Islam and Malay Nationalism: A case study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand 9743350896

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Islam and Malay Nationalism : A case study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand

ISLAM AND MALAY NATIONALISM: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims Southern

of

Thailand

Surin Pitsuwan

J

Thai Khadi Research Institute Ihammasat

University

1985 ISBN 974-335-089-6

150 BAHT

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

As to those who believe And work righteous deeds, They have, for their entertainment, The Gardens of Paradise, Wherein they shall dwell (For aye) : no change Will they wish for from them. Say: "If the ocean were Ink (wherewith to write out) The words of my Lord, Sooner would the ocean be Exhausted than would the words Of my Lord, even if we Added another ocean Like it, for its aid."

1

Say: "I am but a man Like yourselves, (but) The inspiration has come To me, that your God is One God: whoever expects To meet his Lord, let him Work righteousness, and. In the worship o f his Lord, Admit .no one as partner. (Qur’an XVIII: 107-110, translated by A. Yusuf All)

t

MY GRANDFATHER

HAJJI YA C QUB BIN

C

ABD AL-RA''UF

1900-1973

He admonished m e , upon embarking on my Harvard i career to read Sura al-Kahfi for guidance and '£ ♦ inspiration. During my long Harvard career r with many interruptions,

I had many occasions

’to heed his admonition. I

c

Abdul Halim

Bin *isma c Il

June 1982

FOREWORD

This thesis the Malay-Muslims important

on Islam and Malay Nationalism: of Southern

Thailand,

is unigue

A Case Study of in at least two

First, it has gone far beyond a mere description v of local revolt’s and rebellions against the central authorities. During

respects.

the past decade,

of such political government studies

there has already appeared a series

events

reforms

somehow remain

and identities

actions.

The thesis

characteristically attempts

associated presented

thus breaks *a new ground Secondly, academic with

context sense

of obligation

otherwise.

scholarship dealing

with sensitive

particular

the cultural

regional

a measure

and research.

himself who, on top of well-chosen manages

to provide

of Islam within

of Southern

reflection

studies

and

the readers

the socio-political

Thailand.

There

is a strong

It would have been so unusual all along with a calm,

and analysis.

Objectivity

of moral courage,

and emotion-provoking

issues

and

especially such

in

as this

one.

Rights

Development

the thesis basically ships.

into

the gap and

Part of the thesis was presented on Human

deeper

help fill

and involvement.

is in itself

and few, if

here should

knowledge

and scholarly

All the

movements

And yet the whole' study proceeds

objective

integration.

political

training,

of the Malay-Muslims

the

with those

it is the author

insightful

V * S launching

historical

to penetrate

for further

and intellectual

a highly

King Rama

and the,'policy of national

any, have made specific roots

following

of studies

in Thailand.

stands

Quite apart from

in the August 1983 This should

explain where

in the matter of socio-cultural

academic

workshop

relation-

value, it is to be hoped that

all

the approach

could contribute

inquiry

reformolution concerned. brands

and reality

something

of appropriate

to rethinking

and

policy and action by all parties could be free from all

with which we have for so long been

and out of which, unfortunately, solution

positive

then, the whole issue

Perhaps,

of extremism

out of thip piece of scholarly

brought

no constructive

too familiar,

and peaceful

is possible.

» «

Saneh

Chamarik

March 1985

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have Been completed' had it not been for the contribution and assistance, intellectual and otherwise, of innumerable individuals. Although all’ of them cannot be acknowledged here, my sin-

1

cere appreciation for their part is registered on these pages. To my parents, I am most grateful for their patience and support.

I hope that they will come to see that my

turning away from the family's path of religious scholarship will be ‘made up for in some other way.

With the com-

pletion of this work and my Harvard education, and by my future endeavors, I may be able to convince them that I am, in my own way, trying to fulfill fardu kifaya, just as they, through their pious efforts in traditional Islamic education are trying to do. Throughout my academic career I have been assisted financially by many institutions.

The Rockefeller Founda-

tion deserves my deepest appreciation for its generous fellowship, which funded my course work and'research. My thanks also go to my first Acharn in political science, Professor Saneh Chamarik of Thammasat University, for pointing out for me the wonders and challenges of his chosen discipline.

A portion of this dissertation is a

result of my participation in his "Human Rights Research

in Thailand",

Through him, a grant from the Asia Founda-

tion was made available to me. I owe a debt of gratitude to- Professor Harry Jaffa of Claremont- Men’s (McKenna} .College, Claremont, California, Who initiated my interest in Islamic political philosophy and encouraged me to pursue study at Harvard, Professor Nur Yalman, of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard and Chairman of my dissertation committee, has been most generous with his time and intellectual resources.

Only h e understands how he came to the rescue

and pushed me across many abyssal passages along the academic path.

Without him, not only this work, but much else

would not have been possibleProfessor Stanley Tambiah of the Anthropology Department has been an inspiration to me on my journey into the mysterious world of the Thai polity.

His support and gui-

dance are here acknowledged. Had it not been for Professor Muhsin Mahdi, Chairman of the Near Eastern Languages and Civilization Department, I would not have come to Harvard.

His continued support

and encouragement made this final requirement of the graduate study come to a successful completion. My sincere appreciation also goes to Professor Benedict R. O’G. Anderson of the Government Department,

Cornell Uni-

versity, for his help at many turns along the way to this point of completion.

He also managed to explain to my

parents the many risks and perils and the lengthy time required for Ph.D. work. I would not have been able to present this dissertation in its complete form in time, without the tireless assistance in editing, revision and typing of Dr. Laurel Kimura.

Her kindness and patience have been extraordinary

■and, indeed, turned "a possible" into "a success" And finally, for my six brothers and four sisters, who have never seen their eldest brother stay still more than two days, this is' a symbol of my love and caring for them.

S.P.

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

CHAPTER

I

s

INTRODUCTION ............

Introduction

......... 1

-

Theoretical Approach Economic and Social Setting The Economy The Society CHAPTER

II

s

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND s 1902-1922 .....

27

The Royal Connection Patani as' the "Cradle of Islam” The Rebellions of 1903 and 1922 CHAPTER III

s

THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY : 1922-1945 .. 62

Resistance and Accommodation 'Prior to 1932 Political Participation and Cultural Autonomy Forced -Cultural Assimilation and the Malays 1 Reaction The Second World War and the Patani Issue The Patronage of Islam Act of 1945 GHAPTER

TV

s

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS AND THE

C

ULAMA'

REBELLIONS : 1945-1.957 ....... New Role for the

g

Ulama *

Patani Legal Autonomy Under Absolute Monarchy The Muslims' Legal Autonomy Under the Constitutional Regime The Hajji Sulong' Rebellion, of 1947-1948

Ill

PAGE CHAPTER

V

:

THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEGRATION EFFORTS : 1957-1973 .............. 166

Pondok : The Malays’ Madrasa From Pondoks to Private Schools with Secular Curriculum Access to Higher Education The Bureaucratic Recruitment t’S * The Fostering of Closer Relations of Muslim Leadership CHAPTER

VI

:

THE PATH OF VIOLENCE : 1973-1982 ......

216

General Conditions The Separatist Movement and Guerrilla Warfare The National Liberation Front of Patani (NLFP} The Liberation Front of Republic Patani (LFRP) The Patani United Liberation Organization ’ (PULO) Other Forms of political and Military Operations Islamic Fundamentalism The Dac wah Movement The Tarigah Movement The Islamic Militant Groups The International Dimension c The Ethnic Affinity The Islamic Bond The Ideological Forces CONCLUSION ................... ................. .. BIBLIOGRAPHY ................. ......

... 269

.. . .....

284

LIST OF' TABLES

PAGE

TABLES

I

Greater Patani Region ......

..... -

17

II

Results of the General Elections of of Greater Patani 1933-1948 ..........

82

The Muslim Population of ASEAN .............

270

III

LIST OF MAPS

MAP

1

Map of Thailand

2

Map of the Greater Patani Region

ABSTRACT

The dissertation in the movement among

focusses

for cultural

the Malay-Muslims

the final

periods,

responding

tics, the movement but the central

there Thai

rule.

Thailand

tonomy

their religious

consolidation ment

ship have

been penetrated

into the Thai

polity.

reaction

systematize

has always

How the Malay-

rituals

explores

group.

traditional

their griefor au-

and ideals

the process

places

"Their religious

of learning

in order

That

process

to it is analyzed.

conversion

Act of 1945,

forms,

of

of power on the part of the Thai govern-

tudtions,

the pondok

poli-

theme of tnis study.

also

over this minority

Muslims’

historical

and their aspirations

important

The dissertation

force

have expressed

Thai rule

has been another

Region

in Thai national

symbolism.

vances against through

At various

theme and binding

of Southern

Patani

autonomy took various

been Islam and. its rich Muslims

Since

have been many rebellions

to changes for

autonomy

Thailand.

of the Greater

into the Thai kingdom, against

and religious

of Southern

incorporation

and protests

on the role of Islam

efforts

and the government the "Islamic

insti-

and leader-

to integrate

them

and the MalayThe impact.,of

the Patronage attempt

law” of family

of Islam

to codify 'and and inheritance

for the Malay-Muslima is also discussed.

The disser-

tation ends with a description of the emergence of violent movements and guerrilla warfare/ Islamic fundamentalism and foreign involvement in' the latest phase of the minority group’s efforts for its cultural and religious autonomy.

MAP I

LAOS

\ \

- 1? BURMA

'stAnoih*!

I6»l{

pL

Rd El*

NORTHEAST MiWrr Raitfuscur

anoAman

s«

’

KAMPUCHEA

■r

0 CUlf.tf

THAILAND

tntjfflX«ial {wKidary Retenji toundaty R*My land abort 200m UrtttsMMOin

town MMAYS1A

50**F

Thailand

Source: John L.S. Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics, Cornell University Press, 1981.

THAfLAND

MAP XX

s I “?

KMHH

'

Kz

.-

o

w/J

TrAHf

'* vn A n ( 7At OA)

r

k straufit

fmuaav)

i TrtUnf ieundtfy °>«ym/rAa;tanJ. _______ »vr 'no/ay />nvmctr Tka ;/anJ.

tftrfencC

-

the outsiders will have to

accept Islam before they are welcome into the community by their in-laws. extremely rare.

Conversion in the other direction is (Even Muslims from outside the Malay-

speaking area will need to acquire the language ability before they can marry into the Malay society.) The most preferred cj aractei trait among the MalayMus liras is religious piety.

For this reason, religious

leaders enjoy honour, and respect from the people.

The

Imam and the Hajj is (men or women who have been on pilgrimage to Mecca) are held in high regard and act as spiritual advisors to the villagers.

While the kamnan and

the naiban are respected for their positions and relations with the state authorities, they are not regarded as equal in esteem to the Imam and his devout colleagues

Religion,

i.e. Islam, plays a highly important function in the social life of the villagers.

The ultimate goal in life is to

attain all religious virtues symbolized in the term orang baik (morally good man) or al- insan al-salih in the Arabic formulation (Fraser 1966:40)'. The central theme of this dissertation is how* the Malay-Muslims make use of their religion, with its myths and symbols , to solidify their efforts for true political and cultural autonomy.

The forms and styles of these

efforts vary in relation to the overall political atmos-

-26phere of the Thai nation.

To fully appreciate their

efforts, this dissertation will procede chronologically, starting with the final incorporation of the Malay-Muslimprovinces into the Thai state in 1902, and ending with the present violent movement for total separation and politir cal independence.

CHAPTER II THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The four southernmost provinces of Thailand, where the Malay-Muslims are carrying out separatist activities, have had a long history of independence and subordination. The coming of Islam in the fourteenth century to the Malay world of Southeast Asia was the third great world religion which had given rise to empires and principalities with dominion over the whole region.

Hinduism and Buddhism had

come centuries before and had left their mark upon the people.

To paraphrase Geertz, Islam did not come to con-

struct a civilization, it appropriated one when it reached this eastern extremity of its expansive dominion (Geertz 1968:11) . However, Islam did introduce a new dimension into the region’s history.

Prior to Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism

served as the basis for the region's cultures and civilizations.

Their influence had been trans-racial .

The whole

area could be taken as one cultural world linked together through Buddhism with traces of influence from the older Indic religion of Hinduism.

When Islam arrived, its in-

fluence was confined to the people of the Malay race, who inhabited the islands and the southeastern reaches of the Asian landmass.

Before Islam penetrated further into the

mainland, colonialism overtook it as a new force spreading

-28through

the region.

complications the various

Colonialism

into the power races

point

dominate. major

extremity

where

It could

cultures

be viewed

a tributary

territory

belong

the Malay-Muslims

to the Malay

the state

among

these

tend

to keep

ficult

one.

longkorn

(Rama

historians this

to coincide

with

Malaya

1969,

(Thio

Teeuw

a sense ties

Thailand

of belonging

to their

focusses

culture

and Wyatt

and- dif-

centuries

by King Chula-

and was completed

agreement

with

Thailand 1970) .

pro-

on the history

reformation

between

a slow

back through

in 1902

the final

the boundaries

be consi-

is Buddhism.

has been

study

began

who ratified

puts

of the southernmost

trace

the administrative V) , which

mainland

the mainstream.

of Thailand

began,

two

they are part of

religion

of incorporation

While

with

state

to cultivate

from

the kingdom

best

of Southern

their traditional

them apart

the process

beginning

1906,

people,

process

into

where

Islam

the Thai and Malay

Politically,

whose

is trying

and

1978:64).

world.

nation-state

vinces

area

might

separating

Culturally,

The

race

As one scholar

of Thailand

(Elliott

While

when

as the gray

formations"

the Thai

of

is also the nor-

of the Malay

one — overlap.

region

social

and

the people

of the area — the Buddhist-oriented

"The Southern

dered

among

of Thailand

the people

and the Islamic-oriented its

relations

new factors

and cultural .backgrounds.

The southern thernmost

introduced

in

the British,

and British

When

the colonial

the beginning

of the sixteenth

as Siam was only with no real

a group

their

domain

and east known)

from

Indeed,

Caught

their

the major

In the middle

of contention leaders

in Bangkok.

removed

from- positions

Thai

bureaucrats

(Bunnag

Immediately the Thai

of reform,

rule

the power o'f local pals , the local fellow

Malays,

began.

leaders

leaders

(as Siam

Gothamasan reform,

Indeed,

clear

is now

reform

for

in the affairs century,

Patani, was a bone

and the Thai

princes

and royalty

and replaced

by

1976). a movement

even during

to

the process

that

Bangkok

would

and would

appoint

its own princi-

began

reduce

to look

southward

toward

who had by then become

colonized

by the Bri-

tish and expected 1901,

of influence

the 1902

when .it became

north

British

the local

1968,

after

reaching

in the south,

the colonizing

units

in from

and efficiency

Finally,

to consoli-

moving

administrative

of the nineteenth

a capital

political

Thailand

principality

between

were

resist

security

Malay-Muslim

the French

about

principalities

the .imminent threat

and the British

to bring

at

was then known

of urgency

through

empire,

Asia

be considered

to the scattered

Indian

•reasons of national

what

connected

the sense

between

in Indochina

was forced

of state.

century,

to the people of Siam

of colonialism.

to Southeast

that could

power and bring unity

was brought

came

of loosely

power center

of a nation-state. date

powers

to be given

the Raja (king)

protection

of Patani

wrote

and support.

to Sir Frank

their

In

Swettenham

-30-

the British with

governor

the following

of the Strait appeal:

sing and interfering of Patani

Playing colonial vinces

the peaceful

might

Thai

on behalf

to misery

was

the inter-

of these Malays.

come to the rescue

rule,

was suppres-

of the people

the Malay-Muslims

the fear - of the British

upon

powers under

life

The only hope for relief

of the British

in Singapore,

the Thai government

and was condemning

and destruction. vention

with

Settlements

that other

of the Malay

the King of Patani

pro-

wrote:

...ibwill he seen that my application, for* the intervention and good offices of Great Britain, has good grounds on which it is founded, and on which such application can be made to Great Britain or some other of the Great Powers either European or others (Abdul Kadir 1901) The "others" consul

included Japan and Turkey, who maintained a k in Batavia (the Dutch capital in the East Indies)

(Gothamasan

1976:186)

While

eager- to- extend

of Her Britannic the Malay office

with

in. Patani

preferred

Siam and that

Indochina

Swettenham

on September

and the dominion

up the. peninsula

Swettenham

would' diminish

French

143-159) . Patani

states,

that London

goodwill

between

Majesty

his domain

was cautioned to maintain

2, 1901,

friendship with

as a neutral

and. British

all

by the foreign

any interference

her role

wrote

to include

India

and her affairs

buffer

(Jeshurun

back to King Abdul that he, the. king,

state 1971:

Kadir of should, try

-31to see the king of Siam, since he "felt sure His Majesty would redress any real grievances which exist" (Swettenham 1901) . There were,also other reasons why the- British did not wish to interfere with the. Patani region under Thai rule.

Because of the strategic value of the peninsula

(Kiernan 1956:1-20, 1956a: 137-157) , the Germans were pressing Bangkok for"’a concession on the island of Langawi off the, Andaman aoast 'for a coaling station, and the Russians were competing with the French for a concession to construct a canal across the Kra Isthmus.

In their efforts

to resist these mounting* pressures, any move by the British would be used as an excuse to force Thailand to concede to the other powers. Furthermore,

the British had a design on four other

important "dependencies" to the south of Patani.

These were

considered' more immediate, and further consolidation of the British hold on them would be more profitable than antagonizing Thailand over the affairs of Patani.

This diplo-

matic prudence on the part of the British paid off when, the final Anglo-Siamese Agreement of 1909 formally ceded Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis to Great Britain in exchange for the recognition of Thailand's sovereignty over the province of Patani and the transfer of all extra-territorial rights enjoyed by the-British subjects

back to "the ordin-

ary Siamese Courts" (Anglo-Siamese Agreement, 1909) .

-32-

Failure to enlist the British support for their struggle against Thai rule at the turn of the century did not deter the Malay-Muslim leaders of Patani and a cluster of her tributary principalities from carrying on their own efforts to win their autonomy.

The determined efforts on

the part of Bangkok to dislodge all local nobles and replace them with appointees from the capital were faced with equally determined resistance.

Mindful of the sensitivity of the

issue, the Thai reformers moved cautiously so as not to appear to disturb the already well-structured society of the Malays.

As the Siamese king, under whose direction the

administrative reform was being carreid out, admonished his ministers:

"You must be conscious at all times that we

regard Mohammadanism as a religion for those people in that part of the country" (King Chulalongkorn to Prince Damrong, March 6, 1385) . However, the general policy could not be carried out exactly as given by the king in Bangkok.

The local func-

tionaries who were responsible for administering the reform did not get along well with the people.

They were not in-

formed of the customs, Islamic law and even the Malay language spoken by the local populace.

The animosity of the

Malay-Musi ims against the Thai bureaucrats was so intense that at one point they were described as "the leeches and parasites of the state" (The Straits Independent, May 10, 1890) .

Such an image of the Thai bureaucrats remains today.

-33Beginning in 1902, the nobility was stripped of its power and all functions of the provinces were gradually transferred to the bureaucrats from the capital or provinces in the north.

The central government was careful to assign

only conscientious bureaucrats to the Muslim-dominated area. Despite this precaution, the deeper the central government penetrated into the Malay-Muslim socio-cultural world, so foreign to them, the more 'inevitable was the occurrence of social confrontation.

.The process of reform moved at a very

slow pace in the areas of finance, development of social and economic infrastructure and administration of justice. Traditionally, the nobility of the area was required to send the Bunga Mas, ornamental flowers of gold and silver as a token of vassalage to the Thai king every two and a half years.

All dependencies had to follow this state ri-

tual to express their submission to Bangkok and affirm their loyalty to the throne.

Once the reform was instituted, how-

ever, the status of the Malay provinces was also changed from that of being mere dependencies to that of "provinces" and integral parts of the Thai kingdom. The implication of this transformation was farreaching.

In the area of finance, it meant that the nobi-

lity lost its power to tax its people.

While the Bunga Mas

wast no longer expected of them, the central bureaucracy assumed full responsibility for financial affairs.

It also

meant that the nobility had to forego income which it

-34-

usually

collected

revenue.

When

broadened

to include

activities,

from

the public

the collection

system

various

the annual

along with

and the tax base was

occupations

revenue

the vassalage

and commercial

collected

by the central

* •government officials which

were

previously

of the nobility the public (Bunnag

was increased

towards

that

and associates

revoked.

the financial

reform

Exemptions

Resentment became

among

widespread

1971s 15-23) .

was behind

and privileges decided

to relatives

.themselves were

The nobility, people

granted

markedly.

realizing

the following

the majority

i t in its efforts

as symbols

to express

that

to maintain

of autonomy

its grievances privileges

of the its status

and separate

and in 1905,

b.e granted

1.

All noble immediate come from

2.

All of the above-mentioned annual land tax;

identity

requested

to its

children and grandchildren, including relations, be entitled to annual inthe government; be exempted

from

the

3. , All of the above-mentioned be excused from mili.tary services, including fees in lieu of the services; 4.

All persons already in the services lity be excused from personal tax.

Apparently

the Malay-Muslim

get back what

they had lost through

form in terms

of employment

it.

the central

However,

consider

those

nobles

nobility

and descendants

was trying

to

the administrative

and the income government

of the nobi-

which

was only who were

came

rewith

prepared or would

to be

-35enjployed by the government.

Prince Damrong, the Minister

for Interior, emphasized that in principle, they were not to be paid by virtue of their titles, but only by the merit of their services to the government. On the second request, it was decided that tax exemption would be a bad precedent for other ruling families in other parts of the country.

Furthermore, exemption from

tax based on lineage would be perpetuated long into the future, and would certainly deepen the desire for independence in the generations to come.

It was felt that any reward

rendered by the government should be for the purpose of encouraging further integration, not adding to a sense of alienation.

The continuation of royalty would have been a

most poignant symbol of a long history of independence for the Malay-Muslims of Patani and her tributaries. The third point

was also designed to differentiate

the royalty from the commoners by exemption from military services.

In response, the government would only recognize

the direct descendents of the Rajas (kings) The government was adamantly against granting the nobles their last request of exemption front services for all those who were already in the service of the local nobles because it would be tantamount to recognizing private militia that could challenge the authority of the central government in the future.

However, the Minister of Interior

recommended that the King grant exemption from personal tax

-36-

to fifty

people

(Gothamasan

or less under

1976:311-314,

Realizing

that

might

nobility

and its people,

wrote

tone of the government’s activities

Damrong

to increase

and revenues

over the provinces

1

among

the

also decided,

the pension

and his colleagues

the loss of interest taking

Prince

of each raja

197r:19-21).

anti-government

of the King,

the Raja of Patani

Bunnag

the general

response

the consent

spark

the services

with

fee for

to compensate

for

due to the government's

financial

affairs'. The Minister

to the King:

The central government's assumption of responsibility over tax collection and the refusal to grant tax privileges requested can, indeed, affect the rajas' financial status. Even though now there is no need to please them as we .once needed to, but for reason of s-Gate and political prudence, I submit that they should be 1 granted a modest increase... for their pension (Prince Damrong to King Chul-alongkorn, August 29, 1905) . In response also

exercised

clear

prudence.

to the nobility

be taken ment

to Damrong':s suggestion,

required. future

This

when

couraged

of their

in pension

services

precaution

their

incomes

had to be taken so that fell

they would

(Chulalongkorn

was

to

to the govern-

last only as long as their services

and agitated..."

29, 1905).

that it had to be made

that any increase

as a recognition

and would

He felt

Chulalongkorn

were "in the

not feel disto Damrong,

August

-37Another radical change that was introduced into the area was in the form of replacing official positions with new appointees who were either sent from outside or were willing to be coopted by the newly structured civil service system.

Where government supervision was not available

before, new positions were created.

The state, through

its bureaucracy, was taking measured steps to penetrate the Malay-Muslim society in all its dimensions.

Because

the British were also making rapid headway in their development efforts just south of the border, the central government increased the sense of urgency in implementing these measures in order to solidify Thai control over the Malay provinces.

Better living conditions in the Malay states

under the British would definitely challenge the security and the loyalty of the Malays, who happened to be separated from their own people inside Thailand due to the arbitrary boundary line drawn by outside powers.

As Damrong wrote

in his memorandum to his Sovereign: The 7 principalities of the Malays are close to the state of'-Kelantan (one of the states ceded to the -British) and government officials here are all Thais. If ever Mr. Graham (the British Resident in Kelantan) is able to develop Kelantan and attain prosperity over our 7 states, it certainly will be dangerous and will have detrimental effect on the government of our 7 states because foreigners will be convinced that being under Thai rule will not bring prosperity and development. For this reason I humbly submit that we must spare no effort in developing our 7 states so as to make them more advanced than the state of Kelantan (Damrong to Chulalongkorn, April 27, 1904).

-38The government’s tactics were to adopt the British strategies in their development strategy in every way it could.

The British emphasized the construction of infra-

structure in the form of roads, postal services and the provision of security for commercial activities.

Bangkok

followed in minute details, and tried to make the Thai presence felt and accepted as a matter of course.

Government

offices were built along with residences for governors and their entourages.

The local nobility found the efforts

overbearing and led the Raja of Patani to complain to Swettenham in Singapore: Kaluoung

"I beg that there should be no

Commissioner in the State {of PataniJ'* (Abdul

Kadir to Swettenham, December 23, 1901). However, there was one major difference between the Thais' administering their Malay states and the British supervising development efforts in Kelantan: their attitude toward the people.

Rupert Emerson observed the British

attitude quite succintly: To an extraordinary degree the British officials in these States [jtelantan and Trengganu and Kedah, three of the four taken from Thailand J, from the Advisor down, have come to identify themselves with the States they serve; almost in fact, to regard themselves as champions of the particular State in which they happen to be located (Emerson 1964:251-252). They were very clear in their mission and served more as advisors, which they were, than the colonial rulers as their compatriots in other states.

-39-

Emerson continued: There is no great array of alien economic interests to bring pressure to bear on them and they •have no desire to see such interests ihtroduced at the expense of the native tillers of the soil. It is they, and not the Sultan or his Malay councillors-, who conceive and execute policy, but in shaping the policy their chief concern has been the well-being and development of the Malays over whom they rule (Ibid. ) . The main preoccupation

of the Thai policy-makers

had always been the security side of the issue. Thus, t while the British could move confidently in their reorganization of the Malay states under their rule without fear of any political backlash, Damrong and his sovereign in Bangkok were always suspicious

of the true intention of

the Malay kings and princes they put out'of power. Minister reported to the Thai king:

As the

"Because the former

kings and princes are still living, our administrative reform will still have to make some allowances for the t

benefit of these living Malays" July 20, 1906}.

(Damrong to Chulalongkorn,

It is very clear that while the -British

were prepared to recognize the ruling families and keep them in their positions,

the Thais had -decided that the royal

privileges would end at the passing away of the "living generation". Bangkok also was bent on assimilating the local people in order to make its grip over Patani ancl its tributaries as secure as possible.

First,

the Thai high

-40-

officials forced former influential

Malay-Muslim

officers

to "apply for employment" in cities to the north.

A cer-

tain Raja of Ra'geh was himself "offered" a training post in the province of Songkhla (Bunnag 1971:16). there was a definite mission

direction from the Thai king that the

of his Siamese servants posted in the area must

"cultivate those who would enter government though they are foreigners

Majesty’s

servants"

services,

and uphold a different

to acquire Thai hearts and manners

Finally,

Secondly,

even

religion,

just as all other His

(Damrong to Chulalongkorn,

March 4, 1896) .

efforts were made on integrating the sons of the

former Malay nobility into the system by offering them opportunities general.

for on-the-job

training with the Thai governor-

All these tactics were to be applied with greater

intensity up to the present day.

Much of the resentment

on the part of the local people, which still persists, stemmed from these "assimilationist"

policies,

not favoured by elements of conservative Faced with stiff resistence in instituting Chulalongkorn nobles under

which were

sentiment.

and sustained difficulty

the reform of the local administration, was forced to admit that while the rajas and

Thai rule were praticaily stripped of power

with no hope for hereditary

privileges,

those under British

rule were treated "as angels- in heaven”, who needed to do nothing but reign as heads of their principalities.

-4L We forced them to do things they were not willing to perform and sometimes they became mere puppets. To be fair, if we were treated in the same fashion, we would not have been too happy either (Gothamasan 1976:290}. This realization of the region,

i by the king greatly affected the affairs

especially whenever

the Malay-Muslim

lea-

ders sought support from their colleagues under the British in the rebellious

efforts against the Thai authorities.

The Malay-Muslims

felt a sense of deprivation

of the lofty positions of the British Malayan Of all the reforms

in the face nobles.

in the Patani region,

nothing

engendered more hostility among the Malay-Muslims intrusion of Thai offialdom

than the

into the domain of the admi-

nistration of justice which was considered

sacred terrain.

c

In a culture where the law (Shari a) is fused most intimately with customs ( g adat) and life and its meaning is defined by that fusion and "engulfs the total person, connecting foundations

him, as far as he is concerned, of existence",

with social institutions

(Geertz 1968:111),

Invariably

reactions.

While financial

adjustments

caused hard feelings,

upper class, whose

to the deepest any tampering

invited malevolent

reform and other administrative mostly limited to the

power and interests were directly affected

the case of legal reform stirred up hostile feelings among the people at large.

-42-

The bill of reform

introduced by Bangkok in 1902,

called for all legal matters to be put under Thai law with the exception of family and inheritance cases. appointment

of Muslim judges (Qadi) was left to the pre-

rogative of the sitting Thai judges. appointment ment,

caused considerable

and the administrators

measures issue.

The

This control over

difficulty

to the govern-

were forced to seek other

so as not to appear to have the final say on the In October 1902, Damrong and his deputy introduced

a formula

by which each principality would have a pool of

six judges from which the conflicting

parties — rather than

the sitting Thai judges as before — would have the right to choose their arbiter of justice. sion was not absolute.

However, the conces-

The sitting Thai judges in the

principalities would retain

the final decision on any

case decided upon by the Qadis chosen by the parties.

If

the Thai judges approved the opinion given, then the case was to be considered final.

If there was disagreement

between the Thai sitting judge and the Qadis, the parties still had the right to appeal their case to the Thai superior court for the region where no Qadi would be admitted. Two months later, a royal proclamation was issued in Bangkok concerning

the religious courts

in Patani and

its environs, which gave even more control to the Thai authorities.

The courts could only be established

if

-43-

the governors-general approval. required

of the principalities

In the case of a deadlock,

gave their

the Qadis were

to elect one among them to give the final deci-

sion. Although this point sounds rather odd fact that they were already in a deadlock,

given the

the whole system

gave evidence to the fact that the authorities had no adequate knowledge

of how the Islamic legal system operated

and how the religious in a Malay-Muslim

leaders performed their functions

society.

Indeed,

the word Qadi was even

officially taken as Kali, a Thai word that has a rather derogatory scholars

connotation

(Siripachana

1975:66).

c

f ulama *) who were usually referred

The religious to.as the

hag ji (an honorific title for those who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca) were described in some of the official documents in

connection

with the legal reform as "those who

have gone to Kapilavastu" , a city in north India from where the mother of Lord Buddha came (Gothamasan

1976:

299-306, Bunnag 1971:15). The misuse demonstrate

of words and the confusion

the lack of knowledge and familiarity

Thai officials with local affairs. matters

of facts

as religious

of the

In such sensitive

law, the civil authorities were

bound to come into conflict

with the

c

ulama 1 , who , in

Weber's terms, had the authority of the "eternal yesterday", and acted as the custodians

of "the mores sanctified

-44-

through the unimaginably orientation

ancient recognition

and habitual

to conform" (Gerth and Mills 1958:78-79).

The Royal Connections The attempted reform of 1902 by the Bangkok government had brought disruptions institutions

to many of the long-established

of the Malay-Muslims.

The disparagement

of

their royal families was probably the most destabilizing act, which has continued

to have adverse repercussions

the affairs of the area for decades thereafter. through family connections

on

It was

that the nobility sustained

its influence and became unified against external interference

for centuries.

Calamities

that descended upon

one ruling family had always been considered as affecting all.

Thus when the royalty of the seven Malay principa-

lities of the Patani region was driven out of power, their more fortunate

colleagues,

who were indeed,

their

own kin, were ready to assist them in the efforts to regain their lost titles. The network of kinship among the Malay principalities of the past is quite obvious, considering that from the end of the seventeenth first

century until the

quarter of the eighteenth century, there was a suc-

cession ty.

the fact

of kings ruling Patani known as the Kelantan Dynas-

They reigned for forty-one years and extended the

-45-

royal network of royal kinship far and wide throughout the Malay peninsula. relations neighbors,

Aside from the traditional

family

between Patani and her northern Malay state such as Kedah, Trengganu

Kelantan connections rulers of Johore,

and Perlis,

the

brought her closer even to the

the southernmost

state on the peninsu-

la (Wyatt and Teeuw 1970:13-16). When Raja Abdul Kadir ascended the throne of Patani in 1899, the royal family of that principality was even more closely related to the Kelantan ruling nobility. ’ His grandfather,

Tengku Besar, was a Kelan-

tanese princ.e before King Mongkut raja of Patani in 1845.

(Rama V ) appointed him

Abdul Kadir's father,

Tengku

Puteh, who became the next raja, was married to Tengku Che ' , a -daughter of the ruler of Kelantan .

The last

king of Patani, therefore, was a prince of both royal families of Kelantan and Patani (Wyatt 1974:15-16, 1977:70-71). Asian kingdoms

Koch

It was common practice among the Southeast and principalities

to.consolidate

their

power and to ensure political alliances through marriages of their own descendants.

Among the Malay states, this

practice was even more emphasized, for their choices were limited to the Malay noble families as opposed to their X Buddhist neighbors to the north, who had no religious considerations

to bar them from taking sons or daughters

r46of any ruling family as in-laws (Vella 1955:327, 1954:1324a).

This fact also intensified

Gullick

the solidarity

among the Malay rulers and tended to create ' a cultural and, as a result,

a political "distance" from their

Thai counterparts. During the difficult

time of Thai penetration into

the area at the turn of the century,

rebellions

and resis-

tance formed on the basis of family ties and marital relations among the Malay nobility. in Patani, Swettenham

wrote in *1901 that the Malay rulers

met and "bound themselves any forcible

At a wedding ceremony

to make a united resistance

to

exhibition of authority on the part of the

Siamese" (Swettenham

to Chamberlain,

Noyember 20, 1901).

Their plight was viewed with sympathy by the royal families of Kelantan, Kedah

and Trengganu,

who were at pre-

cisely- the same time trying to extricate themselves from Thai rule and avoid total dislodgement overlords, officials

by their British

Thus in late 1900, the appeal to the British in Singapore was a joint effort made by related

nobles of the northern Malay states (Wyatt 1974:39-40). In the final analysis,

the blood ties and family

relations were the most effective Southern Malay-Muslims

to garner support

tance- against the encroaching rience of independence moulded

instruments for the

power.

for their resis-

Their shared expe-

from and subjugation by Siam had

them into a people united by fate and history.

-47-

It was upon this sense of shared identity and familial tie 'that Abdul Kadir and Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddin, son, built their power base and continued numerous

independence

movements

his

to inspire

from across the border

and helped keep alive the desire for autonomy from the Thai state until the present day (Stockwell 1979:142-144) .

Patani as "The Cradle of Islam" Another reason for the persistence of loyalty and ) cultural attachment people feel for Patani is its historical role as a center of Islam in Southeast

Asia.

In-

,deed, the royal families and nobility continued to be the symbols of Patani’ s independence following

the formal incorporation

gious establishment

of Patani

for many decades

of 1901, and the reli-

and its environs served

as the link between these elites and the populace at large.

Like any Muslim

society,

the

c

ulama

1

served

as a legitimizing force to the powers that be and their support was crucial in the maintenance of political power. pendencies,

the

c

In the case of Patani and its de-

uTama ’ played a decisive role and con-

tinues to give definite for separate

and application

inspiration for the struggle

identity and even separatist

The strength of that inspiration

movements.

is rooted in Patani ’s

historical role- as "a cradle of Islam'1.

-48-

The exact date of the Islamic conversion

of the

Patani region has not yet. been established (Winzeler 1974:260, Fraser 1960:20-26, Teeuw and Wyatt 1970:4). Writing in 1613, d'Eredia speculated that Patani adopted Islam before Malacca

traditionally known as the first

"abode of peace" in the reg'ion- (Mills 1930:49). research

In his

into the arrival of Islam in Indonesia, G.W.J.

Dr ewes found that in Trengganu, a neighbor of Patani, the new religion

was firmly established

"1387 at the latest". Tefeuw (1970:4) conclude

by 1386, or

From this finding, Wyatt and that "there is no reason why it

should not have reached nearby Patani by that date, particularly given Patani ’s repute

as an early center of

Islam". In keeping with the Southeast symbiosis

Asian tradition of

between religion and polity (Smith 1978) and

the adoption of the "legitimizing ideology” by the ■wielders of power before the popular, conversion,

Islam

was embraced by the royal households, 'whose members came its proponents

be-

through their intimate relations

with its- learned exponents

Cc ulama 1 ).

The dharma (morality or duty- as interpreted by the Brahmins)

and artha (self-interested

political-econ-

omic actions on the part of the rulers) are two HinduBuddhist concepts widely accepted as the foundation of state legitimacy in pre- Islamic Southeast

Asia.

With

-49-

the arrival became

of Islam,

the Islamized

the same mystical Islamic

states

conversion, tical

the' riegara/agama (polity /religion) Malay

dichotomy

relationship.

of the region

the new- religion

status.

From

which

expressed

In Patani-, as in other

at the time of the Islamic assumed

an immediate

the time of conversion,

poli-

the region

of Patani

began to gravitate

away from the center

political

power of the Thais

and fostered

with

th.e Malay

of Patani ’s power during

part of the seventeenth for the flourishing possible

of Islamic

of Islam,

time was served

Wyatt

When

colonial

Western

on the Malay

works

scholars

readers.

early

nineteenth

established

Daud wrote

ibn

centur

Abdillah

numerous

(Ander-

producing religious

****'* ‘

-' Patani

1970:4). ibn Idris

for

y

By the 'middTe of the eighteenth

and Teeuw

by that

1968:215-219).

their own original

truly deserved

of a ’’cradle of IslaA-in- Southeast

c

which

their foothold

was already

:

92, Wyatt

Hall

Arabia,

f amous-'works of Arab scholars 1

Malay

between

Asia,

1970:297,

Patani

who wrote

and translated

learning.

as its trading center

powers

peninsula,

the early was prepared I This was made

communication

and Teeuw

factor.

the ground

and Southeast

by Patani

son 1980:46,

Islamic

century,

by the intensified

the heartland

her relations

world with Islam as the unifying

The height

of

Asia"

Indeed,

one Patani

theology

the title

Winzeler

al-Fatani,/who

works on Islamic

and

1975: native,

in 1809

( 1 usul

al-din)

-50-

and jurisprudence foremost

(fiqh) , was recognized

as one of the

authorities of Islamic sciences of Southeast

Asia (Salleh 1974:91., Abdullah 1967:131-137). Not irrelevant to the present situation Patani independence movement

is the fact

of the

that these

great scholars of former Patani established their circles of students and followers in Mecca,

the spiritual

center of the Muslim world, and thereby extended their influence

through disciples from all over the Muslim

world of Southeast

Asia.

The present sentiment

of sup-

port for the movement comes from inside Malaysia, nesia and the Philippines. religious

Indo-

For all of them have had

links with the numerous religious institutions

of Patani. The glorious

past symbolized by the nobility and

their familial connections with the Malay ruling houses and the image of Patani as a "cradle of Islam" in the region,

can inspire a separate identiy of Patani only to

a certain extent. independence

The momentum of the struggle

for

could very- easily wear off once those fa-

milies were removed from positions of power and influence.

Now that many institutions of learning have been

created to replace the traditional madrasa of Patani, its past contribution

to Islamic scholarship

forever sustain Southeast its fate.

cannot

Asian Muslims ' interest in

What is of paramount importance

to the con-

« * -51tinuation of Patani 's strong identity and what lends support to its irredentist movement is the uncompromising attitude of its own people.

The Malay-Muslims of Patani

possess what Milton Gordon calls a "shared sense of peoplehood" (Plax 1976:20).

It is this sense of being separate

’from the dominant populace of the Thai nation and its bureaucratic apparatus that can be identified, as the singlemost crucial factor that sustains the conflicts and violence in Southern Thailand today.

It is, in other words, the

problem of ethnicity.

The Rebellions of 1903 and 1922 The first collective reaction to the reform in the Patani region came in 1903-, one year after the reform was introduced.

The movement was coordinated by the Raja of

Patani, Abdul Kadir, who offered a two-pronged strategy: general resistance to draw more oppressive measures from the Thais in order to spark violent rebellion against the new system, and at the same time, seeking foreign intervention, particularly from the British, who were now very interested in the Malay states (Kiernan 1956:1-7, Klein 1959:119-136).

At first, the rajas refused to acknowledge

the order requiring them to relinquish power over their own domains.

Then they ordered their subordinates to boy-

cott all meetings with the authorities, which eventually

-52led to resignation caused

much

assistance would

en bloc.

concern

This

general

resistance

to the Thais,

because

without

at the district

be ineffectual.

the Thais spector

The most

did not know

general

and village

important

the language

reported

levels,

to the Minister

agitate

to hate

the government”

Taking transition general

being dismantled,

challenged

situations transferred

to the British,

principalities civil

ticularly control ready

of Legeh,

strife

and spill to seize

the case

of Legeh,

7 , 1901),

because into

and Saiburi

raja

where to move

Phaya

soon

were The to be

serious. were

could

Sukhumvinit,

The

afflicted par-

get out of

the British

were

into the area.

was described

by Chulalongkorn

struc-

supervi-

This was considered

Kelantan

whose

to the

populace.

line,

the violence

any opportunity

born "and senile" March

Rahman

the

principalities,

particularly

and violence.

dangerous

local

boundary toe

Thai

establishments

by the enraged

the Kelantan

during

'while the former

In all seven

and new government

along

to

Sukhum-

contributed

the new one under

was not yet in place.

directly

(Phaya

of power

elements

of law and order,

forces

with

of the vacuum

period,, subversive

security

are trying

12, 1903) .

advantage

breakdown

ture was sion

March

An in-

of Interior:

with and the rajas

to Damrong,

was that

of the Malays.

to work

vinit

all reforms

problem

"He have no people the people

local

In

as ".most stub-

(Chulalongkorn

to Damrong,

the inspector-general,

-53reported 3s follows: Ti,e chaos could very well engulf the affairs of the seven states by someone inviting the raja of Legeh to spark violence. Once that happens, the British will surely argue that Kelantan is being affected and will inevitably intervene. And the raja is not known for his intelligence either" (Sukhumvinit to Damrong, March 5 , 1901) . With or without outside encouragement, the raja ordered his former functionaries to resign in protest against Thai rule and was himself .braced for a showdown.

That he was counting

heavily on British assistance could be gleaned from his letter written one year before to Sir Frank Swettenham, Governor o'f the Straits Settlement late in 1902: I trust that the troubles and grievances, which are being imposed on my people, will be seen by Your Excellency to be so harassing and unbearable that the peace and well being of the state are endangered, and that it will be seen that such action on the part of the Government of Siam is contrary to the terms on which Legeh agreed to become a state contributary to Siam and contrary to the terms of the document delivered to me by the King of Siam when formally recognising my nomination as Rajah of Legeh by my people and also that it will be seen that my application for the intervention and good offices of Great Britain has good grounds... Such action on the part of Siam towards the Malay states, in this .part of the Malay Peninsula would be likely to arouse much disturbance in the North of the Malay Peninsula (Abdul Kadir to Swettenham, December 23, 1901) . What worried the Thai authorities most was a call to. arms on the basis of religious persecution.

They realized

how potentially explosive the.situation would be if race and religion were to be injected into the ongoing conflicts.

-54-

As Chulalongkorn himself remarked to his Minister of Interior: "I fear that the Malays would rally around the Malays and the Thais would group with the Thais..-, the Malays could very well make troubles by appealing to their religion" (Chulalongkorn to Damrong, March 7 , 1901) . i The raja of Legeh realized his ultimate appeal also and raised the issue in his letter to Swettenham: The men, inhabiting in Legeh, are mostly Mohammadans and when the Siamese festival takes place, all the Chiefs are forcibly invited by the said Kalwong (Thai Commissioner) to kneel down and bow to the portrait of His Majesty the King of Siam and the idols (of Lord Buddha) opposite to it. To worship idols is, it is known abroad, strictly prohibited in Mohammadan Religion. This causes a feeling of disgust and dis-, content among the whole inhabitants in Legeh (Tengu Ngah Shamsooden, Rajah of Legeh to Sir Frank Swettenham, January 18. 1902). The Thai authorities considered him too much of a threat to leave him in his old post.

He was removed and

sent into exile in Songkhla, a city to the north, on March 15, 1901. however.

His political activities did not stop with exile, His colleagues who were still active in their

posts continued to communicate with him throughout his exile and encouraged him to return to his principality to join their efforts in resisting Thai rule.

One colleague was

the raja of Saiburi, who enlisted the support of the religious leaders in his small .principality to boycott the religious court being set up by the authorities (Salleh 1974:35).

The raja of Saiburi lodged his protest against

-55-

the Thai

encroachment

merchant,

to Robert

who eventually

to annex. Kelantan the raja

(Davies

time the resistance

number

up the peninsula

While

the Thai Kelantan

against

proper,

the Thais

plus men

relative der.

were

emotions

in the- area

from

Kelantan

to the Thai

own plan

to convince

not give

them protection

British

general

cipality.

In Rahman, and the Straits the uprising

force

finally

long

was also

religious

judges

to resort

to force,

the direction

it was

they should

resigned

decided

of his own bor-

the raja's could

all seek

that a governor in Saiburi

stationed

submitted

between

(Kiernan

The village

in protest

in the prin-

in the middle

in Singapore

and in some

some

1976:292).

already

universal.

used

the Saiburi-Kelantan

a bone of contention

Settlement

in-

the Malays

the raja

to take up residence

the police The raja

resistance

that the authorities

and that

the government

and Saiburi.

among

authorities,

(Gothamasan

had to be sent

to reinforce

along

protection,

1974:36).

when

under

was organized,

down

ran high

his people

intervention Eventually

putting

and

At the same

British

in Patani

(Salleh

government

states,

12).

under

deteriorated

to stir up trouble

According

Malay

1902:7-8,

to settle

a British

the British

of Indians,

authorities

The situation forty

Duff,

to the Thai .authorities

moved

side

convinced

and her neighboring

of Kelantan

a considerable

William

of 1903. Bangkok

1956:9-19).,

headmen

and the government

cases,

bribery,

and had

to induce

-56-

some

complacency

tually

removed

period

(Damrong

April

19,

among

and sentenced

were

Due

and economic

Thai

dangerous

efforts

even

a German

to their

merchant.

before

the reform

general

uprising

(Archibald

ral to order protested

when

Archibald

on October

any official

Kadir

by the Thais

came

the Thai

functions

his intimate

by the Thais. of ammunition

the British

the Thai minister

22, 1901,

two full months

promulgated, raja would

of Lansdowne,

him to surrender

reform*. Through

Archer,

informed

led by the Patani

and ordered

reform

a shipment

was to be formally

the time

Abdul

design

the attempted

to Marquis

of Patani states

from

was considered

es-

for the area. As men» lead and sustained the resis-

in Bangkok,

of f oreign Phromyong 1974:24, Hadbamrue 1968:73).

It was the first official

ct

on the part of the government to institute a link between the central authorities and the "religious notables" (McVey 1976:96) of the Muslim community.

It can be said that the

central leadership now recognized there existed a way to use ."religious beliefs, practices and institutions to provide cohesiveness to the realm and legitimacy to the holding of power" (Smith 1978 :vi) .

In this case, it was the

c

ulama‘

the mosque councils, the madrasa and the office of the Shaikh al- Is lam (Chular a jamontr i ) that were "integrated" into the state's officialdom (Haemindra 1977:93, Fraser 1960:154). Indeed, it was a political move to weaken

the separatist

movement under the leadership of the traditionally elite families such as Tengku Mahyiddin and’Tengku Abdul Jalal and their relatives.

A close examination of the Decree,

its contents and the personal accounts of its promoters , reveals that the "patronage of Islam" was not quite what the phrase implies.

-101The Patronage of Islam Act of 1'9'45 .The strong resistance the government faced in its effort to integrate the Malay-Muslim population into the socio-political structure of the Thai state was caused, in large measure, by the traditional elites, including the °ulama' and the descendants of former royal and noble families.

From the very beginning of the national unifi-

cation program of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) , rebel-: lions and uprisings were invariably inspired and led by these traditional elites.

Without their cooperation and

support, there could be no peaceful coexistence between minority groups and the mainstream Buddhist population. Ways had to be found to first integrate- these elites into the state power structure and instill a sense of belonging in them.

The foregoing discussion about the role and po-

litical sophistication of these elites suggested that to leave them outside the national political process would be tantamount to giving them incentive to move more quickly towards total separation from the Thai nation.

It is

quite clear that they possessed the trust and the confidence of the populace. The policy followed by Bangkok until the end of the Second World War had been one of benign neglect.

"Be sure

to make it clear," King Chulalongkorn once admonished his ministers, "that we recognize Mohammedanism as a religion

-102of our nation for that .region and for that group of people" (Chulalongkorn to Damtong, March 6 , 1896).

Little else

was done to solicit the support and cultivate a sense of loyalty among those who counted, however,

As long as there

was no overt opposition, the situation* was considered normal.

If and when crises occurred, they would be dealt with

on a case-by-case basis. The unique situation of the Malay states led to such a response.

The central government had very little expe-

rience in dealing with a foreign culture with its own set of values and institutions so drastically different from those prevailing in other parts of the country.

It needed

time to become familiar with "that group of people" and their social and cultural institutions before any meaningful program could be designed to co-opt them.

The new

political ideology introduced into Thailand in 1932, brought and end to absolute monarchy, transferred sovereignty to the people, and fostered a renewed sense of urgency to complete the national integration process through political participation and modernization efforts.

When the

parliamentary system failed and an ultra-nationalistic policy was promulgated, with devastating effects upon the cultural identity of the Malay-Muslims, a new formula had to be found.

The fluid situation in the international

scene made it imperative for Bangkok to bring in the religious elites and give them 'official recognition.

Failure

-103this time would have led to the final separation of the Greater Patani Region. Faced with that undesirable prospect, Pridi Phanomyong, the Regent, proclaimed The Patronage of Islam Act on May 3 , 1945, which aimed at breaking the impasse between the government and the powerful

c

ulam'a1 ,

The preamble

of the Act illuminates clearly what the real intention of the proclamation was about: Whereas the constitution of the Thai kingdom grants full freedom of religion to the people with the King as the Great Sustainer of religions (Akhara Sasanupathampaka) and considering the fact that some Thai people in a certain region profess Islam, it is appropriate that the Muslims should be assisted and protected in.their religious affairs... In a way, what the new government wanted to do was to contain the damage done by the Pibul cabinet and its forced assimilation program which was in effect between 1938-1944.

Almost driven, away from participating in the

national political process, the courted back into the system.

c

ulama* were now being

In order to achieve this

goal, the government disguised its real intention to control,and regulate the activities of the Muslims' religious affairs by extending its assistance and protection to the leading exponents of Islam.

The Buddhist monks (Sangha)

were treated in the same manner when they were being absorbed into the Thai polity in order that their services would help strengthen it.

When the religious hierarchy

-104"was organizationally strengthened, . , (it) was also ppli,tically regulated" (Tambiah 1978:115),

Exactly the same

thing happened with the Malay religious leaders. The king's duty as sustainer and protector of the state relgion (Buddhism) was extended to cover all religions within his realm.

The Act stipulated that new insti-

tutions be established to serve as mediator between the Muslim community and the government.

One of these was the

office of the Chulara j amontri , which was the equivalent of of the Shaikh al-Islam 1926:275).

of the early Islamic empires (Kramers

The occupant would.be considered the spiritual

leader of all Muslims in Thailand.

He would advise the king

and his government o n the ways and means to assist the Muslims and their religious activities.

The Chui araj amontri

would be "His Majesty's personal aide fulfilling His royal duties in the patronage of Islam" (Article III) .

Again,

the office was established as a counterpart of the Sangharaja (the Supreme Patriarch) of the Buddhist religious hierarchy (Tambiah 1976:230-231). The Act also directed the government to establish a purely Islamic educational institution for the Muslim children whose parents hitherto had been reluctant to send them to other schools operated by the government.

This

special school would have special curricula designed to educate its students with proper Islamic instruction. graduates of this institution, to be named "The Islamic

The

-105College

of Thailand",

scholarships college

would

be qualified

for pilgrimage

was

later

government's

to Mecca

established

conscious

the locus of racial

the South

to the central

The most regard

which

"The Central

Committee

are a sizeable

called

the provision

with regard vinces" c

(Article

ulam5 ’ and religious

missal

would

teed that those would

never

to policy

notables

loyalty

with

in Arti-

loyalty

charged

Committees

in those

pro-

of all these

appointment

This

of

the Minister

the advice

recognition

with regard

with

Committees

to Islam

their

VI) .

ulama ' whose

be bestowed

matters

Islamic

To assure

(Article c

in

and "in provinces

to the Provincial

be "in accordance

ster of Interior"

was included

population

pertaining

VII) .

of -atten-

tension

of Thailand"

Muslim

of advice

to affairs

the

for the establishment

of ..Interior may set up provincial with

the focus

and religious

of Islam"

cles V , VI, and VII,

there

The

reflecting

part of the Act of 1945

to the "patronage

where

to draw

IV} ,

area.

relevant

Islamic

(Article

in Bangkok/

desire

tion from

for the King’s

safety

and disof the Mini-,

clause

guaran-

was questionable

and their contributions

to the Muslim

community

would

not be welcome. While the Muslim

an analysis

religious

suffice

it to briefly

mediate

effects

of this formal

leadership discuss

will here

attempt

be given

to integrate in Chapter

the .real intent

of this Act of 1945.

Vr

and im-

-106First of all, it is gather obvious that the Act was drawn up and promulgated in response to the deteriorating situation in the Malay states.

The possibility of being

forced to relinquish the Greater IJatani Region and its eventual inclusion into the emerging Malay Union was very real.

The fact that the ultra-nationalist government under

Pibul Songkram led the country .into the Second World War in alliance with defeated Japan, made that prospect even more threatening.

The Malay-Muslim leaders were counting

on the British to press fox an area-wide referendum to support their claim that the populace preferred a union with Malaya rather than remain as second-class citizens of Thailand.

As Tengku Mahyiddin put it, reflecting the general

sentiment : In the name of humanity and justice we crave that you (the British) do not.recognize the Siamese Government before thoroughly investigating the Fascist ways of administration in the four Malay States is South Siam. Our endurance under the Siamese officials' maladministration is exhausted. We request that a plebiscite be held in the four states" (Haemindra 1976:222). The government's strategy was to appease the region’s religious leaders by bestowing them with titles and recognition and "denied Mahyiddin of his power base”, as Cham Phromyong, the first ChUlarajamontri said (Phromyong 1974: 24).

When the government was forced to return four states

taken from French Indochina towards the end of. the war, Bangkok was fearul that the British would take away the

-107Greater Patani region as desired by the Malay leaders — a return favour for their cooperation during the war, We sent 90 G ulama ’, whose support Mahyiddin would require if he wanted to cede the Thai territory, to foster their friendly relations with fellow; Muslims in the capital.,. They were sent back to the South when the atmosphere was calm" (Ibid.). The patronage of Islam, therefore, was "a short and immediate measure" that the government and some Muslim leaders in the capital devised to counter the irredentist sentiment during the Second World War.

In that context,

it was not a satisfactory remedy for the age-old anti-Thai temperament among the Malay-Muslims in the South. Secondly, the language of the Act of 1945, for the first time, revealed a significant change in Bangkok's atitude toward the Malay-Muslim minority in the South.

They

became officially "the Thai people who profess Islam" (prachachon chao Thai thi nabtue Islam) (Preamble) .

Since the

final incorporation in 1902, they had been referred to as "Khake", "Malayu" and "Mohammedans". The patronage of Islam < Act now equated them with the Muslims in Bangkok whose identity had already been intimately linked with the Thai state (Scupin 1 930 ).

It was this "unilateral change" of designa-

tion that was to become a source of many painful conflicts between the central government, through its bureaucracy, and the Malay-Muslims who still loathe the phrase "Thai-Islam"

► -108Finally, the establishment of institutions fox management and coordination of Muslims' affairs "with the advice and consent of the Minister of Interior" made those institutions dependent on the wishes and whims of the central government.

While appearing to be rendering patronage

to the Muslims, in fact the bureaucracy gained more control over all the religious affairs of the Malay-Muslims in the South.

Each mosque would require the government's appro-

val for its selection of the Imam and his council members (Article VIII) ,

While the Act might have brought titles and

prestige to some Muslim leaders in the capital and the central area, it became a divisive issue in the South, wherethe majority of the Muslims were.

The Malay-Muslims became

"loyalists and separatists", to borrow the phrase employed by Suhrke (1977) .

Those who participated in this process

of "official recognition" would be regarded as betraying the community's aspiration for cultral autonomy and political independence.

Far more than that was the sense of

mistrust and suspicion of the government's sincerity in the affairs of the community in general.

The office of

the Chularajamontri, the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand and the Provincial Islamic Committees, all have been rendered ineffective from the very beginning due to the "center-oriented nature" of these institutions.

Rather

than foster a sense of belonging among the Malay-Muslim minority, the new institutions served as symbols of further

-109- , government interference into the community's affairs.

As

will be- seen in the next chapter, when some of the "officially" recognized members of these institutions realized that their offices were being used by the government to assuage irredentist tendencies with little intention to improve the conditions of life for the minority group, they turned against the government with all the credibility and authority invested in their offices by the government itself . For the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand, the period between 1922 and 1945 was a period of struggle to * maintain their cultural and political identity amidst the changing events within the Thai state.

The Thai "ethnic

chauvinism" under King Wachiravut with the government's forceful drive to introduce Thai secular education into the Greater Patani region was met with stiff resistance and an area-wide rebellion in 1922.

When the parliamentary

system was instituted in Thailand for the first time in 1932, the Malay-Muslim leaders displayed their political I sophistication by their "restrained participation" and won the majority of seats from the region.

When it was

obvious that their goal for autonomy and eventual independence would not be served through parliamentary participation, they once again turned to their traditional elites and solicited support from the Malay population across the border in British Malaya.

With the assumption of power

-110-

of the ultra-national,i.st Pibul policy during

the war,

to the British

forces. became moved

efforts

Finally,

more realistic,

and led Patani efforts ment

forced

patronage to abandon

an open movement region

from

(independence)

government leaders

in Bangkok

in the South.

will

be focussed

their original

for separation

coincided

on

who tried

to

with

objective

of the Greater The intensity

the independence

states , which .finally won

in 1957.

separation

of Islam more meaningful,

the Thai kingdom,

and emotions

of the Malay

occupation

for final

attention

turn'ed

for their coopera-

of the "rect-gnized" leaders

the government's

but who were

the central

chapter,

leaders

the Japanese

prospect

the religious

In the next the roles of some

against

and his pro-Japan

Patani

in exchange

when the

to integrate

make

the Greater

for support

tion in the war

Songkram

of the move-

their merdeka

CHAPTER IV ISLAMIC AFFAIRS AND THE 1945-1957

ULAMA

1

REBELLIONS

It has been generally recognized that one of the lasting effects the Seond World War brought upon Southeast Asia was an upsurge of nationalism, which eventually led to national independence at the conclusion of the war (Hall 1968, Benda 1958, Halland 1953).

Various elements

and indigenous forces within the region became politicized through their participation in the war efforts against the Japanese occupying forces and their sudden realization that the colonial powers were vulnerable after all. The age of colonialism came t