Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264 - 30 BC) 905063608X, 9789050636087

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HUNGER AND THE SWORD

DUTCH MONOGRAPHS ON ANCIENT HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY EDITORS

H.W. PLEKET

- F.J.A.M. MEIJER

VOLUME XX

P. ERDKAMP HUNGER AND THE SWORD

PAUL ERDKAMP

HUNGER AND THE SWORD WARFARE AND FOOD SUPPLY IN ROMAN REPUBLICAN WARS (264 - 30 B.C.)

J.C. GIESEN, PUBLISHER AMSTERDAM 1998

No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any fonn, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. ©by P. Erdkamp, 1998 I Printed in The Netherlands I ISBN 90 5063 608 X

CONTENTS Acknowledgements. Introduction. 1 Part One. Chapter One. Supplying armies. Problems and methods. 11 Chapter Two. The soldier's rations. 27 Chapter Three. Magazines and transport.

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Chapter Four. The means of acquisition 84 Chapter Five. Living off the land. 122 Chapter Six. Food supply and strategy. 141 Chapter Seven. Logistical restraints. A case-study of the Second Punic War in Italy. 156 Part Two. Chapter Eight. Civilian food supply in the ancient world. 188

Chapter Nine. Agricultural production in times of war.

208

Chapter Ten. Food supply and survival in times of war. 241 Chapter Eleven. Population and recovery. A case-study of the Second Punic War in Italy.

270

Conclusions.

297

Bibliography. 305 Samenvatting. 325

Maps. Gaul 107 Spain 131 Greece and Macedon 143 Italy and Sicily 157

Acknowledgements Many friends, scholars, and colleagues have been generous in their support and encouragement, foremost my promotores L. de Blois and J. S. Richardson (University of Edinburgh) and my co-promotor Th. Engelen. I owe special thanks to J.S. Richardson, who kindly undertook the task of correcting my English. Needless to say, any slips of grammar or spelling which remain are exlusively mine. Those who have read and offered advice on the manuscript or specific parts of it at one stage or another, apart from my promotores and co-promotor, include E. Badian (Harvard, Cambridge Mass.), G. Lewis (University of Edinburgh), L. de Ligt (Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht), J .A. Lynn (University of Illinois, Urbana), F. Millar (Brasenose College, Oxford), H.W. Pleket (Rijksuniversiteit Leiden) and C.R. Whittaker (Churchill College, Cambridge). I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to all of them, and to those who are not mentioned for reasons of brevity, but whose assistance is appreciated not less. This work could not have been written without the generous financial support of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Funding for the early stages of the research leading to this book was provided by the Reiman-de Bas Fonds, Stichting Dr. C.L. van Steeden Fonds, and Stichting Wilcordia. These organizations provided me with the opportunity to make use of the excellent facilities of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, the University of Edinburgh, and Brasenose College, Oxford. Finally I want to thank my parents for teaching me the value of a good education, and express my gratitude to my wife Shirley for her helpfulness and continuing patience, and for her refreshing lack of interest in Roman history.

Introduction. Roman wars, like those of later times, took place in a fondscape - a landscape not only consisting of mountains, plains and rivers, but also or men tilling the soil, travelling across sea or land, or employing other means in their struggle for survival (and even happiness). This book undertakes to examine Roman wars in this context of the natural and human environment. Roman warfare is generally examined from the viewpoint of the ancient authors on whose narratives our understanding depends. As a consequence, however, Roman wars seem to have become events that took place on the pages of a book rather than in the environment of the Mediterranean world. The way Roman wars were fought was determined by the geography and climate of the Mediterranean peninsulas, by the ecological restraints on agriculture and transport, and by the economic and social structures of the society of which the armies were a significant part. This book relates warfare to one of the main conditions of survival: it examines on the one hand the food supply of the many thousands that manned the Roman armies, and on the other the impact of war on the food supply of those people not waging war. An examination of the military food supply makes clear that the ecological factor had not been overcome, as can be seen most clearly from the fact that in most of their campaigns the Romans had to abort their operations at the approach of winter and had to retreat to winter-quarters, where they awaited the return of conditions that would allow their large armies to be sustained securely while fighting their foes. The Greek Polybius once remarked on the extraordinary tenaciousness of both sides during the Roman campaigns in Spain. Only the approach of winter, he says, could disrupt the continuous fighting. 1 Though the necessity of feeding thousands of people under often hazardous circumstances was not the only aspect of the seasonality of war, it was the major element to impose limits on the generals' plans. On the other hand, when an advantage over their enemy could be gained, generals would undertake operations at the fringe of the logistically possible. The seasonality of war and the limitations placed on campaigns, as well as the accounts of armies threatened by starvation, show that warfare can not adequately be explained without attention to the armies' food supply. The generals of Antiquity understood very well that an adequate food supply could never be taken for granted. The precariousness of the army's provisionment often made it a welcome target for the adversary's actions. For example, Plutarch informs us that during his campaigns against Mithridates (73-67 B.C.), "Lucullus was not waging war merely for the show, but, as the saying goes, was kicking in the belly". The fourthcentury author Vegetius told his readers: "to distress the enemy more by famine than the sword is a mark of consummate skill." It even was a well-known saying, we are told, that more succumbed to hunger than to the sword.2 Tactical strength often was a precondition for successful provisioning, and the limitations posed by logistics could

1 2

Polybius 35.1. Plutarch, Luc. 11, l; Vegetius, Epit. 3.3; 3.26.

decide between defeat and victory. The problems of army logistics should be situated against the background of the production and distribution of food in Graeco-Roman society as a whole. Historians are increasingly realizing the importance of food supply in the existence of the population of Antiquity. The production and distribution of food in the Graeco-Roman world could guarantee most people no more than a precarious existence between abundance and hunger, the result of man-made disruption as well as the natural insecurities governing agriculture and transportation. This precariousness gave rise to many cropping techniques and social strategies, the purpose of which was to alleviate risk, and which shaped agriculture and the social relations of the ancient rural society. Even if these mechanisms were often successful in warding off individual starvation, most people felt continuously threatened in their survival. When harvest failures were widespread or disturbance of distribution prolonged, the coping mechanisms failed and famine was inevitable. Producers would store food as a precaution against bad years, but they did not always have control over their production, and thus the balancing out of occasional gluts and shortages was not always successful. Also the compensation of regional differences often proved difficult, since the obstacles posed by the landscape had to be overcome by largely animal- and wind-powered transportation. In such a precarious situation, access to food is best when it is as direct as possible, as is witnessed by the general emphasis in Antiquity on autarky. The food supply of the groups within society who depended for their sustenance on the production of others was easily disturbed even at best of times. Accordingly, the sheer existence of ancient cities and towns was based on economic, social and political rights, which had to stabilize their access to food. These structures are at the heart of a major discussion in current ancient economic history, concerning the validity for Antiquity of the concept of the 'consumer city' . Because of their size Roman armies were like mobile cities, moving across the ancient natural landscape, and having their peculiar place in the economic and social environment of the Roman world. Warfare is usually seen as an external factor in the food supply, upsetting and disturbing a precarious balance, thus leading to shortage and even famine. Rightly so, one may add. The sources on ancient wars often paint a bleak picture of armies ravaging fields, plundering stores, burning farm houses, and driving away livestock, thus leading to flight and starvation. A healthy scepticism towards our sources should not lead us to reject such a picture a priori. When analyzing the risk-management strategies of the producers against shortage and famine, it is necessary to distinguish between natural and man-made disruptions of agricultural production. Cropping strategies that were aimed at minimizing the risk of harvest-failure were ineffective against plundering and ravaging armies. War shaped its own set of circumstances in which to judge the usefulness of alleviating measures. By disrupting production and distribution, and by draining off all powers of resilience, wars often caused famine, a situation that was aggravated by the dislocation of the economy as a result of war. In addition, flight and malnutrition stimulated the rise of epidemic diseases, thus leading to temporary depopulation. Ancient authors were not exaggerating when describing wars as dreadful catastrophes. However, warfare and the mechanisms to sustain the military effort should also be seen as elements within the structures of society. Roman armies had become a constant 2

presence in the Mediterranean region by the late third century B.C. The channels to supply these armies were just as much part of the general pattern of the distribution of food as those sustaining the towns and cities, though characterized by their own mechanisms to control supply. The food requirement of the Roman armies compelled the government to find or create ways and means of acquiring food. It was for example the need to feed their armies that at first induced the Romans to levy taxes-in-kind in areas under their control. The means that were employed by Rome to sustain its armies were inextricably related to the structure of society. The apparatus thus built up by the Romans to sustain their armies had not been seen in history before and would rarely be seen afterwards until modem times, and it offered them as much an advantage over their foes as their tactical strength. As the Imperium Romanum expanded, they were able to employ more and more resources, the means and ends of expansion thus being indissolubly connected.

*** The picture offered by ancient sources of the life of people in Antiquity is notoriously lacunose. This is even the case regarding a topic like war and warfare, which was so central to the interests of Greeks and Romans and which looms so large in their historiography. Even within the topic of war, attention was not divided equally. Subjects involving virtues and vices, which could be elaborated in more or less dramatic narrative, gained most of the authors' attention. Rarely offering opportunities for dramatic scenes, the food supply of armies seldom receives more than passing attention. Thorough examination of military food supply is completely lacking, even in the military handbooks, though their authors recognize its crucial importance. Despite the multitude of ancient works written on war, our picture of military food supply is very partial. The sources do not provide sufficient data on any of the wars from the time of the Roman Republic to understand all the aspects of the supply of the Roman army fighting during that particular war, with as a possible exception Caesar's campaigns during the Gallic and subsequent civil war. 3 But while such a limited approach, reconstructing the Roman military food supply during one war, is impossible, a more general approach also seems to be the more interesting. Only by taking all the available data for the Republican wars together is it possible to analyse the Roman army's food supply and to understand the underlying factors that shaped the system. The material on the Roman wars in the imperial period can sometimes provide further insight by arguing backwards and by comparison, because of the similar context of some of

3 Such a analysis of the food supply of Caesar's army has been undertaken by Labisch (1975). This work ignores some important aspects. Placing Caesar's wars in a wider context of Republican practices and of the geography, society and economy of Gaul and the Mediterranean would have allowed a more penetrating analysis of the topic. The recent analysis of Roman warfare by Goldsworthy (1996), fails to offer an adequate assesment of the role of food supply in Roman warfare. Despite occasional mention of this aspect of military campaigns, the topic does not receive the structural analysis it deserves (apart from a brief appendix on the army train pp. 287ff). The author offers lack of evidence as reason for the omission, which is, as I hope to show, an unfortunate mistake, and the more surprising as Goldsworthy refers to Labisch and other studies of Roman military food supply (pp. 104t).

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those wars. Furthermore, due to the limited quantity and scope of the ancient sourcematerial, parallel studies in other ages and societies may often prove of great importance. Ancient authors are never interested in army supply for its own sake. Leaving the few military handbooks aside for a moment, we may confidently state that ancient literature was never interested in a systematic account of warfare. Most of our knowledge of ancient war derives from historiography, but historiography was seldom interested in the means, methods, or background of war. Despite an occasional excursus, for instance on the Roman legionary camp by Polybius or on Roman artillery by Ammianus Marcellinus - two authors who had served as soldiers themselves -, the ancient historiography of war mainly provides narratives about the deeds and fate of individuals and peoples. If, in the process of narrating the deeds of war, historiography does shed light on command structure, logistics or military engineering, this was never prime objective. Lack of interest, however, does not imply lack of knowledge. Sallust had been in charge of transport and supply during Caesar's campaign in Africa, so should be expected to have had a unique insight into the provisioning of armies operating in Africa. Nevertheless logistics receives hardly more attention in his Bellum Iugurthinum than in the works of Plutarch or Appian. 4 Military food supply therefore lacks any systematic account and has to be reconstructed from the occasional remarks offered. Since the food supply of the armies played such a crucial and determining role in warfare, such occasional remarks are not rare in the better accounts, particularly of authors like Polybius and Caesar. But the lack of systematic interest in the subject does have its implications for our knowledge. If our view of the puzzle is hampered by the small number of pieces left, we should also realize that the selection of pieces was not random. Various motives can be identified for an author to pay attention to army supply. In the first place, as an element of strategy, army provisioning does play a role in the motivation given for the actions of commanders. Depending on the insight or interest of an author in strategic matters, we do get a picture of the role played in the conduct of the war by the army's food supply. Unfortunately, some authors lacked deep knowledge of military affairs, and preferred, like Livy, to explain the actions of their main actors by reference to their character and emotions. Most ancient authors were wont to ascribe the historical process to the actions of a few main characters, and not to abstract forces. The characterization of these individuals was therefore an important element of historiography. Part of the characterization of a commander, however, could be his care in preparation of campaigns as opposed to his impulsiveness. This might provide a motive for describing the preparations of a campaign or field action. Because of the crucial role of food supply in the conduct of war, ancient authors paid attention to it from a strategic and tactical viewpoint. However, this seldom provides us with a full picture or with data on the daily routine. When we are told for instance that the

4 As Matthews ( 1989) 291, points out, Ammianus' digression on artillery and siege machinery comes later in his work than most of the sieges to which it was relevant. As for the theory that Ammianus had been a commissariat officer, Matthews (p. 302) rightly remarks that his attention to matters of transport and supply probably reflects nothing more than the general importance of such affairs in warfare. For an analysis of Sallust on warfare, see Syme (1964) 140ff.

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food supply of an army is cut off, we are usually not told how the food was brought there, where it came from, who transported it, how it was acquired etc. In some cases an element of army provisioning, which was normally not regarded worthy of mention, had to be mentioned for the sake of the clarity of the narrative. The numerous non-combatants for instance that were part of all Roman armies were seldom deemed deserving of mention, even by a militarily interested and experienced author as Caesar. In one particularly detailed story in his Gallic War, Caesar records that he sent out troops to forage, but at the outset does not mention the servants. Only when during an enemy attack they become interesting do they suddenly appear. Servants and muleteers, commissariat officials and traders only occur when they happen to step into the light of the main story-line. Matters of routine are seldom narrated, unless the story makes it necessary. Such coincidental side-lights, however, never place the matter that is of interest to us in a systematic context, so that many questions usually remain. A third reason for mentioning routine matters is when something out of the ordinary was reported. This makes it hard to establish whether the scrap of information we possess represents usual practice. Neglect of this rule has earned bellum se ipsum alet a high position on the list of wrongly quoted remarks of ancient sources. Livy draws attention to the external provisioning of the Roman army in Spain in the first half of the second century B.C. twice; both times it is to inform us that, contrary to normal practice, no supplies had to be delivered. The first of these occasions provides the context for Cato's remark.s Cases like these should lead us to be careful in generalizing such data. Arguments e silentio should be even more suspect than usual in ancient history, since silence is so often all we may expect. The silence on the role of contractors in the food supply of the Roman armies is not sufficient ground to assume that they did not play any such role, nor can silence prove that Hannibal did not receive supplies from Africa after his invasion of Italy more often than the scarce references seem to imply. 6 The usual might have been passed by in silence, while the unusual deserved mention. Regarding the military food supply of the Republic, our best historiographical sources are the histories of Polybius and Livy, and Caesar's accounts of the Gallic (5850 B.C.) and Civil War (49-48 B.C.), and in addition Plutarch's Lives and Appian's Roman History. Polybius had personal experience of war, first as cavalry commander of the Achaian Federation, later accompanying the Roman general Scipio Aemilianus. His military narrative is characterized by its soberness and its clear and coherent examination of the strategical and tactical situation. It is from the strategic and tactical viewpoint that Polybius provides most of his information on food supply. 7 Livy, on the other hand, did not have any first hand knowledge of warfare, and his work does not show deep interest in the art of war. Comparison of his work with the parallel account of Polybius shows that he often leaves out military detail in favour of more dramatic and psychological colouring. In accordance with his literary objective Livy includes 'Livy 34.9,12f; 40.35,4. 6 These topics will be discussed in chapters Four and Seven. 7 On Polybius' Roman connections, Gelzer (1964). See on Polybius in general (and for further references): Walbank (1972); also Rawson (1971) 35ff; Marsden (1973) 267-295.; Schepens (1989) 317327; D'Huys (1990). 5

much detailed narrative, thereby providing accidental data on food supply. Unfortunately his detailed narrative is not always trustworthy. His account of Roman wars in the East, however, is better than that of the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.) or the Roman wars in Spain and northern Italy, probably due to the use of Polybius' work. Livy's books, however, are of unique value in that they provide some quantitative data. 8 Appian and Plutarch, neither of whom shows military experience in his works, are usually too brief to provide much additional information on the early wars. Their more detailed accounts of the wars of the first century B.C. on the other hand do provide some valuable data. Plutarch, however, in his Roman biographies seldom provides a coherent and detailed account of the wars fought by the Roman generals. Appian is at his best in his books on the Civil Wars of the first century B.C. Unfortunately, both Plutarch and Appian only provide scraps of information on the food supply of the two sides in the Social War (91-88 B.C.) and the subsequent internal Roman struggle, which would have been interesting as the first major war fought in Italy since the Hannibalic War (218-201 B.C.). 9 The most detailed source on army supply is provided by the work of Caesar on the Gallic War (58-50 B.C.) and Civil War (49-48 B.C.), the more valuable because no other author could appreciate better than Caesar the importance of food supply or could possess such first hand knowledge. For two reasons Caesar pays much attention to food supply: first because it played such a central role in many of his campaigns, secondly because emphasis on preparation was part of his depiction of himself as successful general. By following the pattern 'Caesar analyses the situation; takes the necessary measures; subsequently the action leads to success', Caesar depicts himself as the central force in the Roman conquest of Gaul. This pattern gives him ample opportunity to mention logistical preparation. At the same time, Caesar is a hazardous source for the general practice in the late Republic. Distance and geographical obstacles cut him off almost completely from supplies from the Mediterranean, which were used in most other Roman wars. Vercingetorix made use of the situation by aiming his strategy directly at Caesar's army's food supply. The situation that arose and that was described by Caesar in such detail was therefore not typical. The same holds true for Caesar's campaigns during the Civil War. The situation of 49 and 48 B. C. compelled Caesar to act swiftly, resulting in inadequate preparation of his food supply. Caesar's rashness surprised his opponents and played an important part in his final victory. It is precisely the reason because of which Caesar provides so much valuable information on military food supply in his books on the struggle with Vercingetorix and the campaigns during the Civil War that compels us to use these data carefully. A first hand account by the more careful and organized Pompeius, who fought many of his wars with the backing of the central and local governmental structures in the Mediterranean and in the East, probably would have

8 For a comparison of Livy as a military historian with Polybius, see Erdkamp (1992) 127-147. On Livy in general (and for further references) Walsh (1961); also Burck (1971) 22-46; Walbank (1971) 4772.; Gartner (1975); Luce (1977); Walsh (1982) 1058-1074. 9 Goldmann ( 1988) 6ff, 50ff, concludes that wars are generally depicted by Appian from the viewpoint of the virtues and vices of the commanding generals. In this tendency Appian is typical of ancient historiography. See also Hahn (1982) 251-276.

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given a different impression. 10 Further important insight is provided by two authors from the late Empire: Ammianus Marcellinus and Procopius. Both had first hand knowledge of the military practices of their day - the fourth and sixth century A.D. respectively - and had witnessed part of the wars they covered in their works. Although Ammianus is influenced by the literary tastes of his day, he does regularly provide interesting information on the food supply of campaigns fought in the 350's to 370's A.D. 11 Procopius provides a detailed account of wars fought in Italy and elsewhere by the armies of the former eastern half of the Roman Empire at the start of the sixth century A.D. When it was said earlier that the ancient literature was never interested in a systematic account of the art of war, an obvious exception had to be made for the military handbooks. Unfortunately we happen not to have the ones that were to all probability the best examples of their genre: the books on military science by Cato Maior from the second century B.C. and by Frontinus from the first century A.D. Above all Cato's work would have been of unestimable value for the food supply of Republican armies. We have to console ourselves with the fact that we do possess the collection of military stratagems by Frontinus and with the knowledge that both handbooks were used and reworked by later authors, in the first place by the late fourth century bureaucrat Vegetius. 12 The four books of Frontinus' stratagems contain numerous brief exempla of cunning feats by ancient generals up to the Augustan age. The brevity of the anecdotes, plucked out of their setting, makes them usually typical examples of stories that shed some incidental light on supply aspects, but seldom provide coherent data of the context of supply methods and practices. Furthermore, many of the stories are known from the extant historiography. Nevertheless, Frontinus' Stratagems regularly offer an interesting picture of the strategic and tactical aspects of army supply and occassionaly some routine and technical elements. 13 Vegetius' Epitoma rei militaris offered the Roman emperor of his time advice on how to strengthen the empire's army by returning to the practice of old times. Vegetius had therefore compiled earlier writings, amongst which were probably Cato's and Frontinus' military treatises from the Republic and early Empire, with his knowledge of contemporary practice. 14 The result is an amalgam, not reflecting any period's real

10 The food supply of Caesar's armies has earlier been studied by Labisch (1975). On Caesar as a historian, Mutschler (1975); Gartner (1975); Richter (1977). 11 Crump (1975); Austin (1979); Matthews (1989) 279ff; Nicasie (1997) l49ff. 12 Rawson (1971) 40ff; N.P. Milner in his introduction to Vegetius (1993) xviif. On Roman military treatises in general Campbell (1987) 13-29. 13 On Frontinus, Campbell (1987) l4f. 14 Schenk (1930) offers a detailed analysis of Vegetius' use of his sources. Most convincing is the conclusion that book 2 is based on the early 2nd century A.D. account of Patemus (pp. 8ff). Less convincing, though offering many interesting details, is the analysis of books l, 3 and 4. Schenk concludes that book l offers excerpts from the works of Cornelius Celsus (late 2nd century A.O.), books 3 and 4 from the handbook by Frontinus. Schenk treats the possibility that Vegetius used various sources simultaneously rather lightly, which casts some doubt on his methodology. However, he is correct to state that the fact that Vegetius mentions Cato among his sources does not prove that he had actually read Cato's book himself (pp. 36ff).

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practice. Nevertheless, it does provide useful information. He treats food supply rather cursorily for an author, whose remark "armies are more often destroyed by starvation than battle, and hunger is more savage than the sword" is echoed throughout the ages. 1s Out of a work that in recent translation covers 140 pages, only 2 are dedicated to a paragaph on the "procurement and storage of fodder and grain". After some elaboration of the above quoted remark, this brief paragraph on food supply deals with the importance of having sufficient stores to withstand attack and the importance of withholding the invading enemy provisions for his army. Since the military treatises of Cato and Frontinus were hardly written from such a defensive viewpoint, it is unlikely that Vegetius' paragraph on food supply reflects the essence of either of these earlier works on the topic of military food supply. The rest of the work provides occasional but superficial data, for instance in the advice to locate a camp near sufficient water and forage, or the brief remark on the responsibility of the camp prefect for supplies and transport. 16 While military provisioning is only rarely of primary concern of ancient authors, the profuse accounts of wars and warfare offer sufficient data for a detailed examination of all aspects of military food supply. The first section of this book will examine the logistics of the army provisioning: the quantities involved in feeding soldiers, servants and animals, the organisation of acquisition and distribution, the problems of transport, the powers of magistrates and the role of trade in the acquisition of food, and military and ecological circumstances governing armies 'living off the land'. The study will concentrate on the Roman wars of the Republic, foremost the period from the First Punic War (264-241 B. C.) to the civil wars of the first century B. C. During this period, Rome established its logistical apparatus as it had to meet its increasing military requirements. Moreover, during this period most Roman wars were fought in the Mediterranean region, thus providing uniformity of environmental context. The conclusion will be that the necessity to acquire, transport and distribute large volumes of grain and other food stuffs in the natural and human environment of the GraecoRoman world was one of the major elements shaping strategy. The Second Punic War in Italy will provide a case-study for the analysis of food supply as a major element in waging war.

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15 Vegetius, Epit. 3.3. In his Treatise of military science, London 1780, p. 6, Thomas Simes states "Famine makes greater havoc of an army than the enemy and is more terrible than the bajonet [!]. Where forage and provisions have not been carefully provided, the evil is without remedy. The main and principal point in war is to procure plenty of provisions, and destroy the enemy by famine." This happens to be an almost verbatim copied remark - with just a slight adaptation to current practices by replacing swords with bayonets - taken from Clark's translation of Vegetius' epitome of military science published 13 years before! (Reprinted as Flavius Vegetius Renatus, The military institutions of the Romans, Transl. by J. Clark, Westport 1944.) Simes quoted from Glover (1963) 255f. Vegetius seems to have made an impression on mediaeval readers, although the realities of warfare had changed so much that his advice on most matters could not be brought into practice in mediaeval armies. See Springer (1979) 85-90. 16 Cf. Schenk (1930) 68; Campbell (1987) 16f; Milner (1993).

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The second part of this book will be devoted to a study of the impact of warfare on the production and distribution of food in the urban and rural economy as a whole. Ancient historians regularly remark on the impoverishment and depopulation of particular theatres of war, for instance southern Italy during the wars against Pyrrhus and Hannibal. The devastating impact of wars on the prosperity and population of the regions they were fought in is tacitly taken for granted by ancient and modem historians on Antiquity, but not examined in any detail. Economy or demography are never systematically examined by ancient authors. An examination of the effects of war on civilian food supply can therefore not be successfully undertaken if solely based on the data provided by the ancient sources. In this respect the study of later, better documented times has valuable insights to offer for the understanding of economic and demographic crises as a result of war. Comparable studies regarding early modem Europe of the effects of warfare on the economy in general and the rural world in particular can rely on many contemporary sources, offering a wide spectrum of data. In the first place, census figures (which normally include an indication of occupation and wealth) and archives from landowners, merchants, and authorities often allow a detailed reconstruction of the economic and social situation at a particular time and place. Secondly, archives and contemporary accounts provide precise data regarding the size and nature of the armies and their manoeuvres, as well as regarding their food requirements and the means they employed for fulfilling these needs. Thirdly, the disruption in times of war usually gave rise to an enormous amount of paperwork regarding economic decline, disruption of agricultural production, food prices, material damage, the costs of taxes, requisitions and levies, etcetera. In addition, many contemporaries of wars wrote accounts of local events, thereby offering more or less impressionistic data of the impact of wars on society. Fourthly, church records provide figures on important statistics like baptisms, marriages and burials, which can be combined with other statistics, thus offering insight in the demographic impact of war. The interpretation of the source-material regarding the early modem world is far from straightforward, and the archives and other records do not offer direct answers to questions regarding structures and developments. Nevertheless, the historian of early modem Europe can fruitfully ask many penetrating questions, which the historian of Antiquity would ask his sources in vain. Despite the availability of ample and diverse source-material, the impact of war on population and economy in early modem Europe has not always been perceived in equal terms by historians, who concentrated above all on the effects of the Thirty Years War on Germany. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historians took the accounts of the wartime atrocities at face value and emphasized the material damage and depopulation which was caused by plundering and murdering troops. Hence, the economic decline of central Europe in the seventeenth century was directly and solely ascribed to the havoc caused by war. In reaction, historians on this subject began to take an opposite stance during the 1950s and 1960s. Source-criticism led to the rejection of contemporary accounts as impressionistic rhetoric, which seriously distorted reality. The seemingly objective figures offered by the records were also rejected as mere deception: by exaggerating the material damage and disruption of agricultural production caused by wartime levies and plundering troops, local authorities and individual citizens hoped to reduce the burden posed upon them by warlords and central governments. 9

Concomitantly, the economic decline of central Europe, which was not denied, was seen as part of a much wider, long-term development. Hence, indications of decline previous to the wars were emphasized. 17 In recent years, the pendulum in this discussion among economic historians has swung back. It is realized that source-criticism can not negate the entire picture of damage and disruption, nor deny the population loss which emerges from the sources. The argument of deception was simply taken too far. The discussion, however, has led to more differentiated models to explain long-term development and to assess the place therein of events like the Thirty Years War. Hence, in order to understand long-term developments recent studies concentrate on examining the shortterm and local impact of war on agriculture, economy and population. 18 The discussion on the impact of war on population and economy in the ancient world has probably been influenced by the standpoints predominating in the discussion regarding early modern Europe. Since the study of later times provided the models for the examination of Antiquity, ancient historians understandably often lagged behind in viewpoints. While historians for a long time stressed the disastrous impact of wars like the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) and the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.), in past decades the determining impact of such wars on the long-term economic development of Greece and Italy has increasingly been denied. Rightly so, since wars were only one element among many interrelated factors governing long-term developments. However, this viewpoint on the long-term impact has led historians to deny the graveness of the short-term impact of war on people and economy and to reject the remarks by ancient authors on death and destruction as dramatic topoi. 19 This discussion provides the context of the second section of this book, which undertakes to examine the short-term impact of war on food supply. Unfortunately we lack the records of later times to provide statistical evidence for the conclusions that are drawn. The local studies that have been undertaken in recent years regarding early modem Europe point to crucial factors in wartime crises, which receive inadequate or no attention in the sources pertaining to the Graeco-Roman world. Hence, they allow nuances in the models which the ancient source-material does not allow. Rather than to project the insights derived from the study of later times onto the Roman world, the second part of this book will take as point of departure those agricultural, economic and social elements which the study of later times has pointed out as crucial: the entitlement to food of various segments of society, the effects of wartime economic malaise, the risk management strategies in agricultural production, and the survival strategies offered by the wider economic situation.

17 An excellent survey of the discussion regarding the effects of the Thirty Years War is provided by Theibault (1995) lff. See also Theibault (1993) 27lff. 18 Among recent studies: Friedrichs (1979); Gutmann (1980); Hodges (1983); Theibault (1995). 19 Greece during the Peloponnesian War and the wars of the fourth century B. C. has been the subject of Will (1975) 297-318; Hanson (1983); Ober (l985b); Spence (1990) 91-109; Foxball 1993. Regarding the impact of the Second Punic War, especially Toynbee (1965); Brunt (1971); Cornell (1996).

IO

Chapter One.

*** Supplying armies. Problems and methods. One finds in the history books that many more armies perished through lack offood and lack of order than through enemy action. Cardinal Richelieu, Testament Politique. Due to the lack of attention to matters concerning military food supply, the ancient sources may not necessarily reflect the most important elements involved in the food supply of Roman armies. It is therefore best to start a study of Roman military food supply independently of ancient sources with a general analysis of the various elements involved in military food supply - i.e. acquisition, transport, distribution, etc. - and the factors determining them. This overview is not specifically concerned with Roman warfare. We will be looking at examples from medieval, early modem and even later times, because the similarities of context make such comparisons not only useable, but also useful. It is the purpose of this section to create a model of the factors determining the possible and impossible, which points to the relevant questions concerning the Roman army supply. Such an overview leads to those aspects which may not receive much attention in the ancient texts, but which are crucial for the understanding of the military food supply. It is not the purpose of this section to suggest one conclusive supply system, but to give an overview of the alternatives available and how these alternatives operated in relation to each other and in the reality of actual warfare.

*** It is necessary to give such a general overview in order to clarify some of the concepts used and to stress that none of the elements involved in the food supply of armies can be studied in isolation from its context. Concepts like 'living off the land' and 'foraging' are in modem literature sometimes used rather confusedly and indiscriminately. What is meant by 'living off the land' - plundering, confiscating, or buying? What kind of provisions are being 'foraged' - food for the soldiers or fodder for the animals? The distinction between supplying armies in friendly or hostile territory is furthermore often overlooked - although in reality it sometimes did not make that much of a difference - or between supplying armies during active operations on the one hand and armies in winter-quarter or garrisons on the other. Also the size of armies makes a huge difference. Supply systems that are used by small units do not necessarily apply to huge armies. Military food supply has also to be related to the actual warfare. The aim of armies was not solely to stay alive by arranging adequate supply of food and drink - the latter 11

element not falling within our scope -, but also to wage war, and preferably, to win it. It is important to realize the enormity of the task of feeding armies, which in Roman

times from the third century B.C. and during the late medieval and early modem European wars, could number above thirty thousand people, including the numerous non-combatants. The logistical feats of Roman military organisation would indeed not be repeated until the larger wars of late medieval and early modem times. 1 Such an army outnumbered all but the largest cities of their contemporary world. The com alone consumed by an army of thirty thousand amounted to 750 tons each month. Any additional item in their diet, such as meat, vegetables, olive oil, had to be added to this amount. The element that made it really difficult to supply the armies was mobility; armies on campaign had to move constantly and along unpredictable lines most of the time. This also constitutes the fundamental difference between an army operating in the field on the one hand and an army in winter-quarters and permanent garrisons on the other. Winter-quarters could usually be chosen with the lines of communication and transportation and the resources of the hinterland in mind. In addition to the purely logistical problem, the supply of armies on campaign had to be realized in a way that least hampered military operations. This meant that the supply system had to ensure as much logistical security as possible, while offering as much flexibility in time and space as possible - i.e. providing the opportunity for an army to operate where and when one wanted. The aims of security and flexibility were often contradictory, leaving it to the commander to decide which he regarded as most important in each individual case. 'Living off the land', in its strict sense of plundering, has often been regarded as offering this flexibility, since armies seemed to be able to go wherever they wanted, not being restrained by supply lines and bases. However, as we will see, this brought with it its own limitations, not to mention the basic insecurity of provisioning. No one system provided a solution for all cases; the supply system depended on geographical background, on economical, social and political circumstances and on the military aims and circumstances. 2 The logistics of military food supply involved two important elements: in the first place acquisition of provisions, in the second transportation and distribution of the foodstuffs to the armies. These two elements can not always be distinguished easily, and are in any case closely related. But let us first concentrate on acquisition. Acquisition of provisions can be divided into a wide spectrum of mechanisms, with direct plundering by the individual soldiers on the one extreme, and supply contracts for whole armies on the other. When talking about 'living off the land', the picture of soldiers plundering and looting their daily necessities from the surrounding countryside most easily springs to

1 Cf. Junkelmann (1994), 91. Bowler (1975) 40, explicitly relates the Roman logistical feats to the early modem ones, saying about the supply of British troops in America during the American Revolution: "The logistical problems of an army of up to 65,000 operating thousands of miles from its supply base are enormous. No European government had faced such a task since Roman times.• 2 Perjes (1970) 23: "The warfare of any age is basically determined by economic and social circumstances." It is further clear from his article that Perjes does not underestimate the importance of geographical, political and military factors.

12

mind. In its most simple form, each individual soldier and non-combatant took what he needed for himself. On a more organized level, soldiers and non-combatants gathered foodstuffs from the countryside which were to be distributed among the troops or stored for later consumption. Foodstuffs could be com and other field crops, which were either harvested when ripe, or collected from the field where they were being processed, or taken from the stores and granaries. This mechanism of acquisition is what is referred to by Latin authors when they mentionfrumentatio. In much the same way livestock was gathered, mostly by cavalry troops, from the countryside for consumption by the whole army. 3 The foraging of food was usually only executed within hostile territory, although for instance mercenary troops in early modem Europe or the Tatar allies of the Ottoman Empire did not seem to make much of a distinction between friends and enemies in this regard. 4 The result of plundering or 'foraging' in this manner was that it depleted the resources of the countryside, since it did not spread the burden evenly over a wider area. The loss of seed com and the .loss of animal labour power could cause more damage than simply the loss of the plundered or foraged goods, since it depleted the means of future production. As a result of rural flight and population loss, part of the land would lie bare. When armies planned to stay for long in the same area or return there after a short while, the depletion of resources could be a disadvantage. To some commanders on the other hand, the depletion of local resources was not an unfortunate side effect, but was part of their strategy. As well as providing food for the troops, looting and plundering also robbed the enemy of his resources, and possibly put him under pressure to do something about it, which could be an important strategic goal. To avoid the unwelcome side effect of causing extreme damage to the productive capacity of a region, in early modem Europe the system of 'contributions' evolved. Contributions were a very organized form of plundering; in fact, it left the gathering of the foodstuffs, money, and whatever was required to be executed by the civilians themselves. Contributions were developed from a more simple form, in which hostile troops demanded certain goods from a local community, threatening to bum down the houses and farm buildings if the contribution was refused, hence the name Brandschatzung. This form of plundering was already employed by English and Spanish troops in the sixteenth century. Its toll on local resources was heavy, though, ultimately threatening one's own supply. As a French general clearly stated to his troops, before leading them on campaign in Germany in 1707: "My friends .. .if you bum, if you make the people run away' you will starve. n. 5

3 In order that stolen livestock would be distributed evenly among the army, British soldiers fighting in the American Revolution received 1 dollar for every head of cattle. During one campaign alone some 1,000,000 rations of meat were collected and distributed. For a better regulation of the plundering, a special post of commissary of captures was created. Bowler (1975) 80ff, 181. Cf. Ward (1957) 68f; Keep (1987) 31. 4 Finkel (1988) 203f. s Quoted from Lynn (1993a) 309. For exactly the same reason the 18th century British military author Thomas Simes advises to leave the farmers enough com to live on and to sow. Glover (1963) 262. On the practice of 'brandYchatting' of the Dutch during the Eighty Years' War, Cox (1986) 158f. Cf. Davies (1964/65) 235.

13

The art of plundering was brought to perfection by German generals, in particular Wallenstein, and the French commanders in the seventeenth century, despite the reluctance of the troops to give up their more spontaneous looting. Central to the system of contributions was that army officials got into contact with local rulers and imposed a special war levy. Those communities and provinces that refused, would be burned down. Since most regions gave in to the threat, all the destructive power of the army could be brought to bear on the few that did not. Contributions meant that the resources could be tapped more systematically, using regional administrative structures to spread the burden more evenly. Using these means carefully, one could get the most out of a certain area for a longer time. As the military historian J.A. Lynn phrased it: "For contributions to produce money reliably over time, they had to function like a wellevolved parasite and draw sustenance from the host, not kill it. " As has been said, contributions could be levied in goods, or in money, or in both. As far as contributions of money are concerned, this is not a mechanism for the acquisition of provisions, but a way of financing the war effort. As will be clear, contributions were limited to hostile territory. In whatever form, the threatening presence of an army was often used by the Romans to force local authorities into agreeing contributions of food and money. By such means for instance Manlius Vulso fed his army while campaigning in Asia Minor during the early second century B.C. 6 Somewhere in this spectrum of mechanisms of acquisition we should include taxation in kind. A distinction can be made between irregular wartime taxes and more regular taxes in kind. The Roman annona militaris, for instance, originated as an irregular wartime tax to provide the necessary provisions for the armies, but in later times warfare became so endemic that the annona militaris was turned into a regular tax. Contributions, it can be argued, were also a fotm of irregular wartime tax. 7 Just as with contributions, which were not so much based on sovereignty as on the threat of violence, there was not always a very clear distinction between taxation in kind and taxation in money. The annona militaris as a tax in kind emerged with the developing crisis of the Roman Empire. In the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, conversion of taxation in kind into money taxes emerged with the monetization of the economy, but irregular wartime taxes in kind remained an important part of the Ottoman military supply system. There was a clear advantage in not levying a tax in kind in some more remote areas, but a money tax, the proceedings of which could be used to acquire the necessary provisions in more convenient ways. 8 6 Manlius Vulso blackmailing the states of the interior of Asia Minor into the delivery of money and com: Polybius 21.36; Livy 38.13, 13; 38.14,5ff; 38.15,8ff. See on the development from simple pillaging to the imposition of contributions Lynn (1993a) 286-310 (quote from p. 297). On the implications of the system of contributions on the strategies of early modem wars: Lynn (1993c); Parrot (1985) 18ff. Also Redlich (1959/60) 247-254; Davies (1964/65) 246f. The French in the Peninsula, Ward (1957) 98. The Russians imposed contributions in money and in kind on the occupied Prussian territory during the Seven Years' War. Keep (1987) 31, 34. Cf. Parker (1988) 65ff; Parker (1972) 142ff; Gutmann (1980) 4lff, for contributions in the Southern Low Countries. 7 This leads Perjes (1970) 48, to a rather confused analysis of contributions and taxation in kind. 1 On the Ottoman taxation in kind, Finkel ( 1988) 130ff. •A determining criterion as to whether niiziil was to be levied in cash or kind was the distance from the point of production of the provisions to the place where they were to be consumed.• (p. 142.)

14

When commanders expected advantages from treating the civilian population in enemy territory kindly, they would not simply rob them of their goods. For even clearer pragmatic reasons - apart from any reasons of principle - one would also treat the people on one's own side in a friendly fashion. But necessity sometimes compelled commanders to requisition goods, especially provisions and means of transport, from the civilian population. Requisitions were a mechanism for acquiring provisions and other goods that was used both in friendly and in hostile territory. 9 Army officers, special commissariat officials or government purveyors would requisition those goods that were needed from producers, traders or local authorities. The former owners or authorities received either cash, or more often, because of the lack of hard currency in most armies, receipt notes. A 'fair' price was determined by government decree or by decision of the same army officials. The credit notes usually required the person receiving them to go to a town or army headquarters to receive payment - if money was available. The lack of finances in early modem wars compelled the creditors usually to wait for their payment for years - if they received it at all. Who would pay the bills of the losing side, for instance? Furthermore, when the food stores in a region were seriously depleted as a result of one or two armies feeding from the local resources, most peasants and farmers preferred to hold on to their food reserves instead of receiving money or dubious credit notes. To quote a British commissariat officer from the Peninsular War (1808-1813): "As the Spanish and Portuguese ingenuously declared, in the event of a total lack of supplies, and in the face of the quantities absorbed by the armies, they could not eat our money or our receipt notes, neither could they purchase anything with them for miles around. How were they to live?" 10 The distinction between plunder, confiscation, requisition and purchase is therefore not very clear. What is the difference from plunder, when civilians never saw any money for their requisitioned goods? On the other hand, is it trade when army representatives simply demanded goods, leaving no room for negotiations and paying their own price for it? Often, on the other hand, army and government officials had the right of first option, i.e. they could buy goods that were offered on the market before the other potential buyers. The primary difference here is that the latter system leaves the sellers the choice of bringing their goods onto the market. 11 Trade operated on every possible scale as a mechanism for providing food to armies.

9 Requisitioning was a normal practice in England in the 16th and 17th centuries. Pearce (1942) 41f; Davies (1964/65) 236ff; Gentles (1992) 47. Requisitioning was also practiced by both the British and the Americans during the American Revolution. Bowler (1975) 79; Shy (1993) 173. Cf. Ward (1957) 68f, 82. Among the various methods of irregular taxation in the Ottoman Empire was a system of requisitions, whereby the state paid for the levied goods. Finkel (1988) 130ff. During the Seven Years' War the Russians took recourse to requisitioning, leaving the suppliers only one-third of their stocks. Keep (1987) 42. The French army of the 18th century obtained supplies from local authorities by so-called lettres requisitoriales. Kenneth (1967) 100f. 10 Quoted from Glover (1977) 106. The Spanish peasants not only hid their stocks from the French soldiers, but also from the commissariat officers of their British allies, who requisitioned almost everything they could lay their hands on. Dallas (1926/1927) 132f. Requisitioning ('purveyance') was unpopular in Tudor England. Davies (1964/65) 237f. 11 In Englisch warfare during the late Middle Ages, requisitioning or 'purveyance' provided most of the home-based supply. Runyan (1993) 91.

15

Apart from the sutlers, whose petty trade with soldiers was, as far as food supply is concerned, never on any significant scale, farmers and small-scale merchants offered their goods to armies for sale. If the army officials could offer hard currency, the demand of the army for food often seems to have stimulated supply. To facilitate this trade, markets could be organized in or close to the army camp. 12 In those areas where military purchases became regular, for instance along marching routes or on important transportation lines to regular war zones, the continuous demand could actually stimulate production. One well-known example is the hinterland of the Roman legionary camps along the limes. On the other hand, in the war zone itself, the uncertainties of the time could discourage farmers to bring their produce onto the market. At the other end of the spectrum are the owners of huge estates and the large-scale com traders. Free trade on such a scale exposed the government and armies to the rigours of the market. The increased demand caused price rises, while com merchants often cooperated to exploit the state's demands. When they had sufficient control over the com market, they could create a seller's market, forcing the government to pay hugely inflated prices. On the other hand, the state sometimes accepted these prices, since the businessmen were willing to offer goods on credit. In early modem Europe, the expenditure of states during wartime was usually a multiple of the state's income. Credit was a necessity for these states, and much of it was provided by businessmen delivering goods and services on credit. 13 Problems with sufficient market supply could arise when the trade in provisions was only regional. 14 Trade also happened on an even larger scale, as when communities and states sold their com reserves. The latter type of trade also brings us to the flow of com as part of diplomatic relations: communities and states not only selling com, but also offering it for free, either as a result of a treaty obligation, or voluntarily. It is important to realize that the armies could purchase directly from farmers and merchants, from large-scale traders and landowners, and from states. Commissariat officers and government purveyors therefore not only used confiscation and requisition, but also, depending on the circumstances, purchased on the free market. Finally, the government or the army could stay aloof as much as possible from the process of acquisition and only negotiate contracts with businessmen. In the contracting

12 During their advance into France in 1813/14, the British paid the French farmers in gold; they subsequently did not lack provisions during their operations. Glover (1963) 264. On the other band, the comparative wealth of French and British armies during the American Revolution proved tough competition to the American army in their bid for supplies. Shy (1993) 170. Cf. Hall (1992) 32; Gentles (1992) 45. Markets were for instance organized in classical Greece and in Renaissance Italy. Pritchett (1974) 36ff; Mallet (1974) 140. 13 Parker (1972) 160f. The system of state purchases described by Perjes (1970) 47f. Such market manipulation by com producers is mentioned by Finkel (1988) 127. The owners of Carinthian estates formed a cartel, thereby forcing up the price of com for the Habsburg army. According to Perjes, at the time of the Thirty Years' War, •Austrian food supply was then the poorest of all beyond any question, and this was mainly so because food was procured by state purchase as a rule.• 14 In the year 1600, Dutch traders were capable of delivering about 300 ton bread, 120 ton biscuit and 200 ton oats within a few weeks notice. Cox (1986) 140ff. But it should be noticed that Holland was the most important com market of the time, dealing in huge amounts of com mainly from the Baltic region. Cf. Davies (1964/65) 234f.

16

system, contracts would be given to businessmen to provide specific amounts of provisions. Contracts could be given to feed certain armies, or to provide certain kinds of goods. Furthermore, contracts could not only include the acquisition of goods, but also their handling, storage and delivery. Often these contractors relied on subcontracts to provide them with the provisions they contracted for. The contracts to supply the British troops in America during the American Revolution for instance were in the hands of London-based businessmen, who relied on a network of representatives and subcontractors in Ireland and England to provide the required amounts of bread, biscuit, meat and other foodstuffs. is The contracting system is often seen as directly proportionate to the inadequacy of state bureaucracies. Supposedly it was the only way to execute tasks which required more organisational capacity than the state possessed. A look at the development of the contracting system in early modem Europe, however, raises doubts regarding this hypothesis. The contracting system emerged in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 16 The contracting system developed along with the bureacracy of the early modern states; it did not disappear with it. While the states of the fifteenth and the early sixteenth centuries did not rely on contracts for their armies' sustenance, well developed bureaucracies such as those of eighteenth century Britain and France did. Furthermore, the provisioning of armies under all circumstances through trade and contracts required a well developed commercial economy. That these demands should not be underestimated is illustrated by the structural problems that the British had in providing their troops during the American Revolution with adequate supplies. Nobody would deny that the British were the most developed trading nation of their time. 17 A few remarks should conclude our overview of mechanisms of acquisition. In the first place, these mechanisms provide alternatives. Since none of these mechanisms could apply to all circumstances, various alternatives were always used during the same war. The difficulties inherent in feeding armies compelled governments and commanders to use most of the methods available simultaneously. The question that arises is that of their relative importance. Secondly, it is clear that the mechanisms of acquisition and the logistical system in

Baker (1971) 64ff. On the contract system in 17th century England, Gentles (1992) 41. Parker (1972) 92; (1988) 64. In England the unpopular system of 'purveyance' prevailed until 1565. Contracts were seen as an improvement, but wartime price rises caused problems for the contractors. According to Pearce (1942), the Elizabethan regulations of the com market partly aimed at assisting the supply contractors. According to Perjes ( 1970) 49f, the emergence of the contracting system was due to the rise in army size during the second half of the 17th century. I would also like to emphasize changes in economy and social-political structures. On contractors and army supply in Republican Rome, see Badian (1972) 16ff; Erdkamp (1995) 168-191. 17 Baker (1971); Bowler (1975). The British army in the Peninsula could only take recourse to contracts, as they usually did in north-west Europe, along the coast. Inland there were simply no businessmen of the required scale. Ward (1957) 81. Cf. Hall (1992) 38. There were various large-scale contracts for the provisioning of the 18th century French armies. The so-