International Journal of Comparative Sociology Religion as a factor in cultural consumption: Religious denomination and its impact on reading practices and ballet-opera attendance in Europe

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COS0010.1177/00207152221118627International Journal of Comparative SociologyRius-Ulldemolins et al.

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Religion as a factor in cultural consumption: Religious denomination and its impact on reading practices and ballet-opera attendance in Europe

IJ CS International Journal of Comparative Sociology 2023, Vol. 64(3) 225­–248 © The Author(s) 2022 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions https://doi.org/10.1177/00207152221118627 DOI: 10.1177/00207152221118627 journals.sagepub.com/home/cos

Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins University of Valencia, Spain

Alejandro Pizzi

University of Valencia, Spain

Raul Paya

University of Valencia, Spain

Abstract The influence of social and educational factors has often been used to explain social differences in consumption and cultural practices. Without denying the value of such an approach, this article examines the impact of religious denomination and its influence in shaping cultural practices. Our article argues the need for a macro-social, longue durée [long-term] perspective to shed light on cultural differences and why these linger notwithstanding the market and political convergence found in Europe today. The diverse cultural consumption patterns found in European Union (EU) Member States as evidenced by Eurobarometer surveys are examined through our logistic regression analysis. The findings show the explanatory power of the religion variables used by classical historical sociology. These variables have been largely overlooked by modern studies—a shortcoming this article seeks to redress. We see a link between a country’s historical religion (the religious “factor”) and its cultural consumption.

Keywords Cultural consumption, cultural practices, Europe, religious denomination

Corresponding author: Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins, University of Valencia, Avinguda Tarongers 4B, 46010 Valencia, Spain. Email: [email protected]

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Introduction Over the past 40 years, the study of cultural consumption has been dominated by the debate on the influence exerted by social factors such as class and status. Here, the debate has been marked by Pierre Bourdieu’s theories and concepts. Some authors have argued that Bourdieu’s ideas are out of date, while others stress the need to interpret cultural behavior and practices within a more individual framework, or to adopt a more relational perspective (Lizardo, 2017). One of the challenges to the Bourdieuan paradigm is made by Peterson (2005) and his concept of “omnivorousness.” This refers to a pattern of cultural consumption that is more open and cosmopolitan, understood as the translation to the cultural field of the values of greater tolerance, multiculturalism, and libertarianism found in advanced societies, and typifying post-68 generations (Ollivier, 2008). A new pattern is emerging as the dominant one when it comes to cultural consumption, and is being shaped by growing globalization of tastes, and of institutionalized and daily cultural practices (Cappeliez and Johnston, 2013; Igarashi and Saito, 2014). Nevertheless, such a postnational approach has its limitations. Although there is plenty of literature on the emergence of post-national, cosmopolitan consumption patterns, comparative studies on cultural consumption show that national factors continue to shape trends, with huge differences among countries (KatzGerro, 2017; Savage et al., 2010). Cultural consumption in contemporary societies is diverse in terms of format, language, level of demand, and institutional frame. Space precludes us from covering such a broad canvas. We have therefore narrowed the scope by focusing on reading as a key form of cultural consumption. This choice is supported by various studies that reveal reading to be not only a key factor in shaping cultural tastes but also a good proxy for other kinds of cultural consumption in the sense that reading “opens the door” to other art forms such as theater and classical music (Mauger et al., 2010). Second, reading was widespread among the elites in Early Modern Europe, and gave rise to mass literacy from the end of the 19th century onwards (Vincent, 2000). Finally, it has been a form of cultural consumption in which (as we shall show throughout the rest of the article) the long-term effects can be seen in relation to both (1) the State model genesis (Absolutist or not)1 and (2) religious denomination (Catholic, Mainstream Protestant, or Nonconformist Protestant),2 and the extent to which each either encouraged or hindered reading since the 16th century. Here we shall see how some States, such as the trading republics, historically encouraged their citizenries to read and write. By contrast, Absolutist States over the centuries did not see broad literacy as a priority. The same divide can also be seen when it comes to religious denomination. Here, there was a clear split between Protestant countries (which fostered reading) and Catholic ones which greatly discouraged it. The former fostered mass literacy so that the populace could read The Bible. Catholic nations saw reading by the masses as a threat to both faith and rule (Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Graff, 1987). This influence can still be seen today in the fact that Protestant countries tend to have splendid public library networks providing suitable reading materials for citizens from all walks of life and regions (Duelund, 2008; Irjala, 1996). In principle, these factors can shape trends (such as snobbery and “omnivorism”) in all countries and in similar ways. Nevertheless, religion needs to be considered—an aspect that is often seen as being of little importance. Here, one should note the absence of religion (among other things) in Bourdieuan analysis (Katz-Gerro, 2017). We can term this influence on cultural consumption and practices as “the religious factor,” to paraphrase the classical study by Gerhard Lenski (1961). In this respect, we share the view of Fishman and Lizardo (2013), who argued that comparative studies on cultural consumption assumed that causal factors act in a like manner in all countries. We, on the contrary, consider that “the religious factor” and its interactions with other historical-institutional strands (such as the birth of The State and the formulation of “High Culture”)

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bear greatly on Europe’s diverse patterns of cultural consumption and practices (even if they possess no greater explicative power in making empirical judgments).3 This article takes two key longue durée [long-term] factors into account in historical sociology: the birth of The State and religious denomination, which affect the nature and level of cultural consumption. Both are factors that have been largely ignored by sociology in this field. While the link between religion and cultural consumption is acknowledged in comparative studies (Meier Jaeger and Katz-Gerro, 2012), it has been little-studied compared with demographic and social variables such as age, social class, and gender. Furthermore, it has mainly been analyzed as a variable confined to individuals’ religiosity (Meier Jaeger and Katz-Gerro, 2012; Montoro-Pons and Cuadrado-García, 2018). While religious institutions still influence European societies, their role now goes largely unnoticed (Davie, 2006; Knoblauch, 2003). Here we do not look at how an individual’s religion affects his reading levels but rather focus on the long-term influence of the dominant religion on States’ cultural and education policies (which in turn affect both the kinds and levels of cultural consumption found in European countries). Sociology studies on consumption over the past 50 years have focused on matters of status and their bearing on social class (Bourdieu, 1991; DiMaggio, 1987; Gans, 1985). In terms of individual behavior patterns, we can assume that religion might affect cultural consumption through the formation of values, and shape either a more traditional or a more contemporary taste, in combination with social status and educational level (Van Eijck, 2012). However, this article does not consider religion as a factor in individual choice but rather looks at the social dimension of the dominant religion in each society. In the Durkheimian sense (Durkheim, 1991), we think that religion affects beliefs and that these play a part in shaping the collective consciousness and thus the way society structures cognitive categories. While secularization in Europe can be measured in terms of church attendance and a sense of belonging (Pollack, 2008), from a Neo-Durkheimian perspective, religion, as part of culture, influences collective ways of seeing reality and orders cultural and symbolic practices (Durkheim, 2007). This insight is reflected in earlier studies, which centered on typical forms of consumption and/or on the interpretation of cultural consumption in light of religious denomination.4 The article stresses the effects highlighted by Classical Sociology but that have long been ignored by the contemporary Sociology of Cultural Consumption. What we see are the longue durée impacts made apparent by taking a comparative perspective of the European divide and its persistence (Nelson, 2012). The revelation of these cultural differences shows the value of making long-term macro-historic comparisons in this field (Inglis, 2016b). Thus, without denying the factors and variables most often used in sociological studies on cultural consumption, our contribution is to empirically show that the dominant religion in each State has also exerted a long-lasting limited but relevant influence. It is an element that partially explains the cultural makeup of European nations and the diverse ways in which their citizens have taken part in cultural consumption. Our article addresses this issue by looking at the impact of the historically dominant religion on institutions and on individuals’ cultural consumption patterns.

The birth of The State, religious denomination, and cultural consumption The classic works of sociology focused strongly on religion’s impact on social behavior and on forms of collective organization (Inglis, 2016a, 2016b). The weight sociology placed on religion as a factor shaping people’s behavior rose at the end of the 19th century and fell during the second half of the 20th century.5 This was because of the theory (implicit in much neo-evolutionary sociology) linking: (1) the crisis of “official religion” and the way religiosity was becoming something

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that belonged to the private sphere rather than the public one; (2) the waning importance of religious beliefs in modern societies to the point where they became practically irrelevant (Berger, 1967). While there is some empirical evidence to suggest that religious practice has declined in Europe, especially among the young (Voas, 2008), some authors suggest that it has been transformed into a kind of “cultural religion” in the broad sense of behavioral patterns and national identity traits (Demerath, 2000).6 Hence, we think that the kind of dominant religion in an area may be linked to modes and repertoires that are socially embedded in a community and in ways of taking part in cultural life (Montoro-Pons and Cuadrado-García, 2018; Traunmüller, 2010). Originally, the Church’s forms of internal organization played a key role for many people in learning to become members of a community and in their social experience. In aggregate terms, this collective learning has impacts on a country’s political culture and on the forms taken by State institutions (Gorski, 1993; Jawad, 2012). This disparate impact is most evident when analyzing how religious institutional structures have shaped national political cultures. Thus, the hierarchical structures of the Catholic and of the Orthodox Churches are based on the idea of a pastoral mission among believers. The hierarchy does not believe this mission can be delegated, thus justifying the Church’s vertical power relationships. These structures in turn foster and consolidate a ceremonialist culture focusing on visual elements (Van Eijck, 2012). Moreover, the ecclesiastical hierarchy forged a lasting gulf between the Catholic Church’s “High Culture” among the ruling classes, and the “Low Culture” of the peasantry (Sharot, 2001: 201).7 By contrast, reformed/Nonconformist Protestantism is Congregationalist in nature, fostering (1) local autonomy rather than centralized power; (2) active participation by the community; and (3) a greater willingness to facilitate individual access to reading. In turn, these structures strengthen individuals’ links with a culture that is freer from the pressures of centralized power. From this perspective, we see that Lutheranism lies between the two extremes (that is to say, between ceremonialist and individualist approaches), with regard to institutional forms and the cultural policies they give rise to. This position is explained by churches with less internal hierarchy but is also strongly linked to the process of creating a centralized State and national identity (Anderson, 2009). Lutheranism drove the creation of strong national religious and cultural institutions, and also played a role in training sizable civil and military administrations (Tilly, 1990). Therefore, a dominant religious creed may shape a common cultural sphere affecting both believers and non-believers. The said cultural sphere (marked, among other things, by a long-term process) influences the political culture of a given country and the way in which a State takes political decisions and manages national affairs (Knutsen, 2004). This cultural sphere is relevant because it is a dimension that strongly shapes the institutionalization of culture and, by extension, citizens’ cultural consumption patterns. Such patterns in Europe remain varied despite the convergence processes at work (Rius-Ulldemolins et al., 2019). Accordingly, one needs to go beyond the effects of a religion at the individual level and consider its impact on social institutions and structures through longue durée processes. The effects of such processes are not confined to believers but rather impact all socialized individuals in a country where a dominant religion has shaped society—something that is true in Europe (Huber et al., 1993; Welzel and Inglehart, 2009). We therefore see a link between a country’s cultural consumption and its main creed. In Europe, the key religious currents have been: Catholicism; Protestantism (differentiated in our article between Lutheranism and Nonconformism/Reformism); Orthodoxy. Furthermore, the dominant religion also shapes how society is structured. It also affects believers and non-believers in a limited but detectable fashion, as we shall see below, independently of their social class or other sociodemographic variables. In this respect, religious denominations foster different interaction practices, which in turn may create either more clannish status groups

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or ones that are more egalitarian and open, or serve as markers of social status. Without dismissing the idea that price may well explain these differences, we think that inequality in access to general cultural participation may be a bigger hurdle to visits in countries where the dominant religious denomination is Catholic and a lower hurdle in Protestant countries. This is why we hypothesize that the cultural and institutional factor is influenced by the dominant religion and helps explain the aforesaid differences among European nations. The European context is relevant because on one hand it reveals diversity in The State’s genesis and the presence of different denominations, and on the other, it has become a subject for study based on European Union (EU) surveys on social and cultural similarities within the framework of European convergence (Graziano and Vink, 2008; Sassatelli, 2007). One should note that all of the countries considered European have been mainly Christian since The Middle Ages. Although there were also non-Christian minority religions, they were far from homogeneous and lagged behind their Christian rivals. In Europe, Christian countries can be placed under one of three broad heads: Catholic; Protestant; Orthodox—as the case may be. This split explains significant national differences among European countries today (Nelsen et al., 2015). These differences go beyond individual religiosity and can be considered as social phenomena. Thus, the long predominance of a religious denomination may be intertwined with Nation States’ cultural policies (Knutsen, 2004). In this respect, religious denomination is a component of the factors explaining inequalities in access to and participation in culture. Manow (2004) holds that there is a clear difference in Central Europe that cannot be explained solely by political and institutional factors but rather requires a religious explanation (at least in part). Religion has led to differences among welfare regimes in Catholic, Lutheran Protestant, and Reformed/Nonconformist Protestant countries (Castles, 1994; Huber et al., 1993). Manow argues that Reformed/ Nonconformist Protestantism’s starting point is an anti-State stance in which The State is seen as an actor that is subsidiary to the community’s voluntary action—a societal model found in Great Britain, The Netherlands, and Switzerland. The dominant cultural policy in each European State (influenced by religion through a long-lasting process) affected citizens’ cultural practices. Thus, Protestant lands tend to have networks of public facilities. Libraries are a case in point, fostering access to suitable reading materials for citizens from all walks of life, and from all regions (Duelund, 2008; Irjala, 1996). Therefore, one of the factors explaining the difference in attitude to culture lies in religion, with Protestantism fostering literacy so that the faithful could read The Bible. For example, national literacy campaigns by the Calvinist John Knox ensured that Scotland, despite its poverty, achieved high literacy rates for Europe and higher than in its richer neighbor, England (Graff, 1987: 161).8 Thus, one of the unexpected consequences of Protestantism was not so much “the entrepreneurial spirit” trumpeted by Weber but rather the fostering of a population able to read and write. Promoting literacy played a key role in making culture more accessible and facilitating the training of workers and businessmen in what Liberals would later term “Human Capital” (Becker and Woessmann, 2009). The greater penetration of a culture based on literacy would be one of the lasting legacies influencing cultural policy and consumption in each country. The end result is that nations can be grouped into two broad categories when it comes to cultural policy and consumption: (1) a Northern Protestant zone and (2) a Southern Catholic zone (Rubio Arostegui and Rius-Ulldemolins, 2020).9 More specifically, the influence of religion is not confined to the differences between Catholic and Protestant countries for we must also distinguish between Lutheran Protestantism and other variants such as Calvinism and Nonconformist Protestantism, given that the latter shaped the development of The State and culture in other directions (Gorski, 1993). In countries such as Germany and Sweden, Lutheran Protestantism became a Church that was very close to and in some respects dependent on The State.10 By contrast, in countries such as Switzerland, The Netherlands,

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and Great Britain, the Reformed, Nonconformist Church played a key role in both the shaping and later development of The State (Heidenheimer, 1983). Thus, the presence of reformed currents of Protestantism, such as Calvinism, led to a disciplinary revolution fostering a State imbued with asceticism, bureaucratic control, and rationality (Gorski, 1993). The disciplinary revolution in countries such as The Netherlands led to most citizens calling themselves Calvinists. The same also applied in other countries such as Germany, which was united under Prussia. In the latter case, although the population remained Lutheran, many in The State elite were drawn from Calvinist immigrants or were trained in schools where Calvinism held sway. As a result, it was Calvinism not Lutheranism that decisively shaped the long-term development of The State and its social institutions (Gorski, 1995). The key impact of this orientation is that it strengthened direct State control over the population, not through physical coercion but rather through iron self-discipline and asceticism. This article does not delve into the homogeneity of these two groups of countries given the broad diversity of those in the Protestant area (in part, because of the differences among the various kinds of Protestantism) and the even greater variety among the Catholic nations. In the latter case, there are big differences between Catholic countries in Southern Europe (such as Spain) and Central European countries such as Austria. Here, the Central European nations took a different historical path, especially in the 21st century, revealing a different degree of cultural institutionalization and distinct cultural consumption patterns. Nevertheless, the logic of State development (in which countries such as Spain and Austria shared almost the same Absolutist dynasty from the 16th century to the 18th centuries) and the same religion shaped both the cultural sphere and individuals’ relationship thereto. In this respect, Southern European countries show lower levels of cultural consumption than Central European ones. One should note that the nations falling in the latter group took a less hierarchical approach to culture as a result of (1) their historical paths, which greatly differed from that taken by 17th-century Spanish Absolutism and (2) their subsequent political and cultural institutionalization (Fishman and Lizardo, 2013). Here, the influence exerted by religious denomination can be seen in the crystallization of High Culture in Absolutist Catholic countries, especially in the way these strove mightily to foster the Performing Arts. Hapsburg Austria promoted Baroque as a non-literary style whose focus was on making a visual impact (Van Horn Melton, 1988). In this sense, Opera is linked with Catholicism. The art form was born in Italy, which became the country with the longest opera tradition, drawing singers from every corner of Europe. Nevertheless, Paris was the Capital of Opera in the 19th century. It was also the Capital of a State that defined itself as secular but that was steeped in Catholic culture. Vienna was another key center for opera and the city has always prided itself on its cultural performances. The importance given to cultural performances and displays enshrined the city’s status as The Capital of the Empire, and the symbolic importance of the Imperial Court (Rosenberg, 2014: 741).

Aims and methodology This article analyzes the varied impact of religious historical development on national cultural practices. Their influence (as a long-lasting trend)—along with other factors—shaped the cultural policies and typical cultural consumption found in each land and State (see Figure 1). Our research hypothesis is based on the bibliographical review and discussion. As we shall see below, cultures influenced by Protestantism (especially in its Reformed and Nonconformist variants) foster more frequent reading by a country’s citizenry. This stress on reading stems from the link with a more individual culture that is freer from State control. By contrast, cultures rooted in Catholicism stress the performing arts, especially those with the greatest visual impact.

Type of State domain and Church-State separation

Origin of the State (Absolutist / Non-Absolutist)

Source: The authors.

Figure 1.  Conceptual diagram of religion as a factor in cultural consumption.

Influence of religion on educational and cultural institutions

Main religious denomination (Catholic, Lutheran, NonConformist, Orthodox)

Forms of State intervention (direct or indirect, elitist or democratising)

Differential literacy rates by religious denomination

Type of societal discipline (internalised or coercive)

Average level of cultural consumption by country

Type of cultural consumption in Europe (cerimonial or individual)

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To test our hypothesis, we carried out a quantitative study based on statistical data drawn from Eurobarometer 399 (2013), whose sample comprises 25,576 people from 27 Member States of the EU, offering reliable information on cultural consumption in Europe. So far this “barometer” (survey) is the latest European-level study on cultural practices. We added a variable to indicate the dominant religion in each country and assigned it to all of the individuals in the sample by land. This procedure did not assume that all those individuals shared the same religion but rather that it was a “latent variable” underlying differences in social institutions and was thus linked to political and cultural behavior patterns (Knutsen, 2004; Lane and Ersson, 1999). The said sample is representative of individuals drawn from 27 EU Member States. The data included respondents’ answers to questions on their cultural activities. The dependent variables we used were based on our theoretical model and were (1) annual reading frequency and (2) annual frequency of going to the opera, ballet, and/or dance. Both were ordinal variables and we grouped the categories of both variables thus: 0 times (never); 1–2 times (low); 3–5 times (medium); and over 5 times (high). We added an independent variable to the Eurobarometer to indicate the dominant religion in each country. The categories for this variable were (1) Catholicism; (2) Protestantism, but where Lutheranism predominates; (3) Reformed or Nonconformist Protestantism, including Nonconformism, Anglicanism, Calvinism, and Methodism; and (4) Orthodoxy. Given, we sought to estimate the impact of the dominant religion on the cultural practices of the citizens of EU Member States (independently of individuals’ beliefs), we decided to assign this faith to all the Eurobarometer-sampled individuals for a given country. The goal was to see whether there was a relationship between the dominant religion and cultural habits. This approach did not suppose that all those individuals shared the same religion. On the contrary, our goal was to see whether the culture promoted by each State—influenced by the dominant religion—affected the makeup and quantity of citizens’ cultural consumption. In conducting this analysis, we followed the line taken by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) on the religious denomination classification of European countries.11 We statistically calculated the specific impact of the dominant religion on individual cultural consumption, taking into account a set of control variables to prevent interference bias from other variables and especially those that have been used in other studies to interpret the differences in the comparison of levels of cultural consumption between countries (Katz-Gerro, 2017). Specifically, we used a set of Eurobarometer control variables as (1) age (recoded for youngsters, adults, and the elderly); (2) gender; (3) marital status (as per the original categories, which can be seen in Tables 1 and 2); (4) social status (measured on a self-assessment scale running from 1 to 10, recoded as low, medium, and high); (5) educational level (measured in years of education, also recoded as low, medium, high); (6) residential community (large, medium, and small cities); and (7) occupation (as per the original coding, shown in Tables 1 and 2). These variables served as control measures given that previous studies showed that they either do or may influence cultural consumption habits (Falk and Katz-Gerro, 2016; Katz-Gerro, 2017; Rius-Ulldemolins et al., 2019). In addition, we incorporated a variable for measuring per capita public spending on culture for 2013 in order to standardize the cutoff point for the statistical analysis. We recategorized the original data under “Low,” “Medium,” and “High” categories. The reason we used this control variable was to avoid results being biased by differences between States and how much they spend on culture. These precautions ensured that the observed impact of the dominant religion on cultural consumption was not biased by any of the aforementioned variables. We used multinomial logistic regression (MLR) to measure the effect of the variables. This multivariate technique was employed given the nominal, ordinal nature of most of the Eurobarometer variables (2013). The technique is useful given the way it (1) measures variables and (2) classifies

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Table 1.  Multinomial logistic regression for annual reading levels. 1–2 times (low)a   Dominant religion  Orthodox  Catholic   Protestant (Nonconformist)   Protestant (includes combined) Adjustment variables Cultural spending level per capita  Low  Medium  High Education level  Low  Medium  High Marital status  Widow/widower  Single   Married or with partner   Divorced or separated Type of community  Rural   Small/medium-sized city   Large city Age  Elderly  Adults  Youngsters  Teenagers Social self-placing  Low  Medium  High Occupation type   Manual worker  Unemployed  Homemaker  Self-employed   White-collar employees   Company Manager  Retired Gender  Men  Women

3–5 times (medium)a

Over 5 times (high)a

OR

OR

OR

1b 1.30*** 2.29*** 1.48***

1b 1.24** 2.22*** 1.52***

1b 1.83*** 4.88*** 2.70***

1b 1.10 1.30***

1b 1.43*** 1.91***

1b 1.60*** 2.03***

1b 1.77*** 2.67***

1b 2.31*** 4.65***

1b 2.67*** 7.14***

1b 1.09 1.19* 2.08

1b 1.42** 1.24* 1.08

1b 1.20* 1.11 1.19*

1b 1.23*** 1.29***

1b 1.25*** 1.49***

1b 1.26*** 1.72***

1b 1.14 1.26* 1.56

1b 1.00 1.00 2.78

1b 0.93 0.73*** 4.81*

1b 1.21*** 1.25**

1b 1.35*** 1.51***

1b 1.53*** 1.78***

1b 0.98 0.83* 1.30** 1.50*** 2.00*** 0.89

1b 0.81* 0.80* 1.40*** 1.69*** 2.25*** 0.99

1b 1.03 0.88 1.58*** 1.64*** 3.06*** 1.47***

1b 1.49***

1b 1.78

1b 2.66*** (Continued)

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Table 1. (Continued) 1–2 times (low)a   −2 log verisimilitude Chi-squared R2 Cox and Snell R2 Nagelkerke Population No. of cases and percentage

OR

3–5 times (medium)a OR

27,881.60 5752.07*** .224 .242 27.576 22.732 (82.4%)

Over 5 times (high)a OR            

Source: Author, based on Eurobarometer data (2013). OR: odds ratio. The model is statistically significant and has a Nagelkerke R2 value of 24.2 percent. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. a The reference category is the absence of reading in the past year. b Reference category of each variable.

subjects in light of the values of a set of prediction variables and control variables. In our case, this let us estimate the specific impact of the dominant religion on individuals’ cultural consumption patterns. Specifically, MLR estimates the probabilities of each kind of cultural consumption (reading, opera, ballet and/or dance) as a function of a given benchmark category. The dependent variable—the benchmark category—is lack of consumption (reading, going to the opera, ballet, dances); for the dominant religion (the benchmark being the Orthodox religion), and for the rest of the ordinal variables, the benchmark is the “Low” category. By gender, the benchmark is “Men”; for marital status, the benchmark is “widower.” This let us estimate the specific probabilities that individuals from a given country belonging to a given dominant religion take part in one or other cultural activity and the intensity thereof compared with nations with other dominant religions. Finally, in Appendix 1 we briefly present the results through the discriminant analysis technique, which validates the results obtained in the MLR. That is, by using the same variables through an alternative technique (discriminant) and observing similar results, we consider that the results are validated. This procedure can constitute a proxy for the robustness of our model.

Analysis of the results: the association between religion and cultural consumption We shall now analyze the longue durée differential effect of belonging to countries whose cultural policies are marked by the distinctive influences of their largest and most influential religion shaping State and society. In this respect, we shall examine some of the cultural practices considered theoretically significant by our approach, namely, (1) the frequency of reading (Figure 2 and Table 1) and (2) going to opera, ballet, and dance (Figure 3 and Table 2). The influence of the dominant religion in each country was adjusted by the control variables set out in the “Aims and methodology” section. Specifically, we took the following factors into account in adjusting the results: individuals’ education levels; age; gender; social status; marital status; job type; each country’s public spending per capita on culture; and the size of the municipality in which respondents lived. Therefore, we do not claim that dominant religious denomination is the only or even the most important factor in explaining differences in cultural consumption, but it allows us to explain a limited but significant part in explaining differences between countries.

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Table 2.  Multinomial logistic regression for attendance of opera, ballet, and/or dance performances. 1–2 times (low)a   Dominant religion  Orthodox  Catholic   Protestant (Nonconformist)   Protestant (includes combined) Adjustment variables Cultural spending level per capita  Low  Medium  High Education level  Low  Medium  High Marital status  Widow/widower  Single   Married or with partner   Divorced or separated Type of community  Rural   Small/medium-sized city   Large city Age  Elderly  Adults  Youngsters  Teenagers Social self-placing  Low  Medium  High Occupation type   Manual worker  Unemployed  Home-maker  Self-employed   White-collar employees   Company Manager  Retired Gender  Men  Women

3–5 times (medium)a

Over 5 times (high)a

OR

OR

OR

1b 1.67*** 1.75*** 1.71***

1b 1.57** 1.81** 2.06***

1b 2.14** 1.76 1.82*

1b 1.47*** 1.39***

1b 1.92*** 1.34*

1b 1.88*** 2.22***

1b 1.79*** 3.53***

1b 5.78*** 2.29***

1b 3.08*** 6.149***

1b 1.26 0.97 1.15

1b 1.06 1.02 1.26

1b 1.18 1.17 1.22

1b 1.25*** 1.54***

1b 1.39** 1.81***

1b 1.33* 2.34***

1b 0.79** 0.72** 2.93

1b 0.60*** 0.65* −

1b 0.61** 0.60* −

1b 1.33*** 1.76***

1b 1.18 1.77***

1b 1.12 1.80***

1b 0.89 1.01 2.50*** 1.22 2.00*** 1.24

1b 1.23 1.2 2.53*** 1.62** 2.58*** 1.50*

1b 0.94 0.74** 1.62*** 1.27*** 1.99*** 0.94

1b 1.76***

1b 1.99***

1b 1.66*** (Continued)

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Table 2. (Continued) 1–2 times (low)a   −2 log verisimilitude Chi-squared R2 Cox and Snell R2 Nagelkerke Population No. of cases and percentage

OR

3–5 times (medium)a OR

13,933.70 2419.38*** .101 .147 27.576 22,719 (82.39%)

Over 5 times (high)a OR            

Source: Author, based on Eurobarometer data (2013). OR: odds ratio. The model is statistically significant, presenting a Nagelkerke R2 figure of 15 percent. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. a The reference category is the absence of reading in the past year. b Reference category of each variable.

The adjusted odds ratio (AOR) analyzed here measured the probability that individuals from countries with different dominant religions had of attaining a given reading level and of going to the opera, ballet and/or dances as compared with individuals from countries in which the dominant religion was Orthodox. We used the Orthodox religion as the benchmark category because it is associated with the lowest levels of reading and of going to opera, ballet, and/or dance. With regard to reading, individuals from countries whose culture is shaped by Reformed Protestantism/Nonconformism were the likeliest to belong to the group that reads most (over 5 books a year). This was almost 5 times more likely (AOR 4.8) than people from Orthodox countries. Individuals from countries whose dominant religion was Lutheran Protestantism (whether or not combined with other religions) were 2.7 times more likely to read over 5 books a year in relation to respondents from Orthodox nations. At the same time, individuals from Catholic countries were 1.8 times more likely to read a lot of books compared with respondents from Orthodox ones. Therefore, when it came to the category of the most avid readers, it was people from Protestant/ Nonconformist nations that showed the biggest differences vis-a-vis the other religions. In the case of the “Middle” reading level (between 3 and 5 books a year), individuals in countries with a dominant Nonconformist religion were also more likely to show these higher reading levels. We also found differences (albeit less marked) among people within any given country depending on their creed: “2·2 times more in the case of the dominant Nonconformist religion and 1.5 times in the case of countries with a dominant Protestant religion.” Third, in the low reading band (1 or 2 books a year), we saw the same trend but with narrower differences between the dominant religions. The data therefore revealed the following general trend: as the level of reading rose, so did the relative weight of individuals in countries in which the dominant religion is Reformed/ Nonconformist Protestantism (between 2.3 and 4.8-fold the benchmark figure). These probabilities were greater than for the other dominant religions. That is to say, the AOR showed that the dominant religion affected reading as a cultural practice. Furthermore, the influence of non-conformism seemed to have a greater impact than was the case for other religions in explaining high reading levels. Accordingly, the data supported the hypothesis that the dominant religion had an impact on cultural consumption. It also helps explain reading differences among individuals.

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Figure 2.  Book reading almost once a month in The European Union (2013). Source: The authors from Eurobarometer (2013). Created with Datawrapper.

The results for going to the opera, ballet, and/or dance showed a different pattern from that for reading. First, among those who most often went to performances (over 5 times a year), individuals from countries with a dominant Catholic religion were twice as likely (2.1 times) to do so than individuals from Orthodox ones, while those from Protestant and Nonconformist countries were 1.7 and 1.8 times more likely to do so, respectively. Among frequent performance-goers, these were a little more likely to come from Catholic countries than from Protestant/Nonconformist ones, though the differences were slight. Second, those who went to opera, ballet, and dances (between 3 and 5 times a year) did so more than people in Lutheran and Nonconformist countries (2 and 1.8 times more, respectively). For those who seldom attended such performances (1 or 2 times a year), the differences between people in countries with different dominant religions was less marked (1.7 times more than for Protestants and 1.6 times more than for Catholics). Finally, we observed the following general tendency. Among those who often went to the opera, ballet, and dance, individuals from Catholic countries showed up more in statistical terms, followed by Protestants and Nonconformists. By contrast, the gap between Catholicism and the other religions fell among individuals with the lowest levels of attendance.

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Figure 3.  Attending opera, ballet, and/or dance performances almost one time in a month in the European Union (2013). Source: The authors from Eurobarometer (2013). Elaborated with Datawrapper.

Discussion Our analysis of the findings reveals that religious denomination continues to play an important role in explaining differences and inequalities in cultural consumption. This holds true even after adjusting for other factors such as the sociodemographic variables often used to explain the said differences and inequalities. In relation to reading levels, there were significant average differences between individuals drawn from societies that had followed different historical paths and whose dominant religious denominations varied. This was so in Orthodox and Catholic countries, where average reading levels were markedly lower. In these nations, one can see a longue durée effect. These empirical differences support our initial hypothesis that Catholic and Orthodox religions do less to encourage reading in their countries than do Protestant and Nonconformist ones. By contrast, the differences seen in average reading levels among individuals belonging to societies where the religious denomination is Catholic or Protestant vanish when one looks at average attendance at opera, ballet, or dance performances. Thus in Catholic countries (e.g., France and Italy), average attendance is higher at such events, which enshrine the collective and ceremonial features of High Culture.

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In the case of Protestant denominations (especially in countries with a tradition of Nonconformist Protestantism), one sees the combined impact of (1) the institutionalization of literacy programs and (2) a more individualist notion of literacy as a tool for fostering Bible-reading (a feature of Protestantism). The outcome was the promotion of reading—something whose effects today can still be seen in higher reading rates in Protestant countries. On the contrary, one can see a lesser tendency to attend ceremonial performances (for instance, Opera) in countries such as The Netherlands given that these kinds of culture were frowned upon by Reformed/Nonconformist Protestantism. Hence, our hypothesis considered religious denomination as a social phenomenon explaining differences in individuals’ social behavior, such as cultural consumption. This relationship has already been established in relation to the form taken by The Welfare State (Huber et al., 1993; Manow, 2004). This also applies to voting behavior, where quantitative methods have shown that religious denomination has an impact (Knutsen, 2004). The empirical results of our study supported in a limited but significant way our hypothesis, showing a relationship between the religious factor and cultural consumption.12 The said factor (in addition to educational level and socioeconomic status) also partially explains the observed consumption differences. We therefore could consider religion to be a partly relevant social and institutional factor that produces long-lasting effects on cultural consumption patterns not merely for individuals, believers, or in relation to a person’s belief group but also in terms of religious culture seen as an institutional effect embracing and having impacts on all the individuals in a State (Hayward and Kemmelmeier, 2011). At the same time, reading levels and other kinds of cultural consumption also constitute additional behavior patterns stemming from social factors. That is to say, we are dealing with cultural consumption patterns that are of a collective nature given that they are shaped by social processes and forces.

Conclusion The explanation of cultural consumption in advanced societies has repeatedly been interpreted from the standpoint of socioeconomic and educational levels in different social and geographical contexts (Bennett et al., 2010; Coulangeon and Duval, 2015). It is true that in comparative studies of different societies, the emerging field of cultural consumption has largely supported their hypotheses yet it has also revealed big gaps among European nations (Katz-Gerro, 2017; Savage et al., 2010). Here, taking religion into account as a still relevant factor in interpreting differences in cultural consumption has already been successfully used for comparison purposes (Meier Jaeger and Katz-Gerro, 2012). Nevertheless, the impact of religion has been considered as a variable in terms of the diverse religiosity found among individuals (Montoro-Pons and Cuadrado-García, 2018) but not as a social phenomenon that ties in with the birth of The State, the institutionalization of “High Culture” and education, and the relationships between the cultural sphere, the elites, and the population in general (Gorski, 1993). Thus, the dominant religious denomination in each European State is a significant component of the sociocultural sphere, influencing (among other sociocultural factors) the way in which culture is institutionalized and the resulting consumption patterns. That is why we highlight the topdown nature of power in Catholic hierarchies, with the clergy at the apex of the pyramid and the congregation at its base. This kind of relationship fostered a ceremonialist culture focusing on the visual. As we saw when it came to countries with a dominant Catholic tradition, a greater section of the population flocked to see opera, ballet, and dance. By contrast, Protestant and Nonconformist denominations forged less hierarchical links between Church leaders at the top and believers at the bottom. Such links imply greater autonomy from the centralized power of States, and this is associated with greater social self-discipline (Gorski, 1993). This led to a different institutionalization of cultural policies in those States shaped by Protestantism. One of the long-lasting effects of this

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difference has been that reading among the citizenry was greater in Protestant States than it was in either Catholic or Orthodox ones. At the same time, Lutheran States consolidated a less hierarchical institutionalization of cultural policies yet even so, it was one that underpinned centralized States and homogeneous national identities. This led to a less ceremonialist, visual culture than in Catholic countries. It also meant that Catholic States showed less autonomy from central power and less social self-discipline among their citizenry than was the case in Protestant/Nonconformist States. In this respect, Catholic countries occupy a middle position and are also associated with levels of cultural consumption that are also middling. Certainly, these results do not mean ignoring the fact that other factors linked to socioeconomic and educational inequalities continue to explain most of the differences in cultural consumption between countries, but nevertheless, they imply a relevant contribution to understanding the effects of longue durée in cultural activities and religious denominations in 21st-century Europe. Acknowledgement We would like to thank Professor Mar Griera (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) for her insights and comments, and also the editor and the peer reviewers of the International Journal of Comparative Sociology for their valuable comments on the paper content and analysis robustness.

Funding The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Research project funded by Ministry of Science (Spain) Reference number: RTI2018-096299-B-I00.

ORCID iD Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0582-2786

Notes   1. The model of The State’s genesis and its link to the cultural sphere in Europe can be split in general terms into the evolution of The State along either Absolutist lines or not (Anderson, 1979). On one hand, there were Absolute Monarchies with a court-based culture—this was the case of France and Austria, and (to a lesser extent) Spain. On the other hand, there were States of a more mercantile nature in which the accumulation of capital by elites meant that monarchies played a less dominant role (Tilly, 1992). In the former case, the courts became a sphere of power subordination, strategic competition, and symbolic exhibition among the high nobility, with the Absolute Monarch playing the role of promoter of great works and founder of institutions as a way of legitimizing his primacy and dominion (Mukerji, 2010).   2. We established the dominant religion in each country based on the denomination databases of the World Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett, 1982), systematized and updated by European Value Study (EVS, 2021). The classification of the denominations reflects long research experience, and uses country religious denomination as an explicative variable for electoral behavior (Knutsen, 2004), State Social Welfare spending (Castles, 1994; Wuthnow, 1985), and social and political values (Welzel and Inglehart, 2009).   3. The concept of culture is polysemic and changing throughout history (Cuche, 1999; Williams, 2001). The process of cultural modernization occurs within a restricted social sphere with specific institutions, positions, and roles, as analyzed from different theoretical perspectives by Structuralist Sociology (Bourdieu, 2002) or Interactionist Sociology (Becker, 1984).   4. For example, in studies on visitors and non-visitors to museums, it was noted that the latter were less likely to have a literal belief in The Bible or to consider religion as something important in their lives (DiMaggio, 1996).   5. Classical authors in the social sciences, such as Durkheim and Weber, considered religion of great importance in shaping social behavior patterns (Inglis, 2016a, 2016b). Nevertheless, such studies were later

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  7.

  8.

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10.

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eclipsed by analysis focusing on economic and political factors. Yet over the past few decades, one can find studies (mainly quantitative) that analyze behavioral differences in cultural consumption by religion. Here, one can see consumption differences by European creeds, especially between Protestantism and Orthodoxy, and smaller differences between Catholicism and Orthodoxy (Schwartz and Huismans, 1995). According to earlier studies at the individual level, those stating membership of one of these monotheistic religions are inclined to reject hedonism or individual action or thought. Despite this common strand, there are marked differences between Protestants and Catholics when it comes to cultural consumption and purchasing choices (Essoo and Dibb, 2004). However, contemporary Sociology of Culture has paid relatively little attention to religious denomination as a factor explaining cultural consumption. The complete absence of religion in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1991) La distinción is particularly glaring in this regard. Despite this trend to less religiosity in Europe, when people were asked whether they belonged a religious denomination, only 26.1 percent answered that they did not in the 2021 European Value Study (EVS), 2021). In the survey, 33.4 percent of the respondents said that they were Roman Catholic; 16.3 percent said they were Protestant; 14.9 percent Orthodox, and 6 percent Muslim. We can therefore say that at the demographic level, historical and cultural self-identification continues to be of great importance. Hence, in this article, we group countries following a similar approach as Roman Catholic, or as Eastern Orthodox, as the case may be. Here, we have confined ourselves to general considerations without undertaking an in-depth analysis because this would go beyond the article’s scope. Nevertheless, as we shall show, there is a logic that stems in part from (1) the hierarchical and Episcopal basis of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, which influence the concept of culture and the lack of local autonomy, and (2) States with some welfare provision (Ferrera, 1996), which—as Charles Tilly (1990) notes—are also products of a State with strong coercive powers but that is weak on the infrastructural front or as—Michael Mann (1986) puts it—that wishes to wield power but whose infrastructural power is not up to the job. This reflects cultural policies that are highly fragmented in theory and that are very limited, clientist, and piecemeal in practice (Rubio Arostegui and Rius-Ulldemolins, 2020). As a result, cultural consumption in Southern and Eastern European countries is very low, with weak, fragmented institutionalization of culture compared with Protestant nations (Konsola, 1988; Rubio Arostegui and Rius-Ulldemolins, 2020). Although the achievements of Protestant countries and their link to social and economic progress seem to have been overstated, these still feature prominently in “literacy myths.” That said, there continue to be big differences in relation to States and religious denominations, given that in 19th-century Europe, the Catholic Church and its hierarchy discouraged the populace from reading (Graff, 2011). In Protestant countries, the overall literacy rate was 80 percent in 1875, 90 percent in England and in The Netherlands, and 95 percent in Prussia. By contrast, literacy rates in Catholic countries at the time were much lower: 60 percent in Austria, 60 percent in Belgium, 35 percent in Italy, and 30 percent in Spain (Vincent, 2000). One of the limitations of this article lies in analysis of the Catholic areas in Southern Europe and the Orthodox ones in Eastern Europe. Here, we shall limit ourselves to general considerations without delving into detail because this would go beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, as we have shown, there is a logic that stems from (1) the hierarchical and Episcopal nature of Catholicism and how this shapes the concept of culture and precludes local autonomy; (2) the fragmentary nature of The Welfare State in Catholic countries (Ferrera, 1996). Both factors are products of States that are characterized by a high concentration of coercive power and scant capital (Tilly, 1990, 1995) or, in Michael Mann’s terms, apply the logic of power but have weak infrastructure. This is reflected in cultural policies that are both highly fragmented, limited, and clientist in both theoretical and practical terms (Rubio Arostegui and Rius-Ulldemolins, 2020). Germany’s case is a singular one for the country has both Catholic and Lutheran denominations vying for dominance. This makes the nation harder to classify. Nevertheless, as is argued in this article, one needs to not only take the country’s religious makeup into account but also the influence of religious denomination in the birth of The State. In this case, Germany is the child of Prussia, a Lutheran State that was heavily influenced by the disciplinary revolution begun by Calvinism (Gorski, 1993). Nevertheless, we must qualify this classification with Gorski’s observation on Calvinism’s importance in creating The State through a number of key individuals (royalty, senior officials)—something that is true of The Netherlands, Prussia, and to a lesser extent, England. This influence, despite applying to countries

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with different branches of Protestantism, was nevertheless of key importance in configuring The State and institutionalizing education and culture (Gorski, 1993). 12. Our model explains part of the phenomena analyzed in this article. In other words, in statistical terms, the model explains part of the total variance. Thus, the influence of the dominant religious denomination in each society does not exercise a deterministic influence but rather merely explains the greater or lesser likelihood of citizens often reading or of attending opera/dance/ballet.

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Appendix 1 Discriminant analysis Results of the discriminant analysis on the annual frequency of reading books.  This first table shows the variables introduced in the discriminant model that compares the extreme cases of the dependent variable. That is, compare the group of those who do not have the habit of reading books and those who read five or more books a year. The results of the Wilks Lambda Test show that the variables are significant. In particular, the categories associated with the dominant religion variable are significant.

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Group Means Equality Test  

Wilks Lambda

Catholic Protestant (mixed included) Protestant (Nonconformist) Gender High financing Middle financing Unmarried Married/Single w partner Divorced or separated Education = High level Education = Middle level Large town Small/middle town Teenagers Youngsters Adults Middle class High class Company Manager White-collar employees Self-employed Home-maker Unemployed Retired

.979 .958 .983 .969 .942 .998 1.000 1.000 .999 .880 .995 .990 .999 1.000 .999 .999 .917 .990 .954 .995 1.000 .996 .991 1.000

F

gl2

Sig.

330,235 696,239 274,367 508,593 962,979 24,174 1960 1125 15,740 2,144,783 72,762 162,731 18,018 439 17,746 9169 1,412,079 150,802 756,658 73,421 5046 56,061 134,816 6777

15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689 15,689

.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .162 .289 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .507 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .025 .000 .000 .009

Wilks’ Lambda coefficient is a multivariate test that estimates the differences between the categories (or groups) of the dependent variable (annual frequency of book readings). That is, it estimates the discriminant power of the set of model variables. We see that the p-value of the discriminant function is significant. That is, there are significant differences between the means of the compared groups (those who have frequent reading habits and those who do not). Lambda de Wilks Function test

Wilks Lambda

Chi-square

Gl

Sig.

1

.723

5,086,086

24

.000

Regarding the canonical discriminant function, the eigenvalue table shows the strength of the relationship between the discriminant function and the dependent variable. Therefore, the canonical correlation explains 52.6 percent of the changes in the dependent variable.

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Autovalues Function 1 a

Autovalue a

.383

% of variance

% accumulated

canonical correlation

100.0

100.0

.526

The first 1 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis.

The standardized coefficients of the canonical function indicate the weight of the independent variables to discriminate the groups between those who do not have reading habits and those who read frequently. We see that religion presents the highest values in the function (along with educational level and gender, which we consider to be control variables). Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients  

Function

Catholic Protestant (mixed included) Protestant (Nonconformist) Gender High financing Middle financing Unmarried Married/Single w partner Divorced or separated Education = High Level Education = Middle Level Large town Small/middle town Teenagers Youngsters Adults Middle class High class Company Manager White-collar employees Self-employed Home-maker Unemployed Retired

.255 .382 .391 .376 .264 .145 .033 .030 .039 .638 .382 .175 .088 .035 −.065 −.014 .275 .107 .228 .119 .099 −.024 .005 .141

Results of the discriminant analysis on attendance at stage shows.  The following table shows the variables introduced in the discriminant model that compares the extreme cases of the dependent variable. That is, it compares the group of those who do not have the habit of attending stage shows (opera, theater, dance) and those who attend more than 5 times a year. The results of the Wilks Lambda Test show that the variables are significant. In particular, the categories associated with the variable of Catholic and Protestant dominant religion (mixed included) are significant, consistent

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with the results obtained in the MLR. Likewise, the original results of the logistic regression show that the dominant Protestant religion (Nonconformist) does not have a significant influence on attendance at stage shows among those who attend regularly (more than 5 times a year). However, the contribution of the variable “dominant religion” as a whole is significant. Group Means Equality Test  

Wilks Lambda

Catholic Protestant (mixed included) Protestant (Nonconformist) Gender High financing Middle financing Unmarried Married/single with partner Divorced or separated Education = high level Education = middle level Large town Small/middle town Teenagers Youngsters Adults Middle class High class Company Manager White-collar employees Self-employed Homemaker Unemployed Retired

1.000 .998 1.000 .999 .997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .989 .999 .997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .996 .994 .997 1.000 .999 1.000 .999 1.000

F

gl2

Sig.

6.733 32.380 2.327 10.752 50.532 .946 4.047 3.389 1.151 202.635 16.534 60.878 1.169 .285 .491 1.349 69.540 108.983 60.178 .005 17.148 4.408 9.713 .027

18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18838 18,838

.009 .000 .127 .001 .000 .331 .044 .066 .283 .000 .000 .000 .280 .594 .483 .245 .000 .000 .000 .946 .000 .036 .002 .869

Again, the Wilks Lambda coefficient estimates the discriminant power of the set of model variables. We see that the p-value of the discriminant function is significant. There are significant differences between the means of the compared groups (those who regularly attend and those who do not attend stage shows). Lambda de Wilks Function test

Lambda de Wilks

Chi-square

Gl

Sig.

1

.976

457,003

24

.000

Regarding the canonical discriminant function, the eigenvalue table shows the relationship between the discriminant function and the dependent variable (attendance at stage shows). In this regard, the canonical correlation explains 15.5 percent of the changes in the dependent variable. The results here are also consistent with logistic regression.

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International Journal of Comparative Sociology 64(3)

Autovalues Function 1

Autovalue a

.025

% of variance

% Accumulated

Canonical correlation

100.0

100.0

.155

a

The first 1 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis.

The standardized coefficients of the canonical function indicate the weight of the independent variables to discriminate the groups between those who do not have reading habits and those who read frequently. We see expected aspects, in the sense that the categories that discriminate the most are belonging to the upper social class, living in large cities and having higher education. However, in our original analysis we considered them to be control variables. The specific contribution of the dominant religion has an intermediate weight in relation to the previous ones, but it is significant according to Wilks’ Lambda coefficient. Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients  

Function

 

1

Catholic Protestant (mixed included) Protestant (Nonconformist) Gender High financing Middle financing Unmarried Married/single with partner Divorced or separated Education = high level Education = middle level Large town Small/middle town Teenagers Youngsters Adults Middle class High class Company Manager White-collar employees Self-employed Homemaker Unemployed Retired

.231 .203 .076 .209 .205 .187 .111 −.002 .049 .572 .240 .349 .064 −.016 −.151 −.171 .203 .405 .162 −.020 .210 −.009 −.013 .063