Iran Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology [1/4]

Citation preview

Iran Conference on the

TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

Persepolis/Shiraz, Iran April 10-14, 1977

Volume I

Published by ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF lRAN

Publication Division

HONORARY CHAIRMAN H.E. A.A. Hoveyda

GENERAL CHAIRMAN

H.E. A.Etemad President Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

TECHNICAL CHAIRMAN M. Sarram - Iran

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Chairman, M. Taberzodeh - Iran

Chairman, M. Sarram - Iran

U. Buget

Turkey

M.A. Etemad

W. Cisler

ANS/USA

N. Farivar-Sadrl

Iran

E.M. da Costa

Brazil

W. Kerr

ANS/USA

Iran

K. Effat

Egypt

Y. Korei

Japan

T. lpponmatsu

Japan

H. Kornbichler

ENS

M. M ladjenovic W. Rudloff

Yugoslavia

R. Scalliet

ENS

ENS/Germany

M. Shafique

Pakistan

H .N. Sethna

India

M. Simnad

ANS/USA

E. Ziai

Iran

I. Suetsuna

Japan

T. Wojcik

IAEA

O.J. Du Temple, Secretary to the Executive Committee

REVIEWERS

Thomas Atwell

(LASL/USA)

Sidney Bernsen (Bechtel/USA) Dennis A. Bitz (Bechtel/USA) F. Boorboor (LI Lighting/USA) Salvador N. Ceja (ERDA/USA) Eugene N. Cramer (So. Cal Ed/USA) James Dewar (ERDA/USA) M.A. Etemad (AEOl/lran) N. Farivar-Sadri (AEOl/lran) George A. Ferguson (Howard Univ/USA) Andre H. Gage (PEPCO/USA)

A. Giambusso (ERDA/USA) J . Howe (ANS/USA) Walter Y. Kato (BNL/USAJ Y. Korei (Hitachi/Japan) H. Kornbichler (Uran it/Germany) Sidney Langer (GAC/USAJ P.A. Morris (Scandpower/USA) G. Melese-d 'Hospital (GAC/USAJ M. Jack Ohanian (I EA/USA) Jean Renou (CEA/France) Philippe Sachnine (CEA/France) M. Sarram (AEOl/lran) Roger Scalliet (EdF/France) M. Shafique (PAEC/Pakistan) V. Shmelev (IAEA/USSRJ Massoud Simnad (GAC/USA) I. Suetsuna (Intl Bank Japan) M. Taherzadeh (AEOI/ Iran) George Wessman (GAC/USA)

ii

FOREWORD

The Iran Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology was held in Persepolls/ Shiraz, Iran on 10-14 April, 1977. This conference is unique in that it Is the first international conference held on the specific subject of "transfer" of nuclear technology. Most nuclear scientists today agree that nuclear power is the answer to the world's energy problems, and that the key to the world wide success of nuclear energy is an unselfish "transfer" of nuclear technology and know-how from the developed to the developing countries. Some 650 participants from 43 countries attended this five-day conference. The results of this first conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology were gratifying. Many important and thought provoking papers were presented. The statement made on 7 April by President Jimmy Carter of the United States on the U.S. domestic nuclear policy led to quite a bit of discussion and debate in many of the conference sessions, panel discussions, as well as in informal gatherings held by conference participants. Although no final resolutions were formally endorsed by the conference participants, two major statements were issued. The Points for Discussion were a direct result of the U.S. policy statement. The Persepoiis Prospectus for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy was issued by the Presidents of the American Nuclear Society, the European Nuclear Society and the Japan Atomic Energy Society and reflects the views of the conference participants. Both of these statements are included in these Proceedings. The main features of the Iran conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology were presented by the President of AEOI at the IAEA conference on "Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle" in Salzburg, May 2-13, 1977, in a special panel discussion. The press coverage of the conference has been most impressive.

Iranian Television

interviewed many senior delegates during the conference on issues related to transfer of nuclear technology. Major foreign news services had dally coverage of conference events. Also, many nuclear publications have presented articles about this conference in their recent issues. It is felt that this very important issue of "transfer" of nuclear energy must be discussed on a regular basis by the world's scientists and government representatives. Due to the genuine success of the conference, the Executive Committee has asked the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to host a second conference in 1981. Dr. A. Etemad, President of AEOI, has generously agreed to this proposal. The ANS, ENS, and JAES have also expressed their willingness to co-sponsor the second Iran Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology.

M. SARRAM

Technical

&

Program Chairman

iii

EDITORIAL NOTE

All the papers in these Proceedings have been reset on a composition typewriter to provide a cleaner and more uniform appearance than would have been the case if the authors' originals had been directly reproduced, as was originally the intention. Editorial emendations have been kept to the minimum required to enable the contributions to be read with as little disturbance as possible. Consequently, the texts have been subjected to certain minor revisions in syntax and punctuation; but where an emendation would entail replacing an existing ambiguity with a single meaning which might not be the significance intended by the author, the original has been retained. All tables and figures are reproduced from authors' originals except where these have been unsuitable for photographic reproduction. No attempt has been made to reduce units and standards to a single coherent scheme, since this was felt to be outside editorial terms of reference, but symbols have been made to conform to the most updated international usage as far as possible.

iV

CONFERENCE SECRETARIES Miss A. Bavandi Mrs. J. Sargent Mrs. A. Bishop

EDITORS Mr. G. McMaster Mr. J. Smallidge Mrs. M. Hedjabi

ASSISTANT EDITOR Mrs. W. Simpson

COMPOSITORS C. Hernandez

Chief Typist

H. Zahiri

Typist

K. Jamasbnejad

Typist

F. Sardar

Typist

M. Irani

Typist

V

SUPPORTING COMMITTEES FRANCE Charles Chevrier (EdF)

Michel Pecqueur (CEA)

Jean Claude Leny (Framatome)

Pierre Vi I laros (Sofratome) GERMANY

Klaus Barthelt (KWU)

Heinrich Mandel (RWE)

Karl-Heinz Beckurts (Natl Lab-Julich)

Wolf-J. Schmidt-Juster (Min of Res & Ed)

Hans Henning Hennies (Natl Lab-Karsruhe) /NOIA R. Ramanna (Bhabha ARC)

M.R. Srinivasan (Dept of At Energy)

A.S. Rao (Electronics Corp)

G. R. Udas (Dept of At Energy)

J.C. Shah (Atomic Power Auth) JAPAN S. Hohki (JAES)

H. Nasu (JAPCO)

H. Kimura (Hitachi/Iran)

N. Shibata (JAERI)

Y. Korei (Hitachi)

I. Suetsuna (Intl Bank of Japan)

H. Matsunobu (Sumitomo AE Ind)

K. Uematsu (PNC)

K. Mochizuki (PNC)

Y. Yamamoto (Univ of Tokyo)

K. Mori (JAIF) TURKEY Ero! Akin (Turki~h AEC)

Ahmet Kutukcuoglu (Turkish Elec Auth)

M. Cetin Celik (Mineral Res & Expl Inst) UNITED STA TES Vincent S. Boyer (Phila Elec)

Robert Liimatainen (US Emb/lran)

Walker L. Cisier (Overseas Adv)

Corwin L. Rickard (GAC)

Joseph R. Dietrich (Comb Eng)

Richard W. Roberts (ERDA)

Melvin Feldman (ORNL)

John W. Simpson (Westinghouse)

Richard Kennedy (NRC)

George J. Stathakis (GE)

vi

ANS/ENS/ JAES GOVERNING BODIES

1977 AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY

Executive Committee Vincent S. Boyer, Chairman (President)

Clyde Jupiter

Joseph R. Dietrich (Vice President/President Elect)

Leonard J . Koch

Harry Lawroski (Treasurer)

W. Charles Redman

E. Linn Draper, Jr.

Bertram Wolfe

Melvin J. Feldman

Board of Directors

.•

Sidney A. Bernsen

John S. King

Vincent S. Boyer

Leonard J. Koch

Gordon Brownell

Harry Lawroski

Margaret K. Butler

John A. MacMillan

Paul Cohen

M. Jack Ohanian

Russel L. Crowther

David Okrent

John E. Cunningham

Herman Postma

Joseph R. Dietrich

Joseph A. Prestele

E. Linn Draper, Jr.

James Ramey

Melvin J. Feldman

W.C. Redman

John E. Grund

Weston M. Stacey, Jr.

William H. Hannum

William R. Stratton

Joseph M. Hendrie

J. Ernest Wilkins, Jr.

Clyde Jupiter

Bertram Wolfe

Walter Y. Kato

C. Pierre Zaleski EUROPEAN NUCLF.AR SOCIETY

Steering Committee A. Colomb, President*

N.G. Chryssochoides

Van Erpers Royaards

J. Lewins

G. Tavernier

K.H. Beckurts*

M. Daile Donne

P. Tempus

M. Rozenholc

M. Quinteiro Blanco

L. Sani

C. Salvetti*

H.H. Gott*

C.P. Zaleski*

R. I. Ekholm

J. Kuusi

* Member of the Board

vii

JAPAN ATOMIC ENERGY SOCIETY Kodi Husimi, President

Toshio Yoshioka, Vice President

Kenzo Yamamoto, Vice President

Directors Tsuyoshi Amanuma

Masayosh i Kanno

lsao Fujii

Masami Michijima

Tomonori Hyodo

Tatsuji ro Naganuma

Masami lchimonji

Masuhiko Otsuka

Munemaro Imai

Takanobu Shiokawa

Ryoji lshiguro

Hiroshige Suzuki

Hiroshi Ishikawa

viii

CONTENTS OF VOLUME I

EXPERIENCE IN TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

Plenary Session I Opening Remarks M. Sarra!"

5

Welcome Address A. Nasre-Esfahani

6

The Message of His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr

7

Message from the President of the United States

9

Reply to the Message of the President by His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr

10

Address Amir Abbas Hoveyda

11

Speech Akbar Etemad

15

Address Sigvard Eklund

20

Remarks for opening session Joseph R. Dietrich

33

Address A. Colomb

35

Address Kodi Husimi

37

EXPERIENCE IN TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY Plenary Session l/ IAEA Experience in the transfer of nuclear technology Sigvard Eklund

41

Experience in transfer of nuclear technology H. N. Sethna

52

Technology transfer - its contribution to the Canadian nuclear industry Eric C.W. Perryman

60

The United States experience in the transfer of nuclear technology Robert D. Thorne

74

Experience in transfer of nuclear technology K. H. Beckurts

82

Transfer of nuclear technology obtained by the Argentine Republic as a consequence of the construction of its first two nuclear power stations Oscar J. Quihillalt and Horacio O. Grasso

ix

91

Transfer of technology in the French-Iranian study for a nuclear research center in Iran J. Teillac

96

Pakistan's experience in transfer of nuclear technology M.A. Khan

102

Nuclear power plant construction and operating experience in Japan ~oboru ltoh

112

Possibilities and experience of NTT from an Rand D organization in a small country (Sweden) Gunner Holte

122

Criteria for the choice of research programs in nuclear centers of developing countries M.S. Mladjenovic

127

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION Plenary Session Ill

Utility training Pierre A. Vi llaros, Armand Luxo and Jacques B ruant Manpower requirements for nuclear power programs and associated training programs S.B. Hammond, E.1. Goodman and G.C. Corpus

132

142

Westinghouse experience in the transfer of nuclear technology John W. Simpson

154

Experience with education and training on the job Hans Jurgen Lave and Dieter Nentwich

164

Training personnel for nuclear power stations in Argentina N.H.A. de Libanati, M.A. Brugo and A.J. Lobato

178

Role of a national research organization in the transfer of nuclear technology lshfaq Ahmad

186 191

Tehran nuclear research center M. Taherzadeh The project of Esfahan nuclear technology center (ENTEC) and the transfer of nuclear technology in Iran Reza Khazaneh

194

IMPLEMENTATION OF NUCLEAR POWER Plenary Session IV

Politics of technology transfer (with special reference to the transfer of nuclear technology) Cyrus Manzoor

201

Problems of implementation of the first nuclear power plant in developing countries with particular reference to Egypt K.E. Effat, M.F. EI-Fouly and A.F. EI-Saiedi

212

X

Im plem entation of nuclear energy in Iran A hm ad Sotoodehnia

221

Nuclear power in Japan today: an exam ple of transfer of nuclear technology Hayao Nasu

225

Experience in im plem entation of nuclear pow er projects in Pakistan S.M .N . Zaidi and M . Shafique

233

Im plem entation of nuclear power in Spain A gustin A lonso

242

Organization of science and technology and the atom ic energy program in Bangladesh M . lnnas Ali and N . Islam

256

COO PERATION IN RESEA RCH A ND DEV ELOPM ENT Parallel Session

Cooperation in research and development R.G. Sowden and C.B. Amphlett

270

Advanced research technology transfer M. Naraghi

276

Cooperation in research and development R. Ramanna

281

People transfer - sine qua non for nuclear technology transfer M. Ahmed

291

Science, technology and cooperation among developing countries S.A. Afzal

296

On the question of pure or applied research in developing countries P. Sioshansi, A.S. Lodhi and H. Payrovan

306

The association of France with other countries in the areas of research and engineering C. Moranvi lie

309

Development of laser devices of interest for nuclear applications in Iran: a case study of parallel technology transfer S. M. Hamadani

315

Laser technology transfer R.K. Mosavi

320

NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTERS Parallel Session

Role of national nuclear research centers in transfer of nuclear technology in developing countries Ugur Buget Role of small nuclear research centers in technology transfer Hans Gr'umrn

xi

324 329

The role of national research and development centers in the transfer of nuclear technology J-:-J. Graf and Pierre Mil lies

334

Efforts through national nuclear research institutes: a prerequisite to transfer of nuclear technology M . Em dad Hussain

346

Availability of computer codes for fuel management analyses P. Silvennoinen Experience in reactor research and development programs as educational system for \hermohydraulic engineering G.M . Zaki and M.M . Fikry

351

357

QUALITY ASSURANCE, CODES AND STANDARDS Parallel Session

Quality assurance of a nuclear power plant in Japan Minoru Miki

367

The role of nuclear standards in nuclear technology transfer R.J .A. Neider and Klaus Becker

379

Transfer of nuclear quality assurance technology F.J. French

400

Quality assurance as a means of nuclear technology transfer W. Burkle and W. Kaden

406

Quality assurance during operation of a nuclear plant A. Knockaert, J. Stolz, G. Hostache and J. Wiesendanger

414

Owner's quality assurance as a tool for technology transfer M. Stauffer, P. Grimm and D. White·

425

Qua I ity assurance: a commitment for management, an indoctrination for personnel Jean Smets The need for standards and standardization in nuclear technology Reza Abedinzadeh Problems of quality assurance, quality control and maintenance of capability of trained personnel in nuclear power plant in developing countries A.S.M. Enamul Haque

431 442

449

SAFEGUARDS AND STANDARDS Pora/le/ Session

The IAEA's activities in safeguarding nuclear materials and in developing internationally acceptable safety codes and guides for nuclear power plants R. Rometsch and H . Specter

457 466

U.S. nuclear export policy R.T. Kennedy

xii

Transfer of technology on radiation protection and nuclear safety A.E . Placer

474

Safety standards and regulations in the USA and in Germ any L.F . Franzen and A. Kraut

482

Nuclear technology export and the non-proliferation of nuclear w eapons R. Harde

493

Im plem entation of environm ental prol;Jram s for radiological surveillance of nuclear installations G. Medrano and J. Polim on

499

xiii

EXPERIENCE IN TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

PLENARY SESSION All Invited Papers Chairman: H.E. A. Etemad (Iran}

OPENING REMARKS

M. SARRAM Technical Chairman and Chairman of the Proarom Committee

Your excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies, and gentlemen,

It is indeed an honor for me, as the Technical & Program Chairman of the Iran Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology, to make a few remarks on this opening day. This first international conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology is hosted by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and is co-sponsored by the American Nuclear Society, the European Nuclear Society, and the Japan Atomic Energy Society.

Although the first

session of the conference is being held today, the idea of the conference was initiated two and a half years ago only six months after the establishment of AEOI.

It has been the efforts

of AEOI and its three co-sponsors which have made this unique gathering possible. Over 500 participants from 41 nations of the world are present at this conference.

Today, in this

historic place, the senior representatives of all supplier and recipient nations of nuclear technology have come together, for the first time, with the aim of discussing the many technical, economical, and political issues of the Transfer of Nuclear Technology. The enthusiastic response of so many nations to this conference could only mean that the Transfer of Nuclear Technology is a subject of interest to al I countries. Four plenary and 19 technical sessions plus the two panel discussions on "Experience in Transfer of Nuclear Technology" and "Implementation of Nuclear Power" make up the content of this five-day conference.

Fifty invited papers and 122 contributed papers, se-

lected from some 300 papers submitted to the Program Committee, will be presented in this conference. Eleven major topics will be covered by the papers including "Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Management", "Implementation of Nuclear Power", "Research and Development", "Experience in the Transfer of Nuclear Technology", "Research and Education", "Safeguards and Reactor Safety", "Public Education and Acceptance", and the general economic and political aspects of the Transfer of Nuclear Technology. This morning special speeches will be delivered as announced, and I am sure we all wi 11 benefit from this important plenary session. It is hoped that with your partic.ipation in this conference some of the main issues associated with "the Transfer of Nuclear Technology can be dealt with.

Let us aim at using this

conference as the first step for international understanding and cooperation in the Transfer of Nuclear Technology. Thank you. The General Chairman of the conference; H.E. Mr. Etemad, Deputy Prime Minister and President of AEOI, will chair this plenary session.

5

WELCOME ADDRESS

A. NASRE-ESFAHANI Governor General of Fors Your Excellency, the Prime Minister of Iran, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, Ladies, and Gentlemen. I, as Governor General of Fars Province, have the honour to welcome you, on behalf of the people of Fars and citizens of Shiraz and on behalf of myself. I would also like to thank those who have selected this part of the world for such an important conference. Persepolis, which some of you may have seen, is the heart of the Persian Empire, set up 25 centuries ago. Achamenian kings, in this part of the world, sought and reflected the divine order in the political order and saw their own battles and victories as extensions of the cosmic struggle between good and evil. Nuclear power has both good and evil aspects. Fortunately, the good aspect of atomic energy, such as a better life for mankind by transfer of nuclear technology, is the topic of this conference. For many years, Persia linked the heartland of Asia and cradle of Mediterranean and western civilization, a bridge between East and West. This time, Persepolis is the place for a scientific bridge not only between East and West but also between South and North. We, the people of Iran, are very proud and lucky to have the extraordinary leadership of His Imperial Majesty, the Shahanshah Aryamehr. It was only because of the leadership and sincerity, loyalty and hardwork of His Excellency Amir Abbas Hoveyda, that Iran passed the take-off stage of social and economic development process lately after the Shah and People revolution. Because of the unique rapid development and economic growth of Iran, the growth rate of energy consumption in Iran is estimated at 15 up to 30 per cent per annum. Iran is one of the oil exporting countries, but the main resources of energy of the country are oil and gas and, unfortunately, the known oil and gas reserves are limited. It is because of the limitation of oil resources and because of the high value of oil and gas as raw materials in the petro-chemlcal industry that His Imperial Majesty guided the government to make a new policy for energy in the country. Among all possible energy sources in Iran, nuclear power is the most economical and commercial one. There is a great hope that this gathering of scientists of the world from different countries with different social and political disciplines will promote mutual understandingand cooperation. I hope during these days,that you are the guests of the people Of Shiraz, that you will have an enjoyable time. I apologize for any shortcoming or deficiency you may face during the conference. The people of Shiraz may not be able to contribute to the conference in technical and scientific work, but they offer you roses, nightingales, the poetry of Saadi and Hafez and above all kindness, love, affection and humanity. Nuclear energy has a limited life but kindness, love, affection, humanity and brotherhood exist forever.

6

THE MESSAGE OF HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY SHAHANSHAH ARYAMEHR To Iran Conference on Transfer of Nuclear Technology, Persepolis, April 10-14, 1977 The history of mankind clearly indicates that man has persistently tried to integrate his environment and resources with his fundamental needs, through the discovery of different laws of nature and the provision of various technologies.

Through this evolutionary effort

and cumulative process, which took place in various cultures at different historical times, contemporary man has at his disposal a diversified stock of scientific information and technological know-how. Man's need for a balanced use of his environment and resources for a better quality of life, is more manifest today.

A very large majority of the human race has now taken upon

itself a historical mandate for the achievement of a better standard and quality of life.

The

technological achievements at our disposal constitute a creative force that can truly help man in his quest for the removal of existing international imbalances.

It is now clear to us

all that the prevailing world dualism, more than any other factor, inhibits the potentialities of mankind for achieving a more equitable and healthy environment to live in.

Technology

has the inherent capacity to alleviate this dualism. We are quite aware that the nuclear technology has a distinct place among the technological achievements of man.

The advent of this technology has substantially increased

and promoted the creative potentialities of man.

We are also aware that the utilization of

the fission process in no way represents the ultimate achievement of man in nuclear technology, rather, it should culminate in the utilization of fusion process which represents a cleaner and more lasting source of energy.

Hence, a more orderly and rapid develop-

ment of the nuclear technology wi 11 certainly enhance the feasibility of fusion and broaden the basis for its achievement. At present, Iran has abundant conventional sources of energy.

We recognize the im-

mense potentialities of these resources, but we are equally aware that the consumption of these resources-at the present rate would cause a premature depletion of these reso_urces in the near future.

Purthermore,

we believe that it is certainly wasteful to use existing

oil resources as a major source of energy, rather they should be rapidly directed into alternative productive industrial uses.

To facilitate this transitional process, we should

do our utmost to rationalize the use of oil resources and, at the same time, provide for new and more functional energy resources and technolog_ies.

The long-term energy policy

of Iran is based on such significant understandings. We have advocated this pol icy openly on several occasions, and have invited the world community, notably the industrialized nations, to take the appropriate initiatives for its global promotion.

This reality, however, has not caught the imagination of these nations.

They seem to be unprepared or unable to remould their energy policies to harmonize them with the changing realities and needs of our time, and to pave the way for the development of more functional energy technologies, with a global sense of responsibility and commitment.

In spite of this lag, Iran, 'as a responsible member of the world community, has

7

committed itself to this inevitable course for some time.

We hope that our determination and

efforts for the substitution of conventional energy resources, wi II help transform this indifference, and have a positive impact beyond our frontiers. Iran has embarked on a national mobi I ization program for rapid socio-economic revival. This enormous task will certainly require substantially greater and more functional energy resources and technologies.

We shall maintain our resolve to develop and promote alter-

native sources of energy to sustain our energy independence. At present, we are giving a higher priority to the development of nuclear energy on a substantial scale. According to our plans, we intend to provide a per capita capacity of nuclear electricity of at least half a kilowatt in 20 years time.

The implementation of this ambitious program requires

numerous technologies and services which we hope to provide through international collaboration without endangering the mandate of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to which we adhered from its inception.

Here I would like to stress our conviction

that the growing utilization of nuclear energy even on a large scale, similar to the program of Iran, can be integrated with the non-proliferation goals of NPT. As for Iran, our will to integrate technology with the basic values and foundations of Iran's culture, assumes even a greater significance in relation to the utilization of nuclear technology.

Iranian culture and its historical evolution rest on principles of harmony and

peaceful co-existence and, as such, it has persistently helped to promote cross-culture! understanding.

In this historical context, the integration of nuclear technology with our

culture necessarily implies its humane use for the resurgence of our nation. We are strongly committed to this integrative principle not to please others and not out of fear, but because it is an inherent quality of our culture.

This commitment is vividly reflected in our early

endorsement of NPT and our tireless support for its ideals, in the very nature of our ambitious national nuclear program, and in our proposal for the creation of a nuclear free zone in this part of the world. Regrettably, the NPT has not achieved its expected universality. We, nevertheless, wi II continue to hope that the non-signatory nations adhere to it in good faith so that the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguarding mechanisms are given broader context and greater effectiveness.

We contend once again that the safeguarding system of

the agency is, in no way, inconsistent with the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful applications.

We should, however, not forget that the NPT has two other paramount and

complementary goals, namely transfer of technology and general disarmament. Undoubtedly, the single most important determinant of non-proliferation is a fundamental break-through towards general disarmament and what we can collectively achieve in this vital domain.

The ideal of non-proliferation should indeed be ultimately viewed

and assessed in this context.

Otherwise, it is doubtful whether mankind can successfully

achieve its non-pro Ii feration ideals through negative and discriminatory attitudes. We do hope that this significant gathering would use this opportunity to address itself to these issues as well as other numerous technical problems that the process of technology transfer in general, and nuclear technology transfer in particular, raises.

8

April 8, 1977

Your Imperial Majesty,

On the occasion of the opening of the Iran Conference on Transfer of Nuclear Technology I send to Your Imperial Majesty and to all the delegates in attendance my personal best wishes for a successful meeting. The subjects that wi II be discussed are of vital importance to all people and nations of the world.

I have a deep personal interest in nuclear energy and I am acutely aware

of its potential -- and its dangers. All nations must share in the responsibility to bring the benefits of nuclear science and technology to mankind within a framework which assures that its destructive potential is never unleashed.

I am pleased that the American Nuclear Society is a co-sponsor of

your Conference and that several important departments of the United States Government

are represented. I look forward to hearing about the conclusions of the Conference which 1 am confident will add to our knowledge and insights on this vitally important subject. With best wishes and warm regards,

Jimmy Carter

9

April 8, 1977

Dear Mr. President, I thank you most sincerely for the cordial greetings which you have conveyed to me on the occasion of the opening of the I ran Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology. As you are aware, Mr. President, this Conference wi 11 discuss important subjects relating to all aspects of the Transfer of Nuclear Technology to developing countries with particular emphasis on the practical experience gained and the problem areas in the im-

plementation of nuclear energy programs. I would like to stress the fact, Mr. President, that I fully share your deep interest in nuclear energy and I am profoundly conscious of the potential dangers and harm to mankind that can arise from an irresponsible attitude to it.

In this connection, I would like

to point out that Iran is fully dedicated to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and we shall continue to cooperate with all the nations of the globe to assure this goal for the benefit of mankind.

I am convinced that the results of the Conference will contribute

to a better understanding of the problems of nuclear energy both by the suppliers of nuclear technology and also the recipients of nuclear science and experience. I am particularly pleased that the American Nuclear Society is a co-sponsor of this Conference and that the United States Government Agency will be fully represented. This bears vivid testimony to the very close cooperation that links our two countries together in a wide community of mutual interests. With best wishes and kind regards,

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Aryamehr

10

ADDRESS BY

AMIR ABBAS HOVEYDA Prime Minister of Iran

I am most honoured to be addressing today, as the honorary Chairman of this Conference, such a rare combination of eminent scientists, government officials and representatives of the nuclear industry.

This is an event of considerable importance whose impact will be

strongly felt on decision making processes all over the world.

It has the unique merit of

providing a forum for dialogue among three sectors, in a single community of interest: that of nuclear science and technology. The organization of this Conference in Persepolis - the vivid reminder of one of the world's oldest and most enduring civilizations - symbolizes the continuity of technological evolution.

It attests to the fact that science and technology, being the product of man's

cumulative efforts through millennia, constitute a common heritage. Not a long time ago, I was informed by one of our noted archeologists about a remarkable discovery of copper forging units in two of our provinces, Kerman and Qazvin. Dating back to six thousand five hundred years ago, they are perhaps the oldest known remnants of the ancient technology.

These units, each consisting of copper drills, a kiln,

a crucible and several molds, constituted what you may today cal I a ful I "copper cycle" which, I am sure, we would have not hesitated to sell to any prospective buyer. Such relics reinforce my belief that science and technology_ is a universal property to which humanity should have equitable if not unbounded access. This need is most strikingly evident in the field of nuclear technology. become clear that the world as a whole faces a serious energy problem.

By now it has

This is a problem

which transcends boundaries and involves as much the producers of the conventional energy as it does its consumers.

Even a spartan zero-growth development scheme-unacceptable as

it is to the developing nations - could not be sustained without dramatic new discoveries over the existing conventional sources. Where will all this extra energy come from? The world has roughly enough oil to last about thirty to forty years. Besides, this commodity having, to its unique credit, some seventy thousand derivatives, is - in the words of the Shahanshah of Iran - too noble a product to be burnt as an ordinary fuel.

Renewable sources of energy such as hydro-electric, solar, wind and

geothermal may seem to some to provide the answer.

Unfortunately, we all know, hydro-

electric sources of energy cannot make a significant contribution to world's energy balance. In the case of Iran it is already approaching its natural and economic limits. and geothermal energy are at best promises to be yet fulfilled.

Solar, wind

Besides, therefore, the con-

tinued but diminishing reliance on fast depleting oil, and gradual shift to coal for those countries which can afford it, the only alternative to meet the anticipated energy needs is nuclear energy.

11

Iran's declsion to embark on a large scale nuclear program is solely influenced by such considerations which are in turn based on a careful assessment of available options and future needs. The lack of adequate foresight by governments has in the past, invariably plunged humanity into inextricable and highly dangerous situations. For too long we have had to pay the price of the past failures to look ahead. It was Daniel Bell, I think, who said the advantage we enjoy over our ancestors is not due to any larger share of wisdom but rather to our improved ability to anticipate. With the prodigious progress achieved in science and technology in the last two decades, anticipation has become, if not the most essential, at least one of the most cardinal elements of decision making. The future cannot always be correctly assessed but neither for that matter can one cease to be preoccupied with it. And it is indeed such preoccupation with the future that provides the dynamics of our nuclear program. But before going any further into the premises of our policy, let me restate our position, as plainly as I can, with respect to military uses of nuclear energy. Iran is against the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe that these weapons are already in too many handsand make the world a perilous place to be in. We know that a break-down of the non-proliferation regime might spell the doom of life on this fascinating planet, bringing the demise of all that has gone into making it great and splendid as it is. I cannot give a better testimony to our abiding faith in the cause of non-proliferation than to cite a few simple and irrefutable facts: 1.

Iran actively participated in the negotiation and sponsored the resolution dealing with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We were among the first nations to sign and ratify that Treaty and subsequently enter into agreement with IAEA regarding its safeguard provisions.

2.

In developing its nuclear program, Iran, entirely of its own volition, opted for the type of reactors that consume enriched uranium rather than natural uranium.

3.

The Shahanshah of Iran was the proponent of the idea of the establishment of a nuclear weapon free-zone in the region of the Middle East and Iran has since done everything possible to make this idea materialize.

4.

Iran has made it clear, both in private negotiations as well as in public fora, that it is prepared to accept improved methods of control and safeguards in as far as they are contemplated under appropriate international auspices. It is in such a frame of mind that our nuclear program is molded. But in formulation

of our policy we have not been unmindful of, or insensitive to, what might be regarded as drawbacks. The public opinion still tends to associate nuclear technology with its destructive potentials. We should try to remove this psychological block. The catastrophic potentialities of the nuclear beast must always be kept in mind. But science is not and cannot of itself be evi I. We must, therefore, devise and enforce an ethic for survival, lest the passions of man corrupt the infinite capacity for good that science can bring.

12

More recently the ecological and safety aspects of the problem have come to the fore. With respect to environmental hazards associated with the development of the nuclear technology our convictions have been reinforced by the conclusions of highly authoritative recent studies to the effect that nuclear reactors, designed and constructed in a proper way are far' less hazardous than other technical installations of comparable size. This same point was stressed by Dr. Eklund, the Director General of the IAEA in the course of a recent ·statement before a U. N. Conference. I wish to take this opportunity to note his presence in our.rnidst and to extend to him a most sincere welcome. No doubt we must protect the environment from pollution. But surely we are duty bound also to obliterate that more insidious form of pollution which comes from underfed bodies , from untutored minds. The counsel of wisdom thus is hot to abandon the technology because it is less than perfect but rather to work to remove its imperfections. If there is a danger that power reactors may malfunction and cause radio-active leakage, stringent international safeguards have to be devised and met. Strict security measures should be internationally accepted and applied to prevent plutoniuro falling into irresponsible hands. To implement the above ends, a world consensus should be sought through the strengthening of existing international and supranational institutions. The world's scientists, governments and industry must be seen openly to speak with one voice. But, above all, it is imperative that a continuing dialogue be maintained between political authority and the people whom it exists to serve. Another facet of the problem which wi 11, I am sure, be a main focus of this Conference 1s the problems associated with the transfer of nuclear technology, source material and services. As is known to al I of you, the flow of nuclear technology and services is hindered by certain confusions and ever-increasing unilateral conditions on the part of supplier nations. The parties to the NPT are just as much affected by such policies as are the non-signatories. As we have repeatedly stated, our concern for non-proliferation goes beyond sheer respect for it; we consider ourselves a conscientious objector to nuclear weapon proliferation. Yet we know that the objectives of the non-proliferation treaty can only be served if the supplier nations stop being selective in the implementation of its articles. Article IV of the NPT prescribes free and unimpeded access to peaceful nuclear technology subject only to the acceptance of the safeguard provisions. In the long run the implementation of this Article as well as those prescribed· in Articles V and VI are just as central to the maintenance of the NPT structure as are the 'rest of its provisions. While we believe that new and complementary "Guidelines" and mechanisms might become necessary to better safeguard the increasing diffusion of nuclear energy, they should be developed collectively and be consistent with the ideals of NPT and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The principle of free -and open dialogue between the signatory nations for the solution of collective proolems is essential. Unilateral and secret dialogue cannot enhance but would weaken the non-proliferation structure.

13

Ladies and Gentlemen, This generation of humanity has gone through an unparalleled experience. It has witnessed the demise of one age and the birth of a new one. We have just barely been stripped of the last vestiges of the neolithic age to suddenly emerge in the age of atom and space. But this transformation, having taken place with a flashing speed, has confronted us with a dreadful choice. We must either prosper together or, God forbid, perish together. We cannot thus remain impassive to the course of history. The time has come to mobilize our talents and imaginations to chart the road to survival. The two edged sword of nuclear energy requires a careful forging. By all means let us aspire to minimize nuclear dangers but let us also not fear to take the calculated risks with-out which the human race may, sooner rather than later, shrivel up and die when the world literally runs out of oil. A new and comprehensive approach to the question of nuclear energy, to its potentials as well as its perils, is called for to establish an effective, equitable and non-discriminatory system for controlling as well as developing nuclear energy all over the world. Such an approach must seek to prevent not the transfer but the misuse of technology. The choice today is between the sharing and transfer of technology in an orderly manner under reasonable safeguards and leaving countries to develop nuclear technology independently without adequate restraints. Let me finish my remarks by wishing the Conference and each and every one of you success in this great undertaking which I am sure will have an important bearing on decision making all over the world.

14

SPEECH BY

AKBAR ETEMAD President of AEOI

Before having the pleasure of speaking to this important forum, I would like to extend, on behalf of all the participants and myself, our sincere gratitude for the instructive and inspiring remarks His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr addressed to this conference. I would also like to express our appreciation to His Excellency Mr. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, the Prime Minister, for the constructive and informative speech he contributed to this gathering. Ladies and Gentlemen, It is indeed a pleasure and privilege for me to address this significant, even unique forum. It is unique for two distinct reasons, namely its focus and coverage. Transfer of technology in general, and transfer of nuclear technology in particular, have equal relevance for the developed and developing nations which are the exporters and the importers of technology. Al I nations in our time are equally concerned with the transfer of technology, a topic which has been widely neglected for too long, by scientists and practitioners both. The extensive coverage of this conference is another aspect of its uniqueness. We have nearly 500 participants. They represent 41 countries around the world, of which 23 belong to the developing world. 30% of the participants are from governmental agencies, 15% are from research institutions, 5% are from universities, 20% from private industry and 30% from nuclear industry involved in government projects. Of the 500 participants, 230 are authors who have covered 11 major topics.

177 papers are for oral presentation and 34 additional

papers for publication. There will be 4 plenary sessions, 2 panel discussions and 19 parallel technical sessions. The conference is intentionally organized at this historical junction which portrays a grave perspective. A host of systematic analyses based on available data have attempted to visualize the world community around the year 2000. They all share an important and alarming finding, namely an international community characterized by even greater imbalanced geographical distribution of welfare, socio-economic and technological dualism, poverty, and, as a result, a sense of frustration and resentment. All this, at a time when technology has proven itself to be a credible force to help create a more equitable world community. The less-advanced nations are now consciously trying to dramatically transform themselves through rapid and large-scale transfer of technology. The achievement of this humane goal is ultimately dependent on their ability to provide for the resulting energy requirements, both material resources and the technology. Conventional sources

15

of energy do not have a balanced geographical distribution.

Those nations that are rich

in fossil fuel resources, nevertheless, have to search for alternative energy technologies, simply because their conventional fuel reserves are not infinite, and they can, and, should be put to other productive uses.

In this respect, Iran is an example. A disproportionate

number of less-developed nations, however, have inadequate reserves of conventional fuel resources, and they rightly hesitate to develop an energy infrastructure based on classlcal resources and technologies. They opt increasingly for the only existing viable alternative, namely nuclear energy, which consumes a single-purpose resource.

However, the prevailing nuclear policies and practices of the technologically advanced nations are not formulated in relation to this reality and, as such, are not integrative and forward-looking; rather they are formulated in a piecemeal and isolated manner at the risk of being conservative, uni-dimensional, and distortive. The time has come for policy-makers, scientists and the conscious people of the world to face the agonizing realities of the prevailing dualism which has fragmented our world community and captivated its potentialities and creative forces, and to save the future generations from the continuation of this ailing regime. Obviously, this awareness and the ensuing efforts should start by an honest, resourceful and critical evaluation of the existing constraints and needs. It should begin with an impartial understanding and analysis of the essential properties and resources which constitute the legacy of man, of the primordial needs of the human individual, and of the ongoing universal policies and practices for the al location of these resources. Broadly speaking, natural resources and technology are the essential property of Man. Natural resources are geographically bound, but this should not deprive the human race of easy, equitable, and legitimate access to them. However, the most important possession of the contemporary man and his future generations is science and technology. Mankind

rightly regards them as its patrimony and as an integrative universal process that

is not, or rather should not be, bound by time or place. It should be an evolutionary process energized by his cumulative, complementary and cooperative efforts, the products of which belong to all. Beyond this primordial right, it happens that the majority of lessadvanced nations are not endowed with adequate energy resources and technologies which they need to revive their standard and quality of life. The advanced nations, however, display a peculiar attitude towards technology which is characterized by near-absolute sovereignty over it, even where this involves grave deprivations for the human race.

Ironically enough, the technological nations have an enti-

rely different attitude towards the transfer of natural resources. They regard such resources as the property of mankind and demand free and unconditional access to them. If we deprive technology of Its key integrative and developmental value, we shall then perpetuate imbalance and confrontation. Even more important for the destiny of man, we shall generate the very germs that will ultimately inhibit the smooth and orderly development of technology or, at least, distort its evolution and application. I believe we have not yet evaluated the implications of this grave prospect systematically. I earnestly maintain

16

that the time has come for us all to face this simple reality and the resulting challenge. contend that contemporary man is at a critical threshold. most important test of his historical evolution.

He is experiencing the single

It is against this fragile and gloomy back-

ground that I wish to present my views on the drama of nuclear technology transfer. Let me begin by posing a fundamental question.

Why are an increasing number of

aspiring nations, who possess or do not possess conventional sources of energy, opting for the uti I ization of nuclear energy? This irreversible trend is based on three key factors , (1)

an expected dramatic increase in energy requirements over at least the next few de-

cades, noting that greater efficiency and conservation in energy use, although worthwhile, will not alter this trend in any significant way; (2)

the limitation of fossil fuel

resources and their potential for other industrial uses; and (3)

the prospects of nuclear

energy including the promise of Fast Breeder Reactors. The satisfaction of growing need for nuclear energy, however, is ultimately dependent on an orderly and meaningful transfer of relevant technologies.

Otherwise, the aspiring

nations might abandon or significantly alter their option for nuclear energy. result in chaos.

This would

Alternatively, they wi II have to face the resu I ting complexities and con-

straints which inevitably result in frustration and possibly conflict. tried to moderate confrontation and foster harmony and equity.

But Man has always

The guardians of the con-

temporary world order have often claimed to be committed to promoting this ideal through the creation of appropriate institutions for cross-cultural dialogue and harmony.

The spon-

sors of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constituted this institution with a commendable mandate.

In the absence .of any alternative, aspiring nations adhered

to it in good faith, even with enthusiasm in order to promote its collective non-proliferation goals, and to meet their legitimate needs for technology transfer. This institution, however, has some serious deficiencies. achieved its expected universal dimension. certain reasons, adhered to it.

To begin with, it has not

A notable number of nations have not, for

The resulting vacuum has endangered the non-proliferation

goals of NPT, because this gap is primarily created by the so-called "threshold states". But the most disturbing damage to the institution of NPT, is the growing divergence of the policies and practices of the exporters of nuclear technoloqy from the spirit and letter of the Treaty.

The suppliers of nuclear technology are imposing ever-increasing stringent

and distortive terms for the transfer of this important technology. This attitude, is, in our view, largely the outcome of apparent ambiguities and inconsistencies among the suppliers, and is in direct contradiction with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency both.

The persistence of

this approach not only generates new incentives for proliferation, it also deprives mankind of its vital provisions for the constructive uses of nuclear technology.

Thus, it is only

natural that all nations with a genuine interest in non-proliferation and in the smooth and orderly evolution of the contemporary world order, shou Id be concerned. The fault of the supplier nations does not lie only in their distorted interpretation of NPT; the way in which they try to enforce their views and policies is even more alarming.

17

The adherence of non-nuclear nations to NPT is essentially based on their desire for the sovereign use of nuclear technology for developmental purposes in mutual trust and collaboration, and in a healthy international climate. Unfortunately, the dominant industrial nations adopted a different approach: In 1975 they again disappointed the world community by resorting to "club diplomacy".

The ·

object was to unilaterally define and impose a set of policies and "guidelines" for the transfer', or rather .non-transfer, of so-cal led sensitive nuclear technologies. They seem to have chosen this path under the implicit assumption that NPT, a pluralistic institution, can no longer serve to achieve the goal of non-proliferation.

Ironically enough, the

.founders of the "club of London" individually concede that this approach clearly violates the spirit and letter of NPT. From this stand, I would like to ask what is to be the fate of non-proliferation and of the constructive dissemination of nuclear technology which is our true concern? Does mankind intend to control proliferation through the institution of NPT, or through the unilateral medium of "club diplomacy" which is inherently inconsistent with the ideals of NPT? If NPT cannot effectively achieve the goal of non-proliferation, should we then try to refine it within a universal framework, or should we discard it in favor of some other unilateral mechanism?

Do we really believe that any unilateral mechanism is capable of controlling

the spread of nuclear arms? And finally, we want to know for how long such crucial issues are to be answered -by a select few working behind closed doors?

Are we aware of the im-

plications of unilateral and secretive decision-making for international relations and international organizations? This fundamental issue needs to be dealt with soon, before the cause of non-proliferation and other ideals of NPT have been damaged beyond repair.

We must have the courage

to admit that non-proliferation has developed into an ultimately political phenomenon. Thus, its fate does not lie in the hands of a few scientists whose work is directed towards the development of nuclear weapons, but rather depends on the vision and the wi II of policymakers and statesmen. We want to ensure that the higher ideals of NPT are not used to preserve and promote technological monopoly.

Rather, it should, as it was intended to, serve our aspiration for

an orderly and constructive development of nuclear technology.

I do earnestly maintain

that the process of nuclear technology transfer as a technical and managerial problem is solvable.

All that is needed is the right political vision.

Iran is deeply concerned about these fundamental issues.

We are concerned, because

of our determination to help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and because we intend to develop nuclear energy with the collaboration of other nations.

So, we are deter-

mined to help find a meaningful and equitable solution of this problem, and to assume the appropriate role in the international arena. I call on all politicians and policy-makers, scientists and conscious people to assume an active Tole in the solution of the issues that face us, in order to help achieve the ideals that we al I cherish.

18

If we fail in this collective mission, I am convinced that those nations

which are determined on the development and the use of nuclear technology will contrive to mobilize their resources to develop a technology of their own which it will then not be possible to deny them. The aspiring nations of today can no longer afford to be indifferent to their own destiny, nor can they submit to the uni lateral and paternalistic decisions and whims of a few select nations. The political and technical problems which relate to the transfer of nuclear technology, and our resolve for their successful solution, motivated us to organize this international gathering. Such transfer raises many technical problems and issues which need to be analyzed and resolved.

It also requi.res practical experience and the sharing of that ex-

perience. I, therefore, invite all the distinguished participants to make their personal views and experiences openly available to us.

I believe that our collective dialogue during

the next few days will be constructive. This belief leads me to propose that we maintain our dialogue by organizing periodic future conferences on this theme. Before ending, let me express my gratitude to the American Nuclear Society, the European Nuclear Society. and the Japan Atomic Energy Society which so generously helped us to make our first gathering a reality. In the firm expectation that we shall all' take this opportunity to serve as a useful forum for the evaluation of existing deficiencies and the formulation of appropriate solutions, I wish you a memorable stay in Persepolis.

19

ADDRESS BY

SIGVARD EKLUND Director General International Atomic· Energy Agency

Man's curiosity and ingenuity have made it possible for him to learn the art of inventing. The systematic application of this ability has started and accelerated an industrialization process which, in a number of countries where this process could thrive, has eliminated hard labour and helped to create living conditions unthinkable a few decades ago. A question which presents itself whenever there is a discussion of the ways and means by which the standard of living in developing countries can be improved is how to facilitate the industrialization of these countries.

How can the enormous wealth of experience within

developed countries be transferred to developing countries in the shortest time and at lowest cost? There is no simple answer to this question even if the topic is limited, as at this Conference, to the transfer of nuclear technology.

My remarks today wi 11 deal with the experience

which the IAEA has gained in its attempt, over the past twenty years, to live up to what is required of it according to Article II of its Statute; viz. to "accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure, so far as it is able, that any assistance provided by it or at its request or under its. supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose".

This

last objective, which deals with what we now call safeguards, will be the subject of a special lecture at this Conference by Dr. Rudolf Rometsch from the Agency's Department of Safeguards. There are three main ways in which the IAEA contributes to the transfer of nuclear technology to Member States.

All these ways require the Agency's firm commitment to and

active participation in the actual transfer process. In the first place the Agency acts as an intermediary between its Member States in the transfer of information, experience, materials and equipment.

This function is chiefly

carried out within the framework of the technical assistance program, the main components of which are fellowships, experts' services, scientific visits and equipment.

A closely re-

lated activity is the Agency's research contract program under which applied research and development in selected areas is supported and co-ordinated.

In certain fields these re-

search contracts are grouped into co-ordinated research programs under which, as a rule, the Agency brings together research establishments from both developing and developed countries.

Research contracts are cost-sharing in nature, thus increasing the effective-

ness of the Agency's contribution and ensuring the strong interest of the institutes concerned, and are awarcled primarily to institutes in.developing countries.

Developed coun-

tries contribute to this effort normally through cost-free research agreements.

These re-

search programs usually run for a period of three to five years and progress is reviewed

20

at periodic meetings in which research leaders from participating institutes take part. Leading world experts are often invited to contribute to these meetings where the plans for follow-up work are also developed. The organization of training courses, training seminars, study tours, advisory missions and the publication of training manuals constitute a further substantial and important part of this group of activities. In the second main group of activities the Agency assists its Member States, particularly developing Member States, in establishing their own scientific, technical, legal and organizational infrastructures necessary for the introduction of various nuclear techniques, including the planning, construction and operation of nuclear faci Ii ties. The International Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, the Agency's laboratories in Seibersdorf and Monaco, and the operation of an international nuclear data center with responsibi I ity for the world-wide transfer of information on nuclear data requirements from data users to data producers and of the required nuclear data from data producers to data users, are examples of the mechanisms which the Agency uses in this group as far as nuclear physics and applied nuclear chemistry are concerned. One should also note here the exchange of scientific and technical information through international conferences, symposia and meetings of experts, where reviews are made of progress in selected fields of nuclear technology, and the activities of the International Nuclear Information System (IN IS) to which I sha 11 refer later. The third type of activity is not tied up with specific nuclear projects nor with the specific needs of one or more countries. It is concerned with the international standardization of practices tor the radiological protection of workers and the general public, the safe operation of nuclear facilities and transportation of nuclear materials. This activity helps to ensure a harmonization of policies and regulations from State to State and permits the avoidance of duplication of effort. There are three main fields of nuclear technology in which the types of activity I have described above are applied. These are: 1 . Nuclear power and the fuel cycle 2. The application of isotopes and nuclear techniques 3. Plasma physics and controlled nuclear fusion. The Annex to this paper contains a review of the Agency's activities in the many areas of nuclear technology within these fields. It also provides data to illustrate the scope of the Agency's efforts and mentions some specific problems facing the Agency. Towards the end of the Annex you wi II find a description of the main features of a few activities which are of a wider character and apply to all the fields of nuclear technology with which the Agency is involved, namely INIS, technical assistance activities and the elaboration of the radiological safety standards. I do not intend to repeat here the detailed information provided in the Annex but would like to comment on some general trends which are observable in the Agency's past activities in the main areas of nuclear technology and also point to a few likely future trends.

21

During the first ten years of the Agency's existence, attention in the nuclear reactor area was focused on basic problems such as reactor theory and reactor physics. During this initial period the construction and safe operation of research reactors dominated the technical assistance program in this field. However, in the course of time, the main emphasis has gradually turned to the safety and engineering aspects of power r2,.ctors. As the interest of developing countries in nuclear power increased, the Agency began to develop its nuclear power planning advisory services. In 1971-73 the IAEA carried out a systematic survey of nuclear power potential in 14 of its developing Member States. This was the so-cal led "market survey" which is now being continued in the form of nuclear power advisory missions, planning studies and the preparation of manuals on nuclear power planning and cost evaluation. A nuclear power planning study is usually initiated by sending a questionnaire to the country concerned with details of the required in-put data. Later on a team from the Agency visits the country to finalize the data and to make plans for carrying out the study. Usually a country sends to Vienna two or three planners and programmers for training In the methodology for evaluating alternative power expansion programs. The outcome of this work is an optimal program for expanding electricity supply systems in that country, including the role to be played by nuclear power. These planning studies, as well as practical experience in the introduction of nuclear power in developing countries, have demonstrated that the supply of trained manpower is a critical aspect in the acquisition of this technology. There has been, as a result, a marked increase of interest among developing countries in training related to nuclear power and in 1976 nearly one third of all awards for fellowships and one half of the Agency's training courses were devoted to this field. Mr. B. Hammond of the IAEA will deliver a paper to the Conference's Plenary Session on Research and Education on "Manpower Requirements for Nuclear Power Programs and Associated Training Programs". An important part of the IAEA's nuclear power training efforts has been developed since 1975 in co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United States. This consists of a series of fifteen-week courses on nuclear power project planning and implementation and on construction and operational management. These courses are designed to meet the need for specialized personnel within ministries and utilities-managers, planners, decision-makers and key engineers responsible for the management and supervision of nuclear power projects from the early planning stages to full operation. Recently there have been indications of a growing need for Agency assistance in the training of technicians. We are now constdertnq the best ways and means whereby the Agency can respond to this request. As developing countries expand their nuclear power programs it is natural that training activities should also expand. Increased emphasis on ensuring a supply of well-trained nuclear safety standards will lead to specialized training programs. Such programs have already been initiated in the nuclear material accounting and control area and we are planning a training program on the physical protection of nuclear plant and fuel. In these areas

22

the Agency must always give priority to building up key personnel or, in other words, to helping the country concerned to help itself. Uranium exploration, mining and processing are the main areas of the Agency's activity in the nuclear fuel cycle.

Here, all the different forms of the Agency's activities are em-

ployed, viz. conferences and symposia, training courses and sem inars, specialist meetings, co-ordinated research programs, advisory missions, manuals and technical reports, laboratory services, fellowships, experts and e~uipment, as well as the execution of large-scale UNDP projects. The world's uranium reserves, and estim ated additions thereto, have increased from

u3o8 in the price range up to $30/ lb in 1973 to a current figure of 4 mi II ion tons. It is hoped that the Agency's efforts will contribute to further increases in the future. 3 mi Ilion tons of

In the nuclear safety and environmental protection field, the development of radiological protection standards and the preparation of manuals have, since the very beginning of the Agency, been important and continuous activities. Member States have thereby been provided with technical guidance on how the basic radiation protection standards - usually based on the recommended standards of the ICRP - can be met. These standards have to be revised from time to time as a result of improvements in monitoring methods, new approaches to radiological protection measures worked out by the ICRP and the continuous evolution of nuclear techniques in which radioactivity is involved. The Agency's assistance to its Member States in reactor safety was originally based on the use of research reactors. The increasing demand for assistance, mainly in the form of specialist missions on the safe design and operation of nuclear power plants, led to the introduction of the Nuclear Safety Standards Program in 1975.

Its objective is to work out

a set of five safety codes and some 80 accompanying guides applicable to thermal neutron reactor power plants.

This program responds to the needs of both developed and deve-

loping countries who will obtain from these codes and guides knowledge which can be readily incorporated in their national nuclear power plant safety standards and practices. These documents contain, inter al ia, recommendations on governmental su rvei I lance of the safety of nuclear power plants and deal with such problems as the organization and

responsibilities of the regulatory body, its staffing requirements as well as the scope of national safety regulations and recommended procedures for the I icensing of nuclear power plants.

I would like to stress at this point how important it is for Member States embarking on nuclear power programs to have strong regulatory and control capacities in nuclear safety and radiological protection. Our experience in this area shows that this requirement is not always appreciated by Member States. There is a tendency to look for savings in this area. I would like to use the opportunity presented by this Conference to emphasize how dangerous this tendency might be. Insufficient attention to this vital matter can lead not only to failures at the construction and operation stages but also to costly delays in plant commissioning.

I am sure that the results of the Nuclear Safety Standards Program will

help Member States to overcome difficulties of this kind and we are aware that even the

23

draft documents produced are now being extensively used by a number of countries. expected that this program will have a long-lasting character.

It is

After completion of the set

of codes and guides for thermal reactor nuclear power plants, it is planned to switch to nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

At the same time the established codes and guides will be

kept under continuous review. During the last few years emphasis has been also placed on the management of radioactive waste.

Our work in this area is at present confined to reviewing the progress in

research and development of various techniques.

Ultimately this will lead to the develop-

ment of internationally agreed standards once the selected technologies and practices have reached a certain stage of maturity. The disposal of radioactive waste in the oceans is a subject of growing concern.Agency assistance is provided in two ways. First, the Agency formulates detailed definitions and recommendations regarding radioactive pollutants, as foreseen by international marine pollution conventions, such as the London and Barcelona Conventions .Second, the Agency's International Laboratory of Marine Radioactivity in Monaco undertakes measurement of low level radioactivity in the marine environment. Both of these activities are expanding. The Agency's program in the application of isotopes and nuclear techniques is determined essentially by the needs of developing countries.

The interest of a large majority

of Member States in nuclear technologies has over many years necessarily been confined to radioisotopes and applications of radioactivity in agriculture, medicine, water or mineral resources or industry.

The Agency has always endeavoured to assist countries in

these areas and the Annex contains a description of these activities. Some of these methods have now reached maturity.

For example, in the radiation

preservation of food emphasis was initially placed on supporting and co-ordinating research and feasibility studies; later on pilot plants were established and data necessary for obtaining international clearances were collected and studied.

At present, the main

effort is devoted to the economics and technolog.ical aspects of this technique and to the training of personnel in countries initiating their own food irradiation projects. The introduction of a nuclear technique sometimes involves costly equipment or installations and it is essential that the State concerned should receive sound advice on whether the character and the scope of the practical or scientific problem justifies the application of a given nuclear method and the purchase of the necessary equipment.

To

facilitate this task in the medical field a research program is being carried out with the aim of assesssing the cost effectiveness of various nuclear medicine dlaqaostic procedures under the health conditions found in developing countries. About 70% of all research contract funds are spent on the applications of isotopes and nuclear techniques.

To indicate the order of magnitude of this effort about $11. 2 million

was spent by the IAEA in the period 1972-76 on supporting research

in

which research

institutes from about 75 countries participated. In recent years more integrated forms of co-operation have been developed and the majority of isolated research contracts and agreements have now been merged into co-

211

ordinated reseatch programs. Up to 15 research establishments may take part in these programs and are represented at periodical review meetings which are sometimes associated with training workshops. The total effort therefore is strongly oriented towards the solution of given problems. The wider application of nuclear methods and instrumentation in materials analysis is gradually increasing the demand for the Agency's dose intercalibration services and analytical quality services. Between two and three hundred institutes participate annually in these exercises. The usefulness of dose comparison services for gamma and X-rays applied in radiotherapy is evident from the fact that in 1975 about 10 per cent of the participating institutes showed deviations in their dose assessment of more than

±. 1 O per cent. The results of the Agency's analytical quality control program have shown large systematic errors in many of the analytical results received. Element or radionuclide concentrations reported by different laboratories analyzing sub-samples of an identical material have commonly ranged over one or two orders of magnitude. The steady increase in the number of laboratories and the need for improving analytical methods at lower concentration levels mean that the external independent checking of the reliability of measurements is likely to continue as a useful mechanism of internationa I co-ope ration. In the dosimetry field there is a tendency in the Agency to increase the role of the regional laboratories belonging to the International Network of Secondary Standards Dosimetry Laboratories operated jointly by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the IAEA. Through periodical calibration and testing of radiation measuring instrumentation in Member States of the region, these laboratories can very usefully contribute to ensuring the accuracy of radiation dosimetry. Some of the difficulties encountered by the IAEA in co-operating with Member States in the transfer of various nuclear techniques result from insufficient internal co-ordination between atomic energy authorities and other authorities for health, agriculture, industry, power or raw materials in the State concerned. I am pointing this out because efficiency in this area is essential for Member States about to embark on wider uses of nuclear technology When considering tendencies and experience in direct technical assistance activities of the Agency, it is worth recalling that the term "technical assistance" is nowhere mentioned in the Statute of the IAEA. It was foreseen rather that the Agency would supply nuclear material, plant and services to its Member States at an economic price and indeed would even make a profit out of this business. These profits, or "excess of revenues" as the Statute delicately calls them, together with any voluntary contributions to the Agency were to be placed in a "General Fund" to be used as the Board might determine with the approval of the General Conference. A late addition to the Statute also authorized the Agency "to encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts in the peaceful uses of atomic energy".

25

On the basis of these two provisions, the Agency's Preparatory Com m ission included in the first budget in 1958 a sum of $250,000 for fellow ships provided that sufficient voluntary contributions becam e available.

Out of this modest beginning has grown one of the

tw o m ajor program s of the Agency, nam ely the provision of technical assistance to its developing Mem ber States.

This program stood at about $2 m illion a year during the 1960's and

reached a level of $6 m i II ion in 1977, though m uch of the benefit of this increase has been eroded by inflation.

The Agency's ow n program has been pow erfully am plified by nuclear

energy projects financed by the UND P and executed by the Agency.

These projects are

now running at about $4 m illion a year and have increased in num ber during the last five years from 9 to 19, indicating the interest of developing countries in strengthening their capabilities in the nuclear field. UND P projects.

The Agency's funds often serve as seed money for larger

Many Mem ber States, moreover, make large direct or indirect contributions

to selected program s or projects and I may m ention contributions from the United States, the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germ any, Sw eden, Canada and others.

The

Agency's research contracts program - the first and perhaps the only such program in the UN fam ily - also indirectly contributes about $2 m il I ion a year to the transfer of technology. A ll in all, it is estim ated that the Agency is currently spending or adm inistering funds of approxim ately $15 m i 11 ion a year that contribute directly to the transfer of technology to developing Mem ber States.

The spectrum ranges from relatively short visits of a few w eeks

by expert staff mem bers, for instance on nuclear power plant safety or siting m issions, to UND P projects stretching over several years and costing a m illion dollars or m ore. A s exam ples, one could mention here the UND P project in connection w ith the developm ent of the nuclear power program in Rom ania, w here the UN D P contribution exceeds $1.4 m illion, and another project in Brazil costing $1.28 m illion on the application of nuclear technology to agriculture. W hile these program s have grow n steadily during the last two decades and will, I am sure, continue to do so perhaps more rapidly in the years ahead, there are certain inherent or statutory lim itations on what the Agency can do to help its Mem bers acquire advanced nuclear technology. Firstly, it is obvious that the program m ust be attuned to the changing and expanding needs of the Mem ber States them selves.

There are certain I im its, however, to the dem ands

and absorptive capacity of mem bers in a highly specialized field like nuclear technology. Applications for fellowships, for instance, have risen, but only gradually, during the last 20 years from about 300 a year in the late l 950's to about 500 or 600 a year today.

No point

is served in training redundant experts. In the early days, some trainees preferred to stay in the industrial countries to which they were sent for training .or moved to non-nuclear jobs - sometimes better paid - when they returned home. This represented an unfortunate loss in the value of the assistance provided. The provision of experts' services has increased from 38 experts per year in the early 60's to 56 at the end of decade and is now running at 70 per year. We do, however, encounter problems in carrying out this program and in spending the funds available because

26

of the difficulties in matching the experts available to the requirements of the requesting State. Equipment in an expensive field like nuclear energy is, of course, financially more open-ended, but here too it is a rule in all UN programs that equipment is normally an adjunct to other forms of technical assistance and is only exceptionally supplied as a separate item. In short, the outer limits to technical assistance activities are set by the requirements and absorptive capacity of Member States themselves and within these limits the size of the program is dictated by the funds available.

Today we are able lo fill about 50 per cent of

sound and evaluated requests which is not, of course, enough, but compares favourably with other fields of aid. The growth in the Agency's technical assistance programs should not obscure the fact that the total value of the help we give annually does not amount to more than 1 - 2% of the cost of a single large nuclear power station.

In short, the Agency's activities in technology

transfer relate only to the transfer of the know-how itself- transmission of intellectual property, if I may put it that way, and not of plant or capital or fuel. Should this situation be changed and if so, what could be done to change it? As I said, there are certain statutory I imits. Article 11 (bl of the Statute makes it quite clear that the IAEA itself is not and was not intended to be a capital financing organization although it is empowered to serve as a broker between a Member State and an international or national source of finance. very little prospect of this situation changing.

I can see

There are proposals from time to time that

the Statute should be changed to enable technical assistance to be financed from the Agency's regular budget rather than from voluntary funds.

But even if this were done, and one should

not under-estimate the difficulties involved in such a change, this would not mean that the Agency would be transformed into a financing body like the World Bank or the regional banks. There have also been proposals from time to time that the Agency should serve as a source of supply for subsidized nuclear fuel.

Indeed, the original conception of the Agency

was that one of its main functions would be that of bank or broker for nuclear materials. None of these various proposals have been successfu I, and the Agency's fuel supply function has remained a very limited one, namely serving as a third party in transactions between two Member States.

When problems of supply are encountered because of changes in the supply

policies of the major exporters, there is always a renewal of interest in this type of Agency activity.

Realism, however, leads one to doubt in the Agency's ability to compel a reluctant

supplier to carry out earlier commitments which have been overtaken by changes in its export policies. One of the gradual but unmistakable changes in the Agency's technology transfer program has been the slowly diminishing emphasis on transfer of nuclear science techniques, particularly radioisotope and radioactive techniques and towards a steadily increasing transfer of the major nuclear tech no log ies and development of nuclear fuel resources. As developing countries expand their nuclear power programs it would be natural for this

27

trend to become even stronger. The scope and momentum of this trend is, of course, in the first place a function of the speed with which nuclear power spreads among the developing countries. At present, this trend is slow for a variety of reasons. A major constraint is the large investment capital required for nuclear power plants and especially for the first nuclear stations built in countries which often have to develop suitable industrial and transport infrastructures. A very large fraction of these initial financial requirements must be met in foreign exchange

by developing countries which often already experience serious balance of payments difficulties. In addition, the development of a manpower infrastructure in all areas of nuclear power plant planning construction and operation requires more time than is generally realized. Finally, the uncertainties which have recently developed in some major areas of the nuclear fuel cycle such as reprocessing and recycling and the unexpected changes in export control policies of some industrial nations have had a delaying effect on nuclear power planning in developing countries. This leads me to my next point. Whether, in fact, the trend towards nuclear power in developing countries will continue, depends to a large extent on events in the industrial countries themselves rather than in the developing countries. Unless we are able successfully to overcome the present crisis in many western countries regarding the future of nuclear power and to find some consensus on questions such as nuclear safety, and also on reprocessing and the use of plutonium for recycle and for fast breeders, one of the main sources of the technology we seek to transfer may slowly dry up as the nuclear industry in major industrial countries is gradually starved to death by lack of orders. The nuclear manufacturing industry in some western countries has expanded its exports to developing countries in recent years, but it seems doubtful whether the scope of this activity could ever provide a sufficient base for a truly viable nuclear economy. At the beginning of my presentation, I referred to the basic problems of how to improve the standard of living in developing countries. Even if we only consider the population growth from now to the turn of the century, that is from 4 billion to 6 billion, we become aware that, in order to meet the resulting enormously increased demand for food, the mobilization of all available human ingenuity will be required in order to intensify agricultural methods to the extent necessary. This of course would inevitably lead to a sharp increase in energy consumption. Under these circumstances, I feel that neither developed nor developing countries are in a position to speak about the choice between different alternatives of energy supply. I think we must use al I of them at the appropriate time and in the appropriate place, bearing in mind the finite nature of fossil fuels. A tremendous amount of research has gone into the development of nuclear energy and I do not see how mankind can satisfy its ever increasing energy needs without using this new source of energy. This does not mean that al I problems have been solved with nuclear energy in spite of its very high safety record, but there is a continuous striving towards improvements based on accumulated experience, improvements which are pursued more intensively than in any other energy-producing industry.

28

I believe that the present tide of emotion engulfing nuclear power will gradually subside and that it will play an increasingly important role in meeting the growing demands for energy in both industrialized and developing countries.

29

ADDRESS BY H.E. A. CISSE President, Board of Governors, IAEA

Your Excellency, Prime Minister of His Imperial Majesty's Government, Mr. President, Distinguished General President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Your Excellency was kind enough to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to join in your endeavors. I am pleased to participate on behalf of the Agency as President of the Board of Governors for the period 1976 to 1977. Since the election of my country, Senegal, to the Board of Governors of the Agency, I have become aware of the essential role of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the development programs of our state and particularly in the third world countries. I am pleased to see that our current efforts are precisely related to the transfer of nuclear technology. In developing-countries the need for this transfer is even more pressing, given the gap between their level of development and that of industrialized countries. The International Atomic Energy Agency is working towards this, and undertakes to help its member states build the infrastructure necessary to bring these projects to completion. In this connection, I am glad of the presence of Mr. Eklund, General Director of the Agency, who has visited several third world countries to assess on the spot the Agency's technical assistance programs. Our General Director is just back from a stay in Egypt, and made an official visit to Senegal in January which may indicate the increasing interest of the Agency in the African continent. It is indeed important that in the process of nuclear technology transfer to developing countries, Africa receives particular attention, since it is less developed than other third world countries. In this respect, increased assistance from the Agency would have positive results in the implementation of training programs. The introduction of the teaching of nuclear physics in the Universities of Nigeria, Tanzania, and Madagascar should be spread to a greater number of universities in order to bring out more vocations among African students in the nuclear sciences. In the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy! African states concentrate their activities on the areas of agriculture and medicine. With the help of the Agency, our states are setting up and implementing agricultural research programs and programs for the exploitation of water and other natural resources. Agriculture leads the general economy of Africa, but the necessary research through the use of nuclear technology, which could bring solutions to African agricultural problems, is mainly carried out by organizations in developed countries. Given the particular nature

30

of tropical agricultural problems, applied research should essentially be carried out in Africa, and the creation of radioisotope services should be accelerated in all existing agricultural research centres. Services of this type only exist in a few countries - Senegal, Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Sweden. Radioisotopes are used there, and they allow, among other things, the tracking of chemicals in their path from the earth to the plant and make it possible to perform humidity measurements. Ionizing rays produce genetic effects which may create new varieties of widely cultivated plants, and nuclear methods facilitate the selection of those which will need the least water. That is to say, that such an activity is of greatest interest to the African continent, a great part of which needs water and which as a whole lives mostly off agriculture. To ensure the provision of food supplies for the next ten years is a great worry for Africa; avoiding the loss of such supplies is one of the main objectives of African policy. African countries are very interested in the irradiation processing of foodstuffs and are closely following the evaluation of feasibility tests on irradiated materials, as well as the progress of these techniques in general. Work on food irradiation projects is being carried out in Ghana (on cocoa beans) and in Nigeria (on the sweet potato} with the help of Agency research contracts. The Agency fish irradiation conservation project presently being carried out in Asian countries may have important economic implications for African countries if the results prove positive. Furthermore, Africa has, .of course, the advantage of possessing a good share of the world's uranium deposits, but those which are known and have been exploited are the result of limited explorations, and it is certain that more intense prospection, especially In regions which have not yet been investigated, will result in the discovery of new deposits. Studies in some of these regions are being carried out in Madagascar, Zambia, and Uganda. These explorations should spread to other states. In the medical field, diagnostic and therapeutic methods have recently been greatly Improved by progress in nuclear medicine. Some Iaboratorles and dispensaries using radioisotopes have been built with the assistance of the Agency in many African medical centers. One should mention, in this regard, the services of nuclear medicine of the Le Dantec Hospital in Senegal, of the University Hospital of Kinshasa m Zaire, of the Hospital Korie

Bu In Ghana, of the University College Hospital of Ibadan in Nigeria, and the Isotopes and Radiation Center of Khartoum in Sudan. The Agency's financial budget for technical assistance is however limited, and, to tell the truth, insufficient. Allow me, Mr. President, to call on the donating countries for an appreciable increase In voluntary contributions to technical assistance funds.

31

In fact, when we take the issue of nuclear technology transfer as a whole, the problem which arises for planners and leaders is the lack of a relationship between the development of technology in advanced countries and the difficulties that developing countries have to overcome. This statement is most pertinent in the case of nuclear technology since the use of this technology cal Is for huge sums, a high level of know-how, a complex educational organization as well as a highly-developed industry to provide the necessary maintenance and logistic services. An adaptation of technology is therefore necessary, but the problem is not only technical but political, social, and cultural as well. The object of transfer, whether a reactor or a computer, can be passed from one country to another, and in theory, if not in practice, developing countries can largely satisfy their needs through material transfer from advanced countries. What remains, however, is to fac11itate a transfer to these same third world countries through the Agency, of the know-how necessary for the efficient use of this material. I think this constitutes the legitimate objective that this conference has set itself.

Your

efforts in this direction would therefore be consistent with the passionate call addressed to us, this morning, in his historic message by His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah Aryamehr. I wish you all success in your endeavours.

32

REMARKS FOR OPENING SESSION

JOSEPH R. DIETRICH President-Elect American Nuclear Society

I am very happy to be here with you for what promises to be a most interesting and significant conference.

I take pleasure in expressing my thanks to our hosts, the Atomic Energy

Organization of Iran, and in bringing to them, to the other societies who are cooperating in sponsorship of the conference - the European Nuclear Society and the Japan Atomic Energy Society - and to al I of you, the greetings of the American Nuclear Society. We come together at a time when a portion of the great promise of nuclear power has become a reality, when the whole of that promise remains yet to be fulfilled, and when the imminence -of fulfillment causes some to wonder whether the world can live with it.

I refer,

of course, on the one hand, to the vast potential benefits of nuclear power as embodied in the fast breeder, and on the other to the fears that a closed nuclear fuel cycle wi 11 weaken the international control of nuclear weapons. I cannot bring myself to believe that the human race is so incapable of controlling i\self that it must forego the great benefits of nuclear power - not the least of which is the promise of greater international stability resulting from a plentiful energy supply - in order to avoid blowing itself up.

But I do believe that reliable control is not something that will come about

automatically: we must work at it.

And by "we" I mean those who are gathered here.

The

problem of international control must be solved without degrading the potential of nuclear power for meeting our energy needs .

The problem cannot be solved by technology alone,

nor can it be solved without technology. I bring this subject up at this conference because I believe it challenges us to put broader interpretation on the term technology transfer.

d

We must face the fact that the

term technology will have to cover the problems of making our nuclear power enterprise acceptable to man as well as the problems of making it consistent with the laws of nature.

We must recognize'the term transfer as one signifying a two-way exchange. We must learn to listen as well as to speak: and when we do speak we must answer the questions we heard while listening, and in a language understandable to the questioner.

It takes deep under-

standing to answer technical questions in terms non-technical persons can understand. "The problems of nuclear power are not technical, but institutional".

We have heard

that statement so often in the United States that it has become a cliche, and I expect the same is true in many other countries.

Cliche or not, the statement is true so far as it goes:

but I believe it is an oversimplification.

In a society so technologically advanced as to use

nuclear power, the compartmentalization of problems into technological and institutional is itself an admission that they will be solved inadequately, if at all.

Technological consi-

derations must enter into the fundamental structure of our institutions, just as technology

33

itself becomes a more and more important factor in the business of living.

To bring about

that integration requires a major effort in technology transfer: transfer within our several nations as wel I as between nations.

Please do not think that I am speaking only of those

activities generally categorized as "pub I ic information".

I am speaking of a broader effort

to bring together the highest existing nuclear expertise with the highest expertise in the other essential fields: the fields of business, economics, law-making, regulation, and international affairs.

We, the nuclear technologists, must develop a knowledge of those

fields, and we must find the means of transferring the essential knowledge and understanding of nuclear power technology to the practitioners in those fields. nuclear power will not do the job.

Sales talks for

We must exchange solid, objective, information which

will build a base of understanding. To move in this direction, we, as nuclear engineers and scientists, must broaden ourselves.

We must look beyond our technological boundaries and attempt to understand,

and respond to, the concerns of others about nuclear power. technical understanding.

We must also broaden our

We are the spokesmen for nuclear power, and we must speak

with the authority of knowledge.

When we declare that nuclear power is safe we should

have a sound basts for that conviction within our own personal body of knowledge.

When

we say that the technology exists for the safe disposal of radioactive wastes it should be because we have sufficient understanding of the technology to be convinced - not because we have heard or read a similar statement by a colleague. I realize that what I am recommending is an arduous undertaking, but the importance of bringing safe nuclear power to the world justifies the effort.

If we embark on it we will

find that each ofus here has something to learn, personally, from this conference, even though the main emphasis of the conference is on the transfer of technology between nations. Let us use the conference to the fullest possible advantage.

ADDRESS BY

A. COLOMB President of the European Nuclear Society

It is a great honour and a great pleasure for me to represent the European Nuclear Society at this Conference and to have the opportunity to make some remarks during its opening session.

The idea of this meeting is just about as old as the Society the spokesman of which

I am today.

If I remember well, the first meeting for the preparation of this Conference

took place in 1975 in Paris during the same week the European Nuclear Society was founded, and I am very pleased that, in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the American Nuclear Society, we could help our Iranian colleagues during the preparation of this Conference. The choice of Shiraz for a Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology brings to my mind an interesting historical essay by Prof. C. Northcote Parkinson, the author of the well-known Parkinson's Law.

In this essay, called East and West, Parkinson proposes

a theory for the development of civilization based on an alternating ascendancy between the eastern and western part of the Eurasian Continent.

First Mesopotamia, the Indus

Valley and Egypt, than Greece and Rome followed by the Arabian and European expansions to make a long story short. Although most of these alternations of ascendancy were accomplished through conflicts, they always resulted in an improvement of the general technical and cultural level of civilization.

It is therefore very encouraging to meet here in Persepolis, a city once destroyed

by Alexander the Great, to study peacefully the means that will allow mankind to share the energy resources contained in the nucleus of the atom. Meeting at this spot of the world to talk about a transfer of technology is quite symbolic because the transfer we are studying in this Conference is a direct consequence of a much more fundamental transfer that originated right in this area about eight thousand years ago, I think about the invention and the dissemination of agriculture and animal husbandry. Without this invention, nuclear energy would not exist today because the hunting economy we would sti 11 be I iving in would not al low for the creation of the food surpluses necessary for any cultural and technical development. With this invention, the inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent irreversibly committed humanity to a new way of life.

To enlarge its supply of food and its dominion over nature,

mankind had to pay a high price.

The fierce jays, the sharp exertions and instinctive

satisfactions of the hunt had to be replaced by the tedious labor of ti 11 ing the fields and an unremitting enslavement to seed, soil and season had to be accepted forever.

It is

because this price has been paid in the past and is still being paid today that we can enjoy beautiful things I ike the Great Mosque of Isfahan, the Cathedral of Chartres or a Mozart concerto.

35

I am now very much tempted to draw a parallel between this historical development and the introduction of nuclear power in our energy consuming civilization. As Dr. A.M. Weinberg wrote a few years ago, the price mankind will have to pay in order to use this inexhaustible and almost nonpolluting source of energy is both a vigilance and a longevity of our social institutions that we are quite unaccustomed to. The successful manner in which mankind has assimilated agriculture, the most basic of all human revolutions, inclines me to think that it will also have the maturity and the sense of responsibility called for to use nuclear power for the benefit of all and not for its own destruction. To achieve this goal, we will not only have to explain clearly and patiently the risks associated with the production of nuclear electricity but we will also have to help untangle the real issues from the fallacious ones.

For example, in my opinion, the priorities that

seem to be set today between the non-proliferation issue and the closure of the fuel cycle are wrong.

The production of atomic weapons is definitely a question of national political

aim and if deemed necessary by some, it wi II happen whether the spent fuel from electricity producing plants is reprocessed or not.

On the other hand, the safe terminal storage of

radioactive high level wastes is an absolute necessity for any electro-nuclear program of consequence.

Reprocessing certainly allows for a better and safer terminal storage.

I am convinced that technical societies have an important contribution to produce for the clarification and solution of such problems. Because all nuclear societies have many common interests and because the formation of the European Nuclear Society has shown to me that the federation of fifteen national societies is possible and yields good results, I would like, at this time, to pledge that it is the firm intention of the European Nuclear Society to help with the foundation of any new nuclear society and to collaborate in every way with its programs. To conclude, let me extend my warmest thanks to the organizers of the Conference which, I am sure, wi 11 greatly contribute to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

36

ADDRESS

KOOi HUS/Ml

President Atomic Energy Society of Japan

Mr Chairman, distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen. It is indeed my greatest pleasure and honour to be given the opportunity to address this distinguished assembly on behalf of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan. As President of this Society, which is co-sponsoring the present conference, I cannot refrain from expressing my admiration at the firm purpose and energy with which the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has so effectively arranged this great event. Our Atomic Energy Society of Japan has been able to take part in the preparations for this conference from its earliest stages, by sending members to both the Executive and Program Committees. At the same time we established a Supporting Committee in Japan, to take care of publicity, and to handle the papers sent in for presentation tothe conference.

For the supporting committee, we were able able to obtain wide participation

of members from academic and from industrial circles, and, in particular, from the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation. Taking the lead among the oil producing countries, Iran has embarked on the road to nuclear power generation. We deem it a wise decision. considering that the reserves of oil and gas, however rich, are by nature limited, and should, in our thinking, be utilized to the best advantage and profit of mankind. It should never be too early for a nation on its way to industrialization to start preparing for the day when it will be consuming power at a rate that might appear fantastic today. Many international conferences have been held in the past in the domain of nuclear technology, but they were mostly organized by and for what might be called the "nuclear advanced nations", and consequently not necessarily of value to "nuclear developing nations". The present conference represents a unique undertaking, in that it is focused on the transfer of nuclear technology from the advanced to the developing nations. And. with this aim, this undertaking has the backing of representative societies in three different parts of the world - the European Nuclear Society, the American Nuclear Society and the Atomic Energy Society of Japan. The interest drawn to the event and the support accorded to it are well evidenced by the more than 250 papers submitted from 30 nations, and by your active participation, to count over 500 members. My country - Japan - is often cited as a successful case of technological assimilation. It is true that the event known in Japanese history as the Meiji Restoration, that opened our doors to the Western world in 1867, was followed by persistent acquisition of technology

37

transfer, which permitted a fairly rapid take-off of our technological capability, and which has since contributed richly to our country's industry and economy and to improving our standard of living.

Today, technology transfer is gaining recognition as an effective tool

for easing the North/South disparity -- as an implement just as important as capital trans~er, trading primary products, and solving the accumulated financial liabilities of the developing countries. From the rich successful and unsuccessful experiences we have had in the long history of technological acquisitions, we have now learned several lessons about technology transfer.

I firmly believe that the experiences and lessons in the field of nuclear technology,

which will be delivered in subsequent sessions by my Japanese colleagues, will contribute much value to the purpose of this Conference.

Here, I would like to point out one lesson

of a more general character, namely the importance of general education of the people as well as technical personnel.

Since a new technology of significance introduces a profound

effect in the society, people must be prepared to accommodate to the changes involved. This remark applies especially to a technology in growth, because it is not yet sufficiently made fool-proof or commercialized.

The Japanese people at the time of the Meiji Restoration

were rather happy in having a fairly wide-spread educational system of private or public schools where young people were instructed in reading, writing and arithmetic so that it was rather smooth for the Japanese nation to incorporate the European civilization into the reformed social institutions. Another particular point we Japanese can contribute to the Conference is the grave experience of being severely injured by the first atomic bombs.

This tragic event became

the cause of the Japanese people's insisting on the strict separation of nuclear weapons development from the peaceful and constructive uses of nuclear energy.

This spirit was materi-

alized in the establishment of the fundamental law of atomic energy of 1954, which strongly limits the research and development in nuclear energy only to the peaceful purposes. Japan has recently entered into the NPT, in order to substantiate this spirit in the international scene.

It is thus particularly welcome that Iran has, as the Prime Minister just

declared, firmly decided to promote nuclear technology only and exclusively for peaceful objectives. I would like now to turn to more technical aspects of transfer of nuclear technology. The transfer of nuclear technology, in particular, is a problem involving inter-disciplinary implications, and it is a technology that requires a long lead period from basic and applied research through the stage of demonstration to commercialization. extremely costly technology.

It is also an

Another particularity of nuclear technology is that the trans-

fer cannot be completed after a limited period of assimilation, but calls for continuing international collaboration to ensure the maintenance of a complete fuel cycle -- from securing access to sources of uranium, through refining, enrichment, fabrication. reprocessing, to waste treatment, in the construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants, and for assuring the safety of these installations through constant research and development. A most important aspect of technological transfer is that of the relevant "soft-ware",

38

that is, the training and education of technical personnel, to engage in the construction. operation and maintenance of power plants and other nuclear facilities, including the assurance of their safety, as well as supporting research and development activities.

I am most

gratified to see that a considerable amount of time is planned to be devoted during this Conference to questions related to training and education. Another most important task awaiting the specialists thus trained is to set on foot the supporting industry in their own country to serve the nuclear activities, and to put the transferred technology to practical, productive use.

Here the country's policy-makers

will face the difficult task of deciding what specific aspects of nuclear technology to develop within their own country, and what aspects to leave to importation of hard- and software.

Many circumstances governing the particular country would have to be taken into

consideration -- social, economic, industrial and technological.

And the policy should re-

quire review from time to time in the light of eventual changes in both the national and international picture.

The present Conference should provide an excellent occasion for dis-

cussing those problems, with the accounts of the experience -- successful and unsuccessful -- of one country serving to incite active discussion by the participants from other countries. Japan set forth on the road to nuclear energy in 1954.

Today, with 13 units already

installed, generating a total of 7.4 million kW, and with 15 further units under contruction or projected, to add another 13 million kW in generating capacity, our country has come to rank next to the United States in atomic power generation.

Most of the related technology

was at first imported, but we have today assimilated most of the manufacturing technology, except for certain aspects that might be termed "hard core" technology. We have even come to export to other countries some of the main components such as pressure vessels and cladding material.

Many of the papers contributed from Japan to this Conference

contain a reflection of one aspect or another of our experience in assimilating foreign nuclear technology, and for this reason, should, I hope, be of interest to the participants. In closing, I wish every success which this Conference deserves, and that, through its service to the development of the nuclear activities of the developing countries, it will be able to contribute to their industrial and economic advancement and to the enhancement of their living standards. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

39

EXPERIENCE IN TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

PLENARY SESSION All Invited Papers Chairman: S. Eklund (IAEA/Austria)

A N

N

E X

IA E A EX P E R IE N C E IN T H E T R A N S F E R O F N U C L EA R T E C H N O L O G Y - A R ev iew of th e M a in Ex am p le s of th e A ctiv itie s of th e In tern atio n a l A tom ic En e rg y A g en cy R e latin g to th e T ran sfer of N u c lear T ech n o log y

SIGVARD EKLUND Director General International Atomic Energy Agency

NUCLEAR POWER AND THE FUEL CYCLE

In the field of uranium exploration, mining and processing, assistance is given to Member States in the assessment and development of their indigenous uranium reserves.

Research

is co-ordinated through research contracts in geology, ore processing and recovery of uranium from unconventional sources.

Attention is given to the transfer of information in

the field of uranium geology and production through the convening of symposia and specialists' meetings.

The latter have been used to review progress in such areas as uranium

exploration, geology, exploration methods, radon in uranium mining, uranium ore processing, recognition and evaluation of uraniferous areas, evaluation of uranium resources and natural fission reactors.

In co-operat,on with the Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD) the

IAEA is now initiating a number of specialist workshops on bore-hole logging techniques, gaseous geochemistry, bio-geochemistry, rock geochemistry, etc.

As a rule the results

of such meetings are made available to Member States in the form of technical publications. Technical reports on recommended instrumentation and manuals on geochemical methods and reserves estimation methods have been published. Since 1965, at two-year intervals, the IAEA has been reviewing the world uranium and thorium resources, production and demand. co-operation with the NEA.

These reviews are also carried out in

The resulting reports are widely accepted as authoritative

statements on these subjects. Complementary to these functions, the Agency also directs efforts to develop a standardized presentation of Member States' data on uranium resources with a view to achieving greater consistency in reporting and in the evaluation of regional or global uranium reserves. Direct technical assistance in uranium prospecting and development and ore processing has been provided to 24 countries, i_ncluding four large-scale UNDP projects executed by the Agency in Chile, Greece, Pakistan and Turkey. will be initiated in Peru this year.

Another large-scale project

Four training courses on uraniurr. exploration, evalu-

ation and/or analysis have been organized through the Technical Assistance program.

41

Two hundred and seventy fellows have obtained training in nuclear raw materials, 70 of them during the last three years. In fuel element fabrication and processing, the exchange of information remains somewhat limited owing to commercial interests. As a result of the Agency's concern for the safety aspects of nuclear power, its role in fuel element technology is centered on aspects of quality assurance and quality control. An international Working Group on Water Reactor Fuel Performance and Technology has been formed and it wi II constitute a forum for the harmonization of approaches. Direct techhical assistance in fuel fabrication techniques has been provided to a number of countries. In Romania and Mexico the Agency is executing large-scale UNDP projects. Recently, the main work concerning spent fuel and reprocessing and re-cycling has been carried out within the framework of the Agency's study on regional nuclear fuel cycle centers. This study covers the technical and economic aspects of spent fuel transport and storage, fuel reprocessing, fuel fabrication and radioactive waste processing and disposal. its objective is to evaluate the soundness of the concept of regional or multi-national centers in the light of the legal and institutional considerations and the questions of financial and material security and environmental protection involved. A report covering both the methodology developed for the evaluation of alternative strategies as well as the conclusions of the study wi II be presented to the Agency's Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle to be held in Salzburg next month. The Agency is ready to fol low-up this activity if Member States so wish. In 1973, the Agency completed a survey on nuclear power in 14 developing Member States as part of its work in nuc!ear power planning and economic evaluations. One of the objectives of this study - which is known as the Market Survey - was to assess the economically justifiable market for small and medium power reactors. As part of this study a system of computer codes called WASP (Wien Automatic System Planning Package) was developed with the help of experts from the United States. Since 1973 it has been further developed and has been found by many power system planners to be an excellent means of evaluating alternative power expansion programs. Thirty-three engineers from 17 countries have been trained by the Agency in the use of WASP. Upon request, WASP can be made available to Member States in the form of a magnetic tape containing the FORTRAN listing of the main codes and auxiliary computer codes together with supporting documentation. To date, it has been provided free of charge to 24 Member States and four international organizations. During the last five years, the Agency's activities related to nuclear power planning and economic evaluations have resulted in nine advisory missions on nuclear power, six nuclear power planning studies, the preparation of five codes and manuals on nuclear power planning and the dissemination of nuclear and conventional plant cost data. The activities of the IAEA in the area of advanced nuclear power technology and reactor physics are directed towards fostering information exchange and other forms of technical collaboration among Member States engaged in the development of advanced nuclear power systems and towards improving energy conversion systems. The International

42

W orking Group on Fast Reactors serves as a main forum for inform ation exchange and contributes towards a better co-ordination of research effort in fast breeder technology.

Som e

25 specialist meetings have been held under the aegis of this W orking Group to discuss specific technological areas of current im portance.

Several sym posia have been organized

to review the developm ent of high tem perature gas-cooled reactors, including exploitation of the thorium fuel cycle for both electricity production and high tem perature process heat applications. W ith UNESCO, the IAEA co-sponsors the International Liaison Group on Magnetohydrodynam ic (M HD) Electrical Power Generation, w hich allow s those countries w hich are m ost advanced in this technology to exchange experience and review progress m ade. There has been an increasing participation on the part of developing countries in studies on reactor physics and related areas, e.g. reactor analysis, shielding, physics, and reactor radiation measurem ents. in these areas.

Several co-ordinated research program s have been organized

A training sem inar on the developm ent of nuclear theory and com puter pro-

gram s w ill be organized in 1978 together with the International Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste.

This activity helps developing countries to build up their own capa-

city in reactor physics, which is necessary for ensuring the safe and econom ic operation of nuclear pow er plants. The safe design and operation of nuclear power plants is, of course, a major consideration in the protection of m an and the environm ent from the harm ful effects of radiation. To ensure that com prehensive and self-consistent standards are developed for such plants, the Agency established its nuclear safety standards program nearly three years ago. A set of safety codes and accom panying guides applicable to therm al neutron reactor pow er plants is being prepared by m eans of an elaborate iterative review procedure carried out by separate com m ittees of technical and regulatory experts from countries having developed nuclear pow er program s. The resulting docum ents thus represent not only a consensus based on w orld-w ide experience in the field, but also standards that are internationally acceptable.

To date

codes of practice on siting, operation and governm ental organization have been com pleted, and the two rem aining codes - on design and quality assurance - will be com pleted this year.

Typical of the nearly 40 accom panying guide docum ents which are in the course of

preparation, are those on qualifications of regulatory staff, aseism ic analysis and testing of nuclear power plants, fire protection at nuclear pow er plants, staffing, recruitm ent, training and authorization of operating personnel, and quality assurance program preparation for nuclear power plants w hich are now in the final stages of production. As these docum ents are com pleted they will be prom ulgated to Mem ber States to use as they see fit in the form ulation of their ow n national reactor safety standards and practices.

How ever, the interest in these topics is so great that even the draft docum ents are

already being extensively made use of by a num ber of countries. O f increasing frequency and im portance are the siting and safety m issions for nuclear pow er plants com posed of two or three Agency staff m em bers and an equal num ber of ex-

43

ternal experts. Over the past few years such missions have gone to the Republic of Korea, Iran, Brazil, Mexico, Kuwait, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Singapore and Greece. Joint safety missions are also dispatched on a regular basis to advise on research reactor installations or on any other nuclear facility upon which States seek advice. Of increasing importance and currently of public concern is the protection of man and the environment from any possible harmful effects from the storage, disposal or release of the waste products of atomic energy programs. Here, too, the Agency will ultimately develop suitable standards; however, in this area the technologies are not so well developed as in the areas of radiological protection and nuclear reactor safety. Thus, the Agency's work

at

present is confined

to

reviewing the techniques aimed at ensuring that the releases of_

radionuclides and other contam_inants from the nuclear industry are maintained at acceptable levels, and to assessing the consequences of actual releases and evaluating the potential impact on the environment. Methods for the treatment and disposal of low and intermediate level radioactive wastes have been reviewed and information on these methods has been made available to Member States. A code of practice on the management of radioactive wastes produced by rad iolsotope uses and a code of practice and a gui?e on radiological safety in uranium and thorium mines and mills have been issued as well as four technical reports. The Agency has also pub! ished ten volumes of abstracts on waste management research. Of growing concern is the question of radioactive waste disposal into the oceans. The Agency's initial definition of high level radioactive waste considered unsuitable for dumping in the deep ocean together with its recommendations on the procedures to be followed for the dumping of other materials were accepted at the first meeting in 1976 of the Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (The London Convention). A program of revision is now underway,. and the Agency will provide a similar definition and recommendations for the Barcelona Convention on the Dumping of Waste in the Mediterranean. For any program in which larger quantities of nuclear materials are involved_, the States concerned need to establish a system of control and protection of nuclear materials. Apart from the implementation of its international safeguards, which is the subject of a separate paper for this Conference, the Agency has a duty to assist States in discharging their national responsibilities in regard to nuclear material accountancy control and physical protection. Co-ordinated research programs have been established for plutonium analysis and collection of isotopic composition data for irradiated reactor fuels. The aim of the latter program is to establish a data bank which can be used in a nuclear material control measure known as the isotopic correlation technique. Another program-is now underway to deal with the problems of in-plant instrumentation for nuclear material control. A training course for personnel from States' systems of nuclear material accountancy and control was held in Vienna in 1976. Further courses are planned at basic and advanced levels. In 1975 a booklet entitled "Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials" was issued as a guide for

44

Member St-ates in this important aspect of nuclear material control.

APPLICATIONS OF ISOTOPES AND NUCLEAR TECHNIQUES In the use of isotopes and radiation for agriculture and animal production the history of research in the nuclear sciences, as in other fields, dates back to the last century and to people such as Roentgen, Becquerel and Curie. Two roads of application were discerned at an early stage: the use of isotopes as tracers in studies of chemical and biological pathways and the interaction of ionizing radiation with matter. In 1964 the Joint FAO/IAEA Division was established in the Agency's Vienna Headquarters with a view to pooling expertise in nuclear techniques and in selected areas of agriculture and animal production. The objective of this Joint Division is to exploit the potential of nuclear techniques and to foster applications of isotopes and radiation in research and development for increasing agricultural production, improving food quality, protecting agricultural production from spoilage or losses and minimizing the pollution of food and the agricultural environment. During the last five years about 130 technical assistance projects have been executed by the IAEA which were aimed at strengthening Member States' own capability. Three of these were large-scale UNDP projects in Yugoslavia, India and Brazil and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) supported one such project in Bangladesh. Two new large-scale projects are being initiated now. With a view to strengthening national research capability more than 20 co-ordinated research programs are at present being carried out with the participation of more than 200 scientific institutes. These studies attempt to solve very practical problems as can be seen from the titles of just a few of the co-ordinated programs of research: - fertilizer efficiency studies on grain legumes - use of irradiation and isotope techniques in studies of soil water regimes - use of radiation-induced mutations in rice breeding and production - technological and economic feasibility of food irradiation - radiation preservation of Asian fish and fishery products. An average of two symposia and two training seminars are organized annually. -Since 1964 more than 80 publications have been issued in this field. Two to three international or regional training courses and study tours are organized on an average each year and about 60 individual fellowships are provided. In all these activities supporting services are provided by the Seibersdorf Laboratory, e.g. analyses of stable isotopes and radioisotopes, development of routine screening methods for large numbers of plant samples for mutation breeding and provision of irradiation services. Since 1964 assistance has been given in applications of ionizing radiations whereby food can be preserved against deterioration due to microbial attack or insect infestation or to sprouting or over-ripening. The interest of developing countries in this technology of food preservation results from its very low energy requirement and low investment cost.

45

Through research contracts and large-scale, long-term wholesomeness experiments (some per.formed as part of the International Project in the Field of Food Irradiation, a joint project, co-sponsored by OECD (NEA) in which 23 Member States of the Agency take part) data have been collected with the aim of justifying the 1nternational and national clearance of irradiated food for consumption and the recognition of radiation as an accepted technology in food preservation. In 1976 an Expert Committee, jointly convened by FAO, WHO and the IAEA, met in Geneva and recommended the unconditional clearance of five food items (potatoes, wheat, chicken, strawberries and papaya) and provisional clearance for three (fish, rice and onions}.

This recommendation will be considered by the Codex Alimentarius Commission

of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program in May this year.

A positive decision would

unquestionably represent a breakthrough in this area and the Agency's efforts will be shifted towards assisting and guiding developing Member States in establishing their own food irradiation facilities. Already, scientific guides and technical assistance have been provided to several small-scale projects, mainly in Asia.

A technical assistance request

from Iran in this field is at present under consideration. In the application of nuclear methods in medicine the IAEA assists in the introduction of radionuclide tracer techniques in research and diagnosis. The yearly purchases of instruments and radlonuclides for medical applications now run into billions of dollars in the developed countries.

However, the patterns of disease and health care in these

countries are quite different from the patterns in developing countries.

It is the objective

of the IAEA to promote the transfer of this technology to developing countries in a manner appropriate to their circumstances.

Close co-operation is maintained with the World Health

Organization. About $200,000 is spent per annum by the IAEA to support co-ordinated research programs in such domains as techniques for measuring iron absorption from the diet in the framework of research on iron deficiency anaemia (only isotopic methods can be used in these measurements), and the measurement of tracer element concentrations in various tissues and in vitro assay procedures.

One of the on-going programs aims at developing

cost effectiveness methodology for assessing the appropriateness of various nuclear medicine diagnostic procedures under the health conditions found in developing countries. Another project is being drawn up to appraise the problem of and resources for maintenance of nuclear medicine instruments in developing countries. Conferences, training seminars and one or two smaller meetings per year are organized, often co-sponsored by WHO. These latter meetings usually focus on subjects of special interest to developing countries. Technical assistance projects in this field, aimed at establishing in hospitals and research institutes certain technical capabilities, are currently funded at a cost of nearly $3/4 million per year. Another nuclear technique which is gaining increasing attention in developing countries is the radiation sterilization of medical products.

A co-ordinated research program on

radiation sterilization practices significant to local medical supplies and conditions was set

46

up for Asia and the Pacific region.

The experience gained should serve as a model for fu-

ture similar programs in other regions. East Region.

The next program is likely to be for the Middle

Two training courses (one in India and the other in Argentina) were held

during the last five years as this sophisticated technology requires very specialized personnel.

A manual on radiation steri I ization of medical and biomedical meterials was pub-

bl ished in 1973. were executed.

Eleven technical assistance projects financed from IAEA and UNDP funds Two cobalt-60 facilities for steri I izing medical products were recently

completed in India and the Republic of Korea and similar plants in Egypt, Hungary and Yugoslavia are nearing the commissioning stage. As the numerous applications of isotopes in industry as well as the production of radioactive sources have already reached the stage of routine industrial applications and are widely spread, the Agency's role is now limited to administering technical assistance projects and providing, from time to time, for a review of the latest developments in the field. The use of gamma-radiography in assessing the construction of cross-country pipelines for petroleum products in Tunisia, the introduction of tracer techniques for studying rotary kiln operations in Brazil, and the technology of production of cobalt-60 and iridium192 in Argentina are examples of recent technical assistance projects in this area. The transfer of technology in the domain of production of radioactive sources poses special problems.

Usually, the schedule of operation of research reactors in developing

countries is non-optimal for radioisotope production and the neutron flux is relatively low. Substantial adaptations of techniques to local conditions are therefore necessary as larger samples and even different target materials must be irradiated and this leads to new prohlems, such as purity of the tarqet and the need for different methods for its processing

after irradiation.

In the preparation of labelled compounds and radiopharmaceuticals it is

not always possible to copy the standard procedures used in other countries. A wide range of isotope techniques in hydrology is now available in solving problems which arise in the increasing need for assessment and development of water resources for agriculture, community water supplies and industry.

The Agency operates an analytical

laboratory for environmental isotopes through which it can play a direct operational role in transferring know-how for measuring the natural variations in the stable isotopic and environmental radioisotopic composition of water. unique information in ground water investigations.

This method is providing valuable and In addition to providing services in

analyzing deuterium, oxygen-18, carbon-13, tritium and carbon-14, the distribution of standards and the intercomparisons of measurements for national laboratories are carried out.

Analytical and consultancy services are provided to large-scale UNDP projects carried

out within the United Nations system.

The Agency's program is directed towards promoting

these techniques, and the provision of training in their use and of the necessary analytical services. A subject which is becoming of increasing importance in the nuclear field, and in other fields of technology, is nuclear-based methods and instrumentation for materials

47

analysis. The applications outside the nuclear fuel cycle are to be found in such areas as lndustrxal pollution, industrial quality control, prospecting and the development of natural resources. There are two main ways in which the Agency assists its Member States here. Through the mechanism of co-ordinated research programs in which mainly institutes from developing countries (but also leading research establishments in developed countries) participate, research is stimulated in such fields as nuclear-based methods for trace elements analysis, nuclear-based techniques in geology and mineral prospecting, and elementary analysis by proton-induced X-ray fluorescence. Iran is participating actively in this last program. The other form of direct assistance to laboratories in Member States consists in maintaining their analytical reliability through the provision of analytical quality services. The Agency's Laboratory at Seibersdorf and the International Laboratory for Marine Radioactivity in Monaco are instrumental in providing these services. Assistance is provided by the Seibersdorf Laboratory in the form of the organization of some 6 to 10 intercomparisons per year with 10-15 laboratories participating in each. In addition, reference and standards samples are sent to institutes upon request. In 1976, 500 such samples were shipped to institutes in 40 countries. The Monaco Laboratory, in reflecting the IAEA's concern about sea pollution by radioactivity, has perfected techniques for the measurement of low levels of radioactivity in the marine environment and has used these techniques in the measurement and quantification of a number of marine samples such as fish, plankton, seaweed and sediments. These samples are then made available to Member States to be used as secondary standards to assure the quality of their own measurements. In spite of the substantial development of analytical services in Member States, there is strong support for the continuation of this activity by the IAEA. Because of the large number of new laboratories and the need to improve analytical methods at lower concentration levels, the outside, independent checking of the reliability of measurements is considered as a useful mechanism of international co-operation. As a corollary of all the activities relating to the applications of isotopes and nuclear techniques, assistance is provided to Member States in the dosimetry of ionizing radiations. The Agency's program in this field concentrates on two main projects which are executed jointly with the World Health Organization, viz. the International Network of Secondary Standards Dosimetry Laboratories and the implementation of a dose intercomparison service for gamma and X-rays applied in radiotherapy for the treatment of cancer. At present, 11 'such laboratories are participating in this network, including one in Iran, and 15 more are about to join. The main function of these laboratories is to calibrate and test radiation measuring instruments used in Member States within an increasing number of projects involving the use and the production of ionizing radiations and radioisotopes. Earlier errors in radiation dosimetry which made the application of therapeutic radiation either inefficient or hazardous have underlined the need for ensuring the accuracy of radiation dosimetry. With the same aims, the postal dose comparison service and organized dose comparisons are carried out jointly with the WHO. in 1976, 140 institutes, primarily in the Far East and

48

Pacific area, participated in the service.

Its usefulness can best be demonstrated by findings

in 1975 when about 10% of the participating institutes showed deviations in their dose assessment of more than:::. 10%

Most of them showed a considerable improvement in their results

when they were checked in a second comparison. PLASMA PHYSICS AND CONTROLLED NUCLEAR FUSION It is estimated that about three-quarters of a billion dollars is spent annually on research and development in the field of plasma physics and controlled nuclear fusion by those countries operating large programs.

The IAEA serves as a forum for the exchange.of

scientific information and plans between the nations and laboratories involved. The lnter·national Fusion Research Counci I plays a very important part in this activity.

It is com-

posed of the leaders of ten national programs and meets annually to review the progress made in Merriber States and to advise the IAEA on its future program. The exchange of technical information is facilitated by biennial international conferences on plasma physics and controlled nuclear fusion as well as by workshops and technical meetings on selected aspects. The Journal "Nuclear Fusion" publishes original papers on fusion research. Two years ago a new activity was initiated, namely the coltectton end dissemination of atomic and molecular data for fusion which are necessary in basic research and fusion reactor engineering. Apart from the huge research and development programs in leading countries in this area, it appears that an increasing number of developing countries wish to initiate fusion research.

In addition to contributing to the world's efforts, the experience and knowledge

gained by them can be applied to practical problems such as technology of micro-electronics. To support these efforts a co-ordinated research program on "energetic particle interactions with materials of importance to fusion reactors" has been initiated.

It may be of interest to

this audience to know that, in a few months' time, in the nuclear research center in Tehran which participates in the program I have just mentioned plasma will be brought to the conditions necessary for fusion reaction on a laboratory scale in an ALVAND I experiment. Apart from direct involvement in the transfer of nuclear technology in the fields described above, the Agency carries out a few large-scale activities which are of a wider character and which are applicable to almost ail the fields of technology in which the Agency is involved. Eight years ago the International Nuclear Information System (INIS) was established for the collection and dissemination of information on the scientific, technical, legal, economic and social aspects of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. With the discontinuation of Nuclear Science Abstracts in July 1976, INIS became the world's only international abstracting information system in the nuclear field.

Through this system the Agency furthers

the exchange of nuclear information between countries of varying levels of development.

It

also stimulates the development of improved methods of data handling in the participating Member States.

Fifty Member States and 13 international organizations contribute to a file

which now contains some 300,000 items of nuclear information.

It is estimated that this

file covers some 90% of the total literature published within the nuclear field over the last

49

three years, as well as 35% of the literature published in the previous four years. New data are added at the rate of 60,000 to 70,000 items per year. Member States are provided with the system's output twice a month in the form of computer tapes and a printed abstracts journal, Full text copies of over 85,000 of the documents listed In the INIS fifes can be made available in the form of mlcr_ofiches by the INIS Clearing house. This microfiche 'library' Is growing at the rate of 15,000 new ·items per year. In order to assist countries in planning their own national information structures for co-operation with INIS and serving their own information needs according to local conditions, the Agency conducts regular training seminars and makes available opportunities for trainees and fellows to receive in-house training at the IAEA Headquarters, and provides technical advisory services to national centers. Over 400 participants, the majority of whom are from developing countries, have attended INIS training seminars since 1970. The provision of direct technical assistance has already been mentioned several times in the above description of the Agency's involvement in individual fields of nuclear technology. In general, in recent years the Agency has provided technical assistance.to the value of $8 to ·9 ml II ion per year to some 70 developing countries. Technical assistance is financed from voluntary contributions of the Agency's Member States which are donated in kind and In cash, in some cases in non-convertible currencies. In order to make optimal use of these resources, the Agency has to, for instance, purchase equipment from a large number of countries. This causes some administrative difficulties. In the case of the receiving country, delays in the lnlti.ation of work programs and In the clearance of expert candidates, combined with difficulty in finding experts who are available at the time required, causes delays in the implementation of projects. It has been observed that an average of five years is necessary for the completion of all approved assistance. Another form of direct assistance includes the training of scientists, engineers and technicians. The field of manpower development has always been of main concern to the Agency in its technical assistance to developing countries. This resulted from the understanding that in building up the ability of developing countries to absorb nuclear technology, the availability of qualified personnel was a decisive factor. There are two main forms of training activities: short-term training projects (scientific visits, study tours and training courses) and long-term individual study programs in which fellowships are granted. In recent years 400 - 500 awards per year were made for Individual studies (for periods of 8 - 9 months on an average) and 200 - 300 participants attended short-term training projects (varying in duration from 2 - 14 weeks). The emphasis in the Agency's training program ls shifting from research-oriented to practical applications and technology transfer. There is a marked increase in interest among developing countries in training related to nuclear power where requirements for qualified people grow progressively in quality,_ quantity and diversity as projects are worked out from early planning to completion. Consequently, in 1976, nearly one-third of atl awards for individual study and one-half of the training courses were devoted to this field.

so

The Agency's nuclear power project training program has been conceived as a response to the training requirements in developing countries which are not satisfied by available training opportunities.

A series of 15-week courses began in September 1975 on nu-

clear power project planning and im plementation and on construction and operation management.

More than 250 participants, including managers, planners, decision-makers,

key engineers - experienced professionals who are involved in the nuclear power programs of 39 countries - have been, or are being, trained in these courses. In initiating research on, or developing, applications of nuclear technology in which radioactivity is involved, a State is bound to establish national radiation exposure standards with a view to protecting health and minim izing risk to life and property from the effects of ionizing radiation.

These national standards are based on the recommendations

of the International Comm ission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) - an independent body of internationally recognized experts from many countries in a variety of professions, genetics, biology, radiation biology, medicine, chem istry, physics, radiology, engineering, etc.

One of.the functions of the IAEA of direct relevance to the acquisition of nuclear tech-

nology by any country is the elaboration of radiological safety standards.

The objective

is to provide technical guidance on how the basic radiation protection standards can be met. These comprise both basic safety standards and specialized regulations and codes of practice which are mandatory in the Agency's own work and for work in Member States which receive Agency assistance.

Up to now seven radiological safety standards have been issued,

including the Agency's basic safety standards for radiation protection, standards for radiolum inous tim epieces, transport regulations, and codes of practice for the safe handling of radionuclides, the provision of radiological protection services, and for personnel monitoring. and radiation protection in mining and milling of radioactive ores. To assist Member States in applying these standards to their own activities the Agency has developed a large num ber of manuals of guidance.

For protection of radiation workers

guidance docum ents have been produced, for example, on the organization of radiation protection program s, on the safe operation of facilities and the safe handling of radioactive materials, on physical and medical surveillance of workers, including personnel and area monitoring, on protective clothing and devices, on emergency plans and procedures, and on the handling of radiation accidents and the diagnosis and treatment of radiation injury to workers.

Others now in preparation are on monitoring for internal contam ination, on

safe handling of transuranium elements and tritium , on the radiological safety of betatrons, on the hand I ing of persons involved in radiation accidents, and on the preparation of em ergency plans for nuclear facilities. Sim ilarly, for the radiological protection of the general public and the environment, guidance documents have been prepared on the organization of operational radiation programs for the public and the environment, on environmental monitoring programs for normal operations and emergency situations, on the establishment of discharge I im its for radioactive contaminations, on emergency plans and procedures, and on the handling of accidents that might involve exposure of the public to radiation.

51

EXPERIENCE IN TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY H.N. SETHNA Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy Bombay 1/00 039

ABSTRACT India's experience in building up a self-reliant broad based nuclear industry is a unique example of generating national capability in a soohlsticated area of technology in a developing country. The foundations for this program were laid in the mid fifties with the setting up of what was then known as the Atomic Energy Establishment Trombay (since renamed as Bhabha Atomic Research Center) which is the national center for nuclear research and technology. This center has a unique historical background in that it Is not only a center engaged in setting up research facilities in basic sciences but at the same time undertakes process development for various cnemical ana metallurgical needs of the nuclear industry and also concerns itself with the development and production of nuclear instrumentation, high vacuum equipment, etc. which are required for the atomic energy program. Even at that time a deliberate policy of designing and fabricating equipment for the experimental program as well as for process development was undertaken inhouse. Progressively Indian industry both in the private sector and in the public sector were involved in the manufacture of equipment required for this program. When a decision was taken to start work on the first nuclear power station, two options were open, namely, first to proceed with the design and construction of a prototype power reactor as an lndl· genous venture or to have the power station built with foreign collaboration. The second aiternative was chosen as It was felt that experience in the operation and mainter,ance of nuclear power stations could be accumulated much sooner and considerable time saved in dernonstratinq economic feasibility o,f nuclear power. There have been significant differences in the arrangements made fpr the first and second nuclear power stations, the first one which was built on a turnkey type contract by an American Company and the second in collaboration with Canada. For the first nuclear power station we retained the responsibility for site selection, preparation of tender and contract documents, supervision at site, etc., tasks which some countries entrust to international consulting engineering companies. For the s.econd station, however, responsibility for construction and installation activities was retamed by us with a minimum supervision fro111 Canada. With Canada terminating its association with India from about 1974 onwards, the .responsibility for completion of the second unit has been fully handled by Indians. For the third and subsequent nuclear power stations, responsibility for design, construction and commissioning has been taken up fully by the Indians. Parallelly construction of heavy water plants

52

and a nuclear fuel complex for production of nuclear fuel has also proceeded. The close dove-tailing of research and development activities with industrial operations has been a major source of strength in the success of the program. The paper describes how transfer of technology from research and development groups to manufacturing operations and project sites has taken place successfully.

1.

The title of my paper could perhaps more appropriately be Experience in the Assimi-

lation of Nuclear Technology. An act of transfer is more appropriately applicable to material goods than to knowledge and technology. The experience we have had over the last twenty years with our atomic energy program encompasses not only the transfer and the assimilation of technology but also the generation of technology. These processes are, however, closely inter-linked and I propose to illustrate the manner in which these processes have taken place in the context of the Indian atomic energy program. 2.

I would like to start with the experience we had on the construction of our first research

reactor of the swimming pool type which went into service in 1956. Although we had hardly any expertise of direct relevance to reactor design or construction, a group of young engineers and scientists worked under the leadership of late Dr. H.J. Bhabha on this project and accepted full responsibility for design, construction and commissioning of this facility. Except for the fuel elements which were leased from the U. K., al I other components were designed and fabricated within the country. Of special mention are two areas, one concerning the instrumentation and control and the other fabrication and machining of large aluminium components using high purity aluminium. The scientists who were engaged on the project came primarily from experimental groups involved in cosmic ray research and the engineers in general were young men with high academic training and with some industrial training. The reactor was built and commissioned in a remarkably short period of eighteen months, Apart from providing a very useful facility for research in neutron physics, isotopes, shielding studies, etc., the confidence generated by this project at a time when India was constantly importing all types of capital goods, even of a simple nature, for its Industry, had a profound effect on al I the subsequent phases of planning and implementation of the country's atomic energy program. 3.

We embarked on the construction of a 40 MW thermal research reactor in co-operation

with Canada in 1956. Two experiences from this project are worth recounting in perspective. The first one relates to the use of half the initial charge of fuel produced in India. When this suggestion was made to the Canadian counterparts, they were completely taken aback as they explained to us, with good reason, that manufacture of uranium metal fuel elements required for a reactor was a difficult and risky proposition. However, using the inter-disciplinary scientific teams then available in Trombay, we were able to establish our own capability to produce the fuel elements. When test fuel elements. manufactured in India were irradiated in Canada, they performed as well as Canadian elements. At the time the Canadian technicians left India after construction of the project, the reactor had not yet

53

reached full power operation. A design change that had been incorporated in the Trombay reactor relative to the Canadian counterpart was the replacement of the once through river water cooli°ng system adopted in Canada by a close circuit process water system. Our initial efforts to reach full power operation were prevented by fuet channel blockages and this was eventually traced to bacterial growth on the fuel rods. investigation of the problem as well as arriving at satisfactory solutions and taking the reactor to full power were all done entirely by our own engineers and scientists. 4.

India's first nuclear power station was built oy an American company under a tum-key

type contract. However, the preparatory activities such as site selection, preparation of tender specifications, scrutiny of tenders, selection of successful tenderer and the preparation of the contract were all taken up by Departmental engineers and scientists. It was then customary, as indeed even now for many of the countries embarking on a first nuclear power station, to involve consulting engineering organizations from one of the more advanced countries to render assistance in these matters. We took a deliberate decision to take on all these activities on our own as we looked upon this activity also as a training ground to enable our engineers and scientists to acquire a deeper insight into the new technology. The Involvement of our engineers extended Into the stages of design review, Inspection at manufacturing works and at site and commissioning activities. While in general the participation of owner's personnel In a turn-key contract is limited and does not really enable them to get a deep enough understanding Into the technology, we were able to do substantially better than many others In this regard. S.

The boiling water reactors of our first atomic power station belonging to an early gene-

ration have presented us with many problems and have given valuable experience. Even prior to station commissioning, extensive rectification work at site became necessary In two areas. The first one related to cracks noticed in the stainless steel cladding of the reactor vessel, attributed to chloride Induced stress corrosion cracking. The second problem related to failures In the stainless steel tubing of the secondary steam generators also attributed to chloride induced stress corrosion cracking. Extensive investigations were carried out on the cladding of the reactor vessel and weld repair work was undertaken. To contend with second problem, the steam generators had to be cut off and the entire tubing of S.S. type 308 was replaced by tubes of S.S. type 308L, less susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. While these tasks were carried out under the responsibility of the main contractor, our personnel did most of the site work and thus acquired unique experience. In the subsequent years of operation, we have had to contend with certain design Inadequacies In the reactor internals which resulted in some of the thermal sleeves in control rod guide tube locations being displaced, resulting in damage to the fuel elements. The fuel supplied by the main contractor has behaved less satisfactorily than was expected, thus giving rise to rather high radiation fields in the station. We are at present embarking on a program of chemical decontamination to bring. down radiation fields. Commencing from 1974, fuel fabricated In India from enriched uranium obtained from the U.S. has been loaded in the reactors. It may take us a few more years before all the initial defective fuel is removed

54

from the reactors and we expect an improvement in the radiation situation to take place thereafter.

Commencing from 1976, the fuel management services have been taken over

by our scientists and engineers at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center. 6.

The second atomic power station in India located in Rajasthan employs heavy water

reactors, one of which has been in operation for about four years.

In this instance the

project was taken up as a joint lndo-Canadian collaboration venture.

The Canadians fur-

nished us with nuclear designs and also supplied all the main equipment for the first unit. A Canadian firm of consulting engineers rendered consultancy services on the conventional part of the station.

India retained responsibility for construction of the project and for site

installation activities.

The first unit became critical in the middle of 1972; however, power

feed to the grid was delayed till about April 1973.

We encountered problems in the bearings

of the turbine on two accounts; the first one was due to high loading on the bearings which had to be rectified by providing larger bearing area and the second one was due to foundry sand left in the valve castings and some other components of the turbine system due to improper fettling and cleaning.

In the four years of operation since then there have been three

turbine blade failures, which have resulted in rather low capacity factors for the unit.

Two

of the turbine blade failures have been attributed to marginal design deficiency accentuated by bad fit up in manufacture. nature.

The third blade failure has been considered to be of a random

Considering that the turbine is a conventional piece of equipment whose design and

manufacture is normally well understood, our experience has been particularly unfortunate. We have also found that engineering organizations used to practices prevailing in North America do not adequately appreciate the problems in operation and maintenance of equipment in developing countries such as India.

We had to do extensive re-engineering of many

service systems such as chilled water, compressed air, etc. to achieve better reliability. There were problems even in nuclear areas.

The problem of damage to primary heat trans-

port (PHT) pressurizing pumps due to gas locking and cavitation was eliminated by redesigning the suction line.

Vibrations in PHT bleed circuit due to two-phase flow resulted

in failure of high pressure, high temperature piping leading to spillage of heavy water. Though for the time being the problem has been overcome by strengthening the supports, extensive analysis is being carried out to arrive at a permanent solution.

Failures of

components in the PHT check valves resulted in partial blockage of a few coolant channels. Elaborate inspection techniques were employed to locate the loose components and after extensive mock up trials, the blockages were successfully removed.

For the second unit

of the Rajasthan Station, we embarked on a major program of manufacture of components from within the country.

In this instance, the reactor vessel (calandria), steam generators,

fuelling machines and other such components have all been supplied from Indian sources. Considerable improvements in the system designs have also been implemented to take note of the deficiencies in the operation of the first unit over the last four years. currently under commissioning.

The unit is

The last Canadian technician was withdrawn towards the

latter half of 1974 and as is well known Canada suspended its co-operation on this project from about that time.

55

7.

What has been discussed hitherto relates to experience of technology transfer that

has taken place from overseas and growth of technology within the country.

I would now

like to discuss briefly the transfer of technology from our research and development groups to manufacture and operation groups.

Engineering and scientific divisions of the Bhabha

Atom ic Research Center developed the process parameters for fabrication of natural uranium zircaloy clad fuel elements required for the heavy water reactors.

They also set up

pilot plant facilities and supplied half the initial charge of fuel required for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station Unit-1.

Realizing the need for setting up an industrial complex

geared to meeting the fuel requirements of the country, a decision was taken to set up a fully integrated nuclear fuel complex.

This complex, which has been in operation for about

four years, now produces al I the fuel elements required for our heavy water reactors and also fabricates the fuel elements required for boiling water reactors from im ported enriched uranium .

The complex has plants for production of zirconium sponge from ore, fabrication

uo2 pellets and for finish assembly of fuel elements. In this instance transfer of technology from our research and development

facilities for zircaloy, facilities for manufacture of

groups at Trombay to the industrial complex was achieved by essentially moving many of the key people at the senior and middle levels to the industrial complex. Process designs for al I the plants were carried out by different Engineering and Scientific Divisions at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center. A firm of Indian consulting engineers was used to render general engineering support and to plan layout of the buildings, services, etc. Many problems have been encountered during the commissioning of the different plants and a close interaction of the R&D Groups, the manufacturing units and the users has enabled us to solve the problems and stabilize production. 8. A second example of transfer of technology to an industrial unit relates to the manufacture of electronic equipment required for the nuclear power program. One of the very early units at the Bhabha Atomic Resez-c'1 Center which was a production oriented unit was the Electronics Division. Commencing initially with the production of electronics equipment required for the research programs, the Division moved on to the manufacture of the electronics equipment required for mineral survey and then on to supply of instrumentation and control units for research reactors. Even for our first nuclear power station, some of the instrumentation and control panels were supplied on a subcontract basis to the American contractor responsible for the station as a whole. About this time, a decision was taken to set up a commercial undertaking under the Department of Atomic Energy to manufacture electronics components. nuclear electronics equipment, computers, etc. A separate paper at this Conference describes in some detail the manner in which technology transfer has been effected in this instance.

In the manufacture of nuclear components

for the reactor program, we have involved many of the industries in the private and public sectors. We have now reached a stage when practically all the equipment required for a reactor program is manufactured within the country. Some details about this aspect of the program are being presented in another paper to this Conference. 9.

56

The Indian atomic energy program, although small in comparison to that of the major

countries is a big program compared with those of many other countries of the world. A distinctive feature of this program has been the close interaction of research and development activities pilot plant studies, industrial operations and feed back from operating plants to the design and development groups. Such integration is perhaps unique and has provided considerable strength to the program. We have had numerous instances where technology even available within the country does not get assimilated adequately or transferred properly. For example when embarking on a collaboration project, often at the time of decision making, a view is taken that the collaboration would be of a limited nature, perhaps confined to one design or one product, and that the local industry would gear itself to setting up its own design capability to proceed therefrom. Years later when the need for a new product or existing product of a larger capacity arises, industry finds itself in no better position to proceed on its own and is once again compelled to look for another collaboration venture. Lest I be misunderstood I am not advocating autarchy in the field of technology. However, if a country has decided to embark on setting up design and manufacturing capabi I ity, unless at an early enough stage it sets up appropriate R&D Groups, it wi II never be in a position to take on independent design activities. In the field of nuclear technology the R&D Groups have to be multi-disciplinary. About the same time as atomi_c energy activity in India was initiated, we also had embarked on setting up of institutions for advanced studies in individual disciplines. The impact of such institutions was not very significant at that time as essentially most problems of modern industry tend to be multi-disciplinary. With the growth of industry and also generation of a reasonable level of design capability within Indian industry, we are now in a position to parcel out problems in appropriate packages so that those institutions following individual disciplines are also involved in our developmental efforts. 1 O. Apart from the problems of transfer and assimilation of technology there is another important question relating to dissemination of technology. In our program we realized over twenty years ago, when we had embarked only on our first small research reactor project, that it was extremely important to set up proper training facilities to train the engineers and scientists required for the future program. We have been running at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center a training program year after year for the last twenty years where every year approximately 150 graduate engineers and scientists are given an interdisciplinary training for a period of one year. They are then assigned to work with the various R&D Groups, industrial projects, operating plants, etc. We have more recently set up a training center for engineers and technicians used on nuclear power plant operations and maintenance. The training has been designed not only for engineers but also for trades category personnel. Special emphasis has been given to setting up of mock up facilities of plant items in radiation areas, so that maintenance technicians are trained adequately to attend in as short a period as possible to equipment in such areas. Recently we have commenced work on a nuclear power plant training simulator where we can train and re-train operational personnel. This facility is expected to be commissioned in about two years time.

57

11. The strategy of development to be pursued by any country is naturally governed by the conditions prevailing in that country and objectives it has set itself. Some aspects of this experience however, do have a general relevance and could be of some use for others who are evolving their own -strategies. The principal conclusions from the Indian experienc, In the transfer, asslmllatlon and growth of nuclear technology may be summarized as follows (1) A multl-dlsclplinary reseercnand devel_opment base Is an essential pre-requisite for a country embarking on a nuclear energy program. (2) Even it the objective is confined to satlstectqrv operation and maintenance of nuclear power stations, an adequate back up of RW Groups In areas such as water chemistry, reactor physics, radiation protect'lon, etc. Is required and hence an adequate scientific base is required apart from capability in technologies directly related to plant operation and maintenance. (3) Turn-key type contracts while having the advantage of allowlng a buying country to set up Its power plants in a fairly short time have the inherent disadvantage that Its own engineers and scientists do not acquire adequate understanding of the plant. Where countries embark on such arrangements, they should make special efforts to ensure that given the basic constraints of such contracts, their own personnel acquire as much familiarity as possible. (Ii)

There Is no easy way In which technology can be acquired; making mistakes and

learning through one's own mistakes Is still unfortunately the best way of learning. How-. ever, given an Inquisitive and trained scientific base and enlightened management structure it should be possible to achieve the ability of learning fast with a low probability of mistakes. (5) Transfer of advanced technology to industry cannot be carried out in isolation. However, if the industrial base is widening, the challenges of nuclear technology can be accepted given adequate guidance and support from the R&D Groups. (6) Accepting the challenges of nuclear technology tends to upgrade the technology of the industry in question even in other areas. Our own experience indicates that industries supplying nuclear components have considerably streamlined their quality control and qua I ity assurance activities even on their conventional products. (7) Traditional societies emerging into the technological era have to overcome the inhibitions of hierarchial rnanaqement patterns. Nuclear technology is a young field and it is fair to say that it needs to be put in the hands of young men and women. Young engineers and scientists must be picked up in adequate numbers and be given adequate opportunities for development. (8) In setting up R&D facilities a short term cost benefit analysis can often be an impediment. It is necessary to take a long term view and give adequate freedom to the scientists in the planning of their R&D activities.

58

(9) Most problems of modern techn61cigy as indeed of nuclear technology are multi-discilinary in nature.

Hence team work is of the essence.

This is not always easy to achieve

when highly talented scientists with a strong streak of individual ism are involved.

The

challenge to management however is to achieve a synthesis of this conflict. (10) A training program which draws in constantly year after year bright young engineers and scientists is necessary to enrich the level of .competence of the scientific institution. Development in the nuclear field is so rapid that there is a high risk of obsolescence in

the men involved. This should be guarded against.

59

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE CANADIAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

ERIC C. W. PERRYMAN Director Applied Research & Development, Chalk River Nuclear Research Laboratories Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

ABSTRACT

Technology transfer from the laboratories of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited is discussed in relation to the birth and growth of the Canadian Nuclear Industry. The evolution of the laboratories and their changing emphasis during the commercialization of the CANDU reactor system is described.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Before discussing the part that the nuclear laboratories of Atomic Energy of Canada (AECL) have played in the nucleation and growth of Canada's nuclear industry, it is first necessary to briefly review the history of Canada's nuclear program. The Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories (CRNL) came into being in l944 and the first major research reactor, NRX, came into operation in 1947.

In these early years the laboratory program was focused on nuclear

physics, nuclear chemistry, and plutonium- recovery, with sufficient staff from engineering disciplines to operate NRX.

Until 1952 CRNL was part of the National Research Council,

one of Canada's main scientific research organizations.

In 1952 AECL was created as a

federally funded Crown Corporation responsible for developing the peaceful application of atomic energy in Canada.

This corporation was autonomous in the sense that it had its

own President and Board of Directors who were drawn from power uti Ii ties, industry and universities.

Thus from the very beginning the seeds of cooperation among the major

components of a future Canadian nuclear industry had been sown.

In retrospect this was

probably one of the most important factors in the success of Canada's nuclear program. In 1954 it was decided that Canada should embark on a program to develop nuclear power.

With the knowledge of the superior moderating properties of heavy water and the

experience gained in its management in NRX, it was natural that a reactor based on heavy water moderation and cooling was chosen.

A conceptual design group, formed from people

loaned by Canadian power utilities and interested Canadian companies, was located at CRNL. The first conceptual design was a pressure vessel reactor, moderated and cooled with heavy water and fueled with natural uranium.

Recognizing that larger reactor unit sizes would

give rise to pressure vessels beyond the manufacturing capability of Canadian industry, the decision was made to change the design to the zirconium alloy pressure tube reactor

60

that we know today as the CANDU-PHW*. This was a very bold decision because at that time no significant experience existed with zirconium pressure vessels and the technology of zirconium was in its infancy. In the meantime the second major research reactor, NRU, with on-power fueling, had come into operation at CRNL in 1957. The experience from this showed that on-power fueling could be considered for a power reactor. The detailed design work on Canada's 25 MWe Nuclear Power Demonstration (NPD) reactor was carried out by Canadian General Electric and the reactor came into operation in 1962. Before this reactor was operating, the 200 MWe Douglas Point prototype reactor was committed. Douglas Point started operation in 1967 and revealed a number of weak points sufficiently early that they could be avoided in the design of subsequent commercial reactors. Over the last few years Douglas Point has been a reliable supplier of electricity to Ontario Hydro's grid and of steam to the neighbouring 800 Mg per year heavy water production plant.

In 1971 the

first 500 MWe unit of Ontario Hydro's 2000 MWe Pickering station came into operation and in 1976 the first 750 MWe unit of that utility's 3000 MWe Bruce station started operation. This represents very fast progress and has been a real challenge to Canadian industry. The degree of challenge can perhaps be gauged from the fact that the four primary heat transport pumps in a 750 MWe Bruce reactor need more than the 25 MWe output of the first demonstration reactor to drive them. Reverting back to 1954 when the original conceptual design group was formed, it was recognized that CRNL's function would have to be broader than just basic research and, furthermore, it would be necessary to have a very broad base of technical expertise to support the design and operation of the power reactors. This meant that the laboratory staff had to be augmented with people to work on fuel, fuel cladding, zirconium alloy pressure tubes, calandria tubes, reactor physics, heat transfer, and so on. This gave rise to the growth of applied research and introduced into the laboratory a broader mix of technical people with more emphasis on engineering disciplines. CRNL grew .from a total staff of 975 in 1946 to 2300 in 1958. Recognizing the need for growth but the undesirability of a single establishment becoming too large, it was decided in 1959 to form another research establishment in Manitoba which is the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment (WNRE). The nucleus of staff for WNRE was transferred from CRNL. In 1965 AECL's third major research reactor, WR-1, which is heavy-water-moderated and organic-cooled, came Into operation at WNRE. A full description of the experimental facilities at CRNL and WNRE has been given elsewhere (l). Today the total staff at CRNL and WNRE is 2247 and 784 respectively. The breakdown of the staff complement is similar at both laboratories and is about 20% professionals, 24% technicians, 19% clerical and 37% tradesmen. Some of the professional staff are associated with operating the research reactors and doing design work for the research staff. The number of professional staff actively engaged on research projects is about 370 and about 50% of these are working on projects directly associated with the commercial CANDU-PHW *CANDU-PHW - CANada Qeuterium !:!_ranium - !:'.ressurized !,!eavy !!ater

61

reactor and heavy water production. The remainder are working on advanced fuel cycles, waste management, advanced concepts such as electro-nuclear breeding, and basic research. 2.

LABORATORY PHILOSOPHY

It is often difficult for a laboratory to decide how far to take a particular development. In fully industrialized countries which have significant research and development capability wfthin their manufacturing companies as well as at their national laboratories, there

are a

number of options. In countries such as Canada, where research and development

within industrial manufacturing companies is the exception rather than the rule, there is little choice. Canada's innovative performance and the state of Canadian manufacturing industry has been well described in several documents prepared for the Science Council of Canada

•h" lOOM ,oponla

wilJIAVTPcl·5,,.. •JO•U

Fig. 3.

120

Condenser lnleakage Simulation Test with AVT

Pit~-~ J1ot100--..,...... ••• AVTt,ct.1..,_ .,oo.o.,

I

\

T h/I

H*• ti

\,

Ill

I I I

ii¢♦

'I

\Q= ~J

~i

!

.!l

~

t

8

l

51 s

:.l

-11111111 .,I

0

- ("°°°l,½I)

an, UOJSO.UO>

1

0

~

I~ ~\

I

6.

CONCLUSION

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. has been convinced by its experience that it is of the utmost importance to design trouble-free steam generators and associated systems. Keeping this in mind, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., as a PWR manufacturer, is devoting its best efforts to contributing toward the further world-wide progress of the nuclear power industry.

121

POSSIBILITIES AND EXPERIENCE OF NTT FROM AR AND D ORGANIZATION IN A SMALL COUNTRY {SWEDEN)

GUNNAR HOLTE AB Atomenergi, Studsvik, Sweden

ABSTRACT

Sweden and Studsvik have a strong interest and a long tradition in international collabor-

ation.

This is illustrated by the Marviken and Studsvik Inter-Ramp and Over-Ramp projects.

run in Sweden with wide international participation.

These projects are working examples

of NTT sti 11 not yet been used by countries starting nuclear power programs.

The Swedish

nuclear safety program, the Studsvik Compact Simulator and the Studsvik TLD system (thermoluminescence dosimetry) illustrate other possibilities for NTT. NTT to developing countries from Studsvik has so far consisted of the acceptance of trainees working in various Studsvik projects and laboratories.

There have also been

missions of experts from Studsvik to other countries and sales of instruments and technical know-how.

Both procedures have worked well.

The Swedish government has cut its nuclear technology budget; at the same time the demands on Studsvik increase; the commercial viability of NTT is an important factor for donating nations.

1.

INTRODUCTION

In relation to its population (about 8 million) and its Rand D resources, Sweden has a large nuclear energy program (installed capacity in 1977: close to 4 GW).

The Swedish nuclear

energy Rand D center at Studsvik, which is owned by AB Atomenergi and has about 1000 employees, therefore has close contact with the nuclear energy Rand D abroad. has a strong tradition in international collaboration. have been signed with a large number of countries.

Sweden

Bilateral agreements of.cooperation Studsvik participates in various inter-

national projects and committees abroad within the frame of IAEA, OECD/NEA and lEA. Besides there are international projects in Sweden. \Vi thin a general policy of stimulating the flow of information from Studsvik, there are some factors which limit the possibilities for NTT to developing countries. nuclear power program puts a high demand on the available manpower.

The national

Furthermore, the

government wants Studsvik to be run as much as possible on a commercial basis, and government grants have been decreased. svik for NTT.

In particular, there are no special grants to Stud-

Finally, following the government shift in 1976, the new government is pro-

posing serious cuts in the nuclear Rand D budget for the next fiscal year, except in for instance LWR-safety and waste disposal.

This means that NTT-participation from Studsvik

to a larger extent than before must be based on commercial agreements.

122

2.

POSSIBILITIES FOR NTT

2. 1 The Marviken Projects Marviken was originally built to operate as a heavy water power reactor, but the reactor was never started. It offers unique possibilities for full scale LW-reactor .safety studies. The first Marviken project, designated MX-1, started in 1971 andw.as terminated in 1975. A series of blow down experiments were performed in 1972 and 1973. The program included studies of PS-containment response tests (CRT) to ruptures in the primary pipe system, iodine transport experiments and studies of component behaviour under post-accident conditions. It was a joint project between organizations in Sweden and the other Nordic countries, the FRG and the USA. The costs of the project were 9 M SwCr. The second Marviken project (MX-11) started in 1975 and has just been terminated. It consisted of a second series of containment response tests. In this project also France, Japan and the Netherlands participated. The budget was 15. 5 M SwCr. A third Marviken project (MX-111-CFT) is now under preparation. The aim is critical flow tests i'n comparatively short tubes with large diameters. Experiments are planned to start in late 1977 and the program is planned to terminate in late 1979. The total budget is 28 M SwCr. With a few changes, participation in MX-111 will be the same as in MX-11. There is still a possibility for new partners to join the project. The project is thus one of the possibilities for NTT from Sweden. A fourth experiment, IVT, isolation valve tests, is under preliminary planning. This project offers another possibi I ity for NTT from Sweden. A report of the Marviken projects wi II be given at the IAEA Salzburg conference May 2-13, 1977 (1) . 2. 2 Other Safety Projects A very high .percentage of the present total Swedish nuclear Rand D program is devoted to safety-related projects. For some years, the yearly budget for LWR-safety has been 30 - 40 M SwCr and is expected to stay at this level during the next years. Even in comparison with countries with larger nuclear power programs than Sweden, this is a fairly large budget. The main part of this safety program is executed by AB Atomenergi. Besides the Marviken projects (2. 1) there are about 60 smaller projects performed at Studsvik, in some cases in ·collaboration with the USA, Denmark, Finland and Norway. Participation in any of these projects from developing countries is one of the possibilities for NTT from Studsvik. Rand Don safety problems related to waste handling has earlier had a fairly modest budget in Sweden. However, in a new government bill the utilities are forced to prove that a safe final disposal of waste can be found. This is a condition for starting up new nuclear power stations. As a consequence of this bi II the ·uti Ii ties now have launched a crash program for demonstration of the safety of final waste disposal. Part of this work

123

will be done by AB Atomenergi.

Added to other projects, this means that at present about

40 Rand D projects in the waste management area exist at Studsvik, some of them in collaboration with other countries.

This could in principle be extended to developing countries,

thus offering a possibi I ity for NTT.

2. 3 Power Ramp Tests of LWR-Fuel

Studsvik has about ten years experience in experiments of failure propensity of LWR fuel under power ramp conditions.

The main facilities used in these experiments are the Stud-

svik 50 MWth R2-reactor and various test loops and test capsules in the reactor. A large part of this work has been performed on direct contract with nuclear industry. In 1975, a 3.5 year-iong international project, the Inter-Ramp, was started. international participation from organizations in Europe, Japan and USA. project is tests of fuel for BWRs. currently being started.

It has a broad

The aim of the

A similar project for tests of PWR-fuel, the Over-Ramp, is

It is planned to terminate at the end of 1979.

Use of the facilities

at Studsvik for fuel studies either by participation in these projects or through a bilateral agreement is a possibility for NTT from Sweden. A report of the power ramp tests of LWR-fuel will be given at the IAEA Salzburg Conference [2]

2.4 The Studsvik Compact Simulator

This simulator _has been developed at Studsvik and is an ideal device for training of personnel involved in the operation of a LWR power station. well as for PWRs.

It is programmed for BWRs as

It represents a natural and reasonably inexpensive possi_bility for NTT

from Sweden to countries starting nuclear power programs.

Detailed information on the

simulator is given at the exhibition connected to this conference. The simulator also offers excellent possibilities for on-the-job training at Studsvik. In this way trainees from countries starting LWR-programs can acquire an advanced competence in the area of control, operation and production planning of power reactors.

2. 5 Other Possibi I ities for NTT from Studsvik

Studsvik has laboratories and know-how in all major areas of nuclear power Rand D: neutron physics, reactor physics and technology, heat transfer and flu id flow, process simulation and control, instrumentation, physical metallurgy, irradiation and isotope

service, post-irradiation examination, plutonium hand I ing, reactor safety and radiation protection. corrosion, reactor chemistry, waste management, etc.

Besides the specific

examples mentioned above this offers possibilities for NTT from Studsvik in various ways: a) contract work at Studs vi k, b) contact work abroad, c) sale of hardware, e.g. instruments, d) on the job training at Studsvik, e) training courses in reactor engineering and

124

reactor operation at Studsvik.

With the general limitations stressed under 1. Studsvik

is interested in using any of these means of NTT.

The general policy is that there should

be a free flow of information to developing countries, although commercial factors may enforce a limitation. Examples of b) could be expert rni s s ions from Studsvik, advising on building and running of new laboratories and equipment, for instance for reactor loops. a long experience in this field.

Studsvik has

Examples of c) could be various instruments for such

areas as uranium prospecting, radiation protection measurements and incore power monitoring.

Among those, the Studsvik TLD (thermoluminescence dosimetry) system for per-

sonnel dosimetry should be mentioned in particular.

This system has been delivered to

all nuclear power stations in Sweden and also to Finland and is functioning very well. Another item developed and manufactured at Studsvik is a 6 MW steam generator, very useful when starting up BWRs. Studsvik.

Item d) is the most readi ly available form for NTT from .

Item el could be performed by slight modifications to the 9-week course that

has been given yearly, with good results, since 1974 for students from universities and industry.

3.

EXPERIENCE OF NTT

As stated in 1. there are limitations to the use of the possibilities of NTT from Studsvik. Studsvik is a small Rand D organization compared with other organizations in USA and Western Europe.

Furthermore, other organizations do not seem to be under the same

pressure to be commercial. countries.

Finally, costs in Sweden are higher than in most other

However, the cost level alone is not the only factor governing NTT-possibi-

lities. With increasing awareness of programs 2. 1, 2.2 and 2.3 countries starting to build nuclear power should be interested in participation.

At present how:ver, there is no ex-

perience of NTT from these programs to such countries.

Most of the experience comes

from the possibilities in item 2.4 and 2.5. On the job training, sponsored for instance by IAEA, has so far been the dominating way of NTT.

During the period 1966 - 1976, about 50 persons from developing countries

have worked at Studsvik for periods ranging from a few months to some years.

The pre-

ferred areas of training have been reactor dynamics and control at the Studsvik Compact simulator (2. 4), heat transfer and fluid flow at the laboratory for thermal engineering, neutron physics at the Studsvik Van de Graaff accelerator and reactor operation at the R-2 reactor.

Experience of the training has been good.

The capacity of Studsvik for

training is, however, much larger than what appears from the above-mentioned figures. In some cases financing of the trainee's stay as well as the use of personnel and facilities for training might be a problem, but the positive experience of NTT programs at Studsvik indicates that this number can be raised. There have been missions of experts from Studsvik to countries beginning development of nuclear power.

They have been limited in number, mainly because of the general

125

difficulty for employees with a family to embark on prolonged stays abroad. In general the task of the experts has been to advise on planning new laboratories and equipment.

In particular, advice has been given on fuel element tests in reactor loops and

equipment for reactor simulation studies (2.4). combined with contract work at Studsvik.

In some cases, the missions have been

Experience of these missions has been good.

An area of NTT from Studsvik, which seems to be of increasing importance, is instrumentation.

Many of the difficulties encountered in other forms as NTT are of less import-

ance in this field.

The sum of money involved is limited.

According to our experience,

sales of instruments combined with an expert help regarding the use· and service of the instruments, is a very effective way of NTT.

REFERENCES

1.

Thoren, H-G., and Ericson, L., "Full Scale Reactor Safety Experiments Performed in the Marviken Power Station Sweden".

International Conference on Nuclear

Power and its Fuel Cycle, Salzburg, 2-13 May 1977. 2.

IAEA-CN-36/284 (IV.1).

Moga rd, H., Bergen I id, U., Bodh, R., and Lysell, G., "Experimental Investigation of the Power Ramp Failure Propensity of LWR Fuel".

International Conference on

Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle, Salzburg, 2-13 May 1977. (11.4).

126

IAEA-CN-36/279

CRITERIA FOR THE CHOICE OF RESEARCH PROGRAMS IN NUCLEAR CENTERS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

MILORAD S. MLADJENOVIC Boris Kidric Institute of Nuclear Sciences Belgrade

In the developing world, there are six countries with power reactors in operation and another ten are either constructing or planning them, while it is estimated that the market for nuclear power exists in forty more such countries. In about twenty of them, there are nuclear centers which include various nuclear engineering laboratories. They have been created using the early centers, such as Harwell, Sacley, or Kjeller as models. These centers have passed through three different phases in the last 30 years. Development Phase (1950-1965). - In my country and quite a few others, nuclear energy opened the official government doors to science. The first science administration body to be formed was the nuclear energy commission, and only later were the research councils created. The budgets for nuclear programs grew by one or two orders of magnitude, compared with university research funds. The field was multi-disciplinary and involved a wide range of sophisticated technologies, so that it became the generating force for the creation of quite a number of new disciplines of pure and applied character. To mention a few examples, solid state and plasma physics started in nuclear physics laboratories, our present leading electronics engineers were making our first HutchinsonScarot multi-channel analyzer twenty years ago;

many of our present computer specialists

started with reactor theory. Our first generations of nuclear scientists were trained abroad, mainly in Scandinavia, France, and Great Britain. There was no problem of brain-dratn with that first generation, which had seen the war and devastation of the country and was keen to start rebui Id ing. The impact of nuclear programs on the university was important: the role of research increased, new subjects were introduced, and the first systematic post-graduate studies in nuclear sciences were organized. Although the magic of that early nuclear era is unrepeatable, there is one important conclusion of lasting value to the future: within a decade a developing country can create competent teams of scientists in chosen fields - with proper science policy, of course. So far as nuclear power was concerned, the aim was to be present in a critical field. Expectations about one's own role were vague but youthfully optimistic. Emergence of Nuclear Power (1965-1973). - In the middle sixties the nuclear power situation began to clear up. Due to various and mainly well known reasons, the light water reactor emerged as the winning type, offered by two superpowers for export. Several advanced countries had to give up longstanding independent national nuclear programs, and

127

started buying I icenses.

The industry was taking over and taking away from nuclear cen-

ters the corresponding part of the research program.

In many countries, especially deve-

loping ones, it was realized that independent national nuclear programs are prohibitively expensive.

The situation was aggravated by two additional developments.

First, some of

the glamorous research fields such as nuclear physics, began to feel their age.

Second,

science budgets started levelling off and priorities shifted to such fields as environment. There was great pressure to help industry.

With a great effort, known mainly to insiders,

a new item appeared in the program of nuclear centers: diversification. Of course there are exceptions.

The outstanding example is India, which continued

a vigorous program of nuclear self-sufficiency. The Maturity of Nuclear Energy coincided with the so-called energy crisis of 1973. The role of nuclear power in long-range energy production plans increased appreciably. The nuclear era started in developing countries. (One should mention that few of them began bui I ding nuclear power stations in the sixties.) When a decision is made to buy a nuclear power station from abroad, a change of leading roles becomes visible on the nuclear stage.

First, the decisions are taken by elec-

trical power companies, which take over the management.

Second, domestic industries

want to have their share of the production of components. What the first phase of development of nuclear energy was to the development of research, the third is to industry, which is entering a competitive field with very high standards of quality.

The nuclear center

might find itself pushed to one side, with a secondary role to play, supplying engineers' courses and taking care of safety and protection. suddenly lose importance and relevance.

Some of its research programs might

We shall first consider what might be the role

of nuclear centers if there are no external constraints on the transfer of technology, so that whatever part of the fuel cycle is considered to be necessary, it can be bought.

A

possible set of criteria for the choice of research programs might be the following: 1.

The planning, purchasing, building and operation of proven nuclear power stations represents the horizontal type of technology transfer, which needs consu I ting rather than direct research work.

The experienced scientists and engineers join the teams

for energy planning, choice of technology and fuel cycle, siting, waste management, safety reports, etc.

These are temporary tasks, after which they either return to their

research or fill in the organization structure.

The buying of several power reactors

in one or two decades to come cannot by itself be sufficient reason to start or maintain important reactor physics and engineering laboratories. 2.

Some developing countries might wish to achieve, alone or together, an independence in various stages of the fuel cycle (enrichment, fuel production, reprocessing) , and start buying the technologies.

Their horizontal transfer requires scientists and en-

gineers with a general background close to the field in question.

In this case again

there is no need to set up and maintain specific research laboratories. 3.

Al I the three mentioned fuel cycle technologies are less expensive to buy than to develop without acquiring licenses.

128

An important question is how sensitive a field is to

fundamental advances. Although there is no technology which cannot be Improved by research, some are more sensitive and open to research breakthroughs. The important technology in the fuel cycle, which is most sensitive to research breakthrough, is enrichment. While, for instance, reprocessing is confined to a narrow chemical base, isotope separation rests on an immensely wider physical base, which is constantly broadening. An improvement in the enrichment factor and reduction of energy consumption would certainly widen the very narrow clrcle of countries possessing enrichment facilities.

It is a challenging field which can attract excellence. Of course

it is neither cheap nor easy work, so that it requires a rational and collaborative approach. If I were asked what large machine could be useful in a nuclear center - an accelerator, a research reactor, or a high-power laser - I would recommend a laser. 4.

The nuclear power stations and all other parts of fuel cycle, as well as other radiation sources which exist in every country, permanently require radiation protection. The best basic training for that wide applied and service field can be obtained in nuclear physics, chemistry, or medicine.

5.

For horizontal technological transfer of any part of the fuel cycle, beginning with power reactors, it would be convenient to maintain research in some broader and more fundamental fields, which: (al serve as a basis for various nuclear technologies, operational, or service activities; (bl can be of use for non-nuclear science and technology; (cl are. sti II fresh and non-saturated. Examples are: (ll materials at high temperatures and/or exposed to radiation, and

(2) nuclear medicine. The criterion (cl is not satisfied by nuclear physics and chemistry, but that might be counterbalanced by another criterion: that the laboratories already exist, so that onl.y mobility and inventiveness are needed. May I add one last criterion: if research is successful, no justification is needed for its continuation. Whatever it is, if it is excellent, it should go on. Fuel Cycle Independence. - The above criteria are valid only in the case that the technologies covering the fuel cycle can be bought. Unfortunately the possibilities of transfer are being gradually reduced, with the explanation that the possession of some key parts of nuclear fuel cycle gives the possibility of producing nuclear bombs. A deep concern was expressed this morning by several distinguished speakers about the problem of non-proliferation. I will state briefly our point of view. Two years ago the non-proliferation treaty was reviewed at Geneva. In our opinion the conference was a failure, and at the end Yugoslavia declared that if the sltuation regarding the implemeritatlon of the treaty does not improve in the future, we will reconsider our membership. Now, two years later, we can state that the situation has not only not improved, but even deteriorated. The nuclear arms race has not stopped and new constraints have been

129

imposed on the transfer of nuclear technology. For Instance, we are building a nuclear power station, and now in the middle of the work the supplier Is trying to impose some new restrictions and constraints which we find unacceptable. For many countries which had not and will not have anything to do with nuclear arms, the London Club decisions represent an unjustified brake on development in an important field. Let us hope that the problems of nuclear arms proliferation will be dealt with In a different manner and access to the technologies will be given. lfthis,does not happen, the developing countries wi II sooner or later have to pull their forces together and try to compensate for what has been denied to them. The door should of course be opened to the developed and industrialized world, to governments, industry, laboratories, and.individuals who want to enter joint ventures, under conditions acceptable to both sides.

130

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

PLENARY SESSION All Invited Papers Co-Chairmen: M. lnnas Ali (BAEC/Bangladesh} M. Taherzadeh (AEOl/lran}

131

UTILITY TRAINING PIERRE A. VILLAROS/ARMAND LUXO/JACQUES BRUANT Societe Francaise d'Etudes et de Realisations Nucleaires SOFRATOME France

ABSTRACT The study of operational training systems for electro-nuclear utilities may be conducted through two different approaches. A first analytical approach consists of determining, for each position of a given organization chart, the necessary qua I ifications r"equired and the corresponding complementary training to be provided. This approach applies preferentially to existing classical systems which are converted to nuclear operation with objectives of minimum structural c~anges and conservation of maximum efficiency. A second synthetlcal approach consists of determining the specific character isttcs of nuclear plant operation, then, of deducting the training contingencies and the optimized organization chart of the plant, while taking into account, at each step, the parameters linked to local conditions. This last approach is studied in some detail in the present paper, taking advantage of its better suitability to the problems raised at the first stage of an electro-nuclear program development. In this respect, the possibility offered by this approach to coordinate the training system of a given nuclear power station personnel with the overal I problem· of developing a skilled industrial. labor force in the country, may lead to a reconsideration of some usual priorities in the economy of operation of the nuclear power plant.

1.

INTROpUCTION

The title of this paper "Utility Training" covers a large and intricate matter, the limits of which require to be defined. The fi_rst difficulty is to give a definition of the term "Utility". However, the subject of this Shiraz Conference, devoted to the transfer of.technology in the nuclear field, indicates what type of utilities are conce_rned. Within the set of undertakings which aim to provide

a

continuous technical service of public interest, those to be taken into account

are quite evidently the ones which provide energy of nuclear origin. In the framework of this Conference, the term "Utility" will be applied to either public or private undertakings which operate a number of nuclear power stations-in order to deliver energy to the consumers, in electrical or other form. The second difficulty is to define the limits of the training problems to be discussed.

132

Quite evidently, the entire set of training problems which face a utility endowed with a precise specific character - the operation of nuclear facilities in the present case - may be dealt with by several approaches. A first approach, analytical, conststs. - after a definition of the functions to be assumed for an efficient operation of the facilities - of studying, for each of the operational functions, the mos},appropriate training cycles, then of arranging those cycles in time and space in order to deduct the minimum specific charge of the utility as far as training is concerned. This analytical approach appears to foist itself on utilities where the introduction of nuclear operation is realized as a continuous process, making use of an important existing infrastructure, and without calling for a suddefl acceleration of output. The adaptation to the new specific character of the utility will be attained, in this case, by the minimum transformations in the existing structures, and, concurrently, by individually provided complementary training, according to the functions to be assumed by personnel already in place within the utility. To expose thj s analytical method would be of small interest. One of its characteristics being the research of the best efficiency through a minimum of structural changes. the approaches_ to be considered may prove as various as the uti I ity systems themselves. Moreover, the criterion of non-sudden acceleration of the output, allows the uti I ity to conduct its evolution in a practical closed loop, through internal promotion, and by limiting the external recruitments to the replacement of the non-specialized low-qualification personnel.

All _these factors are in favor of accentuating the particularism of the

various training schemes. However, one cannot neglect the value of the experience gained by such systems, and I shall come back to this point later, in order to stress that such experience may be transferred into the precise definition of a number of technical final qualifications for the personnel.

But it is to be noted, for the moment, that -the very peculiar characteristics

of an analytical approach of the training problems do not allow a complete and global transfer from a system to another. I, then, shall refrain from trying to describe a predetermined training system which could be applicable in the general case. I doubt that the pursuit of such a system is desirable. Such a pursuit would lead, without any doubt, through integration of numerous constraints of ill-defined origins, to organizations of unacceptable complexity, at the operational and financial levels. A second approach, synthetical, consists of studying in all its aspects the new dimension given to the training problems by the specific character of the undertaking - i.e. the nuclear character of its facilities, It is then possible to.r emain with the classical methods applied to the study of a comprehensive training system, and to introduce, at each necessary step, the particular parameters related to the nuclear environment, as well as the equally particular ones related to the global environment. This approach offers the adyantage of being applicable ab initio, either when creating a new organization, or when a sudden increase in the means of production implies resorting to new personnel on a large scale. One cannot see, In this case, any advantage In

133

inheriting the constraints of a given existing organization, rather than attem pting to optim ize both the structures and the training system of the new undertaking. In this approach, the transfer of experience from system to system w ill not appear at the organizational or functional levels, but, on the contrary w ill rem ain at levels independent from the selected system s, 'in particular: the acquired experience in the definition and the positive managem ent of nuclear specific param eters.

Here is a first fundam ental transfer which will allow one to take

into account all particular criteria for the determ ination of an adapted and com prehensive training program . the technical qualifications necessary to perform a given action.

In this case one

m ay - while still gaining from the transfer of experience - diverge from the initial system by defining a set of actions in the fram ework of a new optim ized function. In the present paper, I shall refer to the synthetical approach.

After a short review

of the special characteristics derived from the nuclear aspect of the undertaking w e shall exam ine the influence of those characteristics upon the operation m ethods and the training of the associated personnel.

2.

SPECIFICITY OF NUCLEAR PLA NTS

For any industrial facility the determ ination of optim ized operational procedures leads one to consider both internal and external characteristics linked to the actual running of the facility on the one hand,

and the characteristics linked to the interaction between the

facility and its environm ent on the other hand. rule.

Nuclear facilities abide by this com m on

Moreover, for this type of facility, the external characteristics m ay prevail to

such an extent as to dom inate, som etim es excessively, all problem s related to design, construction, and operation.

The first and basic specific characteristic of nuclear facilities

is right there: the priority given to the interaction problem s betw een the facility and the environm ent. This new priority does not appear so exacting in a num ber of com m on industrial facilities where an optim ized operational procedure is m ainly based upon the best running conditions. T hen, it is to be noted that the managem ent of nuclear facilities, m ore than any others, w ill have to attend to environm ental m atters, and be thoroughly trained to do that. Bearing this first rem ark in m ind, w e m ay define tw o types of organizations which could be used for operating nuclear faeilities. A first type of organization consists of grouping the team s In charge of the internal operation of the facility on the one hand, and the team s in charge of controlling the consequences of such operation upon the environm ent on the other hand. type of organization offers m any advantages.

ation between com m and and control functions is respected.

From a practical point of view ,

it appears possible to train tw o separate categories of operations:

134

At first sight, this

From a theoretical point of view , the separ-

the first one trained in

the common technical disciplines used in any industrial facility, and the second one trained more particularly in the specific matters related to nuclear facilities. In fact, this type of organization does not look practical for nuclear facilities, as a consequence of a new specific characteristic of these types of facilities: i .e, the requirement for instantaneous reactions to certain deviations from the normal operating conditions. This specific characteristic imp I ies a second type of organization where the command and control functions are integrated within the operational teams themselves. Only this type of organization wi II al low a con ti nous control of both internal and external operating conditions. From a practical point of view, this organization dictates the training of an important part of the operation personnel both in the working techniques of the plant components and in the safety techniques designed to keep a close eye on those components. It is important to determine the responsibility level below which such double training is no more mandatory. At the moment of designing the organization chart of the facility, the determination of the aforesaid minimum level will derive from a number of local parameters, namely the number and qualifications of available personnel at the beginning of the training program, the actual environmental conditions, the possibilities for fast interventions ... So, we have determined two specific characteristics of the operation of nuclear faci I ities: the utmost importance gi_ven to the interactions between operational and environmental conditions the necessity of instantaneous reactions and we have deduced the obligation to put into place an operating organization based upon integrated teams, which, down to a certain level, have to perform both the command functions and the internal and external control functions. 3.

COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS

To go further, it is now necessary to assess at what level and with what method the integration of the command and control functions ought to be attained. The solution of this problem mu_st be based on the following evident principle:

the

faster the reaction the more integrated the command and control functions have to be. According to the required speed of reaction, four levels of organization may be selected. The first level is the level of servo systems, where the command and control functions are interconnected within the servo loop, with a minimum reaction time lag, depending upon the input sampling frequency. To examine in detail the limits of application of the servo systems in the command and control of a nuclear facility is not relevant to the framework of the present paper. This remains a design. specification of_ the facility. It is worth noting, . however, that such limits of application exist and that, in particular, a complete automated operation system

,135

does not appear desirable for nuclear power plants. A second remark, concerning the servo systems, should be mentioned. In a nuclear power plant, the specific nuclear parameters (reactivity adjustments for instance) are monitored by servo systems. This could lead to the conclusion that the human operators should not be required to know a great deal about nuclear physics. The second level is the level of human intervention in the command and continuous control of the nuclear plant components when in operation. At this level are grouped all the functions which necessitate a fast and deliberate action, the necessity of which may appear at any random moment, and for which servo systems could not or would not be rei ied upon. Each one of these functions may be represented by a servo loop, where the human element takes the place of an adjusting network. This adjusting network may be strictly programmed .. In this case, we face a transfer of automatism into the human domain. The corresponding operators shal I acquire the mandatory reliable and standard reactions \hrough an intensive training on nuclear power plant simulators. The adjusting network may,

in certain circumstances, modify its programmed

reactions according to inputs coming from outside the main system. In the human domain, this amounts to authorizing a certain fre~dom of appreciation and choice for the appropriate reaction. Whether and when this freedom appears necessary, it will be quite evidently granted only to the highly qualified personnel whose training and experience have developed the required fast and reliable reactions. The third level is the level of systematic data col lection which does not imply any -direct command of the power plant operation. At this level the control function has priority. Practically, the function deals with physical and technical measurements, and collection of environmental data. The personnel in charge of collecting those data may be exclusively trained for the relevant techniques. In the general case no in-depth knowledge ·of the power plant operation would be required. Last, the fourth level is the level of operational statistics and tests. At this level the function is an exclusive control function, and results, in the long run, in adjusting th~ operation and maintenance schedules. The personnel in charge of this fourth level function may be trained according to the same criteria as for the third level trainees. To summarize, the study of the various levels of integration of the command and control functions have shown three different types of personnel to be trained: a)

Personnel assigned to the actual operation of the power plant, with a role of active adjusting networks. Those personnel shall have an in-depth knowledge of the plant operation in running conditions, as well as a good understanding of the physical events which occur within it. They shall present qualities of appreciation and initiative in order to react quickly and reliably in any circumstances.

b}

Personnel assigned to the actual operation· of the power plant, with a role of passive adjusting networks.

136

Those personnel shall have acquired a great autom atism in their reactions, in all circum stances of the pow er plant operation, either norm al or abnorm al. Their training shall be rather oriented towards the instantaneity and reliability of their reactions than towards the detailed know ledge of the plant internal operation. c)

Personnel assigned to control functions, with no im m ediate and direct role in the actual operation of the power plant. Those personnel shall receive a specialized training in the various relevant techniques to be used in the course of their functions. Most of these techniques - w ith the exception of radio-protection - are not specifically nuclear.

4.

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

At this stage, we can try to draw a general layout of the organization chart of nuclear power plant ope_rational services. The particular parameters linked to the country, the plant site, the availability and training methods of operation personnel will be used to define and complete this general layout. The optimization criteria of the power plant organization chart may be grouped in the following manner: technical criteria human criteria economic criteria. For each one of these groups of criteria, we shall only study the limits, any optimization objective taking place between the limits so defined. In the technical domain, the operation of a nuclear power plant may be bounded by two sets of extreme criteria: to be mainly operated as an electricity production tool; to be mainly operated as a transfer of technology tool. In the first case, the power plant design, its nominal power and its site will be mainly determined by the production requirements and the network characteristics. Its operating conditions will be defined with regard to the optimum efficiency of the plant itself. In the second case, the design and power of the plant would be selected as the best adapted to the future requirements of the nuclear development program of the country, even if such design and power d.1 not match precisely the immediate production requirements. As for operation, priority will be given to the training of personnel assigned t9 conduct and control functions, even if such on-the-job training interferes with the overall efficiency of the plant operation. In the human domain, the operation of a nuclear power plant may be bounded by two

137

sets of extreme criteria: to train a I imited number of highly qua I ified and movable personnel; to provide a maximum of stable technical jobs in a given area, in view of its future industrial development. In the first case, it is supposed that an industrial infrastructure is already existing in the nuclear station area, such infrastructure being in a position to provide the necessary skilled technicians in common techniques. Those technicians, flanked by highly qualified specialized personnel, will quite rapidly acquire the necessary complementary training and experience in order to progress-

ively replace their instructors on the organization chart of the nuclear power plant. Such continuous on-the-job training may only be conceived when an upstream manpower reserve exists (industrial plants, fossil fueled electrical generating facilities) and when a downstream recruiting system is available (other nuclear power stations in the construction and operation stages), in order to establish a continuous flow of personnel. For a country in the process of implementing a large electro-nuclear program, this appears as the most efficient solution in order to provide homogeneous and standardized operating teams. It is to be noted, however, that such a standardization in the training of the personnel, essential to the efficiency of mobile teams, implies, as a consequence, standardized specifications for the plant design and operating procedures. In the second case, it is supposed that the nuclear power station, rather than being supported by an existing industrial infrastructure, will, on the contrary be the nucleus of the future industrial development of the area. Then, it is necessary to provide for a complete and thorough training of the entire operating staff of the nuclear power plant. The initial operating staff wi 11 be selected and recruited at the national level. A particular importance will be given to the organization of the workshop and maintenance teams, and the organization chart of the nuclear power plant will reflect the capability of a complete autonomous operation. Starting from this first nucleus of personnel and facilities, it will be possible to develop connected industrial activities in the area (mechanics, electronics, water supply, chemical industries ... ) which, in turn, will generate stable employment and help to settle the population. This concept of an industrial area developing from a highly technical facility appears particularly well suited to the developing countries who are in the process of starting an electro-nuclear program. At this stage, the standardization of the nuclear power stations may be given cl second priority regarding the objective of industrial self-sufficiency of any given area. Later on, obvious economical reasons shall lead to realize progressively the standardization of the programmed facilities. However, at the beginning, one may consider that the choice of the facility to be implemented in a given area should rather depend on the overall industrial development program of the area, than on the specific efficiency of the faci I ity itself. In the economic domain, the operation of a nuclear power plant may be bounded by

138

two sets of extrem e criteria: to generate kilow att-hours at the cheapest price, to prom ote local industrial investm ents, The first criterion im plies a maxim um of savings on the investm ents and operation costs.

As far as investm ents are concerned one shall try to group several nuclear pow er

plants of the sam e design on the sam e site, to join al I regional m aintenance workshops together, to organize centralized w arehouses for spare parts, etc.

A s far as operation

is concerned, one shall try to reduce the num ber of personnel through prom oting the polyvalency of various functions, through developing the sense of anticipation and synthesis at the m anagem ent level.

One shall try as w ell to im prove the overall efficiency of

the pow er plants through the organization of a preventive m aintenance system , through the optim ization of the fuel m anagem ent applied to several power plants ... etc As a m atter of fact it w ill be noted that any priority given to the production of kilowatt-hour at the cheapest price supposes an already w ell settled organization, running a set of several standardized pow er stations in routine w orking conditions. On the contrary, at the start of an electro-nuclear developm ent program , and, m oreover w hether this program is inserted into a large national industrial developm ent undertaking, it w ill appear difficult to give top priority to the production of electricity at the cheapest price. W e have noticed above that the fact of giving priority to the industrial developm ent of a specific area, taking advantage of a nuclear pow er station construction and operation, im p I ied the settlem ent of local populations, and, eventually, the transfer of populations from surrounding areas, through the avai !ability of em ploym ent in connected faci I ities. The first of those facilities will be the maintenance w orkshops of the nuclear pow er station, the w arehouses, the transportation and handling faci I ities. Those facilities will advantageously be erected in the close vicinity of the nuclear pow er station in order to benefit from reduced movem ents of personnel within the area. Likew ise, when the objective is to develop sim ultaneously several areas in the country, it m ay be advantageous to distribute the nuclear pow er station sites within several industrial developing areas, rather than concentrate all nuclear stations on the sam e site. Econom ically, in the short term , the am ount of investm ents necessitated _by the above m entioned schem e w ill be more im portant than the ones necessitated by a solution optim ized for low cost energy production. How ever, the long term advantages for the industrial developm ent of the country m ay prevail in the choice of the actual solution. Those few rem arks will now allow us to define the principles of the training system s to be im plem ented and to com plete the outline of the preceding organization chart. W e will lim it ourselves to a rapid survey of the situation of the industrialized countries on the other hand . For the industrialized countries, the optim ization of the training system will be based

139

upon the fol lowing principles: recruitment of personnel within the existing industrlal"lnfrastructure, complementary training provided mainly on-the-job, In the course of actual operation, training role of the management staff, mobility of personnel between similar nuclear power stations, limited number tf personnel. Those systems will be optimized for a maximum production efficiency of the plants. As a counterpart those systems will inherit the organization structure already in place in the facility, and will contend with adapting progressively such structures to the nuclear specificities. Then, the specific nuclear training of the personnel will always be considered as a complementary training. Those systems lead to a standardization and a regrouping of the nuclear power stations, in order to reduce the investment and operation costs. The organization charts of such systems show a tight connection between the command and control functions , This integration of functions is made possible thanks to the polyvalency of the training, which, in turn, is a condition for internal promotion and external mobi I ity. On the other hand, the maintenance and technical support services become quite independent from a given nuclear power station and are advantageously regrouped at the level of a large set of stations... For the developing countries, the optimization of the training systems may be based -upon the following principles: basic technical training provided to a large number of personnel to be recruited from various sources at the national level; complementary specialized training provided in training centers equipped with nqclear power plant simulators; organization of the nuclear power plant operation teams before completion of the plant construction, and. participation of such teams in the reception tests and start-· up of the plant; permanence of personnel. In a general way, those systems are optimized w]:_tb, the_,objective of creating a large reserve of specialized technical personnel. They· offer the advantage of being able to select, from the beginning, the best adapted structures with regard to the technical, human, and economical objectives of the industrial development program. The specific nuclear training could be limited to a small number of highly qualified personnel, intended for providing a permanent management staff. At the beginning, those systems may easily adapt to some differences between the nuclear stations, as the priority is set for acquisition of experience in a given facility, adapted to local conditions, rather than set for mobility from a station to another. The typical organization charts of such systems show a tendency to separate and specialize the command, control and maintenance functions, while the polyvalency rests

140

with the management levels. 5.

CONCLUSION

Quite evidently both extreme systems which have been just described are not bound to remain rigid with time, They correspond to the beginning and the end of an evolution parallel to the industrial development of the considered country. The pace and the conditions of such evolution shall depend upon the long-term political objectives of the country as well as upon the human and material resources which can be devoted to such objectives. From a country to another, the transfer of knowledge, experience, and technology may only intervene to accelerate or ameliorate the implementation of those objectives which the receiving country is the only one to select and manage. In the case of organizing the operation of nuclear power stations and training the corresponding personnel, we have noticed that the rnultipl icity of local conditions as wel I as the diversity of priority objectives do not permit, in a general way, the transfer of a complete existing system, as a whole, from a country to another. An efficient transfer of technology may· only be realized in the framework of common studies, in a spirit of mutual confidence, between those who are in a position to offer some specific nuclear experience and those whose challenging role is to help their country to acquire it.

141

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS AND ASSOCIATED TRAINING PROGRAMS

5.8. HAMMOND, E.I. GOODMAN, and C.C. CORPUS International Atomic Energy Agency Vienna, Austria

1.

INTRODUCTION

There appears to be a tendency in most countries to underestimate the amount of trained manpower required for a successful nuclear power program. consequences of such a shortfall may be severe.

The economic and technical

Yet it is possible to estimate, within

limits, the required technical manpower once a realistic nuclear power program has been defined, and it is possible to establish a schedule for meeting those manpower needs by mobilizing the various training institutions available domestically, and from bilateral and multilateral sources. A successful manpower development program can be developed systematically by proceeding through the following stages: a.

The nuclear power program must be carefully defined in terms of reactor sizes

and types to be installed, the time schedule of planning, construction, and operation, the extent of participation in the fuel cycle industry, and the degree of regulation required. b.

Model plants and administrative structures can then be envisaged, from which

all manpower requirements are determined, within limits, on a time schedule for the planning, construction, and operation phases.

Much of the information required

to establish manpower estimates for model plants can be obtained from the experience of similar plants already in operation elsewhere but with suitable adjustments to take into account local working, cultural, economic and social conditions.

Some estimates

of model plant requirements are given in this paper, c.

Domestic manpower resources must be determined which can be mobilized to fill

the various positions in the nuclear power program.

Manpower resources include

technical personnel already employed in industry, especially with experience in large civil works, who can be used with little or no re-training, scientists who can be trained and re-oriented to become engineers and technicians, electric utility personnel with thermal or hydro experience, and students being trained and graduated each year from engineering and technical schools in the country. d.

Once the estimates of required manpower have been obtained (stage 2) and

compared to the available manpower resources (stage 3), the overall training requirements can be determined.

At this stage the magnitude of the manpower problem be-

comes apparent in terms of the number of persons to be trained. amount and kind of

142

training required, and deadlines for having qualified personnel on the job. e.

Training program s m ust be organized, existing training facilities m ust be recog-

nized and utilized, and on-the-job training sought and used whenever practical. Universities and technical colleges m ust be given incentives to adapt their program s in engineering and technology to nuclear technologies required by nuclear pow er program s. f.

The nuclear pow er program itself is a fruitful training ground. providing prac-

tical experience in the planning, construction. and operation phases.

At each stage

requiring large num bers of highly qualified personnel, substantial num bers w ith less experience should be included for on-the-job developm ent. The m anpower developm ent program m ust be a dynam ic, well-planned operation, reacting to and meeting changes in training requirem ents, num bers of persons, and tim e schedules.

A successful manpow er program w ill produce a successful nuclear pow er

program .

2.

MAGNITUDE• OF MANPOWER NEEDS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

In our previous paper at the European Nuclear Conference held in Paris in Apri I 1975 global manpower requirements were estimated. Keeping with the theme of technology transfer, it is more meaningful to limit our present estimate to indicate the manpower required by developing countries.

It is well accepted that earlier projections of installed

nuclear capacity for the world were overly optimistic, and those capacity figures would be attained at least 5 - 10 years later than anticipated. For developing countries this postponement may be perhaps even longer, because of a number of factors, incluciing capital scarcity, and the main theme of this presentation limited trained manpower and other limitations related to technology transfer.

In many ways this postponement may be helpful

since additional time becomes available for the training of the skilled manpower required. In Table 1 the IAEA's latest forecast of installed nuclear capacity is used as a basis for estimating manpower required by developing countries. As indicated, it is currently expected that by the end of the year 2000 there will be approximately 300 GWe of nuclear capacity in operation in developing countries. For this nuclear capacity growth. the average annual increase in technical staff shown in Table 1 totals 6000 to meet the capacity additions envisaged for the last decade of this century. This number must be trained gradually beginning S - 6 years prior to commercial operation. The conclusion that can be drawn from this example is that despite the reduced outlook for nuclear power growth there will be a rapid increase in the needs for qualified staff in developing countries. The foregoing estimate is based on only the operations and maintenance requirements of the nuclear power plants. If a developing country considers participating in various aspects of the fuel cycle the numbers in Table 1 become slightly higher, but the power reactor projects dominate al I other requirements.

It is therefore adequate for overall

143

planning purposes to use numbers as presented here, although the fuel cycle requirements will necessitate the availability of additional specialists in that field.

Table 1.

Early 1977 Projection of Installed Nuclear Capacity and Manpower Requirements in Developing Countries 1980

1975 Installed Capacity (Gwe at end of one year)

1.1

7

1985

1990

2000

26

85

300

1981-1985

1986-1990

1990-2000

38

100

300

8

20

30

Assumed Number of Units Added During Period Rounded Annual Average Number of Units Added Average Annual Staffing Additions for Operations and Maintenance * Engineering Technician Total

400 1,200 1,600

1,000 3,000 4,000

1,500 4,500 6,000

* Required gradually 5-6 years prior to commercial operation during the construction and commissioning phase. Does not include project staff of plant owner required about ten years prior to operation nor construction work force. Staffing estimates assume 50 engineers and 150 technicians per unit, are based on limited experience in developing countries, and can vary substantially depending on local conditions. Although many of the staff who eventually operate and maintain a nuclear power unit may become associated with the nuclear project in its earlier planning phases, a separate analysis must be made of these preliminary stages. In general three consecutive stages precede operation as fol lows: Project planning Project implementation Plant construction and commissioning The schedule and manpower requirements for these stages are very much a function of local conditions, the extent of ownership participation, the size of overall nuclear program, and the type of contract used for building a plant. Table 2 presents an estimate of the foregoing requirements for a single project. Because of increased responsibilities by the owner in subsequent projects, and the hand I ing of several projects simultaneously by one organization, the total staff indicated in Table 2 may grow to 200 - 300 professionals. This latter case assumes additions to the grid of at least 2 - 3 nuclear units during each decade.

144

Table 2.

Staffing for a Nuclear Power Project

Stage

Period* (yr)

Estim ated Professional Manpower (man-month)

Permanent Staff**

Temporary Specialists

Project

2-4

500

10-15

10-15

2-3

350

10 Initially 20 Finally

Turn-key with bidding

2

100

10

Turn-key with negotiation

2-3

800

30-40 (ineluding consultants)

Non-turn-key with bidding

2,500

30-40

Supervision, Control and Inspection

Remarks

Planning Project Im plementation

Plant Cons!ruction and 6-7 Commissioning

A range of 10 to 14 years may be required for the stages covered in this table prior to operation. ** Starting in the planning staff, some personnel will continue into project implementation, plant construction, and commissioning, as well as into operations giving continuity to the project organization.

*

3.

COUNTRY'S ASSESSMENT

From the individual country's point of view it will in each case be necessary to perform a careful assessment of the functions which wi 11 have to be carried out under the foreseen contract arrangements and in the existing regulatory situation, and how these functions can be staffed. It will in fact require an assessment of manpower needs and the initiation of a long-term manpower development effort. as has already been done by many developing countries. Each situation must be studied individually as it will be different from others, but there are some general rules which still can be used as a basis: a.

A first nuclear power project must never be seen in isolation but as the first

project in a long term nuclear power program. b.

The long term nuclear power·program should have as one of its goals to increase

the local participation with each project. It is likely that turn-key-type contracts wi 11 be required in the beginning with quite smal 1 participation from loca I industry, but this should increase with future projects. Where to set the targets for future domestic capabilities will again differ among different countries. Likewise, the capabilities of the project and regulatory organizations will most often have to be heavily strengthened by consultants in the first projects. but domestic capabilities should

145

increase with each succeeding project. A nuclear power program will pose new requirements on the training of required manpower. In order to assess the requirements it will be necessary in each individual case to define first the program, that is, the expansion of the power grid, the number of new generating units, and among them the nuclear projects. Many developing countries have received IAEA assistance to perform nuclear power planning studies for this purpose. Secondly, it is necessary to define the functions which are to be performed in the project and regulatory organizations, where outside help is to be sought, and what the targets for the future improved capabilities should be. Thirdly, the capabilities of domestic industry to contribute to projects should be assessed and future targets should be set, even if they are very vague in the beginning. It is possible, and indeed likely, that some factors may introduce definite constraints for the overall program, viz.: the limited availability of financing sets an overall limit to the rate of investment and development; the existing and attainable domestic industrial infrastructure. what can be achieved in the growth of industry development);

(There are limits to

the availability of educated and experienced manpower at engineering, technician and craft levels may in itself fundamentally limit a development program and slow it down until an adequate educational infrastructure has been established, 4.

MORE SPECIFIC MANPOWER NEEDS

Once an overall nuclear program with defined targets has been established within these overall constraints, it is possible to assess the more specific manpower needs. The following areas must be considered: Planning (including such functions as generation and transmission system planning, development of siting programs, studies of siting for general plants, investment planning) . Project preparation and contracting (including plant type evaluation, feasibility studies, qualification of suppliers, bidding document preparation, bid evaluation and contract negotiations) . Contract supervision and follow-up {including site management, contractor coordination, time schedule supervision and quality assurance programming and program implementation) Operation (including operation of the plant, maintenance and technical support in a variety of areas) Fuel cycle services (including definition of fuel cycle requirements and schedules, fuel cycle service and contracts, fuel management and establishment of domestic fuel cycle services at defined levels which can vary from storage facilities to a complete domestic fuel cycle)

146

Regulatory procedures (including both the licensing functions of a regulatory body for siting, construction and operation perm its and the necessary functions of the project organization to obtain the perm its). In each one of these areas it is possible to define the approxim ate qualified m anpow er needs at the different levels of technical managem ent, including group leaders, engineers and technicians.

They w ill cover a broad spectrum of educational disciplines, electrical

and mechanical engineering, physics, chem istry, nuclear and civi I engineering, econom ics, law and public relations.

5.

MO DEL NUCLEAR POW ER PLANT

A specific exam ple of staff requirem ents is now developed for a model nuclear pow er plant show ing the tim e schedule when they wi II be needed.

Based on statistical analysis

of actual data on manpower requirem ents (l), Table 3 is constructed.

The figures appear-

ing in the Table do not correspond to the full force required by a nuclear power project. Excluded as not involving extra training activities outside of w hat are norm ally offered by a country are the conventional engineers and technical personnel available in the m arketplace.

Table 3.

Manpow er Data for a One-Unit 800-M W e Nuclear Pow er Plant*

Manyears

Period, years

Ave.N o. of Men

Design & Engineering ~/

200

4

Construction Management

800

6

130

240

10

24

Owner's Staff

'e.J

Pipefitters-Welders Electricians

*

50 ~/ 145 '::_/

12-18

Regulatory Crafts

Peak No. of Men

6000 1500

6

250

870

6

145

310 170

2./

Conventional professionals and crafts such as ironworkers, millwrights, laborers. etc., are not included in this table.

~/ Graduate engineers and technologists requiring prior training in nuclear power technology (Taken as 25%)

Based on 30% of the staff belonging to the professional category. Based on mean peak-to-average ratio for the crafts. Based on maximum peak.

147

The model for a single-unit 800 MWe nuclear power plant Is completed in Table 4. The individual numbers have been fixed within the limitations in Table 3 and to some 2 extent based on past experiences < >. Certainly these numbers from case to case could vary significantly, but the general trend should remain essentially the same. Some explanations useful in going through the Table are as follows: Project Team - Composed of engineering and design, and construction management, this team starts essentially at 10 years prior to core loading. In 'l ine with good nuclear engineering practice, design and engineering work is 60% complete before construction starts. This explains the reduction in personnel at the beginning of the 6th year before core loading. It is also herein assumed that some 10 to 20 engineering personnel are contributed by the owner in the form of consultants or hired specialists.

Table 4.

Model One-Unit 800-MWe Nuclear Power Plant Trained Manpower Requirement

Years Prior to Core Loading 12

4

6

2

0

10

8

C

F

Project Team

50

50

90

175

170

1. Design & Engineering

30

30

20

10

10

10

50

145

140

60

5

30

30

45

45

ACTIVITIES Planning & Engineering Implementation Construction TRAINING

A

E

6182

Bl

MANPOWER REQUIREMENT A.

2. Construction Management B.

Oeeration Team 1 . Operations

5

2. Maintenance Management C.

70

Owner's Team

10

20

25

30

1. Engineering

10

10

20

10

10

10

8

12

16

30

20

20

150

310

270

100

50

140

170

70

30

35

2. Others D.

Consultants~ecialists*

E.

Regulatory Team

F.

Crafts 1 . Pipefitters-Welders 2. Electricians

6

* Contribution from this group is highly variable and is associated with A, C, and E.

148

Operations Team - The operations staff consists of about five management personnel, iive staff personnel and senior operators. A slightly larger number of maintenance peo3 ple performing technical services and maintenance functions are under this team ( ). The full compliment of theoperatlons organization, for reasons already stated earlier, is much bigger than the figures indicated. Owners' Team - This is a separate group from the project team and concerns itself, among other things, with engineering review, control and inspection of the work done by the project team in order to meet time schedules, the provisions of the specifications, and project cost targets. In addition, it has the added responsibility of helping insure the gradual and proper transfer of technology to the country.

It therefore recruits personnel

and it trains them as the project or power program so demands. When the project is completed, this team continues to operate, performing such functions as fuel management, developmental work, modifications in the operating plant, systems planning, etc. It has direct contact with the regulatory body. The Crafts - The total manpower under this category includes welders and pipe fitters, electricians, carpenters, millwrights, ironworkers, etc., as well as laborers. The average size in a 6-year period of construction is roughly a thousand men with the biggest share divided between welder-pipe fitters and electricians, which together constitute about 40% Regulatory Team - Turning to the regulatory group, here an initial professional staff of 6-8 persons will be needed with training and experience in nuclear-related work. Like the owners' team, this is a permanent staff and must allow itself provision for dropouts assumed at 10% per year.

(A full-time regulatory staff of around 50 professionals

may be the minimum for a country planning to build and operate 5-7 power reactors even when consultants are used extensively by the regulatory group.) The specialization of this staff will be given by their main fields of activities: Site and environment

Radiation protection

Mechanical systems

Fuel Management

Instrumentation

Operations.

Table 4 also shows the commencement of training applicable to the different manpower teams. Taking the case of the Project Team, ideally, the estimated 50 people involved at the start of the project, mostly engineers, should have received prior training In nuclear power engineering with specia.lization in the different aspects of the technology. The operations team generally does not present much of a training problem, since the group is small and always comes in at the later stages of the project. Furthermore, in most cases their training activities are well defined in the contract for the supply of the reactor equipment, and properly taken care of by the contractor. There are unavoidable differences In viewpoints between contractor and owner, however, and for the benefit of the project, the operators and the maintenance unit must be given proper and timely consid-

149

eration. As shown in Table 4, a handful of operations management group should already be designated and trained 5 years before critical loading of the reactor. This is followed 3 years later by the plant staff and reactor operations and by the key maintenance per-: sonnel. Training for the crafts must start at preferably two years before they .get involved in the project. Good base material, i.e., those with extensive experience in industry and conventional plants, may receive training at the start of their recruitment. The problem here foreseen is the resulting strain in industry where, in developing countries, top level technicians are scarce. This example clearly shows that a complete nuclear power program will have requirements for engineering education which, in many. cases, will need changes in the higher educational programs in a country. There will also be a need to supplement the technical education at universities and technical schools with additional programs oriented especially towards planning and supervision of major projects. In industrialized countries this additional education is usually obtained through many years of on-the-job experience and, for project work, this certainly remains the best way to obtain the basic training needed. There are, however, normal I imitations to the number of engineers and technicians who can be educated in this way, and in developing countries the staff which has participated in related types of power projects, refineries or other major industrial projects is most often very small indeed. This type of project-experienced staff is most essential as a core for the owners' organization in building up a nuclear power organization. 6.

TRAINING PROGRAMS

Many utilities and nuclear energy organizations both in· industrialized and developing countries have also established their own supplementary training programs. While they are in themselves necessary, they are most often not enough for the staff requirements for a nuclear power program. For developing countries the main possibilities to train nuclear project staff has been abro.ad, and the IAEA has contributed to this through a series of fellowships. However, the possibi Ii ties in obtaining posts for on-the-job training at power plant projects have been very limited for obvious reasons. Once contracts have been signed, it is possible to get training of staff from architectengineering firms and reactor suppliers. While this training possibility is of primary importance, it is limited chiefly to operating and maintenance staff, including the use of well equipped simulator centers for control room operating training. However, the project planning and supervision staff cannot be trained in this way. Limitations in the above-mentioned training possibilities caused the IAEA to launch a major new program of training courses in nuclear power project planning and implementation which was initiated with a course in Karlsruhe in the autumn of 1975. Four 15-week courses were held under this program in 1976 at Argonne, USA, Scaiay, France and Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of Germany. Four additional courses at these same institu-

150

lions wlrl be completed In 1977. An analysis of the first six courses indicates participation by over 200 Individuals representing 39 countries from about half of the Agency's developing Member States. All participating countries have reached the point where they are at least contemplating going nuclear, although they may not have any definitive program. The biggest portion of the participants come from countries which are in more advanced stages of nuclear projects encompassing feaslbi I ity studies, contracting, construction and operation. The survey courses are designed to meet specific needs for staff at the management and group leader level, but even with the present program we can only meet a part of the project staff needs in any one country. The courses should therefore be supplemented with other training possibilities which still have to be developed. They could include the fol lowing: Regional Agency courses which would be aimed more at the engineering or specialist level in specific fields (e.g. safety, contracting, licensing, quality control and assurance, and manpower development planning). More extensive use of the Agency's fellowship program. It could, for instance, be possible to obtain longer-term offers from both developed and developing countries for on-the-job training in project or regulatory organizations. If these positions were given a well-defined character, e.g. in the quality assurance, technical support, or regulatory review staffs it would certainly help to place fellows with a shorter time, delay than has been possible before. An exchange of personnel between projects in the same geographical region could give very good training possibilities particularly in areas of practical methods and techniques. The time lags which will exist between project schedules could be used in a good manner and help to improve the overall training possibilities for all parties. Experts under IAEA technical assistance programs could be used to assist in assessments, setting up of training programs and also for specific tasks in review of QA New training programs will have to established on a national level by educational institutions and by power and nuclear energy authorities. This is in itself a most important function which will require attention at high levels in authorities. For all these training possibilities the IAEA technical assistance programs can be used, but it is essential to base requests on an overall assessment of needs and a longer-term plan for manpower development, if the I imited means at the Agency's disposal are to have any impact. A regional cooperative approach can, of course, have great benefits through coordination and the better use of facilities and experts. For this reason the Agency is studying a proposal for a regional project for nuclear power development to see if it meets with support from the Member States of the region. Such a project would place definite requirements on participants, e.g. to receive trainees at projects, but it could give equally definite benefits. It could, just as one example, provide a means for establishing training of qua! ity assurance staff at all levels and to specified standards.

151

Whichever means are chosen to establish the training needed, It is still essential to make a careful assessment of the needs along the lines outlined. The Agency is prepared to assist in this respect and we are now collecting the Information we need and developing the models necessary for evaluation of individual country situations. A preliminary list of country data is being considered as illustrated in Annex l to help with this evaluation. The purpose is to make it possible for Member States to request this type of evaluation as part of the planning missions and studies which we are performing.

REFERENCES: 1.

Ramesh N. Budwani, "Important Statistics on Engineering and Construction of Nuclear· Power Plants," American Nuclear Society Meeting, Los Angeles, California, USA, 14-16 September 1976.

2.

J.C. Shah, "Selection and Training of Staff for Nuclear Power Projects," Briefing Course on Technical and Economic Aspects of Nuclear Power Development, Bangkok. Thai land, 3-18 December 1973.

3.

J. D. Grady and J .J. Evans, "Building a Training Program to Meet Plant Startup, ANSI 18 .1 and 10 CFR 55 Requirements,

11

American Nuclear Society Meeting, Los

Angeles, California, USA, 14-16 September 1976. APPENDIX List of Necessary Data for Preparing a Manpower Development Program in a Given Country (Questionnaire to be sent to the country) 1.

General characteristics of the country: Population (by age-groups) Territorial extension Gross National Product (by activities) Energy consumption Cost indexes, inflation,. foreign currency market

2.

Educational structure of the country: Univer-sities (official and private) Technical schools (official and private) Research institutes (official and private) Industrial and commercial organizations Fields of study, type, curriculum. duration Number of students Number of graduates per year

152

3.

Industrial structure Major industries in the fields of: Construction Electricity Mechanics Electronics Chemistry Mining Nuclear Organizations assisting industry (laboratories, research establishments, technical assistance, recruiting of personnel, etc.)

4.

Rules, codes and guides Practices Labor legislation Union organization, influences and extents Promotional policy and systems Quality Control and Assurance

5.

Manpower resources of the Country in the technological fields Subjects, specialties Number of professionals and technicians in activities (listed by specialties) Professional organi zatlons

6

Organization in the nuclear field Groups in the different di sci pl Ines Number of personnel

7.

Nuclear Power Program of the Country

8.

Manpower resources in the nuclear field

9.

Educational structure in the nuclear field

153

WESTINGHOUSE EXPERIENCE IN THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

JOHN W. SIMPSON

Westinghouse Electric Corporation Pittsburgh, Pennysy/vania USA

1.

INTRODUCTION

The methodology of information transfer is as old as the oldest recorded schools in Greece, Iran and the far east. Schools, letters, books and speeches like this one are techniques ages old. In what has often been called the cradle of civilization, we have returned to discuss the implementation of today's knowledge for tomorrow's culture. As nuclear energy technology comes into wider and wider use, the means of transferring the appropriate technology to those entering the nuclear age who require assistance has become a problem. The communications problem is compounded by the large volume of information on research, development, design, manufacture, and operation of electrical power producing nuclear reactors available today. Westinghouse experience with transfer of technical information is two-sided. First is our experience in learning; how we learned and the processes by which we continue to learn. The second is our experience in teaching others. Naturally the transfer of technology is a complex process because of the differences in cultural base, language, educational background, business procedure and law, and the obvious communications delays, ,

transportation, and time handicaps. Nevertheless, Westinghouse has maintained excellent working relationships with several different countries and companies because we believe in taking a very individualized approach. In Japan, in addition to the license for the design and manufacture of PWR systems and nuclear components, Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Company, Ltd. and Westinghouse also participate in a nuclear fuel fabrication company. After an initial training period with U.S. operating personnel, the factory is now staffed entirely by Japanese. In France, we trained and supplied technical information to Framatome, to enable them to become viable participants in' the world market. Today, our relationship continues to be mutually beneficial, expanding into more current technology. Belgian firms, such as the Societe Franco-Beige de Fabrication De Combustibles, and English firms such as the National Nuclear Corporation LTD, deal with our Westinghou~e Nuclear Europe, Brussels office in order to transfer the appropriate technology for the manufacture of nuclear components. In Brussels, a large engineering staff adapts basic PWR technology generated in the United States to comply with European practice. In Italy, a fuel fabrication plant has been developed and is now staffed by Italians, with component I icenses held by Fiat and Breda. Sweden asked Westinghouse for a completely different approach; it prefers

154

to order the entire nuclear "island" design from the reactor vendor, as well as maximizing local content. The Spanish government's requirements for the development of local nuclear industrial capabilities has led to patent, license, technical assistance and training agreements. In Germany, in conjunction with German manufacturers, Steag and Gelsenberg, Westinghouse has established a fuel fabrication company. In short, each country and each company asks Westinghouse for a tailored approach suited to their needs. It is our learning experience which has given us the understanding and ability to meet these requests. 2.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Let us briefly look at the historical development of today's current technical reservoir supporting Westinghouse pressurized water reactor systems. Shortly after World War II, it became clear to a number of people in the United States government that nuclear energy would play an important role in the generation of electricity for central station use. In 1946, a program was started at Oak Ridge, Tennessee to help industry acquire the necessary knowledge to implement this aspect of nuclear technology. The program was a twopronged venture; on one hand, a school was established to train key technical people that already possessed advanced degrees in physics, metallurgy and most of the general control and other engineering which support the design and development of nuclear reactors. The second area of effort was to build a nucleus of 50 to 70 engineers to develop and design a central-station gas-cooled reactor. The initial experimental school succeeded and continued for many years as the Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology. It soon became obvious to the Daniels Pile Group (development engineering nucleus) that insufficient information existed at that time to implement the gas-cooled reactor design. However, the engineers who attended the school and participated in the program, as well as the companies who sponsored them, gained a great deal of experience. Westinghouse was one of those companies who sent personnel to the training program; most of those who came back to Pittsburgh played key roles in our development of a nuclear energy team. During these pioneer years, few people had any experience in the research, development and design of nuclear reactors. Those few people who were experts, were not only doing theoretical physics research but high grade engineering implementation of the prototype design reactor at Oak Ridge, which was a graphite-moderated reactor, and the plutonium reactors at Hanford, Washington. Fortunately, a few of the very competent physicists and metallurgists who had worked with the Manhattan Project during World War II remained in the nuclear energy industry and provided much assistance in training many more people via formal programs and on-the-job training. The importance of these experienced scientists and engineers was obvious to companies entering the nuclear business who found it necessary to select people with broad technical backgrounds and either send them to the Oak Ridge School or provide on-the-job training in nuclear energy.

155

In the United States, much of the early work in nuclear energy was financed by the United States government. The Westinghouse Electric Corporation was fortunate to secure the contract to set up and to operate the Bettis Atomic Laboratory for the Atomic Energy Commission. In this laboratory, work done in cooperation with the Argonne National Laboratory led to the design and manufacture of the prototype submarine reactor power plants for the United States Navy and later to the design and manufacture of the first atomic power plant for the United States Navy submarine, Nautilus. In the following years, Bettis Laboratory also worked on the engines for other submarines and surface naval vessels. They also designed and developed the United States' first commercial nuclear power electric generating plant at Shippingport near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

3.

EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES

Today, a wide range of technical training is required by the nuclear industry to applied research, design, manufacture, operation and testing applications, economic evaluation, regulation, and management. Most high schools in the United States offer courses in chemistry and physics where the fundamentals of science are taught. Basic training is provided by universities, colleges, and technical institutes. There are now 124 colleges and universities offering degree programs in nuclear technology at either the graduate or undergraduate level. The largest of these is the Massachusetts Institute of Technology which has approximately 200 students in its department of nuclear engineering. While graduates with Masters and Doctoral degrees from nuclear technology training programs have tremendous ability, they generally need additional on-the-job training in the various industrial or government installations where they will be working. Even though they do have need for additional training, new engineers and scientists bring new insight to old problems and are of tremendous help to their organizations. Additionally, many technical people enter the nuclear field with only training in basic engineering and scientific disciplines. These personnel usually require even more specialized training after they begin careers in industry. academia or government. The Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology, formally started in 1950, operated until 1965 with a total of approximately 1000 graduates, most of whom went into the growing nuclear energy industry. Essentially, al I of the students of the Oak Ridge School came from major industrial or governmental organizations.

In addition, today, it is not unusual for industrial and other related organi-

zations to send people for a year or more of training at major national laboratories or universities and reciprocally, many universities have their professors spend a year or so in technical work in the nuclear industry. Westinghouse, as is customary in many large industrial organizations, conducts a training program lasting from 6 months to 2 years for many of their new engineering employees. After this, if they go into the nuclear field, they are given additional training

156

in special cour ses run by the company as well as being urged to attend evening classes to obtain graduate degrees. In a few instances, after they have been working for several years, they are encouraged to return to a university to obtain their doctorate degree. Westinghouse, as well as many other corporations, offers many learning opportunities for its personnel.

Evening school classes, divisional courses and corporate education

experiences are offered in a wide variety of areas, engineering to accounting, speech to corporate business law and almost every topic in between that will improve our personnel, broaden their technical knowledge, improve their interpersonal skills, and widen their horizons. By offering these opportunities Westinghouse provides for the transfer of information. For example, within the Westinghouse Nuclear Energy Systems division, two programs exist for new employees. One program is dedicated to personnel with little or no technical knowledge or experience. The second is a sophisticated course for engineering and scientific personnel. Westinghouse personnel teach courses at several universities. In this case, we in industry share our technology with the academic community. These courses are given as part of the normal curriculum with normal credit towards a degree. 4.

INDUSTRY-PROVIDED TRAINING

Reactor manufacturers also provide training programs for customer personnel of both engineering and operating departments. This has also been done by major electrical manufacturers with respect to conventional electrical utility equipment for many years. Training by industry is not restricted to research, development and design engineers as many programs are conducted for welders, testers, quality control, and production personnel. These programs are usually conducted by the industrial organizations, but in a number of cases, state governments have conducted extensive training programs. An example of the kind of program nuclear manufacturers provide for their customers is in the area of operator training. Because of the unique legal aspects of owning and operating a nuclear power plant, there have been many regulations and licensing requirements placed on utility owners in regard to providing competent operating staffs in the United States. The licensing of operators both at a senior operator and operator level is a requirement. In all instances, each candidate for a license must meet specific requirements involving the individual's education, training and experience. A standard regarding this eligibility has been adopted by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In certain instances, training can be substituted for experience, but training cannot substitute experience on a hundred percent basis. After receiving his license each operator or senior operator is required to keep his license in an active status and continue training on a routine basis. Each operator license is required to be renewed every two years.

It can only be renewed if the licensee has had

specific operating experience in the control room and has properly completed an approved requalification training program. Experience includes a number of "hands-on-controls" operations during plant operations. As a substitute for this operating experience, an

157

approved training program on a simulator may be used. The simulator which is utilized should reproduce the same operating characteristics as the licensee's plant and its arrangement of instrumentation and controls should also be similar. In order to assist our customers, Westinghouse maintains a training center at Zion, near Chicago, Illinois. The Westinghouse Nuclear Training Center is a joint venture between Westinghouse Electric Corporation and the Commonwealth Edison Company .. Since opening the center in May, 1972, over 400 trainees a year have attended the center, representing approximately 1800 trainee-weeks per year.

Trainees come from many other

countries as well as United States locations. The first phase of the training program provides the trainee with the basic knowledge, experience and terminology utilized in the nuclear power reactor field, This is accomplished through classroom lectures, laboratory demonstrations, and trainee study and homework. The trainee learns actual participation and practice. The training also includes at least three weeks of live reactor operations and experience, Usually, a small training or research reactor is utilized. The hand I ing of radioactive materials, radiation protection practices and actual hands-on reactor operations are included. The trainee learns how the neutron chain reaction behaves operationally in the steady and transient states. He learns to control the reactor and properly read and interpret nuclear instrumentation. Then, the trainee studies and observes the details of an actual operating nuclear power plant. All the important system components and equipment are studied as well as the systems themselves. The theory of operation, important parameters and overall operations are learned. Systems and equipment are traced through in the operating plant. Technical Specification requirements and system procedures are covered. Operations and procedures can be demonstrated on the simulator as an added and important training feature. Learning the plant and its operation prepares the trainee to do a more successful job of learning the plant operation on a simulator. The last phase, simulator training program, is designed to teach the trainee actual plant operations and the transient characteristics of the overall plant. Not only Is knowledge gained in the operations training but also a skill in manipulation of controls and responsive action to operational situations is practiced. This latter advantage is en9rmously valuable in making the control panel operator more reliable and, of course, less likely to make an operator error. One further advantage is that the simulator is capable of simulating more than a hundred malfunctions in plant operations which would be hazardous in a full scale power plant operation. The trainee spends approximately 100 hours in the simulator control room as part of a three man crew. Equal time is spent as shift supervisor, reactor operator or steam plant (balance of plant) operator. The remainder of the course is spent studying systems and procedures, preparing for and reviewing simulator training operations, studying administrative and emergency procedures and reviewing nuclear power plant technology. The trainees are under continuous evaluation, documented daily, by their instructors. Although the primary use of slmula_tors is for the training and licensing qualification

158

of operating staffs, other individuals in the nuclear power industry have utilized their teaching capabilities. Short survey courses have been developed for design and project engineers of utility companies, vendors, and architect engineering companies. These courses range from three to six days in duration and help the engineer see the overall picture of the plant and its operations from the control room as well as to give him a real operational experience. He learns about the interdependence of systems and how his own area of design or project responsibility interacts with all the others. Usually a brief study of the overall plant system's makeup must be made as part of a program of this type. In addition to initial training and operator retraining programs, other training programs and services are offered at the Zion facility: Nuclear and pressurized water reactor technology training programs tailored to give non-operating personnel a thorough understanding of nuclear technology and the systems, components, operating techniques and safety procedures of a nuclear power plant. Special design lecture series to acquaint attendees with the design and operating characteristics of a Westinghouse reactor. Instrumentation technician programs designed to provide the trainee with an understanding of electronic theory and radiation detection with emphasis on safety and troubleshooting techniques. A health physics technician training program which considers the various forms of radiation, radiation exposure limits, proper handling of radioactive materials and plant safety procedures. Replacement operator training programs which are tailored to each individual's specific needs and consist of the appropriate phases of the initial reactor operator training program and other special training as required. In addition to basic training, provided by universities, job entry training programs and early training programs, provided by companies, such as Westinghouse, there is a great need for continued training and interchange of information between even highly trained and competent engineers and scientists. Technical societies and trade associations play an important role in the continuing technology transfer between individuals in industry, government, science, education, and research scientists. The American Nuclear Society, as well as the various other technical societies representing particular disciplines, publish papers and conduct meetings to further the exchange of technical information. Other organizations, such as the Atomic Industrial Forum, conduct specialized workshops in areas such as the nuclear fuel cycle, safeguarding of nuclear materials, the disposal of waste, radiation damage, and so forth. In addition to technical societies and trade associations, our company conducts a special school to which government, academic and industry people are invited. For the past 8 years, Westinghouse has conducted a training program dealing with environmental

l 59

problems, which is held at Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, 5,

LICENSING RELATIONSHIPS

Transfer of technology Is very important between reactor manuracturers and components suppliers. The reactor manufacturers have in-depth knowledge of the component requirements and the ambient conditions under which they will perform. The supplier, on the other hand, has greater knowledge of what can be most easily manufactured and what will give the best service and reliability. This transfer of knowledge requires a flow of infor-

ll)ation both ways. When an industrial organization has acquired information and wishes to transfer that proprietary ir:,formation to other organizations, this transfer is usually done by means of a license. Most technical work done under government contract is subject to the provision that the results be published and be made available to industry. Usually, simply reading the reports after they have been published is not considered sufficient, particularly for major research projects because of the difficulty of interpretation and the lateness of publication in some instances. Frequently, it is found necessary to correct some of the early reports in major development programs and as the pr.ogram progresses, individuals who do not possess intimate knowledge may be led astray, In order to overcome this handicap, the government frequently permits organizations to have their own engineers work in the contractor's organizations during the development program. The government also publishes technical papers and conducts seminars and training programs to ensure a wide dissemination of information. The United States government has, in a number of instances, entered into bilateral agreements with other governments where nuclear information has been given or interchanged. This has been very helpful and usually successful where both of the countries have major programs in the area involved. In cases where a country Is just entering the nuclear field, it is unlikely such information would be adequate. If a country or a company in another country wishes to enter the nuclear field, the mechanism of obtaining a license from an established reactor manufacturer usually is most successful, because the reactor manufacturer knows the information required since he has had experience in producing the design and the equipment, and has the personnel to provide the information and to work closely with the license to make sure everything ls clearly understood. There are many forms of license agreer:nents, from design information of specific components to an overall agreement for the complete .nuclear steam supply system. If the licensee does not have a large group of highly trained people with a background of design and manufacture of large projects, then more training is involved. A much more extensive license agreement is required if the licensee company or country intends to develop the capability for handling complete nuclear power plants. There are many problems involved in all technology transfer; these include: keeping Information current; making certain changes are compatible with the suppliers' manufac-

160

turing capability and also suitable to the receiver; and the handling of patent rights and proprietary information. In the latter instance, a I icense agreement, in some cases, simply involves giving the design parameters for a piece of equipment or nuclear fuel, without giving all of the necessary know-how so that additional design could be carried out by the I icensee. Westinghouse's licenses with Framatome and Mitsubishi are examples of long-standing technological information transfers. Westinghouse and Framatome, a corporation in France, have had a nuclear licensing agreement since 1958. Under this agreement Framatome receives Westinghouse technology and training, in regard to Westinghouse type PWR's, as well as the right to manufacture, use, and sell under Westinghouse patents for nuclear components.

In 1972, this license was up-dated, and Westinghouse obtained an equity

position in the company. Framatome currently handles the design and the manufacture of all pressurized water reactors sold in France to Electricite de France, and has orders for nuclear plants outside of France. So far, Framatome has received firm orders for thirtyfour nuclear power plants, and has options or letters of intent for twelve additional plants. In 1959 Westinghouse entered into a nuclear license agreement with the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries LTD of Japan. This agreement provided for the release of Westinghouse nuclear technology to Mitsubishi and for the use of Westinghouse patents to manufacture, use, and sell nuclear components. The first Westinghouse order for a nuclear power plant in Japan was with Kansai Electric Power Company for MIHAMA 1, and through the license agreement, Mitsubishi provided some of the equipment for this plant. The next nuclear power plant at this site, sold by Mitsubishi, was a duplicate of MIHAMA 1. In this case, Mitsubishi had the responsibility for the design of the plant and Westinghouse provided some of the equipment. This same general procedure followed In the next two sales of Westinghouse type pressurized water reactors in Japan. In 1971, the I icense agreement was modified to give Mitsubishi access to current technology. Mitsubishi is now able to build nuclear power plants using designs based on recent Westinghouse designs. Thus far, Mitsubishi has designed and built four nuclear power plants in Japan, and has orders for five more. In each of these instances, Mitsubishi and Framatome, there was a large base of experienced and heavy component technical personnel who could easily assimilate the nuclear engineering knowledge involved. Both of these agreements are still in full force. It is interesting to note that the Westinghouse-Mitsubishi relationship first started in 1923 when the Japanese came to the United States government for assistance after the Tokyo earthquake. In order to rebuild their electric power plants, Westinghouse Electric Corporation and General Electric Company received orders for 50 and 60 cycle units, electrical equipment, motors, etc.

The exchange of information has been going on for 54 years

between Westinghouse and Mitsubishi. As of March 1977, Westinghouse has 25 different licenses in eleven different countries.

161

6.

THE W EST ING HOUSE APPROACH

W estinghouse is proud of its history, its perform ance and itr oeople.

Our ability to have

successfully transfered technology to other companies and countries has been dependent on our commitment to nuclear power and the actual experience gained from producing the components, building the plants, and then following through on plant operation, to ensure continuing cost-effective ava i la bi I ity. Westinghouse provided uranium metal for the Chicago Pile, where the first chain reaction was demonstrated. The first atomic submarine, the Nautilus, was launched in 1954; Westinghouse has since designed reactors for more than 120 submarines and surface ships. Westinghouse pressurized water reactor power plants now total 23,000 MWe in operation with 146,100 MWe committed. These plants have achieved 185 plant years of operation. Our rel iabi I ity, maintenance, and performance wi II enable Westinghouse to have, by 1983, 132 reactor vessels and internals, 409 steam generators, 411 reactor coolant pumps, and 6256 magnetic jack controls in service and 30,000 fuel assemblies will have been used or in service. Westinghouse has developed the standardization approach for 2-, 3-, and 4-loop plants with pre-I icensed nuclear steam supply systems, plants and standard information packages in order to assure schedule and technical adequacy. The PWR Nuclear Steam Supply System of Westinghouse is the result of carefully .planned research and development programs in every area of PWR technology and extensive plant operating experience. Notable among the Westinghouse design improvements introduced, many of which are firsts for the industry, over the years are: Successful control led leakage reactor coolant pump. Reactor system to utilize chemical shim control for improved power distributions and fuel cycle management. Reactor system to utilize control rod clusters for improved thermal-hydraulic and nuclear performance. Reactor system to provide a movable incore instrumentation system. Reactor system to utilize 4-percent boric acid, eliminating the need for system heat tracing. Reactor vendor to develop post-accident H recombiners. 2 Reactor system to utilize solid state reactor protection. Reactor system to utilize magnetic jack control rod drive mechanisms. Only reactor vendor to manufacture nuclear grade valves for the NSSS. Reactor vendor to develop (through testing and deyelopment programs) a core heat transfer correlation which was subsequently used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a basis for evaluating other reactor vendors. Reactor vendor to develop unique capability to perform detailed subchannel

162

therm al-hydraulic analysis resulting in increased understanding of core lim its. W estinghouse NSSS has been the keystone for the nuclear industry's most significant standardization efforts: The W estinghouse NSSS design has been selected for France's nuclear program . The SNU PPS project,

the United States' m ost significant standardization efforts,

is built around the Westinghouse NSSS. The w orld's first factory built nuclear power station, the Offshore Floating Nuclear Plant, utilizes a W estinghouse NSSS. W estinghouse is centrally involved in the nuclear industry's m ost significant technological efforts: W estinghouse has the lead role in developing the United States fast breeder reactor w ith both the Fast Flux Test Facility and the Clinch River Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program s. W estinghouse is playing a prom inent role in the initial steps leading to the developm ent of a com m ercial fusion reactor system . W estinghouse has been able to achieve this successful record through a com m itm ent to nuclear pow er; to proven perform ance of its plant system s; and to the transfer of inform ation.

7.

CONCLUSION

Nuclear technology is available in abundance.

The problem is to determ ine w hat, of all

that is available, is suitable for one's specific needs - to evaluate and discard that which is either not applicable or is inadequate or incorrect - to adapt the secured inform ation to the specific problem at hand - to fill in the gaps not covered by published literature to create the extra inform ation needed. 1 m ight add that, in addition to the hard science inform ation required, a successful nuclear energy endeavor needs to acquire expertise in com m unications system s, accounting procedures, safety analysis, quality assurance and strategic planning.

All of these

are techniques for the organization and adm inistration of large, com plex, personnel-dependent business structures.

It is the im plem entation of nuclear technology - the know -how -

that has been uniquely developed at W estinghouse.

W hen we speak of the transfer of

technology, it is this business-system know -how that w e are discussing.

Any group of

com petent scientsts and engineers, with the knowledge and materials available today, may

be able to design a nuclear reactor. However, the building, testing, and maintenance of that unit on the I ine - and then a succession of its sister plants - is the basis for the Westinghouse leadership. The transfer of nuclear technology, so vital to the nuclear industry, wi 11 result in a long line of reactor systems that will successfully meet our collective energy needs - as we at Westinghouse continue the innovative trends set by leadership in nuclear technology today.

163

EXPERIENCE WITH EDUCATION AND TRAINING ON

THE JOB

HANS-JURGEN LAUE and DIETER NENTWICH International Bureau Gesel/schaft fur Kernforschung mbH Karlsruhe, West Germany

ABSTRACT

With the aim of ultimate long-term self-sufficiency in energy supply, a growing number of countries on the threshold of industrialization turn toward nuclear energy as a competitive alternative to increasingly expensive and limited fossil fuels. In many cases, their own uranium sources can be tapped, thus decreasing dependence on energy imports. Moreover, most of these countries see in the introduction of nuclear energy a means of raising the technological level of their industry to international standards. The introduction and use of nuclear energy is, however, hampered by a considerable lack of trained personnel for all essential areas in the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. The development of one's own nuclear industry, especially in the nuclear fuel cycle, even increases this problem. This is accentuated by the fact that uni ike industrialized countries, the developing countries have I ittle or no own resources of industrially pre-qualified manpower. One possible way of overcoming this drawback is close international cooperation, of which a variety of examples are presented and the experience gathered is shown. Bilateral agreements, usually directed towards cooperation In scientific research and technological development, concentrate on personnel training as a means of balancing knowledge levels. Efforts are concentrated on joint applied research projects, this being of great interest to the partner countries in developing their own industrial capacities. In the multi-national field, first experience has been gained with training courses on the introduction, design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. A review of further international projects Is given, To an increasing extent, training programs are becoming an essential part of commercial commitments. Mainly in this field, close cooperation between the supplier firms and research institutions in the receiving countries is responsible for the degree of success of any commercial enterprise and for the transfer of technology as a whole. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the fact that the success of training depends on a variety of efforts made by the receiving country, of which the consequent implementation of an overall national nuclear program is the most.important. Possibilities and recommendations for further improvements are given,

164

1.

INTRODUCTION

Before the worldwide increase in the price of petroleum, the utilization of nuclear energy was not in every case an economic problem for a number of rising nations. "The first nuclear power plant in the southern hemisphere" appeared to be sufficient motive for major capital investments, whereas in most cases problems of specialized training of personnel, economy and the importance of industrial development as a whole were not fully taken into account. in the meantime, developing countries with low petroleum reserves have been forced by considerable increases in the prices of fossil sources of energy to employ nuclear power to satisfy their rising energy requirements for industrial development, and, hence, improvement of living conditions. This has also moved the economic problem clearly into the foreground of interest. Numerous oi I-producing countries regard nuclear power as a suitable means of reserving their non-renewable petroleum and gas reserves for better uses and at the same time accelerating their own industrial development. A number of countries have recently discovered major uranium reserves which will not only satisfy their own needs for a long time to come but, through appropriate export agreements, will help to import the technology and know-how needed to set up nuclear Industries of their own. However, in all these countries, the utilization of nuclear energy is possible only if sufficient trained personnel are available in all areas related to nuclear power. This assigns a key position to the training of qualified staff. Since the specific and specialized training of experts in nuclear technology is still one of the major objectives even in such highly-industrialized countries as the Federal Republ le of Germany, this problem can probably only be solved in the developing countries by coordinated International cooperation. It is therefore probably of gene·ral interest to investigate in more detail the problems of training and education, the requirements to be met by a comprehensive training program and the experience accumulated in the implementation of such programs by referrinfii to the example of the introduction of nuclear power in developing countries. The requirements referred to above can be summarized as follows: (1) As indicated above, the tremendous increases in the prices of fossil sources of energy experienced in recent years (e.g., petroleum from approximately U.S. $2. SO/barrel in 1965 to its present price of approximately U.S. $12. SO/barrel fob Persian Gulf) and their probable exhaustion in the not-too-distant future cause most developing countries to regard nuclear power as the only possibility of becoming independent of Imports of fossil sources of energy in the long run and balancing out the deficits in their foreign trade balances. (2) Most of these countries regard the utilization of nuclear power as a suitable step in the industrialization of their countries or as a chance to familiarize existing indus-

165

tries with the highest technological standards. In the long run, they are quite likely to improve their competitive chances in the international markets. (3) Nuclear energy i~, however, a technology with an enormous requirement of specialized manpower, exceeded perhaps only by space flight enterprises. Even ih the industrialized countries nuclear industry and nuclear research can only make llmlted use of school" or university graduates:

In the developing countries, with their limited facil-

ities for training and education, this is possible to an even lesser extent. In the industrialized countries, therefore, government operated research centers and industry increasingly assume the duties of specialist trelners ,

considerable cost factor.

This constitutes a

In developing countries, which generally have neither

industries nor suitable research centers for special I zed training, other systems and possibilities of funding must be found for this training activity, (4) Relative to other branches of industry, nuclear technology must perform at increasingly higher levels of quality for safety reasons. This requires additional and specific training after the completion of regular professional training, i, e., extra expenditure in terms of cost and time for training and education, 2.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Before making more detailed statements about possibilities of trainlnq in-developing countries and reporting on experience in this respect, the general problem of manpower requirement should be dealt with. The transfer of technology is difficult because the implementation and operation of sophisticated technical plants requires a certain minimum of qualified manpower not easily met from the country's own resources. Of course, this is not due to a sort of intelligence gradient from country to country.

It has rather been proved that a Tanzanian or a Thai,

to mention just two examples, is able to fly a B747 just as safely as an American, Frenchman or Englishman. Instead, the lower level of education and qualifications is caused by insufficient technological development of the country's own Industry, or in other words, by lack of requirements.

This primarily refers to the absence of the qualified middle

class, i.e., craftsmen, technicians and engineers, Moreover, for purely economic reasons most of these countries have outmoded social patterns and behavioural structures which obstruct the training of this technical middle class, The very pronounced trend towards white-collar workers encountered, above all, in developing countries is just one example to be quoted here; it is a consequence of the underestimation of the social status of technicians and engineers and, consequently, overestimation of the academic professions. The need for trained manpower is finally a function of the national contribution made by a country in the construction of a nuclear power plant, also in the management of the fuel cycle, and of the share the national industry is able to contribute. Independent of

166

this aspect, qualified personnel are especially needed for the following areas associated with the construction of nuclear power plants: (1) bid evaluations (2) licensing (3) planning, design and construction of nuclear power plants (4) operation and maintenance (5) safeguards (6) research and development In the construction of at least the first nuclear facility in a country this personnel will not be likely to have practical experience acquired in thecountrv itself. If, in addition, a national components and fuel cycle industry is to be set up, the personnel requirement increases by a corresponding margin. To what level it grows cannot be stated precisely and in general terms because it is too much a function of the conditions prevailing in the individual countries. These include the scope of the nuclear program, the country's own. personnel reserves, the status of industrial development, etc. However, to give a rough indication of the order of magnitude of the problem touched upon, Table 1 lists the personnel requirements for the construction of a nuclear power station as calculated by the IAEA (l) on the basis of a model, but limited to qualified engineers and technicians. Table 1.

Estimated Need for Qualified Engineers and Technicians for NPP Construction and Operation

Plant Owners

Operations Group

E

Headquarters Grouo

Regulatory !Group

Total

T

E

T

E

0

0

14

3

14

-Phase 2, years 5-10

11

25

25

10

Operations

15

25

15

10

T

Suppliers Architect Engineer

Total Staff

&

Consultants

E

E

T

3

3

35

36

35

3

30

35·

1

E

T

25

15

0

67

28

61

so

31

40

131

125

0

0

31

35

E

T

Project work

-Phase 1, years 1-4

Note: For developing countries the staff of the plan~ owner and the regulatory body would be the minimum domestic staff; the staff of the suppliers, architect-engineers and consultants would come from an industrialized country.

167

In the developing countries it is assumed that almost half of the 131 engineers and 125 technicians come from abroad, especially contractors and architect engineers. Only the balance wi II be domestic personnel for the areas of operating and I icensing.

As the

training level of domestic personnel im proves, the contribution from abroad can be correspondingly reduced. The increase in the personnel requirement with rising num bers of nuclear power stations is much more difficult to assess.

It can be assumed that the requirement for oper-

ating staff will rise approximately proportionally, whereas a less-than-proportional increase is sufficient for the areas of planning, consulting and licensing.

To give an

im pression of the orders of magnitude in which the personnel requirem ent in a country must be calculated if nuclear industry is expanded continuously, Table 2 attempts to show the number of persons working in the nuclear industries (reactor manufacturers, manufacturers of auxi I iary systems and components, fuel cycle industries, nuclear power plant operators, manufacturers of measuring gear, isotope laboratories) in the Federal Republic 2 of Germany in 1973 ( ). A breakdown is given of the categories of production, R&D and adm inistration, training of scientific-and management staff, graduate engineers, technicians and laboratory staff, and other manual and non-manual workers.

Table 2.

Survey of the Industrial Personnel Working in the Field of Nuclear Techniques in the Federal Republic of Germany as of April 1, 1973

Field of Activity Production Quantity Scientific and leading personnel

Graduated Engineers

941

1478

Technicians, laboratory assist ants, tracers

p.c.

40, 1 % -,. 7,5S. +

1011

43, 1 % 24,0%

+

53,6% 11,7\

1064

38,5% 25,0%

➔

25,0%

+

+

+

1058 10185

80,8%

168

=

+

100% 63% +

393

218

4225

26,0%

+

100% 21%

+

16,8% 12,3%

Total Staff

=100% 11,7%

+

2760 =100\ 13,8%

+

+

+

7,9%-+ 6,8\ +

2345

2756 2588

1092

12604

+

+

Other employees, laborers, probationers, apprentices I:

Research & Administration Development Quantity p.c. Quantity P.C.

80,9%

100% 16\

+

60, 7%

+

+ 12167

3199

13,8%

+

20028 · 100%

It is interesting to note that graduate staff, 40% of whom work in research, make up only 12% of the total number of staff of approximately 20,000 and that almost 61% of the total staff have either qua I ified non-technical, crafts or non-qualified backgrounds. These figures refer exclusively to persons employed in the nuclear industry.

To this

must be added the staff working in the sector of government-sponsored research and in the licensing field.

In 1973 this totalled approximately another 12,000 persons.

For

purposes of comparison, Table 3 lists the German Nudear Power Program including the 3 share of exports ( ) .

Table 3.

The German NPP Construction Program Including Export Quota as of mid 1974

NPP Name/Site

• VAK, Kahl • MZFR, Karlsruhe • KRB-1,Gundremmingen • AVR, Julich • KWL, Lingen • KWO, Obrigheim • KKN,Niederaichbach • KNK, Karlsruhe • KWW, Wurgassen • KKS, Stade • CNA, Atucha, Argentina • Biblis A • PZEM, Borssele, Netherlands o KKB,Brunsbuttelkoog o KKP-1,Philippsburg o THTR-300,Uentrop o Tullnerfeld A o GKN,Neckarwestheim o KKI, Ohu o KKU, Esenshamm o Biblis B o KKK, Krummel o SNR-300, Kalkar 0 Mulheim-Karlich o Gosgen-Daniken, Switzerland o KWG, Grohnde o Grafenrheinfeld

Order placed in

Net output MWe

Start of commercial operation

15

1958 1961 1962 1959 1964 1964 1966 1966 1967 1967 1969

237 15 255 328 100 20 640 630 319

1961 1965 1966 1966 1968 1968 1973 1973 1973 1972 1974

1969 1969

1145 450

1974 1973

1969 1970 1970 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 1972 1972 1973 1973

770 864 300 692 775 870 1230 1240 1260 280 1215 920

1974 1977 1977 1976 1976 1977 1976 1976 1978 1979 1979 1978

1974 1974

1294 1290

1979 1979

so

• in operation o in construction

169

3.

TRAIN ING W IT HIN THE FRAM EW ORK OF INTERNATIO NA L CO O PERAT ION

The figures m entioned above surely indicate that the requirem ents to be m et by com prehensive training are such that the developing countries cannot cope w ith them alone and urgently need international support.

According to the experience accum ulated so far,

the follow ing possibilities are open:· (a) Bilateral scientific and technological cooperation, m ostly between governm ent sponsored research institutions, within the fram ew ork of inter-governm ental agreem ents. (bl Multilateral cooperation, e.g ., w ithin the fram ework of UND P/IAEA projects. (c) Attendance at training courses run by international organizations (such as the IAEA ) in close cooperation w ith various industrialized countries. (d) Cooperation within the fram ework of com m ercial agreem ents on the supply of nuclear facilities. Probably the most extensive international training program launched so far is the "Pronuclear" training program organized by the governm ent of Brazil.

At the sam e tim e

it constitutes a good exam ple of the attem pt to train by joint efforts on a bilateral, m ultilateral and industrial level the qua I ified personnel Brazi I urgently needs for its am bitious nuclear program (1x600 and 8x1300 MW e are to be installed in PW R's by 1990 w ith a gradually rising contribution of national suppliers and an expansion of the whole national fuel cycle) .

In addition to the purely national efforts and an international training program

organized by UND P in cooperation w ith the IAEA , m uch spacd is reserved for bilateral enterprises.

Details with be given in the follow ing chapters.

3.1 Bilateral cooperation

In training w ithin the fram ew ork of bilateral scientific-technological cooperation schem es, w e have been able to accum ulate experience for m any years since the Federal Republic of Germ any has concluded, prepared or planned intergovernm ental cooperation agreem ents with a total of 17 so-called nuclear developing countries.

Training is generally carried

out in connection w ith the im plem entation of joint R&D projects, i.e., on the basis of specific subjects.

In order to overcom e the differences in the background of experience, this

is m ostly preceded by a training phase for foreign personnel in suitable Germ an research installations.

These efforts are backed up by the delegation of Germ an experts to the

partner countries.

In addition to on the spot training, this step concentrates on consultant

activities in the execution of scientific projects.

Thus, w ithin the bilateral cooperation

w ith A rgentina in the period 1970 to 1975 a total of 28 Argentine scientists and engineers with a total of 270 man-m onths w ere trained at Germ an research establishm ents and in industry.

For the sam e period a total of 53 Germ an experts worked in Argentina as

consultants and trainers for short periods.

170

From experience w e know that a scientist or

engineer from a developing country should undergo training for at least one year in order to derive lasting benefits.

Training periods greatly exceeding two years w ill integrate the

trainee too m uch w ith his new environm ent and sever his contacts w ith his native country, w hich often makes return rather difficult.

On the other hand, experts from industrialized

countries willing to cooperate actively in training and research program s should go to a developing country on the average of tw ice a year for periods of approxim ately four weeks, and also maintain contacts with the working groups in those countries.

This will prom ote

the independent developm ent of the organizations and working groups to be advised and will help prevent the expert from losing sight of his ow n duties in his dom estic institute. This type of training has so far produced largely positive results.

Much of the success

experienced in the cooperation with Argentina, w hich had been agreed upon between governm ent agencies, was undoubtedly due to the sim ultaneous construction of a Germ an nuclear pow er plant at Atucha, because the joint projects w ere based on technological problem s related to this project, and the Germ an reactor industry participating in the nucclear pow er plant was interested in active cooperation and support.

Experience in coop-

eration w ith countries with which no com m ercial nuclear supply contracts had so far been concluded by Germ an reactor industries has show n low er effectiveness because of different interests. For this reason, the experience accum ulated so far perm its the general conclusion to be draw n that m eaningful results of training efforts within the fram ew ork of inter-governmental agreem ents can be achieved only if they are based on clearly defined governm ental or industrial projects.

In our opinion, the existence of a basic governm ent-supported

nuclear program in the partner country, which is im plem ented continuously, is a necessary corollary to the successful training of experts w ho, after having been trained abroad, m ust find the jobs for which they w ere trained.

To quote one exam ple out of many others w e

w ould Ii ke to refer to the case of an Argentine scientist who spent a total of 42 months at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, first in a program concerned w ith the m easurem ent of cross sections of iron and uranium , later using modified Karlsruhe com puter codes for calculations on optim izing the fuel cycle costs of the Atucha Nuclear Pow er Plant.

As

a result of his first activities he w as able to obtain his doctorate at an Argentine university; the know ledge and experience he was able to accum ulate especially in the optim ization work now enables him to hold a position in which he is responsible for the w hole core and fuel m anagem ent of the Atucha Nuclear Pow er Plant. A factor of decisive im portance in the return and reintegration of trained personnel is the absence in m any countries of a balanced salary structure betw een the governm ent sponsored organizations (atom ic energy com m issions, national utilities) and private industry; this balance is needed to prevent excessive drains of trained and urgently needed skilled personnel, if planning, construction and operation of nuclear facilities rem ain the responsibility of governm ent organizations. If no such basic program exists in a partner country, it has been found that scientists and engineers are trained in fields w hich generally m eet their personal interests, but in

171

most cases they are not able to make direct use in their native countries of the knowledge acquired. On their return this may lead to frustration because, after having become accustomed to conditions in an industrialized country, they find it hard to accept a shortage of money, equipment and skilled technical auxiliary staff.

Occasionally, ·and often

successfully, returning scientists try to use the knowledge they have acquired in a host country to build up an independent-research group of their own. This produces projects purely oriented towards basic research which, In general, are of no significance in the solution of the country's economic and social problems. If, in addition, one takes into account that on an average the developing countries spend only O. 2% of the gross national

product

on R&D, as against 3% in the United States, this often constitutes an irresponsible

waste of money and knowledge. Certainly it is a source of great personal satisfaction to a physicist in a developing country to belong to the small group of international experts in the field of fission product physics instead of working in an applied field, which may be less spectacular scientifically, but more important for the development of his country. We think Iran has embarked on a trend-setting scheme to overcome these difficulties. In addition to firm and clear ideas about the nuclear development program of the country, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) regards It as one of Its main duties to train its scientists and engineers abroad with specific reference to various fields. Thus, under a special training agreement concluded between the Gesel lschaft fur Kernforschung mbH (GfK), Karlsruhe, and AEOI, a maximum of 25 Iranian scientists and engineers per annum will be trained at appropriate German training Institutions. Training will cover -the areas of planning and project design of nuclear power plants nuclear safety and environmental research reactor technology special areas of the fuel cycle isotope technology radiochemistry and nuclear chemistry thermonuclear fusion waste management rad iol og i cal protection. Under this agreement, GfK -.:,,ill be responsible for coordinating and supervising the training in all the government sponsored and private German research institutions participating in the scheme. An appropriate reporting scheme will allow the progress and success of the training to be checked in regular intervals, If necessary, the training period will be preceded by a crash course In German and an Introductory course in nuclear technology offered by the Karlsruhe Nuclear Engineering School. At the end of the training period the trainee Is asked to carry out some minor Independent scientific or technical work of his own, to facilitate the overall evaluation, Naturally, a program of this type will guarantee maximum effectlvlty, because the

172

requirement for trained staff has been assessed with sufficient accuracy, training will be for a specific purpose, and after their return the personnel will immediately be able to take up the jobs for which they were trained. Within the framework of cooperation agreed upon between Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany training of the personnel required for the Brazi llan atomic energy program covers a broad space. In an agreed long-term joint program, Brazilian scholarship holders will be trained at suitable German institutions while, conversely, German experts will lecture at Brazilian universities in courses lasting for one to three months on such topics as technology and safety analysis of nuclear power stations reactor materials welding technology standardization, quality control, quality assurance and non-destructive testing radioactive waste rnanaqement incident analysis reactor core analysis thermohydraulic problems in reactors. These lectures are to be supplemented by para I lei specialized courses in Germany for higher level students, post-graduate work, engineers and technicians at graduate level. So far, an additional 180 students have been offered the possibility of attending one-year courses at two Brazilian universities. Conversely, for 1977 the first 40 scholarships have been granted in Germany to young Brazi I ian scientists for periods of one year each. Training will be carried out both at large German science nuclear research centers, at universities and in industry. 3.2 Multilateral Cooperation In addition to the possibility of bilateral training, reference should also be made to the possibility of training within a multilateral framework. Thus, for Instance, the IAEA not only grants training support under its Technical Assistance Program, but also coordinates development programs financed by the United Nations in different countries. Thus, the UNDP/IAEA program on "The Development of Nuclear Technology in Romania" in the period 1973 to 1976 includes provision for training a total of 73 scholarship holders for a total of 584 man-months in the fields of fabrication of uo and fuel elements 2 irradiation and post-irradiation examination of fuel elements reactor physics component development safety corrosion behavior reprocessing.

173

The success of this training, a large part of which was organized in the Federal Republic of Germany, can also be seen from the fact that Romania, largely by its own efforts, succeeded in erecting a technology center within a very short period of time, which is to be a preliminary stage to industrial scale fabrication, and is to produce a fuel element sub-assembly which is presently undergoing irradiation at the Karlsruhe MZFR (Multi-purpose Research Reactor, natural uranium-0 0 reactor of the pressure vessel 2 type, net power 50 MWe). Again, the existence of a clear target, which had been elaborated jointly in advance by experts of the IAEA and from Romania, was of decisive value. The experience accumulated in the Romanian project is certainly beneficial to the new IAEA/UNDP project on "Nuclear Manpower Qualification and Training" in Brazil. Brazil plans to build a total of 9 nuclear power stations by 1990, with increasing participation of national industries in component fabrication and fuel cycle activities being envisaged. The efforts made by the Brazilian side to develop its human resources is to be substantially backed up by the UNDP program, especially training in the fields of (al the complete nuclear fuel cycle for LWR 's fuel fabrication fuel cycle management (bl design, construction and commissioning of nuclear power plants and nuclear power planning (c) components of nuclear power plants technology development programming and management power reactor components technology nuclear quality assurance (d) safety of nuclear power plants (e) nuclear power plant simulator design (f)

instructor training for nuclear power plant operators is planned in Brazil and abroad.

The most important part of this training program will be the establishment of a training center with a training simulator for operators. Simulator operation is expected to start in 1980. Fully aware of the tremendous requirement for personnel trained in nuclear technology in developing countries, and the increasing demand in technologically developed countries planning to intruduce nuclear energy, the IAEA cooperates with the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and France in offering international training courses on "Nuclear Power Plant Project Planning and Implementation" and "Nuclear Power Plant Construction and Operations Management". So far, four courses on project planning and implementation and one course on construction and operations management have been successfully run for a total of 176 participants from 36 countries. The courses are organized for qua I ified personnel intended to hold key positions in project management, operations and i icensing qroups . Participants should have professional experience in organizations wanting to participate in a nuclear project, such as uti Ii ties, I icensing authorities and industry. The courses present a well-founded survey

174

of al I problems associated with planning, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. In addition to hearing lectures by experts In the respective fields, the participants are required to cooperate in practical examples and discussions so that knowledge can also be acquired In depth. The presentations are completed by visits to nuclear industries; this has been found very instructive, especially for participants from less industrialized countries. The experience in running these courses has so far been extremely positive, (4) The overview offered over a period of approximately 12 weeks allows the participants to gain insight into the manifold problems involved in the administrative organization of the construction of a nuclear power station, The courses have also been found to be extremely useful because in the developing countries there is a lack not only of practical experience in the field, but especially also of management experience in large scale industrial projects. It is to be hoped that these courses will make a decisive contribution towards remedying this situation. 3. 3 Industrial Cooperation Certainly the most direct type of training in the sense of a complete transfer of technology is possible under commercial agreements. The supplier of a nuclear power plant has not only the complete know-how associated with the design and construction of such a plant,· but also has access to the experience accumulated in the operation of nuclear power plants by earlier clients. Thus, in addition to offering the training .of plant crews for a nuclear power station, he can also offer the training in all areas associated with design and planning of such a plant, so enabling the client to gradually have specific jobs in follow-on commissions carried out by domestic industries. The most successful example so far of a satisfactory transfer of technology through training on the job has undoubtedly been demonstrated in connection with the purchase of the Atucha Nuclear Power Station in Argentina. Out of the plant crew of 105 persons in the fields of engineering, operation (alternate shifts), maintenance and safety required for the operation of the Atucha Nuclear Power Station, which was commissioned in 1974, 70 engineers and physicists were trained in the Federal Republic and in Argentina. Training in Germany fol lowed a very accurate plan in conventional steam power plants and at the Karlsruhe MZFR and in special courses and seminars, such as basic courses in reactor physics and technology and radiation protection courses. On the average, training took 2. 5 years per trainee. In the Atucha plant proper training was carried out in the fields of assembly and commissioning, This on the average took 1. 5 years, In this way it was possible to have the nuclear power plant run under the full responsibility of the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission after the delivery phase, A similarly comprehensive training effort Is presently being carried out in connection with the construction of the first two 1300 MWe nuclear generating units in Iran. The manufacturer of the plants, KWU, runs an extensive training program in the areas of

175

design, planning, construction and operation of nuclear power plants, the most Important aspect naturally being the training of plant crews. The personnel are subdivided in two groups: category I includes management personnel and plant crews, mostly with university backgrounds, for management duties such as plant superintendent, production manager, technical manager, maintenance manager, etc., and their assistants. Category II comprises such technical plant personnel as mechanical and electrical foremen, welders, electricians, mechanics, technicians, etc. For the two units of Iran 1 and 2, 17 persons are to be trained in category I and 280 persons in category II, the training being carried out both in Germany and on the site. In addition, another 150 trainees must take crash courses in German lasting for up to 6 months. This training is supplemented by the integration of 30 scientists from Iran in the working groups concerned both with planning and designing the nuclear power stations and with manufacturing components and auxiliary systems. Al I trainees will attend introductory courses in reactor technology which again will be organized by the Karlsruhe Nuclear Engineering School. 4.

CONCLUSIONS

A successful transfer of technology must in our opinion go beyond commercial commitments to acquire nuclear facilities and must involve government supported efforts from both sides. These efforts should concentrate to a considerable degree on providing training preferably in industrially oriented fields to help overcome the acute shortage of qualified manpower in the receiving countries. International cooperation is in our understanding only one possibility of overcoming the developing countries' difficulties in assimilating imported technology. We definitely believe that it is at the same time the most effective for both sides. Within international cooperation, on-the-job training plays a key role. Only with this training can the experience and practical ski II needed to fully govern and understand the imported technology be acquired. Naturally, government supported cooperation is far more eff'!ctive if commercial commitments are involved, as we have demonstrated with the examples of Argentina, Iran and Brazil. On-the-job training will, however, only be successful where government-supported nuclear power programs are implemented, The technicians, engineers and scientists trained abroad on the job must find the job they have been trained for when they return to their home countries. Our experience shows that nearly all efforts go to waste if ful I reintegration .in the home country and continued employment In the work these professionals have been trained for is not achieved. The developing countries are strongly urged not to rely on training In the frame of international agreements alone, but to set up and fol low very rigid training programs of their own. Emphasis should thus be put on the training of skilled craftsmen and technicians. To our mind, Iran and Brazil have embarked on trend-setting schemes in this respect.

176

Furthermore, special care should be given to the full reintegration of home-coming trainees. Without doubt, a longer stay abroad has widened his intellect and has strengthened his personality. It would be unwise not to open possibilities of immediate advancement in his professional career. Reintegration in his old job and responsibilities with the same I imitations must lead to frustration and dissatisfaction. Of course better pay combined with increased social status is another essential in making our efforts successful. Only under these circumstances can on-the-job training be of long-term benefit to the technological development of the trainee's home country. REFERENCES (1) Hammond; S. B., et al.: "Global Manpower Requirements for Projected Nuclear Programmes", European Nuclear Conference, Paris, April 24, 1975. (2) Rembser, J., and Steininger: "Man-power" in der deutschen Kernforschung und Kerntechnik, atw, IXI, 1974, pp. 114. (3) Jahrbuch der deutschen Atomwirtschaft, ~. 1975, Dusseldorf. (4) Reuter, H .H.: "Report on the First Two IAEA Courses on Nuclear Power Project Planning and Implementation in Karlsruhe", Int. Conf. on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle, Salzburg, Austria, 1977.

177

TRAINING PERSONNEL FOR NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS

IN ARGENTINA NELLY H.A. DE LIBANAT/, MIGUEL A. BRUGO, and ALBERTO J. LOBATO Training Department Central Nuclear en Atucha - CNA Direccion de Proyectos Comision Nacional de Energia Atomic - CNEA

Argentina

ABSTRACT This paper descr ibes how the Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica-CNEA, an Institution with 26 years of experience in the fields of nuclear research, development and training, faces the problem of preparing the staff for the Central Nuclear en Atucha-CNA, already In operation, and for the other Argentinian Nuclear Power Plants still under project or construction. I.

HISTORY

This is simply a record of how a developing country is solving its specialized personnel training problems in a technology almost exclusive to developed countries. When the CNA construction was decided upon, CNEA faced the problem of forming the professional and technical crew for a nuclear power station.

Personnel with experience

In conventional thermal stations were selected and taught nuclear reactor engineering, physics and basic concepts of radiological protection. The group was completed by CNEA personnel with experience in these subjects and in materials technology. The whole group obtained specific training for the CNA in Germany under the contractor's responsibility. Back in Argentina, all of them took part in the Plant commissioning. No calculation had been made for possible dropouts, thus by October 1973, when the reactor was first loaded with D O, the group trained abroad was smaller than at the outset. 2 At this time the urgent necessity of beginning integral training, planned in accordance with the nuclear program requirements, became evident. The training had to be capable of being quickly put into practice to meet the most urgent needs, and also endowed with a strong dynamism to allow a search for better programs by trial and error. This record describes action and programs which resulted from decisions made according to the circumstances at each moment; hence its commentatory nature.

178

2.

REFLECTIONS ON THE PLANT ORGANIZATION CHART ANALYSIS

The CNA Organization chart includes: A Plant Manager; one Operation and one Production Assistant; Operations, Mechanical Maintenance, Electrical Maintenance, Regulation and Control, Safety and Health Physics, Technical, Training, Civil Works, and Administration Department Superintendents.

In order to simplify this comment we shall not consider the

Administration and Civil Works Departments. The Operations Department operates in three shifts with 6 crews of 13 people per shift, requiring a total of 12 engineers, 42 technicians and 24 assistants. The rest of the Departments require a Chief engineer, assistant engineers, supervisors, technicians and workers. This organization chart therefore demands personnel at the following levels: 1)

experienced university level

2)

experienced technical level and

3)

specialized worker level.

In addition, the supply of assistants for some duties permits the incorporation of personnel at: 4)

recently graduated university level

5)

recently graduated technical level.

A promotion system based on the above mentioned possibilities was thus established As progress is made in setting course programs, the knowledge level for each position and the theoretical and practical tests necessary for promotions are being determined. It should be mentioned that the part of the organization chart taken into account requires 271 people, while the first organization chart presented by the contractors for the CNA consisted of 104 people to handle equivalent responsibilities. Even if this minimum organization chart could assure short-term economic functioning, it eliminates the possibilities of incorporating personnel at levels 4 and 5. In the long-term it therefore would be harmful to the interests of a country depending on a single nuclear power plant to obtain experience and to train personnel. As we said above, at the end of 1973, when the reactor was near to reaching criticality, the CNA could rely on a minimum of trained staff but there were no reserves to replace those who left to take up assistant positions. Besides, it was time to start personnel training for the Central Nuclear en Embalse-Cordoba.CNE -C. Facing this demand, an ideal plan was written which included courses ranging from the management level down to adult primary education. Everyone knew that this plan should be implemented only gradually, according to the most urgent needs. The strongest restriction was to arise from dependence on a single nuclear power plant: the CNA, and a single group of professors: the engineers who knew how to operate it. In fact we set up a permanent program of preparatory courses for engineers and technicians and a dynamic course program.

179

3.

SCHEME FOR OPERATING PLANT PERSONNEL IMPLEMENTATION

3. 1 University graduates The experience of the original group engaged for the CNA showed that it was difficult to compete with the utilities or with industry in obtaining experienced engineers. In view of this, in 1973 it was decided to start a program for recently graduated or young engineers under thirty. Despite the absence of regular programs for nuclear specialization * , Argentine universltles produce a considerable number of electrical, electrorric, Industrial, mechanical, and chemical engineers, physicists, and scientific computer specialists. This gives a choice of,professlonals with a good background in the engineering sciences. It was"then necessary to choose the appropriate training to produce Nuclear Power Plant engineers. A glance at the organization chart offered two options: a)

to train specialists to fill specific positions with the exact knowledge needed to accomplish those duties and on the assumption that they wil I continue in that speciality;

bl

to train flexible- professionals provldlnq them only with sufficient knowledge to join the Plant as training assistants, and assuming that in the future they could choose specialities and even change them according to the nuclear plan requirements.

This second option was chosen and a unique program set up independent of the appl icant's univers'ity career. Looking again at the organization chart, the question arose of how to face plant training after the theoretical cycle. The peculiar characteristics of the Operations Department led to the decision that, as a rule, work in the Plant would begin with assistantship to the Operations Shift Supervisor. In that duty, the trainee must be tested In the qualifications required to perform his duties efficiently. quickly, and safely. He must get the feel Ing of the plant and show knowledge of systems and components. While helping in the operation, he must show his leadership abilities, his reactions in cases of unexpected contingencies, and his attitude towards safety. Only then can he be assigned to other duties, with the assurance that, after having gone through the Operations Shift, he has a knowledge of the whole of the Plant, has witnessed the interdependence of all the systems, and has once seen that a small repair, a simple perforation or a welding, a simple operation such as valve opening, has resulted in a Plant Shutdown.

*

180

(Except for the Physics Master's at the Institute of Physics Dr .J. Balseiro, Bar iloche Atomic Center, from Cuyo University) .

Whichever department to which he is appointed, he will have learnt that that department must work so that the Plant can operate safely and that the Operations Department has the production responsibility. As regards methods of promotion, the sequence would proceed from the Operations through the Maintenance and Technical Departments after the Engineer has gained thorough plant operation experience.

3. 2 Technical Personnel

The involvement of experienced technicians does not present as many difficulties as It does with professionals. This is partly due to the fact that in this case remunerations are competitive with those in the open labor market.

It is possible to take on technicians with

experience in the operation of thermal plants, or in mechanics or electrical maintenance and, after an accelerated training, to assign them to specific duties.

For new technicians,

a promotion system which plots their careers through the plant is planned in advance. The high number of technical school graduates gives a wide choice. After the basic courses described below, participants begin to carry out subordinate duties and gradually acquire general knowledge of the plant.

They finally become quali-

fied to perform duties at the technical level.

3. 3 Workers

The fact that a plant has the necessary specialized workers for its operation and for its planned requirements for the near future does not justify the immediate commencement of training courses for that purpose.

However., talks may be started with professional

training schools on the possibility of starting courses such as welding or piping, by means of an accelerated training program.

4.

STAGES FOR PERSONNEL IMPLEMENTATION FOR PLANT OVERHAUL, CONSTRUCTION AND COMMISSIONING

Facing the problem of carrying out the CNA maintenance and construction, and the CNA 11 project, a promotion procedure or a reconversion program for CNEA or CNA personnel is preferred to the induction of new personnel from industry. Some CNA personnel could, according with their specialities, be assigned to maintenance overhaul, construction or commissioning groups.

These different commitments

would be challenging and must be considered as "on-the-job" training.

The last step is

to integrate specialist positions in the Technical Department of a Nuclear Plant or Plant design group.

This makes it clear that the whole career of an engineer should be set as

his own "continuing education" program. That is why a developing country with one or few nuclear power plants in operation

181

should consider them as school plants or continuing training centers for managed selection and promotion. This human resources policy is the best investment the country can make.

It is un-

avoidable because turn key plants can be bought, and trained operation crews can be obtained for them, but no additional engineers or technicians can be obtained In the same way as are.components spare parts. The law which authorized the erection of CNA allowed for this:

"That the nuclear plant

to be constructed acquires a particular policy in the training of personnel that shall be required in the immediate future before the possible construction of great power reactors. At the same time it wi II permit and stimulate essential technological advance in a field in which the Nation must prepare itself adequately and at the proper time". According to this pol icy, the effort made since 1973 for personnel training made it possible, in December 1976, to accept the responstbtllty of managing the CNA programmed overhaul. Trainee engineers and technicians took part in the works more or less as qualified assistants, their tasks acquiring a true "on-the-job training" role.

In addition, the

utilities that are planning to construct Nuclear Power Plants are carrying out the reconversion of existing personnel or the training of new personnel through the programs described below. S.

PERMANENT ANNUAL PROGRAM OR PREPARATORY COURSES

5. 1 For Engineers Since 1974 four "Courses on Nuclear Power Plants Functioning and Operation" were dictated. Sixty-one engineers have been graduated after one year's study, and another twenty-eight will finish before 1978. This course comprises: 1)

A general cycle including: introduction to nuclear reactors;

nuclear and conven-

tional safety and health physics; and thermodynamics and fluids mechanics. 2)

A CNA cycle starting with an introduction to the plant, during which the student

becomes familiar with the plant through a combination of visits and classes, followed by a description of the CNA Reactor and a plant system description. 31

A practical selective cycle: This is carried out by trainees attached to the Shift

Supervisor Assistant or in other assistant positions. It was decided that, from the beginning, the course would be held in the training center near the plant so that the trainees start to get the feeling of life at a nuclear power plant.

No special facilities have yet been needed. Temporary buildings from the construc-

tion stage are used as classrooms. A Library documentation service and an electronic laboratory are also provided. Qualified CNA engineers with teaching ability are chosen as professors.

182 .

S. 2 Techn1cians' Course Up to the present only two courses of different level and purpose have been dictated; but with such experience a plan for "Introduction to Nuclear Plants" has been prepared and Is working out at present. The purpose of such a plan is to introduce the technician trainee to the nuclear plants problem so that, whatever his speciality and career in the plant, he may obtain: 1)

an overall view of the whole plant operation and simple knowledge of his place In

it. 2)

a basic knowledge of mathematics, physics, mechanics and other theoretical tools

possibly acquired at school, or forgotten. 3)

the safety knowledge necessary for work in the plant.

As with the engineers, this basic cycle comes before entrance to the plant and lasts about three months. The trainees then enter the plant as assistants to the positions it is assumed they will fill on completing the course. 5. 3 Licensing The engineers' and technicians' courses include all the theoretical knowledge necessary for the examinations for the license required for those occupying these positions. Practical knowledge is acquired during plant training which follows the courses. This permits the trainee to obtain specific authorization to operate the CNA.

6.

DYNAMIC PROGRAMS FOR PERSONNEL RETRAINING

Various programs allow the training and retraining of replacement personnel and the updating of experienced staff. Some examples follow. 6. 1 A course on the "600 MW Candu Type Reactor", similar to the CNA reactor. to introduce people to the new power plant now under construction. Attendance is mostly from CNA, CNEA and by nuclear industry engineers connected with the construction. 6. 2 New programs are started whenever one or more technicians or engineers are required to perform new duties. Of great help in "framing" these courses are the printed materials prepared for the permanent courses.

In fact, more than 100 titles were published on sub-

jects covered in every course. The Training Department Instructors selected the most practical and efficient program from these. 6. 3 The Training Department watches for and announces details of courses and seminars dealing with subjects related to nuclear power plants held both at home and abroad, and promotes attendance at them by plant personnel.

183

6. 4 Diffusion Seminars From questions put by utilities personnel, there is clearly a need to communicate the significant features of, and differences between, nuclear and thermal power plants . Accordingly, a one-day Diffusion Seminar was organized.

It consisted of a theoretical presenta-

tion of operation principles, radiological safety concepts and economic implications followed by a visit to the plant. Strong attendance from the nuclear industries, apart from the utilities personnel, necessitated several repeat seminars. Suppliers and manufacturing companies were asked to arrange seminars on their product_s, at which theoretical explanations by specialized engineers could be given.

7.

OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THE TRAINING

Certain goals beyond the simple teaching of courses for technical levels were achieved: 7. 1 At the Plant The work developed over the past two years tended: 7. 1. 1

To achieve effective participation of the staff in training. This participation was

gradual, but of exponential growth. People realized that teaching in the courses obliged them to be informed and to go deeply Into relevant subjects. Besides, the training pl-an favoring displacement and promotion produced an automatic growth of the plant personnel background: 7. 1. 2

To develop. a receptive attitude in admlnlstratlve and managing personnel. Although

it looked as if the planning were assigned exclusively to the technical level, its influence taught all plant personnel.

In fact, the administrative personnel that may attend diffusion

seminars such as those described, or short courses on the Plant description, realize that their role (for instance, when quickly arranging the purchase of a spare part) is vital and may advance or delay a plant start-up. In a developing country, In which the infrastructure is generally deficient, this active and "clever" copartnershlp of the "whole" personnel can be encouraged by the Training Department. 7. 1. 3

To reinforce a responsible attitude towards safety. Safety, In nuclear plants is

specific and particular in character, and should be taught from the beginning of Individual training and revised through review courses. A deep safety program in the permanent courses, and a special recommendation to instructors to emphasize the way in which safety concepts are taken into account from the design and manufacture stage up to systems operation, contribute to the initial background on safety. For retraining. compulsory half-yearly courses have been separated into two levels, one intended only to reaffirm basic concepts, and the other, for managing personnel,

184

which deseribes and discusses the last six months' experience in plant safety. 7.2 At CNEA The work developed in these two years leads to: 7.2. 1

Interaction with CNEA research and development groups through the same

procedures interlinked for interaction with industry. 7. 2. 2

The reconversion of personnel from the R

&

D area who show aptitude for work in

nuclear plant operation. 7. 2. 3

The assignment of technically competent engineers not suitable for nuclear plant

operation to research and development duties. 7. 3 Outside CNEA The work developed in these two years has prepared the way for: 7.3. 1

A fluent dialogue with the industries related to nuclear engineering. through oral

communication between experienced professionals; training of fresh engineers through these programs and the exchange of written information. 7. 3. 2

The assignment of training for welders, pipe-fitters and other skills, as well as the

continuing education for adults at publi.c educational establishments and to have the universities arrange basic nuclear engineering couses , 8.

CONCLUSIONS

In a developing country the nuclear training planning cannot be an exact replica of programs carried out by more developed countries, but original solutions must be found to solve the individual problems. The aim of our training program is, therefore, not only to fulfi Ii the needs of the operational crew for nuclear power plants, but to use this experienced personnel for the construction, commissioning, and design of future projects.

185

ROLE OF A NATIONAL RESEARCH ORGANIZATION IN THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

ISHFAQ AHMAD Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Islamabad, Pakistan

ABSTRACT Nuclear Technology holds great promise for .developing countries because it can contribute to national development.

The developing countries, however,

lack the

resources and expertise to develop nuclear technology through their own efforts.

A

national research organization devoted to the promotion and utilization of nuclear technology can provide an effective channel for the transfer of nuclear technology. The problems which the national research organization is likely to face in executing its tasks as an agent for the transfer of technology are discussed.

An appreciation of these

problems would enable the organization to restructure its priorities so as to achieve maximum effectiveness. The various ways by which the national research organization can speed up the task of transfer of technology are also discussed. 1.

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear technology holds great promise for developing countries, particularly those deficient in fossi I fuel resources. The generation of nuclear power and the application of nuclear techniques in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology can effectively augment energy and water resources, improve industrial performance, agricultural output and health services. The desire of a nation to participate in the benefits of nuclear technology cannot, therefore, be brushed aside as the attempt of a poor cousin to acquire a status symbol

Most developing countries, however, lack the infrastructure and know-

how to develop nuclear technology entirely by their own efforts. For these countries it is imperative to establish an effective channel for technology transfer with maximum local participation. The natural choice for such a channel is a national research organization devoted to the promotion and utilization of nuclear technology and associated sciences. Such an organization will not only transfer know-how developed in Its own laboratories to local industry but - in the context of the situation prevailing in most of the developing countries - more importantly act as a "via media" between overseas exporters of technology and the home industry. 2.

NATIONAL RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

The national organization has to act both as a "receiver" as well as "transmitter" of

186

technology: In order that this process of transfer be optimally beneficial to the recipient country, it is imperative that the "buying" country has some technological capacity of its own, otherwise she can be easily misled into making wrong choices and submitting to unnecessary commitments. Instead of helping a healthy economic development of the country, nuclear technology, like any other modern day technology, can be used as a tool to perpetuate domination and hegemony over developing countries. Technological domination can prove to be an economic disaster for a country with little indigenous S&T capacity and industrial capability, because the lack of even small components can make a huge industry stand still.

Some of the problems that a national research organization concerned with the transfer of technology has to face are mentioned below. First a few general observations applicable to both nuclear and non-nuclear technology are necessary. Buying technology is not as simple as it sounds. There are the claims and counter-claims of rival commercial suppliers with the lavish use of mystifying jargon. Obviously, one needs to be sufficiently knowledgeable in order not to be led into making the wrong choice and regretting everafter. Expertise in the evaluation of bids Is thus an important prerequisite. One would require experts who would not only be able to understand available literature but are also capable of asking pertinent and penetrating questions in the light of local needs. The problems do not end with the identification of needs and the comparative evaluation of bids. One has to find .a system suited to one's own requirements and which has also been functioning perfectly iri the donor country. Even then, one must be prepared for surprises arising from any number of sources such as weather, ambient temperatures, composition of water or some other

II

Innocent" input, different ways of handling etc.

This initial and development "debugging" which is in fact an adaption of imported technology to local conditions must be distinguished from the more routine trouble-shooting once the production plant or service facility has been put into operation. There are problems unique to nuclear technology which further complicate its transfer to developing countries, viz the much higher precision and narrower tolerances of practically ail components associated with a major nuclear facility. This is mainly due to the fact that there are attendant radiation hazards. Also the choice of materials is mainly dictated by nuclear properties, often necessitating the use of toxic or corrosive materials. Even a minor leak, which would be unimportant in conventional plants, might be both.expensive and hazardous in a nuclear facility. This places a major and delicate responsibility on the national nuclear organization. It has to use a local industry which may not even be cognizant of precision at a conventional level. and to convince the persons responsible of the need for precision and then to help the industry develop to the stage that it can cater to requirements of nuclear technology. It is an exceedingly difficult task, but one that must be faced if dependence on ·imports has to be reduced to a tolerable level. Such an effort is worth undertaking, not just for the sake of nuclear technology transfer, but also for its many spin-offs in other fields.

187

3.

HOW A NATIONAL NUCLEAR RESEARCH ORGANIZATION CAN HELP

Now, let me discuss the role that a national nuclear organization can play in helping overcome these problems. The different aspects of this role might be the following: (a} Development of Local Experts The greatest need is to keep informed, both of local needs and of overseas know-how. Further, this knowledge, if it is to be useful, must be better than layman's hearsay. The organization must therefore nurture groups of people with adequate working knowledge of different aspects of the needs and the relevant available technology. In order to develop this intelligent awareness, the persons should not be just "newsletter readers" but those who are actually involved in laboratory, design, development or engineering work. In no other way can one know the difficulties, the problems and the pitfalls. Commercial development of indigenous products and processes in scientific areas of national interest must be encouraged. (b) Improvement of Local Capability Naturally, the national organization cannot undertake all its projects of interest single-handedly. It has to fall back upon local industry both in the public and private sectors. Unfortunately, in the less advanced countries, there is precious little to fal·I back upon. Industries related to machine tools, alloys, special materials, etc. are either non-existent or in their infancy. Even those that exist have perhaps never been called upon to design and fabricate anything more challenging than simple electrical and mechanical components. It would thus be a great exercise in human relations and patience just to convince them that there are situations in which far more precision and control is not just desirable but vital. After this "convincing" process would begin the actual transfer of technology which could be achieved in many different ways; the most effective being the reciprocal attachment of personnel between industry and the appropriate institutes of the national nuclear organization. Here again sociological problems of effective communication and acceptance would be encountered and would have to be solved. (c) Support for Commercial Scale Activity The final stage in any development activity, undertaken with or without local industrial participation, will be the establishment of some sort of commercial plant. The proportion of indigenous effort would be an index of how much the national organization has been able to influence local industry . .However, even after the establishment of a commercial plant, the centers of the national nuclear organization must continue to provide R&D support for their efficient performance. A strong technological orientation at the research centers would provide enhanced trouble-shooting capabilities in the full-scale plants. This is the third major technological aspect of the national organization's interaction with industry.

188

(d) Manpower Development In most developing countires, local universities do not provide the necessary education and training in nuclear disciplines. As the availability of properly trained scientists and technologists is a fundamental requirement of a successful venture In nuclear technology, the national nuclear organization must assume responsibility for further goal-oriented training of manpower. This can be achieved In a variety of' way,s, depending upon the circumstances. If some university Is willing to run a course but is not doing so for shortage of staff and facilities, the facilities may be shared and the staff provided on a part-time basis by the national organization. On the other hand, if the training is very specific and job-oriented It may be inappropriate for an educational institution, In such a case the necessary training Is best provided in one of the institutes of the national organization, Yet another alternative would be for the research institutes to run specialized courses by arrangement with sister institutions. In any case, the training should cater to organizational needs and preferably also have broad national relevance. An important aspect of training which is often overlooked is managerial talent and project Implementation capability, Projects can run to grass as much for technical incompetence as for lack of proper management. It Is Imperative that senior personnel in particular should be given periodical exposure to the latest developments in managerial techniques. If the country provides such opportunities, all to the good; otherwise efforts should be made to find appropriate placements abroad. (e} Talent Pool A national research organization, especially in a sophisticated discipline like nuclear technology, serves as a talent pool upon which the entire nation can draw in time of need. The scientists and engineers working in these research institutes can assist in the formulation of policy and strategy at the national level. They can also provide expert consultancy wherever required, Their services may be loaned for specific periods to sister institutions in the country or even in foreign friendly countries. Such services prove vital to the country as well as immensely satisfying to the scientists and technologists involved. Again proper management Is Involved. An intelligent and far-sighted management can make the "pool" of technologists a source of fresh and invigorating ideas while a narrow-minded administration can turn the same people into a "pool" of stagnation infested with frustration and intrigue. (f) Collaborative Network No organization, however well staffed, can do without the cooperation and collaboration of other organizations. In the sensitive and sophisticated domain of "transfer of nuclear technology" it is all the more imperative that the national organization should establish effective networks of fruitful cooperation and information exchange and its effective dissemination between itself, the concerned industry, universities, other

189

research organizations as well as related government agencies and departments. It should encourage joint projects and sponsor contract research and ensure public awareness of the benefits of nuclear energy applications. The organization should also establish contacts with similar organizations abroad on bilateral, regional and international bases. It should encourage scientific moots, conference and symposia etc. within the country with as broad participation as possible.

It should encourage

state-of-the-art surveys, study institutes, promote personnel contacts and sabbatical visits. 4.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be stressed that nuclear technology is a "fore-front" technology undergoing intensive development in the advanced countries. There is thus a greater danger of obsolescence in nuclear technology than in other industries. This situation is compounded by the fact that nuclear technology is undeniably expensive and capital intensive. Developing countries can ill afford the luxury of making trial investments. They must nave an agency which can weigh the pros and cons competently before taking the plunge. To take an obvious example, there are numerous types of reactors - all with certain advantages and disadvantages. The technologies associated with these reactors are so different that once a country opts for a particular type, it is committed for several years to come. Obviously, such major decisions should be taken after careful and competent consideration, the more so because the transfer of nuclear technology is becoming an increasingly politically sensitive issue.

190

TEHRAN NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER

M. TAHERZADEH Nuclear Research Center Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Iran

ABSTRACT The Tehran Nuclear Research Center was formerly managed by the University of Tehran. This Center, after its transformation to the AEOI, has now become a focal point for basic research in the area of Nuclear Energy in Iran.

I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEHRAN NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER

Prior to the takeover of the Research Center by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, it was utilized partly by the university professors as a training ground for their MS students and partly for their own research activities as well.

What we will discuss in this confer-

ence is its present status with regard to nuclear technology transfer and its future planned activities. The development of the Tehran Nuclear Center started after the takeover by AEOI.

In

this regard, four basic thoughts were actually pursued: 1.

Setting-up goals and objectives

2.

Setting-up a workable organization

3.

Collecting talented manpower

4.

Upgrading the laboratory equipment. With regard to the goals, we have tried not to be timid and set them short

the lack of adequate manpower and laboratory equipment.

because of

We generally have agreed with

the thought that no one can succeed by thinking small and being frightened of spectaculars. For this purpose, we decided to pursue the following objectives in our research activities at the center: a.

To create a scientific community where scientists can gather and communicate for

b.

To assist Iran in the development of nuclear power plants.

the advancement of science and, consequently, upgrade the quality of life. In this regard, it was

decided that our center can contribute in the area of technician training, fuel management studies and reactor calculation in general. c.

To supplement AEOI efforts in the development of nuclear energy in Iran by being

d.

To utilize our facility for manpower training for universities and elsewhere.

actively involved in the energy research programs.

191

These goals are nice and noble, however, they had to be analyzed further so that they can be correctly implemented. With regard to the creation of the scientific community, scientists from various fields were gathered and put to work in their respective specialities. Group discussions were set up among them for the creation of new thoughts and ideas; lectures were given by various speakers in different areas of science. Progress reports were published to gather the results of research activities. In this respect, scientists from different countries were invited to join in our activities. Ne are hoping that, when our laboratory equipment is updated, more of these scien-

tists wi II join us not only for their own satisfaction but also to upgrade the quality of our research programs. In regard to assisting in the development of the nuclear power in Iran, we have set up research programs at the Center for active participation in this field. In one of the research sections, for example, we are transferring nuclear technology to Iran by using computer codes, being developed in our center or elsewhere, to understand the newly purchased nuclear power plants. In another section, the water chemistry group, scientific research is going on to find out the condition and properties of the water near nuclear power plants. We are also heavily involved in the reactor shielding calculation by setting computer codes experiments to determine the requirements for adequate shielding of the reactors. This is, of course, another attempt in the area of technology transfer activity. To supplement AEOl's effort in generating electricity for the country via nuclear energy, we have formed another research group to study fusion. In this respect, it is difficult to transfer technology which is under development and a clear path to the ultimate goal is not yet lined up. We have therefore tried not to set up an unreachable goal by, for example, deciding to manufacture a fusion reactor. We have tried to study the problem and transfer the technique of various approaches to the problem. Nevertheless, we have purchased one of the world's largest capacitor bank systems for studying the linear theta pinch and its diagnostic techniques. In addition, we have tried to transfer laser technology by creating another research group in this field. The TNRC activities in this group mainly consist of studying high power laser interaction with plasma and the development of modern laser equipment. Other uses of the laser are not overlooked. We have also used the facilities of the Center for manpower training. Universities, for example, have used our Center for granting degrees in experimental fields. Other units belonging to AEOI have used the research center for their own manpower training requirements. Having established a set of goals and objectives, one would need to establish a modern organization chart so that the bottlenecks for implementation of these ideas are removed. This new organization is fundamentally established with the idea that technical and non-technical works are clearly separated. We have tried hard not to waste the talent of our scientists for non-technical activities. We have also tried to separate research activities from managing the large experimental facilities. In addition, we

192

have tried to create research groups with clear objectives so that the interference between different groups is limited to the exchange of ideas and efforts and not to the responsibl itiies. With regard to collecting talented scientists, we experienced many difficulties because of the various problems existing in this part of the world. First, we have competition from Universities in hiring good scientists.

After all,

if nothing else, a university can always use its si Iver tongue to absorb any scientist. Second, we have competition from excellent laboratories in the developed countries. Any scientist prefers to work in a place where there is adequate equipment and facilities. We are just at the beginning of the path of our research programs while others are miles ahead.

However, we are offering an open space in research, an excellent opportunity

for any scientist to do this thing without being pushed to do odd jobs. Lastly, due to the lack of pleasant environment within the society and the difficulties in living in a strange country, we have not been successful In hiring all the people we would desire; however, we have tried our best to remove most of these difficulties so that an atmosphere which is required for absorption of scientists is created.

We have contacted

most Iranian scientists abroad to persuade them to join our scientific activities at the center. To have up-to-date laboratory equipment, we have taken the position that any equipment is useful only when it is operable. serviced.

This, however, cannot be if it is not properly

Therefore, service is the key word for any good laboratory equipment.

We

have insisted that different manufacturers provide us with scientific equipment if and only if they can give us good long-term service.

I am glad to report that on two or three

occasions we have been successful in our demands. To sum up, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center has been created to transfer nuclear technology from the fundamental and basic science point of view.

So far, we have been

successful in establishing ourselves and increasing our activities in various fields of science and introducing ourselves as a starter on the very difficult road ahead of us.

193

THE PROJECT OF ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTER (ENTEC) AND THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN IRAN REZA KHAZANEH Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Iran

1.

INTRODUCTION

The projected Iranian nuclear power program requires not only the setting up of nuclear power stations, fuel industry, etc. but also the creation of the necessary infrastructure for their short and long-range support. The build-up of the infrastructure is necessary for a deep insight into nuclear technology, and to make the country more independent of foreign supplies and services, and more self-confident for future tasks. Historically this infrastructure was created in Europe and the United States before the utilization of nuclear energy. At that, time it was necessary to develop the technology in laboratories before it was possible to produce nuclear energy from nuclear power plants. Nuclear research centers were created for this purpose by the governments of industrialized countries, and supplemented by nuclear facilities organized by industry. Our present situation in Iran is very different from that of the industrialized countries at the beginl'ling of the nuclear age. This imposes on us a new orientation for the character of the infrastructure in Iran. These differences are mainly the following: 1.1 Our nuclear program in Iran foresees a rapid increase in the production of electrical energy by installation and operation of nuclear power plants, at the same time as we are organizing the infrastructure. 1.2 We have to transfer the technology from industrial countries rather than to create a new one. Later, we want to participate in the development of nuclear technology, but this is not our primary objective at the present time. 1. 3 A lack of industrial base and qua I ified manpower to some extent forces us to integrate industrial and educational facilities in the infrastructure. 2.

COOPERATION WITH FRANCE

In 1974, shortly after the creation of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, it was decided to create a nuclear research center as a complement to the two existing research centers in Iran, for the transfer and development of nuclear technology. Discussions took place with CEA of France and soon Technicatome, a subsidiary of CEA, and EDF began to cooperate with us on the preliminary design of the center. A site was chosen near the city of Esfahan. The project was named ENTEC or Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center. Cooperation with

19~

Technicatome continued on the detailed design of the center which is now in Its last stage. The construction of ENTEC was begun two months ago. The center will cover an area of 140 hectares and comprise 32 buildings with a total built area of about 80,000 square meters. 3.

OUTLINE OF THE PROJECT

The goal of ENTEC is to acquire expertise and to educate the manpower in the fields of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology. To achieve this, laboratories and workshops are planned in the following fields: - Heat transfer and fluid flow. - Metallurgy and nuclear materials. - Corrosion. - Uranium chemistry and fuel fabrication. -Analytical chemistry. - Hot shops for post-irradiation fuel examination. - Radiochemistry. - Electronics and instrumentation. - Mechanical vibrations. - Testing of reactor components. - Hybrid simulator for nuclear power plants. - Computer center. - Calibration of mechanical, electrical and ionising radiation instrumentation. - Sodium technology. - Nuclear waste treatment and storage. Design of the reactor core and components are supplementary to the above experimental activities. A large design section and workshop will permit the production of a wide range of mechanical equipment. Because of the importance of desalination of sea and brackish water to Iran, ENTEC will also be equipped for studies and experiments in this field. 4.

TEMPORARY LABORATORIES

A center such as ENTEC that is intended to implement the transfer and development of nuclear technology is much more than a collection of buildings and equipment.

In fact, its

main asset resides in its human resources, the quality and the level of expertise of its staff, the relationship that has to be developed between them at the organizational and human level, the development of the spirit of team-work and finally the emergence of an agreeable working atmosphere. The development of these human resources and relationships takes time and we cannot await the completion of the construction of the center to begin

195

this endeavour. Our management strategy for the completlon of this project Is to foresee and develop all of its components, physical or human nature, and let them grow in a natural way to the levels planned for ENTEC. It is in this context that we began to set up temporary laboratories. At present these are a miniature form of the final ENiEC laboratories, housed in temporary buildings with semi-adequate infrastructure. Yet they permit us to start some important and interesting work, to create the nuclei of future research and development teams, to transfer the technology and to train a part of the needed manpower. For example, our groups are busy with the construction of a heat transfer loop, construction of electronic devices and instrumentation, study of the decay heat in power reactors, study of mechanical properties of zircalloy tubes under high temperature and pressure, study of corrosion of zlrcalloy tubes etc. The temporary laboratories will grow as fast as they can absorb new staff, can work efficiently and can initiate new programs. Trainees abroad will join the temporary laboratories on completion of their training program. Once the permanent buildings have been constructed in Esfahan, the temporary laboratories will be transferred to their final destinations. One of the most important functions of the temporary laboratories is the job training of technicians. We know that the technicians are the backbone of all important work in a technological center, and we have to work for their training. About 500 are needed for ENTEC, of which 200 have to be trained In temporary laboratories. The rest will be trained abroad, or in the AEOI reactor technician school that started work a few months ago. The temporary laboratories wi II begin to give support to the activities of the AEOI and to train manpower for the organization. As an example, the fuel fabrication laboratory will not only serve to transfer this technology but also to give training to the staff of AEOI working in various departments. 5.

TRAINING OF MANPOWER

A staff of about 1000 is required for ENTEC in the initial phase, of which about 700 will be scientific and technical staff. They must have training in specialities which are mostly new in this country. Special training programs have to be envisaged and implemented. Part of the staff wi 11 be trained in temporary laboratories that we are setting up and In the existing two nuclear centers. The majority of the staff wi II be trained abroad. Typical training programs abroad last 2½ years. For the first six months, the trainees take a language course and a specially prepared nuclear technology course. After this they enter laboratories in nuclear centers where they are trained In different fields. At present we have training programs running in France, Germany, Britain, and Austria. The training programs in the two latter countries are organized by the AEOI education department. We are discussing the implementation of training programs in

196

other countries. So far the training programs abroad have been only partly satisfactory because of language problems, insufficient background of the trainees in different fields assigned to them and not least the unpreparedness of the laboratories in industrialized countries to supervise the trainees and integrate them into on-going works. We are, however, at the beginning of the implementation of these programs and are confident that a great number of the trainees wi 11 come back with sufficient knowledge and experience in their field. The interest of the industrial countries will be better served if the training programs they implement are successful. 6.

THE PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR PROJECT

We had many ideas about the necessity of having a nuclear reactor in ENTEC. Our objectives for a reactor in ENTEC were in the following order of priority: 6. 1 Acquisition of a deep insight into the technology of PWR. 6.2 Testing of nuclear fuel produced in the center and study of incore fuel management. 6. 3 Testing of reactor components developed in the center or imported. 6. 4 Training of operators for nuclear power plants. After examination of several reactor concepts and projects we concluded that the above objectives can be best served by designing, developing and constructing a small pressurized water reactor. The nuclear steam supply system will be connected to a tur- . bine and generator, and the whole complex will form a small nuclear power plant. We are at present organizing the first study groups to start this project and are holding discussions with. some specialized companies to obtain the necessary technical assistance. The project will have the following phases: - Design of the core, reactor vessel, and reactor internals. - Design of the cooling system and components. - Development and constructloq or purchase of components. - Construction on the ENTEC site. ENTEC staff will have an active role in all the phases of the project. We think that this project will create an engineering core of great value to AEOI both during and after its implementation. During the implementation our engineers will encounter all the facets of this technology and gain invaluable experience. Afterwards, the nuclear power plant will serve for all sort of experiments in fulfilment of the objectives mentioned earlier. In the field of reactor technology our main effort will be deployed on pressurized water reactors but some limited programs on the fast breeders and HTGR's will be carried Jut in parallel. 7.

SCHOOL OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

Attached to ENTEC wi II be a school for nuclear technology. About 100 graduates from

197

Iranian and foreign universities with degrees in natural science and engineering will be accepted after an entrance examination.

The school period will be one year during which

the students will acquire the necessary theoretical and experimental background in the fields of nuclear technology. staff offices.

This school wi II have its own laboratories, lecture halls and

The instructors of the school will be chosen from among the staff of ENTEC.

In this way, more up-to-date and practical aspects of the technology will be absorbed by the. students.

8.

Parallel courses wi II also be organized for technicians.

THE DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF ENTEC

What will be the functions of ENTEC and what are the goals of this project? As pointed out· earlier, our situation in Iran and our nuclear program are different from that of industrialized countries at the beginning of the nuclear age. a nuclear center like ENTEC.

So also are the functions assigned to

On one side, the nuclear technology is already there and we

have to concentrate on ways of transferring it rather than developing it.

On the other side,

our difficulty is that we are setting up an infrastructural facility like ENTEC parallel to the installation of large nuclear power plants.

It is not easy to grasp the technology involved

in a 1200 MW nuclear power plant in a relatively short amount of time so as to be able to give the necessary technological support in the near future.

Nevertheless this function of

support, not only to nuclear power plants but also to the nuclear fuel and other industries that will be created in the future, will be one of the main functions of ENTEC.

The next

function of ENTEC will be to carry out research and development in the field of nuclear technology.

This activity will not only initiate the development of the nuclear industry in

Iran but will contribute largely to the level of.expertise of our scientific and technical staff and is part of their training.

The initial goal is to transfer existing nuclear technology

from industrialized countries.

Our ultimate goal is, of course, to reach the level of re-

search and development of those countries. A third function for ENTEC will be to train manpower for the AEOI.

This function will

be carried out partly in the nuclear technology school attached to ENTEC and partly in its laboratories and workshops.

9.

THE ROLE OF ENTEC IN TH~ TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

ENTEC will play an important role in the transfer of technology both during the realization of the project and after it.

No Iranian institution of this magnitude has ever had compar-

able duties in the transfer of technology, in whatsoever field, as ENTEC wi II have in the field of nuclear technology.

This is because in other domains the transfer of technology

is not as complex, and the necessity for a center for the transfer is not as obvious as in the field of nuclear technology. By implementing the ENTEC project, we are engaged in the transfer of nuclear technology.

198

During the execution of the project the main places for transfer are the temporary

laboratories in which we are gaining experience in different subfields of this technology, and the nuclear centers and facilities abroad where our trainees are learning and gaining experience. We think that the transfer of technology here and abroad is a very important part of the implementation of this project. One of the channels for the transfer is the relationship we have developed with our consultants. We hope to benefit from the expertise accumulated in this field in France. Other channels are connected or will soon be opened to many nuclear centers and industrial enterprises in the world; our pol icy is to deploy collaboration with a large number of institutions for the realization of this project and beyond that to seek for long-range cooperations in different fields. ENTEC is one of the largest nuclear centers in a developing country designed in collaboration with an industrialized country. We have gone through a unique experience in this kind of international collaboration, As far as the consulting services for the design of such a center are concerned, we are satisfied. In the transfer of technology, however, our experience is no better than that of other developing nations. Apart from the political problems associated with this transfer, we feel that the industrial countries are not geared to ease the transfer of nuclear technology. Although they know that this transfer is in their ultimate interests, since after each transfer there is a flow of supplies and services to the developing countries, they are still reluctant to organize themselves efficiently to facilitate it. Often strong competition among the industrialized countries in the nuclear field hampers the transfer of nuclear technology.

It is obvious to everybody that the

transfer of this technology will happen. It is only a matter of time. Since the beginning of large world-civilizations different technologies have been transferred from one corner of the world to another, this at a time when the possibilities for communications were much more I imited than today. We have to learn from history and base the principles of our relationship so as not to hamper a historical phenomenon. It is only under these conditions that we can secure a politically and socially stable world for future generations. From our side I must confess that our major difficulty is a shortage of manpower with enough knowledge and experience to absorb the technology. I conclude my presentation by hoping that we, as well as the industrialized countries, will overcome our difficulties and fulfill this historic task - the transfer of a most intricate and complex technology for the benefit of mankind.

199

IMPLEMENTATION OF NUCLEAR POWER

PLENARY SESSION Al I Invited Papers Co-Chairmen: Jean Claude Leny (Framatome/France) A. Sotoodehnia (AEOl/lran)

POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY) CYRUS MANZOOR Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Iran

The object of this paper is to present a critical analysis of the issues associated with the transfer of technology in general, and nuclear technology in particular, from a sociopolitical perspective.

As such, it somewhat differs, both in content and approach, "from

other presentations of this conference.

Nevertheless, it is my strong belief that an analy-

sis of this nature is not only appropriate, but is significant for every nation that aspires to a sizeable transfer of technology, notably nuclear technology. (l l I shall first attempt to define some key variables and notions related to the generic concept of development.

Within this general sociological framework, I shall then examine

the process of technology transfer with particular reference to nuclear energy.

I.

DEVELOPMENT SYNDROME

Various contemporary social science disciplines have attempted to define development. shall not dwell upon these definitions here, rather, I will present the essential propositions of these attempts only. All approaches and definitions essentially relate to three dominant and interdependent variables, namely differentiation, capacity, and equality.

Differentiation is roughly

synonymous with the notion of polarization and division of work; capacity being the adaptive, innovative and integrative potentialities of man for the management of hls environment (human and non-human) through increasing rationality, applied sciences and organization-

al technology; and equality symbolizes the generic needs and ideals of societies for just participation and resource distribution. (i) The realization and sustenance of these variables have increasingly become dependent on, or the function of, the acquisition and diffusion of technology and the application of modern management techniques (e.g. decisional and information sciences, system analysis,

etc.). Persistent emphasis on the above variables throughout the world is only natural, as contemporary man tends to view development or modernization as a pre-determined process which is commonly equated with "industrialization".

it is not appropriate here to

present a critical evaluation of such deterministic approaches to development, nor is it relevant to present a more appropriate definition which is multi-final and, as such, promotes cross-cultural diversity. Whatever its merits,

the "industrialization model" creates a persisting and ever-

201

growing need for and dependence on technology adoption and diffusion. As the industrialization proceeds, this need and dependence becomes more massive, diversified and critical. Furthermore. future technologies by necessity, progressively become more complex and sophisticated. As such, they will be more capital-intensive, involving increasing financial resources, too complex to be produced domestically, and with a high rate of obsolescence. This poses a serious disadvantage to technological late-comers and heighten:; their dependency on technologically advanced societies. The cumulative impact of technology adoption for industrialization has been studied by many scientists from various social science disciplines. Broadly speaking, it tends to remould generic human needs, work ethics, sense of community, organizational practices, leisure, aesthetics, and, above all, the indigeneous culture. As a result, societies tend to become uniform, with more or less similar needs and dependency on the use of technology and its promotion.

As such, a universal culture and a way of life is emerging.

Through this process of cultural manipulation, as many social scientists have noted, the disseminators of technology have been able to diffuse their own notion of development and way of life, or, in other words, they have tended to domesticate development and culture. In this manner, the world is stratified into those who adopt and generate technology more efficiently, and those nations who should satisfy a disproportionate part of their technology needs through transplantation, thus the notion of technology transfer. As we shall argue later, technology transfer has historically never been an unbound process, rather it has always required submission to certain pre-defined codes and standards of conduct; it is commonly viewed and treated as a political tool. These socio-cultural and political constraints of technology transfer have gradually tended to force a sense of alienation on· a sizeable part of our world population, who are contained in different societies. 11.

REQUIREMENTS FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

A large-scale assimilation of technology by any contemporary nation is ultimately dependent on some key structural requirements. The more relevant and basic ones are briefly presented below: (1) Mobilization of Man and nature: Technology adoption and development require endless institution-building to provide for the increasing mobilization of Man and his environment. Mobilization of Man becomes necessary because of an ever-increasing need for the division of labor and for technocratization. The mobilization of nature is necessitated by the heavy reliance of technology and industry on natural resources , A fundamental need for industrialization and technology use is energy which Man has so far provided through the use and manipulation of natural properties. There is almost a positive and direct correlation between the levels of modernization as perceived by us today, and technology application which itself is positively correlated with energy need. (2) Dependency on transference of capability. Man and society gradually become dependent on technology and its sustained evolution through improvization and change.

202

Thus, technology that was an extension of/or complementary to Man's organism (hands, eyes, etc .. ). and creative ability (mind). has rapidly become a substitute for Man's organism and creativeness.

This substitution is facilitated and promoted essentially

through the creation of appropriate social, economic, political, and cultural institutions. Industrial societies are, more than ever before, dependent on technology, and the socalled developing societies are also rapidly becoming so; they are remoulding their socio-economic fabric and value systems to facilitate technology adoption and industrialization. (3) Obsolescence:

The sustenance of the industrial way of life is directly dependent on

technological obsolescence and substitution.

This phenomenon constitutes a constant

factor in the lives of all industrialized societies, and is the very logic and a fundamental requirement for an industrialized culture.

Therefore, it is mandatory for all industrial-

ized nations, and those which are becoming so, to have a continual option for and access to new technologies, particularly those which have a critical significance.

A prolonged

or a substantial rupture in the technology flow and renovation can critically damage the standard and quality of life in industrialized and/or industrializing societies; the damage being proportionate to their dependency on technology.

111. POLITICS OF TRANSFER The scantly researched theme of technology transfer is overwhelmingly oriented to the constraints of the recipient nations and, as such, is biased.

It is the contention of this

paper that there are more significant constraints on the supplier side, and that, contrary to the prevailing assumptions, the flow of technology from the supplier nations is not an unrestricted process.

This is an important contention, if we accept that an unbound flow

of technology is a sine qua non for a successful industrialization of such a large number of contemporary societies.

I shall try to elaborate on some of these constraints below.

If industrialization is the motto, and technology the vehicle, then the manipulation of technology transfer assumes a critical importance, as against such historical attributes of power as possession of territory, size of population, mi I itary stock. etc.

It is precisely

through this manipulative capability that the technological nations have historically controlled the geographical diffusion of development and, thus, have evolved and maintained their relative hegemony and the existing world regime. Technological manipulation is applied at two distinct levels, political.

Cultural manipulation,

namely cultural and

which manifests itself through the domestication of de-

velopment and culture, was briefly referred to above and does not need further elaboration. A more overt and crude expression of dominance on the part of technological nations is provided by the political manipulation of technology. Ever since the advent of industrialization.

technological societies have used

the medium of technology diffusion to promote and

sustain their global hegemony.

The historical analysis of the first industrial revolution and the diffusion of its resulting

203

technologtes provides revealing insights into this reality. As existing technologies have grown in scale and complexity, and the aggregate technology needs of the industrializing nations have surged, it has become increasingly more difficult for technicologically advanced nations to conceal their historical practice of using technology transfer as a political instrument. But what are the instruments for the exercise of this very significant medium of international power and control? Such notions of "the sphere of influence", alliances, treaties, international and regional agreements, organizations, and "clubs" have historically provided an effective medium for the controlled diffusion of technology and information and, hence, the preservation of technological monopoly of existing power "poles". Today, we all experience the result, namely a rigid and highly articulated differentiation of the world community into an international regime, characterized by its excessive imbalances in the geographical distribution of technology and resources and, hence, national capabilities for survival and renewal. Therefore, a resourceful and unbound transfer of technology cannot be achieved unless the process of technology transfer becomes depoliticized. We know that, given the efficacy of existing technical know-how, even the manifold, sensitive, and complex aspects of nuclear technology, if viewed from a technical perspective, are manageable. For example, WISP and the intricate techniques that it incorporates can help depoliticize even the deployment of nuclear warheads. (3) Contemporary technological societies seem neither to have adopted the right attitude, nor to possess the necessary courage to liberate technology and diffuse it on an equitable basis. Instead, they have continually sought to resist this in.evitable course, and rationalize their uni lateral interests in varying and highly sophisticated manners; often-times the reasoning rests on strong and seemingly valid scientific assumptions and data. It is precisely this tendency that distorts the cross-cultural climate surrounding us. The advent of nuclear technology and its diffusion for energy generation, perhaps more and better than any other contemporary technology, illuminates these distortions. IV. THE DRAMA OF NUCLEAR ENERGY The mobility of man has always required the use of energy. Traditional man relied heavily on his biological sources of energy. With the transformation of the human community, and the increasing utilization of technology by man, the sources of energy were also transformed in such a way that, at present. the biological sources of energy constitute a fraction of the needs of contemporary man. This is so simply because technology is energy-intensive. Contrary to what is commonly thought, the consumption of energy in technological societies cannot be contained, for the sole reason that they are "technology-oriented". Nevertheless, the expected dramatic increase in future energy consumption patterns will largely result from the surging efforts of the so-called developing nations. If the prevail-

204

ing dualistic distribution of universal resources and well-being is not to be perpetuated into the future, then the aspiring nations ought to remould their aspirations and transform their capabilities with a significant speed. This exodus into a new reality requires nonbiological sources of energy, and this increasing need is, and will remain, for quite some time, well above that of the technological societies, simply because the energy base of the aspiring nations is relatively small. Let us refer only to a simple example. The Jessdeveloped regions of the world contain the bulk of the world's population, i.e., roughly about 72 percent, but they consume only about 21 percent of the energy and produce only about 15 percent of the world's electricity. It is worth mentioning that even of this meagre share a substantial part is derived from non-commercial sources of energy; for example, the proportion of non-commercial sources for India in 1960 was over 60 percent. The alarming rate of population increase in less-developed nations will surely accentuate this unfortunate imbalance even further. The less-developed nations, furthermore, have the lowest known reserves per capita of conventional fuels which, at any rate, are expected to be depleted in the near future either through their use for energy purposes or their diversion into other industrial uses. However, beyond the diminishing prospects of fossil fuel resources, lies the relative potential of nuclear energy including the promise of Fast Breeder Reactors. To even reach and maintain the same living standards as the-technological societies now have, the aspiring nations will require this viable energy source, They have no alternative but to develop a nuclear energy.capability, if they are determined to at least partially contain the prevailing world dualism. It is against this universal and evolutionary background that the energy needs of the less-developed nations and their technological requirements ought to be evaluated. In their quest for the utilization of nuclear technology for socio-economic transformation, the aspiring nations collectively adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to satisfy their legitimate needs for nuclear technology transfer, and to help promote its alleged collective non-proliferation goals.

Their optimism, however,

was rather unfounded because it was somewhat devoid of a clear insight into the very logic of technology transfer as perceived by technological societies. Nuclear technology is one of the most sophisticated and advanced technologies of today. Hence, its non-preferential diffusion will help erode the controls and dependencies that have been so carefully developed to sustain industrial hegemony and a highly differentiated and rigid world regime. The technological nations do not seem to alter their historical attitude; rather, they are likely to continue their practice of "Graduated Transfer", namely the release of a given technology when, and only when, adequate controls exist, or a higher substitute technology has emerged to ensure and sustain dependency. As ongoing developments indicate, the substitute for nuclear energy shall not become operational in the near future. In their quest for a strictly controlled diffusion of nuclear technology, the pioneers of this technology have resorted to a host of familiar mechanisms and strategies. We shal I

205

elaborate on some of the key ones only.

The most dominant tool is institutional control.

The institution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the so-called "Club of London", and bilateral cooperation agreements belong to this catagory. The IAEA was allegedly constituted to integrate the potential of nuclear technology with the essential needs of man for peace,

health, and prosperity; it was assigned to 4 achieve this humane integration without provoking or accelerating proliferation. ( ) A simple analysis of the actual performance of IAEA, however, clearly indicates that this global institution has gradually been transformed into a control, or safeguarding, mechanism.

Unilateral controls, which are a negative act, are no longer appropriate, the nations

have learnt to depersonalize or internationalize them.

The positive mandate of IAEA for

the dissemination of nuclear technology, on the other hand has been retained by the supplier nations themselves, except for some minor activities. The dominant institution, however, is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its non-proliferation goals.

The Treaty was presented to the world community

at a time when the nuclear technology market had a duapolistic nature.

The signatory

nations, a disproportionate majority of whom were low on proliferation-potential curve, accepted the control regime of the Treaty and received two principal commitments from the nuclear nations at the time; namely to help diffuse nuclear technology for constructive uses on a just and equitable basis, and to eliminate the generic cause of proliferation, that is arms race.

The control function has been exercised, naturally in the desired direction,

while the promotive mandate of the Treaty had the familiar fate.

The negative mandate of

NPT is perhaps best dramatized by the non-adherence of the so-called "threshold states" to it then and now.

And, as has always happened, the ultimate victims of a distortive

and mis-conceived control mechanism are not those who defy it, but rather those who submit to it. Some recent developments, prohibitive regime of NPT.

however,

have tended to erode the efficacy of the

The initial monopoly of the pioneers of nuclear tech-

nology was lost, and the resulting oligopolistic market could have serious economic and political implicatiens;

it could erode their hegemony and,

that is to be maintained through technology dependency.

with it,

the intricate order

The rapid development of nuc-

lear energy around the world, and the gradual mastery of nuclear science and technology by scientists in less-developed nations also, has tended to accentuate the concern of the technological nations.

The alleged dangers of proliferation should, at least partially, be

seen in this context. The mechanics of an oligopolistic market have been studied extensively by economists. These properties are also equally pertinent to, and valid in, the domain of politics. The prominent feature of an oligopolistic market is that monopolistic interests and controls are not abolished, but are rather extended. and rules of conduct.

This extension inevitably requires new structures

Some of the principal policy alternatives proposed recently, such

as the "Market Sharing Approach", are simply a formula for the organization of the emerg-

206

ing oligopolistic market. The institution of the so-catted "Club of London" is the most dramatic expression of the reality of oligopolistic regime and its unilateral decision-making process for the trans-

fer of nuclear technology. It is an organized attempt to extend transfer controls through the provision of new rules which are to govern the rest of mankind. The recent dramatic shift in the nuclear policy of France and the impending similar shift in the policies of other supplier nations suggest that the adopted mechanism is apparently succeeding. One of the fami I iar strategies that is commonly used by the supplier nations to exercise the policy of "Graduated Transfer" is the fragmentation of the"technology loop". Any technology can be conceived as a loop which comprises the input materials, process technologies, organizational skills, and relevant information. Technological societies tend to fragment their integrated loop into isolated components and adopt stringent transfer rules for those components which possess higher dependency value.

In the domain of nuclear

technology the so-called "sensitive" technologies constitute this critical component. The fragmentation of the nuclear technology loop also, is legitimized on the basis of non-proliferation. However, this contention and other similar concerns of the supplier nations for proliferation, are not entirety genuine.

It seems that they essentially resort to non-

proliferation as a pretext and, as a result, their policies and practices are distortive. Some of these distortions are enumerated below. Let us take an example. Here, I shall only quote from a reputable source within the United States. (SJ According to Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff, several U.S. actions have promoted the proliferation of pro I iferating tech no log ies and, hence, have undermined the non-pro1

iferation ideals of NPT. He outlines them as follows: "First, the United States abandoned its initial policy to provide complete fuel cycle services with the reactors that (it sells)." "Second, the United States failed to increase the capacity of its uranium enrichment plants to keep pace with world-wide demand for reactor fuel, .. " "Third, the United States has sold substantial amounts of plutonium and weaponsgrade uranium to advanced industrial nations (who had not ratified the NPT) while refusing to export such material to developing nations." Fourth, the United States engaged " ... in nuclear trade with nations that had refused to ratify the NPT and were thus under no treaty obligation not to produce nuclear weapons (or to accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities. Of the 29 U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation with other countries, no less than 13 are with nonNPT nations." "Fifth, although the United States has been the world's leading nuclear technology nation, (it has) not developed - even within (the U.S. itself) material-accounting and physical security safeguards capable of reducing risks of diversion, theft, and sabotage to acceptable levels."

207

These im portant inconsistencies may not be due solely to pol icy error or lack of concern.

The logic seems to lie elsewhere.

There are other im portant distortions which are associated with the non-proliferation objectives and strategies of the technological nations. "proliferation" itself.

One relates to the very notion of

The technological societies have persistently, but delicately, given

the im pression that proliferation is only a quantitative concept and, hence, have been urging mankind to devise appropriate means to contain the geographical diffusion of nuclear weapons.

However, ceaseless qualitative im provements in the effectiveness of nuc-

lear weapons and their delivery systems are equally pertinent to the issue of proliferation. Also equally relevant is the process of horizontal pro! iferation among the nuclear nations that the NPAT has deliberately allowed for.

If this contention is valid, and if the non-

proliferation goals of the technological nations are genuine, one could then ask what policies and mechanisms are adopted to contain this global threat 7

The supplier nations also maintain that there is a positive correlation between the transfer of nuclear energy loop and the development of nuclear explosives.

It, however,

neither follows, nor is it sensible for aspiring nations to develop coercive nuclear capability through the slow and highly expensive nuclear energy path. As Mr. Eklund, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency has noted, " ... history has clearly shown, (that) the spread of nuclear exp los ive capacity has not been linked to the building of nuclear power stations, but has been derived from experimental or research reactors coupled with non-commercial or pi lot faci I ities for plutonium separation, heavy water production, enrichment, etc. We must therefore not simplistically equate proliferation with nuclear power growth_,,(G) And as Mr. Etemad noted in his opening speech in the present conference, we "must have the courage to admit that, as was intended, non-proliferation has developed into an ultimately political phenomenon. Thus, its fate lies not in the hands of a few scientists whose work is directed towards the development of nuclear weapons, but rather, is dependent on the vision and the will of pol icy-makers and statesmen." The most striking irony, however, it that those who were, and continue to be, responsible for the proliferation of destructive nuclear means in the human environment both quantitatively and qua! itatively, have assumed a paternalistic mandate to contain proliferation.

And that they have decided to achieve this inherently collective goal

unilaterally and through arachaic diplomatic practices.

We are all aware that the

proliferation of nuclear weapons is ultimately the "symptom" rather than the "disease", and that the so-called power poles are directly and deeply responsible for this unfortunate ailment, namely arms race ,

They themselves accepted this reality when they took

upon themselves a legal obi igation, through the institution of NPT, to alleviate it ttirough gen~ral disarament. forseeable future.

They have not done so, and seem to be intent to ignore it in the

The cause of non-pro! iferation has become so ironic that those nations that have acquired their nuclear technology capability and nuclear arsenal through the rejection of

208

NPT, and outside its ideals, require the signatory nations to observe its non-proliferation goals. The foregoing remarks on the reality of nuclear technologY, transfer are perhaps better crystalized by this poetry from Khalil Gibran: At ebb tide I wrote A line upon the sand And gave it all my heart And all my soul. At flood tide I returned To read what I had inscribed And found my ignorance upon the shore.

V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I conclude my remarks with a brief reference to the more important notions of this presentation. It was argued that the so-called developing nations, which contain a disproportionate part of the world population, have committed themselves to a large-scale and rapid industrialization in order to improve their standard and quality of life.

This commitment is

creating a cumulative and changing need for technology, and the application of technology is in turn transforming their very socio-economic and cultural fabric.

Therefore, any

interference in the flow of technology to these nations has serious implications for their future. Industrialization and the use of technology is energy-intensive.

Accordingly, the

aspiring nations should provide for their rapidly-growing energy needs in the very near future.

Given their meagre or depletable fossil fuel resources, they have no option but to

develop a viable nuclear energy infrastructure. The industrialized nations are wel I aware of the mechanics of technology dependency, and the energy needs of the aspiring nations.

They have, historically, tended to manipu-

late the process of technology transfer as a medium of control and power.

Technology

transfer is being increasingly used even to soften the persisting ideological conflicts in the contemporary world.

The technological nations are using the same practice for the

diffusion of nuclear technology.

Their frequent resort to the issue of proliferation is es-

sentially a pretext to conceal or distort this potentially dangerous practice. The nuclear energy loop is yet not eligible for transfer, not because of its implications for proliferation, as they maintain, but rather because of its high dependency-value. To preserve this dependency through the regulation of the emerging oligopolistic market, the supplier nations have resorted to the archaic practice of unilateral and secretive decision-making; they have substituted the more adaptive and permissive institution of NPT for "club diplomacy", namely the "Club of London".

Unilateral and negative policies

209

are obviously no longer appropriate and workable.

Rather, we should collectively search

for m ore integrative and liberal institutions which help prom ote a pluralistic nuclear technology m arket to test varying transfer policies and practices. Those who are bringing m orality into the realm of politics should rem em ber that universal peace is ultim ately dependent on an equitable distribution of hum an prosperity and on balanced integrity.

This is achieved neither through hegem ony and unilateral

control, nor through depriving Man of the products of science and technology.

Peace is

a universal condition and, as such, it is not divisable. I conclude this presentation with a quotation by Robert Frost: "T w o roads diverged in a wood, And I took the one less travelled by, And that has made all the difference."

FOOT NO TES

(1) in

Technology, and the resulting technological diffusion, have been conceptualized varying

form s using

different theoretical and

approach defines technology

as

involving only

historical approaches.

changes

in artifacts.

The crudest

The econom ic

approach, being more sophisticated, adds labor and m anagerial inputs to the physical artifacts.

This approach

historians

have m ade w ide use of it.

is susceptible to aggregate analysis, A third

approach

and econom ists and

view s technology as a

"socio-cultural" phenom enon, that is, besides involving m aterial and artifact im provem ents, technology is considered to incorporate a cultural, social and psychic dim ension as w ell.

The definition utilized here is com plem entary to the third approach, in the sense

that it adds relevant political attributes, as a significant denom inator, to it.

(2)

For further elaboration of these variables see Jam es Colem an, ed., Education and

Political Developm ent, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 15-18.

(3)

Control technologies for the deploym ent of nuclear w eapons are so m ature now

that we can even locate nuclear weapons in any geographic location but irrevocably preprogram them to perform within established lim its.

The device for preprogram ing the

weapons is referred to under the unclassified title of W ISP.

"The W eapons Intel I igence

System Program is being developed and studied by ERDA w eapons laboratory at Liverm ore, California, and Los A lam os, New Mexico; the Stanford Research Institute; the Sandia Corporation; and the Law rence Radiation Laboratory.

Their purpose is to develop fool-

proof, tam per-proof control m echanism s for nuclear weapons.

These devices w ould pre-.

program the weapons, lim iting such things as minim um -burst altitude, range, direction, geographical area, and m ission".

See W alter B. W ents, Nuclear Proliferation, Public

Affairs Press, W ashington, D.C ., p. 157.

210

(4)

See Articles II and Ill of the Statute of the International Atom ic Energy Agency.

(5)

See Abraham A . Ribicoff, A Market-Sharing Approach to the W orld Nuclear

Sales Problem , Foreign Affairs Job No. 1507, A rticle 21, June 1976, pp. 764-766.

(6)

See Sigvard Eklund, "Statem ents to the Opening Session", Nuclear Energy and

W orld O rder:

Im plications for International Organizations, The Institute on Man and

Science, 1976, p.8.

211

PRO BLEM S OF IM PLEM ENTATION OF THE FIRST NUCLEAR POW ER PLANT IN DEVELOPING CO UNTRIES W ITH PA RTICULAR REFERENCE TO EGY PT

K.E. EFFAT, M.F. EL-FOULY, A.F. EL-SA/EDI

Atomic Energy Establishment Egypt

1.

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear energy has become and will be for years to come an economic and reliable source covering an increasing portion of the future energy needs in many countries. As a result of the four-fold increase in oil prices in the past few years, and the further increases expected in the future, nuclear power plants become competitive with oil fired plants even at sizes as low as 1 SO MWe (l l. In industrially advanced countries, nuclear technology has been and still is being developed at a rapid rate. Electricity production from nuclear plants constitutes a sizeable portion of their total energy production. Recent figures published by the IAEA