have entered Uesi in Armenia, together with commanders of camel-corps; they are bringing up their forces which are of some strength.”340

According to R. F. Harper, Assyria’s intelligence service was very active in Armenia and the intelligence reports that were sent to the Assyrian king Sargon indicate that the military and political leadership at the time was informed about every troop movement in Armenia.341 While the Assyrian spies reported on incentives provided by the Armenian king to Assyrian deserters, it strikes the reader of these letters—or shall we say intelligence briefings—published by R. F. Harper as remarkable that king Sargon demanded the reliability of information to be verified by three different sources within the Assyrian intelligence apparatus. This triangulation of information perhaps most clearly illustrates the unprecedented sophistication of Assyrian intelligence apparatus.342 Assyrian agents made careful note of what was said in the streets and who the king could trust.343 They also kept records of anti-Assyrian propaganda.344 Two letters also rather clearly indicate that the Assyrian secret services did, at the very least, provide some vetting and investigations into the people close to the king and royal officials. Indeed, suspicious behaviour was immediately reported while high-ranking officials in charge of the provinces were required to provide intelligence reports to the leadership on a regular basis.345 It must be stressed here that from their first contact with Arab tribes in 853 BCE,346 the Assyrian empires were collecting and gathering intelligence in order to control the Arabs.347 They utilised intelligence in order to control the Arab tribes and Arab militants while the Arab tribes themselves had become another source of information, spying on their fellow tribesmen.348 Indeed, aside from being characterised as rebellious and of a bellicose nature, these ancient tribes did not express much unity amongst each other, which frequently found expression in raids.349 Particularly the neo-Assyrians experienced difficulties in trying to control these tribes, which in turn required their intelligence services to provide as accurate of information on them as possible.350 These early Arab tribes were subsequently subjected to a very sophisticated espionage and intelligence network. With that, one of the main tasks of the Assyrian intelligence services was to penetrate deep into the enemy’s 340

Thompson (1901). Ibid, p. 88. 342 Ibid, p. 282. 343 Ibid, pp. 277 and 736. 344 Ibid, p. 301. 345 Ibid, p. 88. 346 Dubovsky (2006). 347 Ibid, p. 123. 348 Ibid, p. 123. 349 Ibid, p. 125. 350 Ibid, p. 125. 341

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heartland, which, given the hostile state of affairs at the time, must have—at the very least—prompted some rudimentary counterintelligence activities on the part of the Arab tribes in order to avoid being spied upon. Indeed, the Arabs of the time also ran their own intelligence networks, which were active during peacetime and wartime alike.351 This especially illustrates that there is an Arab concept of intelligence, which formed during the age of J¯ahil¯ıyah and which predates the rise of Islam itself.352 These early Arab tribal approaches to intelligence during times of both war and peace had a great influence on the intelligence activities of the Prophet Muh.ammad,353 which in turn are now frequently quoted by the Islamic State.354 In the earliest stages of the Islamic faith, the Prophet Muh.ammad made use of these intelligence doctrines and developed the associated notions and practices, which were originally inherited from the Arab tribal predecessors. In summary, the Assyrians perfected the system of intelligence collection and intelligence communication. Their intelligence service allowed for wars to be fought and revolts to be suppressed, but also assured the security and safety of the monarchy and the sovereign. What developed in Assyria was a system and an organisation devoted to keeping the monarch in power and assuring loyalty throughout all ranks. Although only a few fragments and pieces of information on the Assyrian intelligence apparatus have been preserved, it can be regarded as the first emergence of an intelligence service. According to F. Dvornik, the influence and importance of Assyrian intelligence and espionage can hardly be overestimated since “from that time on [intelligence] was a special feature of almost all Asiatic absolute monarchies”.355 This is especially true, since the heirs of the Assyrians are, amongst others, the Persians who built their empire on the ruins and ashes of Assyria.

6.10 Persian Intelligence Traditions and Administration “The king has many ears and many eyes.”—Xenophon, Cyropaedia.356

The Assyrian intelligence system had a significant effect on Persian intelligence, through which the associated doctrines and praxes ultimately influenced the intelligence apparatus of the Prophet Mohammed. When the Assyrians penetrated the Persian territories in 836 BC, they only managed to subjugate the Medes (Persian tribes). However, the Medes started to build their own state around 640 BC, when it 351

Beeston (1976), pp. 7–11. Al-Asmari (2013), pp. 89–115. 353 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 90. 354 Al-Qaeda (2016). 355 Dvornik (1974), p. 23. 356 Miller. 352

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became more and more evident that Assyria was in decline. Roughly one hundred years later, in 553 BC, Cyrus the Great emerged and the Persians started a revolt against the Medes. This ultimately led to the foundation of the Persian Empire. Cyrus the Great did not stop there and started to expand his Empire towards Asia Minor, Armenia and some coastal areas in Greece. A huge empire like the one Persia had at the time required a certain level of infrastructure and thus, a system of roads was built in order to communicate messages and information effectively. Last but not least, this level of infrastructure also needed to be established for administrative reasons and to ensure that the central government in Persia could remain in contact with remote provinces and receive timely alerts on the potential dangers outside its borders. At this time, Persia was divided into 20 provinces, each administered by a separate governor (satraps) in a rather cumbersome and decentralised fashion. As such, the first three Persian kings realised that a properly organised and wellfunctioning intelligence service was imperative if the different provinces were to be kept in line. Thus, governors were forced to owe alliance and loyalty to the king alone, which was enforced by ten thousand royal bodyguards known as “The Immortals” and monitored by a specifically established office called “Eye of the King”. Needless to say, the proper functioning of such a monitoring institution depended on a strong intelligence service, which in turn depended on the rapid communication between provinces and the capital.357 Cyrus the Great, for example, not only appreciated the “Eye of the King”,358 but was himself also a master of intelligence in times of peace and war. He was admired for his abilities by the Greek writer Xenophon: “…He prompted many men to make it their business to use their eyes and ears to spy out what they could report to the King to his advantage. As a natural result of this, many “eyes” and many “ears” were ascribed to the king… and people everywhere are afraid to say anything to the discredit of the king, just as if he himself were listening; or do anything to harm him, just as if he were present.”359

Xenophon’s description of Cyrus the Great confirms the existence of large espionage networks, but one can further reasonably assume that some form of secret police unit must have been established.360 Also, the Persian intelligence system appears to have been of hierarchical nature, while “The Kings Eye” was regarded to be a prominent member of the council and a leading member of the Persian cabinet.361 F. Dvornik assesses that the head of the Persian postal service, who was also known as the “Minister of Information, or Intelligence”, was held in great esteem, which is a conclusion he based on the accounts Herodotus.362 Cyrus, however, did not invent this intelligence system. No, rather he copied it from the Assyrians and improved some aspects of the Assyrian system, most 357

Dvornik (1974), p. 24. Miller. 359 Ibid. 360 Dvornik (1974), p. 27. 361 Ibid, p. 31. 362 Ibid, p. 31. 358

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particularly the road and postal system. According to the W. M. Ramsay, the Persians simply used the roads around Asia Minor that were built by the former Assyrian rulers of the region, establishing their royal postal system throughout the whole empire based on an infrastructure363 that was originally established by the Assyrians.364 Still, the Persians appear to have improved old methods and established an unrivalled postal system that went on to be greatly admired by the Greek writers Xenophon365 or Herodotus.366 The latter shall be quoted here since his accounts might best summarise how well the Persian postal and intelligence system worked367 : “Now there is nothing mortal that accomplishes a course more swiftly than these messengers…it is said that as many days as there are in the whole journey, so many are the men and horses that stand along the road, each horse and man at the interval of a day’s journey…The first rider delivers his charge to the second, the second to the third, and thence it passes on from hand to hand.”368

Aside from this messaging system based on horsemen, the Persians also built upon a signalling system originally invented by the Assyrians. This telegraphic communication system—an early form of SIGINT, one might be tempted to say—was used for particularly urgent news and relied on fire signals.369 In fact, general Mardonius relayed the news of having captured Athens for the second time to Xerxes via this form of communication.370

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Neurink J (2015) Dark details emerge from ISIS-occupied Mosul. Rudaw. Accessed online: rudaw. net/english/middleeast/iraq/300920151 NBC News (2014) Key players: who’s who in the battle for Iraq? NBC News. Accessed online: https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/iraq-turmoil/key-players-whos-who-battle-iraq-n130981 Nixon J (2017) Debriefing the president: the interrogation of Saddam Hussein. Corgi Orton K (2016) Profiles of Islamic state leaders. Henry Jackson Society, CRT Orton K (2014) The Assad Regime’s collusion with ISIS and al-Qaeda: assessing the evidence. Accessed online. https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2014/03/24/assessing-the-evidence-ofcollusion-between-the-assad-regime-and-the-wahhabi-Jih¯adists-part-1/ Orton K (2015a) Izzat ad Douri and ISIS. Baghdad Invest Orton K (2015b) The riddle of Haji Bakr. The Syrian Intifada. Medium. Accessed online: https:// medium.com/@KyleWOrton/the-riddle-of-haji-bakr-9a949f1c5669 Qassim S (2015) Baghdadi’s advisor killed in Iraqi raid. ARA News. Accessed online: http://ara news.net/files/2015/12/baghdadis-advisor-killed-in-iraqi-raid/ Ramsay WM (1890) The historical geography of Asia Minor. John Murray Rayburn J (2014) Iraq After America: strongmen, sectarians, resistance—the great unraveling: the remaking of the middle east. Hoover Institution Press Publication, No. 643 Reuter C (2015a) Die schwarze Macht: Der »Islamische Staat« und die Strategen des Terrors. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt Reuter C (2015b) The terror strategist: secret files reveal the structure of Islamic State. Der Spiegel. Accessed online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-str ucture-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html Reuters (2017) Islamic state second-in-command killed in airstrike, Iraqi intelligence says. Accessed online: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crIS-iraq-islamicstate-idUSKBN1733IU/ Riedel B (2014) What we won: America’s secret war in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Brookings Institution Press. pp. ix-xi, 21–22, 93–99 and 105 Roggio B (2008) Who is Abu Omar al Baghdadi?. Long War J. Accessed Online: https://www.lon gwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/who_is_abu_omar_al_b.php Roggio B (2014) IS confirms death of senior leader in Syria. Long War J. Accessed online: https:// www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/isis_confirms_death.php Salih M (2016) How Islamic State is trying to lure Kurds to its ranks. Al-Monitor. Accessed online: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/islamic-state-propagandavideo-kurds-iraq.html Sands P et al (2014) Assad regime set free extremists from prison to fire up trouble during peaceful uprising. The National (U.A.E.). Accessed online: www.thenational.ae/world/syria/assad-reg ime-set-free-extremists-from-prison-to-fire-up-trouble-during-peaceful-uprising Sassoon J (2011) Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party: inside an authoritarian regime. Cambridge University Press Sassoon J (2014) The east German ministry for state security and Iraq, 1968–1989. J Cold War Stud 16(1) Schmeidel JC (2008) STASI: shield and Sword of the Party. In: Aldrich RJ, Andrew C. Studies in intelligence series, pp 153–154 Scholtyseck J (2003) Die Außenpolitik der DDR. Oldenbourg Verlag, pp 28–30 Sekulow J et al (2014) The rise of IS: a threat we can’t Ignore. Simon and Schuster Sly L (2015) The hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein’sThe hidden hand behind the Islamic State Militants? Washington Post. Accessed Online: https://www.washin gtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddamhusseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html Smolansky OM, Smolansky BM (1991) The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence. Duke University Press, pp 28–29

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Speckhard A, Yayla AS (n.d.) The ISIS Emni: the inner workings and origins of ISIS’ s intelligence apparatus. Accessed Online: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-emni-the-inner-wor kings-and-origins-of-isiss-intelligence-apparatus/ Speckhard A, Yayla AS (2016) ISIS defectors: inside stories of the terrorist Caliphate. Advances Press LLC, McLean, VA Suc M (2017) Révélations sur les services secrets de l’Etat islamique. Mediapart. Accessed online: https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/180817/revelations-sur-les-ser vices-secrets-de-l-etat-islamique SyrianDaysOfRage [pseudonym] (2012) Bab AlHawa, Sarmada. Youtube. FSA Frees Syria/Turkey Border from Regime Forces. Accessed online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W13i_N bj3q8 Taylor P et al (2016) IS in Europe: the race to the death. BBC. Accessed online: https://www.bbc. com/news/magazine-35872562 Thomas-Noone B (2015) ISIS Revealed: Spies, Intelligence and Blackmail. The National Interests. Accessed online: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/IS-revealed-spies-intelligenceblackmail-12690 Thompson RC (1901) Robert Francis Harper’s Assyrian and Babylonian Letters. Am J Semit Lang Lit 19(4):235–237 TSG IntelBrief (2014a) From Bucca to Kobani: the hybrid ideology of the Islamic State. The Soufan Group. Accessed online: http://www.soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-from-bucca-to-kobani-thehybrid-ideology-of-the-islamic-state/ TSG IntelBrief (2014b) The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria: a primer. The Soufan Group. Accessed online: http://www.soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-state-of-iraqand-greater-syria-a-primer/ United Nations Security Council (2016) Sanctions list. Accessed online: https://www.un.org/sc/sub org/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/ali-musa-al-shawakh US Department of the Treasury (2013) Treasury designates twelve foreign terrorist fighter facilitators. Accessed online: https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2651. aspx US Department of the Treasury (2015a) Counter terrorism designations. Accessed online: https:// www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20150929.aspx US Department of the Treasury (2015b) Treasury sanctions major Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Leaders—financial figures, facilitators, and supporters. Accessed online: https://www.tre asury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0188.aspx Van Vlierden G (2017) Abu Ubaida al-Maghribi, the Dutch imprisoner of James Foley & co—His true identity revealed—His death detailed—His French successor named. Accessed online: https://emmeJih¯ad.wordpress.com/2017/01/12/abu-ubaida-al-maghribi-the-dutch-imprisonerof-james-foley-co-his-true-identity-revealed-his-death-detailed-his-french-successor-named/ Van Vlierden G (2018) Following the Facebook trail of Abdelhamid Abaaoud’s scouts. emmeJih¯ad, Accessed Online: https://emmeJih¯ad.wordpress.com/2018/03/19/following-the-facebook-trailof-abdelhamid-abaaouds-scouts/ Washington Post (2014a) In Turkey, a late crackdown on Islamist fighters. Washington Post. Accessed online: https://www.washingtonpost.com Washington Post (2014b) The terrorists fighting us now? We just finished training them. Source not available online Wege CA (2018) The changing Islamic State intelligence apparatus. Int J Intell CounterIntelligence 31(2):271–288 Weiss M (2015) ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. Regan Arts Weiss M (2017a) Everything we knew about this IS mastermind was wrong. The Daily Beast. Accessed online: https://www.thedailybeast.com/everything-we-knew-about-this-isismastermind-was-wrong Weiss M (2017b) How ISIS Picks Its Suicide Bombers. The Daily Beast. Accessed online: https:// www.thedailybeast.com/how-isis-picks-its-suicide-bombers

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Woods KM, Lacey J (2007) Iraqi perspectives project: Saddam and terrorism—emerging insights from captured Iraqi documents. Instit Defense Analys 2:203–207 Yayla SA, Speckhard A (2016) Aftermath of another ISIS attack in Gaziantep, Turkey: a possible new internal conflict for Turkey. ICSVE Brief Reports. Accessed online: http://www.icsve.org/ brief-reports/aftermath-of-another-isis-attack-in-gaziantep-turkey-a-possible-new-internal-con flict-for-turkey/

Chapter 7

The First Islamic State and Its Intelligence Services

Abstract In the earliest phase of the religion, Islam was a secret underground movement and Muh.ammad realised that some form of intelligence was necessary to survive. Consequently, Muh.ammad trusted only his inner circle, which continuously provided him with intelligence. He himself hence simultaneously assumed the role of chief of intelligence and counterintelligence, as he wanted to keep his networks, motivations, plans and manoeuvres secret. In this way, counterintelligence was a central component in the foundation of the first Islamic State. The internal security apparatus in particular was to continue to develop long after Muhammad’s death. However, it was not the Prophet himself who was to lead the Muslim conquest. After Muhammad’s death in 632, the Rashidun caliphs who followed him were to expand the Muslim empire and thus lay the foundation for an Islamic intelligence culture. Keywords The Rightly Guided Caliphs · Rashidun · Abbasid Muslim Empire · Postal system · Fatimid Empire · Mamluk Empire · Byzantine When the Prophet Muh.ammad led the rise of the Arabs, intelligence played an essential role, not merely in his battles and wars, but also in spreading the new religion of Islam. At the earliest stage of the religion, Islam was a clandestine underground movement and Muh.ammad realised that some form of intelligence services was needed if it was to survive. Consequently, Muh.ammad only trusted his inner circle, which continuously supplied him with information, which he would later cross-check with the intelligence he had received from his own HUMINT network.1 He kept his plans and military strategies secret at all times and decided to only share details on a need-to-know basis.2 Especially then when Muh.ammad would decide to march towards Mecca and conquer the city in 630 AD, he only shared his plans with his most loyal followers.3 His intelligence network gathered intelligence on foreign threats as much as provided internal security, vetting and counterintelligence frameworks. The Prophet

1

Suwaed and Kahana (2018). Khattab (n.d.), p. 11. 3 Suwaed and Kahana (2018). 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_7

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Muh.ammad himself would take over the role of head of intelligence and counterintelligence at the same time since he aimed at keeping his networks, motivations, plans and manoeuvres secret.4 Indeed, the Qur’an frequently discusses the internal threat termed the mun¯afiq¯un (hypocrites), who were secretly unsympathetic to the Islamic cause and tried to undermine the Ummah, referring to them as being more dangerous to Islam than the worst non-Muslim enemies.5 However, the size and professionalism of the intelligence apparatus of the Prophet are correlated with the rise of Islam as a religion and thus, we can observe different modus operandi when looking at the history of Islam.6 ,7 ,8 While the Prophet resided in Mecca, and during the preliminary stages of Islam, he realised that breaches in his operational security could lead to the suppression of this new religion. Consequently, he kept the identity of his recruits and their meeting places a strictly guarded secret.9 The Quraiš, however, considered the Prophet a threat and a challenge to the tribe’s status in Mecca and the Arabian Peninsula.10 ,11 Consequently, Muslims were exposed to threats, attacks and ultimately, the Prophet’s family was banned in order to put pressure on him. As a result of this hostility, the Prophet Muh.ammad developed his HUMINT networks throughout the city of Mecca,12 which included informers from his own tribe, other tribes and agents inside the Persia Empire, Abyssinia and the Byzantine Empire.13 Indeed, he would also use informers to identify prospective followers of this movement. Since the hostilities, the Ummah had to face in Mecca continued to increase consistently, the Prophet decided to relocate the growing movement to a safer place. The time spent there would become known as the Haj period.14 The Prophet Muh.ammad, particularly in the early stages of Islam and during the first battle against the Quraiš, acted very cautiously. Several incidents are recorded and have become part of the Sunnah where his secret espionage tactics are revealed.15 However, we can safely assume that the Quraiš would have tried to spy upon the Prophet. Especially during the conquest of Mecca, where al-Waqidi reports on a woman who had been sent to the Quraiš in order to warn the people of the Prophet’s plan to attack and who was immediately apprehended.16 An assassination attempt on the Prophet also failed, as the Muslims had agents amongst the enemy, allowing 4

Ibid, pp. 169–184. The Qur’¯an, S¯urah Al-Munafiqun, 63. 6 The Qur’¯ an, S¯urah An-Najm. 53, Verse 4. 7 The Qur’¯ an, al-‘Alaq; Verses 1–5. 8 Bogle (1998). 9 Suwaed and Kahana (2018). 10 Abdullah (2010), p. 62. 11 Donner (2010). 12 Suwaed and Kahana (2018). 13 Al-Mbarkfori (1988), p. 100. 14 Ibn Hisham (1979), p. 424. 15 Al-Tabari, M. (d. 310/923). Tarikh al-rusul wa-l-muluk. 2:433–450. 16 Ibid, 3:48–62. 5

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intelligence on the planned plot to reach Muh.ammad in time. Consequently, the Prophet decided to disguise himself and sped up the necessary arrangements for the group’s Hijra to Medina. Prior to the Hijra, Muh.ammad emerged from his besieged house, recited the Surah Y¯a-S¯ın and threw a handful of sand into the eyes of the besiegers so that they could not see him.17 After the Prophet’s escape from Mecca, he and Abu Bakr spent three days in a cave outside the city while an informer named Abdullah ibn Abu Bakr provided everyone with intelligence on the Quraiš’s manoeuvres. At the same time, Amir ibn Fuhayra relocated his sheep and goatherd in front of the cave in order for the animals to blur human tracks left on the sand, which may have given away the position of Muh.ammad before he could reach Medina.18 Throughout all of Muh.ammad’s military campaigns, the Muslim army opted for noiseless movement during the night and the soldiers learned to remain quiet during marches, having i.e. removed the bells from the camels’ necks to avoid making sound when troops moved during the night.19 In Medina, the Ummah transformed into a nation with a territory, which also meant that the Prophet had to develop and improve his intelligence apparatus. This became especially relevant since the Muslims also encountered Jews or fellow Arabs that had not yet embraced Islam. That fact factored into the Prophet’s intelligence network. This is, according to Suwaed and Kahana, because the Prophet’s agents had established a network and connections amongst various tribes, which had consequently turned less antagonistic towards the Islamic religion, for no less reason their previous exposure to monotheism. In Medina, the intelligence landscape and informers network had changed and with that, the challenges faced by Muh.ammad prompted him to change his intelligence and counterintelligence measures.20 In turn, the Quraiš responded by banning the Muslims socially and economically, but they did not manage to infiltrate them or plant informers.21 ,22 With regard to the counterintelligence aspects during the emigration to Medina, it can be assessed that this operation was planned and executed in absolute secrecy, where stealth and camouflage were used so as to circumvent the Quraiš.23 This allowed counterintelligence to become a central part of the establishment of the first Islamic State, where most especially the internal security apparatus would continue to evolve long after the death of Muh.ammad. This has also been the case since Muslim rulers continued to expand their religion, which also led to an increase in internal threats and conflicts at both borders and frontlines of their empire. Hence, military intelligence has played an important role from the earliest days of Islam. 17

Ibn Kathir (2001). Ibn Hisham (1979), pp. 485–491. 19 Suwaed and Kahana (2018). 20 Ibid, pp. 169–184. 21 Ibn Al-Athir, A.a.F. Al-Kamil Fe-Al-Tarikh, Vol. 2, p. 7. 22 Al-Ghazali (1976). 23 Ibn Hisham (1979), pp. 469, 477. 18

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Muh.ammad’s military intelligence consequently evolved and took shape during the battles he waged against the enemies of Islam’s expansion and the religion itself. If battle campaigns were to be fought successfully, intelligence on the enemy had to be gathered. Moreover, the Prophet also aimed at using his military intelligence gathering capabilities to gather information on treaties and purchases. Measures had to be in place to counter internal enemies and saboteurs, which is why a network of agents was established and run by the Prophet’s uncle Abbas ibn Abd Al-Muttalib. After the Hijra, Abbas remained in Mecca, concealed in his Islamic faith and sent reports on the Prophet’s nemesis—the Quraiš—to Medina. These intelligence reports from Mecca reached Muh.ammad within three days,24 but informers like Abbas were not only stationed in Mecca, but throughout the Arabian Peninsula, in the Byzantine Empire, Abyssinia and in Persia.25 ,26 At the earliest stages of Islam, the Prophet would himself engage in espionage operations and disguised himself when questioning travellers from Mecca about the Quraiš.27 His agents were sent systematically to gather information prior to engaging in conflicts. According to al-Tabari, the Prophet Muh.ammad also received information prior of the battle of Badr from his “eyes”—Besbis ibn Amr and Udi ibn Al-ghbaa—who spied on the Quraiš.28 Once the pair had reached Bader, they settled near a water source and started to listen to the people who came to get water. Besbis ibn Amr and Udi ibn Al-ghbaa overheard several people mentioning that a large camel caravan was expected soon and thus, they decided to inform Muh.ammad. The Prophet realised that this large caravan of camels might indicate the presence of a large military force close by and so he sent his most trusted men ᶜ Al¯ı ibn Ab¯ı T¯alib, az-Zubair ibn al-ᶜ Auw¯am and Saᶜ d ibn Ab¯ı Waqq¯as to provide verification of the intelligence report he had received. The men decided to capture the camels and their caretakers and brought them to the Prophet, who interrogated the captives. These caretakers could not provide Muh.ammad with any information on the size of the army, which prompted him to ask them about the number of camels they had slaughtered each day in order to feed the troops. This allowed him to estimate that enemy’s army was comprised of roughly 1000 men, whereas his interrogation of the captives further revealed a coalition against the Muslims originating from Mecca.29 Lastly, interrogating the camel caretakers also provided the Prophet with information on the enemy’s location, the troops and the weapons they used—information Muh.ammad needed in order to win that battle.30 Intriguingly, Al-Naboodah argues that this can be seen as a reliance on loyal Muslim converts who would subsequently become his eyes and thus, aid in the expansion

24

Ibn Sa’d, M.i.M. Al-Tbkat Al-kobra, Vol. 2, p. 25. Al-Waqedi, M.i.O. Al-Mghazi. Dar al-Kutub, Vol. 2, p. 727. 26 Khattab (n.d.), p. 169. 27 Ibn Hisham 1979), p. 616. 28 Al-Tabari, M. (d. 310/923). Tarikh al-rusul wa-l-muluk. 3:433, 434 and 503. 29 Ibn Hisham (1979), pp. 616–617. 30 Suwaed and Kahana (2018). 25

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of Islam through the use of intelligence.31 All this can be assessed as defending the argument that the Prophet Muh.ammad was required to rely on intelligence in order to spread Islam. Muh.ammad also developed reconnaissance on a tactical level, he dispatched scouts and sometimes would even go to assess a situation first-hand. During the Battle of al-Khandaq, he needed vital information on the Quraiš and dispatched two spies to this end.32 Since the mission was considerably dangerous, he appointed one of the two spies “disciple of the Prophet” in order to motivate him. The Prophet said, “Who will bring me the information about the enemy”? Az-Zubair the spy responded, “I will”. The Prophet said, “Every prophet had a disciple and my disciple is Az-Zubair”.33 Small preparatory reconnaissance teams became a very common feature of the Prophet Muh.ammad’s intelligence service and an equally small secondary team would often follow the initial reconnaissance team in order to verify the information.34 Prior to the battle of “Hudaybiyya”, a scout was sent out by Muh.ammad to evaluate whether the Quraiš tribe was aware of Muh.ammad’s intended Umrah visit to the city of Mecca.35 When the scout returned, he promptly informed the Prophet that the Quraiš might in fact attack Muh.ammad if he tried to enter the city forcefully.36 Aside from reconnaissance teams and scouts, the Prophet also questioned sympathisers of the Ummah, those who held a grudge against common enemies37 and also interrogated captured enemies, who provided the Muslims with crucial knowledge.38 As much as Muh.ammad’s religious motivations played a role in his actions, so too did nationalism and the religious eagerness of the tribes he united called for foreign conquests, which would ultimately come to mean an extension or continuation of Muslim intelligence activities.39 However, it was not the Prophet himself who would lead the Muslim conquest and due to Muh.ammad’s death in 632, the Rashidun Caliphs who proceeded him would ultimately expand the Muslim empire and consequently provide the groundwork for an Islamic Intelligence culture.

7.1 The Rightly Guided Caliphs (Rashidun) “The post is the Muslim’s wing, through which the ruler’s orders are carried out.”40 —‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz.41 31

Al-Naboodah (2005). Rodgers (2008), p. 82. 33 Al-Bukhari Vol. 4(99). 34 Ibn Saad, M.i.M. Al-Tbkat Al-kobra, p. 9. 35 Umrah is the Islamic small pilgrimage. It is a commandment for Muslims similar to the pilgrimage to Mecca, but with no regular date. 36 Al-Karm al-Athir, I.A.H. Al-Kamil Fe-Al-Tarikh, p. 261. 37 Ibid, p. 261. 38 Suwaed and Kahana (2018). 39 Dvornik (1974), p. 191. 40 Ibid, p. 109. 41 Ibid, p. 227. 32

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The patriarchal period of the first four Caliphs is a source of particularly high relevance to Jih¯adi groups and their intelligence capabilities, justifications and operational art. During this time, military conquest thrived and both military generals and tribal chiefs played significant roles in the writing of history.42 Due to the Caliphs’ preoccupation with conquests and war, they had to rely on administrative structures they imitated and borrowed from the Byzantine Empire, from the Persian Empire and from their respective administrations. Indeed, once the era of conquest had ended, the dynasty of the Umayyads took over most administrative tasks.43 It was during this time that the influence of the Persian and Byzantine empires became the most striking and the Umayyad leadership actually decided to divide the administration of the empire along the lines and borders of the former provinces of the previous Byzantine and Persian empires.44 However, some of them were combined, merged together and joined soon after, which resulted in five viceroyalties. According to Dvornik, Omar later tried to establish what could be interpreted as a religious–military commonwealth, but ultimately the Caliphs had to adapt their administration to the customs introduced by Romans, Byzantines and Persians.45 Dvornik goes even further and argues that one of these striking adaptations can be seen in battle formations and the division of the military force (i.e. their military management). Indeed, much like during Byzantine and Persian times, the Caliphs structured their military forces based on a centre, two wings, a vanguard and a rear guard.46 In this regard, we must recognise that the Arabs truly lacked any kind of innovation or ground-breaking approaches and simply copied previously established structures and concepts. Furthermore, the relationship between the first Umayyad administration and the Byzantines and their established organisational structures is truly striking and, to a certain degree, paradoxical. On the one hand, the Byzantines were regarded as the infidel archenemy of the Muslims.47 On the other hand, Dvornik argues that the Umayyad Caliphs actually considered themselves to be successors of the R¯um, thus as heirs and successors of the Byzantine emperors. In fact, the Umayyad Caliphs appreciated the practical usefulness of some of the remaining Byzantine institutions and military management.48 Their creation of a state archive in Damascus under Caliph Abdalmalik certainly imitated Byzantine practices.49 Most striking with respect to the applied intelligence practice is the Umayyad adaptation of a Byzantine intelligence system under Abdalmalik and Omar II, which utilised the previously established postal systems that consisted of relays (khans) between the capital and the remote provinces. This intelligence system was in fact 42

Ibid, p. 191. Ibid, p. 193. 44 Ibid, p. 193. 45 Ibid, p. 194. 46 Ibid, p. 194. 47 Ibid, p. 196. 48 Ibid, p. 196. 49 Ibid, p. 197. 43

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rooted and established by previous empires in the region. It does indeed seem as if the postal and intelligence system set up by the Umayyads is based primarily on the inheritance of Byzantine methodologies and approaches towards government.50 Intelligence activities were of great significance during the first hundred years after the death of the Prophet Muh.ammad, when the Umayyad administration was being developed. This is particularly true in light of anti-dynastic Shi’ite movements, which illustrated to, i.e. Muawiya, how important a good intelligence network could be.51 If the new dynastic regime was to survive, the secret police and at least 4000 reliable men who worked as bodyguards and spies had to continuously foil intrigue and various conspiracies against the government.52 The development of these espionage networks by some well-known governors like al-Hajjaj or Ziyad ibn Abi Sufyan also accompanied the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty and the creation of the first and largest Muslim Caliphate. Furthermore, it played a significant role in enabling the Muslim expansion. The successes of the first Islamic State, the Rashidun Caliphate under the “rightly guided” Caliphs (Sunni Islam), the initial phases of the Islamic conquests, advancing throughout Persia, Levant, Egypt and North Africa (which would become the cornerstones of the Umayyad Caliphate after 661 before Christ) can thus largely be attributed to early intelligence services and espionage networks. Furthermore, the Umayyad Empire can be considered an actual model of Islam’s “Golden Age”, according to Kapplan.53 Intriguingly, the Jih¯adi IS’ polity is based on a rather similar model of decentralised “empires”, which mirror the ones established after the death of the Prophet and his immediate successors, the Rashidun.54 This model for the Islamic golden age was born out of the chaotic circumstances and within the timeframe that followed the death of Mohammed only two years after he had created the first Islamic State.55 Especially when looking towards Jih¯adi (military) thinkers like Abu Bakr Naji, the author of “The Management of Savagery”, we can clearly see an echo of this period of time in his writing, as he lays out the structure and framework for an Islamic governmental system that needs to emerge from chaos and savagery.56 Also, the fast expansion of IS echoes the rapid rise of the first Islamic State, which grew from a small coalition of tribes into the largest empire the world had seen to date in only 50 years.57 In sum, these decisive times have not only been relevant for the establishment of the first Islamic State and the arguably most glorious Islamic Caliphate under the Umayyads, but, even today, echoes history and shapes the ideological foundations and doctrines of Jih¯adi groups.

50

Ibid, p. 197. Ibid, p. 200. 52 Ibid, p. 200. 53 Kaplan (2014). 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Naji (2006). 57 Kaplan (2014). 51

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During the initial years of Islam, intelligence activities were of great importance and they still are today. The Arabic term for “spy” or for an “informant” in fact derives from the word “khabar”, which translates to “news” or “information”, while in traditional sources, the word is closely associated with concepts of secrecy. Thus, the job of a spy as “the carrier of secrets” translates to “yatahasa al-khabar”.58 Such early accounts of espionage activity are commonly and closely associated with the postal service, whereas some sources even regard the job of a postmaster (sahib al-barid) to be the same as that of the spy.59 In the Umayyad state, this espionage system had been based on the dual function of the sahib al-barid, which ultimately turned into the main instrument by which the Caliphs tried to establish their power. The networks of informers also had a significant influence on the military and civil administration.60 According to Al-Naboodah, what started as a pure military intelligence service required to confront adversaries and thwart plots against the government turned into the main driving force behind the state. It drastically shaped the manner in which the government was run.61 Indeed, spies were even ordered to spy on their own family, possible successors or on the behaviour of salesmen, both in times of peace and when espionage became less important.62 Consequently, spies became closely associated with the government and were slowly integrated into the day-to-day affairs. These “news carriers” became more and more important to the rulers and thus, writer and governmental advisor Abd al-Hamid al-Katib advised his Umayyad Caliph Marwan II in Damascus of the following: “You should take cognizance of your subjects, their affairs, their secrets, and their hidden desires and inclinations so that you are well aware of them.”63

or in another interpretation: “Sharpen your eyes on your enemies, take note of their circumstances, their numbers, houses, movements and aspirations, and what they long for.”64

The famous Arab prose writer and author ᶜ Amr ibn Bahr al-Dsch¯ahiz also reflects on the duties of the Caliph:65 “He should know his subjects very well; where they sleep and where they live and their dayto-day affairs. … he should investigate their secrets as closely as a nursing mothers checks the bed for her baby … the happy king is he who knows the secrets of his subjects – the close associates and the public – and who puts all of them under the scrutiny of his eyes.”66 58

Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 158. Al-Tabari, M. (d. 310/923). Tarikh al-rusul wa-l-muluk, 8:67. 60 Ibid, p. 59. 61 Ibid, p. 159. 62 Ibid, p. 159. 63 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 160. 64 Ibid, p. 160. 65 Ibid, p. 159. 66 Ibid, p. 161. 59

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Ab¯u l-Hasan al-M¯award¯ı, a prominent Islamic jurist, underlines the importance of espionage when he states that: “The ruler ought to plant spies on his subjects and associates; eyes that spy on their whereabouts, their news, especially if there is any doubt about them.”67

Indeed, in order to ensure security while people were asleep, “night watchers” known as ‘asas and spies known a ‘uyun, were introduced during the period of the Rashidun. During the Umayyad period, the position of the police chief (sahub al‘asas) was in charge of the “night watchers”. A shift was then seen towards using the networks of spies to monitor people’s whereabouts, activities and tendencies.68

7.1.1 The Caliph Abu¯ Bakr The Ridda Wars, which were fought at the time of Ab¯u Bakr (Ab¯u Bakr ‘Abdall¯ah bin Ab¯ı Quh.a¯ fah as.-S.idd¯ıq), who was a senior companion (Sahabi) and the fatherin-law (father of Aisha) of the prophet Muh.ammad, can currently be identified as the key drivers of this intelligence revolution. The existing body of networks, spies and informants was consequently incorporated into the military activities of Abu Bakr as a part of the ongoing war efforts.69 Intriguingly, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri, who would reach questionable fame as the self-proclaimed Caliph of the Islamic State, has chosen the pseudonym Ab¯u Bakr. His nom de guerre indeed carries the echoes of past Islamic glory as the historic Ab¯u Bakr saved the Islamic faith from dissolution when many followers felt their oath of allegiance was annulled by the death of the Prophet.70 Moreover, most military leaders during the Ridda Wars relied on trusted intelligence sources and individuals within numerous different revolting tribes in Arabia after Muh.ammad had passed away. Ultimately, it was the intelligence-enabled allegiance with these tribes that led to the victories of the Caliph Ab¯u Bakr and towards a unification of the Ummah.

7.1.2 The Caliph Umar Ibn Al-Khatt¯ab Under Caliph Umar ibn Al-Khatt¯ab’s reign, which succeeded Ab¯u Bakr’s as one of the most powerful Muslim Caliphates, a separation between an intelligence service that was needed in the times of war and one that was needed for civil purposes took place.71 The intelligence apparatus under Caliph Umar turned into a means to 67

Ibid, p. 161. Ibid, p. 161. 69 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 158. 70 Kaplan (2014). 71 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 158. 68

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analyse the conditions of the general population while also gaining awareness of their problems and complaints.72 This was particularly due to the geographic expansion of Islam outside Arabia, which rendered internal control more important than it was under Ab¯u Bakr. Thus, Caliph Umar’s attention shifted towards controlling and monitoring the internal affairs of the Islamic State by employing spies (eyes), by the “night watch” system, and lastly by conducting his own night walk through the cities in order to get a first-hand account of current and present dangers.73 …he had an eye on every agent or official who followed him closely and thus the Caliph received the news every morning and evening.74

When ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muh.ammad, and Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah ibn Ab¯ı Sufy¯an, who refused to recognise the former as the Caliph, got into a conflict, intelligence activities started to play another major role and significantly affected this internal power struggle.75 Spies were working for both sides, whereas Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah put specific focus on discrediting and sabotaging his enemy, which included instigating tribal leaders, bribing officials working for ‘Ali and trying to prompt them to switch sides.76 The results of these acts ultimately attributed to ‘Ali’s loss over control in Egypt by removing Qays ibn Sa’d from government,77 the death of the military leader al-Ashtar al-Nakh’i,78 and—ultimately—to ‘Ali’s killing by an assassin of the Kharijites.79

7.1.3 The Caliph Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah After Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah had assumed the Caliphate, he started to pay even closer attention to the Shi’ites and the Kharijites, which resulted in them being put under constant surveillance. In fact, particular attention was given to monitoring the sons of ‘Ali under any circumstance,80 but also high-ranking members of the Umayyads became suspicious and subject to observations as they were known to aspire for power. Particularly the cases of Marwan ibn al-Hakam and Sa’id ibn al- ‘As, who Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah involved in animosity and rivalry, stand out. Hence, Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah appointed one to office and dismissed the other, then later dismissed the new office holder and appointed the man he had dismissed before.

72

Ibid, p. 158. Ibid, p. 163. 74 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 163. 75 Ibid, p. 163. 76 Al-Tabari, M. (d. 310/923). Tarikh al-rusul wa-l-muluk. 5:94–112 and 134–135. 77 Ibid, 5:94–99. 78 Ibid, 5:95–96. 79 Ibid, 5:109. 80 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 163. 73

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In fact, Sa’id even realised the harmful goals of Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah and reminded him in a letter that these policies would run against the kinship of their brotherhood. This letter prompted Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah to apologise to Sa’id, but ultimately he continued using the same tactics.81 In this regard, he particularly relied on the ruler of Basra Ziyad ibn Abi Sufyan, who made extensive use of the “night watch”, which already consisted of an intelligence network of spies, informants and around 4000 policemen.82 According to al-Tabari, Ziyad ibn Abi Sufyan also went about recruiting another 4000 informers and spies, which, measured by the standards of his times, stands out as an incredibly large spy network.83 This network enabled him to monitor the movements of outlaws, to keep close track of the Umayyads and also to impose house arrests on those whose loyalty was in question. Ziyad’s knowledge of his subjects, enemies and friends was the basis of his success in maintaining internal security and managing internal affairs in the provinces.84 Al-Ya’qubi, a renowned Shi’ite historian, reports on a man who asked for an audience with Ziyad. This audience, rather commonly, started with the man introducing himself, but Ziyad promptly interrupted him and is reported to have said: “I know exactly who you are: your name, your family, your sub-tribe, your ancestors, and I know all of you so well that I can tell to whom your dress belongs.”85

This omnipresence of Ziyad ibn Abi Sufyan’s espionage network helped guard the Islamic State under Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah against the plots and uprisings of the Umayyads and Kharijites. Indeed, the revolutionary tendencies of Qurayb ibn Murra and Zihhaf al-Tta’i were crushed before they even had a chance to declare their rebellion.86

7.1.4 The Caliph Yazid After Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah had died, his son Yazid took over as the Caliph of the Islamic State. At this time, the government’s web of spies and informers was further extended, which allowed Yazid to be kept informed, up-to-date and alert regarding most sensitive issues.87 Al-Tabari refers to a letter Ziyad had written: “I was informed that al-Husayn is moving towards Iraq, take guard and be careful: incarcerate on suspicion and arrest on account of accusation and inform me of whatever happens”.88 Yazid’s reign was marked by revolts, desertions and disorder, which not only dramatically increased Yazid’s suspicions and distrust in his own people, but also the level 81

Ibid, p. 163. Al-Baladhuri, Asnab. 4–1:216, 245–254. 83 Ibid, 214. 84 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 166. 85 Al-Tabari, M. (d. 310/923). Tarikh al-rusul wa-l-muluk. 5:237–238. See also: Al-Baladhuri, Asnab. 4–1:175–176. 86 Ibid. 87 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 167. 88 Al-Tabari, M. (d. 310/923). Tarikh al-rusul wa-l-muluk. 5:381. 82

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at which the people he governed grew suspicious of anyone they did not know and regarded as strangers, which they possibly equated to spies.89

7.1.5 The Caliph ‘Abd Al-Malik When ‘Abd al-Malik assumed the Caliphate after Yazid, he inherited a state of internal distrust and paranoia in addition to having to fight on the two fronts simultaneously, namely in Iraq and Hijaz. Hence, ‘Abd al-Malik had to prioritise foreign intelligence and military intelligence over the domestic intelligence system created by Caliph Mu ᶜ a¯ wiyah and Ziyad ibn Abi Sufyan. One aspect of ‘Abd al-Malik’s focus on foreign intelligence was the development of the postal system, which was not only used to carry regular post, but served primarily as a communication channel and network for international espionage.90 As such, the postal and stamp-master Qubaysa ibn Dhu’ib was given the responsibility of reading incoming mail to the Caliph, which included free access to ‘Abd al-Malik day and night, regardless of whether he was in engaged in an important conversation, meetings or even if he was in the company of women.91 Although Qubaysa ibn Dhu’ib was given this position because he had proven to be a loyal and trusted companion, ‘Abd al-Malik still introduced a vetting system, which would enquire information about a candidate’s honesty, honour and loyalty before getting employed by the postal services.92 Internally, ‘Abd al-Malik would try and gather intelligence by holding public meetings, in which his subjects would report to him on rather general affairs and events that took place in the Islamic State.93 He also used to disguise himself in order to go out and experience the viewpoints of his subjects in an incognito fashion.94 In fact, his interest in both civil and military affairs also included gathering information on his son al-Walid and his conduct in order to verify his suitability of becoming the future Caliph.95 However, his son was not the only one who found himself to be under suspicion and rigorous surveillance as ‘Abd al-Malik also ordered two separate spies (for the sake of obtaining two separate and independent opinions) to monitor the well-known governor al-Hajjaj.96 Still, the main focus of ‘Abd alMalik’s intelligence efforts rested in foreign intelligence and on trying to estimate the strength, location and movements of his opponents in Iraq and Hijaz. Thus, he employed a large number of spies for the collection of this highly sought-after information and to transfer the news back to him on the newly established postal routes. 89

Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 168. Al-Askari. Awa’il. 191. 91 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 169. 92 Ibid, p. 169. 93 Ibn al-Jawzi. Al-Muntazam. 4:1632. 94 Al-Taj, 169. 95 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 169. 96 Ibid, p. 179. 90

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In fact, the number of spies he employed and their support network grew so large that a special section of the diwan (administrative office) had to be opened so as to deal with their recruitment and management.97 One of the main tasks of these “eyes”, aside from spying on enemy camps (which occasionally led to some spy executions should one have become discovered98 ) was to build up and form strong ties and alliances with tribal chieftains.99 Indeed, one would try and get as many supporters aligned with one’s own camp as possible and thus, ‘Abd al-Malik forged bonds with the leader of the Shi’ites of Kufa, Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar and other Iraqi leaders who were offered generous governmental posts for their support.100 Particularly when misinformation needed to be spread, poets started to play a significant role in the campaigns of the Caliphs. This was especially relevant with respect to gaining public support and with regard to the justification of certain measures. ‘Abd al-Malik realised the power of poets and placed those who did not support his policies under additional suspicion.101 Once under suspicion, a network of informants continuously followed a person wherever he went, as was the case with ‘Umran ibn Hattan, who was a fierce opponent of Umayyad rule. Spies reporting back to the authorities followed him from Kufa (Iraq) to the Euphrates desert and all the way down to Oman, where his own counterintelligence agents informed him that he was under surveillance, which prompted the Umayyad opponents to continuously relocate and adapt their strategies.102

7.1.6 The Governor Al-Hajjaj While ‘Abd al-Malik greatly cared about the truthfulness and honesty of his “eyes”, it was Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf who extended the intelligence network, following the Caliph’s example of establishing a web of informers in the eastern parts of the Islamic State that are now part of Iraq.103 Soon after ‘Abd al-Malik became the Caliph, alHajjaj left his home and immediately went to the capital of Damascus, where he joined the Caliph’s security force. The efficiency by which he restored discipline during a mutiny in ‘Abd al-Malik’s campaign against Mus’ab ibn al-Zubayr in Iraq impressed the Caliph, and thus, he handed him the command of the military’s rear guard.104 Later, al-Hajjaj was ordered by the Caliph to attack Mecca, where after

97

Al-Baladhuri. Ansab. 7:137. Ibid, 7:137. 99 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 170. 100 Al-Baladhuri. Ansab, 7:98. 101 Ibn Manzur, Mukhtasar, 4:233. 102 Al-Isfahani, al-Aghani, 18:51–53. 103 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 172. 104 Dietrich (1991). 98

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more than six months of siege, he managed to secure a victory over Ibn al-Zubayr, who was killed together with his last loyal followers at the Ka’aba in 692.105 Al-Hajjaj was rewarded with the position as governor of Hijaz, Yemen and alYamama. Throughout his long and by some accounts rather violent career in the security forces of the Caliph, al-Hajjaj positioned his spies wherever he could in order to constantly be a step ahead of his enemies.106 Indeed, it can be said that al-Hajjaj is regarded as one of the historic role models to have managed to bridge intelligence activities with violence. Aside from being a loyal servant of the dynasty,107 he also enforced security with brutality and had little mercy on turned agents or with regard to counterintelligence. When he sent Ayyub ibn al-Qirriyya out in order to spy on the army of Ibn AlAsh’ath, Ibn Al-Ash’ath befriended his spy after the former realised the true nature of Ayyub’s presence. Consequently, al-Hajjaj had him killed based on the accusation that he had joined Ibn Al-Ash’ath’s enemy camp, which he had defeated regardless and prior to the execution of Ayyub.108 In fact, al-Hajjaj not only killed four former companions of Muh.ammad, namely Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr, Jabir ibn Abd-Allah, Sa’id ibn Jubayr and Kumayl ibn Ziyad, but according to Tha’¯alib¯ı,109 he had killed more than 100,000 men in his lifetime.110 Truly, al-Hajjaj had fought many revolts, battles and wars—some of which arguably contributed to him losing his mind at the end of his life—but he also trailblazed the pathways into spy deterrence through violence and brutality. We can witness the reoccurrence of this methodology today when watching the various IS videos featuring barbaric executions, which are also intended to deter adversarial intelligence operations.111 Al-Hajjaj’s intelligence service found itself in constant conflict with the counterintelligence activities of the Kharijites.112 In the same manner that al-Hajjaj distributed his spies amongst his enemies, his enemies answered with the same tactic, which ultimately led to a situation where information gathering became critical in order to make the important first move.113 This fierce battle of intelligence between the two camps is perhaps best illustrated by the security measures he had established at the headquarters of his intelligence service in the capital al-Walid in Iraq. According to I.S. Al-‘Amid, each of the city’s gates was guarded by his loyal and most trusted followers, all of whom would ensure that local residents could stay inside the city during the night while all visitors had to leave before nightfall.114

105

Ibid, p. 40. Al-Tanukhi. Nishwar al-muhadara, 1:137. 107 Dietrich (1991). 108 Ibn Manzur. Mukhtasar, 5:132. 109 Thatcher (1911). 110 Gil (1997). 111 Haberl (2016). 112 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 173. 113 Al-Tabari, M. (d. 310/923). Tarikh al-rusul wa-l-muluk, 6:261–263. 114 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 173. 106

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7.1.7 The Caliph Al-Walid When ‘Abd al-Malik handed the reign over the Caliphate to his son al-Walid, the Banu Hashim in Hijaz became the first target of al-Walid’s “eyes”. This was because the Banu Hashim were traditional competitors of his Caliphate and because they had been identified to be dangerously rebellious against the state in a manner that was based on questioning the authority of the Prophet Muh.ammad and the Sunnah.115 Thus, alWalid looked at them with great suspicion and all the movements of the Banu Hashim were reported by the Caliph’s espionage network. Abu Hashim, for example, found himself jailed after an intelligence report considered him a danger to the Caliphate and further suggested that he was involved in the secret recruitment of the supporters of a new regime.116 The very intelligence report that got Abu Hisham imprisoned later turned out to be truthful and was confirmed by the revolt that ultimately climaxed in overthrowing the Umayyads and in establishing the ‘Abbasid dynasty.117 According to Al-Baladhuri, even Sulayman, the son of the Caliph al-Walid, asked his brother-in-law and cousin ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz on their way to Mecca, “Are there any eyes on us?”118 This was due to Sulayman’s plans to select the highlyregarded ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz as his successor. However, the Caliph al-Walid still tasked Raja ibn Haywah al-Kindi to investigate whether ‘Umar would be a suitable successor.119 Apparently, even the Caliph’s son and crown prince were not spared the watchful eye of intelligence services al-Walid had established. This incident perfectly illustrates the constant surveillance the rest of the population must have been exposed to in al-Walid pursuit to secure the internal and external affairs of the first Islamic State. When ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz finally became Caliph, he too—much like his predecessor ‘Abd al-Malik—disguised himself and walked out during the night to gather first-hand intelligence on the social and economic conditions his state was in as well as receiving a constant supply of intelligence reports from all over the Caliphate through the b¯arid postal system.120

7.1.8 The Abbasid Muslim Empire and the Peak of the Postal System Caliph Abbas launched a new period in Near East history when he established the Abbasid dynasty, which emphasised the new and religious character of the regime. Indeed, the Abbasid dynasty stressed the religious character of the regime, taking 115

Ibid, p. 173. Ibid, p. 174. 117 Ibid, p. 174. 118 Al-Baladhuri. Ansab. 8:201. 119 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 174. 120 Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam, Sirat ‘Umar, 102. 116

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over where the Umayyads had failed to underline the universal character of their religion.121 However, the Abbasid Empire was a Muslim empire, where all those who accepted Muh.ammad as their Prophet and adhered to his faith were considered equal. This revolution of the Abbasids had started in Iraq and Persia, which is also the reason why Bagdad had become the new capital built by Al-Mansur, thus replacing Damascus. Al-Mansur can also be seen as the de facto founder of the dynasty, which saw great developments in the governmental postal system.122 Harun Al-Rashid and his advisor Yahya al-Barmaki have been accredited for this achievement, the latter of the two intriguingly being of Persian origin.123 Al-Mansur, arguably the most unscrupulous Abbasid Caliph, established an intelligence network of merchants and peddlers who got into contact with a large number of citizens on a daily basis and who were not aware of the true purpose of the merchant’s visit. Some of these travellers acted as de facto detectives for him, but also for other Abbasid Caliphs, entertaining similar approaches and networks such as Harun Al-Rashid, whose rule became famous for its scientific, religious and cultural prosperity. While Al-Mamun is commonly known in the West thanks to his appearance in the famous tales “A Thousand and One Nights”, his true historic personality was in fact established by his reign, which initiated the inevitable disintegration of the Caliphate. Many rebellions and uprisings had broken out in Egypt, Morocco, modern Tunisia, Yemen and Khorasan while he also additionally launched campaigns against the Byzantines.124 Hence, it shouldn’t surprise us that he is said to have employed around 1700 elderly women as local informers in his intelligence service in Baghdad.125 The Abbasid Caliphate was also become famous for establishing and extending a postal system. As was the case in the Persian Empire, the postal system was established to transfer messages of concern to the government and only official correspondence.126 Hence, only officially selected people were granted authorisation to make use of the postal system as well as the provided relays and camels used by the messengers. The Abbasids, inspired by their predecessors, set up offices in every province and appointed a postmaster, whose responsibility was described as follows: “He has to dispatch them to the places to which they are addressed. He has to present to the Caliph the reports of the postmasters and informants…”127

Indeed, the postal system was at the disposal of the intelligence system and the postmaster was generally not only responsible for properly handling correspondence, but also the chief of the intelligence service at the same time.128 Hence, the most 121

Dvornik (1974), p. 203. Ibid, p. 208. 123 Ibid, p. 209. 124 Clot (1990). 125 Champion (2008). 126 Al-Mas’udi (1989). 127 Sprenger (1864). 128 Dvornik (1974), p. 216. 122

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important task that was assigned to the postmaster general by the Caliph was to report on the situation in the remote provinces, which included reporting on administrative organs, local officials, and even on the common people, peasants, and prospective harvest.129 In sum, the function of the postmaster was of incredible importance to the Abbasid intelligence system, which—for good reason—was called “the Eye of the Caliph”. In addition to this important administrative organ, the postal system—most particularly in the form it had been given under Al-Mansur—recruited merchants, peddlers, and travellers into their ever-expanding espionage system, who acted as investigators and spied on the people they visited. The Abbasid Caliph Harun Al-Rashid would also become known to employ roughly 1700 elderly women in his intelligence service.130 The spymaster of such a network was called khaibar and appears to have been an independent entity, most commonly an eunuch or Emir. Indeed, the despotic rule of the Caliphs naturally required a well-organised intelligence service in order to keep the ruler in power and ensure public order. What probably illustrates the power of these intelligence chiefs and commanders of the royal bodyguards best is that their powers exceeded those of the kadis (judges) in one specific aspect. The intelligence chief was allowed to act purely on suspicion and threaten severe punishment before a court had proven the guilt of a suspect. Intriguingly, the intelligence chiefs even appear to have utilised rudimentary form of socio-economic profiling, since only lower classes and people acting in a transgressed manner fell under his specific jurisdiction.131 An intriguing overlap of religion and intelligence is seen clearly when one looks at another task the khaibar was entrusted with, namely making sure that the Friday prayers were performed regularly and that Muslims showed up in the Mosque. If some citizens refrained from attending the Friday prayer, it was the authority of the khaibar to admonish them, but also to enforce what he considered morality between the two sexes.132

7.1.9 The Fatimid Empire “… the appointment of a master of state post is absolutely necessary. During the age of paganism and during the reign of Islam, the sovereigns used to obtain from this functionary the most recent information and the used to know what kind of fortunate or unfortunate events had occurred…Sending out police agents and spies shows that the ruler is just, vigilant, and sagacious.”133

129

Sprenger (1864). Dvornik (1974), p. 17. 131 Ibid, p. 217. 132 Ibid, p. 218. 133 Schefer (1897). 130

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Obaydullah Al-Mahdi, who proclaimed himself to be a descendant of Muh.ammad’s daughter Fatima, gave rise to the Fatimid Empire and supported the claim to also be Caliphs and Imams like the Abbasids. His newly founded dynasty started to gain support and influence in Tunisia, while his messianic title “Al-Mahdi” increased his popularity. This allowed him to establish a state that became famous in Arab history, and which would expand over large parts of the Maghreb from Ceuta to Tunisia. This expansion would ultimately see the transferring of the capital city status to Cairo under Caliph Al-Muizz and his general Jawhar.134 After the Fatimids conquered Palestine and Syria, the dynasty reached its peak and greatest glory under the reign of Al-Aziz. The massive success of the Fatimid Empire was largely due to their utilisation of intelligence and the b¯arid postal system, which stretched from Egypt to Spain, Italy and to the West.135 Indeed, the Fatimids took great care of their signalling towers and the infrastructure needed in order to relay messages. This dedication to a functioning network of intelligence elements and postmasters is perhaps best illustrated by one duty general Jawhar had requested from his postal system. When the Fatimid army had advanced all the way to the Atlantic, while conquering Morocco, the general sent live fish to his Caliph in a glass bottle, putting the advanced pace and swiftness of the entire road and postal system to the ultimate test.136 At the end of the Fatimid Empire and during the brief Seljuk protection of the Caliphate of Baghdad, Nizam al-Mulk, a Persian and vizier of Sultan Malik Shah, wrote the following on the importance of the postal service. This piece of writing was brought to paper once the postal system had deteriorated during the Empire’s conflicts with the crusaders, with Armenia and with the controlled provinces.

7.1.10 The Mamluk Empire “If you can achieve it that I will have to pass not one morning and not one night without receiving a report from you, do that.—al-Malik az.-Z.a¯ hir Rukn ad-D¯ın Baibars al-Bunduqd¯ar¯ı.”137

In 1250, the Mamluk dynasty was established and the empire immediately found itself threatened by the Mongol army in 1260. However, it was the strategics of Baybars the 1st and his military management that would set him apart as the true founder of the Mamluk Empire. His military campaigns against the Berbers in Syria or Nubia prompted him to reorganise the Mamluk army and rebuild the navy while restoring the postal service.138 134

Ibid, p. 218. Ibid, p. 218. 136 Mez (1937), p. 501. 137 Sheldon (2008), p. 181. 138 Dvornik (1974), p. 226. 135

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Re-establishment the postal system under Baybars the 1st for the purpose of communication and intelligence illustrates a “narrative of intelligence”, which survived the suspension of the postal system under the Seljuk Empire. Dvornik argues that the existence of this “narrative” of intelligence proves that the concept of intelligence was familiar to Arab intellectuals, geographers and historians throughout the different empires and that intelligence has consequently been a main and dominating feature of Arab and Islamic history.139 However, aside from re-establishing the postal system, Baybars the 1st also improved it and shaped its functions towards a Military Intelligence Agency and away from economic and commercial subjects or targets. This became the most obvious when Baybars the 1st demanded to be informed of the Crusaders’ and Mongol’s movements in addition to requiring his intelligence service to relay information to his military units all across the empire. Most importantly, he demanded to be informed of all possible subversive movements. The latter requirement of Baybars’ intelligence service also appears to be symptomatic of his paranoia, which further manifested itself when he decided not to allocate much power to his viziers.140 His couriers—the baridi—were chosen from the royal retainers and lived in the Citadel in Cairo so that they might be available and at Baybars’ disposal at any given moment.141 The personnel at the relay stations was also instructed to treat the royal couriers with all the necessary amenities, whereas their commanders had to ensure that they were able to travel and transfer information with not only speed, but in as much comfort as possible.142 Baybars went as far as disguising himself as a regular courier in order to inspect the relay stations, test the commanders, and ensure they would not give horses to regular couriers without royal credentials.143 Urgent messages could travel from Damascus to Cairo in two days. However, Baybars also decided to re-establish the pigeon post, which was also used by the Fatimids before him. Baybars took it upon himself to oversee the breeding and training of the carrier pigeons and also ordered that they should wear golden rings around their necks while only the finest paper was to be used for this form of communication.144 In this regard, Baybars’ intelligence services most likely took their inspiration from the Fatimids, who had become famous for their pedigrees suitable for carrying messages across the empire.145 The influence Baybars had on the postal and intelligence services was significant and in fact, lasted over the first half of the fourteenth century.146 After the death of Nasir in 1340, political disorganisation re-emerged and the intelligence service and postal system disappeared from the political sphere. In 1517, 139

Ibid, p. 228. Ibid, p. 228. 141 Ibid, p. 228. 142 Ibid, p. 228. 143 Ibid, p. 228. 144 Ibid, p. 231. 145 Dvornik (1974), p. 231. 146 Ibid, p. 235. 140

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the Mamluk Empire ultimately became part of the new Ottoman Empire after a series of devastating military defeats, which eventually replaced the Byzantine and Arab Empires.147

7.1.11 Byzantine The historian al-Mas’udi provides us with an intriguing story of the first embassy of the Arabs in Byzantine, which was ordered to be set up by Caliph Omar.148 One day after the emissaries responsible for setting up the embassy and arranging some political affairs had arrived before the Byzantine King, they found him in apparent misery, as if a great misfortune had befallen him the day before.149 After they asked him why he requested to see them at such a sad moment, he responded: “I have just received at this moment a letter from my general commanding the border on the Arabic side. He announced to me that the king of the Arabs, that virtuous man, has died…”150

The Byzantine king clearly had a great deal of appreciation and sympathy for the Caliph Omar, although he was talking about his antagonist, but what he reportedly said next illustrates the role intelligence played in Byzantine and how significant of a threat it must have been to the Arabs. The Byzantine king, most likely Constans II (641–668), decided to point the following out to the emissaries: “…I was well informed about his private life and his public activities, and I found that he was constantly and faithfully fulfilling his duties to his Lord”.151

7.2 Why the “Urtext” Matters The role intelligence played at the time of the first Caliphs, which were highly critical years for the Islamic faith, cannot be underestimated. One could go further and also investigate the influences of the Ottoman Empire or the Romans, amongst others. However, this task would ultimately go beyond the scope of this analysis. Furthermore, it was especially at these times and during the aforementioned empires when espionage networks and intelligence facilities were set up for political, military, and administrative use. They served as an exclusive information service to the first Caliphs.152 147

Ibid, p. 235. Al-Mas’udi (1989). 149 Ibid, p. 246. 150 Ibid, p. 246. 151 Al-Mas’udi (1989). 152 Sheldon (2008), p. 176. 148

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The activities of these early intelligence professionals and leaders who knew how to utilise the power of information laid the groundwork for what we can observe today when looking at the ideological drivers of a Jih¯adi intelligence culture. Intelligence activities and the development of espionage networks in the era that lead up to the Umayyads dynasty aided the establishment of Caliphates and further played a significant role in the individual reigns of the “rightly guided” Caliphs, enabling Islamic conquests. All of these “outcomes”—for lack of a better term—have also become IS goals and as such, this brief historic exploration has been highly relevant in order to gain a holistic perception of Jih¯adi intelligence. Intelligence activities were also key drivers in the development of early postal systems and can be regarded as a part of the civilisational, cultural and civic backbone of the first Islamic State. In fact, Caliph al-Walid ordered the most important roads in the city to be illuminated in order to speed up the secret mission of the messagecarriers and streamline intelligence workflows. They weren’t lit so that people would find it easier to walk through their cities at night, as some may believe.153 With the arrival of Islam came the first intelligence revolution and the Prophet Muh.ammad, much like the early Caliphs, was no stranger to utilising it. Under the reign of the first Islamic State, older intelligence systems dating back to pre-Islamic times have, in fact, been enhanced and re-introduced simultaneously to the arrival of Islam. In this regard, particularly the intelligence systems of the ancient Near East and the intelligence apparatus established by the Assyrians stand out as highly influential. Indeed, the Assyrians significantly contributed to the Arab Islamic Civilization during the Umayyad and the Abbasid dynasties.154 Interestingly, according to the Qur’¯an, on the day of final judgement, the angels of Allah will actually speak to a man in Assyrian, which may serve as another indicator of the importance of the Assyrian heritage. However, early Arab tribes also utilised their own espionage networks during both times of war and peace, a notion that was later also utilised and further developed by Muh.ammad.155 The Prophet Muh.ammad, for example, and his followers also considered a sophisticated espionage network to be a vital prerequisite for ideological and military victory during the early stages of Islamic history.156 As Jih¯adi groups are believed to walk in the footsteps of the Prophet, the methods he used when establishing the first Islamic State have turned into doctrines and into ideological and cultural guidelines, while the actions of his successors, governors or aides have become part of the Sunnah and body of Islamic history and traditions.157 If we wish to fully understand the influencers of the man behind the first Islamic State and the cultural and structural drivers of his intelligence apparatus and civic bodies of Islamic government, we must look towards the Ancient Near East. Indeed, a heritage dramatically different from that of European and Anglo-Saxon societies 153

Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 174. Hill (1993), p. 4. 155 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 90. 156 Ibid, p. 99. 157 The Qur’¯ an, S¯urah al-Ah.z¯ab, 33:21. 154

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will present itself and reveal what lies at the historic origin of a Jih¯adi intelligence culture.

References Abdullah S (2010) The Qur’an: an introduction, Routledge Al-Asmari AA (2013) Origins of an Arab and Islamic intelligence culture. In: Gustafson KC (ed) Intelligence elsewhere: spies and espionage outside the Anglosphere. Georgetown University Press Al-Ghazali M (1976) Fiqh Al-Sirah, 7th edn. Dar al-kutub Al-Hadithah, p 29 Al-Mas’udi AH (1989) From the meadows of gold. Routledge, p 93 Al-Mbarkfori SAR (1988) Al-Rahiq Al-Makhtom. Mktabat Ibn Taymiah, p 100 Al-Naboodah HM (2005) Sahib al-Khabar: secret agents and spies during the first century of Islam. Journal of Asian History 39(2) Bogle EC (1998) Islam: origin and belief. University of Texas Press, p 6 Champion B (2008) Spies (look) like us: the early use of business and civilian covers in covert operations. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21(3):530–564 Clot A (1990) Harun Al-Rashid and the age of a thousand and one nights. New Amsterdam Books Dietrich A (1991) al-H.adjdj¯adj b. Y¯usuf. The encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, Volume II: C–G. BRILL, p 40 Donner FM (2010) Muh.ammad and the believers. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p 42 Dvornik F (1974) Origins of intelligence services. Rutgers University Press Gil M (1997) A history of Palestine. Cambridge University Press, p 29 Haberl F (2016) The art of darkness—ideological foundations and present implications of Jih¯adi counter intelligence, counterespionage, denial and deception culture. Journal of Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies 10(1):145–165 Hill D (1993) Islamic science and engineering. Edinburgh University Press Ibn Hisham AMM (1979) Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiah. Moassat Aolom Al-Quran, vol 1 Ibn Kathir A (2001) Stories of the prophet: from Adam to Muh.ammad. Dar Al-Manarah, p 389 Kaplan J (2014) For ISIS, the United States’ military strikes confirm god’s favor. The Martin Marty Center For the Public Understanding of Religion. Accessed online: https://divinity.uchicago.edu/ sightings/IS-united-states-military-strikes-confirm-gods-favor-jeffrey-kaplan Khattab MS (n.d.) Iqtebas Al-Nizam Al-Askari Fe Asir Al-Nubowah (Al-Shoon Al-Dinniah, n.d.), p 11 Mez A (1937) The Renaissance of Islam. Khitab Bavan Naji AB (2006) The management of savagery: the most critical stage through which umma will pass (trans: William McCants, 2006). The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, pp 16–17 and 28–30 Rodgers R (2008) Fundamentals of Islamic asymmetric warfare: a documentary analysis of the principles of Muh.ammad, Edwin Mellen Pr Schefer CHA (1897) Nizam al-Mulk, 1018–1092, Siasset nameh, traite des Gouvernement, compose pour le sultan Melik-chah. E- Leroux Sheldon RM (2008) Espionage in the ancient world: an annotated bibliography of books and articles in Western Languages. McFarland & Company Sprenger A (1864) Die Post- und Reiserouten des Orients. F.A. Brockhaus Suwaed MY, Kahana E (2018) Intelligence in the first Muslim state: 610–632 AD. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 31(1):169–184 Thatcher GW (1911) Tha’¯alib¯ı. In: Chisholm H (ed) Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edn. Cambridge University Press, p 716

Chapter 8

Jih¯adi Intelligence and Epistemology

Abstract In order to understand how Jih¯adis learn, one needs to know who the agents of learning (the students) are, and also identify the processes of terrorist learning, its influences and underlying factors. Jih¯adis learn and educate themselves in order to learn how to achieve their specific goals. Indeed, similar to governments, also nonstate Jih¯adi actors need to continuously learn in order to build on past operational or strategic successes, avoid failures, and stay ahead of their enemies in terms of intelligence or counterintelligence—especially in terms of tactics, technology and capabilities. Consequently, Jih¯adi learning is not only an intelligence capability, but also a force multiplier. To achieve the most effective learning outcomes, Jih¯adis learn from history, their own experiences, the experiences of peers or networks, and from other (Jih¯adi) terrorist organisations, experts, counterterrorism actors (such as governments or security services) and the media. Keywords Intelligence Cycle · Organisational Learning · Knowledge Acquisition · Intelligence Assets · Informants · Operatives · Vicarious learning · Information Distribution · Interpretation of Information · Storage of Information · Incremental Learning · Transformational Learning · Lessons Learned · Organisational Structure · Information Sharing · Decentralisation · Organisational Culture · Operational Environment · Collocation of Knowledge · Practical Knowledge · Real Life Training · Theoretical Knowledge · Institutional Learning Successful terrorist attacks are rarely accomplished by idiots.1

Understanding Jih¯adi learning must include an assessment of who the agents of learning (the students) are, and further establish the processes of terrorist learning, its influences and underlying factors. Jih¯adis learn and continue to educate themselves in order to gain knowledge on how to achieve their objectives. Indeed, much like governments learn, so too do Jih¯adi non-state actors. The aim of Jih¯adi learning is to build on previous operational or strategic successes, avoid past failures, and stay ahead of their enemies in terms of intelligence or counterintelligence, especially with respect to tactics, technology and skill sets.2 Consequently, Jih¯adi learning is 1 2

Forest (2006), p. 1. Kettle and Mumford (2016).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_8

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not only intelligence capability, but also a force enabler and multiplier.3 In order to achieve the most efficient learning outcomes, Jih¯adis learn from history,4 their own experiences, the experiences of fellow fighters or networks5 and from other (Jih¯adi) terrorist organisations,6 experts,7 counterterrorism actors (such as governments or security services8 ) and the media.9 Jih¯adi groups have developed a broad spectrum of processes that help them gain an advantage over an adversary through the acquisition of information and knowledge. For the interplay of intelligence, organisational learning is highly relevant and serves a highly goal-driven purpose that is broadly defined by Jih¯adi operational art as a unifying element. As such, organisational learning capabilities, intelligence activities and a radical Islamic ideology constitute a dynamic interplay and are closely related, while operational art provides the doctrinal guidance and common reference framework. Kettle and Mumford propose a new definition of what they believe would more holistically constitute terrorist learning. They also provide a diagram consisting of four spheres and a centre where terrorist learning occurs. The four spheres, according to their findings, are “organisational”, “generational”, “social” and “individual”— all of which also apply to the epistemology of Jih¯adi groups and Jih¯adi intelligence. However, their work unfortunately does not take a key element of Jih¯adism into account, as it neither considers historical role models nor Jih¯adi culture. It also does not consider the Jih¯adi interpretation of Islam, which can (for the sake of this argument) be summarised as the missing dimension of Jih¯adi ideology and operational art. If one considers the “educational” and training publications of the Islamic State, i.e. manuals, videos or magazines, it becomes evident that the majority of publications link historic role models, religious justifications, legitimisations and ideological fundaments. In other words, Kettle and Mumford are missing the sphere of ideology and operational art when discussing the epistemology within the realms of Jih¯adi intelligence. Discussing the epistemology of Jih¯adi intelligence’s learning capabilities may— aside from adding an ideological layer—enable us to furthermore understand the development and employment of new tactics. Indeed, the more tactics a Jih¯adi group manages to acquire, the greater its operational freedom will be and the greater a group’s readiness to deal with complex situations and governmental counterterrorism efforts will be.10 Thus, shifts in the environment, for example, the most recent military

3

Ibid, p. 1. Selth (1991), p. 299. 5 Forest (2006). 6 Philips (2014). 7 Kettle and Mumford (2016). 8 Jackson (2001). 9 Dalrymple (2015). 10 Bell (1998), p. 183. 4

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failures of the Islamic State, may be compensated, as such “setbacks” reduce future military options. With regards to intelligence, one must also focus on improvements in security and the effects certain operations may have on a group’s public support or on the manufacturing and utilisation of new weapons, i.e. 3D printing, which has also found its way into IS’ repertoire.11 Such learning success goes hand in hand with the capitalisation of new opportunities, which are likely to be linked to a Jih¯adi group’s security environment. In fact, the mere recognition of the existence of new opportunities commonly requires information gathering and a certain interpretative process12 for which the intelligence capabilities of a group are imperative. Jih¯adi groups improving their skills through continuous learning and training can have a significant impact on the execution of operations and the quality of their operational realities. Poorly executed operations can damage a terrorist group’s public profile, which can consequently reduce the self-representative threat level that is needed in order to achieve terrorist goals.13 Some groups like Hezbollah or IS have come to establish expert units—most commonly with a certain intelligence capability or structurally situated within the representative intelligence departments—which enable the group to achieve higher levels of expertise.14 If we look at the Islamic State, we can see that the group has started to focus its recruitment strategies on expert positions and special skilled Jih¯adis, as illustrated by the group’s recruitment questionnaire,15 which also covers questions regarding the skills of the prospect Jih¯adi.16 Reda Hame, a 29-year-old French computer technician may be a good example for such skills-based recruitment efforts by the Emni. The computer expert was in fact only a week into his IS membership when the group’s secret service approached him due to his prior work for Astrium (a subsidiary of Airbus) and his French passport. Reda Hame was instructed in how to use firearms, how to use grenades and in how to use encryption software.17 Once the Emni decided to send him back to Europe, he was driven to the Turkish border, given operational instructions, supplied with 2000 Euros and provided with passwords so as to be able to access encrypted Internet forums.18 11

Haberl and Huemer (2019). Cragin (2005). 13 Jackson et al. (2005a). 14 Ibid. 15 Sims (2016). 16 The 23 questions are: (1) Name; (2) Fighter name; (3) Mother’s maiden name; (4) Blood type; (5) DOB and nationality; (6) Marriage status; (7) Address and place of residence; (8) Level of education; (9) Level of Sharia understanding; (10) Previous job; (11) Countries travelled through; (12) Area entered from; (13) Who recommended; (14) Date of entry; (15) Have they fought before; (16) What role will they take; (17) Any special skills; (18) Current place of work; (19) Security deposit; (20) Level of obedience; (21) Contact numbers; (22) Date and place of death; (23) Notes. 17 Callimachi (2016a). 18 Ibid. 12

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With respect to counterterrorism efforts such as the circumvention of a Jih¯adi groups’ counterintelligence apparatus and security, which is likely to compromise its members, learning capabilities can play a significant role. This is because learning capabilities, thus the ability to learn from one’s own and other’s mistakes, allows a group to potentially overcome counterterrorism operations and strengthen its security. Indeed, Jih¯adi groups engage in a wide range of defensive counterintelligence measures so as to protect themselves (see chapter: Counterintelligence). In this regard, some groups have managed to do better than others and Hezbollah, for instance, has managed to restructure itself and institutionalise lessons learned methodologies.19 IS has also followed in these steps, and consequently, we can find comparatively self-reflective “lessons learned” in its publications. The chapter “AL-QA’IDAH OF WAZIRISTAN—A TESTIMONY FROM WITHIN” found in Dabiq 6 may be a good example, but the group has published many more in their Dabiq magazine series.20 Also, successful learning is critical with respect to ever-changing cyber activities, encryption and online activities, since technological savviness can certainly reduce a group’s exposure and compromise its security. In this context, one must also mention intelligence capabilities and intelligence collection as much as the utilisation of intelligence. Jih¯adi groups are very much dependent upon intelligence and the quality of the information can, as for anything else, mean the difference between success and failure.21 Consequently, many Jih¯adi groups have made intelligence a very high priority, as illustrated by the ominous Emni or by the al-Qaeda’s “Central Section”. In order to arrive at the desired outcomes, specific learning processes need to be implemented for this very purpose.22 Indeed, when preparing for operations, IS has, for instance, aimed at providing a standardised approach towards collecting open source intelligence in order to ensure the success of an operation.

8.1 The Intelligence Cycle and Organisational Learning Organisation’s capabilities can also be maintained despite the loss of manpower or territory. Aside from the operational art framework (see chapter: Operational Art), which can take on a similar function, the ability of a Jih¯adi group to conduct organisational learning, to share capabilities, distribute knowledge23 and store the knowledge in a fashion that is ideally not highly vulnerable to outside forces can drastically

19

Jackson et al. (2005a). IS (2016), p. 48. 21 Jackson et al. (2005a). 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid, p. 6. 20

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increase a groups effectiveness and performance.24 The relevant training and distribution of knowledge can be achieved through formal training camps, specialised courses or online training, while manuals and other types of codified knowledge also play a significant role in storing and sharing information. Indeed, the ability of Jih¯adi groups to achieve this through virtual means has truly enhanced the utilisation of such information. Furthermore, groups like IS or al-Qaeda, with their respective publications Inspire or Dabiq, are maintaining a certain level of capability by sharing their manuals and approaches online and in their network of affiliated groups. In this regard, sharing codified knowledge has taken over a similar function as operational art and can enable a group and its intelligence apparatus to remain operative despite the loss of leadership, manpower, territory or structural components. Learning has been identified to be a process with different stages. According to Huber, learning occurs in a process of four stages, namely knowledge acquisition, information distribution, interpretation and information storage in the organisational memory.25 The stages of the intelligence cycle and the processes that enable Jih¯adi groups to learn and develop do in fact overlap and mutual reactions can be observed simultaneously. This interplay not only illustrates how the Jih¯adi intelligence cycle works inside an organisation, but it further enables us to understand how Jih¯adi groups and their intelligence organisations grow and develop in a reciprocal effect and relative to their level of knowledge and information. In fact, the concept of the intelligence cycle (see chapter: The (Jih¯adi) Intelligence Cycle) itself appears to draw on the applied psychology of the learning process, which26 consists of four functions, namely the direction of the collection, collection of intelligence, processing of intelligence and ultimately the use of intelligence by the decision-maker.27 A highly convincing and sound approach towards terrorist learning processes— applicable also to Jih¯adi intelligence—has been developed by Trujillo et al. The authors propose a model of organisational learning as an information process, meaning that four distinct stages are identified through which information is passed along within a Jih¯adi group.28 In order for organisational learning to take place, the stages of “acquisition”, “distribution”, “interpretation” and “retention” must be passed in a similar way as information passes through the different departments/stages of the intelligence cycle.

24

Ibid, p. 5. Huber (1991), 2(1), pp. 88–90. 26 Omand (2014). 27 Ibid, p. 62. 28 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 55. 25

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8.1.1 Knowledge Acquisition Groups must acquire knowledge, which is required in order to assess their current situation, understand the outcomes of certain engagements and identify improvements they need to make. For internal intelligence services to achieve this, they can either consult external sources or the existing knowledge of their members. This acquisition of information either occurs through congenital knowledge, direct experience, vicarious experience or strategic learning. With respect to an inherited intelligence culture, congenital knowledge might be the most relevant, and this form of knowledge might also be the most important when a new terrorist organisation is founded29 or in order to legitimise and justify certain actions externally or internally.30 Indeed, operational art consists largely of congenital knowledge, a form of knowledge also frequently referenced to by Osama bin Laden for various reasons: “It is a great pride and a big hope that the revelation unto Muh.ammad will be resorted to for ruling. When we used to follow Muh.ammad’s revelation, peace be upon him, we were in great happiness and in great dignity.”31

Direct experience, on the other hand, results from previous activities and actions either intentionally through practice and training or unintentionally through successful or failed operations.32 Additionally, Jih¯adi groups also learn from the failures and successes of other groups, which Trujillo et al. term “vicarious learning”. These are mainly based on monitoring and gathering information on other terrorist groups, Jih¯adi organisations or other illicit actors.33 For example, the connection between AQIM’s former commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar and smugglers across West Africa can hardly be disputed.34 Indeed, he was/is not called Mr. Marlboro for his alleged smoking habits, but rather for his role in cigarette, drug and car smuggling, for he has built a smuggling network across the Sahel in order to finance the Jih¯ad.35 Jih¯adi groups also engage in strategic learning with research, cooperation or acquisition of new weapons and technologies for future purposes.36 Especially al-Qaeda has heavily engaged in strategic learning, which is best illustrated by Osama bin Laden’s reading list obtained from his hideout in Pakistan. One can find works like a report on “Turkish Arms Industry (June 2008)” by the Jamestown Foundation, “Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the Kurds” by the International CrisisGroup (2008), “A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jih¯ad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jih¯adism”, by Guido Steinberg (in Strategic Insights of 29

Ibid, p. 55. Haberl (2016). 31 Lawrence (2005), p. 61. 32 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 55. 33 Ibid, p. 55. 34 Kennedy Boudali (2007). 35 Smith (2013). 36 Kenney (2006), p. 56. 30

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the Naval Postgraduate School (July 2008)), “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era” by Frederic Grare for Carnegie Papers (2006) or the book “The 2030 Spike” by Colin Mason,37 which details the future of depleted fuel supplies, massive population growth, poverty, global climate change, famine, growing water shortages and international lawlessness, which would arguably illustrate the group’s orientation towards strategic learning and research intended to be used in future.

8.1.2 Knowledge Acquisition via Intelligence Assets, Informants and Operatives Networks of individuals and sources are intended to feed information back into the organisation. This information is to then be used for analytical purposes. Jih¯adi groups do not only try to infiltrate their Jih¯adi “competitors”, something done by IS, which is known to infiltrate competing Jih¯adi groups. Still, IS has also started to shift its attention towards a policy of recruiting sympathisers within the intelligence and security services of the Western governments opposing them. The case of a Jih¯adi mole inside the German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) might strike us as particularly relevant. In 2016, the 51-year-old had joined radical Islamic online forums and told his chat partners he was working for the Internal Security Service. The man attempted to provide access to the secret service for fellow Jih¯adis and allegedly forwarded the locations and purposes of secret service operations.38 While it had originally been assumed that the mole had radicalised himself while working on Jih¯ad-related subjects, the man declared (after his arrest) to having deliberately infiltrated the secret service in order to aid his fellow Jih¯adis.39 In the Netherlands, an officer of the so-called Safety and Security Department was arrested on suspicion of leaking investigation information to a Moroccan-Dutch criminal organisation. The man, working as a scout, was responsible for providing the physical security of threatened politicians like Geert Wilders.40 Although the officer was not part of the “inner circle” of Wilders’ protection unit, he still had access to databases containing highly confidential information. A Jih¯adi connection has not been proven by the Rijksrecherche, a department handling internal police investigations, but in general, the connections between criminal North African gangs and Jih¯adi groups are well-know and studied.41 As a result, Geert Wilders’ personal protection team has been replaced by a special military unit.42 37

CIA (2017). Burger (2016). 39 Ibid. 40 Pieters (2017a). 41 Atwan (2008). 42 Pieters (2017b). 38

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Daniela Greene, a rogue translator of the FBI, may be another worrying example of such subversive efforts by Jih¯adis. Greene was born in Czechoslovakia and temporarily raised in Germany. After she married a US soldier, she moved to the US, obtained a Master’s degree in history at Cameron University,43 and—since she was fluent in German—then began working as an FBI linguist in 2011, a position requiring a top-secret security clearance.44 In 2014, she was tasked with the investigation of the German Jih¯adi IS fighter and infamous recruiter Denis Cuspert. She identified his online accounts and telephone numbers and maintained sole access to a third Skype account.45 Greene must have fallen for the charm and rhetoric of the former German rapper, since she decided to warn him that he was under FBI investigation and promised to marry him. In June, 2014, she flew to Istanbul so as to move along to the city of Gaziantep, close to the Syrian border. After having contacted Cuspert, she managed to cross the border into Syria and married him soon thereafter.46 However, within a few weeks, she realised the terrible mistake she had made and opted to flee back to the US, where she was arrested and sentenced to two years in prison.47 Another example can be found in the Queen’s imam Ahmad Afzali, who was arrested by the FBI based on the allegations of being a double agent who had tipped off suspects in 2009. After his arrest, he admitted to telling terrorist suspects about the FBI having shown him the photographs of suspects, inquiring about their character, and that their telephone conversations may be monitored.48 Although the imam claimed that he had no bad or radical intentions, and insisted he had always been loyally helping the FBI, the case of Imam Ahmad Afzali illustrates the potential danger of double agents. Even if they are not fully ideologically aligned with Jih¯adism, but merely in contact with (potential or active) Jih¯adis, they may feel the need to directly or indirectly support their cause. The 2016 assassination of the Russian ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov49 by the off-duty police officer Mevlüt Mert Altınta¸s50 may be a concerning example for the potential reach of radicalised operatives inside a police unit or security service. However, although IS has not claimed responsibility for the attack, the group still celebrated it as a victory for the Jih¯adi cause.51 Later, the Jih¯adi Jaish al-Fatah coalition (formerly Al-Nusra Front) claimed responsibility for the operation,52 while

43

Glover (2017). Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Security Debrief (2009). 49 Walker et al. (2016). 50 Oliphant (2016). 51 Heavy.com (2016). 52 Russian News Agency TASS (2016). 44

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Russian and Turkish investigators concluded in 2017 that the art gallery attack was not linked to al-Qaeda, IS or any other regional Jih¯adi group.53 Still, this example goes to show that officials inside the police or inside an intelligence service may not necessarily be immune to radical ideologies, a weakness Jih¯adi groups are eager to exploit due to the unique access to information and opportunities that security officials commonly enjoy. Indeed, Mevlüt Mert Altınta¸s entered the building using his police identification54 and actually triggered the metal detector, but was ultimately waved through thanks to his official ID.55 Once inside the gallery, he waited until the Russian ambassador had begun his speech and he opened fire on him from behind.56 After he had killed Karlov and injured some in attendance, he circled the gallery, smashed the displayed pieces of art and shouted in Arabic: “Allahu Akbar! We are the ones who pledged loyalty to [the Prophet] Muh.ammad to fight Jih¯ad as long as we live.”57

8.1.3 “Vicarious Learning” and Jih¯adi Intelligence Organisations “…we must look back at the previous Crusader wars against our countries to learn lessons that will help us confront this onslaught, understand the most important causes of these attacks, and learn how they were repulsed and resisted…the confrontation and conflict between us and them started centuries ago.”58

Jih¯adi groups and in particular their respective intelligence departments also learn from the successes and failures of other groups. Indeed, groups can explore and extend their knowledge based on the experiences, success and failures of other illicit groups engaged in similar activities or even from governments.59 Furthermore, they have also incorporated large amounts of “Western” literature, especially with regard to military management. As such, “vicarious learning” may also include learning from various counterterrorism actors or mimicking the methodologies conducted by security services. Also, Osama bin Laden has referred to this type of learning,60 and particularly the published “Abbottabad files” lead us to believe that the former head of al-Qaeda himself frequently consulted the knowledge found in “Western literature”. Some intriguing examples related to intelligence and the acquisition of knowledge on his bookshelf included: “Military Intelligence Blunders” by John HughesWilson, “Bounding the Global War on Terror” by Jeffrey Record, “Guerrilla Air 53

Benli (2017). ABC News (2016). 55 BBC (2016a). 56 BBC (2016b). 57 BBC. (2016a). 58 Ibid, 229. 59 Romme and Ron (1997). 60 Lawrence (2005), p. 243. 54

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Defence: Antiaircraft Weapons and Techniques for Guerrilla Forces” by James Crabtree, “Imperial Hubris” by Michael Scheuer, “Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II” by William Blum, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” by Paul Kennedy or “Unfinished Business, U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century” by Michael O’Hanlon.61 Jih¯adi groups have started to incorporate “Western” military literature, seeing military affairs in a systematic and methodological fashion. This is done in order to improve capabilities, understand the enemy and gather intelligence prior to operations.62 Consequently, a source of professional knowledge gets infused into Jih¯adi organisational learning, intelligence capabilities, and operational art. As argued by Adamsky, Jih¯adi military art is “informed by theoretical learning and importing knowledge from apostates and believers alike.”63 These non-Muslim military approaches can indeed offer practical solutions to practical questions,64 whereas the required doctrines are extracted from the Jih¯adi body of operational art.65 A very intriguing example may be found in the IS publication “Hijrah to the Islamic State”, which aims at guiding prospective IS fighters or future citizens of the Caliphate through various security barriers on their way through Europe, Turkey and ultimately into the Islamic State. While the manual provides some presumably helpful guidance on which routes to take and what to avoid, it does not touch on the aspect of how to pass airport security. In fact, the manual only states the following: “Operatives are instructed to avoid looking nervous. Shaking hands, rapid breathing, cold sweats, and lack of eye contact can all be detected as nervous behaviour by trained security officials.”66

While the previous advice may not strike us as remarkably helpful or insightful, what should spark our interest is the available download link of another external document cited by the Jih¯adi author and supposedly the substitute for the missing chapter on airport security: “Wikileaks: leaked CIA Manual Shows How Operatives Get Through Airport Security Without Blowing Their Cover.”67

This is, however, not the first time a Jih¯adi author has cited the CIA and its workflow in a manual. Obscurely enough, Ali Mohamed felt it necessary to justify his espionage doctrines and statements on the importance of open source intelligence gathering (OSINT) by referencing Allan Dulles, the former Director of the CIA.68 Furthermore, Ali Mohamed had worked as Osama bin Laden’s mole inside the US intelligence community (see chapter: Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed) and he went as far 61

CIA (2017). Stout et al. (2008), pp. 74–137 see also: Ilardi (2008). 63 Naji (2006), pp. 23–24. 64 Lacey (2008), p. 61. 65 Adamsky (2010). 66 IS (2015a). 67 Ibid. 68 Post (2004), p. 100. 62

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as simply copying some material from the US in order to republish it in his al-Qaeda manual. Having been sent to the US as a mole who’s mission was to infiltrate the CIA or FBI, Ali Mohammed did not succeed in penetrating any intelligence operations in the US, but did manage to become a supply sergeant at Fort Bragg for the US Army. In this position, he had access to said field manuals and translated them into Arabic so that they could find their way into the existing body of Jih¯adi knowledge.69 Such an acquisition of highly relevant knowledge and sources such as manuals or blueprints can ultimately increase a Jih¯adi group’s intelligence performance and capabilities.70 However, “vicarious learning” comes with the caveat of having to struggle with a lack of tacit knowledge (expertise and internal knowledge of an organisation) or vice versa, being able to gain explicit knowledge (knowledge than can be recorded). In other words, while a basis of Jih¯adi activities can be found in explicit and recorded knowledge, it is—in fact—the tacit knowledge that provides the actual “how” when making an operation successful, despite the importance of operational art. This means that Jih¯adi groups cannot easily duplicate another group’s tacit knowledge or learn from their governmental counterparts since “hands-on” experience may be required.71 If the right experts can be found, their expertise could be acquired either by recruiting them directly or through consultancy agreements.72 Indeed, this gap and difficulty to fuse tacit knowledge with explicit knowledge has consequently been bridged by the Islamic State and by recruiting former Iraqi intelligence officers like Haji Bakr,73 who would later build establish the Emni, or by recruiting foreign military service men into their ranks. IS Emni officer Abu Khaled, for instance, is a multilingual Syrian who has received military training during his military service. IS leadership spotted his talent and especially, since he had been fluent in Arabic, English and French, became an interpreter, trained Jih¯adist infantrymen and groomed foreign Emni operatives from France.74 Another case consisted of a 31-year-old German soldier with the rank of sergeant, formerly having served in the 4th company of Panzergrenadierbataillon 212. This case may be particularly relevant and even more illustrative. After having subscribed for 12 years of service, the sergeant eventually turned to Salafism and became continuously more radical up to a point where he refused to train German soldiers to use their rifles, as they may one day use them against fellow Muslims.75 After a lengthy investigation by the German Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst), the man was ultimately relieved of his duties. In 2014, he was caught by the German security services attempting to join the Islamic State in Syria. Unfortunately, although the security service caught him, 69

Kenney (2007), p. 141. Jackson et al. (2005a), p. 13. 71 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 56. 72 Jackson (2005a), p. 13. 73 Wege (2018). 74 Weiss (2017). 75 Diehl and Schmid (2014). 70

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presumably 20 other former German soldiers (mainly former conscripts) actually managed to reach IS territories, which raises immediate concerns in the light of their military training, which may now benefit the Islamic State.76 However, although Jih¯adi groups are advertising their need for trained military personnel and fighters, they have not yet actively abused respective military forces for training purposes,77 although IS surely has suggested the exploitation of similar weaknesses in the Western legal and security systems so as to achieve their goals.78 Joint efforts towards specific goals can be highly useful, given that the goals and culture of other Jih¯adi groups or franchises are compatible. If so, such knowledge and intelligence collaborations can be a very valuable for Jih¯adi groups.79 When it comes to tactical and strategic adaption, the Islamic State is learning to embrace regional franchises while the Al Qaeda’s centralised structure has fragmented into regional organisations that have focused on localising their activities under different umbrella organisations.80 The Taliban has also been learning from the tactics and operational success of the Islamic State while Jemmah Islamiah has gained plenty of knowledge from the Al Qaeda. The Hezbollah has resorted to consulting outside experts in order to improve its learning capabilities and most Jih¯adi organisations study governmental security forces carefully in order to improve their counterintelligence measures.81 Indeed, Ali Mohamed may be a good example for all of this, as it can be seen in various Jih¯adi groups that studying and leaning from their enemies is a clear priority. Ali Mohamed elaborates on a Palestinian plot to attack an El Al plane and engages in a short yet relevant discussion as to why the Palestinian attackers failed in their attempt and how their counterpart, the Mossad, managed to thwart their attack with an improvised rocket launcher hidden in a potato cart.82 After reading about this example, we may be tempted to assume that, due to Ali Mohamed’s analysis of this counterterrorism operation, the al-Qaeda operative must have had a special connection or insight into this very operation. However, we are proven wrong by a footnote he had inserted and then references the accounts of a former Mossad agent by the name of Victor Ostrovsky: “This story is found in the book A’n Tarik Al-Khida’ “By Way of Deception Methods,” by Victor Ostrovsky [PH]. The author claims that the Mossad wants to kill him for writing that book. However, I believe that the book was authorized by the Israeli Mossad.”83

Jih¯adi groups have learned their tradecraft from various international actors and have also passed their knowledge along to other Jih¯adi and paramilitary groups. In this regard, intelligence methodologies were taught by foreign actors, especially 76

Ibid. Ibid. 78 Haberl and Huemer (2019). 79 Jackson et al. (2005a), p. 12. 80 Kettle and Mumford (2016), p. 1. 81 Haberl (2016). 82 Post (2004), p. 25. 83 Post (2004), p. 25. 77

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during the Cold War, and then distributed freely within the smaller Jih¯adi community and even within the larger paramilitary community. Indeed, traditionally Jih¯adi groups have learned their tradecraft in military style training camps, which were often supported by governments for a variety of different political reasons. In most cases, these groups were used as minor players in the larger geopolitical strategies of world powers. Most notably, the US has trained a variety of paramilitary organisations during the Cold War in various covert programmes that have only recently been declassified. In addition, the Soviet Union has invested heavily into training paramilitary Jih¯adi organisations, which included the Fatah or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In both cases, training camps been modelled after Soviet facilities, whereas Palestinian militants passed on their knowledge and training in urban warfare, covert operations, and intelligence to other Jih¯adi organisations and revolutionary urban terrorist organisation, most notably the Red Army Faction and various guerrillas in South Asia and Latin America.84 The Palestinian training camps can be considered an important catalyst where, aside from tactical methodologies, also worldviews, ideologies, operational art and connections could be shared.85 The same concept would be used by al-Qaeda and with respect to the group’s camps twenty years later. Also, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard—which partially also received training from the PLO and Russia—trained Hezbollah fighters in how to use rocket launchers, automatic weapons or explosives but also how to practice close quarter combat and most importantly how to conduct covert operations. In turn, Hezbollah later provided training for the Palestine Islamic Jih¯ad, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Palestinian-General Council and most notably al-Qaeda in intelligence activities in Lebanon.86 In the mid-1990s, a small cell of al-Qaeda fighters even attended Hezbollah training sessions in Lebanon and shortly thereafter, Osama bin Laden and Imad Mugniyeh met in Sudan. The two men came to the agreement that Hezbollah would provide al-Qaeda with training in exchange for financial support and manpower.87 Interestingly, Hezbollah did not exchange its self-acquired knowledge for al-Qaeda’s financial support, but merely passed on a training curriculum it had received externally. External training has been a key factor with regards to the Hezbollah’s learning abilities. It has allowed the group to continuously enhance the skill set of its fighters. This training, however, has been provided by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, which in turn lead to Hezbollah members not needing to develop their own learning procedures and approaches, since lessons learned elsewhere have been passed on to the group.88

84

Kenney (2007), p. 136. Ibid, p. 136. 86 Ibid, p. 137. 87 Kaplan (2006). 88 Jackson et al. (2005a), p. 22. 85

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8.2 Knowledge and Learning “So, learn this and keep it in your mind.”89 —Usama Bin Laden

Knowledge itself is the most integral part of intelligence. Since we have established that Jih¯adi intelligence—as much as counterintelligence—required knowledge of the environment, an understanding of the adversary, and a certain l evel of organised intelligence, it is of utmost importance to establish how this very knowledge gets acquired, preserved, passed on, and analysed by Jih¯adi groups. This can be done through various means, at different levels, and within different spheres of knowledge. While it is imperative to look at history and culture in this regard (see chapter: Why history matters), one must also turn to epistemology. We must understand how Jih¯adi groups and their intelligence services acquire knowledge in order to fully comprehend their capabilities. It is relevant to understand Jih¯adi learning procedures in order to grasp how information is analysed or decisions are made within the realms of Jih¯adi intelligence. A group that cannot learn will not be able to adapt to new adversarial approaches in counterterrorism and law enforcement.90 An organisation that learns through its intelligence services, however, can strengthen its capabilities and purposefully adapt to an ever-changing environment. Jih¯adi intelligence services are not just influenced by what can be called Jih¯adi operational art; they also actively contribute to this special sphere of knowledge. Within the realms of operational art, they are consistently adding new ideological interpretations, knowledge strategies, and guidelines from a variety of sources, including “Western” scholarship.91 These are then merged with the existing body of Jih¯adi military knowledge, shared inside the community and are ultimately fused with tales of historic role models or cultural aspects in order to lend them more legitimacy and credibility.92 Developing and employing new strategies and tactics, improving the skills of the recruited fighters and collecting intelligence in order to plan attacks or thwart countermeasures not only enables a group to survive, but also allows the acquired body of knowledge and operational art to survive, even if some of the group’s fighters may not.93 This, in turn, enables Jih¯adi groups to change their operations in accordance with adversarial countermeasures and based on the knowledge created by their intelligence services. Since the Islamic State has spent 2017 losing significant grounds in controlled territories in 2017, the idea of an Islamic Caliphate has left the real and tangible world, having become solely an idea. This idea will eventually become part of the sphere of knowledge of operational art and continue to guide Jih¯adi operations. 89

Lawrence (2005), p. 221. Jackson et al. (2005a). 91 CIA (2017). 92 Adamsky (2010). 93 Jackson et al. (2005a), p. ix. 90

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Indeed, the mere idea of an Islamic Caliphate, without Jih¯adi fighters actually being present and having embarked on a journey towards it (Hijra) has already influenced a large number of recent attackers. Those Jih¯adis were never physically present in the Islamic State, yet were prepared to die for it.94 Anis Amir, for example, who decided to drive a truck into a German Christmas market killing 11 people,95 had never travelled to the “Islamic State”, but felt so strongly about the idea and the concept of it, that it ended up inspiring him to go to the lengths he did.96 For reasons like this, it is crucial to consider the different approaches to Jih¯adi learning and study them within their respective spheres of knowledge. No one is born with the skills to conduct countersurveillance, espionage or intelligence gathering, among many others necessary for a successful Jih¯adi intelligence operative. Jih¯adis learn these skills through practice, training programmes or published Jih¯adi manuals while operational art, doctrines and Islamic principles of warfare are key drivers and sources of knowledge. Furthermore, Qur’¯anic doctrines, historic references as well as up-to-date training materials have become recruitment tools. They have assumed over tasks under the guise of spreading knowledge97 and operational art. They are highly relevant for the dissemination of propaganda. A task also fulfilled, at least in the case of the IS, by their own intelligence service Emni.98 However, Jih¯adi intelligence is additionally and significantly influenced by practical learning and knowledge gained by conducting intelligence, planning previous operations and by assessing failures in order to adapt workflows and approaches. Consequently, we cannot afford to be satisfied with the mere recognition that Jih¯adi groups alter their strategies and counterintelligence operations in accordance with knowledge gained. In fact, from a Jih¯adi viewpoint, it would be counterproductive if the group did not do so. Moreover, we should thrive to understand how they acquire the information that empowers them and determine how this impacts their intelligence performance and analytical approaches. After all, organisational change and organisational restructuring within a group’s intelligence culture does not happen without great effort.99 The development of inherent biases also do not come overnight. Most importantly, the separate sphere of knowledge within the realms of a Jih¯adi intelligence culture’s operational art needs to grow from the soil of sophisticated indoctrination blended with Islamic role models and history. Indeed, this concept of passive learning through culture, language, history, and ideology is often ignored,100 especially when looking at the epistemology of Jih¯adi groups. Jih¯adis must be able to learn in order to identify opportunities, advantages, and opportunities that might grant success.101 Whereas individual Jih¯adis might be able 94

Haberl (2019). Reuscher et al. (2016). 96 Ibid. 97 Kenney (2006), p. 33. 98 Haberl (2018). 99 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 53. 100 Jonassen (1991). 101 Jackson et al. (2005a), p. 3. 95

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build up new skills sets and knowledge, this does not constitute organisational learning, since learning at the organisational level is more than simply the sum of all of the knowledge each member can contribute.102 Groups commonly influence their structures, available knowledge and training through their intelligence services. Their inherent importance grows with respect to enhancing a group’s learning abilities and exercising a certain level of control over what their members learn and do.103 The Emni serves as a fitting example, since this security apparatus has developed competing, vertically organised structures that ultimately monitor each other, the group’s members and the population IS has under its control, constantly looking for indicators of disloyalty.104 This aspect is confirmed by Abu Talha al-Kuwaiti, the former commander of IS’ His’bah Police in Raqqa, who decided to flee the city with some loyal supporters after Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, the then governor of the city, had been executed by the IS security apparatus.105 Nonetheless, Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla have concluded that, according to interviews conducted with former IS members, the His’ bah was of a lower rank than the Emni.106 ,107 Organisational learning does not mean that human characteristics could be applied to an organisation, particularly since Garrat concludes that a relatively small number of people within the organisation have significant influence over the strategic decisions that are taken.108 Still, group learning is more than individual learning and Jih¯adi intelligence plays a critical role in the learning processes of Jih¯adi groups since—per definition—intelligence enables the group to gain and learn from new information. The resulting organisational memory enables a group to take advantage of the capabilities of individuals in order to achieve a grand strategy while simultaneously reducing the dependence on particular group members and their unique skills.109 Most critically, this grand strategy and internal unity, without which a group’s organisational learning capabilities would be jeopardised, is supported and rooted in Jih¯adi operational art. Understanding the key drivers of operational art, the associated learning processes and the interplay amongst them in great detail,110 much less the codified knowledge and learning materials themselves, will provide us with a deeper understanding of the internal workings of Jih¯adi intelligence, especially since the organisational learning 102

Ibid, p. 3. Fiol and Lyles (1985). 104 Wege (2018). 105 Dettmer (2017). 106 Wege (2018). 107 Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). 108 Garrat (1987). 109 Jackson et al. (2005a), p. 10. 110 Definition of organizational learning according to Trujillo: A process through which the members of an organization develop new knowledge about their actions and outcomes, share this knowledge throughout the organization, incorporate it into routines of the organization and store the knowledge in an organizational memory. 103

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process, according to Trujillo et al., closely matches what is known as the “intelligence cycle”. Indeed, the stages of organisational learning pointed out by Trujillo et al. are acquisition, distribution, interpretation and retention,111 while the intelligence cycle commonly consists of direction, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination (see chapter: The (Jih¯adi) Intelligence Cycle).112 Huber also argues that learning activities normally take place in four stages, which are defined as the acquisition of knowledge, sharing knowledge through information distribution, interpreting the shared information (in order for it to become understood) and storing it for future use within the organisational memory.113 As such, the core processes and stages overlap and are held together. They are unified by operational art, which is rooted in doctrines distilled from the earliest days of Islam and the battles fought by the Prophet Muh.ammad.

8.2.1 Information Distribution In order for information acquired to be the most effective and meaningful, knowledge must be distributed within the group. Indeed, distribution plays a critical role since a broad distribution equals a broad implementation and further utilisation of the gained information.114 Furthermore, distribution also allows information to be used at a later point in time, keeps information available or enables information to be stored. It is here that we can see a certain paradox, since Jih¯adi groups have to widely distribute their intelligence workflows, training methodologies and advances in counterintelligence in order for their decentralised network to benefit while it is also this very information that would commonly be safeguarded and kept secret. As such, the distribution part is not just about propaganda and Jih¯adi publications, but also ties in with the counterintelligence mechanism within an organisation. This is due to the compartmentalisation of information and its storage in multiple locations.

8.2.2 Interpretation of Information Interpretation, according to Trujillo et al. is the most important factor in organisational learning. This is because interpretation gives information meaning115 in the same way intelligence analysis leads to a final intelligence product. Without analysis,

111

Trujillo et al. (2004), pp. 55–59. Omand (2014). 113 Huber (1991), 2(1), pp. 88–90. 114 Kenney (2006), p. 57. 115 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 57. 112

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all collected information would simply be intelligence.116 With respect to organisational learning, the interpretation stage heavily depends on the distribution of the information and the safeguarding of said information from security services.117 In fact, if information cannot be safeguarded within a group or if the group’s counterintelligence mechanism does not allow for information to flow between the members, the ability of the group to interpret it correctly and efficiently will be reduced drastically.118 In addition, the Jih¯adi version of analysis can be clouded by specific ideological motivators and justifications rooted in operational art. These ideological elements are not only used to connect an individual with the Jih¯adi cause, but also to affect the interpretation of information. This mechanism dramatically affects analytical reasoning and the biases of the Jih¯adi intelligence analyst or military commander.

8.2.3 Storage of Information Information must be stored in order to access it at some point in future.119 Often times, information is not stored in a physical form, but rather in a group member’s individual memory. However, this approach is highly susceptible to deterioration120 and thus, significant amounts of information are stored by means of distributing information through training.121 Aside from training, organisational knowledge can be stored with the realms of manuals, organisational structures, language, rituals, symbols, within computer systems, offline repositories or within other forms of culture.122 In most cases, Jih¯adi groups will resort to a combination of these methods under the aegis of Jih¯adi operational art and with inspiration from the battles of the Prophet.

8.2.4 Incremental Learning and Transformational Learning In addition to these processes of organisational learning, Jih¯adi groups also conduct “lessons learned” analysis and track their errors, which fundamentally means that the groups are picking up on things and assessing ways by which to make their activities more effective. This is commonly known as incremental learning. Transformational learning on the other hand does not refer to solely changing routines or correcting

116

Omand (2014), see also: Marrin (2017), or see: Marrin (2012). Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 57. 118 Daft et al. (1986). 119 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 58. 120 Carley (1992), pp. 20–46. 121 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 58. 122 Ibid, p. 58. 117

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errors, but it refers to an entire philosophical change within a group.123 In this regard, the group would not only re-evaluate certain workflows and activities, it may even restructure certain goals or shift towards different activities to engage in. Such a shift can be caused by disruption of the group’s environment or because it has recognised that a certain opportunity is within reach.124 The main difference between incremental learning and transformational learning can be seen within rationality and process improvement in response to countermeasures (i.e. changing the detonators on IEDs) versus the innovation of entirely new processes, objectives or structures.125 Incremental and transformational learning as much as the previously discussed processes of organisational learning are defined by a Jih¯adi group’s organisational structure, culture and the availability of information resources. The group’s environment will also play a role. Indeed, the organisational culture and internal structure of a group greatly influences its intelligence and counterintelligence performance, but it also has an effect on the closely linked learning capabilities and “lessons learned”.

8.3 Lessons Learned Although this may sound a bit simplistic, learning lessons can prevent a Jih¯adi group from repeating the same mistake twice or build on previous successes. These lessons learned are passed along in a variety of means and codifications of knowledge. In this regard, learning can happen within or outside of the group, based on the lessons of other terrorist groups or individuals, or with regard to different generations of Jih¯adis, whereas the learner can ultimately become the teacher.126 Within Jih¯adi groups, one can observe this aspect very well when studying IS or al-Qaeda publications, which frequently include observations and lessons learned from other groups or even from their governmental adversaries: “…we have learned from our brothers who fought in the Jih¯ad in Somalia of the incredible weakness and cowardice of the American soldier.”127 —Usama Bin Laden

Such lessons can ultimately be utilised within the context of Jih¯adi activities, thus making them the outcome of terrorist learning.128 The distribution of lessons means sharing them with other students, which can happen within or outside the organisation, with other Jih¯adi organisations, with individuals or with fellow Jih¯adis of different generations of fighters. This ultimately leads to the student becoming

123

Ibid, p. 59. Ibid, p. 59. 125 Ibid, p. 59. 126 Kettle and Mumford (2016). 127 Lawrence (2005), p. 91. 128 Kettle and Mumford (2016). 124

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the teacher, as the student then distributes the information to another student. This dramatically affects the resilience of a Jih¯adi group and its intelligence service.129 Lessons can in fact be of a positive or negative nature, tactical, operational or at times, strategic.130 The more recent shift of IS towards economic warfare may be one example, but the tactical changes the group has to face due to counterterrorism efforts can be considered push factors.131 Indeed, after heavy territorial losses throughout 2017, the group is now more likely to avoid battlefield engagements and instead aim at launching attacks in the MENA region, to participate in other conflict zones or to target Western Economies.132 As such, and especially if we consider the shifting trends with regard to economic warfare in particular (see chapter: Economic Warfare and Destabilisation), these lessons can have varying impacts on beliefs and on the behaviour of Jih¯adis. Indeed, positive lessons commonly reinforce existing patterns, whereas negative lessons often lead to changes and evolutions within the organisation.133 Tactical lessons may have a larger impact on behaviour while strategic lessons tend to impact beliefs,134 as we can observe with IS, which is slowly transcending from a physical Caliphate towards an untouchable idea, which counterterrorism actors will find hard to fight with bombs, tanks, and bullets.

8.3.1 Organisational Structure and Learning The structure of a Jih¯adi organisation is not only relevant for its overall intelligence performance; it also influences its organisational learning capabilities in greater detail. Within an organisation, structure and authority are highly relevant to all organisational learning processes. With respect to the learning capabilities of an organisation, one can distinguish between two aspects of organisational structure— centralisation and robustness.135 According to Schweiger et al., more hierarchical and centralised organisations learn less effectively due to the multitude of organisational levels.136 Smaller, decentralised and less hierarchical groups on the other hand may learn more effectively, but they are also at greater risk of losing the knowledge they have gained again.137 Furthermore, a large number of organisational layers within

129

Jackson et al. (2005a). Kettle and Mumford (2016). 131 Dempsey (2018). 132 Ibid. 133 Kettle and Mumford (2016). 134 Ibid, pp. 1–16. 135 Schweiger et al. (2003). 136 Ibid, pp. 127–140. 137 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 60. 130

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the Jih¯adi organisation allows for greater redundancy,138 which is something we can observe particularly well when looking towards the different layers of Emni. In order to achieve this, a general intelligence department has to report to the “Security Emir” of a region, who in turn oversees the deputy Emirs of individual districts. The head of the secret spy cells and the district’s “intelligence service and information manager” report to each of the deputy Emirs, whereas the local spy cells report their findings to the district Emir’s deputy. Although this concept of an Islamic intelligence service appears to achieve omnipresence and has everyone keeping an eye on everyone else, Haji Bakr’s documents illustrate the connection between culture, religion and intelligence through the envisioned establishment of a sharia judge in the security department (on a regional level) and another sharia judge as the head of prisons and interrogations as well as the district’s security department (on a district level).139 Also on the district level, he establishes a “Head of the Security Base and Trainer of the Sharia Judges in Court and Security Questions Relating to the local secret service”.140 Jih¯adi groups frequently organise their structure in a divided and decentralised fashion, where different workings groups, committees or cells collect, foster and develop a separate body of knowledge. This can be seen in the example of the Emni. Within these cells, members are only told what they need to know in order to succeed in their respective tasks, which can complicate the sharing of information and a collective Jih¯adi ability to learn.141 As an example, in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah (hereinafter also: JI) has established separate territorial groups (or districts), which have been termed mantiqis and tasked with responsibilities throughout the region. These mantiqis are made up of branches known as wakalahs, which are comprised of approximately five men strong operations cells called fiah.142 This heavy focus on individual cells renders the group much less vulnerable to adversarial intelligence gathering and increases its counterintelligence capabilities. However, this level of decentralisation has led to conveying expertise and organisational knowledge among different components.143 In fact, most Jih¯adi groups are not clearly centralised or decentralised organisations, but rather hybrid organisations, and thus, one can find each individual group positioned somewhere in between the two extremes. Alas, a strict division according to the aforementioned definitions cannot always be achieved.144 Still, while a group like the Islamic State could be placed at the rather centralised end of the spectrum, alQaeda (after 1998) would sit somewhere closer to the decentralised end. In any case, the more layers a centralised organisation establishes, or the more cells a decentralised organisation manages to set up, the management of these elements will always prove 138

Ibid, p. 60. Reuter (2015). 140 Ibid. 141 Kenney (2007), p. 153. 142 International Crisis Group (2003), pp. 1–10. 143 Jackson et al. (2005b), p.63. 144 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 60. 139

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challenging for the group and demand more time in order to organise information and the resulting learning capabilities. As such, communication, i.e. secure communication, utilisation of Internet communication channels or radio, all plays an important role in these organisational learning mechanisms and with respect to information sharing. However, some groups—i.e. Hezbollah—have established “workarounds” with respect to their cell structures, which limit their internal information flow.

8.3.2 Information Sharing and Decentralisation The organisational structure of a group—especially cell structures—can be an obstacle with respect to the organisational learning of a group and the sharing of information. In some cases, groups like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, but also the Hezbollah, have resorted to go-betweens in order to bridge the information gaps between cells in order to share knowledge. The Islamic State’s Emni, for example, uses recent European converts as “face-to-face go-betweens” in order to pass along messages between handlers and operatives.145 In the case of Hezbollah, paramilitary units typically include “fighting clerics”, who are religious members of the organisations trained in guerrilla warfare. They communicate with the Hezbollah central command and with different cells in various regions, which allows the groups to share intelligence, knowledge, tactics and approaches, while at the same time keeping a certain level of information security and counterintelligence capability.146 Since these “fighting clerics” started sharing their experience, information and postmortems on previous operations, Hezbollah has performed much better with respect to lessons learned and consequently, the structure has been changing over time.147 Hence, its units of approximately 50 men each have been structured in accordance with geography and the task at hand.148 This means that fighters recruited from southern Lebanon have been reported to be involved in intelligence gathering activities in the border region, whereas members living abroad or those connected to the diaspora might be tasked with collecting funds.149 In order to spot the most promising and intelligent recruits, Hezbollah even ran summer camps and football championships intended for the group’s leaders to select new members.150 This element also defines Hezbollah’s process of learning, since more senior fighters started to transfer their knowledge and lessons learned to new recruits in such an institutionalised fashion.151 145

Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). Kenney (2007), p. 153. 147 Jackson et al. (2005b). 148 Ibid, p. 39. 149 Ibid, pp. 44–46. 150 Ibid, pp. 44–46. 151 Ibid, pp. 44–46. 146

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Regarding the Hezbollah, we can clearly recognise a decentralised approach, whereas the divisions are drawn according to the preferences Hezbollah had at this time in history and based on a rather common cell structure. However, what has made Hezbollah successful at that time was information-sharing capabilities between its units. The Hezbollah could only take advantage of the established intelligence networks—i.e. in the border region—and the resulting learning capabilities thanks to its command-and-control structure based on Shura Councils, regional commander, and “fighting clerics”.152 Each unit has its own dedicated cleric, who acts under the authority of the Shura Council. Jackson argues that, although these clerics do not exercise political power, are not members of the Shura Council or Hezbollah’s Politburo, they are under the indirect influence of the Iranian revolutionary guard and the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.153 This Iranian intelligence service is said to be as powerful as the Ministry of Intelligence and appears to be active at an international level via its Quds Force.154 Aside from acting as a religious guideline and clerical element at the lower end of Hezbollah’s vertical command structure, they are trained in guerrilla-warfare tactics, counterintelligence and secret communication,155 all of which should not come as a surprise. This is because especially during the Hezbollah’s first phase of learning, most operatives have been sent to Iran for training.156 The parallel application of Islamic doctrines, military/intelligence structures, become very apparent when looking at the Hezbollah’s “fighting clerics”. Aside from being able to distribute knowledge, communicate, and indoctrinate from the very top of the group’s hierarchy to the very bottom, the “fighting clerics” enable the group to translate strategies into tactical practice very swiftly.157 The religious nature of said hierarchy within Hezbollah allows leadership to exercise greater control, which again allows the group to rapidly implement changes made at the top throughout the organisation.158 The group’s successes, moreover, can also partially be attributed to its ability to learn new knowledge based on collecting intelligence, then integrating the findings and the resulting strategies into practices on multiple levels of command. In addition, popular support has provided Hezbollah with an advantage, allowing the group to study its enemies, run HUMINT networks and conduct espionage missions, which ultimately lead to a possible anticipation of adversarial tactics and strategies. Within some Jih¯adi groups, lessons learned tend to be localised and not dynamic, while it is imperative that the planning of complex operations and learning from previous experiences demands that information be shared.159 Al-Qaeda and the 152

Ibid, p. 53. Ibid, pp. 37–54. 154 Dumitrescu (2010). 155 Jackson et al. (2005b), pp. 37–54. 156 Ibid, p. 41. 157 Ibid, pp. 52–53. 158 Ibid, p. 54. 159 Kenney (2007), p. 153. 153

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Islamic State have found a very similar solution and, thus, resorted to assigning the task of go-betweens to Emirs. An Emir is most commonly the uniting factor between cells. He generally knows everything there is to know about a certain operation, cell or method.160 According to C. Reuter, members of the Islamic State who operate in either the logistics department, the communication cell or the surveillance cell are connected by the Emirs, who in turn are monitored by a deputy Emir in order to provide an extra layer of security and counterintelligence.161 Not surprisingly, given that the masterminds behind this system used to be our well-documented Iraqi intelligence officer Haji Bakr, the same systems also works at the micro-level within the Emni’s intelligence departments. Subdivisions are responsible for varying tasks from surveillance, to human intelligence collection to information technologies or public relations. All of them are connected by different Emirs who head each cell and the communication with each other in a council.162 When taking a look at IS cadres and the wives of commanders, we can also find a similar approach as women play the role of go-betweens, who relay messages to each other on behalf of their husbands for the purpose of counterintelligence. Indeed, operational security is increased dramatically since the husbands do not have to meet and talk directly,163 which is also practised abroad where IS operatives have evaded detection by making use of go-betweens. These people are commonly recent converts who are not yet connected to any Islamic extremist group. Hence, the communication between new recruits and trained underground operatives is conducted by these “clean men”.164 In this way, Emni operatives are never in direct contact with new recruits, which allows the Emni operatives to remain in the shadows and cultivate an organisational culture of secrecy.165

8.3.3 Organisational Culture and Learning New Information The organisational culture of a Jih¯adi group can facilitate organisational learning through two cultural traits which, according to the model proposed by Trujillo et al., are the organisational interest in learning and the organisational tolerance for risktaking.166 With respect to the interest a group has in learning, one must look at the leadership and its attitude towards acquiring new knowledge167 and collecting intelligence. Likewise, a group’s tolerance in risk-taking is mainly defined by the 160

Ibid, p. 153. Reuter (2015). 162 Ibid. 163 Schmitt (2015). 164 Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). 165 Callimachi (2016b). 166 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 61. 167 Ibid, p. 61. 161

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group’s motivation to introduce new practices and workflows,168 especially with respect to counterintelligence.169 Thus, the more interested an organisation is in learning new information, and the more risks it is willing to take to pursue that goal, the more successful the organisational learning abilities will be.170 However, the availability of resources of knowledge is critical and any organisational learning process ultimately depends upon the availability of both information and individuals to engage in the learning process.171 This ultimately closely relates to the ability of group members to communicate, share and process knowledge.172 Indeed, an organisation’s learning ability is a product of the skills, specialisation and expertise it manages to acquire and recruit.173 German military counterintelligence services fears that Jih¯adis may be trying to use the German Military as a training ground.174 Another example is certainly Gulmurod Khalimov,175 the former IS chief military commander from Tajikistan who initially served as a colonel in the Tajik special operations (OMON), as a police commander and a military sniper. Before he decided to disappear in April, 2015, he participated in five counterterrorism courses in the US and in Tajikistan between 2003 and 2014, which were partially conducted by the private security firm Blackwater (now Academi Security) and included crisis response, hostage negotiation and tactical leadership. Also, while serving as a policeman in Tajikistan, he took the opportunity to participate in several training courses in Russia.176 Aside from looking for specific skills, the IS-offshoot JKBW’s security apparatus has apparently also searched for certain character traits, “The soldiers of this office [JKBW security apparatus], its patrols and all its soldiers were from those assigned by Jaysh Khalid for the interest of the security office after intense vouching processes and special skills, the most important of which is that you cannot know if he is angry, content, joyful or annoyed.”177

168

Ibid, p. 61. Haberl (2016). 170 Trujillo et al. (2004), p. 55. 171 Ibid, p. 62. 172 Ibid, p. 62. 173 Ibid, p. 62. 174 Huggler (2015). 175 Also known as Colonel Khalimov and Gulmurod Halimov. 176 Denis (2016). 177 Al-Tamimi (2018). 169

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8.3.4 Operational Environment and Learning New Information The environment in which a Jih¯adi group is operating in dramatically affects its ability to increase its organisational learning. Indeed, environmental uncertainty can be linked to a Jih¯adi group’s intelligence performance in terms of learning and absorbing information.178 The establishment of the Emni may itself be a good example, as crisis in the operational environment can spark a group to drastically ramp up its learning abilities thanks to the necessity of facing crises.179 Thus, exercising control over the geographic environment has an effect on a group’s learning capabilities. Moreover, the counterintelligence capabilities of a group are significantly affected by the operational environment, as suggested by Mobley.180

8.4 The Collocation of Knowledge The violent Jih¯ad, as much as any kind of terrorist or insurgency activity, requires fundamental knowledge on the enemy as well as on various associated subjects such as cell organisation, clandestine operations, countersurveillance and other elements of insurgency warfare.181 These skills must be taught and practised within Jih¯adi organisations as a prerequisite to a Jih¯adi intelligence framework.182 Hence, Vygotsky suggests that learning occurs in a cultural context through social interactions, which contributes to cognitive development.183 This becomes particularly relevant if one starts to explore the sheer amount of Jih¯adi publications on a variety of subjects not only limited to propaganda or (counter-) intelligence, but also encompassing a variety of other subjects. Indeed, in recent years, the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and other Jih¯adi organisations have developed and published a much larger depository of instructional material than ever before, which is due to the influence the Internet has on Jih¯ad learning. In this regard, the topics considered worth learning and teaching range from mixing poisons, bomb-making, covert operations, espionage techniques, and counterintelligence but—in sum—most of them heavily relate to subjects associated with covert operations and intelligence. They are a reflection of the self-conception and self-image the Emni has of itself, especially since the media and propaganda department of IS is part of this very security organisation.

178

Dodgson (1993). Roux-Dufort et al. (1999). 180 Mobley (2012). 181 Kenney (2007), p. 135. 182 Ibid, p. 135. 183 Vygotsky (1978). 179

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However, this discussion must focus primarily on Jih¯adi learning and the core of a group’s ability to spread and utilise its knowledge and analyse intelligence as a perquisite to any attack. Terrorists acquire skills and knowledge through training, experience and analytical thinking, all of which allows them to alter their practices and workflows in accordance with the efforts of their adversaries.184 As such, intelligence activities and the gathering of new knowledge and information are of utmost importance to the overall development of a group, their performance in adapting by learning, and with regard to their counterintelligence methodologies and accumulation of knowledge.

8.5 Theoretical and Practical Knowledge 8.5.1 Practical Knowledge Jih¯adi knowledge is codified in widely shared handbooks and various online materials that are broadly accessible to interested wannabe Jih¯adis or active fighters online. It is important to assess these sources in order to illustrate Jih¯adi learning and understand the basis of any analytical judgement made within this community, as well as gaining some insight into what Jih¯adi analytical products may look like. Most Jih¯adi groups have produced several training manuals that touch on the value of intelligence and the issue of counterintelligence. Most notable and arguably that which is read the most widely, however, are the publications of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Al-Qaeda has published several training manuals including the Encyclopaedia of Afghan Jih¯ad or the Declaration of Jih¯ad Against the Country’s Tyrants, which heavily emphasises intelligence activities—most likely because the author Ali Mohamad had prior to his radicalisation worked for Egyptian intelligence. These manuals, aside from teaching the reader how to counterfeit money or passports (see chapter: Counterfeiting), or how to behave in prisons, detention centres or during interrogations, also provide extensive lessons on espionage and religious and ideological justifications for the Jih¯adi strategies behind them.185 When those publications emerged, supporters of the al-Qaeda network had already previously collected experience from Islamic resistance fighters in Afghanistan and made this knowledge available to those fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan or their fellow Jih¯adis in Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir.186 These extensive publications touched on various topics relevant to the Jih¯adi intelligence performance such as guerrilla warfare, intelligence collection, dead drops, secret communication, topography, assassinations or covert operations, amongst a large amount of other military topics. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Muqrin and his writings on guerrilla warfare 184

Kenney (2007), p. 135. Ibid, 141. 186 Kenney (2007), p. 141. 185

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have been particularly prolific in this regard, especially since he has partially laid the groundwork for all the aforementioned aspects of intelligence and sufficiently merged them with radical Islamic ideology.187 Since 9/11 numerous manuals have started to appear in an electronic form only, which could easily be shared within a community that increasingly moved online.188 Some of these magazines include, but certainly are not limited to, the publications Al-Aqsa Jih¯ad Encyclopaedia, the Encyclopaedia of Preparation, al-Qaeda’s Sawt al-Jih¯ad, which provides religious and ideological rationales together with military information. There is also the Mu’askar al-Battar, which touches on covert operations, kidnappings and intelligence.189 More up-to-date sources (by late-2018), which cover topics of intelligence and are commonly read and used by various Jih¯adi groups, can be found in the infamous Inspire or Dabiq magazines, published by the al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, respectively. It is, however, not entirely uncommon to publish “special issues”, which have so far touched on economic warfare,190 counterintelligence,191 safe travel,192 assassinations,193 bomb-making,194 poison mixing195 or derailing trains196 as a form of covert operation (See chapter: Covert Operations).

8.5.2 Theoretical Knowledge Theoretical training, which has either been received through various publications online or offline, but also in the training camps, needs to be enriched with local knowledge and experience in the field. Indeed, Jih¯adis learn a variety of important skills simply by “doing” and not necessarily through radical publications. Infiltrating the enemy, writing intelligence reports, maintaining covers, establishing safe houses and various other clandestine activities, according to Bell, must be learned and practised in action and in real life, while only in a few selected cases of online training or publications substitute for real-life experiences.197 Particularly, the intelligence tradecraft is something that cannot be learned solely from the Internet, online publications, videos or manuals. Although these sources may provide the aspiring Jih¯adi intelligence officer with some initial knowledge, other 187

Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009). Lohlker (2019). 189 Kenney (2007), p. 142. 190 Al-Qaeda (2016). 191 IS (2015a), p. 68. 192 IS (2015b). 193 Al-Qaeda (2016). 194 Abdel-Aziz (unknown year a), pp. 1–77. 195 Abdel-Aziz (unknown year b), pp. 1–18. 196 Al-Qaeda (2017). 197 Bell (2002), p. 133. Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 30f. 188

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factors, such as intuition or stamina, affect the operational realities as significantly as preparation and institutional learning. However, Jih¯adi groups have realised this and have started to give greater leeway to their operatives abroad, who cannot participate in real-life training, providing them with more general guidance and advice, allowing them to apply the gained theoretical knowledge universally. These publications, especially those with regard to intelligence and “intelligence operations”, which are in fact assassinations, can be very useful to prospective Jih¯adi attackers. The San Bernardino attackers Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, for example, appear to have acted according to the advice and guidance they had found in such publications. Intriguingly, although the relevant Inspire publication actually focused on killing a specific individual in order to harm the economy, the pair appears to have understood this advice in a more general approach towards their shooting spree.198 Indeed, they prepared IEDs in a manner described in the publication Open Source Jih¯ad and carried multiple weapons, as recommended by the al-Qaeda publication. Especially the Jih¯adi publication “special Inspire edition”, which focuses on assassinations, may be of particular relevance, since the topics of information acquisition are suggested, rudimentary instructions are provided, and the ideological groundwork has been established; yet, there are no detailed guidelines available to the future assassins. However, with respect to undercover activities, one must also mention that Jih¯adis who infiltrate the West or run cells in the territories of their enemies must maintain their cover stories and secret identities over long periods of time. Such undercover activities require skills that need to be acquired in the field and mainly concern the Jih¯adi operative’s mental alertness, emotional stamina and prudence.199 In order to gather intelligence, they need to interact with many different individuals and acquaintances without raising any suspicions. Indeed, according to Burton, this exhaustive task can lead to a “burn syndrome”, which can in turn lead an operative to make irrational moves and decisions without realising that precisely these actions increase, not decrease, suspicion.200 Mastering and managing “burn syndrome”, amongst other key worries an operative may be exposed to, cannot be learned by reading about it. It will need to be trained in practice.201 Still, particularly with respect to counter surveillance and counterintelligence, undercover Jih¯adis may greatly benefit from the published manuals. This is because Jih¯adi groups, for example al-Qaeda’s “Declaration of Jih¯ad against the Country’s Tyrants”, manage to distil rather simple, but effective countersurveillance approaches in the form of simplified recipes and rules of thumb.202 Thus, the “Declaration of Jih¯ad against the Country’s Tyrants”, being the one of the most widely known examples, teaches several courses of action Jih¯adis can take in order to detect surveillance, which must be applied according to one’s intuition and knowledge of the situation. 198

Medick (2015). Kenney (2007), p. 144. 200 Ibid, p. 144. 201 Ibid, p. 144. 202 Ibid, p. 145. 199

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In a similar context, AQ’s Practical Course of Guerrilla Warfare states that “On the offensive, one must always be fully alert while taking care to deceive the enemy into thinking, for example, that the attack is in the West, while the main attack is really in the East, so that the enemy is kept busy with a supporting attack from one direction and is surprised from another direction.”203 The same holds true for most recent Islamic State publications, which also leave some aspects to interpretation, room for improvisation and enough leeway to infuse elements of Jih¯adi operational art. One of the most recent IS publications with respect to counterintelligence, How to Survive in the West—A Mujahid Guide (2015), teaches counterintelligence and deception techniques to future Jih¯adis by connecting each chapter to the group’s own interpretation of ideological references and religious justifications.204 The theme appears to be that manoeuvres and acts of Muh.ammad, and other ideological role models, are interpreted as justifications and guidance for Jih¯adi counterintelligence: “Supporting the Islamic cause is a mentality and ideology more than anything else. You are always looking at everything though your Mujahid eyes, always think how any situation could benefit the Jih¯ad.”205

In the same IS manual, one can find rather broad advice like: “His [the Jih¯adi’s] secret life is totally different, in this life he will look different, and act different because he has to complete missions secretly without exposing his true self to anyone.”206

While the first piece of advice draws from Jih¯adi operational art and connects to a the grand strategy of Jih¯ad and radical Islamic doctrines, the latter advice— as previously mentioned—intentionally keeps the actual instructions rather vague and open for interpretation.207 This intermediate layer of knowledge links the wider Jih¯adi strategy with actual tactics and ultimately enables utility of force. Furthermore, creative imagination and leeway for interpretation is applied when Jih¯adis determine the methods, concepts, preparation and planning of an attack.208 Indeed, based on common strategic goals—with respect to the previous excerpt, this would be “secrecy”—the same outcomes are achieved in different ways and under different circumstances.209

203

Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 117. Lohlker (2016), 7. p. 3. 205 IS (2015b), p. 68. 206 Ibid, p. 7. 207 Adamsky (2010). 208 Ibid. 209 Davison (2008), pp. 37–38. 204

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8.6 Real-Life Training Real-life training cannot always be substituted by theoretical approaches to knowlˇ aᶜ a al-Isl¯amiya) members, for example, edge acquisition. Jemaah Islamiyah (al-Gam¯ have received physical conditioning and are trained in using firearms, tactics, the handling of explosives, the use of IEDs, assassination techniques and, lastly, surveillance, operational security and counterintelligence against local security forces.210 Over the past decade, Jemaah Islamiyah has relied on a combination of venues to address its training needs, and thus, the members of this Jih¯adi group have worked and trained with experts from al-Qaeda and in Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF; Jabhat Tah.r¯ır Moro al-ᵓIsl¯amiyyah) training camps in Afghanistan, Indonesia or in the Southern Philippines.211 Indeed, promising members have even been sent to Afghanistan in order to receive more tailored training modules preparing them for specific operations. This training in Afghanistan was done based on the al-Qaeda’s manual Declaration of Jih¯ad Against the Country’s Tyrants (Military Series), which covers intelligence activities in a fairly detailed manner, while the courses were mainly organised and run by Ali Mohamed,212 who touches on a variety of different topics. Indeed, when al-Qaeda decided to introduce its own training camps in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Somalia, in the Sudan or Yemen, all recruits received training in Islamic law, Islamic history, guerrilla warfare, weapons and explosives.213 It is worth mentioning that the group’s internal promotion and hierarchy system also offered additional and more specialised training to those who performed exceptionally well. These advanced courses consisted of training modules in covert operations, kidnappings, surveillance, counter surveillance, intelligence collection, secret communication, information security, hijackings, cell management and assassinations.214 As such, the knowledge passed on to individuals was highly specialised and tailored towards a specific mission.215 Consequently, the 9/11 hijackers travelled specifically to Karachi in order to undergo mission critical training in English, the Internet, sensitive communication and courses on the local culture in America. This course was led by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who had lived in the United States before.216 While there was a very clear and strict hierarchy and compartmentalisation within al-Qaeda at the time, the training camps also functioned as hubs to develop informal communities and practice a social network as much as knowledge exchange amongst 210

Ressa (2003). Ibid, pp. 102–103. 212 Gunaratna (2002), pp. 71–72. 213 Kenney (2007). p. 138. 214 Ibid, p. 138. 215 Ibid, p. 138. 216 Kenney (2007), p. 138. 211

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Islamists. In this regard, the prospects were exposed to norms and practices associated with al-Qaeda’s cause and its intelligence apparatus.217 Also, within IS, we can find different levels of training that future Jih¯adis had to pass if they were to rise up inside the organisation and eventually become intelligence operatives.218 In this regard, the curriculum ranged from physical training covering running or jumping to swimming or diving to surviving in the wild, navigation and survival training in the desert.219 After the training, recruits had to pledge their allegiance to Abu Muh.ammad al-Adnani (Taha Sobhi Fahla), the alleged head of the Emni at the time, albeit this alleged position cannot be verified.220 An alternative hypothesise, however, supports the assumption that Ayad al-Jumaili oversaw the Emni, since he reported directly to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.221 Still, in 2015, the Emni was desperately searching for European citizens from Britain or Germany—apparently they had enough French citizens already—since al-Adnani had established a global system of intelligence operatives who were planning attacks independently as part of the Emni department for European, Asian and Arab affairs.222 Consequently, those Jih¯adis with Western passports did not remain in the Caliphate long, especially since Western security services had started to place returning fighters under surveillance. However, the Emni had learned from their Western adversaries, and, in order to avoid detection, foreign fighters aiming to join IS were instructed to book all-inclusive holiday packages in Turkey, including a return flight.223 Instead of enjoying their vacation, however, they are smuggled across the border into Syria by Emni operatives in order to educate them in the use of explosives as quickly as possible and within the timeframe and duration of their “vacation”.224 Once the recruits have returned to their respective European countries, they operate with a large level of autonomy with respect to target acquisitions or their modes of attack. Those recruits of Syrian or Iraqi origin cannot be directly assigned to the Emni, but must be tested in other IS positions and are only transferred to the Caliphate’s secret service if they have proven to be reliable, trustworthy and competent. Afterwards, the prospective members are trained in accordance with the needs of the organisation, receiving their training onsite and being mentored by senior members. The Emni in fact only offers specialised courses with regard to military matters, weapons and explosives for members of higher ranks.225 What can be observed throughout the Jih¯adi subculture is that working for the respective intelligence unit either within the Islamic State, al-Qaeda or any other Jih¯adi organisations constitutes an ascendance to the highest echelons of the group. 217

Ibid, p. 139. Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). 219 Ibid. 220 Callimachi (2016b). 221 Coles and Parker (2015). 222 Callimachi (2016b). 223 Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). 224 Callimachi (2016b). 225 Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). 218

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Indeed, after a prolonged and highly intensive indoctrination, novices start to conduct their own activities within these intelligence units, but remain under the supervision of more senior Jih¯adis. Independence generally increases with experience and after successful actions so that they can become legitimate intelligence elements in their own right.226 Thus, practitioners pass their knowledge on in the form of their own war stories, which increases the identification with the Jih¯adi cause and justifies violence, intelligence operations and covert action in the name of a cosmic battle that must be fought in the name if the violent Jih¯ad.227 Indeed, particularly the Islamic State has managed to merge their training with indoctrination in a never-before-seen fashion.228 Aside from the training, however, the resulting immersion in combat enhances the development of social bounds, communities, social network and a more practical exchange of knowledge and experience.229 Indeed, they share norms and practices in their conversations and it is within this environment where most knowledge on intelligence tradecraft and methodologies gets processed, transferred and improved, in addition to receiving a validation of ones Jih¯adi identity. One could in fact observe a very similar training methodology in the mid-to-late 1990s, when JI sent its Jih¯adis to the MILF’s Abu Bakar training camp in the southern Philippines (Mindanao Region). The training was targeted towards the needs of foreign Jih¯adis, which were not limited to JI, but also included al-Qaeda members.230 In the MILF camp, especially in a separate training facility called Camp Hudaibiyah, the training covers firearms and explosives.231 Most importantly, however, the attendants at this training facility serve as trainers and students, teaching and learning from each other (see chapter: Lessons Learned), while they were also sent to the front line front lines between the MILF and the Filipino Army in order to collect real-life battle experiences.232

8.7 Intelligence Collection and Institutional Learning The learning capabilities of Jih¯adi groups depend on acquiring the right intelligence in order for their operations to have the greatest impact. In this regard, the quality of the collected information is paramount and can de facto decide on the faith of an organisation and its envisioned operations. Press accounts, court documents, public hearings, published reports or transcripts can provide Jih¯adi organisations with a large amount of intelligence on potential targets, but also on the weaknesses or methods of 226

Kenney (2007), p. 146. Ibid, p. 146. 228 Lohlker (2016), 7. 229 Kenney (2007), p. 147. 230 Jackson et al. (2005b). 231 International Crisis Group (2003), p. 8. 232 International Crisis Group (2004). 227

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security forces, which can be absorbed in order to plan the next attack.233 Groups also heavily utilise media accounts that describe successful attacks as inspirations and for purposes of propaganda, while simultaneously assessing and responding to counterterrorism measures distilled from such accounts.234 In this regard, Jih¯adis often assess the mistakes of fellow fighters that have either been killed or apprehended235 and try to learn from post mortems. Al-Qaeda heavily emphasises targeted open source intelligence collection with regards to media sources, but also on personal contacts, public officials, newspaper articles, courtroom testimonies or governmental reports on the group. Indeed, alQaeda operatives specifically searched for counterterrorism reports and counterterrorism actives in order to adapt their behaviour accordingly.236 Aside from infamously appearing in a grainy video clip, watching news on himself, Osama bin Laden also collected a variety of counterterrorism and intelligence reports on his computer. Some of these reports, documents and files were: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st Century BOUNDING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM, The Terrorism Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation Carnegie Papers A CRR Report on an al-Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment The Joint Vision 2020 - America’ Military Preparing for Tomorrow US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism An article by Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster on Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations Various Terrorism Research Papers of the RAND Corporation The works of Bob Woodward A publication by the Combatting Terrorism Centre (“Harmony and Disharmony Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities”) The 9/11 Commission Report A Militant Ideology Atlas A Department of Defence “Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” A program of the INTELLIGENCE SUMMIT 2007 The Lipman Report on Al Qaeda The Taliban and Grassroots Terrorism: The Connection Publications of the Combat Studies Institute in Fort Leavenworth entitled – Combating a Modern Hydra Al Qaeda – The Global War on Terrorism

. and 470,000 other files that were recovered from his personal computer.237 233

Kenney (2007), p. 156. Ibid, p. 154. 235 Kenney (2007), p. 156. 236 Ibid, p. 157. 237 CIA (2017). 234

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Another prominent example would be the governmental leak by the NSA while tracking the satellite phone used by Osama bin Laden back in 1998. According to deputy secretary of defence Paul Wolfowitz, after the news had broken that a satellite phone was being tracked by the security service, it never went back online again, indicating that the group was not only carefully monitoring the news coverage about themselves, but also on enemy activities.238 Also, P. Bergen commented on this circumstance: In fact, bin Laden was careful about using his satellite phone, not because he was glued to his computer reading an obscure American newspaper in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan where there was no Internet at the time, but because he wasn’t an idiot… Bin Laden didn’t need The Washington Times to tell him about the risks associated with talking on a satellite phone.239

Another group that has used the concept of Jih¯ad—namely Hezbollah—has a long history of gathering intelligence on the Israeli forces by rather sophisticated technological means, but also in a very rudimentary way.240 For example, when Israel stationed intelligence units along its border with Lebanon, Hezbollah operatives would sneakily start shaking the fence in order to get their attention. Once the Israeli intelligence unit moved closer so as to investigate the noise and the disturbance, the hidden Hezbollah spies would count the number of soldiers, take notes on the types of vehicles, where the commanding officer would get into position, the clothing worn or how to distinguish the different ranks. This information was later used when Hezbollah conducted its attack on the border guards.241 The Israeli Armed Forces’ operating procedures started to work against them during the early to mid-1990s, because local Lebanese espionage networks run by Hezbollah started to understand the applied routines and consequently report them to their umbrella organisation or cell. This network ultimately provided the basis for Hezbollah’s increasing utilisation of remotely detonated claymores, since the organisation had assessed that after a small device had been detonated, the Israeli soldiers would routinely exit their patrol cars in order to seek cover and protection. This led to military successes over the IDF.242 One can assess that the group’s intelligence network and intelligence collection has been institutionalised, which means that individuals inside Hezbollah have been tasked with intelligence-related disciplines rooted in the intelligence cycle (see chapter: The (Jih¯adi) Intelligence Cycle). Indeed, the members of the group’s intelligence network—including recruits and local spies—were paid by the organisation and formally integrated into Hezbollah’s structure, which ultimately allowed the group to expand and grow rapidly.243 238

Kenney (2007), p. 161. Bergen (2018). 240 Kenney (2007), p. 156. 241 Ibid, p. 156. 242 Jackson et al. (2005b), pp. 37–54. 243 Ibid, pp. 37–54. 239

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Establishing structured intelligence principles has increased Hezbollah’s institutional learning capabilities and ultimately allowed for the adoption of new technologies, which included night vision goggles244 or drones.245 This adaptation of new technologies has ultimately had a chain reaction on the group’s overall performance and development. According to Jackson et al.’s publication “Aptitude for Destruction”, it can also be regarded as the foundation of the group’s organisational learning in the 1990s.246 In the same vein, established routines turned out to be valuable sources of intelligence prior to the 1998 embassy bombing in Kenya. This is because al-Qaeda scouts pretended to be informants and thus, warned the embassy security staff of an alleged attack by an unknown terrorist organisation. In the days that followed, the scouts would sit and watch the security preparations and measures that were put in place by the embassy staff.247 Intriguingly, according to Kenney, they did not just assess the security parameters and go ahead with the attack, but rather sent a report containing notes, photographs and maps to Osama bin Laden and other Majlis-ashShura (advisory council) members so that a decision could be made based on their analysis.248 In the early 1990s, al-Qaeda exploited the forged ties with Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia. This close connection would significantly affect Jemaah Islamiyah as an organisation and the group’s organisational learning capabilities—certainly also due to the doctrinal compatibility of the two Jih¯adi groups. However, al Qaeda’s plans in Southeast Asia depended dramatically on Jemaah Islamiyah’s clandestine infrastructure, technical know-how with respect to truck bombs and surveillance capabilities of the relevant targets. The joint plan between al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah had assigned local Jemaah Islamiyah cells with the task of conducting reconnaissance operations together with Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, an al-Qaeda representative in the region in order to guarantee the success of their operations.249 Ultimately, their plans were foiled. The success or failure of a Jih¯adi group can ultimately depend on knowledge, intelligence capabilities and institutional learning. Especially the bombings orchestrated by Jemaah Islamiyah have put a significant focus on gathering intelligence and surveillance. However, the proficiency Jemaah Islamiyah has displayed in this regard is rooted in varying sources of institutional learning, which includes crossorganisational training by al-Qaeda and its training manuals,250 which have historically put significant attention on intelligence capabilities.251 This knowledge and approaches appear to have been passed on to JI since, especially between 2001 and 244

Ibid, pp. 37–54. Jenks (2009). 246 Jackson et al. (2005b), p. 52. 247 Kenney (2007), p. 158. 248 Ibid, p. 158. 249 Jackson et al. (2005b), pp. 57–89. 250 Ibid, p. 81. 251 Post (2004). 245

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2002, it can be observed that Jemaah Islamiyah operatives appear to have accumulated a large amount of experience in surveying potential targets, government facilities or critical infrastructure.252 These Jemaah Islamiyah operatives made photographs, shot video (incl. voiceover commentary), drew sketches of the potential targets and wrote up an edited follow-up report.253 These reconnaissance operations and video recording sessions were conducted over many times and in great detail, which turned out to be particularly useful counterintelligence reasons, since senior commanders could not partake in the reconnaissance operations themselves. Furthermore, according to Jackson et al., these large amounts of videotape became part of the group’ institutional memory as it provided a “permanent record that retained valuable information”.254 The formal retention of such lessons has been termed “organisational memory”255 and according to Easterby-Smith et al., “Members come and go, and leadership changes, but organisations’ memories preserve certain behaviours, mental maps, norms, and values over time”.256

8.8 Why Institutional Learning Matters Jih¯adi groups learn their intelligence tradecraft through publications, informal apprenticeship and formal training programmes, which merges ideological ideas with concrete techniques while strengthening the Jih¯adi identities at the same time. Jih¯adi groups have shown to assign considerable efforts to intelligence and counterintelligence training, whereas al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have mimicked their governmental counterparts significantly. They provide rather rudimentary basic training first—up to the point where authors simply publish links to leaked CIA documents— and those fighters that prove themselves to be talented, promising and valuable, are selected for more extensive training and to ultimately join the higher echelons of their respective intelligence apparatuses. Groups subscribing to a different belief system might even conduct this training and a Sunni group like al-Qaeda has not refrained from receiving training by a Shiᶜ ah group like Hezbollah.257 What Jih¯adis lack in practical training, they supplement with intuition and what has been termed “Jih¯adi operational art” by Adamsky.258 In this regard, within the realms of Jih¯adi learning, it must be said that a fusion between intelligence activities and historic role models, religion and ideology has been created not only to legitimise and recruit, but also to use religion in order to bind and attach operatives to a cause. 252

Ibid, p. 81. Ibid, pp. 57–89. 254 Ibid, pp. 57–89. 255 Easterby-Smith et al. (2000). 256 Ibid. 257 Fighel and Shahar (2002). 258 Adamsky (2010). 253

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No matter how sophisticated the indoctrination of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda or any Jih¯adi organisation, dissent may still happen,259 which, especially with regard to the structural importance of intelligence and counterintelligence inside the Jih¯adi group, would constitute a significant intelligence failure and jeopardise the entire organisation. Once intelligence is attached to religion, culture and ideology, one creates another “safety net” in order to avoid dissent as one might disagree with certain intelligence operations or intelligence goals, but there will be no disagreement with the religious and historical role model aspects. Thus, religion, culture and ideology have become an important element of counterintelligence and has become part of the earliest stages of Jih¯adi learning. Training, learning and knowledge acquisition has truly served multiple purposes for Jih¯adi groups and their intelligence services. However, aside from the mere practical benefit that can affect a group’s performance, the resulting immersion into Jih¯adi indoctrination and operational art can provide validation of the Jih¯adi identity. This is especially true since religious study has always been an integral part of Jih¯adi epistemology, recruitment and indoctrination.260 This mixture of operational art (which may as well date back to the earliest Islamic intelligence efforts under the Prophet Muh.ammad), a Jih¯adi ideology, practical training and a prolonged indoctrination cannot easily be codified into separate knowledge artefacts, but must be seen as a unique Jih¯adi approach towards epistemology, learning and intelligence.

References ABC News (2016) Who was the Ankara assassin? ABC News. Accessed online: https://www.abc. net.au/news/2016-12-20/ankara-russian-ambassador-shooting-who-is-mevlut-mert-altintas/813 5510 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009) A practical course of Guerrilla war (trans: Cigar N), published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency. Washington Abdel-Aziz (unknown year a) The Mujahideen explosives handbook. Org. for the Preparation of Mujahideen Abdel-Aziz (unknown year b) The Mujahideen poisons handbook. Org. for the Preparation of Mujahideen Adamsky D (2010) Jih¯adi operational art: the coming wave of Jih¯adi strategic studies. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33(1) Al-Qaeda (2016) Inspire no. 15. Professional Assassinations Al-Qaeda (2017) Inspire magazine. Train Derail Operations Al-Tamimi A (2018) ‘Islamic state’ in south Syria/an inside look at its internal security apparatus. middle east center for reporting and analysis. Published on www.aymennjawad.org. Accessed online: http://www.aymennjawad.org/21513/islamic-state-in-south-syria-an-inside-look-at Atwan AB (2008) The secret history of Al Qaeda. University of California Press BBC (2016a) Mevlut Mert Altintas: Turkish policeman who shot Russia’s envoy. Accessed online: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38377419 259 260

Samer (2017). Jackson et al. (2005b), pp. 57–89.

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Gerwehr S, Glenn RW (2000) The art of darkness—deception and urban operations. RAND Corporation Glover S (2017) Rogue FBI employee married IS terrorist she investigated. CNN Politics. Accessed online: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/01/politics/investigates-fbi-syria-greene/index.html Gunaratna R (2002) Inside Al Qaeda: global network of terror. Columbia University Press Haberl F (2016) The art of darkness—ideological foundations and present implications of Jih¯adi counterintelligence, counterespionage, denial and deception culture. Journal of Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies 10(1):145–165 Haberl F (2018) Jih¯adi operational art in the digital realm, its ideological origins and implications. ECCWS pp 1–8 Haberl F (2019) The retreat into the desert—the new paradigms of Jih¯adi covert action, subversion and intelligence operations. Studies in Jih¯adism. Berlin, Logos Verlag Haberl, F. & Huemer, F. (2019). The Terrorist/Jih¯adi Use of 3D-Printing Technologies - Operational Realities, Technical Capabilities, Intentions and the Risk of Psychological Operations. ICCWS. pp. 1–8 Heavy.com (2016) IS ‘celebrates’ assassination of Russian ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov. Published online: Heavy.com Huber GP (1991) Organizational learning: the contributing processes and the literatures. Organization Science Huggler J (2015) At least 20 Jih¯adists ‘exploiting German army for training’, says spy chief. Telegraph. Accessed online: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/114 59147/At-least-20-Jih¯adis-exploiting-German-army-for-training-says-spy-chief.html Ilardi GJ (2008) Al Qaeda’s operational intelligence—a key prerequisite to action. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(12):1072–1102 International Crisis Group (2003) White Paper, 2003 International Crisis Group (2004) Southern Philippines backgrounder: terrorism and the peace process, ICG Asia Report No. 80 IS (2015a) Hijrah to the Islamic state—what to packup, who to contact, where to go, stories & more IS (2015b) How to survive in the West—A Mujahid’s guide IS (2016) Dabiq no. 6 Jackson BA (2001) Technology acquisition by terrorist groups: threat assessment informed by lessons from private sector technology adoption. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24:183–213 Jackson BA et al (2005a) Aptitude for destruction, volume 1: organizational learning in terrorist groups and its implications for combating terrorism. RAND Corporation Jackson BA et al (2005b) Aptitude for destruction, volume 2: case studies of organizational learning in five terrorist groups. RAND Corporation Jenks C (2009) Law from above: unmanned aerial systems, use of force, and the law of armed conflict. North Dakota Law Review, pp 649–671 Jonassen D (1991) Evaluating constructivist learning. Educ Technol 36(9):28–33 Kaplan E (2006) The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah relationship. Council of Foreign Relations. http://www. cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-Qaeda-H.izbu‘ll¯ah-relationship/p11275 Kennedy Boudali L (2007) The GSPC: newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s Global Jih¯ad. Combating Terrorism Center. Accessed online: https://ctc.usma.edu/the-gspc-newest-franchise-in-al-qaidasglobal-Jih¯ad/ Kenney M (2006) How terrorists learn. In: Forest JJF (ed) Teaching terror: strategic and tactical learning in the terrorist world. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Kenney M (2007) From Pablo to Osama: trafficking and terrorist networks, government bureaucracies, and competitive adaptation. Penn State University Press Kettle L, Mumford A (2016) Terrorist learning: a new analytical framework. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, pp 1–16 Lacey J (2008) Canons of Jih¯ad. Naval Institute Press, p 61 Lawrence B (2005) Messages to the world: the statements of Osama Bin Laden. Verso Publishing Lohlker R (2016) The “I” of ISIS: why theology matters. Interventionen

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Lohlker R (ed) (2019) World Wide warriors: how Jih¯adis operate online. Religion and Transformation in Contemporary European Society, Band 13. V&R Press Marrin S (2012) Is intelligence analysis an art or a science? International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 25(September):529–545 Marrin S (2017) Understanding and improving intelligence analysis by learning from other disciplines. Intelligence and National Security 32(5):539–547 Medick V (2015) Terror-Indizien heizen politische Debatte in den USA an. Spiegel Online. Accessed online: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/san-bernardino-bluttat-heizt-debatte-inden-usa-an-a-1066013.html Mobley BW (2012) Terrorism and counterintelligence—how terrorist groups delude detection. Columbia University Press, p 136 Naji AB (2006) The management of savagery: the most critical stage through which umma will pass (trans: McCants W). The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies Oliphant R (2016) Russian ambassador’s assassin ‘guarded Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Telegraph. Accessed online: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/21/russian-ambassadors-assassinguarded-recep-tayyip-erdogan/ Omand D (2014) The cycle of intelligence. In: Dover R (ed) Routledge companion to intelligence studies. Routledge, p 62 Philips BJ (2014) Terrorist group cooperation and longevity. Int Stud Quart 58:337 Pieters J (2017a) Elite military unit protecting geert wilders after security leak scandal. NL Times. Accessed online: https://nltimes.nl/2017a/03/01/elite-military-unit-protecting-geert-wilders-sec urity-leak-scandal Pieters J (2017b) Security cop accused of leaking information to criminal gang. NL Times. Accessed online: https://nltimes.nl/2017b/02/22/security-cop-accused-leaking-information-criminal-gan Post JM (ed) (2004) Military studies in the Jih¯ad against the Tyrants. USAF Counterproliferation Center. Accessed online: http://www.au.af.mil/au/cpc/assets/alqaedatrainingmanual.pdf Ressa M (2003) Seeds of terror: an eyewitness account of Al-Qaeda’s newest center of operations in Southeast Asia. Free Press, pp 102–103 Reuscher C et al (2016) Bereits 2010 stahl Anis Amri einen Lastwagen. Welt Online. Accessed online: https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article160510523/Bereits-2010stahl-Anis-Amri-einen-Lastwagen.html Reuter C (2015) The terror strategist: secret files reveal the structure of Islamic state. Der Spiegel. Accessed online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-str ucture-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html Romme G, Ron D (1997) Mapping the landscape of organizational learning. Eur Manag J 15(1):68– 78 Roux-Dufort C et al (1999) Building core competencies in crisis management through organisational learning: the case of the nuclear power producer. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, pp 113–127 Russian News Agency TASS (2016) Media: Jaish al-Fatah claims responsibility for murder of Russian ambassador. Accessed online: https://tass.com/world/921186 Samer (2017) The Raqqa diaries: escape from Islamic state. Hutchinson Schmitt E (2015) A raid on ISIS yields a trove of intelligence. New York Times. Accessed online: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/world/middleeast/us-raid-in-syria-unc overs-details-on-IS-leadership-and-finances.html Schweiger DM et al (2003) Transnational project teams and networks. Making the multinational organization more effective. J World Bus 3:127–140 Security Debrief (2009) FBI says imam worked both sides & tipped off suspects. Published on NY Daily News. Accessed online: http://securitydebrief.com/2009/09/21/fbi-says-imam-ahmad-afz ali-worked-both-sides-and-tipped-off-suspects/ Selth A(1991) Ireland and insurgency: the lessons of history. Small Wars and Insurgencies 2(2)

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Sims A (2016) From ‘blood type’ to ‘special skills’: the 23 questions asked to prospective Jih¯adis upon entrance into ‘Islamic State’. Independent. Accessed online: https://www.independent.co. uk/news/world/middle-east/from-blood-type-to-special-skillsfrom-blood-type-to-special-skillsthe-23-questions-asked-to-a6921881.html Smith GA (2013) Al-Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb. Journal of Strategic Security, pp 53–72. Accessed online: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/ Al-Qaida-in-the-Lands-of-the-Islamic-Maghreb.aspx Speckhard A, Yayla AS (n.d.) The ISIS Emni: the inner workings and origins of ISIS’s Intelligence Apparatus. Accessed Online: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-emni-the-inner-wor kings-and-origins-of-isiss-intelligence-apparatus/ Stout et al (2008) The terrorist perspectives project. Naval Institute Press Trujillo HR et al (2004) Organisational learning in terrorist groups. In: Forest JJF (ed) (2006) Teaching terror: strategic and tactical learning in the terrorist world. Rowman & Littlefield Publisher Vygotsky LS (1978) Mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes. Harvard University Press Walker S et al (2016) Russian ambassador to Turkey killed in Ankara shooting. The Guardian. Accessed online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/19/russian-ambassador-to-tur key-wounded-in-ankara-shooting-attack Wege CA (2018) The changing Islamic state intelligence apparatus. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 31(2):271–288 Weiss M (2017) How ISIS picks its suicide bombers. The Daily Beast. Accessed online: https:// www.thedailybeast.com/how-isis-picks-its-suicide-bombers

Chapter 9

Counterintelligence

Abstract Jih¯adi groups usually set up their own counterintelligence departments and doctrines and train their members in counterintelligence-related skills. Although the modus operandi of groups such as al-Qaida or IS can be compared to state intelligence services, ideological and religious aspects of this phenomenon must also be taken into account. The recruitment of informants by al-Qaida or IS’ establishment of a surveillance state has not only practical, military, strategic or tactical reasons; it also has a religious and ideological level. Intelligence collection, intelligence analysis and, above all, a Jih¯adi group’s counterintelligence, organisational structure, recruitment and counterespionage are influenced and justified by the actions and military leadership of the Prophet Muh.ammad and other historical Islamic role models. This legitimisation forms the foundations and the starting point of the “Jih¯adi counterintelligence culture” and its associated operational art. Keywords Counterintelligence Doctrine · Counterintelligence Apparati · Internal Security · Espionage Deterrence · Deception · Denial · Taqiyya · Deceptive Means · Compartmentalisation · Secret Communication · Local Networks · Public Support · Territorial control “And don’t forget to always make du’¯a to Allah subh¯anahu wa ta’¯ala that He keeps you safe from the plots of the taw¯agh¯ıt of Turkey. The brothers here recommend memorising and reading this a¯ yah constantly during your trip: … And We have put before them a barrier and behind them a barrier and covered them, so they do not see,”1 —Sura Y¯a-S¯ın 36:9 of the Qur’¯an quoted in the IS publication “Hijrah to the Islamic State”2

Jih¯adi groups commonly establish their own counterintelligence3 departments and doctrines, while training their members in the realms of counter-espionage. Although 1

IS (2015a). The Qur’¯an. Sura Y¯a-S¯ın, 36:9. 3 Counterintelligence activities are an integral part of the overall jihadi intelligence culture and albeit some parts of the following chapter have been published previously by the author, these elements must be included regardless in order to provide a holistic picture. Elements have been published in: Haberl (2016a), published by the Austrian Center for Intelligence Propaganda and Security Studies (ACIPSS). An extended version of the paper has been published as the author’s MA Thesis at the University of Vienna under the same title as: Haberl (2016b). 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_9

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one can compare the modus operandi of groups like al-Qaeda or IS with governmental intelligence agencies, ideological and religious aspects of this phenomenon must be considered as well. al-Qaeda’s recruitment of informants or IS’ establishment of a surveillance state does not only have practical, military, strategic or tactical reasons; it also has a religious and ideological layer. Intelligence collection, intelligence analysis and most importantly, the counterintelligence efforts of a Jih¯adi group, organisational structure, recruitment and espionage deterrence are influenced und justified by the actions and military management of the Prophet Muh.ammad and other historic Islamic role models. This legitimization constitutes the fundamentals and starting point of “Jih¯adi counterintelligence culture” and its operational art. This aspect is not only relevant for larger terrorist groups and their goal to remain operative but can consequently also aid lone wolf actors in their attempts to remain undetected. It is of utmost importance in holistically studying and comprehending this subculture, its intelligence and counterintelligence strategies and the resulting implications of the present threat. According to Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for Guerrilla Warfare, the “call for a pure Islamic system free from defects and infidel elements, one based on the book (the Qur’¯an) and the Sunnah” requires “Creating an Islamic intelligence service. This will have the task of oversight over recruitment of individuals and of protecting the organisation from being penetrated. It will also set the security plans for individuals, the leadership, and installations.”4 Interestingly, although Abd AlAziz Al-Muqrin has a clear affiliation to al-Qaeda, his work also had a significant influence on IS, to the extent that it is distributed, shared and read openly within the group and its various publication channels.5 In fact, some IS publications even refer to al-Qaeda-related publications in order to train the group’s undercover members.6 Abu Bakr Naji, the accepted strategist of al-Qaeda as well as IS, also enforces this connection in his study The Management of Savagery, in which he claims: “The administration of savagery has been established in our Islamic history various times. The first example of it was the beginning of the Islamic state in Medina”.7 He continues: “we want to clarify the requirements of the management of savagery in the ideal form we desire and which agree with the aims of the Sharia. These requirements are: Spreading internal security […] Dissemination of spies and seeking to complete the construction of a minimal intelligence agency”.8 If one looks at the stated goals of groups such as IS and al-Qaeda, spreading Islam and intelligence doctrines are indeed closely related. Though this chapter does not aim to compare theological elements, similar tactical and strategic themes can, however, be extracted from the life and battles of Muh.ammad. Thus, aside from any theological debate, these themes are a part of Islamic culture and have a significant effect on the doctrines used by Jih¯adi groups—as well as lone wolf actors—today and their 4

Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), pp. 94 and 109. Gehrke (2016). 6 IS (2015b), p. 27. 7 Naji (2006), p. 11. 8 Ibid, 12. 5

9.1 The Counterintelligence Doctrine

181

interpretations of Islam.9 A contrasting juxtaposition of Jih¯adi counterintelligence activities with historic examples will illustrate this argument and effectively show not only that Jih¯adi organisations need counterintelligence to survive as insurgency groups but that their strong defensive positions and doctrines are rooted in the cultural heritage of the Arabian Peninsula. According to Richard A. Gabriel, the intelligence activities, tactics and strategies that emerged during the earliest years of Islam have become part of the Sunnah and the heritage of Islam.10 As such, they can be seen as a body of principles, values, norms and activities that are essential to how Jih¯adi organisations define themselves and their modus operandi. This, in turn, explains the central role of secrecy, denial and deception, which has a chain reaction on a variety of other activities, such as the established and followed doctrines, internal security, deceptive means, intelligence networks or territorial control.

9.1 The Counterintelligence Doctrine Understanding the legacy of intelligence and the role it played at the birth of Islam is essential to understanding the counterintelligence doctrines of modern Jih¯adi organisations. Analysing the influence of the Islamic intelligence culture on Jih¯adi organisations will only enhance the identified methodologies, tradecraft, and approaches to counterintelligence with a cultural framework that will ultimately allow for a wider and more holistic understanding of the Jih¯adi subculture. This is due to the modelling of counterintelligence doctrines around cultural and religious role models, which not only ensures organisational survival, but also links back to the earliest attempts to spread and defend the Islamic faith.11 ,12 In order to illustrate the impact intelligence culture has on Jih¯adi groups, it may be worth considering that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi might be the official leader of IS and its Islamic Caliphate, but when al-Qaeda tried to establish ties with the self-proclaimed Caliphate, it was Haji Bakr, Baghdadi’s spymaster, and not the Caliph himself, who was first approached by Ayman al-Zawahiri’s emissary.13 This illustrates that within IS, there is a parallel command structure in which elite power brokers establish or remove Emirs and that decisions are not made in Shura councils, but by the “people who loosen and bind”, which translates to ahl al-hall wa-l-aqd. This name refers to those who are powerful and influential in a Muslim state, namely a clandestine circle that has the power to influence the leadership and the masses in secret.14 It is a circle, the name of which is taken from medieval Islam (while similar clandestine circles can be found in most Jih¯adi organisations) and although they cannot all be compared 9

Al-Asmari (2013), p. 108. Gabriel (2007), p. xxx. 11 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 108. 12 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 13 Reuter (2015a). 14 Lawrence (2005), p. 21/Footnote 38. 10

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and measured by the same standards, one reoccurring and uniting element may be their affiliation with secrecy, hidden power broking, and clandestine operations even beyond the operational necessities.15 In 1996, Osama bin Laden acknowledged this in a fatwa: “Due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e. using fast-moving light forces that work under complete secrecy.”16

In addition, an al-Qaeda training manual reminds recruits that in order to become a member of the group, it is necessary to keep secrets and conceal information from even the closest of friends.17 The group goes even further, stating that memos indicate that potential future leaders should have at least five years of work experience and the ability to keep a secret.18 In sum, Jih¯adi groups have established a doctrine of strong defensive positioning before launching operations or when establishing doctrines on how organisations are to be run.19 ,20 Similar themes, strategies, and tactics can be seen in the military management of Muh.ammad, while the regional cultural heritage of secrecy, intelligence, and counterintelligence dates back even further. In fact, pre-Islamic approaches to intelligence networks underpin any further Islamic approach to intelligence and counterintelligence.21 The Arab concept of counterintelligence originated in the ancient age of J¯ahil¯ıyah (Ignorance), which occurred for the Qahtani tribes in the first half of the seventh century and even before the rise of Islam itself.22 Those early Arab tribes utilised their own espionage networks during wartime and peace, a notion that was later also utilised and further developed by Muh.ammad.23 ,24 Indeed, early Arab records of espionage, according to al-Asmarai, show that large portions of an ancient Qahtani army were charged with intelligence-related duties, such as skirmishing, scouting or reconnoitring, whereas nomadic Bedouins were also recruited in order to engage in spying missions.25 The Prophet and his followers later utilised this same system during the earliest years of Islam, as he considered a sophisticated human intelligence network to be a vital concept during this stage of Islamic history.26 Muh.ammad was aware of the presence of spies in Madinah, and at one point, he decided to issue sealed instructions, while dramatically altering the objectives 15

Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). Ilardi (2008), p. 248. 17 Chauhan (2003), p. 46. 18 Mobley (2012), p. 136. 19 Ilardi (2009). 20 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 21 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 90. 22 Beeston (1976), p. 7. 23 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 90. 24 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 25 Beeston (1976), p. 7. 26 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 99. 16

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of the mission.27 This “sting operation” was termed the sariyah mission of Abd Allah ibn Jahsh al-Asadi and was comprised of only eight to twelve men.28 Their orders were to move around randomly and then to open a letter after two days, which included the instructions for a reconnaissance mission to observe the caravans the Quraiš.29 When Abd Allah’s party arrived at the caravans, they found them to be guarded by only four guards. To Muh.ammad, this indicated that his archenemy was largely aware of his manoeuvres due to having planted spies in Madinah. From this point onwards, the Prophet would guard his secrets more carefully, employ better operations security, and continue the establishment of ever-growing human intelligence networks (HUMINT) in order to predict security threats.30 In his book al-Uyun wa l-jawasis, Al-Barhawi mentions that such networks and informants came from all walks of life and were united through their dedication to the cause and adherence to secrecy.31 ,32 The same appears to be true for the Islamic Caliphate established by IS. As one of its ideological beacons, namely Abu Bakr Naji, assesses, “If our groups are close to the place of savagery or there is a way to get to it, and there are spies and individuals in the region of savagery who will give their allegiance to us, then we must study the situation and the extent of our capacity to settle there for the management of this savagery”.33 According to documents obtained from its architect, spymaster, and former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein’s air defence force, Haji Bakr, also known as the “Lord of the Shadows” (one of many aliases), the foundations of the Islamic State mainly rest upon intelligence, surveillance, and secrecy.34 ,35 In fact, Haji Bakr created an Islamic Intelligence State rooted in the gradual infiltration of society through networks of espionage. This gets done by opening Dawahh offices (Islamic missionary centres) and recruiting those who come for the lectures on Islamic life. Thus, religion is connected with intelligence, as those faithful Muslims who visit the Dawahh are instructed to spy on their village.36 Furthermore, secret IS Emni operatives dressed in civilian clothing could be spotted in highly frequented places so that individuals could be arrested upon the slightest suspicion of any wrongdoing or disloyalty. In some cases, civilians also help the Emni, with

27

Qureshi (1991), p. 186. Ibn Ishaq, Sirat Rasul. Oxford UP, p. 286. 29 Rodgers (2008), p. 82. 30 Ibid, p. 82. 31 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 100. 32 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 33 Naji (2006), p. 20. 34 Reuter (2015b). 35 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 36 Ibid. 28

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one example being when an Iraqi surgeon allegedly denounced her own husband, saying he was against IS, which led to his execution.37 ,38 This effort to create a strong domestic intelligence service originates from the notion of establishing a strong defensive position. Thus, agents and human intelligence networks are supposed to function as pre-warning indicators of any impending danger from either the inside or outside. According to Abu Bakr Naji, “The people will be good eyes and armour for us and protect us from spies”.39 Indeed, IS appears to have implemented this doctrine, as the group seemed to be mainly, though not exclusively, concerned with establishing a domestic espionage network. The curricula that was introduced in the classroom hints at this direction as well, since foreign languages, history, and international politics have been banned and replaced with rudimentary math, Arabic and Qur’¯an studies in addition to the history of the present “Caliphate”.40 ,41 This highly complex system of infiltration and surveillance is meticulously maintained through long lists of informants that are installed in various rebel brigades or government militias.42 Details on defeated FSA fighters, their weapons, their participation in fire fights and battles, and a variety of other information are collected by IS members,43 while the recruited informants include former intelligence operatives, regime opponents who have had disagreements with any other rebel group and simply young men who need the money or a job.44 This concept was not invented by “The Lord of the Shadows”, but was already in use by al-Qaeda and a variety of other Jih¯adi groups, insurgencies and governments.45 In fact, the same principle can be found when looking at the Prophet Muh.ammad’s first call to Islam,46 as Gabriel argues that he was not only “a tactician, military theorist, organisational reformer, strategist, combat commander, political leader and heroic soldier”,47 but also the “inventor of insurgency warfare and history’s first successful practitioner of said concept”.48 Most importantly, however, Gabriel concludes that he was also a “master of intelligence in war” and his defensive intelligence networks, denial, deception methodologies and secret service activities eventually came to rival those of ancient Rome and Persia.49 ,50 37

Suc (2017). Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 39 Naji (2006), p. 66. 40 Reuter (2015a). 41 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 42 Ibid, p. 255. 43 Ibid, p. 255. 44 Reuter (2015a). 45 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 46 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 108. 47 Gabriel (2007), p. xviiif. 48 Ibid, p. xviiif. 49 Ibid, p. xviiif. 50 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 38

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9.2 Counterintelligence Apparati and Internal Security Although Muh.ammad can be regarded as the overall commander-in-chief in Medina, Umar bin al-Khattab was responsible for most counterintelligence activities.51 In fact, Umar bin al-Khattab led the earliest recognisable intelligence organisation and counterintelligence found more frequent mention particularly after the Prophet’s rule was established in Medina. He was in charge of day-to-day orders and the implementation of security protocols.52 One particular case, for instance, is Umar bin al-Khattab’s interrogation of a suspected spy, who confessed in order to avoid execution and eventually led the Muslims to their enemy’s camp. However, the counterintelligence apparatus under al-Khattab and the Prophet himself were mainly concerned with protective and operational security, as successive attempts were made at the life of the Prophet.53 Thus, the establishment of security services under al-Khattab was an inevitable step if the new religion was to survive.54 In order to ensure the survival of the Islamic state envisioned by IS, Haji Bakr suggested that two Islamic intelligence services operate in a parallel fashion. In order to achieve this, a general intelligence department has to report to the “Security Emir” of a region, who in turn oversees the deputy Emirs of individual districts. The head of the secret spy cells and the district’s “intelligence service and information manager” report to each of the deputy Emirs, whereas the local spy cells report their findings to the district Emir’s deputy.55 Although this concept of an Islamic intelligence service appears to achieve omnipresence while having everyone watching everyone else, Haji Bakr’s documents illustrate the connection between culture, religion, and intelligence through the envisioned establishment of a sharia judge in the security department at both a regional and district level as the head of prisons and interrogations as well as in the district’s security department.56 At the district level, he additionally establishes a “Head of the Security Base and Trainer of the Sharia Judges in Court and Security Questions Relating to the local secret service”.57 ,58 The structure of Haji Bakr’s intelligence service also includes experts on technology, weapons, and interrogation specialists, whereas economic and property value cells and secret information cells penetrate areas like finance, schools, day-care, the

51

Al-Barhawi (2002), p. 99. Ibid, p. 99. 53 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 107. 54 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 55 Ibid. 56 Reuter (2015a). 57 Ibid. 58 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 52

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media, and transportation.59 Consequently, aside from achieving a form of intelligence omnipresence, power, and control, this system established by IS further enables the group to detect possible enemy spies or Emni dissidents60 : “When you’re in the secret service, everything is controlled … You can’t just leave Islamic State territory.”—Abu Khaled (Former IS Emni officer/trainer)61

According to his own accounts, the former IS Emni officer Abu Khaled was exposed to significant risks after his public statements on IS’ security service, since the group would track him down—even in the “Land of Unbelief”—and deal with him like it did with two Syrian activists, whom they had beheaded. Indeed, Abu Khaled allegedly trained the agents who would leave the Caliphate and work “behind enemy lines” himself.62 Indeed, one of the Emni’s most important tasks is to monitor, identify, and track down opponents and defectors like Abu Khlaed in order to prevent its adversaries from infiltrating the group and thwart any military opposition inside its controlled territory.63 Hence, tribal sheikhs who had cooperated with Syrian or Iraqi government, members of the Finish Awakening movement who had travelled to the region in order to fight IS, clerics who oppose extremism, and those who are suspected of alleged adversarial intelligence operatives could all find themselves on an Emni kill list.64 This approach of eliminating opposition has worked well for the group, especially when it evolved in Iraq in 2003. Intriguingly, this technique is de facto based on extreme Salafist principles adopted by IS, which ultimately aims to create a unified Salafist community by purging the land of any opposition.65

9.3 “Spy Versus Spy” and Espionage Deterrence “On the 17th of Shawwal, the soldiers of the Khilafah succeeded in assassinating a spy working for Afghan government interests in the city of Jalalabad, towards the east of Afghanistan.”66

Counterintelligence in the form of detecting and capturing enemy spies is also something th67 at could be found in the times of the Prophet. In his battles, it was of paramount importance to prevent the enemy from gathering intelligence on 59

Ibid. Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 61 Weiss (2017). 62 Ibid. 63 Mamouri (2014). 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 IS (2017), p. 41. 67 Al-Waqidi, Kitab Al-Maghazi. 1:404, 2:640, 808; Ibn Hisham 3:268; Harawi, al-Hiyal al Harbiyya. 77. 60

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Muh.ammad’s strength, capabilities, and intentions.68 Consequently, he selected intelligence patrols for reconnaissance in order to avoid being taken by surprise while at the same time preventing opportunities for enemy spies and saboteurs.69 In one case, his counterintelligence apparatus foiled the plan to spy on the Muslims that was led by the priest Abu Amie Al-Khazraji, who converted to Islam in order to undermine the Muslim community.70 He further built a mosque within close proximity to the Qiba’s mosque of the Prophet in order to use it as what would today be considered a safe house for his agents.71 ,72 However, through the counterintelligence investigator’s task to monitor the developments at this newly built mosque, Muh.ammad eventually uncovered the real purpose and agenda of Al-Khazraji, then ordered that the building be destroyed.73 The battles of Badr, Dumat al-Jundal, and Bani al-Mustalaq are also good examples. During the conquest of Mecca, a spy of the Hawazin was arrested, and in the Battle of Khaybar, one of the enemy’s bold spies was detected and captured.74 Counterintelligence and the fear of losing sensitive information also dominates the structure of IS’ Caliphate, al-Qaeda, and Fatah amongst other groups, which has led to drastic counterespionage measures. Fatah’s counterespionage personnel have actively engaged in capturing and hunting down Arabs in the refugee camps who were accused of cooperating with Israeli security services.75 In fact, the group’s efforts to provide internal security and execute counterespionage operations amounted to a similar number of captures as its attacks on Israelis in the late 1960s. Those counterespionage units, run by Saleh Khalef, were called Jihaz al Razd.76 ,77 Al-Qaeda has also adapted a very strong counterintelligence doctrine, which constitutes the basis of all operations. In the mid-1990s, the Egyptian intelligence drugged and sodomized the 13-year-old sons of two leading members of al-Qaeda and took photographs of the incident. The two boys were blackmailed and feared that the discriminating pictures might be realised and thus, agreed to place recording devices in their own homes. Additionally, the two boys were forced to deliver two bombs meant to kill Ayman al-Zawahiri, but the plot failed, exposed them, and ultimately led to al-Zawahiri establishing a Sharia court in order to deal with incidents. Despite the opposition of several group members who disagreed with judging the two boys, Zawahiri decided to condemn them for sodomy and treason. Their confessions and executions were videotaped by the leadership of al-Qaeda and

68

Ibid, 1:217, 2:602. Ibid, 1:217, 2:602. 70 Ibid, 3:1047. 71 Ibid, 3:1047. 72 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 73 Ibid, 3:1047. 74 Ibid, 1:404, 2:640, 808; Ibn Hisham 3:268; Harawi, al-Hiyal al Harbiyya 77. 75 Schiff and Rothstein (1972), p. 86. 76 Dobson (1974), p. 39. 77 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 69

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distributed among the lower ranks in order to send a warning of what would happen to “traitors”.78 Indeed, al-Qaeda’s counterintelligence apparatus enabled the group to grow, to remain operative and impervious against infiltration. Osama Bin Laden’s bodyguard is quoted to have said,” We now had the daily reports on the activities in each camp…We also had to collect as much information as possible about all the members. … Fifty brothers selected for their intelligence abilities were constantly on duty … Then they were placed in different parts of the camp to gather the information about what happened there.”79 The group’s designated counterespionage department was referred to as the Central Section and can actually be compared to governmental counterintelligence, as it focuses on uncovering enemy agents, penetrating the enemy’s intelligence apparatuses, and conducting open source intelligence and media monitoring operations.80 The Central Section was further responsible for securing the operation environment, background checks, operational security, and the protection of the group’s leaders.81 ,82 However, the Emni takes these efforts to the next level, as each provincial council has been assigned two Emirs who are not only in charge of covert operations, assassinations, abductions, communication, and encryption, but also responsible of supervising the other Emirs on a regional or district level. Hence, the cell and commando structure are designed to create an omnipresence of the counterintelligence apparatus, which finds its gruesome climax in the public execution of alleged spies for the purpose of deterrence.83 ,84 In a different time and under different circumstances, instilling fear and terror in the hearts of those who allied with the enemies of Islam was also a tactic used by the Prophet Muh.ammad.85 As such, these brutal executions that are still in use today can indeed be regarded as deterrence-based counterintelligence procedures. This receives further justification through radical interpretations of religious reference thanks to tactical guidance by Jih¯adi publications. Executions spark fear and spread terror, which causes deterrence and may frighten potential or active spies, as assessed in The Management of Savagery. This is arguably also a core theme of the executions committed by IS.86 According to Abu Bakr Naji, fear is one of the main reasons for conducting executions in the first place: “the hostages should be liquidated in a terrifying manner, which will send fear into the hearts of the enemy and his supporters.” With respect 78

Suc (2017). Ibid. 80 Mobley (2012), p. 157. 81 Ibid, pp. 157. 82 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 83 Reuter (2015b), p. 276. 84 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 85 Al-Waqidi, Kitab Al-Maghazi. 1:217 and 2:602. 86 Naji (2006), p. 33. 79

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to the captured and executed spies, IS stresses those deterrence-based doctrines even more and appears to follow Abu Bakr Naji’s suggestions of how to deal with captured spies: “One who is confirmed as a spy through evidence must be dealt with in a manner that deters others like him. If he flees, he must be followed and not abandoned, even if this takes years. It is necessary to announce that he will receive his punishment, even after long years. This will often make the weak souls hesitate in doing likewise.”87 ,88 This heavy-handed approach in securing internal security and mounting counterespionage operations is a common feature of most secretive groups. When the infamous Black September Organisation (BSO) terrorist Ali Hassan Salameh joined the Jihaz al Razd in 1967, he was assigned the task of hunting down suspected informants. These informants were dealt with in a brutal fashion, which led to at least 20 of them being killed by the Jihaz al Razd. Those who thought about collaborating with Israel were terrified by the fierce reputation of the group’s counterintelligence department under Saleh Khalef.89 Moreover, al-Qaeda’s former chief of security, Jamal al-Fadl, testified that under his counterespionage regime, at least three informants were caught, two of whom were sent to prison, and the third was executed.90 With respect to IS, the brutal execution of an alleged Peschmerga agent may be a good example, particularly since the group quotes from the Qur’¯an in order to justify such acts. “The penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger […] is none but that they be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be exiled from the land.”—Surah Al-Ma’idah as quoted by IS91

In another video that features the gruesome execution of an alleged Israeli spy by a 10-year-old boy, the Prophet Muh.ammad is referred to as the “The Prophet of Mercy and the Prophet of Battle”. In this video, the assailant says, “Allah has repelled your (the Israelis Secret Service’s) plot.” The spy is accused of “spying on the secrets of the Mujahidin and the Muslims.” Finally, the IS fighter concludes his speech prior to the alleged spy’s execution with the words: “O grandsons of Muh.ammad Ibn Maslamah, we have revealed to you some of the names and pictures of the spies in Jerusalem, so make those who recruited them see their blood flow.”92 Aside from attempting to spread fear through the ranks of the Israeli Security Service, this reference most likely relates to the assassination of the Jew Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf, who led a dirty campaign and sinister scheming against the Prophet, which was carried out by Muh.ammad Ibn Maslamah. It is important to acknowledge that this assassination involved enticing him from his fortress through means of deception. Indeed, the Prophet approved this

87

Ibid, 66. Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 89 Mobley (2012), p. 74. 90 USA v. Usama Bin Laden et al. (2001). 91 CNN (2016). 92 IS (2016), features an interview with the alleged Israeli spy in 2015. A video featuring the execution of an alleged Israeli spy contains also these statements. 88

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approach and gave his consent based on then the concept that war involves concept that war involves deceit93 : “You are only one man; use trickery to relieve us of them, if you can. War is deception.”94

Furthermore, in a conversation with Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf, Muh.ammad Ibn Maslamah claimed to be doubtful of the Prophet, as he could not buy food due to the taxes he had to pay. Consequently, he decided to pretend to be in need of a loan in exchange for his loyalty. As he used the issue with the load to call Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf out of bed, Ka’b came down believing Maslamah would exchange his weapons as the security for the promised loan. However, he still armed himself and heavily scented his body with perfume before facing the nightly visitors. Asking to smell the pleasant scent, Maslamah lured Ka’b into bending over, which gave his companions a chance to strike him down. When all was said and done, Maslamah created a distraction and diverted the attention of Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf towards something else in order to benefit from the element of surprise and deception. This use of deception, which enabled “the knight of the Prophet” to assassinate an enemy who could have been a danger to internal security, has become a common counterintelligence tool of various Jih¯adi groups. In addition, it is the Qur’¯anic reference made by IS that clearly illustrates the important connection between religion, counterintelligence, and a culture of secrecy. This culture is rooted in the former Ba’athist mind-set of secrecy and was introduced to the Islamic State’s overall structure and counterintelligence apparatus by former Iraqi intelligence officers.95 Indeed, as a counterintelligence measure, paid informants can be found spying on their fellow Jih¯adis inside IS, which creates a fear much like the one that could be found in Saddam Hussain’s regime.96 This has gone so far as to have Jih¯adi’s being sceptical and fearful of their own families while children potentially turn against them. This fear, however, is not unfounded since according to interviews conducted by Speckhard and Yayla, children aged just 6 or 7 had been trained in collecting intelligence on their families.97 Within IS, the Emni has also assumed responsibility for the counterintelligence task of finding and deterring spies, which includes their capture, interrogation, torture and execution in order to deter others from doing the same.98 As much as there’s this fear of betrayal from the inside, the Emni applies even greater levels of scrutiny to the outside. Thus, foreign volunteers are questioned and investigated while being kept for an extended period of time in holding centres in order to be sure that they are not adversarial intelligence operatives.99 If the Emni distrusts a potential recruit, the 93

Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:52:270, Sahih al-Bukhari, 5:59:369, Sahih Muslim, 19:4436, Sahih alBukhari, 3:45:687, Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:52:271. 94 Ibn Kathir (2000), p. 152. 95 Sly (2015). 96 Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). 97 Ibid. 98 Speckhard and Yayla (2016). 99 Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.).

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counterintelligence department may decide to send him into battle so that he either proves himself as a worthy Jih¯adi or dies at the frontline.100 Indeed, IS—much like any other illicit organisation—is highly paranoid and wishes to avoid infiltration or disobedience. Hence, a reign of fear is maintained in order to deter the group members from resisting, defecting or from cooperating with adversarial intelligence services. The group frequently opts for the execution of alleged intelligence operatives and, in the case of one member from Kuwait, a beheading was ordered for allegedly cooperating with the British MI6, an accusation that was also written on the body of the accused traitor. However, this particular case must have shucked the group at its core since the Kuwaiti man had in fact been the chief of the Emni in al-Bab city.101 Thus, perhaps it can be assessed that IS’ paranoia and preoccupation with hunting “spies” and informants from Russia, Britain, Israel or any other adversarial security service might be well-founded.102 One example was brought forward by former Emni operative Abu Khaled and concerned an IS member planting SIM card/GPS-based tracking devices, possibly a variation of RFID or radio frequency identification chips. These could be picked up by adversarial drones and this situation illustrates this well-founded fear. Since the IS’ counterintelligence department had assessed that the devices were aiding the coalition drones in spotting targets, the suspected individual was arrested immediately. His execution was soon to follow and was carried out by cutting off his head. The body and head of the intelligence agent were left decaying in the middle of a square for three days, the severed head having been impaled on a stick.103 Countersurveillance Countersurveillance can be understood as the prevention of overt and covert surveillance based on countermeasures that can reduce the risk of exposure. It is only natural that particularly illicit groups like Jih¯adi organisations have dedicated a lot of attention to this aspect of counterintelligence and especially al-Qaeda and its publications on the “General security measures that should be taken by the person gathering information” stand out in this regard. The following measures [taken from al-Qaeda’s Declaration of Jih¯ad against the Country’s Tyrants translated by Post (2004)]104 have thus been proposed by Ali Mohamed and are presumably based on his own experiences serving in Egyptian intelligence: “Performing the exercises to detect surveillance …. These exercises include the following: . Walking down a dead-end street and observing who is walking behind you. Beware of traps. . Casually dropping something out of your pocket and observing who will pick it up. . Walking fast then stopping suddenly at a corner and observing who will be affected. 100

Speckhard and Yayla (2016). Weiss (2017). 102 Weiss (2017). 103 Ibid. 104 Post (2004), pp. 90–93. 101

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. Stopping in front of store windows and observing who is watching you. . Getting on a bus and then getting off after it departs and observing who will be affected. . Agreeing with one of your brothers to look for whoever is watching you.”105

9.4 Deception and Denial Deception and Denial are the backbones of Jih¯adi counterintelligence and tie in with all other military, ideological, and intelligence activities. Although other aspects of a counterintelligence apparatus, such as institutional learning, vetting or intelligence gathering for defensive as well as offensive purposes deserve scholarly attention, none of them would be possible without first establishing a strong doctrine of denial and deception. Today, these two concepts of counterintelligence are as beneficial to the Jih¯adi cause as they were to most battle commanders for the length of recorded history.106 Without them, no (Islamic) intelligence service would be able to operate, at least not secretly. Such a doctrine is a traditional component of conflict, intrinsic to all human interaction,107 and probably as old as warfare itself.108 Even beyond the experiences of human behaviour, deception can be found throughout the animal kingdom, primarily due to the effectiveness of disinformation, camouflage, and denial.109 In sum, the doctrine takes precedence over all other activities110 as it ensures the secrecy needed in order to operate in a clandestine manner. In fact, without Jih¯adi counterintelligence, adversary actors could destroy not only a Jih¯adi organisation, but actually any other clandestine group or military entity alike.111 Finally, Jih¯adi groups have not only managed to adapt their denial and deception strategies to the requirements of the twenty-first century, but have further utilized the two concepts in order to spread their ideology and justify it by linking the means of denial and deception to the military management of the Prophet Muh.ammad. Indeed, in the sophisticated battle strategies of Muh.ammad, denial and deception played a highly significant role with respect to the survival of the Islamic faith. Today, these two counterintelligence doctrines unite members of the Jih¯adi sub-culture in their struggle to remain clandestine, secret, and in the darkness, which goes far beyond their original purpose of gaining a strategic or tactical advantage.

105

Post (2004), pp. 90–93. Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 30f. 107 Caddell (2004), p. 1. 108 Handel (1982), p. 122. 109 Caddell (2004), p. 1. 110 Ilardi (2008), p. 249. 111 Bell (2002), p. 133. 106

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9.5 Deception It’s not the money, it’s the deception that’s critical (Mohamed Merah, French-Algerian Jih¯adi responsible for the Toulouse attacks of 2012).

Jih¯adi organisations have thus far proven the ability to achieve an in-depth understanding of deception as a part of their counterintelligence activities. These efforts may be as simple as trying to get an adversary to focus on Point A instead of at Point B, or as complex as trying to influence the entire military strategy of the enemy over a long period of time.112 ,113 Deception can mean the difference between success and failure of a Jih¯adi group. JI, for instance, successfully evaded governmental authorities throughout Southeast Asia and Australia by operating in low numbers and keeping their cells small, maintaining close ties to the religious milieu, avoiding the acquisition of weaponry until immediately before an attack and by institutionalising operational security. This goes to show how important deception and operational security can be for an illicit group, since JI managed to exist for almost a decade until the Singaporean security service detected them in December 2001.114 Most certainly, the religious group’s clandestine mutation into a serious terrorist threat and Jih¯adi organisation went unrecognised due to its emphasis on the counterintelligence aspect of deception.115 A fundamental dichotomy that can be found in Jih¯adi deception is its breakdown into something active or passive. Passive deception in this case focuses on hiding real intentions and capabilities. Active deception engages in providing false information to an adversary, which may as well be associated with mere camouflage, but is certainly not limited to that.116 Deception ultimately aims to deliberately induce misperception in another117 or consists of information designed to manipulate the behaviour of others by inducing him to accept a false or distorted presentation of his environment, whether physical, social or political.118 ,119 Offensive and defensive deception is used to affect an adversary’s decisionmaking processes, targeting an opponent’s command and control.120 Deception can promote friendly activities of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, thwart the enemy’s capabilities to do the same, protect forces and create opportunities to surprise the enemy.121 Thus, deception aims to produce an inaccurate assessment of a Jih¯adi group’s intentions and capabilities while ensuring operational security 112

Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 27. Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 114 Jackson et al. (2005), p. 62. 115 Harberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 116 Caddell (2004), p. 6. 117 Ibid, p. 15. 118 Whaley (1991), p. 188. 119 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 120 Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 20. 121 Ibid, p. 20. 113

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and tactical advantages at the same time.122 What follows is the delivery of a story that gets told through a variety of media sources in order to produce and enforce the uncovered misperceptions. This story gets told via perception as a channel and can range from classic instruments such as camouflage to disinformation and information operations.123 Consequently, deception gets planned backwards, beginning with the desired outcome and then determining the ends to dictate the means.124 ,125

9.6 Taqiyya Religious and ideological concepts and doctrines are a cornerstone of most Jih¯adi denial and deception practices.126 Islamic beliefs and Qur’¯anic interpretations are central to the denial and deception of a Jih¯adi group. The Shi’a concepts of taqiyya127 (Muda‘rat for Sunni Muslims128 ) and kitman,129 which for the most part refer to practices that have become tenets of Shi’a theology, can arguably be seen as the religious soil and justification for the implementation of denial and deception.130 Taqiyya allows the believer to hide a true agenda under duress, which is a theme that, according to Qazvin, can primarily be extracted from the Qur’¯anic verses 3:28 and 16:106.131 The main Qur’¯anic verse sanctioning deception with respect to non-Muslims states, “Let believers not take for friends and allies infidels instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah—unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions.”132 ,133 Those concepts of Islam have shaped the counterintelligence doctrines of many Jih¯adi organisations, most prominently by the actually Sunni-affiliated al-Qaeda.134 With respect to the theological foundations of the concept, Ignaz Goldminer points out that “it is accepted as legitimate by other Muslims as well, on the authority of

122

Ibid, p. 15. Ibid, p. 28. 124 Ibid, pp. 15–28. 125 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 126 Jessee (2006), 18, p. 371. 127 Campbell (2005), 65. p. 15. 128 Ibrahim (2010). 129 Campbell (2005), 65. p. 15. 130 The extent of the applicability of Taqiyya for Shi’a Muslims is debatable, but the concept exists regardless and has become a legitimate tenet of Islam. 131 The Qur’¯ ¯ ‘Imr¯an, 3:28 and S¯urah An-Nah.l, 16:106. an. S¯urah Al 132 The Qur’¯ ¯ ‘Imr¯an, 3:28. See also S¯urah Al-Baqarah, 2:173; 2:185; S¯urah An-Nis¯a’, an. S¯urah Al 4:29; S¯urah Al-H . ajj, 22:78; S¯urah Gh¯afir, 40:28. 133 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 134 Schultz and Beitler (2004), p. 58. 123

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Qur’an 3:28.”135 Although Shi’a practices allow dissimulation under special circumstances, Sunni Muslims discount the doctrines of taqiyya and kitman.136 It remains unclear whether radical Sunni Jih¯adi ideologues have implemented this very doctrine or not. If so, they have not done so in an explicit manner.137 However, regardless of the doctrinal foundation, Sunni groups such as al-Qaeda and IS still have not refrained from teaching the associated practices so as to improve their denial and deception capabilities.138 Thus, Ranstorp argues that the taqiyya is a central pillar to the operational reality of al-Qaeda139 and is essential to a holistic understanding of the operational and counterintelligence realities of Jih¯adi organisations.140

9.7 Deceptive Means The means, methods, resources, and techniques available to achieve goals of deception are only as limited as the Jih¯adi deceiver’s imagination.141 However, one can group them according to the function they serve according to Gerwehr.142

9.7.1 Camouflage and Concealment “An aspiring assassin should camouflage themselves in order to hide their identity and avoid arousing suspicion as they close in on their target; they should have a cover prepared and be able to easily answer the question, “Why are you here?” The External Operation Team emphasizes the importance of stealth and deception when infiltrating the workplace, concealing both one’s identity and weapon when entering the building and bypassing security.”143 —Inspire Magazine

Camouflage and concealment are used in order to evade detection and utilise terrain to avoid observation.144 They may simply be tactical deception tools that will prevent visual detection but could also be part of a larger and complex deception plan,145 which may go as far as putting poorly done camouflage over a real resource in order to give the impression of a false dummy image and mislead the 135

Spencer (2016). Jessee (2006), 18, p. 371. 137 Spencer (2016). 138 Jessee (2006), 18, p. 371. 139 Schultz and Beitler (2004), p. 59. 140 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 141 Ibid, p. 29. 142 Ibid, p. 29. 143 Al-Qaeda (2016). 144 Katz (2006), p. 3. 145 Caddell (2004), p. 8. 136

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adversary away from that very resource.146 Not as complex, but still reasonably effective, underground trenches were dug by Fatah in addition to strictly enforcing the use of camouflage,147 while some form of camouflage has also been used in a variety of different forms in the battles of Muh.ammad.148 In fact, neither conventional armies nor Jih¯adi organisations can engage in any confrontation today without appropriate camouflage. This old, but successful deceptive device, which can occur in a large variety of different forms and shapes, is consequently closely tied to means of demonstration and diversion.149 ,150 Al-Qaeda also comments on camouflage and concealment, on the ability to act, to change positions, and on concealing oneself by distilling its guidance from the knowledge sphere of operational art, “[An example] is what Noaim Ibn Masoud had done in his mission to cause agitation among the tribes of Koraish, those of Ghatfan, and the Jews of Koreitha. He would control his reactions and managed to skilfully play his role. Without showing signs of inconsistency, he would show his interest and zeal towards the Jews on one occasion and show his concern about the Koraish at another.”151

9.7.2 Demonstration and Diversion Demonstration and diversion are used in order to divert the attention of an adversary in two basic ways: feints and demonstrations.152 A feint is an attack by friendly forces to distract the attention of the enemy, whereas a demonstration has the same purpose, but does not usually involve enemy contact.153 With respect to diversions, AQ’s Practical Course of Guerrilla Warfare states: “On the offensive, one must always be fully alert while taking care to deceive the enemy into thinking, for example, that the attack is in the West, while the main attack is really in the East, so that the enemy is kept busy with a supporting attack from one direction and is surprised from another direction.”154

The Prophet also practiced diverting enemies from the target of an attack. He would put the enemies in doubt and misguide them into assuming that the Prophet would not march against them.155 He achieved this in the battles of Bani Lihyan and 146

Ibid, p. 8. Yaari (1970), p. 356. 148 Waqidi 1:53, 2:445; Ibn Hisham 3:69; Kala’I, 1:130; ‘Imad Talas, al-Rasul al-Arabi. 310. 149 Caddell (2004), p. 8. 150 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 151 Post (2004), p. 32. 152 Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 30f. 153 Caddell (2004), p. 8. 154 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 117. 155 Waqidi 1:403, 2:536, 2:799–805; Ibn Hisham 3:292; Ibn Sa’d 2:44; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:54. 147

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Dumat al-Jundal while also having managed to surprise the leaders and citizens of Mecca, since it was not clear whether he was marching towards Najd, Hawazin or any other region.156 ,157

9.7.3 Disinformation Similarly, disinformation and the spreading of doctored information (or media reports) that gets passed on to the target is also a very common means of deception.158 The Prophet utilized the power of disinformation, for example, during the Hamra’ Al-Asad operation, which was intended to shake the morale of the Quraiši army by disseminating disinformation on the strength, determination, and condition of the Prophet’s troops. This was achieved by his spy Ma’bad Al-Khuzai.159 The deception worked, and his adversary Abu Sufyan decided that it was best to “fold camp and complete their withdrawal to Mecca”.160 ,161 One can observe identical concepts today throughout the Jih¯adi subculture, as most groups try to portray themselves as strong and powerful. They do this to be intimidating to their adversaries through a variety of different approaches, media outlets and publications. The Black September Organisation, for example, would only conduct bogus interviews with media outlets in order to plant disinformation, whereas most other clandestine groups would at least issue an occasional statement.162 ,163 The group’s leader, Hassan Salameh, also allegedly planted rumours amongst Palestinians in Europe that he would plan to travel to Scandinavia. The rumours were picked up by Israeli security services and ultimately led to an innocent man being assassinated by Israeli operatives in Norway.164 Along the same lines, the alQaeda manual recommended readers to make fake telephone calls in order to mislead the adversary.165 Although there is no evidence that members of the group have actually done that, the manual also recommends that members agree on a matching cover story in order to mislead the enemy, even (or especially) when captured and interrogated.166 ,167

156

Ibid. Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 158 Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 30f. 159 Al-Asmari (2013), p. 102. 160 Ibid, p. 102. 161 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 162 Colley (1973), p. 124. 163 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 164 Reeve (1972), p. 190. 165 Chauhan (2003), p. 60. 166 Ibid. 167 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 157

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9.7.4 Spoofing and Mimicry Spoofing and mimicrying allow a Jih¯adi group to portray an entity of significance to the target. For example, IS doesn’t just march into battle. His group has employed tactics of mimicrying and spoofing in order to achieve its goals, when some of its members dressed like rebels and suddenly began to shoot at other rebels, which caused panic and prompted the other rebel group to flee and abandon their territory. Such a simple masquerade, where one group simply switches clothing (wearing the jeans and vests that were normally worn by a different rebel group) helped IS gain significant territory.168 Further, during the 1972 Munich Olympics operation by Black September, the operatives dressed in tracksuits, a simple disguise that was so effective that they were actually helped to climb over the fence by other athletes.169 ,170 In the same category, one can find means of overloading the sensory processing abilities of an enemy by dazzling, which increases the noise level and drowns out the target signal.171 Al-Qaeda utilised a re-adaptation of this doctrine of deceit prior to 9/11, when US intelligence officers picked up considerable noise in the form of increased telephone conversations regarding an impending terrorist attack on the US. However, they found it impossible to tell what was about to happen or where and when it was planned to occur, which allowed al-Qaeda to gain the strategic surprise.172 Increased chatter before the attack did in fact alarm the intelligence community, but pinpointing the location, time or form of the attack remained an impossible task.173 ,174 In another, more historic, example, Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf knew that something was about to happen when Muh.ammad Ibn Maslamah paid him a visit. In fact, he was not only warned by his wife, but also faced Maslamah with his sword drawn.175 However, the noise level of the situation and an additional distraction appears to have contributed significantly to the end of Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf.176

9.7.5 Conditioning and Exploitation Conditioning and exploiting targets can be done based on beliefs and habits, either by reinforcing them or even creating them.177 Conditioning can be seen as the repetition 168

Reuter (2015b), pp. 20–41, especially p. 26. Reeve (1972). p. 1. 170 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 171 Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 30f. 172 Schultz and Beitler (2004), p. 58. 173 Ibid, p. 58. 174 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 175 Rubin (1960). 176 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 177 Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 30f. 169

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of what may be regarded as preparation for a hostile action. However, such hostile action doesn’t follow automatically, which might lead to a false sense of security.178 Al-Qaeda, for example, encourages its secret members and sympathisers to imitate the behaviour of westerners. These efforts at deception include inventing cover stories, shaving, dyeing their hair, wearing blue contact lenses, smoking, drinking alcohol, and even following guidelines on what underpants or cologne to wear.179 In fact, al-Qaeda exploits a potentially biased belief on how a Jih¯adi looks according to Western preconceptions. Its guidelines even include instructions on carrying cologne and cigarettes when travelling in order to distract boarder security. Al-Qaeda has done particularly well in anticipating the weaknesses of its enemies. Consequently, the group further aimed at recruiting individuals with American passports, as it was assessed that they would be given less scrutiny at airport security.180 The doctrines and guidelines it provides on occidental beliefs, values, patterns, behaviours, as well as cultural and historical developments, illustrate its efforts to evade detection by amplifying its targets’ own perceptions.181 ,182

9.7.6 Display and Decoy Displays and decoys are used as dummies to distract the enemy,183 while also the utilization of cover businesses has also been observed with several Jih¯adi groups. Through this type of deception, nonthreatening activities are supposed to disguise a hostile act or hostile preparation.184 Arguably, using covers is one of the most commonly used deception techniques by Jih¯adi groups, and applications of this method range from passport and visa counterfeits to living a double life. One IS manual phrases it, “His [the Jih¯adi’s] secret life is totally different, in this life he will look different, and act different because he has to complete missions secretly without exposing his true self to anyone.”185 ,186 Also, with regards to Hezbollah, displays and decoys have contributed to the group’s success against its adversaries. This is due to the training Hezbollah received from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which included elements of basic operational security and classes on how to disguise themselves such that security services would find them less suspicious. In this regard, some Hezbollah members achieved this and shaved off their beards and dressed in Western-style clothing in order to hide the 178

Caddell (2004), p. 9. Ilardi (2008), p. 258. 180 Bergen (2006), p. 78. 181 Hermann (1996), p. 170. 182 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 183 Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 30f. 184 Caddell (2004), p. 9. 185 IS (2015b), p. 68. 186 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 179

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fact that they were Shi’ites.187 This rather basic approach was also covered by IS’ publications “How to survive in the West” and “The Hijrah to the Islamic State” and by al-Qaeda years earlier, when the group even issued instructions on what underwear and which wrist watches should be worn as well as what type of antiperspirant to should be used in order not to appear suspicious at airport or border crossings.188 ,189 Al-Qaeda has also further established cover businesses and NGOs in Kenya, where the group funded a charity in order to provide operatives with counterfeit documents190 and a fishing company for operational activities.191 Consequently, this technique is closely linked to exploitation and conditioning. However, deception depends on providing an adversary with doctored information and being able to predict how this information will be utilized.192 In particular, the latter aspect requires Jih¯adi groups to understand their adversary’s thought processes and decisionmaking methodologies.193 Indeed, the success of deception critically depends on understanding the enemy’s thought process.194 ,195

9.7.7 Knowing the Enemy Knowing the enemy and understanding the target of the deception is a core element in counterintelligence and may tie into active intelligence gathering and espionage.196 Thus, active gathering of intelligence197 on a target becomes paramount to the deception, as an adversary’s preconceptions, beliefs and intentions need to be understood in order for the deception to be successful. Indeed, deception is constructed around intelligence, but collection efforts are mainly directed towards uncovering the enemy’s perceptions, biases and weaknesses.198 This involves creating a misleading impression of the truth. For this purpose, it is relevant to understand how an enemy perceives reality.199 ,200

187

Jaber (1997). Glasser (2001). Source not available online. See also: Cullison (2004). 189 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 190 Bergen (2006), p. 264. 191 Ibid, p. 264. 192 Katz (2006), p. 3. 193 Ibid, p. 3. 194 Ibid, p. 14. 195 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 196 Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 27. 197 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), pp. 113, 131, 143 and 148. 198 Shulsky (2002), p. 15. 199 Ibid, p. 15. 200 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 188

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Consequently, Jih¯adi groups’ deceptive approaches contain a combination of intelligence with material and behavioural elements in order to achieve successful deception operations.201 In fact, active intelligence gathering methodologies, deception, and denial have been inevitably linked from the origins of warfare to the advent of Islam and the battles of Muh.ammad. Although those records mainly refer to what would be considered military intelligence today, the concept of knowing the enemy has always ensured organisational survival through adaptable denial and deception for the purpose of operational security.202 Consequently, the quintessence of Jih¯adi intelligence doctrines is the allocation of comprehensive information on the operational environment and expectable threats. This requires dual defensive and offensive approaches to counterintelligence.203 Jih¯adi efforts to understand the enemy, its methodologies, tactics and assumptions204 nonetheless exploits weaknesses, increase the chances of operational accomplishments, and allow its planners to draw conclusions for future attacks.205 Equal to most governmental conceptualisations of intelligence, al-Qaeda’s doctrine also reinforces the notion of prioritising the ability to think ahead and predict the future.206 ,207 Muh.ammad made a great effort to establish a highly active and dynamic intelligence collection division.208 In both the battle of Badr and during the conquest of Mecca, he aimed to acquire very detailed information on his enemies,209 but also when he launched covert operations, like the Sariya of ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib.210 In fact, the Prophet favoured ease of movement in order to spy on the enemy.211 In addition, the recruitment of spies has been common practise, and it is consequently not surprising that modern Jih¯adi groups have resorted to the same technique. Although Jih¯adi groups today employ a number of tactics to understand their enemies, those efforts may have reached their climax in the recruitment of a former French intelligence officer by al-Qaeda in Iraq. This provided an inside view into French intelligence tradecraft and further allowed al-Qaeda in Iraq to avoid detection and enhance its clandestine capabilities.212 ,213 The Australian radical John Roche, who planned to bomb the Israeli embassy in Canberra, and dark-skinned recruits in Africa who were operating in Somalia,214 are also alarming indicators of al-Qaeda’s offensive counterintelligence and commitment to understanding the enemy. Another and even more shocking example may be the 201

Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 30f. Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 203 Ilardi (2008), p. 251. 204 Ibid, p. 251. 205 Ibid, p. 251. 206 Post (2004), p. 21. 207 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 208 Waqidi. 1:19; 2:803; Tabari. 2:436; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas. 2:167. 209 Ibn Hisham. 4:160; Kala’i. 1:151. 210 Waqidi. 1:11. 211 Waqidi. 2:462; Ibn Hisham. 4:85; Tabari 2:568. 212 Meek and Momtaz (2014). 213 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 214 Ilardi (2008), p. 259. 202

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al-Qaeda double agent Ali Muh.ammad, who managed to infiltrate the American intelligence community and who worked for both the CIA and Egyptian Islamic Jih¯ad simultaneously, but also for al-Qaeda on the creation of terrorist cells in Tanzania and Kenya. This represents how well al-Qaeda must have understood its enemies.215 ,216 Finally, counterinterrogation has also been taught by al-Qaeda, and these teachings are based on the group’s assessment and analysis of CIA interrogations. The group instructs members to prepare answers as to why they are travelling to a certain destination, further describing what a common interrogation looks like and what interrogation techniques are likely to be used. This even includes instructions not to talk to cellmates in prison since they could be enemy agents.217 ,218

9.7.8 Denial and Secrecy “[This secrecy should be used] even with the closest people, for deceiving the enemies is not easy. …Allah’s messenger – God bless and keep him – says, “Seek Allah’s help in doing your affairs in secrecy.””—AQ manual219

Denial basically refers to denying an adversary useful information, which can be achieved by hiding objects, using encryption, avoiding interception and utilizing secure communication channels along with a number of other digital and analogue means.220 In fact, some groups block all information channels through which relevant information on a group could be learned.221 According to Bell, denial must be structured as a central policy that is essential to all operational efforts.222 Indeed, the inherent illicitness of Jih¯adi groups requires a strong defensive positioning rooted not only in deception, but mainly in denial.223 ,224 “The more an organisation is perceived as illicit, the more necessary is denial […] Denial must be structured as a central policy; no denial, no operations.”225 Furthermore, passive deception may also be regarded as a means of denial. It could include false aliases, secure methods of communication, secure bases of encryption or a combination thereof, as well as various other means allowing for the evasion of detection, thus ensuring survival.226

215

Harber (2009), 22(December), p. 232. Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 217 Chauhan (2003), p. 163f. 218 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 219 Post (2004), p. 26. 220 Katz (2006), p. 3. 221 Shulsky (2002), p. 15. 222 Bell (2002), p. 133. 223 Ibid, p. 133. 224 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 225 Ibid, pp. 133 and 135. 226 Caddell (2004), p. 12. 216

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The Prophet can be regarded as a role model for operational security and keeping important information secret.227 His counterintelligence activities were aimed at negating any intelligence the enemy might have collected on him.228 This can be regarded as a classic denial technique, and it was of the utmost importance to his cause.229 ,230 He practised it through a variety of means such as the following (amongst others): . Implementing speed and swiftness in movement231 . Removing the bells from a camel’s neck in order to avoid detection, as seen in the battle of Mu’tha and the conquest of Mecca232 . Concealing the mobilisation of forces and their state of readiness, as seen in a variety of his battles233 . Using secret codes,234 avoiding detection through ordering his troops to remain silent235 . Preventing weapons from shining in order to avoid detection236 . Issuing commands on the safeguarding of secrets and information about his battle strategy as seen in the conquest of Mecca or the Sariya mission of Abdullah ibn Jahash.237 While the means of warfare may have changed and the methods have been adapted over the centuries by a variety of Jih¯adi groups, the main themes are still present today. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda doctrines involved even more secrecy than in the organisation’s later stages. Members were prohibited from identifying the organisation itself or associating it with attacks for the sake of secrecy.238 Indeed, only in late 2004 (thus, three years after 9/11), did Osama bin Laden actually admit to al-Qaeda’s responsibility in the plot.239 This goes in line with Muh.ammad’s approach, who would keep his plans secret and did not discuss them openly,240 instructing that secrets should be kept secret.241 ,242 227

Waqidi. 1:11, 2:796; Ibn Hisham. 2:245, 4:39; Ibn Sa’d. 2:5; Kala’i. 1:57; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas. 1:226; Ibn al-Katheer. 2:282. 228 Waqidi. 2:792; Ibn Atheer. 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas. 2:167. 229 Ibid. 230 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 231 Waqidi. 2:755; Ibn Hisham. 4:39; Kala’i. 1:138; Ibn Katheer. 4:282. 232 Ibid. 233 Waqidi. 2:796; Ibn Sa’s. 2:33; Tabari. 2:555, 3:38; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas. 2:161. 234 Waqidi. 1:71, 2:466; Ibn Hisham. 2:287, 3:237, Ibn Sayyid al-Nas. 2:282. 235 Waqidi. 1:56, 2:636; Ibn Katheer. 3:216. 236 Waqidi. 1:13; Ibn Sa’d. 2:21; Ibn Sayyd al-Nas. 2:109. 237 Waqidi. 1:12; 2:796; Ibn Sa’d. 2:96. 238 Gunaratna (2002), pp. 4 and 46. 239 Jessee (2006), 18, p. 369. 240 Waqidi. 1:13, 2:636; Ibn Atheer. 2:188; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas. 2:54. 241 Waqidi 1:195. Ibn Hisham. 3:59; Ibn Atheer. 2:188. 242 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a).

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The Qur’¯an itself provides a large number of intelligence and counterintelligencerelated activities, particularly since—as we’ve established—the Prophet appreciated secrecy, trustworthiness, and honesty the most when taking prospective converts to Islam into consideration. This may explain why some Islamic and Jih¯adi groups that try to achieve a specific goal in the interest of Muslims (i.e. liberating occupied territories) may consider counterintelligence not only a tactical and strategic, but even a religious and ideological duty.243 Even before Fatah was created, for example, Yasser Arafat learned how to life a live in secrecy and evade Arab intelligence services when he compartmented his small and secret student organisation in Kuwait.244 Likewise, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the former head of al-Qaeda, was the leader of a clandestine underground organisation in Egypt before he reached the age of 16, which allowed him to gain years of experience in evading Egyptian security services.245 This further influenced the recruits those leaders brought into their organisations, as many of them were used to operating in secrecy and under cover.246 ,247 In sum, although not all Islamic organisations are looking to carry out a violent Jih¯ad, and some may as well be secular nationalist organisations that consider the concept of Jih¯ad as a cornerstone and vehicle of their activity, the doctrine of secrecy and counterintelligence appears to have an overreaching impact that is deeply rooted in a culture in which the Prophet conducted his battles and missions with an eye on covert and clandestine tactics. Consequently, all preparations for war as well as the tactics and strategies would remain secret. Aside from a select few who were known for their trustworthiness and ability to keep secrets, no one was aware of the intentions and capabilities of the Prophet.248 The Sariya of Abdullah ibn Jahash and the conquest of Mecca illustrate this while also indicating early approaches to compartmentalisation, which has become common practise amongst Jih¯adi groups today.249

9.8 Keeping Secrets and Concealing Information “[Mohammed] – God bless and keep him – used to keep work secrets from the closest people, even from his wife A’isha- may Allah’s grace be on her.”—AQ manual.250

243

Ibid. Aburish (1998), p. 47. 245 Al-Zayyat (2004), p. 18. 246 Wright (2007), p. 127. 247 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 248 Waqidi. 1:13, 2:535, 3:1123; Ibn Hisham. 4:15; Ibn Sa’d. 2:56. 249 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 250 Ibid, p. 26. 244

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9.8.1 Compartmentalisation Compartmentalisation, or the creation of various cells inside Jih¯adi groups, reflects an approach that was also utilised by Muh.ammad, since his intelligence officers and those charged with surveillance, counterintelligence, and actively gathering intelligence were not made aware of his plans to conquer Mecca,251 something that was also the case of the Sariya of ‘Abdullah bin Jahash.252 Today, the same holds true for Jih¯adi groups. For instance, prior to al-Qaeda’s US embassy operations in 1998, the technical advisor Muh.ammad Sadiq Odeh was not allowed to meet the al-Qaeda cell member who built the bomb and carried out the attack.253 ,254 This doctrine was also used while preparing the 9/11 attacks, in that information on the attacks was divided amongst five different cells with varying access to operational details.255 Hence, only a very limited number of trusted people were in a position to see al-Qaeda’s full strategy.256 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin stresses that the number of individuals in a cell must not exceed four to six.257 ,258 The Black September Organisation also had a cell-based structure and was highly compartmentalized, as the group’s operatives only knew a few details until a mission was in progress.259 This illustrates that the BSO considered counterintelligence and denial a main priority as well. In fact, Arafat’s denial that the group was a proxy of the Fatah can already be seen as a tactic designed to distract security forces.260 Furthermore, only a few members were allowed to see the complete picture of the group’s operations and strategies.261 In some cases, recruited members did not even know that they were actually participating in a BSO operation until it was initiated and believed they were fighting for the cause of the Fatah.262 ,263 Compartmentalisation also facilitates counterintelligence, counterespionage operations, and internal investigations, because restricting the flow of information renders any list of suspected informants with access to compromised information rather small.264 However, too much compartmentalization has also proven to be fatal to the Jih¯adi cause, as illustrated by a mixed Japanese-Palestinian BSO group. When the group attempted to hijack an aeroplane in 1973, the group’s planner was killed during 251

Waqidi. 2:769; Ibn Hisham. 3:292; Ibn Atheer. 4:81. Waqidi. 1:13, 1:14, 1:15. 253 Mobley (2012), p. 141. 254 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 255 USA v. Zacarias Mousaoui (2002). 256 Burke (2003). 257 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p.106. 258 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 259 Bar-Zohar and Haber (2002), p. 119. 260 Dobson (1974), p. 39. 261 Klein (2007). 262 Dobson (1974), p. 43. 263 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 264 Mobley (2012), p. 232. 252

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the initial takeover, and because no other member held all the necessary information on the mission, it had to be abandoned.265 ,266 JI has attempted to remain focused regionally and thus, set up many small and territorial districts called mantiqis, which were tasked with different responsibilities. The different branches of the mantiqis are known as wakalahs, which in turn consist of cells named fiah, which are made up of a maximum of five group members.267 This structure renders the group to be less vulnerable if some members are arrested or killed and allows it to avoid penetration by adversarial intelligence elements.268 This approach and structure reflect the group’s goal of creating an Islamic state in the region. It reveals its strategy and preparedness to engage in a long-term regional conflict.269 Also, with respect to the Islamic State, we can see similar levels of compartmentalisation that guard the groups against intelligence collection, penetration and espionage. Muh.ammad’s battle strategies indicate that he used a very tight command structure throughout his campaigns and a very structured approach that allowed him to place emphasis on training, which culminated in a designated department that was responsible for preparing various units for battle operations.270 The training included— but was not limited to—reconnaissance,271 covert movement, and camouflage.272 Psychological warfare,273 or taking advantage of the enemy’s weaknesses,274 was taught by the supreme commander on a continuous and institutionalized basis. Still, the Prophet would transmit his doctrines, guidelines and instructions only by letter or preferably verbally in order to remain operationally secure.275 When Mohamed resided in Mecca, the situation for him and his believers turned increasingly hostile and in order to remain secret, he ultimately changed the organisational structure. Hence, he divided and compartmentalised the group into units of five people, which dramatically increased information security and counterintelligence. Indeed, gatherings could be organized easier, exposure and attention was reduced, and276 his followers also arranged meetings secretly while locations and times were also frequently altered.277

265

Dobson (1974), p. 47. Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 267 International Crisis Group (2003), p. 10. 268 Jackson et al. (2005), p. 63. 269 Ibid, p. 63. 270 Waqidi. 1:402, 2:535; Ibn Hisham. 2:230; Qurtubi. 4:306. 271 Waqidi. 1:207, 2:457; Ibn Hisham. 2:245: Ibn Sa’d. 2:45. 272 Waqidi. 1:13, 2:636; Ibn Hisham. 4:265; Ibn Sa’d. 2:96; Ibn Katheer. 3:261. 273 Waqidi. 2:562; Tabari 2:554. 274 Waqidi. 1:396; Ibn Sa’d. 2:21; Tabari. 2:268; Suhayli. 3:28. 275 Waqidi. 1:13; Ibn Sa’d. 2:35; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas. 2:39. 276 Al-Halabi (1902), p. 358. 277 Jaber (1990), p. 131. 266

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With regards to the international architecture of a Jih¯adi group, tight organizational structures have also proven to have a positive impact on counterintelligence performance. This was true for Fatah, BSO, and al-Qaeda until 2001, when the group had to abandon its safe haven in Afghanistan. This remains the case for IS, which exercises command and control over large areas in a very tight organizational manner. This has enabled said groups to implement counterintelligence doctrines and extensive training.278 In contrast, when al-Qaeda loosened its command structure and organizational composition, the group consequently had to rely on previous training or online training in order to increase its counterintelligence performance.279 Similarly, the Egyptian Islamic Group, while aware of counterintelligence doctrines, did not manage to institutionalize them due to its loose command structure.280 Furthermore, tight structures allow for intensive vetting procedures and counterespionage operations, as conducted by al-Qaeda or IS.281 With respect to vetting new members, IS has also engaged in collection with respect to its Emni recruits and, according to Callimachi, future fighters were fingerprinted just across the border from Turkey and had their blood samples taken in addition to having a physical examination.282 The interview of the prospective fighters was also protocolled and typed down on a notebook—most likely by an Emni operative.283 “There’s a vetting procedure … Once a month they have a Shura — which is a sitting, a meeting — where all the videos and everything that is important, they start speaking about it. And Abu Muh.ammad al-Adnani [Head of the Emni] is the head of the Shura.”—IS defector284

Furthermore, the personal computers, of prospective IS intelligence operatives or of new recruit trying to join the organisation had oftentimes been confiscated by the Amn al-Dawla, such that signs of disloyalty or treason could be investigated by the Jih¯adi security service. On an intriguing side note, one former IS intelligence operative reported that his laptop was lost in the Jih¯adist bureaucracy, which ultimately led him to take Amn al-Dawla to court with surprising results: “I swear to God, the judge, he picked up the phone: ‘OK, guys, you have 24 hours. I need his computer. Or you have to compensate him for the computer. Otherwise, I’m going to put you in the square and thrash you in front of everybody.’ You can be a nobody and still seek justice. This is one reason people who hate IS still respect them.”285

278

Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). Mobley (2012), p. 230. 280 Ibid, p. 230. 281 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 282 Callimachi (2016). 283 Ibid. 284 Ibid. 285 Weiss (2017). 279

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9.8.2 Secret Communication Secret and secure communication is paramount to the success of a Jih¯adi operation today as well. So much so that a specific chapter of this work will be dedicated to encryption. However, for now we must merely focus on the fact that Muh.ammad also used coded messages and encryption. Codes were changed from battle to battle and from mission to mission, as illustrated by the case of the battle of Badr and Khandaq as well as the Sariya mission of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kilab.286 Today, code words are still used. They are still different in each battle and are changed after having been uncovered by the enemy.287 ,288 IS has used coded language to discuss terror plots, assigning terms such as “peanut butter and jelly sandwiches” or “culinary school” to signify terrorist attacks and training camps.289 Indeed, the allocation of a pseudonym is a reasonably common tactic amongst Jih¯adi groups. From the beginning of the organisation, Fatah leaders adopted aliases,290 such as Abu Amar for Yasser Arafat or al Assifa (the storm) for the group itself.291 With regards to al-Qaeda, the group has also utilised codes because insecure communication has proven to be a pitfall to al-Qaeda operatives due to electronic interceptions.292 ,293 Khalid Sheikh, bin al Shibh, Muh.ammad, Zubayadah, and Isamuddin have all been caught due to this shortcoming.294 Al-Qaeda has learned from these lapses and repeatedly warns its followers of the risks of intercepted communication channels, both off295 and online.296 Thus, al-Qaeda used encryption and coded messages that were written in the language of globally operating companies, wherein Jih¯ad would be called “work” and weapons would be tools.297 ,298 Interestingly, based on the code word used for the US and UK intelligence services, al-Qaeda appears to have perceived itself as more of an intelligence service, rather than a mere guerrilla organisation, as the term used was “foreign competitors”.299 Indeed, this comparison of the group’s Jih¯adi cause and modus operandi of being

286

Waqidi. 1:72, 2:466; Ibn Hisham. 2:287; Ibn Sa’d. 2:85. Waqidi. 1:8. 288 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 289 Sperry (2014). 290 Yaari (1970), p. 127. 291 O’Balance (1973), p. 28. 292 Jessee (2006), 18, p. 378. 293 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 294 Ibid, p. 378. 295 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 123. 296 Paganini (2014). 297 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 298 USA v. Usama Bin Laden et al. (2001). 299 Ibid. 287

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a competitor and not an adversary to the CIA or MI6 may reveal more about its underlying ideological thinking patterns than it revealed at first glance.300

9.8.3 Local Networks and Public Support Early Arab tribes utilised local intelligence networks and public support, which was an espionage system that was further developed by the Prophet in times of war and peace.301 However, exploiting local networks, public support and HUMINT sources provides certain advantages and actually comes with significant trade-offs. The interplay between counterintelligence doctrines and public support can clearly be illustrated by the events surrounding Fatah after the group achieved a propaganda victory following the battle of Karameh in 1968. In order to benefit from its newly gained publicity and recruit new members who could, amongst other things, be of great importance to the group’s human intelligence networks, Fatah’s leaders had to expose themselves to the media.302 However, Yasser Arafat decided to abandon the safety of secrecy and embark on a campaign to increase the group’s popularity in the West Bank.303 This move resulted in an increased fear that Israeli security services would exploit this openness.304 Although not everyone was allowed to capitalize on the publicity and public support, and a certain level of secrecy remained, this situation eventually led to Arafat almost getting caught by Israeli security forces in the late 1960s. He only managed to evade capture by hiding in a car near the group’s Ramallah compound.305 ,306 Thus, local support is a double-edged sword that can be of great benefit or perhaps even the downfall of a Jih¯adi group due to the inherent counterintelligence lapses, like the one that happened to Arafat. Furthermore, when Jordan increased her measures against Fatah in 1971, it was too late for the group leaders to return to its original secrecy.307 ,308 In fact, this trade-off was to follow Fatah throughout its existence, as its leaders were known to Middle Eastern security services and going underground again would prove to be nearly impossible.309 Eventually, this operational counterintelligence shortcoming would lead to the formation of the Black September Organisation run

300

Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). Al-Asmari (2013), p. 90. 302 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 303 Yaari (1970), p. 245. 304 O’Balance (1973), p. 87. 305 Schiff and Rothstein (1972), p. 78. 306 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 307 O’Balance (1973), p. 28. 308 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 309 Yaari (1970), p. 187. 301

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by Ali Hassan Salameh as the covert and secretive arm of Fatah.310 Unsurprisingly, most of BSO’s key leaders had previously served in Fatah’s Jihaz al Razd counterintelligence organisation or were members of the secretive Muslim Brotherhood, such as Khalil Ibrahim al-Wazir.311 ,312 Having learned from the downsides of publicity that almost got Arafat caught by the Israeli security service, the BSO never had an official spokesperson, which is rather unusual, even for a clandestine group.313 However, such extreme secrecy can also decrease popular support, since lowering profiles may eventually lead the popular support base to lose interest in the cause of the organisation. For example, the Abu-Sayyaf Group,314 which was previously linked to al-Qaeda, but is now IS affiliated, aimed to increase its popularity through media outreach. Developing personal popularity didn’t always aid the group, however, and in fact, its visibility actually provided highly valuable information to its Philippine adversaries.315 ,316 Publicity moves have thus far proven to jeopardize counterintelligence strategies. On the other hand, secrecy and lack of publicity paradoxically limit a group’s intelligence performance as well, because failing to be part of daily interactions with the local population significantly decreases the number of volunteers, trust in the group, and local sources, therefore it lacks in overall counterintelligence strength.317 After al-Qaeda reached fame through the embassy bombings, it managed to exploit local intelligence sources and networks more frequently, as more members of the public were willing to aid the group.318 Indeed, popular support can also lead to increased recruitment due to the fame of a leader and the manoeuvres associated with him. For example, Osama bin Laden’s popularity increased the number of new members,319 while the same holds true for the equally questionable fame of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and his Islamic State.320

9.8.4 Territorial Control Controlling territories can have a significant impact on a Jih¯adi group’s counterintelligence performance. IS has been effective in managing to conquer (and then correspondingly depend on) significant territory, upon which it then controls, influences, 310

El-Rayyes and Nahas (1976). Aburish (1998), p. 35. 312 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 313 Bar-Zohar and Haber (2002), p. 110. 314 Smith (1997), p. 119. 315 Mobley (2012), p. 5. 316 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 317 O’Brien (1999), p. 161. 318 Mobley (2012), p. 235. 319 Bergen (2006), p. 258. 320 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 311

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and exploits the local intelligence landscape. Such territorial control is closely linked to public support and ensures secure communication, physical security and the vetting of new members.321 In sum, this goes a long way in contributing to a Jih¯adi group’s counterintelligence performance.322 Limited to no access to a group’s territory drastically increases that group’s superiority over the local intelligence landscape, sources, and networks, enabling a group to operate in a reasonably free fashion.323 ,324 With respect to Jih¯adi ideology, al-Qaeda also uses local HUMINT sources and networks under the umbrella of “the Ummah having to unite against a foreign enemy”, which the group aims to achieve via its media strategies.325 The same can be said for IS and its publications, while The Management of Savagery by Abu Bakr Naji also picks up on this aspect, reminding its readers that: “the people will be good eyes and armour for us and protect us from spies […] a fact which makes it possible for us to discover the spies and watch each one of them.”326 ,327 However, this counterintelligence advantage has the obvious downside of being able to pinpoint the geographical location of a group, infiltrate it with spies, and conduct mass arrests or military raids.328 In 1990, al-Qaeda used its controlled territory in Afghanistan to increase its counterintelligence procedures, recruitments, and vetting method,329 while ultimately enabling the US to define a clear geographical target after the 9/11 attacks.330 The Abu-Sayyaf Group, al-Shabab, and the more nationalist Fatah and Hamas have also come to encounter the same pitfalls and advantages.331 ,332 Although not all Jih¯adi groups rely on territorial control, al-Qaeda has had to do so throughout its existence. State sponsors such as the Sudan or safe havens such as Afghanistan, the Southern Philippines, Somalia, and most recently northern Mali,333 are doubling as additional layers of security and counterintelligence.334 As such, adversaries will encounter some difficulties in recruiting informants inside the controlled territory or will be spotted by local supporters. The Abu-Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines, for instance, has managed to significantly benefit from this. Although it remains small in numbers, ASG draws a lot of strength from a solid base of local support, which includes intelligence collection, 321

Ibid, 264. Mobley (2012), p. 6. 323 Ibid, p. 6. 324 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 325 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 109. 326 Naji (2006). 327 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 328 Mobley (2012), p. 6. 329 9/11 Commission Report (2006), p. 67. 330 Mobley (2012), p. 15. 331 Ibid, pp. 229–261. 332 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 333 Laub and Master (2015). 334 Mobley (2012), p. 254. 322

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shelter, and hideouts, but which also means it is informed in advance of i.e. military raids.335 In fact, the group manages to blend into the local communities and yet still controls isolated territory, which has led to a very unclear picture of Abu-Sayyaf’s leadership, membership numbers, and internal structure.336 ,337

9.9 The Basis of All Operations Counterintelligence through denial and deception can be among the most rewarding tactical and strategic investments in a conflict for Jih¯adi organisations.338 Further, due to the covert and camouflaged nature of most Jih¯adi groups, denial and deception are essential not only for the sake of operational security and gaining advantages over an enemy, but also that of organisational survival, as they conceal certain activities.339 This is especially true for Jih¯adi groups, as denial and deception constitutes the fundamentals upon which all other activities are conducted. As such, denial and deception have not only been integrated into the workflows of Jih¯adi groups on an operational and tactical level, but have also reached ideological dimensions. In fact, one of the most recent publications of IS, How to Survive in the West— A Mujahid Guide (2015), teaches basic denial and deception techniques to future Jih¯adis by connecting each chapter to the group’s own interpretation of ideological references and religious justifications.340 The theme appears to be that manoeuvres and acts of Muh.ammad (as well as other ideological role models) are interpreted as justifications and the guidance of Jih¯adi counterintelligence: “Supporting the Islamic cause is a mentality and ideology more than anything else. You are always looking at everything though your Mujahid eyes, always think how any situation could benefit the Jih¯ad.”341 The connections between the military strategy of the Prophet, which is in itself partially exposed to pre-Islamic and indigenous influence, and the modern approach of Jih¯adi groups demonstrates that there is a Jih¯adi concept of counterintelligence. This concept dates back to the earliest battles of Islam and beyond. Muh.ammad made use of this pre-existing intelligence network and enriched already established methodologies with new notions, strategies, and counterintelligence doctrines. Today, Jih¯adi groups believe in walking in the footsteps of the Prophet, aiming to re-instate an Islamic Caliphate. They are willing to die for their ideologies and interpretations of Islam. Thus, it makes sense to understand how these Jih¯adi subcultures evade detection and deceive their enemies within the framework of a Jih¯adi 335

Banlaoi (2006), p. 254. Abuza (2005), p. 29. 337 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 338 Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), p. 30f. 339 Caddell (2004), p. 1. 340 Lohlker (2016), 7, p. 3. 341 IS (2015b), p. 68. 336

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counterintelligence concept. Also, Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin frequently refers to the strategies and tactics used by Muh.ammad (as interpreted from the Sunnah) in order to justify methodologies such as assassinations or to ensure internal security.342 He refers to the assassination of Khalid Al-Hudhali by Abd Allah bin Unays343 for planning an attack on Medina and inciting the people of Nakhla or Uranah to fight Muslims.344 Also, the assassination of Ka’b bin Al-Ashraf is mentioned so as to justify drastic measures that ensure internal stability.345 ,346 The doctrines of IS, al-Qaeda or any other armed Islamic organisation that engages in some form of Jih¯ad indicate this connection, even though the goals, approaches and theological or nationalistic practices and ideas of the mentioned groups are highly different. Though not all Jih¯adi groups can be compared and measured with the same standards, one can still apply the notion that their denial and deception efforts support a variety of organisational and operational factors, whereas other factors may be applicable depending on the specifications of each Jih¯adi group.347 Counterintelligence activities conducted by Jih¯adi groups not only serve military, strategic and tactical purposes, but are further based on ideological doctrines, the shape of the organisation, the structure and methodologies of Jih¯adi organisations. IS and its parallel attempts to establish a worldwide Islamic Caliphate and create an Islamic intelligence culture to achieve the former, constitute a good example. One might argue that IS’s lust for power and control made this step inevitable. However, a pre-existing Jih¯adi intelligence culture made today’s clandestine and secretly operating Jih¯adi groups inevitable. Consequently, Jih¯adi counterintelligence must be understood in light of ideology and religion. Not all the doctrines created by the Prophet fit into a time in which warfare is waged from the air, with drones, GPS systems and satellites. Some may claim that a profound engagement with religion, Jih¯adi ideology, and counterintelligence doctrines may be too exuberant and cumbersome, and that it would only concern theologians and scholars of Islamic Science, an academic field that cannot yield an instant counter-terrorism effect or contribute to baffling the emerging threats looming on the horizon.348 Some may believe that Jih¯adi counterintelligence is a mere military problem. This would be a grave error, however, as this work seeks to point out that the ideological connection to the doctrines already practiced by Muh.ammad and other medieval role models significantly affect present practices, approaches, and workflows. In fact, one must turn to ideology for important political clues, in order to, as Sir John Keegan mentioned, “find a way into the fundamentalist’s mind-set and

342

Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 141. Haykal (1976), p. 294. 344 Gabriel (2007), p. 126. 345 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 141. 346 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 347 Jessee (2006), 18, p. 369. 348 Kamolnick (2012). 343

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to overcome it from within”. The Qur’¯an, the Sunnah, and the military management conducted by Muh.ammad himself provide guidelines and doctrines for a large number of intelligence-related activities as well as for a large number of radicalised Jih¯adi readers or misguided scholars. Hence, counterintelligence is considered not only a tactical and strategic necessity, but even a religious and ideological duty.

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Paganini P (2014) Al-Qaeda is developing new Encryption tools in response to NSA surveillance. Security Affairs. Accessed online: https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/24978/cyber-crime/ al-qaeda-encryption-tools.html Post JM (ed) (2004) Military studies in the Jih¯ad against the Tyrants. USAF Counterproliferation Center. Accessed online: http://www.au.af.mil/au/cpc/assets/alqaedatrainingmanual.pdf Qureshi MS (1991) Foreign policy of Hadrat Muh.ammad. Kitab Bhavan Reeve S (1972) One day in September: the full story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli revenge operation “Wrath of God”. Arcade Publishing Reuter C (2015a) The terror strategist: secret files reveal the structure of Islamic state. Der Spiegel. Accessed online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-str ucture-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html Reuter C (2015b) Die schwarze Macht: Der »Islamische Staat« und die Strategen des Terrors. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt Rodgers R (2008) Fundamentals of Islamic asymmetric warfare: a documentary analysis of the principles of Muh.ammad, Edwin Mellen Pr Rubin U (1960) The assassination of Ka’b b. al-Ashraf. Oriens 32, p 65 Schiff Z, Rothstein R (1972) Fedayeen—Guerrillas against Israel. McKay Schultz RH, Beitler RM (2004) Tactical deception and strategic surprise in Al-Qai’da’s operations. Middle East Review of International Affairs 8(2):58 Shulsky A (2002) Elements of strategic denial and deception. In: Godson R, Wirtz J (eds) Strategic denial and deception—the twenty-first century challenge. Taylor and Francis inc. Sly L (2015) The hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein’s the hidden hand behind the Islamic State Militants? Washington Post. Accessed Online: https://www.washin gtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddamhusseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html Smith MLR (1997) Fighting for Ireland? Military strategy of the Irish Republican Movement. Routledge, p 119 Speckhard A, Yayla AS (2016) ISIS defectors: inside stories of the terrorist Caliphate. Advances Press LLC, McLean, VA Speckhard A and Yayla AS (n.d.) The ISIS Emni: the inner workings and origins of ISIS’s intelligence apparatus. Accessed Online: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-emni-the-inn er-workings-and-origins-of-isiss-intelligence-apparatus/ Spencer R (2016) Counterterrorism experts starting to awaken to the reality of taqiyya. Jih¯adwatch. Accessed online: http://www.Jih¯adwatch.org/2013/03/counterterrorism-experts-starting-to-awa ken-to-the-reality-of-taqiyya Sperry P (2014) Jih¯adi tapes reveal ‘PB&J’ code in ‘culinary school. New York Times. http://nyp ost.com/2014/09/13/Jih¯adJih¯adi-tapes-reveal-sinister-pbj-code-in-culinary-school/ Suc M (2017) Révélations sur les services secrets de l’Etat islamique. Mediapart. Accessed online: https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/180817/revelations-sur-les-ser vices-secrets-de-l-etat-islamique USA v. Usama Bin Laden et al (2001) US District Court, Southern District of New York. S(7)98 Cr. 1023. Day 2 USA v. Zacarias Mousaoui (2002) Interrogation of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Criminal Case no. 01-455-A, Defendants Exhibit 941, pp 21 and 24 Weiss M (2017) How ISIS picks its suicide bombers. The Daily Beast. Accessed online: https:// www.thedailybeast.com/how-isis-picks-its-suicide-bombers Whaley B (1991) Cheating and deception. Routledge, p 188 Wright L (2007) The looming tower. Penguin Yaari E (1970) Strike terror—the story of Fatah. Hebrew Publ, Co.

Chapter 10

Encryption and Secret Communication

Abstract Encryption and the use of cryptography have become an integral and traditional part of most intelligence activities. Cryptography enables the preservation of secrets and is thus a cornerstone of counterintelligence. This is because the survival of Jih¯adi groups depends on keeping their activities, planning and communications secret. Therefore, messages must be encrypted in such a way that an intercepting adversary cannot understand them, even if a messenger or message has been intercepted. Keywords Encryption Electronic Encryption · Safe Communication · Operational Security · Telecommunication Security · Dead Drops · Code Words · Carrier Pigeons · Invisible Ink “If it is a message, it must be in code, because it may be seized, and it must be encoded securely.”1 —Abd al-Aziz Al-Muqrin

The need to protect valuable information is as old as mankind itself. Consequently, encryption and the use of cryptography have become an integral and traditional part of most intelligence activities. Cryptography enables the keeping of secrets and thus, constitutes a cornerstone of counterintelligence. This is because the survival of Jih¯adi groups depends on keeping their activities, planning and communication secret. Thus, messages need to be encrypted in a way that prevents an eavesdropping adversary from understanding it even if a messenger or a message has been intercepted. In other words, the adversaries of Jih¯adi groups should face relatively great difficulty in understanding the content, while the intended recipient should be able to decipher the content with relative ease. As abstract is mandatory for this chapter, please provide. i have added an abstract Since Jih¯adi groups operate in secrecy and plan, organize and conduct their operations in secrecy, secret—hence encrypted—communication is of obvious great value

1

Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 131.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_10

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and importance to a group and its internal communication or information management. Indeed, especially due to continuing counterterrorism operations, IS commanders have started to significantly worry about the interception of their communication, which has led to the encryption of communication in order to evade authorities or spread propaganda and training manuals on platforms such as WhatsApp or Telegram—apps that have started to use end-to-end encryption technologies. Many prominent figures in Islamic history felt the urge to encrypt their messages and making them “invisible” by utilizing cryptographic tools of various kinds. In fact, cryptology was even invented in the Middle East. In an intriguing twist of history, some of these ancient hiding techniques and approaches to encryption have resurfaced in the context of digital encryption.2 However, for the most of history, cryptography was mainly restricted to governments and the military. This changed due to ever-growing telecommunication and information technology industries as well as communication systems that are now completely computerized. This development has demanded updated techniques and technologies that could sufficiently protect the information exchanged within IT networks.3 As a consequence of this development, IT security and encryption have ceased to be the exclusive domain of governments, security services, and academia.4 As such, “codebreaking” has become the most important form of intelligence collection in the world today, which consequently has a chain reaction on the impact encryption has had on counterintelligence frameworks. This is because collecting information on an adversary includes sensitive and secret sources that can produce the most trustworthy information, which can hardly be matched by regular human intelligence approaches and other means of gathering intelligence. Modern cryptography is commonly rooted in a scientific approach, and thus, the cryptographic algorithms around computational hardness assumptions are believed to be hard to decode.5 Such systems are, however, not unbreakable in theory, but it is anything but feasible to make such an attempt.6 In general, the cryptography used by Jih¯adi groups focuses on establishing and analysing protocols that prevent their adversaries, counterterrorism operators, governmental security services or the public from reading their messages.7 This includes various aspects of information security such as data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and non-repudiation, which are central to the modern cryptography utilised by Jih¯adi groups to elude detection.8 A British IS supporter, for instance, was hiding IS training material in a USB device disguised as cufflinks. He allegedly intended to provide access to some downloaded materials to terrorists around the world. As a reported member of IS’

2

Van Tilborg (2005). Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Al-Vahed and Sahhavi (2011). 6 Ibid, pp. 55–61. 7 Bellare and Rogaway (2005), p. 10. 8 Mobley (2012), p. 11. 3

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“Cyber Caliphate Army”, he also tried to distribute materials relating to encryption techniques used to communicate anonymously.9 Since it is relatively easy for law enforcement agencies to validate and track an IP address,10 virtual Jih¯adis have started to use TOR browsers that rely on international proxy servers and a network of online channels that enable users to browse the web relatively anonymously.11 Also for the sake of secrecy, voice over IP services have been used by virtual Jih¯adis.12 This is because a computer-to-computer VoIP conversation can be encrypted, which will not necessarily stop law enforcement agencies from intercepting them, but significantly slow them down in analysing them, since analysts will not be able to listen to such encrypted communication in real time.13 The same holds true for various other means of encryption. Thus, VoIP enables terrorists to securely communicate and circumvent sophisticated law enforcement counter strategies. While al-Qaeda used to stress the utilization of real-world dead drops14 and established a complex system of cyphers, IS has not only moved some of its tactical communication on Twitter, but also tend to use metaphors and codewords when discussing targets.15 Finally, encryption technologies have been used by Jih¯adis in order to cover the preparatory phase of an attack.16 The infamous ‘Mujaheeden Secret’s tools’ that use 256-bit encryption, variable stealth cipher encryption keys, RSA 2048-bit encryption keys,17 and encrypted chat forum supported instant messaging may be an alarming example.18 Intriguingly, the Prophet Muh.ammad also used coded messages and encryption and thus, his approaches can be considered a significant part of Jih¯adi operational art. Codes were changed from battle to battle and from mission to mission, as illustrated by the battles of Badr and Khandaq as well as the Sariya mission of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kilab.19 Today, code words are still used: They are still different in each battle and are changed after having been uncovered by the enemy.20 IS has used coded language to discuss terror plots, assigning terms such as “peanut butter 9

Pennink (2017). Newnham and Bell (2012). 11 TOR Project (2015). 12 Yannakogeorgos (2014). 13 Ibid, pp. 43–63. 14 A dead drop is a dead letter box that is used to pass items or information between individuals using a secret location. 15 Gardner (2013). 16 Yannakogeorgos (2014). 17 The design and strength of all key lengths of the Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm are sufficient to protect classified information in the US Intelligence Community. The NSA’s TOP SECRET information requires the use of the 256 bit key length, which is the same strength used by Jih¯adis. 18 Tung (2008). 19 Waqidi, 1:72, 2:466; Ibn Hisham, 2:287; Ibn Sa’d, 2:85. 20 Waqidi, 1:8. 10

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and jelly sandwiches” or “culinary school” to signify terrorist attacks and training camps.21 Indeed, the allocation of a nom de guerre is a reasonably common tactic amongst Jih¯adi groups. From the beginning of the organisation, Fatah leaders adopted aliases,22 such as Abu Amar for Yasser Arafat or al Assifa (the storm) for the group itself.23

10.1 The Roots of Jih¯adi Encryption “Sending an important message in the old days only required a piece of paper, a writing utensil, and a trustworthy messenger that knows the location of the party you need to reach. Today, this is still an effective method if such a messenger is available and can get around without anyone stopping him.”24 —Inspire No. 10

The Arabs are the inventors of cryptology, and it is not surprising that this tradition has found its way into the Jih¯adi subculture. In fact, the ancient Arabs were the first to discover and utilize cryptanalysis. Particularly during the largest expansion of the Muslim Caliphate around the ninth century, science flourished and Arab mathematics became unrivalled across the planet.25 Intriguingly, since the Islamic religion and Qur’¯anic interpretations refrain from picturing or sculpturing, this energy got channelled into literary pursuits and amounted to word riddles, storytelling or sophisticated anagrams, whereas Arabic grammar became an important scientific study.26 This engagement with language ultimately enabled early Arab cryptography. According to D. Kahn, Arab cryptography found its peak in the Subh al-a ’sha encyclopaedia, written by Al-Qalqashandi, which at the time was a systematic survey of all present branches of knowledge.27 The encyclopaedia was completed in 1412, and its cryptologic section concerned "the concealment of secret messages within letters." The encryption is achieved either through symbolic actions and allusions or by using invisible inks and cryptology.28 Al-Qalqashandi in turn distilled his information from the works of Ibn ad-Duraihim ben Muh.ammad, who held official posts under the Mamlukes in Syria and Egypt, and who allegedly authored two books on cryptology, none of which have survived the grinding teeth of time. Ibn ad-Duraihim, according to the Subh al-a ’sha encyclopaedia by Qalqashandi, provided seven systems of ciphers. Remarkably, his list—for the first time in the history of cryptography—included transposition and substitution ciphers, whereas 21

Sperry (2014). Yaari (1970), p. 127. 23 O’Balance (1973), p. 28. 24 Al-Qaeda (2013), pp. 57–61. 25 Khan (1996), pp. 77. 26 Ibid, pp. 77. 27 Ibid, pp. 77. 28 Ibid, pp. 77. 22

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one of his systems is the first-ever created cipher to allow for more than one substitute for a plaintext piece of writing.29 Furthermore, Ibn ad-Duraihim also created the firstever exposition on cryptanalysis, the beginnings of which are probably rooted in a meticulous scrutiny of the Qur’¯an by scholars and grammarians in Basra, Kufa, and Baghdad in order to derive deeper meaning. Ibn ad-Duraihim and Qalqashandi have realised that when practising cryptanalysis, it is imperative to understand and study the language in which the cryptogram has been written. Especially in Arabic, but of course also in most other languages, lists of letters that cannot be found together can exist in a text. The same analysis can be conducted with respect to combinations of letters that are very rare. Thus, according to Ibn ad-Duraihim, tha’ may not precede shin. A most important note for this early approach to cryptanalysis is a list of letters that is provided by Ibn ad-Duraihim, which indicated the “frequency of usage in Arabic in light of what a perusal of the Noble Koran reveals.”30 Intriguingly, the writers also recognize that, in non-Qur’¯anic texts, the frequency may indeed be different from the frequency of letters found in the Qur’¯an.31 Consequently, the frequency of words was counted based on the assumption that certain words were only used in later chapters, thus enabling a chronology of the holy text. Indeed, the Arabs discovered that za’ was the most seldom used letter in the Arabic alphabet, whereas alif and lam were the most commonly used, mainly due to the definite article “al”.32 Cryptanalysts can thus utilise such known frequencies to their advantage and in order to excavate a text from a cipher. Such classical ciphers, which have been discovered by Al-Kindi in his book Risalah fi Istikhraj al-Mu’amma, a book on the deciphering of cryptographic messages, are still rather popular today.33 Tragically, however, this knowledge vanished during the Arab decline, but we should keep in mind that attempts by Islamic scholars to decipher the Qur’¯an has provided the cornerstones of modern cryptanalysis. Al-Qaeda is also aware of the possibilities and shortcomings of most encryption approaches as outlined in one manual: “A letter, number, or symbol takes the place of another letter, number, or symbol. The number (1), the letter (H), or the symbol (_) could take the place of the number (3), the letter (D), the symbol (o), or any other number, symbol, or letter. Notice that in simple ciphers that the same number or symbol always replaces the same letter, while in complicated ciphers, which are currently in use, the same symbol and number replace a different letter each time.”34

What al-Qaeda is trying to circumvent with this approach is indeed the technique of cryptoanalysis. This technique is based on the fact that not all letters of the alphabet are used equally and some occur more often than others while the proportions of these letters’ occurrence remain constant.35 Frequency analysis is regarded to be a 29

Ibid, pp. 77. Ibid, pp. 77. 31 Ibid, pp. 77. 32 Ibid, pp. 77. 33 Al-Kadi (1992), 16 (2), pp. 97–126. 34 Post (2004). 35 Khan (1996), pp. 77. 30

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powerful in order to crack most ciphers, but this form of encryption is still an effective practise regardless, especially if one extends the encryption possibilities in the ways al-Qaeda’s Ali Mohamed describes in his manual as follows: “Types of Ciphers and Codes: 1. Enciphering with coordinates. 2. Enciphering with symbols and words. 3. Enciphering books, newspapers, and magazines.”36

Although most present Jih¯adi communication will be encrypted by digital means such as AES-128 or AES-256 encryption, one must recognise that there are cases where Jih¯adi operatives have decided to use ancient encryption methods for ideological reasons despite modern technologies. Rajib Karim, a technician for British Airways who was aware of the existence of PGP encryption, may be a good example in this regard.37 He in fact rejected the use of modern encryption systems like TrueCrypt in favour of a system in which he made use of Excel transposition tables, which the Jih¯adi network he was part of had itself invented. However, the underlying code system that Karim used was a single-letter substitution cipher, which dates back more than 2000 years. Surprisingly, Karim, who worked as an IT specialist, had in fact used PGP although only for the purpose of encrypted storage. Indeed, even the Yemen-based al-Qaida leader Anwar Al Anlaki urged Karim to use a sophisticated code program named “Mujhaddin Secrets” (explained in detail in the relevant section), which utilises all the AES candidate cyphers, but the IT specialist refused to use it: “because [non-believers] know about it so it must be less secure”.38

10.2 Electronic Encryption, Safe Communication, and OpSec “Also remember to never use iPhones, Androids are securer. Download the app: SureSpot from the GooglePlay store. (The brothers on Twitter share their SureSpot and kik Messenger accounts.)”—IS guidelines on how to travel to Syria39

The Islamic State’s Emni looks at electronic communication with great caution. This may be the case since IS has incorporated counterintelligence measures from former Iraqi intelligence officers, but the group also appears to have learned from the experience of other Jih¯adi organizations like al-Qaeda. The resulting implementations and approaches concern electronic communication via telephone, messaging services or e-mail, which they consider to be monitored and intercepted by governmental security services in order to discover their whereabouts and to thwart impending attacks. 36

Post (2004). Dodd and Batty (2011). 38 The Register (2011). 39 IS (2015). 37

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So, in the same way al-Qaeda refrained from using satellite phones after the group realised that the device used by Osama bin Laden had been tracked by security services,40 the Islamic State group prefers face-to-face communication and avoids exchanging crucial information over the phone or via e-mail. In this regard, IS or al-Qaeda are known to issue what could be termed “communication blackouts”: “No Communication = No Surveillance”41 —Inspire Magazine

Indeed, according to journalist Mekhennet, IS commanders are very well aware of the security risks involving the use of smartphones: “Three older Nokia or Samsung cell phones lay on the seat beside him. For security reasons, he explained [IS commander Abu Yusaf], no one in his position would use an iPhone, which could make him especially vulnerable to surveillance.”42 Such an approach, although relatively secure and hard to penetrate, comes with certain difficulties, particularly when a group’s intelligence services need to communicate with undercover operatives within its controlled territory or with cell members who are deployed abroad.43 However, Jih¯adi groups have established workarounds and special procedures in order to overcome this obstacle. Some of the solutions regularly used by the Islamic State are secure phone communications via encrypted applications like Telegram or WhatsApp. With regards to online communication, IS has instructed its members and supporters to use certain words carefully online and to not discuss plans out in the open. Cryptic terms are used in order to pass through message security while also VPN services are commonly made use of. These services divert the IP addresses of the user.44 The Emni also recommends that Jih¯adis delete their web history by using specialized programs like Cleaner or TrueCrypt, which enables the upload of encrypted messages and avoids the detection of encrypted e-mails.45 Prior to an imminent attack, IS operatives generally cease all electronic communications unless significant changes in the operational planning of the cell have occurred.46 Indeed, according to A. Speckhard, IS defectors have reported that the locations of imminent attacks were commonly discussed between operatives and handlers, while a detail-free policy was practiced the last few days prior to the operation.47 This is a rather common Jih¯adi practice also followed by members of the so-called “External Operations Team” established by al-Qaeda.48

40

Carnevale (2008). Al-Qaeda (2015), p. 7. 42 Mekhennet (2017). 43 Wege (2018). 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Al-Qaeda (2016). 41

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10.2.1 The Snowden Leaks and Jih¯adi Encryption After the Edwards Snowden revelations of 2013, al-Qaeda switched its encryption mechanisms since the group intended to avoid the possible adoption of flawed cryptographic algorithms and techniques. According to Recorded Future, a threat intelligence company, this incident demonstrates that of al-Qaeda has closely followed the media coverage of the Global Surveillance Disclosure, since it was the very first time the group had changed its encryption methodologies49 : “Following the June 2013 Edward Snowden leaks we observe an increased pace of innovation, specifically new competing Jih¯adist platforms and three (3) major new encryption tools from three (3) different organizations – GIMF, Al-Fajr Technical Committee, and IS – within a three to five-month time frame of the leaks.”50

Furthermore, al-Qaeda has developed additional encryption tools in response to the global surveillance leaks and didn’t restrain itself to the “Mujahideen Secrets” tool: 1. Tashfeer al-Jawwal was a mobile encryption tool, which has been developed by the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF). It was released in September, 2013, and is based on Symbian and Android systems.51 2. Asrar al-Ghurabaa was an alternative encryption tool developed by IS in November, 2013. This timing coincides with the time when IS and al-Qaeda parted ways following internal power struggles.52 3. Amn al-Mujahid was an encryption program developed by the Al-Fajr Technical Committee, affiliated with the al-Qaeda organization. The tool was released in December, 2013.53 It should be mentioned at this point that prior to the Snowden leaks, the wellknown original “Mujahideen Secrets” (Asrar al-Mujahideen) were launched in 2007. In addition, the tool Asrar al-Dardashah had been released by the Global Islamic Media Front in February, 2013. The latter is, in fact, an encryption plugin for instant messaging and based on the Pidgin platform.54 “Mujahideen Secrets” was, for instance, used by a group of German Jih¯adis affiliated with al-Qaeda, who were preparing an attack in Europe. They were instructed on how to use it by Younes al-Mauretani in order to remain in touch with their handlers in Pakistan.55 Also, IS militants have reacted to the Snowden leaks and consequently adapted some techniques and approaches from the trove of classified files leaked by Edward Snowden. Indeed, it is these very documents that have helped the group stay a 49

Paganini (2014). Ahlberg (2014a). 51 Paganini (2014). 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Cruickshank (2013). 50

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step ahead of their adversaries and ultimately find a way to expand. In practice, IS commanders are now even using human couriers to transfer messages between each other or, if necessary, resort to encrypted communication.56 The group has also released a manual online, which instructs its followers on how to avoid revealing one’s location and personal information when using Twitter. All this means that IS militants are guided through the process of removing metadata from their tweets or through changing their smartphone settings so that their location cannot be tracked. Lastly, the document recommends that you do not post names, locations or identifiable objects on Twitter.57 IS also advised against using WhatsApp, as the service may be monitored by the NSA and GCHQ.58 An IS technical expert by the avatar name of S3cur1ty11 has instructed IS fighters not to use WhatsApp due to security concerns in an anonymous pro-Jih¯ad forum on the Internet.59 S3cur1ty11 recommended: “WhatsApp is famous among ordinary Muslims… but it certainly is not the most secure. A Christian [indirect reference to the West] who knows the weakness in its security can easily penetrate the device and can then [the West] us]”.πe it against their war against the mujahedeen…There are some serious flaws with WhatsApp through which NSA or British intelligence agency GCHQ can intercept and even manipulate the brother mujaheds [sic].”60

In this regard, the IS expert instructed his fellow Jih¯adis to avoid WhatsApp in favour of an “…alternative messaging tools, which are much safer”.61 S3cur1ty11 was undoubtedly referring to Telegram, which would soon become IS’ preferred means of encrypted online communication, attack planning, and—as observed by Prucha—a “fallback position” from which the group would plan social media raids on trending hashtags or celebrities, otherwise known as g¯ hazwa raids.62

10.3 Communication Through Video Games While some fighters in the field have been instructed to use said encrypted services, the intelligence operatives working inside the Emni have started avoiding these technical means.63 Indeed, Emni officials have come up with a sophisticated solution that fully avoids electronic interception by exchanging information through the online communication features in video games, which may include video calls or a chat functions. In fact, Jih¯adi intelligence operatives have been hiding behind video game 56

Ahlberg (2014b). Russia Today (2014). 58 Ibid. 59 Varghese (2014). 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Prucha (2016). 63 Wege (2018). 57

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platforms by blending in between the thousands of gamers communicating on the internal platforms.64 This further illustrates the high level of awareness and understanding Jih¯ad groups have of electronic interception and surveillance. Modern electronic interception, as practised by some security services, heavily relies on written or spoken words that can cause an intercepting device or services to flag a user as being “suspicious” if certain terminology is made use of in a message, phone call or e-mail.65 Ever since the Snowden leaks in 2013, the world knows that security services such as the NSA use certain keywords in order to trigger their high-tech recording devices. These keywords are not part of the public domain, yet one can assume they most likely concern military terminology and words or phrases used when engaging in the planning of a terrorist attack. It is important to recognise that, in this regard, a surveillance system scans a conversation within the context of a non-military and neutral baseline. Hence, it becomes possible to spot a conversation containing the relevant keywords and content. However, if all communication takes place on an online platform where most users and players engage in conversations about weapons, attacks, and various military terms—as is the case with most first person shooters—a discussion that might relate to a real-world attack or a real-world exchange of weapons might go unnoticed. This is the case even then when large amounts of “suspicious” words are used by the gamers involved. Indeed, the baselines or the neutral reference point becomes a conversation containing said terminology. In other words, Jih¯adi intelligence operatives appear to have searched for a communication platform where it would be commonplace to talk in military terms, bombs or weapons, and they appear to have found such a platform via computer and console games.66

10.4 Communication by Phone and Walkie Talkie “It’s better if you have an Android smartphone which is unlocked. Buy a SIM card at the airport, but don’t buy any SIM card, buy a Turkcell SIM card. Make sure you buy enough minutes for calls (international calls also wouldn’t hurt) and enough data for internet (1 GB should be okay, in sh¯a Allah).”—The Hijrah to the Islamic State.67

Security services are pretty good at tracking phones, but this very capability relies on them knowing which phones need to be tracked. Reports from the Paris attacks suggest that the Jih¯adi terrorists at the Bataclan nightclub threw away a Samsung phone outside the venue, one that had been activated only the day before and which contained maps of the club’s floorplan.68 When police raided the apartment where 64

Ibid. Love (2013). 66 Weimann (2010). 67 IS (2015). 68 Erdmann (2015). 65

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Abdelhamid Abaaoud was residing, they found additional packaging and boxes of phones, which would presumably have been used in a similarly disposable manner. During the hostage situation at the Bataclan, the attackers also took the cell phones from the hostages in order to go online. Intriguingly, none of the mobile phones the investigators found after the attacks had any electronic messages on them whatsoever. This would imply that the attackers had some other way of exchanging information, one that did not rely on email or messaging services such as WhatsApp. Indeed, according to a Bataclan hostage, one of the Jih¯adis “pulled out a laptop” and turned it on to show a “line of gibberish”.69 This statement may indicate that the IS operatives were using some encryption software in order to send messages or communicate with their commanders, which would be difficult for security services to intercept and decrypt. The use of disposable phones (most of which were not even connected to email accounts) and refusal to use any method of communication for extended periods of time shows that the Jih¯adi network operating out of Brussels had been made aware that silence could be the best defence. Indeed, if no communication is sent, none can be intercepted, which also pushes the most tech-savvy security services to the limits of their capabilities.70 Algerian IS commander Adel Haddadi, who entered Europe together with a group of Syrian refugees and who was eventually apprehended in an Austrian migrant facility, is another example.71 He was instructed by the Emni to use a disposable Turkish (versus Syrian) telephone number, then parked on the Syrian side of the border (after he had started his journey towards Austria), since the group believed that this would not raise the same level of suspicion as calls made to Syria.72 Adel Haddidi also maintained contact with the Emni via both Telegram and SMS messages to a Turkish phone number within IS territory. This very Turkish telephone number had also been found written down on a piece of paper inside the trouser pocket of the amputated leg of a suicide attacker at Stade de France.73

10.4.1 Telecommunication Security IS has been very strict with regard to telecommunication security. One example of their caution can be seen with a Swiss foreign fighter named Abou Mahdi al-Swissry, who tried to enter the Islamic state territory with a set of walkie-talkies, failed to declare them upon arrival and was immediately reported to the secret service.74 Another example can be seen with an IS telecommunications engineer, who was 69

Speed (2016). Ibid. 71 Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.). 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Suc (2017). 70

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tortured and threatened with imminent execution by Emni officers for re-establishing the GSM network as the same time as the Islamic state was fighting Syrian forces in Raqqa, potentially enabling the Syrian army to call for reinforcements. The Emni accused the engineer of being a spy, because since he had failed to consult them on the matter beforehand and he ended up receiving a prison sentence. After eight months in detention, he was unexpectedly released, presumably because the Emni officers hoped he would reveal possible accomplices.75 Wireless networks and Wi-Fi boosters appear to be another aspect of digital communication that is of concern to IS’ counterintelligence. It is feared that foreign surveillance agencies may have the capability to intercept these signals and then locate individuals or their devices in a certain area.76 IS is very keen on telling its members how to prevent online surveillance and has even established somewhat of a “help desk” for its members in the form of an encrypted Telegram channel including roughly 2200 members.77 The channel is run by IS cyber security experts who go by the name of “Electronic Horizon Foundation” (EHF).78 It has the stated goal of spreading “security and technical awareness among the monotheists.”79

10.5 Communication by Dead Drops “One of the greatest factors for successful intelligence activity is a sound plan. Any plan for thus type of operation must contain two plans, the first for the one making the drop, and the second for the one making the pickup.”80 —A Practical Course of Guerrilla Warfare

Dead drops have been promoted by Jih¯adi groups, especially by Abd Al-Aziz al-Muqrin in his “A Practical Course of Guerrilla Warfare”, as a means of secret communication and information exchange. Indeed, this form of secret communication—though not necessarily encrypted—has been used by many security organisations as well as paramilitary organisations throughout history. A dead drop is a way of secretly exchanging items or information between two individuals utilizing a secret location, hence enabling them to not have to meet personally. This, in turn, increases operational security and discrete communication. The location and characteristics of a dead drop must allow for the retrieval of information without any of the involved individuals being seen by an adversary or the general public. Abd al-Aziz Al-Muqrin also considers dead drops to be a very effective way of secret communication, and thus, he provides the reader of his manual with a list of considerations of how to set up a dead drop and use it in the 75

Ibid. McCoogan (2016). 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 137. 76

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most efficient manner possible. He considers a sufficient cover of the dead drop to be a prime characteristic in ensuring that neither those who deposit information nor those who pick it up can be spotted by security services. Furthermore, he suggests that the dead drop needs to be accessible quickly so that goods or information would not be discovered by accident or get destroyed by the elements. He concludes by mentioning that it would be necessary to position “flags”—in other words a secret code, which tells an operative that something has been placed in the dead drop—in a way that allows the involved individuals to recognise it easily and retrieve the information quickly.81 In order to prevent security forces from monitoring a certain location he suggests public places like gardens, museums, mosques, restaurants, hospitals, public places or restroom facilities for dead drops.82 Abd al-Aziz Al-Muqrin provides a very accurate and detailed assessment of the procedures, advantages, and disadvantages of dead drops. He not only considers the reduced risk of casualties, but also identifies a possible approach towards counterintelligence and counterespionage in the process: “If one of the operatives is put out of action, the other operative (God willing) will notice that by means of “flags””83

Furthermore, Al-Muqrin identifies a list of disadvantages including the possibility of operational security being compromised by the amount of time needed to set up a dead drop, the amount of time it takes to drop and retrieve information, the difficulty of managing the dead drop “in the shadows” and “behind the scenes”, the inability to control it or the danger of losing the contents to an outside party.84 In the same vein, Al-Muqrin provides some guidelines for security precautions so that the dead drop might be used in the most effective manner. Primarily, he expresses concern with possible surveillance of the dead drop location and thus, recommends a high sense of operational security, which, on the other hand, should not amount to paranoia as this would also arise suspicion.85 He continues to stress the importance of having appropriate covers when approaching the dead drop and that items or messages must be concealed when placing them inside the dead drop so as not to draw attention.86 He concludes his remarks on the security precautions by focusing his attention on the time Jih¯adi operators spend at the dead drop, the time management associated with approaching the dead drop without meeting each other and the importance of flags, which must be highly secure at all times.87

81

Ibid, p. 133. Ibid, p. 133. 83 Ibid, p. 134. 84 Ibid, p. 134. 85 Ibid, p. 134. 86 Ibid, p. 134. 87 Ibid, p. 134. 82

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10.6 Communication by Code Words Secret and secure communication is paramount to the success of a Jih¯adi operation, and code words have been frequently used by Jih¯adi operatives. Al-Qaeda has also utilised codes, because insecure communication has proven to be a pitfall to al-Qaeda operatives due to electronic interceptions.88 Khalid Sheikh, bin al Shibh, Muh.ammad, Zubayadah, and Isamuddin have all been caught as a result of this shortcoming.89 Al-Qaeda has learned from these lapses and repeatedly warns its followers of the risks of intercepted communication channels both offline90 and online.91 That means that al-Qaeda has used encryption and coded messages that were written in the language of globally operating companies, where code words are used. Jih¯ad would, i.e. be called “work” and weapons would be called “tools”.92 Interestingly, based on the code words used by the US and UK intelligence services, al-Qaeda appears to have perceived itself as more of an intelligence service as opposed to a mere guerrilla organization, having used the term “foreign competitors” to describe itself.93 Indeed, this comparison of the group’s Jih¯adi cause and modus operandi of being a competitor to the CIA or MI6, and not an adversary, may reveal more about its underlying ideological thinking patterns than is revealed at first glance.

10.7 Communication via Carrier Pigeons “The Jih¯adists tied a letter with a phone number to the foot of the bird, which was flying to a Jordanian resident.”94 —Brig. Gen Saber al-Mahayreh (Jordanian Border Patrol)

In 2016, Jordanian troops managed to intercept a carrier pigeon sent by the Islamic State to a recipient in Jordan with an addressed letter in an attempt to outsmart security services. This was the use of so-called low-tech devices.95 The bird was carrying a letter containing a telephone number and additional communication instructions for spies in the Al-Raqban refugee camp close to the Jordanian border.96 It can be reasonably assumed that the message was intended for what Jordanian security forces call “war merchants”. These IS-funded men have started to blackmail refugees from Raqqa and Palmyra into providing intelligence for the Emni. 88

Jessee (2006), 18. p. 378. Ibid, p. 378. 90 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 123. 91 Paganini (2014). 92 USA v. Usama Bin Laden et al. (2001). 93 Ibid, Day 2. 94 Albawaba News (2016). 95 The Telegraph (2016). 96 Albawaba News (2016). 89

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Abu Bakr, the first of the “Rightly Guided” Caliphs (rashidun) of the Umayyad Caliphate, relied on this communication system. Abu Bakr governed the Umayyad Caliphate from 632 to 634 and it’s no coincidence that the leader of IS had chosen the pseudonym “Ab¯u Bakr al-Baghdadi”, seeing as how the Muslim territories had become the centre of the Western world under the Caliph of the same name. Indeed, Jih¯adis view the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750) and the subsequent Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258) as a period of Muslim hegemony, ultimately the ideal concept of an Islamic State. This is despite the fact that three of the four first Caliphs died violent deaths. However, one means of obtaining rapid intelligence during the Umayyad period was via carrier pigeons. Despite the fact that Romans utilised such birds, Dvornik assesses that this system was most likely been discovered by the Arabs on their own accord.97 The Arabs must have established this means of communication and intelligence transfer rather early, since early reports from China dating back to the year 700 suggest that carrier pigeons could have been introduced by Arab traders.98 It appears as if Hamdan Quarmat was the first man to establish this system on a large scale in order to send messages to his Babylonian base. But also the Abbasid vizier Ibn Muqlah had based an official in Anbar with fifty carrier pigeons to ensure that intelligence reports could be sent to Baghdad.99 Due to the high demand for these reports, he expanded his pigeon-sending operations in Aqarquf, which employed 100 men.100 The demand for intelligence reports at this time and during the war with the revolutionary sectarians in 927 required carrier pigeons to be sent to him on an hourly basis. 13 years later, the secretary of the Caliph Al-Muttaqi decided to send a message of treasonous content, which was fortunately intercepted the Caliph himself thanks to his network having become more sophisticated. The carrier pigeon network expanded from Raqqa to Mosul and also connected the cities Baghdad, Wasi, Basra and Kufa, according to Mez.101 IS has opted for carrier pigeons despite the availability of online encryption tools, namely the secretive means of communication such as satellite communication, Skype, darknet chat rooms or the group’s heavy utilisation of WhatsApp102 and Telegram.103 The group has also heavily restricted the private raising and training of pigeons in its controlled territories, even having arrested two brothers for this very crime in al-Bab City. The IS h.isba police detained the two brothers and fined them $50, then slaughtered their entire stash of pigeons. This took place while the Free Syrian Army forces had conquered several towns and villages to the north and West

97

Dvornik (1974), p. 218. Ibid, p. 218. 99 Dvornik (1974), p. 218. 100 Ibid, p. 218. 101 Mez (1937), pp. 503 and 504. 102 Graham (2016). 103 Ibid. 98

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of al-Bab City, managing to occupy Qabasin, which is located a mere 9 km to the northeast of al-Bab City.104

10.8 Invisible Ink Invisible ink is in fact a form of steganography.105 The substance is commonly used for writing and generally turns invisible after application, but can later be made visible again through a variety of different means, depending on the type of ink used. Al-Qaeda discusses the utilisation of invisible ink as follows: “The history of invisible writing is somewhat old; spies used various types of invisible ink during World War I, and after the war many improvements were made after chemical compounds were discovered. [These compounds] can make most of these invisible inks become visible. War is still being waged between the nations and terrorist organizations. The Islamic organizations can resort to their modest capabilities of writing letters with invisible ink using materials available on the market which leave no trace at all as long as it is well hidden in the writing.”106

Although the author of the manual—Ali Mohamed—suggests that smooth paper must be used, he spends more time on exploring the different types of invisible ink that are made up of organic and chemical compounds. He considers “milk, vinegar, apple juice, lemon, and urine” as suitable organic inks, as they are easily exposed by heating up the piece of paper. Chemical solutions, which are colourless when they dry, also appear as various colours if they are treated with another solution.107 Even more sophisticated is the chemical solution he provides the reader with. Ali Mohamed suggests the use of aluminium chloride to write letters with secret ink and to expose the writing by dissolving an aspirin in alcohol and wiping the solution on the message.108 As a final consideration when using secret ink, Ali Mohamed recommends that one write an innocent-looking letter with a ballpoint pen over the secret and invisible writing—leaving the space between the lines for the message written with secret ink. Furthermore, according to him, ciphers and code should be used in order to convey information without anyone determining its true content, without having the necessary key: “There must be a special key, which changes from time to time. The cipher key may be composed of a number or group of numbers. It could also be composed of a word, an expression, or a sentence according to what was agreed upon among the correspondents. This key is used to decode the cipher, and is what dictates the steps required to encipher any secret letter.”109 104

The Global Coalition (2016). Dooley (2015). 106 Post (2004), p. 106. 107 Ibid, p. 106. 108 Ibid, p. 106. 109 Ibid, p. 106. 105

References

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References Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009) A practical course of Guerrilla war (trans: Cigar N), published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency. Washington Ahlberg C (2014a) How Al-Qaeda uses encryption post-Snowden (part 1). Recorded future blog post. Accessed online: https://www.recordedfuture.com/al-Qaeda-encryption-technology-part-1/ Ahlberg C (2014b) How Al-Qaeda uses encryption post-Snowden (part 2). Recorded future blog post. Accessed online: https://www.recordedfuture.com/al-qaeda-encryption-technology-part-2/ Albawaba News (2016) Jordan intercepts Daesh messenger pigeon, spy plane at border. Albawaba News. Accessed online: https://www.albawaba.com/news/jordan-intercepts-IS-messenger-pig eon-spy-plane-border-836538 Al-Kadi IA (1992) The origins of cryptology: the Arab contributions. Cryptologia Al-Qaeda (2013) Inspire no. 10 Al-Qaeda (2015) Inspire no. 14 Al-Qaeda (2016) Inspire no. 15. Professional assassinations Al-Vahed A, Sahhavi H (2011) An overview of modern cryptography. World Applied Programming 1(1):55–61. Accessed online: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/46d6/fee601a4f89b448deff8af7f ce9c52d68501.pdf Bellare M, Rogaway P (2005) Introduction to modern cryptography. Published online Carnevale ML (2008) The Wall Street Journal. Accessed online: https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/ 2008/05/28/tracking-use-of-bin-ladens-satellite-phone/ Cruickshank P (2013) Did NSA leaks help al Qaeda? CCN. Accessed online: http://security.blogs. cnn.com/2013/06/25/did-nsa-leaks-help-al-Qaeda/ Dodd V, Batty D (2011) Islamist website urges users to target MPs. The guardian. Accessed online: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/05/islamist-website-mps-timms-iraq Dooley JF (2015) Review of prisoners, lovers, and spies: the story of invisible ink from Herodotus to al-Qaeda by Kristie Macrakis. Cryptologia 40(1):107–112 Dvornik F (1974) Origins of intelligence services. Rutgers University Press Erdmann L (2015) Die Spur auf dem Smartphone. Spiegel online. Accessed online: https://www. spiegel.de/politik/ausland/paris-die-spur-auf-dem-smartphone-a-1063379.html Gardner F (2013) How do terrorists communicate? BBC. Accessed online: http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-24784756 Graham R (2016) How terrorists use encryption. CTC Sentinel 9(6) IS (2015) Hijrah to the Islamic state—what to packup, who to contact, where to go, stories & more Jessee DD (2006) Tactical means, strategic ends—Al Qaeda’s use of denial and deception. terrorism and political violence Khan D (1996) The codebreakers: the comprehensive history of secret communication from ancient times to the internet. Scribner Love D (2013) These are supposedly the words that make the NSA think you’re a terrorist. Business Insider. Accessed online: http://www.businessinsider.com/nsa-prism-keywords-for-domestic-spy ing-2013-6?IR=T McCoogan C (2016) Islamic state ‘help desk’ helps members avoid internet surveillance. The Telegraph. Accessed online: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/02/11/islamic-statehelp-desk-helps-members-avoid-internet-surveillanc/ Mekhennet S (2017) I was told to come alone. Huffington Post. Accessed online: https://www.huf fingtonpost.com/entry/i-was-told-to-come-alone_us_59404ab0e4b04c03fa261631 Mez A (1937) The renaissance of Islam. Khitab Bavan Mobley BW (2012) Terrorism and counterintelligence—how terrorist groups delude detection. Columbia University Press Newnham J, Bell P (2012) Social network media and political activism—a growing challenge for law enforcement. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 7(11):41 O’Balance E (1973) Arab Guerrilla power. Faber & Faber

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Paganini P (2014) Al-Qaeda is developing new encryption tools in response to NSA surveillance. Security Affairs. Accessed online: https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/24978/cyber-crime/ al-qaeda-encryption-tools.html Pennink E (2017) Cyber Jih¯adi with James Bond-style USB cufflinks jailed for eight years over online terror hub. Independent. Accessed online: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/ cyber-Jih¯adi-samata-ullah-james-bond-usb-cufflinks-isis-cardiff-jailed-8-years-online-terrordabiq-a7713486.html Post JM (ed) (2004) Military studies in the Jih¯ad against the Tyrants. USAF Counterproliferation Center. Accessed online: http://www.au.af.mil/au/cpc/assets/alqaedatrainingmanual.pdf Prucha N (2016) IS and the Jih¯adist information highway—projecting influence and religious identity via telegram. Terrorism Research Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies 10(6) Russia Today (2014) IS teaches how to avoid NSA snooping in a tweet. Accessed online: https:// www.rt.com/news/197344-isis-twitter-nsa-manual/ Speckhard A, Yayla AS (n.d.) The ISIS Emni: the inner workings and origins of ISIS’s intelligence apparatus. Accessed Online: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-emni-the-inner-wor kings-and-origins-of-isiss-intelligence-apparatus/ Speed B (2016) Burner phones and mysterious encryption: how is Isis communicating now? The New Statesman. Accessed online: https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2016/03/ burner-phones-and-mysterious-encryption-how-isis-communicating-now Sperry P (2014) Jih¯adi tapes reveal ‘PB&J’ code in ‘culinary school. New York Times. http://nyp ost.com/2014/09/13/Jih¯adJih¯adi-tapes-reveal-sinister-pbj-code-in-culinary-school/ Suc M (2017) Révélations sur les services secrets de l’Etat islamique. Mediapart. Accessed online: https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/180817/revelations-sur-les-ser vices-secrets-de-l-etat-islamique The Global Coalition (2016) Daesh communication clampdown includes carrier pigeons: life under Daesh. Accessed online: http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/IS-communication-clampdownincludes-carrier-pigeons-life-under-IS/ The Register (2011) BA Jih¯adist relied on Jesus-era encryption. The Register. Accessed online: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/22/ba_Jih¯adist_trial_sentencing/ The Telegraph (2016) Islamic state using homing pigeons to deliver messages to operatives outside its ‘Caliphate’. Accessed online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/05/islamicstate-using-homing-pigeons-to-deliver-messages-to-operat/ TOR Project (2015) Overview. Accessed online: https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html. en#thesolution Tung L (2008) Jih¯adists get world-class encryption Kit. ZDNet. Accessed online: http://www.zdnet. com/article/Jih¯adJih¯adists-get-world-class-encryption-kit/ USA v. Usama Bin Laden et al (2001) US District Court, Southern District of New York. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023. Day 2 Van Tilborg HCA (2005) Encyclopedia of cryptography and security. Springer Varghese J (2014) IS warns ‘brothers’ against using ‘unsafe’ WhatsApp fearing NSA, GCHQ Snoop. International Business Times. Accessed online: https://www.ibtimes.co.in/isis-warns-bro thers-against-using-unsafe-whatsapp-fearing-nsa-gchq-snoop-611628 Wege CA (2018) The changing Islamic state intelligence apparatus. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 31(2):271–288 Weimann G (2010) Terror on Facebook, twitter, and YouTube. Brown Journal of World Affairs 16(ii):45–54 Yaari E (1970) Strike terror—the story of Fatah. Hebrew Publ. Co Yannakogeorgos PA (2014) Rethinking the threat of cyberterrorism. In: Chen TM, Jarvis L, Macdonald S (eds) Cyberterrorism—understanding, assessing and response. Springer. pp 43–63

Chapter 11

Counterfeiting

Abstract Jih¯adi agents often have to use false documents to disguise their identity and nationality. This common intelligence practise applies to Jih¯adi groups as well as state agencies. In both cases, individuals involved in intelligence gathering or covert operations may require false or forged passports. The element of safe travel is also significant and important for Jih¯adi groups and the planning of their operations, while ISIS in particular has managed to use forgeries in the area of propaganda as well. Keywords Counterfeit Passports · Safe Travel · PLO · Propaganda “When a Muslim secret agent leaves his country, he tries to cause the least amount of troubles for himself. For example: he will travel on his original passport and not a fake one to avoid more problems in case his fake passport is found to be forged.”1

Jih¯adi operatives often have to use false documents in order to disguise their identity and nationality. This common intelligence practise applies to Jih¯adi groups just as much as does to governmental entities. In both cases, elements involved with human intelligence gathering or covert operations may require false or counterfeit passports:2 Indeed, Ali Mohamed confirms this notion in his al-Qaeda manual: “All documents of the undercover brother, such as identity cards and passport, should be falsified.”3

Identifying intelligence operatives involved in these aspects of operations can soon become a matter of internal security and counterintelligence—especially with respect to Jih¯adis, for whom fake or counterfeit passports are invaluable tools that secure freedom of movement.4 This is because crossing into an enemy’s territory or stepping over the border is generally one of the riskiest parts of an intelligence operation.5 Especially with respect to Jih¯adi groups, the risks of crossing into an adversary’s territory (but also the recruitment and safe transfer of Jih¯adi fighters into 1

IS (2015a), p. 66. Musco and Coralluzzo (2016). 3 Post (2004). 4 Musco and Coralluzzo (2016). 5 Salter (2003), p. 34. 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_11

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warzones, i.e. the territories controlled by the Islamic State) becomes a major risk factor, which certainly explains why such great importance and emphasis have been allocated to counterfeiting passports and operating under false identities6 : “This month, the soldiers of the Khil¯afah sent a forceful message to the camp of kufr and riddah, striking and terrorizing them in multiple lands, and with no visas, borders, and passports to stand in the way.”7

The nationality of a passport can further require a visa or proof of sufficient financial means in order to enter a destination country.8 However, for Jih¯adi operatives, the possibility of travelling without many visa requirements makes a lot of operational sense and thus, European counterfeit passports or stolen European passports are highly sought after.9 Indeed, the 2015 raid of an IS safe house by a Syrian rebel group uncovered the stolen passports of Westerners from the US, the UK, Albania, Germany, Holland, Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Israel, Kosovo, Latvia, Finland, the Czech Republic and France. Potential Jih¯adis used these stolen passports in order to travel to Syria, whereas IS elements and affiliates in the West—most likely related to their intelligence service Emni—specifically targeted people who bore resemblance to said Jih¯adis.10 Two such affiliates of the Islamic State have since been captured by Turkish security services at Istanbul’s international airport carrying 148 original EU passports11 : “What is your excuse oh my brother in Europe? … You, my beloved brother, if you take those small steps today, can reach Syria with your passport in a day or two, without any entry barriers along the way, and not exceeding even five hundred dollars!”12

The Islamic State has issued the story of a young Bengali student who had joined the group at a very early stage, but naturally faced travel issues. Also, in the 14th edition of Dabiq, we can see the emphasis the Jih¯adi group has put on intelligence and counterintelligence as well as on counterfeiting documents and the justification for forgery. “Ab¯u Jandal faced many obstacles on his path for Hijra. His plan was to feign travel to an engineering conference in the Middle East as a cover for his Hijra. He would need a reference letter from his college … but the problem was that he had already stopped attending classes at the college … And so Allah facilitated for him solutions from places he hadn’t expected. Placing his trust in Allah alone, Ab¯u Jandal was able to forge a reference letter from his college, and Allah blinded the eyes of the murtadd¯ın, who didn’t notice the obvious signs of forgery in both the stamp and the signature in the reference letter.”13 6

9/11 Commission Report (2006). IS (2015b), p. 17. 8 Salter (2003), p. 4. 9 Musco and Coralluzzo (2016). 10 Vorgehese (2015). 11 Engel (2015). 12 Jabhat al-Nusra (2015), p. 53. . 13 IS (2016). 7

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Such travel issues, as they are referred to by IS, are an inherent problem when conducting covert or intelligence operations within the Jih¯adi realm. Also, al-Qaeda’s operational planning has been affected by the issue of safe travelling and travel documents since the spring of 1999, when the group realised that their plans may be jeopardised by the fact that the two Yemen-born Jih¯adis (Walid bin Attash and Abu Bara al Yemeni) might not be able to receive US visas, while Saudi operatives in the group such as Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Salem al-Hazmi did not encounter the same difficulties. Due to this particular issue of not being able to obtain US visas for the Yemeni group members,14 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed decided to launch the operation in two separate components.15 The first component would involve the Saudis operatives crashing hijacked planes into targets in America. The second component was originally focused on the idea of a Yemini suicide operative blowing up US-flagged planes in mid-air outside the US and on routes across East Asia.16 The Yemenis never carried out the second part of the operation, but it certainly illustrates the importance of passports and counterfeit documents as they played a key role in the planning of al-Qaeda’s attacks from the very beginning.17 In fact, passports even altered the operational planning of the group.

11.1 The Different Kinds of Counterfeit Passports According to Musco et al., counterfeit passports can be classified as either existing passports, which have been stolen or lost and were forged afterwards by counterfeiters, and blank passports, which are usually original documents from a governmental institution.18 In some cases, governmental employees may also have been involved in the theft of such documents. This steady “migration” of passports onto the black market can be especially observed in states with comparatively weak structures. As such, from 1990 to 2005, roughly 41,000 blank Pakistani passports have disappeared from various embassies or from the ministry of foreign affairs.19 In most cases, the key difference between a forged passport and a blank passport lies in the quality of the counterfeit document, since altering an existing and already printed/filled out passport forces the counterfeiter to first remove the old information and then replace it with new data, which generally requires tools and a specific skill set.20 However, simply adding data or a photograph to a blank document dramatically increases the quality of the forgery and may allow for the easy evasion of border 14

9/11 Commission Report (2006), p. 156. Ibid, p. 156. 16 Ibid, p. 156. 17 9/11 Commission Report (2006), p. 156. 18 Musco and Coralluzzo (2016). 19 Sadiq (2008), pp. 187–189. 20 Musco and Coralluzzo (2016). 15

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checks21 while simultaneously requiring a lesser skillset. Such genuine passports can be obtained by corrupt institutions and officials. This was the case with respect to a group of Indian Jih¯adis who had gotten their hands on original Nepalese passports, which allowed them to enter both Europe or Asia.22 al-Qaeda associate Louia Sakka apparently travelled across the Turkish border up to 55 times using up to 18 different passports.23 In the same vein, al-Qaeda instructed its 9/11 hijackers to obtain new passports—most likely officially issued passports, and not blanks—from the authorities of their home countries prior to their application for a US visa so as to avoid raising suspicion regarding previous travels in areas frequented by al-Qaeda. After having received the “clean” passports, they are most likely doctored by al-Qaeda’s counterfeiters, who then erase suspicious stamps to mislead border officials.24 Indeed, if marginally doctored original passports or blank passports are used by Jih¯adi operatives, investigating or even spotting their covert identities may turn out to be a significant challenge for security services. In Syria, 18,002 blank passports have been stolen from government sites and are now in the possession of IS and other local Jih¯adi groups.25 These passports have not yet been filled out with personal details, which renders them even more valuable— particularly for terrorist attacks. Consequently, IS has set up what has been termed a “fake document industry” in Syria, Iraq and Libya.26 The group is also likely to be in possession of passport-printing machines, allowing them to issue Syrian passports that look mighty legitimate. This has caused significant concern as this likely enabled Jih¯adi operatives to travel to Europe.27 IS allegedly issued 11,000 of their own passports to people living inside its territory. They were produced at a former government ‘Identification and Passport Center’ in Mosul.28 While these passports, baring the Islamic State’s seal, may serve a more propagandistic purpose, authentic-looking counterfeit Syrian passports have already been used in France to enable operatives to work covertly, which ultimately lead to the November, 2015, Paris attacks. A Syrian passport was later found near the body of suicide bomber Ahmad Al Muh.ammad, who successfully launched an attack at one of Paris’ most notable football stadiums.29 Islamic State attacks abroad are commonly planned and executed by the Emni. Emni members and attackers are selected based on loyalty, abilities and their nationality, considering that European passport holders have a distinct advantage when trying to operate covertly on enemy territory. Jih¯adis with Western passports are

21

Musco and Coralluzzo (2016). Sharmer (2015). 23 Rudner (2015). 24 9/11 Commission Report (2006), p. 169. 25 Al-Jazeera (2017). 26 Ross et al. (2016). 27 Ibid. 28 Youmans (2017), 10(60). 29 Reuters (2015). 22

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specifically recruited in order to launch and run operations or attacks in their homelands.30 There are several prime examples for this strategy, most particularly Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the Belgian-Moroccan mastermind behind the November, 2015, Paris attacks31 or Frenchman Reda Hame, who worked as an IT expert for an Airbus subsidiary.32 Both men were approach by the Emni and ultimately ended up working for Jih¯adi intelligence service.33 The IS cadre also went on to supply them with the necessary training and documents.34 Similar efforts to recruit holders of Western passports have also been undertaken ˇ by al-Qaeda-affiliated gˇ am¯a ᶜat Hur¯as¯an (Khorasan Group) and the Gabhat an-Nus.ra ˘ aš-Š¯am). Particularly, the Korasan Group led by ˇ (former Gabhat an-Nus.ra li-Ahl Muhsin al-Fadhli35 has been very active in recruiting European and American Jih¯adis with the respective passports that the bomb-making skills of AQAP could be used for targets in the EU or the US.36 In fact, this effort and recruitment based on respective passports may have climaxed in the establishment of training camps for Western passport holders, so that they could be specifically trained for deployment to their home countries.37

11.2 Safe Travel “ASIO (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation) was also blinded and were unable to gather enough information to prevent me from flying despite their continuous efforts. I had designed my flight so that I would appear to be travelling to Lebanon, disguising it as a trip to visit family. However, my intention was that during my stop-over in Abu Dhabi I would arrange tickets to Turkey.”38

The element of safe travel is significant and important for Jih¯adi groups and the planning of their operations. While IS has allegedly even started an entire industry of falsifying passports,39 al-Qaeda’s preparations and planning for the 9/11 attacks were based on many international trips and meetings. Such operations require safe travel and with respect to al-Qaeda, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah

30

Callimachi (2016). Sky News (2015). 32 Speckhard and Yayla (n.d.), p. 11. 33 Borger (2015). 34 Callimachi (2016). See also: Speckhard and Yayla (2016). 35 Mazzetti et al. (2014). 36 CBS News (2014). 37 Gorman and Barnes (2014). 38 IS (2017), p. 32. 39 At the same point in time Syrian passports were highly expensive to obtain. Hence, they might also have been used as a revenue stream aside from mere supplying IS fighters with them. See: Abdul-Ahad (2015). 31

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facilitated most of the travel arrangements for al-Qaeda Jih¯adis.40 In addition, the group’s security committee had taken responsibility for establishing an entire office dedicated to the acquisition of passports, visas, and occurring issues with their host countries. Ironically, this office was actually located at the Kandahar airport and was run by al-Qaeda’s military chief Mohammed Atef, an Egyptian who much like Ali Mohamed and Ayman al-Zawahiri was an early member of the Egyptian Islamic Jih¯ad group.41 Under his management, the office altered and produced passports, official papers, visas, and IDs.42 Members of the group also engaged in passport collection schemes, and even up to this date, al-Qaeda requires Jih¯adists to hand over their personal documents and passports before joining so that, in the case of their death, at least the passports could be recycled.43 Unsurprisingly, this institutionalisation of counterfeiting is very much in line with the recommendation issued by Ali Mohamed, who wrote: “All falsification matters should be carried out through the command and not haphazardly.”44

Furthermore, al-Qaeda has always dedicated a high level of detail and careful attention to this element of their covert operations, having explicitly identified situations, behaviour or errors that could turn out to be a risk to their operational security and counterintelligence doctrine. Ali Mohamed mentions the safekeeping of passports in his al-Qaeda manual too, and intriguingly also identifies a counterintelligence risk with respect to the use of documents: “Keeping the passport in a safe place so it would not be seized by the security apparatus, and the brother it belongs to would have to negotiate its return (I’ll give you your passport if you give me information.)”45

IS followed a highly similar strategy.46 Furthermore, the office responsible for counterfeiting documents has also held courses for Jih¯adi operatives on how to forge and alter documents. The methods taught in their curriculum extend to substituting photographs and manipulating passport stamps. The office even produced a manual on removing and altering visas, which they circulated amongst Jih¯adi operatives, including Mohamed Atta and Zakariya Essabar, who both received training in alternating passports.47 This training was conducted in order to enable Jih¯adis to make necessary adjustments on their own while travelling and in the field, but also in order

40

9/11 Commission Report (2006), p. 169. Dawoud (2001). 42 9/11 Commission Report (2006), p. 169. 43 Ibid, p. 169. 44 Post (2004). 45 Ibid. 46 Engel (2016). 47 9/11 Commission Report (2006), p. 169. 41

11.3 The Jihaz Al-Amn Al-Muwahhad (PLO) and Counterfeiting

241

to develop an institutional capacity for counterfeiting with respect to institutional learning.48 A similar institutionalised system had been established in parallel by the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria before the group decided to move on to Jordan and Iraq. Their sophisticated system provided their members and refugees with forged documents ranging from university certificates to passports, which they also shipped back to Syria, where these documents ultimately ended up in the hands of Jih¯adi groups. Initially, the local Jih¯adi groups in Syria depended on these documents until they started to develop their own system for counterfeiting documents.49 ,50

11.3 The Jihaz Al-Amn Al-Muwahhad (PLO) and Counterfeiting The utilisation of forged counterfeit passports or blank passports can also be seen with respect to groups and movements established prior to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State group. The PLO, which originally used the concept of Jih¯adism in order to push its nationalistic goals, also has a history of counterfeiting and covert intelligence work based on fake documents. The group’s security service, Jihaz Al-Amn al-Muwahhad (Unified Intelligence Apparatus), which was partially funded by the Gulf States, coordinated the intelligence efforts of all the guerrilla groups and thus, engaged in forging documents as well.51 This was also due to the Jihaz Al-Amn al-Muwahhad’s close cooperation with Libya. Indeed, Abu Iyad (also known as Salah Khalaf), the PLO’s intelligence chief, established close ties with Gaddafi after the Jihaz Al-Amn al-Muwahhad had helped him capture and execute his enemy Omar al-Muhaishi, a former member of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council.52 However, with respect to counterfeiting, the Jihaz Al-Amn al-Muwahhad was also charged with recruiting people with proven skills in forging documents, passports, driving licenses, banknotes or coins.53 These institutionalized efforts to counterfeit passports rendered it comparatively unproblematic for Palestinians to acquire the necessary papers in order to travel and leave the occupied territories.54 It was for the very same reason that the operatives of the Jihaz Al-Amn al-Muwahhad were supplied with forged passports and documents prior to any operation.55 48

Ibid, p. 169. Al-Suri (2002). 50 Ibn Hisham (1979), p. 80. See also: Bashmil (n.d.), p. 127. 51 Sayigh (1999). 52 Zagorin (1989). 53 Al-Asmari (2009), p. 189. 54 Ibid, p. 189. 55 Ibid, p. 189. 49

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11.4 Counterfeiting and Propaganda We can see that passports play an additional propagandistic role within the Jih¯adi subculture. Aside from the operational necessity of obtaining counterfeit documents, they have turned into elements of propaganda and supposedly stimulate selfidentification with the concept of an Islamic State. Not only has the Islamic State started to print its own passports to give itself and its unrecognised territory an air of legitimacy, they have also incorporated these documents into their narrative and propaganda. With respect to international travel, the issuing of passports bearing the insignia of the Islamic State may prove to be lacking all tact, but issuing these passports is certainly more about sending a message. Supposedly, governmental-style documents indicate that the group considers its self-proclaimed Caliphate to be the world’s latest state. Furthermore, according to M. Rainstorm, the introduction of passports can also be seen as psychological warfare, as the cover of the alleged IS passports reads: “If the holder of the passport is harmed, we will deploy armies for his service.”56

Intimidating, as this may seem, the passports issued by IS mainly serve the purpose of self-identification and identification with the group and the Jih¯adi cause as a whole. This element of counterfeit passports must not be underestimated, because selfidentification with the Jih¯adi cause, according to W. Mendel, leads to radicalisation and ultimately Jih¯adization. This is what IS has to say about it: “So come to your State and rally around your Khal¯ıfah. O muwahhid¯ın in the lands of alHaramayn, glad tidings, for the jih¯ad that you prepared your saddles for has arrived to the doorsteps of your homes, and no borders will inhibit you from reaching it, nor will any passports or visas prevent you from achieving it.”57

References 9/11 Commission Report (2006) Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States. W. W. Norton & Company Abdul-Ahad G (2015) Concern over burgeoning trade in fake and stolen Syrian passports. The Guardian. Accessed online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/growing-concernover-trade-in-fake-and-stolen-syrian-passports Al-Asmari AA (2009) Arab Islamic concept of intelligence in the case of Fatah Paramilitary. Brunel University Al-Jazeera (2017) ISIL holds 11,100 blank Syrian passports. Al-Jazeera. Accessed online: http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/isil-holds-11100-blank-syrian-passports-report-170910090 921948.html Al-Suri AM (2002) Lessons learned from the Jih¯ad Ordeal in Syria. Document captured by US troops in Afghanistan 2002. AFGP-2002-600080. Accessed online: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/upl oads/2013/10/AFGP-2002-600080-Translation.pdf 56 57

Youmans (2017), 10(60). IS (2014), p. 23.

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Bashmil MA (n.d) Ghazwat Bader, 7th edn. Dar Al-fikr Borger J (2015) Abdelhamid Abaaoud: dead Paris terror planner leaves behind countless what-ifs. The Guardian. Accessed online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/19/abdelhamidabaaoud-dead-paris-terror-leader-leaves-behind-countless-what-ifs Callimachi R (2016) How a secretive branch of ISIS built a global network of killers. New York Times. Accessed online: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/middleeast/ISIS-ger man-recruit-interview.html?_r=0 CBS News (2014) Al Qaeda’s quiet plan to outdo ISIS and hit U.S. CBS News. Accessed online: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-Qaeda-khorasan-syria-bigger-threat-to-us-than-IS/ Dawoud K (2001) Mohammed Atef: Egyptian militant who rose to the top of the al-Qaida hierarchy. The Guardian. Accessed online: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2001/nov/19/guardianobit uaries.afghanistan Engel P (2015) 2 ISIS suspects allegedly stuffed 150 European passports into pizza ovens to smuggle them into Turkey. Business Insider Deutschland. Accessed online: https://www.businessinsider. de/isis-suspects-passports-europe-2015-12?r=US&IR=T Engel P (2016) It’s ‘hell’: how ISIS prevents people from fleeing its ‘Caliphate’. Business Insider. Accessed online: https://www.businessinsider.de/how-isis-controls-life-Caliphate-raqqa-capital2015-12?r=US&IR=T Gorman S, and Barnes JE (2014) U.S. Tracks threats against West by Al Qaeda Affiliate in Syria. The Wall Street Journal. Accessed online: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-tracks-threats-aga inst-west-by-al-qaeda-affiliate-in-syria-1411083639 Ibn Hisham AMM (1979) Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiah. Moassat Aolom Al-Quran, vol 1 IS (2014) Dabiq no. 5 IS (2015a) How to survive in the West—a Mujahid’s guide. p 66 IS (2015b) Dabiq no. 8 IS (2016) Dabiq no. 14 IS (2017) Rumiyah, Issue no. 13 Jabhat al-Nus.ra (2015) Al-Risalah Magazine, no. 2 Mazzetti M et al (2014) U.S. suspects more direct threats beyond IS. The New York Times. Accessed online: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/world/middleeast/us-sees-other-more-dir ect-threats-beyond-IS-.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimes Musco S, Coralluzzo V (2016) Sneaking under cover: assessing the relevance of passports for intelligence operations. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 29(3):427– 446 Post JM (ed) (2004) Military studies in the Jih¯ad against the Tyrants. USAF Counterproliferation Center. Accessed online: http://www.au.af.mil/au/cpc/assets/alqaedatrainingmanual.pdf Reuters (2015) Paris concert gunman was French, known to have Islamist ties—source. Reuters. Accessed online: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-shooting-gunman-france/paris-con cert-gunman-was-french-known-to-have-islamist-ties-source-idUKKCN0T30YU20151114 Ross B et al (2016) ISIS has whole fake passport ‘industry,’ official says. ABC News. Accessed online: http://abcnews.go.com/International/IS-fake-passport-industry-official/story? id=36505984 Rudner M (2015) Misuse of passports: identity fraud, the propensity to travel, and international terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31(2):101 Sadiq K (2008) Paper citizens: how illegal immigrants acquire citizenship in developing countries. Oxford University Press Salter MB (2003) Rights of passage: the passport in international relations. Lynne Rienner Publishers Sayigh Y (1999) Armed struggle and the search for state: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993. Oxford University Press, p 311 Sharmer C (2015) Nepal on alert for Indian terrorists travelling in Europe with fake passport. Asia News. Accessed online: http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Nepal-on-alert-for-Indian-terrorists-tra velling-in-Europe-with-fake-passport-33852.html

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Sky News (2015) Suspected mastermind of Paris attacks named. Sky News. Accessed online: https:// news.sky.com/video/suspected-mastermind-of-paris-attacks-still-on-the-run-10339037 Speckhard A, Yayla AS (2016) ISIS defectors: inside stories of the terrorist Caliphate. Advances Press LLC, McLean, VA Speckhard A and Yayla AS (n.d.) The ISIS Emni: the inner workings and origins of ISIS’ s intelligence apparatus. Accessed Online: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-emni-the-inn er-workings-and-origins-of-isiss-intelligence-apparatus/ Vorgehese J (2015) Isis Jih¯adis using passports stolen from westerners to travel to Syria. International Business Times. Accessed online: http://www.ibtimes.co.in/IS-Jih¯adJih¯adis-using-passports-sto len-westerners-travel-syria-report-632201 Youmans WL (2017) The Islamic state’s passport Paradox. 21st Century Global Dynamics Zagorin A (1989) Auditing the PLO. In: Norton A, Greenbery M (eds) The international relations of the PLO. Carbondale, pp 196–199

Chapter 12

Safe Houses

Abstract While safe houses play a crucial role in the workflow of intelligence agencies today, they were also part of the Sunnah and the life of Prophet Muh.ammad. In the earliest stages of Islam, when Muh.ammad was trying to grow the movement out of the clandestine underground, it became clear that a secure religious and operational base was needed. Today, in terms of intelligence activities, a safe house is a secret place suitable for hiding people, intelligence operatives or activities from potential adversaries or security services. For Jih¯adi intelligence, they have become an even more important necessity. In addition to securing communications and transport, they have become indispensable for operational Jih¯adi intelligence cells. Keywords A Prerequisite for Intelligence Collection · Osama Bin Laden · Abbottabad Safe House · Al-Qaeda “After the raid on the safe house, they figured out that I had been with the brothers and that we had been planning operations together. So they gathered intelligence agents from all over the world – from Europe and America – in order to detain me.—Dabiq no. 7, Interview with an attacker of the Paris 2017 attacks.”1

While safe houses play a crucial present-day role in the intelligence workflow, they have also been part of the Sunnah and the life of the Prophet Muh.ammad. At the earliest stages of Islam, when Muh.ammad tried to grow the movement from the secretive underground, it became evident that a safe religious and operational base was needed. Muh.ammad consequently embarked on a search for a safe house and the house of al-Arqam ibn Ab¯ı l-Arqam was chosen on the east side of As-Safa Hill2 in order to evade persecution by Quraiš in Mecca. Intriguingly, the Quraiš did not consider it suspicious, as its owner was a member of a clan involved in a dispute with the clan of Muh.ammad,3 but also because it was located in a narrow street, which allowed it to be entered and exited unnoticed. After the prophet had moved into the house of al-Arqam ibn Ab¯ı l-Arqam, it became known as “The House of Islam” or “The Safe House”.4 1

IS (2015a), p. 72. Ibn Hisham (1979), p. 80. 3 Al-Ghadban (1991), p. 49. 4 Suwaed and Kahana (2018). 2

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Today, a safe house, with respect to intelligence activities, is a secret place suitable to hide people, intelligence operatives or activities from potential adversaries or security services. In terms of Jih¯adi intelligence, they have become an even more crucial necessity and aside from securing communication and transportation, they have become indispensable for operational Jih¯adi intelligence cells.5 Furthermore, they can actually bridge the gap between real-life and online training (due to the possibilities of real-life training) without necessarily having to travel outside a country’s borders.6 Indeed, it is necessary for most Jih¯adi operations to run safe houses for the purpose of them either being a centre of armoury, a command and control centre, a rest stop, a bomb factory or for the purpose of indoctrination.7 This diverse approach requires choosing a safe house based on the location and the size necessary for the purpose it is to serve. According to al-Qaeda, this may be either cell meetings, storage of equipment, storage of arms, hiding fugitives or work on the preparation for an attack.8 Safe houses, however, can also play a critical role in indoctrinating and training new recruits. Since many of the higher-ranking Jih¯adi military leaders have been killed or arrested, they may substitute for the social aspects and bonds within the group, which would otherwise be experienced in real-life training, in the field or at the frontline.9 This aspect is in fact highly relevant in order to sustain a Jih¯adi network (see chapter: Jih¯adi Intelligence and Epistemology).10 Safe houses are commonly kept a secret and their location will only be known to a limited number of people in order to guarantee the operational security and the safety of those hiding inside it. To this end, al-Qaeda’s manual, as written by Ali Mohamed, states that, “Under no circumstances should anyone know about the apartment except those who use it”.11 Due to the critical value of safe houses and the high counterintelligence risk involved in cases of exposure, this assessment holds true for Jih¯adi groups and governmental intelligence services alike. Properties used for the purpose of becoming a safe house are commonly rented/bought and returned/sold once they are no longer of any use to the intelligence service. They may serve a variety of different purposes for the time they are occupied by intelligence elements. With respect to al-Qaeda, for instance, renting a safe house has only been done by a select number of members who used false names and covers. The group has dedicated significant attention to acquiring safe houses, and already in one of its early manuals, “Declaration of Jih¯ad against the country’s Tyrants”, devotes an entire chapter to tips on how to inconspicuously rent safe houses.12

5

Gunaratna (2002), pp. 79–80. Tonnessen (2008). 7 Olson (2012). 8 Post (2004). 9 Tonnessen (2008). 10 Ibid. pp. 543–562. 11 Post (2004). 12 Ibid. Ch. Safe houses. 6

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Unless the person has a non-Muslim appearance, no Jih¯adi has been allowed to rent more than one property in a predefined area.13 Additionally, the group has avoided renting properties that may already have been subject to an investigation conducted by security services in the past. They’ll generally prefer newly developed areas where neighbourhoods are not as tight-knit as in older parts of a city.14 In order to facilitate easy escape options and contingency plans in case of a police raid, ground floor properties have also generally been favoured by the group.15 Safe houses should fit well with the overall cover of an operation and should not attract unnecessary attention due to frequent visitors, who may also fail to blend into the environment very well. Despite having been given some safe houses by proresistance Iraqis, some of them located in Mosul or Haditha have been described as “dark, dank places with no hot water or electricity”,16 since due to the lack of popularity of the Jih¯adis amongst the local Iraqi population, the shades had to be pulled down all the times.17 Other safe houses have also been built specifically for a unique purpose. The house that sheltered the journalist hostage Jill Carroll doublefunctioned as a meeting space for command and control and as a bomb-making facility, having been under construction at the time the journalist was held there.18 Tønnessen argues that safe houses can be a perfect environment for indoctrination, as being forced to stay together with fellow Jih¯adis and military or ideological trainers for extensive periods of time may have a profound effect on recruits.19 Indeed, they can play an important role in recruit socialising, which contributes to the commitment of Jih¯adi cadres.20 In order to achieve this, al-Qaeda has put great emphasis on the perfect cover. The group has chosen its safe houses based on detailed considerations with respect to their location, the avoidance of isolated and deserted locations, and with regards to the nature of the utilisation of the property. Consequently, al-Qaeda recommends: “Providing the necessary cover for the people who frequent the apartment (students, workers, employees, etc.) … [and] …Avoiding seclusion and isolation from the population and refraining from going to the apartment at suspicious times.”21

Abd Al Aziz al Muqrin takes the idea of not attracting attention a step further and even recommends that an “appropriate car must be bought to blend in with the neighbourhood’s atmosphere”.22 Furthermore, this emphasis on not causing any unwanted attention also needed to be supported by the relevant documents. Thus, Jih¯adis posing 13

Ibid. Ch. Safe houses. Ibid. Ch. Safe houses. 15 Gunaratna (2002), pp. 79–80. 16 Downey (2006). 17 Ibid. 18 Carroll and Grier (2006). 19 Ghosh (2005). 20 Tonnessen (2008). 21 Post (2004). 22 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 120. 14

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as physicians, for instance, were required to also provide a medical diploma, to be part of a medical union or even possess basic medical knowledge (see chapter: Counterfeiting). Lastly, covers needed to be merged with local conditions and situations. This meant that a doctor was instructed to only open a clinic in a location that would actually be appropriate, suitable and in need for such an establishment, while the cover stories of visiting Jih¯adis must consequently also be matched.23 Al-Qaeda has established cover businesses and NGOs in Kenya and also funded a charity in order to provide operatives with counterfeit documents.24 Additionally, a fishing and a car company were founded in order to support the operational activities in Kenya and Tanzania25 based on the recommendation of Ali Mohamed.26 However, using front companies and business covers to hide clandestine operations and safe houses is not necessarily a new concept and has always been used by spies since the beginning of espionage.27 Especially al-Qaeda has benefitted greatly from the expertise of former Egyptian intelligence operative Ali Mohamed, who eventually wrote up the group’s rather extensive segment on safe houses. It was at the same time—between 1995 and 2000, when Ali Mohamed had spied for al-Qaeda in the US and wrote his manual—when the group started losing significant support from its host state Sudan after the US started to put pressure on it in 1994 shortly after the embassy bombings of 1998.28 Due to the resulting lack of sanctuaries, al-Qaeda had to start relying on safe houses, which were used as meeting places, as arms depots, arms construction facilities, and bomb-making laboratories in addition to centres for religious and war-conducting indoctrination.29

12.1 A Prerequisite for Intelligence Collection Most importantly, safe houses serve an operational purpose and allow for the collection and analysis of intelligence. For example, the safe house of Afghan Jih¯adis, who were operating in New Zealand in 2000 and planning to attack a nuclear power plant, were mainly used for command and control purposes. Their safe house included a conference room, marked up map boards, planning materials, and a photo wall of entry points and exit points of the nuclear power plant.30 A safe house can also be used as an armoury as illustrated by the case of alQaeda supply master Sami Ben Khemais. When his safe house in Milan was raided 23

Gunaratna (2002), pp. 79–80. Bergen (2006), p. 264. 25 Ibid, p. 264. 26 USA. v. Usama Bin Laden et al. (2001). 27 Champion (2008). 28 Wright (2007), p. 272. 29 Tonnessen (2008). 30 Olson (2012). 24

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by the Italian police, firearms, explosives, chemicals needed for explosives, and cyanide were uncovered together with training materials and propaganda videos.31 In addition, the cell of Sami Ben Khemais attempted to transport hydrogen cyanide crystals in containers reassembling tomato cans, which goes hand in hand with the AQ advice to create hiding spots inside the safe house so as to conceal operation-specific weapons, money or passports.32

12.2 Osama Bin Laden’s Safe House The most prominent Jih¯adi safe house, set up for Osama Bin Laden himself, was surrounded by perimeters, concrete walls, and security gates. The safe house itself, while not nothing of note architecturally and very similar to the surrounding buildings, had very few windows but was set up to guarantee a rudimentary level of independence from outside supplies. Thus, it included a vegetable garden, some rabbits, chickens, and a cow. For counterintelligence purposes, phones or Internet wires were absent, and security cameras were installed next to several satellite dishes.33 Furthermore, al-Qaeda issued the guideline of conducting countersurveillance before entering the premise, where permission to enter is first granted with a pre-arranged signal.34 Intriguingly, Osama Bin Laden did not care to follow the advice of his spy Ali Mohamed when establishing this safe house. As to why this was the case remains subject to speculation and perhaps al-Qaeda assumed that Ali-Mohamed, who had already been detained previously in 1998 after the Embassy bombings in Africa, might have informed his interrogators about the strategies he outlined for al-Qaeda. At the very least, Osama Bin Laden must have known that his adversaries were very well aware of al-Qaeda’s manual outlining the strategies for safe houses, as this titbit was widely covered by the news media, which he was known to follow. Nonetheless, Ali Mohamed advised the following: “Care should be exercised not to rent apartments that are known to the security apparatus [such as] those used for immoral or prior Jih¯ad activities…[and]…Avoiding police stations and government buildings. Apartments should not be rented near those places.”35

Osama bin Laden appears to have ignored this advice when he moved into the Abbottabad compound in August, 2005.36 However, earlier in his life, when he lived and launched his operations from Khartoum, Sudan, he apparently heeded Ali Mohamed’s advice, stating that: 31

Ibid. Post (2004). 33 BBC (2011). 34 Gunaratna (2002), pp. 79–80. 35 Post (2004). 36 Hashim (2013). 32

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“It is preferable to rent apartments in newly developed areas where people do not know one another. Usually, in older quarters people know one another and strangers are easily identified, especially since these quarters have many informers.”37

Indeed, when Osama bin Laden moved to Sudan, his house, according to M. Richard, was situated in the rather comfortable Sudanese version of the Bel Air district. It may not have been the most opulent structure in this newly developed area, dominated by wealthy Sudanese or foreigners,38 but it also did not attract much attention, which allowed Bin Laden to even purchase some guesthouses across the street for his top officials.39 This may, moreover, also be due to the advice given by Abd al Aziz al Muqrin, who suggests that a safe house “must be far from workingclass neighbourhoods, where an outsider stands out, because the people all know each other”.40 Safe houses are key-elements of Jih¯adi operations and uncovering a safe house can compromise cells, plans, and materials.41 Al-Qaeda tends to prefer apartments and houses in cities as locations for preparing their operation. This is an approach that has apparently been assumed by IS as well, as a Dabiq interview with the wanted Jih¯adi Abu Umar al-Baljiki illustrates: “We spent months trying to find a way into Europe, and by Allah’s strength, we succeeded in finally making our way to Belgium. We were then able to obtain weapons and set up a safe house while we planned to carry out operations against the crusaders. All of this was facilitated for us by Allah.”42

Furthermore, aside from collecting information—Abd al Aziz al Muqrin even considers it the collection of “raw intelligence”, implying a certain level of analysis, which might be conducted elsewhere or inside the safe house itself.43 Al-Qaeda has used safe houses to observe governmental employees and as hiding places, whereas larger bases in rural areas have been proposed for use to dispatch assassination squads or train members.44 Indeed, aside from their operational importance, safe houses have often been used for training and meeting purposes. Abu’Abdallah alShami taught classes on explosives and on setting up suicide vehicles in his safe house.45 Abu Nasir al-Libi was hosted in the same accommodation46 ,47 and Abu Umar al-Masri converted his home into as safe house in order to create a space for

37

Post (2004). Laessing and Abdelaziz (2011). 39 Richard (2004), pp. 47–48. 40 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 162. 41 Olson (2012). 42 IS (2015a), p. 73. 43 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 165. 44 Post (2004), p. 102. 45 Al-Firdaws Forum (2006a). 46 Al-Firdaws Forum (2006b). 47 Al-Firdaws Forum (2006c). 38

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cell meetings.48 Abu Khalid al-Suri reportedly also stayed et al.-Masri’s house and undergone a course in bomb- making at the same location.49 However, some Jih¯adis in Iraq mentioned that they were only provided with theoretical training, which included how to operate pistols and rifles, but that their training did not cover how to actually shoot them or any practical lessons.50 If we consider the true purpose of a safe house outlined at the beginning of this chapter, namely to secretly shelter intelligence elements, the shooting of rifles and throwing of grenades could theoretically easily lead to detection and amount to a security threat.51 After all, what would be the purpose of avoiding detection at all costs only to achieve the exact opposite by firing weapons inside a supposedly unsuspicious house. This kind of training is best conducted outside of cities: “My guides reassured me that soon we would reach a safe house but in the dark I could not see any sign of human life. Over ridges, through water streams flowing through the mountains, over stony rocks, we came to an area surrounded by trees. When we entered the hollow, we saw a small mud hut. That was the safe house of the Taliban.”52

Al-Qaeda suggests flexibility, stating that if the area doesn’t feature mountains or harsh terrain, all stages of an operation and the necessary safe houses can be moved into cities. This may not hold true for weapons training, but it certainly includes explosives training, indoctrinating future Jih¯adis,53 and providing a platform for creating and socialising committed Jih¯adi cadres.54 Consequently, they also play an important role in what IS has termed the “Hijra” to its Islamic State. As such, they serve a very pragmatic purpose by allowing the provision of supplies, recruits, and counterfeit documents: “Islamic State members have safe houses in Turkey where many travellers live (usually males only). Here identity papers/passports/visas may be forged to help in smuggling people into Syria. However, it is extremely difficult to know the whereabouts of these houses because it is a secret, unless a person has contact with some of its members who give him a contact number and a tazkiyah (a paper signed by an existing member to show he is trustworthy.)”55

A most important detail in this research, safe houses also serve to aid in collecting raw intelligence and subsequent analysis while providing intelligence operatives with a safe hiding place where documents can be forged and attack plans can be made. As such, they are a key element of covert intelligence operations conducted by governmental actors and Jih¯adi groups alike.

48

Al-Firdaws Forum (2006d). See also: Al-Firdaws Forum (2006e). Al-Hisbahn Forum (2006). 50 Tonnessen (2008). 51 Ibid. pp. 543–562. 52 Shazad (2011). 53 Tonnessen (2008). 54 Ibid, pp. 543–562. 55 IS (2015b), p. 6. 49

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References Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009) A practical course of Guerrilla war (trans: Cigar N). Published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency. Washington Al-Firdaws Forum (2006a) From the biographies of the distinguished Martyrs Nr 20—Abu Abdallah al- Shami. Accessed online: https://www.alfirdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?t=17124 Al-Firdaws Forum (2006b) From the biographies of the distinguished Martyrs Nr 3—Abu Umair al-Suri. Accessed online: https://www.alfirdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?t=17124 Al-Firdaws Forum (2006c) From the biographies of the distinguished Martyrs Nr 19—Abu Nasir al-Lib. Accessed online: https://www.alfirdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?t=17124 Al-Firdaws Forum (2006d) From the biographies of the distinguished Martyrs Nr 8—The Group of Knights: Abu Khabab al-Filistini, Abu ‘Umar al-Masri, Abu Sulayman al-Filistini. Accessed online: https://www.alfirdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?t=17124. Al-Firdaws Forum (2006e) From the biographies of the distinguished Martyrs Nr 1—Abu Usama al-Maghribi. Accessed online: https://www.alfirdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?t=17124 Al-Ghadban MM (1991) Al-Manhaj Al-Haraki L-Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiah. Mktabat Al-Manar Al-Hisbahn Forum (2006) From the biographies of the distinguished Nr 11—Abu Khalid al-Suri. Accessed online: http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=50505 BBC (2011) Bin Laden: Zardari denies Pakistan lax on terror. BBC Mobile South Asia. Accessed online: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13263270 Bergen P (2006) The Osama Bin Laden I know—an oral history of the al Qa’ida leader. Free Press Carroll J, Grier P (2006) Hostage: the Jill Carroll story—part 7: false hopes. Christian Science Monitor. Accessed online: https://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0822/p01s01-woiq.html Champion B (2008) Spies (look) like us: the early use of business and civilian covers in covert operations. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21(3):530–564 Downey T (2006) My bloody career. The guardian, 23 April 2006. Source not available online Ghosh A (2005) Professor of death. TIME, 17 October 2005. Source not available online Gunaratna R (2002) Inside Al Qaeda: global network of terror. Columbia University Press Hashim A (2013) Osama Bin Laden’s builder insists he only knew his boss as the master. Al Jazeera. Source not available online Ibn Hisham AMM (1979) Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiah. Moassat Aolom Al-Quran, vol 1 IS (2015a). Dabiq no. 7 IS (2015b) Hijrah to the Islamic state—what to packup, who to contact, where to go, stories & more Laessing U, Abdelaziz K (2011) Bin Laden’s Sudan home left empty over attack fears. Reuters. Accessed online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-binladen-sudan/bin-ladens-sudanhome-left-empty-over-attack-fears-idUSTRE74140Y20110502 Olson DT (2012) Tactical counterterrorism: the law enforcement manual of terrorism prevention. Charles C Thomas Pub Ltd. Post JM (ed) (2004) Military studies in the Jih¯ad against the Tyrants. USAF Counterproliferation Center. Accessed online: http://www.au.af.mil/au/cpc/assets/alqaedatrainingmanual.pdf Richard M (2004) Losing Bin Laden: how Bill Clinton’s failures unleashed global terror. Regnery Publishing Shazad SS (2011) Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: beyond Bin Laden and 9/11. Pluto Press, p 100 Suwaed MY, Kahana E (2018) Intelligence in the first Muslim state: 610–632 AD. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 31(1):169–184 Tonnessen TH (2008) Training on a battlefield: Iraq as a training ground for global Jih¯adis. Terrorism and Political Violence 20(4):543–562 USA v. Usama Bin Laden et al (2001) Testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y., February 21. p 1139ff Wright L (2007) The looming tower. Penguin

Chapter 13

Covert Operations

Abstract Covert operations have become an integral factor for Jih¯adi intelligence. A governmental covert operation could be defined as one that takes place in plain sight, but where policymakers enjoy the advantage of plausible deniability. Such operations can be political, psychological, economic or (para-)military in nature and are inherently secretive. They follow the rationale of intervening in a clandestine way and actively changing an existing situation with oftentimes limited means. Therefore, covert operations are usually conducted instead of overt military operations. They are highly relevant for Jih¯adi intelligence may also include covert activities in the field of propaganda, economic warfare or subversion, which in turn may involve espionage, counter-espionage and deception. Keywords Emni · Assassinations · ISIS · Black Ops · Covert Operations · Clandestine Operations “Definition of Special Operations: These are operations using military means and basic security. Special operations are some of the tasks of groups specialized in intelligence and security.”—Ali Mohamed.1

Covert operations are considered a highly controversial topic within the intelligence community, but they have become an integral factor for Jih¯adi intelligenceespecially with regards to lone wolf terrorist executing such operations. A covert operation in the governmental sense could be defined as an operation that may actually take place in plain sight, but where political decision makers enjoy the benefit of plausible deniability. Such operations might be of a political, psychological, economical or (para-)military nature and are by nature secretive. However, the definition of what would constitute a covert operation varies and, in some cases, they are also referred to as “special operations” or “action operations”.2 The one factor that these different approaches and terminologies have in common is the intention of intervening in a clandestine manner and actively changing a present

1 2

Post (2004), p. 84. Aldrich et al. (2019), p. 433.

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situation.3 As such, covert operations are commonly executed instead of overt military operations. Covert operations can further include covert activities with respect to propaganda, economic warfare or subversion, which may in turn be linked to espionage, counterespionage and deception.4 Since groups such as the Islamic State consider themselves to be a form of political government with military leadership, and since such a group lacks the capabilities to launch overt military operations, covert operations obviously pose the most logical option for achieving their goals. This is particularly true as covert operations would commonly be used if the act of operating in the open would be counterproductive to the overall purpose of the mission.5 Indeed, what is commonly considered a “terrorist attack” by most governments will be considered a “covert operation” or “special intelligence operation” in one form or the other (organized large-scale attacks, suicide bombings, propaganda, assassinations, kidnappings, etc.) by the respective Jih¯adi group: “The Charlie Hebdo operation is considered a special intelligence operation which is categorised under assassinations. Accomplished with high precision and excellence, passing through the stages and steps of a successful assassination operation.”6

The connection between the decision-maker and the intelligence operator is highly significant. According to the definitions of intelligence by Western scholar M. Lowenthal (but also according to the “Military Analysis” conducted by the AQ-run magazine “Inspire”), covert operations must be initiated by the political decision maker and not by the relevant intelligence agency. Indeed, planning for covert operations commonly starts with a decision maker justifying the mission and explaining how it will be the most viable means to achieving a certain strategic end.7 “This is how the target-selection process was completed, as a first step towards the assassination operation. The leadership then selected the method and a suitable person to execute this important operation…Selection of the target was from the central leadership (AQ). The planning and initiation of the operation was in the Arabian Peninsula. The target was inside the heart and protection of the French intelligence system.”8

Covert operatives can also infiltrate a governmental agency and aim to sabotage it from within. A Taliban infiltrator, for example allowed his fellow militants into a police outpost in the regional capital of Lashkar Gah. After the Taliban operative had completed his mission, according to Helmand deputy police chief Haji Gulai, “the Taliban attacked a guard with silenced guns and then entered the check post…They attacked other policemen with hand grenades and killed all of them. They later took their weapons and ammunition and escaped.” After the attack, the infiltrator himself managed to escape together with the Taliban fighters.9 3

Ibid, p. 433. CIA (2003). 5 Aldrich et al. (2019), p. 433. 6 Al-Qaeda (2015), pp. 4–41. 7 Lowenthal (2009), pp. 166–167. 8 Al-Qaeda (2015), pp. 4–41. 9 BBC (2017). 4

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13.1 The Jih¯adi Rationale Behind Covert Operations “When Allah’s Messenger ordered that a spy for the mushrikin be followed and killed, Salamah Ibn al-Akwa’ set out and killed him. So the Prophet gave him his salab (Reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim), and in another narration, he said, “To him be- longs all of his salab.” Since Salamah was alone, there was no need for proof of his kill, so the one who kills a kafir on a dark street or in an alleyway, while no one else is around, does not need evidence of his kill in order to take the salab.”10

The most common rationale behind covert operations is that the decision maker needs a third option lodged firmly between the first option of doing nothing, which according to M. Lowenthal arguably sees as “diplomacy”, and the second option of launching a full out war. With regards to Jih¯adi intelligence operations, it becomes evident that most ideological approaches (i.e. the idea of an indisputable worldwide Caliphate) may not allow for a diplomatic solution, or that diplomatic channels may simply not be in place due to political, ethical or bilateral reasons or concerns. Thus, Jih¯adi groups may commonly not (want to) explore diplomatic channels. Aside from doing nothing, the only option left for a Jih¯adi groups would be an open war, which has arguably actually been declared and is indeed inherent to the ideology followed by most Jih¯adi groups.11 However, although Jih¯adi groups might believe they are busy fighting a righteous and just open war, they are commonly perceived as an insurgency and not necessarily as a bilateral adversary. Lastly, in most cases, Jih¯adi groups simply do not have the means to fight a regular war against an adversary. They may not have the necessary manpower, equipment or control the necessary territory in order to do so. Intriguingly, overt measures are usually explored first by the decision makers, which might explain why the Islamic State has resorted to increasing its covert operations, suicide attacks and assassinations. The group had to deal with significant defeats in the battlefield, and thus, has come to experience that an overt war, much like doing nothing or resorting to diplomacy, does not yield the desired outcome. With that knowledge in hand, covert operations appear to be an appropriate means to the strategic ends of the Islamic State. Alas, other covert approaches, i.e. assassinations, have also been pursued by both al-Qaeda and other Jih¯adi groups. With respect to covert operations, justifications and legitimisations are normally rooted in Jih¯adi ideology and a radical interpretation of Islam (as well as the battles conducted by the Prophet Muhamad). Consequently, Jih¯adi groups find themselves in predicament similar to that which some Western leaders have found themselves in (for various political), as ideological restraints are also organisational restraints. Indeed, covert operations and the issues that accompany them, namely with respect to them, can raise ethical or moral concerns and may collide with certain standards or principles. While Western political decision-makers have found it challenging to bridge this gap, Jih¯adi intelligence has resorted to ideological justifications rooted in operational art and the battles of the Prophet. Consequently, also with regards to 10 11

IS (2017), p. 15. Lowenthal, (2009), pp. 166–167.

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covert operations and assassinations, Inspire magazine draws a connection to the life and times of Muh.ammad in order to justify their means of warfare—especially with respect to assassinations: “The disbelievers and Mushrikin had tried to assassinate the prophet in many different ways. They chose to assassinate him by an individual approach. This occurred when a female Jew poisoned the prophet’s food. Another case is when Umayr bin wahhab wanted to kill the prophet inside his mosque. They also resorted to assassinate him using a group. An example is when a group of Jews wanted to throw a huge stone at the prophet while he was sitting, but Allah saved him. And when the Quraish wanted to kill him by sending a group of fighters to his home. The Quraiš made many attempts to try to kill the Prophet using large-scale military operations, as was seen in many battles. By the grace of Allah all of these attempts were futile.”12

Al-Qaeda also refers to more recent role models, seen i.e. when issue 14 of Inspire magazine published the story about how Suleiman Al-Halaby assassinated Jean Baptiste Kléber. “His target was a French Army General - Jean Baptiste Kléber. Leader of the French occupational forces in Egypt. Reconnaissance for the operation took 31 days, in order as to study the general’s movement and to gain an advantage. On June 14th , 1800 - Suleiman disguised himself as a beggar, Suleiman approached the general and stabbed him with a stiletto. Killing him and wounding Kléber’s chief Engineer.”13

Ali Mohamed, who devised and significantly formed the al-Qaeda’s intelligence doctrine and apparatus, also considered covert operations to be a viable element of Jih¯adi intelligence. In his “Military studies in the Jih¯ad against the Tyrants”—later termed the “Al-Qaeda manual”—he provides us with a rather insightful list of the important factors for special operations: “Importance of Special Operations: 1.

Boosting Islamic morale and lowering that of the enemy.

2.

Preparing and training new members for future tasks.

3.

A form of necessary punishment.

4.

Mocking the regime’s admiration among the population.

5.

Removing the personalities that stand in the way of the [Islamic] Da’wa [Call].

6.

Agitating [the population] regarding publicized matters.

7.

Rejecting compliance with and submission to the regime’s practices.

8.

Giving legitimacy to the Jama’a [Islamic Group].

9.

Spreading fear and terror through the regime’s ranks.

10. Bringing new members to the Organization’s ranks.”14

12

Al-Qaeda (2015), p. 31. Ibid, p. 31. 14 Post (2004), p. 86. 13

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However, he also recognized several disadvantages. Interestingly, he recognizes that military organization’s structure may be revealed with regards to counterintelligence,15 which will allow the adversary to take safeguards and precautions against future operations.16

13.2 The Emni and Covert Operations IS’ Emni—especially, its external operations branch amn al-kharjee—is responsible for conducting covert operations abroad. The infamous unit, which is a department of Emni,17 can be held responsible for planning and carrying out attacks in the West and has been led by Moroccan Abu Suleyman al-Firansi (born as Abdelilah Himich), who prior to his career within IS served as a soldier in the French Foreign Legion for two years.18 He was born in Rabat, Morocco, in 1989 while his family decided to relocate to France when he was a teenager. In 2008, he decided to join the military and even gained combat experience in Afghanistan,19 although he decided to desert in 2010. A year later, he was arrested in Paris, being in possession of 2.6 pounds worth of cocaine.20 His drug-related charges got him a three-year prison sentence in 2013. He was however released after only five months21 and in early-2014, he ultimately travelled to Syria by car in order to fight with an affiliate al-Qaeda group prior to joining the Islamic State, where he ended up working for the Emni.22 Indeed, French and US authorities have identified him as a central figure behind the late-2015 Paris attacks and behind the early-2016 Brussels attack23 together with Abdelhamid Abaaoud,24 Salah Abdeslam, the Moroccan-Belgian Oussama Atar, and at least seven more Jih¯adi cell members,25 who allegedly were responsible for the overall coordination of the two attacks.26 Firansi himself is believed to have planned and orchestrated the attacks on Europe from inside IS-controlled territory,27 where 15

Ibid, p. 86. Ibid, p. 86. 17 Spécial Défense Blog (2016). See also: Weiss (2016). 18 Also known as Abdelilah Himich, Abu Souleymane, Abu Souleymane al-Faransi, Abu Souleymane the Frenchman, Abu Sulaiyman al Fransi, Abu Sulaiyman, Abu Sulayman al-Faransi, Abu Suleiman, Abu Suleyman and Abu Suleyman al-Faransi. 19 Rotella (2016). 20 Weiss (2016). 21 Rotella (2016). 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Also known as Abdel-Hamid Abu Oud, Abou Omar el-Belgiki, Abou Omar Soussi and Abu Umar al-Baljiki. 25 Counter Terrorism Project (2019). 26 Associated Press (2016). 27 Rotella (2016). 16

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Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi rewarded him for successfully planning the attacks on Europe by promoting him to the head of the amn al-kharjee.28 Allegedly, the Emni and amn al-kharjee had previously been headed by Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, who was killed by a drone strike in 2016. Still, an alternative theory supports the assumption that Ayad al-Jumaili oversaw the Emni’s foreign activities, seeing as how he reported directly to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.29 One of the Jih¯adis involved in the 2015 Paris attack was the aforementioned Reda Hame. His handler was Abdelhamid Abaaoud, whose cell was also responsible for the attack on the Brussels airport in 2016. Abaaoud himself was recruited and instructed by Mehdi Memmouche,30 a French IS cadre returned from Syria.31 He consequently left Belgium for the Islamic State, where he would soon rise to become the head of amn al-kharjee unit responsible for attacks in Europe, which were conducted by European IS cadres.32 Abaaoud covertly moved between Syria and Europe and engaged in purchasing firearms, recruitment and attack planning from locations in Greece, Syria, Belgium and France.33 Abaaoud has also allegedly been involved in mentoring Ayoub alKhazzani, who would later attempt to kill passengers on a train from Amsterdam to Paris, but also in the thwarted attacks on a Belgian police station and the murder of a priest in Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray in France.34 This selection of “easy targets”, which might still cost as many lives as possible, reflects a strategy favoured by IS. Attackers such as Reda Hame were given between 2000–5000 EUR to facilitate these attacks and assassinations.35

13.3 Assassinations Making use of assassinations in war is nothing new, especially in asymmetric warfare where traditional laws and rules of warfare rarely apply. This is especially true for Islamist movements, where rules that could govern military operations are limited in scope and to the realms of operational art.36 This leaves the amir with a lot of flexibility, a vacuum that Jih¯adi groups and intelligence organisations are also eager to fill within their own context, which is nonetheless inspired by the assassinations ordered by the Prophet Muh.ammad. Assassinations can have mere political goals. In the times of the Prophet Muh.ammad, one could have become a target for displayed 28

Spécial Défense Blog (2016). Coles and Parker (2015). 30 Also known as Abu Omar the Hitter. 31 Borger (2015). 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Seelow (2015). 36 Rodgers (2008), p. 154. 29

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disaffection or for attempted instigation.37 Needless to say, such an approach can make this element of war rather random and may be abused. The assassination of Asma bint Marwan, a married mother of five, has often been ignored by Muslim authors although it is mentioned in the works of Ibn Ishaq and Ibn Hisham.38 The authority Qadi ‘Iyad accepts this account,39 as do the scholars Haykal,40 Qureshi,41 Watt42 or Sir John Gubb,43 amongst others. This account, however, is highly relevant with respect to assassinations since Asma bint Marwan was a woman, and thus, accusing her of trying the organize an Army against the Muslims—as it was the case with Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf44 —or the killing of Sufyan Ibn Khalid Ibn Nubayh al-Hudhali45 does not sound plausible given the time she lived in. Hence, we are left with the question as to what extent her assassination might have just been rather convenient in light of her fierce criticism.46 R. Rodgers, based on the case of Sufyan Ibn Khalid Ibn Nubayh al-Hudhali (who was assassinated by one of Muh.ammad’s operatives who had simply walked into his camp, engaged him in a conversation, then than struck him down with a sword) states that assassinations might have been a feature of warfare introduced by Muh.ammad himself.47 Indeed, most of the assassinated individuals appear to have been entirely unprotected and utterly surprised by the attack, which may illustrate that the people of the region as a whole might have been ill-prepared for this new and unique aspect of warfare introduced by Muh.ammad.48 With this in mind, if R. Rodgers argues that Muh.ammad used this method to operate outside the realm of experience possessed by his opponents, then it shouldn’t be a surprised that this aspect of the Islamic warfare doctrine has been discovered and recycled by Jih¯adi groups. At the end of the day, at least in the region, it might have been the Prophet Muh.ammad who started this practice.49 Today, Jih¯adi groups have put their focus on the strategic assassination of specific personalities.50 The targets are selected based on hitlists published in the al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine, including economic personalities, intellectuals, politicians, artists (primarily cartoonists who depicted the Prophet Muh.ammad), wealthy entrepreneurs 37

Ibid, 156. Ibn Ishaq, Sirat Rasul. Oxford UP, pp. 675–676. 39 Ash-Shifa IV, 1(3). pp. 378–379. 40 Ibn Ishaq, Sirat Rasul. Oxford UP, p. 243. 41 Qureshi (1991), p. 312. 42 Watts (1956). 43 Glubb (2001), p. 195. 44 Rodgers (2008), p. 156. 45 Ibn Ishaq, Sirat Rasul. Oxford UP, p. 666. 46 Al-Tabaqat. Vol II. p. 30. 47 Rodgers (2008), p. 156. 48 Ibid, 156. 49 Ibid, 156. 50 Wiskind (2016), p. 15. 38

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or company owners.51 The Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine additionally proposed targeting Shi’a Muslim leaders such as Ayatollah Khamenei or Muslim leaders in the West. The latter is particularly relevant for IS’ “greyzone” strategy, which will be discussed in the chapter: The Elimination of the Greyzone as a Jih¯adi Covert Operation. An assassination in the context of Jih¯adi intelligence is the planned killing of an individual as part of an overall strategy. Since assassinations have become a preferred method of covert operations, al-Qaeda has started to instruct aspiring assassins how to carry out operations. Furthermore, the terminology used by the group and in its publications has slightly changed since al-Qaeda published instructions on “how to make a bomb in your mom’s kitchen”.52 Instead of referring to the bombmaker as a “chef”, al-Qaeda has resorted to wording that mimics the terminology of military or intelligence services. It further started to refer to its covert operations planners as the “External Operation Team.”53 This external operation team also provided aspiring assassins with a five-point guideline, which they urge these people to consider so as to launch successful operations. The guideline starts with emphasising intelligence collection on the target in order to be sufficiently prepared and to select a target based on its strategic or tactical significance. Consequently, al-Qaeda’s external operation team of recommends the assassination of important personalities in the West.54 “Some targets, if they are to be assassinated, will bring us closer to victory. This is because the West is based upon intellect and individual personalities, not on thought or opinion. On the other hand, Muslims follow a guided path that does not end with the death of a personality or individual. And because of that, concentrating our operations on important personalities will directly affect the outcome of this war.”55

AQ instructs the gathering of intelligence with respect to where the target lives, works or socializes. Indeed, after the Charlie Hebdo attack, Inspire magazine praised two attackers, namely the Kouchi brothers, for the intelligence gathering prior to the operation.56 Aside from pointing out that one should gather as much information as possible on the area of operation, a special emphasis is placed on the targets schedule and on when he or she will be at a specific location, which could then be matched with potential vulnerabilities and weak points in their daily routines. The group suggests using social media or open source information such as television or magazines, but also that one gain desired information through a target’s close friends or contacts.57 Furthermore, AQ suggests target surveillance and provides instructions on how to collect intelligence on a moving target, aside from stressing the importance 51

Al-Qaeda (2015). Al-Qaeda (2013). 53 Al-Qaeda (2015), p. 66. 54 Ibid, p. 66. 55 Ibid, p. 66. 56 Ibid, p. 66. 57 Ibid, p. 67. 52

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of verifying information. Needless to say, this information may be equally relevant to a lone wolf actor. “This should be done carefully and from a distance, so as not to alert the target. He should blend in with the environment or camouflage himself during the process… Another method is by visiting: Personally visiting the location where you collected the information to personally verify the data collected.”58

The Jih¯adi group recommends planning the operation by exploiting the weak points of a target’s routine and consequently finding out when they are least protected. As a primary guide for such an assassination, al-Qaeda offers a list of questions that need to be answered prior to any action and which should ideally benefit the attacker’s plan of operation: “What is the weak point of the target that can be exploited to penetrate the target? When is the target in least protection? Which is the best technique available to execute the operation? How has the executor prepared for the operation? Is it a Martyrdom [sic] operation, inghimaasi (Immersing oneself [sic] deep into enemy lines) or an assault? What is the technique to be used in order to retreat safely? How will you cover-up your traces and yourself after an operation?”59

Aside from collecting the relevant intelligence, preparation for the assassination also includes acquiring a weapon and training with the weapon of choice at shooting ranges.60 Spiritual preparation is also necessary for the operation. We suggest that you use more than one weapon and consider that the preparation of explosives will take a considerable amount of time. It is also recommended that you practise with small amounts of explosives before the final attack in order to make sure the bomb won’t fail. However, aside from recommending training in hand-to-hand combat, the external operations team recognises that weapons such as knives and firearms might be more available on short notice. Finally, shortly before the attack, al-Qaeda stresses the importance of isolating oneself and remembering how the attack will benefit what al-Qaeda perceives to be the religious justification and empowerment for the attack61 : “O you who believe! When you meet (an enemy) force, take a firm stand against them and remember the name of Allah much, so that you might be successful [8:4]”62

Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin devotes specific attention to assassinations and human targets in his vision of warfare outlined in the “Practical Course of Guerrilla Warfare”.63 For him, assassinations and kidnappings are everyday activities and means of warfare justifiable by Islamic doctrines and principles. Thus, when alQaeda kidnapped Paul Marshall Johnson, a US contractor and helicopter engineer, 58

Ibid, p. 68. Ibid, p. 68. 60 Inspire no. 4 and no. 5 provide instructions for using an AK 47 rifle, including maintaining the weapon and shooting positions. 61 Wiskind (2016). 62 Al-Qaeda (2015), p. 70. 63 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 24. 59

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Al-Muqrin devoted his attention towards proving that Johnson was a justifiable target because of repairs he had allegedly conducted on military helicopters. As such, he argued that although Paul Marshall Johnson had been a civilian, he was still involved in military operations against Muslims, and thus, a kafir muharab.64 Indeed, this argument for the legitimacy of force, violence, and combat is at the heart of his interpretation of the Jih¯adi cause.65 Furthermore, Al-Muqrin recognises the strategic value of such rather tactical operations, kidnappings and killings in a chilling and frightening manner: “When we target Muslims and Christians we make clear the religious nature of the struggle … providing relief to the countries and the people from their [the apostates] presence, and deterring any of their likes… spreading terror within the enemies ranks …”66

He justifies this strategic approach towards deterring adversaries via the killing of unrelated hostages by quoting the Qur’¯an in a considerably vague and ambiguous fashion: “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power.”67

For al-Muqrin, there is truly no differentiation to be made between civilian and military targets. In fact, according to his confident Sawt al-Jih¯ad, killing civilians would even be preferable because of the “pain” it inflicts on America.68 According to him, such assassination operations, incl. those targeting public figures, are justified by the hadith.69 Indeed, he bluntly suggests that characterising an intended target as an enemy of Islam would convince the mujahidin of the legitimacy of the assassination, linking assassinations to Jih¯adi operational art.70 This approach has also been picked up by al-Qaeda with respect to economic warfare (see chapter: Economic Warfare and Destabilisation): “The nerve is its economy. To cut it, we have to separate and isolate America from the world. This will only be realized; firstly by the will of Allah, then by concentrating our efforts and selecting our targets carefully. … Targeting personalities who invest their massive wealth in America and depositing them in its banks.”71

Much like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State years later (most likely inspired by “A Practical Course of Guerrilla Warfare”), Al-Muqrin also provides a list of foreigners who he considers enemies, but further stresses that those who are easy prey are to be attacked first.72 Importantly, although the Islamic State and Al-Muqrin have 64

Ibid, p. 24. Ibid, p. 24. 66 Ibid, pp. 130–131. 67 Ibid, pp. 130–131. 68 Ibid, p. 24. 69 Ibid, pp. 141–148. 70 Ibid, p. 142. 71 Al-Qaeda (2016), p. 3. 72 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 129. 65

References

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created lists of potential targets, the focus varies. Al-Muqrin has put his attention on those who he considers invaders of Muslim countries, and thus, his list considers not only Americans and Israelis, but also Australians in Indonesia or Frenchmen in Algeria.73 Intriguingly, the Islamic State and al-Qaeda put potential targets involved in the economy at the top of their list based on the following rational outlined by Al-Muqrin: “…given the importance of money in our age.”74

Or as al-Qaeda has put it in Inspire magazine: “Whoever understands the components of the American economy knows the importance these personalities play in the revival of the America Economy. The assassination of these economic personalities or their migration from America or the mere fact that they live in insecurity, will later on bring instability to the American economy. The economy is a major component of America’s supremacy in the world.”75

References Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009) A practical course of Guerrilla war (trans: Cigar N), published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency, Washington Aldrich RJ et al (2019) Secret intelligence—a reader. Routledge Al-Qaeda (2013) Inspire no. 10 Al-Qaeda (2015) Inspire no. 14 Al-Qaeda (2016) Inspire no. 15. Professional assassinations Associated Press (2016) Authorities ID possible organizer of Paris, Brussels attacks. Yahoo News. Accessed online: http://sports.yahoo.com/news/authorities-id-possible-organizer-paris-brusselsattacks-160254593.html BBC (2017) Taliban infiltrator’ aids police killing in Helmand province. BBC News. Accessed online: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39112831 Borger J (2015) Abdelhamid Abaaoud: dead Paris terror planner leaves behind countless whatifs. The Guardian. Accessed Online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/19/abdelh amid-abaaoud-dead-paris-terror-leader-leaves-behind-countless-what-ifs. 19 Nov 2015 CIA (2003) National Security Council Directive on covert operations. 10/2 Coles I, Parker N (2015) How Saddam’s men help Islamic State rule. Reuters. Accessed online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate-spec-idU SKBN0TU0YO20151211 Counter Terrorism Project (2019) Salah Abdeslam—an overview. Accessed online: https://www. counterextremism.com/extremists/salah-abdeslam Glubb J (2001) The life and times of Muh.ammad. Coopere Square Press IS (2017) Rumiyah, Issue no. 8 Lowenthal MM (2009) Intelligence—from secrets to policy. CQ Press Post JM (ed) (2004) Military studies in the Jih¯ad against the Tyrants. USAF Counterproliferation Center. Accessed online: http://www.au.af.mil/au/cpc/assets/alqaedatrainingmanual.pdf Qureshi MS (1991) Foreign policy of Hadrat Muh.ammad. Kitab Bhavan 73

Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 130. Ibid, p. 130. 75 Al-Qaeda (2015), p. 31. 74

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Rodgers R (2008) Fundamentals of Islamic asymmetric warfare: a documentary analysis of the principles of Muh.ammad, Edwin Mellen Pr Rotella S (2016) U.S. identifies key player in IS attacks on Europe. ProPublica. Accessed online: https://www.propublica.org/article/us-identifies-key-player-in-IS-attacks-on-europe Seelow S (2015) Abdelhamid Abaaoud, l’instigateur présumé des attentats tué à Saint-Denis. Le Monde. Accessed online: https://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/16/quiest-abdelhamid-abaaoud-le-commanditaire-presume-des-attaques-de-paris_4811009_4809495. html Spécial Défense Blog (2016) Abou Souleiman: l’émir français de Daesh. Accessed online: http:// specialdefense.over-blog.com/2016/04/abou-souleiman-l-emir-francais-de-daesh.html Watts M (1956) Muh.ammad at Medina. Oxford, pp 178 Weiss M (2016) Is this Frenchman running IS terror networks in the west? The Daily Beast. Accessed online: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/01/is-this-frenchman-runningIS-terror-networks-in-the-west.html Wiskind C (2016) Lone Wolf Terrorism and open source Jih¯ad: an explanation and assessment. Int Inst sCounter-Terrorism (ICT)

Chapter 14

Economic Warfare and Destabilisation

Abstract Economic warfare is particularly important in asymmetric conflicts. In this regard, the Prophet Muh.ammad carried out a number of actions aimed at the economic interests of the Quraysh, particularly through a strategy of avoiding direct confrontation on an open battlefield but bleeding them economically by attacking their caravans. Economic warfare, and in particular the subversion of opponents and their respective economies, is also closely linked to intelligence agencies, intelligence operations and covert operations. Especially today and in times of deeply interconnected global economies, technologies and industries, this has become a vulnerability of Western societies that can be easily exploited by Jih¯adi groups. Keywords Economic terrorism · Egypt · Ideology · Investment · Trade · Tourism · Economic Warfare “Today the battle between the Muslims and the enemy, the head of kufr, is entering a new phase. And the most important goal for us at this time is to strike the economy of the head of kufr (America) who are dominating in the world.”1 —Inspire Magazine. “This blessed reaction came by the grace of God Almighty, showing very clearly that this haughty, domineering power, America, the Hubal2 of the age, is based on great economic power, but it is soft. How quickly it fell from the sky, by the grace of God Almighty…So I say that it is very important to focus on attacking the American economy by any means available.”—Osama Bin Laden.3

Especially in asymmetric conflicts, economic warfare is of very high priority, because subtitle actions can have huge impacts on the economic interests of an adversary. In this regard, the Prophet Muh.ammad led a series of actions that targeted the economic interests of the Quraiš, most especially through a strategy that had the goal of avoiding direct confrontation in an open battlefield, but bleeding them economically by attacking their caravans.4 Economic warfare, and in particular, the subversion of adversaries and their respective economies, is also closely linked to intelligence, intelligence operations, and covert operations. This very strategy, 1

Ibid, p. 31. Hubal is a pagan idol whose followers have been defeated by early Muslim forces. 3 Lawrence (2005), p. 164. 4 Rodgers (2008), p. 170. 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_14

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however, has already existed for hundreds of years and economic warfare has always had the potential to be as devastating as conventional warfare.5 Especially today, with its deeply interconnected global economies, technologies and industries, this has become a weak point of Western societies that can easily be exploited by Jih¯adi groups.6 The effectiveness of economic terrorism and warfare is probably best illustrated by the fallout of 9/11,7 which affected the entire world and in particular the American economy. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Osama Bin Laden was well aware of the interconnection between the military and the economy, and that the symbioses between the two would provide a weak point for attacks: “So the struggle is both financial and physical. Even if the distance between us and the American military base is very great, and our weapons do not match up to their planes, we are able to soak up the pressure of these strikes with our broad defence lines. And in another way, it is possible to strike the economic base that is the foundation of the military base, so when their economy is depleted, they will be too busy with each other to be able to enslave poor peoples.”8 —Osama Bin Laden

Indeed, the sector of tourism can also be negatively impacted and decline as a consequence of terrorism, particularly in economically weaker regions.9 In the United Kingdom, the mere attempt to attack a British plane in 2006 led to the cancellation of 1' 280 scheduled flights by British Airways alone, which ultimately cost 40 million GBP.10 Naturally, finding out what the impact a comparatively small terrorist group and its covert operations section could achieve through attacks targeted at the economy is highly interesting to a Jih¯adi intelligence organisation. Groups such as al-Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State have truly recognised the great damage they could inflict on economic targets. In fact, Jih¯adi manuals and publications (i.e. Inspire or Dabiq, but also “A Practical Course of Guerrilla Warfare” by Al-Muqrin) have started to explore targeting sectors of the economy through what has been referred to as “intelligence operations”. Jih¯adi groups are quite aware of the economic consequences of terrorist attacks, kidnappings and assassinations, the means of economic warfare/terrorism, and the pressure they can place on a government.11 This is especially the case since the costs of economic terrorism can be rather low and affordable, whereas the impact on the economy or on a government or society can be tremendous. As such, in addition to the highly effective destabilizing force of terrorism, it has even been identified as having a negative effect on income levels in some countries.12 5

Freeman (2012), p. 1. Ibid, p. 1. 7 Freeman (2012), p. 1. 8 Lawrence (2005), p. 160. 9 Lutz and Lutz (2016b). 10 Ibid, pp. 135–142. 11 Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014). 12 Blomberg et al (2011). 6

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Al-Muqrin also regards the economy as a great opportunity to achieve large-scale devastation. He considers undermining economic targets in order to reduce the sense of stability a population might feel and which every economy requires. His primary target has been identified as the oil industry, its infrastructure, and its personnel, most particularly foreign workers.13 Consequently, it must not strike us as being very surprising that Osama Bin Laden has repeatedly recommended targeting the oil industry and various oil-related sectors in Saudi Arabia.14 Aside from Saudi Arabia, also other states have experienced the negative effects terrorism can have on an economy. For example, Yemen has seen her already wakened economy significantly affected and foreign economic activities decreased dramatically. This is lastly also due to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has indicated that it regards foreign visitors as a corrupting force that would be harmful to an Islamic society. What is left of the tourism industry in Yemen has been discouraged, becoming a direct chosen target of Jih¯adi covert operations to destabilise an economy.15 Also, today and in a much more decentralised fashion, we can witness how lone wolf Jih¯adis engage in economic terrorism. Four British Jih¯adis linked to al-Qaeda attempted to cause economic damage by placing bombs in the toilets of the London Stock Exchange in December, 2010.16 On a different and more subversive level, it was feared by the Department of Homeland Security that members of al-Qaeda could seek employment with US financial institutions and sabotage the economy from right within the system. In this regard, the spokesman of the Department Commander, David Wray, commented: “There is new intelligence that indicated specific interest in financial services and indirect indication… that led us to believe we should provide additional awareness that threats could come from within as well as without.17

14.1 Large-Scale Destabilisation Through Economic Terrorism Jih¯adi groups have resorted to a strategy of trying to destabilise governments, the economy, and society in Western countries as a whole (eliminating the greyzone). This may be due to some significant defeats the Islamic State had to encounter in Iraq and Syria, but also due to an increased focus on the decentralisation of a group’s operations while continuously aiming to achieve the greatest possible impact.18 Jih¯adi operational art can help in this regard and al-Qaeda, for instance, has (in its magazine 13

Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 128. Ibid, p. 126. 15 Loidolt (2011). 16 Burns and Cowell (2012). 17 Sullivan (2003). 18 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009). 14

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Inspire) repeatedly published how war needs to be fought by economic means in order to destabilise systems: “This war is surrounded and supported by America’s Intelligentsia. And our war with America will be prioritized by targeting its economy; and we will select targets by prioritizing economic personalities.”19

With respect to Jih¯adi groups, economic terrorism may also include an attempt at large-scale destabilisation. Such a coordinated approach would affect and disrupt the stability of a state, an economy, a stock exchange or a society. For Jih¯adi groups, these ends have been pursued by violent means although they do not necessarily need to be violent in order to be effective. In fact, the immediate effects of an attack, as much as the resulting psychological impact, can have significant economic consequences.20 The 9/11 attacks have illustrated such an economic effect and today’s Jih¯adi groups have incorporated economic concerns into their attack arsenal. This is based on the assessment that weakening the adversary at the economic level will have a chain reaction and devastating repercussions on an entire system. As Osama Bin Laden put it: “These repercussions cannot be calculated by anyone, due to their very large—and increasing—scale, multitude, and complexity, so watch as the amount reaches no less than $1 trillion by the lowest estimate, due to these successful and blessed attacks.”21 —Osama Bin Laden

Jih¯adi groups try to target governments in their fight against poverty or with respect to other national issues. Acts of economic terrorism could, for example, also be directed against ports, borders or critical infrastructures, which will require extra security measures to be implemented in order to ensure the safety of personnel and the safe transportation of goods. Such measures can, in turn, have a significant impact on the costs associated with exporting and importing products. Particularly with respect to emerging markets and economies slowing down, exports and imports can have an effect on the state’s ability to fight poverty or other issues. The state’s inability to tackle social problems or poverty might cause revolts, which could lead to possible destabilization. This will ultimately result in even greater poverty.22 Indeed, the Jih¯adi author(s) of the “Jih¯adi Iraq—Hopes and Risks” arrive at the conclusion that the main point of U.S. weakness is the rising economic cost of the war. They additionally go into greater detail and assess that war expenditures might not be covered due to the administration’s record-high budget deficit and the weak state of the U.S. economy.23 Another example could be modern-day piracy at the Horn of Africa or Southeast Asia, which prompts governments and logistics firms to invest heavily in security measures. These countermeasures amount to a larger military presence in areas 19

Al-Qaeda (2015), p. 66. Geneva Centre for Security Policy (2005). 21 Lawrence (2005), p. 127. 22 Zalman (2019). 23 Adamsky (2010). 20

14.2 Egypt as an Economic Target

269

affected by piracy, rerouting ships, higher insurance costs, costs associated with private security firms or specialised equipment. The costs are ultimately passed on to the consumer or taxpayer, which redirects finances and diverts money from other economic areas.24 Jih¯adis are very well aware of these connections and repercussions: “The lifeline of big countries is its economy, and the economy is based upon the economic institutions and companies that hold it up. And these institutions and companies are led by groups of individuals, thus being the cream and essential unit of the economy. These easy targets bring about great results. Imagine every CEO, BOD’s and company owner feel threatened in America… is will bring about a dent in the American economy, sending ripples to all policy makers and policies in the US. The cost to the American economy, in all aspects, will be unspeakable.”25 —Inspire Magazine

Although Jih¯adi groups may regard the terminology and concept of economic warfare to be most applicable—especially due to Islamic State’s self-image as a nation state—the term would normally be used in a conflict between actually recognised nation states, with respective armies, and particularly in times of total war. This is because a total war will most likely not only involve the relevant militaries of the involved states, but also go a good distance in mobilizing an entire economy supporting said total war. Causing damage to an adversary’s economy will have a direct influence on its ability to fight a war, a concept that has found its way into the realms of Jih¯adi intelligence operations as well: “Economy is one of the main pillars in building a state. The public depend on it, and the country’s regional and international hegemony is parallel to its economic strength. Moreover, military strength of a country is dependent on its economic strength. Fleets and armies may be mobilized with the sole purpose of protecting the economy from collapsing or even mere shaking…”26 —Inspire Magazine

14.2 Egypt as an Economic Target Egypt has experienced several attacks that have had an economic component. Indeed, Jih¯adi groups have intended to inflict damage on the economic system even prior to 9/11 by scaring foreign tourists away from the country. As a consequence of this strategy, the amount of tourist visits in the 1990s dropped by 50%.27 As soon as the tourism sector managed to recover in the following years, Jih¯adi groups launched additional attacks against tourist destinations in Cairo and on the Sinai Peninsula.28 After 9/11, Jih¯adi groups pursued the same strategy, and 34 people were killed in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2004, whereas an assault a year later left 88 people dead.29 24

US Department of Transportation (2008). Al-Qaeda (2016), p. 31. 26 Ibid, p. 27. 27 Shultz (2007), p. 295. 28 Winter (2011). 29 Tan (2006). 25

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The most recent Islamic State-related attack and downing of a Russian aeroplane, which cost the lives of 224 people, has had a significant impact on the Egyptian tourism industry as well. Consequently, the Egyptian government had to consider the disastrous economic damage deciding to allocate additional funding to rebuild foreign trust into the tourism sector.30 Indeed, aside from affecting society as a whole, terrorist attacks on economic sectors are intended to preoccupy the state’s economic resources while simultaneously increasing public dissatisfaction.31 Economic terrorism, most critically, can also have indirect costs that are not necessarily involved with an actual attack itself. The 2016 attack in Brussels by individuals affiliated with IS led to a closing of the airport that lasted almost two weeks. The airport closure cost 5 million EUR a day and led to a 50% drop in overnight stays in Brussels hotels.32 Costs of this nature concern the resources a government would have to allocate towards counterterrorism efforts and towards preventing future attacks.33 For example, attacks against the aviation sector and aeroplanes—as the example of the Russian Airbus A321-200 of Metrojet Flight 9268 illustrates—commonly result in immense indirect costs to the economy and their individual sectors.34 Metrojet Flight 9268 was brought down by Wilayat Sinai, the Egyptian branch of IS on the Sinai Peninsula, killing all 224 passengers as a response to the Russia’s involvement in Syria and Iraq. In fact, IS even published pictures of the bomb in its Dabiq magazine35 in the hopes of further undermining Egypt’s already struggling tourism industry, something large portions of the national economy depended upon.36 The economic efforts of airlines and governments to prevent future attacks on the aviation industry or on aviation infrastructure (and the associated indirect losses) will tower over the direct losses of an aeroplane that is brought down. Such an attrition strategy has been adopted by various Jih¯adi groups, wherein the stated goal lies in wearing down the government, eroding public support, and steadily undermining both entire industries and indirectly (or directly) related branches. In the words of Osama Bin Laden, this very strategy was achieved in the 9/11 attacks: “… they have fired or liquidated more than 170.000 employees from airline companies, including airfreight companies and commercial airlines.6 American studies and analysis have mentioned that 70 per cent of the American people are still suffering from depression and psychological trauma as a result of the incident of the two towers, and the attack on the Defence Ministry, the Pentagon. One of the well-known American hotel companies, Intercontinental, has fired 20,000 employees, thanks to God’s grace.”37 —Osama bin Laden

30

Van Nickerk and Pizam (2015), p. 119. Harmon (2010). 32 Lutz and Lutz (2016b), pp. 135–141. 33 Tilman (2007). 34 Hastings and Chan (2013). 35 IS (2015). Just Terror. 36 Dunning (2015). 37 Lawrence (2005), p. 12. 31

14.3 The Ideological Basis of Economic Warfare

271

Lastly, according to B. and J. Lutz, attacks of this kind are conducted to convince the government that making changes to policies or institutions is preferable to absorbing the damage that occurs with terrorism and terrorist attacks. Hence, the Jih¯adi’s adversary gets worn down and economically and financially exhausted, which is a strategy al-Qaeda has outlined in great detail in Inspire. “This Jih¯ad can take different forms, shapes and the use of different types of weapons to fight the enemy. And one of the weapons is striking and targeting the enemy’s economic interests wherever they may be found. The Prophet and the companions used this effective weapon in their times. Thee impact upon the enemy was very significant, becoming among the reason for the exhaustion and downfall of the Quraiš, who were considered to be the head of kufr and the biggest threat posed to Muslims at that time.”38 —Inspire Magazine

Intriguingly, as is the case with most aspects of Jih¯adi intelligence and the respective covert operations, they are built on an ideological foundation dating back to the Prophet Muh.ammad and his battle against the Quraiš.

14.3 The Ideological Basis of Economic Warfare Economic warfare generally includes an economic strategy and plan of action with the primary goal in mind to weaken the economy of an adversary. The Jih¯adi version of economic warfare/economic terrorism reflects a predetermined economic policy linked to covert “intelligence operations”, which aims at capturing, sabotaging or controlling critical economic resources by various means. As a result, Jih¯adi intelligence operatives are able to covertly operate and further deprive or sabotage the adversary of critical resources or financial services, without which it cannot function properly. Also, with respect to economic warfare, Jih¯adi groups have resorted towards seeking inspiration, a framework of operational art in the Sunnah, and the life of the Prophet Muh.ammad: “Cutting their nerves and breaking their pride will not be realized unless Muslims follow in the footsteps of the prophet when confronting the Quraiši economy. Renewing the techniques and methods to be in line with the current times. The options available to this kind of Jih¯ad are many and numerous.”39 —Inspire Magazine

The economic warfare strategy of Jih¯adi groups follows ideological guidelines and is, in particular, based on to the relationship the Prophet Muh.ammad had with the tribe of the Quraiš 40 or with the Jewish tribe Ban¯u al-Nad.¯ır. In fact, al-Qaeda devotes a large section in its Inspire publication to justifying economic warfare with the historic and cultural actions of the Prophet Muh.ammad in order to justify economic operations with ideological doctrines and operational art:

38

Al-Qaeda (2016), pp. 27–28. Ibid, p. 31. 40 Ibid, pp. 27–31. 39

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“When the Jews of the Bani Al Nadeer tribe violated the covenant, the Messenger of Allah laid siege on them and cut down their palm trees. They were chopped and burned down. They sent to him that they will get out, but this was after the Messenger had already defeated them. Defeating them by economical warfare.”41 —Inspire Magazine

Al-Qaeda refers to the story of the siege of the Jews of Ban¯u n-Nad¯ır, which can be found with the Sahih Muslims. The tribe of the Ban¯u n-Nad¯ır were Jewish Bedouin Arabs who settled in Northern Arabia at the oasis of Medina in the seventh century. The Ban¯u al-Nad.¯ır challenged the Prophet Muh.ammad when he tried to establish himself as the leader of Medina,42 plotted attacks against him, and were consequently expelled from the oasis. This led them to cooperate with the Quraiš during the battle of the Trench (Ghazwah al-Khandaq).43 After having been defeated by the Quraish at Mount Uhud in 625, the Ban¯u al-Nad.¯ır decided to rise up and challenged the leadership of the Prophet in Medina.44 This meant increasing levels of confrontations in Medina, which ultimately climaxed in a short and private meeting between the Ban¯u al-Nad.¯ır and Muh.ammad, who nonetheless left the location immediately after his arrival and accused the tribe of plotting an assassination against him. It is unclear whether he had learned this through revelations,45 from his knight Muh.ammad ibn Maslama or, according to N. Stillman, if Muh.ammad had just tried to find a casus belli by claiming that the Ban¯u al-Nad.¯ır tribe was planning to assassinate him.46 In any case, Muh.ammad ordered an ultimatum to be given to the Ban¯u al-Nad.¯ır. Al-Tabari claims that in this regard, Muh.ammad ibn Maslama supposedly said, “Hearts have changed, and Islam has wiped out the old covenants.”47 However, the Ban¯u al-Nad.¯ır were determined to fight and sent a message to the Prophet Muh.ammad stating: “We will not leave our houses. Do whatever you like to do.”48 After the siege had lasted for two weeks, the Ban¯u n-Nad¯ır had to surrender when Muh.ammad ordered their palm trees to be burned and cut down. After this surrender, the Ban¯u n-Nad¯ır were allowed to leave the oasis and Muh.ammad allowed them to take whatever they could carry on camels with them, except weapons.49 The story of the Ban¯u al-Nad.¯ır has been specifically made note of by al-Qaeda for the sake of justifying economic warfare and in order to somehow link it to a doctrine set out by the Prophet Muh.ammad. According to the group, this example illustrates the impact economy warfare can have: “Such actions are not futile, but tend to bring their own consequences, results and influence the balance of war in the future … if the head of kufr at that time, the Quraiš, suffered 41

Ibid, p. 30. Stillman (1979), pp. 13–14. 43 Ibid. 44 Al-Mubarakpuri (2005), p. 189. 45 Stillman (1979), pp. 13–14. 46 Ibid, p. 14. 47 Al-Tabari, Foundation of the Community, Vol. 7. State University of New York Press. p. 158. 48 Al-Mubarakpuri (2005). 49 Stillman (1979). 42

14.4 Targeting Investments and Trade

273

immensely because of this Jih¯ad then it is clear proof how effective this kind of weapon and Jih¯ad can be.”50

Indeed, economic terrorism does not necessarily require a lot of resources or manpower, while the results could still be devastating. Most prominently, Osama Bin Laden himself reflected on the strategy of attacking the World Trade Centre on 9/11, creating an economic spiral and turmoil that he and his Jih¯adi hijackers had given to the world. What appears to be the most striking about his statements might be his awareness of the economic repercussions and indirect economic effects Jih¯adi terrorism can have: “According to their own admission, the share of the losses on the Wall Street Market reached 16 per cent.51 They said that this number is a record, which has never happened since the market opened more than 230 years ago. … The gross amount that is traded in that market reaches $4 trillion. So if we multiply 16 per cent by $4 trillion to find out the loss that affected the stocks, it reaches $640 billion of losses from stocks, with God’s grace, an amount that is equivalent to the budget of Sudan for 640 years…”52 —Osama Bin Laden

14.4 Targeting Investments and Trade Jih¯adi economic terrorism can be launched against a variety of targets, some more vulnerable and effective than others.53 The greatest impact can be achieved when the targeted countries or sectors are already weakened or if they already suffer from weak economies.54 Thus, the impact of economic terrorism is much greater in developing countries and emerging economies such as Turkey, Egypt or Tunisia, where Jih¯adi attacks on the economy were especially harmful.55 Particularly in these weak economies, resources, and investments were diverted, and this reduction in resources resulted in lower budgets for security forces or less funding for social programs. The absence of funding and decreased budgets for essential governmental services and programs can result in dissatisfaction with governmental institutions and then provide increased opportunities for Jih¯adi groups to radicalize, recruit and gain strength.56 Indeed, investing in counterterrorism creates transaction costs while spending on security and military increases,57 which then reduce the economic means available for other programs, services, and activities.58 50

Al-Qaeda (2016), p. 30. When the stock markets reopened after the 9/11 attacks on September 17 2001, the Dow Jones Industrial Average index had fallen 684 points (7.1%). By the end of the same week, the Dow Jones arrived had fallen to 1369.7 points, which equals 14.3%. 52 Lawrence (2005), p. 127. 53 Lutz and Lutz (2016b), pp. 135–10-27. 54 Glaser (2015), p. 7. 55 Thompson (2015). 56 Lutz and Lutz (2016b), pp. 10–27. 57 Glaser (2015), p. 84. 58 Mirza and Verdier (2013), p. 944. 51

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This diversion of funds towards highly relevant, yet economically less productive sectors such as the security forces, can be a devastating side effect of economic terrorism.59 Another by-product of attacking the economy can be seen in the potential preoccupation of security forces while guarding possible economic targets. This means that there will be fewer resources available to effectively engage in counterterrorism operations.60 Aside from allocating resources to the security services or military, resulting opportunity costs from the protection against economic terrorism can lead to a governmental and social overstretch, an end Jih¯adi groups desire.61 Terrorism can also lead to a decrease in overall trade.62 Especially with respect to time-sensitive goods, which may require a quick and streamlined transportation infrastructure, delays caused by terrorist incidents could increase costs and significantly affect trade.63 While these direct costs can certainly affect trade networks and infrastructures, terrorist attacks can also result in indirect costs and a chain reaction on national border controls, like the reintroduction of passport controls. The closing of border posts and reintroduction of passport controls in the EU in the wakes of the refugee crisis can be seen as a good example.64 Such border closures and obstacles to international trade are adding to the involved costs, which can be too large to handle for developing and emerging economies.65 In fact, such delays on international shipping lanes can result in the equivalent to a tariff of 2.4% in additional costs to the goods that are moved.66 Jih¯adi groups and their “intelligence operatives” not only target international trade, but also foreign investments. Foreign businesses have indeed become highly attractive targets and in some cases, only investments related to a specific foreign country might be selected as a target.67 The decision as to which business to attack can, in part, be made based on the exposure or vulnerability of an enterprise and then partially based on the economic impact an attack might have. As such, attacks on international investments can also influence indirectly linked factors (such as employment and tax revenues) or the overall development of an economy, which may be highly dependent on international investments. According to Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, one could observe a massive decline in foreign investments in Spain and Greece due to past terrorist attacks.68 Also in the aftermath of 9/11, foreign direct investment in the US declined significantly and did not recover until 2006.69

59

Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013). Lutz and Lutz (2016b), pp. 10–27. 61 Ibid, p. 276. 62 Nitsch and Schumacher (2004). 63 Mirza and Verdier (2013), p. 970. 64 Bewarder and Flade (2016). 65 Lenain et al. (2002), pp. 15, 28. 66 Czinkota et al. (2010). 67 Powers and Choi (2012). 68 Enders and Sandler (1996). 69 Ibid. 60

14.5 Attacking Foreigners and Tourists

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Although larger economies appear to be less likely to suffer such significant impacts by the loss of international investments, it is still remarkable to investigate the effect an event such as 9/11 could have on one of the strongest economies in the world.70 Al-Muqrin suggests targeting wealthy individuals and businessmen in the cities in order to achieve the largest possible impact on the economy as a whole and in order to shake the economic system off balance.71 Indeed, he further assesses that in this regard, especially cities and urban areas represent a state’s prestige and an attack here would to a suffering of the greatest possible economic loss.72

14.5 Attacking Foreigners and Tourists Targeting tourists is another option Jih¯adi groups use to harm a sector of the economy. This is because tourism can be a very important economic factor in some countries and thus, it contributes to the stabilisation of a national economy.73 Indeed, tourists don’t only bring foreign currencies into a country; they are also responsible for generating large revenues and are the basis for small local industries and regional employment. However, despite their importance to the economy (especially in some lesser developed countries), they are seen as soft targets, which are easily accessible. It also proves to be highly difficult for governments and their respective security services to provide protection for them, particularly since they are taking well-known and never-changing routes from their accommodations to local attractions, which permits attackers to plan attacks in advance and gather intelligence on them. Al-Muqrin makes special emphasis of attacking tourists, but adds that in addition to the tactical and military implications, this target acquisition needs to be in line with the Jih¯adi ideology. Indeed, he stresses that targets need to be identified in accordance with the objectives and goals a Jih¯adi group has. He also recommends that the local population be spared of any harm so as to avoid alienating them, particularly in the early stages of the Jih¯ad,74 while there needs to be a focus placed on “Jews and Crusaders” who are visiting Islamic countries instead. Attacks of this nature on tourists can potentially scare away future visitors and make them think twice about their holiday destination. For example, 9/11 triggered a tremendous drop in overall worldwide tourist visits.75 Consequently, stagnating or dropping numbers in international tourism are normally followed by a reduction in revenues and income or employment opportunities for local industries, which can ultimately lead to dissatisfaction with the government and destabilisation of a region, industry or country. In addition, even if visitors return, the long-term negative impact 70

Kumar and Liu (2015). Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 131. 72 Ibid, p. 131. 73 Sönmez et al. (1999). 74 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin (2009), p. 109. 75 Lenain et al. (2002), p. 28. 71

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with regards to investments in facilities and branches related to tourism will outlast the immediate direct effect on the local economy.76 Indeed, these indirect losses might even be greater than the immediate losses and thus, contribute to the destructive goals of Jih¯adi groups and their aim to undermine economies and societies. Tourists can also become the targets of Jih¯adi covert operations for reasons beyond the scopes of economic terrorism, since they are frequently seen as symbols of globalisation. This factor can indeed provide an additional motivation for selecting them as potential targets. The attacks on tourist facilities in Bali in 2002 may illustrate this point, although this particular assault was especially directed towards a source of revenue for the Indonesian government and overall economy. Hence, it caused a significant loss in Indonesian Gross Domestic Product and a 10% loss on the main stock exchange.77 Furthermore, tourists were considered a symbol and manifestation of Western culture, which Jih¯adi groups oppose, particularly in the wake of 9/11 and after the US-led invasion of Iraq.78 In the Middle East, foreign targets are selected in order to generate economic losses or because they are symbols of what is perceived as the West. Thus, targeting them sends a political message regarding the presence of a foreign power or regarding the domestic government’s bilateral dealings.79 In the Southern Philippines, foreign tourists were targeted and executed by the Abu-Sayyaf Group for this very reason.80 Also, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has resorted to kidnapping tourists in order to generate a revenue stream for the group. As a result, tourist visits in the region have drastically been reduced.81 Indeed, the group had specific economic goals in mind and occasionally even executed tourists in order to stop others from coming to the region.82 The same can be said for Tunisia where a 2013 suicide attack in Sousse has sent the message that visits to Tunisia might be dangerous despite no tourists having been killed by a Jih¯adi group prior to the attack.83 Also, the 2015 attack at a museum in Tunis and a hotel in Sousse claimed the lives or more than 50 tourists for the very same strategic reason. Needless to say, the Tunisian tourism sector and the Tunisian economy as a whole suffered greatly from these two incidents. Indeed, the latter attack on the hotel in Sousse resulted in an estimated loss of $500 million.84 Furthermore, even before the incidents in Sousse, the Tunisian government was reluctant to comment on the kidnapping of two tourists from Austria due to the negative impact this would have on tourism revenues.85 Based on the reactions of 76

Van Niekerk and Pizam (2015), p. 118. Abuza (2003), p. 3. 78 Lutz and Lutz (2016b), pp. 13–19. 79 Lutz and Lutz (2016a). 80 Banlaoi (2006). 81 Bergen et al. (2011). 82 Filiu (2009). 83 Ibid, p. 220. 84 Gartenstein-Ross and Moreng (2015), p. 14. 85 Rogan (2008), p. 25. 77

References

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the Tunisian government, one can surely calculate the attention and significance that have been given to this specific strategy of economic terrorism. Jih¯adi groups have also become very aware of how vulnerable the tourism industry can be.86 Such a development may even appear logical in some countries, since the tourism sector has become an important source of foreign exchange for some national economies, particularly in Tunisia, Egypt87 or Turkey.88 Thus, the significance of the sector has rendered it to be an ideal target. In Turkey, the Islamic State has targeted tourists with the specific goal of weakening the Turkish economy in mind.89 An attack on a Turkish nightclub that left 39 people dead in January, 2017 or the New Year’s Eve Istanbul bombing are tragic examples of this strategy.90 Although IS claimed responsibility for the bombing, announcing its revenge for Turkish military operations in Syria, the attacks were directed towards foreign tourists and against the Turkish government. Indeed, killing foreigners in the most prominent locations close to iconic sights in Istanbul has dealt the country’s 30 billion-peryear tourism industry a significant blow. This is no coincidence; the Jih¯adi group orchestrating these attacks has realised that the Turkish economy had already been put under significant pressure by clashes in the southeast, by previous terrorist attacks, and while suffering from strained relations with its international allies.91 In sum, the direct damage from these bombings was much less important than the damage done to the economy as a whole.92

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Rodgers R (2008) Fundamentals of Islamic asymmetric warfare: a documentary analysis of the principles of Muh.ammad, Edwin Mellen Pr Rogan H (2008) Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Terrorism Research Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies, 2(8) Shultz RH (2007) Iranian covert aggression: support for radical political Islamists conducting internal subversion against states in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region. Terrorism Poli Violence 6(3) Sönmez SF et al (1999) Tourism in crisis: managing the effects of terrorism. J Travel Res 38(1):13 Stillman N (1979) The jews of Arab lands: a history and source book. Jewish Publication Society of America Sullivan B (2003) Agency warns banks of al-Qaida risk. MSNBC. Accessed online: http://www. msnbc.msn.com/id/3072757/ns/business-world_business/. Accessed Sept 2011 Tan A (ed) (2006) The politics of terrorism: a survey. Routledge, p 213 Thompson A (2015) Terrorism and tourism in developed versus developing countries. In: Glaser K (ed) Terrorism and the economy: impacts of the capital market and the global tourism industry. Eleven International, p 134 Tilman B (2007) An economic analysis of security policies. In: Tilman B (ed) The economic analysis of terrorism. Routledge, pp 265–271 US Department of Transportation (2008) Economic impact of piracy in the Gulf of Aden on global trade. Accessed online: http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo28119/HOA-Economic%20I mpact%20of%20Piracy.pdf Van Nickerk M, Pizam A (2015) How do terrorism and tourism coexist in turbulent times: introduction to a conflicting relationship. In: Glaser K (ed) Terrorism and the economy: impacts of the capital market and the global tourism industry. Eleven International Weise Z, Sanchez R (2016) Turkish Prime Minister says Istanbul bomber was ‘Islamic State member’. The Telegraph. Accessed online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ turkey/12094350/Explosion-in-Istanbuls-central-square-causes-casualties.html Winter L (2011) The Abdullah Azzam brigades. Stud Conflict Terrorism 34(11):884–886 Yaya M (2009) Terrorism and tourism: the case of Turkey. Defence Peace Econ 20(6) Zalman A (2019) Economic impact of terrorism and the September 11 attacks. ThoughtCo. Accessed online: https://www.thoughtco.com/economic-impact-of-terrorism-and-the-septem ber-11-attacks-3209217 Zalweski P (2016) The Islamic State hits Turkey where it hurts. Foreign Policy. Accessed online: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/14/the-islamic-state-hits-turkey-where-it-hurts/

Chapter 15

The Elimination of the Greyzone as a Jihādi Covert Operation

Abstract IS has recognised the weaknesses of Western societies, thanks in no small part to the analytical efforts of Emni. The challenges posed by the recent migration crisis and the rather problematic integration of certain Muslim communities have left deep gaps and cracks in European societies. The number of Muslims who used to live in a so-called “greyzone” between strong support and serious rejection of fundamentalist Islam as practised by IS is slowly decreasing. This “greyzone” consists of those European Muslims who have managed to find an individual balance between a spiritual identity and a broad and secular national context. Consequently, in order to weaken this construct, it is in the interest of the leadership of IS to move as many Muslims as possible towards a Jihādi interpretation of Islam. The groups have achieved this so far by ultimately alienating Muslim communities and further dismantling their faith in Western and democratic values by aligning them with the ideas, concepts and doctrines of an Islamic State as envisaged in the “Management of Savagery”.

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Keywords Separation Destabilisation Social security Society Psychological operations

IS has come to recognise the weaknesses of Western societies thanks in good part to the analytical efforts of Emni.1 The challenges that have occurred in the wake of the most recent migration crisis and the rather problematic integration of certain Muslim communities have created deep gaps and cracks within European societies. Indeed, what used to be a large number of Muslims that lived in a so-called greyzone between strong support and serious disapproval of fundamentalist Islam as practised by the IS, is slowly diminishing. This “greyzone” consists of those European Muslims who managed to find an individual balance between a spiritual identity and a broad and secular national context.2,3

1

Wege (2018). IS (2015), ch. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone”. 3 Francois-Cerrah (2015). 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_15

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In order to weaken this construct, it is consequently in the interest of IS leadership to turn as many Muslims as possible towards a Jihādi interpretation of Islam. The groups have so far achieved this through ultimately alienating Muslim communities and through further reducing their belief in Western and democratic values, shifting them towards the ideas, concepts and doctrines of an Islamic State as envisioned in the “Management of Savagery”.4 Those who remain on the other end of the “greyzone” spectrum, will be considered apostates and consequently seen as enemies. Indeed, the Islamic State has announced via its outlet Dabiq (which is largely influenced by the Emni), that: “Muslims in the West will soon find themselves between one of two choices.”5

This statement was published only weeks after the Paris shooting of 2015. The brutality of this respective attack stunned French society and brought tensions between French Muslims and their fellow citizens further to the surface. Indeed, grenades were thrown at a mosque in Le Mans and shots were fired at a Muslim prayer hall in Narbonne.6 Such a polarisation of society falls exactly in line with the strategy envisioned by the Islamic State and its approach towards covert operations and destabilisation. In other words, the goals of the Islamic State are not necessarily the actual attacks and atrocities, but the resulting divide and the elimination of a peaceful coexistence between religious groups in Europe and even within Islam itself. Indeed, it is a goal to separate moderate Muslims from Western societies. Furthermore, some Muslims may be forced into radicalisation by increasing suspicion, distrust and hostility of fellow citizens, politics and security services alike. According to J. Bartlett et al., anger at Western foreign policy, personal discrimination, being unable to identify with a national or ethnical identity, and critical views on media and security-related subjects appear to be common attributes of most wannabe Jihādis.7 Thus, IS deliberately exploits these pre-existing biases, narratives and radical ideas with what they call “facts”.8 Indeed, when it comes to radicalisation and ultimately “Jihādization”,9 facts have never really mattered much as long as the narrative contributes to the Jihādi goal. The case of Arid Uka’s online radicalisation that eventually leads to him shooting several American serviceman at Frankfurt Airport, exemplifies how this dangerous mixture of practical and ideological advice poses a threat to governments.10 Social media, in his case, helped convince the 21-year-old man to commit a terrorist attack and eventually proceed further down on the path of

4

Naji (2006). IS (2015), ch. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone”. 6 AFP (2015). 7 Bartlett et al. (2010), pp. 25–28. 8 Manjoo (2008). 9 Moghadam (2008). 10 Gupta and Brook (2013), p. 10. 5

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radicalisation.11 Through his online study of Jihādi literature, YouTube videos, Twitter feeds and websites, but also through conversations on Facebook with other Jihādists, Arid became radicalised. According to him, a Facebook post finally prompted him to carry out the attack on Frankfurt airport.12 The investigation into the content he watched online finally concluded that what he perceived to be “facts” and real videos of American soldiers raping Iraqi women, turned out to be scenes from a Hollywood movie.13 Such a neglection of “factual” information can—as illustrated in Arid Uka’s case—lead to hate, violence and separations within society as a whole. Such a separation, according to the Islamic State, will ultimately force Muslims to either “apostatize” … or to migrate to the Islamic State’s Caliphate in order to escape “persecution by the crusader governments and citizens”. Indeed, their approach does not take any “greyzone” into account and deliberately splits the world into either good or evil. When looking at the media outlets and propaganda goals of the Islamic State, this vision of an apocalyptic struggle, a battle between good and evil, between those who are right and those who are wrong, becomes fairly obvious. In a tragic twist of irony, one cannot but think of George W. Bush’s quote, which launched the war on terror and would ultimately provide the soil for the Islamic State’s expansion in Iraq and Syria: “You are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”—G.W. Bush.14

15.1

The Alienation of Muslims (Propaganda)

Terrorism is theatre and communication.15 Thus, the media has been utilised for propaganda purposes by Jihādi groups and especially by their intelligence services.16 Ideology guides the media outputs while religious statements have to be considered as the basis of most publications.17 Aside from espionage deterrence, one can observe an additional and dual approach towards propaganda that targets recruitment and alienation in the West, either with respect to the “Elimination of the Greyzone” strategy or in order to recruit future Jihādi operatives. IS aims at convincing Muslims that European societies won’t accept them and all attacks or atrocities are targeted to transmit this message or to provide a distorted image of what daily life looks like in the Islamic State.

11

Ibid, p. 10. Ibid, p. 10. 13 Ibid, p. 10. 14 Bush (2001). 15 Waldmann (2005). 16 Fletscher (2006). 17 Farwell (2014). 12

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In order to achieve this Muslim alienation, their communities need to be separated from the societies they live in. Consequently, the group claims that “the world today is divided into two camps”, which IS defines as either kufr (unbelievers) or its own interpretation of Islam. Its main publication Dabiq continues to assess that: “No Muslim has any excuse to be independent of this entity waging war on their behalf … neutrality would doom him.”18

For IS, this accusation of hypocrisy exists not only in Western countries. The same thing can be found in the Middle East too. This makes it easy for the group to distinguish between supporters and enemies—by eliminating the greyzone. Indeed, Muslims who oppose IS ideas are a target. In Dabiq, IS publishes the picture of two elder Muslim men who have expressed solidarity with the “Je suis Charlie” movement and apparently opposed Islamic terrorism, calling them “hypocrites” and “apostates”. The group threatens such Muslims with “the sword” and continues to proclaim that any relationship with the “crusader” nations would mean that an eternity in hell will be inevitable. The reason why IS’ covert operations have put so much focus on the extinction of the “greyzone” also lies in its value to the group’s recruitment narrative. Consequently, this narrative aims at convincing disgruntled Muslims that they cannot live as European Muslims, adhere to Islam and worship Allah. At the same time, IS provides the missing Islamic ideals in the form of a Caliphate, a reminder and distant echo of former Muslim glory and hegemony. As a result, some Muslims may feel pressured into choosing one side or the other. Once someone has arrived at this stage, IS awaits him/her with open arms and the group’s propaganda machinery, which is naturally controlled by the Emni, which offers redemption, power and masculinity while taking concerns of religious freedom into consideration. Indeed, the Internet offers the segmentation of potential recruits according to certain demographics.19 Young people have not only been found to be the primary users of the Internet,20 but also to be the most prone to radicalisation.21 Furthermore, the UK PREVENT strategy found that young people, from lower-income groups and from lower ranking socio-economic levels, are at risk of radicalisation.22 M. Sagemann claims that the average age of internationally operating Jihādis is 25.7 years.23 Finally, T. Frieburger and S. Crane found that young male people that spend a lot of time online and suffer from social deprivation are the most likely to seek solace with one another and are thus, most prone to

IS (2015), ch. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone”. Fox and Madden (2006). 20 Dutton and Blank (2013). 21 Macdonald and Mair (2015), p. 16. 22 Home Affairs Select Committee (2012), p. 8. 23 Sagemann (2008), pp. 47–89. 18 19

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radicalisation.24 In fact, this particular strategy is not new and if one looks beyond the noise created by the new virtual social spaces, what remains is a centuries-old recruiting tactic that preys on the lonely and the isolated.25,26 IS/Emni recruiters have also identified those demographics precisely and introduced them to terrorist literature and romantic Jihādi ideas.27 The “five star” Jihād as advertised by IS constitutes a good example,28 where war-torn Syria is promoted as a paradise.29 Male fighters are targeted through the prism of masculinity30 and consequently Jihādi propaganda often shows athletic ninja-style fighters, armed with machine guns, pistols and military uniforms. In order to set some ideological context and link the propaganda to religion, the banners behind the fighters often show the Shahāda,31 and the design echoes the visual impact of several computer games. What becomes apparent is a feeling of grandiosity, dominance and viewing others as inferior.32 Intriguingly, this very mindset has also been very present within Saddam Hussein’s intelligence apparatus, which has had a significant influence on the modus operandi of the Emni (see chapter: The IS’ Amniyat and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq). Interestingly, recruiters themselves have ended up coming from rather troubled backgrounds with a history of crime and a directionless life. What becomes obvious, also in the biographies of many IS attackers in France or Belgium is a sense of not-belonging and of lacking a place within society, a function or a direction. Also, a gap between the aspirations of young men and women and the actual options they are left with in society appear to be apparent. These missing anchors for social misfits and criminals, like the French-Algerian-Portuguese Omar Mustefai, who attacked the Bataclan concert hall with some fellow Jihādis, may prompt individuals to leave “the greyzone”, meaning that IS brainwashing can actually be seen as working. This is especially true in polarised and separated societies. IS understands the situation European Muslims can find themselves in, and it designs its propaganda to bring them close to their target audience, which sets the group apart from its rivals in the competition for supremacy in the global Jihād.33

24

Frieburger and Crane (2008). Callimachi (2015). 26 Whilst this might be one aspect of recruitment and radicalization it is certainly not the only explanation. Pathways into radicalization vary dramatically and are dependent on the drivers of the relevant male and female individuals. 27 Frieburger and Crane (2008). 28 Sherlock (2013). 29 Erelle (2015). 30 Lohlker (2013). 31 The Shahada (‫ )ﺍﻟﺸﻬﺎﺩﺓ‬is the Islamic creed that declares the belief in the oneness of God and the acceptance of Muḥammad as the prophet. The creed reads: ‘There is no god but Allah, and Muḥammad is Allah's Messenger’ (lā ʾilāha ʾillā-llāh, muḥammadur rasūlu-llāh). One can find the declaration for example on the Saudi-Arabian flag but also on the black banner of IS. 32 Lohlker (2013). 33 Al-Tamimi (2014). 25

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The content produced is available in multiple languages and makes use of a variety of media formats and outlets.34 Particularly videos of executions, gruesome torture and other atrocities have been popular propaganda content35 and are utilised for counterintelligence purposes,36 spreading fear,37 and in order to alienate the Muslim community for the purpose of covert operations. The slick final publications of these propaganda pieces include elements of Islamic law and consequently deliver the much-needed religious justifications38 through a blend of Jihādi ideology, strategic military goals and propaganda.39 Indeed, this final blend of archaic imagery and religious or legal elements enhances the terrorist group’s perceived legitimacy40 and how it’s perceived by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Needless to say, such a perceived legitimacy moves the group much closer to its goal of eliminating the “greyzone”. In sum, the “greyzone” slowly erodes and every terror attack, atrocity or incident involving radical Islam fosters this covert operation and ultimately moves IS closer to its goals. The sophistication of its media strategies, which are heavily influenced by the group’s security apparatus, combined with the ambiguity of Internet propaganda, has led many to believe in the claims to legitimacy of the Islamic State’s Caliphate.41 Indeed, online user accounts continue to disappear in order to participate in outlandish Jihādi fantasies.42 The UN Security Council reported that more than 25’000 foreigners,43 from more than 100 different countries, had been involved with IS at the peak of the group’s territorial control44 and in “defending the Ummah”.45 Even despite the most recent advances in counterterrorism (in light of the defeats IS has suffered), one must acknowledge that its covert operations have had a significant destabilising effect.

34

Lohlker (2014). Piper (2008), pp. 28–38. 36 Haberl (2016). 37 Reuter (2015), p. 257. 38 Macdonald and Mair (2015), p. 19. 39 Lohlker and Abu-Hamdeh (2013), pp. 4–138. 40 Ibid, pp. 4–138. 41 Braniff and Moghadam (2011). 42 Kohlmann (2011). 43 Burke (2015). 44 Cilluffo et al. (2007). 45 Ummah (‫ )ﺃﻣﺔ‬means ‘nation’ or ‘community’ in the context of a supra-national community with a common history and not referring to a geographic nation. As such it can be interpreted as ‘Islamic Community’. 35

References

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References AFP (2015) Paris shootings lead to firebomb attacks on French mosques. The Telegraph. Accessed online: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11332467/Paris-shootingslead-to-firebomb-attacks-on-French-mosques.html Al-Tamimi A (2014) IS, al-Qaeda compete for Supremacy in Global Jihād. Al-Monitor, Syria Pulse. Accessed online: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/IS-qaeda-zawahribaghdadi-Jihādist-syria-iraq.html Bartlett J, Birdwell J, King M (2010) The edge of violence—tackling home-grown terrorism requires a radical approach. DEMOS Think Tank. Published online Braniff B, Moghadam A (2011) Towards global Jihādism—Al-Qaeda’s strategic, logical and structural adaptations since 9/11. Terrorism Research Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies, 5(2). Accessed online: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/ pot/article/view/braniff-towards-global-JihādJihādism/html Burke J (2015) Islamist fighters drawn from half the World’s Countries, says UN. The Guardian. Accessed online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/26/islamist-fighters-drawnfrom-half-the-worlds-countries-says-un Bush GW (2001) Quote: ‘you are either with us, or with the terrorists’. Voice of America. 21 Sept 2001 Callimachi R (2015) IS and the lonely young American. New York Times. Accessed online: http:// www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/IS-online-recruiting-american.html?action= click&pgtype=Homepage&module=second-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=topnews&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report&utm_ campaign=SitRep0629&_r=0) Cilluffo F et al (2007) Networked radicalization—a counter-strategy. Homeland Security Policy Institute, p 7 Dutton W, Blank G (2013) Cultures of the internet—the internet in Britain. Oxford internet surveys report, University of Oxford, pp 4–59. Accessed online: http://oxis.oii.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/OxIS-2013.pdf Erelle A (2015) Skyping with the enemy—i went undercover as a Jihādi Girlfriend. The Guardian. online:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/26/french-journalist-posesAccessed muslim-convert-IS-anna-erelle?CMP=fb_gu Farwell JP (2014) The media strategy of IS. Survival—Glob Polit Strategy 6:49–55 Fletscher G (2006) The indefinable concept of terrorism. J Int Crim Justice 4:894–911 Fox S, Madden M (2006) Generations online. Pew Research Center. Accessed online: http://www. pewinternet.org/2006/01/22/generations-online/ Francois-Cerrah M (2015) Islamic State wants to divide the world into Jihādists and crusaders. Telegraph. Accessed online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/12002726/ The-grey-zone-How-IS-wants-to-divide-the-world-into-Muslims-and-crusaders.html Frieburger T, Crane S (2008) A systematic explanation of terrorist use of the internet. Int J Cybercrim 2(1):309–319 Gupta R, Brook H (2013) Using social media for global security. Wiley Haberl F (2016) The art of darkness—ideological foundations and present implications of Jihādi counterintelligence, counterespionage, denial and deception culture. J Intell Propaganda Secur Stud 10(1):145–165 Home Affairs Select Committee (2012) Roots of violent extremism. In: Nineteenth report of session 2010–2012, HC1446. HM Government IS (2015) Dabiq no. 7 Kohlmann EF (2011) Subcommittee hearing: Jihādists use of social media—how to prevent terrorism and preserve innovation. Committee on Homeland Security, Homeland Security Hearing, p 3. Accessed online: http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearingJihādist-use-social-media-how-prevent-terrorism-and-preserve-innovation) Lohlker R (2013) Jihādi masculinities University of Vienna Press. Study Jihādism 3:1–28

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Lohlker R (2014) Hip hop and Islam—an exploration into music, technology, religion and marginality. Wiener Zeitschrift Für Die Kunde Des Morgenlandes 104:132 Lohlker R, Abu-Hamdeh T (2013) Jihādi thought and ideology. Logos Verlag, Berlin Macdonald S, Mair D (2015) A new strategic environment. In: Jarvis L et al Terrorism online— politics, law and technology. Routledge Manjoo F (2008) True enough—learning to live in a post-fact society. Wiley, pp 2 Moghadam A (2008) The globalization of martyrdom: Al-Qaeda, Salafi Jihād and the diffusion of suicide attacks. Johns Hopkins University Press Naji AB (2006) The management of savagery: the most critical stage through which umma will pass (translated by William McCants, 2006). The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies Piper P (2008) Nets of terror—terrorist activity on the internet. Searcher 16(10) Reuter C (2015) Die schwarze Macht: Der »Islamische Staat« und die Strategen des Terrors. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt Sagemann M (2008) Leaderless Jihād—terror networks in the twenty-first century. University of Pennsylvania Press Sherlock R (2013) What every Jihādi in Syria needs: hair gel, an iPad and KitKats. The Telegraph. Accessed online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10476333/ What-every-JihādJihādi-in-Syria-needs-hair-gel-an-iPad-and-Kit-Kats.html Waldmann P (2005) Terrorismus: Provokation der Macht. Murmann Publisher Wege CA (2018) The changing islamic state intelligence apparatus. Int J Intell CounterIntell 31(2): 271–288

Chapter 16

Jih¯adi Intelligence Activities in the Digital Realm

Abstract The information technologies of the twenty-first century have exposed new vulnerabilities that can be exploited by jih¯adi groups. This increases the necessity to fully understand the phenomenon of jih¯adism and to holistically know and comprehend a new antagonist. However, the academic discourse around jih¯adism in cyberspace does not pay enough attention to radical jih¯adi ideology and its core element: operational art. This very phenomenon can be seen as the basis of the jih¯adi subculture as it allows for an abstract distillation of strategic or tactical guidelines from the Quran, the Ahadith or the Sunnah. Cyber-attacks, cyber-espionage and cyber-propaganda can consequently be linked to the military management of the Prophet Muhammad, to cultural heritage and to the foundation of the Islamic faith. In this regard, operational art provides a common strategic or tactical framework, which allows jih¯adi groups to remain operative and organised on the decentralised battleground that is cyberspace and despite the loss of leadership figures, controlled territory or manpower. Hence, distorted interpretations of Islam have a significant impact on the operational realities. Understanding the interplay between cyberspace and jih¯adi operational art ultimately allows for an effective engagement with the subculture and to undermine its claim to legitimacy through challenging the fundamentals of radical ideologies. This academic study hence focuses on exploring what lies below the radical activities of jih¯adi groups. It attempts to contribute to the existing scholarship on radical Islamic ideologies by linking the offline world of twisted jih¯adi thought, misguided radical interpretations of Islam and jih¯adi military tactics to the virtual realm. Keywords Cyberspace · Cyber disruption · Cyber espionage · Cyber-Vandalism · Psychological operations “You are not different from the Mujahidin in the physical world!”1

The information technology of the twenty-first century has exposed new vulnerabilities that can be exploited by Jih¯adi groups.2 However, the academic discourse 1

Holtmann (2011). Elements of the following chapter on Jihadi Intelligence Activities in the Digital Real have been presented as: Haberl (2018).

2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_16

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around Jih¯adism in cyberspace does not pay enough attention to radical Jih¯adi ideology and its core element: operational art. This very phenomenon can be seen as the basis of the Jih¯adi subculture, as it allows for an abstract distillation of strategic or tactical guidelines from the Qur’¯an, the Ah.a¯ d¯ıth or the Sunnah. Cyber-attacks, cyber-espionage and cyber-propaganda can consequently be linked to the military management of the Prophet Muh.ammad, to cultural heritage and to the foundation of the Islamic faith. In this regard, operational art provides a common strategic or tactical framework, which allows Jih¯adi groups to remain operative and organised in the decentralised battleground that is cyberspace, despite the loss of leadership figures, controlled territory or manpower.3 This means that distorted interpretations of Islam have a significant impact on operational realities offline and in the fifth dimension of warfare. Understanding the interplay between cyberspace and Jih¯adi operational art ultimately allows for an effective engagement with the subculture and to undermine its claim to legitimacy by challenging the fundamentals of radical ideologies and spheres of knowledge.4 It is no longer a matter of if or when Jih¯adism will show up in cyberspace, but rather how. Operational art can provide a framework for cyber-confrontation and the adoption of related warfighting principles by Jih¯adi groups and governments alike. These principles, and the sources upon which they are based, are likely to characterise what Jih¯adi cyber-activities may look like in future. It is of utmost importance to understand their ideological, cultural and historic framework and further, to characterise how operational art may influence cyber-operations. IS, for instance, has already demonstrated that all of its operations contain some cyber-elements.5 These may range from cyber-espionage6 to psychological operations and of course, to actual attempts to launch cyber-attacks. In most cases, however, the borders between these categories are rather blurry as these three elements of cyber-warfare are oftentimes interconnected.7 Jih¯adi groups such as IS have lost significant territorial control and influence in the real world, which has prompted them to further decentralise as a response.8 Given their real-life cell structure, it is not surprising that they have now chosen an operational environment that matches their distributed organisation, namely cyberspace. Indeed, the cyber-battlefields of the brave new world resonate rather well with existing Jih¯adi warfighting principles. This allows the movement to regain direction and to overcome the challenges inherent in a leaderless and decentralised structure.9 In order to compensate for these shortcomings, a set of principles is required, one which could define the means of cyber-operations and achieve common strategic

3

Haberl (2018). Ibid. 5 Harber (2009), 22 (December), p. 232. 6 Weimann (2004). 7 Haberl (2018). 8 Post (2004), p. 92. 9 Haberl (2018). 4

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goals,10 which then produce the same outcomes in different ways and in different environments.11 This important element of operational art serves as a layer of knowledge between strategy and tactics that is often overlooked.12 Fortunately for Jih¯adi groups, a construct of such warfighting doctrines already exists, and they can readily be adapted to the challenges faced in cyberspace. The military principles established by Muh.ammad during his battles can indeed be tailored to the cyber-realm and thus, guide the Jih¯adi cause online. As such, operational art, as a process from which strategic and tactical approaches to military operations can be formulated and distilled from historic, religious and cultural role models will then be used in order to develop Jih¯adi warfighting principles specific to cyberspace.13

16.1 Operational Art in Cyberspace “And here we are again, history repeating itself, the heads of kufr once again using the same ways in the war against Islam but in new forms. As the Quraiš, the head of kufr at that time, fought the Muslims … The same applies to the head of Kufr in our times, America and the West, fighting the Muslims by all means and methods.”—al-Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine.14

If we wish to understand what cyber-warfare means to the Jih¯adi movement, we must first understand the origins of its culture and the actors that played key roles in its establishment. Some Jih¯adi cyber-operations, their online activities or their most recent cyber-attacks may appear familiar and Western in nature, but the Islamic world, which includes the Jih¯adi interpretation of Islam, does not share the same religious traditions or history. Thus, ideological, religious and methodological roots of a Jih¯adi online behaviour need to be interpreted in accordance with what warfare means within the context of Jih¯adi operational art. Their traditions, ideology and present approach to warfare are, as often mentioned in this work, all derived from the battles of Muh.ammad and the earliest military confrontations in the Ancient Near East.15 ,16 The legacy of Muh.ammad, the Sunnah or the Ah.a¯ d¯ıth, as a strong influence,17 provides key drivers, legitimisations and, most importantly, a basic framework for Jih¯adi operational art. Thus, understanding the context of the early Arab and Islamic culture of warfare can enhance our understanding of Jih¯adi warfighting principles today and provide the prerequisite for any future engagements. Especially a look at Muh.ammad’s military management will yield new insights and perspectives on 10

Adamsky (2010). Davison (2008), pp. 37–38. 12 Adamsky (2010). 13 Hall (2011). 14 Al-Qaeda (2016), pp. 27–28. 15 Dvornik (1974). 16 Haberl (2018). 17 Beeston (1976), p. 7. 11

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Jih¯adi use of the Internet and the roots of their actions. As scholars of the ancient world seek to uncover an “urtext” and the earliest version of a manuscript, to which later copies can be compared, any study of Jih¯adism should see us seeking an original source of behaviour that predates future evolutions.18 ,19 Operational art distilled from such an “urtext” can provide a much-needed framework for formulating these core principles, doctrines and methods of warfare in cyberspace.20 While prominent Jih¯adi military thinkers such as Abdel Aziz alMuqrin or Abu Bakr Naji provide some rudimentary military instructions, one can observe that the Jih¯adi movement nonetheless shares a distinct strategic culture, global narrative, and common warfare necessities.21 Of importance is that there is no global command structure or commonly developed plans, strategies and tactics.22 This absence of a coherent and sustainable overall command structure renders it impossible to conduct strategic and operational planning.23 ,24 What adds to this dilemma is the commonly decentralised cell structure of groups, which share a distinct strategic and tactical culture, narratives and common warfare necessities.25 However, according to Adamsky, whose scholarship in this field is hard to overestimate, such an “…absence of a rigid command structure requires a common body of doctrinal knowledge, or what is known in the West as operational art.” Operational art can thus be seen as the missing connector between ideology and the real-life application of force and as an “intermediate layer of knowledge that links wider strategy and discrete tactics and guarantees utility of force”.26 Being an equilibrium between conflicting demands in the decentralised realm of Jih¯adi cyber-warfare operational art can, however, neither be considered a proper strategy nor a proper tactic. It must be seen as a separate layer of knowledge. As such, it acts as a framework for formulating doctrines, which enable the transition of strategic goals into tactical actions. Finally, operational art also acts as a platform upon which commanders and subordinates can achieve a shared understanding of the strategic state of play, an associated tactical problem, and an appropriate military resolution.27 Thus, it can substitute command and control if there is a coherent doctrinal programme,28 as the Qur’¯an and Sunnah regulate the relationship between higher causes and tangible war goals.29 ,30 18

Gustafson (2010). Haberl (2018). 20 Adamsky (2010). 21 Cozzens (2007), pp. 127–164. 22 Mitchell (2008). 23 Adamsky (2010), p. 6. 24 Haberl (2018). 25 Cozzens (2007), pp. 127–164. 26 Haberl (2018). 27 Adamsky (2010). 28 Ibid. 29 Naji (2006). 30 Haberl (2018). 19

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Ideology informs strategic and tactical behaviour.31 Consequently, Muh.ammad’s battles inform and condition the Jih¯adi conceptualisation of warfare.32 The warfighting principles outlined in the Qur’¯an and Sunnah are further developed, adapted and updated by military strategists and Jih¯adi scholars. They commonly enhance the Qur’¯anic view that war is God’s unchangeable will33 and that it is thus controlled and shaped by him.34 Hence, Jih¯adis consider war to be the ultimate truth revealed by Allah, which renders them infallible and applicable to any battlefield or military scenario,35 including warfare in the fifth domain, which commonly includes cyber-attacks, cyber-espionage and cyber-propaganda.36

16.2 Cyber-Attacks and Cyber-Disruption—A Natural Fit “Allah willing, today we will hack your accounts and delete it as you delete the accounts of our ansar brethren. Soon we will delete 100 of your accounts to every one of our accounts. Soon, very soon.”37

Cyber-operations can easily be integrated into existing Jih¯adi approaches to warfare, but they need leadership, a common strategy, and coherence. Operational art may substitute for these lacks. This is because Jih¯adis consider themselves guided by Muh.ammad and adhere to his military management, which was rooted in an insurgency based on stealth,38 quietness,39 surprise,40 speed41 and, most importantly, deception.42 All of these things were attributes commonly associated with cybersymmetric and asymmetric warfare. Muh.ammad engaged in asymmetric warfare when he only managed to put 314 men in the field during the Battle of Badr43 or when he had to use the element of terror in order to instil fear amongst his critics, opponents or enemies. Most importantly, according to R. Gabriel, Muh.ammad was in fact a trailblazer and one of the first successful practitioners of insurgency warfare.44 ,45 31

Moghadam (2008). Adamsky (2010). 33 Ibrahim (2008). 34 Stout et al. (2008), pp. 74–137. 35 Malik (1979), p. 97. 36 Haberl (2018). 37 Middle East Media Research Institute (2014). 38 Rodgers (2008). 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Gabriel (2007), p. xxvi. 44 Ibid, p. xxvi. 45 Haberl (2018). 32

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As Jih¯adis engage in virtual insurgencies, they have realised that the asymmetric and decentralised nature of the Internet goes in line with their interpretation of Islam and their vision of Muh.ammad as role model. The ability to inflict harm with limited capabilities may bear a particular resemblance, since Muh.ammad also made the best use of the manpower he had at his disposal.46 In 624, when he ambushed and raided a Meccan merchant caravan with only 300 men at Badr, he put this skill to the test.47 Jih¯adi groups, though currently not able to compete in the arms race for weaponised IT tools, continue to use an arsenal of capabilities, some cutting-edge, some older and less innovative, depending on the resources they have available.48 Moreover, this approach per se may only illustrate that Jih¯adis use more similar methods of warfare than Muh.ammad did. They are, however, copying the Prophet’s doctrines in even greater detail with respect to cyber-espionage and cyber-propaganda: “AMERICAN SOLDIERS, WE ARE COMING, WATCH YOUR BACK.”49

In 2015, the United States Central Command’s (CentCom) Twitter account was hacked by IS. As spectacular as it may seem, this can hardly be compared to a highlevel sophisticated cyber-attack and CentCom actually referred to it as mere “cybervandalism”. Alas, IS’ Junaid Hussain, who launched the United Cyber Caliphate (UCC) in 2014,50 still achieved his goal. The United Cyber Caliphate he commanded reached 109.000 Twitter followers for CentCom and also leaked classified contact information of senior military personnel.51 ,52 Most importantly, however, IS showed potential recruits that the Cyber Caliphate was ready to attack and convinced other hackers, such as Ardit Ferizi, to penetrate a server in Arizona in order to gather personal information on roughly 100,000 people.53 IS would put many of these names on widely distributed kill list. A Jih¯adi tactic, for which there is actually a historic precedent. When Muh.ammad’s army marched into Mecca, some of his followers (suffah) would hunt down a list of the Prophet’s enemies, people Muh.ammad had marked for execution.54 ,55 Cyber-operations need leadership and while some leadership figures can provide a certain level of structure, it is operational art that can ultimately ensure unity of force. Indeed, the current Jih¯ad cyber-attacks and the publications of kill lists have been executed on an ad-hoc basis and they were not conducted according to a 46

Haberl (2018). Robinson (2002). 48 Haberl (2019). 49 Lamotte (2015). 50 Lohlker (2017).; See also: Lohlker (2018). In Lohlker (2019); Or see: Lohlker (2016). 51 Haberl (2018). 52 Haberl (2018). 53 Ibid, pp. 1–8. 54 Gabriel (2007), p. xxvi. 55 Haberl (2018). 47

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coherent or organised strategy.56 Operational art can, however, provide a homogenous framework as current Jih¯adi cyber-warfare units are structured in small groups, using their technological devices only when they see a target opportunity, while otherwise remaining hidden. Once an opportunity presents itself, these groups join forces and use whatever tools they can get their hands in order to inflict as much damage as possible.57 The rapid formation of new hacking groups and the cooperation amongst them, such as the merger of the Ghost Caliphate Section, the Sons Caliphate Army, the Caliphate Cyber Army and the Kalashnikov E-security team (under the banner of the United Cyber Caliphate) illustrates this tendency.58 Much like the Jih¯adi hackers, the Prophet Muh.ammad followed a similar approach of fighting his insurgency with whatever means he had at his disposal. Sometimes, he would rely on trickery,59 intelligence60 and psychological operations,61 particularly if he felt that a full-on revolutionary attack62 should be substituted by a pre-emptive battle63 or a surprise attack.64 ,65 The Jih¯adi capabilities to launch such cyber-attacks have thus far been limited by their imagination, the technical feasibility and the resources they are able to mobilise. Indeed, they have not shown the capability to launch cyber-operations against critical infrastructure, but between launching a high-level cyber-attack at one end of the spectrum and using the Internet for cyber-propaganda or cyber-espionage at the other end of the spectrum, one can find incidents of cyber-disruption. The CentCom hack may be a good example and although such disruptions are malicious and aggressive, they do not amount to a high-level cyber-attack.66 Cyber-disruptions such as hacking or website defacements currently reflects the skillset of Jih¯adi hackers as they have been notably successful in defacing the websites of US news stations, French governmental services, Kuwait’s parliament and the website of the International Business Times.67 ,68

56

Haberl (2018). Haberl (2018). 58 Middle East Media Research Institute (2016). 59 Azad (2011). Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet. Heritage International Inc. ch. Practical Traits. 60 Ibid, ch. Practical Traits. 61 Ibid, ch. Intelligence Department. 62 Ibid, Department of Medical Services. 63 Ibid, Department of Medical Services. 64 Ibid, Department of Medical Services. 65 Haberl (2018). 66 Yannakogeorgos (2014). 67 Haberl (2018). 68 Haberl (2018). 57

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Undoubtedly, Jih¯adis have heightened interest in developing offensive cybercapabilities, albeit they are currently constrained by inherent resources, organisational limitations and competing priorities.69 Furthermore, ideological elements exist that may also influence the speed of their offensive capabilities. Abu Bakr Naji, a spearheading Jih¯adi strategist, appears to have a significant ideological influence on IS. His highly influential “The Management of Savagery” provides a step-by-step guide towards the establishment of an Islamic state and connects the Jih¯adi cause to the life and times of Muh.ammad. In Naji’s mind, the first six points in his elevenstep plan are concerned with internal matters such as establishing security, providing food or establishing sharia justice, etc. Only the last two points listed by Naji mention possible expansions and offensive attacks.70 Accordingly, Jih¯adi cyber-capabilities have always been more developed with respect to the deep web, allowing them to gain an advantage in secret communication structures and counterintelligence.71 While the most successful operations by the United Cyber Caliphate used to be guided by leadership figures such as Junaid Hussain or his successor Siful Haque Sujan, operational art might take over the leadership element of their asymmetric insurgency. The current lack of command and guidance in cyberspace might force Jih¯adi groups to search for common principles, doctrines and frameworks within the realms of operational art so as to guarantee coherence. Especially now that IS is losing the battle for the real-life Islamic state, the Jih¯adi cause has turned into a war for ideas.72 In this war, they may have no other choice but to guarantee unity of force and legitimise their actions through the adoption of principles deducted from operational art. Two elements of cyber-warfare—cyber-espionage and psychological operations— have thus far been highly influenced by the battles of Muh.ammad. They may provide two highly relevant examples of how influential these doctrines can be.73 ,74 Although cyber-vandalism can be disruptive, a cyber-attack on critical infrastructure can be devastating and, already in 2014, the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee assessed that skilled professionals may get paid by terrorist organisation to launch attacks against companies that are lacking certain capabilities.75 The FBI considers devastating cyber-attacks to happen within in the next ten years,76 though the bureau’s focus has been on malware and strategic cyber-weapons.77 In any case, Stuxnet illustrates the possibilities, since it inflicted real-world damage on critical

69

Clapper (2013). Naji (2006), p. 12. 71 Haberl (2018). 72 Ibid, pp. 1–8. 73 Ibid, pp. 1–8. 74 Ibid, pp. 1–8. 75 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2013). 76 Ackerman (2013). 77 Farwell and Rohozinski (2011). 70

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infrastructure in Iran.78 In the hands of a terrorist organisation, such powerful tools could cause significant damage.79 Critical infrastructure may appear to be an easy target to Jih¯adi operatives and their respective intelligence services such the Emni’s foreign operations branch.80 This is because industrial control systems are different from commercial information and communications technology applications.81 They were not designed to be secure,82 but to automate complex processes on which various industries and governments rely.83 Thus, industrial control systems are critical systems that allow countries, industries, economies or governments to function,84 while a failure of them will result in physical events.85 ,86 Compared to crime ware or root kits, which are relatively easy to find and purchase online and in various dark web forums (in order to attack networks in a relatively straightforward manner), targeting critical infrastructure requires human and financial capital much more.87 Thus, a Jih¯adi organisation aiming to cause physical effects in the real world through cyberspace will be dependent on recruiting or training a team of experts,88 which IS has placed special attention towards doing. For those recruits—i.e. Junaid Hussain—hacking databases like the “Shodan” provide guidance on how to target various critical infrastructure systems ranging from power plants to wind turbines.89 Such databases are drastically lowering the technical bar for Jih¯adi hackers, which consequently has a knock-on-effect on the required expertise.90 ,91 To this point in time, and despite successful previous attacks on critical infrastructure by non-Jih¯adi actors, developing and deploying malware like Stuxnet still requires experts who are familiar with mechanical engineering and the inner workings of the relevant systems in order to deploy a working rootkit. Further, they would be trained in electrical engineering in order to evaluate the impact of the manipulated frequency and somebody familiar with the interface systems or engineering workstations so that the attack symptoms can be concealed by system developers.92 Thus, the

78

Gorman (2012). Archer (2014b). 80 Wilson (2014). 81 Kruger et al. (2012). 82 Ibid, pp. 1–8. 83 Yannakogeorgos (2014). 84 Swearingen et al. (2013). 85 Yannakogeorgos (2014). 86 Haberl (2018). 87 Ibid, pp. 43–63. 88 Conway (2014), pp. 103–123. 89 Graham-Harrison (2015). 90 Conway (2014), pp. 103–123. 91 Haberl (2018). 92 Oliver (2013). 79

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cost of entry remains high,93 but IS has demonstrated the will and potential to engage in this form of warfare through the establishment of the United Cyber Caliphate and other Jih¯adi hacking units, which also heavily engage in cyber-espionage.94

16.3 Cyber-Espionage “We will Hack [sic] you, follow you, spy on you, and take ghaneemah [spoils of war; booty] from you…All your information will belong to us, including your secrets…”95

Cyber-attacks usually involve a lot of preparation and coordination, which consequently requires intelligence capabilities. Although it is sometimes believed that intelligence, its affects and all its current virtual facets are modern creations, one must recognise that its history can also be traced far back into the past—especially in the Near East. Indeed, while the digital realm may be a fairly recent extension of the Jih¯adi cause, the underlying ideological predating of Jih¯adi intelligence has its roots in the earliest years of Islam. Timely and reliable intelligence is as essential to the cyberspace battlefield as it was in Muh.ammad’s day and age or during the peak of the Islamic expansion.96 Furthermore, IS’ foundations and internal architecture rest upon strategic planning, surveillance, and information acquisition.97 Haji Bakr, the group’s former intelligence chief, created an Islamic intelligence state rooted in the gradual infiltration of society.98 The Internet streamlines this process99 and cyber-capabilities have consequently been introduced. In fact, one entire department of the IS intelligence apparatus is assigned to the “Technology Specialist”.100 This position cooperates with at least three sharia judges at the same district level, while their tasks are overseen by sharia judges at a regional level.101 ,102 The intelligence element of Jih¯adi operational art dates back many centuries103 and features Muh.ammad himself as a “master of intelligence in war”,104 but also the espionage conducted by the Qahtani tribes in the first half of the seventh century and

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Conway (2014), pp. 103–123. Haberl (2018). 95 Caliphate Cyber Army (2016). 96 Haberl (2018). 97 Reuter (2015a). 98 Reuter (2015b), pp. 249–280. 99 Macdonald and Mair (2015), p. 21. 100 Reuter (2015a). 101 Ibid. 102 Haberl (2018). 103 Haberl (2016). 104 Gabriel (2007), p. xviiif. 94

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even before the rise of Islam itself.105 Those early tribal Arab intelligence systems developed during times of war and peace also influenced Muh.ammad’s intelligence activities,106 which in turn are now frequently quoted doctrines, recycled by the Islamic State.107 Moreover, the rich and influential inheritance left by the Assyrian Empire,108 the Persians109 or the Mamluk Empire,110 which built one of the earliest intelligence systems, went a very long way in forming political spheres and provided the cultural soil from which future Islamic empires would grow.111 ,112 ,113 The system of roads, for example, was initially constructed in order to relay information as quickly as possible for military purposes. As previous mentioned, Persians simply made use of the roads built by the Assyrians and established their famous royal postal system (al-barid) throughout the entire empire based on the original Assyrian infrastructure.114 ,115 Early accounts of espionage activity even regard the job of a postmaster (sahib al-barid) the same as that of the spy.116 In the first Islamic state after Muh.ammad, the Abbasid Caliphate, the postal and messaging system was based on the dual function of the postmaster, turned into the main instrument by which the first Caliphs established their power.117 This pool of doctrines can still influence Jih¯adi warfighting and intelligence principles today.118 Such established doctrines and tactical, strategic and ideological and cultural guidelines can steer Jih¯adi groups. Their approaches to intelligence are not merely in the dusty trenches of various battlefields, but also in the fifth domain of cyberspace and the murky darknet, which present a new and digital opportunity to walk into the footsteps of the Prophet. Osama bin Laden has described this translation and adaptation of ancient warfighting principles to modern warfare as follows: “We are an umma and have a long history, with the grace of God. We are now in the fifteenth century of this great religion,119 whose complete and comprehensive methodology has clarified the dealing between one individual and another, the duties of the believer towards God, and the relationship between the Muslim country and other countries in times of peace and war. If we look back at our history, we will find there were many types of dealings between the Muslim nation and the other nations in peacetime and wartime, including treaties and 105

Beeston (1976), p. 7. Al-Asmari (2013), p. 90. 107 IS (2016). Dabiq no. 7. 108 Hill (1993) 109 Xenophon. Vol 5. Cryopaedia. Translated by Miller, W. Cambridge University Press. 110 Dvornik (1974), p. 228. 111 Ibid, p. 3. 112 Haberl (2016b). Also see: Haberl (2016a). 113 Haberl (2018). 114 Mehrdad (2016), p. 127. 115 Ramsay (1890). 116 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 159. 117 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 159. 118 Haberl (2018). 119 The Islamic calendar dates from Muhammad’s emigration from Mecca to Medina. Year 1 . therefore corresponds to 622 AD. 106

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matters to do with commerce. So it is not a new thing that we need to create. Rather, it already exists.”—Osama Bin Laden120

Gathering information in cyber-realm espionage primarily increases the kind of capabilities that have an effect on potential physical attacks.121 Seen as such, cyberespionage is used to uncover hidden vulnerabilities in computer systems, which are needed in order to create precise programming instructions and develop successful malware.122 The Prophet Muh.ammad would, prior to any battle, acquire intelligence on his enemy.123 As mentioned earlier, according to al-Tabari, Muh.ammad received information prior of the battle of Badr from his “eyes”,124 but also on secret missions like the Sariyya of Hamzah ibn “Abd al-Muttalib, where he ordered the gathering of intelligence on the number of animals slaughtered for human consumption.125 ,126 On another occasion, Muh.ammad tasked Habbab bin Mundhir with gathering as much information on the adversary as possible by penetrating the enemy’s ranks.127 Particularly in his first battle against the Quraiš, he acted very cautious. Several incidents are recorded and have become part of the Sunnah, where his secret tactics are revealed.128 ,129 Intelligence typically involves the use of such secretive tactics and access to classified information, computers or networks in order to gain a strategic benefit. Moreover, cyber-activities may also prompt real-life espionage. Cyber-espionage commonly involves gaining secret access to computer systems to gather relevant information, which is commonly done through stealth technology,130 through the use of proxy servers, cracking technologies or malware (including Trojan horses) and spyware software tools. The information collected may include network configurations, the precise facility equipment models in operation or valid user passwords.131 However, intelligence tasks of both the past and present are not always limited to a mere gathering of information.132 Muh.ammad occasionally resorted to covert action and assassinations to achieve his political goals. It is also not surprising that Jih¯adi interpretations of Islam gravitate towards those violent parts of the Sunnah or the Qur’¯an. In this regard, the UCC 120

Lawrence (2005), pp. 45–46. Archer (2014a). 122 Wilson (2015). 123 Azad (2011). Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet. Heritage International Inc. ch. Intelligence Department. 124 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 162. 125 Azad (2011). Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet. Heritage International Inc. ch. Intelligence Department. 126 Haberl (2018). 127 Ibid, ch. Intelligence Department. 128 Al-Naboodah (2005), p. 162. 129 Haberl (2018). 130 Wilson (2015). 131 Ibid, pp. 123–137. 132 Haberl (2018). 121

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published a kill list with the names and addresses of American military personnel it had acquired: “…we have your names and addresses, we are in your emails and social media accounts, we are extracting confidential data and passing on your personal information to the soldiers of the khilafah, who soon with the permission of Allah will strike at your necks in your own lands! “So wait; we too are waiting””133

Unsurprisingly, the Jih¯adi hackers who wrote this message found it important to link their statement and the published kill to the Surah at-Tawbah. Indeed, even the wording found in the Qur’¯an strikes some resemblance to the statement of IS.134 “… while we await for you either that Allah will afflict you with a punishment from Himself or at our hands. So wait, we too are waiting with you.”

The assassination of opponents in order to achieve certain political or military goals has been an important tool throughout the Islamic expansion and Muh.ammad’s battles. According to his most influential biographers, it can be assumed that he approved the assassination of Muawiyah bin Al Mugheerah135 and Khalid ibn Sufyan136 in 625, but also supported the assassination of eight men from “Ukil, who converted to Islam, but then apostatised in 628.137 The assassination of the Jew Kab ibn al-Ashraf, who led a dirty campaign and sinister scheming against the Prophet, and which was carried out by Muh.ammad Ibn Maslamah, may be a good final example138 while also illustrating very well how IS uses religious role models to legitimise assassinations using the framework of operational art139 ,140 : “O grandsons of Muh.ammad Ibn Maslamah, we have revealed to you some of the names and pictures of the spies in Jerusalem, so make those who recruited them see their blood flow.”141

Cyber-espionage today enables assassinations while targeted killings and the published kill lists illustrate the additional purpose of intelligence in the virtual realm. The Islamic State Hacking Division has used this aspect of cyber-espionage to spread fear amongst the ranks of its opponents.142 ,143 133

Middle East Media Research Institute (2016). Haberl (2018). 135 Ibn Ishaq, Sirat Rasul. Oxford UP, p. 37. 136 Musnad Ahmad 3:496. Ibn Hisham, Sirat Rasul Allah. Al-Tabari. The last years of the Prophet. Vol. 9. 137 Sahih Bukhari 1:4:234, Sahih Bukhari 5:59:505, Sahih Bukhari 7:71:623. 138 Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:52:270 Sahih al-Bukhari, 5:59:369, Sahih Muslim, 19:4436 Sahih alBukhari, 3:45:687 Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:52:271. 139 Haberl (2016). 140 Haberl (2018). 141 IS (2016). Features an interview with the alleged Israeli spy in 2015. A video featuring the execution of the individual also contains these statements. 142 Haberl (2016). 143 Haberl (2018). 134

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Indeed, IS attempted to circulate a catalogue containing a variety of cyberespionage tools, some of which appear to have been copied from a “penetration testing forum”144 and then modified.145 A large number of these materials grouped in a package entitled the “Book of Terror” focuses on the evasion of detection. However, some tutorials on Wi-Fi network hacking are also available and one particular guide instructs the future Jih¯adi hacker on “Wardriving”, which basically means driving around in a car with a notebook, denoting the relevant antennas necessary to crack Wi-Fi networks.146 Furthermore, the package includes instructions on how to set up Kali Linux, an open-source Linux derivate popular for its security as much as some simple commands enabling the user to crack WPA and WEP encryptions. Intriguingly, the hackers appear to be very conscious of the possible harm they could inflict on fellow Muslims147 : “If you live in an area where there are Muslims then refrain from hijacking networks in order to protect these Muslims from harm.”148

IS hackers have also attempted to hack CCTV security cameras for espionage purposes. Some of the cameras the Jih¯adi hackers tried to access were located in the US, Asia, Europe and Latin America. A list containing cameras from these locations was posted online, including a video tutorial on how to gain access to them.149 However, the attack on vulnerabilities was determined to be a viable rootkit vulnerability that would not require a lot of skill to execute.150 Still, the example illustrates that IS has tried to gain access to closed networks in order to prepare attacks, in order to conceal an attack and in order to execute an attack. Since IS operatives have clearly conducted surveillance operations prior to an attack, accessing CCTV cameras would certainly benefit their intelligence capabilities.151 ,152

16.4 Psychological Operations in Cyberspace “We are preparing for another wave of operations which will fill their hearts with fear and this fear will have no end … By doing so, the amount of the enemy’s fear is multiplied and good media goals are achieved”153 144

Penetration testing, which is also called ethical hacking, involves testing an IT system, computer network or application in order to detect exploitable security vulnerabilities. 145 Cox (2015). 146 Ibid. 147 Haberl (2018). 148 Wood (2015). 149 Paganini (2016). 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Haberl (2018). 153 Naji (2006), pp. 29–30.

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Terrorism is theatre, and thus, cyberspace has been utilised for propaganda and psychological operations.154 The dramatic, disturbing and shocking facets of a terrorist attack are supposed to intimidate a society, government or both.155 Theatrics enhance the perception possessed by the public or decision makers on the risk an organisation poses.156 ,157 Dramatic and shocking images can result in a hyper-inflated perception of the threat a group constitutes158 while weakening an adversary’s determination and spiritual power. In Islamic warfare doctrines, psychological operations have been declared the most important type of warfare since Muh.ammad himself made great use of psychological operations. Indeed, he would leave his enemies perplexed and gain control over their hearts and minds, which would ultimately erode their ability to resist and fight back159 ,160 : “I have been assisted in creating a fear in the hearts of the enemy.”161

In the battle of Khaybar, he made the tribe of the Ghatfan believe that their land was under attack by the Muslim forces, which prompted them to withdraw in fear.162 Similarly, he created fear amongst the Jews of Khaybar and convinced them to surrender and to seek conciliation.163 The commander of the army of Khaybar had been so intimidated by Muh.ammad that his forces felt weary and weak.164 The Prophet granted amnesty to one Jewish person from Khaybar, whose report tells us today how well Muh.ammad’s psychological strategy had worked165 : “The inhabitants of this place have been destroyed out of fear of you.”166

The mass media’s emphasis on terrorist attacks and political rhetoric of fear reinforce this notion in the twenty-first century.167 In this regard, the widely distributed videos of executions of hostages serve a psychological purpose. In the same way, the Prophet inflicted fear in the hearts of his enemies; the Islamic State aims to intimidate the target audience by different means, but to similar ends:

154

Fletscher (2006). Macdonald and Mair (2015), p. 26. 156 Sunstein (2005). 157 Haberl (2018). 158 Macdonald and Mair (2015), p. 26. 159 Azad (2011). 160 Haberl (2018). 161 Ibid, ch. Psychological Warfare. 162 Ibid, ch. Psychological Warfare. 163 Ibid, ch. Psychological Warfare. 164 Ibid, ch. Psychological Warfare. 165 Haberl (2018). 166 Ibid, ch. Psychological Warfare. 167 Ibid, ch. Psychological Warfare, p. 26. 155

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“…the hostages should be liquidated in a terrifying manner, which will send fear into the hearts of the enemy and his supporters.”168

In the same way as IS uses captured weaponry against its enemies, it also uses the West’s media tools and technologies against it.169 It is the intention of Jih¯adi cyberpropaganda for these videos to go viral and not only spread fear, but seek religious justification through reinforcing ideology and establishing itself as the leading global Jih¯adi group.170 Linking their actions to Muh.ammad aids this cause, especially if cyber-propaganda is used in order to spark tensions in an area in which a group operates or with the purpose of provoking sectarian, racial or religious disputes.171 Muh.ammad followed a similar approach to psychological operations, and, particularly during his Sariya missions, he would instil fear amongst the ranks of his enemies. A notable case is the Sariya of Ali ibn Abi Talib with the Bani Sa’d.172 In this case, the Bani Sa’d loaded all their belongings on their camels and fled. Their leader is reported to have said173 : “The army of Muh.ammad is coming towards us and we are incapable of facing them.”174

The way IS uses psychological operations bears a striking resemblance to Muh.ammad’s strategies. In June of 2014, IS could declare two of its most significant victories when it captured the city of Mosul and shortly after, also Tikrit. This could only be achieved through psychological operations targeting Iraqi forces, which resulted in roughly 30,000 soldiers running from an insurgent group of just 800 militants, because they lost faith in their government’s will and determination to win.175 Intriguingly, IS had launched its psychological campaign much before Abu Bakr al Baghdadi had even declared the Caliphate and long before they conquered Mosul and Tikrit. In fact, they had frequently threatened Iraqi Security Forces in videos, which were published as part of their “Soldier’s Harvest” campaign between July, 2013 and June, 2014.176 ,177 This created an environment of fear much like Muh.ammad had done during the Sariya of Ali ibn Abi Talib.178 The doctrines Muh.ammad established in the battle against the Bani Sa’d had been applied by IS in the virtual realm. Furthermore, prior to the assault on Mosul and Tikrit, supporters of the group engaged in a Twitter war, from which IS would eventually emerge victorious based on the amount of tweets the 168

Naji (2006), pp. 33, 66. Rose (2014). 170 Ibid, pp. 31–34. 171 Maghaireh (2009). 172 Azad (2011). 173 Haberl (2018). 174 Ibid, ch. Psychological Warfare. 175 Chulov et al. (2014). 176 Gambhir (2016). 177 Haberl (2018). 178 Azad (2011). 169

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groups sent between July, 2014, and April, 2015.179 However, IS had automated its Twitter omnipresence through programmed “Twitter bots”, like the “Dawn of Glad Tiding” application. This app allowed IS to send automated tweets from the user’s accounts180 and just before the Iraqi forces opted for a retreat in June of 2014, the app had posted about 40,000 propaganda tweets.181 Even after they had conquered Mosul and Tikrit, the group continued to project strength by parading and displaying the might of their forces and the captured weapons. The Prophet Muh.ammad’s approach to psychological warfare was also based on displaying strength. Indeed, during the Battle of Hamra al-Asad, he even took the wounded and handicapped with him in order to increase the size of his army182 and further ordered that as many fires as possible should be lit so as to intimidate the enemy.183 In the same way, Muh.ammad tried to appear more powerful than his army really was, Jih¯adi propaganda in cyberspace aims to achieve the same goal. IS has tried a similar approach and managed to gain additional credibility, not only by showcasing strength and power, but by waving the “Black Standard”, one of the flags once flown by Muh.ammad himself when he fought to spread Islam. He was able to instil fear in the hearts of his adversaries, making them even fear the possibility of coming face to face with him. Much like the fleeing Iraqi troops abandoning their bases and equipment in 2015, the Jews of Bani Nadheer burned down their own houses before the Prophet arrived.184 Ultimately, successful psychological operations can jeopardises the unity and integrity of a country.185 What occurs online can have a very real impact and give a person the feeling of being terrorised.186 Thus far, IS has proven to have a real-life effect, such as causing soldiers to abandon their posts and creating a situation of mass migration (by creating a plethora of refugees) simply through fear, public announcements, and the distribution of violent or radical content, which ultimately affects emotions.187 Jih¯adi groups have also started to look at covert operations and espionage operations as a means of installing fear and creating an aura of omnipresence.188 Indeed, they have done the same in the offline world, where Haji Bakr and a group of former Iraqi intelligence officers created an ever-present surveillance state inside the territory controlled by the Islamic State.189 Aside from heavily relying on spies and agents in

179

Bodine-Baron et al. (2016). Cohen (2015). 181 Vitale and Keagle (2014). 182 Azad (2011). 183 Ibid, ch. Psychological Warfare. 184 Ibid, ch. Psychological Warfare. 185 Yardley (2015). 186 Yannakogeorgos (2014). 187 Associated Press (2015). 188 Reuter (2015). 189 Ibid. 180

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order to control his state,190 Muh.ammad also used them for purposes of psychological warfare.191 Hence, he decided to send Na’im ibn Mas’ud on a mission to divide the confederates and weaken (and exhaust) their forces during the battle of Khandaq.192 Again, we can find a striking resemblance if we take a look at “Management of Savagery” by Abu Bakr Naji193 : “Exhausting the forces of the enemy and the regimes collaborating with them, dispersing their efforts, and working to make them unable to catch their breath by means of operations in the regions of the choice states, primary or otherwise, even if the operations are small in size or effect.”194

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Suwaed and Kahana (2018). Azad (2011). 192 Ibid, ch. Psychological Warfare. 193 Haberl (2018). 194 Naji (2006). 191

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Chapter 17

Conclusion

Abstract When trying to understand the behaviour, internal dynamics, military management and modus operandi of groups such as IS or al-Qaeda, one needs a context to the cultural origins to better understand certain behaviours or actions. In particular with respect to a Jih¯adi intelligence culture, a heritage becomes apparent that is dramatically different from that of European and Anglo-Saxon states. It is in the parallels with the battles of the Prophet Muh.ammad and early Arab intelligence history that we begin to see and understand the actions of the Jih¯adi groups and their leadership today. Unfortunately, religion has become a driving force and resource within the new paradigm of Jih¯adi governance and military management, while the doctrines of Jih¯adi intelligence can be seen as the main mechanism through which power and control can be exercised and terror can be spread. Keywords Jih¯adi Intelligence · Jih¯adi Subculture · Military Mangement · Paramilitary Intelligence · al-Qaeda · Islamic State · Intelligence Culture · Operationale Art · Jih¯adi Warfare “As to how to resist these enemy forces from outside, we must look back at the previous Crusader wars against our countries to learn lessons that will help us confront this onslaught, understand the most important causes of these attacks, and learn how they were repulsed and resisted.”1 —Osama bin Laden

If one tries to understand the behaviour, internal dynamics, military management and approaches of groups such as IS or al-Qaeda, there is a need for context on cultural origins so as to best be able to make sense of certain behaviour or actions. Particularly when trying to holistically understand the behaviour of Jih¯adi groups and their intelligence culture, a heritage dramatically different from that of European and Anglo-Saxon states is clearly evident. It is in the parallels to the battles of the Prophet Muh.ammad and the early Arab intelligence history where we begin to see and understand the actions of Jih¯adi groups as well as their governance today. Alas, religion has become a driving force and resource within the new paradigm of Jih¯adi governance, whereas Jih¯adi intelligence doctrines can be seen as the most prominent mechanism by which power and control can be exercised and terror can be spread. 1

Lawrence (2005), p. 216.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6_17

311

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Although one can compare the modus operandi of groups like al-Qaeda or Islamic State with governmental intelligence agencies, ideological and religious aspects of this phenomenon must be considered in much greater detail. Thus, this work has mapped out the Jih¯adi intelligence landscape and both the present and historical influences that affect it. Indeed, al-Qaeda’s recruitment of informants or IS’s establishment of a surveillance state not only has practical, military, strategic or tactical reasoning behind it; it also has a religious and ideological layer that needs to be put into context. The collection of intelligence, intelligence analysis, and the counterintelligence efforts of a Jih¯adi group, organisational structure, recruitment and espionage deterrence are influenced und justified by the actions and military management of the Prophet Muh.ammad and other historic Islamic role models. Jih¯adi intelligence and the three levels of Jih¯adi warfare are informed and guided by operational art. Wars are generally fought at a strategic, operational, and tactical level, one that concerns irregular wars and bilateral conflicts alike,2 whereas operational art is commonly regarded as a uniting element between these three levels. Hence, the implementations of Jih¯adi intelligence activities have been inspired by an Islamic heritage, which has become the doctrinal reference, ideological framework, and operational art. To the Jih¯adi subculture, this heritage, the life and battles of the Prophet Muh.ammad (Sira), the Sunnah or the Ah.a¯ d¯ıth are the cornerstone of their unique conceptualisation of intelligence and an important element in their overall goals and narrative. As such, they can be regarded additional sources from which Jih¯adi groups have managed to distil intelligence and warfighting doctrines. Consequently, the Jih¯adi conceptualization of intelligence has thus remained unchanged and is considered to be applicable at all times, especially since the Qur’an legitimises and regulates intelligence work, and since the Prophet Muh.ammad himself is considered to be a “master of intelligence in war”. Religion truly does matter to the Jih¯adi intelligence culture and the warfighting principles of the Prophet Muh.ammad, which include large sections on intelligence. They have become the foundation on which a Jih¯adi intelligence culture has been built. Jih¯adi groups are exploring this cultural heritage and doctrines of operational art, which can guarantee unity of force and a coherent military strategy. Through these doctrines and the ever-more sophisticated materials want-to-be guerrilla fighters can access online, Jih¯adi groups will continue to diminish and erode the greyzone within society and to stress the fragile fault lines of social cohesion. Indeed, the paradigm change towards covert operations has taken aim at society as a whole, utilising a concerning combination of operational art, codified knowledge online, intelligence methodologies and returning militants, who may transform radical Islamist support networks in the West and increase the threat of Jih¯adi intelligence operations: “They come out to the streets in specific times, and they are armed with what weapons they have that they can conceal after the end of their work, masked and only wearing the clothes that resemble the clothes of the people of the region, in order to facilitate being concealed for them when they need that, so they spread about in the region, and seize it entirely or in part for a few hours, and they implement the aim of their spreading. Then and when they 2

Franz (1983), pp. 2–12.

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encounter the order to withdraw, they begin to disappear and melt away, without their enemy finding traces of them subsequently.”3

The Jih¯adi modus operandi is currently changing towards more subversive means and an increasing embrace of intelligence operations and the associated operation art. Such subversive intelligence operations might ultimately lead to an infiltration of the military, the police force and other governmental institutions or non-governmental. Jih¯adi cells are very likely to further improve their intelligence capabilities, as they have already recruited assets, attempted social engineering4 or performed surveillance operations by human, technical, and cyber means in order to collect intelligence on their targets.5 Throughout history until this very day, collecting information has always been an important asset to governments in peacetime and war, and the same holds true for Jih¯adi groups and their intelligence activities. When Jih¯adi groups collect intelligence, they commonly favour human sources (HUMINT), which is derived from information obtained from humans. It is a rather inexpensive technique and the oldest info collection technique out there. However, more commonly and especially with respect to IS, Jih¯adi groups make significant use of open source information in order to plan attacks, engage in economic warfare, and to apply a strategic framework to their actions. The collected information is then used at the analytical stage of intelligence, which will aim towards arriving at an analytical product that can be useful to the relevant decision maker. In this regard, intelligence enables Jih¯adi groups to learn and to develop. Indeed, Jih¯adis must learn and continue to educate themselves in order to gain knowledge on how to achieve their objectives. This holds true for larger terrorist organisations and lone wolves alike. Jih¯adi groups and in particular their respective intelligence departments also learn from the successes and failures of other groups, which is generally referred to as “lessons learned”. Such “lessons learned” can, at times, substitute for intelligence analysis—especially with respect to IS or al-Qaeda, who both frequently publish their experiences in their magazines. Amongst other operational secrets, analytical products are commonly protected by their counterintelligence mechanisms. The need to protect valuable information is as old as mankind itself. Consequently, encryption and the use of cryptography, but also falsified passports or safe houses, have become an integral and traditional part of most intelligence activities. Indeed, cryptography enables the keeping of secrets and thus, constitutes a cornerstone of counterintelligence. Thus, Jih¯adi groups establish similar counterintelligence departments, write up doctrines and train their members in the realms of counter espionage. Although one can certainly compare the modus operandi of groups like al-Qaeda or IS with governmental intelligence agencies, ideological and religious aspects of this phenomenon also need to be considered. Understanding the legacy of intelligence and the role it played at the birth of Islam is essential in order to understand the counterintelligence doctrines of modern Jih¯adi 3

IS (2019). Al-Qaeda (2015), p. 56. 5 Ibid, p. 56. 4

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17 Conclusion

organisations. Counterintelligence in the form of detecting and capturing enemy spies is also something that can be found in the times of the Prophet.6 Deception and Denial7 are the backbones of Jih¯adi counterintelligence and tie in with all other military, ideological and intelligence activities or covert operations. Covert operations are considered a highly controversial topic within the intelligence community, but they have become an integral factor for Jih¯adi intelligence. A covert operation in the governmental sense could be of political, psychological, economical or (para-)military nature. Jih¯adi groups have put their focus on the strategic assassination of specific personalities.8 Economic warfare, and in particular the subversion of adversaries and their respective economies, is closely linked to intelligence, intelligence operations, and also covert operations. Especially today, with its deeply interconnected global economies, technologies and industries, the economy has become a weak point of Western society that can easily be exploited by Jih¯adi groups9 —much like their exploitation of cyberspace. Jih¯adism in cyberspace is a highly relevant part of the Jih¯adi subculture as it allows for an abstract distillation of strategic or tactical guidelines from the Qur’¯an, the Ah.a¯ d¯ıth or the Sunnah, also allowing them to be widely distributed. Cyber-attacks, cyber espionage, and cyber propaganda can consequently be linked to the military management of the Prophet Muh.ammad, to cultural heritage, and to the foundation of the Islamic faith. Jih¯adi groups have realised this and also determined that the decentralised nature of the Internet may very will match the decentralised nature of Jih¯adi groups. Jih¯adi intelligence within the framework of rebel governance can be seen as a dynamic process in which legitimisation, authority, power and identity are renegotiated amongst Jih¯adi actors10 and between the terrorists and the terrorised— utilising intelligence methodologies, concepts and doctrines. Especially concerning Jih¯adi intelligence capabilities, pragmatic decision-making by leading Jih¯adi figures inside the respective intelligence and security departments of their organisations, has helped groups like IS or al-Qaeda in achieving their tactical, strategic, domestic and international, ambitions. Utilising religious elements and operational art does not appear to contradict this Jih¯adi pragmatism,11 particularly since their capabilities and intentions range from various intelligence collection methodologies, intelligence analysis, lessons learned, counterintelligence, covert operations to denial and deception efforts. Intelligence has traditionally played a significant role in the governing structures of various Jih¯adi groups, with the most recent and largest state-building endeavour 6

Al-Waqidi, Kitab Al-Maghazi, 1:404, 2:640, 808; Ibn Hisham 3:268; Harawi, al-Hiyal al Harbiyya 77. 7 A brief review of the available research on the topic of deception illustrates scholarly interest starting with Sun Tzu, Vegetius, Machiavelli and Carl von Clausewitz. 8 Wiskind (2016), pp. 15. 9 Freeman (2012), p. 1. 10 Donker (2018), pp. 58–86. 11 Ibid, pp. 58–86.

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termed the “Islamic State”.12 For this Islamic State, a functional administrative system is a key part of the project’s survival, and thus, administrative tasks have also been a common and frequently featured theme in the group’s propaganda, illustrating the importance of governance and administration. Intelligence too, albeit commonly operating within the realms of secrecy, can be considered a significant aspect of this administrative structure, one that will need to be studied in greater detail. Furthermore, holistically understanding the organisational structures of the Islamic State—but also various other Jih¯adi groups—might have direct implications on counterterrorism legislation, policy and military or security operations.13 This is particularly relevant since non-state actors, including Jih¯adi groups, are likely to continue improving their intelligence capabilities, which might include human intelligence, technical aspects of intelligence, and those aspects of the cyber realm. Indeed, much like their governmental counterparts, these non-state actors recruit intelligence sources or perform surveillance operations in order to facilitate their activities and avoid detection.14 We must not be blinded by the initial territorial and military victory over IS or other Jih¯adi groups. The Islamic State has in fact morphed into an “idea” and a mainly ideological construct rooted in Jih¯adi operational art, which is far from being defeated. The Jih¯adis fighting for the “idea” of an Islamic State, will do so in the same vein as the Prophet Muh.ammad, in whose steps they aim to walk. Indeed, also the struggle for the first Islamic State established by Muh.ammad himself had intelligence and counterintelligence at its very core and this very element of warfighting will unite Jih¯adi ranks and a scattered movement online and offline—despite lacking leadership, manpower or controlled territory. If we desire to truly understand how Jih¯adi groups perceive the offline and online battlefields of today, and perhaps how they will do so in future, we must also study their cultural origins, which are not rooted in the same military, political and religious traditions, that have shaped, transformed and altered Western ideas of warfare and operational art over centuries. Hence, we must understand that when IS fighters invaded Mosul in 2011 and Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi led Friday prayers—dressed entirely in black, the colour of the Abbasid Caliphs—he did so as if the last eight centuries had never happened.15 Jih¯adi groups, and in particular the Islamic State, are deeply influenced by doctrines that stem from the earliest period of Islam and indeed also from the intelligence heritage of the ancient Near East, all the while pragmatically utilising modern GPS technology, OSINT, covert operations, encryption, tanks or machine guns. If al-Baghdadi decides to ignore the last eight centuries and if Jih¯adi fighters believe to walk in the footsteps of the Prophet of Islam, we cannot ignore these ancient influencers, cultural origins and stimuli, brushing them off as if

12

Al-Tamimi (2015). Ibid. 14 Coats (2018). 15 Wood, F. (2014). What ISIS’s Leader Really Wants. The New Republic. Accessed online: https:// newrepublic.com/article/119259/IS-history-islamic-states-new-Caliphate-syria-and-iraq. 13

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they were insignificant, for they have contributed directly and indirectly to what has become a Jih¯adi intelligence culture.

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Glossary of Terms

AD Anno Domini AES Advanced Encryption Standard AQ Al-Qaeda AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation BC Before Birth of Jesus Christ BCE Before the Common era BSO Black September Organisation CCTV Closed-circuit television CentCom United States Central Command CIA Central Intelligence Agency COMINT Communications Intelligence DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik EHF Electronic Horizon Foundation ELINT Electronic Intelligence EU European Union FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FININT Financial Intelligence FOB Forward Operating Base FSA Free Syrian Army GBP British Pound GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters GIMF Global Islamic Media Front GPS Global Positioning System GSM Global System for Mobile Communications HUMINT Human Intelligence ID Identity Document IDF Israeli Defense Forces IED Improvised Explosive Device © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. J. Haberl, Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24744-6

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IMINT Imagery Intelligence IP Internet Protocol (Address) IS Islamic State (Terrorist Organisation) ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (IS) ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria IT Information Technology JI Jemaah Islamiyah JKBW Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed (IS-affiliated group) KGB Committee for State Security KUS Katibat Usood al-Sunna MAD Militärischer Abschirmdienst MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence MEDINT Medical Intelligence MENA Middle East and North Africa MI6 Military Intelligence, Section 6 (United Kingdom) MSDI Majlis Shura Dawlat al-Islam NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NSA National Security Agency (United States of America) OMON Tajik special operations OSINT Open-Source Intelligence PGP Pretty Good Privacy PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PO (Box) Post Office Box RFID Radio-frequency identification RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman Encryption SIM Subscriber Identity Module SOCMINT Social Media Intelligence SSO Special Security Organization (Ba’athist Iraq) STASI Ministry for State Security (DDR) STRAINT Strategic Intelligence TOR The Onion Router UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UCC United Cyber Caliphate UK United Kingdom UN United Nations US United States of America USAID United States Agency for International Development USB Universal Serial Bus USD United States Dollar USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol VPN Virtual Private Network

Glossary of Terms