Iran Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology [4/4]

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Iran Conference on the

TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

Persepolis/Shiraz, Iran April 10-14, 1977

Volume IV

Published by ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN Publication Division

CO NT ENTS OF VOLUM E

IV

PROBLEM S OF TRA NSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY Parallel Session

Financial aspects of energy policy for developing countries W.O. Doub U.S. nuclear export licensing system P.L. Strauss

12

Problems facing nuclear research in developing countries H.M. El Hares, F.A. Tayel

18

Problems encountered by an industrialized country in the transfer of nuclear technology J. Renou

25

Retransfer of nuclear technology in the transfer of nuclear technology A. Sekhavat

30

Parameters of radiation technology transfer in developing countries H. M. Roushdy

34

A recipient view of rational technology transfer Y.M. El Sayed, S.K. Shakshooki

49

Transfer of nuclear technology from the viewpoint of the economy of developing countries H. Dadfar

55

NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND WASTE MANAGEMENT Parallel Session

Technology transfer experience in the nuclear fuel cycle P. Jelinek-Fink, G. Lurf

60

The disposal of radioactive wastes in the Asse salt mine E. Albrecht

69

Nuclear fuel cycle in Iran: the need for transfer of technology G. Arabian, M.A. Rahman, M. Sabourian

81

Present status of reprocessing technology: basic outlines of large reprocessing plants J. Couture

91

Radiation protection and handling of wastes arising from normal plant and laboratory operations A. Gauvenet

102

A usable method for the management of high-level waste from nuclear fuel reprocessing W. Heimerl

117

Experience in the management of radioactive wastes from power reactors - scope for regional cooperation K.T. Thomas, A.A. Khan

124

Technology transfer to uranium mine and plant C. Hostache

133

Policies of waste management, radiation protection, safety of nuclear power plants and their fuel cycle M .M . Mahfouz, H.M . Roushdy, M.A . Ayad, E.M .A . Hassan

140

Need of regional cooperation among developing countries in the field of nuclear fuel cycle centers M . Ahsan, S.R . Husain

150

Movement of radioactivity deposited under.ground at the US ERDA Nevada test site I.Y . Bork, R. Stone, H.B. Levy, L.D. Ram spott

156

National acquisition of sufficient know-how to determine procurement of natural and enriched uranium J. Peix, J. -P. Rougeau

166

The nuclear fuel cycle in Iran: possible ways of acquiring the technology C. Arabian

178

SYSTEM S, PLANNING AND INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION Parallel Session

Planning of electrical generation-consumption system M. Carle, M. Lepine, M. Barret

190

Technology transfer by industry for the construction of nuclear power plants H. Frewer, W. Altvater

210

Transfer of nuclear energy into Tavani r's interconnected power system A.A. Nooshin, A.S. Mehraban

228

Nuclear units operation in power systems A. Peltier

242

Nuclear fuel fabrication and related technology transfer in connection with the implementation of a nuclear power program H. Pekarek, H. Reopenack

255

Planning for nuclear power A. Giambusso, D.C. Foster

26ll

Indian experience in the implementation of nuclear power program M.R. Srinivasan

280

An indicator for the economic application of nuclear technology N. N.-Y. Chu, C. Murphy

287

New method of long range or very long range demand forecast of energy including electricity viewed from worldwide standpoint H. Aoki The implementation of nuclear power: the Belgian experience R. Van den Damme

ii

295 318

Transfer of nuclear technology: the developm ent of a supporting industrial base H.J. Grout, M .J.H . Giedroyc

332

ENG INEERIN G, CO NST RUCTION A ND PROJECT MANA GEM ENT Parallel Session

Engineering and construction including management K. Nanjundeswaran

340

Nuclear plant supply contracts meet transfer of technology requirements J. Philipp, F. Alomar

358

Engineering tasks and project handling by foreign and local teams K.R. Schmidt Exchange of information on legal, contracting and technical industrial relationships M. Portier Implementation of civil engineering for nuclear power plants J. Sturmfels, H. Dusenberg An approach to management of nuclear projects in the developing nations R.D. Woodson, P.J. Adam

372

387 393

415

ADVANCED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS Parallel Session

Future advanced energy systems C.L. Rickard, P.U. Fisher

430

Advanced power reactors and developing countries K. Wirtz

445

Multipurpose nuclear process heat for energy supply in Brazil U. Hansen, P. lnden, D. Oesterwind, R.Y. Hukai, R.S. Pessine, R.R. Pieroni, E. Visoni

460

Energy problems and development of multipurpose VHTR in Japan H. Murata, K. Taketani, T. Aochi

480

The LMFBR - further development needs H.-H. Hennies, K. Korting

494

Gas cooled fast breeder reactors - symbiosis with thermal reactors P. Fortescue, G. Melese d'Hospital

504

Advanced nuclear energy systems: retrospects and prospects Z.A. Sabri, N.A. Amherd

519

The introduction of an advanced energy system in a developing country J.H. Mcloughlin

iii

536

STATEMENTS MADE BY PANELISTS DURING PANEL DISCUSSION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF NUCLEAR POWER, 14 April 1977

551

STATEMENTS MADE BY PANELISTS DURING THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE, 14 April 1977

567

Points for discussion

583

Persepolis prospectus for peaceful nuclear power

583

. iv

PROBLEMS OF TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

PARALLEL SESSION

Co-Chairmen: R. Ramana (Bhabha Atomic Research Center/India) C. Manzoor (AEOl/lran)

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF ENERGY POLICY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILLIAM 0. DOUB Leboeuf, Lamb, Liby & Macrae Washington D. C. U.S.A.

It is probably no coincidence that this session on the Problems of transferring nuclear technology was left until the final day of the Conference. To start with a listing of-obstacles might have discouraged us al I unduly. On the other hand, to discuss past successes, methods and additional potential benefits without considering the real-world difficulties would make us all polyannas. Wisely, I think, the planners of this Conference have chosen a middle course. Several days of shared experiences have probably developed the necessary background against which to examine foreseeable problems in an accurate context. Context is especially crucial in regard to the financial aspects of energy policy for developing countries, which is my assigned topic. In fact, however, the perspective of energy pol icy (and particularly of the need for an economic feasibi I ity of nuclear power) will vary from country to country within that overall context. Of necessity, then, I will speak in fairly broad terms. I can only hope that each of the distinguished listeners here today will perceive my generalized observations on financing with an individualized perspective that will make them meaningful, and helpful, to each of you. In my opinion, there can be no such thing as a single "energy pol icy for developing countries". Firs_t of all, there is ample room for dispute on the definition of "developing country". Even more important, there is enormous disparity in population density, natural resources, gross national product, present energy consumption, and overhead. capital infrastructure among various countries that are most often considered to be members of this heterogeneous category. Conventional attempts to subdivide the category of developing nations into "lower income", "middle income" and "higher income" countries

!f

offer only an illusory advan-

tage when it comes to discussing national energy policies. I will admit that~ capita income is germane to energy use patterns and energy development financing;

but I would

hasten to add that energy policy itself logically precedes the question of financing such a policy. And basic national energy policy is more a question of economic geography than it is a question of money and banking in the abstract. Of course there is also the convenient dichotomy used by the World Banky and others, which divides all of the technologically emerging world into only two parts--those countries who are members of OPEC and those who are not. This distinction also is a good deal less helpful than it might seem at first glance.

It is clearly ridiculous to suppose that similar

energy policies should be suitable for Bangladesh (an already densely populated nation with extremely limited domestic fuel resources) and Mexico' (a country with a rapidly

expanding population, but with what appear to be equally fast-growing estimates of recoverable oil reserves).

'V '!!

Neither Bangladesh nor Mexico is a member of OPEC.

Without fruitlessly prolonging this preliminary discussion (which I plan to relate more directly to the financial aspects of energy policy in a few moments), let us consider just one more "simplified" approach to a compartmentalization of the developing countries. That is a combination of the two classification systems I have al ready cited. Suppose we divided the developing nations of the world according to membership or non-membership in OPEC and then further subdivided them by~ capita income. Could we then evolve what one might call "standardized national energy policies"? Probably not!

Brazil and Mexico, for instance, would defy this effort to compel unlformity--even

in spite of other apparent similarities. Within the OPEC community, there would be marked differences--for example--between our host, Iran, and Bahrein. All of this underscores what I expect to be an elementary rule about the financing of energy technology transfer in the years to come:

It is in the best interest of all concerned

that such transfer (and its financing) proceed on a nation-by-nation basis, and, indeed, perhaps even on a project-by-project basis. This need not mean that such transfers should be reduced, or even minimized. On the contrary, it is my personal conviction that they can and should be facilitated and expanded. But the worldwide problems of energy in the decades to come are so great that I be1 ieve the global community and its national constituents must concentrate on maximum efficiency in energy development if we are to achieve maximum effectiveness. are too large for us to be able to afford anything less.

The stakes

I do not consider it overly dramatic

to declare that the most fundamental of all human rights -- survival -- depends on a practical mechanism for satisfying the energy needs of both developing and developed countries on every continent. To take a longer view, let us also remember that our objective should not be so narrow as to support development indefinitely. At some point, our goal must be to make all nations self-developing. Whether that can realistically be achieved by the year 2000 or 2020 or 2050, we must never eliminate it as a goal. And energy will remain an essential ingredient. The OPEC nations themselves recognize that oil and natural gas supplies are finite. Here in Iran, for instance, an extensive plan for nuclear power development~ has been premised on that fact, and on the understanding that petroleum--as a base for a prodigious variety of chemical products--may literally become too precious to burn even within our lifetimes.

Saudi Arabia is contributing to a number of research and development efforts

in the field of solar energy, not only inside its own territory but also in other countries-including the United States. Some are more blessed than others with various resources; but all are limited. My own country has come to recognize (and confess openly) its lack of adequate concern to date about energy waste. In view of worldwide limits, as well as domestic shortfalls, United States leaders are no longer complacent about the fact that less than six

2

percent of the world population, who make up the United States, consume approximately one-third of the world's energy product each year. ~ We recognize that this consumption is roughly proportional to our GNP,

?!

but there are many who believe that--even in such

an energy-intensive society as ours--there is considerable room for conservation through greater efficiency In energy utilization. Appreciative of our contemporary global context, we are reordering and modifying our own energy priorities. We, too, must have our own, distinctive national energy policy-which will differ in content and emphasis from that of France, or Japan, or the Federal Republic of Germany, or almost any other technically advanced country. Each is unique. Yet, there are certain grim facts which al I of us face in common. Detlev Rohwedder, Chairman of the International Energy Agency, was reported to have told the board of IEA last month in Paris that agency studies anticipate import requirements of all oil-consuming nations in the world to total between 42 and 49 million barrels per day by 1985. But those same studies estimated the maximum production capacity of all members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) only in the lower end of that range--44 million barrels a day;

and OPEC's own estimate of the maximum desirable level of produc-

tion Is considerably below the projected needs--totaling some 35 million barrels daily. According to the report, Mr. Rohwedder doubts that energy conservation measures alone can possibly close the serious gap that may appear worldwide within just eight years. Mr. Rohwedder also expressed doubt as to whether solar (and) geothermal energy sources could be developed sufficiently to close the gap, adding that world energy needs in 1985 would still have to be met mainly by oil, coal, nuclear energy and natural gas. Oil and natural gas can be replaced to a large extent only by coal and nuclear energy, he added.~ Even granting that Mr. Rohwedder seems to ignore hydroelectric power (a fair move, perhaps, in view of the relative paucity of suitable sites and the long lead time needed to finance and build new dams of any considerable size), we are clearly threatened by a severe energy crisis in the not-too-distant future. I have previously stated my personal guess that this crisis will come during the mid- to late-1980's. Countries that must import oi I because of insufficient domestic supplies can expect problems. Those that do not have (or cannot quickly develop) coal reserves wi 11 be strapped even more tightly, except to the extent that nuclear generation capacity can be added in time. The countries that could be hardest hit are the very ones that are having the most trouble recovering from the sharp price rises in oil since 1973--the developing nations who are short of foreign exchange to begin with. According to Citibank, '!._/ their external indebtedness increased by 50% in only two years between the end of 1973 and the end of 1975;

and they are clearly incapable of generating enough capital internally to

avoid escalating "development deficits". In general terms, nuclear energy helps to relieve the fossil fuel squeeze throughout

3

the world. To replace a barrel of oil ·anywhere with its uranium equivalent theoretically frees that oil for use somewhere else. Fossil fuel resources are "stretched", According to the normal balance of supply and demand, price rises may even be held in check to some extent. But the fact is that there are constraints on the development of nuclear generating facilities too;

and the difficulty of financing them has not been the least of their prob-

lems in recent years--whether one considers the situation in the developing countries or in some areas that are technologically most advanced. How are the future nuclear projects which are an essential factor in the world energy equation to be financed ? More particularly, how can worthwhile nuclear power projects be financed in developing countries--where a second item in short supply domestically may be investment capital itself ? The dimensions of the capital supply problem for nuclear projects in developing countries can truthfully be sketched today in only vague terms overall. During 1975 and 1976, participants in international conferences lO/ continued to repeat nuclear projec-

tions of 40,000 MWe for developing nations by 1-985, and a World Bank staff working paper which appeared only about a year a.90 predicted that by 1980 "almost 10% of the primary electricity generated in the lower income (non-OPEC, developing) countries and 12% of the primary electricity generated in the higher income countries will be from nuclear plants" ... going on to predict 14% for non-OPEC countries in the middle income countries by the same year.!:.!_/

As of now--with only 37,500 MWe of nuclear generating capacity now

available, under construction, or under contract for 1985 delivery--

0

it seems obvious

that the transfer of nuclear technology has slowed. The safest wager to make about any projection is that it will be wrong. I have not come 6,000 miles to make light of last year's nuclear projections, which we all realize were based on historic and current trends.

It could be that Mr. Rohwedder also will be

off by a couple of years or by a few thousand barrels per day in the pessimistic outlook on oi I avai labi I ity offered by the International Energy Agency. Nevertheless, al I signs still point to a time--not very far off--when world demand for energy (including the justifiably burgeoning demand of developing nations) will insist that the nuclear option be adopted wherever it can be demonstrated to be the most reasonable and economical and generally desirable. Unless some method can be evolved to finance those nuclear projects, everybody will be penalized. We cannot afford to deny any country access to the energy technology it really needs. Although there has been a stabilization in the world energy situation, it is clear that the energy demands of the world by 1985 wi 11 be considerably greater than present, due to population increase and expanding industrial activity. The population increase will be sharpest in developing countries, where industrialization and social progress will translate into significantly higher~ capita consumption in total energy requirements. In the past 15 years, such development has spawned substantial increase in the energy intensity of production within these countries ... and a doubling of their energy consumption.

4

J1/

While oil--and, to some extent, coal--will continue to play a major role in the energy requirements of developing countries (particularly among those with higher incomes), developing countries must increasingly turn to new energy sources. These countries wi II aggressively seek to acquire nuclear power plants. Nuclear power is unmistakably capital-intensive, although its long-term economic advantage over coal and oil can be demonstrated in many locations. Furthermore, most of the capital outlay for a nuclear power plant (perhaps 60 to 70 percent) must be spent by any developing country in foreign exchange or foreign credits, because so much of the equipment and technical skills must be imported. ~

When one ponders the fact that the

cost of a single such plant is measured in hundreds of millions of dollars, the need for external financing is evident. Long construction periods (with the built-in threat of inflation) must be recognized. In varying degrees and through various methods, much of the financing (and even the talk of financing) for nuclear projects in developing areas has involved support and subsidy by the supplier governments. Yet those very governments are faced today by sharply rising demands for internal investment of energy capital. So, what of the future for the capital-short developing countries ? Although this cannot be documented, I believe that the greatest potential for future financing lies beyond traditional patterns. I think it lies with commercial funding--especially in the form of investment pools--and with some completely new sources. I expect it to include private dollars, Eurodollars and petrodollars. And its advent will introduce some new ground rules as well as emphasize some of the old ones. Loans to finance nuclear power projects must be of long duration--preferably 1 S to 20 years or even longer. They must normally be adequate to fund not only construction costs but also substantial startup costs (including the first core of low-enriched uranium for a light water reactor or the heavy water moderator for a CANDU-type reactor--unless special leasing arrangements can be made). Commercial funding will generally mean competitive interest rates, or at least a blending of them with concessionary financing, that will add to total project cost. Yet commercial funds will not be available automatically, even at competitive interest rates. What other factors will influence lenders to cooperate? First, they may be influenced favorably by tax structures within their own countries that would encourage foreign developmental lending--a possibility that I will touch on again near the end of my presentation. But that is hardly a factor that the developing country could affect. What can !.!_ do ? To state it simply, the most important practical feature of a request for such foreign investment is the economic soundness of the proposed project itself. I believe that nuclear power projects in the future must stand or fall on their ability to compete with other forms of energy (which may also require developmental investment) within the given area. All available resources must be analyzed, and there is no room for sophistry. Cost comparisons must be comprehensive and scrupulously fair.

In some cases, nuclear-generated

5

electricity will be a clear winner;

in others it will not.

Let me put that into "bankers' terms". Again, I am quoting Citibank: , ... Private investors are influenced by .... attitudes towards nationalization, capital controls, taxation and the repatriation of earnings. But the expected rate of return is probably the predominant factor;· and it changes along with the changes in the LDC's economic outlook. Thus, the stream of private capital into individual LDCs may fluctuate, but it's not likely to change much relative to their GNP--which also grows faster when times are good ~1. The point is that a nuclear power project that can be presented as the best form of energy development in the set of circumstances at hand can promise better times and attract the necessary capital, while a marginal one wi 11 face great difficulty. In many cases the crucial question wi II be whether or not sufficient demand for electricity exists or can be anticipated, because all of us realize, I believe, that nuclear power cannot be packaged most conveniently and economically at present in small sizes. A 1300 MWe nuclear plant now costs only 50 to 75% more to build than a plant of half that capacity. Regard less of unit size, •it is also a rule of thumb that 10 to 15% of capital cost can be saved by planning to instai I a twin reactor at any given site~ -

Yet the economics

of nuclear power are such that long-term overal I savings can only come from operation at a high load. factor. So, demand must be ready .... along with the transmission and distribution facilities which are also capital intensive. One thing that makes load forecasting especially difficult in a developing country, however, is what could be termed the inertia of energy demand in its relation to gross national product. Must electrical generation remain low because a developing country cannot afford it?

Or would GNP rise with the availability of electricity, so that development

might actually pay for itself?

I am familiar with at least one study

0

that has measured

demand-price elasticity of 1. 8 for electric power in lower-income countries as a whole-suggesting that the latter, more hopeful attitude should prevai I. Instinctively, I favor this approach myself;

but I would warn that prospective commercial lenders will probably

insist on some scientific evidence to support such a presumption in any specific situation where rapid expansion of energy facilities is proposed. Another problem with large-capacity units arises from their possible adverse effect on system reliability. No generating unit, regardless of fuel, is expected to operate continually without some shutdowns for planned or unscheduled maintenance. If a single unit of any sort represents too large a fraction of a system's capacity, such a shutdown could be quite disruptive. One study carried out for ERDA (the United States Energy Research and Development Administration) by an independent consultant group concluded, in fact, that no system should introduce a single generating unit as large as 1,000 MWe unless its total interconnected capacity is at least 20,000 MWe. At this rate, using the rather generous projections of installed capacity made by the International Atomic Energy Agency a few years ago, only five developing countries could accommodate nuclear power

6

units of more than 600 MWe by 1980, with eight more "qualifying" by 1990 and a total of 20 by the end of the century~.

Frankly, I consider this particular "size of system"

guide I ine far too conservative; and there are other aspects of this particular study for ERDA that are probably overly negative. Nevertheless, the general idea that large units fit most comfortably into fairly large systems is a sound one;

and the many other obser-

vations in the study about adapting nuclear power to the needs of developing countries are worth considering. The title of the report is LDC Nuclear Power Prospects, 1975-1990: Commercial, Economic and Security lmpl ications ~/ and-> with some reservations=-l would commend it to you for study. It raises many of the questions that commercial investment consortia might raise;

and it may be wise to anticipate them.

In addition, of course, commercial lenders are likely to be assured by evidences of political stability within the host nation that would tend to minimize non-commercial risks. In this regard, unilateral, unequivocal, and total insurance against risk by the supplier government can probably be ruled out as part of future patterns. An acceptable alternative, however, may I ie in the hopeful recent trend toward "cofinancing" of large capital projects. As summarized in a recent summary of policy options for the U.S. Federal Energy Administration: Cofinancing is a lending procedure in which a default on loans supplied by a private institution constitutes default on international agency loans as well. By increasing the penalty for private loan default, this discourages default. This, in turn, increases the availability of private capital. The additional capital may take the form of a commercial bank's participation in a World Bank loan to a developing country ... Cofinancing makes efficient use of the informational capacity of the large international agencies through their monitoring and evaluation of LDC economies, while simultaneously 201 encouraging private capital flows . As in the past, any degree of risk which remains for such private participation in international financing can be further limited by the simple expedient of sharing loans or direct investment among a number of parties. One more barrier to successful future financing which I must mention is the growing international sensitivity to possible nuclear health hazards and to potential nuclear weapon proliferation. Both problem areas were dealt with in the first session this morning, so I will touch upon them only as they may affect future international financing. Speaking personally, but on the basis of direct involvement with the task of technological regulation, I am convinced that nuclear power reactors can be operated at least as safely as any other large-scale energy source, and with less adverse environmental impact than most. Similarly, safeguards problems are soluble. Nevertheless, political realities should not be ignored; and I believe that external financing will be easier to obtain on projects for which a credible framework of safety, siting criteria, environmental protection, and safeguard regulation has been established in advance. Standardization of plants will thus be of some advantage. Please note that I am not talking about govern-

7

ment-to-government financing alone;· I am suggesting that an adequate regulatory structure may be a sine~ non for future commercial lending--for the simple reason that it offers added guarantees of plant reliability and future operability.

Parenthetically, I will

venture the opinion that the same spirit could infuse future planning for non-nuclear projects as well. This is not a case of arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of other nations;

on the contrary, it is a growing recognition of national interdependence in such

fields as public health and evironmental protection, not to mention the premier area of global peace. It is important that these efforts for the common good not be exercised as a form of discrimination against the developing nations--or interpreted as such. I am pleased and proud that initiatives are also being taken to halt (and even to roll back) what has been called "vertical proliferation" of nuclear weapons through President Carter's proposal to reduce nuclear armaments for the so-called "superpowers". And, although it remains to be seen whether the change of government in India will bring a formal renunciation of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent through adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, there appears at least to be, movement in that direction. As we all know, one sticking point internationally has been the free transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Forsaking the political questions once again for the purely economic, let me remind you that such fuel cycle facilities cannot be cost-effective unless they are built to serve a fairly large number of reactors on a regular basis. For that reason, their financing in most situations is not going to be attractive to commercial investors. On the other hand, full fuel cycle facilities could make economic sense on a multinational, regional basis. I was one of the first among a growing number of persons in the field of international energy who urged that regional reprocessing centers be established under IAEA supervision. I have even gone so far as to suggest some specific locations where the first few might be located--namely, Brazil, the United States, and here in Iran.

Let me interject at this point my belief that financing could be arranged for such

regional ventures, if international agreement on the concept were to evolve. Meanwhile, failure to resolve the uncertainties of the international fuel cycle provides one more barrier to the financing of reactor technology transfer. Plutonium credits cannot be factored into reactor economics unless the contract of sale contains some sort of "buy-back" provision. Costs of high-level waste disposal are another imponderable. And surely a commercial investor is interested in whether or not a power project which he is helping to finance can be assured of fresh fuel supplies throughout its lifetime. All of this brings me to my final, major point.

It is a suggestion to which I would wel-

come your reactions as policy planners, decision molders, and decision makers In your respective nations. It is a suggesion that only slightly but significantly modifies and extends a proposal made several times by President Carter during his successful electoral campaign .... one that he issued in some detail during an address at the United Nations on May 13, 1976, and from which I quote, in excerpt:

8

•... A new world agenda is emerging .... an agenda of priority problems on which nations must cooperate or abdicate the right to plan a future for the human condition. The time has come to put the world energy problem on that new agenda.

Let us hold

! World Energy Conference under the auspices of the United Nations to help all nations cope with common energy problems--eliminating energy waste and increasing energy efficiency;

reconciling energy needs with environmental quality goals;

and shifting away

from almost total reliance upon dwindling sources of non-renewable sources .... ~/ Mr. Carter went on to say that such a conference "should not simply be a dramatic meeting to highlight a problem which is then forgotten", and he set for it a series of specific tasks--of which I would cite but three: advising countries, particularly In the developing world, on the development of sound nationa-1 energy policies; providing technical assistance to train energy planners and badly needed energy technicians; increasing the flow of investment capital from private and public sources into new energy development. ·n; As some of you may recall, Mr. Carter's emphasis at that time was on non-nuclear energy sources;

and in fact the World Energy Agency he envisioned as coming out of such

a conference would not absorb or overlap with IAEA.

Instead, it would work--in his

words--"side by side with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna."

Yet,

he specified that one of the fundamental questions to be examined at the conference would be the extent to which countries might need to depend upon a nuclear energy economy. It seems all but certain that the National Energy Pol icy to be enunciated by President Carter for the United States six days from today will include substantial dependence on the nuclear option. I submit that there are other countries in the world today--including developing nations--for whom the nuclear option is a vital part of a rational and balanced energy policy. For that reason, I would urge widespread and vociferous support for a World Energy Conference to be held at the earliest feasible date--within the year if possible--but with the clear understanding that nuclear energy be considered on its agenda in parallel with other sources.

If developmental lending by private and public

sources is to be encouraged--either on some multinational basis or by statutory encouragement within the developed nations individually--it should flow freely to whatever type of energy project is most suitable in each set of circumstances.

If an "energy window" _is to

be opened at the International Monetary Fund or if some new International Bank for Resource Development is in the offing, those mechanisms should be open to sound proposals for nuclear power projects. I do not make this proposal as a nuclear saleman, for I am not one. Nor can I make it in any official capacity, for I am not an ambassador from any country--developed or developing.

I put It forth merely as an individual who has studied the existing facilities for

financing energy development which in some cases is badly needed, and found those facili-

9

ties ripe for some improvement, but still wanting overall. Nuclear technology is not an end in itself. It is not a badge of prestige. It is a tool-more useful in some instances than in others .... occasionally inappropriate, but sometimes all but indispensable. Broader understanding of those simple truths~ overcome the barriers we discuss today--including the problems of finance. Those barriers must be surmounted. With effort and good will on all sides, they will be! REFERENCES 1)

World Bank, Lambertini, Adrian, Energy and Petroleum in Non-OPEC Developing Countries:

2)

1974-1980, World Bank Staff Paper No. 229, February 1976.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "World Energy Outlook: A Reassessment of Long-Term Energy Developments", A Report by the SecretaryGeneral, OECD, Paris, January 1977. Gordian Associates, Inc.,

"Requirements for Financing Energy Independence in Non-

OPEC Less Developed Countries Through 1990", November 10, 1976. World Bank Staff Paper, No. 229, op: cit. 1. 3)

United Nations , World Energy Supplies, U.N. Statistical Papers, Series J, No. 19, New York:

4)

1976.

Energy Research and Development Administration, L.D.C. Nuclear Power Prospects, 1975-1990:

Commercial, Economic and Security Implications, (Prepared by Richard

J. Barber Associates Inc.) ERDA-52, 1976, p, 11-49. Journal of Commerce, January 9, 1975. In 1974, Mexico resumed her status as a net oil exporter after 30 years. New discoveries in the South, Baja California and the Gulf Continental Shelf in 1974-75 represented nearly a five-fold expansion of oil reserves. While official proven reserves are put at 11 1/2 billion barrels and expected reserves at 23 billion barrels, a Mexican ministry official in March 1977 placed possible reserves at 60 billion barrels. (Information provided courtesy of the Embassy of Mexico, Washington, D .C., and confirmed by private U.S. industry sources). 5)

ERDA-52, op. cit. 4, fig. V-1.

6)

OECD, World~ Outlook, op. cit. 2. U.N., World ~Supplies, Series J, No. 19, ~. 3.

7)

International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Vol. XXX, No. 3, March 1977. International Atomic Energy Agency, Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries: General Report, 1.A.E.A., Vienna, September 1973. World Bank, World Bank Atlas, 1976.

8)

10

New York Times, "Agency Study Sees 1985 Oil Shortage", p. 62, column 3, March 17, 1977.

9)

Citibank, "A First Look at the Developing Countr ies Debt", Citibank Economic Department, June 1976, p. 4.

10) Atomic Industrial Forum/DANATOM, International Conference on Nuclear Power and

the Money Market, April 15-18, 1975, Copenhagen, Denmark. 1.A.E.A. Interregional Training Course on Nuclear Power Project Planning and Implementation, September 8 - December 19, 1975, Bonn, F.R.G. 11) World Bank Paper No. 229,~. 1, p. 14. 12) Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices (Ford Foundation, MITRE Corporation};

Ballenger;

Cambridge, 1977, p. 5.

13) World Bank Paper No. 229. 14) World Bank, Friedman, Efrain, "Financing Energy in Developi·ng Countries" World Bank Reprint Series, No. 27. Reprinted from "Energy Policy", March 1976, p. · 37. ERDA-52,~. 4, p. 11-49. 15) Citibank,~. 9, p. 9. 16) Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group,~. 12, p. 112. 17) Gordian Associates Inc., "Requirements for Financing Energy Development in NonOPEC Less Developed Countries Through 1990", December 23, 1976, p. 9. 18) ERDA-52,~. 4, p. x. 18) Id. 20) Gordian Associates Inc., "Alternative Pol icy Options for Alleviating Shortfal Is in the Ability of Non-OPEC Less Developed Countries to Finance Energy Independence", November 15, 1976, p. 5. 21) Address by President Carter at the United Nations, May 13, 1976. 22) Id.

11

U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORT LICENSING SYSTEM PETER L. STRAUSS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission United States

The purpose of this paper is to describe the United States Nuclear Export Licensing System, or process. Thus, the subject will be the means by which a desired nuclear reactor, or reactor fuel, may be exported from the United States through the obtaining of necessary governmental permissions. Of course, one cannot discuss procedures without admitting that they are shaped by and responsive to United States policy concerning nuclear exports. You have already heard about those policies in some detail, and you know that they have recently been the subject of intense examination within my government. The United States firmly holds the belief that continued development of the benefits of nuclear energy must be accomplished in a manner which can be reconciled with the objective of nonproliferation. The various initiatives the United States has undertaken, and the procedures it has adopted, must be understood In the context of this paramount policy objective. This paper, however, wi II focus on issues of procedure. As you. know, the United States' economy is largely private in character, but the business activities of its corporations are subject to a wide variety of governmental controls. In the case of nuclear materials and facilities, these controls include export controls. No nuclear facility, or component of a nuclear facility, or material useful for fuel for a nuclear facility, may be exported from the United States without the permission of the federal government. The exporter must obtain a license for his proposed shipment. Where the export concerns a nuclear facility component, this license is currently obtained from the United States Department of Commerce. This Department is directly under the authority of the President, and issues the I icense after consultation with other concerned parts of the federal government, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Facilities themselves, and fuel materials for the facilities, must be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

I work for this Commission, and am most familiar with its processes;

the

Commission's procedures also seem to be the most complex and, perhaps, problematical. For these reasons, and because legislative proposals seem likely to broaden rather than diminish the field in which the Commission's procedures apply, this talk will focus on procedures which involve the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The typical first stage in a nuclear export license is one which does not include the export itself, although it may foresee it. This is the negotiation and entry into force of an agreement for cooperation, typical ly between the nation desiring nuclear exports from the United States and the United States. The contents and procedures for such agreements are statutorily defined in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, the organic act for the Unites States' nuclear-related functions. Section 123 demonstrates the principal concern

12

in the nuclear export context with proliferation. The agreeing state is required to guarantee maintenance of security safeguards and standards. Non-nuclear weapons states must guarantee that material to be transferred wi II not be used for atomic weapons, or for mi I itary research or development of any kind.

Further, procedures for mutual agreement

to any transfers of material or sensitive information must be established. The procedures provided for review of such agreements within my government emphasize the importance which is attached to them. After an agreement has been negotiated. the statute requires that it receive the personal approval of the President. He must, further, determine in writing that performance of the agreement wi II promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the United States' national defense and security interests. The agreements are not treaties, and so do not require ratification by our Senate to come into force. However, the Congress has also determined that the President's determination alone is not enough to permit them to enter into force, as would typically be the case for executive agreements. As a further reflection of the importance attached to these agreements, the Congress has provided by statute that they must be submitted to the Congress for its review over a sixty-day period.

If the Congress by resolution of both the

House of Representatives and the Senate disapproves the proposed agreement, it does not enter into force. Our Congress never has rejected a proposed agreement for cooperation, and my own judgment would be that that step is an unlikely one.

However, it has the power to reject,

and that fact is known to those who negotiate such agreements when they are negotiating. Awareness of the importance which is now attached to nonproliferation policy by congressional leaders may itself influence the course of negotiations significantly. The procedure which requires a later public examination of agreements which have been entered gives the examiners' views force even during negotiating stages, Today, particularly, that may be so. As you may know, the Congressional body principally responsible for these issues in the past was the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. This committee had members from both our House of Representatives and our Senate, and was intimately familiar, on a continuing basis, with all national and international issues respecting nuclear energy, For many years, its views were received with great deference from both parts of the Congress. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has now been abolished, and its responsibilities in the international area have been distributed to the individual committees of the House of Representatives and of the Senate responsible for foreign affairs matters generally. Both because of the prominence of the proliferation issue in current political thinking in my country, and because this is a new responsibility for these committees, it would be reasonable to expect rather close congressional attention to any new agreements for cooperation that may come before the Congress. The agreement for cooperation is only the first stage of the export process.

It sets

the framework for United States exports, but does not in itself require or permit specific United States exports. Once a particular export is desired, an application must be filed with my agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This Commission may authorize the 13

proposed export only when two findings have been made: with the governing agreement for cooperation;

first, that it is in conformity

and, second, that the export would be con-

sistent with the United States' defense and security interests. In a moment, I will discuss these determinations and the procedures by which they are made. First, an explanation of the relationship between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the other parts of the federal government will be useful. Please give this particular attention. It may help you to understand if not to approve how our domestic governmental structure has brought about such a complicated framework for international transactions in nuclear materials. You are probably all familiar with the division of governmental authority among executive, legislative, and judicial bodies. The legislative body in the United States is our Congress, Senate and House of Representatives.

It has principal responsibility for the enact-

ment of laws. The judicial body, the courts, resolves disputes among citizens or between citizens and the government regarding the meaning and application of these laws. The executive is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the affairs of government.

In

my country, the executive body is headed by the President and fundamentally responsible to him. The Department of State, for example, carries out most foreign affairs functions under his control and receives its fundamental directives from him. For various domestic purposes, however, we Americans have created by statute a fourth kind of governmental body, the independent regulatory commission. These commissions, typically headed by a council of several members, are not regarded as subject to presidential control or discipline in our domestic law. This is so, even though they may have important executive functions, for example control over the use of radio and television channels. Although the President makes initial appointments to these bodies, with congressional approval, he cannot override their policy decisions or remove Commissioners with whom he disagrees from office. Within the particular functions assigned to them by law, these independent regulatory commissions have been called the (headless} fourth branch of American government. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is .such a commission. Until recently, our independent regulatory commissions would have been only a curiosity of political science to an international group such as this. They have been given wholly domestic functions, our Congress recognizing that internationally our government will be viewed as a whole and "that the conduct of foreign relations should therefore be unified in the President's hands. However, when it created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and gave it legal responsibility for nuclear export licensing, the Congress did not follow this established pattern. The Commission was given the final right to decide whether or not to license a proposed export. Since it is an independent regulatory commission, the President has no formal control over its decisions;

his views and the vrews of the

Department of State, in formal terms, are merely advisory. The Commission is legally free to reject a proposed export, which he supports, if in its own view the proposal does not meet the standards mentioned a few moments ago. Understanding this formal independence, which I am sure seems quite odd from an international perspective, is the key to

14

understanding the American framework for approval of International transactions In nuclear materials. Let me add at this point that the Commission is aware not only of its independence, but of the value of a unified national policy on export matters to the United States and to its nuclear customers. The Commission has repeatedly observed that it expects to give substantial deference to the views of the Executive Branch and, as I will describe, has thorough procedures to assure that those views are received and understood before decisions are taken.

In practice, the Commission has never rejected an export supported by the

President. The Commission participates in all governmental decisions of consequence respecting the formulation of nuclear export policy. And it has supported, in the councils of government, measures to return final control over nuclear export matters to the President, to assure uniformity and central control in matters affecting our nation's foreign policy. Like the requirement for congressional review of agreements for cooperation, however, the Commission's independence of formal presidential control is doubtless a factor which Influences and comp I icates the conduct of nuclear export activities. Now let us return to the determinations which the Commission must make -- first, that the proposed export Is in conformity with an existing agreement for cooperation; second, that the proposed export is consistent with national security and defense interests. Since the President must have found that an agreement for cooperation is itself consistent with national security and defense interests, It might appear that these factors are identical. From this view the Commission's inquiry would be trivial -- does an applicable agreement for cooperation exist? In a case involving the proposed export of a reactor to Spain--a proposal which was approved by the Commission--the Commission decided that the mere existence of an agreement for cooperation was not a sufficient condition for issuance of an export license. An agreement may have been entered years earlier;

the second

question is a question for today, which must be resolved in the current world, in light of current policies and current knowledge. This provides suitable flexibility for responding to changing circumstances, and gives separate meaning to each of the two tests which the Commission's organic law requires. Accordingly, a proposed export license will not be issued unless analysis of today's circumstances, giving appropriate weight to the existence of a valid agreement for cooperation, demonstrates the appropriateness of the export from a nationa I defense and security perspective. The Commission requires accurate information and assessments to make this determination, and these are provided, on its request, by the Executive Branch. A formal procedure has been established, under Presidential order, by which the Department of State serves as coordinator of the views and information of the several executive branch agencies that may be interested in a particular export. It provides these views and information In response to a series of questions addressed to it routinely by Commission staff.

In

addition, there is a highly developed and informal ongoing exchange of information and views, which may include briefings of the Commission and may lead on occasion to diplomatic initiatives or inquiries In advance of Commission decision. Once the record before the 15

Commission has been assembled, it Is analyzed by its staff and presented to the Commission, with separate Executive Branch and Staff recommendations, for its decision. Individual commissioners, who sharply feel their responsibilities in the continuing effort to check the spread of nuclear weapons, have often sought additional information and views on matters of concern to them. Indeed, it is striking that the Commission's public pronouncements in this area have been characterized by dissent at least as often as in its domestic responsibilities. Once the required information is at hand, a decision is taken. It may be appropriate to remark that the Commission knows that prompt decision is important;

these issues are given the highest degree of priority in its deliberations, and delay

when it occurs is usually the product of difficulties in the analytical process -- difficulties which might arise even if the Executive Branch alone was performing these functions, Thus far, I have described a wholly governmental process.

It has often been observed

that Americans love nothing better than to sue their government, and this has also proved to be the case with respect to nuclear export I icenslng. On four occasions, at this writing, private individuals or groups have sought to participate in the Cdmmission's decisions, in each case opposing a proposed export. Each of these matters is sti II before the Commission or the American courts, but some observations are nonetheless possible. Private pa-rticipation in domestic regulatory affairs is not all unusual in the United States. Before a nuclear reactor is licensed, for example, a public hearing very much like a trial is held, at which concerned individuals may appear, present witnesses, examine the witnesses presented by others, and argue their views respecting the construction of the plant and any necessary conditions. The same kind of participation was sought before the Commission in an export license proceeding concerning applications for licenses to export nuclear fuel to Tarapur, India. In that case, the Commission decided several important principles which are now undergoing review in our courts:

first, it set standards

for participation in such proceedings as a matter of legal right. These standards require some individual injury directly connected to the proposed license to be shown. They were not met in that case, and have not been found met in any subsequent proceeding;

usually

the interests put forward by would-be participants have been quite diffuse and political in character. These indirect interests do not suffice to require such applicants to be permitted to participate in the Commission's decision process. Second, the Commission indicated that any hear+nqs it would hold would not be like a trlal in character.

Instead, a hearing llke the inquiry of a legislative committee was con-

ducted in that case. The Commission heard witnesses and conducted its own questioning. but did not permit others to engage in questioning or require other formalities usually associated with trials.

In the case of other applications, even less formal procedures

might be employed, for example submission of written commentary, if that seemed appropriate to the circumstances. The Commission has under way an intensive study of appropriate procedures for such proceedings, which should produce a body of proposed rules at an early date.

16

Finally, the Commission indicated that its inquiry would be limited, as its organic statute suggests, to the criteria already mentioned -- conformity with an agreement for cooperation, and consistency with national defense and security interests.

It had been

suggested that inquiry also be conducted on a broad range of health, safety and environmental issues which were said to be likely to arise from the proposed use of the fuel in question In India .. The Commission remarked that it would be inappropriate for it to attempt regulation of such matters in other countries. Of course, this conclusion does not detract from the Commission's important participation in the work of international organizations and cooperation with other countries in the area of nuclear safety -- particularly, the Commission's assistance in the development of codes of practice and safety guides under the International Atomic Energy Agency. While the role of private participation is thus limited, you must expect that it will continue. The demands for public participation reflect a well-established current of American government. While unusual in the international area -- like the independent status of the Commission itself -- such participation is unlikely to be checked and may even be expanded by the Congress. Congress is likely to see in it still another means of assuring appropriate caution in activities which in some circumstances could threaten further nuclear proliferation. All of the matters I have discussed remain under close study in the United States, and a certain amount of change over the coming months may be inevitable. The Commission is fully aware, however, of the values of predictability, efficiency, and certainty i11 this as In all of its functions.

It will be bending its own effort, using the experience it

has already gained, to make its procedures and its substantive export licensing standards more accessible, precise, and understandable to concerned persons both in the United States and abroad.

I hope to have contributed to that process today.

17

PROBLEMS FACING NUCLEAR RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

HASSAN M. EL HARES El Fateh University Tripoli Libya and FATIMA A. TAYEL Oasis Oil Company Tripoli Libya

ABSTRACT There is a well-known gap between the levels of nuclear research in developed and developing countries in spite of the fact that some developing nations were in the past famous for research in all fields of human activities and that they have now both the will and sometimes the necessary resources to conduct ambitious programs of research. In this paper, a concrete example of a research study in the nuclear energy field conducted by the same person in Switzerland, Egypt and Libya is considered. The difficulties, delays and obstacles encountered while working in a developing country are enumerated, analyzed and suggestions are made In order to decrease the acuteness of these problems in the future. 1.

INTRODUCTION

In the technology oriented present-day society, there is a firmly established connection between research in all fields of human activity on one hand and industrial production and development on the other hand. The volumes of research and development programs and related expenses in both highly industrialized and developing countries directly reflect the difference in technical development and technological level:

while industrialized nations are

spending about 2 or 3% of the gross national product on scientific and engineering research projects, the corresponding expenses spent by the developing countries are of the order of not more than 0. 2% on an average; if we consider the difference in gross national product levels, the industrialized countries are spending on an average 135 times more for research and development than developing countries. fl, 2) In too many developing countries there Is no research work carried on by domestic national industry.

18

Innovations, if any, are brought about as a result of licence agre-

ements or direct dependence on foreign investors. The time lag caused by this situation for the transposition of new ideas into industrial products gives rise to a drastic reduction in competitiveness on the world market, since "the technology avai I able is only that of yesterday" (l}. It is then a must for developing countries to increase the size and diversify the levels of research in al I fields of today's technology since this is the only way to decrease or at least to maintain constant the gap between the highly industrialized and developing countries. In this paper we shall consider some of the difficulties and problems facing research in general and nuclear research in particular when done in developing countries. 2.

RESEARCH DIFFICULTIES CHARACTERISTIC OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Naturally the developing countries do not have a monopoly of these difficulties and problems. They are only more pronounced here, the degree of acuteness depending on many factors (rich or poor developing countries, past hi story of the nation and its culture level, ... } . Since there is a very close relationship between nuclear research and research in all fields of engineering activity, we shall consider at first the problems facing research in general, then those specific to nuclear activity and finally take a practical example 2. 1 Problems Facing Research in General

*

Bad utilization of public funds for research

In too many developing countries public funds for research, If any, are granted not as a function of the importance of the research program itself but directly proportionally to the human relations between the director of the project and the decision-makers. This occur's at al I levels (funds for a simple research point to funds for many departments together). Also a great part of the research funds is sometimes utilized for things having nothing or little to do with research.

*

Little or no research work sponsored by industrial companies

The industrial companies in the majority of developing nations have not yet understood the absolute necessity of sponsoring research in their field of activity. Consequently research can only be done in governmental institutions such as universities, governmental agencies, etc ...

*

Little or no financial incentive for researchers

This has dramatic consequences:

an incessant "brain drain" occurs not only to inclustrla19

lized couhtries but also inside rich developing countries to other Industries or simply to trade business. An example of this is the case of a young Libyan Master of Science who has retired from his job as electrical engineer to open a shop for children's toys and who earns now more than five times his previous salary. No effective supporting facilities

*

Unless it is a purely theoretical work, a researcher needs technicians to help him construct the research apparatus and al I other related instruments and connections. Unfortunately due to the poor theoretical background of technicians in developing countries and their low experience level, they simply don't realize the importance of keeping tolerances within prescribed limits. Also in poor developing countries, the technicians are drained outside the country due to wage incentives and consequently in some developing countries such as Eqypt it becomes easier to find a good Ph.D. than to obtain a good technician for research work. Even purely theoretical works are not easy to do. They need a well organized and upto-date library and this is hard to find in the majority of developing countries due to the lack of financial means, the incompetence of library supervisors and the inherent administrative routine. It is not by chance that successful researchers in the developing nations are generally those who were trained to work practically independently (such as those having received a post-graduate education in Switzerland, France, Germany, ... ). Researchers coming from U.S. Universities have at first many difficulties in adapting the team-work spirit they have learned to the actual conditions prevailing in their developing countries.

*

The absence of an exciting and progressive scientific environment

The existence o,f such an environment would prevent the newly trained researchers from straying away from the field in which they have been carefully trained and educated. A serious problem exists in many developing countries in that the scientists are forced to alter their field of work soon after their return to their original countries, and become active in fields where they have no training at all. Thus a young scientist, who has spent some years abroad being educated in one of the more complicated fields of science, may suddenly find himself in the midst of a power struggle for a higher managerial position. In the face of such financial and hierarchical temptations, the person will soon leave his 3 field and accept a position in management without any previous training in this art ( ) . We completely agree with Mr. M. Taherzadeh, the director of the Nuclear Research Center of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, that If the young scientists are appointed too

20

soon to managerial positions, the shortage of trained personnel to carry out the bulk of scientific research will continue to exist, at least for the next twenty years in the developing countries. In order to counteract this tendency, research positions offered to Ph.D. 's shou Id be so interesting and satisfying that other high-paying-but unrelated - positions can be ignored.

2. 2 Problems Facing Nuclear Research in Part.icular

*

Inefficiency of cooperation agreements

- Many developing nations are not sufficiently aware of all the possibilities offered by multinational cooperation and particularly by the International Atomic Energy Agency. - Bilateral cooperation is deeply affected by all the fluctuations in foreign policy and unfortunately the developing countries are well-known for their sudden "180° - changes" in foreign policy, especially with their neighboring countries. - The agreements of cooperation are sometimes hastily drafted without careful preparation 4 and have generally no follow-up at all. As humorously explained by E.Grubber ( ) statesmen and politicians everywhere in the world are used to travelling to other countries and are eager to sign anything e.g. agreements, contracts, etc.

When nothing

can be signed because all questions of relevance were settled long ago, or because the pending problems could not be settled within the few days set aside for the visit, then people I ike to propose an agreement on cooperation in science and technology.

An

agreement of this kind has many advantages: at first sight, It is politically neutral and can be easily agreed upon.

Furthermore there is no obligation to spend money or

manpower on projects that are not, or are only vaguely , defined, and which will never be executed.

*

No large primary background in nuclear science

According to the recommendations of a joint IAEA-UNESCO panel (S) the relevant national organizations in developing countries must devise ways for popularizing nuclear science in high schools and colleges.

Easily comprehensible information on nuclear science should

be disseminated through suitable pamphlets;

special exhibits with demonstrations and

through mass-media, workshops and round-table discussions should be considered and organized.

*

Man power scarcity in special disciplines

In some developing countries with a remarkable history and culture such as Egypt and Iran there are relatively too many Ph.Os. as compared to the intermediate technicians.

In other

21

countries man power scarcity is obser.ved in practically all dlsclpllnes,

*

Restrictions of developed countries

Students of developing countries sent abroad on missions are frequently forcibly oriented towards fields of poor interest to them by the host organization or country(GJ 2 .3 Practical Example Let us take a concrete example of a research study on a peaceful utilization of nuclear energy conducted by one of the authors (who is citizen of a developing country) in Switzerland, Egypt and Libya and enumerate the difficulties, delays and obstacles encountered while working in a developing country. The aim of the study was the determination of the dynamic responses of a triflux heat exchanger (the three currents being CO2, high pressure steam, relatively low pressure steam) present between the primary and secondary circuit of a nuclear power station. Since the study can have many practical consequences and utilizations, it was not difficult for the Head of the Institute of Automatic Control and Power Plants at the Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule Zurich to find an Industrial company (SULZER Brothers, Winterthur) to sponsor the task; and, effectively, a complete simulation of the primary and secondary circuit of a nuclear power plant was created with the technical help of the company to approximate the conditions existing in the actual plant of EDF-4 in France relative to the heat exchanger subject of the study. SULZER Brothers provided everything from the welders, necessary instruments and machines, to the young engineers needed for the supervtslon of the installation and the recording of results three shifts daily. The concrete results of this sponsorship were as follows: An internal report from the Institute of Automatic Control and Power Plants - ETH Zurich to SULZER Brothers about the dynamic behaviour of the proposed heat exchanger for two different configurations of the heat exchange surfaces (7) . Two doctoral theses at the ETH - Zurich were partly based on some results of the experiments. A considerable amount of practical information and experience was gathered for SULZER Brothers and later employed in the design of similar installations. Many later works were influenced by the results obtained for compressible fluids (a, 9• · · .) . In October 1967, the first author of this paper left Zurich for Alexandria where he worked as lecturer on Automatic Control and Advanced Theory of Machines at the Alexandria Faculty of Engineering. After several months of adaptation he tried to continue his researches in the same field. It was impossible to find financial help from outside the Faculty. Even to find a place to conduct the experiments was a problem. Finally he got an authorization to

22

make a partition wall in an unused passage and then, (we must not forget that it was the immediate post-war time in Egypt) spent many months of personal contacts with the Municipality

ot Alexandria

to get the necessary amount of wood to make the partition. Finally in September

1970 the partition wall was made and the place ready for the introduction of water and electricity but unfortunately a high-ranking Professor of the same Department saw the installation, found it suitable as office for his chief-assistant and simply took it! The theoretical work had more success. Besides lecturing on this subject at the Second U .A. R. Physics Conference in Cairo (1971), the author accepted a researcher of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission as post-graduate student for M.Sc. studies and in 1973 a theoretical thesis on the dynamics of the three incompressible flows heat exchanger for flow disturbances was accepted by the Alexandria Faculty of Engineering. 11 It is interesting to note that two papers on this thesis( • 121, accepted for publication in the bulletin of the Alexandria Faculty of Engineering in March 1973 are not yet published due to the great amount of greek symbols and equations in the papers and the limitations of the printing capacity of the printing-house ! At the end of 1972, the first author went to Tripoli, Libya to teach at the Faculty of Engineering, Automatic Control and Advanced Theory of Machines. Here, money was not a problem but the difficulty was to find qualified intermediate technicians and also post graduate students to carry on the experiments. Since it is the nation's policy to send the best B.Sc. students immediately abroad for postgraduate studies, it was impossible to persuade some of them to do research in Tripoli. Even the average engineer who was not eligible to go abroad for studies, has absolutely no interest in doing postgraduate studies locally for two main reasons: a)

due to the actual scarcity of engineers in Libya, Libyan engineers are overloaded with responsibilities and have not enough time to study and understand completely what they are doing.

bl

3.

Lack of sufficient incentives for postgraduate studies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

From the problems presented above, the following main conclusions can be drawn in order to improve the efficiency of technology transfer in general and nuclear technology transfer in particular: * During the first period of time where there are practically no supporting structures in developing countries, It is essential to train students to work practically independently. In our opinion the team work spirit can only be introduced after the achievement of a certain level of supporting structures.

*

Industrial companies and governments of developing nations shou Id spend at least

3% of their overal I expenses on scientific and engineering research projects.

*

By the introduction of very strong incentives (especially financial) , an exciting and

23

progressive scientific environment should be created with all supporting facilities.

*

Poor developing countries should try to use all the possibilities of bilateral and multi-

lateral cooperation.

*

All developing countries should try to maximize missions to developed countries and

cultural exchanges in all branches of technical activities. REFERENCES 1.

Scharmer, K. "Transfer of technology and scientific-technological cooperation between India and the Federal Republic of Germany",

Communication at the Julich

Nuclear Research Establishment, Julich, November 1976. 2.

Argawal, J., Douges, J ., Horn,E. and Non, A.

3.

an Entwicklungslander", Kieler Studien, Tubingen 1975. Taherzadeh, M. "The problem of the young scientist in developing countries",

"Uebertragung von Technologien

4.

Tehran, July-Sept. 1976. Gruber, E. "Assistance by governmental bodies of other countries", Inter-regional

Progress Report of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran- Nuclear Research Center,

Training Course on Nuclear Power Project Planning and Implementation, School of Nuclear Technology, Nuclear Research Center, Karlsruhe, Germany, Sept.-Dec. 1975. 5.

IAEA and UNESCO "Nuclear Science Teaching Ill", Report of a paner, Athens, May 7-11, 1973.

6.

El Hares H., Kreshman H. and Aswed M. "Education and Training on Nuclear Technology in Libya" Transfer of Nuclear Technology Conference, Shiraz, April 10-14, 1977.

7.

El Hares H. "Comportement dynamique de I 'echangeur de chaleur entre le cycle primaire et secondaire d'une centrale nucleaire" "Institute of Automatic Control and Power Plants, Swiss Fenderal Institute of Technology, 1966.

8.

E. Hares H. "Comportement dynamique d'un echangeur de chaleur a trois courants pour une perturbation de forme quelconque des temperatures d'entree" Edition Kolb Zurich, 1967.

9.

El Hres H. "Reflexions sur la dynamique des echangeurs de chaleur" Nouvelles Techniques, Zurich, A2/1968 p.83-94.

10, El Hares H. "Heat Exchanger Dynamics", Second U .A. R. Physics Conference, Cairo, 1971. 11. El Hares H. and Rizk M. "Steady state temperature distribution along a three· incompressible fluids heat exchanger for small flow perturbations", Bulletin of the Alexandria Faculty of Engineering, accepted for publication, March 1973. 12. El Hares H. and Rizk M. "Transient behaviour of a three fluids heat exchanger for small flow perturbations and/or temperature perturbations", Bulletin of the Alexandria Faculty of Engineering, accepted for publication, March 1973.

24

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY AN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY IN THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY JEAN RENOU

Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique Paris France

Before grappling with the problem of difficulties encountered by the transfer of nuclear technology, the matter should be placed in a more general context. In effect, does a technology transfer occur when a firm sells an airplane, a calculating machine, or a camera? The answer is no. And this fact means that the supplier gains a position of monopol lsttc technological domination, which exists equally between industrialized countries and visa-vis developing countries. The question arises as to whether it is possible to gradually cause the situation to change to enable clients to gain access, not only to knowhow, but to the position of supplier and exporter. This is the question applicable to conventional technologies. A passage to the nuclear field is new, because it contains inherent risks incurred both by military applications and power applications, and because scientific a~d technical training is far more time-consuming and complicated. Nevertheless, the objective is to surmount these barriers. Since, for example, national nuclear centers so often benefit from foreign scientific and technical contributions, one may consider that the road is open for a mutual, progressive transfer of knowhow so necessary to the growing number of countries which wi ii be cal led upon to cooperate in the development of their respective nuclear programs. As desirable as it may be, this transfer will encounter problems of all kinds. TO BEGIN WITH, POLITICAL PROBLEMS I shal I not dwell on this aspect, which does not fall within the scope of the Conference, except to emphasize the tremendous difficulties encountered by exporting nations in defining their own foreign nuclear policy, This led France to create a Conseil de Politique Nucleaire Exter.ieure (Foreign Nuclear Policy Council) in 1976, presided over by the President of the Republic, who, on 11 October, set forth in six points the conditions under which the Government felt it would conduct the foreign nuclear policy of France, As we know, this initiative was taken in an agitated international context, as the growing awareness of the various risks involved in the growth of nuclear energy has-become increasingly widespread so much so as to become electoral topics. The initiative was subsequently followed by other countries. Perhaps, to summarize the French position, it would be fitting to quote from the communique of 16 December which defined it. "France, loyal to its peaceful and humanitarian traditions, does not intend to contribute to the terrible

25

threat posed by pro I iferation of nuclear weapons" and "since nuclear energy represents, for a number of coi.mtries, an energy source which is competitive and necessary for their development, (our country) stands ready to contribute to the implementation of these peaceful applications, in line with the principles which it has defined". Human problems also arise. Having closely followed, for 22 years, the problems of adaptation of all types encountered by individuals, at all levels, to absorb into their language and speech their knowledge and their experience, it seems to me that this is the most difficult basic problem. Scientists, outstanding experts in their specialty and unfamiliar with other areas, only understood each other within a limited, impermeable circle, which is not sufficiently open to teaching and achievements which would have increased the knowledge of the country receiving them. Hence for example, the use of facilities sometimes purchased at high prices has proved a delicate matter, because technological assistance has ceased once the crates have passed customs, because no implementation program had been defined. I tend to feel that in this case both parties share responsibility for errors and wrongs, as industrialized countries train men of value who, in a European context, demonstrate their capacities and adapt to the effort of the country in which they pursue their studies or undergo training, but, once back home, in a completely different environment, show a tendency to lose their bearings.

In many cases, the industrialized country

should make sure of the fol low-up of the training dlspensed . Technicians of industrialized countries fail to realize that their achievements at home, the work of hand-picked teams acting in special psychological, geographic, climatic and industrial situations,

are

difficult to transpose to a completely different country without arduous preparation. Furthermore, the nuclear field is such a new advanced technique that when construction is involved, it is necessary for nuclear specialists to become industrialists and industrialists to become nuclear experts. In this context, Saclay technicians built the Mirabelle bubble chamber before transporting it to Serpukov to harness it to the large accelerator. France has to choose between assembling a CAS (Chaudiere Avancee Standard - Standard Advanced NSS System) in France for transportation to a country of destination, or, obviously, of erecting it on the spot. In both cases these CAS are derived from the CAP (Chaudiere Avancee Prototype - Advanced Prototype NSS System) built by Technicatome, which has been in operation at Cadarache for the past year. The Chantiers de 1 'Atlantique offer these items in various forms to countries interested in low and medium capacity power plants. Others are better qualified than me to elaborate on the difficulties which have to be overcome by industrialists and technicians to present a product, whether a resarch center or reactor, or a power plant, exportable, corresponding to the wishes and needs of the client, who is often inadequately informed of the ideal solution for his par-ticular economic and industrial econtext. This represents for the supplier an extremely supple imagination, which nuclear experts seem to me to have developed alongside the techniques themselves, and which enables them to offer a broad range of solutions, without drifting 26

into a perfectionism of which they were sometimes guilty in earlier days, but which sometimes, Incited them to intense realism when it became necessary to bui Id a laboratory or reactor thousands of kilometers away from France, in a completely different climate. However, above all, for industrialized countries, a dual problem of internal organization and permanent adaptation exists. To begin with, organization. We now clearly realize that it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a complete grasp over the nuclear field as it continues to grow. A decision which may have been trivial some years ago has become political, if only because public opinion becomes more sensitive, because the environment is playing a more important role, and, of course, because exports and transfers are growing by leaps and bounds. The day is past when powerful atomic commissions reporting to a Chief of State or a Minister who had his ear could implement, almost alone, rapidly growing research programs. Increasingly, nuclear power is an industry subject to the laws of a market in which other forms of energy are taken into account, so that it must be competitive. To reach the industrial stage, nuclear power required organizing in every country featuring an electricity production program. These countries have es tab I ished their uti I ity programs in full acknowledgement of the circumstances. The United States, for example, has separated the regulation functions from those of research and development, with nuclear research coming under an Energy Agency. In France, the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique has undergone profound modifications, giving rise to industrial subsidiaries like Cogema for the entire fuel cycle, and Technicatome for reactors. The CEA has acquired a share in the· capital of Framatome and Novatome, enabling it, among other aspects, to make its research potential available to the builders of large power plants, and to participate in the construction of large light water and fast neutron power plants. In France, the regulatory safety functions covering nuclear faci Ii ties have been separated from the research function. These developments did not occur without some rough passages, because they necessitated changes in habits and situations. Nevertheless, this has considerably clarified the situation in our country, and this is why you can witness the French trio presented here, the CEA, largely responsible for nuclear research and production - with some private industries - in the fuel cycle area, EDF the national utility, and Framatome the builder of large power plants (l l . A country wishing to launch a nuclear program wi 11 easily find In France the right door to knock on, whether pertaining to fuel, training of power plant operating personnel, equipment orders etc. At the same time he will be reassured

by the acquisition of holdings by research and production establishments in industrial companies involved in technology transfers. Thus the State is committed and has contracts performed within the framework of an overal I policy. In fact, this situation, briefly exposed here, conceals more complex interactions, but it is undoubtedly true that the French reorganization of two years ago has made it objectively more reliable for those dealing.with it from abroad, and also better organized and more amenable for those responsible for imp I ementation.

27

PERMANENT ADAPTATION

Faces change, replaced by younger persons born in the nuclear age, and who approach this age without fear, but with a resolute matter-of-factness.

(We now know for sure that

petroleum wi II be exhausted and that the sun wi 11 not provide a 11 the answers) . Managers and engineers organize the discoveries of scientists, because the building of dozens of power plants will require a structure completely different from that needed for a prototype. Thus, for example, while the Phenix prototype was built by a team grouping the CEA, EDF and industry, the new 1200 MWe Super Phenix power plant will be built by industry (especially Novatome) for Nersa, the Franco-Italian-German joint utility. Hence Eurodif, a company whose partners are public and private organizations involved in fuel research and production, will sell its product to electricians. This adaptation is simple when specialized industrialists need to be grouped in a specific field to satisfy a client interested in purchasing a reactor or a power plant. It is more complex when an industrialized country has to offer to supply a buyer with the means of deriving maximum use from nuclear centers, reactors and power plants supplied, so that the personnel can assimilate all the training dispensed for operations and maintenance, and also dispense training in their turn, which many of them will certainly do, and to sell tomorrow what they bought yesterday. And this is why the adaptation of which I speak must be mutual so that older ones can transmit their experience to younger ones. and for the latter, who will operate under different conditions from those prevailing in industrialized countries, can themselves conceive a technology adapted not only to the climate. but also to the individuals who implement the technology in their country. These are not the only problems encountered by industrialized countries in the transfer of nuclear technology. One can well imagine that when one arrives for the first time in a country with a weak nuclear personnel infrastructure, with limited financial resources, and whose electrical power network is constantly changing, a complete survey is necessary to enable this country to discuss intelligently those alternatives which will be the best for it, with foreign countries, some wishing to start by constructing or improving research facilities, others, more impatient, simultaneously wishing to build power plants. The history of nuclear technology transfers, whether pertaining to reactors or power plants, is not. indeed far from it, marked by successes alone, and I would be curious to know whether many power plant constructors have, like the group of constructors of French power plants of the time, earned a bonus for having completed the Vandellos power plant in Spain ahead of time. On the contrary, it is often deadlines and estimates which are lengthened. I observed the delivery of Vandellos and its fuel from beginning to end. It seems to me that this achievement was due in particular to the remarkable mutual understanding of the people involved, who revealed their capacities with the progress of negotiations, delivery and startup. And this is why I feel, after so many years devoted to the forging of relations between- different entities in the nuclear field, that problems in nuclear technology transfer are nothing but a daily opportunity to learn patience and trust: patience because those who 28

know often go too fast for those who wish to learn and repetition is necessary, because know-' how is transferred slower than techniques, and because the proper understanding of what one learns is a difficult art; trust, because without trust obstacles will continue to crop up in the nevertheless Ineluctable path of the growth of nuclear power production, and because, if mistrust prevails, countries which gradually develop a need to use these facilities will not use them as well as they might, and will use them later than they could, to the detriment of the I ife of their peoples,

(1) Two years ago EDF/CEA created a subsidiary. Sofratome (SO/SO holding), to perform the role of consultant to foreign clients.

29

RETRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

ALI SEKHAVAT Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Tehran Iran ABSTRACT

It

certainly is the desire of the participants of a Congress on the "Transfer of Nuclear

Technology", and perhaps the profound meaning and true spirit of the organization and accomplishment of such a congress, that the expositions correspond with reality. Therefore this paper is presented to direct attention once more to the value of the "Retransfer of Nuclear Technology in the Transfer of Nuclear Technology", i.e., its retransfer to the original owners in a more accomplished form. In their rivalry, the present proprietors should consider all the security factors and the higher scientific interests before setting up tough conditions and exorbitant prices for the transfer of nuclear technology. HISTORICAL REVIEW When we turn over the leaves of the history of nuclear technology, we might be tempted to claim that we have reached a point where we know to which personalities and to which nations we are indebted for this special branch of the sciences, this technology that has united us today and in this place to discuss the various aspects of its transfer. If we consider the fact that in the remote past investigators and inventors - either in solitary or in team work - laid the foundations for the principles, the subjects, and objects of modern nuclear technology;

or that recently scientific research centers and the

relevant governments have brought it to its actual state and made it widely public;

and

that, after its sale and transfer, they have regained it in an enriched form due to advanced development, is it then out-of-place to suppose that this gradually evolved technology does not stagnate after it has been sold and df str.lbuted, but that on the contrary experiences still further accomplishment due to the efforts of the scientists and the financial support of the importing countries, and that it will be returned to be utilized by the exporting and other countries in a more accomplisi'led form of higher value, which I call "retransfer of nuclear technology". REFLECTIONS OF THE RETRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY My intention in offering this paper is to put the question:

"What has been done to secure

the rights of those persons and countries that have played a special role and part in the retransfer of nuclear technology, and when and where, in which seminar, wi II discus-

30

slons be held on the fact and the values of the retransfer of nuclear technology ? " We all know that there were and are countries like Canada that once were importers, but today are exporters, of nuclear technology. This fact induces us to ask: What was the scientific and economic value of this technology at the time of its arrival in Canada, and how valuable is the retransfer of nuclear technology from Canada to other countries all over the world, as seen from the viewpoint of further development? Indeed, is Canada, importer of yesterday but exporter of today, aware of the values of the retransfer of her nuclear technology and of the eventuality that one day this technology might again be retransferred to Canada in: a more accompl I shed and more valuable form ? How does the world estimate the value of the role of the Indian people, in India and all over the world, and also of that people of other nations, in the retransfer of nuclear technology ? Are the exporting countries aware of the merits of the retransferring nations, and is there any hope that this aspect will influence the transfer of technology in such a manner that it may be managed at higher speed and lower prices ? . Relating to this, I would like to give some very primary examples for the transfer and retransfer of technology from my own native country, I ran, though doubtless much weightier ones could be listed from all over the world. In 1960, some gas detectors, together with the relative references, some radioactive sources, and measuring instruments, were imported to Iran. In 1964, an Iranian investigator studied and examined these detectors and the references, and in 1967, the new technique of the multi-anode gas detector was developed and retransferred to the original producers and exporters. Today, these multi-anode gas detectors are in use for military and non-military purposes in Iran, i.e., in a country which yesterday was in need of this technology. But they are also utilizecl by the prior exporter country. Furthermore, my native country Iran took advantage of the laser technique which was transferred to Iran under easy conditions. The return service was the laser seismograph.

In this altered form, the

laser technique was re-exported. Regarding this, I think that this Conference on the Transfer of r-tuclear Technology, which is being held on an international level in the historical city of Shiraz, should recall the history of the transfer of nuclear technology and consider the values of the steady development of this technology. and the interests and benefits that arise when it is offered to the world for retransfer in a more accomplished form. Such discussions might ensure the part and rights of the scientists, investigators, and countries that today are in urgent want of a nuclear technology which can be transferred without delay and at low prices. In consideration of the fact that it is most probable that in the near future these countries, which are now in want of this technology, will develop it by an impact of their time and money, and that they wi II retransfer it in a more valuable form to the transferring countries, we can easily see that these transferring countries - even if they exported nuclear technology under simple conditions and on a large scale - wi II profit from the retransfer of this same, but more accomplished, technology, a profit which can not be foreseen or precalculated. As an example may serve the fact that I.T.T. of the United States and 31

I. L .M. T. of France today derive greater benefit from the Geiger-Mueller multi-anode gas detector than the retransferring country Iran. In these days it has become obvious that, in the domain of that bone of contention, the "purchase and construction of nuclear power plants", the transferring countries demand exorbitant sums which they then use for further development and research work in this same field. Furthermore, techniques have been transferred which now no longer are up-to-date and must be replaced. Are the exporting countries really convinced that they are transferring the most perfect and up-to-date techniques, and do they admit that the importing countries will develop

them one day

?

I think it adequate to confirm this allegation to cite the example of the transfer of nuclear technology from the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China. Till 1966, China was in this field to a hundred per cent dependent on the Soviet Union. We all know, however, what a high stage of development the nuclear technology of China has reached today. Since the transfer of nuclear technology from the Soviet Union was stopped in 1966, it has proved that scientific progress is not only brought about by the concentration of a nation's potentialities on bringing forth highly qualified scientists who have modern and well-equipped laboratories, generous budgets, and ample credits at their disposal. History has shown that necessity is the mother of invention, and that a feeling of inferiority is developed if its yearning is not satisfied. Necessity, paired with this sense of lack, has filled the scientists and nations with so much strength and ardour that they have attained most significant achievements despite the fact that they had to start with practically empty hands and a minimum of qualified manpower, equipment, and budget. Here it seems suitable to trace the history of what we today call "mother of modern technology".

In doing so, we see that it has sprung and developed from very similar con-

ditions. The situation in the countries with the most advanced technologies is nowadays such that competition has already been replaced by rivalry.

In the production and use of

nuclear technology, however, rivalry wi II lead to the destruction of mankind. Let us then transfer the presently available technology without prejudice to each other. In this way we might perhaps reduce the dangerous competition which leads to destruction and suppression, and which has sprung up in the efforts for immediate access to nuclear technology, between the countries which own nuclear technology, on the one hand, and the countries which want it on the other hand. The scientific, economic and humanitarian findings from this transfer and retransfer of nuclear technology wi II promote the well-being and peace of mankind.

CONCLUSION With the well-being of mankind in mind, and as a scientist of a country in need of nuclear technology, and taking in consideration the fact that at present and in the future this might

32

be the wish of quite a large number of scientists all over the world, I duly appeal to the Chairman of this Committee to convey the contents of my speech to the Main Committee of this Conference. In consideration of the true values of the retransfer of nuclear technology, we should handle its transfer cheaply and quickly in order to stop the dangerous competition which at present exists due the monopoly of a few countries of this technology. With regard to the transfer of nuclear technology on a world-wide level, we should : - instead of being merchants interested only in our own profit - also be generous propagators of the development and transmission of nuclear science. Should the transfer of nuclear technology take place on a commercial basis, then we may hope that the tradesmen

wi II be just, far-sighted philanthropists and promotors of the

sciences. lnshallah ! !

33

PARAMETERS OF RADIATION TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

HAMID M, ROUSHDY

Atomic Energy Establishment Cairo Egypt ABSTRACT The presented paper reviews current status of the major processes of irradiation technology including radiotherapy. sterilization of medical products and biological tissues, inactivation of vaccine viruses. attenuation of infective parasitic stages, preservation of food, treatment of waste waters and sewage sludg_e, control of harmful insects, improvement of field crops, upgrading of industrial products as wet I as material testing and analysis. Moreover, the paper surveys the internationally developed industrial irradiators and correlates the design, plant capacity, capital and processing cost against the actual needs of developing .countries and available acquired experience, The paper drafts the policy for bui !ding up the infrastructure for radiation technology transfer in developing countries including radiation sources;

viz. gamma irradiators,

electron beam accelerators. and nuclear reactors, radiation protection measures, skilled personnel and oriented national planning. Finally, the paper reviews the policy set up in Egypt for the establishment of the National Center for Radiation Research and Technology in view of introducing irradiation techniques for various medical, agricultural and industrial applications. 1.

MODERN RADIATION TECHNOLOGY AND APPLICATIONS

Irradiation technology offers a fascinating outlet for developing countries for improving their conditions of medical care., upgrading of their natural materials, stimulating their industrial development, decreasing their food losses and increasing their crop production. These I ines would certainly contribute to their national economy and would result in an enhanced rate of development in connection with a measurable saving on the hard currency spent on the import of various finished products. 1. 1 Radiotherapy: The principle of this application is to deliver a lethal radiation dose to a tumour. The most highly developed use of radiation sources in therapy has been the large cobalt-60 source

34

in teletherapy machines. Cobalt-60 has highly penetrating radiation, a high output and a reasonably long half-life. The only other radioisotope widely used in teletherapy is cesium-137. Its main advantages are its longer half-life and modest shielding requirements in view of the lower energy emitted radiation. Technically however, it appears less suitable for treatment of deepseated cancers than cobalt-60. For treatment of skin conditions and superficially located tumours, a number of gamma and beta-emitting radiation sources are used e.g. cobalt-60, cesium-137, radium-226 as well as strontium-90 which is used in ophthalmic applicators. Later, high energy accelerators producing high energy-particles or X-radiation have been introduced in the practice of therapeutic radiology. These are either cyclic e.g. Cyclotrons and Betatrons or II near e.g. Van de Graaff and Linacs. During the last 20 years, high-energy electron accelerators together with the radioactive-isotopes cobalt-60 and cesium-137 teletherapy units have become standara equipment for medical practice gradually abandoning conventional X-ray machines;

energy

range 200 to 300 keV, for deep radiotherapy. Application of heavy-particle accelerators, e.g. protons, for medical therapy is still under evaluation. Furthermore, new considerations concerning the response of cancer cells to high linear energy transfer (LET) radiation has led to a renewed Interest in neutron therapy using fast neutron beams. Brachytherapy using small encapsulated gamma - and beta-emitting radioisotopes for interstitial, surface and intercavitary applications ensures delivery of a higher dose of radiation and forms a comp I imentary important technology to teletherapy. 0

1.2 Radiation Sterilization of Medical Products and Bi ological Tissues:

The use of ionizing radiation for sterilization of medical products and biological tissues is now a well established technology which is steadily replacing other sterilization techniques on grounds of convenience, economy and freedom from cross-contamination. Recently, large numbers of new types of medical products, of which many may only be sterilized by radiation, have been introduced to medical practice.

Presterilized medical disposables

have stimulated a drastic change in hospital design and planning. with less need for complex sterilization facilities. The extension of radiation sterilization technique to vari~us hospital supplies, pharmaceutical products, biological tissues, bone bank services, and other items seems quite feasible. Radiation sterilization of medical products has many advantages, particularly in developing countries with dense populations and greater incidence for cross infections. The process permits sterilization of medical products within their plastic packages which is not always possible with steam sterilization and does not suffer from the disadvantages of ethylene oxide sterilization.

35

Introduction of radiosterilization technique in developing countries would certainly stimulate the industrial development of the manufacture of single-use disposable medical products and marketing of sterilized items at a reasonably competitive price.

1. 3 Radiation rnactivation of Vaccine Viruses and Attenuation of Infective Parasitic Stages: Radiation inactivation of viruses serves in the preparation of killed vaccines which retain their antigenicity but lose their infective property. Existing methods of inactivating polio virus for example, by formalin seem to have run into troubles in the actual processing. The use of moderate thermal elevations together with gamma ray inactivation would yield a virus which is antigenically quite potent while at the same time not infectious. Lowering the viable bacterial counts in vaccine preparations through gamma irradiation offers another possibility for improving conditions for vaccine production. Vaccine production through radiation attenuation of certain parasitic stages has been demonstrated as an effective means of controlling certain of the helminthic parasitic diseases. Trials are made to stimulate immune reactions against the parasite using certain parasitic stages as sources of antigens. Modified antigens from sources related to the parasite can be obtained through radiation induced molecular changes in the protein molecules affecting antigenic modification. 1. 4 Radiation Preservation of Food: Food production in developing countries suffers an annual loss of about 30 per cent due to hot climate and unavailability of refrigeration capacities. Conventional methods of food preservation have obvious limitations in view of loss of flavour and freshness associated with canning, the expensive equipment needed for refrigeration and freezing and the steadily rising opposition of public opinion to food additives. The use of ionizing radiation offers a fresh approach to this problem when supplementing existing methods. Commercial advantages arising from the use of this technique in extension of storage life of fruits, vegetables and fish would include reduction of spoilage losses and accessibility of distant markets .. Radiation treatment of potatoes, onions and garlic for sprout inhibition would ensure year-round availability of good quality products. Radiation control of insects in stored grains, flour, cotton and tobacco offers technical advantaqe over fumigation in view of the penetrating power of radiation and the lack of introduction of toxic agents. Food irradiation technology ensures moreover, destruction of parasites e.g. tapeworm in beef meat, destruction of food-poisoning micro-organisms e.g. Salmonella in egg products, and elimination of health hazards as in hairs and wool processing. Radiation sterilization of animal feeds ensures elimination of pathogenic micro-organisms, thus providing better conditions for animal husbandry and hygienic maintenance of experimental germ-free laboratory animals. 36

1. S Control· of Harmful Insects: The importance of·effective measures for insect control and eradication becomes obvious to minimize losses caused by spreading disease to animals and man and infestation and destruction of food crops and stores of al I kind. The method of insect sterilization involves the breeding of the male flies, their sterilization with radiation and their release. After mating with normal females, no off-spring are produced. 1. 6 Improvement of Field Crops: By irradiation of seeds, or of growing plants, it is possible to accelerate more than one thousand fold the rate of production of a wide spectrum of genetic changes in many varieties of agricultural and ornamental plants. From the new varieties produced, most of which will contain undesirable characters, the geneticists must patiently select and breed those which exhibit useful changes e.g. disease-resistance, yield, time of maturity, ease of harvesting ... etc. Measurable growth promotion and better yield can also be obtained through low-dose irradiation of seeds before plantation and cultivation.

1. 7 Radiation Treatment of Waste Waters and Sewage Sludge: Increasing interest can be noted in the use of ionizing radiation in the treatment of waste waters for desinfection, changes in colloidal properties, such as settling rate, filterability of sludges, oxidation of organic substances and changes in biodegradability. Both continuous high dose rate irradiation from electron linear accelerators and gamma irradiation from radioactive isotope sources have been used. 1.B lndlist°rial Radialion Processing:

Irradiation technology has contributed to the manufacturing industries for new product developments. In the plastics industry, different radiation chemistry techniques are used to modify the properties of plastics:

Polymerization which affects the joining together of single mole-

cules (monomers) to form long chain molecules, e.g. ethylene to polyethylene, styrene to polystyrene, acrylamide to polyacryiamide, vinyl acetate to polyvinyl acetate ... etc. Cross-linking of plastic films and their objects to improve their physical properties;

viz.

higher mechanical strength, higher softening temperature, lower solubility in organic solvents .. etc. e.g. cross-I inking of polyethylene. Graft co-polymerization by grafting a monomer onto the surface of a polymer for modification of its specific properties;

viz. resis-

37

tance to or affinity for water or organic materials, static charging .. etc. Degradation of polymers: high doses of radiation can induce discoloration of many plastics, which become brittle and may even crumble to a powder. In the textile industry, graft co-polymerization can radically change important properties of textiles such as dyebility, moisture resistance, luster, soil-release, Inflammability, crease-resistance .. etc. by grafting suitable monomers onto the fibre. With polymers such as nylon, teflon, dacron .. etc. radiation grafting may be the most effective method for modification of their properties. In the wood industry, radiation-cured wood-plastic combinations could be developed with modified technological properties for special floorings, window frames and other outdoor applications and certain highly specialized wood-products. In the rubber industry, ionizing radiation is used for rubber vulcanization resulting in better durability properties of rubber tires and objects. in the petroleum industry, studies are being carried out to determine whether radiation processing could be of advantage in such processes as cracking of hydrocarbons i.e. the conversion of higher boiling fractions of petroleum to more valuable products, improvement of catalysts, evaluation of radiation-resistant lubricants .. etc. In chemical industries, ionizing radiation provides an additional technique for initiation or speeding up of chemical reactions. Radiation syntheses, in general, are more advantageous in reactions which take place exothermically in which the yleld is likely to be increased if the reaction Is carried out at a lower temperature, as radiolysis does not introduce appreciable heating effects, e.g. chlorination of benzene to form benzene hexachloride as insecticide, "sulphur+chlor lnation of cyclo-hexane, production of phenols by oxidation of benzene, irradiation of silicons to form lubricants .. etc.

1.9 Irradiation Technology for Material Testing and Analysis: 1. 9. 1

Non-destructive testing:

With the increasingly rigid requirements of modern industry in ship-building, nuclear reactors, aircraft and rockets, there is growing demand for the rigid inspection of weldings, castings and fabricated products of all kinds. By the process of radiography and radiometry, radiation sources have proved to be particularly valuable for non-destructive testing·. The radiograph gives a permanent picture of the internal structure of the object under examination so that the smallest flaw can be detected under given conditions. Radioisotopes offer a simple and economical approach to non-destructive testing. Cobalt-60 and lridium-192 cover the entire range of steel and heavy alloy thickness (5-200 mm) normally encountered in indutrial radiography.

38

1.t.2

Neutron activation analysis:

Neutron activation analysis has proved a very efficient method of wide applications in industry, agriculture, and medicine including medical and dental studies, veterinary, public health and forensic science. The method proved to be competitive with other important trace-analysis techniques as X-ray fluorescence analysis, atomic absorption and flame emission spectrometry. Nuclear activation techniques of analysis are highly sensitive to many elements of the periodic table and are relatively free from interference by bulk elements in the samples as well as from contamination problems. These are obviously important considerations when elements are being studied at concentrations of parts per million or less. Gamma-ray spectrometry is almost invariably used in non-destructive activation analysis.

Na I (Tl) spectrometry provides high sensitivity but rather poor resolution.

Ge (Li) spectrometry requires considerably more sophisticated equipment and knowledge, but has extremely high resolution, thus making possible many simultaneous determinations. 2.

INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RADIATION TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

2 .1 Radiation Sources: The internationally gained experience in irradiation technology developed different sorts of irradiators. Gamma facilities, electron beam accelerators and nuclear reactors are major radiation sources complementary to each other. The choice of the source for a potential application, particularly for developing countries, should be based on the demand for the process, compromise between desirability and cost and quantitative data on Installation, operation and maintenance costs and conditions. 2 .1 .1

Gamma irradiators:

From an economic point of view. big radiation sources to be installed in developing countries should perform central irradiation services. The centralization of such facilities ensures more utilization of continuously decaying sources, less capital investment required and less auxiliary control units needed for dosimetry, mocrobiological sterility testing, material testing, radiation protection, radiation engineering and R & D laboratories. For industrial gamma irradiators, since the biological shield constitutes the main capital Investment, It is not recommended, particularly for developing countries, to build up a demonstration irradiation facility followed a few years later by another full productlon plant. It would be more economical to build up a full scale biological shield for megacurie capacity, to be initially loaded with moderate source activity, e.g. 100 - 400 kilo-

39

curies, which can be progressively Increased towards full scale production according to actual need. Furthermore, it is desirable for an industrial irradiator, particularly in developing countries, to be used as a multipurpose processing facility in order to justify more significantly the large investment required for its setting up(l) Besides the principal conveyor used for sterilization.of medical products, another auxiliary conveyor system can be installed for use in connection with other sorts of applications and R authorities,

&

D programs. In order to meet the requirements of the regulatory health

to eliminate risk of biological cross-contamination and not to interfere with

the 24-hours daily sterilization processing, the auxiliary conveyor can be run independently in a special area separated from the sterilization area to which the access should be str lctly controlled. Upon the request of Egypt's National Center for Radiation Research and Technology, this design has been implemented by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL). This should be,at present, a compromise on the installation of independent fullscale food irradiators for example which cannot now be fully utilized since challenging research and economic problems in this field should be first solved before commercialization. In developing countries, radiography service should be available at a central body for special jobs requiring the use of specialized equipment and techniques. Cobalt-GO and iridium-192 gamma radiography cameras are easy to operate and cheaper in investment. and maintenance than industrial X-ray machines.

In developing countries, national

or regional policies for local production of short-lived radiography sources as iridium 192, should be maintained in order to realize measurable saving of effort and hard currency spent on their import and the unavoidable losses due to radioactive decay during shipment. Cobalt-GO and cesium-137 gamma teletherapy machines should have a well-planned geographical distribution over the country.

In developing countries, it is recommended that

such facilities should be linked to a central body of service and training, planning on a national level, as well as for formulating the pol icy for regeneration of decayed radiation sources. As to cobalt-GO sources, only a few producers supply the international market with the required sources in various types and sizes. Since the source specifications are not standardized, it is not possible for users to substitute any of these sources in their own particular machines by other available sources. Particularly for developing countries, there is a real need to convince the few big world producers of radiation sources to standardize the outside dlmenslons of the source capsules, at least for sources used in teletherapy and radiography machines. The IAEA Is invited to undertake efforts along this line aiming at surveying existing supplies and recommending certain standard specifications which would be a step forward towards ultimate standardization.

40

Nevertheless, developing countries should formulate their own policy involving knowing the size, shape, specific activity and safety features of their radiation sources. This should be integrated with plans for producing their own sources to the specifications required. For implementation of such a goal, regional co-operation projects should be supported by developing countries making best of use of their available nuclear reactors and through installation of regional high radioactivity hot cells. Further support, technical and financial, along this trend should be expected from international bodies. 2 .1. 2

Electron beam accelerators:

The appropriate choice of an electron-beam accelerator applicable to certain irradiation processing in developing countries should be a compromise between desirability and cost. Cost factors should be analyzed and quantitative data should be obtained on capital, installation, operating and maintenance costs of various machines before deciding on type and size of the source. The selection of an electron beam accelerator should ensure that such a highly technical and expensive device satisfies the requirements of more than one kind of appl icatlon. Medical electron accelerators e.g. Linacs, should only be introduced in developing countries In hospitals or clinics where radiotherapists and physicists have acquired enough experience with gamma teletherapy machines and got training on electron and highenergy X-ray therapy. Introduction of industrial electron beam accelerator technology to developing countries ·should proceed first on a demonstration scale and the very machine should be furnished with more than one type of conveyor in order to serve more than one type of processlngs. ~!though the bulk of industrial applications of electron beam accelerators are in thin film materials, of which a voltage of 500 keV would be adequate, yet in order to be able to run the process on thicker articles such as cable insulation and thicker plastic objects, an electron beam accelerator of 1. 5 to 3 MeV is recommended. Nevertheless, it should be expected that such a machine will not be efficient for all technological purposes. It is believed that once the process is demonstrated and accepted by the industry, there will be a need for other machines to be installed at various sites of applications, since industrial products cannot be brought to such an accelerator machine to take place on a continuous line as in case of the textile, fibre and cable industries. Use of electron beam accelerators for radiographic inspection of metal works has proved to be successful and easy to operate and maintain.

2 .1.3

Nuclear reactors:

Research reactors cont-lnue to serve as Important sources of neutron and gamma radiation

41

that are useful for experimentation in many fields. Neutron irradiation, In particular, constitutes a powerful

experimental tool of wide scope with applications in such diverse

fields of fundamental and applied research as physics, chemistry, life sciences, engineering and materials technology. Advances in instrumentation, automatic data analysis and other new equipment are enhancing the scope of reactor radiation applications and the development of irradiation techniques. Since many of the radionuclides are very shortlived, and in order to achieve shorter time of flight, a fast pneumatic rabbit system is to be bui It and inserted into the reactor. 2. 2 Irradiation Processing: In the field of radiotherapy, developing countries should place special emphasis on the irradiation response of their particular common tumours. Urinary bladder cancer for example, as a bilharzia! complication in Egyp~shows unsatisfactory response to gamma ray therapy. This type of tumour awaits investigation for better treatment using accelerated electron beams. In the field of radiation sterilization of medical products and biological tissues, cost versus benefit studies should take into consideration the actual production cost of sterilized disposables versus the considerable saving on cross infection, hospitalization and various antibiotics. Such saving is in view of the measurable reduction in cross bacterial and viral infections particularly encountered during bulk vaccination. Furthermore, the national gain from the introduction of the latest practices in the disposable devices industry should also be taken into account. For successful application of radiation sterilization method, great efforts should be made, particularly in developing countries, in order to solve the problems connected with the production of medical devices under poor hygienic factory conditions.

It is known

that equipment containing a high number of micro-organisms offers problems with regard to sterilization, pyrogenicity and toxicity. Official regulations for the manufacture of disposables should be formulated in developing countries ensuring that medical equipment is produced under hygienic conditions and subject to the survey and responsibility of competent specialists. Special products might in some cases justify special approval in spite of high contamination levels prior to irradiation, but an Increase of the microbiological efficiency of the sterilization procedure by increasing the radiation dose should in ordinary cases not serve as a measure of compensation for poor hygienic conditions at the production premises 121 However, under the production conditions prevailing in developing countries, we should not expect products of fairly low basic contamination.

In order to avoid signifi-

cant increasing of the required sterl ization radiation dose which would affect the material Itself, efforts should be made to investigate possibilities of radlosensltization of contamtna42

ting microbial organisms and to benefit from the synergistic effect of radiation with other

factors e.g. heat, in order to attain perfect sterility using a reasonable level of radiation dose;

e.g. 2.5 Mrads.

In the field of radiation preservation of food, developing countries should be aware of the problems underlying legislation of irradiated food for international trade. Wholesomeness studies require years to be accomplished; the economic picture, challenging research and technical problems are still to be solved. However, developing countries with more pressing food problems of losses and shortage should have their own policy towards new technology of radiation preservation of food independent of trends of advanced countries with sophisticated refrigerating faci titles. Nevertheless, wholesomeness studies on irradiated food carried out in developing countries who are suffering protein calorie malnutrition should take into consideration the nutritional status of the community as an important parameter in the evaluation of the safety of such kinds of food. However, the stage has now been reached where government approval of radiation processing in many countries has been issued for specific and individual foods. national legislation is still under consideration;

Inter-

yet an attractive future can be foreseen

in this area of radiation technology. Destruction of insects in stored products is of particular interest to developing countries where grain can be stored in some areas for long periods of time subjected to losses, even with the use of chemical fumigation, as high as 30-50 per cent per year.

Irradiation

would kill both. insects and their eggs, and if the grain were irradiated in insect-proof containers, the stored grain would remain insect-free Indefinitely. As for radiation genetics, It should be borne In mind that the production of Improved varieties of agricultural and ornamental plants requires many years of deliberate breeding and selection. In developing countries, more attention should be given to radiation induced growth promotion in field crops which could result in a better yield in a I imlted period of time. For treatment of waste waters and sewage sludge, although Irradiation does produce marked and potentially useful effects in certain cases, the process has not yet been proved economically feasible. Further work along this line is still proceeding and a number of pilot plants have been recently installed in certain developed countries and subjected to evaluation. Developing countries should not consider transfering such a technology before It has been proved economic. Chemical industries are progressively recognizing the usefulness of high-energy Ionizing radiation for Initiating chemical synthesis and polymerization reactions. Radiation processing, along with other technological improvements, has already shown significant economic benefits in such fields as the production of composite materials, surface coatings, modification of textiles and the processing of plastic. In such applications as surface coating, modification of plastics and textiles which

43

require large radiation doses in a very short interval of time, cobalt-60 gamma irradiation is not adequate because of its ltmltatlons on dose rate and inefficiency of irradiating thin sheet materials in a continuous manner. Thus, for such applications, electron-beam accelerators are used. The problem of improving the poor crease-recovery and slow drying characteristics of natural cotton through electron beam processing is of particular interest to the economy of cotton-producing countries since the development of wash and wear clothing, based on synthetic fibres, has taken over a considerable part of cotton's share in the textile mar-

ket. Wood-plastic-composite has proved to be durable and abrasion-resistant. The feasibility of using this technology in upgrading wooden bobbins and shuttles used in textile mills and in preserving historical wooden fine arts does attract particular Interest in certain developing cou,ntries. Plastic concrete and its application in pipings resistant to corrosive effects of natural gases and in solid containers for radioactive wastes disposal from nuclear power plants and other nuclear installations.

2.3 Radiation Protection Measures: In connection with the international increase in the uses of irradiation technology, questions of protection of human population against occupational and medical exposure to ionizing radiation are acquiring great importance. Accordingly, an internationally agreed maximum permissible dose for occupational exposure has been drawn up.

In the last

decades, through the development of modern sophisticated research tools and techniques, the permissible radiat_ion dose level has been progressively reduced as more information has become available on the biological effects of radiation. However, such levels have been drawn up based mainly on biological standards common to developed communities enjoying good health and high nutritional status. Recent radiobiological investigations have proved that protein nutritional.status of the irradiated host influences the magnitude of organ damage and rate of their recovery (3} In accordance with the increasing trends of radiation technology transfer to developing countries suffering protein-calorie malnutrition and endemic parasitic Infestations encountering detectable haet'natological disorders, it seems, therefore, of extreme importance to reconsider the maximum radiation dose levels permissible for medical and occupational exposure in developing countries in order to assure adequate protection measures. National health authorities, in collaboration with WHO and IAEA are invited to undertake an active role along this line 2.4 Skilled Personnel: Before transfering radiation technology, developing countries have to set up the pr Incl44

pies for creating self-sustained scientific and technical schools with competent specia-

lists covering different disciplines of radiation research and technology. Special emphasis should be placed on certain specific fields of special interest to a particular country. The work should be conducted in collaboration with specialists from industrial, medical and agricultural fields.

Training fellowships offered by UNDP and IAEA as well

as bilateral technical agreements with developed countries would contribute significantly to building the infrastructure for the transfer and adaptation of radiation technology in developing countries. Undergraduate as well as post-graduate teaching courses should be conducted at the university faculties and technical schools covering different disciplines of radiation research and technology and dealing with irradiation processing, operation and maintenance of irradiation facilities as well as radiation protection and safety measures. An advanced training course in industrial isotope radiography should be draw_n to meet the needs of professionals and those engaged in the development of techniques for non-routine applications.

2. S Nationa I Planning:

The formulation of a supreme counci I for radiation research and technology membered by specialists from the industrial bodies, concerned ministries, research institutes and uni-, versities is highly recommended, This council advises on planning policy In irradiation technology, to ensure co-ordination and to build infrastructure among various organizations. Under the conditions of developing countries, and in order to avoid the risk of dispersion of efforts and resources that may slow down the national gain from the introduction of such a technology, the counci I should concentrate on definite specific problems related to national development.

When the sufficient man-power and resources become available

to support desired expansion, national planning would embody other disciplines which may be ·gradually added having direct implication on the actual needs of the country.

3.

EGYPT'S NATIONAL CENTER FOR RADIATION RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY (NCRRT)

3.1 Historical:

For the last decade, Egypt has been setting up the principles for creating trained manpower needed to undertake different disciplines of radiation research and technology.

In

parallel, post-and under-graduate university courses have been introduced to different Egyptian universities covering different topics along this line. In 1972, when the Egyptian Government decided to establish the NCRRT, a Supreme Council for Radiation Research and Technology was formulated by the Academy of

45

Scientific Research and Technology membered by specialists from concerned research Institutes, universities, ministries as well as medical, industrial and agricultural organizations. In 1973, Egypt started its Country Programme NCRRT supported by the national Atomic Energy Establishment, Academy of Scientific Research and Technology and Ministry of Public Health. Effective collaboration is being established with all appropriate industries. The Center has been planned to operate as an autonomous body.reporting to the Atomic Energy Establishment through a Governing Council membered by representatives from concerned organizations. Since 1975, the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology has been financing 19 research projects in different fields of radiation research and technology;

4 in the field

of radiosterilization of medical appliances, 3 in the field of food preservation and evaluation, 4 in the field of insect control, 3 in the field of improvement of certain field crops, 3 in the field of cross-linking, grafting and polymerization of plastics, textiles, rubber. wood and concrete, and 2 in the field of irradiation processing and control. The total expenditure on these research projects during the years 1975 and 1976 was 368,131 Egyptian pounds, Including the equivalent of 202,382 pounds in hard currency. To establish the center, the Government of Egypt allocated, during the period 19731976, a budget of 2,897,000 Egyptian pounds including the equivalent of 934,000 pounds in hard for~ign currency. This does not include personnel monthly allowances and the estimated price of the project's site of 1 million pounds. In 1975, the United Nations Development Program contributed to the project by 730,900 US dollars during the period 1975-1977 in the form of consultants, training and equipment component. The International Atomic Energy Agency is acting as the Executing Agency. It has been agreed that the project will be reviewed towards the end of that period in order to decide further UNDP assistance in the next Country Program. Interchange of experience and personnel in the field of radiation research and technology has"been considered through bilateral agreements with Hungary 1972, Denmark 1973 and 1976, Italy 1973 and 1976, India 1976, and Federal Republic of Germany 1976. During 1976, discussions were carried out on possibilities of co-operation with Japan Takasaki Radiation Chemistry Institute, USA North Carolina State University and Canada CIDA. In January 1977, the center was nominated for membership of the European International Association of Industrial lrradiators A. I. I. I. 3."2 Framework of the Center's Organization The project occupies a site of 86000 square meters in Madinet Nasr on the outskirts of Cairo City. The Center is organized in five main divisions: 3.2.1

Division of irradiation facilities:

including:

Industrial cobalt-60 lrradiator, 1 megacurie capacity.

46

Electron-beam Accelerator, 1. S MeV, current 25 mA. with processing system for industrial services. Gamma Cell 220 for acute experimental irradiation. Gamma Cell 40 of cesium-137 for biological irradiation. Gamma radiography cameras for non-destructive testing. Mobile Gamma irradiator of cesium-137 with mechanical processing system. Wood polymerization plant of cobalt-60. Grain lrradiator of cobalt-60. Cobalt-60 and cesium-137 teletherapy rotatory machines. Clinical linear accelerator Linac, 10 MeV. Encapsulated Gamma and Beta smal I sources for brachytherapy. Medium energy nuclear reactor furnished with rabbit system, Li (Ge) detector and multichannel analyzer for neutron activation analysis. 3. 2. 2

Division of pl lot plants:

This includes pilot plants for textile modification, plastic and electric wires cross-linking, rubber vulcanization, wood-plastic-composites, seed and grain desinfestation, food preservation, insect mass rearing and sterilization, radiation polymerization and plastic disposables production I Ines. 3.2.3

Division of R & D: This includes:

-Department of biology and Medicine:

Comprising the following laboratories:

Radiation

Microbiology, Histopathology, Immunology, Parasitology, Haematology, Clinical Pathology, Physiological Chemistry, Neurophysiology, Pharmacology, Tissue and Organ Culture, Cytology and Cytogenetics, Embryology, Biochemistry, Biological Dosimetry, Tracer Techniques and Treatment of Radiation Exposure Accidents. -Department of Food and Agriculture:

Comprising the fol lowing laboratories:

Food Technology, Food Chemistry, Nutrition, Wholesomeness, Entomology, Plant Physiology, Pl.ant Pathology. and Plant Genetics. -Department of Radiation Chemistry:

Comprising the following laboratories:

Radiation Polymerization, Cross-Linking, Surface Coating, Chemical Radiation Dosimetry, Pharmaceutical Chemistry, and Radiation Synthesis. -Department of Radiation Physics and Engineering:

Comprising the following

laboratories: Solid State Physics, Radiation Dosimetry, Health Physics, Control of Radiation Processing. 3.2.4

Division of Technological Services:

This Includes Micro-analytical services, Material testing, Radiography, Radiation proces47

sing, Radiation Monitoring and Protection, Operation and Maintenance of Radiation Facilities, Medical Services, Animal House, lnsectary. 3. 2. 5

Division of Ancillary Services:

This includes Workshops;

mechanical, electrical and electronic, Documentation, Central

Stores, Transportation, Conference Hall and Restaurant. The project will be executed over two Five-Year plans 1973-77 and 1978-82. About 60 per cent of the whole project has been implemented during the first Five-Year Plan. REFERENCES 1)

Roushdy, H .M., "Prospects for Radiation Sterilization of Medical Products in Egypt"

2)

Christensen, E.A., Holm, N.W. and Juul, F.A., "Radiosterilization of Medical Devi-

IAEA Publications, Proc. IAEA/SM-192/79, Bombay 1974, 477-491. ces and Supplies" IAEA Publications, Proc. IAEA/SM-92/22, Budapest, June 1967, 265-283. 3)

Ashry, M., and Roushdy, H. M., "Haematopoeitic Response to the Interaction between Protein Malnutrition and Gamma Irradiation", Isotope and Radiatioh Research, under pub I ication. 1977.

48

A RECIPIENT VIEW OF RATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

YAH/A M. EL-SAYED

and SADDIK K. SHAKSHOOK/

EI-Fateh University Tripoli Libya

ABSTRACT From a recipient viewpoint, it may be wise to limit the transfer of an advanced technology such as nuclear technology to techniques of research and development at the frontiers of knowledge under the support and the integration of international organizations. Advanced technology embedded in projects for products and services should be assessed mainly on an economic basis. A cost-assurance evaluation methodology to assess alternative projects based on different technologies is proposed. An example of power generation by nuclear-fueled plants and by oil-fired plants Is given. 1.

INTRODUCTION

It was rather unfortunate that direct large-scale importation of advanced technology to developing countries in the form of industries and products proved often to be

a

harm

rather than a benefit (l-J). A developing country being motivated by the technological gap overexpanded irrationally while donors from industrial countries overlooked the importance of integration of their supplies with the socio-technical structure of the recipient country. The result was therefore the overloading of the structure by costly investment and little effectiveness to development. Investigators probing into the process of technology transfer took positions at two extr~mes. At one extreme labor-intensive smal I-scale industries were recommended (l, 2) such as small scale bio-gas fertilizer plants, village scale iron foundries, 10 kW power from low head water falls, ox-driven earth movers, and family scale solar stills. At the other extreme (S,9) capital-intensive large scale centralized complexes were recommended such as a nuclear power/water complex, an agro-industrial complex and an animal production complex. In between these two extremes very few ideas were proposed. One interesting example (lO) is a lighter-than-air craft 12% the cost of a Jumbo-jet capable of transporting crops and minerals from places lacking roads. Those in favor of labor-intensive projects emphasize the limitations of the country's Infra-structure and claim the advantages of self-reliance and increased number of jobs for the masses of people rather than a limited labor in urban areas.

In reference (6) it is

ctaimed that the ratio of income control led by the top 20% to the bottom 20% reached S: 1 with 100% to 200% improvement in the income of the poorest 20% over 20 years in the countries which have favored labor-Intensive projects compared with a ratio of 25: 1 and negli-

49

giole improvement in the countries which have favored capital-intensive projects. Those in favor of capital-intensive complexes emphasize the control of energy use. effluent re-use and waste disposal and the effectiveness of raising the standard of living by increased productivity, rise in per-capita income, and the availability of high quality safe products. Obviously neither the capital-intensive approach nor the labor-intensive approach can be completely rejected and the appropriate technology becomes mainly a problem of the best choice under a set of circumstances. The availability of options between these two extremes may be highly desirable for more flexible choices or in other words for more variety in technique buying and selling. A great deal of advanced technology transfer ineffectiveness in a developing country is believed to be due to the fol lowing: 1)

The limited technological options available at two extremes of what should be a spectrum of options.

2)

The mixing of the objectives of technology development with those of development by

3)

The inadequate criteria of the formulation or of the choice of projects and their embed-

technology. ded technologies. 4)

The underestimation of both cost and time of man-power preparation. Either cost or time can be prohibitive. In this paper an attempt is made to rationalize technology transfer in terms of objec-

tives and in terms of criteria of choice as viewed from a developing floor. 2.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TERMS OF OBJECTIVES

There are at least two main objectives for technology transfer: i)

To help develop a new technolgoy.

ii)

To satisfy a need for a product or a service.

A mixing of the two objectives has often been made by developing countries while it is preferable to make a clear distinction between these two objectives since the means are different. For the first objective, maximum creativity for a given investment is sought and the means are research and development on the laboratory scale. At present the prevailing size of technology in many developing countries, the al located budget, and the avai I able manpower do not support fruitful and creative research. The result is stagnation or brain drain. More budget allocation for research by developing countries and more support by developed countries for the transfer of research techniques and faci I ities are needed. Perhaps, the establishing of an international creativity agency to act as an initiator and a coordinator of joint venture research centers, may help create successful research centers in developing countries. This in turn may give a chance to a developing country to contribute to future technologies and to share the solutions to wise use of resources, the harmony

50

with nature and the chances of meaningful employment which have been violated by the

present state of technology. For the second objective minimum cost per unit product or service is sought and the means is production on either a small or a large scale. Since a product or a service may be achieved by more than one technology, the choice of the appropriate technology becomes of vital importance. A simple methodology for assessing alternative projects embedding different technologies is now proposed. The .methodology is a cost-assurance evaluation meant as an aid to decision making. 3.

COST-ASSURANCE EVALUATION

3. 1 Methodology The evaluation is basically economic and the formulation is a modified formulation of the 5 cost-effectiveness evaluation of military projects ( ). The cost coordinate is a coordinate of deductive logic in which relatively deterministic factors are included in terms of cost. Equipment, transport, construction, manpower, energy, materials, training, supporting facilities, ... constitute the total production cost on the cost coordinate. The assurance coordinate is a coordinate of inductive logic in which probability factors are included in terms of uprating and derating coefficients of a target return.

Utility, avaiiabi lity, safety,

... are considered on this coordinate. Total production cost= CP = s l: I+ 0 + E - S

(1)

where I, 0 and E are respectively the total incurred time dependent costs of investment, operation and enforcement summed over suitable subsystems.

Each of these costs consists

of materials, labor and capital. Enforcements include such items as training and supporting facilities. Sis the scrap value. (2)

Target return = CR = p l: CQ

where C is a unit product value and Q is the quantity of a product and the sum is over al I products. Assurance = A = (CR/Cpl. Us.Ut.Du.Da.Ds where Us and Ut are uprating coefficient

(3)

>1 augmenting economic return by induced so-

cial and technical benefits respectively. Du, "Da, Ds are respectively utility, availability and safety derating coefficients each

rograms, the industrial design process, and the design of work methods. Nor are the lengths of the lines proportional to the time duration of the operations. The process is based on the idea that a plant is a total system in which hardware, manpower and software are closely linked. 4.

CONCLUSION

The SOMAIR experience, like a number .of other experiences EUREQUIP has in various developing countries and various types of industries, shows that the "T" method provides a good framework for the implementation of technology transfers. This method stresses a practical way to take into account the constant links existing between men, organization and training. It provides an approach to finding the best adapted solution which must be found in every case. For, if slavish imitation cannot be a real solution, neither can the traditional patterns. So, the success of Technology Transfers wi 11 always largely depend on the creativity of launching teams.

139

POLICIES OF WASTE MANAGEMENT, RADIATION PROTECTION, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND THEIR FUEL CYCLE

M. M. MAHFOUZ Chairman, Radiation Technology & Research Council Center of Radiotherapy & Nuclear Medicine Caira University Egypt

H. M. ROUSHDY Director, National Center for Radiation Research & Technology Egypt

M. A. AYAD Notional Center for Radiation Research & Technology Egypt

E. M. A. HASSAN Nuclear Power Division Atomic Energy Establishment Egypt

ABSTRACT Radiation protection and safety of nuclear power plants and their fuel cycle create public health problems of rapidly expanding magnitude.

The impact of such nuclear plants on the

socio-cultural and socio-political life in different countries has attracted public opinion arguments.

Accordingly, rigid safety control and high standards of radiation protection

are to be maintained. · Continuous reduction in the maximum permissible I imits of radiation exposure during the last five decades para I leis tremendous increases in the cost of appropriate radiation protection measures. A nationwide integrated radiation monitoring network besides controlling occupational exposure would convince public opinion scientifically that environmental radioactivity is kept below the accepted levels. Emphasis is placed on the development of the manpower resources needed in different disciplines of nuclear technology. National state legislations should take into consideration the personality merits of the concerned society as well as future development of nuclear energy programs. To ensure the success of nuclear power technology transfer to developing countries,

140

developed countries and international bodies should exert great efforts to extend scientific and technical aids.

1.

INTRODUCTION

The radiation hazards and effects of potential sources of contamination through gaseous, liquid and solid radioactive release as well as thermal pollution and its possible adverse environmental efforts on the ecology and aquatic community are factors to be considered when nuclear energy programs are implemented.

2.

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LOCATION

With the widespread use of nuclear power for electricity generation, great attention has to be paid to its environmental impact.

The main source of impact results from the siting

and construction of nuclear power plants and other nuclear activities of the uranium fuel cycle. It is known that problems inherent in the nuclear industry may effect the safety, health and well being of the population as well as of the environment.

It seems therefore necessary

to evaluate positive output and long range radiation hazards e.g. air and thermal pollution on human life, plant, animal and natural resources.

Such hazards must be examined from

both present and anticipated future effects on man's environment. The recent great concern shown about the environment quality, and protection, has emphasized that technical measures taken to alleviate the detrimental impact of nuclear energy on the environment must not be viewed in isolation.

Social, psychological, econo-

mic and legal factors are essential ingredients of man's environment.

This calls for the deve-

lopment of a simple conceptual model to show the different components in the whole environment which is defined here for convenience as man's environment, and the inter-relationship between them, in order to enable decision makers to test and evaluate the impact of plant location and construction on the environment.

3.

MAN'S ENVIRONMENT

Within a broader concept, the approach to define man's environment, in which one lives, learns, works, communicates and takes leisure, is a reflection of three main influences or components.

These are, the natural form, the built form and human needs; Fig. (1).

This shows man's environment in an analysis diagram, the arrows indicating the dynamic inter-relationship of those components. nature and natural characteristics.

The natural form is used here to refer broadly to

The built form is used to refer broadly to man-made

form while human needs refer to food, clothing, shelter, interaction and communication. The natural form is usually more or less fixed but may be modified by the built form. In the meantime the built form is influenced by human needs as well as the natural form.

141

HUMAN NEEDS

THE NATURAL FORM

THE BUILT FORM

Food, clothing & shelter.

Sea, river, lake, canal.

Engineering

Interaction & communication.

Land, forest, desert & valley.

Architecture

Energy & Services.

Mountain, hi 11, ... etc.

Planning

Health, safety & security.

Physical characteristics

Landscape

(climate, hydrology, geology & seismic).

Fig. 1.

Man's Environment Analysis Diagram

This means that the changes in any component are likely to affect the whole environment.

Some of these changes may have significant or only slight effects.

Some may be

important in the short term and others in the long term. Therefore, each of these related and interacting components of man's environment should be examined regarding its possible, present and future effects on the others and for its role in the overall evaluation of the impact of nuclear energy application on man's environment. With this general analysis of man's environment, agencies and decision makers can examine in greater deal the impact of nuclear energy programs taking into consideration the fol lowing objectives: To maximize human safety and the well being of the population

142

To satisfy the human needs for electric power and provision of better services to the public To minimize and alleviate environmental damage through reliable control and protection measures To maximize desirable economic impact.

4.

SITING AND CONSTRUCTION

Siting and construction of nuclear power plant involve the following change in land use:· Transportation of radioactive materials and its related constraints - possible modification of the local social and economic context. The construction of the nuclear power plants implies the modification of the architectural concept of the area and landscape besides affecting the local ecology. The construction of nuclear power programs and the siting of nuclear power reactors in co-ordination with regional requirements and planning in an integrated way is extremely important in order for population demands and the quality of the environment to be maintained. The problem of siting nuclear power stations and their ancillary facilities must be closely related to the general pattern of the country's development; national economic planning policies of industrial location, metropolitan and urban physical planning as well as community and social development. A great deal of emphasis has been placed on safety and economic factors which are related to some extent to social factors in making it recognized that all types of nuclear power reactors raise environmental problems caused by the interaction between the plant location and its local or wider environment. It should be noted that the policy of remote siting which has been adopted for safety reasons is no longer insisted upon.

This is mainly due to technical achievements in safety

features and the greater emphasis which has been placed on design, construction, testing, operation and maintenance of nuclear power-installations.

However, as the move towards

semi urban and urban siting continues to progress, further examination of siting criteria is required.

This also requires examining the major implications of a nuclear installation

for nearby areas and its impact on the environment.

This necessitates the consideration of

environmental protection aspects within the planning programs for site selection of nuclear installations to ensure that adequate protection means are incorporated. The site selected thus soon becomes an area of attraction for population movements. When radiation workers settle around the reactor area, confidence in the overall radiation safety status is reflected to public opinion.

5.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The pressure for environmental quality is most evident in calls for environmental protection and control systems.

This provides for conflicting public concern about the intrusions on

143

the environment resulting from the widespread consideration of power reactors and the increasing demand for power and consumption of electricity. Therefore, the overriding goal must be to develop a framework which provides a consistent set of factors for environmental control and protection which should be integrated in the site selection process for nuclear power plants. Two major terms are involved, firstly, the nature and characteristics of the power reactor or nuclear installation in relation to its hazard; secondly, the nature and characteristics of the specific environment in which the plant is to be located. There are a large number of variables involved in these two terms. However, the factors associated with the environmental protection which have to be considered are: air quality water quality, nuclear wastes, landscape, land-use and architecture. The environmental control by one or some of these above will be incomplete or distorted if tested by human needs. 6.

SOCIAL ASPECTS

Planners have an obvious need to be concerned with life style. The society provides the activating framework of human asplratton , needs and control. Thus, the people's social and psychological needs must form the basis for fundamental policy decisions about power plant locations as part of the spatial arrangement and environmenta I conditions. Social and economic factors are constantly in interaction and it is difficult to differentiate and measure the separate effects. Successfu I siting choice is aided by considering the social aspects of the country and the relative region. The social process affects the planning components and socially routed factors such as land-use, housing and education, availability of power and growth demand, etc. which in turn will affect the location of nuclear power plants. The factors which have to be considered are: population, housing, transportation, work, community and public facilities, politics, etc. The formulation of a national siting policy is a government responsibility. However, its successful implementation is increasingly dependent on nuclear energy authorities, local and regional authorities as wel I as public participation. The government is concerned to ensure that broad national priorities are met through government attitude towards safety, laws and regulations, laws regulating environmental quality and control measures, psychology of local population, emergency limits and programs. In practice, one should, look at site plans from the point of view of geometrical principles which govern spatial forms and consider their efficiency in controlling the aspects of physical site characteristics and effects of man-made hazards so as to satisfy the safety regulations and criteria. Consideration should be given to the environmental protection and control aspects as wel I as the social aspects within an integrated approach for siting nuclear plants. 7.

RADIATION HAZARD

Starting from the consideration of some features of the biological risk in nuclear power

144

plant operations, the principal m ethodological approaches by w hich the "acceptable risk" can be established should be carefully considered. then be discussed.

The concept of "U nder risk" should

The basic principles of radiation protection should also be evaluated.

On the basis of the acceptable risk, the prim ary standards, m axim um perm issible doses and dose I im its as w ell as the secondary standards are introduced.

The system of controls

of radiation protection provides a double kind of review : physical and m edical, and a double level action: surveillance and inspection. Nuclear power stations m ay bring to the reactor site and its surrounding area possible radiological hazards.

Toxic radioactive w astes are produced from nuclear reactors and nu-

clear fuel reprocessing plants.

The routine release of these radioactive m aterials into the

atm osphere through vents and stack may com prise gases, vapours and sm all solid particles which could react with environm ental ecological masses such as water and vegetation and would endanger m an's health through internal radio contam ination, unless rigid precautions and thorough geom etrological and ecological studies are made to ensure the environm ental safety. Studies and observations of the im pact of nuclear power plants on the environm ent have revealed that it has greater effects on the environm ent than had previously been recognized. Therefore, it seem s logical that environm ental protection and control aspects of pow er reactors should be taken into account very carefully in order to make nuclear power strategy more val id and useful for developm ent. For adequate protection m easures in nuclear pow er plants, inform ation should be available about the different areas in the plants and around them , the adm issible doses for persons occupied in a controlled area and about radiation surveys and m onitoring. W ith regard to the health surveillance of the personnel in radiation w ork, the rules for pre-em ploym ent and routine m edical exam inations should be strict and efficient.

In

case of radiation accidents, special organizational and medical instructions for operation are necessary.

These problem s are part of the field of action of authorized medical officers

for health surveillance, w hich necessitates special training. Since the risk from radioactive fall out is not confined to the specific area w here the nuclear power reactor is installed and as such a risk is dependent on m eteorological and geographical param eters, this necessitates that fall out detection system should be considered not only nation-w ide, but it should be regionalized.

This w ould undoubtedly help

in attenuating the political and sociological fears from ins ta I lat ion of nuclear pow er plants and building up confidence betw een concerned com m unities in both developed and developing countries. There seem s to be more than one w ay to establish such a large network of radiation monitoring on regional levels.

IAEA is invited to contribute to pilot studies carried out

along such a line. Sophisticated safety aspects and radiation protection devices, although they look at first sight exaggerated and expensive, are in fact very necessary, particularly for developing countries, in order to satisfy public opinion and its socio-political requirem ents

145

which are usually limiting factors affecting the further development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in many countries of the world. Only with reliable and highly technical safety parameters

is it possible to avoid an

anticipated revulsion of public opinion against increasing the number of nuclear installations. 8.

RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISCHARGES

In nuclear power plants, waste discharges are one of three major types: thermal, chemical and radioactive. Chemical and radioactive wastes can occur in three forms: solid, liquid and gaseous. Chemical and radioactive wastes are encountered at various stages of fuel fabrication and reprocessing as well as in power production. Chemical wastes in solid, liquid and gaseous forms, are produced at various stages in the uranium cycle, mining of the ore, fuel fabrication, operation of nuclear power plants and fuel reprocessing. It is less the purpose of this paper to discuss the different aspects of the technology of waste disposal than to reflect on the strategies of such an important procedure. During the operation of nuclear generating stations, radioactive material is produced by fission as well as by neutron activation of corrosion products in the reactor's coolant system. Small amounts of gaseous and liquid radioactive waste are released, then they are processed within the plant to minimize the amount of radioactive nuclides that are ultimately released to the atmosphere and the waterways. Radioactive waste disposal from nuclear power plants presents problems not only concerned with national but sometimes also with regional radiation safety problems, especially when such power stations are situated in geographical areas of a regional political. and sociological nature. This concept should influence the national and international strategies of reactor site selection. The cost of providing adequate protection measures against radioactive waste disposal becomes an important component of the nuclear power plant capital investment which in many cases could determine its feasibility. However, although sophisticated safety measures constitute an economic problem, particularly for developing countries, yet, they are extremely necessary in order to satisfy the socic-psythological requirements of public opinion and to counteract anticipated opposition, which cou Id retard the rate of development of peaceful uses of atomic energy programs. Since any regional environment is a part of the global environment at large, protection of any specific environment contributes to the protection of the world's environment and hence local protection programs should be supported by concerned international organization e.g. IAEA, ICRP, UNEP, UNSCAIR, etc. In this concern, international standard measures for environmental protection against radioactive waste disposal should be carefully formulated. The philosophy governing waste disposal systems should be based upon all interfering 146

parameters including thermal, mechanical, chemical and radiation damage stabilities.

9.

MANPOWER RESOURCES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT

Developing countries should consider very early in their nuclear power programs the necessary training of personnel in specific areas associated with siting, design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

Due to the new developments of technology, training of

the staff should be permanent and continuing. Developing countries should analyze their labor markets in order to determine the availability of persons that have the required qualification for individual job activities and to determine those skills and knowledge levels that personnel will be lacking, in order to identify those training requirements which are actually necessary and thus keep the overall personnel training costs to a minimum.

Regional training programs shared by a nuinber of

developing countries would certainly contribute to saving expenses on such a training component. The infrastructure of scientists, technologists and skilled technicians is a fundamental component needed for transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries.

It wou Id be

a serious mistake to consider other physical and economic components and to overlook the necessary imp I ications of the human resources development. For the implementation of realistic and convincing radiation protection measures in nuclear power plants and their fuel cycle, the infrastructure needed for competent manpower should be formulated and authorized for rigid inspection and follow-up.

National legislation

should be issued, taking into consideration the personality values of the community concerned, as well as local and social value systems. Control of the great number of power plants and their fuel cycle requires increasing numbers of physicists, biologists, biochemists, chemists, engineers, physicians and technicians with a broad or/and specific knowledge of the field.

However, the negative brain

drain is a major problem facing developing countries as regards their manpower development in new technological fields. The philosophy governing evolution of manpower development underlies the educational system laid by the developing countries taking into consideration the interdisciplinary modern approaches, major and specific curricular changes as well as policies.

10. LEGISLATION FOR THE USES AND PROTECTION AGAINST IONIZING RADIATION HAZARDS Legislation of the code of practice is a function of sociological patterns of attitude and human behavior as well as of techno-scientific aspects which are factors to be considered in such legislation at the national level. Since the early years of the twentieth century, the use of radium, and X-ray machines, has been introduced and subjected to progressive technological development.

147

A high peak of the international development in the uses of atomic energy took place In the forties when the first atomic bomb was produced and tested. As the health of the people in any country is a constitutional exercise of the health authority, it is agreed upon that a code of practice or legislation is to be enforced in order to maintain not only protection of radiation workers, but also of the whole population of the country. The role expected from international organizations is to support such governmental attitudes and meanwhile to ensure adequate radiation protection measures over the whole world. In developing countries, legislation is the optimal solution for the enforcement of satisfactory protection services. The philosophy of such legislation should be based upon sharing responsibilities between administrators, utilizers and owners of the radiation facilities.

Whenever the administration owns the plant, the need exists for the presence of a

central organization for the enforcement of the law, the inspection and evaluation of protection services available and activities of radiation protection groups. The responsibility of the utilizers of ionizing radiation dictates the necessity of at least a minimal basic standard level of information and training in order to acquire the capabilities of proper utilization measurements and provision of necessary requirements for protection against ionizing radiation. International committees have provided the world's scientific population with the necessary agreed upon permissible limits of exposure to ionizing radiations, not only at occupational but also at whole population exposure level. In order to achieve all such benefits, the national administration for protection against ionizing radiation should provide facilities for surveillance, training courses and skilled technologists to advise architectural design, standardization and measurement of exposure dose as well as the assessment of possible biological and environmental impacts. Nuclear power plant programs entail services for radiation protection· not only to radiation workers but also for the whole nation. The pub I ic health problems evolving from such nuclear power plants are of considerable concern to the whole environment in respect to radiation exposure levels, radioactive contamination and radioactive wasted isposal. Legislation of protection measures against ionizing radiation must take into consideration all such factors. It is understandable that the atomic energy authority in any country will establish a central body integrated to a constitutional power from local health authorities. This central body should undertake the responsibilities of planning and follow-up in the field of radiation protection measures. Safety codes are concerned with the safety of land-based stationary nuclear power plants designed for the production of power in the form of electricity and/or heat. Safety codes are based on documentation and experience available in national and international systems and practices. Safety codes or practice cover regulations of siting, design, installation, operation and quality assurance of nuclear power plants. These codes of prac-

148

tice establish the objectives and m inim um requirem ents w hich should be fulfilled to provide adequate safety for nuclear power plants. Safety guides recom m end procedures that m ight be followed to im plem ent the relevant codes of practice.

Recom m endations are designed to provide assurance that the operation

of nuclear power plants can be carried out without risk to the health and safety of the general pub I ic and plant personnel.

11. REQ UIREM ENTS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRA NSFER TO DEV ELO PING COUNT RIES

For nuclear technology to developing countries, attention should be paid to the developm ent of technical hum an resources as w ell as to the relevance of the nuclear pow er program to the national socio-econom ic developm ent plan. In m any of the developing countries, it is expected that developm ent of atom ic energy program s will be difficult and slow because of political, econom ic and developm ent priority factors. Transfer of nuclear power technology to developing countries w ould certainly require great collaboration efforts on the part of the developed countries, international organizations and the concerned developing countries.

Bilateral or/and regional co-operation in this field

is highly recom m ended and is extrem ely useful. The need for regional policies for developing countries is quite obvious for harm onization, support and co-operation. organizations do exist.

In many regions of the world, socio-econom ic, political

Em phasis on the role of such organizations in the conceptualization

and im plem entation of these principles is helpful to foster the use of atom ic energy for the developm ent of developing countries.

REFERENCES 1.

IAEA Symposium on Safety of the Environment 1971.

2.

Final of Environmental Statement Related to Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. Jersey Central Power and Light Company. Docket No. 50-219, December 1974.

3.

An Integrated Approach to Site Selection for Nuclear Power Plants. E.M.A. Hassan. A.E.E. Egypt. IAEA-SM-188/7. 1975.

4.

Parameters of Radiation, Technology Transfer in Developing Countries by Hamid. M.

5.

Review on the IAEA Papers on Radioactive Waste from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and

6.

Guidance to the Population when there is a Radiocontamination from one of the Nuclear

Roushdy of NCRET-Atomic Energy Estt. Egypt. 1977. Protection , 1976 by M. AYAD. International Report of A. E. E. Egypt. 1977. Installations. By M. AYAD and S. TAWFIK: IAEA meeting. Ankara -April 1976.

149

NEED OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE CENTERS

MUHAMMAD AHSAN and SYED REZA HUSAIN Institute of Nuclear Technology Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission Dacca,

Bangladesh

ABSTRACT Acquiring a system such as a nuclear reactor or an enrichment plant is a part of the transfer of technology and technological know-how and self reliance is another.

In both cases

the developing nations have their individual limitations. These limitations in the case of fuel cycle services are identified, discussed and solutions given in the perspective of·regional co-operation. 1.

INTRODUCTION

Here we make the assumptions that acquisition of the first nuclear power plant and any of the associated fuel cycle service centers by any country has two objectives. First, it may be more economic to have electricity from a nuclear power plant compared to that from a conventional one. Second, it may be desirable to acquire the nuclear technology for power production in view of the expected future fossil fuel shortage. The second assumption is obviously related to achieving "self-reliance". To achieve self-reliance, however, the transfer of technology should be quick and at a minimum possible cost. Efforts for technology transfer by one single developing country may be unsuccessful because of various limitations. On the contrary, problems associated with the transfer of technology can be effectively solved if handled on a regional basis; and even then, at least in some areas of nuclear technology transfer, the solutions may not be obtained before two decades of regional cooperation in the region studied here. Whether the decision to acquire nuclear technology is due to our first assumption or the second, or both, let us assume further that the decision has been made; and accordingly a country has acquired nuclear power plant (s) . The country has also decided to sustain nuclear power generation based in an increasing proportion on "Self-reliance". Then the problem boils down to the question of how this can be achieved most effectively and quickly. 2.

BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

A developing country, willing to transfer nuclear technology, has to fulfil the following requirements:

150

(1) Acquiring know ledge of the Technology (2) Organizing the acquired know ledge (3) A pplication of the acquired and organized know ledge (4) Financing (1), (2) & (3) above. W e have I isted the above requirem ents in order of priority.

Acquiring know ledge, the

first requirem ent, can be achieved, fundam entally, in three w ays.

First, men can be given

training in the technology in those countries _where the relevant technology has been developed.

Second, the technology can be bought directly w here such a possibility exists.

Third, and perhaps the most difficult, is independent R&D to acquire the technology. Organizing the acquired know ledge, the second requirem ent, w ill include such activities as (1) m otivating the trained personnel for m eaningful R&D , (2)' procurem ent of laboratories & Facilities, (3) conducting R&D , (4) training m ore personnel inside the countrv , (5) creating leadership for increasingly independent developm ent of the technology and (6) inducing a proper job environm ent to retain the trained personnel. A fter the know ledge has been acquired and organized, the country can now be expected to m ake successful application of the know ledge. are interdependent.

It is obvious that various technologies

Even a com plete know ledge of nuclear pow er technology, for exam ple,

w ill depend on other technologies such as turbines, electricity transm ission and m etallurgy, etc.

The aim should be, therefore, to progress step by step tow ards achieving "Self-reli-

ance" in al I the relevant technologies.

3.

SINGLE COUNT RY CO NST RA INT S

Let us consider here the possible constraints which any single developing country may face during the process of technology transfer.

The follow ing I ist for the constraints can be m ade:

(1) Econom ic (2) Financial (3) Technological (4) Industrial (5) O rganizational (6) Others. W hereas constraints (1) - (5) can be described in reasonably concrete term s, the constraints under (6) m ay contain such factors as political in stab ii ity, inefficiency of the

Governmental machinery, lack of proper job environment, brain-drain, etc. We begin here with the study of the first constraint (economic constraint) related to acquiring the fuel cycle services required to support the nuclear power development in the country.

To understand better the economic constraints for the fuel cycle services , a study has been made to find out the break-even costs and the break-even sizes for the following services: (1) Conversion

151

(2)

Enrichment

(3) Fabrication (4} Reprocessing,

and the following assumptions are made (l): 1)

Reference Plant Construction Cost: Cost estimates for the construction of various 2 fuel cycle establishments are taken from the Fitts-Fuji report < J and reproduced below in somewhat modified form: Indicative Construction Costs of Fuel Cycle Facilities

Table:

Capacity

Type of Plant

50

6,000

1,000

40,000

1500 MTU/YR.

200

50,000

1 500 MTU /YR.

1,000

50,000

5000 MTU/YR.

Conversion Enrichment

3000 MT-SWU/YR.

Fabric at ion Reprocessing

2)

Electricity Generations Supported (MWe)

Construction Cost (Million US $)

Extrapolation of Reference Plant Construction Cost: Extrapolation is done by the relation; C Cm = ( 2\ 2 ni' Where, C

0

Cm

F

= Cost of the reference plant of size of S

0

as in Table I.

Cost of a plant of size Sm

s Where, Sm

(~ 2m

Factor f wi II vary with m; but for lack of reliable data of costs for various sizes, f is given a constant value. The study assumed that f= 1.33 3)

Break-even Cost: Expected marked cost for each fuel cycle service in the near future is assumed·as the break-even cost. Table II gives the break-even costs.

Table:

II Break-even Costs for Fuel Cycle Services

Fuel Cycle Services

152

Break-even Cost (US $/kgU)

Conversion

3

Enrichment

100(a)

Fabrication

120(b)

Reprocessing

200 (cl

(al Cost is per kg.-SWU. Cost trend indicates 2-3% increase every six months. Expecting a severe escalation in cost of enrichment service, break-even cost is assumed to be US $ 100/kg. -SWU. (bl Cost reasonably stable. (cl Cost is not expected to be below $200 and cost estimates are uncertain. 4)

Unit Production Cost: UPC is given by, UPC=

A

"j5["

Where, P = total number of units produced per year L = load factor A= total annual cost given by, A = CRF + AR + OM Where , CRF = ___:.i__

t-u-n ?'.

the standard annual capital recovery factor.

AR = annual replacement cost of plant equipment OM = annual operation and maintenance cost i = interest on capital Interest on capital is assumed to be 10%. AR and OM values are taken as 0. 5% and 4% respectively, somewhat higher than customary. 51

Plant life and load factor are taken to be 200 years and 70% respectively.

6)

We consider a region consisting of Turkey, Iran, Afganistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Malayasia, Singapore and Indonesia. These are the countries, more or less, situated north of the Indian Ocean. Projected nuclear power generation for this region is given in Table 111.

"Table:

Ill Existing and Projected Nuclear Power Demand of the Region

Year Existing 1981

Generation Capacity (MWe) 537 3,900

1985

8,200

1990

17,000

beyond 1990

Uncertain

Data is based on: IAEA Report, "Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries", (1974); and Kambhu, P. "Electricity Development in the ESCAP Region", Regional IAEA Training Course on the Technical and Economic Aspects of Nuclear Power Development, Mani la, Phi I ippines, 16-27 Feb. (1976] .

153

RESULT :

UPC for each fuel cycle service is calculated for different plant sizes, plotted

and the break-even plant size corresponding to the break-even cost is determ ined.

Gen-

eration capacity that can be supported by the break-even plant and the year (approxim ately) in w hich the region is expected to generate that m uch electricity from nuclear plants are given in Table IV . Table:

IV

Indication of Y ear in w hich a Fuel Cycle Service is Feasible in the Region

Break-even Plant Size (M TU/YR)

Generation Capacity the Break-even plant can support (M W e)

Year in which the Region m ay have the required Generation Capacity

4,000

1985

25,000

Uncertain

Conversion

3,400

Enrichm ent

1,900(a)

Fabrication

65

2,000

1980

830

27,000

Uncertain

Reprocessing

Table IV now clearly show s whether, purely from an econom ic point of view , a single country can acquire any of the plants to support its ow n nuclear power program .

For en-

richm ent and reprocessing the country has to have power generation of 25,000 MW e and 27,000 MW e respectively,

2,000 MW e supported by an econom ic fabrication plant, though

sm al I, turns out to be quite discouraging w hen seen in the perspective of the existing nuclear power generation program in single developing countries. Let us assum e now , that one of the fuel cycle plants m ay be acquired because of the second assum ption i.e. self-reliance. be sacrificed by the country.

In this case m any of the econom ic advantages may

Financing of the project m ay still rem ain a severe constraint

for most of the developing countries.

If w e go further and assum e that a single country

can finance one or m ore of these plants on its ow n, it may still be constrained by (a) lack of know ledge, (bl lack of industrial capability and (c) lack of proper organization.

The

constraint can be so big that the country m ay have to continue to buy the plants from abroad for generations unless checked by various aspects of transfer of technology in the real sense.

4.

GLOBAL CONSTRAINTS

The real transfer of technology - the knowledge, the training, the industrial capability, is becoming increasingly difficult for the developing nations. This is particularly true for the nuclear technology. The world, in the near future, appears to be divided into three blocs: (1) the nuclear bloc, (2) the oil bloc and (3) the non-nuclear-non-oil bloc. Most of the oil bloc and the non-nuclear-non-oi I bloc is constituted by the developing countries.

154

It may be interesting to note that the nuclear bloc countries are recently showing strong unwillingness to transfer nuclear technology to the developing countries. So much so that some political pressure has been attached to the sale· of a very small research reactor (case of Bangledesh); and similar pressure has been attached with the sale of a small reprocessing plant (case of Pakistan). The sale of a nuclear reactor factory to Brazil is under adverse pressure. Such symptoms are becoming increasingly evident. After a meeting held in London at the end of 1976 by the nuclear bloc countries, including U .S .A., France, Russia and U. K., the official statement said that these countries have come to an understanding on a common pol icy for the export of nuclear technology. A few facts have been mentioned above just to indicate the nature of the Global constraints which the developing nations may have to face in the program for self-reliant nuclear power program. We end up this section by one of the examples to indicate the future constraints. Let us assume that a developing country, at a tremendous cost and effort, has developed a large nuclear program (a large fraction of its total generation capacity). Let, at any point of time in the future, the nuclear bloc countries stop supply of enriched uranium (a must for the light water reactors which are the most predominant), then it will be obvious that the economy of the country will collapse if the power break-down continues for long. 5.

NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

The need for regional cooperation among the developing countries can now be understood in a proper perspective. Let us consider the economic aspects first.

It was seen in Table

IV that with the existing nuclear power generation, not a single country in the region can economically acquire any of the fuel cycle plants. It is also quite obvious that regional co-operation can mean stronger financial capability, a much broader industrial capability and optimum use of technical manpower. More important than anything else, development of technology through R&D is expected to be achieved most effectively by regional co-operation. If "self-reliance" is the key, then one may better start with "regional self-reliance". Lastly, one may note that regional co-operation even among the developed countries is plentiful. These examples of regional co-operation are due to the same economic-financial constraints as discussed above. The difference, however, lies in the fact that for the developing countries they are required for the development of the most basic technology whereas for the developed countries they are required in the most advanced technology. REFERENCES 1.

M. lnnas Ali, M. Ahsan, S. R. Husain, R. K. Chowdhury and A. Rahman:

"Possibility

of Regional Fuel Cycle Centers in the Context of Bangladesh", to be read at the IAEA conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle, 2-13 May 1977, Salzburg, Austria . 2.

Fitts, R. B. and Fuji, H., "Fuel Cycle Demand Supply and Cost Trends", IAEA Bulletin,

.!!,

1 (1976) 19. 155

MOVEMENT OF RADIOACTIVITY DEPOSITED UNDERGROUND AT THE U.S. ERDA NEVADA TEST SITE

I. Y. BORG, R. STONE, H.B. LEVY, AND L.D. RAMSPOTT Earth Science Division Lawrence Livermore Laboratory University of California Livermore, California 91/550 U.S.A.

ABSTRACT

Movement of radioactivity has been minimal at the U.S. ERDA Nevada Test Site (NTS) and relates to the low rain fal I in the area and the general phenomenology of nuclear explosions. Most refractory fission products and unspent fuel are captured in lithological glasses produced by the explosion, and there is forceful ejection of water from the immediate vicinity of the explosion.

Return of the water into the rubblized site inaugurates leaching processes

and consequent mobilization of nuclides.

The slow to moderate movement of the ground water

in the aquifer within northern portions of NTS, 76 to 180 (maximum) meters/year depending on locale, has contributed to the slow movement of the tritium, the most mobile of the radionucl ides.

Sorptive processes are especially important in retarding nuclide movement at NTS.

The altered tuffaceous rocks, which comprise a large portion of the rock in the saturated zone, are rich in zeolites (clinoptilolite) and clays (montmorillonite and illite) which effectively absorb many radionuclides moving through the formation.

To date no radioactivity

has been detected beyond the bounds of the Nevada Test Site nor within any of the approximately 32 water wells within or beyond the boundaries of the site.

All water used at the

site continues to come from wells not far from areas of active underground testing.

INTRODUCTION

Underground testing of nuclear devices began in September, 1957 at the U.S. ERDA Nevada Test Site (NTS).

Since that time more than three hundred tests have been detonated under

ground including seventy eight that are either below the water table or near to it. test below the water table was conducted in Yucca Flats in 1962.

The first

Since the remnant radio-

activity at NTS is largely in a vitrified state, information that has accrued relating to its solution and migration is directly applicable to situations in which reactor waste encapsulated in glass is buried in similar sediments or rock.

The experience also has an analog

with potential movement of radionuclides subsequent to accidental spills or leaks at reactor sites.

156

In the ensuing sections the geologic and hydrological framework at NTS will first be described.

Some indication of the size of the original source term will be given, and finally

the results of monitoring of the groundwater at NTS will be described.

1.

GEOLOGICAL AND HYDROLOGICA"L SITTING AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE

The U.S. ERDA Nevada Test Site occupies about 3600 km state of Nevada (F!q. 11 .

2

in the southern portion of the

It is in the most arid portion of the state where the annual preci-

pitation is 8-16 cm in the valleys.

Shallow accumulations of calcium carbonate (caliche)

in alluvium-filled valleys used for testing indicate that percolating water from precipitation has limited vertical mobility due to near-surface evaporation.

Indian

N

1 0

Fig. 1.

100 km

Location of the U.S. ERDA Nevada Test Site

The test area is part of the Basin and Range physiographic province where North-South trending ranges and valleys alternate.

Testing has occurred primarily in two intermontane

valleys (Yucca and Frenchman Flats) that lack external surface drainage and on a high volcanic mesa (Pahute Mesa) (Fig. 2).

The test site is situated within a tertiary volcanic pro-

vince that contains deposits of rhyol itic ash-flow tuffs, ash-fall tuffs and acid volcanic rocks that range from several hundred to 4000 m thick.

Lying above this volcanic debris in the

157

valleys are thick deposits of alluvial origin.

They are norm ally of the order of 200m but

may be as m uch as 1000m thick.

116° 15' T

116° 00' T

., D

rernor

C2J Tertiary volcanic rocks

~ ~ Paleozoic sedimentary rocks

Mesozoic granitic rocks

.,

~7°00'

10

20

km

Fig. 2. Principal Rock

l

.,

36° 45'

f'.

Types and Test Areas at NTS

.L

The top of the water table, the surface separating the saturated zone from the unsaturated zone, is of the order of 500m deep in the Yucca Flat Test Area and generally lies within tuffaceous rock. On Pahute Mesa it is one to two hundred meters deeper. Both of these features - the thickness of the poorly consolidated valley-fill and the depth to the top of the water table - influenced the choice of this area for underground nuclear testing. The rock that is sufficiently saturated and permeable to conduct ground water and to yield significant quantities of water to wells and springs is cal led the Lower Carbonate Aquifer and underlies Yucca·and Frenchman Flats. It consists of Paleozoic limestones and dolomites. The aquifer is a part of the Ash Meadows ground water basin that discharges at Ash Meadows in the Amargosa Desert (Fig. 3). A second system to the west, the Pahute Mesa ground water system, links several valleys by inter-valley ground water flow through aquifers made up of rhyolitic lava flows and welded tuffs. In both systems, pathways and porosity in the aquifers are believed to be largely in fractures within the units. The vertical movement of ground water through a tuff aquitard beneath Yucca Flat is 4 2 1. Sxl0- to 6x10- m/year. The horizontal movement within the main aquifer beneath central portions of the test site has been estimated to range between 2-180m/year and 2-76m/ year beneath Pahute Mesa. On the southermost bounds of the test site ground water velo-

158

cities as high as 1800m /year have been reported.

The hydrological dom ain at NT S has been

2J;

carefully outlined by W inograd and Thordarson


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FUTURE EXPANSION

Based on the initial plant, additional production modules can be added in order to cover the actual demand.

An important consideration is the initial size of the plant build-

ing and the Initial capacity for auxiliary services, which must be optimized taking into account the scheduled expansion of production capacity in order to minimize investment over a longer period. As far as the manufacture of fuel assembly components is concerned, such as end pieces, control rod guide tubes, cladding tubes, springs, end caps, spacers, etc., it would be economical to purchase these components initially from sub-suppliers (including domestic sub-suppliers for certain parts following appropriate qualification).

When a suf-

ficient volume for parts, which could reasonably be produced by the fuel plant (e.g. spacers), can be obtained, such production could be included in the scope of the plant. Figure 2 shows a possible lay-out of a fuel fabrication plant planned on the basis of the program given in Figure 1.

The initial production starts with rod manufacture and assembl-

ing, first peiletizing and conversion lines are planned to be commissioned about 2 and 3¼ years later, respectively.

The infrastructure contains scrap treatment, storage, workshops,

laboratories, plant auxiliaries, etc.

3.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

The type of cooperation contract between the future domestic fuel manufacturer and the supplier of the technology is strongly influenced by the objectives and the time schedule of a particular fuel fabrication program.

Therefore, cooperation contracts can vary be-

tween a pure know-how and license agreement for fuel manufacture and a complete package of engineering and supply contracts for a fuel fabrication plant as well as of know-how and license agreements covering technology transfer in the areas of fuel design, management and manufacture.

Furthermore, the parties may agree to form a joint company to bui Id

and operate the fuel fabrication plant. In any case, a comprehensive personnel training program needs to be defined which should maximize on-the-job training.

A qualification program for the various sections of

a new plant involving the irradiation of production samples and complete fuel rods or fuel assemblies may be a useful additional step towards an independant capability. The range of technical assistance in the field of nuclear fuel technology and for the design and construction of fuel fabrication plants available from the KWU group under appropriate cooperation agreements is summarized in Table 1.

Specific contractual arrange-

ments can be worked out to satisfy the particular requirements and boundary conditions of the customer. In addition to the planning and construction of a factory and the provision of technical information, the decisive factor for the successful implementation of a technology transfer is the training of qua I ified engineers and technicians and their active participation in project work.

Through careful selection of personnel and through a well planned and efficient

259

Table 1. Technical Assistance Available from KWU in the Field of LWR Fuel

• Design and Engineering Know-how fuel design and engineering (physics, therrnalhydraulic, mechanical) fuel management process computer information design methods and codes experimental and operational data quality assurance irradiated fuel services

• Manufacturing Technology, Quality Control Uranium fuel (from UF5) mixed oxide fuel (from Pu-nitrate or -oxide) Zry cladding tubes (from tube hollows)

• Fuel Fabrication Plants Feasibility studies Planning, design and engineering Supply of manufacturing and quality control equipment Supply of turn-key plants

• Personnel Training programs courses on-the-job training

• Engineering Assistance, Consulting Services • Qualifications Programs

• Supply of Fuel Components spacers. cladding tubes, end pieces, etc.

training program and appropriate involvement In project activities, the technical personnel should gradually, over a reasonable time period, be brought into a position to do independent work, using as reference the technical information obtained from the licensor. An example for an extensive technology transfer program which, in the authors' opinion, will reach this objective, Is given in Figure 3.

260

Activity

Year•

1

3

2

4

7

6

5

8

~

Know-How Transfer and e Technical Assistance e Fuel Fabrication Plant • 1eaeibilit7 Study - Ellgineering ud Lican1ill1 - CoaatNcUOD all4 OolllliHioniq

--

----

c=

llo4 "8A11faot llring /Al• ablil!{_ ,Pellet

---

•ia&

,.CoA••

•• ,1011

•Training Programs C

• Jl&el labrication • hel Nanap ••nt

--- :t> ---- ----- ~---- ·-- ~

-------

• l'llel l>Hip Ucl IDginHriq

• Fuel Irradiation Programs • flat a.aotor1 - Power Beaotor1

---- ::t> -- ---- ~------ ---.-

Fig. 3. Cooperation Program in Fuel Technology

""~

Table 2. Training Program for Fuel Fabrtcatton Plant Personnel Area

Rod Production

Assembling

No.

Trainee

Periods and Months

1 1 1 1

Section Leader Assistant Foreman l/l.~lc)in9 E~ginecr

1x4 2x4 1x4 ht,

1

Section Leader (same as for rod production) Assistant Foreman Assistant for Components Foreman for Components

1 1

1 2 1 1

1 Quality Control

1 1 1 1

1 Maintenance

1 1 1

Miscellaneous

1 1 1

1 Pelletizing

1 3 1

Conversion

1

3

1x4

2x4 1x4 2x4 1x4

Section Leader Assistant for Analytical Laboratoris Assistant for Metallographical Laboratories Assistant for Vendor Qualification Assistant for Quality Control Inspection Assistant for Quality Control Technique and Procedure

2x4

Head Electrician Fuel Rods and Elements Electrician Powder and Pellets Mechanic Fuel Rods and Elements Mechanic Powder and Pellets

2x4

Health Physics Material Manager Industrial Engineer

2x2 2x3 2x3

Section Leader Assistant Foremen

4x6

Section Leader (same as for Pelletizing) Assistant Foremen

1x6 1x4

2x3 2x4 5x3

1x3 1x3 1x3 1x3

1x4 1x6 1x4 4x6 1x6

The transfer of the avai !able know-how (Item 1 of Figure 3) concerns the provision of documents Including technical reports, specifications, drawings, process descriptions,

262

manufacturing instructions, computer codes, quality assurance handbooks, etc. information is up-dated at periodic intervals.

This

The transfer of written information is sup-

plemented by additional means, such as topical discussions, presentations and lectures, as well as technical assistance services in connection with the practical appl icatlon of the transferred know-how. The time schedule for the fuel fabrication plant (Item 2 of Figure 3) is based on the stepwise erection of the various sections of the plant.

Apart from financial considerations,

this approach has the advantage of minimizing technical risks in starting-up a new production and of providing maximum flexibility in tackling any initial problems that may arise. The planning, the supervision of construction and erection, and the commissioning should be carried out in close cooperation between the customer and the licensor, i.e. in joint project groups, to achieve maximum involvement of customer personnel. On the basis of the above time schedule the training program to be carried out can be planned in detail (Item 3 of Figure 3).

The training program for fuel manufacture is es-

sentially aimed at the instruction of the key plant personnel, as there are department heads, shift foremen, qua I ity assurance managers and workshop chiefs.

The training has

two phases: first, there is more general instruction at the licensor's plant, followed by an additional training specific to the new factory at the plant site (Table 2) . The training program for the design and engineering of fuel assemblies and for fuel management includes the training for the mechanical, thermohydraulic and physical design, for the operational management and service of fuel assemblies and for activities concerning the out-of-core fuel management.

The detailed time schedule for these subjects should be

fixed in a manner allowing an immediate practical application of the know-how obtained during the training. The irradiation programs (Item 4 of Figure 3) concern development work on fuel assemblies.

The capsule experiments are, on the one side, a qualification for the manufacture

uo2 fuel On the other side, the technology of irradiation experiments

of test fuel rods and have the objective of examining the behaviour of irradiated manufactured by the I icensee.

(design and manufacture of samples, primary characterization of test segments, planning and carrying out of the irradiation, post-irradiation inspection, and so forth) can be transferred by practical experience to train scientists and technicians.

As qualification for

each fuel assembly, components are manufactured in I imited numbers and put into service in power plants.

Final qualification can be reached by manufacturing test fuel assemblies

as part of a commercial supply of reload fuel by the licensor. Practical experience in the transfer of technology in the field of nuclear fuel design and fabrication has been and is being accumulated in a number of both supplier and recipient countries, forming a valuable basis for the definition of more efficient programs for such transfer.

263

PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR POWER

A. GIAMBUSSO and D.C. FOSTER Office of the Assistant Administrator far International Affairs United States Energy Research and Development Administration U.S.A.

ABSTRACT

In today's world, as nation after nation feels the need to consider alternatives to continued, major dependence upon increasingly expensive and limited sources of conventional nonrenewable energy sources such as oil, there is some evidence of a tendency to automatically opt for a nuclear power program.

To an extent this is understandable.

Nuclear power is

a major energy alternative and power reactors are developed and available.

It is a

"glamorous" though complicated technology and some believe Its implementation has national prestige value.

It is seen as promoting technology growth and therefore industrial

development and resulting higher economic growth and living standards.

It offers a new

form of fuel whicn is riot dependent on a continuous daily supply flow or massive volume storage to assure continuity of power production.

And perhaps most convincing is that

nearly al I of the major energy consuming nations have made very significant commitments

to nuclear power programs. But rational decisions in the energy area will only come about when a nation in its own context undertakes thorough analyses of the costs and benefits of each alternative, evaluation of the optimum developmental use of domestic energy and economic resources, and recognition and full consideration of all the implications of, and requirements for, undertaking new power programs, partjculartv nuclear power. The objective of this paper is to underscore the necessity for a nation considering •going nuclear" to be aware of all the aspects involved, to place these in proper perspective

In relation :o its capabilities and need, resources, and responsibilities, and to recognize the extent and time scale implications of the planning and implementation activities inherent in a nuclear power program. The extent of long-term national and international commitments involved will be stressed and sources of assistance for coping with the many problem areas involved are identified and discussed. Assuming the results of the initial national energy planning analyses indicate that nuclear power is not ruled out as a viable option for the supply of a portion of the projected electric energy needs, there are a number of considerations which should receive careful attention. 1 .

264

Those discussed in the paper are:

overall program planning

2.

provisions for skilled manpower requirements

3.

legislation and regulatory structure

4.

international implications

5.

organizational responsibility

6.

industrial capablHties

7.

reactor type selection

8.

quality control and quality assurance

9.

fuel cycle supply arrangemeA-ts

10. financing 11 . public information and education CONCLUSION In sum, the leadership

in any nation giving consideration to the nuclear option must

recognize that while there are advantages to nuclear power as an energy source, there are significant costs, implications of long-term commitment, and serious international obligations encompassed in such a commitment. These must be weighed in the context of each individual nation's needs, goals, and resources. The efficient implementation of a nuclear power program is only possible with thorough and timely planning and clear-cut designation of authorities and responsibilities. 1.

INTRODUCTION

My objective, as I speak to you today, is to underscore the need for a nation considering the nuclear power option to be aware of all the aspects involved, to place these in proper perspective in relation to national capabilities, needs, resources and responsibilities, and to recognize the scope, importance and time scale implications of the necessary planning and implementing activities. In addition, I will identify sources of information, experience, and assistance which may be available. The developing nations of the world today face a number of serious problems, many of them Interrelated, as they strive to raise the living standards of their people.

Not the

least of these is that of how to provide most effectively for the energy supplies which are necessary to enhance production and provide employment for growing populations. Though It is not new knowledge, there Is increasing general recognition that world energy supplies, based primarily on oil supplies in much of the world, are limited and very unequally distributed.

It has been less generally accepted that world supplies were

significantly underpriced and, as known reserves began to dwindle, would inevitably be subject to rapidly escalating prices. The oil supply crisis of 1973 forcefully brought the situation to the attention of the world. While the Industrial nations are presently the major consumers of world oil production,

265

the economies of most of the developing nations also rely heavily on oil as an energy source. The quadrupling of world oil prices has been more damaging for those countries with limited financial resources to pay for high cost petroleum Imports.

It is also pertinent

to note that the rate of growth of energy demand in developing nations is typically much more rapid than in the developed nations and hence the requirements of the former can be expected to consume a steadily increasing share of the world total. Dwindling world energy reserves, high and increasing prices for oil, and the current heavy reliance on oil, largely from a limited group of suppliers, have focused renewed attention on the need to find alternative energy sources.

In spite of hopes for major con-

tributions to world energy needs from advanced and/or essentially inexhaustible energy sources, such as solar, geothermal, and breeder and fusion reactors, the alternatives available for large scale electricity production in the near term are restricted to coal or nuclear power, development of hydro resources where available, and to a limited extent, geothermal energy. As a result, there has been an understandable tendency to opt automatically for the nuclear option as a means to diversify energy supply sources.

It Is generally agreed that

nuclear power can make a very real contribution to total world energy needs both in the near and longer term. Confidence in the selection of this alternative is to be found in the fact that most industrial nations have made major commitments to nuclear programs and several are actively developing breeder technology. Also, the implementation of a nuclear power program is often perceived as a high technology area which will result In rapid Industrial growth as the result of spinoff benefits from related and supporting industrial activities. Less appreciated are the technical, manpower, Industrial, and economic capabilities required, the necessary infrastruture, the nature and extent of international commitments entailed, and the long-term implications of a national nuclear power decision. And yet, these should weigh heavily in national decisions on the long-term direction of its energy program.

I wi II discuss these in some detai I later.

For some nations, nuclear power may indeed be an important early component of optimum solutions to growing energy needs. In other cases It may not be. The correct choices, in the process of planning for and providing future energy supplies, will differ for each nation. Rational choices can be made only in the context of careful analyses of the real needs and resources of an individual nation. The choices made from the options available will have far reaching consequences both In terms of the effect on a nation's economic growth, social and governmental structure, and on Interrelationships with other nations. It should be recognized that election of the nuclear power option may not lessen dependence upon outside sources of supply, at least initially, but may diversify the

dependence. Thus, the above considerations should enter into major energy planning decisions in developing countries, but sometimes do not, even though well over a decade of effort will precede even the first nuclear project once Initial studies and decisions are complete. Furthermore, for those cases in which the nuclear option appears a •good" or "best" 266

selection, I want to underscore the need for early and comprehensive planning. A necessary first step for nations making decisions about their short and long-range energy programs is to thoroughly understand the demand and supply options available, and their relationship to not only available indigenous and world resources but also to the economic and social goals of the nation. A hard look at the development goals of the nation is a first order of business. The quantities of energy required, its distribution geographically, and the means of most efficiently providing it will depend heavily upon the amount of large centralized industrialization and urbanization envisaged, and the extent to which agricultural production and more diversified industrial capabilities can capitalize on the natural, human, and economic resources. With national development goals established, it is then possible to project the quantities, forms, and distribution of energy needs to meet them. This will entail a compilation of the energy needs, by sector, to supply the requirements for industry, agriculture, transportation and domestic uses as wel I as a clear picture of the geographic distribution of these energy needs. Of principal concern, though necessarily in conjuction with an assessment of total energy needs, is that portion which will be supplied in the form of electricity since this is the area which will be directly impacted by any energy source utilized primarily for electrical generation including nuclear power. With projected needs established, the means of best satisfying them is in order. For this, a comprehensive and realistic evaluation of alternative sources is necessary. This· should focus primarily on indigenous resources but also consider resources available in the world market and take into account not only economics but also the degree of assurance of long-term supplies in terms of the location, diversity, and probable future price trends of such sources. Assuming that the results of the national energy planning analysis indicate that nuclear power Is not ruled out as a viable option for the supply of a portion of the projected electric energy needs, there are a number of considerations which should receive careful attention. While these are all necessary, not all will require the same degree of emphasis and experience indicates that some are much more critical than others in Implementation of the nuclear power option. Some of the principal considerations are-(1 l overall program planning (including feasibility studies) (2} provision for skilled manpower requirements (3} legislation and regulatory structure (4} international Implications (S} organizational responsibility for nuclear program

(6) industrial capabilities for participation and support (7} selection of reactor type (8) quality control and quality assurance programs (9) fuel cycle supplies and arrangements (10) financing arrangements

267

(11) public Information and education efforts 2.

PROGRAM PLANNING

In my view, no aspect of the activities to be undertaken is more Important than the need for thorough and early planning. The complexity of the technology and the need for involvement of a broad spectrum of participants representing various government and private Interests and internatlonal organizations requires thorough planning. And the economic Importance of minimizing the time period from contract signing to an operational plant requires early planning. Any schedule gain here can have great economic impact in savings on Interest during constructlon--a very significant component of the total cost. The magnitude of these is such that a 1-year schedule change can result in about a 7 percent impact on total costs, considering both interest and escalation, and far outweigh the costs associated with earlier planning activities and the early staffing for both utility and Government regulatory groups, to prepare for a smooth project implementation phase. Also Important in this regard is the fact that equipment suppliers wi 11 need to understand fully the system of codes and standards, and the tax and liability laws to which they will be subject In preparation of bids and In negotiation of supply contracts.

Lack of

definition or changing requirements subsequent to conclusion of contracts can be very costly for the recipient nation as a result of design changes to meet requirements. Lest a portion of my thought be lost, let me emphasize that as important as planning for a project Is the overall program planning Is even more vital. Even with excel lent project planning a nation's long-range objective can suffer unless the total program receives· adequate high level attention. J.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Nuclear power technology Is a sophisticated and demandinq one which will require the development and continued growth of a sizable cadre of manpower with a range of skills typically not existing in any country prlor to a nuclear program. Competent managers and a spectrum of technical talents will be needed by the Government regulatory bodies and Industrial participants, as well as by the operating utility, which will have responsibility for project construction and continuing operating and maintenance functions.

There will

be a need for scientists, managers, engineers, and technicians in a spectrum of disciplines, Including energy analysis, nuclear physics and chemistry, radiation and health effects, electronic control and monitoring, mechanical, chemical, and electric equipment design, fuel cycle supply and management, waste processing, packaging and transportation of fuels, spent fuels, and waste management, as well as conventional electric power generation and management. As an indication of the magnitude of the problem, Korea, which has a rapidly developing nuclear power program and • half-doz., plants to be In operation by the middle of the

268

next decade, estimates a need for 2,000 or more trained specialists over the next decade. (l) Arranging for the supply of such a pool of trained manpower, on a schedule commensurate with the need for It, will require a well-planned, coordinated and Intensive effort.

While

existing domestic educational programs and Institutions can play a significant role, It should be recognized that other resources will be needed. Of paramount importance Is the assignment of responsibility for the overall planning for and coordination of the various training efforts. accomplished in several ways.

Education and training can be

Some of It may be done by establishing a training center

for scientists, engineers, and technicians at {or In conjunction with) a nuclear research center or a university research center.

Staff and facilities of the latter would be available

both to participate directly in some of the training and to serve as expert advisors to those directing the training program. Some training can be arranged in cooperation with the foreign industrial groups supplying major equipment and/or fuel, _and with the governmental organizations and training programs in supplier countries.

On-the-job training can be provided as design,

construction, checkout, and operation of the initial project (s) proceed.

After completion

of the initial project on-the-job training can become much more Important.

And finally,

recruited staff can be trained by foreign schools (public or commercial), R&D centers, IAEA courses and seminars, and by contracting with commercial firms for the conduct of courses and training programs.

A possibility worthy of consideration is coordination of

such training programs with one or more other nations with similar needs, especially on a regional basis.

A key consideration in planning for overall manpower needs is that, while

much of the training can proceed in parallel with the developing nuclear program, key senior people in both the management and technical areas will have to be available well before program decisions are made and will themselves be Involved in guiding the selection and training programs for the growing staff requirements In the regulatory, industry, and uti I ity groups.

4.

LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY STRUCTURE

An area that has been a problem in some instances is lack of early attention to the need to enact legislation and establish regulatory structures for the health and safety of the public, provide for environmental protection, and responsibly discharge national and international obligations in relationship to the proper stewardship of nuclear materials and facilities. Vendors, in preparing their bids and specifications packages, must have a clear understanding of the health, safety, and environmental requirements which must be met in addition to more normal commercial requirements.

If regulations In these areas are unavai I able

or still evolving, the ensuing delay and negotiation of changes can be costly in dollars and disrupt project schedules. The establishment of legislation and regulatory requirements and structure is not an area requiring Innovation.

Satisfactory and well-established systems exist In a number

269

of nations of the world.

Many, in fact, are patterned after the systems established in the

United States or other nations with major nuclear programs.

Information about these sys-

tems is readily available and the task of adapting them to suit local needs should not pose a formidable problem.

Advice, assistance, and experience are to be found in the programs

of the IAEA, national, and industrial groups in supplier nations, and from other nations (including other developing countries) with successful programs.

The IAEA, for instance,

has recently begun a series of 15-week training courses for governmental and industrial personnel of member states.

The courses cover essentially all aspects from planning through

operation of nuclear projects and essentials of nuclear regulation.

The IAEA is also currently

compiling a catalog of training sources which exist in member states.

And, the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) periodically provides courses to explain the U.S. regulatory system and its functioning.

5.

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

A decision on the part of a nation to avail itself of the nuclear power option is not one which can be taken in isolation since it will require significant Interaction with other national governments, international bodies and Industrial firms in other countries.

The

planning for a nuclear program should take these relationships Into account in the decisionmaking process in order that international obligations are clearly understood and may be responsibly fulfilled and to prevent unanticipated obstacles or belated beginnings from delaying the program schedules.

Among the most important lr:iternatlonal implications are

those relating to government-to-government agreements permitting commerce in nuclear technology, materials and equipment. These agreements typically involve normal export-import type conditions and requirements but in addition, they include provisions to minimize concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. There have been increasing concerns on the part of a number of nations, suppliers and consumers alike, about the potential threat of both proliferation of nuclear weapons capabi I ities and terrorist activities.

These concerns are focussed primarily on the poten-

tial spread of "sensitive" technologies and facilities, such as enriching and reprocessing, which can lead to direct access to materials suitable for nuclear explosives.

Nations have

become increasingly aware that loss of control over nuclear technology could adversely affect nuclear industry and commerce worldwide.

This would be disadvantageous to us all

in restricting the use of a viable alternative source of energy. It has long been accepted that a decision to pursue peaceful applications of nuclear energy carries with it an obligation to guard against unauthor-ized possession and use of certain nuclear materials.

Consequently, ~ny nation importing certain nuclear tech-

nologies, materials or facilities is required to forswear the use of them for nuclear explosives use and to agree to an international nuclear safeguards regime.

270

This involves

national commitments, on a bilateral basis, with the supplier nation(s) and on a multi-lateral basis involving the IAEA.

These commitments provide for a strict accountability system for

certain materials and related transactions and for access by the IAEA to facilities and stores of materials for inspection purposes.

The agreement with the Agency will include provision

for the right to approve facility designs, from a safeguards point of view, and to install surveillance equipment. In view of increasing world concerns about proliferation, it must be expected that such constraints may increase, at least as they relate to some aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, consequently each nation must weigh the imp I ications of the restraints and conditions required by other nations and international bodies on its sovereign prerogatives and national objectives for assured energy supplies and evaluate the commitment and effort to establish a national regime capable of complying with international requirements and meeting national pub I ic protection objectives. On a bilateral basis, the U.S. and others require an importing country to provide, additionally, physical security protection for some materials to guard against terrorist or other unlawful actions.

While the IAEA does not exercise responsibility for national

physical security programs it has pub I ished recommended standards for such systems. The nuclear supply conditions of most exporting nations are quite similar and thus, negotiation of compatible agreements should present no great obstacles. considerable time is required for such negotiations and their ratification.

However, This should be

taken into account in the planning of a national program with particular attention to the implementing procedures which will govern the actual import of equipment and materials, 6.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

In some countries, existing legislation or infrastructure may make obvious the allocation of responsibility for the undertaking of a nuclear program and the initiating project. other cases, this may not be so.

This issue needs to be addressed early.

In

Competition

and disagreements between involved groups could jeopardize the management and coordination of the overall effort. For project implementation to proceed smoothly, there must be a firm commitment to proceed with the program on the part of top officials, clearly established lines of authority, and strong efforts to coordinate the national and commercial interests.

This

was recently underlined in a report of experience by Mexican officials in connection with 2 the first nuclear project in that country. ( ) Costly and time-consuming delays resulted from lack of such clear-cut designation of authority, changes in management, and a lack of firm commitment on the part of top national officials.

be

While such problems cannot always

avoided, every effort should be made to resolve issues well in advance of project com-

mitments.

The resulting schedule slippage is not only economically costly but affects the

overall power installation schedule.

271

INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES

7.

A single, large nuclear project entails a capital cost of hundreds of millions of dollars--in fact, a 1,000 MWe plant, or larger, can have a total cost in excess of $1 bil I ion.

A large

share of these costs are for conventional labor, building materials, services, construction and assembly labor, and other items which are not necessarily imported or even unique to the nuclear industry.

Even when, for the initial projects, a country intends only to en-

gage in the construction and operation of nuclear plants arranged for under so-called turnkey contracts, there are normally very significant subcontracts let to local industry. In the fulfilling of these obligations, the industries involved will find themselves working to standards and requirements to which they may not be accustomed.

In addition to .the

need for new and high-level skills, they will be called upon to institute quality control programs and will be subject to quality assurance inspections and checks of a rigorous

nature. Decisions on the extent of initial domestic industrial participation should be made in the light of domestic capabilities and the most efficient allocation of the nation's resources. In some cases it may be prudent to delay procurement of equipment or services domestically until one or two projects are operational. Some countries will find it attractive, later in their program, to encourage the participation of their own industries not only in design activities and construction and equipment supply for reactor projects, but also in some aspects of the related fuel cycle. In most cases where nations initially implement a program by importing special equipment and all fuel cycle supplies and services, many may eventually seek to limit the capital

outflow by increasing the amount of domestic industry participation.

The technical

feasibility and economic attraction of such participation, is determined by evaluating both the current status, and the technical growth potential of domestic industries and the associated capital requirements. Over the long term, increasing participation in future projects and in fuel cycle activities, such as uranium conversion and fuel fabrication will depend upon the continued development of industrial capabi I ities and the development of relationships with foreign supply groups for the transfer of suitable technology under llcenses or other arrangements.

While increasing participation should not change total

costs significantly, it can appreciably change the balance of payments aspects of the nuclear program.

And the foreign exchange requirements can be important since an individual nuc-

lear power project is likely to be the largest single capital project to be undertaken by a developing country. In order to bring about successful, timely participation on the part of domestic Industry it will be necessary to determine, well in advance, the ultimate desired industrial capabilities and to plan carefully for their development on an appropriate time schedule. Proposals to undertake commitments before such capabilities are well In hand should be weighed carefully.

272

The important point to be underlined here is a clear designation of responsibility for the planning and implementing activities necessary to develop the industrial capabilities needed to meet the domestic participation goals decided upon.

Only if this responsibi I ity

is delineated and exercised effectively and early will domestic industrial support be available to meet the power program schedules.

8.

SELECTION OF REACTOR TYPE

Though there are a number of reactor types currently operating in the world as central station power plants, the choice faced by a nation embarking upon a new nuclear power program is not as broad as this would imply. basic types offered commercial iy today.

Practically speaking, there are only two

These are the I ight water reactor (LWR), in two

variations--PWR and BWR, and the natural uranium fueled heavy water reactor.

In the

future, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors and breeder reactors may be available but current reactor types are expected to dominate the market unti I the end of the century. The choice between LWR's and natural uranium fueled reactors has major program implications, since the fuel cycle requirements are quite different.

The principal point

is that the choice made is one with long-term consequences, since it is a choice that should be made for a whole program and not on a project-by-project basis.

Both the basic reactor

technology and the fuel cycle services and technology are significantly different.

An attempt

to mix reactor types in a single new program directly impinges upon the planning associated with developing technological proficiency, training manpower, providing the required industrial capabi I ity, arranging for the fuel and fuel cycle services, and oversight of the planning for and construction of power projects involving different reactor types. Since the reactor type selection is, in essence, a program decision, as opposed to a project decision, it should be made on a national basis with full participation of appropriate governmental, industrial, and utility groups since these wil I al I be initimately involved in the implementation of the decision.

If this course is followed, the decision on reactor type

can be made prior to the process of issuing project bid specifications. Factors which should be taken into account in making the programmatic decision on reactor type include-(1) the record of reliability of existing plants (2) the past performance and capabi I ity of suppliers (3) the relative economics in terms of both total and foreign exchange costs for the projected lifetime of plants (4) the number of qualified suppliers (as a measure of competition) (SJ the availability of financing (6) the potential for local participation over the long term (7) the kind and amount of training programs which are available (8) the availability of fuel cycle services (9) the development potential of the reactor type

273

While a nation may ultimately decide to utilize different reactor types in their nuclear power program, it is important that the decision to do so is taken with full awareness of the complexity introduced, since it may expand significantly the technical, Industrial, and manpower training requirements. In this regard, a few words on the minimum feasible powerplant size may be in order. In many developing nations the existing electrical distribution grid system may become a pacing item for the initiation of a nuclear power program.

In spite of some indications

that there might be a considerable market for small nuclear powerplants (such as the IAEA survey of the nuclear power market potential In developing countries) and the fact that smaller units could better match the needs of smaller national power grids, essentially the only standard plant sizes available today are in the 600 to 1,300 MWe electric range, with most plants being installed at 900 MWe or larger. The rule of thumb, in matching powerplant size to total distribution grid capacity, is that no single addition should comprise more than 10 percent of the total installed, interconnected capacity.

Practically, this implies that nuclear power is not suitable for

systems of less than 6,000 MWe of total capacity.

In a rapidly growing system, however,

it may be technically and economically viable to exceed the rule of thumb guide by a factor of two or so and accept the penalty of operaUng a facility at a derated power level for a few years until the full generation capacity can be absorbed on the more efficient base-loaded, full power operation basis without exceeding the reliability risk for the total system.

9.

QUALITY CONTROL (QC) AND QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) PROGRAMS

In order to meet the high standards demanded by the nuclear industry In both fabrication and assembly activities, operation and maintenance, industrial groups, construction firms, craftsmen, and supervisory and management personnel associated with the nuclear program, will be faced with demands to control the quality of products and performance at an unprecedentedly high standard level.

This need not be inordinately

expensive, nor is there anything magic or exotic about the techniques commonly utilized to bring about a rigorous control of quality.

Little in the way of Innovative management

or practice is necessary as effective program·s are in effect in a number of nations and industrial organizations throughout the world.

What is necessary is recognition by the

responsible authorities that inauguration of effective QA and QC programs are necessary for al I construction, assembly, and operation phases and that Indeed these activities are among the most cost-effective Investments In the entire program in terms of assuring a reliable end product and minimizing delays to replace defective equipment. It is quite possible, particularly for an Initial project, to "buy" a QA surveillance capability from a consultant firm and this may well be desirable if there is any possibility that adequate domestic capabilities cannot be available to meet the schedule for that first project--which often taxes national capabilities simply because there are so

274

many firsts and so little experience to serve as guides.

In the long run, however, a

nation should have a purely domestic capability with strong QC programs in industrial groups and QA capabilities In both the customer utilities and the Government regulatory organization In order to assure safe and reliable facilities which operate with minimum downtime and least overall cost.

An excellent means of acquiring the requi-

site national capability is to arrange to have the necessary training programs in parallel with the QA and QC activities for the initial plants so that trainees can actually participate In these and obtain some hands-on experience with the programs in which they will work and for which they will be responsible.

The training program effort

can either be arranged with the consultant group which Is implementing the QA and QC programs for the first project, or with another group. With regard to the industrial application of QA and QC programs, it is my view that one of the most neglected, but vital, aspects is that of "selling" the corporate management on the concept that these are vital activities from the viewpoint of the nuclear program and are in fact cost-effective for the industrial operation itself since they upgrade the quality and reliability of the product or service and hence raise its value. The drive to assure proper quality must originate at the highest echelons of all involved organi zatlons.

10. FUEL CYCLE ARRANGEMENTS Nuclear fuel cycle production faci Ii ties are costly and more complex than those of other, more conventional energy systems.

To provide for the operation of a nuclear power

program arrangements must be made for each plant for procurement of the basic fuel material, uranium, for the various physical and chemical steps Involved in the processing and fabrication of fresh fuel, for reprocessing and/or interim storage of spent fuel, and for the ultimate disposition (including protection) of the packaged radioactive fuel or the separated wastes.

As I noted earlier, some of these arrangements may in-

volve operations which are sensitive from a proliferation point of view, which will introduce some complications or tend to limit options.

Each of the phases of the fuel

cycle will necessitate ascertaining sources of supply In the world market, comparing prices and other supply considerations, negotiating contracts (normally long term and, at least for the vital uranium and enriching services, normally for the economic life of each project), and arranging transportation and financing sources.

In most cases,

except for the initial cores which may be supplied by the primary reactor contractor, supply arrangements will involve dealing with a number of firms, often in several nations. The point I stress is that initiation of activities to establish these supply arrangements will be time-consuming, and will involve a number of groups and jurisdictions within the country and abroad.

These activities must begin early, in relation to plant

schedules, In order to assure reliability of supplies and services and to

avoid

start-up

275

delays.

The experience of other nations can serve as a guide but each nation's domestic

resources and capabilities will result in a different set of perceived options and the resulting decision requirements.

11. FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS

Another area that will require early and serious consideration is that of financing requirements, both for the domestic portion and for Imports.

The advent of increased

oil prices since 1973 has resulted in more emphasis on not only use of nuclear power but also on development and use of indigenous sources, such as hydropower and coal. All of these are more capital intensive than the continued reliance on oil-fired powerplants and the result is that the financial requirements of all central station power production activities are expected to rise as a fraction of total financing requirements. 3 A study ( ) reported last year indicated that the power-related foreign capital requirements for all LDC's might be of the order of $60 billion through 1985, and that nuclear power projects could account for about $12 billion of this.

Information since then

indicates these projections may be too high. Traditionally, 60 percent of the funding for nuclear projects has been supplied by public sources and the balance by private lending institutions. Public, sources usual-ly offer more attractive terms, I.e., somewhat lower interest rate and longer repayment periods.

While there Is not expected to be a serious lack

of sources for funding well-justified projects, it is anticipated that the 60/40 proportion may be reversed over the next decade or so--and this will affect both the total costs and the timing of repayment (and hence the need for foreign exchange currency) due to 4 the different lending rates and maturing times between public and private sources. ( ) In making decisions on lending arrangements for specific projects, lending institutions consider the overall performance of a country in managing its economy, particularly its balance of payments, international reserves, and national budget.

Therefore,

it is imperative that the total national financing structure of the nation come under careful scrutiny by those responsible for power and other planning.

And since private

sources of funding are expected to become increasingly important, early contacts with such institutions to identify options and problems are essential. Assuming that good financial planning can provide reasonable assurance of creditworthiness, there should be no major problem- with availability of funds.

The U.S.

Export-Import Bank, for instance, has provided significant financial support for nuclear power projects in a number of countries both in the form of direct loans and through guarantees of loans from commercial sources.

Some other nations also have similar

export promotion institutions which may make loans available. The larger problem in providing for the financial requirements of power programs may well be that of providing the domestically funded portion since the expected

276

growth in power financing requirements, as a portion of total national financing requirements, will necessitate diversion from other areas of need in the domestic economy.

Experience has shown that the financing problems of utilities have been

due more to inadequate domestic financing than to lack of availability of foreign loans.

12. PUBLIC INFORMATION ANO EDUCATION An area of considerable importance, which directly affects power programs in general and the exercise of the nuclear power option in particular, is that of public acceptance.

Increasingly, over the last few years there has been growing public aware-

ness and concern with matters which affect public health and safety, and the environment.

Too often public bodies with responsibilities for affected programs have been

caught unprepared and find themselves in the position of reacting to pressures and established positions in attempts to reverse developing trends. The necessity for keeping the public well informed about nuclear energy matters is more important than in some other areas due to the uniquely high visibility of nuclear matters. There have been many questions raised concerning safety, reliability of plants, economics, environmental effects relative to other energy forms, and the ultimate disposal of radioactive wastes.

In large part, many misconceptions have arisen as

the result of a failure to keep the public fully and accurately informed.

However, it

should be recognized that part of the problem has been the lack of availability of good technical and economic information in some critical areas such as reprocessing, recycle of uranium and/or plutonium, radioactive waste processing and waste disposal. The best base for a national information program is first hand knowledge resulting from assessments made in connection with the planned power program.

These assess-

ments will be needed to provide assurance that public health and safety will be adequately protected and that environmental considerations are taken into account.

While individual

assessments for specific projects will be made also, generic assessments on a national basis should be made during the program planning phase and the information developed used in the pub I ic information program.

Such national, generic assessments will

also comprise the base for later site-specific assessments. Key factors in a pub I ic information and education program are-(1) to find ways to present technical issues accurately and honestly in language and concepts readily understood by the public. (2) to recognize that there are several "publics" of concern Including the general public, the technical community, and those living in or near the vicinity being considered for a nuclear facility.

(These differ primarily· in the degree of

detail and attention they may be due.) (3) to recognize that there will be opposition groups, as there are to any new

277

program with the potential of affecting the public. (4) to keep the safety and environmental consideration In perspective with other energy resource uses and human activities. For these and other reasons, it is desirable to establish responsibility for coordination of a public information program at the national level, but insulated from pressure groups in either direction to insure freedom of action.

It Is important that the program

be handled competently, and initiated very early in the overall program.

This is an effort

which must be viewed as a long-term, ongoing effort to keep pace with developing technology, program growth and changing public perceptions of costs and benefits from nuclear power in the context of social, economic, and political goals. This is another area in which there is experience to draw from.

There are public

information programs developed and developing in a number of nations in the world, including some of the developing nations.

The IAEA can be of considerable assistance

by making_ avai I able a broad range of informational material on most aspects of nuclear technology, including pamphlets and other literature for public dissemination, and technical studies on nuclear power, the environment, waste management, safety, safeguards, etc., designed for the more sophisticated segments of the public or for use by those designing information for the general public.

Upon request, the IAEA also

will provide advice and assistance in setting up and planning a public information program and assist in providing answers to specific questions which may arise. Public information and education Is a matter in which we all have a common stake and in which we should cooperate.

I think you wi 11 find, for instance, that

both governmental groups in supplier nations and vendors of nuclear power equipment and fuel cycle services or fuel, will be more than willing to supply information which can be helpful in this regard.

It is also an area in which there would seem to be

considerable merit in working with others, perhaps on a regional basis, to maximize effectiveness, to profit by the experiences of others, and to minimize the effort to develop materials and the means to convey Information to the pub I ic.

13. CONCLUSION In sum, it Is my view that the leadership in any nation giving consideration to the nuclear option must recognize that while there are advantages of nuclear power as an energy source, there are significant costs, implications of long-term commitment, and serious International obligations encompassed in such a commitment.

These must all

be weighed in the context of each individual nation's needs, goals, and resources. And the efficient implementation of a nuclear power program is only possible with thorough and timely planning and clear-cut designation of authorities and responsibi lltles. In the case of nuclear power, the watch word might well be Caveat Emptor, but with a slight variation in translation--Buyer Be Aware!

278

14. REFERENCES (1) Nuclear Power Program in Korea, Hoe Lee, ANS Proceedings, The First Pacific Basin Conference on Nuclear Power Development and Recycle, October 1976. (2) Building a Nuclear Power Program, paper by Velez and Viqueira (presented by Sefchovlch), ANS International Conference, November 1976. (3) Financing Energy in Developing Countries, Efrain Friedman, Energy Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1976. (4) Ibid.

279

INDIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM M. R. SRINIVASAN Director, Power Projects Engineering Division Department of Atomic Energy Bombay, India

ABSTRACT The Indian nuclear power program commenced with the construction of a power station consisting of two boiling water reactors each with an output of about 200 MW. This project was executed on the basis of a turnkey type contract by an American Company. The second nuclear ·power station consisting of two reactors with an output of 200 MW each of the pressurized heavy water type was taken up as a joint Inda-Canadian venture. In this instance, while Canada supplied the designs and some of the equipment, India retained the responsibility for project management and construction and installation activities on site. For the second unit of this station a significant number of specialized components including nuclear components have been fabricated in India. For the third nuclear power station, complete responsibility for engineering, design and manufacture of equipment rests with India. A number of novel design concepts have been adopted in this instance. Following this station, work has been initiated on a fourth nuclear power station also consisting of two reactors of 235 MW each. In this instance new designs for a seismic site have been evolved. Work is also in progress on the design of a 500 MW reactor, a number of which are expected to be built in the period after 1985. Efforts made in the country over the last ten years relating to the manufacture of various components required for the nuclear power stati ans and the success achieved are described in the paper.

1.

India at present has three reactor power plants each of approximately 200 MW capacity,

in operation and five units of about the same size in various stages of construction, installation and commissioning (see Table No.1}. The first atomic power station consists of two boiling water reactors and was built by an American Company under a turn-key type contract. Subsequent reactors are all of the heavy water type; one such reactor is at present in operation. The preference for heavy water reactor is based on the fact that they can be fuelled with uranium resources available in the country. These reactors, having high neutron economy, are efficient burners of uranium. Moreover, this reactor system was found to be espe.cially suitable from the point of view of manufacture of components within the country. At the time the first nuclear power station was taken up for implementation, the enriched uranium systems of the American type were economically more competitive and hence the choice of boiling water reactors for that station.

280

Table 1.

Station/R eactor Unit

Indian Nuclear Power Program upto 1982

Location

Reactor Type

Pow er G ross MWe

TAPS - 1 & 2

Ta rapur, Maharashtra

BWR

2

X

RAPS - l & 2

Kota, Rajas than

PHWR

2

MAPS - l & 2

Kalpakkam Tamil Nadu

PHWR

2

NAPS - l & 2

Narora, Uttar Pradesh

PHWR

2

2.

Year of

Criticality

210

1969

X

220

1972 & 1977

X

235

197 8 & 1980

235

1981 & 1982

X

Global tendering in connection with the first nuclear power station provided us with

an opportunity for examining the economic feasibility of the alternative natural uranium reactor system. It was evident that the graphite gas cooled reactors which during the sixties were being bui It in the U. K. and France appeared quite uneconomical. About the same time as we were negotiating for our first nuclear power station (1962-64) a joint study with Canada was initiated to look into the technical and economic feasibility of constructing in India a heavy water type power plant, similar to the one then being built in Canada. Work was initiated on both the first and second nuclear power stations (at Tarapur near Bombay and at Rana Pratap Sagar in Rajasthan) at about the same time in 1964. The two reactors at Tarapur went into operation in 1969, a year after the initially contracted construction period of 52 months for the two reactors.

The delay of one year

in the completion of the project was due to rectification of cladding defects in the pressure vessel noticed at the time of commissioning and due to replacing the tubes of the secondary steam generators by tubes made of material less susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. But for these unexpected problems the reactors would probably have been completed in 52 months as visualized in the contract. Looking back, it may be noted that this construction period had been very short and is a tribute to the effective management both on the part of the main contractor and the owner. 3.

The first heavy water reactor unit at Rajasthan became critical for the first time

in August 1972. However, due to problems encountered with the turbine bearings, regular power supply into the grid system was delayed until April 1973. Thereafter the unit has been operating but has experienced three turbine blade failures, which have affected the.availability of the unit adversely. The three turbine blade failures took place in 1974, 1975 and 1976 and resulted in rather long outages. At present the unit is operating fairly

281

satisfactorl ly though at reduced output as one of the high pressure stages of the bladlng has been removed.

Over the last four and a half years of operation, considerable amount

of experience in heavy water reactor operation has been accumulated.

At the time the

design of this unit was finalized, the first 200 MW Canadian reactor had not yet gone into operation and hence a number of design deficiencies which showed up during initial operation had to be made good.

An important feature of the operation to-date is the successful

on-power fuelling of the reactor; so far 465 channels have been refuel led on-load. ence in fuel performance has also been extremely good.

Experi-

A major problem that has received

considerable attention relates to heavy water management.

The economic success of heavy

water type reactors depends on control of heavy water leak from the systems and the effectiveness of recovery systems. 4.

The 200 MW units of our first and second nuclear power stations although small in

comparison to the much larger single units now being installed in parts of U.S., Europe and even in Iran, have been the largest single units in the grid systems into which they are feeding.

In the case of our second nuclear power station at Rajasthan, the capacity

of the system was initially only 375 MW (excluding the nuclear unit) and there were many instances of grid col lapse following an outage of the reactor

Over the last two years,

however,·the grid Into which this reactor has been feeding, has been interconnected with adjacent systems having a capacity of 2000 MW and this has improved the quality of the grid. However, on certain occasions, the reactor was called upon to feed rather remote loads during which periods the voltage conditions in the system were not satisfactory . The load pattern that obtains in the Northern Region into which the second nuclear power station feeds Is strongly influenced by climatic conditions.

For example

when Irrigation pumping is at its peak, the reserve capacity available in the system is very small.

Due to inadequate provision of under frequency load shedding devices

and inadequate spinning reserve, forced outage of any of the generating units has given rise to low frequencies and cascade tripping.

There have also been instances

when due to good rains in the irrigation period, there is a sudden drop in power demand, thus giving rise to high frequency conditions.

Due to the distributed nature of loads

encountered in the India': systems, problems of a kind not encountered in power systems in North America and Western Europe have to be contented with.

Special efforts

.have to be put in on management of reactive KVA by providing synchronous condensers and shunt reactances at appropriate locations in the grid system.

5.

The second unit of the second atomic power station (at Rajasthan) is now under

commissioning.

In this instance many of the major components such as calandria,

boilers, end shields and fuelling machines were all manufactured In India.

There

has, no doubt, been a stretch in the schedule of the project as a result of the extensive program of manufactur inq within the country.

At the time it was decided to

manufacture thes.e components In India the experience avallabie In the manufacturing

282

shops that were selected for the purpose related to manufacture of cement plants, sugar plants, hydraulic turbines or chemical plant equipment.

Experience in the

fabrication of heavy carbon steel and stainless steel equipment was quite limited. Nevertheless the manufacturers mobilized themselves to handle the tasks and along with the support that was rendered by the Department of Atomic Energy they were able to execute these jobs successfully. 6.

In 1969-70 a decision was taken to embark on the third nuclear power station in

the country, also using two reactors of the heavy water type.

It was then decided

that this project would be taken up for execution with full responsibility for design, manufacture, construction, installation and commissioning resting with Indians.

The

Power Projects Engineering Division of the Department of Atomic Energy was constituted and given the responsibility for the project.

Responsibility for nuclear design

was retained as an in-house function and established Indian Consulting Engineers were engaged for rendering engineering services in the conventional areas of the plant.

Indigenous manufacture of components both nuclear and non-nuclear was pur-

sued vigourously and included such special items as calandria tubes (using zircaloy strips produced in the country), coolant channels (using zircaloy sponge produced within the country) and many other such special components.

The Power Projects

Engineering Division has set up an extensive quality control and inspection group to fol low up manufacture in different shops in the country.

7.

Early in 1974, a decision was taken to proceed with the fourth nuclear power

station at a site near Delhi.

In this instance also, it was decided to build a station

with two heavy water reactors each of 235 MW capacity.

This site is located in a

seismic zone and hence a complete re-design of the plant as a whole was undertaken. The operating basis earthquake corresponds to a peak ground acceleration of O. 15g and the safe shutdown earthquake corresponds to O. 3g.

The station employs a com-

plete double containment design and approaches a zero discharge concept from the point of view of radioactivity discharge into the environment.

Design principles that

are proposed to be used in future 500 MW reactors such as use of larger size components and fewer circuits have been employed.

All components small and big, both

nuclear and non-nuclear· will be produced in Indian shops.

8.

in the early stages of the program, it was necessary for the Department of Atomic

Energy to persuade manufacturers to get into the difficult business of manufacturing nuclear components.

Over the years it has been seen that an increasing number of

manufacturers and component suppliers have been anxious to get into this activity. This enthusiasm has been largely due to the desire to up-date their own manufacturing technologies as a result of executing nuclear jobs, rather than to considerations of commercial benefits.

Table 2 shows the number of manufacturers who have been

283

qualified for some of the major nuclear equipment.

In some instances especially pre-

cision machined components, developmental effort involved was so extensive that the Central Workshop

of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre has been entrusted with the

task.

Table 2.

Qua Ii fied Suppliers for Nuclear Components

Component

9.

Number of suppliers

End shields

3

Calandria

3

Fuelling machines

2

Reactivity Mechanisms

2

Table 3 presents information on the man-hours required for the manufacture of

two nuclear components, namely dump tank and calandrla, both involving precision fabrication and machining in austenltic stainless steel.

Three sets of each component

were fabricated by the same manufacturer and one may see the improvement in productivity measured in terms of the number of fabrication hours.

Table 3.

284

Notwithstanding the bene-

Manhours for Fabrication of Two Large Nuclear Components

Project •

Dump Tank

Calandria

RAPP-2

75, 000

12.p. 000

MAPP-1

66,000

85,000

MAPP-2

55.000

65, 000

fits of such repeated manufacture, as a matter of policy, com petition has been introduced so that no single m anufacturer could extract an undue price from the Departm ent.

10. It is proposed to standardize the 235 MW reactors as used at Narora and construct som e more units of the sam e size.

W ork In parallel is proceeding on a 500 MW reactor

design which is expected to becom e available in the latter half of the eighties.

It is

recognized that standardization of design is essential not only to control equipm ent costs but also to m inim ize construction and installation tim e, thus containing the im pact of interest during construction.

Although it is generally held that capital costs of nuclear

pow er plants of sm all sizes are high, our experience to-date indicates that the cost per kW installed of nuclear pow er stations under construction in India is indeed low er than costs reported currently for reactors in the size range of 1000 to 1300 MW , under construction in som e other parts of the world.

The fact that all engineering and m anufacture

of com ponents is done in India has resulted in keeping inflationary costs to a m inim um . The cost in engineering has been held to a particularly low value as may be seen from Table-4.

Table-5 gives details of m an-hours of Engineers/Scientists for design in the

conventional and nuclear areas and for construction and com m issioning for the Narora Atom ic Pow er Project w here considerable new engineering effort is involved; these figures, however, exclude tim e spent directly on developm ental activities. noticed that approxim ately 5 m i 11 ion m an-hours of effort are involved.

It will be

The relatively

low w age rates prevailing and availability of trained indigenous m an-pow er have no doubt contributed to this favorable situation.

Table 4.

Cost of Engineering as a Percentage of Total Project Cost

Project

%

RAPP-1

14. 6

RAPP-2

12. 7

MAPP - l & 2

4. 5

NAPP - l & 2

5, 7

New Project Units l & 2

4.4

285

Table 5. Manpower Estimate for Engineering 2 x 235 MW Atomic Power Station at Narora Manhours of engineering for design, planning and procurement in Nuclear areas

1,320,000

Manhours of engineering for design, planning and procurement in Conventional areas

750, 000

Manhours of engineering in cons true tion

2, 145, 000

Manhours of engineers and scientists in commissioning

900,000

Total

5,115,000

11. In conclusion it may be stated that capabi I ity for design and manufacture of both nuclear steam supply system and balance of plant on the conventional side has been established.

Facilities have also been established for the supply of nuclear fuel and

control and instrumentation equipment. An immediate constraint to a rapid expansion of nuclear capacity is that of financial resources.

However, in due course of time when

a larger share of national investment is avai I able for such capital intensive projects, we may expect a rapid increase in the installation of nuclear capacity.

286

AN INDICATOR FOR THE ECONOMIC APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

NARISA NAN-YEE CHU and GLENN MURPHY Iowa State University Ames, Iowa 50011 U.S.A.

ABSTRACT

Nuclear technology provides the broad scientific and engineering basis for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

These applications include the production of electricity,

desalination, high temperature metals manufacturing, radioisotope utilization, fertilizer application, insect disinfestation and breeding of new varieties; wood processing and medical therapeutics.

Among these, the use of nuclear energy for the production of elec-

tricity is one of the major applications, and one requiring relatively high capital expenditure. In some instances, the glamour and potential of nuclear technology as a status symbol of modernization has overshadowed practicality.

Before proceeding blindly the prospective

owner should conduct an analysis of benefit versus cost for the nuclear installation in contrast to that for the conventional alternatives. The objective of this paper is to outline the development of and to present a quantitative indicator for effective and economical usage of nuclear technology.

It is expected that this

quantitative indicator would be of particular value to a developing country considering the possibility of investing in a specific application of nuclear energy.

The indicator does

not include all socio-technological aspects of the introduction of nuclear power, but concentrates on the economic aspects.

1 .

METHODOLOGY

A matrix equation (1) DX= G is formed to contain the significant elements related to investment and production.

.. _

>-

L.

L.

Ol

~

V::l 'O C

Q)

'O rtJ L.

I-

rtJ

:l

.! a. u:l :l

zo

C rtJ

l)

Labor Materials Capital (1)

The coefficient matrix D is composed of the difference in cost of labor, material and

287

capital expenditures between a nuclear facility and a conventional alternative.

The vector

Xis the magnitude of the output from the nuclear facility to be utilized In each segment of application.

The summation of elements of the G matrix indicates the total monetary gain

to be expected from the specific nuclear technology being Investigated, I.e. G = 91 + 92 + 93 = (d tt + d21 + d31lx1 + (d12 + d22 + d33lx2 + (d13 + d23 + d33lx3

(i)

Since d's are the cost difference between two forms, if Cc is designated for the cost

c" for that in a nuclear plant, Eq. (2) becomes: CCC n n cc12CCC + c + c Jx + rc + c + c Jx - cc + c + 22 32 2 13 11 23 33 3 21

required in a conventional facility and G =

cc11CCC + c + c Jx 21 31 1

+

n n n n n n n C31lx1 - (C12 +C22 +C32lx2 - (C13 +C23 +C33lx3

(3)

A positive value of G indicates that the nuclear installation is economically advantageous in comparison with its conventional counterpart.

Attention will now be directed to

those factors included in the costs.

1. 1 Principal Variables

The significant factors are summarized in Table I with their symbols, dimensions, and units of measurement. Table 1

1 .

2.

CL= cost of land = C£A where A = Area of land for factory

L2

2 (km )

and C£ = Unit cost of land

YL- 2

2 {$/km )

YT-1

($/yr)

s L = Labor cost= l: N. w. i=i I I where Ni= number of employees in each group needed in a factory

{no. of persons)

Wi = annual wage for each group of labor

YT-1

($/person/yr)

YT-1

($/yr)

and I = 1, 2, 3, ... S 3

3.

S = Cost of feed materials =

_l:

Ri cR.

where Ri = Annual amount ot=~aw malerials fed Into the factory FT-l

{tons/yr)

= 2 = Radioisotopes

FLT- 2

(Cl/yr)

= 3 = Processing materials

FT-l

(tons/yr)

= Unit cost of fissile fuel

YF-l

($/ton)

i = 1 = Fissile Fuel

"'Unit cost of radioisotopes

=

288

Unit cost of processing material

YF-lL-tT YF-l

($/Ci) ($/ton)

4.

Co= Construction cost of the building

5.

0 = Annual production cost includes

and equipment

y

($)

($/yr)

depreciation, interim replacement, license fee, liability insurance, property insurances, property taxes, 6.

r = Present worth factor

YT-l T-1

7,

r D = Domestic interest rate

T-1

(%/yr)

8.

rF = Foreign loan interest rate

T-1

(%/yr)

CD = Domestic capital

y

($)

y

($)

y

($/yr)

YT-1

($/yr)

YT-l

($/yr)

YT-l

($/yr)

YT-l

($/yr)

nuclear facility

FLT

(kwh)

Lf = Station capacity factor

-

maintenance and operating supplies

9.

C

10. CF= Foreign capital (foreign loan)

(%/yr)

C = CD + CF = The capital investment includes expenses of the first load of raw material, factory structures and equipment, construction facilities, engineering services, safety devices, pub I ic information and contingency. Sources of money come from domestic capital, export surplus, or avai I able foreign loan. 11. In = Interest due to foreign and domestic loans = rDCD + rFCF 12. PA= Annual total agricultural productivity increase because of participation of nuclear technology 13. P = Annual total industrial productivity 1 increase because of participation of nuclear technology 14. PT= Annual trade increase because of participation of nuclear technology 15. IE= Sale of electricity generated out of the nuclear power plant= CeLf where E = Electricity generated from the

Ce= Unit electricity price

(%) YF-l L-lT-l (mi 1 ls/kwh)

16. lw = Sale of desalted water produced from the nuclear desalination plant= CwW

YT-l

($/yr}

where W "' Annual amount of water produced 289

L3T-1

by nuclear desalting plant

YL-3

CW = Unit water price

3 (cm /yr) ($/m3)

17. IM = Sale of processed material through a radioisotope plant= CMR

3 where CM = Unit price of processed material 18. N = Plant Life

YT-1

($/yr)

YF-l

($/ton)

T

(yr)

Benefit-vs-Cost Ratio

1.1. 1

To evaluate the benefit-vs-cost ratio, it is assumed that every system may be considered in two parts as indicated In Fig.1.

The outer box (I) represents the overall system.

Annual

The

Annual Output

Input Ti Land CQst_ C

n L .~.(1 1.=1.

.

7

+ r )-1

Increased agricultural roductivit

C

Labor Cost

~

n -i L ).::'Cl_ _ ~- (1 + r c)

ales of lectricit

Fissile foe 1

Constru~tion Cos

Production Cost;;> 0

Increased industrial productivity ')

Radiation sour~r,uclear ales of water CR R2 \facilit cwW

pl

2

Interest on Loa~ n

Processing material

ales of processed aterial

➔

Increased trade ain

(II) I Fig, 7.

Two-Step Benefit Block Diagram

(I)

inner box (11) represents the method of·agent which performs the desired function of transformation.

In this instance, it is a nuclear facility.

its effectiveness T].

Its performance is measured by

It is assumed that T], or the effectiveness functions for the total system.

The functions for box (I) and (11) may be evaluated individually. ratio of benefit to cost can be expressed as:

(C

290

0

G + CF)

Output _ Sales - Production Cost = Tl Input - Tl Investment

lfT] is separable, the

L n

.

n l:(1

l: (Hr ) -t i=i

C

- +

C

+

0

r C ) -I

0-1

n

l=i

ri----------------------~ (Hr

0

J

-i

+

l:n (1

i=i

+ rF)

-i

i=i

The function of effectiveness is evaluated based on box (II) which is a sub-system embedded in Box (I).

One possible expression is

APPLICATION

Two developing countries -- Taiwan and India -- are taken for case studies. Taiwan, a project for a nuclear power plant located at Chinshan is evaluated.

In In

India, a proposal of a dual-purpose nuclear power plant in Kutch-Saurashtra region is investigated.

2. 1 Case Study 1:

Taiwan

Investment and production costs of the Northern Nuclear Plant No.

I are shown in

Table II. Based on Table II, the increasing productivity in each economic sector due to the nuclear ins ta I lation is envisaged as fol lows: For the increasing agricultural productivity pA PA=

E . Lf. fa E

= 97,119,684 NT$

C

Likewise, for the increasing industrial productivity and trade gain, respectively, one has

pl=

pl . E . Lf . fi E

7,307,317,000 NT$

C

PT=

PT . E . Lf. fi E

832,386,840 NT$

C

Substitution of the above economic data into Eq (5) provides: = 1 .363 X 2.684 = 3.6585 This positive result indicates that the adoption of a nuclear power plant at the site would be economically advantageous.

291

Table 2. Econom ic Data for the Evaluation of the First Northern Nuclear Plant in Taiw an. (l) 12 ) ( 3 )

Cost Constituents

Amount

A

Annual total value of agricultural product, PA

A

6,611,862,000 NT$/yr

Annual total value of industrial product, PI

41,335,955,000

NT$/yr

Annual total value of trade, ~T

12,201,638,000

NT$/yr

Total energy consumption, Ec

15171

Fraction of energy used in agriculture, f a

4.57%

Fraction of energy used in industry, f.i

55%

Fraction of energy used in trade, ft

21.4%

Foreign loan, CF

$79,700,000

Domestic loan c

15,212,000,000

0

GWh/yr

NT$

Interest on foreign loan, rF

8,125 %/yr

Interest on domestic loan, r0

8.5 %/yr

Interest paid for the total loan, In Plant

1,552,045,000 NT$/yr Northern Nuclear Plant #1

Plant rating

2

Plant output

1208 MWe

Annual production of electricity E

8127 GWh

X

636

MWe

Project costs including land, labor, capital costs, 18,400,000,000

NT$

Present worth factor

10%

Fixed charge Operation and maintenance

2,314,300,000 NT$/yr

Production cost, O

2,412,360,000

98,060,000

NT$/yr NT$/yr

Fuel cost, S

799,700,000

Unit electricity sale price, ce

0,4402

Capacity factor, Lf

60%

Sale cf electricity, ceLfE

2,146,503,200

gation life time, N

30 years

·2. 1 . 1

NT$/yr

Case Study 2: Kutch-Saurashtra Region, India

An agro-lndustriai complex project has been suggested.

292

NT$/yr

NT$/KWh

The total design capacity of

Table 3.

4 Economic Data of the Agro-Industrial Complex: Kutch-Saurashtra Region. ( )

Capital investment

l.

Plant

--

12.

t:

Foreign exchange (l0 6 Rs)

Total (l0 6 Rs)

Annual

Revenue

Expenses (l0 6 Rs)

from gales (10 Rs)

Power plant

545.0

2725.0

Water plant

117 .4

587.1

Total dual-purpose plant

662.4

3312,1

431.6

407.7

Fertilizer plants

406.8

1564.6

655.4

1138.0

Aluminum industry

208.3

544.2

209.8

270.0

5.

Caustic soda

28.3

70.4

28.0

33.S

f·

Marine chemicals

- - - -

9.9

4.3

8.9

Total industrial block

1305.8

5501.2

1329.l

1858.1

Water distrib~tion system

0.2

53.0

Agricultural block

-

213 .2

188

224.3

823.8 6591.2

1517.l

2082.4

i:

9.

to.

Transportation facilities

&

storage

- -

-

- - - 1306.0

Overall 1, Plant lifetime

25 years

the dual-purpose plant is proposed to be 1200 MW (e) of net saleable power and 6 3 0. 68 x 10 m /d (150 MGD) of desalted water. The agricultural block of the complex involves 16000 ha of cultivatable wasteland which would be reclaimed for cultivation. Table Ill gives the overall capital investment and annual expenses for the KutchSaurashtra project. Calculations proceed as fol lows: 6 PA= 224.3 x 10 Rs/yr P = 1858 x 10

6

1

Rs/yr

PT= 0 = 562 Rs/ha

c2

A = 16000 ha CL =

C

c2 A

= 8. 992

x 10 6 Rs

+ L + C

= 2725 + 587 + 1564.6 + 544.2 + 70.4 + 9.9 + 53 + 213.2 + 823.8 o 6 = 6591.2 x 10 Rs 6 0 = (1329.1 + 188) x 106 = 1517. 1 x 10 Rs/yr L

6

Cf = 1306 X 10

Rs

6 co+ 5285.2 x 10 Rs

= 6% 0 rF = 8% 6 1n = "o CD + rFCF= 421.59 x 10 Rs/yr

r

293

3

= . 487 Rs/m w 8 CwW = 1.208 x 10 Rs/yr

c

Ce= 0.3 Rs/Kwh Lf = 85% 8 C LfE = 26.8 x 10 Rs/yr e

S = (431.6 + 655.4 + 209.8 + 28 + 4.3) x 10

Substitution of the above data into Eq.

6

6 1329.1 x 10 Rs/yr

Rs/yr

(5) gives:

G = -1.864 The negative benefit-vs-cost ratio indicates that the dual-purpose nuclear plant would not be economical in comparison with alternatives.

CONCLUSIONS

An expression was developed for the factor of gain that may be evaluated for specific nuclear installations.

A positive value of the factor denotes economic feasibility of the

proposed ins ta I lation. The factor of gain as evaluated for a nuclear power plant at Chinshan in Taiwan is quite favorable (predicted at 3. 7 during a period of 30 years), while that of a dual-purpose nuclear plant in Kutch-Saurashtra in India, is not advantageous (a negative predicting value) . The inclusion of social and environmental factors into a quantitative evaluation on the adoption of nuclear technology has not been explored.

If such factors could be

included on a quantitative basis, it is believed that through this economic indicator, a decision could be reliably made.

The calculated benefit for a particular nuclear

technique differs from country to country as is shown in the two examples.

4.

REFERENCES

1.

The 1971 Industrial & Commercial Censues of Taiwan and Fukien Area, Republic of China, Vol. 111, IV, VI, 1973, Taipe, ROC. The Executive Yuan.

2.

Chu, S.L. Taiwan Nuclear Power Program 1969-1985. Vol. 1, 1975, Taipei, R.O.C. International Symposium on Nuclear Power Technology and Economics.

3.

Economic Planning Council.

Taiwan Statistical Data Book.

1974, Taipei, R.O.C.

The Executive Yuan. 4.

lya, V.K., Eapen, A.C., Krishnamurthy, K. Applications of Radioisotopes and Radiation Sources in Industry, Radiation Processing and Hydrology, Current Status in India.

Vol. 14, Pages 3-17, 1972, Geneva.

Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

294

Proc. of 4th International

NEW METHOD OF LONG RANGE OR VERY LONG RANGE DEMAND FORECAST OF ENERGY INCLUDING ELECTRICITY VIEWED FROM WORLDWIDE STANDPOINT

HAMAAKI AOKI

Electric Power Development Company Limited, Tokyo, Japan

1.

INTRODUCTION

It is very difficult technique-wise to make a long range forecast of demand for electric energy especially in the countries of semi-developed and developing stages.

In fact in

case of forecast for developing countries, some kind of strained reasoning can be made to apply one or two methods traditionally used in advanced countries (as has been the practice in the past), but there is no decisive method, viewed from a worldwide standpoint, to be found.

Furthermore, as to overall energy demand, it has not been studied

as much as electric power demand and the methods for electric power are only being used as expediencies throughout the world. As for the method referred to herein, "Gross National Product" is adopted as an index of ·"National Economy". There may be various other indexes such as mining and manufacturing index, mining and manufacturing added value, national income, index of industrial production, etc., but these are not compiled in very great detail in world statistics (especially for developing countries), while it is not possible to obtain such figures for future long range or very long range forecasts.

Even if detailed figures

were available they could very well be misleading in regard to the larger goal.

2.

PER CAPITA GNP GROWTH

Energy demand, including electric power, has a close interrelation with the national economy and neither one exists independent of the other.

In consideration of its be-

ing needed by the economic market as an important factor of the overall economy, it is an indispensable condition for the future national economy to be planned in forecasting the future energy demand. While the national economy contains elements which are decided of necessity by the nature of the people such as labor productivity, there are also on the other hand numerous factors which can be manipulated artificially and politically through financial, banking and investment policies and principles and through changes in industrial structure, which are brought about by social and economic demands, and by international demands or influences. artificially.

Contrarily energy demand itself cannot be directly regulated

In effect, the forecast of national economy (per capita GNP in this method)

295

SIZE

r:A ANNUAL GROWTH of PER CAPITA GNP

US $ 1968 PRICE

g

0

0

I

.\1. .1'~ ~-

l>
esordea Q) Cretaceous Oil Shale of Cear6, Outcrops, Crato Cretaoeoua Oil Shale of tJegoaa © Outcrops: Riacho Dooe - Caramagibe13ica da Serra

® © © ®

cretaoeoua 011 ~bale of Beb1a

Outcropas Kara! Tertiary Oil Shale of Sao Paulo Outcropa1 Para1ba Valle7 Oil Shale of Apyn>! Permian Oil Shale of Irati PQJ110tion

Fig. 7. Known Shale Deposits in Brazil

474

de Janeiro

uanbaN Sao Paulo

Cwitibca S6o Mat.us do Sul

Florionopolia

0

300 !500km Scale

Santo

Combustible Gases

~---------------iShale

Fr Suiter

Pyrolysis Vessel

Condenser

Cyclone

Oil Processing Gas l.ine

I

Process

--◄----'

Turbines

•

Steam Generator HT R.

He Line

Hz O Line

Pre- Heater

Pump

Fig. B. Process Diagram of Combined HTR, Petros ix and Steam Cycle System

475

a)

From the view point of technology the HT R w ith the PET ROSIX schem e seem s the sim plest of al I possible process heat applications in Brazi I.

The requirem ents for

tem perature of the processing gas (m axim um 700°C) and steam are well within the present HT R technology. b)

The econom ics of HT R coupling to PET ROSIX is highly dependent on the production cost of the shale oil itself since the basic idea is to substitute part of this oil by nuclear heat.

A detailed study of the cost com ponents is necessary before the

econom ics can be firm ly established. There appears, how ever, to be a large potential dem and for shale oil but again this is strongly dependent on future developm ents in petroleum prospection and production. National considerations m ight guarantee a dom estic m arket for the Brazilian shale oil and an im portant factor that could affect the scale of production is the grow th rate of the dom estic consum ption of oi I.

Fig. 9 show s the extrapolated dem and of the 1974 consum ption of

830,000 bbl/d at the rate of 2 and 4% per year until the year 2000.

A n estim ated dom estic

production of conventional oil in Brazil given by the Governm ent is 500,000 bbl/d in 1985 grow ing to 1,000,000 bbl/d in 1990, and then rem aining constant up to the end of the century. W hen assessing the likelihood of the projections it shouto be borne in m ind that the 2% p.a. increase in oi I dem and would correspond to a per capita constant consum ption.

For

a 2%/year grow th rate (low prediction) the deficit is 390,000 bbl/d in the year 2000.

For

a growth rate of 4%/year (high prediciton) the deficit could be as high as 1,320,000 bbl/d. If we assum e that from 1990 all the additional oil dem and is m et by shale oil extracted via nuclear heat, by the year 2000 for the low prediction case 250,000 bbl/d has to be supplied by shale oil plants based on HT R nuclear heat, equivalent to 6 GW . In the higher and more realistic dem and projection a shale oil capacity of 600,000 bbl/d would require 15 GW .

3. 3 Nuclear Process Heat for Petroleum Refining

It is more than likely that hydrocarbon fuels w ill show signs of depletion tow ards the end of the century and therefore natural petroleum should be reserved for m ore noble applications such as petrochem ical (feedstock) instead of using it to heat chem ical processes. The total process heat requred to feed a 100,000 bbl/d petroleum refinery is equivalent to burning 12,000 bbl/d of oi I.

For the various refining processes roughly 50% of the

energy is required in the tem perature range around 3S0°C , and 50% at tem peratures above 430°C .

These tem peratures are w el I within reach of the present HT R technology and

would w ork with increased efficiency w hen hydrogen is used in refining heavy oil com ponents to light hydrocarbons(lO). In the case of Brazil, although at present 80% of its consum ed oil is im ported, (total consum ption about 900,000 bbl/d) the petroleum refining capacity is above the dem and. 1974 the installed refinery capacity reached 956,000 bbl/d and further large capacity ex-

476

In

2500

1

// 2000

//

-

"'O

4%/Y

]5

.D (")

//

\' //

Deficit

~ 1500 ~

-

a,

/

a:: .Q

--- ------

//

0

C:

1.320.000 bbl/d

2 %/YeOJ-- ---

__. ~

1000

/f77///

0.

E

::,

::Oil

II)

C:

/ Predicted Domestic Production ✓/[Ministry of Commerce and In~ dustry. Brazil 1

0

u 500

0

--- 390.000 bbl/d Deficit

I

/

/

< 1975

1970


t)W~.

p~~)

COIJTeA.c.r

'ST(Ll-

O•S

frs vtvl>At-.1T,

U~~k11..L6P

A.,.s~~w, IN DlJS1R.y.

IHPoere-ti LTPX1;11.1'1

$1(\Ll~ 'TIZAt>-.~ s- .A.-+Jt>

V02

S.,t)

_Co 1-\ l'OIJE:NTS

- '\lT~

I I

-\XI!!

r

i ":)

PEc IRG- CoklTiZel~

.Coi-rri'!-DL.. A-N.D

(v

I\

ToL~t-JC-~S.

Fig. 3.

il • • · ..,- v ,•••••• .,

544

Nuclear Fuel

Manufacturing Package Deal: Information Levels

.fw=:~PE:~ le;'-"·

..,s :

~tili=1~110

b~vavf~ L001Jt~y. At/At\;,,\StttTY

~ f: I ~ Ft? RHkTr 01--l

(2)

t:XTe:t-11'

Fog

Fig. I/.

Available and

Required Information for Exothermic Development