Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264-30 B.C.) 905063608X, 9789050636087

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HUNGERANDTHESWORD

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DUTCH MONOGRAPHS ON ANCIENT HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY ,

EDITORS

H.W. PLEKET

- F.J.A.M. MEIJER

VOLUMEXX

P. ERDKAMP HUNGER AND THE SWORD

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PAUL ERO. K AMP ,,..,

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HUNGER AND THE SWORD WARFARE AND FOOD SUPPLY IN ROMAN REPUBLICAN WARS (264 - 30 B.C.)

J.C. GIESEN, PUBLISHER AMSTERDAM 1998

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j) 6--

69 . E 13 I

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No pail of this book may be translated or reproduced in any fonn, by print, photoprint, microfilm~~y other means, without wrillen pcnnission from the publisher. © by P. Erdkamp, 1998 / .Printed in The Netherlands / ISBN 90 5063 608 X

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CONTENTS Acknowledgements.

Introduction. 1

Part One, Chapter One. Supplying annies. Problems and methods. 11 Chapter Two. The soldier's rations.

27 Chapter Three. Magazines and transport. 46 Chapter Four. The means of acquisition 84 Chapter Five. Living off the land. 122 Chapter Six. Food supply and strategy. 141 Chapter Seven. Logistical restraints. A case-study of the Second Punic War in Italy. 156

Part Two. Chapter Eight. Civilian food supply in the ancient world. 188

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Chapter Nine. Agricultural production in times of war.

208 Chapter Ten. Food supply and survival in times of war. 241

Chapter Eleven. Population and recovery. A case-study of the Second Puoic War in Italy.

270 Conclusions. 2'17 Bibliography. 305 Samenvatting. 325

Maps. Gaul 107 Spain 131 Greece and Macedon 143 Italy and Sicily 157

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Acknowledgements

Many friends, scholars, and colleagues have been generous in their support and encouragement, foremost my promotores L. de Blois and J.S. Richardson (University of Edinburgh) and my co-promotor Th. Engelen. I owe special thanks to J.S. Richardson, who kindly undertook the task of correcting my English. Needless to say, any slips of grammar or spelling which remain are exlusively mine. Those who have read and offered advice on the manuscript or specific parts of it at one stage or another, apart from my promotores and co-promotor, include E. Badian (Harvard, Cambridge Mass.), G. Lewis (University of Edinburgh), L. de Ligt (Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht), J.A. Lynn (University of Illinois, Urbana), F. Millar (Brasenose College, Oxford), H.W. Picket (Rijksuniversiteit Leiden) and C.R. Whittaker (Churchill College, Cambridge). I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to all of them, and to those who are not mentioned for reasons of brevity, but whose assistance is appreciated not less. This work could not have been written without the generous financial support of the Netherlands Organiz:ation for Scientific Research (NWO). Funding for the early stages of the research leading to this book was provided by the Reiman-de Bas Fonds, Stichting Dr. C.L. van Steeden Foods, and Stichting Wilcordia. These organiz:ations provided me with the opportunity to make use of the excellent facilities of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, the University of Edinburgh, and Brasenose College, Oxford.

Finally I want to thank my parents for teaching me the value of a good education, and express my gratitude to my wife Shirley for her helpfulness and continuing patience, and for her refreshing lack of interest in Roman history.

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Introduction. Roman wars, like those of later times, took place in a landscape - a landscape not only consisting of moUJ1taios, plains and rivers, but also of men tilling the soil, travelling across sea or land, or employing other means in their struggle for survival (and even happiness). This book undertakes to examine Roman wars in this context of the natural and human environment. Roman warfare is generally examined from the viewpoint of the ancient authors on whose narratives our understanding depends. As a consequence, however, Roman wars seem to have become events that took place on the pages of a book rather than in the environment of the Mediterranean world. The way Roman wars were fought was determined by the geography and climate of the Mediterranean peninsulas, by the ecological restraints on agriculture and transport, and by the economic and social structures of the society of which the armies were a significant part. This book relates warfare to one of the main conditions of survival: it examines on the one band the food supply of the many thousand'> that manned the Roman armies, and oo the other the impact of war on the food supply of those people not waging war. Ao examination of the military food supply makes clear that the ecological factor bad not been overcome, as can be seen most clearly from the fact that in most of their campaigns the Rnmaos had to abort their operations at the approach of winter and bad to retreat to winter-quarters, where they awaited the return of conditions that would allow their large armies to be sustained securely while fighting their foes. The Greek Polybius once remarked on the extraordinary tenaciousness of both sides during the Roman campaigns in Spain. Only the approach of winter, he says, could disrupt the continuous fighting.' Though the necessity of feeding thousands of people under often hazardous circumstances was not the only aspect of the seasonality of war, it was the major element to impose limits on the generals' plans. On the other band, when an advantage over their enemy could be gained, generals would undertake operations at the fringe of the logistically possible. The seasonality of war and the limitations placed oo campaigns, as well as the accounts of armies threatened by starvation, show that warfare can not adequately be explained without atteotioo to the armies' food supply. The generals of Antiquity understood very well that an adequate food supply could never be taken for granted. The precariousness of the army's provisionment often made it a welcome target for the adversary's actions. For example, Plutarch informs us that during bis campaigns against Mithridates (73-67 B.C.), "Lucullus was oot waging war merely for the show, but, as the saying goes, was kicking in the belly". The fourthcentury author Vegetius told bis readers: "to distress the enemy more by famine than the sword is a mark of consummate skill.• It even was a well-known saying, we are told, that more succumbed to hunger than to the sword. 2 Tactical strength often was a precondition for successful provisioning, and the limitations posed by logistics could

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Polybius 35. I. Plutarch, Luc. 11,l; Vegetius, Epit. 3.3; 3.26. I

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decide between defeat and victory. The problems of army logistics should be situated against the background of the production and distribution of food in Graeco-Roman society as a whole. Historians are increasingly realizing the importance of food supply in the existence of the population of Antiquity. The production and distribution of food in the Graeco-Roman world could guarantee most people no more than a precarious existence between abundance and hunger, the result of man-made disruption as well as the natural insecurities governing agriculture and transportation. This precariousness gave rise to many cropping techniques and social strategies, the purpose of which was to alleviate risk, and which shaped agriculture and the social relations of the ancient rural society. Even if these mechanisms were often successful in warding off individual starvation, most people felt continuously threatened in their survival. When harvest failures were widespread or disturbance of distribution prolonged, the coping mechanisms failed and famine was inevitable. Producers would store food as a precaution against bad years, but they did not always have control over their production, and thus the balancing out of occasional gluts and shortages was not always successful. Also the compensation of regional differences often proved difficult, since the obstacles posed by the landscape had to be overcome by largely animal- and wind-powered transportation. In such a precarious situation, access to food is best when it is as direct as possible, as is witnessed by the general emphasis in Antiquity on autarky. The food supply of the groups within society who depended for their sustenance oo the production of others was easily disturbed even at best of times. Accordingly, the sheer existence of ancient cities and towns was based on economic, social and political rights, which had to stabilize their access to food. These structures are at the heart of a major discussion in current ancient economic history, concerning the validity for Antiquity of the concept of the 'consumer city'. Because of their size Roman armies were like mobile cities, moving across the ancient natural landscape, and having their peculiar place in the economic and social environment of the Roman world. Warfare is usually seen as an external factor in the food supply, upsetting and disturbing a precarious balance, thus leilding to shortage and even famine. Rightly so, ooe may add. The sources on ancient wars often paint a bleak picture of armies ravaging fields, plundering stores, burning farm houses, and driving away livestock, thus leading to flight and starvation. A healthy scepticism towards our sources should not lead us to reject such a picture a priori. When analyzing the risk-management strategies of the producers against shortage and famine, it is necessary to distinguish between natural and man-made disruptions of agricultural production. Cropping strategies that were aimed at minimizing the risk of harvest-failure were ineffective against plundering and ravaging armies. War shaped its own set of circumstances in which to judge the usefulness of alleviating measures. By disrupting production and distribution, and by draining off all powers of resilience, wars often caused famine, a situation that was aggravated by the dislocation of the economy as a result of war. In addition, flight and malnutrition stimulated the rise of epidemic diseases, thus leading to temporary depopulation. Ancient authors were not exaggerating when describing wars as dreadful catastrophes. However, warfare and the mechanisms to sustain the military effort should also be seen as elements within the structures of society. Roman armies had become a constant 2

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presence in the Mediterranean region by the late third

century B.C. The channels to supply these armies were just as much part of the general pattern of the distribution of

food as those sustaining the towns and cities, though characterized by their own mechanisms to control supply. The food requirement of the Roman armies compelled the government to find or create ways and means of acquiring food. It was for example the need to feed their armies that at first induced the Roman.,; to levy taxes-in-kind in areas under their control. The means that were employed by Rome to sustain its armies were inextricably related to the structure of society. The apparatus thus built up by the Romans to sustain their armies had not been seen in history before and would rarely be seen afterwards until modern times, and it offered them as much an advantage over their foes as their tactical strength. As the Imperium Romanum expanded, they were able to employ more and more resources, the means and ends of expansion thus being indissolubly connected.

*** The picture offered by ancient sources of the life of people in Antiquity is notoriously lacunose. This is even the case regarding a topic like war and warfare, which was so

central to the interests of Grcck:s and Romans and which looms so large in their historiography. Even within the topic of war, attention was not divided equally. Subjects involving virtues and vices, which could be elaborated in more or less dramatic narrative, gained most of the authors' attention. Rarely offering opportunities for dramatic scenes, the food supply of armies seldom receives more than passing attention. Thorough examination of military food supply is completely lacking, even in the military handbooks, though their authors recogni:re its crucial importance. Despite the multimde of ancient works written on war, our picture of military food supply is VfrJ partial. The sources do not provide sufficient data on any of the wars from the time of the Roman Republic to understand all the aspects of the supply of the Roman army fighting during that particular war, with as a possible exception Caesar's campaigns during the Gallic and subsequent civil war. 3 But while such a limited approach, reconstructing the Roman military food supply during one war, is impossible, a more general approach also seems to be the more interesting. Only by taking all the •vailable data for the Republican wars together is it possible to analyse the Roman army's food supply and to understand the underlying factors that shaped the system. The material on the Roman wars in the imperial period can sometimes provide further insight by arguing backwards and by comparison, because of the similar context of some of

' Such a analysis of the food supply of C - 's army bas been Ulldertakm by Labiach (1975). This worlt ignores some important aspects. Placing C -'s wars in a wid« context of Republican practices and of the geography, society and economy of Gaul and the Medite..- would have allowed a more penecratiog analysis of the topic. The recent analysis of Roman warfare by Goldsworthy (1996), fails to offer an adequate ac•m1-1 of the role of food supply in Roman warfare. Despite occasiooal mention of this upect of inilitary campaigns, the topic does not receive the structural analysis it de&erves (apart from a brief appendix on the army train pp. 287ft). The author offen Id of evidence as reason for the omiaaion, which is, as I hope to show, an unfortunate mistake, and the more surprising as Goldsworthy refers to Labiscb and other studies of Roman military food supply (pp. 104f). 3

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those wars. Furthermore, due to the limited quantity and scope of the ancient sourcematerial, parallel studies in other ages and societies may often prove of great importance. Ancient authors are never interested in army supply for its own sake. Leaving the few military handbooks aside for a moment, we may confidently state that ancient literature was never interested in a systematic account of warfare. Most of our knowledge of ancient war derives from historiography, but historiography was seldom interested in the means, methods, or background of war. Despite an occasional excursus, for instance on the Roman legionary camp by Polybius or on Roman artillery by Ammianus Marcellinus - two authors who had served as soldiers themselves -, the ancient historiography of war mainly provides narratives about the deeds and fate of individuals and peoples. If, in the process of narrating the deeds of war, historiography does shed light on command structure, logistics or military engineering, this was never prime objective. Lack of interest, however, does not imply lack of knowledge. Sallust had been in charge of transport and supply during Caesar's campaign in Africa, so should be expected to have had a unique insight into the provisioning of armies operating in Africa. Nevertheless logistics receives hardly more attention in his Bel/um Iugurthinum than in the works of Plutarch or Appian. 4 Military food supply therefore lacks any systematic account and has to be reconstructed from the occasional remarks offered. Since the food supply of the armies played such a crucial and determining role in warfare, such occasional remarks are not rare in the better accounts, particularly of authors like Polybius and Caesar- But the lack of systematic interest in the subject does have its implications for our knowledge. If our view of the puzzle is IwI,pered by the small number of pieces left, we should also realize that the selection of pieces was not random. Various motives can be identified for an author to pay attention to army supply. In the first place, as an element of strategy, army provisioning does play a role in the motivation given for the actions of commanders. Depending oo the insight or interest of an author in strategic matters, we do get a picture of the role played in the conduct of the war by the army's food supply. Unfortunately, some authors lacked deep knowledge of military affairs, and preferred, like Livy, to explain the actions of their main actors by reference to their character and emotions. Most ancient authors were wont to ascribe the historical process to the actions of a few main characters, and not to abstract forces. The characterization of these individuals was therefore an important element of historiography. Part of the characterization of a commander, however, could be his care in preparation of campaigns as opposed to his impulsiveness. This might provide a motive for describing the preparations of a campaign or field action. Because of the crucial role of food supply in the conduct of war, ancient authors paid attention to it from a strategic and tactical viewpoint. However, this seldom provides us with a full picture or with data on the daily routine. When we are told for instance that the 4

As Matthews ( 1989) 291 , points out, AmmianllS' digmlSion 011 artillery and sieg,- uwcbinery comes later in bis work than ID06t of the sieges to which it was relevant. As for the theory thal AromwitJS had been a commissariat o fficer, Matthews (p. 302) rightly remarts that bis attentioo to matters of transport and supply probably reflects nothing more than the gmen1 importance of such affairs in warfare. For an analysis of Sallust 011 warfare, see Syme (1964) 140ff.

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food supply of an army is cut off, we are usually not told bow the food was brought there, where it came from, who transported it, how it was acquired etc. In some cases an element of army provisioning, which was normally not regarded worthy of mention, had to be mentioned for the sake of the clarity of the namtive. The numerous non-combatants for instance that were part of all Roman armies were seldom deemed deserving of mention, even by a militarily interested and experienced author as Caesar. In one particularly detailed story in his Gallic War, Caesar records that he sent out troops to forage, but at the outset does not mention the servants. Only when during an enemy attack they become interesting do they suddenly appear. Servants and muleteers, commissariat officials and traders only occur when they happen to step into the light of the main story-line. Matters of routine are seldom narrated, unless the story makes it necessary. Such coincidental side-lights, however, never place the matter that is of interest to us in a systematic context, so that many questions usually remain. A third reason for mentioning routine matters is when something out of the ordinary was reported. This makes it hard to establish whether the scrap of information we possess represents usual practice. Neglect of this rule has earned bellum se ipsum alet a high position oo the list of wrongly quoted remarks of ancient sources. Livy draws attention to the external provisioning of the Roman army in Spain in the first half of the second century B.C. twice; both times it is to inform us that, contrary to normal practice, no supplies had to be delivered. The first of these occasions provides the context for Cato's remark.' Cases like these should lead us to be careful in generalizing such data. Arguments e silenlio should be even more suspect than usual in ancient history, since silence is so often all we may expect. The silence on the role of contractors in the food supply of the Roman armies is not sufficient ground to assume that they did not play any such role, nor can silence prove that Hannibal did not receive supplies from Africa after his invasion of Italy more often than the scarce references seem to imply. 6 The usual might have been passed by in silence, while the unusual deserved mention. Regarding the military food supply of the Republic, OID' best historiographical SOID'CCS are the histories of Polybius and Livy, and Caesar's accounts of the Gallic (5850 B.C.) and Civil War (49-48 B.C.), and in addition Plutarch's Uves and Appian's Roman History. Polybius had personal experience of war, first as cavalry commander of the Achaian Federation, later accompanying the Roman general Scipio Aemilianus. His military narrative is characterized by its soberness and its clear and coherent examination of the sttategical and tactical situation. It is from the strategic and tactical viewpoint that Polybius provides most of his information on food supply. 7 Livy, on the other hand, did not have any first hand knowledge of warfare, and his work does not show deep interest in the art of war. Comparison of his work with the parallel account of Polybius shows that he often leaves out military detail in favour of more dramatic and psychological colouring. In accordance with his literary objective Livy includes

' Livy 34.9, 12f; 40.35,4. ' These topics will be discussed in chapters Four and Seven. 7 On Polybius' Roarm coonections, Gel.7.er ( 1964). See on Polybius in general (and fur further refen:oces): Walbmk (1972); also Rawson ( 1971) 35ff; Marsden ( 1973) 267-295 .; Schepens (1989) 317327; D'Huys (1990).

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much detailed oamtive, thereby providing accidental data on food supply. Unfortunately his detailed oamtive is not always trustworthy. His account of Roman wars in the East, however, is better than that of the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.) or the Roman wars in Spain and northern Italy, probably due to the use of Polybius' work. Livy's books, however, are of unique value in that they provide some quantitative data.• Appian and Plutarch, neither of whom shows military experience in his works, are usually too brief to provide much additional information on the early wars. Their more detai!P.d accounts of the wars of the first century B.C. on the other hand do provide some valuable data. Plutarch, however, in his Roman biographies seldom provides a coherent and detailed account of the wars fought by the Roman generals. Appian is at his best in his books on the Civil Wars of the first century B.C. Unfortunately, both Plutarch and Appian only provide scraps of information on the food supply of the two sides in the Social War (91-88 B.C.) and the subsequent internal Rome.n struggle, which would have been interesting as the first major war fought in Italy since the Hannibalic War (218-201 B.C.).9 The most detailed source on army supply is provided by the work of Caesar on the Gallic War (58-50 B.C.) and Civil War (49-48 B.C.), the more valuable because no other author could appreciate better than Caesar the importance of food supply or could possess such first hand knowledge. For two reasons Caesar pays much attention to food supply: first because it played such a central role in many of his campaigns, secondly because emphasis on preparation was part of his depiction of himself as successful general. By following the pattern 'Caesar analyses the situation; takes the necessary measures; subsequently the action leads to success', Caesar depicts himself as the central force in the Roman conquest of Gaul. This pattern gives him ample opportunity to mention logistical preparation. At the same time, Caesar is a hazardous source for the general practice in the late Republic. Distance and geographical obstacles cut him off almost completely from supplies from the Mediterranean, which were used in most other Roman wars. Vercingetorix made use of the situation by aiming his strategy directly at Caesar's army's food supply. The situation that arose and that was described by Caesar in such detail was therefore not typical. The same holds true for Caesar's campaigns during the Civil War. The situation of 49 and 48 B.C. compelled Caesar to act swiftly, resulting in inadequate preparation of his food supply. Caesar's rashness surprised his opponents and played an important part in his final victory. It is precisely the reason because of which Caesar provides so much valuable information on military food supply in his books on the struggle with Vercingetorix and the campaigns during the Civil War that compels us to use these data carefully. A first hand account by the more careful and organiud Pompeius, who fought many of his wars with the backing of the central and local governmental structures in the Mediterranean and in the East, probably would have

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For a comparison of Livy u a military historian with Polybius, see f.rdlIIIIIIIDlilies to bring corn into hi• caq, md I'- onlen the people from Capua to collect it. See further LabillCb (1975) 74f. 121

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mansio, where they were collected for further transportation. 126 In a most interesting passage, Caesar refers to a system of requisitioned transport, enforced on the communities in Epirus. He sent two of bis legates "into Epirus in order to obtain provisions, and because these districts were some distawP. away he established granaries in certain places and apportioned the neighbouring communities their respective shares in the carriage of corn.• (Caesar, Bell. Civ. 3.42,3.)127 This kind of system is well known from epigraphical evidence from the first centuries of the Principate, although in such cases it per1ains most of all to the assistance of senators aod Roman officials with means of transport, the ~ e d vehiculatio, during the late empire called the cur.rus publicus. In a decree from the reign of Tiberius (14-37 A.D.), regulating the ttanspOrt required of the town of Sagalassus (Asia Minor) - as in other cases - the community was ordered to provide ttanspOrt within the boundaries of its territory. At its border the transport was taken over by its neighbours. They were required to provide a maximum of ten wagons or thirty mules for a senator in each individual case. The transport necessary for the haulage of the supplies for Caesar's army must have been a multiple of this. In both cases it was undoubtedly the responsibility of the local magistrates to share out the burden among the people of their community. Interestingly, the Spanish Crown used a system for its troops during the eighteenth century that was very similar to the Roman practice. 121 It is oot SUiprising that in all periods the army regularly made direct use of the vast amount of overland transport capacity of the civilian population for its transportation requirements.

••• Summing up, in the transportation of organized supplies - in contrast to 'living off the land' in its strict sense - we cao distinguish three phases: transportation to the magazines, transportation from the magazines to the armies (the ~ e d shuttle system) and the army train itself, which was essential for operational independeoce. The limitations of the army train are closely conoected to the magazine system. In order for the army train to remain within the limits of tactical aod logistiClll managability, the army could take along provisions only for a limited period - ma,:imally 15 days, but usually less -, and then only oo the condition that the soldiers would carry a significant portion of their provisions. Therefore armies were compelled to remain within reach of magazines in which army supplies were stored. In order to gain security of provisioomeot, the armies bad to accept a certain limitation of their operational flexibility . Considerations of transport largely determined the locatioo of magazines: usually they were located on the sea-coast or on navigable rivers. Sea or river transport was used as much as possible for transport to and from the magazines. When locatioo allowed, magazines could be supplied over loog distance by sea or from neighbouring regions along rivers. Rivers were

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Buck (1983) 41, 47; OD trUIMT'tl, 44f. Abo the corn delll of Rome with tbe couocil of Tbe68aly in the late aecond cmlury B.C. stipulated that it wu the respoasibility of tbe local officials to tnmsport tbe corn to one of 11tm, meotiomd harbours. Gamsey et al. (1984) 36f; Herz (1988) 41. 121 Cf. Labi.ech (197S) 73f. 121 Mitdiell (1976). Livy 42. l,9ff, DWJtioas problans uiaiJ1a from the requisitioning of auinwls from Rome's allies OD beilalf of Ronrm mqutntes. The ayatem he deacribes ia similar to that of the vdricu/atio. For early moc1ern Spain, ~ (1970) 32f. 82

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also used as distribution networks to transport the supplies from the magazines to the armies.

However, in the Mediterranean region navigable rivers are rare, the more so in summer, when wars usually were fought. Also in periods of peak rainfall, river transport could be disrupted. Long distance supplies by sea were disrupted in winter. Only under serious compulsion, would a commander risk relying on sea transport during winter across open sea. The required capacity for sea transport was usually not difficult to manage. Over relatively short distances, the supply could be managed by not more than a few do:zen ships. Over long distance, the number of ships increased, not only because the return trips would take longer, but also because the risk of disruption necessitated the building up of large reserves. This could lead to peaks of shipping capacity. Serious peaks, however, would occur when troops bad to be transported. The means of acquiring such shipping depended on the required capacity: the state probably owned a few freighters and supplemented this by transport contracts. Peak demands were solved by requisitioning ships in large numbers. Whenever supplying could make use only of land transport, supply lines bad to be short. I ,and transport could be undertaken by wagons, which was only practical in the supplying of magazines. The army train consisted mostly of pack-animals The overland transport capacity required by Roman armies was very large. When operating at the limits of its capacity, the system could break down, for instance because of flooding or extreme rainfall. Despite the importance of transportation by river or sea, the largest volume bad to be managed by overland transport. This, however, was not foreign to the nature of the civilian economy. Most civilian transport was undertaken over short distances over land. In order to manage its requirement the military bad to tap these resources.

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Chapter Four.

*** The means of acquisition. War depends for its decision in large measure upon the commissary. and those in want of supplies are inevitably bound 10 be defeated by their enemy. Procopius of Caesarea, History of the Wars 8.23, 15. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, considerations of transport shaped to a large degree the way wars were fought. They also were a determining factor in the means of acquisition used by the Roman army and government and in the geographical sources of food supplies. The near impossibility of bringing supplies long distances over land meant that while inland regions could not supply their agricultural produce to armies waging war in other regions, armies waging war in isolated spots could not profit from

long distance supplies. Productive regions with access to waterways could not only supply their markets in peacetime, but also contribute to Roman military needs throughout the Mediterranean, as long as the armies operated close to the sea or navigable rivers. One question to be asked in this chapter about the nature of the supply of corn and other foodstuffs is about the sources of the supply, i.e. what regions supplied their corn and other foodstuffs to the Roman armies? Not surprisingly, regions like Sicily and Africa, whether as allies or as provinces, regularly contributed to Roman military needs, but the large-scale suppliers, while prominent in the ancient sources and the modern handbooks, cenainly do not provide the whole picture. Armies like that of Manlius Vulso, operating in the inland regions of Asia Minor during the first half of the second century B.C., could simply not be reached by African or Sicilian corn and bad therefore to rely on local supplies. The same holds true for Caesar, who during his Gallic War (58-50 B.C.) was operating on the periphery of the Roman world. It is clear therefore that the locality of war determined to a very large degree the sources of food supplies. The food requirement of the Roman armies compelled the government to find or create ways mt means of acquiring food . This might seem too obvious to mention, but it is worth while emphasizing that day-to-day requirements, and especially those of the armies, led to the creation of governmental structures, rather than some sense of 'Empire' .1 A second question to be asked therefore is about the means the Roman army and government used for the acquisition of the required foodstuffs. Sources of It is inl"fl'l'd:ing to note that Tilly (1990) 14, ~ that •sate structure appeared chiefly as a byproduct of rulers' efforts to acquire tbA rn,.,,.. of war•. 1

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supply and means of acquisition were inextricably connected. As far as organiUld supply is concerned - in contrast to foraging and plundering - allied contributions, taxes-in-kind, ad hoe levies, private and non-private trade may be distinguished as means through which the Romans acquired military supplies. Levies, tributes and allied contributions were to a large degree determined by the needs of the moment. The distinction between various 111eans Qf acquisition leads also to the question whether Roman military supply was dominated by private trade channels, as some assume, or whether the distribution channels involved in the supplying of the armies were of a political nature, to be distinguished from free market-channels. These channels may not always be clearly distinguished, but should nevertheless not be confused. This involves analysis of the governmental apparatus - 'imperial' and local, civil and military available for the management of the food supply of the armies. The question whether indeed it was private business and not the Roman state itself, based on local governmental institutions, that managed the corn supply of the Roman armies is important for our understanding of the Roman wars, the state and trade in this period. Roman levies in kind arose directly from the need to supply the armies. At first Rome demanded levies in kind in response to the immediate military need in each particular war :zone. In some conquered areas, especially Sicily, Rome took over existing systems of taxation to supply its armies; in others the continuous, though fluctuating, need for corn and other supplies by the armies present in that area turned ad hoe demands into a permanent levy of tributes in money and kind. This latter development can be seen most clearly with regard to the stipendium in Spain.2 A prime requirement for the enforcement and expansion of Roman power was therefore directly satisfied on the basis of that same political and military power. 3 Besides ad hoe levies on vanquished enemies, and taxation in conquered areas, this was also done by means of contributions from allies; the line between both means of acquiring supplies in many cases was very thin. But let us first concentrate on levies and taxation.

••• Prominent in this regard are the tithes of Sicily and Sardinia. Livy mentions on several occasions during the War against Antiochus III - in the years 191-189 B.C. - and once again during the War against Perseus - in 171 B.C. - that the Senate ordered the praetors of Sicily and Sardinia to levy a second tithe. Part of this tithe corn was to be shipped to Rome, the major part was to be used on behalf of the Roman army waging war in the East.• It is usually assumed that the tithe corn of Sicily and Sardinia was normally used (largely or solely) on behalf of the people of Rome.' It was only when the wars fought in the East increased the military need, the argument goes, that second tithes were levied on behalf of the armies. It might be argued, however, that the tithe

2

Richardson (1976) 147ff. Cf. Riclwd.eoo (1994) 569. 3 Cf. Dahlbeim (1977) 76: • Auf eine Kurze Formel gebnicht ist die Entstehung der romischen Pro,,,inz:ialb~:haft dadUJch gt,kmnmclmel da8 die Sache (die Hemchaft) du Programm (die Art und Weise dee Hemchcms) beotimmte und Diehl umgetehrt. • • 191: Livy 36.2,12-13; 190: 37.2,12; 189: 37.50,9-10; 171: 42.31,8. 'Toynbee (196S) II 217; Rickman (1980) 44; Gamsey (1988) 193f.

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corn was always (largely or solely) consumed by the Roman military, which at the time had become a continuous feature of the Mediterranean regioo.6 Neither Livy nor any other author provides any disproof of this hypothesis, but DO reference to prove it beyond doubt exists either. There is an unfortunate paucity of evidence regarding the destination of the tithe corn of Sicily and Sardinia throughout the Republic, except for the four brief references in Llvy mentioned above. A discussion of the Sicilian and Sardinian tithe corn can best start with a discussion of the development up to the point when second tithes are first mentioned. After Rome had won the First Punic War (264-241 B.C.), the western part of Sicily was brought under direct Roman rule, while Syracuse, ruled by king Hiero II, remained a loyal ally. In 238 B.C. Sardinia was also annexed. According to Llvy (23.48,7) both Sicily (except the kingdom of Syracuse) and Sardinia paid some kind of tribute (vectigal) in the years before the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.). While Sicily and Sardinia had delivered tribute before the war, he says, they DOW (216/5 B.C.) hardly sustained the troops stationed on the islands. Rome had to turn to its allies to feed its troops. 7 VectigaJ refers in this period to a tax-in-kind, undoubtedly a levy of corn, and maybe other agricultural produce.• No more about this levy is known beyond the fact of its existence. It has to remain a question whether it did primarily provide for the Roman troops on the island, or whether it also provided for military requirements in Italy or even the population of Rome. The problem of feeding the one legion stationed on Sardinia and the two legions on Sicily, even before major warfare broke out on both islands, seems to wpport the former supposition. After Hiero's death in 215 B.C. , Syracuse defected to the Carthaginian side; large-scale warfare would continue on Sicily until 210 B.C. Whatever system of taxation may have existed prior to the Second Punic War, the outbreak of fighting on the island disrupted its operation. In 212 B.C., however, Syracuse was captured by Roman troops, and subsequently the whole island was turned into a Roman province. It was probably during the reorganisation of the province in these years that Hiero's tax-system in the kingdom of Syracuse was introduced on the whole island as the /ex Hieronica . Sicily's potential as a supplier of corn will have been prominent in the reorganisation of the province. 9

6

Basically this hypothesis was air-ty proposed by Frank (1959) 160, who states: "In times of i-e, wbeo only five to six legi0118 were u-1 for prrisoos or minor wars in Spain and Gaul, presumably the regular islad tithes sufficed for the armies, while Italy was probably just about selfsupporting. • Unfortunately be failed to produce 1111y evidence for bis statement. 7 Livy discusses tb,, iDNleq1U1Cy of the food supply of the Roman armies on Sicily and Sardinia in more detail in 23.21, lff. 1 Schwabn (1939) 10. 9 In I.ivy 27.5,5, Valerius claims to have stnighteoed affajrs on Sicily: in i-e and war the island is now a moet dependable source of the grain supply. In 26.40, 15f and 27.8,18f this is explicitly described as tbe restoration of the situation of the pro-war yeus. The incidental ship.-its by Hiero and the contributiOIIS to the troops stationed on the island before 111d during tbe first yeus of the Sec.ood Pullie Wu by no s can be compared to the structural importance of the island during the late Republic, which is brought to mind by tbe phnising of the Llvi&ll IICCOUDI. Similarly Brunt (1971) 274. Cf. Toynbee (1965) II 211 ; Verbrugghe (1971) 8ff; Verbrugghe (1972) 537; Dablheim (1977) 61ff; Rickman ( 1980) 37; Gamaey (1988) 186. On the date of the introduction of tbe /ex Hieronica: Toynbee (1965) II 222; Pritchard (1970) 3S2f. 86

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Not until the preparations for the Roman invasion of Africa in 205 8.C., however, does Livy - our prime source in this matter - provide evidence for significant shipments of Sicilian corn. Corn was shipped from Sicily to the Roman army at Tarentum and to Rome in the year 20'J B.C. Whether this is to be attributed primarily to the restauratioo of Sicily's agriculture or to the fact that in this year Rome reduced the number of troops stationed on the island from 4 to 2 legions, opening up room for incidental exports, remains unclear. 10 Apart from these minor shipments of corn, it is only with regard to Scipio Africanus' invasion of Africa in 205 B.C. that we meet significant contributions of Sicily to regions outside of the island. Livy's silence regarding shipments of corn from Sicily for the previous years may not be conclusive. However, Livy (29.1,14) tells us that Scipio in 205 B.C. requisitioned corn from the Sicilian towns and spared the corn from Italy. This points first of all to the inadequacy of the regular tribute from Sicily at that time to sustain the army concentrated on the island, since the regular tribute bad to be supplemented by ad hoe levies, i.e. the requisitioning of corn. 11 Secondly, it would have been a case of carrying owls to Athens if at the same time as corn from Italy was shipped to Sicily to provide for Scipio's invasion army, the island in tum was shipping corn to Italy. The same argument applies during the campaigns in Africa. The overseas supplies did not only come from Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain; significantly, in 204 B.C. supply from Italy itself is mentioned. This role of Sicilian corn in the Roman military food supply is continued during the Second Macedonian War (200-197 B.C.), when for the year 198 B.C. corn shipments to the army in Greece are mentioned from Numidia, Sardinia and Sicily. 11 The development on Sardinia seems to have been similar to that of Sicily. As we have seen, there was a vectigal on the island before the war. Livy (23.21,lff) complained that in 216/5 B.C. both provinces could hardly sustain their troops. Also harsh requisitions during the first years of the war, when one legion was stationed

10

Livy 27.8,18. Already the year before, in 210 B.C., there bad bem a failed alte!Jlpt to ship corn to the garri8oo in the citadel of Tarmtum. I.ivy 26.39 tells us bow the CODvoy wu beaten off by the opposina fleet. The garri8oo of Tumtum, holding the citadel for 8011111 time DtJW while the town itself wu in the bands of Rome's enemies, could have been only very small. The shipment mmtioned by I.ivy, if historical, can not have amounted to very much. Although scepticism reguding I.ivy's acoount of the events at Tumtum in gaieral appropriate, that 8effll8 to be not the cue in the present inslance. In the first place, the war fared badly enough for the Romans without them ackting ficticious failun,s. In the second place, as Kutofka ( 1990) 95 , points out, the acoount of the shipment is told with military 1111d nautical expertise, while the defeated Roman oomnwnder is not depicted as • bragging egomaniac; both these elemmts are not typical for the story-tellers of the late anNlistic. 11 Verbrugghe (1972) 537 !«JS this rather as the introduction of a corn tu by Scipio. Why would the Ronwn• wait until 20S to introduce such important taxation as that on corn? It acems rather late to introduce such a tu, while it would have bem the business of Marcus Valerius, who had bem sent to reo,ganiu things on the island to introduce taxation, not Scipio's. The explanation of Sc,amuua (1959) 234, who sees the iequisition as an additional quota besides the tithe, is to be prefened. 12 Supplies from Sicily: I.ivy 29.35,1 (cf. Polybius IS.I); 30.24,Sf; Sicily, Sardinia 1111d Italy are mentioned in 29.36,1-3; Sardinia. Sicily and Spain in 30.3,2. Shipment during the Macedonian War from Nwnidia, Sardinia 1111d Sicily: 32.27,2. 87

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there, are mentioned. 13 In 215 B.C. large-scale fighting broke out, but in contrast to Sicily this lasted only briefly. From that year until 200 B.C. , however, two legions were stationed on the island. It does therefore seem surprising when we are told by Livy that the Roman commander. after having pacified Sardinia in 215 B. C., sent corn to the aediles in Rome. This is the more surprising since at about the same time the authorities in Rome complain about the difficulties of feeding the troops on the island. There seems to be some inconsistency either in Livy's account or in the actions of the Roman authorities. Nevertheless, in 212 B.C. Sardinia was able to supply corn to the army which was operating in Campania at the time and which numbered six legions. 14 As we have seen, Sardinia also contributed corn to Scipio's army in Africa from 204 B.C. onwards and to the Roman army fighting in Greece in 198 B.C. We can sum up by saying that until 205 B.C. there hardly seems to have been room for major contributions by Sicily to other than military consumers, while at least once the tribute bad to be supplemented by requisitions. The situation on Sardinia seems to have been better in that it did supply corn to the armies fighting in Italy. From the invasion of Africa onwards both Sicily and Sardinia seem to have played a structural role in the overseas military food supply; this role is continued during the Second Macedonian War. This would in itself not be evidence against shipments to Rome, if we bad not known about the role of Italy in the years 205 and 204 B.C. as a supplier of corn to the war :zones, rather than as a receiver of corn. Rome did indeed receive corn from overseas in the last years of the war and after the war bad ended, but do these shipments constitute evidence for a regular supply of Sicilian or Sardinian tithe corn to Rome on any significant scale? Corn was sent from Spain in 203 B.C., which was distributed at 4 asses per modius to the population of Rome by the aediles. Livy furthermore remarks that in 202 B.C. "the supplies sent from Sicily and Sardinia lowered the price of grain so much that the merchant would leave bis grain to the mariners to cover the freight" . In the years 201 and 200 B. C., the aediles made themselves popular by cheaply selling off corn, that was sent from Africa by Scipio. 1' A few years later, in the year 196 B.C., Sicily again sent a large supply of corn to Rome. According to Livy (33.42,8), this shipment bad been sent by the Sicilians voluntarily; if this is true, tithe-corn was not involved. Furthermore, it is no coincidence that the Second Macedonian War (200-197 B.C.) bad ended the previous year. The dependence on military circumstances is even more direct in the case of the shipments from Spain in 203 and from Africa in 201 and 200 B.C. The shipments to Rome, it seems, were the result of windfalls arising from the end of the fighting, which resulted firstly in military reserves becoming available, secondly army demands diminishing and thirdly tributes demanded from the vanguished peoples increasing,

13

Harsh requisitions are more trustworthy as a solution for the Roman troubles to supply their troops stationed on the island than the help kindly offered by the Sardinian allies mentioned by I.ivy a few c.pita earlier (23 .21, lff). 14 I agree with Brant (1971) 274, though, that Sardinia will not have produced much above the a-i of the two legions stationed there until W7 B.C. On the fighting on Sardinia during the Second Punic War, Dyson ( 1985) 25lff. " I.ivy 30.26,5f; 30.38,5; 31.4,6; 31.50, 1. Cf. Toynbee ( 1965) ll 338; Verbruggbe (1972) 537; Hen (1988) 29; Garnsey (1988) 193. 88

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rather than any deliberate and structural policy to supply Rome. We should not conclude from the fact that Spain and Africa were able to send corn to Rome in these particular circumstances that they did so structurally; neither should we conclude that Sicily or Sardinia did. 16 During the War against Antiochus (191-188 B.C.) a second tithe was levied on both Sicily and &u-dinia in three consecutive years (191-189 B.C.). While the largest part of the double levy of both islands was sent to the army in Greece, at least part of this corn was shipped to Rome. These supplies to Rome constitute the most important argument for the hypothesis that tithe corn was normally used to provide a regular supply for the city of Rome. Moreover, Carthage and Numidia also sent corn to Rome, besides contributing a large supply to the army in the east. As a coosequence of the military consumption of the tithe, it is argued, the grain supply of Rome must have been in jeopardy during the wars against Antiochus and Perseus. There is in fact ooe more or less explicit indication of a food crisis in the city, when grain traders were punished in the year 189 for hoarding grain (Livy 38.35,5). The fact that part of the additional tithe corn was shipped to Rome - Livy does not actually say that it was the urban population which was to be the main beneficiary, in contrast to the instances ~ above seem to be the primary reason for assuming that the regular tithe corn was shipped to Rome as well. 17 First we have to correct the assumption that the corn which was promised l>y the Carthaginians and Numidians in 191 B.C. partly supplied the Roman market; this assumption is based on a false interpretation of Livy's account. Livy (36.3,1) informs us that the Senate sent embassies to Carthage and Numidia, who had to solicit corn to be supplied to the army in Greece. In 36.4,5-7 the Carthaginian government promises to supply on behalf of the army 500,00011 modii of wheat and the same amount of barley, half of which would be sent to Rome. The Numidian Iring Masinissa promises to send to the army in Greece 500,000 modii of wheat and 300,000 modii of barley, to Rome 300,000 modii of wheat and 250,000 modii of barley. In the case of the Carthaginian corn the shipment is explicitly intended for military use. The large amounts of barley shipped to Rome would also make more sense when intended for horses and pack-animals than for the population of the city. Why would the Senate want to have part of this corn, which was to be used on behalf of the war in the East, delivered in Rome? First of all, during the war troops were temporarily stationed in or near the city during recruitment and tniining. More importantly, the first campaigns of the war were fought in Greece, but during the year 190 B.C. the fighting was

"A1ao Briscoe (1973/1981) I 66 points to the exceptional circumslances It the time. However, on the buia of lheee samo refmmces, :Rickuwn ( 1980) 67 concludes that "from the time of Hannibal' s defeat It the Cllld of the lhird century B.C. African corn bad fOUDd its way on to the RolDIII mubt no 1- than that of Sicily and Spain". Cf. Fnmk (1959), 98; Herz (1988) 29. 17 Ricbmn (1980) 44; Herz (1988) 29ff; Garnsey (1988) 193f. Hillen (1991) 514, in his DOie to 36.2, 12 11111ee that lbe tilbe corn of Sicily and Sardinia wu normally 1-1 for the troops stationed lbere. 1b.i.s cannot be the ~ . for since the Cllld of the Second Punic War hardly my boops (belides local, allied troops) oormally were stationed there. (See esp. Toynt- (1965) 652.) 11 The l'Mting of Ibis figme is UDCertaiD. Cf. Briscoe (1981) II 225. This might al8o explain why the ~to be OODlributing far leas than their Jllnmidim rival Mui ..;m 89

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transferred to Asia Minor. Magazines bad to be provided on behalf of this campaign, and indeed we find in the year 190 B.C. shipments of corn and wine from Italy to the magazine on Cbios, which was serving the Rpman army operating on too main land. 19 Rome had to retain the possibility of employing the Carthaginian and Numidian corn wherever it would be needed and therefore had it brought to Rome. This supply to Rome was therefore not intended for the Roman civilian market. This leaves the shipments of tithe-corn to Rome. As a matter of fact, only Sardinia is ever mentioned as a supplier of tithe-corn to Rome; in all four years that the levy of a second tithe is mentioned in Llvy's account - 191-189 B.C. and 171 B.C. -, all the tithe-corn from Sicily is shipped to the armies. Furthermore, it is only in 191 and 190 B.C. , not in the subsequent years (in 189 B.C. and during the Third Macedonian War in 171 B.C.), that Sardinian tithe-corn was shipped to Rome. In 191 B.C. this amounted to a double tithe, in 190 B.C. to part of it. 20 For what purpose was the Sardinian tithe-corn in these years intended? Was it to be used on behalf of the armies or the population of Rome? Unfortunately, unlike the Carthaginian corn mentioned above, which was explicitly intended for military use, Livy does not provide explicit evidence. It may therefore be possible that the double tithe in 191 B.C. was intended for the two legions stationed in Rome in that year, as well as for the same purposes as those for which the African corn was shipped to Rome, but there is no hard evidence for this hypothesis. It is therefore equally possible that the tithe corn from Sardinia in 191 and 190 B.C. was at least in part intended for the civilian population of Rome. But before I go further into the disctmion of whether this proves any regular supply of tithe-corn to the people of Rome, I want to ~ that the amounts involved were probably not very large. The war against Antiochus (191-188 B.C.) provides the clues for the assumption that the amounts involved in the tithe of Sicily and Slirdinia can not have been very voluminous. The simple fact is that the two to four legions, operating in the war in the East in addition to the navy, consumed not only the double tithe-corn of Sicily and a major part of the Sardinian double tithe-corn as well, but in addition to this also consumed at least 1,3 million modii of wheat from Africa21 , and contributions from Pergamon, Macedon and other allies. 1be Roman army and navy fighting the war in the East, which has been mimated some 50,000 men in 190 B.C., and 75,000 men in 189 B.C., consumed much more than the regular tithe of Sicily and Sardinia. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. Firstly, the tithe-corn of Sardinia can only have been a small part of the total consumption of a city like Rome, even at this early time. Secondly, the yield of the Roman levy on Sicily and Sardinia can not have exceeded the requirement of the eight or ten legions and the Roman fleet, which operated in the Mediterranean during the first decades of the second century B.C ..22 Those scholars

19

Livy 37.27,1-2. 191: Livy 36.2 ,12 f. 190: 37.2, 12. 189: 37.S0,9f. 21 And probably more, if indeed the ,-Jing of the amount inv olved in the shipment from Carthage bas to be corrected upwards. 21 For the stn,ogth of the ROlllllllarmy in the war against Antiochus-esp. Brunt (1971) 274 ; 657f. For a survey of the numb« of legiOll8 in the period 200-168 B.C. - ToYJII- ( 1965) 652. The contribution from Carthage 1111d Masini- in Livy 36.3,1; 36.4 ,5ff. The amount ofwi-t promiwd by

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who assume that the Sicilian and Sardinian tithe-corn fed the population of Rome as well as the armies clearly overestimate the amounts yielded by the tax. As said above, the Sardinian tithe-corn, which was shipped to Rome in 191 and 190 B.C., may have been intended for military or alternatively for civilian use. Assuming that it was shipped to Rome by the Senate on behalf of the population of the city, can this be regarded as evidence for the regular shipment of titbtH:om to Rome from Sardinia and Sicily? This leads to the question of why the Senate would order tithe-corn shipped to Rome, if they did oot do so in other years. The reason might be compeosatioo for the disruption of the corn trade as a result of the army supply. During the war against Aotiochus, Rome demanded an extra tithe from both Sicily and Sardinia; moreover, a large amount of corn from Africa was shipped to the East. This meant that corn which was probably otheiwise intended for the large-scale and longdistance corn market was transferred to military use. In the case of Sicily's tithes, it should be clear that an additional tenth of the harvest, although paid for by Rome, seriously depleted the market supply. We do not lcnow what percentage of Sicily's harvest was usually brought onto the market. We do know, however, that besides seed corn and consumption by the agricultural producers, overseas shipment can only have coostituted a part of Sicily's harvest. Teo percent of the harvest must have constituted a significant depletion of the overseas trade com.23 Although the corn trade of the second century B.C. remains largely a mystery, it seems reasonable to assume that a decrease in the market supply resulted in rising prices. Did these few million modii of corn, however, have a serious effect throughout the western half of the Mediterranean? The answer must surely be negative, since the amount involved in the military food supply was relatively small in comparison with the total consumption of the whole population of the region. The effect was nevertheless significant, because not the whole corn trade was involved - neither the local, small-scale trade, nor the trading from the hinterland to the regional towns - but the large-scale, overseas trade normally supplied by regions like Sicily and Africa. The effect was strongest in those areas that relied structurally on overseas supply. Most towns will have relied for the most part oo their own hinterland. Even Rome was throughout the Republic supplied to some extent from

Carthage on bebalf of the umy is UDCertain. Assunwlg that the CarthaginiUJs will have contributed about as much as their rival in Numidia, the total UDOUDts to some l,S00,000 modii of wheat -1 800.000 modii of barley. Pergamon also contributed com (Polybius 21.20; Livy 37.37,S; 37.S3,9). See also Brunt (1971) 11. Becm1ae be wrongly UllUlllll8 the monthly ntioa.s to be :l irudNd of 4 modii, his Mlirnefee 'iave to be corrected to 2.400.000 -1 3.600.000. u Cf. Herz (1988) 3lf. He not only points to the trmsfer of trade com to the umy supply, but also to the large number of ships p1ee1ed into the lnll8pOrtation of suppliee. This 1aU« point may be ~ euggeraled. See Chapter Three. Iotereetin&ly, Herz (p. 35ft) also points to the troubled food aupply of Rome in the late second cmtmy B.C., which led to the dismillSll of the quaestor Ostiensis L. Appuleius Satuminus -1 the UAignment of the cura annona to the princeps senatus M. Aemilius Scaurus. These troubles wae probably related to the reomt wan in Africa 1111d Sicily, but also to the supply of the army of Marius which was preparing in 80Ulbem Gaul for the eJ1pecled w apiost tbe Germanic 1111d Celtic peoples. Ou the supply of this umy from the Mediteanaw"'° upriver, aee Plutarcb, Marius 15.1. Alao Oamaey (1988) 203f _...,... •lw duriog the first cmtmy B.C. tbe OVOIWS wan diuupted the flow of corn to Rome. 91

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its own hinterland.,.. But Rome and a few other cities of similar scale, like Capua and Tareotum, relied to a significant degree on the overseas corn market. The Sicilians, who sent a million modii of wheat to Rome in 196 B.C. as a gesture of good will, might otherwise have sold it to the same people in Rome. As a result of the transfer of corn from the overseas market to the military corn supply during the war against Antiochus, prices would rise in Rome and other cities in a similar position. The Senate, however, could give the people in Rome an advantage in the competition with the other cities on the corn market, by levying a second tithe on Sardinia in 191 and 190 B.C., shipping it to Rome and selling it there. This supply was oot sufficient to feed the population of Rome, but that was oot what was required; it was enough to limit the pressure on the corn prices in Rome. That it did not do so in the other cities was no concern of the Roman Senate. These measures by the Senate may be compared to the several instances where corn was distributed to the population of Rome in the years around 200 B.C. or to the time when a shipment was sent from 1bessaly in the late second century B.C. The shipment from Thessaly amounted to about half a million modii, which is only a fraction of the total, annual consumption of the population of Rome at the time. However, at the right time of year even a small supply could make a material difference to the corn market of the city. See for instance Cicero (De domo sua 11), regarding a dearth during the first century B.C.: corn "was being kept stored in custody, in order that its alleviating effect in the actual throes of famine might be more gratifying; it was to be produced as an unlooked-for surprise" . 25 Even if we therefore assume that the Sardinian tithe-corn was intended for the people of Rome in 191 and 190 B.C. - which is by no means certain-, there is no reason to assume that this reflects a structural supply of the city of Rome from Sardinian tithe-corn, let alone from the tithes from Sicily. From the war against Antiochus until the end of the Third Macedonian War (171168 B.C.), the number of legions fluctuated between eight and twelve, while allied contingents and marine troops also had to be supplied with food. For instance, four legions were stationed in Spain from 187 B.C. onwards; that is almost as large an army as the one operating during the war against Antiochus. The Roman troops in Spain were normally supplied from overseas. That is clearly implied in the only two references to the army supply in Spain. Although we are told in these passages that in 195 B.C. and in 181 B.C. overseas shipments were not required, they obviously were

,. Brunt (1971), 286, assnDJN a subetantial supply of corn mxl other food products to the city of Rome from its Italian bint«laod eveo in lbe first century B.C. and in lbe early principate. See also De Neeve (1985a) 445f. To their material I want to add Appian, Bell. Civ. 1.67 and 1.69, in which pusapi it is clearly stated lhat during the siege of Rome by Mariua and Cilma, lbe food supply of Rome was cut off not only by bloctiog lbe Tiber downstream of the city, but above lbe city as well. In the following events Mariua captw"ell lbe neighbouring towns "wbeie grain was stored for the ROIDIIIS". Having first blocked the supply over - and river, it is coocluded, he now also bad lateo cnmmand of the supplies by land. Because of the localioa of towns like Aricia and Lanuvium, it is improbable that o v - com, that was shipped to Italy oo behalf of the city of Rome, would have been stored there, inland mxl miles from the Tiber. It is more probable that this grain, DJNDt for Rome, bad been grown oa the fertile soils of ceotnl Italy. 25 Llvy 26. 10,2; 30.26,Sf; 31.4,S; 31.49,8ff; 33.42,8. See also Ricknwi (1980) 34ff; Garnsey et al. (1984) 38; Gamaey (1988) 193f. 92

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in other years. 26 The sources do not provide any evidence on the food supply of the two to five legions annually operating in Cisalpine Gaul and Liguria. Rome continuously required corn on behalf of its armies, stationed in Spain, Gaul and Liguria, and it is reasonable to assume that the tithes on Sicily and Sardinia provided a continuous supply for these armies. During the Third Macedonian War we find the final mention in our sources of the levying of a double tithe on both i!;lands, intended for the army and fleet operating in Greece. Again this is supplemented with supplies from other sources, in particular 2,000,000 modii of wheat from Carthage and Numidia. This large supply from Africa, together with the !;maller size of the army compared to the one operating during the war •gainst Antiochus, e~lains why a double tithe was levied only once during the war. Rome did not need extra supplies from Sicily, which may also explain the permission given in 169 B.C. to Rhodes to import (i()(),000 modii of wheat from Sicily (Polybius 28.2). These events have been interpreted as showing that Sicily's produce since its incorporation into the Roman empire was reserved for Rome.27 This conclusion is unfounded and overlooks the circumstances of these events: Rhodes asked permission in the middle of the Third Macedonian War (171-168 B.C.). At the most it indicates that the Romans reserved Sicily's produce for their own needs in wartime. It would be practically impossible for Rome to control the private trade of the farmers and corn merchants on the island. It may even be possible that Rhodes bought (i()(),000 modii of titbc-corn from Rome. After all Rhodes was at the time one of the most important allies of Rome; her warships played an important role in the fighting against Macedon. While Rhodes bad to rely on imports of corn sttucturally, the corn supply was hampered by Antiochus IV's invasion of Egypt. 21 Quite naturally the Romans may in these circumstances have supported one of their allies in the war against Macedon with a shipment of corn. After all, Rome requested contributions of corn from allies on many occasions. A more likely interpretation than a monopoly on Sicily's agricultural produce, therefore, is that in wartime Rome reserved Sicilian corn for its own armies, but in 169 B.C. allowed her important ally Rhodes to buy (i()(),000 modii of corn, which may possibly have been supplied from the tithe. Summing up, we can conclude that the hypothesis that the regular tithe of Sicily and Sardinia was shipped to Rome for use by the population of that city is totally unfounded. It bas to be emphasized that Sicily's tithe is never mentioned in relation to the corn supply of Rome. Shipments to Rome in the years 203-200 B.C. arrive only once from Sicily and Sardinia; Spain and Africa provided corn in the other years. These shipments are related to events in the war woes; success and the end of fighting released corn to be used on behalf of the population of Rome. These are ad hoe measures, increasing the popularity of the politicians involved. Neither the shipments of tithe-corn from Sardinia to Rome in 191 and 190 B.C. nor the t,1Ctmission granted to Rhodes in 169 B.C. provide strong indications for the regular supply of Sicilian or Sardinian tithe-corn to Rome. The shipments from Sardinia to Rome during the war » Livy 34.9, 12f; 40.35,4. 17 Rktmm (1980) 105; C•- (1984) 80. Cf. Toynbee (1965) Il 217; Welbak (1979) ill 327f; Herz ( 1988) 33. 21 C - (1984) 80f. Cf. Welbak (1979) ill 328. Bertholdt (1984) 188ff. 93

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against Antiochus may very well have been used for the army, but even assuming that this is not the case, far from indicating a regular supply, they can more satisfactorily be explained as measures to compensate for the disruption of the corn trade as a result of the increased army supply. On the other band, Rome had to provide continuously for the needs of the eight to twelve legions, the allied troops and the fleets operating in the Mediterranean - mostly in the Western half - during the first decades of the second century B.C. While explicit evidence may be lacking, it is likely that the regular tithe of both islands was usually intended to make a significant contribution to this continuous military requirement of corn. Increased employment of troops by Rome, as in the war against Antiochus, led to the transfer of additional corn to the military, not only from Sicily and Sardinia, but also from Carthage and Numidia, which otbelwise could have been intended for the corn-market. If this is right, the Roman government did not employ the resources of the empire on behalf of the people of Rome as early as is usually assumed.29 The empire at this date was rather used to support the main instrument to continue this empire: the army .

••• The dvitales faedera/lJe, liberae and stipendiariaL may have had different legal relations with Rome, but it may be doubted whether this meant that they did not all contribute corn - and other foodstuffs - to the Roman war effort. 30 Most communities in the war wne or in a geographical position to supply the armies did contribute to the Roman need of corn and other supplies to feed its armies, in the form of allied contributions, ad hoe levies, and inter-governmental trade. The dvilas stipendiariae had to pay tribute, either in money or in kind, to Rome; others may have contributed corn gladly and voluntarily, such as Pergamon, fighting at the side of Rome •gaimt their foe, the Seleucid Empire. Some sold the corn they might in other circumstances have had to contribute for free.

The distinction between regular aid by allied states and ad hoe contnl>utions, which were enforced by the presence of the Roman armies, will in some cases have been subtle. The statement of Cicero (de imp. Cn. Pomp. 38.15), who doubts that more cities of the enemy were ruined by Roman troops than allied cities as a consequence of the quartering of troops during winter, leaves no doubt as to the harshness of Roman demands. It must be emphasized that Cicero had the chaotic times of the first century B.C. in mind and may have exaggerated for rhetorical effect, but even in earlier times the Romans probably forced helpless allies to provide winter-quarters and supplies.31

" It i4 impoesit,ie to ay wbeo the R0111111 aovemmmt clirect.ly ord«ed a regular supply of public corn to the city of Rome, since the sources for such diacussion _, lacking It might be of interelll that public g,aua.ies only seem to appear wbeo C. Gniccbua organil'A'd tlie distribution of cheap corn in Rome. Cf. Rickman (1980) 47ff, 138f; Herz (1988) 43f. ,o Schwalm (1939) !Off; LintoU (1993) 38ff, 70ff. 31 An 111ample is provided by Livy 43.6, I ff: an Atbeaiao embassy UDdertinm the um__.., given by Athens to the ROIIIIII army during the 1bint )l&le with RiclrowJ'• ectual ICCOUDt, I CID only _,me that Sirts confused Ricltowo's diacuaaiODS of the Ro™ taxatioo in Sicily md Asia, since ~ does indeed argue that in Asia (oot in Sicily) the com was irnnwliately sold in the province (p. 43). Cf. Meijer (1986) 188. Tax collectors were by no 1J1Mns • oecessi~. Acconlioa to Braund (1983) 241-244, C - e1so issued a decree which axled the uee of publiami to collect taxes from itMMM The system introduced by C - in Asia, md probably J•MMM. wu oonmlly pnctiaed in other provinces. Liotott (ebove) 78. states: "lo general, then, 01ataide Asia [DDtil . Julius c-rJ md Sicily, the cities were given . a global sum to collect md to pus 011 to the governor ex the tax-collector; it was up to them how Ibey rai8ed it. • On the role of cities in the Roma taxatioa system -Corbi« (1991). She empb•si- tlw the city remeined the basic 1111.it fOI" taxcollectioo ■od that the executioo of the tas1r wu entrusted to the local officials, oot to my repieseotatives of the central power (p. 231). ,m Cf. Linton (1993) 129: "The In•,erium RoDmlWII wu founded 011 the polis. Cities provided Rome with • cb■oocl for her comnwods ■od for her dem■ods fm ~ through taxatioo. •

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*** A final topic to be addressed is the role of trade and private contractors in military food supply. As regards to trade as source of corn for the Roman armies the distinction has to be emphasized between private corn trade and distributution of corn by non-private means. Examples of the latter we have seen in the previous discussion, for instance of the deals between Hiero, Carthage and Masinis.q on the one hand and the Roman government on the other. This kind of corn trade was an aspect of the normal diplomatic relations between states. Kings like Hiero and Masinissa used the corn they received through taxation as means of diplomacy or as trade goods. As the relations with Rome show, the line between purchases and voluntary contributions is very thin. A further example of non-private corn distribution is provided by the second tithe which was occasionally levied on senatorial orders on Sicily and Sardinia. Rome paid for this corn, and although the price was fixed by Rome and the 'sellers' did not have any choice in the deal, this can be seen as some sort of trade. On a smaller scale the governor had the right to buy corn for their own use (in eel/am) in a similar fashion, according to a price that was fixed by the administration. 103 Largescale trade therefore occurred as part of diplomatic relations and even on the borderline with taxation. 104 The purchases from states like Epirus and Thessaly, and also of smaller communities from which Rome bought corn on behalf of its armies, have to be seen in the same light of non-private corn distribution. In 169 8.C., Livy (44. 16,2) informs us, the consul Q. Marcius, operating in Greece during the Third Macedonian War, had purchased 20,000 modii of wheat and 10,000 modii of barley from Epirus, payment of which would be given to their envoys in Rome. The volume involved is "mall, only sufficient to provide 5,000 men with one monthly ration of wheat. Rome also sent legates to Etruria during the Second Punic War and to Apulia and Calabria during the preparations for the Third Macedonian War to buy corn on behalf of the troops.'°' Having emphasized the importance of non-private distribution and the role of local instiwtions, it is time to tum to the role of private trade, since it has usually been assumed that private contractors and trade were crucial for the Roman army supply. A major role in the corn supply of the Roman armies, from at least the third century B.C. on, is ascribed to large-scale contractors. Focusing rather restrictedly on the limited state administrative apparatus and therefore overlooking the role of local instibJtions, scholars have seen civilian institutions embedded in private trade as the only possible channel through which Rome could manage the provisionning of the armies. In Badian' s influential study of the societares publicarwrum, it is supposed that the feeding of the Roman armies exceeded the capabilities

Ricbard8on (1994) 583. Alao Frank (1959) 204: "The indepelldmt grain trade did not gain iarae profits lhrought the wan, beca1se 80 much of the grain ll8tJd Ihm wu public property (tithe&, a eecoad tithe bought by the stat.e, oc gifts of allies).• ,os Etnuia: I.ivy 2S. 1S,4; 25 .20,2; 27.3,9 . In the lint passage it is stated that the legatus himself aocoq,anied the supply shiJ18 to Tumtum, but there is aome doubt on the reliability of this case. See most recently Kukolb (1990) S7ff. This might cast doubt on boch ocber instances u well, but in the liebt of other t'Vi~ there is bardly enough reason to reject the nw:bmism u such. Apulia and Calabria: I.ivy 42.27,8. IQ)

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of the Roman governmental apparatus; as a result, the state in Republican times bad to rely on large-scale contractors, who took care of all aspects of organiution, administration and execution. 106 While emphasizing the efforts undertaken in the wars of expansion since the Hanm"balic War, Badian says "it is important to ~ that, as far as we can see, the publicani were in charge of the commissariat for all these wars, providing the logistics, and the organiution that enabled the legions to win them. • 107 The role given to private entrepreneurs assumes that they were capable of supplying and distributing huge amounts of corn without much difficulty. On the other hand, the capabilities of the Roman governmental structure seem very limited. Based on the supposition that the governmental apparatus of the Roman Republic was totally inadequate, the argument has been that the state was hardly involved at all in managing the corn supply; that its magistrates, legates and COllllIWlders only expressed the need for corn and that the actual job was done through private trade and private entrepreneurs. I hope to have shown that the available executive institutions were adequate to manage the major part of the army supply through non-market channels. Even with respect to the acquisition of corn through trade at a high level - locating surplus corn and making transactions with the people who could provide it, whether they were community councils, corn merchants or farmers - it should be emphasized that this did not require a huge administrative apparatus, and could be managed by special legates, non-combatant members of the military staff or personal representatives. The three kgati which were sent by the Senate to Apulia and Calabria in 172 B.C. to buy corn oo behalf of the army are examples of such men, as is Octavian's freedman, whom the triumvir sent during the Civil Wars to acquire corn. The as,,;igoment of three legates to go to Southern Italy would have been needless, if it was the usual practice to delegate the actual job to contractors. 101 The commission of the military corn supply to the societates publica,wrum, as envisaged by Hadian, suggests that a few businessmen took care of all aspects of organiutioo, administration and execution. The important part played by large-scale contractors was

Tenney Frank suggested that as a result of the fraud during the Hmnibalic War, the awe purchased its supplies through its own magistrates during the Eastern Wars. Frank (19S9) 149. Unfortunately be only refers to the second tithes, which were levied in Sicily md Sardinia, md fails to provide evidence for this "-is ToYJII- (196S) 356, says that Fnmk may be right ill •ting that the supplies were handled by the government itself md also in suggesting that a change of policy had hem brought about by the unhappy experieoce of the Hamibalic War. He remub, however, that I.ivy's notices of the tithes do not clear up thi.s point, but points to the transaction with Epi.rus in Livy 44. 16,2f. To which more later. Frank's suggestion provoked Badian to remarlc sarcastically: "He does not give us any idea of how the magistratt,s suddenly acquired the technique and the organization that enabled them to ffllNl'I the complicated business of buying supplies md providing lnlluport. Did the state itaelf now go into the CODl:nlcting business?" Badian (1972) 27f. Brant (1976) 210, agrees with Blldian. saying in his Geaurm edition "man bnn sich nicht sehr gut vOl'6(ellen, welcbes andere System auJler der Requirierung iiberhaupt anwendbar war.• Furthermore, Blldian (1972) 16ff. Th.is eoq.hasi$ on the role of private business, caused by the nidimentary governmental structw'e, is, according to Rickman ( 1980) 26, 34, an important point in connection with the civilian corn supply as well Badian seems to be regarded as decisive since. See e.g. Brant (above); Gnien (1984), 6S; Cornell (199S) 128f, 131; Ricbanllon (1996) 28f. The point had alao been made hy Orogdi (1968) 1188. Badim has recendy criticizied my proposals in the Ge.urm .Jitioo of ' Publicans md sinnen': Badian (1997) 238-244. ""Badian (1972) 27. 1 Livy 42.27,8; Appian, Bell. Civ. S.78. See aleo C - , Bell. Gal. 3 .7,3; Bell. Aft. 21 , 36; Slnbo, Geogr. 3 .4,20; Appian, Bell. Civ. 3.11. 1116

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presumed not only necessary because of the rudimentariness and inadequacy of the governmental structure, but also because of an assumed strict division between a class of politicians and generals and a class of businessmen, which would make it necessary for the state to rely on the mediation of the publicani. However, was there indeed such a wide social and economic gulf within the Roman elites between the class providing the magistrates and generals, and those whose economic existence was based on trade? The wealth of the elite was based on agriculture, which made contact with at least the corn or wine trade almost inevitable. There was no need for an intennediate class to make economic relations between generals and large-scale ttaders possible. The profits which were to be gained in the provisioning of the armies made it interesting enough for traders to approach a legate or commander themselves.109 The involvement of trade and that of contractors are two separate issues. The argument against large-scale contractors is not to argue that trade was not involved at all in the food supply of the Roman armies. Two topics therefore remain to be discussed: first, the available evidence for the role of large-scale contractors in the food supply of the Roman armies, and, secondly, the role of private trade in general. The supposed structural role of large-scale contractors in the food supply to the Roman armies is based largely on a rather dubious story which involves publicani in the provisioning of the Spanish army dwing the Hannibalic War (Llvy 23.48,4-49,4 and 25.3,8-5, 1). In the year 215 B.C. the commanders of the army in Spain informed the Senate of their accomplishments, but also of the shortage of money, clothing and corn. They would try to get money themselves, but clothing and corn had to be delivered from Italy, if the province were not to be lost. The Senate agreed that these demands were justified, but lacking the necessary resources they decided to appeal to those who bad made profits before from statecontracts to deliver the necessary supplies to the Spanish army on credit. On the day fixed by the praetor, nineteen individuals in three societates were willing to subscnl>e to the contracts on two conditions. Firstly they demanded exemption from military service for the duration of the contracts and secondly they demanded that the state should carry all the risk of adverse weather conditions or hostile actions (23.48,4-49,4). Some years later one of these publicani - M. Postumius from Pyrgi - was charged with fraud. Together with a .colleague - T. Pompooius from Veii - be bad deliberately sunk worthless ships or pocketed money for non-existent ships and cargoes. The accusations and the ensuing trial led to a political row. At first the Senate was reluctant to take action, because it was afraid of offending the class of public contractors. When two of the tribunes started prosecution nonetheless, the publicani closed their nmks lUld at first tried to obstruct their action using the veto of one of their colleagues; later they resorted to simple violence. As a result, the Senate took a firm line with the publicani (25.3,8-5,1). The message coming from Spain in 215 B.C. reflects similar complaints made hy the Roman commanders of Sicily and Sardinia For the sake of the argument it may be allowed to repeat briefly the earlier discussion from the point of view of the nature of Livy's information on supply problems on these occasions. In 23.21 Livy informs us that the resources of the provinces of Sicily (the western part of the island at that time) and Sardinia were inadequate to sustain the armies. On Sicily the difficulties were resolved through the assistance of king Hicro II of Syracuse, who temporarily paid and supplied the Roman

°' On the businees interests of the ROIIIIII elite D'Arms (1981).

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troops. This is echoed regarding Sardinia, where the allied communities promised to deliver supplies. While the difficulties of these provinces in supplying sufficient corn and other necessities is plausible in itself, Livy's account cooceming Sardinia raises some doubts. While be mentions in 23.21 that allied communities voluntarily promised wistance, elsewhere we are told that the harsh requisitions on the island caused ~Carthaginian agitation. 11 Furthermore, the troubles on Sardinia are dated to 216 B.C., which is a year earlier than one might expect. It is only in the year 215 B.C. that the number of legions stationed on the island was increased from one to two. Fighting, moreover, broke out in the year 215; until then, as far as we know, peace had been kept. We are told in 23.48,6f - nota bene in the passage that explains the steps taken in 215 B.C. to supply the armies in Spain that Sicily and Sardinia still hardly sustained their troops. 111 It might be suggested that at least in the dating of the troubles and in the voluntary assistance of the allied towns, Livy's

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source(s) copied the pattern of events on Sicily. The same complaints as those made by the commanders on Sicily and Sardinia are voiced in 23.48 by the commanders in Spain. Clothing and corn, it is said, had to be delivered from Italy, if the province were not to be lost. But is reliance on external supplies remarkable, ooe may wonder? As we have seen, during the first decades of the second century B.C., the armies in Spain generally relied on external supplies. When Cato in 195 B.C. send back to Italy the supply-ships and when in 181 B.C. the commanders informed the Senate that as a result of their successes and the pacification of the province no supplies were required, this clearly implies that normally supplies had to be shipped in from elsewhere.112 The number of legions operating in Spain in the early second century B.C. was the same as during the first years of the Second Punic War, while the base from which the Romans could opei-ate was incomparibly larger in the 190's and 180's B.C. than in the years following 218 B.C. It would therefore rather have been remarkable if the army in Spain in 215 B.C. had not been relying on corn from Italy. Moreover, from the beginning of the war we hear of supplies being send from Italy to Spain.113 It is plainly wrong to imply, as in Livy 23.48, that the Roman army in Spain in the early years of the war should normally have been able to rely solely on local resources. In 23.48 the troubles on Sicily and Sardinia are briefly referred to and one might wonder whether the complaint regarding Spain is not inspired by the account regarding Sicily and Sardinia. The note on the required shipment of corn and clothing, and the reliance on pubUcani to supply them, open a brief account of affairs in Spain. The sources that are used by Livy for his account of the Spanish events during the early years of the Second Punic War have been 110

Livy 23 .32,Sf. Cf. Brunt (1971) 274. Livy 23.41 ,6f. Furtbermore, the inadequacy of the iswid to support its troops is followed by the llhipmmt of tribute paid by defeated Sardiniao peoplee 10 Rome, where the money is delivm,d IO the quwtor, the corn IO the aedilis and the prisoners 10 the praetor. It a.I least odd that the corn is ebipped to Rome, while the troops, numbering two legi008, remain on the isln. the more eo since 8hortly afterwards the province still is unable to wpport its troops. Cf. Rowland ( 1984) 285. It is a usual practi9e that the tl,,fNled enemy bas 10 provision for the Roman boope. 112 Livy 34.9, 12f; 40.35,4. 113 Tllo first passage regarding llhipmmts of grain to Spain is to be found in the wort of Polybiua 3.106, 7. Livy 22.11 ,6 DWJtiOll8 that the freighters, who brought provisirm to the army in Spain, bad bem captured by the Cardriginian fleet. In 217 B.C. P . Scipio was amt to Spain with a large llhipmmt of supplies (Livy 22.22, 1). Cf. Riclwdson (1986) S7. 111

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characterized as inferior. While the essence of the events described by Livy in 23.49 and later are broadly possible, the details provided by Livy are extremely doubtful. 114 The first half of Livy's story, which provides the sole evidence for the role of publicani in the food supply of the Roman armies, therefore occurs in a generaJly unreliable context, while it contains some elements which are plainly untrusthworthy. The secood half of the story (25.3,8-5, 1) is not better. The most serious criticism is that the story contains many anachronistic elements. The Senate, we are told, was reluctant to take action, because it was afraid of offending the class of public contractors. Badian rightly rejected the depiction of the political row which implies •an organiz.ed ordo publicanorum with the sort of status and powers it had in the age of Cicero· . The relationship between the Senate and the publicani, as depicted by Livy in this case, is in stark conttast to the description of public contractors given by the second century B.C. author Polybius in his account of the Roman constitution. "There are in fact many ways in which the Senate can either inflict great hardship or ease the burden for those who manage public property, for in every case the appeal is referred to it. More important still is the fact that the judges in the majority of civil trials where the action involves large interests are drawn from the Senate. The resuh is that all citizens, being bound to the Senate by ties which ensure their protection, and being also uncertain and afraid that they may need its

help, are very cautious about obstructing or resisting its will.• (Polybius 6.17.) 'All citizens' in this context refers to all citizens participating in state contracts. Polybius emphasizes in this passage, which probably describes society in his own time, the dependence of public contractors on the Senate. 11' Not even half a century after the Second Punic War did the publicani have such a powerful position as described by Livy in the row over the fraudulent contractors. Their powerful role in politics began at the end of the second century B.C. Badian points also to certain inconsistencies in the attitude of the Senate. The planned obstruction of the action of two of the tribunes by the veto of a third, together with the use of open violence in a public assembly, seem no less anachronistic and find an obvious parallel in the late secood century e.c.116 Both the passages in Livy concerning the contract to supply the Spanish army - 23.48ff and 25.3ff - are clearly discredited by untruths, inconsistencies and anachronistic elements. They are part of the same tradition, and we have to conclude that this information comes from a not reliable one. 117 Though Livy may be the only source we have for the internal affairs of Rome in this period, we must lldmit that he often is not trustworthy. In the Llvian tradition "the actual history was written in the late Republic, often in the light of

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Ricbardaoo (1986) 39. Bedim (1972) 45; Bnmt (1976) 178.

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The reference to T . Pompouius also suspicion. The elabonde story of bis defeat as pnefectus aocium in 25. 1,3ff eeems to be a doublet of events which bad taken place before. See Kukolb (1990) 31ff. 117 Compere tbe uncritical attitude towards the Llvian account by Frmlt (1959) 86, 149; Toynbee (1965) II 352ff; PelAry (1976) 82f; RidoWJ ( 1980) 33f; Ricbardlioa (1986) 42f; Brucoe (1989) 75; Sirb (1991) 32; Seibert ( 1993) 287ff. 116

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contemporary events. • 11• It may be suggested that the data on the warfare in Spain in the early years of the Second Punic War were elaborated into a largely fictional account, which was in the case of the supply problems inspired by events elsewhere. The author, on whose account Livy (directly or indirectly) derives, was clearly hostile to the class of the wealthy publicani, who bad by the late second century B.C. acquired a powerful but disputed position in Roman politics. This hostjlity seems to be implied by the phrase that those whom the state bad made rich, should provide the state some credit, and also by the remark which ends the whole story: this was the result of the fraud of the publicani and of their audacity to defend themselves. 119 The story as told by Livy derives from a late Republican source, since one of the main motives of the story - the dangerous influence of the publicani - would not have made sense before. The sole mention of a contract to supply corn to the Roman armies therefore occurs in a very doubtful story. It would be inadmissible simply to erase all those elements that have to be rejected, and let the rest stand as historic truth, as bard evidence. A story that contains plainly untrue elements and that bas been elaborated using anachronistic issues should be regarded as fabricated in its totality, rejecting all elements, unless we have reason to assume otherwise. Fraud as described in the story undoubtedly could occur in a civilian context as well as in a state context; it could furthermore occur in state contracts other than military supply contracts. Those shippers who contracted the transportation of public corn were liable for damage caused by negligence or malpractice only, unless the contract included a special clause, the receptum nautarum, which transferred the risk of bad weather as well to the shipper. This left room for similar fraudulent actions as the one described by Livy. We do not know to what extent anachronistic elements, possibly, moreover, from a civilian context, are projected to the military context of the late third century B.C., or whether legal niceties were sacrificed to the vivid expressiveness of the story. 120 In the light of this likelihood,

111 Badim (1972) 18f. Cf. p. IS: "No Roman history was written before about 200 B.C. Th" cld1i!~

of earlier history were often freely invented by later writers in the light of contemporary interests and

cooditions. • 119 Livy 23,48, 10; 25.S, I. The accusation even gains force by the comperiBOD with those civilians, knights and centurions who performed their duties for free (Livy 24. 18,10ft). •21> According to the story, the two fraudulent publicani pocketed the money for both the ships and the cargo. In order to stimulare supply, the stale bad agreed to pay even for cargoes that did DOI arrive in Spain, due to adverse weather or bostile action. Therefore the cargo was still owned by the conlnlctors. One of tbe deowids of the publicam bad been a favourable liability clause. N0111111ly, the matter of liability arises because the shipper tnnsports somebody else's goods. Liability in such I case meant that the transport contractor bad to pay for d•rnage or loss of the goods. During the late Republic it was usual to include a clause in private tnnsport contracts - the receptum nalllarum - that expanded the liability of the tnmsport contractor to include circUllllllaDces beyond ooe•s cootrol, like weather, piracy etc. Without such a clause the shippu was only liable for dolus malus 111d culpa, that is for ma1k.e or negligence. As it seems, the pubUcani in Livy's account bad shifted liability for circumstances beyond their control - adverse weather and piracy - to the stale, but on I cargo that was not yet delivered to the stale. Alternatively the stale might hive bought the corn from the supply coolnletors 111d then ship it - using tnmport conlnlets - to the army in Spain. In such cases, the acquisition of corn and the tnmsportllioo of it were separate i - . A similar situation will have arisen when the stale Jet out coolnlcts to ship tax~. If the tnmsport coolnlets of the stale in tbeae cases were similar to private tnDsporl contnclS, the CODlnletor was liable at least fOI" malice and negligence, depending oo the conlnlet Ibey might also be liable for damage due to circumstances beyond their cootrol. If the stale wmted to 117

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it would be bard to argue that while the rest of the story bas to be rejected, the element of the military supply contract bas to be taken at face value, in spite of the lack of any evidence to corroborate the existence of military supply contracts at any point in Roman history. In a later instance, however, Livy is thought to have provided corroboration of the theory, when he mentions Cato's measutes regarding the food supply of his army in Spain in 195 B.C. As has been mentioned before, in 195 B.C. Cato sent back the supplies, because he wanted to emphasize that he would make the war sustain itself during the campaign that he was about to start. The relevant passage in Livy (34.9,12) says: Id era/forte tempus anni, ut jrumenJUm in areis Hisponi habere111; itaque redemptoribus vetitis jrumenJUm parare ac Romani dismissis 'bellwn ' inquit 'se ipsum aln '. Some scholars see this as the dismi~ of the publicani, who had contracted for the provisionment of food to the Spanish army. 121 1be text, however, does not allow only this interpretation, for 'redemptor' may just as well have the meaning of 'supplier' or 'entrepreneur' in general or of 'transport contractor'. In Livy 42.3,11 redemptores refers to contractors, who had been contracted by the Senate to return marble rooftiles to the temple Juno Lacinia in Bruttium, from where they had been illegally taken. m Redemptor can refer to anybody who had undertaken to perform a task. 'Parare' does not only mean 'buy', but also 'furnish', 'equip', 'deliver' and 'supply'. A likely translation therefore is "Cato forbade the transport contractors to deliver the grain and sent them back to Rome" 123• Livy 34.9,12 provides no evidence for a supposed role of publicani in the military food supply. Furthermore, Polybius in his discussion of the publicani in book 6 does not mention contracts for the food supply of the armies. In 6.17 he ev~n illustrates the great importance of these societates with examples of contracts in several domains: • All over Italy an immense number of contracts, far too numerous to specify, are awarded by the censors for the construction and repair of public buildings, and besides this the collection of revenues from navigable rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, lands - in a word every transaction which comes under the control of the Roman government - is farmed out to contractors.• Admittedly, Polybius explicitly says that his examples are not exhaustive; it is therefore no hard evidence that contracts to supply corn to the Roman armies are not among them. However, if the contracts for the provisioning of the armies had included the food supply, this would have been one of the most profitable fields. The omission is more easily understood if the food supply, which would have been a huge assignment., formed no part of

ldinnil•le tile. oootncts, lhe tnmllpOrt oootract could simply have left out lhe clauae that expanded the oootractor's liability to wealher md hoetile action. The risk of ship losacs _.... normally to have hem curied by the mercbamt or tnmllprt-d at arrival in Italy 20,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and in addition some elephants. Polybius refers to an inscription set up by Hannibal. Seibert (1993) 112, however, argues that Hannibal hiDJMlf falsified his numbers at the arrival in Italy, to make his victories seem even more impressive. If Polybius' fll'lirnates ,.f Hannibal's army at the Rhone are correct, this would meu that Hannibal in the meantime had l06t some 18,000 infantry, but surprisingly only 2,000 cavalry. 1 Cf I alftlby (1978) 39; Shean (1996) 177. Seibert (1993) 107, ass•unes that the delivery of provisions, shoes, cloths etcetera bad been planned Iona before, and bad not simply been the result of Hannibal•s chance assistance of a local leader. 9 Cf. Seibert (1993) 107: "Hier wurdeo die Soldaten auch mit allem Notweodigen fiir die bevorstebende Alpeniiberquenmg ausgeriistet. •

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fodder requirement with another 400 or 500 tons of barley, hay and straw. (The Punic soldiers may, however, have killed the mules after they had done their task.) As said before, this is not impossible. Hannibal may have foreseen the large number of days it would cost to cross the Alps; be may have ordered all footsoldiers, servants and horsemen in bis army to carry their own rations through hostile territory; Hannibal's allies may have provided sufficiently large stocks, and be may have bad recourse to a train of 10,000 mules. But this merely shows the possibility from a logistical point of view of a successful crossing of the Alps. In the face of the many unlikely assumptions that have to bf- made, oowever, we would need evidence to agree with Seibert and disagree with the ancient sources. Their picture is therefore probably right, that Hannibal's army set out with insufficient provisions, inadequately supplemented with food stuffs gathered en route, losses among the mule-train possibly even aggravating the problems. The army subsequently experienced hunger during the later stages of the crossing of the Alps.10 In Cisalpine Gaul, Hannibal's army found sufficient food, which they initially may have had to gather themselves from the countryside.11 Some Celts awaited further developments, since Polybius says that after the first Punic sucuss against the Romans at the Ticinus all surrounding Celts declared their support, "according to their intentions in the first place", and supplied provisions. Until next spring, Hannibal remained among bis various Celtic allies, at first north of the Po, after the battle at the Trcbia south of that river. The ample supplies of the Celtic allies were supplemented with provisions captured in the Roman magazine at Clastidium.12 While in Cisalpine Gaul, Hannibal operated in the region which acted as bis supply base. The strategic and logistic picture changed for the next year or so, when Hannibal's army had to live off the countryside. He did not bold any territory beyond the reach of bis army. In Xenopbon's metaphor, Hannibal was sailing the hostile sea of Italy. That be managed to do so for the next period with considerable success was not only based on the tactical superiority of the Punic army, but also on the coherence between his strategical goals and logistical limitations. While the food supply of the Punic army could be managed most easily in condant movement along fertile regions, the unfocused nature of the war at the time also meant that Hannibal was not bound to a particular region. Hence Hannibal's army marched, while constantly ravaging and foraging, through Etruria, along the Adriatic coast to Apulia and from there to Campania, where some time was spent in plundering the rich countryside. Polybius emphasi7.Cs the abundance of supplies gathered by the Punic army throughout their

•° Cf. KaJustedt (191 3) 38Sf. 11

Polybius 3.60 meiely says that Hannibal established a camp in order for the army to recuperate. Polybius 3.66. 3.68: "The Celtic population who ioblbited the plain [ ... ] supplied them with abundant provisions.• Cwtidium: Polybius 3.69; cf. Uvy 21.48,8f. It is aom,,times suppoeed that the Cells were eager at the end of the winter to get rid of this burden to their resoun:es. Polybius 3. 78, the buis for this -••on• says that they were eager to tnmsfer the ww from their own into Rom territory. Cf. Uvy 22.1,2. 12

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march.13 Meanwhile Hannibal hoped to make an impression on Rome's allies: the havoc caused in the countryside would either provoke the Romans into active resistance, or would expose their impotence. Both Roman defeat and lack of action would force the threatened communities of Italy to change sides in order to avoid the devastation of their countryside.14 In 217 B.C. , however, his strategy did not yet meet with success. The Punic army's living off the land enforced strict adherence to the seasonality of warfare. 15 Hannibal realized that his army could not continue its wanderings during winter, when scarcity of provisions would increase its vulnerability. Therefore be started preparation of his winter-quarters quite early in the year, late July or early August, when stocks were still full.16 He left Campania. taking part of his booty especially cattle17 - with him, and left for Gerunium in Apulia, which he bad selected for its fertility as location of his winter-quarters.1• Foraging parties were sent out, only temporarily successfully hindered by Roman troops. 19 Although the winter did not threaten his army, be bad to allow the Romans the opportunity to reorganiz.e their war effort. The Romans, however, failed to take the initiative from him. When the ripening of crops allowed, Hannibal's army left winter-quarters and marched southwards. There they captured the Roman magazine at Caonae, and huge stocks of corn with it. They now threatened the allies in this region, while the Roman military food supply bad been disrupted. The Roman Senate bad prepared for battle by increasing the army in Apulia to eight legions, with which to crush Hannibal's troops. 20 Their subsequent defeat was to alter the situation of the war. The Roman armies in these years bad been supplied from magazines in their

13

Polybius 3 .82 ; 3.86; 3 .87; 3.88; 3.90. Cf. I.ivy 22.3, 3ff; 22.9,3ff. Seibert (1993) 151, assumes that H1111111oal •s troops at first did not plunder the countryside, since be claimed to have come as the liberator of the Italic peoples. The army must al least have gathered food, though. 14 Polybius 3.90 oo H81111ibal's strategy of devastation in Campania: "This move, be was convinced, would bring one of two results: either be would compel the enemy to fipl, or be would prove beyond doubt that be was the ffl!"ltei- of the field and that the Romans were aboodooi.ng the country to him. This demonstration, be hoped, would cause alarm among the cities and persuade them to throw off their allegiance to Rome.• Cf. Polybius 3. 82; 3 .91. I refer to Enlkamp (1992) 127-147, for a more detailed dillCUSsion of wider aspects of the Punic and Roman strategy during these early years of the war. Cf. Frederikseo (1984) 238. " Seibert (1993) 169f (cf. 182), arpes that shortage in Ca~i• forced Hannibal to abort operatioas prematurely. "Logistiacbe Probleme gewmoWJ erbeblicben Einftu8 auf die operative Plan1111g. • They always do. It was, howevei-, not so much tbe threat of shortage in Caoq•oia that made Jf81111ibal think of winter-quarters, but the avoidance of such problems al a later staee. Similarly erroneous and mil'lfWling is tbe flta'-lt (p. 173) that the 1aclt of an operational base forced Hannibal• s soldiers to perfoaw duties, "die eigeotlich zweitrangig warm". 16 Polybius 3 .100. Time of year according to Derow (1976) 275 . In the contemporary calendar, this was late August or early September. At this time of year, tbe harvest bad alrfWly been gathered. Cf. Bnint (1971) 271. Otherwise Dorey and Dudley (1971) 60. 17 Polybius 3.93,4ff. Cf. Llvy 22.16,7f. 11 Polybius 3.92; 3 .94; 3 . 100. 19 Polybius 3. IOOff. Appian, Hann. IS agrees that the Punic army had al,undant provisions for tbe

win!«. 20

Polybius 3.107. 163

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operational base. One example of such a magazine is that of Clastidium during the campaign fought in Cisalpine Gaul. During the winter of 218-217 B.C. Roman armies were stationed at Ariminum and in Etruria, in order to block the progress of the Punic army further south. Magazines were established in both locations to serve these troops. Finally, as we have seen, the Romans established a depot in ('~nnae.11 Only in this case do we know that the provisions were supplied from the hinterland of the magazine, as they were gathered in the region of C8nusium, from where they were brought downriver to Camiae.11 1be sources of supply of the other magazines l'l"main unknown, but it is likely that also in these cases neighbouring regions contributed to them. 1be Roman system of magazines had ideally suited the kind of warfare they bad fought in Italy before. Operations in the wars fought in the fourth and third century B.C. bad been more or less static, since both the Rnmans and their opponents in Italy bad fought in well-defined war :zones. In 217 B.C., however, the war was not static and immobile, but fluid, determined by Hannibal's initiative. Hannibal's elusive army was taking the war to regions unprepared by the RPmans . Whether this was part of Hannibal's planning or whether it was merely the result of his other strategic deliberations and logistic considerations, the way he cooducted the war disrupted the Roman~· magazine-system. 23 Polybius emphasizes explicitly on various occasions that Hannibal's army was well provided with provisions. In contrast, a structural element of Livy's account of these years is to emphasize the inadequacy of the Punic army's food supply. In the first place, Livy has omitted all mention of the Celtic allies' contributions during the months in Cisalpine Gaul, while he alleges that the Punic army suffered food shortages. 24 Secondly, Hannibal's army was supposedly threatened with hunger in Campania, where the food-supply is said to be inadequate for the army's oeeds.l$ Most importantly, Hannibal's food supply is supposed to have been successfully hindered by the strategy of Fabius Maxi.mus. Not only is this diametrically opposed to Polybius' account, but we have also seen that the Romans lacked the tactical prerequisite to pose any serious 21

Cwtidium (modem Casteggio): Polybius 3.69; Livy 21.48,8-9; Appian, Han. 7. Ariminum (modem Rimioi) 111d Etnuia: Polybius 3. 7S; Appi.ln, Hann. 9. The locatioo of the magazine in Etruria is unknown. Camwe (ioodem Canoe), Polybius 3 .107. 22 Polybius 3. 107,3. Cf. Walbank (1957) 441. For what it is worth, one may add that accordin1 to Livy 22.52,7, the Roman troops that bad fled to Canusium were provided with clothes 111d food by a wealthy lady called Busa. Cf. Ungem-StemberJ (1975) 68. Appi.ln, Hmm. JS mmtiOll8 ample supplies in the town of Geronia. This seems not to be in accordance with Polybius 3. 100,4. 23 In contrast, Seibert (1993) 182, MSIIIDM that the RolDID supply from fortified cilies was advantageous during the "Bewepngsbieg". 24 Livy 21.48,8. See also Kahrstedt (1913) 393ff, according to whom the capacity of Cisalpine Gaul to sustain the Punic army was fairly limited. Polybius offers no support whatsoever fOI" this supp06itioo. Not ooly oom Polybiua mmtioo the •bundance of provisions contributed to the Punic army, he also empbasizA!8 the fertility 111d productiveness of the regioo (2.15). Moreover, the burden of the Pullie army was sp,-1 over a large aree, since it moved around until after Trebia, while the numerous rivers facilitated easy tnnsport. See on this Livilm motive in ,--al, Erdkamp (1992). Cl~y adhering to I.ivy's IICCOUDI is S1-n (1996) I 79ff. ., Livy 22.lS,2. Seibert (1993) 169, wants to retain at least some of this: it is not the inadequacy of the countryaide, but the Punic army's devastatiOll8 that cause the threat of shortage. Schmitt (1991) 181f, also rejects Livy in favour of Polybius.

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threat to the Hannibal's foragers - a sufficiently strong cavalry against Hannibal's superior horsemen - and that even Livy has to admit the incapability of Fabius Maximus to do anything about the plundering of Campania. Most of the time - the temporary success of Minucius being the only exception - the Romans kept a safe distance between themselves and their opponents.26 Livy continues in the same vein when claiming that the Punic stores had been almost exhausted at the end of the winter 217-216 B.C.; Hannibal is even supposed to have contemplated returning to Gaul. 27 The purpose of this falsification is obvious: it has to compensate for the string of Roman defeats and their impotence against the Punic foe. Rome may not have been successful in the field, but was slowly defeating the enemy by other me.ans .21 The exemplum of the CUnctator is to show that there is more honour in accepting superficial disgrace and rejecting shortsigbted fame, while gaining success by uoshowy means, and this was also to reflect positively on Rome itself. This tendency made it necessary to emphasize troubles on the Punic side, and to invent them where there were none. Conversely, it bad not been Rome itself that bad been defeated by Hannibal, but individual generals who bad been motivated by personal gain and individual fame.29 We may safely conclude that in those instances where Livy deviates from Polybius regarding Punic food supply, his account should be rejected. Recently, however, Seibert bas emphasized, partly influenced by Livy' s account, the disadvantages stemming from Hannibal's compulsion "die militiriscben Operationen nicbt nacb den Erfordernissen einer effektiven Kriegsfiihrung auszuricbten, sondern sie vorrangig geografiscben, lclimatischen und versorgungstecbnischen Gesichtspunkten unterzuordoen. "30 One may object that, in the first place, such considerations always play a role - more or less and in different ways - in waging war. In the second place, as I have argued, for the time being Hannibal's strategy was not hampered by bis army's food supply, nor bad this offered many opportunities to the Romans to strengthen their position. During the period from spring 217 B.C. to summer 216 B.C., Hannibal managed very well to avoid the weaknesses inherent in his food supply. His army was sufficiently strong to live off the land, while bis limited operational flexibility did not hamper his strategy. The Romans could not take the initiative to use these limitations against hi.m.

***

26

See Chapter Five. Part of this teodeocy are also the so-called Fabian decrees, ordering the evacuation of supplies from the open country. (Livy 22. 11,4). Cf. Sheen (1996) 181. n Livy 22.32, lff; 22.40,Sf. See also Kahrstedt (191 3) 2 13; Schmitt ( 1991) 2 14ff. Cf. Seibert ( 1993) 187 : Hannibal impatiently bad to await the arrival of spring, while his stores were diminillbing. This coloured version o f events surely owes much to Livy. 21 Succinctly put: Minucius •was not to ~ . said Fabius, that nolhing bad been accomplished, beca11ae almost the whole SUmDV>f bad been tediously spent in baffling the enemy• (Livy 22.18,9). C f. 22.39, 13ff. 2' This is diacusaed in more detail in Erdk•mp (1992). lO Seibert ( 1993) 169, 182.

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The victory at Cannae finally brought about the defection of at least a few of Rome's allies to the Cartbaginian's side, but simultaneously it altered the nature of the war in such a way as to expose Hannibal to the limitations brought about by the lack of a sufficient supply base on which to draw. At the same time, the war that was to be waged around the most important of Hannibal's allies, Capua, suited the Romans very well because of its static and immobile nature. Nevertheless, the next years were the hardest for the Romans to sustain, and crucial for the final outcome. As we will see, the overseas regions could supply little precisely in those years that the Roman military needs were highest. The fact that during these years Italy was thrown back oo its own resources gave the richest Italian 11gricultural regions a crucial role in the waging of the

war. It is a widespread assumption that during the Second Punic War, corn from Sicily, Sardinia and even Egypt fulfilled the needs of Italy. In the recent edition of the Cambridge Ancienr History, J. Briscoe wrote that Roman strategy "meant accepting that Hannibal could not be prevented from ravaging large parts of the Italian countryside, the loss in corn production being met by imports from Sicily, Sardinia and, eventually, Egypt. •31 The basis for this assumption is the prominent role given in the account of Livy to shipments from Sicily and elsewhere to Italy during and after the war. At this point, therefore, we should summarize our earlier conclusions regarding supplies from Sicily and Sardinia during the Second Punic War.32 In the years 216-215 B.C., Sicily - that is, the Roman province, which did not include Syracuse - and Sardinia were hardly capable of sustaining the legions and allies stationed on the islands. Hiero of Syracuse provided supplementary provisions to the Roman troops on the island, and sent small shipments of corn to Italy in 216 and 215 B.C. (in total about equal to the food required by one legion during two years). Shipments from Syracuse stopped with the death of Hiero in 215 B.C. The situation worsened when warfare broke out on the island in the same year. If there had been difficulties feeding two legions up to 214 B.C., these problems must have increased during the years 213-210 B.C., when four legions and allied forces (besides temporarily a Punic army) were operating on the island. After the end of fighting in 210 B.C. and the reduction of troops on the island to two legions, opportunities for overseas shipments must have gradually increased and were consciously stimulated by Rome. In

"Briscoe (1989) SO. Thiel (1946) 186, wrote that the Ro111111 supremacy at sea "enabled them during the most critical years of the war (from 217 to NT), when Hannibal was ravaging Italy and the soil could DOI be tilled regularly, to import grain by sea from Sicily and Sardinia and thus to guard the civil population as -11 as the armies from starvation. • Various authors assn me that in this Italian crisis deliverance came from Emt. T. Mnmmsm (1902) I 647, maintains that, together with Sicilian grain, it was a delivery from Egypt that forestalled a severe famine. Just as speculative is Beogtson (1979) 78: • Als im Jahre 210 in Italien eioe Hungersnot ausbrach, die zweifellos auf die Verwilstungen des Krieges zurickmfiihren ut, da batten die das Gliick, eioe reicbe ~ van Ptolemaios IV, dem Konige Agypteos, 1.11 erbaltea. • Cf. Meijer (1986) 170: "The long route to Egypt was particularly important to the Romans, now that the imports from Sicily stagu•ted. • See also Heuss (1960) 87. Casson (1984) 82ff, is DOI very coovincing. Walbmk (1967) II 137, observes regarding Polybius' emphasis on the role of the wars in the eastern Meditenanean that these were "hardly relevant to the Roman corn supply, which depended on Sicily and Sardinia until Italian cultivation could be restored.• n See Chapter Four.

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2()1) B.C., the Roman army operating near Tarentum received supplies from Sicily. Nevertheless, only in the case of the operations in Africa from 204 B.C. does an important role of Sicily in supplying overseas theatres of war become clear. The picture is less bleak regarding Sardinia. Large-scale fighting was limited to the year 215 B.C.; problems of feeding the troops stationed on the island were therefore problably also limited to the early years. Nevertheless, two legions were permanently stationed on Sardinia from 215-207 B.C. While we know that Sardinia contributed corn to the war in Italy at least in the year 212 B.C., we sbould not exaggerate the volume of these supplies.33 Also Sardinia was contributing corn to the Roman troops in Africa.

Finally we have to address the supplies from Egypt, which have been ascribed an important role by some modem authors. 34 This alleged importance of Egyptian corn is based on the mention in a fragment of Polybius' work (9.1 la,1-2) of an embassy to Ptolemy, which was to request a delivery of corn. This request was necessary, Polybius informs us, because of the desb·uction of the total harvest in Italy and because Rome could turn nowhere else for help, since wars were being waged in every part of the world, except in Egypt." Since this is the only directly relevant passage, it is impossible to say with certainty if there ever was a shipment of corn from Egypt to Italy during the Second Punic War. An incidental shipment is quite possible, but is also of no importance. A structural supply of corn is quite another matter. Neither Livy nor any other source mentions such a supply. While arguing e silentio is generally a hazardous undertaking, in this case the silence of the sources does probably weigh against an Egyptian corn supply on a significant scale. Two arguments support this assumption. In the first place, before the conquest by Augustus all structural markets of Egyptian corn have to be sought in the eastern Mediterranean. We know that during the second century B.C. Rome bought grain from Numidia, Carthage, Thessaly and Epirus. There is no delivery known from Egypt to Italy or to any of the Roman armies during the third or second centuries B.C. 36 Egyptian corn supplies to Italy during the Second Punic War would have been exceptional indeed. In the second place, such

33

Bnint (1971) 274, "Only part of the island is fertile, and it may be doubted whether it produced a 1arJe suprlus over 111d above what the garrillOO required.• ,. Cf. I.ivy 27.4,10 who, however, dom not mention my request for corn. Cf. Walbak (1967) II 137; Bnint (1971) 274f; Heinen (1972) 639f; Jlic;ko- (1980) 27f. According to I.ivy 36.4,lff, the kings of Macedon and Egypt offered money and corn for the war against Antiochus. This information, however, is widely distrwlted. See for the discussion Brieooe (1981) 224f; also Hillen (1991) SlSf. "As Bnint (1971) 274f, rightly pointed out, the devastation to Italian agriculture can not have been as bad as Polybius makes it out, since agricultural production must have continued. Also I.ivy (36.4,2ff) meatiODS a leeation to Egypt, but -.us to mow noChing of the supply of Egyptian corn. The historic worth of this pas&age should not be oven,aliawted. Walbank (1967) 137, points out the mistakei: made by I.ivy or his IIOUJ'Ce. ,. One may point out that, if we awy take Livy 36.4 at face value, the as,istance Ptolemy offeted to Rome in the War against Antiochus m only existed of gold and silver, not com_ Casson (1984) 8lff, tries to make a case that Egypt did supply the Jlnmans on a 1arJe scale before. The only argument he offers, however, is that otherwise the whole structure of interregional distribution of surplus production in the eastern medite.1- would have been totally upset by Augustus' harsh intervention. Why should there not have been such a re-structuring? 167

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large-scale assistance to Rome in her greatest crisis would have been of great historic importance and diplomatic value. We should expect to find at least a hint of such lifesaving corn supplies in the sources on Roman-Egyptian relations up to the Roman annexation of Egypt. In this case the burden of providing evidence should therefore rest with those historians who assume a structural corn supply from Egypt on the shaky basis of one request. Spain occurs in this context only as a consumer of corn, not as a supplier. As we have seen, the Roman troops were supplied from Italy during the first years of the war, and continued to be in need of overseas shipments until the fighting was over. In the first years two legions bad to be sustained; in the period 210-206 B.C. even four legions bad to be provisioned for37 • Only during the final stages of the war the situation improved. After the Roman victory in Spain the vanquished bad to deliver provisions for six months. 38 The next year we hear of supplies being sent from Spain to the army in Africa. 39 We may conclude that during many years only Sardinia was able to supply corn on a regular basis to Italy. In view of the presence of two legions from 215 to 2C17 B.C. the provisioning of which constituted at first a problem to the island - we should not overestimate the volume of supplies. Shipments from Sicily on a significant scale are out of the question before the reorganization of the province after its pacification and the reduction of troops stationed on the island, i.e. before the year 209 B.C. Moreover, we may doubt the reliance in Italy on overseas corn in the final stage of the war, since Italy appears as a supplier of corn to Scipio's army on Sicily in 205 B.C. and in Africa in 204 B.C. At least during the years following the battle of Cannae, therefore, the Roman armies operating in Italy were largely dependent on the resources of the peninsula.

Although the sources are too imprecise and uncertain to allow absolute quantification of the burden posed on the resources of Italy by the military food requirement, we can at least make a relative estimate over time. Starting point is the number of legions that Rome had brought in the field during the war.40

The number of legions in Spain according to Toynbee (1965) n 650f. " The cooclusioo that the Spanish army usually was bein& ~ from o v - is supported by tbo similar ca88 of 181 B.C. , in wbicb two tribwti militlllfl of the Spanish army inform the Roman Seo•te of the conquest of Celtiberiae end the pacification of the province, end that in Ibis year no money nor grain bad IO be smd IS usual IO the army. In this i-51•ge, IS in the year 215 B.C., the provisioning of tbe army in Spain is• cue for the Roman government. The famous cue of Ceto's belUlllt se ips""' a/et in the year 195 B.C. is slightly different, as be oo bis own aulbority forbids supplies to be bought. The cmlnl issue however is, that in Olber years external supplies were necessary. (I.ivy 23.48,4ff; 34.9, 12f; 40.35,4.) 11 is • shame - do not know, where these supplies came from. During the wars apinst Sertorius • century later Gaul played an important role in the provisioning for the Roman armies. (Cicero, Foot 13; Pluterch, Sert. 21.5; Sellust, Epist. Pomp. ad seo. 9 .) 37

" Livy 30.3,2. 40

Toynbee (1965) II 650f. Livy's data 011 legions in the field bave regularly i - distrusted, end it is clear that they can not be taken et face value. Kabrstedt (1913) 441f, rejects for instmce tile continuous preeence of two legiooes urbanae in Rome. This would only streagtbeo my point. Cf. Bnml (1971) 645ff. 168

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216 215 214 213 212 211 210 209 208 207 206 205 204 203 202 Italy 8 8 11 11 14 12 9 11 11 13 11 7 8 8 6 total 13 14 20 22 25 23 21 21 21 23 20 18 19 20 16 1be number of legions by themselves, however, give a somewhat distorted picture, since it bas to be assumed that casualties and problems of recruitment resuJted in

undermanned legions. If we assume with P.A. Brunt, whose analysis of all available data on manpower during the Second Punic War is exhaustive, that real strength of Roman legions steadily declined after C'.annae to reach a low point in the years after 212 B.C., it becomes even more clear that in the years 214-211 8.C. the number of soldiers under arms in Italy was at its maximum. In the subsequent years the numbers fell, only to rise temporarily again in 207 B.C. with the arrival of a second Punic army in Italy. After this army was defeated, Hannibal withdrew to Bruttium, and numbers of soldiers in Italy fell furtber.41 Even though these numbers do not include the allied forces - figures oo which are simply not available42 -, these estimates indicate the development of the military exertion (in the form of manpower) made by Rome. It is clear that Rome could not count on overseas supplies precisely in those years during which the largest number of soldiers bad to be sustained in Italy. Conversely, when the potential of Sicily and Sardinia to assist Italy in feeding the armies increased, armies in Italy diminished. Moreover, if we take into account that in these later years, Rome bad increased its control over the most fertile and productive regions of Italy, compared to the situation in the years between Cannae and the capitulation of Capua, it becomes clear that Rome depended on Italian production and not on overseas supplies for the supply of the Roman armies during the crucial years of the war. Nevertheless, the burden on Italy during the years 216-211 B.C. clarifies the Roman policy of increasing its control over Sicilian agricultural production during the reorganization of the province after the pacification of the island. A more detailed look at the most fertile regions in Italy and how they fared during the war is necessary for further understanding of the role of military food supply in the way the war was waged. The three most productive regions of the Italian peninsula are Etruria, Campania and Apulia. A secondary role can be ascribed to Latium, catabria, the Lucanian plain on the Ionian coast, and the coastal plains of Bruttium. The fertility of many parts of Etruria, Latium and campania is due to the volcanic zone of western Italy. Fertility of Etrurian soil is praised by many ancient authors, including Livy on the occasion of the Punic army's plundering on its way through

41

According to Livy 22.36,3, the strength of• Roman legion was increased in the year 216 B.C. to 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, which is supported by Polybius 3. 107. However, the loaes and the problems regarding recruitment must have resulted in heavily undermanned legions. On recruitment, see mainly Livy 23.14,2ff; 24.1l,6ff; 25.5,2ff; 26 .26,10; 27.9,lff; 27.10.3ff; 27.38,lff; 29.15,lff. Cf. Toynbee (1965) 87ff; Brunt (1971) 403ff. On Roman I06Se8, Toynbee (1965) 65ff; Brunt (1971) 421. Veith (1928) 303, state that the large number of legions raised by the Romans during the Second Punic War can only be explained if they were seriously undermanned. According to Brunt (1971) 418, the average real strength of the legions declined from 4,500 in the year 218, 4 ,000 in 215 B.C. to approx . 3,000 from 211 B.C. onwards. One should also add the naval forces, numbering according to Brunt (p. 421), 36,000 people in 212 B.C. and 53,400 in 208 B.C. 02 Brunt (1971) 420, rightly argues that later annalists on the basis of later practice and the number of legions in the field estimated the number of allies and lrellted lhese .....timates as fact. 169

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northern Etruria. 43 Most importantly, Etruria played an important role in the food supply of the city of Rome from Republican times onwards. When in Livy's first decade Etruria is already given this role in the fifth century B.C., this is in all

probability a retrojection of later times on early Roman history.44 Nevertheless, the intensive agriculture of the interior basins and river valleys was quite early geared to the marketing of surplus production. Equally well-known is the productivity of Campania, primarily of the region of Capua, which is, according to Polybius, Strabo and Pliny, the most fertile region of Italy. Their praise goes foremost to C,ampanian corn, among the best of the peninsula.~ Of slightly less agricultural importance than the ager Falernus was the valley of the Liris to the north.46 The region of Apulia is mentioned in the same breath as Campania by the agricultural writers Varro and Columella. 47 When addressing food production in Italy, the region of Apulia is usually overlooked by modem authors, probably because of its unfavourable position regarding the city of Rome." The region did nevertheless export corn, possibly trading this corn across the Adriatic.49 Some parts of Apulia, however, were unsuited for production of corn, leading to characterizations as pauper aquae Daunus.'° The corn-producing regions have to be sought in the Tavoliere, near modem Foggia, and in the hinterland of Bari.'1 In the Middle Ages and early modern period, Apulia was an important supplier of corn, especially to the cities of northern Italy, but also throughout the Mediterranean, of equal importance as Sicily.' 2 As we have seen, Hannibal chose the region of Gerunium as the site of his first winterquarters in Italy because of its productivity, while during the same winter, supplies from the region of Canusium went to the Roman troops, numbering eight legions and probably about as many allied soldiers." Each of these regions was under normal conditions capable of sustaining a large army and of contributing significantly to the food requirement of troops elsewhere. Many troops were of course dispersed throughout Italy. In Picenum, for instance, there was one legion stationed in the years 214 and 213 B.C., and two legions in the year 43

Naval Intd.Jigeoce Division (1945) 92; Cary (1949) 123ff; Spurr (1986) 85f. See for inslloce Diodorus Siculus 5.40,3; Livy 22.3,3; Varro, Res rust. 1.44, If; Strabo, Geogr. 5.2,5; Plioy, Nat. Hi6t. 18.67. Cf. Brunt (1971) 705. 44 Brunt (1971) 286, 705; Garnsey (1988) 167ff. .s Polybius 3 .91; Strabo, Geogr. 5.4,3; Varro, Res rust. 1.2,6; Columella, Res rust. 3.8,4; Plioy, Nat. Hi6t. 18.111. Cf. Appian, H11111. 43. Naval Intelligaice Division (1945) 95; Cary (1949) 134; Spurr (1986) 7; Garnsey (1988) 189. "Wightman (1981) 286, stresses the relative underdevelopment of the Liri-valley, despite Romm colonisation. Cf. Arthur (1991a) 9ff; Wightman aod Hayes (1994) 43. 47 Varro, Res rust. 1.2,6; Columella, Res rust. 3.8,4. "Hiil9ell (1895) 289; Cary (1949) 140. ,. Strabo. Geogr. 6.3,9; Varro, Res rust. 2.6,5. Cf. Livy 42.27,8. Horace, Od. 3 .30,11; Epod. 3.16; Sat. 1.5,77f. Cf. Seneca, Epist. 87,8. See also Naval lntd.Jigeoce Division (1945) 26. " Naval Intelligence Division (1945) I I !ff; Walker (1967) 190f; Spurr (1986) 7; Small (1991) 212. n Braudel (1972) S4; 329; 579; Pryor (1988) 134. See also Dyson (1992) 240 on the rising importance of Apulia io late antiquity. " Polybius 3 . 100.

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2CJ7 B.C. This region, which saw little fighting throughout the war, should have been able to at least largely sustain such relatively ..:roall 11umbers of troops, possibly with the assistance of neighbouring regions like Urobria and Aemilia. A more important issue is the provisioning of the larger concentrations of troops, not only on the Roman, but also on the Punic side, in regions upset by the turmoil of war. For instance, taking into account a rough estimate for allied troops and non-combatants, a force of six legions, such as operating in Campania in 212 and 211 B.C. would number between 40,000 and 55,000 people.

*** Following the Punic victory at Cannae, the Apulian towns of Salapia, Aecae, Herdonea and Arpi defected to the Punic side. Significantly, however, the Latin colony Venusia and the Roman colony at Luceria remained loyal to Roroe. When Hannibal marched through Samnium on bis way to Caropania, the Hirpini, including the town of Compsa, joined his cause. From Compsa, Hannibal sent a separate Punic force to Bruttiuro, which was left undefended by Roroe. The case of the wealthy and influential city of Capua, however, is the roost important example of Hannibal's strategy bearing fruit: far from being driven into the bands of Rome by Hannibal's devastations in its territory the previous year'4, Capua defected to the Punic side, followed by the smaller towns of Atella and Calatia. Frederilcsen emphasized the effectiveness of Hannibal's strategy of destruction: • Although Hannibal was unable to undertake a set siege of a city, be bad followed a usage as old as warfare itself in the areas be bad passed through and bad ravaged the standing corn: to such pressures Capua, with its wide territory and small undef~nded villages, was peculiarly vulnerable. Like others of the states that went over to Hannibal, especially those of the unroilitary south, Capua may have found herself unable to resist the immediate threat of loss of harvest and lands."" It is impossible to say why some communities defected and others did not, since in Livy's account their motives are buried under a mass of fiction and distortion." If the common people of Nola, a neighbouring town, are said to have been inclined to join Hannibal because of their fear of personal danger and further damage to their fields, this might reflect some of the true feelings at the time, but might, on the other band, reflect nothing more than

,. Polybiua 3.90,7ff; 3.92,2; Livy 22. 14, lff; 22. IS,2f. Seiben's argument (1993) 157, that Hlllllibal's stralegy of destructiou in the ead benefitted Rome, since it drove Rome's allies into her bmcls for protectiou, is DOI borne out by the events. " Frederiksen (1984) 241. This crucial point is mi58ell by Shean (1996) 184, when be describes Hlllllibal's army as "little more than a band of brigands, forced to wander the countryside in -,eh of ~ • Rather than aimlessly wandering through Italy, Hannibal's ravaging o f the moel fertile regious of Italy is al the hmrt of his strategy. "See Ungem-Sternberg (1975) 24ff, for an analysis of the various cootndictory IICCOUllla of Capua's derectiou. Tbe false traditiou, that ~ y in 217 B.C. the city 's defectiou was planned was elaboratod in detailed and sweeping narrative, including a Ca11•1N1i-«1 embassy to Rome, d,,nwnding one of the annual coosulahips. (Ibidem 46ff.) This went too far even for I.ivy (23.6,8). On the political situatiou in Capua, also Frederiksen (1984) 239ff. 171

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the imaginative writings of a much later author." In any case, Nola did not join Hannibal, and neither did any of the other important Campanian towns and cities, like Cumae and Naples. The result was that Hannibal did not have a firm bold of Campania, which was to lead to a fierce struggle over possession of the region during the following years. In the year 216 B.C., the Punic army managed to capture the town of Nuceria, but failed to take Naples, Nola and Cumae. Livy exaggerates the setbacks to Hannibal, by multiplying the futile attempts to capture these cities, and by exaggerating Hannibal's need of taking a sea-port. Conversely, some of the Roman successes in combat with the Punic troops are probably not historic." Nevertheless, the gains made by Hannibal during the campaign of 216 B.C. were quite limited, since his army was not able to threaten significantly the walled towns and Roman fortifications. The siege of the town of Casilinum, which was strategically located on the river Voltumus, turned out to be a time-consuming affair and had to be continued during the winter 216-215 B.C. During winter, Hannibal quartered his army in fortifications on Mons Tifata. The basis for Hannibal's food supply in this struggle were the contributions offered by Capua and his other allies in the region, and the plunder be could gather from the territory of the communities which remained loyal to Rome. Even if the dispersed allies in Apulia and elsewhere had been capable of contributing significant amounts of corn, it would have been impossible to transport such amounts over land over the long distances involved, especially across the Apennines. Allied contributions and foraging were adequate to sustain the army for the time being. Hannibal bad arrived in Campania late in the summer or in the early autumn of 216 B.C., therefore after harvest time. The crops from the previous season had not been harmed by any actions from either Punic or Roman side. However, Hannibal did not manage to alter the situation significantly in the months available until the end of the next summer. He did conquer Casilinum, which bad to be starved rather than stormed, but the other garrisoned towns and Roman fortifications were too strong to be taken in this way. At the end of the campaigning season, Hannibal withdrew his army into winter-quarters in Apulia.

Whether Hannibal was as anxious to capture a harbour as Livy wants to have us believe, and therefore as frustated by the failure to do so, may be doubted. 59 If Hannibal's main objective had been possession of a harbour, one may wonder why be

"Livy 23 .14,7 . Ungem-Sternberg (197S) 64f, rejects the passage. (Cf. Lu.enby (1978) 88.) In general be concludes (ibidem, 7S): "Das Volk sollte allgemein in der Weise als 11DZ11verwsig und unpatnotisch diskreditiert werdeo". He points out (p. 76) that the question as to the motives of Italian corr.munities either to defect or to remain loyal to Rome can only be answered very i~rfectly. ,_ Streit (1887) 2 tff. Cf. Frederiksen (1984) 256ff. Largely adhering to Livy's account, Seibert (1993) 216ff, concludes regarding Hannibal's generalship "so gro8 sein Ruf als Scblachtenlenker war, so licberlich IDIIChte er sich mit 9einen Attaclten auf befestigte Stidte". The purpose of the distortion is clear. The fact that other authors went even further than Livy is shown by Pomeroy (1989) 162-176, regarding the C'aoq...,im IQWn of Nuceria. " Livy 23. IS , If (•desiring to gain possession of a coast town to which ships might have a safe passage from Africa"); 23.36,Sf. Frederiksen (1984) 239, assumes that the search for a harbour was the main motive for Hannibal to go to C.1111..,ia after Cannae. Cf. Streit (1887) 20f; Miltner (1943) 238f; Shean (1996) 18S. 172

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did not look for one in Etruria after the Roman disaster at Trasimene. From Spain or Sardinia, the approach to the coast of Etturia was less dangerous than to the coast of Campania. Moreover, a harbour by itself would have made only half of the difference: Hannibal would also have needed a slrollg fleet to claim supremacy at sea and to protect any convoys. Throughout the Second Punic War, Carthage made good use of those stretches of sea that Rome, because of the lack of nearby harbours to operate from, could not coottol, and from the fact that the Mediterranean is rather vast compared to the smallness of the Roman fleet. However, it is clear that Carthage did not make a serious effort to oust the Roman warships from the Mediterranean. When in 217 B.C. a Punic fleet touched on the Etrurian coast near Pisa, expecting to meet Hannibal there, their reaction to the approach of 120 quinqueremes was to head back to Carthage. 60 While Punic ships can be found on the coasts of Liguria, Sardinia, Sicily, and southern-most Italy - and once in the Adriatic-, they never appear again on the coast of the Roman heartland. 61 During the next years the most serious weakness of Hannibal was the inadeq1U1cy of his food supply. Though his army was still sufficiently imoog to forage in hostile territory, resources here and in the territory of Capua inevitably declined. In later years, the population of Capua continuously suffered food shortages and would have been hard pressed to sustain Hannibal's numerous army as well. 62 During the rest of

., S-Jmm ( 1960) 132, distinguuhes 'local' from 'general' superiority at-· "Local naval superiority will enable a power to maintain con1111uniert (1993) 181. Cf. livy 22. 11,6. According to livy 21.51,4f, a Ptmic fleet bad 1-sed near Vibo in Bruttiwn in the prev1ous year, to ravage die territory of the town. Sucli action aeems not to have '-1 1epeated Rejected by K.ahntedt (1913) 401. 61 Polybius 8.16; 9.9,11; livy 26.20,7ff; 26.39,10,19; 27.6,l3f; Appian, Hann. 34. Cf. Miltner ( 1943) 242f. Also the treaty with Macedonia was not intended to improve Hannibal's position in the Adriatic. OtberwiB&, KabnJtedt (1913) 449. The treaty as given by Polybius 7.9,lffwas a defensive pact bdwem Hannibal and Philip, which did not make provision for any active intervention by one of the allies in the other's wanone. Alleged plans for a Macedonian invasion of Italy in I.ivy's account are part of a false, Roman tradition, as is most receody pointed out by Mantel ( 1995) passim. Philip did not have a fleet sufficienlly 8lrollg to pose a aerioua threat to the Romans in the Adriatic, as is witnessed by his reaction at the tint approach of Roman warships: be withdrew, never to ~ cy action at - again during the WU". '2 Livy 25.13,lff. Toynbee (1965) ll 122, argues that the bu,e concentration of RlmD boope in Cao,e;,., which was primarily a corn-producing COUiiby, rsilted in "the loea of mc.b wu--year's cereal crop•. This, by the way, be assumes to have been only light economic da-ge, since DO olive or fruit ~ were involved. While the long term economir da-r was limited, wibll!11ed by the agricultunl wealth of the region in the eecood ceotw-y B.C., the abort term effect of the toes of a large part of the produce on which the economy of the mcieot world was based, 1111181 have been aerious indeect As B1\1111 (1971) 273, righdy obeerved, at lllllSI 110111e agricultunl production IDll8t have cootinoed during tbe8e yNn, since there would otherwise have been DO Capua left to surrender. Frederweo'a (1984) 241, claim, however, that Capua during the years 216-211 B.C. was an indi$pllilsable IIOllrCO of provisiODS and 173

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the operations here, Hannibal was not able to spend as long a time in Campania as he did in 216-215 B.C. Hannil)al returned in the summer of 214 B.C. to plunder the surrounding area. In the year 213 B.C., Hannibal did not return, probably because, firstly , he realiud that the food supply would be inadequate and his presence would only aggravate the problem, and secondly, because he could achieve but little to impro'le the position of Capua. lo 212 B.C. he sent a small force to bring provisions. Inevitably the inadequacy of the Punic food supply in Campaoia limited the pressure he could bring to bear upon the Romans in this war zone.6.l The situation suited the Romans very well. Although they had not been able to use their superior numbers at C,annae effectively, around Capua they managed to do so excellently, while still avoiding battle with the feared Punic army. lo 216 and 215 B.C., six legions were engaged in defending the loyal towns around Capua and in threatening Hannibal's allies. Livy may not be trustworthy in all details, but when he tells us that the Roman consul of 215 B.C. used the departure of the Punic army to devastate the territory of Capua, he will not be far from the truth. 64 Roman troops remained in winter-quarters in the war zone and did not reduce the pressure OD the hostile city or their territory. The basis for this successful Roman strategy was their ability to sustain this army OD the same location from the end of 216 B.C. until the capitulation of Capua in 211 B.C . Unfortunately, we are given only a few glimpses on the supply of the troops in Campania, which, however, supports the earlier conclusion that, generally, communities neighbouring to the war zone supplemented long-distance supplies. Livy informs us that after Hannibal's departure in the year 215 B.C., probably in the early autumn at the latest, the Roman consul ordered corn from Nola and Naples to be transported to the Roman encampment near Suessula." Although a similar statement does not occur in the rest of the account of the fighting in Campania, it would be odd if this had been the only occasion for the local allies to supply the Roman army. While the foraging and plundering parties of the Punic troops and their Campanian allies in 215 and 214 B.C. must have damaged crops of the neighbouring territories, there cannot have been much further damage in the years 213 and 212 B.C, since Haooihal kept away and his allies were oo match for the Roman legions. Pressure on Roman resources was sufficiently strong for all communities in the region to have contributed provisions. A confinnation of this is provided by the remark that Roman troops were partly withdrawn during the winter 215-214 B.C. in order not to burden the Roman

industrial wealth should be rejected. Hence, al8o Shem's (1996) 181f, bypocbesis, that Hannibal was forced to maintain cootrol of die ager C.oq-oJS beca118e it was bis "chief base of supply" is wrong. If my region could claim this role, it surely DJU8l be Apulia. Cf. Kabrstcdt (1913) 463f; Dudley and Dorey (1971) 76. 61 Frederikseo (1984) 259, agrees that the Livian account of the ClmpaigJI of 214 B.C. pow 80IIIC problems, but f~ the historicity of a Roarm vi~. since 9()111Mbing he to cause Hannibal's witbdnwal. to Tanmtum. However, the inadequacy of bis food supply is a more plausible reason. Though Shea (1996) 168, rightly ...,qihesi?e6 that "Hannibal W1l8 not able to mmin in my one place for m exlellded period of time", he is mil!lak"'D to - its lll08l grave effects during the first yoers of the war. "Livy 23.46,9ff. Cf. Livy 23 .48, lf; 25. 13, 1; 25.lS, 18; 25.18,lf; Appian, Hann. 36; Froatinus, Strat. 3.4 , 1. '-' Livy 23 .46,9 .

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aUies. 66

Besides the contributions from local allies, the Roman armies received supplies from Etruria and Sardinia. The evidcocc does not allow quantification, but the role of Etruria should not be underestimated, since it was the only important agricultural region of Italy which did not see any fighting, excqx for the superficial plundering by the Punic army in 217 B.C.67 The strategic position of Casilinum, which had been captured by Hannih:tl in the spring of 215 B.C., is shown by the fact that when the Romans bad regained its possession, they established a magazine there. Coro was transported up the Voltumus to this magazine. • At the mouth of the Voltumus, where there is now a city, a stronghold was fortified, and there and at Puteoli, which Fabius Maximus had previously fortified, a garrison was placed, so that the sea in that neighbourhood and the river might be in their power. To these two strongholds by the sea the grain which bad been sent recently from Sardinia and that which the praetor Marcus Junius bad purchased in Etruria was transported to Ostia, so that the army might have a supply through the winter.• (Livy 25.20,2f). From the mouth of the Voltumus and from Puteoli, provisions arriving from Etruria and Sardinia were regularly transported to the armies. 69 External supplies seem to be connected with the increase of the Roman effort in Campania; in 212 B.C. six legions were stationed around Capua. These supplies made possible the increased employment of large numbers of Roman troops. Interestingly, in the same year two legions were stationed in Etruria, which were to remain there until the end of the war. Livy explains this measure as a precaution regarding pro-Carthaginian agitation, but it is difficult to filter the historic truth from his account. Since there was no Puoic threat to Etruria in these years, the statiooiog of troops must be related to internal affairs of Etruria. Furthermore, since any additional troops could only increase the demands on manpower and agricultural resources, Rome must have felt compelled to do so. It is hard to imagine why such anti-Roman feelings should arise in a region, which bad not been threatened or harmed by the war for five years and in which not one town had defected to Hannibal after the Roman disaster at Lake Trasimeoe. A plausible cause might be seen in political unrest as a result of harsh requisitions or enforced purcha$cs by Rome. Certainly Rome could not afford to lose supplies from Etruria at a time when the resources from Apulia and Campania were hard pressed or not 11vailable.69

"Livy 23.48,2. "Alao Toyn'- (1965) 1110. In lbe lllllt years of lbe war, Mago is 8ufll,O«d to have invaded Etruria from neighbouring Liguria. Tbe8e pwages have to be rejected. See -tly, Kutofb ( 1990) 131 f. • Livy 25.22,5. See also Strabo, Geoar- 5.4,6. Cf. Kahrstedt (1913) 474. • Taking Livy ntber too much at face value, Pfiffig (1966) 193-210, empb•Bim, pro-Cutbaginian feelings in Etruria from lbe start of lbe war. The theory of Van Son (1963) U,7-274, that lbe llllffllt in Etruria wu related to lbe anticipation ffllUlting from lbe - i of one ueculum and lbe start of another in ']J)8n B.C., -Y have added~ at the approach of a new millamium in 2001 A.D. He is ript to ilt.e& lbe fact tbat lbe FtnJ8clla8 M!Dliiwl loyal after Truinw,e aQd ClllDN, 'lilly to qitate -,.inst R~ at a time when Hmmiblll's position -•POd ~ i u g . H - « , while lb,, dating of lbe uecula ntber insecw:e, the surprising part of it is tbe silCIK>C in our IIOUlall. Facts lib thee would have appealed to 1ll0lt Roman authors, while there would have little rea1011 to supprw it, if related to lbe political mu-est. Moreover, SMCula chaqed often, but there is little rea1011 to that Ibey inevitably led to political turmoil. If Ibey did in this case, there must have been III added fflUOll. On tbe llllffllt in 175

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Supply from Etruria is also mentioned regarding the garrison of Tarentum, but this occurs in a rather untrustworthy context. The city of Tarentum had been taken by Hannibal, except for the citadel. Livy tells us that corn was bought in Etruria and shipped to the ganison in Tarentum. 70 Regarding the events around the fall of Tarentum, however, w e ~ an alternative account by Appian. 71 Appian informs us that the garrison was to be supplied from the neighbouring town of Thurii, but that this convoy was taken by Hannibal and his allies, which led to the defection of Thurii. The versions of Livy and Appian are irreconcilable, and the events of Appian must be regarded as the more plausible. The events at Tarentum play an important role in Livy's account, as they are used to illustrate such Livian motives as Punic slyness, Roman perseverance and man's wealrnesses in times of war. As Kukofka in his recent analysis points out, it is more likely that in the Roman tradition the role of the neighbouring town of Thurii was replaced by direct intervention by the Roman Senate, than the other way around. 72 The second passage referring to supplies from Etruria to the garrison of Tarentum occurs in the context of a brief survey of annual affairs. It is quite possible that this reference is based on the earlier mention. Although there is therefore little evidence to support supply from Etruria to the war wnes in Italy other than the operations before Capua, Livy's false version might reflect the importance Etruria had indeed had during the war. 73 Following the increased Roman pressure on Capua, Hannibal made a final attempt to save his ally early in 211 B.C. The attempt was futile, since the food supply was even more inadequate and the Roman fortifications were still una~lable to the Punic army. 74 As is well known, Hannibal tried to divert the Roman troops by marching towards Rome, but this move seems to have been accurately assessed by the Roman generals, since they did not budge and the pressure on Capua was not relieved. The result was that Hannibal returned to the south of Italy and that Capua and the smaller towns had to capitulate. The fate of Capua had already been sealed when Hannibal had failed to increase his control of Campania during the campaigns of 215 and 214 B.C. If the example of Capua had been followed by other towns besides unimportant places like Atella and Calatia, and his allies had controlled a larger territory, the situation would have been significantly different, and might have changed the outcome of the war. More control over Campania would have meant a larger base of resources from

Etnuia in general, cf. Toynt- (1965) 23f; Dudley and Dorey (1971) 89. 10 I.ivy 25.15,4; 27.3,9. 71 Haan. 34. 72 Kukofb (1990) 57ft'. " The 'vohmtary' oootributions of the Etnuian towns to Scipio Africanus • campaigns in Africa mipt be a similar cue. According to I.ivy 28.45, 14ft', several Etnuian towns made voluntary gifts of corn and Cher necessities. Thi• po-p and its context is undoubtedly not to be taken at face value. The problem, however, is to determine bow far incredulity bas to be taken. Pfiffig (1966) 205ft', rejects the idea of voluntary gifts, and a&8IIIDll8 that the contributioos were levied as punishlJW!t for political unrest during the previous years. A problem in this case is the fact that CMre is beeclina the list, while it is depicted in the earlier IICCOUllt as loyal to Rome. Moreover, some of the so-called allies were Roimn municipia. Brant (1971) 655f, also rejected the Senate's decision to limit recruitmeot to voluni--&. See also Frank (1959) 93f; Toynbee (1965) n 11; Garnsey (1988) 189. 14 Also Kahntedt (1913) 490. 176

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which to support the Punic army during protracted and coocentrated operations. The increased pressure on the enemy that would have been possible in such a case might have given him the opportunity to threaten Rome itself.75 Not once during the war was Hannibal in a position to act against the city of Rome. Hannibal ante portas is a dramatic highpoint in Llvy's account, but militarily it was quite unimportant. 76 Recently, J. Seibert has argued that Hannibal lost the war because he did not attack where it mattered; he should have besieged Rome, but his main and fatal shortcoming as a gcoeral lay in this weakness in siege warfare. The strategy devised by Hannibal - der Stellvertreterlcrieg, as it is termed by Seibert - was futile . Victory could not be gained by fighting a war in southern Italy. Also in 211 B.C. "wire der Aogriff auf das Gebiet und die Hauptstadt der Romer der einzig ricbtige Ausweg aus seiner Misere geweseo" .77 Although Seibert realiu:s that the food requirement of Hannibal's army limited its operations71 , he fails to see that it is precisely in the impossibility for Hannibal of undertaking such protracted actions at besieging a large city, that the Punic army's problems with its food supply had its most crucial effect. 79 Hannibal understood that it would require a miracle for his army to take Rome within one campaigning season. Besieging a large city in Republican warfare often meant waiting until the people inside the city starved. A strongly walled city was hardly ever taken by mas.s attack. Such an attack would moreover result in many casualties for the attacking side. It bad taken Hannibal's army about eight months to capture Saguntum. The Roman siege of Syracuse was a very protracted affair, and when Rome finally undertook the siege of Carthage during the Third Punic War, it took years to complete. Even the siege of such a small town as Casilinum had taken the Punic army months to finish . It was impossible for Hannibal to supply his army in Latium during the time it would require to capture Rome. His army was not strong enough to both undertake the siege of Rome and at the same time conduct foraging missions over increasing distances into the surrounding countryside. Splitting his army would have meant that the numerically stronger Roman armies could have attacked his foraging parties. At a time when the countryside would have been exhausted and food stuffs would have been scarce in the open country, his army would have starved before the people in the city of Rome did. The events in Campania had shown that it was

15

Additional troops by themselves would bav" rnede at beet little difference. Cf. Streit (1887) 14. Also Seibert (1993) 306ff: "voo reiner Semati0118gier aufgebauschtea Bericbte. • Scales like the one wbm Mabarbal accuw Hmnibal to be able to win a battle, but not a war, becau8e Hmnibal refuaN to march apinst Rome after Cinoae. are of little historic value. R«-tly, Schmitt (1991) 250ff. This criticiam of Hmnibal'a genenllhip is supported by modem bistorians, - d y Seibert (1993) 200. However, as Dudley and Dorey ( 1971) 67f, also pointed out, in 216 B.C. Hamiibal did not have sufficient troops, nor the provisiOllS to feed them, to uodertake the siege of Rom&. Al9o si-a (1996) 184, coocludes that lack of supplioa made u attaclc of Rome after the victory at Come impoesible. Cf. Fitton-Brown (1959) pnsim; 1•zmby (1978) 85f; Lazmby (19%) pwim71 Seibert (1993) 324. On the 'StellverudelUieg', p. 484ff. 11 Seibert (1993) 483. " II is therefore misplaced to reproach Hannibal with lack of patience in the allacb on towns. Cf. Seibert (1993) 274. The &1'JWlltOI that Hmnibal did not po.- the equipment to attack Rome is weak; be could have built such equipmeol. Thua, Si-a (1996) 164f. 76

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impossible for Hannibal to focus his operations dwing a long period in ooe location. Rather than showing the shortcomings of Hannibal, his avoida,w, of a siege of Rome shows that Hannibal was a sufficiently great general not to tty and undertake the impossible.80

*** During the years 216-211 B.C. the Roman effort in Italy had largely been concentrated in campania. The operations meanwhile undertaken in southern Italy, mainly in Apulia, Samoium and Lucania, were of a more unsettled nature, and the years from 211 B.C. onwards were of a similar character. lo these operations, the Romans could not limit themselves to waging war from the walls of their fortifications. Hannibal remained tactically strong, and was still virtlially unhio•-·

pNSIP~.

"Dudley and Dorey (1971) 70, erroneously argue that lack of supplies hampered the mobility of the Punic anoy. 181

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countryside, as it had done near Gerunium in the year 217 B.C.94 During the operations in Campania, the regions of Apulia and neighbouring Calabria played an important role in this regard." Apart from considerations of food supply, the military objective of providing support to his allies must have played a role in deciding the location of winter-quarters. In most years, Hannibal chose not to take up winterquarterS in the region where operations had been undertaken during the previous campaigning season. Apulia had already provided winter-quarters during the winter 217-216 B.C. The following winter, Hannibal bad remained in the territory of his newly won ally Capua, but be had arrived late in the year and resources bad not been affected in the previous agricultural season. During the next two winters, however, he aborted operations in Campania (in 215 and 214 B.C.) to take winter-quarters in Arpi and Salapia. In the year 213 B.C. the Punic army operated in Calabria and took up winter-quarters near Tarentum. Also in this case, agricultural resources had not been damaged by large-scale operations during the previous growing cycle. For the following years, the sources lack precise data on the location of the Punic army's winter-quarterS. lt is, however, probable that the winter-quarters continued to add to the element of mobility in Hannibal's operations, in that the need for sufficiently rich food resources will have compelled the army to find locations that had not seen large-scale operations in the previous season. It may be assumed that the Punic army took winter-quarters in the extreme south of Italy in almost all of the years from 212 B.C. onwards,96 when agricultural production in the more northern regions was too much threatened during the campaigning season to be able to sustain the army throughout the year. It cannot be ruled out that the Punic army received overseas shipments on behalf of its winterquarters in Lucania or Bruttium. After control of Campania had been firmly restored, Apulia became the centre of Roman operations. From this region, operations were also undertaken in Samnium, Lucania and Calabria. Apulia had already seen a large Roman effort in the years 214 and 213 B.C. It is highly likely that not only Apulia, in as much as it was still under Roman control, but also the neighbouring regions were heavily burdened with the provisioning of these troops. Between 217 and 2CY7 B.C., the coastal regions north of Apulia were unaffected by the fighting, and vast stretches of Calabria also did not see any operations until the year 213 B.C. 97 Rome had to siphon off a large proportion of surplus production from the various communities, but it was in its own political and military interest not to damage future production and not to overburden the allies. Hannibal, however, could ruthlessly plunder hostile territory. While Apulia and 94

Cf. I.ivy 24.20, !Sf: in preparation of the Puoic army's winter~ers near Tareutum, grain is gathered from the fields of MelapOlltum and Heracleia, which at the time were not yet Puoic allies. " I.ivy 23.46,8; 23.48,8ff. Appian, Hann. 43, mentions winter-quarters in l...ucauia in the winter 211-210 B.C. The passa1e is brief, and contains the unlJustwofthy accusation that indulgence and luxury weakened the Puoic soldier's fighting spirit. I.ivy 27.1 ,Sfmight suggest Bruttium. Winter-quarters in Lucania, however, seem to fit belle.- a swpriee attaclr. against Herdonea in the spring of 210 B.C. 96 Thus, Briscoe (1989) 54. He also points to De Sanctis' suuestion that Hannibal took quarters in Apulia again in the winter 210-209 B. C. " On the chronology of the defection of communities in Calabria, Kulr.ofb (1990) 24. A plundering party of Numidian honemeo, I.ivy 24.20,16. Until the preeeoce of a Puoic army, Bnmdisium and Tareutum dnmimled the region. 182

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Calabria therefore may have provided ample provisions for the Punic army during three consecutive winters up to 212 B.C, Roman troops bad to rely on a far wider region to gather sufficient supplies. The total burden on the region must have been heavy indeed. When the armies in Campania were increased again to six legions in 212 and 211 B.C., Rome bad insufficient manpower left to keep up the effort in Apulia. In these years, Roman troops in Apulia were reduced to two legions, while Hannibal was mostly occupied elsewhere. The end of the fighting in Campaoia in 211 B.C. opened up opportunities to increase the war-effort in other theatres of war, which was at least as much a matter of limited manpower as of limited food resources. In the year 210 B.C. the number of legions operating in Apulia and in Spain was doubled to four legions each. It is highly likely that the contributions from Etruria and Sardinia - and possibly Sicily - for the next years were committed to the troops fighting in Spain. There is, however, reason to assume that at least some supplies were shipped from Etruria, Campaoia, Sardinia or Sicily to the Roman armies operating in Apulia or Calabria, though large convoys sailing continuously along this coastline seem out of the question. Because of the physical nature of the Ionian coast, it was not favoured with many harbours. In 212 B.C. Tareotum bad fallen into Punic hands, followed by the defection of the towns oo this coast. Until the recapture of Tareotum in 2()1) B.C., Rome bad no recourse to any harbours between Rhegium in Bruttium and Bruodisium on the Adriatic coast of Calabria. A Punic fleet was temporarily operating in these waters. Coosequently, it may have proven difficult to ship provisions in bulk along this coast. In 210 B.C. a Roman convoy from Sicily to the garrison in Tareotum was defeated in battle by their opponents." In the next year, when the Rnmaos recaptured Tareotum, the Roman army in the region received supplies from Sicily.99 The reduction of the Roman army in Sicily probably made provisions available for troops outside of the island. The sources do not mention any further shipments from the west, and the Romans may not have needed to rely on the West. However, it is unlikely that Rome would have sustained four (and later six) legions in this region, without making any use of the agricultural wealth of Campaoia. As we have seen, ancient warships were oot suited to

,. Livy 26.39, lff. The supply of the garrison can not have involved a lar,e shipment. There is little reason to doubt the historicity of lbeee events, since the Jlnmans would not invent the defeat of their own wanhips. One may also point out the cbaracterimtion of the IICCOllllt by Kukofb ( 1990) 95: "Der Bericbt, dem wir die8e Schildenmg verdanken, ist 1111hr ausfiibrlicb uod einsicbtig. Viele Einzelbeiten wenlen mitgetei.lt uod vor allem an nautiechen Decails balte sein Ve,r.-r &ro8es I n ~. ( ... ] D. Quinctius ist nicb m einem verblendden, iiberbeblicbeo Angeber benhgewilrdi,t, wie soviele Ulllerleame riimiscbe Anfiibrer in den Annalistenda~ IJUDgen." Leu credulity is appropriate regarding the events in Tarentum following this failure. According to Livy 26. 39,20ff, the Ro111111 garrison nwnapd to foroe their way through the city of Tarentum, attack and defeat 4 ,000 foraging troops outside the city, and return into safety of the citadel. This is a clear example o f the Roman historiographers• principle that a Ronrm defeat bad to be halall"«I by a Punic one. Cf. Kabrscedt (1913) 288 ( "der obligate Annalistensieg"); Bnmt (1971) 273 ; Kukofb ( 1990) 96f. An earlier and similar aise is the blocbde of the city's supply by the Roman citadel in Livy 25 . 11, I lff; Appian, Hann. 34. Polybius 8.34,3ff, does not mention any such blockade. Cf. Kukofb (1990) 45 . "Livy 27.8, 18f. A blot on the trustworthiness of the passage may be seen in the anachronistically luge role ascribed to Sic ily in the feeding of the population of Rome even before the war. 183

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the continuous surveillance of entire coastlines. In a favourable wind, small convoys of fast sailing freighters may have occasionally dared to sail along the Punic held coasts and to bring supplies to the Roman harbours on the Adriatic Sea. Transportation over land across the Apennines from Campania to Apulia would have been impractical. However, a town like the Latin colony of Beneventum in Samnium could have been supplied by convoys in a six day round trip. A mere 2,000 mules could within six months supply a magazine in Beneventum with more than 4,000 tons of corn, sufficient to sustain 12,000 soldiers for a year. Even though there is no such mention in the sources, I would suggest that in so far as corn was not shipped to the Adriatic, it was moved from Campania to magazines in the war zone. In addition, Roman troops probably took winter-quarters in Campania, and used it as supply base during operations in neighbouring Samnium and Lucania. Both in Campania and in Sicily, Rome paid conscious and deliberate attention to the agricultural production of these regions. After the capitulation of Capua harsh measures

were decided - according to our sources - against those communities in Campania, which bad defected to Hannibal's side after Cannae, but these seem not to have been fully executed. Rome took action against the aristocracy, which was held responsible for the policy of Capua and the other towns, and limited the functioning of Capua as a political entity. However, against the earlier decision, the population seems not to have been expelled, probably in order not to endanger swift restoration of the agricultural production of the region. 100 While Livy does not confirm that the measures be mentions were not executed, he does say that Rome's leniency towards Capua was the result of the fertility of the region.101 Similarly, during the organisation of the province of Sicily, now incorporating the former kingdom of Syracuse, much attention was given to its agricultural productivity and to the system of taxation that bad to ensure for Rome a large measure of control over the resources that could be gathered in the province.10'2 The desperate years between Cannae and the capitulation of Capua - when demand was highest, but Rome had largely lost control of highly productive regions such as Campania, Sicily and Apulia - must have convinced the leading men of Rome of the crucial military importance of having sufficient food to supply its armies. This surely is reflected in the measures that were taken. Even though the burden was lightened in the next years and the importance of overseas corn for the warfare in Italy limited, from now on taxation in kind and military food supply were structural elements of the relations between Rome and the overseas regions under its control. Slowly Rome gained control over Apulia, which improved the Roman armies' food supply as much as it increased Hannibal's problems. The Roman capture of Tarentum must have meant the end of the Punic control of territory in Calabria.103 Hannibal continued to be forced to use a very mobile kind of warfare, but this also meant that while be could defeat Roman troops now and then, be could not put significant pressure 100

Toynt- (1965) II 229f; Ungem-Stemberg ( 1975) 118ff; Frederiksen (1984) 244ff. See also

Cbapler Eleven. IOI I.ivy 26. 16,7f. 102

Toyn1- (1965) II 210ff. ,o, Kahrsledt (1913) 506; Kukolb (1990) 110. 184

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oo them. The Roman armies steadily captured Hannibal's allies. In 2CJ7 B.C. the Punic position might have improved, since a second Punic army bad entered the Peninsula under the command of Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal and was heading south along the Adriatic. However, before this army could reach Apulia, where Hannibal was waiting, it was annihilated. After the death of his brother and the loss of his army, Hannibal may have regarded it as useless to start all over again by invading and plundering regions like Campania :md Etruria, or quite possibly he may have lost confidence in the tactical superiority of his army. In any case, Hannihal gathered his garrisons from the remaining allies in southern Italy and withdrew his army to Bruttium, to remain there until he left for Africa in late 203 B.C. 104 According to Livy, the years in Bruttium brought hunger and diseas,: to the Punic army, and that may quite probably be true. "For added to everything else was this also, that he had no hope even of feeding his army except from the Bruttian region; and even supposing all of it to be under cultivation, it was nevertheless too small to feed so large an army. Moreover, a great part of the young men, drawn off from the farming of the land, bad been claimed instead by the war. [... J Furthermore, nothing was being sent from home, since they were concerned about their hold upon Spain.• (Livy 28. 12,6ff.) Since the Punic army remained in Bruttium for several years and overburdening of the agricultural resources inevitably led to decJ'easing production, the assessment given by Livy of the inadequacy of Bruttium to feed the army may be correct. However, the tendency earlier in his work to emphasi7.C problems on the Punic side, and foremost to invent food shortages and hunger where there were none, causes some hesitation in taking his account at face value without question. Polybius does not mention hunger and neither does Appian clearly. The above passage in Livy is preceeded by a positive characterizatioo of Hannibal, which in its location in the account and in phrasing clearly corresponds to a similar characteriz.ation in Polybius. 1°' Polybius does not mention hunger, but the fragmentary nature of Polybius does not allow to cooclude with any certainty that in the account of the Greek author food shortages did not occur. Because of the brie~ of the account of Appian, absence of a clear mention of hunger or disease can not be conclusive. 106 Given the plausibility of food shortages, we may therefore in essence believe Livy regarding the inadequacy of Bruttium. Was the Punic army supplied from Africa? Whether Livy is correct in his statement that Carthage did not sent supplies because they gave priority to Spain, has to be doubted. Spain bad been lost by that time, while up to Scipio's invasion, Carthage should have been able to support more than one army with supplies. As a matter of fact, Carthage did at one time, probably in 205 B.C., sent a fleet of freighters, which,

°' Kukofb (1990) 124f.

1

"Da er ""'Sib, da8 jede All8Sicbt auf WiederanfnabDV> einer offea.sivea Kriegsfiibnma aescbwunden war, lwcblo8 er, alJes Land nordlich vou Thurioi ZP !innwm • io, Kalustedt (1913) 316; Kukofb (1990) 127ff. 106 Furthermore, livy 28.46, IS stresses not only the havoc cau-1 by 1111 epidemjc in the Punic army, but also in that of their Roman opponent If livy or his source bad made it up, why would lhey invent 1111 epidemjc in the Roman army? Cf. livy 29.10, !ff.

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however, was blown off course and fell into the hands of the praetor of Sardinia.107 The statem~t is brief, but there is nothing to indicate that these were the only freighters sent on their way to Bruttium in these years, except for the above quoted passage. Livy might be incorrect, however, to assume that Carthage did not support Hannibal, except for the failed attempt in 205 B.C. Is it credible that Hannibal, having had experience with feeding a large army in Italy for more than 10 years, would withdraw into the limited space of Bruttium and await inevitable hunger? His decision to withdraw to Bruttium may have been based on the expectation that be would receive provisions there from Africa. In the final years of his stay in Italy, however, the situation changed. In the first place, a Roman army invaded Africa in 204 B.C., which must have ended any intention of the Carthaginian government to send shipments to Italy. In the second place, the position of the Punic army was steadily encroached upon by the Roman armies. In the year 205 B.C. Locri fell into Roman hands. 1°' While it would have been impossible to form a blockade against fast sailing freighters along an entire coast, supplying a large army with a significant amount of provisions must have become increasingly difficult. According to Appian (Hann. 54) Hannibal "despaired of wistance from the Carthaginians" after the failed attempt of 205 B.C. Realizing that "be could not stay there long" , Hannibal increased the pressure on the Bruttians by levying taxes and transferring their settlements to the plains. Under the circumstances, food shortages in Hannibal's army during the final years are to be expected.

*** The Second Punic War was not determined solely by considerations of military food supply; their role always have to been seen in the interplay with tactical and strategical factors. If it had not been for its tactical strength, the Punic army would not have been able to roam the land and defeat the Romans at Trasimene and Cannae. Furthermore, the unfocused nature of the war before the defection of Capua ensured the coherence between considerations of supply and strategical goals. During the next years, however, the concentration on Campailia exposed Hannibal to the limitations inherent in the nature of his army's food supply. While the RClmans had a sufficient supply base, in which Etruria and Sardinia played an important role, to threaten Capua and the other defected towns in Campania continuously, H~bal was increasingly incapable of putting continuous pressure on the enemy. For the same reason he could not threaten

107

Interestingly, this case provides insight into the untrustworthy nature of IDIDY of Livy 's sources: "Coelius stale6 that they were laden with grain smt to Hannibal and with provisiODS, Valerius that they were captured while canying Etruscan booty and captive Ligurians and Mootani to Carthage. • Coelius' version returns in Appian, Hann. 54. Kahrstedt ( 1913) 327. Kukofka (1990) 130ff, provides an analysis of the background of the distortion in Valerius' 11CCOUDt. Kukofka (p. 130) misukemy assumes that, due to the lack of support from the Cuthaginian government to Hannibal, the ships were smt out "obne Rud&n...,09ebaft• . Actually, the ships were blown of course because they were sailing ships - as freighters usually were - and did not have - unlike warships - recowB8 to rowers. A criticism of Livy's account of military affain in Bruttium: Streit ( 1887) 48ff. 1°' A critical analysis of the events IMding to the loes of Locri in Kukofka ( 1990) 133ff. 186

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Rome or lay siege to any of the other cities of Italy. Operations that were undertaken in the rest of southern Italy were of a less focused nature, and this continued after Rome gained complete control of Campania. While Hannibal was still sufficiently strong to move about through southern Italy more or less freely, bis allies in southern Italy never constituted a real supply base from which to put pressure on bis enemy. Apulia played an important part as a location for bis winter-quarters. llannibal could defeat Roman armies, but could gain little benefit from these victories. Its superior manpower allowed Rome slowly to regain control over the regions of southern Italy. The capitulation of Capua had allowed Rome to increase its effort in Spain and in Apulia. When a second Punic army under Hasdrubal was defeated, and thereby the chance to alter significantly the strategical situation lost, Hannibal gave up and withdrew into Bruttium. It became increasingly difficult to ensure sufficient provisioning of bis army, and therefore Hannibal's soldiers probably left Italy in the same hungry state as they had entered it at the foot of the Alps fifteen years earlier. The fate of Hannibal and bis army shows that the outcome of wars is not only decided in battle. Despite the fact that the Romans more than once met disaster on the battle field, Hannibal had to leave Italy only to witness the defeat of Carthage in Africa. The inadequacy of bis army's food supply was instrumental in this outcome, since it limited what was strategically feasable . Had be gained more control of Italy's important agricultural regions, the outcome might have been different. On the other hand, Rome's victory is based on its manpower and its resources in the form of food . It should also be noted that Italy's food production was far more important during the crucial years than the i.mports from overseas, which are usually stressed. There is a tendency to divide the development and expansion of the Roman Republic in separate phases. The phase of the Punic Wars - establishing supremacy in the West is distinguished from the phase of the wars in the East. However, the development of Rome in the early second century B.C. can not be separated from the experiences of the Second Punic War. Of crucial importance during this war was the availability of sufficient provisions to feed large concentrations of Roman and allied troops, while Rome's access to the required resources during the crucial years was hampered by their opponent. Rome had to devise ways to gather food resources from Italy and its overseas possessions on a larger scale than previously. After the restoration of Roman rule in Campania and Sicily, Roman policy in these regions was partly determined by these experiences. The nature of Rome's access to food resources was significantly altered by the end of the Second Punic War. The first time we see this in operation is during Scipio's campaigns in Africa. In the year 200 B.C., Rome could rely not only on a large pool of experienced and successful allied and citizen veterans, but also on an apparatus to sustain continuous military effort. Whatever the strain on the peoples of Italy during the previous eighteen years, at the end of the Hannibalic War Rome was far from exhausted as a military power. The means for war were available, and Rome used them willingly and with success in subsequent years.

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Chapter Eight.

*** Civilian food supply in the ancient world. The sky has woven the fabric of the years with varying increase. Sme it has enriched with great abwuiance ofproduce, some it has doomed 10 be ill-starred and barren, disappoinling the cOUlllrymon ·s lobour with hopes that turned out to be empry and unfruitful.

Prudentius, A reply to Symmacbus 2.997ff.

1Jie food supply of armies should be seen in the context of the general supply of food, since soldiers were depeodeot on society's production for all their needs. This was as much the case during the Roman Republic as at any time before or later. The access of the Roman armies to food, based as it was on governmental support and military power, was secure compared to some segments of civilian society, and sometimes proved detrimental to the food supply of these civilians. Moreover, warfare itself caused disruption of the production and transportation of food. The various groups within the general population each had different ways of access to food; the characteristics of these means of ~ to food, together with those of production and transportation, make up the general structure of the food supply. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some structural elements of the food supply and thereby provide the background for the effects of warfare on civilian food supply. Structure in history is made up of the seemingly endless sequence of events, and in that sense the concepts of 'structure' and ·event' are not easily separated. Moreover, though the shon-term developments should be seen in the context of the long-term structure, the latter is also determined by the nature and frequency of the first. The structure of food supply in the ancient world may therefore as profitably be studied as a response to the nature and frequency of events causing its disruption as it may be seen as a complex of factors determining the effects of these disruptions. Any analysis that separates the two aspects inevitably tends to underexpose the reciprocity of their relationship. On the other hand, trying to expose simultaneously the interplay of all long-term and short-term factors involved obscures the argument and fails to lead to clarity. The discussion of the civilian aspect of warfare and food supply in Roman Republican wars will therefore start with an analysis of some structural elements, which, as will be argued, determined the structural vulnerability of the food supply for 188

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large segments of the population of that time. Disagreement with Gamsey's thesis that "famine was rare, the outcome of abnormal conditions, whereas scarcity was common· may be stated at the outset. A full discussion of Gamsey's arguments would exceed the purposes of this chapter. However, a few points may be noted briefly. Garnsey's conclusions may have been influenced by bias in the sources regarding famines. Garnsey empbasiz.es that famines should be analysed on a spectrum from minor shortages to disastrous famines. Elements such as price movements, epidemics, or migration determine the place of particular crises on this spectrum. However, as Garnsey himself points out, Greek and Roman authors were not interested in the structural aspects of famines or food supply. It is to be feared that the extent to which diagnostic elements did or did not occur and the degree to which these elements are emphasized, is not so much related to the gravity of the situation, but rather to the function of the text. Because of reasons also related to the nature of our sources, silence rules in this respect regarding rural and isolated regions, which probably were the most vulnerable, while attention is aimed almost exclusively at the a-typical cities of Athens and Rome. Moreover, the sources do not allow us to judge the situation of the urban masses. We do not know to what extent hunger was a chronic problem in the cities. Furthermore, Garnsey makes much of the inscriptions about measures by governments and private individuals to alleviate the situation. However, it is not in the nature of such inscriptions to illuminate the limitations of such measures. A further criticism to be made is that Garnsey pays little attention to the political, social and economic context of agricultural production and of the access to food of various segments of society. The latter criticism is best substantiated by examining the role of such elements, as will be done in this chapter. Finally, one may wonder - though the argumentative value may be limited - why even in early modem England devastating famines occurred so frequently, if in the ancient world survival strategies of peasants and alleviating measures of townspeople were capable of almost doing away with famines.• The structural elements together will provide a model for the various times and regions within the time-span and geographic range that are taken together as the Graeco-Roman world in general. The factors constituting this model will have differed according to period and region, not only in their specific content, but also in their interplay. The model allows for a relatively wide range of variations according to time and region, but also provides the means to assess - as far as available sources permit the structure of the food supply of a specific region at a specific time .

••• 1

The quotation is from Garnsey (1990) 127. Also Garnsey (1988). Similar, Newman et al. (1990) 111 (but cootndicted ibidem 1171). Contrast Evans (1981) 442: "It may fairly be concluded that the ' spectre of mrvatioo haunted the imperium Romanum, an irnmiiwrt and frequmdy de.lly peltileace. • For the lack of sourcee regarding the situation of the food supply in the cities, cf. Kohna (1988) 106ff. Cf. Walt« and Schofield (1989) 38f. 189

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At the core of the food supply is the balance between resources and population. According to Malthus, the limits to the available resources set the limits to the expansion of the population, which operates through positive checks, leading to increased mortality and reduction of excess population, and preventive checks, which limit growth in the first place. Though the analytical value of the Malthusian model is beyond doubt, it bas become clear that some refinements are required. Ester Boserup argued that population size is not merely a dependent variable of available resources, but also determines itself the availability of resources by influencing levels. of productivity. Essentially, by increasing total labour input at the cost of labour productivity, for instance by shortening or completely parting with fallow, the level of available resources is increased. However, the factors determining labour intensity or soil productivity do not operate in a vacuum and increases in available resources are limited themselves. Moreover, intensification tends to increase vulnerability of production and thereby the level of risk. 2 The balance between resources and population remains a crucial element, but bas foremost to be seen in the context of political, economic and agricultural structures.3 First of all, the predominantly small scale of agricultural production resulted in a small and moreover vulnerable surplus production. As is wideJy known, a vast majority of the ancient population (80 or 90 %) was agriculturally productive and produced the surplus required to feed a small, non-agriculturally productive segment of society (10 or 20 %). Agricultural surplus is that part of total production which is not required to continue production, i.e. is harvest lninus seed and consumption by agricultural workers and farm animals. The low level of surplus production is partly due to the low level of technology in ancient agriculture, which caused relatively low yields and soil productivity. Low harvests and high amounts of seedcorn reduced surplus production.4

2

Boeerup (1965). Cf. JODgman and Dekker (1989) 116; Newmm et al. ( 1990) 102f. Seavoy (1986) 1Off, argues that peasant societies avoided 118 much 118 possible the intensificatiOD of agricultural practice that would be required to 1 - the vulnenbility to h1111ge,-, which wu related to peasant mentality and the social stnlcture of peasant communities. However, both the mentality and social structure of peasan16 were determined by the wide.- political and economic context. The structural causes of susceptibility of peasant societies to hunga sbould be seen OD this level, and not OD that of the 'la.zy peasanl' . His study provides nevertheless a valuable malysis of the attitudes and practices of peasants regarding a&riculture and labour. 3 Regarding early modem Europe, Bramer (1976) 30-75, has stiesaed that political structures are the key factor in detennining economic development. According to him, the stnlcture of class relatioos - or, more genen.lly "P"'"king, the political structure - determines "the manner and degree to which particular demographic and commercial changes will affect IODg-run trends in the distribution of income and economic growth• . His malysis of the variatioos in European economic deveJoim-t from the late Middle Ages to the beginnings of capitalism makes it clear that the role of political structures was a crucial ooe. Nevertheless it remains that the Malthusian pressure betweai population and resoun:es coostituted the engine of historic developmeot. Cf. Newman et al . (1990) 115f. • Finley (1985) 169, ascribes to the low leyel o f technology, besides the limited development of distribution and the limitations of food preservation, a ct11eial role in the structural vulnerability of the food supply in the ancient world. Cf. Garnsey lll)d Sal.ler (1987) 52: "Technology (.. . ) renwined backward, preventing a major advance in the productivity of agriculture.• Compare Braudel (1972) 244: 190

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However, this is only one side of it. Low labour productivity, which was the result of the structure of agricultural production, had an even more important share in the low level of surplus production, even under circumstances that led to higher soil and seed productivity. The low labour productivity was the result of the unfavourable balance between on the one hand access to land and capital and on the other available labour capacity. Basically as a result of pressure on the land, small-scale producers generally had to work small plots with too much labour to reach optimal levels of labour productivity.' Without other elements involved, such as taxation or rents (topics to which we will return shortly), low labour productivity tended to diminish surplus production. Two examples may clarify this point. We will take as example on the one hand a commercial farm, on the other hand four peasant households working the same land. workers harvest / seed

cons. per worker seed corn average production prod. minus seed - per worker surplus production

c0 romecci1l farm

pe;tSBQts

10 6: l 200 kg. 800 kg. 4800 kg. 4000 kg. 400 kg. 2000 kg.

20 7: 1 200 kg. 800 kg. 5600 kg. 4800 kg. 240 kg. 800 kg.

In these examples, the commercial farmer's five workers produce on average a surplus sufficient to feed ten people (a ratio of I :2), while the peasants' 20 workers, despite their higher productivity of soil and seed, only produce on average a surplus for four people (a ratio of 5: l). Some might argue that low level of technology and low level of labour productivity are usually one and the same thing, since the latter is the result of the former. That might be true in some cases or to some degree, but low labour productivity is not necessarily the result of the low level of technology. The wealthy commercial farmer's labour productivity may have profited from his recourse to oxen to plough his land, to better tools and implements, and maybe even from his better knowledge of things like crop rotation - which is highly conjectural indeed. Nevertheless, this is only a factor besides and indepeodent of the low labour productivity resulting from the small scale of production. The above examples illustrate that, all things being equal or even with soil and seed productivity in favour of peasant farming, the small scale of agricultural

"Yields were anwll and in view of the limited spece devoted to c:ereal growing, the Meditenanean always 011 the verge of famine • On the level of yields in the R0111111 world, Evans (1980) 135; Evans (1981) 429ff; Spurr (1986) 83f; Garnsey and Saller (1987) 79ff. Spurr (1986) 8Sff, provides m ,.hundllDC"l of comparative material. Compare McArdle (1978) 95, 011 yields in early modem Tuscany, which flumwled in the nnge of 5. 7: 1 and 6.9: 1. 'Basically, CbaylDOV (1966) 91ff. Alao, P. Frdkarnp (fortbcoming). 191

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production bad a large share in limiting surplus production. The same factors also determined the degree of fluctuation of surplus production. It is crucial to realiu that the surplus fluctuates more heavily than total production, which is caused by the fact that most factors determining surplus are hardly influenced by the . size of the annual harvest. The share of the harvest that has to be invested into production to continue production at the same level is more or less inflexible. In other words, the amount of corn that is reserved for seed corn and the consumption by the workers can not be reduced much without affecting levels of production. The fluctuation of the annual harvest is therefore largely at the cost of surplus production. The larger the share of seed corn and consumption of producers in the harvest, the larger the fluctuatiom of the surplus. This means that the surplus fluctuates more heavily in small-scale agricultural production than in more large-scale, commercial farming .6 The above examples may be used to clarify this point. Taking the same figw-es, but u.wming a reduction of the harvest against average of 25 %, it becomes clear that the pea.qnts experience shortage, while the commercial farm still produces a surplus. workers cons. per worker seed corn harvest prod. minus seed - per worker surplus or shortage

comrnacjal farm

msaots

10

20 200 kg. 800 kg. 4200 kg. 3400 kg. 170 kg. -600 kg.

200 kg. 800 kg. 3an context oot only political, economic and social rights which gave access to food, but also buying power, infrastructure and ties with

271, 284f. A more optimistic opinion reearding the role of trade in Gamsey ( 1988) 70ff. Also Hahn (1983) 33ff; Fulford (1987) 58-75. Braudel (1972) 570, remarks on the grain trade in the 16th cmtury Medite.aanea..: "Typically grain purcbues made locally, within a cloeed economy and II small radius. Towns chew on the gnnaries of the SWTOUDding countryside. Only large cities could afford the luxury of importing such a bulky commodity over long distaDces." Regarding inland Spain, Reller ( 1990) 155, remarks that the lack of national or regional grain mutets until well into the 19th cmtury prevented the allevwion of food shortages. In his study of market integration in France, Weir (1989) 206ff, concludes that in the 18th cmtury there existed several re,ional corn mutets in Fnmce, wbo8e price developments sbow no correlation. ., Dio Chry806l0m 46, 10. .. Julian, Mi80p0g0D 368cff. Cf. AmmuanW1 Marcellinus 22. 14, lf. Al80 Cicero, Ad AU. 5.21. The point was riJade by Finley (1985) 33f. Cf. Gamsey ( 1988) 22f. ., Flavius Joeephus, Ant. Jud. 15,307. Cf. Ant. Jud. 20,101. Ammianllll Marcellinus 28. l,17f. See al80 the deliv~ of corn from Egypt to E.,ii-,s in the second cmtury A.D. DW11ioned earlier. Furthermore, for infdance Tacitus, Ann. 2 .59; Pliny, Pan. 30,5; Historia Augusta, M . Antoninus. 11,3 . Cf. Worrle (1971) 334ff.

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the interregional corn market were concentrated. On the other hand, most peasants and tenants who cultivated corn and similar crops bad access to at least some food. The situation was worse for those who did not produce primary foodstuffs. The situation was similarly grave fot those among the urban 11UWCS who, when the mechanisms to ward off famine failed, were faced with high prices at a time when the url>an economy faltered.

••• The structural factors that governed the food supply in the ancient world and that determined the degree to which the food supply was vulnerable to disruption in each particular context, may be summariz.ed as follows : I . the low level of technology; 2. the predominantly small scale of agricultural production; 3. the important role of political, social and economic rights in the access to food; 4. the generally low level of buying power and the vulnerability to economic depression as a result of high food prices; 5. the limited capacity of ttaosportatioo over land; 6. the limited development of infra-structure and distribution chaooels.46 lo the introduction to this chapter, Garnsey was critiud for paying insufficient attention to the political, social and economic context of agricultural production and of the access to food of various segments of society. I hope to have shown the crucial importance of these structural factors in understanding the food supply of the ancient world. These factors have to be seen against the background of highly irregular production, due to adverse weather conditions. The realization that "summer and winter do not come very year with the same cowitenaoce; the spring i_s not always rainy or the autumn moist", 47 simple l!S it may seem, was nevertheless a factor determining many aspects of ~cieot society. By itself, however, bad weather does oot explain vulnerability of food supply. The above discussion may also illuminate why serious famines are so rare in the ancient sources, since the regions of the Mediterranean world and the segments of society that were most vulnerable to disruption of the food supply are the ones that are least visible in the sources.

46 Cf. Finley ( 1985) 169: "The 1111Cifnt world, with its low level of teclmology, limited methods of distributioo, and reetricted ability to preacrve foodstuffs, lived with the pe.lDlllellt threat of funine, especially in the cities". Finley ptobably overeeti-ted the problem of food preacrvation. Com could be stored quite easily for ooe or even two years. One may argue that, if preacrvatioo of foodstuffs bad been a problem, IIIICimt far-. would have cultivated more millet, which kept excepliooally well in storage, and lea wi-t or barley. See for in.,_ C - , Bell. Civ. 2.22. Also, Braudel (1972) 595. Compere Abel (1974) 295ff, regarding the elemmts causing e~II- ftuctuatiom of corn prices in -1y modem Europe: 1. highly ft1n1aatiog harvests; 2. !1)11 BDMII ombt-sbare in production; 3 . oom as dominant food; 4. bigb transport C081s; 5. laclt of fiD1111Ciu reeerves. 41 Columella, 1 pnef. 23. 2(f1

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Chapter Nine.

Agricultunl production in times of war. When the fires hod been kindled, the mighry violcu:e of thal raging element consumed all the grain, which was filled our on the now yellowing stalk, and every kind of growing pia,u, so unerly thal from the very banks of the 1igris all the way to the Euphrates not a green thing was to be seen. Ammianus Marcellinus 18.7,4. Having discussed some structural aspects of the food supply of the ancient world, it is time tQ address the occurrences and disturl>ances in the context of war, and assess their effects on the civilian food supply. The high incidence of harvest failure, which was due above all to the geographic and climatic circumstances of agricultural production, was a determining factor in the structure of ancient food supply. The very irregularity of production determined the importance in the ancient world of the various means of creating an agricultural surplus. The frequency of harvest failures, together with the limitations of transportation and economic development, induced a large part of the population to keep their involvement in agricultural production as direct as possible. The previous chapter has shown, however, that by themselves production and its annual fluctuations are inadequate to explain the nature .of food supply. As we have seen, the structural level determined the resilience of the various segments of society to the disturl>ances of the food supply. Moreover, such disturl>ances did oot only operate through failures of production, but also through interruption of distribution and entitlement. This chapter will be concerned with the effects of war on agricultural production, the oext with the effects oo distribution and entitlement. Various mechanisms tried to compensate for disturbances in either production or distribution and entitlement. Some of these have already been addressed in the previous chapter, as for instance market exchange to compeosate for local shortages. Those IDC('.hanisms, that were primarily aimed at decreasing vulnerability to failures of production or compensate for losses by emergency production, can be characteriz.ed as 'physical' strategies. Farmers could, for iostance, try to ward off harvest failure by cultivating various types of corn, some of which were hardy against cold, others against drought. If this failed, a second harvest could be attempted, if the time of year and the growth cycle allowed, and if seed corn was 11vailable. Other measures should be characteriz.ed as 'social', aimed at alleviating shortages through such means as social storage and exchange 208

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channels.• An analysis of food supply failures bas thus not only to distinguish between failures of production, distribution and entitlement, it also bas to incorporate the various strategies that were aimed at managing risk. Thus far, primarily natural causes of harvest failure have been addressed, as no farmer could ever expect to escape them and they gave rise to most risk management strategies. However, war created a different set of circumstances in which to assess the effectiveness of these strategies. Therefore the effects of war on civilian food supply should not be addressed as a topic of secondary importance to 'natural' harvest failures and their effects. Instead the topic merits a separate study within the context of warfare and food supply. In his study of rural life in the southern Netherlands in times of war, M.P. C,utmaon concludes that armies, even if only passing through, could destroy the agricultural production of an entire community for that year. What effects such devastation bad on economy and demography of the region is a different matter, but the severity of the short-term damage that could be caused by armies in hostile territory is beyond doubt. 2 In contrast, there is a tendency nowadays among ancient historians to deny that soldiers could cause more than superficial harm to crops and farmsteads . The study of devastations in ancient wars and their effects on economy and community in &eoeral bas been almost exclusively concentrated on the Greek world.3 The discussion of devastations in Greek warfare was triggered mainly by the question whether there were any negative, long-term effects on the economy; centtal in this discussion was Attica after the Pelopoonesian War (431-404 B.C.). Rightly there seems to be consensus now to reject long-term decline of the economy as a dir~ result of devastations. However, this discussion bas put too much emphasis on cash crops like the vine and the olive, which were regarded as ceottal to the economic prosperity of a region like Attica. The effects on primary food crops received but fleeting attention. Since damage to the current year's harvest of grain, olive or vine was regarded as only marginal, and longterm damage bad to be denied, Hanson concluded that devastations bad DO real purpose. • Agriculture and warfare are the most conservative of sciences, where tradition dies bard. Soldiers would instinctively devastate cropland even when there were DO important military, political or economic objectives.••

1 As Forbes (1989) 90, points out, there were various levels of mecbani91118 dealing with increuings levels of di.anlptioo of the food supply. Some were aimed at alleviating the normal intenmnual tluebwtioos, others operated in tiffll'AI of emet'lleDCY. On 'rislr .......,--1• in ancimt farmi4g, - Gemaey (1988) 43ff; Halswd and Jones (1989) 41 -SS; Gallant (1991). l Gutmann (1980) 36, 77f. , Since Toynbee (196S) and Brunt (1971) no detailed inveetigatioo bes beeai Ulldertelteo of the situation in Italy during the Second Pullie War, while Greece during the Pelopo!IDCl8ian War end the wan of the fourth century B.C. has beeai the subject of many: Will (197S) 297-318; Hanson (1983); Ober (1985•) 171-188; Ober (198Sb); Hervey (1986) 205-218; Spence (1990) 91-109; Foxhall (1993). See also Westl■k" (1969) 84-100; Millier (197S) 129- 156; Osborne (1987) 137ff; Burte (1990). • H■naoo (1983) lSl. Foxhall (1993) 142, ■gn,es: "in the fifth century and ..tior, teclmiq1a of •lllleking ■gricultunl crops would have beeai pretty ineffective in direct terms•. She argues that the ~ of wertime r■v-,ing bas not to be sought in lb,, l"A!11l d■,mg,,, but in the disruption of "the llOCiel f■bric of the city" (p. 143), since the burden was spre■d uneveoly and thus would cause the breakdown of unity. She thus offen • refiDenwit of Hansoo's hypothesis. Cf. regarding Roman wan, Goldsworthy (1996) 285.

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Conversely, the present discussion will concentrate on short-term effects on the production of primary food crops. The effects of warfare on agriculture can be separated into three elements: the effects on agricultural products, on the process of production, and on agricultural labour. The first element is the most obvious: what harm was done by hostile armies to crops in the fields and food stuffs in storage rooms, mainly by way of foraging and ravaging, and what physical strategies could farmers employ to lessen their losses?' The second element is the effect of war on the process of agricultural production, mainly by obstructing the work in the fields and upsetting the agricultural calendar. From the point of view of the farmers, the crucial element here is the degree of flexibility in time. This leads to a discussion of emergency sowings in a military context and the role of storage. War not only bad its impact on field crops, but also on livestock, whose function regarding food supply was twofold: animals provided food in the form of meat, cheese etcetera, and aided the production process by way of manure and labour. The following discussion will first assess the immediate impact of warlare on agricultural products and the process of production.

*** Warfare affected the crops in the fields and the food stuffs in the stom mainly by way of foraging and ravaging troops. While the purpose of foraging is primarily to gather sufficient amounts of food and fodder to sustain the army, ravaging parties aim at causing destruction in as wide an area as feasible. The destruction of crops and farmsteads is an important element of ancient accounts of warfare. It will be clear, however, that the explicit remarks of ancient authors about the severity of the havoc caused by ravaging armies should not always be taken at face value. Motives can easily be found for exaggerations of the damage done. Generals are likely to exaggerate the harm they can do to the enemy, while historians and orators are bound to use sharp colours to captivate the audience's atteotion.6 Moreover, ancient accounts are usually written in terms that do not allow meaningful quantification. However, while the bias of the sources and their vague and impressionistic nature does not allow us to prove the severity of damage done, the shortcomings of the sources do not provide evidence for the contrary either. One way of determining the possible extent and severity of destructions is by looking in detail at their execution. lo what follows we will first address the technical aspects of ravaging: which crops were destroyed in what way. Both the methods of destruction available to the troops and the tactical aspects will then be used to asess the severity and range of possible damage. If indeed the methods available to ancient soldiers were time-consuming or inefficient, as bas been argued regarding Greece, actual damage can only have been limited. The discussion at first will concentrate on cereal crops, mainly wheat and barley,

' Though from a analytical point of view, foraging may be aem as • form of entillenwJt baaed on military power, which should for 11111 l'CU0ll be treated as ott- forms of entitlen-t in the context of war, from the practical viewpoint ravaging alJd foraging are bard to dialinguisb. 6 Cf. aociett• - I S of destruction in Thucydide& 8.24,3; C -. Bell. Gal. 4.38; 6.43; 8.3; Cicero, Verr. 2.3,47; Polybius 9.lla. Similar Sallust, Epist. Pomp. ad een. 9; Appian, Bell. Civ. S.74; Heroclim 8.S,3ff; Ammianus Man:ellinus 24.8,2. 210

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since cereal crops were, at least in the Roman context, the primary targets of ravaging raids, not the olive or the vine. The number of references in the Roman context to devastations explicitly and solely aimed at grain in contrast with the silence of the sources on destruction of olives or vine is surely significant.1 At least in the minds of the authors, ravaging enemy land was associated with grain, and not with vine and olives.• The situation in Greece may have been different, since general remarks about rural devastation do mention orchards u well as grain, while in at least one case the threat of destruction was specifically aimed at the grape barvest.9 But also in Greek sources we find references to the destruction solely of grain. 10 Due to the impressionistic nature of narratives of Roman wars, they rarely specify the methods used of destroying crops.11 Mentions abound of armies 'ravaging' hostile fields or 'destroying' crops, without any insight being given into the precise method used. The verbs used in Latin texts are usually general expressions for 'to ravage' or 'to devastate' and less often specific expressions like 'to cut down' or 'to burn'. The general verbs can be divided in three classes. The first class comprises the most common words 'vasto' (including 'pervasro' and 'devasro') and 'desolo' . These can be best translated with 'to lay waste', 'to leave uninhabited' or 'to make desolate', and have the connotation of an emptied landscape. The second class comprises the verbs 'popular' (or •depopulor') and •infesro' . ' Popular' derives from the multitude spreading out over an area; ' infesro' means 'to harm', 'attaclc' or 'molest'. Both have as primary meaning in our context 'to ravage' and 'to pillage' with the connotation of a plague (like locusts). 'To pillage' as such is expressed by 'praedari'. The third class refers to the physical damage: 'comunpo', 'lacero' , 'vexo' , 'diripio' and 'perdo'. The first four can be translated with 'to ruin', 'to damage' or 'to destroy'. 'Locero' and 'diripio' include the more specific 'to tear to pieces' or 'mutilate' . ' Perdo' refers to the destruction of something. To sum up, central to the first class is the landscape, to the second the ravaging activity, the third the material damage. Since the methods of destruction are determined by fundamental characteristics of the plant physiology of grain, it seems useful to open with a brief description of the 7

A refeaeoce to deslnlction of trees and vines occurs in Ammi11111>11 Marcellinus 28.6, 13, referring to the raids into the African province of Tripolis by the neighbouring Austoriani in 365 A.O . 1 Polybius' description of the destruction of rural Italy during the Secood Punic War refers only to grain (9. lla). In 2 12 the coosuls 1-i the legions into ~ ia to ruin the grain (Livy 2,5. 15, 18). Similarly, an Athaiian embassy, complaining about the ruthless devastation of their land by Philip of Macedon•s army, refers to the •sown crops' ('sata'), besides buildings, people and livestock (I.ivy 31.30,3). Cf. I.ivy 28.5,15. Significantly, the riclmees of Etruria, falling victim to Hllllllibal's Wut,drtioed rav~g in spring 217, is deacribed as abundance of corn and livestock (I.ivy 22. 3,3). ' lbucydides 4.84ff makes clear that Bruidas•s threat to their vineyards shortly before harvest wu sufficient to make the Act111bians revolt from Athens. According to Diodorus Siculus (2.36,7), parties waging war in India would leave the cultivators of the &Oil alone, and would not bum 11,e lands of their oppoomts or cut down their orchards. A general remark on ravaging by Polybius 23.15 refers to trees. Not every reference to trees and vine, lbough, a. imply commeir.ial olive orchards and vineyards, since moet petsan•s will have grown aome vine and olive trees on their farmstead purely for own consumption. Cf. Xenophon, Mem. 2. 1, 12f. 10 In bis brief account of the Spartan invasion into Attica of 428, Diodorus only meotiODS corn. Likewiee, lbucydidee (6.94) on the Athtmian raids in Sicily. Cf. Xenophon, Hell. 4.7, 1; Isocratee, Arch. 79; Pluwcbus, Cleom. 26, 1. 11 lbis wu al&0 obaerved by Hanaon (1983) 42, regarding wars in Clwical Greece. 211

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most relevant aspects. During the early phases of its growth corn was a difficult crop to destroy. 12 The earliest phases include the gennioarion of the seed corn and the growth of leaves and short stems. Each of these stems can potentially grow one ear. These are called the 'tillers'; the phase of growth during which the tillers develop is

called 'tillering'. From a single wheat grain, a large number of stems can develop, but genereally most plants will ultimately posses 4 or 5 ear bearing stalks During this part of the growth of the wheat plant, it is difficult to do serious damage, short of ploughing it under or uprooting it (which is not a serious option). 13 Since the wheat plant is still green - and will be for some time-, it can not be burned. Trampling of the corn, which would result in breaking the stems, or cutting the stems would be ineffective, since the plant would develop new tillers for the ones that are cut. This ability of the plant was used in Roman times - and others periods - to let sheep graze on fields of young corn. It could stimulate the growth of the plant and thereby ultimately enlarge the yield. Too intensive grazing, however, would do some damage to the plant, but would not kill 1"t • 14

However, after the tillers start 'shooting', that is developing the grain bearing ears, the crop could be severely damaged by breaking or cutting the tillers. Since in this stage the plant will not develop new tillers for the ones that are killed, the percentage of tillers that are broken or cut would roughly correspond with the percentage of the crop that would be lost. This is only roughly the case, since the root system would be able to send more nutrients to the remaining tillers, thereby ensuring a better development of the ears. Tbe ultimate corn yield will be determined by three elements: the number of ears, the development within the ears (i.e. the amount of corn bearing spikelets within the ear) and the development of each grain itself. Tbe increase in development of ears and grains could, however, only result in a small compensation for the loss of tillers. In the ripening phase, the plant rapidly will become dry enough to be destroyed by fire. Tbe growth of the grains in the ear can be characterized by two developments: the dry matter content of the grain increases rapidly for a period, then slowly phases out into a constant weight. Tbe water content of the grain decreases slowly, so that the grain itself ultimately has a moisture content of about 14 %, with only slight differences for various kinds of corn. If wet conditions were to continue for weeks at a time, it would not dry out this much, but that is unlikely to occur in the Mediterranean region." By the time the ripening grains are drying out, the rest of the plant will dry out as 12

The growth cycle of cereal crops is Qplained in numerous agricultural hmMlboob. Pen:ival (1921) esp. 66ff; Klages (1947) esp. 92ff; Kirby and Appleyard ( 1981). " According to frontinUB, Strat. 3.4 , l , the army of Fabius MnilUUS trampled the MWllings of the Capuans in 2 1S B.C. , thereby destroying the next buvest. The theory daties this possibility, though I have not tried to confirm it by ex ~ t s. The only refermce to ploughing (23.19 , 14) OCCU1"8 in I.ivy's famous 110C0Wt of Hannibal's siege of Clsilinum. The land under the city walls, that alledaed)y had bem ploughed by the Carthaginians, was 110WD with turnips by the besieged people. The story ceatres UOIRld the heroic ohsrimcy of the people o f Clsilinum, which caused not little frustation to Hannibal . It am confidmtly be ff!iected u not

bi.storic. 14

White (1970) 180; Skydsgaard (1974) IS; Spurr (1986) 64f; 8 - (1983) 4S (fooen()(e). " Keat (197S) 92f, 103; Kirby and Appleyard ( 1981) 70. For figures of water contmt of grain by buvest: Thorpe (1890) 490. 212

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well. The change in the plant is easily recogniuble as the colour of the stalks lUld leafs turns from green into yellow. During the growing stages of the plant, the water cootent of the plant will be well over 50 %. When a crop is ripening, the water content of the wilks lUld leafs will drop significantly. The dryness that ultimately will be reached depends on the conditions of humidity and temperature. This fact has to be kept in mind when comparison is made between northern Europe and the Mediterranean. 16 There can be no doubt about the thorough experience of ancient peasanti; and farmers with regard to the practical aspects of arable farming, though their outlook differed from that of modern agricultural scientists and farmers. Most soldiers came from a rural background in all periods of history up to modem times, and certainly in Republican Rome. Soldiers in Antiquity, therefore, undoubtedly bad adequate knowledge of the growth of crop plants to be able to cause optimal damage at each particular phase of the crop's growth. Discussion in the Greek context bas resulted in misguided scepticism about the efficiency of the destruction of cereal crops. Burning crops was a quick and devastatingly efficient method, but allegedly only rarely possible. Trampling was not very time-consuming, but it is not considered very efficient either. Hanson assumes that trampling was not very effective and that cutting, although more time-consuming, was therefore preferred. 17 However, the efficiency of trampling unripe corn should not be underestimated. In friendly territory armies would take care to stay clear from the arable fields, so as not to damage the minding crops.•• Marching a troop of foot soldiers and horsemen, determined on doing as much harm as possible, through a standing field of green corn could with hardly any effort cause severe damage to the crop and result in the loss of a significant part of the potential harvest. As was explained above, broken tillers would not produce grain and would not be replaced by new growth. The part of stems in a green crop that would be broken was almost equal to the percentage of loss of the potential harvest. More sophisticated means of destroying crops than simple trampling were, however, easily available for ancient soldiers, although not mentioned in the sources on Roman practice. According to Arrian, Anabasis 1.4, l , Alexander bad his soldiers bold their spears crossed while crossing a corn field. As a result, all the stalks would be broken or at least laid flat. This instance, however, is in fact not a case of ravaging fields. Alexander led his army through a deep cornfield that concealed the army to ensure a surprise attack on the nearby enemy. It refers nevertheless to an effective means that 16

It bas to be added dl&I the water cooteot of a plant is DO( a COIISlant factor. It can fluctuate heavily aod

is determined by the molllffl.tary conditiOIIB. Plants therefore undera a daily fluctuation of waler coolalt from a high point early in the lllOrlWl8 to a low point in the afternoon. The difference can be as gn,at as 20 " of ttw, masimum Waler coolalt. Figures for a crop of OalS in Germany indicate dl&I the wat« cooteot of the plant mmins llbout 60 " before the ,ipening pbaM starts. When fully ripe, the wat« cooteot of the plant was 35 "· TbefiguresarefromBretsclmeider, Leipzig 1859, citedbyJnbnsoo(1869). Seoal8oPercival(1921) 139ff; Muimnv (1929); Klages (1947) 144ff. 17 Hanaon (1983) 44. Accepced for in.._.,. hy Goldsworthy (1996) 99f, tboup be -Ii.,.. the military efficiency of such IIJ'ateSies. Seo alao Cornell (1996) 107. Cf. Follhall (1993) 140: •simply trampling the grain would DO( stop the harvest, though it would slow it down and wioualy reduce yields• . She accepts Iunsoo't

COOClusiOIIB. 11 Henson (1983) 44, who refers to Xenopbon, Hell. 7.2,10. Alao Procopius, Bella 7.1,9. 213

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was easily available to the Roman armies for destroying unripe crops too. Plutarch, Cleomenes 26.1 , provides us with the only detailed account of destroying unripe crops other than by simply trampling or cutting. Cleomenes' army "appeared suddenly before the city of Argos, ravaging the plain and destloying the grain, not cutting this down, as usual, with sickles and knives, but beating it down with great pieces of wood fashioned like spear-shafts. These his soldiers plted as if in sport, while passing by, and with no effort at all they would crush and ruin

all the crop. • Speculative as the conjecture must be, it seems reasonable to assume that soldiers also used some of the tools that were to hand in surrounding farmsteads for destructive purposes. Threshing rods, for instance, could be just as effectively applied in beating down grain. 19 Hanson observed that according to Plutarch in the above quoted passage, most other armies cut the grain with knives and sickles. He concluded therefore that before this innovation, the normal way of destroying a standing crop was to cut it down and not to beat it down or flatten it in other ways. Plutarch's remark should, however, not be interpreted as saying that crops usually were cut to destroy the crop, but that crops often were foraged rather than destroyed. Greek armies could usually not rely on the vast resources and well-organiud supply that provided support for Roman armies. Their soldiers, when not sustained by their own or their allies' territory, probably had to rely in many circumstances on foraging. As long as the needs of the army were not fulfilled by other means, ripe crops provided food, and even unripe crops provided fodder for the animals Plutarch's 'cutting' therefore probably refers to foraging and does not mean that the more time-consuming practice of cutting was preferred to trampling or thrashing unripe corn. Neither is there any reason to assume that the above described method was an innovation, apart from the silence in the sources. 20 To give a rough idea of the amount of damage that could be done by mere

19

l see no reason to assume, like Hanson (1983) 45 (foocnote), that it would be difficult to cover 1111 entire field with my handh"1d implements. He argues that farmers in modem Greece thin winter grain by allowing flocks to graze oo the crop and not by band. lbis obeervation is hardly ~levant. Fumcts thin a young crop by arazing sheep mostly because a double purpoee can be fulfilled: not only is excessive growth curbed, but the sheep are fed in a period when mountain pestu~ are not available. Moreover, thinning of a crop happened in a different phase of the growth cycle of the plant. While grazing would not happen after the shoots with the grain bearing ears bad developed. beating down grain would have been ineffective in the early growth phase. During Flarnininwi' campaign in 195 B.C. in Greece, the ripe grain waa harvested, while the unripe waa traq>led down and de&troyed. Similarly C - r in Gaul tells us that "the coro-eiten zu einer Winscluiftsgeschichle des rOmischen J:gyptens, St. Katharinen 1991 . Duncan-Jones, R., 'The choenix, the artaba and the modius' , 'Zeitschrift ftJr Papyrologie und Epigraphik 21 (1976) 43-52. --, The economy of the Roman empire. Quantitalive studies, Cambridge 19822 • Dupaquier, J., 'Demographic crises and subsistence crises in France, 1650-1725' , in: J. Walter and R. Schofield (ed.), Famine, disease and the social order in early modem society, Cambridge studies in population, economy and society in past time, 10, Cambridge 1989, 189-199. Dyson, S.L., 'Settlement patterns in the ager Cosanus. The Wesleyan University survey' , Journal of Field Archaeology 5 (1978) 251-268. ---, •Settlement reconstruction in the ager Cosanus and the Albegna valley. Wesleyan University research 1974-1979' , in: G.W.W. Barker and R. Hodges (ed.), Archaeology and Italian society. Papers in Italian archaeology II, 8 .A.R. lot. Ser., 102, Oxford 1981 , 269-274. ---, 'The villa of Buccino and the consumer model of Roman rural development', in: C. Malone and S. Stoddart (ed.), Papers in Italian archaeology IV. Classical and medieval archaeology, Oxford 1985, 67-84. ---, The crealion of the Roman frontier, Princeton 1985. ---, Comrrwnity and society in Roman Italy, Baltimore 1992. Eckstein, A.M. , 'Unicum subsidium populi Romani. Hiero II and Rome, 263 B.C. 215 B.C.', Chiron 10 (1980) 183-203. Engels, D. W., Alaander the Great and the logistics ofthe Macedonian army, Berkeley 1978. ---, 'The problem of female infanticide in the Greco-Roman world', Classical Philology 75 (1980) 112-120. --, 'The use of historical demography in ancient history' , Classical Quanerly 34 (1984) 386- 393. Erdkamp, P., 'Polybius, Livy and the Fabian strategy' , Ancient society 23 (1992) 127147. ---, 'The corn supply of the Roman armies during the third and second centuries B.C. ', Historia 44 (1995) 168-191 . ---, 'Agriculture, underemployment, and the cost of rural labour in the Roman world' , forthcoming. Evans, J .K. , 'Plebs rustica. The peasantry of classical Italy', American Journal of Ancient History 5 (1980) 19-47, 134-173. ---, 'Wheat production and its social consequences in the Roman world' , Classical Quanerly 31 (1981) 428-442. ---, 'Resistance at home. The evasion of military service in Italy during the second century B.C. ', in: T . Yuge and M . Doi (ed.) , Forms of Control and subordinalion in antiquity, Tokyo 1988, 121-140. ---, War, women and children in ancient Rome, New York 1991. Eyben, E., 'Family planning in Graeco-Roman antiquity', Ancient Society 11-12 ( 19801981) 5-82. Faber, J.A. , 'Dearth and famine in pre-industrial Netherlands', Acta Historiae 309

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