Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox 9781685851965

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Japan's Navy

Japan's Navy POLITICS AND PARADOX, 1971-2000

Peter J. Woolley Foreword by James E. Auer

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LYN N E RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 2000 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2000 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Woolley, Peter J., 1960Japan's navy : politics and paradox, 1971-2000 / Peter J. Woolley Foreword by James E. Auer Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-819-9 (he : alk. paper) 1. Japan. Kaijojieitai. 2. Japan—Military policy. 3. Japan— Politics and government—1945- I. Title. VA653.W66 1999 359'.03'0952—dc21 99-27841 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America @

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

In memorium: Scott Clausen Robert Estrada Youngkoo Lee Robert Zuzick

Contents

List of Illustrations Foreword, James E. Auer Preface Acknowledgements

ix xi xiii xvii

1

Primer: Approaching Policy and Politics

2

A Cultural View: T h e Kata of Maritime Forces

23

3

T h e Legal/Constitutional C o n u n d r u m : Constraint and License in Article 9

39

4

T h e Pulling a n d Hauling of Sea-Lane Defense

65

5

An Organizational Response to Japan's First War: Money, Minesweeping, and the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991

89

6

7

1

UN Peacekeeping Operations: Realism, Caution, Incrementalism

111

In Sum: Democracy, Strategy, and Alliance

131

Selected Bibliography Index About the Book

151 161 165

vii

Illustrations

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 1.4 Table 1.5 Map 1.1

Population and Land Area of U.S. Allies Most Populous Countries Japan's International Trade Petroleum Consumption Island Countries of the World J a p a n and Surrounding Seas

Table 2.1 Map 2.1

Milestones in JMSDF Development Deployment of JMSDF

34 35

Table 3.1 Table 3.2

Constitutional Chronology Breaking the 1-Percent Barrier in Defense Spending

48

Table 4.1 Map 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3

4 4 5 5 5 9

50

Table 4.5

Chronology of Sea-Lane Defense 1,000 Miles f r o m Tokyo Typical Comparison of Pacific Fleets, 1984 Typical Post-Cold War Comparison of Pacific Fleets, 1997 Comparison of Pacific Fleets Adjusted for Operability, Availability, and Weapons Parity, 1998 Differences in JMSDF Destroyers

Table 5.1

Gulf War Chronology

102

Table 6.1

Peacekeeping Operations Chronology

119

Table 4.4

IX

71 73 79 80 81 82

Foreword James E. Auer In 1942 as the United States and J a p a n slugged it out in the Pacific, Yale professor Nicholas J o h n Spykman wrote o n e of the finest geostrategic volumes ever published. Titled America's Strategy in World Politics, Spykman accurately n o t e d the lack of o r d e r a n d central authority in international society and, thus, the n e e d for individual states to make the preservation and improvement of their power position a primary objective of their foreign policy. Spkyman went on in America's Strategy to accurately foresee the rationale for a U.S.-Japan alliance based on each nation's geostrategic location. It would be interesting to know how his thought was received in 1942; today he appears to have been particularly farsighted and obviously ahead of his time. Admiral Arleigh Burke was o n e of the many Americans who f o u g h t h a r d against J a p a n ' s Imperial Navy. Writing to me in 1970, Admiral Burke, who is accurately regarded by officers of Japan's postwar navy (its Maritime Self-Defense Force) as their f o u n d e r , stated that I might wonder why he, who f o u g h t so hard against and "hated" J a p a n , came to s u p p o r t the establishment of a postwar J a p a n e s e naval force. He said it was a matter of national interest; either J a p a n was to have some kind of postwar navy as a maritime nation, or the U n i t e d States was going to have to carry o u t those f u n c t i o n s on Japan's behalf. Admiral Burke had changed his assessment of J a p a n ' s character based on lectures given to him at his request, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, by retired J a p a n e s e Admiral Kichisaburo N o m u r a , J a p a n ' s ambassador in Washington, D.C., at the time of Pearl Harbor. Burke had been sent to Tokyo to assist Vice Admiral C. T u r n e r Joy following the o u t b r e a k of the Korean War. Desiring to learn about J a p a n , Admiral Burke asked a Naval Academy classmate who knew J a p a n well to r e c o m m e n d a teacher; his classmate recomm e n d e d Admiral Nomura. Burke wrote to me that Admiral N o m u r a

xi

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Foreword

taught him the history of J a p a n and o f its relationships with Korea and China. But most of all, Admiral Burke told me, Admiral Nomura won him over within a few months and ultimately led him to appreciate the dignity and goodness of the Japanese nation as a whole, "a dedicated, purposeful people." Admiral Burke stated that when Admiral Nomura died in 1964 he lost one of the closest friends he ever had. Arleigh Burke persuaded the Navy Department in Washington, D.C., that Japan needed a navy and won approval of the loan of a series of older U.S. ships to begin that effort in 1952. He also recommended that Japan select a group of ten distinguished former naval officers to plan a new force, believing that leadership was a navy's most important component. At the suggestion of Edwin O. Reischauer of Harvard University, I wrote about those developments in my dissertation, "The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971." There was little written about Japanese postwar defense at that time, and Professor Reischauer suggested that I might be able to write an interim account, pending a definitive future volume by a Japanese scholar. I don't know if I succeeded, but now Peter Woolley has taken that history forward 30 years in a far more scholarly and dispassionate analysis of Japan's naval development and policies. Woolley's work is a comprehensive, balanced, and rational account of the cultural, legal, and political hurdles encountered and overcome by the Japanese government in growing the MSDF. As he notes, "By the end of the twentieth century Japan had the strongest navy in the Pacific Ocean excepting that of the United States." In the author's words this development "was not the result of a conspiracy of Japanese militarists or nationalists. Nor was it a conspiracy of the United States to rearm an anti-communist ally." However, Woolley accurately notes, "overlooked through most of the Cold War, except by foreign policy specialists, was the importance of J a p a n as an ally of the West and specifically as an ally of the United States." Although I am unsure if enough foreign policy specialists are cognizant of that reality, I sincerely believe that two distinguished Americans would be very comfortable with Woolley's conclusions: Professor Nicholas J o h n Spkyman and Admiral Arleigh Burke. This book gives them due honor and is a valuable gift to historical and political scholarship. James E. Auer Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation Institute for Public Policy Studies Vanderbilt University Nashville, Tennessee

Preface

"Do they have a defense policy? I thought they weren't even allowed to have a military," Westerners have said. Some like to add, "I guess there's not much to write." Comments of Japanese nationals vary little from those of Westerners. Many Japanese are simply puzzled by talk of Japan's defense forces, as if the subject must be completely uninteresting. Others want to make certain their interlocutor knows that Japan does not have an army or navy but "self-defense forces": not kaigun but kaijoh jiei-tai. Such responses are a reflection of the public dialogue between Japan and the West and, more particularly, between Japan and the United States. Much of that dialogue is about economic competition, the condition of the U.S. or Japanese economy, the stock markets, trade and tariff barriers, capital flows, and trade deficits. When the topic is not the economy, it is about comparing social institutions and habits: the educational system, the role of women in the family and in business, and tips for success in business management. Most of these conversations focus on the differences between Japan and the West. Most conversations begin with the premise that Japanese culture is different and therefore all else must be different. Overlooked are a number of bedrock characteristics that Japan shares with the rest of the developed democracies. Overlooked too is the role Japan played in support of an international system that produced unparalleled prosperity, made unbelievable progress in technology, and withstood a long, cold confrontation with the inimical political system of the Soviet Union. Overlooked through most of the Cold War, except by foreign policy specialists, was the importance of Japan as an ally of the West and specifically as an ally of the United States. Instead, many Americans gave much credit for the fall of communism to the Reagan administration; many others tried not to give credit to that administration, finding the seeds of inevitable decline in the Soviet Union itxiii

xiv

Preface

self. But credit was overdue to the stalwart allies of the United States, in Europe and Asia, whose armed forces, economies, and political resolve—combined with those of the United States—in sum constituted a formidable challenge to the Soviet Union. Among these U.S. allies was Japan. With its 120 million people, its archipelago strung across the maritime approaches to the Russian Far East, its powerful economy, its first-rate commercial technology, and its democratic constitution, it did indeed make a valuable ally for the United States and could not have failed to make an impression on decisionmakers in the Kremlin. 1 As the Cold War thawed, with unpredictable consequences, change likewise came to Japan: in the 1980s and 1990s a number of remarkable circumstances emerged. 1. T h e implosion of the Soviet Union and the precipitous deterioration of the Soviet navy recalibrated the naval equation in the western Pacific. 2. Japan's Liberal Democratic Party—in part as a consequence of the fall of Soviet communism—fell from power, bringing new parties into the Japanese parliament, bringing leaders of other parties into government, and consequently forging a much broader consensus among the political parties about the legitimacy of Japan's defense forces and the role they may play in international politics. 3. Japan fulfilled a pledge to undertake the defense of sea-lanes up to 1,000 miles from Japanese shores. 4. Japan deployed minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of the 1991 war over Kuwait. 5. J a p a n deployed its Self-Defense Forces in several UN peacekeeping operations. Thus the equation of power and politics in northeast Asia was quite different in the first decade of the post-Cold War era from what it had been. It was not merely the absence of the Soviet Union nor an economically flourishing China that made the difference. Japan's Cold War buildup of military forces, especially naval forces, made it a regional power rather than a local one, and the insistence by the United States and others that Japan overtly contribute more to the security of the democratic and free-trading world enticed Japan out of its almost complete security isolation. Still Japan was difficult to understand. U.S. observers in particular seemed perplexed by Japan's foreign policies: postwar J a p a n was a country of political paradoxes. Its economic reach was global, powerful, and much in evidence; its military reach was regional, ten-

Preface

XV

tative, and of low profile. Japan had had a legacy of militarism and brutal expansionism, but had been living for decades under stable, democratic, parliamentary government. It was financially, environmentally, and inextricably entwined with the rest of the world; it was unsure what its responsibilities were to that world. Its prosperity was largely made possible by the stability and free trade that constitute the creed of the postwar United States, but its relations with the United States were in economic matters ambivalent, if not often strained. Its only ally was the United States, and for the United States Japan was an important ally—but almost everyone in Japan and the United States was divided over what contribution Japan should make to international security. For Americans at least, how to think about Japan was the most perplexing of questions. Many people who write about Japanese politics are as difficult to understand as Japan itself. If Japan does not care to invest more in defense spending, then it is taking a free ride in security matters; if Japan increases its defense spending, however, it is rearming and fanning the flames of nationalism and resentment in the region. If Japan does not contribute manpower to international operations, again it is shirking its duty; if Japan deploys personnel, it is paving the way to a military hegemony. If Japan suggests it should have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it must then take greater responsibility for UN operations, including military operations. If Japan contributes more to military operations, then it is insensitive to the many peoples that suffered at the hands of Imperial Japanese forces in the Pacific War. If Japan liberally interprets its constitution to allow for the deployment of troops, then it does not respect its own constitution, but if Japan declines to make an expansive interpretation of its constitution to allow for the deployment of troops then it is hiding behind the constitution. This book is not then a straightforward description of Japan's navy or Self-Defense Forces at an operational level. It is about Japan's defense policies and about Japan's use of its Maritime Self-Defense Forces. It is also about varying interpretations of those policies, various motivations, and various ways to approach those policies. While it may become clear to the reader that the author has some definite opinions in this regard, the reader is invited to draw conclusions independently. Peter J. Woolley

Note 1. The view from the Kremlin certainly included such things as a disastrous

xvi

Preface

war in Afghanistan, overcrowded and unsanitary apartments around Moscow, seething nationalist resentments, shoddy products, and the prospect that the United States would succeed in its fantastic technological goal of comprehensive missile defenses. The view from the Kremlin might just as well have included a ring of vigorous industrial democracies whose working class had no envy for the Soviet life, whose governments were firmly allied with that of the United States, and whose military organizations were as well trained, well supplied, and technologically advanced as any.

Acknowledgments

The author is indebted to many kind people who granted interviews, expounded, disagreed, and offered encouragement. All of these gave generously of their time; only some, I suspect, will remember me: Hiroaki Sato of JETRO, but above all a fine poet; his friend Noriko Seki who introduced me to her friend David Sanger of the New York Times as well as Adm. Manubu Yoshida, JMSDF (ret.), Vice Adm. Taketo Takata, JMSDF (ret.), and Atshushi Seki, all of whom graciously answered questions that were probably too direct. Tanami of the International House of J a p a n facilitated many introductions and interviews; Hisao Iwashima of Iwate University did likewise. A n u m b e r of U.S. and Japanese military officers were open and kind: Maj. Thomas N. Hasebe, USAF; Col. Katsuhiro Sei,JASDF; Capt. Hirotsugu Yamashita, JMSDF; Maj. Tatsuo Kamei,JGSDF; Noboru Inada of the Japan Air Staff College; and Takehiko Imaizumi of the JDA. Members of the Cabinet Research Office were equally open and generous: Yasuo Kawamura, Nobutaka Tachibana, and Sadao Onishi. Scholars who kindly tolerated and informed me included Shigekatsu Kondo, Shinsuke Daitoh, and Hirotsugu Yamashita of the National Institute for Defense Studies; Yoshikazu Sakamoto of Meijei Gakuin University; Yuji Suzuki of Hosei University; Paul Godwin of the National Defense University; as well as Hiroyuki Kishino and Shigeki Nishimura of the International Institute for Peace. I am deeply impressed by the passion and analytical skill of several news writers: Kiyofuku Chuma and Shunji Taoka of Asahi Shimbun, Ed Offley of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, and Joshua Handler of Greenpeace. And I am indebted to the U.S. State D e p a r t m e n t and Donald Wheeler of Kean University for including me in the 1990 Fulbright/Hayes Group Project in Japan. I am grateful to the U.S. Naval War College and to Robert Wood, dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, for my a p p o i n t m e n t in 1995 as advanced research scholar. I am thankful too for advice, encouragement, and criticism offered by many fine scholars associ-

xvii

xviii

Acknowledgments

ated with the U.S. Naval War College, among them J o h n Hattendorf whose many kindnesses can never be repaid, Capt. J i m Giblin, USN (ret.), whose knowledge o f the J M S D F is encyclopedic, George B a e r and Mack Owens whose encouragement was much needed, and Ambassador Frank McNeil, whose insider knowledge o f diplomatic affairs is riveting. Fairleigh Dickinson University twice awarded grants for my study o f J a p a n ' s defense policy, and many colleagues offered much needed encouragement: Kathryn Douglas, Harry Keyishian, J o h n Scheimann, and Kei Sakayama. Likewise a n u m b e r o f people read and criticized various articles and chapters for this volume over the years: James E. Auer o f Vanderbilt University, Anthony J o e s o f St. J o s e p h ' s University, Paul Wice of Drew University, King Mott of Seton Hall University, David Charters of the University of New Brunswick, Pel Boyer and Tom Grassey o f the Naval War College Review, and Cdr. Mark S. Woolley, USN. I am also grateful to my wife, who not only tolerates but accommodates my antics. For errors and shortcomings that remain, I alone am responsible. P.J.W.

1 Primer: Approaching Policy and Politics

This book is primarily a b o u t the d e v e l o p m e n t and activities of J a p a n ' s Maritime Self-Defense Force, the JMSDF, in the last t h r e e decades of the twentieth century. T h e JMSDF is a first-class navy, a m o n g the most powerful and most expensive maritime forces in the world and, at the end of the twentieth century, the second most powerful naval force in the world's largest ocean. T h e JMSDF is also the most cosmopolitan of J a p a n ' s defense services: more than either the Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) or the G r o u n d Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), the JMSDF has trained and deployed abroad, b e e n m o r e often to distant places, and j o i n e d with friendly forces for combined exercises. O n its own merit J a p a n ' s maritime force deserves close examination. But because the e x p a n d i n g responsibilities of the JMSDF were the result of a national decisionmaking process, this book is also a b o u t the politics of J a p a n ' s national defense strategy a n d policy— roughly since the early 1970s when J a p a n publicly accepted responsibility for the defense of sea-lanes beyond its territorial waters a n d through the 1990s when J a p a n dispatched g r o u n d troops to foreign soil to participate in UN operations. While the JMSDF was traditionally the most visible of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, its roles and missions developed alongside those of the g r o u n d a n d air forces and were naturally reflective of the outcomes of Japan's national defense debate. Further, any work t o u c h i n g on J a p a n e s e policymaking, even in such matters as national defense, must of necessity touch on collective decisionmaking, on collective behavior, and t h e r e f o r e on the question of what explains Japan's collective behavior. So, this book is also a b o u t various a p p r o a c h e s to u n d e r s t a n d i n g J a p a n e s e policymaking in general, and its chapters weigh cultural explanations of selected Japanese policies against several other approaches. 1

2

Japan's Navy

In the chapters ahead, several episodes in the expansion and use of the JMSDF are examined as both characteristic and symptomatic of the redevelopment of Japan's defense policy. The episodes are examined and reexamined in different lights: each chapter employs a different, generic decisionmaking model. Chapter 2, by employing a cultural explanation, offers a broad view of Japan's steadily expanded circle of naval activity from the 1950s through the 1990s. A cultural model is almost by definition one that identifies a unique pattern of behavior, but a cultural explanation is nonetheless a pattern that is more descriptive than causal. Chapter 3 examines the origins, effects, and evolution of the legal constraints on the activities of the JSDF. The institutional approach takes seriously the political efforts to adhere to the constitution. Chapter 4 looks at the politics and the unpredictable results of the strategic division of labor between the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF in defending sea-lanes in the Pacific. Chapter 5 focuses on Japan's difficulty c o n f r o n t i n g the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991. Japan's policy options as the crisis unfolded are examined in light of the organizational routines available to the government. Chapter 6 narrates the development of policies that finally allowed the government to employ the JSDF in UN operations. In Chapter 7, we return to the broader question of Japan's strategic position in the northwest Pacific and its alliance with the United States. For the uninitiated this introductory chapter reviews, first, the thorny question of how to approach Japan: as a unique political, economic, and cultural p h e n o m e n o n , or as a case to be compared with like and unlike cases? It then reviews some of the most common intellectual models of decisionmaking used to come to grips with policy in many countries, not just Japan. In successive chapters these models will be used, as a prism is used, to view and review episodes in the development of the JMSDF in particular and defense policy in general.

The Comparative Conundrum Is Japan unique? A problem that plagues every area specialist is the question of the ways in which a region, its people, and its politics are unique. Scholars study a country because it is different from what they know and because those differences are somehow important. But how important? Which differences are most important? And what are their effects? 1 These questions are of especial importance in examining Japan, for it is a country of seeming paradox: an eastern country that is

Approaching

Policy and

Politics

3

Westernized, a traditional c o u n t r y that is postindustrial, an e c o n o m ically p o w e r f u l c o u n t r y with a low-profile d e f e n s e posture, an important ally of the U n i t e d States o f t e n seen as a rival, a n d a c o u n t r y with a "no war" clause in its c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t s p e n d s a great deal o n national d e f e n s e . If J a p a n is u n i q u e , t h e n o n e may also assert that the r o o t causes of J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e policies are u n i q u e . Japan as

Unique

T w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y J a p a n a n d t h e U n i t e d States were in readily app a r e n t ways dissimilar. Consequently, many J a p a n e s e a n d Americans p r e f e r r e d to e x a m i n e a n d explain p r o b l e m s b e t w e e n t h e two countries in terms of these obvious differences. T h e most obvious differences were cultural, a n d b o t h J a p a n e s e a n d Americans o f t e n insisted that J a p a n e s e culture was n o t j u s t particular b u t u n i q u e . I n d e e d , they c o n c l u d e d , J a p a n itself was u n i q u e . By the 1980s, w h e n J a p a n h a d e m e r g e d as b o t h a crucial ally of the West a n d a worrisome t r a d e partner, disputes over J a p a n ' s t r a d e a n d d e f e n s e policies h a d b e c o m e ritualistic. T h e a p p r o x i m a t e incantation u s e d to invoke J a p a n ' s u n i q u e status was roughly this: smallhomogeneous-xenophobic-island-trading-nation-precarious ly-dependent-onimported-raw-materials-and-dominated-by-a-single-party. Steven R e e d , in his aptly titled book, Making Common Sense of Japan, was a m o n g a few observers a r g u i n g against this p o p u l a r view. 2 As R e e d a r g u e d , J a p a n is small in c o n t r a s t to its largest t r a d i n g p a r t n e r a n d only ally, t h e U n i t e d States. A n d J a p a n is small w h e n c o m p a r e d with n e i g h b o r i n g C h i n a a n d Russia. But J a p a n is n o t small w h e n c o m p a r e d with t h e U.S. allies in E u r o p e o r w h e n it is comp a r e d with most countries (see Table 1.1). N e i t h e r is J a p a n small in terms of p o p u l a t i o n : it is a m o n g the ten most p o p u l o u s countries of t h e world a n d it is the most p o p u l o u s ally of t h e U n i t e d States (see Table 1.2). J a p a n is h o m o g e n e o u s , m u c h m o r e so t h a n t h e U n i t e d States. But its h o m o g e n e i t y as m e a s u r e d by ethnicity a n d class is a post-Empire a n d postindustrial p h e n o m e n o n . After the d e f e a t of the J a p a n ese E m p i r e in 1945, K o r e a n a n d C h i n e s e p e o p l e s living in J a p a n were repatriated. (Even so, a n u m b e r of minorities r e m a i n e d in postwar J a p a n i n c l u d i n g the Ainu, B u r a k u m i n , Chinese, Koreans, Nikkeij i n , a n d Okinawans. 3 ) F u r t h e r , the r u i n b r o u g h t by war a n d t h e restructuring of g o v e r n m e n t a n d industry after the war went a long way to e l i m i n a t e h u g e d i f f e r e n c e s in class a n d i n c o m e t h a t h a d characterized J a p a n e s e society f o r centuries. J a p a n is i n d e e d a t r a d i n g n a t i o n like all the industrialized nations of world, t h e U n i t e d States a n d t h e c o u n t r i e s of Western

4

Table 1.1

Japan's

Population and Land Area of U.S. Allies (1998) Area Area Population (rank in group) (1,000 sq. mi.) (millions)

Country Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Greece Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Turkey United Kingdom United States

Table 1.2

Navy

15 1 13 4 7 11 9 6 14 8 12 5 3 10 2

11.8 3,831.0 16.6 211.2 137.8 50.9 116.3 145.7 15.9 125.2 34.3 194.9 301.4 94.2 3,678.9

Population (rank in group) 13 9 14 6 3 12 7 2 10 15 11 8 4 5 1

10.2 29.1 5.2 58.8 80.2 10.4 58.3 127.6 15.8 4.4 10.6 39.1 70.5 59.0 272.0

Most Populous Countries (1998)

Country China India United States Indonesia Brazil Pakistan Russia Bangladesh Japan Nigeria

Rank

Population (in millions)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1,292 1,036 272 212 175 154 152 134 128 114

Europe foremost among them (see Table 1.3). All the Western industrialized countries import and are dependent upon imported raw materials for their energy (see Table 1.4), and are equally dependent upon manufacture and reexport for their magnificent economic progress in the twentieth century. That J a p a n is an island nation does not make it unique. T h e r e are, after all, numerous island nations in the world (see Table 1.5), some of which also have democratic governments. Japan's parliament has indeed been dominated by one party, the Liberal Democratic Party, since the mid-1950s—but this is hardly unique, either. The Democratic Party in the United States controlled the House of Representatives from 1931 until 1995 with the exception of only four years; Italy's Christian Democrats held power from

Approaching

Table 1.3

Exports + Imports ($ billions)

United States Western Europe China South Korea Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore Thailand Australia and New Zealand Indonesia

Table 1.4

197 128 58 48 43 31 30 30 28 24

Petroleum Consumption Millions of Barrels/Day

Japan 1971 1981 1991

Table 1.5

5

Politics

Japan's International Trade (1995)

Rank Country or Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Policy and

4.4 4.7 5.5

Percent World Consumption

United Western States Europe World 14.8 15.6 16.1

13.2 12.9 13.6

Japan

49.2 60.3 65.5

8.9 7.8 8.4

United Western States Europe Combined 30.1 25.9 24.6

26.8 21.4 20.8

65.9 55.0 53.7

Island Countries of the World

Country Australia Bahrain Cyprus Cuba Great Britain Iceland Indonesia Ireland Jamaica Japan Madagascar Malta New Zealand Philippines Sri Lanka Taiwan

Area (1,000 sq. mi.) 2,966.2 0.3 3.6 44.2 84.4 39.8 741.1 27.1 4.2 145.7 226.7 0.3 103.7 115.8 25.3 13.9

Area Rank

Population (millions)

1 15 14 8 7 9 2 10 13 4 3 15 6 5 11 12

19.0 0.6 0.8 12.0 58.0 0.3 212.0 3.7 3.0 128.0 15.5 0.4 3.7 77.0 20.0 23.0

Populate Rank 7 13 12 9 4 15 1 10 11 2 8 14 10 3 6 5

1945 to 1993; Germany's Free Democratic Party was part of the ruling coalition for thirty years; and the Swedish Socialist Party held its remarkable unbroken dominance from 1936 to 1976, a full forty years in power. 4

6

Japan's Navy

Finally, whether the J a p a n e s e are today more or less x e n o p h o b i c than the Russians, Chinese, Germans, or Americans is debatable. J a p a n e s e militarism, nationalism, and racism were amplified only in the early nineteenth century—about the same time such trends developed in Germany and elsewhere. 5 T h e J a p a n e s e are in any case hardly unique in exhibiting xenophobia. The Uniqueness of Geography T h e topography of the J a p a n e s e islands is certainly peculiar. T h e islands were formed by volcanoes, about sixty o f which were still counted as active at the end of the twentieth century. Except for the n o r t h e r n m o s t island o f Hokkaido, the interior o f the islands is mountainous, steep, and difficult to develop or farm: only about a fifth of J a p a n is easily habitable. T h e population is thus concentrated along the coasts and especially on a few spacious low-lying plains. O n these plains, cultivation was easy and the cultivation o f rice was made easier still by the harnessing o f an ample supply of fresh water from the mountains where rainfall was regular and copious. Rice and fish were the most economically sensible harvest. T h e traditional diet, agricultural staples, and fishing persisted into the twentieth century, but those low-lying plains, which were typically centered around large natural harbors, grew into huge urbanized ports: Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yokohama on the Kanto Plain accounting for about a third o f J a p a n ' s population; Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe, which formed the Kansai District; Nagoya on the Nobi Plain or Chuba District; and Kitakyushu and Fukuoka. Relative Position J a p a n ' s position relative to the rest o f the world is more peculiar than its topography and more telling. T h e islands, though classified as part o f Asia, stand o f f the Asian c o n t i n e n t by anywhere from a hundred to several hundred miles. This physical separation historically kept the J a p a n e s e population apart from the rest o f Asia and had important consequences for Japan's cultural and political development. Indeed, the separation was the primary reason that so many observers emphasized the unique character o f things J a p a n e s e . Still, J a p a n ' s status as an island nation standing o f f the wellbeaten paths o f continental civilization was not singular. C o m p a r e J a p a n ' s position off the northeast coast of continental Asia with that o f Britain o f f the northwest coast o f E u r o p e : Britain and J a p a n shared the geographical advantage o f being insulated by a mantle o f sea; the difficulties o f navigation for many centuries made travel to

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and from the islands hazardous and limited; and both countries were at the periphery of continental politics. The sea made them both naturally defensible and also made them, eventually, into trading and maritime nations—a notion to which we will return. What is singular is how far J a p a n is from the continent in contrast to how far Britain is from its mainland neighbors. Britain at its nearest point to the continent is only twenty miles away; J a p a n is more than a hundred. J a p a n and England are obviously both insulated from their continental neighbors, but Japan is the more so because of the seas that surround it. 6 T h e British usually had the advantage of a defensive natural moat but could also easily traverse the moat and were thus rarely cut off from the European continent. Indeed, the bulk of the population of Britain was physically oriented toward the continent. T h e seemingly island-bound inhabitants o f Britain developed into traders, explorers, and empire builders much sooner than did the Japanese. On the other side of the globe, travel between Asia and J a p a n was a more difficult affair because of the greater distances. Furthermore, the bulk of the Japanese population did not live in regions facing the Asian continent but on the far side of the great barrier island, facing toward the Pacific Ocean. Finally, the Japanese archipelago was poorly endowed with natural resources of modern fuel. Coal, found throughout the British Isles, and the fuel of the industrial revolution, had to be imported by Japan. Japan's history does indeed reflect the way it was both insulated from attack and isolated from cultural, economic, and political transactions. T h e twin influences of insulation and isolation were overcome by modern modes o f transportation and communication. But Japan's geography continues to have great salience in the postindustrial age, especially seen through the strategic lens of the U.S.-Japanese alliance: J a p a n is located in the northwest Pacific Ocean and is the close neighbor of China and Russia. Strategic

Position

On a clear day Russian territory can be seen from Japanese soil. Standing on the northern tip of Hokkaido, one can peer across twenty-five miles o f the Soya-kaikyo (La Perouse Strait) at Sakhalin. From the northwest coast of Hokkaido, say from the town of Shibetsu, one can look about twelve miles across Nemuro-kaikyo (the Nemuro Strait) to Kunashiri-shima, an island claimed by Japan and occupied by Russia. 7 Russia is truly a large country compared with Japan, though like J a p a n its population is heavily concentrated in some regions while most areas are sparsely populated. Most of the Russian population is

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separated from Japan by the vast expanse of Siberia, but Russia's most important Asian port of Vladivostok opens onto the Sea of Japan. No modern Russian strategist could have failed to appreciate the obstacle posed by Japan to Russian strategic mobility. Nor could any Japanese strategist fail to see Russia as an unwelcome Asian power. T h e Japanese islands form a rough crescent a thousand miles long that is both a natural and political barrier to Russian naval and air power. Partly because of this geographical discomfort, J a p a n and Russia twice in the twentieth century declared war on each other, were locked in the Cold War for forty years, and through the end o f the century continued to have territorial disputes. At the same time, Japan's proximity to Russia was used to advantage by the United States. Throughout the Cold War the United States took the lead, in combination with Japanese forces, in patrolling the Sea of Japan and defending the several straits—all bordering Japan—which lead from Vladivostok and the Sea of Japan to the open expanse of the Pacific (see Map 1.1). To pass northward from Vladivostok and the Sea of Japan, ships must enter either the Tatar Strait or La Perouse Strait. T h e Tatar Strait leads, after some 300 miles, not to the Pacific Ocean but to the Sea of Okhotsk, which in turn must be exited by traversing the barrier Kurile Islands. La Perouse Strait is the much shorter route and is flanked on one side by Russia's Sakhalin Island but on the other by Japan's northern island of Hokkaido. T h e strait is less than thirty miles wide and lets into the Kurile Basin at the southern end of the Sea of Okhotsk. To pass eastward from Vladivostok and the Sea of Japan, ships traverse the Tsugaru Strait between Hokkaido and Japan's main island of Honshu. At its narrowest point that fifty-mile-long strait is less than fifteen miles wide. To pass south from Vladivostok and the Sea of Japan, ships must enter the eastern or western channel of the Korea Strait, which is bordered on each side by U.S. allies: to the east by Japan, to the west by the Republic of Korea. Naturally, all these passages were carefully watched throughout the Cold War. Indeed, the U.S. Seventh Fleet's and the JMSDF's combined antisubmarine patrols were perhaps the most intimidating feature of U.S.-Japanese deterrence of the Soviets by the 1980s. Virtually every submarine that came out of Vladivostok was immediately detected by a U.S. or Japanese P-3C. Soviet submarine commanders knew that U.S. and Japanese forces knew where they were, and they knew that, in wartime, they would be hunted down and destroyed quickly. Japan's position relative to other Asian countries has been important as well. Japan's largest island, Honshu, at its closest point to

Map 1.1 125'E

130'E

Japan and Surrounding Seas 135* E

140'E

145'E

Sakhalin Island

Sta o,

Okhotsk ¿s

45'N

40'N

35'N

OCEAN 30'N

125* E

130'E

135'E

140'E

145"E 500 Miles

0 0

500 KM Parallel scale at 40"N O'E

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the Asian mainland, is only about a hundred miles by sea from South Korea. And the Republic of Korea is a long-standing ally of the United States, a country that U.S. troops fought ( 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 3 ) to preserve from the designs of North Korea, and in which the United States stationed up to 40,000 troops continuously since the conclusion of the Korean War. As long as the United States defended South Korea, the Americans depended on using Japan as a rear area for supply, training, and communications; as long as North Korea remained an aggressive regime, Japan relied on the United States to contain it. Beyond the Korean peninsula lies the world's most populous country and the last of the great communist oligarchies. Only 450 miles of sea lie between Japan's southernmost port of Kagoshima and China's greatest commercial port, Shanghai. It is Japan's Ryukyu Islands that divide the East China Sea from the Pacific Ocean. T h e Japanese archipelago, taken together with Taiwan and the Philippine Islands, constitutes a lengthy natural barrier to any Chinese aspirations to blue-water naval power. China's dominant presence on the coast of East Asia makes it only logical for Japan to choose between an alliance with this great Asian continental power to the west and the great U.S. maritime power in the east. For most of the time since the Meiji Restoration and the end of isolation (1868), Japan's governments chose to look beyond China to the United States and Europe for friends. In the one period in which a Japanese regime alienated its Western friends ( 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 4 5 ) , it enmeshed itself in a war on the Asian mainland that it could not find a way to win. 8 In that war Japanese armies ravaged both China and the army of the Kuomintang. Consequently Japan's war inadvertently led to the resurrection of Mao Tse-Tung's Communists (and Mao's armies' finishing off the Kuomintang after Japan had withdrawn from China). Japan's war in China, prosecuted by the most savage means for no remotely justifiable end, embittered the Chinese population against Japan, and the collective memory o f this war ensured that China would thereafter look upon any regime in Japan with suspicion, if not fear. Japan has lived with the legacy of that war in its diplomatic relations with other countries of the Pacific Rim. Japan's pan-Asian war ( 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 4 5 ) sent invading troops as far as Burma to the southwest and New Guinea to the southeast. Virtually all the Asian Pacific countries suffered from Japan's imperial aspirations. 9 Consequently, all have remained wary of, if not outright opposed to, Japan's postWorld War II rearmament, and all were equally opposed to the possibility of Japan's helping police the region in the post-Cold War era.

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Thus, another paradox of Japan's modern foreign relations lies in the disparity between its enormous economic importance in the region and the limited role that Japan has played in the region's defense. There is more to Japan's strategic geography than old and bitter memories of war, however. An enormous quantity of Japan's exports and imports cross the South China Sea, through the Indonesian archipelago and the Straits of Malacca. Forty-two percent of Japan's exports (by value) took this route in the 1990s, as did 42 percent of Japan's imports (by value). 10 At the same time, Japanese corporations owned more than a quarter of all tonnage transiting the Straits of Malacca. 11 In all, more than a thousand supertankers every year pass eastward through the straits, many bound for Japan, and many bound elsewhere but owned by Japanese firms. The strategic geography of Japan is a matter reaching well beyond the Japanese islands to distant lands and seas, going where trade, capital, and Japanese nationals go. What Is Not Unique to Japan Because there has been a long-standing emphasis on the ways in which Japan differs from the United States and from the West, important similarities—and therefore causalities—have been necessarily overlooked. But Japan is in essential ways very like the United States. Japan is a democracy. Although it is fashionable in some academic quarters to elevate the ideal model of democracy and point out the shortcomings of real democracies, 12 it cannot be gainsaid that Japan has a stable representative regime in which elites peacefully, and according to prescribed public law, alternate in office. In this crucial way Japan and the United States, as well as the NATO allies, share fundamental agreement about the way governments should be constituted. This fundamental agreement is probably more important than any other in these nations' inherent sympathy for one another and in their alliance against antiliberal governments. But there are other fundamental similarities. Like the leading countries in the West, Japan is a maritime, industrialized, and commercial nation. The long period of Japanese prosperity since the Meiji Restoration largely has been due to the enormous volume of both domestic and international trade in which the Japanese people have engaged. Moreover, this trade is sea-borne. Raw materials for manufacture travel to Japan in bulk over the sea, as well as an enormous volume of manufactured goods for domestic consumption. Japan exports by sea, and Japanese firms operating in dozens of countries on the Asian Rim and elsewhere carry on much

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of their trade by sea. Freedom of the seas is a large part of what makes possible the prosperity of all developed nations. By the end of the twentieth century Japan's gross domestic product is second only to that of the United States. J a p a n has long been a seafaring nation, if only to harvest the abundant food in the waters around its islands. But even before the modern era, water travel, albeit by inland waterways and calm inland seas, was essential to Japan's internal communication, cultural cohesion, and domestic trade. In sum, the first thing to be said in a modern study of Japanese society is not that it is essentially different from other countries, and especially from the United States, but that Japan is notably similar to the United States: it is a maritime, democratic, industrialized, and commercial nation. As such, it shares many of the same international interests of the United States and NATO powers. These f u n d a m e n t a l interests include stable political regimes a r o u n d the globe, reliable and strong security arrangements, the defeat of antiliberal ideologies, stable currencies and markets, and the maintenance of a peaceful commercial environment—in short, the status quo of the p o s t World War II era. To satisfy the political-military aspect of these interests, Japanese governments in the postwar era pursued two policies in general. First, they relied heavily on the leadership of U.S. foreign policy and on the umbrella of U.S. defense policy through the formal arrangements of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In this context, Japan was a faithful, cooperative, and valuable ally of the United States. Second, Japan redeveloped its military and naval capacity with first-class technology and first-rate training, maintaining, however, a low international profile. In this context Japan was a quiet power. Paradoxically, it was because Japan was a quiet power that its policies stirred criticism and apprehension both from within and without. 1 3

Competing Approaches to Explanation and Prediction Almost everybody comes to a subject of study with some general notion of cause and effect. Political scientists and other observers, including journalists, use many avenues to explanation and prediction, but oftentimes these approaches are not explicit. 14 Sometimes they are purposely implicit; sometimes the implicit model is unconscious. The usefulness of models in general is that they purposely organize one's observations, helping to distinguish between the important and the less important facts. Making one's model explicit in an examination of Japanese policymaking is especially useful: Americans

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a n d J a p a n e s e tend to c o m p a r e their own case only with that of the other. Consequently, m u c h of the discussion of U.S.-Japanese relations is stuck in a h o t h o u s e comparison limited to only the U n i t e d States and J a p a n . A m o n g the most c o m m o n models, and those that are employed in the chapters following, are the cultural model (Chapter 2), the institutional model (Chapter 3), and what have been called the rational actor model (Chapter 6), the governmental politics model (Chapter 4), and the organization model (Chapter 5). 1 5 T h e r e are certainly other approaches—political scientists have no shortage of methods— but these five models are used implicitly and frequently in most journalistic accounts and editorial commentary as well as in political science tracts. Of course, each model has its value and limitations. The Cultural

Model

T h e most p o p u l a r a n d f r e q u e n t attempts to explain J a p a n e s e national policy tend be in terms of culture, that is to say, in terms of values and perceptions broadly shared and deeply held by the Japanese population. Japanese and Americans alike prefer the convenience of a cultural explanation perhaps because the J a p a n e s e a n d American cultures appear to be so very different and naturally lead to the conclusion that all else may be explained by this f u n d a m e n t a l contrast. 1 6 Culture, however difficult to identify as a causal variable, is real a n d is reflected in practice by habits of behavior. Cultural explanations have several advantages. A single powerful cultural trait may, for example, allow the novice to grasp in quick o r d e r a variety of unusual a n d dissimilar actions and perceptions. And specialists, even when writing for o t h e r specialists, also sometimes find cultural explanations the most theoretically efficient and elegant way to explain decades, even centuries, of history and politics. Collective behavior may, after all, imply collective traits. Collective traits are woven into p a t t e r n s of perceptions, values, and decisions. Those patterns a m o u n t to a culture. Thus, when coming to grips with collective behavior, both novice a n d specialist are inclined to search f o r u n d e r standing in the well-worn patterns of culture. Cultural explanations also have shortcomings. Critics recall the axiom that a single theory or c o n c e p t that claims to explain everything can really explain nothing. Finding the lowest c o m m o n den o m i n a t o r in a complex array of behavior smooths all the complexity, all nuances, a n d even the m e a n i n g of events into what may a m o u n t to a trivialized and simple-minded view—little more t h a n a label that serves as a substitute for real u n d e r s t a n d i n g of cause and effect. O n e easily discovers these labels in casual conversations about

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Japan's defense policy. A popular cultural explanation insists that the post-World War II "Peace Constitution" and the reluctance of the Japanese government to become ensnared in international military operations reflect the fact that the Japanese are fundamentally docile or pacifist or xenophobic. T h e equal and opposite cultural explanation is also popular whenever the topic is the rearmament of Japan or Japanese influence on the Pacific Rim: the Japanese are fundamentally aggressive, dominating, and nationalistic. 17 Another criticism of cultural theories is that they too easily coopt contrary evidence. It seems that no matter what events transpire that contradict someone's portrait of a culture, those events are soon incorporated into the theory even if it means changing the description of the culture. In the 1980s, for example, many commentators portrayed the Japanese as single-minded seekers of corporate success who had found a working formula and relentlessly applied it. And the Japanese could do this, the argument went, because their culture disposes people to be hardworking, obedient and unquestioning of authority. T h e United States, which apparently did not have these traits, was therefore doomed. 1 8 But in the mid-1990s, as Japan experienced a recession, a banking crisis, and years of sluggish growth, the cultural explanation was that, unlike the creative and dynamic Americans, the stifled and rigid Japanese simply could not adjust to new market conditions and new competition and were not willing to reconstruct their outmoded and corrupt ways of doing business. 19 Another problem with cultural explanations is that they often fail the test of prediction, which is crucial to any theory that claims to explain a complex array of variables. However well cultural traits seem to explain past behavior, the challenge and the proof are still in the ability to accurately predict what will happen or, at the very least, to understand what is happening at the moment. But a problem occurs because cultural theories are about habits of perception and behavior, while the future is about unexpected developments and unusual demands. Culture is about continuity of behavior; the future we cannot predict is about discontinuity. Culture is about apprehending the ordinary; the future is, frequently enough, about confronting the extraordinary. So, it is the future that brings crises and demands, hardships, and bounties: the circumstances that need to be predicted and understood are precisely those that are not ordinary and that are not merely a continuation of a well-worn set of circumstances. The old cultural explanation is suddenly found wanting under the pressures of a new environment.

The Institutional

Approach

Another useful way to comprehend the causes and effects of a political system is the institutional approach. This approach suggests that

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collective activity, such as politics, is c h a n n e l e d by a government's institutions, laws, j u s t i c e system, constitution, electoral mechanisms, and other regulating apparatuses. T h e institutional approach quite rightly recognizes that political activity is both channeled and limited by the political structures o f a country or group of countries, or even by the lack o f such structures. I f one understands what the important structures are and how they work, one sees the limits and possibilities o f political action. Americans like the institutional approach when examining their own government: the model is widely used in high school civics classes and is implicit in much o f the nightly news reports, especially around election time. 2 0 But the institutional approach is often shouldered aside by o t h e r models, either when the writer knows little about the workings o f the political institutions o f a country and needs a shortcut o r when the writer knows too much o f those institutions and has concluded that the institutional approach fails to explain e n o u g h . Indeed, the central critique o f the institutional approach revolves around the question o f whether institutions explain politics or politics explains institutions. F o r example, was the conservative nature o f J a p a n ' s long-ruling Liberal D e m o c r a t i c Party a function o f electoral rules that f o r c e d politicians to address the localized c o n c e r n s o f their constituents, or were the electoral rules a reflection o f the p r e f e r e n c e for local machine-style politics? O r again, did the no-war clause o f J a p a n ' s constitution impose a certain pacifism on the J a p a n e s e government and people after World War II, or was the persistence o f the no-war clause and the government's strenuous efforts to adhere to it a reflection o f postwar J a p a n ' s popular pacifism? In short, the institutional approach to politics is n o doubt useful and illuminating but raises the question whether the institutional characteristics o n e examines are the cause or effect o f other political outcomes.

Rational

Actors

T h e rational actor model posits, in brief, that decisionmakers carefully assess the national interest, calculate their capacity to react, and then logically deduce the best course o f action to take. T h e model implies that (1) a c o m m o n or national interest is real; (2) the national interest can be discerned (at least by the discerning) and is, m o r e often than not, the same as the self-interest o f the decisionmakers; and (3) government decisions are reasonable attempts to protect or e n h a n c e these interests. 2 1 T h e rational actor model is attractive not least of all because much public debate is often about the national interest, and in this debate public figures often publicly justify their opinions and decisions in

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terms of the greater good of society. It is t h e n easy to believe a n d easy to investigate the idea that well-defined national interests drive foreign policy. O n e advantage of the rational actor approach is that many policymakers do indeed think in terms of what is in the "perm a n e n t and aggregate interests of the community." 2 2 Such public officials often are patriotic people charged with protecting and serving the state. They speak publicly and offer easily accessible explanations of their actions. And t h e r e is o f t e n sincerity, if n o t at least some truth, in what they say even t h o u g h many dismiss such public statements as mere rhetoric. Another advantage of the rational actor model is that it reminds us to try to see the world t h r o u g h the eyes of others, to get inside their heads, so to speak. We are certainly more likely to u n d e r s t a n d what these policymakers are thinking if we try to u n d e r s t a n d what it is that they see when they make their calculations. T h e rational actor model also has liabilities. T h e most obvious of these is the definition of the word "rational." What is rational to one person or to one set of decisionmakers is not necessarily rational to others. Thus, the m o d e of rationality must be identified. When this is applied to J a p a n e s e decisionmakers, o n e is likely to get tangled in the attempt to define their rationality. Moreover, one is likely to define whatever the decisionmakers d o as "rational" even if reasons have to be invented. T h e r e r f o r e , if J a p a n wants to contribute to UN peacekeeping activities even at the cost of bitter debates over constitutional limitations, then critics of Japanese r e a r m a m e n t will say that is because J a p a n is subtly trying to revive its military prowess and to advance the development of its defense policy even at the expense of the Peace Constitution. This tends to be the view of many Asian countries including China, Singapore, and Russia. 23 But if critics are inclined to say J a p a n does n o t contribute e n o u g h to international peacekeeping efforts, then they explain it is because the Japanese are hiding b e h i n d the Peace Constitution while focusing on economic gain. This tends to be the view of many editorial writers in the United States. 24 T h e critics in each case see the government as rational and calculating, but the commentators offer contradictory rational explanations of the same policy. Governmental

Politics

A n o t h e r m o d e of analysis, particularly popular with government officials and people in the know, is the governmental politics model. This approach relies on knowledge of the political players, their personal opinions, their support groups, and their prejudices and limitations. T h e assumption h e r e is that if one knows who thinks what,

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and one knows how influential each player is, then one can arrive at a reasonable explanation or even a prediction of how policy debates will turn out. This approach is frequently used by foreign service officers, intelligence analysts, and journalists who have personal contacts in the government, are stationed in the foreign capital for a long period, and see themselves as specialists in the domestic politics o f their host country. T h e approach is enlightening in the near term, especially when decisions are imminent and the force o f personality, as well as the size and force o f personal followings (e.g., interest groups), will play an important role in the policy outcome. Indeed, some o f the most exciting and informative current political history is written as a drama o f competing personalities and intersecting forces. This governmental politics approach has its shortcomings as well. For one, the government actors in an open, competitive society such as that o f J a p a n o r the United States c h a n g e regularly as parties alternate in power and as people c h a n g e offices, retire, or are promoted. Long-term predictions—even intermediate-term predictions—are not possible if everything depends on who prefers what and how persuasive these people are at any given m o m e n t on any given issue. T h e same holds true even in a closed and uncompetitive society: government actors in a closed or oligarchic society are purposely obscured, and their personal lives and political discussions take place behind a wall o f secrecy. Second, there is the problem o f diverging interpretations o f the personalities involved: the government actor will be understood and analyzed differently by different people. People in the know seem rarely to agree about who said what and who prefers what and which politician's or bureaucrat's opinion is most important. T h e r e is again the problem that government actors and our interpretations o f them tend to be understood in unique terms; the governmental model is more often historiographic or even j o u r n a l istic than it is a basis by which we can understand broad stretches o f time, or a series o f events, or use to predict new developments. 2 5 Employing the governmental model approach, we tend to see all outcomes as unique because these outcomes d e p e n d on the personalities involved in making the decision. Change the personalities involved and, o n e presumes, the political outcomes change as well. And if outcomes are all unique, then trying to predict outcomes is largely a waste o f time. Organizational Model T h e organizational approach suggests that the various departments and agencies and o t h e r organized groups within government have

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certain well-established routines that are simply part of what the organization does. Each organization will naturally have routines different from those of other organizations and each will have a limited variety of routines meant to cope with a limited variety of demands. T h e de facto policy of government is enacted in these bureaucratic routines. The process of decisionmaking in government, especially in time of crisis, may be essentially one of selecting from the many routines available from the organizations under the government's authority. Thus, policymakers who want to do anything consult relevant bureaucracies and administrators to see first what is possible. Bureaucratic chieftains and technocratic specialists educate the political leadership and offer options. Policymakers then decide which of the options will be most effective under the circumstances. T h e organization model is attractive in large part because it begins with an element of realism. It begins by asking what the organization is capable of doing. What an organization is capable of doing is largely what it already does, or has done many times, or, at least, has planned for and rehearsed. For example, was it likely during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1991 that Japan would deploy ground forces to the Saudi Arabian desert? Perhaps Japan would not have done so only because Japan's ground forces had never planned for such a mission and would have been ill equipped and ill prepared to carry out such a different routine. Decisionmakers would have been, at the very least, risking disaster by asking the J G S D F to do something it was not prepared to do. By the same logic, was it not likely that in 1991 Japan's Ministry of Finance would contribute money to the UN coalition to help defray the costs of the operations and their consequences as Japan had done before? Or was J a p a n likely to deploy naval forces to sweep mines in the Persian Gulf given the JMSDF's long experience in minesweeping and overseas training? O f course organizations do change and vary their routines over time. What the U.S. Navy, or even the Internal Revenue Service, was capable of doing in 1969 was not exactly the same as what it could do in 1999. Government organizations both grow and decline in response to technology, political demands, budgets, and competition from other departments and agencies. T h e organization approach helps explain why some decisions rather than others were taken in a crisis, and it has some predictive value because it helps narrow the possibilities of a government's course of action. But when a government has more than one appropriate and effective organizational routine to enact at decisionmaking time, one may have to resort to yet another framework to explain or predict why one option was selected over another.

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In Sum There are many approaches to understanding and predicting a government's policies. All are useful, all are limited. What is required is to know which method and model is being used, consciously or unconsciously employed, and intentionally or unintentionally implied. The next chapter employs a cultural explanation to offer a broad view of Japan's steadily expanded circle of naval activity from the 1950s through the 1990s. Chapter 3 takes an institutional approach to examine the origins, effects, and evolution of the legal constraints on the activities of the JSDF. Chapter 4 uses the governmental politics model to explain strategic debates and the resulting division of labor between the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF in defending sea-lanes in the Pacific. Chapter 5 revisits Japan's critics during the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 and examines Japan's decisionmaking as the crisis unfolded in light of the organizational routines available to the government. Chapter 6 employs a rational actor model to narrate the development of policies that finally allowed the government to employ the JSDF in UN operations.

Notes 1. Everybody and every political community might be in some measure distinct, but they are also in some measure similar. Nonetheless, most observers are tempted to explain every unexpected event, every diverging opinion, and every peculiar policy in terms of the differences that define a country. This is not unreasonable: different outcomes must have different causes. The further temptation, however, is to see and examine only the differences and to overlook similarities. The mesmerizing notion that the country is unique quickly becomes an obstacle to understanding. In methodological terms, one's study becomes a reifying exercise: believing it so produces only the evidence that supports the belief. This is particularly true in the case of Japan. 2. I have embellished on the mantra "small island nation," which is explored at length by Steven Reed, Making Common Sense of Japan (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 6-17. Reed cites Richard Samuels, who in turn says the full mantra is "small-island-nation-precariously-cutadrift-in-a-hostile-world." 3. See Michael Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan (New York: Routledge, 1994) and for another example Michael Weiner, ed., Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity (New York: Routledge, 1997), which explores the principal minorities in Japan; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); and George Hicks, Japan's Hidden Apartheid: The Korean Minority and the Japanese (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1997). 4. T. J . Pemple, ed., Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).

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5. T h e greatest i n f l u e n c e in this d i r e c t i o n was t h e work of Moto-ori, a S h i n t o revivalist a n d a u t h o r of the widely r e a d Kojiki-den c o m p l e t e d in 1822. Moto-ori's disciple Hirata, b o r n in 1776, e x t e n d e d t h e a r g u m e n t s of Motoori: it was n o t C h i n a that was t h e elect n a t i o n b u t J a p a n , t h e c o u n t r y of t h e gods. Paul J o h n s o n points to the c h r o n o l o g i c a l parallel of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of u l t r a n a t i o n a l i s m in G e r m a n y a n d J a p a n in The Birth of the Modern (New York: H a r p e r C o l l i n s , 1991), p p . 801-814. 6. J a p a n was also, f o r b e t t e r o r worse, b e t t e r i n s u l a t e d t h a n Britain. C o n s i d e r t h a t t h e mighty M o n g o l s twice a t t e m p t e d a n d twice failed to subd u e J a p a n s o m e 200 years a f t e r William of N o r m a n d y successfully crossed t h e English C h a n n e l to c o n q u e r E n g l a n d in 1066. In 1274, t h e M o n g o l s l a n d e d o n Kyushu b u t quickly w i t h d r e w b e c a u s e f o u l w e a t h e r t h r e a t e n e d their f l e e t a n d their r e t r e a t . They r e t u r n e d in 1281 a n d this time a t t e m p t e d to press battle, only to have a t y p h o o n destroy the fleet. 7. See inter alia S t e p h e n Blank, "We Can Live W i t h o u t You: Rivalry a n d D i a l o g u e in Russo-Japanese Relations," Comparative Strategy 12 (1993): p p . 177 ff.; Rajan M e n o n , "Japan-Russia Relations a n d N o r t h e a s t Asian Security," Survival 38 ( S u m m e r 1996): p p . 59-78. 8. Also s u p p o r t i n g this analysis is T a r o Yayama, "What O t h e r N a t i o n Can J a p a n D e p e n d O n ? " FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 1 J u n e 1996. Yayama concludes t h a t J a p a n can d e p e n d o n n o o t h e r n a t i o n a n d "any o t h e r choice besides t h e J a p a n - U . S . alliance w o u l d a m o u n t to m i s c h i e f - m a k i n g t h a t w o u l d invite instability a n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n . " 9. See t h e persuasive article by Nicholas D. Kristof, " T h e P r o b l e m of Memory," Foreign Affairs 77, 6 ( N o v e m b e r / D e c e m b e r 1998): p p . 37-49. 10. See inter alia]o\m J. N o e r with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, a p p . A (Washington, D.C.: N a t i o n a l Defense University Press, 1996), p p . 67 ff. 11. Ibid., p. 68. 12. O n e clever reviewer replied to such criticisms: "I submissively follow . . . millions of o t h e r s in using t h e t e r m d e m o c r a t i c as a s y n e c d o c h e f o r all political ideals we esteem these days; t h o u g h it is clear e n o u g h t h a t it is n o t synonymous with t h e rule of law, o r a n a r r a n g e m e n t of countervailing powers, o r a n e n l i g h t e n e d system of c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e , o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n tees of the right to h o l d property, or a d o z e n o t h e r desirable things." Adrian Marriage, "Japanese D e m o c r a c y : A n o t h e r Clever Imitation?" Pacific Affairs 63, 2 (Fall 1990): p p . 228-233. 13. Because J a p a n was a substantial power in t h e sense t h a t it h a d all the traditional bases of p o w e r — p o p u l a t i o n , industry, technology, wealth, stability, a n d a r m e d forces—it stirred a p p r e h e n s i o n that it was t o o p o w e r f u l a n d that its policies were b e c o m i n g o n c e again chauvinistic a n d t h r e a t e n i n g . Because it was a q u i e t power, p u r p o s e l y staying in t h e s h a d o w of t h e U.S. alliance, s e e k i n g c o n c i l i a t i o n o r i g n o r i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n , l e t t i n g o t h e r s take the lead in i n t e r n a t i o n a l policy, a n d c o n c e n t r a t i n g o n e c o n o m i c r a t h e r t h a n military d e v e l o p m e n t , it stirred criticism t h a t it did n o t c o n t r i b u t e e n o u g h e i t h e r to t h e alliance or, at t h e e n d of t h e Cold War, to t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. 14. For a c o m p r e h e n s i v e survey of m a n y m o d e l s a n d t h e o r i e s see J a m e s E. D o u g h e r t y a n d R o b e r t Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, any edition. 15. See inter alia G r a h a m T. Allison, who p e r f e c t e d a n d e x p l o r e d in detail these t h r e e models in The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

Approaching

Policy and

Politics

21

16. O n e of the best commentaries on the use of cultural explanations is found in Steven R. Reed, Making Common Sense ofJapan. An attempt to dispel the usefulness of cultural explanations was also made by Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma ofJapanese Power (New York: Knopf, 1989) and "The Enigma of Japanese Power: A Response to Misunderstanding," IHJBulletin (Spring 1990): pp. 4-6. 17. For two unflattering but c o m p e t e n t cultural portraits written before the e n d of the Cold War a n d J a p a n ' s ensuing years of economic stagnation, see Roy T h o m a s , Japan: The Blighted Blossom (Vancouver: New Star, 1989); J o h n Woronoff, Politics the Japanese Way (London: Macmillan, 1988). 18. See any n u m b e r of books p u r p o r t i n g to explain J a p a n a n d the J a p a n e s e in the 1980s when many considered J a p a n the next great threat to the United States. A favorite was Ronald Dore's Taking Japan Seriously: A Confucian Perspective on Leading Economic Issues (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987). Dore asserted that the main ingredients of J a p a n ' s success included the facts that "the Japanese work hard" a n d "the Japanese are well educated." It was difficult to tell whether Dore, a Briton, was reflecting m o r e a b o u t J a p a n or Britain. 19. See, for example, Michael Lewis, "The World's Biggest Going-Out-ofBusiness Sale," New York Times Magazine, 31 May 1998, p. 34 ff.; in the same issue, Walter Russel Mead, "Asia Devalued," p p . 38-39; a n d David Sanger who spent several years as the Tokyo b u r e a u chief f o r the New York Times in J a p a n ' s peak economic years, could not resist poking f u n once J a p a n ' s economy h e a d e d toward its nadir: "Pieces of Advice for Japan," New York Times, 28 J u n e 1998, sec. 3, p. 1. 20. See Albert R. Papa, "The Allure of Civics Book Democracy," in Peter J. Woolley a n d Albert R. Papa, eds., American Politics: Core Argument/Current Controversy ( U p p e r Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1998), pp. 7-10. 21. T h e rational choice school has, over the years, e n g e n d e r e d vigorous debate a n d many persuasive and subtle refinements. It is beyond the scope of this book to evaluate the evolution of rational choice theory. 22. T h e phrase " p e r m a n e n t and aggregate interests of the community" belongs, of course, to J a m e s Madison, who asserts that the j o b of elected public officials is to discern what is best over the long run for the whole community and to distinguish this f r o m narrow, short-term, a n d selfish interests. See Federalist, Nos. 10 a n d 51. 23. See, f o r example, several official reactions to J a p a n ' s Gulf War contributions in 1990 and 1991: Yang Bojiang, "Gulf War Challenges Japan's Foreign Policy," Beijing Review, 22-28 April 1991, pp. 9-11; TASS report, "Japanese Intentions in Gulf Worries Neighbors," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Soviet Union, 24 October 1990, p. 13; "Lee on Japan's Dep l o y m e n t in Gulf, U.S. Bases," in FBIS Daily Report, East Asia, 8 N o v e m b e r 1990, p. 34; a n d "Philippines D e m a n d s Rationale," FBIS Daily Report, China, 30 April 1991, p. 2. But A. M. Rosenthal writing f o r the New York Times (19 O c t o b e r 1990) declared that "generations to c o m e will . . . curse the day" when the United States successfully p e r s u a d e d J a p a n to assert once again its military potential. 24. See c o m m e n t s on J a p a n ' s hesitant responses to t h e Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. Flora Lewis of the New York Times, f o r example, c o n d e m n e d J a p a n ' s "dithering passivity on all but trade" in h e r editorial "The Great Game of Gai-astu," 1 May 1991, p. A25. T h e Wall Street Journal was harsher: see Donald Hellmann, "Japan's Bogus Constitutional Excuses in the Gulf," 6 February 1991, p. A12.

22

Japan's Navy

25. In an a t t e m p t to s u r m o u n t this p r o b l e m of subjectivity, some theorists at the intersection of psychology a n d political science have constructed personality typologies m e a n t to predict how decisionmakers will behave. See, as a famous example, Benjamin David Barber, Presidential Character ( U p p e r Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, any edition). But fitting any given politician into a category of personality is an exercise that itself becomes subjective.

2 A Cultural View: The Kata of Maritime Forces1

T h e one thing on which commentators agreed at the end of the Cold War was that Japan had significantly rearmed since its defeat in 1945. T h e J S D F were technologically first-rate and the J M S D F was, by comparison with the maritime forces o f its neighbors, quite capable. What commentators disagreed upon was the significance of the rearmament, the reasons behind rearming, and the role those forces should play in the world order. In some circles the J S D F were portrayed as timid and restrained and were seen by many as no more than a decorative, high-technology appendage to an economic powerhouse. T h e defense forces were described, for example, as "reluctant samurai" and "wary warriors." 2 Disgruntled multilateralists saw Japan hiding behind its no-war clause in the constitution and still vigorously pursuing the "Yoshida doctrine" of eschewing military spending in favor of economic investment and trade opportunities. Others portrayed the Japanese forces as contrived continuations o f the old imperial army and navy that were waiting for another chance to dominate Japanese policymaking and reassert martial power. Some observers apparently did not believe that Japan's government was truly democratic and suggested that Japanese militarism and racism, so dominant a force in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was only temporarily dormant behind the facade of the U.S.-Japanese alliance and would resurface given a chance. How did J a p a n come to rehabilitate its armed forces? And how did J a p a n manage to assume the role of the foremost ally of the United States in the Pacific? How one saw the Japanese as a people and how one saw the political processes of Japan shaped the answers to these two questions. Some saw the Japanese resurgence, both economic and military, as part of a rational design either on the part of U.S. foreign policy

23

24

Japan's Navy

or of Japan's government. Some saw it as a function of an irrepressible Japanese culture, and some as the interplay of various and competing political forces. O t h e r chapters in this book will examine some of these competing views. In this chapter, a cultural explanation is offered as a way to comprehend in short order both the apparently radical transformation of Japanese defense posture since the 1960s and the incremental nature of changes in defense policy. Cultural explanations are attractive because they tend to be elegant. A single trait can illuminate decades of seemingly disparate and u n c o n n e c t e d decisions. If we want to know how the JSDF, and more specifically the JMSDF, went f r o m being essentially a territorial guard to a regional force working closely with the United States, we may trace the development of new defense roles in a cultural pattern. Among the many explanations of Japan's low-profile but substantial contributions to Western security, one cultural factor can elegantly portray the JSDF's incremental growth in size, quality, and missions: the kata factor. 3

A Cultural Explanation Japan has demonstrated in defense affairs, as in other areas of political and cultural behavior, a clear preference to act only after careful planning and rehearsal. Japan's cultural predilection for kata, or form, contrasts sharply with the preference of Americans for improvisation and innovation. Kata illuminates the pattern of the development of roles and missions for Japan's Self-Defense Forces and, more especially, for Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force in the post-World War II era. As the JMSDF steadily developed and perfected new roles and missions over several decades the pattern was first, incremental growth in capability; second, long practice; and, finally, the performance of a new mission and public acceptance of that new mission. In this way, the JMSDF's sphere of activities was an ever widening circle that suggested not timidity but prudence, competence, and steady evolution—kata. T h e r e are many other factors that can explain, d e p e n d i n g on one's predilection, the snail's pace of development or the slow but steady and sure rehabilitation of Japan's military forces. Among the many influences that contributed to the pace of evolution of the JSDF were constitutional constraints, parliamentary legislation and resolutions regulating the activities of the JSDF, pressure from other countries, encouragement from the United States, relative inexperience of the Japanese cabinet in using military means, structure of

A Cultural View

25

party politics, views of bureaucracies that competed with the Defense Agency for resources, and, finally, the public's apprehensions about the use of the JSDF. 4 All of these were important and each deserves its due, but such influences are left for other chapters. The relatively limited experience of the JSDF in the context of a cultural emphasis on kata is examined here. Kata Translated Kata can be translated as form, a model, a pattern, a mold, type, kind, style, an example, usage, tradition, rule, formality, or formula. Some of these English words carry negative connotations in the West, and many of the same words connote things that Westerners break with encouragement and great satisfaction (e.g., molds, patterns, rules, formalities, formulas). Some of these are things Westerners gladly renew or reinvent (e.g., forms, models, styles, types). The Japanese expression kata ni hamatta, meaning conventional, stereotyped, grooved, or manneristic, likewise has negative connotations in the West but not so in Japan. Kata ni hamaru, "to be in kata," is desirable. Kata ni hamaranai, "out of form," is undesirable. Kata yaburi, "to break form," is treated with caution, for that would be unconventional, unusual, or extraordinary: that is, all things in which the West tends to delight. The experience and training—the kata—of the JSDF was of central importance to the development of new roles and, thus, the limits and character of JSDF activities. It was the JMSDF that generally led the way to new forms, missions, and roles by subtly or gently breaking tradition and yet incorporating the new role neatly into past forms. Among the three components of the JSDF, the JMSDF was the most cosmopolitan and yet the least in the public eye when rehearsing its missions. Its vessels frequently ventured far beyond territorial waters for training and goodwill missions: it performed the dangerous and highly skilled task of minesweeping in territorial waters over many decades and later was deployed in the Persian Gulf following the 1991 war for Kuwait. It worked closely with the U.S. Navy at the everyday tactical level, having joined in combined exercises since 1955. When in port the activities of the JMSDF were more visible than those of its sister services. By way of contrast, the most impressive of the JGSDF units were relegated largely to the underpopulated island of Hokkaido, whose chief city of Sapporo is well over 500 miles from Tokyo. The JGSDF's chief mission, as far as much of the public was concerned, was civil defense, particularly in the event of earthquakes. 5 Similarly, the JASDF, though sophisticated and numerically

26

Japan's Navy

considerable, had long kept a low profile and certainly did not deploy warplanes overseas, though in the 1990s it did dispatch transports. 6 T h e J M S D F based its ships near population centers, and its bases in Sasebo, Kure, and Yokosuka facilitated interaction between it and the U.S. Navy—a relationship not so easily attained by the other Japanese and U.S. armed services. 7 Although it is clear that the roles and missions of the J M S D F were both expanded and limited by government views and the climate of public opinion in Japan, the United States, and in the rest of the Asia Pacific region, it is not necessarily true that the J M S D F (or any other branch of the J S D F ) would have quickly or effectively expanded its missions and roles under different circumstances. In part, the climate of public opinion was influenced by what missions the public or government thought the J S D F could perform. All well, the missions and roles of the J S D F were limited by what the J S D F components thought they could perform. And in the end, public opinion was just as likely to have reflected the development of missions by the J S D F as it was to have limited the JSDF. 8 T h e new missions the JMSDF took on were planned for and rehearsed, were consequently accepted by the public, and later receded into the ordinary background of public affairs. The kata of Japan's growing use of its naval and military forces was easily demonstrated in three cases: the overseas deployment of ships, the policy of defending sea-lanes near Japan, and the use of minesweepers in the Persian Gulf. Below, we consider each of these developments as a function of kata. In subsequent chapters, we will reexamine each development more closely to employ other perspectives. Dispatch of Forces

Overseas

Consider as a first example of cultural predilection the way that the J M S D F came to be dispatched overseas. T h e Maritime Safety Agency had not been established until 1948, three years after the end o f World War II, and the Defense Agency and the J M S D F were not established until 1954. In the infant years of the establishment of the J S D F it was generally considered unconstitutional to send any forces outside Japanese territory. But a few years later, the J M S D F regularly went abroad and was never again a stay-at-home force. Domestic objections eventually came to be limited to a few quarters. T h e Japanese public gradually accepted the fact or overlooked it, 9 and the JMSDF led the way to dispatches o f f e r e e overseas for many purposes. How did all this come about? In 1957 the Defense Agency first announced that it would dispatch J M S D F vessels overseas: four ships were going to Midway Island

A Cultural View

27

and Hawaii. These included the destroyer Harukaze, 1,700 tons, which was to be the flagship, and was the first Japanese-built warship of the postwar era, and the 1,400-ton frigates, Sugi, Haya, and Kusu. T h e proposed training mission met with objections that Japanese armed forces were being sent overseas in violation of the legislative resolution o f 1954 that defined the postwar limits of the new JSDF. T h e government defended the mission, contending that the prohibition on sending forces overseas did not preclude training—even if the flagship was the Harukaze. In fairness to those who unsuccessfully objected, there was much else to focus on in late 1957 and early 1958. A few days before the training mission to Hawaii was made public it was also announced that Japan would build two destroyers for the JMSDF that were to be paid for by the United States under the Mutual Security Assistance Program. Two weeks later Prime Minister Kishi ( 1 9 5 7 - 1 9 6 0 ) made a public appeal to 5,000 assembled troops to build up the JSDF, and later on that same day the troops marched through Tokyo on parade. T h e next day J a p a n held its first naval review of the postwar era under the eyes of the prime minister, who went aboard the warship Yukikaze with several foreign military attachés. Seven weeks later it was announced that Japan was buying Sidewinder missiles from the United States, and this drew very strong criticism in the national legislature, the Diet. But even these episodes were lost in the general swirl of events both domestic and international. T h e Soviets had successfully launched an ICBM as well as a satellite. In Japan, the withdrawal of thousands of U.S. Air Force personnel provoked great anxiety over unemployment, and a wave of strikes had swept the country by January 1958, including crippling stoppages in the steel industry and a walkout by the Seamen's Union. Kishi managed to escape bitter criticism from many quarters by making well-publicized trips abroad. In any case, the argument having been made and won for sending ships of the J M S D F abroad, the training missions continued. J M S D F ships had begun to return to Hawaii annually, and for good measure visited the western coast of North America, stopping in Canadian ports in 1959 and adding Mexico to the tour in 1961. By 1963 J M S D F ships had ventured as far as Western Europe and stopped in Thailand, Egypt, and Turkey along the way. By 1965 J M S D F ships had circumnavigated South America and stopped in Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina. In 1970 the J M S D F finally visited Africa, making ports of call in Mozambique and Kenya. Despite the gradual extension of training cruises year by year, objections dwindled until they were barely heard. The annual white paper on defense once included among its appendixes a record o f these overseas training cruises, but by the 1980s such cruises no longer

28

Japan's Navy

merited comment. Meanwhile, the personnel of the JMSDF gained more experience than they would have as crews of a local, coastal maritime force. They sailed the proverbial seven seas, became acquainted with distant ports and foreign navies, learned the logistics of long-term deployments, and practiced the diplomatic formalities of entering foreign territorial waters. In these methodical exercises, the JMSDF went beyond the old understanding that overseas deployments were limited to training. Until 1965 Japan's Antarctic observation teams had been transported and supplied by a vessel of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (MSA). But in 1965 the ship dispatched for this purpose was the icebreaker Fuji, a vessel of the JMSDF. 10 Because this ship was not leaving Japanese waters on a training mission, it was argued that this went against the prohibition on the dispatch of armed forces overseas. But the government said that the old understanding did not mean to prohibit support of a peaceful, scientific mission. So, the regular dispatch of JMSDF icebreakers well beyond Japanese territorial waters soon became a routine event that was soon to be ignored or forgotten by the public. JMSDF missions and the general acceptance of those missions went together, gently and gradually, thereby allowing the JMSDF to develop its competence and enabling the JSDF to extend its range of activities. The practice of sending JMSDF ships beyond the waters immediately surrounding Japan provided the basis for other later precedents, specifically the defense of a 1,000-mile sea-lane, minesweeping in foreign waters, and the dispatch of JSDF assets for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the United Nations. Defense of Sea-Lanes The defense of sea-lanes of communication (SLOC) within 1,000 nautical miles of Japan is another illustration of the way in which Japan's defense policy evolved according to a predilection for careful planning, practice, and the gradual expansion of roles and responsibilities. The capability and experience of the JMSDF in sea control, including antisubmarine warfare (ASW), developed in tandem with the expanding national policy of defending sea-lanes in the 1970s and 1980s. While many analysts argued that Japan was not capable of assuming the new mission of sea-lane defense and that Japan would never meet the expectations of U.S. defense planners, it happened, to the contrary, that Japan eased into its new role over several decades while developing the kata of sea-lane defense. 11

A Cultural View

29

It was in 1971 that the respected J a p a n e s e defense c o m m e n t a t o r Hideo Sekino declared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings that "the protection o f the sea communications of J a p a n should be given first priority in the national defense o f J a p a n , and the prevention o f direct invasion o f J a p a n should be made the secondary function o f the maritime defense force o f J a p a n . " 1 2 According to Sekino, a guerre de course was the most likely kind o f conflict, and in such a case "Japan must at least secure the sea c o m m u n i c a t i o n s north o f Indonesia on her own." 1 3 T h e f o r m e r imperial navy officer was making n e i t h e r an idle boast nor a plea to deaf ears. By 1971 the J M S D F had thirty-eight destroyers and frigates, while the U.S. Seventh Fleet had an inventory o f fourty-four. T h e J M S D F also had 180 maritime aircraft, and most o f these for antisubmarine warfare and reconnaissance. 1 4 By the end o f 1977 the director general o f the J a p a n e s e Defense Agency (JDA), testifying before the Cabinet Committee in the House o f Councilors, said that the J S D F were "ready to exercise the right o f self-defense generally within 500 miles from its coasts and in important sea-lanes within 1,000 miles." 1 5 He could say this in part because the J M S D F was embarked upon yet a n o t h e r building program. T h e National Defense Program Outline o f 1976 called for J a p a n to have 60 ASW ships, 16 submarines, 2 minesweeping flotillas, and 16 ASW squadrons supplemented by 220 aircraft. 1 6 In the same decade the J M S D F had practiced the kata o f refueling at sea, and by 1979 had put into service a new fleet oiler and p l a n n e d an additional three fleet replenishment ships. Clearly the J M S D F was expanding not only in numbers but in capabilities: both the oilers and the refueling skills were prerequisite o f deep-water operations and sea-lane defense. 1 7 By 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki ( 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 2 ) said that he looked forward to a new "division o f roles" between his country and the United States operating in the northwest Pacific. 1 8 Suzuki was alluding to the idea—alternately quietly discussed and publicly u r g e d — that J a p a n take responsibility for sea-lane defense and allow U.S. naval forces to c o n c e n t r a t e on o t h e r roles and o t h e r areas o f the Pacific. 1 9 Only a year earlier the J M S D F had first participated in RIMPAC exercises (naval training for Pacific Rim allies) with the U.S. Pacific Fleet, contributing two destroyers. Thereafter, J a p a n ' s participation in RIMPAC steadily grew. By 1984 the J M S D F ' s c o m m i t m e n t to this exercise included four destroyers, eight ASW aircraft, and a flag officer. 2 0 T h e policy o f sea-lane defense within 1,000 miles was all but official by 1983. Prime Minister Nakasone ( 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 7 ) , a former director general o f the J D A , endorsed the notion o f defending J a p a n ' s

30

Japan's Navy

sea-lanes "between Guam and Tokyo and between the Strait o f Taiwan and Osaka." 2 1 T h e JDA's 1983 white paper subsequently included an explanation of this policy and its requirements. White papers thereafter simply listed the 1,000-mile sea-lane defense as one o f several roles o f the JSDF. However, some still wondered if the policy o f sea-lane defense was a hollow c o m m i t m e n t — a policy embraced to placate the Americans but somewhat fanciful. But that was not the J a p a n e s e way. Between the time that Prime Minister Suzuki had stated that sea-lane defense would be pursued and the time Prime Minister Nakasone implemented the policy, the J M S D F had embarked on an extensive upgrade program for its long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft— a program that included the acquisition o f m o r e than forty Grumman P-3C Orions. And the surface warriors looked forward to a new class of destroyers with guided missiles. In addition, the J M S D F began an extensive modernization of existing destroyers and frigates, including Harpoon and Sea Sparrow missile systems as well as closein weapons systems. In 1985 Jane's Fighting Ships said, "This is a growing force which has improved greatly not only in numbers but in modernity over the last ten years." 2 2 T h e Asian Defense Journal hailed the J M S D F destroyer fleet as "one of the most modern in the world." 2 3 By way of comparison, the U.S. Seventh Fleet now had, in addition to its aircraft carriers, a total o f 20 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, while the J M S D F had 31 active destroyers, with 8 m o r e being built, and 18 frigates. Even as the Soviet threat receded in the 1980s, J a p a n continued to improve its capacity for sea-lane d e f e n s e . 2 4 T h e production o f Aegis-equipped destroyers began in 1990, making J a p a n the only U.S. ally that had bought this extremely capable albeit expensive air defense system. J a p a n watchers c o n t i n u e d to debate the degree to which the J M S D F had fulfilled its pledge to take over the 1,000-mile S L O C defense, but that pledge was never hollow. From 1971 to 1991 J a p a n systematically and cautiously put into place the necessary elements for sea-lane defense, acquiring the right capabilities, courting both public and bureaucratic support, and training with the U.S. Navy. In short, the kata of sea-lane defense had e m e r g e d after preparation, practice, and acceptance that covered more than two decades. The Kata of Minesweeping

and Dispatch

to the Persian

Gulf

Another example o f the kata o f J M S D F missions was the dispatch o f a flotilla o f minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in March o f 1991 almost immediately after the end o f major military operations in the

A Cultural

View

31

region. Much of the U.S. public viewed this dispatch as too little too late in the war and perhaps even thought it typical of Japan's lack of contribution to international security. But in fact the deployment o f four minesweepers and two support ships to distant and potentially dangerous waters was a milestone in the use of the JSDF. 2 5 Never before had the J M S D F been sent into potentially hostile waters (with the public's knowledge): this was a precedent-setting step o f great proportion. 2 6 Moreover, once the minesweepers were on station, they were explicitly allowed by the J D A to give "fuel, lubricants, fresh water and food" to allied vessels, thus lending support to foreign warships in foreign waters and setting yet another precedent. 2 7 How was it that the government, the Japanese public, and the J M S D F were ready to accept the dispatch of warships to the Persian Gulf in 1991? T h e Japanese government's preferred choice of military responses to the Persian Gulf crisis in the fall of 1990—deploying a minesweeping flotilla—was favored because it was an action that the government had previously considered and because it was a contingency for which the JMSDF had planned. During hostilities just four years earlier in the Persian Gulf, in 1987-1988, when oil tankers were subject to seaborne mines and attacks from Iranian gunboats, the United States had asked Japan to contribute to the international naval effort to escort reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. T h e Japanese cabinet considered the request, and, even though the request was eventually turned down, the JMSDF's Maritime Staff Office made contingency plans in the event that the cabinet decided to grant the U.S. request. A reasonable request it was, not because Japan owed the United States some debt but because the J M S D F operated more than forty of the world's most modern mine warfare ships. It was also reasonable because Japan had been perfecting the kata of minesweeping for several decades. In fact, after the end of the war in 1945, Japanese minesweepers had continuously searched the surrounding waters to remove or destroy tens of thousands of mines sowed in Japanese waters by both U.S. and Japanese forces during World War II. Even after the disbanding of the rest of the Imperial Navy, Japan's minesweepers continued to operate under the rubric of the MSA and were called into service by the United States at the start of the Korean War. 2 8 Several dozen Japanese minesweepers in late 1950 worked to clear mines from Korean harbors because the U.S. Navy was woefully short of both minesweeping vessels and experienced crews—a situation not remarkably different from that o f the late 1980s and early 1990s. 2 9 T h e United States' request for minesweeping help in 1987-1988, the first since the Korean War, was declined. This was reasonable

32

Japan's Navy

then not because of the request's novelty or the task's potential danger but because of the Japanese public's unfamiliarity with this J M S D F capability and the JMSDF's inexperience in the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, two retired J M S D F admirals were sent aboard U.S. escort vessels in the Persian Gulf in 1988 to observe the allied operation and report back on whether Japanese participation might be feasible in the future. The admirals produced an unofficial study for the independent "Strategy and Research Center" in Tokyo. Their report was subsequently circulated in the Diet, Foreign Ministry, and the JMSDF Staff Office. 3 0 The report intended to show that an escort mission could be undertaken by the JMSDF in the Persian Gulf and how that mission could be successfully accomplished. So it was that just two years later when the next Gulf crisis broke in August and September of 1990, the JMSDF had contingency plans on hand for a Persian Gulf mission and began almost immediately to update and revise those plans. The JMSDF was well ahead of its sister services in planning, in experience, and in the effort to convince the cabinet that the force's mission could be completed. In contrast to the JMSDF, the JASDF did not initiate its contingency planning until early November of 1990, some four months after the crisis began. T h e J G S D F began even later and made only minimal gestures toward planning. However, the JASDF had made enough progress in its preparations that the cabinet had a fair choice to make. JASDF pilots were on alert for several weeks in January and February of 1991 as the war began in earnest. JASDF pilots were briefed by U.S. Air Force officers on air routes to the crisis region, procedures, possible dangers, and even desert survival techniques. Pallets with food, spare parts, medicines and other supplies were set out and ready to be loaded—if the orders came. 3 1 In the end, orders did not come for the JASDF but for the JMSDF. For the cabinet this was the logical choice. O f the three branches of the JSDF, only the JMSDF had substantial overseas experience since it had been allowed for almost two decades to conduct overseas training missions. Also, the government could favor JMSDF plans simply because it was more familiar with those plans and more confident in the J M S D F prospect for success. 32 T h e J M S D F plans were ready, the force itself was ready, and the force's task was well rehearsed. T h e maritime mission was selected as the next step in the JSDF's widening circle of activities. Kata

Continued

Within a few years of the passage of peacekeeping legislation, the JSDF had been on missions not only to the Persian Gulf but to Cambodia,

A Cultural View

33

M o z a m b i q u e , Zaire, a n d the Golan Heights o n the Israeli-Syrian border. T h e Diet h a d passed new laws explicitly allowing t h e JSDF to take p a r t in U N o p e r a t i o n s (see C h a p t e r 6). A n d several new comp e t e n c e s were b e i n g a c q u i r e d . In the mid-1990s the JMSDF saw work begin o n an 8,900-ton amphibious l a n d i n g ship to carry two air-cushioned vehicles. A few years earlier such a p r o j e c t would have b e e n t h o u g h t f a r b e y o n d t h e notional line t h a t l i m i t e d t h e missions a n d roles of t h e JMSDF. But P r i m e Minister M u r a y a m a (1994-1996), a Socialist whose party h a d l o n g m a i n t a i n e d that the existence of the JSDF was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , e x p l a i n e d that the "role the U n i t e d Nations plays f o r peace a n d stability is extremely big" a n d that J a p a n would be taking a leading role in U N p e a c e k e e p i n g missions. 3 3 T h e r e f o r e , J a p a n r e q u i r e d new capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces. T h e s e were, of course, capabilities t h e JMSDF already h a d in e m b r y o n i c f o r m : in 1992 the JMSDF h a d already b e e n s u p p o r t i n g a battalion of JGSDF e n g i n e e r s in Camb o d i a with two o l d e r l a n d i n g ships as well as a fast c o m b a t s u p p o r t ship that m a d e r e g u l a r trips between Sihanoukville a n d Singapore. 3 4 ( T h e s u p p o r t ship, J D S Towada, h a d b e e n c o m m i s s i o n e d in 1987 as t h e first of a new class.) T h u s , sealift capacity a n d UN-related missions f o r the JSDF developed t o g e t h e r in g o o d f o r m . Escort missions were also part of an evolving capability a n d kata. J a p a n h a d twice b e e n asked to aid in the escort of m e r c h a n t s h i p p i n g a n d h a d itself suggested that it c o u l d h e l p to police t h e b a n d i t r i d d e n waters of t h e Malacca Strait. T h e MSA intitiated t h e r e g u l a r escort of the J a p a n e s e f r e i g h t e r Akatsuki Maru carrying p r o c e s s e d p l u t o n i u m f r o m E u r o p e to J a p a n . T h e JMSDF's a d d i t i o n of Aegise q u i p p e d destroyers to its flotillas n o t only i n c r e a s e d t h e c o m p e tence of the JMSDF in antiair a n d a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare b u t also enabled the f o r c e to o p e r a t e outside the r a n g e of protective land-based aircraft in d e f e n s e of m e r c h a n t shipping. 3 5 Criticism of J a p a n e s e foreign a n d domestic policies was c o m m o n place in the West in the 1990s. But J a p a n ' s a c c e p t a n c e of new intern a t i o n a l responsibilities, t h e steady e x p a n s i o n of military b u d g e t s , a n d the ever widening circle of missions p l a n n e d a n d practiced by the JMSDF were largely u n r e c o g n i z e d . In 1945 it h a d s e e m e d implausible that the U n i t e d States within 10 years would be e n c o u r a g i n g t h e ref o r m a t i o n of J a p a n ' s military forces. A n d in 1970 few would have predicted that in 10 years the U n i t e d States would request that J a p a n be responsible f o r a 1,000-mile radius of sea-lane defenses. Yet by the late 1980s, n o t only h a d t h e JMSDF b e e n rebuilt i n t o o n e of the most c o m p e t e n t m a r i t i m e forces in the Pacific b u t it h a d also d e p l o y e d overseas at the e n d of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l war in the Persian Gulf. All these l a n d m a r k developments were b o t h presaged a n d m a d e possible by t h e kata of the JMSDF. T h e p a t t e r n of t h e previous f o u r d e c a d e s

34

Japan's Navy

was simple: incremental growth in capability, followed by long practice, and finally a culmination in a new mission and public acceptance of newly enlarged responsibilities. See Table 2.1 and Map 2.1 for milestones in the development of the JMSDF and domestic deployment of the force. Table 2.1 1948 1954 1956 1958 1959 1961 1963 1965 1970 1979 1980 1981 1984 1987 1989 1991 1992 1993

Milestones in JMSDF Development Maritime Safety Force established. Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force established. Resolution in House of Councilors prohibits overseas dispatch of JSDF. First naval ship produced domestically since World War II. First overseas training cruise by JMSDF (to Hawaii). JMSDF overseas training cruise includes Canadian ports of call. JMSDF overseas training cruise includes Mexican ports of call. JMSDF overseas training cruise includes ports of call in Western Europe, Thailand, Egypt, and Turkey. First out of area dispatch for other than training: icebreaker Fuji dispatched to Antarctica. JMSDF overseas training cruise includes ports of call in Africa (Mozambique and Kenya). Fleet oiler comes into service. Three replenishment ships planned. JMSDF takes part in RIMPAC exercises. Japan agrees to take responsibility for the defense of sea-lanes in 1,000-mile radius. New class of fleet support ships authorized. Japanese-flagged vessels attacked in Persian Gulf. United States requests minesweepers. Feasibility study conducted. Combat support ship JDS Towada commissioned. JMSDF-U.S. Navy joint minesweeping exercises begun. JMSDF minesweepers dispatched to Persian Gulf. JSDF personnel supported in Cambodia by JDS Towada. First Kongo class destroyer (DD) commissioned, displacing 7,250 tons and Aegis equipped.

Map 2.1 125'E

130'E

Deployment of JMSDF 135'E

45'N

140'E

145'E

45'N

Oininattr IK'fen st Districi

Ominàto I Wense Districi

40'N

40'N

M;ii/liru Defense District

KURE

35'N Sasebo g Defense District

35'N

^YOKOSUKA Yokosuka Defense District

(

SASEBO*

30'N

30'N

25'N

25'N

125'E

130'E

135'E

140'E

145'E

0

1

0

500 Miles

1

500 K M Parallel scale at 40'N O'E

1

36

Japan's Navy

Notes 1. An earlier version of this chapter appeared as "The Kata of Japan's Naval Forces," Naval War College Review (NWCR) XLIX, 2 (Spring 1996): pp. 59-69. 2. The analyst Harry Summers wrote the "Reluctant Samurai" for Defense & Diplomacy 9, 1-2 (January-February 1991): pp. 7-11. The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies is a recent RAND study by Norman Levin, Mark Sorell, and Arthur Alexander (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993). 3. The phrase is borrowed from Boye Lafayette De Mente, Japan's Secret Weapon: The Kata Factor (Phoenix: Phoenix Books, 1990). 4. For a thorough treatment of many factors see Joseph P. Keddell Jr., The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993). 5. This public view was particularly evident in the public's criticism of the JGSDF following the Kobe earthquake of January 1995. Disaster relief was long an important justification of the JGSDF to the public. The government andJDA had ceased to emphasize the civil defense role of the ground forces' having become, after 1990, much occupied with the possibilities of peacekeeping missions. But habits die hard, and the public had not forgotten years of JDA advertising. 6. JASDF C-130 cargo planes were deployed to Zaire in 1994 in support of humanitarian relief operations and to Cambodia in 1992. 7. See G. A. Rubinstein and J . O'Connell, "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces," Naval Forces 11, 2 (1990): pp. 78-83. 8. Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan, p. 4, says that Japan's public opinion "tends to follow the course of events, rather than to determine specific outcomes." An analysis of Japan's changing public opinion is found in David Brobow, "Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, 4 (December 1989): pp. 571-604. 9. The first postwar dispatch of Japanese warships overseas actually took place before the establishment of the JDA and the JMSDF: Japanese minesweepers were co-opted by U.S. naval forces operating against North Korean forces in 1950. See James Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971 (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 64-68. 10. See the story in, among others, Japan Times, 21 November 1965. 11. For example, in 1981 Ted Shannon Wile concluded that "there is no indication that the Japanese will attempt to develop a convoy escort capability in the foreseeable future" and that "there is no evidence that Japan has embarked on a program to militarily secure her sea-lanes." See "Sealane Defense: An Emerging Role for the JMSDF?" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1981), pp. 143-144. Thomas B. Modly, writing in the NWCR a few years later, suggested that this defense perimeter was a fiction and that the JMSDF was far from being able to protect it adequately from Soviet forces: "There exists a significant chasm between the political commitment to adopt such a policy and the reality of Japan's efforts to attain the necessary capability." Modly concluded "the military significance of the Japanese 1,000-mile defense policy is rather questionable." See "The Rhetoric and Realities of Japan's 1,000-Mile SeaLane Defense Policy," NWCR XXXVIII, 1 (January-February 1985): pp. 2 5 36. For a similar but more optimistic conclusion see Michael Ganley, "Japan-

A Cultural View

37

ese Goal to Protect Sea Lanes: More Rhetoric than Reality?" Armed Forces Journal International 123, 2 ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 5 ) : pp. 104, 107. By contrast, a 1987 study f o u n d that with only "marginal increases in its capabilities to c o n d u c t air defense, strait c o n t r o l , a n d convoy o p e r a t i o n s , J a p a n could d e f e n d its sea lanes against a t h r e a t f r o m the Soviet U n i o n " without relying on the U.S. Navy! S e e Daniel I. Gallagher, " S e a L a n e Defense: J a p a n e s e Capabilities and Imperatives" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1 9 8 7 ) . More recently, J a m e s Auer asserted that in the 1980s J a p a n "increased its air defense and antisubmarine capability significantly so as to make its goal [ o f a 1,000-mile sea-lane defense] a near reality." See "Japan's Changing Defense Policy," The New Pacific Security Environment, Ralph A. Cossa, ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1 9 9 3 ) , p. 82. 12. Cmdr. H i d e o S e k i n o , Imperial J a p a n e s e Navy ( R e t i r e d ) , "Japan a n d H e r Maritime D e f e n s e , " U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1 9 7 1 , p. 119. 13. Ibid., pp. 103, 119. 14. Ibid., pp. 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 ; J a m e s E. Auer, "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force: An Appropriate Maritime Strategy," NWCR XXIV, 4 (December 1971): pp. 3 20. 15. C o m m e n t s o f J D A Director General Asao Mihara as reported by the Japan Times, 16 N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 7 , were in response to questions a b o u t the ability o f J a p a n to protect shipping in the Strait o f Malacca. 16. J a p a n e s e Defense Agency, Defense ofJapan (Tokyo: J a p a n e s e Defense Agency, 1978, p. 2 0 6 . 17. Auer, Postwar Rearmament, p. 252, asserted that "Japanese ships . . . show g o o d skill at fueling at sea when exercising with U.S. support vessels; a n d it could b e that in an e m e r g e n c y situation . . . J a p a n ' s m e r c h a n t fleet could be used in support o f the MSDF's front line units." 18. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f State, "Visit o f Prime Minister Suzuki," Department of State Bulletin 81, 2051 (June 1 9 8 1 ) : p. 3. 19. See, for example, New York Times, 17 D e c e m b e r 1980, p. 25; 14 J a n u ary 1981, p. 7; 9 April 1981, p. 5; 5 May 1981, p. 14; 29 July 1981, p. 4; 22 Dec e m b e r 1981, p. 3. 20. P. Lewis Young, " T h e J a p a n e s e Maritime Self-Defense Forces: Major S u r f a c e Combatants, Destroyers, a n d Frigates," Asian Defense Journal, Sept e m b e r 1985, p. 86. 21. Washington Post, 19 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 3 , pp. A I , A12, A13. Nakasone said at the same time that J a p a n "should be like an unsinkable aircraft carrier," a r e m a r k that at the time drew m u c h m o r e attention in J a p a n and the Soviet U n i o n than any o f his o t h e r remarks. 22. Jane's Fighting Ships (Alexandria, Va.: J a n e ' s I n f o r m a t i o n G r o u p , 1 9 8 5 ) , p. 143. 23. P. Lewis Young, " T h e J a p a n e s e Maritime Self-Defense Forces: Major S u r f a c e Combatants, Destroyers, a n d Frigates," Asian Defense Journal, Sept e m b e r 1985, p. 87. 24. This improvement was in both relative and absolute terms: J a p a n did not draw down its military spending or development plans even as the Soviet U n i o n c r u m b l e d . S e e P e t e r J . Woolley, "Japan's Security Policy: I n t o the Twenty-First C e n t u r y " J o u r n a l of East and West Studies 21, 2 ( O c t o b e r 1 9 9 2 ) : pp. 1 0 7 - 1 1 9 .

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Japan's Navy

25. These were the JDS Hayase, which served as the flagship; the Tokiwa, one of three brand-new fleet support ships; and the Yurishima, Hikoshima, Awashima, and Sakushima, which were all newly commissioned in 1988 and 1989. 26. See above, note 9. 27. "Gulf Cooperation Mission Questioned," Japan Times, Weekly International Edition, 18-24 November 1991, p. 3. 28. Auer, Postwar Rearmament, pp. 6 4 - 6 8 . 29. See, for example, Tamara Moser Melia, Damn the Torpedoes: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Navy Historical Center, 1991), pp. 129 ff.; J o h n F. Tarpey, "A Minestruck Navy Forgets Its History," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114 (February 1988): pp. 44-47. 30. Author's interview (25 July 1991) with Adm. Manabu Yoshida, JMSDF (ret.), and Vice Adm. Taketo Takata, JMSDF (ret.), who went to the Persian Gulf and wrote the report. 31. Author's interview with various JASDF officers and instructors at the Air Staff College and Yokota Air Base, July-August 1991. 32. This was also the conclusion of several members of Sorifu, the Prime Minister's Research Office, interviewed July 1991 by the author. 33. "Japanese Navy to Bolster Sealift, Supply Abilities," Defense News, 2 4 - 3 0 October 1994, p. 18. 34. For a narrative of the complete range of J S D F activities in Cambodia see Defense offapan 1993 (Tokyo: Japanese Defense Agency, annual), pp. 127-151. 35. See, for example, "The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force," fane's Intelligence Review, February 1992, p. 62.

3 The Legal/Constitutional Conundrum: Constraint and License in Article 9

Did the legal or institutional structure of Japan after 1948 have a real effect on defense policy? The answers given depend entirely on one's analytical approach. If, for example, one employs a strictly cultural or strictly elitist analysis, the constitution and other legal strictures would be seen as subordinate to, or even reflective of, other political determinants. In a cultural view, habits of perception and behavior drive politics, shaping and defining legal and institutional forms. To those who see elite decisions as the driving factor in defense policy, the constitution would be strictly the outward and visible sign of inward and elitist proclivities. 1 But what if the constitution were in itself a driving force, a parameter, that defines and confines the political debate to certain limits? T h e n , the institutional rules and the constitution would themselves influence political outcomes. Thus was article 9 of the Japanese constitution a recurring obstacle to understanding Japan's postwar defense policy. T h e language of the peace clause seemed to leave no room for equivocation. Article 9 appeared to be both severe and straightforward in its prohibition of military forces, let alone military action. Thus there was room for wonder in the disparity between the apparently absolute language of the constitution and the fact that Japan had significant armed forces. The confusion was compounded by complex interpretations and applications of the article's two paragraphs. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

39

40

Japan's Navy

One might no more take this clause literally than one would take literally any portion of the U.S. Constitution. The proverbial man on the moon, given only a copy of the U.S. Constitution, would in that document discover little of practical value about the U.S. political system and the rules that govern it. In the United States it has long been as the eminent constitutional scholar Charles Evans Hughes put it: "We live under a constitution but the Constitution is what the judges say it is." And by extension, the U.S. Constitution does not say, nor prohibit, whatever the Supreme Court does not say it says nor prohibits: Japan's case is not altogether dissimilar. Indeed, from a comparative perspective, the postwar Japanese form of government was peculiar, less because it was Japanese than because it followed in fundamental ways the structure of the U.S. system, including a relatively brief constitution with an enumeration of individual rights and a court system independent of the legislature or executive. 2 That the court should be an independent branch of government was an essentially U.S. model. But that the court should be able to exercise the power ofjudicial review was hardly unique, because it was a practice found in some degree in seventy countries by the end of the "American Century." At the same time, only a few countries strongly and effectively used judicial review at all levels of their formal judicial hierarchy: Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Pakistan, and Japan. 3 In Japan, the meaning of article 9 evolved and was open to interpretation, though not necessarily by the Supreme Court, just as every other part of the constitution of Japan or of the United States was open to change in interpretation and its application to practical situations. Naturally the original intent of the article was of great interest to citizens, scholars, interest groups, and political leaders. And just as naturally, article 9 ofJapan's "peace" constitution was frequently presented as a unique feature of Japanese politics and one exclusively reflective of Japan's wartime experiences. Yet the origins and variable interpretations of this article, once set in a historical context and considered in light of other political circumstances, reflected a complex array of political and legal forces. The only thing that might surely have been said was that the article was very popular when adopted in 1946 by a warweary population that had been under the boot of militarism, the spell of adventurism, and the intoxication of imperialism for a long time. Enough was enough. The article remained popular throughout the remainder of the century, framing every debate on security affairs.

The Occupation and Original Intent One way of getting at the meaning of article 9 is to ask what the framers of that constitution originally intended. Consequently scholars

The Legal/Constitutional

Conundrum

41

have searched the record, while many of the politicians and staffers present at the formulation of the constitution have pieced together various accounts of what the framers were thinking. Unfortunately, they disagree. The allied occupation of Japan ( 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 2 ) under Gen. Douglas MacArthur profoundly affected the postwar politics of all Asia. Following Japan's surrender in August of 1945 the victorious allies, which included the Soviet Union, set about occupying, disarming, governing, and quarreling over the future of Japan. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers General MacArthur opposed the Soviet Union's demand that Japan be divided and that the Soviet Union be allowed to occupy, at the least, half the island of Hokkaido. Instead, MacArthur insisted that the Japanese archipelago remain a political whole—unlike Korea across the strait and unlike Germany on the other side of the world. MacArthur also opposed demands that the Japanese emperor himself be tried as a war criminal and insisted that the emperor remain a symbolic part o f the political system. MacArthur often ignored the advice of the Allied Council for Japan, ostensibly the ultimate occupation authority. MacArthur himself was in fact the authority behind the occupation and in the way of a common paradox, was the leading, authoritarian member o f the elite who bequeathed a democratic constitution to the country he ruled. 4 The document, however, was not really MacArthur's, nor was it exclusively the work of the Americans. 5 T h e new constitution, written in late 1945 and early 1946, carried over many of the forms of the old Meiji constitution. And just as the Meiji constitution had blended a number of familiar domestic institutions and practices with borrowed institutions and practices, so the postwar constitution retained much of the character of the old while borrowing ideas and forms from Japanese scholars and political parties, as well as from abroad. T h e first draft constitution was largely the work of J o j i Matsumoto, a legal scholar appointed by Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara. 6 MacArthur deemed the work far too conservative, that is, undemocratic, and moved quickly to supplant it. MacArthur's aides subsequently drafted a model constitution meant to demonstrate what was necessary to construct a lasting, stable democratic order. Their model became the working draft; the finished product came to be called the MacArthur constitution. 7 Between the draft and the finished product, Shidehara's cabinet ministers, the Cabinet's Legislation Bureau, the emperor's Privy Council, fourteen subcommittees of the Diet, and the Diet itself all wrote, rewrote, edited, altered, and amended the "model." So, how much was MacArthur's and what did article 9 intend?

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Japan's Navy

A m o n g the explanations for article 9 is that MacArthur himself f o u n d the Japanese u n i q u e in their attachment to war: For centuries the Japanese people, unlike their neighbors in the Pacific Basin—the Chinese, the Malayans, the Indians and others— have been students and idolaters of the art of war and the warrior caste. . . . Unbroken victory for Japanese arms convinced them of their invincibility, and the keystone to the entire arch of their civilization became an almost mythological belief in the strength and wisdom of the warrior caste. It permeated and controlled not only all the branches of the government, but all branches of life—physical, mental, and spiritual. It was interwoven not only into all government process, but into all phases of daily routine. It was not only the essence, but the warp and woof of Japanese existence. 8

MacArthur thus insisted on a strong antidote to this cultural predisposition. T h e c o m m o n story is that those elements of the J a p a n e s e elite who might have objected to the no-war clause—and o t h e r clauses—withheld their objections h o p i n g that MacArthur would stand in the way of the e m p e r o r ' s being tried as a war criminal and the dissolution of the imperial institution. But it is n o t clear that MacArthur came to the idea of the r e n u n c i a t i o n of war himself or that he alone insisted on it. T h e r e is evidence that the no-war suggestion originated with Prime Minister Shidehara a n d his government. 9 Certainly the clause was popular with other party leaders. T h e idea may have come f r o m the e m p e r o r himself who had spoken of a new and pacifist J a p a n in his New Year's address of 1946. Whatever the case, r e n o u n c i n g war was n o t a n o t i o n u n i q u e to J a p a n . As students of J a p a n have p o i n t e d out, the r e n u n c i a t i o n of war was a p o p u l a r ideal in the years following World War I: both J a p a n and the United States were signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which m e a n t to outlaw recourse to war as a solution to international disputes. T h e r e was n o reason why such pacifist sentim e n t should n o t be on the minds of the reconstructionists, both J a p a n e s e a n d Western, in postwar J a p a n . 1 0 But did article 9 mean that Japan had no right to self-defense?

T h e first penciled notes made by MacArthur's aides had a no-war clause that read: War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection. No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force. [Emphasis in original.] 11

The Legal/Constitutional

Conundrum

43

O n e might conclude f r o m this original draft that no question could arise over w h e t h e r J a p a n should have an a r m e d force n o r even whether J a p a n should d e f e n d itself. Even taking the revisions into account, some Japanese scholars continued to argue that case. 12 These scribbled notes of MacArthur's aides were revised significantly. How significantly? T h e evidence suggests that at least the p r o m i n e n t figures who supported article 9 never m e a n t that J a p a n should not d e f e n d itself f r o m attack. What was m e a n t was that J a p a n should n o t resort to force short of being attacked. 1 3 Col. Charles Kades of MacArthur's staff r e c o u n t e d that he himself deleted the phrase "even for preserving its own security," following J a p a n ' s renunciation of war, because "it was unrealistic to ban a nation f r o m exercising its i n h e r e n t right of self preservation." 1 4 MacArthur and his primary aide, Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney, evidently agreed. MacArthur, in his memoirs at least, c o n f i r m e d that the renunciation of war did not preclude the right of defense: "Nothing in Article 9 . . . prevents any and all necessary steps f o r the preservation of the safety of the nation. Article 9 was aimed entirely at eliminating Japanese aggression." 1 5 Kades also claimed that he approved of two o t h e r alterations m a d e by members of the Diet. T h e phrases "aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order" and "in o r d e r to accomplish the aim of the p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h " were, according to Kades, h e l p f u l to the i n f e r e n c e that J a p a n could i n d e e d d e f e n d itself: "The r a t h e r vague terms" of these a m e n d m e n t s , wrote Kades, "would p e r m i t J a p a n to have forces, such as a h o m e guard a n d a coast guard sufficient to repel any invasion." 16 Only 3 years after the constitution was ratified, Prime Minister Yoshida attempted to explain why the right of self-defense was not reserved explicitly: Of late years most wars have been waged in the name of selfdefense. This is the case of the Manchurian Incident, and so is the War of Greater East Asia. The suspicion concerning Japan today is that she is a warlike nation, and there is no knowing when she may rearm herself, wage a war of reprisal and threaten the peace of the world. . . . I think that the first thing we should do today is to set right this misunderstanding. 17

Others pointed out that article 66 of the 1946 constitution requires that "the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians." Such a qualification implied that there were to be noncivilians and therefore a military organization of some kind. 1 8 There was also article 51 of the UN Charter to point to since it was contemporary

44

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with the Japanese constitution and made explicit the right of each nation to defend itself from armed attack. 19 The record is also convincing that policymakers in Washington, far from MacArthur and the Diet, believed that some degree of Japanese rearmament was necessary whatever the constitutional restrictions. These included George F. Kennan and J o h n Foster Dulles. Only a few years later, at the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. administration would be strongly urging rearmament and the Japanese government in 1950 would form the National Police Reserve (NPR) of 75,000 members. In 1951, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty stated that "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat." 2 0 In 1952 the NPR was reformed into the National Safety Forces, which included maritime forces. By the end o f the Korean War the U.S. Congress passed the Mutual Security Act to provide financial assistance to arm U.S. allies, and Japan was included. Prime Minister Yoshida was happy to accept the money so long as it did not require revision of article 9. U.S. Secretary of State Dulles required no revision. From the National Safety Forces Yoshida and his majority created the SelfDefense Forces. The opposition complained bitterly, and the nationalist conservatives were not satisfied either. Yoshida would last only 1 more year in office but the J S D F was officially born in 1954. Did article 9 mean that Japan could not participate in collective security such as that which the UN was supposed to offer ? It was widely believed that the new international organization formed by the San Francisco Treaty, the United Nations, would have the obligation, the authority, and the troops to provide some significant measure of security to the world. The San Francisco Treaty and the UN were not like the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations: the United States had j o i n e d the UN, as had the Soviet Union. There was reason to believe, at least for a brief time, that the postWorld War II order would be handled collectively by the great victorious powers and that the UN would have contributions from all the signatory countries. Japan too would eventually be included in UN forces. Japan's role in such peacekeeping missions was queried in the Diet even as Japan was moving toward UN membership in the mid1950s. The government's answer was that Japan's peace constitution was not an obstacle to contributing a fair share to UN activities and that membership would not embroil Japan in international conflicts. 21 But, in fact, any consideration of an internationalist military role never got far because the question was soon submerged by both Japan's exclusive alliance with the United States and the fact that the UN was itself preoccupied with the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. After

The Legal/Constitutional

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45

Japan did j o i n the UN in 1956, the government refused requests from UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in 1958 that Japan contribute troops to the observer group in Lebanon and in 1961 to UN forces in the Congo. 2 2 Sending Japanese troops as such to wield force in a foreign country was said to be very much against the constitution (and against the prevailing sentiment) since the agreement was that Japan would not as a sovereign nation use force or the threat of force to resolve disputes. What Japan might do was to contribute, not troops from the Self-Defense Forces, but personnel. If such personnel were Japanese but not representatives of the armed institution of the state, then they could participate in a unified UN military force just as citizens of any other country might do. The point was null. The UN had no unified force, would not acquire one, and was weak in any case. In 1957, just a year after Japan j o i n e d the UN, the official white paper on defense concluded that Japan would "deal with external aggression on the basis of t h e j a p a n U.S. security arrangements pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression." 23 The statement reflected reality. Collective security under the UN was not working out. T h e United Nations was an ideal postponed. Collective security was for the time being and for a long time to come a moot question. The question would not be revisited until the Cold War was over. Did article 9 mean that Japan could have an ally that would use Japan as a base and a staging area for not only Japan's defense but the defense of the ally's national interests ? That Japan could have an ally was never a central problem. Article 9 said nothing of other countries' protecting Japan. There were other questions. Should Japan choose sides in the confrontation between communist and liberal democratic camps or should Japan choose a neutral path, avoiding the entanglement in international affairs that had proven so disastrous in the first place? If Japan chose a neutral path, would it not have to rearm to protect itself and, moreover, return to the ancient policy of isolation? And if Japan should choose a protecting ally, then how much could and should Japan do to support the ally? Choosing a neutral path was not realistic. 24 With Mao's communist China allied to the Soviet Union, and with the United States occupying Japan, a serious go at neutrality would require immediate rearmament and possibly an amendment to the constitution. Article 9 was popular; rearmament was not. The Socialists and others could easily block any amendment to the constitution since it would require a two-thirds vote in both houses of the legislature and a public referendum. If rapid rearmament was not domestically possible, and

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if international isolation was undesirable, then an alliance with the United States was logical. The United States could provide security to a Japan living on the rim of a continent swept by communist victories, and would not only be a powerful protector but obviate the need for rapid rearmament by Japan. The sticking point was what Japan would be required to do within the alliance. Prime Minister Yoshida and his government had a fairly expansive idea of what Japan would do for its ally even if his ideas for what Japan's forces would do were very limited. In the security treaty negotiated in 1951 Japan could lease army, air, and naval bases and allow the lessee to use those bases at its discretion to defend its interests without having to consult the Japanese government. Clearly many disagreed with the Yoshida government's interpolation. A thoroughly pacifist left wing found the wholesale accommodation of the United States a complete negation of the pacifist principles of Japan's new international relations. The nationalist conservatives, on the other hand, found that the security treaty had gone too far in that it made Japan more a protectorate of the United States than an ally. Nonetheless, Yoshida's interpretation won the day. The Diet ratified the security treaty alongside a formal treaty of peace. Japan's expansive use of an ally, and the ally's expansive use of Japan, was an acceptable and early addendum to article 9. In sum, what was originally intended was from the inception of the constitution a subject of debate, and article 9 was consequently subject to interpretation, elaboration, detailed articulation, and change. 2 5 Indeed, if article 9 had been perfectly clear to everyone, without nuance or room for interpretation, and if everyone had agreed on the meaning for all time, subsequent debate would be obviated. Not everyone was in complete agreement. There was subtlety and room for inference: thus the meaning and application of the peace constitution changed.

License and Limitation The constitutional addendum that allowed Japan to rearm and the United States to operate its military freely from Japan was hardly the last word. When the governments of Japan and the United States attempted to renew their security treaty in 1960, the disparity between popular sentiment and the realism of Cold War demands once again became apparent. 2 6 The treaty chafed: the United States retained the ability to put down insurrection in Japan, 2 7 and would be able to use its leased bases in Japan for military operations in East Asia without the necessity of

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47

consulting the Japanese government. In addition to the treaty clauses, there were occasional ugly, widely publicized incidents between U.S. soldiers and Japanese civilians. In these conflicts the Americans were subject only to U.S. military law and not Japanese. The United States had used the bases in Japan to great advantage (for both nations) during the war in Korea, but the fear persisted that Japan would become embroiled in another Asian war. Mao had triumphed in China, and, while the distant Americans could afford to ignore and isolate this new communist regime allied with the Soviet Union, there were reasonable misgivings about the wisdom of such a policy for Japan. Moreover, in 1958 the United States and Red China had nearly come to blows over the last redoubt of the nationalist Chinese on Taiwan; this crisis highlighted the peculiar position of Japan as the East Asian ally of the United States. Finally, the 1951 treaty had not even explicitly bound the United States to defend Japan. 2 8 Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi was himself a hawk who had built up the J S D F and strongly supported the common anticommunist cause o f the United States and Japan. Some in Washington were still suggesting that Japan rearm on a larger scale and that it participate more actively in collective defense arrangements on the Pacific Rim. Kishi negotiated a treaty in 1959-1960 that did not require Japan to increase the size of its armed forces and bound the United States to defend and to consult with Japan. 2 9 Japan was not obligated to defend anything but Japan itself. T h e treaty also made clear that Japan maintained "residual sovereignty" in the Okinawan Prefecture though it was still administered by the United States. 3 0 T h e United States would no longer have the latitude to act against domestic upheaval in Japan. However, the United States could still use the Japanese bases to defend its interests anywhere on the Pacific Rim. Again nationalist conservatives were unhappy because the treaty did not provide for a more expansive definition of defense. Again the Left was unhappy because the treaty provided too expansive a definition of defense. T h e pacifist conservatives were happy because the status quo allowed Japan to concentrate on economic development and leave the expensive and divisive problem of security affairs in the hands of a powerful protector. Others were satisfied because the treaty treated Japan as an ally and an equal. But Kishi's case for the treaty was not helped when the Soviet Union brought down a U.S. U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory on 1 May 1960 even as the Diet considered the proposed treaty. President Eisenhower was scheduled to visit in J u n e . And although Kishi wanted the treaty ratified in time for the visit, the Diet session expired on 26 May without ratification. Kishi extended the session but only by ordering police to expel Socialist Party members who had tried to physically prevent the

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speaker of the House of Representatives from calling the vote. Kishi won the vote as a matter of course but was irretrievably weakened. Protests erupted even outside the Diet building, and police used tear gas and force to dispel the crowds. 31 A revolt in his own party in the House of Councilors forced Kishi to resign in return for the rebels supporting the treaty. The treaty was law, but the strains of competing constitutional interpretation had been brought to the open. (See Table 3.1.) The Casuistry of Article 9 To maintain a broad consensus around the meaning and application of article 9, successive governments made every effort to define explicitly what they believed the constitution allowed and what it did not. For example, from the beginning it was decided that article 9 allowed Japan a treaty arrangement with the United States but did not allow Japan to contribute JSDF units to UN peacekeeping operations. Japan could contract with the United States for the defense of Japan as was done in the 1960 security treaty but it could not promise the defense of some other territory: a treaty alliance for the defense of Japan was allowed; a collective security agreement for the mutual defense of two or more countries was not allowed.

Table 3.1 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1960 1967 1976 1981 1987 1991 1992

Constitutional Chronology

Surrender; occupation begins. New constitution is ratified by the Diet. New constitution takes effect. Maritime Safety Force established. Chinese Communists defeat Chinese Nationalists. North Korea invades South Korea. National Police Reserve formed. U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Allied occupation terminated. National Police Reserve becomes National Safety Forces. Maritime Safety Force becomes Maritime Security Force. U.S. Congress passes Mutual Security Act. Japan Defense Agency supersedes Japan Safety Agency: National Safety Forces become Self-Defense Forces. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. Government announces three nonnuclear principles: no possession, no production, no permission. Government announces that defense spending will be held under 1 percent of GNP and Japan will not export military goods. Responsibility for sea-lane defense to 1,000 miles announced. One percent threshold crossed in defense spending. Minesweepers dispatched to the Persian Gulf. J S D F legislation altered to allow limited participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

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49

O t h e r high-profile b u t low-impact rules, b o t h f o r m a l a n d informal, c a m e i n t o practice to b u i l d a n d r e i n f o r c e t h e legal c o n s e n s u s a r o u n d article 9. JSDF units could n o t be d i s p a t c h e d a b r o a d . T h e geographical scope of d e f e n s e was limited to J a p a n e s e territory a n d territorial waters. D e f e n s e c o o p e r a t i o n with t h e U n i t e d States d i d n o t e x t e n d to resupplying U.S. military units or vessels. T h e g o v e r n m e n t would n o t s p e n d m o r e t h a n 1 p e r c e n t of gross n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t o n d e f e n s e . JSDF w e a p o n s h a d to b e defensive r a t h e r t h a n offensive. T h e J D A was n o t a c a b i n e t d e p a r t m e n t with a d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r b u t an agency with a d i r e c t o r general. A n d m e m b e r s of the JSDF did n o t wear u n i f o r m s in public. In fact, each of these practices r e p r e s e n t e d an e f f o r t to m a i n t a i n t h e legitimacy of t h e JSDF b u t e a c h practice h a d its own complicated subplots that, f r o m time to time, h a d to b e a l t e r e d — o r simply c h a n g e d to make a point. 3 2 T h e n o t i o n t h a t JSDF u n i t s s h o u l d n o t go a b r o a d was a d j u s t e d a n d r e a d j u s t e d many times as n e e d a n d o p p o r t u n i t y arose. It was t h e JMSDF t h a t b e g a n r e f i n i n g t h e rules o n t h e overseas d i s p a t c h of f o r c e s in 195 8. 3 3 A t r a i n i n g mission to Midway Island a n d Hawaii s e e m e d obviously to b r e a k the rule, b u t the g o v e r n m e n t successfully a r g u e d that JMSDF training cruises were n o t i n t e n d e d to be curtailed by the p r o h i b i t i o n o n overseas force. Training by d e f i n i t i o n was n o t f o r c e . 3 4 T h e a r g u m e n t won, t h e t r a i n i n g exercises took place m o r e a n d m o r e frequently, a n d t h e JMSDF trainers v e n t u r e d f a r t h e r a n d f a r t h e r a b r o a d . Later, JASDF pilots w e n t to t h e U n i t e d States f o r t r a i n i n g , a n d m e m b e r s of t h e J G S D F also visited t h e r e to practice with antiaircraft batteries. T h e JMSDF r e f i n e d t h e r u l e again in 1965, s e n d i n g t h e iceb r e a k e r Fuji to the Antarctic to resupply J a p a n e s e observation teams. This was n o t a training mission, yet it was the overseas dispatch of a JMSDF vessel. But it was, said t h e g o v e r n m e n t , f o r p e a c e f u l a n d scientific purposes, s o m e t h i n g the overseas p r o h i b i t i o n did n o t i n t e n d to thwart. T h e rule, however r e f i n e d , was still in force in 1991 w h e n t h e g o v e r n m e n t d e p l o y e d six J M S D F ships to t h e Persian Gulf f o r minesweeping. H e r e again, the g o v e r n m e n t was c a r e f u l to p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e war b e t w e e n t h e U N allies a n d Iraq was over. T h e m i n e sweepers were b o u n d to stay in i n t e r n a t i o n a l waters, a n d , a f t e r all, the p o i n t was to remove mines that were an obvious hazard to peaceful navigation. Subsequently the g o v e r n m e n t sent JSDF units to Cambodia, Mozambique, a n d the Golan Heights as p a r t of U N operations a n d to Zaire a n d Kenya as p a r t of U N h u m a n i t a r i a n relief missions. In n o case of i n t e r n a t i o n a l travel were t h e JSDF to wield force, n o r were they to settle disputes. In a n o t h e r e x a m p l e of a rule p r a c t i c e d to m a i n t a i n t h e consensus a r o u n d article 9, P r i m e Minister Miki's g o v e r n m e n t suggested in

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1976 that Japan should not spend more than 1 percent of GNP on national defense—otherwise it might be thought that Japan was building up the war potential prohibited by its constitution. The new benchmark was announced under the twin pressures of rising defense budgets and requests from the United States to share the defense burden. T h e question had become how much was enough? The 1 percent rule was temporarily satisfying. The rule put what appeared to be a definite limit on defense spending and yet it allowed for significant increases in defense spending as the GNP increased. The policy came under attack in the 1980s. Prime Minister Nakasone argued that 1 percent was not a concrete ceiling but only a benchmark. To make his point he vowed to spend more than 1 percent on defense. When this was accomplished in 1987, defense spending came to 1.004 percent of GNP. Japan also spent more than 1 percent in 1988 (1.013 percent) and in 1989 (1.006 percent) but, the point having been made, spending thereafter slipped back under the benchmark (see Table 3.2). Another thorny interpretation turned out to be what was meant by Japanese territory. If self-defense in case o f attack was allowed, what exactly would have to be attacked for Japan to exercise the right of defense? T h e definition under the first security treaties was limited to territory under the administration of Japan. In the 1960 treaty such territory did not include Okinawa Prefecture (consisting of the island o f Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands south o f Okinawa) since those remained under U.S. administration. In 1983 a great leap was made. With the encouragement of the Reagan administration, Japan accepted responsibility for the defense of sea-lanes out to 1,000 miles. The new defense pronouncement caused little stir. For one, the role of Japan in sea-lane defense had been talked about for several years. T h e idea had made its debut in defense circles in 1971. 3 5 By

Table 3.2

Breaking the 1-Percent Barrier in Defense Spending (in 100 million current yen)

Year

Defense Budget

1955 1965 1975 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1995

1,349 3,014 13,273 31,371 35,174 37,003 39,198 41,593 47,236

% GNP 1.78 1.07 0.84 0.997 1.004 1.013 1.006 0.997 0.959

Source: Japanese Defense Agency, Defense of fapan.

GNP (est.) 75,590 281,600 1,585,000 3,146,000 3,504,000 3,652,000 3,897,000 4,172,000 4,928,000

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1981 P r i m e Minister Suzuki h a d publicly expressed his i n t e n t i o n to e m b r a c e it. 3 6 Second, it was n o t clear to most p e o p l e e i t h e r in J a p a n o r the U n i t e d States that J a p a n h a d the m e a n s to take o n such a responsibility. But m o r e i m p o r t a n t , t h e g o v e r n m e n t m a d e clear that J a p a n ' s responsibility f o r international sea-lanes was only in the event that Japan were under attack. T h u s , the m a n y possible implications of sea-lane d e f e n s e were b l u n t e d by a narrow definition of what that defense entailed. A c c o r d i n g to this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , J a p a n would already have to b e u n d e r attack. T h e n the JMSDF would u n d e r t a k e sea-lane defense. In 1983 t h e n a r r o w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was based o n a significant deg r e e of realism. It was p r e s u m e d t h a t any attack would b e a Soviet o n e . Clearly, if the Cold War b e c a m e hot, J a p a n would want to fulfill its obligation u n d e r t h e U.S.-Japanese treaty. J u s t as clearly, t h e JMSDF would be greatly n e e d e d a n d c o u l d be most effective if able to o p e r a t e significantly outside J a p a n ' s territorial waters. T h e n a r r o w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n soon w i d e n e d to allow f o r t h e possibility of attacks o n the sea-lanes that m i g h t take place without an attack o n J a p a n e s e territory. This too m a d e sense. J a p a n ' s vital maritime lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o u l d b e a t t a c k e d w i t h o u t J a p a n e s e territory p e r se b e i n g a t t a c k e d . In such a case, n e i t h e r t h e U n i t e d States n o r J a p a n could r e f r a i n f r o m intervention o n the basis of legal niceties. T h e d e f e n s e white p a p e r eventually e x p l a i n e d that "generally s p e a k i n g it is difficult to m a k e a wholesale d e f i n i t i o n of exactly how f a r this g e o g r a p h i c area stretches [for t h e exercise of self-defense] because it would vary with separate individual situations." For those in J a p a n a n d elsewhere who objected to the e x p a n d i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of d e f e n s e at sea, fate i n t e r v e n e d to u n d e r m i n e b o t h interest in t h e p r o b l e m a n d the likelihood that any new policy would b e tested. T h e new Soviet C o m m u n i s t Party C h a i r m a n G o r b a c h e v was a r e f o r m e r who was inadvertently n u m b i n g the power of his empire while trying to save it. Still, the d e f e n s e of sea-lanes left o p e n o t h e r possibilities. Was it constitutionally possible to escort J a p a n e s e vessels t h r o u g h t r o u b l e d sea-lanes w h e n t h e r e was n o actual attack b u t only t h e t h r e a t of attack? If J a p a n ' s sea-lanes were vital b e t w e e n Tokyo a n d G u a m , were they n o t also vital b e t w e e n Tokyo a n d t h e Persian Gulf, a n d , if so, c o u l d n o t m e r c h a n t vessels b e e s c o r t e d against t h e possibility of attack a n y w h e r e in i n t e r n a t i o n a l waters? By 1987, P r o f e s s o r Masashi Nishihara of J a p a n ' s National Defense Academy h a d anticipated such questions: "The clause when Japan is under attack can b e stretched furt h e r to m e a n a situation where, f o r instance, J a p a n e s e tankers in the Gulf a n d the I n d i a n O c e a n are u n d e r attack." 3 7 P e r h a p s n o t coincidentally, it was also in 1987 that the U n i t e d States first e x p l o r e d t h e

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possibility of Japanese naval assistance in the Persian Gulf to escort reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. But in 1987, the Japanese government was not ready for the more expansive possibilities in sea-lane defense. As the b o n d s of the Cold War were loosened a n d the fog of the new world order descended, the public questions of sea-lane defense receded f r o m sight. A n o t h e r long-standing practice was n o t to allow the JSDF to resupply U.S. units. T h e Americans could use J a p a n e s e bases but had to maintain their own lines of communications and resupply themselves: otherwise, it was agreed, J a p a n would be participating by proxy in conflict. T h e JSDF could on the o t h e r h a n d be resupplied by U.S. forces. But as the JMSDF maneuvered more frequently with the U.S. Navy and as b u r d e n sharing b e c a m e a larger issue in the 1980s, the long-standing prohibition on resupply came u n d e r pressure. In particular, both Americans and J a p a n e s e w o n d e r e d how much logistical help the JSDF might offer if a full-scale Korean conflict restarted. Publicly the rule was maintained. Privately there was much speculation. Well out of the public eye the minesweepers deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1991 gave "fuel, lubricants and fresh water and food" to allied naval vessels. 38 Thus the JMSDF gave support to foreign naval vessels in foreign waters and tweaked the rule. No matter: a few years later the rule was modified anyway. In September 1997, a new security a g r e e m e n t with the U n i t e d States allowed the JSDF to provide military goods a n d services to U.S. a r m e d forces u n d e r limited circumstances: in j o i n t operations with the JSDF and during U.S. peacekeeping operations. In a n o t h e r example, recall that there were few official export restrictions on Japan's very small arms industry. But, in 1967, as the potential for arms exports and political repercussions had grown, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), rather than the cabinet or foreign office, p r o m u l g a t i n g the "Three Principles of Arms Exports"—that arms could go n e i t h e r to communist governments n o r to those u n d e r UN embargo, nor to countries "involved in or likely to become involved in international conflict." 3 9 As part of a later general application of article 9, the Miki g o v e r n m e n t ann o u n c e d in 1976 that J a p a n would refrain f r o m exporting arms altogether. This noble sentiment proved difficult to apply or enforce. The ban extended to weapons technology but not to high-technology products such as helicopters and aircraft engines to customers in Sweden, Norway, or the United States. Neither did the ban extend to low-technology exports sold commercially such as ammunition also used for sport, revolvers, and police gear to developing countries. Dualuse items, such as patrol boats, small landing craft, and air transports,

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53

difficult to classify as strictly for military use, were sold to Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Japan also turned over, at the direction of the U.S. government, old U.S.-built navy frigates to Taiwan and the Philippines. 40 Prime Minister Nakasone's government modified the nonexport policy in 1983, announcing that it would not apply to exports of weapons technology to the United States. But problems and controversy continued. Since it was clear that even a low-profile arms export industry could have adverse consequences, the government was forced to consider what effect those exports had on the politics of their customers. 4 1 Several of Japan's largest debtors, recipients of economic assistance, and sometime buyers of low-end or dual-use hardware were also spending substantial portions of their budgets on their militaries. These included, for example, the poverty-stricken countries of Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Pressure developed in Japan to link overseas development assistance (ODA) to the recipients' defense spending, and by 1991 Japan's ODA had subtle strings attached to emphasize "demilitarization, democracy and environment." 4 2 Japan's nonnuclear policy proved only a little easier to comprehend and enforce. The policy announced by the cabinet in 1967 and resolved in the House of Representatives in 1971 was that Japan would not possess, nor produce, nor allow on its territory nuclear weapons. That J a p a n would not possess nuclear weapons was not a problem. There was clearly a loathing of the horrible weapon. That Japan would not produce a nuclear weapon was at least partially compromised by the enormous nuclear power industry that required and produced no shortage o f capable engineers and plutonium. At the same time, the U.S. Navy maintained a policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence o f nuclear weapons aboard its vessels. Whether nuclear armed vessels continued to enter the U.S. facilities at Yokosuka was either a matter of trust or convenient disinterest. Still, perhaps the best example of attempting at once a firm adherence to article 9 and maintaining a clear definition of defense activities is in the difference between "offensive" and "defensive" weaponry. Insofar as the constitution forbade "war potential," the overarching question o f what makes the potential for war was constantly in dispute. When the director general of the National Safety Agency was asked in 1952 to give an example of what constituted war potential, he suggested j e t airplanes. 4 3 About the same time, the government justified the defense forces by asserting that forces unable to conduct modern warfare, such as their own, could not be construed as war potential. (Critics found the logic wanting: If the forces were not capable of conducting modern warfare, then of what use were they?) 44

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As time and technology marched on the J S D F acquired j e t airplanes, but other weapons were ruled out. Guided missiles were suspect as offensive weapons in the late 1950s but by the 1980s were de rigueur for JMSDF ships. 45 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and long-range bombers were cited as offensive war material—even if Japan was under the extended deterrent umbrella of the U.S. ICBM and strategic bomber forces. Nuclear weapons were ruled out—even if the United States guaranteed the defense of Japan in part by extending its nuclear shield. Aircraft carriers were also ruled out because carriers implied forward-based forces—even as the Americans all but homeported a carrier in Yokosuka. 46 Later, "offensive aircraft carriers" were ruled out, but, by implication, the possibility was allowed that some kind of platform for aircraft could be allowed even if only for helicopters. 47 Possibly the most practical limitation on the J S D F was actually the least discussed: that the JSDF's stocks of ammunition and fuel were never much more than would allow for training exercises—not enough to allow even a few weeks of intense operations. But this, rather than being a stated policy, was rather the result of perennial budgetary processes in which last-minute savings were naturally sought in low-profile expenses. 4 8 In sum, the difficulties of distinguishing between self-defense and war potential were to be expected. Indeed, all the informal rules developed, altered, and sometimes discarded were consensual attempts to keep the J S D F behind some notional barrier of offensive war potential: the ban on the overseas dispatch of J S D F units, limiting defense spending to 1 percent of GNP, the nonexport policy for weapons, and the three nonnuclear principles. Prime Minister Ikeda probably offered in 1965 the best explanation that could be had: "The Self-Defense Forces are not to be determined conceptually or numerically, but the strength should be determined according to the national situation, world affairs and the development of scientific techniques." 4 9

Collective Security Revisited Having arrived at, debated, redefined, and refined these various understandings of the limitations on defense policy, Japan was forced to revisit the bedrock issues of constitutional prohibition at the end of the Cold War. For 45 years, the fundamental direction of constitutional interpretations had to and did take into account the great East-West confrontation between liberal democracy and communist authoritarianism. The confrontation having passed, new political pressure from within and without required new considerations.

The Legal/Constitutional

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55

No time was allowed to ruminate over constitutional issues. T h e pressures of the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990-1991 forced the issue: the UN sanctioned the use of force to expel Iraqi forces f r o m Kuwait; NATO allies c o n t r i b u t e d significant forces; and dozens of o t h e r countries contributed at least symbolic forces. J a p a n was paralyzed in extrapolated constitutional definitions, locked in debate, bitterly criticized, and bewildered. O n the o n e h a n d , the politics of the evolution of article 9 had d e t e r m i n e d that J a p a n could not "exercise" its right of collective defense since this would have involved J a p a n in d e f e n d i n g territory o t h e r t h a n its own. T h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g was also that sending the JSDF a b r o a d was t a n t a m o u n t to settling disputes with a r m e d force and was therefore prohibited. And still there was the question of how far public support for the JSDF e x t e n d e d while public support for article 9 was also strong. T h e balance had b e e n maintained only with utmost sensitivity. O n the o t h e r h a n d there were completely new political circumstances. And, in r e t u r n i n g to original intent, it could not be denied that J a p a n was somehow m e a n t to be both protected in a framework of international cooperation and be contributing to that framework. T h e original penciled notes had said that J a p a n would rely "upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection." This m e a n t the United Nations. Further, the security alliance with the United States had been justified by the absence of an effective defense mechanism within the UN. T h e official and honest decision h a d b e e n that J a p a n would "deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements pending more effective functioning

of the United Nations

in t h e f u t u r e in d e t e r r i n g a n d

repelling such aggression." 5 0 T h e f u t u r e had now arrived. Such a f u n d a m e n t a l redirection of constitutional policy could not be d o n e in the relatively short time that it took the Persian Gulf crisis and ensuing war to finish. But such a redirection did not itself take much longer, and, given the many layers and complexity of constitutional interpretations, it was a remarkable shift. 5 1 T h e legal justification f o r sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in April 1991 was made in the customary way—within the existing consensual interpretations and going just a bit beyond. (The subsequent decision to send the JSDF to Cambodia u n d e r UN auspices was justified by legally altering the JSDF's authorizing legislation.) Minesweepers sent to the Persian Gulf, the government emphasized, were n o t going to a war zone. T h e war, after all, was over. Furthermore, the minesweepers would be operating in international waters. T h e mission of the flotilla was simply to clean up, to clear hazards to international navigation. It was thus a peaceful mission, c o n d u c t e d in international waters, in opposition to no nation and using no force.

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As for the extraordinary distance to which the J M S D F was deployed, the government pointed out that article 99 of the J S D F legislation prescribed minesweeping as one of the duties of the J M S D F without specifying any geographic limits. T h e JMSDF, sticking to its contingency plans made in 1987 and well practiced in its sensitivity to public opinion, did not allow helicopters to travel with the minesweepers. 5 2 By contrast, however, participating under the UN flag on the territory of a foreign nation (i.e., Cambodia) required more than new exercises of accepted interpretations: such a mission required new laws. Careful not to proceed too far beyond the accepted limits of article 9 yet entering into groundbreaking policy, the government crafted legislation that satisfied not only the Liberal Democratic Party and the party's breakaway members but as many of the opposition members as could be had. 5 3 (It was kept in mind that one attempt to pass such legislation had already failed miserably in the fall of 1990.) In this renewed attempt to maintain a broad consensus on the use of the JSDF, the 1992 legislation was on the surface cautious, but for the domestic legal and constitutional context quite understandable. The enabling legislation thus emphasized first that parties to a conflict had to have reached a cease-fire agreement. Second, the parties in conflict had to explicitly agree to both UN peacekeeping forces and Japanese forces operating on their territory—thus neither the UN nor the J S D F would be imposing a settlement on the conflict. Thus the J S D F would be strictly impartial. J S D F weaponry would be limited to "the minimum necessary to protect the lives" of J S D F personnel, meaning that the use of force could be contemplated only if self-defense became necessary. T h e only condition that allowed the Japanese government some degree of flexibility was one that said that if any of the other conditions ceased to be satisfied, the government "may withdraw its contingent." 5 4 In another concession to the opposition, a portion of the public, and the need for broad support, the JSDF's participation in UN operations would be limited for at least 5 years to rear-area activities: medical, sanitary, transport, engineering, and construction. T h e legislation passed with 329 in favor, 17 against, and 141 abstentions. Underlining both the caution and remarkable change in policy was the fact that important opposition parties changed long-held positions. T h e Socialist Party had opposed the new J S D F legislation— the peacekeeping operations bill—but soon j o i n e d the consensus, and compromised its position on the legality of the J S D F in order to participate in a new coalition government in 1993. A year later, when the Socialist Party (JSP) leader, Tomiichi Murayama, became prime minister, the party reversed virtually all of its positions on security

The Legal/Constitutional

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57

affairs. As prime minister, Murayama allowed JGSDF troops to go to Zaire and JASDF personnel to go to Kenya as part of a UN humanitarian mission following the genocide in Rwanda. Under Murayama's government preparations were also made to send JGSDF troops to the Golan Heights. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) also changed its position. This party was very effective in extracting concessions from the government, watering down the peacekeeping operations legislation and, perhaps inadvertently, broadening the legislation's appeal. 55 The question of participation in UN operations was now at least temporarily settled, but the question of collective security arrangements was not. All the same, a new debate had been opened and promised to lead to further evolution. As far back as 1961, Japan's ambassador to the UN had suggested that it was incongruous for Japan to sign the UN treaty and "refuse all participation in the UN armies." 56 Brought under pressure to resign, he was forced to retract his statement. By 1995, however, former Prime Minister Miyazawa had restated the proposition and was able to remain well within the new consensus: "Japan could not avoid its international responsibility to participate in the peacekeeping force." 5 7 Former Prime Minister Nakasone was at the same time pushing the limits of consensus in suggesting that article 9 be rewritten not so much as to allow the government complete discretionary use of the J S D F but to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the constitution: "Rather than leaving it the object of skepticism, the article should be revised in clear language to attain public consensus." Nakasone would let stand the first paragraph and replace the second to state "that Japan may possess armed defense forces to maintain Japan's independence and peace and contribute to UN-led international cooperation endeavors." 58

The Supreme Court: Not the Last Word The evolution of constitutional debate in Japan's postwar era was hardly unique. The process was broadly similar to constitutional evolution in the United States and elsewhere. What was perhaps different was the profile of the Japanese Supreme Court in shaping interpretations. In short, the court was consistently reluctant to resolve any part of the debate by fiat. The U.S. Supreme Court, it should be pointed out, had two branches of national government with which to contend. In the contest for power, the three-cornered competition always made temporary alliances of two of the three branches. When the U.S. Supreme Court would have a congressional majority or the executive on its

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side, it t h e n had m o r e latitude to decide policy. Conversely, the Court was historically reluctant to involve itself in matters where the executive o p i n i o n and the majority sentiment in Congress were in sympathy. This reluctance showed itself most especially in matters of security policy. 59 Japan's court had to c o n t e n d with only one institution consisting of a fused executive a n d legislature. 6 0 T h a t party leaders carefully constructed a n d g u a r d e d the consensus a r o u n d defense policy relieved the court of both the opportunity and the necessity to intervene and d e f i n e article 9 beyond merely ratifying the p o p u l a r consensus. T h a t party leaders took such pains to construct and maintain consensus demonstrated their unwillingness to yield the power to define this part of the constitution to a rival institution. Several landmark cases d e m o n s t r a t e d both the court's shyness a n d its ability to apply techniques of judicial self-restraint a n d d e m o n s t r a t e d as well the court's weakness in the face of a disciplined legislative majority and broad political consensus. 6 1 In the 1959 case Sakata v. Japan,62 the court had squarely ruled that J a p a n had an i n h e r e n t right as a sovereign nation to selfdefense. But the court avoided ruling on the constitutionality of the JSDF and f u r t h e r declined to define "war potential." 6 3 In 1973 a district court ruled in Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry v. Ito that the JSDF was unconstitutional. An appeals court set aside the lower court's decision 3 years later, ruling that article 9 clearly prohibited wars of aggression, but that the court, given the language of the article, was u n a b l e to d e t e r m i n e the constitutionality of the JSDF. W h e n the case was appealed again to the Supreme Court, the justices ruled in 1982 that the entire question was political, that the issue had to be settled by political organs, and that the plaintiffs had no standing in court. T h e t e c h n i q u e of self-restraint h e r e was the d o c t r i n e of political question employed likewise by the U.S. High Court when n e e d arose. 6 4 Japan's Supreme Court again employed the doctrine of political question in the Hyakuri Base case in 1989. T h e court supported two lower courts' decisions that the legality of the JSDF was a question to be decided by political organs and not the courts. Whether the JSDF had the war potential prohibited by the constitution was a j u d g m e n t "entrusted to the Diet, the body that legislated the two defense laws and . . . ultimately responsible to the people." 6 5 In sum, the evolutionary u n d e r s t a n d i n g and applications of article 9 were n o t dissimilar to the labyrinthine constitutional debates f o u n d in the United States. From a strictly constitutional/legal point of view, Japan's peculiar evolutionary understandings of key parts of its constitution were hardly unique, not even unusual, and certainly

The Legal/Constitutional

59

Conundrum

n o t d u p l i c i t o u s . In t h e e n d , t h e l e g a l / c o n s t i t u t i o n a l analysis sugg e s t e d several c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t d i f f e r e d f r o m t h o s e o f m a n y analysts a n d critics: J a p a n ' s constitutional

constraints were real a n d

not

m e r e l y a c o n v e n i e n t r e f u g e f r o m o t h e r m o r e difficult p o l i c y c h o i c e s . T h e i d e a l i s t i c s p i r i t o f a r t i c l e 9 was b r o a d l y p o p u l a r . T h e

mainte-

n a n c e o f a c o n s e n s u s a r o u n d t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a r t i c l e 9 was o f c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e in d o m e s t i c politics, a n d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h a t c o n s e n s u s f o r c e d c o n s t r a i n t s o n s u c c e s s i v e g o v e r n m e n t s . A n d all o f t h e a b o v e s e r v e d as a s t r o n g e x p l a n a t i o n f o r J a p a n ' s c o m m i t m e n t t o u n i l a t e r a l d e f e n s e a n d e x t r e m e c a u t i o n in b u i l d i n g a n d d e p l o y i n g military forces.

Notes 1. See, f o r e x a m p l e , the recurring a r g u m e n t that the Yoshida d o c t r i n e has driven postwar politics: that Prime Minister Yoshida purposely and single-mindedly evaded any foreign policy liabilities to accomplish the task o f e c o n o m i c rehabilitation t h r o u g h n e o m e r c a n t i l i s m . T h e most sensible and persuasive presentation o f this argument is made by Kenneth Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: American E n t e r p r i s e Institute Press, 1 9 9 6 ) . O t h e r s have taken the a r g u m e n t to the point o f malicious conspiracy. 2. In the case o f J a p a n , the executive and legislature are fused as in Britain and Germany. 3. Article 81 o f the constitution o f J a p a n states: " T h e S u p r e m e Court is the court o f last resort with power to d e t e r m i n e the constitutionality o f any law, order, regulation or official act." For a comparative view see H e n r y J . A b r a h a m , The Judicial Process, 7th ed. (New York: O x f o r d University Press, 1 9 9 8 ) , ch. 7. 4. T h a t elites and d e m o c r a c y are n o t antithetical to o n e a n o t h e r is an old idea and still persuasive. See, f o r example, T h o m a s R. Dye and H a r m o n Zeigler, The Irony ojDemocracy, 10th ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1 9 9 6 ) . 5. T h e r e are claims to the contrary such as Ray A. M o o r e , "Reflections on the O c c u p a t i o n o f J a p a n , " Journal of Asian Studies 38 (August 1 9 7 9 ) , but see m o r e convincing accounts such as R o b e r t E. Ward, " T h e Origins o f the Present J a p a n e s e Constitution," American Political Science Review 50 (Decemb e r 1 9 5 6 ) ; T h e o d o r e McNelly, " T h e J a p a n e s e Constitution: Child o f the Cold War," Political Science Quarterly (June 1 9 5 9 ) . 6. Shidehara had originally appointed Prince K o n o e to draft the constitution. K o n o e was well known by the conservatives, and his sympathies had b e e n openly American before World War II. Konoe, however, had also b e e n prime minister b e f o r e the war, and there was great pressure to try him as a war criminal. He subsequently c o m m i t t e d suicide. 7. MacArthur's i n f l u e n c e was especially r e m a r k e d u p o n by the early postwar historians such as Katsuo Okazaki who claimed "in m o r e than 2 0 0 0 years o f J a p a n e s e history, n o o t h e r f o r e i g n e r has ever so profoundly affected J a p a n " in Contemporary Japan ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 4 ) . 8. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1 9 6 4 ) , pp. 309-310.

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9. Professor Kenzo Takayanagi, who chaired the J a p a n e s e government's commission to investigate the origins o f the constitution, c o n c l u d e d that Prime Minister S h i d e h a r a suggested the idea to MacArthur and n o t vice versa: "Some Reminiscences o f J a p a n ' s Commission on the Constitution" in Dan F e n n o H e n d e r s o n , ed., The Constitution of Japan: Its First Twenty Years, 1947-1967 (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 7 1 - 8 8 . General MacArthur (Reminiscences, p. 3 0 3 ) also claimed in his memoirs that the suggestion came from Shidehara. 10. See Pyle, Japanese Question, who spins out this a r g u m e n t well, pp. 8 - 9 ; T h e o d o r e McNelly, "General Douglas MacArthur and the Constitutional D i s a r m a m e n t o f J a p a n , " Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, ser. 3, 17 ( 1 9 8 2 ) : p. 37. 11. Q u o t e d by Charles L. Kades, who was deputy c h i e f o f the Governm e n t Section, G e n e r a l Headquarters, S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r f o r the Allied Powers, in " T h e American Role in Revising J a p a n ' s Imperial Constitution," Political Science Quarterly 104, 2 ( S u m m e r 1 9 8 9 ) : p. 2 2 4 . Note that the first draft also reflects the official postsurrender policy for J a p a n "to insure that J a p a n will not again b e c o m e a m e n a c e to the U n i t e d States or the peace and security o f the world." 12. See Kazuyuki Takahashi, " C o m m e n t , " Law and Contemporary Problems 53, 2 (Spring 1 9 9 0 ) : pp. 1 8 9 - 1 9 2 ; T h e o d o r e McNelly, " T h e Renunciation o f War in the J a p a n e s e Constitution," Armed Forces and Society 13 (Fall 1 9 8 6 ) . 13. T h e U.S. Senate had even a m e n d e d the Kellog-Briand Pact to allow an attacked nation to defend itself. 14. Kades, "American Role," p. 236. 15. MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 304. 16. Kades, "American R o l e , " p. 2 3 7 . T h e s e were known as the Ashida a m e n d m e n t s after Hitoshi Ashida, who was chair o f a c o m m i t t e e o f seventy m e m b e r s o f the J a p a n e s e House o f Representatives a p p o i n t e d in late J u n e 1 9 4 6 to consider a m e n d m e n t s to the draft constitution. 17. Minutes o f the p r o c e e d i n g s in the J a p a n e s e House o f Representatives, Official Gazette Extra & (27 J u n e 1 9 4 6 ) , 4 (col. 1); cited in ibid. 18. Pyle, Japanese Question, p. 11. 19. Article 51 o f the UN Charter declares: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the i n h e r e n t right o f individual or collective self-defense if an a r m e d attack occurs against a M e m b e r o f the U n i t e d Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and security." 20. T h i r d paragraph o f the preamble to the Security Treaty Between the United States and J a p a n , 8 S e p t e m b e r 1951. 21. Akihiko Tanaka, " T h e Domestic Context: J a p a n e s e Politics and UN P e a c e k e e p i n g , " in Selig G. Harrison and Masashi Nishihara, eds., UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: C a r n e g i e Endowment for International Peace, 1 9 9 5 ) , pp. 8 9 - 9 0 . 22. Shigeru Kozai, Kokuren no heiwa iji katsudo (Tokyo: Yukikaku, 1 9 9 1 ) , pp. 4 7 8 - 4 8 7 ; r e c o u n t e d in ibid. 23. J a p a n e s e Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: J a p a n e s e Defense Agency, 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 34. 24. See Tetsuya Kataoka, The Price of a Constitution (New York: Crane Russak, 1 9 9 1 ) , ch. 9. 25. As with the U.S. Constitution, a contemporary understanding c a n n o t c o m e with a literal reading or an investigation o f original intent.

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26. A g o o d a c c o u n t is given by M i c h a e l B a r n h a r t , Japan and the World Since 1868 ( L o n d o n : Edward A r n o l d , 1995), p p . 158-165. 27. Article I, p a r a g r a p h 1 of t h e Security Treaty Between t h e U n i t e d States a n d J a p a n said t h a t U.S. f o r c e s c o u l d "at t h e e x p r e s s r e q u e s t of t h e J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t . . . p u t d o w n large-scale i n t e r n a l riots a n d disturb a n c e s in J a p a n , caused t h r o u g h instigation a n d i n t e r v e n t i o n by a n o u t s i d e Power or Powers." 28. See Treaties and Alliances of the World: An International Survey Covering Treaties in Force and Communities of States (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), ch. 14; or Treaties in Force (Washington, D.C.: D e p a r t m e n t of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, 1970), p a r t I. 29. "Each party recognizes t h a t a n a r m e d attack against e i t h e r Party in t h e territories u n d e r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of J a p a n would be d a n g e r o u s to its own peace a n d safety a n d declares that it would act to m e e t the c o m m o n dang e r in a c c o r d a n c e with its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision a n d processes." Treaty of M u t u a l C o o p e r a t i o n a n d Security Between t h e U n i t e d States a n d J a p a n , 1960. 30. T h e 1951 Treaty of P e a c e with J a p a n h a d p u t a l m o s t t h e e n t i r e Ryukyu Island c h a i n u n d e r t h e administrative c o n t r o l of the U n i t e d States. Only 2 years later the U n i t e d States r e t u r n e d c o n t r o l of the A m a m i Islands, j u s t n o r t h of Okinawa, to J a p a n . In 1968 t h e U n i t e d States r e t u r n e d m o s t of t h e r e m a i n i n g islands save Okinawa. T h e U n i t e d States r e l i n q u i s h e d t h e administration of Okinawa in 1970. 31. Largely b e c a u s e of this violence P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r ' s visit was canceled. 32. O n e m i g h t be t e m p t e d to say t h a t t h e r e is a u n i q u e J a p a n e s e or orie n t a l logic b e h i n d each of these rules, b u t o n e n e e d n o t go far to f i n d similar e x a m p l e s of c o m p l i c a t e d f o r m a l a n d i n f o r m a l rules g o v e r n i n g p a r t i c u larly sensitive political issues in the U n i t e d States: affirmative action, sexual h a r a s s m e n t , o r school d e s e g r e g a t i o n are g o o d examples. 33. T h e r u l e in q u e s t i o n h e r e was s e c t i o n 21, article 5 of t h e D e f e n s e Agency E s t a b l i s h m e n t Law. 34. J a m e s Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971 (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 121. 35. H i d e o Sekino, "Japan a n d H e r Maritime Defense," U.S. Naval Instit u t e Proceedings, May 1971, p. 119; J a m e s Auer, "Japan's M a r i t i m e SelfD e f e n s e Force: An A p p r o p r i a t e Maritime Strategy," Naval War College Review XXIV ( D e c e m b e r 1971): p p . 3 - 2 0 . 36. Japan Times, 11 N o v e m b e r 1981, p. 1. 37. Masashi Nishihara, "Prospects f o r J a p a n ' s D e f e n c e S t r e n g t h a n d Int e r n a t i o n a l Security Role," in T. Stuart Douglas, ed., Security Within the Pacific Rim (Aldershot, E n g l a n d : Gower, 1987), p. 43. But see also P r i m e Minister N a k a s o n e ' s early allusions to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s r e p o r t e d in Asahi Shimbun, m o r n i n g edition, 5 February, 10 M a r c h , 25 M a r c h , a n d 19 April 1983. 38. "Gulf C o o p e r a t i o n Mission Q u e s t i o n e d , " Japan Times, Weekly Intern a t i o n a l Edition, 1 8 - 2 4 N o v e m b e r 1991, p. 3. This a c c o u n t a p p e a r e d sometime a f t e r the transaction a n d thus criticism was d a m p e n e d . 39. J a p a n e s e D e f e n s e Agency, Defense of Japan. 40. See Hartwig H u m m e l , The Policy of Arms Export Restrictions in Japan, O c c a s i o n a l P a p e r s Series N u m b e r 4 (Tokyo: I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e R e s e a r c h Institute Meigaku, 1988), p p . 8, 2 3 - 2 6 ; R e i n h a r d Drifte, Arms Production in Japan (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986).

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41. The implications were hardly overlooked by the press. See, inter alia "Son of Toshiba," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 September 1991, pp. 10-11; "Missile Parts Probe Shadows of Japan's Arms Sales Policies," Pacific Stars and Stripes, 16 July 1991, p. 7. 42. Japan's 1991 white paper on overseas development assistance for the first time tied aid to political values. See also "Tokyo to Link Aid More Closely to Politics," Japan Times, Weekly International Edition, 14-20 October 1991, p. 3; Kenneth Pyle, "Japan's Pacific Overtures," The American Enterprise (November/December 1991): pp. 29-37; "Questions Fly at LDP Plan to Link ODA to Arms," Japan Times, Weekly International Edition, 18-24 March 1991, p. 3; "New Aid Policy Emphasizes Markets, Demilitarization, Democracy & Environment," Weekly Japan Digest, 6 July 1992, p. 14. 43. James Auer interview with Takutaro Kimura (17 December 1970) cited in "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force 'Forever' to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World," Law and Contemporary Problems 53, 2 (Spring 1990): p. 177. 44. Kazuyuki Takahashi, "Comment." 45. For example, the Takatsuki class destroyers carried two quadruple surface-to-surface (SSM) Harpoon launchers and an octuple launcher for Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); Tachikaze class destroyers carried Pomona Standard SAMs and Harpoons SSMs; and Shirane class destroyers carried SAMs but no Harpoons. 46. The USS Midway was not technically homeported in Yokosuka but was on "extended deployment" with the Seventh Fleet. 47. Japan's first Osumi class LST (landing ship, tank), which became operational in 1998, had a flight deck large enough to carry both medium- and heavy-lift helicopters. 48. Auer, Postwar Rearmament, pp. 246-251. 49. A. Kyoshitsu, Self-Defense Strength of Japan (1967) p. 182, quoted in Auer, "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution," pp. 179-180. 50. Japanese Defense Agency, Defense of Japan; emphasis added. 51. Seejiro Yamaguchi, "The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics," Journal oj Japanese Studies 18 (Winter): pp. 55-172. 52. Such a prohibition was probably not necessary for the public's sake but was an extra and respectable precaution against a public backlash. Without helicopters the minesweepers were hampered insofar as the helicopters were meant to scout ahead of the vessels for shallow mines. But not having helicopters also forced the Japanese flotilla to rely more heavily on allied, especially U.S., vessels. 53. T. Yamauchi, "Gunning for Japan's Peace Constitution," Japan Quarterly 39 (April/June 1992): pp. 159-167. 54. Diplomatic Bluebook 1992 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992), p. 53. 55. See Japan Times, Weekly International Edition, 29 October 1990, p. 1; 11 March 1991, p. 7; 23-29 March 1992, p. 3. 56. Tanaka, "Domestic Context," p. 90. 57. Kiichi Miyazawa, "Rethinking the Constitution—A Document Tested by Time," Japan Quarterly 44, 3 (July-September 1997): p. 13. 58. Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Rethinking the Constitution—Make It a Japanese Document," ibid., p. 7. For an elaborate mapping of the position of other elected officials see "Politicians Classified on Constitutional Revision," FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 29 December 1995.

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59. See, as examples, U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Hirabayashi v. United States (1943), Dennis v. United States (1951), and Duncan v. Kahanamoku (1946). In Hirabayashi, the Court avoided ruling on the legality of requiring Japanese Americans to report to detention camps. In Dennis, the Court managed to escape the f u n d a m e n t a l question of whether the C o m m u n i s t Party was a clear a n d present d a n g e r to national security. In Duncan, the Court decided that Mr. D u n c a n h a d b e e n improperly convicted by a military c o u r t in wartime Hawaii but cannily waited until after the war to make its ruling. 60. For an e x a m i n a t i o n of article 9, the balance of powers in J a p a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t , a n d a comparison with the U n i t e d States, see Kendrick F. Royer, "The Demise of the World's First Pacifist Constitution: Japanese Constitutional Interpretation a n d the Growth of Executive Power to Make War," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 26 (November 1993): pp. 749-801. 61. T h e seminal article is by t h e late J o h n P. Roche, "Judicial SelfRestraint," American Political Science Review (September 1955): pp. 762-772. Roche points out that "the power of the [U.S.] S u p r e m e Court to invade the decision-making a r e n a . . . is a consequence of that fragmentation of political power which is n o r m a l in the United States. No cohesive majority, such as normally exists in Britain, would p e r m i t a politically irresponsible j u d i ciary to usurp decision-making functions, but . . . there are few issues in the United States on which cohesive majorities exist." 62. Also known as the Sunakawa case, in which defendants justified their i n t e r f e r e n c e on a U.S. air base by claiming that t h e U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty was unconstitutional. 63. T h e case is typically cited as the first in which the doctrine of political question was invoked (see below). T h e particular t e c h n i q u e of selfrestraint, however, is more akin to judicial parsimony, using as few principles as possible to resolve the case a n d laying o t h e r questions conveniently aside. Roche, "Judicial Self-Restraint," p. 768. 64. Roche writes: "A juridical definition of the term is impossible, for at root the logic that supports it is circular: political questions are matters not soluble by the judicial process; matters not soluble by the judicial process are political questions." See also the work by a f o r m e r chief justice of the S u p r e m e Court of J a p a n , Kisaburo Yokota, "Political Questions a n d Judicial Review: A Comparison," in Dan F e n n o H e n d e r s o n , ed., The Constitution of Japan, pp. 141-166. 65. Q u o t e d in Auer, "Article Nine of J a p a n ' s Constitution," p. 183.

4 The Pulling and Hauling of Sea-Lane Defense1

Some 50 years ago Japan's imperial navy had been completely defeated in war, and what was left of it had been by and large dismantled or blown up or sold for scrap. At the end of the twentieth century Japan has the strongest navy in the Pacific Ocean excepting that of the United States. How did this remarkable state of affairs come about? It was not the result of a conspiracy of Japanese militarists or nationalists. Nor was it a conspiracy of the United States to rearm an anticommunist ally. And it was not the result of some innate martial spirit in Japanese culture that irrepressibly made itself manifest. It was the result of political considerations on both sides of the Pacific. That Japan's maritime forces are so remarkably rehabilitated at the end of the century is the result first of the "pulling and hauling that is politics" in Japan. 2 It is, second, the result of the pulling and hauling in other important countries and between countries that is international relations. These politics abroad produced results remarkable in themselves and far beyond the power of J a p a n — o r the United States—to control and in some instances even to predict. This chapter reflects upon Japan's commitment to help defend 1,000 miles of sea-lanes radiating from Tokyo as well as upon the politics of that commitment and the peculiar results. Japan's public pledge in the early 1980s to undertake the defense o f sea-lanes within 1,000 miles of Honshu, its main island, illuminated several important arenas of political maneuvering. First, the JMSDF, JDA planners, assorted bureaucrats, and various elected officials argued over the selection of this defense commitment, fought for resources to be invested in the appropriate naval assets, and only slowly came to fulfilling the commitment. In another arena there was the international pull and tug between Washington and Tokyo punctuated by misunderstandings and disagreements over the creation, the timing, and.

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the definition of the commitment. The third arena was in the change and turmoil in the Soviet Union as well as the post-Maoist policies of China that had the eventual effect of magnifying the successful buildup of the Japanese maritime forces. Among the most important political actors then in the saga of sea-lane defense were Prime Ministers Suzuki and Nakasone, and U.S. President Reagan. There were of course many other key players at various bureaucratic vantage points and levels in Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. This chapter also considers the result of those politics: a tremendous shift in naval power in the western Pacific in the 1990s that was largely unanticipated and unremarked upon. The shift was in large part attributable to the demise of the Soviet navy: because the huge Pacific fleet of the former Soviet Union had deteriorated, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force became at the end of the century the most consequential navy of the western Pacific—excepting again that of the United States.

Genesis of Sea-Lane Defense It was in the late 1960s that the notion of extending the range of Japan's maritime defense began to take root in both the United States and Japan. The Japanese economy had been rehabilitated; the U.S. economy was showing signs of relative decline. Moreover, the United States was straining under fiscal and monetary pressures: the Vietnam War squeezed the budget as did new entitlement programs, and inflation was picking up speed. Americans had not yet extricated themselves from the morass that Vietnam had become. There was worry among U.S. and European defense planners that the United States was overcommitted in foreign affairs and perhaps dangerously overextended in military obligations. To get more bang for fewer U.S. bucks, defense planners wanted a greater security contribution from Japan. Thus, a communiqué issued in 1969 by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato stated that "Japan would make further active contributions to peace and prosperity in Asia." 3 And, responding to a war-weary American public, President Nixon emphasized that the noncommunist countries in Asia long under the protective umbrella of the United States "were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area." 4 While neither Prime Minister Sato nor President Nixon identified specific activities and efforts, they had gently broached the idea of more equitable burden sharing, and the notion would be discussed quietly in back channels for years to come. In public the debate was a different story—especially as reflected by the U.S. Congress.

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For many editors, politicians, and interest groups in the United States, a greater defense effort f r o m J a p a n was measured in terms of the money J a p a n spent on defense and n o t in terms of what role J a p a n played in the alliance. Japan's defense spending was sometimes p r e s e n t e d as a percentage of GNP and sometimes presented as percentage increases over the previous year's budget. It was often comp a r e d with the e n o r m o u s a m o u n t s the U n i t e d States spent on defense and sometimes with how m u c h the E u r o p e a n allies spent. J a p a n e s e a n d U.S. defense s p e n d i n g a m o u n t s were j u s t as o f t e n superficially c o m p a r e d with and, by implication, linked to unemploym e n t rates, poverty rates, f u n d i n g for education, deficit spending, inflation, growth in GNP, trade deficits, and a host of social statistics and problems. Framed in these ways, the a r g u m e n t over J a p a n ' s defense contribution was m o r e often a b o u t J a p a n ' s goodwill or ill will than it was a rational evaluation of what defense role J a p a n could play within the alliance. At root m u c h of the criticism was a defense of or an excuse for pet policy proposals of all kinds: more or less defense spending, education f u n d i n g , nontariff trade barriers, tax reform, or deregulation. T h e haggling over J a p a n ' s defense policies n o t only began to mirror the dickering over trade issues but was in part an outgrowth of those economic issues. T h e debate grew m o r e and more distasteful, if n o t rancorous, over the next decade. By 1980, President Carter's secretary of defense, Harold Brown, was openly criticizing J a p a n , calling a 7.6 p e r c e n t increase in Japan's defense b u d g e t "so modest that it conveys a sense of complacency that is n o t justified by the facts." 5 T h e U.S. State D e p a r t m e n t was a little less emotional, saying that the Japanese decision not to increase defense spending even m o r e than 7.6 p e r c e n t "must be considered disappointing, whether one measures these defense spending figures against the target set by Japanese defense officials earlier this year, or against the requirements of equity in distributing the b u r d e n s of mutual security a m o n g the advanced industrial democracies." 6 But what was wanting m o r e than carping was a program or strategic design to justify significantly more defense spending in J a p a n . And something had come up. Sometime before the U.S. defense secretary's fit of pique, a few defense analysts h a d recognized the advantage in giving J a p a n n o t j u s t an ultimatum to increase defense spending but a role to justify that spending. A strategic goal would n o t only give direction and p u r p o s e to s p e n d i n g but, m o r e i m p o r t a n t , it could be a c o h e r e n t policy to c o m p l e m e n t U.S. strategy, needs, and limitations. That role could be sea-lane defense in the northwest Pacific. 7 O n the J a p a n e s e side, the idea of sea-lane defense was publicly aired in the early 1970s by Hideo Sekino, a respected f o r m e r officer of the imperial navy. Sekino suggested that Japan's defense priorities

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be r e o r d e r e d so that "the protection of the sea communications of J a p a n should be given first priority in the national defense of J a p a n , and the prevention of direct invasion of J a p a n should be m a d e the secondary f u n c t i o n of the maritime defense force of Japan." 8 According to Sekino, a guerre de course was the most likely kind of conflict in the western Pacific, not an all-out Soviet assault on the Japanese archipelago, and in such a case "Japan must at least secure the sea communications n o r t h of Indonesia on her own." 9 Sekino's idea made strategic sense. With the Soviets maintaining three fronts, in Europe, Central Asia, and East Asia, and with the Soviet leader, Brezhnev, engaging the Americans in the diplomacy of détente, it was increasingly difficult to imagine u n d e r what circumstances the Soviet empire would attempt a direct assault on Japanese territory. If stability gave way to war somewhere in Asia, it would more likely be a sporadic, sometimes measured b u t confusing affair a r o u n d the fringes of national territories and an indirect rather than direct assault. Sekino's a r g u m e n t also made political sense. Spending more and m o r e money on the JGSDF to practice a conventional defense of Hokkaido was hardly an attractive option for those exposed to electoral accountability. Expanding the JASDF or JMSDF without a definite p u r p o s e or without a clear strategic framework would be domestically u n p o p u l a r a n d justifiably invite international criticism. But expanding the maritime forces within the framework of the U.S.Japanese alliance, and with a definite strategic purpose that was complementary to regional stability, was politically viable: factions in the Liberal Democratic Party would be happy to embrace it, the U.S. Dep a r t m e n t of Defense would s u p p o r t it, a n d the internationalists in business and politics in both countries would see the sense of it. If Sekino's a r g u m e n t lacked any concrete example of Japan's potential vulnerability in its sea lines of communication, this was compensated by the oil embargo that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. J a p a n imported virtually all of its oil as well as its mineral ores. J a p a n had become the world's n u m b e r o n e i m p o r t e r of twenty d i f f e r e n t categories of primary goods. As one Japanese observer put it, "The fatal weakness of J a p a n is in its poor resource endowments." 1 0 Sekino was not without detractors. Chief a m o n g these was Osamu Kaihara, a long-time m e m b e r and f o r m e r h e a d of the Defense Bureau, a unit within the civilian-run JDA. Kaihara and others argued that securing sea lines of communication could be nothing but an illusory goal. Those lines were innumerable and extended all over the Pacific and Indian Oceans. T h e "lines" themselves really were not fixed corridors that could be defended as if they were territory, and

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much o f these notional lines were geographically well beyond what could be justified as within J a p a n ' s constitutional right to self-defense. Moreover, defending sea-lanes meant defense against the Soviet Union's huge surface navy and stealthy nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Such a defense strategy was therefore infeasible given the limited resources o f the JMSDF, the enormity of the task being proposed, and the limited public support for such an undertaking. 1 1 Kaihara called the J M S D F ' s sea-lane defense an unrealistic dream, while Sekino's supporters asserted that to ignore such a defense was unrealistic. 1 2 In the final accounting, however, the J M S D F had some things that its opponents in the Defense Bureau did not: a long-range vision, a definite organizational p r e f e r e n c e for that vision, earnest allies in the Liberal Democratic Party and i m p o r t a n t business leaders, a government that at least did not quash the plan but kept the option o p e n , 1 3 and a geopolitical situation in which sealane defense b e c a m e attractive to J a p a n ' s ally. Ironically, both the Sekino vision and the Kaihara vision maintained a great deal o f relevance at the end o f the Cold War some 25 years later. For one, a guerre de course b e c a m e the most likely kind of naval action in the post-Cold War era. Second, while, as Kaihara suggested, a defense against the Soviet navy was probably a nearimpossible task, the disintegration o f the Soviet government and a neglected p o s t - C o l d War Russian navy helped a great deal to make an unrealistic dream far m o r e realistic. Yet even in the 1970s Sekino was partially vindicated. By 1971 the J M S D F had acquired 38 destroyers and frigates as c o m p a r e d with the U.S. Seventh Fleet's 44. T h e J M S D F also had a total o f 180 maritime aircraft, primarily for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and reconnaissance. 1 4 T h e rub was that the J M S D F had "one small tanker as almost its sole vehicle o f at sea refueling." 1 5 But the National Defense Program Outline o f 1976 called for J a p a n to have 60 ASW ships, 16 submarines, 2 minesweeping flotillas, and 16 ASW squadrons supplemented by 2 2 0 aircraft. 1 6 And in 1 9 7 9 the J M S D F put into service a new fleet oiler and p l a n n e d an additional 3 fleet replenishment ships. T h e sea-lane defense plan was making headway: both the oilers and the refueling skills were prerequisites o f deepwater operations and sea-lane defense. An experienced U.S. observer had already asserted that "Japanese ships . . . show good skill at fueling at sea when exercising with U.S. support vessels; and it could be that in an emergency situation . . . J a p a n ' s m e r c h a n t fleet could be used in support of the MSDF's front line units." 1 7 T h e notion of sea-lane defense grew more realistic and attracted m o r e public attention as the J M S D F gained in quantity and quality.

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In 1977 the director general of the JDA, responding to questions about the ability of Japan to protect shipping in the Strait of Malacca, said that the JSDF were "ready to exercise the right of selfdefense generally within 500 miles from its coasts and in important sea-lanes within 1,000 miles," specifically near Saipan and Taiwan. 18 Thus the stage was set for an agreement on what role Japan's defense forces should play to ameliorate the argument over how much money Japan spent on defense.

Political and Operational Convergence In 1981 the Americans and Japanese began to converge on an agreement—alternately quietly discussed and publicly urged—where Japan would commit to sea-lane defense far beyond its territorial waters and allow U.S. naval forces to concentrate on other roles and other areas of the Pacific. 1 9 The new Reagan administration and its deputies in the Department of Defense eagerly embraced the idea of sea-lane defense, urging it on the JMSDF, the JDA, and the Japanese government. Japan's political leaders were, it seemed, ready to accept it. When Prime Minister Suzuki came to the United States to meet with the new U.S. president in 1981, he declared that some new "division of roles" between Japan and the United States in the northwest Pacific was desirable and that Japan would "seek to make even greater efforts for improving its defense capabilities in Japanese territories and in its surrounding seas and air space." 2 0 Subsequently, commentators on Japan's sea-lane defense identified 1981 as the year in which Japan officially made the sea-lane defense commitment (see Table 4.1 for a sea-lane defense chronology). In politics, however, things are not that simple. The waters of sea-lane defense were muddy. The Americans and Japanese began disputing the context and meaning of Suzuki's remarks made in English on his visit to the United States. Americans seized upon the prime minister's remarks as an official and immediate commitment to sea-lane defense, but Suzuki himself denied even the following year that any concrete commitment had been made. The prime minister, when confronted by Communist and Socialist Party questioners before the Budget Committee of the House of Councilors, swore off the pledge completely. 21 A few months later he was still hedging: "Strict constraints should be imposed on such sealane operations . . . if such defense operations are to be carried out." 2 2 Since the idea had been made public, public opposition to sea-lane defense bubbled to the surface. Most of the opposition parties were, as a matter of course, opposed to the extension of both defense

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Table 4.1 Chronology of Sea-Lane Defense 1969 1970-71 1973 1978 1976 1979 1981 1982 1983

1991

Nixon-Sato communiqué calls for shared defense burden. Sekino and Auer publish ideas for sea-lane defense. Arab-Israeli war; first oil embargo. Iranian revolution: oil embargo and shock. National Defense Program Outline calls for increase in ASW ships, submarines, and aircraft. New fleet oiler comes into service; three fleet replenishment ships planned. Prime Minister Suzuki visits United States, calls for new "division of roles" for United States and Japan in northwest Pacific and states that defending sea-lanes to 1,000 miles is Japan's new policy. Nakasone becomes prime minister. U.S.Japanese study group formed to plan joint operations for sea-lane defense. Nakasone cabinet exempts United States from prohibition on export of defense technology and vows to spend more than 1 percent of GNP on defense. Soviet Union dissolved.

lines and cooperation with the United States. 23 It was n o t until 1983, after the f o r m e r director general of the JDA, Nakasone, b e c a m e prime minister, that a formal decisionmaking g r o u p u n d e r t o o k a study of the new policy, and it was n o t until 1984 that the policy was incorporated into the five-year defense plan. With the Cold War still on, the opposition was not going to defeat the majority Liberal Democratic Party, and the Nakasone faction in the party was squarely for sea-lane defense. Meanwhile, the confusion over Suzuki's remarks made it possible for clouds of suspicion and d o u b t in U.S.-Japanese relations to f o r m over the question of w h e t h e r or n o t J a p a n ' s gove r n m e n t really m e a n t what it said. Many on the U.S. side concluded that the policy of sea-lane defense was hollow—a c o m m i t m e n t e m b r a c e d to placate the U n i t e d States b u t somewhat fanciful, given what they saw as an i n a d e q u a t e n u m b e r of ships, submarines, and maritime aircraft. Such a conclusion was n o t difficult to reach given the e n o r m o u s tonnage and app a r e n t sophistication of the Soviet navy, especially when c o m b i n e d with its arsenal of both nuclear weapons a n d land-based Backfire bombers. O n e observer concluded in 1981 that "there is no evidence that J a p a n has e m b a r k e d on a p r o g r a m to militarily secure h e r sealanes." 2 4 In 1984, an International Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic Survey concluded that "Nakasone's rhetoric was o u t r u n n i n g reality" and that "the MSDF is simply n o t in a position to assume responsibility for sealane defence out to a 1,000 mile limit, and probably could not be in such a position in u n d e r a decade at least, assuming this responsibility would r e q u i r e a m a j o r re-equipment programme." 2 5 In 1985, a n o t h e r analyst concluded for the Naval War

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College Review that "there exists a significant chasm between the political c o m m i t m e n t to adopt such a policy and the reality of J a p a n ' s efforts to attain the necessary capability." 26 O t h e r analysts r e a c h e d similar conclusions. 2 7 (See Map 4.1.) In fact few U.S. or J a p a n e s e analysts h a d an easy time j u d g i n g Japan's potential for sea-lane defense. From the beginning there had b e e n m u c h confusion over what this exactly m e a n t . Were sea-lanes straight lines, for example, between Tokyo and Guam and f r o m the Strait of Taiwan to Osaka? 28 O r were sea-lanes on a plane, such as the seas between Guam and the Philippines, all of which were to be m a d e defensible? Did sea-lanes m e a n surface a n d u n d e r w a t e r warfare or did they include the air space as well? O r again, did sea-lane protection m e a n the most i m p o r t a n t lanes that h a p p e n e d to be within 1,000 miles: the straits a r o u n d J a p a n and high-traffic areas app r o a c h i n g Taiwan? Did it m e a n the ability to organize a n d protect convoys or did it mean dominating all m e r c h a n t and naval activities within 1,000 miles? Did sea-lane defense imply a traditional guerre de course of sporadic attacks that might be d e f e a t e d by convoy protection? O r did it m e a n defense against an onslaught by Soviet naval, air, and amphibious forces in East Asia? T h e r e were n o easy answers. These were m o r e political questions than operational or tactical ones. Defense analysis aside then, the question of J a p a n ' s commitm e n t to sea-lane defense lay obscured in the fog of U.S.-Japanese relations. In part, the Americans' suspicion of Japan's c o m m i t m e n t carried over f r o m the battle of the late 1970s to increase J a p a n ' s defense spending. T h e J a p a n monitors in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere c o n t i n u e d to evaluate J a p a n ' s defense contribution in terms of money spent. In addition, Prime Minister Suzuki's alternately careful a n d wavering responses in 1981 a n d 1982 e n c o u r a g e d skepticism. But also, in part, U.S. expectations had r u n well a h e a d of J a p a n e s e planning. Many on the U.S. side had taken Suzuki's 1981 statement to be an immediate reality. But U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, as insistent as he had b e e n , actually had asked only that J a p a n make the commitment to acquire the capability. Thus the comm i t m e n t had been a c o m m i t m e n t to a goal. T h e goal, the secretary of defense suggested, should be attained within a decade: that would be 1991. In the time between Prime Minister Suzuki's public suggestion that sea-lane defense was desirable and Prime Minister Nakasone's move to cement it as official policy, the JMSDF had embarked u p o n an extensive u p g r a d e p r o g r a m for its long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft. T h e program included the acquisition of a n o t h e r forty P-3Cs as well as a new class of destroyers with guided missiles. In

Map 4.1

1,000 Miles from Tokyo

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addition, the JMSDF undertook an extensive modernization program that added Harpoon and Sea Sparrow missile systems as well as closein weapons systems to existing destroyers and frigates. In March 1983 a U.S.-Japanese study group began to plan joint operations for sea-lane defense. 29 By the end of September the JMSDF and U.S. Navy had conducted a joint exercise for the "mock defense of Japanese trade routes." 30 The JMSDF also joined the annual RIMPAC exercises with the U.S. Pacific Fleet in 1980, committing two destroyers, or escort ships as they were euphemistically called. Thereafter, the JMSDF's participation in RIMPAC steadily grew. By 1984 the JMSDF contribution included four destroyers, eight ASW aircraft, and a flag officer. 31 In 1985, Jane's Fighting Ships said of the JMSDF that "this is a growing force which has improved greatly not only in numbers but in modernity over the last ten years."32 The Asian Defense Journal hailed the JMSDF destroyer fleet as "one of the most modern in the world."33 The U.S. Seventh Fleet had actually been trimmed down and now had a total of twenty frigates, destroyers, and cruisers, while the JMSDF had thirty-one active destroyers, with eight more building, and eighteen frigates. As the decade wore on, and even as the Soviet threat receded, the operationalization of sea-lane defense advanced. The JMSDF improvement was in both relative and absolute terms: Japan hardly drew down its military spending or development plans even as the Soviet Union, as it later turned out, was crumbling, not restructuring. 34 The decade of improvement culminated in 1990 in construction starts for Aegisequipped destroyers. The JMSDF was the only U.S. ally navy to buy the most expensive and effective fleet air defense system of its time. In the end a number a political trends had converged. The JMSDF's sea-lane defense plan had won enough support in Japan, and the JMSDF had gradually built up its blue-water capabilities. The United States embraced the new naval role for its Pacific ally, was slowly drawing down forces in the western Pacific, and was concerned more and more with the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf than with the northwest Pacific. The Soviet Union, en route to restructuring, fell apart.

A Peculiar Resultant: A New Naval Equation in the Pacific Despite the often voiced doubts of policy and defense analysts, Japan fulfilled its political and strategic commitment to acquire the capability to defend 1,000 miles of sea-lanes. Judging by the steady improvement of the JMSDF from 1970 to 1990, sea-lane defense was never a hollow promise. Judging by both absolute and relative improvements

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in the J M S D F after 1990, the plan probably well e x c e e d e d any expectations. Naval forces in the Pacific changed remarkably in the 1990s. For the JMSDF, improvements had a low profile, and change was incremental but substantial. F o r the Russian fleet, c h a n g e was dramatic and rapid—though analysts were never certain quite how much the Russian Pacific fleet had deteriorated. Meanwhile, the United States gradually reduced its naval forces in the Pacific. O t h e r smaller, regional navies, such as that o f the People's Republic o f China, grew somewhat in stature if not in reality. In sum, J a p a n ' s J M S D F was in a much improved position in absolute terms, and even m o r e so in relative terms. Russia and the Pacific Fleet T h e most significant c h a n g e in Pacific seapower was the deterioration o f Russia's Pacific fleet, the successor to the much feared Soviet navy. T h e ironic twist was that, however important the changes were in Russia's Pacific fleet, they were little talked about at the time. Perhaps this was because little was known of the new Russian navy's actual capabilities. Consequently, Russia's Pacific fleet continued to be regarded with respect. Published compilations o f tonnage, weapon systems, and combatant ships continued to reflect the superiority of the Soviet Pacific fleet of a decade earlier. Indeed, no one wanted to underestimate the carcass o f the Soviet navy only to see it revitalized as a menacing sea monster. On the o t h e r hand, reports suggested that much o f the fleet had b e c o m e underwater or unseaworthy within a few years o f the dissolution o f the Soviet regime. Sailors were undernourished: there were reports of sailors dying o f malnutrition. Ships were not fully crewed; those ships that did operate at sea c o n f i n e d their exercise to local water; and desertion and corruption were taking their toll. Even fossil fuel, one o f Russia's abundant natural resources, was in short supply. T h e r e were often no funds available to pay for the fuel, nor for dockyard repairs or even spare parts. Months went by without new deployments. 3 5 What analysts were reluctant to say was that Russia's Pacific fleet had deteriorated so much that even if a revanchist coalition had c o m e to power in Moscow, it would have b e e n a matter o f many years b e f o r e the Pacific fleet could recover from neglect and desertion. 3 6 China's People's Liberation Army

(Navy)

In lieu of a powerful Soviet navy to occupy defense analysts, attention shifted to the naval forces o f the People's Republic o f China. T h e

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examination of China's maritime ambitions quickly became a thriving cottage industry. Dozens o f articles exploring the supposedly growing capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (Navy), or PLA(N), appeared in both academic and industry publications. 3 7 Specialists focused their attention more than ever before on the possibilities of conflict in the South China Sea. Examinations of the intricate claims on the Spratly and Paracel Islands cropped up in every mention of Asian defense issues, whereas a decade before few Westerners had noticed the thousands of island-rocks in China's southern sea. T h e question of whether China would acquire an aircraft carrier was soon supplanted by questions of what kind of carrier China would acquire, when it would be operable, and what it would be used for. Chinese discussions with Russia and other potential arms and technology suppliers were carefully scrutinized and the likely consequences projected in naval calculations. Some analysts clearly entertained the proposition of a U.S. assistant secretary of defense who said "the Chinese are determined, through concealment and secrecy, to become the great military power in Asia." 3 8 But the many articles on China's naval developments had one other important commonality: they pointed to China's potential naval capabilities, they speculated as to what China's ambitions might be, and they guessed that China might build a blue-water navy. T h e possibilities were all tantalizing in their way but had the cumulative effect of persuading readers that there was much more to China's navy than was the case. T h e actual condition and size of the PLA(N) was not cause for alarm. Its five nuclear-powered attack submarines appeared to be barely serviceable and, given reports of high internal levels of radiation, were possibly more dangerous to their own crews than to anyone else. T h e PLA(N)'s obsolescent diesel submarines were no match for the high-technology, ASW capacity of Japan's JMSDF. Most were not maintained at an operational level and many were apparently mothballed. Further, the ability of PLA(N) crews was limited by the rare and brief deployments of the submarines, which spent most of their years in port. Although some ships of the new Luhu and Jiangwei classes were equipped with modern armaments, China's other frigates and destroyers generally were not. None in the fleet had an area missile defense system nor had any a strong antisubmarine capability. One could not fail to note, though many did, that Taiwan had nearly as many principal surface combatants as China. China's many naval bases on its long coastline were necessary to accommodate an unusual number of small ships with very limited operational range, including more than 370 fast attack craft armed only

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with guns and over 180 vessels for mine countermeasures. The PLA(N) was by the end of the century still largely a coastal and defensive force. The alarmists argued that all this could change. But when? Rebuttals pointed out that many China watchers were looking two or more decades into the future. They were assuming that China's economy would continue to grow at a terrific rate, that the government in the face of rising expectations and economic devolution would be able to maintain domestic tranquillity, and that surplus wealth would be harvested for a blue-water naval building program. Further, it was suggested that an expanded Chinese navy would necessarily upset balances in the western Pacific, manifest its new power in the South China Sea, and make a grab for the Spratly and/or Paracel Islands. Only one or two of those assumptions needed not to prove true in order to make the entire scheme fall apart. 39 Spending increases of 10 percent per year were impressive, but the PLA(N)'s base spending was fairly small to begin with and its fleet was aging, starved for training, and plagued with technical problems. And since the army controlled the PLA(N), one could wonder how much money that army would sacrifice from its own operations and modernization for a dramatic increase in naval building. However well China was progressing in terms of GNP growth, it was beset with a host of growth-related problems, including bouts of inflation that undercut the PLA(N)'s budget plans. The PLA(N) also had to compete for resources with a civilian sector that had pressing claims as crime increased, pollution worsened, housing shortages became acute, and corruption spread. And with little notice taken, the growing private economy had converted China in the 1990s to a net importer of oil. Even though analysts fretted that China would use the Russian shipyards as their bargain basement for modernization, little came of the shopping. There was concern that China would purchase an aircraft carrier, but Thailand actually bought one first—a helicopter carrier built in Spain. In any case, the PLA(N) had no aircraft for a carrier and little capacity to protect and sustain such a vessel. One analyst, going against the tide of opinion, concluded about the PLA(N) that it would "not be able to project and sustain offshore military operations for at least thirty years." 40 Another said of China: "It is, in short, one of the weakest of the great powers and the least qualified to fill any so-called vacuum in Asia." 41 The U.S. Navy This navy was still with certainty the most competent, reliable, and powerful maritime force in the Pacific. Even so, there still was some

78

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question a b o u t the U.S. Navy's relative strength. T h e U.S. naval equation was in itself complicated. For o n e , as t h e Cold War pressures eased t h e U n i t e d States red u c e d its naval p r e s e n c e in the western Pacific, albeit gradually. Seco n d , despite a substantial U.S. f o r w a r d d e p l o y m e n t a n d t h e availability of as m a n y as t h r e e aircraft carriers, the U.S. Navy could n o t b e e x a m i n e d strictly by t h e n u m b e r s . U.S. naval forces assigned to t h e Pacific were also assigned to t h e I n d i a n O c e a n , a n d to the Arabian Sea a n d Persian Gulf as well. At any given time, a n d b a r r i n g an e x t r a o r d i n a r y e f f o r t , only a b o u t o n e - t h i r d of t h e U.S. Pacific Fleet was actually available f o r o p e r a t i o n s in t h e western Pacific. I n d e e d , anticipating the n e e d to invest m o r e naval assets in the t r o u b l e d waters of southwestern Asia was o n e r e a s o n t h e U.S. p l a n n e r s e n c o u r aged the JMSDF's growth a n d the sea-lane d e f e n s e plan. A third p a r t of the e q u a t i o n had to d o with the relative strength of the several Pacific navies. Any c o m p a r i s o n of Asian navies with t h e U.S. Pacific Fleet n e e d e d to take into a c c o u n t the geographical reality that virtually the entire navies of J a p a n , China, a n d Pacific Russia were effectively o n station while the U.S. ships were h o m e p o r t e d largely in Cali f o r n i a a n d Hawaii. O n e c o u l d say t h a t t h e U.S. Navy was in the western Pacific b u t it was n o t o / t h e western Pacific insofar as it was f o u n d in many o t h e r waters at any given m o m e n t . JMSDF's Absolute

Improvements

I n c r e m e n t a l i m p r o v e m e n t s to t h e JMSDF h a d b e e n little n o t i c e d over t h e years. Progress was o f t e n o v e r s h a d o w e d by criticisms of J a p a n as a f r e e r i d e r in i n t e r n a t i o n a l security a r r a n g e m e n t s . But J a p a n ' s naval forces were first rate in quality a n d by t h e e n d of t h e c e n t u r y were n o l o n g e r o v e r s h a d o w e d in q u a n t i t y by o t h e r Pacific fleets (see Tables 4.2, 4.3, a n d 4.4). In absolute n u m b e r s the JMSDF h a d n o t increased significantly. Yet a closer look revealed that o l d e r a n d o u t d a t e d p l a t f o r m s were retired steadily a n d were j u s t as regularly r e p l a c e d by the most m o d e r n ships. T h e result was that, u n l i k e o t h e r Asian navies, t h e e n t i r e J a p a n e s e fleet was m o d e r n — r a t h e r t h a n having a few recent, showy acquisitions masking the obsolescence of the rest. J a p a n c o n t i n u e d , moreover, to p u r c h a s e a n d m a n u f a c t u r e t h e most technologically advanced systems. J a p a n was the only country to acquire the superlative Aegis fleet air d e f e n s e system, using those systems in the new Kongo class destroyers of which t h e r e were four. T h a t t h e J D S Kongo c o u l d j u s t as well have b e e n classed as a cruiser was f u r t h e r testimony to the difficulty of c o m p a r i n g Asian navies by the n u m b e r s . T h e J D S Kongo, an " e n l a r g e d a n d i m p r o v e d

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79

Typical Comparison of Pacific Fleets, 1984 United States Soviet Union

China

Japan

SSBN (Nuclear-powered ballistic submarine)

6

24

3

0

SSB (Ballistic-missile submarine)

0

7

1

0

SSGN 42 (Nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine)

20

0

0

SSG (Guided-missile submarine)

0

4

0

0

SSN (Nuclear-powered submarine)

0

20

0

0

SSK (Diesel submarine)

3

50

107

14

CVN (Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier)

2

2

0

0

CV (Aircraft carrier)

4

1

0

0

Battleships

1

0

0

0

Cruisers

18

11

0

0

DDG (Guided-missile destroyer)

14

10

0

0

DD (Destroyer)

15

8

19

31

FFG (Guided-missile frigate)

18

11

0

0

FF

27

49

30

18

99

92

49

49

(Frigate)

Principal surface combatants

a

Source: Compiled by Jason Herman, RMNWC. Note: a. Of these, six were CGN, twelve were CG.

version of the USS Arleigh Burke," displaced 9,485 tons (full load), and was comparable with the USS Ticonderoga class. The JDS Kongo and her sister ships carried Harpoon SSMs in two quadruple launchers as well as Standard SAMs with radar homing to 40 nautical miles and vertical-launch antisubmarine rockets (ASROCs) (see Table 4.5). Unlike the Ticonderoga, Kongo had no hangars, though one could be added. The Kongo class was a substantial departure for Japan in size and capability for its surface fleet, and the appearance of this class of ship was all the more remarkable considering that Japan's primary maritime rival, the Russian fleet, had deteriorated. 4 2

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Table 4.3

Typical Post-Cold War Comparison of Pacific Fleets, 1997 United States

Russia

China

Japan

8

16

1

0

SSGN (Nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine)

20

28

5

0

SSG (Guided-missile submarine)

na

na

1

0

SSK (Diesel submarine)

na

17

44

16

CVN (Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier)

3

0

0

0

CV (Aircraft carrier)

3

1

0

0

Cruisers

13

9

0

0

DD/DDG (Destroyers/Guided-missile destroyers)

18

11

17

42

FFG (Guided-missile frigate)

20

10

39

20

FF

na

23

na

na

SSBN (Nuclear-powered ballistic submarine)

(Frigate)

Amphibious MCM (Mine countermeasures)

18

15

74

8

1

67

184

37

Sources: Jane's Fighting Ships (Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: Jane's Data Division, annual); The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, annual); The Alamanac ofSeapower (Arlington, Va.: Navy League of the United States, annual) Note: na signifies not applicable

Like the Kongo, Japan's other guided-missile destroyers were commonly listed as DDs rather than DDGs, which may have seemed to the public much less threatening than the guided-missile destroyers of the U.S. and Russian navies, which were fitted with sophisticated surfaceto-air guided missiles. But any realistic comparison of naval capacities distinguished between Japan's relatively modern ships with welltrained crews and the older, less capable ships of other Asian navies. T h e JMSDF's submarine fleet was also in superior condition by comparison with those of other Asian navies. Because Japan's sixteen submarines were diesel powered they gave the impression of a small and even second-rate force, but in fact these sixteen were among the quietest submarines in the world, their crews were considered expert, and their ASW technology was first rate.

The Pulling and Hauling of Sea-Lane Defense Table 4.4

81

Comparison of Pacific Fleets Adjusted for Operability, Availability, and Weapons Parity, 1998 United States

Russia

China

Japan

20

18

6

16

3

0

0

0

12 1 0

na 0 6

na 0 0

4 0 0

DDG (Guided-missile destroyers)

18

6

0

6

DD (Destroyers)

na

na

18

28

FFG (Guided-missile frigates)

20

10

0

0

FF

na

23

38

23

Principal surface combatants

54

45

56

60

Oceangoing replenishment

10

11

2

4

SSG (Guided-missile submarines, nuclear or diesel) attack submarines (carrying antiship missiles) Aircraft carriers Cruisers

(CG-Aegis) (CGN) (CG)

(Frigates)

Note: For consistency, some ships have been reclassified: e.g., Japan's Kongo class matches U.S. Ticonderoga class cruisers (see Table 4.5 for more detail). Five Chinese Jiangnan class frigates are not included because they have no missile armaments. Some other Chinese frigates, usually listed as "FFG," are here presented as "FF" due to the short range of their missiles, na signifies not applicable.

JMSDF Reconsidered In the early 1990s those who gave the JMSDF its due still included a note of caution. The U.S. commander of the Pacific Fleet said in 1991: J a p a n has the capability to defend itself against all but perhaps a resurgent Soviet Union. They have invested a lot o f money to build a very capable self-defense force. . . . We operate with the J a p a n e s e navy a lot; they are good. We have a mutual defense a r r a n g e m e n t with J a p a n , but they really have the capability to defend themselves. 4 3

Two years later the most noted American observer of the JMSDF, James Auer, said that in the 1980s Japan had "increased its air defense and antisubmarine capability significantly so as to make its goal [of 1,000-mile sea-lane defense] a near reality." 44

82

Table 4.5 Class Kongo Shirane Hatakaze Haruna Murasame Asagiri Hatsuyuki Tachikaze Takatsuki

Japan's Navy

Differences in JMSDF Destroyers Tonnage

Aegis

SSM

SAM

9,500 5,200 5,550 5,000 4,550 4,200 3,800 3,900 3,250

X

X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X

Close-in Warfare ASROC Systemx2 Helicopter X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X(3) X (3) X X X

Sources: Japanese Defense Agency, Defense offapan (1997); Jane's Fighting Ships (Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: Jane's Data Division, annual); Jane's Fighting Ships: Recognition Handbook (Jane's Information Group, 1994).

Public perceptions of the JMSDF's capability lagged t h r o u g h o u t the decade even after it became clear that Russia was staggering u n d e r its collapsed political and economic infrastructure and China was stumbling u n d e r the weight of progress. O n e reason was simply habit: for decades the JMSDF had been dwarfed by the navies of the two superpowers whose forces in the Pacific far o u t n u m b e r e d anything the JMSDF could even h o p e to muster. T h e steady enlargement and improvement of the JMSDF over several decades was anything but headline news. The incremental changes simply escaped notice or failed to compare with the excitement of U.S. and Soviet naval developments. Second, it was difficult to break that habit so long as it was difficult to compare the strengths of the various navies of the western Pacific in the peacetime confusion of the post-Cold War era. China's navy, for example, was growing in n u m b e r s in some categories but it still had little blue-water capability. T h e Russian navy still had large numbers although many of those ships were operationally defunct. Third, the size and disposition of the U.S. Navy m a d e it difficult to j u d g e the relative strength of the JMSDF. However superior the U.S. Navy was in toto, it was a global navy whose whole was more than the sum of its constituent ships, fleets, and bases. T h e strength of the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific was itself a relative matter given the navy's many commitments elsewhere. A f o u r t h reason for perceptual lag was that many defense watchers were in the habit of seeing the JMSDF, and indeed all of Japan's armed forces, as "limited." T h e JMSDF was limited by constitutional and legal constraints most obviously, as well as by public sentiment, even if those limits are n o t now as strict as they once were. T h e JMSDF was limited also to an o p e r a t i n g range of 1,000 miles of

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sea-lanes. From the masts of a global navy, 1,000 nautical miles would not seem far. From San Diego to the Strait of Hormuz, for example, requires more than 11,000 miles of sailing; f r o m Honolulu to Singapore it is almost 6,000 miles. For the U.S. Navy, which was deployed all over the world, a voyage of many thousands of miles was comm o n p l a c e . But it was the U n i t e d States that was in a peculiar geographic position. O n e thousand miles of Pacific Ocean for those already on station is a great deal of brown, green, and blue water. T h e sailing distance is only 1,262 nautical miles f r o m Yokohama, J a p a n , to Saipan in the Mariana Islands, a stretch of water specifically described as J a p a n ' s sea-lanes by Prime Minister Nakasone. 4 5 Sailing f r o m Osaka to Keelung, Taiwan, is almost exactly 1,000 miles: between Yokohama a n d Shanghai it is 1,040 miles; f r o m Nagasaki to H o n g Kong it is 1,069 miles. These are, for comparison, the same sailing distances as between Alexandria, Egypt, and Odessa, Ukraine; or between Marseille, France, a n d Izmir, Turkey. 46 I n d e e d , f r o m the JMSDF base in Maizuru to Vladivostok is only 485 miles: about the same distance as between H a m b u r g and Aberdeen or between Marseille and Tunis. T h e last reason to explain the perceptual lag of the JMSDF's relative capabilities is that J a p a n , correctly, was not perceived as an actual or potential threat to the United States and its other allies. It was China, instead, that was perceived as a potentially destabilizing and hegemonic regime, but not because it was modernizing its army and navy. Rather, simply because China was seen as a potentially hostile influence in the western Pacific many observers thought it only prud e n t to keep an eye on the PLA(N). J a p a n , as a staunch ally of the U n i t e d States, naturally attracted m u c h less attention to its a r m e d forces than did nonallies. In sum, even though analysts in the 1990s anticipated a revolution in naval balances to be wrought by China, the most remarkable p o s t Cold War change in naval armaments was in part a result of what China did not do—that is, dramatically modernize. T h e JMSDF's improved relative position was also in part a function of the unpredicted political events that b r o u g h t the existence of the Soviet Union to a s u d d e n end in 1991. That improved position was in part a political outgrowth of the economic tensions that had grown u p between the United States and Japan, and was also part of a sincere and combined U.S. and Japanese concern with reasonable defense b u r d e n sharing. Further, it was the result of pressures within the JMSDF and the Liberal Democratic Party to offer a coherent and justifiable role for Japanese defense organizations. Thus did the JMSDF emerge as a maritime force with both the capacity and the training to do as the Japanese government had promised for so many years: d e f e n d 1,000 miles of

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sea-lanes radiating from the main Japanese island. It was not a startling conclusion, but it was one that observers were reluctant to draw.

Notes 1. An earlier version o f this chapter appeared as "Japan's Sea-Lane Defense Re-Visited" in Strategic Review XXIV, 4 (Fall 1 9 9 6 ) : pp. 4 9 - 5 8 . 2. T h e language is taken from, and the framework is a version of, Graham Allison's g o v e r n m e n t a l politics m o d e l where " t h e r e are many actors . . . who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well . . . who act in terms o f no consistent set o f strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions o f national, organizational, and personal goals . . . who make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics." Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1 9 7 1 ) , p. 144. 3. " T h e Nixon-Sato C o m m u n i q u e , " New York Times, 22 November 1969, p. 14. 4. Ibid. 5. "Japan's B u d g e t f o r Arms S e e n as I n a d e q u a t e , " New York Times, 31 D e c e m b e r 1980, p. 1. 6. Ibid. For o t h e r reports o f Harold Brown's complaints, see "Japanese I g n o r i n g U.S. Advice to Raise Defense S p e n d i n g , " Washington Post, 10 February 1980, p. A20; "Defense Secretary Sees Waste in Military Spending," New York Times, 17 D e c e m b e r 1980, p. 25. 7. A m o n g those analysts was J a m e s Auer, who served the secretary o f defense as a special assistant for J a p a n e s e affairs. 8. Cmdr. Hideo Sekino, Imperial J a p a n e s e Navy (ret.), "Japan and H e r Maritime Defense," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1971, p. 119. Comm a n d e r Sekino also published his views in J a p a n : "A Diagnosis o f O u r Maritime Self-Defense F o r c e , " Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World), November 1 9 7 0 . His views were magnified by J a m e s Auer's writings on the J M S D F : "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force: An Appropriate Strategy?" Naval War College Review (NWCR) X X I V , 4 ( D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 1 ) : pp. 3-20; and The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971 (New York: Praeger, 1 9 7 3 ) , pp. 134 ff. 9. Sekino, "Maritime Defense," pp. 119, 103. 10. Kazuo Sato, "Japan's R e s o u r c e Imports," The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 5 1 3 (January 1 9 9 1 ) : p. 77. See by the same author "Increasing Returns and International Trade: T h e Case o f J a p a n , "Journal of Asian Economics 1 (March 1 9 9 0 ) : pp. 8 7 - 1 1 4 . 11. Kaihara's views are r e c o u n t e d in detail in Auer, Postwar Rearmament, pp. 1 3 4 - 1 4 3 , and "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense F o r c e , " p. 5. 12. Auer, Postwar Rearmament, pp. 135, 139. 13. Ibid., p. 145. 14. Sekino, "Maritime D e f e n s e , " pp. 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 ; and a similar analysis by J a m e s Auer, "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense F o r c e , " pp. 3 - 2 0 . 15. Auer, Postwar Rearmament, p. 252. 16. J a p a n e s e Defense Agency, Defense ofJapan (Tokyo: J a p a n e s e Defense Agency, 1 9 7 8 ) , p. 206. 17. Auer, Postwar Rearmament, p. 252.

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18. T h e c o m m e n t s of D i r e c t o r G e n e r a l Asao M i h a r a , testifying b e f o r e t h e C a b i n e t C o m m i t t e e in t h e H o u s e of C o u n c i l o r s in 1977 as r e p o r t e d by t h e Japan Times, 16 N o v e m b e r 1977, p. 4. 19. See, f o r e x a m p l e , New York Times, 17 D e c e m b e r 1980, p. 25; 14 J a n u ary 1981, p. 7; 9 April 1981, p. 5; 5 May 1981, p. 14; 29 July 1981, p. 4; a n d 22 D e c e m b e r 1981, p. 3. 20. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, "Visit of P r i m e Minister Suzuki," Department of State Bulletin 81, 2051 (June 1981): p. 3. 21. "Suzuki D e n i e s P l e d g e to U.S. o n S e a l a n e D e f e n s e , " FBIS Daily Report, Asia and Pacific, 6 April 1982, p. C I . 22. "Suzuki Talks to Press o n S e a l a n e D e f e n s e " FBIS Daily Report, Asia and Pacific, 3 S e p t e m b e r 1982, p. C I . 23. O t h e r s d o u b t e d t h e wisdom of t h e policy as well. See " S e a m a n ' s U n i o n O p p o s e s S e a l a n e D e f e n s e C o n c e p t , " FBIS Daily Report, Asia and Pacific, 10 N o v e m b e r 1982, p. C2; a n d editorials in t h e Mainichi Daily News, 31 March 1982, p. 5, a n d 31 August 1982, p. 2. 24. Ted S h a n n o n Wile, "Sealane D e f e n s e : An E m e r g i n g Role f o r t h e JMSDF?" (Master's thesis, Naval P o s t g r a d u a t e School, 1981), p p . 143-144. 25. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute f o r Strategic Studies, "Japan's D e f e n s e Outlook," Strategic Survey 1983-1984 ( L o n d o n : I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute f o r Strategic Studies, 1984), p p . 99-102. 26. T h o m a s B. Modly, "The Rhetoric a n d Realities of Japan's 1,000-Mile SeaLane Defense Policy," NWCR XXXVIII, 1 (January-February 1985): pp. 25-36. 27. For such similar conclusions, see Michael Ganley, "Japanese Goal to P r o t e c t Sea Lanes: M o r e R h e t o r i c t h a n Reality?" Armed Forces Journal International 123, 2 ( S e p t e m b e r 1985): p p . 104, 107; Tetsuya Kataoka, "Japan's Def e n s e N o n - B u i l d u p : W h a t W e n t Wrong?" International Journal on World Peace (April-June 1985): p p . 10-29. In o n e of t h e few c o n t r a r y cases, a 1987 study f o u n d that with only "marginal increases in its capabilities to c o n d u c t air defense, strait c o n t r o l , a n d convoy o p e r a t i o n s , J a p a n could d e f e n d its sea lanes against a t h r e a t f r o m t h e Soviet U n i o n " w i t h o u t relying o n t h e U.S. Navy! See D a n i e l I. Gallagher, "Sea L a n e D e f e n s e : J a p a n e s e Capabilities a n d Imperatives" (Master's thesis, Naval P o s t g r a d u a t e School, 1987). 28. Shortly a f t e r b e c o m i n g p r i m e minister, N a k a s o n e d e f i n e d J a p a n ' s sea-lanes as "between G u a m a n d Tokyo a n d b e t w e e n t h e Strait of Taiwan a n d Osaka." Washington Post, 19 J a n u a r y 1983, p p . A I , A12, A13. 29. "Joint U.S.-Japan S e a l a n e D e f e n s e Study S u g g e s t e d " FBIS Daily Report, East Asia, 11 M a r c h 1983, p. C2. 30. "Japan-U.S. J o i n t S e a l a n e D e f e n s e Exercise Begins," FBIS Daily Report, Asia and Pacific, 25 S e p t e m b e r 1983, p. C8. 31. See P. Lewis Young, " T h e J a p a n e s e M a r i t i m e Self-Defense Forces: M a j o r S u r f a c e C o m b a t a n t s , Destroyers, a n d Frigates," Asian Defense Journal ( S e p t e m b e r 1985): p. 86. 32. Jane's Fighting Ships (Alexandria, Va.: J a n e ' s I n f o r m a t i o n G r o u p , 1985), p. 143. 33. P. Lewis Young, " T h e J a p a n e s e Maritime Self-Defense Forces: M a j o r S u r f a c e C o m b a t a n t s , Destroyers, a n d Frigates," Asian Defense Journal (Sept e m b e r 1985), p. 87. 34. See P e t e r J . Woolley, "Japan's Security Policy: I n t o t h e Twenty-First Century," Journal of East and West Studies 21, 2 ( O c t o b e r 1992): p p . 107-119. 35. See B e n j a m i n S. L a m b e t h , "Russia's W o u n d e d Military," Foreign Affairs ( M a r c h / A p r i l 1995): p p . 86-98; Douglas Ross, "Maritime Security in the

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Navy

North Pacific During the 1990s," in Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, eds., Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution at Sea in the Post-Cold War Era (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1994), pp. 7 9 - 8 6 ; and various comments in Jane's Fighting Ships (annual). 36. Certainly some analysts reached this conclusion. See Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, "Russia's Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast Asia," Pacific Viewpoint 35, 1 (May 1994): pp. 4 9 5 - 5 1 2 ; and James A. Kelly, "For the United States in Asia, a Danger Is a Vacuum of Leadership," Seapower 38, 1 (January 1995): pp. 3 0 - 3 9 . 37. See, for example, Ehsan Ahrari, "China's Naval Forces Look to Extend T h e i r Blue-Water Reach," Jane's Intelligence Review (April 1 9 9 8 ) : pp. 3 1 - 3 6 ; Stephen P. Aubin, "China: Yes, Worry About the Future," Strategic Review (Winter 1998): pp. 1 7 - 2 0 ; Nigel Holloway, "AWake-Up Call on Mischief Reef: Who Controls the South China Sea?" Far East Economic Review, 13 April 1995, p. 11; Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, "Who Rules the Waves? T h e Arms Race on the Pacific Rim," Asian Affairs 26 (October 1995): pp. 2 9 1 - 3 0 4 ; "China Moves to Fill Naval Power Vacuum," Defense News, 26 April-2 May 1993, p. 18; J o h n B. Haseman, "Military Developments in the South China Sea Basin," Military Review, February 1993, pp. 5 5 - 6 3 ; Bryce Harland, "For a Strong China," Foreign Policy (Spring 1994): especially p. 49; Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993): pp. 136-152, and by the same author "East Asia's Militaries Muscle Up," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53 (January/February 1997): pp. 5 6 - 5 7 ; Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs (November/December 1993): pp. 5 9 - 7 4 ; Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, " T h e Military Build-Up in Asia-Pacific," Pacific Review 5, 3 (1992): pp. 1 9 7 - 2 0 8 ; J . N. Mak, " T h e Chinese Navy and the South China Sea: A Malaysian Assessment," Pacific Review 4, 2 (1991): pp. 1 5 0 - 1 6 1 ; Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security." Military Review, May 1994, pp. 2 8 - 3 2 ; Stephen L. Ryan, "The PLA Navy's Search for a Blue Water Capability" Asian Defence Journal, May 1994, pp. 2 8 - 3 2 ; David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," Survival (Summer 1994): pp. 4 3 - 5 9 ; J i You and Xu You, "In Search of Blue Water Power: T h e PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990s," Pacific Review 4, 2: pp. 137-149. 38. Remarks ascribed to J a m e s Lilley, who was until January 1993 assistant secretary of defense for international affairs, quoted in Barbara Opall, "U.S., Allies Fear Chinese Buildup," Defense News, 26 April-2 May, 1993, pp. 1 , 18. 39. An excellent examination of these assumptions was made by Shulong Chu, "The Russian-U.S. Military Balance in the Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific Region and the 'China Threat,'" Journal of Northeast Asian Affairs X I I I , 1 (Spring 1994): pp. 7 7 - 9 5 . See also Christopher D. Yung, People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1996). 40. J o h n J . Schulz, "China as a Strategic Threat: Myths and Verities," Strategic Review X X V I , 6 (Winter 1998): p. 5. 41. Gary Clintworth, "Greater China and Regional Security," Australian Journal of International Affairs 48, 2 (November 1994): pp. 2 1 1 - 2 2 9 , offers a most persuasive analysis of China's military developments and nondevelopments. See also Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security (Summer 1994): pp. 1 6 9 - 1 9 4 . And see a study that asserted first that for "China to possess" even "a regional navy, it

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must do at least o n e o f the following: (1) build a regional naval capability; (2) import Western technology, reverse e n g i n e e r that technology, and mass p r o d u c e platforms and weapon systems for a region-oriented navy from that technology; ( 3 ) buy all the assets it needs f o r a regional naval capability." T h e study t h e n c o n c l u d e d that C h i n a could do n o n e o f those things: Christopher D. Yung, People's War at Sea. 42. T h e cynical could point at some historical parallels. For instance, in a n o t h e r era the Kongo class also marked a departure f o r the J a p a n e s e navy. T h e first Kongo, laid down in 1912, was a d r e a d n o u g h t 1 0 , 0 0 0 tons heavier than the largest J a p a n e s e battleships o f the time, Kawachi ( 1 9 1 0 ) and Settsu ( 1 9 1 1 ) , that displaced a m e r e 2 0 , 0 0 0 tons. T h e Kongo o f 1 9 1 2 was also the first in a class o f f o u r ships, and those ships were c o m p l e t e d and commissioned even as E u r o p e a n fleets were b e i n g withdrawn from the Pacific O c e a n to b e c o n c e n t r a t e d in h o m e waters. Kongo and h e r sister ships, Kirishima, Haruna, and Hiei, survived into World War II. 43. "A Pacific P r e s e n c e : Interview with Adm. R o b e r t J . Kelly, CINCPACFLT," Seapower, D e c e m b e r 1991, p. 12. 44. J a m e s Auer, "Japan's Changing Defense Policy," The New Pacific Security Environment, Ralph A. Cossa, ed. (Washington, D.C.: National D e f e n s e University, 1 9 9 3 ) , p. 82. 45. F o r Nakasone's remarks see Washington Post, 19 J a n u a r y 1983, pp. A I , A12, A13. 46. All distances are in nautical miles and represent surface transit o f actual sea routes between ports. See Distances Between Ports, 7th ed. (Bethesda, Md.: Defense Mapping Agency, 1 9 9 2 ) .

5 An Organizational Response to Japan's First War: Money, Minesweeping, and the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-19911 Japan's role in the 1991 Persian Gulf War was unusual and noteworthy for several reasons. Since the end of World War II, Japan had never been publicly asked to contribute military or naval forces to any kind of U.S. or even UN military operation. Japan's involvement in several episodes had either been solicited behind the scenes (and answered in the negative), or had not been carried out under the Japanese flag (as in the Korean War), or had been limited to financial contributions to multilateral forces (as in the 1987-1988 escorting of reflagged oil tankers in the Persian Gulf). Japan's naval and air forces had, of course, been crucial to the anti-Soviet alliance in the northwest Pacific region for many decades, and under the aegis of the United States-Japan Security Treaty Japan had participated in dozens of combined naval and air exercises with U.S. forces. Japan had also long allowed the United States to use bases in Japan as a rear area for the latter's ground and air forces based in South Korea. In the 1980s, the questions of whether Japan could contribute more to UN operations and whether Japan should have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council were also discussed. But nothing came of those discussions—until after the Persian Gulf conflict. Thus, we revisit here a noteworthy but obscure episode that constituted a definite departure from normal uses of the JMSDF and represented a significant expansion of Japan's role in international security affairs.

An Unremarkable Event? In the third week of April 1991, the Japanese government formally announced that it would deploy ships of the JMSDF to the Persian Gulf to help detonate or remove an estimated 1,200 seaborne mines and make international waterways safe for navigation. The announcement 89

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was not a complete surprise. T h e Japanese government had for many months debated its obligations, options, and role in the allied war effort. But the war for Kuwait was over m u c h sooner than anyone had anticipated. J a p a n ' s participation in that war had b e e n in cash a n d loans: $13 billion, which was a substantial contribution. (Some commentators q u i p p e d that the United States might even have turned a profit on the short war.) But J a p a n had contributed no manpower— had risked no lives, had shed no blood. During months of wrangling in the Japanese cabinet and in the Diet, the official apology to the allies was that the constitution and laws of J a p a n prevented the dispatch of J a p a n e s e forces overseas—and most certainly to combat zones. Now U.S. and allied troops had left the battlefields, and now J a p a n was deploying naval vessels. Six vessels in all would go. T h e 2,000-ton JDS Hayase would serve as the flagship leading four state-of-the-art coastal minesweepers: the Yurishima, Hikoshima, Awashima, and Sakushima, all commissioned as recently as 1988 and 1989. They would be a c c o m p a n i e d by the JDS Tokiwa, one of three brand-new fleet support ships designed and acquired to make long deployments of JMSDF ships possible. This was news. O r was it? Japan's decision to deploy warships to the Persian Gulf received substantial attention in Asia but little in the United States. T h e Washington Post reported Japan's a n n o u n c e m e n t of this novel deployment of warships on page 21. 2 T h e story of the Japanese minesweepers actually leaving port 2 days later was b u m p e d u p to page l l . 3 T h e Wall Street Journal ran a brief story on page 10 suggesting that the deploym e n t was a cautious but important step for J a p a n ' s government and armed forces. 4 T h e New York Times had little to say at all. Scant attention to this m o m e n t o u s change in J a p a n e s e security policy was also the case in academic journals. T h e reason for this scant attention could well have b e e n that Americans were preoccupied with their own involvement in the Persian Gulf and with the fate of Saddam Hussein: the American public had f o u n d J a p a n e s e participation peripheral to the outcome of the war, the financial contribution notwithstanding. By the time J a p a n had decided to deploy forces to the Persian Gulf region, the war had b e e n over for m o r e than a m o n t h . Newspapers in the United States had f o u n d space enough to criticize Japan's hesitant responses in the fall of 1990 when the Persian Gulf crisis d o m i n a t e d the news, b u t they had little enthusiasm left to report this drastic change in Japan's policy after war had been concluded. By contrast, the deployment of Japan's naval forces was a topic of great interest to the U.S. government before and d u r i n g the Persian Gulf war. It was of c o n t i n u i n g interest to the Chinese, Australian,

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Indonesian, Korean, Malaysian, and Singaporean governments. Japan's press and public also found the event noteworthy. Thus, among those who followed the matter at all, the dispatch of the minesweeping flotilla fell on a continuum somewhere between unremarkable and an event of signal importance. But how and why did Japan's government come to select this specific and peculiar policy option? Why did Japan not do more—or less? Was the deployment merely a feeble, or cynical, gesture designed to placate public opinion in the allied countries? Or was it clever—taking advantage of an opportunity to undo the irritating restraints of the Peace Constitution? Or was the whole episode no more than reflection of the Japanese public's passive or disdainful view of politics among foreigners?

Revelation and Reaction: A Review Answers to the questions posed above came from many quarters. Opinions fell roughly into three categories: (1) the critics who found wanting Japan's entire response to the Persian Gulf crisis; (2) the apologists who wished to explain Japan's predicament to the critics; and (3) the alarmists who found disconcerting the signs of a newly assertive Japanese government. Some of these commentators argued that Japan's collective policy response was the reflection of Japanese culture. Some analysts in every category described the deployment of warships to the Persian Gulf as the product of rational actors who considered specific Japanese national objectives. Others assessed the decision as the result of difficult bargaining among various political actors. A third, albeit dry, possibility was that the decision was best understood as an organizational output born of standard operating procedures and routinized institutional behaviors. 5 Critics: Dismay and

Disappointment

The most common reaction in the United States to Japan's Persian Gulf crisis policies was disappointment or annoyance. In the view of many commentators Japan's policy responses were simply too slow— in addition to being too little. Although Japan had j o i n e d in the diplomatic condemnation of Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, it had been initially unwilling to endorse the use of force to respond to the invasion. Japan had quickly pledged money to underwrite the buildup of allied forces in Saudi Arabia, but it seemed to have to be cajoled into contributing a significant share of the cost. On 29 August the government announced its intention to provide funds for refugee relief, transport, and medical services, but neglected to mention

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how much. The following day, the chief cabinet secretary attempted to correct the mistake by announcing that the aid would come to $1 billion. He made no impression. The New York Times called the contribution "modest." 6 Two weeks later, the figure was adjusted to $4 billion, but it seemed that Tokyo was begrudging the money. 7 Critics who found Japan's lethargy intolerable asserted that Japan should have responded quickly and positively to a world crisis that required immediate action by the world's most capable and affected powers. 8 The American public agreed. The Washington Post reported that 30 percent of Americans had "lost respect for Japan because of the Gulf crisis." 9 Dismayed commentators turned easily to detraction. Since they had established that Japan's reaction was slow, the next question was: "Why was Japan so slow?" Offered were a variety of answers largely centered on the peculiarity of Japan and the Japanese: Japan's specific behavior in response to the Persian Gulf crisis was put into a general context of Japan's behavior on a range of political issues. A New York Times columnist explained that Japan's "dithering passivity on all but trade" is because Japan is "incapable of initiative, in a sense immature." 1 0 If Japan was slow, critics reasoned, then this showed once again that Japan was not a truly reliable ally of the United States. Or worse, Japan was providing more evidence for the long-pressed charge of being a free rider in international security affairs. The New Republic, in the mood for puns, called Japan's posture "burden shirking." 11 An op-ed writer for the Wall Street Journal, not in the mood for Japan's apologies, called the posture one of "bogus constitutional excuses." 12 By the time Japan decided to send minesweepers to the Gulf in addition to contributing $13 billion, the dismayed commentators saw the naval force as a late, feeble gesture made long after all the important decisions and risks had been taken by more courageous, better organized, reliable countries. One academic reviewer characterized it as the "belated dispatch of four small wooden minesweepers two months after the hostilities ended." 1 3 Apologists:

Incrementalists

and

Optimists

Not everyone was dismayed. Plenty of Japan watchers attempted to put Japan's various reactions to the Persian Gulf war in a context of Japanese strengths and limitations. Some among them stressed the incremental nature of Japan's changing foreign policy and emphasized what Japan might be able to do further in the post-Cold War era. Some stressed that Japan's government had overcome enormous obstacles to change. Almost all pointed to what Japan had actually done rather than what it had not.

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Incrementalists saw in Japan's Persian Gulf war policies much evidence that J a p a n was changing, albeit slowly. They could point out that there was, first, an enormous commitment of money in support of the allied military action against Iraq. T h e r e was, next, a robust discussion of the overseas use of the J S D F and civilian personnel. This debate was in itself a rather new phenomenon even if it exasperated Japan's critics in the United States and Europe. 1 4 And finally the entire episode sparked legislation that would smooth the way for Japan's future participation in UN peacekeeping operations. T h e elusive peacekeeping legislation, debated long and hard in the Diet, spawned a cottage industry in speculation about Japan's future role as a peacekeeper within or without the UN. Incrementalists were reading Japan's tea leaves. They saw Japan's role in the Persian Gulf hostilities as altogether encouraging. And indeed, there were many encouraging signs available to those who needed a lift of spirit: the government was openly sympathetic to the West's policy and strategy; it provided many billions of dollars of aid to the United States; and Japan furnished this money even though it was linked to an immediate tax hike. Finally, Japan made good on all its promises to participate in UN peacekeeping activities. Within only 3 years of the Persian Gulf war, J a p a n had sent J S D F personnel to Cambodia and Mozambique and had used the JASDF to help with relief activities for Rwanda. The earlier deployment of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf had fit nicely into the accumulating evidence that J a p a n was taking seriously its new commitment to cooperate in the new international order. T h e Wall Street Journal, for example, called the deployment of the J M S D F ships a "cautious but significant step in [Japan's] effort to define an international role beyond that of banker and trader." 1 5 Others looked not to the future, but emphasized what Japan had actually done in the Persian Gulf crisis and the enormous effort Japan had made to overcome opposition and apathy at home. These optimistic apologists were understandably sympathetic to Japan's peculiar difficulties with the question of war. If J a p a n was slow, or if Japan was hesitant, if Japan lacked confidence, or if the government encountered opposition to its support for the Persian Gulf operation, all this was to be expected. Apologists called to mind the stubborn pacifist segment of public opinion that, like the Peace Constitution, was the legacy of Japan's bitter war experience in the 1930s and 1940s. They pointed to the difficulty posed by the constitution's article 9, which was so plainly restrictive and could not be twisted much further than it already had been by the establishment of substantial ground, air, and naval forces. This group o f commentators thought criticism of J a p a n unreasonable. How could the Western allies think that J a p a n would suddenly shed its immunities and

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a u t o l i m i t a t i o n s to p a r t i c i p a t e in a war o n t h e o p p o s i t e side of t h e globe? 1 6 T h e apologists, if they m e n t i o n e d the m i n e s w e e p i n g e x p e d i t i o n at all, p o i n t e d o u t how carefully circumscribed that mission h a d to b e to maintain public s u p p o r t f o r such an u n u s u a l use of the JSDF. T h e minesweepers had to be deployed after the war, r a t h e r t h a n d u r i n g it, because it was i m p o r t a n t n o t to associate the actions of the JSDF with the aggressive a n d f o r c e f u l actions taken by t h e U n i t e d States. T h e minesweepers h a d to o p e r a t e only in i n t e r n a t i o n a l waters. And, finally, the minesweepers were merely clearing obstacles to i n t e r n a tional navigation, a r o u t i n e f u n c t i o n of any respectable coast guard. Prime Minister Kaifu c o u n t e d first a m o n g the apologists. Having s u f f e r e d the slings a n d arrows of o u t r a g e d A m e r i c a n journalists a n d m e m b e r s of t h e U.S. Congress, Kaifu was c o m p e l l e d to e m p h a s i z e how m u c h J a p a n h a d d o n e f o r the allies. "It j u s t makes m e gnash my teeth that the kinds of things we've d o n e have n o t b e e n p r o p e r l y valu e d , " h e said. 1 7 Kaifu asserted t h a t r a t h e r t h a n "too little t o o late," J a p a n h a d d o n e "as m u c h as possible, as quickly as possible." 1 8 T h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r correctly p o i n t e d o u t t h a t J a p a n ' s financial b u r d e n f o r t h e war r a n k e d b e h i n d only that of t h e U n i t e d States, Kuwait, a n d Saudi Arabia. T h e p r i m e minister could also brag that J a p a n h a d quickly f r o z e n Iraqi assets a n d e m b a r g o e d Iraqi oil, a n d that J a p a n ' s first f i n a n c i a l c o m m i t m e n t to t h e U N coalition h a d c o m e a full 10 days a h e a d of Germany's. Kaifu's final gesture of solidarity with t h e U n i t e d States was to sign off o n the d e p l o y m e n t of JMSDF ships to the Persian Gulf, a gesture that, like J a p a n ' s o t h e r Gulf war policies, attracted less a t t e n t i o n a b r o a d t h a n h e wanted. Alarmists: Prophets of Doom In a final category of o p i n i o n m a k e r s were those w h o saw J a p a n ' s Persian Gulf war policies in g e n e r a l a n d t h e d e p l o y m e n t of minesweepers in particular as a signal, if n o t revolutionary, event in c o n t e m p o r a r y J a p a n e s e history. For c o u n t r i e s uneasy with J a p a n r e a r m e d any military action o n J a p a n ' s p a r t was u n w e l c o m e . C h i n a w a r n e d all a l o n g that J a p a n s h o u l d n o t get ideas a b o u t d i s p a t c h i n g forces o u t of area, and, predictably, the Asian b e h e m o t h severely criticized J a p a n w h e n the decision was m a d e . C h i n a ' s official news agency, X i n h u a , called t h e p l a n "a d a n g e r o u s first step in s e n d i n g troops overseas." 1 9 T h e Soviet news service, TASS, said that "Japanese military circles a n d politicians . . . have d e c i d e d to use t h e Gulf crisis to m a k e a b r e a k t h r o u g h in e c o n o m i c a n d military-political terms o n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene." 2 0 N o r t h Korea also m a d e a fuss. But even the Philippine g o v e r n m e n t asked that the J a p a n e s e assure Asia "that they will n o t start building u p their military might." 2 1

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T h e s e alarmed parties, j o i n e d by others on the Pacific Rim and by J a p a n e s e opposition groups, believed that e n c o u r a g i n g J a p a n ' s military development by, for instance, asking J a p a n to send J S D F personnel to the Persian Gulf theater was a foolhardy policy eventually to be regretted by everyone. Perhaps the kindest among them would e c h o the sentiments o f the president of Singapore who o n c e likened the U.S. e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f J a p a n e s e military development to giving liquor-filled candies to an alcoholic. T h e current prime minister was no kinder. Asked if J a p a n had not changed since the war, L e e Kuan Yew paraphrased the well-known French maxim, saying: " T h e more it has changed, the less it has changed." 2 2 E Pluribus

Unum

In fact all these disparate views had a great deal in c o m m o n when explaining, deploring, or defending J a p a n ' s policy responses during the Persian Gulf conflict. They all tended to portray J a p a n as unique. T h e dismayed J a p a n bashers saw J a p a n ' s policy responses as peculiarly inadequate when c o m p a r e d with the responses o f o t h e r (read Western E u r o p e a n ) U.S. allies. T h e s e critics saw in J a p a n ' s weak and hesitating reactions the same sort o f footdragging and lethargy that, they said, J a p a n exhibited in trade issues. J a p a n , they concluded, was unique in its desire to avoid the costly and difficult responsibilities o f a wealthy and powerful nation even though it had profited from free trade, from the U.S. security umbrella, and from the international o r d e r that it had refused to help defend. B u r d e n shirking was simply reflective o f a flawed culture. T h e deployment o f those four small wooden minesweepers was a belated, cynical gesture designed to placate critics or to serve some other selfish agenda. 2 3 T h e incrementalists also tended to portray J a p a n as unique if only because, as they insisted, one had to emphasize the gradualist nature o f policy changes in J a p a n . O t h e r countries may have b e e n capable o f making bold departures in policy when the situation warranted. But not J a p a n . In J a p a n consensus had to emerge, for example, through nemawashi24 and ringisei,25 This general t h e m e was not applied to the foreign policy of any other industrialized democracy, only to J a p a n ' s . T h e apologists likewise pointed to the unique constraints o f J a p a n ' s formulation o f foreign policy: the Peace Constitution; a pacifist public; a vociferous opposition that wished to interpret article 9 as narrowly as possible; and the cultural n e e d to build consensus. T h e s e factors prevented J a p a n (a unique state or tokushu kokka) from being like normal states (zairaigata kokka). In such a peculiar context J a p a n ' s policy responses, including the deployment o f minesweepers, could charitably have b e e n seen as an unusual and admirable show

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of action and solidarity with the UN despite so much domestic opposition. Finally, the alarmists, who saw in Japan's policy responses a harbinger of revolution in Japanese foreign affairs, more than implied that Japan is somehow unique. In their view postwar reforms had merely whitewashed militarism, which was now beginning to show through the old paint and would reveal itself fully in time. 2 6 Naturally, they watched carefully the decisions made in Tokyo throughout the Persian Gulf crisis and, not least of all, the decision to dispatch the JSDF. Hence, after Japan's minesweepers were on their way to the Persian Gulf, one of Singapore's larger daily newspapers ran the headline: "Japan Impatient to Make Breakthrough in Military, War Issues." 27 While all the competing views of Japan's Persian Gulf war responses may have held at least kernels of truth, all tended to rely on the notion that only peculiar reasons could explain Japan's behavior. Could Japan be unique in all these different ways?

Revisiting Models of Decisionmaking That Japan was unique was a popular theme among Japanese and non-Japanese, especially Americans. But it was equally a view that invited skepticism. 28 Japan's decision to send minesweepers might have been understood more clearly without recourse to the uniqueness of Japan, although most commentators found they could not avoid it. What models of decisionmaking did these various opinion leaders employ in their analysis of Japanese policy? Certainly those who saw in Japan's policies an inability to act based on "dithering passivity" or other collective traits were using a cultural model for their explanation. These critics were frustrated perhaps because, as they saw it, Japan's collective behavior did not seem rational for a great power with a national interest in protecting oil supplies and maintaining stable prices while professing to be a responsible member of the international community. Also employing a cultural model were those who insisted that behind Japan's polite facade lay an incorrigibly aggressive people. (Likewise those who compared the Japanese to alcoholics were making a cultural generalization.) Other critics of Japan's policy at least hinted at the rational actor model of governance—where policy consists of the "purposive acts of a unified national government." 2 9 Others saw in those same responses an ultrarational agenda that merely presented itself in the guise of inaction and hesitancy. The Japan of the Japan bashers was "centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing," 30

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and the Persian Gulf Crisis

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and, we might add, this ultrarational behavior was uniquely Japanese. O r as one Persian Gulf conflict reviewer put it, "Japan has been portrayed as the h o m e of selective and clever players with ruthless and scornful attitudes." 3 1 In an attempt to balance the critics, apologists generally tended toward a more complex and dynamic view of Japan's policy responses as generated by the governmental politics model—where relevant actors behave "according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals," and where governmental decisions are "a resultant of various bargaining games a m o n g players in the national government." 3 2 Players in this conceptual model make policy "not by a single rational choice but by the pulling a n d h a u l i n g that is politics." 33 Thus the apologists saw J a p a n ' s pluralistic society pulling in d i f f e r e n t directions: t h e r e were the various opposition parties a n d leaders; the pacifist tendencies of the public; the monetary and fiscal sensibilities of the Ministry of Finance; the hawkish factions of the Liberal Democratic Party; and external pressures f r o m Asian neighbors as well as f r o m the United States. To earn their living, Japanologists especially, following the governmental politics model, rec o u n t e d in great detail the p r e f e r e n c e s and politics of the relevant players. O p p o n e n t s of the minesweeping mission included all the opposition parties save the Democratic Socialist Party led by Keigo Ouchi. Supporters included Keidanren C h a i r m a n Gaishi Hiraiwa; C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e Chairman Rokuro Ishikawa; J a p a n Employers' Federation President Eiji Suzuki a n d leading m e m b e r s of the Liberal Democratic Party; Koji Kakisawa, c h a i r m a n of the Liberal Democratic Party's National Defense Commission; Tadashi Kuranari, chair of the Security Research Commission; f o r m e r Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe; f o r m e r Prime Minister Nakasone; f o r m e r Prime Minister Takeshita; faction leader Michio Watanabe; f o r m e r Deputy Prime Minister Kanemaru; and many o t h e r notables. Prime Minister Kaifu was said to be a fence sitter who required great persuasion before he accepted the views of the hawkish politicians. In this view then, Japan's behavior resulted f r o m the pulling and hauling that is Japanese politics, and, of course, Japanese politics were unique. T h e third model of government behavior was left aside by most analysts. T h e organizational process m o d e l would have suggested that J a p a n ' s government acted only as its organizations could enact routines. 3 4 Minesweeping was an organizational routine: other policy responses involving the JSDF simply were not available because little or n o routinized behavior existed. The Japanese government had sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf because minesweeping was a routinized task, and among the organizational responses available to Japan this one was well prepared by both the JDA and the JMSDF.

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T h e organizational process model did not lend itself to exciting headlines for editorials and op-ed pieces. Nor would the apologists have found much gratification in the dry bureaucratic contours o f this approach. B u t the organizational process model had its place a m o n g explanations and might have b e e n found satisfying when o t h e r models had yielded all the insights they would. T h e organizational process model did not necessarily rely on any unique characteristics o f J a p a n ; it relied on the generalization that governments consist of organizations that produce dry-as-dust outputs. J a p a n , like any o t h e r country, consisted o f such organizations, and from those organizations' repertoire of routines was constructed J a p a n ' s Persian Gulf policy. In the case at hand, the J D A was among the many organizations in J a p a n that might have responded to the Persian Gulf war. T h e J D A in turn consisted o f the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces. These "existing organizations, each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and programs," largely defined the government's military options. T h e s e options had b e e n " d e t e r m i n e d primarily by routines established," or not established, "in these organizations prior to that instance." 3 5

Establishing Routines T h e government's routinized policy options in the Persian Gulf crisis were essentially three. T h e first routinized response to the Persian Gulf conflict was the payment o f money to the United States and to o t h e r "front-line countries" as they were called. T h e second routinized option was the deployment o f minesweepers. A third possibility was the dispatch o f both civilian and military planes for the transport o f civilian refugees and for resupply and delivery o f humanitarian aid such as food, clothing, medicines, and even medical staff. Two o f these options were in fact selected, coordinated, and carried out. T h e third was briefly pursued and dropped. In large measure the routines that were carried through had been established by 1987 or 1988, several years prior to the Persian Gulf war. The Persian GulfPrequel

of 1987 and Checkbook Diplomacy

Between January 1987 and July 1988, ten Japanese-owned m e r c h a n t vessels suffered attacks in the Persian Gulf or in the Strait o f Hormuz, through which some 55 percent o f J a p a n ' s imported oil passed. Similarly, oil tankers under many flags were casualties of the prolonged war between Iraq and Iran. T h e United States' eventual response to

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these attacks was to police the international waters of the Persian Gulf. Kuwaiti oil tankers in particular were reflagged as U.S. vessels and given escort by the U.S. Navy. T h e Americans were n o t alone in the venture: several Western E u r o p e a n navies j o i n e d the effort, and the Soviet navy also escorted its share of m e r c h a n t ships t h r o u g h the Persian Gulf. T h e U n i t e d States requested J a p a n to j o i n the Western Europeans in deploying naval vessels for escort duty and minesweeping. T h e J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t considered the request seriously but declined. Instead, Prime Minister Nakasone took the slightly unusual step of helping to finance the allied naval operations by making direct, cash payments to the U.S. government. 3 6 T h e event was only slightly unusual because J a p a n h a d b e e n using money in various ways for a long time as s o m e t h i n g of a substitute for expenditures on its own armed forces. Payments went out in many forms, but chief a m o n g these were overseas development assistance (ODA) and both direct and indirect subsidies of U.S. armed forces stationed in J a p a n . ODA by the late 1980s had not only grown to the p o i n t where it e x c e e d e d U.S. foreign assistance b u t it was m o r e and m o r e f r e q u e n t l y justified in political-strategic terms. J a p a n ' s a n n u a l defense white p a p e r explained that ODA was m e a n t to "influence the peace a n d stability of the international community." 37 Likewise J a p a n ' s subsidy of U.S. forces stationed in J a p a n steadily grew until it covered about half the estimated costs of those forces. Thus, offering financial assistance to the United States for its 1988 Persian Gulf operations was derived f r o m an established routine: subsidizing U.S. a r m e d forces a n d providing money to help maintain stability in the international system. T h e only new wrinkle was the direct link of specific U.S. naval operations to money that J a p a n specifically appropriated. T h e Persian Gulf crisis in 1990 was on a m u c h larger scale than that of 1987-1988 b u t the routine was similar. Checkbook diplomacy was a well-practiced strategy—one that the Ministry of Finance, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the cabinet understood, and one that could be said to have had a record of success. T h e only thing left to haggle over was the precise a m o u n t of aid to be o f f e r e d to the United States and others. What was u n p r e c e d e n t e d in 1990-1991 was the size of the military o p e r a t i o n in which J a p a n ' s chief ally was a b o u t to engage and, t h e r e f o r e , the a m o u n t of money that J a p a n would offer. O n e might speculate that any hesitation on Japan's part in the winter m o n t h s of 1990-1991 was d u e to the relative inexperience of the Ministry of Finance with such a large-scale and costly crisis. But in the end, aid was forthcoming in amounts larger than ever before and it was appropriated more swiftly.

100 Minesweeping

Japan's Navy

Routines

What options, aside from checkbook diplomacy, were available to the government o f J a p a n in 1990 as the Persian Gulf crisis moved toward a war? In fact, there were only two practical military responses to be offered by the organizations that constituted J a p a n e s e government. O n e o f these options was air transport, the other was the deployment o f minesweepers. For the J M S D F , and perhaps for all the services taken together, there was probably a no m o r e routinized military operation than the clearing o f seaborne mines. Article 9 o f the constitution notwithstanding, the practice o f minesweeping went back to the days o f surr e n d e r and was thus older than the present constitution. Even as World War II ended, J a p a n e s e minesweepers searched the waters o f J a p a n to remove or destroy tens of thousands of mines sowed by both U.S. and Japanese naval forces. And even after the disbanding o f the rest o f the imperial navy, J a p a n ' s minesweepers continued to operate under the rubric o f the Maritime Safety Agency. T h e s e same vessels were called into service by the U n i t e d States at the start o f the Korean War. Thus, without the knowledge o f J a p a n ' s public, several dozen J a p a n e s e minesweepers in late 1950 worked to clear mines in foreign territorial waters—Korean harbors—because the U.S. Navy was woefully short of both minesweeping vessels and e x p e r i e n c e d crews. 3 8 In 1987 the situation was not all that different from 1950. T h e U.S. Navy was again short of both minesweepers and experienced crews. In fact, one might say that minesweeping was one organizational response to a crisis the U.S. Navy was not prepared to make; after all, Americans had not needed to clear mines from their own waters since 1942. T h e U.S. Navy had not launched a single new minesweeper since 1958, and the few that it operated by 1987 were in the Naval Reserve and in need of some repair were they to be sent overseas. Testifying before Congress, the secretary o f the navy explained that his organization "spent more than 25 years not developing or buying new minesweepers or minehunters." 3 9 T h e United States had tended to rely on NATO allies for minesweeping chores, and U.S. naval officers saw mine countermeasures as a career dead-end. By contrast, the J M S D F operated forty-two modern mine warfare ships and had e x p e r i e n c e d crews to match. Many officers at comm a n d level had served years aboard minesweepers and had contributed their experience in mine countermeasures to the construction o f new minesweeping ships. Moreover, J a p a n had about five dozen escort vessels equipped with some o f the latest technology. In operational terms, the United States' request for help from the J M S D F was quite logical.

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T h e JDA's Maritime Staff Office (MSO) in 1987, aware that the United States had made a request for a Japanese contribution to the police action in the Persian Gulf, began to calculate what would be r e q u i r e d were they i n d e e d to deploy minesweepers that far away. 40 This "case study" (what Americans would call a contingency plan) proved n o t to be useful in 1987-1988 because this time the cabinet decided against deploying JSDF p e r s o n n e l abroad. But the study proved extremely useful in 1990-1991 when organizational responses to the Persian Gulf crisis were reconsidered. 4 1 In addition to the MSO's unofficial plans made in 1988, a private think tank in Tokyo u n d e r t o o k its own study of the situation. T h e think tank's m e m b e r s h i p included a n u m b e r of the Liberal Democratic Party's elected officials as well as a n u m b e r of retired JSDF admirals and generals. Unlike the MSO, the think tank had no legal restrictions and could publicly suggest and discuss what it chose to. O n behalf of this "strategy a n d research center," two retired JMSDF admirals went aboard U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf to observe the allied o p e r a t i o n a n d r e p o r t back w h e t h e r and how JMSDF participation in escort missions might be feasible in the future. T h e admirals' report subsequently circulated in the Diet, Foreign Ministry, a n d the MSO. 4 2 T h e r e p o r t c o n c l u d e d that the JMSDF could successfully undertake an escort or minesweeping mission in the Persian Gulf. So it was that when the next Persian Gulf crisis broke just 2 years later, in August 1990, the scenario was repeated. It was reported that as early as August 1990 President Bush, in a private conversation with Prime Minister Kaifu, suggested that J a p a n might contribute minesweepers to the allied buildup. 4 3 Australia's prime minister, Robert Hawke, said in September 1990 that he would "welcome a J a p a n e s e decision to send minesweepers to the Gulf or get involved militarily in other ways." 44 Britain's foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, also visited Tokyo in September to say, "If J a p a n can manage it within its Constitution, it can contribute armed forces. That is fine. We welcome Japanese minesweepers." 4 5 These officials were all well aware of the particular organizational response J a p a n was capable of making. Meanwhile, back in J a p a n , the JMSDF quietly dusted off the studies it had made in 1987-1988 and began to update and revise those plans as the public a n d private debates began anew over how to res p o n d to the Persian Gulf situation. In that 1991 debate, advocates for the JMSDF could argue with some conviction n o t only the legality of an overseas d e p l o y m e n t of the JSDF but, m o r e i m p o r t a n t , that the JMSDF was perfectly capable of p e r f o r m i n g the mission— that minesweeping was an appropriate response to the crisis and that risks were minimal. 4 6 (See Table 5.1 for a Persian Gulf conflict chronology.)

102 Table 5.1

Japan's Navy Gulf War Chronology

2 August 1990 5 August 6 August 7 August 17 August 29 August 30 August 14 September 16 October 8 November 29 November 6 December 17 January 1991 24 January 18 February 24 February 28 February 2 March 24 April 26 April 28 April 26 May 5 June

JASDF

Iraq invades Kuwait. Japan announces ban on oil imports from, and trade with, Iraq. UN Security Council passes Resolution 661 imposing economic sanctions on Iraq. Japan as member of the Security Council supports the resolution. United States announces deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia. Iraq announces that foreign nationals remaining in Iraq and Kuwait are hostages. Tokyo announces assistance for refugee relief and countries neighboring Iraq. No dollar amount announced. Tokyo announces that aid will amount to $1 billion. Tokyo announces that aid will amount to $4 billion. UN Peace Cooperation Bill introduced in Japanese Diet. United States announces doubling of forces in Saudi Arabia. Peace Cooperation Bill withdrawn from Diet. UN Security Council sets 15 January deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Iraq announces that hostages will be released. Operation Desert Storm begins with air strikes. Tokyo announces $9 billion aid package and willingness to use JASDF transports to airlift refugees. USS Princeton and Tripoli strike mines. Ground attack begins. Cease-fire. Final ground battle. Tokyo announces deployment of minesweepers. Minesweepers leave port. Minesweepers rendezvous at Kasari Bay. Minesweepers arrive at Dubai, United Arab Emirates. JMSDF's minesweeping operations begin.

Routines

When the moment came in 1991 to decide whether Japan could make an outward and visible sign of support for the UN allies, the cabinet did have a second feasible plan from the JDA. The JASDF had offered its organizational response to the Persian Gulf crisis: air transport. This service had cemented plans to help repatriate refugees from Iraq's neighbor, Jordan. The plan was convincing enough that in January 1991 the cabinet made the legal preparations to allow the JASDF to fly its transport planes overseas. 47 It appeared as though the JASDF would be the first service to break the barrier to overseas deployment. JASDF pilots were on alert for several weeks in January and February of 1991 as the war began in earnest. U.S. Air Force officers briefed JASDF pilots on air routes to the region, standard procedures, possible dangers, and even desert survival techniques. Pallets with food, spare parts, medicines, and other supplies were set out and ready to be loaded—if orders came for the JASDF. 48

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There was, however, a flaw in the JASDF plan. The success of the JASDF's organizational response—which included air control, maintenance, and refueling—depended upon the cooperation of the country into which the JASDF planes were to fly. The Kingdom of Jordan, supporting Iraq and having a large and restless population of Palestinians, was not enthusiastic about the United States' Japanese ally operating in Amman. 4 9 Further, the airlift of refugees turned out not to require the specialized services of an armed air force, especially one whose C-130 transport planes could each carry only thirty passengers. (Large civilian airliners were already doing the work of ferrying refugees.) Plenty of civilian aircraft were available to the UN's International Organization for Migration, which was experienced in coordinating the evacuation of refugees.

The Final Choice In the end orders came for the JMSDF, not the JASDF. This was predictable. Of the three branches of the JSDF, only the JMSDF had had substantial overseas experience since it had been allowed for almost two decades to conduct overseas training missions. Another important difference was that the JMSDF was well ahead of its sister services in planning, experience, and the effort to convince the cabinet that its mission could be completed. In contrast to the JMSDF, which had begun its planning (or replanning) in early September 1990, the JASDF did not initiate any studies until early November 1990—almost 4 months after the Persian Gulf crisis began. (The J G S D F had begun even later and made only minimal progress.) The cabinet could select JMSDF plans simply because it was by then familiar with those plans and confident in the prospect for success. 50 Thus it was somewhat misleading when J S D F Chief of Staff Makoto Sakuma, a JMSDF officer, announced on 15 April 1991 that the government had formally asked the J S D F to "consider formation of a minesweeper squadron, equipment needs, and compile specific information on floating mines in the Gulf." 5 1 Such a squadron had been "considered" quite thoroughly, and, in fact, the planning was done. Only 1 week later the government announced its intention to deploy the minesweepers overseas, and days later the minesweepers left port to travel to the other side of the world. 52 In fact, long before Sakuma made his 15 April "request" of the JMSDF, plans were ready, the JMSDF was ready, and the task was well rehearsed. The "organizational output" of the JMSDF had triumphed over that of other organizations.

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This organizational theory also explained why the minesweeping flotilla carried with it no helicopters, a peculiar omission according to some commentators. Helicopters would have served as both scouts for shallow mines and as crucial rescue transport in the event of disaster. Without its helicopters, the flotilla had to coordinate its sweeps closely with U.S. and German flotillas to take advantage of their helicopters. T h e widely accepted explanation for leaving the helicopters behind was that their inclusion would have required an extra support ship and that this escort ship with a helicopter bay would give an offensive, or even warlike, look to the flotilla. This was possibly true. Nonetheless, one editorialist for the daily Sankei Shimbun concluded that the concern about image was "silly." 53 He was disappointed that it was the MSO and not the cabinet that decided to leave out the helicopters. But he also interviewed a staff officer who explained, "We were afraid that the whole project would be scrapped if we asked for too much." 5 4 This was not only an immediate and legitimate concern, given the novelty of the JMSDF mission, but it had been part of the plan all along. The problem with sending helicopters on an escort vessel went back to deliberations in 1988: from the beginning the MSO had known that it would have to sell its organizational output to the cabinet and the public. Not including the helicopters and the escort ship softened the edges of the MSO's suggested dispatch of naval vessels flying the Japanese flag in Persian Gulf waters. T h e MSO did not ask for helicopters and it did not get them. But the JMSDF plan had gone ahead; other plans had not.

The JMSDF Leaves

Home

This turned out to be not the "belated dispatch of four small wooden minesweepers" but rather a well-planned deployment of modern warships with experienced crews. Six ships were deployed in all. T h e combined crews numbered 511. The flagship, Hayase, was 2,000 tons. Her four minesweeping companions were each 510 tons, and each was a relatively new ship commissioned since 1988. 5 5 One tender with a displacement of 8,150 tons also went along. 5 6 Naturally, the four minesweepers had wooden hulls, which minimized the possibility of accidentally detonating magnetic mines. 57 It was debatable whether this particular organizational response by Japan was belated. It may have been the case that public relations with the United States would have been better had the deployment in the Persian Gulf episode come sooner rather than later. It also may have been the case that no response would have satisfied a Western public primed to discount all that the Japanese government did. Whichever the case, had Japan's minesweepers been sent much earlier

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in the crisis they probably would have been of little use to an ally that for a long time had not valued mine countermeasures in its planning. In Operation Desert Shield, U.S. Navy minesweepers were a low priority. T h e i r assigned p o r t was Abu Dhabi, some 500 miles f r o m the minefield. Moreover, before February 1991 these ships were not even assigned the support vessel that would allow them to operate at sea for e x t e n d e d periods. Thus U.S. minesweepers spent the m o n t h s leading u p to the outbreak of hostilities in training, and were not to see action until well after the air war had gotten u n d e r way. General Schwarzkopf, c o m m a n d e r of the allied forces, had decided that he did n o t want a minesweeping operation to touch off any explosions or c o n f r o n t a t i o n s b e f o r e the d e a d l i n e of the allied ultimatum had passed on 15 J a n u a r y 1991. Also, as it turned out, the allied plan of attack on the Iraqi army did not include an amphibious assault on the Kuwaiti coast. Therefore, whatever minesweeping that took place in the period after the ultimatum and before the allied ground attack was little more than an effort to keep up the appearance that an amphibious landing might occur. 58 Had Japan's minesweepers been deployed in a more timely fashion, in S e p t e m b e r 1990 for example, they merely would have kept o t h e r allied minesweepers company in Abu Dhabi. T h e actual usefulness of this particular organizational response by the JMSDF would have been r e n d e r e d minimal by the organizational outputs of the U.S. armed forces that did not include or require mine countermeasures. But the deployment of the JMSDF minesweepers was n o t irrelevant. Antishipping mines being the p o o r man's device, Iraq h a d sowed some 1,100 of t h e m in a h u g e semicircle 30 to 60 miles f r o m the Kuwaiti coast. 5 9 In all, twenty-nine minesweepers and ten s u p p o r t ships f r o m eight countries were kept busy for a long summer. 6 0 By all accounts, the JMSDF p e r f o r m e d at the elevated level expected given its long experience in, and organizational attention to, minesweeping. 6 1 In sum, J a p a n ' s various policy responses to the Persian Gulf war were in large measure what J a p a n e s e organizations h a d b e e n prepared to do before the war. T h e a m o u n t and kind of preparation for these responses was in direct p r o p o r t i o n to the kinds of experiences that J a p a n ' s organizations had b e e n t h r o u g h a n d l e a r n e d f r o m . Rather than concluding that weak and hesitant responses to the Persian Gulf crisis had revealed some d e e p flaw in Japan's government, o n e might just as well conclude that J a p a n ' s organizations had had minimal exposure to the type and intensity of international crisis generated by the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf episode. All in all, however, u n d e r slightly irregular circumstances J a p a n ' s policy responses were within the predictable range of organizational routines.

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Notes 1. An earlier and m o r e polemical version o f this chapter can be f o u n d in Peter J . Woolley, "Japan's 1991 Minesweeping Decision: An Organizational Response," Asian Survey X X X V I , 8 (August 1 9 9 6 ) : pp. 8 0 4 - 8 1 7 . 2. "Japan S e n d i n g Minesweepers to Persian Gulf," Washington Post, 25 April 1991, p. A21. See also "Japan May Help Sweep Mines from Persian Gulf Waters," Washington Post, 12 April 1991, p. A30. 3. "Japanese Minesweepers Set Sail for Persian Gulf," Washington Post, 27 April 1991, p. A l l , A15. 4. "Japan, by S e n d i n g Minesweepers to Gulf, Takes Step Toward B r o a d e r World Role," Wall Street Journal, 25 April 1991, p. A10. 5. T h e advantages and disadvantages o f the t h r e e m o d e l s — r a t i o n a l actor, governmental politics, and organizational routines—were reviewed in C h a p t e r 1. T h e models were originally p r e s e n t e d by G r a h a m T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1 9 7 1 ) . 6. "Where's T h e i r Fair Share?" New York Times, 6 September 1990, p. A26. 7. For a fuller a c c o u n t see Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "Chronicling J a p a n ' s Crisis Diplomacy," Japan Echo X I X , 1 (Spring 1 9 9 2 ) : pp. 3 6 - 4 2 translated from "Wangan senso to Nihon n o gaiko," Kokusai Mondai (August 1 9 9 1 ) : pp. 2 - 1 3 . On burden sharing, see Danny Unger, "Japan and the Gulf War: Making the World Safe f o r J a p a n - U . S . Relations," in Andrew B e n n e t t , J o s e p h Lepgold, and Danny Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War (New York: St. Martin's, 1 9 9 7 ) , pp. 1 3 7 - 1 6 3 . 8. For an e x c e l l e n t treatment o f American perceptions see R. Christop h e r Perry "American T h e m e s Regarding J a p a n : T h e Persian Gulf Case," in R o b e r t J . Puckett, ed., The United States and Northeast Asia (Chicago: NelsonHall Publishers, 1 9 9 3 ) , pp. 2 7 3 - 2 9 9 . 9. "Japan's New Frustration," Washington Post, 17 March 1991, p. A21. 10. Flora Lewis, " T h e G r e a t Game o f Gai-atsu," New York Times, 1 May 1991, p. A25. And see also Walter Russell Mead's op-ed p i e c e in the Times, "Germany and J a p a n — D r a g g i n g T h e i r Boots," 3 February 1991, p. 19. Mead at least c o m p a r e d J a p a n with the o t h e r U.S. ally whose military had b e e n rehabilitated after defeat in World War II. 11. J o h n B J u d i s , " B u r d e n Shirking," New Republic, 4 March 1991, p. 21. 12. D o n a l d H e l l m a n n , "Japan's Bogus Constitutional Excuses in the Gulf," Wall Street Journal, 6 February 1991, p. A12. 13. David Arase, "New Directions in J a p a n e s e Security Policy," Contemporary Security Policy 15, 2 (August 1 9 9 4 ) : p. 46. 14. See also Courtney Purrington and A. K., "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf Crisis," Asian Sitroey X X X I , 4 (April 1 9 9 1 ) : p. 322; and David Yamada, " R e a r m i n g J a p a n : A Militech Society," Current Politics and Economics of Japan 1, 1 ( 1 9 9 1 ) : p. 16. 15. "Japan, by S e n d i n g Minesweepers to the Gulf, Takes Step Toward B r o a d e r World R o l e , " Wall Street Journal, 25 April 1991, p. A10. 16. See, for example, Kyoko Inoue, "Respect the J a p a n e s e Constitution," Chicago Tribune, 20 February 1991, p. 12; Urban L e h n e r , "Tokyo's Full Support for U.S. in Gulf Is Limited by Public Apathy," Wallstreet Journal, ^January 1991, p. A8; and Steven R. Weisman, "Test f o r J a p a n ' s L e a d e r : Kaifu Faces Growing Difficulty in Building a Consensus on Tokyo's Role in G u l f War," New York Times, 8 February 1991, p. A l . 17. "Japan's New Frustration," Washington Post, 17 March 1991, p. A21.

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18. Ibid., p. 26. 19. " X I N H U A o n J a p a n ' s SDF D e p l o y m e n t to Gulf," FBIS Daily Report, China, 23 April 1991, p. 5. See also " R o u n d u p o n J a p a n ' s T r o o p Dispatch," 24 April 1991, p p . 4 - 5 ; a n d "Li P e n g Discusses Minesweepers," 2 May 1991, p. 13; Yang Bojiang, "Gulf War Challenges J a p a n ' s Foreign Policy," Beijing Review, 2 2 - 2 8 April 1991, p p . 9 - 1 1 . 20. "Japanese I n t e n t i o n s in Gulf Worries N e i g h b o r s , " FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union, 24 O c t o b e r 1990, p. 13. 21. "Philippines D e m a n d s Rationale," FBIS Daily Report, China, 30 April 1991, p. 2. 22. "Lee o n J a p a n ' s D e p l o y m e n t in Gulf, U.S. Bases," FBIS Daily Report, East Asia, 8 N o v e m b e r 1990, p. 34. 23. O n e better considered view—which unfortunately e m e r g e d long after the Persian Gulf conflict—incorporated symbolic reasons with long-range goals a n d selfish gain. "The m a i n reasons [for t h e d e p l o y m e n t of minesweepers] were (1) to provide a symbolic gesture of h u m a n s u p p o r t for multinational eff o r t a n d strengthen U.S.-Japan ties; (2) to break the deadlock within the country o n nonfinancial contributions to world problems a n d serve as a p r e c e d e n t f o r f u t u r e SDF dispatch abroad; a n d (3) to allow J a p a n e s e companies to be inc l u d e d in lucrative reconstruction projects in the Gulf Region." See Courtney P u r r i n g t o n , "Tokyo's Policy Responses D u r i n g the Gulf War a n d the Impact of the 'Iraqi Shock' o n J a p a n , " Pacific Affairs 65, 2 ( S u m m e r 1992): p. 171. 24. Figuratively, l o n g a n d c a r e f u l c o n s e n s u s b u i l d i n g b u t literally, cutting a r o u n d the roots of a p l a n t b e f o r e t r a n s p l a n t i n g . 25. A system of inclusive discussion or talking a r o u n d . 26. C h i n e s e P r e m i e r Li P e n g in M a r c h 1991 w a r n e d t h e P e o p l e ' s Congress t h a t "the Chinese a n d J a p a n e s e p e o p l e s h o u l d m a i n t a i n c o m m o n alertness against t h e t e n d e n c y of a h a n d f u l of p e o p l e toward reviving J a p a n e s e militarism." For text see "Li P e n g Delivers R e p o r t at 25 March Session," FBIS Daily Report, China, 27 March 1991, p p . 9 - 3 6 . 27. " S i n g a p o r e Press Cites Action," FBIS Daily Report, China, 30 April 1991, p p . 2 - 3 . 28. T h e q u e s t i o n of u n i q u e n e s s is reviewed in C h a p t e r 1 of this v o l u m e . For t h e m o s t lucid a r g u m e n t against t h e e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r of J a p a n ' s cult u r e see Steven R. Reed, Making Common Sense ofJapan (Pittsburgh: University of P i t t s b u r g h Press, 1993); a n d Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation ( A r m o n k , N.Y.: M. E. S h a r p e , 1998). 29. G r a h a m T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 4-5. 30. Ibid., p. 67. 31. Perry, "American T h e m e s . " 32. Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 6. 33. Ibid., p. 144. 34. Ibid., p. 67. 35. Ibid., p. 68. 36. See various stories in FBIS-EAS Daily Report: "Readiness to Share Gulf Convoy Costs Shown," 14 S e p t e m b e r 1987; "Dispatch of Patrol Boats to Gulf R u l e d O u t , " 21 S e p t e m b e r 1987; "Official Rules O u t Military Role in Gulf," 24 S e p t e m b e r 1987; " N a k a s o n e Accepts Responsibility in Gulf," 30 Septemb e r 1987; "Shared Cost of P r o t e c t i n g Gulf S h i p p i n g U r g e d , " 2 O c t o b e r 1987; " G o v e r n m e n t D r a f t s Gulf Assistance P r o g r a m " a n d " N a k a s o n e A p p r o v e s Plan," 6 O c t o b e r 1987.

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37. See, f o r e x a m p l e , J a p a n e s e D e f e n s e Agency, Defense of Japan 1990 (trans, by Japan Times), p. 81. For f o r e i g n aid statistics a n d a s u m m a r y of prog r a m s a n d motivations see R o b e r t Orr, The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power (New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1990). 38. T h e s t a n d a r d a c c o u n t of this is J a m e s Auer, The Postwar Rearmament ofJapanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971 (New York: Praeger, 1973), p p . 63-68. 39. Secretary of t h e Navy H. Lawrence G a r r e t t III, testimony of 21 February 1991 q u o t e d in T a m a r a Moser Melia, Damn the Torpedoes: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Navy Historical C e n t e r , 1991), p. 129. See also J o h n F. Tarpey, "A M i n e s t r u c k Navy Forgets Its History," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114 (February 1988): p p . 44-47. 40. See P e t e r J. Woolley, "Low Level Military T h r e a t s a n d t h e F u t u r e of J a p a n ' s A r m e d Forces," Conflict Quarterly XIII, 4 (Fall 1993): p p . 6 4 - 6 5 ; "Readiness to Share Gulf Convoy Cost Shown," FBIS Daily Report, East Asia, 14 S e p t e m b e r 1987, p. 2. 41. Such a study could n o t be r e f e r r e d to as a c o n t i n g e n c y plan because c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n n i n g i m p l i e d t h a t f o r m a l a u t h o r i t y h a d b e e n i m p a r t e d to the J D A or MSO a n d that in some m e a s u r e t h e action c o n t a i n e d in the plan has b e e n legally s a n c t i o n e d . 42. A u t h o r ' s interview (25 July 1991) with Adm. M a n a b u Yoshida, JMSDF (ret.) a n d Vice Adm. Taketo Takata, JMSDF (ret.) who went to the Persian Gulf a n d wrote the r e p o r t . See also "Japan Discusses S e n d i n g Troops Overseas," FBIS Daily Report, China, 19 April 1988, p. 16; "Vinogradov Views J a p a n ' s Persian Gulf Plans," FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union, 21 April 1988, p. 6. 43. "Bush Reportedly Asked Kaifu f o r SDF Dispatch," FBIS Daily Report, East Asia, 16 O c t o b e r 1991, p. 1. 44. "Hawke 'Would W e l c o m e ' J a p a n e s e Military Role," FBIS Daily Report, East Asia, 18 S e p t e m b e r 1990, p. 74. 45. "Britain's H u r d Urges S e n d i n g of Troops to Gulf," FBIS Daily Report, East Asia, 11 S e p t e m b e r 1990, p. 7. 46. Allison, Essence of Decision, p p . 113-114, says t h a t in t h e organizational process m o d e l "the political leaders who sit a t o p g o v e r n m e n t organizations d o m a k e m a j o r decisions a b o u t which o r g a n i z a t i o n s shall play o u t what p r o g r a m s where." 47. Several articles o n this d e v e l o p m e n t a p p e a r e d in FBIS-EAS, Daily Report, 25 J a n u a r y 1991: " C a b i n e t to Allow Gulf Dispatch of SDF Planes," p p . 1 - 2 ; "Advance T e a m to P r e p a r e Way," p. 2; "Kaifu T e l e p h o n e s Bush," p. 3; " F u r t h e r o n Additional Gulf Aid," p p . 8 - 9 . 48. A u t h o r ' s interview with JASDF officers a n d i n s t r u c t o r s at t h e Air Staff College a n d Yokota Air Base, July 1991. 49. "Jordan ' U n c o m m i t t e d ' o n SDF Evacuation Plan," FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 31 J a n u a r y 1991, pp. 2-3: " G o v e r n m e n t to Rescind SDF D e p l o y m e n t Ord i n a n c e , " FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 19 April 1991, p. 16. 50. This was also the conclusion of several m e m b e r s of Sorifu, t h e P r i m e Minister's Research Office, interviewed by t h e a u t h o r 24 July 1991. JSDF officers in various b r a n c h e s a g r e e d with this assessment as did S h u n j i Taoka, a senior staff writer f o r Asahi Shimbun, interviewed by t h e a u t h o r o n 9 August 1991, who called t h e decision a "bureaucratic predisposition" a n d "not a cultural o n e . " 51. For Sakuma's press c o n f e r e n c e see "Study of Minesweeping Mission O r d e r e d , " FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 16 April 1991, p. 11. See also "Decision o n

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Minesweeper Dispatch 'Likely' in May," FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 19 April 1991, pp. 1 1 - 1 2 . 52. Planning had to take into a c c o u n t that the minesweepers could keep to sea only 1 week at a time. T h e voyage to the Persian Gulf required ports o f call at Subic Bay, Philippines; Singapore; Penang, Malaysia; Colombo, Sri Lanka; and Karachi, Pakistan. 53. U s h i b a Akihiko, " T h e Minesweeping Mission: A J o b Well D o n e , " Japan Echo, X I X , 1 (Spring 1 9 9 2 ) : pp. 4 3 - 5 0 (translated from "Sokaitei n o 188 nichi ga touta m o n o , " Chuo Koron, J a n u a r y 1992, pp. 1 5 8 - 1 6 9 ) . 54. Ibid., p. 46. 55. J D S Yurishima and Hikoshima were commissioned in D e c e m b e r 1988. J D S Awashima and Sakushima were c o m m i s s i o n e d in D e c e m b e r 1989. Minesweepers are by definition small, about the size o f an o c e a n g o i n g fishing boat. 56. J D S Tokiwa with a crew o f 135. 57. Even with wooden hulls the minesweepers underwent demagnetizing b e f o r e e n t e r i n g a their sweep zone. T h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n o f minesweeping technology was not available until the end o f the decade: u n m a n n e d remotec o n t r o l l e d d r o n e ships driven a h e a d o f a p a r e n t platform. See David Foxwell, "New T e c h n o l o g y Tackles the Mine T h r e a t , " Jane's Defence Systems Modernization X , 2 (June 1 9 9 7 ) : pp. 2 2 - 2 5 . 58. Even so, two U.S. Navy warships, Tripoli and Princeton, hit mines. " T h e mining o f two important Navy warships in waters believed to b e minefree o n c e again emphasized the U.S. Navy's recognized failure to sustain adequate c o m b a t MCM capability." Melia, Damn the Torpedos, p. 129. 59. Most o f the mines were o f Italian or Soviet make. Even a single rep o r t o f a single m i n e inhibits shipping. For a detailed description o f the p r o b l e m o f mines in the Persian Gulf see David K. Brown and David Foxwell, " R e p o r t from the F r o n t : MCM and the T h r e a t B e n e a t h the S u r f a c e , " International Defense Review 7 ( 1 9 9 1 ) : pp. 7 3 5 - 7 4 1 . 60. Participating were the United States, U n i t e d Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, and J a p a n . 61. See, for example, Akihiko, "Minesweeping Mission," whose a c c o u n t o f the flotilla's success is enthusiastic.

6 UN Peacekeeping Operations: Realism, Caution, Incrementalism

For a half-century following its defeat in World War II, J a p a n dwelled in the shadow of the United States and h a n d l e d questions of defense policy almost entirely t h r o u g h the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. But in that half-century, J a p a n became the world's largest d o n o r of foreign economic aid, the world's largest creditor, and the leading exp o r t e r of investment capital. By the 1980s its h u g e trade surpluses had become an irritation to its trading partners: its corporate wealth was almost legendary. J a p a n had the world's second largest GNP. Japanese business had established a substantial presence t h r o u g h o u t the developing world, reaching far beyond East Asia to South America and to Africa. At the same time that J a p a n ' s economy was recovering and booming, the military establishment was also rejuvenated. From 1951 to 1991 J a p a n p r e p a r e d a conventional defense against the Soviet Union. Of course, J a p a n rebuilt its military as it did its economy in the shadow of East-West rivalry and as a partner of the United States. But by the time the haze of the long Cold War had lifted, J a p a n ' s G r o u n d Self-Defense Force was larger than that of Great Britain. 1 Its Maritime Self-Defense Force was, after that of the United States, the most p o t e n t in the Pacific. If m e a s u r e d in U.S. dollars, J a p a n ' s defense expenditures were the third largest in the world. 2 By the time the Soviet U n i o n collapsed in 1991, J a p a n h a d military attachés in twenty-nine embassies a r o u n d the world, including in most of the Pacific Rim nations. A decade shy of the new century it was clear that J a p a n ' s geopolitical equation h a d radically altered: (1) the Soviet U n i o n h a d strangely and suddenly dissolved and (2) J a p a n had acquired a huge stake in the economic status quo of the world order. J a p a n had both the capacity and the interest in contributing to the defense of the international security of a peaceful, free-trading world order. Ill

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There were, to be sure, incremental changes in Japan's defense policy over several decades that had led to Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations in distant corners. But these policy changes might also be attributed to a realistic view of international politics and a rational decisionmaking process. Even as many analysts presented a picture of a Japan that shirked international involvement, an equally telling picture was that of a Japan struggling under both internal and external pressures to find ways to contribute more to international security. Japan's first attempts to j o i n UN operations were marred by bitter controversy at home. But the government persevered, overcame the opposition, and succeeded within a few years in contributing personnel to UN operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, and Zaire. How did Japan arrive at a post-Cold War policy that allowed the use of the JSDF in UN peacekeeping operations? The changes were brought about not only by pressure from the United States but by new threats to Japanese security. Among the many problems that grew in proportion to Japan's wealth were terrorism directed specifically against Japanese nationals, piracy on the high seas, conflicting territorial claims on the western Pacific Rim, and threats to the freedom of navigation. One could conclude that Japan pursued—without cynicism—a rational and realistic path in foreign security policies: reassessing threats and readjusting policy to meet those threats. Rational behavior, after all, does not have to be swift or radical. Moreover, many theorists who have embraced the rational model of decisionmaking have suggested an incremental approach to national policy. "Put in its simplest form," according to one summary, "this means that policy makers, especially in democratic states, prefer to separate their decision making problems into small segments that enable them to make incremental or marginal rather than far-reaching, profound, or irreversible choices." 3 Japanese leaders, rather than having a grand strategic design, wrestled over and again with new information and new demands and circumstances and altered course slowly—too slowly for some critics, too quickly for others—but nonetheless in rational ways given the changing domestic and international environment.

Japan as a Target Japan's long-standing postwar preference for a low profile in international affairs could not be maintained so long as Japan's role in international business expanded and its wealth grew. The effect of Japan's emergence as an economic power in the 1980s and its pervasive

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p r e s e n c e in business a r o u n d t h e globe m a d e J a p a n m o r e a n d m o r e t h e o b j e c t of envy. F u r t h e r m o r e , J a p a n ' s close a l i g n m e n t with t h e U n i t e d States in f o r e i g n policy m a d e J a p a n m o r e a n d m o r e the obj e c t of hostility. J a p a n , as befit a global e c o n o m i c power, began to face a variety of threats ranging f r o m banditry to low-level military attacks. In troubled developing countries, J a p a n e s e businessmen b e c a m e a p r e f e r r e d target f o r thieves a n d guerrilla factions searching f o r quick cash a n d expensive jewelry. In o n e typical attack in the Philippines in the s u m m e r of 1990, bandits netted an estimated $17,000 in cash a n d jewelry after a m b u s h i n g f o u r J a p a n e s e businessmen in their car outside Manila. In 1991, in P e r u , guerrillas of t h e S h i n i n g P a t h a t t a c k e d t h e J a p a n e s e Embassy o n the very day that Peru's P r e s i d e n t Fujimori, the son of J a p a n e s e i m m i g r a n t s , a t t e n d e d a c o n f e r e n c e of t h e InterA m e r i c a n D e v e l o p m e n t Bank. 4 T h e c o n f e r e n c e , coincidentally, was b e i n g h e l d in Nagoya, J a p a n . Only m o n t h s later t h r e e car dealers off e r i n g J a p a n e s e cars f o r sale were b o m b e d by the Shining Path. Later that summer, the guerrillas m u r d e r e d t h r e e J a p a n e s e e n g i n e e r s a n d b o m b e d a r e s e a r c h c e n t e r f u n d e d by t h e J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t . 5 W h e n they m u r d e r e d a J a p a n e s e tourist they explained, "He is J a p a n ese like Fujimori." 6 Friction over fishing rights a n d territorial waters b e c a m e comm o n p l a c e by the 1980s. In o n e well-publicized episode in N o v e m b e r 1983, t h e N o r t h K o r e a n g o v e r n m e n t t o o k p r i s o n e r two J a p a n e s e c r e w m e n f r o m t h e f r e i g h t e r Fujisan Maru a f t e r t h e i r vessel strayed i n t o the p o r t of N a m p ' o . T h e two r e m a i n e d in jail f o r 4 years b e f o r e their trial e n d e d in 1987, w h e n they were t h e n s e n t e n c e d to 15 years in prison. T h e Soviets too were n o t o r i o u s l y j e a l o u s of their territorial waters a n d fishing rights, b u t the successor Russian state was every bit as harsh a n d c o n t i n u e d to seize J a p a n e s e fishing boats. 7 To the south, in the East C h i n a Sea, J a p a n e s e fishing boats bec a m e the favorite target of pirates. Such pirates would at times o p e n fire o n the f i s h e r m e n . In o n e such attack by a ship flying t h e flag of the People's Republic of China, ten m e n , some of w h o m were in military u n i f o r m , b o a r d e d a n d searched a J a p a n e s e boat f o r 20 minutes. 8 Piracy was m u c h worse in o t h e r parts of t h e Pacific Rim. In t h e busy straits a r o u n d the I n d o n e s i a n a r c h i p e l a g o piracy thrived. A r e c o r d h i g h of e i g h t e e n ( r e p o r t e d ) acts of piracy against J a p a n e s e ships took place in the Malacca Strait in 1991. It was a r e c o r d year f o r piracy against o t h e r n a t i o n s too in those waters, a n d it p r o m p t e d J a p a n , Singapore, a n d Malaysia to d e m a n d that the I n d o n e s i a n gove r n m e n t patrol t h e straits m o r e effectively. 9 G o v e r n m e n t s as well as b a n d i t s a n d pirates b e g a n to c o n s i d e r J a p a n a worthy target. T h u s in the waters of the Persian Gulf J a p a n ' s

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m e r c h a n t m e n came u n d e r attack. Between January 1987 and July 1988 Iranian revolutionaries attacked up to ten Japanese-owned merchant ships; that four of those ships flew the Japanese flag made no difference. Japan's pervasive economic interests and close identification with the world order status quo meant that Japan could not escape those hostilities previously reserved only for Western governments. Even Japan's good diplomatic and economic relations with Iraq were of little worth in 1990 after Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Kuwait. Nearly 800 Japanese nationals were stranded in Kuwait and Iraq after the invasion. Most were soon released, but 200 Japanese hostages were included among the "human shields" alongside U.S. and British hostages. 10 Following the lead of its largest trading partner and only ally, J a p a n had j o i n e d the United States in condemning the invasion and imposing economic sanctions. Explaining his ecumenical approach to hostage taking and human shields, Saddam Hussein said: We will never allow anybody, whomever he may be, to strangle the people of Iraq without having himself strangled. If we feel that the Iraqi people are being strangled, that there are some who will deal a sanguinary blow to it, we will strangle all who are the cause of this. 11

J a p a n was not exempt f r o m Saddam's machinations any more than any other prosperous industrialized democracy. In sum, what one saw in the last years of the Cold War was a country that, as it had become ensnared in its global economic expansion and matured as a democracy and an ally of the United States, was at once pressured by friends and events to take a more active role in international security affairs. But J a p a n could calculate that a more active role was in its own interest. It had really reached a point where it could be exempted from neither the responsibilities nor the cost of international influence. T h e question remained of what it should do and when.

False Starts Long before Japan passed legislation authorizing participation in UN operations, there were attempts both from within and without to expand Japan's military roles. From without the United States periodically pressured Japan, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. First, there were attempts by both Japanese and Americans to get Japan to contribute more to the alliance. In 1950, for example, the issue was U.S. use of bases in Japan. Prime Minister Yoshida sent his

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finance minister, Hayato Ikeda, in April 1950 to the United States to suggest the Americans could continue to base armed forces in Japan in return for a permanent peace treaty. T h e United States found this appealing, but in J u n e the Korean War began and Americans were using the bases anyway for the purpose of conducting military operations on the Korean Peninsula. In Japan a public and legislative outcry followed, and Yoshida found himself caught between nationalist demands that Japan rearm and pacifist demands that Japan be neutral in the East-West confrontation. Yoshida got a peace treaty but constructed a separate security treaty that gave the United States wide latitude in its use of bases in Japan: the United States would be able to use those bases for military operations in East Asia as it saw fit and without having to consult the Japanese government. At the same time, some Americans, including J o h n Foster Dulles, wanted J a p a n to rearm and perhaps go so far as to amend the constitution to do so—demands that the prime minister was determined to resist. Nonetheless, by 1953, Yoshida accepted aid from the United States under the Mutual Security Act, which would subsidize the reconstruction of a Japanese armed force, and in 1954 the government authorized the organization of theJSDF. Six years later the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty was renegotiated under Prime Minister Kishi. Some Americans were still suggesting that Japan rearm on a larger scale and, further, that it participate actively in collective defense arrangements. Kishi came away with a treaty that did not require Japan to increase the size of its armed forces, and he got many other concessions but could not avoid mass protests against the treaty, the government, and the United States. To Kishi's embarrassment, the protests forced the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan. Still later, as Japan's economy recovered, Japan's defense spending was directed at defraying the expense of basing U.S. armed forces in Japan. By the 1990s more than half the cost of the bases was subsidized by the Japanese government. T h e subsidies were certainly a peculiar feature of the U.S. military presence abroad where, in many instances, the United States was being held up for larger and larger lease payments by the countries hosting U.S. bases. And there was, finally, the effort to have the J M S D F take a greater responsibility in the Cold War task of defending the sea-lanes of communication in the northwest Pacific Ocean. That debate began in the late 1960s and continued beyond the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, but in any case was one more successful attempt to expand Japan's active role within the framework of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. There were also periodic attempts, primarily by the United States but also by UN officials, to lure J a p a n out of its absolutist posture on nonintervention. 1 2 In 1958 and 1961 UN Secretary General Dag

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Hammarskjold asked that Japan contribute J S D F personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. These requests were rebuffed. 1 3 In September 1965, the United States informally requested help from Japan during the Indonesian upheavals that year as thousands of people fell victim to mob violence across the archipelago. Japan flatly refused to become involved. Ten years later, in 1975, the United States informally requested Japanese help in the evacuation of Saigon. The Japanese government determined that constitutionally it could not use military aircraft or military pilots to meet the request but that it might be willing to send the private, commercial jumbo jets of Japan Air Lines (JAL). ButJAL pilots refused what they rightly perceived as a potentially dangerous mission. More than a decade later, the United States requested Japanese assistance in the Persian Gulf action of 1987-1988. It asked Japan to send some of its forty-two minesweepers to U.S. and other NATO naval forces policing the vital oil route from the gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. Japan's government seriously considered the request this time and still refused. But the government did decide to make direct cash payments to the United States to defray the costs of the U.S. deployment of naval escorts in the Persian Gulf. In August 1990, the United States once again suggested that Japan send naval vessels to the Persian Gulf, this time to support the international blockade of Iraq. Once again, and after some deliberation, Japan declined the request but once again did decide to offer several billion dollars of assistance to the United States as the leader of the UN coalition reacting to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Japan also gave financial assistance to Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt, which were suffering economically from lost trade with Iraq. The government also managed to coax 100 physicians to go to Jordan to help cope with the refugees who had flooded across the border from Iraq. Then, most spectacularly, Japan sent a flotilla of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in April 1991. Once the minesweepers were on station, they were explicitly allowed by the JDA to give "fuel, lubricants, fresh water and food" to allied naval vessels, thus lending support to foreign warships in foreign waters. 14

The Right Political Circumstances The right political circumstances for a sea change in Japan's defense policies began to fall into place after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Fresh in the American mind was the memory of Japan's booming economy and high-profile purchases of properties in the

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United States—thus, Americans were unstintingly critical of J a p a n ' s reaction to the crisis, which so obviously impinged on the control of oil supplies f r o m the Persian Gulf states. Rather than seeing Japan's dilemma, editorialists in the United States saw Japan's government as purposely evasive or cheap or simply irrationally detached f r o m the international scene. This American criticism was different f r o m any that had gone before. It was not merely more carping about Japan's contribution to the alliance or the burdens of defense against communist states. This time the whole world had c o n d e m n e d the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and this time an u n p r e c e d e n t e d international coalition was being assembled that would include at least token military detachments f r o m dozens of countries m u c h smaller in population, or in size, and certainly in wealth than J a p a n . This time, J a p a n seemed n o t to be shrugging its governmental shoulders at the representatives of the United States but brushing off the vast majority of states in the United Nations. Moreover, Mikhail Gorbachev had drawn the fangs of his own Soviet Union. The Soviets had c o n d e m n e d the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and p u t up little resistance to the military coalition led by the United States against Saddam Hussein. Without the automatic opposition of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, the UN suddenly appeared to have a wholly different kind of legitimacy and potential for collective military action—putting the question more squarely than ever before as to whether and how J a p a n would contribute to the e n f o r c e m e n t of UN initiatives. Within J a p a n , nationalist conservatives f o u n d in the crisis a new opportunity to press the case for removing limits on the JSDF. Internationalists too could hardly deny the n e e d to rethink J a p a n ' s prohibition of contributions to any kind of foreign military o p e r a t i o n u n d e r any circumstances. It was surprisingly clear, and shocking, to others that J a p a n ' s monetary contributions in s u p p o r t of the coalition were received not gratefully but suspiciously—if not disdainfully. As the Persian Gulf crisis wore on t h r o u g h the fall of 1990, as criticism of J a p a n was unabated, and as many Japanese elites were themselves frustrated by the government's slow-motion reactions, debate began openly about the possibility of contributing manpower to UN forces. O n e editorial writer for Yomiuri Shimbun summarized the shift of circumstances: In order to meet the challenge we face, it is urgent that we re-evaluate the constitutional interpretations that have been accumulated throughout the Cold War era and establish a new route to peace based on a new perspective in the days of the "post-Cold War." For example, there is the interpretation that the collective right of selfdefense is unconstitutional, but there is no express stipulation to

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that effect in the constitution. It is merely the interpretation of successive cabinets, formulated within the framework of the Cold War.15 T h e end of the Cold War and new circumstances suggested the n e e d to change Japan's policy. Policy would indeed change, but n o t before some foundering. O n e last false start would take place in the fall of 1990 as J a p a n searched for a reasonable response to the international crisis. Ichiro Ozawa, secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party, engin e e r e d a UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Bill, a n d Prime Minister Kaifu introduced it to the Diet. T h e bill was m e a n t to allow J a p a n to make limited contributions to the allied coalition against Iraq. U n d e r this proposal, a "peace cooperation corps" u n d e r civilian leadership would be able to recruit volunteers but also make use of JSDF p e r s o n n e l for n o n c o m b a t a n t operations. Central to the legislation was that m e m b e r s of the JSDF could participate in this overseas intervention, and not just civilian volunteers or JSDF members on temporary leave. The proposal to deploy members of the JSDF naturally sparked loud opposition. Since Prime Minister Kaifu was himself unwilling to press the issue, the bill had to be withdrawn. 1 6 T h e defeat in the legislature was no surprise. J a p a n had for decades explicitly avoided security a r r a n g e m e n t s outside the U.S.Japanese Security Treaty, and had for just as long avoided debate on the transformation of the military status quo. Neither Japanese legislators nor private citizens were prepared for a sudden break with past policy. T h e Diet debate over the cooperation bill centered not on the question of what J a p a n could do in the crisis b u t what J a p a n could not do. 1 7 Moreover, in the fall of 1990 no one knew how the Persian Gulf crisis would play out. No one knew that the coalition led by the United States would hold together, deal Saddam Hussein a quick and convincing defeat with few allied casualties, and finally withdraw its forces f r o m the theater of operations without sparking a revolution in regional politics or even driving up the price of oil. Members of the Japanese public and their legislators were hardly unique in their trepidations a b o u t w h e t h e r a war in the Persian Gulf region would lead to an open-ended, bloody, and financially ruinous long-term involvement. T h e i m p o r t a n t and u n p r e c e d e n t e d response was that JSDF legislation was introduced and that the deployment of the JSDF abroad was d e b a t e d — n o t defeated. 1 8 T h e Persian Gulf crisis had forced the issue of participation in international military operations into the o p e n and p r e p a r e d the way for subsequent legislation, debate, and eventual passage. In fact, the Persian Gulf crisis a n d the domestic debate worked changes on both public o p i n i o n and on the positions of the party

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leaders. For example, in August 1989, a year before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a Japanese poll showed that only 22 percent of respondents might approve of JSDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations, while a hefty 46 percent opposed the idea outright. Another 30 percent "didn't know" or "could not say in a word." But in the same poll, 72 percent of respondents approved the idea of the JSDF's being deployed abroad for "disaster relief activities," an activity with which the public was familiar. The poll results suggested that the actual details of foreign assignments of the JSDF were of central importance to the public and, more important, that with more details forthcoming there was room for change. 1 9 (See Table 6.1 for a chronology of peacekeeping operations.) In September of 1990 most polls in Japan showed, unsurprisingly, a general opposition to cooperation with the allied military effort. Yet more specific questions revealed important distinctions.

Table 6.1

Peacekeeping Operations Chronology

August 1989 2 August 1990 16 October 1990 8 November 1990 24 April 1991 19 September 1991 31 October 1991 18 November 1991 3 December 1991 23 March 1992 May 1992 15 June 1992 17 September 1992 4 May 1993 March/April 1993 14 May 1993 26 September 1993 30 September 1994 18 November 1994 25 December 1994 8 January 1995 31 January 1996

Poll shows 46 percent oppose any use of JSDF for UN peacekeeping; 22 percent in favor; 30 percent undecided. Iraqi invasion of Kuwait begins Persian Gulf crisis. UN Peace Cooperation Bill (UNPCB) introduced in Diet. UNPCB is withdrawn from Diet consideration. Minesweepers dispatched to Persian Gulf without new legislation. New UN peacekeeping operations bill is introduced to Diet. Ceremony marks success and disbandment of special Overseas Minesweeper Force. Diet begins deliberations on new peacekeeping operations bill. House of Representatives approves peacekeeping operations bill. Cambodian Premier Hun Sen visiting Tokyo asks that JSDF participate in the UNTAC. Poll shows 20 percent of the public oppose any use of the JSDF abroad; 68 percent approve the use of Japanese troops for UN peace operations. Diet passes UN Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill. Troops begin deployment to Cambodia. Khmer Rouge ambush results in five Japanese casualties, including one fatality. First JSDF troops deployed to Cambodia are rotated. Forty-eight JSDF troops sent to Mozambique. JSDF engineers return from Cambodia. One hundred JSDF troops sent to Zaire. Legislation passed to allow the JSDF to rescue Japanese citizens abroad in emergency. JSDF personnel return from Zaire. JSDF personnel in Mozambique return home. Forty-three JSDF troops sent to Golan Heights.

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Opinion was evenly split over whether to send transport planes to evacuate refugees. Opinion favored sending such civilian personnel as physicians or technicians to help the allies. And a survey of business leaders showed that 77 percent supported the idea of sending JASDF planes to assist in the transport of refugees. Almost 80 percent of the business leaders agreed that the Persian Gulf conflict raised the "need for law and systems for emergencies." 2 0 A year after the Persian Gulf war was over, and while peacekeeping legislation was being debated in the Diet, a national poll showed that only 20 percent of the public opposed any use of the JSDF abroad and that fully 68 percent approved the use of Japanese troops for UN peacekeeping operations. 2 1 The e n d of the Cold War and the successful operation in the Persian Gulf even led some of the pacifist, or at least neutralist, opposition parties into new territory. T h e Socialist Party, for example, had long insisted not only that the constitution f o r b a d e the overseas dispatch of forces b u t that the JSDF was itself unconstitutional. 2 2 T h e party was vociferous in its opposition to the UN peacekeeping bills of 1990 and 1992. The Socialist Party's members of the lower house had even taken the dramatic step of resigning en wa55«just before the seco n d such bill came to its final vote in a vain attempt to force a general election. 2 3 But even the Socialist Party had been willing to consider f o r m i n g a civilian corps f o r overseas duty provided that the corps m e m b e r s were u n a r m e d . Moreover, some m e m b e r s of the party a r g u e d that it was time to accept the constitutionality of the JSDF. 24 Partly because of its leadership's strident opposition to the peacekeeping operations bills, the Socialist Party suffered a resounding loss in the s u m m e r elections of 1993. In opposition, the party had held 134 seats in the lower legislative house. After the election the party came to power in a coalition government u n d e r Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, b u t with only 73 seats, fewer than it had ever held in its history. What is more, the party indicated that it could compromise its staunch principles on armed forces in o r d e r to participate in a new coalition government. Indeed, after the Socialist Party j o i n e d the ruling coalition in August 1993, the party's leader, Tomiichi Murayama, had himself b e c o m e p r i m e minister by J u n e 1994 and reversed all the party's long-held positions on security affairs. With no irony lost, this Socialist prime minister, whose party had for so long d e n i e d even the legitimacy of self-defense forces, would himself preside over the JSDF's dispatch overseas. 25 T h e Democratic Socialist Party likewise c h a n g e d its position through the pressure of the Persian Gulf war and the post-Cold War realignment. From the beginning of the Persian Gulf crisis the Democratic Socialist Party had agreed that the g o v e r n m e n t could send p e r s o n n e l to the conflict area so long as they were u n a r m e d . T h e

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Democratic Socialist Party leadership also allowed that these personnel could include members of the J S D F so long as they did not wear their J S D F uniforms. A year later, by December 1991, the Democratic Socialists were seriously negotiating with the Liberal Democrats over the new peacekeeping legislation. The former had voted against a version of the peacekeeping operations bill the previous month in the lower house of the Diet, but the legislation had yet to go to the upper house. The Democratic Socialists had extracted a number of concessions from the government, ensuring that the bill would be limited in scope, and consequently they supported the bill. 2 6 Some 20 months after Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu had presided over the first attempt at a peacekeeping operations bill, the government of Prime Minister Miyazawa triumphed with a vote of 329 in favor of the bill, 17 against, and 141 abstentions. 27

The Bill T h e peacekeeping operations bill that finally passed the legislature in J u n e 1992 was as severely criticized as any other significant foreign policy change. Many saw it again as too little and too late, an empty gesture that kept the military on too tight a rein, required no expensive financial commitments, and allowed Japan to continue to concentrate on the business side of its international relations. To the pacifists and to those who feared a resurgence of Japanese militarism the peacekeeping operations bill was one more alarming step in the rehabilitation of Japan's military, now allowing the armed forces to be sent overseas. But the passage of the bill reflected the new circumstances of the post-Cold War era, and the limitations of the bill reflected extreme caution on the part of both the government and public. T h e J S D F would only j o i n UN peacekeeping operations under two restrictive conditions: (1) a cease-fire had to be in place, and (2) all parties to the conflict had to have consented to both the UN force and the participation of Japanese forces. T h e peacekeeping operations law added that the peacekeepers had to maintain impartiality and that if any of these conditions ceased to be met after the deployment that the forces could be withdrawn. Weapons for the J S D F would for all intents be limited to sidearms. 2 8 The legislation also limited the J S D F for several years to such rear-area roles as medical aid, repair of bridges and roads, logistical support, and, of all things, environmental protection. The legislators agreed that, at least for a time, the J S D F would not participate in the riskier business of patrolling neutral zones, collecting weapons, disarming or relocating troops, or monitoring a cease-fire. 29

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The legislation implied that the bulk of the overseas work would be done by the JGSDF—which was, however, the least well prepared of the three service branches for participating in overseas missions. It had never operated abroad, and had trained either for large-scale and conventional ground warfare against a notional Soviet invasion or for civil defense in the event of an earthquake or a similar domestic contingency. T h e JASDF and JMSDF were much more ready to operate abroad in tandem with any amalgam of non-Japanese forces; the JMSDF most of all had a long-rehearsed advantage in allied and joint-service operations. But even if some plan for using primarily the JMSDF best suited the organizational characteristics of the JDA, it was the peacekeeping operations bill as passed that suited best the domestic political equation. Because of the relative inexperience of the JGSDF, and because of the inexperience of the service branches working together, deployments had to be kept small. The JGSDF would have to work up to the complicated tasks of foreign duty under a variety of circumstances and obstacles. And the Japanese public would have to warm up further to the new international role while the government felt its way through the complicated maze of having defense personnel scattered abroad.

Cambodia: Cutting Teeth There were only 2 months between the passage of the peacekeeping operations bill in J u n e 1992 and the deployment ofJSDF personnel to Cambodia in September. In fact the government and the JDA anticipated both the passage of the peacekeeping legislation and the deployment to Cambodia. T h e peacekeeping legislation had first been introduced and withdrawn while the Persian Gulf crisis was heating up, but following the successful military outcome of the subsequent war for Kuwait and the t u r n a r o u n d of public opinion in Japan, it was clear that some kind of legislation would pass, especially because of the JMSDF's successful minesweeping operation. Only the extent of the limits of that legislation was awaited. Indeed, when Cambodian Premier H u n Sen came to Tokyo, it was expected that he would publicly ask for Japan to participate in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Moreover, Japan had quietly and successfully campaigned to have one of its senior diplomats appointed to direct UNTAC. 30 Still, deploying the JGSDF was not like sending minesweepers off to the Persian Gulf. The JMSDF had been minesweeping for decades; was used to occasional, long, and distant deployments; and had had contingency plans, however discreet, for its first out-of-area mission

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the previous year. In contrast, the J G S D F had had little preparation, and, to complicate matters, the mission to Cambodia would require a joint-service effort. After a small advance team went into Cambodia in September 1992, the JASDF airlifted the first army troops to foreign soil. T h e JASDF also lifted UH-1H helicopters to Cambodia while the J M S D F sea-lifted CH-47 helicopters to Thailand to be flown into Cambodia. The bulk of the ground forces was a battalion of 600 engineers from the Middle Army normally based at Itami. Being the last of the UN forces to arrive, they were assigned the last sector, an area in southwestern Cambodia consisting primarily of hilly and heavily forested terrain. T h e i r assignment was to repair two heavily damaged highways. The rest of the Japanese contribution of personnel consisted of seventy-five civilian police officers, eight military observers, and fortyone civilian election monitors. While camp was set up for the engineers the J M S D F provided one supply ship, two landing ships, and berths for those constructing the camp from September through December 1992. J M S D F ships, tied up at the port city of Sihanoukville, also provided bottled water given that the J G S D F was unprepared to purify water or dig wells until several months into the mission. Pilots and crews of the JASDF also gained from the experience. The JASDF airlifted supplies, vehicles, and personnel to Cambodia using C-130H aircraft on weekly flights from Japan for over a year. In fact, while things went reasonably well for the air and maritime forces, the ground forces encountered many problems. Credentials, identification tags, and license plates were slow to be issued, sometimes lost, and difficult to replace. Minefields made the engineers cautious and cost time. Basic materials for road paving were delivered after long delays. Coordination with local governments and with the headquarters for UNTAC was poor. In fact, the prime minister's office had unwisely refused a J S D F request to detach several officers for staff duty at the UNTAC headquarters. In addition, the Japanese government, so concerned that things must go right, required the J S D F to relay every request and every order through the government support offices. Such micromanagement delayed responses, created confusion at the operational level, and hampered logistical coordination. 3 1 The government had also predictably limited the rules of engagement to ensure that no engagement would take place: members of the J S D F could use their weapons—limited to sidearms—in self-defense but in defense of absolutely no one else. Despite the problems, in 6 months the engineers would repair forty bridges and repave about sixty miles of roads before these personnel were rotated in April 1993. All seemed to go well enough.

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It was on 4 May that an ambush by Khmer Rouge guerrillas wounded five Dutch soldiers and four Japanese and killed a Japanese policeman, Haruyuki Takata. This death, the second of a Japanese in Cambodia, combined with the four casualties touched off a storm of criticism in the Diet and a blanket of sentimental media coverage. The opposition attempted to take advantage of the bloodshed and publicity to demand the withdrawal of the JSDF. The government was nervous and concerned but held firm.32 In any case, the UN mission to Cambodia met with some successes. Cambodian elections had been held in May 1993, a new government was subsequently installed, and a new constitution was promulgated by September. The role of Japan in the UN operation was obscure by most measures: in all, UN personnel numbered 22,000 in Cambodia, making the Japanese contingent of 724 a very small part of the mix. 3 3 Japan's greatest impact probably came through Yasushi Akashi, a veteran Japanese diplomat who was the United Nations' choice to direct UNTAC. Moreover, the embarrassing legacy among some of those who closely watched Japan's participation was that some twenty of the seventy-five Japanese police had fled their posts, returning to the relative safety of the capital, Phnom Penh, after the ambush of 4 May that had left one of their number dead. The incident reflected poorly on the J S D F and on the Japanese government even though these were civilian police in their first and very unusual overseas assignment and not members of the JSDF. 3 4 In sum, the Japanese participation went along rational and even predictable lines. The deployment was rightly small in order to account for the relative inexperience of the government, the public, and the JGSDF with peacekeeping missions. That the JGSDF ran into a number of logistical and operational difficulties was due mainly to inexperience. 3 5 The Japanese public was shocked at the death of two of its civilians, and the government hesitated at first but stood firm in the face of criticism and went on with the operation. The JASDF and JMSDF did extremely well in their logistical roles, supporting not only their sister service in Cambodia but also transporting equipment to Cambodia for the Philippine troops participating in UNTAC. Finally, the mission concluded well enough to allow the government to continue its participation, albeit in small ways, in UN operations elsewhere in the world.

The Cambodian Success: Peacekeeping Continues The real success of Japan's peacekeeping operation mission to Cambodia was that it was by no means a disaster. Though scrutinized heavily

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by the Japanese press and criticized by military experts in the United States, the mission went reasonably well. In the spring of 1993, only halfway through the Cambodian mission, the government felt confid e n t e n o u g h to deploy forty-eight JSDF troops to Mozambique. This specially created Movement Control Company u n d e r t o o k essentially administrative duties at Maputo Airport in s o u t h e r n Mozambique and at Beira Airport in central Mozambique. 3 6 T h e real point of this dispatch of the JSDF was to show that peacekeeping duties were n o t an e x p e r i m e n t d e p e n d e n t on the o u t c o m e of the C a m b o d i a n mission: p e a c e k e e p i n g would persist as a policy of the g o v e r n m e n t . Moreover, the new mission to Mozambique, though numerically tiny, b r o u g h t the JSDF to yet a n o t h e r continent. 3 7 T h e next year, the JASDF went to Kenya and JGSDF troops went to Zaire on a humanitarian mission following months of genocide in n e i g h b o r i n g Rwanda. This was the third mission taken u n d e r the new peacekeeping legislation and the second in Africa, but the mission had several remarkable features. T h e deployment to Zaire did not require the Diet's approval insofar as the peacekeeping operations bill stipulated that only peacekeeping missions n e e d e d such approval. H u m a n i t a r i a n missions could be u n d e r t a k e n at the government's discretion, a n d the gove r n m e n t exercised this discretion for the first time. T h e government that deployed the JASDF and JGSDF to Zaire was headed by Prime Minister Murayama, head of the Socialist Party that for so long had insisted that even the existence of self-defense forces was illegitimate. T h e party had boycotted the peacekeeping operations vote in J u n e 1992, but then had softened its position, j o i n e d in a coalition government in August 1995, and reversed many of its policies at its convention in September 1993. Its leader became prime minister in J u n e 1994 and was now dispatching troops overseas. As was the case f o r Cambodia, the UN a p p e a l e d directly to the J a p a n e s e government for its participation in Rwanda. And just as it was a J a p a n e s e diplomat, Yasushi Akashi, the director of UNTAC, who made the appeal to Japan's government in 1992, it was a n o t h e r diplomat, Sadako Ogata, the UN high commissioner f o r refugees, who made the request in 1994. 38 Looking a r o u n d for o t h e r opportunities the following year, the government decided to favor the UN Disengagement Observer Force m o n i t o r i n g the tension-strained Golan Heights between Israel and Syria. After careful coordination with the Canadian Ministry of Defense, the Japanese government decided that JGSDF personnel could replace a small Canadian transportation unit, a n d in J a n u a r y 1996 forty-three JSDF troops went to the Golan Heights. These troops served only in a logistical role, transporting supplies f r o m ports in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, but the UN troops they supported were full

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peacekeepers. Moreover, the mission to the Golan Heights represented the first time that J S D F personnel were deployed to a buffer zone between warring states. Thus, the J S D F came as near to peacekeeping in the Golan Heights as the peacekeeping operations law allowed. 39 T h e obvious conclusion after so many deployments was that Japan's J S D F had joined UN operations for good and would continue to expand its geographic scope and build a record of success. T h e less obvious conclusion was that the J S D F was gaining experience in overseas deployments and interservice cooperation. T h e J S D F also had reason to continue to develop its air- and sealift capabilities. Both the J M S D F and JASDF began thinking of aircraft with longer range and larger capacities, tankers for midair refueling, and more aircraft that could support more and larger deployments of J S D F troops in UN operations. 4 0 In addition, the J M S D F was planning for more and larger logistics and landing ships. In 1993 the J M S D F officially requested a new class of tank-landing ships, and the first, J D S Osumi, was launched by 1997 and completed its sea trials the following year. At 9,000 tons, the Osumi was designed to carry trucks or tanks and up to 390 troops. It could also carry landing craft and host a heavy-lift helicopter. 4 1 T h e ship's logistical capacities thus could be applied not only to transporting J G S D F units in Japanese territory— its official mission—but could be used to insert or support peacekeepers in UN operations or, at a later date, to assist in the emergency rescue of Japanese nationals abroad. 4 2 One more conclusion is that while Japan's defense policy changed in the post-Soviet era, the domestic and international debates did not. There remained on the one side critics who feared a resurgence of aggressive Japanese military power and those on the other side who disdained a Japan that did not contribute more to stability and security either through its armed forces or through its diplomatic and economic policies. Many of those critics saw the Japanese government as precisely rational—either always searching for opportunities to reassert its power or always seeking to shirk its obligations to the wider community of allies and neighbors. If either or both views were simplistic it was because such critics attributed too much rationality to governments. It was perhaps more the case that a realist Japanese government dealt with international change under various political pressures and changed its policy incrementally. Policymakers in Japan's Diet, in the cabinet and ministries, and in the JSDF, like policymakers elsewhere, preferred to separate their problems into segments that allowed them to safely make a series of incremental changes of policy. Nowhere in the peculiar transition from Cold War to new world order did the policymakers care to misstep

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where the public's support for these changes might evaporate, where the United States might become even more critical of Japanese policy, or where international support might be jeopardized by too much or too little change in Japan's policy.

Notes 1. Although Japan's standing army was by the early 1990s a little larger than Great Britain's, Japan had few reserve ground forces, of perhaps 40,000, whereas Britain had 260,000 in the army reserves. 2. Japan's defense expenditures are inflated by a number of factors including the exchange rate that reflects a strong Japanese yen, purchasing power that is undermined by unusually high domestic costs, and subsidies provided to the U.S. armed forces for various expenses incurred for their bases. 3. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 4th ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997), p. 465. Herbert Simon for one suggests that rather than optimizing choices, policymakers take a "satisficing" approach to rational decisions where policymakers examine possibility after possibility until they find one answer that seems at least minimally acceptable. See Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1958) or "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics LXIX (February 1955): pp. 99-188. 4. "Peru's Rebels Cut Power and Attack Embassies," New York Times, 7 April 1991, p. 4. 5. "Peruvian Guerrillas Kill Three Japanese Aid Workers," Pacific Stars and Stripes, 16July 1991, p. 7. 6. In 1996 the guerrillas once again selected the Japanese Embassy as their target and this time as the object of their most spectacular operation: resulting in 460 hostages, including the Japanese ambassador to Peru and President Fujimori's mother and sister. 7. Such stories punctuate the news reports, for instance, "Soviets Nab Japanese Fishing Boat," Japan Times, Weekly International Edition, 3-9 December 1990; and New York Times, 16 August 1994. 8. This episode was reported in "Pirate Raids Resume on Japanese Boats," Pacific Stars and Stripes, 22 July 1991, p. 7. 9. Barbara Kwiatkowska, "Current Status of the Indonesian Archipelagic Jurisdiction," paper presented at the Joint Conference with the Law of the Sea Institute and the Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute in Seoul, 15 July 1993, pp. 14-15. 10. New York Times, 27 November 1990, p. 1, or Japan Times, Weekly International Edition, 19 November 1990, p. 4. 11. Saddam's statement carried in toto in the New York Times, 24 September 1990, p. 12. 12. According to one claim, the idea of participating in UN operations had "been a long-standing age-old proposal, particularly on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has been put forward on the table of national discussions since some 20 to 30 years ago." See Aurelia George, "Japan's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations," Asian Survey XXXIII, 6 (June 1993): p. 563.

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13. For discussion see Akihiko Tanaka, " T h e Domestic Context: J a p a n e s e Politics and UN Peacekeeping," in Selig Harrison and M. Nishihara, eds., UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: C a r n e g i e Endowment for International Peace, 1 9 9 5 ) , pp. 9 0 ff. 14. Hideki Sakata, "Gulf Cooperation Mission Questioned," Japan Times, Weekly International Edition, 1 8 - 2 4 November 1991, p. 3. T h e deployment o f the minesweepers was supposedly legally justified by article 99 o f the J S D F legislation, which allows minesweeping activities without actually specifying any geographic limits. 15. Yomiuri Shimbun, "Let the Prime Minister Boldly Challenge His Opp o n e n t s in Constitutional D e b a t e , " 13 O c t o b e r 1990, as translated by Ito Kenichi, " T h e J a p a n e s e State o f Mind: Deliberation on the Gulf Crisis," Journal ofJapanese Studies 17, 2 ( S u m m e r 1 9 9 1 ) : p. 282. 16. F o r a critical narrative o f the prime minister's Persian Gulf war politics, see Atsushi Odawara, " T h e Kaifu B u n g l e , " Japan Quarterly (JanuaryMarch 1 9 9 1 ) : pp. 6 - 1 4 . 17. See Ito Kenichi, " T h e J a p a n e s e State o f Mind," pp. 2 7 6 ff. 18. A point also made by Courtney Purrington and A. K., "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf Crisis," Asian Survey X X X I , 4 (April 1 9 9 1 ) : p. 322; and by David Yamada, " R e a r m i n g J a p a n : A Militech Society," Current Politics and Economics of Japan 1, 1 ( 1 9 9 1 ) : p. 16. 19. Prime Minister's Office, Public Opinion Survey on Japan's Peace and Security, trans, by Foreign Press C e n t e r ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 9 ) , p. 12. 20. Keisai Koho Center, "Industry's View o f the War," Economic Eye 12, 2 (Tokyo: Keisai K o h o Center, S u m m e r 1 9 9 1 ) : p. 17; New York Times, 2 4 Sept e m b e r 1990, p. 1, and 2 November 1990, p. 9; a n d Japan Times, Weekly International Edition, 29 O c t o b e r 1990, pp. 1, 6, and 7. A poll by Yomiuri Shimbun in the spring o f 1991 reportedly f o u n d that 75 p e r c e n t o f respondents thought the dispatch o f minesweepers to the Persian Gulf had b e e n "necessary," while only 20 p e r c e n t thought the minesweepers should not have b e e n dispatched: Toshio Asakura, "National Consensus," By The Way 7, 6 (Novemb e r / D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 2 ) : p. 9. 21. "Yomiuri Poll Finds 6 8 % Approval o f Using Troops f o r P e a c e k e e p ing," Daily Japan Digest, 6 May 1 9 9 2 , p. 2. But a Nihon Keizai poll showed in July after the p e a c e k e e p i n g operations bill had passed that 4 6 p e r c e n t still o p p o s e d the legislation a c c o r d i n g to Japan Digest, 7 J u l y 1 9 9 2 , p. 2. Meanwhile, the newspapers' editorials themselves disagreed: Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun r e m a i n e d o p p o s e d to the p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s bill, while Yomiuri Shimbun and Sankei Shimbun favored it. For a summary o f headlines see "Editorial Highlights: W h e r e the J a p a n e s e Press Stands on the PKO Issue," By The Way 2, 6 ( N o v e m b e r / D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 2 ) : p. 10. 22. Now the Social Democratic Party o f J a p a n . 23. T h e sting o f the mass resignations was lessened when the lower house's speaker, Yoshio Sakurauchi, refused to approve the resignations. 24. For reports o f shifting party positions, see inter alia "JSP Reverses S t a n c e , " Japan Times, Weekly I n t e r n a t i o n a l Edition, 29 O c t o b e r 1 9 9 0 , p. 1; "Tokyo Debates," New York Times, 20 S e p t e m b e r 1991, p. A3. 25. Murayama would authorize the dispatch o f J G S D F troops to Zaire and J A S D F personnel to Kenya as part o f a humanitarian mission following the g e n o c i d e in Rwanda. Also u n d e r Murayama's g o v e r n m e n t preparations were made to dispatch J G S D F troops to the Golan Heights. And, during his

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t e n u r e as p r i m e minister, t h e JSDF's g o v e r n i n g legislation was a m e n d e d to allow t h e JASDF to rescue J a p a n e s e nationals a b r o a d in cases of emergency. 26. See Japan Times, Weekly I n t e r n a t i o n a l Edition, 29 O c t o b e r 1990, p. 1; 11 M a r c h 1991, p. 7; a n d 2 3 - 2 9 March 1992, p. 3. 27. T h o s e who were m a d e uneasy by the vote with 141 m e m b e r s a b s e n t m i g h t also n o t e t h a t t h e p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s bill was e x p o s e d to a l e n g t h y d e b a t e : 75 h o u r s in t h e lower h o u s e a n d 105 h o u r s in t h e u p p e r house, a near record. 28. See J a p a n e s e D e f e n s e Agency, Defense ofJapan (Tokyo: J a p a n e s e Def e n s e Agency, 1992 o r any v o l u m e t h e r e a f t e r ) . T h e bill also t e m p o r a r i l y set the m a x i m u m n u m b e r of t r o o p s d e p l o y e d to any o n e place at 2,000. 29. J a p a n e s e D e f e n s e Agency, Defense of Japan, 1996, p. 153 f o r J S D F p e a c e k e e p i n g duties. 30. See Barbara Wanner, "Japan Views Leadership Opportunities T h r o u g h the U n i t e d Nations," J a p a n Economic Institute R e p o r t No. 10A (13 March 1992). 31. Lt. Col. A n d r e w H. N. Kim, U.S. Army, offers a g o o d a c c o u n t of ope r a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s e n c o u n t e r e d by t h e J G S D F in C a m b o d i a in "Japan a n d P e a c e k e e p i n g O p e r a t i o n s , " Military Review (April, 1994): p p . 2 2 - 3 3 . 32. See inter alia William Branigan, "Japanese Killed D u r i n g A m b u s h in Cambodia," Washington Post, 5 May 1993, p. 1; Paul Bluestein, "Japan: Is Camb o d i a Too Costly?" Washington Post, 8 May 1993, p. 15. 33. T h e r e were 724 J a p a n e s e p e r s o n n e l in t h e first r o t a t i o n a n d a b o u t 1,200 r o t a t e d t h r o u g h in all. T h e s e figures d o n o t i n c l u d e JASDF a n d J M S D F p e r s o n n e l w h o p a r t i c i p a t e d in logistical s u p p o r t by air a n d sea. 34. See New York Times, 24 O c t o b e r 1993, a n d Victor Mallet, " C a m b o d i a Shatters Myth of J a p a n e s e Warrior," Financial Times, 25 May 1993. 35. As t h e a n n u a l white p a p e r o n d e f e n s e e x p l a i n e d , t h e mission in C a m b o d i a was "the first of its kind f o r the SDF a n d t h e r e is n o d e n y i n g t h e fact t h a t t h e r e were s o m e trials a n d e r r o r s in the c o n d u c t of the p r e p a r a t i o n s a n d t h e carrying o u t of t h e assignments." J a p a n e s e D e f e n s e Agency, Defense ofJapan (1996), p. 124. 36. T h e duties of t h e s e p e a c e k e e p e r s consisted of c h e c k i n g i d e n t i t y cards, giving directions to arriving p e r s o n n e l , a n d c o o r d i n a t i n g the l o a d i n g a n d storage of cargo. 37. A year earlier, in the s p r i n g of 1992, s o m e c a b i n e t advisors were already discussing the possibility of j o i n i n g t h e U.S. a n d U N f o r c e s in Somalia. See r e p o r t in Japan Digest, 16 J u n e 1992, p. 1. 38. Japan Times, Weekly I n t e r n a t i o n a l Edition, 29 A u g u s t - 2 S e p t e m b e r , p p . 1, 5; a n d see "Japanese L a n d in Zaire," New York Times, 24 S e p t e m b e r 1994, p. 1. 39. Actually, t h e JSDF's G o l a n p e a c e k e e p e r s may have g o n e a little beyond what the law allowed. T h e law f o r b a d e any JSDF u n i t f r o m participating in military drills o r a r m e d exercises u n d e r U N c o m m a n d . H e n c e they did n o t p a r t i c i p a t e in drills as a unit, b u t as individual p e r s o n n e l d r i l l i n g with o t h e r military p e r s o n n e l . See " P e a c e k e e p e r s in Golan E x p e c t e d to J o i n Military Drills," FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 10 F e b r u a r y 1996. 40. See, f o r e x a m p l e , Isao Miyamoto, "Self D e f e n s e F o r c e ' s New Airc r a f t f o r 21st C e n t u r y : D e f e n s e P e r i m e t e r Will E x t e n d to Space," Gunji Kenkyu,]u\y 1996, p p . 114-129, translated in FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 28 J u n e 1996.

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41. D a m o n Bristow, "Osumi Unlocks J a p a n ' s Maritime Potential," Jane's International Defense Review, February 1998, pp. 5 3 - 5 6 ; and Kazutomi Nakayama, "Japan's JMSDF, Warship Designs," FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 6 J u n e 1996. 42. In 1997 when J D S Osumi was launched, the latest J S D F legislation o f 1 9 9 4 allowed only air rescue o p e r a t i o n s o f J a p a n e s e nationals abroad. F o r o t h e r interesting speculation on what the J M S D F might c o n t r i b u t e to UN operations, see J e f f r e y I. Sands, Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United Nations (Alexandria, Va.: C e n t e r for Naval Analyses, 1 9 9 3 ) .

7 In Sum: Democracy, Strategy, and Alliance

One thing that distinguished the United States of the twentieth century from the great powers of the past was its enlightened cultivation of reliable and strong allies whose geostrategic interests, as well as their ideological inclinations to liberal democracy and liberal economics, coincided with those of the United States. 1 Notably, following World War II, the United States deliberately fostered the political, economic, and democratic well-being of both friends and former enemies, including Japan. Subsequently, the commitment and reliability of those democratic allies was an essential element of U.S. security and prosperity. It was no less imperative, though the Cold War had ended, that the United States make the most of its position and interest by continuing to cultivate those allies. To a great degree U.S. policymakers recognized this. But to some extent Americans in general maintained a certain ambivalence toward their allies, especially J a p a n . At the end o f the century, the U.S.-Japanese alliance was in fact strong though not widely appreciated by the publics of the two countries. T h e alliance had endured five decades and was still evolving. At the end of the Cold War, it continued to hold the promise of being a bulwark of stability and democracy. On both sides o f the Pacific, policymakers repeatedly stressed that the U.S.-Japanese alliance was the most important bilateral relationship in the world. But naysayers abounded. Commentators from academia, government, and business doubted that Japan and the United States could be anything but rivals given their competing economies, their differing expressions of democracy, their contrasting cultures, and their unequal defense burdens. On both sides of the Pacific writers questioned whether the alliance was an anachronism of the Cold War. They wondered whether J a p a n would be forced to carve out a new and more independent role for itself: Japan might become a leader in a new Asian 131

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bloc that could contain and bargain with China; or it might ally with China; or it might be a leader for peace and economic development within the framework of the United Nations. At the same time, well-informed and attentive Americans were just as likely to view Japan as an actual, or potential, rival to U.S. power as they were to see a country whose economic prosperity was intimately linked in positive ways to their own. 2 Even some policymakers who were well aware of Japan's importance as an economic partner nonetheless saw Japan as a country that must be sternly tutored on the subject of trade and firmly kept on the straight and narrow path of democracy and liberal economics. Edwin Reischauer, the former Harvard professor and U.S. ambassador to Japan, who spent a lifetime explaining Japan to outsiders, conceded that Japan had "earned itself a reputation for being a thoroughly egocentric country interested only in its own welfare." And yet, he pointed out, Japan's "continued wellbeing or even existence depends on international cooperation and trust." 3 Others pointed an accusing finger at Japan as a free rider in security affairs, linking Japan's postwar prosperity to the convenience of the U.S. security umbrella. Still others thought little of the value of Japan's defense forces, seeing them either as a token contribution to the alliance or as a stealthy and clever vehicle for technology transfer. Such confusion was nowhere more surprisingly expressed than at a strategic game played at the U.S. Naval War College in the mid-1990s. Some of the brightest and best officers, ones who would be considered in a few years for flag rank, played parts in the strategic game as the U.S. president, the secretaries of state and defense, and members of the National Security Council. Their task was to assess, decide, and respond to national crisis heaped upon crisis. Other players in the game came from universities, the State Department, and other federal departments and agencies. T h e guests played the parts of foreign governments, the NATO secretary general, and various officers of the United Nations. 4 On day one of the game there was a Bosnian Serb uprising that threatened NATO ground troops and tens of thousands of Croat and Muslim Bosnians. On day two there was an attempted coup d'état in Indonesia, followed by the immediate threat of civil war in that country and the announcement that the straits and seas of the Indonesian archipelago were an exclusion zone, closed to all international shipping. On day three a surly government in Ukraine was threatening nuclear blackmail. On successive days the crisis worsened in both Europe and Asia. With turmoil in Indonesia developing first into civil war and then into a confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore, the Japanese "government" was frantic. The Japan players sent urgent dispatches to

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the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t asking, later d e m a n d i n g , what the U n i t e d States p l a n n e d to do. T h e Asian situation a n d J a p a n ' s c o n c e r n s were ign o r e d . T h e U.S. team was o v e r w h e l m e d by events a n d u n f a m i l i a r with politics on the Pacific Rim; the team c o n c e n t r a t e d its efforts on the m o r e familiar territory of N A T O and the E u r o p e a n theater. N o t until the J a p a n e s e team sent a démarche, t h r e a t e n i n g to act alone in the waters of the southwest Pacific, did the U n i t e d States hastily respond. T h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t players then insisted on taking the lead in p r o t e c t i n g shipping, d e f e n d i n g international passages, and even m e d i a t i n g the conflict. T h e U.S. team asked the J a p a n e s e governm e n t to c o n f i n e its c o n c e r n s to Japan's territorial waters. T h e A m e r i c a n s in this strategic scenario were n o t merely overw h e l m e d by the n u m b e r of crises to which they had to respond. T h e y were o v e r w h e l m e d by the c o m p l e x i t y of d e a l i n g with upheaval in a r e g i o n w h e r e there is n o f u n c t i o n a l equivalent of N A T O with its int e g r a t e d c o m m a n d structure s u p p o r t e d by c o u n t r i e s w h o s e p e o p l e and g o v e r n m e n t s have l o n g i d e n t i f i e d themselves closely with U.S. g l o b a l interests. I n t e l l i g e n t a n d well-educated o f f i c e r s s e e m e d d a u n t e d by the p r o s p e c t of c o o p e r a t i n g with J a p a n and they were shocked by the possibility that Japan m i g h t f o r g o U.S. leadership in the Pacific. A f t e r i g n o r i n g the Japanese g o v e r n m e n t f o r some time, they s h o u l d e r e d Japan o u t of the way completely. In short, the U.S. players treated Japan as a j u n i o r and a n n o y i n g partner. T h e scenario played o u t at the U.S. Naval War C o l l e g e in that year hardly qualified as a p r o o f of the condition of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Even t h o u g h pieces of the scenario were credible, it was an exercise in analysis a n d p o l i c y m a k i n g a m o n g p e o p l e w h o were unlikely to h a n d l e such crises at a political level. Moreover, the Japanese players were not Japanese and perhaps took a perverse pride in tweaking, o n b e h a l f of Japan, the A m e r i c a n giant. Nonetheless, the scenario p o i n t e d to the mutual uncertainty that sometimes plagues the minds of both Japanese and U.S. leaders. It was perhaps because the e n e m y was not a m o n o l i t h i c c o m m u n i s t threat e m a n a t i n g f r o m Russia that the players were unsure of their alliance politics.

Japanese and U.S. Interests W h e n push c a m e to shove, the uncertainty of the U.S. Navy officers was surprising because the U.S. Navy and Japan's JMSDF had w o r k e d so well together over p r e c e d i n g decades. I n d e e d the U.S. Navy never really let the Japanese navy die but, for a variety of reasons, resuscitated, nurtured, m a d e use of, and e n c o u r a g e d the rebirth of Japan's maritime forces.

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U.S. and Japanese interests coincided at the end of World War II in ways that were, at the end of the Cold War, in danger of being forgotten even though similar interests persisted. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the United States had needed a bulwark against instability and aggression in the northwest Pacific: Japan, for its part, was ruined and could not go it alone. The United States anticipated that it would have more defense commitments than peacetime resources could adequately provide for: Japan anticipated the need for a powerful ally that could provide not just military resources but a stable, acceptable political framework in which Japan could prosper. And there were then, as later, many mundane chores to perform. Though officially disbanded, the Japanese navy continued to function as an organization after World War II, albeit under the supervision of the allied command. 5 Naval vessels were assigned to transport duty, repatriating tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers scattered around the Asian Pacific. Further, the vessels were needed to remove or explode the tens of thousands of mines that had been laid in the waters around the Japanese archipelago by the United States to hamper Japanese shipping, and there were more that had been laid by the Japanese navy itself to hamper the U.S. Navy. T h e minesweeping operations continued for decades. 6 Indeed, these Japanese vessels gamely assisted the U.S. Navy in the Korean War because they made up a large and experienced force much needed by the U.S. Navy to protect amphibious operations. 7 Matters were facilitated greatly by the warm friendship between Adm. Arleigh Burke, who became the U.S. chief of naval operations, and Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura, who remained an important figure in postwar politics as an advisor to Prime Minister Yoshida. Beyond the idea that the political interests of the United States and Japan coincided, the operations of the two navies coincided and the navies developed a close working relationship. Fifty years after the end of World War II, two authoritative observers pointed out that the relationship went well beyond what the U.S.-Japanese security treaties required: "The two navies share information, technology equipment, supplies and resources; they work, operate, and train together; and they trust, respect and depend on each other." 8 However, beyond this operational level of cooperation and mutual respect, the relationship was nevertheless clouded. By the beginning of the end o f the Cold War, segments o f the American and Japanese public had begun to focus most keenly on the economic competition between their two countries and the political problems engendered by shifting financial, trade, and employment patterns. On the Japanese side, the revisionist view of the alliance was represented by Shintaro Ishihara, author of The Japan That Can Say No.9 Ishihara's polemic stated, among other bizarre claims,

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that J a p a n could find advantage by restricting trade with the United States in computer microchips. O n the U.S. side, the revisionist view was represented in The Coming War with Japan, which posited that the e c o n o m i c competition o f J a p a n and the U n i t e d States was an early symptom o f the almost inevitable clash o f the two countries in the p o s t - C o l d War e r a . 1 0 In short, the self-imposed defeat o f the comm o n Soviet enemy had called the basis o f the alliance into question, as people narrowly viewed friction in e c o n o m i c matters as representative and inclusive o f the entire U.S.-Japanese relationship. It was much less c o m m o n to begin at the beginning and see the many fundamental similarities between the United States and J a p a n : to see the enormously important cooperation that had c o m e from an enduring and mutually beneficial political alliance, and to remark upon the many changes that J a p a n e s e foreign policy had u n d e r g o n e through half a century o f democracy and prosperity. B e n e a t h the superficialities, J a p a n was at the end o f the Cold War like the U n i t e d States in essential ways: a wealthy, democratic country d e p e n d e n t on stable international trade for its industry, commerce, and wealth. Moreover, J a p a n ' s value as a U.S. ally was increased rather than diminished by the rehabilitation o f its armed forces. Japan's defense establishment was substantial and its navy first rate: its defense expenditure, measured in U.S. dollars, ranked fourth in the world—and, in fact, ranked second a m o n g industrialized countries and first among nonnuclear countries. 1 1 While Japan's public and politicians remained extremely wary o f international entanglements, developments showed that u n d e r clearly defined circumstances and limits the government was willing to do its part in fostering political stability around the globe. In this way, the skepticism embedded in J a p a n e s e public opinion when it came to foreign relations was not dissimilar from that o f many editorial writers in the U n i t e d States, perennially cautious about their own country's role and commitments abroad. It should hardly have been surprising to a wary American public, even o n e focused on e c o n o m i c issues, that J a p a n was a m o n g the most supportive o f U.S. interests in the Pacific nor that the J a p a n e s e Self-Defense Forces were the greatest c o m p l e m e n t to the U.S. force structure in the Pacific theater. Scenarios o f instability, disrupted international c o m m e r c e , and imperiled democratic development were o f grave c o n c e r n to a J a p a n that accounted in the 1990s for 18 perc e n t o f the world's GDP and had d o n e much in the previous three decades to aid the e c o n o m i c and political development o f Pacific Rim countries as well as cooperating with U.S. defense planning. Like the United States, J a p a n was wrapped in the comforting embrace o f the sea and was thereby insulated (though n o t isolated) from the rest of the world even in the age o f nuclear weapons and air

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forces. But unlike the United States, J a p a n had well-armed neighbors and potential trouble spots nearby—a fact that spectacular advances in technology could not overcome. From J a p a n ' s western shore to the Korean Peninsula was still fewer than 100 miles, and the important Russian city o f Vladivostok remained only 400 miles from Japan's northern island o f Hokkaido. Thus, while many in the United States saw any sort o f upheaval in Asia as something far in the distance and perhaps far in the future, the Asian world looked very different to those on the Pacific Ocean's western rim. A prosperous United States in the 1990s expressed certain optimism in the new world order: the spread o f democracy and the ultimate triumph o f liberal market practices. Yet J a p a n ' s outlook was cautious: the economy was mired in stagnation; the depressed stock market had u n d e r m i n e d the collateral o f both corporations and banks; and by 1998 bad bank debt was estimated at $1 trillion. Analysts fretted over the rapidity of both political and e c o n o m i c change in East Asia. While the United States in the post-Cold War decade sought an elusive peace "dividend" by cutting back on defense expenditures, J a p a n largely resisted any real reductions in defense spending and asserted that political uncertainties on the Pacific Rim demanded continued vigilance. Between 1984 and 1994 J a p a n ' s military expenditures increased, in constant dollars, by m o r e than 30 percent. By 1995 the J a p a n e s e Diet had agreed on a series o f defense cuts, but those cuts were m o r e a result of budget pressures in the midst o f chronic e c o n o m i c stagnation than the result of any bottom-up review o f defense needs. Further, those cuts had little impact on the readiness, training, and even the size o f the JSDF. T h e ceiling, o r maximum number, for m e m b e r s o f the J G S D F was cut drastically, from 185,000 to 145,000. But in fact the J G S D F had never recruited or employed its maximum n u m b e r of troops. At the time o f the cutbacks, the J G S D F had j u s t around 150,000 troops: a 21 percent reduction in the ceiling m e a n t a 3 p e r c e n t cut in p e r s o n n e l . 1 2 Likewise, the J M S D F had to reduce its force by one escort division, a few destroyers, and some antisubmarine aircraft. But the vessels and aircraft that were retired were old and b e c o m i n g obsolete. 1 3 As J a p a n ' s annual white paper on defense repeatedly explained: " T h e situation around J a p a n is complicated . . . unstable . . . and fluid." 1 4 What did J a p a n ' s foreign policy analysts see?

Japan's New World Order Despite the final dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1 9 9 1 — o r perhaps because o f that dissolution—Japan's geopolitical c o n c e r n s b e c a m e

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more complex, not less so. T h e list of potential problems was long. T h e new Russian Republic was, even after several elections, unstable and verging on the chaotic. T h e Chinese government seemed stable for the short term but, as events in Tienanmen Square had showed, China was not immune to domestic disorder. Moreover, China had begun to pursue a number o f territorial disputes with neighbors— not least of these being one of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, a key sea-lane for Japanese trade. 1 5 Anxious concern with developments in China increased in the 1990s. T h e opening of Chinese markets had been hailed as a milestone of reform, but the opening of trade and commerce made China's domestic situation less predictable, bringing both dissent and corruption to the surface of Chinese politics. For these reasons, Japanese foreign policy analysts feared the consequences for Japan (as well as for Korea and Taiwan) of upheaval in China. T h e consequences of Chinese instability, the analysts believed, might include such things as a monumental refugee crisis, the loss of hard-won and expensive investments in China's industries (or Taiwan's industries), environmental contamination from China's worsening air and water pollutants (or, worse, ill-maintained nuclear reactors), or a chauvinistic grab for long-disputed territory. 16 At the same time, North Korea's surreal saga of famine, repression, and threats o f war against South Korea suggested other unhappy scenarios for Japan and the United States. North Korea's nuclear weapons program, its wretched economy, and its militaristic regime quickly became a recipe for international disaster. Conflict on the Korean Peninsula remained one o f the chief concerns for J a p a n , as it did sporadically for the United States. Japan's defense white papers continued to assert that the "Korean Peninsula is inseparably related with J a p a n geographically and historically, hence the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is of vital importance to the peace and stability of East Asia as a whole, including Japan." 1 7 Elsewhere on the Pacific Rim, dozens of territorial disputes lurked behind the rosy facade of rapid economic development. Among these disputes were conflicting claims over the Kurile Islands. T h e islands were the inheritance of the new Russian Republic, still occupied by a Russian army division, and still a continuing source of irritation between the Japanese and Russian governments. 1 8 J a p a n perennially insisted that the Russian Republic abide by the 1855 Treaty o f Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation in which the islands south of Uruppu belonged to Japan: Etoforu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai islets. Another argument continued over the Senkaku Islands of the East China Sea. These tiny islets, occupied by J a p a n but just 200

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miles from Taiwan, were claimed also by China and Taiwan. However insignificant the mass of these islands, the international law of the sea, with its exclusive economic zones, made even the smallest islet important, especially if oil or mineral deposits were to be discovered on or beneath the ocean floor. 19 Events of the post-Cold War decade showed that continuing interest in the islands combined with national chauvinism might destabilize the area. In 1990, for example, Japanese ultranationalists had installed a lighthouse on Uotsuri to underscore their enthusiasm for Japan's territorial stake. A few months later, Japan's Maritime Safety Agency intercepted two Taiwanese vessels intending to land people on one of the islands to stage a protest. Official statements from China, Taiwan, and Japan followed, all unequivocally reasserting their claim to the islands. 20 A replay of the incidents occurred in 1996 as Japanese nationalists again constructed a lighthouse on one of the islands, and, again, Taiwanese fishermen protested, sending a hundred boats to the area. 21 Again in May and J u n e of 1997 the protests continued, and Japan's Maritime Safety Agency was fending off fishing vessels. Japan, for its part, could not tolerate Taiwan's claim to the islands; to have done so would have strengthened China's claim, and exacerbated the Sino-Japanese dispute. 22 Farther from J a p a n , but still of great concern, were the actual and potential problems (including the threat of religious and ethnic rebellion) of Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, and the Philippines. In this region of substantial Japanese business activity were not only new records of production, trade, and profits but also ominous signs of instability. Despite their UN-supervised elections Cambodian factions were still armed to the teeth. And, in 1997, Cambodia's communist faction proved that skepticism was warranted as it succeeded in a coup d'état against the royalist faction—-just as it seemed that the Khmer Rouge was disintegrating. With its prospering economy, Thailand was subject to the crosswinds of traditionalism and the demands o f a growing, educated middle class. In 1992 an elected but shaky parliament took over the reins o f government from a military j u n t a but was harried by constant protests over land reform, corruption, and a gyrating currency. Adding to the Thai government's problems were armed Muslim separatists in the southern provinces, as well as disputes with the troublesome government in Myanmar (Burma) and continuing problems with refugees from Cambodia. Meanwhile, Indonesia was undergoing explosive population growth, complex ethnic and religious tensions, and rapid economic development. President Suharto's economically successful but politically corrupt regime was a crisis waiting to happen. Likewise, the future of the Philippines, with its many tongues and peoples, as well as economic classes and disparities, could not be viewed with equanimity.

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Thus, even as J a p a n had b e e n reluctant to b e c o m e directly involved in territorial disputes, domestic upheavals, or inter-Asian conflicts, it was nonetheless anxious to play some role in support of both the United States and the international community that the United States had led for so long. Given J a p a n ' s substantial e c o n o m i c interest around the world, the J a p a n e s e government was obliged, as was the United States, by its self-interest to be c o n c e r n e d with matters a long way from its shores. T h e U.S. e c o n o m y was the largest in the world, J a p a n ' s the second largest. T h e U n i t e d States was richly endowed with natural resources; J a p a n was not. J a p a n was consequently the world's n u m b e r o n e i m p o r t e r o f twenty different categories o f primary goods, including iron ore, coal, and unmilled cereals. Japan's vaunted e c o n o m i c power was in large measure the product o f a stable international order. Like those of the United States, J a p a n ' s investments, income, influence, supplies o f raw materials, domestic luxuries, and even inexpensive labor d e p e n d e d on stability abroad. H e n c e J a p a n , like the United States, benefited handsomely from its alliance with the United States and came to actively encourage and reinforce the international order. T h e skeptics remained. Was J a p a n capable o f supporting and complementing U.S. defense interests? If so, to what degree? Even if J a p a n was capable, was not the government too timid, too much restrained by domestic politics, and therefore not willing to assist the United States? Were other Asian countries willing to contemplate receiving more than j u s t J a p a n ' s e c o n o m i c assistance?

Policy and Action T h a t J a p a n ' s interests coincided neatly with those o f the U n i t e d States was shown in J a p a n ' s fundamental foreign and defense policies. Despite the many editorialists who found that every J a p a n e s e policy dispute, each hesitation, and every dilemma provided evidence to criticize J a p a n ' s security policies as inadequate to the task, there was much evidence to the contrary. Overseas development assistance, facilities for U.S. armed forces, participation in UN peacekeeping operations, the J S D F ' s force structure, and sea-lane defense were well-established policies indicative of J a p a n ' s role as a supporter of U.S. interests—which differed little from Japan's. Overseas Development

Assistance

Both to supplement and circumvent its security policy, J a p a n began a substantial program o f overseas development assistance (ODA) to countries o f the Pacific Rim. J a p a n ' s ODA, by several measures, not

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only e x c e e d e d foreign e c o n o m i c aid given by the United States but by the end o f the Cold War was the greatest a m o u n t o f assistance given by any country o f the world. 2 3 Moreover, that aid increased steadily over the years even as U.S. foreign e c o n o m i c assistance was under regular congressional attack and was reduced and c h a n n e l e d to an ever smaller n u m b e r o f recipients. All the while J a p a n responded positively to the United States' request that J a p a n increase its financial support for developing countries. J a p a n ' s ODA was not strictly humanitarian, nor was it merely an e c o n o m i c tool, but a strategic gesture made to foster both economic and political stability. J a p a n saw foreign aid, as did the United States, as a political and diplomatic tool, as a preventive measure against threats to political instability in countries o f special c o n c e r n . In 1991, not coincidentally the last year o f U.S.-Soviet rivalry, official J a p a n e s e publications began to link ODA directly to the broad goals of democratization and environmental protection and to the better defined goals o f reducing weapons exports and liberalizing both internal and external trade rules. 2 4 T h e O D A was directed mostly at Asia and at the most strategically sensitive countries o f Asia. More than 65 percent o f J a p a n ' s ODA was extended to counties o f the Pacific Rim, with Indonesia and China sharing the greatest amounts. As the UN revived in the early 1990s, J a p a n ' s e c o n o m i c power was also put to use in trade embargoes led by the United States. J a p a n ' s cutoffs o f both trade and e c o n o m i c assistance in support o f U.S. or UN political and security goals only added to the power o f U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War era. Facilitating U.S. Forces J a p a n ' s hospitality to U.S. armed forces was not c o m m o n even a m o n g U.S. allies. While observers on both sides o f the Pacific apparently came to believe that U.S. armed forces in J a p a n served the purpose of restraining J a p a n and making other Asian countries more comfortable with the rehabilitation o f J a p a n ' s armed forces, in fact both the U n i t e d States and J a p a n reaped benefits from their cooperation on Japanese territory. In J a p a n , the U n i t e d States stationed troops, military aircraft, and naval vessels whose missions were directed at the same regions and trouble spots that c o n c e r n e d the J a p a n e s e government—such as the Korean Peninsula. T h e J a p a n e s e government consequently bore much o f the cost o f the military bases, including paying for J a p a n e s e employees working for U.S. armed forces as well as such utilities as water and heat. By the mid-1990s, J a p a n ' s financial support o f the U.S. military amounted to the equivalent o f $6 billion (or 625 billion

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yen) per year. J a p a n e s e governments were supportive o f the U.S. bases even when domestic interest groups b e c a m e m o r e and m o r e critical o f U.S. military facilities, the noise and pollution they produced, and the precious real estate they occupied. UN Peacekeeping

Operations

A n o t h e r way in which J a p a n demonstrated its support o f international order was its participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Although this had o n c e b e e n unthinkable, J a p a n used this vehicle to deploy forces, however small, at great distances from J a p a n e s e shores. Albeit after heated debate, J a p a n ' s Diet passed the Law Conc e r n i n g Cooperation for U n i t e d Nations P e a c e k e e p i n g Operations and O t h e r Operations in 1992 and successfully renewed the legislation in 1995. T h e restrictions on J S D F deployment did n o t inhibit the development o f new missions n o r J a p a n ' s e x p a n d i n g participation in UN operations. To the contrary, the careful consideration each mission was given did not merely minimize the risk but ensured the public's c o n t i n u i n g support for such operations. This logic worked in similar fashion in the United States. Public support in the U n i t e d States for military operations abroad waxed or waned with the public's perception o f the success o f each mission. 2 5 Few objections, for example, were raised in 1992 when President Bush deployed soldiers to Somalia to ensure that food would be delivered to hundreds o f thousands o f starving people. Months later, a fruitless m a n h u n t for a clan leader, said to be a culprit in Somali politics, resulted in the deaths of eighteen U.S. soldiers and humiliating television footage of captive U.S. soldiers. Public opinion in the U n i t e d States turned sour, and the U.S. troops were withdrawn. By contrast, o t h e r episodes o f U.S. intervention maintained the American public's support so long as the mission met expectations by minimizing casualties and fulfilling publicly ann o u n c e d goals. Likewise, what J a p a n managed in the 1990s was a series o f qualified successes in UN peacekeeping operations that actually increased public support o f J S D F participation. 2 6 T h e mere passage o f the 1992 peacekeeping operations bill was a significant departure from past policy. And the passage of the bill was not for show: it was immediately followed up by the deployment o f 600 J S D F troops and 75 civilian police to Cambodia. Since most o f the J S D F troops were engineers and not soldiers many observers were not satisfied. T h e test o f political will came in May 1993 when a J a p a n e s e police officer was killed in Cambodia and four others were injured in an ambush. T h e government resisted impassioned pleas to withdraw

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the J a p a n e s e c o n t i n g e n t . T h e foreign minister declared that J a p a n could not be "the first to say goodbye and leave Cambodia j u s t because there is some fighting in some areas." 2 7 Thus, however many the difficulties with peacekeeping participation, J a p a n was on a new course that included sending u n i f o r m e d and armed troops abroad and it accomplished this in the midst of a vast electoral realignment that brought to power parties that in previous eras opposed the J S D F altogether. J a p a n also c o n t i n u e d to pay 14 p e r c e n t o f the expenses for all UN peacekeeping operations. Limits remained on J a p a n ' s participation in UN operations and would surely remain for some time. But the most important limit was not a consequence o f J a p a n e s e culture or history, as many believed, but o f U.S. experiences in intervention: J a p a n was not willing to approve proposals that allowed the United Nations or the United States to change a mission in mid-course as had been done in Somalia. Otherwise, the careful nurturing of public support would be in vain were the J S D F or the Japanese government to be responsible for the failure o f a mission never clearly presented to the legislature or the public. Airlift, Civil Defense, and

Minesweeping

As the J a p a n e s e government and public b e c a m e used to their active participation in troubled areas abroad and as the self-defense forces gained e x p e r i e n c e , J a p a n ' s involvements multiplied and the J S D F ' s range o f activities expanded. T h e J S D F had both the equipment and the necessary training to perform a variety o f missions. For example, the J A S D F used its C-130 transports to airlift personnel and supplies to refugee camps in Zaire and Rwanda. 2 8 More C-130 transports were to be acquired, and the J A S D F c o n t i n u e d drawing up contingency plans that required the use o f such transports for the evacuation o f J a p a n e s e nationals or officials from crisis areas. Although the J G S D F was in the early 1990s behind the other services in preparing for its deployment abroad, it caught up with the sister services. Commentators continued to iterate that J a p a n was unlikely to send armed troops to hostile areas, but the position o f the J G S D F c h a n g e d remarkably during the decade. Troops carrying sidearms were sent to areas where little hostility was anticipated, such as Mozambique, and n o n c o m b a t troops were sent to areas where some risk was anticipated, such as Cambodia. O n e o f the special features o f the J G S D F was that it had long practiced disaster relief operations in J a p a n , and this training gave the J G S D F an obvious role to play in many UN missions. Meanwhile, the JMSDF, the service with the most operational experience abroad, continued to employ its expertise in clearing seaborne

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mines. T h e J M S D F had more than forty o f the most modern mine warfare ships and far outstripped the U.S. Navy in this specialty, both in numbers o f ships and experience. Despite the intensive use o f minesweepers in the Persian Gulf, mine countermeasures in the U.S. Navy continued to be an obscure specialty, losing budget battles. 2 9 O n e could not help but wonder when the next time would be that the United States would ask for Japanese help, and when it would ask specifically for minesweepers. T h e question of where was easier to answer—anywhere from the Senkaku Islands to the Strait of Malacca. Sea-Lanes of Communication During the Cold War, the strength of Japan's economy and the desire o f the United States to have its defense burden shared m o r e evenly among allies c o m b i n e d to convince the J a p a n e s e government to take up the defense o f sea-lanes up to 1,000 miles south and southeast of J a p a n . T h e commitment, first made in 1981, was obscured by bickering over the particulars o f defense b u r d e n sharing and about U.S.J a p a n e s e trade in general. Thus, it went largely unnoticed throughout the 1980s that J a p a n was acquiring the ability to fulfill its c o m m i t m e n t to sea-lane defense and by the e n d o f the decade had d o n e so. T h e e n d o f the Cold War e n h a n c e d and amplified J a p a n ' s naval position rather than diminished it. T h e U.S. Navy was still clearly the most competent, reliable, and powerful naval force in the Pacific, and the U n i t e d States was still best qualified to fill any so-called vacuum in Asia. B u t the U n i t e d States in the 1990s was c o n c e r n e d as much with a balanced budget as it was with Asian power relations—and so was p r e o c c u p i e d with downsizing its armed forces. Consequently, the U n i t e d States reduced its naval p r e s e n c e in the western Pacific. Further, U.S. naval forces assigned to the Pacific were assigned to the Indian O c e a n and to the Persian Gulf as well. T h e J M S D F had four times the n u m b e r o f P-3C antisubmarine planes than those assigned to the U.S. Seventh Fleet and almost three times the n u m b e r o f destroyers. T h e J M S D F was of high quality, and the peculiar political shifts o f the 1990s had resulted in J a p a n ' s active-duty principal surface combatants outnumbering those o f either Russia or China. In general the J M S D F of the 1990s was far m o r e c o m p e t e n t than the American public's perception o f it. Although the J a p a n e s e constitution and public opinion still limited the deployment o f J a p a n e s e armed forces, those limits were not as strict as they o n c e were and were growing m o r e liberal. J a p a n ' s c o m m i t m e n t to sea-lane defense was a help to the U n i t e d States, which found its defense c o m m i t m e n t s in the p o s t - C o l d War era

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hardly diminished even though the forces at its disposal were. A thousand miles of sea-lane defense allowed the United States to uphold commitments elsewhere while Japanese forces lent a hand.

Limits and License One might ask, however, whether Asian nations, even those that might be threatened by rebellion, would ever be willing to receive more than just economic assistance from Japan. Generations of people with firstor secondhand memories of the Pacific War are still alive and in government. 30 For this reason, even if no other, Japan could not take the place of the United States in protecting stability in the Asian Pacific Rim. There were Asian protests even when Japan deployed minesweepers to the faraway Persian Gulf. Singapore's president was most uncomplimentary, likening the U.S. support of Japan's defense capabilities to giving "liquored candies to an alcoholic." 31 China too disapproved of the mineclearing mission, claiming—correctly—it was "a dangerous first step in sending troops overseas." 32 But many other countries did give their public approval. And by the time the Diet passed legislation allowing the JSDF to deploy forces abroad and participate in UN peacekeeping operations, protests had all but died away. Japan's public followed a similar pattern. Objections were made when policy changes were proposed. But the proposals went forward with support. The operations were well defined, and the protests diminished. 33 T h e Japanese public was skeptical of foreign entanglements and certainly not used to them but willing to support both the United States and the United Nations. For example, polls taken after 1992 showed that the public's view of whether UN peacekeeping operations were generally successful correlated positively with the public's support for JSDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Likewise, to the extent that the public perceived that UN humanitarian relief operations were successful, the public's opinion was reinforced in favor of JSDF participation in those operations. In this way, Japan's public was not altogether dissimilar from other publics (including that of the United States) that shied away from openended commitments, runaway costs, and the possibility of casualties. For all these reasons Japan maintained definite limits to its peacetime military involvements. The boundaries that limited Japan's participation in defense affairs more easily came to mind for most people than did the actual and potential roles that Japan could fulfill in a partnership with the United States and United Nations. Japan was already doing more for Western defense than many realized. As we have seen, the JSDF participated in sea-lane defense, mineclearing, humanitarian assistance,

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and peacekeeping operations. If one found the list lacking, the activities of the J S D F might have been compared with the U.S. military doctrine on military operations other than war (or M O O T W ) . 3 4 M O O T W (pronounced "moot-wa") was the Pentagon's fashionable acronym of the 1990s. It essentially covered every military operation other than "large-scale, sustained combat." T h e definition o f M O O T W was worthy of being manufactured by a Japanese constitutional scholar. MOOTW, according to the official doctrine, can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how they differ from operations in war. Although MOOTW and war may often seem similar in action, MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests. 3 5

According to the official literature there were sixteen categories of MOOTW, ranging alphabetically from arms control efforts to support to insurgency. 3 6 Cynic and critic alike might have asked what types of MOOTW Japan was prepared to undertake. T h e answer was surprising. O f the sixteen MOOTW, J a p a n had already participated in ten: arms control, combating of terrorism, counterdrug operations, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, and show of force. O f the six remaining M O O T W that Japan was technically capable of, and given the correct international circumstances politically able to undertake, there were four more: enforcement of economic sanctions, enforcement of exclusion zones, ensurance of freedom of navigation and overflight, and noncombatant evacuation operations. Only two M O O T W were beyond Japan's political possibilities in the absence of some wrenching change in the domestic and international system: strikes and raids and direct support to insurgencies. O f course, the Pentagon's variations on M O O T W were broadly and even loosely defined. In part, such broad categorizing was why J a p a n had already performed at least ten such variants. But in part too, Japan's government and J D A were more engaged and more versatile than they were often given credit for. It remained a diplomatic and defense planning task for the United States to see that Japan's limitations were also appreciated, under the proper circumstances, as a limited license. By the end of the "American century" the Pacific Rim was host to a number of countries that fell somewhere into the spectrum of democracy—somewhere at least beyond the complete absence of

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democracy: for example, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Some of these countries still faced internal and external threats to their stability, to their development of democratic practices, and to their commercial or diplomatic relations with the United States. In times of crisis, it was the United States that took the lead in organizing a coherent policy of diplomatic, economic, or military interventions in the region. More and more, the United States, both by design and necessity, asked help of other Asian nations where it could find help and was asked for help by the same. But among those Asian Pacific nations, Japan was without question the most powerful, the most democratic, the most stable, and the nation whose interests coincided most nearly with those of the United States. The strongest U.S. allies have been, like the United States, industrialized, secular, democratic states committed to the free exchange of goods and ideas, to the stability of the international order, and to the warding off of the claims and threats of illiberal ideologies. As the United States has faced continued threats to the world order; threats to the domestic stability of friendly governments; and threats of ethnic, religious, and authoritarian assaults on human rights around the globe, it could make good use of its allies or forgo an important source of political, economic, and military support. Likewise, Japan could do no better than to have a democratic and maritime power as ally.

Notes 1. The one exception might be Periclean Athens, but the great city-state more than a few times imposed a democratic system on its rivals and was heavy-handed in enforcing alliances. See Peter J. Woolley "The Role of Strategy in Great Power Decline," Naval War College Review X L I X , 1 (Winter 1996): pp. 19-37. 2. The latter decades produced a spate of books and articles about the Japanese threat too numerous to list here. Representative of the thesis in defense matters was The Coming War with Japan by George Friedman and Meredith Lebard (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). About Japan's political relations with the United States there was Pat Choate, Agents of Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in the United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System (New York: Knopf, 1990). Asserting that "Japanese power is actually a carefully structured hierarchy, and the capstone is . . . the little-understood and low-profile Ministry of Finance," was Eamonn Fingleton, "Japan's Invisible Leviathan," Foreign Affairs (March/April 1995): pp. 6 9 - 8 5 . In economics and business there was a veritable cascade of books explaining Japanese success—usually in cultural terms—and the Japanese threat to U.S. economic dominance. 3. Seizaburo Sato, Kenichi Koyama, and Shumpei Kumon, eds, Postwar Politician: The Life of Former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1990), see Introduction.

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4. T h e author played his part as a m e m b e r o f the J a p a n e s e government. 5. For a brief narrative see Tetsuo Maeda, The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces, trans, by Steven Karpa (Chicago: Edition Q, 1 9 9 5 ) , ch. 5. 6. T h e mines n u m b e r e d at least a h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d a n d were concentrated near the busiest sea-lanes, in straits and a p p r o a c h i n g harbors. Several h u n d r e d J a p a n e s e vessels participated in the c l e a n u p a n d were comm a n d e d by Kyuzo Tamora, a f o r m e r officer o f the imperial navy. 7. See the memoirs o f the director o f the Maritime Safety Board, Takeo O k u b o , Days of the Call of the Sea (Tokyo: Kai you m o n d a i kenkyukai, 1 9 7 8 ) ; J a m e s E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71 (New York: Praeger, 1 9 7 3 ) , pp. 4 9 - 5 2 . 8. Naoyuki Agawa and J a m e s E. Auer, "Pacific Friendship," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ( O c t o b e r 1 9 9 6 ) : p. 56. 9. Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan Than Can Say No (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 9 9 1 ) . 10. F r i e d m a n a n d L e b a r d ' s a r g u m e n t at r o o t was that "the desire f o r J a p a n to control its e c o n o m i c destiny c a n n o t be achieved without displacing the U n i t e d States Navy f r o m its p r e e m i n e n t role in the Pacific." T h u s , in their thesis, e c o n o m i c competition would lead to political and, later, to military and naval competition. But a better e c o n o m i c r a t i o n a l e — i f o n e m u s t — would be that the prosperity o f the United States and J a p a n depends on the fact that n o o n e " c o n t r o l s " the Pacific O c e a n . T h e navies o f the two countries are t h e r e to e n f o r c e the f r e e d o m o f the seas on which c o m m e r c i a l interests and prosperity d e p e n d in both countries, and in a good many others on the Pacific Rim. 11. Defense expenditures were notoriously difficult to c o m p a r e , a m o n g o t h e r reasons, because soft c u r r e n c i e s such as China's, or unstable currencies such as Russia's, or overvalued h a r d c u r r e n c i e s such as J a p a n ' s , produced misleading real dollar conversions. In addition, purchasing power diff e r e d greatly f r o m o n e country to a n o t h e r and, in J a p a n ' s case, prices f o r domestically p r o d u c e d goods a n d services were as m u c h as two to t h r e e times world market prices. Nonetheless, J a p a n ' s military expenditures were far g r e a t e r than most p e o p l e realized. S e e World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms C o n t r o l a n d D i s a r m a m e n t Agency, a n n u a l ) . 12. T h e J G S D F was m a n n e d at 8 4 . 7 p e r c e n t o f its authorized level or 2 7 , 0 0 0 troops u n d e r the limit. T h e J A S D F was m a n n e d at 9 6 . 5 p e r c e n t and the J M S D F at 9 5 . 8 p e r c e n t . T h e cutback in g r o u n d troops was then largely on paper. 13. T h e J A S D F was similarly directed to eliminate an F-4 fighter squadron. 14. See J a p a n e s e Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: J a p a n e s e Defense Agency, a n n u a l ) , where chapters 1 - 2 typically offer an assessment o f the international military situation. Also, a review o f J a p a n ' s actual and potential security problems by Makoto Sakuma, a f o r m e r chairman o f the JDA's J o i n t Staff C o u n c i l , is f o u n d in " F o r m e r M S D F Staff C h i e f on Security Issues," FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 10 July 1996. 15. For an e x c e l l e n t summary o f the dispute and the interests involved see B o b Catley and Makur Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea (Singapore: Ashgate, 1 9 9 7 ) . 16. For a summary o f similar and differing views see H e e Yoo Se, "SinoJ a p a n e s e Relations in a C h a n g i n g East Asia," in Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E.

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S h a r p e , 1993), p p . 303-322. Se n o t e d at the time t h a t " m a n y J a p a n e s e scholars c o n s i d e r C h i n a to be the c o u n t r y most t h r e a t e n i n g to J a p a n " in t h e p o s t Cold War era. O n t h e China-Taiwan d i s p u t e see C h e n Q i m a o a n d Wei Yung, Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Perspectives from Mainland China and Taiwan, O c c a s i o n a l P a p e r ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: Atlantic C o u n c i l , M a r c h 1988). O n J a p a n ' s interest in the dispute see "Tokyo ' C o n c e r n e d ' A b o u t Tension Across Taiwan Strait," FBIS-EAS Daily Report, 24 F e b r u a r y 1996. 17. J a p a n e s e D e f e n s e Agency, Defense offapan., ch. 2, sec. 5; also Christop h e r W. H u g h e s , " T h e N o r t h Korean N u c l e a r Crisis a n d J a p a n e s e Security," Survival 38 ( S u m m e r 1996): p p . 79-103. 18. See S t e p h e n Blank, "We Can Live W i t h o u t You: Rivalry a n d Dialogue in Russo-Japanese Relations," Comparative Strategy 12 (1993): p p . 175 ff.; R a j a n M e n o n , "Japan-Russia Relations a n d N o r t h e a s t Asian Security," Survival 38 ( S u m m e r 1996): p p . 5 9 - 7 8 ; a n d a n e x c e l l e n t s u m m a r y of t h e s e p r o b l e m s in A n d r e w K. H a n a m i , The Military Might of Modern Japan ( D u b u q u e , Iowa: K e n d a l l / H u n t , 1995). 19. O n J a p a n ' s territorial disputes in t h e East C h i n a Sea, see inter alia K. T. Chao, "East C h i n a Sea: B o u n d a r y P r o b l e m s Relating to t h e Tiao-yu-ta'i Islands," Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 2 (1982): p p . 4 5 - 9 7 , a n d in t h e same volume Ying-Jeou Ma, " T h e East Asian Seabed Controversy Revisited: Relevance (or I r r e l e v a n c e ) of t h e Tiao-yu-ta'i ( S e n k a k u ) Islands Territorial Dispute," p p . 1 - 4 4 : a n d Tao C h e n g , " T h e Sino-Japanese Dispute over t h e Tiao-yu-ta'i ( S e n k a k u ) Islands a n d t h e Law of Territorial Acquisition," Virginia Journal of International Law 14, p p . 221-266. 20. "Japan Reverses C o u r s e in S e n k a k u Islands Dispute," Japan Times, Weekly I n t e r n a t i o n a l Edition, 5 - 1 1 N o v e m b e r 1990, p. 3. 21. Japan Weekly, 31 July 1996, p. 2. 22. It was actually over t h e s e islands, p a r t of t h e Ryukyu a r c h i p e l a g o , t h a t m o d e r n J a p a n first p u t its Westernized military to t h e test in 1872. Retaliating f o r the m u r d e r s of several J a p a n e s e m a r i n e r s in the Ryukyu Islands, J a p a n ' s Meiji g o v e r n m e n t attacked the island of Formosa, an i m p o r t a n t Chinese d e p e n d e n c y , a n d by this punitive f o r c e won a n i n d e m n i t y f r o m the Chinese g o v e r n m e n t . 23. A m o n g J a p a n ' s t o p t e n aid r e c i p i e n t s were C h i n a , I n d o n e s i a , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , T h a i l a n d , Malaysia, a n d Korea. See inter alia R o b e r t Orr, The Emergence ofJapan's Foreign Aid Power (New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1990); Alan Rix, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity f o r L e a d e r s h i p , " Pacific Affairs 62, 4 (Winter 1990): pp. 461-475; Shafiqul Islam, ed., Yen for Development: Japanese Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burden-Sharing (New York: Council o n Foreign Relations Press, 1991). 24. J a p a n ' s 1991 white p a p e r o n overseas d e v e l o p m e n t assistance f o r t h e first t i m e tied d e v e l o p m e n t aid to political values. See Takashi Kitazume, "Tokyo to Link Aid M o r e Closely to Politics," Japan Times, Weekly I n t e r n a tional Edition, 1 4 - 2 0 O c t o b e r 1991; Yoichi F u n a b a s h i , "Japan a n d t h e New World Order," Foreign Affairs 70, 5 (Winter 1991-1992): p p . 66 ff.; "New Aid Policy Emphasizes Markets, Demilitarization, Democracy a n d E n v i r o n m e n t , " Weekly Japan Digest, 6 July 1992, p. 14. 25. See, f o r instance, J o h n D. Issacs " T h e Domestic C o n t e x t : A m e r i c a n Politics a n d U N Peacekeeping," in UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives, Selig S. H a r r i s o n a n d Masashi N i s h i h a r a , eds. ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: C a r n e g i e Institute, 1995), p p . 73-88. 26. A poll in 1989 showed t h a t less t h a n a q u a r t e r of the public w a n t e d t h e J S D F to p a r t i c i p a t e in U N p e a c e k e e p i n g b u t t h a t 72 p e r c e n t w o u l d

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a p p r o v e of t h e J S D F d e p l o y m e n t a b r o a d to h e l p with disaster relief. Two years later, a majority o p p o s e d t h e g e n e r a l n o t i o n of c o o p e r a t i n g in t h e allied war e f f o r t against Iraq, b u t was evenly split over t h e m o r e specific questions of w h e t h e r to s e n d JSDF planes to h e l p evacuate r e f u g e e s a n d to s e n d physicians o r t e c h n i c i a n s to h e l p in n o n c o m b a t areas. A f t e r t h e passage of the p e a c e k e e p i n g bill in 1992, p u b l i c s u p p o r t f o r t h e legislation was u n c o m m i t t e d with a b o u t a t h i r d in favor, a t h i r d o p p o s e d , a n d a t h i r d u n d e c i d e d ; a f t e r t h e d e p l o y m e n t of JSDF e n g i n e e r s to C a m b o d i a a n d the successful election t h e r e , 55 p e r c e n t of the p u b l i c a p p r o v e d of the legislation. 27. "Renewed Fighting Revives PKO Debate," Japan Times, Weekly Intern a t i o n a l E d i t i o n , 2 2 - 2 8 F e b r u a r y 1993, p. 1; a n d " G o v e r n m e n t Reassesses PKO Mission in C a m b o d i a , " 1 7 - 2 3 May 1993, p. 1; " P e a c e k e e p i n g Role Doubts Raised," 2 4 - 3 0 May 1993, p. 1. Some critics took pleasure in p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t a f t e r o n e J a p a n e s e p o l i c e m a n was killed in t h e s p r i n g of 1993, twenty o t h e r p e a c e k e e p e r s f l e d their posts. T h e s e f l e e i n g p e a c e k e e p e r s were civilian p o l i c e m e n , however, a n d n o t m e m b e r s of t h e JSDF. 28. T h e C-130 only carries ninety-two p e o p l e , a n d t h e r a n g e of t h e s e p l a n e s is 2,300 miles. For their mission to M o z a m b i q u e t h e p l a n e s h a d to ref u e l at least f o u r times, b u t the 2,300-mile r a n g e gives t h e m significant possibilities o n the Asian Rim. 29. See T a m a r a Moser Melia, Damn the Torpedoes: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: Navy Historical Center, 1991); a n d J o h n F. Tarpey, " M i n e s t r u c k Navy Forgets Its History," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, F e b r u a r y 1988, p p . 4 4 - 4 7 . 30. See Nicholas D. Rristof, " T h e P r o b l e m of Memory," Foreign Affairs 77, 6 ( N o v e m b e r / D e c e m b e r 1998): p p . 37-49. 31. Asked if J a p a n h a d c h a n g e d since World War II, t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r of S i n g a p o r e , Lee K u a n Yew, said n o . See "Lee o n J a p a n ' s D e p l o y m e n t in Gulf, U.S. Bases," FBIS Daily Report, East Asia, 8 N o v e m b e r 1990, p. 34. 32. " X i n h u a o n J a p a n ' s J S D F D e p l o y m e n t to Gulf," FBIS Daily Report, China, 23 April 1991, p. 5. See also " R o u n d u p o n J a p a n ' s T r o o p Dispatch," 24 April 1991, pp. 4—5; a n d "Li P e n g Discusses Minesweepers," 24 April 1991, p. 13. 33. For e x a m p l e , by t h e time m i n e s w e e p e r s were d i s p a t c h e d to t h e Persian Gulf, 75 p e r c e n t of the p u b l i c s u p p o r t e d the m e a s u r e . 34. See Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Joint P u b 3-07) 16 J u n e 1995. 35. Ibid., p. vii. 36. Ibid., p p . III-l ff.

Selected Bibliography

There can be no one kind of source that comprehends the actions of a state. T h e policies of such a complex organization can only be distilled to manageable proportions and never completely understood. Moreover, understanding Japan is complicated by the morass of prejudices and myths against which one must always be on guard. Clearly one of the best avenues of exploration is in the personal interview of participating players. This author has been fortunate to have been afforded a number of these. But one can never interview enough people nor be sure that one is getting a candid view nor even reconcile the diverse views one gets from such conversations. Newspapers tend to be the least helpful of sources. Their interest in any given policy or series of actions tends to be short-lived, their reporting sporadic. News writers have already distilled events for a mass audience, and they, like the audience, tend not to be specialists. But newspaper accounts do have the virtue of keeping straight the chronology of events as well as reflecting the prevailing elite opinion of the day. The best sources for the incremental unfolding of policy and the fits and starts of decisionmaking are reports from the more obscure news wires, specialized digests, and government reports. T h e U.S. State Department's Foreign Broadcast Information Service is invaluable for both official commentary at all levels, as well as wire stories that never make it through the editorial filters of major newspapers. Books and periodical articles that impinge on Japan's place in the world and, more particularly, on the causes and effects of its official policy are not necessarily found in a bibliographic search that includes the word "Japan." Comprehension of the country, its actions, and its politics must be pursued in the context of a world order driven by U.S. policy, a Pacific region defined by the intersection of several great powers, an area historically dominated by the 151

152

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Bibliography

great Chinese civilization, a political economy linked closely to the rest of the world, and even a domestic context that has been shaped by great events of the past and the influence again of the United States. Thus in the bibliography below are found as many books concerned with China, the United States, and Russia as with Japan.

Books and Articles Agawa, Naoyuki, a n d J a m e s E. Auer. "Pacific Friendship," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ( O c t o b e r 1996). Allison, G r a h a m T. The Essence of Decision. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. Arase, David. "New Directions in J a p a n e s e Security Policy." Contemporary Security Policy 15 (1994). Asakura, Toshio. "National Consensus." By The Way 7 ( N o v e m b e r / D e c e m b e r 1992). A u b i n , S t e p h e n P. "China: Yes, Worry A b o u t t h e F u t u r e . " Strategic Review (1998). Auer, J a m e s . The Postwar Rearmament ofJapanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971. New York: Praeger, 1973. Auer, J a m e s . "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force: An A p p r o p r i a t e Maritime Strategy." Naval War College Review XXIV (1971). Auer, J a m e s . "Article N i n e of J a p a n ' s C o n s t i t u t i o n : F r o m R e n u n c i a t i o n of A r m e d Force ' F o r e v e r ' to t h e T h i r d Largest D e f e n s e B u d g e t in t h e World." Law and Contemporary Problems 53 (Spring 1990). Auer, J a m e s . "Japan's C h a n g i n g D e f e n s e Policy." The New Pacific Security Environment. Ralph A. Cossa, ed. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: National D e f e n s e University, 1993. Barber, B e n j a m i n David. Presidential Character. U p p e r Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, m u l t i p l e editions. B a r n h a r t , Michael. Japan and the World Since 1868. L o n d o n : Edward A r n o l d , 1995. Blank, S t e p h e n . "We Can Live W i t h o u t You: Rivalry a n d Dialogue in RussoJ a p a n e s e Relations." Comparative Strategy 12 (1993). Bojiang, Yang. "Gulf War C h a l l e n g e s J a p a n ' s Foreign Policy." Beijing Review ( 2 2 - 2 8 April 1991). Brobow, David. "Japan in the World: O p i n i o n f r o m D e f e a t to Success." Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (1989). Brown, Delmer. Nationalism in Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955. Catley, Bob, a n d M a k u r Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea. Sing a p o r e : Ashgate, 1997. C h o a t e , Pat. Agents of Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in the United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System. New York: Knopf, 1990. Chu, Shulong. "The Russian-U.S. Military Balance in the P o s t - C o l d War AsiaPacific Region a n d t h e ' C h i n a T h r e a t .'"Journal of Northeast Asian Affairs XIII (1994). Clintworth, Gary. " G r e a t e r C h i n a a n d Regional Security." Australian Journal of International Affairs 48 (1994). C o h e n , S t e p h e n D. An Ocean Apart: Explaining Three Decades of U.S.-Japanese Trade Frictions. Westport, C o n n . : Praeger, 1998.

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153

Dale, Peter. The Myth ofJapanese Uniqueness. L o n d o n : C r o o m Helm, 1986. De M e n t e , Boye Lafayette. Japan's Secret Weapon: The Kata Factor. P h o e n i x , Ariz.: P h o e n i x Books, 1990. D e p a r t m e n t o f Defense. The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region. Office o f International Security Affairs, 1998. D e p a r t m e n t o f Defense. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. J o i n t Pub 3-07, 16 J u n e 1995. Distances Between Ports, D e f e n c e Mapping Agency, 1992. D o r e , Ronald. Taking Japan Seriously: A Confucian Perspective on Leading Economic Issues. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press: 1987. Dougherty, J a m e s E., and R o b e r t L. Pfaltzgraff J r . Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. 4th ed. New York: Addison Wesley L o n g m a n , 1997. Drifte, R e i n h a r d . Arms Production in Japan. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986. Drucker, Peter F. "Japan's Choices." Foreign Affairs 65 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . Er, L a m P e n g . "Japan a n d the Spratley's Dispute: Aspirations a n d Limitations." Asian Survey 3 6 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . Fingleton, E a m o n n . "Japan's Invisible Leviathan." Foreign Affairs 7 4 ( M a r c h / April 1 9 9 5 ) . F r i e d m a n , G e o r g e , and M e r e d i t h L e b a r d . The Coming War with Japan. New York: St. Martin's Press: 1991. Funabashi, Yoichi. "Japan and the New World Order." Foreign Affairs 70 (Winter 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 ) . Gallagher, Daniel I. "Sea L a n e D e f e n s e : J a p a n e s e Capabilities a n d Imperatives." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1987. Gallagher, Michael G. "China's Illusory T h r e a t to the South C h i n a Sea." International Security ( 1 9 9 4 ) . Ganley, Michael. "Japanese Goal to P r o t e c t Sea Lanes: M o r e R h e t o r i c than Reality?" Armed Forces Journal International 123 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . G e o r g e , Aurelia. "Japan's Participation in UN P e a c e k e e p i n g O p e r a t i o n s . " Asian Survey X X X I I I ( 1 9 9 3 ) . Gluck, Carol. Japan's Modern Myths. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. G r e e n , Michael J . Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. H a n a m i , Andrew K. The Military Might of Modern Japan. D u b u q u e , Iowa: K e n d a l l / H u n t , 1995. Hara, Kimie. "New Light on the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute." Japan Forum 8 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . Hicks, G e o r g e . Japan's Hidden Apartheid: The Korean Minority and the Japanese. Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1997. Hughes, Christopher W. " T h e North Korean Nuclear Crisis and J a p a n e s e Security." Survival 38 ( S u m m e r 1 9 9 6 ) . H u m m e l , Hartwig. The Policy of Arms Export Restrictions in Japan. Occasional Papers Series N u m b e r 4. Tokyo: International Peace Research Institute Meigaku, 1988. H u m m e l , Hartwig. "Japan's Military Expenditures After the Cold War: T h e 'Realism' o f the P e a c e Dividend." Australian Journal of International Affairs 50 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . Hurst, G. C a m e r o n . " T h e U.S.-Japanese Alliance at Risk." Orbis 4 0 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . I n o g u c h i , Takashi. "Japan's Response to the G u l f Crisis: An Analytic Overview. "Journal ofJapanese Studies 18 ( 1 9 9 2 ) .

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Isaacs, J o h n D. "The Domestic Conflict: American Politics and UN Peacekeeping." In Selig Harrison, and M. Nishihara, eds., UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995. Islam, Shafiqul, ed. Yen for Development: Japanese Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burden-Sharing. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991. Ito, Kenichi. "The Japanese State of Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis." Journal ofJapanese Studies 17 (1991). Japanese Defense Agency. Defense ofJapan. Tokyo: Japanese Defense Agency. Annual. Johnson, Paul. The Birth of the Modern. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Kades, Charles L. "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution." Political Science Quarterly 104 (Summer 1989). Kaplinsky, Raphael. Easternisation: The Spread ofJapanese Management Practices to Developing Countries. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1994. Kataoka, Tetsuya. The Price of a Constitution. New York: Crane Russak, 1991. Kataoka, Tetsuya. "Japan's Defense Non-Buildup: What Went Wrong?" International Journal on World Peace (April-June 1985). Katzenstein, Peter J. Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998. Keddell, Joseph P., Jr. The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993. Kelly, James A. "For the United States in Asia, a Danger Is a Vacuum of Leadership." Seapower 38 (1995). Kim, Andrew H. N. "Japan and Peacekeeping Operations." Military Review (April 1994). Klare, Michael T. "The Next Great Arms Race." Foreign Affairs 12 (Summer 1993). Kozai, Shigeru. Kokuren no heiwa iji katsudo (Tokyo: Yukikaku, 1991). Kristof, Nicholas D. "The Problem of Memory." Foreign Affairs 11 (November/ December 1998). Kwiatkowska, Barbara. "Current Status of the Indonesian Archipelagic Jurisdiction," paper presented at Joint Conference with the Law of the Sea Institute and the Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute in Seoul, Korea, July 1993. Lambeth, Benjamin S. "Russia's Wounded Military." Foreign Affairs (March/ April 1995). Leitenberg, Milton. "The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations." Asian Perspective 20 (1996). Levin, Norman, Mark Sorell, and Arthur Alexander. The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993. MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. Mack, Andrew, and Desmond Ball. "The Military Build-Up in Asia-Pacific." Pacific Review 5 (1992). Maeda, Tetsuo. The Hidden Army: The Untold Story ofJapan's Military Forces, trans, by Steven Karpa. Chicago: Edition Q, 1995. Mak, J. N. "The Chinese Navy and the South China Sea: A Malaysian Assessment." Pacific Review 4 (1991). Mansfield, Mike. "The U.S. and Japan: Sharing Our Destinies." Foreign Affairs 68 (1989). Marriage, Adrian. "Japanese Democracy: Another Clever Imitation?" Pacific Affairs 63 (Fall 1990).

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M a t s u m o t o , S h i g e r u . Motoori Norinaga: 1730-1801. C a m b r i d g e , Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. McNelly, T h e o d o r e . " T h e J a p a n e s e Constitution: Child of t h e Cold War." Political Science Quarterly 69 (June 1959). McNelly, T h e o d o r e . " T h e R e n u n c i a t i o n of War in t h e J a p a n e s e Constitution." Armed Forces and Society 13 (Fall 1986). McNelly, T h e o d o r e . " G e n e r a l D o u g l a s M a c A r t h u r a n d t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l D i s a r m a m e n t of J a p a n . " Transactions of the Asiatic Society ofJapan, Series 3, 17 (1982). Melia, T a m a r a Moser. Damn the Torpedoes: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: Navy Historical Center, 1991. M e n o n , R a j a n . "Japan-Russia Relations a n d N o r t h e a s t Asian Security." Survival 38 ( S u m m e r 1996). Meyer, Peggy F a l k e n h e i m . "Russia's P o s t - C o l d War Security Policy in N o r t h east Asia." Pacific Viewpoint 35 (1994). Miyazawa, Kiichi. " R e t h i n k i n g t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n — A D o c u m e n t Tested by lime." Japan Quarterly 44 (July-September 1997). Modly, T h o m a s B. " T h e R h e t o r i c a n d Realities of J a p a n ' s 1,000-Mile SeaL a n e D e f e n s e Policy." Naval War College Review XXXVIII (1985). M o o r e , Ray A. "Reflections o n t h e O c c u p a t i o n of J a p a n . " Journal of Asian Studies 38 (August 1979). Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation. A r m o n k , N.Y.: M. E. S h a r p e , 1998. N a k a s o n e , Yasuhiro. " R e t h i n k i n g the C o n s t i t u t i o n — M a k e It a J a p a n e s e Docu m e n t . " Japan Quarterly 44 (July-September 1997). N i s h i h a r a , Masashi. "Prospects f o r J a p a n ' s D e f e n c e S t r e n g t h a n d I n t e r n a tional Security Role." In T. Stuart Douglas, ed., Security Within the Pacific Rim. Aldershot, E n g l a n d : Gower, 1987. Noer, J o h n J., with David Gregory. Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e University Press, 1996. O d a w a r a , Atsushi. " T h e Kaifu B u n g l e , " Japan Quarterly (January-March 1991). Orr, R o b e r t . The Emergence ofJapan's Foreign Aid Power. New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1990. Orr, R o b e r t T. "Why Aid? J a p a n as a G r e a t Power." Pacific Affairs 67 ( 1 9 8 9 1990). P e m p l e , T. J., e d . Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes. Ithaca, N.Y.: C o r n e l l University Press, 1990. P r i m e Minister's O f f i c e . Public Opinion Survey on Japan's Peace and Security (August 1989). Puckett, R o b e r t J., ed. The United States and Northeast Asia. Chicago: NelsonHall Publishers, 1993. P u r r i n g t o n , C o u r t n e y . "Tokyo's Policy Responses D u r i n g t h e Gulf War a n d the I m p a c t of the 'Iraqi S h o c k ' o n J a p a n . " Pacific Affairs 65 (1992). P u r r i n g t o n , Courtney, a n d A. K. "Tokyo's Policy Responses D u r i n g t h e Gulf Crisis." Asian Survey XXXI (1991). Pyle, K e n n e t h . "Japan's Pacific O v e r t u r e s . " The American Enterprise (Novemb e r / D e c e m b e r 1991). Pyle, K e n n e t h . The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era. 2d e d . W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: AEI Press, 1996.

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Qimao, C h e n , and Wei Yung. Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Perspectives from Mainland China and Taiwan. Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, March 1988. Reed, Steven R. Making Common Sense of Japan. Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1993. Rix, Alan. "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity f o r Leadership." Pacific Affairs 62 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . R o c h e , J o h n P. "Judicial Self-Restraint." American Political Science Review (September 1955). Ross, Douglas. "Maritime Security in the North Pacific During the 1990s." In Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, eds., Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution at Sea in the Post-Cold War Era. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1994. Royer, Kendrick F. " T h e Demise o f the World's First Pacifist Constitution: J a p a n e s e Constitutional I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and the Growth o f Executive Power to Make War." Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 26 (November 1993). Rubinstein, G. A., and J . O ' C o n n e l l . "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces." Naval Forces 11 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . Sands, Jeffrey I. Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United Nations. Alexandria, Va.: C e n t e r f o r Naval Analyses, 1993. Sato, Kazuo. "Japan's Resource Imports." The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 5 1 3 (January 1 9 9 1 ) . Sato, Kazuo. " I n c r e a s i n g Returns a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade: T h e Case o f J a p a n . " Journal of Asian Economics 1 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . Sato, Seizaburo, Kenichi Koyama, and S h u m p e i K u m o n , eds. Postwar Politician: The Life of Former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1990. Schulz, J o h n J . "China as a Strategic T h r e a t : Myths and Verities." Strategic Review X X V I ( 1 9 9 8 ) . Se, H e e Yoo. "Sino-Japanese Relations in a C h a n g i n g East Asia." In Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993. Sekino, Hideo. "Japan and H e r Maritime Defense." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1971. Sekino, Hideo. "A Diagnosis o f O u r Maritime Self-Defense F o r c e . " Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World), November 1970. Shin'ichi, Kitaoka. "Wangan senso to Nihon no gaiko" ("Chronicling J a p a n ' s Crisis Diplomacy"). Kokusai Mondai ( 1 9 9 1 ) . Simon, Herbert. Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan, 1958. Simon, H e r b e r t . "A Behavioral Model o f Rational C h o i c e . " Quarterly Journal of Economics L X I X (February 1 9 5 5 ) . Summers, Harry. "Reluctant Samurai." Defense & Diplomacy 9 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . Synge, Richard. Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997. Takahashi, Kazuyuki. " C o m m e n t . " Law and Contemporary Problems 53 (Spring 1990). Takayanagi, Kenzo. "Some Reminiscences o f J a p a n ' s Commission on the Constitution." In Dan F e n n o Henderson, ed., The Constitution of Japan: Its First Twenty Years, 1947-1967. Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1968. Tanaka, Akihiko. " T h e Domestic Context: Japanese Politics and UN Peacekeeping." In Selig G. Harrison and Masashi Nishihara, eds., UN Peacekeeping:

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Japanese and American Perspectives. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: C a r n e g i e Endowm e n t f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace, 1995. Tarpey, J o h n F. "A Minestruck Navy Forgets Its History." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114 (February 1988). T h o m a s , Roy. Japan: The Blighted Blossom. Vancouver: New Star, 1989. U n g e r , Danny. "Japan a n d t h e Gulf War: M a k i n g t h e World Safe f o r j a p a n U.S. Relations." In A n d r e w B e n n e t t , J o s e p h L e p g o l d , a n d D a n n y Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War. New York: St. Martin's, 1997. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State. "Visit of P r i m e Minister Suzuki." Deparment of State Bulletin 81 (June 1981). Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth. "Who Rules the Waves? T h e Arms Race o n t h e Pacific Rim." Asian Affairs 26 (1995). W a n n e r , B a r b a r a . "Japan Views L e a d e r s h i p O p p o r t u n i t i e s T h r o u g h the U n i t e d Nations." J a p a n E c o n o m i c Institute R e p o r t No. 10A (1992). Ward, R o b e r t E. " T h e Origins of t h e P r e s e n t J a p a n e s e Constitution." American Political Science Review 50 ( D e c e m b e r 1956). Weiner, Michael. Race and Migration in Imperial Japan. New York: R o u t l e d g e , 1994. Weiner, Michael. "Discourses o n Race, N a t i o n a n d E m p i r e in Pre-1945 J a p a n . " Ethnic and Racial Studies 18 (July 1995). Weiner, Michael, ed. Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity. New York: R o u t l e d g e , 1997. Wile, Ted S h a n n o n . "Sealane D e f e n s e : An E m e r g i n g Role f o r t h e JMSDF?" Master's thesis, Naval P o s t g r a d u a t e School, 1981. Williams, J u s t i n , Sr. "American D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n Policy f o r O c c u p i e d J a p a n : C o r r e c t i n g t h e Revisionist Version." Pacific Historical Review 57 (1988). W o l f e r e n , Karel G. van. The Enigma of Japanese Power. New York: Knopf, 1989. W o l f e r e n , Karel G. van. " T h e J a p a n P r o b l e m . " Foreign Affairs 65 ( 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 ) . W o l f e r e n , Karel G. van. " T h e E n i g m a of J a p a n e s e Power: A Response to Misu n d e r s t a n d i n g . " IHJBulletin (Spring 1990). Woolley, P e t e r J. "Low Level Military T h r e a t s a n d t h e F u t u r e of J a p a n ' s A r m e d Forces." Conflict Quarterly XIII (1993). Woolley, P e t e r J . "Japan's 1991 M i n e s w e e p i n g Decision: An O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Response." Asian Survey XXXVI (1996). Woolley, P e t e r J. " T h e Kata of J a p a n ' s Naval Forces." Naval War College Review XLIX (1996). Woolley, P e t e r J. "Japan's Sea Lane D e f e n s e Re-Visited." Strategic Review XXIV (1996). W o r o n o f f , J o h n . Politics the Japanese Way. L o n d o n : Macmillan, 1988. Yamada, David. " R e a r m i n g J a p a n : A Militech Society." Current Politics and Economics ofJapan 1 (1991). Yamaguchi, J i r o . " T h e Gulf War a n d t h e T r a n s f o r m a t i o n of J a p a n e s e Constitutional Politics." Journal ofJapanese Studies 18 (Winter 1992). Yamaguchi, T. "Gunning for Japan's Peace Constitution."/a/>an Quarterly 39 (1992). Yokota, Kisaburo. "Political Q u e s t i o n s a n d J u d i c i a l Review: A C o m p a r i s o n . " In D a n F e n n o H e n d e r s o n , ed., The Constitution ofJapan: Its First Twenty Years, 1947-1967. Seattle: University of W a s h i n g t o n Press, 1968. You, Ji, a n d X u You. "In Search of Blue W a t e r Power: T h e PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in t h e 1990s." Pacific Review 4 (1991). Young, P. Lewis. " T h e J a p a n e s e Maritime Self-Defense Forces: M a j o r Surface C o m b a t a n t s , Destroyers, a n d Frigates." Asian Defense Journal (1985).

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Bibliography

Yung, Christopher D. People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century. Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1996.

Interviews Aichi Kazuo, Director-General, International Bureau, Liberal Democratic Party, 12 July 1990. Chuma Kiyofuku, Deputy Chairman, Editorial Board, Asahi Shimbun, 13 August 1991. Daitoh Shinsuke, Director, Department of Military History, National Institute for Defense Studies, 9 August 1990. Hasebe, Thomas N., Major, USAF, Air Staff College Instructor, 19 July 1990. Imaizumi Takehiko, Public Information Division, JDA, 15 July 1991. Inada Noboru, Defense Agency Instructor, Air Staff College, JASDF, 30 July 1991. Ishizuka Yoshikazu, Editor, Japan Times, 25 July 1991. Iwashima Hisao, Professor of International Relations, Iwate University, 12 July 1990, 1991. Katsuya Hirose, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Hosei University, 11 July 1991. Kawamura Yasuo, Foreign Affairs Research Department, Cabinet Research Office, 24 July 1991. Kishino Hiroyuki, Senior Research Fellow, International Institute for Global Peace, Japan, 8 July 1991. Kondo Shigekatsu, Director, First Research Office, National Institute for Defense Studies, 25 July 1991. Nakamura Yoshio, Deputy Director, International Economic Affairs Department, Keidanren, 7 August 1990. Nishihara Masashi, Professor, National Defense Academy, 19 July 1991. Nishimura Shigeki, Lieutenant Colonel, JGSDF, Senior Research Fellow, International Institute for Global Peace, 8 July 1991. Okito Saburo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 July 1991. Onishi Sadao, Foreign Affairs Research Department, Cabinet Research Office, 24 July 1991. Sakamoto Yoshikasu, Deputy Director, International Peace Research Institute of Meiji Gakuin University, 4 August 1990 and 15 July 1991. Sei Katsuhiro, Colonel, JASDF, Liaison to Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan, 10 July 1991. Tachibana Nobutaka, Cabinet Research Office, 24 July 1991. Taoka Shunji, Senior Staff Writer, Asahi Shimbun Weekly, 9 August 1991. Takata Taketo, Vice Admiral, JMSDF (ret.), 25 July 1991. Yamashita Hirotsugu, Captain, JMSDF, Professor, First Research Office, National Institute for Defense Studies, 25 July 1991. Yoshida Manabu, Admiral, JMSDF (ret.), 25 July 1991.

Newspapers Asahi Shimbun Chicago Tribune Daily Yomiuri Financial Times Japan Times

Selected

Bibliography

Mainichi Shimbun New York Times Pacific Stars and Stripes Wall Street Journal Washington Post

Other Periodicals Asian Defense Journal Beijing Review Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists By The Way Defense News Economic Eye Far Eastern Economic Review Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy Japan Echo Military Review New York Times Magazine Nihon Keizai Survival Virginia Journal of International Law Weekly Japan Digest

Reference Works Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs International Defense Review Jane's Defence Systems Modernization Jane's Intelligence Review Strategic Survey World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers Yearbook of International Law and Affairs

Government Documents Department of State Bulletin Diplomatic Bluebook FBIS Daily Report, Asia and Pacific FBIS Daily Report, China FBIS Daily Report, East Asia FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union Official Gazette Extra Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, 8 September 1951 White Papers on Defense White Papers on Overseas Development Assistance

Index

Abe Shipntaro, 97 Abu Dhabi, 105 Aegis, 30, 74, 78 Akashi Yasushi, 124, 125 Allied Council for Japan, 41 Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW), 8, 28, 69 Argentina, 27 Australia, 101 Brazil, 27 Britain, 6-7, 101, 111 Brown, Harold, 67 Burke, Arleigh, 134 Burma, 10, 138 Bush, George, 101, 141 Cambodia, 32-33, 49, 55, 93, 122-5, 138, 141-142 Carter, Jimmy, 67 China, 7, 10, 45, 47, 94, 113, 132, 137-138, 140, 144; People's Liberation Army (Navy) [PLA(N)], 75-77, 80-83 Colombia, 27 Communist Party, 70 Congo, 45 Constitution, 14, 39-63; Meiji, 41 Cultural Model, 2, 13-14, 23-34, 96, Defense Bureau, 68 Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), 57, 97, 120-121 Diet, 41, 46, 47-48, 53, 58, 93, 118, 125, 136 Dulles, John Foster, 44

East China Sea, 10, 113, 137 Egypt, 27, 116 Eisenhower, Dwight, 47, 115 Exports, 5, 11-12; arms, 52-53 Fuji, 28, 49 Germany, 94 Golan Heights, 33, 49, 125-6 Gorbachev, M., 51, 117 Governmental Politics Model, 16-17, 65-66, 96-97 Guam, 30, 72 Guerre de course, 68-69, 72 Hammarskjold, Dag, 45, 116-117 Hawke, Robert, 101 Hiraiwa Gaishi, 97 Hokkaido, 6, 8, 25, 68, 136 Hong Kong, 83 Honshu, 8-10 Hosokawa Morihiro, 120 Hughes, Charles Evans, 40 Hun Sen, 122 Hurd, Douglas, 101 Hyakuri Base, 58 Ikeda Hayato, 54, 115 Imports, 5, 7, 11-12, 68, 139 Indian Ocean, 51, 68, 72 Indonesia, 53, 68, 113, 116, 138, 140 Institutional Approach, 2, 14-15, 39-40, 58-59 Iraq, 91, 93, 98, 105, 114 Ishihara Shintaro, 134 Ishikawa Rokuro, 97

161

162

Index

J a p a n Air Lines, 116 J a p a n ' s Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF), 25, 32, 49, 68, 102-103, 120, 122-126, 142 J a p a n ' s Defense Agency (JDA), 29, 31, 49, 68, 69, 98, 102, 116, 122 J a p a n ' s G r o u n d Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), 25, 32, 49, 68, 103, 111, 122-126, 136, 142 J o r d a n , Kingdom of, 102-103, 116 Kades, Charles, 43 Kaifu Toshiki, 94, 97, 101, 118, 121 Kaihara O s a m u , 6 8 - 6 9 Kakisawa Koji, 97 K e i d a n r e n , 97 Kellog-Briand Pact, 42 K e n n a n , George F., 44 Kenya, 49, 125 Kishi N o b u s u k e , 27, 47-48, 115 K h m e r Rouge, 124, 138 Kongo, 78-80, 82 Korea, Republic of, 8 - 1 0 , 47, 89, 134, 137, 140 Korea Strait, 8 Korean War, 10, 44, 100, 115, 134 K u o m i n t a n g , 10 Kuranari Tadashi, 97 Kurile Basin, 8 Kurile Islands, 8, 137 Kuwait, 52, 90, 91, 94, 97, 105 La Perouse Strait, 7 L e b a n o n , 45 Lee Kuan Yew, 95, 144 Liberal D e m o c r a t i c Party (LDP), 4, 56, 68-69, 83, 97, 99, 118, 121 Malaysia, 113 Maritime Safety Agency, 26, 28, 33, 53, 100, 138 Maritime Staff Office, 31, 101 M a t s u m o t o Joji, 41 Mao Tse Tung, 10, 47 MacArthur, Douglas, 4 1 - 4 3 Mexico, 27 Miki Takeo, 4 9 - 5 0 Ministry of Agriculture v. Ito, 58 Miyazawa Kiichi, 121 Militarism, 6, 40, 121 Military O p e r a t i o n s O t h e r t h a n War ( M O O T W ) , 145

Ministry of Finance, 18, 97, 99 Ministry of I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e a n d Industry (MITI), 52 Mozambique, 33, 49, 93, 125 Murayama Tomiichi, 33, 56, 120, 125 Mutual Security Act, 27, 115 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 29-30, 50, 53, 66, 69-72, 83, 97, 99 National Police Reserve, 44 National Safety Forces, 44 Nemawashi, 95 N e m u r o Strait, 7 New Guinea, 10 Nishihara Masashi, 51 Nixon, Richard, 66 N o m u r a Kichisaburo, 134 N o n - e x p o r t policy, 5 2 - 5 3 N o n - n u c l e a r policy, 53 N o r t h Korea, 10, 94, 113, 137 Ogata Sadako, 125 Okinawa, 47, 50 Organizational Process Model, 17-18, 97-98, 104-105 O u c h i Keigo, 97 Overseas D e v e l o p m e n t Assistance (ODA), 53, 99, 139-40 Pakistan, 53 Palestinians, 103 Peace c o o p e r a t i o n corps, 118 P e a c e k e e p i n g O p e r a t i o n s (PKO) Bill, 57, 118, 121-122, 141 Persian Gulf crises, 30-32, 52, 55-56, 89-109, 116; 1987-1988, 98-101, 113-114; 1990-1991, 18, 49, 55, 117-120 Peru, 113 P e t r o l e u m , 5, 68, 96, 98-99, 138 Philippines, 53, 72, 94, 113 Piracy, 113 Public o p i n i o n polls, 118-120 Rational Actor Model, 15-16, 96-97, 112 Reagan, Ronald, 66; administration, 50, 70 Reed, Steven, 3 Reischauer, Edwin O., 132 RIMPAC, 29, 74

Index Ringisei, 95 Russia, 7-8, 76, 113, 137; navy, 69, 75, 80-82 Rwanda, 93, 125 Ryukyu Islands, 10, 50 Saddam Hussein, 114 Saipan, 70, 83 Sakata v. Japan, 58 Sakuma Makoto, 103 San Francisco Treaty, 44 Sato, Eisaku, 66 Saudi Arabia, 18, 91, 94 Sea-lanes, 8, 28-30, 50-51, 65-87 Sea of Japan, 8 Sea of Okhotsk, 8 Sekino Hideo, 29, 67-69 Senkaku Islands, 137-138 Shidehara Kijuro, 41-42 Shining Path, 113 Singapore, 83, 95, 96, 113 Socialist Party, 45-46, 56, 70, 120, 125 Somalia, 141-142 South China Sea, 11, 137 Soviet Union, 27, 41, 45, 47, 83, 94, 111; Navy, 8, 66, 68-69, 71, 74-75 Soya-kaikyo, 7 Spratly Islands, 137 Strait of Hormuz, 83, 98, 116 Strait of Malacca, 11, 33, 70, 113 Strait of Taiwan, 30, 72 Suzuki Eeji, 97 Suzuki Zenko, 29-30, 50-51, 66, 70-72

163

Takeshita, Noboru, 97 Taiwan, 47, 53, 70, 83, 137, 138 Takata Haruyuki, 124 Tatar Strait, 8 Terrorism, 112-113 Thailand, 27, 53, 123, 138 Tokushu kokka, 95 Training missions, 26-28, 49, 54 Tsugaru Strait, 8 Turkey, 27, 116 United Nations: Disengagement Observer Force, 125; International Organization for Migration, 103; Security Council, 89; Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 122-124 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 44, 46-47, 50-52, 89, 111, 115, 118, 134 Venezuela, 27 Vietnam, 66, 116 Vladivostok, 8, 83, 136 Watanabe Michio, 97 Weinberger, Casper, 72 Whitney, Courtney, 43 Yoshida Doctrine, 23 Yoshida Shigeru, 43-44, 46-47, 114-115, 134 Zairaigata kokka, 95 Zaire, 33, 49, 125

About the Book

Japan's navy, after that of the United States, is now the most potent in the Pacific Ocean. This book examines the development and potential of the Japanese navy in the context of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Woolley presents Japan's coming o f age as a military—primarily naval—power in a series of case studies on sea-lane defense, minesweeping, and participation in UN peacekeeping operations. He also considers recent political and military decisions from a range of analytical perspectives. Throughout his analysis, he emphasizes the strategic importance of Japan to U.S. interests in maintaining international stability. Peter J . Woolley is professor of comparative politics at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

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