Japanese Defence: The Search for Political Power 9789814379359

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JAPANESE DEFENCE The Search for Political Power

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEASI was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the multi-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer. The Regional Strategic Studies Programme (RSSPI was set up in February 1981 in response to the need to supplement global concepts and methods of analysis with a closer understanding of the realities in the region; to ensure that much of this is done in the region and with as much input as possible by Southeast Asians themselves, thereby leading to the creation of a body of expertise on security issues resident in the region; and to see that, in terms of Southeast Asian participation, there would be greater involvement of the different strands of Southeast Asian opinion and expertise, including not only the academic community but also government and military personnel, mass media, and, as the opportunity arises, the business and commercial sectors. The major objective is to encourage study of various security issues and developments affecting the area. The Programme is based at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies under the overall supervision of its Director, who is guided by a regional committee, a Programme Planner, and a Co-ordinator.

ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY

JAPANESE DEFENCE The Search for Political Power

S. JAVED MASWOOD Griffith University

I5EA5

Regional Strategic Studies Programme Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Published by Instit ute of Southeast Asian Stud ies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 Al l rights reserved. No part of this pub lication may be reproduced, stored in a ret rieva l system , or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 1990 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies The responsibi/itv for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusivelv with the author and his interpretations do not necessanlv reflect the views or the policv of the Institute or its supporters.

Cataloguing in Publication Data

Maswood, S. Javed. Japanese defence : the search for politica l powe r. (Issues in Southeast As ian secu rity ) 1. Japan--Defenses . I. In st itute of Southeast Asian Studies (Si ngapo re) . Regional Strategic Stud ies Programme. II . Title. Ill . Series. UA845 M42 1990 sls89-91708 ISBN 981-3035-39-0 Typeset by The Fototype Business Printed in Singapore by Kin Keong Printing Co Pte Ltd

Contents

List of Tables

VII

Acknowledgements

IX

A Framework for the Ana lys is of Japan's Defence Po licy II

The Post-War Japanese Defence Establishment

25

Ill

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

45

IV

Reg iona l Imp lications of J apan's Defence Bui ldup

78

v

Conc lusion

95

Glossary

101

Bibliography

103

Index

11 2

List of Tables

Breakdown of Japanese Defence Spending for Selected Years 3.2 Breakdown of Japanese Defence Spending, 1980-88 3.3 Joint Mil itary Exercises between the United States and Japan, 1978-88 3.4 Rimpac Naval Manoeuvres, 1980 and 1988

3.1

57 62 69 69

Acknowledgements

This book was largely completed during my one-year stay at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, in 1987- 88 . I gratefully acknowledge the help and support of Professor K.S. Sandhu, Director of the Institute, and all the other staff who made my stay there pleasant and enjoyable. In particular, I would like to thank the Publications Unit staff who saw the book through to publication.

I

A Framework for the Analysis of

Japan's Defence Policy

Introduction It has become common wisdom to analyse Japan's foreign policy in the post-war period as a derivative of unique and particularistic features of the Japanese polity. This distinctiveness is not so much a part of Japanese culture or tradition as it is of the superstructural edifice that was shaped and created in the aftermath of defeat in World War II. More specifically, Japan's unique status among the collectivity of states has been said to emanate from the post-war Constitution under which Japan renounced the right of war to settle international disputes and even to maintain armed forces. This was largely the result of American idealism and the belief that defects in state structure were the principal cause of international conflicts. 1 The philosophical underpinning of this can be traced to Woodrow Wilson and his strong commitment, after World War I, to make the world safe for democracy and for democracies to make the

2

Chapter One

world safe. The Occupation authorities in Japan, after World War II, went a step further and not only established a democratic polity but also institutionalized the noble objective of non -violence as an addi tional guarantee against militarism. Japan, thus, became a singular experiment in history from which it has been unable and unwilling to extricate itself, as a result of accumulating expectations as a role model . Under the post-war Constitution, Japan renounced power politics and embarked on a path that strictly separated economics and politics. For its security and defence, Japan agreed to rel y on the United Nations which, it was hoped, would create an international environ ment of peace and stability obviating the need for nationa l defence. Since the right of belligerency has been traditionally recognized as a sovereign right, the fact that Japan renounced this conferred on it a status that was historically unparalleled. In co mbination with this, the wartime experiences and subsequent defeat engendered a "pacifist" sentiment within Japan that al lowed the experiment to continue, in principle. These wartime experiences were apparently sufficient to demonstrate the futility of wars. Together, the structural constraint (the "peace" Constitution) and the popular pacifism served to limit the growth of the military and facilitated the task of economic reconstruction. The peace clause of the Constitution, Article 9, reads as follows: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovere ign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes . In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The opening clause of the second paragraph has become known as the Ashida Revision as it was the then Japanese Prime Minister, Hitoshi Ashida, who claimed responsibility for its insertion . In actuality, it was the idea of Tokujiro Kanamori, the Minister of State for the Constitution, who believed that it would enable the future maintenance of land, sea, and air forces . An objection to this revision was raised by the Chinese delegates to the Far East Commission who

A Framework for the Analysis of Japan's Defence Policy

3

understood its significance but the Supreme Commander for Allied 2 Powers ISCAP) declined to take it up with the Japanese Government. Later, even as Japan developed a potent war fighting machinery, it continued to proclaim strict adherence, at least in spirit, to the constitutional principles. This was possible partly because the military establishment was euphemistically called the ground, air, and maritime self-defence forces, suggesting that these defence forces could not be offensively deployed or employed. Eventually, however, the disjuncture between the constitutional principles and the practical reality called into play a dextrous act of constitutional juggling to legitimize the growing defence capabilities. The self-defence forces have been justified as necessary in view of the fact that the aspiration for a world peace based on justice and order (second paragraph of Article 9) has not been realized and because the United Nations has proved unable to preserve international peace. Still, post-war Japanese governments have been careful to affirm their commitment to the principle of non-belligerency not only as a concession to domestic public opinion but also to allay fears abroad of future Japanese militarism. Obviously, however, the Constitution has been interpreted in a relatively flexible manner and while that might suggest that the structural constraints have been less than effective, a number of auxiliary constraints were developed around it to limit the freedom of action of the Japanese Government. For example, as a "peaceful" country, the legal structure made little allowance for dealing with potential threats to national security. Likewise, the "spirit" of the Constitution seemed to suggest that there had to be clear limits on defence expenditure to ensure that the military did not grow unchecked . In the early period, the limit was defined by the successive long-term defence plans which were replaced, in the mid-1970s, by the one per cent ceiling on defence expenditure. These and other constraints were the ones, as shall be seen below and in the following chapters, that Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone tried to overcome in his attempt to normalize the Japanese state. As the term normalization implies, it was an attempt to remove the image of Japan as a unique country which was based on some of the constraints discussed above and perpetuated by the general pattern of post-war politics that emphasized economic and welfare concerns to the neglect of political issues . In its place, Nakasone sought to achieve a balance between political and economic goals

4

Chapter One

and reinstate Japan as an equal member in the international state system, with a political role and influence commensurate with its economic power. It should be emphasized, however, that the concept of a normal state had as its referent not pre-war Japan but rather the contemporary state system. The rearmament of Japan was perhaps inevitable. As early as April 1946, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, asserted that the United Nations was unlikely to ever be successful in its charter ambitions unless all countries renounced war, implying that Japan could not anticipate success in its chosen path if other countries failed to accept the principle. 3 Once Japan had established a quasi-military establishment, there followed the emergence of an ongoing debate on the role, size, and capabilities of the forces. In general, the defence debate in Japan has involved "idealists"- proponents of unarmed neutrality or variants of it-and "realists" who take a less sanguine view of international events and the feasibility of relying on the goodwill of others. However, not all realists are necessarily in favour of full-blown rearmament . According to one prominent realist, for example, Japan must ... explore untried possibilities by continuing her historically unprecedented attempt to identify the nation's raison d 'etre with peaceful, noncompetitive values; we must be proud of the fact that Japan alone is attempting this and confident that we can succeed 4

Still, most realists on the defence issue would argue on the inevitability of a significantly expanded defence establishment. For example, Makoto Momoi has, for over a decade, maintained that Japan would soon end its failed experiment and initiate a programme of remilitarization. Even though they were in a minority, it appeared that proponents of a bigger defence establishment had convinced themselves that if they talked long and loud enough, their predictions would somehow come true. In December 1967, Takeo Fukuda, then Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, stated that with the resolution of the Okinawa reversion issue, the party hoped to reopen the defence debate in a more positive way. 5 Behind this suggestion was, of course, a particular interpretation of Japan's international environment and the Soviet threat. It was assumed that a growing Soviet threat in the region made Japanese rearmament both inevitable and desirable. The

A Framework for the Analvsis of Japan's Defence Policv

5

onset of U.S.-Soviet detente and the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, however, weakened the arguments for a defence bui ldup and the projected increase in the defence estab lishment failed to materialize. Even so, the incrementa l approach to defence expend iture did not have an altogether negligible impact. In terms of absolute defence expend iture, Japan already ranked twe lfth in the world by 1970 and eighth by the mid-1980s even though it was a small percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) . By the late 1980s, annua l Japanese defence expenditure had, on a comparative basis, risen even further. This was, however, largely a function of currency revaluation and the appreciation of the Japanese yen from around ¥240 to about ¥130 to the U.S. dollar in the period after the Plaza Accord of September 1985. Japanese and Western scholars, in the early 1970s, optimistica ll y predicted a defence buildup in Japan and a larger po litica l role in the international system . That thi s failed to materialize requires an explanat ion if only to preempt a cynical response to such claims at the present. By the turn of the 1970s, Japan had recovered miraculously from the wartime setbacks and it appeared that economic growth was unstoppable. Based on future projections of continued economic growth, analysts claimed that a greater politica l clout and role was inevitable. In reality, however, the 1970s ushered in a series of economic crises that did not bode well for growth and we lfare, and with each successive crisis Japan found itself desperately trying to sustain its economic vitality. The two oil crises, the dol lar shock, the collapse of the Bretton -Woods monetary system, the rising drift towards protectionism, all meant that economic growth, instead of being taken almost for granted, became an issue that preoccupied Japanese decision makers. With attention span taken up by economic threats and cha llenges, ve ry little consideration was given to the issue of a politica l role which might explain why such a role was so slow in maturing. In contrast to the 1970s, the present circumstances are more propitious to the development of this role. Firstly, despite slower economic growth in the 1970s, Japan man aged the economic crises with considerable success, which renewed its sense of economic confidence. Instead of the earlier preoccupation with the economic vulnerab ilities, Japanese leaders, today, are now more sure of their ability to ta ckle econom ic challenges. Significantly, insofar as international trade issues are concerned, the Japanese role

6

Chapter One

is shifting away from one that is of a reactive nature to one involving activism in the interest of stabilizing the liberal international economic order. Secondly, the question of defence buildup has come to be based more on an independently derived threat perception and on making a greater contribution to the collective Western defence efforts . In previous years Japanese threat perception and support for defence buildup were largely predicated on the state of U.S.-Soviet relations . Now threat perceptions are being defined largely in terms of Japan-Soviet relations and the persisting abnormality in their bilateral relationship due to the unresolved territorial dispute. With the new emphasis on making a positive contribution to Western security, defence issues are less likely to be affected by the vagaries of Western threat perception alone ensuring, in turn, a steady expansion of defence capabilities in line with Japan's international responsibilities. This is not to deny, however, that Western threat perceptions will be inconsequential but simply that short-term fluctuations in threat perception may have less impact on the long-term responsibilities of Japan as a member of the Western alliance. In so far as Japanese threat perception is concerned, through the 1980s, the Japanese defence establishment has projected the Soviet Union as either the "potential threat" or increasingly, as the main threat to Japanese security. 6 To some extent this has helped secure domestic support for the Japanese defence buildup. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and USSR will significantly reduce the Japanese threat perceptions or that it will undermine the efforts to expand defence. Indeed, one Japanese Foreign Ministry official, delinking Japan's defence efforts from the INF Treaty, stated that Japan should not be lulled into an optimist, pacifist mood since " . . it is necessary for us to further strengthen Western solidarity" 7 Osamu Kaihara, former Secretary General of the National Defence Council stated that even with the IN F Treaty it was unlikely that Soviet defence expenditures would decline and that obvious that the U.S. will be given the U.S. fiscal crisis it was " . looking forward to greater defense contributions [from Japan] all the way into the 1990s". 8 The negligible impact of the IN F Treaty on calculations of Japanese defence is evidence of the fact that Japan's defence buildup is no longer premised on Western threat perceptions but rather on what is necessary for Japan to accomplish as part of

A Framework for the Analysis of Japan's Defence Policy

7

its burden -sharing responsibilities with other countries of the West. The 1981 White Paper on Japanese defence contained, for the first time, a section on Japan's role as a member of the West and the 1985 White Paper clearly outlined its responsibilities . It stated that Japan should stri ve to build up its defense capa bility necessary for se lfdefense by taking into consideration a sense of so lidarity [with the West]. Thi s should always be cons idered since Japan, as a member of the free world nations, will seek to maintain and boost its prosperity in the future. 9

Thus, defence preparedness became a function of an independently defined threat perception and the requirements imposed by the need to maintain Western solidarity. In bringing about this change the importance of the leadership factor should not be underestimated. Nakasone was, by all accounts, an atypical prime minister who deliberately overstepped the bounds of existing national consensus to give new direction to Japan's defence policy, as shall be seen below. The appointment of Nakasone as the Director General of the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA) in the early 1970s was seen by some as an indication not only of the willingness to debate the defence issue more openly and remove it from the realm of taboo subjects but also to press ahead with the task of assuming a greater defence responsibility. This was because Nakasone was generally perceived to be more hawkish on defence issues than any of his predecesso rs . Under Nakasone, the JDA issued its first ever Defence White Paper to inform and educate the public but, other than that, the 1970s saw no real change and Japan remained a "unique" country.10 At a time when international tension was on the decline it was inevitable that proponents of stronger defence would become increasingly isolated. Not only did the defence buildup fail to materialize but the Japanese Government, in 1976, also imposed new limits on defence spending, restricting absolute defence expenditures to under one per cent of the GNP. In the 1980s, particularly following the selection of Nakasone as the Prime Minister in 1982, the question of national defence became a significant area of concern. This was aided by the changed pattern of international relations, especially the erosion of detente following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Whereas the U.S.-Soviet detente

8

Chapter One

of the 1970s was based on the revised Western image of the Soviet Union as a "status quo" power, the invasion of Afghan istan quickly dissolved that image and t he USSR was once again seen as a "revolut ionary" and an expansionist state. In Japan, too, this invasion had a profound effect and popular journa ls and books frequently portrayed the USSR as a threat to wo rld peace and Japan. As mentioned above, this helped secure a more favourable reception for the subsequent defence bu ildup efforts of the Japanese Government. Apart from the two factors that redefined these efforts- a more specific threat perception and Western so lidarity-, a third factor that Nakasone emphasized was the task of making the trans ition from a "peace country" (heiwa kokka) to an "ord inary country" (zairai-gata kokka)n This became the umbrella concept for organizing and promoting the defence bui ldup effort . Defence bui ldup was no longer an end in itself but rather to be achieved indi rectly and automatically once consensus had been reached on the abstract concept of the normal state. Normalization of the state was not necessarily intended to imply a renuncia t ion of the peace clause of the Constitution. Rather, it wou ld appear that an important thrust of the po licies of the Nakasone administration was to introduce an ambiguity on the issue of Japanese non-belligerency. As in the case for credibility of all iance commitments, certitude of response is not a prerequisite as the adversary on ly needs to be reminded of the possibility of alliance support, thus vagueness on the issue of non-be ll igerency was sufficient to meet the min imum demands of the pacifist and pro -defence groups. It was satisfactory for the pacifists since there was no renunciation of the peace c lause and it satisfied the other side, as well as the United States, since it allowed for a more flex ible interpretation of the Const itution. How Nakasone introduced this f lexibi lity w ill be seen further below.

Nakasone and the Normal State The idea of a normal state came from the emerging interest-power differential in Japan. It also addressed the demands by the United States for Japan to relieve some of the U.S. burdens in Northeast As ia. As such, the init iative for normalizi ng the state became a useful mechanism for ach ieving both status enhancement and strengthen ing

A Framework for the Analysis of Japan 's Defence Policy

9

ties with the United States. Thi s is not to suggest that the expansion of the defence forces wh ich might result from the perceived need to bridge the interest-power differential will necessari ly also translate into a w illingness to directly uti lize political power in defence of the national intere st , or in the use of force overseas. Normalization of the state shou ld not, therefore, be interpreted as a usurpati on of the Constitutio n bu t rather as firstly, a means to greater burden-sharing between Japan and the United States in the interest of strengthening their alliance commitments and, second ly, a way to enhance t he status of Japan in the internationa l arena and give it a greater say in international affairs. It is unlikely that there w ill be a forma l change in the non-offensive nature of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces keeping in mind, of course, that t he demarcation between offensive and defensive forces is artificial and arb itrary, useful mainly in polemics . In the policy matrix of the Nakasone administration, political normalizatio n was a direct counterpart of economic international ization . Together, these two concepts provided t he framework for Japan's political an d econom ic integration into the global system. Th e political agenda of the Nakasone admin istration was to effect a complete sett lement of the post-war accounts, for the fact that Japan had become established as a unique country seemed somehow tanta mount to carrying th e guilt of the Pac ifi c War into the indefin ite future. Th e objective was for Japan to become a state like any other in the international system, playing a role commensurate w ith its capa bilities and not burdened w ith unrealistic expectat ions as a role model for a new, radically altered, form of internatio nal politics. The latter, in a sense, was also denying Japan a proper ro le in the internationa l system because it artificially, at least on a psychological plane, in hibited the acquisiti on of political power and political status. This aspect also ti ed in with the problem of how to manage the inte rest-power differential or the disjuncture between political and eco nomic power. Thi s disjuncture was a resu lt of the post-war preoccupation with eco nomic growth and the constraints imposed on the acqu isition of military power, an integra l t hough not the sole compo nent of politica l power. As an economic power, Japan progressively acquired interests far in excess of its capacity to defend them . Its low polit ica l statu s meant it was ofte n unable to inf luence decisions that sig ni ficantl y affected its eco nom ic interests. Thus, Japan's lack of political power relegated it to the role of a minor

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Chapter One

participant in international affairs . This, together with the heightened threat perception, led to the view that Japan should develop the potential to safeguard its interests. There was also the recognition that power was a composite concept and even if economic power was an important element in power calculus, it alone was an incomplete basis for political power. Thus, even if interdependence scholars disputed the utility of military factors in the power potential of a country, it remained an important element which could not be completely neglected. Moreover, although Japan's emergence as an economic power did have a significant impact on the international system, it should be noted that this impact had not necessarily been "willed". On the other hand, the exercise of power must always be regarded as a purposive act and, in term s of this criterion, Japan had very little positive influence over international events. This was becau se, as Kent Calder argued, Japanese foreign policy was reactive and displayed ad hoc responses to external stimuli and shocks instead of being the product of internal policy directions. One characteristic of the reactive state, according to Calder, was its failure to "undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it [had) the power and national incentives to do so. ".12 The problem here is that Calder defines power too restrictively in its economic sense, ignoring its composite nature. Also, it should be mentioned that power is not simply a given that exists independently but must also be defined in the social context of international relations . As such, while Japanese foreign economic policies have been generally rea ctive, with important exceptions in recent years, this has largely been the result of a disjuncture between national interest and national power and not, as Calder suggests, despite a congruence of interest and power. The interest-power differential also accentuated a critical aspect of Japan's economic growth and stability. It is generally accepted that the economic miracle achieved by Japan was due to the existence of a liberal international economic order (LIEO) that provided Japanese exporters relatively easy access to foreign markets. If this is accepted to be true, it follows that liberal trade will continue to be of importance to Japan's economic growth. Thus, it can be argued that maintenance of the Ll EO is intri cate ly tied to the Japanese national interest. Within the Realist tradition in international relations, it is commonly recognized that maintenance of a liberal trading system requires the presence of a hegemonic power to exercise leadership.

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This is based on the analysis of the Great Depression of the inter-war years by Charles P. Kindleberger. In the post-war period, the United States had provided this leadership. However, with its economic decline, the U.S. leadership function had weakened. It created a groundswell of protectionist sentiment within the country and international pressure on Japan to accept some of the burdens of regime maintenance, including an expanded defence potential. The stability of the Ll EO is crucial to the econom ic well-being of Japan given the importance of international trade. In view of its reliance on imported raw materials and other primary products, Japan depends on the continued availability of opportunities to expo rt finished products overseas to pay for its imports. The problem is that in the process Japan has accumulated a huge balance of payments surpluses which led to heightened critic ism of its trade practices and, in particula r, the relative closure of its market to manufactured imports. All this was not without substance as statistics bear out . In 1983, the share of manufactured imports to GNP was 2.7 per cent for Japan as opposed to 5.2 per cent for the Un ited States and 13.4 per cent for West Germany. 13 In recent years, however, Japanese foreign economic policies have displayed a clear willingness to play a more responsible role in the international system and accept an equ itable distribution of the costs of regime maintenance. As part of its international obligations, Prime Minister Nakasone was especially carefu l to emphasize that the past practice of separating econom ics and politics could no longer be continued. This separation of economics and politics (seikei bunri) was based on the Yoshida Doctrine which affirmed that Japan wou ld never acquire political power and, instead, concentrate its efforts on economic growth and we lfare. This had further underscored Japan's unique status in the state system. In Nakasone's view, howeve(, Japan as an economic power had acquired certain interests and the defence of those interests required it to possess the requisite capabilities. It was important to shed the unique status and become a normal state with a more balanced power potential . For most of the post-war years, Japan had relied on the United States to protect its interests , which the latter was ready and willing to do as long as it enjoyed clear military supremacy and economic vital ity. However, w ith the relative econom ic decline of the United States, domestic political consensus rapidly coa lesced around the view that the country should scale back its international commitments

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to give priority to its own economic revitalization and demand a greater level of burden-sharing on the part of its allies . There were two aspects to the increased pressure on Japan . First, there was a desire to ext ra ct a greater economic contribution from Japan for the stability of the liberal trading regime. For example, a possible economic contribution could be as a balancer of periodic global supply and demand imbalances which, if left unchecked , could give rise to increased protectionist measures in the United States and globall y.14 The second aspect was to force Japan to do more for its own defence and thereby relieve the burden on the United States which was considered to be partially responsible for the U.S. economic decline. The latter U.S. objective was facilitated by a heightened sense of threat perception in Japan and the fact that East Asia appeared to become the meeting ground of two conf licting and hostile ideologies. As Yoshikazu Sakamoto observed, through long periods of history one could note a strong "westward" movement in the Un ited States and an "eastward" movement in the Soviet Union , w ith a point of convergence in the Asia -Pacific region .15 The convergence had acquired a new significance in the 1980s because of the U.S. decline and assertion of Sov iet mil itary presence. It was natural, therefore, for Japan to display a greater commitment to its own defence so as to lighten the U.S. burden.

Constraints on the Japanese Defence Buildup The growth of protectionist sentiment in the major externa l markets of Japan was to play an important role in diluting the domestic co nstraints on defence buildup. Protectionism, left unchecked, threatened to usher in upheavals that had marked the inter-war period. Within the United States, protectionism grew out of the perception that the burdens of maintaining the libera l economic regime, directly or indirect ly, compounded by its defence role, had led to the relative decline of the country. The United States also begrudged the fact that other regime members, particularly Japan, which were key benefi ciaries of the LIEO had not contributed their "fair" share to regime stability by supplementing the United States as a balancer of global supply and demand imbalances . Thus, attention focused on the

A Framework for the A nalysis of Japan's Defence Policy

13

free ridership problem and it was argued that it was no longer in U.S. interests to underwrite the prosperity of others at a net cost to itself. It was unfair, however, to accuse Japan of "free riding" on Western defence efforts . Thi s was certainly not a conspiracy on the part of the Japanese Government but rather a reflection of a host of factors that prevented positive action. Not only did the Constitution, largely a U.S. construct, prohibit the development of offensive capabilities but there was a genuine public allergy to matters relating to defence, even to the discussion of it. There were others who advocated a cautious approach given the newness of democracy in Japan. It was felt that Japanese democracy was still susceptible to a relapse and that the presence of a large military establishment would be inimical to the stability of the democratic political institutions. According to Akira Fujiwara the danger that Japan might revert to militarism was sti ll there just asthe Taisho democracy in the 1930s gave way to fascism .16 At the same time, it shou ld also be pointed out that the U.S.-Japan defence relationship was not entirely one-sided. The incorporation of Japan into the Western security alliance also benefited the United States by giving it basing rights and other privileges. It is easy to neglect this important dimension since the benefits gained are of an intangible nature and, even where acknowledged, have not prevented Western critics of Japanese defence policy from accusing it of taking a "free ride" on Western defence efforts. The notion of the "free" or "cheap" ride contains the assumption that the Japanese economic miracle has been achieved as a result of its low defence expenditure. Chalmers Johnson pointed out the flaws with this sort of reasoning when he held up South Korea as having achieved a similar sort of economic miracle despite having to foot a hefty defence bill as com pared to its GNPn In 1982, while South Korean per capita defence expenditure was US$110, that of Taiwan was US$193, and Singapore's was US$373; the corresponding figure for Japan was only US$87.18 The heavier defence burden of the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) was apparently having no appreciable effect on their economic growth . It would be wrong, therefore, to attribute the Japanese economic growth solely to low defence expenditures but it cannot be denied

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Chapter One

that Japanese defence spending, in terms of percentage of GNP, is much less than other simi larly advanced countries . It probably did help but as James Morley suggested, an expanded defence burden would have placed only a minor drag on the economic growth of the 1960s.19 In the immediate post-war period, significant rearmament may have been comparatively more detrimental to economic growth and the Japanese Government, under Shigeru Yoshida, strong ly resisted foreign pressure to rearm. Even after Japan's economic recovery, the Yoshida legacy continued to hinder the U.S. vision of incorporating Japan more fu ll y into the Cold War setting 20 However, this was not simply the case of one individual's struggle for his future vision of a pacifist Japan. The objective conditions were such that even had Yoshida wished otherwise, there may not have been much he cou ld have done. Apart from the domestic constraints on defence buildup, there were also regional constraints. Countries in the surrounding regions that had suffered Japanese co lonialism before and during World War II all harboured a serious distrust of future Japanese political directions and wou ld have preferred to see Japan in a state of permanent demilitarization. Under these circumstances , any attempt by Japan to rapidly enhance its defence capabi lities would have invited a strong anti-Japanese backlash . This apprehension of these regional countries was at its peak in the early post-war period. When Japan regained its independence, several countries in the Pacific region sought and obtained U.S. commitment to their security from any possible future Japanese threat . The ANZUS Alliance, linking the United States with Australia and New Zealand, and the U.S.-Philippine Military Pact were manifestations of this fear of the revi val of Japanese militarism. From a regional perspective, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty can also be interpreted as advantageous if one accepts the premise that the treaty has helped to keep in check unilateral Japanese rearmament. 2 1 A caveat must be added here that the regional countries do not necessarily share a common perspective. In the early years, China, for example, was a harsh critic of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, believing it to be an anti-Chinese instrument . Chinese reaction bears particularly heavy on the minds of Japanese policy makers and while the Chinese Government no longer condemns the security treaty, it still periodically expresses concern over Japanese rearmament .

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The Quest for Status Normalization Given its unique status, Japan has often found itself left out of the mainstream of international relations. This relative impotence can be attributed partly to its non-military status and the consequent dependence on the United States for its security. The objective of political normalization, however, should not be understood as the replacement of dependence with autonomy but rather the creation of a greater equality in the relationship between the two countries. Dependence on the United States was the result of the fact that the United Nations, the hoped-for guarantor of international peace, had become hobbled by the Cold War rivalry. In practical terms, Japan's dependence on the United States undermined its credibility as an internat[onal actor, both intra- and inter-bloc . Its lack of influence was because "free riders", as Japan was perceived to be, are typically beneficiaries of the system but do not themselves influence it. The defence policy of Prime Minister Nakasone was designed to elevate Japan's international standing. The main thrust of his policy was to create an alliance among equals with the United States, removing the stigma of dependence without, however, moving out of the alliance framework . The objective was to gain recognition as an equal partner in the Western alliance but not necessarily to play a role in the inter-bloc rivalry. While the potential Soviet threat, too, figured in the overall calculus, the Straits Times correctly observed that More than being a foil to th e Soviet Union-the too large, too close official enemy - the government wants Japan to balance its economic , diplomatic, and military capabilities within 10 years 22 The differences between a normal and a unique state have alread y been stated and what is necessary now is to determine what Japan could possibly expect to gain by becoming a normal state. For the ad vocates of this path, the most obvious benefit would be an increment in international political standing. However, even those who do not necessarily advocate a stronger political presence appear to be sensitive about not being taken seriously and being snubbed in diplomatic fora . According to Masahide Shibusawa : Japan's spectacular economic success during the 1960s did not solve its problem of isolation . If anything , it magnified its vulnerability and reinforced its dependence on the United States.

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This was at least part of the reason why it was so seriously unsettled by some of the events which descended upon it during the 1970s such as the Sino-US rapprochement, the Arab oil embargo and the sudden outburst of anti -Japanese demonstra tions in Southeast Asia, which exposed the basic weakness of its position in the world. 23

For example, Japan felt slighted at not being invited when the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany met for a summit meeting in the French Carribean island of Guadeloupe in January 1979. Japan had participated in all the four previous summit meetings which had dealt mainly with economic issues and problems of economic policy co-ordination, but the Guadaloupe summit focused specifically on East-West tensions and arms control. Japan's exclusion seemed to convey the clear message that economic power was not sufficient to gain a say in international political issues. Furthermore, Japanese leaders were also conscious of the fact that, despite being an economic power and a major financial contributor, Japan did not possess a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations and often had to compete for, and lose out on, a temporary seat. These instances only served to confirm the belief that political clout was not a natural attribute of economic greatness alone. In a society where "keeping face" is an important societal consideration, Japan repeatedly "lost face" on the international stage. Thus, those who advocated the acquisition of political power did so on the conviction that a better congruence between political and economic power would help to enhance Japan's international standing. Indeed, this was the same argument as that used by analysts who predicted a larger political role for Japan in the early 1970s. One Japanese analyst observed that when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko addressed the United Nations General Assembly in October 1970, he spoke to an overflowing crowd, but when Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato took the podium after Gromyko, he was left speaking to an almost empty hall. This incident appeared to confirm that however proud Japan may be of ranking third in terms of GNP in the world, economic power alone will not enhance its international voice. 24

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There is certa inly no illusion within Japan that it should strive for a superpower position even though it is not too unlikely that it will, in the foreseeable future, overtake the USSR in terms of the size of the economy. Japan also has no pretensions about providing leadership within the liberal international economic system. At best, the objective is to achieve the status of a middle power which Michael Haas identified as a prominent actor that might be sought as an ally but is never, of itself, a leader of a subsystem 25 That may be true, but in a period of U.S. economic decline there does appear to be an expanded scope for a supportership role. The support role as envisaged by Nakasone had both political and economic dimensions. Japan's economic support role can be understood in terms of the internationalization of the Japanese economy which includes both domestic indust rial restructuring and liberalization of the Japanese market to manufactured imports, especially from the newly industrializing countries of Asia . Normalization of the state and defence burden -sharing can be understood as the political equivalent of Japan's global economic role. Unlike in the earlier period when the proponents of a defence buildup argued on the need to be ready to defend the co untry in the event of an external attack, the arguments in the 1980s under the Nakasone administration were slightly different and emphasized equally Japan's respon sibilities towards the international system as a whole. Accordingly, the arguments for greater defence spending moved away from a purel y sec urity problematique to one combining it with that of international obligations. Nakasone, for example, consistently emphasized Japan's identity as a member of the Western bloc and the responsibility, therefore, to contribute more to its defence. One factor that contributed to Nakasone's ability to further his defence objectives included the general resurgence of nationalism in Japan in rece nt years. Of co urse, there is still considerable domestic opposition to Nakasone's vision of a strong, militarized country, particularly within the Japanese academic co mmunity, which points out that military power should not be narrowly equated with political power. According to Hirosh i Kimura, the Soviet Union, despite being a military superpower, had not been very successful in arrogating political advantage to itself within the Asia -Pacific region. Japan, he argued, should learn from the Soviet Union and not overestimate the importance of military power in the overall power equation. 26 However,

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it should be noted that Nakasone's objective was not to transform Japan into a military su perpower to comp lement its status as an economic superpower, but rather to overcome its institutionalized status as a unique country. Mike Mansfield, who served as th e U.S. Ambassador to Japan for over a decade and through Nakasone's term as Prime Ministe r, observed that the objective was to make Japan more confident of itself. However, he added the cla rifi cat ion that "this confidence should not be confused with a desire for a strong military role for Japan" 27 In assessing the achievements of the Nakasone administration, not all analysts are in agreement that it represented a major new phase in the development of the Japanese military establishment . Some prefer to see it as business as usual with no major dramatic change from the past trend while others see it as the beginning of a new era in Japanese politics. However, even those in the latter category, Kiyofuku Chuma, for example, do not underestimate the importance of prior preparatory wor k (root binding or nemawashi in Japanese), as shall be seen in Chapter Ill . In the former group, Ronald Dare, for example, finds an overwhelming evidence of continuity and suggests that in the one area that Nakasone was determined to take the initiative- defence - he was quickly forced to back off in the face of domestic pressure, despite forceful rhetoric. 28 He argued that it was not just popular opposition but the nature of Japanese politics that prevented a major new departure in policy terms. It is commo nly acknowledged that Japanese politics is based on consensus and group decision making which restricts the ability of the individual actors in having their agenda implemented without first securing consensus. From this general principle, Dare drew the conclusion that there was little in the policies of the Nakasone administration that would have been significantly different had one of his rivals been the Prime Minister. It is argued here, however, that Nakasone's leadership had a strong bearing on the success of his policies. He provided leadership on the basis of personal example and sought to achieve at the level of inter-state relations the status equality that he had achieved at the personal level with other Western leaders, especially with the U.S. President, Ronald Reagan . With Reagan, Nakasone was on a first-name basis and he gained co nsiderable symbolic value from the so-called Ron -Yasu dialogue. It suggested to the domestic audience that their Prime Minister was an important

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world leader and, indeed , equal in status to the leader of the Western wo rld . This set Nakaso ne apart from his predecessors an d gave additional mea ning to his poli cy objectives. He was not successful in all his undertaking s, but hi s st rong convictions enab led him to persist till the end of his term whe re someone else wo uld have opted to back down. Also, whi le it is generall y tru e that "J apanese politicians onl y commit themselves on issues on w hich consensus had been arrived at ... ",2 9 Nakaso ne was not in the traditional mould of co nsensus taker. He attempted, with so me success, not only to do more than the preva iling co nsensus allowed, but also to push through a new consensus to ensure th e future co ntinuity of his policy initiati ves. Certainly, without the politi ca l co nstraints, Nakasone's policies would have been more forcef ul . As it is, Nakasone was often derisively referred to as "presidential Prime Minister". Another political constraint in Japan is the nature of the Japanese bureau cracy. Politicians in Japan , generall y, do not possess as much power an d authority as do th e different burea ucratic org anizations. An administrative vice-minister, for example, has a greater influence and say on the affairs of that particular ministry than either the politically appointed minister or vice-minister. The roots of bureau cratic dominance in Japan go back to the Tokugawa period (early seventeenth century to 1868) in Japanese history and the practice of sankin kotai whereby the various daimyo (feudal lords) were forced to spend inordinately long periods of time in the capital city of Edo and away from their own fiefs. The institution of this system in 1635 was designed to weaken the power base of the daimyo and strengthen that of the Tokugawa rul ers. The system of alternating residen ce was quite successful in its objective but it also resulted in the bureau cratization of the political process. This was becau se the Daimyo were virtuall y incapable of undertaking th e affai rs of their domains in view of the amount of tim e they had to spend . . . in Edo [Tokyo]; administrative responsibility, th erefore, was entrusted to their retainers 30

The retainers belonged to the samurai class who, after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, were pensioned off and formed the core of the official bureaucracy. Th e bureau cratic dominance of the political

20

Chapter One

process was further entrenched and reinforced during the Occupation period when many Japanese politicians we re purged from political life. The purge was intended to remove corrupt politicians responsible for Japanese militarism. The void that was created was filled by ex-bureaucrats who provided many of the post -war Prime Ministers . The system perpetuates itself because parliamentarians in Japan lack adequate support facilities and rely on the bureaucracy for research assistance and policy planning 31 Given the power and influence of the bureaucracy, it is unwise, therefore, to expect any one individual to make a strong impact on the system. This is very different from most Western countries where a new administration usually brings in a new set of agenda often quite different from that of its predecessor. In Japan, however, continuity is the rule rather than the exception. Nakasone's achievements, as such, were all the more significant since he had to overcome not only bureaucratic dominance but also bureaucratic inertia, a trait common to all bureaucracies regardless of the environmenta l setting. By nature, bureaucracies are immobilist especia lly when their narrow interests are at stake. All this is not to suggest that Japanese politicians are complete prisoners of the bureaucracy but simply that their room to manoeuvre is restricted. When measured in terms of quantitative indicators, the ach ievements of the Nakasone administration may not appear to be wholly dramatic, but it would be equally wrong to regard Nakasone as being completely bound by the tradition that had evolved over time. He did not push through any major weapons procurement decisions. Instead, he emphasized the need to achieve a new consensus away from the one that had been formed by the Yoshida Doctrine to one where Japan played a more active role in international politics. Just as the Yoshida Doctrine had shaped defence policy for several decades, Nakasone hoped that a new consensus would bring greater realism into the defence issue and help to shape future defence policies . However, it should not be forgotten that the task confronting Nakasone was inherently more difficult than what Yoshida had to deal with. For example, Yoshida was responding to the natural inclination of the masses towards pacifism - a pacifism generated by the suffering endured during the war and the humiliation inflicted by the later defeat and occupation of the country. Th e crisis that confronted Japan in those early post-war years made his task easier since crises,

A Framework for the Analysis of Japan 's Defence Policy

21

by discrediting the past, enable the initiation of a new beginning. Nakasone, however, was responding to a potential crisis in U.S.-Japan relations but one that was not physically threatening or tangible. Despite the difficulties, Nakasone was willing to take the initiative and it would be unfair to place him in the same category as his predecessors. Of course, some of his predecessors, too, had had the courage to take the initiative as in the case of Prime Minister Masayoshi Oh ira when he set out to introduce a value-added tax system. However, the plan had to be shelved when the ruling party received a severe setback in the following elections. Nakasone, on the other hand, not only took the initiative but survived through many controversial issues . Although the term "alliance" was first used by Prime Minister Suzuki to depict U.S.-Japan relations, he was forced to retract it under strong domestic opposition. Nakasone not only reasserted it but went a step further to express the view that the United States and Japan shared a common destiny. His administrative reforms as well were a bold initiative entailing the privatization of such large state monopolies as the Japan National Railway and the telecommunications giant, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT). His successful privatization of these companies has been evaluated as a "silent revolution"n He was the first Prime Minister to have served longer in that post than the maximum designated two terms of two years each . At the end of his two terms in office, he was granted an extension of another year, highly irregular by Japanese standards where frequent rotation serves as an important vehicle for keeping all aspirants to the prime ministerial position satisfied. Nakasone's success in holding on to power for five years was, to a large extent, due to his ability to maintain a high level of popular support. He was known for his wakari-vasui seiji or "easy to understand" politics which enabled him to establish and maintain good rapport with the masses. By no means, however, did this ensure success for all his policy initiatives and most conspicuously, in the field of military and defence, he failed to secure the passage of an antispying legislation to erase the reputation that Japan had acquired as a haven for spies. Among his positive achievements was the removal of the one per cent of GNP ceiling on defence expenditures, but this could also be downplayed since the actual increase, despite the symbolism, was only a small increment. In Japan, policies are made on the basis of an incremental approach and rarely is a dramatic

Chapter One

22

shift clearly visible. The symbolism, however, was important to his objective of removing the image of Japan as a unique country. More importantly, as mentioned, Nakasone introduced a sense of realism to the defence debate in Japan. This is the only way to interpret his frequently repeated phrase on the necessity of settling post-war accounts .

Notes

2 3 4 5

6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14

Although Japan was, theoretica lly, under a combined Allied occupation, in reality it was under U.S. occupation and the other Allied Powers had little input into the post-war structure of Japanese politics. SeeS. Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution''. Japan Quarterly 35, no. 3 (JulySeptember 1988) : 237-38. T. McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution". Armed Forces & Society 13, no. 1 (Fall 1986): 86. L. Olson. Japan in Postwar Asia (London : Pall Mall Press. 1970!, pp. 123-24 . H . Otake, Nihon no Boei to Kokunai Sei;i:" Detente kara Gunkaku [Japanese defence and domestic politics: from detente to militarization] (Tokyo : Sanichi Shobo, 1983), p. 30 . The island of Okinawa, south of Kyushu, had been retained by the United States for strategic reasons, even after Japan was granted independence in the early 1950s. The United States agreed to return it to Japanese sovereignty in the late 1960s. The White Paper issued by the JDA in the 1980 (p. 58) and 1981 (p. 85) editions described the Soviet Union as th.e potential threat . The 1986 White Paper explicitly identified the USSR as the main threat to Japan. SeeR. Matthews and J. Bartlett , " The Stirring of Japan's Military Slumber". The World Today44, no. 5 (May 1988) : 79 . Japan Times, 3 January 1988, p. 3. Japan Times. 7 March 1988, p. 18. JDA White Paper, Tokyo, 1985, p. 55 . The first White Paper caused so much controversy that for a number of years after that no such White Papers were issued. Otake, op. cit., p. 39. K. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation : Explaining the Reactive State", World Politics 40, no. 4 (July 1988) : 519. M . Matsuda, "0-Bei Shokoku to no Boeki Mondai no ichi shiten: Seihin Yunyu Hiritsu Hijo Yoso no Datosei ni Tsuite" [One perspective on trade problems with U.S. and Europe : concerning the appropriate levels of manufactured imports], Boeki to Kanzei, March 1986, p. 25. For an explanation of how supply and demand imbalances can lead to trade protectionism, and the role of large economies in managing such global imbalances. see S. Strange and R. Tooze, eds .• The International Politics of Surplus Capacity (London: George, Allen & Unwin, 1981) .

e

A Framework for the Analysis of Japan's Defence Policy 15

16

17 18 19

20

21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31

23

Y. Sakamoto, " Genda i no Heiwa o Kangaeru: Maega ki ni Kaete" [Th oughts on peace in the contempo rary period : in lieu of preface]. Sekai, no. 471 (February 1985), p 34 A. Fujiwara, Sengoshi to Nihon Gunkaku Shugi [Postwar history and Japanese militarism] (Tok yo: Shin Nippon Shuppan Sha, 1982), p. 61. Such sent iments are more co mmon to th e regional coun tri es and more w ill be said on this in a later chapter. C. Johnson, " Reflection s on th e Dilemma of Japan ese Defense", Asian Survey 26, no. 5 (May 1986) . GT. Harris, " Economic Aspects of Military Expe nditure in Deve loping Cou ntries A Su rvey A rt icle", Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, no. 1 (June 1988): 85. J.W. Mo rl ey, " Econo mism and Balanced Defense", in Forecast For Japan: Security in the 1970's, edited by J.W. Morley (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 25. E.J. Mac-Anigboro and R. E. Wei se, "Shige ru Yo shida- Compromise and Progress in Pursuit of Japan's National Development, 1946- 1954", Asian Profile 15, no. 6 (December 1987): 528. K. Chuma, Saigunbi no Sei;igaku [The poli tics of rea rmam ent] (Tokyo: Chishi kisha, 1985) , p. 25. Straits Times (Singapore), 23 January 1988, p. 6. M. Shibusawa, "Japan and its Region", Asia Pacific Community, no. 29 (Summer 1985), p. 32 J.K. Emmerson, A rms, Yen & Power: The Japanese Dilemma (New York: Dunellen Publishing Company, Inc., 1971) , p. 396. See C. Holbraad, Mtddle Powers in International Politics (London St . Martin's Press, 1984), p. 73. See, for example, R. So lomon, The Role of Japan in United States Strategic Policy for Northeast A sia, Canberra Papers for Strategy and Defence, No. 39 (Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Stud ies Centre, Re sea rch School of Pacific Studies, Austra lian National Uni ve rsity, 1986), p. Ll4. M. Mansfield, "The U.S. and Japan: Sha ring Our Destinies", Foreign A ffairs 68, no. 2 (Sp ring 1989): 10. R. Dore, Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustmem in the Japanese Economy, 7970-7980 (London: The Ath lone Press, 1986), p. 23. J. Glaubitz , "Japanese Foreign and Security Policy", Aussen Politik 35, no. 2 (2nd Quarter 1984), p. 176. J-P. Lehmann, The Roots of Modem Japan (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd ., 1982), p 57. On the re lationship between politicians and the bureaucracy, see R.C. Christopher, The Japanese Mind: The Goliath Explained (New Yo rk : Lind en Press/ Simon & Schuster, 1983), Chapter 11. Th e relation ship is changing , however, w ith politicians ga inin g in influence and leverage over the burea uc rats. Thi s change is due to the emergence of the zoku (tribes) within the ruling LDP. The zoku is a group of po lit icians who have developed eno ugh functional expertise to be ab le to w ith stand pressu re from bureaucrats and in turn be ab le to provide more direction to the bureaucracy. For detai ls, see M . Aoki, "The Japanese

24

32

Chapter One Bureaucracy in Economic Administration: A Rational Regulator or Pluralist Agent?", in Government Policy towards Industry in the United States and Japan, edited by J.B. Shoven !Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19881. "Nakasone Seiji 5 nen no so -kessan" [General assessment of the 5 years of Nakasone politics]. Chua Karon, December 1987, p. 152.

II The Post-War Japanese Defence Establishment

The Japanese Constitution and Defence Buildup In this chapter, the development of the military establishment in post-war Japan will be traced as a prelude to understanding the normalization policies of the Nakasone administration. Japan today maintains a formidable military force, with annual defence spending now in excess of US$25 billion . In principle, the military in Japan is defensive in nature and therefore, allegedly, not the ultimate tool of diplomacy. By insisting that the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) were qualitatively different from regular armed forces, the Japanese Government hoped to show that maintenance of the SDF did not violate the spirit of the Constitution. In practical terms, however, the Japanese Government was only emphasizing its commitment never to use the acquired military potential in an aggressive or contraconstitutional manner. It tried to impress on the critics that even though the military was being expanded, there was no intention

26

Chapter Two

on the part of Japan to pose a threat to any other country, and that calculations of intent should be kept separate from capabilities. Accordingly therefore, there was no need for others to be alarmed by the defence buildup since the Constitution remained as the guiding principle. The constitutional fig leaf was retained even as it lost its restrictive potential. It is possible to argue that the refusal to accept force as a tool of diplomacy is contradictory to the concept of a normal state since such a state would be expected to retain the sovereign right to use force as a tool of diplomacy. Yet , there are good reasons for keeping the issue of a normal state (defined as a state without any unique constraints) and the concept of usable force separate. It was not important for Nakasone, nor did he attempt, to replace the SDF with the regular armed forces that they, in effect, had become. At no time during the Nakasone years did the " peace" Constitution ever become an issue. What was at stake could easily be achieved without constitutional revision as it had, over the years, become the subject of flexible interpretation. The Americans, for instance, are justifiably proud of their 200year-old Constitution which has never been rewritten, even if it has been amended. This was possible because of its elasticity and the fact that there was considerable scope for reinterpretation as time and circumstances demanded . The post-war Japanese Constitution has been equally flexible. From what initially appeared to be a rigid set of guidelines (for example, Article 9 which forbids the maintenance of military potential) has emerged a constitution with considerable interpretational freedom. As a result of this flexibility which the government and the ruling party insist upon, the maintenance of the SDF has been determined to be a constitutionally sanctioned right. For much of the post-war period , the opposition parties steadfastly maintained that the SDF was unconstitutional but since the late 1970s, most have given their acquiescence to the status quo. Only the Japan Communist Party remains opposed to it and the Japan Socialist Party has taken the vague position of regarding the SDF as unconstitutional, yet legally established . The courts have been reluctant to rule on the constitutionality of the SDF and judgements have varied . The Sapporo District Court in the early 1970s ruled the SDF unconstitutional but this ruling was quashed by the Sapporo High Court and then susta ined by the Japanese Supreme Court in

The Post-War Japanese Defence Establishment

27

1982. 1 Because of the flexible interpretation of the Constitution, the Liberal Democratic Party appears to have adopted the position that a constitutional revision is no longer necessary. Of course, this is a realistic position since the constitutional guidelines on amendments are much too stringent to make it a feasible proposition. Yet, it can not be denied that the ability to interpret the Constitution according to changing circumstances has removed the earlier concern for constitutional revision. The constitutional bar on the maintenance of armed forces is contained in Article 9. It has been variously asserted that it was imposed by the Occupation forces or that its inclusion was proposed by the Japanese themselves . In any event, if it was meant to be a strict bar to the development of military potential, it has not been completely successful. TheJapanese Government, at present, interprets Article 9 as forbidding only war potential and not self- defence capability" ... to protect Japan's territory and people" .2 War potential, however, is a subjective judgement and the explanation of what constitutes war potential has hardly remained static. In its liberal interpretation war potential could be seen as meaning only offensive capabilities. Both the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the revised 1960 Security Treaty explicitly contained the expression of hope that Japan would eventually assume responsibility for its own defence while at the same time avoiding weapons that could pose an offensive threat to other countries. The difficulty has been in demarcating between offensive and defensive weapons and, it would appear, neither the Japanese nor the U.S. Governments have been particularly fussy about clearly defining and upholding this principle. The idea of excluding offensive weapons from the Japanese military arsenal was to provide for a purely non-provocative defence. According to Barry Buzan, non-provocative defence required that a country's " .. . military capability should be confined as much as possible to one's own territory". 3 In theory, the notion of a non-provocative defence is a sound way of easing international tensions but goes against established military wisdom that the best defence is a good offence. The contradiction between the ideal of non-provocative defence and the practicalities of providing for the best defence is not easy to resolve. The Japanese Government has taken the easier route of distinction on the basis of intent . The recent weapons acquisition programme suggests that offensive weapons defined as capable of

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Chapter Two

striking enemy territories are not automatically beyond the purview of Japanese self-defence. It is also possible, therefore, that the restriction notwithstanding Japan might act, in future, to further boost its defence capabilities in some significant way. Although the existing defence establishment is, allegedly, a purely defensive force and not capable of being used to initiate hostilities, the distinction, as mentioned, is difficult to establish. When Japan acquired the F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft in the 1970s, for example, both the bomb sights and the mid-air refueling nozzle were removed, thereby restricting their combat radius and ability to bomb enemy territory. In 1973, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka had categorically stated that Japan would not possess air refuelling capabilities because that would violate the principle of strict self-defence by giving the Air Self-Defence Force extended striking range which would constitute offensive capability. This was done to appease the opposition parties which were hostile to what they perceived to be inordinate defence buildup. Since then, changes in public opinion and general acceptability of the SDF have brought about changes in the opposition stance. Thus, when the F-15 Eagle was acquired in the late 1970s, there was no vocal opposition to the government's decision to leave the bomb sights in place as well as the mid-air refueling capabilities.

The Post-War Japanese Military The beginning of Japanese rearmament was very modest. The initial impetus came with the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 and the redeployment of U.S. forces from Japan to the Korean peninsula. Japan did not take an active part in the Korean conflict, but its minesweeping fleet was instrumental in the American landing on the Korean peninsula . Although defeated and under U.S. occupation, Japan still had the best minesweeping capabilities in the region . This, too, would have been dismantled but for the intervention of the Korean War. After the outbreak of this war and under U.S. pressure to fill the vacuum resulting from the withdrawal of its forces from Japan, the Japanese Government established, that same year, the Police Reserve Force (Keisatsu Yobitai). In 1952, to complement the Police Reserve Force, the Japanese Government authorized the establishment of the Maritime Police Reserve Force (Kaijo Keibitai) .

The Post-War Japanese Defence Establishment

29

Under the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in September 1951, Japan regained its independence the following year. Two years later, the Police Reserve Force was reorganized into the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF) and the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF). At the same time the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) was also set up to form, together with the other two services, the combined Self-Defence Forces (SDF) . Immediately after the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, Japan also entered into a Mutual Defence Agreement with the United States. This permitted the continued stationing of U.S. forces on Japanese territory and extended to Japan the U.S. nuclear and security umbrella . The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was the result of their mutual perception that such a treaty was essential since Japan lacked the effective means to defend itself from "irresponsible militarism" that remained a feature of world politics. 4 The reorganization of the Police Reserve Force was necessary to obtain U.S. security guarantees. While negotiating the Security Treaty, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had warned the Japanese Government of the possibility that the U.S. Senate might fail to ratify it if the Treaty was seen to imply a unilateral extension of security guarantees to Japan. He suggested that because of the Vandenberg Resolution, Japan had to take positive measures to provide for its own defence if it wanted a U.S. commitment to come to its aid in an emergency. The Vandenberg Resolution stated that the United States could only enter into collective security arrangements if these were firmly based on the principles of effective self-help and mutuality.5 This meant that unless Japan did its part to provide for its own defence, the lJnited States might not be in a position to offer firm security guarantees. To ensure Senate approval for the Security Treaty, Dulles proposed that Japan should commit itself to the establishment of a 350,000-strong military force. Japan, however, had no wish to rearm to the extent that the United States would have liked and, in any case, lacked the economic resources to provide for its own defence. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida insisted that rearmament to the level being demanded by Dulles was not possible in view of the more pressing tasks of economic reconstruction and development . But even if he had been more amenable to U.S. pressure, there was little public support for rearmament and the U.S. demands would have been

30

Chapter Two

difficult to implement in any case. The national priority, as defined by Yoshida, formed the basis for successive Japanese Governments that continued to emphasize economic objectives over political ones. The Security Treaty was, from the beginning, the subject of intense controversy since the Constitution denied the right of collective defence to Japan even if the Charter of the United Nations recognized that all sovereign countries possessed the right of collective defence. For example, it was not clear whether Japan was required to assist the United States when it was involved in a conflict, but so long as this was only a theoretical issue given the absence of capabilities, the possibilities were not too disturbing. Japan, then, was much too weak militarily to come to the aid of the United States. However, with the acquisition of a fairly substantial military potential and considering the recent emphasis on Japan's role as a member of the Western bloc, the issue has again become prominent. The controversy persists despite the fact that the 1951 Peace Treaty asserted that the Allied powers recognise that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense ... and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements. 6

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations also granted that right, but the position taken by its opponents was that the Constitution, the supreme legal document, did not sanction collective security. This issue will be discussed when evaluating the policies of the Nakasone administration. With the establishment of the SDF and the Security Treaty, the two pillars of post-war Japanese defence policy had been set up. One was to maintain the minimum necessary defence potential to deter aggression and deal with low level conflicts and the second was to rely on the United States for a broader security guarantee. The establishment of the National Defence Council in 1956 and the adoption in May 1957 of the Basic Policy for National Defence (Kokubo no Kihon Hoshin) completed the basic national security structure. This merely confirmed that Japan would continue to rely on the United States for its security but at the same time increase its own defence capabilities with regard to national resources and the prevailing domestic situation. 7 The growth of the SDF in the following period took place under

The Post-War Japanese Defence Establishment

31

successive long-term defence plans, the first of which was implemented in fiscal year 1958 for a three-year period . The various plans provided guidelines for the quantitative buildup of the forces during the stipulated period. The first three defence buildup plans earmarked only quantitative improvements in the defence establishment but the fourth plan also entailed a qualitative jump forward . The total defence expenditure contained in the fourth plan was almost double that of the third plan despite the atmosphere of relaxed international tensions, largely because it had been approved prior to the changed international setting. The fourth plan went through a rather lengthy and controversial gestation period because of disagreements within the various branches of the government. Work on this plan was begun in October 1970 and it was formally adopted in October 1972. The main thrust of the fourth defence buildup plan was to strengthen the MSDF. Nakasone, then Director General of the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA), told the Diet Budget Committee hearings in February 1971 that the total tonnage of the MSDF should be increased to 240,000 tons from the existing 140,000 tons in the fourth plan and eventually to 300,000 tons over the next ten years.8 To secure these objectives the J DA asked fo r a 19 per cent a year increase in the defence budget over the term of the plan . The Ministry of Finance, however, insisted on an increase of not more than 12 per cent a year which would have fixed the annual increment at slightly below that ach ieved during the third plan . In the final approved plan, the JDA actually did better than its original request and secured an increase of 19.2 per cent a year. This was largely due to fiscal expansionary pressures forced upon the government to stave off a possible economic recession following the revaluation of the yen in 1972. Still , the defence budget increase fell short of the overall budgetary expansion of 21.8 per cent. 9 However, none of the four long-term defence buildup plans were successful in achieving their objectives completely either because of financial or other constraints . Despite the fact that the JDA had secured the desired funding for the fourth plan, it failed to achieve its targets as a result of the increase in oil prices which induced inflationary pressures that eroded the purchasing capacity of the allotted weapons procurement budget. 10 The fourth plan established the following guidelines for the future defence posture of Japan and suggested that :

32

Chapter Two

1. Japan should be ready to deal with limited aggression by maintaining air and sea control around the country. 2. If the above should fail, Japan should be ready to resist and prevent the imposition of a fait accompli. 3. Together with denial and resistance, Japan should be able to terminate any contingency with the support of the United States. 4. Japan should rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella against nuclear threats. 11 The fourth plan was the last long-term defence buildup plan because the government recognized the difficulties of long-term planning in a swiftly changing international environment. Long-term defence planning was relatively easy when the economy was on a stable growth pattern, but this could no longer be safely assumed . The world economy was in recession and the Japanese economic growth, too, had slowed down considerably making it difficult to pre-allot a fixed defence budget over a long period. With the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) that was subsequently adopted the government ". . . decided to adopt an approach that would obviate the need to calculate several years' expenditures in advance". 12 Also, since defence preparedness was a function of international tensions, it was not considered desirable to adhere to a fixed plan that could not take into account changes in the levels of these tensions. This point was clearly brought out by the U.S.-Soviet detente and the U.S.-China rapprochement which dramatically lowered East-West tensions. It was also considered desirable to end the series of long-term plans to avoid giving the impression that the buildup had no end. It was, indeed, partly for this reason that the fourth defence buildup plan was also referred to as the "new" plan . 13 The NDPO was adopted in 1976 and, unlike the previous plans, was open-ended and did not specify a time frame for the achievements of the targeted defence expansion. The government had decided against the wisdom of fixed-term planning because it feared that a repeat of the acrimony and wrangle like that which had preceded the fourth plan would be detrimental and demoralize the SDF personnel. The NDPO established the ultimate peacetime defence goals for the country. As such the outline was a departure from earlier defence buildup plans based on immediate threat potentials. Instead it specified the minimum defence potential necessary to ward off small-scale

The Post-War Japanese Defence Establishment

33

attacks. To ensure this the N DPO established hardware requirements for each wing of the defence establishment. The NDPO remains the country's basic national defence policy today. With the adoption of the NDPO there was also a widespread expectation that some quantitative limit would be set up to control defence spending in the years of slower economic growth. Prime Minister Takeo Miki, himself a pacifist, was also in favour of some absolute limit on defence expenditure. When he became the Prime Minister in December 1974, he appointed Michita Sakata as the Director General of the JDA. Sakata set up a private advisory committee called the Boei o Kangaeru Kai (Society to Deliberate on Defence) . The report of this advisory committee was submitted in September 1975. It observed that one per cent of GNP had become the unwritten limit on defence spending. In the 1950s and early 1960s, defence spending had often exceeded this limit but as the economy entered the high growth phase, total defence spending declined below one per cent and remained there through the fourth defence buildup plan. Whether or not such a limit made sense in the slow growth period, it was the considered opinion that defence requirements were not likely to be very pressing given the lower levels of international tensions.

U.S.-Japan Security Arrangement Throughout this period, the Japanese defence strategy was based on the position that accorded the SDF a secondary role to the U.S.Japan security alliance. Up until the end of the 1970s, however, the government carefully avoided using the term "alliance" to describe the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in deference to public opinion and also to avoid a constitutional wrangle. The Security Treaty, as mentioned before, was signed in 1951 immediately after the Peace Treaty. In Japan, however, the Security Treaty was seen as a somewhat dubious document because it did not clearly commit the U.S. forces to come to the defence of Japan in case of aggression . The treaty stated that the United States was only willing to maintain its forces in Japan, a de facto security commitment since it was unlikely that an external power would attack Japan as long as U.S. troops were stationed there. The withdrawal of these troops from Japan was also subject to mutual agreement which

34

Chapter Two

meant that they would be there as long as either the United States or Japan wished their continued presence. Under the terms of the Security Treaty, the United States was also granted the right to intervene domestically to maintain peace and stability. Even though this made sense at the time when the treaty was signed, it became increasingly difficult, politically, to accord to the U.S. forces stationed in Japan the right to act to maintain internal peace and order. When the treaty was signed, the Japanese Government was still sufficiently concerned about internal threats to include the above clause in the treaty, but with the passage of time it came to be seen more as an affront to national sovereignty. Revision of this treaty became an important item on the agenda when Nobusuke Kishi became Prime Minister in February 1957. His main objective was to secure a more definite U.S. commitment to the defence of Japan . In return he offered some further improvement in the SDF capabilities but reiterated the continued importance of economic development and stressed the importance of Japan as a stable and prosperous country. 14 An agreement to review the treaty was reached when the Japanese Foreign Minister visited the United States in September 1958. Actual negotiations were started in April 1958 and the two sides reached agreement on a revised security treaty in early April 1960. 15 The revised treaty was a much more equal treaty and contained a firm U.S. commitment to the security of Japan from external threats . Articles 5 and 6 delineated the security arrangement . From the Japanese point of view, Article 5 is taken to mean a unilateral security guarantee from the United States. On the other hand, the United States interprets Article 6 as obligating Japan to contribute to U.S. objectives of maintaining the security of the Far East .16 Actually, however, the treaty did not place any such obligations on Japan besides contributing to its own security. Although Article 6 stated that the treaty would be invoked in case of an attack on either party, it contained the clause that restricted its scope to " . . territories under the administration of Japan . . . ",or the U.S. bases in Japan . The process of treaty ratification led to bitter anti-government pro tests in Japan largely because of the methods used by the Kishi administration to force the treaty through the National Diet. Although the revised treaty restored Japan's residual sovereignty, not all were equally convinced that it had enhanced Japan's security. Two days after the treaty was signed in Washington, the Asahi Shinbun, a

The Post-War Japanese Defence Establishment

35

strident critic of a stronger defence posture stated in its editorial of 21 January 1960: The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty does not necessarily guarantee Japan's security since only East-West peace and, in particular, U.S.-USSR peace can guarantee the security of Japan . In other words, to secure Japan's security, it is essential to strengthen peace between the U.S. and the Soviet Union . Should U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorate, no matter how many U.S.-Japan security treaties we have, not only will they not ensure Japanese security but, like a two-edged sword (moroha no surugJ) will become a threat to the survival of Japan n

In the period following the revised Security Treaty, Japan remained smug in its view that it had acquired a firm commitment from the United States. There was little concern or worry also as long as the United States was actively involved in Asia and the prevailing view was that if it was willing to defend South Vietnam, it would most certainly come to the defence of Japan . The Nixon Doctrine of 1968 which signalled U.S. disengagement from Asia created some unease in Japan as it was a clear indication that the United States expected the Asian countries to do more for their own defence and relieve the U.S. burden . If detente and the relaxation of international tensions had not intervened shortly afterwards, it is possible that Japan would have tried harder to overcome the domestic constraints on defence expansion. Towards the end of the 1970s, detente appeared to be crumbling and this brought increased U.S. pressure on Japan to boost its defence capabilities. Apart from this pressure, there were also doubts within Japan as to the credibility of the U.S. security commitment when, in 1977, President Jimmy Carter announced the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea. Not only was this seen as detrimental to stability in the Korean peninsula, it also pointed to the fragility of U.S. security guarantees. Although President Carter later rescinded the decision, the damage to U.S. credibility had been done.

Japanese Threat Perceptions Together with the above and with an intention to lay the groundwork for an expanded defence potential, Japanese threat perceptions

36

Chapter Two

were being more explicitly defined by the J DA . Whereas the Soviet Union had previously been defined simply as a "potential threat" implying the presence of capability but absence of intention, in mid1979 when JDA Chief Ganri Yamashita visited the United States, he agreed with U.S. Defence Secretary Harold Brown that the Soviet threat had increased. 18 This did not mean, however, that there was a complete congruence in the U.S. and Japanese perceptions of the Soviet "threat" . In particular, the Japanese were, still, less willing to subscribe to such notions about the Soviet Union as being an "evil empire", and so forth. This negative reinterpretation of Soviet intentions was partly based on the rapid Soviet military buildup in the region as exemplified in the deployment of the Backfire bomber and the aircraft carrier Minsk. However, these were only enhancements of threat capabilities not necessarily implying negative intentions. What seemed to imply hostile intentions towards Japan were reports that the Soviet Union had redeployed military forces on the disputed Northern Territories of Etorofu and Shikotan, after an absence of about eighteen years. The Soviet Union was also reported to be building military bases on these islands. The Northern Territories, comprising the islands of Etorofu, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and the Habomais, are claimed by Japan but are under the possession of the USSR . The intransigence of both sides has prevented the two countries from signing a peace treaty to formally end World War 11. 19 Taking advantage of the changes in the international environment, the JDA adopted a three-pronged approach · 1. Early completion of the N D PO; 2. Enhancement of the SDF capabilities; and 3. Joint military exercises with the United States . Furthermore, General Nagano, the Chief of Staff of the GSDF, speaking before a group of businessmen in late March 1979 suggested that revision of the NDPO might be necessary in view of the changed security environment. This was the first public reference to a revision of the NDP0 20 It should be repeated here that the NDPO specified the peacetime defence requirements of the country and that it specified no deadline for completion. True, the NDPO had been drafted on the basis of certain assumptions on the state of international relations, but opponents could argue that a heightened threat perception did

The Post-War Japanese Defence Establishment

37

not necessarily require a greater defence expenditure but that it was the responsibility " . .. of politicians to work hard to minimize threats from the neighbouring countries". 21 Western critics, however, are quick to fault this line of reasoning . According to Donald Hellmann, The very extensive dependence on the United States has allowed defense plans to develop in a kind of international vacuum, in which the direction and tempo of expansion have been treated more as a budgetary issue than a strategic one. . . 22

This, however, ignores the fact that regional considerations do indeed bear heavily on Japanese defence policies but, fortunately or otherwise, do not make it possible for the government to expand defence expenditures very rapidly. The 1979 Defence White Paper warned that the Soviet military buildup was eroding the military balance between the two superpowers. This implied a need for Japan to take additional measures. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later in the year provided additional grist to those who believed in the higher level of danger posed by the Soviet Union and this message was repeated incessantly during the double election in the summer of 1980. Public perception of a Soviet threat was also acute. In a poll of 10,000 university students almost 65 per cent of the respondents said they felt that Japan faced a distinct military threat. 23 In the elections, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won a landslide victory as the electorate apparently chose to maintain political continuity in the face of a heightened threat perception . Another possible factor for the dramatic reversal in the declining support for the LDP was sympathy voting because Prime Minister Ohira had died shortly before the elections. There was also a spate of books and articles depicting the many different scenarios under which the Soviet Union could invade Japan, some of which were reported to have been authored by retired SDF officers . One former official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shinsaku Hogen, wrote a book in 1981 titled Nihon no Gaiko Senryaku [Japan's foreign policy strategy] in which he argued, referring to experience gained from long dealings with the USSR, that Soviet intentions towards Japan had never been good and that Japan should be ready to defend itself on its own. According to Otake, Hogen tried to do for Japan what George Kennan had done earlier for the United States. 24 All this was clearly designed to

38

Chapter Two

weaken the domestic opposition to defence bu ildup by heightening the perception of the Soviet threat to Japan. Balanced observations, however, tended to discount the possibility of the Soviet Union attacking Japan on grounds that, despite the military buildup, the Soviet Union still lacked the logistic capability to launch an invasion . Looking at the nature of the Soviet threat Paul Keal argued that the Soviet military buildup in Asia was not directed at Japan but rather had three other purposes in the main : (1) deter the United States; (2) launch nuclear strikes against the United States; and (3) launch conventional attacks against China and the United States .2 5

Comprehensive Security and U.S.-}apan Defence Co-operation During his term in office, Ohira had set up a private advisory body called the Comprehensive National Security Study Group (CNSSG) to study future national security policies. The CNSSG, headed by Masamichi lnoki, submitted its final report in the summer of 1980 wherein it called for a defence expenditure of slightly more than one per cent of GNP. However, it also downplayed the relative importance of the defence establishment for the provision of national security. Given Japan's dependence on foreign sources for its food, energy, and resource requirements and the vulnerabilities created thereby the report emphasized that security could not be interpreted solely in military terms. It had to include the other important objectives for the well-being of the people and the country. To ensure comprehensive security, the report suggested that diplomacy be juxtaposed with the narrow definition of security in purely military terms . The term "comprehensive security" thus came to embody both military and economic security. Rather than signalling a departure from the Yoshida legacy of separating economics and politics (and with emphasis placed on the former) , comprehensive security also de-emphasized the political-military definition of security by subsuming it within a broader concept that included economic security. Although the CNSSG report was not formally adopted as government policy, it did generate considerable debate within Japan and also helped to counter U.S. pressures for the expansion of Japanese

The Post-War Japanese Defence Establishment

39

defence capabilities . The report contained the implicit assumption that power was not a fungible category and t hat, therefore, military power could not be relied upon solely to ensure security in other areas of concern . In other words, since security itself was a comprehensive concept, the means to achieve that, too, had to be comprehensive. The military was simply one of the several means available. Quite understandably, officials at the JDA did not consider the notion of comprehensive security feasible arguing that" . . . non-military defence is impossible in the current world climate" .26 In the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, there was no provision for joint military action between the two countries because the Japanese negotiators held the position that such a clause would be contrary to the Constitution and Article 9. 27 Till the mid-1970s there did not even exist any institutional structures for research on the subject of military co-operation . Still, it was becoming obvious that if the security arrangement was to be effective in responding to a particular situation, there had to be some co -ordination of action and a division of labour to avoid redundancies . After the fall of Saigon, when Prime Minister Takeo Miki visited the United States in August 1975, the two countries agreed to formally study joint military co-operation and for this purpose set up the U.S.-Japan Defence Consultation Committee (Nichi-Bei Anzen Hosho Kyogi Kai) . A specific subcommittee, the Defence Co-operation Subcommittee ( Boei Kyoryoku Sho-iinkai), was also established following Defence Secretary James Schlesinger's visit to Japan later that same month to provide a forum for specialists to discuss the various issues of strategy, information, and back-up support . The subcommittee was formally set up in July 1976 and it made possible, for the first time, public discussion of what had previously been conducted in strict secrecy. For example, the Three Arrows Plan, news of which leaked out in 1965, was a similar exercise conducted secretly because it could have been interpreted as being unconstitutional. When the Three Arrows Plan became public it created a furore in the Diet because the JDA, in making secret contingency planning to meet an internal communist threat, was seen to have violated the principle of civilian control. There was additionally some disquiet that the discussions were being conducted by uniformed personnel of the SDF and that this was in contradiction to the principle of civilian control. 28 However, with the military playing a prominent part in the formulation of such an important document,

40

Chapter Two

though not an official bilateral agreement, it was feared that the principle of civilian control was being eroded . As a result of the negotiations, in November 1978 the United States and Japan agreed on the Guideline for U.S.-Japan Defence Co-operation (Nichi -Bei Boei Kyoryoku no tame no Shishin). The agreement pointed to areas of defence co-operation and division of labour, and also prepared the way for joint military exercises. 29 (The MSDF had been conduct ing joint exercises with the U.S. Navy since 1955.) Joint exercises between the ASDF and the U.S. Air Force started in November 1978 with the GSDF expected to follow shortly in similar joint exercises with the U.S. Army. The Guideline comprised three sections: strategy to deter aggression; strategy to deal with aggression on Japan; and co-operation between the United States and Japan to deal with emergencies in the region that might affect Japanese security. The two countries explicitly agreed that Japan would repulse a limited aggression on its own but that in situations where this became problematic, Japan would await the assistance of the United States to repel such an attack. 30 The Guideline only referred to areas of co -operation between the two countries . The actual form and content c:if the co -operation were left to be finalized by the SDF and the U.S. forces . Accordingly, in 1979, work was begun on U.S.-Japan joint military strategy research and completed in November 1984. This will be discussed in the following chapter. Briefly, however, it portrayed a scenario of what might happen in case of war and Japan's expected role and share of the defence burden. Research was also carried out in the area of emergency legislation and in October 1984 the second research report was released. This will also be discussed further in the following chapter. Th e Guideline was a new and significant development in U.S.-Japan relations since it marked the beginning of a possible new role for Japan within the alliance and a move away from its "protectorate" status. With the Guideline in place, U.S. pressure on Japan increased for it to assume burden-sharing. The two areas in which the United States showed particular interest were technology transfers and sealane defence. Prior to the 1980s, Japan's sea-lane defence concept extended out to only several hundred miles with the convoying of ships out to 1,000 nautical miles .31 The first indication that the United States wanted a modification of this concept came when Foreign Minister Masayoshi ltoh visited Washington and was told by Defence

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47

Secretary Caspar Weinberger that Japan should assume responsibility for the area west of Guam and north of the Philippines. This responsibility did not merely imply the convoying of ships but included sea control since the concept of convoying had become outdated in the age of long-range missiles. Shortly afterwards, in May 1981, when Prime Minister Suzuki visited Washington he stated that Japan should secure sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles. At a news conference on 8 May 1981, he appeared to reaffirm this when he said : "These are areas that I believe we should defend and do so within, still, the framework of our Constitution . " 3 2 This was, however, not the clear-cut promise that the United States took it to mean and which it publicized thereafter in its annual defence review for the year 1985. In Japan, Suzuki's statement took foreign ministry officials by surprise, but they had already learned to expect surprises from Suzuki. Ever since becoming the Prime Minister he had acquired the reputation as an individual who was unaware of the ABCs of diplomacy. In the words of one senior foreign ministry official, He listens carefully to our briefings and then asks all the appropriate (tekikaku) questions. While th is leads us to believe that he has understood the issues, in actuality this is not the case. This has happened all too frequently.33

Although in the past there did not exist any formal demarcation of responsibi lities between the United States and Japan, their respective capabilities did suggest an implicit understanding under which Japan wielded the shield and the United States the lance. Thus, the ASDF possessed interceptors while relying on the U.S. Fifth Air Force for attack capabilities . Similarly, the MSDF weapons programme emphasized an anti-submarine warfare role while relying on the U.S. Seventh Fleet for surface and air defence. 34 As such, the purpose of the Guideline may be to explicitly force Japan to acquire the sword and play a more active role in its defence and for regional stability. Although long-term defence planning was abandoned in 1976 with the completion of the fourth defence buildup plan, the basic principle of long-term planning was reinstated in 1980 because it was felt that this was the best way to achieve the targets of the NDPO. In that year the JDA formulated the Mid-Term Defence Program Estimate (MTDPE), a revolving defence plan to direct the completion of the NDPO. The

42

Chapter Two

MTDPE was intended to be an internal JDA document with no official status and meant only to facilitate planning within the J DA. The term of the plan was five years although it was reviewed and reformulated every three years. As a result, the basic policy of national defence continued to be based on the NDPO while the weapons procurement plans came to be based on the MTDPE since the latter outlined the weapons procurement schedule. This schedule, however, was never realized because of the official policy of restricting the defence budget to under one per cent of GNP. At the time it was formulated, the one per cent ceiling was considered adequate to meet defence requirements since the economy was growing at a relatively high rate ensuring, in turn, a steady expansion of the defence budget. Difficulties became obvious, however, when the economic growth rate slowed down and the defence budget failed to keep up with the projected requirements. This led to an increase of pressure both from within the defence establishment and from the U.S. Government for the removal of the one per cent limit to defence spending. This was one of the first tasks that Nakasone took upon himself when he became the Prime Minister and it will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.

Notes

2 3 4 5 6

7 8

9 10

T. McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution", Armed Forces & Society 13, no. 1 (Fall 1986): 84. JDA, Defence of Japan, 1979, p. 63. Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), pp. 277-78 . See the preamble to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. M. E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 60. S. P. Gilbert, "Northeast Asia in American Security Policy", in U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach, edited by W.T. Tow and W. R. Feeney (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 80. JDA, Defence of Japan, 1985, p. 61. H. Otake, Nihon no Boei to Kokunai Seiji: Detente kara Gunkaku e [Japanese defence and domestic politics: from detente to militarization] (Tokyo: Sanichi Shabo, 1983), p. 72. Ibid., p. 86 . T. Umemoto, "Boei Seisaku no Henka to Keizokusei" [Continuity and change

The Post-War Japanese Defence Establishment

11

12 13 14 15

16

17 18 19

20 21

22

23 24 25 26 27 28

43

in defence policy], in Sengo Nihon no Taigai Seisaku [Postwar Japanese foreign policy], edited by A. Watanabe !Tokyo: Yuhikaku Sensho, 1985) , p. 324. M. Momoi, "Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies", in The Foreign Policv of Modern Japan, edited by R .A. Scala pi no !Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 358- 59. K. Ito, "The 1% Spending Ceiling: An Idea Whose Time has Passed" , Japan Echo 14, no. 2 !Summer 1987) : 58. Momoi, op. cit, p. 358. Weinstein, op. cit., pp. 83 - 84. A. Kaminishi, "'60 Ampo Kaitei kara '80 Guideline Ampo e" [From the 1960 Security Treaty Revision to the 1980 Guideline Agreement], Sekai, no. 502 !June 1987), p. 89. K. Chuma, Saigumbi no Se1jigaku [The politics of rearmament] !Tokyo: Chishikisha, 1985), p. 68. Article 5 states, "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger ... ". Article 6 states, "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan . S. Tsuru, "Nichi-Bei Ampo no Minaoshi o" [Towards a revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty], Sekai, no. 502 (June 1987), pp. 26-27. Otake, op. cit, pp. 273-74. For details on the territorial dispute and its historical and legal backgrounds, see T. Nakagawa, "Japan's Northern Territories in International Politics", Japan Review of International Affairs 2, no. 1 !Spring/Summer 1988). Otake, op. cit, p. 282. This is in reference to a statement made by the JDA Chief Kurihara to the effect that, "As a politician it is my duty to make the Japanese people conscious of the Soviet threat". See S. Tsuru , "Nichi -Bei Ampo no Minaoshi o" [Towards a revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty], Sekai, no. 502 !June 1987), p. 25. D.C . Hellmann, "Japanese Security and Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy" , in The Foreign Policv of Modern Japan, edited by R.A. Scalapino !Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 329- 30. Asahi Shinbun IChokan), 28 November 1980, p. 1. Otake, op. cit, p. 8. P. Keal, "Japan's Strategic Role in the Pacific", Asian Pacific Review, no. 3 !Winter 1986) A. Rix, "Japa n's Comprehensive Security and Australia", Australian Outlook 41, no. 2 !August 1987): 79. Weinstein, op. cit., pp. 88 - 89. Thi s principle of civilian control has been very important in post-war Japanese politics as a means of preventing the militarism of pre-war years. Under it the civilians maintain control and command over the military, and uniformed personnel are excluded from overall policy making . See H. Buck, "Civilian Control of the Military in Japan", in Civilian Control of the Militarv: Theorv and

44

29 30 31 32 33 34

Chapter Two Cases from Developing Countries, edited by C. E. Welch (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1976), p. 180 . A . Fujiwara, Sengoshi to Nihon Gunkoku Shugi [Postwar history and Japanese militarism] !Tokyo: Shin Nippon Shuppan Sha, 1982), especially pp. 90ff. Umemoto, op. cit ., pp. 325- 26. Chuma , op. cit., p. 118. Ibid ., p. 109. Ibid., p. 122. Ibid ., p. 209 .

III Nakasone and Japanese Defence

Introduction Throughout the post-war period, Japanese defence expenditures remained well below international norms when measured ; as a percentage of theGN P. Over time, this became a source of increased friction in U.S.-Japan relations. U.S. pressure, particularly that emanating from the Congress, increased significantly and in positive relationship to the Japanese economic " miracle" and inversely to economic conditions in the United States . Starting in the early 1970s, the U.S. balance of payments position deteriorated while Japan continued to amass ever increasing yearly surpluses, with some exceptions as in the years immediately following the oil crises. Since the bulk of Japanese surplus was with the United States and a significant portion of the U.S. deficit was with Japan, the connection between economic performance and military expenditure, however fallacious, was readily made and provided easy ammunition for Japan-bashing .

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Chapter Three

The difference between Japan's actual and potential contribution to Western security was so great as to generate charges of a Japanese "free ride" on U.S. defence efforts. Towards the end of the Nakasone administration, however, the attitude of the U.S. Government had shifted significantly and official pressure on Japan to raise defence spending was much reduced. At the Si xteenth U.S.-Japan Security Conference held in Hawaii in January 1986, for example, the United States offered full support to the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) and the proposed defence budget for fiscal year 1986. This was in sharp co ntrast to the U.S. position at the same conference five years earlier when it suggested that Japan's defence establishment should be at least 1.2 to 2 times more than that targeted in the NDPO. 1 Th e attitude of the U.S. Congress, however, remained hardline and in 1987, the two houses passed a resolution cal ling upon Japan to increase defence spend ing to 3 per cent of GNP2 There are two plausible explanations for the shift in the official U.S. attitude towards Japan's defence buildup. Firstly, it might be interpreted as an indication of support for the policies of the Nakasone administration as having a lasting directional change in the field of defence planning . Secondly, it could be taken to mean that the United States had come around to the position that it preferred a weaker and subservient Japan to a stronger and, probably, more assertive and independent one. On the latter point, it has been argued that a militarily stronger Japan would feel a reduced need for U.S. protection and might, gradually, drift away from its alliance re lationship with the United States . According to this position, Japan had become much too important economically to be allowed to drift in the direction of a more independent position and that it was in the U.S. interest to ensure that Japan remained firmly allied to the United States. This may have become particularly important with the emergence of Japan as a "supporter" within the liberal international economic order (LIEO) and its readiness to accept some of the leadership costs that the United States had previously shouldered on its own as, for example, in providing an open market for manufactured products and helping thereby to ease global supply and demand imbalances . The U.S. ability to provide single-handed leadership had declined with the deterioration of its economic performance making it all the more important to "recruit" supporters that would assist in the maintenance of

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

47

the essential stability of the system. The structure of a dual hegemonsupporter management mechanism within the LIEO may have made it imperative to preserve a unity of purpose which a strongly armed and independent Japan might have made more tenuous. However, while the fear may have been real that a stronger Japan would be more independent, the actual course of events during the Nakasone years suggests that a militarily stronger Japan could only be accommodated, regionally and domestically, within a stronger alliance relationship. As such, it is believed that the first explanation was the main reason behind the more positive appraisal of Japanese defence efforts. This shall be examined further below. The change in the U.S. position was an expression of support for Nakasone for having achieved a level of military preparedness con sidered more or less acceptable. This, in turn, suggests that Nakasone had brought about a significant departure from past policies. Indeed, if the defence budget growth is taken as a measure, Japanese defence expenditures, under Nakasone, rose at a faster annual rate than that of the United States under President Ronald Reagan . However, not all are convinced that the policies of the Nakasone administration represented a major change from established precedents. According to John Burgess, what he [Nakasone] did was rarely more than build upon trends (with trademark flair for the dramatic, public gesture) that his predecessors had set in motion years earliera

Thus, in this view, when Nakasone visited the Yasukuni Shrine for the war dead in his official capacity, he was only building upon past visits by his predecessors, albeit in private capacity. In any event, whichever explanation is preferred, it is unlikely that U.S. pressure on Japan will revert to its earlier intensity. However, this is not because of a reduced threat perception which, as Cumings observed, was the result of the recently concluded IN F Treaty between the two superpowers: The recent intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement and the summit in Washington severely undercut a prime rationale for pressing Japan on security issues- the Soviet threat, particularly the SS-20s on Asian soil, which are now being dismantled 4

Rather, it was because of a conviction in the Japanese sincerity of purpose for as previously stated, Japanese defence efforts are no

48

Chapter Three

longer based solely on threat perceptions but also on an acknowledgement of responsibilities as a member of the Western alliance. In the late 1970s, as Chairman of the Executive Council of the LDP, Nakasone had consistently stressed the need for constitutional revision to enable the establishment of the necessary defence potential. 5 However, as the Prime Minister, constitutional revision never became a major policy issue of the administration, perhaps because, as Herb Bix noted, the Constitution had begun to atrophy from the late 1970s onwards .6 The flexibility in the interpretation of the Constitution had made this less important. According to one source, it was obvious that though required by constitutional mandate to adhere to a non-belligerent status, Japan has, with considerable U.S. encouragement developed "self-defense" forces increasingly able to respond to situations elsewhere though designed solely to meet national defense needs. 7

It was argued by Chuma that although Nakasone's achievements should not be downrated, neither should it be ignored that his achievements were made possible by the groundwork that had already been laid by his predecessors. Of course since politics and diplomacy are arts of achieving the possible, not the impossible, it would have been unfair to expect Nakasone, despite his rhetoric, to have achieved what would have been impossible in any case. The operative constraints did restrict the field of the possible, but even so he managed to infuse more realism into the question of defence and security. Highlighting the achievements of the Nakasone administration in the field of national defence, Chuma wrote, Since becoming the Prime Minister in November 1982 Yasuhiro Nakasone has transformed the nature of Japan's relationship with the U.S. from one of "passive alliance" to "active alliance". This was made possible by the effective root-binding (nemawashtl work done by his predecessors, Masayoshi Ohira (1978-80) and Zenko Suzuki (1980-82). Firstly, he resolved the long-standing issue of the legality of transferring defence related technology to the United States. Following that, in the six-month period from his installation as Prime Minister, he visited Korea and the ASEAN countries and secured their support for Japan's defence buildup. Moreover, he proclaimed unity with the Western alliance at the Williamsburg summit and expressed support for the U.S. decision to deploy INF missiles in Europe . ... 8

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

49

The U.S.-Japan Military Alliance As mentioned earlier, Nakasone was not the first to proclaim alliance unity with the West. Prime Minister Suzuki proclaimed it in 1981 but promptly modified it to leave out any military connotations. On the other hand, Na kaso ne used the term "alliance" in its usual sense and emphasized the military aspect of it. 9 Moreover, he carried it a step forward . He not only proclaimed alliance wi t h the West but also used the term "unmei kyodotai" (co mmon destiny) to characterize U.S.-Japan relations . The use of this term resulted in controversy in Japan because of its pre-war connotations and the fact that the same phrase had been used to describe Japan's axis pact with Germany and ltaly. 10 This may appear somewhat at variance with the common perception of Nakasone as a Gaullist but ca n, in fact, be simply expla ined . Nakasone started his political career early in the Occupation period when he won a seat in the lower house of the Diet campaigning for a greater awareness of the Soviet menace. At the same time, throughout the Occu pat ion period, he always wore a black tie to express sorrow at the indignity being forced upon Japan. This would clearly make him stand out as a strong nationalist in the Gaullist mould . But Nakasone was a prescient and an astute politician , fully aware of the constraints impeding an independent Japan. As long as he was a backbench politician, he co uld easily display his emotions but he learned to make compromises as responsibilities demanded . He remained convinced of the potential Soviet threat but was also aware that the parameters of the Japanese defence buildup were demarcated in terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. He was aware of this even in the early years of his political career despite his opposi tion to the policies of the Occupation authorities. In a representation he made to General MacArthur in late January 1951, he wrote that he "firmly believe[ d) that the rainbow bridge of idealism spanning 11 over the Pacific Ocean must not be faded with clouds and mists" . He also went on to say that the true defence of Japan was possible only through the combination of the liberty-loving peoples, but as equals. He realized that any attempt by Japan to embark on a remilitarization programme would only raise the suspicion of other Asian countries including China, and that defence buildup could, therefore, only be carried out within the framework of the Western

50

Chapter Three

alliance. It is, perhaps , natural that the regional countries feel safer and trust more an external power, the United States, than a potential new power within the region, Japan . As a result of the lingering wartime memories, the regional countries remain uneasy about an independent and militarized Japan . 12 Thus, any attempt to realize a zairaigata kokka (ordinary country) could only be undertaken within the alliance relationship. One reason for wanting to change Japan from its unique status into an ordinary country was to give it a more active role in international affairs more commensurate with its economic power. This quest for a more active role may appear somewhat contradictory with the emphasis on alliance identity that characterized the Nakasone administration; but as mentioned in the previous chapter, it was through its alliance relationship and contribution that Japan hoped to acquire its desired political status within the international system . Although Robert C. Christopher wrote that "the men who rule Japan still insist that it is in their country's best interest to remain a U.S. client", 13 the policy of normalizing the state was not simply designed to sustain a patron-client relationship. It was, instead, an attempt to create a more equal and reciprocal relationship. One consequence of the emphasis on the Western alliance was the failure to ma ke any progress in relations with the Soviet Union which, in fact, deteriorated under the Nakasone administration. The main obstacle to normal relations between the two countries is the dispute over the sovereignty of four small islands north of Hokkaido. As Takehito Seki has pointed out , to facilitate the return of the four disputed islands, Japan has to create the proper conditions, including perhaps guaranteed security of passage out of the Sea of Japan for the Soviet Union . 14 This, he argued, required a loosening of the al liance relationship with the United States to avoid giving the impression that Japan was firmly within the anti-Soviet alliance. Instead, Nakasone threatened to do the opposite and close the exit paths for the Soviet navy in the event of hostilities. Because the U.S.-Japan alliance is essentially an anti-Soviet alliance, it is understandable that the USSR has been unwilling to make concessions so long as the alliance structure remained in place. It would appear that Nakasone suffered the same fate with respect to the Soviet Union as did former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in respect to China . In the early 1970s, Sato as Prime Minister staunchly supported

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

51

the U.S. anti-China policies until he found the ground cut from under him by the Sino-U.S . rapprochement . He was forced to resign shortly thereafter because of his inability to make headway on normalizing relations with China , which was finally achieved by his successor Kakuei Tanaka. Like Sato, Nakasone was also a staunch supporter of the strongly anti-Soviet line of President Reagan and he too found himself out in the cold when the second Cold War had subsided with a moderation of Reagan's anti-Soviet rhetoric and the promise of better U.S.- Soviet relations. Without wishing to make a straightforward parallel between Sato and Nakasone, the similarities do provide some insight. Nakasone was inherently incapable of taking advantage of the seemingly moderate and reformist Gorbachev regime. In January 1986, however, the two countries resumed talks at the foreign minister level after a lapse of eight years but neither side was willing to make any concession on the territorial issue. The only agreement was to continue such talks on a regular basis, at least once a year. 15

Nakasone and the Japanese Military In examining Nakasone's attempt to shape the future direction of Japanese defence, it is useful to make a distinction between defence superstructure and infrastruct ure. Defence superstructure might be interpreted as the actual wherewithal to conduct military operations or, in other words, the forces in being and the weapons systems. The infrastructure, on the other hand, might be regarded as the operating environment in general and the legal/societal structures in particular to enable effective military operations. The development of the defence superstructure in Japan has been governed by the various buildup plans and the parameters established by the NDPO of 1976, that is the maintenance of the following force posture during peace time: 16 GSDF

180,000 men

MSDF

4 Escort Flotillas 60 anti-submarine patrol craft 16 submarines 2 minesweeping flotillas

52

Chapter Three

16 anti-submarine aircraft squadrons 220 operational aircraft ASDF

10 squadrons of fighter-interceptors 3 squadrons of support fighters 6 air defence missile groups with Nike SAMs 1 reconnaissance squadron 1 AEW squadron 3 transport squadrons 430 aircraft

The NDPO did not stipulate any time frame for its implementation, but in a separate decision it was agreed to build up to the stipulated level with annual expenditures not exceeding one per cent of GNP. When Nakasone became Prime Minister in late 1982, the NDPO had still not been realized. The force levels prescribed by the NDPO restricted what Nakasone could do in terms of superstructural developments, except to push for an early implementation of the NDPO targets. Furthermore, Japan had already acquired some of the most sophisticated weapons systems in the world and there was no immediate need for a significant quantitative or qualitative buildup in the defence superstructure. In any case, this could hardly have been undertaken without first completing the buildup targeted in the NDPO. This was indeed one of Nakasone's major objectives and it was reflected in his attempt to abolish the one per cent ceiling on defence expenditures . It was one aspect of the infrastructural reform he pursued in order to ease the constraints on the future expansion of the defence superstructure, should that become necessary. To understand Nakasone's policies in the area of defence and international relations in general, it is necessary to place it in the context of the rightist drift in Japanese society in recent years. Even the left-of-centre political parties, which had consistently questioned the constitutionality of the defence forces, had become reconciled to it as an institution of irreversible reality. It was unusual also that when the U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Carl Vinson visited the port of Yokohama in December 1984, it was met with a relatively quiet reception. Nakasone not only utilized this "reawakening" but actively promoted it to further the government's objectives. For example, even though nationalist anthropology had lost respectability in Europe,

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

53

Nakasone entrusted a right-leaning cultural anthropologist, Takeshi Umehara, to establish a Japanology institute. According to Nakasone, "Now is the time to establish Japan's identity once again. " 17 This could be interpreted as evidence of Nakasone's narrow nationalism but more accurately it was an attempt to preserve a national identity in the face of what was, for him, inevitable internationalism. In a sense it was the socio-cultural parallel to what had repeatedly happened on the industrial front. In Japan, economic liberalization and removal of protection from specific industrial sectors had, in the past, always followed a prior strengthening of the competitiveness of that industry to ensure its survival under conditions of open competition. The same appears to have been considered true for the social front as well. Convinced that in the future Japan could not persist without radical internationalism, Nakasone sought to ensure that the Japanese society would be able to maintain its identity. To prepare the ground for internationalism, it was necessary to have a "robust" society that was not inordinately burdened down with guilt and which saw the historical roots extending beyond the immediate forty years of the post-war period. According to William Wetherall, All that Nakasone has said and done, since becoming a member of Japan's lower house in 1947, shows that he has been inspired by pre-war patriotism to achieve two post-war goals : regain for the Japanese people the sovereignty he feels that Japan lost after the "Greater East Asia War", and regenerate in them the sense of ethnic pride he believes they must have to contribute to the world as respected globalists with a firm ethnic identity.18

In Chapter I, however, it was suggested that the empirical referent of the normalization policy was not pre-war Japan but rather the other advanced states in the contemporary period. Nakasone was certainly inspired by patriotism but not of the pre-war militaristic type. While Wetherall is essentially correct in referring to pride and patriotism, it is believed that reference to the pre-war period muddles, rather than clarifies, the issue by introducing the connotations of militarism. It should also be pointed out here that militarism is not a constant feature of Japanese history even if it was dominant during, and in the years preceding, World War II. Nakasone's policies were very atypical of post-war Japanese politics

54

Chapter Three

and Nakasone was an uncharacteristic Prime Minister. Despite the fact that he headed only a small faction within the LDP, he was bold and aggressive in his attempt to wipe the slate clean of post-war politics. Throughout his five years as Prime Minister, he managed to maintain a high popularity standing with the masses except for short periods when his policies seemed to go well beyond the domestic consensus achieved. That was perhaps part of his strategy. Particularly in the field of defence, the domestic consensus lagged so far behind his policy objectives that, rather than wait for the consensus to move slowly forward, he would take and push for a position so far out of line that even the resulting compromise resulted in a significant directional change. Examples of this can be seen both in the case of the formulation of the Mid-Term Defence Program Estimate (MTDPE) and in the attempted removal of the one per cent ceiling on defence spending in 1985.

The One Per Cent Ceiling on Defence There was no doubt that, when Nakasone assumed the presidency of the LDP, the issue of the one per cent ceiling would be a major item on the agenda of the new administration. At the same time, because he headed only a small faction within the LDP, it was obvious that the task would not be easy. Not, however, because support for the one per cent ceiling was strong within the LDP which it was not, but because others feared a heavy-handed approach, like that of Kishi in ratifying the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The only committed support for the one per cent ceiling was probably within the Miki faction because of Miki's dovish views and because he was responsible for the introduction of the ceiling . The untenability of the one per cent limit, however, had long been obvious. Even the Comprehensive National Security Study Group report (1980), while downplaying the importance of military factors in ensuring national security, still presented the view that an appropriate level for defence spending would be somewhat above one per cent of GNP. Initially, Nakasone decided to play it cautiously. He was repeatedly pressed on the issue and each time gave his commitment to try his best to adhere to the limit on defence spending . Also, he probably felt it better to wait till it was time to reyiew and reformulate the rolling MTDPE

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

55

rather than force the issue in the middle of an existing MTDPE, even though it was only an estimate and not an official plan. According to party regulations, the term of a Prime Minister is limited to two terms of two years each. This was necessitated by the factional nature of the LOP and by the need, therefore, to prevent the monopolization of power by any one faction over an extended period of time. Having become Prime Minister in late 1982, Nakasone's maximum stay in office, given party rules, was until the fall of 1986. The review of the existing MTDPE covering the period 1983-87 (the Japanese abbreviation is Showa 56 Chugyo or simply 56 Chugyo) was due in 1985 and Nakasone's strategy was to upgrade the heretofore internal JDA estimate into an official government plan . When· the Defence Council (now renamed the Security Council) met in August 1985, Nakasone, accordingly, told them to try and have the new plan, the MTDPE for 1986-90 (59 Chugyo), adopted as an official five-year defence buildup plan . The purpose of the new MTDPE was to com ~ plete the buildup envisaged in the ND~O and the expenditures that would be required to do that inevitably meant that the one per cent ceiling would have to be broken . Nakasone hoped to do this in the first year of the MTDPE since that would be the last year (fiscal year 1986) he would have control over the national budget, given the maximum of two two-year terms for a Prime Minister. From the beginning, Nakasone himself spearheaded the campaign for upgrading the MTDPE to an official plan . He hoped thereby to break the ceiling on defence expenditures. His determination on the latter issue was clearly indicated when he stated that he would persevere in this even if it meant attracting criticism upon himself (dora o kabutte demo "to be covered in mud")_19 Speaking at an LOP seminar in July 1985 at Karuizawa, Nakasone strongly hinted at the removal of the one per cent ceiling on defence and said that he wanted to use the new MTDPE as a "chance" to revitalize the defence consciousness of the people. 20 Having staked his credibility on the one per cent issue, he instructed the Secretary General of the LOP, Shin Kanemaru, to work for party unity and agreement to do away with the expenditure ceil ing. Kanemaru, however, was unable to align the different factions behind Nakasone's objectives and in early November 1985 reported to Nakasone that there was considerable opposition to removing the ceiling within the party. The main opposition came from the party

56

Chapter Three

elders-Miki, Fukuda, and Suzuki-and the New Leaders-Shintaro Abe, Noboru Takeshita, and Kiichi Miyazawa (so called because of their contention for party leadership to replace Nakasone without, at the same time, being factional leaders as was the case for all previous party presidents) . According to Chuma, the opposition was not based on matters of principle but it was rather their way of registering dissent with Nakasone's heavy-handed tactics . This violated the established practice of team play and harmony and was a real-life demonstration of the Japanese proverb that a nail that sticks out will get hammered in . Unlike in the case of the one per cent issue, there was no serious opposition to raising the internal JDA plan as an official document, partly in deference to U.S. pressure which favoured it as the best way to ensure the early completion of the NDP0.2 1 The MTDPE was officially adopted as a government plan on 18 September 1985 and it had the same status as the earlier defence buildup plans. The MTDPE as officia lly approved entailed a total defence expenditure of ¥18.4 trillion over the five-year period of the plan . In terms of the projected GNP growth over the term of the plan, it was certain that at some point during the term of the plan, defence spending would have to break through the one per cent limit . So long as the plan was unofficial, it would have been easy to contain spending ; but having approved the total defence spending officially, it seemed only a matter of time. Thus, although Nakasone lost his bid to do so in the fiscal year 1986 budget, he had the satisfaction of knowing that he had not failed completely. The official acceptance of the MTDPE meant that Nakasone had won , in principle, the one per cent issue since the total expenditure entailed in the plan was in excess of one per cent of GNP. He had however lost, at least temporarily, on the principle of having the ceiling abolished . The MTDPE, as approved, had three specific objectives : 1. Expand the capability for defending Japanese air space, protecting its vital sea lanes, and successfully engaging in combat in coastal waters and beyond; 2. Improve C3 1 (command , control, communication , and intelligence) ; and 3. Enhance ability to engage in sustained combat . In terms of weapons procurement, emphasis was on frontal equipment and the achievement of the targets laid down in the NDPO.

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

57

Under the plan, the ASDF was to acquire 63 F-15s and 5 E-2Cs bringing the total number of operational aircraft to 415 or about the same as the 420 envisaged in the NDPO. The MSDF was to acquire 50 P-3Cs bringing its total of operational aircraft to 214 as opposed to the target of 220 . In terms of escort vessels the target was to be exceeded by 2 as 9 new escort ships were to be procured bringing the total to 62 ships. 22 Even though the emphasis was on achieving the NDPO targets, it was . by no means certain that the MTDPE, at the time it was adopted, would be able to achieve that. This was essentially because the amount allocated for weapons procurement is usually a small proportion of total defence outlays, with the bulk of the defence expenditures being devoted to personnel costs, as Table 3.1 shows. In recent years, however, the weapons procurement share of the defence budget has increased and this, together with the rapid appreciation of the Japanese yen, since late 1985, could conceivably make a difference between the current plan and all the others that had preceded it and which had all fallen short of established targets. The benefit of the higher yen is that it has reduced import prices of goods and weapons systems in yen-based terms. But even if the quantitative targets are not fu lly realized, in qualitative terms Japan will have exceeded the defence objectives of the NDPO, simply because the weapons that have been introduced since the NDPO was decided upon and those weapons systems that have been included in the MTDPE are vastly more sophisticated than originally envisaged . TABLE 3.1

Breakdown of Japanese Defence Spending for Selected Years (In percentages) Fiscal Year

Personnel

Weapons

Others

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988

49 .3 46 .6 44 .6 45 .1 42 .7

20 .7 22.4 26.3 26.9 28.1

30 .0 32 .0 29.1 28 .0 29.2

SOU RCES : Defense of Japan and Asian Security, various issues.

58

Chapter Three

With respect to the intractable issue of budgetary ceiling on defence expenditures, Nakasone had not given up completely and he still retained the hope of capping his prime ministership with that elusive goal. Although the LOP regulations allowed a ma ximum of two terms or four years for a Prime Minister, Nakasone was confident of getting an additional year on grounds that stability was essential to see through what was then a crucial transitory phase in U.S.Japan political and economic relations. His claim was bolstered by the fact that he had developed a good working relationship with the U.S. President and by his domestic popularity, due largely to a creative foreign policy. In order to ensure an unprecedented fifth year in office, he decided to call for a "double" election for both Houses of the National Diet in the summer of 1986. The only previous "double" election was in 1980 when the Diet was dissolved following a successful no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Ohira . Nakasone expected to do well in the election and hoped thereby to force a bending of the party rules and stave off the challenge of the new leaders. At the July 1986 double elections, the LOP secured a resounding victory. It obtained an absolute majority in the Diet and the largest number of seats in its thirty-one years as a party.23 Shortly thereafter, based on success at the polls, Nakasone was granted a one-year extension on his term in office. In forming his new Cabinet , Nakasone's prime consideration was to ensure minimum opposition to his plans on defence spending. The key portfolios were defence, finance, foreign affairs, and the Chairman of the LOP's Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) and Nakasone allocated all of these, with the exception of foreign affairs, to the Suzuki faction . Only the foreign affairs portfolio was retained by the Nakasone faction . The reason behind giving the crucial posts to the Suzuki faction was to silence its opposition to increased defence spending . This is a well established strategy to overcome the factional politics of the LOP. Silencing doves within the parties, however, does not by any means ensure compliance by the bureaucracies, which in Japan wield a greater clout than the respective ministers. Nakasone's strategy in cabinet appointments was not so much directed at bureaucratic compliance as at party unity. The budget preparations for the following fiscal year (April-March) are usually begun late in the preceding calendar year. Given the GNP growth figures, it was understood that any growth of more than 4.8 per cent in the defence budget would

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

59

mean exceeding the one per cent limit. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) was particularly interested in keeping fiscal expenditure down as part of its strategy to balance the budget by the year 1990, an official target of which Nakasone himself was supportive. Prior to actual budget negotiations, the J DA indicated that it would be seeking an increase in expenditure of 6.5 per cent over the current fiscal year. On 25 December 1986 the MOF announced its proposed defence budget that allowed for an increase of only 4.1 per cent. The proposed MOF budget was for ¥3.4795 trillion, which left a margin of only ¥245 billion before the one per cent ceiling was breached . The small margin eventually proved insufficient to maintain the ceiling in the negotiations that followed between the JDA and MOF to come to a compromise position . In the past two years following such budgetary negotiations the defence budget had been increased by about ¥500 billion from the initial allocations made by the MO F.24 Shortly after the M OF declared its position, the J DA countered with a demand for an increase of 6.76 per cent . The upward revision of the JDA estimate was explained as necessary since earlier, on 12 December 1986, the government had decided that it would contribute a greater share to the maintenance of the U.S. bases in Japan. This was intended to provide some relief to the U.S. Government which had had to meet a dramatically increased financial burden in Japan as a result of the revaluation of the yen. After the the starting position of the two ministries was established, as always happens in Japanese budgetary politics, the MOF and the JDA began restoration negotiations ( fukkatsu sessho) to restore items on the budget that had been slashed by the MOF. In these negotiations the JDA eventually managed to restore funding for several weapons systems including the Patriot SSM, anti-tank helicopters, and funding to establish the construction costs for an Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar system . The initial MOF position was that the revaluation of the yen had reduced the budgetary requirements for weapons purchase and that therefore a large total increase was unwarranted . From 25 December 1986 to the eventual finalization of the defence budget on 30 December that same year, Nakasone tried to present the image that he was not a key player in the issue and that he would not interfere to support the JDA position . Members of his faction expressed the view that "if things proceed as they are, this year also the defence budget will be

60

Chapter Three

under 1 percent" .25 Yet, the ceiling was broken in the final resolution . Although Nakasone adopted a lower profile than in the previous year, there was no change in his determination . On 28 December 1986, he was reported to have told Cabinet Secretary Masaru Gotoda that, As the second year of the mid-term defence power consolidation plan (FY1986-90 MTDPE) we must secure the necessary level of funding . Whether or not that exceeds the one percent ceiling is irrelevant . There is no need to be concerned about our position in the Diet. 26

The MOF under Kiichi Miyazawa refused to make concessions to the JDA chief and on 29 December 1986 Gotoda intervened and suggested that the matter be resolved through discussion between himself as the Cabinet Secretary and the party bosses including Abe, Takeshita, and Ito. In this way the issue became essentially an intra-party issue rather than an inter-ministry one and showed the importance of Nakasone's careful allocation of party posts. Political fortune was also in Nakasone's favour. His two opponents in the 1985 showdown, Takeo Fukuda and Zenko Suzuki, had decided to step down as leaders of their factions in favour of Miyazawa and Abe respectively. These new leaders were no doubt content to have this thorny issue resolved by Nakasone rather than have to deal with it at a later date, if they were successful in their bid for party leadership. At the meeting, Gotoda laid down three possible alternatives: an increase of 4.8 per cent that left the status of the ceiling ambiguous; an increase of 5.4 per cent that the JDA felt was the minimum necessary to achieve the MTDPE; and a compromise figure of 5.2 per centY The decision of the party leaders was to accept the compromise proposal and raise the defence budget by 5.2 per cent bringing it to 1.004 per cent of anticipated GNP. According to Gotoda, a 5.2 per cent annual growth would be sufficient to complete the NDPO during the current MTDPE. Nakasone continued to maintain a low profile, and at a news conference on 30 December 1986 he praised the one per cent limit as having been a useful guideline for the past ten years, but added that given the downturn in economic growth compared to the mid-1970s, the limit had become impractical and an obstacle to the realization of the MTDPE. Still, the breaching of the ceiling on defence expenditures led to some discomfort both domestically and within the region . There were immediate calls for

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

61

some alternative mechanism whereby to curtail a possible spiralling of the defence budget . Nakasone responded, in January 1987, by instructing two Cabinet ministers to work out a new ceiling on defence expenditures. The United States was quick to express its disapproval of this while the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian , was equally quick to register Chinese concern that Japan was becoming a military power. This concern was conveyed to LDP Secretary General Takeshita when he visited Beijing in January 1987.28 Confronted with conflicting pressures, the government chose the middle option . In late January 1987, it was annol.!nced that the government and the LDP had agreed to limit defence spending up to 1990 to the level of ¥18.4 trillion as envisaged in the 1986-90 MTDPE and thereafter to the level stipulated under the subsequent MTDPEs. Thus, the ceiling was subject to reviews at least every five years. It satisfied the immediate demand for a ceiling and left open the possibility that over the long term the ceiling may not exist. As Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda suggested, it could not be taken for granted that all future five-year defence plans would specify an aggregate sum . 29 Nakasone was careful, however, to allay any fears that Japan would embark on a rapid remilitarization programme. In late January 1987 he gave the assurance that, We will continue to abide by the spirit of the decision taken by the Miki Cabinet [to limit defence spending to under 1 percent of GN Pl. In the five-year defence plan [MTDPEL total outlays will be Yen 18.4 trillion and while this comes to 1.02 percent of GNP on a yearly basis, it is almost the same as 1 percent .30

As such, it would appear that the "under one per cent" ceiling had been changed simply to an "around one per cent" ceiling . Although the one per cent ceiling on defence expenditure was broken there was no immediate or inordinate increase in the defence budget. The previous year's budget was exceeded by less than ¥200 billion and there was no change in the incremental approach to budgetary allocations, as shown in Table 3.2. What is significant about defence expenditures in recent years is the fact that there has been positive growth even as overall budgetary expansion has been kept to zero. Although defence expenditure in fiscal year 1987 was expected to exceed the one per cent of GNP ceiling by a small margin, it actually

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Chapter Three

TABLE 3.2 Breakdown of Japanese Defence Spending, 1980-88 Fiscal Year

Amount (¥billion)

Change

GNP

(%)

(%)

1980 1984 1986 1987 1988

2230.2 2934.6 3343.5 3520 .0 3700.2

+6 .5 +6.55 + 6.58 +5.20 +5.20

.90 .99 .993 1.004 1.013

SOU RCE S: Same as for Table 3.1

stayed below the ceiling, due to a better-than-predicted economic growth . This, however, does not detract from the significance of the original decision which, in principle, abolished the ceiling. For fiscal year 1988, the government approved defence expenditures of ¥3 .7 trillion or about 1.013 per cent of GNP.

Sea Lane Defence The 1986-90 MTDPE was, as mentioned, designed to achieve the targets of the NDPO but the JDA, over the intervening years, has argued that those targets themselves have to be revised in view of developments since then and projected new roles for the JSDF. According to the JDA: Since the procurement of aircraft and vessels involves a time lag of between 3-4 years, the realization of the levels envisaged in the NDPO will be around the yea r 1992 or 1994. However, in terms of sea lane defence, there are items that cannot be procured urider present plans . These include long-range flight patrol capabilities over the seas to meet incoming potential threats . At the time [of NDPO] such long-range capabilities were not considered necessary. Accordingly this will be the subject for study in th e next defence plan and the acquisition of this needed capability will be even further in the future.31

The JDA has argued that since the NDPO visualized only a restricted role for the SDF and because Japan had since then committed

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

63

itself to a 1,000-nauti ca l-mil e sea lane defence, th e NDPO had to be upgraded acco rdin gly. Besides seekin g a more long -range ca pability for its airc raft , inc luding th e possibi li t y of air refu elli ng tanke rs, it has also presse d for th e proc urement of an OTH radar system w hich wo uld gi ve it detecti on ca pabiliti es o ut to about 3, 000 kil o metres and prov ide for both mainland and maritim e air defence. Th e MSDF has bee n parti cul arl y co nce rn ed w ith air defence over th e seas in keepin g w ith th e expected sea-lan e defence responsibilit y. Th e OTH represents th e co nce rn for ea rl y threat detecti on gi ve n th e proximity of th e potential threat so urce and t he absence of depth of defence. Th e AS DF alrea dy possesses eight E-2C A EW airc raft to supp lem ent gro und -base d radar. In th e 1986-90 M TDPE , it ann ounced plans to ac quire fi ve more alth ough it was reported th at idea ll y it wo uld like t o ac quire t he Boeing E-3 AWAC beca use of th e short on-stati on tim e of t he E-3Cs, co nsidered a handi ca p if a 1,000-nauti ca l-mile sea- lane defence co nce pt is to be full y im plemented n Th e OTH is a key feature of th e MTDPE and fun din g to ca rry out sit ing an d cost surveys was sec ured in t he fi sca l yea r 1987 budget. It is like ly to become a major co nsiderati on in th e next MTDPE and w ill , no doubt , engende r hea ted de bate on w heth er J apan is beco min g too close ly alli ed w it h th e United States and cont rad ict ing th e co nstituti onal prin ciple th at prohibited co llective secu rit y. Thi s is beca use th e United States has so far in sisted, for purposes of protect ing high tec hnology, t hat t he in fo rm ation co llected through t he OTH be analyse d at its Kami seya fac ilit y in Yo kohama, w hi ch wo uld also process data co llected from th e sa me type of rada r systems th at it pl ans to co nstru ct o n its territory in t he Pac ific . Th us, un de rstandab ly t here is so me oppositi on , eve n w ithin th e JDA, t hat eve n th ough Japa n wo uld pay about ¥50 billi on for th e system , it wou ld effective ly be under th e co ntrol of th e United Statesa 3 Th e U.S. conce rn , howeve r, is und erstandabl e parti cul arl y in li ght of t he violati o n by a subsidiary of th e Toshiba Co rporati on of Coco m restri cti ons on t he expo rt of se nsiti ve mil itary- related techn ology/ prod ucts to co mmuni st co untries w hen it so ld prec isio n mi lli ng eq ui pment to t he Soviet Union . Th e iss ue of J apa n assumin g greater respo nsibilit y fo r th e defence of its sea lanes in th e weste rn Pac ific had beco me a signifi ca nt U. S. co nce rn in th e peri od followin g th e Soviet invas ion of Afghani stan , and th e U. S. dec ision to redep loy so me of its nava l forces in th e Pac ifi c to th e In dian Ocea n to co unte r any sprea d of Soviet influence

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there. To compensate for the depletion of its forces in the Pacific, the United States began urging Japan to boost its own maritime forces and thereby relieve the U.S. burden . The concept of sea lane defence was described as a "goal" in the JDA White Paper of 1983, whereas the typical U.S. perception of it was as a firm "pledge" given by Prime Minister Suzuki during his May 1981 summit meeting with President Reagan . Shortly after the summit joint communique was issued, Suzuki gave a press conference for Japanese journalists during which he, however, denied that Japan had accepted any new commitments. He stated further that the division of roles did not refer to military roles and that Japan had not assumed responsibility to compensate for the transfer of U.S. naval forces from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. 34 This led Martin Weinstein to a pessimistic conclusion regarding the Japanese commitment to sea lane defence although he correctly predicted that the longer-term prospects, beyond a four-year time span, were brighter. Indeed, shortly after Nakasone became Prime Minister, he stated that, 1. Japan should become like an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" defending against the Soviet "Backfire" aircraft. 2. Japan should exercise full control of the straits through Japanese islands to block passage of Soviet ships and submarines. 3. Japan should secure and maintain ocean lines of communication to several hundred miles and "if we are to establish sea lanes then our desire would be to defend the sea lanes between Guam and Tokyo and between the Strait of Taiwan and Osaka ... " 35

Although the term "unsinkable aircraft carrier" produced a domestic political row and an angry retort from the Soviet Union, the more controversial aspect of the above was the possible closure of the Straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya, the egress points for the Soviet Pacific Fleet from the Sea of Japan. Japan maintains that such an action on its part would be totally within the concept of self-defence but that it would do so only when attacked or facing imminent attack. In general, Japan's commitment to sea lane defence will probably remain limited to missions vital for the defence and security of Japan- not missions for the defence of the north-west Pacific on behalf of the United States. 36 However, the ability to clearly demarcate interests is becoming increasingly difficult.

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

65

Japan's ability to defend sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles would certainly benefit the United States much like the U.S. deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean benefits Japan by protecting its oil supplies from the Middle East. This is so because it is highly unlikely that Japan will be forced to actively defend its sea lanes except in the context of a superpower conflict. Indeed the question of sea lane defence has been somewhat divorced from any analysis of Soviet intent to pose an independent threat to Japan's overseas trade. An effective Japanese capability to defend sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles would reduce the burden on the United States and free its forces currently based in the region for possible deployment elsewhere in an emergency. The concept of sea lane defence in Japan is similar to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and entails keeping a few sea lanes open for free transit of merchant ships rather than the convoying of ships. For this restricted purpose, two imaginary routes have been determined as vital- the southwestern route stretching to Taiwan, and the south-eastern route which is the "main sea route carrying raw materials and crude oil from Southeast Asia and the Middle East" .37 The sea-lane defence issue is closely inter-linked with Japan's ability to block the three exit points from the Sea of Japan and thereby deny open sea access to the bulk of the Soviet Pacific Fleet (SPF) that is deployed in bases located in the Sea of Japan. Initially, the issue of sea lane defence and that of blocking the open sea access of the SPF were two separate issues, but by natural progression the two have become conjoined, with perhaps more emphasis on the latter. The southern strategy of sea lane defence has also become the northern strategy of bottling up the SPF submarine fleet in the Sea of Japan. This became obvious in the fall of 1986 when the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Armitage stated that the U.S. interpretation of the 1,000-kilometre sea lane defence also included the closure of exit points from the Sea of Japan for Soviet submarines .38 After the initial surprise, the JDA was quick to adjust to this strategy. The following year, the JDA Chief Yuko Kurihara stated that the next defence plan would give priority to the Ground Self-Defence Forces (GSDF) which was another way of emphasizing the need to defend against the northern threat .39 Japan already possesses a respectable minelaying capability and its ability to interdict Soviet surface vessels will be further enhanced

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when the deployment of the SSM-1 is completed . Procurement funds were made available in the 1986-90 MTDPE. The SSM-1 is a Japaneseproduced surface-to-ship missile with a range of about 150 kilometres which will be deployed mainly in the northern island of Hokkaido. Given its long range, all the navigable waters of the three straits would be within striking distance of the SSM-1 even if the launchers were positioned well inland . According to John O'Connell, the SSM-1 together with the Patriot, a long-range air defence missile scheduled to enter ASDF service around 1990, would make it extremely difficult for enemy ships to transit the straits. 40 The MSDF has also decided to acquire the Aegis air defence system to protect Japanese convoys from missile attacks by the Soviet Backfire bombers. However, Japan is not likely to acquire sea-lane defence capability before the middle of the 1990s when all the above weapons systems are expected to be in place. According to U.S. estimates, however, effective sea lane defence would require further enhancement of the Japanese force structure, including about 350 F-15s (as opposed to the projected 187 under the current MTDPE), 70 destroyers, 25 submarines, and 125 P-3Cs. 41 One problem that currently exists is the lack of co-ordination among the three services of the SDF. Effective sea lane defence will require co-ordinated action from these three services. However, no such mechanisms have yet been adequately developed. In fact, these services do not even conduct joint military exercises at present. The GSDF must be able to protect ports and harbours from surface attacks through the deployment of cruise missiles; the ASDF must be able to protect the air space and the P-3Cs operated by the M SDF; and finally, the MSDF must perform effective minesweeping and ASW functions . The ASDF, at present, is handicapped by the short range of its aircraft . The mainstay of the ASDF, the F-15s, have an operating radius of 1,120 nautical miles which is barely sufficient for a 1,000-nauticalmile sea lane defence. As a result, possible acquisition of mid-air refuelling tankers and aircraft carriers has gained in prominence in recent years . Although the acquisition of aircraft carriers has been speculated upon, it is very unlikely that Japan will in fact do so. This is partly because of the constitutional constraints on maintaining power projection forces and partly because such a move would invite a critical reaction from the regional countries. Interestingly, however,

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

67

in 1988 the JDA chief told the Budget Committee (yosan iinkai) of the Lower House of the Diet that a distinction could be made between aircraft carriers for offensive and defensive operations and that possession of the latter type would not be in violation of the Constitution . Nevertheless, he stated that it was unlikely to become an issue for procurement in the immediate future.42 One alternative is the acquisition of the Skyhook/Harrier system which consists of a crane installed on any medium-sized surface vessel which is able to latch on to a fixed wing aircraft, a Harrier in this case, as it manoeuvres alongside the ship. This would allow the aircraft to be either refuelled for another mission or pulled on board for servicing and rearming. 43 This might give the necessary air support that would be needed to effectively assume responsibility for a 1,000-nautical-mile sea-lane defence concept . The Skyhook is still being looked into and any decision on its procurement and deployment will be well in the future. Even apart from this, according to U.S. estimates, Japan would have to expand defence expenditures by around 10 per cent a year for ten years to acquire effective sea-lane defence capabilities. 44 Budgetary constraints, however, have made such a large increase impractical . During the period 1980-85, Japan's defence budget increase on a nominal basis was over 6.5 per cent a year and this at a time when the overall general accounts budget remained more or less constant.

Achieving Reciprocity in US. -Japan Relations A major emphasis of the Nakasone administration was to enhance the alliance relationship with the United States in the direction of greater reciprocity and demarcation of responsibility. It was reported that the two countries had reached an agreement, as provided for in the Guideline, on the issue of their joint strategy in dealing with an emergency, that is, aggression on Japan . This agreement was reportedly signed in December 1984 but the contents have been kept a strict secret .45 A rough gist of the report, however, was leaked to the press and carried by the vernacular Yomiuri Shinbun in January 1987. It depicted a scenario where conflict in the Middle East, initiated presumably by the Soviet Union, had escalated to pose a threat to Japanese sea lanes accompanied by an attack on Japan and the occupation of the northern island of Hokkaido. As a result of this

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simulation exercise, the three main pillars of defence for the SDF were identified as effective air defence strategy, sea lane defence, and defence of Hokkaido.46 The credibility of U.S. security commitments to Japan has often been questioned, partly because a one-sided commitment is necessarily weaker than genuine interdependence and reciprocity. However, Japan has been constrained from achieving greater reciprocity because of the commonly held view that its Constitution denied Japan the right of collective security. The constitutiona lity of co llective security appeared to have been reso lved in 1969 when a government report titled The Relationship between the Right of Collective Security and the Constitution confirmed that collective security was not permitted . Nevertheless, under Nakasone, whatever constraints there were have been considerably weakened. This can be seen clearly in the case of sea lane defence. The issue of achieving a division of responsibility between the two countries in the area of sea lane defence was first broached by U.S. Defence Secretary Weinberger when Japanese Foreign Minister ltoh visited the United States in March 1981. Later, ltoh told the Diet that such a division of responsibility would amount to collective security and was therefore not possible under the Constitution. 47 Likewise, when Japan participated in the "Rimpac 80" naval exercises with the United States, the opposition parties interpreted this as leading to collective security, but the government insisted that the exercise was not intended for the defence of a third country. The limitations have since been progressively weakened . In February 1983, shortly after becoming Prime Minister, Nakasone responding to questions from the Komei Party stated that in the event of an attack on Japan, the SDF had the right to go to the assistance of the U.S. Fleet should it be interfered with while on its way to the Japanese islands to render assistance. Although this was later clarified as possible only in the vicinity of Japan, this was still a significant broadening of the concept of self-defence. 48 To further enhance the credibility of U.S. security commitments and improve their joint war-fighting capabilities, the two governments agreed, in January 1987, to conduct research on the issue of interoperability of their forces, not only in terms of weapons systems but also inclusive of command and management structures. This was important to ensure speedy and effective response in the case of an

69

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

emergency. The joint research that is currently underway is focused mainly on the communications systems . The inter-operability of fo rces and war-fighting capabi lities have also been tested through regular joint mil ita ry manoeuvres. A lthough such ma noeuvres have become regu lar events since the early 1980s, their intensity and scale have increased markedly in recent years. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 give an indication of the sca le of joint exercises between the two countries . The issue of techno logy transfer was taken up in earnest by the United States in the 1980s as a way of equal izing the one-sided nature of its defence re lationsh ip with Japan . The problem for Japan was

TAB LE 3.3 Joint Military Exercises between the United States and Japan, 1978- 88 Land Manoeuvres (No. of Troops) Year

Japan

U.S.

1978 1981 1988

0 1'160 4,545

0 600 4,850

*

-

Naval Manoeuvres (No. of Ships)* U.S .

Japan

14

(23)

Japan

U.S.

(33)

60

55

20 (101)

1,166

857

25

97 (133)

Air Manoeuvres (No . of Aircraft)

Figures in parentheses indicate number of aircraft involved. No manoeuvres.

SouR CE: "'lkkoku Heiwa Shugi' o Koeru" [Going beyond 'Pacifism in One Country'], Sekai, no. 521, November 1988, p. 34.

TAB LE 3.4

Rimpac Naval Manoeuvres, 1980 and 1988 Escort Ships

1980 1988

Submarines

2 8

Supp ly Ships

Aircraft

Anti - Submarine Helicopters

Men

8(P-2J) 8(P-3C)

8

690 2,300

- None were involved. Note : The Rimpac naval exercises are held every two years . The aircraft involved in 1980 was the P-2J and in 1988 the P-3C. SouRCE: Same as for Table 3.3.

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that the government had established the so-called "Three Principles" in 1969 which prohibited military-related exports to conflict areas, countries under a United Nations sanction, and communist countries . Defence technology was also considered within the ambit of the 1969 decision. In 1976 this was further strengthened to include a ban on the export of weapons manufacturing facilities . Notwithstanding, U.S. pressure on Japan intensified when Weinberger visited Japan in 1983. He stated quite bluntly " .. . that the American people were not going to continue to underwrite Japanese security unless they gave in a little" .49 According to U.S. sources, the government of the United States did not have a list of any particular technology that it desired from Japan; it simply wanted to create a structure that would enable co-operation between American and Japanese companies for research and development on weapons systems. 50 In January 1983, shortly prior to Nakasone's first official visit to Washington, the Japanese Government formally agreed to make a special exception for the United States and excluded it from the restrictions imposed by the Three Principles, even if the United States became involved in conflicts. In November that year, a memorandum was signed between the two countries to facilitate the transfer of military technology. There was some criticism that the technology transfer agreement with the United States contradicted the ban on weapons export. The Japanese Government, however, maintained that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was an instrument to maintain peace, and that since technology transfer would strengthen the bilateral security agreement, there was no contradiction of the spirit of 1969. 51 It argued that the rationale of the 1969 decision was to ensure peaceful conflict resolution rather than resort to force and that this objective was strengthened by the newly concluded technology transfer agreement. It was decided that details of actual technology transfer would, in principle, be kept secret . However, according to reliable sources, since the signing of the agreement there have been two cases of technology transfer, one involving the overhaul of naval auxiliary oilers with the technical assistance of lshikawajima Harima Shipyards of Japan and another involving guidance technology for the "Keiko" surface-to-air missilesY The freeing of restrictions on technology exports was also significant for the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SOl) . In early 1985, the United States formally solicited the participation of the Pacific allies-Japan, Australia, and South Korea-in the SOl, creating a

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77

new and interesting dilemma for the Japanese Government. A decision to refuse participation could have been based on Japanese· proscriptions against the military use of outer space. On the other hand, a decision to participate could be based on the view that the SDI was strictly defensive, as its name implied. However, this is more open to debate and disagreement. Two years later, in August 1987, after many study missions to the United States, the Japanese Government finally decided to allow private participation in SDI research while at the same time withholding official sanction . One reason behind Japan's unofficial participation was to make sure that it was not left out of any possible technological breakthroughs that might result from the SDI research . However, official commitment was withheld in deference to the 1969 Diet resolution that outer space be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. While the government also refused to commit any particular firm to participate in the project, A. Glicksman was confident that "market forces" would provide a sufficient incentive for private sector involvement in the project . 53 Several Japanese companies already appear to be involved . Hitachi Magnetics, for example, is providing magnetic components for a· particle beam weapons research project at the Los Alamos Research Center in the United States. 54 The first formal contract under the SOl programme was agreed to in Washington in 1988 for nine Japanese firms to undertake a " defense architecture study" and submit a report on threats to U.S. and Japanese interests in the region from shortand medium-range missiles, and possible defences. Although the amount involved is only U S$3 million this could lead to further con tracts depending on the report and provided the SDI is continued by the United States. 55

Nakasone and the Anti-Espionage Bill In keeping with the objective of strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, anti-spying legislation became a major issue during the 1980s. This was felt necessary on two grounds. One was the fact that Japan had acquired the reputation of being a "spy haven" (spy tengoku) with little or no legislation to curb such activities. Of course, as a country with a Peace Constitution and no military establishment in the traditional sense, there were not supposed to be any military secrets. Proponents of anti-spying legislation argued that effective

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legislation was necessary to prevent journalists and newspapers from acquiring and reporting state secrets . Another reason was that the government considered it necessary in order to strengthen military co-operation with the United States as envisaged in the Guideline between the United States and Japan . There was reason to believe that the United States would not be fully forthcoming in the sharing of sensitive technology unless there was some assurance that the military secrets would be protected. The Guideline, for example, stated that "the S.D.A. (Self Defence Army) and the U.S. military take responsibility, respectively, for the securing of information". 56 It worried the Japanese Government when it discovered, in January 1980, that a retired Major General had been handing over JDA materials on the People's Republic of China to the Soviet Union in exchange for cash. There were other instances of espionage. In late May 1987, four Japanese were arrested for the theft and sale to Chinese and Soviet officials in Tokyo of secrets relating to the F-16 Falcon and the E-3C Hawkeye ASW, interceptor, and anti-submarine aircraft, respectively.57 The one that caused the most difficulty in U.S.-Japan relations was the well-known Toshiba affair, which resulted in a particularly harsh reaction in the United States . It was discovered that a subsidiary of Toshiba Corporation had supplied sensitive milling equipment to the Soviet Union allowing it to build quieter propellers for its submarines and thereby evade detection. The Toshiba affair left many Americans wary and concerned for the future of U.S. military-related technology transfer to Japan because of the fear that transferred technology might possibly be obtained by the Soviet Union. Consequently, members of the U.S. Congress demanded a halt to such transfers of technology to Japan . With a view to redress the damage and enhance submarine detection, the Japanese Government agreed to build acoustic surveillance ships jointly with the United States and monitor Soviet submarine activity using towed five-kilometre-long sonar array leased from the United States. Even before the Toshiba scandal had surfaced, the Japanese Government had decided to strengthen existing legislation to protect state secrets. Although mistaken, a not too uncommon perception in the West is that Japan has no anti-spying legislation . Chalmers Johnson, for example, stated that It should be understood that Japan does not have a law against espionage; Soviet officials without diplomatic immunity who

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

73

are caught by the Japanese police simply board an Aeroflot flight to Moscow. 58

The quiet departure of Soviet officials caught for spying may have more to do with political considerations than with the absence of legislation . The existing legislative framework includes the Kokka Komuin Ho, Chiho Komuin Ho, and the Jietai Ho -all of which forbid individuals from divulging secrets that they are privy to under the threat of imprisonment with hard labour for a term not exceeding one year.59 Admittedly the penalties are weak, but the legislative structure is not completely absent. In the revised legislation proposed by the government, stiffer penalties without any maximum upper limit were provided for. Opposition to the proposed bill was great not only within the general public but within the ruling LDP as well. Diet member Tanigaki (LDP), while agreeing with some of the ideas contained in the bill, nevertheless maintained that the people as the sovereign had a right to know.60 There was also opposition to the bill because it was felt that its passage would re-create the authoritarian pre-war situation and because it was a potential threat to human rights. The ambiguous nature of the draft bill also worried the opponents of the legislation. Although it carried harsh penalties, the bill did not specify what constituted state or military secrets; this was left to the discretion of the J DA. 61 As this contained the possibility of abuse, it resembled the secrecy legislation of imperial Japan which left it to the respective ministers of the army and navy active serving officers to determine what was a state secret. The government drafted the bill in 1984 and submitted it to the 102nd ordinary session of the Diet in June 1985. Debate on the bill continued in the 103rd Diet session and when the session of the Diet ended in December 1985, the legislation passed away without any action having been taken. In view of opposition to the proposed secrecy legislation in Japan, the United States has apparently softened its position on the security of military secrets. When a Japanese delegation representing both government and industry visited the United States in April 1986 to investigate SDI co-operation, the U.S. Government accepted the security control measures of the Japanese Government and provided classified briefings for them .62 More importantly, in April 1988, to protect American military technology transferred to Japan, the two governments signed an agreement whereby Japan

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promised to maintain the secrecy of patented American security-related technology. 63 To sum up, therefore, the normalization policies of the Nakasone administration were less than a complete success insofar as success is defined simply as the realization of policy goals. Nakasone was successful in making important progress in overcoming the one per cent ceiling on defence expenditures and in promoting defence cooperation between Japan and the United States, to the extent perhaps of elevating it to the level of a collective security agreement. This last aspect overturned the established governmental policy of prohibiting the export of weapons and weapons-related technology. These were important areas of success but the structural constraints include the prohibition on deployment of troops overseas even as peace keepers for the United Nations, as well as the three non-nuclear principles established in 1968. These two constraints did not emerge as important issues on the Nakasone agenda, the latter perhaps because of a general perception that it was incompatible with the security agreement with the United States and was most likely being violated in any case. The issue where Nakasone was forced to concede defeat was in the proposed anti-spying legislation. This was so because the legislation was widely seen as too draconian and because it failed to strike a balance between the right to know and the necessity of protecting state secrets. But if the purpose of anti-spying legislation was to reassure the United States that a greater integration of the two defence establishments would not compromise U.S. secrets, then it would appear that some of the obstacles have been removed through bilateral agreements. On balance, despite the failure to secure passage of the anti-spying bill, Nakasone must be credited for having made significant progress towards the objective of status normalization, especially when considering the success in abrogating the ceiling on defence expenditure, achieving reciprocity in U.S.-Japan defence arrangements, and widening the scope of collective security.

Notes K. Chuma, " Nihon no Boei Seisaku no Tenkan to Kokusai Josei " [Changes in Japanese defence policy and the international environment]. Kokusai Mandai,

Nakasone and Japanese Defence

2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18

75

no. 312 (March 1986), p. 21. See also, Asahi Shinbun (Yukan), 18 January 1986, p. 1. "Hiyo Futan; Tsuyomaru Atsuryoku" [Burden-sharing: the pressure increases], Yomiuri Shinbun (Chokan), 13 April 1988, p. 1. John Burgess , "Nakasone : A Leader Who Led Too Fast for the Consensus", International Herald Tribune, 9 December 1987, p. 11. B. Cumings, "Power and Plenty in Northeast Asia: The Evolution of U.S. Policy", World Policy Journal5 , no. 1 (Winter 1987-88): 96. H. Otake, Nihon no Boei to Kokunai Seiji: Detente kara Gunkaku e [Japanese defence and domestic politics: from detente to militarization] (Tokyo: Sanichi Shabo, 1983), p. 241 . Herb P. Bix, "The :Japanese Challenge': US-Japan Relations at Mid-Decade", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 17, no. 4 (October-December 1985): 33. T. B. Hayward, "As its Dynamism Grows, an Upgrading of the Structure of the Pacific is Long Overdue", Sea Power 31, no. 1 (January 1988) : 54. K. Chuma, Saigunbi no Sei;igaku [The politics of rearmament] (Tokyo: Chishikisha , 1985), p. 212-13. A. Tokinoya, "The Japan-US Alliance: A Japanese Perspective", Adelphi Papers, No. 212 (Autumn 1986) , p. 7. Y. Nagai, "Beyond Burden Sharing", in U.S.-Japan Relations: Towards a New Eqwlibrium (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1983), p. 17. M. and S. Harries, Sheathing The Sword: The Demilitarisation of Japan (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987), p. 257. A distinction should be made here between militarization and militarism . The latter carries the connotation of an intention of military aggrandizement. R.C. Christopher, The Japanese Mind: The Goliath Explained (New York: Linden Press/ Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 298-99. Takehito Seki, "Nihon no tai-So Seisaku o Kangaeru" [Thoughts on Japanese policies towards the Soviet Union], Sekai, no. 501 (June 1987), p. 142. H. Kimura, "Nissa Kosho: Furukute Atarashi Mandai" [Japan-Soviet negotiations: continuing relevance of an old problem], Kokusai Mandai, no. 313 (April 1986), p. 51. In the period since then there have been conflicting signals given out by Soviet analysts and leaders on the Northern Territories issue. In late 1988, for example, Yevgeni Primakov, Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow, in an interview with a Japanese news agency suggested that the Northern Territories issue should be on the agenda when the Soviet Foreign Minister visited Tokyo later in the year. Later, however, Soviet Vice-President Anatoly Lukyanov, while in Tokyo to attend Emperor Hirohito's funeral, stated that settlement of the territorial dispute should not be a precondition for improving bilateral relations. See JDA, Defense of Japan, 1979, pp. 75-79. I. Buruma, "The Right Argument: Preserving the Past to Reclaim Japanese 'Supremacy'", Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 February 1987, p. 82 . W. Wetherall, "Nakasone Promotes Pride and Prejudice", Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 February 1987, p. 86

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19

Chuma, "Nihon no Boei Seisaku no Tenkan to Kokusai Josei" [Changes in Japanese defence policy and the international environment], p. 23. See Asahi Shinbun IChokan), 24 December 1986, p. 4. See, for example, S. Ushio, "'1% waku' kekkai no 500 nichi" [500 days of resolving the 'one per cent problem']. Chua Karon, April 1987, p. 144. K'. Chuma, "The 1986-90 Defense Plan: Does It Go Too Far?", Japan Quarterly 33 (January-March 1986). Research Institute for Peace and Security (Tokyo), Asian Security 1986 (London : Brassey's Defence Publishers Ltd., 1986), p. 161. Asahi Shinbun (Chokan), 26 December 1986, p. 2. S. Ushio, op. cit., p. 148. Ibid. Asahi Shinbun (Chokan), 31 December 1986, p. 3. Japan Times, 12 January 1987. p. 1. Japan Times, 25 January 1987, p. 1. Ushio, op. cit ., p. 141. Chuma, "Nihon no Boei Seisaku no Tenkan to Kokusai Josei" [Changes in Japanese defence policy and the international environment]. p. 24. K. Ebata, "Ocean Air Defense Japanese Style", Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute 113, no. 3 (March 1987): 100. G. Jacobs, ':Japan Views its Defence Build-up", Asian Defence Journal, August 1986, p. 54. M.E. Weinstein, ':Japan's Defense Policy and the May 1981 Summit", Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 1, no. 1 (March 1982): 27. J. F. Bouchard and J. H. Douglass, "The Japanese Navy and the Sea Lanes Defense", Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute 110, no. 3 (March 1984): 90-91 . Ibid., p. 96. Ebata, op. cit., p. 98. "Kita ni Muita Sen-Kairi Boei" [The southern strategy of 1,000 nautical miles sea-lane defence]. Yomiuri Shinbun (Chokan), 15 April 1988, p. 1. Ibid. J. O'Connell, "Strategic Implications of the Japanese SSM-1 Cruise Missile", Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 6, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 57. C. Johnson, "Reflections on the Dilemma of Japanese Defense", Asian Survey 26, no. 5 (May 1986): 570. "Keizai Taikoku no Boei Ryoku" [The military power of an economic superpower", Part 8, Yomiuri Shinbun (Chokan), 19 April 1988, p. 1. Jane's Defence Weekly 8, no. 4 (10 October 1987): 784-85 . P. Polomka, "The Security of Western Pacific: The Price of Burden Sharing", Survival 26, no. 1 (January/February 1984): 11 .. Chuma, "Nihon no Boei Seisaku no Tenkan to Kokusai Josei" [Changes in Japanese defence policy and the international environment], p. 31. "'Nichi-Bei Kyodo Kenkyu' to 'Jiki Chubo'" ['Joint U.S.-Japan research' and the 'next defence plan']. Jiyu, May 1987, p. 55. Chuma, Saigunbi no Seijigaku [The politics of rearmament]. p. 116. Ibid., pp. 137-38. The JDA Director-General Tanigawa said that the U.S.-Japan

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

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Security Treaty did not obligate Japan to defend U.S. fleets in the open seas but that such a role was within the scope of the JDA in the vicinity of Japan. See Asahi Shinbun (Chokan), 13 February 1983, p. 2. See "China Chooses to go it Alone", ISIS [Institute of Strategic and International Studies] Focus, no. 30 (September 1987), p. 28. Asahi Shinbun (Yukan), 14 January 1983, p. 3. Ibid., p. 1. See "China Chooses to go it Alone", ISIS Focus, no. 30 (September 1987), p. 28. A. Glicksman, "The Reagan Initiative and the Pacific Allies: The View from Japan and Australia", Asian Perspective 10, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 1986): 216. R. Drifte, Arms Production in Japan: The Military Applications of Civilian Technology (Boulder, Colorado and London : Westview Press, 1986), p. 84. Holloway, N. "Barricading Space: The first Star Wars contracts to affect Asia", Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 November 1988, pp. 36-37. S. Sunami, "Nakasone's 'Anti- Espionage Bill' Threatens Human Rights", AMPO Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 19, no. 1 (1987): 34. See Asahi Shinbun (Chokan), 20 May 1987, p. 1. C. Johnson, "Japanese-Soviet Relations in the Early Gorbachev Era", Asian Survey 27, no. 11 (November 1987): 1159. S. Tanigaki, "Warera Jiminto Giin 'Spy Boshi Ho-an' ni Hantai Suru" [We, the LDP Diet members oppose the 'Anti-Spying Bill'], Chua Karon, April 1987. Ibid. A. Fujiwara, Sengoshi to Nihon Gunkaku Shugi [Postwar history and Japanese militarism] (Tokyo: Shin Nippon Shuppan Sha, 1982), p. 135. Drifte, op. cit., p. 86. Straits Times (Singapore), 13 April 1988, p. 2.

IV

Regional Implications of Japan's Defence Buildup

Japan in the Asia-Pacific Region In so far as overcoming the stigma of a unique state has been identified as involving a reduction of the interest-power differential, it would be normal for the regional coLmtries to be apprehensive about the potential use of increased power resou.rces. This is so because of historical reasons and the fear not only of political domination by Japan but also of Japanese militarism . This chapter will attempt to analyse these concerns and the potential for Japan to overcome the burdens of the past. In the discussion so far, the regional variable has been used as a partial explanation for Japan's low defence spending. Japanese policy makers have always been sensitive about the reaction of the regional countries to Japan's military development programmes. With some exceptions, the reactions, generally negative, have either held back defence expansion or been used to rationalize a low defence posture.

Regional Implications of Japan's Defence Buildup

In this chapter, the nature of regional constraint and the regional implications of Japan's new-found readiness to play a more active role will be examined. A caveat must be introduced here on the meaning of activism. It has been argued that Nakasone's defence policies can be understood in terms of the concept of normalizing the state, and that the need for normalization arose as a result of the interest-power differential and the perceived need to be able to protect state interests as well as enhance Japan's international standing. If that is indeed the case, it is possible to envisage situations where Japan might intervene in the region to restore or sustain stability even where such intervention is not desired by the regional countries. However, in this chapter it will be argued that Japanese activism is unlikely to be intrusive. Japan's attempt to narrow the interest-power imbalance should not be interpreted as a willingness to use political power to defend its interests, particularly where other means are available. It is unlikely that the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) will deploy forces in the Gulf region to protect shipping and keep the oil routes open . This, despite the fact that 60 per cent of Japanese oil imports pass through the Straits of Hormuz as opposed to only 7 per cent for the United States. Still, the problem of the interest-power differential remains important with respect to the division of labour within the Western alliance. This division of labour, functional in nature, as in the 1,000-nautical-mile sea-lane defence concept, will inevitably raise the profile of Japan in the region though not necessarily in a threatening manner. This is contingent, of course, on a strict adherence to the principle of division of labour. As such, it will be argued that the normalization of the state in Japan need pose no danger to the regional countries that still harbour some distrust of the Japanese. The problem, however, is one of perceptions . It is not too uncommon to find the view that Japan might one day, again, try to impose its hegemony over the region. There is continuing fear that notions of Japanese supremacy and superiority contained in the ancient chronicles, Nthon Shoki and Kojtki, and which provided the rationale for the development of Japanese militarism could again rear their ugly heads to destroy the post-war framework. The fear of Japanese militarism is particularly strong in the region where it is felt that existing Japanese efforts to boost defence capabilities will eventually result in the revival of militaristic tendencies.

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It is perhaps understandable for scepticism to be voiced about the possibility of eliminating an important factor in the history of modern Japan in a matter of decades, but the significance of postwar changes that have made the danger of resurgent militarism very remote should not be underestimated . Whereas the myths about Japanese superiority have a long history, Japanese militarism was a particular phenomenon of the post-Meiji period and not an unbroken feature of Japanese society and politics. In the pre-war period, the ancient myths provided the emotional content to militarism, but its reality was based more on the structure of the Japanese polity that gave the military an inordinately large influence in policy making. Unlike in the pre-war period when military supremacy within the government was institutionalized, the post-war structure has institutionalized civilian control over the military. The danger of militarism, as such, is more hypothetical than real. In November 1970, novelist Yukio Mishima committed hara kiri (suicide in the samurai spirit of disemboweling and decapitation) in the headquarters of the Ground Forces Eastern Command in the hope of inspiring a return to the martial spirit of nationalism and militarism. As he harangued the crowd gathered below before committing suicide, he only managed to evoke a feeling of disbelief. According to John Emmerson, The failure of Mishima Yukio to inspire the Self-Defense Forces by his dramatic appeal and suicide revealed that the Japan of the 1970's [was] not the Japan of the 1930's.1

A similar sentiment was expressed by Muthiah Alagappa when he suggested that what was happening in Japan was not rampant militarism but rather a waning of pacifism and a resurgence of realism. 2 Nevertheless, several analysts point to "clear" and "conclusive" indications of a rebirth of militarism in Japan . For example, Edwin Hoyt isolated seven separate instances that led him to the conclusion that militarism had again taken hold in Japan. The seven instances include, for instance, the growing practice of singing the national anthem, Kimigayo, in schools. He wrote, None of these seven signs of change, by itself, meant that militarism per se [sic] had returned to Japan . But taken together they clearly indicated the return of a strong patriotic feeling, of nationalism, being instilled in children as it had not been for more than thirty years .3

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This is no more than a convenient equation of nationalism and patriotism with militarism when, in fact, the latter means much more, including a preference for military solutions in a general non-democratic setting . Here, the instance of the textbook scandal of 1982 can also be cited. One Japanese newspaper claimed to have obtained evidence that the Japanese Ministry of Education had decided to conceal Japan's war guilt in revised editions of history textbooks. As the news spread, . .. there were riots in Asian cities; three hundred Korean war veterans marched on the Japanese embassy in Seoul, and Japanese envoys seeking to explain the misunderstanding were refused entry to the country while the South Korean Cabinet met for emergency discussions. China called it a plot to revive militarism, and delivered a formal protest

The Japanese Government, in the end, was forced to apologize publicly but later it was discovered that the original newspaper report had been inaccurate and no such alterations had been made. The entire incident can be seen as a good example of fear generated through ignorance. This is not to suggest, however, that militarism has been completely eradicated in Japan, but simply that it exists only as a minority view and the system of checks is effective enough to prevent its resurgence. To argue otherwise, in effect, heaps scorn on Japanese democracy which, while different from the Anglo-Saxon model, is still based on the will of the people.

Japanese Militarism and Regional Concerns The fear of the regional countries about future Japanese militarism is understandable considering that they had been exposed to its consequences in the past . Their apprehensions of a revival of the past is accentuated by Japan's economic dominance and the feeling that this dominance could, over time, be juxtaposed with military dominance unless ceaseless vigilance continues to be exercised to nip it in the bud . Within Japan too, there is a section of the society that interprets rearmament as the first step towards remilitarization . These are the diehard constitutional loyalists who regard the 1945 Constitution as the only bar to militarism and, consequently, any

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divergence from its strictest interpretation as opening the pathway to creeping militarism in Japanese society. For example, in September 1985 Shuichi Kato suggested that three events of the past summerthe breach of the existing ceiling on defence expenditures; the visit by Prime Minister Nakasone to the Yasukuni Shrine where the war dead (and war criminals) are interred; and the introduction of a draft of the secrecy legislation in the Diet-were a clear indication of a rebirth of militarism in Japan. However, as Chalmers Johnson pointed out with respect to these allegations, the one percent ceiling was not broken; Nakasone was damned if he did and damned if he did not go to Yasukuni, much like the situation President Reagan faced on his visit to the Bitburg military cemetery in Germany in May; and the Official Secrets Law is intended, at least in part, to control flagrant industrial espionage in Japan . . . The idea that these events added up to a militaristic Japan is anything but self-evident. 5

Because of the lingering uneasiness, Japanese dealings with the regional countries of Asia were relatively subdued during much of the post-war period . It was only in 1977 that the then Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda announced the Fukuda Doctrine spelling out Japan's intention to play an active role in the region without, however, becoming a military power. This was the first time that a Japanese Prime Minister had outlined a framework to guide Japan's relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. But even in the period following the Fukuda Doctrine, there was little change in actual policies. Symbols of change were there but it was hard to identify the contents of the change. As a gesture of goodwill, Prime Minister Suzuki, for example, visited the countries of the region before going to the United States and, thus, diverged from established tradition. It symbolized and asserted Japan's identity as an Asian country whereas previously it was often seen as a Western outpost in Asia. The importance of this break with precedence, however, should not be exaggerated as Japan's primary attachment is, and will likely remain, with the United States. The problems facing Japan in the region are, according to Ronald Morse, similar to what the United States confronts in Latin America and what Europe faces with the USSR and the Middle East- negative historical experiences that foster mutual distrust .6 The important question, therefore, is whether the regional countries

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are ready for a more active Japanese role. In the past, they resisted all Japanese attempts to gain influence in the region. Thus, when Japan proposed that the headquarters of the Asian Development Bank be located in Tokyo, the regional countries insisted that it be elsewhere. Perhaps the resentment towards Japan today is less than what it was in the 1960s, but it would be no exaggeration to suggest that past memories still linger and haunt the leaders of the regional countries which militates against the acceptance of a more active Japan. It is unusual for the bitterness to have remained for such a long period and part of the blame for this lies with Japanese political leaders who have not done enough to reassure the r@gional countries. It is understandably worrisome when political leaders in Japan, at times, make statements that seem to downplay Japanese atrocities during the war. Although such individuals in Japan are probably in a minority, their high profile within the government adds to the difficulty of managing relations with the regional countries. Statements that deny the legitimacy of history from individuals like Masayuki Fujio and Seisuke Okuno have become recurrent problems that seem to suggest that Japan, as a whole, is unrepentant of its past policies. As such, from the outside, it appears that as long as there are individuals who do not accept Japan's responsibility for past wrongs, the future may still contain the possibility of such wrongs being committed again. 7 Indeed, this is also the concern of one Japanese analyst, Rokuro Hidaka, who draws a parallel between the pre-war period and the present. He suggests that the militarism of the past could be attributed to "irresponsible" leadership and finds that such individuals, denying Japan's responsibility in the war, have continued to occupy high posts in the government and the LDP in the post-war period. While acknowledging the important difference that public opinion may have supported militarism in the pre-war period unlike in the present, he still felt obliged to warn of a potential danger. 8 However, as mentioned above, there is another important difference between the pre- and post-war systems that should not be ignored, that of structural checks to militarism. The Japanese democracy and the principle of civilian control are important mechanisms preventing a resurgence of military dominance in society. The persistent negative attitude of the regional countries towards Japan may also be partially attributed to the fact that there was little

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that was positive in the post-war relations that could purge and replace the old perceptions and provide a new basis for relations between these countries and Japan. The countries of the region feel that they have been denied any spillover benefits of Japan's economic strength and growth since their entry into the Japanese market has been restricted to primary products even though their exports of manufactured products to other countries have risen markedly. The animosity lingers because of the perception that Japan has not aided these countries' developmental objectives by providing an open market for their manufactured goods. It should be pointed out, however, that the blame does not rest entirely with Japan. For one thing, the regional countries have not taken full advantage of avenues open to them. For example, since the establishment of the Office of Trade Ombudsman (OTO) by the Japanese Government to deal with overseas complaints, the regional countries have made only a few representations to it. Until about the end of 1987 the OTO had dealt with and resolved 339 specific complaints on trade matters. Of this number only 3 had been lodged from Singapore and 1 from Indonesia. This is indicative of a lack of effort and preparation on the part of the regional countries. 9 The concern that is often expressed by the regional Asian countries regarding Japanese military plans has two essential dimensions. The first relates to the fear that remilitarization may be accompanied, perhaps with some time lag, by militarism. Thus, there have been periodic statements of concern from countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) about the rearmament efforts of Japan to pre-empt the possibility of militarism. Here, it is useful to clarify the distinction between the two concepts. Remilitarization refers simply to the buildup of the military establishment and is, of itself, neutral and innocuous, whereas militarism refers to an ideological commitment to the pursuit of military solutions to what are essentially non-military problems. Militarism, as such, is undesirable for stability and peace. However, it should also be pointed out that there is no correlational or causal linkage between militarism and remilitarization. The post-war Occupation authorities tried to eradicate militarism in Japan which was considered to be at the root of Japanese aggression during the Pacific War. But, this was achieved not through the demilitarization of Japan per se but rather through political reforms, including the institutionalization of the principle of civilian control of

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the military. As long as these political and economic structures are firmly entrenched, there seems little reason to be concerned about militarism in Japan, whether or not the government embarks on a remilitarization programme. The second aspect of the concern is the view that a militarily potent Japan will become more independent of the United States. Thus, according to Masashi Nishihara, In fact , when certain Southeast Asian leaders, such as Presidents Suharto and Ferdinand Marcos, warned about a Japanese " military buildup," commentators suggested that their true purpose was to persuade the United States to retain and restore its military presence in South east Asia . 10

President Richard Nixon's Guam Doctrine (1969) pointed to a future U.S. disengagement from Asia. In the post-Vietnam period the regional countries were particularly worried that the U.S. interest in Southeast Asia had "dropped virtually to zero ___ " . 11 Indeed, even within the United States, the likelihood of isolationism was frequently discussed as a logical reaction to the preceding years of U.S. globalism . This was also considered historically inevitable given the past pattern of recurring cycles of globalism and isolationism in U.S. foreign policy. The fears of some of the regional countries were exacerbated by President Carter's decision, reversed later, to withdraw ground forces from the Korean peninsula. It must have been reassuring to the Southeast Asian leaders when the Reagan administration initiated a major buildup of the military forces including those in the Asia-Pacific region . It is now highly unlikely that the United States will withdraw from the region and allow the Soviet influence to grow. It is perhaps ironical but the Soviet presence in Vietnam probably serves as a guarantee of U.S. commitment in the region given the nature of the superpower conflict. On the negative side of the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay is the increased Japanese perception of a Soviet threat and a stimulus to its military buildup as the Soviet Pacific Fleet, for the first time in history, sits astride the South China oil routes . 12 The non-communist regional countries also tend to view U.S. presence in the region as a check on Japanese militarism . This would imply that as long as the U.S.-Japanese alliance remained intact, the possibility of Japanese militarism would remain small . However, these countries are not sure how stable the alliance will prove to be once

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Japan is strongly armed. Related to this is the feeling that as long as the United States remains committed to the Asia-Pacific region, Japanese defence buildup would be accepted even if reluctantly. It is natural, therefore, to find increased concern about Japanese militarism whenever the perception of imminent U.S. withdrawal from the region is strong, as for example, when President Carter announced troop withdrawals from the Republic of Korea . It is not that the regional countries would prefer that Japan not play a major role in the region but they would like to see this role within the framework of a U.S. presence in the region . They do not wish to see Japan supplanting the United States but would be willing to accept a supplementary, supportive role for Japan.

Japan's Regional Role As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is not the Japanese intention to supplant the United States and, indeed, during the 1980s, Japan actively sought to strengthen its alliance relationship with that country. This was partly the result of regional constraints, and Japanese political leaders are aware of the dangers of ignoring the external factors. They are well aware that a foreign policy that defies objective conditions is not likely to have much success, but the difficulty is that the various external factors are not always easy to reconcile. Japan hopes to allay the fears of the regional countries that it will develop as a major military power; at the same time, however, the United States has openly pressed Japan to play a more active role in the region and relieve some of the burdens on the United States which it now finds difficult to bear given the relative economic decline. Obviously, a balance is necessary between the appropriate Japanese capability and U.S. presence in the region, and the extent to which Japan can supplement the United States without actually supplanting it . The regional countries of Southeast Asia, at the moment, do not want a situation where Japan's military capabilities are developed to such an extent as to allow the U.S. presence to be markedly reduced . Japan has, so far, found U.S. pressure difficult to resist because of its overall dependence on the United States and because of its interest in preserving the alliance relationship. Emphasizing the alliance

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commitment provided a justification for both the defence buildup and the reform of some specific superstructural features. It is not, however, a political expedient to be done away with once the defence goals have been achieved . Prime Minister Nakasone, considered a strong advocate of a remilitarized Japan, never suggested that Japan should acquire an independent defence capability. The objective realities are such that it is inconceivable for Japan to maintain or achieve an independent defence capability which, in turn, necessitates the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The maintenance of a strong alliance relationship between Japan and the United States works to reassure the countries of the region that history will not repeat itself. From their point of view, the most worrisome prospect is the 1,000-nautical-mile sea-lane defence concept and the prospect that it might initiate a process leading to the development of an autonomous defence capability for Japan . So much was the concern that Presidents Soeharto and Marcos travelled to Washington in the fall of 1982 "to express their reservations with a vehemence that surprised American officials". 13 When Prime Minister Nakasone visited the ASEAN countries in early 1983 he was pressed to clarify the Japanese concept of sea lane defence. He assured the leaders of the regional countries that the sea-lane defence concept did not stretch into Southeast Asian waters . According to Michael Leifer, ... there has not been any sign that Japan, with so much tanker traffic at risk, has deemed it practical to contemplate a projection of naval power beyond a 1,000-nautical mileperimeter measured from Tokyo ... 14

Japan's main interest in Southeast Asia is in ensuring its security. This region straddles Japan's important trade routes and is also important in its own right as a major source of industrial raw materials. Furthermore, Japanese direct investments in the region are quite substantial and stability is obviously important to safeguard these investments. In maintaining this stability, Japan sees an important role for ASEAN which explains its willingness to support the general foreign policy objectives of the ASEAN countries . If there is a region in which Japan has direct security interests it is Northeast Asia, particularly the Korean peninsula, for reasons of propinquity and the fact that this peninsula is like a dagger pointing

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at the heart of Japan . As such , Japanese interests have, in modern times, been to prevent a hostile power from entrenching itself on the peninsula, as was the case during the Russo-Japanese War at the turn of this century. But in the post-war period, Japan only reluctantly agreed to acknowledge its security interests when pressed to do so by South Korea . In 1981, the government of South Korea demanded a payment of US$6 billion from the Japanese Government as compensation for the South Korean military effort which indirectly benefited Japanese commercial interests by preserving stability on the peninsula. Japan's initial response was to reject the demand but Prime Minister Nakasone later agreed to a payment of US$4 billion over a seven-year period. This loan and credit package was agreed upon after intense behind-the -scene pressure on Japan by the United States, presumably on grounds that Japan should share the burden of regional stability. In announcing the aid package, Nakasone stated that he appreciated the South Korean defence efforts which contributed to peace and stability and that maintenance of pea ce on the Korean peninsula [was) imperative for the peace and stability of East Asia, including Japan. 15

In a similar way, recent interest in a min i-Marshall plan for the Philippines in which Japan wou.ld play a key part may be interpreted as part of a similar U.S. plan to force Japan into a larger security role in the region and offset the cost of U.S. commitments there. As such, the protestations of the countries involved that the Marshall Plan concept had no linkage to the ongoing negotiations on the future status of U.S. bases in the Philippines might have simply been a public affairs exercise aimed at maintaining the fig leaf of separation between security and economic issues.16 It is reported that the U.S. President and Japanese Prime Minister exchanged notes in early March 1988 dealing specifically with the Philippine problem and that the U.S. concern was also reiterated when Under Secretary of State Gaston Sigur visited Tokyo in April 1988.17 With the Philippines' de'mand for compensation vastly in excess of current base payments and with reduced U.S. ability to pay, attention has naturally turned to the regional ally that is seen as able to subsidize the U.S. policy of containing the Soviet Union. It would be no exaggeration to suggest that the United States has no intention of allowing the Philippines to take the same route that Spain took when it forced the United States

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to withdraw its F-16 fighter aircraft from Spain. The main stumbling block for the United States in the Philippines is the issue of financial compensation for which it hopes to obtain support from Japan. The issue of an economic development fund, a "Marshall Plan", is not unrelated to Japan's national interest in so far as it is likely to create conditions for political stability in the Philippines. Political stability would secure foreign investment there and, just like the original Marshall Plan for Europe, would also be very important in staving off the communist challenge to the Philippine Government. Japan, however, would not want to be identified as strongly anti -communist since it must coexist with the communist bloc countries in the region. If the Plan is implemented, it will fall within the acceptable Japanese role to ensure regional stability, that is, the use of monies to shore up a favourable regime rather than overt or covert involvement in domestic politics, which would be both unconstitutional in Japan and regionally unacceptable. The use of money for political ends has been defined as the concept of "strategic aid" . 18 It is no surprise that Japan has scrupulously avoided any direct involvement in the domestic politics of any of the regional countries, even when human rights violations are concerned, say for example, in the Philippines or South Korea . Japan is cognizant that its regional interests are best served by economic development in the region, which explains its important role in the establishment of the Asian Development Bank and the fact that the bulk of Japanese foreign developmental assistance is given to countries of the region. The pressure on Japan to assume a greater responsibility for regional stability and order is not a recent innovation of U.S. foreign policy. It has been a standing objective since the end of World War II. In the early post-war period, Dean Acheson wanted Japan restored as a second rank regional power, constrained by the United States but free to dominate its historic territory. George Kennan agreed with this objective but he also wanted Japan to develop the capacity to resist the Soviets which would "establish a balance of power such as had existed at the turn of the century, and would avoid needless waste of American lives and wealth" .19 This may have been the intent but the actual development of post-war international relations, however, was very different. Unlike West Germany, Japan found itself isolated from the region and reinvolvement did not begin in earnest till after the late 1960s when the various ASEAN countries

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adopted a policy of welcoming foreign investment to facilitate their export-oriented growth strategy. Japan as the major Asian economic power stood to benefit from this policy change. By around the mid1970s, the volume of Japanese investment in Indonesia, Thailand , and Malaysia had surpassed that of the United States. Because maritime transport is crucial to Japan's economic survival85 per cent of its exports in 1983 were sea borne-sea lane defence is extremely important to the Japanese. Yet a 1,000-nautical-mi le sea lane defence is no firm assurance against maritime disruptions and reflects more the burden-sharing between the United States and Japan and a strengthening of the alliance ties. Supplementing the Japanese area of responsibility, the United States indicated in March 1982 that it would do as much as was necessary to ensure the safety of the Pa cific -Indian Ocean sea lanes 20 As a further indication that the alliance relationship is in no immediate danger of dissolution, the Japanese Government announced that instead of developing its own next generation fighter aircraft, it would co-operate with the United States and opt for joint production, possibly a variant of the General Dynamics F-16 . According to Fred Greene, while this had definite advantages to the United States it would also maintain the "bilateral security framework that so many of Japan's neighbours deem vital to their own security vis-a-vis Japan" 21 Another commonly expressed fear of the regional countries is that Japan might add ". military muscle to its economic domination 22 of the region". The concern about economic domination goes back to the early 1970s. As the Far Eastern Economic Review in 1971 commented, the regional countries cannot help wonder, "Wi ll Japan be content with trade alone?" 23 The leve l of concern can be fathomed from the fact that the Thai National Student Centre, in 1972, launched a ten-day boycott of Japanese products to "make the Thais realize the danger of the Japanese economic domination of their country". 24 This was repeated again in 1974 when Prime Minister Tanaka visited the Southeast Asian countries. While Japanese economic domination of the region is an undisputed fact and perhaps inevitable, it must be pointed out that it has not been altogether unwelcome as most of the regional countries offer generous foreign investment terms to invite foreign capita l. Japan has merely taken advantage of an aggressive marketing campaign pursued by these countries and the success of their marketing strategy

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should not also be used to heap blame on Japan for dominating the region economically. At the same time the important changes taking place in the economic relations between Japan and the other Asian countries cannot be ignored. As a result of the rapid revaluation of the yen since 1986 and a greater sense of responsibility to the stability of the global liberal trade regime, the Japanese Government is actively pursuing a policy of enhancing the level of regional interdependence through a division of labour. This will no doubt be beneficial to the regional countries since it will give them access to the lucrative Japanese market from which they had been largely shut out in the past . As these positive measures begin to gain in importance, it can be expected that the feeling of hostility towards Japan will abate. The fear of militarism is also unfounded because the structural checks introduced in the post-war period make the Japanese polity sufficiently different from the pre-war model. The Japanese political system contains built-in checks and balances, like for instance civilian control of the military, to prevent a recurrence of the past. It is unlikely, therefore, that the age of Japanese militarism will repeat itself. Of course, these structural checks have never been put to test, which partly explains the view that it would be safer if they did not have to be put to test at all. Even Japanese scholars appear unsure of the resilience of post-war structural reforms and fear that democracy might fall victim to a rightist assault . This, however, cannot be an a priori argument against defence expansion since there is no reason to assume that militarization will inevitably lead to militarism. Since the interest-power differential has been the central framework for analysis in this book, an explanation of how the resolution of this discrepancy might affect the regional countries is called for, in particular, whether the acquisition of military power to supplement economic power will translate into domination, both military and economic. However, as already suggested, it is not at all certain that Japan will acquire vastly expanded military power and, furthermore, just as its economic power is intricately bound up with the economic vitality of the United States, its military power is also likely to be within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, restricting the scope for autonomous and independent action. At the same time, it is by no means true that all regional countries are equally opposed to the Japanese defence buildup. While Indonesian President Soeharto expressed concern, the Malaysian Prime

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Minister Mahathir appeared ready to accept the assurances given by the Japanese during his visit to Japan in 1983 that the Japanese defence buildup was for purely defensive purposes and not an indication of the countrys desire to become a military power. 25 The objectives of the Japanese Government are to enhance its standing in the region and .play a more active role but as a part of the region rather than as an external power. Japan has carefully avoided involvement in the internal affairs of any of the regional countries unlike the other Western countries which have, at one time or another, sought to influence domestic politics. Thus, it was not surprising that Japan adopted a hands-off policy during the 1986 Philippine uprising, being careful not to appear as leaning to any one side. If there is to be an increased Japanese role in the region it will be based on its interest in maintaining peace and stability there, given that the region is a complex mix of different ideologies and latent and overt hostilities. In this respect it is likely to take the shape of promoting dialogue and understanding between the various countries rather than as intrusive involvement . For example, the South Korean President Roh Tae Woo expressed his desire to the Japanese Prime Minister to improve relations with the Peoples Republic of China and urged the latter to explore the possibilities. As a "facilitator", Toru Yano suggested that Japan had the useful function of conveying the peaceful intentions of the ASEAN countries to the Indochinese side. It can also keep ASEAN apprised of the true intentions and inward-looking tendencies of the Indochinese nations, thereby allaying needless tension in both blocs. 26

The Japanese have also been careful in maintaining a wide range of linkages, formal and informal, within the region. Despite ASEAN opposition, Japan does allow some trade with the Vietnamese regime in the hope of securing stability for Thailand and in an attempt to reduce Vietnamese dependence on the Soviet UnionY Based on the same logic Japan even maintains informal links with the North Korean Government since ". . . it exposes North Korean leaders to the attractions and merits of the industrial achievements and political freedoms of the West". 28 All this is justified by the need to preserve regional harmony and stability and minimize the possibility of regional tensions assuming crisis proportions. Trade and strategic aid are two policy instruments used by Japan to promote regional stability and

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lower tensions. Thus, it appears that Japan's main political tools in the area are non-military and economic in nature. As long as there is no change in this, Japanese defence buildup need pose no immediate challenge to the regional countries of Asia.

Notes

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11

12

13 14 15

16

J. K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power:. The Japanese Dilemma (New York: Dunellen Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 398. Muthiah Alagappa, "Japan's Political and Security Role in the Asia-Pacific Region", Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, no. 1 (June 1988): 25ff. E. P. Hoyt, The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WW II (New York: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1985), p. 134. M. and S. Harries, Sheathing The Sword: The Demilitarisation of Japan (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987), p. 265. Chalmers Johnson, "Reflections on the Dilemma of Japanese Defense", Asian Survey 26, no. 5 (May 1986): 558-59. R.A. Morse, "Japan's Search for an Independent Foreign Policy: An American Perspective", Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 3, no. 2 !Summer 1984): 37. See for example, Kwan Weng Kin, "Japan Must Act Fast Against Provocative Politicians", Sunday Times (Singapore), May 1988, p. 16. Rokuro Hidaka, "'Heiwa' to 'Hanei' o Kangaeru" [Thinking about peace and prosperity], Sekai, no. 521, November 1988, p. 23. S. Miyachi, "Nihon Shijo e no Ajia no Kujo to Chumoku" [The Japanese market attracts Asian attention and criticism], Chua Karon, May 1988, p. 133. M. Nishihara, "Japan: Regional Stability", in Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region, edited by J.W. Morley (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1986), p. 83. Toru Yano, "The 'Fukuda Doctrine' and its Implications for Southeast Asia: A Japanese Perspective", in Southeast Asian Affairs, 1978 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978), p. 61. W.T. Tow, "Japan: Security Role and Continuing Policy Debates", in AsianPacific Security: Emerging Challenges and Responses, edited by Y.W. Kihl and L.E. Grinter (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986). C. E. Morrison, "Japans Politico-Security Roles in Southeast Asia", Foreign Relations Journal 2, no. 2 (August 1987): 99. M. Leifer, "The Security of Sea-lanes in Southeast Asia", Survival 25, no. 1 (January/ February 1983): 99. Nishihara, op. cit., p. 78. See also, B. Cumings, "Power and Plenty in Northeast Asia: The Evolution of U.S. Policy", World Policy Journal 5, no. 1 (Winter 1987 -88): 81; 95-96. U.S. Defence Secretary Frank Carlucci, however, explicitly. linked aid to security when he suggested that Japan should increase aid to countries like the Philipwhose political and economic health pines, Afghanistan, and so forth "

94

17 18

19

20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Chapter Four is vital to our collective security". This statement did not please Japanese foreign ministry officials because the issue was not only sensitive within Japan but also because the countries receiving aid would have liked to, at least superficially, keep the two issues separate. See The Wall Street Journal, 10 June 1988, p. 20. Yomiuri Shinbun (Chokan), 13 April 1988, p. 1. See D.T. Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Atd and Japanese Foreign Policy (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexi ngton Books , D.C . Heath and Company, 1986). Cumings, op. cit., p. 86. Others, however, assert that the U.S. policy was to isolate Japan from the region . Thus, according to Shibusawa, "The policy of the Allied powers at the time was to deny Japan any involvement in Continental Asia and rather to let it live in virtual isolation". See M. Shibusawa, "Japan and its Region", Asia Pacific Community, no. 29 (Summer 1985), p. 31. T. Akaha, "Japan's Response to Threats of Shipping Disruptions in Southeast Asia and the Middle East", Pacific Affairs 59, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 268. F. Greene, "The United States and Asia in 1987: Progress Brings Problems", Asian Survey 28, no. 1 (January 1988): 15. As further evidence of burden-sharing between the two countries, Japan expects to raise its contribution over the coming years from 30 to 50 per cent of the costs of U.S. forces in Japan, mostly for rent and other land-related expenses. This statement is attributed to the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew. See Bangkok Post, 16 December 1987, p. 1. Quoted in I. Isenberg, ed., Japan: Asian Power (New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1971), p. 134. M. Shibusawa, Japan and the Asian Pacific Region: Profile of Change (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 73. See International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Survey, 1982-1983 (London: IISS, Spring 1983) . Yano, op. cit , p. 63. Tow, op. cit., p. 140. Nishihara, op. cit., p. 77. According to Yasutomo, it is not unlikely that the Japanese populace might sanction aid to the Indo-Chinese countries if such an aid plan were " .. . presented as part of a peace diplomacy aimed at reducing international tension s". See Yasutomo, op. cit., p. 116.

v Conclusion

In this concluding chapter, some further observations will be made on how "normalization" of the state might be explained. Insofar as normalizing the state was a policy objective of the Nakasone administration, it represented a departure from earlier practices that more or less accepted, as given, the status of Japan as a unique country. At the same time, Nakasone was also building on the groundwork laid by his predecessors. Accordingly therefore, Nakasone's policies were both an extension of the past and, yet, suffic iently different to justify a new label. The emphasis on normalization was an inevitable reaction to the post-war politics and the need to rehabilitate Japan in the international state system and purge the persisting wartime guilt. The question, however, is not simply one of Japan's wartime guilt or innocence but rather how the country could use its economic strength and vitality

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to assume a more responsible role in the international system. It was argued that Japan's uniqueness, based to a large extent on its wartime guilt, had become a constraint to the development of a political role. Thus, Nakasone explained his policies as an attempt to settle post-war accounts. Normalization was also a nationalistic reaction to the perceived humiliation suffered by Japan in post-war international politics. There were a number of instances where Japan felt slighted when it was denied a say in international affairs despite its economic strength. Consequently, for a state aspiring to play a role in the international system, the task of normalizing a unique status became a natural agenda for action . In all this, however, Nakasone's own role cannot be overlooked. He began his own political career on a strongly nat.ionalist platform at a time when nationalism appeared to have been discarded as a bankrupt political philosophy. Whether someone else in his position would have acted in the same manner is, although conjectural, rather unlikely. His successor, Takeshita Noboru, was regarded as being in the traditional mould of Japanese leaders, emphasizing a consensual pattern of decision making whereas Nakasone would often exceed the parameters of existing consensus in the hope that consensus would follow. To generalize, Takeshita was more of a consensus taker while Nakasone was a consensus leader. In so far as normalization was an inevitable reaction to a unique status, it reflected the common political phenomena of reinterpreting the wisdom of the existing state of affairs. This was the case with the revisionist explanations of the Cold War and similarly, in the case of Japan, Nakasone sought to revise the "postwar solution" because of its punitive nature. It is interesting to compare Japan's position at the end of World War II with that of France after the Napoleonic Wars. Although Napoleon was defeated, France was readily rehabilitated into the Concert of Europe without any wartime guilt. On the other hand, the settlement imposed on Japan in the post-war period denied it equal membership in the international state system. Where France at the end of the Napoleonic Wars was a normal state, Japan at the end of World War II became a unique state. It cannot be denied that the Japanese experiment was a noble attempt, but the failure of this experiment, as it was indeed bound to fail in the context of the Cold War, itself became the seed for the later revisionism.

Conclusion

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It is understandable that the revisionism has engendered concern in the regional countries that it reflects a pendulum swing to the militaristic past. It is feared that this revisionism might ultimately result in the co llapse of democratic Japan much as the Weimar Republic could not withstand the onslaught of the Nazi Party. Essentially, the danger for contemporary Japan is that the shift to the right within the Japanese society which was used to aid the normalization policies of the Nakasone administration might become an uncontrollable onslaught sweeping away the structure of democracy and civilian control in Japan. For the doomsayers, this is not merely a possibility but a creeping reality. They point to the events surrounding the recent and prolonged illness of Emperor Hirohito as the basis of their concern, particularly the god-like veneration this had seemingly re-awakened in Japan for the Emperor and the imperial system. It was interpreted by the doomsayers as an early warning that the past had not become entirely irrelevant and that the danger of a backslide was real. In the lengthy period of the Emperor's illness an aura of mourning pervaded the society as the country prepared for the imminent demise of the longreigning monarch, bringing to end a troublesome era in Japanese history. What was worrisome was the way the palace authorities tried to shroud the Emperor's illness in secrecy as if it was not a proper topic for discussion by the general public, and the way the mass media elevated the Emperor to a godly status. The media imposed strict self-censorship, not allowing any criticism of the emperor system or of his role and responsibility during World War II. For those already troubled by the rightward drift of the Japanese society, the recent turn of events seemed to be ample indication of a society rapidly hurtling towards an unpleasant future. On the other hand, it could be argued that the prolonged nature of the Emperor's illness was, however ironical, a blessing that helped purge the nation of the last remaining sentiments of the old order. There was no doubt that the passing of the Emperor would reflect the passing of an important period in Japanese history, but the extended duration of the transitional phase provided time for reflection and a sober assessment of the situation . The extended transitional phase, in fact, helped to dissipate and dilute the effect of the transition. Shortly after the death of Emperor Hirohito, The Economist (London) made the following observation:

98

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Emperor Hirohito rendered one last service to his people. He lingered on his deathbed for four months . An immense outpouring of grief was spent within a couple of weeks of his falling seriously ill on September 19th [1988] . By the time he succumbed to stomach cancer on January 7th, Japan was no longer in mourning. Instead, it was looking forward to a new era, and relieved that it could at last put behind it the turbulent old one.'

Furthermore, to those who are fearful that Japan's military pro gramme may run haywire, it could be pointed out that the process of normalizing the state in Japan has been conducted within the framework of an alliance with the United States . If there is any danger at all, it lies in the event Japan decides to go it alone and follow the Gaullist principle, but this is a very remote possibility. The process has been carried out, not only in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but also in conjunction with the internationalization of the economy. This latter policy objective has emphasized the dependence of Japan on a stable pattern of international relations and the necessary internationalist policies, on its part, to contribute to that stability. It is unlikely that Japan will want to upset this stability. Nor should it be ignored that it is not only the regional countries that wish to ensure that the past is not repeated . Japan, too, came out of World War II convinced that militarism was not a real option and could only hurt the country's long-term economic prospects. Moreover, the structure of democracy in Japan and civilian control of the military minimizes the chances of an extreme shift in Japanese politics. Despite the fact that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been in power since the mid -1950s when it was formed, it has not been able to ignore public opinion. Its electoral successes reflect the success of its policies but, often, public opinion has rapidly coalesced to defeat unpopular policy initiatives. Accordingly therefore, it is argued here that the fear of militarism or the more extreme argument that militarism has already re-established itself in Japan may be based more on irrational emotionalism than on sound analysis. Finally, the likelihood that Nakasone's policy direction will, in fact, be maintained by his successors needs to be considered. It has been stated that Nakasone sought to revise the Yoshida legacy that separated political and economic issues and focused primarily on the latter. The importance of this legacy in the post-war period was that Yoshida's successors, such as Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato, chose

Conclusion

99

to carry it through and extend its basic framework. Even the notion of Comprehensive Security could be regarded as falling broadly within the ambit of the Yoshida legacy. The ultimate success of normalization policies will similarly depend on whether or not Nakasone's successors show the same commitment to build on it. Nakasone did not try to replace the emphasis on economic issues with defence and political concerns, but rather to achieve some form of balance between the two. His administration was responsible for bringing in new and major initiatives in both Japan's foreign economic relations and defence policies. The important question is whether these changes will be adhered to or abandoned by his successors. It is perhaps too early to give a definitive answer but, as would be expected, there are still supporters of the Yoshida legacy within the ruling LDP. One of the so-called "new leaders", Kiichi Miyazawa, stated in an interview in 1980 that the Constitution makes Japan "a special state" (tokushu kokka), and that there is no other option available. He went on to say that "All we can do when we are hit on the head is pull back. We watch the world situation and follow the trends." 2 Miyazawa was one of the contenders to succeed Nakasone but it was Noboru Takeshita who eventually triumphed. Under Takeshita there was no change in policy direction and, in a statement reminiscent of his predecessor, Nakasone, he suggested that even if there was a relaxation of tensions between the two opposing blocs, there could be no change to the fundamental principle that world peace was based on military balance and that Japan would push ahead with its ongoing defence buildup 3 This suggests that the new direction initiated by Nakasone is not an aberration but likely to be a sustained policy shift. There may be setbacks and other periods of slow progress but, over the long term, future governments in Japan will probably maintain the policy objective of normalization simply because it more accurately reflects the realities of Japan in the contemporary period.

Notes 1 2

The Economist, 14 January 1989, p. 25. SeeK B. Pyle, "Changing Conceptions of Japan's International Role", in Japan

100

3

Chapter Five and the Pacific Quadrille: The Major Powers in East Asia, edited by H.J. Ellison (Boulder, Colorado and London: Westview Press, 1987), p. 202. Mainichi Shinbun (Yukan), 29 May 1989, p. 1.

Glossary

AEW ASDF ASW BPND GSDF JDA LDP LIEO MFA MOF MSDF MTDPE NDPO OTH

Airborne Early Warning aircraft Air Self-Defence Force Anti -submarine warfare Basic Policy for National Defence Ground Self-Defence Force Japanese Defence Agency Liberal Democratic Party Liberal international economic order Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Finance Maritime Self-Defence Force Mid-Term Defence Program Estimate National Defence Program Outline Over-the-horizon radar

Glossary

102

SDF SDI

Self-Defence Forces Strategic Defence Initiative

Note on Japanese Names:

Japanese names in the text appear in the order of personal name followed by family name.

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Weinstein, M .E. Japan 's Postwar Defense Policy, 7947-7968. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971 . ___ . "Japan's Defense Policy and the May 1981 Summit" . Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 1, no. 1 (March 1982): 23-33. Welch , C. E., ed . Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1976. Wetherall, William . "Nakasone Promotes Pride and Prejudice" . Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 February 1987. Yamakage, S. Japanese-American Relations and Comprehensive Security. Tokyo : World Economic Information Services, 1986. Yano, Toru. " The ' Fukuda Doctrine' and its Implications for Southeast Asia : A Japanese Perspective" . In Southeast Asian Affairs, 7978. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978. Yomiuri Shinbun (Chokan), 13 April 1988. Yasutomo, D.T. The Manner of Giving Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1986.

Index

Acheson, Dean, 89 ANZUS, 14 Armitage, Richard, 65 Basic Policy for National Defence, 30 Bix, Herb, 48 Brown, Harold, 36 Burgess, John, 47 Buzan, Barry, 27 Calder, Kent, 10 Carter, Jimmy, 35, 85, 86 Christopher, Robert C., 50 Chuma, Kiyofuku, 18, 48, 56 Comprehensive National Security Study Group, 38ff, 54, 99

Constitution (Japan), 13, 25ff, 30, 48, 66, 68, 81 and political normalization, 9 and post-war politics, 2 and Self-Defence Forces, 25 Article 9, 2, 3, 27, 39 revision, 26, 48 Dore, Ronald, 18 Dulles, John Foster, 29 Emmerson, John, 80 Fujiwara, Akira, 13 Fukuda, Takeo, 4, 56 Doctrine, 82

773

Index Gorbachev, Mikhail, 51 Gotoda, Masaru, 60 Gromyko, Andre, 16 Guam/Nixon Doctrine, 35, 85 Haas, Michael, 17 Hellmann, Donald, 37 Hidaka, Rokuro, 83 Hogen, Shinsaku, 37 Hoyt, Edwin, 80 Japan interest-power differentiaf, 9, 10 normal/ordinary state, 8, 11, 26, 53, 95, 96 Northern Territories dispute, 36, 50 peace country, 8 political normalization, 8- 9, 15ff, 25, 79 unique/special state, 3, 7, 9, 11, 18, 78, 96, 99 Japanese Defence anti-spying legislation, 71ff expenditure, 25, 32, 46, 47, 59, 61 free ride, 13, 15, 46 one per cent ceiling, 42, 52, 54ft MTDPE, 41, 42, 55-57, 60, 63, 66 NDPO, 32, 33, 36, 41, 42, 46, 51, 52, 56, 57 remilitarization/rearmament, 4, 14, 29, 61, 87 threat perceptions, 6, 8, 35ft, 85 Three Arrows Plan, 39 Johnson, Chalmers, 13, 72, 82

MacArthur, General Douglas, 4, 49 Mansfield, Mike, 18 Militarism-Japan, 3, 13, 53, 78ft, 81ff, 91, 98 Miyazawa, Kiichi, 60, 99 Momoi, Makoto, 4 Morley, James, 14 Morse, Ronald, 82 Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 3, 7, 8, 11, 15, 17, 50, 51' 53, 58, 88, 96 achievements, 18, 20, 21, 47, 48, 99 presidential Prime Minister, 19 Ron-Yasu dialogue, 18 visit to the United States, 70 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, 47, 82 National Defence Council, 30, 55 Nishihara, Masashi, 85 Nixon/Guam Doctrine, 35, 85 O'Connell, John, 66 Police Reserve Force, 28, 29 Roh Tae Woo, 92 Sakata, Michita, 33 Sa to, Eisaku, 16, 50, 51, 98 Seki, Takehito, 50 Shibusawa, Masahide, 15 Sigur, Gaston, 88 Strategic Defence Initiative, 70, 71, 73 Suzuki, Zenko, 41, 48, 49, 56, 58, 60, 64, 82 Tanaka, Kakuei, 28, 51

Kaihara, Osamu, 6 Kanamori, Tokujiro, 2 Kanemaru, Shin, 55 Keal, Paul, 38 Kimura, Hiroshi, 17 Kindleberger, Charles, 11 Kishi, Nobusuke, 34 Kurihara, Yuko, 65 . Leifer, Michael, 87

U.S.-Japan alliance, 33, 48, 49ft, 86, 87, 90 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 14, 27, 29, 33, 34, 35, 39, 54, 70 Wetherall, William, 53 Weinberger, Caspar, 41, 68, 70 Weinstein, Martin, 64 Yamashita, Ganri, 36

The Author S. Javed Maswood is a lecturer in the division of Asian and International Studies, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia . He teaches international relations and political economy, and Japanese politics and foreign policy. He is the author of Japan and Protection (1989).