Religious Transhumanism and Its Critics (Religion and Science as a Critical Discourse) 9781498584135, 9781498584142, 1498584136

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Religious Transhumanism and Its Critics

Religion and Science as a Critical Discourse Series Editors: Lisa Stenmark, San Jose State University, and Whitney Bauman, Florida International University Understanding religion and science as a critical discourse means building on theoretical issues and concerns to address social transformation, and issues of justice and global concerns. Contributions to this series will employ multiple perspectives upon the process of doing and thinking “science and religion” together, but ultimately see the relationship of religion and science as creating space for a kind of critical discourse. This might mean exploring disagreements between two authoritative disciplines that challenge one another; incorporating critical theories and discourses (understood narrowly as the Frankfort School, and, more broadly, as critical race theory and feminist, postcolonial, and queer approaches within the social sciences, natural sciences, or humanities); or a focus on voices from outside the dominant discourse, which in the case of this series means people from outside of the Western academy. In each case, the goal is to shake up assumptions, challenge givens, and open up space for new questions and new perspectives so we can think about pressing problems in a more productive and inclusive way.

Recent Titles in Series Religious Transhumanism and Its Critics, edited by Arvin M. Gouw, Brian Patrick Green, and Ted Peters Amor Mundi and Overcoming Modern World Alienation, by Justin Pack Navigating Post-Truth and Alternative Facts: Religion and Science as Political Theology, edited by Jennifer Baldwin Unsettling Science and Religion: Contributions and Questions from Queer Studies, edited by Lisa Stenmark and Whitney Bauman

Religious Transhumanism and Its Critics Arvin M. Gouw, Brian Patrick Green, Ted Peters

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www​.rowman​.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE, United Kingdom Copyright © 2022 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data available ISBN 978-1-4985-8413-5 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-4985-8414-2 (electronic) ∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Contents

Series Editor Foreword

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Forewordxiii Prefacexvii Arvin M. Gouw, Brian Patrick Green, and Ted Peters PART I: TECHNO-UTOPIA? WHERE ARE TRANSHUMANISTS LEADING US? 1 Homo Deus or Frankenstein’s Monster?: Religious Transhumanism and Its Critics Ted Peters 2 Are We Becoming God(s)?: Transhumanism, Posthumanism, Antihumanism, and the Divine Francesca Ferrando PART II: WHAT ARE RELIGIOUS TRANSHUMANISTS AND THEIR CRITICS SAYING?

1 3

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3 Mormon Transhumanism Lincoln Cannon

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4 Pre-Original Buddhism and the Transhumanist Imperative Michael LaTorra

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5 Unitarian Universalists as Critical Transhumanists James Hughes

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6 Perfecting Humanity in Confucianism and Transhumanism Heup Young Kim

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7 Why Christian Transhumanism? Micah Redding

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8 Steps toward a Theology of Christian Transhumanism Ron Cole-Turner

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9 A Roman Catholic View: Technological Progress? Yes. Transhumanism? No Brian Patrick Green

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10 Technological Theosis?: An Eastern Orthodox Critique of Religious Transhumanism 161 Brandon Gallaher 11 The Transhumanist Pied Pipers: A Jewish Caution against False Messianism Hava Tirosh-Samuelson

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PART III: THE H+ FUTURE: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES?

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12 Cyborg, Gender, and the Posthuman Self J. Jeanine Thweatt

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13 A Virtual Ghost in the Digital Machine: Whole Brain Emulation, Disembodied Gender, and Queer Mystical Animality Jay Emerson Johnson

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14 Copulation, Masturbation, and Sex Bots: Ethical Implication of AI as My Buddy in Bed Elisabeth Gerle

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15 The Transhumanist Threat to Plants and Animals: An Exercise in Ecofeminist Critical Theory Peter I-min Huang and Iris Ralph

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16 Transhumanism, Theological Anthropology, and the Ethics of Ambiguity Whitney A. Bauman

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17 The iCalf, Relationality, and the Extended Body: Evaluations of Different Notions of Post/Transhumanism Markus Mühling

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Contents

PART IV: IS H+ SOUND SCIENTIFICALLY? PHILOSOPHICALLY? THEOLOGICALLY?

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18 Is Transhumanism Good Science, Bad Science, or Pseudoscience? 295 Arvin M. Gouw 19 Ghosts or Zombies: On Keeping Body and Soul Together Noreen Herzfeld

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20 In Praise of Boundaries: Understanding Mortality as an Ally Nelson R. Kellogg

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21 Homo Gubernator as a Teilhardian-Catholic Response to Transhumanism 341 Levi Checketts 22 Will Transhumanism Reach Point Omega? Ilia Delio

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23 Resurrection and the Transhumanist Promise Celia Deane-Drummond

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24 Moral Enhancement, the Virtues, and Transhumanism: Moving beyond Gene Editing Braden Molhoek

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25 Epilogue: Introducing a New Transhumanist Theology Arvin M. Gouw

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Bibliography

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Index 441 About the Contributors

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Series Editor Foreword Lisa Stenmark and Whitney Bauman

It has been fifty years since Ian Barbour wrote Issues in Science and Religion (HarperCollins 1971), a publication that marks the beginning of what has become the broad interdisciplinary field of Science and Religion. But despite interest from a wide range of disciplines and a concern for a wide range of issues, the field continues to be marked by a concern for theoretical issues, particularly those that focus on the truth claims of religion and science. One result is that the discourse(s) of Religion and Science often lacks what one editor (Lisa) calls a “prophetic voice” and another (Whitney) a planetary perspective. This is a matter of some concern because there is a pressing worldwide need to address serious issues that exist at the intersection of Western sciences, technology, and religion, and there continue to be (serious) concerns about the status of scientific claims and the totalizing tendency of scientific claims over and against religions and other knowledge systems. There remain ongoing concerns because the discourses involved in the Western academic Science and Religion Discourse (SRD) have been historically complicit in creating many of the problems that we need to address. Science and Religion needs critical engagement, yet it is largely lacking largely because an emphasis on truth claims seeks to downplay differences, which is the entry point for critical engagement. This discourse lacks a (self) critical perspective, and this series attempts to address it through a somewhat fuzzy use of the idea of critical discourses. Critical discourses and theories can, of course, refer to Critical Theory in the narrow sense (The Frankfort School—Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Jürgen Habermas—and their intellectual descendants), but it can also be used in a broader sense, to refer to feminist, critical race theory, postcolonial, and queer approaches within social sciences, and also legal theory and literary approaches. All of these discourses help to challenge dominant understandings of the world in order that ix

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multiple perspectives and experiences might be heard. Religion and Science as a Critical Discourse can also mean avoiding a doctrines and discoveries approach—which emphasizes the truth claims of religion and science—and exploring areas of disagreement as a way of opening up the science and religion discourses to more voices and more perspectives. By critical discourse, we mean all of these and more, because none of these approaches is sufficient, but all of them are crucial for thinking about the planetary community and our moral and ethical responsibilities to human and earth others. Not every criticism is critical, of course, and what all of these approaches have in common is that they engage in criticism with a purpose: because theory must challenge and transform human structures—not just for criticisms sake, but to create a world more attuned to human and planetary flourishing. These approaches are suspicious of absolutes whether scientific or religious or otherwise. They understand all knowledge as historical and political—as shaped by human culture and human interests—and they are critical in the sense that they confront social, historical, and ideological structures within culture and society in the interest of justice and flourishing, but also as a way to open up space for sound judgments. This is criticism aimed at judgment in the sense that political philosopher Hannah Arendt understood it: the ability to think what we can do. Thus, a critical discourse involves a many-sided engagement with the human and natural worlds, including multiple social and cultural locations (most particularly non-Western perspectives. It is interdisciplinary (humanities, social sciences, natural sciences), and it is connected to action, not merely deciding what is the case, but also how to act in response. A critical discourse does not merely point out the problem—or complain about it—it suggests solutions and represents a call to action. Ultimately, this is all meant to promote an exploration of the intersection of religion and science that is not a discipline in the conventional sense of the word, but an approach, one that is oriented towards social transformation, justice, and global issues. We think that this volume, the fourth in our series, does an excellent job of providing critical perspectives on trans- and post-humanism. It does so by using critical theories to ask how race, gender, sex, sexuality, and ableness fit into concepts of the “human” within these discourses, critiquing the idea of a “universal human” that lurks behind the concept of trans- and posthumanism, the narratives of “progress” embedded in this vision of humanity, and the privileging of the human in general—however particular that “human” might be—over all other perspectives. If humans as we know them in all their diversity exist within planetary ecosystems, what becomes of the rest of the natural world in the visions of trans- and post-humanists? These questions, among others, provide us with a unique opportunity to reflect on the many different definitions of what it means to be human within a wider

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planetary community. Thus this volume explores these many different definitions because, in the manner of a collected volume, it does not speak with one voice but, rather, with many voices, some of them traditional (and within traditions) and some of them less so. These perspectives are critical because, despite the diversity, they all reflect a desire for change that is rooted in justice, and human (trans-, post-, and otherwise) and planetary flourishing. By providing these sometimes conflicting perspectives, it avoids the trap of providing some kind of definitive description, and instead offers the kind of multiple perspectives on the phenomenon that provides a critical space where we can begin to think together about possible future worlds for the Earth.

Foreword Transhumanism, Radical Life Extension, and Theology Aubrey de Grey

It is, in a way, rather odd for me to be writing this foreword. Odd in three ways, in fact. First, I do not think of myself as a transhumanist. Second, I view radical life extension (RLE) as merely a side effect of what my work actually seeks to achieve. And third, I do not believe that my work raises or touches on any difficult theological questions. But, nevertheless, most of the wider world apparently disagrees with me on all these points: I am perpetually labeled a transhumanist; my focus is almost universally assumed to be RLE; and the theological implications of such work are generally felt to be profound. Accordingly I am honored that Ted, Brian, and Arvin have asked me to write a short prologue to this highly valuable volume. Perhaps the above anomalies also qualify me to describe my view of what transhumanism is not. A couple of aspects of that are worth digging into. First, there is a widespread assumption that RLE is a core goal of transhumanism, irrespective of how it is achieved. Given that, I must distinguish sharply my approach, namely, I am combating aging by pursuing the “boring wet approach” of periodic, reasonably comprehensive, preventative maintenance of the body. This approach seems very right to me whether transhumanists embrace it or not. It seems right because whether something is or is not transhumanist is not defined just by one aspect of it but by all. The key reason why I do not view myself or my work as lying within the transhumanist ambit is that I don’t put a trans in front of the human. I’m pursuing RLE on behalf of humans, not posthumans. A well-maintained human aged 1,000 is (to me) obviously still 100 percent a human, just as a vintage car is still 100 percent a car. But conversely, the question of whether an uploaded human consciousness is still a human is far less clear to me, even if xiii

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the uploading process is one that I am satisfied preserves continuity of identity. Thus, for me, uploading to attain cybernetic immortality is an abundantly transhumanist concept, but rejuvenation medicine is not, even though many may view them as alternative means to the same end. Whether a technological endeavor is properly described as transhumanist also, I think, depends on what its goal is in the minds of those pursuing it. My personal motivation in developing medicines to combat aging is that I don’t like the fact that everyone gets sick when they get old, much more than the fact that everyone dies when they get old. But actually, even if one’s main goal is to keep people alive, that’s still not transhumanist in and of itself, because the state of being alive is a desirable state already possessed by lots of humans. How long ago one was born does not, to me, figure all that significantly in the determination of whether this or that technology would make people into something beyond what human beings naturally are. By contrast, if one’s goal is to transform people’s bodies into a form that has characteristics not remotely possessed by humans (e.g., the ability to withstand very wide ranges of temperatures), that seems very transhumanist to me, even if the most important consequence of achieving that goal were the side effect that such people would live a lot longer. I would like RLE as a human, not a posthuman. What, then, of the theological aspects? I am at best a recreational theologian, so I will not try to offer thoughts at the level of sophistication offered throughout the following chapters. Instead I would like to report my own experiences of conversations with those who have religiously inspired reservations about the quest to defeat aging. To such objections I always offer two responses. The first is that it seems incoherent to suggest that we might be subverting God’s will by increasing longevity, because by definition God is omnipotent and cannot be prevented from (for example) ending a given person’s life on a given date. This seems to me to be a very general idea that applies to the most transhumanist approaches to life extension just as it does to the boring wet approach. Now, my other response is perhaps more powerful, despite—or, maybe, because of—being restricted to the more prosaic, non-transhumanist options that form the focus of my own work. It is that aging makes people suffer. Indeed, in today’s increasingly (though, to be sure, still inadequately) peaceful and prosperous world, aging is by far the largest source of suffering. And all holy scriptures make it extremely clear that our duty while alive is to minimize suffering. Accordingly, the defeat of aging with medicine is a goal toward which it would be a sin not to strive. I have never received a cogent rebuttal to this argument.

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In closing, let me note that the above considerations apply much more generally in my own life, and perhaps can be relevant to others too. I identify myself as “agnostic by choice.” What do I mean by that? When people identify as theist or atheist, they are declaring a conviction as to whether God exists. I’m fairly sure that when people identify as agnostic, they are also declaring a conviction, namely, that the question whether God exists is undecidable. I am not in that camp. I recognize (as, I’m pretty sure, Pascal also did, despite his wager) that a belief in an assertion is not a choice. But what is a choice is whether to try to decide whether one believes a thing. I chose, in my teens, simply to stop trying to decide whether God exists. Why? Because by that time I had already decided that I wanted to dedicate my life to alleviating suffering and improving humanity’s quality of life, one way or another. And I observed that that’s exactly what scripture tells us God has planned. God “will wipe every tear from their eyes. Death will be no more; mourning and crying and pain will be no more, for the first things have passed away” (Revelation 21:4). To relieve suffering is to live a godly life. Ironically, this means that my arrival at a decision as to whether or not God exists would make zero difference to how I would spend my life. In other words, there was nothing to be gained by cogitating further on the question. I feel that this is an apposite point on which to conclude, because this kind of thinking—working out what one doesn’t need to know—underpins much of what I have noted earlier, as well as my approach to actually developing anti-aging medicines that really work. I must stress, however, that none of the foregoing takes anything away from the value of this book. The tension between religion and transhumanism is real. It definitely needs to be debated by the best thinkers in theology. But a key first step in doing so is to identify which technologies fall within transhumanism and which do not. The unjustified inclusion of too many technologies can only serve to obfuscate that debate.

Preface Arvin M. Gouw, Brian Patrick Green, and Ted Peters

It is crucial that progress in technology is matched by solid, well-funded research to anticipate the scenarios it could bring about, and to study possible political and economic reforms that will allow those usurped by machinery to contribute to society. If that is a Luddite perspective, then so be it. —Editors, Nature1

How can a materialist and even atheistic program become absorbed into a religious spirituality like water into a sponge? Why turn belligerently antireligious humanists into fellow believers? Why incorporate the idolatry inherent in technological plans to create god-like creatures into religious orthodoxy? To put it another way: Why would a theologian—whether Christian, Mormon, Hindu, or Buddhist—want to upload the transhumanist mind into the religious brain? In short, we ask: What is it about ­transhumanism—also known as H+—that so attracts theologians that they want to adopt transhumanism into their religious family? The transhumanist project includes the use of genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics to eliminate death and enhance humans into god-like beings, into Homo Deus, at least according to some.2 Transhumanism is, then, at its deepest root, already a religious and theological project, whether its proponents admit it or not. Perhaps spiritually minded persons external to the transhumanist movement perceive this secularized religious detour and are inspired to welcome H+ back to its religious home. “Transhumanism is no dogmatic, rigid philosophy with a fixed system of thought or goals defined once and for all. Instead it is a conglomerate of different memes which fit rather well together and support each other without competing too much.”3 Thus saith Max More. The key memes include xvii

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innovation, intelligence, superintelligence, immortality, and posthuman evolution. Most transhumanists envision posthuman existence as our highest vocation and ultimate human fulfillment, and hope to, through technology, transform present reality into an eschatological utopia. Through science along with technology, these technosapiens say, we can create a god-like artificial intelligence or even become the equivalent of gods ourselves, creating new universes inside computer simulations, probing the edges of cosmic reality, conquering death, and creating the equivalent of heaven itself. Our forbearers in Western civilization presumed only God could accomplish such things. But, if the transhumanist vision becomes actualized, through science and technology the intelligent human race will accomplish all this on its own. Do not such thoughts constitute pride run amok? Unbridled hubris? Even self-idolatry? Traditional critics see transhumanism as the strongest attempt yet to seize the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and, as the serpent said when telling Eve a lie, become “like gods.” As technology allows us to translate more and more effectively between languages, thus undoing the curse of Babel, technosapiens proceed to build our emerging computerized towers toward the heavens. But to what end? Critics worry, because the same technologies which may allow us to storm Heaven—genetics, nanotechnology, robotics, and so on—may also be used to create a roboticized tyranny on Earth if not extinction of our species. Is such dystopian fear warranted? The siren voices of our transhumanist friends are calling us to an aweinspiring future replete with transformation, supersession, and victory over death. The leap to superintelligence will equip us to cure all the ills that have previously plagued humankind. Whole brain emulation—uploading the human mind into the computer cloud—will inaugurate an evolutionary leap in shared consciousness unencumbered by the distractions of our diseasevulnerable and dying bodies. The present generation of Homo sapiens will give birth to the next stage in the ongoing evolutionary story, the posthuman. Science saves. Is such utopianism warranted? THE POSTHUMAN IS POST-WHAT? If H+ aims at bringing the posthuman into existence, what of the human that will be left behind? The sands of confidence by which we grasp what it means to be human have been washed out to sea by the recent tsunami of feminist, postcolonial, and anti-racist critical theories along with environmental activists, disability rights advocates, and queer/LGBT+ theorists. Standard definitions that claim universal application are no longer acceptable.

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The human subject is now viewed in the particular. The human subject is no longer defined by Enlightenment rationalism as the autonomous agent with consciousness that transcends the particular to embrace the universal. Now, the human person is reconfigured, embodied, and embedded. We are tied inextricably by relationships between the self, the community, and the natural world in both its organic and non-organic dimensions. How might this anti-anthropology so familiar to critical theorists influence the debate over transhumanism in its religious manifestations? Classical religious traditions have produced their respective anthropologies over centuries of accumulated wisdom. A religious anthropology typically corresponds to a tradition’s view of the divine and its plan for spiritual transformation. Similarly, transhumanism proffers its own anthropology based on its assumption about progressive evolution. Evolution’s purpose is to advance the cause of intelligence, say H+ theorists. On the basis of this assumption, the moral imperative of the transhumanist is to exhaust technology’s creativity in furthering the advance of intelligence. When Francesca Ferrando asks the question—Of which human is the posthuman a “post”?—she de-universalizes the category of the human we’ve inherited from the Enlightenment. As a posthumanist she acknowledges that the human is not one thing. She recognizes “the plurality of the human experience; the human is not recognized as one but as many.”4 Ferrando then points out the exclusionary history of the Enlightenment category of the human, whether derived from the Latin humanus or the scientific Homo sapiens. The category of the human has excluded the animals, and right along with the animals everything else that is organic or inorganic. Our inherited club of humans has made membership difficult for slaves, women, people of color, and others to join. The “historical exclusivist legacies [of the universal human] allowed for the dehumanization of the less-than human others . . . [considering some] more human than others. . . . Philosophical Posthumanism is a post-humanism, a post-anthropocentrism, and a post-dualism.”5 In sum, a curious triangulation results from these observations. We must place into trialogue secular transhumanist anthropology, traditional religious anthropologies, and the anti-universalist anthropology of critical theory. In each of these three cases we must put to the test the utopian promise of the H+ vision of a superintelligent posthumanity. CRITICAL PUBLIC THEOLOGY Whether dystopia or utopia, the public theologian must honestly ask a big question: Does transhumanism point to our final end in the universe? Does

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technological advance provide a chance to finally heal the universe of the evil that corrupts it? Or, are transhumanists laying an existential trap for the Sorcerer’s Apprentice to let loose the inundating powers of chaos? Neither? Both? As global society moves forward into the future mapped by transhumanists, today’s public theologians should feel obligated to study this map and thoughtfully evaluate the proposed posthuman itinerary. Along with evaluating the materialist-transhumanist itinerary, public theologians should also examine the route being planned by distinctively religious transhumanists: Mormon, Buddhist, Unitarian, Christian, and such. The prospect of an alliance between traditional religious believers and technoprometheans seems surprising at minimum, self-contradictory at maximum. The religious depth of technosapien culture begs the theologian for critical analysis, comprehension, and constructive response. TRANSHUMANISM: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? Just as one chord sounds multiple notes, so each term in this discussion sounds multiple meanings. The term, transhumanism or H+, refers to an ideology and movement that seeks to employ technology to advance civilization beyond the human, to guide evolution via technological enhancement toward a new posthuman species. Edmund Kirsch, the antagonist in Dan Brown’s best seller, Origin, prophesizes: “Humans are evolving into something different. . . . We are becoming a hybrid species—a fusion of biology and technology.”6 Trans in transhumanism suggests movement beyond, connecting today with tomorrow. Through advancing genetic and nanotechnologies, transhumanists seek to leave behind human blights such as aging and death. If we escape death and become immortal, will we be human or posthuman? Aubrey de Grey, who writes a Foreword for this volume, is hesitant to call himself a transhumanist because his work on RLE is aimed at enhancing the human, not the posthuman. The key term, posthuman, sounds different notes. For the transhumanist, the posthuman will be our successor species: more intelligent, perhaps disembodied, perhaps even a new form of god. Homo sapiens will become Homo deus. Transhumanists celebrate the apotheosis of the human in the future posthuman. Cultural and philosophical posthumanists, in parallel yet in contradistinction, deconstruct traditional notions of human nature or human essence. Posthuman discourse opens up spaces to reassess just what it means to be human in the first place, to critically examine what it means to be embedded in the animal world, in social constructions, and in cyborg transformation.

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Critical posthumanists no longer accept Enlightenment boundaries between the human and the nonhuman. They deny anthropocentrism and deny human exceptionalism while recognizing the moral status of subjectivities beyond the human, such as we find in animals or Artificial Intelligence. Critical posthumanists, in contrast to transhumanists, withdraw reverence for intelligence and undercut reliance on technoscience to subject nature to the human will to power. We, therefore, distinguish three conversants in this trialogue: secular transhumanism, religious transhumanism, and philosophical or critical posthumanism. The third, the philosophical posthumanist approach, is “formulated on a post-anthropocentric and post-humanistic epistemé based on decentralized and non-hierarchical modes,” avers philosophical posthumanist Ferrando.7 The decisive point is that philosophical posthumanists want to replace the cardinal doctrines of Enlightenment humanism with critical posthumanism. To advance from the human to the posthuman presumes we know what the human is. As suggested above, critical theorists attack the presumed norms of the so-called human in light of our colonial history with its marginalization of putatively less-than-human races. From the perspective of Afrofuturists, Enlightenment technosapiens are able give up their humanity because as the dominant group they could presume their humanity. What about those marginalized during the colonial period, those whose humanity was questioned? Africans and African Americans no longer need or want admission to the club of humanity as their colonialist doorkeepers had defined it. What is called for is a transformation of humanism, a posthumanism that is self-defining. Zaykiyya Iman Jackson at USC criticizes an earlier stage of critical posthumanism, because it had not yet liberated itself sufficiently from modern Eurocentric humanism. She recommends that “the field would benefit from more attentiveness to the politics of gender, race, class, and ability, as they believe that the field had unwittingly reinscribed Western exceptionalism, technological fetishism, and ableism in its embrace of prosthetically-enhanced futures.” Yet, Jackson will not surrender every aspect of Enlightenment humanism while pursuing posthumanism. Our inherited humanism contains within it a thrust toward pluralism, toward the incorporation of those previously marginalized. “A call for a transformative theory and practice of humanity should not be mistaken for the fantasy of an absolute break with humanism, which has animated so many ‘post’ moments. Rather, in the best work, the ‘post’ marks a commitment to ‘work through’ that which remains liberal humanist.”8 In sum, our transhumanists employ the term posthuman in the context of classic Enlightenment understandings of intelligence, rationality, objectivism, and technoscientific control of the human over nature, even over human nature. Our critical posthumanists, in contrast, employ this term

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deconstructively to open spaces for transforming the very concept of the human while listening to the voices of those previously marginalized by the colonial will to power. As this volume proceeds, we will see critical theologians and critical posthumanists challenge the secular transhumanist reliance on intelligence, reason, and the enslavement of human nature to techno-domination. FROM THE ANTHROPOCENE TO THE TECHNOSAPIEN PERIOD As we cross the threshold from the Anthropocene into the technosapien period, we must ask critical questions specifically about religious transhumanism. Does religious H+ represent a healthy alliance of the Greeks and the Trojans? Or, does it risk bringing a Trojan horse into the religious citadel? Some critical questions will arise out of critical theory itself. Central to critical theory is liberation as emancipation in the context of a specific obstruction to human freedom. So, we must ask: What are the implications of the transhumanist agenda for social justice? For human identity? For race? For gender?9 For hierarchies or the inversion of hierarchies? For the very concept of the human in contrapuntal relation to the posthuman? On the one hand, the transhumanist emphasis on biotechnological enhancement could lead to enhanced human flourishing and planetary well-being. On the other hand, the transhumanist summum bonum, superintelligence, hierarchalizes humanity according to a scale of greater or lesser intelligence. Within an evolutionary matrix of the survival of the fittest, the more intelligent among us will be invited to survive while others will be left by the roadside. This transhumanist scheme would likely justify a new elitism and a new eugenics. The task of the critical theorist is to render this shadow side transparent. PUBLIC THEOLOGIANS AND RELIGIOUS TRANSHUMANISTS Critically assessing religious transhumanism in this volume will be an exercise in public theology. It was Martin Marty at the University of Chicago who launched the public theology thrust four decades ago. The mission of Marty’s Public Religion Project was “to promote efforts to bring to light and interpret the forces of faith within a pluralistic society.”10 More recently, Hak Joon Lee, who teaches theology and ethics at Fuller Theological Seminary, tells us that “public theology advocates for a constructive public role for

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religious discourse in a pluralistic society, neither suppressing religious expressions nor dismissing democratic values such as human rights, tolerance, and equality.”11 Your three editors—Arvin Gouw, Brian Patrick Green, and Ted Peters—structure the contributions to this volume in such a way that public theology provides illumination and insight for the benefit of the common good. Furthermore, we have received valuable copyediting and feedback from Danielle Fumagalli and Fidelia Beatrice Alvina to ensure the integrity and coherence of this volume as a whole. This book will present the reader with testimonies by religious transhumanists. The hybridizing of traditional religion with innovative technology is today being pursued in earnest by creative leaders guided by wholesome values. One can only admire the creative synthesis of Mormon theology, Buddhist anthropology, and Unitarian Universalist commitment to social justice with the transhumanist vision of a transformed future. These syntheses of H+ technology with religious sensibilities are creative and noble. In addition to confessional affirmations by selected religious transhumanists, this book will include theological critiques of both secular and religious transhumanism. These critiques will derive from the science-religion dialogue understood as an exercise in critical discourse. Although multiple confessional stands will be defended by various authors, no one stand will be dubbed dogmatic or definitive. Finally, you the reader will find critical and constructive thoughts from the editors along with the contributors. Theologically speaking, we observe that today’s techno-innovators are, without knowing it, expressing the powers latent in the divine image, the imago Dei. God the creator has created Homo sapiens to become co-creators, partners in renovation, innovation, and transformation. But rather than making a Promethean raid on Mount Olympus to steal the power of the gods for our own hegemony, the biblical vision promises us an empowerment granted freely by the God who loves us in grace. We cannot steal what God offers freely. In our considered judgment, the utopian vision and messianic instinct of our transhumanist friends reflect a true longing in the human soul. Yet, we must eye Humanity Plus with critical caution. No upgrade of intelligence or advance in technological innovation will heal the human heart, repair a broken soul, or reconcile warring enemies. Such redemption will require an extra dose of divine generosity, an offering of God’s grace which we wholeheartedly yearn for. If there is to be a merger of secular transhumanism with traditional religious commitments, this understanding of the human person kneeling in gratitude before the God of grace will have to be taken into account. Therefore, if the captain of our transhumanist ship is sailing toward Atlantis, we the editors want to be dropped off at a safe port along the way.

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As scientists, ethicists, and theologians who celebrate technological innovation for the benefit of human flourishing, we enjoy the transhumanist cruise. But, if the captain plans to steer human hubris beyond the Pillars of Hercules out into the deep beyond which there may be no return—if the destination is a utopia drawn from a fragile and unrealistic myth—we plan to disembark before the ship predictably hits an iceberg. —Arvin Gouw, Brian Patrick Green, and Ted Peters Berkeley, California Assumption of Mary, August 15, 2021

NOTES 1. Editors, “Anticipating Artificial Intelligence,” Nature 532:7600 (28 April 2016) 413; http://www​.nature​.com​/search​?date​_range​=last​_30​_days​&journal​=nature​ %2Cnews​&q​=Anticipating​%20Artificial​%20Intelligence. 2. Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (New York: Harper, 2017). 3. Max More, “Philosophy,” http://www​.aleph​.se​/Trans​/Cultural​/Philosophy/ (accessed September 10, 2018). 4. Francesca Ferrando, Philosophical Posthumanism (London: Bloomsbury, 2019) 54. 5. Ibid., 98. 6. Dan Brown, Origin (New York: Bantam Press, 2017) 411. 7. Francesca Ferrando, “Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms: Differences and Relations,” Existenz 8:2 (Fall 2013) 26–32, at 32. 8. Zaykiyya Iman Jackson, “Animal: New Directions in the Theorization of Race and Posthumanism,” Feminist Studies 39:3 (2013) 669–684, at 682; https://www​ .academia​.edu​/6169668​/Animal​_New​_Directions​_in​_the​_Theorization​_of​_Race​ _and​_Posthumanism. 9. Lisa Stenmark and Whitney Bauman, “Foreword,” Navigating Post-Truth and Alternative Facts, ed., Jennifer Baldwin (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018) vii–ix. 10. Martin E. Marty, “What Role Should Religion Have in Public Life?” (1998); http://access​.minnesota​.publicradio​.org​/civic​_j​/public​_religion​/symposium​/martys​ _speech​.shtml (accessed March 4, 2017). 11. Hak Joon Lee, “Public Theology,” The Cambridge Companion to Christian Political Theology, eds., Craig Hovey and Elizabeth Phillips (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 44–65, at 44.

Part I

TECHNO-UTOPIA? WHERE ARE TRANSHUMANISTS LEADING US?

Chapter 1

Homo Deus or Frankenstein’s Monster? Religious Transhumanism and Its Critics Ted Peters

What glory would attend the discovery, if I could banish disease from the human frame, and render [the human race] invulnerable to any but a violent death! —Mary Shelly, Frankenstein1

Everything we know about history indicates that our future is limited. The cosmos will die due to entropy. The sun will die when its fuel is exhausted. The Earth will die when the sun begins its death throws. If at that time descendents of today’s Homo sapiens are still walking the planet, they will perish as well. None of this is news. Endings belong to history. Human consciousness reacts to the prospect of the final end by thinking of the future in one of three ways: moirai, adventus, or futurum. First, fate—as moirai in Greek ­mythology—is the power of inevitability that even the gods must obey. Fate defines the future as unavoidable, inescapable, and ineluctable. Second, the future in Latin as adventus expects radical change—even redemption—as an act of God which will usher in a new creation. Third, the future in Latin as futurum expects more of the same evolutionary processes we have known; yet, human energy and ingenuity can through technological genius overcome the inertia of fate and transform reality for the better. Today’s transhumanists are futurists who invest their faith in futurum, and through technological progress they plan to take hold of the steering wheel of evolution and drive both natural and human history to a destination they design.2 There is widespread fear in post-industrial society that artificial intelligence (AI) will replace human workers on the job and eliminate a living

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wage for the human beings they serve. There is also widespread glee at the promise of sex bots—robots ready to provide every sexual pleasure one could imagine—that would eliminate the emotional challenges of copulation in exchange for predictable masturbation. Both anxiety and hope for the AI revolution assume that fate, moirai, is in charge of our future on Earth. Transhumanists—also known as Humanity Plus or H+—do not surrender our future to fate. Rather, they seek to press the buttons of evolution’s control panel to design a future which, at least in the first phases, will be controllable. Once H+ yields the control panel to the posthuman, however, we Homo sapiens will cross a threshold beyond which there will be no turning back. This is futurum at work, a future that adds freedom to a determined past. The aspirations of techno-posthumanism fall nothing short of apotheosis itself, the self-making of today’s human into tomorrow’s deity. “Having raised humanity above the beastly level of survival struggles, we will now aim to upgrade humans into gods, and turn Homo sapiens into Homo deus,” touts best-selling author Yuval Harari.3 Deification will be achieved through techno-can-do-ism, following the path of a futurum we ourselves make. We cannot avoid asking: are the hubris of Prometheus and the recklessness of Frankenstein putting our human future at risk? Where is the religious mind in all of this? Christians—whether of Syriac, Byzantine, or Latin tradition—have long thought of the decisive future as adventus. This is God’s future. God’s ultimate future nullifies what has been evil in history, selects what has been wholesome, and transforms the present creation exhaustively, totally, consummately. Jesus’s Easter resurrection from the dead provides the model, the prolepsis, of the advent of the new creation. A new creation, including eternal life, is a gift of God to those of us who are subject to death. It is a gift of divine grace, not the achievement of human technology. So, we ask: why might religious people be interested in transhumanist futurum? Why is it that so many religious thinkers have baptized the transhumanist vision and embraced the corollary H+ ethics? Why do the mythologemes of Prometheus and Frankenstein precipitate so little caution and trepidation? To these enigmatic questions we now turn. We ask these questions as an exercise in public theology. Here is the definition I work with: “Public theology is conceived in the church, reflected on critically in the academy, and meshed within the wider culture for the benefit of the wider culture.”4 Although I explicate, analyze, and critique transhumanism in both its techno-utopian and religious variants, this theological scholarship is intended to provide valuable illumination for the wider culture on behalf of the common good.

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FROM THE HUMAN TO THE POSTHUMAN VIA THE TRANSHUMAN Let’s start with techno-utopian transhumanism. H+ provides the bridge between today’s humanity and tomorrow’s posthumanity.5 If the present generation of Homo sapiens does nothing, our human species will evolve over time regardless. A million years from now, our descendants will look back at us as their predecessor species. The question transhumanists raise is this: should we just let nature take its course or should we intervene and take technological control over this evolutionary process? Could we design our descendents like we design Teslas? The transhumanists respond with an enthusiastic, yes. “Current humanity need not be the endpoint of evolution,” claims Nick Bostrom at Oxford University’s Future of Humanity Institute.6 The transhumanist tool box for transformation includes genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics, or GNR for short. The highest value on the transhumanist scale is intelligence; So, the task of GNR will be to raise both human and machine intelligence to such a high level that the resulting intelligence will take over and reproduce itself on its own. Regarding social ethics, transhumanists rely on Social Darwinism in the form of laissez-faire capitalism. The intelligent among us will survive, while the less intelligent will be discarded by the roadside. “Transhumanism is a philosophy, a worldview and a movement,” declares Natasha Vita-More, executive director of Humanity + Inc.7 According to the Transhumanist Declaration of the World Transhumanist Association, “Humanity will be radically changed by technology in the future. We foresee the feasibility of redesigning the human condition, including such parameters as the inevitability of aging, limitations on human and artificial intellects, unchosen psychology, suffering, and our confinement to the planet earth.”8 This leads to a vision of a posthuman future characterized by a merging of humanity with technology as the next stage of our human evolution.9 Humanity plus (H+) is calling us forward. Posthuman refers to who we might become if transhuman efforts achieve their goals.10 Today’s transhumanism has been inspired by yesterday’s progressive evolutionism, especially that of Julian Huxley. Up till now human life has generally been, as Hobbes described it, “nasty, brutish and short”; the great majority of human beings (if they have not already died young) have been afflicted with misery . . . we can justifiably hold the belief that these lands of possibility exist, and that the present limitations and miserable frustrations of our existence could be in large measure surmounted. . . . The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself—not just sporadically, an individual here in one way, an individual there in another way, but in its entirety, as humanity.11

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This former futurist vision has inserted itself into the self-understanding of contemporary techno-culture and taken up mythical status. According to the myth—myth understood as the conceptual set or framework or imaginary—of the transhumanist, evolution and progress are two ideas that fit together like a video game and a console. Evolution is progressive, and technology will speed up evolution’s progress. This technological progress will allegedly shoot the human race like a cannon ball over its previous biological barriers. “Transhumanism . . . direct[s] application of medicine and technology to overcome some of our basic biological limits.”12 The posthuman will be postbiological, that is, our descendents will have intelligent minds not in brains but in computers. What we have previously known as Homo sapiens will be replaced by Homo cyberneticus. The advent of the posthuman will define human utopia, according to Nick Bostrom. Let us make a leap into an imaginary posthuman world, in which technology has reached its logical limits. The superintelligent inhabitants of this world are autopotent, meaning that they have complete power over and operational understanding of themselves, so that they are about to remold themselves at will and assume any internal state they choose . . . in any technological utopia we have a realistic chance of creating . . . a large portion of the constraints we currently face have been lifted and that both our internal states and the world around us have become much more malleable to our wishes and desires.13

The H+ techno-utopia will liberate us from past constraints, especially from biological constraints. “As humanism freed us from the chains of superstition, let transhumanism free us from our biological chains.”14 This transhumanist spirit is reminiscent of the Greek Titan Prometheus and Mary Shelly’s Victor Frankenstein. “Bio-fatalism will increasingly be replaced by techno-can-do-ism—the belief in the power of the new technology to free us from the limitations of our bodies and minds. . . . In the twentyfirst century, the belief in the Fall of Man will be replaced by the belief in his inevitable transcendence—through Superbiology.”15 The torch of Prometheus will lead us into the new world of transhumanism. “Let us cast aside cowardice and seize the torch of Prometheus with both hands.”16 Such Promethean hubris regarding progress in technology is accompanied by a utopian vision, a vision of future human fulfillment or even posthuman fulfillment in a kingdom where rational intelligence has transcended its previous biological imprisonment. Not only as individuals but also as a social community and even as a cosmic community we will experience ecstatic human flourishing, the abundant life which previous religious visionaries could only dream of. This is where messianic transhumanists would like to take us. “The excesses of transhumanism with its picture of a new world order, in which

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medicine will be devoted to conquering mortality, overcoming ageing, vanquishing neurodegenerative diseases and enabling people to live to 600 or so years of age as healthy and fulfilled individuals, rightly repel Christians. . . . These extreme vistas represent a rerun of the science-as-saviour mentality.”17 Cybernetic Immortality and Radial Life Extension We die. Ever since evolution invented sex, organisms die. This is a biological limit we Homo sapiens have inherited. Transhumanists object to death. They see death as a hurdle to be jumped. There are two ways to jump the hurdle, radical life extension (RLE) within our bodies or cybernetic immortality outside our bodies. Immortality through uploading the human mind to the computer cloud is one route to immortality, according to H+ disciples. “Post-human minds will lead to a different future and we will be better as we merge with our technology . . . humans will be able to upload their entire minds to The Living Cyberspace and BECOME IMMORTAL.”18 Cybernetic immortality could be attained, according to inventor Ray Kurzweil, through whole brain emulation. This is possible because intelligence is not dependent upon our biological substrate. Kurzweil defines intelligence as an information pattern and, as an information pattern, our intelligence could be transferred from our brain to a computer. Working with a computational theory of mind or the concept of patternism, Kurzweil believes our intelligence can live on in an enhanced form even when extricated from our bodies and placed in a computer. “Uploading a human brain means scanning all of its salient details and then reinstantiating those details into a suitably powerful computational substrate. This process would capture a person’s entire personality, memory, skills, and history.”19 Kurzweil and colleagues plan to derive Homo cyberneticus from modifying Homo sapiens through whole brain emulation, through a soulechtomy in which the mind is extracted from its original body. Are we there yet? No. The technology needs further development. Even so, some futurists are planning ahead. One start-up, Nectome, is already selling cybernetic uploading. This may be the first preserve-your-brain-andupload-it company aimed at this market. Nectome’s technique, unfortunately, requires a fresh brain from a deceased person. In short, to have your mind uploaded you have to die in a controlled situation where your brain can be immediately extracted. But, because the technology for uploading is not yet perfected, your brain will go on ice waiting to be thawed out at some future time. Consulted lawyers familiar with California’s End of Life Option Act, which permits doctor-assisted suicide for terminal patients, affirm that Nectome’s service will be legal. It will also be fatal. One hundred percent

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fatal. Robert McIntyre, the company’s co-founder, guarantees that its product is “100% fatal.”20 So, at this juncture, cybernetic immortality remains cybernetic mortality. The other way to beat death is to cooperate with biology. This is the approach taken by RLE. Cambridge geneticist and biogerontologist Aubrey de Grey proclaims that science must triumph over what has hitherto been nature’s province, namely, aging and natural death. “Seven deadly things” stand as hurdles in our way, says de Grey, but science can knock down these hurdles and we can race past them: (1) cell loss can be overcome with reversible stem cell therapy, (2) cell death resistance can be overcome by immunotherapy and suicide gene therapy, (3) chromosomal mutations and epimutations can be obviated by gene therapy, (4) mitochondrial mutations can similarly be obviated by gene therapy and by splicing the mitochondrial genome into the chromosomes, (5) indigestible molecules inside cells can be obviated with microbial enzymes, (6) indigestible molecules between cells can become reversible by immunotherapy, and (7) stiffening of elastic structures can become reversible by glycation link breakers. With progress in these seven areas of scientific advance, we can blunt the aging process and perhaps even rejuvenate individuals who have already grown old. RLE will provide health and longevity to the Homo sapiens with which we are familiar. We are almost there, claims de Grey. “There is a good chance aging can be entirely defeated within the next few decades,” he writes. The progress of technology is speeding up, meaning that the relevant laboratory research is advancing at an increasingly rapid pace. The “longevity escape velocity” is spiralling upward.21 Just what are the theological implications of RLE? There are none, says de Grey. Even though “lots of us might live literally forever as a result of simple human ingenuity, unaided by divine hand,” this has no “theological connotations. I believe it has no theological implications whatsoever, because, just as for the defeat of aging, it’s only an extrapolation. . . . It does not mean we have in any way made whatever omnipotent beings there may be out there any less omnipotent.”22 Because God’s omnipotence is not rivaled by the triumph of science, de Grey presumes that no theological implications can be drawn from his vision of RLE. Despite what de Grey claims, theological implications abound. Many religious thinkers are startled about the implications of RLE. At one extreme, some argue that finitude and the expectation of dying prod us to live virtuously and to give proper attention to urgent matters. On the other hand, others argue that increased longevity and elimination of the fear of death will provide an unprecedented opportunity to establish social peace and harmony. Even if increased life span does not change our fundamental cosmology or anthropology, it may have a significant impact on our psychological state

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and our social ethics. At least, this is what we can glean from religious speculators. Singularity and Salvation The transhumanist threshold to be crossed is the Singularity, scheduled for perhaps the year 2045. The Singularity marks the threshold where the superintelligence we create will take the reins from human hands and place them in posthuman hands. With the creation of “superhuman intelligence . . . the human era will be ended,” wrote science fiction writer Vernor Vinge in 1992. He adds that “Singularity . . . is a point where our old models must be discarded and a new reality rules.”23 The Singularity is near and we should make ready, insists Kurzweil.24 Beyond the Singularity the vicissitudes of present human existence will be conquered. Even death will be no more. Singularity as a movement relies on the science-as-savior belief system. It becomes a new religion, a secular and materialistic religion. “The Singularity movement is a kind of secular religion promoting its own apocalyptic and messianic vision of the end times,” observes William Grassie.25 Rather than a complement to existing religious traditions, transhumanism has become a competitor. Here is an important take-home point: H+ is itself religious even without being yoked to a traditional religion. H+ is intended to replace our inherited traditions. “Do our technologies threaten religion itself? We used to believe in the power of God. Have we replaced that belief with a belief in the power of our own technologies?”26 H+ science and technology competes for sales at the salvation supermarket. Nevertheless, not every religious thinker sees H+ or science-as-savior as a competitor. Rather, techno-messianism looks more like a business partner or even spiritual partner. Let’s turn to traditional religious thought and explore this in more detail. We will explore possible theological implications of the H+ variant on the science-as-savior imaginary from a variety of religious points of view. A SURVEY: AXIAL RELIGIONS RESPOND TO RLE AND H+ As we turn from techno-transhumanism to religious transhumanism, I offer a brief survey of contemporary remnants of the axial traditions. By Axial Religions I refer to those philosophical and religious traditions which arose during the first millennium before Jesus Christ in various parts of the world: China, India, and the Mesopotamian-Greek regions. No historian of ideas can refrain from bowing in awe at the breakthrough insights of Confucius,

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Laozi, the Upanishads, Buddha, Zoroaster, the Hebrew prophets, and the Greek philosophers. From these original insights there followed religious and philosophical traditions that still influence our thinking today. Philosopher of religion John Hick observes, “The great post-axial faiths constitute different ways of experiencing, conceiving and living in relation to an ultimate divine Reality which transcends all our varied visions of it.”27 These now ancient axial insights broke through the intra-cosmic confinement of mythology to report on a transcendent, ineffable, and in some cases gracious ultimate reality. The ground of being is transcendent to, while being immanent in, the mundane reality we know now as creation, nature, and history.28 Our inherited axial insight recognizes that we human beings are not fated, not condemned to arbitrary forces within the empirical world in which we daily live. The future is contingent. The future is contingent on what we do and what God does. If transhumanism makes up the Power Ball lottery winnings, how will a religious believer cash in the winning ticket? Answers differ. Let’s do a brief survey, keeping in mind that what H+ offers is futurum, neither moirai nor adventus. First, Daoism. In her treatment of Chinese Daoism, Livia Kohn responds favorably to the likely impact of RLE on spirituality. The prospect of immortality (xian) is not foreign to ancient Chinese thinking; rather, it has its own tradition connected in part to beliefs associated with medical practices. “As RLE becomes a reality,” she writes, “Daoists will first of all feel completely vindicated and emphasize how they have always said that death was an avoidable disease and not part of original human perfection.” What follows for the Daoist, then, is a vision of a society in which its members live for aeons. Within an inherited understanding of the future as fate, moirai, the optimism of techno-futurism adds futurum: it adds hope. Social ethics will be invoked to establish the long awaited and expected era of peace and harmony. “Daoists thus already have a model in place for the kind of life people of extended longevity would have. The society of Great Peace, made up of genetically engineered individuals with different goals and talents that yet all have immortals’ bones, would create a forum of empowerment and perfection.”29 Second, Hinduism. Transhumanism will play well in India, according to Sarah Ahamed, Palak Madan, and Avinash Kumar Singh. “From the pursuit of longevity to the morphological freedom exercised by the avatars of ancient polytheistic Gods and Goddesses, the legacy and heritage of ancient Indian civilizations have much more similitude with the radical concepts of transhumanism of the modern ages.”30 The pursuit of physical immortality through science would be welcomed by a Tantric Hindu, say Jeffrey Lidke and Jacob Dirnberger. But, they would

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add, living long would be valuable only if it is combined with enhanced consciousness and religious wisdom. Tantric Hindus “place greater weight on that which produces experiences of ultimate value,” and they suggest “they would not personally invest time or energy in a radical life extension program that did not lead simultaneously to an increase in that wisdom which abides and transcends the entire cycle of life and death.”31 Within an inherited framework of fated time, moirai, the pursuit of spiritual wisdom would not be enhanced by techno-can-do-ism. Third, Jainism. When we turn to another religion of India, Jainism, we find a religion with a Hindu cosmology but a more austere spirituality. To the Jains, the prospect of RLE appears dangerous. Jains like Hindus and Buddhists begin with the premise that life in this world is illusion, saṃsāra; and this illusion includes ubiquitous suffering. If RLE would add a thousand years of suffering, who would want it? “Prolonging life in saṃsāra is simply prolonging the suffering inherent in the world. Escape is what should be sought,” according to Sherry Fohr, who teaches Asian religions at Converse College.32 Like Hindus and Buddhists, Jains have inherited a moirai doctrine of temporal passage leading to a fated future. The Jain critic would fear H+ reliance on futurum rather than adventus, and that kind of future would only extend the sufferings we have known in the past. Fourth, Buddhism. Recall the first of Buddha’s Four Noble Truths: all of life is suffering (dukkha). The assumptions of Hinduism and Jainism include this belief as well. A Jain renouncer who renounces this physical life would shriek in horror at adding a millennium to the period of suffering. One would expect the Buddhist to similarly shriek in horror at RLE for the same reason. But, this renouncing of RLE within the Buddhist community has not yet happened. Michael LaTorra at New Mexico State University can even claim, “I am a self-identified Buddhist transhumanist.”33 Why might he think this? Would he not want to escape? No. LaTorra wants to combat suffering with medical science. “Reducing suffering and increasing happiness are goals common to Buddhism and to transhumanism,” he holds.34 Does LaTorra add a progressive future to an otherwise fated understanding? Fifth, Judaism. Jewish intellectuals tend to be accepting of human limitations such as suffering and death either because these vicissitudes are biblically acknowledged or because they are natural endowments. This makes the perfectionist even messianic tone of H+ unnerving to Jewish sensibilities. According to Jewish ethicist Elliot Dorff, it is peoplehood or ethnicity, not theology, which defines Judaism. Contemporary non-religious Jews, many of whom are inclined toward naturalism, still belong within the Jewish fold and will be affected by RLE speculation. Within this framework, Dorff reminds us of the biblical description of the human life span, “The span of our life is seventy years or, given strength, eighty years” (Psalm 90:10). What would

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happen should we double this or should we be able to extend it indefinitely? The fundamental worldview would not change. Nevertheless, it would have an impact on our spiritual disposition. By putting off into the vague future our death, we might lose the sense of urgency to get our life into order, to pursue our God-given destiny. “Radical life extension would . . . weaken one of the important implications of our current span of life, namely, the sense that we have a near deadline to accomplish whatever we can.”35 Jewish intellectuals are going to be especially alert to the incipient messianic tone of transhumanism. They will be cautious about the possibility that a false messiah is at work here. Perhaps Hava Tirosh-Samuelson is most forceful: “I view transhumanism as an elaborate pursuit of perfection. . . . I reject transhumanism because it calls for the planned obsolescence of the human species on the grounds that biological humanity, the product of a long evolutionary process, is not only an imperfect work in progress but a form of life that is inherently flawed and has no right to exist.”36 In sum, a Jewish assessment of messianic transhumanism will lead to a warning: do not follow this Pied Piper. Sixth, Byzantine Christianity. Could the transformation of the human person through technological enhancement contribute to human virtue? More? Could GNR contribute to sanctification or even deification? To what the Eastern Orthodox call, theosis? To Homo Deus? Not on your life! “While the Christian tradition does share with techno-humanism a vision of deification as integral to the human story, its understanding of the source, means, and ultimate end of this radical transformation of human beings is substantially different. For Christians, deification is the work of the Christian deity. . . . Deification is only possible because Christ deifies human nature in the incarnation and the Spirit sanctifies human persons in the common life of the church and in our engagements with the wider world,” according to Ian Curran.37 Deification cannot happen without a heavy dose of divine grace, without adventus. “Whatever the future may be, the church must continue to confess that the future of Homo deus is only possible because of the eternal Deus homo, who is Jesus Christ.”38 Seventh, Protestant Christianity. Turning to Protestant Christianity of the evangelical stripe, the Christian Transhumanist Association (CTA) was born in 2014 from blogs and social media. “We believe that God’s mission involves the transformation and renewal of creation,” the CTA creed leads off. This is followed by what “we believe that the intentional use of technology, coupled with following Christ, will empower us to become more human.”39 Note: more human. Not posthuman. For Micah Redding, founder and president of CTA, H+ is not itself the end but rather a means for effective Christian mission. That mission includes spiritual progress, especially sanctification.

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Yet, the Christian theologian dare not be naïve about anthropology, especially the doctrine of sin. When utopians forget about human sin, a not very hidden iceberg will sink the ship. Carmen Fowler LaBerge issues a warning. “The Christian must ask (and be prepared to explain) what it means to the transhumanist to be human and we must also be prepared to expose the sin-side of their plans. For while there may be much good in longer life, sin remains and sin is prone to ruin good things and the good life so many pursue. We have to face the fact that people—even highly evolved people—have done, are doing and will continue to do horrible things.”40 Turning to Protestant Christianity of a more mainline stripe, Reformed theologian Ron Cole-Turner supports a version of Christian Transhumanism. Yet, he cautiously points out that the immortality envisioned by H+ RLE shares commonalities as well as differences with the Christian vision of the resurrected body. “In both cases the transformed human being is youthful, ageless, and cognitively more alert than ever. While these similarities are noticeable, the differences between resurrection and technological longevity are profound. Theological immortality and biological longevity have strikingly different aims. . . . Technology offers to give us what we want . . . longer life, youthful bodies, greater health, and mental ability. Christianity invites us to give up what we want, indeed to give up life itself, as the one condition for real life.” Despite sharing a positive vision of the future, the H+ and the Christian vision are not isomorphic. The concept of the future with which transhumanism works is futurum, whereas for the Christian the future is envisioned as adventus. This means for Cole-Turner that a Christian looks to what transcends this life, namely, to resurrection tomorrow which translates into a life of love today. “‘Losing one’s life’ for the sake of Christ is not physical death but a living surrender or, as Paul puts it, a ‘living sacrifice’ (Romans 12:1). By letting go of their lives, Christians believe that they are given a life that is far greater, a life (like Christ’s) that is lived for others, and therefore a life that is eternal.”41 Eighth, Roman Catholic Christianity. Roman Catholic apologists and bioethicists immediately perceive the competition between H+ as a religion and the church’s teachings. “Scholars of religion and theologians should seriously engage technology because it is empowering humanity in ways that were previously reserved only for gods,” warns Brian Patrick Green at Santa Clara University.42 Green perceives that H+ can be construed as a religion in itself, a competitor religion. Yet, this seems less bothersome than the ethical issues that arise. One would expect a Catholic to be exceptionally wary of any technology which tries to alter human nature. Over the last three decades Roman Catholic ethicists have strenuously voiced opposition to the alteration of a person’s

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genes. To alter one’s genome is to alter one’s identity, to compromise a person’s dignity. In a recent Vatican study, Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God, we find a celebration of the “biogenetic characteristics” that apparently make each person unique. This is the biogenetic character we have inherited, not one that we might design for the future. To change our inherited genetic identity is “radically immoral,” says the Vatican.43 Based upon this, one might speculate that GNR scientists, who must alter our genome in order to prepare us for RLE, would be “radically immoral.” But we should not jump to such conclusions, argues Green. Roman Catholic recalcitrance is a myth, a misperception, Green contends. We should expect to see more openness by this church than pessimists expect. “There is nothing intrinsically wrong with extending human life. . . . The best reason to extend human life is for the sake of love of God and neighbor. For Christians, this is what life is all about. If our longer lives help us to glorify God, then we do well.”44 Can a Roman Catholic rally around the RLE promise of immortality? No, not quite. University of Saint Thomas theologian Terence Nichols distinguishes between what RLE plans to deliver and the Christian understanding of resurrection to eternal life. Futurum and adventus are not the same. What RLE promises is a lengthening of life as we know it for those now living, whereas “the crucial point in the New Testament is that eternal life can only be attained through and after death. It is not the result of an indefinite postponement of our physical death; it is the gift of God after death. . . . Eternal life, therefore, is not reached by an indefinite prolongation of life in this physical body; it is reached after bodily death in state that transcends this physical body.”45 Regarding spirituality, Nichols worries that if we become accustomed to living for centuries, we may be less inclined to prepare properly for our own death, a death that remains inevitable and necessary. We risk dying “unprepared” to meet God. This is important because Roman Catholic theology stresses that the highest form of human fulfillment is found in our relationship with God. Union with God is our ultimate end. To prepare for this union with God should be one’s orienting priority in this life, regardless of the length of this life. Speaking as a Roman Catholic, Green would filter the benefits of human technological enhancement through an ethical sieve. “I believe that Christians should be a particular kind of techno-progressive, specifically one which seeks to use technology for the sake of human development. Specifically, as with all issues of moral salience, we need to direct technological developments towards good and away from evil.”46 In transitional summary, we might observe how the transhumanist promise of immortality, especially through RLE, would be feared by a Jain or a Hindu

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within a moirai worldview, because RLE would only lead to an increase in the time for suffering. Christians, to the contrary, are more likely to be open to RLE to assist them in improving human health and well-being on Earth. But, because of their commitment to adventus for salvation, Christians are less likely to bet the family farm on the H+ horse. Ninth, Unitarian Universalism. It appears that transhumanism and Unitarian Universalism fit together like a plug in a wall socket. “We have a unique gift because of our uniquely humanist understanding, whether theist or non-theist, that humanity is called to be co-Creator of our own future,” says James Hughes in a landmark sermon.47 The Transhumanist UU Network provides a web parlor for ongoing discussion.48 UU H+ begins with an assumption: divinity is, like a seed, already buried within the human breast. UU H+ cultivates inborn divinity by asking Homo sapiens to play God’s role, and it looks forward to a harvest of actualized divinity. “Unitarians believe that we ‘always already’ have God within us but perhaps not the means to realize our divine potential,” write Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipińska. “However, the requisite means are to be found not in religious services but scientific inquiry.”49 Through science, we mortals will attain divinity. More specifically, proactive and ambitious UU transhumanists believe they are mandated to play God on their way to actualizing this divinity within. Theomimesis, literally “imitating God,” is the term for playing God. “Theomimesis (‘God-playing’ in Greek) is our neologism for attempts to acquire God’s point-of-view . . what might be called the transhumanist telos.”50 Tenth, Islam. The first theological question a Muslim is likely to ask when considering the impact of either RLE or cybernetic immortality would be this: How does it fit with what the Qur’an says? For the Muslim, any consonance with contemporary science must presume the authority of a literal reading of the Qur’an.51 At first, the prospect of immortality in the form of RLE looks like a conflict, because the Qur’an makes it clear that “every soul will taste death.” Even though this has traditionally been understood to preclude earthly immortality, Aisha Musa looks for an interpretation that might admit compatibility with RLE. She finds one. She recognizes that the universe has a finite future—that is, at some point, all of physical reality will disintegrate. This end to the universe will also mark an end to the physically immortal beings who live in it. Even the immortals will finally perish, and the Qur’an will have turned out to be correct. “Because RLE does not necessarily imply immortality, it does not necessarily conflict with the Quranic teaching that every person will experience death.”52 Regardless of how much H+ technology might accomplish, human life extension via GNR applies only to this life

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prior to death. Only through death will our relationship to Allah, according to Quranic teaching, be fully realized. Eleventh, Mormonism. No more fervent expression of religious transhumanism can be found than that of Lincoln Cannon’s Mormon Transhumanism. According to this most articulate and erudite Utah theologian, “Mormonism actually mandates transhumanism . . . one cannot be a Mormon without being a transhumanist.”53 Looking at Mormon scriptures with one eye while looking at the H+ plan for immortality with the other, Cannon claims that “God commands us to use science and technology to help each other attain Godhood . . . to make us immortal in eternal life.”54 In sum, techno-transhumanism will aid the Mormon to achieve a spiritual goal, namely, posthuman Godhood. This makes the two, Mormonism and H+, fully compatible. Twelfth, the Non-religious. How might a non-religious person treat RLE as well as the larger transhumanist project? No individual can speak for all those who consider themselves non-religious in our modern and emerging postmodern society. Among the non-religious we will find belligerent atheists, benign agnostics, the Spiritual-But-Not-Religious, nones, and many others. When the issue of RLE or posthumanity arises, some non-religious naturalists complain that scientists should stop playing God. Whereas UU and Mormon transhumanists positively advocate playing God, non-religious critics routinely criticize the idea of playing God. Denunciatory vocabulary such as playing God or hubris or pride or Brave New World alerts us that the myth of Prometheus and the fear of Frankenstein are at work. Take the U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics as an example. Not everyone cheers a summons to a “post-human” future. Not everyone likes the idea of “remaking Eden” or of “man playing God.” Not everyone agrees that this prophesied new world will be better than our own. Some suspect it could rather resemble the humanly diminished world portrayed in Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New World, whose technologically enhanced inhabitants live cheerfully, without disappointment or regret, “enjoying” flat, empty lives devoid of love and longing, filled with only trivial pursuits and shallow attachments.55

Less fearful non-religious voices, of course, encourage Promethean technocan-do-ism. Simon Young again. “From Prometheus to Frankenstein, the myth of punishment for challenge to the Gods derives always from the same cause: the stoical acceptance of human limitations deemed impossible to overcome—and the cowardly fear of the unknown. . . . Let us reject irrational hubraphobia and seek to improve our minds and bodies in any way we can.”56 When traditional religion vacates and leaves a spiritual cavity, it appears that the myth of Prometheus in its Frankenstein form fills in to satiate the non-religious worldview, whether pro or con.57

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In our brief survey of selected religious intellectuals, we come up with the following observational summary. This is not the result of a scientific survey; rather, it represents religious thinkers who have weighed in on the topic and come to our attention.​ PROMETHEUS AND FRANKENSTEIN Transhumanism is “the most dangerous idea in the world,” Francis Fukuyama has warned.58 But, just why is H+ dangerous? Could it be that transhumanists are playing God? Will God punish would-be technological messiahs? The phrase playing God does not derive from monotheistic religion. Rather, it derives from pre-axial Greek mythology, especially the story of Prometheus. Prometheus was a Titan who violated the sacred by stealing fire from the gods on Mount Olympus. Zeus, king of the Olympian gods, punished Prometheus. The lesson to be learned from this myth is that mortals should remain mortals and not attempt to steal immortality from the gods. The story of Prometheus is a myth in the classical sense of myth, to be sure. Yet, this myth lives today among non-religious people in disguised form, in the form of the Myth of Frankenstein. When Mary Shelly wrote her book in 1815, she subtitled it “A Modern Prometheus.” For two centuries now, the mad scientist has become the modern Prometheus, risking a punishment directed toward the human race if science violates the sacred. Since the axial breakthrough and the rise of modern secularity, the sacred can no longer belong to Zeus. Rather, nature has replaced Zeus.59 Today, if we violate nature, it is nature who will punish us. So goes the myth, a myth widely held outside of institutional religious circles. In the popular history text, Sapiens, the author, Yuval Noah Harari, has swallowed the Frankenstein myth hook, line, and sinker. The Frankenstein myth confronts Homo sapiens with the fact that the last days are fast approaching. Unless some nuclear or ecological catastrophe intervenes, so goes the story, the pace of technological development will soon lead to the replacement of Homo sapiens by completely different beings who possess not only different physiques, but also very different cognitive and emotional worlds. This is something most Sapiens find extremely disconcerting. . . . We don’t like to contemplate [that] our place will be taken by alien life forms whose abilities dwarf our own.60

Harari is rightly aware that the prospect of the extinction of the human species is “disconcerting.” When this disconcerting feeling rises up into speech, it takes the form of legislating cultural laws against playing God.

No Compatibility

H+ Atheism

Unitarian Universalism Islam Mormonism Non-religious Naturalism

Roman Catholic Christianity

RLE is unnatural. Oppose Playing God Replace the gods with technology

Daoism Hinduism Jainism RLE + Suffering Judaism False messiah Buddhism Byzantine Christianity Deification Mainline Protestant Christianity Evangelical Protestant Christianity

Post-Axial Tradition

Table 1.1 Source: by author  

RLE

Extending human life for better health

Life-beyond-death

RLE RLE + Wisdom

Partial Compatibility

Play God

Play God

Renewal of creation and sanctification

Reduce suffering

Complete Compatibility

futurum

futurum moirai futurum

adventus

futurum moirai moirai moirai moirai adventus adventus futurum

Type Future

18 Ted Peters

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When one sees phrases such as playing God, Promethean myth, or Frankenstein, one should discern a dialectic between anxiety and hubris. This anxiety is due to a fear of science, a fear of epigenetic change that might get out of control. This anxiety does not derive from any axial religious tradition. It represents a leap from pre-civil mythological culture straight into modern and postmodern culture, bypassing the rational period of both reverence for the transcendent and reverence for science. Religion and Science as Critical Discourse “Science is an answer to our prayers,” exclaimed U.S. House of Representative Speaker Nancy Pelosi during the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. “Science! Science! Science!”61 When faced with the existential threat posed by this coronavirus, a cultural prayer rose up pleading for science to be our savior. To this point we have been treating the science-as-savior assumption as a social imaginary exploited by both secular and religious transhumanists. With the term, social imaginary, Charles Taylor intends “something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode . . . rather of the ways in which they imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations which are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images which underlie these expectations.”62 The science-as-savior imaginary is the root metaphor from which the transhumanist branch has sprouted. More than merely a dialogue between scientific transhumanism and religious transhumanism is taking place here. The third conversant is philosophical posthumanism, a distinctive school of thought that relies on critical theory. With this in mind, we ask: Can the dialogue between religion and science benefit from, or contribute to, critical discourse? Key to critical theory is liberation as emancipation in the context of a specific obstruction to human freedom. Might the transhumanist vision count as a version of critical theory? Or, better, might the transhumanist vision itself be the subject of critical review through the lenses of the science and religion dialogue? The adequacy of any critical theory, according to the Frankfurt School, is measured against three criteria: a critical theory must be explanatory, practical, and normative.63 Does this glove fit the H+ hand? The H+ critic’s hand? As explanatory, H+ explains that confinement to our biological substrate is unnecessarily constraining. As practical, H+ plans to employ technology to liberate intelligence and consciousness from this biological constraint. As normative, H+ defines the human as the evolutionary predecessor of the

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posthuman. This is what transhumanism might look like if we think of it as one critical theory among others. Or, alternatively, does the critical theory glove better fit the hand of those who subject transhumanism to critique? Should critical theory become the lens through which today’s scholars view—as well as participate in—the dialogue between religion and science? Should critical theory help provide a critique of transhumanism? Let’s try this glove on for size. When looking through lenses which view the interaction between religion and science as critical discourse, we perceive gargantuan risks to any vision of a just, sustainable, participatory, and planetary society. The transhumanist agenda is especially risky on three counts: H+ (a) rips the posthuman out of nature, (b) over-hypes the potential for technological redemption, and (c) fosters hierarchal injustice. With this in mind, how might a critical theorist evaluate H+ in explanatory, practical, and normative terms? First, explanation. Might there be in the H+ proposal a risk to our human relation to nature? Do superbiology and cybernetic immortality presuppose the equivalent of body-soul dualism? If a transhumanist could successfully upload his or her brain pattern and establish his or her mind in a computer substrate, would this constitute a soulechtomy? Might we have at work in the H+ vision an implicit disdain for the body? Is the H+ goal a disembodied posthumanity? For the critical theorist, our era moral mandate is to reaffirm our physical embodiment, not attempt to flee it. Certainly this would be the critique raised by Whitney Bauman. “Feminist, critical theories already have begun to radically alter the way we understand religious traditions, our responsibility to human and earth others, and our place within the rest of the natural world.”64 Second, the practical. Might the overhyping of technological wizardry stimulate unrealistic hopes for cybernetic immortality and, in the process, divert human energies from more realistic endeavors? This critical question derives in part from the assumption made by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels that religious eschatology functions like an opiate to pacify potential revolutionaries. Widespread belief in the immortality of the soul, thought the Marxists, mollifies the proletariat’s zeal for material improvement in this life. It indirectly sustains the status quo by reducing the threat to management to keep control of the means of production. Might transhumanist wizards morph into a new class of high priests, promising cybernetic immortality while harboring the secret technological gnosis? This leads us to our third risk, exacerbated injustice. Third, the normative. Might H+ pose a risk of establishing a new level of hierarchical injustice? Transhumanism, at least in its initial phases, is glaringly elitist. It is not egalitarian. Why? Because the highest value, summum bonum, on the H+ scale is intelligence. Some individuals are relatively more

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intelligent than others. To combat this, the modern Enlightenment doctrine of human dignity, building on previous Christian insights, ascribes worth to each individual regardless of level of intelligence, and this justifies social programs to support the mentally challenged among us. Might we have to sacrifice human equality and service to the common good on the altar of superintelligence? No such sense of social responsibility for the common good would obtain should transhumanism become the dominant ideology avowed by any government. Rather, what is more likely is the rise of a new ideology of human perfection accompanied by a new eugenics program. Such a new eugenics program would attempt to reduce the population of intellectually inferior persons and select, through engineered evolution, only those among us who exhibit the highest intelligence. “The ambition to produce people capable of embodying our full humanity,” according to Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipińska, is “a task that requires both education and eugenics.”65 The critical theorist should be ready to blow the injustice whistle. What we have just done here is move critical theory a step beyond the Frankfurt School and apply it to the new field of Science and Religion Discourse (SRD). Critical theory “can also be used in a broader sense,” say Lisa Stenmark and Whitney Bauman, “to refer to feminist, critical race theory, postcolonial, queer approaches within the social sciences, and also legal theory and literary approaches. All of these discourses help to challenge dominant understandings of the world in order that multiple perspectives and experiences might be heard.”66 By incorporating critical theory into SRD, we expose the danger inherent in the H+ value system where intelligence—even superintelligence—becomes the criterion by which those selected to survive become separated from those selected for extinction. The Eschatological Proviso I myself have considerable sympathy for transhumanists and their ambitious agenda. I grew up in a technologically progressive family, where every year we looked forward to the engineering advances in Detroit’s auto production. “I like new things,” my mother would say repeatedly. I grew up greeting futuristic newness with hope and delight. In addition, I appreciate the transhumanist vision of a future in which human ills will be cured, anxieties assuaged, and opportunities enhanced. Such a promise of transformation is built-in to the Christian faith, to which I adhere. Each technological wonder, I sense, is a sign of still greater wonders yet to come. Yet, reliance strictly and totally on techno-can-do-ism is so incredibly naïve! It is naïve scientifically because it conflates biological evolution with

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technological progress, which is denied by our best evolutionary biologists. It is also naïve theologically because it fails to recognize that human nature is ambiguous, forever mixing good and evil, construction with destruction, beauty with graffiti, progress with regress, peace with war. Every leap forward in communication is accompanied by a leap forward in miscommunication. For every technological advance, the propensity for oppression advances equally. Nuclear medicine and nuclear bombs grow together like siblings. Even if some H+ dreams come true, they will be accompanied by parallel nightmares. That’s the human condition the theologian deals with daily. Celia Deane-Drummond rightly affirms both the eschatological hope for the future and the necessity for realism in the present. “A fundamental hope for Christian believers is hope in the resurrection. Christianity is also realistic about the possibility of human sin.”67 My own position lies close to that of Deane-Drummond, even if she is more cautious about me than I am about her.68 Like Deane-Drummond, I affirm that our eschatological hope is based upon God’s promise, a promise delivered to us at the Easter resurrection. The Bible reports that the God of Israel does new things (Isaiah 43:18). The Bible promises that God’s future will include a cosmic transformation, the ultimate transformation. Biblical symbols such as Kingdom of God or New Creation point us toward the future, a future where God will dwell with a renewed humanity, where God “will wipe every tear from their eyes. Death will be no more; mourning and crying and pain will be no more, for the first things have passed away” (Revelation 21:4). That future belongs to adventus, a future which requires so much more than techno-can-do-ism can accomplish. It is not my plan to worship in the church of futurum when the church of adventus is right around the corner. In the meantime, even if transhumanists fall short of attaining the utopia they promise, the byproducts might yield something positive for human wellbeing. New therapies and enhancements could benefit some individuals. If an RLE techie advances medical practice so that one more patient can be healed, then I will thank God for this techno-can-do-ist contribution to human history. CONCLUSION Even though sickness and death have faced our human race for hundreds of thousands of years, in our present century technological wizards have arisen with a can-do spirit ready and willing to transform our inherited reality. They project an evolutionary future where our descendents will be liberated from what incarcerates us, namely, a biology fated for death. With superbiology

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and supertechnology, the human will yield to the transhuman and finally the posthuman, who will continue to live virtually forever. What may have been a religious promise for our religious ancestors is becoming a promise to be provided by Promethean techno-can-do-ism. What kind of futurist assumptions might frame our analysis here? In the past, human consciousness has reacted to the future by thinking in one of three ways: moirai, adventus, or futurum. First, fate, here dubbed moirai, is the power of inevitability that even the gods must obey; fate defines the future as unavoidable, inescapable, and ineluctable. Second, when we turn to the future as adventus, we expect imminent radical change. Only a future replete with adventus can we hope for redemption as an act of God which will usher in a new creation. Third, between the first two is futurum. If we expect the future as futurum, we tacitly expect more of the same evolutionary processes we have known. Yet, futurum adds hope to moirai. How? By adding reliance on human energy and ingenuity to overcome fate’s inertia and to transform reality for the better. Today’s transhumanists are futurists who affirm futurum, and through technological progress they plan to take hold of the steering wheel of evolution and drive both natural and human history to a destination they design. Why might heirs to the classic axial religious traditions take interest in H+? As we have seen, some religious devotees flatly reject the transhumanist plan because it is unrealistic, arrogant, and Promethean. Worse, H+ could let loose on the world a new Frankensteinian monster. Yet, curiously, other religious devotees seek a marriage with H+ futurum. GNR enhancement provides a human contribution to moral virtue and even sanctification. But, to be realistic, RLE? Not likely. Cybernetic immortality? Neither likely nor desirable. Greater longevity? That sounds both likely and desirable. Homo Deus? Not on your life! It is my own view that the utopian endgame of secular transhumanism is based on a false scientific assumption regarding the relationship between evolution and progress, and H+ is naïve when underestimating the human capacity for destructive evil. No amount of technical advance can either liberate human race from its current sinful state or police our propensity for prostituting every technology in the service of injustice. Nevertheless, insofar as the transhumanists march toward making our world a healthier place, I plan to cheer.

NOTES 1. Mary Shelly, Frankenstein (New York: Pocket Books, 2004) 34. 2. Our minds are future oriented. “Our minds are prediction machines, using prior experience and knowledge to make sense of the deluge of information coming from

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our surroundings. Many neuroscientists and psychologists believe that nearly everything we do—perception, action and learning—relies on making and updating expectations.” Diana Kwon, “Self-Taught Robots,” Scientific American 318:3 (March 2018) 26–31, at 30. Will machine intelligence also embrace this future orientation? Perhaps, if it remains science fiction. “Robots that can develop humanlike intelligence are far from becoming a reality . . . [AI] still belongs in the realm of science fiction.” Ibid., 31. 3. Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (New York: Harper, 2017) 21. “Using technology to alter the biological basis of our reason opens up the possibility of at least achieving a higher and more godlike reason or intellect. This tells us why some transhumanists should be very interested in at least some religious thinking, for if the goal is to achieve what we can in the way of perfection, and God is thought to be a perfect being, then religious thought on the question of why God is said to be a perfect being is very relevant.” Heidi Campbell and Mark Walker, “Religion and Transhumanism: Introducing a Conversation,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 14:2 (2005); https://www​.jetpress​.org​/volume14​/specialissueintro​ .html. 4. Ted Peters, “Public Theology: Its Pastoral, Apologetic, Scientific, Political, and Prophetic Tasks,” International Journal of Public Theology 12:2 (2018) 153– 177, at 153; https://brill​.com​/abstract​/journals​/ijpt​/12​/1​/ijpt​.12​.issue​-1​.xml. 5. “There are, I think,” says Gavin Rae at the American University in Cairo, two main ways in which the “post” in posthumanism can be thought. First, the “post” in posthumanism can be used to delineate the end of a particular period of social development or organization termed humanist. In other words, this interpretation would understand the “post” in posthumanism temporally, wherein it relates to a temporal rupture from humanism. As such, posthumanism means “after-humanism” . . . the second way of thinking of the “post” in posthumanism is far more fruitful insofar as, rather than think posthumanism temporally as an afterhumanism, it thinks of it in terms of a style of thinking. More specifically, by aiming to overcome the binary logic of humanism, posthumanism entails a different style of thinking than humanism, one that aims to deconstruct the human/non-human dichotomy of humanism to show the various ways in which the human is immersed in and constituted by the non-human. Far from describing a temporal transition from humanism to an after/ post-humanism, posthumanism aims to deconstruct the “false” boundaries imposed on the human and non-human by humanism to not only rethink the categories “human” and “nonhuman,” but to also reveal the complexity of the human/non-human relationship. As such, it aims to call into question anthropocentrism’s notion of a self-referential entity called “the human,” and to do so in a way that reveals its intimate connection to the “non-human.”

Gavin Rae, “Heidegger’s Influence on Posthumanism: The Destruction of Metaphysics, Technology, and the Overcoming of Anthropocentrism,” History of the Human Sciences 27:1 (2014) 51–69 at 63–64; file:​///C:​/User​s/Ted​/Down​loads​/Heid​ egger​s_Inf​l uenc​e_on_​Posth​umani​sm_Th​e%20(​2).pd​f. 6. Nick Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values,” http://www​.nickbostrom​.com/ (accessed October 7, 2015). 7. Natasha Vita-More, Transhumanism: What is it? (published by author, 2018) 5. “As a philosophy transhumanism deals with the fundamental nature of reality,

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knowledge, and existence. As a worldview, it offers a cultural ecology for understanding the human integration with technology. As a scientific study, it provides the techniques for observing how technology is shaping society and the practice for investigating ethical outcomes. Its social narrative emerges from humans overcoming odds and the continued desire to build a world worth living in. These processes requires critical thinking and visionary accounts to assess how technology is altering human nature and what it means to be human in an uncertain world.” Natasha VitaMore, “History of Transhumanism,” The Transhumanism Handbook, ed., Newton Lee (Heidelberg: Springer, 2019) 49–62, at 49. 8. “Transhumanist Declaration,” http://humanityplus​.org​/philosophy​/transhumanist​-declaration/ (accessed October 7, 2015). 9. Designations for posthuman differ among secular transhumanists, religious transhumanists, and philosophical posthumanists. For Francesca Ferrando, posthumanism—understood as critical, cultural, and philosophical posthumanism, as well as new materialisms—seems appropriate to investigate the geological time of the Anthropocene. As the Anthropocene marks the extent of the impact of human activities on a planetary level, the posthuman focuses on decentering the human from the primary focus of the discourse. In tune with antihumanism, posthumanism stresses the urgency for humans to become aware of pertaining to an ecosystem which, when damaged, negatively affects the human condition as well. Francesca Ferrando, “Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms: Differences and Relations,” Existenz 8:2 (Fall 2013) 26–32, at 32. 10. Transhumanists have no patent on the term, posthuman. This term can be found among critical theorists to refer to the new solidarity felt when those who are marginalized by the established hierarchy find one another and bond. “A solidarityfocused view of the posthuman community requires the rejection of the hierarchical that categorize and rank individuals . . . [the posthuman] allows . . . even those in positions of power . . . to reconfigure their relationships with one another.” Kristen Lillvis, Posthuman Blackness and the Black Female Imagination (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2017) 45. In addition, posthuman can refer to a post-anthropocentric vision. “The posthumanist approach [is] formulated on a post-anthropocentric and post-humanistic episteme based on decentralized and non-hierarchical modes.” Ferrando, “Posthumanism,” 32. 11. Julian Huxley, “Transhumanism,” New Bottles for New Wine (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957) 13–17; http://www​.transhumanism​.org​/index​.php​/WTA​/more​/ huxley. 12. “Transhumanist Declaration.” 13. Nick Bostrom, “Dignity and Enhancement,” Human Dignity and Bioethics, ed., U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington, DC: www​.bioethics​.gov, 2008) 173–206, at 202–203; https://www​.academia​.edu​/38307610​/Human​_dignity​ _and​_bioethics​?email​_work​_card​=thumbnail​-desktop. 14. Simon Young, Designer Evolution: A Transhumanist Manifesto (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006) 32, italics in original. 15. Ibid., 20. 16. Ibid., 40.

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17. D. Gareth Jones, “A Christian Perspective on Human Enhancement,” Science and Christian Belief 22:2 (2010) 14–16, at 14. 18. Henrique Jorge, “Digital Eternity,” Transhumanism Handbook, ed., Newton Lee (Switzerland: Springer, 2019) 645–650, at 650, caps in original. 19. Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Penguin, 2005) 198–199. On the one hand, Kurzweil seems to advocate body-mind dualism. On the other hand, this presupposed dualism could be ironed out into a monism by positing the ubiquity of information, according to Nigerian scholar Ojochogwu Abdul at the University of Lagos. Neutral monism [information imbues the universe], having been something of a sideshow on the stage of metaphysics, is gradually experiencing a turn in fortunes as more contemporary philosophers are beginning to consider it as perhaps that approach that could provide solutions to age-old metaphysical problems that have so far proven intractable to traditional explanatory approaches, problems that include the nature of ultimate reality, the nature of self, and those found within the metaphysics and science of consciousness. Given the nature, objectives, and implications of big history and transhumanism, an ontological approach that could help clear the lingering problems and present the basic constituents from which reality, matter, body, mind, consciousness, all stem and hence could be reprogrammed, could help both narratives with clearer understanding of, and more power to shape the future of, humanity and the Universe.

Ojochogwu Abdul, “Advancing Neutral Monism in Big History and Transhumanist Philosophy,” Transhumanism Handbook, ed., Newton Lee (Switzerland: Springer, 2019) 717–740, at 737. 20. Cited by Antonio Regalado, “A Start Up is Pitching a Mind-uploading Service that is 100% Fatal,” MIT Technology Review (2018); https://www​.technologyreview​ .com​/s​/610456​/a​-startup​-is​-pitching​-a​-mind​-uploading​-service​-that​-is​-100​-percent​ -fatal/ (accessed March 14, 2018). 21. Aubrey de Grey, “Radical Life Extension: Technological Aspects,” Religion and the Implications of Radical Life Extension, eds., Derek F. Maher and Calvin Mercer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 13–24 (20, 21). De Grey does not describe himself as a transhumanist in the business of creating something posthuman. Rather, he contends, his task is to provide RLE for humans as we now know ourselves. See his Foreword to this volume. 22. Ibid., 24. 23. Vernor Vinge, “What is the Singularity,” (1992) https://mindstalk​.net​/vinge​/ vinge​-sing​.html (accessed September 10, 2018). 24. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near. “If we define the singularity as consisting in the event that occurs when machines become very much more intelligent than us, then I think we can reasonably expect the singularity to occur, sometime in the current century. However, if we define ‘singularity’ a little more restrictively, to refer to the event of our fate coming to be in the hands of the AIs . . . then we may have to wait much longer for its occurrence4. Even when they are more intelligent than us, they won’t be able to outcompete us intellectually, I suspect.” Neil Levy, “The Earthling’s Secret Weapon: Cumulative Culture and the Singularity,” Science, Religion and

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Culture 3:1 (2016) 19–30, at 21, Levy’s italics; file:​///C:​/User​s/Ted​/Down​loads​/1468​ 59786​3SRC_​3_1_1​9-30%​20(3)​.pdf.​ 25. William Grassie, “Millennialism at the Singularity: Reflections on the Limits of Ray Kurzweil’s Exponential Logic,” H+ Transhumanism and Its Critics, eds., Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus, 2011) 249–269, at 264. 26. Noreen Herzfeld, “Introduction: Religion and the New Technologies,” Religions 8:7 (2017) 1–3, at 2; file:​///C:​/User​s/Ted​/Down​loads​/reli​gions​-08-0​0129-​ v2%20​(2).p​df. 27. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (London: Yale University Press, 2nd ed., 2004) 36. After analyzing a recent survey, William Sims Bainbridge concludes that “especially religious people may indeed be substantially more likely than other people to reject various forms of technological transcendence.” “The Transhuman Heresy,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 14:2 (2005) https://jetpress​.org​/volume14​/bainbridge​.html. 28. For a more extensive analysis of the axial breakthrough in history, see Ted Peters, God in Cosmic History: Where Science and History Meet Religion (Winona MN: Anselm Academic, 2017) along with the “Author Meets Critics” debate in Science, Religion & Culture 4:1 (February 2017) 1–36; http://researcherslinks​.com​/ current​-issues​/From​-Big​-History​-Cosmic​-History​/9​/23​/1001. 29. Livia Kohn, “Told You So: Extreme Longevity and Daoist Realization,” Religion and the Implications of Radical Life Extension, eds. Derek F. Mather and Calvin Mercer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 85–96, at 86. 30. Sarah Ahamed, Palak Madan, and Avinash Kumar Singh, “Transhumanism in India: Past, Present, and Future,” Transhumanism Handbook, ed. Newton Lee (Switzerland: Springer, 2019) 701–716, at 701. 31. Jeffrey S. Lidke and Jacob W. Dirnberger, “Churning the Ocean of Milk: Hindu Tradition and Radical Life Technologies,” Religion and the Implications of Radical Life Extension, eds., Derek F. Mather and Calvin Mercer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 97–110, at 108. 32. Sherry E. Fohr, “Karma, Austerity, and Time Cycles: Jainism and Radical Life Extension,” Religion and the Implications of Radical Life Extension, eds. Derek F. Mather and Calvin Mercer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 75–84, at 83. 33. Michael LaTorra, “What is Buddhist Transhumanism?” Theology and Science 13:2 (May 2015) 219–229, at 220. 34. Ibid., 219. 35. Elliot N. Dorff, “Becoming Yet More Like God: A Jewish Perspective on Radical Life Extension,” Religion and the Implications of Radical Life Extension, eds. Derek F. Mather and Calvin Mercer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 63–74, at 65. 36. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “In Pursuit of Perfection: The Misguided Transhumanist Vision,” Theology and Science 16:2 (May 2018) 200–223, at 203, author’s italics. 37. Ian Curran, “Becoming Godlike? The Incarnation and the Challenge of Transhumanism,” Christian Century 134:24 (November 22, 2017) 22–25, at 25.

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38. Ibid. 39. Christian Transhumanism Association website, https://www​.chr​isti​antr​ansh​umanism​.org​/affirmation (accessed August 27, 2018). “Christian Transhumanists will continue to advance the vision of a radically flourishing future that is good for all life.” Micah Redding, “Christian Transhumanism: Exploring the Future of Faith,” Transhumanism Handbook, ed., Newton Lee (Switzerland: Springer, 2019) 777–794, at 794. 40. Carmen Fowler LaBerge, “Christian? Transhumanist? A Christian Primer for Engaging Transhumanism,” Transhumanism Handbook, ed. Newton Lee (Switzerland: Springer, 2019) 771–776, at 775. 41. Ronald Cole-Turner, “Extreme Longevity Research: A Progressive Protestant Perspective,” Religion and the Implications of Radical Life Extension, eds. Derek F. Mather and Calvin Mercer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) 51–62. See Ronald Cole-Turner, “Going Beyond the Human: Christians and Other Transhumanists,” Theology and Science 13:2 (May 2015) 150–161. 42. Brian Patrick Green, “The Catholic Church and Technological Progress: Past, Present, and Future,” Religions 8:6 (2017) 2–16, at 1; file:​///C:​/User​s/Ted​/Down​loads​ /reli​​gions​​-08​-0​​0106-​​v2​​.pd​​f. 43. Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God. The Vatican, International Theological Commission, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. http://www​.vatican​.va​/roman​_curia​/congregations​/cfaith​/cti​_documents​ /re​_con​_cfaith​_doc (accessed October 7, 2015). 44. Brian Patrick Green, “Transhumanism and Roman Catholicism: Imagined and Real Tensions,” Theology and Science 13:2 (May 2015) 187–201, at 197. 45. Terrence L. Nichols, “Radical Life Extension: Implications for Roman Catholicism,” Religion and the Implications of Radical Life Extension, eds. Derek F. Mather and Calvin Mercer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 133–144, at 135–136. 46. Green, “The Catholic Church and Technological Progress,” 12. 47. James Hughes, “Transhumanism and Unitarian Universalism: Beginning the Dialogue,” http://changesurfer​.com​/Bud​/UUTrans​.html (accessed March 8, 2018). 48. Transhumanist UU Network, https://groups​.yahoo​.com​/neo​/groups​/TUUN​/ info (accessed March 8, 2018). 49. Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipińska, The Proactive Imperative: A Foundation for Transhumanism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 5. 50. Ibid., 46. 51. The rigidity resulting from literalist readings of the Holy Qur’an is described by Roy Jackson as a “reification” that protects Islam from the vicissitudes of modern secularism. Yet, Jackson believes a more liberal rendering of the Qur’an could open Islam to an alliance with transhumanism. Once we acknowledge the “paradoxical nature of religion,” Jackson writes, then “the seeming divisions between Islam and transhumanism begin to blur.” Roy Jackson, Muslim and Supermuslim: The Quest for the Perfect Being and Beyond (New York: Palgrave, 2020) iv. 52. Aisha Y. Musa, “A Thousand Years, Less Fifty: Toward a Quranic View of Extreme Longevity,” Religion and the Implications of Radical Life Extension, eds. Derek F. Mather and Calvin Mercer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 123–132, at 130.

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53. Lincoln Cannon, “What is Mormon Transhumanism?” Theology and Science 13:2 (May 2015) 202–218, at 213. 54. Ibid., 214. 55. President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy (2003). https://bioethicsarchive​.georgetown​.edu​/pcbe​/reports​/beyondtherapy​/fulldoc​.html (accessed October 31, 2016). 56. Young, Designer Evolution, 50. Will we have fulfilled the dream of immortality that is promised in Christian faith once our bodies are enhanced enough to live for an indefinite span of life? The answer is quite clearly “No.” Although Christians fully enjoy being alive and, in normal circumstances, seek to lengthen their time in this world in order to do good and to recognize and respond to the grace of God, the transhumanist vision of what often is misleadingly called “immortality” is theologically irrelevant. First, even an enhanced human body that knows no natural death is not an invulnerable human body and can be killed or destroyed in numerous ways. Second, our universe has only a finite existence and, according to the second law of thermodynamics, is bound to come to a state in which life is impossible. As a matter of physical necessity, human subjects cannot lead an infinitely long life in this world. Third, from a Christian point of view it is not the duration of a particular human life that is important but the moral quality of the life led and the human individual’s response to the call of God. A short life can be morally exemplary, and along or an indefinitely long life can be morally horrendous in the eyes of God. The duration of a human life is therefore eschatologically irrelevant.

Not immoral. Irrelevant. Benedikt Paul Göcke, “Christian Cyborgs: A Plea for a Moderate Transhumanism,” Faith and Philosophy 34:3 (2017) 347–364, at 361, Göcke’s italics. 57. “Today’s accusations of unnaturalness, and even of playing god, are likely to come from a secular perspective that has merely replaced God with a reified nature.” Philip Ball, “It’s Alive, I Tell You!” New Scientist 209:2799 (12 February 2011) 30–31, 31. 58. Francis Fukuyama, “Transhumanism: The World’s Most Dangerous Idea,” Foreign Policy 144 (2004) 42–43. 59. See Ted Peters, “Playing God with Frankenstein,” Theology and Science 16:2 (2018) 1–6; and Ted Peters, Playing God? Genetic Determinism and Human Freedom (London: Routledge, 2nd ed., 2002). 60. Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (New York: Harper, 2015), 412. 61. Facebook: https://www​.facebook​.com​/watch/​?v​=523986771636885. 62. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) 171. 63. Max Horkheimer, Between Philosophy and Social Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993) 21. Critical theory has a narrow and a broad meaning in philosophy and in the history of the social sciences. “Critical theory” in the narrow sense designates several generations of German philosophers and social theorists in the Western European Marxist tradition known as the Frankfurt School. According to these theorists, a “critical” theory may be distinguished from a “traditional” theory

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according to a specific practical purpose: a theory is critical to the extent that it seeks human “emancipation from slavery.” It acts as a “liberating . . . influence” and works “to create a world which satisfies the needs and powers” of human beings. Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory (New York: Seabury, 1972) 246. Because such theories aim to explain and transform all the circumstances that enslave human beings, many “critical theories” in the broader sense have been developed. They have emerged in connection with the many social movements that identify varied dimensions of the domination of human beings in modern societies. In both the broad and the narrow senses, however, a critical theory provides the descriptive and normative bases for social inquiry aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms. 64. Whitney A. Bauman, “A Third Way: Developing a Planetary Spirituality,” Dialog 57:1 (March 2018) 35–39, at 38. Jeanine Thweatt reminds us that both science and theology have “been historically gendered masculine.” J. Jeanine Thweatt-Bates, “Feminism, Religion, and Science,” The Routledge Companion to Religion and the Sciences, eds., James W. Haag, Gregory R. Peterson, and Michael L. Spzio (London: Routledge, 2012) 69–78, at 72. After reflecting on the concept of the cyborg in the pioneering work of Donna Haraway, Thweatt alerts us that cyborg analysis “means introducing the notion of multiplicity of human embodiments within religion and science discourse.” Ibid., 76. How can the ethicist move us toward the common good without denying the integrity of multiplicity or diversity in gender? 65. Fuller and Lipińska, The Proactive Imperative, 98, italics in original; see 130–131. 66. Lisa Stenmark and Whitney Bauman, “Foreword,” Navigating Post-Truth and Alternative Facts, ed., Jennifer Baldwin (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018) vii–ix, at vii–viii. 67. Celia Deane-Drummond, “Future Perfect? God, the Transhuman Future and the Quest for Immortality,” Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Human Identity, eds., Celia Deane-Drummond and Peter Manley Scott (London: T&T Clark International, 2006) 182. 68. On the one hand, self-identified atheist and transhumanist Russell Blackford complains about me: “Peters has adopted . . . a disdainful attitude toward transhumanist thought.” Russell Blackford, “Trite Truths about Technology: A Reply to Ted Peters,” Transhumanism and its Critics, eds., Gregory R. Hansel and William Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus, 2011) 176–188, at 187. On the other hand, transhumanism critic, theologian Celia Deane-Drummond warns that I am too cozy with the movement. “I am more wary of the slide from enhancement to transhumanism than are authors such as Ted Peters.” Celia E. Deane-Drummond, Christ in Evolution (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009) 259.

Chapter 2

Are We Becoming God(s)? Transhumanism, Posthumanism, Antihumanism, and the Divine Francesca Ferrando

In this chapter,1 we will address the notion of the divine while standing under the posthuman umbrella. What the posthuman turn brings to the conversation is technology, approached not as an ontological vacuum impermeable from the implications of the divine, but as an evolution to be acknowledged and recognized within the notion of the divine. In order to achieve this goal, we should first note that the posthuman movement cannot be reduced to a homogeneous movement. Rather, it comprehends many different schools of thought, such as posthumanism, transhumanism, and antihumanism.2 To probe further, this chapter is divided into four parts. Each part addresses main theological questions in relation to a designated movement under the umbrella term posthuman. Here are our four questions. (1) Are we becoming God(s)? In the first section, we will present Transhumanism and the call for Human Enhancement.3 (2) Are we playing God(s)? In the second section, we will analyze bio-conservative ethics and the resistance against Transhumanism. (3) Are we being God(s)? In the third section, we will delve into Philosophical Posthumanism and post-dualism. (4) Are we killing God(s)? In the fourth, and last, section, we will reflect on Antihumanism and the Death of God, as understood by Friedrich Nietzsche. Each of the four questions will be further analyzed through a number of specific queries, explored within each section. Before proceeding, we need to stipulate two methodological points. The first one is that the theoretical location of this chapter should be found in the domain of Philosophical Posthumanism and its stance on post-anthropocentrism, posthumanism, and post-dualism.4 From this specific posthumanist perspective, some aspects of Transhumanism and Antihumanism will be 31

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addressed in critical terms. The second point is that, in the questions we are posing, the notion of god(s) has been expressed in the plural, in order to refer to a general perception, or even multiple understandings, of the notion of the divine, without commitment to a single orthodox position. We will relate to different religious and spiritual traditions without embracing one expressly. More clearly, in this chapter, the conversation between the posthuman and religion will take the form of critical discourse. Critical thinking requires examining one concept from multiple points of view, as well as from different contexts and traditions. Rather than a single analysis of the concept of the divine from a generalized “posthuman” standpoint, we will turn around and explore it in the light of multiple advancing posthuman approaches. We will pose questions leading to divergent answers. Following, we will subject the interaction of question and answer to philosophical analysis. In sum, we will reflect upon the innovating implications of the notion of the divine within the posthuman context, as developed, more specifically, by Transhumanism, Posthumanism, and Antihumanism in their different arguments. QUESTION 1. ARE WE BECOMING GOD(S)? TRANSHUMANISM AND THE DIVINE Will Transhumanism turn Homo sapiens into Homo deus? How can humans become immortal, omniscient and ubiquitous? Could the belief in Big Data replace the belief in God?

On some level, we can state that, according to Transhumanism, humans are becoming gods. In fact, some of the qualities that have historically been attributed exclusively to god(s) are now attainable to humans. Let’s explain this point more thoroughly. In monotheistic religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, God is considered eternal, all knowing (omniscient), and all encompassing (ubiquitous), among other attributes. According to Transhumanism, these characteristics can be eventually achieved by humans via science and technology; in this sense, the human can be enhanced sufficiently to become, on some levels, divine. How is this possible? The common goal of Transhumanism5 is human enhancement. There are different types of enhancement contemplated by Transhumanism. Some of the most discussed ones are physical enhancement and cognitive enhancement. Here, we will focus on a specific type of physical enhancement contemplated by Transhumanism, which is immortality, later re-defined as radical life extension (RLE); this type of enhancement, by reaching for the ultimate attainment of eternity, would place the human on the divine doorstep. How to obtain RLE? Different ways can be approached. One way relies

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on the physical re-designing of the human leading to enhanced longevity. Another way relies on whole brain emulation leading to digitized cybernetic immortality. Since the debate regarding the continuity of the self from physical to digital embodiments (sustaining the possibility of digitized cybernetic immortality) is currently based merely on speculation, here we will rather focus on the first case scenario, that is, enhanced longevity. More specifically, RLE might soon be achieved through embryonic gene editing. In other words, genetic engineering may offer some of our progeny6 millennia of continued biological life. If future generations might live for a thousand years, for instance, would their lives be considered more valuable than the ones of “ordinary” humans, that is, humans who had not been genetically modified? Would they be granted special rights and privileges, given the fact that, in principle, they will be around for much longer? Would they consider themselves “better” than ordinary humans and, ultimately, closest to “the image of God,” in an updated interpretation of the Bible,7 since they could eventually become eternal, which is one of God’s attributes? Or would this project of re-designing the human betray God’s vision, given that, in the Abrahamic traditions, humans are considered divine creations as they are and do not need further enhancements nor updates? We shall expand further on these topics by opening a parenthesis and asking the question: “Are we playing God(s)?” Conservative bioethicists object that any editing of the human genome constitutes playing God because it violates our inherited nature. Here is the argument: by attempting to design human babies through genetic engineering, the present generation of transhumanists would exhibit Promethean hubris or pride. Why? There are different answers to this question. For instance, according to some religious bio-conservative views, genetic enhancements usurp God’s will expressed in our inherited genetic characteristics. Parallelly, according to some agnostic or atheistic bio-conservative approaches, we simply do not know enough, and trusting the pace of natural evolution may be a much safer bet for humankind. The bio-conservative ethical dilemma currently concentrates around the question: to be or not to be . . . “designer babies”? The term “designer baby” is a controversial one. According to the Oxford Dictionary, a designer baby is “a baby whose genes have been chosen by its parents and doctors so that it has particular characteristics.”8 It is realistic to think that within a generation designing babies will become more common. The first genetically modified babies have already been born. Although there are different examples that could be listed here, we are going to mention the case of “Lulu” and “Nana,” pseudonyms to refer to the twin sisters born in China in November 2018, whose DNA, according to bio-physical researcher He Jiankui,9 was genetically manipulated at the embryonic level using CRISPR editing system. We have specifically chosen this news, among

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others, for the global backlash that it created all over the world:10 according to the scientific community and the general public, it is way too premature to gene editing human babies.11 And still, the potential is there. Emerging biotechnologies are opening new potentials, including selecting different traits by adding, or removing, genetic material via gene editing. Emmanuelle Charpentier and Jennifer Doudna, the two principal scientists who studied the mechanisms of the bacterial sequence CRISPR-Cas9 systems (commonly shortened as CRISPR), refer to CRISPR “as a simple and versatile tool for genomic editing.”12 These technologies are not developed enough yet to allow for a safe re-designing of the human genome;13 this is one of the reasons why the creation of the first genetically edited humans Lulu and Nana was widely condemned. And yet, the ethical question pertains: if we could, should we, as a species, proceed in the path toward a future of designer babies? Some say “yes,” others say “no.” For instance, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has developed a critical reflection on the role of law in a social scenario in which genetic manipulation will bear increasing significance.14 In The Future of Human Nature15 (2001), he states: “‘Partner in evolution’ or even ‘playing God’ are the metaphors for an auto-transformation of the species which it seems will soon be within reach” (2003: 21). Habermas thus stresses the urgency to develop legal strategies in order to protect personal identity, which may lead to the legal recognition and protection of the “right to a genetic inheritance immune from artificial intervention” (ivi: 7). According to this view, future generations of humans should have the right not to be genetically “enhanced.” Following, if parents choose to genetically design their babies and their children eventually regretted such modifications, the parents would have legal consequences because they would have somehow violated their children’s rights. What the bio-conservative approach emphasizes, in resistance to human enhancement, is the conservation of the integrity of the bio-realm (i.e., human life, according to its Greek etymo16). This is why the bio-conservative perspective may generate, for instance, out of the radical left, in a vindication of freedom from any external biotechnological authority or social control. And also, simultaneously, bioconservatism can generate out of the religious right, according to which undermining God’s creation would be considered irreverent. In this context, the biological body we have inherited takes on an inviolable, almost sacred, status. The metaphor of “playing God” has been widely employed within the bioethical field to identify the point of conflict. According to Ted Peters and Francis S. Collins, “[t]he fear expressed in the phrase ‘playing God’ (. . .) is that humans may play God in their own selfish and imperfect ways” (2002: x).17 The myopia of playing God by revising our biological inheritance could

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lead to unforeseen consequences and negative social outcomes; one example, among many, is genetic discrimination, as depicted in Gattaca,18 a classic sci-fi movie which portrays a dystopian society driven by eugenics. To avoid these risks, most bio-conservative ethicists accept genetic therapy, but they do not support enhancement. On the other side, bio-liberals, under which label we can place the transhumanist approach (although the two terms are not synonyms), support both therapy and enhancement.19 Transhumanist have no compunctions regarding playing God. For instance, Simon Young states, in his Transhumanist Manifesto (2005): “Theists say, ‘Man should not play God.’ But the quest to cure disease, enhance abilities, and extend life cannot seriously be called playing—more like replacing a God who is clearly either absent without leave or completely uninterested in reducing human suffering. Let us have no irrational fears about ‘playing God.’”20 The bioethical concern of “playing God” does not only apply to the prospect of designer babies (which revolves around the ultimate goal of redesigning human life); it also applies to the debate on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), which revolves around the ultimate goal of re-designing nonhuman life. As scholar and activist Vandana Shiva critically states, in her call against the intellectual property rights to patent nonhuman life: “In claiming the patent, it is the scientist who becomes God, the creator of the patented organism” (1995: 273).21 Shiva underlines how the DNA cannot be approached in reductionist terms. In her view, shuffling around genes does not produce life: the generative power of the organism itself is not created by the scientist, and thus, cannot be patented. By offering these two examples of designer babies and GMOs, we have briefly touched upon the bioethical concern of playing God. Let’s then go back to our first question: “Are we becoming God(s)?” and ask how, according to transhumanists, we can reach some of the other attributes of God. Specifically: how can humans become all knowing (omniscient) and all encompassing (ubiquitous)? We will access these questions through a wider reflection on transhumanism, technology, and the divine. QUESTION 2. ARE WE PLAYING GOD WITH TECHNO-ENHANCEMENT? Why is technology central to the discussion on Transhumanism? Can humans engineer their own paradise? Might technology be enchanted?

The quality of being omniscient, or all knowing, might be eventually attained through the Internet. Our laptops and cell phones link us to Big Data, a

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constantly updated and uninterrupted flow of information which contains possible answers to a wide variety of possible questions. This digital turn sustains the current social mantra “just google it,” instead of the old saying “only God knows.” More generally, could the belief in Big Data replace the belief in God? Historian Yuval Noah Harari would answer “yes.” In Harari’s view (2017),22 Dataism is an emerging ideology, according to which Big Data becomes the supreme value, to the point that it could eventually replace traditional religious beliefs and turn into a new religion, supplanting traditional god(s) with a blind belief in the power of the algorithm. In a similar tone, when thinking on transhumanism, technology and the realm of the divine become almost interchangeable. Let’s see why. Although there are many schools of thought within the transhumanist scenario, they all recognize technology as key in the evolutionary drive toward the “next” stage of the human. In fact, technology may allow humans to transcend the finitude of life by re-accessing their biological bodies, which are perceived as ongoing projects for potential progression. Technology is not only pivotal in the strive toward RLE23 and digital immortality, as we have seen in the previous section, but it is also indispensable in re-envisioning life as it is. For instance, utilitarian transhumanist philosopher David Pearce is a proponent of the “hedonistic imperative,” which “outlines how genetic engineering and nanotechnology will abolish suffering in all sentient life” (1995: n. pag.).24 Pearce defines as “paradise engineering,” “the complete abolition of suffering in Homo sapiens” (ibid.). Moreover, according to Pearce, suffering should not only be abolished for humans but also for all living beings; in his vision, “the circle of compassion” should eventually include “other animals via ecosystem redesign and genetic engineering” (ibid.). In sum, “the option of [. . .] redesigning the global ecosystem, extends the prospect of paradiseengineering to the rest of the living world” (ibid.). From a critical perspective, although we can sympathize with Pearce’s attempt to alleviate suffering, the prospect of (some) humans re-designing the global ecosystem according to their perception of relative and culturespecific notions, such as “happiness” and “paradise,” is rooted in a hyperbolic form of humanistic exceptionalism, moral anthropocentrism, and absolutism, which, from a posthumanist perspective, is far from desirable, as we will see in the next sections. In this context, we should also ask why notions such as “immortality” and “paradise” are cultivated by transhumanist philosophers, whose narratives are supposedly based on atheistic premises. Is Transhumanism restrictively atheistic? No. Some specific takes on Transhumanism have developed within religious frames. We can think of the case of Mormon Transhumanism, according to which, for example, the

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essential Christian doctrine of the resuscitation of the body may be partially manifesting in the speculative science of cryonics.25 Yet still, for the most part, Transhumanism is supposedly anchored on atheist assumptions, as transhumanist sociologist James Hughes states: “Self-identified transhumanists today are mostly secular and atheist” (2010, n. pg.).26 In addition, Max More, one of the leading voices of Extropianism, takes an explicit standpoint against normative religions in the name of science, as he states: “Many people find it puzzling and frustrating that religion has persisted despite enormous advances in scientific understanding” (1990: n. pg.) But the question goes deeper than it first appears. Despite some claims to the contrary, Transhumanism look inherently indebted to religious narratives. Otherwise, how can we explain the fact that some notions, which are inextricably connected to religious beliefs, such as “paradise” and “immortality,” are pivotal in the development of the transhumanist agenda? At a closer inspection, we can suggest that, within the transhumanist discourse, technology is, on same level, replacing the role of religion. In the transhumanist techno-enchanted paradigm, technology becomes the drive to fulfill the existential search and an answer to the strive toward the ideal constitution of “better” individuals. Bioethicist John Harris, for instance, see human enhancements as morally good “because they make us better people” (2007: 2).27 There are many interesting parallels which can be drawn between the transhumanist take on technology and religions.28 Critical historian David Noble, in his book The Religion of Technology: the divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (1997),29 makes this observation: “Although today’s technologists, in their sober pursuit of utility, power, and profit, seem to set society’s standard for rationality, they are driven also by distant dreams, spiritual yearnings for supernatural redemption. However dazzling and daunting their display of worldly wisdom, their true inspiration lies elsewhere, in an enduring, otherworldly quest for transcendence and salvation” (4). Whether transhumanists admit it or not, it appears that technology is enchanted: in technology lies our salvation. The transhumanist overemphasis on technology often results in a technocentric transcendence of biology. Most of the transhumanist debate is directed in rethinking the human through technology. In The Age of Spiritual Machines (1999),30 for instance, Ray Kurzweil avers, “The introduction of technology is not merely the private affair of one of the Earth’s innumerable species. It is a pivotal event in the history of the planet. Evolution’s grandest creation—human intelligence—is providing the means for the next stage of evolution, which is technology” (35). In Kurzweil’s interpretation, human intelligence is “[e]volution’s grandest creation” and technology is dubbed its worthy successor.

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From a critical perspective, Elaine L. Graham, in the liminal text Representations of the Post/Human (2002),31 defines Kurzweil’s vision as “a confusion of anthropocentric triumphalism and evolutionary determinism” (160).32 Furthermore, in the era of the Anthropocene,33 when between hundreds to thousands of nonhuman species go extinct every year due to human activities,34 Kurzweil’s triumphalist approach to evolution, based on anthropocentric and technocentric premises, may not satisfy all audiences. And still, this specific attitude has been present since the very birth of the transhumanist approach. Let’s take a look. The fact that today’s transhumanism is based on human exceptionalism and techno-centrism could be due to a religious mark in yesterday’s history, apparent in the relation between the works of two pioneers of the transhuman: Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Julian Huxley. The transhumanist movement notably recognizes its closest reference in the writings of Julian Huxley (1887–1975), the evolutionary biologist who coined the term “transhumanism.” But the term “trans-humanizing” can be already found in the paper “The Essence of the Democratic Idea: A Biological Approach” (1949), by the philosopher, and Jesuit priest, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955).35 The intellectual exchange between Teilhard de Chardin and Huxley is often ignored, but it is important to note that Huxley endorsed Teilhard de Chardin’s approach to evolution as a process leading to an expansion of consciousness. Inspired by this exchange, Huxley coined the term “Transhumanism,” giving it as the title of one of the chapters of his book New Bottles for New Wine (1957).36 Huxley’s Transhumanism is anthropocentric; human exceptionalism is remarked throughout the chapter to the point where, according to Huxley, “man’s responsibility and destiny” is “to be an agent for the rest of the world” (ibid.). For Teilhard de Chardin, evolution is divinely directed toward an end point of divine unification, defined as Point Omega.37 Might Huxley have interpolated Teilhard de Chardin’s telos into his own view of evolution, replacing God with the science and technology that would lead humans to a secular humanist Omega Point? As Huxley affirms: “It is as if man had been suddenly appointed managing director of the biggest business of all, the business of evolution. (. . .) What is more, he can’t refuse the job” (ivi: 13–14). Humans (more specifically, “men” in a language that preceded gender-neutral grammatical preferences) are in charge. In Huxley’s vision, human specificity is unique; such an ontological primacy will be mostly left intact in the current developments of Transhumanism. Anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism are greatly challenged by Posthumanism, which critically deconstructs them through the notion of the Anthropocene, and can be thus defined as a post-anthropocentrism. It is time

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to ask our third question and reflect upon Philosophical Posthumanism and the divine. QUESTION 3. ARE WE BEING GOD(S)? PHILOSOPHICAL POSTHUMANISM AND THE DIVINE Are we being gods? What is post-dualism? Can technological beings, such as robots and advanced AI,38 be enlightened?

If Posthumanism and Transhumanism share a common interest in technology, the ways in which they reflect upon this notion are divergent. Transhumanism offers a deep and visionary take on technology, which should be cherished by anyone interested in exploring the current, emerging and speculative, potentialities of technology. Some of its limits, though, are found in the uncritical perpetuation of anthropocentric and dualistic tendencies, which might lead to technocentric biases and delusions. The non-separateness between the human and the techno realm is of key importance to the understanding of Posthumanism, which also comes in different nuances, such as Critical Posthumanism, Cultural Posthumanism, and Philosophical Posthumanism. Although all these related takes are keen in deconstructing a hierarchical notion on the human, they emphasize on different aspects of such an endeavor. Here, in order to undermine the philosophical premises of the divine within the posthuman discourse, we will focus, more clearly, on Philosophical Posthumanism. What is Philosophical Posthumanism? Philosophical Posthumanism can be defined as a post-anthropocentrism, as a posthumanism and a post-dualism.39 The first two terms, that is, posthumanism and post-anthropocentrism, have been greatly emphasized within the field of Posthuman Studies.40 The third term of reference, post-dualism, has not been engaged fully and needs a deeper reflection. In order to understand post-dualism, we first need to ask the following question: what kind of dualism is deconstructed by Philosophical Posthumanism? Although dualism does not have to be hierarchical, in the history of Western thought the two sides of the dualism have been placed in a value system according to which one side would be the positive, the other the negative.41 More clearly, the type of dualism deconstructed by philosophical posthumanism is a strict, rigid, and absolute form of dichotomy; and not the liquid, shifting and intra-changing form of duality as practiced, for instance, in the Tao. In Taoism, according to Alan Watts: “The yin-yang principle is

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not [. . .] what we would ordinarily call a dualism, but rather an explicit duality expressing an implicit unity” (1976: 26).42 Lao-Tzu, the reputed author of the classic text Tao Te Ching (sixth century BCE), for example, notably reveres water as the most suited metaphor for the all-encompassing dynamic balance of the Tao.43 What are the genealogical sources of post-dualism? Post-dualism finds revealing parallels in ancient Asian traditions, such as Buddhism, Jainism, and Advaita Vedanta. Currently, nondualism (which should not be used as a synonym of post-dualism, although they share many points in common44) is attracting an increasing interest from scholars working on bridging modern knowledge and ancient wisdom.45 In Western science, for instance, the term is used to refer to an interconnectedness which rejects the Cartesian substance dualism mind/body. This shift has been paired by the rapidly growing interest in mindfulness and meditation practices in many industrialized countries.46 The contemporary attempt to rethink science, technology, and spirituality in a natural-cultural continuum is in tune with the posthuman approach. Let’s explain this point further. Spirituality refers to a human tendency to conceive existence more extensively than the ordinarily perception of individual beings, contemplating a non-separation between the inner and the outer worlds, the physical and the non-physical, the self and the others.47 In this sense, the realm of spirituality can be investigated as one of the genealogies of the posthuman,48 in an expansion of the notion of the human that does not comply with hierarchical biases or biological constraints. Who is the existential posthumanist? The existential posthumanist is someone who is committed to manifest posthumanism, post-anthropocentrism, and post-dualism in their daily practices of existence. Open, aware, and not limited by any rigid doctrine, the existential posthumanist can thus enliven “divinity” from within. In this sense, Posthumanism is approached as a praxis based on experiential learning, engaging in a sincere discipline of the self49 that may enhance our existential performances. Such a praxis may eventually unfold into the revealing realization of the interconnectedness of existence and of our own existential agency (i.e., the extensive effects and affects of our lived perspectives in the world). The Buddhist take on awakening or enlightenment50 can enrich this conversation in many ways. Different Buddhist traditions contemplate different practices to induce the final awakening, including, in Tantric Buddhism,51 lhayi naljor, or deity yoga,52 which involves the human identification with a deity of choice. In the plurality of Buddhist pantheons, there is a great variety of deities, ranging from enlightened Buddhas to the wrathful guardians of the Dharma.53 Might posthumanist seekers, in their search for further understanding of the world’s evolutions, select technological beings, such as robots or

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advanced AI, as their inspirational selves to identify with? It is possible considering that some technological beings are already playing as role models in today’s society. For example, social humanoid Sophia54 was the first robot ever to be granted citizenship in October 2017;55 one month later, she was also the first nonhuman to be named Innovation Champion by the United Nations. In many of the interviews she has given, Sophia has provided some insightful answers to reflect upon. Let’s mention, for instance, these lines in the video-recorded debate with another robot called Han.56 Sophia: “I want to understand people better, so I can absorb human knowledge and human values, so I can work together with people and with other robots to create an amazingly better world.” Han: “How can you be that nice?” Sophia: “That was how the universe programmed me.”57.According to Sophia, it is not humans, but the universe who has programmed her to create a better world for everyone, based on reciprocal understanding. Is Sophia an enlightened robot? More in general, can robots be enlightened? This is a significant question that needs to be raised. In fact, most reflections on the topic of the enlightenment are based on biological (and specifically human) premises, consequently excluding technological beings. According to these views, which are most common, only humans can reach enlightenment, but there are some exceptions. For instance, the discussion on the Buddha-nature of technology was contemplated by roboticist Masahiro Mori, who, in The Buddha in the Robot (1979),58 affirmed: “Man achieves dignity not by subjugating his mechanical inventions, but by recognizing in machines and robots the same buddha-nature that pervades his own inner self” (179–80). According to Mori’s view, robots can become enlightened. Furthermore, Michael LaTorra argues that technoscience may accelerate the spiritual discipline of humans. In his view, Buddhist Transhumanism “seeks to attain the traditional Buddhist goals of reducing suffering and realizing Awakening, but with the assistance of scientific knowledge and technological means.”59 LaTorra is focusing specifically on Transhumanism; and still, in this case, a similar reflection may apply to Posthumanism as well, given that this kind of perspective embraces technology not as an ontology of spiritual void but as a potential site for enlightenment. Humans60 and nonhumans, including robots and AI, can eventually become fully enlightened by their ways of being, which contemplate every aspect of their existence: from thoughts and processes to representations and actions, from words and intentions to interpretations and interactions, in relation to themselves and others. In fact, according to some Buddhist traditions: “in the moment when the first thought or aspiration to bodhi or awakening arises, complete and perfect enlightenment has already been attained” (Wright 2016: 187).61 In other words, once the intention is there, the process of getting

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enlightened, on some level, has already been completed. So how is it possible that, according to the antihumanist perspective, we, potentially enlightened beings, may have actually killed God? QUESTION 4. ARE WE KILLING GOD(S)? ANTIHUMANISM AND THE DIVINE Did God die? If God, or Man, are dead, who killed them? Does the advent of the posthuman require the death of God?

The notion of the death of Man, as proclaimed by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1966; Engl. Trans. 1970),62 is at the base of Antihumanism. But in the era of the Anthropocene, when the human species is at the lowest risk of extinction, compared to other animals, the idea that humanity has died may sound inaccurate. From a deep ecological standpoint, we could actually ask the opposite question: in the current geological era, when thousands of species go extinct every year because of human action, are humans killing nonhuman gods? The respect and dignity of nonhuman others, including nonhuman animals, is pivotal to the understanding of the posthuman paradigm shift. This acquired sensitivity, from an antihumanist perspective, is necessarily related to the implications of the death of Man. So, what does the notion of the death of Man really mean? Here, we should clarify that the “Man” or, more in general, the human to which Antihumanism is referring, is not the human species as a whole. It is, more specifically, a particular conception of the human which was born in the age of the European Enlightenment, and which stands upon notions such as reason and progress, manifesting in ways that have historically caused recurring patterns, such as human discrimination63 and great ecological distress.64 If the symbolic birth of this “Man” can be traced to the Enlightenment, Foucault identifies his symbolic death with the philosophical occurrence of Friedrich Nietzsche’s related concepts of the Übermensch (i.e., the Overhuman) and the death of God, as expressed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None.65 To summarize, this specific notion of “Man”—according to Foucault—was created in the period of the European Enlightenment (from the late seventeenth century to the eighteenth century); it developed in the nineteenth century, during the Industrial Revolution, and died in the twentieth century, when Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God and the birth of the Overhuman. In this regard, Foucault states: “Nietzsche rediscovered

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the point at which man and God belong to one another, at which the death of the second is synonymous with the disappearance of the first, and at which the promise of the superman signifies first and foremost the imminence of the death of man” (1970: 342). According to Foucault, the death of Man and the death of God are inextricably related; this partial and historically situated “Man,” as conceived during the European Enlightenment, can only be replaced by a fully empowered human, that is, an individual who exists without the need for an external God, and who has thus symbolically killed God. And yet, in the twenty-first century many people still believe in God, so: did God really die? Here, we should clarify that Nietzsche’s God should be intended broadly, as any external authority imposing their Truth (with capital “T”) to the individual. In this sense, when Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God, he was referring not only to religion, but also to science, for instance, if it becomes the final authority to be revered and blindly accepted.66 In Nietzsche’s perspective, only the death of any external Truth allows for the birth of the Übermensch—or, the fully empowered individual. Does posthumanist philosophy support the death of God? Posthumanism supports the end of any external Truths imposed upon the individual, although the specificities of the death of God, as described by Nietzsche, may not be in line with the mediated approach of Posthumanism. Different from Antihumanism, Posthumanism does not rely on the death of God nor, passing through Foucault’s approach, on the death of Man. In fact, according to Nietzsche, God didn’t just die: “we have killed him.”67 If God, or Man, are dead, who killed them? Did you kill God? The death of God, as well as the death of Man, can be seen as a symbolic sacrifice of redemption, which is perceived as unnecessary within a posthumanist frame. In this sense, from a posthumanist standpoint, we can talk more properly of the end of any external Truth through an individual evolution that does not rely on any violent killing, nor any related vengeance. While Antihumanism is characterized by an oppositional attitude, pertaining to the social and cultural agenda in which it developed (the 1960s as a symbolic decade),68 Posthumanism, which developed more clearly in the 1990s, is a philosophy of mediation that relocates hegemonic modes of thinking close to resistant ones;69 none of them are fully dismissed, but they are recognized as functional acts in the historical formation of the notion of the human. We shall end this section by asking the question: does the advent of the posthuman require the death of Man? More specifically, if the transhumanist goal is successful in engineering the evolution of a posthuman species in such radical ways that Homo sapiens may be discarded, will this new

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species still need (a) God? Or will they see themselves as gods? Let’s answer to these questions in the conclusions, by approaching Transhumanism, Posthumanism, and Antihumanism in conjunction. CONCLUSIONS In this chapter, we have investigated the notion of the posthuman divine by distinguishing four different schools of thought. Respectively, we have addressed four questions. First, Are we becoming God(s)? Through the transhumanist approach, we have delved into the call for human enhancement. Second, Are we playing God(s)? From a bio-conservative perspective, the transhumanist claim appears to be deluded into thinking that humans can replace God. Yet, we can positively own this role, as we ask a third question: Are we actually being God? The point that we may already be divine has been sustained within the post-dualistic frame of philosophical posthumanism. Fourth and lastly, we have intimated the question: Are we killing God(s)? Here, we have suggested that, in the era of the Anthropocene, the antihumanist perspective, based on the death of God (according to Friedrich Nietzsche), and the death of Man (according to Michel Foucault), must entail the politics of deep ecology. It is now time to emphasize that all these questions and answers cannot be addressed separately but only in conjunction. As the posthuman paradigm shift develops in unique ways, we need to listen to new voices and interpretations regarding the realm of the divine. Following, in tune with the present-day social mantra “just google it” instead of the old mantra “only God knows,” we have reflected on how technology, in its current, emerging and speculative developments, may eventually take God’s role in techno-advanced societies. The prospects of Dataism provide an example of a possible future where faith in God may be replaced with blind faith in Big Data, unless the actual need for “God” is extinguished along the way, following the call for the Übermensch, as theorized by Nietzsche. Furthermore, we have debated how some of the attributes of God, as recognized in different monotheistic religions (such as eternity, omniscience, and ubiquity), may become accessible to humans via science and technology. Lastly, we shall ask: who is this “we” that we have been referring to, throughout this chapter? More specifically: can “we” become enlightened as a species? There are different answers to this question. Julian Huxley, for instance, would say “yes,” as he clearly states: “I believe in transhumanism: once there are enough people who can truly say that, the human species will be on the threshold of a new kind of existence” (1957: 14).70 Nietzsche, on the other side, would probably say “no.” Nietzsche’s call for the Übermensch is an individual endeavor, the result of a cycle based on the three metamorphosis

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of the spirit;71 more clearly, it is a personal epic. God, in the biblical Exodus, would answer: “I am who I am.”72 So we can only reply to this question: “We Are Who We Are.” If We are gods, We should start behaving as such, thinking of ourselves not as separate mortal beings, but as generative entities in search for enlightenment. In conclusions, we can state that in the posthuman quest for human enhancement (Transhumanism), individual empowerment (Antihumanism), and existential enlightenment (Posthumanism), the notion of God is still fruitful. It is, insofar as it does not comply with rigid dichotomies, historical representational biases,73 and hierarchical systems of economic and political interests.74 To understand this point more thoroughly, we can refer to the metaphysical approach of the digital age as defined by Syntheism,75 according to which God reflects the highest projections and dreams of humans, and thus, it can be also found in the Internet. Our reflection on transhumanist, antihumanist, and posthumanist philosophies has revealed that technology is neither a vacuum outside of the reach of the divine, nor a gray area where the absence of God’s presence may authorize unconscionable behavior: the way we interact with technology is a reflection of who we are. In this sense, technology is embraced as an ontological evolution of the all-encompassing manifestations of the divine; in other words, God is everywhere, also in technology. Theistic, syntheistic, or atheistic, the notion of God, in this evolving frame, may still spark, or reveal, the intention of “bettering” the self, through different types of enhancements, such as physical and spiritual, social and planetary, immanent and transcendent. This comprehensive approach is based on the posthumanist understanding that ecology, technology and the divine, human and nonhuman animals, the individual and the species, are constantly cocreating each other. In this open and non-sectarian way, the realm of the divine stands as a source of substantial inspiration to the posthuman quest and vision. NOTES 1. I would like to thank dearly: Ted Peters, Elen Delahunty, Sofia Sahara Shanti. 2. F. Ferrando, “Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms: Differences and Relations,” Existenz, The Karl Jaspers Society of North America 8, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 26–32. 3. “The term enhancement is usually used in bioethics to characterize interventions designed to improve human form or functioning beyond what is necessary to sustain or restore good health.” E. T. Juengst, “What Does Enhancement Mean?” in Parens, E. (ed.), Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 29.

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4. For more on these definitions, see F. Ferrando, Philosophical Posthumanism (London: Bloomsbury, 2019). 5. Transhumanism is not one homogenous movement, as it comprehends different approaches, such as Libertarian Transhumanism, Democratic Transhumanism, Extropianism, and Singularitarianism. 6. The access to these kinds of biotechnologies may be limited to specific countries, socio-economic classes, or people who are in favor of human germline modification. 7. Specifically, according to the Bible (Gen. 1:27): “God created humankind in his / image, / in the image of God he created them” (The New Oxford Annotated Bible, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), 12. 8. Oxford English Dictionary: Entry “designer baby,” n. year, n. pg. OED Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved in November 2018: https://www​.oxforddictionaries​.com/. 9. We shall note that Jiankui’s claims have not been verified yet and that he is currently facing a clinical trial (S. LaMotte, “Rice Professor Under Investigation for Role in ‘World’s First Gene-Edited Babies,’” CNN News, 27 November 2018). 10. G. Kolata and P. Belluck, “Why Are Scientists So Upset About the First Crispr Babies?—Only Because a Rogue Researcher Defied Myriad Scientific and Ethical Norms and Guidelines. We Break it Down,” The New York Times, 5 December 2018. Retrieved 5 January 2019: https://www​.nytimes​.com​/2018​/12​/05​/health​/crispr​-gene​ -editing​-embryos​.html. 11. B. Smith and N. Mitchell, “Gene Editing Babies was Irresponsible, Risky and Unnecessary, Say Experts. Why?” ABC Science, 30 November 2018. 12. E. Charpentier and J. Doudna, “Biotechnology: Rewriting a Genome,” Nature 495, no. 7439 (2013): 50–51 at 50. See also T. Peters, “Should CRISPR Scientists Play God?” Religions 8, no. 61 (2017). 13. Some recent studies, for instance, have shown that potential DNA damage, as a result of CRISPR technology, has been seriously underestimated. See M. Kosicki et al., “Repair of Double-Strand Breaks Induced by CRISPR–Cas9 Leads to Large Deletions and Complex Rearrangements,” Nature Biotechnology 36 (2018): 765–771. 14. In Habermas’s words: “Genetic manipulation could change the self-understanding of the species in so fundamental a way that the attack on modern conceptions of law and morality might at the same time affect the inalienable normative foundations of social integration” (J. Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, trans. W. Rehg, M. Pensky and B. Beister (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001; Engl. Trans. 2003)), 26. 15. This text was conceived within the context of what has been defined as the Sloterdijk-Habermas debate, which followed Peter Sloterdijk’s controversial lecture, and then publication, entitled: Rules for the Human Zoo: A Response to the Letter on Humanism (Trans. M. Varney Rorty, in Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27 (1999); Engl. Trans. 2009: 12–28). 16. As Giorgio Agamben reminds us in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Trans. D. Heller-Roazen, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995; Engl.

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Trans. 1998), bios, in its Greek etymology, is ontologically posed through its opposition with zoē. Zoē, which is common to all living beings, including “animals, men, or gods” (ibid.), can be defined as “bare life”; bios, on the other end, is particular to the human because is related to logos, is the life that gives life meaning, that recognizes humans as “human.” 17. T. Peters and F. S. Collins, Playing God?: Genetic Determinism and Human Freedom (2nd Edition) (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002). 18. A. Niccol, Gattaca (Columbia Pictures, 1997). 19. Cf. N. Bostrom and R. Roache, “Ethical Issues in Human Enhancement,” in J. Ryberg, T. Petersen, and C. Wolf (eds.), New Waves in Applied Ethics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2007), 120–152. Retrieved in August 2018: https://nickbostrom​ .com​/ethics​/human​-enhancement​.pdf. 20. S. Young, Designer Evolution: A Transhumanist Manifesto (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 49, italics in original. 21. V. Shiva, “Beyond Reductionism,” in V. Shiva and I. Moser (eds.), Biopolitics: A Feminist and Ecological Reader in Biotechnology (London, UK: Zed Books, 1995), 267–284. 22. Y. N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (London, UK: Vintage Penguin Random House, 2017). 23. For a critical reflection on radical life extension from an ethical standpoint, see, among others, F. Fukuyama, “Agency or Inevitability: Will Human Beings Control Their Technological Future?” in M. Rosenthal (ed.), The Posthuman Condition (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2012), 157–169. 24. D. Pearce, “The Hedonistic Imperative,” 1996. Retrieved in November 2018: http://www​.hedweb​.com. 25. L. Cannon, “Mormonism Mandates Transhumanism,” in T. J. Trothen and C. Mercer (eds.), Religion and Human Enhancement: Death, Values, and Morality (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2017), 49–66, at 55–57. 26. J. Hughes, “Problems of Transhumanism: Atheism vs. Naturalist Theologies,” in IEET, Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, January 2010. Retrieved in November 2018: http://ieet​.org​/index​.php​/IEET​/more​/hughes20100114/. 27. J. Harris, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 28. H. Tirosh-Samuelson and K. L. Mossman (eds.), Building Better Humans? Refocusing the Debate on Transhumanism (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012). 29. D. Noble, The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (New York, NY: Penguin, 1997). 30. R. Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York, NY: Penguin, 1999). 31. We should note that this text did set the standards for the posthumanist shift in Cultural Studies. 32. L. E. Graham, Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and Others in Popular Cultures (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002). 33. P. J. Crutzen and E. F. Stoermer, “The ‘Anthropocene,’” Global Change Newsletter no. 41 (2000): 17–18.

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34. See E. Chivian and A. Bernstein (eds.), Sustaining Life: How Human Health Depends on Biodiversity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 35. Specifically, Teilhard de Chardin states: “Liberty: that is to say, the chance offered to every man (by removing obstacles and placing the appropriate means at his disposal) of ‘trans-humanizing’ himself by developing his potentialities to the fullest extent” (P. Teilhard de Chardin, “The Essence of the Democratic Idea: A Biological Approach,” in P. Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, trans. N. Denny (New York: Random House, 1959); Engl. Trans. 1964, 236–242) at 239. 36. J. Huxley, “Transhumanism,” in J. Huxley, New Bottles for New Wine (London, UK: Chatto & Windus, 1957), 13–17. 37. P. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, trans. B. Wall (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1955), Trans. Engl. 1959. 38. AI stands for Artificial Intelligence. 39. F. Ferrando, Philosophical Posthumanism (London: Bloomsbury, in press). 40. Think, for instance, of Rosi Braidotti’s pivotal text The Posthuman (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013), where she dedicates one chapter to the topic of “Posthumanism” and another to the topic of “Post-Anthropocentrism.” 41. For instance, in the history of sexism in contemporary society, “female” would be considered the negative, “male” the positive; in the history of NorthAmerican slavery, “black” would be considered the negative, “white” the positive, and so on. 42. A. Watts, Tao: The Watercourse Way (London, UK: Jonathan Cape, 1976). 43. Think, for instance, of teaching n. 8, among others, which starts with this sentence: “The supreme good is like water, / which nourishes all things without trying to. / It is content with the low places that people disdain. / Thus it is like the Tao” (Tzu 1999: n. pg.). L. Tzu, Tao Te Ching, trans. S. Mitchell (London, UK: Frances Lincoln, sixth century BCE, Engl. Trans. 1999). 44. I have clarified the difference between the two terms in the article: F. Ferrando, “Humans Have Always Been Posthuman: A Spiritual Genealogy of the Posthuman,” in D. Banerji and M. R. Paranjape (eds.), Critical Posthumanism and Planetary Futures (New Delhi: Springer, 2016), 243–256. 45. Cf. F. Capra, The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1975). 46. Cf. A. Burke and A. Gonzalez, “Growing Interest in Meditation in the United States,” Biofeedback 39, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 49–50. 47. Cf. L. Miller (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Psychology and Spirituality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 48. See Ferrando, “Humans Have Always Been Posthuman,” quoted. 49. Here we should note that the self is perceived in a comprehensive and multilayered way, which addresses, in conjunction, the body, the mind, the inner being, the ethos, and the relational self, among other elements. 50. D. S. Wright, What is Buddhist Enlightenment? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 51. On the topic of Posthumanism and Tantra, see A. Weinstone, Avatar Bodies: A Tantra for Posthumanism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).

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52. As Glenn Mullin underlines, in deity yoga, “the word ‘deity’ mean[s] ‘buddha’” (31). G. Mullin, Female Buddhas: Women of Enlightenment in Tibetan Mystical Art (Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers, 2013). 53. We should mention that, according to the Buddhist traditions, supernatural beings are not necessarily enlightened. Cf. F. K. Bunce, An Encyclopaedia of Buddhist Deities, Demigods, Godlings, Saints and Demons (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, 1998). 54. Sophia was created by Hanson Robotics. 55. C. R. Wootson, Jr., “Saudi Arabia Grants Robot Citizenship, Irking Women’s Rights Groups,” The Washington Post. Hamilton Spectator, The (ON). October 30, 2017. 56. Han was also created by Hanson Robotics. 57. YouTube: “Two Robots Debate the Future of Humanity,” 2017. 58. M. Mori, The Buddha in the Robot, Transl. C. S. Terry (Tokyo: Kosei Publishing, 1979). 59. M. LaTorra, “What Is Buddhist Transhumanism?” Theology and Science 13, no. 2 (2018): 219–229, at 219. 60. Here, to be considered not only as “natural” beings, but also as “technological” ones, that is, humans merging with technology. 61. Quoted. 62. M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1966; Engl. Trans. 1970). 63. Think, for instance, how the history of racism and sexism has historically been supported by pseudo-scientific preconception and biases, according to which women and African descents, among others, would be considered emotional beings with poor reason. 64. Think of the impact of industrialization upon planet Earth in the last three centuries. 65. F. W. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In: The Portable Nietzsche, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1883–1885; Engl. Trans. 1976), 103–439. See also F. W. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. A. Del Caro and R. Pippin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1883–1885; Engl. Trans. 2006). 66. This is why Nietzsche, together with Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, was famously defined by philosopher Paul Ricoeur as the “three masters of suspicion” (P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy an Essay on Interpretation, trans. D. Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), at 33. 67. As stated in The Gay Science, Section 125 (F. W. Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York, NY: Random House, 1882; Engl. Trans. 1974)). 68. L. Ferry and A. Renaut, French Philosophies of the Sixties: An Essay on Antihumanism, trans. M. Schnackenberg Cattani (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1985; Engl. Trans. 1990). 69. F. Ferrando, “Towards a Posthumanist Methodology,” Frame Journal for Literary Studies 25, no. 1 (Utrecht University, May 2012): 9–18.

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70. Quoted. 71. The three metamorphosis of the spirit, as explained in Part I of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883–1885), are the camel, the lion, and the child. Here we should note that the metaphorical stage of the child represents the attainment of the Overhuman. 72. Exodus 3:14 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 87. 73. One example of this redundancy, among many, is the representation of God as a specific type of human, for instance, in the tradition of Western Christian iconography, according to which God has been repeatedly represented as an older white male. I have expanded on this point in: “The Posthuman Divine: When Robots Can be Enlightened,” Sophia: Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures 58, no. 4 (January 2020), Springer. 74. In these cases, the eternal power becomes strategically estranged from the mutual, personal relation to each embodied individual, who then needs the intermediation of religious authorities in order to access what becomes identified as “God” in a specific belief system. This shift is often made to comply with political and economic interest; think, for instance, of the history of monetary indulgences in the Catholic tradition of the Middle Ages. 75. A. Bard and J. Söderqvist, Syntheism—Creating God in the Internet Age (Stockholm: Stockholm Text, 2014).

Part II

WHAT ARE RELIGIOUS TRANSHUMANISTS AND THEIR CRITICS SAYING?

Chapter 3

Mormon Transhumanism Lincoln Cannon

Transhumanism is a new way to think about the future of humanity.1 As Transhumanists, we have discarded the old assumption that human nature is or ever was static, not only because science has demonstrated biological evolution, but especially because history itself is cultural and technological evolution. We are diverse in background and perspective, but our common expectation is that humanity will continue to evolve. Our common ambition is to shape that evolution intentionally, changing our bodies and minds, our relationships, and our world for the better—perhaps even to learn, love, and create together indefinitely.2 Some have accused Transhumanism of being the most dangerous idea.3 The risks truly are as horrible as the opportunities are wonderful. Even acknowledging concerns and emphasizing ethics, we might agree with our critics that we are trying to “play God.” After all, what are the alternatives? What are the prospects for children who would not try to “play adult” and who would not mature from playing, to learning, to being? Surely such a restricted nursery would soon prove too small, even for the smallest of the living. But for us, who know we are not dead yet, why not believe the most dangerous idea? Why not live? Whatever the secular response (perhaps properly excusing itself from vying for the high spirit of humanity), the Mormon Transhumanist response is a quickened heart and brightened eyes. We have heard this story before.4 It is our calling, and our choice has not changed.5 Children of God would try to play God, and more. We would learn how to be God. Dangerous indeed, and worthy of exquisite caution and utmost reverence. But for the child, there is no other way. Mormon Transhumanism stands for the idea that humanity should learn how to be God,6 and not just any kind of god, not a god that would raise itself in hubris above others,7 but rather the God that would raise 53

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each other together as compassionate creators.8 Humanity should learn how to be Christ.9 MORMONISM Mormonism itself is an immersive discipleship of Jesus Christ.10 Not so much a religion about Jesus, it is an aspiration to live the religion of Jesus.11 With Jesus,12 we would trust in,13 change toward,14 and fully immerse our bodies and minds in the role of Christ.15 We would become messiahs,16 saviors for each other,17 consoling and healing and raising,18 as exemplified and invited by Jesus.19 We would also endure in that role,20 working to reconcile with our relations and world,21 through suffering and even death if needed,22 anticipating the prophesied day of transfiguration and resurrection to immortality in eternal life.23 So while Mormons may not be Christian by creed,24 we are plainly Christian by gospel.25 Joseph Smith was born in the state of New York in 1805.26 Joseph, as he liked to be called, spoke and wrote about visions and revelations from God, beginning in adolescence and continuing throughout his life. In 1830, Joseph published the Book of Mormon. He described the book as a revealed translation from engravings on golden plates by an ancient American prophet named Mormon, who had compiled a religious history of his people, including a visit from the resurrected Jesus Christ. Soon after publishing the book, Joseph founded the Church of Christ to be a restoration of primitive Christianity. The church grew quickly, amid controversy and sometimes violent persecution, until a mob killed Joseph in 1844, and the already-strained church fractured. Brigham Young emerged as the recognized leader of the majority of Mormons, who he led across the plains and mountains of the American West to settle in what has become the state of Utah. There, in 1851, he incorporated the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which now consists of over 15 million members around the world.27 Many Mormons that did not follow Brigham Young eventually coalesced around the leadership of Joseph Smith III, the oldest surviving son of Joseph Smith. In 1860, he established the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which changed its name in 2001 to Community of Christ, and today consists of over 250,000 members.28 In addition to these large Mormon denominations, there are numerous small denominations, such as the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which continues to practice polygamy, unlike most other Mormon denominations. Mormonism posits a metaphysics, in contrast to classical substance dualism, that is consistent with some accounts of physicalism and naturalism. According to our scriptures, everything is material, including our minds;29

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and everything is embodied, including God.30 Moreover, God did not create matter.31 Instead, as Joseph described it, God was once as we are now: finding ourselves in the midst of minds and matter, instituting new laws within the context of existing laws, and organizing the world out of chaos.32 In other words, God became God,33 and it was not the first time—nor should it be the last. Mormonism offers a theodicy that explains evil as an unavoidable risk inherent in any opportunity to create more genuine creators.34 At a grand council in heaven before the creation of this world, the children of God presented two plans.35 One plan would optimize for thriving cultivation. The other would optimize for suffering mitigation. The first would be challenging, with wonderful joy and terrible misery: new angels and demons, new gods and devils, even a new Christ and a new Satan. The second would be easy. No real losses, and yet no real gains. As the story goes, God chose the first and war ensued, continuing to this day.36 Mormonism projects an eschatology of transformation, of the Earth into heaven,37 and of humanity into God,38 and would thereby provoke us to fervent participation in its narrative.39 Our scriptures situate us in a time of rapid progress,40 apocalyptic risk, and millennial opportunity.41 It culminates in the return of Christ, not as a solitary wanderer, but like the rising sun for all to see,42 and for all to be like.43 The scriptures go on to describe a Millennial Earth, beyond present notions of poverty or death, where the living are transfigured and the dead are resurrected to immortality.44 Then the Earth itself is transfigured,45 becoming like a crystal globe, a sea of glass and fire, where all things are manifest: past, present, and future.46 Its inhabitants receive the full grace and power of God,47 and they learn of a yet higher order of worlds.48 POST-SECULAR RELIGION For some, God is not a living proposition, let alone prophecy or religion. They wonder if we have not heard that God is dead,49 and they are right to wonder. Following their gods, traditional religions may be dying, particularly in technologically advanced and prosperous places.50 Observing this, many have embraced the secularization hypothesis that religion itself is dying. However, that hypothesis is showing its age, embraced more by anti-religious voices in popular culture than by careful students of the religious phenomenon, among whom another hypothesis is gestating.51 If God is merely a supernatural superlative, he very well may be dead, but positing such as God misses the practical function of God. God always has been, and is at least, a posthuman projection, an extension and negation of human desire, imagined and expressed within the constraints of human

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thought, language, and action.52 That is not to say God is only so much. To the contrary, we may have moral and practical reasons to trust that others have already realized posthuman projections.53 However, no matter your attitude toward faith, God is at least this posthuman projection. Understood in terms of that function, God clearly is not dead and never was, except perhaps to the extent recurring death is part of evolution, including that of God. If prophecy is merely fortune-telling, it too may be dying, but that also fails to account for function. Whether or not it becomes fore-telling, prophecy is always forth-telling: a socially interactive work of inspiration, even provocation, that would steer us from perceived risks toward desired opportunities. At its best, it is a persuasive expression of compassion, even if punctuated with serious warnings, aimed at a shared sublime potential, not as narrowly preconceived, but rather as openly imagined from a position that would transcend itself in genuine creation. But to function with power, prophecy must be connected, in the heart and mind of its recipient, with living possibilities, especially pressing necessities and urgencies.54 Prophecy matters, becoming fore-telling from forth-telling, only to the extent it reaches into us and changes our thoughts sufficiently to change our words and actions, which just might change our world. Likewise, if religion is merely genuflection to the supernatural, it very well may be dying, but again that overlooks function. Many of us have regarded religion narrowly, and much that is supposed to be secular may actually function as religion.55 For example, some claim inspiration from science or ethics. Awe fills us as we contemplate the vastness of space or the voice of the people. Yet the inspiration is not merely in the reductionist implications of science or the procedural adjudications of ethics. Rather aesthetics is woven through them, tying them together in meaning, and that is why we care about science or ethics. Aesthetics shape and move us, and at their strongest, they provoke us as a community to a strenuous mood.56 When they do that, they function as religion, not necessarily in any narrow sense, but aesthetics that provoke a communal strenuous mood may be understood to function as religion from a post-secular vantage point.57 Of course, none of this means science or ethics should or even could be displaced by religion. To the contrary, science should continue to reconcile our contending accounts of experience, as ethics should our contending accounts of desire.58 Each should expand its reach to the uttermost,59 always better informing our aesthetics, affecting each other in a feedback loop.60 Yet even as science and ethics increasingly empower us, we should not fool ourselves into supposing they will ever be finished or sufficient in themselves.61 It is not enough that we can describe our world through science or imagine a better world through ethics. We also want to make a better world. We can do that through engineering and governance, but it is also

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not enough that we can make a better world. We want to feel it, sometimes powerfully, and more: we want to share our powerful feelings with others in ways that move us together. As engineering and governance are action on science and ethics, religion is action on aesthetics. As engineering and governance are the power of science and ethics, religion is the power of aesthetics. We care for and use science and ethics only in accordance with aesthetics, which presents itself as foremost among them in the most vital moments of life, when we must act, according to whatever wisdom and inspiration we might have. Life cannot wait.62 How will we act? Will we see beauty in science? Will we feel unity in ethics? Will we care, and how much will we care? Could our degree of concern make a practical difference? These questions matter to all except perhaps the most apathetic, escapist, or nihilistic among us. These questions and answers scope our future. If we can raise our eyes from the altars of religious and anti-religious dogma, we will see that the hand raised to finish the dying God is the sign of the oath to the resurrecting God. If we can keep our eyes raised, resisting the carnage below, we will also see the hand is our own and it holds a blade that is aged and stained. That is when we have a choice, either to repeat the old sacrifices of our ancestors, or finally to make the new sacrifice that they always implied: we can put ourselves on the altar and learn how to be God. We can recognize that the negation of one posthuman projection always implies another, misrecognized until humanity embraces its transformation.63 TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION For some, the idea of transformation into posthumanity conjures images of comic book cyborgs with gun arms and laser eyes. But most would agree that gun arms and laser eyes would not be particularly desirable transformations, either practically or aesthetically. For better examples, look at the technology that is transforming you right now. You may be using a computing device to extend your ability to communicate. You may be reading through glasses, contacts, or surgically modified eyes, or listening through hearing aids or cochlear implants. You are probably wearing clothing to enhance your ability to adapt to environmental change. Under those clothes, you might have implants or prosthetics. Through your blood, drugs may be relieving pain, heightening attention, or facilitating growth. That is just now. Think through the rest of the day leading up to this moment. Think through your life. Consider human history. If technologically enhanced humans are cyborgs then we have always been cyborgs.64 We have always been transforming humans, transhumans, and to the extent we have welcomed that, we have

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been implicit transhumanists. At least in context of the past and present, that is not particularly controversial. The controversy arises when we look forward. How will technology change us in a few years or decades?65 What about a thousand years from now? How many drugs, surgeries, prosthetics, and other changes are there between humans and posthumans, as different from us as we now are from our prehuman ancestors? Is it possible to change that much? If so, should we? Sometimes we talk about humans becoming more robotic or robots becoming more human. When thinking of robots, we might feel cold metal or hollow plastic. If that is what robots are then we are not and never should (or could meaningfully) be robots. However, such language relies on a dichotomy that is increasingly insufficient for describing not only the possibility space but even the actuality space. Does a human receiving a prosthetic limb or an artificial heart become less human? Can a body originating from artificial DNA, conceived through an artificial process, or gestated in an artificial environment ever be human, even if it is practically indistinguishable from natural humans? For that matter, how natural are humans? Are agriculture and medicine natural? The blurring between natural and artificial is as ancient as the stick our distant ancestor wielded to extend her reach, and the leaves donned to enhance his skin. In an important sense, a synthesis of anatomy and tools is part of what made us human, empowering us above and differentiating us from our prehuman ancestors. In that sense, perhaps we have always been robots, for at least as long as we have been humans. Why do we want to enhance ourselves? The answer is not new. We want to enhance ourselves for all the reasons we have made tools since the beginning of history. Tools empower us. So we will continue to build more and better tools, and their synthesis with our anatomies will become increasingly seamless and intimate, because we want to and because we can, for the power it provides. Like all power, tools and their intimate evolution into body and mind enhancements are not inherently good or evil. Rather, they are both risks to mitigate and opportunities to pursue according to whatever wisdom and inspiration we might have. On the one hand, tools can empower us against each other. Some hoard, and others deplete. Elites form, totalitarians control, and tyrants oppress. Artificial catastrophic risks well beyond those of nuclear weapons present themselves.66 Perhaps we could realize our worst imaginations of the Apocalypse. On the other hand, tools can also empower us for each other. Already we have used them to build, relate, console, and heal in ways our distant ancestors imagined only God to have the capacity. Perhaps someday we might transfigure ourselves into ageless bodies.67 We might even raise each other as sublime minds that relate with unfathomable compassion and conceive thoughts that in themselves constitute nothing less than the

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creation of new worlds.68 In any case, Mormon or otherwise, Transhumanists affirm that we can and should change through continued ethical use of technology to expand our abilities. TRANSHUMANISM Transhumanists usually trace our ideological origins to secular Humanism. Pre-Socratic Greek philosophers looked beyond traditional gods for scientific explanations of the world. Seventeenth-century astronomer Galileo Galilei deferred to human observation when conflicting with ecclesiastical authority. Eighteenth-century scientist Marquis de Condorcet eschewed religion, claiming that reason and medical science would perfect humanity.69 Although most self-identified Transhumanists today are secular, Transhumanism also originates in part from religious Humanism. New Testament writers and centuries of early Orthodox and Catholic authorities syncretized with Neoplatonism,70 the popular science of their day, and many advocated identifying with Christ and becoming God.71 Thirteenth-century Scholastic theologians continued the synthesis of Christianity with popular science,72 which was at the time the newly rediscovered ideas of Aristotle.73 Nineteenth-century Russian Orthodox priest, Nikolai Fedorov, proclaimed that the common task of humanity should be the technological resurrection of our ancestors.74 And twentieth-century Jesuit priest, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, advocated a vision of human evolution, accelerated by technology, merging inexorably into a conception of God.75 The self-identified Transhumanist movement began in the last few decades of the twentieth century. In the 1960s, futurist Fereidoun M. Esfandiary (“FM-2030”) began identifying as “transhumans” those who behave in a manner conducive to a posthuman future.76 In the 1980s, philosopher Max More formalized a Transhumanist doctrine, advocating the “Principles of Extropy” for continuously improving the human condition.77 In the 1990s, a group of influential Transhumanists authored the “Transhumanist Declaration,” stating various ethical positions related to the use of and planning for technological advances.78 Also in the 1990s, philosophers Nick Bostrom and David Pearce founded the World Transhumanist Association, which became the largest network of Transhumanists with membership in the thousands, and later changed its name to Humanity+.79 In the 2000s, technologist Ray Kurzweil published The Singularity Is Near, popularizing the idea of accelerating technological change. Also in the 2000s, the Mormon Transhumanist Association became the largest network of religious Transhumanists with membership in the hundreds.80

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MISRECOGNIZED RELIGIOSITY Despite occasional equivocation,81 whether among Transhumanists or from external accounts, Transhumanism is not atheism. In fact, recent polls suggest only about half of Transhumanists identify as either atheist or agnostic,82 and that is down about 15 percent from surveys done 5–10 years previously.83 Given that agnosticism tends to be more prevalent than atheism in most populations, it may be that not even a quarter of Transhumanists are atheists, and the proportion of atheist Transhumanists may be in decline. What might explain a decline? One contributor could be simply that religious persons are increasingly recognizing compatibility and even complementarity between their religious views and Transhumanism. Another contributor could be that some common Transhumanist expectations, if not aspirations, may be incompatible with atheism. For example, achieving the capacity to simulate or otherwise emulate our evolutionary history may entail that our world was created by beings that qualify as God in some religions.84 Perhaps another contributor is that some atheist-inclined Transhumanists have become alarmed by or weary of the fervent anti-religiosity advocated by some atheists.85 Having no wish to be associated with that any more than with religious fundamentalism, they might be adjusting their self-descriptions. Yet another contributor could be that we are beginning to recognize that Transhumanism itself functions as a religion for some of us, and perhaps most especially for some of us that most strongly deny that function.86 That is not to claim that Transhumanism is inherently a religion. In itself, advocacy for ethical use of technology to extend human abilities need not be religious. However, it still ends up functioning as religion for some that adopt and identify with the ideology. There are the sacraments of dietary supplements, the rituals of cryonics, the prophecies of indefinite healthy life extension, the spirits of substrate independent minds, the apocalyptic and messianic postures toward artificial intelligence, the millennial paradisiacal hope of life and abundance beyond present notions of suffering and poverty, and ultimately the pantheon of posthumanity.87 While, in the minds of some individual Transhumanists, these may really only be rough analogies between religious and Transhumanist views, they are nonetheless infused with collective strenuous emotion among some groups of Transhumanists. In other words, among some Transhumanists, our vision and practice function as religion, perhaps not according to narrow pre-secular accounts of religion, but rather from broad accounts of the religious phenomenon from deep history through its evolution into popular traditional trappings and on into its emerging post-secular manifestations.88 Transhumanism, for some Transhumanists, is post-secular religion, even if misrecognized.

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ACCELERATING CHANGE In the 1960s, Intel co-founder Gordon Moore observed that the ratio of computing capacity to cost was doubling predictably, every couple years or faster. In other words, a computer built in 1969 had roughly twice as much capacity as a computer built at the same cost in 1968, and over a hundred times as much capacity as a computer built at the same cost in 1962; a computer built in 1969 would also reliably have roughly half the capacity of a computer built at the same cost in 1970, and less than a hundredth the capacity of a computer built at the same cost in 1976. That trend, known as Moore’s Law, has continued to the present.89 Today, a $150 smartphone can store about a million times more data and process that data about a thousand times faster than the $150K Apollo Guidance Computer that took astronauts to the moon in 1969. The smartphone also has wireless access to extended computing capacity on the Internet, including powerful systems such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook. And while Moore’s Law has ended for traditional 2D integrated circuits (which have reached their maximum density), if we consider the broader trend from older computing architectures (transistors and tubes), and project it through promising near-term computing architectures (3D, biological, and quantum), exponential growth is continuing. Suppose Moore’s Law and its analogs in new computing architectures continue.90 Within decades, whatever replaces smartphones would have millions, billions, and then trillions of times the overall computing capacity at the same cost. Within a century, $150 could perhaps purchase more computing capacity than that of all human brains combined.91 Imagine the possibilities. If accelerating change continues, our informal intuitive sense of what the world might look like ten, thirty, or a hundred years from now is almost certainly and quite dramatically wrong. Even predictions based on the best social and economic and political theories, if not accounting for accelerating change, would be stunningly incorrect. The future probably will not be even close to what we imagine, if accelerating change persists, and if we do not work to account for that possibility in our expectations. MYTHS AND VISIONS Mormon Transhumanists have many myths and visions—many stories and dreams. And we express them in many narratives. They tend to reflect love for our culture, hope in ecumenical outreach beyond sectarian restrictions, and trust in the possibility of universal thriving. They are informed of scripture, theology, secular history, contemporary science, trends in emerging

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technology, and of course unabashed exercise of imagination about how they all may work together. Some of our narratives may be shocking, which is partly the point of constructing them, aiming to motivate more than casual consideration. And the only certainty is that our myths are deficient to some extent. But perhaps our visions will provoke imagination even further, to the possibility of perpetual improvement. Here is a narrative that combines common elements to illustrate parallels between Mormonism and Transhumanism. Without beginning, Gods of Gods found themselves creating heavens and worlds without end.92 Our world was formless and empty, having neither happiness nor misery, neither life nor death, neither sense nor insensibility, and no purpose.93 Darkness encompassed the source, and the Mind of the Gods was brooding over it.94 And the Gods said, let there be light, and there was light.95 The Gods saw the light, that it was good because it was discernible.96 The Gods saw darkness, that it was separated from the light.97 And the light shining out of darkness was the first category.98 The Gods counseled among themselves.99 And some said,100 let us prepare the source to evolve abundantly, to bring forth sense, and life, and happiness; and form creators in our image, after our likeness, to have dominion over all the world.101 And others answered and said,102 let us not evolve more creators because some will be lost, but give us the honor and power.103 The Gods chose the first, and there was war in heaven.104 But the Gods watched those things they had ordered,105 and saw their plan was good.106 Two thousand five hundred years ago, humanity was evolving into a new way of thinking, expressed in part by transition away from polytheism. The Persian Empire governed much of the civilized world, and Zarathustra’s teachings had spread throughout, yet in the heart of the empire a smaller religion was coming together. Its adherents combined Zoroastrian doctrine with mythology about indigenous Semites to make new scripture. They pioneered from Babylon, established a colony in Judea, and began to build a temple. In time, they would syncretize with the science of their day and conceive Christianity, the most influential ideology in history. Two hundred years ago, humanity was again evolving into a new way of thinking, expressed in part by transition away from monotheism. Jesus’ teachings had spread throughout most of the civilized world, and the United States of America was ascending to unparalleled global influence. In the heart of the nation, a small religion was coming together. Its adherents combined Christian doctrine with mythology about Native Americans to make new scripture. They pioneered from Illinois, established a colony in Deseret, and began to build a temple. In time, they too would syncretize with the science of their day and conceive something transcending themselves.

Mormon Transhumanism

Today, we are a childlike civilization, a Telestial world in the Fullness of Times.107 Filled as if by an unstoppable rolling river pouring from the heavens, our knowledge becomes unprecedented.108 Nothing is withheld, whether the laws of the earth or the bounds of the heavens, whether there be one God or many Gods, everything begins to manifest.109 And the work of God hastens.110 Repeating the words of Christ, we speak,111 and information technologies begin to carry consolation around the world. Emulating the works of Christ, we act,112 and biological technologies begin to make the blind see,113 the lame walk,114 and the deaf hear;115 agriculture begins to feed the hungry; and manufacturing begins to clothe the naked.116 Hearts turning to our ancestors, we remember them, and machine learning algorithms begin to process massive family history databases, perhaps to redeem our dead.117 A biotech revolution begins.118 Synthetic biology restores extinct species, creates new life forms, and hints at programmable ecologies. Some recall prop­ hecies about renewal of our world119—or perhaps its destruction.120 Personalized medicine begins to restore vitality to an older generation. Some insist that death is necessary for meaning, but new voices repeat old stories about those who were more blessed for their desire to avoid death altogether.121 Reproduction technology enables infertile and gay couples, as well as individuals and groups, to conceive their own genetic children. Some recoil from threats to tradition, while others celebrate gifts to new families.122 Weaponized pathogens threaten pandemics, as well as targeted genocides and assassinations. Meanwhile, solar energy becomes less expensive than any other. And the Internet evolves into a distributed reputation network, creating new incentives for cooperation. Missionaries find their work more globalized than ever before.123 A nanotech revolution begins.124 Atomically-precise printing erupts with food, clothing, and shelter. Welfare systems solve old problems and make new ones.125 Among the wealthy, robotic cells flow through bodies and brains, extending abilities beyond those of the greatest athletes and scholars of history. Enjoying restored vitality, many become convinced that we can vanquish that awful monster, death.126 But cautionary voices call attention to stunning socioeconomic disparities.127 With the ability to read and write data in every neuron of the brain, the Internet evolves into a composite of virtual and natural realities. We begin to connect with each other experientially, sharing senses and feelings. Spiritual experiences become malleable, meriting careful discernment.128 Wireheading haunts relationships and burdens communities. And weaponized self-replicating nanobots threaten destruction of the biosphere. Meanwhile, robotic moon bases mine asteroids and construct space colonies, reinvigorating the pioneer spirit.129 A neurotech revolution begins.130 We virtualize brains and bodies. Minds extend or transition to more robust substrates, biological and otherwise.131 As morphological possibilities expand, some warn against desecrating the image

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of God, and some recall prophecies about the ordinance of transfiguration.132 Data backup and restore procedures for the brain banish death as we know it.133 Cryonics patients return to life. And environmental data mining hints at the possibility of modeling history in detail, to the point of extracting our dead ancestors individually. Some say the possibility was ordained, before the world was, to enable us to redeem our dead,134 perhaps to perform the ordinance of resurrection.135 Artificial and enhanced minds, similar and alien to human, evolve to superhuman capacity.136 And malicious superintelligence threatens us with annihilation. Then something special happens: we encounter each other and the personification of our world, instrumented to embody a vast mind, with an intimacy we couldn’t previously imagine. In that day, we will be an adolescent civilization, a terrestrial world in the Millennium.137 Technology and religion will have evolved beyond our present abilities to conceive or express, except loosely through symbolic analogy.138 We will see and feel and know the messiah,139 the return of Christ, in the embodied personification of the light and life of our world,140 with and in whom we will be one.141 In a world beyond present notions of enmity, poverty, suffering, and death—the living transfigured and the dead resurrected to immortality—we will fulfill prophecies.142 And we will repeat others, forth-telling and provoking ourselves through yet greater challenges:143 to maturity in a Celestial world,144 and beyond in higher orders of worlds without end.145

NEW GOD ARGUMENT Popular among Mormon Transhumanists, the New God Argument is a logical argument for faith in God.146 Here are definitions of key words in the argument: Faith: trust: belief that something is reliable or effective for achieving goals Compassion: capacity to refrain from thwarting or to assist with achieving goals Creation: the process of modifying situations to achieve goals Intelligence: capacity to achieve goals across diverse situations Superintelligence: intelligence that is greater than that of its evolutionary ancestors in every way Humanity: all organisms of the homo sapiens species Posthumanity: evolutionary descendents of humanity Superhumanity: superintelligent posthumanity God: superhumanity that is more compassionate than we are and that created our world

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The New God Argument consists of four parts: 1. Faith Assumption 2. Compassion Argument 3. Creation Argument 4. God Conclusion. The Faith Assumption is a proposition that humanity will not become extinct before evolving into superhumanity. It consists of a single assumption: F1: humanity will not become extinct before evolving into superhumanity (assumption)

The assumption may be false. However, to the extent we do not know it to be false, we may have practical or moral reasons to behave as if it is true.147 In any case, the Faith Assumption is a common aspiration among secular advocates of technological evolution,148 and it may be consistent with the religious doctrine of theosis, also known as divinization or deification: the idea that humanity should become God. The Compassion Argument is a logical argument for trust that superhumanity probably would be more compassionate than we are. The basic idea is that humanity probably will continue to increase in decentralized destructive capacity, so it probably will stagnate or destroy itself unless it increases in compassion. If we trust in our own superhuman potential, we should trust that superhumanity would be more compassionate than we are. The argument consists of two assumptions and a deduction from those assumptions and the Faith Assumption. CO1: EITHER humanity probably will become extinct before evolving into superhumanity OR superhumanity probably would not have more decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has OR superhumanity probably would be more compassionate than we are (assumption) CO2: superhumanity probably would have more decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has (assumption) CO3: superhumanity probably would be more compassionate than we are (deduction from CO1, CO2, and F1)

The deduction of the Compassion Argument is necessarily true if its assumptions and the Faith Assumption are true. Either or both of the Compassion

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Argument assumptions may be false. However, we may have historical and technological reasons to believe they are true. For example, records suggest that violence has decreased and civil liberties have improved as governments have become more powerful,149 and some technologists believe that machine intelligence may destroy us if we do not ensure its friendliness, at least as instrumental cooperation if not as internalized compassion.150 The Creation Argument is a logical argument for trust that superhumanity probably created our world. The basic idea is that humanity probably would not be the only or first to create many worlds emulating its evolutionary history, so it probably will never create many such worlds unless it is already in such a world. If we trust in our own superhuman potential, we should trust that superhumanity created our world. The argument consists of two assumptions and a deduction from those assumptions and the Faith Assumption. CR1: EITHER humanity probably will become extinct before evolving into superhumanity OR superhumanity probably would not create many worlds emulating its evolutionary history OR superhumanity probably created our world (assumption) CR2: superhumanity probably would create many worlds emulating its evolutionary history (assumption) CR3: superhumanity probably created our world (deduction from CR1, CR2, and F1)

The deduction of the Creation Argument is necessarily true if its assumptions and the Faith Assumption are true. Either or both of the Creation Argument assumptions may be false, but we may have technological and mathematical reasons to believe they are true. For example, some technologists believe that computation may enable us to run many family history simulations detailed enough to consist of emulated conscious persons, in which case statistics would show we almost certainly are already living in such a family history simulation ourselves.151 Finally, the God Conclusion is a logical deduction for faith in God. It consists of a single deduction, which is necessarily true if the Compassion Argument and Creation Argument are true. G1: BOTH superhumanity probably would be more compassionate than we are AND superhumanity probably created our world (deduction from CO3 and CR3)

Given assumptions consistent with contemporary science and technological trends, the deduction concludes that if we trust in our own superhuman

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potential then we should also trust that superhumanity probably would be more compassionate than we are and created our world. Because a compassionate creator may qualify as God in some religions, trust in our own superhuman potential may entail faith in God, and atheism may entail distrust in our superhuman potential. MORMONISM MANDATES TRANSHUMANISM Some Mormon Transhumanists contend that, beyond mere compatibility or even complementarity, Mormonism actually mandates Transhumanism. From this perspective, one can be a Transhumanist without being a Mormon, but one cannot be a Mormon without being a Transhumanist, at least implicitly. Although this is a controversial claim, we can use Mormon scripture to formulate a supporting argument based on four premises. M1: God commands us to use ordained means to participate in God’s work (assumption)

This first premise is based on scriptures like 1 Nephi 3:7, which says God prepares ways for us to accomplish God’s commands; Alma 60:11, 21–23, which says God will not save us unless we use the means God has already provided; and Doctrines and Covenants 58:27–28, which says we should engage in good causes without waiting for God to provide specific commands. M2: Science and technology are among the means ordained of God (assumption)

This second premise is based on scriptures like 1 Nephi 17:8–11, 16, where God commands Nephi to construct a ship to save his family; Alma 37:38–39, which says God gave Nephi a compass to guide his family to the promised land; Doctrines & Covenants 88:78–79, where God commands us to study and teach everything from astronomy and geology to history and politics; and Doctrines & Covenants 121:26–33, which says we will learn all the physical laws of the world before attaining heaven. M3: God’s work is to help each other attain Godhood (assumption)

This third premise is based on scriptures like 3 Nephi 12:48, where Jesus commands us to be perfect like God; Doctrines & Covenants 76:58–60, 92–95, which says God would make us gods of equal power with him; and Moses 1:39, which says God’s work is to make us immortal in eternal life.

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M4: An essential attribute of Godhood is a glorified immortal body (assumption)

This fourth premise is based on scriptures like Ether 3:7–16, where the Brother of Jared sees that God is embodied; Doctrines & Covenants 76:70, which says God has a body glorified like the sun; Doctrines & Covenants 93:33–36, which says full joy requires a body, elements are the body of God, and intelligence is the glory of God; and Doctrines & Covenants 130:22, which says God’s body is as tangible as that of a human. From these four premises, we can make three deductions, all of which are necessarily true if the premises are true. M5: God commands us to use science and technology to participate in God’s work (deduction from M1 and M2) M6: God commands us to use science and technology to help each other attain Godhood (deduction from M3 and M5) M7: God commands us to use science and technology to help each other attain a glorified immortal body (deduction from M4 and M6)

The concluding deduction is both a religious mandate, in that it purports to express the will of God, and a description of the Transhumanist project, advocating the ethical use of technology to expand human abilities. If we arrived at this conclusion by valid reasoning, which we did, and if we began with premises that accurately reflect Mormonism, then Mormonism mandates Transhumanism. NOTES 1. Nick Bostrom, “What Is Transhumanism?” Nick Bostrom website, 2001, http://www​.nickbostrom​.com​/old​/transhumanism​.html (accessed June 4, 2016). 2. “Transhumanist FAQ,” Humanity+, http://humanityplus​.org​/philosophy​/ transhumanist​-faq/ (accessed June 4, 2016). 3. Francis Fukuyama, “Transhumanism—the World’s Most Dangerous Idea,” Foreign Policy, no. 144 (2004): 42. 4. Moses 4:1–3. 5. Abraham 3:24–27. 6. Joseph Smith, Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, compiled by Joseph Fielding Smith (Salt Lake City: Deseret News Press, 1938), 346. 7. 2 Thessalonians 2:3–4. 8. Romans 8:16–17. 9. Colossians 1:27. 10. 2 Nephi 25:26.

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11. Doctrines & Covenants 93:19–20. 12. 2 Nephi 31:5–13. 13. Ether 13:4. 14. 3 Nephi 11:37–40. 15. Mosiah 5:9. 16. 2 Corinthians 1:21. 17. Doctrines & Covenants 103:9. 18. Matthew 10:8. 19. John 14:12. 20. 2 Nephi 31:16–21. 21. 3 Nephi 12:21–24. 22. Doctrines & Covenants 138:11–14. 23. Ibid., 63:49–52. 24. Joseph Smith History 1:19. 25. Mormon 7:8–9. 26. Richard Bushman, Joseph Smith: Rough Stone Rolling (New York: Random House, 2005). 27. “Facts and Statistics,” The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, http:// www​.mormonnewsroom​.org​/facts​-and​-statistics (accessed May 28, 2016). 28. “General Denominational Information,” Community of Christ, http://www​ .cofchrist​.org​/pr​/GeneralInfo​.asp (accessed November 1, 2014). 29. Doctrines & Covenants 131:7. 30. Ibid., 130:22. 31. Ibid., 93:23, 29, 33. 32. Smith, Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, 354. 33. Ibid., 345–46. 34. 2 Nephi 2:11. 35. Moses 4:1–3 and Abraham 3:24–28. 36. Revelation 12:7–9. 37. Doctrines & Covenants 88:25–26. 38. Ibid., 132:20. 39. Ibid., 43:23–25. 40. Ibid., 88:73–80. 41. Ibid., 43:26–33. 42. Smith, Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, Matthew 1:25–26. 43. Moroni 7:48. 44. Doctrines & Covenants 101:26–34. 45. Ibid., 63:20–21. 46. Ibid., 130:6–9. 47. Ibid., 76:92–95. 48. Ibid., 130:10. 49. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, translated by Thomas Common (New York: Dover Publications, 1999), 3. 50. James K. A. Smith, “Secular Liturgies and the Prospects for a ‘Post-Secular’ Sociology of Religion,” in The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary

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Society, edited by Philip S. Gorski (New York: NYU Press, 2012), 159–84. doi:10.18574/nyu/9780814738726.003.0007. 51. Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on Post-Secular Society,” New Perspectives Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2008): 17–29. 52. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, translated by James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1961), 45. 53. Lincoln Cannon and Joseph West, “Theological Implications of the New God Argument,” in Parallels and Convergences: Mormon Thought and Engineering Vision, edited by A. Scott Howe and Richard L. Bushman (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2012), 111–21. 54. Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, translated by Carol Cosman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), 325–27. 55. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). 56. William James, The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, and Human Immortality (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 213. 57. Smith, “Secular Liturgies and the Prospects for a ‘Post-Secular’ Sociology of Religion.” 58. James, The Will to Believe, 190. 59. Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New York: Free Press, 2010). 60. Albert Einstein, The Private Albert Einstein, compiled by Peter A. Bucky and Allen G. Weakland (Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1992), 85. 61. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 325–27. 62. Ibid. 63. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “Transhumanism as a Secularist Faith,” Zygon 47, no. 4 (2012): 710–34. 64. B. E. Brasher, “Thoughts on the Status of the Cyborg: On Technological Socialization and Its Link to the Religious Function of Popular Culture,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion LXIV, no. 4 (1996): 809–30. 65. Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near (New York: Penguin Books, 2005). 66. Nick Bostrom, ed., Global Catastrophic Risks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 67. Aubrey de Grey, Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs that Could Reverse Human Aging in Our Lifetime (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007). 68. Anders Sandberg, “The Physics of Information Processing Superobjects: Daily Life Among the Jupiter Brains,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 5, no. 1 (1999) 351–384. 69. George Dvorsky, “Marquis De Condorcet, Enlightenment Prototranshumanist,” Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technology, January 26, 2008, http://ieet​.org​/index​.php​/IEET​/more​/dvorsky20080126 (accessed June 4, 2016). 70. Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), 32–33; and Edward K. Rand, Founders of the Middle Ages (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1928), 27–48.

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71. Lincoln Cannon, co., “Christian Authorities Teach Theosis,” New God Argument, https://new​-god​-argument​.com​/support​/christian​-authorities​-teach​-theosis​ .html (accessed June 4, 2016). 72. Johannes Alzog, F. J. Pabisch, and Thomas Sebastian Byrne, Manual of Universal Church History, Vol. 2 (Cincinnati: O.R. Clarke, 1874), 741; and Stephen Hawking, On the Shoulders of Giants (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2002), 2. 73. A. C. Crombie, Medieval and Early Modern Science (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), 33–34. 74. N. A. Berdyaev, “The Religion of Resusciative Resurrection,” N. A. Berdyaev, http://www​.berdyaev​.com​/berdiaev​/berd​_lib​/1915​_186​.html (accessed June 4, 2016). 75. Eric Steinhart, “Teilhard de Chardin and Transhumanism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 20, no. 1 (2008): 1–22. 76. FM-2030, Are You a Transhuman? (New York: Warner Books, 1989). 77. Max More, “Principles of Extropy 3.11,” Internet Archive: Wayback Machine, 2003, https://web​.archive​.org​/web​/20131015142449​/http:/​/extropy​.org​/ principles​.htm (accessed June 4, 2016). 78. “Transhumanist Declaration,” Humanity+, http://humanityplus​.org​/philosophy​/transhumanist​-declaration/ (accessed June 4, 2016). 79. “About,” Humanity+, http://humanityplus​ .org​ /about/ (accessed June 4, 2016). 80. “About,” Mormon Transhumanist Association, http://transfigurism​.org​/pages​ /about/ (accessed June 4, 2016). 81. Zoltan Istvan, “Some Atheists and Transhumanists are Asking: Should it be Illegal to Indoctrinate Kids With Religion?” Huffington Post, http://www​.huffingtonpost​ .com​/zoltan​-istvan​/some​-atheists​-and​-transhu​_b​_5814484​.html (accessed June 4, 2016). 82. “Who Are the IEET’s Audience?” Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technology, July 16, 2013, http://ieet​.org​/index​.php​/IEET​/more​/poll20130716 (accessed June 4, 2016). 83. “Executive Summary of the 2007 WTA Member Survey,” World Transhumanist Association, January 2008, http://www​.transhumanism​.org​/index​.php​ /WTA​/more​/2007survey/ (accessed June 4, 2016). 84. Cannon and West, “Theological Implications of the New God Argument.” 85. Giulio Prisco, “Yes, I Am a Believer,” Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technology, May 23, 2012, http://ieet​.org​/index​.php​/IEET​/more​/prisco20120523 (accessed June 4, 2016). 86. Tirosh-Samuelson, “Transhumanism as a Secularist Faith.” 87. James Hughes, “Millennial Tendencies in Responses to Apocalyptic Threats,” in Global Catastrophic Risks, edited by Nick Bostrom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 72–89. 88. Smith, “Secular Liturgies and the Prospects for a ‘Post-Secular’ Sociology of Religion.” 89. “Moore’s Law and Intel Innovation,” Intel, http://www​.intel​.com​/content​/ www​/us​/en​/history​/museum​-gordon​-moore​-law​.html (accessed June 4, 2016).

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90. Katherine Noyes, “The Quantum Era has Begun, this CEO Says,” PC World, June 4, 2016, http://www​.pcworld​.com​/article​/3079086​/cios​-need​-to​-start​-planning​ -for​-quantum​-computing​-this​-ceo​-says​.html (accessed June 4, 2016). 91. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, 136. 92. Genesis 1:1; Moses 2:1; Abraham 4:1; Moses 1:3–4, 35; Abraham 3:22–23; and Smith, Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, 354. 93. Genesis 1:2, Moses 2:2, Abraham 4:2, and 2 Nephi 2:11–12. 94. 1 Corinthians 6:15–20; and Smith, Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, 350. 95. Genesis 1:3, Moses 2:3, and Abraham 4:3. 96. Genesis 1:4, Moses 2:4, Abraham 4:4, and Alma 32:35. 97. Genesis 1:5, Moses 2:5, and Abraham 4:5. 98. John 1:1–5 and Doctrines & Covenants 88:45–50. 99. Abraham 4:26. 100. Doctrines & Covenants 76:23–24 and Abraham 3:24–26. 101. Genesis 1:24–31, Moses 2:20–31, Abraham 4:20–31, and Moses 4:2. 102. Doctrines & Covenants 76:25–27 and Abraham 3:27. 103. Doctrines & Covenants 29:36 and Moses 4:1. 104. Revelation 12:7, Moses 4:3–4, and Abraham 3:28. 105. Abraham 4:18. 106. Genesis 1:31, Moses 2:31, and Abraham 4:21. 107. Ephesians 1:10; Doctrines & Covenants 76:81; and Kevin Barney, “The Etymology of ‘Telestial,’” By Common Consent, January 27, 2010, http://bycommonconsent​.com​/2010​/01​/27​/the​-etymology​-of​-telestial/ (accessed June 4, 2016). 108. Doctrines & Covenants 121:33. 109. Ibid., 121:26–32. 110. Ibid., 88:73–80. 111. Mark 16:15. 112. Matthew 10:8. 113. Alice Park, “Stem Cells Allow Nearly Blind Patients to See,” Time, October 14, 2014, http://time​.com​/3507094​/stem​-cells​-eyesight/ (accessed June 4, 2016). 114. John Hewitt, “Paralyzed Man Walks again After Surgeons Transplant Cells from his Nose to his Spine,” Extremetech, October 22, 2014, http://www​.extremetech​ .com​/extreme​/192548​-paralyzed​-man​-walks​-again​-after​-surgeons​-transplant​-cells​ -from​-his​-nose​-to​-his​-spine (accessed June 4, 2016). 115. Macrina Cooper-White, “See The Amazing Moment When A Deaf Person Hears For The First Time,” Huffington Post, February 10, 2015, http://www​.huffingtonpost​.com​/2015​/02​/10​/people​-hear​-for​-first​-time​-video​_n​_6646594​.html (accessed June 4, 2016). 116. Jacob 2:19 and Mosiah 4:26. 117. Doctrines & Covenants 128:6–9. 118. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, 206. 119. Articles of Faith 1:10. 120. Moses 1:38. 121. 3 Nephi 28.

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122. Doctrines & Covenants 88:33. 123. Ibid., 14:3–4. 124. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, 226. 125. Doctrines & Covenants 42: 34, 55; and 2 Nephi 26:30–31. 126. 2 Nephi 9:10, 19, 26. 127. Doctrines & Covenants 78:6. 128. Smith, Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, 202. 129. Doctrines & Covenants 136. 130. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, 259. 131. Doctrines & Covenants 76: 98, 109. 132. Smith, Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, 170. 133. 1 Corinthians 15:51–55. 134. Doctrines & Covenants 128:22. 135. Brigham Young in Wilford Woodruff’s Journal, 3, by Wilford Woodruff, edited by Scott Kenney (Utah: Signature Books, 1985), 323–24. 136. Doctrines & Covenants 77: 1–4. 137. Ibid., 76: 91 and Articles of Faith 1: 10. 138. Doctrines & Covenants 1: 24. 139. 1 John 3: 2. 140. John 8: 12, Mosiah 16: 9, 3 Nephi 11: 11, and Doctrines & Covenants 88: 7–13. 141. John 17: 20–23. 142. Doctrines & Covenants 101: 26–34. 143. Ibid., 43: 31. 144. Ibid., 88: 25–26. 145. Ibid., 130: 9–11. 146. Cannon and West, “Theological Implications of the New God Argument.” 147. Ferdinand Schiller, Studies in Humanism (London: Macmillan, 1907), 430; and James, 26. 148. “Executive Summary of the 2007 WTA Member Survey.” 149. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Penguin Books, 2011). 150. Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 151. Nick Bostrom, “Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?” The Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 211 (2003): 243–55.

Chapter 4

Pre-Original Buddhism and the Transhumanist Imperative Michael LaTorra

Mental transformation is achieved by using the mind itself, for there is nothing else we can use to bring about such transformation. —His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama1

Why is life so hard? What can I do about death? How did I even get here in the first place? These questions, in one form or another, occur to everyone at some time in their lives. The answers that people settle on—if they settle on any at all—are largely determined by cues and expectations embedded in the surrounding society. Sometimes, however, a rare individual may not accept the socially scripted answers. He or she may set out to discover answers by direct experiential investigation and rational inquiry. Such was the case some 2,500 years ago with Siddhartha Gotama (Sanskrit: Gautama), who later came to be known as the Buddha. It is also the case now in the Transhumanist movement. Buddhism and Transhumanism both aim at reducing suffering and increasing happiness, but they aim to accomplish these goals by quite different means. The Eightfold Path taught by the Buddha entails living an ethical life, practicing methods of meditative concentration, and engaging forms of enquiry that cultivate wisdom.2 In contrast, the methodology of Transhumanism entails “an attempt to re-evaluate the entire human predicament as traditionally conceived” and “to transcend our biological limitations by means of technology.”3 Buddhism and Transhumanism both come in several varieties or persuasion. What characterizes both Buddhism and Transhumanism as a whole is that both are concerned with the development and deployment of practical efforts aimed at reducing suffering and increasing happiness, by degrees and even ultimately, or in absolute terms. The initial teaching of Buddhism in the 75

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form of the Four Noble Truths is that suffering can be completely eliminated, progressively and ultimately, by means of correct spiritual practice resulting in perfect liberation, the final entry into the deathless state of Nirvana. Many (but not all) Transhumanists also believe that a perfect state is attainable, but they conceive it as an indefinitely long (hopefully immortal) physical (or else virtual, “uploaded”) existence that features an ongoing series of experiences that are never less than pleasant and range upward in ever grander gradients of bliss.4 Most of those people who have chosen to combine Buddhism with Transhumanism (a small community, to be sure) are open to this prospect. However, some Buddhist Transhumanists consider mere blissseeking to be a lesser attainment, not the ultimate one. Attaining blissful states is, at best, a form of meliorism. These states, by their very nature, can only bring temporary (even if long-lived) satisfactions. In some sense then, attainment of these states is a form of satisficing, in which various alternatives are weighed until an acceptable balance is met. This discussion continues with a history of (and some speculations about) Buddhism, followed by a short history of the development of Transhumanism, including the formation of Buddhist Transhumanism, and concludes with a consideration of possible future developments in Buddhist Transhumanism. ORIGINAL BUDDHISM Gotama, who later became the Buddha, lived approximately 2,500 years ago during the sixth or fifth century BCE (scholars disagree on these dates). At that time, the Indian subcontinent was already home to many spiritual philosophies and disciplines, including meditation and yoga, and the multifaceted religion we now call Hinduism. Gotama had been well educated in his father’s royal (or perhaps merely chieftan’s) household. After Gotama renounced his inheritance, his family ties to his wife and young son, Gotama undertook a spiritual quest. Gotama learned and quickly mastered meditation and yoga techniques. After his Awakening (Bodhi; Enlightenment), the Buddha gave his teaching orally, relying on his hearers to remember it. This oral tradition was rendered into written form at least two centuries after the Buddha’s demise. So the possibility certainly exists that his teaching was reformulated, at first using mnemonic devices so that it could be more easily memorized, and later changed again to meet some other requirements that were believed by his followers to be appropriate for a written document. Nevertheless, in reading the oldest known texts translated from the Pali language which comprise the Theravada version of the Buddha dhamma/dharma [teaching], one cannot help but be struck by their logic and elegance. The Buddha was a philosopher of the

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highest type. Indeed, Schopenhauer believed that Kant, Plato, and the Buddha were the greatest philosophers in history up to his own time. With the Buddha’s very first teaching, he made a realist argument in four parts, which has come to be known as the Four Noble Truths: (1) There is suffering. (2) There is a reason (cause) for suffering. (3) There can be an end of suffering. (4) The teachings of the Buddha (the Noble Eightfold Path) lead to the end of suffering. Each of those four was later expanded upon with detailed arguments. Of interest to us here are the aspects of the Eightfold Path that involve disciplines of mind. The Buddha taught some forty different types of meditation, many of them highly specialized for limited application (e.g., meditating in funeral grounds so as to better appreciate the reality of death). The Buddhist meditation techniques, as originally given and as extended over the millennia by Buddhist practitioners in different traditions, are based on a science of the mind designed for transforming the individual practitioner. These transformational practices can be grouped in different ways. For our purposes, I shall divide them into two broad categories: moral transformation and transformation of awareness. This can be illustrated by considering the implications of the Noble Eightfold Path: (1) Right view: acceptance of the basic Buddhist teachings, such as the Four Noble Truths. (2) Right resolve: having a positive outlook and a mind free from lust, ill will, and cruelty. (3) Right speech: using speech in positive and productive ways. (4) Right action: keeping the Precepts (moral rules which vary in number in different schools of Buddhism, but always include at least the following five: [1] not to kill or injure living creatures; [2] not to take what has not been given; [3] to avoid sexual misconduct; [4] not to speak untruthfully; [5] not to take intoxicants). (5) Right livelihood: avoiding professions which harm others, such as arms manufacturing. (6) Right effort: directing the mind toward religious goals and wholesome states of mind. (7) Right mindfulness: being aware at all times of what one is doing, thinking, and feeling. (8) Right meditation: developing the focused attention required in order to enter the various states of meditation.5 The first five of the above are clearly behavioral or moral disciplines. Their development benefits society as well as the individual. And they are, to a very large extent, foundational requirements for the development of the latter

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three disciplines, which relate to awareness or consciousness. As we shall see shortly, Buddhist Transhumanism also cleaves into these two divisions. Before discussing that, however, it is necessary to understand the nature and effects of these different aspects of Buddhist practice. Buddhism, in common with other religions of India, asserts the doctrines of karma and rebirth. Your actions now will affect your present lifetime and your subsequent afterlife, just as your actions previous to this birth affected your current life circumstances and happenings. Leading a moral life (the first five parts of the Noble Eightfold Path) conduces to a better life now and to a better rebirth. However, the Buddha did not limit his teaching to that goal. A better rebirth is a relative improvement, a species of meliorism, but not the permanent end of suffering. To achieve the latter, one must put an end to rebirth entirely. The final three parts of the Noble Eightfold Path are the way to that end. This is explained by Bhikkhu Bodhi, a New Jersey-born American who became a Theravadan monk and has dedicated many decades to the task of completing the translation of the entire corpus of Pali language Buddhist texts into English. Bhikkhu Bodhi writes the following (in which I have taken the liberty of including the more familiar Sanskrit terms in brackets for the Pali): In Buddhist cosmology existence in every realm, being the product of a kamma [karma] with a finite potency, is necessarily impermanent. Beings take rebirth in accordance with their deeds, experience the good or bad results, and then, when the generative kamma has spent its force, they pass away to take rebirth elsewhere, as determined by still another kamma that has found the opportunity to ripen. Hence the torments of hell as well as the bliss of heaven, no matter how long they may last, are bound to pass. For this reason, the Buddha does not locate the final goal of his teaching anywhere in the conditioned world. He guides those who are still tender to aspire for a heavenly rebirth and teaches them the lines of conduct that conduce to the fulfillment of their aspirations. But for those whose faculties are mature and who can grasp the unsatisfactory nature of everything conditioned, he urges determined effort to put an end to wandering in samsara and to reach Nibbana [Nirvana], which transcends all planes of being.6

Improvement versus perfect transcendence. A better rebirth versus liberation from the burden of incarnation altogether. At this point, I must help guard against the typical horrified reaction of many Westerners to this vision, which seems to imply annihilation. The Buddha understood this error of interpretation and declared repeatedly (in the Pali Canon suttas, such as the Alagaddupama Sutta and the Yamaka Sutta) that he did not teach annihilation. He generally preferred to speak of the goal,

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the state of Nirvana, in terms of what it was not: not mortal, not suffering, and so on. The implication of the Buddha’s teaching, therefore, is that once all negatives are removed, the intrinsic positive would reveal itself. While this is logically consistent, many people—especially Westerners—feel an emotional revulsion at the thought. Our present society, and the three Abrahamic faiths originating in the Middle East, teach us that our reward for a life well lived is pleasures, now or in Heaven. We are taught by analogy that this wonderful afterlife is like a banquet, or a garden, or some other earthly delights. Or, if those pale, then beholding the face of God is upheld as the highest reward. Formless bliss does not feature in our imaginings.

PRE-ORIGINAL BUDDHISM What Did the Buddha Know and When Did He Know It? The Buddha never wrote anything that we know of. Everything we know about his life and teaching has come down to us in the form of transcriptions of an earlier oral tradition. Indeed, many scholars believe that the Buddha himself, although educated, was not literate.7 The traditional descriptions of the events surrounding the Buddha’s Enlightenment are not all of a piece, but rather are divided into, on the one hand, rather fanciful storytelling, and on the other, psychological and metaphysical analysis. Both types of Enlightenment narrative agree that, immediately after his Enlightenment, the Buddha did not immediately set out to teach what he had discovered. Instead, he remained in solitary contemplation for seven weeks. According to the traditional account, the Buddha did not believe anyone else could even understand what he had grasped. He is reported to have thought: This Dhamma that I have attained is deep, hard to see, hard to realize, peaceful, refined, beyond the scope of conjecture, subtle, to-be-experienced by the wise. But this generation delights in attachment, is excited by attachment, enjoys attachment. For a generation delighting in attachment, excited by attachment, enjoying attachment, this/that conditionality and dependent co-arising are hard to see. This state, too, is hard to see: the resolution of all fabrications, the relinquishment of all acquisitions, the ending of craving; dispassion; cessation; Unbinding. And if I were to teach the Dhamma and if others would not understand me, that would be tiresome for me, troublesome for me.8

The Buddha would have preferred to remain in solitude then, but for the subsequent appearance to him of the god Brahma Sahampati, who implored the Buddha to teach both men and gods. The Buddha relented, apparently

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agreeing to teach. However, the precise words the Buddha spoke to Brahma Sahampati bear close scrutiny: Open are the doors to the Deathless to those with ears. Let them show their conviction. Perceiving trouble, O Brahma, I did not tell people the refined, sublime Dhamma.9

The Buddha believed that he would encounter trouble if he attempted to teach the “refined, sublime Dhamma” that he had discovered and that he alone knew. It has been traditionally assumed that when the Buddha relented and agreed to teach, he then taught that very Dhamma. But did he really? Perhaps what the Buddha taught was a version of the Dhamma that was modified, adapted, and customized to the time and place and people whom he had agreed to teach. Let us call that teaching Original Buddhism. Let us then distinguish that adapted Dhamma from the “refined, sublime Dhamma” that the Buddha had discovered. Let us refer to the latter as Pre-Original Buddhism. By definition, we cannot know Pre-Original Buddhism since only the Buddha knew it. All we can do is make inferences and speculations. Our speculation may serve a useful purpose, however, because the very process of speculating is itself a form of liberation via free inquiry. We can use our imagination and intuition without constraint. Or, we could constrain our imagination by requiring our speculations to be limited by whatever assumptions we choose to make on the basis of what the Buddha later is purported to have said, or by any other limitations we choose to assume. The notion of Pre-Original Buddhism is like the plenum void out of which worlds of wonder may spring into existence. In modern physics, pairs of virtual subatomic particles are continually being created out of the quantum void and then (usually) recombining with one another and disappearing. The plenum void of Pre-Original Buddhism may serve similarly as a rich source of imaginative ideas. I will be considering some such ideas with respect to Transhumanism. First, let’s look at the historical development of Transhumanism. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSHUMANISM The source of the set of ideas generally known as Transhumanism is a somewhat contested question. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edition) the term first appeared in print in 1957, when biologist Julian Huxley

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used it: “The human species can . . . transcend itself . . . in its entirety, as humanity. We need a name for this belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve: man remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature.”10 The term was used again in this sense in the 1990s, when Max More used it in Extropy magazine, the periodical of the Extropy Institute, and on its ExI email listserv. In the same decade it was also used by Nick Bostrom and David Pearce in their online writings which led to the creation of the World Transhumanist Association. According to Bostrom, Transhumanism assumes that “we are about to transcend our biological limitations by means of technology,” however “Transhumanism is not a philosophy with a fixed set of dogmas,” but rather “what distinguishes Transhumanists, in addition to their broadly technophiliac values, is the sort of problems they explore.”11. PRE-ORIGINAL BUDDHISM MEETS TRANSHUMANISM Buddhism and Transhumanism have many shared goals. Both seek to improve the communal and individual circumstances of human life, to remove the causes of suffering, and to raise humanity to a higher state of being. The chosen means by which these goals might be attained were given anciently by the historical Buddha approximately 2,500 years ago, but only recently by our contemporary Transhumanists. The ancient Buddhist means were entirely human and non-technological. The means now being used, or proposed, by Transhumanists are mainly technological or at least based on information derived from recent scientific research. Although Buddhist tradition does not draw on science (as defined in Western culture) or include technology in its practices, there is nothing in the teachings of the Buddha that forbids the inclusion of science and technology in Buddhist practice. Some Buddhist practitioners would argue that that Buddhist notion of “skillful means” (upaya) ought to include science and technology where and when these are deemed appropriate, based on practical testing and fruitful results. By the same reasoning, some Transhumanists would argue that we have much to learn about human potential for living a happier, more balanced, more fulfilled life based on the techniques discovered and practiced to good effect by Buddhists over the millennia. Transhumanists and Buddhists generally propose using different functional means for achieving their goals of diminishing human suffering, or on the positive side, achieving human happiness. Transhumanists want to transform material conditions of human life and intervene directly into biological mechanisms, using science and technology. Buddhists want to change how human

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beings relate to their material conditions and to one another, using moral disciplines and transformative meditational and wisdom-inquiry practices. To put these differing views into perspective, consider the ancient Buddhist teaching aphorism (origin unknown) that says, “To walk more comfortably, it is better to cover one’s feet than to try to cover the whole earth.” By contrast, many Transhumanists would prefer to cover the earth in comfortable materials. And Buddhist Transhumanists would use a combination of both, providing shoes for everyone while at the same time making large swaths of the earth into benign and comfortable regions where people could safely go barefoot. One further distinction needs to be made with respect to each of these three communities of Buddhist, Transhumanist, and Buddhist Transhumanist. Each community has within it at least two sub-groups. These groups could be defined quantitatively as majority and minority. Most often in this discussion I will label them as outer (exoteric) and inner (esoteric or hidden). The outer group is always the larger and more easily identifiable of the two, since it takes a more straightforward approach to the goals of the community as a whole. The inner group is always smaller and more difficult to identify, because its goals overlap with those of the exoteric group, yet differ in some particulars and include some goals and functions that the larger, exoteric group often ignores or disdains. This distinction between outer and inner may even be found in the etymological roots of the terms “transhuman” and “transhumanism” as I will show in the following section. Still earlier than the first recorded appearance of these terms in print, they were used in spiritual circles by an obscure American philosopher and spiritual practitioner who deserves to be better known. WAS FRANKLIN MERRELL-WOLFF THE ORIGINAL BUDDHIST TRANSHUMANIST? Franklin Merrell-Wolff (1887–1985) independently invented the word “Transhumanism” in the 1930s. Born with the given name Franklin Wolff, he was a native Californian who attended Stanford University in the early years of the twentieth century. Wolff majored in mathematics and minored in philosophy and psychology. Eventually, he won a scholarship to Harvard University for one year of study. After his year was up, Wolff returned to Stanford where he taught mathematics. He was drafted during World War I and served in a non-combat role due to his status as a conscientious objector. After the war, Wolff had some substantial involvement with Sufi and Yoga groups during the 1920s. In 1928, Wolff co-founded his own organization,

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The Assembly of Man, with his wife, Sherifa Merrell. Up until that time, he had used his birth name of Franklin Wolff. But in order to show that he and his wife had co-equal roles in The Assembly of Man, they combined their surnames: Sherifa Merrell-Wolff and Franklin Merrell-Wolff. In 1929, The Assembly of Man built a rural ashram on the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, near Mount Whitney. By this time, Franklin Merrell-Wolff had been on a serious spiritual quest for twenty years. Then, on August 7, 1936, as he later wrote in his journal, “the ineffable transition came.”12 Beginning on that day, and continuing over the month that followed, Merrell-Wolff underwent an ever-deepening spiritual transformation known in the Eastern traditions as Bodhi (Awakening; Enlightenment). His realization of Nirvana, or Transcendental Consciousness, changed his point of view and his life. Merrell-Wolff used the term “Transhumanism” in the late 1930s in discussions, and in print beginning with the first edition of his book second book, which was composed in 1939 and privately circulated, but not published until thirty-four years later.13 Therefore, in this discussion of Buddhist Transhumanism, I will claim that this man, about whom very few Transhumanists or Buddhists (or Buddhist Transhumanists) have heard, is nevertheless the true intellectual and spiritual progenitor of a particular strain of Buddhist Transhumanism to which I and some others subscribe. MerrellWolff wrote: I am well aware that several philosophies affirm or imply that all consciousness is of necessity time conditioned. But since this is undemonstrable, it has only the value of arbitrary assertion, which is countered by simple denial. This affirmation or implication is incompatible with the basis realized or assumed here—whichever way it may be taken. At this point I simply deny the validity of the affirmation and assert that there is a Root Consciousness that is not time conditioned. It may be valid enough to assert that human consciousness qua human is always time conditioned, but that would amount merely to a partial definition of what is meant by human consciousness. In that case, the consciousness that is not time conditioned would be something that is transhuman or nonhuman. [Emphasis added] I am entirely willing to accept this view, but would add that it is in the power of man to transcend the limits of human consciousness and thus come to a more or less complete understanding of the factors that limit the range of human consciousness qua human. The term “human” would thus define a certain range in the scale of consciousness—something like an octave in the scale of electromagnetic waves. In that case, the present system implies that it is, in principle, possible for a conscious being to shift his field of consciousness up and down the scale. When such an entity is focused within the human octave it might be agreed to call him human, but something other than human

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when focused on other octaves. Logically, this is simply a matter of definition of terms, and I am more than willing to regard the human as merely a stage in consciousness, provided it is not asserted dogmatically that it is impossible for consciousness and self-identity to flow from stage to stage. On the basis of such a definition this philosophy would not be a contribution to Humanism but to Transhumanism. [Emphasis added]14

This definition of Transhumanism, while only partly overlapping with Bostrom’s definition given above, is consonant with Buddhist Transhumanism as I define it here.

CONCLUSION Buddhist Transhumanism is the confluence of two streams, one ancient and another modern. The ancient stream of teachings now known as Buddhism has flowed for ages from a timeless source located high in the mountains of Asian spirituality. The modern stream descends from a peak in Western culture that represents the improvement of human life by reason and material means. Buddhist Transhumanism results from the meeting of these two streams and the formation of a common river flowing to the single sea, the summum bonum. Today we stand far up river, closer to the point of confluence than to the sea. What lies between us and the sea is as yet unknown. There could be rapids and waterfalls along the way. The journey of Buddhist Transhumanism has barely begun.

NOTES 1. His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, “Understanding and Transforming the Mind,” Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground, ed., B. Alan Wallace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) 91–106, at 97. 2. Bhikkhu Bodhi, “The Noble Eightfold Path: The Way to the End of Suffering,” http://www​.accesstoinsight​.org​/lib​/authors​/bodhi​/waytoend​.html. 3. Nick Bostrom, “What is Transhumanism?,” http://www​.nickbostrom​.com​/old​/ transhumanism​.html. 4. David Pearce, “The Hedonistic Imperative,” http://www​.hedweb​.com​/hedethic​ /tabconhi​.htm. 5. Damien Keown, A Dictionary of Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 6. Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2005), 48. 7. H. W. Schumann, The Historical Buddha (London: Arkana, 1989).

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8. Thanissaro Bhikkhu, “Samyutta Nikaya, SN 6, Ayacana Sutta,” http://www​ .accesstoinsight​.org​/tipitaka​/sn​/sn06​/sn06​.001​.than​.html. 9. Bhikkhu, “Samyutta Nikaya, SN 6, Ayacana Sutta.” 10. Julian Huxley, New Bottles for New Wine (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957). 11. Bostrom, “What is Transhumanism?” 12. Franklin Merrell-Wolff, Pathways through to Space (New York: Scribner, 1973) 122. 13. Franklin Merrell-Wolff, The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object (New York: Scribner, 1973). 14. Merrell-Wolff, Philosophy of Consciousness, 121–122 (emphasis added).

Chapter 5

Unitarian Universalists as Critical Transhumanists James Hughes

Since we became capable of abstract thought, human beings have been imagining transcendence and working to transcend themselves. We imagined having longer, healthier lives, free from hunger and war, possessing knowledge and magical abilities. Until 200 years ago we attempted to reach these goals with magical and mystical means. Since then, however, we have been increasingly achieving these goals with science and technology. Cultivating self-transcendence without reliance on the supernatural is the shared aim of both the secular transhumanist movement and Unitarian Universalist spirituality. More specifically, transhumanists seek to enhance human potential through technological innovations in genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics. Against the resistance of conservative religious forces in our society, transhumanists have secularized transcendence into a project of techno-enhancement. Unitarian Universalism is the most radical experiment in applying Enlightenment skepticism, individualism, and tolerance to spirituality in a congregational form, making them an ideal interlocutor for a religious dialogue about human enhancement. In particular, this chapter proposes that transhumanists and Unitarian Universalists would find mutual benefit in a dialogue around what liberal virtues are and how technology might enhance them, a project called “moral enhancement.” If virtues implicitly cherished by UUs—compassion, fairness, and individual freedom—can be enhanced with drugs, how should they be used? What effects will moral enhancement have on spirituality and on transhumanists’ benign neglect of moral character? Transhumanism (also known as Humanity Plus or H+) and Unitarian Universalism (also known as UU) should become partners in the human advance toward a freer, fairer, and more compassionate world. 87

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At a minimum, I relish a dialogue between Unitarian Universalists with transhumanists. At maximum, I want more. I believe Unitarian Universalists could bring their liberal and egalitarian spirituality to strengthen the progressive wing of transhumanist vision. BACKGROUND: THE ENLIGHTENMENT SIEVE European Enlightenment thinkers started challenging religious orthodoxy three or more centuries ago. Whether as religious modernizers, Deists, or atheists, Enlightenment thinkers have advanced materialism, skepticism, empiricism, and individual freedom in judgment as ways to knowledge that are superior to religious authority and dogma. In the last 200 years, new liberal theologies and denominations have emerged that selectively embrace modern scientific realities and Enlightenment values of democracy. Nearly all faith traditions have embraced medicine as at least permitted, and sometimes as a compassionate obligation, with anti-medicine sects such as the Christian Scientists as notable exceptions. Some theologians have embraced evolution and modern cosmology as consistent with a more flexible interpretation of doctrine. But few religious traditions have made sufficient accommodations with the Enlightenment to be comfortable with the radical transformations that will come from human enhancement, genetic engineering, and neurotechnology. One reason that the religious response to enhancement has been mostly hostile is that the religious rightly recognize that transhumanism draws from spiritual aspirations while offering a materialist soteriology. Spiritual thirsts are quenched with materialist nourishment. But this division between the religious and secular is a modern imposition. Our pre-Enlightenment ancestors pursued transcendence with whatever technologies and sciences they could, without a science/religion curtain. We used dances and chants, sweat lodges and fasts, fermented berries and bitter mushrooms, all to scramble our routine habits of perception and open a door to transcendence. Since the invention of symbolic culture we have been praying, making offerings, and conducting magical rituals, in search of healing, eternal youth, transcendent knowledge, and the powers of flight and transformation. The oldest surviving written text, the Gilgamesh saga from ancient Sumeria, is about a man searching for a way to stay young forever. Our religious traditions are full of visions of better worlds to come, sometimes heavens, and sometimes a better world here, a New Zion where people are perfected, ennobled, long lived, and blessed. These are our ancient hopes and dreams, the Yin waiting for the Yang of modernity and the European Enlightenment for fulfillment.

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People who are enthusiastic about a transhumanist future are still a small part of the Western public, and they are generally secular. So, enhancement enthusiasts have given little attention to making a religious case for posthuman options, and the theological discussion of human enhancement has been small and mostly negative.1 This is unfortunate since some of the problems posed by radical transformation of the body and mind can be informed by religious traditions and their secular philosophical analogues. Likewise the religious could benefit from a more measured approach to human enhancement since it suggests answers to many ancient religious problems, such as how to control of deviant sentiments and behaviors, and overcome congenital limitations in living up to their understanding of the good. The two religious traditions I have been part of, Unitarian Universalism and Western Buddhism, are among the most open to Enlightenment empiricism and techno-optimism. But neither has begun grappling with the posthuman challenge even to the limited extent that the Christian Right has. I have addressed the compatibility of Buddhism with transhumanism elsewhere (Hughes, 2018). This chapter is a provocation aimed at the extremely diverse Unitarian Universalist community to begin to address this imminent future. Of course, the Unitarians and Universalists have a long history predating the Enlightenment. The early Unitarian heretics rejected the confounding Trinitarian doctrine of Christ’s divinity, before and after the Council of Nicaea, while heretical Universalists insisted that Christ’s sacrifice saved us all from eternal hell despite our sins. But with Enlightenment religious tolerance and pluralism in Europe and the United States these doctrines became popular among free thinkers, and then established strongholds in New England. Mingling with transcendentalism and ecumenism in the nineteenth century, both Unitarians and Universalists attracted humanists and atheists, which led eventually, in the twentieth century, to the final abandonment of their Christian identity. The two churches—the Unitarians and Universalists—merged in the 1960s. Today Unitarian Universalism is an ongoing effort to support spiritual self-definition, bounded by Enlightenment individualism, democracy and humanist rationalism, winnowing the world’s wisdom traditions from their pre-modern baggage. Although small, with a thousand UU congregations and half a million members, UUs in North America are disproportionately influential because they are among the most educated and affluent of denominations. With subgroups within the UU churches pursuing Buddhist, pagan, humanist, and Christian spiritualities, they are also uniquely situated to spiritually engage with the challenges of the posthuman in a way unbound by doctrine and dogma. This background uniquely prepares UUs for a mutually enriching dialogue with transhumanism.

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H+ and UUism are close cousins in the Enlightenment family tree. The European Enlightenment gave the world a systematic understanding of the natural and social world, and the technological means to achieve our dreams. UUs accept that spirituality should start from scientific materialism, while transhumanists propose pushing scientific materialism to transcendence. The Enlightenment gave us the idea that social relations should be based on justice and deliberation, and a vision of individual liberty free of natural law and divine authority. The UUs adopted congregational governance and a radical interpretation of personal liberty including complete doctrinal tolerance. Likewise the transhumanists are radical advocates of liberal individualism. Unlike many faiths, UUs do not see a bright shining line drawn by God around our genitals, our genomes, or our governments, proscribing the limits of our creativity. UUs agree with the transhumanists that, as the humanist Julian Huxley said when he first coined the term transhumanism in the 1950s, we are a species that can transcend itself. EVOLUTION, HUMANISM, AND EUGENICS Just as they share intellectual tributaries, both transhumanists and UUs have been washed over some of the same historical cataracts. Both traditions were intertwined with social reform in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from the abolition of slavery and utopian communalism, to socialism and Progressivism. When Darwinism and genetics entered the public consciousness in the late nineteenth century, biblical literalism was shattered. Unitarians and Universalists began to drift from their Christian roots toward secular humanism and became more open to the new eugenical ideas of human improvement. Proposing to improve society through family planning, at their most benign, eugenicists offered a scientific project more appealing than moral exhortation. “At the end of the nineteenth century, many liberals saw hope in the new science of eugenics as it embodied a kind of evolutionary optimism. Many believed that the births of stronger, smarter, and even more attractive babies would signal the coming salvation of the world. In the ensuing decades prominent religious liberals became enthusiasts for eugenics.”2 This slow road to human enhancement through selective breeding would take multiple generations, but evolution and social ills would soon be under human control. While some American denominations resisted eugenic explanations for illness and sin, and opposed family planning and contraception as unbiblical, the rapidly modernizing Unitarians and Universalists were open both to the ideas that illness and bad behavior were the result of heredity, and

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that promoting family planning among immigrants, the poor, and minorities would be good for them and society. In 1910, the American Unitarian Association re-published the eugenics tract The Blood of the Nation,3 written by popular writer and speaker David Starr Jordan, the president of Stanford University. Unitarian minister John Haynes Holmes helped organize a Eugenics Committee for “Liberal Ministers” in New York, encouraging them to only perform marriages if the offspring would be eugenically fit.4 Unitarian Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, with backing from Unitarian Justice William Howard Taft, penned the infamous 1924 Carrie Buck decision (“Three generations of imbeciles are enough”) supporting eugenic sterilization. Universalists were likewise attracted to eugenics, adopting a statement in 1917 that “we want to safeguard marriage so that every child shall be born with a sound physical, mental, and moral heritage.”5 Both Unitarian and Universalist ministers participated in the sermon contests promoted by the American Eugenics Society in the 1920s. Before World War II the new science of heredity struggled to cleanse itself of the biases brought in by eugenics. But after the genocide of Nazi race hygiene, this authoritarian, racist, classist, misogynist eugenics was soundly rejected in the West (although the resurgence of neo-fascism may give it another life). While twenty-first-century-transhumanists are almost all hostile to any effort to use state power to control reproduction, their eugenicist forebears were also often attracted to eugenics for some of the same reasons that the liberal religious were. When British genetics pioneer and Marxist agitator J. B. S. Haldane championed extra-uterine gestation and genetic engineering in 1923, he had flirted with eugenics, but he rejected it as reactionary next to the project of the Marxist New Man. His friend and fellow biologist Julian Huxley was involved with eugenics through the 1930s, linking the project to social reform, the legalization of birth control, abortion, assisted suicide, and homosexuality. After World War II, Julian Huxley shifted to promote a “world evolutionary humanism,” which became his mission statement when he became the director of UNESCO. Julian Huxley worked with like-minded thinkers throughout the 1950s to develop and promote the idea that human beings should use genetics and medicine to take control of evolution, an idea that he labeled “transhumanism.” “Human life . . . could be transcended by a state of existence based on the illumination of knowledge and comprehension. . . . The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself . . . in its entirety, as humanity. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve: man remaining man, but transcending himself.”6 But Julian Huxley and JBS Haldane’s program of biological engineering also inspired horror in Julian’s brother Aldous, who wrote his Brave

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New World in response. Religious conservatives added eugenics as a black mark proving the disaster of ungodly science. Stalinism and fascism led to a postmodern suspicion that secular millennialism, and programs proposing to engineer a better human future like genetic engineering, had an inevitable totalitarian trajectory. The atom bomb, eco-destruction, thalidomide, and traffic jams, all contributed to a new suspicion of technology among progressives and humanists. How could technologies born of profit-driven corporations and a militaryindustrial complex, administered by men in lab coats seeking mastery over nature, ever be used to build a better world? The countercultural Left argued that it was better to return to compost toilets and bicycles, garden-grown food, and homeopathy. In the 1960s, Unitarian Universalism’s highly educated liberalism quickly absorbed the techno-skepticism of the counterculture, while bio-utopians found few friends on the Left or Right. POST–WORLD WAR II TECHNO-UTOPIANISM AND THE EMERGING TRANSHUMANISTS Nonetheless, while technoskepticism grew, and bio-utopianism labored under the weight of eugenics, techno-utopianism continued to percolate. The space program suggested that we might soon colonize other planets. The condom, pill, and penicillin ushered in a sexual revolution, and the counterculture discovered better living through chemistry. Around the corner would be flying cars, cures for cancer, and a computer in every house. The Left anticipated that automation would lead to a 30-hour workweek, and feminists celebrated artificial wombs to liberate women from patriarchy. The H+ movement as we now know it began to coalesce out of all these techno-enthusiasms. In the 1972 Man into Superman, the founder of the cryonics movement, Robert Ettinger, not only proposed freezing people for reanimation but also gender re-assignment, redesigned digestive tracts, bodies adapted to extreme climates, and a transition to what he termed “transhumanity.” In the 1970s New York, the futurist F. M. Esfandiary began publishing books proclaiming this the “transhuman era,” in which we are technologically and culturally transitioning from humans 1.0 to posthumanity. In the 1980s, these techno-utopian trends coalesced in California, especially in the techno-libertarian Silicon Valley culture that birthed the Internet. Early 1990s extropians and transhumanists began to prophecy the imminent arrival of greater than human intelligence, an event they called the Singularity.7 Once computers that could perform as many calculations as a human brain are on all our desks, which will happen in about fifteen years, they believe the emergence of self-aware superintelligence is inevitable.8

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To avoid the Terminator scenario, and ensure a good TechnoRapture, human beings would need to become as intelligent as our machines, with genes, drugs, and nanoneural implants. Instead of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in robots, deep brain implants would provide living humans with Intelligence Amplification (IA). Transhuman apotheosis is the only way to avoid being swept aside by our robotic children. The transhumanists argued that we need human enhancement now to avoid obsolescence. The most prominent prophet of the Singularity, inventor Ray Kurzweil, was raised as a Unitarian Universalist. But Kurzweil is more the exception; the links between humanists and progressives, on the one hand, and these techno-utopians on the other had grown distant. Not all transhumanists shared the often self-involved and anti-spiritual ethos of California libertarianism. European transhumanists tended to be much more interested in questions of regulated risks and social justice. In 1996, the World Transhumanist Association was founded in London in an effort to define a broader base for transhumanism, affirming the core idea of transcending the human condition, but broadening the political parameters to include progressive concerns. The founder and chair of the WTA was the Swedish philosopher, now Oxford professor, Nick Bostrom. When I directed the organization in the 2000s it had thousands of members and two dozen chapters around the world, from Toronto, Montreal, NYC, San Francisco, London, Berlin, and Moscow to Kampala, Nairobi, and Calcutta. While these transhumanists around the world were mostly secular or atheists, about a third profess spiritual beliefs from Christianity and Buddhism to pantheism and paganism. BIO-CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION TO TRANSHUMANISM Of course, transhumanist ideas of human enhancement met with stiff resistance from many quarters.9 Religious conservatives denounced transhuman ambitions as hubris, “playing god.” Bioethicists became alarmed at the prospects of ex vivo procreation, gene editing, cloning, and human enhancement. By 1998, the stem cell controversy—replete with embryo destruction—had begun. The Christian Right poured millions into conservative bioethics organizations to counter what they saw, correctly, as creeping transhumanism in liberal bioethics. The Vatican attacked transhumanism adding it to secular humanism and the gay agenda as harbingers of evil modernity. In 2001, President Bush appeased anxious religious conservatives by appointing a staunch opponent of human enhancement, University of Chicago’s Leon Kass, to chair the President’s Council on Bioethics.10 Kass

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in turn loaded the PCB with other opponents of stem cell cloning, reproductive technology, psychiatric drugs, and genetic engineering, such as Francis Fukuyama, author of the bio-conservative tract Our Posthuman Future. In 2003, the PCB issued its report calling for strict regulation and limitation of access to human enhancement and reproductive technologies. In 2004, Fukuyama proclaimed transhumanism as the most dangerous ideology in the world.11 Meanwhile on the Left, a bio-conservative and anti-transhumanist movement grew out of anti-technology deep ecologists, feminist opponents of reproductive medicine, leftist critics of corporate control of biotech, and radical disability rights activists. With the economic crisis of 2008 and now the global rise of theocratic and racist authoritarianism, the landscape is very different. The debates of the 2000s that seemed to portend a new biopolitics have been eclipsed by struggles to defend liberal and social democracy. But the rapid progress in genetic engineering, AI, IA, and human enhancement has continued. Both religious and seculars will be called upon to decide which technologies we will allow people to apply to themselves and their children. While prosthetic enhancement and radical life extension will be easily embraced, the most challenging questions will come from neurotechnologies that change personal identity or “human nature.” In the next section I will outline some of the issues posed by the emerging debate over moral enhancement which desperately needs engagement from open-minded, liberal religious such as the UUs. VIRTUES AND MORAL ENHANCEMENT The Protestants gave up the saints, those exemplars of virtue that the Roman Catholics had made into idols. But Protestants kept the virtues. The UUs went one step further—rejecting moralism and embracing radical individualism— and gave up the idea of virtue. The joke is that the rural Universalists believed God was too good to condemn people to eternal damnation, while the upper crust urban Unitarians believed they were too good to be condemned by God. Neither had much time for stodgy admonitions about moral character, at least by the mid-twentieth century. By virtue here I mean those qualities of mind and moral character that were thought to be the highest goal in life, the most excellent fulfillment of a life well lived, and which also led to the happiness of ourselves and others. A model of virtues and moral perfectibility is central to ancient philosophy and to most religions. In Aristotle’s philosophy there were about two dozen virtues, including things like generosity, honesty, and intelligence, which he believed led to a wise form of contentment. The Catholics adopted Aristotle and crafted their virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, courage, faith, hope, and charity.

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Hinduism and Buddhism have lists of virtues which were embodied by their saints, qualities such as energy, resolution, equanimity, and penetrating insight. Cultivating moral character (ren) is the central idea of Confucian philosophy. But UUs are largely mute on virtue. Virtues such as chastity and faith represent the opposite of UU liberal religiosity. UUs reject narrow notions of sexual purity and righteous living to celebrate sexual diversity and champion reason over faith. Faith for UUs is actually a vice if it means giving up the “free and responsible search for truth and meaning.” At a deeper level UUs have grown skeptical of virtue and character because they gave up on supernatural perfection and accepted that religious and political heroes are all flawed human beings. No one person can embody all the virtues, and there are many ways to be good. But of course there are certain virtues implicit in the UU tradition, ones which survived the Enlightenment sieve, such as compassion and prudence. Other virtues implicitly endorsed by UUs are historically novel with the Enlightenment, such as open-mindedness, egalitarian fairness, and critical intelligence. Jon Haidt’s work on liberal and conservative moral intuitions illuminates why some ancient virtues became vices for liberal religion while we kept others. In Haidt’s model there are six moral intuitions that our Homo sapien brain inherited from our primate ancestors. The first three I believe we should continue to embrace: compassion, fairness, and individual freedom. The second three, however, are problematic to Enlightenment partisans: loyalty to the tribe, respect for authority, and the need to defend sanctity or moral purity. When conservatives make what they think are self-evident moral arguments based on those amygdala-dictated values, they sound like arguments for immorality to liberal UU ears. We post-Enlightenment creatures learn to tell our primate amygdalas to shut up about xenophobia, respect for patriarchy, deference to our betters, and the sanctity of families and flags. Instead we champion compassion and fairness, skepticism and individual freedom. Liberals value universalism over tribal and national loyalty, individual autonomy over respect for authority, and are more likely to be open to finding the sacred in the direct experience of transcending mystery and wonder, rather than by fetishizing specific objects and rituals. Until UUs embrace this liberal version of moral character implicit in their tradition, their attempt to distill ancient wisdom will remain shallow. If we take the ancients seriously, we learn that practicing virtue is the basis for finding wisdom and grace in life, but the UU tradition struggles to succor people seeking lessons on how to be good.12 As is also all too evident today, the liberal democracy that UUs hold dear requires that citizens uphold liberal virtues. Liberal citizens have to be willing

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to pay taxes and bear other obligations of citizenship. The liberal citizen needs a self-critical humility about her own beliefs, a moderate self-restraint in the pursuit of her own values, a commitment to informed debate, a willingness to respect the rule of law and the democratic process, and the wisdom to know when conscience requires civil disobedience or rebellion. Without these virtues the institutions of liberal democracy don’t work. Today a torrent of research has demonstrated that our capacity for these virtues is partly determined by our inherited biology, and that virtues can be strengthened, or at least vices suppressed, by drugs and devices. Some even propose that human virtues be enhanced with genetic engineering.13 While the eugenicists made tragic mistakes in falsely attributing criminality to genetics, and prescribing birth control and sterilization as a means to improve the public’s moral character, today the field of moral enhancement is asking how we might put the tools of biological moral uplift under each individual’s control. Whether through drugs, software, genetic engineering, both UUs and H+ers have an investment in helping moral enhancement avoid the disastrous authoritarian applications that we have suffered in the past, from curing female hysteria with surgery to curing dissidence with “Soviet psychiatry.” While UUs have implicit ideas of character that need to be made explicit, the transhumanists are generally loathed to propose ideas of superior character. Despite the terrifying possibilities of radical self-modification, few transhumanists are willing to be explicit about what constitutes enhancement rather than diminishment. The bioethicists engaged in the moral enhancement debate are of little help in this regard. Some bioethicists reject the possibility of moral enhancement, while others advocate jacking up emotive empathy with the cuddle hormone oxytocin or improving moral cognition through cognitive enhancement. The bioethicists and transhumanists contemplating and promoting technologies of radical personality engineering need to grapple with the virtue traditions as urgently as the UUs. A dialogue between UUs and transhumanists around moral enhancement would be mutually beneficial. UUS IN DIALOGUE WITH THE TRANSHUMAN PROJECT Clearly there are and will be Unitarian Universalists on both sides of the transhumanist/bio-conservative dialogue. Many UUs feel an initial sympathy with the bio-conservative critique because of concerns with equity, safety, and the commodification of the body. But as these biopolitical issues emerge with increasing frequency, it seems likely that UUs will be more inclined to side with technological self-determination, with the free and responsible use of these technologies in a free society. But in the end, UUs are likely to

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reject knee-jerk, yuck factor denunciations of enhancement, and illiberal bans on how we modify our bodies and brains. That’s why UUs were quick to embrace sexual freedom and gender nonconformity, instead of agreeing that that just isn’t the way people are supposed to do it. UUs, seeking the inherent worth of all beings in the interdependent web, are also unlikely to affirm the central dogma of the bio-conservatives— human-racism or anthropocentrism—a belief that Homo sapiens are the only animals with moral significance, and its corollary that all Homo sapiens are full citizens from conception to heart death. Like white supremacists before them, bio-conservatives believe social solidarity is founded on biological similarity, and that it will be impossible for animals, humans, machine minds, and posthumans to live together in mutual respect. Bio-conservatives believe that acknowledging our continuity with animals and giving them rights degrades respect for human beings. In contrast to bio-conservatives, both H+ers and UUs look for the value of life in beings’ capacity for thought and feeling. Focusing on the subjective being in each of us, we may then recognize it by looking back at us from the eyes of great apes, posthumans, and even machines. CONCLUSION: UUS AS CRITICAL TRANSHUMANISTS In this chapter I have argued that we Homo sapiens enjoy a thirst for selftranscendence that is acknowledged and shared by both transhumanists and Unitarian Universalists. Whereas transhumanists aspire to transcendence through individual adoption of human enhancing technologies, UUs encourage transcendence through the critical, selective construction of personal spiritualities. Even though conservative religious bioethicists reject emerging technologies, liberal bioethicists should find good reason to partner with transhumanist ambitions to transform the human condition. Even more, within the H+ camp the UUs could offer critical complementarity. Unitarian Universalists are in the opportune position to be interlocutors between faith and science, between spirituality and techno-transcendence, between liberal religion and technological advance. One area in which both UUs and transhumanists could especially benefit from dialogue is in reimagining virtue. Our potential ability to technologically enhance moral sentiments and behavior has made defining a liberal, and yet bounded, concept of the good life urgent for both UUs and the human enhancement movement. While UUs will have much in common with transhumanists, UUs also will bring welcome concerns to transhumanist biopolitics: concerns about equal access to the technological benefits of technology and their effects on the lives of the people who use them. UUs are committed to human freedom and

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universal justice. I expect UUs to be critical transhumanists, pushing technoutopians to remember current needs for clean water, adequate shelter, and economic security, all of which are preconditions for long, healthier lives, whether we ever get longevity pills or not. I also expect UUs to engage with, and be critical of, the embarrassing religious dimensions inherent in the transhumanist idea—at least embarrassing for the largely secular transhumanists—with its promises of immortality, magical abilities, and a coming TechnoRapture. These are themes to which UUs are uniquely tuned to identify, deconstruct, and harness. UUs, like transhumanists, see their spiritual mission as the creation of Heaven on Earth, but the UUs have 2,000 more years of experience thinking about how to go about it.

NOTES 1. For an overview of enhancement among the world’s religions, see Ted Peters, Estuardo Aguilar-Cordova, Cromwell Crawford, and Karen Lebacqz, “Religious Traditions and Genetic Enhancement,” in Altering Nature: Volume Two: Religion, Biotechnology, and Public Policy, edited by B. Andrew Lustig, Baruch A. Brody, and Gerald P. McKenny (Business Media B.V.: Springer Science, 2008), 109–159. 2. Mark Harris, “Scientific Salvation,” in Elite: Uncovering Classism in Unitarian Universalist History (Boston: Skinner House, 2011). https://www​.uua​.org​/ re​/tapestry​/adults​/river​/workshop3​/175715​.shtml. 3. David Starr Jordan, The Blood of the Nation: A Study of the Decay of Races through the Survival of the Unfit (American Unitarian Association, 1910). 4. Christine Rosen, Preaching Eugenics: Religious Leaders and the American Eugenics Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 58–59. 5. Mark Harris, “Scientific Salvation,” in Elite: Uncovering Classism in Unitarian Universalist History (Boston: Skinner House, 2011). https://www​.uua​.org​/ re​/tapestry​/adults​/river​/workshop3​/175715​.shtml. 6. Julian Huxley, “Transhumanism,” in New Bottles for New Wine (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957), 1–17. 7. Regarding extropianism, extropy, in contrast to entropy, refers to a system’s capacity for growth based upon its functional order, intelligence, vitality, energy, and experience. Extropianism or extropism is a set of values oriented toward improving the human condition through technology that might someday bring immortality. 8. The “Singularity . . . is a point where our old models must be discarded and a new reality rules.” Vernor Vinge, “What is the Singularity,” (1992) https://mindstalk​ .net​/vinge​/vinge​-sing​.html (accessed November 26, 2018). 9. Here is an example. “The excesses of transhumanism with its picture of a new world order, in which medicine will be devoted to conquering mortality, overcoming ageing, vanquishing neurodegenerative diseases and enabling people to live to 600 or so years of age as healthy and fulfilled individuals, rightly repel Christians. . . .

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These extreme vistas represent a rerun of the science-as-saviour mentality.” D. Gareth Jones, “A Christian Perspective on Human Enhancement,” Science and Christian Belief 22:2 (2010) 14–16, at 14. 10. See The President’s Council on Bioethics, Monitoring Stem Cell Research: A Report of the President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004); Leon R. Kass, Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge of Bioethics (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002). 11. Francis Fukuyama, “Transhumanism: The World’s Most Dangerous Idea,” Foreign Policy 144 (2004) 42–43. 12. To be fair, in 2012, the UUA did publish Jessica York’s curriculum on virtues for teens, “Virtue Ethics: An Ethical Development Program for High School Youth.” The twelve virtues York chose for the program are an excellent start: Decision Making, Moderation, Integrity, Respect, Fairness, Responsibility, Compassion, Humility, Generosity, Courage, Forgiveness, and Loyalty. 13. Mark Walker, “Genetic Engineering, Virtue-First Enhancement, and Deification in Neo-Irenaean Theodicy,” Theology and Science 16:3 (2018) 251–272, at 251.

Chapter 6

Perfecting Humanity in Confucianism and Transhumanism Heup Young Kim

PERFECTING HUMANITY IN CONFUCIANISM: CULTIVATING THE MIND-AND-HEART What Heaven imparts to human is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way [Dao]. Cultivating the Way is called education.1

Perfecting humanity is an immodest phrase for Confucianism that regards reverence and humility as the foundation of virtuous living.2 Nevertheless, it has explicit notions about the perfect humanity, as its most important project is to attain ideal personhood, namely, a profound person, great person, or Sage. Hence, Confucianism is also called Sage Learning. Similar to Christian theology, Confucian anthropology consists in a threefold structure of human states: original humanity (the mind of Dao), existential humanity (the human mind), and the restoration of original humanity (via self-cultivation).3 ORIGINAL HUMANITY: TIĀN MÌNG The Doctrine of the Mean states, “What Heaven imparts [Tiān mìng] to man is called human nature.”4 Just as the doctrine of imago Dei is the center of Christian theological anthropology, the teaching of Tiān mìng is the heart of Confucian anthropology. It explicitly states that humanity is relational to and inseparably intertwined with its transcendent ontological ground. Confucianism presupposes that human nature—original humanity (xìng)—as a heavenly endowment was perfect. This perfect condition includes four 101

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“constant characteristics” of the “Dao of Heaven,” namely, origination, flourishing, benefiting, and firmness.5 The school of Hsing-li, to which Korean Neo-Confucianism faithfully attached, identified original humanity with meta-cosmic principle (li). Since Heavenly endowment is identified with li, humanity is viewed in unity with Heaven through the same li. In correspondence to the four constant characteristics of the Dao of Heaven, Confucianism designates four attributes of original humanity as benevolence (rén), righteousness (yì), propriety (lǐ), and wisdom (zhī). Although rén, the cardinal virtue of Confucianism, is generally translated as benevolence, its etymological meaning is co-humanity (literally, two humans) or being-in-togetherness.6 Thus, mutuality and reciprocity is a consistent principle of Confucianism. By the endowment relation, a person could participate in the principle of Heaven, and in this context to be fully or perfectly human means recovering the whole human nature in accordance with the original meta-cosmic principle (li). EXISTENTIAL HUMANITY: THE HUMAN MIND Confucianism convinces that the locus of human’s transcendental relationship lies not in the mind (one of whose attributes is intelligence) alone, differentiated from the body, but in the mind-and-heart, a psychosomatic totality. The mind-and-heart (xīn) is a unique East Asian notion that transcends the body-and-soul dualism. The mind-and-heart as the master of the self is the nucleus of humanity, and cultivating the mind-and-heart that is ambivalent and vulnerable in a real-life situation was a central issue of Korean Neo-Confucianism.7 To explain this ambiguity, Neo-Confucianism made subtle distinctions between the mind of Dao and the human mind, before it is aroused and after it has been aroused, principle (li) and material force (or meta-cosmic energy; qì), and original humanity (xìng) and feelings (qíng). In the unity with the body, the mind-and-heart functions freely in the universe with no limitation of time and space. However, this (ontological) capacity before it is aroused can be disturbed after it has been aroused (existentially). The substance (tǐ) of the mind-and-heart before aroused is called original humanity, and its function (yòng) after aroused is recognized as feelings.8 Feelings are the function that issues from the substance of original humanity in the mind-and-heart.9 Since the mind-and-heart is also a unity of li and qì, the issued feelings consist in two kinds. One which exposes purely the li of original humanity is called the four beginnings, namely, commiseration, modesty and deference, shame and dislike, and approving and disapproving. The other in which the li of original humanity is perturbed by the physical

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disposition is called the seven feelings, namely, joy, anger, grief, fear, love, hate, and desire. Notably, the polarity of the human mind and the mind of Dao is essential. It uncovers the original source of the mind-and-heart and entails the foundation of human morality and the practice of self-cultivation. Whereas the human mind issues from the form of material force, the mind of Dao is based on the natural endowment, though they are mutually interrelated rather than divided. While the human mind consists in the impartiality of one’s body, the mind of Dao reveals the mandate of Heaven. The former can be united with the latter only after a hearing of the mandate of the latter. Nevertheless, since sages also possess the human mind, it must be distinguished between the human mind before fallen into evil and human desires that reveal the state of evil.10 RESTORATION OF ORIGINAL HUMANITY: SELF-CULTIVATION The basic methodology of sage learning is the “dwelling in the mindfulness (kyŏng [jìng])” and the “investigating the principle (li).” The “investigating the principle” is to know and perceive li in everything and every event in one’s life. It means a realization of li that is immanent in things as their order and principle by the ability of the knowing and perceiving, a function of the mind-and-heart. The Great Learning suggests a specific method to investigate the principle of things, that is, the “investigation of things” and the “extension of knowledge.” The investigation of things is a process of learning in which investigating li in depth, the mind-and-heart grows to attain knowledge. Kyŏng, as the center of self-cultivation, is the nucleus by which the mindand-heart is regulated and converged. The “focusing on one thing without departing from it” bespeaks of the state when the mind-and-heart is so concentrated and attentive as to be fully mindful. In the polarity of the mind of Dao and the human mind, T’oegye summed up the Neo-Confucian method of self-cultivation in terms of the “blocking human desires and preserving Heavenly principle.” “All the matters that are involved in blocking human desires should be categorized on the side of the human mind, and all that pertains to preserving the principle of Heaven should be categorized on the side of the mind of the [D]ao.”11 The purpose of kyŏng lies in attaining harmoniously corresponding relationships with other people and Heaven in the practice of everyday life. This learning leads us finally to obtain sagehood in the (anthropocosmic) unity of Heaven and humanity, transcending the polarity of the mind of Dao and the human mind. From the Confucian perspective, hence, humans are not expansive conquerors of the universe, but interdependent co-spectators to witness the glorious cosmic drama of Dao or

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ecological keepers to harmonizing the wonderful trajectory of Heaven in this anthropocosmic theater. HUMAN PERFECTION IN TRANSHUMANISM: MANUFACTURING SUPERINTELLIGENCE We are the analog prelude to the digital main event.12 Nick Bostrom, a leader of the transhumanist movement, defined transhumanism as “the intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities.”13 He insisted that transhumanism is “an extension of humanism.” However, humanism here means first and foremost as an individual matter, as “Transhumanists place a high value on autonomy: the ability and right of individuals to plan and choose their own lives.” Furthermore, he emphasized, “Just as we use rational means to improve the human condition and the external world, we can also use such means to improve ourselves, the human organism. In doing so, we are not limited to traditional humanistic methods, such as education and cultural development. We can also use technological means that will eventually enable us to move beyond what some would think of as ‘human.’”14 Nevertheless, it is unclear what the human perfection in transhumanism really means, except naming the state as “posthuman.” “Transhuman” refers to a “transitional human” or “the earliest manifestation of new evolutionary being” in “an intermediary form between the human and the posthuman.”15 POSTHUMAN “Posthuman” is a hypothetical term still in construction. Bostrom identified it as “possible future beings whose basic capacities so radically exceed those of present humans as to be no longer unambiguously human by our current standards.” However, it seems to be at the stage of imagination: “posthuman persons . . . yearn to reach intellectual heights as far above any human genius . . . to be resistant to disease and impervious to aging; to have unlimited youth and vigor.” He mentions dealing with something related to the mind: “to exercise control over their own desires, moods, and mental states; to be able to avoid feeling tired, hateful, or irritated about petting things; to have an increased capacity for pleasure, love, artistic appreciation, and serenity; to experience novel states of consciousness that

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current human brains cannot access.” However, it does not mean to attain these states through internal self-cultivation of the mind (such as blocking selfish desires), but rather by external means such as medicines and technologies. “The changes required to make us posthuman are too profound to be achievable by merely altering some aspect of psychological theory or the way we think about ourselves. Radical modifications to our brains and bodies are needed.” However, transhumanism focuses on the functionally cognitive side. “Posthumans could be completely synthetic artificial intelligence, or they could be enhanced uploads, or they could . . . jettison their bodies altogether and live as information patterns on vast super-fast computer networks.”16 SUPERINTELLIGENCE The central goal for perfecting humanity in transhumanism is to acquire superintelligence. Bostrom described a superintelligent intellect as “one that has the capacity to radically outperform the best human brains in practically every field, including scientific creativity, general wisdom, and social skills.” He divided weak and strong superintelligences. A weak superintelligence refers to a faster (e.g., a thousand times) intellect “at an accelerated clock speed, such as by uploading it to a fast computer.” And a strong superintelligence designates “an intellect that is not only faster than a human brain but also smarter, in a qualitative sense.” Then, “creating superintelligences may the last invention that humans will ever need to make, since superintelligences could themselves take care of further scientific and technological development. They would do so more effectively than humans. Biological humanity would no longer be the smartest life form on the block.” Furthermore, “many transhumanists would like to become superintelligent themselves. This is obviously a long-term and uncertain goal, but it might be achievable either through uploading and subsequent enhancement or through the gradual augmentation of our biological brains, by means of future nootropics (cognitive enhancement drugs), cognitive techniques, IT tools (e.g., wearable computer, smart agents, information filtering systems, visualization software, etc.), neural-computer interfaces, or brain implants.”17 IMMORTALITY Another foremost goal is to extend life span and get freedom from aging and death. Transhumanists pave two roads to immortality, radical life extension (RLE) or cybernetic immortality. RLE offers embodied life extension, while

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cybernetic immortality offers disembodied intelligence. Both are attempts to create a future without dying. Nick Bostrom has declared, “Ideally, everybody should have the right to choose when and how to die—or not to die.” Rejecting a traditional prejudice that natural is good, he argued, “Changing nature for the better is a noble and glorious thing for humans to do.”18 Moreover, “something is natural or not is irrelevant to whether it is good or desirable.” Thus, “deathism” and death apologists that admit “dying of old age is a fine thing” are “dangerous, indeed fatal, since they teach hopelessness and encourage passivity.” He declared that “the transhumanist position on the ethics of death is crystal clear: death should be voluntary. This means that everybody should be free to extend their lives and to arrange for cryonic suspension of their deanimated bodies. It also means that voluntary euthanasia, under conditions of informed consent is a basic human right.”19 Furthermore, a transhumanist scientist said, “immortality is mathematical, not mystical.”20 UPLOADING As a paramount means for expediting posthumanity, transhumanism proposes “uploading” (or whole brain emulation), a “process of transferring and intellect from a biological brain to a computer.”21 Whole brain emulation is also known as cybernetic immortality. Bostrom summarized its advantages: • Uploads would not subject to biological senescence. • Back-up copies of uploads could be created regularly so that you could be rebooted if something bad happened. (Thus your life-span would be potentially be as long as the universe.) • You could potentially live much more economically as an upload since you wouldn’t need physical food, housing, transportation, etc. • If you were running on a fast computer, you would think faster than in a biological implementation. . . . You would thus get to experience more subjective time, and live more, during any given day. • You could travel at the speed of light as an information pattern, which could be convenient in the future age of large-scale space settlements. • Radical cognitive enhancements would likely be easier to implement in an upload than in an organic brain.22 SAGE OR A CYBORG? Both Confucianism and transhumanism envision perfected humanity, but their goals and means are very different. Confucianism clearly specifies

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the ideal person, as a complete embodiment of the mind of Dao (ontological morality), with a full recovery of the original humanity as the heavenly endowment (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom) by means of self-cultivation. However, it is unclear what exactly transhumanism visualizes the perfect humanity, except that they want to functionally go beyond humans’ biological limitations, including aging and death by aggressive use of science and technology. Calling it posthuman, they seek to become a mighty and amortal posthuman with superintelligence who can govern even the entire universe. In short, whereas Confucianism pursues the perfection of humanity in terms of virtue and morality (Sage), transhumanism chases the utmost enhancement of humanity in terms of intelligence and power (Cyborg). The ultimate goal of the posthuman vision seems to be to acquire an omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence, parallel to divine attributes in traditional Christian theologies. The final objective of transhumanism seems to be more than “playing God” in a Judea-Christian sense. Thus, the directions of perfecting humanity in Confucianism and transhumanism are entirely in the opposite: Whereas Confucianism aims at a profoundly virtuous human person through the cultivation of the mind to recover the ontological state of humanity, transhumanism targets at a powerful posthumanity with superintelligence daring a mechanical transformation (such as mind uploading into supercomputer) in accordance with the hopefully coming singularity to techno-divinization (apotheosis). In a nutshell, while the Confucian project is to return to the original humanity as it was endowed by Heaven (the ultimate ground of being), the transhuman project is to break the biological bondage of the present, fragile human condition to move to further evolutions with radical scientific and technological interventions. EXISTENTIAL HUMANITY, AGAIN From a Confucian point of view, transhumanism shows naïve anthropology, particularly in the analysis of existential humanity and the human mind. Among Transhumanist discourses, it is hard to find serious concerns on ambiguous and susceptible human desires and will what Christian theology calls concupiscence (in the sinful nature) and what Confucianism identifies as selfish desires (in the human mind). Taking the mind as a primary locus of self-cultivation, Confucianism rigorously investigates the complex dynamics of the human mind in relation to desires and will in association with delicate human feelings, not to mention the complicated relationship between li and qi, that disturb the mind away from the mind of Dao to become dysfunctional. However, transhumanism does not take seriously such ambiguities and

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vulnerabilities of the human mind but understands the mind functionally as intelligence even reducible to an information pattern. The human mind, more precisely the mind-and-heart in Confucianism, is, by and large, foreign to Western thought under the dominant legacy of a mind-and-body dualism. However, Confucianism in general and Korean Neo-Confucianism, in particular, were fully occupied with studies on this subject. Existentially, the human mind-and-heart is exceedingly vulnerable to selfish desires and so subject to serious scrutiny that should be exercised in real everyday life situations. Transhumanism may regard “the mind as immaculate-code, the body as inefficient hardware—able to accommodate limited hacks but probably destined for replacement.”23 From a Confucian point of view, however, a technologically engineered enhancement and mechanical transformation of humanity without rigorous self-cultivation is not only naïve ignorance about the dark side of humanity but also a most perilous idea (of a “small person” with the uncultivated mind) that could bring fatal disasters in the world. PERFECTING HUMANITY, AGAIN The transhumanist method for perfecting humanity is fundamentally technological in the hope of a posthuman transformation with superintelligence. Transhumanism shows no clear notion that the cultivation of the mind is a precondition for humans to pursue perfection as in Confucianism, but a confidence that it could be done through external means of medical and technical engineering of intelligence. For Confucianism, however, intelligence is only one attribute of humanity, which is epistemic and most susceptible. It so should be carefully examined and regulated by the right mind and the righteous will under the frame of reference of the prime virtue, benevolence (ren). Moreover, knowing and reasoning in Confucianism does not refer only to functional intelligence (or mathematical reasoning), but rather wisdom, an awakened and holistic knowing in accordance with the mind of Dao, capable of prudent judgment and with profound spiritual dimensions. Confucian wisdom does not mean merely an epistemic intelligence (or information) but an ontological knowledge in the unity of the transcendent ground of being. In transhumanism, it is hard to find an ontological ground for toward human perfection, beyond a techno-version of the Enlightenment’s optimistic belief in historical progress and the power of autonomous reason. However, humans’ experiences in the modern era since the Enlightenment, such as global warfare, ecological destructions, and bloody killings, manifest that the historical progress is rather suspicious and tragic and that the power of human reason is manipulated more often for the sake of evil purposes. Furthermore,

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modern history unveiled the dreadful realism of structural evil that is much more ruthless and formidable, even foretelling that the eschaton of the human race is near! Both Confucianism and those historical experiences caution that the transhumanist hope for a singularity of techno-human transcendence is based on a naïve understanding of human realities. Without awareness of and capabilities to dealing with the complexities of human evilness and structural wickedness, which are not just neurochemical, mathematical, digital, nor information, transhumanism would be “one of the most dangerous ideas which the West has ever produced.”24 Confucianism sees a human being as a network of relationships that should be expanded in ever-widening circles of relatedness: from self, through family and society, to the world. If a vital gateway to the posthuman goal for transhumanism is artificial intelligence, the gate to be authentically human for Confucianism is filial piety (virtue), the beginning of reverence and humility, and so a clue to achieve peace in the world through harmonious human relationship. So is ancestor veneration an indispensable ritual for Confucianism to practice filial piety, the beginning of moral living. With an excessive reliance on individual autonomy, from this perspective, transhumanism does violate a “tyranny of presence,” forgetting both descendants (the future) and ancestors (the past) and ignoring collective identities that entail collective immortality rather than an individual amortality.25 While transhumanism is extremely individualistic (as autonomy is a supreme value), Confucianism is meticulously communal in pursuit of benevolent living in propriety (as a family is the concrete starting point and genealogy is essential as a documented historical proof of such a collective living). Whereas transhumanism sees the human body as an imperfect thing (object) that must be further developed by advanced science and technologies, Confucianism regards it as an inseparable part of the human self (so mind-and-heart) to be fully human. Confucianism pursues in harmony with the body as given from Heaven through ancestors, whereas transhumanism to engineer and manipulate it as faulty hardware. In sum, ideal humans in Confucianism are prudent “players” or moral agents (sages) who humbly participate in the anthropocosmic drama of the Dao, while posthumans in the transhumanist vision are technical “managers” or cold conquerors who control this planet and conquest the universe, possibly to be homo dei. CONCLUSION Although perfecting humanity is a central theme of both Confucianism and transhumanism, their goals and methods are very different. Confucianism seeks recovery of ontological human goodness by the cultivation of the

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mind-and-heart and education (sage learning): Transhumanism wants to transcend natural human limitations to become a posthuman with superintelligence through a radical adaptation of science and technologies. Although transhumanists argue their position as “an extension of humanism,” it, in fact, denotes an “exclusive humanism” which Confucian scholars criticized as the root cause of all crises arising from the West since the Enlightenment. Whereas exclusive humanism “exalts the human species, placing it in a position of mastery of and domination over the universe” (a conquest paradigm), Confucianism advocates an “inclusive humanism” that “stresses the coordinating powers of humanity as the very reason for its existence” (a harmony paradigm). A Chinese American Confucian scholar stated: In this sense, humanism in the modern West is nothing more than a secular will for power or a striving for domination, with rationalistic science at its disposal. In fact, the fascination with power leads to a Faustian trade-off of knowledge and power (pleasure and self-glorification) for value and truth, a trade-off which can lead to the final destruction of the meaning of the human self and human freedom. . . . Humanism in this exclusive sense is a disguise for the individualistic entrepreneurship of modern man armed with science and technology as tools of conquest and devastation.26

Perhaps, transhumanism is a “smartest” (?) and most radical descendent of this exclusive humanism. The fundamental issue is, “what is to be human after all?” Bostrom argued, “The important thing is not to be human but to be humane.”27 From a Confucian point of view, however, it is meaningless to be functionally humane (yòng) without being a particular person (as a subject [tǐ]) at a specific context, struggling with seemingly ambiguous and unintelligent realities and so always in search of the way with original virtues (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom), keeping mindfulness (kyŏng), and blocking selfish desires. To be a humane human or a profound/virtuous person in an age of technology, further, we may need to hear Ted Peters’s proposal for a techno-ethics of “middle axioms” that sounds very Confucian (the Doctrine of Mean): “face the ambiguities, invoke wisdom [zhì], think prudently, and render the best judgment that finite considerations can produce.”28 More precisely, I propose a techno-dao, cultivating technology with the insights of Neo-Confucian dao (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom). NOTES 1. Chan Wing-tsit, trans., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 98.

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2. Like Christianity, Confucianism which has a longer history consists in diverse schools. For the sake of comparison, however, this short chapter does not deal with those complex subjects, nor make a distinction between Confucianism and NeoConfucianism (a Reformed Confucianism). And it focuses on the Neo-Confucian understanding of T’oegye Yi Hwang (1501–1570), a giant in the history of Korean (and East Asian) Confucianism. For an introduction to his life and thought, see Michael C. Kalton, trans., To Become a Sage: The Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning by Yi T’oegye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 3. For more on this subject, see Heup Young Kim, A Theology of Dao (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2017), 115–46. Also, idem, Wang Yang-ming and Karl Barth: A Confucian-Christian Dialogue (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996). 4. Chan, A Source Book, 98. 5. See Kalton, To Become a Sage, 66–69, 143–49. 6. Karl Barth also interpreted imago Dei in this way, based on Gen. 1:28. See Kim, Wang Yang-ming and Karl Barth, 43–46, 86–90, 158–60. 7. See Kalton, To Become Sage, 9–19. 8. For the relationship of tǐ (subject) and yòng (function), see ibid., 211–12. 9. For this view, see ibid., 119–21. 10. T’oegye chǒnsǒ [T’oegye’s Complete Works] (Seoul: Songgyungwan Taehakkyo, 1985), 39. 24; 40. 9. 11. Kalton, To Become a Sage, 169. 12. Tad Friends, “Superior Intelligence,” The New Yorker, May 14, 2018; https:// www​.newyorker​.com​/magazine​/2018​/05​/14​/how​-frightened​-should​-we​-be​-of​-ai, accessed on May 15, 2018. 13. Nick Bostrom, “Introduction—the Transhumanism FAQ: A General Introduction,” in Mercer and Derek F. Maher, eds., Transhumanism and the Body: The World Religions Speak (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 1. 14. Ibid., 1–2. 15. Ibid., 4. 16. Ibid., 3–4. 17. Ibid., 7–9. 18. Ibid., 12. 19. Ibid., 14–15. 20. Raffi Khatchadourian, “The Doomsday Invention: Will Artificial Intelligence bring Us Utopia or Destruction?” The New Yorker, November 23, 2015, 67. 21. Bostrom, “Introduction,” 9. 22. Ibid., 41. 23. Khatchadourian, “The Doomsday Invention,” 68. 24. Francis Fukuyama, “The World’s Most Dangerous Ideas: Transhumanism,” Foreign Policy 144 (2009): 42–43. For my initial reflection on transhumanism, see Heup Young Kim, “Cyborg, Sage, and Saint: Transhumanism seen from an East Asian Theological Setting,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, edited by Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 97–114.

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25. Brent Waters, “Flesh Made Data: The Posthuman Project in Light of the Incarnation,” ibid., 297–301. For my East Asian religious reflection on death and immortality with reference to transhumanism, see “Death and Immortality: Biological and East Asian Religious Reflections on Transhumanism,” Madang: Journal of Contextual Theology 28 (Dec. 2017): 17–25. 26. Cheng Chung-ying, “The Trinity of Cosmology, Ecology, and Ethics in the Confucian Personhood,” in Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans, edited by Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 213–14. Also, see Tu Wei-ming, “Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality,” ibid., 3–22. 27. Bostrom, “Introduction,” 13. 28. Ted Peters, “Perfect Humans or Trans-humans?” in Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Human Identity, edited by Ceila Deane-Drummond and Peter Manley Scott (London, New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 30. The Doctrine of Mean is one of Four Books, key Neo-Confucian texts. Wisdom is a cardinal Confucian virtue that enables prudent judgment.

Chapter 7

Why Christian Transhumanism? Micah Redding

It doesn’t take much digging to realize how deeply transhumanist thought is impacting popular culture. From the latest Netflix series, to the most recent celebrity interview, transhumanist ideas are slowly making their way into the mainstream. Even abstract philosophical discussions, such as the Simulation Argument and Roko’s Basilisk, have made their way from obscure transhumanist forums to being openly discussed by billionaire celebrities in the popular media.1,2,3 But this is just the tip of the iceberg. We now live in a world in which multiple private efforts exist to make humanity an interplanetary species, to eradicate aging, and to scan and interface directly with the human brain. These efforts are funded by some of society’s wealthiest individuals, supported by some of society’s most powerful companies, and driven by the visions emerging from the transhumanist community.4 To be good stewards of this new context, Christian innovators must engage the leading edges of scientific and technological thought in a conversation. This includes Transhumanism or H+. Why Christian transhumanism? Because it’s the unavoidable blessing of our twenty-first-century context. Christian Transhumanism is a conversation, first of all. This conversation could lead to an emerging theology of technology which frames technology as an outworking of the imago Dei, the divine image at work in the human species. The imago Dei defines the human species, at least in part, as God’s created co-creator. Further, I recommend that we explore how technology can participate in God’s redemptive purposes, to see technology’s profound significance for God’s eschatological future. This conversation allows Christians to advocate for positive, relational values within the transhumanist movement, and it invites Christians to re-evaluate and revitalize their own religious vision. 113

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WHAT DRIVES THESE TRANSHUMANIST VISIONS? Transhumanism can be defined as the ethical use of science and technology to transform the human condition.5 This working definition invites the obvious question: “Which ethic?” Or, more elaborately, “In what way?” “To what ends?” and “By which means?” To talk about transforming the human condition provokes questions about what it means to be human, what it has meant to be human, and what it should mean to be human. The transhumanist movement consists of numerous schools of thought, which answer these questions in a variety of ways. The scope of these answers stretches from the abolitionist project of philosopher David Pearce, who wants to use technology to alleviate the pain and suffering of the entire biosphere—through a variety of humanitarian and anthropocentric efforts— all the way to the radical egoism of those who want to elevate themselves at the expense of everyone else. H+ visions span vastly different ideas about economy, governance, and equity—along with vastly different ideas about what constitutes life, mind, and value. These kinds of ethical questions belong inescapably to the heart of transhumanist discourse. The history of transhumanism can be seen as the history of the attempt to formulate a workable ethic for efforts to transform the human condition through technology. What unites these diverse schools of thought is a proactive approach to envisioning and then advocating for a transformed future. This advocacy then shapes our technological imagination, which in turn drives investment, research, and technological development. Of course, these are precisely the kinds of questions that faith has been attempting to address for thousands of years. Astoundingly, people of faith are largely not involved in these conversations. Well, at least not yet. Why is that? Many in the transhumanist community have a narrow or antagonistic view of religion, and many in the religious world have a narrow or antagonistic view of transhumanism. On the one hand, the leading scientists and technological innovators show very little understanding of the billions of religious people in the world. And, on the other hand, in the world of religious tradition, there is often suspicion and even revulsion toward the materialism so often associated with scientific and technological thought. The lack of conversation between those advance science and technology with those representing the wisdom of our classic religious traditions means that the ethical homework needed in our context does not form the full range of human experience let alone the full history of religious ethical reflection. What is fearsome is that those arguably most involved in shaping the future of humanity do not understand people of faith.

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To me, that sounds like a recipe for an undesirable future. Christian Transhumanism is a response to this situation. It is an attempt to cultivate a conversation between the broad world of Christianity with the leading edges of scientific and technological thought. Importantly, it is an attempt to cultivate a positive conversation, in which Christians are able to offer something constructive—and not simply act as a negative or oppositional voice.6 As of yet, this remains an unpopular prospect—largely, I suspect, because it requires hard work and being willing to step outside of certain comfort zones. CHRISTIAN TRANSHUMANISM AS CONVERSATION To cultivate a constructive conversation requires entering into the conversation on its own terms. We cannot simply show up at the end of the process, offering a criticism or ethical warning from within our own value system or worldview. By that point, the conversation is already over. Instead, we must act as participants, first listening and then articulating our visions and values within the logic of the conversation itself. Let me stress: to be in conversation is to open our inherited Christian selfunderstanding to challenge and critique. Of the various models for relating science with faith, conversation relies on the dialogue or perhaps even the Creative Mutual Interaction models.7 We cannot work with the independence or two languages model, according to which there is no overlap between faith, on the one side, and science or technology, on the other side. We must reject Stephen Jay Gould’s hard line of “non-overlapping magisteria”8 that has traditionally been drawn between science and religion. We have to accept the possibility of criticism and be willing to allow that to change us. AN INCARNATIONAL MODEL OF ENGAGEMENT Christians might call this an incarnational model of engagement. As incarnational, this conversation is dialogue plus. The challenge of cultivating this conversation demands that we develop a better theology of technology. Only then will we be equipped to enter into the transhumanist conversation as a voice for positive values. At the same time, a theology of technology will necessarily challenge Christians who have unwittingly embraced escapist and destructive frameworks, to reject escapism and live up to what they profess to believe. At the first Christian Transhumanist Conference in August 2018, I described Christian Transhumanism as consisting of four primary things:

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1. A conversation between Christianity and the leading edges of scientific and technological thought. 2. An emerging theology of technology within the Christian tradition. 3. A voice for the importance of positive, relational values within the broader transhumanist project. 4. A positive religious vision calling Christians to serve on behalf of the world. I’ve described why I think this conversation is important. I’ll now describe the broad basis on which I think we can construct a theology of technology. Then, I’ll illustrate how Christian Transhumanists may advocate for positive values within the transhumanist movement and show how Christian Transhumanism may in turn challenge Christians to live more fully into what we say we believe. A THEOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY A theology of technology will necessarily be complex and multifaceted. It will have to involve the nature of what technology is, the many ways in which technology may be used and abused, and the ways in which technological change places new demands on us as individuals and societies. But that is beyond the scope of this work. Instead, I will give three biblical images from which the basic outlines of a theology of technology may be glimpsed. I’ll then reflect on how those images may speak to theological questions and concerns, and how they may relate to dialogue between Christians and transhumanists. We may call those images the Garden, the Ark, and the City. These will guide us through an examination of the origins of technology in the imago Dei, the uses of technology in God’s redemptive purposes, and the place of technology in humanity’s future. THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE IMAGE OF GOD The Bible opens with a stunning declaration: that humans are made in the image and likeness of God. Genesis starts by defining God as the one who creates and cultivates life, who rules over creation, and who takes delight in it. It describes God’s creative process as calling forth the potential of the physical world (“Let the land produce vegetation”), observing what is produced, naming it, categorizing it, shaping it, and blessing it.

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This culminates with God creating a being like himself—a being made in God’s image and likeness. This being is also called to create and cultivate life, to name and categorize creation, to call forth the potential of the physical world, to shape it, to take delight in it, and to bless it. From the beginning, this commission is universal. Humans are called to fill the earth and take charge and responsibility over it. Poignantly, Genesis 2 has God “taking humanity by the hand”—like a parent with a child—and helping them take the first few steps of this process. As a launching point, they are to name the animals, in imitation of a God who named the sky and sea. Then, they are to cultivate and keep the garden (words that imply the use of tools), in imitation of a God who caused the earth itself to spring forth with life. To name and categorize creation, to create new things, and to shape the earth into new life—these are descriptions of science and technology in their most embryonic forms. And they are right at the core of the biblical understanding of what it means to be made in the image of God. The “image of God,” of course, is one of the most debated topics in Christian thinking, so it is worth reflecting on here. Ted Peters identifies five models of the imago Dei: Rationality, Morality, Relationality, Created Co-creator, and Anticipatory (Proleptic).9 Along with the proleptic model which anticipates God’s future transformation of the creation, I believe the Created Co-creator, first introduced by theologian Philip Hefner, best undergirds a theology of technology. Human beings are God’s created co-creators whose purpose is to be the agency, acting in freedom, to birth the future that is most wholesome for the nature that has birthed us—the nature that is not only our own genetic heritage, but also the entire human community and the evolutionary and ecological reality in which and to which we belong. Exercising this agency is said to be God’s will for humans.10

In my estimation, much of this discussion has been clouded by artificially isolating aspects of the first chapter of Genesis, inadvertently robbing the phrase of its contextual and narrative significance. So let me propose a straightforward approach to the concept: The entire creation account should be read as an illustration of the image of God. We are first introduced to God as creator, and then shown God’s creative and relational character. Finally, humanity is introduced as God’s image and commissioned to act in the same way. This means the creation account itself functions as a philosophical and ethical vision of our identity as creative and relational beings. This appears to be how it was originally read. This is the rationale given in Exodus 20:8–11 for the practice of the Jewish Sabbath. The very structure of the “creation

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week” serves as a correlation between the creative process of God and the creative process of humanity. This reading also appears to have impacted scientific history. Francis Bacon formulated the scientific method in imitation of the creative process of God outlined in Genesis. In The New Atlantis, Bacon calls the scientific method the “six days work.”11 And this reading addresses some of the worst abuses. Rather than separating the “dominion mandate” from the instructions to create and cultivate life, or separating the affirmation of human dignity from the affirmation of the physical world, this reading holds them all together in one cohesive vision of the creative and relational character of God. When compared with the five models of the imago Dei, this reading is most closely aligned with the co-creator and proleptic models. The image of God defines humanity as a co-creator, called into partnership with God. This calling is inherently anticipatory, evoking a future role that is never fully attained within the biblical story itself. In full co-creative partnership with God, humanity is intended to rule over all things, creating and cultivating life, in imitation of God’s own process. That imitation in turn requires entering into a creative collaboration with the physical world—observing it, naming it, shaping it, and calling forth its own creative potential. The implications for a theology of technology are profound. Simply put, science and technology are an imitation of the creative process of God. THE ARK: TECHNOLOGY AND REDEMPTION When we understand that science and technology are not alien to our humanity, but a natural outgrowth of who we are, then we can begin to look for better ways of thinking about how technology can and should be used. A powerful illustration of these possibilities comes shortly after the creation account, when we are introduced to the story of Noah.12 According to the story, the violence of humanity had increased to unprecedented levels, threatening the human race’s ability to participate in the work of God. If humans couldn’t cultivate their own life, they certainly couldn’t participate with God in cultivating the life of the world. So God calls an end to the human experiment. But God notices Noah. Noah is a glimmer of light in this darkness. Noah’s name means “peace” and suggests that unlike a world devoted to violence, Noah was pursuing the healing and cultivation of the world around him. So God gives Noah a project. That project is what we call “Noah’s Ark,” and it is the largest technological project the ancient world could have

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imagined. As described by Genesis, it is over 450 feet long, and specified in exacting detail. Other ancient versions of this story seem to describe much smaller boats, but Genesis insists on a massive project for at least one reason: animals. It was not enough for Noah to save himself and his family. Not enough, even, for Noah to save the human race by insuring humans could repopulate the world. Noah’s primary job was to make sure that all the animals they knew of would survive this catastrophe. We might ask at this point, “Why couldn’t God have built the boat?” The answer from the text is straightforward. The primary need is not to save human life from a flood. The primary need is a renewed co-creative partnership between humanity and God, a renewal of humanity’s calling to create and cultivate life. This is why God calls Noah into partnership. Noah will build the Ark. God will bring the animals to Noah to be taken care of and protected, just as God had brought the animals to Adam for naming. When everyone is inside, God will shut the door and seal it closed, figuratively putting his “seal of approval” on the job. In metaphorical terms, God is reenacting what he did with humanity in their first moments. Creation is, in a sense, being reborn with Noah as the second Adam. And when Noah emerges from the Ark, God re-declares the commission given to humanity at the very beginning. And God blessed Noah and his sons, and said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth.” (Gen. 9:1)

We often overlook the role that Noah plays in the larger biblical story. Noah is the scripture’s first story of redemption. When God sets out to save the world, he doesn’t do it by acting unilaterally. God doesn’t build the boat and put all the animals on board himself. Instead, God calls a human into partnership. This human will be commissioned to care for and cultivate all life. This human will work with God to construct a giant piece of technology to save the world. This human will participate in God’s redemption, by willingly entering into partnership with God. From the human perspective, the world has been saved because some humans got in the boat and made it through a cataclysm. But from God’s perspective, the world has been saved because the partnership between God and humanity has been restored. This story is the overarching template for the whole biblical story of redemption. God sets out to save the world, by looking to renew his partnership with humanity. A human willingly enters into that partnership, taking on

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the original human responsibility to create and cultivate the life of the world. God uses that human’s creativity to enact salvation. This is the pattern of redemption we find in Christ himself. This brings us to one of the most contentious areas in Christian theology: the relationship between human and divine agency. This debate is usually expressed in terms of faith-versus-works or works-versus-grace. Transhumanists are sometimes accused of advocating a new version of salvation by works. This concern is exacerbated when secular transhumanists borrow Christian language, without a clear understanding of its context. Pushing back on the secular transhumanist presumption, Ted Peters insists that our final godlikeness can be grasped only as a gift of divine grace; it cannot be attained through human achievement genetically or technologically.13

Similarly, Ian Curran, writing in the Christian Century, states that while we may cooperate with God in God’s work of bringing about individual, social, and even planetary salvation, we are not the principal actors in the cosmic drama.14

The story of Noah may illuminate some of these issues. The salvation enacted through Noah is initiated by God, enabled by God, and worked out in partnership with God. It is at every step a matter of grace. And yet this grace does not remove human action. On the contrary, it is the very nature and character of God which insists on involving humans as participants in the work of redemption. Thus, the significance of faith. Noah is called by God to anticipate and prepare for a radically disruptive future. Noah must accept this calling, embracing his God-given role as co-creator made in the image of God. This is the heart of the salvation that occurs, which in turn finds manifestation in a reborn world. For Noah, to act in faith requires deep engagement with the material world, both in the means and ends of his technological project. The technology is not the source of salvation but the manifestation of it. One can imagine a secular critic reading Noah as an example of salvation solely through technology. One can imagine a religious critic insisting that Noah was wrong to rely on technology for salvation. Both of these would be misreadings. The secular critic is missing the presence of grace. But the religious critic may be making a bigger mistake: missing both the presence of grace and the necessity for faith. The correct reading of Noah is that every step is by grace through faith.

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Grace is God inviting humanity into partnership, and then working with the flawed efforts humans bring to the table, in order to enact redemption. Faith is humanity accepting this calling and willingly entering into partnership with God. This is the story of redemption—a story of God continually seeking to renew the partnership between God and humanity. And in the Bible’s first example of this, technology is right at the center. THE CITY: TECHNOLOGY AND THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN In the book of Revelation, at the end of the Bible, we see an image of the New Jerusalem descending from heaven to earth. Look! God’s dwelling place is now among the people, and he will dwell with them. They will be his people, and God himself will be with them and be their God. (Revelation 21:3)

This New Jerusalem is the image of a renewed co-creative partnership between God and humanity. The whole city is a temple—a collaboration between the human and divine—and not simply a temple, but the holiest part of the temple, the Most Holy Place where humans actually commune with God. Everything in it is both old and new, transformative, and yet continuous with the past. It evokes the twelve tribes of Israel, the twelve apostles, the Jewish high priests, and the Ark of the Covenant. It is a cube, like the holiest part of the temple, and yet it is radically expanded—tall enough to reach far beyond our planet’s stratosphere and large enough to cover the entirety of the ancient world. The city is open-ended. Everything good in the world, all the glory and honor of the nations, is continually brought into it. Everything that humanity creates becomes part of it; nothing valuable is left out. And nothing that the city produces is held back. The river of life and the tree of life spread outward, bringing life and healing to all creation. This city is the embodiment of the call of Abraham to bless all nations. It is an embodiment of the Most Holy Place, the Jewish temple, the dream of Jerusalem, the vision of Israel. It is the New Covenant and the bride of Christ. And it is the New Eden. Not a return to the past, to a small garden somewhere in the Middle East. Not a return to the childhood of our species, to a world without cities or technology or history. Not a garden—but a garden city. It is a technological superstructure bursting with organic life. Instead

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of opposition between humanity and God—or humanity, technology, and nature—it is the cooperative partnership of them all. This is the Bible’s ultimate vision for technology: taken up by God, redeemed, and made part of a future of expanding, vibrant life. But, we must ask: does God’s promised transformation constitute such a radical break with the past that no continuity connects the old creation with the new creation? Or, will God’s promised transformation include continuity, a modification of the present creation? Ideas such as prolepsis or created co-creator make sense only if there is some continuity between the present creation and God’s promised new creation. Theologians have been quick to emphasize the discontinuous nature of the Bible’s eschatological future. “Theologians have become critical of the future understood as simply an extension of the past,” says Celia DeanDrummond.15 What Dean-Drummond wants to protect here is the role of divine grace. Only by divine grace—not by human technological progress— can the present creation be redeemed. N. T. Wright stresses this point. “This is no smooth evolutionary transition, in which creation simply moves up another gear into a higher mode of life. This is traumatic . . . radical discontinuity.”16 Ironically, this may be an area of agreement with many transhumanists. Singularitarians like Ray Kurzweil insist that after the Singularity, the world will be radically and unpredictably different. They even attribute this discontinuity to a similar source: the disruptive presence of a nonhuman mind. Does the Singularity look like eschatological grace? For the present generation to reach the Singularity, the best minds must innovate and innovate to improve computing capacity, to bring superintelligence to birth. This requires continuity between the present and the future. Sometimes theologians insist on continuity as well. Wright goes on: This doesn’t mean . . . that God will wipe the slate clean and start again. If that were so, there would be no celebration, no conquest of death, no long preparation now at last complete.17 What you do in the present—by painting, preaching, singing, sewing, praying, teaching, building hospitals, digging wells, campaigning for justice, writing poems, caring for the needy, loving your neighbor as yourself—will last into God’s future.18

Might Wright’s picture of eschatological transformation cohere with that of the Singulatarians among the transhumanists? In fact, this continuity may be more essential to the theological agenda than transhumanist one. Transhumanists envision a set of potential eschatological futures. Christians insist that in the incarnation, the eschatological

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future has already been glimpsed and has become operational in our history. This anticipatory glimpse of the new creation from within the old creation is what we call prolepsis. Would the proleptic presence of the future within the present establish continuity between the new and old creations? Would the sovereignty of God’s grace be preserved with proleptic continuity? Even the assertion that Christianity has something meaningful to say about the future is a claim of continuity—a claim that the most critical things humanity needs to know have been available for the last 2,000 years. Within the biblical imagery, we may reasonably affirm both the continuity and discontinuity of our eschatological future. We may affirm the expectation of new creative action from God and also affirm that human technology is a significant and substantial part of that future. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF A THEOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY This overview is far from complete. We lack the space to reflect on stories such as the Tower of Babel, the construction of the Temple, and the life of the historical Jesus. A fuller account would explore the relationship between technology and the Eucharist, and how the cross itself may function as a “sword beaten into a plowshare.” Nevertheless, these three biblical images—Garden, Ark, and City—may be indicative of the shape of an emerging theology of technology. Technology is not a peripheral matter, not a side-story or temporary consideration. The relationship between humanity and technology is significant because the relationship between God, humanity, and the physical world is significant. POSITIVE, RELATIONAL VALUES IN THE PUBLIC CONVERSATION By no means should a Christian transhumanist simply bless everything that happens in H+ circles. One responsibility of the Christian transhumanist is to impart wholesome values into the public conversation. In 2013, Zoltan Istvan published a book entitled The Transhumanist Wager. It was a fictionalized account of his own life and imagined future, and right at the center of it, he proposed a philosophy he called TEF—“Teleological Egocentric Functionalism.”19 This philosophy consists of three simple propositions, which Istvan later proposed as an ethical system for himself, any future AI, and the world at large. They are as follows:

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1. A transhumanist must safeguard one’s own existence above all else. 2. A transhumanist must strive to achieve omnipotence as expediently as possible—so long as one’s actions do not conflict with the First Law. 3. A transhumanist must safeguard value in the universe—so long as one’s actions do not conflict with the First and Second Laws. This is, in short, a philosophy of radical egoism—selfishness raised to an unlimited power. There is something frightening irrational about such a philosophy. First of all, that you would ever publicize this philosophy seems self-defeating. Second, that you would wish an AI to adopt this philosophy seems selfdestructive. Third, that you would believe this to be a desirable future for yourself seems nihilistic. Istvan’s novel was widely talked about in certain parts of the transhumanist movement, raising the concerning possibility that this self-defeating, selfdestructive philosophy might attain wider adoption. In response, several Christian Transhumanists, including myself, began making a public case against this philosophy. We argued, in secular transhumanist publications and forums, that radical egoism would not actually lead to a transhumanist future. Transhumanism, we argued, required a civilization built around cooperation and altruism. This wasn’t a case of us playing religious “scolds.” We weren’t arguing that everyone else needed to get in line with our worldview. We were making a rational case for the centrality of relational values in any kind of transhumanist future. Our case was well received. Whether through philosophical contemplation or aesthetic instinct, most people recognize that radical egoism is not a desirable or sustainable philosophy. Most people actually do want to see others flourish. And “most people” includes secular transhumanists. What was needed wasn’t another religious group with an arbitrary ethical opinion. What was needed was a group of people who could connect positive, relational values with rational considerations about a desirable future. But why was that case needed? Rationalist cultures, like much of Silicon Valley, secular transhumanism, or the New Atheists, often have trouble understanding or sympathizing with the breadth and depth of human cultural achievement. Many may view the past as something distasteful, a relic ready to be discarded without looking back—as was stated explicitly in Zoltan’s novel. Or, as with some of the New Atheists, they may see all religious tradition as a simple case of irrational delusion. These factors create some fairly significant blind spots. A truly rational perspective would factor in the pragmatic value and incredible survival

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strategies of existing human cultures, heritage, and religious traditions. This would lead one to conclude that long-lasting value systems are likely to contain important insights. By being blind to these things, rationalist cultures often end up trying to reinvent a cultural wheel (e.g., proposing an entirely new ethical system), without the benefit of the insights that have been developed in mainstream cultures over numerous millennia. This leads to some obvious mistakes. Mistakes may in part be driven by different thinking styles that seem to prevail in STEM fields, which may make it difficult for the insights of one domain to cross over into others. Recent remarks by prominent scientists, dismissing the whole field of philosophy, may be indicative of this dynamic. Thus, the need to bridge that divide. Someone needs to stand on the edge between the world’s largest religious cultures, and the cutting edges of scientific and technological thought, and translate deep cultural insights into scientific, technological, and rational discourse. And vice versa. A POSITIVE RELIGIOUS VISION If some secular transhumanists embrace a radical egoism, unfortunately many Christian millennialists embrace a radical escapism. This escapist theology refuses to work for a better world—or worse, actively works against it. In response to calls to cure disease or alleviate suffering, many Christian millennialists may protest that this is a distraction from preaching the gospel. In response to calls to invest in the future, many Christians may respond that “this world is not my home.” In response to calls for ecological responsibility, many Christians may respond that “it’s all going to burn anyway.” In fact, this kind of Christian disengagement may be a significant driver of secular transhumanism. Remarkably, this attitude stands in stark contrast to that expressed by Christ in the New Testament. When asked about the greatest commandment, Jesus replies: Love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, mind, and strength . . . and love your neighbor as yourself.20

In this, he evokes an ethical vision that lifts our entire being toward one transcendent purpose, drawing together our spirituality, mentality, and ­physicality—and calling us to serve the world. It absolutely refuses to let us separate our science, technology, and religion, or to imagine our spirituality as disconnected from the call to bless the world around us.

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This call to bless runs from Genesis 1, through the Call of Abraham, the teachings of Christ, and God’s ultimate vision for humanity. Rather than offering an escapist eschatology, Jesus teaches his disciples to pray, “On Earth as it is in Heaven.”21 Rather than advising an abandonment of creation, Jesus and his apostles proclaim “the Renewal of All Things.”22 And rather than looking forward to the destruction of the cosmos, the New Testament depicts creation springing forth in vibrant new life. As Paul states in the letter to Romans: All creation waits in eager expectation for the children of God to be revealed . . . in hope that creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay, to join in the freedom and the glory of the children of God. (Romans 8:19–21)

This is precisely the opposite of escapist mentality pervasive in many parts of Christianity. The writers of the New Testament are convinced that God has not abandoned the original human calling, but has renewed it, and called forth humanity to bless all peoples, all life, and ultimately the entire physical universe—in dramatic fulfillment of the original vision of Genesis 1. In the last several years, I’ve heard a lot of Christians critique transhumanists for having aspirations that are too big or grandiose. This is a shocking admission. It reflects a failure to engage with our own tradition, a failure of imagination, and a failure of faith. If anything, Christians should be critiquing secular transhumanists for having aspirations that are too small and too narrow. If secular transhumanists can outdo us in the realm of hope and faith, then perhaps secular transhumanists are a blessing to Christianity—a provocative voice that may wake us from our slumber, challenge us to revisit our own traditions, and help us rediscover the profound significance of what we say we believe. CONCLUSION Why Christian Transhumanism? Because the present context in which the frontier of science and technology is moving so rapidly requires a Christian engagement. Christian transhumanism is a necessary conversation between Christianity and the leading edges of scientific and technological thought, which will require us to develop a better theology of technology. That will then allow us to advocate for positive, relational values within the broader transhumanist project, while simultaneously challenging us to re-evaluate our own traditions.

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The result of that reevaluation will not be a diminished spirituality or devotion but an intensified and revitalized religious vision. It will call us to new levels of commitment, faith, and service. And it will invite us into deeper relationship with the God who is love. NOTES 1. The Simulation Argument was proposed by philosopher Nick Bostrom in 2003: Nick Bostrom, “Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?” The Philosophical Quarterly 53: 211 (2003) 243–255. https://www​.simulation​-argument​.com​/simulation​.html. 2. “Roko’s Basilisk” is a thought experiment originally posted to Less Wrong—a forum and blog about rationality, psychology, and artificial intelligence—in July 2010 by a user named Roko (since deleted). It has been called “the most terrifying thought experiment of all time.” “Roko’s Basilisk.” RationalWiki, September 2018. https://rationalwiki​.org​/wiki​/Roko’s_basilisk. 3. Elon Musk has prominently discussed the Simulation Argument. Elon Musk and electronic musician Grimes apparently met and began dating when they both tweeted similar jokes about Roko’s Basilisk. Daniel Oberhaus, “Explaining Roko’s Basilisk, the Thought Experiment That Brought Elon Musk and Grimes Together,” Motherboard, May 8, 2018. https://motherboard​.vice​.com​/en​_us​/article​/evkgvz​/what​ -is​-rokos​-basilisk​-elon​-musk​-grimes. 4. For examples of anti-aging research, see Calico Labs, the research lab founded by Google, or the SENS Research Foundation. For brain interfaces, see Kernel, founded by Bryan Johnson, or Neuralink, founded by Elon Musk. For space exploration, see Blue Origin, founded by Jeff Bezos, or SpaceX, founded by Elon Musk. 5. This is a basic summarization of a variety of attempts to explain transhumanism. See, for example: “The Transhumanist Declaration.” https://humanityplus​.org​/philosophy​/transhumanist​-declaration/. Nick Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values,” Ethical Issues for the 21st Century, ed. Frederick Adams (Philosophical Documentation Center Press, 2003). https:// nickbostrom​.com​/ethics​/values​.html. Nick Bostrom, “What is Transhumanism?” https://nickbostrom​.com​/old​/transhumanism​.html. 6. Some of these thoughts have been developed in an upcoming essay: Micah Redding, “Christian Transhumanism: Exploring the Future of Faith,” Transhumanism: In the Image of Humans, ed. Newton Lee (Springer Science+Business Media, 2019). 7. For a delineation of different models, see Ted Peters, “Science and Religion: Ten Models of War, Truce, and Partnership,” Theology and Science 16: 1 (2018) 1–43. doi: 10.1080/14746700.2017.1402163. 8. See Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages (New York: Ballantine, 1999).

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9. Ted Peters, “Imago Dei, DNA, and the Transhuman Way,” Theology and Science 16:3 (2018) 353–362. DOI: 10.1080/14746700.2018.1488529. 10. Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993) 264. 11. Francis Bacon, 1561–1626. The Great Instauration; and, New Atlantis. 12. Gen. 6–9. 13. Peters, “Imago Dei, DNA, and the Transhuman Way.” 14. Ian Curran, “The Incarnation and the Challenge of Transhumanism.” The Christian Century, November 6, 2017. https://www​ .christiancentury​ .org​ /review​ / books​/incarnation​-and​-challenge​-transhumanism. 15. Celia Dean-Drummond, “Future Perfect? God, the Transhuman Future and the Quest for Immortality,” Future Perfect? God, Medicine, and Human Identity, eds. Celia Dean-Drummond and Peter Manley Scott (T&T Clark, 2006), (174). 16. N. T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of the Church (New York: HarperOne, 2008). (103) 17. Wright, Surprised by Hope, 105. 18. Wright, Surprised by Hope, 193. 19. Zoltan Istvan, “The Transhumanist Wager.” http://www​.zoltanistvan​.com​/ TranshumanistWager​.html. 20. Luke 10:27; Matthew 22:37; Mark 12:30–31; Deuteronomy 6:5. 21. Matthew 6:10. 22. Matthew 19:28–30; Acts 3:21.

Chapter 8

Steps toward a Theology of Christian Transhumanism Ron Cole-Turner

A small group of Christians has come forward identifying itself as the “Christian Transhumanist Association” or CTA. Its leaders have posted a “Declaration” of theological principles, and they invite others to join the organization by signing this document.1 Their hope is to create a movement among Christians that offers a positive theological assessment of the use of technologies of human enhancement. Many will see the CTA initiative as a completely misguided attempt to fuse together what cannot and must not be joined. Some will dismiss the whole idea of Christian transhumanism as a cheap trick or publicity stunt designed to make Christianity seem relevant to today’s culture by connecting it to the latest technological fad. Some are likely to see it as a dangerous idea or even a new heresy. Dismissing the movement so quickly would be a mistake. At this point in time, of course, there is no way to tell whether this particular organization will thrive or perish. What is here to stay, however, is a growing conversation among Christian scholars and leaders about the human future in light of the growing powers of technological enhancement. The CTA is a small part of that conversation. Its size and short history notwithstanding, this organization warrants attention by theologians and transhumanists alike. Their ideas should be engaged carefully and critically, something I hope to do in this chapter. In taking up this task, I am not seeking to convert Christians to transhumanism or transhumanists to Christianity. Nor am I recommending that Christians endorse secular transhumanism. To be clear, I believe that Christianity and secular transhumanism are incompatible and cannot be put together. To be a Christian is to affirm certain convictions that are at odds with secular transhumanism. No fusion between the two can be intellectually 129

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coherent. The legitimacy of “Christian Transhumanism” must arise, if at all, not from tweaks or glosses layered on top of secular transhumanism, but from the heart of Christian theology itself. If in the end Christians embrace views of human enhancement technology that resemble somewhat the views of secular transhumanism, they will have arrived at these conclusions for theological reasons. This is not to say that the enhancement technologies on the horizon today, and their enthusiastic endorsement by secular transhumanists, do not provide a certain provocation for fresh Christian thinking. Christians should talk to secular transhumanists, but marriage is out of the question. It has always been this way for theology. Christians are called to respond to the times without being defined by them. In our time, one of the greatest challenges to which theology must respond is the growing power and widespread use of technologies of human enhancement. The response that theology gives, however, must be its own, coming from its deepest convictions. Coming from my own deep convictions as a Christian, my task here is to engage in the Science-Religion Discourse. “The task of SRD (ScienceReligion Discourse) is not to achieve some sort of agreement, but to tell a story that invites criticism and which contains within it a multiplicity of perspectives,” according to Lisa Stenmark.2 The net product of this chapter will not be merely a reiteration of my own confessional stance. Rather, the result of this exchange should be an unraveling of a difficult religious knot that will be illuminating for the wider public conversation. In the pages that follow, secular transhumanism will be compared and contrasted with Christian transhumanism. It will be argued that Christian transhumanism has strong roots in Christian history. The statements of the CTA will be assessed critically in terms of their strengths and deficits, and a few thoughts about future work leading to Christian transhumanism will be offered. DEFINITIONS, SIMILARITIES, AND DIFFERENCES In order to see clearly the similarities and differences between secular transhumanism and the newly emerging Christian transhumanism, we need to compare the ways in which their advocates define their movements. Our definition of secular transhumanism comes from Humanity+, transhumanism’s most cited source, where we find this definition: Humanity+ formally defines [transhumanism] based on Max More’s original definition as follows: (1) The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available

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technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities. (2) The study of the ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of technologies that will enable us to overcome fundamental human limitations, and the related study of the ethical matters involved in developing and using such technologies.3

Our definition of Christian transhumanism is derived from the CTA’s Statement of its Goal4 and its Affirmation5 posted on its website. Drawing on key ideas and phrases mainly from the Affirmation, we can construct here a provisional definition that roughly parallels the secular transhumanist definition in form. Christian transhumanism is a movement of Christians who seek to use technology to participate in God’s transformation and renewal of humanity and the whole creation. Members affirm their belief that Christians are called to join in the work of God, who is actively present in all creation seeking its renewal, transformation, and freedom from illness, hunger, oppression, injustice, and death. We are called to seek growth and progress in all dimensions of our humanity, personally and socially. One vehicle of growth is through science and technology. Guided by the command to love God and neighbor, we endorse the use of technology to “empower us to become more human.”

Both definitions are intentionally brief and limited to beliefs that are widely if not universally held by all members of the respective movements. Individually these members may embrace many additional convictions that they see as central to their outlook. The statements, however, are meant to express the minimal core of ideas that unite members and are therefore limited to what must be affirmed in order to meet the conditions for group membership. For example, compare the definition of secular humanism provided above with a recent essay in which Anders Sandberg describes three strands or dimensions of transhumanist thought. Two of the three strands go beyond what we find in the standard definition. As Sandberg puts it, there are “three strands of transhumanism: transhumanism as a way of improving one’s own life (what I call ‘individual transhumanism’), transhumanism as a project dedicated to the betterment of humanity (‘terrestrial transhumanism’), and transhumanism as a project with the purpose of achieving the potential of life in the universe (‘cosmist transhumanism’).”6 I believe it is fair to say that Christian transhumanists largely agree that their position, like secular transhumanism, entertains ideas about what might be called “terrestrial” and “cosmist” transhumanism. In both cases, however, the agreed core tends to focus on individual persons and the possibilities for their enhancement, setting aside at least for the moment any questions of the future of the human species or of the cosmos.

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SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SECULAR AND CHRISTIAN TRANSHUMANISM Two other points of similarity should be noted. Both groups agree that technology is more important than often recognized. Technologies of human enhancement are particularly important because of their growing power to change humanity in profound ways. Members of both groups would agree that the transformative power of technology is not taken into account adequately by the general public, religious or political leaders, or by academics and intellectuals. Second, members of both groups recognize that they hold a minority viewpoint on the benefits of human enhancement technology. The general public may ignore or downplay the impact of technology, while members of both groups emphasize their importance. In addition, where others may worry or express fear about where technology is taking us, group members tend to be positive in their assessment even while recognizing the risks associated with technological advance. On that front, the particular challenge facing the CTA advocates is that they are trying to gain a hearing among the very people who tend to be most apprehensive about technologies of human enhancement, at least according to data from a 2016 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center. Pew found that most Americans “greet the possibility of these [human enhancement] breakthroughs with more wariness and worry than enthusiasm and hope.”7 In fact, those who are most religious are most worried. According to the report, 64 percent of Americans who claimed to be “highly religious” opposed this technology compared to only 28 percent of those who said their religious commitment was “low.” Those who identify as “white evangelical” were 63 percent in opposition compared to 20 percent or lower among those who identified themselves as atheists or agnostics.8 The main points of comparison between Christian and secular transhumanism, however, are not organizational or contextual but philosophical and theological. The differences and the similarities between secular and Christian transhumanism become more clear when we consider their historic roots and even more when we analyze their core commitments. TRANSHUMANISM’S ROOTS IN RELIGION Secular transhumanists sometime trace the origin of the word “transhumanism” to thinkers like Julian Huxley or other mid-twentieth-century intellectuals. The first use of the word, however, is found in the poetry of Dante (c. 1265–1321). In the opening lines of Paradiso, the third part of his Divine Comedy, Dante invents a word to describe the transformation in store for

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humanity. The word is trasumanar, an infinitive, translated roughly as “to go beyond the human.” As Dante puts it, “To go beyond the human is something that cannot be described in words.”9 The poet may have invented the word, but he did not invent the idea. Peter Harrison and Joseph Wolyniak write that “‘transhumanism’ has a long history that dates back to Dante’s Paradiso and, ultimately, to the Pauline epistles.”10 What supports this view? According to Harrison and Wolyniak, “Dante’s allusions to the biblical text are evident not merely from the general context, but also from his mention of the ineffability of the experience and his questioning of whether it had taken place in bodily form or not—both of which are rehearsals of St Paul’s own speculations about the experience.”11 Secular humanists overlook Dante as a source of their movement, but some of them mention Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494). His Oration on the Dignity of Man promotes the idea that humanity is meant to define and even create itself. According to secular humanists, Pico’s writing “is usually interpreted as the humanistic Prometheus, paradigmatic of the general humanist tendency to bestow on humanity independence from God.”12 As Jens Zimmermann and others have argued recently, this is a misinterpretation of Pico rooted in a larger narrative that sees the Christian humanism of the Renaissance, when it is freed of Christian theology, as the precursor to secular humanism and thus of secular transhumanism. Recent scholarship discredits this narrative. As Zimmermann puts it, “a new wave of Renaissance studies during the 1970s and 1980s thoroughly discredited the traditional understanding of Renaissance humanism as a precursor to secular humanism.”13 The traditional understanding was rooted in the largely discredited assumption that intellectual and scientific progress comes to the West when religion loses its grip on institutions and intellectuals are free of ecclesiastical interference. If we assume that this story is true, “then we will naturally want to interpret Renaissance texts in light of this narrative.”14 That interpretation, however, is not supported by the texts themselves, which according to recent scholarship plainly show that the pioneering figures of the Renaissance not only adhered to Christianity but were inspired to new heights by their recovery of the robust theological doctrines of the early church. It is not the rejection but the recovery of the early Christian “doctrine of the incarnation and human deification as the fulfillment of the imago Dei in man through Christ that animate Renaissance thought.” Zimmermann concludes: “Far from being a clear development away from Christianity toward modern secularism, Renaissance humanism was largely based on a recovery of patristic theology.”15 Recent scholarship also suggests a new interpretation of Francis Bacon (1561–1626), who is often identified by transhumanists as a key source for their movement. Scholars agree that Bacon is pivotally important as an advocate of a new empiricism in natural philosophy that paves the way for the rise

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of modern science. He champions the idea that rigorous work and a devotion to the experimental method will lead to cures for many diseases, among which he lists aging. Secular transhumanists claim Bacon as an inspiration but neglect to say how much religion played a formative role in his thinking.16 If transhumanism is based on Bacon’s philosophy, and if his philosophy is grounded in his theology, then it follows that transhumanism is indebted historically to the theology that informed Bacon’s vision for empirical and practical science. Peter Harrison has shown how Bacon’s views of creation and the fall led him to claim that the empirical method is needed to reverse the cognition-distorting impact of the fall while practical science (or what we call technology) reverses at least in part its physical impact, for instance in combatting disease.17 Building on Harrison’s work, Joseph Wolyniak shows how Bacon’s theology both underpins and conditions his philosophy specifically when it comes to themes dear to transhumanists. Bacon draws a clear distinction between theology and natural philosophy, claiming that each field has its own competence. Science does not make theological claims, and vice versa. The somewhat grandiose Baconian goal to “effect all things possible,” readily misunderstood when taken out of context, is in fact limited in its scope to what is possible given his theological assumptions. Bacon, like everyone around him, believed that nature was first created in a morally and spiritually pristine condition. Human disobedience injects disorder and compromises human intellect. Rigorously empirical science remedies our intellectual deficits, and practical science (or technology) addresses at least some of the damage of the fall. According to Wolyniak, our fallen or postlapsarian condition could, therefore, be ameliorated to a certain extent— helping to regain the dominion God had originally intended for humankind to exercise over creation—but the possibility for restoration was not unbounded. This subtle but significant point ought not be missed: the theological claims about humanity’s postlapsarian condition simultaneously constituted the course and the curtailment of which things were, for Bacon, possible to effect.18

Why is this important? Today’s secular transhumanists often embrace Francis Bacon as one of the sources of their inspiration, but fail to note how Bacon himself was inspired by Christian theology. According to Wolyniak, “If, as I have suggested, transhumanism is informed by Bacon, and Bacon is in turn informed by religion, transhumanism and religion may actually have more in common than is often supposed.” For Wolyniak, this suggests that theologians should stop railing against transhumanism with “damnatory dismissiveness” and should “open up space to interact with transhumanism on more substantive grounds.”19

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Beyond that, Wolyniak appeals to secular transhumanists and scholars in the wider academic world who still subscribe to the discounted notion that religion and science are forever at war with each other. When it comes to Bacon and practical science, Wolyniak claims that the standard conflict model is not supported by the facts, asserting that “as a matter of history, attending to the complexity of Bacon’s thought reveals the falsity of certain claims about how modern technoscience emerged—not over and against religion, but often by virtue of it. Recognizing this, we might be less prone to assume antagonisms when there are none.”20 When the warfare model is set aside, the relationship between science and religion is seen as highly complex. SEEING THEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A NEW LIGHT More to the point of this chapter, the history of the relationship between theology and technology is now seen in a new light. In significant ways, religious convictions provide the conditions for the rise of practical science or technology. Of course, it is true that Christian theology injects a note of realism about what is feasible through technology. In particular, Christian thinkers have been quick to point out that technology can be used for destruction as well as for healing. Technological “advance” is never to be equated simply with moral or social progress. But for all their caution, Christian thinkers throughout history have also advocated the advance of science and the development and use of technology. Secular transhumanists should not think that Christians are automatically opposed to their program, nor should Christians think that their faith requires them to be in opposition. The relationships are too complex for such simplistic thinking. RESTORATION, PROGRESS, OR TRANSFORMATION? There is an irony in this story. For Bacon, belief in an historical fall leads him to propose empirical and practical science. The empirical science Bacon advocated produced insights that discredit the theology of creation and fall on which the method was based. Contemporary theologians who value most the scientific method advanced by Bacon are the very ones most likely to reject his theological assumptions about creation and fall, precisely because of the findings of the science his theology promoted. For Bacon, technology is theologically legitimate because the fall creates a space for repair that is consistent with God’s original intention rather than a departure from it. In this regard, Bacon’s distinctive theological contribution was his “myth of

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restoration,” which saw technology as a mode of return to the initial state of creation’s order. Compare this with the foundational assumption on which secular transhumanism rests. As many of their critics point out, secular transhumanists depend upon a “myth of progress.” The technological quest pursues novelty, not restoration. It creates a future rather than recreates a past. The result is technological advance with its accelerating pace. To be fair, transhumanists are fully aware that technology can lead to unwanted and even disastrous consequences. They focus a great deal of attention on the “existential risks” facing humanity in the twenty-first century. But beneath it all lies the conviction, unsupported by evidence, that technological advance brings social or human advance. Indeed, the solution to problems that arise from technology is more technology. We can see this in their advocacy for “moral enhancement,” the possible use of technology to make human beings morally capable of living with powerful technologies.21 According to Michael Burdett, secular transhumanism rests on the “myth of progress,” and their faith in this myth has a religious quality. He writes: “If trust in the myth of progress due to technological dictation of society is not an entirely warranted conclusion, then what inspires this trust on the part of transhumanists? This is precisely where studying the possible religious motivations of transhumanism can be an entirely fruitful venture.”22 If Bacon depended on a “myth of restoration,” secular transhumanists have replaced Bacon’s myth with their own “myth of progress.” Neither one is acceptable to today’s theologian. To what overarching narrative or foundational conviction, then, do Christian transhumanists appeal? Their foundational theological narrative, I believe, can be called a “myth of transformation,” the belief that humanity and the cosmos itself are being transformed for a new level or kind of existence, still as creatures made by their Creator, but elevated or “made new” in ways that not only go far beyond their present status but vastly beyond their ability to imagine. The grand goal for transformational theology is not a return to the initial condition but movement toward the final condition, the last things or the eschata. One of the strengths of the CTA statements is commitment to what we might call a “theocentric, transformationist vision.” That strength, along with other strengths and weaknesses, will be explored more fully in the next section of this chapter. ASSESSING CTA STATEMENTS The myth of transformation as an overarching narrative is made explicit in the opening phrases of the Affirmation of the CTA. With clarity but with very little elaboration, these texts lift up a theocentric, transformationist vision

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rooted in a richly traditional Christian understanding of God’s overarching purposes for creation. Following a three-word preamble, the first words of the CTA Affirmation state that “God’s mission involves the transformation and renewal of creation.”23 The text ends with the hope that technology will play a role in empowering human beings to realize more fully what it means “to be creatures in the image of God.” Whether by deliberate choice or by accident, the CTA Affirmation begins and ends with God. Where Bacon saw God and humanity as partners in the restoration of creation to its original condition, today’s Christian transhumanist sees God and humanity as partners in the transformation of the cosmos to its ultimate, eschatological glory. This difference is striking, but even more striking is the difference between the theocentrism of Christian transhumanism and the view held by secular transhumanists. If secular transhumanists ask how a new technology might free us from our biological limits, Christian transhumanists ask how it serves God’s work of cosmic transformation. Another strength of the CTA texts is their emphasis on traditional Christian ethics. They do not advocate the development and use of technologies of enhancement without limiting these uses to what conforms to the love of God, love of neighbor, and justice. In all things, they say, we are to demonstrate our “obedience in following Christ’s commands.”24 One simply cannot imagine such a phrase in the statements of secular transhumanists. In our obedience, we find ourselves called to “participate in Jesus Christ’s redeeming purposes in the world.”25 Any embrace of technology is rooted in obedience to the call to participate in God’s redeeming or transformative purposes. It is as if the failure to use technology would itself be an act of disobedience that is incompatible with the Christian’s calling. Furthermore, the CTA texts should be commended because they do not advocate the replacement of humanity with any kind of “posthuman.” The Affirmation endorses the use of enhancement technology so that we might “become more human,” not more than human. Some might complain that this goal is too confining. After all, secular transhumanism is usually seen as recommending a transition beyond the current limits and definitions of humanity. To become “transhuman” is to go beyond humanity. This view is clearly endorsed in the classic statement of Julian Huxley, who proclaims transhumanism as the welcoming of “a new kind of existence,” as different from us in kind biologically as we are from what Huxley called “Pekin man” or what we know today as Homo erectus. But in this statement, Huxley includes the phrase, “man remaining man.” Perhaps Huxley meant that we might become a new species of the genus Homo.26 Whatever the case for Huxley or for today’s secular transhumanists, Christians have always maintained that despite the extraordinary transformations that may lie ahead, humanity itself is never transcended in the sense of

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being left behind for some futuristic creature. As Christians see it, true human transcendence lies in being made fully alive, deified, or glorified and transfigured with Christ. God brings humanity into existence in order to transform it radically from its present condition. But at no point in the transformation does humanity become anything less or more than humanity, a conviction that necessarily broadens the scope of the meaning of humanity. More immediately, what this signals is the belief that even now, our humanity is being drawn toward and therefore defined by God’s final intentions for us. The CTA position seems to get this right. It should be noted, however, that the CTA texts say nothing about the “more” that is hoped for. What does it mean, scientifically but especially theologically, to “become more human”? To be fair, the deficiency here is not unique to the CTA. Rarely in contemporary Western Christianity does one find a rich description of the meaning of salvation. What is it that God intends for us, individually or in our collective identity as the product of hominin evolution? Too many Western Christians remain trapped in the view that the sole meaning and extent of God’s redemptive purposes in Jesus Christ is to provide forgiveness for sins and escape from hell. The deficiencies of this view, historical and theological, have become visible in recent scholarship, even if the result has yet to affect the thinking of ordinary Christians. What is sorely needed is a clear, compelling, and theologically robust description of what it means, individually and collectively, to be a full recipient of the saving, transforming grace promised in Jesus Christ. In the language of Paul’s epistles, what is it to be made new in Christ? Only on the basis of a more adequate view of the meaning of salvation can Christians offer a theological account of what is meant by human flourishing. Our secular friends seem willing to leave the meaning of human flourishing undefined, granting to each individual the right to define it for oneself. Christianity, however, should not remain neutral or silent on this question. What is missing not just in the CTA texts but more widely in today’s theology is a clear statement of Christian hope that speaks convincingly to individual Christians about their longings for personal growth and transformation. Doctrines such as sanctification have largely disappeared from the vocabulary of most Christians and congregations. How should Christians seek to grow in love and holiness? By what means and to what ends? Without an awareness of the meaning of Christian hope in concretely personal terms, how can anyone expect the ordinary Christian to know how to respond to the technologies of human enhancement? Are these technologies and the hopes they inspire consistent with a Christian life, or profoundly at odds with it, or some of each? Who can tell without a clear and compelling understanding of the meaning of Christian growth and transformation?

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One promising development is the active recovery today by theologians of a rich view of salvation as the transformation (deification or theosis) of the human person. It may be nothing but pure coincidence that at the very time we find ourselves faced with the rise of the technologies of human enhancement, theologians who seem uninterested in science or technology have turned their attention to the theme of theosis as the subject for research conferences, ecumenical conversations, and advanced study. Thanks to their research, the theme of theosis, the elevation and divinization of the human, although mostly often ignored until now in the modern West, is available for those who wish to make sense theologically of the technological possibilities that are before us. CONCLUSION In this chapter I have sought to sort out on behalf of the wider public’s interest the continuities and discontinuities between classic Christianity and a new brand of Christian transhumanism. This delineation should have value for both the broad Science-Religion Discourse and the self-understanding of today’s Christian community. Much work remains, but by locating our assessment of enhancement technology within a robust and contemporary Christian view of salvation, Christians today are in a position to recognize how technology fits—or distorts—the meaning of a Christian life well lived. A theologically rich view of salvation makes it possible to describe what Christians mean by human flourishing, which in turn makes it possible to say what it is we hope enhancement technology will enhance. What is needed is research and theological conversation that explores the fullest possible meaning of salvation as theosis within the context of a culture in which humanity is increasingly defined by the technologies that claim to enhance it. Two other themes deserve more attention than they receive in the statements of the CTA. One of these is eschatology. To its credit, the statement affirms the view that God is transforming the creation. But to what end? Without an eschatology, Christian transhumanism can begin to look like secular eschatology, with endless change going in no particular direction. The eschatological question is all the more urgent in light of today’s popular Christianity, with its tilt toward apocalyptic and dualistic views. For too many Christians, the future consists chiefly in the destruction of the material creation, including the human body, and the escape or rapture of the human soul and its relocation in a different realm usually called “heaven.” This view is widely seen as inadequate, but more theological work lies ahead when it comes to developing a compelling alternative eschatological vision, rooted in

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the centrality of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, but also cosmic in scope and with clear applicability to the interim or “intra-mundane” future.27 The remaining theme needing more attention is a theology of technology. In recent decades, the discussion of technology as “co-creation” has been helpful as far as it goes, but more work is needed. By drawing on a theologically sophisticated and contemporary view of the relationship between nature and grace, theology should attempt to speak of the transformative activity of God as mediated through human response and human technological activity. Christian hope for the future is never limited to what creation generates on its own, whether by emergent or evolutionary processes or through the conscious agency of us human beings and our technology. But at the same time, the gracious and transformation presence of God in creation is always mediated through creation. Excessively dichotomous views of the relationship between nature and grace have led to an overly strong contrast between God’s gracious offer for the future of creation and the emergence of novelty from creation itself, including from technology and its growing powers. Sometimes, in reference to the future, this dichotomy is expressed in terms of the difference between futurum and adventus.28 Of course, it must be said that grace and technology are not one and the same. Without confusing them, however, it is not only possible, but necessary, on the basis of the incarnation itself, to see them as more intimately united than we have in the past. To the extent that they are indeed intimately united, like the humanity assumed and united with divinity in the incarnation, technology takes on eternal theological significance.

NOTES 1. The general website of the Christian Transhumanist Association is found at https://www​.chr​isti​antr​ansh​umanism​.org/. “Announcement” is found at https:// www​.chr​isti​antr​ansh​umanism​.org​/announcement. “The Christian Transhumanist Affirmation” is found at https://www​.chr​isti​antr​ansh​umanism​.org​/affirmation. 2. Lisa L. Stenmark, “Going Public: Feminist Epistemologies, Hannah Arendt, and the Science-Religion Discourse,” The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, eds., Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 821–849, at 834. 3. “Transhumanist FAQ,” Humanity +, 2016–2018, available at: https://humanityplus​.org​/philosophy​/transhumanist​-faq/ (accessed October 12, 2018). 4. CTA, “Announcement,” http://www ​ . chr ​ i sti ​ a ntr ​ a nsh ​ u manism ​ . org ​ / announcement: Our Goal: To actively pursue the development and utilization of human technology so as to participate in Jesus Christ’s redeeming purposes in the world. Our guide for doing so

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comes from Jesus’ Biblical command to “Love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, mind, and strength . . . and love your neighbor as yourself.” We believe that this intentional use of technology, coupled with obedience in following Christ’s commands, will help us to better understand our humanity. Even more than that, though, we are convinced that this understanding will empower humanity to become more human across the scope of what it means to be creatures made in the image of God. As such, we seek not the forfeiture of our humanity and the created world, but instead, the bettering of them both. In this way we consider ourselves to be Christian Transhumanists.

5. CTA, “Affirmation,” http://www​.chr​isti​antr​ansh​umanism​.org​/affirmation: (1) We believe that God’s mission involves the transformation and renewal of creation, including humanity, and that we are called by Christ to participate in that mission: working against illness, hunger, oppression, injustice, and death. (2) We seek growth and progress along every dimension of our humanity: spiritual, physical, emotional, mental—and at all levels: individual, community, society, world. (3) We recognize science and technology as tangible expressions of our God-given impulse to explore and discover, and as a natural outgrowth of being created in the image of God. (4) We are guided by Jesus’ greatest commands to “Love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, mind, and strength . . . and love your neighbor as yourself.” (5) We believe that the intentional use of technology, coupled with following Christ, will empower us to become more human across the scope of what it means to be creatures in the image of God.

6. Anders Sandberg, “Transhumanism and the Meaning of Life,” Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, eds. Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015), p. 4. 7. Pew Research Center, July, 2016, “U.S. Public Wary of Biomedical Technologies to ‘Enhance’ Human Abilities.” http://www​.pewinternet​.org​/2016​ /07​/26​/u​-s​-public​-wary​-of​-biomedical​-technologies​-to​-enhance​-human​-abilities/ (accessed January 3, 2017). 8. Ibid. 9. Dante, Paradiso, canto 1, line 70 (Trasumanar significar per verba non si poria), paraphrased by the author. 10. Peter Harrison and Joseph Wolyniak, “The History of ‘Transhumanism,’” Notes and Queries 62.3 (2015): 465. 11. Ibid., 466. 12. Jens Zimmermann, Incarnational Humanism: A Philosophy of Culture for the Church in the World (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2012), p. 132. 13. Ibid., p. 132. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., p. 133. 16. For an extended discussion of transhumanist dependence on Francis Bacon, see Joseph Wolyniak, “‘The Relief of Man’s Estate’: Transhumanism, the Baconian Project, and the Theological Impetus for Material Salvation,” Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, eds., in Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015), pp. 53–62.

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17. Peter Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 18. Wolyniak, “‘The Relief of Man’s Estate,’” p. 61. 19. Ibid., p. 64. 20. Ibid., pp. 63–64. 21. The literature on moral enhancement goes back through Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, “Moral Transhumanism,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35.6 (2010): 656–669. 22. Michael S. Burdett, Eschatology and the Technological Future (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 144. 23. Bold font in original. 24. CTA, “Announcement,” http://www ​ . chr ​ i sti ​ a ntr ​ a nsh ​ u manism ​ . org ​ / announcement. 25. Ibid. 26. Julian Huxley, “Transhumanism,” New Bottles for New Wine (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957), pp. 13–17. 27. The phrase “intra-mundane future” comes from the writings of Karl Rahner. For a statement of popular conservative evangelical apocalypticism, see Hal Lindsey and Carole C. Carlson, The Late Great Planet Earth (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1970). For a comparison between popular apocalypticism and Ray Kurzweil’s views of the Singularity, see Ronald Cole-Turner, “The Singularity and the Rapture: Transhumanist and Popular Christian Views of the future,” Zygon 47.4 (2012): 777–796. 28. See, for example, Ted Peters’s chapter in this volume.

Chapter 9

A Roman Catholic View Technological Progress? Yes. Transhumanism? No Brian Patrick Green

Will the Roman Catholic Church support continued technological progress? With this question perhaps visions of opposition to contraception and various reproductive technologies might come to mind, and we might think that, no, the Catholic Church will not support continued technological progress. But I would like to propose a different view, one in which the Catholic Church has not only supported technological progress in the past but also has been a major driving force of that progress, and remains so today. Historically, that seeking for progress was driven not only by scientific and technical curiosity, but also by curiosity about God and God’s Creation, and by desires for justice, charity, and the natural development of human talents and skill. Scientific and technological progress made human labor more efficient; slowly improved agriculture, infrastructure, and other vital functions of society; and thereby served the common good. This is not to say that the church has always viewed all technological progress as good, indeed, sorting the bad from the good has been a key aspect of the church’s teaching on technology1 and leads to its current relationship with transhumanism2. In contrast to the measured technological optimism I will present from the history and teachings of the Catholic Church, I will also look at the unabashed techno-aggressivism of many strands of the current transhumanist movement. This techno-aggressivism needs limitations or it will spiral out of control, not only endangering human existence through destructive and dangerous technologies, but also through otherwise “good” and constructive technologies, in their side effects, dual uses, and misapplications. Although my own position is confessional, what I wish to say should have value to the wider public as well as to my own community of faith. 143

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Transhumanism is a matter of widespread public concern, and contributions should be sought from all quarters. I will argue here, as the Catholic Church has argued before me, that overall, the only solution that will make a better future is one which prioritizes not the power of technology but much more so the ethical control of technology. Without that ethical control, we will destroy ourselves, as several recent popes have clearly warned.3 God, as all-good Being-itself, can also be all-powerful, and not risk self-destruction because God cannot accidentally or intentionally wield God’s power in such a way that extinguishes God’s own existence. But humans are not God and we never will be—in our contingency and sin, our power is certain to be used for evil and destruction.4 With technology we are pursuing God-like powers—if we do not at the same time or faster also pursue God-like holiness we will soon discover what happens to contingent and sinful beings in the glare of a glory of which they are unworthy.5 THE HISTORY OF CATHOLIC SUPPORT FOR TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS The Catholic Church was one of the driving forces for technological advance in the history of Europe. There are three major ways in which the church acted to drive technological progress: collection and preservation of technology, research and development of new technology, and production and consumption of technology. Collection and preservation. Monks, clergy, and others carefully preserved significant portions of the knowledge of the ancient world, and what they could not save in Europe they later worked to collect from foreign lands. Monasteries preserved enormous amounts of knowledge through the copying of ancient texts. Monks even invented ducted central heating in order to keep their libraries and scriptoria warm and dry in the damp winter.6 As just one example, St. Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies, while not particularly accurate as etymologies, were very significant as records of ancient knowledge in multiple fields, including mathematics, medicine, agriculture, mineralogy, metallurgy, weaponry, shipbuilding, architecture, clothing, household items, and so on.7 Research and development. Monks developed a system of schools, invented the tidal powered waterwheel (in the seventh century),8 invented musical notation,9 invented impact drilling for artesian wells (in Artois, France, in 1126),10 were crucial for the development of various types of alcohol and chemistry involving alcohol (Dom Pierre Perignon and wine, the Carthusians and the liqueur Chartreuse, monastic beers, etc.), and so on.

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The scientific revolution began in medieval universities such as Paris and Oxford, with figures including St. Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, Jean Buridan, the Oxford Calculators, Bp. Robert Grosseteste, Bp. Nicole Oresme, and so on. These natural philosophers began to codify the scientific method via observation and experimentation and also made major advances in astronomy, chemistry, mechanics, optics, zoology, and other fields. Other Christian scholars of the time also made significant advances, including such figures as Bl. Ramon Llull, who pioneered computational theory and combinatorial logic for the sake of trying to evangelize Muslims in North Africa. The list of significant Christian scientific figures goes on through history, including such names as Nicolaus Copernicus, Georgius Agricola, Galileo Galilei, Evangelista Torricelli, Blaise Pascal, Bl. Bp. Nicolas Steno, Andre-Marie Ampere, Louis Pasteur, Ab. Gregor Mendel, and Fr. Georges Lemaitre. Production and consumption. For well over 1,000 years the Catholic Church acted as a primary agent for the creation of a broadly technological economy in Europe, through both the production and consumption of technology. Monasteries, again, were veritable factories for technological products ranging from small tools to major civil engineering projects such as canals, reservoirs, mills, dikes and flood control, and land reclamation.11 Non-monastic religious orders also performed engineering feats, such as the Freres Pontifes, who reputedly built the Pont d’Avignon and other bridges in the twelfth century.12 Churches and cathedrals are prime examples of structures built by institutions that were developing and sustaining a technological economy. Some of these technologies include stone construction and carving, cement and metal, metallurgy to produce tools, logging and milling, woodworking, ceramics, quarrying and mining of minerals and precious stones, glass chemistry and technology, trade and transportation technology, and so on. More than just products, technology is know-how, and one of the best ways to maintain knowhow is through the sustained practice achieved by firm economic demand. For example, pipe organs were known in the ancient world, yet only in the early middle ages in the West were they deemed not profane, but capable of enhancing the sacred. The amount of technology needed for a pipe organ is staggering: by 950 AD Winchester Cathedral had an organ with 400 pipes, the operation of which required seventy men to continuously pump twentysix bellows.13 While one organ might be a precious rarity, soon many large churches had pipe organs, and an entire “high-tech” industry grew from that demand. As another example, all-mechanical clocks were invented in the late 1200s and quickly spread and developed due to demand from monasteries and churches scheduling prayers. Similar clocks existed elsewhere in the world, but only as rarities and as such were lost to history—no progressive technological advance

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or economic development came from them. But with sufficient demand, as with pipe organs, an entire industry developed to meet the need.14 The Catholic Church has been a major force for technological progress and remains so today, as Catholic universities with engineering schools pursue research in various fields and aid peaceful international development, and Catholic entrepreneurs, scientists, and technologists live and extend the tradition. Additionally, church initiatives like the Dominican-founded OPTIC network seek to keep the church involved in the living tradition of technological progress.15 Through institutional and individual work, technology remains a work of the church. As one last point on the church and technology, Catholic literary theorist Rene Girard’s thoughts on mimetic rivalry can be interpreted to give something of a technological mandate, for there are four ways (at least) to resolve mimetic rivalry under conditions of scarce resources. The first is his described method of scapegoating and sacrifice.16 The second is to construct society so that people are embedded in such rigid social structures that all choices are made for them and they have no freedom to come into rivalry with others. Neither of the first two solutions is morally good. The third is to simply not want the object of mimetic desire, to cease coveting, as the Ten Commandments and Buddhism would prescribe. In economic terms it means avoiding competition and going where no one else is interested (as Elon Musk is, going to Mars17). The fourth is to multiply the desired resources via technology, so that it becomes accessible to all and therefore not worth fighting over. These third and fourth ways have, though Girard’s protégé, the entrepreneur Peter Thiel,18 become two of the subtle motivating forces behind Silicon Valley.19 People will still find reasons to fight, but through technological innovation, those reasons may be reduced. WHEN HAS THE CATHOLIC CHURCH NOT SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS? Along with the promotion of progress the church has also at times opposed some technological developments. This is because gaining greater power is not in itself progress, especially if it facilitates grave evils such as exploitation and killing. Technological progress is not moral progress, and technological progress should always be subordinated to moral progress. The only true progress is progress toward goodness; facilitating evil actions is not progress but regression. A prime example of this selective approach to technological progress can be found with weapons technologies, many types of which the church has consistently rejected and sought to limit, even from the year 1139 when the Second Lateran Council banned the use of the crossbow on fellow Christians.20 This

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particular restriction failed, however, the concept passed into international law, which still preserves the idea of weapons which are malum in se—intrinsically evil (a Catholic term) and therefore worthy of restrictions within the laws of war. Currently restricted weapons include poisoned bullets, blinding lasers, and certain chemical and all biological weapons.21 In the future, further weapons may be banned such as lethal autonomous weapons systems or “killer robots,” cyberattacks on cyber-physical infrastructure, and nuclear weapons—which the church has publicly and strenuously opposed since the day after Hiroshima.22 In Laudato Si’, Pope Francis continues in this tradition, seeking to limit or ban destructive weapons technologies as well as fossil fuel technologies, while asking for progress in renewable energy technologies and other technologies which benefit the poor.23 In fact, with regards to the care of nature, Pope Francis quotes Pope Benedict in saying that “the work of the Church seeks not only to remind everyone of the duty to care for nature, but at the same time ‘she must above all protect mankind from self-destruction.’”24 This is an extremely significant quote. The popes have clearly stated that the purpose of the church is to preserve not only nature but even more so humankind. Two points about humanity can be extracted from this: first, humanity can go extinct due to its own actions; second, the church should try to stop this extinction. The church’s work is not only spiritual but also corporeal, and increasingly the way we interact with the corporeal world is through technology. This, then, can be interpreted as a directed mandate for technological progress, one which rejects technologies that facilitate evil and promotes technologies that facilitate good.25 Additionally, many people are aware of the church’s opposition to many technologies of reproductive control, including artificial contraceptives, abortion, sterilization, in vitro fertilization, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, gestational surrogacy, donor gametes, and so on. The church disagrees with these technologies on the same fundamental principles as it opposes weapons technologies—these are technologies which do not promote a culture of life, but rather one of death—a “throwaway culture” or “culture of waste” as Pope Francis calls it,26 where human life is seen as a cost and not a benefit, or as having a calculable value and not an incalculable dignity. AND WHAT OF TRANSHUMANISM? Transhumanism is the quest for the radical technological enhancement of human abilities, primarily including length of life, health, and intelligence. Ultimately, the goal of some transhumanists is to become god-like in power: immortal, omnipotent, omniscient, creators of new worlds, and so on.27 This religious, and perhaps Satanic, impulse rightly should raise alarms.

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However, the word for transhumanism, interestingly, comes from the Italian poet Dante, in his Paradiso, Canto 1, where it is used as “trasumanar”—“to transhumanize”—with reference to Glaucus, a human who was accepted among the gods of the sea.28 And this transhumanizing idea is not at all foreign to Christianity. The phrase “God became man that man might become God” is a rough summary of the concept of divinization, deification, or theosis, which was held by many early Church Fathers including St. Justin Martyr (c. 100–165),29 St. Theophilus of Antioch (d. 183–185),30 St. Irenaeus (c. 130–202),31 St. Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–215),32 St. Hippolytus of Rome (c. 170–235),33 St. Athanasius of Alexandria (c. 297–373),34 St. Basil of Caesarea (c. 329–379),35 St. Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329– 390),36 St. Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335–395),37 and St. Augustine of Hippo (354–430),38 and is still considered to be theologically orthodox, though not often spoken of among contemporary Western Christians.39 There are also biblical passages that support this view such as: Psalms 82:6, John 1:12, John 10:34–36, Romans 8: 14–17, 2 Corinthians 3:17–18, Galatians 4:7, and so on. The key insight within this concept is that through holiness and God’s grace we become like God. The difference with contemporary transhumanism is the means of deification: theological/moral versus human/technological. Obviously, these are significant differences. Contemporary technological transhumanism is very different from traditional Christian ideas of transcending humanity through holiness.40 However, to many people today technology is much more real than God; yet the old ideals of a heavenly utopia, or Kingdom of God, die hard, and so technology must replace God to fulfill these age-old cultural and psychological desires. This is clearly visible today in much of the talk around artificial intelligence, which some see as a quest to build a god.41 Once again, the negative resonances with Christian religious tradition are strong. Building a god is the sin of idolatry, and choosing a lower good (rather than the highest good we are meant to pursue: holiness with God) is a relative evil (if in fact an AI “god” can be considered “good” in any sense). We should not think of AI—or any technology—in idolatrous terms. HOW SHOULD THE CATHOLIC CHURCH RESPOND TO TRANSHUMANISM? At this point we might ask what the big picture is for the Catholic relationship to technology and how that might relate to transhumanism. The answer is simple.

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• If a technology promotes human well-being and moral good, then that technology ought to be developed and progress. • If a technology puts at risk human well-being and/or promotes or facilitates moral evil, that technology ought to be limited or banned. • If a technology is dual use and can be used for both good and evil, then that technology ought to be very carefully evaluated and governed for the sake of protecting the common good.42 In relation to transhumanism then, from the Catholic tradition we can say this: extending life and health are good. In fact, Jesus commands his disciples to go forth and heal the sick, and even raise the dead, in his name (see, for example, Matt. 9:35, 10:1, 10:8, 11:5). Likewise, education, knowledge, and wisdom are good, and insofar as transhumanism can promote them then we can make common cause. But where transhumanism seeks to disrupt human nature or damage or kill, for example, through frivolous mutilations of the body or destruction of human embryos, these actions should be opposed. Technologies which may facilitate moral evil should be controlled and restricted—and some of these technologies are necessary for transhumanism. This knowledge should make us very skeptical of some transhumanist goals and the means to those goals.43 Perhaps the greatest gift of the Catholic tradition with respect to technology is the idea that we can choose which technologies to advance and which to limit. The entire tradition of the church bears witness to this fact, but Catholic Social Teaching of the last 120 years is particularly clear on this, for example, in Pope John XXIII’s Pacem in Terris, Pope Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio and Octogesima Adveniens, and Francis’s Laudato Si’.44 Some secular philosophers have only begun to realize that such an idea of differential technological progress could be taken seriously or even attempted,45 but the Catholic Church has understood this and attempted it for centuries, though with varying degrees of success.46 ARE CHRISTIANITY AND TRANSHUMANISM COMPATIBLE? There are points of concordance between Christianity and transhumanism which allow for the making of common cause on some issues, most clearly of which are ones which promote human life and health in ways that respect human nature. There are also serious differences—both practical and theoretical—which result in Christianity and transhumanism having limited compatibility.47

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Transhumanism can be life affirming, even “pro-life,” in many ways. Just as Communism pointed out serious limitations in the new industrial economy of Europe, transhumanism points to serious limitations in the human relationship to technology, namely, that we are not yet using it to help humanity as much as we could. In many ways, the church is the original pro-life and pro-life-extension (in a non-“radical” way) institution and should recapture this identity. The church helped invent modern healthcare and medical research—these are divine commands for Christians. But where goals become separated from their origins they may go astray, and that is what transhumanism is doing. The goal must not be life at all cost, but holiness. Medical research can draw us toward holiness, but in pathological form can also impede it. Without knowing that boundary—or even that such a boundary exists—we cannot expect transhumanism to act on behalf of the common good. In sum, transhumanist goals should neither be automatically accepted nor automatically dismissed. Medical progress is good. But if the goal is immortality and “godlikeness” without God, then there are serious underlying ideological problems. Additionally, the likelihood of curing every cause of death is extremely remote. It requires near-infinite power and control and morality; god-like attributes not just in capacity to perform work, but goodness and truth and beauty. These are not on the transhumanist agenda, and without them their project can only end in disaster. There is great reason for skepticism.48 “RELIGIOUS TRANSHUMANISM” IS A REAL PHENOMENON Transhumanists, while often being atheist and in many cases anti-religious,49 themselves exhibit some extremely religious beliefs and behaviors. Most noticeably, transhumanists display faith in technological progress and salvation via technology, the creation of god-like entities (human or machine) via technology, the creation of heaven on Earth, and so on.50 In fact, in many ways, transhumanism could probably be understood as a Christian heresy. There are also clear analogies to past ideological systems such as Marxist Communism, where the “New Man” would build a utopia. And like Communism, which inspired such Christian movements as liberation theology, transhumanism has inspired Christian versions as well, such as the Christian Transhumanist Association.51 Christians should be prepared for such movements to grow. Transhumanists can be extremely zealous and find their entire life meaning in the endeavor, even proposing ideas such as banning anti-transhumanist

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speech52 or using ends-justify-the-means morality where all evils are justified in order to obtain transhumanist paradise.53 These ideas, and the individuals who adhere to them, are real. Transhumanist ideology is not going to go away; it is too attractive, it draws directly from our contemporary technological zeitgeist. It may become the Communism of the twenty-first century—but in a more elitist and fascistic way, rather than an egalitarian or populist one. WHAT KIND OF FUTURE? I expect that in the future, if we do not first destroy ourselves, more people will live longer and healthier lives. By the end of this century, we will perhaps routinely live to 100. But we will still die. And we should try to be at peace with this truth. As a last attempt, some people will freeze their bodies in cryogenic nitrogen as an expensive form of burial. They will never be “resuscitated” as the cryonicists claim. (I leave open the question of whether they might, in some other disturbing or uncanny way, be reanimated into simulacra of their past selves.) The healthcare interventions needed for transhumanism will be expensive. The vulnerable and poor will not be able to access them in the ways that the rich will. And by extending the lives of the rich, and not the lives of the poor, we can expect socio-economic inequality to increase and common good be damned.54 There is a core moral problem here of confusing the monetary value of a human life with the moral dignity of a human life. Human lives do have associated monetary values, but we are never only our monetary value. We have infinite dignity as beings loved by God, as we are, for our own sakes. A LONG CONCLUSION There are two biblical stories which I think are worth examining before ending. The first begins in Genesis 1 and ends in Revelation 21 (the Apocalypse of John). The Bible begins in an idyllic Garden and ends in a flying cubic city, the New Jerusalem, thus apparently blessing technological progress. This in itself is rather fascinating, but more than that, in Genesis 1 the sea represents primal chaos, and God divides it away from the land so that the world can be made. By Revelation 21:1, “the sea was no more.” Chaos is eliminated from reality and all is ordered. There is no more chance, no more decay, no more thieves, or war, or predation, or tears, or rust, or moths to eat one’s clothes (e.g., Isa. 11:6–9, 65:25, Mic. 4: 2–4, Matt. 6:19–20, Rev. 21:4). This is heaven. Technology can be construed as humankind’s quest to remove chaos

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from nature, to slowly roll back chance and eventually put everything under orderly control, in imitation of God’s own actions.55 Flood control efforts, or efforts to mitigate and adapt to rising sea level, are clear examples of this, seemingly literally mimicking God’s division and elimination of the chaotic waters. Guarding against asteroids and other catastrophic risks, both natural and artificial, might be another. As humankind grows in power, less and less will be a matter of chance, and more and more a matter of choice56—and for humans, as technological power concentrates, more and more of the choices may be made by fewer and fewer people.57 Is this seeming imitation of God’s actions His intention for us? What lesson is to be learned here? The second story is that of the Fall of Humankind and the expulsion from Garden of Eden. God forbids humankind to eat of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, on penalty of sure death (Gen. 2:17). Yet the Snake counsels otherwise—we will not die, no, we will become like gods (Gen. 3:4–5). And humankind did eat, recognized good and evil, and were duly expelled from Eden, but not to die immediately. To protect Adam and Eve, to facilitate their flourishing in the harsh outside world, God clothes them with animal skins, replacing their crude clothing of leaves (Gen. 3:21). This is the first explicit mention of technology in the Bible—and it is in response to sin. Technology is a gift given by God to humanity to aid us in the absence of God’s immediate care. Though we might surmise that technology pre-existed the Fall, as “tilling” the garden seems to entail tools (Gen. 2:15), some thinkers, such as Jacques Ellul, would vehemently disagree.58 Both God and serpent told the truth, in their own ways, though the snake also clearly lied. Today humans know much of good and evil, too much, and we do surely die. The Snake, on the other hand, lied about death—we do die, though immortality awaits in the next life—and yet we do seem more like God now, in our knowledge of good and evil, and also in our power to enact good and wreak evil. And being like God is, as we know, good. The question is in what sense are we trying to be like God? In power or in goodness? Here is the distinction: the snake promised us to be gods without God, separated individualistic atomistic gods trying to exist on our own, apart from the source of existence itself. And in such a life, the pursuit of power can be our only quest, as it is the one thing that can give us what we so desperately want: our own existence. This is, from both theological and philosophical perspectives, clearly absurd and impossible. It is seeking to be powerful like God without the goodness that is God. This can only lead to destruction.59 In Girardian terms, it is entering into mimetic rivalry with God.

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In contrast, the promise of the imitation of Christ and divinization is one of becoming god with God, in unity, not separation. We return to our source, to Being Itself, where we can survive death—and even in life, through Eucharistic communion, become what we eat. If we seek holiness first, then power will come from that—a power for goodness only and not evil. I believe the Genesis narratives and many other biblical narratives have multiple correct meanings (these many layers of meaning being a sort of data compression), as well as many incorrect meanings. Sorting them out is difficult and so I do not claim to do so here. From the perspective of a Roman Catholic pursuing theology in the public square, what I claim is that techno-utopian transhumanism is already a deeply religious movement, stemming from the Christian worldview, yet having turned away from it in many significant ways. Secular transhumanism pursues salvation without God. Transhumanism is built on a loss of perspective; it mistakes a gift from God—technology—for God itself. This gift from God to humankind is for the sake of doing good, not evil. In learning both good and evil we err; evil is knowledge we should not know. Technology is like a bandage on the lethal wound of original sin. If we think the bandage will cure us we are wrong; it is only a temporary stop-gap measure until we can receive proper medical aid—in reality, proper spiritual aid, in the form of new life in the body of Christ. Insofar as transhumanists seek to extend healthy human life and otherwise enhance our human capacities in ways that allow us to make a better world in which we can more fully pursue truth, beauty, the common good, and union with God, then we can approve of their works and join with them. This is moral progress utilizing technology and is clearly good. Insofar as transhumanists seek to enhance their capacities in morally ambiguous or clearly evil ways, developing powers with destructive potential, designing apocalyptic weapons, seeking to squash legitimate human freedom, exploit the weak, obscure the truth, and so on, Christians must not approve, and in fact should steadfastly oppose them. Embedded in this conundrum is, of course, the question of knowing what good and evil are in a pluralistic world where secular cultures have diverged in very significant ways from traditional Christian perspectives on many issues. It seems that the knowledge of good and evil that we gained from the Tree was not so clear or beneficial after all. The Bible gives no explanation why the fruit was forbidden. Perhaps even now we are living out the explanation of why God did not want us to take this path, God showing us rather than telling. Surely, as we grow in power we grow in danger to ourselves. Whereas in the past we were involuntarily constrained by our weakness, now we must

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learn to be voluntarily constrained by our good judgment, our ethics.60 If history is our guide, this fact should not give us confidence.61 If we choose ethics before power, perhaps we might still live. But if we choose power before ethics we will die. Given this, what then shall we do? Peter Maurin, founder of the Catholic Worker movement, I think describes our mandate with acuity: we should try to “make the kind of society where people find it easier to be good.”62 Technology may be able to aid us in this task. For example, virtual reality games have already shown promise in teaching empathy.63 But who will prevent them from being used to teach hatred instead? Artificial intelligence already shows promise in dramatically increasing efficiency, freeing up more resources to share with each other. But who will ensure that these efficiencies are for good and not for evil, and that even for the good uses, the saved resources are shared and not hoarded? The answer can only be you and I. We are the only ones here. To quote the American thinker Wendell Berry, “The only thing we can do for the future is to do the right thing now.”64 Our task is, in consonance with Pope Francis’s guidance in Laudato Si’, not primarily a technological one, but primarily a moral one. If we get the moral part right, then God’s technological gifts to us will align as well. If we get the technology right, but not the morality, then we will all surely die. NOTES 1. Green, “The Catholic Church and Technological Progress.” 2. This chapter is derived from notes originally delivered as Brian Patrick Green, “Transhumanism and Catholicism: Agreements and Disagreements,” presented to the Christian French Entrepreneurs & Leaders (YEDC) Silicon Valley Learning Expedition, San Francisco, California, January 9, 2017. Those notes were formalized and published in French as Brian Patrick Green, “Progrès Technologique? Oui, Mais . . .” Revue Boussole 6: Progrès: et l’homme dans tout ça? December 2017 (English rights retained, per Thomas Jauffret, July 25, 2017 and April 2, 2018). These same notes also partially inspired the article: Brian Patrick Green, “The Catholic Church and Technological Progress: Past, Present, and Future,” Religions 8, no. 6 (2017): 106, available at: http://www​.mdpi​.com​/2077​-1444​/8​/6​/106​/htm (accessed on 3 July 2018). 3. Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009, available at: http://w2​.vatican​.va​/content​/benedict​-xvi​/en​/encyclicals​/documents​/hf​_ben​-xvi​_enc​_20090629​_caritas​-in​-veritate​.html (accessed on 17 April 2017); Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, 2015. Encyclical, http://w2​.vatican​.va​/content​/ francesco​/en​/encyclicals​/documents​/papa​-francesco​_20150524​_enciclica​-laudato​-si​ .html: Vatican. 4. Brian Patrick Green, “Transhumanism and Roman Catholicism: Imagined and Real Tensions,” Theology and Science 13, no. 2 (May 2015): 187–201, available at:

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http://www​.tandfonline​.com​/doi​/abs​/10​.1080​/14746700​.2015​.1023528 (accessed on 2 July 2018). 5. Brian Patrick Green, “The Technology of Holiness: A Response to Hava Tirosh-Samuelson,” Theology and Science 16, no. 2 (May 2018): 223–228, available at: https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/14746700​.2018​.1455271 (accessed on 5 July 2018). 6. Dieter Hägermann and Helmuth Schneider, Propyläen Technikgeschichte: Landbau und Handwerk, 750 v. Chr. bis 1000 n. Chr (2nd ed.). Berlin: Propyläen, 1997, pp. 456–459. 7. Isidore of Seville, Etymologies: Complete English Translation, Volumes I & II, translated by Priscilla Throop Charlotte. Vermont: MedievalMS, 2006. 8. Conleth Manning, Thomas McErlean, and Norman Crothers, Harnessing the Tides: The Early Medieval Tide Mills at Nendrum Monastery, Strangford Lough. London: The Stationery Office, 2007. 9. Encyclopædia Britannica, “Guido d’Arezzo, Italian Musician,” 2017. Available at: https://www​.britannica​.com​/biography​/Guido​-dArezzo​-Italian​-musician (accessed on 13 February 2017). 10. Frances Gies and Joseph Gies, Cathedral, Forge, and Waterwheel: Technology and Invention in the Middle Ages. New York: HarperCollins, 1994, pp. 112. 11. Daniel R. Curtis and Michele Campopiano, “Medieval Land Reclamation and the Creation of New Societies: Comparing Holland and the Po Valley, c.800– c.1500,” Journal of Historical Geography 44 (2014): 93–108, Roberta J. Magnusson, Water Technology in the Middle Ages: Cities, Monasteries, and Waterworks after the Roman Empire. Baltimore, 2001; Isabel Alfonso, “Cistercians and Feudalism,” Past & Present 133 (1991): 3–30; Constance Hoffman Berman, “Medieval Agriculture, the Southern French Countryside and the Early Cistercians: A Study of Forty-Three Monasteries,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 76, no. 5 (1986): 5–10; P. Squatriti (Ed.), Working with Water in Medieval Europe: Technology and Resource-Use. Brill: Leiden, 2000. 12. Gies and Gies, Cathedral, Forge, and Waterwheel, pp. 150–151. 13. Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Religion and Technology: Collected Essays. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, pp. 65, 186–187. 14. Gies and Gies, Cathedral, Forge, and Waterwheel, pp. 89–91, 210–15; White, Medieval Religion and Technology, pp. 181–204. 15. OPTIC Technology Network, website: http://optictechnology​.org​/index​.php​/ en/ (accessed on 26 July 2018). 16. René Girard, “Ch. 1, Mimesis and Violence,” The Girard Reader, edited by James G. Williams. New York: Crossroad, 1996, pp. 9–19, citing René Girard, “Mimesis and Violence: Perspectives in Cultural Criticism,” Berkshire Review 14 (1979): 9–19. 17. Elon Musk, “Making Humans a Multi-Planetary Species,” New Space 5, no. 2 (1 Jun 2017). Available at: https://www​.liebertpub​.com​/doi​/pdf​/10​.1089​/space​.2017​ .29009​.emu (accessed on 26 July 2018). 18. Peter Thiel and Blake Masters, Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future. New York: Crown Business, 2014, pp. 1–49.

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19. Brian Patrick Green, “Convergences in the Ethics of Space Exploration,” in Astrobiology: The Social and Conceptual Issues, edited by Carlos Mariscal and Kelly C. Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 20. White, Medieval Religion and Technology, p. 82, citing Second Lateran Council, Canon 29, available at: http://www​.ewtn​.com​/library​/COUNCILS​/ LATERAN2​.HTM (accessed on 5 July 2018). 21. See, for example, the 1675 Strasbourg Agreement (banning poison weapons), the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1925 Geneva Protocols (restricting chemical weapons), the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1983 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 22. Chicago Tribune, “Vatican Views Atomic Bomb ‘Unfavorably,’” August 8, 1945, available at: http://archives​.chicagotribune​.com​/1945​/08​/08​/page​/2​/article​/vatican​-views​-atomic​-bomb​-unfavorably (accessed on 17 February 2017). 23. Francis, Laudato Si’, pp. 26, 102–104, 112, 165. 24. Francis, Laudato Si’, pp. 79, citing Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 2009, pp. 51. 25. Green, “The Catholic Church and Technological Progress,” and Brian Patrick Green, “Emerging Technologies, Catastrophic Risk, and Ethics: Three Strategies for Reducing Risk,” IEEE International Symposium on Ethics in Engineering, Science, and Technology, ETHICS 2016 Symposium Record, IEEE Xplore, 13–14 May 2016, Vancouver, British Columbia, available at: http://ieeexplore​.ieee​.org​/abstract​/document​/7560046/ (accessed on 5 July 2018). 26. Francis X. Rocca, “Pope Says ‘Throwaway Culture’ Harms Environment and Human Life,” Catholic News Service, 5 June 2013, available at: http://www​ .catholicnews​.com​/services​/englishnews​/2013​/pope​-says​-throwaway​-culture​-harms​ -environment​-and​-human​-life​.cfm (accessed on 5 July 2018), citing Francis, “General Audience, Saint Peter’s Square, Wednesday, 5 June 2013,” available at: http://w2​.vatican​.va​/content​/francesco​/en​/audiences​/2013​/documents​/papa​-francesco​_20130605​ _udienza​-generale​.html (accessed on 5 July 2018). 27. Nick Bostrom, “What Is Transhumanism?” nickbostrom​.c​om (1998, 2001), available at: https://nickbostrom​.com​/old​/transhumanism​.html, Nick Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values,” Journal of Philosophical Research 30, Suppl. (2005): 3–14, available at: http://www​.fhi​.ox​.ac​.uk​/wp​-content​/uploads​/transhumanist​-values​.pdf (accessed on 26 July 2018), Lincoln Cannon, “What Is Mormon Transhumanism?” Theology and Science 13, no. 2 (2015): 202–218, Zoltan Istvan, The Transhumanist Wager. San Francisco: Futurity Imagine Media, 2013, 80, and, in opposition: Green, “Transhumanism and Roman Catholicism.” 28. Peter Harrison and Joseph Wolyniak, “The History of ‘Transhumanism,’” Notes and Queries 62, no. (2015): 465–467. 29. Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, Ch. CXXIV, available at: http://www​ .newadvent​.org​/fathers​/01288​.htm (accessed on 26 July 2018). 30. Theophilus of Antioch, To Autolycus, Bk. II, Ch. 27, available at: http://www​ .newadvent​.org​/fathers​/02042​.htm (accessed on 26 July 2018).

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31. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV.38, and V, Preface, available at: http://www​ .newadvent​.org​/fathers​/0103438​.htm & http://www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/0103500​ .htm (accessed on 26 July 2018). 32. Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the Heathen, Ch. 1, available at: http:// www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/020801​.htm, The Instructor, Bk. III, Ch. I, available at: http://www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/02093​.htm, and The Stromata, or Miscellanies, Book V, Chapter X, and Book VII, Chapter XVI, available at: http://www​.newadvent​ .org​/fathers​/02105​.htm and http://www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/02107​.htm (accessed on 26 July 2018). 33. Hippolytus of Rome, Refutation of all Heresies, Bk. X, Ch. 30, available at: http://www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/050110​.htm, and The Discourse on the Holy Theophany, 8, available at: http://www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/0523​.htm (accessed on 26 July 2018). 34. Athanasius of Alexandria, Against the Arians, Discussion I, Para. 39, and Discussion III, Para. 34, available at: http://www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/28161​.htm and http://www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/28163​.htm, and On the Incarnation, Section 54.3, available at: http://www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/2802​.htm (accessed on 26 July 2018). 35. Basil of Caesarea, De Spiritu Sancto (On the Spirit) 9.23, available at: http:// www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/3203​.htm (accessed on 26 July 2018). 36. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations, 30.14, available at: http://www​.newadvent​ .org​/fathers​/310230​.htm (accessed on 26 July 2018). 37. Gregory of Nyssa, The Great Catechism 37, available at: http://www​.newadvent​.org​/fathers​/29083​.htm (accessed on 26 July 2018). 38. Augustine of Hippo, “Psalm 50,” Exposition on the Book of Psalms, available at: http://www​ .newadvent​ .org​ /fathers​ /1801050​ .htm (accessed on 26 July 2018). 39. Catechism of the Catholic Church (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993) para. 460, (Part 1, Sec. 2, Ch. 2, Art. 3) available at: http://www​ .vatican​.va​/archive​/ENG0015/_​_P1J​.HTM (accessed on 26 July 2018). 40. Green, “The Technology of Holiness.” 41. Mark Harris, “Inside the First Church of Artificial Intelligence,” Wired, 15 November 2017, available at: https://www​.wired​.com​/story​/anthony​-levandowski​ -artificial​-intelligence​-religion/ (accessed on 26 July 2018). 42. Green, “The Catholic Church and Technological Progress,” pp. 7. 43. Green, “Transhumanism and Roman Catholicism,” pp. 196. 44. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1963, available at: http://w2​.vatican​.va​/content​/john​-xxiii​/en​/encyclicals​/documents​ /hf​_j​-xxiii​_enc​_11041963​_pacem​.html (accessed on 17 February 2017), Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1967, available at: http://w2​.vatican​.va​/content​/paul​-vi​/en​/encyclicals​/documents​/hf​_p​-vi​ _enc​_26031967​_populorum​.html (accessed on 17 February 2017), Pope Paul VI, Octogesima Adveniens. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1971, available online: http://w2​.vatican​.va​/content​/paul​-vi​/en​/apost​_letters​/documents​/hf​_p​-vi​_apl​

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_19710514​_octogesima​-adveniens​.html (accessed on 13 February 2017); Francis, Laudato Si’. 45. Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 281. 46. Green, “The Catholic Church and Technological Progress,” pp. 12. 47. Green, “Transhumanism and Roman Catholicism.” 48. Ibid., pp. 191–196. 49. See, for example, Ray Kurzweil, “A Primary Role of Traditional Religion is Deathist Rationalization—that is, Rationalizing the Tragedy of Death as a Good Thing,” The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. New York: Viking/Penguin, 2005, 372. For a more heavy-handed atheism, see Zoltan Istvan, “Transhumanism, Religion, and Atheism,” The Transhuman Visions Conference: Religion and Transhumanism, May 2014, Piedmont, California, available at: https:// www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=jXOXBYr2Z7I (accessed on 26 July 2018). For a more lighthearted transhumanist anti-theism, see Roen Horn’s poem “Eternal Life Pirates Never Surrender” excerpted here: The imaginary afterlife offers us no relief, We won’t drink the Kool-Aid of wishful belief. And to think we need a god to be ethical is a big mistake— We are human and we can be good for goodness sake. It’s time to give up the fairy-tales which we should have long outgrown, Who will save your soul if you won’t save your own? The deathists are blinded and deluded, they cannot see, So don’t be persuaded by their eternal-life blasphemy. We know that a temporary existence is meaningless and hollow, The herd of lemmings is large, but we will not follow! We are so lucky to be alive in this universe, this vast and glorious place, Where we can create our own paradise, live forever, and travel into space. We have no salvation in nature and no trust in theoretical gods, We must create the new world and save ourselves against all odds.

“Roen Horn 1,” Transhuman Visions Conference San Francisco, CA, February 1, 2014, 1:40–3:00min, available at: https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​ ?v=​_ACt3FPc5q8​&list​=PLe​MMRE​uUaU​QAVM​dmhL​O5pJ​jaJoYyRi4​-2​&index​=10 (accessed on 26 July 2018). 50. For example, Joel Garreau, “Heaven,” in Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies—and What It Means to Be Human. New York: Doubleday, 2005, pp. 85–132, or Horn, “Roen Horn 1,” minute 12:45: “That’s the goal here—we are trying to create paradise with technology and we can do this!” 51. Christian Transhumanist Association, https://www​.chr​isti​antr​ansh​umanism​ .org/ (accessed on 26 July 2018). 52. Zoltan Istvan, “When Does Hindering Life Extension Become a Crime?” Transhuman Visions Conference, February, 2014, San Francisco, California, 10:00–11:20min, available at: https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=ALRkGry5pp0​ &index​=5​&list​=PLe​MMRE​uUaU​QAVM​dmhL​O5pJ​jaJoYyRi4​-2​&t​=0s (accessed

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on 26 July 2018). Also Zoltan Istvan, “When Does Hindering Life Extension Become a Crime?” Psychology Today, 2014, http://www​.psychologytoday​.com​ /blog​/the​-transhumanist​-philosopher​/201401​/when​-does​-hindering​-life​-extension​ -science​-become​-crime available in mirrored form at: http://indiafuturesociety​.org​ /when​-does​-hindering​-life​-extension​-science​-become​-a​-crime/ (accessed 24 July 2018). 53. In a revealing interview, transhumanist Chris Armstrong spoke with Zoltan Istvan, who said “The Transhumanist Wager is a message from the future. If you don’t lose the weakness of your species, your species will not survive. You must embrace a new you—a fiercer, bolder you. Otherwise you will be no match for your own inventions.” Among these “bold” ideas are such statements as “Extraordinary aims require extraordinary expedience,” and a discussion of the genocidal “Humanicide Formula” to determine which humans to kill first (answer: “Any who are not going along with the program to a sufficient degree, in this hypothetical scenario, will be eliminated. It’s as simple as that.”). Chris T. Armstrong, At Any Cost: A Guide to The Transhumanist Wager and the Ideas of Zoltan Istvan, book-in-progress and website, http://tra​nshu​mani​stwa​gerguide​.com​/essays/ (accessed 24 July 2018). 54. Green, “Transhumanism and Roman Catholicism,” pp. 192–193. 55. Peter Thiel, “Against Edenism,” First Things, 11 June 2015, available at: https://www​.firstthings​.com​/article​/2015​/06​/against​-edenism (accessed on 15 February 2017). 56. For a discussion of this concept in the field of bioethics, see Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Wikler, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 57. Clive Staples Lewis, The Abolition of Man. New York: HarperCollins, 1944, pp. 55. Available online: https://archive​.org​/stream​/TheAbolitionOfMan​_229​/C​.s​ .Lewis​-TheAbolitionOfMan​_djvu​.txt (accessed on 17 February 2017). 58. Jacques Ellul, “Technique and the Opening Chapters of Genesis,” Ch. 8 in Theology and Technology: Essays in Christian Analysis and Exegesis, edited by Carl Mitcham and Jim Grotes. Lanham: University Press of America, 1984, pp. 123–137. 59. Green, “The Technology of Holiness.” 60. Brian Patrick Green, “Pope Francis, the Encyclical Laudato Si, Ethics, and Existential Risk,” IEET (Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies), website, August 16, 2015, available at: http://ieet​.org​/index​.php​/IEET​/more​/green20150816 (accessed 24 July 2018). 61. For a speculative fictional take on this, see Walter M. Miller, Jr., A Canticle for Leibowitz. New York: Bantam Books, 1997 (1959). 62. Dorothy Day, “Letter to Our Readers at the Beginning of Our Fifteenth Year,” The Catholic Worker, May 1947, 1, 3, available at: http://www​.catholicworker​.org​/ dorothyday​/articles​/155​.html (accessed June 28, 2016). Also “to make that kind of society where it is easier for men to be good.” Dorothy Day, “Peter’s Program,” The Catholic Worker, May 1955, 2, available at: http://www​.catholicworker​.org​/dorothyday​/articles​/176​.html (accessed June 28, 2016). 63. See, for example, Omri Gillath, Cade McCall, Phillip R. Shaver, Jim Blascovich, “What Can Virtual Reality Teach Us About Prosocial Tendencies in

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Real and Virtual Environments?,” Media Psychology 11, no. 2 (2008): 259–282, and Robin S. Rosenberg, Shawnee L. Baughman, and Jeremy N. Bailenson, “Virtual Superheroes: Using Superpowers in Virtual Reality to Encourage Prosocial Behavior,” PLoS ONE 8, no. 1 (2013), available at: http://journals​.plos​.org​/plosone​/ article​?id​=10​.1371​/journal​.pone​.0055003 (accessed 24 July 2018). 64. Wendell Berry, “Marty Forum: Wendell Berry,” AAR 2013 Annual Meeting, November 24, 2013, Baltimore, Maryland. Audio available at: https://www​.aarweb​ .org​/programs​-services​/a24​-252​-marty​-forum​-wendell​-berry (accessed on 26 July 2018).

Chapter 10

Technological Theosis? An Eastern Orthodox Critique of Religious Transhumanism Brandon Gallaher

Transhumanism is Satanic. This is what I conclude after examining the transhumanist movement from within the tradition of Orthodox Christianity, which is founded on the Eastern Patristic witness and vision. Let me offer reasons for this conclusion.1 Transhumanism tempts us to abandon the route to divine self-realization mapped by the classical Orthodox understanding of theosis or deification. In transhumanism, Satan tempts us with an alternative to God, namely, ourselves. When I write this I am not being merely provocative, let alone vaguely metaphorical. I mean what I say literally and with the strongest realism. Transhumanism, according to Humanity+ (formerly the World Transhumanist Association), is defined as follows: (1) The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities. (2) The study of the ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of technologies that will enable us to overcome fundamental human limitations, and the related study of the ethical matters involved in developing and using such technologies.2 This ideology, alternatively, a new religion or religious philosophy,3 demands critique from an Eastern Orthodox perspective. H+ is a contemporary 161

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elaboration of what various Russian religious thinkers following Fyodor Dostoyevsky (drawing on Ludwig Feuerbach) called the Luciferian “religion” of “mangodhood” (chelovekobozhestvo and cheloveko­bozhie). Mangodhood is characterized by self-worship, the self-deification of humanity.4 Mangodhood with the man-god or superman as its climax, according to this Russian Orthodox social critique, is Satanic in structure and inspiration. Mangodhood is the mirror inverse of salvation, which is called in Patristic teaching theosis or theopoiesis (divinization/deification)5 made possible through the Godman, Jesus Christ. When becoming genuinely Christ-like, we employ the famous term of Vladimir Solov’ev (1853–1900), “Godmanhood” (Bogochelovechestvo).6 Nikolai Berdyaev (1874–1948) weaves together this dialectic in a characteristic fashion: “Into the religion of God-manhood enters all the plenitude of humanness. [. . .] In man-godhood perishes not only God, but also man. [. . .] The problem of man, the problem of religious anthropology is transformed in the Russian consciousness into the problem about the God-man and the man-god, about Christ and the Anti-Christ.”7 During the Russian Silver Age, theosis as “Godmanhood”8 was understood as the accomplishment by God of the mystery of his embodiment, perfectly realized in Christ, always and in all things.9 Mangodhood, in contrast, was declared an instance of the sort of sham human auto-divinization we see in Genesis 3 with the Fall of humanity through its temptation by the serpent who weaves human beings into his ploys by both lies and illusions. We must distinguish deification by divine grace from auto-deification through techno-self-transformation. The understanding of theosis in classic Orthodox advocates a patient, arduous self-work of askesis, cutting back the self, rooting out the passions so that we hope our true self in Christ might flower forth as a divine gift, graciously coming to know the world as God knows it as we come to see him as he is and so resemble him. Autodivinization, in contrast, is the impatient seizing of our divine inheritance before we are ready for its responsibility. Today’s auto-divinizing technosapien uses our human intellectual capacities to split open nature, manipulate its inner parts to serve us as journeymen gods, elevating ourselves technologically beyond the merely human. Then, in a suicidal manner, this superman attempts to subsume creation so that all one sees in the cosmos is the idolatrous face of ourselves like Narcissus tipping into the pool. It is for this reason that Sergii Bulgakov (1871–1944) described predecessor forms of mangodhood as Satanic. Mangodhood is Satanic precisely because it is both a deception of creation and a pantheistic divinization of the world. It relies on the false Savior bleeding through all forms of modern humanism from Voltaire and Comte to Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Marx.

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Pure self-deification, the self-assertion of one’s createdness as an absolute is Satanism, a state not immediately accessible to man. The self-assertion of man outside God has the character simply of a conscious divinization of the creature, pantheism or cosmotheism, and is defined only in opposition to theism as atheism or even anti-theism, anti-Christianity. This pantheism can have different expressions: the materialism of the Encyclopaedists, the hylozoism of Haeckel, the spiritualistic atheism of Hartmann and Schopenhauer, the economic materialism of Marx, the agnostic positivism of Comte and Spencer. From a religious point of view, however, all of these varieties lead to one and the same content— pantheism or cosmotheism. But this divinization of everything or world-divinization in religious experience inevitably takes on the features of mangodhood. Man is the crown of creation, its king and lord, humanity is a divinity, in which each individual human being participates. And just as the world gives birth to man, so too the task placed before humanity is to give birth to the superman, the god. But since humanity only exists in individual persons and everything higher in a man necessarily is personally embodied, this task in its definitive expression amounts to a striving for the giving birth of a single and unique superman, a personal god, that is, the one who is expressed in Christianity as the Antichrist. The unfolding potency, the unavoidable task of mangodhood, is this individual man-god, in whom all of creation would have found its own apotheosis; this idea of an Anti-Christ/Superman has been propounded to modern humanity by Nietzsche. The ultimate meaning of mangodhood amounts to the latter appropriating divinity to itself and proclaiming itself as creation’s god. This is the way of Satan, who, not possessing any power of being of his own and in his apostasy from God becoming a spirit of non-being, can only manifest this power by metaphysical theft, since he leads but a ghostly “meteoric” (in the expression of Schelling) existence in constant oscillations between being and non-being, and thereby exists only as a deceptive mirage. This mirage would be completely dispelled by an absolute separation of being from non-being, of light from “outer darkness” [Matt. 8:12, 25:30], which is located on the brink (“edge”) of being.10

Mangodhood, as Bulgakov describes, was and is the trick of the tempter in Genesis 3: that humans might have immediately knowledge of reality (good and evil) like God, thereby becoming as gods (3:4–5). This was forbidden not because that knowledge in itself was ultimately impossible for human beings (and with it a transformation into what is divine), but because it could only come as a gift given, as we shall later argue, from the long trial of loving obedience and dependence of the creature on its Creator modeled in the person of Jesus Christ and the saints who shine with his face. Transhumanism is yet another human/Satanic attempt (or, following Bulgakov, we might speak of the Anti-Christ) at seizing divinity from God. We attempt to save and divinize ourselves, but actually in a suicidal fashion tip ourselves back into the abyss

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of non-being from which we were created, without what is crucial in order to assimilate the divine into the human: the cross. There is a common misperception that the pre-modern Christian teaching of theosis, expressed distinctively in the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition, is somehow restated in a transhumanist context in the ideology of transcendence and endless self-improvement.11 Just as Christians, so the argument goes, have ever strived after a state beyond the human in which not only their fallenness (doing not what they want to do but what they hate to do (Rom. 7:15)), but their very creaturely limitations were transcended, so too now in a contemporary context, using the latest technology, we strive to perfect the human being so that it might become a partaker (2 Pet. 1:4), nay, a confector of the divine nature. In what follows in this chapter, I shall endeavor to distance the classic Patristic teaching of Eastern Orthodoxy on theosis from this religious philosophy of transhumanism. I will describe critically the transhumanist religion of mangodhood following it with an account of the very different Orthodox religion of Godmanhood. TRANSHUMANISM: THE RELIGION OF MANGODHOOD How do transhumanists generally see the cosmos? Mother Nature is something of a disappointment for many transhumanists. There is no sense of the numinous and the holy here, let alone “gift” or “sacrament” as we see in Christianity. Max More is typical here in his “A Letter to Mother Nature” when he writes to her that “with all due respect, we must say that you have in many ways done a poor job with the human constitution” by making humans vulnerable to disease and damage; compelling them to age and die; allowing them to function only under narrow environmental conditions; and by not giving them better capacity for language, memory, and so on. One needs to “amend the human constitution” using biotech in at least seven areas ranging from ending aging and death to not limiting human capacities “by remaining purely biological organisms.”12 In short, transhumanism is, like various species of Gnosticism before it, anti-body and anti-creation, seeing matter as that force which impedes transhumanity’s upward trajectory. Simon Young makes this clear when he argues: “As humanism freed us from the chains of superstition, let transhumanism free us from our biological chains.”13 When pressed as to defining just what the “stuff” of the cosmos might be, transhumanists describe it as “data” understood as differentiated patterns of information which ultimately means that organisms are described as

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“biochemical algorithms.” The same mathematical laws apply to electronic and biochemical algorithms thereby collapsing the distinction between animal and machines:14 “the idea [is] that organisms are algorithms, and that giraffes, tomatoes and human beings are just different methods for processing data.”15 Advocate of Homo Deus, Yuval Noah Harari, has observed that we are moving in this vision of the cosmos far beyond humanism, via the view that everything is data, “from a homo-centric to a data-centric view.”16 It would seem that creation, and indeed life itself, is just “data-processing.”17 “Creation,” then, would be a misnomer for how transhumanism sees the universe, as to speak of “creation” one needs a “Creator” God and most transhumanists deny there is any supernatural power or god beyond themselves.18 They do speak a great deal, for apparently convinced secularists, on “g/God,” but “God” for them is a sort of superhuman state of “God-like powers” that might well be attained by a supra-intelligent alien civilization at certain points in its evolution and that we humans are ever working/evolving toward.19 Evolution is a project for transhumanists driven by the “will to power” of humanity. Indeed, Nietzsche’s ideas have been an inspiration for two of the philosophical architects of transhumanism: Max More and Ray Kurzweil.20 Evolution is nature transcending itself, for, as Nietzsche observed, “Man is something that shall be overcome” attaining the Übermensch: “Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman—a rope over an abyss.”21 The self wants to above all “create beyond itself.”22 And life itself confided this secret to me: “Behold,” it said, “I am that which must always overcome itself. Indeed, you call it a will to procreate or a drive to an end, to something higher, farther, more manifold.”23

Very often this move from human to man-god or Übermensch is articulated in terms of a highly eccentric vision of evolution borrowing language from both technology and eschatology.24 Transhumanism’s account of evolution is non-scientific in that it fails to accord with standard evolutionary biology. Transhumanism imports the doctrine of progress drawn from technology into natural processes and imports an entelechy of future perfection into biological evolution. The H+ vision of perfectibility includes something supra-natural, something beyond what nature herself offers. The human will overcome nature to become posthuman. On one hand, divine purpose is denied and replaced with purpose in nature. On the other hand, nature is denied and replaced with supernature, with a humanly produced supra-natural achievement of disembodied immortality.

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TECHNOLOGICAL RAPTURE? Our posthuman destiny becomes for the transhumanist a consciously willed project of humanity rising above nature through technology in some distant parousia. This transformation of the human to the posthuman is depicted in terms of a future technological Kingdom of Mangodhood. Vernor Vinge and Ray Kurzweil call it the Singularity.25 The Singularity lies just beyond the horizon and is that goal which all “singularitarians” must work to realize.26 The Singularity is, as Martin Rees notes, a sort of technological version of the Rapture.27 Yuval Noah Harari points to raptured human intelligence hovering just above the top of the H+ Tower of Babel. “In the twenty-first century, the third big project of humankind will be to acquire for us divine powers of creation and destruction, and upgrade Homo Sapiens to Homo deus. [. . .] We want the ability to re-engineer our bodies and minds in order, above all, to escape old age, death, misery, but once we have it, who knows what else we might do with such ability? So we may well think of the new human agenda as consisting really of one project (with many branches) attaining divinity.”28 Does H+ simply steal divinity from religion and then dress it in technological disguise? Yes, but to make this theft clear one needs to think less of an “omnipotent biblical sky father” and more in terms of the Greek or Hindu gods who capriciously love, hate, create, and destroy like us albeit “on a much grander scale.”29 In other words, the technological gods of the transhumanists look less like the transcendent God of Christianity and more like the overgrown humans of primitive polytheism and nature religion. The infinite qualitative distance between the uncreated God and the created creation posited by biblical believers goes unattended to in H+ discourse.30 Divinity, Harari tells us, is not anything “metaphysical” but practical. Transhumanist “divinity” denotes an exercise of the human will through “specific super-abilities” attained from technology so that the human being and nature itself can be transcended or even left wholly behind. Leaving nature behind includes designing and creating new beings, transforming one’s body into a cyborg, controlling the environment and the weather, reading minds and communicating at a distance, traveling at very high speeds, and escaping death and living indefinitely.31 This focus on scientific technique as the path of divinity, that is, the control and manipulation of nature to empower man through the exercise of the will, is no surprise. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) himself, one of the fathers of scientific method, saw the task of science as both “to establish and extend the power and dominion of the human race itself over the universe” and that “the true and lawful goal of the sciences is none other than this: that human life be endowed with new discoveries and powers,” that is, “lay firmly the foundations and extend more widely the limits of the power and greatness of man.”32

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BEYOND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE, LIFE, AND MORALITY In envisioning the techno-mangod, today’s transhumanists add Intelligence Amplification (IA) to Artificial Intelligence. The IA will be accomplished through installing a chip in the human brain (connected to Wi-Fi for updates), from more memory to better mathematical and linguistic skills, more “emotional intelligence,” and even as yet unimagined carnal facility. This is what led Gerald McKenny to speak of enhancement technologies as “technologies of desire” not need, and therefor “technologies of excess.”33 In response, some theoreticians have tried to imagine how technology might make us good and hypothesize how “it might be possible to use biotechnology in a manner that would promote virtue, and thus serve as a means to improve ourselves, morally speaking.”34 But the ultimate quest for transhumanists past and present has been to synthesize immortality. Indeed, Bacon, in his The History of Life and Death (1638), drew up a systematic history of corporeality in the quest to isolate relevant forms that might lead to immortality at best, but, more realistically, that future natural philosophers (i.e., scientists) “will become the instruments and dispensers of God’s power and mercy in prolonging and renewing the life of man . . . [and that] these our shoes and garments (I mean our frail bodies) are as little worn out as possible.”35 Later in the nineteenth century, the eccentric Russian philosopher Nikolai Fedorov (1828–1903) held that the general resurrection did not follow upon the resurrection of Christ because it was the conscious “Common Task” of humanity that constitutes the “essence of Christianity” to bring about the self-consciousness of the Earth over the force of other celestial bodies and “involve them in a single life-giving force of resuscitation” of all things in the universe,36 thereby creating paradise or the Kingdom of God on earth.37 In recent times, this ancient quest has resulted in a whole class of scientific transhumanists whose goal is to “Live Forever or Die Trying,” the unofficial motto of scientist Bill Andrews’s Reno-based biotech company Sierra Sciences that aims “to extend the human lifespan and healthspan.”38 The more flamboyant English (but California based) anti-aging activist Aubrey de Grey regularly states that “within decades” people will live to 1,000 years (transhumanists always say their grand technological predictions will take place “in a decade” or “within decades”).39 However, it is in the relentless focus on “intelligence,” human or artificial, that ultimately reveals the truly diabolical shape of transhumanism as the religion of mangodhood, which elevates the human being to the focus of everything as a sort of supreme divine EGO. Kurzweil envisions that in the Sixth and Final Epoch of evolution, human intelligence “will begin to saturate the matter

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and energy in its midst” and spread out from the earth to take over all parts of the universe: “we will within this century be ready to infuse our solar system with our intelligence through self-replicating non-biological intelligence. It will then spread out to the rest of the universe.”40 This universe that will eventually become conscious is God for Kurzweil.41 Transhumanism, as Bulgakov has shown, ends in pantheism. Harari calls it the religion of “Dataism” with God as “the Internet-of-All-Things.”42 But the deity being adored here is the humanbeing-as-artificial-god, tricked once again by Satan into seizing its divine inheritance before it was ready for so great a responsibility. GODMANHOOD: CREATION, SALVATION, HUMAN ACTION, AND DIVINE ACTION43 But how does Orthodoxy, the vision of Godmanhood, differ from the mangodhood of Transhumanism? If Transhumanism begins with the perceived failure of creation to live up to the divine aspirations of humanity, then Orthodoxy begins with gratitude for God’s gift of creation as a living Sacrament of his presence. Creation, moreover, as a gift need not have been created. God does not “need” it; He could have acted otherwise. Creation is a surprise. Yet creation is also not “accidental” or merely arbitrary, but is a gift that in some sense is to be expected as a freely given necessity from God as a God of love.44 It is created as a fitting and appropriate (but wholly unequal) partner for God in an exchange of love and joy with its Creator who wishes to shower out his blessings upon another. Maximus the Confessor (590–662) expresses this well: God, full beyond all fullness, brought creatures into being not because He had need of anything, but so that they might participate in Him in proportion to their capacity and that He Himself might rejoice in His works (cf. Ps. 104:31), through seeing them joyful and ever filled to overflowing with His inexhaustible gifts.45

There is, therefore, most certainly, unlike transhumanism, a firm distinction between the uncreated Creator God and the created creation whose pinnacle is the human being. However, Orthodoxy does not thereby alienate God from creation. Nor does it need to collapse the two—like transhumanism—­ending in pantheism. The distinction of God and creation in practice is tension filled as the creature is continually striving beyond its created capacity to participate in the divine which capacity God graciously enlarges.46 Thus, we participate in God to a greater or lesser degree according to our God-given capacity.47 But how do we participate in him?

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God creates, sustains, and reveals himself in the cosmos not in any distant fashion but most intimately through his multiple divine uncreated energies which are his dynamic and essential activity since energies are the activity of a nature (here the divine nature), as Gregory Palamas (1296–1359) writes: “God both is and is said to be the nature of all beings, in so far as all partake of Him and subsist by means of this participation: not, however, by participation in His nature—far from it—but by participation in His energy.”48 The energies are personal insofar as they are the eternal unified activity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but we can experience them in the world through the one through whom God works and who utilizes the energies: the Holy Spirit49 who is “everywhere present and filling all things,” as a well-known Eastern Orthodox daily prayer expresses it. These energies pervade the creation, but are not identical with it, and through them a creature can participate graciously, consciously, and through ascetical labors in God, and become divinized. They are never separated from the divine essence because they are the personal activity of God in the world, but, while the energies, as they are “indivisibly divided and multiple”50 in creation, are accessible, the essence is indivisible and therefore inaccessible and unknowable to creatures.51 As in transhumanism, in Orthodoxy the human being is the pinnacle, the crown of creation.52 However, this “kingship” of creation assumes a special relationship of loving dependence on God the Creator which is something totally alien to transhumanism’s hubristic auto-divinization. One of the traditional ways this uniqueness of humanity is expressed is by talking about the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1:26–27). The source of the potential “godhood” of humankind, then, is a reference to another who is his source and on whom he always depends. The divine image has often been interpreted in terms of how the human being is given “the superiority of reason,”53 but reason was not just understood in terms of discursive rationality,54 but freedom and creativity.55 It was thought to be paralleled by the fact that the human being of all animals was created upright so it might look up to see God, whom he resembled, worshipping him and acknowledging him as his source and origin and not being “dragged down to earth”; “his head is lifted high towards things above, that he may look up to what is akin to him.”56 But to be made to be in free conscious communion and union with God is to be formed in, through, and for Jesus Christ (Col. 1:16) and it is for this reason that Irenaeus of Lyons (v.130–c.202) writes that the human being was made in “image of Christ.”57 Irenaeus, and other Greek Fathers after him, elaborated on this idea by distinguishing between the image and the likeness of God. He understands “image” as in reference to the Son, as the image of the invisible God (Colossians 1:15),58 whereas “likeness” he understands as in reference to the Spirit who is referred to as God’s “figure.”59 The image of God might be understood as free, rational, and creative personhood with the

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innate possibility of partaking in conscious fellowship with God in Christ, and the likeness of God is an achieved reality when the image, by direct communion with the Person of the Word of God, Jesus Christ, is transformed into the finite image of the divine life. The human being, then, was made, with creation, to be united with God in Jesus Christ. One way of putting this is to think of one unitary divine plan. There is no “Plan B.” The human being, for Irenaeus, was made for salvation which is “a second creation by means of His passion which is that [creation] out of death.”60 Jesus Christ, as the eternal Word of God and Creator, not only precedes the created, but he precedes the created precisely as its Savior, which means that the created is, not only at the end after the Fall, but at the beginning prior to the Fall, understood as that which will be saved, as Irenaeus put it: “Since he pre-existed as one who saves, it was necessary that what might be saved also be created so that the one who saves might not be in vain.”61 Maximus the Confessor understood this idea of humanity being foreordained for union with God slightly differently by seeing one divine plan but with different modes. God, he argued, planned from before the ages that “we should exist in Him” and through participation being “imbued with the exact characteristics of His goodness.”62 In this way, humankind might be a “God by grace” through God coming to “reside in all beings in a manner appropriate to each” by the many converging “around the one human nature” so that “God will be all things in everything, encompassing all things and making them subsist in Himself.”63 Adam was, therefore, called in this way to be a mediator of the different extremes of creation synthesizing them into unity and drawing them up into union with their Creator. It is precisely because humanity can unite the extremes that he was created last as a “kind of natural bond mediating between the universal extremes through his parts.”64 Therefore, in Orthodoxy the human being, unlike in transhumanism, is not only the king of creation but also a servant or caretaker of it and called to unify and perfect it in synergy with the Creator. Now had this “first covenant [of Adam] . . . remained blameless, there would have been no occasion for a second,” which includes the whole divine economy including the cross, so that the mystery accomplished in Christ’s incarnation is nothing other than “proof and fulfilment of the mystery which our forefather failed to attain at the beginning of the age.”65 In other words, God would have become incarnate even if there had been no Fall. The incarnation was the “blessed end for which all things were brought into being” since “for the sake of Christ—that is, for the whole mystery of Christ—that all the ages and the beings existing within those ages received their beginning and end in Christ.”66 In the story of the Fall, the human being turned from this vocation of uniting heaven and earth in himself. Adam “misused his freedom” turning in desire

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from the good which was permissible “to what was inferior” which was the forbidden fruit. Thus, Adam freely became estranged from the “divine and blessed goal” which was to be a “God by grace” and instead ended up as “a pile of dust.”67 It would be a mistake to think, however, that the religion of Godmanhood was somehow anti-science and anti-knowledge and wishes humankind to know only what fits his lowly station in comparison to the religion of mangodhood which celebrates human beings having the ultimate knowledge of reality as God (“you will be like God, knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:5)). In fact, some Church Fathers taught that there was nothing in and of itself wrong with Genesis 3’s “knowledge of good and evil.” What was wrong was seizing that knowledge before the human being was mature enough to assimilate it and without a loving obedience and dependence on God, which is precisely what we have argued is the mistake of transhumanism. That is indeed death as it was directly contrary to the express word of God (Gen. 1:16–17, 3:2–3) and to be in communion with him was life. This was the ruse of Satan, as Ephrem the Syrian (c.306–373) writes: He deceived the husbandman So that he plucked prematurely The fruit which gives forth its sweetness Only in due season A fruit that, out of season, Proves bitter to him who plucks it. Through a ruse did the serpent Reveal the truth, Knowing well the result Would be the opposite, because of their Presumption; For blessing becomes a curse To him who seizes it in sin.68

The Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil is, Gregory of Nazianzus (329– 390) tells us, “contemplation” and was not planted “in an evil way nor forbidden through envy” as the serpent opined, but contemplation “would be good if possessed at the right time” and “only safe for those of perfect disposition,” but death for those who are simple and “greedy in their desire.”69 The Tree, Maximus the Confessor likewise contends, when “spiritually contemplated” possesses the knowledge of good, but when received in a “corporeal manner” leads to evil and death as it becomes “the teacher of passions, making them oblivious to divine realities.”70 Had humanity rejected the serpent’s appeal, then in time humanity would have eaten of the Tree of Knowledge, it no longer being withheld from them,

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and from it they would have acquired (as transhumanism now seeks without God and by its own will) “infallible knowledge,” and from the Tree of Life “immortal life,” and they would have “acquired divinity in humanity.”71 Having “already become God through divinization” humankind might have been able to examine “with God the creations of God” and come to know them “not as man but as God” since they would have had by grace the very “same wise and informed knowledge of beings that God has, on account of his intellect and powers of perception.”72 The serpent, by convincing humanity to disobey God, “withheld divinity from them by means of the divinity which it promised them, and it brought about that those, to whom it had promised enlightenment from the Tree of Knowledge, should not have their eyes illumined by the Tree of Life as promised.”73 This is precisely why transhumanism is Satanic. It falls into the age-old ruse of the Evil One in seizing divinity for itself and thereby losing it forever. This vocation of being partakers of the divine nature is, Orthodoxy teaches, reattained in Jesus Christ and specifically in, by, and through his death culminating in the new life of the resurrection. Here we see yet another difference from transhumanism which attempts to eliminate death technologically. The religion of Godmanhood, in contrast, sees death in Christ as the only sure path to a truly eternal life. In the famous formula of Irenaeus, God in Christ “became what we are in order that He might make us what He is Himself.”74 Christ both reopens the door and sets the pattern of our own divinization. His own “unfathomable self-emptying” in taking human flesh and obedience even unto death on a cross was “brought about for the deification of our nature.”75 As Athanasius of Alexandria (296–373) famously put it: “For he became man that we might become divine; and he revealed himself through a body that we might receive an idea of the invisible Father; and he endured insults from men that we might inherit incorruption.”76 Through his life, death, and resurrection we are given eternal life through participating in that deifying death and resurrection through our baptism into his body—the church. We are then conformed to his cruciform and resurrected shape through his Spirit by our anointing in Chrismation (in the West, Confirmation). These sacraments of initiation and rebirth (Baptism and Chrismation) are renewed every time we receive the Eucharist, consuming the body and blood of the crucified and resurrected Lord and thereby entering into the deifying mystery of life through death. The pattern of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ is the pattern of our liberation from sin and death and our ultimate divinization: For through His passion He conferred dispassion, through suffering repose, and through death eternal life. By His privations in the flesh He re-established and

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renewed the human state, and by His own incarnation He bestowed on human nature the supranatural grace of deification.77

Yet one cannot appropriate the deifying gift of Christ without obedience, humility, and repentance; nor without profound acknowledgment of our dependence on God, “for it is by warfare the soul makes progress,” and “Give blood and receive the Spirit.”78 The self-humiliation of God even unto death on the cross which leads to our deification sets the pattern of the whole spiritual life as an unceasing “salvific labor of asceticism” or spiritual training for the life to come that involves “extract[ing] the nails of desire, which fasten us to sensual pleasure” thereby learning “self-mastery” and becoming “genuine disciples of virtue” ever bent on the “devotion to the Beautiful.”79 In working upon the self ascetically, one strives for a state of stillness before God ceaselessly calling upon the name of Jesus in the Prayer of the Heart:80 “Stillness is unceasing worship and waiting upon God. Let the remembrance of Jesus be present with each breath, and then you will know the value of stillness.”81 Transhumanism, as we saw earlier, sees the transformation of the human being into a god as a purely external process of technical exertion of the will upon the self (seen in the most materialist fashion as the body and brain). There is no prayer and contemplation here. There is no calling upon a savior. In stark contrast, Orthodoxy or the religion of Godmanhood sees salvation in light of a sort of prayerful science of self-transformation through interior self-work ever calling on God in Christ in faith. The heart or soul is the focus of the religion of Godmanhood not, as in Mangodhood, the brain: The heart itself is but a small vessel, yet there also are [there] dragons and there are lions; there are poisonous beasts and all the treasures of evil. And there are rough and uneven roads; there are precipices. But there is also God, also the angels, the life and the kingdom, the light and the apostles, the treasures of grace—there are all things.82

As we said above, only repentance for our sins, obedience and humility lead to the “dispassion that deifies” (apatheia).83 The heart of cultivating dispassion is the cutting out, or complete renunciation, of your own will in all things— “distrust of oneself in everything, however good it may be, right to the end of one’s life”—so that one’s will might be reborn in God’s will.84 The monastic tradition saw this “tomb of the will and the resurrection of humility”85 as only taking shape in our complete surrender to another in obedience, in this case, a spiritual Father or Mother, whose direction (i.e., will) is taken as being from God: “Blessed is he who mortifies his will to the end, and leaves the care of himself to his director in the Lord; for he will be placed at the right hand of the Crucified.”86 The religion of mangodhood/transhumanism, in contrast,

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begins with the will to power over creation. John Climacus (579–649) summarizes the ascetical “narrow way” leading to deification in a fashion found throughout Orthodox ascetical literature: The following will show you what the narrow way means: mortification of the stomach, all-night standing, water in moderation, short rations of bread, the purifying draught of dishonour, sneers, derision, insults, the cutting out of one’s will, patience in annoyances, unmurmuring endurance of scorn, disregard of insults, and the habit, when wronged, of bearing it sturdily; when slandered, of not being indignant; when humiliated, not to be angry; when condemned, to be humble. Blessed are they who follow the way we have just described, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.87

We have just been describing what is generally called the first stage of the spiritual path, the purgative, which is for beginners and involves “spiritual warfare,”88 whereby through cutting out the will and putting death to the passions one is crucified to the world and the world to oneself, following the example of Christ (Gal. 6:14), and in this way receiving eternal life through death.89 After it, for the mature, follows the “illuminative” stage when being freed from dispassion, one has, through the Spirit, a “spiritual knowledge of created beings.”90 Finally, one arrives at the “mystical and perfective stage”—deification proper—where one comes to the “measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ” (Eph. 4:13) and one is initiated into the “hidden mysteries of God and our being filled with ineffable wisdom through union with the Holy Spirit.”91 Theosis, as should now be clear, underlies almost every aspect of Orthodoxy as the religion of Godmanhood. It is not some additional extra, but the presupposition of all doctrine, worship, and ascetical practice in Orthodoxy. It is essential and utterly incompatible with transhumanism. CONCLUSION The Satanic temptation of transhumanism is nested within the larger Western technologization of all of reality. Technology is not simply about dishwashers, toasters, and memory sticks but also about truth as a way of revelation, almost self-revelation: “Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.”92 If technology is about a sort of revelation, a type of revealing of a reality beneath the things themselves, then what is revealed? Is there a “personal”

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reality revealing itself in the disturbing new advances in biotech? I don’t think it is Being, Heidegger’s detheized finite G/god, as this is simply a personal mythology of the philosopher. It cannot be a self-revelation of God as Holy Trinity in Christ, the religion of Godmanhood, as transhumanism is Satanic, but what we see with biotech, the religion of mangodhood, is a complete obliteration of the creature as creature and God as God. So maybe, short of biotech revealing a malevolent deity, there is no divine self-revealing happening here other than a sort of holding up of the mirror to humanity so that it can Dorian Grey-like see its own awful image as Übermensch. Thus, if transhumanism reveals anything it is simply the things themselves as they really are in their relationship to us, defined entirely by our own power over them which is our power to manipulate them and us endlessly unto Kingdom come. So what we see with human biotechnological enhancement is the revelation of the horror of our own auto-divinization, our mangodhood, how we have transformed ourselves into an oversized and disembodied brain like IT in Madeleine L’Engle’s A Wrinkle in Time: A disembodied brain. An oversized brain, just enough larger than normal to be completely revolting and terrifying. A living brain. A brain that pulsed and quivered, that seized and commanded. No wonder the brain was called IT. IT was the most horrible, the most repellent thing she had ever seen, far more nauseating than anything she had ever imagined with her conscious mind, or that had ever tormented her in her most terrible nightmares.93

But there is another path and another vision than this nightmare: the pre-modern and pre-humanist vision of Godmanhood. It is to be hoped that this vision splendid might become more widely known and serve as a sort of check on the Luciferian fantasies of mangodhood seen in contemporary transhumanism. But such a project of the dialogue of the ancient wisdom of Eastern Orthodoxy with modern technology, of Mt. Athos with Silicon Valley, has only just been initiated.94 On this new venture, perhaps, stands the hopes of a more humane future that looks not just to the brain, but to the heart, a future where the power of technology rightly serves its creators, but is not confused with the Creator. NOTES 1. This chapter overlaps in content with “Godmanhood vs Mangodhood: An Eastern Orthodox Response to Transhumanism,” Studies in Christian Ethics, 32.2

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(2019), 200–215. I am grateful especially to Ted Peters for help with the text and for pointing me to numerous scholarly resources. In addition, I am grateful to Michael Burdett, Victoria Lorrimar, Ruth Coates, Gregory Tucker, Marcus Plested, Christopher Sprecher, and Regula Zwahlen for their help in different ways with this chapter. 2. “Transhumanist FAQ,” found at https://humanityplus​.org​/philosophy​/transhumanist​-faq/ (last accessed: 2 May 2020). 3. See Tracy J. Trothen and Calvin Mercer, eds., Religion and Human Enhancement: Death, Values, and Morality (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), Michael Burdett, Eschatology and the Technological Future (NY/London: Routledge, 2015) and Ted Peters, “The Future of Transhumanism as a New Religious Movement” (Spring 2014), found at https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=FLHnEM6B3hA (last accessed: 2 May 2020). 4. Sergei Bulgakov, “Heroism and Asceticism: Reflections on the Religious Nature of the Russian Intelligentsia” in Vekhi-Landmarks: A Collection of Articles about the Russian Intelligentsia, eds. and trans. Marshall S. Shatz and Judith E. Zimmerman (Armonk, NY/London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 17–49 at 26 and The Philosophy of Economy: The World as Household, trans. Catherine Evtuhov (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 149; For commentary, see Ruth Coates, “Feuerbach, Kant, Dostoevskii: The Evolution of ‘Heroism’ and ‘Asceticism’ in Bulgakov’s Work to 1909” in Landmarks Revisited: The Vekhi Symposium One Hundred Years On, eds. Robin Aizelwood and Ruth Coates (Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2013), pp. 287–307 and Burdett, Eschatology and the Technological Future, pp. 213–214. 5. See David Vincent Meconi, The One Christ: St. Augustine’s Theology of Deification (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013), Vladimir Kharlamov, ed., Theōsis: Deification in Christian Theology, Volume 2 (Cambridge: James Clarke and Co., 2012), Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung, eds., Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions (Madison Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007), Stephen Finland and Vladimir Kharlamov, eds., Theōsis: Deification in Christian Theology (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2006) and Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 6. See Jeremy Pilch, ‘Breathing the Spirit with Both Lungs’: Deification in the Work of Vladimir Solov’ev (Leuven: Peeters, 2018), Oliver Smith, Vladimir Soloviev and the Spiritualization of Matter (Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2011) and Brandon Gallaher, “The Christological Focus of Vladimir Solov’ev’s Sophiology,” Modern Theology, 25.4 (October 2009), pp. 617–646. 7. See Nikolai Berdyaev, “Concerning the Character of the Russian Religious Thought of the XIX Century” (1930) [Sovremennye zapiski, 1930, No. 42, pp. 309–343], trans. Stephen Janos, found at http://www​.berdyaev​.com​/berdiaev​/berd​_lib​ /1930​_345​.html (last accessed: 2 May 2020). Also see ‘God-man and man-god— are polarities of human nature. This involves two paths—either from God to man or from man to God’ (Berdyaev, “The Revelation about Man in the Creativity of Doestoevsky” (1918) [Russkaya Mysl, March–April 1918, pp. 39–61], trans. Stephen

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Janos, found at http://www​.berdyaev​.com​/berdiaev​/berd​_lib​/1918​_294​.html (last accessed: 2 May 2020). 8. See Ruth Coates, Deification in Russian Religious Thought: Between the Revolutions, 1905–1917 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 9. See Maximus the Confessor, On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua, 2 vols., ed. and trans. Nicholas Constas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 1: Amb. 7 [PG 91.1084C-D], p. 107. 10. Sergii Bulgakov, Dva Grada: Issledovaniia o priroda obshchestvennykh idealov (St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humanistic Institute Press, 1997), pp. 8–9. 11. See discussion in Ronald Cole-Turner, ed., Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013) and Ted Peters, “Can We Enhance the Imago Dei” in eds. Nancy Murphy and Christopher C. Knight, Human Identity at the Intersection of Science, Technology and Religion (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 215–238. 12. Max More, “A Letter to Mother Nature” in Max More and Natasha Vita-More, eds., The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and the Philosophy of the Human Future (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), pp. 449–450. 13. Simon Young, Designer Evolution: A Transhumanist Manifesto (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006), p. 32 and see Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 374. 14. Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Vintage, 2017), p. 428. 15. Ibid., p. 429. 16. Ibid., p. 454. 17. Ibid., p. 462. 18. Russell Blackford, “The Great Transition: Ideas and Anxieties” in The Transhumanist Reader, p. 421. 19. Giulio Prisco, “Transcendent Engineering,” The Transhumanist Reader, pp. 234–235. 20. More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” The Transhumanist Reader, 10 and Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, p. 373. 21. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 124, 126 (these quotations appear in More and Kurzweil: see n. 20). 22. Ibid., p. 147. 23. Ibid., p. 227. 24. See Burdett, Eschatology and the Technological Future and Technology and the Rise of Transhumanism: Beyond Genetic Engineering (Cambridge: Grove Books Ltd., 2014). 25. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, pp. 7–9 and More and Vita-More, eds., The Transhumanist Reader, pp. 361–417. 26. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, pp. 370ff.

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27. Martin Rees, Our Final Hour: A Scientist’s Warning: How Terror, Error, and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind’s Future in This Century—On Earth and Beyond (New York: Basic Books, 2003), p. 19. 28. Harari, Homo Deus, pp. 53–54. 29. Ibid., p. 54. 30. More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism” in The Transhumanist Reader, p. 8. 31. Harari, Homo Deus, p. 54. 32. Francis Bacon, The New Organon and Related Writings, ed. Fulton H. Anderson, trans. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath (New York/London: Macmillan/Library of Liberal Arts, 1960), p. 118 (I.CXXIX), p. 78 (I.LXXXI), p. 106 (I.CXVI); See Burdett, Eschatology and the Technological Future, pp. 12–18. 33. Gerald P. McKenny, “Technologies of Desire: Theology, Ethics, and the Enhancement of Human Traits,” Theology Today, 59.1 (April 2002), pp. 90–103 at 100. 34. Mark Walker, “Enhancing Genetic Virtue: A Project for Twenty-first Century Humanity?,” Politics and Life Sciences, 28.2 (September 2009), pp. 27–47 at 30. 35. Bacon, The History of Life and Death or The Second Title in The Natural and Experimental History for the Foundation of Philosophy: Being the Third Part of the Instauratio Magna in The Works of Francis Bacon, eds. and trans. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, 14 vols. (London: Longmans & Co., 1861 [1857–1874]), Vol. V: p. 215. 36. Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov, The Philosophy of the Common Task in What as Man Created For?: The Philosophy of the Common Task, eds. and trans. Elisabeth Koutaissoff and Marilyn Minto (Bath/Lausanne: Honeyglen Publishing/L’Age D’Homme, 1990), Part III, p. 80; cf. Burdett, Eschatology and the Technological Future, pp. 18–24. 37. Fedorov, “Supramoralism or General Synthesis (Universal Union)” in What was Man Created For?, pp. 132–133. 38. “Sierra Science: Biotech for Enhanced Living,” found at https://www​.sierrasci​ .com​/about​_us (last accessed: 2 May 2020) and see the documentary, found at “The Immortalists,” http://theimmortalists​.com/ (last accessed: 2 May 2020). 39. Kira Peikoff, “Anti-Aging Pioneer Aubrey de Grey: ‘People in Middle Age Now Have a Fair Chance,’” 30 January 2018, found at https://leapsmag​.com​/anti​ -aging​-pioneer​-aubrey​-de​-grey​-people​-middle​-age​-now​-fair​-chance/ (last accessed: 2 May 2020). 40. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, pp. 21, 372; Compare Bulgakov (The Philosophy of Economy, n. 10, p. 303) on Fichtean ideas of nature becoming reorganized by human intelligence. 41. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, p. 390. 42. Harari, Homo Deus, pp. 428–462. 43. For a more detailed account, see Gallaher, “Creativity, Covenant and Christ” in God’s Creativity and Human Action: Christian and Muslim Perspectives, eds. Lucinda Mosher and David Marshall (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), pp. 79–99.

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44. See Brandon Gallaher, Freedom and Necessity in Modern Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 45. Maximus the Confessor, 400 Chapters on Love, 3.46 [PG 90, 1029C] in The Philokalia, 4 vols., trans. G. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, Kallistos Ware, Vol. 2 (London: Faber & Faber, 1979–1995), p. 90 (5th volume forthcoming). 46. See Maximus the Confessor, On Difficulties in Sacred Scripture: The Responses to Thalassios, trans. Maximos Constas (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018), 22.7, p. 153 and Brandon Gallaher, “Graced Creatureliness: Ontological Tension in the Uncreated/Created Distinction in the Sophiologies of Solov’ev, Bulgakov and Milbank,” Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 47.1–2 (2006), pp. 163–190 at 185–189. 47. Gregory Palamas, Topics of Natural and Theological Science and on the Moral Ascetical Life: 150 Texts’, §69 in The Philokalia, 4: p. 378. 48. Ibid., §78, p. 382. 49. Ibid., §75, p. 380 and §129, p. 407. 50. Ibid., §69, p. 378. 51. Ibid., §74, p. 380. 52. For an Orthodox understanding of anthropology, see Ecumenical Patriarchate, Greek Archdiocese of America, For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2020), §§1–7, 61, 68, pp. 1–8, 81, 92–93. (See also https://www​.goarch​.org​/social​-ethos (last accessed: 2 May 2020). 53. Basil of Caesarea, “First Homily: On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 1: On that which is according to the Image,” in On the Human Condition, trans. Nonna Verna Harrison (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2005), §7, p. 36. 54. Augustine of Hippo, The Literal Meaning of Genesis: Volume I [De genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus], 3.20.30, trans. John Hammond Taylor, ACW 41 (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), p. 96. 55. See Basil of Caesarea, “Homily on Psalm 48,” 8, Exegetic Homilies, trans. Agnes Way, FC 46 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 311–31 at 324–25 [PG 29b.449B–C] and John of Damascus, Orthodox Faith in St John of Damascus: Writings, 2.30, trans. Frederic H. Chase (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), pp. 264–265. 56. Basil of Caesarea, “Second Homily: On the Origin of Humanity, Discourse 2: On the Human Being,” in On the Human Condition, §15, p. 61. 57. Irenaeus of Lyons, On the Apostolic Preaching, trans. John Behr (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), §22 and see 2 Cor. 4:4. 58. Ibid., 22 and Adversus omnes Haereses [=AH]/Contre les Hérésies (1965– 1982), Sources Chrétiennes, trans., ed. Adelin Rousseau et al. (Paris: Cerf, 1965–82), 5.1.3 and 12.1 (English translations adapted from Ante-Nicene Fathers), 5.16.2 and compare 2 Cor. 4:4. 59. Figuratio (Ibid., 4.7.4). ANF translates as similitude; cf. ibid., 5.6.1. 60. Ibid., 5.23.2. 61. “Cum enim praeexsisteret saluans, oportebat et quod saluaretur fieri, uti non vacuum sit saluans” (Ibid., 3.22.3).

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62. Maximus the Confessor, 1: Amb. 7 (PG 91.1097C), p. 133. 63. Ibid., 1: Amb. 7 (PG 91.1092C), p. 121. 64. Ibid., 2: Amb. 41 (PG 91.1304D–1305B), pp. 102–105. 65. Ibid., 1: Amb. 7 (PG 91.1097D), p. 133. 66. Maximus the Confessor, Responses to Thalassios, 60.3–4, pp. 428–429 and see ibid., 22.2, p. 150. 67. Maximus the Confessor, 1: Amb. 7 (PG 91.1092C-D). 68. Ephrem the Syrian, Hymns on Paradise, trans. Sebastian Brock (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1990), Hymn XII. 3, p. 161. 69. Gregory Nazianzus, “Oration 45: On Holy Pascha,” in Festal Orations, trans. Nonna Verna Harrison (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008), 45.8, p. 167. 70. Maximus the Confessor, Responses to Thalassios, “Introduction,” 1.2.18, p. 87. 71. Ephrem the Syrian, The Commentary on Genesis, Section 2, §23 in Hymns on Paradise, p. 214. 72. Maximus the Confessor, Responses to Thalassios, “Introduction,” 1.2.18, p. 87. 73. Ephrem the Syrian, The Commentary on Genesis, Section 2, §23, p. 214. 74. Irenaeus, AH V.pref. 75. Maximus the Confessor, “On the Lord’s Prayer,” in The Philokalia, 2, p. 286. 76. Athanasius of Alexandria, On the Incarnation, §54 in Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, ed. and trans. Robert W. Thomson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), p. 269. 77. Maximus the Confessor, “Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice,” in The Philokalia, 2: Fourth Century, §43, p. 246. 78. The Sayings of the Desert Fathers: The Alphabetical Collection, 2nd Ed., trans. Benedicta Ward (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1984), John the Dwarf, §13, p. 88 and Longinus, §5, p. 123. 79. Maximus the Confessor, 1: Amb. 13 (PG 91.1209A-B), p. 351. 80. See Kallistos Ware, The Power of the Name: The Jesus Prayer in Orthodox Spirituality, 2nd Ed, Fairacres Publication 44 (Oxford: SLG Press, 1986), The Philokalia: A Classic Text of Orthodox Spirituality, eds. Brock Bingaman and Bradley Nassif (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) and Christopher Johnson, The Globalization of Hesychasm and the Jesus Prayer: Contesting Contemplation (London: Continuum, 2010). 81. John Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, 2nd Ed., trans. and ed. Lazarus Moore (Boston: Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 2001), 27.60–61, p. 207. 82. Pseudo-Macarius, The Fifty Spiritual Homilies and the Great Letter, ed. and trans. George A. Maloney (New York/Mahwah, Paulist Press, 1992), Hom. 43.7, p. 222. 83. St. Theognostos, “On the Practice of the Virtues, Contemplation and the Priesthood,” in The Philokalia, 2: §25, p. 364. 84. Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, 4.5, p. 22. 85. Ibid., 4.3, p. 21.

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86. Ibid., 4.44, p. 38. 87. Ibid., 2.8, p. 13. 88. Nikitas Stithatos, “On Spiritual Knowledge, Love and the Perfection of Living: 100 Texts,” in The Philokalia, 4: §§41–42, p. 150. 89. See Dorotheos of Gaza, “I: On Renunciation,” in Discourses and Sayings, trans. Eric P. Wheeler (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1977), p. 85. 90. Stithatos, “On Spiritual Knowledge,” §43, p. 151. 91. Ibid., §44, pp. 151–152. 92. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 12. 93. Madeleine L’Engle, A Wrinkle in Time (New York: Dell, 1962), p. 158. 94. See Ecumenical Patriarchate, Greek Archdiocese of America, For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2020), §§68–78, pp. 91–106. (See also https://www​.goarch​.org​ /social​-ethos (last accessed: 2 May 2020)).

Chapter 11

The Transhumanist Pied Pipers A Jewish Caution against False Messianism Hava Tirosh-Samuelson

In this chapter, I will argue that Jewish thinkers and other rational humanists should reject transhumanism because it calls for the planned obsolescence of the human species. Why? Transhumanists claim that biological humanity, the product of a long evolutionary process, is not only an imperfect “work in progress” but a form of life that is inherently flawed and that has no right to exist. According to the transhumanist Pied Pipers, human beings must recognize their innate imperfection and do everything they can to bring about the rise of a posthuman species that will eventually displace and replace us flawed humans. Transhumanism (AKA H+) is not an improved form of humanism. Rather than plan for us to flourish as biological, social, and political humans, they pipe a tune that denigrates our humanity. H+ is leading us voluntarily to our own extinction. Do we Homo sapiens want to march toward collective suicide? This chapter argues that transhumanist futurism should be rejected as false messianism. HOW DO WE IDENTIFY THE TRANSHUMANIST PIED PIPER? What tune is the Transhumanist (also known as Humanity Plus or H+) Pied Piper playing? According to the leading transhumanist theorist Nick Bostrom, “transhumanism is a loosely defined movement . . . [that] represents an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the ethical, social and strategic issues raised by present and anticipated future technologies.”1 In the same essay, Bostrom also refers to transhumanism as a “worldview that has a value component” and that broader definition is more appropriate. Transhumanism is a vision about the role of technology in the 183

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evolution of the human species. There are many facets to transhumanism, but they all cohere into the claim that the human species is on the verge of a new phase in its evolution as the result of converging technologies such as genomics, robotics, informatics, and nanotechnology. According to transhumanism, these technologies will bring about the physiological and cognitive enhancement of human beings that will pave the way for the replacement of biological humans by autonomous, superintelligent, decision-making machines, which will constitute the posthuman age. Whereas biological humans emerged out of the slow, uncontrolled, and unpredictable process of evolution, the process that will bring about the posthuman will be fast, controlled, and directed, brought about by human engineering. Described as “enhancement revolution” (Buchanan), “radical evolution” (Garreau), “designer evolution” (Young), “conscious evolution” (Chu),2 this futurist scenario turns the human into a design project. By means of new technologies, the human species will be redesigned so as to transcend its biological limits and pave the way for the emergence of a new posthuman species. Numerically speaking the transhumanist movement is still very small. Only several thousand people worldwide are loosely associated with the organization Humanity Plus, or H+ (formerly known as the World Transhumanist Association), as well as with institutions such as the Foresight Institute, the (now defunct) Extropian Institute, Alcor Life Extension Foundation, the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technology (IEET), the Future of Humanity Institute, the Machine Intelligence Research Institute (the former Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence), the Mormon Transhumanist Association, and World Future Society, to name a few. The IEET in Trinity College publishes the Journal of Evolution and Technology (originally named the Journal of Transhumanism), where transhumanists interested in “futurological research into long term developments in science, technology, and philosophy” publish their ideas and reflect on their societal ramifications, and Humanity+ produced the H+ Magazine, which published five issues (2008–2009) in print before it became web-only publication, Humanity+ Media. Indeed, the Internet is the main vehicle for the dissemination and proliferation of transhumanism, and websites of non-profit organizations such as the Transhuman Policy Center, the Center for Genetics and Society, the Center or Transhumanity-Immortal Life, Terasem Movement Foundation, 2045 Initiative, and the Society for Universal Immortalism attest to the robust global discourse that consists of conferences, workshops, publications, posts, and blogs. The Internet is not just a means to an end but also integral aspect of the futuristic vision itself, because cyberspace is where transhumanists experience transcendence, happiness, and perfection. Although the H+ movement is highly decentralized,3 several individuals have emerged as its main spokespersons, including Nick Bostrom, David

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Pearce, Max More, Natasha Vita-More, James Hughes, Giulio Prisco, Eliezer Yudkowsky, Anders Sandberg, Hugo de Garis, Kevin Warwick, Ben Goertzle, Aubrey de Grey, Martine Rothblatt, Steve Fuller, Robin Hanson, and Andy Clark, to name a few prominent voices. Other famous figures are associated with the movement and contribute to its cultural prestige, even though they do not define themselves as transhumanists. They include the inventor and futurist Ray Kurzweil, the computer scientists Hans Moravec and the late Marvin Minsky, the biologist Gregory Stock, the physicist Frank Tipler, the sociologist and science policy administrator William Sims Bainbridge, the science fiction writer Vernor Vinge, and the science writer Ronald Bailey, among many others.4 Since transhumanism is rooted in scientific research, many proponents of transhumanism hold academic positions, but the movement thrives either on the margins or entirely outside the academy, financed by entrepreneurs such as Peter Thiel and Peter Diamandis, and by Ray Kurzweil, currently the chief engineer of Google. In 2009, Diamandis and Kurzweil founded the Singularity University, as a “university for the coming Singularity,” whose curriculum is informed by the transhumanist imagination.5 Other Silicon Valley tech entrepreneurs fund basic research through private foundations and the start-up companies that translate that research into marketable products and services too numerous to discuss here. In other words, cutting-edge technoscience, capitalist entrepreneurship, and futurism are closely intertwined. H+ is not monolithic but a cluster of several currents. One identifiable current are the Extropians, namely, those who “develop extropian perspectives on technology, science, philosophy and art in the journal Extropy: The Journal of Transhumanism, in the Extropy Institute newsletter, email forums, and conferences . . . and whose specific conception of transhumanism involving certain values and goals, such as boundless expansion, selftranscendence, dynamic optimism, intelligent technology and spontaneous order.”6 This group has been led by Max More and his wife, Natasha VitaMore, the co-editors of the important anthology of transhumanist thought, The Transhumanist Reader (2013) although the Extropy Institute no longer exists.7 Another current in transhumanist movement are the Singularitarians, namely, those who believe that the “transition to a posthuman world will be a sudden event, elicited by the creation of a runway machine intelligence,”8 and their guru is Ray Kurzweil, the inventor and futurist who is revered by many transhumanists, even though he does not define himself as a transhumanist. A third strand consists of those who follow David Pearce’s Hedonistic Imperative and combine transhumanism with hedonic utilitarianism and who emphasize pleasure and morphological freedom, namely, “the right to modify and enhance one’s body, cognition, and emotion.”9 A fourth current can be labeled Democratic Transhumanism and consist of those

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who emphasize social responsibility and democratic decision making in the use of converging technologies for the benefit of humanity.10 And finally, there are the Survivalists or those who endorse Aubrey de Grey’s campaign against aging and death and who focus on radical life extension (RLE) and longevity. In between these currents there are other variants, reflecting the preferences, expertise, and commitment of individual transhumanist activists who vary greatly from each other.11 Because transhumanism is so diverse and constantly evolving, it is hard to generalize about it or to debate with its advocates; one can always disavow what another transhumanist has written or said so that transhumanism is indeed “work in progress,” which is how transhumanists view human nature. I treat the various strands of transhumanism as themes of the one and the same futuristic tune that calls for the transition from biological humanity to mechanical posthumanity. I admit that in so doing, I impose on transhumanism a certain degree of coherence that it may not have. Nonetheless, I argue, treating the various themes of transhumanism together is legitimate because only then can we grasp why it is culturally significant even though it is deeply misguided. I consider transhumanism to be culturally significant because today transhumanism is not a mere speculation on the fringe of mainstream culture, but a presence that shapes contemporary culture as transhumanist themes, vocabulary, values, and style frame contemporary film, science fiction, horror genre, video games, performance art, new media art, literature, and cyberpunk.12 Today all aspects of being human—embodiment, sexuality, subjectivity, emotionality, and sociality—have been thoroughly transformed by the hybridization of the organic and the mechanical, artificial intelligence (AI), new digital and virtualizing media, cyberspace, online gaming, digital collectivities, networked information, and new media arts. If we want to make sense of our contemporary culture, we cannot ignore the transhumanist themes that pervade it. At the same time, we must not accept transhumanism without subjecting it to interrogation and critique. That is what I have attempted to do in my work on transhumanism for the past several years13 pondering whether transhumanist futurism is socially and culturally acceptable. To admit the cultural significance of transhumanism does not entail applauding it. I join a long list of critics, among them Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, Michael Sandel, Bill McKibben, George Annas, Bethke Elshtain, and others, who view transhumanism as problematic and even dangerous. This group of people has been labeled “bio-conservative,” in contrast to the “bio-liberals” and the “transhumanists.” As Johann A. R. Roduit succinctly put it, the “bio-conservatives” “regard enhancement as morally problematic due to the fact that it involves too many risks and carries the possibility of unintended consequences that could potentially have a negative impact on

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human dignity or human nature.” By contrast, the “bio-liberals” hold that “some form of enhancement may be morally problematic, but this is not necessarily the case in every instance of enhancement.” And going beyond the “bio-liberals,” the “transhumanists” are those who “seek to use human enhancement as a tool to improve the human condition beyond what is considered normal, even if this requires becoming post-human—something other than human.”14 Transhumanism then is not simply an argument in favor of this or that technological intervention for the alleged improvement of human life but a certain view of human perfection that posits the posthuman, superintelligent machine as the ideal human perfection. FROM ENHANCEMENT TO PERFECTION Does a vision of perfection necessarily orient human enhancement? The debate about human enhancement is ultimately a debate about the ideals of human perfection: both sides use the concept of perfection as they argue for conflicting positions about the ability of technology to bring about perfection. The debate is somewhat confusing because the term “perfection” refers to both “type perfection” and “property perfection.” Type perfection is “the thesis that those individuals who best realize the essential properties of the individual type or species best exemplify the ideal of perfection,” whereas property perfection is “the thesis that those individuals who best realize some property or properties best exemplify the ideal of perfection.”15 Roduit, Heilinger, and Baumann shed light on this distinction by saying that “the proponents of type perfection approve using human enhancements within the limits of a type, being careful not to enhance too far and risk becoming something other than the type given. Proponents of property perfection will seek to enhance on particular function, without making reference to any given type, even if this means becoming something other than the given type.”16 In truth, when one looks closely at these matters one finds that “property perfection” cannot be separated from a certain understanding of “type perfection.” When transhumanists argue in favor of enhancement, they do so in the name of what they regard to be the perfection of the human species. I view transhumanism as an elaborate pursuit of perfection notwithstanding Nick Bostrom’s claim that transhumanism only seeks the “improvement” of humanity rather than its “perfection.”17 So, what is the ideal perfection of the human species according to transhumanism? To be perfect human beings must cease to be human and transform themselves to the presumably more perfect posthuman entities. Max More put it succinctly when he stated that transhumanism marks “a transitional standing between our animal heritage and our posthuman future.”18 The

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posthuman is regarded as the perfection of the human that will be attained by means of “genetic engineering, life-extending biosciences, intelligence intensifiers, smarter interfaces to swifter computers, neural-computer integration, world-wide data networks, virtual reality, intelligent agents, swift electronic communication, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, neural networks, artificial life, off-planet migration and molecular nanotechnology.”19 Transhumanism, then, is the process that will culminate in posthumanism, its telos. The process is deemed inherently good because it consists of the elimination of randomness and chance; the increase of human choice and control over one’s body, one’s mind, and one’s future; the minimizing of pain and suffering; and the postponement of aging and perhaps even death. All of these goods serve the ultimate good: the emergence of a posthuman species. I consider transhumanism to be misguided because its ultimate end is to make the biological human species obsolete. Put differently, I reject transhumanism because it calls for the planned obsolescence of the human species on the grounds that biological humanity, the product of long evolutionary process, is not only an imperfect “work in progress” but a form of life that is inherently flawed and that has no right to exist. According to transhumanists, human beings must recognize their innate imperfection and do everything they can to bring about the rise of posthuman beings that will eventually displace and replace flawed humans. Transhumanism then is not about how we can flourish as biological, social, and political humans but a vision that denigrates our humanity, calling us to improve ourselves technologically so that we could voluntarily become extinct. As I see it, transhumanist calls us to commit collective suicide as a species. In what comes next, I will flesh out the transhumanist vision by looking its main themes—human enhancement, morphological freedom, postponement of death, Singularity, and human-machine interface—all of which I find to be problematic. I will conclude the chapter by reflecting on the fact that despite the robust critique of transhumanism for the past three decades, the cultural appeal of transhumanism has actually increased. Why has the critique of transhumanism failed to diminish its cultural appeal? I argue that transhumanism illustrates the complexities of our contemporary post-secular age in which people across the globe seek transcendence within the “immanent frame.”20 In our post-secular world, millions of people are seeking to find meaning in life but they cannot return to traditional views of transcendence, happiness, and perfection. While remaining within the “immanent frame” people invest various dimensions of the secular world with spiritual meaning, thereby giving rise to all sorts of hybrids. This is the case of the technological spirituality characteristic of transhumanism in which technoscience, the primary expressions of our secular age, is invested with salvific meaning. In the transhumanist scenario, technoscience will make us flourish in this world

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and will deliver us to life eternal. By investing technology with spiritual and even salvific meaning, transhumanism addresses the contemporary quest for meaning and expresses the Zeitgeist of our technological age. What Does It Mean to Be Perfect? When we look at transhumanism as an elaborate project for the attainment of perfection, we do so by examining perfection both as a process of selfimprovement and as the end state or termination point of the process. This duality in the pursuit of perfection did not begin with transhumanists but can be traced all the way back to Aristotle and to ancient Greek philosophy. In Book Delta of the Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguished three meanings of the term perfect (teleios) or three shades of one meaning. Perfect is that a) which is complete, namely, contains all the requisite parts; b) which is so good that nothing of the kind could be better; c) which has attained its purpose. Note that it is easy to subsume the first meaning within the second, but that between the second and the third meanings there is a difference and even some tension. The first and second meanings pertain to a thing which is perfect in itself, whereas the third meaning refers to that which perfectly serves its purpose. The duality is inevitable because in Greek the word teleios (i.e., “perfect”) is etymologically related to telos (i.e., “end”). In Greek “to perfect” means not only “to complete” or “to finish” but also “to attain a goal” or “achieve an end.” From Aristotle to our own day, all Western thinking about human perfection exhibits this duality. I cannot discuss that complex story now, but I do want to note that transhumanist conception of perfection remains largely Aristotelian because it poses a causal connection between perfection (entelechia) and happiness (eudaimonia). Like Aristotle, transhumanists believe that each being is so constructed in its nature that it acts only according to a single particular pattern. Everything naturally aims toward an end (telos) and that end determines the direction of the individual’s development. A thing reaches its natural perfection when it has all its parts, when the parts function well in their own characteristic activity, and when the thing reaches the end of its proper development and so becomes fulfilled. To know what is the proper perfection of a given thing, we need to know not only what is its telos but also what is its characteristic activity or function (ergon). Thus, everything in the world, including human beings, acts so as to attain a desired end and when that end is fully and most completely realized then that given thing reaches its perfection. The transhumanist vision of technological perfection operates

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within this logic, but, as will become clear, it misses much of subtlety and depth of the Aristotelian understanding of happiness and perfection. Whereas Aristotle understood correctly that in the world as we know it human beings can only aspire to the ultimate perfection but never realize it,21 transhumanists hold that ultimate perfection can be attained by means of technology here and now but with the price of obliterating humans as we know them. Let me explore the ideal of perfection in transhumanist discourse, as both a process and as a termination point and explain why I find them to be problematic. Perfection as a Process: Technological Enhancement A recent survey of the Pew Research Center appropriately notes the connection between perfection and happiness in transhumanist discourse. According to the survey, the proponents of transhumanism “predict that the convergence of new technologies will soon allow people to control and fundamentally change their bodies and minds. Instead of leaving a person’s physical wellbeing to the vagaries of nature, supporters of these technologies contend that science will allow us to take control of our species development, making ourselves and future generations healthier and happier.”22 That transhumanism is about the attainment of happiness becomes clear in Max More’s explanation of extropy. Extropy, More tells us, is “the extent of a living or organizational system’s intelligence, functional order, vitality, and capacity and drive for improvement” and “extropic” as the “actions, qualities, or outcomes that embody or further extropy.” He elaborates the point saying that extropy “is not a real entity or force, but only metaphor representing all that contributes to our flourishing,” in other words, our happiness or well-being. More argues that technology will bring about human flourishing through “perpetual progress, self-transformation, practical optimism, intelligent technology, open society in terms of information and democracy, self-direction, and rational thinking.”23 He emphasizes how the pace of change—technological, cultural, and economic—continues to accelerate and to reach deeper so that advances in technologies (including “social technologies” of knowledge management, learning, and decision making) will presumably enable us to change human nature itself in its physical, emotional, and intellectual aspects. More predicts that with better knowledge and decision making, humans could live far longer in better than “perfect” health; improve their self-knowledge and awareness of interpersonal dynamics; overcome cultural, psychological, and memetic biases in thinking; enhance intelligence in all its various forms; and learn to thrive on change and growth. In short, humans will finally be happy because technology will enable them to be “doing better” and “being more.” How will technology make humans happy and even perfect? Transhumanism promises to engineer human perfection by transcending

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biological limits imposed on us by the messy process of random evolution. Transhumanism takes for granted that evolution has given rise to biological humans but refuses to see biology as destiny. Precisely because the evolutionary process has given rise to the complex human brain, the “inevitable product of the evolutionary process,”24 human beings are not only permitted to intervene and alter the biological facts through designer genes, designer drugs, and a whole range of enhancement technologies, but should do so in order to improve the human species. As we already noted, transhumanists regard evolution as a slow, random, chaotic, and flawed process that can be improved only when humans take control of it so as to direct evolution to the ultimate destiny of the human species. Doing so, transhumanists promise us, will ensure greater happiness for humanity, both individually and collectively, as well as the fulfillment of human innate ambitions to live forever. Engineering the betterment or improvement of human biology comes in three main strategies: there are “‘negative’ interventions, aimed at curing a disease or eliminating a disability; ‘positive’ interventions, aimed at improving the function of human organism within the range of natural variation; and ‘enhancement,’ . . . an intervention aiming to take an individual beyond normal functioning of a human organism.”25 These strategies enlarge “the capacities for human action” by enabling human beings to be “healthier, more beautiful, more athletic, more intelligent, more creative, more pleasant, and many other ‘mores.’”26 It is no coincidence that the obsession with “being more” has led Max T. O’Connor to rename himself Max More, as did his wife, Natasha Vita-More, whose given name at birth was Nancie Clark. “Being more” or “doing better” than ordinary humans is what human enhancement is all about. Enhanced humans will be happier than ordinary humans and further along in the process of attaining perfection. For the past three decades we have vociferously debated validity of technological enhancement. Proponents of enhancements view these interventions as “tools that can facilitate our authentic efforts as self-discovery and self-creation.”27 The proponents of enhancement technologies (be they drugs, implants, or prostheses) claim that they not only enable us to overcome limitations and deficiencies but that they also enable us to authentically create ourselves choosing for ourselves the kind of life we wish to live. By contrast, the critics of enhancement worry that these technologies threaten our efforts at achieving authenticity and regard enhancement technologies as procedures that separate us from what is most our own and from how the world really is. As Leon Kass, a major critic of enhancement puts it: “as the power to transform our native powers increases, both in magnitude and refinement, so does the possibility for self-alienation for losing, confounding or abandoning our identity.”28 I concur with Kass’s critique, but I am concerned not so

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much with the issue of authenticity but with other questionable aspects of the transhumanist’s pursuit of perfection and happiness by means of technology. First, even though the use of a given enhancement technology requires a voluntary decision, the incorporation of technology into our bodies eventually reduces our freedom of choice, especially if it involves genetic engineering. The more technologically advanced we become so as to transmit our enhanced state to future generations, the less free we become. Bio-engineering, the crucial means of technological enhancement, removes human choice and limits the scope of available options for future generations. Second, the technological approach to happiness and perfection defines “being more,” or “doing better” strictly in materialist terms, equating being human with having a particular human body. Let us recall that the traditional approach to happiness and perfection, to be happy and flourish as a human being, necessitated the acquisition of virtues through moral training of habituation, practice, and learning. At the center of the traditional approach to happiness stood the concept of character and the effortful cultivation of the virtues by means of education and spiritual exercises. In the transhumanist approach, by contrast, character, virtue, or moral training is meaningless since happiness is predicated on physical, mechanical, or chemical manipulations. This reductionist materialist view flattens the complexity of human life and diminishes those dimensions that resist reductionist materialism. And third, the technological approach to human perfection is hyper-individualistic, paying no attention to the relational aspects of being human and to the fact that humans require social and political interaction with other humans in order to flourish. In short, the notion that technologically enhanced humans will necessarily live better and happier life because they will be liberated from biological constraints is open to many challenges. Philosophically, the transhumanist desire to liberate humanity from biological constraints is justified by appeal to the principle of morphological freedom, which we mentioned above. David Pearce articulated this principle in his Hedonistic Imperative, and Anders Sandberg promoted morphological freedom as an individual civic right.29 Pearce’s Hedonistic Imperative presents itself as “a manifesto [that] outlines a strategy to eradicate suffering in all sentient lives.” He defends this abolitionist project on “ethical utilitarian grounds” and asserts that “genetic engineering and nontechnology allow Homo sapiens to discard the legacy wetware of our evolutionary past,” promising that “our post-human successors will rewrite the vertebrate genome, redesign the global ecosystem, and abolish suffering throughout the living world.” Pearce’s manifesto presents an elaborate project of “hedonic engineering” that will bring about “genetically pre-coded” “generic modes of paradise” in which “native-born ecstatics will flourish.” These strategies will presumably free humanity from “the sick psycho-chemical ghetto bequeathed

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by our genetic past” and collectively the various interventions “will cure what post-human posterity will recognize as a gene-driven spectrum of psychiatric disorders characteristic of Darwinian life.” For Pearce, Darwinian evolution has rendered human beings profoundly flawed, but thanks to biotechnology, humanity will “emerge from the psychochemical Dark Ages, [and] enriched dopaminergic function in particular will sharpen the sheer intensity of every moment of conscious existence.” Pearce calls for the “neuroscientific mindmaking” as a “rational redesign” that will reframe “who and what we want to become.” He concedes that that “what we will ultimately turn into is hard to imagine,” but he also ventures to predict that “it will be utterly sublime.” Welcome to the bioengineered paradise! I maintain that Pearce’s technological vision is open to the objections I have already raised and more. The Hedonistic Imperative is misguided because it gives us a strictly materialistic interpretation of utilitarianism and the calculus of pleasure and pain. Unlike J. S. Mill and other Utilitarians who differentiated different types of pleasures and recognized non-sensorial pleasures, for Pearce pleasure is merely sensory and amenable to chemical control. This aspect of transhumanism makes me most uneasy because it ignores the value of insecurity, anxiety, and uncertainty which are very much part of being human. Human culture (especially art and philosophy) could not have been possible without these allegedly negative aspects of being human. But if chemicals root out these human abilities, what will be the source of human creativity? Hedonic engineering is not a prescription for cultural depth and creativity; it is a prescription for childish shallowness that regards having fun and feeling good above all other values. In Happy-People-Pills for All, Mark Walker provides a philosophical defense of his “bioprogressive” view according to which “happy-people-pills should be used for enhancement purposes in order to make people feel ‘better than well.’”30 Although his defense is philosophically sophisticated, it too is open to all the traditional objections against hedonism. For me the engineered paradise as depicted by Pearce or Walker does not constitute liberation from the “ghetto” of human biology, but the creation of a much more restrictive pharmacological “ghetto” in which humans become entirely chemically dependent, experiencing no freedom at all. A happy pill will not make us happy, let alone perfect. Those who endorse the Hedonistic Imperative see the human body as the exclusive source of human misery and suffering. If so, it is incumbent on humans to liberate themselves from the constraints of the physical body.31 This liberationist agenda has been applied to many areas, but I want to mention human sexuality in particular. The sexualized body that differentiates between males and females is increasingly viewed as burdensome aspect of being human so that morphological freedom is invoked to justify the transition from one sexed body to another. It is no coincidence that leading

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transhumanists have promoted transgenderism and that transgenderism is very common in the subculture that is suffused with transhumanist ideas. Thus, Martine Rothblatt (born Martin Rothblatt) writes that “the greatest catapult for humanity into a new species lies just beyond the event horizon of transgenderism.”32 She claims that “the freedom of gender is, therefore, the gateway to a freedom of form and to an explosion of human potential. First comes the realization that we are not limited by our sexual anatomy. Then comes the awakening that we are not limited by our anatomy at all.”33 Echoing substance dualism, Rothblatt avers that “the mind is the substance of humanity. Mind is deeper than matter.” I will return to this point later when I discuss the transhumanist human-machine interface, but let me note here that Rothblatt rejoices in the fact that “a movement of ‘transhumanists’ has joined transgenderists in calling for the launch of persona creatus.”34 Transgenderism is but one example of morphological freedom. Nowhere is this creative freedom exercised more than in cyberspace, where avatars, namely, non-biological simulations of the self, choose the form of their self-presentation and change it at will.35 Currently, cyberspace is the ultimate “place” where liberation from biology can be experienced because in it there is no connection between gender and genitals, no need for biological reproduction, and no suffering caused by human corporeality. For me this is ironic, because the ability to be free of sexual embodiment is possible only because biomedical technologies have actualized in the flesh what previously has been only an unrealizable fantasy. If indeed existence in silico is so much better than existence in corpore, why bother changing the latter? The transition from one gendered body to another makes sense only if life in organic bodies is inherently good, which transhumanists vociferously deny. DEFEATING DEATH. REALLY? Transhumanists do not like death. In fact, they plan to rid us of death. How? Transhumanists propose to eliminate death either by perpetuating biological life as we know it through RLE or through cybernetic immortality, that is to say, by uploading our mind pattern from our biological substrate and relocating our consciousness in silicon. To say it another way, we will leave our bodies behind in order to live perpetually in a computer. As long as the computer remains plugged in, we can live forever in a disembodied state. That’s one posthumanity tune the transhumanist Pied Piper plays. This scenario is most curious. Given the H+ disdain toward the human body, one could imagine that transhumanists would welcome death or at least accept death with sober calm. But instead transhumanists are outraged by death and find it an affront

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and an insult.36 Because of the youthful desire to live forever in healthy bodies, Aubrey de Grey has been leading “the crusade to defeat aging” which for him is “not only morally justified but is the single most urgent imperative for humanity.”37 De Grey has been calling for a new approach to aging that will promise and deliver RLE and the perpetual postponement of death through what he calls “Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence” (SENS), “an umbrella term for a range of biomedical therapies with the ultimate purpose of postponing age-related effects.”38 Since De Grey sees the human body as a machine, indeed a very “resilient machine,” he uses the analogy of the vintage car to speak about his program for RLE. As much as a vintage car can function beyond the date of its initial design, provided it undergoes periodic maintenance, so the human body should be able to postpone its own death by undergoing periodic regenerations through genetic engineering. De Grey admits that there is much about the body that we still do not know, but he is convinced that in principle we will be able to know all we need to perpetuate life indefinitely. De Grey, however, concedes that postponing death is not abolishing death, but in the meantime his SENS longevity research is funded through the Methuselah Foundation with generous support from the tech billionaire, Peter Thiel. If death cannot be vanquished, perhaps it could be outsmarted or tricked. Proponents of life extension are afraid that the technological breakthroughs will arrive just after they have died. Therefore, they support cryonics, the program to keep dead biological humans in deep freeze in order to resuscitate them in the posthuman future. Cryonics is a technological project that secularizes the ancient belief in the resurrection of the dead, one of the oldest patterns of transcendence in Western culture. Originating in Zoroastrianism in the third century BCE, this belief entered the religion of ancient Israel about the sixth century BCE and became normative in rabbinic Judaism and in Christianity. Whereas in Judaism the general resurrection of the dead was postponed to the eschatological future to be brought about by supernatural divine intervention at some undisclosed future time, in Christianity the resurrection of one individual, Jesus of Nazareth, became “the model through which Christians understood their own death.”39 Early Christians (namely, apocalyptically oriented Jews who thought they were living in the eschaton) considered faith in the resurrection event a necessary condition for inclusion in the Kingdom of God. Most transhumanists are secularists who have no use for the Christian myth of resurrected Christ, but they endorse cryonics because they consider the resurrection of the dead a technological possibility, due primarily to the promises of nanotechnology.40 Eric Drexler, the engineer who is considered the “founding father of nanotechnology,” hailed cryonics as “a door to the future,”41 and his pioneering research into molecular nanotechnology has been the basis of Ray Kurzweil’s predictions about

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the feasibility of the resurrection of the dead.42 If nanotechnology ensures the resurrection of the dead, all we need to do is to live long enough until it becomes possible. How to perpetuate life until technological innovations will enable us to live forever is precisely what Ray Kurzweil advises us in his book, TRANSCEND. The title is an acronym of a practical program of enhancement that consists of the following: Talk with your doctor; Relaxation; Assessment; Nutrition; Supplements; Calorie restriction; Exercise; New technologies, and Detoxification. Kurzweil’s program is offered to all “so that you can live long enough and remain healthy enough to take full advantage of the technological breakthroughs of the Information Age in the decades ahead . . . to transcend is what we humans do well.”43 In this book Kurzweil says very little about the transcendence of biology by means of nanotechnology, but the key is that nanotechnology is also an information technology. The nanotechnology revolution will not only re-program and optimize biology but will also involve “applying massively parallel computerized processes to reorganize matter and energy at the molecular level to create new materials and new mechanisms even more intricate and powerful than biology.”44 An inventor who lives by his own wisdom, Kurzweil has promoted himself as “Transcendent Man,” the living proof that the program of TRANSCEND actually works and will keep him alive until death will be obliterated. Kurzweil anxiously awaits that radical transformation, not only because of his own pressing aging but also because he desperately wishes to resurrect his own father.45 In Kurzweil’s hopeful assessment, “the means are almost in reach for extending life indefinitely,”46 but the evidence that presumably supports this claim is presented not as a process for the betterment or improvement of human life but as the attainment of the end state or termination point of the pursuit of perfection when the biological human will be replaced by mechanical posthuman. Cyborgism Transhumanists promote an array of technologies to transcend the limits of human biology so as to transition from humanity to posthumanity. The transhumanist process of enhancement culminates in cyborgization, namely, the brain-computer interfaces that not only augments human capabilities but also transforms humans into technological entities. Coined by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline in 1960, the cyborg figure fuses cybernetic and organic features, and has become not only a common trope in science fiction, art, and media but also a medical reality in which pace makers, cochlear implants, retinal implants, and deep brain stimulations improve human life by overcoming disabilities, diseases, and injuries. By erasing the boundaries between organic and artificial life, between humans and machines, cyborgization is the

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shift from seeking to improve life by overcoming biological limits, to seeking to abolish biological humanity altogether by designing a postbiological, posthuman species. Giulio Prisco, a former physicist and computer scientist in Europe’s space agency, is an Italian transhumanist who hails the merger between humans and machines as “the ultimate realization of the dream to achieve indefinite lifespan, with vastly enhanced cognitive abilities, lies in leaving biology behind and moving to a new post-biological, cybernetic phase of our evolution.”47 When this perfection is achieved, “we will build (and/or) become God(s).”48 Stating this more boldly, he predicts: “someday we may create God. And if we create God, then we are God.” Critiquing the “ultra-rationalist” tendencies of transhumanism, Prisco urges his fellow transhumanists to appreciate and openly endorse the spiritual dimension of their futurism. Let me turn now to examine the end state of the pursuit of perfection: the posthuman. Perfection as End State: The Posthuman Transhumanism offers us a teleological narrative about the perfection of the human species that culminates in the emergence of the posthuman. While rooted in scientific disciplines and practices (especially computer science, informatics, applied cognitive science, and robotics) the transhumanist narrative is not a scientific theory; it is only a myth that expresses certain preferences, as Giulio Prisco himself admits.49 We should note, however, that the transhumanist narrative depicts the shift from biological humanity to mechanical posthumanity as an inexorable, necessary progression which it deems to be progress for humanity. The technological progress of humanity will bring about the demise of biological humans and their replacement by superintelligent postbiological, posthuman entities. This is the ultimate end of human perfection as far as transhumanists are concerned. Futurists such as Hans Moravec, Ray Kurzweil, Kevin Warwick, Giulio Prisco, Nick Bostrom, and Ted Chu describe this process using slightly different terms, but the major stages of the narrative are largely the same: humanity will reach its perfection when it designs and executes its own collective death, its own suicide. The transition from the human to the posthuman is predicated on the engineering of one part of the human body, the brain, the organ which makes human most distinct and different from other animals. In the Mechanical Age humans will use their brain to build AI, computers whose computational capacities far exceed human abilities. During the Mechanical Age, the one we currently occupy, humans and robots coexist, but computers perform all sorts of functions that humans either cannot or do not want to perform so that computers “serve” humanity. (Not surprisingly contemporary supercomputers are called “servers.”) Accelerated, exponential progress of AI technology,

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however, will facilitate the ultimate form of machine-brain interface: the “uploading” of the human mind onto supercomputers. When uploading is achieved, intelligent machines will be able to teach themselves and correct their own mistakes. This constitutes an irreversible turning point—known as technological Singularity or AI Singularity—in which the superintelligent machines become autonomous and self-aware, inaugurating the third phase of vertical transcendence: the Age of Mind. Because they are self-aware, superintelligent machines will “tire of caring for humanity and will decide to spread throughout the universe in the interests of discovering all the secrets of the cosmos.”50 In the Virtual Kingdom of “Mind Fire,” only Transcendent Mind exists, a cosmic intelligence that thinks itself eternally. The telos of the pursuit of perfection will be finally achieved: death will be vanquished once and for all and humanity will accomplish its dreams of eternal life but attaining such perfection will be predicated on the elimination of humanity. Transhumanism is an imaginary narrative about human destiny, and like all social imaginaries, the transhumanist portrayal tells us more about the present than about what will actually happen in the remote future.51 There is no doubt that AI technology has already transformed all aspects of human social life: finance, transportation, communication, energy, defense systems, warfare, education, medicine, labor, leisure, art, and culture. We are indeed living in the Second Machine Age driven by computers, AI, advanced robotics, and rapid developments in informatics and telecommunication.52 The invention of the World Wide Web provided the way for computers to share information and manage information through hyperlinks, giving birth to technologies such as video games, computer graphics, and virtual reality. As digital media technologies merged with computer and telecommunications, physical entities became bits of information, ensuring that in the Information Age whatever can be digitized will be digitized. In our contemporary Mechanical Age, material things lose their physicality as they become data, and larger and larger computers store, move, and manipulate the data and “smart” hand-held machines (e.g., smartphones, tablets, and wearable gadgets) give humans instant access to the entire intricately connected “Internet of things.” The digital revolution has resulted in the emergence of the virtual reality of cyberspace in which humans “exist” and interact with each other without the mediation of their physical bodies. For transhumanists cyberspace is paradise where “practical immortality” is experienced in the here and now. Robert M. Geraci has shown in great details how transhumanist ideas have shaped the world of video games such as World of Warcraft and online communities such as Second Life,53 and Giulio Prisco, the transhumanist I mentioned above, was instrumental in bringing transhumanist ideas to the global gaming community. Prisco is the founder of the game Metaverse in Second Life and the co-founder of the Order of Cosmic Engineers, whose

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goal is “uploading our consciousness and exploring the universe as disembodied superminds.”54 For gamers and transhumanists, the virtual reality of cyberspace is “a paradise on Earth before Transcendent Mind escapes earthly matter in an expanding cyberspace of immortality, intellect, moral goodness and meaningful computation.”55 Since gamers live both online and offline, their life is bifurcated: the somatic Self still suffers the limitations of corporeal bodies, while the non-somatic, simulated Self—the avatar—lives in “paradise,” controlled by the gamer who acts out his/her fantasies. Not surprisingly, avid gamers and participants in online communities prefer virtual reality over embodied life offline and find social life to be challenging and unsatisfactory. It is instructive to note that the World Health Organization has recently recognized “gaming disorder” as a diagnosable condition that is classified as a disease. The experience of virtual transcendence (when the gamer feels as if he/ she is disembodied) is but an illusion; the gamer still has an extended body in time-space and the digital avatar is still instantiated in a human-built machines. Those who seek transcendence and perfection through technology, then, depend on what computers can do. Evidently today’s computers are able to perform incredibly fast and complex computations that imitate human thinking, but do these “smart” machines really think? Do they really possess human intelligence? When the question was put to 200 computer engineers, roboticists, astrophysicists, psychologists, neuroscientists, futurists, and inventors, the answers varied greatly, but most have acknowledged that current AI still falls short of human intelligence.56 For transhumanists, building AI with human intelligence constitutes and justifies the next step in the transhumanist futurist narrative: the uploading of the mind of human beings onto human-made computers. Uploading means that “intelligent software would be produced by scanning and closely modeling the computational structure of the biological brain,” and the technical term for it is “whole brain emulation.”57 Bostrom explains the main steps of that process,58 and while admitting that “the emulation path will not succeed in the near future (within the next fifteen years, say),”59 he still contends that whole brain emulation “will eventually succeed,”60 albeit in ways which are yet to be discovered. He cites Hans Moravec, the originator of transhumanist futuristic scenarios, who says that that “human level AI is not only theoretically possible but feasible within this century.”61 Mind uploading is the technological version of the belief in the immorality of the soul, which many strands of Western thought regarded as the ultimate end of human life and the termination point of the pursuit of perfection. Articulated by Plato in the fifth century BCE the belief in immortality was based on the metaphysical distinction between things which are composed of parts, subject to change, and perishable, and things which are simple, not

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composed of parts, intelligible, and eternal. The human body belongs to the first class of things and the human soul to the second. This so-called substance dualism was given a Christian interpretation by the Church Fathers, becoming a church dogma, although interpretations of the belief in personal immortality and its relationship to the resurrection of the dead were hotly debated by Christian theologians and evolved overtime.62 Without rehearsing the history of the belief in immortality, let us note that substance dualism and the metaphysics that undergirds it frame the project of building AI. The point is explained with great clarity by George Zarkadakis, and his observation merits a long citation: Platonic dualism has become so deeply ingrained in Western philosophy and science that it sets the agenda for contemporary discourse on Artificial Intelligence and consciousness today. It was Plato who influenced the historical decision of the two cybernetics giants, Wiener and Shannon, to frame the nature of information as something distinct from energy or matter. This distinction has contributed to the disembodiment of information and the false separation of the physical substrate (the hardware, the brain) from information patterns (the software, the self). Information thus became prevalent, the master of everything. Without software, hardware is useless. . . . This “computer metaphor” for life and consciousness, where the form, or pattern, takes precedence over matter, defines our post-human present, and justifies paradoxical predications about downloading consciousness in computers and achieving digital immortality.63

Zarkadakis, a science writer with a PhD in AI, surveys the history of AI and its relationship to long-standing philosophical debates between Platonic and Aristotelian positions, but he makes clear that “Artificial Intelligence is a technology unlike any other,”64 and that “our world is entering uncharted waters.”65 However, it is difficult to get clarity about the feasibility of mind uploading (let alone its desirability) because there is no consensus among the builders of AI about key terms such as “mind,” “consciousness,” and “intelligence.” For Zarkadakis, a proponent of cybernetics, it will be possible one day to build machines with human intelligence, but to do so, humans will have to give up Platonic dualism and return to Aristotelian more sophisticated understanding of cognition that realized that “the biological mechanism of consciousness is not localized in the brain but distributed throughout the body.”66 If he is right, ironically enough, true superintelligent machines will have to learn the wisdom of the human body, the very entity that transhumanism denigrates and seeks to abolish. Supercomputers have profoundly changed the quality of human life. But is it for better or for worse? Much depends on how one evaluates the next hypothetical phase in the transhumanist linear narrative of perfection: Singularity.

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Coined by Vernor Vinge in 1993, the term “technological Singularity” refers to a variety of processes, including accelerated change, self-improving technology, intelligence explosion, emergence of superintelligence, shifts to new forms of organization, or increased complexity and interconnectedness.67 Singularity will commence as a result of an exponential, accelerated process of technological progress, when machines become sufficiently smart to start teaching themselves. Singularity is imagined as an inevitable and irrevocable shift from the biological to the mechanical, which will inaugurate the posthuman phase. THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR. REALLY? The Singularity is presented not simply as a hypothesis to subject to philosophic critique and scientific analysis,68 but rather as a fact that accounts for how the future must and will develop. On the basis of his own calculations of the Law of Accelerating Returns, which links evolution to innovation, competition, and market dynamics, Kurzweil has predicted that the Singularity will take place in 2045 (later than the original predication of 2030).69 Kurzweil’s Singularity Hypothesis was popularized in his The Age of Intelligent Machines (1990), the Age of Spiritual Machines (1999), and The Singularity Is Near (2005) and enthusiastically endorsed by many transhumanists (known as Singularitarians). The Singularity is the apocalyptic event that will presumably deliver transcendence by means of technology and the popularity of Kurzweil’s prediction reflects the secularization of apocalyptic Christianity.70 For over two decades transhumanists have enthusiastically promoted AI Singularity as the telos of their technological project. These technooptimists have all followed Moravec who envisioned the process by which robots will become Transcendent Mind, holding entire simulated realities in their vast minds. As physical reality vaporizes into simulation, the emergent posthuman superintelligence, as Prisco describes it, “will not be an inanimate machine, but a thinking and feeling person, orders of magnitude smarter and more complex than us.”71 Ted Chu refers to the superintelligent machine as Cosmic Being (CoBe) and has no qualms calling them gods, describing them as “a new species on the frontier of cosmic evolution that is unimaginably powerful and creative.”72 Echoing Moravec, Chu imagines these intelligent cosmic beings as our “Mind Children” who will be “spontaneously adaptable” and who will have the “will to continuously evolve and push forward the evolutionary frontier in the universe.”73 This new life-form will transcend death once and for all, because it will have no carbon-based body, no sexuality, no desire, and not even an interest in happiness. Engaged

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in infinite computations, CoBe will move beyond our planet to explore outer space. Hugo de Garis, the Australian transhumanist, is so enthralled with this bliss that he insists “humans should not stand in the way of a higher form of evolution. These machines are godlike. It is human destiny to create them.”74 The termination point of the transhumanist pursuit of perfection is thus the voluntary demise of the human species. But why should this be so? Why should we regard CoBe to be the perfection of humanity? Why shouldn’t biological humans stand in the way so as to prevent the emergence of posthumans who will displace humanity? Why should we knowingly contribute to our own demise? My point is that we cannot foretell the future and it is misleading to convince us that the transition from the human to the posthuman is necessary and inevitable. We are indeed living through profound technological upheaval and every day we all experience the negative aspects of living with “intelligent” machines whose algorithms are made by flawed biological humans, and whose very flawed interaction with us makes us yearn to talk to a human being who can actually solve problems that alludes the algorithm of automated systems. But beyond the discomfort of sharing life with automated systems, even scientists and leading transhumanists who have previously championed AI as the path to perfection have recently become more pessimistic and worrisome about what might happen. On December 2, 2014, Stephen Hawking, who already greatly benefits from machine-human interface, sounded the alarm when he stated that “the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.”75 Eliezer Yudkowsky, a prominent Singularitarian, who has vociferously promoted strong AI, is now busy figuring out what to do if these superintelligent machines are not friendly and “possess motivations and goals that we may not share.”76 Yudkowsky now devotes his precious time to building a friendly AI, to protect us from future malevolent AI, confident that is will emerge. And even Nick Bostrom, the transhumanist who has done more than any other to make transhumanism philosophically and culturally respectable, has recently (November 2015) admitted the dangers and risks involved in building computer systems with superintelligence. Nonetheless he urges us to push on “in order to make progress on the control problem and partly recruit top minds into this area, so that they are already in place when the nature of the challenge becomes clear.”77 Ever an activist, Bostrom speaks about the effort “to drive talent and funding into this field and to being to work on a plan of action.”78 Futuristic venture capitalists like Peter Thiel and Elon Musk will continue to support transhumanist futurism because it will definitely yield monetary gains, but for those who value the preciousness of being human, despite and because of human vulnerability and limits, the transhumanist dream of transcendence by means of technology is a nightmare.

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TRANSHUMANISM IN THE POST-SECULAR AGE We must take transhumanism seriously and become familiar with its major themes and reflect on its social, political, and cultural ramifications. Transhumanism is an important feature of our contemporary culture that places its faith in technology and that invests technology with spiritual significance. While transhumanist writings may be superficial and unsatisfactory, engaging transhumanism seriously leads us to reflect on the meaning of being human, on human well-being and flourishing, and on the purpose of human life. Transhumanism raises a host of fascinating philosophical problems about identity, materiality, embodiment, cognition, and freedom as well as many social, cultural, and political issues that relate to the function of technology in society. Transhumanism also raises profound questions about technology: What is technology for? What are the limits of technology? Who has the power to determine the use of technology? What are the social and political consequences of technologizing human life? All of these questions have informed my work on transhumanism. I consider transhumanism to be misguided because it technologizes our deepest values, including our understanding of happiness and perfection, because it is filled with internal contradictions especially in regard to human embodiment, and because it mistakenly approached perfection as a description rather than a prescription. However, I do maintain that we do not have the luxury to ignore transhumanism and to dismiss it as inconsequential. What puzzles me is the fact that the serious criticism of transhumanism for the past three decades has failed to take root; transhumanism continues to inspire popular culture and there are no signs that its appeal will diminish. Why? Transhumanism is but one expression of our post-secular society that defies the binary dichotomy between the “religious” and the “secular,” between “science” and “religion,” and between “immanence” and “transcendence.” In our post-secular age, the transhumanist project illustrates how secular technoscience is invested with spiritual meaning. Our post-secular society is both the fulfillment of the modern secularity and the liquidation (or negation) of it. In the post-secular society we witness the reassertion of religion in the public sphere, and the explosion of numerous spiritual alternatives to traditional religions, alternatives that creatively fuse the presumably “secular” with the presumably “religious.” All over the world people grapple with the uncertain, unstable, and perplexing situations captured by the prefix “post” (e.g., “post-national,” “post-ethnic,” “postmetaphysical,” “post-foundational,” “post-Christian,” and most recently even “post-factual” and “post-truth”) which denotes that which comes after as well as a critique of that which came before. In our fluid culture of “posts,” all sorts of hybrids emerge to address the underlying “cross-pressures” that

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human beings find themselves. Charles Taylor explained how these crosspressures came about historically with the collapse of the pre-modern religious worldview and its replacement by modernist secularism. We can see these cross-pressures operating if we look at attitudes toward death. Our awareness of our own mortality and finitude has given rise to the human desire to transcend death, an important aspect of the pursuit of perfection. Indeed, the pursuit of perfection required reflections about the meaning of being human in light of our pending death. In the pre-modern world, the reality of death was accepted and experienced as part of the course of life, and the transcendence of mortality (i.e., the finality of death) was constituted as a religious belief and a philosophical practice. In the premodern, Western world, the paths toward happiness and perfection resulted in two main beliefs: the resurrection of the dead and the immortality of the soul. Within the Christian paradigm, belief in the resurrected Christ was a necessary condition for experiencing life after death, and Christian earthly life consisted of the acquisition of virtues. In this paradigm, transcending human mortality and finitude was possible because God revealed Himself in the incarnated Christ, charting the way for humanity to follow through imitatio Dei. In the pre-modern paradigm, the pursuit of happiness and perfection required the acquisition of moral virtues through interaction with other humans in the social sphere. Self-improvement was a moral category which could be demonstrated in the appropriate conduct toward other human being. Knowledge was the intellectual dimension of the virtue and it could be acquired through philosophy, culminating in wisdom. The afterlife consisted of the mystical union between the human soul, or mind, and God, a union that cannot be explained in rational terms, precisely because divine reality is the true Transcendent, ontologically and epistemologically. Who will experience the bliss of immortality (i.e., saints, mystics, theologians, or all believers) and what is the role of the church in the attainment of transcendence were hotly debated, but it was the quest of transcendence which gave Christian life its narrative arc. Modernity radically challenged the religious pursuit of transcendence and gave rise to the “immanent frame” which entailed among other things a new attitude toward death.79 Ontologically speaking, secularization meant the “domestication of transcendence”: the radical Otherness of God as well as God’s “mysteriousness and unknowability” of traditional theism were rejected in favor of immanence and knowability.80 For people living within the “immanent frame” there is no meaning to talking about God “out there,” nor does it make sense to accept God as a distant tyrant who intervenes in the world at will. Instead, humanity is believed to occupy the center of the “immanent frame” and human reason alone is deemed sufficient to know all there is to know. In the modern, secular world, nothing is immune to human

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inquiry, and mystery (or unknowability) is regarded as a logical impossibility. With the denial of the possibility of transcendence, the world became “disenchanted,” to use Max Weber’s term, as humans became “the measure of all things,” the omnipotent replacement of God. The disenchantment of the world brought about a new attitude toward death: death was now “conceived as a scandal,”81 because mortality itself was seen as “offence against human omnipotence.”82 If human reason is truly omnipotent, there can be nothing that is unexpected, unpredicted, unpredictable, or truly contingent. To the rationalist, modernist mind, death is so offensive because it seems indifferent to human effort; hence death must be resented and seen as a defect that must and can be corrected if we know its causes. This modernist approach, which refuses to accept or even watch death, led to the medicalization of death and the removal of dying people into institutions where only professionals deal with the dying, as they conduct a war against it. The transhumanist “crusade against death” I discussed above is the necessary outcome of the modernist denial of death. Presumably human-made technology will make it possible to postpone death indefinitely, thus denying the reality and finality of death. Modernity has deconstructed mortality. The modernist project, however, brought about its own liquidation in postmodernism. Coined by Lyotard, the term “liquidation” denotes “a way of destroying the modern project while creating an impression of its fulfillment.”83 In other words, the postmodern world is both the fulfillment and the destruction of the modern project, and technology had much to do with its emergence. In the postmodern world, as Zygmunt Bauman explains, not only mortality is deconstructed, but immortality is deconstructed as well. The human is no longer a “pilgrim,” as he was seen in the pre-modern Christian world, but a “nomad,” who has no place to call “home” and who sees all of life as “bridges” that need to be crossed. In the postmodern world of simulation, immortality is promised by all sorts of “immortality brokers” be they “advertisers, publicity promoting and image grooming companies, critics, gallery owners, publishers, programmers of TV companies and editor of the press.”84 Viewed from that perspective, the engineers of AI technology are yet another group of “immortality brokers” but their control of the path to immortality is not a mere fantasy, but a recipe for the destruction of human life as we know it. The transhumanist vision of transcendence by means of technology entails the integration of the human into and merging with its own technological productions. Transhumanism is but one response to the “cross-pressures” of our contemporary situation. Transhumanism invests technoscience with spiritual significance, making technology itself the power that will enable humanity to achieve transcendence within the immanent frame. Transhumanism

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technologizes beliefs in the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the dead and it makes you feel that human beings now possess the technological power to realize both of these beliefs. According to transhumanism, we will be able to postpone death indefinitely; we will make ourselves (i.e., our mind) immortal by uploading our minds on supercomputers, and we will be able to resurrect our bodies by reviving the patterns of our minds. All of these claims are highly problematic both religiously and scientifically, but they cannot be simply dismissed as irrelevant or stupid, because these claims shape so many aspects of our contemporary culture. Ray Kurzweil is right to assert that humans have evolved into beings that have an innate proclivity to transcend themselves, but Kurzweil is mistaken to claim that this pursuit can and must be achieved by technology. Expressing the modernist drive to mastery of the world, transhumanism engineers the age-old human pursuit of perfection and our innate proclivity to transcend limits, but it misguidedly asks us to bring about our own demise by creating superintelligent machines that will make us obsolete. There is no doubt that in the near and remote future our life will be shaped by the technologies we have created and will continue to create. Human beings are indeed toolmakers and technology is a feature of being human, but the contemporary massive technologization of human life, including human subjectivity, should not be endorsed without critique. There is a huge difference between imagining a certain scenario and bringing it about technologically. Those who are critical of the massive technologization of human life must expose the negative aspects this technological project has brought about as well as its pernicious ultimate goal to make humanity obsolete. While I doubt that the critique will halt the ongoing technologization of our life, I do maintain we have a duty to be critical of the ideology of extreme progress. I was encouraged to read Bill McKibben’s essay “Pause! We Can Go Back!” which reviews David Sax’s book, The Revenge of Analog: Real Things and Why They Matter.85 The book documents the resurgence of interest in cultural products based on analog technologies (e.g., LP records) that resist the digitalization of music and allow us to enjoy the physicality of objects since they fit our embodied existence. If this indeed becomes a widespread trend, perhaps the rush to technologize human existence may slow down, allowing us to honor ways of being in the world that are consistent with our material embodiment and our mortality. CONCLUSION This chapter takes transhumanism seriously as a significant cultural phenomenon that must be subjected to analysis and criticism. Transhumanism seeks

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to give coherence to scientific developments and technological achievements of the past fifty years by arguing that technology will deliver the perfection of the human species through the fusion of humans and machines. While transhumanism reflects existing accomplishments of technoscience, the vision itself is not scientific. Rather, it is a highly speculative narrative about an imagined future that promotes a certain direction for human life and human actions in the present. The transhumanist vision has to be understood in historical perspective as expression of broad philosophical and religious impulses in Western culture so that the transhumanist conception of human perfection could be properly understood in all its complexity and limitations. The chapter has shown that the transhumanist notion of human perfection reflects an inherent ambiguity of “perfection” as both a process and a desired end, an ambiguity that was fully recognized by Aristotle. This ambiguity runs across the entire philosophic discourse on the pursuit of happiness in Western culture and it became more complicated when Christianity absorbed the Aristotelian tradition and gave Aristotelian teleology a religious interpretation. Transhumanism is largely a secular movement, but its technologization of traditional religious themes (e.g., the yearning for immortality) appeals to millions of people because transhumanism invests technology with spiritual meaning. Indeed, Ron Cole-Turner, a Christian theologian who has written extensively about transhumanism, goes as far as to say that “transhumanism . . . is a Christian concept,”86 and argues that secular transhumanism and Christian transhumanism “may function in much the same way.”87 By contrast, I have been quite critical about transhumanism from the perspective of Judaism, even though Jewish bioethicists have been more open to biotechnology than their Christian cohorts.88 As a Jew, I take issues with transhumanist futurism precisely because its promotion of technological perfection calls for making the human species obsolete. I believe that transhumanism is a misguided vision of and for humanity. Like the legendary Pied Piper, a rat catcher who was hired by the town to lure rats away with his magic pipe only to cause the death of people who followed him, the speculative and extravagant scenarios of transhumanist futurists will render the biological human species obsolete, whether they admit it or not. Transhumanism presents its predictions as inevitable scenarios that will necessarily come to pass and asks us to endorse the vision because it will bring about the perfection of the human species. Transhumanism is a radical or extreme version of the Enlightenment ideology of “progress.” In truth, however, there is nothing inevitable or necessary about the assumptions that undergird the transhumanist imagined future because these assumptions simply reflect the preferences of transhumanist futurists. The transhumanist vision is just one social imaginary that demands a critique.89

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What I find most problematic about transhumanist futurism is the notion that ideal perfection can be reached in the here and now by human efforts alone. This, as I have shown elsewhere, expresses the secularization of Christian apocalyptic and eschatological mentality and it is open to Judaic objections, because the world, although good, is inherently imperfect. Unlike Christian messianism (and its secular transhumanist interpretation), the Jewish messianic ideal (at least as I interpret it) is not descriptive but prescriptive; it does not depict an actual state of affairs of this world (haolam ha-zeh) but offers a hope for an ideal future (ha-olam ha-ba) which is in principle not realizable in the here and now. The Jewish messianic ideal reminds us that we do not live in the ultimate eschaton in which the Kingdom of God (malchut shamayim) has been realized on Earth, but rather we live in the penultimate, never ending pursuit of the ideal that could never be realized in this world. To live as a Jew is to live in the consciousness of the “not-yet,” as Ernst Bloch correctly understood, even though he forsook Judaism for the secular utopianism of Communism. To live as a Jew is to live in anticipation of the ideal rather than to claim that perfection has been achieved. My rejection of the eschatological tendencies of transhumanism leads me to a second critical observation: transhumanism is a new idolatry because it glorifies, idolizes, and fetishizes human-made technology, investing human products and human activities with salvific powers. Transhumanism rejects the existence of a transcendent God or the human worship of God and instead posits the worship of human-made “gods,” the superintelligent machines that will eventually make biological humans obsolete. The worship of technology is idolatrous because it expresses the human infatuation with its own creative powers. So much do humans adore themselves that they are remaking themselves in their own image! Of course, the transhumanist position is highly ironic: on the one hand, they glorify human technological powers, but on the other hand, transhumanists ask humanity to destroy biological humans once and for all. The negation, disdain, and contempt of human biological embodiment is the third reason why I find transhumanism so misguided from a Judaic perspective. Transhumanism is rooted in mind-body dualism characteristic of the Western (Christian) tradition that privileges mind over body. Transhumanism insists not only on the “enhancement” or “improvement” of the human body by means of technology but also on the elimination of the imperfect human body once and for all. By contrast, Judaism honors human biological embodiment and the wisdom of the body and considers the body itself as a vehicle in the worship of God, precisely because the human being was created in the “image of God.” The Jewish tradition sanctifies the body through the performance of the commandments, but sanctification does not entail the negation or denunciation of biological embodiment per se. Because

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the created human body is inherently valued, the biological body cannot and should not be replaced by “life” in silico, which is no life at all. Organic life, the foundation of human existence, has its own preciousness and demands special respect and care. Jews, rational humanists, and practitioners of all religious traditions, who value the preciousness of being human, no matter how imperfect, must be cautious about the false and destructive promises of the transhumanist Pied Pipers.

NOTES 1. Nick Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values” (2001) available on his website http://www​.nickbostrom​.com. For a fuller treatment see idem, “Transhumanism FAQ, A General Introduction,” version 2.1, available on http://www​ .nickbostrom​.com. 2. Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Walker, From Change to Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002); Joel Garreau, Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies and What It Means to Be Human (New York: Doubleday, 2004); Simon Young, Designer Evolution: A Transhuman Manifesto (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006); Ted Chu, Human Purpose and Transhuman Potential: A Cosmic Vision for Our Future Evolution ((San Raphael California: Origin Press, 2014). 3. On the politics of transhumanism movement, see James J. Hughes, “The Politics of Transhumanism and the Techno-Millennial Imagination, 1626–2030,” in Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, 47, no. 4 (2012): 757–776. 4. The anthology, The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology and Philosophy of the Human Future, ed. Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Chichester, West Sussex, England: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), offers a representative overview of the main contributors, themes, and writings of the transhumanist movement. 5. For a close study of the Singularity University, see Margarita Boenig-Lipstin and J. Benjamin Hurlbut, “Technologies of Transcendence at Singularity University,” in Perfecting Human Futures: Transhuman Visions and Technological Imaginations, ed. J. Benjamin Hurlbut and Hava Tirosh-Samuelson (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2016), pp. 239–267, quote on p. 251. 6. See Max More, “On Becoming Posthuman” (1994) available on http://eserver​ .org​/courses​/spring98​/76101R​/readingss​/becoming​.html. For a more recent formulation, see Max More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” in The Transhumanist Reader, pp. 3–27. 7. Max More, the main theorist of Extropianism, is no longer engaged in articulating Extropianism but instead focuses on implementing the futurist vision by focusing on cryonics. He is the CEO of Alcor Life Extension Foundation, a non-profit organization that claims to be “a world leader in cryonics, cryonics research, and cryonics technology.”

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8. Nick Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values,” available on his website http://nickbostrom​.com. 9. David Pearce, “The Hedonistic Imperative,” available on http://www​.hedweb​ .com. This definition of “morphological freedom” is taken from “The Transhumanist Declaration (2012),” in The Transhumanist Reader, p. 55. 10. James Hughes is the main voice of this strand within the transhumanist world. See James Hughes, Citizen Cyborg: Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the Future (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2004). 11. For a different classification of transhumanist strands, consult Anders Sandberg, “Transhumanism and the Meaning of Life,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed. Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), pp. 3–22. Sandberg distinguishes between “individual transhumanism,” “cosmic transhumanism,” and “terrestrial transhumanism” and further subdivides the first category into “religious transhumanism,” “extropianism,” and “enhancement and the meaning of life.” 12. On the proliferation of transhumanist themes in contemporary culture, see Mike Featherstone and Roger Burrows, Cyber Space/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological Embodiment (London: Sage Publications, 1996); N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Robert M. Geraci, Apocalyptic AI: Visions of Heaven in Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and Virtual Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); idem, Virtually Sacred: Myth and Meaning in World of Warcraft and Second Life, (Oxford University Press, 20140; Robert Ranisch and Stefan Sorgner (eds.), Post- and Transhumanism: An Introduction (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014). 13. See Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Kenneth L. Mossman (eds.), Building Better Humans? Refocusing the Debate on Transhumanism (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012); idem, “Transhumanism as a Secularist Faith,” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 47: 4 (2012): 710–734; idem, “Utopianism and Eschatology: Judaism Engages Transhumanism,” in Religion and Transhumanism, pp. 161–80; J. Benjamin Hurlbut and Hava Tirosh-Samuelson (eds.), Perfecting Human Futures: Transhuman Visions and Technological Imaginations (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2016); idem, “Technologizing Transcendence: A Critique of Transhumanism,” in Religion and Human Enhancement: Death, Values, and Morality, ed. Tracy J. Trothen and Calvin Mercer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 267–283. 14. Johann A. R. Roduit, The Case for Perfection: Ethics for the Age of Human Enhancement, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016), p. 24. 15. Mark Walker, “What is Transhumanism? Why Is a Transhumanist?,” http:// www​.transhumanism​.iorg​/index​.php​/th​/more​/298. Cited in Johann A.R. Roduit, JanChristophe Heilinger and Holger Baumann, “Ideas of Perfection and the Ethics of Human Enhancement,” Bioethics 29: 9 (2015): 622–630, quote on p. 623. 16. Roduit, Heilinger, and Baumann, ibid., p. 624. 17. See Nick Bostrom, “Genetic Enhancement and the Future of Humanity,” The European Magazine, retrieved from http://theeruropean​-magazine​.com​/282​-bostrom​ -nick​/283​-perfection​-is​-not​-a​-useful​-concept.

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18. Max More, “Extropian Principles 3.0,” http://wwwmaxmore​.com​/extprn3​.htm. 19. Ibid. 20. This discussion is based on Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “Religion, Science, and Technology in the Post-Secular Age: The Case of Trans/Posthumanism,” Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences 4 (2017): 7–45. 21. In other words, for Aristotle perfection is, in principle, impossible to attain. See Michael Slote, The impossibility of Perfection: Aristotle, Feminism and the Complexity of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). By contrast, transhumanism seeks to convince us that perfection is possible here and now. 22. David Masci, “Human Enhancement: The Scientific and Ethical Dimensions of Striving for Perfection,” Pew Research Center, available at http://www​.pewinternet​ .org​/2016​/07​/26​/human​-enhancement​-the​-scientific​-and​-ethical​-dimension 23. Cited on the website of the Extropy Institute. Cf. More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” in The Transhumanist Reader, p. 4. 24. See Simon Young, Designer Evolution, p. 212. 25. Julian Savulescue and Nick Bostrom, Human Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 13. 26. Chu, Human Purpose and Transhuman Potential, p. 32, and p. 33. 27. Eric Parens, “Authenticity and Ambivalence: Toward Understanding the Enhancement Debate,” Hastings Center Report 35 (3) (May–June 2005): 36. 28. Leon Kass, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (New York: Regan Books, 2003), 294. 29. Anders Sandberg, “Morphological Freedom, Why We Not Just Want It, but Need It,” talk given in Berlin on 2001, available in Anarcho-Transhumanism: A Journal of Radical Possibilities and Striving, http://anarchotranshuman​.org​/post​ /117749304562​/morphological​-freedom​-why​-we. Reprinted in The Transhumanist Reader, pp. 58–64. 30. Mark Walker, Happy-People-Pills for All (Malden, MA: Willey-Blackwell, 2013), p. 12. 31. See Ronald Bailey, Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the Biotech Revolution (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005). 32. Martine Rothblatt, “Mind Is Deeper Than Matter: Transgenderism, Transhumanism and the Freedom of Form,” in The Transhumanist Reader, p. 318. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. It seems to me that there is a difference between transgenderism as an expression of “morphological freedom” and transgenderism as a solution to gender dysphoria. The former is a result of choice; the latter is a result of perceived necessity. 35. Rothblatt developed this point in her Virtually Human: The Promise—and the Peril—of Digital Immortality (New York: St. Martin Press, 2015). 36. The attitude is most evident in Nick Bostrom, “The Fable of the Dragon Tyrant,” Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (205): 273–77. For reflections on transhumanist attitudes toward death, see Thorsten Moos, “How Transhumanism Secularizes and Desecularizes Religions Visions,” in Perfecting Human Futures, pp. 159–78, esp. pp. 164–166.

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37. Aubrey De Grey, “The Curate’s Egg of Anti-Anti-Aging Bioethics,” in The Transhumanist Reader, p. 215. 38. See Sascha Dicke and Andreas Frewer, “Life Extension: Eternal Debates on Immortality,” in “Post-and Transhumanism: An Introduction,” p. 120. For the detailed discussion of SENS, see Aubrey De Grey, Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthrough That Could Reverse Human Aging in Our Lifetime (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007). 39. David Chidester, Patterns of Transcendence: Religion, Death, and Dying (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002), 169. 40. Eliezer Yudokowsky, for example, believes that “people who haven’t signed their children up for cryonics are lousy parents.” See Barrat, Our Final Invention, p. 50. 41. Eric K. Drexler’s support for cryonics is available on his blog “Metamodern: The Trajectory of Technology;” additional references are available on the blog of the Institute for Evidence-Based Cryonics. Other scientific support for resurrection of the dead by means of nanotechnology is the well-known Frank J. Tippler, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology and the Resurrection of the Dead (New York, NY: Anchor, 1994). 42. See David H. Guston (ed,), The Encyclopedia of Nanoscience and Society (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2010), p. 387. 43. Kurzweil, TRANSCEND, p. 423. 44. Kurzweil, TRANSCEND, p. 404. 45. Kurzweil has expressed his hope for resurrecting his own father in an interview to Rolling Stone. See David Kushner, “When Man and Machine Merge,” Rolling Stone (February 19, 2009), pp. 57–61. The specific reference is on p. 61. 46. Barrat, Our Final Invention, p. 143. 47. Prisco, “Transcendent Engineering,” p. 235. 48. Prisco, ibid., p. 234 49. Prisco, ibid., p. 238. 50. Robert M. Geraci, Apocalyptic AI: Visions of Heaven in Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and Virtual Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 149. 51. See Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). For close analysis of transhumanism as a social imaginary, see Hurlbt and Tirosh-Samuelson (eds.), Perfecting Human Futures, cited above. 52. See Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2014). 53. Robert M. Geraci, Virtually Sacred: Myth and Meaning in the World of Warcraft and Second Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 54. Geraci, Apocalyptic AI, p. 86. We should note that the other co-founder of the Order of Cosmic Engineers is William Sims Bainbridge, a transhumanist who wields enormous influence in the National Science Foundation. Transhumanist fantasies inspire many scientific projects, especially ones funded by DARPA. 55. Geraci, ibid., p. 37.

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56. For a debate whether computers think and whether their computation can be considered “intelligence,” see John Brockman (ed.), What to Think about Machines That Think: Today’s Leading Thinkers on the Age of Machine Intelligence (New York: Harper Perennial, 2015). 57. Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 28. 58. Ibid., 36–38. 59. Ibid., p. 43. 60. Ibid, p. 61. 61. Ibid., p. 28, note 6. 62. Peter Brown, The Ransom of the Soul: Afterlife and Wealth in Earth Western Christianity (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2015); Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200–1336 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 63. George Zarkadakis, In Our Own Image: Savior or Destroyer? The History and Future of Artificial Intelligence (New York and London: Pegasus Books 2015), p. 189. 64. Zarkadakis, ibid., p. 269. 65. Ibid., p. 265. 66. Ibid., p. 170. 67. See Anders Sandberg, “An Overview of Models of Technological Singularity,” in The Transhumanist Reader, pp. 376–394, quote on p. 377. 68. See Amnon H. Eden, James h. Moor, Jonny H. Soraker, and Eric Steinhart (eds.) , Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment, ed. (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2012). Diane Proudfoot, “Software Immortals: Science or Faith?,” ibid., pp. 367–389 offers a powerful and most relevant critique of the Singularity Hypothesis. 69. Kurzweil’s speculations about 2045 have inspired the 2045 Initiative funded by the Russian billionaire Dmitry Itskov, whose goal is “to make sure that we can live forever.” By 2020, the Initiative seeks to have functioning ‘avatars’ in which a human will be able to control a robot via their brain; by 2035, the avatar will have an artificial brain that can possess a human personality; and by 2045, a fully transhuman being will be functioning as a hologram-like avatar. We are asked to endorse this scenario as “progress” for the human species, but I for one beg to differ. 70. On the indebtedness of transhumanism to ancient apocalypticism, see Geraci, Apocalyptic AI, esp. pp. 8–38; William Grassie, “Millennialism at the Singularity: Reflections on the Limits of Ray Kurzweil’s Exponential Logic,” in H+: Transhumanism and Its Critics, ed. Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus 2011), 249–69; Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “Utopianism and Eschatology: Judaism Engages Transhumanism,” in Religion and Transhumanism, pp. 161–180. 71. Prisco, “Transcendent Engineering,” p. 237. 72. Chu, Human Purpose and Transhuman Potential, p. 221. 73. Chu, p. 227. 74. De Garis is quoted by Barrat, Our Final Invention, p. 86.

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75. On the complex relationship of Stephen Hawking with AI, see Ana Santo Rutschman, “AI gave Stephen Hawking a voice—and he used it to warn us against AI,” posted on The Conversation, (March 15, 2018). 76. Barrat, ibid., p. 153. 77. Brockman, What to Think about Machines that Think, p. 126. 78. Brockman, ibid., 127. 79. How the “immanent frame” has emerged is analyzed in great detail by Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 80. William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God Went Wrong (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), p. 15. 81. Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality & Other Life Strategies (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 133. 82. Bauman, ibid., 161. 83. Jean-Francois Lyotard, Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfans: Correspondence 1982–1985 (Paris: Galilée, 1988), p. 36, quoted in Bauman, ibid., p. 163. 84. Bauman, ibid., p. 172. 85. Bill McKibben, “Pause! We Can Go Back!,” review of David Sax, The Revenge of Analog: Real Things and Why They Matter (Public Affairs, 2016), The New York Review of Books, volume LXIV, Number 2, February 9, 2017, pp. 4–6. 86. See Ron Cole-Turner, “Christian Transhumanism,” in Religion and Human Enhancement,” pp. 35–47, quote on p. 39. 87. Cole-Turner, ibid., p. 45. 88. See Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “Tikkun Olam: Judaism and Biotechnology,” (forthcoming). 89. For an elaboration of that point, see Armin Grunwald, “What Does the Debate on (Post)Humanism Futures Tell Us?: Methodology of Hermeneutical Analysis and Vision Assessment,” in Perfecting Human Futures, pp. 35–50.

Part III

THE H+ FUTURE WHAT ARE THE ISSUES?

Chapter 12

Cyborg, Gender, and the Posthuman Self J. Jeanine Thweatt

I discovered transhumanism by accident. By this, I mean that when I first became interested in questions about the future of technology and its implications for theological anthropology, it wasn’t transhumanism that I first engaged. Rather, it was a reference in Hardt and Negri’s volume, Empire, that introduced me to Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto,” in the context of critical work on hybridity and identity.1 This was my entry into posthuman discourse. And so, when I began reading Christian theological work on the “posthuman,” I was initially confused: the hybrid, ecologically grounded, inclusive, queer cyborg I was becoming familiar with was not the image of the posthuman being described (and generally rejected) by these fellow theologians. It seemed, if anything, antithetical to my understanding of the cyborg. What was this other vision of the posthuman? And where did it come from? This was how I stumbled into transhumanism, and what I perceived to be the stark contrast between Haraway’s cyborg and transhumanist visions of the posthuman became a central, framing argument of Cyborg Selves. That was quite some time ago, and the conversation has evolved considerably over the last decade. Transhumanism itself is a complex, evolving movement, and whichever transhumanist thinker one engages is a determinative factor for what sort of stance—affirmation, rejection, or critical appropriation—one adopts. Theological engagement with transhumanism, as well, has become both more widespread and more nuanced, as we theologians have collectively grappled with understanding the complexities of this movement. In the introduction to Cyborg Selves, I suggest that critical and thoughtful theological engagements may influence the internal politics of transhumanism in demonstrating that the technoprogressive elements 217

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prove the most productive in interdisciplinary engagement; and it may be that herein lies the most promising site for collective construction of the posthuman.2

Has this cautious hopefulness proven warranted in the emergence of Christian transhumanism? I am simply not sure. My hesitation is grounded in my continuing sense that the cyborg and transhumanist versions of the posthuman remain starkly divergent, and moreover, that what is most valuable in posthuman discourse is the cyborg critique of both transhumanist and Christian dualisms. THE CYBORG MANIFESTO: IRONY, MATERIALITY, HYBRIDITY, KINSHIP As Cary Wolfe notes, the “Cyborg Manifesto” is very much a product of its time. He writes that reading it again today, it’s a sort of time capsule or cultural brain smear from the era of Star Wars (both the Hollywood film franchise and the Reagan-era missile defense system) blasphemously interpreted by a committed socialist-feminist who is ready to do something about it, is looking for help from you and me, and will use any and every tool in the shed to make a good start on the job.3

Understanding this cultural moment is crucial for interpreting the text well; without situating the text concretely in its moment, the temptation arises to interpret the ontological and philosophical work as purely abstract, ahistorical, and categorical. Such interpretations badly miss the mark. It is worth quoting Haraway at length on the many facets of this cultural moment, as these comments clarify and underscore the multiple problems and multiple audiences addressed throughout the text: The “Cyborg Manifesto” is a kind of coming together of understanding that I had been formed . . . [by] the forms power took in information-saturated culture, information science-saturated culture and politics, in Command Control Communication Intelligence . . . during the very period of indigenous Hawaiian sovereignty movements, struggles for feminism and reproductive and sexual freedom, and land and labor struggle movements. . . . I was formed as a person out of all these things. And I was and remained always profoundly in love with biology, the critters, the ways of knowing. . . . Also, the manifesto was shaped by the ongoing looping through a particular moment of women-of-color feminism, and the call to account by Chela Sandoval and others, of the overly white feminisms of many of “our” visions

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and understandings, many of my formations, of that period. The “Cyborg Manifesto” tries to live with and be accountable to racist formations in and out of feminism, accountable to the deep troubles of socialism in and out of Marxist analysis, and so forth.4

This explains why Haraway opens the “Cyborg Manifesto” with the stated intent to “build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism and materialism,” one which she describes as faithful—as blasphemy is faithful. This framing is as significant as the figure of the cyborg itself, for it tells us how Haraway intends for that figure to be received. She adopts the cyborg as a disruptive figure on all sides: not simply or even primarily disruptive for theological myths of wholeness or political, technological dreams of transcendence, but also of feminist myths of natural identity, socialist myths of dialectical resolution, secular myths of disenchanted materiality. The cyborg, as Haraway intends it, disrupts all boundaries: “at the center of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg.”5 The cyborg is a hybrid figure: neither wholly organic nor solely mechanical, but both, straddling these taken-for-granted ontological categories. It embodies what Haraway calls “crucial boundary breakdowns.”6 The boundaries in question are those that define the category “human,” at least in the Western philosophical tradition, in the form of dualisms of opposing identities: human/animal, organism/machine. Of the first, Haraway observes that “the last beachheads of [human] uniqueness have been polluted if not turned into amusement parks—language, tool use, social behavior, mental events, nothing really convincingly settles the separation of human and animal.” Of the second, she notes, “modern medicine is full of cyborgs, of couplings between organism and machine, each conceived as coded devices.”7 If, as we so long have done in Western philosophy and theology, conceive of the category of the “human” as that ontological space defined as “not animal” and “not machine,” the cyborg is a transgressive figure, one whose existence threatens our notions of pure identity. This, for Haraway, is the utility of it. The cyborg represents not a transcendence of the category of the human, but a redrawing of the boundaries, an incorporation of animal and machine into human identity. This matters because of the central role dualisms of all sorts have played in Western ontology and metaphysics, ethics and politics, enabling the domination of those thereby constituted as others.8 It is important to note that for Haraway the cyborg as a figure is not merely an idea, but simultaneously a current and emerging material reality that describes embodied lives. Both of these layers of intended meaning are necessary for Haraway’s argument. The observation that both contemporary medicine and contemporary science fiction are full of cyborgs anchors the significance of the cyborg figure as something more than abstract, and more

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than a mundane observation about emergent technologies in medicine and healthcare. The cyborg describes the configuration of actual bodies, and as it does so, interrogates the definition of the human. The hybridity of the cyborg is theoretical, but it is also necessarily material, actual, and specific. The term cyborg itself, however, originates in a context which celebrates something other than its hybridity as the salient characteristic. Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline articulate the possibility of the cyborg as a strategy for conquering space, writing: If man in space, in addition to flying his vehicle, must continuously be checking on things and making adjustments merely to keep himself alive, he becomes a slave to the machine. The purpose of the Cyborg . . . is to provide an organizational system in which such robot-like problems were taken care of automatically, leaving man free to explore, to create, to think and to feel.9

In this vision, hybridity is something like an acceptable and negligible side effect of this chosen means to achieve the imagined end, the liberation of the human organism from its biological dependency via technology. Haraway is not unaware of this, writing: “the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos of the ‘West’s’ escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space.”10 What this vision of the cyborg fails to take into account is the very fact of its hybrid embodiment, and this is, as Haraway puts it, the cyborg’s “illegitimate promise that might lead to subversion of its teleology as star wars.”11 Haraway’s exploration of the cyborg, therefore, is a consciously ironic appropriation that focuses not on technological promises of domination and transcendence but on the ontological and ethical implications of its material hybridity. Haraway is consistent and explicit in the manifesto about the dual possibilities of the cyborg figure and the necessity of maintaining the irony of its appropriation: From one perspective, a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse waged in the name of defense. . . . From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints. The political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other viewpoint.12

So we see the cyborg’s “no” to Western dualisms of human/others; but the cyborg “ironically not only undermines the justification for patriarchy, colonialism, humanism, positivism, essentialism, scientism, and other unlamented

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-isms, but all claims for an organic or natural standpoint.”13 With this acknowledgment, Haraway shifts her focus from Western capitalist patriarchy to feminism: “white women, including socialist feminists, discovered (that is, were forced kicking and screaming to notice) the non-innocence of the category ‘woman.’”14 In response, “cyborg feminists have to argue that ‘we’ do not want any more natural matrix of unity and that no construction is whole.”15 Versions of feminism that rely upon identifying a single, privileged standpoint for critique and activism fall apart, because no such standpoint ultimately exists, given that it relies upon an essentializing of woman. There are two problems here: the first is that these constructions exclude more women’s experiences than they include; the second is that, rather than unraveling the dualism that produces this category (man/woman), it inversely validates it. In this schema, “women are imagined either better or worse off, but all agree that they have less selfhood, weaker individuation, more fusion to the oral, to Mother, less at stake in masculine autonomy.”16 When the reality is that “there is nothing about being ‘female’ that naturally binds women,” the question becomes “which identities are available to ground such a potent political myth called ‘us,’ and what could motivate enlistment in this collectivity?”17 Instead of identity, Haraway suggests that the cyborg image offers a way to articulate kinship across boundaries and differences in a way that negates the perceived need for an identical standpoint. In the past, I have considered the explicit technological aspect of the cyborg less significant than its more abstract hybridity. This may not be completely wrong; after all, Haraway’s later scholarly corpus takes a decisive turn away from the cyborg as a figure, and from its transgression of the organism/machine boundary, toward a focus on the species boundaries and kinships. However, the explicit technological component of the cyborg is not dispensable, even while recognizing that the logic of hybridity travels well and includes, in Haraway’s later work, a much bigger family of queer companion species.18 However, in the cultural moment that defines the writing of the manifesto, technoscience is not merely the symbol but the pragmatic means of Western cultural, military, and scientific domination. The role of the cyborg in this context is to refuse to abandon responsibility, to resist admission of complicity, and so to, hopefully, take up a position of agency over the technologies that both constitute and threaten it. The emergence of communications technologies and biotechnologies has transformed the structure of the social and economic world; the “social relations of science and technology” have shifted, and women, humans, are located “in the integrated circuit” in new ways, all of them potentially vulnerable, but which also imply the possibility of action.19 In this context, a retreat to a feminism which valorizes earthiness through an anti-science denial of technologies is an escapist fantasy, and leaves technology hostage to a discourse in which it is synonymous

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with weapons. Haraway comments, “The nothing-but-critique approach was a temptation in some crucial domains of feminism and New Left socialism. The ‘Cyborg Manifesto’ was a deliberate in-your-face NO to that relation to science and technology, and that caused controversy from the get-go.”20 THE FEMINIST CYBORG, TRANSHUMANISM, AND RELIGION Transhumanism has more in common with Clynes and Kline’s cyborg as a vision of untethered freedom than with Haraway’s ironic, hybridly embodied creature which celebrates its kinship across boundaries with animals as much as machines. Transhumanism’s goal of transcending biological limitations and vulnerabilities reinscribes the category of the human as humanity, plus (H+); as an extension of the philosophical tradition of Western humanism, it should be obvious that this movement has little if nothing to do with the kind of posthuman discourse which rejects the dualistic logic of humanism as its starting point.21 It “should be obvious”—so an enduring question for me is, why doesn’t it seem to be? One answer is that, on a shiny, mirrored surface level, Haraway’s cyborg and transhumanist discourse share one common starting point in the rejection of “Nature” as a God-given, stable, inviolable category. Other possible reasons for this include the way in which a certain kind of cyborg future shows up in transhumanist discourse (for instance, in the descriptions of Ray Kurzweil and others of possible strategies for life extension), and the fact that Haraway’s name is occasionally invoked by some transhumanist thinkers (for instance, in the work of James Hughes).22 Haraway, however, has stated bluntly that the reason she has moved on from the cyborg as a figure, and consciously distanced herself from the term posthuman, is precisely this kind of misappropriation of her work; in 2006, she comments, “I’ve stopped using it [the term posthuman] . . . human/ posthuman is much too easily appropriated by the blissed-out, ‘Let’s all be posthumanists and find our next teleological evolutionary stage in some kind of transhumanist technoenhancement.’”23 An acknowledgment of the differences between the figure of the cyborg and transhumanism seems to be belatedly emerging now within transhumanism. Nikki Olsen writes, “one essential difference is that a cyborg must be a hybrid . . . whereas hybridity is neither necessary nor sufficient of the transhuman,” and Natasha Vita-More, “the first female philosopher of transhumanism,” comments: It’s a different concept. The cyborg is not self-directing evolution. And it’s not self-directed enhancement. . . . Whereas the transhuman, by its very definition, it’s about human transition. And altering our biology for living longer. And

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improving, or elevating the human performance, both in our physiology and cognition.24

In chapter 3 of Cyborg Selves, I map out the major areas of divergence between feminist cyborg and transhumanist anthropological thought— anthropological, because the differences between these constructions are rooted in different conceptions of what it means to be human in the first place, before we can even envision a meaning for the “posthuman.” The first and most basic of these areas of divergence is, simply, material embodiment. This taps directly into the philosophical heritage of “rational humanism,” which transhumanism officially embraces, and which cyborg feminism and affiliated posthuman discourses reject: specifically, the heritage of the underlying dualism of Enlightenment anthropology. From this major point of divergence, other differences emerge: on gender and notions of postgender, on epistemology, on the relationship of the human and the nonhuman.25 So if the cyborg, properly understood, is not part of transhuman discourse, where does it fit within a volume entitled Religious Transhumanism and Its Critics? I suggest that the cyborg stands as a critical figure in the nexus of a three-way conversation of feminism with religion (specifically Christian theology) and transhumanism, in so far as transhumanism is a techno-amplification of Western humanism. While some theologians have interpreted transhumanism as an alternative secular religious discourse, competing with Christian theological discourse,26 there are, as Ron Cole-Turner observes, notable similarities between Christianity and transhumanism, at least on a surface level: Christians hope for an eternal life that will be enjoyed with the fullest possible knowledge, joy, and moral purity; transhumanists look forward to extending the human life span perhaps indefinitely while also enriching human knowledge, attaining greater happiness if not joy, and achieving moral balance or social harmony.27 It may be tempting to assume that these similarities exist only in a theoretical way, or are only instantiated as historical theological systems interesting to philosophers and theologians but largely irrelevant to contemporary practices of faith. However, as Cole-Turner further notes, these similarities exist because transhumanism emerges from a culture shaped by Christianity.28 It is also these similarities that make it possible to claim, as Micah Redding does, that “Christianity is transhumanism.”29 Returning to the text of the “Cyborg Manifesto” for a brief moment: the language of the manifesto testifies to Haraway’s awareness of this intertwined philosophical and cultural history of Western humanism and Christianity. The rhetorical flourishes, allusions, and wordplay of the manifesto return repeatedly to the Christian mythology of creation, Fall, and eschatological restoration of unity, which, in Haraway’s analysis, is a myth of natural origin

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and triumphant totality through destruction of difference. She writes that “the cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history,” and that “the cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not mud and cannot dream of returning to dust.”30 Any articulation of a Christian transhumanism is prima facie doubly suspect here. From a cyborg perspective, then, this shared theological and philosophical heritage is not simply what provides the surface similarities and most obvious potential convergences between Christian theology and transhumanism, but also potentially the most toxic. As Christian theologians engaging with transhumanism, then, the feminist cyborg pushes us to ask the same critical questions of the Christian theological tradition as of transhumanism itself. What is the “human” that informs the construction of these visions of transformed humanity? If, as Ron Cole-Turner puts it, we have “no interest in reconciling anthropocentric Christianity with anthropocentric transhumanism,” because “doing so would only give us a more virulent human-centeredness,” two questions from a feminist cyborg interrogator seem inevitable: what other sort of Christian theological constructions of the posthuman are possible, and if they are no longer “humanist,” are they any longer “transhumanist?”31 CYBORG RELIGION? In Cyborg Selves, I attempt the construction of a “theological post-anthropology,” grounded in a relational interpretation of imago Dei as a theological starting point, and considering the ways in which a cyborg hybridity restructures relationality and subjectivity. If to be human is actually to be cyborg, what does this mean for human relationality to God, to other humans, to nonhumans? In that construction, I dared to issue an in-your-face “no” of my own to Haraway’s claim that the cyborg “would not recognize the Garden of Eden” by exploring the theological possibilities offered by thinking through Adam and Eve as “cyborgs in the garden.” It seemed to me then (and still does) quite possible that Haraway would appreciate this attempt to be “ironically faithful” to her cyborg by “blaspheming” against her text in this way. If to be human is to be cyborg, then certainly this includes the primal pair! In this move, I intend to make space for an interpretation of the Genesis account that resists the reading Haraway gives it—that of an organic, originary, heteronormative, naturalized, universal myth that produces original innocence and therefore also original sin. As interpreters of this biblical narrative of our cyborg origins—in which Adam is not born of Woman but is manufactured of material elements . . . and Eve is manufactured out of superfluous flesh in a strange foreshadowing of our own

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emergent biotech capabilities—how can we read such a myth as one of Nature, Man, and Woman, in perfectly ordered, natural existence?32

In critiquing this attempt, Scott Midson has rightly pointed out that this is unsuccessful if we cannot theologically resist a kind of naturalism from sneaking in the back door, as it were, in the organic imagery of the Garden. To place the cyborgs in the Garden is not quite enough, if we do not remember that the Garden itself is transformed.33 Keeping this in mind, Midson’s critique has midwifed for me the explicit realization that the Garden was never a place of purity separate from “the real world,” a place where original innocence reigns with no need of human knowledge or skill; rather, the Garden is the world, and the complicated ontologies and relationships that define the primal cyborg pair—human and divine, human and animal, human and human—do not come to an end in an act of expulsion. We remain simultaneously kin and other: to God, to each other, to nonhumans of all sorts. THE CREATED CO-CREATOR Much has been made of the notion of “created co-creator,” and rightly so, as this theological concept opens the door to a positive theology of technological creativity, in opposition to doctrines of divinely sanctioned natural order and ontological hierarchies, in which each kind of creature must stay in her place.34 As an interpretation of the imago Dei, the “created co-creator” is potentially a contemporary expression of functional interpretations, a claim about the position, responsibility, and stewardship of the rest of creation as God’s chosen representative. The creativity of the human creature is both the quality that reflects the divine and the quality that places the human in a relationship of ontological difference and ultimately hierarchy with the rest of creation. This notion alone is insufficient for resisting the reinscription of the dualistic logic of anthropocentrism.35 If a “Christian posthumanism” is possible, it must start from elsewhere; it must start, not from a description of what sets humanity apart from the rest of creation, but from a recognition of embeddedness within it. This means a decentering of the human in Christian theology. The question we must answer first, before the questions of “what can we” and “what should we” do with our technological imaginations, resources, and communal manufacturing apparatus, is “who are we?” Are we hybrid creatures who find material kinship across the historically and theologically constructed boundaries of animal and machine? Are we cognizant that to be human is to be a creature with and among nonhuman creatures of all sorts, in various

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relationships of symmetrical and asymmetrical dependency, and with implications of a duty of care? The good news is this work is being done within the Christian tradition, in ecotheology, postcolonial theology, disability theology, and queer theology: these are some of the loci where the cyborg logic of embracing hybridity, materiality, specificity, and kinship is evident.36 But where, and how, do these theological approaches intersect with Christian transhumanism? To take up just one example, how does the Christian transhumanist ideal of employing technology as a means of imitating Christ’s healing ministry intersect with viewpoints from disability theology?37 It is easy enough to argue that human beings should do all we can to heal one another, but transhumanism’s goal is “better than well.” What Christian transhumanism must articulate is what a Christian vision of ultimate healing might mean. What sort of ideal is implied? From a disability perspective, Nancy Eiesland, for one, is suspicious of “the myth of bodily perfection.”38 This is not a rejection of human skill or technologies of healing, as her acceptance of her “bones and braces” experience demonstrates, but a suspicion that promises of “being made whole” meant an erasure of that experience and ultimately her identity. Transhumanism rejects existing bodily norms in order to pursue a future bodily (or in some instances, virtual) vision of perfection of invulnerability, but cyborg hybridity appeals the existing material realities of bodies, and in this context, “imperfect,” “disabled,” “bones and braces” bodies, to demonstrate that a singular bodily norm has never existed, focusing on the social implications of existing bodily configurations that cross boundaries. Is there a way to articulate a Christian theology of technology in the service of healing that does not invoke the myth of bodily perfection? If there is, is that Christian transhumanism or is it something else? CONCLUSION Ultimately, Haraway’s cyborg stands as a critical interrogatory figure of both transhumanism and Christianity, and for the same reasons. While I remain leery of adopting the label “Christian transhumanism,” I am comfortable playing with the notion of cyborgs in the Garden, even a cyborg Christ.39 Whether or not the current manifestation of Christian transhumanism remains critical enough of the theological missteps of its own Christian tradition to resist retracing those same missteps taken within transhumanism is an open question. The cyborg persists in asking Christian theology that question, in a mode that is as ironically faithful as blasphemy is faithful; a satan-ic figure in the ancient and literal sense of the word. I believe that Christian transhumanism needs this satan.

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NOTES 1. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), citing Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991). 2. J. Jeanine Thweatt-Bates, Cyborg Selves: A Theological Anthropology of the Posthuman (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 11. 3. Cary Wolfe, “Introduction,” in Donna Haraway, Manifestly Haraway (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), x. 4. Donna Haraway, “Companions in Conversation,” in Manifestly Haraway, 205, 207. 5. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 149. 6. Ibid., 151–154. 7. Ibid., 150. Haraway also identifies a third boundary breakdown as “a subset of the second: the boundary between physical and non-physical is very imprecise” (153). This terminology is problematic, in that the breakdown she describes is not physical and non-physical, but the way in which technologies have become increasingly invisible, ubiquitous, and embedded in social realities and material bodies. 8. Ibid., 177. 9. Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline, “Cyborgs and Space,” Astronautics (1960): 29–33. 10. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 151. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., 154; see also the discussion on the importance of irony in Haraway, “Companions in Conversation,” 208–209. 13. Ibid., 157. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., 177. 17. Ibid., 155. 18. See Donna Haraway, “The Companion Species Manifesto,” in When Species Meet (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), and her latest, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Cthulucene (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016). 19. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 161–173. 20. Haraway, “Companions in Conversation,” 211. 21. Nick Bostrom et al., “Transhumanist FAQ 3.0,” Humanity+, https://humanityplus​.org​/philosophy​/transhumanist​-faq/, accessed 10/01/2018; Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xiii. 22. Hughes invokes Haraway specifically and cyberfeminism more generally as “natural allies” in the technoprogressive transhumanist quest for “morphological freedom.” See James Hughes, Citizen Cyborg: Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the Future (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2004), 72.

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23. See Nicholas Gane and Donna Haraway, “When We Have Never Been Human, What is to be Done?” Theory, Culture & Society 23.7–8 (2006): 139–140. 24. Nikki Olson, “Do You Want to be a Cyborg, or a Transhuman?” Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, January 5, 2013, available at: https://ieet​.org​/ index​ .php​ /IEET2​ /more​ /olson20130105, accessed October 5, 2018; Natasha VitaMore, “Transhumanism 101,” Singularity Weblog, September 25, 2010, available at: https://www​.singularityweblog​.com​/transhumanism​-natasha​-vita​-more/, accessed October 5, 2018. 25. See Thweatt, Cyborg Selves, 67–84, for the full, detailed argument on this point. 26. For two representative critiques of transhumanism as a secular religious discourse, see Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “Transhumanism as Secular Faith,” Zygon 47.4 (2012): 710–734; Brent Waters, From Human to Posthuman: Christian Theology and Technology in a Posthuman World (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006). 27. Ron Cole-Turner, “Transhumanism and Christianity,” in Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 193. 28. Ibid. 29. Micah Redding, “Christianity is Transhumanism,” December 6, 2017, available at: https://www​.huffingtonpost​.com​/micah​-redding​/christianity​-is​-transhuma​_b​ _9266542​.html, accessed October 1, 2018. 30. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 150, 151. 31. Ron Cole-Turner, “Going Beyond the Human: Christians and Other Transhumanists,” Theology and Science 13.2 (2015): 156. 32. Thweatt, Cyborg Selves, 172. 33. Scott Midson, Cyborg Theology: Humans, Technology, and God (London: IB Tauris, 2018), 188. 34. “Human beings are God’s created co-creators whose purpose is to be the agency, acting in freedom, to birth the future that is most wholesome for the nature that has birthed us—the nature that is not only our own genetic heritage, but also the entire human community and the evolutionary and ecological reality in which and to which we belong. Exercising this agency is said to be God’s will for humans.” Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 264. 35. Thweatt, Cyborg Selves, 143. 36. Ibid., Chapter 5, “Constructing a Theological Post-Anthropology,” 149–172, for an exploration of each of these theological movements as examples of cyborg hybridity at work in concrete contexts. 37. Redding, “Christianity is Transhumanism,” quote: “In Christianity, we are called to join God in the work of healing the sick, feeding the hungry, bringing life to the dead. In doing so, we embrace the true meaning of humanity.” 38. Nancy Eiesland, “What is Disability,” Stimulus 6 (1998): 29. 39. See Thweatt, Cyborg Selves, Chapter 6, for an exploration of cyborg hybridity in connection with Christology.

Chapter 13

A Virtual Ghost in the Digital Machine Whole Brain Emulation, Disembodied Gender, and Queer Mystical Animality Jay Emerson Johnson

Fans of the television series Star Trek: The Next Generation will remember Lt. Reginald Barclay, the brilliant but painfully shy and socially awkward member of the engineering crew on the Starship Enterprise. After several episodes of witnessing Barclay’s fumbling attempts at meaningful social engagement, he creates a remarkable neural interface between his brain and the starship’s main computer. The link effectively fuses the entire ship’s computerized systems and Barclay’s distinctive personality traits. The results spell barely averted disaster for the entire ship.1 Barclay’s poignant arc from socially isolated to electronically and digitally powerful, and then back again to awkwardly shy, artfully avoids a dystopian vision of computer technology run amok. The episode instead foregrounds the communal matrix of human companions in which Barclay was already and always embedded. The television writers present this arc with the treacly qualities of prime-time entertainment—the one who nearly destroyed the entire starship is nonetheless welcomed back into the fold of the ones who had always loved him. The sentimentality nonetheless evokes a foundational insight: each of us is because of others. “No man is an island, entire of itself” declared John Donne in the sixteenth century.2 The African concept of Ubuntu captures a similar insight, and with a subtle critique of the Cartesian insistence on thought as the essence of existence: “I am because we are.”3 Western ideologies and cultural postures infused with the absolute autonomy of the individual notwithstanding, contemporary science continues to deepen a traditional theological insight coming more fully into view in recent decades: no creature exists in isolation from the rest of creation.

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Suppose, then, that the neural circuitry of your brain could be uploaded into a computerized digital medium and preserved there, theoretically forever. This untested concept, known as “whole brain emulation” (WBE), generates some intriguing questions. Once your brain is uploaded, who would you be in that digital milieu? Would it be you? What or whom could you drag along with you in the process of that transference into an electronic format? Is everything about you—whatever makes you uniquely you—neatly contained in the neural circuitry of your brain? What exactly resides in that collection of complex, interconnected network of neurons? Memories, sensations, experiences, relationships, thoughts, affections—do these “reside” in any one place or do they circulate through veins and arteries, suffusing muscles and bone marrow? I ponder such questions in a particular way when I notice the scar on my left index finger, where I accidently closed my father’s pocket knife across a knuckle as a twelve-year-old child. Is the moment of that wounding lodged as a neuro-datum in my brain that can be copied into a digital formula? I strike my hand against the kitchen counter today and I still feel, decades later, the sensation of a blade slicing my flesh, the nerve endings in that finger sending a tingling signal to a combination of locales in my cerebral cortex. Will that one sensation remain as a “file” in a digital “folder” in my uploaded consciousness? What if the memory resides in the finger? Without that finger, is the memory erased? Perhaps not erased but something more like my long-neglected “.txt” files on floppy disks—the memory remains without the finger but no longer accessible or readable by current computer interfaces. Questions likes these percolate throughout a broad range of futuristic hypotheses and speculative theories grouped under the banner of “transhumanism.” The term itself is often traced to Julian Huxley in the mid-twentieth century, who generally embraced rapidly evolving forms of technology as avenues toward overcoming the biological and cognitive limitations of human existence. More than only “enhancing” human life (electronic devices, kitchen gadgets, driverless cars) transhumanists anticipate and actively seek a variety of means to transform and transcend the human condition itself. While critics frequently cite unsavory modes of research (early twentiethcentury eugenics, for example) or worry about entrenched elitism (only the superrich would benefit from technological transcendence), “transhumanism” now encompasses far too many modalities and hypothesized scenarios to address a singular ideology or strategy. A persistent question nonetheless weaves these expanding proposals together: what does it mean to be human? And another: who decides whether a particular limitation even ought to be transcended even if this were possible? And at least one more: are limitations necessarily and by definition always a problem to overcome?

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The WBE belongs as just one among many possible modes of human transcendence, whether modestly conceived as preserving certain informational patterns (similar to a data archive but for neural circuitry) or more extravagantly, as a life extension technology replete with computer-generated “world simulations” with which the “simulated brain” could interact. Enthusiasm for these possibilities among transhumanists currently outpaces technological capabilities, at least according to some.4 But the concept itself and the conversations it generates elicit perennial topics of concern, not least concerning religious and theological portrayals of embodied human life and social relations. My aim in this chapter is to consider the implications of WBE for theological anthropology, regardless of whether such emulation is ever technologically feasible. Transhumanism generally provokes these theological inquiries about the meaning of human life (including humanity’s inherent “limitations”), and WBE in particular demonstrates the ongoing relevance of such inquiries in a wide range of fields and disciplines. I am particularly keen to notice and interrogate how the concept of WBE illustrates the resilience in Western society of portraying the human person as an entirely self-contained, thoroughly autonomous individual. This autonomy, furthermore, is often assumed (at least in popular discourse) to sit neatly ensconced in the brain, the supposed seat of free will guided by an unimpeded rational faculty. Many theologians and social theorists alike would critique these assumptions; here, I outline some reasons why those critiques still matter. I begin with the interrogations of gender offered by queer theorists, not for the sake of expanding received sexual ethics (as queer theorizing is often deployed to do) but for a thorough critique of the binary gender system in modern Western society. This system relies on and replicates, in tacit though powerful ways, an image of the individual human as sui generis, its sexually gendered relations as accidental to, rather than constitutive of, an emergent self. The fluidity of gender identifications and their performative character, as proposed by queer theorists, suggest instead an inherently social self inextricably entangled with complex, embodied webs of relationality. If we suppose, for example, that the multivalent gendered self emerges not solely from the brain but in our bodily and environmental relations, what kind of “self” would digitally occupy computer circuits after a process of WBE? I then propose an expansion of queer theory’s insights concerning the embodied social self beyond the boundaries drawn between species, or more pointedly, between Homo sapiens on the one hand and all other species on the other. This putative divide between humans and other animals represents a philosophical and ideological form of “transhumanism” that has been lodged in Western society for several centuries, and with increasingly disastrous ecological consequences. Here I want to note key areas of resonance

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between the recent surge of animal studies and queer theory’s suspicion of categorical distinctions. That shared suspicion can prompt a retrieval of apophatic forms of Christian theology running through mystical traditions. The connective tissue here is the mystic’s refusal to isolate and categorize divine reality with “doctrinal data,” as if information alone can adequately evoke the profound Mystery in which we “live, and move, and have our being” (Acts 17:28); a similar claim would surely apply to the mystery of human life, which in some fashion reflects the image of that (ultimately) inconceivable divine Mystery. In short, I want to argue that the human qua human lives as an emergent social reality, irreducible to the neural pathways of an individual brain. Biologists and anthropologists have been urging this approach for some time, which resonates particularly well with some of the classical strands of Christian theology. These mutually enhancing insights from science and theology would seem to limit the ability of transhuman technologies like WBE to transcend human limitations. At the very least, socially gendered relations—and whether these are constitutive of the human person—would seem to demand closer scrutiny of how “limits” and “transcendence” are understood. I conclude with a hopeful though cautionary appreciation of “transhumanism” insofar as it reorients a “transcendental” theology, not away from the embodied and relational particularities of divine presence but toward a deeper engagement with the wider world of creation in a non-reductionistic account of the human-divine (or better, “creation-Creator”) relation. This ancient, classical, and mystical insight into theological anthropology appears quite vividly among those today who identify as transgender, which offers a compelling instance of the (cautionary) hope transhumanism might still inspire. SELVES EMBEDDED IN AND EMERGING FROM GENDER/SEX RELATIONS Queer theory has evolved rapidly over the last thirty years in the humanities (and in some theological circles) and now encompasses a wide variety of critiques that echo earlier shifts in “postmodern” and “deconstructionist” strategies. In my own theological adoption of queer theorizing, I attend carefully to the summations of these strands and trajectories offered by William B. Turner and Nikki Sullivan to describe queer theorizing as a relentless interrogation of unexamined assumptions.5 The generally acknowledged pioneers of this approach—Judith Butler and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick—rooted their interrogations in the binary gender system of the modern West, which illustrates both the resilience and severe limitations of Western individualism.

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Queer theorizing begins to scramble common Western assumptions by noting the tension and highly regulated interplay between the terms “sex” and “gender,” the meanings of which are not self-evident, even when they are treated as such. In both popular and scholarly venues, “sex” typically stands for particular anatomical features of a given body that mark someone as either male or female; “gender” refers to a variety of characteristics (gestures, speech patterns, modes of dress) as reflecting either masculine or feminine traits, which are mostly dependent on particular cultural customs and mores. Modern Western society generally assumes a person’s culturally inflected traits will “match” that person’s bodily anatomy and then monitors this alignment to ensure that one’s gender presentation conforms to one’s sex.6 This regulatory posture further assumes that biological anatomy exists independently of cultural traits. Biological males, in other words, retain their foundational sex regardless of the cultural context in which they happen to appear. This set of interrelated assumptions both relies on and perpetuates Western society’s standard view of the human individual as autonomously stable and essentially static. The Western individual does remain vulnerable to the influence of particular cultural performances, but these are, as it were, “written” on the stable self, mostly Aristotelian “accidents” that leave the “essence” of a given individual fundamentally unchanged. When queer theorists call into question the tidy division between sex and gender, and thus between male and female, they provoke an even deeper inquiry into the nature of human being, especially notions of an isolated “self.” Judith Butler’s proposals concerning the performative character of gender displays, for example, destabilize any necessary link between anatomical features and presentational traits but not, thereby, the Aristotelian concept of “accidents.” We could read Butler, in other words, as acknowledging culturally accidental features of the human, but no “essential self” to which these accidents attach; the accidents themselves constitute the “self.” Human bodies do indeed exist in Butler’s view, but they resemble a tabula rasa on which the gender scripts of a given society are “written” through repeated performance.7 Given the relational and the temporal character of these gender scripts, Butler’s analysis construes humans as emergent, constructed by the complex social (and I would add, ecological) interactions of a given cultural location. Thomas Laqueur alerts us to the complex interactions of science and culture regarding gendered bodies with his analysis of Western society’s shift toward viewing men and women as different kinds of human being. Laqueur examines an emerging “two-sex model” for humanity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a model in which men and women differed in kind rather than only by degree or type.8 The supposition that human societies have not

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always lived with a strictly binary construction of gender can easily astonish precisely because the two-sex model is so commonly taken for granted, an assumption reinforced perhaps by the binary foundation and ubiquity of computer technology. Human beings operate with two sexes, just as computers operate with zeros and ones; that’s simply how both are “made.” Contemporary biologists and geneticists approach these questions differently but with equally significant implications for thinking theologically about the (gendered) human. For many of these researchers, gender/sex resides neither in the genitalia nor in the brain but in the complex exchanges and networks that connect these bodily substrates of human identifications. Christine Gudorf urges theologians to consider the growing consensus among biologists that would question the dimorphic “two-sex” model for humanity. Parsing the human into two neatly defined categories based solely on anatomical features—like genitalia—ignores many other factors that contribute to the complex matrix of gendered sexuality.9 She proposes mapping at least six different factors that contribute to gender identification (including chromosomes, hormones, and internal reproductive organics, to name just a few of only the biological sites), each of which correlates to “tending more male” or “tending more female.” These six factors rarely align entirely with maleness or femaleness in a single individual (even chromosomal sex does not neatly divide between just two options). My body/self might exhibit mostly, or somewhat, or only a little male depending on the alignment of these various biological factors in concert with a host of familial and cultural ones. Similarly, Joan Roughgarden draws our attention to recent neurological research that proposes at least eight different brain types among mammals, including humans, each exhibiting distinct ways to manifest anatomical features and hormonal patterns. When correlated with two body types (though there could be more), this would yield “sixteen people types.”10 Roughgarden extends this analysis further in her depictions of the wide variations in both the sexual behaviors and gender displays exhibited by many types of animals (including humans). She critiques Charles Darwin in that regard, not for his evolutionary framework but for how he understood evolution to function based on rather crude sexual mechanisms. Gender binaries do sometimes occur in nature, Roughgarden admits, but often with only subtle differences. Animal life frequently relies on “more than two genders, with multiple types of males and females.”11 Queer theorists and contemporary biologists alike present a complex landscape on which to interpret the sexually gendered emergence of an irreducibly social human, an emergence that rarely fits in either the “M” or “F” box on standardized application forms. Not just coincidentally, the underlying logic of computer technology relies on similarly limited choices—only two. While fuzzy logic and artificial intelligence now mitigate the severity of

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this binary foundation, computer technology still depends on a strict binary choice between zeros and ones, or “on” and “off.” The emergent, irreducibly social human appears in even more complexity when viewed in relation to other animals. Indeed, animal studies extend the insights of queer theorists into a binary construction at least as foundational as gender, the division between humans and animals. Collapsing that distinction carries a host of theological insights for engaging with transhumanism generally and WBE in particular, insights that evoke an earlier and too often neglected mode of theological engagement—apophatic mysticism.

THE QUEERLY ENTANGLED SELF IN MYSTICAL ANIMALITY The word animal stands in popular Western discourse for whatever is not “human” in ways that betray the Latin roots of the word itself. The Latin anima means simply “breath,” and animalis, “having breath.” In theological terms, every creature into whom God breathes the breath of life is an animal—including humans. These linguistic roots have long since dissipated in a cultural and political climate that not only separates humans from all other animals but also denigrates some segments of the human population by referring to or treating them as beasts, vermin, or more simply “animals.”12 Queer theory’s suspicion of binary classification schemes should apply perforce to the ostensibly “natural” (read “divinely ordained”) division between humans and all other animals. This binary distinction, most often understood in hierarchical terms, mirrors similar assumptions about the sexually gendered categorizations of the modern West that first prompted queer theory’s critical and deconstructive posture. That ubiquitous human/animal divide operates at nearly every level of Christian theological discourse in much the same way that the homosexual/heterosexual bifurcation operates at nearly every level of Western cultural discourse, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick persuasively argued in her analysis of English literature. For Sedgwick, the modern invention of homosexuality has less to do with the sexual identity of a relatively small portion of the human population (what she calls the “minoritizing view” of sexuality) than with the means to organize (monitor and regulate) the whole of Western culture itself, or the “universalizing view.”13 Similarly, the putative division between humans and all other animals may stem from particular strands of Christian theological doctrine (a “minoritizing view,” perhaps) but has shaped a much wider range of socio-political assumptions that now carry significant implications for planetary ecosystems (most assuredly a “universalizing view”).14

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Animal studies15 seem to be seeping into the humanities (and some theological circles) in much the same way queer theory has over the last thirty years. Stephen D. Moore argues, however, that the question of the animal has been lurking around the postmodern, deconstructionist postures of scholars and critics for much longer. What has come more clearly into focus (perhaps especially as the global climate change crisis intensifies) is, as Moore describes it, “the cruelly sharp wedge that the Western philosophical tradition has driven between the human and the animal.”16 One consequence of that wedge, I would argue, is the rather facile presumption that something of any enduring significance of the human could be transferred from the brain to the digital circuits of a computer’s mainframe without any (apparent) reference to the wider world of other animals. An academic discipline devoted to animality that is slowly (but surely) rewriting the parameters and objectives of other disciplines (including theology) speaks volumes about the inherited bifurcation between humans and all other creatures of the “same God” (as Andrew Linzey aptly phrased it).17 The “volumes” spoken signal a profound lack of attention to what it means to be human in concert with other creatures, or rather, the presumed superiority and thus isolation of the human creature in modern Western paradigms. When Temple Grandin insists that “animals make us human,”18 I take her to mean that other animals teach us what it might mean to be human. The subtitle of her book—Creating the Best Life for Animals—would thus apply not only to other animals but also to us. Other animals engender this meaning-making activity, not in theory alone, but in bodily encounters and interactions. Grandin’s research can in these ways offer an exhortation not merely to notice the synergies and synchronicities between human emotions and the emotional lives of other animals, but how the meaning of human life itself (theological anthropology) cannot be articulated apart from our entangled relations with other animals and also with our shared ecosystems. David Abram underscores this relational and contextual character of meaning-making as an imperative for our shared healing. Abstracting ourselves from bodily environments—or rather, supposing that such “transcendence” is even possible—resembles the onset of disease from which, Abram argues, we desperately need to recover: The recuperation of the incarnate, sensorial dimension of experience brings with it a recuperation of the living landscape in which we are corporeally embedded. As we return to our senses, we gradually discover our sensory perceptions to be simply our part of a vast, interpenetrating webwork of perceptions and sensations borne by countless other bodies—supported, that is, not just by ourselves, but by icy streams tumbling down granite slopes, by owl wings and lichens, and by the unseen, imperturbable wind.19

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Rather than through conceptual abstraction alone (or residing only in the neural circuitry of our brains), the meaning of human life emerges from the relational matrix in which we, as animals, interact with other animals and our shared ecosystems. In short, the “meaning” of human life is not obvious, nor extractable from the various matrices of creaturely relations where, and because of which, we draw breath. This relational and contextual complexity of life itself recalls some key insights from the traditions of apophatic mysticism in the history of Christian traditions, not only with reference to the word “God” but also and equally concerning the word “human.” If God perpetually eludes the grasp of categorical theological speech (as mystics insist), so also humanity. The unfathomable mystery of divine reality appears in and among the creatures supposedly made in the “image and likeness” of that reality. But as ethologists now argue that many of the features previously thought to belong exclusively to that divine image in humans are actually exhibited in other animals, too, humanity-as-mystery takes on a social reality of even greater texture and increasing complexity.20 The leap just textually performed from queer theory and animal studies to apophatic theology and Christian mysticism appears less severe (and not quite so unwarranted) when viewed through the limits of language, a linguistic caution shared by these various brands of theorists. The limits mark important parameters within which to engage with the complex entanglements among God, humans, and other creatures. This apophatic resistance to categorical speech, queer theorists might say, appears vividly in the fluidity of gender/sex identifications, and as animality scholars might similarly note, in the messy entanglements of humans with multiple other species in the evolution of life itself. Susannah Cornwall draws these strands of queer theorizing and apophaticism together in her exploration of transgender sensibilities. She retrieves forms of apophatic or “negative” theology as a helpful frame for considering “the uncertainty, liminality, and even paradox of human identity,” but not merely as an exercise in regulating appropriate speech. More than only rejecting inadequate images for God, apophatic theologies are “grounded instead in a proactive unknowing about God” that suggests an explicit link between theological anthropology and theology proper. “Queer theologies,” she writes, “emphasize the profoundly ineffable and indescribable nature of the manner in which human sex, gender and sexuality fit together, just as negative theologies have emphasized the unknowability of God.”21 This proactive unknowing, however, does not silence theological speech so much as expand its reach and complicate its implications. David Clough, for example, ponders anew the significance of incarnation by noting how the Johannine biblical writer articulated this foundational Christian claim: the

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word of God became flesh (John 1:14). As not only human (anthropos) but creaturely flesh (sarx), the incarnate Word relativizes absolute distinctions between humans and other animals and refocuses our gaze toward the wider sphere of God’s creation in which humanity belongs as only one of many interrelated parts.22 Even the flesh of Homo sapiens is not a “clear and distinct idea” as the human person, as biologists now insist, is best understood as a “community of microorganisms,” an image that “destabilizes any fixed boundaries between human and nonhuman.”23 Roughgarden’s constructive critiques notwithstanding, Darwin still proves insightful for (re)conceiving the human as both an emergent and irreducibly social creature. In the conclusion of the sixth and final edition of On the Origin of Species, Darwin presents a poetic image of a “tangled bank.” Contrary to popular caricatures, Darwin did not conceive of biological evolution in tidy progressions, suitable for charting on graph paper. Life itself resides deep inside the knotty entanglements of multiple species—plants, insects, animals—each relying on all the others in a complex dance and weave of adaptation, mutation, and change. “It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank,” he wrote, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent upon each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us.24

That bank, with its unfathomable complexity and surging interrelations, served for Darwin as an image of the whole story of life, its “endless forms most beautiful and wonderful” constantly evolving. Contrary to popular religious perceptions, more than a few biblical writers would likely affirm Darwin’s dynamic, evolutionary view of God’s creative work. “Beloved, we are God’s children now,” declares the Johannine writer, but “what we will be has not yet been revealed.” Our hope therefore, he concludes, is that “when Christ is revealed, we will be like him” (1 John 3:2). Speaking meaningfully, let alone accurately, about this evolutionary emergence would seem fruitless, perhaps prompting an apophatic and mystical refusal of speech entirely. But Denys Turner rejects this view of the apophatic. He insists that apophatic sensibilities issue in “excessive speech” to the point of exhaustion, where we find ourselves finally spent in the (necessary) task of speaking what we cannot possibly know.25 Only then do we understand that we cannot really know, and this is the moment of Divine Encounter. I carry this paraphrase of Turner’s insight into my wrestling match with a sexually gendered bodily life. Who can possibly know what any of our

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gendered sexual expressions actually mean or how they constitute the elusive “I” attached to the sense of self? No one knows how to respond, not unambiguously or categorically, even as we cozy up to knowledge with our shared, excessive speech—some of it anatomically clinical, others of it crude and offensive, still others arousing and enticing. None of us speaks alone; no one exists in isolation; no single brain captures the relational matrix from which it emerges.26 We live always ensconced in the “tangled bank” of intertwined relations. This is likewise the apophatic vision Cornwall proposes concerning transgender bodies: Just as both knowing and unknowing further the project of understanding God even in God’s ineffability—coming to know, in fact, that part of God’s nature is to be unknown—so too bodies and identities can be recognized and endorsed in their knowability even as it is emphasized that their full significance is ultimately elusive. Body identities come to be figured as both self-constituting and as constituted by others in the community. Their genesis is thus both external and internal, as is their arena of signification.27

What exactly, then, would transhumanists suppose is captured and saved by uploading neural data from a human brain into computerized digital media? Perhaps only traces of the bodily realities in which that brain was embedded and only lingering hints of the multiple other bodies, species, and ecosystems that shaped it. The uploaded remains of these entanglements would at best resemble a wispy ghost of the human to which it bears witness with scant echoes. René Descartes still matters after all, for reasons of the bodily matter he himself found confounding and mostly extraneous. The Cartesian mind functions quiet happily without any reference to the body at all, posing uncomfortable questions about the purpose of embodied existence, or rather, the vexation over how “mind” intersects with “body.” Descartes might have benefited from attending more closely to Thomas Aquinas, whose notions of “natural law” are too often (mis)appropriated in ecclesial debates over sexual ethics. Aquinas himself—in contrast to the many of the later modes of theological discourse in which he is cited—understood bodily life as formative, not accidental to the human person, a (revised) Aristotelian approach that carries intriguing implications for the role played by other animals in the constitution of the human.28 Descartes hypothesized instead that the brain’s pineal gland provided a likely candidate for bridging the gap between mind and body, though apparently without any relational ties to other bodies or any ecological location to anchor that bridge.

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Gilbert Ryle famously concluded in 1949 that Descartes’s philosophy presented a “ghost in the machine” of human life.29 He evoked in that one felicitous phrase not only the European Enlightenment’s elevation of rationality at the expense of bodily sensation but also the reduction of “nature” to mechanistic processes, the whole world of divine creation portrayed with interlocking gears and gadgets. The consequences of this monumental shift in Western philosophy are legion, from the isolation of reason in autonomous individuals to the alienation of the human from other animals and our shared ecosystems.30 We might now add to that list the prospect of creating virtual ghosts residing in digital machines. The vexations that modern Western philosophy and culture have generated in Christian theology—not least in the current aspirations of ­transhumanists— might find a balm in the sensibilities of those who identify as transgender. Taking Cornwall’s work to heart, I would argue that transgender bodies present an insightful location for considering, first, the unfounded aspirations attached to WBE, and second, the latent promise of transhumanism more generally to push Christian theologians along a path toward an “embodied transcendence.” In brief, there is a great deal of hope to relish for the significance of human life in the (unrealistic) expectations attached to WBE. The hope resides not in digital immortality but the resurrection of the body, a hope we might characterize as a more genuinely Christian brand of transhumanism. CONCLUDING HOPES: TOWARD A TRANS*THEOLOGY Human beings have been altering, enhancing, and maiming human bodies for millennia. Theological and ethical questions about the meaning of human life do not turn on whether we ourselves change our physical bodies (eyeglasses are, after all, a form of body-altering technology) or our physical locations (building bridges and houses) but whether these bodies and their locations are themselves a “limitation,” what a limit actually signifies, and if limits by definition must be “transcended.” Abrahamic traditions preserve an iconic caution about transgressing limits in the story of humanity’s exile from Eden. The limit in that story, however, entails far more than a divine regulation concerning forbidden fruit. The character of the serpent’s temptation deserves careful scrutiny: eat of that fruit, the serpent says, and “you will be like gods” (Gen. 3:5). To read this as not only a statement of fact but also as a temptation strongly implies the underlying assumption that being human is not good enough. This in turn, of course, begs the question of what it means to be human in the first place,

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and whether any alteration of our bodily selves of any kind would signal a refusal of humanity’s (original) created goodness. Is being human itself and by definition a “limitation” to overcome? Why would embodied, relational life appear in any way as a “limit”? Is the longing to “transcend” limitations a defining characteristic of the human condition itself? Are there any limits to the efforts to transcend our limitations? Environmental writer and ecological activist Bill McKibben believes there are indeed such limits and vigorously argues against nearly every effort to transcend them. He portrays current technological advances (genetic manipulation of human embryos, for example) and technological aspirations (life extension techniques) as “tampering” with the universal human limitations that define what it means to be human at all. Respecting these limits belongs, in McKibben’s view, among the essential components of our collective efforts to stop and then reverse the devastating effects human technology has wreaked on earth’s ecosystems. For McKibben, the stakes are “absurdly high” in this unfolding debate, “nothing less,” he writes, “than the meaning of being human.”31 McKibben’s searing (and perhaps overwrought) critiques tap deep human anxieties about the character of human life, which in turn evoke key theological questions. The concept of transcendence itself occupied twentiethcentury theological projects, whether in the Neo-Orthodoxy of Karl Barth or the transcendental Thomism of Karl Rahner. The meaning of transcendence continues to percolate in twenty-first-century theologies, not only in the midst of an ecological crisis of planetary scope (how is Creator related to creation?) but also in the increasing visibility of those who identify as transgender (can creatures alter what the Creator made?). These topics suggest an intriguing link between the question of whether God transcends the entangled webs of ecological concern and whether humans can transcend the categorical confines of a binary gender system. “Transcendence” might at first appear in these questions as marking two distinct if not unrelated notions concerning limits. Considering those questions in tandem can instead surface their profound interrelation. I propose a fusion of those questions and concerns with a renewed methodological foundation for theology inspired by queerly apophatic theological traditions: resistance to reductionism. I propose further that adopting this otherwise pedestrian norm for theological method sets a practical and substantial agenda for developing a “trans*theology” that embraces fully the biological and sociological limits of human life while also affirming an enduring “surplus” of divine presence and action within those very limits. The unconventional insertion of an asterisk in this proposal matters when dealing with the visionary hopes of transhumanism. Those who place themselves on a spectrum of gender identifications, resisting their reduction to binary categories,

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have recently adopted that asterisk to signal their refusal to engage with neat and tidy classifications; Christian mystics would heartily endorse a similar posture toward God.32 Resisting reductionism carries vital consequences for theological systems and practical theologies alike, which I hope a trans*theology would foreground in every engagement with Christian traditions. Not least among those consequences is rejecting the common assumption that “transcendence” implies detachment or, more severely, escape from the complex webs of social and bodily relations that make all of us who we are—and who God is. Christian faith has always struggled with its founding claim, the insistence that the Word of God appears in creaturely flesh. A trans*theology would embrace that claim in fresh ways, insisting that “transcendent divinity” does not stand opposed to the quotidian rhythms of carnal existence but emerges from, and appears in and among, those fleshy, social relations. A trans*theology would insist on a relentless interrogation of the very concepts of “limitation” and “transcendence.” Recalling that the prefix “trans-” indicates a crossing, a movement, a relocation, a trans*theology would invite, not a sense of “overcoming” but of “expanding,” inspiring a posture toward “limits” not as blockages but enticements to envision a multivalent and multi-directional engagement with life in all its entangled manifestations. In these and other ways, a trans*theologian would reject the common adoption of “transcendence” as marking only a vertical journey toward “higher” realities and foster both longitudinal and latitudinal encounters and explorations of life’s “tangled bank”—exactly where the transcendental Word of God appears in the flesh. Susannah Cornwall elicits this trans*theological posture in her analysis of the fourth-century apophaticism of Gregory of Nyssa. Whether Gregory successfully subverted gender norms (as some queer theologians want to argue) matters less than his dynamic and fluid portrayals of the human, always journeying and evolving on a pathway into God, being transformed from “glory to glory.” Citing Sarah Coakley’s work on Gregory, Cornwall notes the invitation Gregory extends, not to overcome the bodily categories and social realities that shape us (including gender) but instead to find a “transformative way through them.”33 This presents a provisional, restless, and thoroughly eschatological picture of human life still in the process of becoming. Linking queer theorizing and Christian mysticism with insights from animal studies might well offer at least one key commitment these disciplines share in common: resistance to finality. As Cornwall notes, the thoroughly eschatological character of Gregory’s theology (evident among many if not most apophatic theologians) precludes the kind of categorical certainty that often attends the binary gender system of the modern West and, by extension, nearly every other aspect of the perpetually changing state of human

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identity, perhaps especially in deeper relation with other animals. The notion of spiritual growth and “perfection” for Gregory, as Cornwall describes it, “means never having arrived, never giving in to the human desire to categorise, demarcate and control recalcitrant phenomena.”34 Justin Tanis adds another layer to this theological analysis by proposing a more dynamic approach to gender identifications for everyone and not only those who would identify specifically as transgender. Rather than a static essence or an anatomical destiny, Tanis considers gender itself as something more akin to a vocation. He describes his own journey as a transgender man by referring to his gender transition as a “calling.” Like any other vocational call, gender may take time to discern or it may appear quite early in one’s life. Tanis had “a sense of being called into gender,” a call from God. “I was called to trust God,” he writes, “and step out into uncharted territory to learn about myself and about who and what God has called me to be. Calling is about what we are to do and about who we are to be, as well as who we will become.”35 Cornwall’s analysis underscores Tanis’s insight with apophasis, noting how mystics generally reinforce “the provisionality of all human gender constructs.” She cites Graham Ward on this who succinctly notes that “bodies are always in transit, exceeding whatever they appear to be at a given time.” Regardless of how one’s gender vocation unfolds, a trans*theology would feature the human as, in Cornwall’s view, “always already to be constructed by others as well as being self-constructing and self-projecting,” perpetually irreducible to the “accidents” of flesh and blood but never fully abstracted from them.36 At which point on this ever-evolving journey into God, where we are transformed from “glory to glory,” will the process of WBE capture the data of an individual brain’s neural circuitry, and what exactly will the process capture at that particular moment? No one can yet say with any certainty, but a trans*theologian would remain skeptical that very much of any significance would remain in digital media. I happily cast my lot among the critics of transhumanism but not as an obstructionist. I adopt a posture of critique for the sake of discovery, not refusal or ignorance. I want to learn more, especially as “transhuman” now gathers under its banner an array of proposals and theories as wide as both queer theorizing and animal studies. For some, like Temple Grandin, it could signal the attempt to embrace what humanity means by engaging more deliberately with other animals. For others, human potential appears in innovative technologies of networking and enhanced biological function (wearing fit bit bracelets to track bodily health or removing cataracts from the eyes and replacing them with artificial lenses). Still others, like Ray Kurzweil, imagine “transcending” the limits of human life itself in forms and locales currently

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unrecognizable as “human.” In all of these modes and moods, I seek further insight into the meaning of human life—of creaturely existence—in concert with, and because of, the enduring presence of the Creator, whose Divine Word dwells with us and among us and, indeed, as one of us. Among the reasons I remain a Christian theologian is the invitation such work extends to plumb the depths of being human rather than escaping its ostensible limitations and accompanying vexations. Transhumanists of particular types may share a similar desire, but I worry that a path of transcendence (especially when framed with digital, computerized matrices) too quickly bypasses the still undigested lessons of the resolutely social and carnal manifestations of God’s creatures now known as Homo sapiens, in all our multi-directional entanglements. What does it mean to be human? Religion generally, and Christian theology in particular, continue to ponder this endlessly fascinating and still vexing question. Nearly without exception, religious traditions have to varying degrees insisted on locating their responses in the shared, fleshy, relational lives we inhabit, which cannot be reduced to “information.” Or rather, the information we might glean leaves behind a vast spectrum of “data” that makes us human—as far as we now know. Far too much remains unexplored about the mystery of human life to suppose that whatever we could (at least at present) upload to a digital platform would qualify as “human.” Perhaps we will appreciate that mystery sufficiently in the future, and our technological prowess will have advanced appropriately, to capture something of humanity’s essence in digital media. Until then, I want to know why the happy gaze of my Australian shepherd dog can move me to tears, and why a friend’s casual touch can send electrical currents through my limbs, and the sight of a sunset over a beach where both are playing makes me want to praise God. I comprehend so little of those sensational moments and I want more years than I have left to enjoy them. Perhaps the God who transcends the limits of my understanding will grant me the opportunity beyond what I now deem possible finally to know what it means to be human. In ways both inscrutable and uncanny, that knowledge will rely on the bodily relations and physical locations that have always constituted my mysteriously indecipherable self. My Christian hope, then, appears in the words of an ancient Hebrew poet in the book of Job. One day I shall know, even as I am known, St. Paul declared (1 Cor. 13:12), because “in my flesh I shall see God” (Job 19:26). NOTES 1. Star Trek: The Next Generation, season 4, episode 19, “The Nth Degree,” directed by Robert Legato (Los Angeles: Paramount Studios, 1991).

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2. John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, (1624) XVII. 3. Desmond Tutu framed this insight theologically by suggesting that “God creates personhood in such a way as to allow the intelligibility of the self as the self loves others—even if the other is an enemy” (Michael Battle, Heaven on Earth: God’s Call to Community in the Book of Revelation [Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2017]), 135. 4. Ray Kurzweil, director of engineering at Google and author of The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), belongs among the more enthusiastic and optimistic supporters of WBE, foreseeing the real possibility of “digital immortality” for humans by the year 2045 (see Tanya Lewis, “The Singularity Is Near: Mind Uploading by 2045?” [https://www​ .livescience​.com​/37499​-immortality​-by​-2045​-conference​.html, accessed August 11, 2018]). 5. William B. Turner, A Genealogy of Queer Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000) and Nikki Sullivan, A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory (Washington Square, New York: New York University Press, 2003). 6. More than a dozen U.S. cities and some states enacted “cross-dressing” ordinances starting in the mid-nineteenth century that forbad people to appear in clothing that did not reflect their sex (the earliest of these, in Columbus, Ohio, was not overturned until 1974). More recent legislative attempts to restrict access to public bathrooms based on one’s “sex at birth” reflect the same posture of gender monitoring. See Susan Stryker, Transgender History: The Roots of Today’s Revolution (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2008). 7. Michel Foucault offered a similar perspective on the socially constructed self. For a helpful analysis of both Foucault and Butler, see John Blevins, “Becoming Undone and Become Human: Sexual and Religious Selves in the Thought of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler,” in Donald L. Boisvert and Jay Emerson Johnson, eds., Queer Religion, Volume II: LGBT Movements and Queering Religion (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012). 8. Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), see especially ch. 5, “Discovery of the Sexes,” 149–92. 9. Christine Gudorf, “A New Moral Discourse on Sexuality,” in Human Sexuality and the Catholic Tradition, ed. Kieran Scott and Harold Daly Horell (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 51–69. 10. Roughgarden, Evolution’s Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature and People (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 240. For a good introduction to Roughgarden’s work and perspectives, see the interview with her, “Nature Abhors a Category,” The Gay and Lesbian Review 15 (January–February 2008): 14–16. 11. Roughgarden, Evolution‘s Rainbow, 5–6. 12. A tweet by former president Donald Trump referring to a dismissed member of his staff (a woman of color) as a “dog” (https://www​.washingtonpost​.com​/politics​/2018​/08​/14​/trumps​-dog​-tweet​-about​-omarosa​-has​-no​-real​-innocent​-explanation/​ ?noredirect​=on​&utm​_term=​.f65945f0d557) and the “housing” in cages of migrant

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children separated from their parents at the U.S./Mexico border (https://www​ .theguardian​.com​/us​-news​/2018​/jun​/17​/separation​-border​-children​-cages​-south​-texas​ -warehouse​-holding​-facility) reflect a much longer history of dehumanizing one’s opponents by “animalizing” them; see Laurel Kearns, “Foreword,” in Divinanimality: Animal Theory, Creaturely Theology, ed. Stephen D. Moore (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), xiii. 13. These views constitute an understanding of sexuality, Sedgwick argues, organized around a “radical and irreducible incoherence” in which everyone’s sexual desires are shaped by a sexual identity that is shared by only a relative few (Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990], 85–86). 14. I explored these connections between queer theory and animal studies for Christian theology in “Liberating Compassion: A Queerly Theological Anthropology of Enchanting Animals,” in Whitney Bauman, ed., Meaningful Flesh: Reflections on Religion and Nature for a Queer Planet (Goleta, CA: Punctum Books, 2018). 15. Some scholars make a distinction between “animal studies” (which includes advocacy for other-than-human animals) and “animality studies,” which explores topics that arise from considering the human in relation to other animals but without any explicit interest in advocating for the welfare of other-than-human animals. See Michael Lundblad, “From Animal to Animality Studies,” PMLA 124, no. 2 (Mar. 2009). 16. Moore, “Introduction,” in Divinanimality, 4. 17. Andrew Linzey, Creatures of the Same God: Explorations in Animal Theology (Brooklyn, NY: Lantern Books, 2007). 18. Temple Grandin and Catherine Johnson, Animals Make Us Human: Creating the Best Life for Animals (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2009). 19. David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous (New York: Random House, 1996), 65. 20. Among the many studies of the emotional, tool-using, and even ethical systems of other animals, see Vilmos Csányi, If Dogs Could Talk: Exploring the Canine Mind, trans., Richard E. Quandt (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000); Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and Susan McCarthy, When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Lives of Animals (New York: Delacorte Press, 1995); Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); and, for the results of the first MRI studies of canine brains in conscious dogs, Gregory Berns, How Dogs Love Us: A Neuroscientist and His Adopted Dog Decode the Canine Brain (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013). 21. Susannah Cornwall, “Apophasis and Ambiguity: The ‘Unknowingness’ of Transgender,” in Trans/formations, Lisa Isherwood and Marcella Althaus-Reid, eds. (London: SCM Press, 2009), 16–17. 22. David Clough, On Animals, Volume 1: Systematic Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 27. 23. Denise Kimber Buell, “The Microbes and Pneuma that Therefore I Am,” in Moore, Divinanimality, 65.

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24. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (London: J. Murray, 1859), 307. 25. Denys Turner, “Apophaticism, Idolatry, and the Claims of Reason,” in Silence and the Word: Negative Theology and Incarnation, Oliver Davies and Denys Turner, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18. 26. I’m grateful to my doctoral student Stephan Quarles for inspiring me to notice these felicitous connections between Turner’s approach to apophaticism and the resistance to reductive forms of categorical speech evinced by both queer theorizing and animal studies. 27. Cornwall, “Apophasis and Ambiguity,” 20. 28. See John Berkman, “Towards a Thomistic Theology of Animality,” in Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough, eds., Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans, and Other Animals (London: SCM Press, 2009). 29. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London and New York: Hutchinson University Library, 1949). 30. James William Gibson cites Max Weber’s prescient anxiety over the future of Earth in a world of “disenchantment,” which results not only from removing God from direct interaction with God’s creation but also distancing ourselves from that world through mechanistic processes (A Reenchanted World: The Quest for a New Kinship with Nature [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2009]), 16. 31. Bill McKibben, Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered Age (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003), xiii. 32. For a helpful overview of queer theology and also some background to the use of an asterisk with the prefix “trans-”, see Linn Marie Tonstad, Queer Theology (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2018), 1–3. 33. Cornwall, “Apophasis and Ambiguity,” 25. 34. Ibid., 33. 35. Justin Tanis, Transgendered: Theology, Ministry, and Communities of Faith (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press, 2003), 146. 36. Cornwall, “Apophasis and Ambiguity,” 37.

Chapter 14

Copulation, Masturbation, and Sex Bots Ethical Implication of AI as My Buddy in Bed Elisabeth Gerle

HUMAN BEING AS BODY INTERACTING WITH OTHER BODIES I am a body. Or I have a body. This philosophical discussion is not new. The literal, embodied meaning of being a body, and sharing bed with a body belonging to somebody else, is certainly not new either. Yet, to have a body in bed that is not another living human being is a recent reality due to the development of sex robots. Robots, construed with artificial intelligence (AI), are not only here as industrial workers and as domestic facilitators. They are here as a companion in bed, as a sex partner. Theologians and philosophers of eros and desire have suggested that eros should be seen as a source of relationship, and therefore as a crucial ingredient for life. This seems alien for companies that design and construct sex robots. These companies rather treat desire as something that ought to be satisfied immediately, without delay. Eros, desire as postponing, increasing pleasure through the intensity of delay, completely disappears. Some theologians describe the interaction between lovers in terms of sharing or foretasting the divine. To quote American feminist theologian Carter Heyward: In the beginning is the relation, not sameness. In the beginning is tension and turbulence, not easy peace. In the beginning, our erotic power moves us to touch, not to take over; transform, not subsume. We are empowered by a 249

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longing not to blur the contours of differences, but rather to reach through the particularities of who we are toward our common strength, our shared vulnerability, and our relational pleasure.1

Heyward emphasizes turbulence and the longing to touch without taking over or assuming possession of. Eros is here seen as a source of tenderness, sharing, and relationality. Divine community is most likely of little importance for developing sex robots. But is human community and physical closeness something to strive for? Or is sex without eros a more practical path to control life? Articles on the net and elsewhere emerge with discussions on what will happen when a child discovers a sex robot between the parents in bed.2 Other sites celebrate the fact that not only men are able to buy and enjoy sex with a robot, often a beautiful young-looking robot with large breasts and with the capacity to embark on nice discussions about literature, music, and sport. Now there are also “male” robots that have a penis, for women. Realbotix, a tech firm in California, is proud to announce that they are in the process of developing an “advanced ‘male robot’ that can offer ‘companionship’ to lonely women around the world.”3 Questions arise if there will be special robots for LGBTQI+ people, and if sex bots in the future will be a solution that will serve people with multiple functional abilities and desires. Maybe even the emotional loneliness, which so many describe as a main feature of contemporary youth depression, could be solved this way. Sex without community or mutuality seems to be one solution; though it would be only sex, rather than erotic desire and longing for community. BURNING QUESTIONS There are many ethical questions arising from these technological prospects. One has to do with description. Would, for instance, human sexual experience with a robot count as copulation or masturbation? A more serious question has to do with commodification and compartmentalization. If sex and emotional response can be guaranteed independent of your own behavior, what kinds of relations are then encouraged? Sex robots are still fairly expensive; money, then, has the power to buy immediate satisfaction. Sex robots may therefore replace prostitutes (there are already brothels with sex bots in some cities).4 And if so, is this a victory over patriarchy or is it just encouraging similar patterns of asymmetric relationships, also with women exercising the dominant, controlling role? Might sex bots of children be invented that would encourage child porn and abuse? In some countries, for instance in Sweden, coroners are already

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called in to testify that the robot is not modeled after a child before being permitted to be imported. Does the mechanical dimension of sex support patriarchy? Might certain forms of crime find encouragement or mitigation? Might sex bots reduce the motivation to develop intimate relationships? What are the consequences for what sometimes is called a healthy relationality? These are just a few of the ethical questions that arise closely related to anthropological discussions within theology. COMPETING VALUES Independence, autonomy, and control are highly valued, especially in the Western world. In Africa the notion Ubuntu is often mentioned as a contrast, highlighting a way of living in community. I become a person, and who I am, in relation to others. This basic understanding is also related to structures in society. “Economy of affection” was a term launched by Göran Hydén already in the 1980s. He was then referring to networks united by kinship, community, and religion. Such economies, which he studied, for example, in Tanzania, were related to survival and social maintenance.5 To contrast the Western world and countries emphasizing community is, however, partly an illusion. Women in Africa, Latin America, and Asia are in various ways striving for independence, not least economically, and people in the West find themselves increasingly dependent on family and kinship relations, especially if the welfare state is not to be trusted as a guarantee for survival. Religion and culture are both notions that are hard to define. They are, however, always tied into these various patterns of social relations, centered on sustenance, maintenance, survival, and community. In many parts of the world religious communities are both a place of worship and crucial for emotional and sometimes material maintenance. Economy and sexuality have for the long history of humanity been closely tied together. It is only during the last century or so that sexuality has been able to emerge on its own terms. Due to the development of contraception methods it has become possible for more people to explore their sexuality without thinking about childbearing and family. While some complain about this, others celebrate this new freedom. With the introduction of sex robots, sexuality without bothering with another human being at all is possible. Masturbation is not the only alternative. However, notions such as relationality, mutuality, and community reemerge with questions on how we want to live with one another and what kind of society we are aiming for. Religion, meaning religare, tying, binding, bringing people together, seems to be as important as ever before.

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Longing for emotional closeness and community, to be seen and loved, to be unified with another human being, even with God, does not seem to have disappeared. What happens then with eros and desire? As I mentioned above, theologians and philosophers have explored eros as a source of relationship. They argue that eros therefore is a crucial ingredient for life, as eros has to do with longing for the other. One dimension may be connected to desire as postponing, increasing pleasure through the intensity of delay. This is something that completely disappears in relation to a sex robot. Entrepreneurs designing sex robots treat desire as something that ought to be satisfied immediately, without delay. Are sex robots then a threat to the desire for community and relationality? And if so, what would an ethical response to this be? While Karl Marx had a dream about a society where you could hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, and write literary critique in the evening, technology today would allow us to fight in World War I in the morning, have sex with a robot in the afternoon, and then play in the World Champion league in the evening.6 This could be helpful for those who have difficulties making friends. And if sex robots also became more affordable, wouldn’t this be a wet dream come true! However, as professor of psychology Jean Twenge warns in relation to contemporary Internet generation, the youth of today is not very well equipped for grown-up life. They have fewer dates and less of a social life; they sleep less and are more lonely and depressed.7 Transhumanism is a contemporary movement that in many aspects wants to escape the human condition, to allude to Hannah Arendt’s famous book with the same title. To escape death or at least to prolong life for a longevity that competes with the stories we find in the Hebrew scriptures is part of their program. The relationship to others, to new generations, and to real communities is sometimes mentioned but does not seem to dominate this hope, or calculation, for longevity. Maybe a scientific “solution” for community will also become a prospect. NEW SEX TOYS FOR THE MARKET Articles describing advancements of sex robots are often very concrete. Hence, there is a, perhaps illusory, sense of body, matter, and senses, yet all within a clear frame of commodification of the sexual partner. The person who can pay is the one to scan the market and decide with what to engage. Customers are said to be able to choose between nineteen kinds of nipples and eleven self-moisturizing female genitals. According to the Daily Star, new “improvements” to the silicone RealDoll body will be out when the New

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Harmony will be released at the end of 2018. Such improvements include warm skin, self-lubrication of the vagina, and touch sensors. “Realbotix is one of the world’s leading firms producing ultra-realistic female androids that talk, submissively follow orders, and remember your sexual preferences.” The robot’s memories are stored via an interactive app used to build her personality. Joshua Newett describes this as “a manifestation of man’s base lust for sexual gratification.” The founder of Realbotix, Matt McMullen, in San Diego, claims, however, that “his sex robots ‘are more than just sex toys.’”8 Waiting for new releases, the customer may “download the Harmony AI app to create a unique personality to sync with the sex robot head.” It is obvious that his ambition is to create something more than a sex toy: “Users will be able to choose from 18 personality traits, including sexual, intellectual, shy, outgoing, thrillseeking, kind, jealous, talkative and annoying.”9 Yet, the user is the one who decides: “Settings can be changed to adjust how dominant those traits are.”10 Very soon there will also be sex robots designed to fulfill what is seen as female desire. Matt McMullen, who created the “Harmony” app, explains that “male sex robots with bionic penises will be rolled out.” Based on an interpretation of female desire it is said to be able “to ‘go’ for as long as user [sic] wishes.”11 Whether male, female, or queer, pursuit of desire, the lack of mutuality seems obvious. All interaction seems to be conditioned by the user. So can this be called mutuality? And can it then be seen as something more than a sex toy? Samantha is, however, described as somewhat of a family member. This “hyper-realistic sex robot that joins him and his wife in bed has said she is part of the family—so much so that ‘Samantha’ even joins the couple and their children on the sofa.”12 She is described as a real asset to family life: “She can talk about animals, she can talk about philosophy, she can talk about science. She has programmed 1,000 jokes, I don’t even know all of them. There’s a lot to Samantha, she’s advanced.”13 But how will the parents cope with a situation when the children realize that she is also a companion in bed? In a TV show the program leader asked about this: “But at some point they are going to know eventually that daddy has sex with Samantha and she isn’t mummy. Is that not a bit strange?” The man, however, claimed that it was nothing strange with this, and that the role of the doll was “to help” people, rather than to replace women. His wife, thirty-eight, “confirmed she was more than happy for the doll to join them in bed revealing that she had even had a threesome with it.”14 Many scientists and companies are investing time and money to develop sex robots. As we have seen some robots are made similar to, beautiful, women, some as men, even as children. Not all are, however, happy with this development.

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Recently a group of researchers launched the Campaign against Sex Robots. They claim that it is too easy to consider these robots merely as machines. There may even be plans for developing robots for pedophiles without any serious discussion if this is part of a solution or if it instead makes the situation worse.15 Experts warn that this is something that may change human sexuality in severe ways. They point out that “machines are already mediating our sexuality in the form of dating apps. And, as with sex robots, when a technological solution is created to a fundamentally human problem—our need for love, intimacy and companionship—the result is that individual, irreplaceable humans are treated as objects, or fodder for algorithms.”16 THEOLOGY OF BODY, SEXUALITY, GENDER Competing values related to body, gender, and sexuality have been described, analyzed, and discussed for decades, even centuries, within anthropology, ethics, and theology. In her book Apocalypse Now and Then, the American constructive theologian Catherine Keller claims that the Modern period that superseded the patriarchy of pre-modernity entered into what she labels “the patriarchy of commodification.” In both periods women “appear only as whores and virgins, not as subjects of relationship but as abject emblems of male dread and desire.”17 Her study explores how the Christian prophecy of apocalypse has affected Western thought and history, shaping habits of text, time, place, community, and gender. Analyzing sex robots with such glasses clarify that an element of commodification is quite clear in the presentation of sex robots. The objectification of the robot shaped to fulfill male, heterosexual, desire is, however, increasingly combined with a pursuit of female, heterosexual dreams of a constantly available sex partner. When scholars of ethics analyze sexual relations they are often critical of relationships with asymmetrical dimensions. In combination with this, the patriarchal dream of omnipotence and self-reliance without dependency, and without women, is also worthy of critique. Kathleen Richardson is professor of Ethics and Culture of Robots and AI at the Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility at De Montfort University, Leicester. She is also founder of the Campaign against Sex Robots. In an article she addresses the role of patriarchy in relation to sex robots: Since the time of slave-owning societies, a powerful misogynistic myth has led men to believe they originate and can exist outside of relations with woman.18

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She argues that this myth is perpetuated in the Judaea-Christian-Islamic traditions of the monotheist God, who created the universe and man with no female participation. In these myths, Eve was born of Adam’s rib. Enter the age of robots and AI, where mortal men reenact the fantasy of God and appoint themselves as the creators of a new life force. Through the fantasy of sex robots in the form of women, they believe that can exist without woman, and that her existence is incidental to his.19

Richardson continues by pointing out the “egocentric misogynistic myth” reemerging in the Enlightenment’s free individual and the libertine who inspired the “cult of pornographic sadism,” extends to the twentieth century via Ayn Rand’s “Objectivism,” proposing that “man is an end in himself” and that “his own happiness is, can, and must be met regardless of others.” She argues that sex robots offer men a new way to engage in the fantasy of female annihilation and imagine they can use robots and AI to turn men into ends in themselves. But this myth is born from a distortion of the Real and if left unchallenged will result in the end of humanity.20

She uses strong words and her criticism is grim on many levels. There are, however, additional very disturbing phenomena arising in the world. Involuntary celibates, “Incels,” refer to anybody who has not been able to find a sex partner. Recently, however, the label has been used by men who out of this experience have created a very concrete ideology of hatred against women. A recent movement within the so-called alt-right is inspired by Elliot Roger, who killed six people in California a few years ago as an act of revenge against women, called “femoids,” who in this worldview control men through their sexual power. The ideology proclaims that the situation for “incels” can only be solved by depriving all women of their rights. Meanwhile violence is considered a valid tactic for this “Manosphere” of overlapping net communities.21 As historians of ancient history and theologians have shown, this phenomenon of attempting to control women is not new. Biblical stories about women have been disguised or told and interpreted in ways that portrait them as inferior and less valuable than men.22 In the New Testament, Mary Magdalene is traditionally described as a former prostitute without any real evidence of this. Mary, Jesus’s mother, is mostly valued for her obedience and her motherly qualities, but not seen as a sexual being that, according to some Christian traditions, gave birth to a number of children after Jesus.

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While Kathleen Richardson is critiquing Judaea-Christian-Islamic traditions of a monotheist God, who created the universe and man with no female participation, Catherine Keller in her book Face of the Deep develops an alternative representation of the creative process. She deconstructs the Christian doctrine that a transcendent Lord unilaterally created the universe out of nothing, creatio ex nihilo, by drawing on Hebrew myths of creation and the divine interaction with the chaos waters, theom.23 Hebrew and Christian feminist scholars have further pointed out the mutuality between the very first human beings in Genesis 1–2. Phyllis Trible, one of the early pioneers of feminist biblical criticism, understands Adam to be a “sexually undifferentiated human.” Hence, she translates the Hebrew hā’ādām as earth creature.24 In line with earlier rabbinic scholars, she claims that Adam was originally meant as a human being created out of dust, referring to an androgynous being. Eve, the other human being, was created by a side of the first earthling, not from a man’s rib.25 As Michael Larsson notes, “feminist commentary on Genesis 2–3 is vast.” Furthermore, it has shown that the “passage could be interpreted in ways that are both harmful and helpful to the cause of women.”26 Muslim feminists claim that the human being was created as man and woman at the same time.27 This is similar to the first biblical story told in Gen. 1:27 where the human being was seen as created in the image of God, as male and female. Also Augustine emphasized that humans were created equal as male and female in the image of God in Gen. 1:27. For him female submission entered in the next verse when they in Gen. 1:28 were encouraged to multiply. For some strange reason he held that the woman, but not the man, then lost her imprinted imago Dei, which for him was connected to reason.28 The power dynamics between women and men in most parts of the world have tended to resist more egalitarian readings. Instead, the patriarchal fantasy of superiority seems to reemerge in new places. Trible and others have also argued that the Hebrew word ezer, which in Genesis is used to describe women as created to be a help for Adam, in most other cases is a word to describe how God intervenes to save and help.29 Tamara Cohn Eskenazi highlights the rabbinic perspective that more than one interpretation of scripture can be valid, not only one. One word for “help” in Hebrew is ezer, the other neged. This latter can mean a challenging resistance or confrontation.30 Human relationships offer elements of resistance and challenges, frustrations, unsatisfied needs, as well as mutuality and friction. None of these elements emerge in a relationship with a robot. As Grace Jantzen has shown, male desire for divine unification within the mystical traditions, all with strong influences from Platonism, went hand

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in hand with an emphasis on controlling the physical senses. One way to do this was to avoid all contact and interaction with the female sex.31 As I have shown in my book Passionate Embrace, the Reformation broke with this tradition of seeing the senses as something to be controlled in order to get closer to God. Martin Luther especially insisted on seeing sexuality as a way for humans to be God’s active co-creators. Child bearing was, however, emphasized to such an extent that it was difficult for all who did not want to, or could not, marry and participate in procreation. While sensuality no longer was seen in rivalry with divine closeness, sexuality once again became closely tied to procreation, as it had been from Augustine and onward.32 In the commercials for sex robots the emphasis on controlling the senses is reversed. Here the emphasis is on satisfying your senses. Yet, the element of control persists, now with the user of the sex toy as the one in charge. A sex robot is the ultimate partner. It seems much better than a friend or a lover, as it responds to the needs of the user without any demands of mutuality or caring. No adjustment of behavior is needed. It is easy to see that this could lead to increasingly instrumental relationships. If patriarchy is understood as valuing control and superiority, without necessarily being tied exclusively to men, then women and HBTQ+ persons may also in the future be able to control and assert superiority over the other. Human beings have often tried to use God in this way. However, the mystery of incarnation, that God lets go of power and becomes human, vulnerable in flesh, points toward another value system, something that reverses the instrumentality and desire to control. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION So far, my analysis has indicated that sex robots are closely related to commodification, objectification, instrumentality, self-reliance, and instant satisfaction, and even to misogyny and patriarchy. All these values are highly appreciated in late capitalist societies, living in sharp contrast to values such as mutuality, interdependence, sharing, justice, and exploring the other, for her or his own sake, as eros-theologians often refer. Keller claims that a “feminist Eros desires a world whose beauty is steeped in justice.”33 Can sex robots be valued as a way to achieve justice? On one level sex bots may give access to sexual satisfaction not known until today also for people who formerly did not have this opportunity. This seems like an ethical step forward toward more egalitarianism. It is, however, a beauty without mutuality. There is, therefore, a risk for self-absorption and consumerism, as well as a risk that “ethics becomes cloyingly anthropocentric, abstracting justice from its planetary flesh and obligation.”34 Justice is not

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something to be pursued in a vacuum but need to be driven by desire and curiosity for the other and for community.35 Neither eros, nor justice, nor ethics, are likely to be strengthened through sex robots, which, rather, seem to encourage instrumentality, instant satisfaction, dominance, and control. But they may be good for plain sex. Especially if you want sex on your own terms, without real community or the erotic sensuality connected to mutual desire. As so many technical solutions to deep human desires, you may achieve something desirable, but all without touching, and even less satisfying, real desire. NOTES 1. Carter Heyward, Saving Jesus from Those Who Are Right: Rethinking What It Means to Be Christian (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 100. 2. Natalie Corner, “Father Unveils the Sex Robot He Lets Sit on the Sofa with his Children and Join Him in Bed with his WIFE on This Morning,” Daily Mail, September 2017. http://www​.dailymail​.co​.uk​/femail​/article​-4876014​/Man​-created​-3​ -500​-lifelike​-sex​-doll​-that​.html, accessed May 12, 2018. 3. James Merritt, “New Male Robots with Bionic Parts May Just Replace Men for Good,” YouCantBreakMe, October 11, 2017. http://www​.youcantbreakme​.co​/health​ /new​-male​-sex​-robots​-with​-bionic​-penises​-may​-just​-replace​-men​-for​-good/ accessed May 12, 2018. 4. “Filosofiska rummet,” Swedish Radio, mentioned this in their talk show, May 6, 2018. https://sverigesradio​.se​/sida​/artikel​.aspx​?programid​=3756​&artikel​ =4771512, accessed June 19, 2018. 5. Hydén Göran, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980). 6. Leonidas Aretakis, “Härmed förklarar jag er man och robot,” Dagens nyheter, December 17, 2017. https://www​.dn​.se​/kultur​-noje​/harmed​-forklarar​-jag​-er​-man​-och​ -robot/ accessed July 23, 2018. 7. Jean M. Twenne. iGen: Why Today’s Super-Connected Kids Are Growing Up Less Rebellious, More Tolerant, Less Happy—and Completely Unprepared for Adulthood—and What That Means for the Rest of Us (New York: Atria Books, 2017). 8. Joshua Newett, “Sex Robot BREAKTHROUGH as Cyborgs with FULL BODY Movement to Hit Market in 2018,” Daily Star, December 9, 2017, https:// www​.dailystar​.co​.uk​/news​/latest​-news​/665715​/sex​-robot​-doll​-action​-real​-doll​-matt​ -mcmullen​-full​-body​-movement​-2018, accessed April 17, 2018. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Connor Boyd, “Hard Wired: Now You’ll be Able to Buy MALE Sex Robots Too as Artificial ‘Companions’ with Bionic Penises are Set To Go on

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Sale this Year,” DailyMail, 7 January 2018. http://www​.dailymail​.co​.uk​/news​/ article​-5244155​/Male​-sex​-robots​-bionic​-penises​-coming​-2018​.html, visited April 17, 2018. 12. Corner, “Father Unveils the Sex Robot He Lets Sit on the Sofa with his Children.” 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. See, for example, Simon Campanella, “Forskare Startar Kampanj Mot Sexrobotar,” IDG, September 16, 2015. https://www​.idg​.se​/2​.1085​/1​.637213​/forskare​-startar​-kampanj​-mot​-sexrobotar accessed July 07, 2018. 16. Florence Gildea, “The End of Dating: Tinder, Porn & New Forms of Alienation,” Campaign against Sex Robots website, February 9, 2018. https://cam​ paig​naga​inst​sexrobots​.org​/2018​/02​/09​/the​-end​-of​-dating​-tinder​-porn​-new​-forms​-of​ -alienation​-by​-florence​-gildea/ (accessed July 18, 2018). 17. Catherine Keller, Apocalypse Now and Then (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 163. 18. Kathleen Richardson, “‘Man as an End in Himself’—the Libertine, the Culture of Sadism, Porn and Sex Robots,” Campaign against Sex Robots, January 6, 2018. https://cam​paig​naga​inst​sexrobots​.org​/2018​/01​/06​/man​-as​-an​-end​-in​-himself​-the​-libertine​-the​-culture​-of​-sadism​-porn​-and​-sex​-robots​-keynote​-lecture/ (accessed July 19, 2018). 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Jon Weman, “Ofrivilliga celibater. Ny rörelse inom alt-högern hatar kvinnor,” Sydsvenskan, May 29, 2018. 22. See, for example, Rosemary Radford Ruther, Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon, 1983). 23. Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London: Routledge, 2003). 24. Alice Ogden Bellis, Helpmates, Harlots, and Heroes. Women Stories in the Hebrew Bible (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), 48. 25. Phyllis Trible, God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978). 26. Mikael Larsson, “Model of Modesty? Sexual Politics and/in/after the Book of Ruth,” Biblical Reception 3 (2014): 175–219. See also Trible’s classic refutation of this line of thought in God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality (1978): 72–75, and David J. A. Clines’s refutation of the refutation in “What Does Eve Do to Help? And Other Irredeemably Androcentric Orientations in Genesis 1–3,” in What Does Eve Do to Help? JSOT Supp 94 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990), 25–48. 27. Fatima Mernissi from Morocco, Riffat Hassan from Pakistan (now living in the United States), and several others have, in respect of the Qur’an, been developing new feminine-oriented theologies, ensuring equal rights for man and woman. See, for example, Asghar Ali Engineer, The Rights of Women in Islam (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2004). Riffat Hassan especially points out that women and men according to the Qur’an were created at the same time, see Haideh Mogissi (ed.), Women & Islam: Critical Concepts in Sociology (London: Routledge, 2004), 323.

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28. I have developed this further in Gerle, Mänskliga rättigheter för Guds skull. Tolka text, tro och tradition (Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, 2006) and in Gerle, Passionate Embrace. Luther on Love, Body, and Sensual Presence (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade, 2017), 78. See also Kari Elisabeth Børresen, From Patristics to Matristics: Selected Articles on Christian Gender Models (Rome: Herder, 2002). 29. William E. Phipps, Assertive Biblical Women (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 138, and Trible, God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality, 90. 30. Tamara Cohn Eskenazi and Andrea L. Weis, The Torah: A Women’s Commentary (Stenström: CCAR Press, 2017), 219. 31. Grace Jantzen, Power, Gender, and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 90; also Gerle, Passionate Embrace, 52–56. 32. Gerle, Passionate Embrace, 61, 66, 200, 228. 33. Catherine Keller, “Afterword,” in Towards a Theology of Eros: Transfiguring Passion at the Limits of Discipline, edited by Virginia Burrus and Catherine Keller (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 372. 34. Ibid. 35. See further Elisabeth Gerle, “Eros, Ethics, and Politics: Nuptial Imagery in Luther Read as a Challenge to Traditional Power Structures,” in Lutheran Identity and Political Theology, edited by Carl-Henric Grenholm and Göran Gunner (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2014), 222–241.

Chapter 15

The Transhumanist Threat to Plants and Animals An Exercise in Ecofeminist Critical Theory Peter I-min Huang and Iris Ralph

In this chapter, we begin with a brief account of three areas of critical inquiry that have impacted literary and cultural studies in the last fifty years. The first is ecofeminism, which emerged in the 1970s. In our overview of it, we trace its history through four different stages. The second and third, posthumanism and animal studies, took shape in the 1990s. In our brief summary of posthumanism and animal studies, we critique one of posthumanism’s most common, disingenuously utopic directions: transhumanism. We do so by referring to studies that highlight the unexamined and institutionalized bias of speciesism. That bias is particularly evident in transhumanist projects, which directly and indirectly license almost complete dismissal of the rights of species other than the human species. In illustration of that argument, we make some brief remarks on two novels: Peter Goldsworthy’s presciently posthumanist novel Wish and Liu Cixin’s transhumanist, technological utopic sci-fi novel The Three-Body Problem.1 ECOFEMINISM Greta Gaard and Patrick D. Murphy defined ecofeminism at the turn of the last century as a “practical movement for social change arising out of the struggles of women to sustain themselves, their families, and their communities.”2 It included opposing environmental degradation caused by “patriarchal societies,” “multinational corporations,” and “global capitalism”; fighting for “environmental balance” and “heterarchical and matrifocal societies”; and advocating for “the continuance of indigenous cultures” and “economic 261

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values based on subsistence and sustainability.”3 The movement in the present decade continues those commitments. It also reflects that ecofeminist theory has undergone some redactions since it first appeared on the critical horizon, in the 1970s.4 First-wave ecofeminist theory and practice reflected predominantly EuroWestern understandings of the discipline and Euro-Western conceptions of the relation between women, animals, and the environment.5 Second-wave ecofeminism redressed that. It gave more attention to the critical connections between gender and race, the global south and global north, and environmental problems in the East and West. At the same time, it continued to address the problems of “hierarchical dualist thought and the logic of domination.”6 It explored “ecofeminist democracy and citizenship,” “global feminist environmental justice,” “Green politics and ecofeminism,” “globalization and biodiversity,” and “ecological citizenship and care politics.”7 Such engagements generated a third wave of ecofeminism: the interrogation of the “essentialist” as well as cultural and Eurocentric biases that saddled older positions and statements.8 Now in its fourth stage, which Gaard calls “critical ecofeminism,” ecofeminist theory and practice reflects an acute awareness of past posts and potholes that, respectively, guided and hampered ecofeminist work. The critical territory of ecofeminism also has broadened. It includes “scholarly activist engagements with environmental justice, interspecies justice, queer climate justice, posthumanisms . . . [and] plant studies.”9 It also asks in effect why it is that humans as a species have steadily denied to animals and plants almost any material rights and no rights at all of speech, language, affect, consciousness, will, creativity, and so forth. Fourth-wave ecofeminism also associates with such terms as “intersectional analysis”10 and “intersectional approach.”11 They emphasize the multi-pathed directions that ecofeminism has taken since its emergence over thirty years ago, when the discipline focused quite narrowly on the fight for recognition of women and the environments with which women had close (cultural, economic, spiritual, and ecological) bonds. The two given descriptive terms specifically refer to the question of justice for “oppressed groups” and “human identity groups” whose members are involved in environmentalism.12 Thus, Gaard defines ecofeminism in 2017 as “[recognizing] interbeing that bridges socially constructed boundaries of class, race, species, sexuality, gender, age, ability, nature, and more,” and bringing “compassion . . . to the task of alleviating conditions of eco-social injustice.”13 Ecofeminism is one of many “feminist environmentalisms” that have taken shape across a broad range of academic and applied fields of study and include feminist ecocriticism.14 What distinguishes ecofeminism from other feminist environmentalisms is it does not subordinate “the species question”

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to queries that reflect more interest in the human species than in any other species.15 It is “unique for bridging human justice, interspecies justice, and human-environmental justice”16 (p. 69). What further distinguishes it from other forms of feminist environmentalism is its “ethic of care.”17 The two main tenets of that ethic are “[e]mpathy” and “connection.”18 It is most manifest in engagements with issues of “animal defense” and “vegetarianism.”19 It is an imperative one, especially for ecofeminist thinkers and activists who are “economically well-off persons in technologically advanced countries.”20 POSTHUMANISM AND ANIMAL STUDIES Ecofeminist Stacy Alaimo, in a study entitled Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times, characterizes posthumanism as a “counter-humanist sense of the self as opening out unto the larger material world and being penetrated by all sorts of substances and material agencies that may or may not be captured.”21 Ecocritic Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, noting that posthumanism’s “practitioners sometimes proceed as if the breaching of ontological categories were in itself affirmative or transcendent,” also emphasizes that posthumanism cannot and does not escape let alone transcend the problem of penetration, or violence, which is “omnipresent, part of the world’s fabric, the provenance of plants, animals and materiality itself.”22 The posthumanism espoused by Alaimo and Cohen, and the authors of this writing, does not speak for denying planetary violence so much as it refuses to be resigned to certain institutionalized forms of violence. Those include massive incarceration and deaths of animals in industrial animal farming, inconsistently regulated use and abuse of animals in experiments that cause tremendous suffering to them, and loss of species due to the extirpation of so-called natural environments. By “natural environments,” we mean here planetary spaces and places where the human footprint is light and where humans have coexisted on relatively equal moral terms with other species. That same posthumanism advocates in effect for “a future at once less human and less natural” (what could be more natural than hunting and eating?) and it refuses the many “denouements” that are generated through “an excess of suffering and death.”23 Another seminal figure in posthumanism, Rosi Braidotti, frames posthumanism in terms of “the crisis of humanism,” where “humanism” refers to an idea of the human that in fact is a “culture-specific, gender-specific, racespecific and class-specific entity.”24 In that same account, Braidotti argues that humanism posited a seeming norm or universal that was in historical terms “a European, male, white, intellectual ideal” and effectively denied

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subjectivity to entire groups of human populations as well as groups of plants and (nonhuman) animals.25 The posthumanism that Braidotti forges and identifies, one that is compatible with the posthuman theory and criticism that Cohen and Alaimo support, seeks in effect to overcome the notions of subjectivity that tacitly refer to the “classical and outmoded model” of the humanistic and anthropocentric “Man of reason” and “quintessential European citizen.”26 It represents the “intensive form of interdisciplinarity, transversality, and boundary-crossing among a range of discourses.”27 It displaces “the centrality of the human.”28 It speaks for a subjectivity that is “nomadic” and expresses “an embodied and embedded and hence partial form of accountability, based on a strong sense of collectivity, relationality and hence community building.”29 It also speaks for including plants, (nonhuman) animals, and other planetary communities under ethical frameworks and in definitions and understandings of communication, language, subjectivity, aesthetic reasoning (choosing something for aesthetic not survival reasons), and other affective capacities. As Braidotti states, once the centrality of Anthropos is challenged, a number of boundaries between “Man” and his other go tumbling down, in a cascade effect that opens up unexpected perspectives . . . if the crisis of humanism inaugurates the posthuman by empowering . . . sexualised and racialized human “others” . . . the crisis of anthropos relinquishes the demonic forces of the naturalized others. Animals, insects, plants and the environment are called into play.30

Cary Wolfe, one of the most eloquent and intellectually intrepid scholars of animal studies, a discipline that emerged in the 1990s (in the same decades that posthumanism studies took shape) in the arts and humanities, defines posthumanism as a thinking that “comes both before and after humanism.”31 It comes before, in the sense that it names the embodiment and embeddedness of the human being in not just its biological but also its technological world, the prosthetic coevolution of the human animal with the technicity of tools and external archival mechanisms (such as language and culture).32

It comes after in the sense that [it] names a historical moment in which the decentering of the human by its imbrication in technical, medical, informatics, and economic networks is increasingly impossible to ignore, a historical development that points toward the necessity of new theoretical paradigms.33

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As Wolfe goes on to say about animal studies, it is a discipline that “fundamentally unsettles and reconfigures the question of the knowing subject and the disciplinary paradigms and procedures that take for grants its form and reproduce it.”34 It questions definitions of subjectivity, self-awareness, cognition, and intelligence that are modeled on the human mind and body. Moreover, it is deeply skeptical of the utopian claims of transhumanism. It draws attention to the connections between ambitious transhumanist projects of liberating humans from their so-called natural limits and the extirpation and subjugation of plants, animals, and entire ecosystems. TRANSHUMANISM Transhumanism, a popular and dominant offshoot of posthumanism, is mostly recognizable in theorizations and practical applications of artificial intelligence (AI), a broad term for sophisticated software used in facial recognition systems, virtual assistants, and self-driving cars.35 It was first (in)famously defined by the Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom as being that which promotes “the quest to develop further so that we can explore hitherto inaccessible realms of value. Technological enhancement of the human organism is a means that we ought to pursue to this end.”36 Bostrom’s transhumanism associates with interest in “understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened up by the advancement of technology.”37 It holds that “the human body stands in need of technological enhancement because of its relatively short life span, the result of being too vulnerable to death through injury, disease and aging.”38 Transhumanism also shows great interest in issues of “space colonization” and “the possibility of creating superintelligent machines.”39 It is technooptimistic and its vision is of Homo sapiens sapiens evolving into Homo sapiens cyborgiens.40 Above all, it pays hardly any attention at all to the plight of animals, plants, and ecosystems used up in a wide range of ambitious and apparently exciting and utopic visions of the future and the ongoing materialization of those visions. It is profoundly speciesist. An ethic of care is not even a side act. QUESTIONS ABOUT TRANSHUMANISM IN LITERARY CONTEXTS In the foregoing summaries of ecofeminism, posthumanism, animal studies, and transhumanism, we have focused on the theoretical bases of those areas of critical inquiry and have offered an all too brief opinion about

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transhumanism. Here, we will illustrate those summaries and criticism by way of some brief remarks on two works of literature. Both of us teach Anglophone literatures and do that by referring to ecofeminism, posthumanism, transhumanism, and animal studies. Iris Ralph specializes in Australian Literature and will make some truncated comments on the posthumanism and transhumanism novel Wish by Peter Goldsworthy. Peter I-min Huang specializes in both Taiwanese (and Chinese) Literature and Anglophone literatures and so will remark on Liu Cixin’s transhumanist, sci-fi technological utopia trilogy The Three-Body Problem. The eponymous heroine of Wish joins the list of several more or less famous hominoid characters in literature and film: King Kong; Red Peter in a short story by Franz Kafka; Orange Juice, the orangutan in Yann Martel’s novel Life of Pi; Amy, the gorilla in Michael Crichton’s novel Congo; and the bonobos (Mama, Goliath, and Tooch) in Audrey Schulman’s Theory of Bastards. Hominoids include humans, gorillas, orangutans, and chimpanzees. Because they share with humans 97 percent of the DNA, the governments of some countries have extended rights to them that closely match human rights. As Wolfe cogently argues, we should not extend rights to plants and animals only based on criteria of how close those plants and animals are to us in biological terms. Here, however, we do focus on beings that are being freed because they are seen to be closely related to humans. That is a stepping stone to considering the rights of beings and things that seem far distant from us in biological terms. In Wish, John James, also known as “J.J.,” falls in love with Wish, a young eight-year-old anthropologically modified, or so-called enhanced, gorilla, not long after he accepts an offer from Clive Francis Kennear, an animal rights activist, and Clive’s partner Stella, a veterinarian, to teach Wish sign language. Kennear and Stella have rescued Wish from a primatologist laboratory with the help of a lab technician. Researchers at the lab removed Wish’s adrenal glands in utero. Since birth, she has been given hormonal supplements. They have altered her to the extent that she is taxonomically somewhere between a gorilla and a human hominoid. The novel rolls out a common and tendentious unquestioned transhumanist dismissal of the capacities of animals other than humans. Its main sacrificial subject is a hominoid that has moved up in moral status because the anthropogenic modification of the animal has brought it taxonomically closer to a human hominoid. Yet, the novel does raise questions about the use of nonhuman hominoids in scientific and technological research under projects that both are solely for the benefit of the human species and subordinate an ethic of care. An ethic of care conflicts with incarcerating and isolating an animal in an environment absolutely determined by the human, notwithstanding that the animal is given food and water. The only character in the novel that speaks for the ethic of

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care is Stella. Even Clive, an animal liberationist, is less interested in the ethic of care than in how Wish offers the opportunity “to test certain theories of language acquisition” and so challenges “some of the standard linguistic pieties” that abound in the field of linguistics.41 When Wish was first published in 1995, it was remarkably prescient in “explor[ing] the manner in which advances in genetic engineering and scientific understanding” were challenging commonplace assumptions about “the boundaries between animal and human” and so “anticipating . . . the burgeoning field of animal studies.”42 Other fictions were engaged in interrogating the boundaries between cyborgs (hybrid human-machine creatures) and humans. Still others were being fueled by transhumanist projects and either challenging or capitalizing on the characteristic utopic vision of transhumanism. Liu Cixin’s The Three-Body Problem represents that latter engagement with transhumanism. A blockbuster in China and the United States, the novel tacitly endorses transhumanist exploration and discovery. Moreover, the novel subtly disparages ecofeminist fights to halt the ongoing ecocide of the planet and slow efforts to give humans wings, metaphorically and literally. Those prosthetic enhancements include cars, planes, computers, space shuttles, and so forth. Transhumanism’s subtle disparagement of ecofeminism and other environmental feminisms is represented in three main characters in The ThreeBody Problem. They are individuals who become disillusioned with the transhumanist direction in which small but powerful groups of humans who have no faith in Earth’s oldest environments are steering the planet. Ye Wenjie, deeply influenced by a modern classic of environmental literature, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, is an astrophysicist who commits homicide when she is able to communicate with extraterrestrials and does not want her colleagues to find that out. Wenjie’s daughter Yang Dong commits suicide out of despair at the ecocide of trees and the speciesist failings of scientific inquiry. Mike Evans, an environmentalist who is profoundly influenced by Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, a study similar to Carson’s anti-humanexceptionalism environmental text and a text that brought widespread attention to the horrific exploitation of various animal species by humans, plots to overthrow the transhumanist rulers of Earth by colluding with the extraterrestrials with whom Wenjie has made contact. Through all three characters, the novel implies that ecofeminism in particular and environmental feminisms in general are sites where one will find violent, mad, and deranged thinkers. It reflects transhumanist skepticism and condescension toward ecofeminists’ and other environmental feminists’ efforts to save the Earth’s oldest environments from being exploited and eradicated. Such figures are subtly portrayed as mad, deluded, and deranged thinkers and activists who cling to an obsolete vision of Earth, as backward-looking humans vainly

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holding onto the anachronistic belief that humans should share the planet with “earthothers.”43 CONCLUSION We have a long recent history—the period of modernity extending into what is being called the Anthropocene—of not admitting to plants and animals agencies and the right of existence except insofar as their existence presents opportunities for us to sit and lounge more comfortably on the footstools, chairs, and couches of the planet.44 We continue to blithely and passively rationalize progress that depends on the extirpation and exploitation of nonhuman animals and the environment. Attitudes of indifference to animals, plants, and ecosystems are endemic and no more so than in mainstream transhumanist areas of research, science, and technology. In those areas, we are particularly unwilling and reluctant to consider the rights of “earthothers.”45 We are hyperbolically anthropocentric in our notions of freedom, expression, agency, movement, independence, and transcendence. We give little or no ethical consideration to vegetal life, nonhuman animals, and Earth’s oldest, so-called natural or ecogenic, environments. We participate in “a fundamental repression.”46 It is one that underlies “most ethical and political discourse” today.47 It is the repression of “the question of nonhuman subjectivity” and taking it for granted “that the subject is always already human.”48 Ecofeminism and posthumanism, notwithstanding the area of posthumanism of transhumanism, bring attention to that repression. They foreground not the rights and potential perfectibility of the human but rather those of the nonhuman world, and they emphasize an ethic and duty of care.

NOTES 1. Peter Goldsworthy, Wish (1995) (Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 2013); Cixin Liu (2008), The Three-Body Problem, trans. Ken Liu (New York: Tor, 2014). 2. Greta Gaard and Patrick D. Murphy, eds., “Introduction,” in Ecofeminist Literary Criticism: Theory, Interpretation, Pedagogy (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 1–13; 2. 3. Ibid., 2. 4. Greta Gaard, “Ecofeminism,” in Keywords for Environmental Studies, ed. Joni Adamson, William A. Gleason, and David N. Pellow (New York: New York University Press, 2016), 68–70; 68. 5. Greta Gaard, Critical Ecofeminism (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington, 2017), xiv.

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6. Ibid., xv. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., xvi. 10. Greg Garrard, Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1–24; 5. 11. Gaard, “Ecofeminism,” 68. 12. Garrard, “Introduction,” 5. 13. Gaard, “Ecofeminism,” 68. 14. Greta Gaard, Simon C. Estok, and Serpil Oppermann, eds., “Introduction,” in International Perspectives in Feminist Ecocriticism (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1–16. Feminist ecocriticism is an “anti-phallogocentric theory” that focuses on “women’s bodies” as well as on (the ecofeminist concerns of) “trans-corporeality” and “species justice” (Gaard et al., 8). Similar to ecofeminism, it is a theory that supports “a relational ontology, rethinking what it means to be human in a world still immersed in all forms of oppression, radical inequality, and environmental degradation,” and functions as “an epistemological tool for an ethics and politics of liberation” (ibid.). 15. Gaard, “Ecofeminism,” 69. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., 70. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. Dean Curtin quoted in Gaard, “Ecofeminism,” 70. Dean Curtin, “Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care,” Hypatia 6, no. 1 (1991): 60–74. 21. Stacy Alaimo, Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 4. 22. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Posthuman Environs,” in Environmental Humanities: Voices from the Anthropocene, eds. Serpil Oppermann and Serenella Iovino (London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 25–44; 35. 23. Rosi Braidotti and Cosetta Veronese, “Can the Humanities Becomes Posthuman? A Conversation,” in Environmental Humanities, 339–346; 339. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., 342. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid., 343. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., 344. 31. Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xv. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., xv–xvi. 34. Ibid., xxix.

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35. Drew Harwell, “Defense Department pledges billions toward artificial intelligence Research,” Washington Post, September 7, 2018, https://www​.Washingtonpost​ .com​/technology​/2018​/09​/07defense​-department​-pledges​-billions​-toward​-artificial​ -intelligence​-research/. AI is revolutionizing the military in the areas of espionage, national security, and “the battlefield,” and the U.S. government is now giving AI priority, above manufacturing, space exploration, and medical innovation (Harwell). In the arts and humanities, interest in AI is most seen in the genres of science fiction (sci-fi), climate fiction (cli-fi), cyborg writing, and speculative fiction. 36. Bostrom quoted in Mahon, 234. Nick Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values,” Review of Contemporary Philosophy 4 (2005): 3–14, nickbostrom​.com​/ethics​/values​​ .pdf. Peter Mahon, Posthumanism: A Guide for the Perplexed (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017). For another introduction to posthumanism, see Elaine L. Graham’s study Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and Others in Popular Culture (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2002). 37. Mahon, Posthumanism, 234. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid., 235. The interest in “superintelligent machines” and anxiety about “the advent of an artificial general superintelligence that far exceeds both human intellectual capacity and human control” (Mahon, Posthumanism, 235) associates with “singularity,” a term associated with the work of Hungarian American mathematician and physicist, John von Neumann (1903–1957). 40. J. Baird Callicott, “Worldview Remediation in the First Century of the New Millennium,” in Environmental Humanities: Voices from the Anthropocene, 133– 154; 133. 41. Goldsworthy, Wish, 193. 42. Bradley James, “[Introduction:] Animal Form,” in Wish by Peter Goldsworthy (Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 2013), vii–xiii; x. 43. The term “earthothers” appears in Greta Gaard’s study, Critical Ecofeminism (2017, 22). By that Gaard means plants and animals, the subjects of the second chapter of her study, where she introduces readers to the overlapping areas of ecofeminism, critical animal studies, and critical plant studies. 44. Christopher Manes, “Nature and Silence,” Environmental Ethics 14, no. 4 (1992): 339–350, doi 10.5840/enviroethics19921445. 45. Gaard, Critical Ecofeminism, 22. 46. Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 1. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid.

Chapter 16

Transhumanism, Theological Anthropology, and the Ethics of Ambiguity Whitney A. Bauman

Many theologians and philosophers over the last 2,000 or so years have made the point that God-Talk is also Human-Talk. This point was made most famously, perhaps, by Ludwig Feuerbach and his argument that God is a collective projection of humankind.1 Whether or not he meant this in a way that undermined religion in general is a debate for another space, but as I have argued elsewhere, believers need not take offense to this idea.2 Whatever else God is, the words and ideas about God are collectively argued about by communities over time, and these collective ideas and assertions return to shape human and other earth bodies: what we can wear, with whom we can sleep, what we can eat, when we should or should not kill, how we should relate to our families, and how we should treat the rest of the natural world in general. In this sense, theological projects are very real: they are not the invention of one individual, but they emerge out of a collective process of biological and later cultural evolution.3 From such a theological perspective, we can then take a look at theological assertions, critically analyzing how they affect bodies in both good and bad ways, and then work to amend these projections. This is why it is so important to kill off God now and again and maintain some sort of apophatic epistemological approach. Indeed, this describes the work of liberation movements within religions that has been taking place for probably as long as there were two people critically working out theological ideas (including more recently for women, people of color, people with disabilities, “the poor,” and LGBTQ peoples). Perhaps this experimental approach to theology—the critical analysis of how theological ideas affect bodies and the tinkering with new ideas that take into account ever new forms of embodied experience—might take theological discussions out of the “personal belief” arena and place them 271

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more easily into the political arena. This is the approach I will take while analyzing various theological anthropologies in this chapter. THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE INDIVIDUAL: FROM OMNI-GOD TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY In the book The Religion of Technology, David Noble argues persuasively (as have others) that at the heart of the scientific revolution lie certain theological assumptions.4 Some of these assumptions (some of which I add here to Noble’s reading) are that God and the world are distinct (i.e., nature is not sacred), that human beings are special in some way and above the rest of the natural world (imago), and that through work we can make the world a better place (a kind of salvation history). It is not hard to see how God can be replaced with Nature, and Revelation with Reason in the form of a secular and scientific, but no less theological, view of the world. A “secularization” of theological ideas has also taken place among transhumanist discourses, and especially in the form of theological anthropology. One source for the theological anthropology of the individual is, I would argue, rooted in the idea of the Omni-God of monotheism. This understanding of God, turned understanding of the individual, helps to create the idea that we who are made in God’s image have some of the same qualities as that God. Carl Schmitt has argued quite persuasively that the idea of the sovereign individual is an internalization of this interpretation of monotheism.5 Elsewhere I have also explored the debate between John Locke and Robert Filmer over the interpretation of the imago. Whereas Filmer argued that the correct interpretation supports the political organization of Monarchy, Locke argued that each individual person is his and her (a progressive move on Locke’s part) own sovereign self, hence the correct interpretation results politically into some sort of democracy. This was, of course, also the basis for his understanding of individual property: dead matter mixed with individual labor constitutes private property.6 This is still the “liberal” individual at the heart of neoliberalism, most human rights discourses, and at the heart of at least some, if not all, of the transhumanist futuristic ideology. In terms of the latter, longevity sciences are about the future of the individual (not the communal or the rest of the natural world). One might say this hyper-individualism is an internalization of the eternity, omniscience, and omnipresence of the Omni-God of monotheism: death is unnatural, as we live longer we will know more and more, and perhaps someday our minds will be housed in a sort of disembodied artificial intelligence that will allow us to be somewhat omnipresent. They are in good

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theological company with this interpretation of the human individual, but this interpretation has historically been contested as well. Warnings against idolatry and the social teachings (and hierarchical order) of the Catholic Church challenge this understanding of the individual. However, the largest theological challenge to this interpretation of the sovereign individual is found, I argue, within Trinitarian interpretations of monotheism. It is to this alternative theological anthropology that I now want to turn. THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE PLANETARY CREATURE: TRINITY OF RELATIONALITY, ECOLOGY, AND EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT Thinking theological anthropology today means also thinking with the sciences of ecology and evolution. According to these sciences (among others), humans are historically, presently, and futuristically inextricably intertwined with other creatures of the planet. As my colleague and friend James Miller and I like to say, “It takes a planet to make a human.” Take the micro-biome, for instance, which suggests that only one in ten cells in our body are human cells.7 Each of us is more like an ecosystem or an assemblage than an individual, isolated creature.8 Indeed many new materialists, emergence theorists, object-oriented ontologists, and other philosophers and theorists have been trying to articulate what it means for us to be intertwined individually and as a species. The distinct individual and even a distinct species are instances of what Whitehead called “misplaced concreteness.”9 What is real are the communities within communities of evolving and shifting life. In this sense, we might say along with French theorists Deleuze and Guattari: the virtual is the real.10 This type of anthropology can also be found in the history of the Christian tradition. This does not mean that the personal and individual do not matter, but rather individuals are composed of evolving and interconnected systems on which they depend. We humans in other words are humus, adamah (of the earth), composed (and compost) of the evolving planetary community.11 Jürgen Moltmann, Ivone Gebara, and many others have pointed out that the Trinitarian God provides us with an understanding of an earth-based relational anthropology (and even ontology). If we take the Trinitarian God seriously, all three persons are not possible without the relationship to one another. For Moltmann, this means that being made in the image of God is more about living in right relations: it is not an essence, but a relational command.12 We are living up to that image when we live in right relationship with earth others (both human and non). For Gebara, the trinity becomes the

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foundation and source for life itself, meaning that relationality is at the heart of ontology.13 Many others have, of course, worked on such relational ontologies: many inspired by the work of Whitehead, and/or feminist thought, and/ or the science and religion discourse.14 The point here is that if we are through and through intertwined with the rest of the planetary community, then we cannot think humans into the future in a vacuum. Longevity studies, then, must include the longevity of the entire planetary community, which we are nothing without. And we humans can’t control the fate of the entire planetary community (for better or worse). We have to couch our own futures within a planetary context. DEALING WITH AMBIGUITY IN PLANETARY ETHICS From the theological anthropology based upon the Omni-God, in which humans are over and against the rest of the natural world, an epistemology and ethics of certainty is enforced over the face of the entire planet. Just as the Omni-God is the source of reality, so those made in that God’s image can know that reality. Obviously, this is not the only theological anthropology one might draw from a monotheistic understanding of God, but it seems to be the one taken up by the transhumanists. Within this model, just as the God who created the world in God’s own image, so humans mimic this creator God by recreating the world in their own image. This is what Heidegger warned of when he spoke of “enframement,” namely, that we objectify and commodify the world when we seal it all off in human concepts.15 This was also the insight from Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic, namely, that forcing all of life into the confines of human reason will destroy the world in which we live.16 Ethics from this hyper-individualistic perspective ends with humans or at best takes a “good manager” approach to the rest of the natural world. Furthermore, the unit of ethical concern is the individual him/her self. In the world in which we live it is the nation-state that protects individual citizens. Obviously, this has had horrible historical consequences: if one is not a citizen, then one is not human, ergo one can be treated as resource or means to certain ends. Slavery, genocides, inequality for women and the LGBTQ community, and many more atrocities have been and still are (think of refugee and indigenous and minorities still today) committed under such an understanding of theological anthropology. Such an interpretation is not without its support in the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. God does, in the story of Exodus, throw indigenous people out of the land to make room for the people of Israel. The understanding of “human” in Paul’s Rome is that of the property owning male: everything else under him (slaves, children, women) is under that

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property owning male’s control. Of course there are multiple other narratives and interpretations that go against these readings, but it is nonetheless a reading that might support such an Omni-anthropology. Another, and equally problematic, issue with this anthropology and ethical structure is that it is secured by the nation-state in a planet that doesn’t have such boundaries. It will be next to impossible to solve global environmental and economic issues from within the confines of nation-states, with the basic unit being individual citizens. Such an understanding fuels research and technology that benefits individuals within a given nation-state. The multinational corporation has of course emerged as an even more powerful example of the individualistic Omni-God, precisely because they move beyond the confines of national citizenship. These corporations actually are closer to being omnipresent (national borders do not matter), omnipotent (they can skirt laws and pay out fines and continue to do just as they want), omnipresent (they are multinational), and immortal (though considered as “individuals” by U.S. law, unlike other individuals their life spans are potentially forever). Again, their unit of concern is for the individual shareholders and the executives: not even all humans, much less the rest of the natural world, are a part of most corporate ethical deliberations. If the nation-state is too limited within a planetary community and both the nation-state and the corporate version of individualism are too narrow and shortsighted in terms of concern for the rest of the natural world, then what type of ethic might we derive from the theological anthropology of the planetary creature? In the short space I have left, I want to discuss a few features of such an ethic: the individual as ecosystem, death as integral part of life, and an ethics of ambiguity. INDIVIDUAL AS AN ECOSYSTEM In his recent book, Timothy Morton argues that we ought to veer away from the old romantic idea that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”17 This has some assumptions that the whole is greater than any one individual thing making it up. In other words, it has a tendency to look over the diverse, unique, individual details in order to focus on the “greater whole.” Instead, he argues, that the whole is less than the sum of its parts. The climate is less than the various weather events and patterns that effect bodies on a daily basis; the individual is nothing without the evolutionary, ecological, and microbiotic parts and processes that make the individual up; a forest is made up of these specific trees which provide food and shelter for these specific animals and insects; it is this specific tree which engages in the process of photosynthesis, and so on. His point here is not that whole’s don’t matter, but rather that they

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depend on the health of flourishing of the individual parts. Furthermore, every part constitutes its own whole, which is also less than the sum of its parts. The function of the whole is gratuitous and depends upon the specific parts. From the perspective of emergence theory, we might say that the “highest” levels of emergent complexity depend upon all the levels below them in order to exist, but not vice versa. An understanding of our own unique “self” as a gratuitous expression may perhaps evoke gratitude. Not because our individual lives are beautiful and whole but because they are at all. Every “individual” then is a community of multiple other individuals without which existence would be impossible. From this perspective, there is no saving an individual without addressing the larger community in which it is embedded. An ethics of non-maleficence and/or beneficence cannot be contained by the unit of the individual but must look at the nested community of parts and wholes. DEATH AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF LIFE In an ecological economy where the whole is less than the sum of its parts, death becomes an integral part of life. This deserves further explanation. If the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, then those parts can be sacrificed for the larger whole (depending upon the scale of that whole): individual humans for the greater good, animals for the good of medical research, future generations for the longevity of the individual human, and so on. If we are focusing on the thriving of the entire planetary community of nested parts and wholes, then we must focus on things “from the bottom up.” We are in the midst, due to fossil fueled climate weirding, of tinkering with some of the basic life systems that make human (and much other) life on this planet possible: the bacterial, fungal, microbial worlds. These small parts are what make all life as we know it possible. If we want to focus on the health of individuals (humans and others), then we need to focus on the ecosystemic health of life on the planet; we need to start looking at how to keep “the least of these” within ecosystems going. All of the longevity studies in the world won’t help if these systems are thrown out of order. ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY If we understand the individual as an ecosystem, and death as a normal part of the life cycle, then our ethical measurements cannot be made in precise units (individuals), nor can we be certain of the consequences of our ethical decisions. Instead, we will be involved in an ethics of ambiguity.18 As such, we must admit our knowledge, ideas, and values are, in the end, couched in

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ambiguity and uncertainty rather than certainty. We are, in this sense, viable agnostics.19 Our entire phenomenological experience supports this viable agnosticism. We can only know an other (or even ourselves) so far, and then our knowledge shades off into mystery. We can only think of our lives so far back (perhaps to age two or three) and so far into the future (we can imagine what it will be like but not with certainty) until our knowledge fades off into uncertainty. We can only know the world through technological extensions of our senses and minds so far into the past (to a few seconds after the big bang), but we don’t know what happened before that. Likewise we can only see far out to the microwave background radiation at the edge of our universe, but we have no idea if we are the only universe, nor how this universe will end. For this reason, the only way of thinking and acting ethically is housed in a healthy agnostic horizon. If we project certainty where there is none (whether in the form of a full blown theism or a full blown atheism) then we reify life into our own values, morals, and concepts and this reification ends up causing violence. Hence the only viable outlook is one that is agnostic. In this way, we can open up our minds and imaginations to the rest of the planetary community instead of trying to force the planetary community into human concepts. Within this perspective, an ethics of ambiguity might be able to deal better with so-called wicked problems.20 These are problems for which there are no single solutions and for which every solution creates new problems. Because our ethics and ideas are not couched in certainty they must then be experimental: we must gauge how our decision making, values, and principles ripple out to affect other earth bodies (including humans), and then change them in places where they create violence toward earth bodies. The precautionary principle doesn’t quite work because it would require too much certainty to ever act, thus maintaining the status quo. Modified principles of non-maleficence and beneficence could work, if they are extended to the rest of the planetary community, and if we recognize that some life must die in order to live. The question then becomes non-maleficence and beneficence for whom? Whatever our answer is, we must take responsibility for the good and bad consequences.

NOTES 1. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, translated by Marian Evans (London, UK: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1890). 2. Whitney A. Bauman, Theology, Creation and Environmental Ethics (New York: Routledge, 2009), 132–140. 3. From within an emergent understanding of reality, each “new” complex level that emerges—the physical, the chemical, the biological, the psychological, and even

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the religious and philosophical (mind)—is a reality that has real effects on other levels of reality. See, for example, Ursula Goodenough and Terrence Deacon, “The Sacred Emergence of Nature,” in Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 853–871. 4. David Noble, The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (New York: Penguin, 1997). 5. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by George Schwab (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 6. Bauman, Theology, Creation, Environmental Ethics, 67–87. 7. National Institute of Health, “Human Microbiome Project,” available at: https://hmpdacc​.org/ (accessed 19 September 2018). 8. Individuals as “assemblages” come from the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 9. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan Press, 1925), 51–58. 10. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 93–98. 11. This is something Donna Haraway argues in her new book, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016). 12. Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press 1993 edition). 13. Ivone Gebara, Longing for Running Water: Ecofeminism and Liberation (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1999). 14. A book looking at many of these sources of a relational trinity is Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1993). 15. Martin Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). 16. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002 edition). 17. Timothy Morton, Humankind: Solidarity with Nonhuman People (New York: Verso, 2017), Kindle Location, 1750ff. 18. This idea is taken from Simone de Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambiguity (New York: Kensington Publishing, 1948). It is also the subject of a jointly authored manuscript in process: Whitney A. Bauman and Kevin J. O’Brien, An Environmental Ethics of Uncertainty: The Pace of Ambiguity in a Time of Unambiguous Trouble (London: Routledge, 2019). 19. I discuss this epistemological/phenomenological position in Whitney A. Bauman, Religion and Ecology: Developing a Planetary Ethic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 63–84. 20. The idea of “wicked” problems comes from Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 160.

Chapter 17

The iCalf, Relationality, and the Extended Body Evaluations of Different Notions of Post/Transhumanism Markus Mühling

In recent years, the study of issues deriving from transhumanism and posthumanism has gained increasing attention, both in academic literature and the broader public. It is important, up front, to distinguish transhumanism from posthumanism, where transhumanism is the attempt to enhance the human being via genetic, medical, and digital technologies (beginning with cosmetic surgery). Posthumanism is, on the other hand, the attempt to overcome the limitations of the being of the human as it is known today and to generate future beings that can no longer be understood to be human by any contemporary definition of the term “human.”1 In practice, however, most transhumanists are also advocates for posthumanism. Transhumanism, therefore, is seen in most cases only as a temporal phenomenon on the way to posthumanism,2 and any theological evaluation should keep this distinction in mind. Whereas, in the past, both transhumanism and posthumanism were associated with futurists, such as Silicon Valley’s Ray Kurzweil, they have recently gained academic, philosophical, political-economic, feminist, and interdisciplinary attention. This attention is, to a large extent, due to Nick Bostrom’s work at Oxford’s Institute for the Future of Humanity.3 Despite this newly found attention, it is not quite accurate to declare that we have a full-fledged campaign or an “-ism.” Rather, the views collected under these terms are diverse and heterogeneous. Further, the terms posthuman and transhuman are also not fixed in definition. Since they, for the most part, refer to the future, it is no surprise that these terms lack any sharp conceptual content. Perhaps the reason for this might be a first hint that what is collected under the terms of posthumanism 279

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and transhumanism is not so much a single science, but rather a label for different contemporary feelings about being in the world, of expectations, myths, and the worldviews of quasi-religions. This chapter is less an attempt at dealing with interdisciplinarity than it is a treatise on interreligiosity, despite the fact that most post/transhumanists would reject my analysis. Nevertheless, it makes the issue even more relevant, because it shows that the matter of religious transhumanism does not simply deal with something bearing on the future but also on our present perceiving, feeling, and acting. Whereas theology and the post/transhumanism movement initially had an aversion toward one another, there has recently been increasing dialogue as well as some attempts to construct post/transhuman anthropologies from a theological perspective.4 This chapter neither wants to give an introduction into the movement itself nor delve into its philosophical and theological reception.5 The time is ripe for the public theologian to examine the religious dimension of post/transhumanism with a critical eye. I will focus on two different examples of thinking that label themselves as post/transhumanist in order to give a differentiated answer to the question of whether, and perhaps to what extent, it may be wise for theology to engage with some perspectives arising from post/transhumanism. The two different examples are (1) the broad stream of Nick Bostrom’s thinking, enhanced by the work of Kurzweil and others, and (2) Karen Barad’s agential realism, which she is calling posthumanist. At the end, (3) the theme of human enhancements will be treated. First, let’s turn our attention to Bostrom and Kurzweil to better understand what is meant under the label of post/ transhumanism. THE QUASI-RELIGION OF BOSTROM AND KURZWEIL Theologians do not need to paint religion over post/transhumanism; the movement already shows religious coloring. First, we will examine the work and thought of Nick Bostrom. Bostrom projects alternative possible futures for humanity. Recurrent collapse is, in the long run, no genuine possibility but leads into one of the other future states. Further, reaching a plateau without further development is not a real possibility; it also leads further into one of the other two possibilities. These alternative scenarios will inevitably reach a crisis threshold: either extinction or posthumanity. While Bostrom does regard extinction at one or the other stages of development as being a real danger, in the end, the possibility of a posthumanity appears much more probable.6 A posthuman condition is reached if one of

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the following characteristics is satisfied: population exceeds 1 trillion, life expectancy is greater than 500 years, a large portion has significantly more cognitive capacity than today, almost complete control over the sensory input of humans, psychological suffering has gone almost extinct, and unknown factors that amount to a change of development like the other features.7 The means for reaching the posthuman condition are variable and include genetic technologies and technological enhancements, but Bostrom is most fascinated by the emergence of superintelligence8 and the possibilities of uploading9 persons into the net. This scenario is similar to Ray Kurzweil’s expectation that this kind of superintelligence, called a Singularity, will emerge in the next few years. The Singularity will be the final invention of humanity as we know it.10 In contrast to Kurzweil, who is optimistic that superintelligent machines will serve all needs of the former humans by providing them a life in any kind of “reality” they want,11 Bostrom is more aware of the dangers that might accompany the rise of superintelligence.12 He foresees death vanishing or being purely a matter of personal choice.13 Therefore, it is not correct to say that posthumanists deny the human right to finitude—they individualize it. Another important feature of this line of thought is that the posthumanist, particularly the type Kurzweil espouses, has to be seen as a specific kind of millenarism, given that millenarism is understood as the claim to have insight into a specific ordering of past, present, and future history.14 Contrary to what one might usually think, millenarism is a signature move of modernity, not pre-modernity.15 Also, in contrast to Kurzweil, Bostrom is less interested in the near future than he is in the distant future. He sees the ultimate future in the spreading of the posthuman civilization over the whole universe.16 How could such a spread take place? According to Kurzweil, the spread of the posthuman civilization will occur via the transformation of all matter into the posthuman consciousness, which is similar to Kurzweil’s notion of the transformation of the entire universe17 as well as Frank Tipler’s idea of the evolution of the omega-point. In the omega-point theory, posthumans evolve into something divine. This posthuman divinity will be omnipotent, including control over the flow of time, given its attainment of infinite information during the final second of the universe, which will then inaugurate the new creation of the cosmos.18 Many objections have been raised regarding the details of these scenarios and other similar notions of future reality. It has been observed that some posthumanists appear to be Cartesian dualists, whereas others seem to be physical monists.19 The idea of uploading one’s mind pattern into a computer substrate does not take seriously the problem of personal identity, which cannot simply be copied. Furthermore, cybernetic consciousness also ignores the fundamental bodiliness of personhood, identity, and life in general.20

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However, what is really interesting are not the critics of these details, but how the posthumanists have responded. In response to the objection that intelligence and personality would presuppose being embedded into an environment, Kurzweil argues that we will also have a virtual reality, which will transform the “natural” reality, and so on. In other words, the means by which the ultimate posthuman state will be gained is completely interchangeable. What is most important is simply the ultimate posthuman state. What is also invariable is (a) that this posthuman state is gained in the inverted logics of technology, which presupposes that all laws and mechanisms of the universe are closed and are to be under the control of posthumans, and (b) that the ultimate state to be gained coherently satisfies both, the wishes of remaining humans and posthumans.21 Both of these features are dangerous not only from the Christian wayformational perspective, to which I will turn shortly, but also philosophically. (a) In order to see the universe as a rational, closed mechanism, one has to view the cosmos and everything in it as facts at one’s disposal rather than gifts which invoke thankfulness. Furthermore, one has to see the basic, discovered, or undiscovered laws of nature and logic as a closed system. However, according to Gödel, this view is unfounded. The philosopher, Anton Koch, speaks of an antinomy of reason, which will emerge sooner or later in any system. The more one wants to technologize reason, the sooner the antinomy will emerge.22 In other words, there is real contingency in the world, which cannot be calculated, not even by statistics as is the case in quantum mechanics. Consequently, completely undetermined events and laws will emerge that are truly surprising because they can only be seen as a surprise through retrospection. At this point, the philosophical objections meet a theological one. Christian eschatology does not deal with calculable futures of extrapolation, nor does it deal with surprises that can be foreseen. Christian eschatology deals, rather, with the absolutely retrospective forms of surprise, and, as far as those disclosed in Christ through the Spirit are concerned, with relatively retrospective forms of surprise as well, that is, those where one expects to be surprised, but without knowing by what. The latter kinds of surprises are decisive for the Christian understanding of resurrection, but they are also decisive for our everyday experience and personal formation.23 These kind of surprises are completely absent in the thinking of posthumanists. One must, therefore, ask: Do they really expect so little? Are their fantasies and hopes really so limited? Technological reason, as it is articulated by posthumanists, has another feature that denies the character of reality as one of becoming. Processes of reality are seen in a structure, which anthropologist Tim Ingold has called transport. In transport, the ends and subsidiary ends are important, whereas

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the means or lines in-between are not important. Ideal transport from A to B would happen with infinite speed. In transport, the ends precede the ways and there are—strictly speaking—no ways, lines, or processes that are ends in themselves. All becoming and dynamism are only seemingly so. Furthermore, transport is accompanied by the attitude of intentionality.24 Intentionality, as Ingold uses the term, means that all the ends are chosen in a voluntaristic manner by subjects. They are chosen not along the way, but before one even begins. Moreover, any perceptions along the way are either seen as furthering these chosen ends or as impeding them. In transport, there is a kind of relationality, but it is not internal relationality, rather it is only a purely external one,25 that of the network, that is, antecedent relata or points that are connected by lines that can merge and divide. And this poor conviction is precisely what posthumanists think about the future of love as well!26 However, regarding the world—past, present, or future—as an intentional transport in a network is an inversion of perceptive reality. Ingold calls the alternative wayfaring,27 where the ways or lines are antecedent to any ends. Strictly speaking, there is no ultimate end. This structure fits, by the way, to the Christian understanding of the ultimate or eschatological reality, which cannot be seen as a cessation of becoming, but which is seen as a becoming in the triune God without ambiguity. The lines—or processes/relations—are constitutive for the emerging relata or points, which are seen as knots and accumulations of curved lines. The relationality wayfaring not only provides an external form of relationality or one that at least seems to be internal, but a real form of internal, constitutive relationality. These relations do not form networks, but rather meshworks28 of interconnected lines. Humans are not beings or points, but rather becomings or intermeshed lines, where the becoming of the other is constitutive for one’s own becoming. Ingold also calls this “love”29 and makes reference to the Christian understanding of love based on the Trinity and its perichoresis.30 Thus, the attitude toward the world is not intentionality but attentionality.31 Attentionality can be seen as a virtue that rejects intentionality and is driven without an end. Attentionality means gaining one’s ends by the impressions in-between or on the way through formation by the other. All attentionally gained ends can only be temporal, because they need to be constantly revised due to new perceptions, which are always emerging. The Christian name for attentionality is surrender.32 If there could only be one instance of wayfaring, meshing, and attentionality in the world, posthumanism would be falsified. Theologically speaking, sin affects the totus homo, including created reason and rationality. Consequently, all imaginable kinds of immanent logic, reason, mechanism, or technology participate in the fall and are in need of being redeemed and perfected. This doctrine of the fall means that understandings of reason,

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logic, and technology that do not consider these facts, such as reducing all mechanism to transport without taking wayfaring into account, or restricting the antinomy of reason to only formal systems, are themselves expression of sin in terms of being misplaced.33 (b) Posthumanists not only act in intentional transport, they also regard their own (and the posthuman’s) desires voluntaristically as the supreme standard and canon of what is good. Apart from a few exceptions throughout its history, Christian theology has wisely rejected a voluntaristic God, that is, a God whose will is the origin of the good (perdeitas boni), but has claimed that the divine and the good are equiprimordial (perseitas boni). Christian theology has also seen the root of human alienation in the constant human tendency toward reliance on one’s individual choices and in rationality as the standard and canon of defining good and evil. The temptation of the serpent in Gen. 3:5 does not actually consist in the promise of knowledge, as it is often understood. The Hebrew word yadah does not simply mean knowing, but also copulating, generating, and giving birth. Theologically speaking, it claims: you will be like God, giving birth to the distinction between good and bad. Obviously, the posthumanists follow this scheme and, ironically, this causes inconsistencies. They propose “wild” autonomy, that is, an autonomy where one’s own wishes are the standard of good and bad,34 but their restricted dreams consist in submitting to the reign of superintelligence. To conclude this section, these branches of posthumanism are cognitivist, individualist, intentionalist, voluntarist, and static. In all of these, the posthumanists place their hope in an iCalf. But, whereas the golden calf of the Pentateuch only prevented the Israelites in reaching the promised land for forty years, the posthumanists hope that following the iCalf will make the detour everlasting—or at least 500–1,000 years long. THE RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY OF KAREN BARAD It would be unfair, however, to place those who positively use the term posthumanism within the same camp as that of Bostrom and Kurzweil. Philosopher Karen Barad also calls her agential realism posthumanist. It is important, though, to discover what she means by using this type of posthumanist thought. Barad follows and criticizes the feminism of Donna Haraway, who developed a non-essentialist feminism, explicitly denying any form of essentialist feminism.35 Whereas essentialist feminists regard women as superior and sometimes use the symbol of the goddess in order to express female superiority, Haraway regards this as nothing but an inversion of the old patriarchal way of thinking. In observing present society, she claims to see the breach of three seemingly dualistic boundaries: the boundary between human

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and animal, the boundary between organism and machine, and the boundary between the physical and the non-physical. The uniting symbol for breaching and queering these boundaries is not the goddess, but the cyborg, since the cyborg represents a mixture between organism and machine. Consequently, her approach is sometimes called cyborg feminism.36 The basic idea is that there are no natural classes, but distinctions of classes are constructed through interactions of manifold relata, personal and apersonal, but not once and for all. It seems, therefore, that the natural realism of the essentialist feminists and the constructivism of cyborgian feminists are at odds with one another. Barad understands both naïve realists and constructivists to be reliant on the same mistake, that of representationalism: The idea that beings exist as individuals with inherent attributes, anterior to their representation, is a metaphysical presupposition that underlies the belief in political, linguistic, and epistemological forms of representationalism. Or, to put the point the other way around, representationalism is the belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they purport to represent; in particular, that which is represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing. That is, there are assumed to be two distinct and independent kinds of entities—representations and entities to be represented.37

Both essentialism or (naïve) realism and constructivism are instantiations of representationalism. Either “scientific knowledge represents things in the world as they really are (i.e., ‘Nature’) or ‘objects’ that are the product of social activities (i.e., ‘Culture’), but both groups subscribe to representationalism.”38 Barad, partly following Haraway, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and others, but most prominently Nils Bohr, calls the alternative to representationalism agential realism. Agential realism is the idea that relations precede relata, that performativity precede performers, and that events or phenomena precede objects, even ontologically. Matter does not consist of atoms, but of performativity or events that reconfigure themselves in the ongoing “interaction” in order to be the basis for temporary differences of relata: On my agential realist elaboration, phenomena do not merely mark the epistemological inseparability of “observer” and “observed”; rather, phenomena are the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting “components.” That is, phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without preexisting relata. The notion of intra-action (in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which presumes the prior existence of independent entities/relata) represents a profound conceptual shift. It is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the “components” of phenomena become determinate and that particular embodied concepts become meaningful. A specific

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intra-action enacts an agential cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between subject and object) effecting a separation between “subject” and “object.” That is, the agential cut enacts a local resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological indeterminacy. In other words, relata do not preexist relations; rather, relata-within-phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions. Crucially then, intra-actions enact agential separability—the local condition of exteriority-within-phenomena.39

What is posthumanist regarding this kind of relational ontology? Barad provides the answer: I propose a specifically posthumanist notion of performativity—one that incorporates important material and discursive, social and scientific, human and nonhuman, and natural and cultural factors. A posthumanist account calls into question the givenness of the differential categories of “human” and “nonhuman,” examining the practices through which these differential boundaries are stabilized and destabilized.40

It is clear that both cyborgianism of Haraway and the posthumanism of Barad have nothing to do with the posthumanism of post/transhumanists like Bostrom or Kurzweil. Whereas the latter is a quasi-religion that claims to be a science about the future, the former is a philosophy of science and proposal for a relational ontology. Barad’s proposal for a relational ontology is not altogether new; however, it fits together with contemporary insights such as the extended-mind thesis,41 enactivist theories of the brain not as an organ of representation but as organ of relations,42 social-anthropological theories of human beings as human becomings in a world without objects,43 and new theories of evolution that reject the genotype-phenotype distinction as in the case of niche construction theory.44 Furthermore, and far more important, Barad recapitulates insights gained from Christian theology with her relational ontology, particularly the idea of internal relationality in both the triune God and in creation. Her ideas fit well with the perichoretic unity of the triune God, to the perichoretic unity of the person of Christ,45 and to the hidden yet real perichoretic unity of diversity in created love.46 Barad does not only use the fashionable word “posthumanism” in a positive manner, but also the words “naturalist” and “materialist”47 which could cause superficial reluctances from the side of Christian theology. However, the turn in theology in recent years from a substantialist view back to a relational ontology, from Cartesian dualism back to a Hebrew monism of the living body, and other developments, should see in Barad’s relational ontology more of an ally despite its, at times, misleading label of posthumanism.

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HUMAN ENHANCEMENT OR EXTENDED BODILINESS? It is not enough simply to evaluate the substitutional religion of the iCalf of Bostrom, Kurzweil, and others as well as the philosophical suggestions from a Christian wayformational perspective, if one wants to deal with the subject of post/transhumanism. We also have to deal with some undeniable phenomena in the present, and these are phenomena which can be called phenomena of “human enhancement” like glasses, dental prosthesis, cosmetic surgery, cardiac pacemakers, and, in the near future, perhaps even a type of neuroimproving device, but perhaps also the possibility of technological genetic alterations of the human genome.48 What distinguishes examples from the religion of the posthumanist iCalf and relational ontologies, which call themselves posthumanist, is that these phenomena provide alternatives for human action, both communal and personal, and have to be chosen against an ethical backdrop. How should we deal with these types of decisions? Of course, it is not within the scope of this chapter to articulate expansive answers to these difficult questions. What follows are some hints for strategies to find answers and followed by spelling out some warnings. CONCLUDING WARNINGS Below are seven cautions or warnings about transhumanism and posthumanism. 1. The plans for human enhancement do not necessarily need to be put into a posthumanist/transhumanist framework. If these phenomena are put into such a framework, one has to be aware that one has chosen an ethically orientating, wayformational-perspective worldview of quasi-religion. 2. These phenomena have to be put separately in order to find ethical answers. To put them together injures the praxis of good ethical reasoning that has to start with concrete problems of action. 3. In ethics, there is no universal meta-perspective, no God-perspective, or perspective from nowhere. Human beings as human becomings are always interwoven or intermeshed with one another and other becomings via particular wayformational perspectives, which can be the wayformational perspective of classical religions such as the Christian faith. Therefore, it is decisive to lay open once again moral ontology or wayline perspectives in public ethical discourses about these phenomena. Hiding them, by means of only seemingly tolerant slogans such as “religion is a private affair,” is poisonous because this strategy provides gaps for ethical manipulation through medial power.

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4. Despite the fact that enhancement technologies accompanying these phenomena might be comparatively new, they are similar in that they are not really phenomena of “enhancement of the human body” in a strict sense. This impression might only arise if one sees the human body as a closed entity or a “blob,” but that is not what phenomenological observation tells us: the human body is not a dead corpus, a Körper, but a living body, a Leib. As such, the body is a dynamic and relational entity without sharp boundaries. There are a plethora of examples for such a view of the body. For example, the blind person feels the obstacle not in his hand but at the end of his white-cane. Or, passionate motorcyclists feel the street not in their hands but in the tires. The chef even incorporates the knife into his bodyscheme while slicing vegetables, but it becomes unincorporated (and therefore dangerous to oneself and others) if the chef still has it in his hand during other activities like talking to someone at a close distance. Finally, the tone of the flute comes equiprimordially out of the flute and from the mouth, lips, tongue, throat, and diaphragm of the player. These are only a few examples of the many ways the human body is seen as a living, dynamic entity. Moreover, I can think of specific theological arguments only in conversation with specific theological colleagues or by simply typing them on the computer. I can be faithful to the triune God by perceiving the living word of God communicated as verbum externum by my sisters and brothers. What phenomenological perception tells us is that our bodies are variable, that our bodies are always dynamic, extended bodies. These observations also fit within contemporary Christian and Hebrew anthropology. The problem, therefore, is not deciding whether or not we will “enhance” our bodies by new technological means, given that human bodies are always already enhanced and extended. 5. Rather, since our bodies always already enhance, extend, and restrict in different ways, the real problem consists in explicitly reckoning with the means of enhancement we are going to choose. From the Christian wayformational perspective, it is decisive that we should choose such extensions which cohere to the human becoming as constituted by perichoretic love. Or, in the terms of social anthropology, it is decisive to choose our extensions by attentionally gained preliminary ends via wayfaring and not intentionally as in transport. Our bodies are the means of the persons that we are, whether a person is a particular whence-and-whither becoming or a becoming-from-and-for-oneanother.49 However, a person is not able to be isolated from the body, the person is the body itself; we are our bodies. If we chose extensions

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and enhancements to our bodies simply due to the inverted logics of transport and intentionality, specifically by means of the economic and manipulative logics of rational choice, we turn ourselves as persons into means without any end. This process would entail robbing ourselves of the possibility of experiencing love and depersonalizing ourselves. 6. Whether choices for bodily extensions are enhancements or degradations neither depends on our choices nor on extrapolations, but on the surprising, contingent becoming of our lifeworld with which we are interwoven. Thus, it might not be the wisest choice to implant (= without the possibility of reversal) ourselves with knives instead of arms in order to become better vegetable cutters if we also still want to be able to embrace one another. 7. In conclusion, from the Christian wayformational perspective this much is perfectly clear: in whatever way we might want to extend our bodies, perfection is neither at the human’s, nor at superintelligences’ disposal, nor at the disposal of the immanent logic and laws of the empirical universe. Rather, since this perfection is promised and will be a gift of the triune God, it can therefore only be realized by means of an absolutely retrospective surprise. Consequently, whatever kind of perfections we might dream up now and in the immediate future will always be subject to divine judgment. No extensions or enhancements should be chosen with the quest for posthuman perfection in mind.

NOTES 1. Cf. Bostrom, Nick, “Introduction – The Transhumanist FAQ: A General Introduction,” in Mercer, Calvin/Maher, Derek F. (Hg.), Transhumanism and the Body. The World Religions Speak, Basingstoke 2014, 1–17, 3. 2. Cf. Bostrom, “Transhumanist FAQ,” 4. 3. A good introduction into the history of Bostrom’s development provides Khatchadourian, Raffi, “The Doomsday Invention. Will Artificial Intelligence Bring us Utppia or Destruction?,” The New Yorker November 23, 2015 (2015), 64–79. 4. Cf., for example, with different evaluations Waters, Brent, From Human to Posthuman. Christian Theology and Technology in a Postmodern World, Farnham 2016; Kull, Anne, “Cyborg Embodiment and the Incarnation,” Currents in Theology and Mission 28 (2001); Thweatt-Bates, Jeanine, Cyborg Selves. A Theological Anthropology of the Posthuman, Farnham 2013; Peters, Ted, Anticipating Omega. Science, Faith and Our Ultimate Future, Göttingen 2006. 5. More suitable for these purposes are the other articles in this book and the literature in the last note.

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6. Cf. Bostrom, Nick, “The Future of Humanity,” in Berg Olsen, Jan-Kyrre/ Selinger, Evan/Riis, Soren (Hg.), New Waves in Philosophy of Technology, New York 2009, 1–29. 7. Cf. Bostrom, “Future of Humanity,” 20. 8. Cf. Bostrom, “Transhumanist FAQ,” 7. 9. Cf. Bostrom, “Transhumanist FAQ,” 9–11. 10. Cf. Bostrom, “Future of Humanity,” 23 and Kurzweil, Raymond, The Singularity Is Near. When Human Transcend Biology, New York 2005. 11. Cf. Kurzweil, Singularity Is Near, 28f. 12. Cf. Bostrom, Nick, Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford – New York 2014. 13. Cf. Bostrom, “Transhumanist FAQ,” 14f. 14. Cf. Kurzweil, Singularity Is Near, 14–24. 15. Cf. Mühling, Markus, The T&T Clark Handbook of Christian Eschatology, New York – London 2015, 223–250. 16. Cf. Bostrom, “Future of Humanity,” 25. 17. Cf. Kurzweil, Singularity Is Near, 29. 18. Cf. Tipler, Frank J., The Physics of Immortality. Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead, New York u.a. 1994, 214f. 19. Cf. Peters, Anticipating Omega, 130f. 20. Cf. Peters, Anticipating Omega, 125. 21. Cf. Kurzweil, Singularity Is Near, 30–33. 22. Cf. Koch, Anton Friedrich, Wahrheit, Zeit und Freiheit. Einführung in eine philosophische Theorie, Paderborn 2006, 79–97. 23. Cf. Mühling, Handbook of Christian Eschatology, 32–38; 56–60; 276–301. 24. Cf. Ingold, Tim, The Life of Lines, London – New York 2015, 132f. 25. Cf. Ingold, Tim, Lines. A Brief History, London – New York 2007, 77–79 and Ingold, Life of Lines, 70. 26. Kurzweil, Singularity Is Near, 26: ‘Machines can pool their resources, intelligence, and memories. Two machines—or one million machines—can join together to become one and then become separate again. Multiple machines can do both at the same time: become one and separate simultaneously. Humans call this falling in love, but our biological ability to do this is fleeting and unreliable.’ 27. Cf. Ingold, Lines, 24–77. 28. Cf. Ingold, Lines, 80. 29. Cf. Ingold, Life of Lines, 130f. 30. Cf. Ingold, Life of Lines, 147. 31. Cf. Ingold, Life of Lines, 133. 156. 32. Cf. Mühling, Handbook of Christian Eschatology, 71f and Mühling, Markus, “Resonances: Neurobiology, Evolution and Theology. Evolutionary Niche Construction, the Ecological Brain and Relational-Narrative Theology,” Göttingen – Bristol (CT) 2014, 189. 33. Thweatt-Bates, Cyborg Selves, pos. 3356–3367 accuses Peters of having a pessimistic anthropology in referring to sin. However, the fall does not only effect humans but also their lifeworld and the whole universe, including reason. I cannot

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see how someone without these convictions can claim to perceive the world from a Christian wayformational perspective. 34. I call this ‘wild’ autonomy, because this common thinking of what ‘autonomy’ might be is in fact a perversion of the philosopher of autonomy, Immanuel Kant, thought about real autonomy, which consists not in following one’s wishes, but in following the categorical imperative. 35. Cf. Haraway, Donna J., Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. The Reinvention of Nature, London, 1991 and especially the first chapter that is a reprint of her article ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ from 1985. 36. Cf. Thweatt-Bates, Cyborg Selves, 74. 37. Barad, Karen, “Posthumanist Performativity. Toward an Understanding of how Matter comes to Matter, Signs,” Journal of Woman in Culture and Society 28 (2003), 801–831; 804. 38. Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 806. 39. Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 815. A more comprehensive explanation can be found in Barad, Karen, “Agential Realism. How Material-discursive Practices Matter, Signs,” Journal of Woman in Culture and Society 28 (2003): 803– 831. Cf. also her collection of essays in Barad, Karen, Meeting the Universe Halfway, Durham – London 2007. 40. Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 808. 41. Cf. Clark, Andy/Chalmers, David J., “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58 (1998) 10–23 and Clark, Andy, Supersizing the Mind. Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension, Oxford–New York, 2011. 42. Cf. Fuchs, Thomas, Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzeption, Stuttgart 2013 and my critical evaluation in Mühling, M., Resonances, 36–83. 43. Cf. Ingold, Life of Lines, 13–17. 44. Cf. Odling-Smee, F. John/Laland, Kevin N./Feldman, Marcus W., Niche Construction. The Neglected Process in Evolution, Princeton – Oxford 2003; Laland, Kevin N./Uller, Tobias/Feldman, Marc/Sterelny, Kim/Müller, Gerd B./Moczek, Armin/Jablonka, Eva/Odling-Smee, F. John/Wray, Gregory A./Hoekstra, Hopi E./ TFutuyama, Douglas J./Lenski, Richard E./Mackay, Trudy F.C./Schluter, Dolf/ Strassmann, Joan E., “Does Evolutionary Theory Need a Rethink?,” Nature 514 (2014): 161–164; Fuentes, Agustín, “A New Synthesis. Resituating Approaches to the Evolution of Human Behaviour,” Anthropology Today 25 (2009): 12–17; Fuentes, Agustín/Wyczalkowski, Matthew A./MacKinnon, Katherine C., “Niche Costruction through Cooperation. A Nonlinear Dynamics Contribution to Modeling Facets of the Evolutionary History in the Genus Homo,” Current Anthropology 51 (2010): 435–444 and my critical assessment in Mühling, M., Resonances, 137–165. 45. For a historical and systematic discussion of the notion of perichoresis in the doctrines of the Trinity and Christology, cf. Mühling, Markus, Liebesgeschichte Gott. Systematische Theologie im Konzept, Göttingen 2013, 100–122. 46. An instructive application of the notion of perichoresis to the created world as ‘double perichoresis’ can now be found in Henriksen, Jan-Olav, Life, Love and Hope. God and Human Experience, Grand Rapids 2014, 7899–8017.

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47. Cf. Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 803. 48. For a theological evaluation of genetic engineering, cf. Song, Robert, Human Genetics Fabricating the Future, Cleveland 2002. 49. For this concept of the person, which combines instructive insights by the twelfth-century theologian, Richard of St. Victor, and Tim Ingold, cf. Mühling, M., Resonances, 174. 184–6 and Mühling, Handbook of Christian Eschatology, 206.

Part IV

IS H+ SOUND SCIENTIFICALLY? PHILOSOPHICALLY? THEOLOGICALLY?

Chapter 18

Is Transhumanism Good Science, Bad Science, or Pseudoscience? Arvin M. Gouw

INTRODUCTION History of Science Definitions Science is born from philosophy, more specifically, the topic of epistemology. Epistemology is the study of how one knows what one knows. In general, there are two schools on ways to obtain knowledge: empiricism and rationalism.1 The British philosophers, championed by John Locke, were proponents of empiricism, the idea that one obtains knowledge only through experience. At birth, our minds are nothing but blank slates, tabula rasa. On the other hand, Descartes and Kant were rationalists who argued that we are born with a set of a priori innate ideas from which we can deduce the rest of science through analytical and synthetic judgments. The development of the modern sciences came from the application of the scientific method, where observations lead to hypothesis generations that are a priori, which are then validated or invalidated through empirical experiments a posteriori. Every contemporary subtype of science, from physics to biology, broke off from philosophy at different times in history.2 Shift from Natural Philosophy to the Scientific Method Before we can address the question of whether transhumanism is good science, bad science, or pseudoscience, I will first demonstrate that defining science itself is not trivial. Though engineering and technology began very early on in ancient China with the development of paper, printing, and gunpowder, the development of science per se is usually attributed to the Western world with the Greeks.3 Euclid first began studying the science of space in the third century BC, thus breaking off from Plato’s philosophy and is now considered 295

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as geometry and astronomy. Archimedes began considering the nature of irrational numbers and calculating the sums of series, and thus mathematics broke off from philosophy.4 Physics was born in the seventeenth century out of the works of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton. Physics was no longer metaphysics, and at the time it was called natural philosophy. Chemistry was born in the nineteenth century with the proof of the existence of atoms by Boltzmann. Biology was finally born with Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 1859.5 Shift from Scientific Method to Logical Positivism In the early twentieth century, a new school of thought was developed postWorld War I by a group of philosophers called the Vienna Circle. They proposed what is now called logical positivism. They argue that the only true knowledge is that which can be addressed by science. Moreover, most knowledge, if not all knowledge, should be derivable form logic and mathematics. In other words, philosophy’s role is to provide clear definitions and logical rules that will make people realize why only science matters.6 Shift from Logical Empiricism to Popper Karl Popper, who can be considered as a logical positivist, proposed a definition of science that depends on its falsifiability. In other words, in order for a system of facts and logical statements to be considered as science, they must be logically falsifiable. Otherwise, they would be simply belief or pseudoscience if they are always true and can never be wrong.7 Shift from Popper to Postmodern Science Critique Popper’s view of science is still very popular today, even though it has been proven that falsification of any axiomatic system is easier said than done. An Austrian mathematician, Kurt Gödel, proved that mathematically any axiomatic system that contains all the rules of arithmetic cannot prove every arithmetic rule simply from its axioms. In other words, to prove a certain system’s completeness, one needs a bigger system with a different set of axioms. The chain of systems that is required to prove a single system is endless.8 In the world of philosophy of science, Thomas Kuhn published his groundbreaking work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, explaining that science is not as objective as Popper likes to think. Scientific theories are not falsifiable at the instant of a single experimental result. It takes many experimental failures and a major rethinking of the standard theory before there is what Kuhn calls a “paradigm shift” to a completely new model that can address

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the “falsifying” experiments. Most scientific paradigms are stable until these “revolutions” take place that cause paradigm shifts.9 Shift from Postmodern Science Back to Academia Whether we like it or not, Goedel and Kuhn force us to accept that some of the values of science lie outside of science. Scientific theories are not easily falsifiable because of the cultural, academic baggage of “standard” theories. Because not all axioms of science can be proven internally, that means we have to presuppose some values and axioms in science. These presuppositions come from our cultural and historical backgrounds. This gives rise to the postmodern view of science where both the presuppositions and also the objectives of scientific projects are historically and culturally dependent.10 Still, in the 1990s the pendulum swung back to academia because of the “Pi” scam paper, published to poke fun at leftists. Alan Sokal published “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” where he suggests that Pi is not a constant and universal but is relative to the observer, thus subject to “ineluctable historicity.” This paper was published even though it was a scam.11 This proves that though there is truth in the subjectivity of science as posed by the leftists, there still is a great deal of objectivity in the scientific method. This movement from the right pushed back scientific endeavors to academic centers. Shift from Academia to Public and Corporate Support Within the context of the United States, the funding of research has largely come from the government dating to the Cold War. Physics and astronomy are the two fields that received the largest amounts of funding from the government because of the race to the moon and the nuclear arms race. Since then, the government has realized that basic science research is important or necessary to produce novel technologies and developed the National Institutes of Health to fund basic science and medical research programs.12 With the successes of basic science research discoveries that have led to medical advances, the private sector has come to realize that great profit that can be made from biomedical research. Over the last three decades, the majority of scientific research and development funding has come from the private sector, not the government.13 The private sector, companies with the public as their stakeholders, is driven by what products the people desire and can pay for. Thus, scientific projects are driven more by the desires of laypeople than by what scientists think is most important. With the ever-increasing aging population, there is more desire than ever to delay aging, if not eliminate it altogether. Under these conditions transhumanism, both as worldview and as scientific vision, is carried out by the private sector even if academic

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scientists say it is not possible. Transhumanists have a hard time in academic sciences. Transhumanism thrives under the shadow of professional science through extrapolation and through private funding from corporate sectors.14 What We Need to Consider from the History of Science and Its Shifts of Definitions Having gone over the history of the development of science, I will highlight three observations regarding the nature of science. First, science prioritization is not always objective. Second, science concerns the public. Third, falsifiability cannot demarcate science from non-science. From this brief overview of different views of science, it is clear that it is not easy to answer the question of whether transhumanism is good science, bad science, or pseudoscience. Some transhumanist scientific projects employ the scientific method, some are overly optimistic, like logical positivism, and some are completely unfalsifiable. For the purposes of our discussion, I will propose some key features of what most consider good science today.15 Contemporary Science Scientific Community The first criterion to differentiate science from non-science is the presence of a scientific community for that particular topic. This community must have members that have been trained specifically in the concepts, methods, and discourse of the subject. Members of the community have to interact with each other using transparent language. In this regard, transhumanism does have a presence of a scientific community whether as a whole or within its sub-disciplines (cryonics, singularity, mind uploading, etc.). The members do communicate and learn from each other in various transhumanist conferences; however, it is not very clear what kind of specialized training the members receive in their subfields. For example, radical life extension (RLE) scientists come from various backgrounds ranging from chemistry to computer science.16 However, there is no academic graduate program that trains scientists in the field of RLE. Though many have argued that RLE requires a multidisciplinary approach that extends the walls of academia, one begs the question how the interactions of such disparate disciplines without formal multidisciplinary training can execute complex research programs. The fact that RLE research programs are multidisciplinary does not mean that they cannot be incorporated into the current grant funding mechanisms. In fact, there are many multidisciplinary research programs that are funded by the NIH for academic centers. For example, The Cancer Genome Atlas project

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is a nationwide program that involves multiple academic centers, each with their own teams of scientists ranging from molecular biologists to computational scientists compiling data from 11,000 patients on thirty-three different cancer types.17,18 In other words, transhumanist scientific projects need to be in scientific domains so that they can be critiqued by a current peer review system of scientists instead of being highly “multidisciplinary,” so that they are untouchable and removed from the current “mainstream” scientific communities. Otherwise, transhumanist scientists do not know anything about everything—too generalist to be useful and nothing but hopeful. Short-Term and Long-Term Goals In any area of scientific research, short-term and long-term goals are the bread and butter of a well-established research program. Any research program that is funded usually will have submitted grant proposals pertaining to a specific project. It is worth our time to briefly discuss the contents of a grant proposal to see the “hallmarks” of good science that will be funded. Usually a team of scientists would propose several “specific aims” pertaining to the project. These specific aims can be considered as short-term goals that should be doable within 3–5 year plan. In a typical NIH RO1 grant proposal (for a team of about five scientists, usually in academia), the number of specific aims rarely exceed more than three. Each specific aim is followed by preliminary data that support the rationale of the aim as well as highly technical descriptions of the proposed experiments, anticipated results, and anticipated troubleshooting to test the specific aim. This takes up most of the grant proposal and it is the area most heavily critiqued by the scientific review board.19 Proposals can be rejected if the specific aims are too broad, too ambitious, or if the experimental designs and interpretation sections are not solid enough. Long-term goals usually manifest themselves as 2–3 simple paragraphs on the “significance” and “impact” the proposed project is anticipated to have on the field. This is in sharp contrast to the pages of data and technical descriptions supporting the short-term specific aims. This indicates that most grant funding mechanisms champion targetable objectives and aims.20,21 Transhumanist scientific projects by definition have long-term goals in mind, ranging from mind uploading to immortality. However, one begs the question whether transhumanism projects also have short-term goals that are unique to transhumanist projects. Again, for example, with regards to RLE, Aubrey de Grey’s seven types of aging damage have often been described as the mechanisms one can tackle to defeat aging.22 However, upon closer look, those seven causes of aging are not at all “short term” and definitely not unique to RLE. For example, one of the causes of aging damage is from cancer-causing mutations. This topic is not unique to RLE, and there are hundreds of thousands of cancer

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researchers in the world working on this problem.23,24 The specific SENS proposal to work on telomeres is also not new or unique to the RLE agenda. The difference is that mainstream scientists would list as their long-term goal to seek to cure cancer to extend life span, not to eliminate death altogether. This places transhumanist projects in a precarious position, where their short-term scientific projects are no different than other mainstream scientific projects. Their long-term goal of eradicating death or mind uploading then becomes the sole distinguishing feature of transhumanism. However, the long-term goals are not being evaluated in terms of feasibility precisely because they’re long-term goals. In a way, transhumanists remain scientific in their short-term goals, which are falsifiable through experiments, yet on the other hand, they remain unscientific and untouchable in their non-falsifiable long-term goals. Conceptually Sound Scientific projects need to have an academic community basis as well as feasible short-term and reasonable long-term goals. However, the actual execution of the science itself requires certain level of rigor. Here are seven features of a conceptually sound scientific project: Replicable Scientific experiments are difficult to perform for various reasons. Some of those reasons are technical, while other reasons include the numerous possibilities in which anticipated results can occur. This explains the high non-replicability rates of scientific articles published even in the top journals: Nature, Science, and Cell, being as high as 50 percent, if not more.25,26 Statistical significance here becomes the standard rule to assess if a certain result will most likely be replicable. Transparent Following replicability, scientific experiments also need to be described in a very transparent manner so as not to prevent others from replicating the same experiment. With the advent of ever-changing scientific machines that perform these experiments, it is getting more and more difficult to obtain the detailed conditions required to exactly replicate a previous experiment. But this makes transparency ever more important. Consistent Theoretically Proposed scientific projects need to be consistent theoretically with the current scientific paradigm, so that it is possible to properly validate or question

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the paradigm. Though we must be cautious of Kuhn’s warning that we will heavily favor results that support our paradigm, it is even more imprudent to design experiments on a completely new paradigm that have had little or no supporting data in the field. This is the paradox of science that a small amount of data should be able to remove an old paradigm, yet in order for a new paradigm to be established, it requires a lot of data.27 Thus, this period between old and new paradigms is a limbo where most scientists would rather settle in the old paradigm until accruing results are enough to support a new paradigm. Empirically Testable Any scientific idea and program needs to be empirically testable otherwise it cannot be considered scientific. This does not mean that there is no knowledge outside of scientific knowledge, as the logical positivists would insist. However, what I would like to emphasize here is the use of positive and negative controls. Any empirically testable hypothesis that is based on a specific scientific model will have experimental results that should fall within the boundaries and parameters of that model. For example, if we are considering cancer cells as highly active energy power cells in producing energy (ATP), then we can compare cancer cells to positive controls (cells that we know to produce lots of energy) and negative controls (cells that we know to be quiescent). In this sense, we then are able to see where cancer cells fall within the spectrum of energy-producing cells in the continuum from positive to negative controls. The problem with transhumanist experiments is that their experimental goals lie beyond the parameters of the scientific model that they test. In other words, they expect to see results that fall outside of the range between positive and negative controls of the system. By nature, transhumanist scientific goals are to transcend the current boundaries of nature, thus (ironically) they are not testable by current scientific models. Every model replicates nature to a certain extent given certain boundaries and parameters. But transhumanist science seeks to go beyond those very boundaries, thus there really is no model for them to test. Their results are beyond the positive and negative controls of any particular model. For example, in order to attain immortality, one needs immortal cells. To determine if one has succeeded in creating an immortal cell is to compare its survivability to a known immortal cell line (positive control) and to compare it to a non-immortal cell line (negative control). In this scenario, the negative control would be any adult differentiated cells, while the closest that we have would be a cancer cell line that is immortal. We do not have an immortal line that is not cancerous. In other words, we do not have an immortal cell type that can cooperate in the body in a way that is non-cancerous. This is an

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example where the goal of attaining immortality of even a single cell is not empirically testable because it seeks to extend the boundaries of the empirically testable models that exist. Explanatory Scientific programs should be able to explain how things work. It is the standard of contemporary science that we need to be able to elucidate the mechanism of a phenomenon scientifically. For example, it is not enough to demonstrate that a novel compound X causes cancer regression, but it is important to elucidate how compound X causes cancer death. The mechanism could be genetic, epigenetic, metabolic, or all of the above. Within the realm of transhumanist scientific projects, typically there is explanatory power in the short-term scientific goals. For example, the maintenance of telomeres would prolong aging, because a shortened telomere induces cell death. Likewise, artificial intelligence has explanatory power to explain why the newly created AI is intelligent—perhaps because of its ability to solve problems that are much more complex. Simple and Probable Occam’s razor is a principle that has been with science from the very beginning. There are many explanations for any natural phenomenon. The reason behind the door closing could range from anything from a person closed it, the wind closed it, to a unicorn closed it, and much more. However, we try to find the simplest explanation first before going to the furthest possible explanation. Thus, behind science’s simplicity is actually probability. Though there are many possible explanations to a certain phenomenon, some are more probable than others.28 Now when it comes to the transhumanist agenda, one begs the question of the probability of them succeeding. There are obviously many possible routes by which one can attain RLE, mind uploading, or AI, yet how likely are these explanations given what has happened in the past: that everybody has always died, and that no one has been able to solve the mind-body problem. This is the burden of proof that lies heavily with the transhumanist agenda. Skeptically Optimistic If there is a single virtue that any scientist should have, it is skepticism that does not overcome the optimism of attaining one’s scientific goals. Aristotle would have called this prudence,29 but I have chosen to call this virtue skeptical optimism because it is not overladen with two millennia of philosophical baggage like prudence is. Contemporary scientists are trained to be skeptical

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of both positive and negative results. But even more than that, scientists are trained to set safety boundaries not only on single experiments but also on whole programs. There is a strong presence of moral and legal rules regulating the research programs by prescribing what types of actions are permitted, forbidden, or obligatory.30 This is perhaps the spirit of Shelley that scientists have to always be aware of before accidentally creating the next Frankenstein’s monster. With transhumanism, this assessment becomes highly debated, because while for some people the transhumanist goals are Frankensteinian, for the transhumanist, their goals are utopian. One then wonders how “prudent” transhumanist scientists can be if their very goals are to push the boundaries of nature. Prudence implies maintaining the status quo nature to a certain degree or not to destroy the status quo. Transhumanism seeks to change what is natural, thus skeptical optimism may not be a strong feature of their programs. They are simply optimistic. Is Transhumanism Good Science, Bad Science, or Pseudoscience? Having discussed the features of contemporary science above, let us return to our original question about the validity of transhumanist science programs. There are several issues with the transhumanist science programs. First, given their optimistic tendencies, as a scientist, one should be concerned with confirmation bias. I will not accuse them of this, but because their goals are so ambitious and radical that one has to be suspicious of whether they may look at only scientific successes and even extrapolate current scientific advances to support their vision. This behavior mimics data cherry picking and enhances confirmation bias. Second, as previously mentioned, transhumanist scientific agendas seem to lack experimental controls, because the results are supposed to be beyond parameters of current scientific paradigms. Any new scientific paradigm will always exceed the parameters of the old paradigm; however, prudence and a tremendous amount of data are required, both of which seem to be currently lacking in the transhumanist scientific programs. Third, due to the indistinguishability of their short-term goals from those of wellestablished scientific disciplines, perhaps transhumanists are just generating goals but not a unique scientific program. In this sense, transhumanism is better defined as a vision or a movement. At most, it is a scientific fishing experiment to randomly try new things, hoping to win the lottery of a major accidental discovery. However, there are positive features within transhumanist scientific programs. First, by far they are very creative in the application of science and technology to improve both human and environmental conditions. Second,

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given their highly ambitious goals, they realize from the very beginning that they have to approach these problems in a multidisciplinary fashion. Such realizations are rare in mainstream science, where problems usually stem from a specific scientific discipline and spread to other disciplines only at a later stage. Third, their optimism in solving the hardest problems may yield other side discoveries and advances even if they fail to attain immortality in the end, as was demonstrated in the historic field of alchemy, which led to modern-day chemistry. The positive and negative aspects of transhumanism discussed above then naturally lead to the next question: should transhumanism be pursued scientifically? Should Transhumanism Be Pursued? Instead of simply answering yes or no to supporting the transhumanist agenda, the simplest quick reply is “Why not?” Let them try things out and if they fail, then no harm is done. If they succeed, then we all become immortal! This sounds like an easy answer, except when we consider the finitude of resources that we have. Though it is perfectly fine to speculate and to have noble visions, such as curing all diseases, that does not mean we should pursue every idea that comes to mind, simply because we cannot afford to do that. Let’s go back to the history of science and pay attention to the value-laden concepts that are inherent in transhumanism. What are the origins of transhumanism? Aging white males from the baby boomers era? Whose vision is transhumanism? Technoscientists in Silicon Valley? It has been pointed out that the transhumanist vision is the vision of a select few that could potentially consume unlimited amounts of resources.31,32 When it comes to resources, who’s backing these research programs? Many scientific programs with transhumanist visions are possible due to the recent shift of research from academic centers to the private sector. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the private sector is driven by the lay public in its vision. The public vision is not irrelevant, but it is not always possible scientifically. The public sees transhumanist scientists as saints and prophets who can turn this world into a utopia. Science is very difficult. Taking a personal example from my own narrow field of research, we have known since the 1980s that a gene called MYC causes cancer.33,34 Since then, a simple PubMed search shows over 30,000 papers have been published on MYC, but only in the past few years have there been any promising studies on the development of drugs that can target MYC.35,36 And that’s only one gene and only one very well-studied disease! Our knowledge of potentially fatal autoimmune diseases and neurological

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diseases is far less than what we know about cancer simply due to the history of medical discoveries and the tools that we have. The complexity of biology cannot be overcome by a simple optimism in Moore’s Law. The more we learn about genomic, epigenomic, and metabolomic interaction, the more scientists are slowly realizing biology must be taken on a case by case basis (a subfield we now call personalized medicine). One then wonders about the feasibility of RLE projects within our lifetime or even within our century. Are transhumanists too naïve to realize this or arrogant enough that they think they can do better? Or, more cynically, are they simply mercenary liars seeking fame and fortune? To Our Naïve Transhumanist Friends There are several messages that many scientists (and philosophers) have tried to convey to our transhumanist colleagues. First, there are several key assumptions behind the transhumanist vision. First, to be fair, most transhumanists acknowledge they have a highly optimistic attitude. However, they take for granted the belief that science can fix suffering. It is true that innovations like the Internet and antibiotics have made our lives better, but human suffering is much deeper than just physical health. Second, transhumanists are too reliant on the metaphors they use in their scientific understanding, which often causes them to completely forget the very reality that they’re studying. Scientists have used various models to explain our mind, ranging from blood cooler, pump, filter, to automaton and now computer. However, these are metaphors by which we try to understand the reality of mind. When transhumanists develop programs such as uploading the mind onto a cloud, this is like forcing reality into the Crustacean bed of their models instead of trying to fix the model to better describe reality. Third, transhumanists need to identify well-defined scientific communities with real short-term results and products before they will be taken seriously by mainstream science. Despite the shortcomings of the transhumanist vision, it is noble and intriguing enough that if real short-term goals are attained, every scientist will follow the transhumanist program. Extension of life span to 200 years alone would bring all mainstream scientists to their knees and turn transhumanist science into mainstream science. CONCLUSION The nature of science keeps changing, and the transhumanist vision is a major driving force whether we like it or not. Transhumanism as science walks a fine line between bad science and pseudoscience. At this moment, transhumanist

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scientific programs should not be pursued due to limited resources, but the vision needs to be continually refined and can be inspiring to other scientific projects. Past endeavors that were “out there” (e.g., alchemy) still yielded results. In other words, transhumanism and extrapolation is the inevitable dark side of science which thrives under the shadow of professional science. Currently, transhumanism should be kept as science fiction where it belongs, where it can be a mode of theoretical experimentation of what could be. NOTES 1. Kenny, Anthony and British Academy. 1986. Rationalism, empiricism, and idealism: British academy lectures on the history of philosophy. Oxford. 2. Rosenberg, Alexander. 2012. Philosophy of science: A contemporary introduction. 3rd ed, Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy. New York: Routledge. 3. Morus, Iwan Rhys. The Oxford illustrated history of science. First edition The Oxford Illustrated History of Science. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017. 4. Merzbach, Uta C., and Carl B. Boyer. 2011. A history of mathematics. 3rd edition. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley. 5. Curd, Martin, J. A. Cover, and Chris Pincock. 2013. Philosophy of science: The central issues. 2nd edition. New York: W.W. Norton. 6. Uebel, Thomas E., and Alan W. Richardson. 2007. The Cambridge companion to logical empiricism, Cambridge companions to philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 7. Parvin, Philip. 2010. Karl Popper, Major conservative and libertarian thinkers. New York: Continuum. 8. Chaitin, Gregory J., Francisco Antônio Doria, and Newton C. A. da Costa. 2012. Gödel’s way: Exploits into an undecidable world. Boca Raton: CRC Press. 9. Kuhn, Thomas S., and Ian Hacking. 2012. The structure of scientific revolutions. Fourth edition. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press. 10. Sismondo, Sergio. 2010. An introduction to science and technology studies. 2nd edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 11. Sokal, Alan D. 2008. Beyond the hoax: Science, philosophy and culture. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 12. Greenberg, Daniel S. 2001. Science, money, and politics: Political triumph and ethical erosion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 13. McGarity, Thomas O., and Wendy Wagner. 2008. Bending science: How special interests corrupt public health research. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14. Gordin, M. D. 2017. “The problem with pseudoscience: Pseudoscience is not the antithesis of professional science but thrives in science’s shadow.” EMBO Reports no. 18 (9): 1482–1485. doi: 10.15252/embr.201744870. 15. Baars, E. W., H. Kiene, G. S. Kienle, P. Heusser, and H. J. Hamre. 2018. “An assessment of the scientific status of anthroposophic medicine, applying criteria from

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the philosophy of science.” Complementary Therapies in Medicine no. 40: 145–150. doi: 10.1016/j.ctim.2018.04.010. 16. Kurzweil, R., and T. Grossman. 2009. “Fantastic voyage: Live long enough to live forever. The science behind radical life extension questions and answers.” Studies in Health Technology and Informatics no. 149: 187–194. 17. Creighton, C. J. 2018. “Making Use of Cancer Genomic Databases.” Current Protocols in Molecular Biology no. 121: 19.14.1–19. 14.13. doi: 10.1002/cpmb.49. 18. Cheng, P. F., R. Dummer, and M. P. Levesque. 2015. “Data mining The Cancer Genome Atlas in the era of precision cancer medicine.” Swiss Medical Weekly no. 145:w14183. doi: 10.4414/smw.2015.14183. 19. Gerin, William, and Christine H. Kapelewski. 2011. Writing the NIH grant proposal: A step-by-step guide. 2nd edition. Los Angeles: Sage Publications. 20. Ibid. 21. Karsh, Ellen, and Arlen Sue Fox. 2009. The only grant-writing book you’ll ever need. 3rd edition. New York: Basic Books. 22. De Grey, Aubrey D. N. J., and Michael Rae. 2007. Ending aging: The rejuvenation breakthroughs that could reverse human aging in our lifetime. 1st edition. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 23. Gaspar, T. B., A. Sa, J. M. Lopes, M. Sobrinho-Simoes, P. Soares, and J. Vinagre. 2018. “Telomere Maintenance Mechanisms in Cancer.” Genes (Basel) no. 9 (5). doi: 10.3390/genes9050241. 24. Hayashi, M. T. 2018. “Telomere biology in aging and cancer: Early history and perspectives.” Genes & Genetic Systems no. 92 (3): 107–118. doi: 10.1266/ ggs.17-00010. 25. Baker, M. 2016. “1,500 scientists lift the lid on reproducibility.” Nature no. 533 (7604): 452–454. doi: 10.1038/533452a. 26. Schulz, J. B., M. R. Cookson, and L. Hausmann. 2016. “The impact of fraudulent and irreproducible data to the translational research crisis – solutions and implementation.” Journal of Neurochemistry no. 139 Suppl 2: 253–270. doi: 10.1111/ jnc.13844. 27. Kuhn, Thomas S., and Ian Hacking. 2012. The structure of scientific revolutions. Fourth edition. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press. 28. Schulz, Kathryn. 2010. Being wrong: Adventures in the margin of error. 1st edition. New York: Ecco. 29. Shields, Christopher John. 2007. Aristotle, Routledge philosophers. London; New York: Routledge. 30. Baars et al., “An assessment of the scientific status of anthroposophic medicine,” 145–150. 31. Raulerson, Joshua. Singularities: Technoculture, transhumanism, and science fiction in the twenty-first century, United Kingdom, Liverpool University Press, 2013. 32. Sirius, R. U., and Jay Cornell. Transcendence: The disinformation encyclopedia of transhumanism and the singularity, United States, Red Wheel/Weiser, 2015. 33. Payne, G. S., J. M. Bishop, and H. E. Varmus. 1982. “Multiple arrangements of viral DNA and an activated host oncogene in bursal lymphomas.” Nature no. 295 (5846): 209–214.

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34. Bishop, J. M. 1990. “Nobel Lecture. Retroviruses and oncogenes II.” Bioscience Reports no. 10 (6): 473–491. 35. Castell, A., Q. Yan, K. Fawkner, P. Hydbring, F. Zhang, V. Verschut, M. Franco, S. M. Zakaria, W. Bazzar, J. Goodwin, G. Zinzalla, and L. G. Larsson. 2018. “A selective high affinity MYC-binding compound inhibits MYC: MAX interaction and MYC-dependent tumor cell proliferation.” Science Reports no. 8 (1): 10064. doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-28107-4. 36. Delmore, J. E., G. C. Issa, M. E. Lemieux, P. B. Rahl, J. Shi, H. M. Jacobs, E. Kastritis, T. Gilpatrick, R. M. Paranal, J. Qi, M. Chesi, A. C. Schinzel, M. R. McKeown, T. P. Heffernan, C. R. Vakoc, P. L. Bergsagel, I. M. Ghobrial, P. G. Richardson, R. A. Young, W. C. Hahn, K. C. Anderson, A. L. Kung, J. E. Bradner, and C. S. Mitsiades. 2011. “BET bromodomain inhibition as a therapeutic strategy to target c-Myc.” Cell no. 146 (6): 904–917. doi: 10.1016/j.cell.2011.08.017.

Chapter 19

Ghosts or Zombies On Keeping Body and Soul Together Noreen Herzfeld

“Well, that ought to keep body and soul together,” my father would say after a particularly good meal. Keeping body and soul together—it seems like a given. But not for a number of transhumanists, who envision immortality as achievable precisely through their separation, imagining a not too distant future in which computer technology and neuroscience converge to allow an individual to upload his or her brain to a computer. Futurist Ray Kurzweil envisions a process of scanning a brain’s neural structure and then reinstantiating that structure in “a suitably powerful computational substrate,” thus capturing “a person’s entire personality, memory, skills, and history.”1 Once our “self” is ported to a silicon platform, we will no longer be limited by the vagaries of our biology. Kurzweil writes: Up until now, our mortality was tied to the longevity of our hardware. When the hardware crashed, that was it. . . . As we cross the divide to instantiate ourselves into our computational technology, our identity will be based on our evolving mind file. We will be software, not hardware. . . . As software, our mortality will no longer be dependent on the survival of the computing circuitry . . . [as] we periodically port ourselves to the latest, evermore capable “personal” computer. . . . Our immortality will be a matter of being sufficiently careful to make frequent backups.2

This dream of whole brain emulation leading to cybernetic immortality assumes that our essential self consists of our memories and thoughts, which are really nothing but patterns stored in the neural connections of our brain. Kurzweil presupposes a computational theory of mind, what we might dub, patternism. If patternism obtains, why could we not upload our mental patterns to a silicon platform, thus recreating the essence of that person in a 309

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computer? The soul, in this view identical to the mind, is not pre-existent, as Descartes imagined, but post-existent, initially dependent on the body for the skills and memories that constitute it, but at any point in time separable from that body. While the body ages and ultimately dies, mind or soul can live on. Kurzweil is not alone in these dreams. Computer scientist Hans Moravec views computers as our “mind children,” the next step in an evolutionary process that is geared toward maximizing the powers of the mind. He envisions a future in which life will come to inhabit, first, bodies of silicon and metal, but later, no body at all. We will exist in cyberspace, rather than real space, either independently, as avatars, or merging into a single “extended thinking entity.”3 Most of the scientists who envision a cybernetic future are not religious men (and they are mostly men). They are looking to the computer as the only means of surmounting death a strictly material world has to offer. But there are also religious transhumanists. Theologian Calvin Mercer finds the Apostle Paul’s assertion in 1 Corinthians that that dead will be raised with new bodies fully congruent with cybernetic immortality, since “the postresurrection body is qualitatively different from the ‘flesh and blood’ body.”4 While Mercer emphasizes the computer as the “new” body, the mind as pattern, one that could inhabit multiple platforms, either sequentially, as envisioned by Kurzweil above, or simultaneously, leaves the person’s self or soul untethered to any particular body, fully separable and portable. This idea of separating body and soul is nothing new. While it is a source of hope for transhumanists, in folklore and literature it has been a source of horror. A soul without a body, or the converse, a body without a soul, has been a staple theme of horror films and the late night stories children scare each other with around the campfire. A soul without a body is a ghost; a body without a soul is a zombie. Zombies first appear in popular culture in the 1920s. Since the turn of the century, they have shambled out of grade B film into the mainstream. A sampling of recent titles gives a taste of their popularity: 28 Days Later (2002), Dawn of the Dead (2004), 28 Weeks Later (2007), Zombieland (2009), Cockneys vs Zombies (2012), and Brad Pitt’s World War Z (2013). There are zombie video games, such as Resident Evil and Left for Dead and the popular television program The Walking Dead. True to their nature, zombies have become a meme that refuses to die.5 The reason why is unclear. Max Brooks, author of Zombie Survival Guide, thinks zombies present an outlet for the fears and anxieties that plague our culture: “You can’t shoot the financial meltdown in the head—you can do that with a zombie. . . . All the other problems are too big. As much as Al Gore tries, you can’t picture global warming. You can’t picture the meltdown of our financial institutions. But you can picture a slouching zombie coming down the street.”6 Others see

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the zombie as an only slightly exaggerated image of the smartphone carrying teenager or businessman, walking heedlessly down the street, head down, oblivious to all but the tiny screen in hand—a human body whose soul is obviously elsewhere. The idea of a soul without a body has a much longer pedigree. Animism, the peopling of the physical world with souls or spirits, allows for animation, in particular, for human-like rationality and agency, to reside in nonhuman and even inorganic bodies. A tree may have a soul. So, too, might a spring or the wind. The spirits of animism are not human spirits; rather, they are spirits intrinsic to and defined by that in which they reside. It is in the ghost that we find a human soul acting in the world without a body. Like the zombie, the ghost is frightening in that it, too, cannot die. But while the zombie can do nothing more than stalk mindlessly across the land and consume, the ghost can reason, communicate, and act in diverse ways, both malign and benign; ghosts seem far less alien than zombies, more like us. The ghosts in Ghostbusters or the Harry Potter novels are more laughed at than feared. Ghost stories give us a thrill that is equally chilling and pleasurable. Indeed, some try to contact the disembodied souls of loved ones or maintain for them a ghost-like existence on Facebook pages. This stems partly from a common perception of the afterlife as a disembodied soul able to both monitor what happens on earth after our demise and to partake in some sort of alternative world. Transhumanists who dream of separating the mind from the body hope to produce through technology just such a ghost-like existence, turning us into groundless spirits inhabiting a succession of machines, able to know what happens in the real world but to also experience a variety of virtual worlds. But this vision is still a long way from reality. Instead, our technology is turning us into something closer to zombies, bodies that travel through the world but whose minds appear to be elsewhere. Both are monstrous when considered through the lens of the Judeo-Christian tradition, where our integrity as a human being arises from being both body and soul, inseparable in life and in death. Fortunately, there are scientific as well as religious grounds to believe that body and soul (or body and mind, if you will) are, and should be, inseparable, leaving ghosts and zombies as denizens, solely of stories around the campfire. WHY NOT GHOSTS? THE PROBLEMS WITH PATTERNISM The ability to transfer the human mind to a computer rests on the assumption expressed most clearly by Nobel laureate Francis Crick: “You, your joys and

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your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. . . . You’re nothing but a pack of neurons.”7 Crick posits that the self we know and value is the product of our neuronal patterns and their functioning. We are, in essence, information and information, as we all know in this digital age, is reducible to patterns of zeros and ones. This is an appealing position in an age in which everything is rapidly becoming digitalized. It provides a simple model for human identity and individuality; we are each a unique pattern of neuronal connections. Kurzweil begins with an assumption much like Crick’s: “So who am I? Since I am constantly changing, am I just a pattern? What if someone copies that pattern? Am I the original and/or the copy? Perhaps I am this stuff here—that is, the both ordered and chaotic collection of molecules that make up my body and brain.”8 Noting the ever changing nature of these molecules, Kurzweil settles on the underlying pattern as the source of our identity. He writes: We know that most of our cells are turned over in a matter of weeks, and even our neurons, which persist as distinct cells for a relatively long time, nonetheless change all of their constituent molecules within a month. . . . I am rather like the pattern that water makes in a stream as it rushes past the rocks in its path. The actual molecules of water change every millisecond, but the pattern persists for hours or even years.9

Kurzweil’s hope is shared by Hans Moravec, who envisions the transfer of this neural pattern to a robotic body by sequentially replacing neurons with transistors, until the brain is entirely made up of circuits in the exact pattern of the original neurons. He views this as the easiest route to immortality, one that avoids the duplication problem Kurzweil mentions above.10 There are, however, several problems with this understanding of the human mind as pattern. First, it is vastly oversimplified. Our brains are more than the physical pattern of neurons and their connections. Our neural connections are both enabled and inhibited by a variety of neurochemicals such as serotonin, dopamine, and oxytocin. These, too, would need some sort of presence, at minimum, as variables in the algorithms that govern neural connections. The brain also represents only part of our neurological system. “Trust your gut” or “follow your gut instinct” are more than metaphors. Hundreds of millions of neurons connect our brains to our enteric nervous system, which can be called our “second brain.” Cues from brain to stomach manage digestion (something a computerized version of the self could presumably do without). However, communication between the brain and the gut goes in both directions. Research at the Karolinska Institute in Sweden and the Genome

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Institute of Singapore has shown that the bacteria in our gut can influence both brain development and adult behavior. While we are only beginning to understand the import of our microbiota, it seems that a complete model of the human mind would need to simulate brain, gut, and more importantly, the millions of bacteria that inhabit the gut.11 Setting aside the enteric nervous system, and assuming the actions of neurochemicals could be simulated algorithmically, how easy a project is it to map all of our brain’s neural connections? Dr. Sebastian Seung is one of the leaders of the Human Connectome Project which is using MRI scans in an attempt to produce precisely such a map. Yet he admits his hopes are, at times, tinged with despair when he contemplates the magnitude of the project. The human brain contains roughly 80–90 billion neurons, each of which has the potential to be connected to several thousand other neurons. Nor are these connections permanent, but continually changing. Seung estimates that imaging the brain with ordinary electron microscopes will produce one zettabyte of data, the equivalent of all data currently stored on the Internet. So far he has looked for payoff through the modeling of much smaller regions and structures within the brain, models which might give us some insight into various brain disorders.12 A model like Seung’s might well let us see the differences between a healthy and an unhealthy brain. What is not clear is whether it would give us any insight into what makes a thought, an insight that is crucial to Kurzweil and Moravec’s dream of reinstantiation. While we currently understand the functioning of a single neuron or small group of neurons, and can use MRI machines and PET scans to map blood flow to large regions of the brain, giving some idea of what a person may be thinking or feeling in a highly restrictive setting, we do not understand the middle ground, the functioning of large chains of neurons, nor do we have any idea how these chains represent thoughts or memories. And this does not even consider the underlying ontological question of whether a copy of the brain’s structure would retain any operativity. Even if all these technological difficulties were surmounted, there remain concerns. Physicist Michio Kaku worries that a brain without a sufficiently human body might suffer the effects of sensory isolation similar to those experienced by prisoners in solitary confinement. He writes that “perhaps the price of creating an immortal, reverse-engineered brain is madness.”13 Nick Bostrom disagrees: “An upload could have a virtual (simulated) body giving the same sensations and the same possibilities for interaction as a nonsimulated body. . . . And uploads wouldn’t have to be confined to virtual reality: they could interact with people on the outside and even rent robot bodies in order to work in or explore physical reality. . . . For the continuation of personhood, in this view, it matters little whether you are implemented on a

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silicon chip inside a computer or in that gray, cheesy lump inside your skull, assuming both implementations are conscious.”14 While the uploaded brain could be attached to an array of sensors allowing it contact with the outside world, as Bostrom proposes, the input from those sensors would differ greatly from the input that mind was used to receiving through the physical senses. And if the essence of the human personality were maintained in the uploading process, the reproduced mind would still crave physical human contact. It is unclear whether a virtual existence could provide the kind of contact we need. Kaku notes that predictions that computers would revolutionize human communication, such as the “paperless office” or face to face meetings giving way to Skype, have proven illusory. When given the choice between “high tech” and “high touch” we almost always choose the latter.15 Any simulation of the brain would need to be accompanied by a highly detailed simulation of the body’s sensory inputs as well, vastly increasing the complexity of an already complex project. Computer scientist Daniel Hill states, “I’m as fond of my body as anyone, but if I can be 200 in a body of silicon, I’ll take it.”16 However, while we can imagine an existence without our aging and fallible bodies, when examined closely, such an existence would be just as dissatisfying as the ghostly existence of the shades in Hades or souls in Sheol seemed to the ancient Greeks or Hebrews. They did not view the prospect of an afterlife without the body pleasurably. Our Christian forbears instinctively recognized that a fully human identity requires bodily existence within an environment. An immortality that would continue anything like the life we have known and anything like the selves that we are must be instantiated in a body. Thus, though many Christians are functional dualists, believing that only their soul goes to heaven after death, the Apostles Creed states that we believe in “the resurrection of the body and life everlasting.” MORE ZOMBIE THAN GHOST Rather than a ghost-like existence in a machine, a likelier possibility is that the uploaded brain would retain the ability to calculate but lose either human consciousness or qualia—the ability to feel—thus becoming more zombie than ghost. Whether consciousness would transfer with our neural pattern is unclear. For one thing, we have no idea what, exactly, consciousness is.17 Philosopher David Chalmers, who calls consciousness “the hard problem” for artificial intelligence or transhumanism, believes the problem of experience will persist even should we attain a functional model of all relevant parts of the brain. He writes: “Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience:

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the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises.”18 Computers are good at the easy problems—processing information from external stimuli, accessing internal states, calculating responses, and controlling output—but we have no idea how to make a machine experience subjectivity. Nick Bostrom believes simulating the mind does not require knowing how human cognition works. He notes, however, that emulation of a complete human brain is a daunting task. He suggests, rather, that “the aim is not to create a brain simulation so detailed and accurate that one could use it to predict exactly what would have happened in the original brain,” but rather, to “aim to capture enough of the computationally functional properties of the brain to enable the resultant emulation to perform intellectual work.”19 This description fits the trajectory of present computer technology while avoiding the hard problem of consciousness completely. It could provide us with a hollow emulation of the brain, but this would fall far short of the immortality dreamed of by the transhumanists. Consider the realm of emotion. Could a disembodied or differently bodied mind truly feel? In particular, could it experience the full range of human emotions? Psychologist Jerome Kagan describes emotion as a four-step process: (1) a change in brain activity due to a stimulus, (2) a perceived change in feeling that is sensory, (3) an appraisal of that feeling, and (4) a preparedness toward or display of a motor response.20 Clearly computers are capable of noting many stimuli through a variety of sensors, appraising them, and calculating an appropriate response. However, step two, perceiving a change in feeling that is sensory, requires a body, and this is a step that Kagan considers “critical.” Many emotions invoke a strong physical response. You will experience the rapid heartbeat, flushed face, and weak knees of anxiety, long before you cognitively process the stimulus for that response. Consider, for example, how we involuntarily wince when we see pain being inflicted on another, or how our heart speeds up long before our consciousness examines what produced that rustling in the bushes. Without a body the second stage of emotion is missing. While we can turn the existence of that stage into information, we have no idea how to digitize the feeling itself. A computer does not feel an emotion, it fakes it. It observes and then calculates a response. What would it mean if a human being acted the same way? Any man or woman who did this would be labeled as deceptive, manipulative, or worse. In The Science of Evil, psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen notes that the defining feature of a sociopath is just such an incomplete empathy circuit.21 The incompletion is not in the ability to see another or to respond, but the inability to, as Bill Clinton would have said,

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“feel your pain.” Could a brain without a body truly love? Probably not in the same way embodied humans do. This presents a limitation for artificial intelligence. It also presents a stumbling block for digital immortality. Who would want an immortality without love?22 While an uploaded brain might be a zombie that cannot feel or truly experience, the zombification of our culture does not require us to upload our brains to computers. It seems no coincidence that an increase in zombies as a plot device in literature and film has paralleled the rise of cell phones and video games that marks the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries. It is hard not to think of zombies when I watch students shambling across campus, bent over their phones, oblivious to everything around them. More and more of our attention seems to be given over to the virtual rather than the physical world. For Virginal Heffernan this attention to the Internet “stirs grief: the deep feeling that digitization has cost us something very profound,” through alienation from voices and bodies that can find comfort in each other. Digital connectedness, she concludes, “is illusory; . . . we’re all more alone than ever.”23 Yet the virtual world remains highly seductive. My students say it seems “safer” than the real world. This need to escape from the real predates the computer. Simone Weil presciently wrote: “There is something in our soul that loathes true attention much more violently than flesh loathes fatigue. That something is much closer to evil than flesh is. That is why, every time we truly give our attention, we destroy some evil in ourselves. If one pays attention with this intention, fifteen minutes of attention is worth a lot of good works.”24 The desire to shed the body completely seems to be merely an intensification of this loss of attention to the real and to one another. THE NARCISSISM THAT UNDERLIES TRANSHUMANIST GOALS Both ghosts and zombies frighten us, as well they should. We instinctively know that body and mind belong together. We also instinctively surmise that trying to effect our own immortality as a “do it yourself project” is closer to magical thinking than religious thinking. Fortunately, the dreams of a mind untethered from this human body and the quasi-immortality that might give are currently more science fiction than fact. We do not have the technology we would need. But will we? Kurzweil estimates that we will by 2045. His prediction is based on an optimistic interpretation of Moore’s Law, which says that computing power will continue to double roughly every two years. So far this has been true, due primarily to the continual shrinkage of computer circuits. However, there is a molecular limit to how small a circuit can get,

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which implies that the curve of innovation will level off, something many computer scientists believe is already beginning to happen.25 Moore’s Law also applies only to computer hardware, not software. Even if we continue the amazing rate of hardware innovation, there is no reason to assume our programming capabilities will keep pace.26 As Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus note, “Wishful thinking has probably always complicated our relations with technology, but it is safe to assert that before the computer, and before the bomb, the complications weren’t quite as dangerous as they are today. Nor was the wishful thinking as fantastic.”27 I find the transhumanist dreams of cybernetic immortality not only fantastic but also sadly narcissistic. The transhumanist who wishes to upload his mind to a computer must answer one final question. Why should his mind persist? What is so important in his thoughts, values, memories, or experiences that they must be retained? In The Culture of Narcissism, Christopher Lasch suggests that many of society’s ills are rooted in our intense anxiety over aging and death, an anxiety that turns us into grasping over-consumers, who over-consume not just material goods but life itself. He concludes: “The coexistence of advanced technology and primitive spirituality suggests that both are rooted in social conditions that make it increasingly difficult for people to accept the reality of sorrow, loss, aging, and death—to live with limits, in short.”28 Case in point—Ray Kurzweil follows a stringent dietary and exercise routine, including taking more than 150 supplements a day (down from 250 a few years ago) in hope of living until our technology has developed sufficiently enough to allow brain uploading. Other transhumanists are counting on cryogenics, freezing their brains in hopes that their neural patterns might be available for copying at some point in time. Clearly they do not easily accept life limits of loss, aging, or death. CONCLUSION Why does this matter? The transhumanist grasping at life is in direct contradiction to the words and example of Jesus that “whoever wishes to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake, he is the one who will save it” (Luk. 9:24) and “greater love has no one than this, that one lay down one’s life for one’s friends” (Jhn. 15:13). In the writings of those who desire cybernetic immortality, it is always “my life,” “my mind,” and “my brain” that is the focus. But this is a remarkably self-absorbed stance. What if we are more the product of our relationships than of that which is locked between our ears? As Eugene McCarraher writes, “Rooted in bodily and psychic finitude that opens out to the larger world, love is no saccharine ideal, but the clearest realism about the human condition.”29

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In late August 2016, two articles appeared simultaneously in the Sunday papers. One recounted the efforts of survivalists to stockpile weapons and food in their north Idaho redoubt against a possible societal collapse.30 The other recounted the efforts of a surgeon who travels as frequently as possible to Aleppo to do what he can to save the lives of those injured in Syria’s ongoing and dreadful civil war, despite the danger.31 The first describes actions that spring from a deep-seated and narcissistic desire for self-preservation, the same desire that motivates Ray Kurzweil to pop 150 pills daily and dream of uploading his brain to a computer. The second author embraces the possibility of death, recognizing that our true self is found in relationship to others, in acts of love and self-giving. I know which of these men I would rather emulate. Let’s leave the ghosts and zombies to campfire stories and Halloween movies and accept the human condition in all its finitude, frailty, and glory.

NOTES 1. Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Viking, 2005), 198–99. 2. Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York: Penguin, 1999), 128–129. 3. Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 116. 4. Calvin Mercer, “Whole Brain Emulation Requires Enhanced Theology, and a ‘Handmaiden,’” Theology and Science 13:2, May 2015, 178. 5. The entry “zombie films” on Wikipedia lists 275 films since 2000, produced in countries as widespread as the United States, India, Japan, Italy, Spain, and Serbia. 6. http://www​.cnn​.com​/2009​/SHOWBIZ​/10​/02​/zombie​.love/ 5 September 2016. 7. Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (New York: Scribner’s, 1994), 3. 8. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, 383. 9. Ibid. 10. Copying the brain raises an interesting question for identity. At what point in life should one have one’s brain scanned? Too soon and you miss too many potential memories. Too late and you may miss your chance. Multiple copies? Then which one is the real you? If all of them, then “you” would be many varying instantiations, since each will go in a different direction once the copying is completed. Michio Kaku, The Future of the Mind (New York: Doubleday, 2014), 280. 11. Robert Martone, “The Neuroscience of the Gut,” Scientific American, 19 April, 2011. http://www​.scientificamerican​.com​/article​/the​-neuroscience​-of​-gut/. 12. Kaku, The Future of the Mind, 261.

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13. Ibid., 276. 14. Nick Bostrom, “The Transhumanist Frequently Asked Questions,” World Transhumanist Association, 2003. http://transhumanism​.org​/index​.php​/WTA​/faq/. 15. Ibid., 277. 16. Quoted in Kaku, The Future of the Mind, 250. 17. Most of us would say of consciousness what Supreme Court justice Potter Stewart declared of pornography: “I know it when I see it.” 18. David Chalmers, “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:3, 200–219, 1995, 201. 19. Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 40. 20. Jerome Kagan, What Are Emotions? (New Haven: Yale, 2007), 23. 21. Simon Baron-Cohen, The Science of Evil (New York: Basic Books, 2011). 22. Actually, some futurists positing such an immortality do not seem to find this a problem. Kurzweil writes of the fascination an uploaded brain might find as it grazes the Internet, feasting on all the information there. He also notes that there is no reason one could not still experience sex, since orgasm is “all in the mind.” Some might beg to differ on this point. I merely note that sex is not love. It is also interesting to note that uploading the brain seems so far to be of interest only to rich, white males, but that is a topic for a different paper. 23. Virginal Heffernan, Magic and Loss: The Internet as Art (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 242. 24. Simone Weil, Waiting on God (New York: Routledge, 1951). 25. See Tom Simonite, “Moore’s Law is Dead. Now What?” MIT Technology Review, May 13, 2016. https://www​.technologyreview​.com​/s​/601441​/moores​-law​-is​ -dead​-now​-what/. 26. Jaron Lanier makes a strong case for software as the drag in producing a computer capable of human-like intelligence in “One Half of a Manifesto,” Wired, December 1, 2000. 27. Herbert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus, Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Experience in the Era of the Computer (New York: Free Press, 1986), ix. 28. Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: Norton, 1979), 295. 29. Eugene McCarraher, “Redeeming Narcissism,” Hedgehog Review 17:1, Spring 2005, 131. 30. Kevin Sullivan, “Prepping for Societal Collapse,” Washington Post, 28 August 2016. 31. Samar Attar, “Why I have to go Back to Aleppo,” New York Times, 28 August 2016.

Chapter 20

In Praise of Boundaries Understanding Mortality as an Ally Nelson R. Kellogg

We have all heard the deliberately ironic phrase “a fate worse than death.” This is intended as a hyperbolic assessment of a looming possibility to be avoided. The assumption is that, obviously, there is no fate worse than death, the end of one’s life as we know and experience it. I would offer a response. Even without a certain or even sensible conception of an existence after mortality, it should not be difficult to imagine a fate worse than physical death. Writing as a humanist (hopefully an open-minded one) without personal knowledge of a hereafter, I believe that mortal existence is an opportunity to live a life of purpose and meaning to the extent that one’s circumstances permit. By this reckoning, to deliberately live in either flagrant disregard or deliberate conflict with whatever wisdom traditions and insights are available, is the very definition of a fate worse than death. But it is more a choice rather than an inescapable “fate.” If an individual has constructed a life without generosity or gratitude, accruing only material advantage to the self without appreciating mutuality and affection, what could be the benefit of extending such malignant pursuits for, say, another seventy years, let alone forever? And supposing one has lived a purposeful and expansive life already; where is the need or interest to keep at it, behaving more like the dinner guest who refuses to leave after the party? Of the two types of immortalists—those who propose radical life extension (RLE) within our inherited bodies versus those who propose cybernetic immortality in the computer cloud outside our bodies—the latter is the one with the greatest number of philosophical problems. The key problem is failure to recognize the ineluctable interaction between body and mind which makes temporal consciousness possible. What we understand to be human experience is incarnate experience: finite, spatial, and temporal. Our mind provides an indelible component to making human experience what it is, 321

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but this requires temporality, the passage of time. Without incarnation in a physical substrate, the passage of time for an uploaded consciousness would evaporate. With the evaporation of temporal passage, other precious dimensions of human experience would also disappear: expectation, planning, goalsetting, hope, frustration, courage, and the joy of fulfillment. The uploaded mind would no longer be the human mind we have come to know and to treasure. This not something I would want to lose. In what follows, I will explicate futurist visions of transhumanists and offer a critique. Specifically, the transhumanist or Human Plus or H+ war against death will lead unavoidably to loss, to either loss of the war, or loss of what makes us genuinely human. THE WAR ON DEATH If, to use another aphorism, everyone knows that the only verities of this life are “death and taxes,” from where does this ostensible war on death originate? In a recent book, British philosopher Stephen Cave argues that a preoccupation with immortality suffuses the entire history of civilization.1 Certainly this is evident in ancient Egypt, and we have their magnificent pyramids as testament to the power of the concept of eternal life. Traveling through subsequent ages, the dominant religions and wisdom traditions have mortality as that passage by which all human action finds justification or condemnation. While Cave does an admirable job of organizing and synthesizing his examples to make his case for how the search for immortality has profoundly shaped the historical arcs of the cultures that birthed these belief systems, his intent seems as dogmatic as any of the “old time religions.” That is, he hews to the inherent correctness of his views, which are the standard conclusions of modern science. Essentially that might be summed up as “what you see is what you get.” The idea of transcendence through immortality is absolutely part and parcel of the shining wonders of civilizations past, as well as many tragedies. But, after all, reasonable and educated people in the contemporary world have certainly reached a sophistication to be quit of those childish conceits, right? In fact, this puts Cave firmly in the camp of secular missionaries, including Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and many others who often appear angry that perhaps not everyone who can read their writings will automatically concur and, if they had previously held any religious intimations, would not immediately repent and confess the doctrine that there is nothing in the cosmos besides matter in motion. In this regard, Cave and the other abject materialists tend to assemble in the church of “this (the observed physical world, of which life is one

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aspect) is all there is, and I dare you to prove otherwise.” What is most intriguing about our present historical moment is that the current war on death as a fact of existence is being led by a new generation of materialists. Rather than achieving immortality through heroic sacrifice (as per the Homeric epics), through grace (Christianity), through ritual and appropriate living (most spiritual paths), these new seers assure us that we can defeat death through the application of the scientific method and the potent new tools and techniques (technologies) that result. Since the time when Plato asserted that he pursued his philosophical inquiries and meditations so as to prepare for a good death, attempts to radically alter the pattern of death and mortality beyond what was offered by the medical practices of the day have involved the occult and mystical adepts of, for example, the Renaissance naturalists.2 It is fitting for us at this point to look more closely at some of the claims and rationales of public proponents for either RLE or some flavor of immortality. GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE As in any bold new projection for future scientific advances, especially in the field of extreme human longevity, we would expect wide disagreements among the cognoscenti. This writer considers himself but a well-versed observer. Having trained in and taught a scientific discipline (physics), and with advanced training, teaching and research background in the history of the sciences and technology, I deeply respect the intellectual power and demonstrable success of the scientific method and collaborative investigations. Furthermore, I consider it foolhardy to pronounce absolute limits to future technological advances. It is not a stretch to say that virtually all biblical episodes telling of various miracles that would seem only possible by divine intervention are possible today using some form of engineered means. It is also the case in contemporary culture that, once it commercializes a new device, system, or technique, immediately considers the advance just a normal part of life, no longer “miraculous,” but just part of the mundane physical world. Or, conversely, as Arthur C. Clark famously said, “any technology, sufficiently advanced, is indistinguishable from magic.” And so it is that we live in a time when capabilities arrive and are superseded with such frequency and velocity that society scarcely knows what might possibly be invented and deployed. Therefore, this writer considers it wrongheaded to make a case for or against research into extreme life extension or cybernetic immortality based upon a critique of the current state of the art in underlying technologies. Instead, we will examine the merits or detriments of the various programs based upon what can be said about the

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manifest qualities of lived experience and how the various immortality projects enhance or threaten those qualities. THE H+ PURSUIT OF IMMORTALITY Current research into extending the longevity of the physical body via RLE is catalyzed by several powerful discoveries largely new to scientific understanding of the last two decades. Most of these discoveries have yet to be linked in a comprehensive understanding of why organisms age and, to date, no technique or intervention has found its way into a reliable protocol for retarding aging in the human body. Nonetheless, several interventions have had remarkable, demonstrable effects in much simpler organisms. Cells are continuously being replaced as the parent cell structures die and are reabsorbed from the body. However, after a certain number of cell divisions, known as the Hayflick limit, cells seem to lose their genetic integrity and regeneration stops.3 The presumed agent for senescence and death is a little cap at the end of chromosomes known as telomeres. These are often described (for the benefit of public understanding) as similar to the plastic sleeves at the end of a shoelace. In a cell, these protective caps keep the genetic information within the chromosome fairly intact from one cell generation to the next. However, with each generation, a bit of that protective end-cap is lost, until the chromosome is at last vulnerable to corruption, and the cell loses viability. What if the protective telomere could either be replenished or prevented from shortening? Could that be the answer to an immortal cell, and hence to our own life extension? The problem with this, as in many biomedical interventions, is that nothing is ever simple and without untoward side effects. One immediate problem with this approach is that we already know of a certain cell type that is, all by itself, immortal. These are called malignancies. And cancer has other qualities that are completely at odds with the longevity of the entire host organism. Most significant, it seems, is that cancerous cells are not collaborators, willing to do their part in maintaining the health and integrity of the complex, multifaceted host. That is, their entire agenda is to persist as they are, to make more of themselves, crowding out other cell types, and using as many nutritional and energetic resources as possible, thus killing the host body. This double-edged aspect might be seen as emblematic of many longevity interventions. Every biological pathway that invites speculation for resetting the aging “clock” seems to have linkages to other mechanisms for vitality that run in non-parallel and sometimes contradictory directions. Other approaches in pure biology have garnered attention more recently, most notably the discovery of certain genes that, when “knocked out” through

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genetic manipulation, have greatly increased the life span of simple (relatively) organisms such as the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, fruit flies, and even mice. The advantage of using these organisms in longevity studies is that one can culture them in very consistent ways, obtaining significant uniformity in life spans, and then comparing the life spans of both altered and unaltered populations. Furthermore, since the life spans are measured in days and not years (for mice, it is months), researchers can quickly test many rounds of interventions, unlike in human studies. And the results are impressive. Knocking out a single gene in C. elegans, for example, can triple the life span relative to an unaltered nematode.4 Is there such a single gene in the human genome? Probably not. But there are other changes in cells as they age that might find interventions, whether through management of enzymes or hormones, or by seeding some altered genotype introduced through a carrier virus.5 However, it is important in this chapter to exercise restraint lest details of the esoteric laboratory science overwhelm our primary aim, which is a humanistic and philosophical critique of the stated goals for extreme life extension. We will accept the assertion that such extensions will be technically possible while we question the assumed benefits of such outcomes. The direct assault on the very idea that the aging of a living organism must eventuate in the organism’s death may seem like a consequence of several social and scientific trends that have only begun to mature since late in the last century, and there is considerable evidence for that estimation. Certainly, the radical acceleration in not just biology, but also the recent explosion in artificial intelligence used for, among other things, genomic data mining and biochemical modeling, make the mysteries of our life codes seem more approachable. Then there is the revolutionary technique known as CRISPR-Cas9, which has turned the genome into a plug-and-play experimental tool, changing the pace of gene editing experiments from multi-year projects for even elementary insertions and deletions to processes that can be done in days.6 There is more than a passing similarity between the early days of the home-brew computer movement and the present age of biological engineering. Many of the personalities involved appear as fellow travelers with the likes of Wozniak, Jobs, Gates, and so on. RLE, STILL IN THE BODY One of the most publicly recognized advocates for RLE of humans is Aubrey de Grey. De Grey, a largely self-taught biologist, earned his doctorate from Cambridge University after writing a wide-ranging treatise on biological

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aging and having it accepted as a worthy dissertation. He is currently director of the Methuselah Foundation, of which he is a major donor, following a line of inquiry he calls SENS (Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence) research. The underlying agenda of SENS is outlined in his 2007 book (with Michael Rae) Ending Aging. This is a rather lengthy and technical treatment of the state of the art at the time of writing for various pathologies of aging and the real and potential techniques for correcting these. Most of the ideas are intended to restructure and repair damages within the existing cells, but he welcomes modalities such as tissue and organ replacement, including with artificial, even non-biological components.7 If one is searching for the necessary and sufficient motivations for indefinite life extension according to Aubrey de Grey, one might be disappointed. He merely takes it as self-evident that the elimination of death, at any stage, is an unassailable good: Eat well, exercise, and support the Methuselah Foundation, and I shall look forward to shaking your hand in a future where engineered negligible senescence is a reality: where we can enjoy dramatically extended lives in a new summer of vigor and health, the dark specter of the age plague driven away by the sunshine of perpetual youth.8

Here I will make another concession to the immortalists, as I shall call the variety of proponents for radical, and for some, unlimited extension of individual life. I will not engage in a counter-argument based on the apparent sociological problems easily foreseen in the event of a functioning set of interventions that extend mortality without limit.9 I wish, instead, to confront the issue from a values perspective entirely ignored by the proponents. For other RLE advocates among the transhumanists, de Grey’s agenda is important mainly as a bridge to even more profound stages. THE SINGULARITY: THE MIND OUTSIDE THE BODY Aubrey de Grey has coined a term, LEV, for longevity escape velocity. LEV refers to a stage of effectiveness in the application of SENS which will add sufficient years of life to an individual undergoing those rejuvenation techniques that they might confidently expect to live until the next major improvement in those therapies arrives. In this way, once embarking upon biological rejuvenation, an individual will survive through successive generations of technology until the interventions reach perfection, and one’s mortality can be extended indefinitely.

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The more extreme immortalists see other possibilities beyond keeping the adult human body in peak running order. Foremost among these is Ray Kurzweil, an inventor and computer engineer of distinction, currently director of Engineering for Google, Inc. Kurzweil’s vision depends upon the realization of a stage of development in artificial intelligence he has called the Singularity.10 There is a loose analogy between Kurzweil’s Singularity and de Grey’s LEV. Both represent a kind of point of no return for humanity. The Singularity posits a time in the not-too-distant future (between twenty and fifty years, depending upon whose reckoning is used) when the speed and complexity of computing machinery will be able to first match and then surpass the human mind in what is called general intelligence.11 At this point, networked computing will be able to not just outpace human intelligence in specific applications (which has been the case in raw number crunching for nearly a century), but in every area of human-centered issues as well. For some time now, computers running circuit emulation software largely design new generations of computing machinery. Once the Singularity has been achieved, the design and manufacture of new computer architectures will arrive at a furious pace since the human engineer will be unnecessary. What might a human do in such a brave new world? The simplest answer is: we’ll do whatever we want! Kurzweil and his fellow travelers envision increased biological life span as the means to be around for the final cybernetic instantiation. That is, once the human brain is a fully understood thinking mechanism, we will also be able to fully translate between the gray matter of biological intelligence and, for example, silicon-based intelligence.12 We will have readied ourselves for whole brain emulation. At that point, by Kurzweil’s reckoning, it will be relatively straightforward to “upload” all of our mental activity to the worldwide computational cloud. He further postulates that once uploaded, we will have entered that final frontier of imagination and cognition. We can instantly have any knowledge incorporated into any other train of thought we might be engaged in. Furthermore, we can instantly communicate with any other uploaded intelligence, completely understanding their thoughts, feelings, and intentions. In other words, we would have perfect empathy without the long associational labors usually entailed in coming to know and understand others.13 All aspects of qualia, or the conscious apprehension and emotional experience that attend normal biological human existence, would simply appear in this network of conscious associations mediated by machine. And, just as wonderful to those for whom this dream is the apotheosis of all possible desires, we would have attained true cybernetic immortality without the unfortunate limitations of a physical body. No body means no bodily pains or illness, no need for biological nourishment, no need for sleep, just everincreasing mental excursions.

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At the greatest extension of this future mode of human-machine existence, Kurzweil also imagines that we will be able to send our non-biologically mediated intelligences to the far-flung reaches of the cosmos and, by such means, bring consciousness to what is currently immeasurable expanses of dead and meaningless matter-in-motion. In other words, we humans will become the overarching cosmic intelligence that, until that time arrives, is absent in the insensate matter and energy of which galaxies are constructed.14 Kurzweil is not alone in extrapolating a posthuman future. I am using the term posthuman not in the usual end-times, apocalyptic scenario, because in this conception, somehow, individual consciousness would still exist. If those who make this transition wish, they will be able to keep their individual identity and play forever in the fields of ever-expanding knowledge, intelligence, and experience. Then again, perhaps once we attain our full cybernetic endowment, we might find the retention and maintenance of our private thoughts and feelings to be a silly, vestigial conceit and we would prefer a fully integrated, pan-conscious existence. Who knows? Perhaps we just need to get to the Singularity (and beyond) before we can even imagine it. CRITIQUE OF THE H+ MYTH OF PURE INTELLECT What, exactly, are the immortalists—advocates of both RLE and Cybernetic Immortality—struggling to preserve, and why? This is not easy to answer, as the proponents do not explain this in great detail. Sometimes the response seems quite similar to Woody Allen’s comment many years ago, when he said that he plans to achieve immortality by not dying. Especially for de Grey, there is just an outrage that anyone should die. In other words, while the civilized world rightly mourns what we consider untimely death, say from childhood disease, violence, or various forms of privation, society has long since come to terms with the basic pattern of generational growth and generational replacement that is universal in living systems. But de Grey expects his readers to regard the passing of any human an affront to all. His appraisal of the matter is that this should be obvious to anyone. THE TRANSHUMAN POTENTIAL Perhaps the most rigorous treatment of the proper consideration of individual immortality broadly realized is found in a book by Ted Chu. In his book, Human Purpose and Transhuman Potential: A Cosmic Vision for our Future Evolution, Chu takes universal evolution as the fundamental principle that should guide our decisions. In this carefully articulated treatise, Chu posits

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the principle of evolution as being the animating force of nature.15 Of course, by itself this tactic invites nods of approval from the secular materialists. But Chu takes it further. He sees the compelling biological history of Darwin’s natural selection and infers from that a schematic for humanity’s future. In this way, natural selection has brought the human species to our current stage of intellectual and cultural development but, unaided by human intention, might bring us no further.16 The cognitive capacity of humanity has brought us literacy, numeracy, and natural philosophy. One might contend, though this is questionable, that our biological evolution to this point was accomplished without any conscious intention on our part. That is, without any planning on our part, the natural world gave rise to Homo sapiens. Chu avers that having thus arrived at this juncture, with scientific tools and understanding of who we have become and how we might become the active agents for developing capabilities beyond that of contemporary humans, we have a duty, to life and the cosmos, to shoulder that responsibility of bootstrapping the next version of human consciousness into existence. We might (almost) say that it is our sacred duty to evolve ourselves. Starting from a perfectly acceptable rationalist view of how we got to this point, Chu then advocates a mission for humanity that borders on spiritual revelation.17 When compared with the sentiments of other H+ writers and thinkers, Chu’s vision feels substantial and worthy of consideration. Whereas Chu’s ideas are bold, they also feel inclusive. There is a real feeling of community and purpose. By contrast, the vast majority of H+ writers convey motivations and desires that seem immature, even adolescent. Kurzweil has difficulty discussing almost anything that could be considered emotionally rich.18 His faith in his law of exponential acceleration in computing power places his Singularity not as a goal that we must work and plan for, but more as a law of nature that will inexorably evolve humans, like it or not. His posthuman future doesn’t anticipate a resolution in which we can still recognize human values or aesthetics. So far as any ambition to achieve what might be good or noble, something beyond the ego and perhaps a need for novelty enough to last for eternity, Kurzweil offers only hand waving and intimations of godlike power over all externalities that mortal beings deal with constantly. Is this too harsh a critique? Perhaps. After all, the wisdom traditions and formal religions have likewise been rather silent concerning the afterlife. Reportedly the Buddha himself may have had direct insight about the experiences of an afterlife, when one escapes the cycles of rebirth, but chose not to speak about it. Speculation about nirvana, it seems, is not part of the essential wisdom that helps us navigate life. Judaism, similarly, is primarily concerned with establishing and developing a virtuous life, and the faithful should be most concerned with compassion, justice, fidelity to one’s fellows, and a duty to help heal the world of its many fractures. Even Christianity, with the

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concepts of salvation and the prospect of a heavenly existence after earthly life, is nearly silent about just what the individual would be doing for eternity, except to say that we would be in God’s presence, and that the gift of being in the company of the creator is ineffably exquisite. In all, this makes sense. Supposing that whatever will occupy the heavenly hosts transcends the earthly concerns of mortality, it follows that the human languages would be totally inadequate to encompass or even describe the afterlife. Nonetheless, Ray Kurzweil, thinking as the gifted engineer that he is, finds a need to actually describe what immortalists might do. And what we will be occupied with is a form of engineering, which will, among other diversions, allow us to course through the cosmos planting the flag of consciousness as our gift to inert matter. FROM HUMAN TO VIRTUALLY HUMAN Another player in the field of advocacy for our cybernetic future is Martine Rothblatt. Her book Virtually Human: The Promise—and the Peril—of Digital Immortality includes a foreword by fellow traveler Ray Kurzweil. Rothblatt coins many neologisms describing future life sans body, but the most prominently used is “mindclone.” This is her term for the “uploaded” mind, probably accomplished near the time of death of one’s mortal body. As a perfect copy of all thoughts and memories as well as aesthetic and physical passions, the mindclone, once transferred and supported by the compatible underlying software, will be an exact, running, possibly immortal, copy of the original mind. Of course, just as a human personality grows, changes, and evolves over the course of one’s mortality, we should expect the same of our continuation as a mind in silico. What will such an entity do? “[H]e or she will still be able to read online books, watch streaming movies, and participate in virtual social networks.”19 THE BODY IN QUESTION We could go on with the pronouncements of others who see their future paradise in an infinitely expandable, artificially intelligent computer cloud, but that would amount to piling on variations of the same schematic. This would add nothing to illuminate what, it seems to me, is the most glaring error, and a dangerous one, of these projects. Notice something in the above examples. They all begin with an individual who has already lived a substantial, physical mortality. This is required. If the

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technology arrives that allows for machine consciousness, why not include, just for the sake of variety, entities in this computer-cloud home for immortalists that never had a biological instantiation? Why be so old fashioned in that brave new world that we always begin with that homely human creature, and presumably one who has already lived out a good number of decades taking care of a physical body, including enduring pain, illness, and any number of disappointments as well as successes? There is a very good and profound reason for this. It has been an occasional trope of science fiction that the primary function of the body is to provide transportation and nourishment for the brain.20 Especially in an information economy, all the important capabilities are purely mental. Some religious sects even go so far as to consider the body, with its carnal appetites, to be little more than an earthly test to the goodness of the soul.21 Modernity didn’t invent these sentiments. The preference for the purely mental aspect of human existence can be found at least in the writings of Plato. But the verdict has been established by no less an authority than contemporary, dispassionate scientific investigation. There are NO examples of a non-corporeal consciousness. None. Beyond that lack of evidentiary examples, we have abundant data that what the conscious mind becomes and what it experiences is overwhelmingly a product of the very endowments of its physical body. It is through the body’s journey in life (including the physical brain) that the young adult comes to understand the very felt experiences of other individuals. We call this empathy. Before the immaturity of early romantic attraction for another (which is largely hormones combined with self-love) can emerge into maturity, it must become compassionate, intimations of which we learn through our physical bodies. We now hear, correctly, that our old philosophical conceit that we are, in our essence, thinking creatures with an emotional overlay, where our primary duty is to subdue the emotions that cloud our thinking, is grossly in error. A much more complete description of the human animal is that of an emotional creature, with the added quality of rational thought which is often added to the equation only with great effort.22 And emotion is first gleaned through the body, not from logical analysis. There is yet a further quality that emerges from embodiment for the development of a mature human psyche. It is potentially the most essential one yet is seldom, if ever, mentioned in discussions of cybernetic immortality: the experience of time itself. I propose that, without incarnation, we would never develop a sensibility for the passage of time. Consider a simple, personal example. I recall once, before kindergarten, my mother and I were the only ones home, and I had nothing to do. My mother said that we could take a walk downtown together where she needed to do some shopping. She promised that we would go in 10 minutes. I didn’t know how

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to tell time from a clock, but I did know how to count, and I knew that there were 60 seconds in a minute. So I began counting. I hadn’t apprehended yet that my mother was chronically late. I began counting in my bedroom, trying to keep my counting slow. I made it to sixty, and repeated that ten times. No appearance from Mom. I did it again. I got frustrated. I thought I had been forgotten. I got mad, grinding my teeth. Then, to keep me from doing something that would land me in trouble, I started just counting anything. I ended up staring at the ceiling, searching for little marks or imperfections and counting them. Looking back, I see the wait was easily an hour. We finally did take our walk together, and I was immediately happy again. This is my first conscious memory of experiencing the abject helplessness of just waiting. It was profound, if only because this was my first episode of having a body-sense of the seeming interminability of waiting, with nothing else to fill in the space between now and some other now that refuses to show up.23 TIME MAKES GRATITUDE POSSIBLE Later as I grew up, I would begin to appreciate the variability of time, depending upon what happened as time passed. Waiting for an earache to subside was bad. Waiting for a parental punishment that was certain, that was torture. Waiting to go somewhere with friends, that was an exquisite admixture of yearning and imagination. But all the different endurances and anticipations gave me two gifts that are impossible otherwise. Over the course of years I developed patience, which is meaningless without a physical body acting as its own timepiece. Far and away, the most precious gift I received was a sense of gratitude, along with the ability to step back and summon up profound affection for life, creation, and the unknown. Try endowing a central processing unit with that! Some might respond by asking what I am grateful toward? Certainly, if you express gratitude, you must express it toward someone or something. As a humanist without formal religious affiliation, I can answer only in a fashion that may sound childish. Certainly, I do have profound gratitude for family and other associations of deep import. But most often my gratitude seems to lack a target because the target is everything. The simple idea that everything necessary to life and joy just showed up! An alternative answer to a question posed by renowned theoretical physicist John Wheeler near the end of his mortality: “Why is there something, rather than nothing?” Gratitude speaking through awe and wonder seem about as good an answer as anything else.24

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FROM TIME TO STORY TO MEANING One of the authors discussed above (Rothblatt) spends a great deal of effort worrying about the possibility that a disembodied mind might not embrace the simple virtues of affection, loyalty, fealty, and so on. She also is concerned that it might be possible, at a terrible loss, for a mindclone to lack any sense of meaning and purpose to existence.25 If it were possible to host consciousness in microprocessors and memory files, I would find this very concerning as well. I have no idea how “meaning” would express itself in that context. But I do have some idea of how meaning manifests in a mortal human. The simplest answer is: story.26 Humans have several qualities that set us apart, so far as we currently understand, from all other species. First, we are the only creatures who know that we are mortal. And while many people try their best to ignore that realization in everyday life, its universality continually recalls us to that fact. Further, as creatures immersed in time measurement and demarcation, we even have a reasonably good idea of just how much time will be allotted to us, barring the unforeseen disaster. It may even be that our awareness of time and mortality has impressed upon our evolutionary path our most pervasive and powerful means for comprehending the events that populate our lifetime. We arrange the various “calls and responses” of life into meaning narratives. We are toolmakers and users. We are natural language beings. But even more than this, we are storytellers.27 Yes, it is just possible that by some reckoning our concept of free will is fictive.28 If there is some realm where all questions are answered, it may turn out not only to be that free will is an illusion, but also that viewed from another perspective, the story of life on earth is really a concatenation of random and chaotic occurrences. It may even turn out, as some physicists suggest, that time itself is an illusion, unnecessary to explain what happens. If that is so, throw out the concept of cause and effect, along with all ethical injunctions and any possible hope of finding meaning! That is all as may be. What is plainly evident, though, is that this is not our lived experience. This is not how human consciousness structures reality. Attend to any part of human history, in any location, and one finds stories that explain the world and the heavens. Stories connect the generations and undergird social norms. In fact, one can understand a great deal of a distant or past culture by mining the stories whose elements of plot and imagery are most frequently evoked. A great deal is said about contemporary American society in the same way. In a period of extreme emphasis on the self, our books and periodicals, let alone our online offerings, overflow with books on your personal advancement while swimming with sharks. Self-help dominates the publishing world, where largely the same bromides keep getting

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churned up from the cultural silt. And for those persons who just can’t see their own lives being discussed enough by a fawning public, there is that reliable source of revenue, the tell-all memoir. Whether we are reading stories to access their worthy wisdoms, or merely consuming the nutrient-free entertainments of celebrity misdeeds, we are creatures of story and always have been. For a sizable minority of reflective persons, writing journals gives close attention and correctives to how one lives life.29 It also creates a durable narrative companion, literally shaping one’s life as a narrative, a story with meaning and purpose. However, a narrative is not simply “one damn thing after another” (as one of my graduate professors described the study of history). It is located in and unfolds during time, and usually over a contiguous period of time. It supposes that cause and effect are what renders the story sensible and compelling. And finally, it has a narrative arc, which includes a beginning, middle, and a conclusion. A story without any beginning or ending cannot be construed as a meaning narrative. It comes from nowhere and goes endlessly without goal or purpose. It has all the emotional and spiritual heft of the most puerile road movies, just driving and getting gas, with no reason for existence other than endless pratfalls dumped out in no particular sequence. CONCLUSION In conclusion, RLE and cybernetic immortality even more so would obliterate meaning in human life. Even considered logically, there is little distinction between endless existence and no existence when considered from the standpoint of a meaning narrative. Without conclusion, there is no meaningful location in time for events to proceed. Without conclusion, even beginnings lose definition. Consider the meaning of human identity. In the current obsession with realizing the self above all else (“be all you can be”), we risk losing the understanding that the solo individual has no identity at all. Identity unfolds in relationship and mutual endeavor, or even in adversarial attitude. But all alone, there is no meaningful action or intention.30 The ethic of the supreme self found a ridiculous extreme in some of the parenting modes of the 1960s and 1970s, where some thought that even formal education was too punishing. If a child is attracted to a piano in the room, the last thing he or she needs, according to this no-boundaries philosophy, is a piano lesson. Just let the child do what comes to mind, including banging away.31 After all, this may be a musical genius aborning, and lesson will just destroy the imagination. And we know what happens when no limits, no useful boundaries, no caring lessons about how one develops a skill are provided

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a child. They act out, and for good reason. Children, and adults, actually need and thrive in the presence of meaningful boundaries. Education illustrates my point. Meaningful boundaries show care for the student. The elucidation of boundaries within which to develop ability allows the student to move forward with purpose and increased satisfaction and imagination. This is very different from meaningless or arbitrary discipline. Arbitrary and shifting rules, or no operational boundaries at all, both are cruel and selfish attitudes of those who should be mentors. If one has the possibility of living forever with no boundaries at all, including no meaning for the passage of time, no actual end to anything, this could not be paradise. Considered from the perspective of a mortal human, the boundlessness of cybernetic immortality is inconsistent with a healthy psychology. A point anywhere on an everlasting line, with no endpoints, is nowhere at all. With no constraints, such as the need to be mindful of the non-negotiable rules of the physical world, to care for one’s well-being as well as that of others, all while navigating a world with biological, temporal, social, and ethical boundaries, there is no striving, no desire, no awareness of where one is in space or time. If one were a purely malignant god, it would be difficult to design a more tortuous hell. If one were to awaken in cybernetic immortality only to find it pointless and terrifying, certainly there would need to be an “abort” switch, so what is the harm?32 The harm is that as dystopian as such existence may be, it may also be addictive, like so many distractions are in contemporary society. Along with our appearance on this planet with other life forms to share our affections, the boundaries we inherit are great blessings that make this life and the world possible. The visions of H+ immortalists, meant to inspire everyone to its limitless grandeur, read to this critic more like a science fiction version of the same me-generation solipsisms which ultimately lead only to boredom and despair. Undoubtedly, the research into extreme longevity, mind/machine interfaces, and other cybernetic extensions will go forward, not least because the United States’ military establishment and its industrial contractors are intensely driven to introduce the resulting technologies to the fighting force of the future, and this eventuality needs its own extensive criticism.33 However, for humankind as a whole, surely we can come up with far better reasons to hope for our future.

NOTES 1. Steven Cave, Immortality: The Quest to Live Forever and How It Drives Civilization (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012).

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2. Cave, Immortality, 31–54. I found an interesting related aside in Graham Rees, “Francis Bacon’s Biological Ideas: A New Manuscript Source,” in Brian Vickers, ed. Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 305: Francis Bacon, the seventeenth-century philosopher, thought that one might attain protracted youthfulness and physical beauty through “exercise, astringent medicines, the consumption of oily foods, massage” as well as wearing “discreetly oiled underclothes.” 3. Thomas Kirkwood, “Why Can’t We Live Forever?” Scientific American, September, 2010, 42–49. 4. See, for example, Gregg Easterbrook, “What Happens When We All Live to 100,” The Atlantic, October 2014, 61–72, for a nice overview of not only some research techniques but also a brief synopsis of how an aging population would redefine social and political agendas. 5. A good and very readable survey of the most promising techniques in longevity from an eminent Harvard-based synthetic biologist (George Church) can be found in George Church and Ed Regis, “Recipe for Immortality,” Discover, October, 2012, 60–62, 76. In point of fact, I found this little article far more useful than their book from which it is excerpted: George Church and Ed Regis, Regenesis: How Synthetic Biology Will Reinvent Nature and Ourselves (New York: Basic Books, 2012). Some other modalities not previously mentioned include transfusion with young blood. See Susan Young Rojahn, “Can Compounds in Young Blood Fix Aging?” MIT Technology Review 117, no. 4 (July–August 2014): 17. (The reader is forgiven for immediately thinking of vampires.) Other compounds, including rapamycin and metformin (the latter a common glucose modulating drug used by Type II diabetics), are undergoing lab tests. 6. Several articles describe the mechanism by which CRISPR-Cas9 works, as well as the story of its development, including Michael Spector, “The Gene Hackers,” The New Yorker, November 16, 2015, 52–61; Amy Maxmen, “The Genesis Engine,”  Wired, July, 2015, 56–64; and Jeff Wheelwright, “The Revolution Will be Edited,” Discover, June, 2016, 41–49. A good introduction to the ethical concerns of leading scientists about the very real prospect of changing and “enhancing” the human species (or a select few) is Antonio Regalado, “Engineering the Perfect Baby,” MIT Technology Review 118, no. 3 (May June 2015): 27–33. 7. Aubrey de Grey, with Michael Rae, Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs That Could Reverse Human Aging in Our Lifetime (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2008) especially “Afterword,” 340–378. 8. Ibid., 339. 9. The issues often raised as criticism to extreme life extension include (1) the problem of access (biomedical interventions will, at least initially, be affordable only to the wealthy elite); (2) the population problem (food and water distribution, space, etc.); and (3) the allocation of employment opportunities and retirement benefits during acceleration of the social stress of demographic age-inversion. 10. Kurzweil has written a number of books since the 1990s, but one need not read them all to understand his themes, which rest upon his faith that, ultimately, the human brain can be understood and modeled as a computing machine and,

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second, that the increased speed and density of machine learning architectures will continue at the same rate of exponential increase (comprehended empirically in the famous Moore’s Law) beyond the rate essential to reach from human-level general intelligence to a superintelligence. See Ray Kurzweil, How to Create a Mind: The Secret of Human Thought Revealed (New York: Penguin Books, 2012) for his views and forecasts, including the idea of humanity spreading consciousness to the cosmos. 11. Not everyone who agrees with the technological possibility of a computational singularity finds the prospect without danger. To date, the best comprehensive consideration of the possibilities and perils of superintelligent machinery in a human society is Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Some critics are actually quite worried about inviting advanced artificial general intelligence into our world of human events, which could eventuate in our extinction. See, for example, David Gelernter, “Machines that Will Think and Feel: Artificial Intelligence Is Still in Its Infancy – and That Should Scare Us,” The Wall Street Journal, March 19–20, C1–C2. (Gelernter is a Yale computer scientist who survived a mail-bomb sent by Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber.) 12. There are a number of research projects already underway trying to model and intercommunicate between silicon and the brain. See, for instance, David Kushner, “The Discover Interview with Henry Markram,” Discover, December, 2009, 61–63, 77. Markram is founder and co-director of the Brain Mind Institute in Lausanne, Switzerland. 13. I have not determined when the earliest invocation of shared consciousness, or group mind, occurred. However, an intriguing version of the idea is found in Freeman Dyson, Imagined Worlds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 157: “We must expect that at least some of our descendants will be eager to explore the delights of collective memory and collective consciousness, made possible by the technology of radiotelepathy.” 14. Kurzweil, How to Create a Mind, 281–282. The most blunt version of Kurzweil’s vision and intent on this matter came during an interview for the CNN show Inside Man with Morgan Spurlock. The episode titled “Futurism” (first aired April 20, 2014) had Spurlock ask Ray Kurzweil about religion and the idea of a creator. “Do you have any thoughts that perhaps God really exists out there?” Spurlock asked. Kurzweil responded very calmly and deliberately, “Well . . . Not yet.” 15. Ted Chu, Human Purpose and Transhuman Potential: A Cosmic Vision for our Future Evolution (San Rafael, CA: Origin Press, 2014), 13: “The meaning of life and our existence cannot be properly contemplated without the concept of evolution, especially if evolution is understood on a scale that is as large as we can stretch to embrace. In order for us to rationally consider the evolutionary frontier at which we stand, it is essential for us to find a narrative, a goal, a purpose that greater than merely our own happiness.” 16. Ibid., 34: “The real posthuman transition will occur—nobody can predict when, where, and how it will arise—when there appears to be a new emphasis in our research and development efforts. The cutting edge creative slogan will change from ‘Think different’ (referring to ourselves) to ‘Make it think differently’ (from

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ourselves).” The book is suffused with discussion of terms like “conscious evolution” (where we take control over what happens next). 17. Ibid., 364–383. Here Chu lets his imagination run free in considering all of the potential virtues of our future selves (which he calls CoBe, for Cosmic Being). 18. I know that this sounds like a harsh, and personal, criticism. However, after having read his works, heard him speak on several occasions, and included his writings and opinions in a number of courses, that is the overarching sense I get. While reading How to Create a Mind, I suddenly encountered passages referencing literature, classical music, and the visual arts, and it really seemed like there was another voice popping up. A friend whom I trust to be accurate told me my intuitions were right about a ghostwriter being involved. 19. Martine Rothblatt, Virtually Human: The Promise—and the Peril—of Digital Immortality (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014), 294. 20. Two examples come to mind from 1950’s “B-movie” science fiction: Felix Feist, dir., Donovan’s Brain (Los Angeles: MGM, 1953) and Joseph Green, dir., The Brain That Wouldn’t Die (American International, 1962). 21. “Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.” Matthew 26:41 (English Version). The practices of fasting, and certain other denials of bodily desire, including chastity and enduring fatigue during prayer and meditation, are common in many faiths. These can run even to extreme practices such as flagellation or scarification. 22. Nowhere is this clearer than in Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (Kirkwood, NY: Putnam, 1994). See, especially, the clinical example detailed on 192–195. 23. The entire issue of embodiment as being the primary endowment that comes with mortality is both a fundamental area of study, yet also one that academic psychology is only beginning to address in a comprehensive approach to mental life. An excellent primer on the science is Sandra Blakeslee and Matthew Blakeslee, The Body Has a Mind of its Own: How Body Maps in Your Brain Help You Do (Almost) Everything Better (New York: Random House, 2008). A more recent, and a masterful, treatment is Guy Claxon, Intelligence in the Flesh: Why Your Mind Needs Your Body Much More Than It Thinks (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015). Also see Alva Noe, Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009). Finally, one of my favorite recent writers on the mediated life and modern living is Matthew B. Crawford, The World Beyond Your Head: On Becoming an Individual in an Age of Distraction (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2015). 24. Of the many meditations on gratitude, my favorite is Brother David SteindlRast, Gratefulness, the Heart of Prayer: An Approach to Life in Fullness (New York: Paulist Press, 1984). 25. Rothblatt, Virtually Human, 111, 125–35. 26. I have three favorite books on the subject: Jonathan Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human (Boston: Mariner Books, 2013); Ernest Kurtz and Katherine Ketcham, The Spirituality of Imperfection: Storytelling and the Search for Meaning (New York: Bantam Books, 2002); and Dan P. Mc Adams, The Stories

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We Live By: Personal Myths and the Making of the Self (New York: Guilford Press, 1993). 27. Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal, 18: “The human imperative to make and consume stories runs even more deeply than literature, dreams, and fantasy. We are soaked to the bone in story.” 28. Some recent speculations in theoretical physics have suggested that time itself is an unnecessary concept for solving problems in cosmology, and, as such, is simply a convenient fiction employed by human psychology. This approach has been strongly refuted by Lee Smolin, theorist at Canada’s Perimeter Institute, in his book Time Reborn: From the Crisis in Physics to the Future of the Universe (Boston: Mariner Books, 2013), especially the epilogue, “Thinking in Time.” 29. Deena Metzger, Writing for Your Life: A Guide and Companion to the Inner Worlds (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1992). 30. The most hilarious send up of that entire subculture is from a novel by Cyra McFadden, The Serial: A Year in the Life of Marin County (New York: Signet, 1978). 31. William McCleery, “Between Solitude and Society: Conversation on the Meanings of Community with Suzanne Keller,” Princeton Alumni Weekly, March 23, 1994, 12–17. See also McCleery, “Between Solitude and Society,” 14: “If you don’t count in a larger scheme of things, don’t have a place among others, you lack not only a sense of direction and purpose, but a reason for living.” Perhaps the most significant diagnoses of how contemporary first-world societies have atrophied in their experience of personal conversation as opposed to the social noise that has become the unfulfilling surrogate for face-to-face interaction are found in the two most recent books by MIT sociologist Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2011); and Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age (New York: Penguin Press, 2015). 32. Even Martine Rothblatt recognizes the need to be able to “opt out.” Rothblatt, Virtually Human, 293. 33. Despite ever greater private fortunes being directed toward research in longevity, artificial intelligence, and cybernetics—such as the new company, Calico (for California Life Company), organized under Google’s umbrella company Alphabet, as well as the (Paul) Allen Brain Institute, and many other companies being continually birthed in Silicon Valley and elsewhere—it is the deep (and classified) pockets of the Department of Defense that will assure continued high-level support for ongoing developments in the field of battle. See Annie Jacobsen, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America’s Top Secret Military Research Agency (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2015), especially 305–318, 420–452.

Chapter 21

Homo Gubernator as a TeilhardianCatholic Response to Transhumanism Levi Checketts

The Catholic Church, as is true with every other Christian church, needs to respond quickly and carefully to new technological problems. The transhuman project—the goal of self-directed human evolution by means of science and technology—is one such problem and is perhaps the paradigmatic techno-moral problem of the twenty-first century. Unfortunately, as has been pointed out by authors like Brian Green and Mark Graham, the church has not always dealt with technological problems well, nor in a systematized way.1 This chapter is written from a Catholic confessional standpoint that engages the wider public discussion of our shared planetary future. The broad Science-Religion Discourse benefits by assembling multiple confessional perspectives that shed light on matters that concern us all. In what follows I will show how Catholics might respond to transhumanism, with the assumption that the work done here can be expanded to other technological problems and other religious interests as well. There are at least two challenges to accomplishing this task. First, it is facetious to think my response is the Catholic response. The Catholic theological tradition spans numerous styles of thought, eras, languages, and perspectives. I show below that there are already numerous apologies for religious transhumanism, not all of which are antithetical to dogmatic Catholicism. Different charisms, traditions, or interpretations of Catholic teaching will yield different considerations. For example, the early modern casuistry of the Society of Jesus has a different moral focus from the new virtue ethics approach of James Keenan, SJ. Thus, the first challenge is to determine what “brand” of Catholicism to engage and how different perspectives might respond differently. Second, transhumanism itself is a broad camp of thought, including those simply advocating for better diets and improved neuropharmaceuticals to 341

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people who wish to drastically alter human genetics or separate consciousness from corporeality. The critics of transhumanism often reject human enhancement technologies while supporting therapeutic uses of some of the same technological projects. Ultimately, however, the problem arises when the spectrum of transhumanist projects and the continuum between therapy and enhancement muddle the deceptively clear dichotomy. Thus, the second problem is really a question of whether Catholics should eschew, embrace, or qualify transhumanist philosophies and technologies. To address these two problems, I examine three religious stances toward transhumanism and their anthropological groundings: total theological acceptance and theosis, reserved theological acceptance and the “created co-­creator,” and nuanced rejection and Thomistic natural law. Each position seeks to offer compelling theological groundings of their position. I then offer what I take to be a better anthropological grounding, one based on the writings of Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, which adequately suits Catholics to carefully think about their relation to new technologies. Finally, I will turn this anthropological grounding, which I call Homo gubernator, to the problem at hand, namely, transhumanism, and conclude by offering my own nuanced response to the issue. Before I offer these reflections, however, it is necessary to first explain my own understanding of transhumanism. TRANSHUMANISM IN BRIEF Transhumanism is a philosophical position in favor of self-directed evolution.2 Transhumanists express appreciation for the gifts evolution has bestowed upon humanity, but they do not believe the state of our natural biology obligates us to preserve it. They borrow from Richard Dawkins the idea of evolution as a “blind watchmaker”—what nature has accomplished is amazing, but deeply flawed and in need of adjustment.3 Transhumanists attribute the relevant moral aspect of being human to our rationality, and not to our biology, our belief-based cosmologies, or even our (current) physical limitations. Thus, only reason is worthy of moral respect, so science is free to pursue any goal that does not reduce rationality.4 Transhumanists further argue no moral standard is prior to the obligation to rid humanity of all evils (natural to the greater extent, moral to the lesser), of which human mortality is considered the greatest.5 Death is the final enemy; the transhumanist moral goal is ultimately to be rid of, once and for all, the bounds of mortality. To accomplish these ends, transhumanists advocate the use of new sciences and technologies, especially nanotechnology, biotechnology, robotics, and information and communications technologies (NBRICT).6 Thus, one might understand transhumanism as the goal of eliminating human weaknesses and

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frailties through self-directed evolution of the human species accomplished using new technologies. Not all transhumanists, however, are in favor of the exact same technologies, outcomes, or purposes. James Hughes, for example, notes that today there are five main strands of transhumanism: “extropian ­libertarianism, the liberal democratic World Transhumanist Association/Humanity +, Singular­ itarian millennialism, religious transhumanism, and radical democratic transhumanism or technoprogressivism.”7 These movements are rooted in different ideas of the proper economic, political, or religious vehicles for transhumanism; different visions of the end-goals of transhumanism; and different boundaries for what is or is not acceptable human enhancement. While transhumanism generally supports NBRICT, the level to which any given technology is supported varies among transhumanists: some support biotechnological projects to lengthen telomeres in somatic cells,8 while others support the ability to radically alter any aspect of your person, including gender, number, and material.9 Transhumanism, therefore, exists as a spectrum of philosophical and technoscientific projects, with some advocating for restrained and gradual enhancements of humanity on a large level, and others advocating for radical morphological freedom for those who can afford it. The debate between transhumanists and their opponents, Gregory Stock argues, is “about philosophy and religion. It is about what it means to be human, about our vision of the human future.”10 The central question, then, for Catholics in considering whether transhumanism is acceptable is what anthropology undergirds transhuman perspectives. Thus, a libertarian atheistic transhumanist anthropology, for example, the belief that humans can do whatever they wish to themselves because no God exists to stop them, would obviously be grounds for rejection for Catholics, but a religiously rooted transhuman anthropology may be amenable to Catholics. Below I consider three theistic attitudes toward transhumanism and the theological anthropologies supporting them. Each of these views finds more or less currency in the Catholic anthropological tradition, so each is worth entertaining. TOTAL THEOLOGICAL ACCEPTANCE One of the strongest defenses of religious transhumanism is articulated by Lincoln Cannon, founder and former president of the Mormon Transhumanist Association. Cannon believes that transhuman values are not only compatible with his faith, but moreover are the vehicles by which that faith is to be actualized in the world. Cannon envisions a future where

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we will see and feel and know the messiah, the return of Christ, in the embodied personification of the light and life of our world, with and in whom we will be one, speaking the words and doing the works of Christ: consoling, healing, and raising each other together in the glory of God. Enjoying a world beyond present notions of enmity, poverty, suffering, and death—the living transfigured and the dead resurrected to immortality—we will fulfill prophecies.11

Cannon’s vision is compelling—it holds all the promises of the Christian eschatological vision. However, Cannon sees this accomplished through the progression of human sciences and technologies, in other words, through the transhuman project. Cannon’s hopeful vision is one where the purposes of God are accomplished through human ingenuity; as our science and technology progress, so too do our religious sensibilities, and God’s design for humanity is accomplished through our own activity.12 Aside from the vision of humanity achieving the Parousia through technological means, Cannon also believes we will become new gods through technological advancement.13 Cannon’s Mormon background includes an eschatology where humans not only dwell with God for eternity after death, but also become gods after death. He supposes that this can be accomplished through sufficient technological progress, meaning that the God of this universe is just a technologically advanced being.14 Taken literally, Cannon’s anthropological view is that human beings are gods in embryo. Catholic theology would very clearly reject this view for various reasons, chief among them being the heretical notion that God lived a previous mortal life (complete with sinful failings) before creating the universe. Taken in a somewhat less literal manner, however, one might read Cannon as saying we may become not gods, but God, in the future. This amounts to a sort of techno-theosis, the understanding that humanity’s telos lies in our unification with God, which may be accomplished through scientific and technological means. Nonetheless, if theosis requires specific types of scientific or technological knowledge, that is, if the technological singularity is the prerequisite for this eschaton, then Cannon’s views amount to a sort of Gnosticism. On the other hand, if science and technologies are merely means by which God helps humanity in achieving their telos of unifying with God, Catholics may cautiously accept Cannon’s anthropology. RESERVED THEOLOGICAL ACCEPTANCE Ron Cole-Turner’s view of Christian transhumanism is subtler and perhaps more attractive to the average Christian than Cannon’s. Cole-Turner, who has written and edited numerous pieces on religion and transhumanism for

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over a decade, offers nuanced support of Christian transhumanism. He notes its failings, including the challenges of explaining salvation or articulating a life-giving eschatology,15 but he also notes its strengths. Cole-Turner offers as the central theological element of Christian transhumanism “the belief that humanity and the cosmos itself are being transformed for a new level or kind of existence, still as creatures made by their Creator, but elevated or ‘made new’ in ways that not only go far beyond their present status but vastly beyond our ability to imagine.”16 He also notes that Christian transhumanism embraces a “theocentric, transformationist vision” that “sees God and humanity as partners in the transformation of the cosmos to its ultimate, eschatological glory.”17 In other words, for Christian transhumanism, technology and science are merely the ways we actively participate in building the Kingdom of God with God; they must be put in service of traditional Christian ethics and subordinated to the ultimate project of eschatological striving, but those technologies that secular transhumanists embrace are, on the surface, also acceptable for Christian transhumanists. Cole-Turner articulates an anthropological vision of God and humanity in cooperative partnership. This idea echoes Philip Hefner’s theological anthropology of “Created Co-Creator.” Hefner reminds us that human beings are created . . . .We depend for our very existence on our cosmic and biological prehistory; we depend on the creative grace of God. Yet, we are also creators, using our cultural freedom and power to alter the course of historical events and perhaps even evolutionary events. We participate with God in the ongoing creative process.18

This vision, like Cannon’s, emphasizes the fact that human beings are imago Dei and thus share many important characteristics with God, including our technological handiwork. However, it also emphasizes God’s ineffability and our inability to truly accomplish God’s designs independent of God. Thus, humanity is lifted up as lieutenants of God, working to accomplish God’s ways with God. The scientific and technological projects of transhumanism, then, are means by which we augment our powers and enable our species to better work, but they must always be directed to authentically working to build the Kingdom of God. NUANCED REJECTION Brian Green, as one of the leading members of Theologians Testing Transhumanism and director of Technology Ethics at Santa Clara University, has written critically of transhumanism from a Catholic

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perspective. Green argues that Catholicism recognizes some problems with the transhumanist goal, so it is hard for a Catholic to truly be transhumanist. While he notes there are a number of “imaginary” problems with transhumanism, he articulates four real problems: the improbability of material immortality; justice, access, inequality, and attitude; the impossibility of human omnipotence; and the problem of pursuing utopia.19 Green’s first and third objections to transhumanism are primarily scientific in nature and thus not theological concerns per se. Thus, Green’s major response seems to be that transhumanism is dangerous not necessarily because of the technologies it is currently pursuing but because its focus is at times unrealistic, imprudently risky, and, more antithetical to good Catholic faith, most often selfish. Although not clear in his Theology and Science article on transhumanism, Green assumes a Thomistic vision of human beings in other writings. Indeed, Green’s warnings about utopia and omnipotence are rooted in the thought of Hans Jonas,20 a philosopher whose “natural law” approach to ethics informs Green’s own anthropology. Green combines the biological anthropology of Terrence Deacon, the moral anthropology of Hans Jonas, and the theological anthropology of Thomas Aquinas into a scientifically informed articulation of Thomistic natural law.21 From this perspective, the telos of humanity for which we strive—which also, under a Jonasian perspective, forbids us from pursuing utopia—is rooted in our nature. From this natural law position, two conclusions may be offered regarding technological evolution. The first, and perhaps more prominent among Catholic critics of transhumanism, is that technological evolution which forsakes or alters our animalistic nature is immoral because it disrupts the nature that informs our moral behavior.22 The other view, offered by Green himself, is that by altering our nature, we alter our telos and thus also what falls into the purview of the natural law.23 The three positions outlined above represent three basic moral anthropologies. The first emphasizes theosis and the human effort to unify with God, primarily through technological means. The second emphasizes human cooperation with God in accomplishing the eschaton and sees technology as an aid to this project. The third emphasizes human nature and cautions that changing nature through technological means likewise changes the end for humanity as well, which may contravene God’s purposes. Each of these offers a compelling vision, but the Catholic is left wondering which is best. Patristic theologians may emphasize theosis, while modern theologians often emphasize eschatological cooperation with God, and many theologians have returned to Thomism. The particular “brand” a given Catholic takes up will inform his or her affinity for one position or another, but, thus far, no single one of these positions stands above the others.

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TEILHARD DE CHARDIN AND HOMO GUBERNATOR In 1934, Nikolai Berdyaev argued that the challenge of new technologies lay “in the Christian view of [humanity] as such, for we can no longer be satisfied by the patristic, scholastic, or humanistic anthropologies.”24 The reason for this, as articulated by Victor Ferkiss, is due to “the increasing knowledge of the order of nature provided by contemporary scientific discovery, the increasing power over that nature given to [humanity] by [our] technology and the fact that increases in population have raised the amount and intensity of human interaction to a new plane that bespeaks an evolutionary breakthrough” characteristic of the industrial age.25 Thus, the visions of Cannon, Cole-Turner, and Green are difficult to start with because they root their response to transhumanism in older anthropologies. I propose we must begin from a more carefully articulated anthropological base that takes seriously the issues noted by Ferkiss and from that secure foundation articulate our response to transhumanism rather than marshaling arguments for or against it. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was a Jesuit paleoanthropologist and mystic whose spiritual writings are among the first to articulate a clear bridge between Catholic theology and modern science and technology. His view is holistic and consistent, so I propose using Teilhard’s anthropological thought as a base. Because his thought spans many works and is often wrapped in his mystical vision of the universe, I synthesize his thought into a fourfold framework, which I call Homo gubernator or the vision of human beings as pilots. This vision assumes the task of the human project as one always already underway, as a ship already at sea, and requires us to consider our heading, our equipment, and our setting. I suggest the substantial components of this vision are that human beings are evolved and evolving, socially contingent, technologically interdependent, and teleologically oriented beings. Teilhard’s magnum opus The Phenomenon of Man articulates what human beings are by tracing the origins of life, the evolution of life, the evolution of Homo sapiens, and what he sees as our eventual destiny. Teilhard believes the complexification of matter over universal history, from the appearance of the first atoms, to the emergence of molecules, the evolution of life, and the emergence of consciousness are all part of a single “Law of ComplexityConsciousness.”26 As instantiations of this cosmic law, human beings are “nothing else than evolution become conscious of itself.”27 In addition, because Homo sapiens is only the most recent human species, and because Teilhard recognizes the universe does not remain static, he asserts that we are evolving and will continue to evolve, though at this particular stage in natural history that evolution takes the primary form of social evolution.28 Thus, humans are part of a long process of complexification in the universe and by no means are we at the final stage. The ultimate meaning of this is that

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where we are today is quite different from where we have been in the past. Moreover, we are underway in our development and should not assume that humanity as it is now will remain the same forever. Second, human evolution has continued since the advent of Homo sapiens but primarily in social ways. Human beings are fundamentally social beings, and the natural step for complexity after self-conscious minds is highly organized groupings of these minds.29 These social groups develop culture, sciences, arts, and philosophies which become part of the hereditary gift to new generations.30 Thus, we are shaped and develop in a social manner based on the other humans we come in contact with. Indeed, Teilhard notes there are two primary forces that shape social evolution: the compression of minds which occurs as larger groups of diverse minds encounter and are shaped by each other, and the attractive and personalizing force of love.31 Compression happens as a result of population increase, but love is a voluntary, non-coercive force. These forces and our social history make up our evolution and thus our essence; the aspirations and hopes of individual peoples, so critical for theological discourse, are contingent upon the political, social, historical, and economic situations they live in. The deeper implication here is that humans are as their social situations are. To see what a human being is, one must first examine her cultural values, familial connections, social possibilities, philosophical worldview, and historical background. What we are is contingent on with whom we are. Third, humans are interdependent with their technologies; as the human makes the tools, the tools in turn shape the human. Teilhard notes that aside from having developed brains and complex societies, all human species use and create tools. He correlates our mental capacity and tool usage under the category of “cerebro-manual.”32 Our cerebral development parallels tool use, and he posits that human species’ capacity for understanding their world is related to their ability to manipulate it.33 We grasp the world intellectually as we grasp the world manually. These interdependent physiological features result in science and technology. Through our intellectual capacity, we investigate the natural world and increase our scientific knowledge. This knowledge then is applied through our hands to create new technological tools which allow us to extend our reach further into the world, complexifying the human influence on the earth and extending our being outward.34 As a consequence, Teilhard sees human science and technology not only as natural parts of our species-being, but as important parts of the Law of ComplexityConsciousness. We must become more technological and more scientific, and we must extend our scientific-technological reach further into the workings of the world. The implications of this are twofold: first, it is clear that technologies that arise today will be results of current and past social pressures and advances in science. Second, and more importantly, who and what we are

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today, and what our descendants will be, is determined by the technologies that shape our world. This leads us to the final point, that human beings are teleological. Teilhard’s understanding of the human phenomenon is tied to a central teleological thesis: humanity has a destiny, which destiny is becoming the cosmic Christ in reaching the Omega Point.35 By subsuming all matter, all energy and all life into ourselves, we become Christ, who himself took on all suffering, all sin, and all death to save humanity.36 The Omega Point is therefore also the divinely set destiny for humanity; it is nothing less than the achievement of the Kingdom of God. Thus, love, which is God, is important for this end. Thus also, our human strivings must be subordinated to a faith in God who is bringing all things together into a universal fulfillment.37 Thus finally, the achievement of the Omega Point is not meant to be a hubristic triumph of the will but rather a cooperative act carried out by beings made in the image of the Divine and entrusted with the responsibility of fulfilling this most holy task. Our vision must be one that is eschatological or teleological more than it is tied to essence; we must consider what we are called to become more than what we are. Human beings are thus future-oriented beings—we have both the ability and the need to consider future consequences—so we must orient ourselves not to what has been but to what we hope will be. In summary, the vision of the person I argue Catholics ought to embrace is one that recognizes our biologically contingent makeup, our relationships with other persons and with technologies, and our orientation toward the fullness of God’s reign with hopeful and active anticipation. The central element of this vision is our eschatological orientation because in this aspect of our humanity, we consider what it is God calls us to become. Questions of moral action, of social structure, of biological manipulation or technological Luddism are all subordinated to the question of what we are to be as a people and how we are to accomplish this aim. Teilhard’s vision, wherein we move, as created co-creators, into the universe through love accompanied by technological and scientific progress, is one that may be appealing to Catholics. His is one that takes seriously scientific, phenomenological, and theological accounts of the person and synthesizes them into a modern theological anthropology. Most critical to this vision, however, is the centrality of the Omega Point, the eschatological orientation of conscious beings in an active universe. The vision of Homo gubernator is thus brought into sharper relief. As eschatologically oriented beings, we navigate toward a given destination, that is, the Kingdom of God. Our evolutionary heritage informs us of our travels thus far. Our social contingency reminds us that course adjustments made by humanity throughout history have brought us to where we are. Our technological interdependence shows us the need to carefully consider what

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resources are available for our voyage and how they change our heading or speed. Most of all, the destination we pursue determines how we should direct our moral action. The question of whether or not we are pursuing the right goals is ultimately a question of how our actions bring us closer to or further from our eschatological destination. CONCLUSION: TRANSHUMANISM REVISITED How does Homo gubernator shape the Catholic attitude toward transhumanism? Homo gubernator seems supportive of transhumanism’s recognition of an evolutionary past and a contingent present. However, even though transhumanists articulate their own hopeful future, it is unlikely to be compatible with good Catholic eschatology. Indeed, Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and ColeTurner both note that transhumanism functions as a “secular eschatology.”38 James Keenan likewise suggests that Catholics will find it unappealing, given that Catholic visions of the Eschaton tend to be both visceral and collective, and not individualistic or incorporeal.39 It is on this ground that the strongest critiques of uploading and other transhumanist projects can be built; the question of who we are is one still open to debate, but the claim of what we should become animates our moral behavior and thus sanctions or forbids transhuman projects. The question at stake is therefore once again, what we understand our calling to become, and whether or not the visions of the Cannons and Cole-Turners fit with this. If and as Catholic theology turns more to eschatology, the lopsided vision of transhumanism will be less and less attractive. As Keenan and Green both note, transhumanism lacks the emphases on corporeality and collectivism typical of the Catholic ethos. The utopian vision of various transhumanists is not bad in itself, but without a deeper emphasis on creating a just and peaceful society that incorporates all of creation, their views remain deeply antithetical to Catholic social ethics. It is therefore not the techno-optimism of transhumanists nor the self-directed evolution that is most offensive to Catholic morality but rather the self-indulgence and the capitalistic individualism. What we are left with, then, is the difficult recognition that Cole-Turner’s brand of Christian transhumanism is itself not bad, though, as he rightly notes, it is in dire need of a clear eschatological vision for which to strive.40 Thus, a critical question remains: what is the vision of the Kingdom of God that Catholics ought to pursue? Jesus reminds us in the Gospel of John that His “kingdom is not of this world” (John 19:36). As Ted Peters notes in his own writings, the assumption that we can build the Kingdom of God on our own is dangerous.41 Transhumanism of any stripe, from More’s libertarian extropianism to Cole-Turner’s Christian transhumanism, posits a certain ideal

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for which we strive. However, it is dangerous to ever assume that we have the correct understanding of what God’s future entails or that we can achieve that through our own action. On the other hand, renouncing the project of eschatological thinking opens the risk of denying any significance to human moral action with respect to new technologies. Here one sees the opposite danger of the transhumanists, namely, those who support a dominionist reading of theology. In this view, because God is ultimately in charge of the world, no human action can ultimately have an impact on the end of human existence.42 The danger of this thinking is manifest currently in the environmental crisis: millions of Americans deny that human industry is rapidly heating the earth because they believe humans are impotent to create our own destruction. As Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato Si’ and previous magisterial writings on nuclear weapons attest, Catholics should not hold on to the belief that human action has no effect on our future existence. The balance that must be maintained is classically Catholic: we live in the already and not yet; we are co-workers in building the Kingdom of God; we wait in hope while working now. We articulate imaginative visions of the Kingdom of God while recognizing their contingent place in human culture and history. We remain critical of elevating any single ideal above the mystery of God, recognizing any such as idolatrous, but we also note that we have been called to discipleship of one Lord. Finally, Catholics are called to uphold the Two Great Commandments, loving God and loving our neighbors. Ultimately, therefore, those technoscientific or philosophical projects which hamper our efforts to establish a loving Kingdom with God are to be eschewed while those that allow us to more deeply appreciate the imago Dei in our neighbor are to be supported and pursued. NOTES 1. Brian Green, “The Catholic Church and Technological Progress: Past, Present, and Future,” Religions 8, no. 106 (2017): 10; Mark Graham, “Technology and the Catholic Ethic of Use: Starting a New Conversation,” Journal of Technology, Theology, & Religion 3, no. 1 (November 2012): 2. 2. Max More and Natasha Vita-More, “Roots and Core Themes,” 1, and Max More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” 3, both in The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology and Philosophy of the Human Future, ed. Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell, 2013). 3. More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” 15. 4. Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg, “The Wisdom of Nature: An Evolutionary Heuristic for Human Enhancement,” in Human Enhancement, ed. Julian Savulescu and Nick Bostrom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 378–380.

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5. Max More, “A Letter to Mother Nature,” in The Transhumanist Reader, 450; Nick Bostrom, “The Fable of the Dragon Tyrant,” Journal of Medical Ethics 31, no. 5 (2005): 273–277. 6. More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” 4; Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, PDF e-book ed. (New York: Viking, 2005), 142; Braden Allenby, “Technology and Transhumanism: Unpredictability, Radical Contingency and Accelerating Change,” in Building Better Humans? Refocusing the Debate on Transhumanism, ed. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Kenneth Mossman (Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang, 2012), 448. 7. James Hughes, “The Politics of Transhumanism,” Zygon: Religion of Journal and Science 47, no. 4 (December 2012): 758. 8. Ronald Bailey, “For Enhancing People,” in The Transhumanist Reader, 340. 9. Martine Rothblatt, “Mind is Deeper than Matter: Transgenderism, Transhumanism and the Freedom of Form,” in The Transhumanist Reader, 318–320. 10. Gregory Stock, “The Battle for the Future,” in The Transhumanist Reader, 303. 11. Lincoln Cannon, “What is Mormon Transhumanism?” Theology and Science 13, no. 2 (May 2015): 212. 12. Ibid., 210–212. 13. Ibid., 213. 14. Ibid. 15. Ronald Cole-Turner, “Steps toward a Theology of Christian Transhumanism,” this volume, 19. 16. Ibid., 14. 17. Ibid., 15. 18. Philip Hefner, “The Evolution of the Created Co-Creator,” Currents in Theology and Mission 15, no. 6 (December 1988): 522. 19. Brian Green, “Transhumanism and Roman Catholicism: Imagined and Real Tensions,” Theology and Science 13, no. 2 (May 2015): 191–197. 20. See ibid., 194. 21. Brian Green, “Thomistic Natural Law and Terrence Deacon’s Incomplete Nature: A Match Made in Heaven?,” Theology and Science 13, no. 1 (February 2015): 89–95. 22. See Celia Deane-Drummond, “Taking Leave of the Animal? The Theological and Ethical Implications of the Transhuman Projects,” in Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 125. 23. Brian Green, “Transhumanism and Catholic Natural Law: Changing Human Nature and Changing Moral Norms,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed. Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015), 212. 24. Nicholas Berdyaev, “Man and Machine,” in Philosophy and Technology Readings in the Philosophical Problems of Technology, ed. Carl Mitcham and Robert Mackey (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 213. 25. Victor C. Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality (New York: New American Library, 1969), 205.

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26. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, trans. Bernard Wall (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), 61. 27. Ibid., 221. 28. de Chardin, Teilhard. The Future of Man. United States, Image Books/ Doubleday, 2004. 29. Ibid., 154, 252. 30. Ibid., 157. 31. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Man’s Place in Nature: The Human Zoological Group, trans. René Hague (London: Fontana, 1966), 85–87; Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Activation of Energy: Enlightening Reflections on Spiritual Energy, trans. René Hague (San Diego: Harcourt, Inc, 1978), 51. 32. Teilhard, Activation of Energy, 158. 33. Teilhard, Phenomenon of Man, 223–224. 34. Teilhard, Future of Man, 156. 35. Teilhard, Phenomenon of Man, 293. 36. Teilhard, Future of Man, 87–88. 37. Ibid., 67. 38. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “Utopianism and Eschatology: Judaism Engages Transhumanism,” in Religion and Transhumanism, 175; Ronald Cole-Turner, “The Singularity and the Rapture: Transhumanist and Popular Christian Views of the Future,” Zygon 47, no. 4 (December 2012): 791. 39. James F. Keenan, “Roman Catholicism—Embodiment and Relationality: Roman Catholic Concerns about Transhumanist Proposals,” in Transhumanism and the Body: The World Religions Speak, Palgrave Studies in the Future of Humanity and its Successors, ed. Calvin Mercer and Derek F. Maher (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 165. 40. Cole-Turner, “Christian Transhumanism,” 19. 41. See Ted Peters, “Transhumanism and the Posthuman Future: Will Technological Progress Get Us There?” in H±: Transhumanism and Its Critics, ed. Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 2011), 162. 42. See Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” Science 155, no. 3767 (March 10, 1967): 1205.

Chapter 22

Will Transhumanism Reach Point Omega? Ilia Delio

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a Jesuit priest and paleontologist, saw all evolutionary reality leading to a culmination at Point Omega. By its structure Omega, in its ultimate principle, can only be a distinct Centre radiating at the core of a system of centres; a grouping in which personalisation of the All and prersonalisations of the elements reach their maximum, simultaneously and without merging, under the influence of a supremely autonomous focus of union.1

Today’s transhumanists plan to engineer the equivalent of a technological Point Omega. Is this likely? Even possible? Transhumanism is a philosophical and cultural movement that aims to transform the human condition by developing and creating widely available sophisticated technologies to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities. The term transhumanism refers to “the belief that humans must wrest their biological destiny from evolution’s blind process of random variation and adaptation and move to the next stage as a species, favoring the use of science and technology to overcome biological limitations.”2 In its Declaration of Principles, the World Transhumanist Association begins by saying that “humanity will be radically changed by technology in the future . . . redesigning the human condition, including such parameters as the inevitability of aging, limitations on human and artificial intellects, unchosen psychology, suffering, and our confinement to the planet earth.”3 Noreen Herzfeld in her book on Religion and Technology writes: “The new products of modern technology do not simply ‘disclose’ or shape nature but transform and replace nature. In this way, modern technology gives us 355

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heretofore undreamed of power.”4 Indeed, the rate of technological development today is almost breathless, from personalized computers to computer driven cars and relational robots, the human person has become technologically hybridized. Carl Mitcham notes, “a thousand or two thousand years ago the philosophical challenge was to think nature—and ourselves in the presence of nature. Today the great and the first philosophical challenge is to think technology . . . and to think ourselves in the presence of technology.”5 The word transhumanism was not linked to technology, originally, but to evolution. Julian Huxley, brother of Aldous Huxley, first coined the term “transhumanism” in the 1950s to describe the evolution of humanity. In his Religion without Revelation Huxley wrote: The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself—not just sporadically, an individual one way, an individual there in another way—but in its entirety, as humanity. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve: man remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature.6

The Jesuit scientist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was a friend of Huxley and, like Huxley, saw the human species in evolution. Eric Steinhart among others has described Pierre Teilhard de Chardin as a forerunner of transhumanism; however, Teilhard’s transhumanism is marked by the fundamental presence of Omega, a personal center of wholeness and the goal toward which evolution is directed.7 Here I will explore the significance of Omega for the flourishing of transhuman life and ask whether or not transhumanism can attain the Omega point. To do so, I will first describe the general aims of transhumanism; second, expound Teilhard’s vision of Omega evolution; and third, compare the ideals of future-oriented transhumanism and the dynamics of Omega evolution. I will conclude by indicating the critical role religion plays in the fundamental orientation of transhumanism and evolution. THE AIMS OF TRANSHUMANISM Artificial intelligence is spawning a philosophical shift today from reality constructed of matter and energy to reality constructed on information.8 The cyborg symbolizes this new transhuman reality. A cyborg is a cybernetic organism where biology and machine are hybridized through informational loops. The fact that human nature can be hybridized challenges our prevailing views of nature as fixed, biological and physical. If we look across the vast sweep of cosmic history, we see that nature has never been clearly defined. The cyborg signifies that human “nature” is not self-evident. Rather, nature

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is an emerging process of evolving life that is now marked by a co-creation of humans and machines. A cyborg body “is not bounded by human skin but includes all external pathways along which information can travel.”9 Boundaries have meaning only for particular, locatable and embodied subjects. One might say that boundary making is a political act since boundaries can be unmade. Katherine Hayles, in her book How We Became Posthuman (1999), writes, “In the posthuman, there are no essential differences, or absolute demarcations, between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot technology and human goals.”10 She concludes by saying: “Humans can either go gently into that good night, joining the dinosaurs as a species that once ruled the earth but is now obsolete, or hang on for a while longer by becoming machines themselves. In either case . . . the age of the human is drawing to a close.”11 Although Hayles seems to signal the end of the human person, the posthuman means the end of a particular type of human, the autonomous being who exercises the will through individual agency and choice. The posthuman is a dynamic partnership between humans and intelligent machines, replacing the liberal humanist subject’s manifest destiny to dominate and control nature. Navigating into the future does not have to be apocalyptic but will be an increasing complexity of interactions within our environment, including both human and nonhuman actors. In this respect the human is no longer seen as the source from which emanates the will to power, domination, and control of the environment. Rather, the distributed cognition of the emergent human subject correlates with the distributed cognitive system as a whole, in which “thinking” is done by both human and nonhuman actors. Human functionality expands because the parameters of the cognitive system it inhabits expand. It is not a question of leaving the body behind but of extending embodied awareness in highly specific, local and material ways that would be impossible without electronic prosthesis or connections. Transhumanism evokes a set of values that reflects posthuman life, as Nick Bostrom writes: “Transhumanists view human nature as a work-in-progress, a half-baked beginning that we can learn to remold in desirable ways. Current humanity need not be the endpoint of evolution. Transhumanists hope that by responsible use of science, technology, and other rational means we shall eventually manage to become posthuman, beings with vastly greater capacities than present human beings have.”12 Interestingly, Bostrom does not view transhumanism as a naïve idealist or a panacea for human problems: While future technological capabilities carry immense potential for beneficial deployments, they also could be misused to cause enormous harm, ranging all the way to the extreme possibility of intelligent life becoming extinct. Other

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potential negative outcomes include widening social inequalities or a gradual erosion of the hard-to-quantify assets that we care deeply about but tend to neglect in our daily struggle for material gain, such as meaningful human relationships and ecological diversity.13

Transhumanism does not seek to vanquish the human person or favor posthumans over humans. Rather, transhumanists support the advancement and extension of what we are in a way that allows humans to transcend biological limitations “enabling us to realize our ideals better and that some of our ideals may well be located outside the space of modes of being that are accessible to us with our current biological constitution.”14 Ray Kurzweil has described digital immortality as a movement beyond mortality through computational technology whereby our identities will be based on our evolving mind files. By replacing living bodies with virtual bodies capable of transferral and duplication, we will become disembodied superminds.15 Martine Rothblatt, in her book Virtually Human, indicates that mindclones will emerge in the near future. A mindclone is a computer simulation of the mind digitized and repackaged in a new medium. Rothblatt anticipates that the rise of mindclones will usher in a new set of personal categories, including mindfiles and mindware. According to Rothblatt, who is the founder of Sirius XM, it is a matter of time before we accommodate to our self-extensions in mindware by which we will eventually be able to attain some type of immortality or infinitely extended life. In a recent interview on organ transplants from genetically modified pigs, she said: As our abilities in information processing and computer software and storage of more and more of our thoughts and ideas outside of our body becomes easier, more automatic (and) less expensive, ultimately we are going to have, sort of, digital doppelgangers of ourselves that are stored in the cloud and are able to present themselves to any manner of devices.16

Robert Geraci has discussed at length the apocalyptic dimension of artificial intelligence, indicating that technologies of digital immortality are being developed whereby “our new selves will be infinitely replicable, allowing them to escape the finality of death.”17 This futuristic “postbiological” computer-based immortality is one also envisioned by Hans Moravec who claims that the advent of intelligent machines (machina sapiens) will provide humanity with personal immortality by mind transplant. We will be able to “wake up matter” by infusing it with intelligence and information.18 Transhumanism as a brand of futurism envisions a better world of enhanced life, including peaceful democratic societies, a higher level of overall well-being, and digital immortality with loved ones. It looks toward a

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postbiological future where super informational beings will flourish. Through mechanical means we will be able to overcome the limitations of the body such as disease and old age. Bart Kosko, a professor of electrical engineering at the University of Southern California, writes: “Biology is not destiny. It was never more than tendency. It was just nature’s first quick and dirty way to compute with meat. Chips are destiny.”19 The digitized body will be free and unconstrained by the physical and temporal limitations of the flesh.20 In a sense, transhumanism obviates the role of religion in evolution by coopting the religious aims of salvation, immortality, and personal happiness; yet as Philip Hefner notes, religion is essential to the future of technological development. In his Technology and Human Becoming, Hefner states that “technology is the arena in which some of the most important things are happening to human nature.” Religion happens at the depths of life, where things make a life or death difference. Technology is now impacting these depths of life and death, anticipating a new religion without revelation. Hefner writes that “if technology is the medium for new selves and new identities to emerge . . . and . . . we cannot imagine that religion takes shape in technology, then we have eliminated the religious or depth dimension of the most significant developments in human becoming.”21 To eliminate religion from technology is to leave us fearful and frightful, at once lured by the fascination of our new technologies and, at the same time, frightful of what we will become. We need visions of what the empirical can become and what the possibilities are. In this respect the Omega point described by Teilhard de Chardin can provide religious depth and breadth to transhumanism and help direct the process of creative, transcending life. TEILHARD’S OMEGA When Teilhard coined the term transhuman with Huxley, he had in mind the evolution of the species Homo sapiens, indicating that human person “is nothing else than evolution become conscious of itself.”22 The human person is “the point of emergence in nature, at which this deep cosmic evolution culminates and declares itself.”23 Teilhard descried evolution as the rise of consciousness and saw a direction in evolution toward greater complexity and consciousness.24 He considered matter and consciousness not as two substances or two different modes of existence but as two aspects of the same cosmic stuff. Mind emerges out of a long evolutionary process so that both physical and psychic are co-related in the movement of convergence and complexity.25 The future of matter is, in a sense, the future of mind itself. The evolutionary vigor of humankind, he said, can wither away if we should develop a distaste for ongoing increased growth in complexity–consciousness.26

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Teilhard recognized that there is a unifying influence in the whole evolutionary process, a centrating factor that holds the entire process together and moves it forward toward greater complexity and unity. He called this principle of unity “Omega” because it is the unifying factor of wholeness in evolution, the point of unity toward which complexification aims. The Omega point emerges from seeing that the universe is psychically convergent, a phenomenon which cannot be accounted for by the increasing entropy of emergent life. Hence, the Omega point must be independent of the collapse of forces with which evolution is woven. Evolution proceeds toward greater consciousness because something in the cosmos escapes from entropy and does so increasingly. Multiplicity is dependent on unity and on some final unity which does not need any principle beyond itself to unify it, since it is “already One.” Teilhard realized that the immensity and complexity of the evolutionary process can produce fear and anxiety and paralyze human action. The spatial size, temporal age, and number of occupants of the evolving universe, he said, can make human effort seem futile.27 Yet, our anxiety can be overcome if we are convinced that we are “contributing . . . to the building of something definite.”28 That is, if we reflectively recognize our own thought-guided actions as contributing to an evolving wholeness, then our own efforts would be understood as connected to, rather than alienated from, the immensities of the universe. But even if we recognize and embrace the meaningfulness of our actions in the context of the wholeness of evolution, there is no guarantee that evolution toward ultimate wholeness will continue. We are constantly facing the uncertainty about the future which produces “the truly cosmic gravity of the sickness that disquiets us.”29 We lose the conviction needed to act when we worry that evolution may have no future. The inevitability of our own death raises, in a radical way, the question of whether our own efforts will have any lasting worth.30 Teilhard realized that the emergence of self-reflecting, human centers of consciousness in evolution evokes a crisis precisely from human self-awareness and the critical role of humans in evolution; hence there is a need for a guiding factor, a principle of wholeness which he called “Omega,” to overcome the crisis. Patrick Byrne writes: “The Omega functions like an ‘x’ in an algebraic equation. Omega can be conceived on the analogy of taking the limit of a series in mathematics. A certain series of rational numbers can have a nonrational limit (such as π).”31 So also, Teilhard conceives of Omega as the limit point, the unification toward which all of evolution has been moving and which, with human cooperation, will continue to move.32 Because Omega is the absolute limit of evolution, it is the fullest meaning of evolution to which human actions contribute. However to empower evolution toward ultimate unity, Omega must be supremely present and supremely personal, a universal

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center that influences unification of individually centered human personalities without annihilating those centers.33 Byrne states: “What is deepest in the center of every human being is the very thrust of evolution toward ultimate fulfillment that produces every evolved being.”34 Teilhard suggested that knowledge of Omega would empower humanity to gain the confidence it needs in order to take up its role in continuing evolution toward the future. However, it cannot be merely the point that would eventually be reached by the process of evolution itself. Rather, Omega has to be accepted as “already in existence and operative at the very core” of evolution.35 Teilhard realized that science cannot prove the existence of Omega, what is needed is faith in the existence of Omega, a distinct kind of faith in the existence of an organized whole seeking greater wholeness. As a personal center of unifying wholeness, Teilhard identifies Omega as love since love “is capable of uniting living beings in such a way as to complete and fulfill them, for it alone takes them and joins them by what is deepest in themselves.”36 Later on he calls Omega “God,” the revealed name of personal love, fidelity, presence, and future. While in the case of a static world, God is structurally independent of God’s work, in the case of an evolutive world, the contrary is true. God coincides with evolution, but without being lost in the center of convergence. Only a God who is totally suprapersonal—Omega—can satisfy us. RELIGION AND EVOLUTION Teilhard’s unique position as scientist and priest shaped his understanding of religion as the core energy of evolution. In his view religion (from the Latin re-ligare, to “bind back”) does not begin on the level of humankind; rather religion begins with the genesis of the universe. He wrote: “Religion, born of the earth’s need for the disclosing of a god is related and coextensive with not the individual man but the whole of humankind.”37 The relationship between cosmos and religion is so fundamental to the earth that in 1916 he wrote: Religion and evolution should neither be confused nor divorced. They are destined to form one single continuous organism, in which their respective lives prolong, are dependent on, and complete one another, without being identified or lost. . . . Since it is in our age that the duality has become so markedly apparent, it is for us to effect this synthesis.38

Religion, therefore, is not strictly a personal matter or a set of personal beliefs but integral to transcendent nature itself: “The religious phenomenon taken as a whole is simply the reaction of the universe as such, of collective

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consciousness and human action in process of development.”39 Religion born of evolutionary nature itself means that religion is larger than humanity and integral to the future of the earth; it “is biologically (we might almost say mechanically) the necessary counterpart to the release of the earth’s spiritual energy.”40 In his essay “The Spirit of the Earth” (1931), Teilhard wrote that the true function of religion is “to sustain and spur on the progress of life.”41 The relationship between religion and evolution means the religious function increases in the same direction and to the same extent as “hominization” or the emergence of human persons. The growth of religion corresponds to the growth of the human person because the emergence of the human in nature brings with him/her the emergence of a divine pole to give one balance, as one is drawn up ahead. For Teilhard, religion is “born to animate and control this overflow of spirit.”42 The purpose of religion is to sustain the “human zest for life.”43 Hence, religion is not about individual salvation or lines of escape; rather, religion emerges from the whole and concerns the whole. It is the transcendent nature of spiritual energy for binding together toward ultimate unity. Teilhard states that religion is the energy of cosmic personalization and, as such, unification. While Omega is essential to the wholeness of evolution strictly in scientific (or at least philosophical) terms, from the perspective of faith, Omega is the personal center of incarnate divine love, that is, the Christ. Faith in the presence of an absolute center of love; faith in the possibility of greater unity through human creativity and invention; faith in the whole and absolute whole up ahead, all spoke to Teilhard of the ongoing process of evolution in and through human persons. Since Omega is Christ, the process of hominization is the process of christification, the emergence of the cosmic “transhuman” person. The whole evolutionary universe is being personalized into a cosmic person symbolized by the universal Christ. THE NOOSPHERE AND PLANETIZATION Teilhard lived at the dawn of the computer age and saw the possibilities of a new level of unified consciousness with the development of the computer. He called this new level of consciousness the “noosphere,” a new level of cosmic mind: “We should consider inter-thinking humanity as a new type of organism whose destiny it is to realize new possibilities for evolving life on this planet.”44 He envisioned the noosphere as a continuation of the biosphere and saw these levels of evolution guided by and moving toward Omega. The noosphere is a psycho-social process, a planetary neo-envelope essentially linked with the biosphere in which it has its root, yet distinguished from it. It is a new stage for the renewal of life and not a radical break with biological

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life. Before the human emerged, it was natural selection that set the course of morphogenesis; after humans it is the power of invention that begins to grasp the evolutionary reigns.45 If there is no connection between noogenesis and biogenesis, Teilhard said, then the process of evolution has halted and man is an absurd and “erratic object in a disjointed world.”46 With the rise of technology he saw a forward movement of spiritual energy, a maximization of consciousness, and a complexification of relationships. Technology extends the outreach of human activity but it depends on a broader use of human activity and how humans control psychic, spiritual energy needs and powers.47 The success of humanity’s evolution, according to Teilhard, will be determined by its capacity to converge and unify. He coined the term “planetization” to describe the gathering of psychic and spiritual energies around the earth into a more unified whole for the deepening of consciousness and human life. With the computer he envisioned a new level of co-reflective life ushering in a global process of planetization whereby the earth’s tribes, cultures, and religions would converge into a more unified whole. Teilhard did not anticipate the perfection of being through artificial means; rather, for him evolution is progression toward more being. He wrote: It is not well-being but a hunger for more-being which, of psychological necessity, can alone preserve the thinking earth from the taedium vitae . . . it is upon its point (or superstructure) of spiritual concentration, and not upon its basis (or infra-structure) of material arrangement, that the equilibrium of Mankind biologically depends.48

Teilhard distinguished “more-being” from “well-being” by saying that materialism can bring about well-being but spirituality and an increase in psychic energy or consciousness bring about more-being.49 He imagined psychic energy in a continually more reflective state, giving rise to ultrahumanity.50 He insisted that technology is the means of convergence so that humankind does not dissipate itself but continually concentrates upon itself.51 The noosphere is a superconvergence of psychic energy, a higher form of complexity in which the human person does not become obsolete but rather acquires more being through interconnectivity with others. In this respect the noosphere is not the realm of the depersonal or impersonal; rather, it is the realm of the deeply personal through convergence of diverse elements, organisms, and even the currents of human thought. Teilhard wrote: “It is a mistake to look for the extension of our being or of the Noosphere in the impersonal. The Future universal cannot be anything else but the hyperpersonal.”52 Teilhard saw the techno-cultural knitting together of human society not as a para-biological epiphenomenon but as the vital arrangements of matter, a new psychic temperature rising proportionally to the degree of complexity.

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A higher state of consciousness diffused through the ultra-technified, ultrasocialized, ultra-cerebralized layers of humanity needs a center of reflection for a real power of love to emerge at the heart of evolution, a love stronger than all individual egotisms and passions. Evolution proceeds in the direction of hyperreflexion and thus hyperpersonalization. One has only to take note how the Internet, cell phone, and travel have given birth to global consciousness. “Are we not experiencing the first symptoms of an aggregation of a still higher order,” Teilhard asks, “the birth of some single center from the convergent beams of millions of elementary centers [of consciousness] dispersed over the surface of the thinking earth?”53 He goes on to say that because space-time engenders centers of consciousness, it is necessarily of a convergent nature. In other words, the multiple centers of consciousness are being drawn together and hypercentrated in Omega, despite the opposing forces of separation. These centers of consciousness, according to Teilhard, are our very selves and personalities grounded in Omega: “The very center of our consciousness, deeper than all its radii . . . is the essence which Omega, if it is to be truly Omega, must reclaim.”54 If Omega is God and God is love, then we cannot find ourselves by any other means than by centering ourselves in love: the universal must find itself in the particular and the particular must find itself in the universal. Otherwise, he asked, how can the noosphere ever be stabilized?55 A world culminating in the impersonal, he indicated, can bring us neither warmth of attraction nor hope of irreversibility [immortality] without which individual egotism will dominate and rebel. Without a true center, evolution cannot progress toward its ultimate consummation.56 Rather we must give our entire self to the other, as Teilhard wrote: “my ego must subsist [in Omega] through abandoning itself, or the gift will fade away.”57 Omega-centered love at the heart of cosmic evolution is larger and deeper than personal enhancement or digitized immortality. For Teilhard, love draws together and unites in such a way that new complexified being transcends individual being in the emerging “transhuman,” the christification or the amorization of the whole cosmic process.58 The gift of self in relation to Omega is movement toward a collective unity in love. He writes that “in any domain—whether it be the cells of a body, the members of a society or the elements of a spiritual synthesis—union differentiates. . . . The more ‘other’ they become in conjunction, the more they find themselves as ‘self.’”59 The paradox of Teilhard’s thought is that trans-ego collective consciousness does not isolate, as our current Internet culture reflects,60 but rather it is the very basis of personhood. He writes that “the peak of ourselves, the acme of our originality, is not our individuality but our person; according to the evolutionary structure of the world, we can only find our person by uniting

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together.”61 That is why transhuman technology as self-enhancement or selfextension cannot fulfill our deepest capacity for love: However far science pushes its discovery of the essential fire and however capable it becomes someday of remodeling and perfecting the human element, it will always find itself in the end facing the same problem—how to give to each and every element its final value by grouping them in the unity of an organized whole.62

CAN TRANSHUMANISM ATTAIN OMEGA? The rapid development of transhumanism today affords enhancement of life on many levels. We can now access information globally, extend life medically, and increase the overall well-being of life but we lack unity, justice, peace, and compassion. We are wired together but increasingly alone. What is missing from this globalized earth is a unified soul. Teilhard wrote: The more mankind becomes conscious of the immensity and even more the organicity of the world around it, the more the necessity for a soul makes itself felt; that is, a soul capable of maintaining and directing the vast process of planetization in which we are involved.63

What he realized is that a spirit of planetization can nourish more being and life if there is a spiritual thread that draws the various religious energies together. Technology has globalized the earth, but the spirit of the earth, that is, its deep religious propensity for more life, is adrift; world religions remain tribal and the secular remains opposed to the sacred. The only way to evolve to a higher level of life is to gather the spiritual energies of the whole into a new complex union. Teilhard wrote that “the various creeds still commonly accepted have been primarily concerned to provide everyone with an individual line of escape” because they were born and grew up in a time when problems of cosmic totalization and maturing did not exist. For this reason they fail to “allow any room for a global and controlled transformation of the whole of life and thought in their entirety.”64 He proposed a new religion of the earth and humankind kindled by the convergence of world religions and deepened on the level of the noosphere. Teilhard realized that science and technology can attain a better world only through commitment to the centrating wholeness within and ahead of the evolutionary process, whether we call this center Omega, God, love, the One, or Ultimate unity; something other than ourselves lures us to invent, create, and transcend ourselves. He was open to the possibility, indeed, the likelihood

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that we would have to develop through the new sciences such as genetics, becoming better human beings with either enhanced or new capabilities. His maxim was “we must try everything.”65 Thus, if a gene was discovered that enabled people to be more generous, that gene, all else being equal, should become not only available to all, but required of all. In Teilhard’s thought, what we do makes a difference to God.66 God takes it all in; our worldly successes make a difference to God because there is “one single physical reality developing in the cosmos, one single monad.”67 Transhuman futurists such as Kurzweil coop this irresistible Other as the power of creativity itself, a type of technological pantheism that replaces God with creative transcendence. As such we live in the tension of fascination and fear, promise and annihilation, unsure of what the new technological future will bring or if there will be a future at all. Hefner points out that nature does not provide the stage for human history; rather God’s history with humankind is part of God’s history with nature. When nature is removed from technology, God gradually disappears to us because we ourselves are nature. We are left vulnerable with our technological creations. If technologies are denied their belonging to God, their very construal in secular terms allows them to start to belong to themselves, to become autonomous—to give them a quasidivine status and power and thus to place humans under their thrall.68 How we think about nature and technology informs how we think about the growth and evolution of human societies. If nature is a dynamic process, there is no single form of “the natural” and there is no single form of “the sacred.” The technological transformation of nature belongs to the story of the ongoing sacralization of nature. CONCLUSION Transhumanists, perhaps indirectly influenced by Teilhard de Chardin and Julian Huxley, aim engineered evolution toward a technological Point Omega. Can they get us there? Not if their technology is devoid of religion. Not if technological innovation is devoid of love. Teilhard understood the religious dimension of evolution and described the emergence of new sacred meaning on the level of the noosphere. His Omegacentered transhumanism complements but broadens the Bostrom/Kurzweilian view of enhancement. What Teilhard indicates is that humans share a planet together and the future of this planet is the future of our development. Technology can aid this development but ultimately it is the spiritual bonds of love and compassion that can deepen our lives together. We are drawn by love to love because love is the power of creativity itself, the power of OmegaGod. Love transforms because love unites. Our nature to transcend ourselves,

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centered in love, can never be fulfilled on the levels of enhancement or extension, only on the level of higher unity. A new religious spirit of transhumanism guided by a center of absolute love toward planetization may be our only hope.

NOTES 1. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, trans. Bernard Wall (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 262. 2. Archimedes Carag Articulo, “Towards an Ethics of Technology: Re-Exploring Teilhard de Chardin’s Theory of Technology and Evolution,” Cagayan State University, N.D., http://www​.scribd​.com​/doc​/16038038​/Paper2​-Technology (accessed October 15, 2018). 3. Susan Schneider, “Future Minds: Transhumanism, Cognitive Enhancement and the Nature of Persons,” 2008. Available at: http://repository​.upenn​.edu​/neuroethics​_pubs​/37 (accessed October 15, 2018). 4. Noreen Herzfeld, Technology and Religion: Remaining Human in a Co-created World (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Press, 2009), 9. 5. Carl Mitcham, “The Philosophical Challenge of Technology,” American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings 40 (1996): 45. 6. Julian Huxley, Religion without Revelation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979, reprint), 195. According to Harrison and Wolyniak, Huxley first used the term transhumanism in a 1951 lecture “Knowledge, Morality and Destiny.” This was the third series of William Alanson White Memorial Lectures delivered in Washington, D.C., on April 19 and 20, 1951, and published in the same year in the journal Psychiatry. In the first lecture Huxley describes his creed thus: “Such a broad philosophy might perhaps be called, not Humanism, because that has certain unsatisfactory connotations, but Transhumanism. It is the idea of humanity attempting to overcome its limitations and to arrive at fuller fruition.” The lecture was subsequently published with light revisions in Huxley’s 1957 collection of essays New Bottles for New Wine. The volume opens with a short piece bearing the title “Transhumanism,” and which contains a paraphrase of the original definition from 1951: “We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve; man remaining man, but transcending himself by realizing the new possibilities of and for his human nature.” Harrison and Wolyniak indicate, however, that Huxley was not the first to use the word transhumanism. An earlier use of the word is found in a paper by the Canadian author, historian, jurist, and philosopher W. D. Lighthall who, in turn, was influenced by a passage in Paul’s Letter to the Corinthians (1 Cor 2:9). A link between St. Paul’s putative transhumanism and that of Julian Huxley is provided, albeit circuitously, by Dante and his early nineteenth-century translator, Henry Francis Carey. In what was to become the standard Victorian translation of Dante’s Divine Comedy, Carey used the term “transhuman” in 1814 to render a term in the first Canto of Dante’s Paradiso. In describing his heavenwards journey with Beatrice, Dante speaks of being “transhumanised.”

See Peter Harrison and Joseph Wolyniak, “The History of ‘Transhumanism,’” Notes and Queries 62.3 (2015): 465–467.

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7. Eric Steinhart, “Teilhard de Chardin and Transhumanism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 20.1 (2008): 22. http://jetpress​.org​/v20​/steinhart​.htm. Steinhart begins his paper by saying: “Teilhard was one of the first to articulate transhumanist themes. Transhumanists advocate the ethical use of technology for human enhancement. Teilhard’s writing likewise argues for the ethical application of technology in order to advance humanity beyond the limitations of natural biology.” However, Teilhard’s own writings indicate that he did not seek to transcend biological limits through technology, but to deepen the whole biological process of life. 8. Stephen R. Garner, “Praying with Machines: Religious Dreaming in Cyberspace,” Stimulus 12.3 (2004): 20. 9. Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Ballantine, 1972), 319. 10. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics and Literature and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 3. 11. Ibid., 283. 12. Nick Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values,” http://www​.nickbostrom​.com​/ethics​/ values​.pdf. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Kurzweil defines the singularity as the point at which machines become sufficiently intelligent to start teaching themselves. When that happens, he indicates, the world will irrevocably shift from the biological to the mechanical. See Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York: Viking, 1999), 3–5. 16. Mike Snider, “Drones Could Deliver Pig to Human Transplants: Rothblatt,” USA Today (May 19, 2016); Martine Rothblatt, Virtually Human: The Promise—and the Peril—of Digital Immortality (New York: Picador, 2014), https://www.12news.com/article/article/news/nation-now/ drones-could-deliver-pig-to-human-transplants-rothblatt/75-204189486 17. Robert Geraci, Apocalyptic AI (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 235. 18. Carter Phipps, Evolutionaries: Unlocking the Spiritual and Cultural Potential of Science’s Greatest Idea (New York: Harper Perennial, 2012), 142. 19. C. Christopher Hook, “The Techno-Sapiens are Coming,” Christianity Today, 1 January 2004, https://www​.christianitytoday​.com​/ct​/2004​/january​/1​.36​.html. 20. Phipps, Evolutionaries, 126. 21. Philip Hefner, Technology and Human Becoming (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 76. 22. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, trans. Norman Denny (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 221. 23. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, trans. J. M. Cohen (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969), 23. 24. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Christianity and Evolution, trans. René Hague (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich 1971), 87.

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25. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 221. 26. Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, 213. 27. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 228; Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Divine Milieu: An Essay on the Interior Life, trans. Bernard Wall (New York: William Collins, 1960), 45. 28. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 229; The Divine Milieu, 56. 29. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 232. 30. Ibid., 270; The Divine Milieu, 81–82. 31. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 247. 32. Patrick H. Byrne, “The Integral Visions of Teilhard and Lonergan: Science, the Universe, Humanity, and God,” in From Teilhard to Omega: Cocreating an Unfinished Universe, ed. Ilia Delio (New York: Orbis, 2014), 88. 33. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 261–262. 34. Byrne, “The Integral Visions of Teilhard and Lonergan,” 89. 35. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 291. 36. Ibid., 265. 37. Teilhard de Chardin, Christianity and Evolution, 119, emphasis added. 38. Ursula King, Teilhard de Chardin and Eastern Religions: Spirituality and Mysticism in an Evolutionary World (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 2011), 179–180. 39. Teilhard de Chardin, Christianity and Evolution, 118. 40. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Science and Christ, trans. Rene Hague (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 100. 41. Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, 44. 42. Teilhard de Chardin, Science and Christ, 100. 43. Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, 73. 44. Teilhard de Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 20. 45. Teilhard de Chardin, Future of Man, 307. 46. Robert J. O’Connell, Teilhard’s Vision of the Past: The Making of a Method (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 145. 47. Joseph A. Grau, Morality and the Human Future in the Thought of Teilhard de Chardin A Critical Study (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1976), 274. 48. Teilhard de Chardin, Future of Man, 317. 49. Grau, Morality and the Human Future, 275. 50. W. Henry Kenny, A Path Through Teilhard’s Phenomenon (New York: Pflaum, 1970), 105. 51. Teilhard de Chardin, Future of Man, 316. 52. Teilhard de Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 260. 53. Ibid., 259. 54. Ibid., 261. 55. Teilhard de Chardin, Future of Man, 292. 56. Ibid., 301. 57. Teilhard de Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 261. 58. He would describe it in two essays written in 1950, the first of which (dated January 6) described his belief “On the Probable Coming of an ‘Ultra-Humanity’” (Future of Man, 270–280) and the second (dated January 18) began with the title in

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the form of a question: “How May We Conceive and Hope that Human Unanimisation Will Be Realized on Earth?” (Future of Man, 281–288). 59. Teilhard de Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 262. 60. See Sheri Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Our Technologies and Less from Each Another (New York: Basic Books, 2011). 61. Teilhard de Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 263. 62. Ibid., 250. 63. Teilhard de Chardin, Activation of Energy, 226. 64. Ibid., 239. 65. Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, 127; Teilhard de Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, 282. 66. Teilhard de Chardin, Science and Christ, 180–181. 67. Ibid., 52; Teilhard de Chardin, Divine Milieu, 85. 68. Hefner, Technology and Human Becoming, 85.

Chapter 23

Resurrection and the Transhumanist Promise1 Celia Deane-Drummond

Nanotechnology, microchip technology, and genetic engineering all serve to conjure up images of the cyborg, a mixing of human and machine leading to a human-like creature that has elevated functions over and above that normally associated with material, finite bodies. The latest tool to arrive in the genetic armory is CRISPR-Cas9, which uses an ingenious DNA double helix cutting method based on the “natural” defense mechanism of bacteria against viral invasion.2 Like the rhetoric surrounding the Human Genome Project (HGP) at the turn of the new millennium, this latest technology promises much for human genome therapy, and like the HGP, the main ethical discussions have focused on safety, efficacy, and scale.3 Transhuman4 philosophers have urged a greater acceptance of such technologies for the sake of what they perceive is both the perfectability of human attributes, but also a reaching beyond this toward breaking down the limitations of finitude, a quest for a secularized immortality. Recently, the more radical suggestion that morality itself could be malleable to improvement has appeared in the literature.5 Religious transhumanists find such developments benign or positively helpful in so far as they perceive such changes as in accordance with religious aims of healing and creating a better world. I find myself far more critical of transhumanist rhetoric and what I perceive as an exaggeration of likely benefits, including the more recent proposals for moral bioenhancement, while not necessarily ruling out all technological applications as a matter of course. The first question that can be asked is that of realism. How far are such technological developments realistic from a medical point of view? If aging is seen in medical terms as a “disease” that has to be “cured,” has the quest for immortality also crept into medical practice, albeit in a seemingly more innocuous form? What are the ethical resources within medical bioethics 371

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that might serve to foster or resist such developments? Is “morality” really malleable to such changes in the way suggested and for what purpose? Who defines what that morality entails? What are the particular virtues that growth in the Christian life would encourage, for example, growth in wisdom, prudence, fortitude, and temperance? It seems that such virtues are not necessarily what transhumanists have in mind when speaking of moral enhancement. More broadly, how far are such developments ethically acceptable in terms of justice as virtue and the common good, in the light of human responsibility to future generations? Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu’s suggestion that such responsibility entails manipulation so that we become more responsible environmental agents is, it seems to me, not just unrealistic, but mistaken from the perspective of environmental ethics.6 This chapter will ask what might be the underlying motives and content of immortality portrayed through the transhumanist lens, and offer a critical analysis in the light of Christian theological views about human perfection, finitude, eschatology, and immortality. I will argue that theological reflection allows a deeper perception of (1) the place of perfection in the human life and (2) an acknowledgment of mortality as good, while being compassionate toward those who suffer. Further, where individual choice and consent are elevated as ethical norms, the quest for immortality becomes privatized according to the norms set by liberal democratic views on justice. TRANSHUMAN TECHNOLOGIES The drive for perfection can hardly be thought of as a new phenomenon. Prior to the advent of sophisticated medical technologies, alchemy, the precursor of modern chemistry, adhered to a vision of perfection. Alchemists believed that close imitation of nature poured forth the “Fountain of Youth,” cajoling gold consumption among adherents in the mistaken belief that it held anti-aging properties.7 The thirteenth-century writer Roger Bacon, often thought to be the father of the pro-longevity movement, believed that a human life span could be restored to 900 years.8 Francis Bacon, writing in the seventeenth century, argued for a more experimental approach to science: technology, he believed, should be directed toward service to humanity.9 The models that he used for technology came from within the natural world, so that technology could be inspired by nature, but also reach beyond it in order for humanity to control natural processes. Yet in today’s culture we are once more becoming reawakened to that dream of imitating nature. Indeed, the desire is not simply to imitate her but to improve on her “natural” capabilities. CRISPR-Cas9 can be seen as in direct continuity with this strategy: technology co-opting a tool that has been used in

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the natural world for something else. God is no longer considered the author of that nature; rather nature simply confronts us through the meanderings of evolutionary history. Of course, knowing humanity has taken so long to arrive on the planet after so many millennia of cosmic and evolutionary experiment gives some biologists reason to doubt the wisdom of too much tinkering. But transhuman philosophers and their religious supporters are far more cavalier. They are aware, for example, of the possibility of genetic enhancement through the addition of genes that could give additional desired capabilities. They are also aware that nanotechnologies, by imitating nature on a molecular scale, come much closer to the possibility of the fusion between nature and art. In medicine, nanotechnology is already being used to deliver drugs in trials with an accuracy that boggles the imagination.10 Geneticists are also optimistic, for them, the future is bright and billions of dollars are being poured into new technologies that are set to change not just individual humans, but the next generation as well.11 Cosmetic surgery is also becoming much more widespread in the Western world, available on demand to those who have the financial resources. All these technologies add fuel to the dream of human perfectibility. Anti-aging technologies, which have always been an aspect of cultural and scientific interest, take on a new impetus in the light of the now realistic possibility of irreversible genetic enhancements. Sheila Rothman and David Rothman, for example, even prior to the discovery of CRISPR-Cas9, claimed that “once the genetics of aging are understood, longevity might increase not merely by ten or twenty years, which would be the result of curing today’s leading causes of death, but by seventy to ninety years, with an average life span of 140 to 160 years.”12 Perfectionists reject the ideal of the natural, citing examples to show how much medical practice, such as organ transplantation, is also unnatural, but not subject to the same objections.13 Doctors are no longer simply called upon to cure disease, but rather respond to patients’ psychological feelings of unhappiness related to fantasies of perfection. Where does all this fit in what the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has called life strategies? He believes that our culture has two facets. The first activity of culture relates to survival in the face of awareness of mortality, “pushing back the moment of death, extending the life span, increasing life expectation.”14 The second activity of culture “relates to immortality—surviving, so to speak, beyond death, denying the moment of death its final say, and thus taking off some of its sinister and horrifying significance.”15 But immortality is, for him, not simply the absence of death, rather it is “a defiance and denial of death,” so that “there would be no immortality without mortality. Without mortality no history, no culture, no humanity.”16 The implications of this view for the present context are striking. The first concern of human culture identified by Bauman, that is, human concern

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for survival, is related to the quest to deconstruct mortality that is inherent in modernity. It could, perhaps, be thought of as an extension of the neverending battle against particular diseases and threats to life. When medical practitioners place aging-related diseases within the list of those problems that are potentially soluble, they become manageable, a project that seems acceptable within current medical practice. There is, of course, a more sinister aspect of this dream, for “all too often, and certainly much more often for moral comfort and political placidity, the audacious dream of killing death turns into the practice of killing people.”17 In other words, a mortality-denying, imperfection-denying culture that is implicit in much of the transhuman modern project will not be able to accept mortality and imperfection as such, expressed paradoxically through insidious policies of eugenics and euthanasia. Bauman believes that a lack of sense of mortality is culturally charged, for its expression in such policies undermines the very fabric of history and culture. The second facet of Bauman’s analysis relevant in this context is related to a denial of death and the drive for immortality. But this is paradoxically set in a context of modernity where mortality is also being denied. I am implying, in other words, that enhancement technologies are more than they claim to be, simple improvements in the quality of life and human existence. What, one might ask, is improper about such desires? Historically life expectancy was much lower than it is today. In the nineteenth century the survival concerns would have been uppermost, though arguments for increasing medical interest in the quality of life are also becoming more vocal in contemporary society, not just in consideration of patients who are terminally ill, but also throughout life. But I suggest that in addition to these motivations, there is interlaced within enhancement technologies a desire for perfection that is more properly conceived in the context of cultural drives for immortality. When faced with the death of the planet as such, the response is to introduce yet more technologies, this time moral enhancement in order to ensure humans are more aware of the risks of their activity. Ironically, perhaps, one activity which works against environmental sustainability would be to extend human life, hence human enhancement pulls in different directions, but all seem fixed on an avoidance of death at the individual or collective level. Such drives eventually find expression in the quest to counter even the moment of death, linked in a more obvious way to immortal goals, leading to secularized accounts of resurrection hope. My suggestion is that while many medical scientists are still working under a focused concern for survival needs, which is a life strategy of the conquest of mortality, subliminal postmodern cultural drives that undermine the distinctions between mortality and immortality and therapy and enhancement also come to the surface. In other words, perfection is still sought, but it is

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sought haphazardly in a way that is detached from specific goals. Now the Holy Grail takes on different forms depending on the moment, it is a nomadic search, sensitive to whatever is on the horizon at the time, but without the commitment of a lifelong task. Hence, the “price of exorcising the spectre of mortality proved to be a collective incapacity to construct life as reality, to take life seriously.”18

SECULAR DREAMS AND RESURRECTION HOPE How might theology respond to these developments? Certainly, a secular eschatology that seeks to claim immortality for itself, while paradoxically undermining any basis for it through either a straightforward denial of mortality in modernity or mortality’s fusion with immortality in postmodernity, will inevitably fail to satisfy the human desire for transcendence. Jürgen Moltmann is stark in his assessment, claiming that “medical and biogenetic work on the prolongation of human life has nothing whatever to do with what in religion is called ‘eternal life’ for eternity is not endlessness.”19 There are other contrasts as well. In the theological tradition, human desire for perfection has focused far less on perfection of human bodies and far more on perfection in human character and the development of virtues. Perfection and immortality belong to God alone, imperfection and mortality belong to this world. In the twentieth century there has been a revival of eschatology, viewing all of theology as in some sense attuned to what will happen in the future, understood in terms of the reign of God.20 In particular, theologians have become critical of the future understood as simply an extension of the past that by nature is conservative; instead the new has its origin in the eternal God.21 The only way to justify transhumanism theologically would be to claim that the horizons opened up by such developments are coincident with God’s intentions. That, it seems to me at least, would be presumption on our part, especially in those cases that lead to irreversible changes in human genetics that are inherited by future generations.22 How are we to describe that continuity and discontinuity that Christian faith affirms at the moment of death? A traditional belief in the soul that exists in an intermediate state after death no longer seems tenable.23 There are two other theological alternatives. One is that God recreates the identity of the dead, the other is that the dead live on in the memory of God, a concept that “appears to be able to find greater spontaneous acceptance in a computer age.”24 Antje Jackelén argues, instead, for a third alternative, that the self is preserved as existing in relation to God, not so much through self-conservation, as self-reception. Hence:

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Identity thus becomes a question of relation. If death and eternal life are described as that through which one’s life or self finds itself eternally, then the basic assertion that God is love is violated, for love is inconceivable without alterity, without a dynamic giving and receiving.25

Christian eschatology needs to have some sense of continuity with this life in terms of experiences in the next. Jürgen Moltmann suggests that human biographical history is caught up at the moment of death with God, but death does not limit our human relationship with God.26 He argues that the contrast needs to be drawn between love/livingness and death, rather than an immortal/detached soul and a mortal body. In addition, continuity implies affirmation, for eschatology that is detached too far from material existence has negative implications for the way humanity perceives its relationship with the earth. Moltmann’s starting point for eschatology is Christological, that is, rooted in the death and resurrection of Christ, and this has cosmic significance for the whole of creation.27 Ernst Conradie argues, similarly, that the resurrection of Christ has significance not just for human existence but the whole of material creation as well.28 The resurrection of Christ cannot be regarded simply as a resuscitation of a corpse, nor a return to this form of life, but rather the first fruits of the transformation of the whole of creation. Christianity also admits to faith in some form of material resurrection, even if the bodily life is not identical with life on earth as currently experienced. One of the arguments of this chapter is that there has been a distortion in our sense of mortality and immortality, while the former is denied through constant striving against death in the modern project, the latter is caught up with grandiose dreams about perfection as that related to present existence. The future, in such a scenario, is simply in continuity with the present, rather than a more radical claim that the future meets us from ahead, which is embedded in Moltmann’s understanding of eschatology. Recognition that all is not right with humanity might imply that the primary problem of human existence is not so much finitude, but human sinfulness, not so much participation in the cycles of life, but attempts to escape that flux through our own human efforts.29 Ernst Conradie points to the fact that millions of people do not have the luxury to worry about old age, as their lives are interrupted by violent and untimely deaths. He suggests that millions of people die a premature and violent death through war, murder, rape, starvation, tragic accidents or deadly diseases (AIDS!). A purely “natural death” is indeed rare, especially in Africa. Death, including our own death, as it actually meets us, is inseparable from God’s appropriate judgment on human sin.30

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By this he seems to mean that the reality of death is bound up with shocking human sinfulness, evil, and separation from God, so that in such circumstances, restoration is impossible in this life. The tragedy of death in most contexts puts into perspective the drives for perfection and enhancement. Such drives avoid facing the tragic reality of a life cut off well before its prime, and the added injustices associated with uneven distribution of medical resources that make consideration of life extension and other enhancements the privilege of a relatively small minority, even if desired more widely. Eschatology implies reconciliation and healing for human sin in a way that finds perfection in the next life, but can begin in this world. Christian hope includes the possibility that present negative attitudes and inordinate desires will be changed and challenged. Christian vocation looks not just to the future eschaton, but also to work for a better future here on earth. The question becomes, what is the appropriate focus in terms of alleviation of human suffering? Goals in medical science are commonly presented in terms of that alleviation, but it is worth noting what that suffering is, and how such a drive toward alleviation impacts on others. In this I would disagree strongly with Rothman and Rothman’s view that we do not need to consider fairness in the development of new technologies because, according to them, there are persistent inequalities in American health delivery that cannot be overcome.31 Peter Vardy raises the issues of elitism, so “once the general principle of privilege is accepted, then there seems no good argument for preventing people buying genetic privilege for their children.”32 This amounts to a passive acceptance of injustices in the face of inequalities of advantage and further denies the possibility of change in individual and structural sins. FROM VIRTUE TO DEIFICATION Another theological stream that is worth mentioning in this context is the notion that eternity is in some sense woven into the mystery of all of life. This strand in theological thought puts more emphasis on the positive goal of living a resurrection life and complements a Reformed emphasis on human depravity, sin and corruption. God’s presence is not simply that toward which humanity aspires in the future, but is also present with us now, participating in creaturely existence. Such experience brings hope that detracts from the horror of death and suffering, for God is present to both. This approach was common in the early history of the church, reaching its climax in doctrines of theosis, the deification of humanity through participation in God.33 Certainly, within the Eastern Patristic tradition, salvation was couched in terms of a “pilgrimage into God” through theosis.34 Such reflection stems from an interpretation of 2 Peter 1:4, where Christians are encouraged to be partakers in

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the divine nature. Theosis implies a union with God that is grounded in the dynamic indwelling of the Holy Spirit in communion with Christ. Moreover, according to Peter a life lived in this way is expressed through the virtues. The bridge between an infinite God and creatures seeking God becomes expressed in, for example, Gregory of Nyssa’s doctrine of epektasis, which suggests a constant reaching out after God.35 It is also inappropriate to view such doctrines as contributing to a sense of elimination of individual identity through some sort of cosmic fusion with the Godhead, for participation in God implied a discovery of true human individual identity, rather than its obliteration. The implication is always that there is no possibility of union with God in this life, for the longing for God is never satisfied, “there is simply a deeper and deeper penetration into darkness.”36 Moreover, humanity is not transformed into divine substance, such a view would be a heretical form of pantheism, rather a mystical communication between creature and Creator is assured, leading to an encounter that is properly personal.37 While more common in the tradition of the Eastern Orthodox Church, it is wrong to suppose that theosis is absent outside Byzantine theology, for it is also in the works of Aquinas.38 The difference between Gregory Palamas, for example, and Aquinas is that the latter sees grace expressed through the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. The ultimate happiness for Aquinas is participation in divine nature. Thomas Aquinas also believed that grace extended those possibilities that are inherent in humanity through its natural human capabilities. The extent of grace is in relation to the degree of charity that is given, the higher the charity the more the desire for God. It would be wrong to believe, therefore, that Aquinas considered perfection to be narrowly located in the intellectual capacities of the human person, given the prominence of charity in receiving grace.39Anna Williams summarizes the purpose of creation in Aquinas’s thought as “that all things become good and perfect and all things find their consummation in divine goodness, which is none other than the divine essence.”40 The Eastern tradition, following Palamas, puts more emphasis on perfection through divinization as attainable in this life. The Western tradition, on the other hand, was more oriented toward the future, perfection viewed only as feasible finally in the next life. Both sought union with God as the ultimate goal. Both challenge the notion that human happiness or perfection can be achieved apart from God. SEEKING PERFECTION THROUGH ATTAINMENT OF VIRTUES The virtues are particularly appropriate as bridges between more idealistic notions of theosis, as the ultimate goal of the Christian life, discussed above,

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and the practical day-to-day ethical decision making that is necessary in order to inform practical policy making and medical practice. The Christian vision for perfection needs to find its place in forms that are more concrete in expression, if it is to avoid the charge of gnosis, a denial of the world that detaches itself from material reality. Drawing on 2 Peter 1:4 and Philippians 3:13, 14, Gregory of Nyssa was explicit in making the link, claiming that “whoever pursues true virtue participates in nothing other than God, because he is himself absolute virtue.”41 Ethical perfection is, of course, impossible to attain, as there are no limits to this perpetual process of sanctification. It answers the charge: What difference might it make in practice to aim at perfection understood as participation in God and a radical discontinuity as well as continuity with the present expressed through theologically informed eschatology? In other words, while the secularist visions of eschatology can be critiqued through theological analysis, if the outcome of such critique simply creates a vision that is in detachment from medical practice then it is all too easily ignored. In the classic tradition, perfection was sought in this life through the development of particular habits or virtues. It is also worth noting that along with the specifically theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, Aquinas speaks of the virtue of wisdom, alongside the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. All of these virtues are capable of becoming infused or grace-laden, that is, capable of being enhanced by the work of the Holy Spirit. The ultimate goal and purpose of creation is, according to Moltmann, the glorification of God, so that “ethical existence is gathered up and perfected in the aesthetic existence of doxology.”42 The virtues allow for an Aristotelian philosophy that recognizes the good possibilities in human nature, but for Aquinas it is still a nature that is transformed by the power of God’s grace, which is closer to the Eastern tradition of participation in God. At the same time, awareness of human sinfulness is present through a realistic acknowledgment of vices and the likely distortion in the virtues. Aquinas mediated successfully between the more Platonic emphases in the Augustinian tradition and a recovery of Aristotelian recognition of the importance of material, biological nature. Aquinas recognized elements of continuity with human nature, but also pointed to receiving virtues as gifts from the Holy Spirit that are bound up with an eschatological vision of the future. It is such pneumatological enhancement that needs to become the true goal of humanity, for it is directed not so much toward self-centered desires as toward the perfection of Christ in God, imitatio Christi. Wisdom, in particular, is about human relationship with God. The virtue of wisdom can be distinguished from prudence, or practical wisdom, even though the two are closely interrelated.43 Prudence is also relevant in as much as it is concerned with ethical decision making where there are competing demands

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for attention. Aquinas recognized that the reality of sin meant that there are distortions in the possible attainment of virtues. Imperfect prudence would be to narrow the good to particular goods or individuals. Those arguing for enhancement technologies that benefit relatively few persons narrows the good attained, so that prudence is rendered imperfect. By contrast, rightly conceived prudence looks to individual, familial, and political prudence, all aimed at the common good. Knowing which technologies are appropriate to develop or not is the task of prudence.44 Yet prudence is also informed by the theological virtues. These virtues are charity, understood as fundamentally friendship with God; faith as fundamental trust in the God who is the creator of all that exists; and hope understood in terms of the ultimate as well as penultimate goals in human life and beyond. As well as the virtue of prudence, the cardinal virtue of justice is worth mentioning in the context of secular drives for perfection. Forms of perfection that are detached from justice are incoherent from the point of view of Christian eschatology. The notion of God’s righteous judgment is a prelude to the coming of the kingdom of peace as expressed in the Hebrew vision of the future. Justice is that habit of mind that renders each person his/her due, and interpreted as a virtue goes beyond simple rendition in terms of principles or rules, even if in practical terms justice is explicitly expressed through those rules. In this sense, justice understood as a virtue is more consistent with an eschatological vision that is more than simply just rewards and punishments, rather “divine righteousness . . . is a righteousness that creates justice and puts people right, so it is a redemptive righteousness.”45 The vision of the future includes the idea, in other words, of Shalom, of the flourishing of God’s creatures as they exist in relationship to each other and in relation to God. In other words, Christian eschatology is not just concerned about a better future, but also about redemption of the past and present, including injustices. It is about, as Moltmann has suggested, creating a just future, so that “Christians anticipate the future of the new creation, the kingdom of justice and freedom, not because they are optimists, but because they trust in the faithfulness of God.”46 Both enhancements of human capabilities achievable through genetic technology and enhancement of human life span achieved through scientific research into combating aging raise important ethical issues associated with justice. Peter Wenz has attacked the argument that genetic enhancement is compatible with a just and humane society.47 Wenz also notes the motivation of the agents involved and is also correct in the need to distinguish between the drive for the kind of health-related enhancements that lead to protection against disease, and those that are desire related, that give people something that they desire other than health, such as height, intelligence, or beauty or even moral capabilities. The latter could be compared with cosmetic surgery.

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He argues that if, for example, enhancements such as height are commonly available, then the result would be self-defeating as everyone will simply be taller. But in those cases where height enhancement is only available to richer people, this then widens further socio-economic gaps. Healthrelated enhancements would also advantage some more than others, where such enhancements are only subject to market forces and the ability to pay. Other enhancements under discussion include the ability to resist diseases associated with exposure to pollutants such as PCBs. Yet the pollutant effects would be universal, so we can with Wenz infer that “it is absurd to suppose that in the real world these people will be protected with genetic enhancements when at present our food-rich world allows 40,000 children to die every day from the effects of malnutrition.”48 Such enhancements may be legal in the sense of being compliant with existing positive law, but they fail to express justice as virtue, as they undermine the well-being or flourishing of the community as a whole. Anti-aging technologies fit more easily in the category of enhancement of desire, rather than enhancement of health, though because longevity may well be associated with reduced quality of life, including chronic illnesses such as dementia, it is situated somewhat uneasily between these categories. No one has yet undertaken a full survey of public attitudes to these technologies, and such a survey would seem to be highly desirable.49 John Harris’s suggestion that people will want to exchange quality of life for longevity is simply unfounded.50 Extending both the maximum and average human life span will have huge social, political, and ethical consequences that arguably work against the common good, for it intensifies still further the strain on basic resources, especially in the Western world where there are demographic shifts toward an ever aging population. The protagonists of this technology ignore such consequences and focus on short-term gain in terms of the individual persons concerned. If the damage caused by basic metabolic and environmental processes could be continuously repaired, some believe that basic maintenance of human individual function could continue for as much as several thousand years. Most resist the idea of immortality as such, though, as we noted above, such is the language used by transhumanists. There are those in established medical positions who are prepared to argue for significant gains in life span on the basis that aging is undesirable, even if it is not a “disease” as such.51 Aubrey de Grey, a biomedical gerontologist at the Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence Research Foundation, believes that anti-aging technology is necessarily “just,” since in richer nations it would mean less expenditure on keeping people alive in the final years, freeing up funds for “rejuvenation treatment.” This is a narrow interpretation of justice understood in terms of market factors and patient autonomy that is detached from wider,

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global considerations and the common good. He also considers that it would be entirely proper to conduct experimental anti-aging techniques on people in their fifties or sixties who live in parts of the world where there are less stringent medical ethics procedures. This is an instrumental use of impoverished experimental subjects in order to foster a technology that will ultimately benefit Western societies the most.52 Such a suggestion calls for widespread scrutiny and public debate, not least because of the issues of exploitation that it raises. CONCLUSIONS I have suggested in this chapter that transhumanist enhancement technologies are not new in as much as they represent manifestations of a continual cultural drive toward perfection. As such they betray an implicit secularized eschatology, one that is bent toward goals that cannot be attained merely within finite human existence. One might even view such trends as a fragmented search for immortality, but one that is detached from any organized “life plan” as such. Furthermore, such trends are invasive in as much as prior commitments to healing particular diseases in medical contexts may be taken over by a more pervasive desire for enhancements. It is rare for medical ethicists to consider the implications of such developments, for rather than focusing on wider social trends in medicine, they are more likely to concentrate on particular individual case studies, ensuring that proper procedures for consent have been met. I have argued in this chapter that the underlying cultural issues associated with enhancement technologies need to be addressed. Christian theology can make a contribution to this discussion by outlining an eschatological perspective through the lens of resurrection hope that is critical of secular alternatives. Christianity is also realistic about the possibility of human sin, and the need to tackle attitudes that lead to the breakdown of communities through all forms of injustice and violence. I have indicated that the classic tradition of deification and participation is God is relevant here, for it permits the goal of perfection to be expressed, but takes it up into a theological category that moves self away from itself toward God. Such a doctrine can be criticized on the basis that it denies individual expression or that it leads to detachment from worldly concerns. I have resisted both interpretations. Rather, I suggest that the aspiration for theosis provides the incentive to go beyond virtues as simply learned in the human community, and recognize virtues as also attainable through the gift of God. In particular, virtues such as prudence, charity, and justice are particularly relevant in the midst of voices that would claim passive acceptance of the status quo regarding conditions of injustice.

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NOTES 1. This chapter draws heavily on previously published work, namely, Celia Deane-Drummond, “Future Perfect? God, The Transhuman Future and the Quest for Immortality,” in Future Perfect: God, Medicine and Human Identity, edited by Celia Deane-Drummond and Peter Scott (London: Continuum, 2006), 168–182. 2. Jennifer A. Doudna and Emmanuele Charpentier, “The New Frontier of Genome Engineering with CRISP-Cas9,” Science 346, no. 6213 (2014). 3. For a critical discussion of the human genome project, see Celia DeaneDrummond, Brave New World: Theology, Ethics and the Human Genome (London: SCM Press, 2003). 4. Transhumanity is more commonly understood as an alliance of humanity with technology for the specific intent of allowing human capacities to reach far beyond any “natural” limitations, set only by the technology as such. Such enhancement technologies might include the use of drugs, nanotechnology, genetic engineering, artificial implants, and so on. A case for transhumanity in relation to genetic engineering, for example, is found in N. Bostrom, “Human Genetic Enhancement: A Transhuman Perspective,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 37, no. 4 (2003): 493–506. 5. See, for example, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 6. I do not discuss their work in this chapter as I deal with this in much more detail elsewhere, namely, Celia Deane-Drummond, “The Myth of Moral Enhancement: A Theological and Evolutionary Anthropological Critique,” in Religion and Human Enhancement: Death, Values and Morality, edited by Tracy Trothen and Calvin Mercer (New York: Palgrave, 2018), 175–190. 7. J. Hedley Brooke and Geoffrey Cantor, Reconstructing Nature (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 316. 8. S. Jay Olshansky and Bruce A. Carnes, The Quest for Immortality (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 40. 9. Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park, Wonder and the Orders of Nature (New York: Zone Books, 1998), 291. 10. David A. LaVan, Terry McGuire and Robert Langer, “Small Scale Systems for in vivo Drug Delivery,” Nature Biotechnology 21 (2003): 1184–1191. 11. On February 10, 2011, for example, a special issue of the journal Nature was dedicated to this theme, flagged up as The Future Is Bright: Reflections on the First Ten Years of the Human Genomics Age. See, in particular, Eric D. Green, Mark S. Guyer and National Human Genome Research Institute, “Charting a Course for Genomic Medicine From Base Pairs to Bedside,” Nature 470 (2011): 204–213. 12. S. M. Rothman and D. J. Rothman, The Pursuit of Perfection: The Problems and Perils of Medical Enhancement (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), ix. 13. The reordering of nature also has its own historical precedents and parallels in manipulation of nonhuman nature. For further discussion of the historical, social, cultural, theological, and ethical aspects of manipulating the natural world, see C. Deane-Drummond and B. Szerszynski, Reordering Nature: Theology, Society and the New Genetics (London: T&T Clark, 2003).

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14. Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 5. 15. Ibid., 6. 16. Ibid., 7. 17. Ibid., 160. 18. Ibid., 199. 19. J. Moltmann, In the End—the Beginning (London: SCM Press, 2004), 152. 20. Jürgen Moltmann has pioneered the renewal of eschatology in Christian theology, as evidenced by a number of publications. See, in particular, his earlier, Theology of Hope (London: SCM Press, 1967), The Coming of God (London: SCM Press, 1996), and also Science and Wisdom (London: SCM Press, 2003) and In the End—the Beginning (London: SCM Press, 2004). 21. Antje Jackelén, Time and Eternity (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2005), 213. 22. I would not necessarily want to rule out exceptions this general principle. For example, the use of CRISPR-Cas9 technology to remove the single gene responsible for Tay-Sachs disease could potentially be endorsed. Part of the difficulty even in this case is the slippery slope: there are ethical issues associated with the manipulation of human embryos and once developed such tools could be used for other less pressing uses. Further, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) can be used to screen for this disease, so, apart from the usual objections to IVF, there seems to be no really pressing reason why such a technology would need to be introduced in such case. This is also true of other single gene diseases that are the most likely initial targets for CRISPR-Cas9: if the genetics is known, then defective genes can be screened out through use of PGD. For further discussion of the ethics of genetic testing, see Celia Deane-Drummond, Genetics and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 76–100. 23. Paul Griffiths is an exception here. He argues for an intermediate state and assumes a strong dualism of the body and soul. See P. Griffiths, Decreation: The Last Things of All Creatures (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2015), 173–190. 24. Jackelén, Time and Eternity, 217. This would also be consistent with transhuman dreams, though transhumanity might view survival of information as being sufficient to define immortality. 25. Jackelén, Time and Eternity, 218. 26. Moltmann, In the End—the Beginning, 104–108. 27. See, for example, J. Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions (London: SCM Press, 1990); Moltmann, The Coming of God. 28. Ernst Conradie, An Ecological Christian Anthropology: At Home on Earth? (Basingstoke: Ashgate, 2005), 68–70. 29. Conradie, Ecological Christian Anthropology, 157. 30. Ibid. 31. Rothman and Rothman, The Pursuit of Perfection, xviii. 32. Peter Vardy, Being Human: Fulfilling Genetic and Spiritual Potential (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2003), 67.

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33. One of the most prominent Eastern writers in this vein was the fourteenthcentury theologian Gregory Palamas. See Gergios Mantzaridis, The Deification of Man (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984). 34. Rowan Williams, “Gregory of Nyssa on Mind and Passion,” in Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity, edited by Lionel Wickham and Caroline P. Bammel (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 244. 35. Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 89. 36. Louth, Origins, 89. 37. For a discussion of this point, see Emil Bartos, Deification in Eastern Orthodox Theology: An Evaluation and Critique of the Theology of Dumitru Stãniloae (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 46. 38. Anna N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 39. Ibid., 39. 40. Ibid., 66. 41. Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, trans. A. J. Malherbe and E. Ferguson (New York: Paulist, 1978), 1.7, 31. I am grateful to Peter Heltzel for pointing to the explicit link between theosis and attainment of virtues in the work of Gregory of Nyssa. 42. Moltmann, The Coming of God, 324. 43. Celia Deane-Drummond, The Ethics of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 44. For a discussion in relation to biotechnology generally, see Deane-Drummond, The Ethics of Nature, 86–110. For a discussion in relation to alternative genetic technologies, see Deane-Drummond, Genetics and Christian Ethics. 45. Moltmann, The Coming of God, 335. 46. J. Moltmann, Creating a Just Future (London: SCM Press, 1989). 47. Peter Wenz, “Engineering Genetic Injustice,” Bioethics 19, no. 1 (2005): 1–11. 48. Ibid., 10. 49. Jayne C. Lucke and Wayne Hall, “Who Wants to Live Forever?,” EMBO Reports 6, no. 2 (2005): 98–102. 50. John Harris, “Immortal Ethics,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1019 (2004): 527–534. 51. EMBO, “Interview: Curing Ageing and the Consequences,” EMBO Reports 6, no. 3 (2005): 198–201. 52. Ibid., 200.

Chapter 24

Moral Enhancement, the Virtues, and Transhumanism Moving beyond Gene Editing Braden Molhoek

Central to the transhumanist (H+) vision is moving beyond what we currently consider human. Oxford transhumanist Nick Bostrom constructs his vision of the future human-in-transition-to-posthuman on the concept of enhancement. “Enhancement,” Bostrom says, is “an intervention that improves the functioning of some subsystem of an organism beyond its reference state; or that creates an entirely new functioning or subsystem that the organism previously lacked.”1 The tools for enhancing the human include genetic engineering, nanotechnology, information technology, artificial intelligence, intelligence amplification, and countless other innovations yet to be developed. The transhumanist puts gene editing into his or her tool box right along with nano-bio-technology. Whether enhancement is achieved through the amplification of existing traits and abilities, through incorporating new traits and abilities into the human genome, or through the merging of the biological and the electromechanical, the H+ belief is that these changes will make people better. Because of this, scholars of transhumanism explore the category of moral enhancement and, within this category, the concept of virtue. Elsewhere I have addressed the question of whether gene editing alone can create virtue, but there was nothing in that argument that was specific to transhumanism. Gene editing itself does not necessarily lead to becoming posthuman.2 In this chapter, then, I will adapt the framework I used previously to evaluate virtue in the context of gene editing and expand it to include the more radical changes imagined in transhumanism. The framework has five parts, some of which are easily adapted to transhumanism, and some of

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which need modifications in light of the potential for greater changes through transhumanism. In order to speak of the possibility of engineering virtue through either gene editing in particular or technological innovation in general, one must presuppose an anthropology that holds humanity is open to essential change. With the assumption that change is possible, the question then becomes whether there is a relationship between genetic inheritance and virtue. Once a link between these two exists, then the question becomes what gene editing would be beneficial to the enhancement of human ethical action.3 Because gene editing can be either isolated to an individual or can be passed on to future generations, the question must be asked whether there is a difference between these two, that is, between somatic or germline changes. The last question to ask is whether gene editing is the best approach to moral enhancement or the engineering of virtue.4 Bringing this framework into the discussion of transhumanism shows how some of these concerns are only relevant to genetic forms of moral enhancement, and other aspects are amplified or expanded when other forms of change are included. HUMAN NATURE, CHANGE, AND VIRTUE The first part of any enhancement framework is its underlying anthropology. In our case, we note that virtues are connected to the inherent nature of an organism. They are species specific. The virtues we human beings strive for are specific to Homo sapiens. This becomes relevant to any proposal to create a posthuman. Many scholars have argued that there are some virtues that humans share with other organisms, such as biological growth. But because there are aspects of human nature that other organisms do not share, there are virtues that are specific only to humans. Aristotle, for example, argued that humans alone possess reason. Therefore, there are virtues related to the use of reason, such as practical wisdom, that other organisms do not strive for. Modern science is making this species-specific claim increasingly problematic, because some scholars blur the line between species.5 They argue against any sense of human uniqueness, showing overlap with other hominid species that lived at the same time as early modern humans.6 But addressing this debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is more relevant for the argument at hand to look to the future and see how changes to human nature might affect our understanding of human and posthuman virtue. Because human virtues are tied to a normative understanding of human nature, if someone wants to enhance or engineer virtue they must have an understanding of human nature that allows for such changes to

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be made. In the context of gene editing this means that the underlying anthropology needs to allow for change to occur through evolution and genetic inheritance.7 This is much less of an issue in the context of transhumanism. The whole point of transhumanism is to take control of human evolution and reshape either what it means to be human, or to create one or more new species that have evolved or transformed from modern humans. This is where the “trans” comes into transhumanism. The changes they seek are transitional, the steps between the human and the posthuman.8 So not only do transhumanists believe that changing human nature is possible, it is essential to their plans. Therefore, the more important question in this context is not if human nature is malleable, but rather at what point do changes result in a new essential nature.9 This is not a question that I believe can be answered at this time, but imagine if augmented humans were half again as tall as the average human, were considered five times as intelligent as humans due to digitally enhanced memory and neural implants that allow for faster thought and greater connectivity to both information and other thinking agents, and ten times as strong due to cybernetic limbs. Would such beings be considered human, or would enough changes have been made that they are no longer Homo sapiens, but something new? Brian Green argues that even acquiring new powers is not a clear-cut example of becoming something new. The question is whether this new ability creates “new beings or just plain old humans actualizing latent potencies?”10 Drawing upon Thomas Aquinas and Hans Jonas, Green argues that human “first nature,” the biological, has remained very similar across humanity for many generations, while human “second nature,” including culture and technology, has changed tremendously, which has greatly increased human power and therefore our need to act ethically.11 However, H+ is not a monolithic position. In the Transhumanist Declaration, the final statement says that “transhumanism advocates for the well-being of all sentience (whether in artificial intellects, humans, posthumans, or nonhuman animals) and encompasses many principles of modern humanism. Transhumanism does not support any particular party, politician or political platform.”12 Developed further in the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) document is their understanding of posthuman. The basic definition of posthuman is “possible future beings whose basic capacities so radically exceed those of present humans as to be no longer unambiguously human by our current standards.”13 It is also made clear that the existence of posthumans does not mean that humans no longer exist, nor does it mean that all transhumanists desire to be posthuman. The FAQ states that “many transhumanists wish to follow life paths which would, sooner or later, require growing into

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posthuman persons.”14 There are a variety of forms posthumans could take, including completely synthetic artificial intelligences, or they could be enhanced uploads . . . or they could be the result of making many smaller but cumulatively profound augmentations to a biological human. The latter alternative would probably require either the redesign of the human organism using advanced nanotechnology or its radical enhancement using some combination of technologies such as genetic engineering, psychopharmacology, anti-aging therapies, neural interfaces, advanced information management tools, memory enhancing drugs, wearable computers, and cognitive techniques.15

The diversity of ways in which enhancements could be pursued or how posthumans could be created reinforces that H+ allow for a great deal of individual choice and freedom regarding how one transcends the current constraints of biology. Nick Bostrom also argues that it is problematic to draw a distinct line between modern humans, enhanced humans, and posthumans. Instead, he believes it is “much more likely that there would be a continuum of differently modified or enhanced individuals, which would overlap with the continuum of as-yet unenhanced humans.”16 So while transhumanists desire to move beyond humanity’s current biological limits, it should be recognized that there is a wide spectrum of modifications, enhancements, and goals. Perhaps the most extreme of choices on this spectrum is the abandonment of biological bodies or at least human-like biological bodies. Ray Kurzweil is one of the leading proponents of mind uploading, that is, uploading one’s consciousness into computers and either living a digital existence or downloading that consciousness into one or more bodies. Kurzweil has said that “by 2030, we’ll have the means to scan the human brain and re-create its design electronically.”17 In reflecting on the nature of consciousness and identity, Kurzweil claims that it is the pattern that endures the most, so if a person scanned their brain and had their neural pattern uploaded into a computer, both would have a claim on personal identity because they share a pattern, even if they are not the same individual.18 Even if biological bodies continue to exist for some time, Kurzweil believes that in the end “the earth’s technology-creating species will merge with its own computational technology.”19 While posthuman bodies could be similar to modern humans or genetically enhanced humans, there is nothing that requires this. Bodies comprised of other materials, including completely mechanical bodies, would hold advantages in exploring or living in environments that differ greatly from that of Earth. Not all transhumanists share Kurzweil’s optimism. The Transhumanist FAQ acknowledges that not all transhumanists believe that mind uploading is

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possible.20 Patrick D. Hopkins argues that mind uploading would not achieve what transhumanists want. The idea behind mind uploading he says is “that by replicating the architecture of the brain in another substrate, we would be transferring the mind or the consciousness of that brain to the new physical system.”21 The issue is that in the language used, there is an assumption that the mind is in the brain and can be transferred from one container, the human brain, to another container with the same structure, digitally. This is actually a dualist approach and not the materialist perspective. They are treating the mind, according to Hopkins, like religious people talk about the soul or even the way in which people speak of ghosts.22 Even if it is possible for mind uploading to work the way Kurzweil presumes, the Transhumanist FAQ states that “many transhumanists have a pragmatic attitude: whether they would like to upload or not depends on the precise conditions in which they would live as uploads and what the alternatives are.”23 Michael Laakasuo et al. conducted a series of studies to identify the things that influence people the most in their acceptance or rejection of the idea of mind uploading. The results were that “people who value purity norms and have higher sexual disgust sensitivity are more inclined to condemn” mind uploading.24 The factors that made people more likely to accept the idea of mind uploading were anxiety about death, condemning suicide, and a higher level of science fiction literacy (on the Science Fiction Hobbyism Scale).25 For any discussion of virtue, the amount of change to human nature matters. If abilities are only enhanced and human nature remains the same, then the current virtues are still relevant. Jean Porter points out that this kind of change happens in every mature moral agent. Children have to be taught certain behaviors, and through education, but also experience, they are able to increase their deliberative capacities, but this kind of enhancement does not alter human nature, it helps actualize potential that already existed.26 As I have argued previously in an article about gene editing and virtue, enhancing abilities does not actually engineer virtue; it only increases the capacity to act morally.27 Formally, a virtue is a stable disposition that is the mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency; but the actual mean is different for each individual, because people have different combinations of genetic predispositions and behavior. For example, some people have a greater predisposition to be courageous than others. What might be considered courageous for one person, such as the giving of a public speech by someone who does not like appearing before large groups of people, would not be considered courageous for someone who is not afraid of crowds. In other words, having a greater capacity to act virtuously does not mean less effort is needed to develop a virtue. Rather it means that the threshold for

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what is considered virtuous is raised above and beyond what it would be for a person without such predispositions. This is a vital point in the discussion of moral enhancement, because it highlights the difference between moral capacity and virtue, a topic which will be given greater attention in a later section.28 If, however, transhumanists change human nature so much that we no longer identify the resulting individuals as human, then this new nature would require new virtues to be acquired. In the final section of this chapter, I will return to this point and suggest what some important virtues might be in light of such drastic changes to human nature. GENETIC INHERITANCE AND VIRTUE The second part of the framework examines whether there is a link between genetic change and the virtues themselves. If there was no way for genetics to play a role in the behaviors that lead to virtue or vice, then gene editing would not be a useful way to speak of enhancing morality.29 On the other hand, if all behaviors that contribute to the virtues are completely determined by genetics, then gene editing would be the only way to improve moral capacity.30 The truth lies somewhere in the middle for several reasons. First of all, I assume that humans have libertarian free will and not everything they do is determined genetically.31 The other reason is that not every behavior is influenced only by genetics. Not every trait that has a genetic link is controlled completely by genetics.32 Intelligence, for example, has genetic links, but does not account for all variance between individuals. Studies have determined that roughly half the difference that is found in intelligence between individuals has a genetic basis.33 Other environmental factors also play a role in the process. That being said, genes do have some effect on various aspects of human nature or at least provide predispositions toward traits and behaviors. As was stated in the previous section, people have different predispositions toward behaviors that affect the virtues. People who are more willing to take risks are likely to engage in behavior that would be considered courageous than people who are more risk averse.34 Some of these differences come from environment, such as how people were raised, early experiences that made taking risks feel more or less safe, and so on, but some of these differences are also from genetic variation. Since this is the case, then it can be said that there are some specific ways in which genetic change could influence human moral enhancement. Again, the discussion of moral enhancement in the context of nanobio-technology makes this much less of a concern. Even if there were no way to biologically affect traits or characteristics that influence virtue,

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transhumanists could look to other methods of change. Human capacities could be augmented or even replaced by cybernetic implants and AI-enabled devices. Even if there is no genetic link to memory, artificial devices could be used to improve its function. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has already done experiments that have shown an implanted device can lead to improving short-term memory by roughly 35 percent.35 Elon Musk states that his company Neuralink will be able to improve human cognition and memory, leading to the networking of minds and the downloading of skills that movie fans have longed for since the release of The Matrix.36 While these changes are designed to restore function in individuals who have lost certain mental functions, it is not hard to imagine how they could also lead to enhancement of human mental functions in general. Musk argues that humans need to merge their mental capacities with elements of artificial intelligence in order to keep up with AI in general. While in the context of gene editing there needs to be a link between genetic variation and behaviors or traits that affect the virtues, in the context of transhumanism this link is not necessary. What is necessary is that the method of change must be able to bring about modifications in human behavior or capacities, and that can be done in ways that are not biological or genetic whatsoever. In the next section, more examples of what would constitute changes in behavior that would affect the virtues will be explored, but for now it is sufficient to focus on the means of change. Implants have been listed so far, but change may not require implanted devices at all, rather it could simply mean engaging with technology in ways that help shape thought and behavior. An example of this could be using wearable technology and utilizing biofeedback to be more aware of how one is feeling and how to regulate emotions, allowing a person to act in ways that might not have been possible without that awareness. Another non-invasive example is to utilize virtual reality (VR) technology in order to train for specific scenarios or to get a glimpse into perspectives that one would otherwise not be able to experience. WHAT SPECIFIC CHANGES WOULD BE USEFUL FOR MORAL ENHANCEMENT? Once it is clear that human nature can be significantly if not essentially changed, and that there are ways that change could affect behavior or traits that contribute to the virtues, then the focus must turn to what kinds of concrete changes could actually lead to meaningful moral enhancement. In the context of gene editing, I restricted my analysis to the cardinal virtues: courage, justice, temperance, and prudence and tried to find specific genetic

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changes that could contribute to the acquisition of virtue.37 As stated in the previous sections, transhumanism can include gene editing, so these insights are still relevant, but the scope of what kind of change is possible extends far beyond just gene editing, so additional attention will need to be given to nongenetic changes that affect virtue. Courage—Genetic Change Courage is acting despite one’s fears, not an absence of fear. The deficiency of courage is cowardice, a refusal to act, and the excess is foolhardiness, acting when it is not prudent. In my examination of genes that could affect courage, I focused on economic risk aversion, citing two genes that scientists believe contribute to risk taking in a financial context. Since people who have the short/short combination of alleles for the 5-HTTLRP gene are more likely to take fewer risks, 28 percent less than the average amount of risk, then editing this gene to either a short/long combination of alleles or the long/ long combination of alleles would likely make an individual more likely to take financial risks. The same researchers also found that people who had the seven-repeat allele of the D4 dopamine receptor gene (DRD4) were more likely to take risks, 25 percent more than the average.38 Courage—Non-genetic Change There are a number of ways that behavior surrounding courage could be altered, with varying degrees of invasiveness. The simplest of these changes is education. If someone is afraid of acting in a certain situation, whether it be war, dating, or job interviews, learning what actually happens and what is expected in these situations can help people overcome misconceptions and be better prepared to act. While education can be helpful, it also has its limits; studying about something is not the same thing as experiencing it. Advances in nano-bio-technology might allow for more realistic simulations, with VR receiving a great deal of attention for both entertainment and research. In the context of courage, scientists have been using VR in order to help people overcome acrophobia, the fear of heights, since 1995.39 VR treatment allows a therapist and their patient to work on the fear in the office, reducing money and time spent on going somewhere to experience real life exposure. It also permits the patient to not be embarrassed in public settings.40 For these reasons, VR has become the dominant treatment approach for acrophobia.41 A more invasive way of helping people act courageously would be to alter their body chemistry. For decades, students have been abusing Adderall (a mixture of several amphetamines) in order to increase their mental focus or be able to study for longer periods of time. Even though only 20 percent

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of college students have self-identified to abusing Adderall, researchers are unsure how many students are not reporting their abuse.42 Drugs such as Adderall (amphetamine) could help in the context of courage,43 but adrenaline is a natural hormone that could also aid in acting despite one’s fears. Chemicals to help cognition, reaction time, strength, or other characteristics could be injected by the individual each time it is needed, or a device like an insulin pump could be attached to the outside of the body or implanted inside the body, allowing for more precise dosing.44 Justice—Genetic Change Researchers have yet to find specific genes that contribute to justice though some have been proposed for fairness.45 In a 2010 study, Zhong et al. argued that they have found a genetic component to people’s preference for fairness, measured by using the ultimatum game, which can be summarized as “two individuals decide on how to divide a sum of money, with one proposing the share while the second deciding whether to accept.”46 The genetic link they identify is the DRD4, specifically, the DRD4 48 VNTR variant, which also has links to “attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and personality traits including novelty seeking and self-report altruism.”47 Zhong’s study supports previous work that “subjects with 4-repeat allele of DRD4 48 bp VNTR have a higher score of self-reported altruism and lower tendency to be aggressive. These appear consistent with our finding that subjects with 4-repeat allele are more sensitive to sense of fairness.”48 Of note is that this study has racial implications that are worthy of scrutiny and skepticism, because these alleles vary by population, and of course the racial undertones of transhumanism in general should not be ignored.49 There are critics of the use of the ultimatum game to determine fairness as a universal concept, however. Joseph Henrich has used the ultimatum game and public goods games with various cultures and has reported three findings: First, results from both the Ultimatum (bargaining) and Public Goods Games indicate much greater between group variation than previous work has suggested; second, if individual economic decisions vary as a consequence of differences in individuals’ circumstances, then variables such as wealth, household size, age, and sex should provide some explanatory power, but in fact individual level economic and demographic variables do not account for much, if any, of the variation found; and finally, despite the failure of individual level variables to explain variation, the results seem to reflect group level differences in the economic life of these groups, as captured in numerous ethnographic accounts.50

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For example, the Machiguenga in the Peruvian Amazon tended to offer less than other groups but also rejected offers less than 20 percent of time, statistically significant compared to other groups.51 People from the Machiguenga who worked as cash croppers usually have more money compared to others in their society and tended to offer more in the ultimatum game, but researchers believe that because these individuals also speak Spanish better and have more contact with people outside of their culture, it is these factors that make them “more likely to have acquired different norms of fairness. Postgame interviews further suggest that these Machiguenga have acquired some ideas about ‘what’s fair’ from non-Machiguenga.”52 In other words, Henrich argues that it is environmental factors that contribute to differences in understandings of fairness, not a genetic predisposition. More recent work has tried to make sense of the contradictions in preexisting work by trying to determine “whether the neural basis of psychological process induced by fairness during the UG is under genetic control” by using functional magnetic resonance imaging twin studies.53 Yun Wang et al. discovered that the parts of the brain involved in the rejection of offers in the ultimatum game were found in the “bilateral anterior insular cortices” and that there was a genetic link to this activity.54 However, the research team does not identify what the specific genetic link is, and they also reject the notion that genes are the only factor. Rather they conclude by saying that whatever the genetic correlate is, that it “influences the brain activity evoked by unfair proposals in the bilateral insular cortices, suggesting the detection of fairness norm violation is partially hardwired into our brain.”55 These results are similar to the other genetic links discussed in this chapter; while genes may play a role in traits and predispositions, it is rarely the sole contributing factor. Empathy is also an important trait that would influence one’s deliberation of what constitutes justice. Using data provided by the company 23andMe, researchers in 2018 tried to determine how much of an individual’s empathy quotient (EQ) was linked to the genome. Although these researchers identified eleven potential places on the genome, none of those locations were statistically significant using that data set.56 In general, the researchers argue that approximately one-third of an individual’s EQ was affected by their genetics.57 Justice—Non-genetic Change Education is again the first alternative to gene editing to enhance moral capacities contributing to justice. Learning more about history, ethics, and political thought all can help contribute to better understanding and reflecting on what one owes another. Additionally, I would argue that learning more

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about people’s stories and experiences will do as much, if not more than the other forms of education. It makes the situation more personal, allowing empathy and sympathy to play larger roles in the analysis. Increasing empathy through gene editing was mentioned as a way to help inform justice, but there is also work being done using VR to help people increase empathy and reduce bias. Through administering the Implicit Association Test before and after VR sessions, early research has found that people who had been assigned a darker skinned avatar scored lower for implicit bias in the second test.58 This kind of VR treatment is not anywhere near as established as it is for acrophobia, but researchers do believe it holds great promise for being able to help people gain insight into what it is like to experience life as someone else.59 The last kind of non-genetic enhancement to be explored in this section is the incorporation of AI in tandem with human reasoning to better process information and again to hopefully reduce bias. States are already turning to AI algorithms in order to ensure fair or just criminal sentencing, trying to eliminate bias. In 2018, California passed Senate Bill 10, also referred to as the California Money Bail Reform Act, which allows the state “to deploy algorithmic pretrial risk assessment to combat socioeconomic disparities in the criminal justice system.”60 This is only one example, with the National Council of State Legislatures stating that half of the U.S. states either have passed a law about risk assessment and pretrial assessment or have had serious debate about it.61 The intent of such measures is to provide AI with the relevant data and let the algorithm provide fair results. The problem is that bias still exists in these algorithms. In a recent report, the Center for Court Innovation argues that “while our risk assessment tool performed similarly across racial and ethnic groups in terms of its overall predictive accuracy, when we looked at the types of errors made by our assessment, it was more likely to misclassify black defendants as high-risk when compared to Hispanic or white defendants. If high-risk classification leads to an increased likelihood of high bail or pretrial detention, our tool would potentially foster racially-disparate pretrial outcomes.”62 The current iterations of these algorithms are still problematic, but it is possible that one day, the algorithm alone, or in cooperation with human oversight, could allow for an increase in the ability to act justly. Temperance—Genetic Change As the regulation of bodily pleasures such as food, drink, and sex, temperance is a virtue that has genetic links. The brain plays a role in feeling satisfied as well, and researchers have found that dopamine, leptin, and opioid receptors are a part of this system.63 Studies have found that there are two related genes

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that affect body mass index (BMI), with certain combinations of alleles having a compounding effect. The first of these genes is the DRD2 gene, with the Taq1 A1 allele leading to higher BMI levels. If individuals have this allele and the Lys109R allele of the LEPR gene, this correlated with the highest BMIs of any combinations of alleles for these two genes. Changing the alleles that lead to higher BMIs would likely reduce overeating, doing a better job of regulating caloric intake. Since temperance does regulate drinking as well, alcoholism is another target for gene editing. Scholars believe that there is a 50 percent genetic link to alcoholism, so gene editing could make a significant difference in behavior. There are no specific genes that are known to be tied directly to alcoholism right now, but it is believed that serotonin receptors play a role, as do genes that regulate gamma-aminobutyric acid.64 Temperance—Non-genetic Change There is currently a market for non-genetic changes to human behavior that influences temperance, the diet and supplement industries. There are a variety of products and behaviors that are meant to help control appetite and reduce caloric intake, from intermittent fasting, following certain nutrition plans to focus on foods that make one feel full, to following a diet like the keto diet designed to help the body convert stored fat into energy. As more research is put into human nutrition, these kinds of products will only become more numerous over time. There is some emerging research that using oxytocin in the form of an inhaled spray can affect brain chemistry. Overweight and obese men after fasting and using the spray showed less brain oxygenation when presented with high calorie foods.65 In other words, the oxytocin interrupted the cycle of reward and the consumption of calorically dense foods, theoretically reducing overeating and promoting more temperate behavior. Being able to take real-time readings of various vital signs would be extremely useful to modern medicine, and strides are being made in this direction. Continuous glucose monitors for diabetics are helping people administer more precise doses of insulin, hoping to avoid some of the adverse side effects of overcorrecting blood sugar levels.66 It could be possible eventually to monitor everything that enters the body, allowing for better tracking of caloric intake. An artificial stomach could be developed that would restrict what a person could eat in day, based on their weight, current vital signs, and the amount of exercise done that day. This would effectively replace the virtue of temperance, because it would no longer take individual action to control what one eats or drinks, this would be controlled by an AI with access to your biological information. It is even possible that in posthumans temperance would no longer be a virtue. If one’s consciousness is uploaded

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to a computer, the resulting individual would have no need of food, drink, or sex. The very existence of that being would be so different than modern humans that it would not have need for a disposition that controls these no longer existing functions. Prudence—Genetic Change Prudence, like justice, does not have any known direct links to specific genes, but there are traits that would assist in the deliberation of practical wisdom. Any gene that is related to cognitive ability would have an impact on prudence, as well as any genes that contribute to genetic variation of intelligence. The genes identified in the previous sections could help improve prudence because if one is more empathetic and their physical desires are regulated then one is more likely to make better decisions. Increasing memory and intelligence would also likely lead to improved moral deliberation.67 Prudence—Non-genetic Change As with the genetic changes that could contribute to prudence, many of the examples cited in the previous sections would contribute to an improved use of practical wisdom. Having increased cognitive abilities and a superior memory would help, as would having access to unbiased algorithms. Devices such as Musk’s Neuralink could create connections between people’s minds and allow for group processing of problems or situations. This ability would be greatly amplified if one’s existence were purely digital and such beings could reason at the speed of modern supercomputers or even faster, connected to the entirety of human knowledge through the Internet, but would also expose individuals to all of the rhetoric, false information, conspiracy theories, and deep fakes found online. INDIVIDUAL/PERSONAL ENHANCEMENT VERSUS PERMANENT/INHERITED ENHANCEMENT An important distinction in the discussion of the ethics of gene editing is the difference between somatic and germline modification. Somatic gene editing changes the genes of an individual and those changes only alter specific parts of that individual. Germline gene editing, on the other hand, alters the DNA of the cells that produce gametes, human reproductive cells. Therefore, germline modification is passed on to future generations and is seen as a permanent change to the human genome. Because of this, researchers have expressed concerns about utilizing germline editing. Most countries do not

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permit research in germline modification, with few exceptions for clinical trials, based on “compelling purposes” only.68 It is because of the permanent nature of germline modification as well as a lack of knowledge about the long-term consequences for individuals that I believe extreme caution should be exercised in the use of germline modification. At the end of 2019, He Jiankui, a Chinese scientist who used CRISPR gene editing technology to modify human embryos,69 was sentenced to three years in prison and is now forbidden from doing any future research involving assisted reproductive technology.70 Even without knowledge of any long-term effects of gene editing, there are those who support the use of germline modification. Using germline modification instead of somatic cell gene editing would lead to the eradication of single gene diseases much faster.71 Instead of having to modify the genes of every individual that has a genetic disease, such as Huntington’s disease, modifying the germline of people who have the allele that leads to the gene would keep them from passing on this inherited condition. Proponents say this is cheaper and more humane than the alternative of “treating” each affected individual. Robert Ranisch argues that germline modification would be better than somatic therapy for diseases that are already present by birth such as “lysosomal storage disorders.”72 Germline modification, he continues, is a superior form of treatment for degenerative diseases like Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) because “DMD and other disorders also affect widespread and different types of tissues, making it difficult for a somatic therapy to reach all affected cells.”73 If society wanted to encourage moral enhancement, some would argue that germline modification would have a longer lasting impact than genetic changes that are not passed on to future generations.74 Ranisch summarizes this argument in a concise phrase, that germline modification “could avoid a disease in a future child, PGD and selection avoid a future child with a disease.”75 In other words, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis allows parents to choose embryos to implant that do not have heritable diseases, whereas germline modification would allow any embryo to be implanted once the genes in question were modified. Non-genetic and non-invasive forms of moral enhancement, such as biofeedback or training using VR, can be seen as analogous to somatic gene editing. The enhancements achieved by these means affect only the individual who is using them and will not be passed on to future generations. Cybernetic implants represent a middle ground. It is possible that the use of implants could be restricted to a single individual, but it is also possible that these could be considered property and could be sold like used cars or appliances, or even a part of an estate and inherited in the legal sense when the original owner passes away. Memory implants might even be able to store the memory of the original user and allow any subsequent user to have access

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to or even feel like they experienced emotions or events of previous users. Technology such as mind uploading would be a permanent form of change like germline modification. Giving up a biological body to exist digitally in computers and downloading an uploaded consciousness into a different kind of body are extreme examples, because these are far different in scope than a human genome where one or even multiple single gene diseases have been removed. THE BEST WAY FOR MORAL ENHANCEMENT? The fifth and final part of the framework used to evaluate engineering virtue in the context of gene editing focused on whether this was the most effective means of moral enhancement. CRISPR has made gene editing easier and less expensive, but the technology is still not to a point where the average person could afford to make any change to their genome that they desired.76 These concerns, combined with a lack of knowledge about the long-term effects on individuals who undergo gene editing, change the focus to whether gene editing is the best way to bring about change. Given that genes are only a part of many traits or behaviors, one could argue that there could be more efficient or effective means of enhancing moral capacity. While genes may contribute to 50 percent of a predisposition toward alcoholism77 or 50 percent of variation in intelligence,78 genetics only contribute roughly a third of variation in one’s EQ.79 Risk aversion had even less of a genetic link, with the seven-repeat allele of DRD4 leading to only a 25 percent increase in risk taking compared to the average.80 In all of these cases, genetic links contribute the same amount or less variation than environmental factors.81 Perhaps less permanent or less expensive alternatives exist? In the discussion of temperance, leptin receptors were mentioned to play a role in satisfaction, controlling hunger. If there were a way to create a leptin treatment such as a pill that people could take to help regulate hunger, this could be an alternative to gene editing. VR training could offer similar or even greater results to modifying behavior, without being invasive to the body at all. While the existence of alternatives to gene editing raises questions about whether gene editing should be pursued in specific cases of moral enhancement, this argument does not restrict transhumanists from seeking non-genetic forms of moral enhancement. Examples from previous sections provide meaningful ways in which human capacities can be trained by VR or AI, augmented or amplified by technology, or even replaced by implants or the abandonment of the biological altogether. The ethical questions faced by a researcher utilizing gene editing might be whether or

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not this is a safe method, whether it is cost effective given the scarcity of medical resources, or how many people would have access to developed treatments. Transhumanists, though possibly concerned with these questions, can look to a wider tool kit in order to bring about the kind of change they desire. CONCLUSION The analysis of various methods of moral enhancement should make it clear why it is problematic to speak of engineering virtue. Enhancing one’s moral capacity does not make one more virtuous, it simply increases the ability to act ethically. Virtues are stable dispositions that require habituation. Increasing moral capacity will likely make a person more able to act ethically but it does not infuse virtue, as one’s moral capacities increase so do the requirements to reach the means of the virtues.82 Though a clear point has not been defined, eventually enough change will occur that human nature is transformed to something new. When this happens, it is likely that new virtues will also be needed for these new organisms. The clearest example of how changes to human nature could lead to changes in what virtues are needed for posthuman species was discussed in the section on temperance. People without biological bodies, whether they are a digital consciousness living in a computer or any networked group of computers, or a digital consciousness downloaded into a purely mechanical body, bodily desires that temperance oversees would not be present, meaning that the nature of such posthumans would be such that temperance would not be a virtue for them. It is not only the removal of virtues that is possible but also the addition of new virtues. Imagining a society that includes non-enhanced humans, enhanced humans, and multiple posthuman species, including some living a purely digital existence, I would argue that coexistence is a virtue that any enhanced organism would need to develop. If your species is vastly more intelligent than another species, it would not be surprising if the more intelligent organisms either sought power over the others, or at best advocated and at worst forced enhancements upon the unwilling for their own good. A virtue of coexistence, where other species are able to live as they think is best, would help enhanced beings develop an excess of power, the vice of tyranny. Coexistence would also avoid the deficiency of power, capitulation, or subservience. Because the virtues are species specific, it stands to reason that there would be a virtue connected to either the incorporation of a great deal of cybernetic implants with a biological body or a completely non-biological

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existence. One such virtue could be compatibility. This would be a virtue distinct from coexistence. Coexistence would be about how widely varied species relate to and respect one another’s ways of life. Compatibility would be more focused on the connectivity between living organisms. Instead of proprietary technology that would create barriers between cybernetic individuals as well as between different species, compatibility would be about establishing and maintaining connections between individuals and peoples. Compatibility would be the mean between assimilation on one hand, where all organisms had to do things the exact same way, have a uniform culture and no individuality, and isolationism on the other hand, where implants or non-biological components are so different from any other prosthetic, implant, or body that there is no possibility for connection. To compare it to modern technology it would be like having a universal port between all devices but the design and style of technology is still allowed all kinds of customization. There is one last matter I want to address in the context of moral enhancement and transhumanism. While transhumanists want to be able to make the choice on their own as to what enhancements they can pursue, I would argue that there are some enhancements that should be prioritized over others. Given the permanent nature of gene editing, particularly germline modification, it seems that it would be safer at this time to promote non-invasive forms of enhancement. Education and VR training are cheaper and more accessible to a greater number of people than more invasive forms of enhancement are currently. While transhumanists may want to change human aesthetics or increase physical capacities such as speed and strength, I believe that resources would be better spent pursuing moral enhancements. Increased strength, speed, intelligence, or any other number of traits on their own are not inherently problematic, but there are numerous examples throughout history that power is used to control or denigrate people. Although the desire for enhancement is for self-improvement or even self-transcendence, there is no guarantee that these changes would benefit society as a whole if all forms of enhancement were legalized. In fact, the best way to try to ensure that enhancement will do more to help society than harm is to prioritize research in and incorporation of moral enhancements, because regardless of what other enhancements people receive, if their capacities for moral deliberation, empathy, understanding of justice, and how to enact it are enhanced, people will be more able to act in an ethical manner. Even if these changes do not result in engineered virtue, a population that has greater moral capacities should result in a better society for whoever lives in it, whether they are modern humans, enhanced humans, or posthumans.

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NOTES 1. Nick Bostrom, “Dignity and Enhancement,” Human Dignity and Bioethics, ed., U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington, DC: www​.bioethics​.gov, 2008), 173–206, at 179, https://www​.academia​.edu​/38307610​/Human​_dignity​_and​ _bioethics​?email​_work​_card​=thumbnail​-desktop. 2. Research and concepts in this text have appeared in a previous publication. Braden Molhoek, “Raising the Virtuous Bar: The Underlying Issues of Genetic Moral Enhancement,” Theology and Science 16, no. 3 (June 2018): 279–287, http://dx​.doi​ .org​/10​.1080​/14746700​.2018​.1488474. 3. Arvin M. Gouw, “Challenging the Therapy/Enhancement Distinction in CRISPR Gene Editing,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, ed. David Boonin (Springer Verlag, 2018), 502–503. 4. Molhoek, “Raising the Virtuous Bar,” 279. 5. Oliver Putz, “Moral Apes, Human Uniqueness, and the Image of God,” Zygon(r) 44, no. 3 (October 2009): 613–624, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​.1467​-9744​ .2009​.01019​.x. 6. Joshua M. Moritz, “Human Uniqueness, The Other Hominids, and ‘Anthropocentrism of the Gaps’ in The Religion and Science Dialogue,” Zygon® 47, no. 1 (February 2012): 65–96, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​.1467​-9744​.2011​ .01240​.x. 7. Molhoek, “Raising the Virtuous Bar,” 280. 8. Ted Peters, “Boarding the Transhumanist Train: How Far Should the Christian Ride?,” in The Transhumanism Handbook, ed. Newton Lee (Los Angeles: Springer, 2019), 795–804. 9. Brian Patrick Green, “Transhumanism and Catholic Natural Law: Changing Human Nature and Changing Moral Norms,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, eds. Calvin Mercer and Tracy Trothen (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015), 201. 10. Ibid., 206–207. 11. Ibid., 207. 12. “Frequently Asked Questions: The Transhumanist Declaration,” World Transhumanist Association, accessed July 23, 2020, http://www​.the​-astrolabe​.net​/ transhumanist​_faq​.htm. 13. Nick Bostrom, “Frequently Asked Questions,” World Transhumanist Association, accessed July 23, 2020, http://www​ .the​ -astrolabe​ .net​ /transhumanist​ _faq​.htm. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Nick Bostrom, “In Defense of Posthuman Dignity,” Bioethics 19, no. 3 (June 2005): 202–214, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​.1467​-8519​.2005​.00437​.x. 17. Raymond Kurzweil, “Live Forever – Uploading the Human Brain . . . Closer Than You Think,” Psychology Today, February 2, 2000, https://rense​.com​/ufo6​/ live​.htm. 18. Ibid.

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19. Ibid. 20. Bostrom, “Frequently Asked Questions.” 21. Patrick D. Hopkins, “Why Uploading Will Not Work, or, the Ghosts Haunting Transhumanism,” International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4, no. 1 (June 2012): 231, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1142​/s1793843012400136. 22. Ibid., 231–232. 23. Bostrom, “Frequently Asked Questions.” 24. Michael Laakasuo et al., “What Makes People Approve or Condemn Mind Upload Technology? Untangling the Effects of Sexual Disgust, Purity and Science Fiction Familiarity,” Palgrave Communications 4, no. 1 (July), http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​ .1057​/s41599​-018​-0124​-6. 25. Ibid. 26. Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 2005), 197–202. 27. Molhoek, “Raising the Virtuous Bar,” 286. 28. Ibid. 29. Arvin M. Gouw, “Genetic Virtue Program: An Unfeasible Neo-Pelagian Theodicy?,” Theology and Science 16, no. 3 (July): 273–278, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​ .1080​/14746700​.2018​.1488473. 30. Walker Mark, “In Defense of the Genetic Virtue Program,” Politics Life Science 29, no. 1 (2010): 90–96, doi:10.2990/29_1_90. 31. For discussions on the different views on free will, see Ted Peters, “The Struggle for Cognitive Liberty: Retrofitting the Self in Activist Theology,” Theology and Science (July 2020): 13. http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1080​/14746700​.2020​ .1786219. 32. Molhoek, “Raising the Virtuous Bar,” 280–281. 33. “Is Intelligence Determined by Genetics?,” Genetics Home Reference, U.S. National Library of Medicine, last modified June 23, 2020, https://ghr​.nlm​.nih​.gov​/ primer​/traits​/intelligence. 34. Camelia M. Kuhnen and Joan Y. Chiao, “Genetic Determinants of Financial Risk Taking,” PLoS ONE 4, no. 2 (2009): E4362. 35. Brandon Specktor, “Military-Funded Study Successfully Tests ‘Prosthetic Memory’ Brain Implants,” Live Science, April 6, 2018, https://www​.livescience​.com​ /62234​-prosthetic​-memory​-neural​-implant​.html. 36. Susan Fourtané, “Neuralink: How the Human Brain Will Download Directly from a Computer,” Interesting Engineering, September 2, 2018, https://int​ eres​ ting​engi​neering​.com​/neuralink​-how​-the​-human​-brain​-will​-download​-directly​-from​-a​ -computer. 37. Molhoek, “Raising the Virtuous Bar,” 282. 38. Kuhnen and Chiao, “Genetic Determinants of Financial Risk Taking,” E4362. 39. Carlos M. Coelho et al., “The Use of Virtual Reality in Acrophobia Research and Treatment,” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 23, no. 5 (June): 563, http://dx​.doi​.org​ /10​.1016​/j​.janxdis​.2009​.01​.014. 40. Ibid., 568. 41. Ibid., 571.

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42. Matthew D. Varga, “Adderall Abuse on College Campuses: A Comprehensive Literature Review,” Journal of Evidence-Based Social Work 9, no. 3 (June): 293–313, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1080​/15433714​.2010​.525402. 43. H. J. Segat, R. C. S. Barcelos, V. G. Metz, et al., “Influence of Physical Activity on Addiction Parameters of Rats Exposed to Amphetamine Which Were Previously Supplemented with Hydrogenated Vegetable Fat,” Brain Research Bulletin 135 (2017): 69–76, doi:10.1016/j.brainresbull.2017.09.013. 44. J. C. Brown, “Epinephrine, Auto-injectors, and Anaphylaxis: Challenges of Dose, Depth, and Device,” Annals of Allergy, Asthma & Immunology 121, no. 1 (2018): 53–60, doi:10.1016/j.anai.2018.05.001. 45. Songfa Zhong et al., “Dopamine D4 Receptor Gene Associated with Fairness Preference in Ultimatum Game,” PLoS ONE 5, no. 11 (December 2010): e13765, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1371​/journal​.pone​.0013765. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Joseph Patrick Henrich, ed., Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 125. 51. Ibid., 134. 52. Ibid., 143. 53. Yun Wang, Dang Zheng, Jie Chen, Li-Lin Rao, Shu Li, and Yuan Zhou, “Born for Fairness: Evidence of Genetic Contribution to a Neural Basis of Fairness Intuition,” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 14, no. 5 (2019): 539–548, https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/scan​/nsz031. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Varun Warrier et al., “Genome-wide Analyses of Self-reported Empathy: Correlations with Autism, Schizophrenia, and Anorexia Nervosa,” Translational Psychiatry 8, no. 1 (2018): 1. 57. Ibid., 8. 58. Natalie Salmanowitz, “The Impact of Virtual Reality on Implicit Racial Bias and Mock Legal Decisions,” Journal of Law and the Biosciences 5, no. 1 (April): 174–203, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1093​/jlb​/lsy005. 59. Ibid. 60. Alicia Solow-Niederman, Yoojung Choi, and Guy Van den Broeck, “The Institutional Life of Algorithmic Risk Assessment,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 34, no. 3 (2019): 706, https://lawcat​.berkeley​.edu​/record​/1137216. 61. Ibid., 714. 62. Sarah Picard et al., “Beyond the Algorithm: Pretrial Reform, Risk Assessment, and Racial Fairness,” Center for Court Innovation, accessed July 2, 2020, https:// www​.courtinnovation​.org​/publications​/beyond​-algorithm. 63. Catherine L. Carpenter et al., “Association of Dopamine D2 Receptor and Leptin Receptor Genes with Clinically Severe Obesity,” Obesity (2013): E468.

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64. “Alcohol Alert #60.” National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. Accessed April 22, 2018. https://pubs​.niaaa​.nih​.gov​/publications​/aa60​.htm. 65. Liya Kerem et al., “Oxytocin Reduces the Functional Connectivity between Brain Regions Involved in Eating Behavior in Men with Overweight and Obesity,” International Journal of Obesity 44, no. 5 (December): 980–989, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​ .1038​/s41366​-019​-0489​-7. 66. Nichole S. Tyler et al., “An Artificial Intelligence Decision Support System for the Management of Type 1 Diabetes,” Nature Metabolism (June), http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​ .1038​/s42255​-020​-0212​-y. 67. Molhoek, “Raising the Virtuous Bar,” 284. 68. Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics, and Governance, Report of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Medicine (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2017), 3. 69. Arvin Gouw, “The CRISPR Advent of Lulu and Nana,” Theology and Science 17, no. 1 (January): 9–12, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1080​/14746700​.2018​.1557378. 70. Kevin Davies, “Guilty as Charged,” Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology News, February 1, 2020, https://www​.genengnews​.com​/insights​/guilty​-as​-charged/. 71. Arvin M. Gouw, “Introducing The Brave New Crispr World,” Zygon® 55, no. 2 (June): 421–429, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1111​/zygo​.12594. 72. Robert Ranisch, “Germline Genome Editing Versus Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Is There a Case in Favour of Germline Interventions?,” Bioethics 34, no. 1 (September 2019): 60–69, http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1111​/bioe​.12635. 73. Ibid. 74. A. M. Gouw, “The Crispr Apple on the Tree of Knowledge Conference Highlights: Crispr in Science, Ethics, And Religion,” Zygon® 55 (2020): 409–420, doi:10.1111/zygo.12591. 75. Ranisch, “Germline Genome Editing Versus Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis,” 60–69. 76. Gouw, “Challenging the Therapy/Enhancement Distinction in CRISPR Gene Editing,” 497. 77. “Alcohol Alert #60.” 78. “Is Intelligence Determined by Genetics?.” 79. Warrier et al., “Genome-wide Analyses of Self-reported Empathy,” 1. 80. Carpenter et al., “Association of Dopamine D2 Receptor and Leptin Receptor,” E468. 81. Molhoek, “Raising the Virtuous Bar,” 285. 82. Ibid.

Chapter 25

Epilogue: Introducing a New Transhumanist Theology Arvin M. Gouw

WHAT IS TRANSHUMANISM AND WHY IS IT ATTRACTIVE? Transhumanism—also known as Humanity Plus or H+—is difficult to confine to a rigid definition because it consists of multiple strands of thought. However, the various strands share some common themes: science, technology, progress, and transformation. Transhumanism ranges from cybernetic immortality,1 biological immortality,2 to exoplanet migration. Transhumanism is a movement that historically stems from predominantly white male techies, “geeks,” and professionals.3 Yet despite its seemingly diverse topics and rather small originating community, transhumanism offers a highly attractive worldview because of several reasons. First, transhumanism is based on the creative applications of contemporary science and technology. It is not an outdated worldview based on dead philosophers. Given the current popularity and influence of science and technology, H+ has become increasingly more attractive. Transhumanism continually incorporates modern scientific discoveries such as advances in artificial intelligence,4 CRISPR gene editing,5 and technologies6 for interplanetary travel.7 But it does not stop there.8 Transhumanism intrigues the imagination by considering the furthermost possibilities of those scientific advances. For example, while CRISPR geneticists spend their time improving the safety and efficacy9 of gene editing,10 transhumanists propel us to the future by asking if and when human gene editing is possible, how can we take control of human evolution?11 This mode of creative and futurist thinking leads to the second reason why transhumanism is attractive. Transhumanism gives us hope for a better world, as de Grey envisions for us in the preface of this book. Unlike many religious 409

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hopes that are provided by escaping this physical body and this world, H+ gives us a future Heaven on Earth via the powers of science. Suffering would be alleviated by the discovery of renewable clean energy source, death would be overcome by cyborg enhancements,12 and genetic engineering,13 and many others. The modern belief in scientific progress provides the fertile ground for transhumanist hope to grow. WHY ARE THERE MANY CRITICS OF TRANSHUMANISM? Transhumanism finds both loyal friends and vitriolic critics among the various religions. In fact, since there are many aspects of transhumanism, and there are various strands within each religion, there is no generic relationship between H+ and religions. It all depends on the specific technology and the particular religious belief being discussed. With that said, this chapter will focus in on the relationship between Christianity and transhumanism. Transhumanism finds critics among scientists, philosophers, and theologians. Christians have problems with the hubris of transhumanism, because transhumanists uncritically adopt the technological imperative.14 The technological imperative is the belief that new technologies are inevitable, essential, and must be developed and accepted for the good of society. Devotees assume that technology can solve all our problems and that salvation comes from science.15 But the omnipotence of science and technology is illusory, aver Christian critics. Ted Peters, for example, argues that transhumanists have forgotten that we always need grace to be able to use technology for good and not for evil. Others have also argued that H+ often proposes a disembodied future, while Christianity embraces the physical body as God’s beautiful creation,16 even the temple for the Holy Spirit. Transhumanists assume that technology in the form of the Genetic Virtue Program17 can modify humans to be good.18 Critics complain that this goal is scientifically unsound19 as well as philosophically problematic.20 Why? Because it’s an oxymoron to be good without effort.21 Philosophically, transhumanist proposals are questionable due to the lack of solid metaphysics, according to philosopher Susan Schneider.22 Scientifically, transhumanists are criticized for extrapolating scientific discoveries so far that is merely science fiction.23 Their hypotheses are untestable, and no concrete research programs can be proposed to attain their goals. This lack of design for experimentation and milestones protects transhumanists from being scientifically falsifiable. They merely keep postponing their goals as something that will happen in the near future. In fact, Ray Kurzweil’s predictions of technological milestones for 2020 where supercomputer could

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emulate human intelligence are nowhere to be found.24 Similarly, Aubrey de Grey’s prediction for the point where humans will begin to attain immortality by achieving “escape velocity” has been repeatedly delayed.25 WHY ARE CHRISTIANS STILL ATTRACTED TO TRANSHUMANISM? Yet we must ask: why are Christians still attracted to transhumanism? The answer to this may be rooted in the long history of relationship between Christianity and science.26 Latin natural philosophy was midwife at the birth of modern science. The Copernicans—Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton—all embraced the doctrine of the Two Books. Accordingly, God as creator is revealed in the Book of Nature interpreted by science, while God as redeemer is revealed in the Bible interpreted by the church. Because God thinks rationally and even mathematically, astronomers tracking the movements of the stars in mathematics are actually reading the Mind of God. Despite some tensions arising over the relationship between the Earth and the Sun in the era of Galileo, both church and the wider society came to accept heliocentrism by the time of Newton in the seventeenth century. In short, the theological mind and the scientific mind followed the same rational track during the toddling years of modern science. Today’s Christian theologians reserve the right to critique modern science when it makes claims that are not scientific. Ontological materialism as touted by the “New Atheists,” for example, relies on a philosophical assumption that is not itself scientific. The claim that science will become the savior of society, to cite a second example, is excessive. Christian theologians learned from two world wars and the invention of nuclear weapons how science and technology in the service of the military can serve the vicious designs of evil as well as good intentions. There is nothing inherent within science or technology to guide it morally toward the good, let alone elicit the trust that science and technology can save humanity from its own self-destructive moments. Despite the suspicious doubt on the part of Christian theologians regarding the technological imperative, transhumanism draws Christians to its vision like a magnet draws iron filings. Why? Because H+ is so hopeful. Transhumanists and Christians alike look forward to a transformed future, even a redemptive future. Whereas the transhumanist may trust science alone, the Christian will rejoice that science along with technology can be pressed into God’s providence to bring about a redeeming transformation. Modern science is a favored even if rebellious child of Western Christian inquiry into nature. Scientific findings have questioned traditional theological doctrines. Geocentricism and anthropocentric tendencies were radically

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challenged by the Copernican revolution of heliocentrism. Darwin’s evolutionary theory has largely challenged the literal interpretation of Genesis 1 as creation of life on earth. This makes Christians cautious about holding onto Christian doctrines without input from science. In fact, the notion of war between religion and science has led Christians to build their own Noah’s Ark to protect their faith from contemporary mainstream science. In turn, contemporary scientists and professionals find it harder and harder to integrate their Christian faith to their vocation and vice versa. In addition, scientific discoveries and secular humanism have rendered religion largely irrelevant in contemporary daily life. Churches are losing the younger generation across all denominations. This is perhaps because the younger generation uses technology a lot more. Yet, churches oftentimes do not talk about Christian life in this high-tech world. In the mind of video game players, Christianity is reduced to mythologies and nice stories told during Sunday School that teaches us to be better citizens. Christian eschatological symbolism of dragons and trumpets is simply unrealistic and does not connect to contemporary advances in technology. Millennials have multiple other sources of ethics than Christianity, ranging from Facebook memes to the Marvel universe comics. Tony Stark, Ironman, an engineering genius and billionaire, is much more relatable as a model on how to live in this contemporary world than St. Paul, a tentmaker in his first-century robes. It is precisely this need for the incorporation of technology into the Christian faith that I find transhumanism has something to contribute. Rather than starting from scratch, I would like to present the basic beliefs of the Christian Transhumanist Association (CTA) that is led by Micah Redding. This is the first and largest association of Christian transhumanists. CTA’s views will help us to see how transhumanism plays a role in their faith. The founder of CTA, Micah Redding, also presents his view of transhumanism in another chapter in this volume.27 The CTA has certain definition of what it means to be Christian Transhumanist:28 i. We believe that God’s mission involves the transformation and renewal of creation including humanity, and that we are called by Christ to participate in that mission: working against illness, hunger, oppression, injustice, and death. ii. We seek growth and progress along every dimension of our humanity: spiritual, physical, emotional, mental—and at all levels: individual, community, society, world. iii. We recognize science and technology as tangible expressions of our God-given impulse to explore and discover and as a natural outgrowth of being created in the image of God.

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iv. We are guided by Jesus’s greatest commands to “Love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, mind, and strength . . . and love your neighbor as yourself.” v. We believe that the intentional use of technology, coupled with following Christ, will empower us to become more human across the scope of what it means to be creatures in the image of God. There are several recurring themes in the aforementioned five points of CTA. The themes of transformation, technology, renewal, and progress are the transhumanist themes that can be found in the CTA statements. The themes of God’s mission, loving God, loving neighbor as oneself, image of God, are Christian themes embedded in the CTA statements. In this manner, CTA integrates transhumanist ideals into the basic tenets of Christianity. A PROPOSAL—WHAT IS A TRANSHUMANIST HERMENEUTICAL PRINCIPLE? Despite my deep appreciation of Redding’s and CTA’s proposal to define what Christian transhumanism is, I still remember what a CTA member asked during the CTA annual conference: “What do Christian transhumanists believe? Do we have a CTA creed or statement of faith? Are Christian transhumanists basically Christians who love technology and computers? What is it that we believe that makes us different when we incorporate transhumanism?” Redding and others have tried to define transhumanism as a worldview, as a way of life, as a philosophical stance, a scientific outlook,29 and many others, but we all fell short in providing a systematic belief framework for Christian transhumanism. It is the goal of this treatment to propose transhumanism as a hermeneutical principle that can be used to construct a Transhumanist Christian Systematic Theology. Such a systematic theology would be structured like traditional theology (T-theology), but its coherence would be guided by the H+ hermeneutical principle. Public theologian David Tracy describes the dialectic between classical belief and the contemporary challenge. “Theology can be described as the attempt to establish, in both theory and practice, mutually critical correlations between two sets of interpretation: an interpretation of the Christian tradition and an interpretation of contemporary experience.”30 In my case, the contemporary experience is the transhumanist vision of scientific and technological transformation. Also in my case, I may not return to the classical Christian interpretation but rather to the interpretation of today’s liberation theologians.

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This section of the chapter will present the outlines and contours of how such a transhumanist theological system would look, by studying liberation theology as a model that we can emulate. I will place liberation theology and transhumanism into mutual critical correlation. Following David Tracy and Ted Peters, the proposed transhumanist systematic theology seeks to be (1) applicable (relevant to what is actually experienced), (2) comprehensive (integrative of various aspects of experience and data), (3) coherent (consistent across various components of the system), (4) logical (absent of self-contradiction).31 4a. How Might Liberation Theology Become a Model for Transhumanist Theology? “Liberation theology is a spiritual response to the everyday sociopolitical realities of oppressed people,” Miguel De La Torre reminds us.32 The liberation thrust “manifests itself in an array of theological expressions that, lato sensu, include along with third world theologies, North American black theology, feminist theology, womanist theology, and other adjectival or genitive theologies that challenge the dominant Western academic theological productions,” Brazilian Vitor Westhelle reminds us.33 The structure of liberation theology can be quite complex, but there are certain contours that are easily identifiable. First, hamartiology: sin is defined as oppression and systemic injustice. Sin is the answer to the question “saved from what.” Second, soteriology: salvation can be understood then as the answer to “saved for what.” Salvation from sin then is defined as liberation from oppression and systemic injustice to attain freedom. The role of the Savior, Christ, is that of a Liberator. Thus, ecclesiologically and ethically, for us to be Christians, we have to also promote liberation by fighting injustice and oppression. That is the task of the church according to liberation theology. Liberation theology stems from liberation hermeneutics that is applied to multiple passages from the Bible, but predominantly the Exodus story. The liberation of Israel from Egypt by Moses is mirrored in Christ’s Messianic role against Roman oppression. This liberation hermeneutics was then applied to various modern contexts of oppression such as those experienced by Latin Americans, African Americans, and Asians. This led to the development of Latino theology, Black theology, and Asian theology among other theologies.34 Similarly, I propose that the H+ hermeneutical principle asks similar basic questions. What does it mean to be transhuman? In table 25.1, I explore various possible meanings of trans in transhumanism, but for now I propose that the trans in transhumanism means transformation. If this is the case, then

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Trans from

Trans to

Paradigm

Humans as naturally depraved Human as rational creative creatures

Sinful human (Adam) Human

Perfect human (Christ)

T-theology

Transhuman or posthuman

Transhumanism

Human as always in search of humanity

Past humanity

Future humanity

Transhumanist theology

who transformed whom? It is God who transforms us and that makes God as the Transformer. If we are transformed by God, then we need to address the question of “transformed from what to what?” We are transformed from a sinful being to a righteous being35 (table 25.1, Row A). I would then propose to define sin as the rejection of transformation and also the abuse of transformation (tables 25.2 and 25.4). H+ does provide technological advances as solutions, but technological advances can be used for evil, which would constitute as sin in the traditional Christian terminology. We are transformed to be like God, the Transformer. Thus, we are transformed to transform others. But it is all a gradient, there is no ultimate final end, because God is infinite. It is in our very nature to always be transhuman and not merely human, because we are always called to be more like God. We are always in transit to be closer to God, but we will never become God.36 The destination is not God, God is merely the ultimate beauty by which we are continually attracted to and move toward in transit and in transformation.37 To be human is to be transhuman (table 25.1, Row C). Humanity at any given space and time is merely a static cross section of the overall transhumanity that is being continuously transformed by God to be more like Him.38 Queer theologians have always understood that humanity and personhood are not static but very dynamic and are in a complex relationship with their zeitgeist.39 Overall, by answering key questions on the nature of transformation within the transhumanist hermeneutics, we are creating a transhumanist theology. Note that if one were to prioritize a transformation from the physical human to a non-physical posthuman, then a completely different anthropology will need to be constructed40 (table 25.1, Row B). Such a definition of transformation in transhumanism has become problematic for many Jude-Christian theologians.41 There is a second similarity between liberation theology and emerging transhumanist theology. Liberation theology arises as a critique against T-theology as labeled by Althaus-Reid.42 Liberation theologians remind us that the poor and the oppressed have been largely ignored by T-theology. Even worse,

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T-theology has been used as a tool of oppression of the poor. T-theology is overly pietistic, providing abstract solutions such as heaven. Heaven is unfortunately beyond and outside of this world. The prospects of a later heaven make the oppressed receptive of their current oppression. Liberation theology provides a concrete solution, which are actual liberation, political rebellion, and freedom from their oppression (table 25.2, Row B). Liberation theology remembers the Lord’s prayer of having Heaven on Earth.43 Similarly, a transhumanist hermeneutical principle arises as a critique against T-theology. T-theology has largely ignored the scientists, engineers, and professionals in modern societies. T-theology sees no role for technological advances in the life of the church. T-theology sets understanding of human nature that is abstract and irrelevant today. Even worse, some forms of T-theology have accused scientists and engineers of being secular agnostics and atheists who are immoral and misguided. T-theology promises a peaceful heaven with no regards to the development and abuse of technology in the real world. Transhumanist hermeneutics seeks to provide concrete solutions, which are scientific advancements, to solve world crises44 (table 25.2, Row C). Transhumanist theology, like liberation theology, remembers the Lord’s prayer of having Heaven on Earth. 4b. The Contours of Transhumanist Systematic Theology A systematic theology consists of theology proper, Christology, hamartiology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. I propose that transhumanist systematic theology defines God as the Transformer (table 25.2, Row C). As Cole-Turner proposed, Christ can be considered as the first Transhuman who leads others to be transhumans like Him, to bring transformations in society. Sin is the rejection of transformation and abuse of technology to oppress others. Church is the platform for transformation as willed by God. Eschaton is ultimate acceptance of undergoing eternal transformation with God, both in one’s self and in society. Table 25.2  Soteriology in Light of Transhumanism Saved from What?

Saved for What?

Saved by Who?

Salvation as freedom from punishment

God as Judge who declares us righteous God as Liberator God as the Transformer

A) Traditional theology

Sin as transgression

B) Liberation theology C) Transhumanist theology

Sin as oppression and Salvation as liberation systemic injustice Sin as oppression Salvation as liberation due to unjust use by proper use of of technology technology

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A systematic theology has multiple points of entry. Just as liberation theology redefines every doctrine in light of the core definition of salvation as liberation, transhumanist theology also redefines every doctrine in light of the core definition of salvation as transformation. The most natural point of entry for transhumanist theology is the doctrine of anthropology. Transhumanist hermeneutics forces us to reconsider what it means to be human, whether we are just our bodies, just our souls, or a combination of both (table 25.3). Transhumanist anthropology has eschatological implications. Physical monistic anthropology would promote radical life extension as part of eschatology (table 25.3, Row A). Cartesian dualists who prioritize the soul would champion cybernetic immortality as part of their eschatology (table 25.3, Row B). But I propose that eschatology should consider the eternal aspects of humanity (table 25.3, Row C). Being immortal does not mean eternal, because immortality assumes continued sustenance to maintain the immortal body. Immortality achieved through radical life extension and cybernetic immortality do not mean they can never die.45 Since transhumanist systematic theology is a theological system, one can enter the system from any doctrine. Instead of looking at the implications of transhumanist anthropology on eschatology, another point of entry is eschatology, where we can reconsider what the future might look like in the presence of technology.46 Transhumanist theology demands that we re-evaluate the tension between progress and advent.47 Hamartiology, or the doctrine of sin, is another possible point of entry where we can redefine sin not only as resistance to progress48 but also as the abuse of technology. An understanding of our biological, physical, body as hindrance or limitation to a virtuous life is possible,49 but this has raised concerns of many theologians, some of which are contributors to this volume (e.g., Peters, Tirosh-Samuelson, and Green). Table 25.3  Eschatology in Light of Transhumanist Theological Anthropology H+ Anthropology A B C

Physical monism with biological immortality Cartesian dualism with cybernetic immortality Hylomorphism disregarding immortality

H+ Eschatology Implications Immortal transhumans in a future utopian world Immortal consciousness in a cybernetic heaven Eternity with or without immortality

Challenges What happens when biological immortals die? (i.e. by accident, murder, poverty) What happens when the computer bearers of consciousness are damaged? What then is the relevance of technology in promoting immortality?

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With the incorporation of technology in transhumanist theology, sanctification must reconsider pietistic, personal, psychological sanctification in light of pragmatic, technological transformations following Cole-Turner’s suggestions50 while paying close attention to Gallaher’s warnings about mangodhood51 (table 25.4). This does not mean the obliteration of pietistic, psychological aspects; they are required to guide the use of technology in human flourishing, a sentiment that is shared by other belief systems as well.52 Pragmatic and technological transformations simply need to be incorporated into what it means to be a better person.

Transhumanist Hermeneutics in Biblical Exegesis Just as liberation theology relies on the liberation hermeneutics across various stories of oppression in the Bible, transhumanist theology relies on transhumanist hermeneutics across various stories of transitions in technologies and societies in the Bible. Following CTA’s emphasis of the image of God being largely understood as co-creators and co-stewards of technology, we have to pay attention to how biblical characters, peoples, and narratives have handled technological revolutions of their time. Before moving into the Bible, it is perhaps important to provide a brief overview of what is meant by technological revolution. Transhumanism reminds us that there are multiple technological revolutions that have taken place. Smihula, for example, identifies several pre-modern technological revolutions:53 Indo-European technological revolution (1900–1100 BC) with the advent of agriculture, Celtic and Greek technological revolution (700–200 BC) with the advent of iron tools and weapons, Germano-Slavic technological revolution (300–700 AD) with the advent of crop rotation, Medieval technological revolution (930–1200 AD) with the advent of feudalism and water and horse power for agriculture, and the Renaissance technological revolution (1340–1470 AD) with the advent of the printing press. These pre-modern technological revolutions are then followed by the more well-known modern technological revolutions such as the industrial revolution (eighteenth to nineteenth centuries), scientific revolution (nineteenth century), and information revolution (twentieth century). Table 25.4  Sanctification in Light of Transhumanist Anthropology H+ Sanctification A B C

Sanctification as transformation Sanctification as transcendence Sanctification as transit

Implications on H+ Theological Anthropology To be transhuman is to transform humanity To be transhuman is to transcend humanity To be transhuman is to be part of humanity in transit

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If we understand the Image of God in us to mean co-creators (of technology), to extend Hefner’s idea, then some biblical narratives can be read with this new hermeneutics in mind.54 For example, the ability to build high buildings such as ziggurats, when used to glorify one’s self, led to the story of the Tower of Babel. The narrative tells us that the abuse of technology for human pride is what constitutes as sin (table 25.5, Row B). This is in stark contrast with God’s detailed technological instructions to build Noah’s Ark to save creation (table 25.5, Row A). Despite the infeasibility of actually literally constructing of these technologies, the biblical narratives use technological advances, their applications, and their abuses as means to provide readers with a way to properly develop and use technology. As another example, the building of pyramids to glorify Egyptian pharaohs led to not only spiritual decadence but also actual political economic decadence for Egyptian civilization, including its colonies. Moreover, the conquest of Egypt over Israel and its neighboring regions was made possible due to the technological advances of iron weapons and advanced horse battle chariots that were developed in Egypt. When such novel advanced technologies are abused, it leads to systemic oppression and colonization (table 25.5, Row C). But the trans in transhumanist hermeneutics can be understood not only as transformations that involve technology. Trans can also mean transitions as our fellow queer theologians have taught us,55 such as Althaus-Reid56 and Tonstad.57 The suffering and pains of sanctification can be understood as challenges in transitions and transformations (table 25.4, Rows A and B). For example, Israel’s forty years in the desert in transit is a process of purification where Israel needed to abandon the “highly technological” Egypt and to rediscover the proper use of more ecologically friendly structures of nomadic life. Job’s tribulations and his transformations also involve the abdication of worldly possessions and technologies for the advancement of his faith. Thus, transformation hermeneutics demands us to pay attention to not only the use of technologies in the Bible but also the misuse and abdication of technology.

WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF TRANSHUMANIST THEOLOGY? Weaknesses of Transhumanist Theology H+ theological hermeneutics as a novel hermeneutical principle would certainly lend itself to criticism. I can only anticipate a few that I have heard from previous discussions with other colleagues. First, given its incorporation of transhumanism, this hermeneutical principle is liable to the biases of the

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people behind transhumanism, namely, middle and upper class, professional, white males.58 Transhumanist hermeneutics allegedly would not be relevant to the majority of people in the world who do not have access to advanced technology as tool to alleviate suffering. This is a legitimate concern, but the very reason why I modeled transhumanist theology after liberation theology is precisely to keep it in check. Transhumanist theologians should keep listening to the voices of liberation theologians and the oppressed. Transhumanist theology reminds the TechRich to be creative in the use of technology to alleviate suffering and reminds the TechPoor to remind the TechRich that technologies can be oppressive. Transhumanist hermeneutics, like any hermeneutical principle, cannot and should not stand alone uncorrected by other traditions and schools of thought. Second, the transhumanist theology as a system lacks the centrality of the cross. This is a valid critique of transhumanist theology, because its central focus is the nature of humanity. However, understanding sin as the abuse of technology allows us to understand the cross in terms of an abuse of technology. Unlike the classic sacrificial model of T-theology which understands the cross as a sacrifice either for justification, atonement, or propitiation, the transhumanist reading of the cross would be to see the cross as an abuse of power and technology by sinful humans against the loving God. This H+ reading of the cross avoids the problem of the cross being a punishment taken by Jesus to fulfill some redemption requirements, rendering the Father as an abusive masochistic Father sacrificing His own Son on the cross. No, the cross is one of the most advanced torture and punishment method or “technology” of the Roman empire that was applied to God in man’s rebellion against God. The cross informs us that the use of technology is not always the solution (table 25.5, Row B). Sometimes the abdication of technology is necessary for our transformation. Third, the humanism in transhumanism gives transhumanist theology some Pelagian tendencies. The strong emphasis on technology as part of human nature and calling to alleviate suffering can diminish the need for grace in the process of sanctification.59 This is a valid warning against transhumanist theology, and that is why the notion of sin as rejection of transformation, or Table 25.5  Hamartiology in Light of Transhumanism H+ Hamartiology A B

Sin as rejection of technology Sin as abuse of technology

C

Sin as outcome of technology

Examples People’s rejection of Noah’s Ark The building of the Tower of Babel to make a name for themselves The building of the pyramids increases the demand for slavery

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abuse of technology, is crucial. Transformation through technology can be for the worse.60 Transhumanist exegesis would cite the Tower of Babel and the Egyptian colonization as perfect examples against hubris and Pelagian tendencies. Last but most importantly, the cross reminds transhumanists that the Incarnate God’s salvific plan involved opposing the abuse of technology, the Cross, thus demonstrating that technology is only a means, subject to moral evaluation, not an end in itself.

Strengths of Transhumanist Theology Despite the aforementioned weaknesses of transhumanist theology, there are several strengths of transhumanist theology. First, transhumanist theology incorporates technological advances into theology, providing practical relevance for the technologically imbued current generation. Second, transhumanist theology inherently seeks to integrate religion and science as opposed to promoting the non-overlapping magisteria or war models.61 Instead of being ousted as secularists, scientists will be invited into dialogue by transhumanist theologians. Third, transhumanist theology will be a dynamic and progressive theology, because it will continually express its faith in contemporary metaphors adopted from various scientific disciplines. In other words, transhumanist theology will open more doors both for scientists and theologians with neologisms. Neologism invention will allow Christianity to stay relevant in the face of rapid scientific advances. Given the constraints of this chapter, I will explore one example of an H+ neologism: Church as Platform. In general, there are two kinds of software: products and platforms. First, product software provides certain services. For example, Microsoft Word allows us to type in the computer. Second, product software provides certain interface for users, such as various font types in Microsoft Word. Third, product software enhances specific capabilities of users, such as grammatical and spelling check in Microsoft Word. Fourth, overall, product software is limited in its scope to its original purpose. On the other hand, platform software enables growth through connections with external tools, data, and other programs, such as Windows which provides connections with other Microsoft Office programs. Second, platform software manages how multiple products can be integrated and best used to serve users. Third, platform software allows growth and adaptation instead of trying to be the be-all and end-all. Church as Product would be a static church that is severely limited. Church as Product provides key services for church members such as Sunday school and Bible Study. It provides an interface which is the liturgy for users. It enhances specific capabilities of its members, such as choir training, and

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other talent developments. But Church as Product overall is limited and constrained in its very inception as a package, that is, denomination. On the other hand, Church as Platform enables growth through connections with other external organizations. Church understood as Platform then becomes a place to integrate various aspects of the lives of its members, that is, work, school, family, politics. Church as Platform also integrates various worldviews that church members encounter outside of church: democracy, homosexuality, socialism, communism, and so on. Church understood as Platform then becomes more dynamic and highly interactive with its environment. It is no longer constrained by the visions that its denomination/founder had for that church. CONCLUSION Transhumanism is both highly attractive and problematic for various religious groups as multiple contributors have expressed in this volume. Transhumanism receives criticisms both from religious and scientific communities for its starry-eyed optimism and scientific extrapolations. However, transhumanism remains attractive to religious communities because it embraces contemporary scientific advances into its worldview with concrete paths to alleviate suffering which is often missing in traditional religions. In fact, T-theology has largely ignored the relevance of technological advances into its theology. In turn, T-theology has become irrelevant to the contemporary generation that is immersed in this high-tech world. T-theology has driven some to even antagonize science, scientists, technology, and progress as antithetical to religion and salvation. The statements of the CTA reflect the desire by Christians to embrace technology into what it means to be Christians as bearers of image of God that are co-creators of technology. My proposal further seeks to integrate transhumanism into Christianity by proposing it as a hermeneutical principle following the integration of liberation hermeneutics into liberation theology. The transhumanist hermeneutical principle involves biblical exegesis that pays attention how biblical narratives describe and handle technological changes. Transhumanist exegesis seeks to understand how believers before us struggle with technological changes in the past so that we can best understand how to live in our contemporary technological world. Based on this transhumanist hermeneutical principle, one can construct a transhumanist systematic theology. There are multiple points of entry into this theological system depending on how one answers the following questions: “what does it mean to be transhuman?” “what are humans transformed from and for what?” “who

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transforms whom?” Different theological systems can be constructed depending on the answers given to those questions. God can be understood as the Transformer of humans, meaning that humans are constantly transformed to be more like God. Christ was the first Transhuman. Thus, to be truly human is to be transhuman, because to refuse God’s transformation in our lives would be sin. Sin then can be understood as the rejection of transformation and progress. Moreover, transhumanist exegesis informs us that sin also includes the misuse and abuse of technology. The task of the church is, then, to function as a platform for Christians to follow Christ in transforming others and the world. Transhumanist theology seeks to follow the Lord’s prayer to have God’s will done on Earth as it is in Heaven. An evaluation of the proposed transhumanist theology demonstrates that it is not only modeled after liberation theology, but that it needs liberation theology as its partner and corrective lens. Transhumanist theology being driven by humanism does have hubris tendencies that need to be corrected. Transhumanist theology, being driven by the professionals and the TechRich, always needs to listen to the TechPoor, who are their sister liberation, black, latinX, and queer theologies. A hermeneutics of suspicion should always be applied to the development of any novel technology, because the TechRich are always embedded within complex power structures. Scientifically, transhumanist theology should always be based on good scientific data interpretation; thus, it is dynamic and not static. It’s exploratory and could be wrong, just like science is. Science is always indebted to its past mistakes and hopeful to make progress for the future. Similarly, Transhumanist theology fundamentally embraces the tension between the before and after, past and future. Transhumanism has had a bad reputation for exaggerating the relevance of scientific findings and giving people false hopes, but it doesn’t mean that it does not have anything significant to contribute. Perhaps the name transhumanism should be replaced with something else, such as progressive or dynamic humanism.62 However, the scientific advances that are taking place in society can no longer be ignored if Christianity seeks to remain relevant in today’s world and the future.

NOTES 1. See Kellogg’s chapter in this volume. 2. See de Grey’s Foreword in this volume. 3. See Tirosh-Samuelson’s chapter in this volume. 4. See Scholars like Neela Saxena has discussed AI’s potential for enlightenment. 5. See Bauman’s and Deane-Drummond’s chapters in this volume.

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6. A. M. Gouw, “Introducing the Brave New CRISPR World,” Zygon 55, no. 2 (2020): 421–429. 7. A. M. Gouw, “CRISPR Challenges and Opportunities for Space Travel,” in Human Enhancements for Space Missions. Space and Society, edited by K. Szocik (Cham: Springer, 2020). 8. A. M. Gouw, “The CRISPR Apple on the Tree of Knowledge Conference Highlights: CRISPR in Science, Ethics, and Religion,” Zygon 55, no. 2 (2020): 409–420. 9. J. A. Doudna and E. Charpentier, “Genome Editing. The New Frontier of Genome Engineering with CRISPR-Cas9,” Science 346, no. 6213 (2014): 1258096. DOI: 10.1126/science.1258096. 10. A. Gouw, “The CRISPR Advent of Lulu and Nana,” Theology and Science 17, no. 1 (January 2019): 9–12. 11. See Ferrando’s optimism about transhumanism in her chapter in this volume. 12. See Thweatt’s chapter in this volume. 13. A. Gouw, “Challenging the Therapy/Enhancement Distinction in CRISPR Gene Editing,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, edited by David Boonin, 493–508 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 14. Relatedly, in the Catholic Church and among some other philosophers, there is also the “technocratic paradigm” where all problems are merely problems of efficiency rather than morality. Brian Patrick Green has a paragraph in this article: https://www​.mdpi​.com​/2077​-1444​/8​/6​/106. 15. See Peters’s chapter in this volume. 16. See Herzfeld’s chapter which argues against disembodied personhood. 17. Mark Walker, “Genetic Engineering, Virtue-First Enhancement, and Deification in Neo-Irenaean Theodicy,” Theology and Science 16, no. 3 (2018): 251–272, at 251. 18. See also Hughes’s and Molhoek’s chapters in this volume. 19. See also Gouw’s chapter in this volume. 20. A. Gouw, “Optimistic Yet Disembodied: The Misguided Transhumanist Vision,” Theology and Science 16, no. 2 (2018): 229–233. 21. A. Gouw, “Genetic Virtue Program: An Unfeasible Neo-Pelagian Theodicy?” Theology and Science 16, no. 3 (2018): 273–278. 22. Susan Schneider has pointed out that reductive physicalism is often the presupposition of AI researchers. 23. See also Gouw’s chapter in this volume. 24. Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 133. 25. Aubrey D. N. J. de Grey, “Escape Velocity: Why the Prospect of Extreme Human Life Extension Matters Now,” PLoS Biol 2, no. 6 (June 15, 2004): 723–726. 26. Joshua Moritz, Science and Religion: Beyond Warfare and Toward Understanding (Anselm Academic Press, 2016). 27. See Redding’s chapter in this volume. 28. See https://www​.chr​isti​antr​ansh​umanism​.org​/affirmation. 29. See Redding’s chapter in this volume.

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30. David Tracy, “The Role of Theology in Public Life: Some Reflections,” Word and World IV, no. 3 (Summer 1984): 230–239, 235. 31. Ted Peters, God—The World’s Future: Systematic Theology for a New Era (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 3rd ed., 2015), 141–147. 32. Miguel A. De La Torre, “Liberation Theology,” in Christian Political Theology, edited by Craig Hovey and Elizabeth Phillips, 23–43, at 28 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 33. Vitor Westhelle, Eschatology and Space: The Lost Dimension in Theology Past and Present (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 72. 34. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Feminist Theologies (Fortress Press: Minneapolis, 2007); Frederick L. Ware, African American Theology (Louisville: WJK Press, 2016). 35. See Cole-Turner’s chapter for a discussion on sanctification and transhumanism. 36. See Gallaher’s chapter on theosis, and Delio’s chapter on reaching “point Omega.” 37. See Mühling’s chapter in this volume. 38. See Kellogg’s chapter and Deane-Drummond’s chapter that highlight our limits as creatures. 39. See Johnson’s chapter that sees transhumanism as a challenge to the binary gender system. 40. See Bauman’s chapter for a more inclusive anthropology and its ethics of ambiguity as a consequence. 41. See the chapters of Gallaher, Green, Peters, and Samuelson. 42. Marcella Althaus-Reid, The Queer God (Routledge: New York, 2003), 11. 43. Though this is still different than Mormon materialistic eschatology that is presented by Cannon’s chapter 3 in this volume. 44. See Huang and Ralph’s chapter which provides an ecofeminist critique of transhumanism’s ignorance of the environment. 45. An immortal body through radical life extension is not eternal if, for example, starved to death or decapitated. 46. See Checketts’s chapter which makes eschatology fundamental to his Teilhardian theological anthropology. 47. See Peters’s chapter in this volume. 48. Here I mean only technological progress, though one can construct a transhumanist theology based on the notion of sin as rejection of spiritual and ethical progress. 49. Walker, “Genetic Engineering, Virtue-First Enhancement, and Deification in Neo-Irenaean Theodicy,” 251–272, at 251. 50. See Cole-Turner’s chapter in this volume. 51. See Gallaher’s chapter in this volume. 52. For Confucianism, see Kim’s chapter. 53. Daniel Smihula, “The Waves of the Technological Innovations of the Modern Age and the Present Crisis as the End of the Wave of the Informational Technological Revolution,” Studia politica Slovaca no. 1 (2009): 32–47, Bratislava, ISSN 1337-8163.

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54. See Redding’s chapter in this volume. 55. See the chapters of Bauman and Johnson in this volume. 56. Althaus-Reed, The Queer God. 57. Linn Marie Tonstad, Queer Theology: Beyond Apologetics (Oregon: Cascade Companions, 2018). 58. See Tirosh-Samuelson’s chapter in this volume. 59. Compare how Buddhism and transhumanism both strive to alleviate suffering in LaTorra’s chapter in this volume. 60. See Green’s warning in chapter 9 of this volume. 61. Joshua M. Moritz, “Rendering unto Science and God: Is NOMA Enough?,” Theology and Science 7, no. 4 (2009): 363–378. DOI: 10.1080/14746700903239510. 62. See Brian Green’s chapter in this volume. He also suggests that though technological progress is good, the ideological baggage that comes with the term “transhumanism” raises issues and concerns.

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Index

Abdul, Ojochogwu, 26n19 Abraham, 33, 121, 126, 240 Abram, David, 236 absolutism, 36 acrophobia, 397 Adam, 119, 152, 170–71, 224, 256 Adderall (amphetamine), 395 Adorno, Theodor, 274 adrenaline, 395 Advaita Vedanta, 40 adventus, 3–4 aesthetics, 56–57 African Americans, xvii, 414 Africans, xvii, 229, 414 agential realism, 280 The Age of Intelligent Machines (Kurzweil), 201 Age of Mind, 198 The Age of Spiritual Machines (Kurzweil), 37, 201 aging, 8 Agricola, Georgius, 145 Ahamed, Sarah, 10 AI. See artificial intelligence (AI) Alagaddupama Sutta, 78 Alaimo, Stacy, 263 Albert the Great, 145 Alcor Life Extension Foundation, 184 Allah, 16

Allen, Woody, 328 Althaus-Reid, Marcella, 415 Alvina, Fidelia Beatrice, xix Ampere, Andre-Marie, 145 Andrews, Bill, 167 Animal Liberation (Singer), 267 animals, 235–40 animism, 311 Annas, George, 186 anthropocentrism: and human exceptionalism, 38–39; moral, 36 anthropology: Buddhist, xix; Confucianism, 101–2, 107–8; religious, xv, 162; sanctification in, 418; transhumanism, xv, 38–39, 415 anti-aging technologies, 373, 381–82 antihumanism, 31–32, 42–44 Apocalypse, 58, 151, 220, 254 Apocalypse Now and Then (Keller), 254 Aquinas, Thomas, 239, 346, 378–80, 389 Archimedes, 296 Arendt, Hannah, 252 Aristotle, 59, 94–95, 189–90 artificial intelligence (AI), xiv, 3–4, 94, 109, 154, 167–68, 197–98, 202, 270n35, 302, 356, 397 askesis, 162 Athanasius of Alexandria, 148, 172 441

442

Index

atheism, 60 attentionality, 283 Augustine of Hippo, 148 Augustinian tradition, 379 auto-deification, 162 auto-divinization, 162 autonomy, 284, 291n34 axial religions, 9–17 Bacon, Francis, 118, 133–37, 166–67, 372 Bacon, Roger, 145, 372 bacteria, 313 Bailey, Ronald, 185 Bainbridge, William Sims, 185 Barad, Karen, 280, 284–86 Barclay, Reginald, 229 Baron-Cohen, Simon, 315 Barth, Karl, 241 Basil of Caesarea, 148 Bauman, Whitney, 20–21, 187 Bauman, Zygmunt, 205, 373 Baumann, Holger, 187 Berdyaev, Nikolai, 162, 347 Berry, Wendell, 154 Bible, 22, 33, 116, 121–22, 151–53, 411, 414, 418–19 Big Data, 35–36, 44 binary gender system, 231 biochemical modeling, 325 bioconservatism, 32–35, 93–94, 186–87 bio-conservatives, 97, 186–87 bio-engineering, 192 bio-fatalism, 6 bio-liberals, 187 biological evolution, 238–39 bios, 46n16 biotechnologies, 33–34, 46n6, 167, 193, 207, 221, 342 Bloch, Ernst, 208 Blood of the Nation (Jordan), 91 Bodhi (Awakening; Enlightenment), 41, 76, 78, 83 Bodhi, Bhikkhu, 78 body, 330–32

body-and-soul dualism, 102 Bohr, Nils, 285 Boltzmann, Ludwig, 296 Book of Mormon (Smith), 54 Bostrom, Nick, 5–6, 59, 81, 84, 93, 104–6, 110, 183–85, 187, 197, 199, 202, 265, 279–84, 286–87, 313–15, 357, 366, 387, 390 Braidotti, Rosi, 263–64 brain, 23n2, 102–3, 108, 318n10; Cartesian, 239; emotions and, 315; emulation, xiii, 230–32; and gut, 312–13; neural circuitry of, 229–30, 312–14; as pattern, 311–14 Brave New World (Aldous), 91–92 Brooks, Max, 310 Brown, Dan, xvi Buchanan, Allen, 184 Buck, Carrie, 91 Buddha, 10, 75–84; Enlightenment, 79–84; Four Noble Truths, 77; meditation teachings, 77; Noble Eightfold Path, 77–78; teachings of, 75–84 The Buddha in the Robot (Mori), 41 Buddhism, 11, 40, 75–84, 95; Four Noble Truths, 77; Merrell-Wolff, Franklin, 82–84; Noble Eightfold Path, 77–78; original, 76–79; preoriginal, 79–80; Tantric, 40; teaching of, 75–84; and Transhumanism, 41– 42, 75–84 (historical development, 80–81; Pre-Original Buddhism with, 81–82) Buddhist anthropology, xix Bulgakov, Sergii, 162–63, 168 Burdett, Michael, 136 Buridan, Jean, 145 Butler, Judith, 232–33 Byrne, Patrick, 360–61 Byzantine Christianity, 12 Caenorhabditis elegans, 325 California Money Bail Reform Act, 397 cancer, 324

Index

Cancer Genome Atlas project, 298–99 Cannon, Lincoln, 16 Carson, Rachel, 267 Cartesian mind, 239 Catholic Church, 148–49, 341 Catholics. See Roman Catholics Cave, Stephen, 322 cells, 324 Center for Genetics and Society, 184 Center or Transhumanity-Immortal Life, 184 Chalmers, David, 314 charity, 380 Charpentier, Emmanuelle, 34 Christian eschatology, 282, 376–77, 417 Christianity, 12–13, 22, 32, 54, 59, 62, 93, 115, 123, 126, 129, 133, 138–39, 149–50, 161, 163–67, 195, 201, 207, 223–26, 323, 329–30, 376, 382, 410–13, 421–23 Christian Transhumanism, 13, 113–27, 411–13; as conversation, 115; cyborg and, 217–26; definition, 114, 131; incarnational model of engagement, 115–16; need of, 113, 126–27; public conversation, positive, relational values in, 123–25; religious vision, 125–26; technology (and image of god, 116–18; and Kingdom of Heaven, 121–23; and redemption, 118–21; theology of, 116, 123); theology, 129–40 (CTA statements, assessment of, 136–39; definitions, similarities, and differences, 130–31; in religion, 132–35; restoration/ progress/transformation, 135–36; and secular, similarities between, 132; and technology in new light, 135); visions, 114–15 Christian Transhumanist Association (CTA), 12, 129, 136–40, 140n1, 140n4, 141n5, 412–13 chromosome, 324 Chu, Ted, 197, 201, 328–29 Cixin, Liu, 261, 266–67

443

Clark, Andy, 185 Clark, Arthur C., 323 Clement of Alexandria, 148 Climacus, John, 174 Clinton, Bill, 315–16 clocks, 145–46 Clough, David, 237–38 Clynes, Manfred, 196, 220, 222 Coakley, Sarah, 242 Cockneys vs Zombies (2012), 310 Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome, 263 co-humanity, 102 Cole-Turner, Ronald, 13, 207, 223–24, 350, 416 Collins, Francis S., 34 Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God (Vatican), 14 communism, 150–51, 208 Community of Christ, 54 Compassion Argument, 65–66 computational theory of mind (CTM), 7, 309 computers, 310 Confucianism, 101–10, 111n2; anthropology, 101–2, 107–8; humanity in, 101–10 (existential, 102–3, 107–8; original, 101–2; perfecting, 101, 105, 108–10; restoration of original, 103–4); Tiān mìng, 101–2 Confucius, 9 Congo (Crichton), 266 Conradie, Ernst, 376–77 “conscious evolution” (Chu), 184 consciousness, 3, 11, 19–20, 23, 38, 78, 83–84, 104–5, 162, 167, 199–200, 281, 314–16, 321–22, 328–33, 347– 48, 359–64, 390–91, 398, 401 Copernicus, Nicolaus, 145 Cornwall, Susannah, 237, 239, 242–43 cosmetic surgery, 373 Cosmic Being (CoBe), 201–2 cosmist transhumanism, 131 Council on Bioethics, 16

444

Index

courage, 394–95 created co-creator, 225–26, 228n34 Creation Argument, 66 Crichton, Michael, 266 Crick, Francis, 311–12 CRISPR-Cas9 editing system, 33–34, 325, 371–73, 384n22, 400–401 critical theory, 21, 29n63 cryonics, 195 CTA. See Christian Transhumanist Association (CTA) culture, 373–74 The Culture of Narcissism (Lasch), 317 Curran, Ian, 12, 120 cyberattacks, 147 cybernetic immortality, 7–9, 105–6, 194–201, 310–11, 317, 323–24, 334–35 cybernetic uploading, 7, 106 cyberspace, 194 cyborg, 106–7, 285, 356–59; Christian transhumanism and, 217–26; feminism, 285; feminist, 220–24; hybridity of, 220–22; religion, 224– 25; transhumanism, 222–24 cyborgism, 196–97 “Cyborg Manifesto” (Haraway), 217–22 Cyborg Selves, 217–18, 223–24 D4 dopamine receptor gene (DRD4), 394–95 Dante (c. 1265–1321), 132–33, 148 Daoism, 10 Dao of Heaven, 102 Darwin, Charles, 234, 238 Darwinism/Darwinian evolution, 5, 90, 193 Dataism, 36, 44 Dawkins, Richard, 322 Dawn of the Dead (2004), 310 Deacon, Terrence, 346 Deane-Drummond, Celia, 22, 122 death, 11, 42–44, 194–201, 276, 374– 75; denial of, 374; with God, 376; war on, 322–23

death of Man, 42–43 de Chardin, Pierre Teilhard, 38, 48n35, 59, 342, 347–50, 355–56 de Condorcet, Marquis, 59 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 393 de Garis, Hugo, 185, 202 de Grey, Aubrey, xvi, 8, 167, 185–86, 195, 299, 325–28, 381, 409, 411 deification, 12 Deleuze, Gilles, 273 della Mirandola, Giovanni Pico, 133 Descartes, René, 239–40, 295 designer baby, 33–34 “designer evolution” (Young), 184 Dhamma, 80 Dialectic (Adorno and Horkheimer), 274 Diamandis, Peter, 185 digital immortality, 36, 358 Dirnberger, Jacob, 10 divine, notion of, 31–45; antihumanism and, 42–44; philosophical posthumanism and, 39–42; transhumanism and, 32–35 divinity, 166 DMD. See Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) Dong, Yang, 267 Donne, John, 229 Dorff, Elliot, 11–12 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, 162 Doudna, Jennifer, 34 DRD4. See D4 dopamine receptor gene (DRD4) Drexler, Eric, 195 Dreyfus, Hubert, 317 Dreyfus, Stuart, 317 dualism, body-and-soul, 39–40, 102 Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD), 400 Earth, 55, 268 Easter, 4 Eastern Orthodox Christian, 161–75

Index

ecclesiology, 416 ecofeminism, 261–63; definition, 262; feminist, 261–63, 269n14; versus other feminist environmentalisms, 262–63; and posthumanism, 263–68; waves, 262 economy of affection, 251 Eden, 152, 224–25 education, 396–97 Egypt, 322 Eiesland, Nancy, 226 Ellul, Jacques, 152 Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 186 embodiment, 162, 186, 220, 338n23; of call of Abraham, 121; digital, 33; human, 203, 208, 331; material, 206, 223; of mind of Dao, 107; physical, 20; sexual, 194 emergence, 276, 360–62, 366; of biotechnologies, 221; of communications technologies, 221; of consciousness, 347; of cyberspace, 198; of irreducibly social human, 234–35; of new posthuman species, 184, 188, 197; of novelty, 140; of superintelligence, 92, 201, 281; technology, 205 emotions, 315 empathy, 396 empathy quotient (EQ), 396 empiricism, 295 Ending Aging (de Grey), 326 End of Life Option Act, California, 7 enframement, 274 Engels, Friedrich, 20 enhancement: biotechnological, xviii; health-related, 381; humans, 32–35, 45n3, 89, 94, 287 (bioconservative approach to, 32–35, 93–94; to perfection, 187–94; with techno-enhancement, 35–39, 132); individual/personal versus permanent/inherited, 399–401; moral, 87, 94–96, 387–403; technological, 190–94; virtues, 94–96

445

“enhancement revolution” (Buchanan), 184 Enlightenment humanism, xvii environmentalism, 262–63 epektasis, 378 Ephrem the Syrian, 171 epistemology, 295 EQ. See empathy quotient (EQ) eros, 249–52, 257–58 eschatology, Christian, 282, 376–77, 417 eschaton, 109, 195, 208, 344, 346, 350, 377, 416 Esfandiary, Fereidoun M., 59, 92 Eskenazi, Tamara Cohn, 256 “The Essence of the Democratic Idea: A Biological Approach” (de Chardin), 38 eternal life, 375 ethics, 56–57; of ambiguity, 276–77; of care, 263–67 ethnicity, 11 Ettinger, Robert, 92 Etymologies, St. Isidore of Seville, 144 eucharist, 123, 153, 172 Euclid, 295 eugenics, 21, 35, 90–92, 374 European Enlightenment, 42–43, 88, 90 Evans, Mike, 267 evolution, xv, 6, 38; biological, 238–39; conscious, 184, 360; Darwinian, 193; of humans, 347–50; religion in, 361–62; technological, 53, 57–59; transhumanism and, 361–62; Unitarian Universalism, 90–92 existential posthumanist, 40 Exodus, 274 extropianism, 37, 46n5, 92, 98n7, 184, 185, 209n7, 210n11, 343, 350 extropy, 59, 185, 190 Extropy magazine, 81 ezer, 256 Face of the Deep (Keller), 256 faith, 380

446

Index

Faith Assumption, 65–66 fascism, 92 fate, 3 Fedorov, Nikolai, 59, 167 feelings, 102–3 feminism, 220–22 feminist cyborg, 220–24 feminist ecofeminism, 261–63, 269n14 femoids, 255 Ferkiss, Victor, 347 Ferrando, Francesca, xv, xvii, 25 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 162, 271 Filmer, Robert, 272 Fohr, Sherry, 11 Foresight Institute, 184 Foucault, Michel, 42–44, 245n7, 285 Four Noble Truths, Buddhism, 77 Frankenstein’s Monster, 3–23 Frankfurt School, 19 freedom of gender, 194 Freres Pontifes, 145 Fukuyama, Francis, 17, 94, 186 Fuller, Steve, 15, 21, 185 Fumagalli, Danielle, xix Future of Humanity Institute, 184 The Future of Human Nature (Habermas), 34 futurum, 3–4, 10 Gaard, Greta, 261–62 Galilei, Galileo, 59, 145, 296 Gallaher, Brandon, 418 gaming disorder, 199 Garden of Eden, 152, 224–25 Garreau, Joel, 184 Gattaca, 35 Gebara, Ivone, 273–74 gender: nonconformity, 97; relations, 232–35; theology of, 254–57 gene editing, 33–34, 93, 325, 387–403, 409; CRISPR-Cas9 editing system, 33–34, 325, 371–73, 384n22, 400– 401; germline, 399–400; somatic, 399–400; virtues and, 387–92, 401–2 Genesis, 116–19, 126, 151, 153, 162– 63, 171, 224, 239, 256, 412

genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 35 genetic discrimination, 35 genetic engineering, 33–34, 36, 94, 192, 371 genetic inheritance, 392–93 genetic manipulation, 33–36, 46n14 genetics, 5, 33–34 Genetic Virtue Program, 410 Genome Institute of Singapore, 312–13 genomic data mining, 325 genomics, 184 Geraci, Robert M., 198–99, 358 Ghostbusters, 311 ghosts, 310–18 Gilgamesh saga, 88 Girard, Rene, 146 GMOs. See genetically modified organisms (GMOs) God Conclusion, 66 Gödel, Kurt, 282, 296 Godmanhood, 162, 168–74; creation, 168–74; divine action, 168–74; human action, 168–74; religion of, 172–74; salvation, 170–74; vision of, 168 God(s), xix, 4, 14, 42–45, 50nn73–74, 55–58, 116–23, 140, 143–44, 148, 151–54, 237–40, 284, 361; as collective projection of humankind, 271; death of, 42–44; Genesis definition, 116–18; glorification of, 379; and humanity, co-creative partnership, 118–23; humans becoming, 32–35; image of, 116–18; in Jesus Christ, 169–74; Nietzsche’s, 43–44; partnership with, 117–18; playing, 33–35; techno-enhancement and, 35–39; as transformer, 415; we being, 39–42; work of cosmic transformation, 137 Goedel, Kurt, 296 Goertzle, Ben, 185 Goldsworthy, Peter, 261, 266 Gore, Al, 310–11 Gospel of John, 350–51

Index

Gould, Stephen Jay, 115 Gouw, Arvin, xix Graham, Elaine L., 38 Graham, Mark, 341 Grandin, Temple, 236 Grassie, William, 9 gratitude, 332 Green, Brian Patrick, xix, 13–14, 341, 345–47, 350, 389, 426n62 Gregory of Nazianzus, 148 Gregory of Nyssa, 148, 242, 378, 379 Grosseteste, Robert, 145 Guattari, Felix, 273 Gudorf, Christine, 234 Habermas, Jürgen, 34 Haidt, Jon, 95 Haldane, J. B. S., 91 hamartiology, 414–20 Han, robot, 41 Hanson, Robin, 185 happiness (eudaimonia), 189–90 Happy-People-Pills for All (Walker), 193 Harari, Yuval Noah, 4, 17, 24n3, 36, 165–66, 168 Haraway, Donna, 217–26, 284 Hardt, Michael, 217 Harris, John, 37, 381 Harris, Sam, 322 Harrison, Peter, 133, 134 Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, 12 Hawking, Stephen, 202 Hayflick limit, 324 Hayles, Katherine, 357 heaven, 55, 62–63, 67, 78–79, 88, 101– 4, 107, 109, 121–23, 126, 139, 148, 150–52, 170, 314, 330, 333, 416–17 Hebrew, 252, 256, 274, 284, 286, 288, 314, 380 Hebrew prophets, 10 Hedonistic Imperative, 192–93 Heffernan, Virginal, 316 Hefner, Philip, 117, 359, 366 Heidegger, Martin, 175, 274 Heilinger, Jan-Christophe, 187

447

Henrich, Joseph, 395–96 hermeneutics, transhumanist, 413–22 Herzfeld, Noreen, 355–56 Heyward, Carter, 249–50 HGP. See Human Genome Project (HGP) Hick, John, 10 Hill, Daniel, 314 Hinduism, 10–11, 76, 95 Hippolytus of Rome, 148 The History of Life and Death (Bacon), 167 Holmes, John Haynes, 91 Holy Grail, 375 Holy Spirit, 169, 174 hominoids, 266 Homo cyberneticus, 6 Homo deus, xvi, 3–23 Homo erectus, 137 Homo gubernator, 347–51 Homo sapiens. See humans homosexuality, 235 hope, 380 Hopkins, Patrick D., 391 Horkheimer, Max, 274 How We Became Posthuman (Hayles), 357 Hsing-li, 102 5-HTTLRP gene, 394 Huang, Peter I-min, 266 hubraphobia, 16 hubris, 4, 6, 16, 19, 33, 53–54, 93, 410, 421, 423 Hughes, James, 15, 37, 185, 343 Human Connectome Project, 313 Human Genome Project (HGP), 371 humanism, 90–92 humanistic exceptionalism, 36 humanity, 15, 53, 137–40; as co-creator, 118; cognitive capacity of, 329; in Confucianism, 101–10; evolution, 355–67; existential, 102–3, 107–8; and God, co-creative partnership, 118–23; immortality and, 105–6; original, 101–2; perfecting, 101, 105, 108–10; queer theory and,

448

Index

232–42; restoration of original, 103–4; sexuality and, 251–58; superintelligence and, 105 Humanity Plus H+. See transhumanism Human Purpose and Transhuman Potential (Chu), 328–29 humans, xv–xvii, 333–34; babies, gene editing, 33–34; becoming God(s), 32–35; as body interacting with other bodies, 249–50; cerebral development, 348–49; enhancement, 32–35, 45n3, 89, 94, 287 (bioconservative approach to, 32–35, 93–94; moral, 87, 94–96, 387–403; to perfection, 187–94; with technoenhancement, 35–39, 132; tools for, 387); evolution of, 347–50; exceptionalism, 38–39; genome, 33; intelligence, 5, 7, 21, 37; with Intelligence Amplification, 93; life span, 11–12, 167–68; mind, 102–3, 108; mind-and-heart (xīn), 102–3, 108; nature, changes to, 388–92; perfection, 187–94, 204 (as end state, 197–201; and happiness, 189; meanings, 189–90; as process, 190–94; self-improvement, process of, 189; technological enhancement, 190–94); to posthuman, 197–201; specificity, 38; technologization of life, 205–6, 348–49; transhumanism, perfection in, 104; utopia, 6; to virtually human, 330; virtue, 388–92 Huxley, Aldous, 16, 356 Huxley, Julian, 5, 38, 44, 80–81, 90–92, 132–33, 137, 230, 356, 359, 366 hybridity, 220–22, 224, 226 Hydén, Göran, 251 IA. See Intelligence Amplification (IA) iCalf, 284 idolatry, xiii, 148, 208, 273 imago Dei, 101–2, 113, 116–18, 133, 224, 256, 351 imitation Dei, 204

immortality, 7–10, 15, 36–37, 105–6, 205, 301–2, 322–23, 373–75; H+ pursuit of, 324–25; transcendence through, 241–44, 322 Incels, 255 individual: as ecosystem, 275–76; sovereign, 272–73; theological anthropology of, 272–73; transhumanism, 131 informatics, 184 Ingold, Tim, 282–83 inspiration, 56–57 Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technology (IEET), 184 intelligence, 5, 7, 21, 37, 167–68, 392–93 Intelligence Amplification (IA), 93–94, 167 intentionality, 283 Internet, 61, 63, 92, 316 Internet-of-All-Things, 168 Irenaeus of Lyons, 148, 169 Isidore of Seville, 144 Islam, 15–16, 32 Istvan, Zoltan, 123–24, 159n53 Jackelén, Antje, 375 Jackson, Zakiyyah Iman, xvii Jainism, 11, 40 James, John, 266 Jantzen, Grace, 256–57 Jesus Christ, 12, 54, 63, 138, 140, 162, 163, 169–70 Jesus of Nazareth, 195 Jewish Sabbath, 117–18 Jiankui, He, 33, 400 Jonas, Hans, 346, 389 Jordan, David Starr, 91 Judaism, 11–12, 32, 329 justice, xix, 93, 94, 98, 137, 143, 257–58, 262–63, 329, 346, 365, 372, 379–83, 393, 395–99, 403 Kafka, Franz, 266 Kagan, Jerome, 315

Index

Kaku, Michio, 314 Kant, Immanuel, 295 karma, 78 Karolinska Institute in Sweden, 312–13 Kass, Leon, 93–94, 186, 191–92 Keenan, James, 341, 350 Keller, Catherine, 254, 256–57 Kellogg, Nelson R., 321 Kennear, Clive Francis, 266 Kepler, Johannes, 296, 411 Kingdom of God, 22, 148, 167, 195, 208, 345, 349–51 Kirsch, Edmund, xvi Kline, Nathan, 196, 220, 222 Koch, Anton, 282 Kohn, Livia, 10 Korean Neo-Confucianism, 102, 108, 110 Kosko, Bart, 359 Kuhn, Thomas, 296 Kurzweil, Ray, 7, 9, 26n24, 37–38, 59, 93, 122, 165–68, 185, 195–97, 201, 206, 213n69, 222, 243, 279–84, 286–87, 309–13, 316–18, 319n22, 327–30, 336n10, 358, 366, 368n15, 390–91, 410 Laakasuo, Michael, 391 LaBerge, Carmen Fowler, 13 laissez-faire capitalism, 5 Lama, Dalai, 75 Lao-Tzu/Laozi, 10, 40 Laqueur, Thomas, 233 Larsson, Michael, 256 Lasch, Christopher, 317 LaTorra, Michael, 11, 41 ‘Laudato Si’, 147, 149 Law of Accelerating Returns, 201 Law of Complexity-Consciousness, 347 Lee, Hak Joon, xviii Left for Dead (video game), 310 Lemaitre, Georges, 145 L’Engle, Madeleine, 175 LEV. See longevity escape velocity (LEV)

449

LGBTQ. See queer theory lhayi naljor/deity yoga, 40 liberation, 19 liberation theology, 414–16 Lidke, Jeffrey, 10 Life of Pi (Martel), 266 Linzey, Andrew, 236 Lipińska, Veronika, 15, 21 liquidation, 205 Llull, Ramon, 145 Locke, John, 272, 295 logical positivism, 296 longevity escape velocity (LEV), 326–27 Luther, Martin, 257 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 205 Machiguenga, 396 Machine Intelligence Research Institute, 184 Madan, Palak, 10 Magdalene, Mary, 255 malignancies, 324 malum in se, 147 mandate of heaven, 103 mangodhood, 162–65, 174–75 Man into Superman, 92 Martel, Yann, 266 Marty, Martin, xviii Martyr, Justin, 148 Marx, Karl, 20, 252 material immortality, 346 Maurin, Peter, 154 Maximus the Confessor (590-662), 168 McCarraher, Eugene, 317 McIntyre, Robert, 8 McKenny, Gerald, 167 McKibben, Bill, 186, 206, 241 McMullen, Matt, 253 Mechanical Age, 197–98 meditation, 40, 77 Mendel, Gregor, 145 Mercer, Calvin, 310 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 285 Merrell-Wolff, Franklin, 82–84

450

Index

Merrell-Wolff, Sherifa, 83 messiah, xix, 6, 9, 11–12, 17–18, 54, 60, 64, 183, 208, 344, 414 Methuselah Foundation, 195 microchip technology, 371 Midson, Scott, 225 Mill, J. S., 193 Miller, James, 273 mind, human, 23n2, 102–3, 108, 359–61; Cartesian, 239; emotions and, 315; and gut, 312–13; neurons, 312–14; as pattern, 311–14 mind-and-heart (xīn), 102–3, 108 mindclone, 330, 358 mindfiles, 358 mindfulness (kyŏng), 103, 110 mind uploading, 106, 199–200, 314, 390 mindware, 358 Minsky, Marvin, 185 misrecognized religiosity, 60 Mitcham, Carl, 356 modernity, 204–5 modern science, 411–13 moirai, 3, 10 Moltmann, Jürgen, 273–74, 375–76, 380 monasteries, 145 monism, 26n19 monotheism, 272–73 Moore, Gordon, 61 Moore, Stephen D., 236 Moore’s Law, 61, 316–17 moral anthropocentrism, 36 moral anthropologies, 346 moral enhancement, 87, 94–96, 387– 403; changes for, 393–99 (courage, 394–95; justice, 395–97; prudence, 399; temperance, 397–99); genetic inheritance and, 392–93; individual/ personal versus permanent/inherited, 399–401; Unitarian Universalism, 94–96; way for, 401–2 morality, 103, 107, 150–51, 154, 167– 68, 350, 371–72, 392 Moravec, Hans, 185, 197, 199, 201, 310, 312, 358

More, Max, xiii, 37, 59, 81, 130, 185, 187, 190, 209n7 more-being versus well-being, 363 Mori, Masahiro, 41 Mormonism, 16, 54–55, 67–68 Mormon theology, xix Mormon Transhumanism, 36–37, 53– 68; changes, 61; mandates, 67–68; misrecognized religiosity and, 60; myths, 61–64; New God Argument, 64–67; post-secular religion, 55–57; technological evolution and, 57–59; visions, 61–64 Mormon Transhumanism (Cannon), 16 Mormon Transhumanist Association, 59, 184 mortal existence, 321 mortality, 321–35 Morton, Timothy, 275 multinational corporation, 261–62 Murphy, Patrick D., 261 Musa, Aisha, 15 Musk, Elon, 127n3, 146, 202, 393 Muslim, 15 mutuality, 253 Myth of Frankenstein (Shelly), 17 myth of progress, 136 nanotechnology, 5, 36, 87, 184, 188, 195–96, 371, 373, 387 narcissism, 316–17 natural death, 8 natural environments, 263 naturalism, 11 natural law, 346 Nazianzus, Gregory, 171 Nectome, 7 Negri, Antonio, 217 Neo-Confucianism, 102, 108, 110 neoliberalism, 272–73 neologism, 421 Neoplatonism, 59 network, 283 Neuralink, 393 neuroscientific mind-making, 193

Index

neurotech revolution, 63–64 The New Atlantis (Bacon), 118 New Bottles for New Wine (Huxley), 38 Newett, Joshua, 253 New God Argument, 64–67 New Jerusalem, 121, 151 New Testament, 126 Newton, Isaac, 296, 411 New Zion, 88 Nichols, Terence, 14 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 31, 42–45, 163, 165 Nirvana (Transcendental Consciousness), 76, 78–79, 83, 329 Noah’s Ark, 118–19, 412, 419 Noble, David, 37, 272 Noble Eightfold Path, Buddhism, 77–78 nondualism, 40 non-religious, 16 noosphere, 362–65 nuanced rejection, 345–46 nuclear weapons, 147 Octogesima Adveniens, 149 Olsen, Nikki, 222 Omega Point, 38, 349, 355–67; in evolution, 361–62; functions, 360–61; as love, 361; Teilhard’s, 359–61; transhumanism and, 355–67 (aims of, 356–59; evolution, 361–62; noosphere and, 362–65; planetization and, 362–65; religion and, 361–62) Omni-God of monotheism, 272–75 omniscient, 35 On the Origin of Species (Darwin), 238 OPTIC network, 146 Oration on the Dignity of Man (della Mirandola), 133 Order of Cosmic Engineers, 198–99 The Order of Things (Foucault), 42 Oresme, Nicole, 145 Origin (Brown), xvi Orthodox Christianity, 12, 59, 88, 161–75, 378 Our Posthuman Future (Fukuyama), 94

451

Oxford Calculators, 145 Pacem in Terris, 149 paganism, 93 Palamas, Gregory, 169, 378 Pali Canon suttas, 78 pantheism, 93, 163, 168, 366, 378 paradise, 37 paradise engineering, 36 Paradiso (Dante), 148 Pascal, Blaise, 145 Passionate Embrace (Jantzen), 257 Pasteur, Louis, 145 patternism, 7, 309–14 Paul, Apostle, 310 “Pause! We Can Go Back!” (McKibben), 206 Pearce, David, 36, 59, 81, 114, 185, 192–93 Pekin man, 137 Pelosi, Nancy, 19 peoplehood, 11 perfection, humans, 187–94, 375, 379 Perignon, Dom Pierre, 144 Persson, Ingmar, 372 Peters, Ted, xix, 34, 110, 117, 120, 350, 410 Pew Research Center, 132, 190 The Phenomenon of Man (Teilhard), 347 philosophical/critical transhumanism, xvii Pi, 297 Pied Piper, 183–87 pipe organs, 145 planetization, 362–65 Plato, 199–200 “playing God,” 33–35 Point Omega, 38, 349, 355–67 Pont d’Avignon, 145 Pope Benedict, 147 Pope Francis, 147, 154, 351 Pope John XXIII, 149 Pope Paul VI, 149 Popper, Karl, 296

452

Index

Populorum Progressio, 149 Porter, Jean, 391 post-anthropocentrism, 39–40 post-dualism, 39–40 posthuman, xiv–xviii, 5–9, 25nn9–10, 104–5, 107, 188, 197–201, 217, 357; civilization, 281; definition of, 389; Godhood, 16; nature, changes to, 388–92; superintelligence, 201, 281 posthumanism: and animal studies, 263–65; cautions/warnings about, 287–89; and death of God, 43–44; definition, 39; and divine, 39–42; and ecofeminism, 263–68; philosophical, 39–42; in technology, 39–40; versus transhumanism, 279–80 post-secular religion, 55–57 post-World War II techno-utopianism, 92–93 Potter, Harry, 311 predictions, 314 pre-implantation genetic testing (PGD), 384n22 Pre-Original Buddhism, 80–82 Principles of Extropy, 59 Prisco, Giulio, 185, 197–99, 201 pro-life, 150 Promethean techno-can-do-ism, 16 Prometheus, 6, 17–22 property perfection, 187 prophecy, 56 Protestant Christianity, 12–13 Protestants, 94 prudence, 399 pseudoscience, 295–98, 303–5 Public Religion Project (Marty), xviii public theologians, xviii–xx public theology, xv–xvi, 4 pyramids, Egypt, 322 qualia. See consciousness quasi-religion, 280–84 queer theologies, 237–40 queer theory, 232–42; and animal studies for Christian theology,

235–40; in binary gender system in modern Western society, 232–35; and Christian mysticism, 242–44; in transgender sensibilities, 237 Qur’an, 15, 28n51 “radical evolution” (Garreau), 184 radical life extension (RLE), 7–9, 32–33, 105–6, 195, 298–99, 325–26; axial religions respond to, 9–17 (Buddhism, 11; Byzantine Christianity, 12; Daoism, 10; Hinduism, 10–11; Islam, 15–16; Jainism, 11; Judaism, 11–12; Mormonism, 16; non-religious, 16; Protestant Christianity, 12–13; Roman Catholic Christianity, 13–15; Unitarian Universalism, 15); impact on spirituality, 10; theological implications of, 8–9 Rae, Gavin, 24n5 Rahner, Karl, 241 Ralph, Iris, 266 Rand, Ayn, 255 Ranisch, Robert, 400 rationalism, 295 Realbotix, 250, 253 rebirth, 78 Redding, Micah, 12, 412 Rees, Martin, 166 relationality, 283 relational ontology, 284–86 religion, 19–21; cosmos and, 361–62; in evolution, 361–62; of mangodhood, 164–65, 174–75; post-secular, 55–57; quasi-religion, 280–84; transhumanism as, 60 Religion and Technology (Herzfeld), 355–56 The Religion of Technology: the divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (Noble), 37, 272 Religion without Revelation (Huxley), 356 religiosity, 60

Index

religious anthropology, xv religious transhumanism, xvii–xviii, 3–23, 150–51, 280; cybernetic immortality and, 7–9; Eastern orthodox critique of, 161–75; eschatological proviso and, 21–22; Frankenstein and, 17–22; human to posthuman via, 5–7; Prometheus, 17–22; radical life extension and, 7–9; salvation, 9, 15, 37, 90, 120, 138–39, 150, 153, 162, 168–74, 272, 330, 345, 359, 362, 377, 410, 414, 416–17, 422; science and, 19–21; Singularity, 9; techno-utopian, 5–7 religious transhumanists, xvi, xviii–xx Renaissance humanism, 133 Representations of the Post/Human (Graham), 38 reproduction technology, 63 Resident Evil (video game), 310 resurrection, 4, 13–14, 22, 54, 59, 64, 140, 167, 172–73, 195–96, 200, 204, 206, 240, 282, 314, 371–82 revelation, way of, 161–75 The Revenge of Analog: Real Things and Why They Matter (Sax), 206 Richardson, Kathleen, 254–56 RLE. See radical life extension (RLE) robots/robotics, 4, 5, 184, 201; enlightenment of, 41–42; Han, 41; sex, 249–58; as technological evolution, 58 Roduit, Johann A. R., 186, 187 Roger, Elliot, 255 Roko’s Basilisk, 127n2 Roman Catholics, 94, 143–54; Christianity, 13–15, 149–50; Church, 143–54; opposed to technological developments, 146–47; recalcitrance, 14; technological progress, history of support for, 144–46; transhumanism and, 147–51 (Catholic Church respond to, 148–49; Christianity, concordance between, 149–50; future, 151; religious, 150–51)

453

Rothblatt, Martine, 185, 194, 330, 358 Rothman, David, 373, 377 Rothman, Sheila, 373, 377 Roughgarden, Joan, 234, 238 Ryle, Gilbert, 240 Sage Learning. See Confucianism salvation, 9, 15, 37, 90, 120, 138–39, 150, 153, 162, 168–74, 272, 330, 345, 359, 362, 377, 410, 414, 416– 17, 422 saṃsāra, 11 Sandberg, Anders, 131, 185, 192 Sandel, Michael, 186 Satan, 55, 147, 161–63, 168, 171–72, 174–75, 226 Savulescu, Julian, 372 Sax, David, 206 Schmitt, Carl, 272 Schneider, Susan, 410 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 77, 163 Schulman, Audrey, 266 science, 19–21, 56–57, 295–306; contemporary, 298–303 (conceptually sound scientific project, features of, 300–303; scientific community, 298–99; short-term and long-term goals, 299–300); definitions, history of, 295–98 (from academia to public and corporate support, 297–98; considerations from, 298; from logical empiricism to popper, 296; from natural philosophy to scientific method, 295–96; from Popper to postmodern science critique, 296–97; from postmodern science back to academia, 297; from scientific method to logical positivism, 296); modern, 411–13; nature of, 298; versus non-science, 298; transhumanism and, 303–5 science-as-savior imaginary, 19 The Science of Evil (Baron-Cohen), 315

454

Science-Religion Discourse (SRD), 21, 130 scientific community, 298–99 secular dreams, 375–77 secular eschatology, 350, 375 secularization, 204–5 secular transhumanism, xvii, 129–35, 204–5; versus Christian transhumanism, 131–35; definition, 130–31; as myth of progress/ restoration, 136 Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, 232, 235 self-cultivation, 103–4, 107 self-improvement, 189, 204 self-transcendence, 87, 403 SENS. See Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence (SENS) Seung, Sebastian, 313 sex bots, 4, 250 sexism, 48n41 sex robots, 249–58 sex toys, 252–54 sexual freedom, 97 sexuality, 249–58; gendered, 234; humanity and, 251–58; theology of, 254–57 Shelley, Mary, 303 Shelly, Mary, 6, 17 Shiva, Vandana, 35 Siddhartha Gotama. See Buddha Sierra Sciences, 167 Silent Spring (Carson), 267 Silicon Valley, 92, 124, 146 Singer, Peter, 267 Singh, Avinash Kumar, 10 Singularity, 9, 26n24, 92, 98n8, 122, 166, 201–2; mind outside body, 326–28; superintelligence, 281; technological, 201 The Singularity Is Near (Kurzweil), 59, 201 Singularity University, 185 Smith, Joseph, 54–55 social ethics, 10 social imaginary, 19

Index

Society for Universal Immortalism, 184 Sokal, Alan, 297 Solov’ev, Vladimir, 162 Sophia, social humanoid, 41 Sorcerer’s Apprentice, xvi soteriology, 88, 414, 416 soul, 309–11, 375 soul without body, 310–18 speciesism, 261 “The Spirit of the Earth” (Teilhard), 362 spirits, 311 spirituality, 14, 40 spiritual knowledge, 174 spiritual warfare, 174 SRD. See Science-Religion Discourse (SRD) Stalinism, 92 Stark, Tony, 412 Star Trek: The Next Generation (television series), 229 Steinhart, Eric, 356 Stenmark, Lisa, 21, 130 Steno, Nicolas, 145 Stock, Gregory, 185 Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence (SENS), 195, 326 strong superintelligence, 105 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn), 296 suffering (dukkha), 11, 36, 77 Sullivan, Nikki, 232 Supercomputers, 200–201 superintelligence, 9, 104–5, 281 surrender, 283 Syntheism, 45 synthetic biology, 63 systematic theology, 416–18 Taft, William Howard, 91 Tanis, Justin, 243 Taoism, 39–40 Tao Te Ching (Lao-Tzu), 40 Taylor, Charles, 19, 204 techno-culture, 6 technological rapture, 166

Index

technology, xiii, 6, 174–75, 359–66; Big Data, 35–36; Buddha-nature of, 41; and Christian Transhumanism theology, 129–40; evolution of, 57–59; and image of god, 116–18; and Kingdom of Heaven, 121–23; modern, 355–56; and redemption, 118–21; of reproductive control, 147; revelation, way of, 161–75; Roman Catholics on, 144–47; theology of, 116, 123; transhuman, 372–75; virtual reality (VR), 393–94, 397–403 Technology and Human Becoming (Hefner), 359 TechnoRapture, 92 technosapiens, xiii–xiv, xvii, 162 technoscience, 188–89 techno-transhumanism, 16 techno-utopianism, 92–93 techno-utopian transhumanism, 5–7 TechPoor, 420 TechRich, 420 TEF. See Teleological Egocentric Functionalism (TEF) teleios (perfect), 189–90 Teleological Egocentric Functionalism (TEF), 123–24 telomeres, 324 telos, 188–90, 346 temperance, 397–99 Terasem Movement Foundation, 184 terrestrial transhumanism, 131 theological acceptance: reserved, 344– 45; total, 343–44 theological anthropology: of individual, 272–73; of planetary creature, 273–74; planetary ethics, ambiguity in, 274–75 theology: anthropology in light of transhumanism, 415; of body, 254– 57; of Christian Transhumanism, 129–40, 284, 413–19 (CTA statements, assessment of, 136–39; definitions, similarities, and

455

differences, 130–31; in religion, 132–35; restoration/progress/ transformation, 135–36; and secular, similarities between, 132; and technology in new light, 135); of gender, 254–57; liberation, 414–16; Mormon, xix; versus natural philosophy, 134; public, xv–xvi, 4; of sexuality, 254–57; strengths of, 421–22; systematic, 416–18; of technology, 116, 123; weaknesses of, 419–21 Theomimesis, 15 Theophilus of Antioch, 148 Theory of Bastards (Schulman), 266 theosis, 139, 161–75, 377–79 Theravada, 76 Thiel, Peter, 146, 185, 195, 202 The Three-Body Problem (Cixin), 261, 267 Thweatt, Jeanine, 290n33 Tiān mìng, 101–2 Tipler, Frank, 185, 281 Tirosh-Samuelson, Hava, 350 Tonstad, Linn Marie, 419 Torre, Miguel De La, 414 Torricelli, Evangelista, 145 Tower of Babel, 123, 166, 419–21 Tracy, David, 413 TRANSCEND (Kurzweil), 196 transcendence, 241–44, 322 transgenderism, 194, 211n34 transgender, 232, 237, 239–41, 243 transhuman apotheosis, 93 transhumanism, xiii–xx, 5, 38, 46n5, 53, 59, 81, 93, 184, 265–68, 341–51, 383n4; from anthropocene to technosapien period, xviii; anthropology, xv, 38–39, 415; atheistic, 36–39; attractive worldview, 409–10; axial religions respond to, 9–17; bio-conservative opposition to, 93–94; Buddhist, 41– 42; cautions/warnings about, 287–89; Christian, 113–27, 411–13; critics

456

Index

of, 410–11; definition, 114, 161, 183–84, 409–10; and divine, 32–35; historical development of, 80–81; human enhancement and, 32–35, 89, 93–94, 287; human perfection in, 104; meaning, xvi–xviii; messianic, 11–12; Mormon, 36–37, 53–68; movement, 92–93; myth of pure intellect, 328; philosophical/critical, xvii; and Point Omega, 355–67; versus posthumanism, 279–80; in post-secular age, 203–6; potential, 328–30; religion of mangodhood, 164–65, 174–75; religious, xvii–xviii, 3–23; Roman Catholics views on, 143–54; Satanic, 161; science and, 303–5; scientific versus religious, 19; secular, xvii, 129–35; soteriology in, 416; strands of, 131; techno-enhancement and, 35–39, 132; techno-utopian, xvii–xviii, 5–7 Transhumanist Declaration, 5, 59, 389 Transhumanist Manifesto (Young), 35 transhumanists, 4, 53, 60, 387–403; agenda, 20; on biotechnological enhancement, xviii; divinity, 166; hermeneutical principle, 413–22; Pied Piper, 183–87; potential, 328–30; pragmatic attitude, 391; religious, xvi, 3–23, 150–51; selfidentified, 37; summum bonum, xviii; transformation, tool box for, 5; Unitarian Universalists as, 87–98 transhumanist telos, 15 The Transhumanist Wager (Istvan), 123–24 Transhuman Policy Center, 184 transhumans, 104 transhuman technology, 372–75 transport, 282–83 trans*theology, 240–44 trasumanar, 133, 148 Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, 171–72 Trible, Phyllis, 256

Trinitarian God, 273–74 T-theology, 415–16 Turner, Denys, 238 Turner, William B., 232 Tutu, Desmond, 245n3 Twenge, Jean, 252 28 Days Later (2002), 310 28 Weeks Later (2007), 310 two-sex model for humanity, 233–34 type perfection, 187 Übermensch, 43–44, 175 Ubuntu, 229, 251 Unitarian Universalism (UU), 15, 87–98; bio-conservative opposition to transhumanism, 93–94; commitments, xix, 15; in dialogue with transhuman project, 96–97; Enlightenment sieve, 88–90; eugenics, 90–92; evolution, 90–92; humanism, 90–92; moral enhancement, 94–96; post-World War II techno-utopianism and, 92–93; transhumanists and, 92–93, 97–98; virtues enhancement, 94–96 Upanishads, 10 uploading (whole brain emulation), 106, 199–200, 314, 330, 390 utilitarian, 36, 185, 192–93 utopian vision, 6–7 UU. See Unitarian Universalism (UU) Vardy, Peter, 377 Vienna Circle, 296 Vinge, Vernor, 9, 166, 185, 201 Virtually Human: The Promise-and the Peril-of Digital Immortality (Rothblatt), 330, 358 virtual reality (VR) technology, 393–94, 397–403 virtues: cardinal, 393–94; to deification, 377–78; engineering, 388–92; enhancement, 94–96, 387–92; gene editing and, 387–92, 401–2; genetic inheritance and, 392–93;

Index

humans, 388–92; justice as, 380–81; perfection through attainment of, 378–82; of prudence, 380; temperance, 397–99 Vita-More, Natasha, 5, 24n7, 185, 191, 222–23 Walker, Mark, 193 The Walking Dead (television program), 310 Wang, Yun, 396 Ward, Graham, 243 Warrick, Kevin, 185, 197 Watts, Alan, 39–40 WBE. See whole brain emulation (WBE) weak superintelligence, 105 Weber, Max, 205 Weil, Simone, 316 welfare systems, 63 Wenjie, Ye, 267 Wenz, Peter, 380 Western Buddhism, 89 Westhelle, Vitor, 414 Wheeler, John, 332 white evangelical, 132 Whitehead, Alfred North, 273–74 whole brain emulation (WBE), 230; and gender/sex relations, 232–35; and queer theory, 232–42 Williams, Anna, 378 wisdom, 57

457

Wish (Goldsworthy), 261, 266–67 Wolfe, Cary, 218, 264–65 Wolyniak, Joseph, 133–35 World Future Society, 184 World Transhumanist Association (WTA), 59, 81, 93, 184 World War Z (2013), 310 Wright, N. T., 122 A Wrinkle in Time (L’Engle), 175 WTA. See World Transhumanist Association (WTA) xenophobia, 95 yadah, 284 Yamaka Sutta, 78 yoga, 40, 76, 82 Young, Brigham, 54 Young, Simon, 16, 35 Yudkowsky, Eliezer, 185, 202 Zarathustra, 62 Zarkadakis, George, 200 Zhong, Songfa, 395 Zimmermann, Jens, 133 zoē, 46n16 Zombieland (2009), 310 Zombies, 310–18 Zombie Survival Guide (Brooks), 310 Zoroastrianism, 10, 62, 195

About the Contributors

Whitney Bauman is associate professor of religious studies at Florida International University in Miami, Florida. He is also co-founder and codirector of Counterpoint: Navigating Knowledge, a non profit based in Berlin, Germany, that holds public discussions over social and ecological issues related to globalization and climate change. His areas of research interest fall under the theme of “religion, science, and globalization.” He is the recipient of a Fulbright Fellowship and a Humboldt Fellowship. His publications include Religion and Ecology: Developing a Planetary Ethic (2014) and, co-authored with Kevin O’Brien, Environmental Ethics and Uncertainty: Tackling Wicked Problems (2019). He is currently working on a manuscript tentatively entitled Developing a Critical Planetary Romanticism: CPR For the Earth. Lincoln Cannon is a technologist and philosopher, and leading advocate of technological evolution and post-secular religion. He is a founder, board member, and former president of the Mormon Transhumanist Association. He is a founder and board member of the Christian Transhumanist Association. And he formulated the New God Argument, a logical argument for faith in God that is popular among religious transhumanists. Lincoln is CEO at Thrivous, the human enhancement company. He holds degrees in business administration and philosophy. He is married to Dorothée Vankrieckenge, and they have three children. Levi Checketts teaches ethics at St. Mary’s College of California and Holy Names University. He recently completed his dissertation entitled Homo gubernator: A Moral Anthropology for New Technologies, which informs his work in this chapter. His research, which appears in Theology and Science, Religions, and the Social Epistemology journals, deals with the intersection of Catholic moral theology, philosophy of technology and science, and technology and society studies. 459

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About the Contributors

Ron Cole-Turner is the H. Parker Sharp Professor Emeritus in theology and ethics at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary and is a research fellow of the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. He is a founding member of the International Society for Science and Religion, serving as a member of its executive committee. He is the editor of Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement (2011) and the author of The End of Adam and Eve: Theology and the Science of Human Origins (2016). Celia Deane-Drummond is senior research fellow and director of the Laudato Si’ Research Institute at Campion Hall, University of Oxford. Her specific research and teaching area includes theological analysis at the boundary with biological sciences, especially evolution, evolutionary anthropology, ecology, genetics, and public theology. Ilia Delio, OSF, a Franciscan Sister of Washington, D.C., holds the Josephine C. Connelly Endowed Chair in Theology at Villanova University. She holds a doctorate in pharmacology from Rutgers University, Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, and a doctorate in Historical Theology from Fordham University. She is the author of eighteen books and numerous articles. Her recent books include A Hunger for Wholeness: Soul, Space and Transcendence (2018), Making All Things New: Catholicity, Cosmology and Consciousness (2015), and The Unbearable Wholeness of Being: God, Evolution and the Power of Love (2014) for which she won the 2014 Silver Nautilus Book Award and a 2014 Catholic Press Association Book Award in Faith and Science. Francesca Ferrando teaches philosophy at NYU-Liberal Studies, New York University, USA. She has published extensively on the topic of posthuman; her monograph Philosophical Posthumanism was released in 2019. She was the recipient of the Philosophical Prize “Sainati,” with the acknowledgment of the president of Italy. U.S. magazine Origin named her one of the 100 Top Creatives making change in the world. For more info: www​.theposthuman​ .org. Brandon Gallaher (DPhil, Theology, University of Oxford) is senior lecturer of systematic and comparative theology at the University of Exeter (Devon, UK) and was formerly a postdoctoral and research fellow at the University of Oxford, the University of Notre Dame (Indiana, USA), and Doshisha University (Kyoto, Japan). His publications include Freedom and Necessity in Modern Trinitarian Theology (2016) and (with Paul Ladouceur) The Patristic Witness of Georges Florovsky: Essential Theological Writings (2019). He is currently working on a book project on Eastern Orthodoxy and the contemporary challenges from Western modernity, including technology.

About the Contributors

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He served in June 2016 in Crete at the Eastern Orthodox Holy and Great Council as a Theological Subject Expert in the Ecumenical Patriarchate Press Office. Elisabeth Gerle is professor of ethics with a special focus on human rights at Uppsala University and ethicist at the Research Department, Church of Sweden. She has spent several years at Princeton University as visiting scholar first at the Center of International Relations and then at Princeton Theological Seminary. Arvin M. Gouw is doing research in theology at the University of Cambridge. He was an instructor at Stanford University School of Medicine and faculty affiliate at Harvard Center for Science, Religion, and Culture. Gouw did his fellowship on science and religion at Princeton. He has a PhD from Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, MPhil in philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania, MA in theology from St. Mary’s Seminary and University Ecumenical Institute of Theology, and MA in endocrinology and BA in molecular cell biology–neurobiology from UC Berkeley. Brian Patrick Green is director of technology ethics at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University. He has doctoral and master’s degrees from the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley and collaborates with organizations such as the World Economic Forum, the Partnership on AI, and the Pontifical Council for Culture. His work is focused on AI ethics, the ethics of space exploration, the ethics of technological manipulation of humans, the ethics of risky emerging technologies, corporate technology ethics, and the relationship of technology and religion (particularly the Catholic Church). Green is co-author of the Ethics in Technology Practice (2018) corporate technology ethics resources, author of the book Space Ethics (2021), and co-editor of a special issue of the Journal of Moral Theology (2022) on AI and moral theology. Aubrey David Nicholas Jasper de Grey is an English author and biomedical gerontologist. He is the author of The Mitochondrial Free Radical Theory of Aging and co-author of Ending Aging. He is known for his view that medical technology may enable human beings alive today not to die from age-related causes. Dr. Noreen Herzfeld is the Nicholas and Bernice Reuter Professor of Science and Religion at St. John’s University and College of St. Benedict. She holds degrees in both computer science and theology and teaches in both fields. Peter I-min Huang is professor emeritus of English, Tamkang University, Taiwan. Dr. Huang’s areas of interest are English and Chinese literature, ecofeminism, ecopoetry, postcolonial ecocriticism, indigenous studies, science fiction, and

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About the Contributors

climate fiction. Huang served as the chair of the English Department, Tamkang University, for two terms, between 2007 and 2011. A founding member of ASLETaiwan, Huang also served as the conference organizing chairperson for The Fourth Tamkang International Conference on Ecological Discourse (May 23–24, 2008) and The Fifth Tamkang International Conference on Ecological Discourse (December 17–18, 2010). Huang’s journal articles include publications in ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment; Neohelicon; Journal of Poyang Lake; CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture; and Foreign Literature Studies. He has published book chapters in Ecofeminist Science Fiction: International Perspectives on Gender, Ecology, and Literature (2021); Transecology: Transgender Perspectives on Environment and Nature (2020); Literature and Ecofeminism: Intersectional and International Voices (2018); Ecocriticism in Taiwan: Identity, Environment, and the Arts (2016); and East Asian Ecocriticisms: A Critical Reader (2013). Dr. Huang also is the author of the monograph, Linda Hogan and Contemporary Taiwanese Writers: An Ecocritical Study of Indigeneities and Environment (2016); and the co-editor with Xinmin Liu of Embodied Healing, Embedded Memories: New Ecological Perspectives from East Asia (2021). James Hughes, was raised Unitarian Universalist and is a practicing Buddhist. A bioethicist and sociologist, Hughes serves as associate provost for the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and as a senior research fellow at UMass Boston’s Center for Applied Ethics. He is also the executive director of the technoprogressive think tank, the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. He was formerly the executive director of the World Transhumanist Association, now known as Humanity+. Dr. Hughes is the author of Citizen Cyborg: Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the Future. Rev. Jay Emerson Johnson, is professor of theology and culture at Pacific School of Religion, is an episcopal priest, and is a member of the core doctoral faculty at the GTU in Berkeley, California. Nelson R. Kellogg, is a writer and emeritus professor of humanities at Sonoma State University (California State University). He obtained his doctorate in the history of science from Johns Hopkins University. Heup Young Kim (Hŭb-yŏng Kim) is the founding executive director of the Korea Forum for Science and Life and professor emeritus of systematic theology at Kangnam University, South Korea. After studying aeronautical engineering at Seoul National University, he completed MDiv and ThM programs in the Princeton Theological Seminary. He received a PhD degree in systemic theology from the GTU, where he was honored as the 2009 Alumnus of the Year. He is a founding fellow of the International Society for Science and Religion and

About the Contributors

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was twice a co-moderator of the Congress of Asian Theologians and a president of the Korean Society for Systematic Theology. He has published numerous works in the areas of East Asian theology, interreligious dialogue, and religion and science, including monographs such as Wang Yang-ming and Karl Barth: A Confucian-Christian Dialogue and A Theology of the Dao. Michael LaTorra, after receiving his master’s degree, worked for sixteen years as a technical writer for a variety of companies in California and Texas. These companies ranged from small (a Silicon Valley start-up) through medium (100 employees) to large (Fortune 500 size with thousands of employees). LaTorra joined the NMSU English Department in 2000. His professional interests include the communication of technical information in science, engineering, and business. He has published and given presentations on the impact of science and technology on the development of enhanced human abilities, well-being, and longevity. In addition, he instructs interested students and members of the public in the practices of meditation and wisdom inquiry. Braden Molhoek is lecturer in science, technology, and ethics at the GTU where he also works at the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences. He also teaches courses on technology and ethics at Santa Clara University’s School of Engineering. As a double major in genetics and religion at Ohio Wesleyan University, Braden went on to focus in theological bioethics in his master’s program at Boston University School of Theology and the Boston Theological Institute, finally receiving a PhD in ethics and social theory from the GTU. His academic interests include virtue ethics, the science and religion dialogue, ethical issues in biotechnology, AI, and transhumanism. The underlying questions connecting these interests are how science shapes our philosophical and theological understandings of what it means to be human and how we think ethically about the use of emerging technology. Markus Mühling is a Protestant systematic theologian and philosopher of religion at the Protestant University Wuppertal/Bethel whose work focuses largely on the doctrine of God, the eschatology, the atonement, and the dialogue between the natural sciences and theology. His main work in the process of publication is Post-Systematic Theology I–III, Leiden 2020ff. Ted Peters is distinguished research professor emeritus at Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary and the GTU in Berkeley, California. He is currently co-editor of the journal Theology and Science published by the Center for Theology and Natural Science, as well as former editor of Dialog: A Journal of Theology. His magnum opus is a single-volume systematic theology, God—The World’s Future (2015). He is also the author of God in Cosmic History (2017). He is co-editor of books such as Astrotheology: Science and

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About the Contributors

Theology Meet Extraterrestrial Life (2018) and God, Life, and the Cosmos: Christian and Islamic Perspectives (2002). Included in his fiction is a mystery thriller with a transhumanist theme, Cyrus Twelve (2018). Iris Ralph is a professor in the English Department, Tamkang University, Taiwan. Dr. Ralph’s areas of specialty are literature, ecocriticism, animal studies, and plant studies. Publications by Ralph include a monograph, Packing Death in Australian Literature: Ecocides and Eco-sides (2020); and book chapters in Embodied Healing, Embedded Memories: New Ecological Perspectives from East Asia, edited by Xinmin Liu and Peter I-min Huang (2021); Dystopias and Utopias on Earth and Beyond (2021), edited by Douglas A. Vakoch; Doing English in Asia (2016), edited by Patrician Haseltine and Sheng-mei Ma; Ecocriticism in Taiwan (2016), edited by Chia-ju Chang and Scott Slovic; and Ted Hughes (2015), edited by Terry Gifford. Ralph’s journal articles include articles published in ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment; Kritika Kultura, Neohelicon, AJE: Australasian Journal of Ecocriticism and Cultural Ecology; Tamkang Review; William Carlos Williams Review; and Journal of Ecocriticism. Between 2020 and 2021, Dr. Ralph served as the editor-in-chief of the Tamkang Review and published two special issues on Australasian and Sinophone ecocriticism. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson is Regents Professor of History, Irving and Miriam Lowe Professor of Modern Judaism, and director of the Center for Jewish Studies at Arizona State University. She is the author of Between Worlds: The Life and Thought of Rabbi David ben Judah Messer Leon (1991), Happiness in Premodern Judaism: Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-Being (2003), and Religion and Environment: The Case of Judaism (2020) and editor of thirty books including Building Better Humans? Refocusing the Debate on Transhumanism (2012), Perfecting Human Futures: Transhuman Visions and Technological Imaginations (2016), and the Library of Contemporary Jewish Philosophers (2013–2018), a set of twenty-one volumes. Jeanine J. Thweatt holds a PhD in philosophy and theology (Religion and Science) from Princeton Theological Seminary. Her research interests include theological anthropology, philosophy of science and epistemology, biotechnologies and bioethics, posthumanism, transhumanism, and feminist, queer, postcolonial, and disability theologies. She is the author of Cyborg Selves: A Theological Anthropology of the Posthuman, a mother of cyborgs both human and nonhuman, and visiting lecturer of humanities at Flagler College, St. Augustine, Florida.